“SO CALAMITOUS A SITUATION”: THE CAUSES AND COURSE OF DUNMORE’S WAR, 1744-1774

James Phillip Rife

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
History

Approved:

________________________
Professor A. Roger Ekirch, Chair

________________________  __________________________
Professor Daniel B. Thorp                             Professor Frederic J. Baumgartner

September 9, 1999

Keywords: Dunmore, Connolly, Shawnees, Virginia, Logan, Cornstalk

Copyright 1999, James P. Rife
“So Calamitous a Situation”: The Causes and Course of Dunmore’s War, 1744-1774

James Phillip Rife

(ABSTRACT)

Dunmore’s War was the last colonial war in America before the Revolution. This conflict was the culmination of nearly thirty years of intrigue and violence in the so-called “Western Waters” of the trans-Allegheny region of Virginia, which included the valleys of the Ohio River and its lower tributary system. This thesis traces the origins of the war, and suggests that, among other things, the provisions in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 for the westward extension of the Indian boundary line and soldier settlement contributed mightily to the instigation of the war between Virginia and the Shawnees. Indeed, Virginia’s former provincial soldiers took advantage of the waning authority of the royal government in the west to secure their bounty lands, at the expense of the Shawnees and their allies in the Ohio Valley. Matters reached a climax during the curious administration of Virginia’s last colonial governor, Lord Dunmore. Dunmore, who harbored his own western land ambitions, allied himself with the soldiers and land speculators, and instituted policies aimed at extending Virginia’s jurisdiction over the Ohio Valley and Kentucky against the directives of his superiors in London. Accordingly, the thesis examines the royal governor’s motivations, policies, and conduct in the events leading up to the conflict. Finally, the thesis contributes a fresh, complete narrative of the war itself, which has been lacking for some time in the field of Virginia History.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In researching and writing this thesis, I have become indebted to many people who have aided my efforts in a variety of ways. First, I wish to thank my committee members, Professors Roger Ekirch, Daniel Thorp, and Frederic Baumgartner for their friendship, expert guidance, and unwavering patience in the course of this work. On too many occasions, their encouragement and knowledge helped me overcome difficulties in research direction and historical perspective. I would also like to thank Professors Joseph Wieczynski and Young-Tsu Wong for their warm friendship and support during my tenure at Virginia Tech. I can only hope that my future colleagues will be as kind and considerate as they have been. I am also grateful to Professor Linda Arnold whose numerous suggestions and keen insight has substantially aided me in my graduate studies. Professor Crandall Shifflett likewise deserves special thanks for introducing me to the world of professional historical research. I simply cannot say enough about the History Department secretaries, Rhonda Wills, Linda Fountaine, and Janet Francis. They were always ready to drop what they were doing to help me, even with the most trivial of problems. It is doubtful that I can ever repay them for all they have done for me over the past two years. The staff of the Carol Newman Library, especially in the Interlibrary Loan and Special Collections departments, helped me locate old texts and other important primary sources that I so desperately needed in my research. My thanks goes out to all of those fine people. I would also like to thank my friends and fellow teaching assistants, Eric Bright, Kevin Roberts, David McCall, Regan Shelton, Caroline Neely, and Paul Grady. I will always treasure their friendship. I also want to express my gratitude to my mother and father, Fay and Phillip Rife. Over the years, they have strongly supported me in everything I have endeavored to accomplish and for that I am extremely thankful. Finally, I would like to thank my fiancée Samantha Jane Gaul for tolerating me throughout the past year. This thesis was researched and written at her expense, and I am in her everlasting debt for standing by me in the good times, and the bad.
CONTENTS

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................i

Table of Contents..........................................................................................................ii

Introduction.....................................................................................................................1

Chapter 1 “Some as Fine Land as I Ever Saw”.................................................................19

Chapter 2 “A Temporary Expedient”...............................................................................43

Chapter 3 “Furth Fortune and Fill the Fetters”.................................................................80

Chapter 4 “Deep Strokes of Monopoly in the West”.......................................................116

Chapter 5 “The Very Worst Kind of Military Government”...........................................125

Chapter 6 “An Indian War was Part of the Virginia Plan”..............................................149

Chapter 7 “The Opportunity We Have So Long Wished for”........................................180

Chapter 8 “There is Nothing but War, Confusion, & Consternation in this Country...207

Chapter 9 “Such a Battle with the Indians was Never Heard of Before” ...............217

Chapter 10 “Who is There to Mourn for Logan?”......................................................254

Epilogue.......................................................................................................................273

Appendix I...................................................................................................................283

Bibliography...............................................................................................................289

Vita...............................................................................................................................308
Introduction

On October 13, 1774, Virginia militiaman Colonel William Fleming wrote his wife Nancy a poignant letter from a battlefield at Point Pleasant, located deep in the backcountry at the junction of the Great Kanawha and Ohio Rivers. In his letter, the severely wounded Virginian reassured his wife that "I am yet amongst the living," and that "my wounds are in a good way." Fleming, who had "received three balls, two through my left arm & one in my left breast," also concisely related the details of the vicious fighting he had experienced three days earlier in open battle with the Shawnee nation and their allies. He wrote, in a grim understatement, "on Munday last, we were alarmed by some from Camp that had been pursued by Indians." In fact, the Shawnees, numbering approximately five hundred warriors, had very nearly overrun Colonel Andrew Lewis' Southern Division of 1,100 Virginians as they slept on the morning of October 10. The Indians had been stopped outside of the Virginians' camp and pushed back only after the surprised militiamen managed to rally and confront the Indians with superior numbers. In Fleming's words, "it was a hard fought Battle" that "lasted from 7 in the Morning to an hour by sun [dusk]" before Lewis "by timely & Opportunely supporting the lines secured under God both the Victory & prevented the Enemys Attempts to break into Camp." Fleming closed with a promise to Nancy that "if it please God to spare me I propose coming in to the Inhabitants the first Opportunity." The wounded officer, despite

being given "over for lost" by his compatriots, survived and kept his promise to Nancy, returning "home in safety" on November 22.²

The Battle of Point Pleasant, so concisely described by Fleming, was the climax of a conflict known to history as Dunmore’s War. This conflict was a fierce struggle between the Shawnees and Virginians that engulfed Virginia’s backcountry for the greater part of 1774. This war has received only scant attention by modern scholars in the fields of Virginia and Early American history. More often than not, the war is simply glossed over as a footnote, or as a secondary, even trivial sideshow to the more important political events occurring in Williamsburg and elsewhere during 1774. This tendency is unfortunate, since the war had some influence on the events that occurred in the following years, and was important for the settlement of Kentucky and the future western movement. Also, many previous historians have often portrayed the war merely as a curious anomaly instigated only by localized frontier animosities between encroaching settlers and the Indians. The roots of the conflict run much deeper, however.

This thesis carefully traces the origins of the war through the activities of land speculators and the doomed efforts of the royal government to implement a comprehensive imperial management policy, beginning with the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The thesis contends that, among other things, the provisions included in the Proclamation for the future westward extension of the Indian boundary line and soldier settlement contributed heavily to the instigation of the war between Virginia and the Shawnees. Indeed, Virginia’s veterans of the French and Indian War took advantage of the waning authority of the royal government in the west to secure their bounty lands, at the expense of the Shawnees and their allies in the Ohio Valley. Matters reached a climax during the administration of Virginia’s last colonial governor, Lord Dunmore. Dunmore, who harbored his own western land ambitions, allied himself with the

soldiers and land speculators, and instituted policies aimed at extending jurisdiction over the Ohio Valley and Kentucky against the directives of his superiors in London. The most spectacular manifestation of Dunmore’s determination to control the Ohio Valley is seen in the seizure of Pittsburgh by his agent provocateur John Connolly, which was the immediate backdrop for the war. Hence, the thesis also examines the royal governor’s motivations, policies, and personal conduct, as well as those of Connolly, in the events leading up to the war. Finally, this study presents a fresh, thoroughly researched narrative of the war itself, in an effort to supercede past written accounts, which, sadly enough, have grown stale over time.

**Primary Sources**

Fortunately, a wealth of primary materials exists detailing the origins of the conflict as well as the conduct of the actual campaign. Many of the chief participants of the expedition were literate and corresponded regularly with one another. Letter writing was the chief method of long range communication among militia officers and white settlers on the frontier, and most of the correspondence relating to the topic has been preserved, mainly through the diligent efforts of Dr. Lyman C. Draper. Beginning in the early 1840’s, Draper began assembling a massive collection of documents relating to the history of the old frontier. Within his celebrated *Draper Manuscripts*, are hundreds of catalogued letters and other pieces of correspondence pertaining to Dunmore's War. After Draper's death in 1891, the entire collection was bequeathed to the Wisconsin Historical Society, and placed into the capable hands of Dr. Frederick Jackson Turner. These documents are invaluable to any prospective researcher of Dunmore's War or the Appalachian Frontier in general. For convenience in research, microfilmed copies of the *Draper Manuscripts* can be accessed through the various University libraries.
Supplementing the Draper Manuscripts are several important published collections of primary sources. In 1905, Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Kellogg, both noted historians of the frontier, published the essential Documentary History of Dunmore's War. This annotated work chronologically highlights the more meaningful documents located within the Draper Manuscripts and is an important guide to the collection as a whole. Another published primary source critical to the understanding of the events surrounding the war is the five-volume set of the American Archives, 4th Series, edited by Peter Force between 1837 and 1853. Included within this important compilation are documents pertaining to Indian diplomacy, including the translated and recorded speeches of Shawnee and Delaware chiefs at Pittsburgh, as well as the correspondence of the Indian agents and Pennsylvania officials who sought to prevent the war. The Pennsylvanians, in particular, were uniformly hostile to Virginia and sympathetic to the Indians during Dunmore's War. The valuable perspective of the Pennsylvanians can be found in volume X of the Colonial Records of Pennsylvania: Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, 1771-1775 as well as in volume III of the Pennsylvania Archives, Papers of the Governors, 1759-1785 and the St. Clair Papers. The St. Clair Papers, comprising the correspondence of Arthur St. Clair, Chief Magistrate of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania and archenemy of Commandant John Connolly, are especially essential for exploring the Pennsylvania-Virginia border dispute. Other published documentary collections dealing with the events, land speculation, and Indian diplomacy in the years between the French and Indian War and Dunmore's War include the Papers of Sir William Johnson (14 volumes) and the Documents Relative to the Colonial State of New York (15 volumes). Volumes VII and VIII of the latter collection are especially important since they include official directives from Whitehall to the Indian Agents and the royal governors, transcripts of Indian councils, and the correspondence of the Superintendent for Indian Affairs in the Northern Department, Sir William Johnson, to his superiors in London. Lord Dunmore's written orders to his militia officers can be found in the Draper Manuscripts and the published Documentary History of Dunmore's War. Also, the
governor’s exchange of correspondence with Colonial Secretaries Hillsborough and Dartmouth is well preserved in "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776" in the Bancroft Transcripts, the Library of Congress Transcripts of the Public Record Office Documents, Colonial Office Series 5, (America and the West Indies), and in the published Aspinwall Papers of the Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society. The land speculation activities of George Washington and the others are well documented in the thirty-nine volume compilation by John C. Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources 1745-1799, the five volume collection edited by Stanislaus Hamilton, Letters to Washington and Accompanying Papers, and the Washington-Crawford Letters, published by C.W. Butterfield in 1871.

**Historiography**

The relative neglect of the topic in many scholarly texts notwithstanding, there is in fact a rather limited historiography of Dunmore's War. The conflict was first mentioned in print in Thomas Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia, originally published in 1787. In this early book, Jefferson briefly discussed the immediate cause of the fighting, i.e. the murder of Logan's family, and summed up the campaign in a few concise sentences, without any thoughtful analysis. After this off-hand treatment, Dunmore's War then receded back into murky mists of memory, as no significant discussion outside of private correspondence took place until the publication of the Reverend Joseph Doddridge's Notes on the Settlement and Indian Wars in the Western Parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania in 1824. Doddridge, who obviously was influenced by the jaded and often embellished accounts of aging war veterans, offered a simplistic interpretation of Dunmore's War based upon the ugly propaganda spread during the early stages of the Revolution in Virginia. In his Notes, Doddridge spoke of a conspiracy, or at least a "good understanding" between Dunmore and the Shawnees in a plan to slaughter the Virginia
militiamen in the backcountry. Dunmore, according to Doddridge, "received advice from his government of the probability of the approaching war between England and the colonies, and that afterward all his measures with regard to the Indians had for their ultimate object an alliance with those ferocious warriors for the aid of the mother country in their contest with us."\(^3\) Seven years later in 1831, Alexander Scott Withers built upon Doddridge's assertion in his *Chronicles of Border Warfare*. In this romanticized view of the war, Withers took the argument one step further by claming that if in fact Dunmore had betrayed his militiamen to the Indians at Point Pleasant, then "the blood of Virginia, there nobly shed, was the first blood spilled in the sacred cause of American liberty."\(^4\) In other words, the Battle of Point Pleasant was the first battle of the American Revolution.

Effectively countering these dubious themes was the *History of the Early Settlement and Indian Wars of Western Virginia*, published in 1851 by Wills De Haas. In his fairly accurate narrative, De Hass efficiently used written primary evidence for the first time to dispute both Doddridge's and Withers' accounts of Dunmore's War. After careful consideration and study of the recently published *American Archives*, he arrived at the conclusion that "The charge of treasonable design so industriously made against Dunmore, although plausible in part, is not sustained by facts and circumstances."\(^5\) Taking a shot at their reliance on a single, unsubstantiated account of the governor's supposed duplicity, De Hass chided both Doddridge and Withers for their imperfect research in his brief analysis. In a movement toward historical professionalism, he confirmed through his use of primary sources, both "original and reliable," exactly "how

---

3 Joseph Doddridge. *Notes on the Settlements and Indian Wars of the Western Parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania from 1763 to 1783*. (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1876), 179.

4 Alexander Scott Withers. *Chronicles of Border Warfare or, a History of the Settlement by the Whites, of North Western Virginia and of the Indian Wars and Massacres in that State*. (Clarksburg, VA: Joseph Israel, 1831), 178.

skeptical we should be where a single person testifies, and especially from memory." With that said, interest in Dunmore's War dwindled, due in part to the rising sectional crisis of the 1850's and the advent of the Civil War. Consequently, it would be over a quarter of a century before Dunmore's War received further scholarly attention.

That attention came in 1879, when professional historian George Bancroft saw fit to include a less-than-accurate yet flamboyant account of the war in his six-volume epic *The History of the United States from the Discovery of the Continent*. In his flourishing prose, Bancroft characterized the battle of Point Pleasant as "the most bloody and best contested in the annals of forest warfare." However, he erred by blaming the Indians solely for the war, wildly exclaiming that "the annals of the wilderness never ceased to record their barbarous murders." Indeed, Bancroft's entire narrative reeked of the "brave frontiersman" perspective that was so deeply ingrained on the American consciousness at that time, even going so far as to assert that "The settler had every motive to preserve peace." This erroneous assumption, influenced no doubt by the continuing Indian wars on the Great Plains and in the Far West, shrouded Dunmore's War in a cloak of glorious adventurism. According to Bancroft, the Indians were "but little removed above the brute creation," while the "noble Virginians" who had poured "out their blood to win the victory for western civilization" were heroes "worthy to found states." Taken in this rather extreme context, the Battle of Point Pleasant was not only a victory for American republicanism, but for the world as whole, as western ideals and civilizing institutions marched triumphantly westward, at least in Bancroft's judgement.

---

9 *Ibid*.
In 1889, amateur historian and future President Theodore Roosevelt tackled the problem of Dunmore's War with a similar westward looking interpretation in his six-volume work *The Winning of the West*. Roosevelt interpreted the expedition as a most important event in American history. While not quite going as far as Withers, he argued that the war "was the opening act in the drama whereof the closing scene was played at Yorktown."\(^{11}\) Roosevelt also insisted that the successful outcome of the campaign "made possible the twofold character of the Revolutionary War, wherein on the one hand the Americans won by conquest and colonization new lands for their children, and on the other wrought out their national independence."\(^{12}\) Haughty language aside, the future president neatly summarized his opinion of the significance of the Point Pleasant expedition for the future of the United States without resorting to Bancroft's high-strung rhetoric.

Roosevelt's argument gained heavyweight support from Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893. In an address to the American Historical Association on December 14 of that year, Turner publicly announced his famous thesis that "Up to our own day American history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West"\(^{13}\) While never mentioning Dunmore's War by name, Turner noted that the "effect of the Indian frontier as a consolidating agent in our history is important" and "that the unifying tendencies of the Revolutionary period were facilitated" by frontier regulation and conflict. The Ohio Valley was particularly important for Turner, who argued that its settlement "forced the nation away from a narrow colonial attitude into its career as a nation among other nations with an adequate physical basis for future growth."\(^{14}\) Of course, left unsaid was the fact that the valley would have never been settled, at least for some time, if the Shawnees had

\(^{11}\) Roosevelt. *The Winning of the West*, I, 244.

\(^{12}\) *Ibid.*, 244.


defeated the Virginians at Point Pleasant. With all of this in mind, there is no doubt how Turner felt about Dunmore's War in regard to the Revolution and the subsequent development of the American nation.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1902, J.T. McAllister returned to Withers' old interpretation in his two-part article entitled "The Battle of Point Pleasant," published in the \textit{Virginia Magazine of History and Biography} in 1902. McAllister, a frontier historian of lesser stature than Turner, rather clumsily used Roosevelt's \textit{The Winning of the West} as his basis for arguing that Point Pleasant was in fact the first battle of the Revolution. Additionally, McAllister focused the spotlight back on Dunmore and his actions during the campaign in an attempt to show that the royal governor left Lewis' Southern Division "in its position [at Point Pleasant] for the purpose of having it destroyed" by Cornstalk.\textsuperscript{16} While McAllister's accusation of treachery against Dunmore was nothing original, it did gain a new audience in certain historical circles.

After Thwaites and Kellogg published their \textit{Documentary History of Dunmore's War} in 1905, primary documents pertaining to Dunmore's War, previously found only in the \textit{Draper Manuscripts}, became widely available in a more manageable compilation. In 1909, Virgil A. Lewis, a descendent of Andrew Lewis, used this resource to produce the first fully researched narrative of Dunmore's Expedition. In \textit{History of the Battle of Point Pleasant}, Lewis contributed a highly detailed account of the battle, which was well overdue, as well as confronting McAllister's flawed interpretation of the campaign. Using Thwaites and Kellogg's \textit{Documentary History} together with statements made by previous historians, Lewis attacked McAllister's characterization of a treacherous Dunmore, arguing convincingly that "Lord Dunmore was not guilty of double-dealing with the Virginians; that the Indians were not, in 1774, the allies of Great Britain, and that they did

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, 15.
\textsuperscript{16} McAllister, "The Battle of Point Pleasant," VMHB, IX, 396.
not become such, until the spring of 1778.\textsuperscript{17} Despite his successful engagement of McAllister, Lewis chose not to address the underlying problems behind Dunmore's War, emphasizing only the campaign narrative. Consequently, much of the history leading up to the event is glossed over, leaving modern students somewhat in the dark regarding the war's historical context. Nevertheless, Lewis’ use of the newly published primary material found within Thwaites and Kellogg's compilation mark 	extit{History of the Battle of Point Pleasant} as an important addition to the circumscribed historiography of Dunmore's War.

In 1917, Clarence Alvord gave Dunmore rough treatment in his classic two volume study, 	extit{The Mississippi Valley in British Politics}. Alvord, in this first extensive scholarly discussion of politics and economics in the Virginia backcountry, argued persuasively that by fighting the Shawnees, "Dunmore and his friends sought to gain a foothold north of the Ohio in land which Virginia could still claim by charter right."\textsuperscript{18} Historian Randolph C. Downes likewise believed that land speculation was the root of the trouble. In 1934, he published in the 	extit{Mississippi Valley Historical Review} his decidedly Beardian interpretation of Dunmore's War, condemning it as a "complete surrender to land-hungry frontiersmen and speculators."\textsuperscript{19} Three years later, Thomas P. Abernathy supported Downes' argument and its "needless war" theme, adding that while Dunmore "was indeed the ally" of speculative interests, he was also "to some extent the victim" of land-hungry Virginians.\textsuperscript{20} In addition, Abernathy strongly contended that Dunmore was actually "Connolly's secret partner in speculations in Kentucky lands" and that "the settlement of central Kentucky was obviously his chief concern."\textsuperscript{21} He suggested that Point Pleasant

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{17} Virgil A. Lewis. 	extit{History of the Battle of Point Pleasant}. (Charleston: n.p., 1909), 95.
\textsuperscript{18} Clarence W. Alvord. 	extit{The Mississippi Valley in British Politics}. 2 volumes. (Cleveland: A.H. Clark, 1917), II, 193.
\textsuperscript{19} Randolph C. Downes. "Dunmore's War: An Interpretation," 	extit{Mississippi Valley Historical Review}, volume 21 (December 1934), 319.
\textsuperscript{20} Thomas P. Abernathy. 	extit{Western Lands and the American Revolution}. (New York: University of Virginia Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, 1937), 99.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 115.
\end{flushleft}
was really a proxy battle for control of the Kentucky grasslands, since "it was clear from
the start that Dunmore wished nothing more than that the Shawnee cease interfering in the
settlement" of that region. This was a serious departure from previous interpretations of
Dunmore's War, which took it for granted that Dunmore was aiming for the land north of
the Ohio River.

In 1963, Richard O. Curry presented Dunmore in a far more favorable light, contending that Dunmore was a "realistic champion of colonial rights" instead of a "tool of land jobbers." In pursuing this line of argument, Curry took sharp issue with Alvord, Downes, and Abernathy, all of whom "in their monocausative, economic determinist point
of view apparently could not appreciate any better than Whitehall that any attempt to
resolve the western question without some recognition of the 'rights' of Virginians could
only have serious consequences for Great Britain." Curry had especially harsh words
for Abernathy, whose "conclusion that the liberal peace terms Dunmore granted the
Shawnee indicate only that the governor was interested in opening Kentucky has no valid
basis." After attacking this triumvirate of economic determinists, as Curry called them,
he characterized Dunmore as a sympathetic figure who "not only courted personal disaster
by his course of action as governor of Virginia but grasped fundamental issues involved in
the conflict over western lands that blundering, inept or ill-advised crown officials in
London failed completely to comprehend." While this radical reevaluation of Dunmore's
career was a refreshing stimulant to the debate over the meaning of the war, serious
academic interest in the topic nevertheless declined once more, and Dunmore's War
receded back into the ambiguous domain of footnotes and detached references for another
thirteen years.

22 Ibid., 113.
23 Richard O Curry. "Lord Dunmore-Tool of Land Jobbers or Realistic Champion of Colonial "Rights?:" An
24 Ibid., 293.
25 Ibid., 294.
In 1976, historian John Alexander Williams brought Dunmore's War and the Battle of Point Pleasant briefly out of obscurity in his book *West Virginia: A History*. Adopting a political determinist perspective to the campaign, Williams suggested that a battle at Point Pleasant was destined to happen sooner or later because of its location at the convergence of several different political boundaries between the various Indian groups and whites. Settlement routes through the northern mountains were blocked by the powerful Iroquois Confederacy, and by the Cherokees and their allies in the south. Subsequently, the borders of these formidable empires converged in a muddle of politically fragmented and militarily weaker Indian groups in the Upper Ohio Valley. Hence, the mountainous northwest, despite its great natural obstacles, offered the path of least military and political resistance by the Indians, and became the natural breakthrough point for white settlers.\(^{26}\) In other words, the Ohio Valley was the weak link in the chain of Indian power. These observations lead Williams to abruptly declare that "it was man and not nature that made the Chesapeake-Ohio corridors the spearhead of advance into the interior." Regarding the final importance of Dunmore's War and the Battle of Point Pleasant, Williams argued that the results were negligible since the intervening events of the Revolution "opened up more inviting pathways of empire than the rivers that flowed past Point Pleasant."\(^{27}\) Thus, the political and territorial gains of the American Revolution superceded any advantage that may have been won at Point Pleasant, compounding "the irony to realize that it was, in some degree, the battle fought here that made these changes possible."\(^{28}\)

More recently, Dunmore's War has experienced something of a renaissance within the emerging fields of cultural and social history. In 1991, Richard White published his original study entitled, *The Middle Ground*. In his book, White gave the war a sophisticated new spin, arguing that the conflict was in effect a cultural war, fought between backcountry settlers and the Indians in an ever shifting "middle ground." This


"middle ground" was, according to White, the place "in between cultures, peoples, and in between empires and the nonstate world of villages." Ultimately, the middle ground became "the area between the historical foreground of European invasion and occupation and the background of Indian defeat and retreat." Hence, the Battle of Point Pleasant was a significant event in a cultural conflict raging between the European and Algonquian worlds, whereby the "middle ground" shifted even further westward into the Indian hunting grounds of Kentucky.

Albert Tillson looks at Dunmore's War from a social perspective in his book *Gentry and Common Folk: Political Culture on a Virginia Frontier, 1740-1789*, also published in 1991. Tillson, in searching for the roots of backcountry order, found the frontier elite (i.e. William Preston, Andrew Lewis, William Russell, etc.) using the conflict for its own interests. These leaders, by trying to "replicate both the political institutions of the east and the deferential culture that supported them," maintained only a tenuous authority over their less sophisticated militiamen in the years leading up to Dunmore's War. Consequently, a military expedition against the Shawnees gave the elite an opportunity to strengthen its influence over the "commonfolk." Through high rank in the militia and active campaigning, members of the elite hoped to quell the rising populism that threatened their control of order in the backcountry. In the end, they were only partially successful as "problems of discipline in the militia, desertion, and violence against friendly Indians" marked popular defiance to their elitist values. Also, local populist leaders, such as Joseph Drake, William Cocke, and George Mathews, seriously challenged the hierarchical structure of backcountry authority by stirring conflicts between elite and popular ideals of leadership. This challenge reached its zenith during

---


30 Ibid., x.


32 Ibid., 51.
Dunmore's War. In order to deal with the rising influence of the "popular dissidents," the elite adopted "a new political ethos centering on the values of regionalism, voluntarism, and republicanism."

Tillson's study, while failing to address the specifics of the war itself, is an important contribution to the literature, especially for the author's discussion of backcountry power structures and the rise of the patriot movement in the upper Shenandoah valley.

In 1992, Michael N. McConnell dived into the realm of ethnohistory and produced his important work, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774*. For the first time, McConnell looked at the conflict from the perspective of the Shawnees, and argued that Dunmore's War "represented a fundamental turning point in the history of the Ohio Indians." According to McConnell, the war was significant for two reasons. First: it was an offensive war waged by Virginians on the Ohio Indians' home ground; second, it resulted in the first direct cession of Ohio Country territory by the local Indians. In other words, after the militia's victory at Point Pleasant, "the new contest for the Ohio country after 1774 turned on only one issue: exclusive control of the land itself." Hence, after accepting the peace terms dictated by the Virginians, the Indians had no further hope of ever gaining "a new role in the new American empire in the west."

The most recent scholarly work that substantially discusses Dunmore's War is Eric Hinderaker's *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800*, published in 1997. In this study, Hinderaker sheds new light on the old problem of the importance of the war to the American Revolution. He argues that Dunmore's War was
an early manifestation of an emerging American empire of liberty, which superceded the old French and British empires of commerce and land respectively. According to Hinderaker, the campaign, itself "originating in the collapse of royal authority in the vicinity of Pittsburg," was in fact the origins of revolution in the Ohio Valley.\footnote{Eric Hinderaker, \textit{Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800}. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 189.} Prior to Dunmore's War, the way for western independence had been prepared in the years following the French and Indian War by weak land policies and ministerial neglect. As a result of the absence of any real imperial authority and protection in the backcountry, Euroamerican frontier residents developed a collective will of personal freedom and took matters into their own hands "by staking a \textit{de facto} claim to the land and organizing locally to defend it."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 191.} With the backcountry settlers so organized, Dunmore's War became the "liberating event that defined the contours of the revolution in the west before the actual Revolution had even begun."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 194.} Thus, the battle at Point Pleasant was not necessarily the first battle of the Revolution, but the beginning of a new kind of American empire, one based on the dual ideologies of liberty and national development.

Other books that have been invaluable in the preparation of this thesis include James Titus' \textit{The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia} and Fred Anderson's \textit{A People's Army}. Titus' work in particular is useful for exploring the Virginia military establishment and the rising social and cultural forces that arose out of French and Indian War in Virginia. The creation of a distinctive American identity through Indian war is the focus of Jill Lepore's recent \textit{The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity}. While not dealing with Dunmore's War per se, Lepore's insight into Early American war, culture, and language is essential for any student of the period. Complementing Lepore's study, and reaching further into the field of Early American military history are John E. Ferling's \textit{A Wilderness of Miseries: War
and Warriors in Early America and Don Higginbotham's important collection of essays War and Society in Revolutionary America: The Wider Dimensions of Conflict. These two strong contributions to the field give a sharp focus to the military aspects of Colonial America, and how the hostile environment of the frontier and Indian fighting shaped American military institutions prior to the Revolutionary War. Also, William L. Shea's The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century, Patrick M. Malone's The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians, and Armstrong Starkey's European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815 offer excellent overviews of wilderness warfare in Early America. Shea's work is particularly useful for the review of the development and history of Virginia's militia system.

Ethno-historical works dealing with Indian perspectives of white encroachment and settlement include Francis Jennings' The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest, James Axtell's The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America, and James H. Merrell's The Indians' New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of. These three books represent a solid secondary literature upon which any prospective research into Native American ethno-history must be based. A substantial contribution to this genre is Colin Calloway's The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities. In his book, Calloway takes a significant step forward in the understanding of how Indians dealt with the American Revolution as well as relating the events that occurred in the Ohio Valley and Kentucky grasslands in the aftermath of Dunmore's War.

Other, older works that have substantially contributed to the writing of this thesis are Jack M. Sosin's Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775 and The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763-1783, as well as John Anthony Caruso's The Appalachian Frontier and Otis Rice's The Allegheny Frontier: West Virginia Beginnings, 1730-1830. Sosin's two books are classic studies of British western lands policy and frontier expansion prior to the Revolution. Despite their age, both works offer
superb accounts of British political maneuvering in London coupled with shady land dealings by speculators in the backcountry, climaxing with the Vandalia scheme in the early 1770s. The comprehensive studies by Caruso and Rice complement Sosin, giving excellent overviews of frontier development during those critical years between 1763 and 1774.

In the sphere of biography, Percy B. Caley's massive unpublished dissertation *Dunmore: Colonial Governor of New York and Virginia, 1770-1782* spanning 957 typewritten pages, is simply the most thoroughly researched biography of Lord Dunmore available. In this study, written over a period of fourteen years, Caley documents the royal governor's desire for western lands during his tenures in New York and Virginia. While Caley tends to lose his objectivity in dealing with his subject, his much-cited dissertation is an essential basis for any work dealing with the royal governor and his activities in Virginia and Pittsburgh. Patricia Givens Johnson provides two other biographies this thesis has drawn from. The first, *William Preston and the Allegheny Patriots*, is a well-researched discourse on the life of Colonel William Preston, including his activities at Smithfield during Dunmore's War. The second work, *General Andrew Lewis of Roanoke and Greenbriar* is likewise a good account of Lewis' life and business activities on the frontier, including detailed research into his military career. *Colonel William Fleming of Botetourt, 1728-1795* by Edwin P. Goodwin likewise contributes a useful perspective on the campaign through its focus on Fleming and his role on the frontier from his military service in the French and Indian War through the Revolutionary War.

This thesis contributes a sorely needed reevaluation of Dunmore's War and addresses several important questions that have never been satisfactorily answered in previous scholarship. Why did it happen? How did Virginia’s French and Indian War veterans and land speculators undermine the Indian boundary line established by the Proclamation of 1763? What were Dunmore’s motivations in seizing control of Pittsburgh and launching a
military expedition to the Shawnee towns? Why were the Shawnees essentially isolated in the war? In exploring these questions and others, this work aspires to contribute a fresh account of the circumstances and events of Dunmore’s War, and perhaps spark further scholarly interest in this neglected topic.
"SOME AS FINE LAND AS I EVER SAW…"

The Beginnings of Land Speculation and British Land Policy in the "Western Waters," 1744-1763

The French and Indian War, the North American theater of the much larger, worldwide Seven Years' War, officially ended on February 10, 1763 with a British triumph. On that date, British minister plenipotentiary Lord John Russell, 4th Duke of Bedford, met in Paris with his respective French and Spanish counterparts Csar Gabriel de Choiseul and Don Jerome Grimaldi to formally conclude a comprehensive peace treaty that, among other things, radically realigned the territorial boundaries within North America. This realignment reflected the military supremacy that Britain had gained on the continent after some eight years of bitter warfare in the strategic Ohio River Valley, the Great Lakes region and Canada. In the Treaty of Paris, the British gained the territories of "Nova Scotia or Acadia in all its parts" and "Canada, with all its dependencies, as well as the island of Cape Breton, the other islands and coasts in the gulph and river of St. Lawrence, and in general, everything that depends on the said countries, lands, islands, and coasts."¹ Also, and perhaps more importantly, the "confines between the dominions of his Britannick Majesty [King George III of Great Britain] and those of his Most Christian Majesty [King Louis XV of France], in that part of the world" were shifted far westward to "a line drawn along the middle of the River Mississippi, from its source to the river Iberville, and from thence, by a line drawn along the middle of this river, and the

lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea."² The French, under the auspices of their "Most Christian Majesty," retained New Orleans, but relinquished to the British the port of Mobile "and everything he [Louis XV] possesses, or ought to possess, on the left side [looking southward] of the river Mississippi."³ The Spanish, for their part, lost "Florida, with Fort St. Augustin, and the Bay of Pensacola, as well as all that Spain possesses on the continent of North America, to the East or to the South East of the river Mississippi."⁴ In short, a victorious Britain gained all of the territory in North America east of the Mississippi River, ranging from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico. These immense, new North American acquisitions held great promise for the mercantilist driven British government, which found itself deeply in debt as a result of the war. Consequently, Britain looked forward to reaping the economic benefits of its new territorial cessions in the years ahead. In order to do this, the British first needed to institute a comprehensive and coherent policy for the administration of their newly ceded western lands, including tight regulation of colonial expansion and the Indian trade. Unbeknownst to the British, however, their subsequent efforts to administer and regulate the new lands were doomed to failure by the encroachment of hunters, land speculators, surveyors, traders, and settlers from their oldest and most aggressively expansionist colony, Virginia.

Virginia harbored old but strong claims to the newly ceded western lands. The charter of 1609 had vaguely defined the colony's boundaries as:

…all those Lands…situate, lying, and being, in that Part of America called Virginia, from the Point of Land, called Cape of Point Comfort, all along the Sea Coast, to the Northward 200 miles, and from the said Point of Cape Comfort, all along the Sea Coast, to the Southward 200 miles, and

---

² Ibid., 938-9.
³ Ibid., 939.
⁴ Ibid., 941.
Falling within these broad claims were the valleys of the Ohio River and its lower tributary system. This interlocking network of river valleys represented a natural breakthrough point into the continental interior through the formidable barriers presented by the Blue Ridge, Allegheny and Cumberland chains of the Appalachian Mountain range. The bottomlands lying along the rivers sheltered abundant wildlife and offered fertile, black soils, making the valleys ripe for settlement. The surveyors Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon passed through the region while staking out their boundary line and recorded in their journal that the lands of the Ohio Valley were simply "the best of any in the known parts of North America." Not surprisingly, the Ohio Valley became extremely attractive for Virginians, whether they were long hunters searching for game, or prospective settlers seeking a new life in the west.

Virginia land speculators, too, were attracted to the Ohio Valley. Their activities in the area dated back to 1744, when Virginia had reached a shaky understanding with the Iroquois Confederacy. In the Treaty of Lancaster of that year, the Iroquois grudgingly relinquished to Virginia their nominal claim over the Valley of Virginia as well as those western lands along the Ohio River. This was a tenuous proposition, since real Iroquois power in those lands had declined, and no one, Indians included, really knew the exact boundaries of the cession. Within months, large-scale land speculation schemes in the so-called "western waters" manifested themselves. In the spring of 1745, two major land companies organized and received grants from the governor and General Assembly of

---


Virginia. The first, the Greenbriar Company, was given 100,000 acres along the Greenbriar River in western Virginia and authorized to survey and settle the lands within four years. Similarly, the Wood's River Company was given an equal grant under the same terms along Wood's or New River in southwestern Virginia. These two companies went to work, and quickly surveyed their grants. Soon after, settlers found their way into the two river valleys, and successfully established the first major settlements in the Virginia backcountry under the banners of the two land companies. By 1752, those settlements seemed to be well on their way to prosperity. In 1747, two more speculative ventures emerged, both of which dwarfed the Greenbriar and Wood's River companies by comparison. Backed by the British Crown, the Loyal Company received 800,000 acres along the far western end of the Virginia-North Carolina border, while the Ohio Company received 200,000 acres in the Upper Ohio Valley. This latter grant would cause complications for the British in the future.

The Ohio Company had been organized in 1747 by Thomas Lee, in conjunction with other prominent Virginia planters and land speculators who saw profit in the influx of German and Scotch-Irish settlers then flooding the colony through the Valley of Virginia. Among the company's leading members were two eastern gentlemen from the Piedmont, Lawrence and Augustine Washington. Encouraged by the examples of the Greenbriar and Wood's River companies, the Ohio Company first petitioned the governor of Virginia for 500,000 acres of land along the Ohio River for the purposes of settlement and trade with the Indians on the basis of Virginia's "sea-to-sea" charter. Governor William Gooch, sensitive to the geopolitics of the time, refused the request out of fear of antagonizing the French, who were then moving aggressively into the Ohio Valley. The governor, however, passed the petition along to the Board of Trade in London out of respect for the company's powerful membership. The Board of Trade in turn passed the petition on to

---

8 For a more complete account of the creation and later speculation activities of the Ohio Company, see Kenneth P. Bailey, *The Ohio Company and the Western Movement, 1748-1792: A Chapter in the History of the Colonial Frontier*, (Glendale, California, 1939).
the Privy Council. The Council, more concerned about halting French expansion in North America than appeasing land jobbers, saw the strategic value of allowing a large land grant to British subjects in the Ohio Valley. Accordingly, the petition was approved, with the stipulation that the company would settle one hundred families within seven years. For the protection of the settlements, the company was also required to build and garrison a fort at the strategic "forks" of the Ohio, a confluence of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers that geographically dominated the Upper Ohio Valley. Finally, the land grant was pared down to 200,000 acres, with the rest being granted after the Privy Council's initial conditions were met. Immediately upon receiving these instructions from the Council, Governor Gooch signed the grant in July 1749.

With the blessings of the British government, the Ohio Company began surveying the land grant, and made preparations to settle the Ohio Valley. Time was against the company, however. The French, acutely aware of the machinations of the Virginians, had quickly moved to block access to the region. By 1753, a series of French forts completely isolated the Ohio land grant and threatened the rest of Virginia's western land claims. In October of that year, Robert Dinwiddie, the new governor of Virginia and a prominent member of the Ohio Company, sent a 21 year-old surveyor turned militia major named George Washington into the Ohio Valley to assert Virginia's claims to the area. Washington was the half brother of Lawrence and Augustine Washington, and a young man who harbored land ambitions of his own. After making his way into the Ohio Valley, Washington instantly recognized the economic opportunities in the lands he was to claim on behalf of Virginia and the company. Years later, he commented on his favorable first impression of the Ohio Valley, noting that it included "some as fine Land as I ever saw." He also shrewdly noted that "an enterprising Man with very little

---


Money may lay the foundation of a Noble Estate in the New Settlements Upon Monongahela (the lower fork of the Ohio) for himself and posterity.\textsuperscript{11} After making mental notes of what he saw, Washington subsequently confronted the French with Virginia's claims. The French rebuffed Washington, who returned a few months later with some 150 Virginia militiamen to discuss the issue at a different level. The resulting clash was a disaster for the young Virginian, whose bellicosity did nothing less than start a war that would ultimately involve three continents, and more immediately, completely engulf the Virginia backcountry with murder and mayhem. This conflict, of course, was the French and Indian War.\textsuperscript{12}

From the outset of hostilities, Virginia had initially tried to prosecute the war alone by organizing a "Virginia Regiment" to do the fighting. Initial enlistment was so poor, that Governor Dinwiddie issued a rash proclamation promising a share of 200,000 acres of land along the Ohio River "to such persons, who by their voluntary engagement and good behavior in the said service, shall deserve the same."\textsuperscript{13} The proclamation was somewhat disingenuous, since Virginia did not, at the time, control the land promised by the governor. But the prospect of free land in the west, the hollowness of Dinwiddie's proclamation notwithstanding, was too great for some. By early summer 1754, Washington (now promoted Colonel) fielded a force of 292 officers and men, all expecting a share in the land that Virginia expected to possess when the war was over. On Washington's roster were the names of several men who would one day become significant figures in western land speculation and future backcountry warfare, including Andrew Lewis and his younger brother Charles, William Crawford, William Preston, William Fleming, William Christian, William Russell, and Arthur Campbell.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 237.

\textsuperscript{12} For the best discussion of Virginia's involvement and participation in the French and Indian War, see Titus, \textit{The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia}.

\textsuperscript{13} Titus, \textit{Old Dominion at War}, 47; The original Proclamation is reprinted in William Waller Hening, ed., \textit{The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619}, 13 volumes, (Richmond and Philadelphia, 1809-23), 7:661-62.
The future aside, however, Washington marched his Virginia Regiment straight into ignominious defeat in 1754, with an abortive attempt to seize control of the Forks of the Ohio by attacking the French stronghold at Fort Duquesne. In 1755, the British Army arrived and took direct control of military operations in the Ohio Valley. The British regulars did no better than the Virginians, however, and suffered a whole string of disasters over the next two years, the most notable being Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela. As a result of these failures, coupled with the dismal performance of the backcountry militia charged with defending the frontier, the Greenbriar and Wood's River settlements were left virtually defenseless, and were repeatedly raided by France's Indian allies. In July 1755, the homestead of Colonel James Patton at Draper's Meadow, one of the Wood's River settlements, was attacked and destroyed.\textsuperscript{14} Patton was killed, as well as four other friends and family members. Five more were carried into captivity, including Mary Draper Ingles, who later escaped and returned to Draper's Meadow in an epic journey worthy of Odysseus. The Greenbriar settlements were hit even harder. A month after the Draper's Meadow Massacre, a small fort housing fifty-nine people was attacked and besieged by the Indians. Within four days, twenty-five people had been killed, two girls were captured, eleven houses burned, and some 500 horses and cattle were either slaughtered or driven off.\textsuperscript{15} Other settlers were similarly attacked, and by 1758, "A Register" attributed to William Preston circulated throughout the colony listing the casualties.\textsuperscript{16} During 177 confirmed Indian raids, 129 backcountry settlers had been killed, 22 wounded, and 153 taken into captivity. In the face of such pressure, the Greenbriar settlements were abandoned, and those settlers who had already ventured across the New River were driven back. Under these circumstances, the prospects for future settlement in the Virginia backcountry appeared bleak.

\textsuperscript{14} Joseph A. Waddell, compiler, \textit{Annals of Augusta County}. (Richmond, 1886), 72-3.


The Indians primarily responsible for these attacks were the Shawnees. These particular Indians lived in five major towns and numerous villages along the Scioto and Muskingum Rivers, both upper tributaries of the Ohio River. Their geographic location in the Ohio Valley gave them the easiest access to the Virginia backcountry settlements through the river network. A Virginia militiaman described the Shawnees, in comparison with other Indian tribes, as:

…the most bloody and terrible, holding all other Men, Indians, as well as White Men, in contempt as Warriors, in comparison with themselves. This opinion made them more restless and fierce than any other savages, and they boasted that they had killed ten Times as many white people as any other Indians had. They were well-formed, active and ingenuous people; were assuming and imperious in the presence of others not of their own Nation, and sometimes very cruel.  

Traveler Nicholas Cresswell had the occasion to see four Shawnees up close in the fall of 1774. According to Cresswell, their physical appearance complemented their fearsome reputation:

They are tall, manly, well-shaped men, of a Copper colour with black hair, quick piercing eyes, and good features. They have rings of silver in their nose and bobs to them which hang over their upper lip. Their ears are cut from the tips two thirds of the way round and the piece extended with brass wire till it touches their shoulders, in this part they hang a thin silver plate, wrought with flourishes about three inches in diameter, with plates of silver round their arms and in the hair, which is all cut off except a long lock on the top of the head. They are in white men's dress, except breeches which they refuse to wear, instead of which they have girdle round them with a piece of cloth drawn through their legs and turned over the girdle, and appears like a short apron before and behind. All the hair is pulled

from their eyebrows and eyelashes and their faces painted in different parts with Vermilion. They walk remarkably straight and cut a grotesque appearance in this mixed dress.\textsuperscript{18}

Indian Superintendent Sir William Johnson commented on their martial qualities:

Hunting and War are their sole occupations, and the one, qualifies them for the other, they have few wants, and those are easily supplied, their properties of little value, consequently, expeditions against them however successful, cannot distress them, and they have courage sufficient for their manner of fighting, the nature and situation of their Countrys, require not more.\textsuperscript{19}

One reason for the Shawnees' ferocity may lie in their dark history of restlessness, war, and seemingly endless migration.\textsuperscript{20} Originating in the Lake Erie Region sometime before 1600, the Shawnees were related to the Kickapoo, Sauk, and Fox Indians of that area. During the powerful Iroquois invasions of the 1660's, the Shawnees splintered and moved southward in separate bands past the Cumberland River into the southern valleys, most notably those of the Tennessee and Savannah rivers. However, the wayward Shawnees came into conflict with the Cherokees and the Catawbas, the two most dominant tribes in the southeast, sometime in the 1690s and were driven away. Moving northeast through the Valley of Virginia, the largest of the Shawnee refugee groups briefly settled in the Piedmont on the Virginia-Pennsylvania border about 1700, where they came into contact with the Delawares. In the 1720s, trouble with the Iroquois resurfaced, and the Shawnees were forced to move again, taking the Delawares with them. Blocked in the


\textsuperscript{19} Sir William Johnson to the Colonial Board of Trade, November 13, 1763, in Edmund B. O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, eds., \textit{Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York}, 15 Volumes, (Albany: Weed, Parsons, 1856-87), VII, 574. Cited hereafter as NYCD.

\textsuperscript{20} The best anthropological study of the Shawnees, particularly of their migrations and culture, can be found in Jerry E. Clark, \textit{The Shawnee}, (Lexington:University of Kentucky Press, 1993), 5-27. An excellent primary account of Shawnee culture and traditions, especially in war, can be found in Vernon Kinietz and Ermine W. Voegelin, eds., \textit{Shawnee Traditions: C.C. Trowbridge's Account}, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1939).
north by the Iroquois, and to the south by the Cherokees and the Catawbas, the Shawnees migrated westward into the Upper Ohio Valley. Once there, they found the valley inhabited by a host of other, smaller tribes and factions, such as the Mingoes, the Ottawas, and the Wyandots to name a few. These small groups were essentially the debris of the same Iroquois invasions of the seventeenth century that had originally shattered the Shawnees, and all still owed nominal fealty to the Iroquois chieftains in Onondaga [site of the great Iroquois Council fire]. However, Iroquois power over that region had faded substantially since the seventeenth century, and the Shawnees and Delawares settled, respectively, in the valleys of the Scioto and Sandusky Rivers with no real interference from the Six Nations. The smaller splinter bands of Shawnees who had become isolated from the main group during the exodus subsequently found their way into the Ohio Valley, and the Shawnee nation was largely reconstituted by the 1740s. Accordingly, the Shawnees emerged as the most powerful of the Ohio Valley Indians in the 1750s. After allying with France against the British, they became the most formidable enemy faced by the Virginians during and after the conflict, at least until the Revolutionary War.

By 1758, the British had rallied and irrevocably turned the tide against the French by finally capturing Fort Duquesne on November 25. The structure, built four years earlier while Washington was attempting to intimidate the French, was repaired and substantially enlarged by the British, who renamed it Fort Pitt. Its designation as the headquarters of the British Army in America signaled the beginning of tangible British authority in the Ohio Valley. After news circulated among the Ohio Valley Indians of the French reverses, backcountry raiding tapered off. The Indians waited to see what would happen now that the British were the dominant European force in the region. The French had been defeated. But, as the British and the Virginians subsequently learned, the Indians had not.

---

After the Treaty of Paris, the British government set about designing a program to administer their new territories and placate the thousands of sullen Indians they had inherited from the French. The basis for this program was found in the 1757 Treaty of Easton, orchestrated largely by the British Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Northern Department, Sir William Johnson. Johnson was an Irishman and an expert in the complex art of Indian diplomacy. Upon accepting the position of Indian Superintendent in 1755, he had proven himself as something of a miracle worker by salvaging British relations with the Six Nations, who were threatening to side with the French. Early on, Johnson had recognized the reasons behind the relative ease of France's subdution of the Indians, particularly the Shawnees and the Delawares. He wrote to the Board of Trade in May 1756 that:

The great Patents of Land which had been purchased and taken up in those parts and our extended scattered settlements beginning to crowd upon the Indians, had been a long eye sore to them, infected them with jealousy and disgust towards the English…

Thereafter:

Those Delaware and Shawnee Indians who lived nearest the Ohio…went among their brethren who dwelt on the Susquehanna and propagated those prejudices against the good intentions of the English…

The only way to pacify the Indians, according to Johnson, was "by breaking these Grants and Patents and thereby putting an end to the jealousies of the Indians on that account.” The Board of Trade agreed with Johnson's assessment of the source of the Indian troubles and authorized him to appease the Six Nations, who had similar grievances themselves, before dealing with the others. The result of this effort was the Easton Treaty. In the

---

22 Sir William Johnson to the Board of Trade, May 28, 1756, in NYCD, VII, 87.
23 Ibid., 87.
24 Sir William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, November 10, 1756, Ibid, 170.
25 Lords of Trade to Governor Charles Hardy of New York, March 19, 1756, Ibid., 77.
agreement, the British "engaged not to settle the Lands beyond the Allegheny" until the Crown [represented by Johnson] and the Six Nations had arranged for reasonable purchase and cession.26 The Iroquois, in turn, agreed to "embrace [the British] with the greatest pleasure as Our Friends and Brethren" and take up the hatchet against the "French and their Indians." 27 With peace made, and the Iroquois placed at odds with the western Indians, Johnson helped save the British war effort.

The success of the Easton treaty led Johnson to envision a much broader and more comprehensive policy for dealing with all the Indians after the war. Using his agreements in the treaty as a model, he first proposed that all colonial dealings with the Indians, especially the trade that would inevitably follow British success in the west, be centralized through the offices of the two Indian superintendents, Johnson in the north and Captain John Stuart in the south.28 The British Army, playing a supporting role, would back the two Indian departments, and police the frontiers for violators of the policy. Next, Johnson fully intended to play the tribes off against one another, since he harbored no illusions about the possibilities of a united Indian front in the event of another breakdown in relations, warning that if the Indians "could arrive at a perfect union, they must prove very dangerous neighbors."29 As a solution to this threat, Johnson endeavored to "create a misunderstanding" among all the Northern Indians "so as to render them Jealous of each other."30 This divide and conquer strategy would depend heavily upon the recognition of several separate Indian confederacies, all nominally under Iroquois hegemony, but in actuality, in competition with one another for primacy in the west. Additionally, Johnson


28 McConnell, A Country Between, 137.

29 Johnson to Gage, March 16, 1764, in Alexander Flick, ed., The Papers of Sir William Johnson, 14 volumes. (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1928), IV, 368. Hereafter cited as SWJP.

30 McConnell, A Country Between, 137; Johnson to Gage, January 12, 1764, SWJP, IV, 296; Johnson to Gage, January 27, 1764, Ibid., 308.
firmly believed that peace on the frontier could only be maintained by physically separating the two races. He wrote to the Board of Trade in May 1759 that the present "Treaties of Limitations with the respective Provinces agreed upon, and religiously observed with regard to the Bounds of our settlements towards the Indian Country" would be beneficial.31 But, Johnson knew that speculators had already infiltrated the colonial governments, and that provincial enforcement of the treaties would prove most unsatisfactory if allowed. Accordingly, Johnson suggested to the Board of Trade "that a certain line should be run [by the Crown] at the back of the Northern Colonies beyond which no settlement should be made, until the whole Six Nations should think proper of selling part thereof."32 The British Army, under the advice and direction of the Indian agents, would assume the task of enforcing this demarcation line, stretching from Canada to Florida, until the western lands could be legally bought and ceded by authorized representatives of the British government. Johnson's plan was radical, but had merit. By taking the right to deal with the Indians away from the colonies and private individuals and concentrating it in the hands of the Indian agents and the royal government, some consistency could be brought into the purchase of western lands. More importantly, centralized imperial management would carefully regulate any future western expansion and bring a halt to all illegal encroachment of Indian lands. Finally, the Indian departments with the backing of the royal government and the army could manage commerce more firmly between the Indians and the colonists, thereby preventing much of the fraud that had exasperated the Indians before the war.

While Johnson's comprehensive plan looked very good on paper, there would be great difficulties involved in carrying it out. First, enforcement relied upon the permanent presence of the British Army in the west. In a politically unstable world, the army could be called away at a moment's notice to fight elsewhere, leaving the backcountry

31 Johnson to the Board of Trade, May 17, 1759, in NYCD, VII, 377.
32 Sir William Johnson to the Board of Trade, November 13, 1763, in Ibid., 578.
completely vulnerable to illegal white encroachment and certain Indian retaliation. Also, the expense of maintaining a permanent frontier garrison was nearly prohibitive, especially when the British government was already burdened with heavy war debts. If the frontier posts were to be manned, the provincials would have to contribute financially to the effort. Additionally, the trust of all the Indians would have to be gained in order for the plan to succeed. If the tribes, including the Six Nations, ever felt collectively deceived or betrayed, then the entire frontier from north to south could very easily erupt into a general Indian war. The final, and perhaps greatest, problem with Johnson's plan was his assumption that the backcountry colonists would respect British authority in the west by strictly adhering to all official treaties and proclamations issued by the royal officers, especially when confronted with the regulars that Johnson anticipated having on hand to enforce the law. Johnson would later discover the fallacy of this assumption on both accounts. But this problem, as well as the others, seemed entirely manageable at the time, and Johnson forwarded his proposals to the Board of Trade for consideration.

While the French and Indian War wound down and the Board of Trade mulled over his suggestions, Johnson tried to take the initiative and begin implementing parts of his program on an ad hoc basis through the British Army. However, he encountered resistance from the British officer corps, which declined to subordinate itself to the authority of the Indian agents. General Sir Jeffrey Amherst, promoted to Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in America in 1759, was in the forefront of these British officers. Amherst, a narrow-minded, professional soldier typical of the British Army at that time, was as uncompromising as he was egotistical. Not surprisingly, he was extremely cool to Johnson's idea of having the military playing second fiddle to the Indian agents, and in fact resented what he perceived as civilian interference with his military command. Subsequently, Johnson found out rather quickly how far his royal commission

---

33 Which nearly happened during Pontiac's Rebellion.
34 McConnell, A Country Between, 151.
as Indian Superintendent went in dealing with the military. Amherst, exercising his ultimate authority as Commander-in-Chief, determined to carry out his own brand of Indian policy through martial law, while Johnson was reduced to merely an advisory capacity. This was hardly the role that Johnson had envisioned for himself.

Amherst proved to be an unfortunate choice as the initial executor of Britain's new western lands. First, the general made no secret that he held a "very Contemptible Opinion of the Savages," and insisted on treating the western Indians as if they were conquered peoples.\(^{35}\) Second, he had a limited understanding, perhaps influenced by his racism, of the Indian need for the exchange of gifts in conducting diplomacy.\(^{36}\) When Amherst banned all diplomatic gift giving in late 1762 despite Johnson's strong protestations, the Indians, who had long been accustomed to French generosity, became even more suspicious of British motivations. Making matters worse was Amherst's plan to establish mini-colonies of farmers and tradesmen around his newly occupied frontier posts in order to support his occupation forces.\(^{37}\) This would have resulted in the very kind of settlement that Indians abhorred. Not surprisingly, Amherst's attitude and policies seemed to confirm the worst about British intentions in Indian minds, and tensions sharply increased on the frontier, the exact opposite of what Johnson and the Board of Trade had intended.

The appearance of long hunters and squatters from Virginia in the Ohio Valley further fueled the rising anger of the Indians. These frontiersmen began infiltrating the region sometime after 1759 when the final French troops were pulled out. By 1761, their numbers had risen to the point where regular, armed clashes threatened to rekindle the war. The Indians bitterly complained to Colonel Henry Bouquet, Amherst's chief lieutenant at Fort Pitt, about the encroachments. But the British Army, strung out along

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 151-2; Sir Jeffrey Amherst to Sir William Johnson, July 8, 1761, SWJP, III, 505.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 163-4.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 169.
the frontier, proved utterly incapable of dealing with the elusive hunters from Virginia. While Bouquet could not stop the long hunters, he could do something about the Virginians who had squatted along the Monongahela and Youghiogheny rivers. On the basis of the Treaty of Easton, Bouquet issued a proclamation in October 1761 that ordered everyone settled west of the Alleghenies out. After meeting resistance from the determined squatters, Bouquet sent his soldiers into the illegal settlements and burned their cabins, thereby clearing the Upper Ohio Valley of white settlers, albeit temporarily.

Bouquet's actions brought him into direct conflict with the Ohio Company. After Washington's botched attempt to evict the French out of the Ohio Valley, the company had seen its land grant become a war zone. When the French finally evacuated the region in 1759, the company's prospects for claiming its Ohio lands seemed to improve. However, Johnson's Easton treaty presented an unwelcome obstacle to the frustrated speculators. Washington and another officer from the Virginia Regiment named George Mercer vowed to "leave no stone unturned to secure to ourselves this Land."\(^{38}\) Using Dinwiddie's promise of 200,000 acres of land on the Ohio for volunteers in the Virginia Regiment and the prior existence of the Greenbriar and Wood's River settlements as a means of pressing the issue, the two officers asked the new governor of Virginia, Francis Fauquier, to intercede with the Board of Trade on their behalf.\(^{39}\) Fauquier, despite serious misgivings, asked the Board about the grant, blandly stating that since the Ohio Valley was "now cleared of the Enemy, people seem to be very desirous to settle on the fine fertile lands."\(^{40}\) The Board of Trade, which had been informed on a regular basis of the Indians' grievances by Johnson, was in no mood to allow the Virginians to provoke further


trouble. The Board bluntly replied to Fauquier that hostilities with the Indians had ended "solely upon Our having engaged…not to Settle upon their hunting Grounds," and that any attempt to settle those lands, particularly in the Ohio Valley, would constitute an "Open Violation of our late solemn Engagements" with the Indians and probably lead to another war.\(^{41}\) On the question of the Greenbriar and Wood's River settlements, the Board allowed them to remain since they had been chartered and actually settled before hostilities had commenced in 1754. Also, the two settlements were more or less out of the way of the Indians, and offered no immediate threat to their hunting grounds. But in regard to any of the other grants, i.e. those of the Ohio Company, Fauquier was absolutely forbidden to allow further settlement of "any Lands upon the waters of the Ohio, until His Majesty's further pleasure be known."\(^{42}\) That argument was ended.

Getting nowhere with the Board of Trade, the Ohio Company resorted to more underhanded measures in their pursuit of the Ohio lands. In July 1760, Maryland trader and founding member of the Ohio Company Thomas Cresap approached Colonel Bouquet and offered an outright bribe for his help in securing the land grant, as well as aiding in the procurement of Swiss and German settlers for the company.\(^{43}\) The bribe, a partnership and 25,000 acres of the company's best land on the Ohio, was tempting, but Bouquet flatly refused, citing the terms of the Easton Treaty as binding on all parties despite any prior purchase or arrangement, colonial and private.\(^{44}\) After learning of Cresap's bribery attempt, the Board reacted strongly. A circular letter, issued in the king's name, demanded that the colonies "support and protect the said Indians in their just rights and possessions and to keep inviolable the treaties and compacts which have been entered into with them,"

\(^{41}\) Board of Trade to Fauquier, June 13, 1760, C.O. 5/1367, 409-412, (Library of Congress Transcripts).

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 412.


the most recent being the Treaty of Easton.\textsuperscript{45} Furthermore, the colonial governors were ordered to:

\begin{quote}
…publish a proclamation in our name strictly enjoining and requiring all persons whatever who may either willfully or inadvertently have seated themselves upon any lands so reserved to or claimed by the said Indians without any lawful authority for so doing, forthwith to remove therefrom.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

This official sanction of Bouquet's creative extension of the Easton treaty's provisions into Maryland and Virginia revealed the movement within the British government toward a centralized imperial management policy, including the establishment of a permanent boundary line dividing the colonies and Indian territory as suggested by Johnson.\textsuperscript{47} However, a final comprehensive plan would have to wait until a formal peace treaty was concluded with the French, which would not be forthcoming until the spring of 1763.

Bouquet's stiff rebuff, backed by the royal government, did not stifle the western land ambitions of the company's membership, many of whom were looking even further westward for land speculation opportunities. Among these members was George Washington. After the land cessions of the Treaty of Paris became final in the spring of 1763, Washington and his half-brother Augustine joined seventeen other prominent Virginians in signing the Articles of Agreement for the Organization of the Mississippi Company. This company proposed to settle a huge tract of land consisting of 2,500,000 acres lying in the Mississippi River Valley, north and south of the Ohio River, encompassing most of the present states of Illinois and Indiana, and large portions of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.\textsuperscript{48} This land was to be exempt from quitrents and taxes for twelve years, in which time the company would "seat the said lands with two-hundred

\textsuperscript{45} Circular letter to the Colonial Governors in North America, December 12, 1761, in Labaree, \textit{Royal Instructions}, II, 477.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{47} McConnell, \textit{A Country Between}, 168-9; Rice, \textit{The Allegheny Frontier}, 54.

Families, at least, if not interrupted by the Savages or any foreign enemy."49 Each of the proposed fifty members, nineteen of which (Washington included) had already signed on, would receive 50,000 acres for themselves.50 In light of the Ohio Company's past failures to make good on its claims in the Ohio Valley, it is difficult to comprehend how Washington and his fellow speculators felt they could get the Board of Trade to go along with this proposed new grant of even more land in an even more volatile region. Whatever their expectations, the Virginians' new scheme was completely wrecked when the "savages," as they called them, did indeed interrupt their plans in the summer of 1763 during Pontiac's Rebellion.

Three months after the Paris peace treaty, Indian resentment and hostility finally exploded into open violence on the frontier. The immediate occasion for the outbreak was Amherst's repeated refusal to provide gifts, especially blankets during the unusually harsh winter of 1762, but his racism and refusal to treat with the Indians as equals played large roles in their dissatisfaction. In May 1763, an Ottawa chief named Pontiac launched a surprise attack on Fort Detroit, and very nearly overran Britain's premier outpost on the Great Lakes.51 Other lesser posts were attacked and annihilated. The Shawnees, who along with the Ottawas had been the chief instigators of the uprising, attacked and besieged Fort Pitt with the help of the Delawares and the Mingoos. Turning their attention south toward the lower Ohio tributaries, Shawnee war parties ranged out to once again drive white settlers out of the region. One such party, numbering some 60 warriors, struck the Greenbriar settlements, which had been resettled in 1761, especially hard. Led by a young Shawnee named "Keigh-tugh-qua," or the "Cornstalk," the war party came to the

49 Quoted in Ibid., 89.
51 Francis Parkman provides the most recognized account of Pontiac's Rebellion in the outdated History of the Conspiracy of Pontiac, (Boston, 1851); However, Howard H. Peckham successfully argues that Pontiac was not the all-powerful chieftain that Parkman made him out to be, and that the uprising was not as well organized nor as well coordinated as usually believed. See Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising, (Princeton, New Jersey, 1947).
chief settlements on Muddy Creek [a tributary of Cheat River, but running near the Greenbriar] and "introduced themselves into the People's Houses under a Mask of Friendship." Apparently, "every Civility was offered them by the People, providing victuals and Accommodations for their Entertainment," but as festivities wound down, the Shawnees turned on their hosts and "Killed the Men and made prisoners of the Women and Children." Why these settlers were not alarmed at such a large party of Shawnees (who, as the narrator suggests, were probably not painted for war) is an open question. They may have been trying to offer genuine hospitality and friendship in contrast to the darker purpose of the Indians. As it happened, the settlers disturbing lack of discretion cost the men their lives, and the women and their children their freedom. The Shawnees moved along to the next settlement, at the Levels of the Greenbriar River where the same scene was essentially replayed. The narrator relates:

There were between fifty and one hundred persons, men, women, and children, there. The Indians were entertained as at Muddy Creek, in the most hospitable manner. Arthur Clendenin [owner of the house] having just arrived from a Hunt with three fat Elks, they were plentifully feasted. In the Mean Time, an old Woman with a sore Leg was showing her Distress to an Indian, and inquiring if he could administer to her Relief, he said: "I think I can," and drawing a Tomahawk, instantly killed her, and almost all the men that were in the House.

After the old woman was dispatched, general chaos erupted within the settlement as the Shawnees commenced their bloody work. The spectacle was awful, as the narrator graphically describes:

At Clendenin's a Scene of much Cruelty was performed, and a Negro Woman, who was endeavoring to escape, killed her own Child, that was pursuing her and crying, lest that she might be discovered by its cries. Mrs. Clendenin did not fail to abuse the Indians with Terms of Reproach,

52 "John Stuart's Narrative" in MAH, I, 672.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
calling them Cowards, &c., although the Tomahawk was drawn over her head with Threats of instant Death, and the Scalp of her husband lashed about her Jaws.55

Some of the settlers escaped into the darkness, but were hotly pursued by the Shawnees. One man named Conrad Youcam (Yokam) "fled to Jackson's River, alarmed the People, who were unwilling to believe him, until the Approach of the Indians convinced them."56 The Jackson's River settlers' initial disbelief and hesitation cost them dearly. The narrator laments that "The People all fled before them [the Shawnees], and they pursued on to Carr's Creek in Rockbridge County, where many Families were killed and taken by them."57 On the way back to the Shawnee towns, the Greenbriar captives (all women and young children) suffered terribly. Mrs. Clendenin, the tough Scoth-Irish woman who had put up quite scrap with the Shawnees in her home, planned an escape. The narrative continues:

Mrs. Clendenin gave her infant to a Prisoner Woman to carry, as the Prisoners were in the Centre of the Line, with the Indians in Front and Rear, and she escaped into a Thicket, and concealed herself till they all passed by. The Cries of the Child soon made the Indians inquire for the mother, who was missing, and one of them said: "I will soon bring the Cow to her Calf," & taking the Child by the heels, he beat out its Brains against a Tree, and throwing it down the Path, all marched over it, until its Guts were trampled out with the Horses…58

The unfortunate Mrs. Clendenin survived however, and she returned home to find her husband's scalped corpse lying "in the yard where he was killed in endeavoring to escape over a Fence with one of his Children in his Arms."59 While Mrs. Clendenin mourned

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
the loss of her family, Cornstalk and his band returned to the Ohio Valley with their captives. Virginia, however, had not heard the last from Cornstalk.

In the meantime, other settlements in the Virginia backcountry, "from Potowmack almost as low as the Carolina Line," would experience similar attacks from other roving bands of Indians. Governor Fauquier limited the damage, however, by calling out a thousand militia men to defend the frontier. Under the command of Colonel Adam Stephen and Major Andrew Lewis (both veterans of the Virginia Regiment), the militia performed much better than it had in the French and Indian War. By dividing into thirty separate companies and garrisoning small forts along vital entry points into the Virginia Valley, the militia managed to contain the Indian attacks to the deep Virginia backcountry. While this was no consolation to the Greenbriar settlements, Virginia proper was spared the ravages of Pontiac's Rebellion.

At Fort Pitt, Amherst was stunned into mental paralysis. As outpost after outpost in the Northwest fell to the Indians, the general faced the dismal prospect of losing all the "extensive and valuable Acquisitions" that Britain had gained from the French in the Treaty of Paris. In a grim irony, the Indians accomplished in three months what the French could not do in six years. By July, all British outposts west of the Appalachians had been overrun and destroyed, with the important exceptions of Forts Detroit, Niagra and Pitt, all of which were under siege. Amherst, trapped inside Fort Pitt, struggled to find a solution to beat back Pontiac's forces, even suggesting the use of small-pox invested blankets to infect the Indians. In August, the general decided on two measures to relieve the pressure. First, an expedition under Captain James Dalyell was sent to Detroit with

60 Lt. Governor Francis Fauquier to Sir Jeffery Amherst, August 2, 1763, in George Reese, ed. The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier, Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, 1758-1768, 3 volumes, Virginia Historical Society, Virginia Historical Documents, 14, 15, 16. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1980-83), II, 1001.

61 "By the King, A Proclamation, George R.", The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politicks, and Literature, For the Year 1763. London, 1764; published December 8, 1763 in the Pennsylvania Gazette.

supplies and ammunition, which allowed the fort to withstand and ultimately break Pontiac's siege. The second was another relief expedition led by Colonel Bouquet, whose objective was to raise the siege at Fort Pitt by attacking the combined Shawnee, Delaware, and Mingo forces then surrounding the fort. On August 5 1763, Bouquet encountered the Indians at Bushy Run, Pennsylvania, and endured a hot day of wild Indian charges and a harrowing night of no water. The next morning found Bouquet and his small force, reduced to 245 effective men at arms, surrounded, and threatened with extermination. When the Indians renewed their attacks early in the morning of August 6, Bouquet stood his ground, and led a counterattack that scattered the Indians and raised the siege. His success, in conjunction with that of Dalyell's, signaled the beginning of the end of Pontiac's Rebellion. The Indians, who had fully expected the French to return with their armies and complete the conquests, were sorely disappointed when nothing of the sort happened. Consequently, the various tribes began bickering with one another, and Pontiac's Confederacy literally fell apart over the next six months. By late 1764, most of the tribes had signed separate peace treaties, and brought the fighting to a close. The Shawnees, along with the Delawares and the Mingoes, were the last of Pontiac's allies to make peace with the British. They finally concluded a peace treaty with Johnson on July 13, 1765, and reluctantly agreed to "be admitted as children of the Great King of England." Thus, the British established a tenuous hegemony over the Ohio Indians and accepted full responsibility for protecting their new "children" from their provincials in the future.

Despite the Shawnees' apparent acceptance of British sovereignty over the western lands, they were not really satisfied with the terms of Johnson's treaty. They had not been militarily conquered, and did not need British protection. The inability of the western

63 Ibid., 193.
Indians to maintain a united front against the British had left them isolated, however. As a result, the Shawnees, as well as the other Ohio Indians, had little choice but to forego war and maintain an uneasy peace in the years ahead. The British, for their part, sought to strengthen that peace after their close call with Pontiac. The royal government in fact felt that it now had a document to this end. This was the Royal Proclamation of 1763, signed and sealed by King George III on October 7.
"A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT…"

Chapter 2

The Rise and Fall of the Comprehensive "Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs"

As Pontiac's Rebellion threatened to entirely annihilate the British presence in the western land cessions, the royal government worked with renewed urgency to find a solution to end the fighting and appease the Indians. Johnson's proposals of four years earlier had been left in official limbo while fighting continued between France and Britain. As previously seen in the circular letter of December 12, 1761, the royal government was already warm to Johnson's plan of imperial management of western lands, but could do nothing further until a permanent peace agreement was reached with the French. Now, with that peace in place, but the Indians still at war, Johnson's comprehensive program presented itself as a solution to the crisis then engulfing the American colonies. In May 1763, Secretary of State Egremont, most probably at the behest of Johnson, wrote to the Board of Trade and advocated the official adoption of Johnson's plan for all of the colonies. He wrote:

…his Majesty's Justice and Moderation inclines him to adopt the more eligible Method of conciliating the minds of the Indians by the mildness of His Government, by protecting their persons and property, & securing to them all the possessions rights and Privileges they have hitherto enjoyed & are entitled to most cautiously guarded against any Invasion or Occupation of their hunting Lands, the possession of which is to be acquired by fair purchase only, and it has been thought so highly expedient to give the earliest and most convincing proofs of his Majesty's gracious and friendly
Intentions on this head, that I have already received and transmitted the King’s commands to this purpose to the Governors of Virginia, the two Carolinas & Georgia, & to the Agent for Indian Affairs in the Southern department…¹

The absence of Johnson's name on the recipient list for the "King's commands," as well as those of the colonial governors in his Northern Department, suggests that he was the catalyst behind Egremont’s letter. Whether Johnson was involved or not, Egremont must have felt that the Indian agent had already been carrying out the "King's commands" since it was not deemed necessary to include him on the recipient list. With Egremont prodding it along, the Board of Trade officially decided to institute a centralized western lands policy in August. The policy would closely follow Johnson's blueprint for imperial management, and the first step in its implementation would be the issuance of a formal royal proclamation built upon provisions found within the Treaty of Easton. Johnson was accordingly given notice by the Board that:

…we have proposed to his Majesty that a proclamation should be issued declaratory of His Majesty’s final determination to permit no grants of lands nor any settlement to be made within certain fixed bounds under pretense of purchase or any pretext whatever, leaving all the territory within these bounds free for the hunting grounds of the Indians Nations, and for the free trade of all his subjects.²

This proclamation would be a provisional measure designed to stabilize the frontier until Johnson had time to work out and execute the details of his broad program, including the negotiation of a final, comprehensive boundary treaty with the Indians. Furthermore, the Board informed Johnson that it would rely chiefly upon the Indian Departments in the future instead of the army in shaping Indian policy:

¹ Lord Egremont to the Board of Trade, May 5, 1763, in NYCD, VII, 520-1.
² Board of Trade to Johnson, August 5, 1763, NYCD, VII, 535.
…by what general plan the interests and politics of the Indians are to be form'd and directed, will in a great measure depend upon such opinions and proposals as we shall receive from you and His Majesty's Agent for the Southern District, upon this subject…

This was a major coup for Johnson, who had long advocated the primacy of the Indian Departments over the army in dealing with the Indians. The army, now under Amherst's more amenable successor Major General Thomas Gage, would play the supporting role that Johnson had originally envisioned for it. After notifying Johnson and Stuart of its intentions, the Board of Trade met once more in September to draft a final version of the Proclamation to present to the Privy Council and King George III for approval. On October 5, the Council finally received the document, and King George signed it two days later. The Proclamation of 1763 was now formally law in North America.

The Proclamation was sweeping. The Board of Trade, acting under King George's seal, solemnly decreed that:

…no governor or Commander in Chief in any of our Colonies…[shall] presume for the present, and until our further Pleasure be known, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass Patents for any Lands beyond the Heads or Sources of any of the Rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the west and north-west, or upon any Lands whatsoever, which, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us aforesaid, are reserved to the…Indians.

In other words, all settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains was banned for the time being. Furthermore, the Board, informed by Johnson and others that "great Frauds and Abuses have been committed" in private land purchases from the Indians, expressly ordered that "no private Person [will] presume to make any purchase from the said Indians

---

3 Ibid.
4 See Appendix I.
5 "By the King, A Proclamation, George R.", The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politicks, and Literature, For the Year 1763. (London, 1764); Published in the Pennsylvania Gazette, December 8, 1763; Appendix I.
of any Lands reserved to the said Indians." As for squatters, a few of which had once again taken up residence in the Ohio Valley and elsewhere, the Board minced no words:

...We do further strictly enjoin and require all Persons whatever who have either wilfully or inadvertently seated themselves upon any Lands within the Countries above described, or upon any other Lands which, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are still reserved to the said Indians as aforesaid, forthwith to remove themselves from such Settlements.6

Finally, the Board dictated the conditions for the conduct of the Indian trade in North America, declaring that:

…the Trade with the said Indians shall be free and open to all our Subjects whatever, provided that every Person who may incline to Trade with the said Indians do take out a License for carrying on such Trade from the Governor or Commander in Chief of any of our Colonies respectively where such person shall reside, and also give Security to observe such Regulations as We shall at any Time think fit, by ourselves or by our Commissaries to be appointed for this Purpose, to direct and appoint for the Benefit of the said Trade.7

The colonial governors, the Commander in Chief, and "those employed in the Management and Direction of Indian Affairs" were all ordered to carry out the initial stages of the new management policies prescribed in the Proclamation. Despite its provisional nature, the Proclamation seemed to be a powerful first step for the British government in bringing its turbulent western lands under control.

Johnson, of course, was most pleased with the document, which he believed would "prove of great service" in quieting the frontier.8 Upon its receipt in December, he

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Johnson to the Board of Trade, January 20, 1764, in NYCD, VII, 599.
immediately "paid all due regard, and caused the same to be reprinted and made publick."9

Others were not so enthralled. David Robinson, a member of the Ohio Company, sneered that the land Britain had won through much blood, sweat, and tears was now to "be given as a Compliment to our good Friends and faithful Allies, the Shawnee Indians."10 George Washington was not impressed either. He told his good friend and fellow speculator William Crawford that he could never look at the Proclamation "in any other light than as a temporary expedient to quiet the minds of the Indians."11 Washington confidently predicted that "It must fall, of course, in a few years, especially when those Indians consent to our occupying the lands."12

Washington, who fully appreciated the provisional nature of the decree, was not engaging in wishful thinking. The proclamation, despite its repugnance to the land speculators, in fact hinted very strongly that the boundary line would be legally moved westward at some later date. This possibility was found in a provision inserted by the Board allowing the British government some maneuver room for any future, regulated expansion. The Trade Commissioners had pledged that:

…if at any Time any of the Said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some public meeting or Assembly of the said Indians…13

This provision would soon become the very instrument with which speculators would dismantle the Proclamation Line.

---

9 Ibid.
10 David Robinson to William Thompson, February 18, 1764, in the DSS, 2QQ44-5.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
Another item included within the proclamation that would contribute mightily to the undermining of the royal government’s intentions was the provision for soldier settlement. The Board of Trade, perhaps encouraged by the Secretary of War, had decided to reward British regular soldiers for their hard service during the French and Indian War. Therefore, the Board proclaimed that in recognition of…

…the Conduct and bravery of the Officers and Soldiers of our Armies, and to reward the same, We do hereby command and impower…our Governors of our several Provinces on the Continent of North America, to grant without Fee or Reward, to such reduced Officers as have served in North America during the late War, and to such Private Soldiers as have been or shall be disbanded in North America, and are actually residing there, and shall personally apply for the same, the following Quantities of Lands…

Field officers were to receive 5,000 acres, captains--3,000 acres, subalterns or staff officers--2,000 acres, non-commissioned officers--200 acres, and private soldiers--50 acres. The provision seems clear that only former regulars qualified for the land grants. However, the provincial soldiers, especially those interested in western lands such as Washington, would later interpret the allowance as including them also. Compounding this problem was the question of exactly where these land grants were to be made. By virtue of the complete ban on settlement west of the Appalachians, the Proclamation strongly implied that the land grants were to be made somewhere on the eastern side of the Allegheny Mountains. However, the provision did not explicitly say this, and seemingly left the matter open to argument. Inevitably, the former provincial soldiers demanded the land that they deemed as rightfully theirs, and later began pressuring royal officials to accommodate their claims through westward extension of the boundary line.

In June 1764, Johnson sent the Board of Trade a substantial paper detailing the fine points of his comprehensive plan. Among the important details were the stationing of

---

15 Alvord, *Mississippi Valley*, II. 112.
interpreters, smiths, and deputy Indian agents at the principal forts where traders conducted business with the Indians.\textsuperscript{16} The Indian Superintendents would carefully monitor and regulate prices of goods sold to the Indians. In London to support Johnson was his chief deputy, George Croghan. Croghan, an Indian trader with nearly as much experience in Indian diplomacy as Johnson, met with the Board of Trade on June 8, and presented a long letter outlining his own views as well as Johnson's.\textsuperscript{17} Regarding the benefits of the Proclamation Line and the resumption of diplomatic gift-giving, Croghan wrote:

This Boundary and some favors annually bestowed on them [the Indians] will secure to us the valuable Fur Trade, the free possession of the Lakes Erie and Untarie, with as many posts in that Country as will be necessary for us to carry on Trade with them…\textsuperscript{18}

On July 10, the Board, after taking into consideration Croghan's views as well as reviewing General Gage and Superintendent Stuart's prior written comments on the subject, formally approved Johnson's plan and sent a circular letter to colonial officials in America. The so-called "Plan for the future Management of Indian Affairs" listed forty-three provisions which, among other things, formally divided the American colonies into two districts for the management of Indian affairs under two superintendents, allowed for five deputies, with a commissary, and an interpreter for each tribe in the Southern District and one for each post in the much larger Northern District.\textsuperscript{19} The plan also confirmed the provisions of the Proclamation that involved the Indian trade, the private or colonial purchase of Indian land, and the ban on western settlement. Additionally, the army was taken out of Indian diplomacy altogether, and placed at the disposal of the Superintendents and their agents. Finally, the Board repealed "all laws now in force in the

\textsuperscript{16} Sosin, \textit{Whitehall and the Wilderness}, 75.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{18} George Croghan to the Board of Trade, June 8, 1764, in \textit{NYCD}, VII, 604.
\textsuperscript{19} "Plan for the future Management of Indian Affairs" issued by the Board of Trade, July 10, 1764, in \textit{Ibid.}, 637-41.
several Colonies for regulating Indian Affairs or Commerce," and carefully defined the procedures for any future Crown purchase of Indian land. Of the latter point, the Board was specific, declaring:

    That no purchases of lands belonging to the Indians whether in the name and for the use of the Crown or in the name and for use of proprietaries of Colonies be made but at some general meeting at which the principal Chiefs of each Tribe claiming a property in such lands are present and all Tracts so purchased shall be regularly surveyed by a sworn surveyor in the presence and with the assistance of a person deputed by the Indians to attend such survey and the said surveyor shall make an accurate map of such Tract which map shall be entered upon record with the Deed of conveyance from the Indians.\textsuperscript{20}

With these forty-three provisions for the management of Indian affairs now firmly embedded in a single British imperial policy for the administration of western lands, Johnson must have felt completely vindicated.

    Johnson's triumph proved fleeting as his grand scheme immediately encountered the complex realities of America and its western lands. First, the western Indians, led by the Shawnees, balked at allowing the Six Nations to speak for the whole in early negotiations. Next, money for the resumption of diplomatic gift giving, an enhanced force of Indian agents, and the upkeep of British regulars on post in the west was grossly insufficient.\textsuperscript{21} Johnson and the Board had originally intended to meet these expenses with a tax on the fur trade. The Stamp Act riots and the strong colonial opposition to any other kind of taxation quickly precluded that method of revenue. Since no money was forthcoming from the heavily indebted British government, Johnson was left shorthanded in departmental manpower and poor in the diplomatic purse. Even worse, the riots had forced Gage to shift troops out of the west to police the east, thereby weakening Johnson's intended enforcement arm of the program. Those garrisons that were left in the west

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 641.

\textsuperscript{21} McConnell, \textit{A Country Between}, 237.
proved hopelessly inadequate to patrol the vast Northwest Territories. The riots also shook the home government, as Whitehall went through five different administrations from 1765 to 1770.\textsuperscript{22} This political instability, and resulting inconsistency in overall imperial policy, deprived Johnson of the support he sorely needed to make the policy work.

Most ominous of all, however, was the unceasing encroachment of white settlers past the Proclamation Line. As Johnson and the Board of Trade soon discovered, the hunters and settlers completely ignored British authority and wandered wherever they pleased. Future governor of Virginia Lord Dunmore, writing later of the same problem, observed that:

\begin{quote}
Authority...and policy are both insufficient to restrain the Americans; they do and will remove as their avidity and restlessness incite them. They acquire no attachment to place: But wandering about seems ingrafted in their nature; and it is a weakness incident to it that they should ever imagine the lands further off are still better than those upon which are already settled…\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Dunmore's superior, Lord Dartmouth, agreed, stating that "I am free to confess that I very much doubt whether that dangerous spirit of unlicensed emigration into the interior parts of America can be effectively restrained by any authority whatever."\textsuperscript{24} The ever pragmatic General Gage, who had been dubious of the Proclamation Line's practicality from the start, commented with keen insight on the problem, writing:

\begin{quote}
All the good I can foresee from the present boundary is that it will stop the clamors of the Indians for a short time. The wound is only skinned over and not probed to the bottom. If means are not fallen upon to protect the Indians in their persons and propertys, it matters little where the boundaries are fixed. The Frontier people have now transgressed them,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23} Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774," in Thwaites, Dunmore's War, 371; DSS, 15J4-48.

\textsuperscript{24} Dartmouth to Stuart, March 3, 1773, in C.O, 5/74, 63, (Library of Congress Transcripts).
have neither been effectually removed or punished for their encroachments, and when the proposed limits shall be fixed I despair not of living long enough to hear that they have transgressed them also.\textsuperscript{25}

Johnson was forced to face this harsh reality when long hunters and squatters reentered the Ohio Valley, specifically at Red Stone Creek (a tributary of the Monongahela). As before, most of these were from Virginia. Worse yet, they began killing Indians.\textsuperscript{26} General Gage branded these Virginians "Lawless Banditti," and decided that their presence was in due part to the "Weakness of the [colonial] Governments to enforce obedience to the Laws."\textsuperscript{27} In a damning revelation of the impotence of the new imperial management policy, Gage wrote to Lt. Governor Fauquier in Virginia and urged him to act on behalf of the Crown.\textsuperscript{28} The best Fauquier could do was issue a proclamation of his own, which appeared in the \textit{Virginia Gazette} in August 1766. Fauquier blustered:

Whereas I have lately received letters from his Excellency Major General Gage…informing me that several people of Virginia, have seated themselves on lands belonging to the Indians, to the westward of the Allegheny Mountains…in disobedience to his Majesty’s commands (notified by the Proclamation of the 7\textsuperscript{th} of October 1763), in violation of the friendship subsisting between us and the said Indians, and in contempt of the dreadful consequences which I am warned are to be suddenly apprehended from such unjust and licentious proceedings: I have therefore, to put a stop to these and all other the like encroachments for the future, thought fit…to issue this proclamation…hereby strictly enjoining and requiring all persons who have made such settlements immediately to evacuate the same, and to pay the strictest obedience hereafter to his

\textsuperscript{25} Gage to Johnson, May 5, 1766, in \textit{SWJP}, V, 201.

\textsuperscript{26} Johnson to the Board of Trade, June 28, 1766, in \textit{NYCD}, VII, 837.

\textsuperscript{27} Gage to Johnson, May 5, 1766, in \textit{SWJP}, V, 201.

\textsuperscript{28} Sosin, \textit{Whitehall and the Wilderness}, 107-110.
Majesty's commands herein signified; which if they shall fail to do so they must expect no protection or mercy from Government, and be exposed to the revenge of the exasperated Indians.29

Where the Royal Proclamation failed to excite the attention of the wayward settlers and frontiersmen, Fauquier's Proclamation did even less. The exasperated governor wrote to the Board of Trade that "Perhaps the leaving them to the Mercy of the Indians may be the best if not the only Way to restrain them."30 Johnson, extremely worried about the implications of this illegal encroachment, wrote to the Board of Trade that:

I was in some hopes that this conduct of theirs [the Virginians] would receive a check and that the Delinquents would have been apprehended and punished, for they now bid defiance to Authority and think of settling where they please.31

The Superintendent also tacitly admitted that his program was floundering, and warned "that I can no longer amuse the Indians with promises of Justice as they see plainly that we either want the power or the will to redress them."32 Accordingly, Johnson made an appeal to the Lords for help in salvaging his program, writing:

If the plan [of July 10, 1764]...be carried into Execution or some establishment fixed as expressed in the letter I was then honored with for the regulation of Indian Affairs both Commercial & Political upon one general system under the direction of Officers of the Crown so as to set aside all local interfering of particular Provinces & the power of the Superintendent and his Officers clearly ascertained it would be a saving to the Crown and an advantage to the Public, and till then I cannot see how it is possible to remedy the foregoing evils or effectually prevent the seeds of

29 “A Proclamation by the Honorable Francis Fauquier, esq., his Majesty's Lieutenant Governor, and Commander in Chief of the Colony and Dominion of Virginia,” published August 8, 1766 in the Virginia Gazette.
31 Johnson to the Board of Trade, June 28, 1766, in NYCD, VII, 837.
32 Ibid., 837.
discontent from growing into a rupture. I shall do everything I can to still
the minds of the Indians, but sensible of the weakness of my efforts…I
must again beg your Lordships support, and that you will be pleased to
recommend it in such a manner as may be most conducive towards
effecting it on that footing which promises the most success.\(^{33}\)

But, Johnson's plea for aid in implementing the "Plan for the future Management of
Indian Affairs," so grandly decreed by the Board only two years earlier, produced quite
the opposite result of what Johnson asked for. The Board of Trade, after carefully
considering Johnson's letter, completely reevaluated the comprehensive program, and
decided to scrap most of the forty-three provisions altogether. In a report to the king, the
Board determined that Johnson's scheme of imperial management of the western lands
had utterly failed, writing that "no one general plan of commerce and policy is or can be
applicable to all the different nations of Indians of different interests and in different
situations."\(^{34}\) Furthermore, the Board advised the king to further curtail the military
presence in the west, stating that the army posts "cannot be maintained but at an expense
disproportioned to the degree of their utility."\(^{35}\) Also, the powers of the Indian
superintendents should be reduced to diplomacy only, and that the Indian Trade, "and all
other Indian affairs" be turned over "to the management of the several colonies."\(^{36}\) As far
as the Proclamation Line went, however, the Board felt that it should be maintained, and
that measures at last be taken to negotiate a final boundary settlement. The Board wrote:

\[\ldots\]that this boundary line should as speedily possible be ratified by your
Majesty's authority, and that the Superintendents should be instructed and
empowered to make treaties in your Majesty's name with the Indians for
that purpose.\(^{37}\)

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 838.

\(^{34}\) The Board of Trade to King George III, March 7, 1768, in NYCD, VIII, 24.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 25.

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 20.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 23.
King George gave his consent to all the Board's new proposals, and on April 15, 1768, Secretary of State Wills Hill, the 2nd Earl of Hillsborough, wrote to the royal governors in America:

Upon mature consideration of the present Regulations…and the difficulties which have attended the Execution of the Plan in general, his Majesty has thought fit that it shall be laid aside; that the Regulation of the Trade shall be left to the Colonies…and that the Boundary Line between the Indians and the Settlements of his Majesty's subjects shall be finally ratified and confirmed.\(^{38}\)

On the same day, Hillsborough also wrote to Johnson and broke the bad news.\(^{39}\) In Hillsborough's letter, Johnson was ordered to carry out the provisions of the new plan, with explicit instructions on the actual location of a permanent boundary line. Superintendent Stuart received similar orders. Thus ended Johnson's comprehensive imperial management plan and the beginning of a series of treaties that all but destroyed the integrity of British authority in the Ohio Valley.

While the Board of Trade was dismantling Johnson's management program, the Virginia speculators were becoming increasingly concerned that the land granted to the Ohio Company was going to be lost to either illegal settlement or new land speculation schemes. Washington was particularly worried. In September 1767, he decided to take action in order to save those lands of the Ohio Valley that he desired for himself. He wrote to his old friend William Crawford, and offered:

…to join…in attempting to secure some of the most valuable lands in the King's part, which I think may be accomplished after awhile, notwithstanding the proclamation that restrains it at present…\(^{40}\)


Accordingly, Washington inquired if this land could be discreetly secured "from the attempts of others" to settle it, since:

Any person…who neglects the present opportunity of hunting out good lands, and in some measure marking and distinguishing them for his own, in order to keep others from settling them, will never regain it.\textsuperscript{41}

Washington knew that his land greed was overcoming his loyalty to the Crown, and therefore cautioned Crawford to "keep this whole matter a secret," since "I might be censured for the opinion I have given in respect to the King's proclamation."\textsuperscript{42} The Virginia colonel also feared that:

…if the scheme I am now proposing to you were known, it might give alarm to others, and, by putting them upon a plan of the same nature, before we could lay a proper foundation for success ourselves, set the different interests clashing, and probably, in the end, overturn the whole.\textsuperscript{43}

To avoid the uproar that would inevitably accompany discovery of this bit of skullduggery, Washington suggested to Crawford that "All this may be avoided by a silent management, and the operation carried on by you under the guise of hunting game…"\textsuperscript{44} After Crawford completed his covert journey, Washington would "have the lands immediately surveyed, to keep others off, and leave the rest to time and my own assiduity."\textsuperscript{45} As payment, Crawford would receive a "reasonable proportion of the whole." Crawford agreed to the scheme, replying that "I heartily embrace your offer upon the terms you proposed."\textsuperscript{46} Crawford set off, subsequently marking off some 128,000 acres of prime land along the Monongahela and Ohio Rivers for Washington and himself, and for

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 2-3.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} "Crawford to Washington, September 29, 1767" in Ibid.
the Virginia soldiers who held similar land claims.\textsuperscript{47} Washington, in the meantime, sat back and awaited developments on the political front for a more favorable atmosphere in which to press his claims in the Ohio Valley.

Washington had some very good reasons to worry over his Ohio lands. Not only were squatters beginning to become a serious problem, but speculative groups outside of Virginia were also eyeing the same Ohio Valley lands that Washington wanted. Rumors of the impending formation of a new land company began swirling in colonial circles as early as 1767, when William Crawford informed Washington of "flying news" whereby "some of the great men in Philadelphia want to take the land themselves."\textsuperscript{48} There was more truth in Crawford's report than Washington or any of the other Virginians cared to hear about. In 1768, a powerful syndicate of colonists and English merchants began making plans to present a petition to the Crown for a tremendous land grant west of the Alleghenies. This group included such men as Thomas and Horace Walpole, Lord Camden, and Thomas Pitt of England; Samuel and Thomas Wharton, and Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania. During the Board of Trade's deliberations over the problems of the comprehensive Indian policy in 1767, the syndicate had exerted substantial pressure for an extension of the boundary line in order to accommodate their scheme. This pressure may have in fact influenced the Board's decision to abandon the imperial management plan, but Hillsborough, no friend of land jobbers, had limited the impact of the speculators' interference by giving Johnson and Stuart precise instructions as to where to run the final boundary line. The boundary envisioned by Hillsborough would run from the Susquehanna to the Ohio River, and along that stream to its junction with the Great Kanawha River, and from there in a straight line to Chiswell's Mine on New River.\textsuperscript{49} This would purposely clear Dinwiddie's 200,000-acre military grant to the soldiers of the Virginia Regiment and allow the repossession of the Greenbriar Valley settlements, while

\textsuperscript{47} Knollenberg, \textit{George Washington}, 94.


\textsuperscript{49} Rice, \textit{The Allegheny Frontier}, 61.
impeding the Walpole-Wharton group's scheme for the settlement of far western Virginia and Kentucky, embodied in a new colony to be called Vandalia.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, Hillsborough seemed to have defeated the ambitions of the syndicate while solving the nagging land problems that had plagued the Crown since before the French and Indian War. The speculators, however, turned to someone who had the power and ability to include their claims within any cession made by the Indians. This was none other than Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Northern District.

Sometime after issuing his plea to the Board of Trade for help in saving his comprehensive plan, Johnson got wind of the Board's intentions to return control of Indian affairs back to the colonies. Knowing full well the implications of future colonial management, Johnson wrote Hillsborough:

\begin{quote}
I wish the Colonies may Act wisely in the Management of the Indian Trade, as a good deal will depend upon it at this time this will require much pains & expense, else they must not expect to send any Traders into the Indian Country. Altho' the much greater part of those who go a trading are men of such circumstances and dispositions as to venture their persons any where for extravagant gains, yet the consequences to the public are not to be slighted, as we may be led into a general Quarrel thro' their means.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

As a result, Johnson, decided to disregard Hillsborough's specifications and negotiate for a much larger land cession to satisfy the numerous colonial interests in the west, public and private, while securing a permanent border that would separate the two races for the foreseeable future and prevent a new Indian war. On the eve of the final boundary line negotiations, Johnson admitted as much to Governor Henry Moore of New York, candidly stating that "it was my intention to Obtain as Much Land as I possibly could, and agreeable to such Boundary as would be most Advantageous to the Province, and

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{51} "Johnson to Hillsborough, August 17, 1768," in \textit{NYCD}, VIII, 94.
agreeable to the Indians." While plotting the new land cession, Johnson also sought to accommodate those friends who had shared in the burdens of his work over the past decade. Among these was his chief deputy, George Croghan. Croghan, who had faithfully served Johnson for many years, had a claim to 200,000 acres in the vicinity of Fort Pitt and the Youghiogheny River that he had privately purchased from the Six Nations in 1749, but had been frustrated by the Proclamation Line. Also, the deputy had gone bankrupt after losing everything he owned during Pontiac's Rebellion. As such, Croghan represented a group called the "Suffering Traders," who collectively lost £85,912 in trading goods during the outbreak, and sought to recover the losses through land cessions and the organization of a small scale venture called the "Indiana" Company. Two of Croghan's associates in the group were Samuel Wharton and William Trent, both prominent members of the Walpole-Wharton syndicate. Taking advantage of Croghan's friendship with Johnson, Wharton and Trenton, accompanied by Croghan, approached the Indian Superintendent and asked for his support in obtaining land from the Northern tribes. Johnson agreed to comply with the speculators' request, pledging to "procure an Advantageous Grant" as part of the boundary treaty. After making this alliance with the speculators, Johnson commenced treaty negotiations with the Six Nations on October 24, 1768. The end result was the corrupt Treaty of Fort Stanwix.

At the treaty congress, held at Fort Stanwix in western New York, Johnson met with representatives from all the northern tribes. However, he made it clear from the start that he would be negotiating primarily with the Six Nations, and that the Ohio Indians would be treated only as "dependents," a situation that was bound to result in bad feelings and

52 "Johnson to Governor Henry Moore, September 28, 1768," in SWJP, VI, 411.
54 Johnson to John Blair, September 25, 1768, in SWJP, VI, 406-7.
dissension among the Indians.\textsuperscript{56} Johnson had previously conceded that the Delawares and the Shawnees deserved a place in the negotiations because "some [of those] lands actually belonged to them formerly."\textsuperscript{57} The superintendent, however, fell back on his old tactic of recognizing Iroquois sovereignty over the Ohio Indians, whether it still existed or not. Consequently, the Shawnees and the Delawares, who allowed the Six Nations to negotiate on their behalf despite serious misgivings, were reduced to observer status.\textsuperscript{58}

During the meetings, which were shrouded in an atmosphere of "mystery and knavery," the Indians were not the only ones negotiating.\textsuperscript{59} Representatives from New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia met with one another and with Wharton and Trent of the Walpole-Wharton syndicate.\textsuperscript{60} The commissioners from Virginia, Dr. Thomas Walker and Andrew Lewis, represented the interests of the Loyal and the Greenbriar companies respectively, and came to Fort Stanwix to insure that the new boundary line and the impending land cessions did not conflict with their claims. Lewis in particular wanted to protect his share of Dinwiddie's soldier bounty land. Consequently, the representatives of all the various colonial interests reached an understanding with one another, and with Johnson, whereby no objections would be raised to a large grant to the "Suffering Traders," on the condition that the final boundary line would be established at the mouth of the Tennessee River instead of that of the Great Kanawha, as instructed by Hillsborough. The deal was sealed, and as a result, Johnson successfully negotiated an overextension of Hillsborough’s intended northern boundary line, justifying his actions on

\textsuperscript{56} McConnell, \textit{A Country Between}, 248.
\textsuperscript{57} Johnson to Gage, April 23, 1768, in \textit{SWJP}, XII, 476.
\textsuperscript{58} McConnell, \textit{A Country Between}, 256.
\textsuperscript{59} Quoted in Kate Mason Rowland, \textit{Life of George Mason: Including his speeches, public papers, and correspondence}, 2 volumes, (New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1892), II, 26.
\textsuperscript{60} Rice, \textit{The Allegheny Frontier}, 62-3.
the flimsy pretense that the Six Nations had insisted on the extra land cession as a goodwill measure. 61

The ramifications of this radical alteration of the more limited cession authorized by Hillsborough were staggering. First, colonial borders finally reached the Ohio River, bringing the Shawnee hunting grounds in Kentucky within reach of the Virginians, who were more than ready to take advantage of the speculation and settlement opportunities offered by the cession. 62 Second, Johnson's portion of the boundary line did not meet the line negotiated by Superintendent Stuart with the Cherokees in the Treaty of Hard Labour, signed three weeks earlier on October 17. 63 Stuart, who had followed Hillsborough's instructions to the letter, had run his southern boundary line to the Great Kanawha. Consequently, Johnson's divergence had produced a gulf of several hundred miles between the two supposed meeting points. Additionally, the powerful Cherokees, ancient enemies of the Six Nations, refused to accept a Kentucky cession based on dubious Iroquois claims of sovereignty, which the southern Indians very well knew were shallow. This new state of affairs promised nothing short of disaster. Johnson, by accommodating the speculators, had produced a first class mess for the Board of Trade.

Hillsborough, after learning of Johnson's disobedience, was furious. The Secretary harshly rebuked his Indian superintendent, writing that he could not see why:

...you [were] induced to depart from the Boundary line, directed by the Report of the Lords Commissioners for Trade & Plantations, which upon the whole, after much consideration, had been determined upon political and commercial principles to be the most desirable one, and to which by His Majesty's commands you [were] instructed to adhere; for besides that

61 Johnson to Hillsborough, November 18, 1768, in NYCD, VIII, 110.
the deviation from that line is contrary to the opinion of His Majesty's Servants on this side, and the obtaining so large an additional tract of land in that part of the continent is considered by them as productive only of disadvantage and embarrassment, the worst of it is, that it will not only probably produce jealousy and dissatisfaction among the Cherokees, but will also tend to undo and throw into confusion those settlements and agreements for the other part of the Boundary Line, which the Superintendent for the Southern District has concluded so ably & so precisely according to his instructions.64

To remedy the situation, Hillsborough directed Johnson to tactfully surrender the Kentucky lands back to the Six Nations, and renegotiate the treaty with an aim to securing the southern boundary line as established by Stuart's Treaty of Hard Labour.

Johnson defended himself in a letter written on June 26, 1769, insisting that while the Indians would readily take the land back, they would become suspicious if "the Virginians especially the Frontier Inhabitants should take possession of, & begin settlements on those lands" after the king had declined the cession.65 Furthermore, Johnson believed that colonial expansion was inevitable, and that it seemed like a good idea at the time to "get as extensive a Cession as was practicable" in order to "prevent the general ill consequences which must attend the Establishment of such settlements without the Indians consent."66 While arguing his case, Johnson let slip his other intentions in straying from Hillsborough's instructions, stating that "I saw a Deed in the hands of the Virginia Commissioners for great part of these lands which they assured me had formerly met with encouragement from his late Majesty & the then Ministry."67 The Virginia Commissioners, of course, were Walker and Lewis, and the deed was for lands granted to the Loyal and Greenbriar companies in 1745.

64 Hillsborough to Johnson, January 4, 1769, in NYCD, VIII,145.
65 Johnson to Hillsborough, June 26, 1769, in Ibid., 172.
66 Ibid., 172-3.
67 Ibid., 172.
Johnson's admission that land speculators had influenced his negotiations with the Indians did not make Hillsborough feel any better. The Secretary, while realizing the dilemma posed by having a disjointed boundary line, allowed the Kentucky cession to remain but nullified the "Grant of Land made to the Indian Traders, and to Mr. Croghan" during the treaty congress until "those persons shall make application to His Majesty thereupon, and when the nature, extent and situation of the grants themselves, and the foundation on which they have been solicited, shall be further explained." After seemingly thwarting the "Suffering Traders," Hillsborough informed Johnson that "It is not however His Majesty's Intention that the Settlements of His Subjects should be carried beyond the Boundary of Virginia, as proposed to be fixed near the Kanawa River." By limiting settlement to the east of the Great Kanawha, Hillsborough harbored hopes of undoing the damage that Johnson had done by having Stuart negotiate another treaty with the Cherokees, one that would negate the Kentucky cession while still ending the original southern boundary line at the Great Kanawha. This attempt to reconnect the two boundary lines would ultimately make a bad situation worse.

Stuart, who had steadfastly withstood efforts of land speculators to subvert him in the past, now found himself facing renewed challenges to his authority after receiving Hillsborough's new instructions. Lord Botetourt, the new governor of Virginia, first sent his two commissioners Walker and Lewis, both of whom had just returned from the Fort Stanwix congress,

\[\text{...to convince Mr. Stuart that the line he proposes to run from Chiswell's mine to the mouth of the Great Konhaway, will so much contract the limits of this Colony, as to make it extremely prejudicial to his Majesty's Service,}\]


\[69\] Ibid.

as well as injurious to the people who have been encouraged to settle to the Westward of his propos’d Boundary.\textsuperscript{71}

The commissioners were also to suggest to the Superintendent that he actually had violated his instructions, since it "appeared" that

\begin{quote}
…Sir William [Johnson] had orders to consult the Governors upon such points as might affect their several provinces, and it presumable that Mr. Stuart's orders were agreeable to Sir William's, tho' no consultation with the Governor of this Colony hath been had upon tthis subject, nor any opportunity allow'd to Virginia to shew their strong objections to this very limited Boundary.\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

After Stuart showed no sympathy for the Virginians' position, Walker and Lewis tried the same chicanery on the Indian agent as they had Johnson, specifically by flashing a deed of ownership of the Kentucky lands before the superintendent.\textsuperscript{73} When that failed, the speculators then attempted to circumvent the Superintendent's office and deal directly with the Cherokees, offering substantial bribes to a number of Cherokee chiefs, all the while peppering Botetourt with forged letters indicating Cherokee willingness to treat with the Colony.\textsuperscript{74} Stuart, who maintained his integrity throughout the whole sordid episode, reported the interference of the speculators to Hillsborough:

\begin{quote}
Every step that could be thought of was taken by a set of self-interested men in the province of Virginia to embarrass me, in the settlement of a boundary line. Emissaries were sent into the nation, to practice upon the Indians, and prevail upon them to refuse treating with me.\textsuperscript{75}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{71} "Instructions from Lord Botetourt to Col. Lewis and Dr. Walker, December 20, 1768," published in the \textit{Virginia Magazine of History and Biography}, Volume XIII, number 1, (July 1905), 28-30.
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid.}, 28.
\textsuperscript{73} Alvord, \textit{The Mississippi Valley}, 79.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Ibid.}, 83.
\textsuperscript{75} Stuart to Hillsborough, November 28, 1770, in C.O.5/72, 29, (Library of Congress Transcripts).
\end{flushright}
Hillsborough firmly supported his Indian superintendent, and ordered Botetourt to reign in the two commissioners. The secretary also reprimanded the governor for submitting to "the dictates of turbulent individuals" seeking to push the boundary line further westward.\textsuperscript{76} With the Virginians temporarily stifled, Stuart managed to produce a treaty roughly to Hillsborough's specifications which adjusted the boundary line westward from the North Carolina-Virginia border to a point near Long Island on the south branch of the Holston River, extending northward to the mouth of the Great Kanawha River. This was the Treaty of Lochaber, signed on October 22, 1770.\textsuperscript{77}

The Lochaber treaty, along with the Fort Stanwix agreement, completely erased the claims of both the Six Nations and the Cherokees to most of the land in Trans-Allegheny Western Virginia, and opened the way into the Ohio Valley and Kentucky. Hillsborough, who had intended to repair the damage done by Johnson's collaboration with the speculators, found that he ultimately powerless to stop the massive emigration of settlers who sought to take advantage of the Fort Stanwix Treaty. Consequently, thousands of settlers, primarily of Scotch-Irish and German stock, poured into the areas west of the mountains in the spring and summer of 1769.\textsuperscript{78} Fort Pitt, once an isolated military post, soon became a teeming village called Pittsburgh, as several thousand men, women, and children settled along the Forks of the Ohio.\textsuperscript{79} The Greenbriar settlements revived, and the Monongahela and Kanawha Valleys saw a veritable flood of Virginians arrive and take up permanent residence in the fertile lowlands. In the south, thousands more migrated up the Valley of Virginia and filtered into the valleys of the Holston, Clinch, Clinch,
Wautaga, and Nolichucky Rivers, moving ever closer to the hallowed Kentucky hunting grounds of the Shawnees.

Spearheading this latter group was a professional wanderer named Daniel Boone. Boone, a Pennsylvanian who had been living happily with his wife and family in North Carolina, set out on May 1, 1769 with several close friends on order "to wander through the wilderness of America, in quest of the country of Kentucke." The party passed by the Lochaber Treaty Line unmolested, and found their way through Cumberland Gap and into the plush grasslands of Kentucky. When the group finally reached the Kentucky River, "a number of Indians rushed out of the a thick cane-brake upon us, and made us prisoners." Boone's camp was plundered, and the explorers were treated "with common savage usage." After seven days of captivity, the Indians freed the party, and sent them on their way with a stern warning:

"Now brothers, go home and stay there. Don't come here any more, for this is the Indians' hunting ground and all the animals, skins, and furs are ours. If you are so foolish as to venture here again, you may be sure that the wasps and the yellow-jackets will sting you severely."

Boone and his party ultimately had to fight their way out of Kentucky, losing one man in the process, before returning home. Despite his close call with the Indians, Boone was enthralled by the land he had seen, which he "esteemed a second paradise," and determined to go back, "at the risk of my life and fortune." He would indeed return later, along with many others who planned on making Kentucky their new home.

---

81 Ibid., 172.
82 Ibid.
84 Ridge and Billington, America's Frontier Story, 173.
The Indians who had attacked Boone were Shawnees. After Pontiac's Rebellion, the Shawnees had been deliberately ignored in the British policy making process, which, under Johnson's direction, operated under the pretence of Iroquois power over the Ohio Indians. This became all too apparent to the Shawnees at the Fort Stanwix treaty congress, when Johnson snubbed them while catering to the Six Nations. As a result, they had left the treaty congress extremely dissatisfied with the proceedings, and the outcome of the final negotiations. Consequently, Johnson widened the already substantial gulf between the Iroquois and the Shawnees.\footnote{McConnell, A Country Between, 256.} Another result of Johnson's treatment of the Shawnees was the alienation of the Ohio Indians from the Superintendent's office, as well as the complete discrediting of the Six Nations as a viable mediator with the British for Indian affairs. When the news of the Fort Stanwix treaty reached the towns of the Ohio Indians, there was much consternation at the discovery that Johnson had negotiated for Kentucky without allowing any of the Shawnee or Delaware delegates to attend the final boundary discussions. Moreover, the Iroquois, who ostensibly was supposed to look after the best interests of the Ohio Indians, had bargained away the Kentucky hunting grounds in the closed session without consulting any of the Shawnee or Delaware delegates. Even worse, the Iroquois refused to share the money and goods obtained in the deal with their western counterparts as compensation for the lost land and resources.\footnote{Ibid., 256.} The same thing had happened in the south, where the Cherokees ignored Shawnee protests and opened an inevitable second avenue of white settlement into Kentucky by agreeing to the Lochaber treaty. Hence, the Shawnees felt betrayed at every turn, and resolved to chart their own course from that point on.

Beginning in 1770, the Shawnees began making concerted efforts to form their own pan-ethnic Indian confederacy with Indian groups to the west, primarily the Illinois and the Miamis, as well as with the neighboring Ottawas Mingoes, Wynadotts, and
Delawares, to act as a bulwark against white settlement. By 1772, they had reached such a degree of success that Johnson was obliged to report to Hillsborough the dire news of a "great Congress" held at Scioto in which the hosts [the Shawnees] circulated war belts "representing themselves and the Illinois Indians with ten confederate Nations between them." Hillsborough, who was still angry with his Indian agent, lamented:

Every day discovers more and more the fatal Policy of departing from the line prescribed by the proclamation of 1763, and the extension of it, on the ground of a cession made by the Six Nations of lands, their right to which is denied by other Nations, equally powerfull and more numerous, instead of being attended with advantage to this kingdom, & Security to the Colonies, is now likely to have no other consequence than that of giving a greater scope to distant settlements, which I conceive to be inconsistent with every true principle of policy, & which I clearly see…will most probably have the effect to produce a general Indian War, the expense whereof will fall on this Kingdom.

With another remonstration from Hillsborough ringing in his ears, Johnson, with some help from Stuart in the south, deftly thwarted this particular Indian effort at unification in the west, and would do so again the following year. But, the rising intensity of frontier violence and fraud, coupled with the unrelenting waves of settlers moving westward, was beginning to overtake Johnson's diplomatic maneuvering, and the Indian war that Hillsborough so dreaded grew more likely as time progressed.

The Shawnees worst fears about the vulnerability of Kentucky to white expansion were well founded. In May 1771, Colonel John Donelson began surveying the final boundary line as specified in the Treaty of Lochaber. The surveyor, a Virginian who had been present at the Lochaber negotiations, ran into two serious complications. First, squatters from Virginia had already established homesteads in the Clinch, Holston, and

---

87 Ibid., 256-7.
88 Johnson to Hillsborough, April 4, 1772, in NYC, VIII, 291.
89 Hillsborough to Johnson, July 1, 1772, in Ibid., 302.
Powell River valleys, well past the boundary line. Next, Donelson discovered that the line would run through a region "so mountainous rugged and difficult of access, that they could not have accomplished it in many months," and then only at great expense. As a solution to both problems, several Cherokee chiefs, who had accompanied the surveyors as allowed in the treaty, "suggested" extending the line further westward so as to leave the illegal settlements outside of Cherokee territory, as well as bypassing the rough terrain. The details behind this "suggestion" are shadowy, and there is strong evidence to suggest that Donelson promised the Cherokee chiefs presents worth £500 for their compliance in allowing a substantial deviation from the boundary described in the treaty. Also, in light of the subversive activities of the Virginia speculators during Stuart's negotiations with the Cherokees, and the amount of territory gained by the deviation, the latter's decision to disobey his clear instructions is suspicious. Whatever the case, Donelson subsequently marked the boundary line from the south branch of the Holston River, as indicated in the treaty, but struck northwestward over the Powell River, through the Cumberland Mountains into Kentucky, to the North Fork of the Cumberland River until coming to a tributary of the Kentucky River. From there, the line followed the Kentucky northward to the Ohio River. This detour, according to Donelson, established a sensible "natural boundary, not easily mistaken," and also eliminated the problem posed by the squatters while keeping the Cherokees happy. More importantly, Donelson's deviation, if approved, brought a huge portion of Kentucky under Virginia's jurisdiction and finally made that land available to the speculators, all but promising future settlement in the Shawnee hunting grounds. While the Virginians and the Cherokees may have been

90 Dunmore to Hillsborough, March 20, 1772, "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft Transcripts.
92 Alden, John Stuart, 284.
pleased, the Shawnees were most definitely not, openly expressing "their extreme resentment at the encroachments of the white people, on their hunting ground."\textsuperscript{94}

Further aggravating the Indians was the influx of unlicensed traders, mainly from Virginia, into the Ohio Valley. Future farmer and writer J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur observed this particular class of unscrupulous Virginians firsthand and wrote:

They trade with them; the worst of people are permitted to do that which none but persons of the best characters should be employed in. They get drunk with them and often defraud the Indians. Their avarice, removed from the eyes of their superiors, knows no bounds; and aided by little superiority of knowledge, these traders deceive them and even sometimes shed blood.\textsuperscript{95}

The British Army had long proved incapable of policing the traders, as well as the hunters and squatters. In 1772, General Gage was finally ordered to evacuate all regulars posted in the west, and to dismantle Fort Pitt.\textsuperscript{96} The departing army took with it the last vestiges of royal jurisdiction in the west, and left the treaty cessions up for grabs among the various competing interests. This final collapse of British authority, coupled with the shady manner in which the Donelson Line was run, as well as the surging tide of white settlement spurred on by rampant land speculation, all but guaranteed future trouble in the Ohio Valley.

From Mount Vernon, Washington was watching the situation in the Ohio Valley intently. Crawford’s clandestine scouting trip had been extremely successful, and after the Fort Stanwix Treaty had apparently opened the Ohio Valley to legal settlement, Washington felt confident to push his claims with the new governor of Virginia, Lord


\textsuperscript{96} McConnell, \textit{A Country Between}, 268-9.
Botetourt. In May 1769, Washington mentioned to Botetourt "in a very cursory manner, the claim of Sundry Officers of the first Troops raised in this Colony in behalf of themselves, and the Soldiery of that day to certain Lands westward of the Alleghany Mountains." In December, the colonel officially petitioned the governor and the Council "in behalf of himself and the Officers and Soldiers who first immbarked in the Service of this Colony" for the 200,000 acres promised by Dinwiddie in 1754,

...in one or more surveys...on the Monongahela its Waters from the long Narrows up to...Nicholas Knobs; on the New River or Great Canhawa from the Great Falls therein to the Mouth thereof; and on Sandy Creek...from the mouth to the Mountains...  

Washington continued:

One half of the Land promised by [Dinwiddie's] Proclamation is to be laid contiguous to the Forks of the Monongahela, consequently cannot interfere in any manner whatsoever with the boundary lines, admitting, that the most contracted one, is finally established. And next, because the Country in general, but more especially that part of it where the first quantity is located, is settling very fast, and of course every good and fertile spot will be engrossed and occupied by others, whilst none but barren Hills, and rugged Mountains; will be left to those, who have toil'd, and bled for the Country, and whose right to a part of it is fixed by the strongest Assurances which Governm't could give them so long ago as 1754.

Left unsaid was the fact that the Virginian already had secretly scouted and secured his substantial share of the grant, which he later declared as "the Cream of the Country." After finishing the first draft of his letter, Washington received word from Thomas Walker that:

99 Washington to Botetourt, December 8, 1769, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 530.
…the Lands near the Fort are reserved in the Indian Sale [at Fort Stanwix] for the Traders. If so, as this would have been the most valuable moiety of our grant we shall humbly hope to be endulg’d (this being an event w’ch could not be foreseen) in laying the like q’ty in some other good spot of earth rather than wait a determination of that matter in England.\textsuperscript{101}

This land reservation around Fort Pitt was the result of the shady deal worked out among Johnson, the Six Nations, the "Suffering Traders," and the Virginia commissioners. Consequently, Washington left a postscript at the end of his draft, proposing a response to this unwelcome news. He wrote:

If time cannot be obtained to look out the Land, and we are obliged to locate it immediately, in that case do it according to Colo. Lewis’ Memm. with Mr. Walthoe [Walpole] provided none of those spots fall within the reserv’r for the Traders.\textsuperscript{102}

Andrew Lewis' memorial to Walpole, which has been lost, apparently contained the written details of the deal struck between the Virginia commissioners and the Wharton-Walpole syndicate at Fort Stanwix. Consequently, Washington determined to reach a similar understanding with the group.\textsuperscript{103}

In the final draft of his petition, Washington thought to ask for a "special surveyor" to be employed since an official surveyor would slow the process and incur "Expence much beyond what a poor soldier is able to bear."\textsuperscript{104} Washington's petition was approved, and he was subsequently directed to publish a notice to all claimants in the Virginia Gazette to file their claims through him.\textsuperscript{105} As for the "special surveyor," Botetourt agreed to allow Washington to petition the President and Masters of the College of William and Mary to

\textsuperscript{101} Washington to Botetourt, December 8, 1769, in Fitzpatrick, \textit{Writings of Washington}, II, 532.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{103} See the meeting described in Washington's Journal Entry, October 8, 1770, in Cleland, \textit{Washington in the Ohio Valley}, 240-1.

\textsuperscript{104} Quoted in Knollenberg, \textit{George Washington}, 92.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ibid.}, 93.
appoint an independent surveyor outside of the colonial government. Washington quickly recommended William Crawford for the job, and the officials at William and Mary, apparently ignorant of the collusion between the two Virginians, approved the appointment. With Crawford's authority to survey the veterans' lands thus sealed, most of Washington's immediate work was done. The Ohio lands that Washington had literally been fighting for since the French and Indian War were safe by virtue of the Fort Stanwix cession. Better yet, they had already been secured during Crawford's "hunting trip." After Crawford's appointment as "special surveyor" was approved at William and Mary, Washington's secretly secured lands were in effect retroactively legalized. All that was left for Washington to do was take an inspection tour and conduct some business discussions with a couple of old acquaintances from the French and Indian War, George Croghan and Thomas Cresap, both members of the Walpole-Wharton group.

On October 5, 1770, Washington left Mount Vernon and rode toward the Ohio Valley. Two days later, Washington briefly stopped by Crawford’s homestead, where the surveyor decided to accompany the colonel on his journey. On October 8, the two Virginians met with Cresap in western Maryland, where the pair learned of developments with the Walpole-Wharton syndicate, specifically "the particulars of the Grant said to be lately sold to Walpole and others, for a certain Tract of Country on the Ohio." Cresap also informed the Virginians of the possibility of buying into the Vandalia scheme, intimating that "some of the Shares in the New (Charter) government on the Ohio might

---

106 In taking all the prime bottomland for themselves, Washington and Crawford were later accused of betraying the trust of the soldiers they were supposedly working for. Several of Washington's former officers complained loudly when they discovered that the land Crawford had surveyed for them was generally very poor. Crawford reported to Washington in November 1773 that the officers were "a good deal shagereened…as there front on the River was not over a Mile and a half, the most of them, and Run back almost five mile and you in Chief of your Survays have all bottom…none in that Country is so good as your Land…", Crawford to Washington, November 12, 1773, in Hamilton, Letters to Washington, IV, 275; Butterfield, Washington-Crawford Letters, 34.

107 Details of this trip in Washington's own words can be found in "Remarks and Occurs.,” published in Cleland, Washington in the Ohio Valley, 240-269.

108 Journal Entry, October 8, 1770, in Ibid., 240-1.
be bought very Cheap from some of the present Members.” After learning the details and potential opportunities of Vandalia from Cresap, Washington and Crawford traveled on to Pittsburgh, arriving on October 17. The next evening, the Virginians dined with Croghan at the officers club in Fort Pitt, and again the next day at Croghan Hall. In the meetings with Cresap and Croghan, the Virginians apparently reached an “understanding” similar to that made with Walker and Lewis at Fort Stanwix. The two “Suffering Traders” probably assured Washington and Crawford that the Walpole-Wharton syndicate would respect the Virginia soldiers' claims in the Ohio Valley, and evidently promised that if Vandalia was chartered, Crawford's surveys could be patented under that government. This was at least Washington's understanding, who said as much in a later letter to Thomas Lewis. To seal the deal, Croghan "intended to accompany" Washington and Crawford "part of the Way down the [Ohio] River" and take note of the locations of the Virginians' scouted lands for future reference. With this agreement in hand, Washington's fears were evidently allayed since he later made plans for settling his property near the mouth of the Great Kanawha River, an advertisement for which appeared in the September 1773 issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette. In the ad, Washington exhorted the virtues of the "Ohio Lands" he was leasing, noting that:

---

109 Washington to George Mercer, November 22, 1771, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 72.

110 No known documentation exists which positively confirms what Cresap and Croghan specifically arranged with Washington regarding the problem of Virginia soldier grants. However, Washington's letter to Thomas Lewis, February 17, 1774, hints very strongly that the deal involved Washington's submission of the same land patents he had received from the Virginia government to the new charter government of Vandalia, which in turn would immediately recognize the claim with no questions asked. Washington wrote: "...I now enclose you a warrant for 50,000 acres of Land, as also the surveys which Captain Crawford has made for me in that Country; these I intended, if the new Colony had taken place on the Ohio, to have patented in that Governm't, if I could not obtain them under the Proclamation of 1763." Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 183; See also Rice, The Allegheny Frontier, 72, 76-8.

111 Journal Entry, October 19, 1770, in Cleland, Washington in the Ohio Valley, 247.

112 Rice, The Allegheny Frontier, 72, 77; Advertisement of the Ohio Lands, published in the Pennsylvania Gazette, September 1773; Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 144-6.
...it may not be amiss further to observe, that if the scheme for establishing a new government on the Ohio, in the manner talked of, should ever be effected, these must be among the most valuable lands in it, not only on account of the goodness of the soil, and the other advantages above enumerated, but from their contiguity to the seat of government, which more than probable will be fixed at the mouth of the Great Kanawha.  

The proposed capital that Washington spoke of was to be built on a large tract of land, later named Point Pleasant by Andrew Lewis, at the confluence of the Great Kanawha and the Ohio Rivers. Lewis had claimed the land by virtue of Dinwiddie's Proclamation and had reserved it with the Walpole-Wharton syndicate at Fort Stanwix. That Washington would call favorable attention in his advertisement to the proximity of his own land to the capital of the new charter government at the height of the Vandalia mania reveals his confidence that he would eventually have his land either way, whether under Virginia's jurisdiction, or Vandalia's.

While dining at Fort Pitt, Washington also acted on Cresap's information regarding the possibility of buying into Vandalia by attempting to privately purchase 15,000 acres from Croghan, as well as buying out the latter's proprietary share in the scheme. Croghan, who was eager to liquidate his holdings to avoid debtors' prison, was enthusiastic about the prospect of doing business with Washington, but the private bargain between the two was never finalized after Crawford later learned of the trader's suspect survey techniques.

Before Crawford's discovery of Croghan's surveying incompetence, however, the three speculators set out to inspect the lands Crawford had located, canoeing up and down

---

113 Ibid.
115 Wainwright, George Croghan, 276-7.
the Ohio and that stream's lower tributaries for the next several weeks. Along the way, Washington discovered another prime "piece of land" that he wanted included in his grant, "being the first bottom on the So. East side [of] the river above Capteening, as also a little above a place where the effects of a hurricane appear among the Trees, and opposite to a Creek on the other side near the upper end of the bottom, call'd Pipe Creek."\(^{116}\) In mid-November, the party encountered the towns of the Ohio Indians. Washington observed:

> The Indians who live upon the Ohio (the upper parts of it at least) are composed of Shawnas, Delawares, and some of the Mingoos, who getting but little consideration that was given for the Lands Eastward of the Ohio, view the Settlement of the People upon this River with an uneasy and jealous Eye, and do not scruple to say that they must be compensated for their Right if the People settle thereon, notwithstanding the Cession of the Six Nations thereto.\(^{117}\)

After hearing these loud complaints regarding uncontrolled white settlement and Iroquois duplicity, Washington and Crawford returned to Pittsburgh fully satisfied with what the lands they had had seen, but a little disconcerted by the sullen behavior of the Indians.

Immediately upon the group's return, Croghan introduced Washington to his nephew, a young man named John Connolly. Connolly was an adventurer of high charisma and quick wit. In his youth, he had studied medicine, "the practice of which it was intended I should pursue," but abandoned that profession to be a soldier.\(^{118}\) He had served as a regular in the British Army, leaving the service after a stint at the "unimportant station" of Martinique.\(^{119}\) During Pontiac's Rebellion, he once again volunteered for service, and "served two campaigns, at my own private expense; and as became me, cheerfully and


\(^{119}\) *Ibid.*
ambitiously encountered the dangers and fatigues of war.”

After the uprising burned itself out, Connolly had:

...explored our newly acquired territory, visited the various tribes of native Americans, studied their different manners and customs, undertook the most toilsome marches with them through the extensive wilds of Canada, and depended upon the precarious chance for my subsistence for months successively.

As such, he had gained "an aptitude to enterprize, very proper to form a partizan officer," which would become all too obvious in the future. After wandering through the Northwest with the Indians for several years, Connolly came to Fort Pitt to live with his uncle, George Croghan, and set up a modest medical practice, gaining some local prominence in the process.

Connolly's experiences in the Ohio and Illinois lands had not only instilled a restless energy inside him, but also an avid interest in land speculation. As such, he quickly captivated Washington, who described him as "a very sensible Intelligent Man who had travell'd over a good deal of this Western Country." More importantly, Connolly knew the value of the lands to the north and west of the Ohio River, which he described to Washington as:

...exceedingly desirable on many Accts. The Climate is exceeding fine, the Soil remarkably good; the Lands well Watered with good streams, and full level enough for any kind of Cultivation. Besides these advantages from Nature, it has others not less Important to a new settlement, particularly Game which is so plenty as not to render the Transportation of Provisions there (bread only excepted) altogether unnecessary, but to

---

120 Ibid., 310-11.
121 Ibid., 311.
122 Ibid.
enrich the Adventurers with the Peltry for which there is a constant and good Market.\textsuperscript{124}

Naturally, Washington's interest was only further heightened by this information. Accordingly, the Virginian, who appreciated "enterprising men," wrote more of this new, potentially useful acquaintance and the appealing ideas driving the adventurous ex-soldier:

\begin{quote}
Dr. Connelly is so much delighted with the Lands, and Climate on this River; that he seems to wish for nothing more than to induce 100 families to go there to live that he might be among them. A new and most desirable Government might be established here to be bounded (according to his Acct.) by the Ohio Northward and Westward. The Ridge that divides the Waters of the Tennesee or Cherokee River Southward and westward and a line to be Run from the Falls of Ohio, or above so as to cross the Shawana River above the Fork of it.\textsuperscript{125}
\end{quote}

From Washington's account, it is evident that the soldier turned physician turned speculator was extremely interested in the settlement of Kentucky, which may help explain Connolly's future conduct in the Ohio Valley.

After this final meeting, Washington returned to Mount Vernon, arriving home on December 1 after an absence of "9 Weeks and one Day."\textsuperscript{126} The trip had been extremely productive. Not only had Washington explored his new land holdings in the Ohio Valley and even found some more prime tracts, but the meetings with the two Indian traders and Connolly had rekindled his interest in the Trans-Allegheny lands of Kentucky and the Northwest, which had remained in the back of his mind ever since the Mississippi Company fiasco of 1763. Washington's later attempts to acquire some of this land through the Vandalia scheme, as suggested by Cresap, ultimately bore no fruit, but the Virginian found another effective instrument to achieve his objective in the soldier

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 268.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 269.
settlement provision of the Proclamation of 1763. Also, Washington discovered a powerful new ally in Virginia, the new governor, Lord Dunmore.
Chapter 3

"FURTH FORTUNE AND FILL THE FETTERS"

The Dunmore Regime

On October 15, 1770, while Washington and Crawford were in the Ohio Valley inspecting their new land, the governor of Virginia, Lord Botetourt, died after an administration of only two years. The Privy Council, upon receiving news of Botetourt's death, quickly named a successor. On January 19, 1771, John Murray, the 4th Earl of Dunmore, Viscount Fincastle, and Baron of Blair, Mouili and Fillimet, was appointed as the new colonial Governor of Virginia.¹

Dunmore was born in 1730 in Scotland to a distinguished family related to most of the royal houses of Europe.² The Earl was also directly descended from the Royal House of Stuart through his mother, resulting in a distant claim to the throne of England. As such, King George III, who harbored a special fondness for Dunmore, often referred to the latter as "Our Trusty and Right Well-beloved Cousin."³ The Murray family, which carried the house motto "Furth fortune and fill the fetters," entered the peerage in 1684 during the reign of King Charles II.⁴ Since then, the family's fortunes had ebbed and flowed with the

² The only fully researched biography of Dunmore ever written is Percy B. Caley's 957 page unpublished dissertation, Dunmore: Colonial Governor of New York and Virginia, 1770-1782, University of Pittsburgh, 1939.
⁴ Caley, Dunmore, 19.
political tides within Great Britain. During the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745-6, Dunmore's father William had served as an officer in the Highland army of Prince Charles Edward Stuart. After the disastrous battle at Culloden Moor in 1746, the Murray family struggled to hold on to its land holdings, along with its economic and social position within the British nobility.

While his father was fighting for Bonnie Prince Charlie, the younger Murray received a classical education, studying under Lord Bute.\(^5\) Afterwards, he performed the obligatory military service expected of a young nobleman, serving first as an ensign and then a lieutenant in the 3\(^{rd}\) Foot Guards.\(^6\) Apparently, soldiering in the British army was not to the younger Murray's taste, and he had left the service by age 25. After William Murray died in 1756, John succeeded him as the 4\(^{th}\) Earl of Dunmore, taking a seat in the House of Lords as a representative peer of Scotland in the twelfth and first two sessions of the thirteenth parliament of Great Britain (1761-9).\(^7\) During this time, he became a close friend of King George III, and an active participant in the occasionally raucous debates in Parliament.

On January 2, 1770, the Privy Council appointed Dunmore as the new colonial governor of New York. Dunmore, who was strongly considering the improvement of his family's fortune through the acquisition of land in North America, eagerly accepted the commission.\(^8\) On October 18, 1770, three days after Botetourt's death in Virginia, Dunmore arrived in New York with much fanfare and "good humour."\(^9\) Once settled in the colony, Dunmore was immediately introduced to the land problem left over from the


\(^6\) Caley, *Dunmore*, 20.


\(^9\) Dunmore to Hillsborough, October 24, 1770, in *NYCD*, VIII, 32.
French and Indian War. During the war, Governor Hardy, like Dinwiddie in Virginia, had issued a promise of a land grant to any New Yorker who volunteered to serve in the provincial forces. As in the Virginia, this promise had not been kept because of the Proclamation Line. Consequently, a mob of veterans had rioted, demanding their land, several weeks before Dunmore arrived. The energetic new governor firmly confronted this problem by issuing a strong proclamation ordering the rioters to desist, and by having the ringleaders arrested, "even if a posse were necessary." In order to ease the pressure of the veterans, Dunmore asked Hillsborough, who by this time was under political attack by the regrouped Walpole-Wharton syndicate, to lift his injunction against settlement west of the Alleghenies. While Dunmore awaited an answer, disgruntled veterans harassed him daily, leading the governor to write two more letters urging his superior to quickly act upon his request. Hillsborough's cryptic reply, which Dunmore received in February, informed the governor that his request had been referred to the Board of Trade, and that the secretary would rely upon Dunmore's "Justice and Wisdom" to settle the matter until a formal decision could be reached.

Hillsborough's seemingly lame response to Dumore's request reflected the secretary's growing political isolation within the Board of Trade, engineered by the chief protagonist of the Vandalia scheme, the wealthy London merchant Thomas Walpole. After Hillsborough had issued his injunction against settlement west of the Great Kanawha River in response to the Fort Stanwix Treaty, which seemed to foil the syndicate's efforts, Samuel Wharton traveled to London in 1769 to plot with Walpole in order to overcome Hillsborough's intransigence. Wharton and Walpole pooled their formidable resources and brought their combined political power to bear against Hillsborough, thereby seriously weakening the secretary's position within the British Cabinet. The Walpole-

10 Caley, *Dunmore*, 26; Proclamation of Governor Dunmore, October 1770, in *NYCD*, VII, 661ff.
11 Caley, *Dunmore*, 27.
12 Ibid. 27; C.O. 5/1075, 275, (Library of Congress Transcripts).
Wharton syndicate was further strengthened by the organization of the Grand Ohio Company, or more simply, the Walpole Company. This company, comprised of the Philadelphia speculators as well as some of the most important government officials in Great Britain, consolidated and absorbed the smaller Indiana and Ohio companies, and proposed to purchase 2,400,000 acres of land from the Fort Stanwix cession for £10,460, the exact sum the Crown had paid to the Six Nations for the entire cession.\textsuperscript{14} The Virginia soldier grants would be respected, thus removing any opposition from the House of Burgesses, while the Loyal and Greenbriar companies, represented by the Virginia commissioners Walker and Lewis, had already been accommodated at Fort Stanwix.\textsuperscript{15} Hillsborough tried once more to trump the speculators by suggesting that the Walpole Company enlarge its grant to 20,000,000 acres, enough land for another colony, in order to prohibitively increase the purchase price and therefore scuttle the scheme.\textsuperscript{16} The secretary's gambit failed, however, and the purchase price remained at £10,460.

That Hillsborough was feeling the pressure of the Walpole Company was evident when the secretary saw fit to secretly instruct Dunmore to "enquire and find out of the people here, on the scheme of agitation of establishing a Colony on the Ohio."\textsuperscript{17} Dunmore readily complied with the wishes of his patron. His report, sent not even a month after his arrival in New York, reflected the opinion of the "people of property," most of whom believed:

\textit{…that such a Colony will only become a drain to them (now but thinly peopled) of an infinite number of the lower Class of inhabitants, who, the desire of novelty alone will induce to change their situation; and the

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 71.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 72.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Dunmore to Hillsborough, November 12, 1770, in \textit{NYCD}, VIII, 253.
withdrawing of those Inhabitants will reduce the value of Lands in the provinces even to nothing…

Consequently, "all who have any knowledge of such affairs concur in condemning the project," to which Dunmore expressed his own prophetic opinion, one which dripped with grim irony in light of the governor's future career. Dunmore wrote:

Add to this the great probability, I may venture to say (with) certainty, that the attempting a settlement on the Ohio, will draw on an Indian war; it being well known, how ill affected the Ohio Indians have always been to our interest, and their jealousy of such a settlement, so near them, must be easily foreseen.

Therefore, Dunmore strongly urged Hillsborough "not to suffer this scheme to have effect."

Despite Dunmore's favorable report, Hillsborough's star was swiftly falling, and on July 1, 1772, the Board of Trade finally approved the petition for the new colony of Vandalia after four years of intrigue, bribery, and debate. After this resounding political defeat, Hillsborough continued to fight to the bitter end against the grant, ultimately taking his case to the Prime Minister Lord North before resigning in defiance on August 13. The Privy Council approved the petition of the Walpole Company the day after Hillsborough's resignation, and the way seemed to be clear for the Walpole-Wharton syndicate to organize its new charter government.

---

18 Ibid., 253.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 For the full, unsavory details of the Walpole group's efforts to undermine Hillsborough, see Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness, 181-210.
22 Ibid., 205.
Vandalia was destined to oblivion, however, as the Walpole-Wharton syndicate overestimated the magnitude of its victory and became greedy. After Vandalia's prospective boundaries were intentionally muddled and significantly extended to encompass a much larger area than agreed upon, the Crown Law Officers brought the company's proposed charter under intense scrutiny. On July 1773, the inspectors submitted a devastating report questioning the feasibility of the plan for collecting quitrents under the terms of the joint tenancy proposed by the Walpole group and the Board of Trade. A second objection to the land grant was the apparently deliberate vagueness of the colony's boundaries. The inspectors, with just cause, suspected duplicity by the speculators, and soundly condemned the lack of definite boundaries in the western part of the colony. Consequently, final approval by the King was delayed until the Board of Trade worked out the technical problems with the charter and overcame the objections of the Crown Law Officers. The delay cost the speculators precious time they did not have. By December, Vandalia, like the "Mountain in Labor," scarcely "bro't forth a Mouse." The Boston Tea Party had provoked the final crisis between the home government and the American colonists, thereby occupying the full attention of the Board of Trade and precluding the creation of any new colonies in America. The Vandalia scheme was hopelessly wrecked, and the western lands of the Ohio Valley and Kentucky remained open to the Virginians.

While Hillsborough was struggling for his political life against the Walpole juggernaut, Dunmore had dispatched the rioters and quieted New York's frontier with a modest infusion of land patents, quite contrary to Hillsborough's directives. But, the secretary was far too busy to pay much attention to the grants, and Dunmore soon began scheming to acquire his own land in northeastern New York, demonstrating a deviousness

---

25 Croghan to Dunmore, April 9, 1774, quoted in Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness*, 228.
26 Caley, *Dunmore*, 27ff.
that would later color his administration in Virginia. In February 1771, Dunmore arranged for fifty-one of his new American friends to petition him for 51,000 acres of land "wholly uncultivate, situate Eastward of Lake Champlain in the County of Albany," in order to "cultivate and improve the same." This was done to circumvent the king's order of the previous year that no more than 1,000 acres should be granted to any one person, an injunction no doubt issued at Hillsborough's behest in the secretary's personal war against the Walpole-Wharton syndicate. On July 6, Dunmore approved the petition of his fifty-one associates, and the provincial seal was placed on the patents two day later. Four days after that, Dunmore's collaborators formally transferred their land patents, "containing in the whole the quantity of Fifty One Thousand Acres," to the governor "for and in consideration of the sum of five shillings to each of them in hand paid." Dunmore, citing the body of the law while violating its spirit, justified the transaction later as "a fair open and strictly legal acquisition" in which the "grants of fifty-one real Grantees, in a patent of fifty-one thousand acres of land, subject to the same quitrents and conditions, as land were granted upon by order of Government." By making this purchase, Dunmore hoped to settle his 51,000 acres with immigrants from Scotland, presumably with his family established as the lords of this new domain.

28 Caley, Dunmore, 35.
29 Ibid., 36.
30 Quoted in Ibid., 36; Lossing, "Grants of Land," in AHR, II, 100ff.
32 Caley, Dunmore, 37; Goldsbrow Banyar to Johnson, July 18, 1771, in SWJP, VIII, 192.
His intentions were thwarted when unwelcome news arrived from London of an unsolicited and unwanted promotion.\textsuperscript{33} On December 11, 1770, seven weeks after Dunmore arrived in New York, Hillsborough wrote to the governor that:

\begin{quote}
\ldots his Majesty has been graciously pleased, in consequence of the death of Lord Botetourt, to nominate your Lordship to the Government of Virginia, and it is a great pleasure to me to have the honor to acquaint your Lordship with this mark of his Majesty's favour.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

Dunmore's promotion, easily solicited by virtue of the governor's blood relation and friendship to the king, must have indeed been a "great pleasure" to Hillsborough, who considered the young Scot a strong ally against the Walpole-Wharton syndicate. As already seen, the secretary had entrusted his protege to discreetly inquire about American attitudes toward Vandalia the previous summer, and Dunmore had quickly delivered. Having such an ally appointed Governor of Virginia seemed to give Hillsborough a valuable weapon with which to thwart the Walpole group, since a governor of that colony was in the best position to battle the western land claims of the speculators. Hillsborough, however, was apparently oblivious to Dunmore's own land ambitions, and it must have come as a great shock to the secretary when the governor vigorously resisted the transfer to Virginia.

When Hillsborough's letter reached Dunmore near the end of January 1771, the governor tried to keep the news quiet, at least until he had time to try and reverse the appointment.\textsuperscript{35} By mid-February, however, rumors were circulating of the impending transfer, and Dunmore openly complained to his closest associates, declaring categorically that he would never go to Virginia.\textsuperscript{36} With the prospects of his new western landed estate in New York now threatened by an unsolicited promotion, Dunmore decided to throw "his

\textsuperscript{33} Caley, \textit{Dunmore}, 78-84.

\textsuperscript{34} Hillsborough to Dunmore, December 11, 1770, in \textit{NYCD}, VIII, 260.

\textsuperscript{35} Caley, \textit{Dunmore}, 81.

\textsuperscript{36} Hugh Wallace to Johnson, February 17, 1771, in \textit{SWJP}, VII, 1145.
weight at home" and attempt to have the commission rescinded through the influence of his friends at court. In March, a packet arrived from London containing a new governor's commission along with instructions for the management of Virginia, dated February 7, 1771 and signed by King George. An unmistakable royal command was written into the instructions that Dunmore would be hard-pressed to ignore: "You are therefore to fit yourself with all convenient Speed, and to repair to Our said Colony of Virginia." Hillsborough reiterated the king's order in an accompanying letter, writing that "I am to signify to your Lordship the King's pleasure that you lose no time in repairing to the your Government of Virginia.

In a demonstration of outright insubordination, Dunmore refused to leave for Virginia, at least until he heard from his friends at court who were endeavoring to have the orders changed. By June, no word had arrived, and Dunmore began grasping for straws. He impertinently wrote Hillsborough that "I continue in the same inclination of desiring to remain in this government; I shall not remove untill I receive your lordship's answer." In his letter, Dunmore also proposed a scheme to trade places with his incoming successor, Governor William Tryon of North Carolina, who was then enroute to New York to assume the duties as that colony's new governor. In the face of this disobedience, Hillsborough reluctantly compromised, consenting to Dunmore's suggestion of a possible exchange of governors, but leaving the final decision up to Tryon. When the latter arrived in New York aboard the sloop Sukey in the early morning of July 8, Dunmore rowed out to the ship and made his pitch to Tryon. After hearing Dunmore's proposal

---

37 James Rivington to Johnson, February 25, 1771, in Ibid., 1157; Caley, Dunmore, 82.
40 Hugh Wallace to Johnson, April 8, 1771, in SWJP, VIII, 66; James Rivington to Johnson, May 6, 1771, in Ibid., 98.
42 Caley, Dunmore, 86-7.
43 Ibid., 87.
to swap commissions, Tryon demurred, and adamantly refused to go to Virginia. As far as Tryon was concerned, he had been appointed governor of New York, and governor of New York he would be. This stern refusal forced Dunmore's hand, leaving the Scot no choice but to take up his commission as governor of Virginia. After his failure to convince Tryon to take the Virginia commission, Dunmore quickly received his 51,000 acres of land from his fifty-one associates, the patents to which had been legalized with the provincial seal the very day Tryon arrived. The official transfer was conducted on July 12, and within two weeks, Dunmore was off, not to Virginia, but to the north in order to inspect his new land acquisitions.

Dunmore was away for well over a month. He first stopped at Johnson Hall, and met Sir William Johnson, who entertained the governor and provided Indian guides in order to aid in the inspection of the land acquisition. After experiencing Johnson's "many Civilities, & kindnesses," Dunmore proceeded to trek up and down the mountains of northeastern New York, which had been cleared by the Fort Stanwix treaty. His impressions are unknown, since the governor left no written account of this part of his exploratory journey. It may very well be possible that Dunmore was disappointed with his purchase, since he rarely mentioned his New York holdings after leaving the colony, and later found reason to travel the Ohio Valley to see prospective land acquisitions before venturing to formally acquire them while governor of Virginia. Whatever the case may be, Dunmore lost his New York lands after the Revolution, when Vermont successfully seized the area during a border squabble with New York.

After returning from his trip in late August, Dunmore was disappointed to find no reinstatement order from London. Apparently his "weight at home" had not been as

---

44 Ibid., 89.
45 Dunmore to Johnson, August 24, 1771, in Philadelphia Historical Society Library; quoted in Ibid., 90.
46 Caley, Dunmore, 35-7.
heavy as he thought it was. The governor then resigned himself to go to Virginia, and finally left New York for the Old Dominion on September 8.

Dunmore arrived in Williamsburg on September 25 to a rather cool reception, since his public reluctance to assume the new post and subsequent procrastination in coming to Virginia had already alienated his new public.\textsuperscript{47} In spite of the Virginians obvious apathy for their new governor, Dunmore determined to "endeavor exactly to follow the steps" of his deceased predecessor, Lord Botetourt, and promised to carefully follow Hillsborough's instructions in managing Virginia.\textsuperscript{48} In light of his recent insubordination, Dunmore's sincerity was questionable. He had used deception to acquire a land grant of an illegal size, and had defied his superior with blatant foot-dragging in accepting his new post, conduct unbecoming of a royal official in both instances, especially for a colonial governor. Consequently, Dunmore's promise to Hillsborough sounded hollow, and indeed would not be kept.

As in New York, Dunmore had barely taken office before he was confronted with the same land problem that had nagged his predecessors and superiors over the past decade. In November 1771, Colonel Donelson returned from his surveying expedition and presented the new governor with a map outlining his southern boundary line, complete with its deviation to the Kentucky River.\textsuperscript{49} While examining Donelson's survey map and listening to his account of the Kentucky lands, Dunmore forgot all about New York, and instantly became a champion of Virginia's territorial rights. On March 20, 1772, the governor wrote to Hillsborough and enthusiastically informed the latter of Donelson's line, including a crudely drawn map for the secretary's consideration. The map was misleading in its representation of the Kentucky River, which was drawn far eastward of

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 104.

\textsuperscript{48} Dunmore to Hillsborough, October 3, 1771, "Virginia, Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in the Bancroft Transcripts; Dunmore to Hillsborough, October 1771, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49} Alden, John Stuart, 285.
its true course. The river had also been mislabeled as the "Louisa River" instead of the Catawba, which was the current designation of the Kentucky in 1771. All in all, the map's inaccuracy seemed calculated to deceive a casual inspector of the true magnitude of Donelson's deal with the Cherokees.\textsuperscript{50} Dunmore likewise downplayed the size of the Cherokee cession, cheerfully reporting to his superior that the surveyors:

\textit{...conducted it [the boundary line] as nearly as possible, conformable to their orders, have only deviated from them, as your Lordship will see by the map, by continuing from the point on Holstein's river, where it is intersected by the division line of this colony and North Carolina, down that river a small distance, to a place from whence they had an access, than was any where else to be found, to the head of Louisa river; which they follow to its conflux with the Ohio...Thus, except where they cross from Holstein's to Louisa river, which being of no great distance and the country passable, they have been able to be particularly careful in marking, they have established a natural boundary, that can never be mistaken.}\textsuperscript{51}

Consequently, Dunmore strongly urged the Board of Trade to ratify Donelson's new line, claiming that it would spare Virginia much confusion and bloodshed, and considerable expense.\textsuperscript{52} Imploring his superior to act quickly, Dunmore pointed out that settlers already lived beyond the Lochaber line, and would be stranded in Cherokee territory if that boundary were allowed to stand.\textsuperscript{53} To remedy the problem, Dunmore asked Hillsborough to rescind an order sent to Governor Botetourt in July 1770 forbidding the governor and the Virginia Council from making any further western land grants until a final decision was made on the Walpole grant.\textsuperscript{54} This order had been sent when the tide began turning against Hillsborough during the latter's struggle against the Walpole-Wharton syndicate, and at roughly the same time the secretary had asked Dunmore to

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid.}


\textsuperscript{52} Alden, \textit{John Stuart}, 286.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}
inquire into American opinions of a possible new colony in the interior. As intended, the injunction had blocked any legal claim Virginia harbored past the Lochaber line, leaving the land acquired in Donelson's large cession reserved for Vandalia, if the new colony gained approval from the Crown. Dunmore, who had already given Hillsborough his candid opinion of Vandalia in his letter of November 12, 1770, apparently thought his superior might acquiesce to allowing Virginia to have the western land rather than the Walpole group at this stage of the game. If so, then the governor was sadly mistaken.

Hillsborough, who had seen enough skullduggery over the issue of Indian boundaries to satisfy any rogue, was not so easily persuaded by Dunmore's entreaties. The secretary had been disappointed by his protégé's behavior in New York, and must have suspected Dunmore's sincerity in asking for the ratification of Donelson's line, especially after the governor tactlessly mentioned in an accompanying letter that since he was now posted in a place "where there is a probability of my remaining some time," he imagined no "better occupation for my leisure hours, than applying" himself "to the settling of some of the vacant Lands, which the new boundary line now offers." Dunmore, with tongue firmly in cheek, mused that this endeavor "will be a means of my ingratiating myself very much with the people of this Colony, as it will shew, by my desire of acquiring an interest in this particular country, that my Attachment to New York did not proceed from any dislike to this." Hillsborough's suspicions over his governor's motivations were probably reinforced when Dunmore finally remarked in his private letter that he wished to place his estate "on any part which I may chuse, of the lands newly given up by the Indians." Accordingly, Hillsborough, who apparently took the time to check Donelson's map with other known charts of the Kentucky lands, saw the misplacement of the Kentucky River and balked at Dunmore's request, writing rather sharply that:

---

55 Dunmore to Hillsborough, November 12, 1770, in NYCD, VIII, 253.
57 Ibid.
The deviation in the Indian boundary line made by the commissioners who were appointed to mark it out in consequence of the treaty of the Cherokees [Lochaber], at the same time that it very much surprises, appears to me to be a matter of very great moment, and to require the most serious attention; and as that treaty was the result of the unanimous opinion of His Majesty's confidential servants, that it was expedient for the true interest of this country, that the settlements of His Majesty's subjects should be confined to the limits prescribed by that treaty, it will be my duty, before I submit my own opinion to His Majesty upon the alteration which has been made, to receive their sentiments upon this proceeding. 59

To underscore his point, Hillsborough repeated for Dunmore's sake the July 1770 order prohibiting the governor and the Virginia Council from making any land grants beyond the Alleghenies until further notice. 60 Hillsborough resigned two months later, and his successor, William Legge, 2nd Earl of Dartmouth, a prominent associate of the Walpole group, quickly reconffirmed the order after taking office, for obvious reasons. Whitehall's repeated refusals to allow Virginia's claims to the Kentucky lands lying within Donelson's deviant boundary line seemingly stopped Dunmore for the time being. 61 The governor's western land ambitions would not remain stifled for long, however, especially when Virginia's soldier-speculators began descending upon Williamsburg. These men would soon bring Dunmore's attention to a northern avenue into Kentucky, one that offered greater opportunities for an enterprising man seeking a noble estate. 62 This, of course, was the Ohio Valley.

After returning from his tour of the Ohio Valley, Washington began working toward the acquisition of more western lands. In a meeting with several of his former soldiers in March 1771 at Winchester, Washington resolved "to proceed at all hazards to surveying"

58 Ibid.
60 Alden, John Stuart, 286.
61 Ibid., 288-7; Alvord, Mississippi Valley, II, 183-4.
62 Alden, John Stuart, 286
the lands officially granted by Lord Botetourt and the Virginia Council in December 1769. He also announced his determination to petition for a "second distribution" of land under the soldier settlement provision of the Proclamation of 1763. There was some confusion as to whether provincial soldiers were included in the Proclamation, since the provision in question seemed to allow land only for regulars. However, Washington held that "the services of a Provincial Officer" were "as worthy as those of a regular one", and that the Proclamation land grants could "only be withheld from him with injustice." As such, the provincial soldiers were entitled to the same rewards as the regulars, and that the military grants under the Proclamation would be allowed one way or the other. Indeed, this popular interpretation of the soldier settlement provision had previously been suggested in Virginia as early as 1768, and soon after became accepted fact throughout the colonies. Hillsborough, who Washington believed to hold a "malignant disposition towards Americans," disagreed with this interpretation, and made his opinion known "that Provincial officers were not comprehended in that Proclamation." The royal government contradicted its colonial secretary, however, by promising to instruct the governor of West Florida to issue grants to the provincial soldiers under the Proclamation in his colony. Hence, Washington ignored Hillsborough's assessment of the soldier settlement provision, and assured his men that their claims under the Proclamation of 1763 were valid, and that he would work to secure them with the incoming governor, Lord Dunmore.

In the early spring of 1772, Washington visited Williamsburg and met Lord Dunmore for the first time. During the visit, Washington broached the subject of soldier settlement and urged the governor to make the Proclamation grant to his men since there was "no doubt of the powers of Government to issue it" and, "especially too as their claim is prior

---

63 Ibid., 184-5.
64 Washington to Thomas Lewis, February 17, 1774, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 185.
65 Alvord, Mississippi Valley, II, 184-5.
66 Washington to Thomas Lewis, February, 17, 1774, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 184.
67 Alvord, Mississippi Valley, II, 184-5.
to, and better founded, than any other, having a solemn Act of Government and the
general voice of the Country in their favor.\(^{68}\) The governor, who took an immediate
liking to the Virginia colonel, was sympathetic to the soldiers' claims, but informed
Washington that an "absolute and bona fide grant of the land" could not yet be legally
given to the soldiers. Dunmore, who was then anticipating word from Hillsborough in
response to Donelson's Line, told the Virginian that he could issue "certificates" entitling
the soldiers to their allotments if and when the boundary extension was ratified.\(^{69}\) These
certificates would be so vague and general that land could be selected in almost any
available unoccupied tract, thereby giving the soldiers the strong benefit of the doubt
when their claims were legalized.\(^{70}\) Washington, however, "did not embrace" this "very
obliging offer" since "delay at this time in the prosecution of our plan, wou'd amount to
the loss of the Land" since squatters were daily taking the "choice spots" he wanted for
himself and his soldiers.\(^{71}\) As a compromise, Dunmore permitted the soldiers to "take
such steps (at their own expence and risk) as others do, to secure their quantity agreeably
to Proclamation" in anticipation of the expected legalization of any land they may choose
in the west to satisfy their claims.\(^{72}\) Washington accepted Dunmore's certificates and left
Williamsburg with somewhat less than he had hoped for, but had at least gained
permission to openly scout in the west for more land with the governor's promise that any
land located under the Proclamation would be retroactively legalized at some time in the
near future.\(^{73}\)

Of course, both Hillsborough and Dartmouth, refused to recognize the Donelson Line
and left Dunmore legally powerless to make land grants west of the Alleghenies.

\(^{68}\) Washington to Dunmore, June 15, 1772, in Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington*, 86.


\(^{70}\) Caley, *Dunmore*, 156.


\(^{72}\) *Ibid.*, 86.

\(^{73}\) Caley, *Dunmore*, 157.
Dunmore, strongly admonished by Hillsborough in the letter of June 6 to follow his instructions and enforce the original Proclamation line, apparently arrived at the conclusion that Whitehall was hopelessly out of touch with reality in regard to the western lands problem. Accordingly, he wrote a defiant letter to Hillsborough's successor Lord Dartmouth, and defended his position on the Donelson Line, stating: "I have always strictly paid obedience to these orders, but at the same time I apprehend, they have never had the effect desired, because they have not in the least prevented, the occupying of those lands." After this appeal failed to change his new superior's mind, the frustrated governor began instituting his own brand of western land policy, quite contrary to his express instructions of the previous year.

Andrew Lewis, like Washington, appeared in Williamsburg that spring seeking to gain more western land under the Proclamation of 1763. Like his friend Washington, he began courting Dunmore's favor, but tried a different tactic, specifically by introducing the governor to the practice of land speculation. Dunmore expressed considerable interest in getting involved, and in May 1772, Lewis arranged for the governor to become a silent partner in the Loyal and Greenbriar Companies. This infusion of heavyweight political power into the two companies allowed the speculators to run roughshod over the squatters who had settled the far reaches of the colony before the Lochaber Treaty had legalized their homesteads. Furthermore, notice was given to prospective settlers that they must expect to buy lands from either veterans holding legal land patents, or from the two land companies if they expected to settle in western Virginia. To enforce the policy, Dunmore ordered the county sheriffs and justices of the peace (especially those in the newly established Fincastle County in far southwestern Virginia) to evict any settler who

---

74 Dunmore to Dartmouth, November 16, 1772, "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in the Bancroft Transcripts.
77 Ibid.
encroached onto lands claimed by either of the two companies. This renewed recognition of the land companies' rights by Dunmore and his Council resulted in a flurry of speculation activity in far western Virginia, which would haunt future settlers for the next forty years. By wielding his power at the behest of the speculators to intimidate homesteaders, for a share of the profits, Dunmore became, in the words of historian Otis Rice, the "greatest plunger of them all."

While giving Virginia's land companies new fangs, the governor also began planning the settlement of his own estate. During Washington's first visit, Dunmore had learned of the opportunities lying within Ohio Valley and beyond. Naturally, the governor's interest was piqued, and he subsequently made plans to visit the Ohio Valley via Pittsburgh during the summer of 1773 to see the lands for himself. Dunmore, who had become friendly with Washington since the two had first met, asked the colonel to accompany him on the journey to act as a guide. Washington eagerly accepted the invitation, writing: "I will, at all events, be ready by the first of July to accommodate you through any and every part of the western country which you may think proper to visit." Washington left no doubt as to the purpose of the tour when he later wrote that he could lend "every assistance...towards facilitating any Schemes your Lordship might have of procuring Lands to the Westward of us, for yourself." The colonel also took the liberty of recommending Crawford as an additional guide, writing that the surveyor:

...was a good woodsman, and well acquainted with the lands in that quarter...I am persuaded that such a person will be found necessary in an

78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Alvord, Mississippi Valley, II, 181-2; Rice, The Allegheny Frontier, 76-7.
excursion of this sort, from his superior knowledge of the country, and of the inhabitants.\textsuperscript{83}

Washington made one further suggestion:

\ldots if your Lordship chooses to have an Indian engaged, I will write to Colonel Croghan, Deputy Indian Agent, who lives near Pittsburgh, to have one provided.\textsuperscript{84}

Thus, Washington obliged Dunmore to see Croghan, who could provide the governor with the means to scout for land along the Ohio River.

Virginians were officially told that the governor was going west over "almost impassible and uninhabited mountains" to "render himself an eye and ear witness, of the indispensable necessity of granting the backlands" in order to assert Virginia's rights "on the spot" against an "aspiring and encroaching spirit of the princely Proprietor" of Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{85} There was truth in this statement since a longstanding border dispute between Virginia and Pennsylvania at the Forks of the Ohio had strained relations between the two colonies for some time. The basis of this dispute is found in the colonies' respective charters.\textsuperscript{86} As seen in the first chapter, Virginia held a strong claim to the lands 200 miles north and south of old Point Comfort, "up into the land throughout from sea to sea, west and northwest."\textsuperscript{87} Pennsylvania's vague 1681 charter specified a boundary five degrees west of, and paralleling, the Delaware River, including three

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, 28.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{85} A Virginian, in the Virginia Gazette, March 3, 1774; Also printed in Force, American Archives, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 277.

\textsuperscript{86} Caley, Dunmore, 162.

\textsuperscript{87} Koontz, "Washington on the Frontier," VMHB, XXXVI, 5, 306.
degrees of latitude, starting at the thirty-ninth parallel. Consequently, the two land grants overlapped one another in the area surrounding the Forks of the Ohio.

Geography, native inhabitation, and French occupation had prevented both colonies from pushing their claims to the disputed territory against each other until after Pontiac's Rebellion. During that last conflict, Virginia soldiers had helped raise the siege of Fort Pitt, while the Pennsylvanians had refused to contribute anything to the campaign. As such, Virginia later acted on the assumption that the Forks of the Ohio fell within her jurisdiction, not only by right of charter, but by virtue of the colony's sacrifices in the relief expedition to the fort. The Virginians' claims were strengthened by the continuing existence of the Ohio Company, which had received a substantial royal grant of 200,000 acres near Fort Pitt from the Privy Council in 1749. The Pennsylvanians protested, but the Proclamation of 1763 temporarily rendered the dispute moot since the Ohio Valley, which was really at stake, was declared off limits until further notice by the royal government. After the Treaty of Fort Stanwix moved the boundary line further west and seemingly opened the Ohio Valley to settlement, a flood of settlers from Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania entered the region, and the dispute flared anew. Pennsylvania had acted first and opened a land office near Fort Pitt. Land patents to territory disputed by the Ohio Company were granted to Pennsylvanians, and the Virginians began to retaliate against the new settlers with violence. Two years later, the Pennsylvania Assembly created Bedford County, but left its town seat, also called Bedford, east of the Alleghenies. Magistrates and peace officers appointed by Lieutenant Governor Richard Penn appeared to enforce Pennsylvania laws, and the

88 Caley, Dunmore, 162.
89 See St. Clair to Benjamin Chew, April 28, 1774, in Smith, St. Clair Papers, I, 295-6; Also Patricia Givens Johnson, Andrew Lewis of Roanoke and Greenbriar, (Southern Printing Company: Blacksburg, Va, 1980), 123-4.
91 Ibid.
Provincial Council of Pennsylvania made plans to build a courthouse and a jail in Pittsburgh in order to extend jurisdiction over the area.\(^\text{92}\)

When the magistrates, led by Captain Arthur St. Clair, attempted to levy taxes on the Virginians, a resistance movement led by Croghan and Michael Cresap, the son of the old Maryland "Suffering Trader" Thomas Cresap, organized to prevent the collection of any such revenue. Many of these Virginians went further, and "resolved to appose Everey of Pens Laws as they Called them, Except Felonious actions, at ye Risque of Life, & under the penelty of fiftey pounds, to be Recovoured or Leveyed By themselves off ye Estates of ye failure."\(^\text{93}\) Of the two ringleaders, Michael Cresap seemed to be the "prime mover" behind the operation, and was most active in spreading the "ridiculous story" that "this Province did not extend beyond the Alleghany Mountain, but that all to the westward of it was King's Land."\(^\text{94}\) To the extreme chagrin of the magistrates, Cresap's agitation took "great hold of the people, and together with Mr. Croghan's claims and surveys [had] put numbers in a very doubtful situation," and would "probably make it very difficult to carry the laws into execution."\(^\text{95}\) When General Gage made known his intentions to evacuate and raze Fort Pitt, Governor Penn literally begged the general to retain the garrison, ostensibly to guard against an Indian outbreak, but really to maintain Pennsylvania's slim grasp of authority over Pittsburgh. Gage refused, brusquely declaring that "no government can undertake to erect Forts for the advantage of Forty and Fifty People."\(^\text{96}\)

After Gage and the British regulars left Pittsburgh that winter, taking the final vestiges of royal authority with them, the Provincial Council had tried to bring order out of chaos


\(^{94}\) Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Shippen, Jr., July 18, 1772, in Ibid., 265; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Shippen, Jr., September 24, 1771 in Ibid., 260-1.

\(^{95}\) Ibid.

\(^{96}\) Gage to Penn, November 2, 1772, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st Series, IV, 457f.
by establishing a new county that encompassed all of Pennsylvania's claims in the west. On February 26, 1773, Westmoreland County was thus created. The next day, Arthur St. Clair became chief magistrate and sixteen justices of the peace were appointed to bring law and order to the new county. St. Clair presumed to include a large segment of Virginia's Augusta County within his jurisdiction, and sought to extend his authority as far as a hundred miles down the Ohio River. These actions had elicited low rumblings of resentment in Williamsburg, and gave Dunmore a publicly defensible reason to undertake a journey to Pittsburgh, since the creation of Westmoreland County conveniently coincided with his initial planning of the trip, as seen in Washington's letter to Dunmore on April 13, 1773.97

Despite the reality of the border dispute, rumors circulated among the Williamsburg elite regarding the sincerity of Dunmore's motives in traveling to Pittsburgh. Typical of this persistent gossip was Patrick Henry's assertion to Thomas Wharton that the governor's determination "to settle his family on this continent" was the real motivation behind Dunmore's trip.98 Whether Dunmore used the border dispute as an excuse to scout out his own land or to actually wave Virginia's flag at Pittsburgh, there is no doubt that the governor recognized the seriousness of the border dispute, not only for the Virginians who had settled the Forks of the Ohio, but also for the Virginia speculators who sought to acquire land in the Ohio Valley. In light of his future actions, it may very well have occurred to Dunmore that Pennsylvania was the more immediate threat to Virginia's western ambitions instead of Vandalia.

Dunmore departed for Pittsburgh on July 8. Washington was ultimately unable to accompany Dunmore because of the sudden death of his stepdaughter Martha Custis, but

97 Thomas Wharton to Thomas Walpole, May 2, 1774, in "Letters of Thomas Wharton," PMHB, XXXIII, 331; Washington to Dunmore, April 13, 1773, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 132.
the governor insisted on travelling on to Pittsburgh anyway, stopping at Crawford's home along the way. At Crawford's, the governor tarried for a few days, and no doubt heard further descriptive accounts of the Ohio Valley and the troubles at Pittsburgh, in which the surveyor "told Lord Dunmore the true state of the matter." In return for Crawford's observations and opinions, Dunmore made several promises to the surveyor. Crawford had already chosen a prime tract of land at the mouth of the Little Kanawha River. Dunmore agreed to patent the tract for his host "if I would send him a draft of the land," and if " the new government [Vandalia] did not take place before he got home." The governor also promised Crawford, "if it should be in his power," to give the Virginian a job as a surveyor for a potential new county under Virginia's jurisdiction that may be formed "west of Pennsylvania" if Vandalia for some reason collapsed.

After making his promises, Dunmore left Crawford's and traveled the final leg to Pittsburgh. Crawford did not accompany Dunmore because of a prior engagement, but sent in his stead another of Washington's former soldiers named Adam Stephen, who knew his way around the Ohio Valley as well as Crawford. Upon entering Pittsburgh on August 12, Dunmore received what could only be called a hero's welcome from the Virginians who had settled the area. Dunmore later wrote to Dartmouth that the people "flocked about me & beseeched me, not only as they were his Majesty's subjects, but likewise as they were those within the Government over which I preside, to appoint Magistrates and officers of Militia, to remove these grievous inconveniences under which

100 Crawford to Washington, November 12, 1773, in Ibid., 35; Crawford to Washington, January 10, 1774, in Ibid., 40.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
they labored." The "grievous inconveniences" the Virginians were suffering under were, of course, the laws and taxes of Pennsylvania.

Once in Pittsburgh, Dunmore quickly found Croghan, and the two discussed the border situation and the prospects for land acquisition in the Ohio Valley. Croghan informed the governor of his resistance activities against the Pennsylvanians, and also took the opportunity to ask for a Virginia patent for his 200,000 acres that had languished while the various royal and colonial authorities and speculative interests intrigued against one another for the region. With the prospects for Vandalia beginning to wane and the Pennsylvania authorities moving to fill the vacuum, Croghan probably felt this was the last avenue left to legalize his old claim, which had since been confirmed by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. The governor obliged the trader, and granted his request. Croghan then introduced Dunmore to his nephew, Connolly. Connolly had been previously informed of the governor's impending trip, possibly by Washington. Consequently, he had then asked Captain Thomas Bullitt, who was organizing a surveying expedition down the Ohio under vague authority, to secure a 2,000-acre tract of land at the so-called Falls of the Ohio, well past Donelson's Line (now the site of present day Louisville, Kentucky). After Bullitt agreed to survey his tract and had started his descent down the Ohio, Connolly had written to Washington requesting aid in procuring his military grant of 2,000 acres from the governor on the basis of the doctor's military service in Martinique during the war. Washington, who of course had not accompanied Dunmore to Pittsburgh, may very well have spoken with the governor on Connolly's behalf before the journey. He may have

103 Dunmore to Dartmouth, March 18, 1774, "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in the Bancroft Transcripts.
104 Wainwright, George Croghan, 286-7.
106 Since their first meeting in November 1770, Connolly and Washington had maintained a friendly correspondence. Apparently, Washington had come to hold the doctor in high regard since he wrote the following to James Wood, who was then undertaking to explore the possibility of locating land in West Florida on the colonel's behalf: "Doctor Connolly is curious in his observations and sensible in his
also recommended the young man as a potentially useful ally at Pittsburgh, on the basis of the doctor's keen intellect and seemingly limitless energy, as well as his extensive travels in the Northwest. Whether Washington was involved or not, Dunmore agreed to grant Connolly's claim at the specified location, as well as another 2,000 acre tract for a friend named John Campbell.107 Connolly was extremely pleased. On August 29, he wrote Washington that:

I dare not presume to give my opinions touching the Character of so considerable a Personage, but I flatter myself I shall not widely differ from your sentiments if I conclude him to be a Gentleman of benevolence & universal Charity, & not unacquainted with either Man or the World.108

107 Dunmore's Affidavit, October 25, 1782, in Connolly, "A Narrative of the Transactions, Imprisonment, and sufferings of John Connolly, an American Loyalist and Lieutenant-Colonel in His Majesty's Service," in *PMHB*, XIII, (Philadelphia, 1889), 287f. Connolly intended to lay out a town at the Falls of the Ohio and sell his 2,000 acre tract in lots of 80 feet by 240 feet for an enormous profit. In April 3, 1774, issue of the *Maryland Gazette*, he and Campbell published an advertisement which read: "The subscribers, patentees of land at the Falls of the Ohio, hereby inform the public, that they intend to lay out a town there in the most convenient place; the lots to be eighty feet front, and two hundred and forty deep, the number of lots that shall be laid off at first, will depend on the number of applications, the purchase money of each lot to be four Spanish dollars, and one dollar per annum quit rents for ever. The purchasers to build on each lot within the space of two years, from the first of next December, a loghouse not less than sixteen feet square, with a stone or brick chimney, and as in that country it will be necessary the first settlers should build compactly, the improvements must naturally join each other; it is further proposed for the conveniency of the settlers, that an out lot of ten acres, contiguous to the town, shall be laid off for each that desire the same, and that at an easy rent on a long lease. Attendance will be given by the patentees at Pittsburgh, till the middle of June next, at which time one of them will set off from thence toexecute the plan. The advantageous situation of that place, formed by nature as a temporary magazine, or repository, to receive the produce of the very extensive and fertile country on the Ohio and its branches, as well as the necessary merchandizes suitable for the inhabitants, that shall emigrate into that country, (as boats of fifty tons burthen may be navigated from New Orleans, up to the town) is sufficient to recommend it; but when it is considered how liberal, nay profuse nature has been in stocking it so abundantly, that the slightest industry may supply the most numerous family with the greatest plenty, and amazing variety, of fish, fowl, and flesh; the fertility of the soil, and facility of cultivation, fit it for producing commodities of great value with little labour; the wholesomeness of the waters, and serenity of the air, render it healthy; and that when property may be so easily acquired, we may with certainty affirm, that it will in a short time be equalled by few inland places on the American continent."

Dunmore was likewise impressed with Connolly. After getting to know the doctor and hearing many of the same accounts of the Northwest territories that Washington had heard, Dunmore decided to appoint Connolly as his western agent on the spot.\textsuperscript{109}

After meeting Croghan and Connolly, Dunmore evidently undertook to agitate Pennsylvania's war veterans.\textsuperscript{110} The governor allowed a rumor to spread that all Pennsylvania officers who had served "with the Established troops" and would seek to patent their land claims under the jurisdiction of Virginia, had only to "produce Governor Penn’s Certificate of the Commissions & Service" to receive their military grants.\textsuperscript{111} Dunmore apparently confirmed the rumor to the Pennsylvanians by publicly stating that he "would undoubtedly order Patents to all such Officers."\textsuperscript{112} The news of Dunmore's seeming generosity spread quickly, and several Pennsylvania officers, without waiting to receive Governor's Penn's certificates, commissioned a surveyor named Captain William Thompson to locate their lands near the Falls of the Ohio.\textsuperscript{113} Their patents would not be forthcoming, however, as Dunmore conveniently forgot about his "promise" when Thompson appeared in Williamsburg four months later with the surveys for the governor's approval.\textsuperscript{114} By then, Dunmore did not need the Pennsylvania veterans, since he had other plans for the extension of Virginia's jurisdiction over the Ohio Valley. Hence, the Pennsylvania officers were out of luck.

The rest of Dunmore's journey in the Ohio Valley is shrouded in obscurity. However, the governor must have traveled at least part of the way down the Ohio, possibly with Croghan, and found the land he was looking for. Upon his speedy return to "the

\textsuperscript{109} Wainwright, \textit{George Croghan}, 286-7.
\textsuperscript{110} Caley, \textit{Dunmore}, 179-180.
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{113} Caley, \textit{Dunmore}, 180.
\textsuperscript{114} Armstrong to Washington, December 24, 1773, in Hamilton, \textit{Letters to Washington}, IV, 290ff.
Williamsburg] Palace in good health" on September 8, Dunmore sent a petition to the king, declaring that he had found "considerable tracts of land still vacant and never before planted in the back parts" of Virginia, and that "the petitioner having five sons, humbly prayeth that Your Majesty will be graciously pleased to grant him a tract of one hundred thousand Acres, being twenty thousand for each of his said Sons." Dunmore further asked "that the said Grant may be free of Quit Rents, and that he have leave to locate the same together or in five different Surveys and upon such part of the said vacant Land as to the petitioner shall be most convenient." Dunmore may have been counting on his personal friendship with the king in bypassing the Board of Trade and making a direct appeal for his land. If so, then the king disappointed him by referring his request to Dartmouth and the Board of Trade for consideration. Needless to say, Dunmore did not receive his land grant.

After Dunmore returned to Williamsburg, Washington received word of Connolly's 2,000 acre grant and heard the rumors of Dunmore's approval of land grants for Pennsylvania officers. If this were true, then the governor's actions ran quite contrary to what he had told Washington in June of the previous year. The colonel still held the promissory certificates that Dunmore had given him during their first visit together. However, if the governor were now granting lands on the Ohio, those certificates would be useless since, in Washington's words, "the Officers of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Carolina &ca. &ca., [would] flock there in Shoals, and every valuable spot [would] be

---


116 Ibid., 197

117 Ibid., 205.


120 Washington to Dunmore, June 15, 1772, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 85-7.
Consequently, Washington was perplexed. Taking no chances, he quickly wrote a letter to Captain Bullitt, under cover of Crawford, asking to have 10,000 acres of his allotted Proclamation land surveyed, ideally "near the mouth of the Scioto, that is, to the western bounds of the new colony, as may be." If better lands were available, Washington made it clear that he would accept them "quite down to the Falls, or even below; meaning thereby to get richer and wider bottoms, as it is my desire to have my lands run out upon the banks of the Ohio." Crawford was to carry Washington's letter and intercept Bullitt on the Ohio, and then accompany him down the river to personally oversee Washington's land surveys.

Prior to writing Bullitt and Crawford, Washington had written to Dunmore to see if the rumors were true. In the letter, Washington had come straight to the point:

I have lately heard my Lord, that Captn. Bullet has begun to Survey lands below the Western boundary talk'd of for the New Colony on the Ohio; and that your lordship hath signified your Intention of Granting Patents for those Lands, to the Officers & Soldiers claiming under his Majesty's Proclamation of Octr. 1763. If so, then Washington wished to "receive the advice of it as a particular favor; because nothing but the apprehension of your not doing it, Induced me to apply to your Lordship for a Certificate of my Services & Right." After this unsubtle reminder to the governor

121 Washington to Crawford, September 25, 1773, in Ibid., III, 153
122 Ibid., 29-30.
123 Ibid. Andrew Lewis warned Washington not to use illegal methods to get his land surveyed, as Connolly and others were apparently attempting to do during Bullitt's Expedition. Lewis wrote, "If it ever came to be disputed, it would be illegal and void. Dr. Connolly's obtaining a patent in a way similar to what you desire, has made so great a noise that it is in everybody's mouth & in particular the lawyers who say it may be set aside any time. I would advise you by all means to strictly follow ye artifices of designing men...", Lewis to Washington, March 9, 1774, in Hamilton, Letters to Washington, IV, 349-51.
125 Ibid., 164.
126 Ibid.
of his promissory certificates, Washington posted his letter and awaited the governor's response.

That response was not long in coming. In a letter dated September 24, 1773, Dunmore replied to Washington:

I last post received yours of the 12th inst. (that is September) wherein you beg to be informed whether I propose granting patents to such officers and soldiers as claim under his Majesty's proclamation in 8ber 1763. I do not mean to grant any patents on the Western waters as I do not think I am at present impowered so to do. I did indeed tell a poor old German lieutenant who was with me, and informed me he was very poor and had ten children, that I might possibly grant him a patent contiguous to that which he had under Mr. Dinwiddie's proclamation, which, I suppose, is what may have given rise to the report you have heard.127

It is doubtful that the governor was telling Washington the full truth, since Connolly's 2,000 acres at the Falls of the Ohio were ultimately patented in December, and openly advertised in the Maryland Gazette the following spring.128 Also, William Thompson's appearance in Williamsburg on behalf of the Pennsylvania officers that same month lends support to the suspicion that Dunmore was being less than forthright with Washington.129 At any rate, Washington accepted Dunmore's explanation, but detected a weakening of the governor's position on the Virginia soldiers' Proclamation grants. Writing to John Armstrong on October 10, 1773, the Virginia colonel quoted Dunmore's reply very carefully, placing emphasis upon the governor's words think, at present, and possibly. After deconstructing the governor's letter, Washington told Armstrong that "I could scarce think he would change his opinion without giving [officers of his own government] some intimation of it, either in publick or private manner; and yet there are some words in his

127 Dunmore to Washington, September 24, 1773, quoted by Washington to John Armstrong, October 10, 1773, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 155-6; Underlined words highlighted by Washington.
128 William Preston to Washington, March 7, 1774, in Hamilton, Letters to Washington, 345-6; John Armstrong to Washington, December 24, 1773, in Ibid., 292. See also Connolly's Advertisement, April 3, 1774, Maryland Gazette; note 290.
letter (which I have marked) which seem to imply an expectation at least of doing it."\textsuperscript{130} If so, then Armstrong was advised to survey what land he could in a "united endeavor" with other officers in order to "induce government to comply with their just requisitions by fulfilling its own voluntary promises."\textsuperscript{131} Washington admitted that this was "a kind of lottery" since the "chance of the prize" may not be "worth the expense of a survey," but expressed confidence, perhaps based upon his own surreptitious activities in the Ohio Valley, that the Virginia soldiers were "at least upon a par with those who are occupying the country."\textsuperscript{132}

With Dunmore seemingly on the verge of making the soldiers' grants, Washington applied even greater pressure on the governor. The colonel's case was substantially strengthened by a Royal Order in Council that had been issued on April 7, 1773. In this decree, the Privy Council had sought to stabilize the colonies' western boundaries by prohibiting all further land grants until the royal government had time to rectify the disjointed demarcation lines created by the Fort Stanwix and Lochaber treaties, and Donelson's survey. The Council had solemnly declared:

Whereas it has been represented to his Majesty that the State and Condition of his Majesty's Colonies and Plantations in America do both in Justice and Expediency require that the Authority for granting Lands, contained in the Commissions and Instructions given to his Majesty's Governors…should be subjected to other Conditions than those at present prescribed in the said Instructions. It is hereby Ordered that…all…his Majesty's Governors. Lieutenant Governors or other Persons in Command in his Majesty's Colonies in North America who are entrusted with the

\textsuperscript{129} Armstrong to Washington, December 24, 1773, in Hamilton, \textit{Letters to Washington}, 292.
\textsuperscript{130} Washington to Armstrong, October 10, 1773, in Fitzpatrick, \textit{Writings of Washington}, III, 156.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Ibid.}
Disposal of his Majesty's lands in the said Colonies, do forebear upon Pain of his Majesty's highest Displeasure and of being immediately removed from their Offices, to issue any Warrant of Survey, or to pass any Patents for Lands in the said Colonies, or to grant any License for the Purchase by private Persons of any Lands from the Indians, without especial Directions from his Majesty for that Purpose…

One important exception was incorporated into the decree, however. The Council allowed that land could be granted under colonial authority:

...only in the Case of such Commission[ed] and non Commissioned Officers and Soldiers, who are entitled to Grants of Land in virtue of his Majesty's Royal Proclamation of the 7th October 1763, to whom such Grants are to be made and passed in the Proportions and under the Conditions prescribed in his Majesty's said Proclamation.

Washington accordingly embraced this exception and wrote again to Dunmore "on the Subject which the gentlemen conceive themselves entitled to under his Majesty's bounty of October 1763." The colonel argued that:

The exception in favor of the Officers and Soldiers, contained in his Majesty's order in Council of the 6th of April last [sic], they humbly conceive is so strong an implication of your Lordship's right to grant them these lands, as to remove every restraint you were under before; and as there are no waste Lands to be had in this Colony, but such as lay upon the Western Waters, they humbly pray for leave to survey on the river Ohio and its waters below the mouth of Scioto (the Western boundary of the New Colony, should it ever take place); apprehending that your excellency hath an undoubted right to grant Patents for them, as these Lands have ever been considered as appertaining to Virginia; warranted, as they have been

133 Order in Council prohibiting all Grants of Land until otherwise instructed, April 7, 1773, in NYCD, VIII, 357-8.
134 Ibid.
135 Washington to Dunmore, November 2, 1773, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 157-8.
informed, by the Colony, charter, and sold by the Six Nations at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768: Nor is the right thereto, it is humbly presumed, by any means hurt by the nominal Line, commonly called the Ministerial Line [established by the Treaty of Lochaber], since that transaction seems to have been considered by Government as a temporary expedient (at the instigation of the Indian Agent) to satisfy the Southern Indians, who as it is said, have disclaimed any right to the very lands in contest; no other regard having been paid to it by the ministers.\textsuperscript{136}

Getting to the heart of his argument, Washington continued:

> The Officers of Virginia Troops impressed with these sentiments, and having undoubted reason to believe that these sentiments, and having undoubted reason to believe that there is no other chance left them to obtain their lands, but on Ohio, and knowing at the same time that the Officers of Pennsylvania under a belief that these Lands do appertain to Virginia, and that patents will be granted for them have surveyed 200,000 acres, would fain hope that they may be allowed to proceed by authority to make their surveys also, any where upon the Ohio or its waters below the Scioto, humbly representing to your Lordship that a delay in this case, is, in effect, equal to a refusal, as the Country is spreading over with Emigrants, and experience has convinced all those who have had occasion to attend to the matter, that these people when once fixed are not to be dispossessed, were it politic to attempt it.\textsuperscript{137}

After this neat summarization of the Virginia soldiers' fears and frustrations, Washington concluded his eloquent plea by gently chiding Dunmore over the rumors of prospective grants for Pennsylvania officers, and for allowing Connolly to claim his Proclamation land before Virginia's veterans:

> The Officers have an entire confidence in your Lordship's disposition to accelerate their just rights; they have no other dependence, and hope to start equal with those other Officers, whose pretensions are not better founded than their own.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Ibid.} \\
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid.} \\
\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid.}
To sweeten the petition, Washington went to some personal expense and ordered "a Barrel of White thorn Berries for his Excellency the Govr" as an early Christmas gift. Either Washington's petition or the berries finally convinced Dunmore, who had only recently protested that he had no authority to make such grants, to change his mind. On December 15, 1773, the governor in Council finally ordered that the "officers and soldiers" who had served in the French and Indian War, including "those who were raised by their respective colonies," should be allowed "to locate the lands, they claimed, under the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763, wherever they should desire." Furthermore, every officer would be "allowed a distinct survey, for every thousand acres." Once the order was publicly announced, news quickly spread throughout the colony, and a veritable flood of petitions for Ohio and Kentucky land by Washington's veterans and their heirs, some as far away as New York, flowed into Williamsburg. Dunmore granted the greater part of them. Washington received his 5,000 acres, and much more from the land rights he had purchased "at trifling cost" from his lower ranking soldiers, many of whom had been "in want of a little ready money." Colonels Andrew Lewis and Adam Stephen, Captain Bullitt, and five other officers collectively received 21,940 acres in Botetourt County. Colonel William Preston received a 3,000-acre tract of bounty land on the Kentucky River, and William Christian, also a Colonel, took 3,000 acres near Connolly's tract at the Falls of the Ohio and on Salt River. These grants

139 Washington to Thomas Newton, Jr., in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 167.
140 Governor Dunmore's Order in Council, December 15, 1773, quoted in Alvord, Mississippi Valley, II, 186.
141 Ibid.
were but a relatively small percentage of the total awarded to the Virginia soldiers by Dunmore, but constituted, in Washington's words, "the Cream of the Country."\textsuperscript{146}

While wading through the overwhelming numbers of petitions for land from Virginia veterans, or those claiming to be veterans, Dunmore also assigned himself the delicate task of explaining to Dartmouth why he had acquiesced to the Virginians' demands with an arbitrary change of policy without consulting Whitehall. In so doing, the governor was armed with the knowledge that the Vandalia scheme was in trouble. That fall, hostilities had flared in Massachusetts between the colonists and the British, and word had filtered into Williamsburg and Philadelphia that final approval of the Walpole grant had been indefinitely delayed as a result. Crawford had cheered to Washington that "since the new proprietary government [had] fallen through," the western lands would "remain in the hands of Lord Dunmore."\textsuperscript{147} The governor subsequently took advantage of this development and rather bluntly informed his superior that he had "formally ascertained" the western "limit" of Virginia to be Donelson's Line, which had been run at Virginia's expense in order to clearly demarcate Cherokee land from that of the colony, all in accordance with the Treaty of Lochaber.\textsuperscript{148} Therefore, Dunmore claimed that the Donelson Line, by virtue of the Lochaber Treaty, completely superceded the Proclamation Line. As far as granting lands reserved for Vandalia, Dunmore also flatly refused to recognize the new colony, since he knew of it only by "common report," which offered no specifics in the way of boundaries.\textsuperscript{149} Furthermore, in view of the Donelson's boundary extension, "no grant can make their claim valid anywhere within the limit which has been formally ascertained and with such authority given to this Colony."\textsuperscript{150} In making this

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{146} Washington to Neville, June 16, 1794, in Hamilton, \textit{Letters to Washington}, XXXIII, 407.
  \item \textsuperscript{147} Crawford to Washington, December 29, 1773, in Butterfield, \textit{Washington-Crawford Letters}, 39.
  \item \textsuperscript{148} Dunmore to Dartmouth, June 9, 1774, in "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft Transcripts.
  \item \textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
argument, Dunmore completely ignored the fact that Donelson's Line had not been ratified by the Board of Trade, and that Hillsborough had specifically ordered him to reinstate the original Proclamation Line, an order which had been confirmed by Dartmouth upon taking office in order to protect Vandalia's integrity.

Upon learning of Dunmore's amazing piece of insubordination, Dartmouth sternly reprimanded Dunmore. The secretary informed his renegade governor in no uncertain terms that he knew about the surveys in the territory reserved for the new charter government, and strongly protested the "impropriety of laying out any lands within that Tract until His Majesty's Pleasure be finally known." \(^{151}\) Regarding the claims of provincial soldiers under the Proclamation of 1763, Dartmouth shared Hillsborough's opinion that it seemed "at least very doubtful whether provincial Officers and Soldiers are included that Proclamation." \(^{152}\) Therefore, Dunmore was forbidden to allow any further military grants or to issue patents.\(^{153}\)

Dunmore received Dartmouth's reprimand and preeminent instructions in the summer of 1774, and in the words of one of the Philadelphia speculators, "his Lordship could not help expressing much warmth [at] the receipt of those prohibitory orders, and it appeared that he was much disappointed in not being able to serve himself and some others by locating a large track." \(^{154}\) Dunmore's "warmth" was more likely over the news of the final rejection of his personal land grant in the Ohio Valley that he had requested from the king the previous fall, which may have arrived the same time as Dartmouth's letter. \(^{155}\) This would explain the remark about the governor wanting "to serve himself" with some land.

\(^{151}\) Dartmouth to Dunmore, April 6, 1774, C.O. 5/1352 1-2, (Library of Congress Transcripts).  
\(^{152}\) *Ibid.*  
\(^{153}\) Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness*, 228.  
At any rate, Dunmore neither had the time nor the inclination to dwell on Dartmouth's instructions because he was then planning to make his big move in the Ohio Valley by seizing control of Pittsburgh.
"DEEP STROKES OF MONOPOLY IN THE WEST"

Kentucky Bound

On October 30, 1772, Captain Thomas Bullitt ran an advertisement in the *Virginia* and *Pennsylvania Gazettes* announcing plans for a surveying expedition down the Ohio River to secure Kentucky lands for soldiers making claims under the Proclamation of 1763.¹ Those that wished to have their claims surveyed should meet him in Pittsburgh in the spring.² The expedition would be quite illegal under British policy, but Virginia authorities, specifically the President and Masters of the College of William and Mary, had appointed Bullitt as an official surveyor of the colony and authorized him to conduct surveys along the Ohio River.³ Presumably, Dunmore knew about the appointment despite later protestations that he had not been consulted.⁴ In response to Bullitt's proposal, some of Washington's veterans met in Fredericksburg to make arrangements for securing their surveys during the imminent expedition.⁵ The ex-soldiers either disliked or

¹ *Virginia Gazette*, October 30, 1772; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, October 30, 1772.
² Ibid.
³ Abernathy, *Western Lands*, 84. Bullitt's commission was produced at court in Botetourt County on February 10, 1773. The minutes of those proceedings state: Thomas Bullett produced a commission appointed him Surveyor of a District on the Ohio. Whereupon he entered into & acknd. Bond with John Bowman and Michael Bowyer, his security, in the penalty of five hundred pounds, conditioned as the law directs. Whereupon he took the usual oaths to his Majesty's person and Government, repeated & subscribed the test, and also took the oath of Surveyor," in Lewis Preston Summers, *Annals of Southwest Virginia 1769-1800*, (Kingsport: Kingsport Press, 1929), 174.
⁵ Abernathy, *Western Lands*, 85.
distrusted Bullitt since a veteran named Hancock Taylor was appointed to accompany the surveyor on the expedition to safeguard the Virginians' interests.\(^6\)

The idea of launching a surveying expedition into Kentucky had not originally been Bullitt's, but apparently came from one George Morgan, an associate of Connolly who had explored the Illinois country but suffered from serious financial woes stemming from Pontiac's Rebellion. Sometime during the summer of 1772, Morgan had approached Bullitt with a proposal of "joyning a company" with some "very able men" to survey Kentucky lands with the intention of acquiring a monopoly of salt springs and lead mines in that region.\(^7\) Bullitt had carefully considered Morgan's offer, and despite the serious risk of Indian attack, saw a great opportunity for personal advancement. If successful, the proposed expedition would not only leave the surveyor a substantial share in the monopoly, but would allow Bullitt to independently survey prime tracts of bounty land for himself past the mouth of the Scioto River. Washington, with whom Bullitt apparently shared a mutual distrust, would be cut completely out as the middleman.\(^8\) After deciding that the rewards outweighed the risks, Bullitt had agreed to organize the expedition. He warned Morgan, however, that complications may arise, especially, "when men [who] are engaging in weighty affairs" in the Ohio Valley might correctly interpret the surveys as "deep strokes of monopoly in the West."\(^9\) With this caveat, Bullitt had informed Morgan

\(^{6}\) Washington, for one, did not hold the surveyor in very high regard: "Bullitt is no favorite of mine, and therefore I shall say nothing more of him, than that his own opinion of himself always kept pace with what others are pleased to think of him-if anything, rather ran ahead of it." Washington to John A. Washington, March 31, 1776, in Force, *American Archives*, series 4, V, 561-562.

\(^{7}\) Thomas Bullitt to George Morgan, March 6, 1773, quoted in Abernethy, *Western Lands*, 85.

\(^{8}\) Washington, upon learning of Bullitt's expedition, also saw fit to dispatch his own agent, Crawford, to accompany the surveyor and personally look after the colonel's land surveys. Crawford's instructions were: "…you must know from him what surveys he has made, as also what entries are lodged, in order that you may steer clear of them." After giving Crawford his assignment, Washington commented: "…I know I gave him mortal offense, by interesting myself in procuring the commission I did for you." This "commission" that Washington mentions was a position as surveyor for the Ohio Company, recently left vacant by the death of Christopher Gist. Apparently, Crawford and Bullitt were rivals for the job, and Washington's intervention on behalf of the former was the source of the discontent.

\(^{9}\) Bullitt to George Morgan, March 6, 1773, quoted in Abernethy, *Western Lands*, 85.
and his new associates, that he would "be without doubt be about Fort Pitt the 20th [of] April" and "shall be glad to see one of you."\textsuperscript{10}

While Bullitt was outfitting his expedition at Fort Pitt in the spring of 1773, Connolly approached the surveyor and made arrangements to have his 2,000-acre tract surveyed near the Falls of the Ohio along with the others. After talking business with Connolly, and then with several of the Morgan's "able men," the surveyor began his journey down the Ohio. At the mouth of the Great Kanawha, he met up with Hancock, and a woodsman turned surveyor named James Douglas.\textsuperscript{11} Other "military adventurers" who joined Bullitt at this time included the soldier-surveyor James Harrod and his assistant Isaac Hite, along with James McAfee and his two brothers George and Robert from Augusta and Fincastle Counties.\textsuperscript{12} The McAfees had previously traveled up the Salt and Kentucky Rivers, making surveys all the way in accord with Donelson's Line, with the expectation that Bullitt would authenticate their work once they joined forces.\textsuperscript{13} The powerful surveyor of Fincastle County, William Preston, had sanctioned the McAfee party, most probably since Dunmore had let it be known that it was permissible for the soldiers to "take such steps (at their own expence and risk) as others do, to secure their quantity [of land] agreeably to Proclamation" pending ratification of Donelson's Line.\textsuperscript{14}

Before beginning the actual surveying, Bullitt took a solo excursion up the Scioto River to the Shawnee towns, leaving his men behind on the Ohio.\textsuperscript{15} The object of this risky mission was to secure Shawnee consent to his surveying operations and the settlement that would quickly follow.\textsuperscript{16} Within two or three days, he came upon the

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 85-6.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 86.
\textsuperscript{14} Washington to Dunmore, June 15, 1772, in Fitzpatrick, \textit{Writings of Washington}, III, 86.
\textsuperscript{15} Abernathy, \textit{Western Lands}, 86.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
primary Shawnee town of Chillicothe, and not surprisingly, the Shawnees reacted with much hostility to this intrusion, especially from a Virginian. Only the intervention of a Pennsylvania gun and rum trader named Richard Butler, who was trusted by the Indians and happened to be in Chillicothe at the time, saved Bullitt from a brutal death at the stake.\textsuperscript{17} After saving the surveyor, Butler agreed to play the dual roles of mediator and translator in the negotiations that Bullitt wanted to open with the Shawnees for the purchase of the Kentucky lands for Virginia.\textsuperscript{18} Speaking for the Shawnees was none other than Cornstalk, who had risen to become the primary chief of the tribe in the years since Pontiac's Rebellion. The negotiations were opened, and speeches were exchanged, with Butler giving Cornstalk's replies to Bullitt in written form.\textsuperscript{19} Cornstalk again reiterated the point that the Shawnees had been ignored at Fort Stanwix, and had not received any payment, either in goods or money, from the Six Nations. Hence, they did not recognize the validity of that treaty, and as far as they were concerned, Kentucky remained Shawnee territory. Regarding Bullitt's proposed surveys, Cornstalk scoffed that such activities "were designed to deprive us of the hunting of the country, as usual…the hunting we stand in need of to buy our clothing."\textsuperscript{20} After hearing Cornstalk's complaints, Bullitt intimated to the Shawnees that they would be paid (presumably by Virginia) for their lands that the Six Nations had first bargained away without their consent and proper compensation.\textsuperscript{21} In return for their permission for Virginians to survey and settle Kentucky, the Shawnees would be also allowed to hunt on the south side of the Ohio River with no molestation from the settlers. Finally, Bullitt also told Cornstalk that "great men from Virginia" would soon come to the Shawnee towns with money and goods to

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} It is unclear as to how Bullitt intended to negotiate with the Shawnees if he did not understand their language. Luckily for Bullitt, Butler was available not only save the surveyor's life, but to act as a translator during the speeches.

\textsuperscript{19} Guy Johnson to General Frederick Haldimand, August 26, 1773, in SWJP, VIII, 875-6; Abermethy, Western Lands, 86.


\textsuperscript{21} Johnson to Haldimand, August 26, 1773, in SWJP, VIII, 875-6.
complete the deal. Cornstalk and the Shawnees evidently accepted Bullitt's word, with some reluctance no doubt, since the surveyor left Chillicothe alive with the impression that he had reached a friendly understanding for the cession of Kentucky to Virginia.

After some reflection, the Shawnees seemed to develop further doubts about Bullitt's promises. Shortly after the surveyor left Chillicothe, a Shawnee delegation appeared in Pittsburgh to inform the new deputy Indian agent Alexander McKee, who had replaced Croghan, of Bullitt's visit. The Shawnees wanted to know if the Virginian's promises were sincere, and if "great men from Virginia" were actually coming to Chillicothe to rectify the injustice done to the Ohio Indians at Fort Stanwix. McKee, who knew of the expedition, was evasive, neither denying nor confirming Bullitt's authority to make such promises. However, he mentioned that the king was planning to establish a new charter government south of the Ohio River and east of the Kentucky River to the Great Kanawha on the basis of the Fort Stanwix treaty, or, in other words, in the heart of the Shawnees' Kentucky hunting grounds, without any compensation for the Ohio Indians.

The Shawnees reacted to this news with much consternation. Not surprisingly, their hunters were in a hostile mood when they left the Ohio Valley sometime in early September to range through Kentucky and southwestern Virginia. The Indians soon discovered another group of surveyors on the Ohio River. These surveyors, numbering approximately sixty men, were led by Captain William Thompson, who had been hastily commissioned by Pennsylvania veterans after hearing the rumors of possible bounty lands under Virginia's jurisdiction. Thompson's party had left Pittsburgh at the end of August,

---

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Johnson to Dartmouth, September 22, 1773, in NYCD, VIII, 395-6.
27 Abernathy, Western Lands, 85.
and had rushed to catch Bullitt before the latter's group reached the Falls of the Ohio. Somewhere between the mouth of the Kentucky River and the Falls, the Shawnees fell upon Thompson's men after dark, killing several and driving off all the pack animals. Thompson's surveyors managed to fight off the Shawnees and save most of their equipment. While considering his options after this misfortune, the Pennsylvanian determined that his men were much closer to Bullitt's group than Pittsburgh. Therefore, Thompson decided that the safest course of action appeared to be carrying on and joining forces with Bullitt, instead of turning around and fighting his way back up the Ohio. As luck would have it, Bullitt was not too far away, and Thompson's party soon reached the relative safety of the Virginian's larger party. Bullitt allowed Thompson's men to travel with his group, and the combined parties resumed their surveying activities, ultimately reaching the Falls in early October.

After attacking Thompson's party, at least some of the Shawnees followed the Kentucky River south, before turning east, and passing through Cumberland Gap. They apparently missed the large, heavily armed, and alert, Bullitt-McAfee party, since that group had already descended past the mouth of the Kentucky and was working its way toward the Falls at the time. Entering Powell's Valley, the Indians encountered a large train of settlers moving westward toward Kentucky. Leading this group was Daniel Boone. Boone had recovered from his last negative experience in "Kentucke" four years earlier, and had determined to return with his family. Leaving Yadkin, North Carolina on September 23, 1773, Boone and his family, "in company with five families more," moved through the Holston River Valley and on into Powell's Valley, where they were joined by William Bryan and forty other settlers.\(^\text{28}\) While the augmented group rested before the

next leg of the journey, Boone's eldest son James took a small company of armed men to the fort of Captain William Russell in the Clinch River Valley for provisions. After securing the supplies, the younger Boone's company began the return trip back to the main party, taking Russell's son Henry and two slaves along. In the early morning hours of October 10, a "cloud of adversity" overtook James Boone's company. The small group had camped a few miles in the rear of the larger party. While asleep, their camp was overrun in a rush by the Shawnees. The entire company was captured and tortured before being killed. The Indians then attempted to attack the elder Boone's main camp, but were discovered by alert pickets. A brief skirmish ensued, in which the settlers "defended [themselves], and repulsed the enemy." Before retreating, the Shawnees scattered the settlers' cattle, and thoroughly "discouraged the whole company." The next day, Boone took an armed party to retrieve the mutilated bodies of James and his companions. Altogether, six had been killed, and one wounded in the attack. After this "adverse fortune," Boone's group "retreated forty miles, to [Russell's] settlement on Clench River," before breaking up and returning home. Boone and his family, minus James, stayed with Russell and helped garrison the latter's fort near Castle's Woods during the winter of 1773-4. The Shawnees evidently returned to the Ohio Valley after this incident since no further attacks were reported that winter. But, tensions remained high in the backcountry for sure, and according to Dunmore, some of the more "timorous" settlers and "those that had families, began to leave their habitations” in the expectation of another Indian war.

29 William Russell's Fort was located 1 mile east of present day Castlewood, Virginia.
30 Summers, History of Southwest Virginia, 142-3.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 376.
Bullitt completed his surveys sometime in either late October or early November, and he arrived in Williamsburg in early December with the fruits of his labor. On December 10, Dunmore patented the surveys in the name of "Mr. Douglas, an assistant to Cap't Bullet who had been regularly appointed." Dunmore then found it necessary to pressure Fincastle County surveyor William Preston into endorsing the legalized patents. Preston, despite sanctioning the McAfee party, doubted the legality of the surveys made past Donelson's Line. Dunmore insisted, however, and the county surveyor reluctantly signed Bullitt's patents, formally bringing Kentucky under the jurisdiction of Fincastle County and Virginia.

Since Dunmore took such an avid interest in having Bullitt's surveys legalized, it is likely that the governor had been well aware of the nature of the expedition from the start, despite his denials to Washington to the contrary. Washington arrived at this conclusion before the expedition had returned, writing to Armstrong in October that he had finally succumbed "to the prevailing opinion that Bullet is proceeding by authority in the surveys he is now making." The colonel's supposition was strengthened soon afterward when Bullitt and his younger brother officially became two of Dunmore's western land agents within months after the governor approved their surveys.

Bullitt's visit with the Shawnees also added an element of intrigue to the affair. While parleying with Cornstalk, Bullitt had led the Indians to believe that "great men from

36 Ibid.
37 Washington to Armstrong, October 10, 1773, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, III, 156; William Johnson informed Dartmouth of Bullitt's expedition, and apparently shared Washington's opinion that the surveys were authorized: "...I find that a certain Captain Bullet with a large number of People from Virginia are gone down the Ohio beyond the limits of the proposed Government, with authority (as is said) to survey and lay out Lands there, which are to be forthwith Patented...this has a good deal alarmed the Indians who sent Six Shawanese from Sioto to Pittsburgh with a message, a copy of which is herewith enclosed." Johnson to Dartmouth, September 22, 1773, in NYCD, VIII, 395-6.
Virginia" would come and provide money and gifts to the Shawnees in payment for their lands given away by the Six Nations in the Fort Stanwix cession. "Great men" was the typical euphemism of the day for governors and other high colonial and royal officials in parleys with the Indians. That Dunmore was in Pittsburgh, within fairly reasonable traveling distance of Chillicothe, while Bullitt was making such promises is suspicious. Adding to the mystery is the governor's disappearance for several days after meeting with Croghan and Connolly. Rumors had circulated in Philadelphia that Connolly had "informed Ld Dunmore of the extreme richness of the lands which lay on both sides [of] the Ohio," and that Hillsborough and Dartmouth's "prohibitory orders," which had been sent to the governor "relative to the land on the hither side (or Vandalia)," had caused Dunmore "to turn his thoughts to the opposite shore," and attempt to "obtain by purchase or treaty from the natives a tract of territory on that side." If there is any truth at all to the rumors, then it is feasible that if Dunmore had in fact taken a brief excursion down the Ohio to look for land, he may have also attempted to travel to Chillicothe after Bullitt's preliminary introduction to meet with Cornstalk. There is no definite evidence to confirm that Dunmore was trying to strike a deal with Cornstalk, and as it happened, no meeting took place between the governor and the chief, possibly because of Shawnee anger over McKee's revelation of the plans for Vandalia.

Chapter 5

"THE VERY WORST KIND OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT"

John Connolly Seizes Pittsburgh

Following the approval of Bullitt's surveys, Dunmore turned his attention to gaining control of the Ohio Valley.\(^1\) As noted previously, the governor had heard the rumors of Vandalia's decline, and apparently decided that it was time for Virginia to seize control of the Forks of the Ohio from Pennsylvania.\(^2\) During his summer journey to Pittsburgh, settlers from Virginia had approached Dunmore and asked for the appointment of "Magistrates and officers of Militia" under his authority to "remove" the "grievous inconveniences" of Pennsylvania's laws and magistrates.\(^3\) Dunmore had considered this petition completely "reasonable" and felt that he could not "refuse complying with it."\(^4\) However, he thought that he needed to consult with his council first, and had advised the petitioners to make a pilgrimage to Williamsburg to see him after his return home.\(^5\) Before dismissing the disgruntled petitioners, Dunmore had suggested that a new county could perhaps be created, with its boundaries extending at least two miles east of Pittsburgh, up the Monongahela to the mouth of "Buffaloe Creek," and west to "Grave

---


\(^3\) Dunmore to Dartmouth, March 18, 1774, in "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft *Transcripts*.

\(^4\) *Ibid*.

\(^5\) *Ibid*.

125
Creek, below Wheaton." Accordingly, a group from Pittsburgh led by Connolly arrived in Williamsburg in December to discuss with the governor Virginia's possible assumption of jurisdiction in the region surrounding the Forks of the Ohio. The petitioners argued that "Charter limits of the Province of Pennsylvania could not justify the exercise of jurisdiction beyond the Western bounds of that government." Hence, "the magistrates of Pennsylvania [had] usurped a power of jurisdiction that was not only illegal but extremely prejudicial to the inhabitants." Therefore, the petitioners prayed that Dunmore would grant the "necessary authority to prohibit such usurpation, until his Majesty's royal pleasure was known." Dunmore, who did not need very much convincing, met with his council, and made the momentous decision to extend Virginia's jurisdiction over Pittsburgh and the Forks region. To fulfill this objective, Dunmore selected the "most respectable" of the representatives, whom he believed "very properly qualified" to act as Virginia's new law enforcement officers in Pittsburgh. Connolly was appointed to lead this "respectable" group, and received Dunmore's commission as a militia "Captain" with the grandiose title "Commandant of the Militia of Pittsburgh, and its Dependencies." Connolly's principal subordinates would include William Crawford's half brother John Stephenson, as well as Crawford's son-in-law William Harrison. Among the magistrates would be Connolly's friend John Campbell, Major Thomas Smallman, and a militiaman named John Gibson. Their official orders were to "promote order and justice among the

---

7 Connolly, "Connolly's Narrative," in *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, volume XII, number 3, (1888), 312.
10 Dunmore to Dartmouth, March 18, 1774, "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in *Bancroft Transcripts*.
people, and provide for their defense in case of danger from the Indians."\textsuperscript{14} Unofficially, they were to peacefully bring Pittsburgh under the jurisdiction of Augusta County by quietly superceding the authority of Pennsylvania's magistrates and officers, until the General Assembly could create a new county.\textsuperscript{15} With their commissions thus signed and sealed, Dunmore's men quickly returned to Pittsburgh and plotted the takeover. The date set for the coup was January 1, 1774.

Connolly acted on his orders and assumed his post, but was anything but discreet. He publicly announced his usurpation of power in Pittsburgh by issuing a proclamation:

Whereas, his Excellency John, Earl of Dunmore, Governor-in-Chief and Captain General of the Colony and Dominion of Virginia, and Vice Admiral of the same, has been pleased to nominate and appoint me Captain, Commandant of the Militia of Pittsburgh and its Dependencies, with Instructions to assure His Majesty's Subjects settled on the Western Waters, that having the greatest Regard to their Prosperity and Interest, and convinced from their repeated Memorials of the grievances of which they complain, that he purposes moving to the House of Burgesses the Necessity of erecting a new County, to include Pittsburgh, for the redress of your Complaints, and to take every other Step that may tend to afford you that Justice for which you Sollicit. In order to facilitate this desirable Circumstance, I hereby require and command all Persons in the Dependency of Pittsburgh, to assemble themselves there as a Militia on the 25\textsuperscript{th} Instant, at which Time I shall communicate other Matters for the promotion of Public Utility. Giver under my Hand, this 1\textsuperscript{st} day of January, 1774.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Dunmore to Connolly, April 25, 1774, in "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft Transcripts.

\textsuperscript{15} Dunmore to Penn, March 3, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council, X, 156-7; Proclamation of John Connolly, January 1, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, X, 141.

\textsuperscript{16} Proclamation of John Connolly, January 1, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, X, 141-2.
By the 6th, copies of this "extraordinary advertisement" appeared throughout Pittsburgh and were also "dispersed through the Country at the same Time." Connolly also spread the fiction that Dunmore had "made Application to General Haldimand for a Sergeant and 12 Men, to be sent immediately to this Place, in order to support his Authority." The Virginians in town were apparently pleased by Connolly's action, since the new commandant wrote his superior that "The Intelligence was so agreeable that every countenance expressed the highest satisfaction, and none but the interested officers shewed signs of dissatisfaction." The Pennsylvania authorities were a little more than dissatisfied, however. They were stunned. Magistrate Æneas Mackay informed Arthur St. Clair of Connolly's proclamation, and predicted that "This impudent Piece will, I am afraid, be the means of creating great Confusion and disturbance in this County, unless proper Steps will be taken to check it in Time." He further warned that "There is no doubt but all the Disaffected and Vagabonds that before evaded the Law and Justice with so much Art, will now flock in Numbers to the Captain's Standard, if not prevented in Time, the consequence of which we have just Cause to dread." Mackay also stated that Pittsburgh was in such an uproar and the loyalties of the inhabitants were so suspect, that he was "at a Loss for a Person whose fidelity could be depended upon" to regularly update Chief Magistrate St. Clair, who lived in Lingonier. As such, Mackay felt that St. Clair's immediate return to the village was "absolutely necessary at this Time." In the meantime, Mackay refused to be intimidated by Connolly, and let it be known that "the

17 Æneas Mackay to Penn, April 4, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4th Series, I, 269; Mackay to St. Clair, January 11, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, X, 140-1.
18 Ibid.
19 Connolly to Dunmore, written from "Westmoreland Gaol," January 28, 1774, "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft Transcripts.
20 Æneas Mackay to St. Clair, January 11, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, X, 140-1.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
next Court for Westmoreland would be held at Pittsburgh," as scheduled.24 One of the magistrate's subalterns informed Connolly of this, at which "the Captain replied in a Rage, Damn him if [I] would not oppose it."25 Upon hearing of Connolly's outburst, Mackay realized exactly "how determined he will be to Carry his Designs into Execution."26

St. Clair arrived in Pittsburgh soon after receiving Mackay's startling report of the chaos generated by Connolly's power grab. Once there, the chief magistrate struggled to find a way to deal with this upstart rival. He knew that he had to act before Connolly's militia muster on the 25th, but felt limited in what he could do since he could expect no instructions from Governor Penn before that date. St. Clair ultimately decided that he would have to proceed on his own authority, and seek Penn's approval later. The chief magistrate's solution for dealing with Connolly was simple. He planned to respond by apprehending the commandant sometime before the muster, and then demanding "such Security of Mr. Connolly for his good Behaviour as he will not be able to procure, and in Consequence to have him committed."27 St. Clair hesitated, however, and first sought legal advice from a respected lawyer named James Wilson before employing this dubious legal device, "to know if there is any other legal way of securing Mr. Connolly, and to desire he would suggest any other Method to preserve the Peace of the County."28 Wilson, seeing no other alternative, wrote St. Clair that the arrest would be legal. When the chief magistrate read Wilson's reply, his conscience was eased and he felt free to act decisively.

On the morning of January 25, before the muster, St. Clair and his magistrates confronted Connolly, and asked him if he were "the author of the advertisement requiring

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 St. Clair to Joseph Shippen, January 12, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council, X, 140.
28 Ibid.
the people to meet as a militia." \(^{29}\) Connolly avowed that he was. St. Clair then demanded that the commandant produce "sureties for his good behavior." \(^{30}\) Connolly flatly refused, declaring that he could not comply with the demand "in justice to myself or in honour to the Commissions both as a Civil and Military Officer held" under the authority of Lord Dunmore. \(^{31}\) St. Clair then arrested him on the spot, and had him "committed" to "Westmoreland Gaol." \(^{32}\)

St. Clair had entertained hopes that "sending [Connolly] out of the way would have put an end" to the unrest that had gripped Pittsburgh since the commandant's proclamation of three weeks earlier. As the magistrate subsequently informed governor Penn, he "was mistaken" in this belief. \(^{33}\) In place of the muster, "about eighty persons in arms assembled themselves" and paraded through the town, "making a kind of feu de joy." \(^{34}\) Connolly's men then "proceeded to the Fort [Pitt] where a cask of rum was produced on the parade, and the head knocked out," which was, as St. Clair wryly noted, "a very effectual way of recruiting." \(^{35}\) Determining that "a scene of drunkenness and confusion was likely to ensue," St. Clair assembled all his magistrates and addressed the revelers with his own proclamation, which he had the foresight to prepare before arresting Connolly. He declared, in part:

"The Proprieties of Pennsylvannia claimed the country about Pittsburgh, and the settlers quietly acquiesced in that claim; and as soon as doubts began to arise about it they took effectual pains to satisfy themselves"


\(^{30}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{31}\) Connolly to Dunmore, written in "Westmoreland Gaol," January 28, 1774, "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft Transcripts.


\(^{33}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{34}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{35}\) *Ibid.*
whether or not they were right in that claim, and actually found the country a considerable distance west of that place within that Province: And so far are they from delaying the running their boundary line, we have the best authority for saying that a petition has been a considerable time before his Majesty for this purpose...The jurisdiction of Pennsylvania has been regularly extended to Pittsburgh, and exercised there for a number of years...and you yourselves have acknowledged it, by applying for your lands in that Province. Whether that extension has been legally made or not, can be determined by the Crown alone...And it must be evident to you that Lord Dunmore, as Governor of Virginia, can have no more right to determine this matter then one of us...As his Majesty's Justices and protectors of the public peace of Pennsylvania, it is our duty to tell you your meeting is an unlawful one, and that it tends to disquiet the minds of his Majesty's liege subjects. We do in his Majesty's name require you to disperse, and retire yourselves peaceably to your respective habitations.36

Either St. Clair's appeal for calm had its intended effect or an alcohol induced drowsiness overcame the drunken parade, because the boisterous crowd soon dispersed. Toward night, however, the mob reassembled. This time, Connolly's men were in a much uglier mood. St. Clair decided that discretion was the better part of valor, and "thought it most prudent to keep out of their way."37 The rioters descended upon the jail, and roughed up Connolly's jailer. The commandant, perhaps more fearful of a real murder charge instead of a trumped "sureties" charge, used "his influence effectually to prevent the resentment of the whole body of the people for this insult upon the only Government they acknowledged."38 The riot ended, and Connolly wrote Dunmore from his cell, informing the governor of his situation and asking for nine more militia commissions since "there is three hundred men enlisted, and to be embodied on the West side of the Monongahela, and undoubtedly out of the limits" of Pennsylvania.39

36 Ibid., 268.
37 Ibid., 267.
38 Dunmore to Dartmouth, March 18, 1774, "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft Transcripts.
39 Connolly to Dunmore, January 28, 1774, in Ibid.
Whereas Connolly disdained an escape with the help of rioters, he was not above using his own charm and guile in making a jailbreak. Mackay reported to Penn that, on February 2, the commandant:

Found means to prevail with the Sheriff, and obtained his leave to visit his associates at this place [Pittsburgh], where he staid a few days, and then, instead of returning to jail, according to his promise to the Sheriff, he went up to Red Stone settlement, where, with the assistance of his friends in that quarter, he assembled about twenty armed men, who guarded him from there to or near the frontiers of Virginia.\footnote{Mckay to Penn, April 4, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 269-70.}

The sheriff, John Proctor, apparently accepted Connolly's word of honor as a gentleman that he would return before court convened in April, and allowed the commandant to leave the jail.\footnote{Thomas Smith to Joseph Shippen, April 7, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 271.} The Pennsylvanians were appalled at Proctor's serious lapse in judgment, and ordered the sheriff to "raise the posse" in order to recapture the commandant.\footnote{Thomas Smith to Joseph Shippen, April 13, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 273.} Proctor, who may or may not have been a Connolly supporter, proved "extremely backward and remiss" in this endeavor, leading one of the magistrates to comment that the sheriff's conduct "was a little mysterious."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} Therefore, Connolly made a clean escape. While at Red Stone, a stronghold of Virginians led by the Marylander Michael Cresap, the commandant held "two or three musters" of the militia.\footnote{Joseph Spear to St. Clair, February 23, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 269.} He also procured a petition "signed by 587 of the Inhabitants" that explained their reasons for preferring the "mild, easy and equitable government" of Virginia to the "expensive administration" of Pennsylvania.\footnote{Accompanying Petition, Dunmore to Dartmouth, March 18, 1774, "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft Transcripts; Force, American Archives, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 275-6.} The petition further outlined a long list of grievances that the settlers supposedly held against Pennsylvania, which among others, included oppressive
administration, dishonest lawyers, heavy taxation, and poor defense against the Indians. After securing the petition, Connolly and his twenty bodyguards rode to Staunton, where Dunmore arranged for the exiled commandant to sworn in as a "Justice of the Peace for Augusta County," which of course now encompassed the area surrounding the Forks of the Ohio, at least in the minds of Virginians. Connolly then plotted his return to Pittsburgh.

While the Pennsylvania magistrates and Connolly were squaring off in Pittsburgh, Governors Penn and Dunmore began waging a war of words from their respective capitals in Philadelphia and Williamsburg. Penn had received St. Clair's urgent dispatch and call for instructions on January 20. The governor accordingly informed the chief magistrate that he would "do right in apprehending [Connolly] and some of his principal Partizans" and "holding them to reasonable Security for their appearance at the next Sessions, to answer for their Conduct." This letter arrived after St. Clair had arrested Connolly, but confirmed the chief magistrate's action. Penn, after learning that "Mr. Connolly has most certainly a commission from Lord Dunmore," then took the matter up with Virginia's governor. He wrote Dunmore in a polite, even friendly tone:

A few Days ago I received by Express, from the Western Frontiers of this Province, the enclosed Copy of an Advertisement, lately set up at Pittsburgh and divers other Places in that Quarter of the Country, by one John Connolly, who has taken upon him as Captain Commandant of the Militia at Pittsburgh, and its dependencies, by virtue of your Lordship's Commission, as he says, to command the People to meet him there as a militia on the 25th Instant, and to exercise Jurisdiction over them, as Settlers under your Government within the Dominion of Virginia. A Step

46 Ibid.
47 Crawford to Penn, April 8, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council, X, 165.
48 Penn to St. Clair, January 20, 1774, in Ibid., 145.
so sudden and unexpected could not but be matter of great Surprise to me, as well as very alarming to the Inhabitants of those parts, who have taken up, improved, and hitherto peaceably enjoyed their Lands under Grants from the Proprietaries of this Province.  

Penn, supposing to be "too well acquainted with your Lordship's Character, to admit the least idea that you would countenance a measure injurious to the Rights of the Proprietaries of Pennsylvania, or which might have a tendency to raise Disturbances within their Province," proceeded to carefully recite the surveys Pennsylvania had taken to ascertain its Western Limit in order to "satisfy you that [Pittsburgh] is, beyond doubt, within this Province."  

To further support his assertion, Penn enclosed a map of the specified surveys to convince Dunmore of the legitimacy of Pennsylvania's jurisdiction over Pittsburgh. If Dunmore still "entertained any doubt respecting this matter," then Penn hoped he would at least avoid "those mischiefs which must naturally arise in Cases of clashing and disputed Jurisdiction," specifically the appointment of officers and the exercise of jurisdiction in the disputed region. Thereby, the people "would remain in the quiet and undisturbed Possession of the Lands they hold under this Province," until "some temporary Line of jurisdiction" could "be agreed on by Commissioners, to be appointed by both Governments, to confer on this Subject. Or until the "affair" could "be settled by His Majesty in Council."  

Dunmore replied to Penn with a snide, arrogant letter. The Virginia governor informed his counterpart that he had in fact, with the advice of his council, appointed "certain officers" in a "remote District of the County of Augusta, in this Colony, which includes Pittsburgh," and that Pennsylvania's surveys were no good since they "were made

---

49 St. Clair to Penn, February 2, 1774, in William Henry Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 2 volumes, (Cincinnati: Robert Clark, 1882), I, 282; Penn to Dunmore, January 31, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council, X, 149-50.  
50 Penn to Dunmore, January 31, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council, X, 149-50.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.
without the participation of this Government, or the Assistance of any Person on the Part of the Crown."53 As far as his decision to extend Virginia's jurisdiction over Pittsburgh, it "ought not to have been either unexpected or surprising, as you are pleased to say it...when it is well known that formal Declarations were made by the Assembly of Pennsylvania, that Pittsburgh was not within the jurisdiction of that Government at the time that Requisitions were made to them for the Defence of that Place, the burden of which, on that Account, fell on this Government.54 This comment was in reference to Pennsylvania's refusal to contribute to the relief of the besieged Fort Pitt in 1763 at the height of Pontiac's Rebellion. Dunmore also told Penn that he would not "either revoke the Commissions and Appointments already made, or defer the appointing of other such Officers as I may find necessary for the good Government of that Part of the Country, which we cannot but consider to be within the Dominion of Virginia, until His Majesty shall declare the contrary."55 Furthermore, Dunmore trusted his officers in Pittsburgh, and could see no reason for "disturbances" in the region, unless they were occasioned "by the violent proceedings of your Officers, in which Opinion I am justified by what has already taken place, in the irregular Commitment of Mr. John Connolly, for acting under my Authority.56 As a final slap to the Pennsylvanians, Dunmore insisted "upon the most ample reparation being made for so great an Insult on the authority of His Majesty's Government of Virginia, and no less can possibly be admitted than the dismissal of the Clerk (St. Clair) of Westmoreland, who had the Audacity, without any authority, to commit a Magistrate acting in the legal discharge of his Trust, unless he (St. Clair) can prevail, by proper Submission, on Mr. Connolly to demand his Pardon of me."57

53 Dunmore to Penn, March 3, 1774, in Ibid., 156-7.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
Of course, Governor Penn had no intention of dismissing St. Clair or forcing him to apologize to Connolly. The governor did respond with a lengthy, sneering letter of his own in which he endeavored to "set [Dunmore] right in some matters which [he did] not seem to be fully informed of." This retaliatory blast became typical in a series of acrimonious exchanges between the two governors that lasted well into the summer. Dunmore attempted to bring Dartmouth into the battle on his side by accusing Penn of being power hungry, and declaring that any right Pennsylvanians claimed to Fort Pitt had "become derelict" since they had "declined doing anything to resist the invasions of the French on the Ohio" and to aid the British garrison at Fort Pitt during Pontiac's Rebellion. Surprisingly, Dartmouth seemed to accept Dunmore's misleading assessment of the situation. The secretary informed Dunmore that:

…the Steps you have taken to introduce Order & Government amongst those settlers were not only proper in themselves but necessary to prevent an extension of Claims on the part of Pensilvania in prejudice of the King's Rights, and it is His Majesty's pleasure that you should continue to exert & to exercise the Authority of the Government of Virginia in that District until the King's farther Pleasure shall be known.

Thus bolstered by his superior, Dunmore carried on with his verbal war with Governor Penn over which colony controlled Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania or Virginia.

Connolly returned to Pittsburgh with a vengeance on March 28. In his company were several "men without character and without fortune," thugs in short, to guard the commandant's person. After his arrival, he learned of an inflammatory proclamation that

---

58 Penn to Dunmore, March 31, 1774, in Ibid., 158-62.
59 Dunmore to Dartmouth, March 18, 1774, in "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft Transcripts.
60 Dartmouth to Dunmore, June 1, 1774, in C.O. 5/1352, 93ff, (Library of Congress Transcripts). See also Dartmouth to Penn, August 26, 1774, in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 787-8; The secretary ordered Penn to "desist from issuing any orders for extending the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania beyond those places where it has been hitherto usually exercised" since "such a partial extension of jurisdiction may have the effect to disturb the peace of the King's subjects settled on the frontiers of both Provinces, and may occasion violence and bloodshed."
Penn had issued that banned "tumultuous" gatherings of over twelve men, who, "in the space of an hour" after being told disperse, would be arrested, judged guilty of a felony, and as punishment, suffer "death without benefit of clergy."\textsuperscript{61} Connolly, carrying 12 blank officers' commissions from Dunmore (three more than he had asked for), openly met with his supporters at the ruins of Fort Pitt and updated their orders on March 30.\textsuperscript{62} Sheriff Proctor and the magistrates Devereux Smith, Andrew McFarlane, and Æneas Mackay heard about the meeting and "repaired to the Fort in order to discover the Doctor's intentions."\textsuperscript{63} They were determined to "read them the Riot Act" if Connolly and his men were "anywise tumultuously disposed."\textsuperscript{64} The Pennsylvanians found "about twenty odd men, some with and some without arms," and Connolly bearing two letters from Dunmore, which were then obligingly read aloud for the benefit of the sheriff and the magistrates.\textsuperscript{65} In the first letter, Dunmore:

\begin{quote}
…greatly applauded the Doctor's conduct, when taken by the Sheriff, for not giving bail, and commanded him to persevere in the prosecution of the plan he begun on, maintaining the possession of Fort Pitt and its dependencies, and to put the militia and other Virginia laws in force, concluding with a promise of being powerfully supported by his Lordship.\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}

The second letter was a duplicate of that sent to Governor Penn, which sneered at Pennsylvania's claims to Pittsburgh. After Connolly finished reading both of Dunmore's letters to the Pennsylvanians, he "turned on his heel" and told them that "he would be glad to speak to [them] in a bar room just at hand."\textsuperscript{67} Before stalking off, he stated that

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{61} Penn's Proclamation, January 22, 1774, in C.O. 5/1353, (Library of Congress Transcripts).
\textsuperscript{62} Mackay to Penn, April 4, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 269-70; Thomas Smith to Joseph Shippen, April 7, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 271-2.
\textsuperscript{63} Mackay to Penn, April 4, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 269-70.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{flushright}
"although he, in obedience to Lord Dunmore's positive orders, had assembled these men, in order to hear the aforesaid letters read," he had "no intention to take any step contrary to the established rules of law at this place, until after the court."\textsuperscript{68} After which, he would then "deliver himself up, and abide by the judgment of the same, and requested of us to observe the like pacific measures in the mean time."\textsuperscript{69} The Pennsylvanians replied that they "were adverse to violent proceedings, unless forced to it in [their] own defence," but expected that "he, the Doctor, did not mean we should desist from exercising the duty of [their] station."\textsuperscript{70} Connolly told them that he did not, and the Pennsylvanians prudently left the fort, completely convinced that the commandant, despite his clam demeanor, was "determined to carry his point, or lose his life in the attempt."\textsuperscript{71}

After his encounter with the sheriff and the magistrates, Connolly took possession of Fort Pitt and began restoring the structure. The fort almost immediately became a visible symbol of Virginia power, and its reconstruction coupled with promotions to "civil or military employments" or "promises of grants of land on easy terms" brought Connolly nearly two hundred recruits for his militia in only a few days. Connolly also spread some more rumors, specifically that "the Colonel of militia of Augusta County [Charles Lewis] is under orders to be in readiness to march to this place on the shortest notice."\textsuperscript{72} The effect on the Virginia partisans was electric, and as Mackay dourly noted, "the giddy headed mob are so infatuated as to suffer themselves to be carried away by these insinuating delusions."\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
A series of incidents occurred the day after the meeting that boded ill for any peaceful coexistence between Connolly and the Pennsylvanians. Trouble began when Sheriff Proctor served a writ on one of Connolly's militia lieutenants, and the commandant retaliated by having the sheriff taken by a King's warrant, holding him "in custody for some little time." Formidable "parties of armed men" under Connolly's command soon roamed the streets of the village and engaged "in constant pursuit of [the] Deputy Sheriff and [his] Constables," making it impossible for the magistrates to carry out their business. A deputy sheriff from Augusta County later appeared with "writs in his hands against Captain St. Clair and the sheriff, for the arrest and confinement of Mr. Connolly." Connolly's thugs also began harassing Mackay, who, in St. Clair's absence, was acting leader of the Pennsylvania faction. While pursuing the constables, a "perjured villain" turned militiaman named Philip Reily "grossly insulted" Mackay by "shaking a stick" at the magistrate's nose. One of the hiding constables emerged long enough to arrest and confine Reily to jail for this offense. The rest of the Reily's armed party heard of the arrest, and "immediately came to Mackay's house and proceeded to the most violent outrages." Mrs. Mackay was "wounded in the arm with a cutlass," and the magistrates, and "those who came to their assistance, were treated with much abuse." The prisoner was subsequently rescued from jail while Mackay's house was ransacked. As a result of

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
77 Mackay to Penn, June 14, 1774, in Force, *American Archives*, 4th Series, I, 471.
78 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
the confrontations, the village degenerated into a "scene of anarchy and confusion." It would get worse.\textsuperscript{82}

On Wednesday April 6, Connolly kept his "word of honour" to Proctor and appeared in court to answer the charges against him.\textsuperscript{83} The appearance was not at all what the magistrates had in mind when they had first arrested the commandant on January 24 though. At the head of a small army numbering between one hundred fifty and one hundred eighty men, all on horseback "with colours flying," Connolly rode down the main street of Pittsburgh toward the courthouse.\textsuperscript{84} His men were all heavily armed, and their officers had "their swords drawn," ready for action. One observer noted that "amongst all those who assembled there was not one single man of property," and that "the greatest part of them were such as obliged to hide themselves from their creditors, or such as under the necessity of taking shelter in this part of the country to escape the punishment due their crimes."\textsuperscript{85} The magistrates had already heard that Connolly "was mustering a large party in order to prevent the court from sitting."\textsuperscript{86} Accordingly, they had ordered the Sheriff "to raise as many men as he could collect, to prevent [the magistrates] from being insulted by a lawless set of men acting under the colour of authority."\textsuperscript{87} Only a few "ill-armed" citizens could be found who would be willing to resist Connolly's men, and the magistrates faced the prospects of a "very disagreeable situation."\textsuperscript{88} It was close to noon

\textsuperscript{82} Mackay to Penn, April 4, 1774, in Force, \textit{American Archives}, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 270-1.
\textsuperscript{83} Thomas Smith to Joseph Shippen, April 7, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 271.
\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid.}; Deposition of Henry Read, relative to the Disturbances made in Westmoreland County by the Virginians, April 7, 1774, in \textit{Minutes of the Provincial Council}, X, 168.
\textsuperscript{85} Thomas Smith to Joseph Shippen, April 7, 1774, in Force, \textit{American Archives}, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 272.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ibid.}, 271.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibid.}
and the afternoon recess was at hand, so the magistrates "thought it prudent to adjourn the court" in hopes that Connolly's "lawless desperate banditti" would disperse.\textsuperscript{89}

When Connolly and his army arrived and found the courtroom deserted, the commandant placed sentinels at the courthouse door and sent a message "that he would wait on the Magistrates and communicate the reasons of his appearance."\textsuperscript{90} In the meantime, he and his men proceeded to terrorize any Pennsylvanians they found in the immediate vicinity of the courthouse. Coming across a store run by magistrate Joseph Spear, Connolly spied Spear's clerk tying up skins at the front door. Connolly then ordered Reily, who apparently had become the commandant's sheriff, to seize the clerk and take control of the store, which was fully stocked with "a large Quantity of Goods and Skins."\textsuperscript{91} The clerk "requested [that] he might have liberty to lock up the Store" before he was taken away.\textsuperscript{92} As the hapless clerk turned without thinking to "go towards the Store Door," Connolly seized him "by the Breast," and bellowed, "let the Skins and Store go to the Devil."\textsuperscript{93} Now in a rage, Connolly also told the clerk that if his "Master were here, [he] would serve him in the same manner."\textsuperscript{94} The clerk and several other Pennsylvanians were led away under armed guard to Fort Pitt, while Connolly and some of his men indulged themselves with some "Toddy" they pulled out of a tavern next to the store.

The magistrates, upon learning of Connolly's seizure of the courthouse, reconvened court after the emergency noontime recess in the house of a Mr. Hanna. They then sent word to Connolly that they would hear him there. Connolly soon appeared, and

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 271-2.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} Deposition of Henry Read, relative to the Disturbances made in Westmoreland County by the Virginians, April 7, 1774, in \textit{Minutes of the Provincial Council}, X, 168.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
announced that he had a statement he wanted the magistrates to hear. The commandant then pulled out a written speech and began reading:

    I am come here to be Occasion of no Disturbances, but to prevent them. As I am countenanced by Government, whatever you may say or conceive, some of the Justices of this Bench are the cause of this Appearance, and not me. I have done this to prevent myself from being illegally taken to Philadelphia. My orders from the Government of Virginia not being explicit, but claiming the Country about Pittsburgh, I have raised the Militia to support the Civil Authority of that Colony vested in me.

Connolly continued:

    I am come here to free myself from a Promise made to Captain Proctor, but have not conceived myself amenable to this Court, by any Authority from Pennsylvania, upon which Account I cannot apprehend that you have any Right to remain here as Justices of the Peace constituting a Court under that Province; but in order to prevent Confusion, I agree that you may continue to act in that capacity, in all such Matters as may be submitted to your determination by the acquiescence of the People, until I may have Instructions to the Contrary from Virginia, or until His Majesty's Pleasure shall be farther known on this Subject.  

He also reread Dunmore's insulting letter to Penn before demanding a written reply from the magistrates to his "modest address and proposals." The harried Pennsylvanians agreed to consider Connolly's speech and then begged leave to privately consult among themselves in drafting a response. Connolly agreed and returned to the courthouse to await their answer.

The magistrates "soon agreed on the terms of the answer" which exhibited "firmness and moderation," and yet produced no "undue concessions." Also, the carefully crafted

95 Dr. Connolly's Address to the Magistrates of Westmoreland County, April 6, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council, X, 167.
96 Thomas Smith to Joseph Shippen, April 13, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4th Series, I, 273.
97 Thomas Smith to Joseph Shippen, April 7, 1774, in Ibid., 272.
reply did not attend "with the most fatal consequences" since the magistrates firmly believed that the "greatest part" of Connolly's men "were wishing for some colourable reason to quarrel." With their response thus completed, the magistrates then "purposed to deliver the answer in the courthouse," but upon arrival, "were refused admittance" by the sentries. Connolly came out, and a magistrate named George Wilson formally delivered the address. The magistrates declared that:

The Jurisdiction of the Court and officers of the County of Westmoreland rests on the legislative Authority of the Province of Pennsylvania, confirmed by His Majesty in Council. That Jurisdiction has been regularly exercised, and the Court and Officers will continue to exercise it in the same regular manner. It is far from their Intention to occasion or foment Disturbances, and they apprehend that no such Intentions can with Propriety be inferred from any part of their conduct, on the Contrary, they wish and will do all in their Power to preserve the public Tranquility…

By giving such a reply in the face of such coercion, the Pennsylvanians demonstrated admirable courage. They fully expected a violent reaction from the commandant, but were completely surprised when Connolly made no comment and merely handed them copies of his address in exchange for theirs. The magistrates were then allowed to depart "more peaceably than might have been expected."

Connolly's deceptive calmness at the reception of the magistrates' reply belied his anger over their defiance. The very next evening, Connolly issued King's warrants against the three leading magistrates, Æneas Mackay, Devereux Smith, and Andrew McFarland for their participation in drafting the written answer he had requested. Connolly's sheriff Reily immediately took the three men into custody and remanded them into the well-used

98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Answer of the Magistrates of Westmoreland County to the foregoing Address of Dr. Connolly, April 6, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council, X, 167-8.
101 Smith to Shippen, April 7, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4th Series, I, 272.
jail. Connolly, who must have taken delight in the reversal of roles he had facilitated, offered to release them "on condition of giving Bail to take [their] trial at Staunton Court in Virginia." The three magistrates refused, and were then "hurried away like criminals to the jail" of Augusta County, "exposed to the insults of the rabble who [were] sent as their guard" the entire way. With the leaders of the Pennsylvania faction jained, exiled, or bullied into submission, Connolly now had tight control of Pittsburgh with no one to challenge him. Governor Penn was powerless to act since Pennsylvania lacked "the Power of raising a Militia," while Virginia had some 60,000 ready militiamen, at least in theory. Consequently, Pittsburgh came under virtual martial law administered by Connolly and enforced by his "banditti."

Connolly's regime was brutal. Personal property was destroyed, livestock was wantonly slaughtered, houses were arbitrarily raided and searched, and Pennsylvanians were routinely beaten and robbed. One inhabitant of the village lamented in a letter to Philadelphia that Connolly's regime amounted to nothing more than the "very worst kind of military government," and called Virginia's government as one of the "most despotic on earth." Before the summer was over, conditions in Pittsburgh would get worse, especially after Connolly turned his attention to the so-called "dependencies" of the village, which included the lands lying close to the Indian towns further down the Ohio River.

While Connolly was basking in his megalomania in Pittsburgh, Æneas Mackay was in Williamsburg appealing to Dunmore for the release of his two associate magistrates Smith

---

102 Devereux Smith to Penn, April 9, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council, X, 170.
103 Thomas Smith to Joseph Shippen, April 13, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4th Series, I, 273.
104 Penn to Crawford, April 22, 1774, in Minutes of the Provincial Council, X, 171-2; Dunmore to Dartmouth, March 8, 1774, "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft Transcripts.
106 Extract's of Letters received from Philadelphia, June 24, 1774, in Ibid., 449-50.
and McFarland, and for relief from Connolly's reign of terror. Mackay had found his own means "to procure leave" after only a day's journey out of Pittsburgh, and had ridden hard for six days "in order to lay Connolly and his militia's conduct before my Lord Dunmore in as true and clear a light as we had experienced from their tyranny and oppression."\textsuperscript{107} Dunmore met the Pennsylvanian, and listened to his story "to an end," before informing the magistrate that "Connolly was authorized by him, as Governor of Virginia to prosecute the claim of that Colony to Pittsburgh and its dependencies."\textsuperscript{108} As for the taking of prisoners, Dunmore informed Mackay that Connolly "only imitated the Pennsylvania officers, in respect to Connolly's imprisonment by them."\textsuperscript{109} The meeting lasted for over an hour, and the governor and the magistrate spoke their "minds very free to each other."\textsuperscript{110} Dumore dismissed the Pennsylvanian, but agreed to release Smith and McFarland from the Augusta County jail, sending a letter to that effect by way of Mackay on the latter's return trip a week later. The governor also slipped an ominous sounding proclamation into the letter packet for the sheriff's perusal and transmittal to Connolly. The proclamation again reiterated Virginia's jurisdiction over Pittsburgh, and authorized Dunmore's appointed officers to "repel any insult whatever."\textsuperscript{111} The militia was also

\textsuperscript{107} Mackay to Penn, May 5, 1774, in Force, \textit{American Archives}, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 282-3.
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{111} Lord Dunmore's Proclamation, April 25, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 283. The full text reads: Wheresas, I have reason to apprehend that the Government of Pennsylvania, in prosecution of their claim to Pittsburgh and its dependencies, will endeavour to obstruct his Majesty's Government thereof, under my administration, by illegal and unwarrantable commitments of the officers I have appointed for that purpose, and that that settlement is in danger of annoyance from the Indians also; and it being necessary to support the dignity of his Majesty's Government, and protect his subjects in the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of their rights, I have therefore, thought proper, by and with the advice and consent of his Majesty's Council, by this Proclamation in his Majesty's name, to order and require the officers of the militia in that district, to embody a sufficient number of men to repel any insult whatever; and all his Majesty's liege subjects within this Colony, are hereby strictly required to be aiding and assisting therein, as they shall answer the contrary at their peril. And I do further enjoin and require the several inhabitants of the territory aforesaid, to pay his Majesty's quit rents, and all public dues, to such officers as are, or shall be appointed to collect the same, within this Dominion, until his Majesty's pleasure therein shall be known. Given under my hand, and the seal of the Colony, at Williamsburg, this 25\textsuperscript{th} day of April, 1774, in the fourteenth year of his Majesty's reign. Dunmore. GOD SAVE THE KING.
authorized to protect the village from any "annoyance from the Indians," presumably from further raids on settlers and surveying parties. Furthermore, the inhabitants of Pittsburgh were "strictly required to be aiding and assisting therein, as they shall answer the contrary at their peril." These fierce words seemed to leave no doubt that Dunmore stood firmly behind Connolly's actions.

Mackay's account of the commandant's behavior in Pittsburgh must have disturbed the governor, however. Despite his firm handling of the magistrate and the apparent harshness of the proclamation, Dunmore saw fit to include in the packet a long, private letter to Connolly ordering his western agent to temper his activities in Pittsburgh. Dunmore began his letter with a mild criticism, softened by an understanding that the Pennsylvanians had arrested the commandant first in the affair. In light of the "violent example of aggression" demonstrated by St. Clair and his magistrates, and Governor Penn's approval of their actions, he wrote, "I own though perhaps your conduct be not in this instance strictly justifiable, I cannot wholly condemn."

Dunmore began to sharpen his words as he continued, however, perhaps revealing anger over a situation that was beginning to get out of control. He continued, "At the same time I cannot forebear to let you know that I very much disapprove of the length to which you suffered your intemperate heat to carry you" in seizing the Pennsylvania magistrates…

…without sufficiently justifiable cause, other than retaliation, which has more the appearance of a reprisal in war than the act of a Magistrate who is ill qualified for the trust reposed in him unless he be dispassionate and prudent, and which your behaviour in the beginning of this affair gave me reason to believe you were; but the deviation which in this instance you have shown, makes me think it necessary to remind you that you cannot hope for the protection of this government longer than you adhere, in the

112 Ibid.
113 Dunmore to Connolly, April 25, 1774, in "Virginia: Official Correspondence, 1768-1776," in Bancroft Transcripts.
execution of the powers which you have been invested with, to the strict rules of law and justice; and the more the Proprietary Governor of Pennsylvania prevents, by his imperious declarations of his extravagant pretensions, a possibility of our settling any limits with him, the more cautious you and the other Magistrates, appointed by this Government are required to be of disturbing the Peace of the Country you live in, the intent of your appointment having been to prevent the irregularities to which a country is but too subject, where the boundaries are not well ascertained. And therefore, to remove all just ground of complaint from the Proprietary Governor, I do advise you to compromise in the best manner you are able the commitment which you have rashly made of the three Pennsylvania Magistrates.114

Dunmore then informed his wayward agent that he had already taken the first steps in reestablishing peace with the Pennsylvania authorities by ordering the sheriff of Augusta County to release the three magistrates. The governor then proceeded to tell Connolly what he wanted done in Pittsburgh and how to do it. Dunmore continued:

I must inform you that it is the sense thereof that no process be suffered to be served by the officers under the Proprietary Governor, on the Inhabitants of Fort Pitt or district thereof understood to be within the Government of Virginia and County of Augusta; that no levies be suffered to be raised by the said officers on the said people, or generally any act of government suffered to be exercised by authority of the Proprietary Govenor, within the aforesaid district; and should, notwithstanding, any attempt of this kind be made, that then the persons so attempting be committed, but peaceably and without tumult and disorder, to prison, there to be proceeded against according to law unless they find sufficient security for their good behaviour for the future.115

In short, Dunmore wanted Pennsylvania jurisdiction to be destroyed through legal arrests, without resorting to any violence, trumped up charges, or terrorism against the inhabitants of Pittsburgh, in order to remove any cause for serious complaint by Governor Penn. More importantly, the Virginia governor did not want Connolly and his men to create

114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. Section underlined by author for emphasis.
such violent disturbances that would attract Dartmouth's scrutiny to their activities. Therefore:

…I think it necessary to repeat that no steps be taken by us can be intended to countenance, in the most distant respect, any irregularities, tumults, or disorders or to give encouragement to those people of which there are always too many, who on such occasions only support one government because they have rendered themselves obnoxious to the other.\textsuperscript{116}

With this final admonition, Dunmore enclosed his letter in the packet along with the release order for the three magistrates and his proclamation for Mackay to deliver to the sheriff of Augusta County, who in turn would forward the packet along to Connolly.

As Dunmore sealed up his packet and sent Mackay on his way back to the Ohio Valley, he did not know that a several violent incidents had already occurred that would result in anything but peace and order in the "western waters" of Virginia for the rest of the year. The violence had not been between Virginians and Pennsylvanians, but between Virginians and the Indians, and as before, surveyors and settlers, as well as Connolly's activities in Pittsburgh, were the catalysts behind the troubles.

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Ibid.}
Chapter 6

"AN INDIAN WAR WAS PART OF THE VIRGINIA PLAN"

Hostilities Commence in the Ohio Valley

The western waters of Virginia and Kentucky had been relatively quiet throughout the winter of 1773-74. Since the attacks of the previous autumn, the Shawnees had been content to remain at peace, but the Indians continued to warily watch the Ohio River and the hunting grounds to the south for any further surveying or settlement activity. In early April, an incident occurred which boded ill for a peaceful summer. Three independent surveyors named Thomas Glen, Lawrence Darnell, and William Nash, along with six assistants, appeared on the Ohio well past Donelson's Line with the intention of surveying land along the Salt River for several prominent Virginia speculators. The Shawnees intercepted the party and ordered the white men all ashore. The outgunned surveyors complied, and the Indians took them prisoner. For three harrowing days, the angry Shawnees "held a Counsel over them" to decide their fate. The Shawnees were apparently in a charitable mood that week since they only "took everything [the surveyors] had" and then "sent them off" with a fearsome threat. From that point on, the Shawnees declared, they would "kill all the Virginians they could find on the River & rob & whip the Pennsylvanians." After the surveyors were released, a delegation Shawnee chiefs led by Cornstalk appeared in Pittsburgh to confer with McKee. Upon arrival, the chiefs were instantly

---
1 John Floyd to William Preston, April 26, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 7; DSS, 3QQ19;
2 Ibid.
"alarmed at seeing parties of armed men patrolling through [the] streets" and quickly made their way to the Indian agent's office. Pleasantries were dispensed with, and Cornstalk curtly informed the McKee that the colonial and royal authorities "should be acquainted of the very great numbers of [white] people going down this River beyond the Bounds fixed for them, and overspreading the Hunting Country" of Kentucky. The chief then related how his young Shawnees were "disappointed in their hunting, and find the woods covered with the White People, and their horses, where they used to find their game." Furthermore, the uproar in Pittsburgh as well as the increasing regularity of the surveying expeditions down the Ohio distressed the Shawnees. Rumors that "the White People propose[d] building a large Fort low down the River" that summer had also reached Shawnee ears. For these reasons, the Shawnees were "convinced" that war was "apparent" in white minds, since "otherwise such preparations wou'd be laid aside." Therefore, it was the obligation of the "great men" of the colonies to put an end to all the trouble, and prevent another outbreak of war. McKee replied that he would do what he could, but offered no promises to the disgruntled Indians.

Soon after Cornstalk's appeal to McKee, another more formidable party of surveyors assembled at the mouth of the Great Kanawha River. These surveyors had been sent by William Preston, who had not felt entirely comfortable with his endorsement of Bullitt's surveys back in December, even at Dunmore's insistence. Accordingly, Preston had

---

3 Ibid. See also the Journal Entry for April 26, 1774, "Hanson's Journal," in Ibid., 116; DSS, 14158-84.
4 Mackay to Penn, April 4, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4th Series, I, 270.
5 Extract from the Journal of Alexander McKee, April 8, 1774, in NYCD, VIII, 462.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. Cornstalk told McKee: "…what we have seen and been witness to since we came here serves to confirm our fears, as well as the constant assembling of our Brethren with Red Flags (the surveyors) convince us that war is till apparent in their minds, otherwise such preparations wou'd be laid aside."
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 "Thomas Hanson's Journal" in Ibid., 114-5; George Rogers Clark to Dr. Samuel Brown, June 17, 1798, in Brantz Mayer, Tah-Gah-Jute; or Logan and Cresap, (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1867), 150.
decided to send his own men into Kentucky to redo Bullitt's work, and had commissioned his protégé John Floyd to lead another expedition to the Falls of the Ohio for that reason. Bullitt's former assistant James Douglas was also commissioned to accompany Floyd to help locate the original survey marks. Preston had advertised his intentions in the *Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland Gazettes*, stating that:

Notice is hereby given to the gentlemen, officers, and soldiers, who claim land under his Majesty's proclamation of the 7th of October, 1763, who have obtained warrants from his Excellency the right honorable the Earl of Dunmore directed to the surveyor of Fincastle County, and intend to locate their land on or near the Ohio, below the mouth of the Great Kanawha or New River, that several assistant surveyors will attend at the mouth of the New River on Thursday, the 14th of April next, to survey, for such only as have or may obtain his lordship's warrant for that purpose.¹¹

Preston also prudently warned that "Several gentlemen acquainted with that part of the country are of the opinion that to prevent insults from strolling parties of Indians, there ought to be at least fifty men on the river below the Great Kanawha to attend to the business."¹² Therefore, "should the gentlemen concerned be of the same opinion, they will, doubtless, furnish that or any less number they may believe necessary."¹³ With that said, Preston had sent his expedition leaders on their way on April 8 (the same day Connolly had the three magistrates arrested). By mid-month Floyd and his party reached the mouth of the Great Kanawha and met up with twenty-six adventurers who had answered Preston's ad.¹⁴ Also encamped at the rendezvous point were some eighty or ninety people who had resolved "to make Settlements" in Kentucky, and had, like Preston, designated the mouth of the Great Kanawha as "the Place of general Rendezvous."¹⁵

¹¹ *Virginia Gazette*, March 9, 1774; *Maryland Gazette*, March 10, 1774; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, March 9, 1774.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Hanson's Journal Entries, April 8 and April 20, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, *Dunmore's War*, 114-5.

¹⁵ Clark to Brown, June 17, 1798, in Mayer, *Logan and Cresap*, 150.
Among this latter group was a young Virginian named George Rogers Clark, who would later become a noted Indian fighter and patriot in the American Revolution. A small party of thirteen long hunters had already departed several days prior to the arrival of Floyd's company of surveyors. At the rendezvous, the newly integrated expedition took a couple of days to organize itself before beginning the long descent down the Ohio sometime around April 17.

A Shawnee hunting party soon discovered the long hunters, and the large group of surveyors and settlers following some ten miles behind. Without waiting to consult with their headmen, the Indians resolved to "place themselves on both sides of the Ohio" and then "kill the Virginians and rob the Pennsylvanians" as they had previously threatened with the Glen-Darnell-Nash party. Consequently, the long hunters were attacked on the night of April 15. A fierce skirmish ensued, and the Shawnees retreated after reportedly losing three of their warriors. The hunters lost one killed, one seriously wounded, and one missing. After this close call, the hunters decided to turn back. They shortly encountered Floyd's surveyors and the settlers coming down the river, and informed the party leaders of the clash. After some discussion, Floyd's well-armed group of surveyors and military adventurers decided to take their chances and continue on to the Falls to complete their work. The settlers, however, had few men with "experience in Indian warfare," and decided to send for Michael Cresap, who was known to be in the vicinity, to "Command the Party" and lead them into Kentucky.

Cresap arrived shortly thereafter, and was horrified to find the settlers, their ignorance of Indian warfare notwithstanding, plotting their own raid against a Shawnee town at

---

16 Hanson's Journal Entries, April 8 and April 20, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, *Dunmore's War*, 114-5.
17 John Floyd to William Preston, April 26, 1774, in *Ibid.*, 7; DSS, 3QQ19.
20 Clark to Brown, June 17, 1798, in Mayer, *Logan and Cresap*, 150-1.
Horse-head Bottom on the far side of the Ohio River. He had been told of the attack on the long hunters, and was worried that something serious was afoot in the Shawnee towns. The settlers were overjoyed at Cresap's arrival, and, according to George Rogers Clark, they "now thought [their] little Army compleat, and the Destruction of an Indian Town inevitable." A council was quickly called, and to the shock and surprise of the would-be Indian fighters, their "intended General" strongly dissuaded them "from the Enterprize." Cresap alleged "that appearances were suspicious," and "that there was no Certainty of a War." Cresap also told the settlers that if they "made the attempt proposed he had no doubt of Success," but warned "that a War at any Rate would be the result," in which case, they "would be blamed for it and perhaps justly." However, if the settlers "were determined to execute the Plan," then Cresap agreed to "lay aside all considerations," send for his militiamen and share their fortunes. The militant settlers must have begun to doubt themselves at this point since one of them asked Cresap "what measure he would recommend." The Marylander replied that they should all return to his large post at Wheeling "to obtain Intelligence of what was going forward," and "that a few Weeks would determine the Matter, and as it was early in the Spring, if [they] should find that the Indians were not hostilely disposed," then they "should have full Time to prosecute [their] intended Settlements in Kentucky." The settlers agreed, and followed Cresap up the Ohio to Wheeling.

The news of the independent surveyors' ordeal and the skirmish between the Shawnees and the long hunters traveled quickly to Pittsburgh. After hearing these reports, Connolly most probably saw an opportunity to exercise his authority over Pittsburgh's

---

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
"dependencies" by instigating a full-blown Indian war. Either that or he simply overreacted. Whichever was the case, the commandant sent a runner with a letter to Cresap declaring that a war was inevitable, and that the Indians would strike as soon as the season permitted.\textsuperscript{27} The people of Wheeling were urged to fortify, and Cresap was ordered to take appropriate measures for the defense of the region. Upon receipt of Connolly's incendiary express on or about April 21, Cresap planted a "war post," called a council of his militiamen and the Kentucky-bound settlers, and then read the letter aloud. All agreed that hostilities had commenced, and accordingly, "War was formally declared."\textsuperscript{28} All of Cresap's men, settlers included, then engaged in the bizarre spectacle of an Indian style war dance around the post, hooping and hallooing at the tops of their lungs.\textsuperscript{29} Sometime during the "ceremonies," two fresh Indian scalps were brought in. They had been taken from two Shawnees who had had the bad luck to pass by on the river while the war dance was in progress.\textsuperscript{30} Both were friends of the gun trader William Butler, whose brother Richard had saved and then aided Bullitt the previous summer during the surveyor's parley with Cornstalk.

On the morning of April 26, Cresap learned that "there were two Indians with some traders near and above Wheeling" traveling down the river by canoe.\textsuperscript{31} He quickly assembled his militiamen, reinforced by eager recruits from the settlers, and proposed to "waylay and kill the Indians upon the river."\textsuperscript{32} A militia colonel named Ebenezer Zane violently opposed Cresap's proposal, arguing that "the killing of those Indians might

\textsuperscript{27} Clark to Brown, June 17, 1798, in Mayer, \textit{Logan and Cresap}, 152-3.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{30} See footnote 2, in Smith, \textit{St. Clair Papers}, I, 299.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}
involve the country in a war."\textsuperscript{33} Cresap was not swayed by this recital of the logic he had espoused himself only days before. Consequently, Zane was shouted down, and Cresap led his motley group out of Wheeling for the first time to wage war on the Indians. The militiamen traveled only a few miles up the Ohio River, came ashore, concealed their canoes, and then hid in the weeds along the riverbank to ambush the unsuspecting trading party.\textsuperscript{34} A canoe soon appeared carrying a white man and two Indians. As the canoe passed Cresap's position, several of the militiamen opened fire, and one of the Indians, a Shawnee, was instantly killed. The white man in the canoe, an associate of Butler named Stephens, threw himself in the water to avoid getting hit, while a second volley of gunshots killed the other Indian, this time a Delaware. Cresap then took several of his men, climbed into his canoe, and paddled out to claim the scalps of the Indians they had killed. Stephens, who had not seen who had fired on him, soon observed Cresap's canoe "coming up" and began swimming toward it.\textsuperscript{35} The militiamen pulled Stephens out of the water, and found themselves at a sudden loss for words. After the indignant trader demanded to know who was responsible for killing his two Indian guides, Cresap's men rather sheepishly (and incredulously) "denied knowing anything of what had happened to them (the Indians)."\textsuperscript{36} Stephens knew better, but had no choice but to accompany the militiamen to Wheeling. Once they arrived, a worried Zane met the party at the riverbank. Examining Stephens' canoe and seeing "much fresh blood and some bullet holes" in the vessel, Zane "enquired what had become of the Indians."\textsuperscript{37} Cresap replied that "they had fallen overboard."\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} "Intelligence from Pittsburgh," in the \textit{Pennsylvania Gazette}, May 25, 1774; McKee to Johnson, May 1, 1774, in \textit{NYCD}, VIII, 463.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Zane to Brown, in Jefferson, \textit{Notes on Virginia}, 235.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
The next day, April 27, another report arrived in Wheeling of a larger party of Indians descending the river. This news was brought by a man named McMahon, who told Cresap that "five Indian canoes had stopped at his house on their way down the River, containing fourteen Indians."\(^{39}\) As fortune would have it, this group of Indians was the Shawnee delegation led by Cornstalk, heading home after their visit to Pittsburgh.\(^{40}\) The Shawnees had asked McMahon "for some provisions," at which the white man had refused, telling them that "two of the Brethren had been killed by the White People the day before [the two Shawnees who had been killed during the wardance]."\(^{41}\) The Shawnees had replied that "if it were so, they knew nothing of it," and then proceeded down the river.\(^{42}\) Upon hearing McMahon's information, Cresap collected fifteen of his militiamen (one of whom was Clark), and embarked onto the river to intercept the Shawnees.\(^{43}\) Cresap and his men did not have to paddle far before they discovered the Indians trying to slip by Wheeling by "taking advantage of an Island to cover themselves" from the view of the militiamen.\(^{44}\) Cresap's party immediately fired at the Shawnees and gave pursuit. After a fifteen-mile chase down the Ohio, the Shawnees were finally forced ashore at Pipe Creek, a very small stream obscured by bushes on the western side of the Ohio, exactly opposite the mouth of Graves Creek.\(^{45}\) The chiefs then turned to fight the militiamen along the riverbank. During the resulting skirmish, a Shawnee chief named Othawakesquo (known simply as Old Ben to the whites in Pittsburgh) was killed and two more were wounded, while the militiamen had one man killed and another "shot through

\(^{39}\) McKee to Johnson, May 2, 1774, in NYCD, VIII, 463.
\(^{40}\) Devereux Smith to Dr. Smith, June 10, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 468.
\(^{41}\) McKee to Johnson, May 2, 1774, in NYCD, VIII, 463.
\(^{42}\) Ibid.
\(^{43}\) Clark to Brown, June 17, 1798, in Mayer, Logan and Cresap, 153.
\(^{44}\) Ibid.
\(^{45}\) Ibid; "Intelligence Received at Pittsburgh," May 1, 1774, in Nicholas B. Wainwright, "Turmoil at Pittsburgh: Diary of Augustine Prevost, 1774," in the Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, volume LXXXV, (April 1961), 146-7.
The Shawnees melted into the forest and escaped to the Delaware towns, which were nearby. Cresap, whose men took the opportunity to scalp the dead chief and plunder the Indians' canoes, found a "considerable quantity of ammunition," "sixteen Keggs of Rum," "two saddles," and "some bridles." Cresap's "Frontier Banditti," as Indian agent Guy Johnson called them, spent the night, and returned to Wheeling the next day. Cresap was flushed with his "victories" and boldly declared that he fully intended to "put every Indian he met with on the river, to death, and that if he cou'd raise men sufficient to cross the River, he wou'd attack a small village of Indians living on Yellow Creek." He then began planning a raid for the next day.

The village Cresap spoke of was an encampment of Mingoes located at the junction of Yellow Creek and the Ohio River, some fifty-three miles up the Ohio from Wheeling, and forty miles west of Pittsburgh by land. The small Mingo tribe was essentially the remnant of an Iroquois colony settled in the Ohio Valley after the great invasions of the seventeenth century. Over the years, however, the Mingoes had broken their ties to the Six Nations, and affiliated themselves with the Ohio Indians, fighting alongside the Shawnees, the Delawares and others in both the French and Indian War and Pontiac's Rebellion. While the Mingoes were just as fierce as the Shawnees in war, they were far more amenable than their Algonquian neighbors in peace. After signing a treaty with

---


47 Devereux Smith to Dr. Smith, June 10, 1774, in *Ibid.*, 468.

48 Clark to Brown, June 17, 1798, in Mayer, *Logan and Cresap*, 153; McKee to Johnson, May 2, 1774, in *NYCD*, VIII, 463.

49 Guy Johnson to Dartmouth, July 12, 1774, in *NYCD*, VIII, 471.


51 Alexander Scott Withers, *Chronicles of Border Warfare or, a History of the Settlement by the Whites, of North Western Virginia and of the Indian Wars and Massacres in that State*, (Clarksburg, VA: Joseph Israel, 1831), 134; See Comment by Thwaites in footnote.
Johnson in 1765, the Mingoes had consorted peacefully with the whites, and gained a good reputation with traders and settlers around Pittsburgh.

The most prominent of the Mingoes was John Logan, who had been friendly to the whites and often acted as a mediator in disputes between Indians and traders. Logan, who was not a chief despite popular belief, was a complex character. He was the second son of a Cayuga chief named Shikellamo, who himself was actually of French descent but had been taken on a raid and adopted by that tribe while still a child. Logan's mother was a Mingo woman, who apparently held some position of esteem in the tribe. His Indian name was "Tah-gah-jute," which means either "Short Dress" or "Long Lashes" in the Iroquois language. His father had also given him his white name in honor of Pennsylvania Indian agent and provincial secretary James Logan, who had died in 1751. Physically, Logan was impressive, measuring well over six feet tall, "strong and well proportioned," and carrying a "manly countenance." One acquaintance even "thought him the most martial figure of an Indian" he had ever seen. He was also light skinned, nearly white, and spoke good English. Those who personally knew Logan were also impressed by his keen intellect, and many considered him as a "man of superior talents." The Mingo openly boasted of "his friendship to the white people" and took "great delight in acts of hospitality to such of the white people whose business led them that way."

One account of Logan's magnanimity involved a shooting match between the Mingo and

52 Mayer, *Logan and Cresap*, 59.
54 *Ibid.*, 53; See footnote 1 in same.
55 Diary Entry, September 16, 1772, in McClure, *Diary*, 57.
56 During his later raids in the New, Clinch and Holston valleys, Logan was thought to be a white man. See Arthur Campbell to William Preston, October 9, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, *Dunmore's War*, 238; *DSS*, 3QQ117. Also, James Robertson to William Preston, August 12, 1774, in *Ibid.*, 140; *DSS*, 3QQ74.
one of his white guests.\textsuperscript{59} The wager was to shoot at a mark for a dollar a shot for whoever came closest to the target. In the contest, Logan subsequently lost "four or five rounds" and then declared himself beaten.\textsuperscript{60} As his guest was preparing to leave, the Mingo went to his cabin and brought out "as many deerskins as he had lost dollars" to pay his debt.\textsuperscript{61} His guest, who had no intention of collecting anything for what he considered a "friendly contest of skill and nerve," tried to refuse the peltries.\textsuperscript{62} Logan was adamant, and the white man reluctantly accepted the deerskins after offering a horn of powder to his host in return for the gracious gift.\textsuperscript{63} Logan declined, and the two friends parted company, both men having their sense of integrity fulfilled. Westmoreland County magistrate William Brown related another account of the Logan's kindness toward whites. When one of the magistrate's daughters was learning to walk, the girl's mother lamented "that she could not obtain a pair of shoes to give more firmness to her infant steps."\textsuperscript{64} Logan was then visiting his the magistrate, and had overheard the mother, but said nothing at the time. A little later, he asked Mrs. Brown if she would allow the girl to spend the day with him. The girl's mother was understandably hesitant to allow her toddler to go anywhere alone with an Indian. But, Magistrate Brown was a friend of Logan's, and he trusted the Mingo completely, even stating that "he was the best specimen of humanity, white or red, he ever encountered."\textsuperscript{65} So, Mrs. Brown reluctantly consented, and the little girl was placed in Logan's care for the day. Towards nightfall, the Indian and the toddler reappeared at the Browns' residence in Pittsburgh, and the little girl was wearing a brand

\textsuperscript{59} Mayer, \textit{Logan and Cresap}, 52.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 55.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 57
new pair of finely crafted moccasins, the product of Logan's superior leatherworking skills.\textsuperscript{66}

There was a dark side to Logan, however. First, he was plagued by a "fondness for liquor," and often "exclaimed against the white people, for imposing liquors upon the Indians."\textsuperscript{67} His problems ran far deeper than simple alcoholism, however. Logan once told an acquaintance that "he knew he had two souls, the one good and the other bad: when the good soul had the ascendant, he was kind and humane, and when the bad soul ruled, he was perfectly savage, and delighted in nothing but blood and carnage."\textsuperscript{68}

Personal demons also haunted the Indian. Missionary David McClure had a disturbing encounter with Logan in September 1772. McClure was on his way to preach in the Delaware towns when he "saw Capt.\textsuperscript{n} Logan in the woods," leaning on the muzzle of his gun and "apparently in great distress."\textsuperscript{69} The missionary observed with some concern that the Indian "stood pale & trembling," and that "His eyes were fixed on the ground, & sweat run down his face like one agony."\textsuperscript{70} McClure approached Logan and "asked him how he did."\textsuperscript{71} Logan replied by pointing to his breast, and exclaimed, "I feel very bad here. Wherever I go the evil monethoes (Devils) are after me. My house, the trees & the air, are full of Devils, they continually haunt me, & they will kill me."\textsuperscript{72} The Mingo then asked McClure what he should do. McClure was taken aback by this "strange sight," and could offer nothing better to the Indian than recommending repentance and the asking of forgiveness from God, stating that "the Great Spirit above will not suffer the Devils to

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 56.


\textsuperscript{68} \textit{The American Pioneer}, 2 volumes, (Cincinnati: H. P. Brooks, 1842), I, 359; See also note 21 in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 305-6; Historian Richard White also arrived at the conclusion that Logan was "already a deeply disturbed man" when he commenced his raids. See White, \textit{The Middle Ground}, 361.

\textsuperscript{69} Diary Entry, September 16, 1772, in McClure, \textit{Diary}, 56-7.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 57.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 56.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 57.
McClure then left Logan "in the same distress" as he found him, and continued on his journey, not completely satisfied with his thoughts "relative to the cause of the distress & agitation of so renowned a warrior." Logan recovered from this particular seizure, but his mental and emotional stability remained questionable. In light of his subsequent actions, it seems reasonable to suggest that he was a virtual powder keg waiting to explode.

On April 28, Cresap led his men out to raid the Mingoes' village. Five miles up the river, the party "halted to take some Refreshment." While taking a break, Cresap began questioning the "Impropriety of executing the proposed Enterprize." A general discussion followed, and soon "it was generally agreed that those Indians had no hostile Intentions, as it was a hunting Camp composed of Men, Women, and Children with all their Stuff with them." After some more soul searching, the would-be raiders changed their minds and "opposed the projected Measure." Interestingly, the foremost advocate of peace among the men was Cresap, who had declared only the day before that he wanted to "put every Indian he met with on the river, to death." Cresap and his militiamen, now ashamed at what they were planning to do, decamped and took the overland road to Red Stone settlement, where they awaited further orders from Connolly.

While Cresap and his men suffered a crisis of conscience in planning an attack on friendly Indians, others had no such scruples. One such person was John Connolly. After he had circulated his express letters throughout the white settlements in the Ohio Valley declaring that "war was at hand," the commandant decided to take the offensive himself.

---

73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Clark to Brown, June 17, 1798, in Mayer, Logan and Cresap, 154.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 McKee to Johnson, May 2, 1774, in NYCD, VIII, 463.
and strike the closest Indian settlement to Pittsburgh, the Mingo village at Yellow Creek. 80 Accordingly, he sent 32 of his militiamen under the command of one of his cronies, Daniel Greathouse, to Baker's Bottom, which was named for the grog-house kept by Joshua Baker opposite the village across Yellow Creek. 81 Baker had been on very friendly terms with the Mingoes, primarily by engaging them in a profitable rum commerce. Baker's wife also habitually gave milk to the Indian squaws for their children, and in so doing, had developed a particularly close friendship with Logan's sister, who had an infant daughter. 82 On the morning of April 29, Greathouse and his band arrived at Baker's Bottom and announced to the barkeeper his intention of killing the Mingoes across the creek. 83 He then attempted to enlist some of Baker's white associates to aid in the attack, promising "a great deal of plunder" and that "little danger would follow the expedition." 84 Several agreed to join Greathouse's party. That afternoon, the militia leader concealed his men in the bushes around the tavern. He then crossed the creek, brazenly walked into the Mingo village, and then "counted their number." 85 Greathouse's presence did not go unnoticed. One of the squaws encountered the militiaman and cautioned him that "he had better return home, as the Indian men were drinking, and that having heard of Cresap's attack on their relations down the river, they were angry." 86 After listening to the squaw's warning, Greathouse finished his head count, and "found that they were too large a party to attack with his strength." 87 Near nightfall, the militiaman returned to the tavern and quickly concocted another plan. He determined that the best course of action was to lure a few Indians over to the tavern at a time, where his

81 "Declaration of the Honorable Judge Innes," November 14, 1799, in Ibid., 241.
82 Michael Cresap, Jr. to Lyman C. Draper, October 1845, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 15.
83 "Deposition of James Chambers," April 20, 1798, in Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, 239.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
militiamen could then kill them piecemeal. Therefore, Greathouse asked Baker to give the Mingoes "what rum they could drink" when "any of them came to his house" the next day, and "to let him know when they were in a proper train," so that he could "then fall on them." Baker, who apparently lacked good business sense, agreed to participate in this proposed wholesale slaughter of his best customers. Greathouse then moved his militiamen away from the tavern and into the woods for the night to lessen the chances of discovery by the Indians.

Early the next morning, Saturday, April 30, the militiamen quietly returned to Baker's Bottom, and once again concealed themselves along the creek bank and in the bushes surrounding the tavern. Greathouse, accompanied by two men named John Sappington and Nathaniel Tomlinson (Baker's brother-in-law), entered the tavern to wait with Baker for the Indians' regular morning appearance. Very shortly after the militiamen settled into their positions, a canoe carrying four unarmed Mingo men (including Logan's younger brother John Petty), Logan's elderly mother, his sister, who was carrying her infant daughter on her back, and another elderly squaw arrived at Baker's Bottom. The men desired their daily rounds of rum while the women wanted to pick up milk from Mrs. Baker. Sappington later recalled that the Indian men "immediately got rum" from Baker and "became very much intoxicated." Logan's brother Petty was feeling particularly jovial that morning, and soon discovered Tomlinson's military coat and tricorn hat hanging by the door of the tavern. Petty put on the coat and hat, and in a drunken

88 Ibid.
89 "Reminiscences of Judge Henry Jolly," in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 9; DSS 6NN22-24; "Recollections of George Edgington," in Ibid., 17-7; "The Certificate of John Anderson," June 30, 1798, in Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, 238; "Declaration of Sappington," in Ibid., 255-7; For the identity of Logan's brother, see footnote 1 in Butterfield, Washington-Crawford Letters, 87. Logan later told the "Suffering Trader" George Morgan that his mother and sister were killed at Yellow Creek. See footnote 91 in White, The Middle Ground, 361. Logan told one of his prisoners that Cresap's [sic] men had "taken his cousin, a little girl, prisoner" and wanted to "exchange the subscriber for his cousin." The baby was Logan's niece instead of his cousin. See "Declaration of William Robinson," in Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, 243. Also "Certificate of William Huston," in Ibid., 237; "Deposition of James Chambers," in Ibid., 239.
90 "Declaration of Sappington," in Ibid., 256.
swagger, pranced around the room swearing, "I am white man." Tomlinson became
annoyed and demanded his regimental coat from Petty, "which the Indian did not feel
disposed to yield to its owner."\footnote{Cresap to Draper, in \textit{Ibid.}, 15.} Petty then turned and made for the door, at which time, Sappington "jumped to his gun" and "shot the Indian."\footnote{"Declaration of Sappington," in Jefferson, \textit{Notes on Virginia}, 255-6.} Tomlinson followed the mortally
wounded Petty outside and "stabbed him while in the agonies of death," saying "Many a
deer I have served in this way."\footnote{"Recollections of Edgington," in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 16-7.} Greathouse, who was "prepared with a tomahawk,"
quickly dispatched one of the other drunken Indians, while the other two attempted to get
away. Greathouse's militiamen "rushed out" from their hiding places upon hearing the
rapport of Sappington's gun, and shot down the two Indian men as they ran toward the
woods.\footnote{"Declaration of Sappington," in Jefferson, \textit{Notes on Virginia}, 256.} The three squaws, who had remained outside the tavern with Baker's wife to
help milk the cow, saw what was transpiring and also tried to flee along the creek bank.
But the militiamen turned their guns on the Indian women and shot at them also, killing
Logan's mother and the other old woman instantly. Logan's sister managed to run some
distance before being overtaken by a militiaman named John Neville, who "shot her in the
forehead" at "six feet distance."\footnote{Journal Entry, May 3, 1774, "Extract of McKee's Journal," in \textit{NYCD}, VIII, 464.} The young woman evidently "lived long enough
however to beg for mercy for her babe," whose father was a Pennsylvania trader named
John Gibson.\footnote{"Reminiscences of Jolly," in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 10.} Neville "cut the strap by which the child's cradle hung at her back," and
"intended to have dashed its brains out," but "was struck with some remorse on seeing the
child fall with its mother."\footnote{Journal Entry, May 3, 1774, "Extract of McKee's Journal," in \textit{NYCD}, VIII, 464.} After hearing the woman's final pleas to spare the child, Neville relented and allowed Mrs. Baker, who apparently was oblivious to the plot, to take
the baby girl from the dying mother. Several days later the infant was placed into the care

\footnotesize

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Cresap to Draper, in \textit{Ibid.}, 15.}
\item \footnote{"Declaration of Sappington," in Jefferson, \textit{Notes on Virginia}, 255-6.}
\item \footnote{"Recollections of Edgington," in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 16-7.}
\item \footnote{"Declaration of Sappington," in Jefferson, \textit{Notes on Virginia}, 256.}
\item \footnote{Journal Entry, May 3, 1774, "Extract of McKee's Journal," in \textit{NYCD}, VIII, 464.}
\item \footnote{"Reminiscences of Jolly," in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 10.}
\item \footnote{Journal Entry, May 3, 1774, "Extract of McKee's Journal," in \textit{NYCD}, VIII, 464.}
\end{itemize}
of William Crawford, until Gibson could return from a trading expedition to the Shawnee towns.  

The gunshots and the women’s screams alerted the Mingoes across the creek to the trouble, and soon a canoe with two Indians came near the tavern to see what had happened.  Greathouse's men, having "ranged themselves along the bank of the river," immediately open fire and killed both of them.  Two more canoes embarked across the creek toward Baker's Bottom, carrying eleven and seven armed Mingoes respectively.  The Mingoes attempted to land below the militiamen, but were turned back under heavy fire, losing four of their number in the process.  Not being able to land anywhere near the tavern, the enraged Indians then exchanged heavy fire with Greathouse's men from their side of the creek for the rest of the day, with no further casualties on either side.  The militiamen remembered to scalp the dead Indians, women included, in order to signify that the killings were acts of war instead of cold-blooded murder.  Logan, who had heard the uproar and witnessed the final stages of the massacre, was grief stricken and confused.  He had always been the friend of whites, and could not comprehend why his family and people had been killed so treacherously.  Since it was known in the Mingo village that Cresap had led the attack against the Shawnee chiefs three days before, then he must have been the man responsible for this outrage.  At least that is what Logan undoubtedly decided in his own mind since he later placed the blame for this massacre squarely on the shoulders of Michael Cresap.

98 Crawford to Washington, May 8, 1774, in Butterfield, Washington-Crawford Letters, 48; Also Valentine Crawford to Washington, May 7, 1774, in Ibid.  Valentine wrote Washington of the massacre: "On Saturday last, about 12 o'clock, one Greathouse, and about twenty [sic] men, fell on a party of Indians at the mouth of Yellow Creek, and killed ten [sic] of them.  They brought away one child a prisoner, which is now at my brother's William Crawford's."

99 "Declaration of Sappington," in Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, 256.

100 Reverend Joseph Doddridge, Notes on the Settlements and Indian Wars of the Western Parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania from 1763 to 1783, (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1876), 173.

101 See Thwaites' comment in Withers, On Border Warfare, 149.
A day or so after the murders, Wheeling settler John Poole ran across Logan deep in the woods, sitting on a log with his head resting on his hands. Poole hailed the Mingo, who looked up and, with tears welling up in his eyes, asked, "Brother, you know me--John Logan?" Poole nodded. Logan then asked with uncertainty, "Are you my brother?" Poole replied, "Yes," and the Mingo suddenly arose and embraced the white man with a hug. Pool then asked him why he was sad. Logan finally burst into tears and cried, "Your brothers have killed my people on Yellow Creek, and I'm sorry for it." The settler shared some food and water he was carrying with Logan, who, generous as ever, responded by giving Poole a pipe and flint in exchange.

Within a week, however, Logan's "bad soul" emerged, and he appeared with several other Mingoes in the Shawnee town of Wakatomica on the Muskingum River to recruit a war party. While there, he saw "twenty seven or thirty" Pennsylvania traders pressing peltries, one of which was Richard Butler, and immediately fell into a rage. When Logan and his men moved to "cut down" the traders, the Shawnee chiefs intervened and "spoke boldly in defence of them to the Mingoes." The Shawnees told Logan that "they had brought the traders amongst them, and were determined to protect them in their bosoms until they could return them safe home." Furthermore, the Shawnee chiefs said, "if the Mingoes could not be satisfied without taking revenge upon the white people for the loss they sustained, that they must look for it a greater distance than in their towns

---

103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Devereux Smith to Dr. Smith, June 10, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4th Series, I, 468-9; Journal Entries, June 1, 1774, and June 5, 1774, in "Extracts of McKee's Journal," in Ibid., 481-2.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
upon the people whom they had pledged their faith to preserve." Logan, stopped by the chiefs from killing the traders, decided to heed their advice and look for vengeance away from the Shawnee towns. He assembled a select war party of thirteen to twenty warriors, and left Wakatomica "very angry," threatening to "kill all white people [he] should meet with." That night, Logan's party returned to Wakatomica and stole fifteen horses from the Shawnees. They then headed back to Yellow Creek, where they prowled the "common road" between Baker's Bottom and Pittsburgh, "hunting for ten days to catch some traders." The Delawares learned of the war party, however, and had "stopped the traders from going that road," temporarily frustrating Logan's hunt.

On or about May 20, Logan claimed his first victim. A young trader named Campbell somehow became separated from his party and took a wrong turn onto the path leading to Gekelemuckepuck (Newcomer's Town), a prominent Delaware village. The man was almost in sight of the village when Logan and his men fell upon him. Campbell was "murdered, and cut to pieces; and his limbs and flesh stuck up on the bushes." Some of the Delawares heard the commotion, and ran out to see what was happening. They soon discovered Campbell's mangled corpse, and proceeded to gather up his remains and bury him. Logan and his warriors returned later and saw what the Delawares had done. The

110 Ibid.


112 Ibid. 284; "Letter of David Zeisberger," May 24, 1774, in Ibid., 285. The Shawnees held a "great Stock of Horses" that they had acquired through many years of trading, raiding, and stealing. Preston later mentions this stock as an enticement for militiamen seeking plunder in his recruiting call of July 20, 1774. See "Circular Letter of Colonel William Preston," July 20, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 92; DSS, 3QQ139.


114 Ibid.

115 Ibid.; Devereux Smith to Dr. Smith, June 10, 1774, in Ibid., 469; John Montgomery to William Allen, June 3, 1774, in Ibid., 464; "Ravages of Indian Invaders" in Pennsylvania Gazette, June 22, 1774.

war party then rode into Gekelemuckepuck, where Logan furiously exclaimed "against the
conduct of these [white] people, setting forth the cruelty of Cresap towards women and
children, and declaring at the same time, that they would, in consequence of this cruelty,
serve every white man they should meet with in the same manner." Logan, carrying
Campbell's scalp, then rode off with his followers to seek other prey.118

Logan struck again a few days later. Near Wheeling, Sheriff John Proctor was out
serving warrants for St. Clair and Mackay. Logan's party waylaid the sheriff, killed and
then scalped him.119 After killing Proctor, Logan's warriors then turned eastward toward
the Monongahela valley, splitting into two separate bands.120 Around June 1, Logan's
men "killed and scalped one man, his wife, and three children" on Muddy Creek.121 Three
more of the same man's children were taken prisoner, but were later found dead, and
scalped, on the creek bank.122 On Saturday, June 4, neighbors discovered a man named
William Spier, "his wife, and four children, murdered and scalped" on Cheat River.123
The Indians had left "a large broadaxe sticking in [Spier's] breast," while the man's wife
was found "lying on her back, stripped naked."124 All the cattle were killed likewise, and
"a man's coat, with several bullet holes in it" and another murdered child was found in a
field away from the settlers' cabin.125 The following Monday, "one Henry Wall" and a

117 Ibid.
118 "Extract of a Journal of the United Brethren's Mission on Muskingum," May 20, 1774, in Force,
American Archives, 4th Series, I, 284.
119 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 22, 1774.
121 Devereux Smith to Dr. Smith, June 10, 1774, in Ibid., 469
122 Ibid., 470.
123 Maryland Gazette, June 30, 1774; Pennsylvania Gazette, June 22, 1774.
124 Maryland Gazette, June 30, 1774
125 Ibid.
man named Keener were found murdered and scalped "within sight of a fort built on Muddy Creek."  

While Logan led the larger band and committed the murders on Muddy Creek and Cheat River, his splinter group appeared in the New River valley. The June 2 issue of the *Virginia Gazette* reported that the Indians engaged in a "smart skirmish, on the branches of New River" with "a party of white people, who were out surveying lands." The surveyors admitted to losing "eight men and a boy" during the fight, and claimed they had driven off the Indians, supposedly killing eight. The raiders then disappeared into the backcountry as quietly as they came, leaving turmoil in their wake. News of the Yellow Creek massacre and Logan's bloody reprisals spread rapidly throughout the Upper Ohio Valley settlements, and terror soon gripped the entire region. Crawford informed Washington as early as May 8, a week after the Yellow Creek killings, that "Our inhabitants are much alarmed, many hundreds having gone over the mountain, and the whole country evacuated as far as the Monongahela; and many on this side of the [Youghiogheny] river are gone over the mountain." Crawford's brother Valentine likewise reported that news of the massacre "almost ruined all the settlers over the Monongahela," causing them to move "as fast as you ever saw them." The younger Crawford estimated that "one thousand people crossed the Monongahela in one day at three ferries that are not one mile apart." In Pittsburgh, the "greatest confusion" reigned as refugees poured into the settlement for protection from the Indians. St. Clair told Governor Penn that "The panic that has struck this country" threatened "an entire

---

126 *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 22, 1774.

127 *Virginia Gazette*, June 2, 1774; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 15, 1774; *American Archives*, 4th Series, I, 373.


130 *Ibid*.

131 Devereux Smith to Dr. Smith, June 10, 1774, in Force, *American Archives*, 4th Series, I, 468.
depopulation," and that "the country must very soon be totally evacuated unless some thing was done to afford the inhabitants the appearance at least of protection."\textsuperscript{132} Indeed, as historian Richard White has noted, it seemed that little more than a dozen vengeful Indians would succeed in rolling back the tide of white settlement in the Ohio Valley.\textsuperscript{133}

Two Pennsylvania settlers very nearly made the miserable situation even worse by killing a harmless Delaware named Joseph Wipey some eighteen miles from Pittsburgh shortly after the Yellow Creek massacre.\textsuperscript{134} The two men, John Hinkson and James Cooper, had openly stated their intentions of killing an Indian, and St. Clair had tried to stop them. He failed, however, and the Delaware was murdered in cold blood. The body was "hid in a small run of water" and "covered with stones."\textsuperscript{135} An exasperated St. Clair exclaimed, "It is the most astonishing thing in the world the disposition of the common people of this country; actuated by the most savage cruelty, they wantonly perpetrate crimes that are a disgrace to humanity, and seem at the same time to be under a kind of religious enthusiasm, whilst they want the daring spirit that usually inspires."\textsuperscript{136} This murder threatened to provoke the Delawares into war. These traditional Shawnee allies had been thoroughly Christianized by Moravian missionaries in years since Pontiac's Rebellion, but had maintained enough of their warrior heritage to remain a formidable threat to white settlers in the Ohio Valley, especially if they fell in league with the Shawnees and Mingo. Hence, if the Delawares joined either of their allies in war against the whites, the Ohio Valley settlements, Pittsburgh included, would face a disaster of the highest magnitude.

\textsuperscript{132} St. Clair to Penn, May 29, 1774, in Smith, \textit{St. Clair Papers}, I, 301-2.

\textsuperscript{133} White, \textit{The Middle Ground}, 342.

\textsuperscript{134} St. Clair to Penn, May 29, 1774, in \textit{St. Clair Papers}, 301-2.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Ibid}.
As thousands of frightened settlers fled eastward, and thousands more "forted up," McKee, Croghan, and, Connolly hastily called a conference in Pittsburgh to meet with representatives of the several involved tribes and attempt to rebuild the peace. Chiefs from the Six Nations appeared the first week of May, as well as the venerable chief of the Delawares, George White Eyes, a Mingo headman named Kayashuta, and the Shawnee Cornstalk, who was none the worse for wear despite his rude experience at the hands of Cresap's "frontier banditti" only a week and a day earlier. Cornstalk opened the proceedings, rather surprisingly, as an advocate of peace. The Shawnee declared:

We are sorry to see so much ill doing between you and us. First you killed our brother Othawakeesquo [in Cresap's Pipe Creek attack], next our elder brothers the Mingoes [at Yellow Creek], then the Delawares [Wipey's murder]. All which mischiefs, so close to each other, aggravated our people very much; yet we all determined to be quiet till we knew what you meant; our people were all getting ready to go to their hunting as usual, but these troubles have stopped them. The traders that were amongst us were very much endangered by such doings from the persons injured [Logan], but as we are convinced of their innocence, we are determined to protect them, and sent them safe to their relations and other friends, and it will, we hope, be looked upon as a proof of our good intentions.  

As further proof of his sincerity, Cornstalk promised to send his brother along with the traders in case Logan attacked them.  Cornstalk then asked Connolly to "endeavour to stop such foolish people [Cresap, Greathouse, etc.] from the like doings for the future" since the Shawnee had already "with great trouble and pains prevailed upon the foolish people amongst us [except Logan] to sit still and do no harm till we see whether it is the intention of the white people in general to fall on us." 

138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
Connolly replied by blaming the murders on the young and misguided on both sides (an outright lie). The commandant also offered his sincere regrets that the violence between the two races had occurred just as "the great Headman of Virginia and all his wise people" were preparing to consider the matter of settling the territory bought from the Indians at Fort Stanwix (i.e. Kentucky). Moreover, those Virginia settlers who were moving into that particular region would be ordered "to be kind and friendly" to their new Indian neighbors," as your late neighbours from Pennsylvania were. 

This was hardly what the Shawnees wanted to hear, but Cornstalk promised to continue to work towards peace "in hopes that matters might be settled." Croghan and McKee then drafted a condolence message to the offended Indians and performed a ceremony with the chiefs, which entailed "covering the [symbolic] bones of their deceased friends with some goods suitable to the occasion & agreeable to their custom." To the relief of the Indian agents (but probably not Connolly) White Eyes was conciliatory, and agreed to "use his best endeavours to accommodate matters." White Eyes took the condolence message and promised to bear it to any Shawnees and Mingoes who had not been represented at the meeting, and would report back with their answers as soon as possible. The chiefs then departed, while Croghan, McKee, and Connolly forwarded the council's proceedings, along with a joint letter from the attending chiefs, to Dunmore, which asked that he restrain the Virginians from attacking Indians.

Cornstalk's pacifism in view of everything that had happened puzzled McKee. Intelligence soon arrived, however, that suggested (perhaps wrongly) the chief may have been stalling for time until he could convene another congress at Scioto and attempt to

---

141 Ibid.
144 Devereux Smith to Dr. Smith, June 10, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4th Series, I, 468.
finally construct the western Indian confederacy the Shawnees had long wished for. A Shawnee informant told the agent that "Although you have frequent Meetings with our great men, and they profess a friendship for you, and that they wou'd not keep anything a secret from you," they "do not divulge all they know, to you." 145 The informant related that "a great Meeting has for some years past, and is now expected to take place at Scioto, & Indians from Nations Westward and Southward expected it, this meeting, whenever it happens is the fixed time of striking the English." 146 While the chiefs "of several Nations have been busied in conducting good speeches about, the Warriors are of different sentiments in general & use it as a cover to this general design, and the hopes depending upon it have prevented many broils with the white people, though now mischief seems almost unavoidable from the Disposition of our people in general." 147 McKee's informant further warned that the plan had been "upon foot for many years," and that "almost all Indians this way wish to strike those people gone down the River [the surveyors]." 148

This information seemed to be confirmed in part on May 25, when White Eyes returned from Wakatomica and Chillicothe with bad news. 149 The Delaware had addressed the Shawnees and found them extremely hostile. The Shawnees looked upon what Croghan, McKee, and Connolly had said as "all to be lies," and noted that it was the whites "who are frequently passing up and down the Ohio, and making settlements upon it." 150 There were no chiefs amongst the Indians at the lower towns, they said, but plenty of warriors, who "were preparing themselves to be in readiness." 151 The Shawnees had then bitterly commented, "You tell us not to take any notice of what your people have

145 McKee to Guy Johnson, in NYCD, VIII, 467.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
done to us; we desire you likewise not to take any notice of what our young men may now be doing."\textsuperscript{152} In the same sarcastic tone, they had issued a threat: "Since there is "no doubt you can you [Croghan, McKee and Connolly] can command your warriors when you desire them to listen to you, we have reason to expect that ours will take the same advice when we require it, that is, when we have heard from the Governour of Virginia."\textsuperscript{153} After this outpouring of venom, the Shawnees had then made a significant point in closing by renewing "the ancient friendship that subsisted between our forefathers" and the Pennsylvanians.\textsuperscript{154} Traders from that colony would be welcomed and protected, while Virginians could expect no such treatment.

The intelligence relayed by McKee's informant plus the Shawnees' insolent answer to White Eyes was enough justification for Connolly, who had not wanted peace anyway, to take more extreme action against the Indians. The informant must have particularly impressed the commandant, since he wrote St. Clair that he was "determined no longer to be a dupe to their amicable professions, but on the contrary, shall pursue every measure to offend them."\textsuperscript{155} Hence, before even hearing the Shawnee reply to Croghan and McKee's condolence message and appeal for peace, Connolly wrote a misleading letter to Dunmore to persuade the governor that "the Indians have been the aggressors, and thereby the occasion of the fatal consequences which have ensued."\textsuperscript{156} Connolly told Dunmore another bald-faced lie in a second letter dated June 9, specifically that the Shawnees had "openly declared their intention of going to war with the white people, to revenge the loss of some of their nation."\textsuperscript{157} Furthermore, the Cherokees, according to Connolly, would join the Ohio Indians in making war on the colonists. Connolly had also written to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[152] \textit{Ibid.}
\item[153] \textit{Ibid.}, 479-80.
\item[154] \textit{Ibid.}
\item[155] Connolly to St. Clair, July 19, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 678.
\item[156] Dunmore's Answer to the Speech of the Indians, Dated May 7, 1774," May 29, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 482.
\item[157] Connolly to Williamsburg, June 9, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 394.
\end{footnotes}
George Washington and played on the colonel's land interests in the Ohio Valley in an effort to gain approval for the measures taken against the Indians. The commandant told Washington that forts would have to be built at Wheeling, at the mouth of the Great Kanawha, and also on the bank "opposite to Hockhocking River to overawe the Indians if settlement on the Ohio was to be encouraged. These forts could also act as forward staging bases from which an overland expedition could be launched against the Shawnees "to send terror into their country for the present, & keep them from annoying our settlements; & hereafter will forever deter them" from molesting surveyors and settlers engaged in "lawful designs down the Ohio." Connolly felt confident that the other tribes would become conciliatory if the Shawnees were "thoroughly chastised and convinced." Accordingly, it seemed that peace had never been an option for the commandant from the start. Arthur St. Clair arrived at this very conclusion, and told Governor Penn that "an Indian War was part of the Virginia plan; I am satisfied it must at least be part of Mr. Connolly's plan, for he has already incurred such expense by repairing the fort and calling out the militia that I think it is impossible that Colony will ever discharge it unless disturbances be raised that may give his maneuvers the appearance of necessity."

By the first week of June, Connolly was making definite preparations to lead a "march from Fort Pitt [now fully repaired and renamed Fort Dunmore in honor of Virginia's governor] with three or four hundred men he had embodied for the purpose of chastising the Shawanese, and to erect forts at Wheeling and Hockhocking to overawe the Indians, and from thence to carry the war into their own country."

---

159 Connolly to Washington, May 28, 1774, in Ibid., 4-5; Connolly to Washington, June 7, 1774, in Ibid., 8.
160 Ibid.
161 St. Clair to Penn, May 29, 1774, in Smith, St. Clair Papers, 300.
162 St. Clair to Penn, June 16, 1774, in Ibid., 471-2.
reasonably sure of the governor's approval since he took draconian measures to provision his expedition without waiting for a reply from Williamsburg. His militiamen were thus ordered to "shoot down the cattle, sheep, and hogs" and to "also press horses, and take by force any property they think proper," while promising payment from the "Government of Virginia." Connolly even had the audacity to ask St. Clair to contribute some of his Pennsylvanians to "act in concert with " the Virginians during the expedition. St. Clair, somewhat amused at Connolly's gall, declined to draw Pennsylvanians "into an active share in the war they have had no hand in kindling." St. Clair's refusal to help did not stop Connolly, however, and the march was set to begin on June 13.

Logan's attacks reached feverish intensity before the expedition could proceed, and Connolly felt compelled to track down the Mingo first. On Saturday morning, June 11, the commandant sent a party of forty militiamen led by Captain Francis McClure and Lieutenant Samuel Kincaid down the Monongahela toward Cheat River to pursue Logan and his warriors. The militiamen reportedly had "orders to fall on every Indian they meet, whether friend or foe." Late that evening near Ten Mile Creek (which empties into the Monongahela ten miles above Michael Cresap's Red Stone Fort), McClure and Kincaid became either careless or foolhardy, and "advanced some considerable distance ahead of their men." As dusk was settling over the creek, four Indians, probably some of Logan’s men, leaped out of the evening shadows and fell upon the two isolated officers, killing McClure "on the spot" and severely wounding Kincaid. The Indians, who had apparently been stalking the militiamen all day, faded back into the woods and "made

---

163 Devreux Smith to Dr. Smith, June 10, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4th Series, I, 469.
164 St. Clair to Penn, June 16, 1774, in Ibid., 472.
165 Ibid.
166 St. Clair to Penn, June 12, 1774, in Ibid., 467.
167 Post Script dated June 13, 1774, Ibid., 470-1; Mackay to Penn, June 14, 1774, in Ibid., 471; St. Clair to Penn, June 16, 1774, in Ibid.
168 Ibid.
their escape without so much as being fired at."\textsuperscript{169} The privates shortly "came up" and found their officers lying on the riverbank.\textsuperscript{170} McClure was hastily buried, and the militiamen literally ran back to Pittsburgh that night carrying "their wounded Lieutenant."\textsuperscript{171} 

The attack on McClure and Kincaid evidently cooled the commandant's enthusiasm for personally leading a foray against the Indians since preparations in Pittsburgh for the expedition ground to a halt. Mackay gleefully reported to Governor Penn on June 14 that "Connolly's intended expedition is knocked in the head at this time."\textsuperscript{172} St. Clair, more concerned with the well being of his Pennsylvanians than personal pique, noted with "some satisfaction" that "the Indians seem to discriminate between us and those who attacked them, and their revenge has fallen hitherto, on that side of the Monongahela [with the exception of the Campbell and Proctor killings], which they consider as Virginia."\textsuperscript{173} Others made similar observations. One Pennsylvanian observed that "There has been no mischief done by the Indians in this fork [the Allegheny] of the river yet, which gives us the reason to believe that the stroke is aimed at the Virginians only."\textsuperscript{174} Logan said as much himself when he arrived back in the Shawnee towns on or about June 20.\textsuperscript{175} Carrying thirteen scalps he had taken personally, the Mingo announced that "he [was] now satisfied for the loss of his relations, and will sit still until he hears what the Long Knife (the Virginians) will say."\textsuperscript{176} 

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{170} Post Script dated June 13, 1774, Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{171} Mackay to Penn, June 14, 1774, in Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 472. 
\textsuperscript{174} "Extract of a Letter received at Philadelphia," June 19, 1774, in Ibid., 429. 
\textsuperscript{175} St. Clair to Penn, June 22, 1774, in Smith, St. Clair Papers, I, 316. 
\textsuperscript{176} Montgomery to Penn, June 30, 1774, in Force, American Archives, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 546.
After postponing his expedition, the commandant allowed his men to harass and abuse the Indians who regularly came to Pittsburgh on business. On June 16, "a friendly Indian, who had been reconnoitering the woods with Captain McKee, was fired upon by one of Connolly's militia, but luckily made his escape." Later that day, the same Pennsylvania traders that Logan had attempted to attack in early May, arrived with "ten canoes loaded with peltry." Cornstalk's brother and two other Shawnees faithfully escorted them, just as the chief had promised. The grateful traders then prudently conducted the Shawnees away from Pittsburgh to Croghan's house for safekeeping, where the Indians received a "handsome" payment of goods for their fidelity. Connolly learned of the Shawnees' presence at Croghan's when Richard Butler applied to him for their protection from the militiamen, and asked the commandant to acquaint himself with the Indians. Connolly "absolutely refused, saying, he could not speak to them, as he looked upon them as enemies." The commandant then assembled a party of forty-one armed men and attempted to kill the Indians before they escaped. Connolly was too late, however. St. Clair, Butler and the other traders, managed to convey the Shawnees over the Allegheny River into Indian territory, "just as the guard surrounded Mr. Croghan's house." The commandant returned with his party to Pittsburgh in the evening, "enraged at being disappointed in the execution of their murderous purpose." The next morning, another "advertisement" was posted throughout Pittsburgh. It read:

177 "Extract of a Letter received at Philadelphia," June 19, 1774, in Ibid., 429.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid., 429; St. Clair to Penn, June 22, 1774, in Ibid., 474; "Memorial to Governour Penn from the Inhabitants of Pittsburgh," June 25, 1774, in Ibid., 484.
181 "Memorial to Governour Penn from the Inhabitants of Pittsburgh," June 25, 1774, in Ibid., 484.
Whereas the Shawanese have perpetrated several murders upon the Inhabitants of this Country which has involved this Settlement in the most calamitous distress; and whereas I have good reason to believe that certain imprudent people continue to carry on a correspondence with, and supply the said Enemies with dangerous Commodities to the infinite prejudice of his Majesty's subjects, and expressly contrary to an Act of Assembly prohibiting such unwarrantable intercourse: These are therefore in His Majesty's Name, strictly to require and command all His Majesty's Subjects, to take notice hereof and to deport themselves as the law directs, as they may be assured that a contrary conduct will draw on them the utmost severity thereof.\footnote{183}

Connolly then "sent two parties down the river in pursuit of the Shawnees."\footnote{184} The militiamen were under orders that "no Indian of any Nation should be spared," and that any white man "interposing on their behalf should meet the same fate."\footnote{185} At Big Beaver Creek, Connolly's men "intercepted them, and fired on them, and wounded one, and then ran off in the most dastardly manner."\footnote{186} After his militiamen failed to kill the escaping Indians, Connolly sent a militant "Speech to the Shawanese, importing that Logan and his party be immediately delivered up," and upon refusal, "they (the Virginians) are determined to proceed against them with vigour, and will show them no mercy."\footnote{187} In reply to this piece of bombast, the commandant received an ominous silence from the Indians.

\footnote{183}{Footnote 1, "Proclamation of Connolly," June 18, 1774, in Smith, \textit{St. Clair Papers}, I, 316.}
\footnote{184}{St. Clair to Penn, June 26, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 318-9.}
\footnote{185}{Deposition of William Wilson, July 13, 1774, in \textit{American Archives}, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 544.}
\footnote{186}{St. Clair to Penn, June 26, 1774, in Smith, \textit{St. Clair Papers}, 318-9.}
\footnote{187}{Æneas Mackay, Joseph Spear, and Devereux Smith to Joseph Shippen, Jr., July 8, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 548.}
Chapter 7

"THE OPPORTUNITY WE HAVE SO LONG WISHED FOR…"

Dunmore's War Intensifies

While Connolly was busy stoking the flames of war in Pittsburgh, Dunmore heard alarming reports from the frontier of Logan's raids. He also received "flagrant misrepresentations of Indian affairs" from Connolly over who was to blame for the violence.¹ Moreover, Connolly informed the governor of his plan to march on the Shawnee towns with three or four hundred militiamen to "thoroughly chastise" the Indians. On the basis of Connolly's grossly inaccurate reports of the Indian troubles, Dunmore quickly came to the same conclusion of his commandant, specifically that "the Shortest and most effectual way" to "bring the Indians to terms" was "to raise a body of men and Send them directly to the Shawnese Country."² But, the governor doubted that Connolly had the necessary strength on hand to successfully carry out such a march. Accordingly, the governor began to envision a much larger expedition, one fully outfitted and supported by the colony of Virginia. On May 12, he applied to the House of Burgesses to "provide [financially] for this Matter."³ The Assembly "did not adopt the Plan proposed," but directed Dunmore's attention to "an Act, in force, against Invasions and Insurrections, which empowers the Governor to employ the Militia upon those emergencies," which the burgesses felt would be "sufficient to repel the hostile and

---

¹ Makay, Spear, & Smith to Shippen, Jr., July 8, 1774, in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 548.
² Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 379; DSS, 15J4-48.
³ Ibid.
perfidious attempts of those savage and barbarous Enemies." With the militia placed at his disposal, Dunmore proceeded to begin preparations for a large-scale expedition into the Ohio Valley, despite the burgesses' refusal to pay for it. Almost all of Virginia's militia officers were representatives in the House of Burgesses, and happened to be in Williamsburg at the time. Dunmore took advantage of this piece of good fortune, and summoned the leaders to the governor's palace to discuss his plan. He met first with Colonels Andrew and Charles Lewis, two brothers who commanded the Botetourt and Augusta county militias, respectively. The two officers were warm to Dunmore's proposal of an offensive expedition to the Shawnee towns, and soon left for their respective counties to organize the frontier defenses and begin mustering their forces. The governor held Andrew in especially high regard at the time, writing a little later to Connolly, "I know him to be prudent, active, and resolute, and therefore very fit to go on such an expedition" despite his "advanced age" of fifty-four. Therefore, Dunmore must have decided during this initial military consultation to place the elder Lewis in command of the southern wing of the frontier army that was to assemble in the months ahead. Also in Williamsburg at the time were the primary militia officers from Fincastle County, Colonel William Preston, Lieutenant Colonel William Christian, and Major Arthur Campbell. The governor likewise met and advised these men to immediately return home and muster their men. They were ordered to spread the news during their journey westward that Virginia would carry the war into Shawnee country and turn the tables on the Indians. Washington also was in Williamsburg with the other officers at the time, but was just beginning to immerse himself in revolutionary activities. Consequently, he deferred to

---

4 Ibid.
5 "John Stuart's Narrative," in MAH, I, November 1877, 673.
6 Dunmore to Connolly, June 20, 1774, in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 473; "Circular Letter of Colonel William Preston," in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 92; DSS, 3QQ139; Lewis had also been responsible for introducing Dunmore to the benefits of the Loyal and Greenbriar Land companies.
Lewis and took no part in the subsequent organization or execution of Dunmore's Expedition.

After sending his militia officers on their way home to begin their preparations, Dunmore sent a circular letter to his county lieutenants, which amounted to an official declaration of war by Virginia:

The Intelligence which I have received from Fort Pitt, of the Motions and disposition of the Indians giving me now good grounds to believe that hopes of a pacification can be no longer entertained, and that these People will by no means be diverted from their design of falling upon the back parts of this Country and Committing all the outrages and devastations which will be in their power to effect, it is necessary (the Assembly not having thought proper to pay attention to this Momentous business though they were Sufficiently apprised of it) that we Should have recourse to the only means which are left in our power to extricate ourselves out of so Calamitous a Situation.⁹

Dunmore then gave his preliminary orders for the mustering of the militia and the organization of the frontier defenses, and intimated that he would strongly approve of any offensive measures undertaken by the militia officers of the frontier counties:

You are therefore upon receipt of this letter immediately to give orders that the Militia of your County be forthwith embodied, and held in readiness either to defend that part of the Country or to march to the Assistance of any other, as occasion may require, and in General to exert those few powers, which the Act of Assembly, in this Case, authorizes, in the best manner, according to your abilities, that may answer the present exigence; leaving it to your own Zeal and discretion to provide extraordinary means for any extraordinary occasions that may arise, as, if you Should find, by following the Enemy into their own Country and beyond the limits prescribed in the Act of Assembly and can prevail your Men to agree to it, that it would be an opportunity of Stricking Such a

Stroke as might prove decisive, I cannot but Suppose the Necessity of it would Justify you with your Country, and the benefit accruing from it ensure you their applause, and therefore oblige the Assembly to indemnify you; but this however I can only recommend to your own Judgment to do as you shall think best, as people will be more apt to determine the merit of such a Measure by the event than by the reasons which induced you to adopt it, and it exceeds the Authority which I have to vest you with.\textsuperscript{10}

The county lieutenants were urged to use their own best judgment to decide if small forts needed to be constructed. Dunmore advised their construction since they "would Serve best to protect the adjacent Settlers," "to Secure all important papers," and likewise "Cover the retreat of the Militia in Case the Number of Indians should unfortunately make that step at any time Necessary."\textsuperscript{11} He also believed "that a Fort at the Conflux of the Great Kanawha and the Ohio would Answer Several good purposes of this kind."\textsuperscript{12} Dunmore then revealed his intention of eventually assembling the militiamen from the several counties into a single backwoods army, telling his lieutenants and militia officers to keep in touch with one another so that they would "be able to assist each other in the most effectual and expeditious Manner, and, if to answer any good purpose to join your respective Corps of Militia into one body."\textsuperscript{13} Fully aware of the lack of vital military supplies in the backcountry that would be needed for such a military force, the governor promised to furnish his men with "powder and ball, as expeditiously as possible" and "at [his] own risque."\textsuperscript{14} Finally, Dunmore concluded by taking the opportunity to proudly announce that Fort Pitt had been renamed Fort Dunmore in his honor.\textsuperscript{15}

Later, Dunmore wrote Connolly:

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
I entirely approve of the measure you have taken of building a fort at Wheeling, and also of marching into the Shawanese Towns, if you think you have a sufficient force; and I desire you will keep a constant correspondence with Colonel Andrew Lewis, that you may co-operate in such measures as may be thought effectual.\(^{16}\)

The governor then gave Connolly the means to excuse himself from personally leading an expedition into Indian country, an endeavor in which the commandant had entertained second thoughts after the attack on McClure and Kincaid. Dunmore ordered:

> It is highly necessary that you continue at Fort Dunmore, and I think therefore, that you could not do better than send Captain William Crawford with what men you can spare to join him, and to co-operate with Colonel Lewis, or to strike a stroke himself, if he thinks he can do it with safety...if anything of that kind can be effected, the sooner it is done the better.\(^{17}\)

Connolly's officers were directed to take "as many prisoners as they can of women and children."\(^{18}\) If the good doctor should "be so fortunate as to reduce those savages to sue for peace," Dunmore growled, then "I would not grant it to them on any terms, till they were effectually chastised for their insolence, and then on no terms, without bringing in six of their heads as hostages for their future good behaviour, and these to be relieved annually, and that they trade with us only for what they may want."\(^{19}\) Obviously, the governor was growing more belligerent as plans for his large expedition began taking shape in earnest.

By July, Dunmore's war fever had reached such heights that he had decided to return to the Ohio Valley and personally direct military operations against the Indians. The governor gave slightly different reasons to different people for his decision to assume

---

\(^{16}\) Dunmore to Connolly, June 20, 1774, in *American Archives*, 4\(^{th}\) Series, I, 473.

\(^{17}\) *Ibid.*


\(^{19}\) *Ibid.*
personal command. He told Andrew Lewis that "the Discovery of Indians & universal Alarm throughout all the frontiers of the Colony & the unhappy situation of the Divided People settled over the Alagany Mountains makes it necessary for me to go in person to Fort Dunmore to put Matters under the best Regulation to Support a Blow that will Breake the Confederacy & render their plans abortive." Preston heard more or less the same thing from the governor, who wrote the Fincastle surveyor that he was "Determined to proceed immediately to Fort Dunmore or the mouth of Wheeling with 250 or 300 good men or as many more as can be spared in order to compell the Indians to a lasting peace after chastising them for their late murders & out Rages." Dartmouth was later told that "the accounts sent by the officers of the militia of the mutinous and ungovernable spirit of their men, whom they could by no means bring to any order or discipline or even to submit to command, determined me to go up into that part of the country, and to exert my own immediate endeavours on this important occasion." Another explanation was given to the Virginia public, which was informed that Dunmore was traveling to Pittsburgh "in order to take a view of the situation of the frontiers of this Colony," and "to settle matters amicably with the Indians," purposing "to have conferences with the different Nations, to find out the cause of the late disturbances." Whichever reason stood behind Dunmore's decision to become personally involved in a campaign against the Shawnee towns, he determined to make the most of this opportunity for military adventure. Accordingly, he left Williamsburg on July 10 for the Ohio Valley with the full intention of waging an offensive war against the Shawnees as proposed to Lewis and Preston, and contrary to what he told Dartmouth and the citizens of Virginia.

20 Dunmore to Lewis, July 24, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 97-8; DSS, 3QQ141.
22 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 382-3; DSS, 15J4-48.
On July 12, the governor stopped briefly at a plantation called Rosegill and took the time to reiterate his orders to Lewis for a march to the mouth of the Great Kanawha:

All I can now say is to repeat what I have before said which is to advise you by no means to wait any longer for them to Attack you, but to raise all the Men you think willing & Able, & go down immediately to the mouth of the great Kanaway & there build a Fort, and if you think you have force enough (that are willing to follow you) to proceed directly to their Towns & and if possible destroy their Towns & Magazines and distress them in every other way that is possible. And if you can keep a Communication open between you, Wheeling Fort, & Fort Dunmore I am well persuaded you will prevent them from crossing the Ohio any more & Consequently from Giving any further Uneasiness to the Inhabitants on the Waters of the Ohio.24

Dunmore then told Lewis that he was currently in transit "up to the Blue Ridge from whence there is already march'd a large body of Men to Join you, thinking you would be ere this at the Mouth of the Great Kanaway."25 The governor continued, "I shall immediately on my going up see if more men fit for Service are to be had [and] send them down, if I should think it Necessary."26 He closed with guarded optimism, "I make no doubt that Col' Preston will do all in his power to Assist you & I flatter myself that from your Joint efforts you will be able to give a pritty good Ac't. of [the militia]."

Lewis was troubled after reading Dunmore's letter. Not only had the governor assumed that a large-scale muster of the militia would be a relatively simple affair, but he had also expected the militia commanders to pay all the necessary expenses themselves in the hope that the Assembly would reimburse them later, as insinuated in the circular letter to the county lieutenants. With the enormity of his task beginning to weigh on him, Lewis lamented to Preston:

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
The governor from what he wrote us has taken it for granted that we would fit out an Expedition & has acted accordingly. I make no doubt but will be as much Surprised at our backwardness, as he may call it, as we are at y^e precipetet steps in y^e other quarter. Don't fail to come and let us do something. I would as matters stand, use great risque rather than a misscarrage should happen.27

Preston did do something to help Lewis. From his home at Smithfield on July 20, the Fincastle colonel issued a recruiting call for at least two hundred and fifty volunteers for the expedition. In his ringing call to arms, Preston beckoned:

…we should turn out cheerfully On the present Occasion in Defence of our lives and Properties, which have been so long exposed to the Savages; in which they have had too great Success in taking away. We may Perhaps never have so fair an Opportunity of reducing our old Inveterate Enemies to Reason, if this should by any means neglected. The Earl of Dunmore is Deeply ingaged in it. The House of Burgesses will without doubt enable his Lordship to reward every Volunteer in a handsome manner, over and above his Pay; as the plunder of the County will be valluable, & it is said the Shawnese have a great Stock of Horses. Beside it will be the only Method of Settling a lasting peace with all the Indian Tribes Arround us, who on the former Occasions have been urged by the Shawnese to ingage in a War with Virginia. This useless People may now at last be Obliged to abandon their Country, Their Towns may be plundered & Burned, Their Cornfields Destroyed; & they Distressed in such a manner as will prevent them from giving us any future trouble.28

After making this appeal to the militiamen's sense of greed and promising total war against the Shawnees, Preston hoped "the men will Readily & cheerfully engage in the Expedition as They will not only be conducted by their own Officers but they will be Assisted by a great Number of Officers & Soldiers raised behind the Mountains whose Bravery they cannot be Doubtfull of."29 The colonel ended by pleading, "The Opportunity we have So long wished for, is now before us," and that "Interest, Duty, Honour, Self

27 Andrew Lewis to William Preston, July 1774, in Ibid., 87-8; DSS, 3QQ62.
28 Circular Letter of Colonel William Preston, July 20, 1774, in Ibid., 91-3; DSS, 3QQ139.
29 Ibid.
preservation, and every thing, which a man ought to hold Dear or Valuable in Life ought to Rouze us up at present; & Induce us to Join unanimously as one man to go [on] the Expedition.\textsuperscript{30}

Preston would not go on the campaign, however, since Dunmore, before leaving Williamsburg, had charged him with the defense of the southwestern Virginia settlements and to maintain the peace with the Cherokees. With the hostile atmosphere then engulfing the frontier, in which the common white settlers regarded all Indians as the same regardless of tribal affiliation, this last task was particularly difficult. Upon returning from Williamsburg, Preston had been forced to deal with an immediate crisis that threatened to bring the Cherokees into the war. In the newly settled Wautaga Valley, located at the far western border between North Carolina and Virginia, a friendly horse race between some Cherokees and settlers had turned ugly. A local bully named Isaac Crabtree lost the race and rashly shot and killed a friendly Indian called "Cherokee Billy," who happened to be the son of a headman.\textsuperscript{31} Understandably, the killing agitated the Indian's friends, and Preston's subordinate Arthur Campbell warned, "we may expect a reprisal will be made shortly."\textsuperscript{32} The settlers' refusal to apprehend and testify against Crabtree compounded the problem, leading Campbell to bemoan, "I am persuaded it would be easier to find 200 Men to screen him from the Law, than ten to bring him to justice."\textsuperscript{33} So bolstered by his neighbors' protection, Crabtree then attempted to conduct his own personal campaign against the Cherokees on the Nolichucky River. He had heard that two or three Indians were hunting in that area, and took a "few mislead followers" to waylay them.\textsuperscript{34} As Campbell noted with some satisfaction, "our Hero was disappointed in

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Major Arthur Campbell to William Preston, about June 20, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 38-9; DSS, 3QQ40.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Arthur Campbell to Preston, June 22, 1774, in Ibid., 40-1; DSS, 3QQ41.
his expectations; for instead of finding two, or three, defenceless wretches he was
informed of 37 Warriors being in the Neighborhood, who were apprized of his
intentions." Crabtree immediately "departed the place, with precipitation," and caused
no further trouble in that quarter.

Preston still had to repair the damage done by Crabtree's actions. He sent a deeply
apologetic letter via Campbell to the Cherokee chiefs, condemning the "most unmanly &
barbarous manner" in which Cherokee Billy had been murdered. Preston further wrote,
"This Act of Barbarity & Breach of Publick Faith is justly abhorred and detested by all the
Good People in Fincastle County." "The murder must have been done by One, or a very
few of the most worthless and abandoned of the White People," and that "Such People
would kill any one of our own People that might offend them." Therefore, Preston
sincerely hoped that "the great men of the Cherokees" would view this murder as a deed
"committed by a few of the basest" of the white people and not hold the rest responsible.
He then promised to apprehend and severely punish the murderers so "that the Blood may
be washed out of the Path, that our people and yours may Travel with Safety wherever
their Business calls them."

The chiefs were receptive to Preston's appeal, and Campbell soon advised the worried
colonel that "the Cherokees would willingly avoid a War with us," especially since "their
Magazine of Powder is chiefly damaged, by being Stored up in Bags, in a Cave, or some

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
such place, under Ground."\textsuperscript{42} Campbell confirmed this information two weeks later when he wrote to Preston that the Cherokee chiefs had met in council and accepted his explanation and apology for Crabtree's behavior.\textsuperscript{43} As far as joining the Ohio Indians in a war against Virginia, the chiefs made it clear that they had no intention of aiding their ancient enemies, since a "Shawanese had killed one of their men lately in sight of their town."\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, there would be no war between Virginians and the Cherokees this year.

While Preston was defusing the crisis with the Cherokees, he also took measures to warn his surveyors in Kentucky of the imminent war. Floyd was a close friend of Preston, and the county lieutenant feared the worst for his protégé. On June 20, he sent William Russell an express asking the militia captain to send some men into Kentucky retrieve the party. Russell replied on the 26th, "I am sensible good Sir of your Uncommon concern for the Security of Captain Floyd and the Gentlemen with him, and I sincerely Sympathize with You, least, they should fall a Prey, to such Inhuman, Blood thirsty Devils, as I have so lately suffered by [the attack of October past]."\textsuperscript{45} Consequently, Russell promised to send "two of the best Hands" in his company, "Dan\textsuperscript{1}. Boone, and Mich\textsuperscript{1}. Stoner; who have Engaged to search the Country, as low as the falls, and to return by way of Gaspar's Lick, on Cumberland, and thro' Cumberland Gap: so that by the assiduity of these Men, if it is not too late, I hope the Gentlemen will be apprised of the eminent Danger they are Daily in."\textsuperscript{46} Boone and Stoner set out later that same day, and over the next sixty-two days, would cover eight hundred miles in what would ultimately turn out to be a needless

\textsuperscript{42} Arthur Campbell to Preston, June 23, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 47-49; \textit{DSS}, 3QQ44.

\textsuperscript{43} Arthur Campbell to Preston, July 9, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 72-3; \textit{DSS}, 3QQ58.

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid.}
journey, since the surveyors would discover on their own the precariousness of their situation.\footnote{47}

Floyd and his men, who were determined "to do the business they came on & try the consequences unless a superior Force should attack them," had resumed their expedition on April 20, shortly after meeting the retreating long hunters who had been attacked on the 15\textsuperscript{th}.\footnote{48} On the 26\textsuperscript{th}, Nash, Glen, and Darnell stumbled into Floyd's encampment along side the river and apprised him of their earlier ordeal.\footnote{49} Floyd listened to their account of the Shawnee threat against Virginians, but was unperturbed. He decided to continue on, and invited the three surveyors to join his group for safety. Nash and Glen accepted, while Darnell joined Hancock Taylor's smaller accompanying party.\footnote{50} Beginning with Patrick Henry's tract of five hundred acres on May 2, Floyd began a series of surveys that superceded all of Bullitt's prior work. This work consumed all of May, June, and part of July.

On May 26, Floyd received his first warning that a serious Indian war had brewing.\footnote{51} A canoe flying a red flag appeared on the river carrying two friendly Indians, who oddly enough, held "a pass from the Commandant at Fort Pitt, to go down the River in order to collect their Hunters, and cause them to go home, as they expected a war between the white people & the Shawnee."\footnote{52} The two Indians then gave Floyd a distorted account of the Yellow Creek massacre, which immediately worried the surveyors, and "put our

\footnote{47} "Narrative of Boone," in John Filson, \textit{The Discovery, Settlement and present State of Kentucke}, (Wilmington, 1784), 58.

\footnote{48} For a complete account of Floyd's activities, see "Hanson's Journal," in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 110-33; \textit{DSS}, 14J58-84.

\footnote{49} Journal Entry, April 26, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 116.

\footnote{50} \textit{Ibid.}


\footnote{52} \textit{Ibid.}
people into different opinions as to what to do."\textsuperscript{53} After the Indians departed, a general discussion ensued. Some of the surveyors suggested making a run "down the river by way of the Mississippi."\textsuperscript{54} Floyd and most of his men held firm, however, and were "determined to do the business they came on, if not repulsed by a greater force than themselves."\textsuperscript{55} This opinion carried the day, and the expedition continued, though the surveyors remained on their guard. Floyd lost one of his men on the morning of June 13, when "one Jacob Lewis departed from the camp, on Salt River" to hunt and disappeared forever.\textsuperscript{56} On July 6, Floyd split his party into three separate groups in order to complete the surveys as quickly as possible in order to get out of Kentucky that much sooner. Floyd would lead one group, James Douglas the second group, and Hancock Taylor would oversee the third group. Floyd planned for the three parties to finish their surveys and reunite on August 1 at a place simply called the Cabin, which had been built a year earlier at the headwaters of Salt River by explorer James Harrod, and would later evolve into Harrodsburg.

Not surprisingly, Floyd's risky division of the labor did not work out as planned. On July 8, Taylor and his men were surveying at the Falls when they "were surprised and fired upon by a party of about twenty Indians."\textsuperscript{57} Two men named James Hamilton and James Cowan were killed, and "as the enemy rushed upon them before it was possible to put themselves in any posture of defence," the surveyors "were obliged to abandon their camp, and make their escape."\textsuperscript{58} During their harrowing three-week journey across Kentucky, Taylor's group made "several discoveries of the enemy on the way," and had to

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{56} "Letter from Colonel William Preston, Dated Fincastle, August 13, 1774," in \textit{American Archives}, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 707-8.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ibid.}
fight their way home.\textsuperscript{59} In a skirmish on the Kentucky River, Taylor "received two balls in his Boddy, one of which proved mortal."\textsuperscript{60} He "traveled two or three days," and his men carried him two more before he died.\textsuperscript{61} Another surveyor named James Strother was shot down before the beleaguered party arrived in the Clinch Valley settlements on July 29.\textsuperscript{62}

Douglas' men found the remains of Hamilton and Cowan several days after the initial attack, and decided to halt their work and make an early rendezvous at the Cabin. They arrived on July 22, and upon finding Harrod's cabin a smoldering ruin, decided to depart "down the Mississippi, as several had before proposed returning home that way."\textsuperscript{63} Before Douglas began his descent, however, he left Floyd a confusing message written on a tree, which read: "Alarmed by finding some people killed we are gone down this way."\textsuperscript{64} Douglas and his men then took the scenic route home, riding a large perogue down the Ohio and Mississippi to New Orleans, traveling through Pensacola and Charleston, before finally arriving in Williamsburg in December.\textsuperscript{65}

Floyd arrived at the destroyed Cabin two days later on July 24, and was "surprised to find every thing squandered upon the ground & two fires burning."\textsuperscript{66} Floyd found Douglas' message and was puzzled by its vagueness. Had Douglas gone back down to the camp where the three groups had originally parted company, or had he gone down the

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60} Captain William Russell to Preston, August 28, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 173; \textit{DSS}, 3QQ84.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.


Floyd decided that the latter was true (which it was), and did not tarry long at the Cabin. As William Preston later noted with great relief, he "immediately set out" with his small party, "steering for our settlements, and after an extreme, painful, and fatiguing journey of sixteen days, through mountains almost inaccessible, and ways unknown," he "at last arrived on Clinch River." Specifically, Floyd and his men, completely missing Boone and Stoner, emerged out of the Cumberland mountains at Pound Gap on August 9, where they came to Blackburn's Fort "near the Rye Cove" in southwestern Virginia. Floyd finally realized the extent of the hostilities, and exactly how much danger he and his men had been in, when he found Mr. Blackburn's family "forted in, prepared for war with the Shawnees."

While Floyd's party was struggling to escape Kentucky, Connolly had finally managed to launch a preliminary assault on the Upper Shawnee towns from Wheeling. The attack was made by "respectable body" of Virginia militiamen from the Shenandoah Valley led by Major Angus McDonald. McDonald was another interesting character in a tale full of them. He was a Scottish Highlander of Clan Glengarry, born about 1727, and raised and educated in Glasgow. He became a professional soldier and a patron of the House of Stuart, and like Dunmore's father, had fought for Prince Charles Stuart at Culloden in 1746. After the Highlanders' disastrous defeat, McDonald fled first to France and then to America, settling in Winchester on an estate he named "Glengarry"
about 1750.\textsuperscript{73} During the French and Indian War and Pontiac's Rebellion, he served in the provincial forces as a sergeant, ultimately fighting with Bouquet at Bushy Run. In late 1763, he retired as a captain, but remained an active leader in Frederick County. When Dunmore became governor, McDonald was commissioned as a major of militia, perhaps as a compliment from one Jacobite Scot to another.

When hostilities erupted in the Ohio Valley, Dunmore had issued McDonald the same orders he had given Lewis, except that the major was to proceed to Wheeling and construct a fort after mustering his men.\textsuperscript{74} McDonald had then demonstrated superior organizational skills by quickly mustering four hundred men in eight companies from Frederick and Berkeley counties, while Lewis at the same time was complaining to Preston that the governor might be expecting too much too soon from his backcountry militia.\textsuperscript{75} After mustering his men, the major had set out for Wheeling on an overland march, and arrived at that settlement in mid-July. He had begun construction on the fort, which he named Fort Fincastle after one of Dunmore's titles, but was relieved of the work by Crawford, who had been sent down from Pittsburgh with some more men by Connolly.\textsuperscript{76} Crawford, a captain, was supposed to assume command of the entire militia force as Dunmore had suggested to Connolly on June 20, but upon his arrival he deferred to McDonald's higher rank.\textsuperscript{77} Accordingly, Crawford agreed to oversee the completion of Fort Fincastle, while the major took the opportunity to act on Dunmore's suggestion of

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74} Lewis, \textit{Battle of Point Pleasant}, 20.

\textsuperscript{75} "Extract of a letter from a Gentleman at Redstone, Received at Williamsburg, August 18, 1774," in \textit{American Archives}, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 722-3; Lewis to Preston, June 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 87-8; DSS, 3QQ62.


\textsuperscript{77} Ibid. 95-6.
"following the Enemy into their own Country" and "Stricking Such a Stroke as might prove decisive."  

While Crawford finished and garrisoned the fort, McDonald reorganized his army to incorporate Michael Cresap's men from Red Stone and Wheeling into the expedition and chose his target, Wakatomica. This was the easternmost Shawnee town and home to the most aggressive of the Shawnees, from which Logan had recruited his war party. With his army provisioned for a seven-day march and the objective chosen, McDonald and his militiamen left Wheeling on the morning of July 26, descending the Ohio River in perogues and canoes until they reached the mouth of Fish Creek, ninety miles from Wakatomica. From there they quickly marched to the eastern bank of the Muskingum River. The expedition proved to be more rigorous than McDonald expected, and once at the Muskingum, the major ordered his men to set up camp for a three-day rest. In camp, the hungry militiamen consumed all of their rations (a failing common to all new soldiers on their first campaign before and since) leaving none for the hard days ahead. They later became "incensed" at McDonald for this, and reached the conclusion that he was no Indian fighter, despite his experiences during the French and Indian War and Pontiac's Rebellion.

The march resumed after the rest period, and for the next couple of days McDonald's army advanced up an eerily quiet Muskingum valley, with his scouting parties coming within six miles of Wakatomica without so much as seeing or hearing an Indian. On

---


79 "Extract of a letter from a Gentleman at Redstone, Received at Williamsburg, August 18, 1774," in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 722-3.

80 Henry Howe, Historical Collections of Ohio; containing a collection of the most interesting facts, traditions, biographers, anecdotes, etc. relating to its general and local history, (Cincinnati: Bradley and Anthony, 1848), 381-3.

81 Ibid., 381-2.

82 Ibid., 381.
Sunday evening July 31, however, one such party "discovered three Indians coming towards them on horseback." The Indians saw the scouts, who instantly opened fire, and retreated back to the Shawnee town. McDonald's main force came up on Tuesday August 2, and the scouts once again "met three Indians," who were assumed to be "spies from a large body" lying ahead. The Indians were in fact bait for McDonald's army. The scouts again opened fire, and the Indians "ran, giving the war whoop." McDonald's men heard the commotion ahead, and "immediately formed in three columns, expecting to be attacked." In this order, the militiamen "advanced about half a mile" and encountered an ambuscade numbering fifty or sixty Shawnees, who had "made blinds on the path side to waylay" McDonald's army. An intense skirmish erupted. After a few minutes, the Shawnees were overwhelmed by McDonald's superior numbers, and began a fighting retreat. As one white participant in the skirmish recalled, "We drove the Indians before us about a mile and a half, they firing upon us from every rising ground, when at last they ran." Four Indians were killed in the clash and an indeterminate number were wounded. The Virginians, for their part, lost two men killed and six wounded.

McDonald promptly collected his men, who were "much scattered in the woods," and, "leaving a party [of 25 men] with the wounded," advanced five more miles until he reached the shore opposite" Wakatomica. Once there, McDonald "observed the Indians

83 "Extract of a letter from a Gentleman at Redstone, Received at Williamsburg, August 18, 1774," in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 722.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
88 "Extract of a letter from a Gentleman at Redstone, Received at Williamsburg, August 18, 1774," in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 722.
posted on the bank," intending to dispute the army's passage across the river.\textsuperscript{90} Some more skirmishing ensued, with both sides "endeavouring to conceal themselves behind tree, logs, &c., watching an opportunity to fire on each other."\textsuperscript{91} During this sniping contest, which lasted until nightfall, another Indian was killed.\textsuperscript{92} Late that evening McDonald called a council of his officers to discuss their options. It was decided "to cross lower down the river with a party in the night, to amuse the Indians," while two companies led by Captains Michael Cresap and Henry Hoagland would cross the river above Wakatomica before daybreak the next morning, "and secure the banks, to cover the landing" of the militiamen.\textsuperscript{93} Just as the war council was adjourning, a Delaware and a Mingo were brought in by an interpreter to see the major. The Indians requested peace, to which McDonald agreed, but only if they could secure five hostages from the Shawnees. The two Indians returned to the town, and were not seen again. Sometime in the night, McDonald received reports from his scouts that the Indians were removing their old people, women and children, and effects to other towns. Suspecting treachery, McDonald ordered the attack to proceed as planned the next morning.

Cresap and Hoagland crossed the river upstream with their men at dawn, and did not advance more than two hundred yards before discovering a Shawnee "party in ambush under the bank."\textsuperscript{94} One of Cresap's militiamen recalled, "On our endeavouring to surround them, they ran off, when about thirty of our men pursued them close, a battle ensued."\textsuperscript{95} During the resulting hand to hand combat, Cresap himself "tomahawked and scalped one Indian," and according to the eyewitness, "many more must have been wounded" judging

\textsuperscript{90} "Extract of a letter from a Gentleman at Redstone, Received at Williamsburg, August 18, 1774," in \textit{American Archives}, 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 722.
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Ibid.}, 723.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Ibid}.
from "the quantities of blood on the woods." 96 Captured in the melee was the Mingo who had spoken with McDonald the previous night. 97 This Indian was spared and removed under guard across the river to McDonald's camp, and was later taken back to Wheeling by the retiring army. 98

Cresap and Hoagland regrouped their men and then stormed into Wakatomica, where they found the town completely deserted. The militiamen lit their torches, and Wakatomica was soon ablaze. The two captains returned with their men to the main body, and in the next two days, McDonald's army found five more abandoned villages in the area, "all of which [were] burnt, together with about five hundred bushels of old corn, and every other thing [the Indians] had." 99 The militiamen also "cut down and destroyed about seventy acres of standing corn." 100 This last impulsive action proved detrimental to the army, which was running dangerously low on provisions since the militiamen had eaten all of their personal rations during the three-day rest. With his food supply dwindling, McDonald searched in vain for some Indians to fight and game to hunt. Finding neither, he was forced to declare victory and hastily retreat before his army starved.

The return trip to Wheeling proved particularly trying for McDonald and his army. As the last bits of food were consumed, discipline, never good among the militiamen to begin with, deteriorated. The men blamed McDonald for their plight and began to mercilessly harass their major, accusing him of cowardice and even threatening him physically. Typical of the abuse heaped on him during the retreat was an incident related

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
99 "Extract of a letter from a Gentleman at Redstone, Received at Williamsburg, August 18, 1774," in *American Archives*, 4th Series, I, 723.
100 Ibid.
by an eyewitness years later. During the initial skirmish of August 2, McDonald had apparently taken cover behind a fallen log, "sufficiently remote from danger had there been no defence," as a militiaman named Jacob Newbold recalled.\footnote{Howe, \textit{Historical Collections of Ohio}, 383.} Newbold later attempted to boost the morale of the retreating army by making a joke of this, shouting repeatedly, "Who got behind the log?" A chorus of militiamen replied, "The major! The major!"\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.} McDonald was not amused, and threatened to punish Newbold with flogging for spreading the story. Newbold, not about to submit himself to a British regular's punishment, flung down his rifle, uprooted a hickory stick, and assumed an aggressive posture.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.} He then told the major to his face that he had seen him slink behind a tree during the hottest part of the fight, and sneered, "That's your sort!"\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.} McDonald backed down and walked away, to the loud jeers of his men. Another incident of a similar nature occurred when a militiaman named Abraham Thomas was working to unclog his rifle, which had fouled during the skirmish. He had disassembled it and was beating the breech with his tomahawk, making quite a noise in so doing.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.} McDonald, perhaps sensitive to attracting the attention of the Shawnees to the deteriorating condition of his army, walked up to Thomas, "swearing, with an uplifted cane, threatening to strike."\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.} Thomas rose to his feet, and pulled his rifle barrel up "in an attitude of defense."\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.} McDonald "dropped his cane" and once again "walked off, while the whole troop set up a laugh."\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.}

McDonald and his militiamen reached their boats on the Ohio on August 7, and were sorely disappointed to find none of the anticipated provisions from Redstone, only green
"corn in the ear." Undaunted, "every man was soon at work with water in gourds or leaves fashioned in the shape of cups, while some provident ones enjoyed the luxury of tin cups; but all seemed alike to enjoy the repast." Across the river, several men discovered a drove of hogs "in tolerable order," and "shot one and eat him on the spot without criticizing with much nicety the mode or manner of preparation." About August 12, the bedraggled army finally paddled into Wheeling to await supplies from Red Stone, and for Lord Dunmore, "who is expected every day, and who will, no doubt, put an end to this Indian war."

Word spread quickly through Pittsburgh and the Monongahela settlements of the major's low scalp count and the poor condition of his returning army. St. Clair wrote to Penn on August 25, "There was, indeed, such confusion amongst the troops, and dissension amongst the officers, that had they met with any number of the enemy, they must certainly have been cut off." Accordingly, the magistrate predicted that Dunmore would lose interest in a larger expedition since "The season is now far advanced, and the country is exhausted," and another large body of militiamen could not be supported. St. Clair also firmly believed that the Virginians' "last exploit has not given them much stomach for another."

Dunmore, who was in Winchester at the time gathering supplies and powder for his militia, heard the same reports as St. Clair had, and was in fact disappointed with McDonald's performance. The governor informed Dartmouth of McDonald's expedition,

---


112 "Extract of a letter from a Gentleman at Redstone, Received at Williamsburg, August 18, 1774," in *American Archives*, 4th Series, I, 724.


noting that the major's men "fell upon one of their towns called Wahatomakie on the Muskingham waters, where they took a few scalps, killed some and made one prisoner, destroyed their Town and totally erased their plantations."\textsuperscript{116} However, Dunmore regretted that "this produced no Change in the designs of these People."\textsuperscript{117} In fact, the governor conceded that McDonald's expedition had actually worsened the situation, since the attack on Wakatomica had "not yet called those home that were out on this side of the mountain," and the number of attacks on settlers in the backcountry were increasing in boldness and frequency.\textsuperscript{118} Skulking parties of Indians had even been discovered among the more established settlements in the Shenendoah Valley, "some of them venturing within twenty-five miles of Botetourt Court House," before being driven away.\textsuperscript{119} Accordingly, and despite St. Clair's predictions to the contrary, Dunmore firmly resolved "to march with a body of men over the Alleghany Mountains, and then down the Ohio to the mouth of the Scioto" in order to "fall upon the lower [Shawnee] towns undiscovered."\textsuperscript{120} He hoped that his expedition might thus "put an End to this Most horrid War in which there is neither honour, pleasure, nor profit."\textsuperscript{121} Thus, Dunmore continued his recruiting and the provisioning of his growing army for the upcoming fall campaign.

The destruction of Wakatomica and its surrounding villages did not seriously injure the Shawnees. If anything, the Virginians' attack helped them win sympathy and allies from the other western tribes. St. Clair noted with much concern that while the Delawares were firmly for peace, "the Wyandots, the Hurons, and the Tawas (Ottawas) have been waivering," and were "inclined to assist" the Shawnees who had "applied to them" for

\textsuperscript{116} Dunmore to Dartmouth, August 14, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 150; DSS, 15J149.
\textsuperscript{117} Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 382; DSS, 15J4-48.
\textsuperscript{118} Dunmore to Dartmouth, August 14, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 150; DSS, 15J149.
\textsuperscript{119} "News from Williamsburg." July 14, 1774, in \textit{American Archives}. 4\textsuperscript{th} Series, I, 536.
\textsuperscript{120} Dunmore to Dartmouth, August 14, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 150; DSS, 15J149.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Ibid.}
help. The Miamis and Illinois were likewise rumbling over McDonald's expedition, leading St. Clair to warn that if the Virginians did not halt their attacks, then "some of the Western Nations will certainly join [the Shawnees]." The Six Nations, alarmed at the attacks on the Indians in the Ohio Valley, even threatened to take up the war hatchet against the Virginians.

The specter of Iroquois hordes overrunning the Ohio Valley and western Virginia brought Sir William Johnson off his sickbed one last time to reaffirm Britain's alliance with the Six Nations and prevent a general war. Johnson had spent the past three years successfully scuttling Shawnee attempts to build their own Indian confederacy, the most notable being the great congress of Scioto held in 1772. During this time, however, his health had sharply declined, and by the summer of 1774, he had "found himself much indisposed." The Cresap-Greathouse attacks and Dunmore's subsequent bellicosity had reverberated long and low in the Mohawk Valley. When news reached the ailing Johnson that the Six Nations were aroused, he called another council of Iroquois headmen to discuss the "present posture of affairs." On Friday July 9, some five hundred chiefs appeared at Johnson Hall, where the Indian Superintendent immediately began conference proceedings to urge the Iroquois to intercede with the Shawnees, and to persuade other western tribes to stay out of the war. The Iroquois opened the council with the biting observation that the white people were "as ungovernable, or rather more so," than the young Indians. Johnson was then reminded that "it was most solemnly agreed at the General Congress held at Fort Stanwix in 1768...that the Line then pointed out and fixed

122 St. Clair to Penn, August 8, 1774, in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 682.
123 Ibid.
124 Guy Johnson to Dartmouth, July 12, 1774, in NYCD, VIII, 471-2.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
128 Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with the Indians, July 9, 1774, in NYCD, VIII, 476.
between the Whites and Indians should forever after be looked upon as a barrier between us, and that the White People were not to go beyond it.” If so, the Iroquois told Johnson, then:

It seems…that your People entirely disregard, and despise the settlement agreed upon by their Superiors and us; for we find that they, notwithstanding that settlement, are come in vast numbers to the Ohio, and, and gave our people to understand that they wou'd settle wherever they pleas'd. If this is the case we must look upon every engagement you made with us as void and of no effect, but we hope it is not so, & that you will restrain your people over whom you say you have authority, and make them lay aside their ill designs, and encroachments, as it has already occasioned jealousies and ill blood, and may be productive of infinite mischief, and trouble, and we must beg that if your people insist upon settling so near ours, they may be made subject to some authority that can keep them in order.

The Iroquois also finally admitted that they had not anticipated the consequences of the Fort Stanwix Treaty, and issued a warning that a war in the Ohio Valley would necessarily spread throughout the northwest unless the British brought their subjects under control:

…at the Fort Stanwix Treaty in 1768, we gave up a great deal of land which we did not expect wou'd be suddenly overspread with people, but we now see with concern that they do not confine themselves within their limits, which must end in troubles…These things, Brother, and particularly the murders and robberies your people commit have kindled a flame which is as yet small, but unless quenched in time, it will overspread the country so that we can't stop it.

Johnson replied to these complaints and the warning by noting the "irregularities committed by the Indians about the branches of the Ohio and Mississippi [the attacks on

---

129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid., 481.
Boone and the surveyors]."\textsuperscript{132} He also made "many arguments to convince them that they shou'd exert more authority over their allies, and keep them in better order."\textsuperscript{133} Finally, the superintendent gave "a particular account of the different schemes of the Shawanese" to build their own confederacy with the western tribes, an alliance that would surely "cast an odium on the Six Nations."\textsuperscript{134} Johnson, fully fatigued by his efforts, then adjourned the conference for the weekend.

By Monday, July 11, Johnson clearly had not recovered from Friday's proceedings, but he was determined to continue the conference. That morning, he delivered an address promising that King George would take measures to prevent further intrusions into Indian territory, but that it was the business of the Iroquois to "enquire into the conduct" of their dependents, "& to punish them, who by their misconduct afford encouragement to others."\textsuperscript{135} After concluding his speech by ordering "Pipes and Tobacco, and some Liquor for the Indians," Johnson collapsed from overexertion on his front porch. His son-in-law, Colonel Guy Johnson, and several Indians carried him "to his chamber where he was seized with a suffocation of which he expired in less than two hours."\textsuperscript{136} Johnson's dramatic death in the midst of the proceedings affected the Indians greatly. They assembled "in the most apparent Confusion" and applied to Colonel Johnson "to know whether he had received authority to transact affairs with them."\textsuperscript{137} The younger Johnson replied that "there was not sufficient time to receive His Majesty's Commands touching their former Requests," but that "they shou'd rest contented as he would continue to conduct these matters 'till farther Orders."\textsuperscript{138} He then sent the Indians back to their camps,

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 477.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 477-8.
\textsuperscript{136} Colonel Guy Johnson to Dartmouth, July 12, 1774, in Ibid., 471.
\textsuperscript{137} Proceedings of Sir William Johnson with the Indians, July 11, 1774, in NYC\textit{D}, VIII, 479.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
"assuring them that he shou'd early in the morning give them more particular Information."\textsuperscript{139}

The following day, Colonel Johnson reassembled the Indians and announced that he would assume responsibility for concluding the council and follow the elder Johnson's "great example."\textsuperscript{140} The Indians then asked permission to attend Johnson's funeral and to perform a Ceremony of Condolence.\textsuperscript{141} Both requests were granted. On July 13, Johnson was carried from Johnson Hall to Johnstown and deposited in the family vault, "attended by upwards of 2000 persons from the neighboring Country, with the Indians, who behaved with the greatest Decorum, and exhibited the most lively marks of real sorrow."\textsuperscript{142} After the Christian ceremony, the Indians conducted their Ceremony of Condolence, which was carried out with great solemnity. Colonel Johnson reconvened the council shortly afterward to "proceed upon business of public concern" and promised to "do everything in my power for the Interest of the Public" and the Indians.\textsuperscript{143} Playing on the Indians' very real grief over Johnson's death, the colonel managed to "convince the Six nations that it was their duty and interest to calm their people" and to "divert the attention of the other Tribes near Ohio from the Shawanese."\textsuperscript{144} So, in death, William Johnson achieved his final triumph by robbing the Shawnees of any support they may have garnered from the Six Nations, and effectively isolated the conflict to the Ohio Valley. Thus, the Shawnees and their western allies found themselves alone in the struggle against the Virginians, since the Cherokees were content to leave them to their fate, and the Six Nations and the Delawares had decided firmly on peace.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Colonel Guy Johnson's Address, in Ibid., 479.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 480.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 482.
\textsuperscript{144} Guy Johnson to Dartmouth, July 26, 1774, in Ibid., 473.
Chapter 8

"THERE IS NOTHING BUT WAR, CONFUSION, & CONSTERNATION IN THIS COUNTRY..."

Southwestern Virginia Besieged

As Dunmore's War intensified, the Shawnees began raiding the Virginia backcountry in earnest. On June 29, Colonel William Christian informed a militia captain named Joseph Cloyd that a "Capt Dickison has had a battle, with the Indians at green Bryer [near Andrew Lewis' house], that one man is killed & two wounded, the rest fled to a house where they are besieged."\(^{145}\) Two weeks later on July 13, six people were killed and scalped at Dunkard Creek near Pittsburg by "a party of thirty-five Indians."\(^{146}\) On July 31 at Muddy Creek, which seemed to endlessly draw Indian attacks, the Shawnees fell upon militia Colonel John Field and a man named Walter Kelly, who were out taking leather from a tan trough.\(^{147}\) The Shawnees "Tomhak'd Kelley, and Cut him Vastly," killing him, while Field, bloody and bruised, managed elude his attackers and escape into the woods.\(^{148}\) Field's son was also killed in the raid while a Negro girl belonging to Kelley was taken prisoner. Three weeks later, the Shawnees returned to Kelley's cabin, and this time killed his brother William, while capturing Walter's daughter. William Preston's friend Thomas Hogg and three other men were killed and scalped some time during the


\(^{146}\) Connolly to St. Clair, July 19, 1774, in *American Archives*, 4\(^{th}\) Series, I, 678.

\(^{147}\) "John Stuart's Narrative," in *MAH*, volume 1, (November 1877), 374-5.

\(^{148}\) *Ibid.*; James Robertson to Preston, August 1, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, *Dunmore's War*, 104; *DSS*, 3QQ69.
first week of August. On August 7 at the home of old Palser Lybrooke on Sinking Creek, some fifteen miles from Preston's manor, the Shawnees attacked three families who had gathered there for a Sunday dinner. Two of Lybrooke's children and another boy were playing in a canoe on the far side of the creek at the time, and the Shawnees fell upon them first. The Indians then crossed the creek and attacked the house. Lybrooke was severely wounded in the arm, while his wife and sucking infant, "a young woman, the daughter of one Scott, and a child of one widow Snyde, were killed." The Shawnees "scalped the children, all but one, and mangled them in a most cruel manner." Three young boys were taken prisoner, and the Indians "set off from there with the greatest caution." After "Walking on Stoney Hills the worst way Imaginable," two of the boys escaped from their captors the following Tuesday night and were found by some of Major James Robertson's men near the Blue Stone River.

Indian attacks also commenced in the upper Clinch River valley. A man named John Henry was "dangereously wounded" by two Shawnees on September 8 near Captain Daniel Smith's Station, while his wife and three children were captured. Search parties found "some Indian Signs in [Henry's] Cornfield," and discovered an abandoned camp

150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.; James Robertson to Preston, August 12, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 140-1; DSS, 3QQ74.
152 "Letter from Colonel William Preston," August 13, 1774, in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 707; James Robertson to Preston, August 12, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 140-1; DSS, 3QQ74.
154 James Robertson to Preston, August 12, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 140-1; DSS, 3QQ74.
155 Ibid.
157 Arthur Campbell to William Preston, September 9, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 192; DSS, 3QQ94; Daniel Smith's Fort was located 17 miles northeast of present day Lebanon, Virginia.
"where about 12 or 15 Indians had Breakfasted." Three Indians near Maiden Spring's Station attacked one of Captain Smith's soldiers on the 13th. The soldier "escaped himself without being hurt," and tho' to have killed one of them. That same evening, Smith's scouts "discovered the tracts of a party of the Enemy going off with Horses and the prisoners." Preston reported that this mayhem was not confined to the far western settlements, since "Sundry other people have also been murdered along the frontier parts of the neighboring counties." Consequently, all of Western Virginia was fully cloaked in fear as late summer drifted into autumn, leading Preston to lament, "There is nothing but War, Confusion, & Consternation in this Country, the Inhabitants flying in Crowds; leaving their Farms in Ruins and Desolation."

John Logan also returned to the war path that summer despite his declaration in June that he was "now satisfied for the loss of his relations." On July 12, the Mingo and seven other warriors appeared on the west bank of the Monongahela River. William Robinson and two other men were working in a field that day when Logan's party surprised them. Logan shot down one of the men, while Robinson and the other man were captured. The Mingo proceeded to introduce himself to his prisoners as "Captain Logan," perversely adopting the title of the hated company commanders of the militia. Robinson was amazed that Logan "Spoke English well, and very soon manifested a friendly disposition" toward his captives. For some reason, Logan took a special interest

158 Ibid., 193.
159 Arthur Campbell to Preston, September 17, 1774, in Ibid., 203; DSS, 3QQ98; Maiden Spring's Station was located 12 miles southwest of present day Tazewell, Virginia.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
164 John Montgomery to Penn, June 30, 1774, in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 546.
in Robinson, whom he told "to be of good heart, that he would not be killed, but must go with him to his town, where he would probably be adopted in some of their families."\textsuperscript{166} The Mingo also warned Robinson "above all things that he must not attempt to run away."\textsuperscript{167} Robinson heeded Logan's advice, and "in the course of the journey to the Indian town he generally endeavoured to keep close" to the Mingo, who eagerly engaged in "a great deal of conversation" with his prisoner.\textsuperscript{168} Throughout the journey, Logan continued to encourage Robinson "to be chearful and without fear; for that he would not be killed, but should become one of them; and constantly impressing him not to attempt to run away."\textsuperscript{169} Sometime near the end of the journey, the conversation turned toward the Yellow Creek massacre, and, according to Robinson, Logan "always charged Capt. Michael Cresap with the murder of his family."\textsuperscript{170}

On July 18, the Indians and their prisoners arrived at the Mingo town of Seekonk (known to whites as the Salt-Lick Town), located 30 or 40 miles up the Scioto.\textsuperscript{171} Robinson immediately found that the rest of the Mingoes were not as nearly friendly as Logan had been. He was quickly "tied to a stake, and a great debate arose whether he should not be burnt."\textsuperscript{172} Logan insisted "on having him adopted, while others contended to burn him."\textsuperscript{173} At length, Logan prevailed, and "tied a belt of wampum round him as the mark of adoption, loosed him from the post and carried him to the cabin of an old squaw," where the captive was informed "that he now stood in the place of a warrior of the family

\begin{footnotes}
\item[166] Ibid.
\item[167] Ibid.
\item[168] Ibid.
\item[169] Ibid.
\item[170] Ibid.
\item[171] See comment by Thwaites in footnote 1, Withers, \textit{Chronicles of Border Warfare}, 185. 'Seekonk' is a corruption of the Iroquois word 'kseek-he-oong,' which means "a place of salt."
\item[173] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
who had been killed at Yellow Creek.\textsuperscript{174} Three days later, Logan brought Robinson "a piece of paper, and told him he must write a letter for him," which the Mingo "meant to carry and leave in some house where he should kill somebody."\textsuperscript{175} Robinson agreed to carry out this grim task. Logan then made some ink with gunpowder, and his captive "proceeded to write the letter by his direction, addressing Captain Michael Cresap."\textsuperscript{176} Logan then took the completed letter, "and set out to war again."\textsuperscript{177}

In September, Logan and his men emerged out of Kentucky to raid the Holston and lower Clinch Valley settlements. On September 8, a man named Samuel Lemmy was taken prisoner on the North Fork of the Holston River while the families of John and Archibald Buchanan fled into the woods to safety.\textsuperscript{178} On September 23, Logan's men took two slaves prisoner at Blackmore's Fort, and killed or captured a "considerable number" of cattle and horses.\textsuperscript{179} The following day, Logan himself struck the homestead of John Roberts, located on Reedy Creek, a branch of the Holston's North Fork.\textsuperscript{180} Roberts, his wife and several children were killed and scalped. James, Roberts' ten-year-old eldest son, was captured, while another was grievously wounded and left for dead.\textsuperscript{181} A war club with a message tied to it was found on Roberts' dinner table. This was the letter that Logan had dictated to Robinson before he had left his town. It read:

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 242-3.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 243.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{178} Arthur Campbell to Preston, September 17, 1774, in Ibid., 202-3; DSS, 3QQ98; Arthur Campbell to Preston, September 29, 1774, in Ibid., 218; DSS, 3QQ106.
\textsuperscript{179} Arthur Campbell to Preston, September 26, 1774, in Ibid., 209; DSS, 3QQ104; Blackmore's Fort was located 10 miles north of present day Gate City. Logan had the two slaves with him when he returned to the Ohio Valley on October 21. See William Christian to Preston, November 8, 1774 in Ibid., 305; DSS, 3QQ130.
\textsuperscript{180} "Circular Letter of William Cocke," September 25, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 208; DSS, 3QQ103; Arthur Campbell to Preston, September 26, 1774, in Ibid., 210; DSS, 3QQ104; Arthur Campbell to Preston, September 29, 1774, in Ibid., 218; DSS, 3QQ106; Logan Historical Society, The American Pioneer, 2 volumes. (Cincinnati: H. P. Brooks, 1842), I, pp. 14, 208.
To CAPTAIN CRESSAP--What did you kill my people on Yellow Creek for. The white People killed my kin at Coneestoga a great while ago, & I thought nothing of that. But you killed my kin again on Yellow Creek, and took my cousin prisoner then I thought I must kill too; and I have been three times to war since but the Indians is not Angry only myself.\textsuperscript{182}

The letter was signed, "Captain John Logan," and dated July 21, 1774. Neighbors found the murdered family and Logan's letter, and tended to the wounded boy. Arthur Campbell met the boy, and reported, "He received but one Blow with a Tomhake on the back of the Head, which cut thro his scull, but it generally believed his Brains is safe."\textsuperscript{183} The child recounted the vivid details of his family's murder, and "returned sensible Answers" when his "Uncle questioned him."\textsuperscript{184} It was generally believed that he would survive his trauma, "being an active wise boy" who continued to "talk sensibly."\textsuperscript{185} On October 6, however, the boy died. Campbell told Preston that "he was an extraordinary example of patience and resolution to his last, lamenting "he was not able to fight enough for to save his mammy."\textsuperscript{186}

The crisis deepened when the Indians attacked three of Boone's men at Moore's Fort on September 29, "between sunset and dark."\textsuperscript{187} One Jim Duncom was "shot dead on the spot; and Scalped, altho a party of Men ran out of the Fort to the place as soon as the Guns

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid. See footnote 45 in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 208.

\textsuperscript{182} Arthur Campbell to Preston, October 12, 1774, in Ibid., 246; His "kin at Coneestoga" were some friendly Mingoes who had been lynched by the so-called "Paxton Boys" in December 1763. The Paxton Boys were vigilantes from Virginia dedicated to killing Indians. See Brooke Hindle, "The March of the Paxton Boys," in the William and Mary Quarterly, third series, volume III, number 4, (October 1946), 461-486; His "cousin" was really his niece. Also, Logan's contention that he was only angry and not the Indians is curious in view of the Mingoes initial reaction to Robinson and the onset of large-scale raiding by the Shawnees before the letter was written. Perhaps he meant that his vengeance was personal.

\textsuperscript{183} See footnote 50 in Ibid, 218.

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{186} Arthur Campbell to Preston, October 6, 1774, in Ibid., 233; DSS, 3QQ116.

\textsuperscript{187} Arthur Campbell to Preston, October 1, 1774, in Ibid., 219; DSS, 3QQ109. Moore's Fort was located at present day St. Paul, Virginia.
fired." The Indians fled into the shadows of the forest, and night prevented the militiamen from following them. About roughly the same time Duncom was killed, "a Man upon the South Fork [of Holston] narrowly escaped being taken Prisoner in another raid." These successive attacks, as well as the Roberts' killings, threw the Holston and lower Clinch Valley settlements into a frenzy. Captain Daniel Smith informed Preston that "The late Invasions of Indians hath so much alarm'd the inhabitants of this River [Clinch] that …some of the more timorous among us will remove to a place of Safety, and when once the example is set I fear it will be followed by many." This tendency for flight resulted partly from the shortage of powder and ammunition that was taken away by the militia companies for Dunmore's Expedition. Campbell struggled to "keep the people from flying the Country" by "giving them assurances…that everything will be done…to have Ammunition speedily brought into the Country." He also prevailed upon "most of the Inhabitants" to erect Forts, making no doubt that they would "dispute the Country valiantly if once provided with ammunition." Campbell's entreaties were ultimately successful, though powder and ammunition remained scarce, and he took pride in noting that "most of the people in this Country, seem to have a private plan of their own, for their own particular defence." This took much of the pressure off the militiamen for defending the scattered homesteads, and allowed the officers to concentrate their meager resources to track down the Indians.

---

188 Ibid.
189 Arthur Campbell to Preston, September 29, 1774, in Ibid., 216; DSS, 3QQ106, 107.
190 Daniel Smith to Preston, October 4, 1774, in Ibid., 228; DSS, 3QQ114.
191 See George Adams to Preston, October 4, 1774, in Ibid., 228; DSS, 3QQ113, 228; Adams wrote, "Amunition is very scarce With us Which is ye occasion of abundanc of Feare."
192 Arthur Campbell, September 29, 1774, in Ibid., 216; DSS, 3QQ106, 107.
193 Ibid.
194 Arthur Campbell to Preston, October 6, 1774, in Ibid., 232; DSS, 3QQ115.
The militia officers were puzzled over the identity the mysterious raiders in their midst. The white inhabitants of the Holston and Clinch valleys knew most of the prominent Cherokee warriors, but had never heard of a "Captain John Logan." Daniel Boone examined Logan's war club and thought it was Cherokee in origin. Others agreed with Boone's assessment. Campbell was not so sure. At first he believed the marauders were "only Spies," but soon came to believe that the Indians were "some of Major McDonald's desperate fugitives that has taken refuge some where on the Ohio to the back of us." After the raid on Moore's fort, Logan and his warriors apparently attempted to carry out two simultaneous attacks on two separate forts nearly forty miles apart. Blackmore's Fort, which had been raided two weeks earlier, was the first of these. Boone had detected the signs of an impending second attack, and had warned Campbell that "the Indians [have] been frequently about Blackmore's since the Negroes [were] taken." His intuition proved correct. On Thursday, October 6, the Indians "silently crept along under the Bank of the [Clinch] River completely out of view" to position themselves for a "bold push to enter the Fort as the People [were] chiefly all some distance away from the Gate." A man named Deal Carter stumbled upon the raiders, and "immediately commenced hallooing Murder." One of the Indians fired and missed Carter, but another shot him "thro the Thigh." Carter tried to make a run for safety. His injury hobbled him, however, and in Campbell's words, "One fellow more bold than the rest,

---

195 Arthur Campbell to Preston, October 1, 1774, in Ibid., 220; DSS, 3QQ109.
196 Ibid. Arthur Campbell to Preston, September 29, 1774, in Ibid., 216; DSS, 3QQ106, 107.
197 Ibid., 221; Arthur Campbell to Preston, September 29, 1774, in Ibid., 216; DSS, 3QQ106, 107.
198 Arthur Campbell to Preston, October 12, 1774, in Ibid., 244-5; DSS, 3QQ118; See Arthur Campbell to Preston, October 1, 1774, in Ibid., 220; DSS, 3QQ109.
199 See Arthur Campbell to Preston, October 1, 1774, in Ibid., 220; DSS, 3QQ109.
200 Arthur Campbell to Preston, October 12, 1774, in Ibid., 244-5; DSS, 3QQ118.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
soon ran up and tomaked and scalped him” within "55 Steps of the Fort." Two of the militiamen inside the fort fired at Carter's assailant while another soldier shot at one of the Indians in the distance. All three white men missed, and the Indians returned the fire, also missing their marks. The Indians fled, but returned two nights later to steal six more horses and to kill or scatter all the remaining cattle in the fields surrounding the fort.

At almost exactly the same time that Blackmore's fort was being assaulted, on October 6, Logan and several warriors appeared in Sapling Grove outside of Evan Shelby's fort. Shelby had stripped the garrison of powder and men for Dunmore's Expedition, leaving behind only a skeleton force to guard his settlement. The Indians apparently did not know this. One of Shelby's slaves was working some three hundred yards from the fort. Logan promptly captured her. He carried the woman some distance away and began interrogating her, asking "how many guns were in the fort, "and other questions relative to the strength of the place." The woman repeatedly refused to answer, at which he became angry and "knocked her down twice." In the middle of the interrogation, the Indians saw or heard "a Boy coming from the Mill," and "immediately tyed the Wench" and "went off to catch the Boy." While they were away, the woman slipped her bounds, "made her escape," and sounded the alarm at the fort. Shortly after the incident, she described her abductor to Campbell as a "larger Man, much Whiter that the rest" who "talked good English." Campbell wrote Preston that this "was the same kind of a person Mr. Blackmore saw in pursuit of the Negroes" on September 23.

---

203 Ibid.
204 Ibid., 245.
205 Shelby's Fort was located on Beaver Creek in present day Bristol, Tennessee.
206 Arthur Campbell to William Preston, October 9, 1774, in Ibid., 238-9; DSS, 3QQ117.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
with the slave woman's clear description of his antagonist, Campbell expressed confidence to Preston that the "sculking Enemies may be found out this week." Small ranging parties were quickly organized, and militiamen patrolled the paths from Reedy Creek to Moccasin Gap in search of the large, light-skinned Indian. Campbell was too late, however. Logan was gone. After the anticlimactic incident at Fort Shelby, the Mingo had gathered his warriors and their prisoners together and began the long journey back to the Ohio Valley. On October 21, Logan and his men appeared in Chillicothe with Roberts' son and Blackmore's two slaves. The Mingo claimed to have personally killed "either 5 or 7 people" on "the Fronteers next [to] the Cherokee Country." If Logan was expecting a triumphant return to the Ohio Valley, he was sorely disappointed, since he now discovered to his everlasting bitterness that the war was all but over.

212 Arthur Campbell to William Preston, October 9, 1774, in Ibid., 240; DSS, 3QQ117.
213 William Christian to Preston, November 8, 1774, in Ibid., 305; DSS, 3QQ130.
214 Ibid.
Chapter 9

"SUCH A BATTLE WITH THE INDIANS HAS NEVER BEEN HEARD OF BEFORE"

Dunmore's Expedition and the Battle of Point Pleasant

While southwestern Virginia was bearing the brunt of the Indian attacks, Dunmore was slowly making his way from Winchester to Pittsburgh with two regiments of militia, about seven hundred men, which he had recruited from Frederick and Berkeley Counties, accompanied by twelve wagons of baggage.\(^1\) Before leaving Winchester on August 27, the governor had given Andrew Lewis his final orders, dated July 24:

I intend to take as many men from this quarter as I can in order in such short time & desire you to raise a respectable body of men and join me either at the mouth of the great Kanaway or Wailen [Wheeling] as is most convenient for you. The Indians having spies on the frontiers they may bring all the force of the Shawnees against you in your march to the mouth of the Kenewey so I would have you consider in what time you could get them and other things ready to meet me ay eny place at Ohio in as short time as you can...I wish you would acquaint Colo. Preston of contents of this letter that those he sends out may join you and pray be as explicit as you can as to the time & place of meeting.\(^2\)

With the campaign thus locked into execution, Dunmore followed Braddock's Road to the mouth of the South Branch of the Potomac River, stopping there about August 30 to meet

---


\(^2\) Dunmore to Lewis, July 24, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, *Dunmore's War*, 97-8; DSS, 3QQ141.
with Connolly, who had come down from Pittsburgh to confer with the governor. Dunmore called a council of war, and discussed the expedition with Connolly and Colonel Adam Stephen, who was commanding the Berkeley County Regiment. During the council, Connolly suggested that it might be more prudent for Lewis to march up the Little Kanawha River and meet the governor at that river's mouth instead of joining forces at the mouth of the Great Kanawha as previously directed in Dunmore's orders of July 24. Dunmore and Stephen agreed with Connolly's logic. The governor then wrote to Lewis and ordered a change in the line of march toward a new rendezvous point at the mouth of the Little Kanawha, some fifty miles upstream from the mouth of the Great Kanawha. A scout was then sent to find the colonel and deliver the order. After sending the runner on his way, Dunmore promoted Connolly to major and the council ended. Connolly then returned to Pittsburgh ahead of the governor, who chose to travel with his militia army.

From the South Branch of the Potomac, Dunmore's army pushed on to old Fort Cumberland, and from there marched on the winding pathways through the mountains to the mouth of Redstone Creek on the Monongahela. During this strenuous part of the journey through the wilderness, Dunmore demonstrated his Scottish toughness by "marching on foot and carrying his own knapsack" as well as sharing the hardships with the privates." At the Monongahela, the army divided. Colonel Stephen and his Berkeley County Regiment steered toward Wheeling across country, driving a herd of beef before them. As Stephen's regiment marched off, William Crawford arrived to greet Dunmore. The governor immediately promoted the surveyor to major and placed him in command of the Frederick County Regiment. Dunmore and his remaining militiamen then followed the Monongahela to Pittsburgh, arriving on September 11.

3 Lewis, Battle of Point Pleasant, 22; St. Clair to Penn, August 27, 1774, in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 685.
4 Andrew Lewis to Preston, September 8, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 190-1; DSS, 3QQ93.
5 "Sketch of Dunmore," by Lyman C. Draper, in Ibid., 426.
Dunmore arrived slightly ahead of his army, entering the village "in three small canoes." This humble entrance, in the words of an observer, "totally disappointed the poor Commandant, who had with vast pain & labour introduced a new mode & sistem of discipline amongst his veterans, and had intended to receive his Lordship with all the pomp, etc., imaginable." Once ashore, Dunmore hurried to the rebuilt Fort that now bore his name. Connolly had prepared an apartment inside, and the governor, after taking a walking tour around Fort Dunmore, entered the post to set up residence. A sentry standing guard at the fort's gate saw Dunmore, and laid down his rifle, "went up to his Lordship, & with his hat off welcomed him heartily." Dunmore laughed "heartily" over the sentry's over-enthusiasm, and proceeded to make himself at home. The rest of the governor's evening "was spent tête à tête with the Commandant" in discussion over the present state of affairs in the Ohio Valley, a conversation apparently accompanied by a great deal of drinking, the result of which was "visible in [Dunmore's] countenance the next day." Despite the governor's private censure of Connolly the previous April, and the commandant's subsequent disregard of Dunmore's orders that he act more discreetly in ruling Pittsburgh, the two men got along famously. Indeed, all seemed to be going to Dunmore's plan with the exception of the Indian war, and even that seemed to be turning to the governor's personal advantage for the enhancement of his prestige in Virginia.

The next day, McKee appeared at Fort Dunmore and informed the governor that delegates from the Delawares and the Six Nations in Pittsburgh were willing to intercede

---


8 *Ibid*.

9 *Ibid*.

10 *Ibid*.

with the Shawnees, and wished to parley with him. Dunmore, still groggy from his late night drinking session with Connolly, met with the delegation, and discovered "those Nations not only disposed to peace, but attached to our cause." White Eyes spoke for the whole group, declaring "that they now hoped & wanted to assist him in healing up the breach that had been made in the chain of friendship by some rash young people of both parties." The Delaware chief promised to "go down to the Shawanese" and bring them to an appointed place at an appointed time, and to use his influence "to incline them to Peace." Dunmore agreed to White Eyes' proposal and chose the mouth of the Little Kanawha River as the conference site, since he was expecting Lewis to be marching that way with his division of militiamen. The date set for the meeting was September 30.

In the meantime, Dunmore continued to work out the fine details of his expedition and scrounged for more provisions, which were becoming increasingly scarce because of Connolly's prior activities and McDonald's foray to Wakatomica. While so doing, he soon fell in company with a professional Swiss officer in the service of the British Army named Augustine Prevost, who was in Pittsburgh at the time visiting his father-in-law, George Croghan. Prevost was a keen observer and bluntly commented on Dunmore's incapacity for military command. The officer wrote, "His Lordship's scheme & plans of operations are very like those of a novice, & of a man that is ignorant of the matter [he] is upon. He has no store either of provisions, ammunition, or, what is worse, money, & the House of Burgesses are very unwilling to grant him any." Dunmore's apparent

---

12 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 383; DSS, 15J4-48.
14 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 383; DSS, 15J4-48.
15 Ibid.
16 Like so many others, Prevost had become enmeshed in Croghan's disastrous real estate speculations, and had suffered financially for it.
17 Wainwright, "Turmoil at Pittsburgh," 132.
operational incompetence is rather surprising since he had prior military service as a lieutenant in the 3rd Foot Guards of the British Army.\textsuperscript{18} Perhaps this was a reason why he had left the service before entering the House of Lords years before. At any rate, the governor was no military genius, but he made up for his deficiencies with resolve and by engaging in some dubious business transactions. As Prevost noted, lack of money was Dunmore's primary concern since "His own salary [was] not sufficient to defray such a burthen of expenses."\textsuperscript{19} As a temporary solution to the pay and provisioning problem, the governor contracted with "a few individual traders" to "pay off his soldiers & offrs. With goods out of their stores" with the stipulation that "they might charge a large, very large advance such as 300%." This ploy worked, and Dunmore, through such measures, managed to hold his army together around Pittsburgh for the upcoming campaign.

Through several squirrel hunting excursions, boisterous drinking sessions, and a shooting contest, Prevost came to know Dunmore personally.\textsuperscript{20} After all was said and done, the officer admitted that he did not know "what to make of him, of his measures, or of his conduct" in provoking a border crisis with Pennsylvania and by waging a war against the Shawnees. Prevost firmly believed that "His Lordship in a private character is by no means a bad man," but "On the contrary, he is a jolly, hearty companion, hospitable & polite at his own table."\textsuperscript{21} However, he felt that Dunmore was surrounded by "evil counselors" and was dangerously flawed with a "very weak will" and easily swayed by those around him.\textsuperscript{22} Therefore, in Prevost's opinion, "as a Governor, or the commander of an expedition," Dunmore was "the most unfit, the most trifling and the most uncalculated person living."\textsuperscript{23} As such, Prevost predicted that "The anals of Virginia will show the truth

\textsuperscript{18} Caley, \textit{Dunmore}, 20.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 140-141.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 143.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
of one, & the event of his conduct in the latter capacity will sufficiently evince that of the other."\textsuperscript{24}

One of the "evil counselors" mentioned by Prevost who attended Dunmore was Connolly. Throughout the governor's sojourn at Pittsburgh, the commandant incessantly shadowed his master, much to Prevost's disgust. The Swiss officer had made Connolly's acquaintance before Dunmore's arrival by having dinner with the commandant and his wife. Prevost wrote of the private encounter, "Our meeting seemed very sincere & friendly, & not withstanding the many accounts I had heard to his prejudice, I could not help to wish that he might be wronged, butt in a few hours after was soon convinced of his little worth, & that he was capable of doing what he was accused of."\textsuperscript{25} Prevost's description of Mrs. Connolly, was just as unflattering:

\begin{quote}
\ldots her complexion & features appeared to me to be infinitely ugly. In a decent, plain garb, she appeared tolerable. Her temper in appearance seems to be a very diabolical one. In short, to sum up her character, she has all the gesture & conduct of a serpent.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

Perhaps this explains Connolly's seemingly perpetual belligerence. Prevost was even less charitable in his opinion of Connolly's troops. He considered Fort Dunmore as nothing more than a "nest of cutthroats" under occupation by "ruffians & plunderers."\textsuperscript{27} He further observed that "Both offrs. & men are people of the most infamous and abandoned

\begin{footnotes}
\item[24] \textit{Ibid}.
\item[25] \textit{Ibid}.
\item[26] \textit{Ibid.}, 138. Connolly's wife was named Susanna, but was more commonly known as Sukey. See note 60 in \textit{Ibid.}, 128. Prevost had absolutely nothing good to say about her. On September 8, he wrote in his diary, "I was sorry to find that Mrs. [Connolly] bore the character of a [crossed out], that one S.G. [Simon Girty?] was supposed to be much in her good graces. Lord what infamy, further that he expected much from her intimacy with [Connolly?].", \textit{Ibid.}, 129-30; See also notes 65 and 60 in same.
\item[27] \textit{Ibid.}, 129-30.
\end{footnotes}
characters," and that "such lawless villains there never was the like." Such were the two hundred men of Connolly's self styled "West Augusta Battalion."

On September 23, Dunmore set out from Pittsburgh with Crawford's Frederick County Regiment and Connolly's West Augusta Battalion for Wheeling. Prevost was sure the expedition was a disaster in the making, writing that the governor "has little or no provision, only a few canoes, very few bad men & those all inclined to quit him & return to their habitation." Despite these problems, Dunmore carried on, with Crawford's men driving another herd of cattle along the eastern bank of the Ohio River, while the governor and Connolly's troops descended in canoes. The army arrived at Fort Fincastle on September 30. The reunion between Colonel Stephen's Berkeley County Regiment and the Frederick County Regiment plus the West Augusta Battalion brought Dunmore's militia strength up to nine hundred men. The addition of Major Angus McDonald's four hundred men, who had been waiting for the governor at Wheeling since their return from Wakatomica, gave Dunmore a formidable force of thirteen hundred militiamen in total. Lewis, however, had not arrived with his contingent, much to the governor's disappointment. This did not seriously hamper Dunmore's plans, however, since the governor determined that he had enough men present to accomplish his purpose if need be without Lewis' help. So, the expedition continued.

28 Ibid., 130.
29 Lewis, "Battle of Point Pleasant," 23.
30 Wainwright, "Turmoil at Pittsburgh," 143.
31 Valentine Crawford to Washington, October 1, 1774, in Butterfield, Washington-Crawford Letters, 97-8. Despite Prevost's assertion that Dunmore had "little or no provision" and "few canoes," the governor actually had a substantial herd of cattle at his disposal and enough canoes to carry Connolly's men.
33 Lewis, Battle of Point Pleasant, 23.
34 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 384; DSS, 15J4-48.
35 Ibid.
At Fort Fincastle, White Eyes reappeared and brought Dunmore the "disagreeable news" that "the Shawanese would listen to no terms, and were resolved to prosecute their designs against the People of Virginia."36 The governor was not really surprised. In response, he sent Crawford and his five hundred-man regiment, with "fifty pack horses and two hundred bullocks, ahead to meet Colonel Lewis at the mouth of Hockhocking, [twelve or fifteen miles] below the mouth of the Little Kanawha," in case the Colonel arrived there instead of at Wheeling.37 While waiting, Crawford was "to build a stockade fort, or a large blockhouse" in preparation for Dunmore's arrival.38

Dunmore waited for several more days on Lewis, but "being unwilling to increase the expence of the Country by delay," he decided to proceed alone.39 Before leaving, he sent three scouts out with another message to Lewis, which now invited the colonel to join him at the mouth of the Hockhocking River.40 Dunmore then took his men on down the Ohio to the new rendezvous point. Once there, he found Crawford and his regiment engaged in the construction of a fort, per the governor's orders. Dunmore christened the structure Fort Gower in honor of one of his friends in the House of Lords, and made it his new base of operations.41 However, there was still no sign of Lewis. Dunmore then sent White Eyes with another message to the Shawnees. On the evening of October 9, the Delaware chief returned with the disturbing news that nearly five hundred "Warriors were gone to the South, to Speak with the Army there, & that they had been followed by another Nation,

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 384; DSS, 15J4-48.
40 Ibid.; For the identity of the three scouts, see note 3, in "Fleming's Journal," in Ibid., 285.
41 Howe, Historical Collections of Ohio, 49.
that they would begin with them, in the morning and their business would be over by Breakfast time."\textsuperscript{42} Then, said White Eyes, "they would speak with his Lordship."\textsuperscript{43}

After receiving the governor's written orders of July 12 and 24, Lewis and his lieutenants struggled to muster and organize a southern contingent from Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle Counties for the march to the Shawnee towns.\textsuperscript{44} He had decided to unite the various components of his division on a savannah at the "Great Levels" on the Greenbriar River. After building his force, he planned to follow the Great Kanawha River to its mouth, on the basis of Dunmore's discretionary orders, since that route was by far the easiest for an army marching through the mountains to the Ohio. His task was difficult, and he faced almost every conceivable problem that could confront an army commander. But, of all the militia officers in Western Virginia, he was probably the one most capable of organizing an army from scratch and making the march.

Lewis was fifty-four years old, which was considered an "advanced age" at that time for an active militia officer.\textsuperscript{45} A contemporary described him as "a person upwards of six Feet high, of uncommon Strength and Agility, and his Form of the most exact Symmetry."\textsuperscript{46} He carried a "stern and invincible Countenance, and he was of a distant and reserved Deportment, which rendered his presence more awful than engaging."\textsuperscript{47} Governor Moore of New York remarked during the Fort Stanwix congress in 1768 that


\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid.} White Eyes told Dunmore that nearly 500 warriors had gone south to attack Lewis. Fleming exaggerates the number as 700 warriors, and later even more. See Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 384-5.

\textsuperscript{44} Lewis, \textit{Battle of Point Pleasant}, 24.


\textsuperscript{46} "John Stuart's Narrative," in \textit{MAH}, volume I, (December 1877), 742-3.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}
"the Earth seemed to tremble under him as he walked along."\textsuperscript{48} Lewis apparently "despised sycophant means of gaining Popularity, which never rendered more than his superior merits extorted."\textsuperscript{49} As such, his "Character was not calculated to gain much Applause by commanding an Army of Volunteers, without Discipline, Experience or Gratitude."\textsuperscript{50} Despite his aloof personality and commanding presence, however, his intimate friends, Washington among them, fondly called him "Paddy."\textsuperscript{51}

Lewis had seen extensive military service in the provincial forces during the French and Indian War. He had been with Washington at Fort Necessity, and received two wounds in that battle.\textsuperscript{52} His first independent command had ended in disaster in 1756 during the Sandy Creek expedition against the Shawnees, when an officers' squabble and an attempt at imposing discipline, exasperated by his autocratic manner of command, led his men to mutiny and desert en masse.\textsuperscript{53} In 1758, he fought in Forbes' campaign against Fort Duquesne, and had been captured by the French in an ill-founded reconnaissance mission led an impetuous British major named James Grant.\textsuperscript{54} Freed by Amherst during the conquest of Canada in 1759, Lewis marched against the Cherokees a year later and helped cow that nation into a lasting peace with the British. During Pontiac's Rebellion, Lewis again distinguished himself by guarding Virginia's southern frontier with five hundred men against any renewed attacks from the Cherokees. In 1765, he clashed with a group of vigilantes calling themselves the "Augusta Boys," who killed a group of friendly Cherokees and almost instigated another Indian war from that quarter.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}  
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ibid.}  
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Ibid.}  
\textsuperscript{51} Patricia Given Johnson, \textit{General Andrew Lewis of Roanoke and Greenbriar}, (Southern Printing Company: Blacksburg, Virginia, 1980), 110.  
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, 26.  
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, 47-55.  
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}, 89-98.  
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}, 131-40.
apprehended the murderers, and as a result, found £1,000 price placed on his head by the gang. He survived the encounter however, and his prestige in western Virginia soared. Afterward, he had reentered the surveying profession and become heavily involved in land speculation and Virginia politics. In 1768, Lewis was chosen, along with Dr. Thomas Walker, to act as a commissioner for Virginia at the Fort Stanwix treaty congress, where he safeguarded the interests of Virginia, the Greenbriar and Loyal land companies, and his own military land grant (under Dinwiddie's Proclamation).\footnote{Ibid., 141-53.} Very soon afterward, he and Walker appeared at the treaty council held at Hard Labour, South Carolina, and resorted to deception in an attempt to subvert the southern Indian superintendent Captain John Stuart.\footnote{Ibid.} Later, Lewis was appointed county lieutenant of Botetourt County by Dunmore and was elected to the House of Burgesses, in effect becoming the most powerful man in the Virginia backcountry, with the possible exception of his friend William Preston.\footnote{Lewis' homestead "Richfield" was located at present day Salem, Virginia, near Roanoke. See Johnson, Andrew Lewis, 157-8.} Such was the man who would lead the Southern Division of Dunmore's backwoods army.

Lewis arrived at the "Levels of the Greenbriar" on September 1, and found that the first militia companies had already arrived and organized the camp, called "Camp Union." Lewis was pleasantly surprised, and wrote Preston, "we shall have a much Larger Number than was expected."\footnote{Lewis to Preston, September 8, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 190; DSS, 3QQ93.} Despite the good turnout, however, recruiting had in fact been a problem. Many men had declined to serve on the vague promises of pay, while others refused "to Leave their Wives and Children exposed to the Mercy of the Enemy."\footnote{John Montgomery to William Preston, October 2, 1774, DSS, 3QQ110.} The massacre of the Lybrooke family and their friends at Sinking-Creek further hindered
recruitment. Some men chose not to muster because of outright cowardice. Others saw the Dunmore's Expedition as a piece of work by land jobbers, and refused to have any part of it. This was particularly the case in the arrest of John Bowyers of Botetourt County, who openly declaring that the militiamen "would be Cursed Fools for going" since they "would get no pay" while Colonel Lewis would "get his Land Survey'd." Bowyers must not have been alone in his opinion since it was asserted that his denunciations resulted in "a great Hurt to the Raising of men."

Those men who chose to muster very often proved undisciplined and unruly. A typical example of this common problem can be seen in the efforts of Major James Robertson of the Watauga settlements. Robertson had collected twenty men as early as July 19, but he could not get them to march until the twenty-first. He finally prodded his company into motion by inspiring his men with "a Great Deal of Both good words and Bad ones." Robertson had hoped to leave earlier for the rendezvous at Camp Union, but, as he remarked, "it was not in my power. Some had grain to put up and to Leave them would not do for I would Scarcely Ever See them again." Preston did not make Robertson's work any easier, by telling the major on July 22 that "If there are more Officers than are allowed by Law for the proportion of Men, they are to be discharged, or take their chance for their Pay when the Accounts come to be settled." This was a

---

61 Arthur Campbell to Daniel Smith, August 9, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 134; DSS, 4X43.
62 Major James Robertson to Preston, September 4, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 179-80; DSS, 3QQ91.
63 "Deposition of Adam Wallace in Regard to John Bowyer," September 10, 1774, in Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, volume XIII, number 1, (July 1905), 46.
64 Ibid.
65 Major James Robertson to Preston, July 20, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 94-5; DSS, 3QQ66.
66 Ibid.
67 Preston to Robertson, July 22, 1774, in Ibid., 95; DSS, 3QQ138.
problem since most of Robertson’s men wanted to be officers. The harried major tried to carry out Preston’s orders, and reported woefully back that:

…Harry Thomson Setts off tomorrow they tell me and his Party all Goes off with Him. Onless you Send some men down the case will be Bad So that I must stay with not more than six men unless I kill Part and tye the Other. I expect we will have a war amongst ourSelves without that of the Indians.68

Lack of ball and powder was likewise a serious problem, as elsewhere in the backcountry, and Robertson complained to Preston on August 1 that his company would "Undoubtedly Break up Unless we Get Some Ammunition."69 Five days later, he was even more insistent: "Pray Sir send down some Flower and Powder and Lead if Possible. Let it be Good or Bad."70 Scarce provisions compounded Robertson's problems, and he sourly noted that "There is Two Cursed Scoundrels Old Pete and his son Jacob has Corn Beef and Old Bacon Plenty to Spare and will by no means Let it go without the ready Cash…I imagine they do all they can to hurt the expedition."71

During the last week of August, Robertson tried to induce more men to enlist in his company, which by then had encamped at Culbertson's Bottom on New River. He met with poor success in getting "these Hulkinge young dogs that can be Well Spar'd" to join the expedition, and deemed it necessary to solicit help from two other militia captains to "Stir up Some Backward Scoundrels in their Companys to turn Out or Else force them for no Honour nor Intreateys will move them."72 At the same time, Robertson also faced a coup attempt by a faction within his company calling themselves "Deal's Buckeyes." He asked for Preston’s help in quelling the mutiny, relating that "I have had more uneasiness

---

68 Robertson to Preston, July 26, 1774, in Ibid., 99; DSS, 3QQ67, 68.
69 Robertson to Preston, August 1, 1774, in Ibid., 105; DSS, 3QQ69.
70 Robertson to Preston, August 6, 1774, in Ibid., 110; DSS, 3QQ71.
71 Robertson to Preston, September 4, 1774, in Ibid., 180; DSS, 3QQ91.
72 Robertson to Preston, September, 1, 1774, in Ibid., 174-5; DSS, 3QQ88.
this Eight days Amongst these Deals Buckeyes then I have had this three years…there is some procarious Gen¹. amongst us who makes some mutiny amongst the men as they want Compⁿ.⁷³ Preston and his subalterns apparently intervened on Robertson's behalf, leading the major to write in gratitude:

I Must be for Ever Obliged to all my good friends for assisting me in Getting my Comp⁷⁴ made up as I thought it was meerly Impossible to do it in the time and I am sure there is not Such as Other Comp⁷⁴ for the Quaintyty of men belonging to the Whole. Dear Sir I wish you Everything that would make you happy.⁷⁴

Robertson finally marched with fifty-five men (including a company led by Captain Michael Woods) for Camp Union on September 16, and soon joined with Colonel William Christian's Fincastle Battalion.

The militia company officers themselves, particularly in the Fincastle Battalion, made Lewis' task more difficult by squabbling among themselves over rank and who would command which men. The trouble with the Fincastle officers started when Captain Joseph Drake and a crony named Vance came into conflict with Preston, Arthur Campbell and his brother William, by organizing their own company at the expense of John Floyd, who had just returned from Kentucky and wanted to go on the expedition.⁷⁵ The dispute soon spilled over into the companies of Evan Shelby, Daniel Smith [who commanded the Clinch Valley defenses] and William Russell. Relations between the various officers became so acrimonious that Campbell was obliged to tell Preston that "Drake has done hurt to Shelby, & Billey Campbell [his brother] and one Vance has done the like in Captain Smith's company to the prejudice of Russell."⁷⁶ An attempt by Campbell to

---

⁷³ Ibid.
⁷⁴ Robertson to Preston, September, 15, 1774, in Ibid., 200; DSS, 3QQ96.
⁷⁵ Floyd to Preston, August 26, 1774, in Ibid., 163-4; DSS, 33S35-49; Ibid., 167-7; Arthur Campbell to Preston, August 28, 1774, in Ibid., 170; DSS, 3QQ85.
⁷⁶ Arthur Campbell to Preston, August 19, 1774, in Ibid., 159; DSS, 3QQ80; Russell to Preston, August 16, 1774, in Ibid., 157; DSS, 3QQ78; Russell magnanimously offered "to resign his Interest to Captain Floyd,
replace Drake with Floyd led to Vance's resignation and a revolt among Drake's followers. A temporary compromise allowing the militiamen to "join their first proposed Officers" restored a tenuous peace. Campbell then passed the problem on to Lewis, writing, "I will endeavour to humour all parties until they come to rendezvous, and perhaps you can fall on some method then for the best." With order restored, the militia's companies began their journeys to Camp Union. William Russell's company of thirty-four men left his fort on August 16, and three days later, Campbell reported that three companies under Evan Shelby, William Campbell, and William Herbert marched "in high spirits from this place with upwards of eighty men." William Campbell's company was driving a herd of cattle, numbering nearly two hundred beeves, which slowed their march. Other companies from Fincastle County under Joseph Crockett, Anthony Bledsoe, and the much-abused John Floyd left at the same time.

Despite their differences, most of the Fincastle men reached Camp Union sometime in the first week of September, and were grouped together into the Fincastle Battalion under Colonel William Christian, which fielded a total strength of some three hundred-fifty men. Contingents from Botetourt and Augusta Counties likewise arrived, and were organized into regiments under Colonels William Fleming [a trained physician] and Charles Lewis [Andrew's brother], respectively. Colonel John Field, who had so recently escaped death at Walter Kelley's farm, arrived with a force of forty men calling of the Volunteers" as a possible solution to the problem. He wrote, "this I wood gladly do, to serve my good Friend [Floyd]."

77 Floyd to Preston, August 28, 1774, in Ibid., 167-8; DSS, 33S35-49
78 Arthur Campbell to Preston, August 19, 1774, in Ibid., 159; DSS, 3QQ80.
79 Ibid.
80 Russell to Preston, August 16, 1774, in Ibid., 157; DSS, 3QQ78; Arthur Campbell to Preston, August 19, 1774, in Ibid., 159; DSS, 3QQ80.
81 William Christian to Preston, September 3, 1774, in Ibid., 176; DSS, 3QQ89.
82 Lewis, Battle of Point Pleasant, 28.
themselves the "Culpepper Minute Men." Field, who "brought orders from Lord Dunmore to Colo. Lewis requiring him to be received with his men," immediately caused problems. He insisted that his was an independent company, "under no particular instructions" and "not subject to the control of others." In short, he was determined to find his own way to the Shawnee towns and exact some personal vengeance on the Indians. Field left Camp Union and proceeded on his way by way of a different route. Lewis let him go, and continued, probably with some relief, organizing his Southern Division, which by then had swelled to nearly twelve hundred men. All in all, Lewis was impressed with his men, writing Preston, "It is with pleasure I can inform you that I have had but little trouble with ye Troops to what I expected, and I hope they will continue to do their duty with the same cheerfulness." Evidently, the tempestuous officers from Fincastle County had smoothed over their differences, since Lewis made no mention of their problems.

The march began on September 6 with the Augusta County Regiment, numbering nearly six hundred men, leading the way down the Great Kanawha. The Augusta men took five hundred pack horses, one-hundred and eight beeves, and 54,000 pounds of flour, and were ordered to proceed to the mouth of Elk River, build a storehouse for the flour, and make canoes for the transport of the rest of the provisions. While the Augusta County men were moving out, Lewis received Dunmore's order dated August 30, which proposed to change the axis of the Southern Division's march from the mouth of the Great

83 Christian to Preston, September 7, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 185; DSS, 3QQ92.
84 Ibid.
85 "John Stuart's Narrative," in MAH, volume I, (November 1877), 677; Andrew Lewis to Preston, September 8, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 185; DSS, 3QQ93.
86 William Christian to Preston, November 8, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 301; DSS, 3QQ130.
87 Andrew Lewis to Preston, September 8, 1774, in Ibid., 185; DSS, 3QQ93.
88 William Christian to Preston, September 7, 1774, in Ibid., 185; DSS, 3QQ92.
Kanawha, as previously directed, to the mouth of the Little Kanawha. The colonel was stunned, and somewhat vexed at the governor, who apparently did not understand that an army's line of march under such difficult circumstances could not be easily altered on such short notice, especially after the men were already in motion. Lewis immediately guessed who was behind the order, and fired off a quick letter to Preston:

I received a letter from his Lordship...which was dated ye 30th August...He had Colo. Stephens & Major Connoly at his elbow as might be easily discovered by ye contents of his Letter, which expressed his Lordships warmest wishes, that I would with all the troops from this quarter Join him at ye Mouth of the Little Kanaway...I wish he had not done so in his letter to me.  

Lewis then wrote Dunmore a more politic reply, stating that "it was not in my Power to alter our rout" and mentioned the circumstances as to why such a sudden change in plan was not possible. After politely informing the governor that his order was impractical and impossible to carry out, Lewis continued with his original plan and ignored Dunmore's new directive. However, Lewis' reply never reached the governor for some reason. Consequently, the two divisions were completely out of touch with one another from the start, and never effected a junction as Dunmore had planned. This left Lewis and his men completely on their own for the duration of the expedition. As a result, they became an inviting target for the Shawnees and their allies.

On September 12, Fleming's Botetourt Regiment commenced its march with Lewis accompanying it. The companies of William Russell, and Evan Shelby, constituting the advanced elements of Colonel Christian's Fincastle Battalion, also descended the Great

---

89 Andrew Lewis to Preston, September 8, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, _Dunmore's War_, 185; DSS, 3QQ93.
90 Ibid. Colonel Adam Stephen and Lewis harbored a long grudge against each other stemming back to a trifling incident over proper uniforms in the French and Indian War. See Johnson, _Andrew Lewis_, 82-3.
91 Ibid.
Kanawha with Fleming and Lewis. The rest of Christian's men, slowed by William Campbell's cattle drive, became the rear guard for the division by default. Captain Bledsoe's company was detached to guard Camp Union and Lewis' line of retreat if such a measure proved necessary, while Christian struggled to catch up with the main body.

Charles Lewis and his Augusta Regiment reached the Elk River on September 21 after a difficult march of one hundred and eight miles. There had been no roads; the entire route was nothing more than a tangled forest. Captain John Stuart (not the Indian superintendent) aptly described the terrain crossed by the militiamen: "The Way was mountainous and rugged...At the time we commenced our March no Tract or Path was made, and but few white men had ever seen the place."93 "Sudden and frequent Showers of Rain" had drenched the militiamen and made for slippery marching up and down the steep slopes of the mountains, which were, in the opinion of William Fleming, "about a mile & half in Ascent & as much in descent."94 Despite the hostile environment, the militiamen had persevered and arrived at their destination with their numbers intact. The younger Lewis chose a site about a mile above that river's mouth and began constructing canoes and a storehouse for the enormous quantity of flour his men were carrying. The elder Lewis, along with Fleming's Regiment and Shelby's Company, arrived two days later, joining the work.95 Lewis was surprised and probably chagrinned to find Colonel Field and his men encamped with Fleming. Field had been attacked by Ottawas sometime after leaving Camp Union, losing two men, and had decided to rejoin Lewis, yet insisting that he was still independent by virtue of his rank.96 Lewis humored Field and allowed him to stay. On the evening of the 25th, Lewis became concerned as no word had yet

---

92 Colonel Fleming's Journal, September 25, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 284; DSS, 2ZZ71, pp 47-56.

93 "John Stuart's Narrative," in MAH, volume I, (November 1877), 675.

94 Fleming's Journal, September 19, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 284; DSS, 2ZZ71, pp 47-56.

95 Fleming's Journal, September 25, 1774, in Ibid., 285; DSS, 2ZZ71, pp 47-56.

96 Ibid., 284; "John Stuart's Narrative," in MAH, volume I, (November 1877), 677.
arrived from Dunmore in response to his letter of September 6. Accordingly, he sent out five scouts to locate the governor and his Northern Division.  

By September 30, eighteen large canoes had been constructed and the Southern Division was ready to begin its drive to the Ohio River. Before leaving, Lewis decided to take no chances and changed the marching order of his division in case of an Indian attack. Two large columns were formed. The Botetourt Regiment formed the right column, while the Augusta Regiment constituted the left. Each column was then divided into what Fleming called "two grand divisions." Each "grand division" was further divided into four subdivisions. A company of skirmishers led by Captain John Lewis [Andrew's nephew] "advanced a little way in front of the [two] columns," and two parties of flankers, consisting of a hundred men each, spread out in wide semi-circles from the main body to guard the flanks. A guard was organized to bring up the rear, while all the "Bullocks & Pack horses fell in betwixt the Front and Rear divisions."

In this formation, Lewis' Southern Division crossed the Elk River on October 1, and continued following the Great Kanawha toward the Ohio. The route was no easier than it had been between Camp Union and the mouth of Elk River. Heavy rains continued to soak the militiamen and dampen the gunpowder, as well as making the advance through the backcountry more treacherous. Fleming recorded in his orderly book, "We Marchd

---

98 William Fleming to his wife, September 27, 1774, in *Ibid.*, 213; DSS, 2ZZ5.
through rich Bottoms & muddy Swamp Creeks, meeting with them every mile or half miles," causing the pack horses to become "much jaded."\footnote{Ibid., 334.} Because of the rains, the river itself was rough, and the overloaded canoes began overturning, or simply falling apart. Fleming noted with concern that in one such incident on October 2, "27 bags of Flower were floated," and two guns were lost along with some baggage.\footnote{Ibid., 335.} The next day, he recorded that "the Sutlers had a Canoe overset, and one of Our double Canoes Split," with the loss of some valuable provisions and ammunition.\footnote{Ibid.} Incidents of desertion and petty thievery were also recorded as the increasingly miserable militiamen struggled through the wilderness, and guards had to be placed around the camp and canoes during the nightly halts.\footnote{Ibid.} On October 4, Lewis encountered the remnants of a landslide and the debris from a great storm that severely hampered the Southern Division's march. Fleming again recorded in his orderly book:

The falling timber or Hurricane as it is cald is about two miles in breath & extends from the River, about the same distance across the River. The mountain is pretty near & appears swept clear of timber for the same distance, appearing like a Clear’d Field. The tops of the trees on this side all lye from the River And on the Other side towards the River some are broke pretty high, the most tore up by the roots.\footnote{Ibid., 336.}

After navigating through the tangled mass of roots and fallen tree limbs, the militiamen marched "through several defiles, & over three or four muddy runs with very high and Steep banks, in many Places the hills came so cloase to the river that the two Columns were obliged to march in One path about [for] about two miles.\footnote{Ibid., 337.}
On October 6, Lewis and his militiamen finally reached the junction of the Great Kanawha and the Ohio, and encamped on a piece of land owned by the colonel himself, called Point Pleasant.\textsuperscript{111} Floods of years past had marked the trees, some nine or ten feet from the ground, but otherwise the point afforded "the most agreeable prospect" by providing "an extensive View up both rivers & down the Ohio."\textsuperscript{112} The river appeared "very level" with "deep, Still water," and the fall foliage was blazing with color, despite the rains of the past week.\textsuperscript{113} Lewis, no doubt annoyed at not finding Dunmore already encamped at the mouth of the Great Kanawha, immediately ordered his men to halt and set up their own camp for a much-needed rest from the rigors of the past week.\textsuperscript{114} The canoes were to be unloaded, a shelter for the stores was to be built, and each company was ordered "to have a Necessary House as soon as possible," or "otherwise the Camp must become foul and sickly."\textsuperscript{115} One ensign, eighteen privates, several of the cattle drivers, and six scouts were sent back to the last encampment to round up some lost cattle.\textsuperscript{116} Also, each captain was required to "to give a list of his Comp'y. present" in order to construct a formal payroll to present to the House of Burgesses upon the militia's return home.\textsuperscript{117}

While Lewis' men were setting up the camp, the colonel "met with an Advertizement" which pointed him toward a "letter lodged in a hollow tree from his Lordship."\textsuperscript{118} This

\textsuperscript{111} Point Pleasant had been acquired and surveyed by Lewis under Dinwiddie's Proclamation. At Fort Stanwix, the "Suffering Traders" had worked out a deal with the colonel whereby the new charter government of Vandalia would recognize his claim to this particular piece of land. Indeed, plans were laid to establish the new colony's capital at Point Pleasant. See Rice, \textit{The Allegheny Frontier}, 76-7; Also Johnson, \textit{Andrew Lewis}, 144-5, 175.

\textsuperscript{112} "Colonel Fleming's Orderly Book," in \textit{Ibid.}, 338; \textit{DSS}, 2ZZ72.

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{114} Fleming to Colonel Adam Stephen, October 8, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 237; \textit{DSS}, 2ZZ71.


\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Ibid.}, 338.
was the message Dunmore had sent by the three scouts before leaving to join Crawford and Stephen at the mouth of the Hockhocking. Lewis sent a reply upriver to the governor that he needed several days to rest his men, and give Christian's Fincastle Battalion, which had just arrived at Elk River, time to catch up. After sending a scout with the message on his way, Lewis settled down at Point Pleasant to rest and await Christian's arrival.

For the next three days, the militiamen began construction of a fort, a storehouse, and especially the necessary houses that Lewis had ordered. During this halt, the militiamen were lulled into a false sense of security. Only a few individual Indians had been observed in the distance by the flankers throughout the expedition thus far. Since the militiamen had reached the Ohio River without "aney Molestation from the Enemy," they felt quite secure in their numbers and their own ferocity. Also, they were seriously underestimating the Shawnees, in terms of both numbers and courage. Militiaman William Ingles neatly summed up the Virginians' complacency:

We encamped in the forks of the river where we looked on ourselves in Safe Possission of a fine Encampment and thought ourSelves a Terror to all the Indian Tribes on the Ohio and thus Luld in safety till Sunday the 9th & after hearring a Good Sarman Preached by the Rev’d Mr. Terrey went to Repose with Our Gards Properly Posted at a distance from the camp as usual little Expecting to be Attack’d by any Party of Enemy as we looked upon them to be so much inferiour to us in Number.

While Reverend Terry was preaching to the lounging militiamen, Cornstalk was on the other side of the river massing his own mixed force to attack Lewis. The Shawnee chief had worked throughout the summer to build a small confederacy of tribes from the Ohio Valley and the Northwest to resist the Virginians. To a certain degree, he had been successful as Wyandotts, Ottawas, Miamis, a few disgruntled Delawares, as well as the

---

119 Fleming's Journal, October 1, 1774, in Ibid., 286; DSS, 2ZZ71, pp 47-56; "Colonel Fleming's Orderly Book," in Ibid., 340; DSS, 2ZZ72.

120 Captain William Ingles to Preston, October 14, 1774, in Ibid., 258; DSS, 3QQ121.
bereaved Mingoes responded positively to Shawnee war belts. But, he had failed to win the support of the more powerful Cherokees, the Iroquois, and most of the Delawares, which effectively left the Ohio Indians isolated in the war. As a result, Cornstalk probably only had at most about five hundred warriors at his disposal, even though later eyewitness accounts gave the total (most certainly exaggerated) as somewhere between eight hundred and a thousand. Still, this was a formidable force in itself, and extremely dangerous, since the Indians would be powerfully motivated to fight; their homes, families, and livelihood were at stake.

Previously, Cornstalk had been an advocate for peace, despite his own rude experience at Pipe Creek, and had urged his young Shawnees to "sit still and do no harm" until it could be determined if the whites were actually going to attack the Shawnees en masse. Connolly's bellicosity and McDonald's expedition had long since removed any doubt of that, and yet Cornstalk still hesitated. On August 6, just after the destruction of Waketomica, he and the other Shawnee headmen had received a passionate message from Governor Penn warning them of the consequences of a war with Virginia. Penn had written:

\[
\text{Consider, brethren, that the people of Virginia are like the leaves upon the trees, very numerous, and you are but a few, and although you should kill ten of their people for one that they kill of yours, they will at last wear you out and destroy you. They are able to send a great army into your country, and destroy your towns, and your corn, and either kill your wives and children or drive them away...Therefore, brethren, let me advise you}\]

121 St. Clair to Penn, August 8, 1774, in American Archives, 4th Series, I, 682-3.

122 Isaac Shelby to John Shelby, October 16, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 273-4; DSS, 7ZZ2; "Extract of a Letter from Staunton, Virginia, dated November 4, 1774," in Pennsylvania Gazette, November 16, 1774; White Eyes, who knew for sure, told Dunmore at Wheeling that nearly five hundred Shawnees had gone off to attack Lewis' division. Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 384-5; See also Floyd to Preston, October 16, 1774, in Ibid., 268; DSS, 33S44-49.

to forget and to forgive what is past, and to send to the Governor of Virginia, and offer to make peace.\textsuperscript{124}

Evidently, Cornstalk had taken Penn's message to heart, and arrived at the conclusion that the Indians ultimately could not win a war with Virginia, even if they managed to claim a victory or two against the militiamen. The chief was no coward, but he was a realist. Despite his repeated entreaties for peace throughout August and September, however, his militant young warriors had refused to listen to him and had begun serious raiding in the Virginia backcountry. So the Shawnee chief had found himself in the unhappy situation of being forced (by virtue of his position as the headman of Chillicothe, the leading town of the Shawnees) into leading the Indians into a war he knew they could not win. With the die cast so, Cornstalk had resigned himself to his fate.

Despite his reluctance to fight, Cornstalk had constructed a plan that was simple yet elegant. Shawnee scouts had been carefully watching the movements of both divisions almost from the start, and as a result, the chief was fully cognizant of the forces arrayed against them.\textsuperscript{125} He knew that if either division crossed the Ohio uncontested, then Chillicothe and the other Shawnee towns and villages would most likely suffer the same fate as Wakatomica. Cornstalk decided against waging a defensive battle somewhere on the western side of the Ohio, since he knew the Indians could not hope to overcome the advancing Virginians', especially on two separate fronts. The ruins of Wakatomica stood as a stark reminder of this. Consequently, a surprise attack similar to that made against Braddock's Expedition early in the French and Indian War seemed to be the only chance for a Shawnee victory. Accordingly, Cornstalk chose to attack Lewis' division first since it was inferior to that of Dunmore's, and was completely isolated with no hope of reinforcement and resupply. Lewis' men were also weakened with fatigue, and the

\textsuperscript{124} "A Message to the Chiefs and Warriors of the Shawanese Indians from Governor John Penn," August 6, 1774, in \textit{St. Clair Papers}, I, 335-6.

\textsuperscript{125} Throughout the march of Lewis' divisions, scouts reported seeing isolated Indians shadowing the militiamen. See "Fleming's Orderly Book," Journal Entries for September 25, September 28, September 29, October 5, in \textit{Ibid.}, 328-337.
miserable weather that had plagued them during their journey of the past week had 
damaged their gunpowder and flour supplies. Also, Christian's Fincastle Battalion, 
constituting nearly one-third of Lewis' entire force, was still straggling behind some 
twenty miles, which left the colonel short on riflemen to oppose the attack. Finally and 
perhaps most importantly, Lewis had unknowingly obliged Cornstalk by encamping his 
militiamen on the end of the point between the Great Kanawha and Ohio Rivers, which, if 
closed off at the neck, would become a perfect trap from which the Virginians could not 
escape. All in all, the conditions seemed extremely favorable for a smashing Shawnee 
success, but time was crucial. Lewis had to be attacked before Christian arrived or 
Dunmore began his march across the Pickaway Plains toward Chillicothe.

So, on the evening of October 9, Cornstalk took his warriors either "six or eight miles" 
up the Ohio River, and then floated them across the river on some seventy rafts.126 
Before crossing himself, the chief prudently lined the opposite banks of the Ohio and 
Great Kanawha Rivers with a few warriors, boys, and squaws to kill any militiamen who 
tried to escape by swimming across when the attack commenced.127 He then led his men 
in the darkness southeast across the base of the point, cutting the militiamen's line of 
retreat. Once his warriors were in position, Cornstalk allowed them to rest for a few hours 
before making the assault.128 While his warriors were resting and preparing themselves 
for the upcoming battle, Cornstalk still nurtured serious doubts about the wisdom of their 
enterprise. So, in the hours before the attack, he tried one last time to talk some sense into 
the other chiefs. As related by Captain John Stuart, Cornstalk "proposed to the Indians, if 
they were agreed, he would come and talk with us and endeavor to make Peace" instead

126 Fleming to Bowyer, October 13, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 256; Preston to Patrick Henry, October 31, 1774, in Ibid., 292; DSS, 3QQ128.
127 Ibid., 257; Christian to Preston, October 15, 1774, in Ibid., 264; Fleming wrote, "…that they came fully convinced they would beat us I think is certain. They cros'd the River & encamped the same side with us the Evening before…the Enemy in expectation of forcing us into the Ohio had lined the opposite bank with some & the lower forks likewise was not neglected. the Enemy had brought their boys and squaaas to knock us in the head I suppose."
128 Fleming to Bowyer, October 13, 1774, in Ibid., 256-7.
of making an attack.\textsuperscript{129} They would not listen to him, however, so at first light, the reluctant Cornstalk hurled his eager warriors toward Lewis' sleeping militiamen. The date was Monday, October 10, 1774.

Either Providence, fate, or dumb luck saved Lewis and his Southern Division from the Shawnees. A couple of early morning hunting parties had left camp, quite against orders, in search of fowl for breakfast. Two men from Russell's Company named Joseph Hughey and James Mooney trekked about a mile outside of the Virginians' camp just before sunrise, and ran headlong into Cornstalk's advancing Indians.\textsuperscript{130} Shots rang out, and Hughey was killed on the spot. Mooney fled and made it safely back to camp, where the gunfire had awakened many of the militiamen. Lewis was already up, and Mooney quickly found and told the colonel that he had seen "above five Acres of land covered with Indians, as thick as one could stand beside another."\textsuperscript{131} Lewis was skeptical. But when Valentine Sevier and James Robinson [not the major from Watauga] of Shelby's Company rushed into camp with the same story, the colonel "ordered a detachment from every company" to assemble and form two columns of one hundred and fifty men each to chase away what he imagined "to be some scouting party."\textsuperscript{132} The "drums by order immediately beat to arms," and three hundred sleepy militiamen soon fell into the ranks.\textsuperscript{133} Colonel Charles Lewis, wearing the scarlet waistcoat of a British officer that morning, took charge of the Augusta contingent and marched off toward the right, near the foot of a hill that overlooked the camp.\textsuperscript{134} Colonel Fleming quickly organized his Botetourt contingent, which included the Fincastle companies led by Evan Shelby and William Russell. Fleming's men then departed their camp and marched to the left "along

\textsuperscript{129} "John Stuart's Narrative," in \textit{MAH}, I, (November 1877), 677.
\textsuperscript{130} Isaac Shelby to John Shelby, October 16, 1774, in \textit{Dunmore's War}, 271-2; \textit{DSS}, TZZZ2.
\textsuperscript{131} "John Stuart's Narrative," in \textit{MAH}, I, (November 1877), 676.
\textsuperscript{132} Fleming's Journal, October 10, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 286; \textit{DSS}, 2ZZZ1, pp 47-56.
\textsuperscript{133} "Fleming's Orderly Book," October 10, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 341.
\textsuperscript{134} See note 4 in Lewis, \textit{Battle of Point Pleasant}, 44; Fleming's Journal, October 10, 1774, in \textit{Dunmore's War}, 286; \textit{DSS}, 2ZZZ1, pp 47-56.
the Banks of the Ohio, at about 200 yards distance" from the Augusta men. The two
columns briskly advanced about three-quarters of a mile, when a scattering of shots was
suddenly heard. Then, on the right in front of the Augusta wing, the entire forest seemed
to erupt into blazing gunfire. Charles Lewis, who was leading his wing over clear
ground at the time, was "speaking to his men to come on" when he was mortally wounded
in the first terrible volley." Several of his men were also shot and killed at the same
time. Lewis "turned and handed his gun to a man and walked to Camp," telling his men
as he walked along, "I am wounded, but go you on and be brave." He stumbled back
"to his tent with some Assistance" and died several hours later.

Almost immediately after Lewis' Augusta line was blasted, Fleming's Botetourt men
were similarly attacked. Fleming, like Lewis had been out in front of the column
leading his men, and was likewise shot in the Indians' first volley, receiving "three balls,
two in the left arm and one on the left breast." As Lewis had done, Fleming, "with
great coolness and deliberation," stepped "slowly back and told [his men] not to mind him
but to go up and fight." Fleming then retired to his own tent, and while it was thought
his wound was mortal, he survived the expedition. Now leaderless, the two militia

---

135 Ibid.
136 “Fleming's Orderly Book,” October 10, 1774, in Ibid., 341; DSS, 2ZZ72.
137 Christian to Preston, October 15, 1774, in Ibid., 265.
138 Ibid.
139 Fleming to Bowyer, October 13, 1774, in Ibid., 255.
140 Fleming to his wife, October 13, 1774, in Ibid., 253.
141 Christian to Preston, October 15, 1774, in Ibid., 265.
142 Ibid.
143 Fleming wrote of the gruesome nature of his wounds, "I received three balls in the left Line, two
struck my left arm below the Elbow broke both the bones, & I find one of them is lodged in my arm. A
third entered my breast about three Inches below my left Nipple and is lodged some where in the Chest.
On finding my self effectually disabled I quitted the Field. When I came to be drest, I found my Lungs
forced through the wound in my breast, as long as one of my fingars. Watkins attempted to reduce them
ineffectually. He got some part returned but not the whole. Being in considerable pain, some time
afterwards, I got the whole Returned by the Assistance of one of my Own Attendants." Fleming to
Bowyer, October 13, 1774, in Ibid., 255.

243
columns attempted to return the fire, but a second volley followed quickly by a third from
the Indians forced the militiamen to "quit their ranks & fly to trees" to try to stem the
attack. The Indians rushed forward "with Dismal Yells & Screams," and broke the
militiamen's rough battle line, pushing them back "perhaps one or two hundred yards
under heavy fire."\footnote{Fleming's Orderly Book, October 10, 1774, in Ibid., 341-2; DSS, 2ZZ72.}

Back in camp, the heavy firing and the wild yells of the Shawnees convinced Lewis
that the militiamen were facing something more than "some scouting party." Consequently, Lewis became "fully employed in Camp" by directing the militiamen in the
battle\footnote{Fleming's Journal, October 10, 1774, in Ibid., 287; DSS, 2ZZ71, pp 47-56.}
He began rushing "necessary reinforcements where wanted on the different quarters," and "cleared a line across & with the brush & trees Made a breastwork and
lined it with the men that were left in Camp" in case Cornstalk broke through the militia's
battle lines.\footnote{Ibid.}
Lewis also sent of a runner with a message to Christian, urging the
Fincastle men to hasten their march to Point Pleasant in order to help repel the Indians.\footnote{Floyd to Preston, October 16, 1774, in Ibid., 267; DSS, 33S44-49.}
Throughout the day, Lewis was an engine of activity, and he carried out his duty as the
division commander as he should have by conducting the battle from the camp instead of
on the firing line. For this, he would later be unjustly accused of cowardice by many of
his militiamen.\footnote{A Ballad appeared soon after which derided Andrew Lewis' supposed conduct at Point Pleasant: "Old
Andrew Lewis in his tent he did set, With his cowards around him, alas he did sweat, His blankets spread
over him and hearing the guns roar, Saying was I at home I would come here no more." See Dunmore's
War, 435.}
Despite the later criticism, Fleming wrote, "Colonel Lewis...behaved
with the greatest Conduct & prudence and by timely & Opportunely supporting the lines
secured under God both the Victory & prevented the Enemys Attempts to break into
Lewis would spend the rest of the day directing reinforcements, and overseeing the hasty improvements of the camp's fortifications.

Meanwhile, the battle lines stabilized somewhat after Lewis' reinforcements began arriving. The first of these to arrive was Colonel Field and his Culpepper Minute Men. Field took command of the Augusta line, and allowed himself to be distracted by an Indian who talked "to amuse him whilst some others were above him on his right hand among some loggs, who shot him dead." Evan Shelby then moved over from the Botetourt line to take command of the right wing, while relinquishing his company to his son Isaac. For the next three hours, the "Action continued Extreemly Hott " and "Very doubtfull" for the Virginians. Throughout the battle, the combatants were "never above twenty yards apart, often within six, and sometimes close together, tomahawking one another." According to one militiaman, the Indians seemed gripped in a wild frenzy, and in several instances, ran "up to the Very Muzels of our Gunes where they as often fell Victims to thire Rage." Isaac Shelby wrote afterwards that "its really Impossible for me to Express or you to Conceive Acclamations that we were under, sometimes, the Hideous Cries of the Enemy and the groans of our wounded men lying around was Enough to shuder the stoutest hart."

---

149 Fleming to his wife, October 13, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 253-4; DSS, 2ZZ6.
150 William Ingles to Preston, October 14, 1774, in Ibid., 258; DSS, 3QQ121
151 Ibid., 258; Isaac Shelby to John Shelby, October 16, 1774, in Ibid., 274-5; DSS, 7ZZ2;
153 William Ingles to Preston, October 14, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 258; DSS, 3QQ121.
154 Isaac Shelby to John Shelby, October 16, 1774, in Ibid., 276; DSS, 7ZZ2;
The Shawnee chiefs "ran continually along their line exhorting the men to "lye close" and "shoot well," and "fight and be strong."”

Captain John Stuart saw Cornstalk himself in the midst of the battle, encouraging his warriors:

I could hear him the whole Day speaking to his men very loudly, and one of my Company, who had once been a prisoner, told me what he was saying: "Be strong, be strong." 156

On the banks across the Ohio and Great Kanawha Rivers, the men and women Cornstalk had posted to kill any militiaman who tried to swim for safety had nothing to do except cheer their warriors on, shouting repeatedly, "Drive the white dogs in!" 157

By noon, Lewis' superior numbers began to tell, and the Indians commenced a long, fighting retreat. Isaac Shelby recalled that "the Close underwood, many steep bancks & Loggs greatly favoured their retreat, and the Bravest of their men made the use of themselves, whilst others were throwing their dead into the Ohio, and Carrying off their wounded." 158 After noon, "the Action in a small degree abated but Continued sharp enough till after one o'Clock." 159 During this time, the Indians fell back "to a most advantageous spot of ground, from whence it appeared to the officers so difficult to dislodge them, that it was thought most advisable to stand, as the line then formed, which was about a mile and a quarter in length, and had sustained till then a constant and equal weight of the action, from wing to wing." 160 A stalemate ensued, and the Indians began taunting the Virginians, damning them as "Sons-of-Bitches" and deriding the military fifers so common in colonial militaries by shouting, "Don't you whistle now!" 161 They

---

155 William Ingles to Preston, October 14, 1774, in Ibid., 264; DSS, 3Q121

156 "John Stuart's Narrative," in MAH, I, (November 1877), 678.

157 Christian to Preston, October 15, 1774, in Ibid., 264.

158 Isaac Shelby to John Shelby, October 16, 1774, in Ibid., 275.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid.

161 Christian to Preston, October 15, 1774, in Ibid., 265.
also loudly claimed to have "2000 men for them" coming on the morrow, to fight the eleven hundred militiamen they were now facing (a credit to Cornstalk's scouts for correctly ascertaining the size of Lewis' Southern Division). They finally "made very merry about a treaty," which puzzled Lewis' men who knew nothing of any treaties being negotiated.

To drive the Indians out of their strong position, Lewis "resolved to throw a body of men into [their] rear." Accordingly, he sent three companies under Captains Isaac Shelby, John Stuart, and George Mathews to attempt this maneuver against the Indians' left flank. As Stuart recounted:

They were called from the front to the point where the two rivers meet, and then proceeded under cover of the bank of the Great Kanawha for three quarters of a mile to the mouth of Crooked Creek; and from thence along the bed of its tortuous course to their destination; there they ascended the high bluff bank...and poured a destructive fire upon the Indian rear; and they believing that this was the long expected reinforcement, under Colonel Christian, gave way, falling back toward the place from which they came that morning.

At the same time, more reinforcements arrived from camp, and the militiamen in the front lines made "a fierce onset" against the Indians' right, forcing Cornstalk's warriors "from their stations" and causing "them to retreat by degrees about a mile." The Indians repeatedly counterattacked by summoning "all the force they could raise & making many pushes to break the line." Their efforts failed, however, as Lewis' more numerous

---

162 Ibid.

163 Ibid.; The taunts about a treaty were most likely about Dunmore's attempts to meet with the Shawnees at Wheeling and arrange a peace.


165 Ibid.

166 "Fleming's Orderly Book," October 10, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 342; DSS, 2ZZ72.

167 Ibid., 343.
militiamen held their ground. By three or four o'clock, the Indians were growing "quite dispirited" despite "all the attempts of their Warriours to rally."\textsuperscript{168} They were seen using their tomahawks to cut saplings "to take off their wounded," and the rate of gunfire slackened considerably on both sides as powder and ammunition ran low.\textsuperscript{169} Every so often, the Indians fired a shot to prevent pursuit.\textsuperscript{170} By dusk all the Indians had retreated back across the Ohio, leaving the Virginians in command of the field. Lewis issued orders for the militiamen "to return in slow pace to [the] Camp, carefully searching the dead and wounded and to bring them in, as also the scalps of the enemy."\textsuperscript{171} Double guards were mounted around the camp's perimeter while the scattered Virginians made their way back. The watchword for the night was "Victory."\textsuperscript{172}

As darkness descended over Point Pleasant, the militiamen arrived back at camp exhausted and shocked. The Indians had caught them completely by surprise, and very nearly overrun their camp while they were sleeping. After Cornstalk's initial onslaught had been beaten back, the Indians had stayed and fought it out all day, which was completely contrary to their usual "hit-and-run" manner of wilderness warfare. Consequently, lavish praise was heaped upon the Shawnees and their allies from the militiamen, who had long been frustrated at the Indians' skulking ambushes and night attacks on isolated homesteads. According to Stuart, Cornstalk came to be exalted in camp for finally leading the Indians in a stand up battle, and for discovering "great Military Skill in his plan of March and Retreat."\textsuperscript{173} In a similar vein, Fleming wrote, "Never did the Indians stick closer to it, nor behave bolder."\textsuperscript{174} In another letter, he added,

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{169} Christian to Preston, October 15, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 264.
\textsuperscript{170} Stuart, "Memoir of Indian Wars," 46.
\textsuperscript{171} "Fleming's Orderly Book," October 10, 1774, in \textit{Dunmore's War}, 342; \textit{DSS}, 2ZZ72.
\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Ibid.}, 343.
\textsuperscript{173} "John Stuart's Narrative," in \textit{MAH}, I, (November 1877), 678.
\textsuperscript{174} Fleming to Bowyer, October 13, 1774, in \textit{Dunmore's War}, 256; \textit{DSS}, 2ZZ7. 
"they fought bravely & stood it a long time, making many desperate pushes and resolute stands."  

William Christian reported to Preston, "From what I can gather here I cannot describe the bravery of the enemy in the battle. It exceeded every man's expectations." Several of Lewis' veterans told Floyd that the Fincastle men had been "much prayed for that day in time of the engagement" because of the Indians' obstinacy. One weary veteran simply concluded, "Such a battle with the Indians, it is imagined, was never heard of before."

The militia officers were not quite so generous in praising their own men. Floyd wrote, "I am also told there were never more than three or four hundred of our men in action at once, but the trees & logs the whole way from the camp to where the line of battle was formed, served as shelters for those who could not be prevailed on to advance to where the fire was." Floyd also heard more unflattering details of the some of the militiamen's conduct during the engagement:

There was no one officer who had his own men; there were the first 300 sent out, some from each company, and when they found there was fighting enough for the whole, it was impossible for the officers to collect their own men so that when they saw any doing no good, and ordered them to advance, they refused and said they would be commanded by their own officers. Certain it is, that about the number I mentioned & many of the officers fought with a great deal of courage and behaved like heroes, while others lurked behind and could by no means be induced to advance to the front.

Whether the militiamen behaved like heroes or not, Floyd was deluged in exaggerated accounts of the Virginians' great "victory." By the militiamen's own wild tally, nearly a

---

175 "Fleming Letter" in *Ibid.*, 346-7; *DSS*, 2ZZ72; See note 67 by eds.
177 "Extract of a letter from Staunton, Virginia, dated November 4, 1774, in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 16, 1774.
178 Floyd to Preston, October 16, 1774, in *Dunmore's War*, 268; *DSS*, 33S44-49.
thousand Indians had attacked them. Isaac Shelby informed his uncle that they had repelled an assault "by the United tribes of Indians--Shawnees, Delawares, Mingoos, Taways (Ottawas), and of several Other Nations in Number not less than Eight Hundred and by many thought to be a thousand." Fleming thought that they had had between "7 or 800 Warriors to deal with." Captain Stuart was noncommittal in his conjecture: "Some asserted there were upwards of one Thousand; some said no more than four or five hundred. The correct number was never known to us." Floyd was thoroughly unimpressed with most of the militiamen's calculations, and reported so to Preston:

I will just mention what my opinion is about some things, as there are many conjectures with regard to the number of Indians & etc.; some think eight hundred, some one thousand...in searching about and seeing the track of the Indians made and the rafts they crossed the river on, it is my opinion there were not more than five hundred at most.

As far as the great victory claimed by the Virginians, Floyd bluntly concluded, after making close observations of the battlefield and taking into account the numbers of dead and wounded on both sides, that "It really appears to me to have been a partly drawn battle."

Despite the militiamen's exaggerations, there can be no doubt that Lewis' Southern Division had been thoroughly bloodied by Cornstalk's attack. Casualty figures for the Virginians varied depending on which primary account is consulted. But according to the most careful estimates, nine commissioned officers and forty-six noncommissioned officers and privates were killed outright; ninety-two were wounded, while fifteen of

182 Fleming to Bowyer, October 13, 1774, in *Dunmore's War*, 256; *DSS*, 2ZZ7.
184 Floyd to Preston, October 16, 1774, in *Dunmore's War*, 268; *DSS*, 33S44-49.
those later died. When William Christian finally arrived in camp with the Fincastle Battalion near midnight, he saw for himself the carnage wreaked by the battle:

I have been through all the camps and believe that many more men will die. There are many shot in two places, one in particular I observed with two bullits, some in three. They are really in a deplorable situation, bad doctors, few medicines, nothing to eat or dress with proper for them makes it still worse…The cries of the wounded prevented our resting any that night.

Fleming's severe wounds had left the Southern Division without a qualified physician. Consequently, Lewis sent a message to Dunmore, informing him of the battle and "begging for medicines and a surgeon." Lewis hoped that "humanity" would induce the governor to come to their aid. If not, however, then the colonel determined to do the best he could with the wounded, and renew the battle on the morrow if the Indians should return. If they did not choose to renew the contest, then Lewis fully planned to pursue them across the Ohio to their towns with the Southern Division, whether Dunmore helped or not.

The number of Indian casualties was never known for sure, since they "were exceedingly active in concealing their dead." During the battle, they continually carried off their fallen warriors. Some of the dead was thrown into the river. Captain Stuart saw a militiaman "draw out three that were covered with Leaves, beside a large log, in the

---

\[186\] Dr. Draper compiled this estimate after carefully evaluating the original sources. This is the commonly accepted figure of the Virginians' casualties at Point Pleasant. See Lyon G. Tyler, "Westward Extension," *Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, volume VII, (April 1926), 238.

\[187\] Christian to Preston, in *Dunmore's War*, 262.


\[192\] "Extract of a letter from Staunton, Virginia, dated November 4, 1774, in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, November 16, 1774.
Midst of the Battle."

Twelve more Indians were found "concealed in one place" while twenty-one were recovered where they lay. Most of these had already been scalped in order to prevent the Virginians from doing it. Despite the Indians' attempts to frustrate the militiamen in this regard, seventeen Indian scalps were taken by the militiamen, which were later "dressed & hung upon a pole near the riverbank." Isaac Shelby ultimately believed that "Its beyond a Doubt their Loss in Numbers far Exceeds ours, which is Considerable." Fleming thought "the Indians never had such a Scourging from the English before." Stuart was more restrained in his calculations, however, saying "it [was] possible the slain on both sides [were] about equal." The Shawnees later admitted to having twenty-eight of their own killed, but this number did not include the other tribes who had sent warriors to fight the Virginians.

All in all, the Indians most probably suffered roughly the same number of casualties as the Virginians, if not more, since the Shawnees' enthusiasm for continuing the war was effectively chilled. After returning to Chillicothe, an angry and frustrated Cornstalk called a council of his remaining headmen to consider their options. Passionately, he "upbraided the Indians, for their Folly in not suffering to make peace, on the Evening before the Battle." The chief reportedly said, "What will you do now? The big Knife is coming on us, and we shall all be Killed. Now you must fight, or we are undone." The Indians sat

---

194 Ibid.
195 Fleming's Journal, October 10, 1774, in Ibid., 287; DSS, 2ZZ71, pp 47-56.
196 "Fleming's Orderly Book,” October 12, 1774 in Ibid., 346; Isaac Shelby to John Shelby, October 16, 1774, in Ibid., 275.
197 Ibid.
198 Fleming to Bowyer, October 13, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 256; DSS, 2ZZ7.
200 See editor's note in Dunmore's War, 347.
201 "John Stuart's Narrative," in MAH, I, (December 1877), 747.
202 Ibid.
in stone silence. Cornstalk then suggested, "Let us Kill all our Women and Children and go and fight till we die."\textsuperscript{203} Still, no one answered. After a few awkward moments, he arose and struck his tomahawk in a post, and jeered, "I'll go and make Peace!"\textsuperscript{204} With his decision made, a messenger was dispatched to Dunmore, who was by then approaching the Shawnee towns.

\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Ibid.}
Chapter 10

"WHO IS THERE TO MOURN FOR LOGAN?"

The War Ends

On the morning of October 10th, Dunmore appeared nervous to observers. White Eyes had told him the evening before that five hundred Indians had gone south to "speak to the army" there. Up until then, Dunmore had no idea where Lewis was, or if he had even assembled a militia force at all. He had not heard from the colonel at all since July, and as far as Dunmore knew, there was no southern contingent, at least until White Eyes arrived and told him the Shawnees were planning on attacking some army in the south. Shortly after White Eyes revealed his news, one of Lewis' scouts had arrived and informed the governor that Lewis was at the mouth of the Great Kanawha, and that the Southern Division needed a few days rest before marching to the mouth of the Hockhocking. Presumably, the scout also related Lewis' strength to the anxious governor. It was too late to march his northern division southward to be of any assistance, and a warning message would not arrive in time. So the governor apparently decided to await further developments and trust in Lewis to defend himself. So, while the colonel was fighting it out with the Shawnees, Dunmore was pacing along the Ohio River twenty-eight miles away at Fort Gower. Sometime that morning, he reportedly placed "his ear at the surface of the river" and "said he thought he heard the firing of guns." The governor

---

1 Howe, Historical Collections of Ohio, II, 406.
2 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 384-5.
3 See note by Thwaites in Withers, Chronicles of Border Warfare, 180.
4 Howe, Historical Collections of Ohio, II, 406; Sound travels faster and farther through water than air, so if Dunmore was in fact listening at the right time, then it is very possible that he could hear the roar of the
then asked a young militiaman named Abraham Thomas to do likewise. Thomas complied, and "reported that it was the rattle of musketry."\(^5\)

Word evidently spread through Dunmore's camp that something was happening to the south of Fort Gower, and Lewis' scout, a militiaman named William Mann, tried to persuade the governor to march to Point Pleasant and reinforce the Southern Division.\(^6\) Connolly objected and argued that the Northern Division should immediately march straight to the Shawnee towns while all the warriors were engaged with Lewis.\(^7\) Dunmore apparently agreed with his major's logic, and on October 13, he marched his men westward toward Chillicothe. Before leaving, and even learning about the details of the battle, the governor "wrote Col. Lewis to meet him about 20 miles on this side of Chillicosse at a large ridge."\(^8\) During the march, his main force encountered no Indians, but a scouting party thwarted an ambush attempt, killing six or eight warriors and taking sixteen prisoners.\(^9\) Lewis' message and request for medical aid reached Dunmore sometime on the 16\(^{th}\), but the governor continued his march without hesitation, apparently confident that the colonel could manage well enough on his own.

On the morning of October 17, Dunmore was about fifteen miles from Chillicothe, when a Pennsylvania trader named Matthew Elliot appeared with a white flag.\(^10\) Elliot announced that he spoke for Cornstalk and the other Shawnee chiefs, and asked that the Virginians halt their march and send an interpreter so that they may discuss peace terms.

---

5 Ibid.

6 Christian to Preston, October 15, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 264.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., 263.

9 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Ibid., 384-5.

Dunmore refused the request, saying he would rather negotiate in the field, and continued his march.\footnote{Withers, \textit{Chronicles of Border Warfare}, 182.}

The next day, the governor and his division reached a large ridge overlooking the Pickaway Plains, only eight miles from Chillicothe. He ordered a new encampment in the fields surrounding a huge oak tree.\footnote{See eds. note in \textit{Dunmore's War}, 302.} The tree bark was peeled off, and Dunmore wrote on the exposed wood in red chalk, "Camp Charlotte," in honor of the Queen of England.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.} On October 19, a delegation of eight Shawnee chiefs led by Cornstalk appeared and asked for peace. Dunmore must have then had a sudden change of heart about thoroughly "chastising" the Shawnees as he had originally planned since he now agreed to meet with the Shawnees. Consequently, he convened a council with the chiefs that evening. Cornstalk opened the proceedings with a bold speech that outlined the wrongs suffered by the Indians in the years since the French and Indian War. His eloquence surprised many of the militia officers present. Colonel Benjamin Wilson wrote of Cornstalk:

> When he arose, he was in no wise confused or daunted, but spoke in a distinct, and audible voice, without stammering or repetition, and with peculiar emphasis. His looks while addressing Dunmore, were truly grand and majestic; yet graceful and attractive. I have heard the first orators in Virginia, Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee, but never have I heard one whose powers of delivery surpassed those of Cornstalk on that occasion.\footnote{Quoted in Withers, \textit{Chronicles of Border Warfare}, 185-6.}

The chief noted "the once happy and powerful condition of the Indians" but bemoaned "their present fallen fortunes and unhappy destiny."\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.} He exclaimed against the treachery of the whites and the dishonesty of the traders, and proposed as the basis of a treaty that "no white person should be permitted to carry on a commerce with the Natives for
individual profit.” However, he wanted their white brethren to send the Indians such articles as they needed at a fair price, in exchange for their furs and skins, and that the sale of rum to Indians be entirely forbidden. After speaking for several minutes, Cornstalk stood aside, at which the other chiefs immediately "proposed laying themselves at the Gov's mercy and told him to make the Terms and they should be complied with." Dunmore obliged and announced his terms, which were relatively lenient considering the circumstances the Indians now found themselves in. The governor required the Shawnees to give up all prisoners, white and black, captured in previous wars, and to pay for all destroyed property. They also had to give up all their horses and agree to future trade regulations as dictated by the King. More importantly, the Shawnees had to forego any future hunting or traveling on the south side of the Ohio River, except in legal trade with the white people. This would effectively cede the lands of Kentucky to Virginia, which perhaps was Dunmore's true motivation in launching his expedition in the first place. In return, the governor promised that no white people would be allowed to hunt on the northern side of the Ohio, and guaranteed future protection from white encroachment. The Indians were probably extremely suspicious of this last promise, but were in no position to argue. Finally, Dunmore required that several Shawnee chiefs be turned over as hostages to insure compliance with the peace terms. The council adjourned while Cornstalk and his chiefs retired to Chillicothe to start making arrangements to meet Dunmore's peace terms.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Christian to Preston, November 8, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 304; DSS, 3QQ130.

19 William Crawford to Washington, November 14, 1774, in Butterfield, Washington-Crawford Letters, 54-5; Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Dunmore's War, 386; Lewis, Battle of Point Pleasant, 56.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.
During the council, Dunmore noticed that no Mingoes were present and asked why Logan was not involved in the negotiations. Cornstalk replied through an interpreter that the Mingoes weren't inclined to peace and that Logan was still angry with the Virginians. The governor then dispatched Colonel John Gibson, whose young wife (Logan's sister) had been killed at Yellow Creek, to bring the Mingo in to discuss peace. Gibson set out and found Logan drunk in a cabin in Chillicothe. Logan had arrived only a day or two earlier from his raiding excursion in the Holston and lower Clinch River valleys. He had brought back James Roberts and two of Blackmore's slaves as prisoners. Logan, on seeing Gibson and learning of his mission, reacted violently. He proclaimed that he was "a warrior, not a councillor, and would not come" to any such peace council. Gibson calmed him down and asked again. Logan again demurred, declaring that "he was like a Mad Dog, that his Bristles had been up and were not yet quite fallen--but that the good talks now going forward might allay him." Finally, after repeated entreaties by the colonel, the Mingo suggested that they take a walk together. Gibson agreed and the two men walked for a distance into the woods before sitting down on a fallen log. Logan then shed "an abundance of tears," and delivered a sad soliloquy:

I appeal to any white man to say, if ever he entered Logan's cabin hungry, and he gave him not meat; if ever he came cold and naked, and I clothed him. During the course of the last long and bloody war, Logan remained idle in his cabin, an advocate of peace. Such was my love for eht white people, that my countrymen pointed as they passed, and said, 'Logan is the friend of white men.' I had even thought to have lived with you, but for the injuries of one man. Colonel Cressap, the last spring, in cold blood, and unprovoked, cut off all the relations of Logan, not sparing even my women and children. There runs not a drop of my blood in the veins of

---

any living creature. This called on me for revenge. I have sought it. I have killed many. I have fully glutted my vengeance. For my country, I rejoice at the beams of peace. But do not harbour a thought that mine is the joy of fear. Logan never felt fear. He will not turn on his heel to save his life. Who is there to mourn for Logan? --Not one. 27

Gibson apparently had the presence of mind to write down Logan's words, in order to relate to Dunmore exactly what had been said. He also tried to correct the Mingo by informing him that "it was not Colonel Cressap who had murdered his relations, and that although his son Captain Michael Cressap was with the party who killed a Shawnese chief and other Indians, yet he was not present when his relations were killed at Baker's, near the mouth of Yellow Creek." 28 Logan was adamant, however, and Gibson did not push the point. With Logan's speech in hand, Gibson returned to Camp Charlotte and read it aloud to the governor and the militia officers. George Rogers Clark and Cresap, among others, heard the speech. Clark "discovered that Cresap was displeased and told him he must be a very great Man, that the Indians shouldered him with every Thing that had happened." 29 Cresap merely "smiled and said he had a great mind to tomahawk Greathouse about the matter." 30

After hearing Logan's response to his summons, Dunmore learned that the Mingoes would not accept his peace terms, and were plotting to take their prisoners and the horses they had stolen, and flee to the Great Lakes region. 31 The governor immediately ordered Crawford to take two hundred and forty men, and march to Seekonk "to pursue their

27 "Logan's Speech," in Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, 63; For authenticity of the speech, see George Rogers Clark to Dr. Samuel Brown, June 17, 1798, in Ibid., 155; Clark wrote, "I was intimate with Cresap, and better acquainted with Logan at that Time than with any other Indian in the Western Country, and had a knowledge of the Conduct of both Parties. Logan is the Author of the Speech as related by Mr. Jefferson."


29 Clark to Brown, June 17, 1798, in Mayer, Logan and Cresap, 155.

30 Ibid.

journey."\(^{32}\) Crawford left on the night of the 25\(^{th}\), and marched out "under pretense of going to Hockhocking for more provisions" in order to deceive the numerous Indians who were then milling around Camp Charlotte.\(^{33}\) After marching a few miles, Crawford then turned around, and marching "with as much speed as possible," arrived at Seekonk the ensuing night.\(^{34}\) Just before daybreak, the militiamen "got around [the town] with one-half [their] force," while "the remainder [was] sent to a small village half a mile distant."\(^{35}\) Crawford's surprise attack was foiled when a Mingo discovered one of the Virginians in the darkness, and obliged the militiaman to shoot him. The sleeping Mingoes in Seekonk were alerted by the gunshot. Consequently, most of them awoke and escaped before Crawford's men could storm the town. However, six Indians were still killed, several more were wounded, and fourteen prisoners (mostly women and children) were taken.\(^{36}\) Crawford observed after the attack that "the whole of the Mingoes were ready to start, and were to have set out the morning we attacked them." Consequently, the Virginians "got all their baggage and horses, ten of their guns, and two white prisoners."\(^{37}\) The plunder was subsequently sold among Crawford's militiamen for a total of four hundred pounds sterling. Seekonk and the smaller village were then put to the torch. Crawford's attack constituted the only offensive action of Dunmore's Northern Division during the entire war, and in comparison with McDonald's expedition, was quite successful in terms of plunder and in forcing the Mingoes to sue for peace.

In the meantime, Dunmore had reconvened his peace council with the Shawnees to work out the final details. The proceedings had barely started when news arrived that Lewis' Southern Division was approaching Chillicothe. The Indians suspected treachery

\(^{32}\) Ibid.
\(^{33}\) Ibid.
\(^{34}\) Ibid.
\(^{35}\) Ibid.
\(^{36}\) Ibid.
\(^{37}\) Ibid.
by Dunmore and feared that Lewis' men were "going to attack their towns."\textsuperscript{38} So, they quickly quit Camp Charlotte and prepared to fight. Dunmore immediately sent a message to Lewis stating that "he had very near concluded a peace and that he [Lewis] was to halt his troops" where they were.\textsuperscript{39} It looked as if the peace negotiations had completely collapsed, and Dunmore was not happy.

After the battle at Point Pleasant, Lewis had spent a week burying his dead, tending to the wounded, improving his fortifications, and rounding up his dispersed cattle.\textsuperscript{40} Plunder was also collected off the battlefield, which amounted to "23 guns, 80 blankets, 27 Tomahawks with miscellaneous Match coats, Skins, shot pouches, powder horns, and Warclubs."\textsuperscript{41} Everything was sold among the militiamen for approximately £100.\textsuperscript{42} Early on the 13\textsuperscript{th}, Dunmore's message arrived directing Lewis to take his division and join their forces south of "Chillicosse at a large ridge," meeting "next Tuesday at noon," October 18.\textsuperscript{43} Lewis knew he could not make the appointed time since he did not "propose crossing the Ohio before Monday."\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, the colonel hastily composed a message to Dunmore asking that the Northern Division move southward to join his Southern Division, since it was fully expected that the Shawnees would fight all the way from the Ohio to Chillicothe.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, Lewis' men, who now had a healthy respect for the fighting abilities of their adversaries, thought another battle was imminent if the Indians had not yet fallen upon Dunmore's division.\textsuperscript{46} Lewis' message never reached Dunmore, however, so the colonel, hearing nothing in return from the governor, left three hundred men under

\textsuperscript{38} "Fleming's Journal," in Dunmore's War, 290.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 289.
\textsuperscript{40} "Fleming's Orderly Book," October 12, 1774, in Ibid., 346-7.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} "Fleming's Journal," in Ibid., 288.
\textsuperscript{44} Christian to Preston, October 15, 1774, in Ibid., 262-3.
\textsuperscript{45} Isaac Shelby to John Shelby, October 16, 1774, in Ibid., 277.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
the incapacitated Colonel Fleming at camp to guard the wounded and the provisions, and crossed the Ohio on October 17 with some seven hundred militiamen. For the next several days, the Southern Division advanced without incident. On October 23, Lewis was within fifteen miles of Chillicothe when Dunmore's message arrived ordering the militiamen to halt. At this point, Lewis was probably beginning to dislike and distrust his superior. Consequently, he gave Dunmore a rather curt reply that the area his men were currently marching through was "inconvenient" for camping, and that the Indians had fired on them that very morning (which may or may not have been true). 47 So, the Southern Division marched on.

Early the next morning, another message arrived from Dunmore stating that "Peace was in a manner concluded, that the Shawnees had agreed to his terms, and therefore Colo. Lewis was to encamp where he was." 48 However, the governor invited Lewis "& any Officers he tho't proper" to come over to Camp Charlotte to participate in the treaty council. 49 After fighting a severe battle with the Shawnees only two weeks before, Lewis was understandably dubious about the whole affair, and "did not imagine it would be prudent to go to his lordships Camp with only two or three Officers, and therefore marched thither with a design to Join his Lordship" with his entire force. 50 On the way, however, his guide took the wrong path, which "led betwixt the towns & his Lordship's Camp," placing the Southern Division squarely between Camp Charlotte and Chillicothe. 51 Soon, Lewis encountered an angry Dunmore riding from Camp Charlotte accompanied by John Gibson, White Eyes, and fifty of the governor's own militiamen. Dunmore demanded to know why Lewis "did not stop when he was ordered, or if he

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 289-90.
51 Ibid., 290.
proposed to push on to the towns."\textsuperscript{52} Lewis explained what had happened, and that the governor "need not be Apprehensive of his Attacking the Towns after receiving his Lordship's orders."\textsuperscript{53} Evidently Dunmore was satisfied with this explanation. But in case Lewis had any ideas about marching on to the Shawnee towns, Dunmore decided to spend the night with the Southern Division.

That night, word passed around Lewis' camp that Dunmore was making peace with the Shawnees before the militiamen could plunder and pillage Chillicothe as Preston had promised back in July. Not surprisingly, most of the men probably felt cheated, and that their efforts and blood had been for naught.\textsuperscript{54} Many felt that the governor was negotiating a hollow victory, since the Shawnees had not been chastised despite all his bold rhetoric, and that the Indians still remained a threat to the backcountry. As a result, threats of violence to his Lordship's person resonated throughout the camp. Lewis' son recalled fifty years later that his father had to "double or triple the guard over his marquee to prevent the men from killing the governor."\textsuperscript{55} One of Lewis' officers also recollected that "to his knowledge, there were more than one hundred flints picked the next day for Lord Dunmore."\textsuperscript{56} With such hostility coursing through the camp, Dunmore was bound to have seen the militiamen's ire, and was perhaps eager to get them away from Chillicothe as soon as possible.

Accordingly, the next morning, October 25, Dunmore called all Lewis' captains' together, and tactlessly informed them that the Shawnees "had agreed to all his Terms," and that the Southern Division's presence "could be of no service, but rather a hindrance

\textsuperscript{52} Christian to Preston, November 8, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 303; "Fleming's Orderly Book," October 12, 1774, in \textit{Ibid.}, 356.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, 356.

\textsuperscript{54} See eds. note in \textit{Ibid.}, 303.

\textsuperscript{55} Andrew Lewis, Jr., "A Letter of Colonel Andrew Lewis, Jr. to S.L. Campbell," in the \textit{Virginia Historical Register and the Literary Companion}, I, 32-3.

\textsuperscript{56} Major Thompson, in "Indian Relics," \textit{The Virginia Historical Register and Literary Notebook}, III, (January, 1850), 40-1.
to the peace being concluded." Consequently, he ordered Lewis and his militiamen to return home without pomp or congratulations. Lewis, who probably felt unappreciated, obliged the governor and marched his disgruntled militiamen away from the Pickaway Plains that very day. By the 28th, the Southern Division was back at Point Pleasant, having covered the same territory in only three days that had taken them six during their advance. Once at Point Pleasant, Lewis left a permanent garrison of fifty men under Captain Matthew Arbuckle, and released the rest of his men from their duties under the militia law. The disbanded militiamen then marched for home, scattered "from the Elk to the Levels…from Point Pleasant to Warm Springs…all in little companies." Thus ended the Point Pleasant campaign, and Andrew Lewis’ respect for his governor.

With the departure Lewis' Southern Division, the Shawnees returned to Camp Charlotte accompanied by Mingo representatives (but not Logan) and concluded negotiations with Dunmore. The Indians were pleasantly surprised to find, "contrary to their expectation," that no punitive measures would be taken against them, and "agreed to everything with the greatest alacrity." It was stipulated that these agreements would be ratified at a much larger council to be held the following spring at Fort Dunmore. With peace made with the Shawnees and the Mingoes subdued, Dunmore and his Northern Division began the journey home about October 31. On November 5, he arrived at Fort Gower with his men. Once there, the Northern Division broke up into small companies, and the men began their return journeys home. Connolly returned to Pittsburgh on November 12 and resumed his oppression of the Pennsylvania magistrates. Dunmore, however, crossed the Ohio from Fort Gower and traveled to Wheeling. From there he

58 “John Stuart's Narrative,” in MAH, I, (December 1877), 744.
59 Christian to Preston, November 8, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 306.
60 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Ibid., 386.
rode to Winchester, and then on to Williamsburg, finally arriving in the capital on the afternoon of December 4.\textsuperscript{61} Dunmore's War was now officially over.

Upon his return to the governor's palace, Dunmore found two blistering letters of reprimand from Dartmouth. The first of these took Dunmore to task for his insubordination and his presumption to institute his own western land policy contrary to directives from Whitehall. Dartmouth wrote:

\begin{quote}
Upon this occasion the Measures that have been pursued by Government respecting the Country lying between the Ohio River and the Northern boundary of North Carolina and the grounds of policy of those Measures from the Royal Proclamation of 1763, down to the present Time, have been examined with due attention…Your Lordship cannot have been ignorant of those Measures and must have seen that it has been the invariable Policy of this Country to prevent, by every possible means, any Settlement of the King's Subjects in situations where they could not fail of exciting the Jealousy of and giving Dissatisfaction to the Indians, and where at the same time the Settlers would be out of the reach either of the controul or protection of the King's Government.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

Dartmouth then reminded the governor that it was upon this policy that the King, by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, forbade settlement beyond the Heads of the River that fall into the Atlantic Ocean.\textsuperscript{63} Even though the Six Nations had ceded "the Lands on the South of the Ohio, as low down as its confluence with the Cherokee [Tennessee] River" in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, the King's official acceptance of these lands had been had been "accompanied with an order to Sir William Johnson to assure those Nations of His Majesty's firm resolution not to suffer any Settlement to be made below the Kanawha River."\textsuperscript{64} After briefly mentioning the boundaries set down by the Lochaber treaty in the

\textsuperscript{61} Virginia Gazette, December 8, 1774.

\textsuperscript{62} Dartmouth to Dunmore, September 8, 1774, in Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, X, 4\textsuperscript{th} series, 725-728.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 725.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
south, Dartmouth then confronted Dunmore with a grudging admission accompanied by an ominous warning:

…it would, as your Lordship contends, be advisable, upon Grounds of general Policy, to allow Settlements under the authority of the Government of Virginia, beyond that Line…yet while these Compacts with the Indians remain in full force and The King's Sacred Word stands pledged for the observance of them, every attempt on the part of the King's Subjects to acquire title to and take possession of lands beyond the Line fixed by His Majesty's authority & every encouragement given to such an attempt, can be considered in no other light that that of a gross Indignity and Dishonour to the Crown, and of an Act of equal Inhumanity and injustice to the Indians, that cannot fail to be attended with fatal Consequences.\(^{65}\)

Therefore, Dartmouth felt it necessary to express the King's stern displeasure and to put Dunmore on his guard for the future.\(^{66}\)

Dartmouth was not finished with Dunmore yet. In a second letter written on the same day, the secretary again severely scolded the governor, this time over Connolly's activities in Pittsburgh and for misrepresenting the true state of affairs in the Ohio Valley to Whitehall. Governor Penn had sent a list of substantiated charges against the Commandant to Whitehall, including information that Connolly had provoked the Indians into war instead of the inverse as Dunmore had led the secretary to believe. Dartmouth apparently confirmed Penn's accusations "through a variety of other Channels."\(^{67}\)

Therefore, the secretary saw fit to acquaint Dunmore with Penn's assertion that:

…the Hostility of the Indians upon the Ohio River, which had spread such general alarm and distress throughout the Back Settlements, was occasioned by the unprovoked ill treatment of those Indians by the people of Virginia, who had barbarously murdered about eleven of the Delaware and Shawnee Tribes; and that many friendly Indians who had generously

\(^{65}\) Ibid., 726.

\(^{66}\) Ibid.

\(^{67}\) Dartmouth to Dunmore, September 8, 1774, in Ibid., 723-4.
afforded protection to the persons and goods of Indian Traders, from the violence of some of their young Warriors; and who were at the risk of their own Lives, escorting those Traders to their friends near Pittsburg, were, contrary to all faith, attacked, and some of them wounded by a party of Virginians sent out for the purpose by one Connolly, a Militia Captain, having a Commission from the Government of Virginia.  

Dartmouth was particularly galled at Connolly's reconstruction of Fort Pitt, "which was demolished by the King's express Orders," and the efforts to build new forts down the Ohio. Consequently, Dartmouth was induced:

To take the earliest opportunity of acquainting your lordship with this Information, to the end that the facts asserted, if not true, may be contradicted by your Lordship's authority; but if otherwise (which I cannot suppose to be the case) such steps may be taken as the King's Dignity and Justice shall Dictate.  

Confronted with Dartmouth's threat of punishment, Dunmore sat down and wrote what could only be considered an apologetic for his entire administration in Virginia. This lengthy letter, full of lies, half-truths, and misrepresentations, attempted to refute all of Dartmouth's accusations. Dunmore carefully wrote:

However Sensible I am of the kindness of your Lordship's intention, in the caution which you are pleased to give me for my future conduct, I must be so free as to declare, that I do not perceive the Misconduct which has made your Lordship think such a caution necessary; neither do I discover the justice of the heavy rebuke, which your Lordship communicates to me...but that I must depend on the integrity of my actions, and the uprightness of my intentions for my Justification, which if I am not so fortunate to make His Majesty and your lordship as fully Sensible of, as I am myself conscious of.  

---

68 Ibid., 723  
69 Dartmouth to Dunmore, September 8, 1774, in "Aspinwall Papers," 724.  
70 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 368-395.
The governor then gave a recital of events in the Virginia backcountry as he saw them, spanning back to 1763. He especially noted the murders committed by Indians while completely ignoring those committed by white frontiersmen during the preceding decade, noting in particular the attack on James Boone's party in October 1773. Dunmore glossed over his own role in the subversion of the Lochaber Treaty line and baldly lied about the subsequent encroachments by surveyors into Kentucky:

When I was removed to this government I found the boundary line, mentioned by your Lordship to have been Stipulated in the Treaty concluded at Lochaber the 18th of October 1770, putting into execution; the finishing hand given to that Service after I came here, and I transmitted an Account of it, with a Map of the line, the 20th of March 1772; and My Lord I have invariably taken every Step which depended on me, to prevent any infringement of it by the people of this Colony, with regard to Grants, has any infringement of it been made, or Settlement either that the power of this Government could prevent.71

Of course, he failed to mention Connolly's grant at the Falls of the Ohio, the grants allowed to Washington's veterans the previous December, or the surveying expeditions into Kentucky.

After an in depth discussion of the wandering nature of the Americans, Dunmore then defended Connolly. He denied that the Commandant had provoked the Shawnees into war. On the contrary, Connolly's reconstruction of Fort Pitt had kept the "Neighboring Indians in awe," while "the prudence observed by Mr. Connolly" had firmly held them "to our interest."72 Dunmore acknowledged that "several accidents" had in fact occurred around Pittsburgh, but that he and Connolly had attempted to apprehend the guilty parties, with no success. As for the reconstruction of Fort Pitt, the governor admitted that he had ordered it, but for a good reason:

71 Ibid., 371.
72 Ibid., 380-1.
...this, your Lordship has seen in my Relation, was done by my order: but if it be seen as it really was, in the light of a temporary work for the defence of a Country, and its terrified Inhabitants in a time of imminent danger, I presume it will appear very different from reestablishing a Fort which had been demolished by the King's express orders, as if this Act of mine had been contrary to or in disregard of His Majesty's orders: And my Lord, I fear, that it must be owing to the unfavourable opinion which your Lordship conceives of my administration, that it did not readily occur to your Lordship that the distress and alarm, of which you were apprised at the same time, however they were occasioned, required that Step, and accounted for it.  

After noting the Indian attacks that occurred in the Virginia backcountry that summer, Dunmore then gave a fairly accurately account of his and McDonald's expeditions to the Shawnee towns, including details of the battle at Point Pleasant and the peace council at Camp Charlotte.

The last part of letter was spent in castigating Governor Penn, who was primarily responsible for informing Dartmouth of Dunmore's activities. Dunmore asserted that Penn, in making unwarranted charges to the Pennsylvania Assembly, "hath Sullied the dignity and Solemnity, which belongs to Such an Act as Communicating the business of the Publick to their representatives, by making it the conveyance of falsehood and imposition," which tended to aggravate tensions between the two colonies. Dunmore was confident that Dartmouth's intelligence had all sprung from the same Source: "from the Malevolence which that Gentleman thinks he has cause to manifest towards me." Aiding Penn's cause, according to Dunmore, were the Philadelphia newspapers, which led the public to believe that the Virginia governor was acting "only in conjunction with a parcel of Land Jobbers" with "views of emolument" to himself," and that by such means he was "procuring Grants of Land." This last charge must have particularly stung

73 Ibid., 388-9.
74 Ibid., 388.
75 Ibid., 389.
76 Ibid., 391.
Dunmore since he made such a point of refuting it to Dartmouth. Perhaps, the truth hurt. At any rate, he concluded his polemic with hopes that the king and the secretary would be convinced that he had not been careless with the lives of the Indians, even though he exerted "some vigorous Measures to put an end to their disputes with his Majesty's Subjects." 77 As an afterthought, he added that he had never been "Negligent in any respect of [his] Duty." 78

Incredibly, Dartmouth and King George accepted Dunmore’s explanation and took no action against the governor. The secretary even went so far as to write, “it is with the greatest satisfaction that I have it in command from The King to acquaint your lordship, that what you say in justification of your conduct…leaves no room in the Royal Breast to doubt of the Uprightness of your Lordship’s Intentions.” 79 Apparently, the king could not bring himself to remove his “right well-beloved” cousin from his post, especially since the war had ended successfully and the royal government did not have to pay for it. Also, Dartmouth was currently engaged in dealing with the crisis in Boston, and perhaps was not willing to take a chance on replacing Dunmore (which would have taken some time) at such a critical time when the colonies were on the brink of revolution. A royal governor was immediately needed in Virginia to maintain control of the colonial government, so Dunmore, most likely by circumstances, kept his job.

The citizens of Virginia were far more charitable in their opinion of Dunmore's War at the time than Dartmouth had initially been. On December 8, the Virginia Gazette crowed that "in little more than the space of five months," the conflict had been successfully ended, “owing to the zeal and good conduct of the officers and commanders who went out

77 Ibid., 395.
78 Ibid.
in their country’s defense."80 Angus McDonald reported in January 1775 that "the news is that all the Country is well pleased with the Governor's Expedition."81 Washington, just back from the 1st Continental Congress in Philadelphia, wrote, "We look upon the Peace, which Lord Dunmore made with the Indians to be conclusive and certain, and that I dare say it will be of lasting duration."82 The Virginia Convention, meeting in Richmond on March 20, 1775, lavished praise upon the governor with a unanimous resolution declaring that:

…the most cordial thanks of the people of this Colony are a tribute justly due to our worthy Governour, Lord Dunmore, for his truly noble, wise, and spirited conduct on the late expedition against our Indian enemy.83

The freeholders of Fincastle County issued a similar message of thanks to the governor, as did the faculty of William and Mary College.84 Even Pennsylvanian Arthur St. Clair was forced to admit Dunmore's success against the Indians, writing on December 4, "It is probable from these Circumstances we shall have no more trouble with them, and things have come to a much better end than there was any reason to have expected."85 Folk songs and ballads were written of the governor's supposed exploits on the campaign. A typical ballad cheered:

Our Royal Governor Dunmore, he being of high renown,  
With fifteen hundred jovial men, he marched towards their town,  
With a full resolution, to slay both old and young,  
For all the barbarous actions, the savages had done,  
The Indians with aching hearts, on bended knees did fall  
And for his Lordship's mecry, so loudly they did call,

80 Virginia Gazette, December 8, 1774.
81 McDonald to W. Harrod, January 8, 1774, in Dunmore's War, 395.
84 "Address of the President and Professors of William and Mary College to John, Earl of Dunmore," in Ibid., I, 1019.
85 St. Clair to Penn, December 4, 1774, in St. Clair Papers, I, 348-9.
His Lordship with compassion, forgave them from that day.
If all the costs and charges amongst them they would pay.  

Dunmore's prestige and popularity among Virginians reached their zenith that winter, and he fully expected to reap the "happy effects" of his expedition in the years to come. His campaign had been an unqualified success. Peace with the Indians had been restored at their expense. Virginia remained in firm control of the Forks of the Ohio, much to the chagrin of the Pennsylvanians. And, the Shawnees at Camp Charlotte had all but ceded Kentucky to Virginia, which satisfied the colony's soldiers, land speculators, and settlers. Indeed, it seemed as if the governor had finally solved the western land problem in Virginia's favor, and under Dartmouth's nose, with his boldness. Moreover, his coup in the Ohio Valley seemed to promise the landed estate in the west that he so desperately wanted for himself and his family. As the turbulent year 1774 came to a close, Dunmore, despite Dartmouth’s displeasure, basked in his triumph and planned for a prosperous new year as the victorious governor of Virginia.

---

86 Dunmore's War, 438.
87 Dunmore to Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, in Ibid., 386-7.
Despite Dunmore’s triumph, his administration was doomed. Within one short year, he would become probably the most despised man in Virginia. While he had been away, the first Virginia Convention had met and resolved to support the rebels in the occupied city of Boston. Dartmouth had sent Dunmore a message dated November 11, 1774 authorizing the use of force to crush the revolutionary movement that was beginning to organize in Virginia. When Dunmore arrived in Williamsburg in December, he found the city quiet (the calm before the storm) and did not need to act on Dartmouth’s orders. In March 1775, however, the Virginia Convention reassembled in Richmond, and the colony formally moved toward revolution. A defense committee was organized, headed by Washington, Lewis, and Christian. Dunmore became alarmed, and on the night of April 20, removed the colony’s primary store of gunpowder from the magazine in Williamsburg, and placed it on board the *H.M.S. Fowey* at anchor in the James. The Virginians were enraged, and the governor subsequently lost all control of the colony. On the morning of June 8, Dunmore and his family fled from an angry mob and took refuge aboard the *Fowey*. The House of Burgesses under Patrick Henry assumed full governmental power. In November, Dunmore attempted to regain power by declaring martial law. He also issued a proclamation freeing all black slaves and indentured servants who ran away from their masters and joined his “Ethiopian Regiment” to march against the rebels. His ploy failed, and the militia defeated the “Ethiopian Regiment” at Great Bridge in December. Dunmore burned Norfolk on January 1, 1776, and retreated to Gwynn’s Island in the Chesapeake Bay, where Andrew Lewis, with much satisfaction no doubt, finally drove him out of the colony for good on July 8, 1776.
Dunmore spent the rest of the Revolution sailing up and down the Atlantic Seaboard, and plotting his return to Virginia. But, he would never set foot in the former colony again. After the Revolutionary War ended, he sat rather inconspicuously in the House of Lords until receiving another appointment as governor of the Bahamas in 1787. For the next nine years, he served an uneventful term until being relieved of his duties in 1796. He returned to England and lived in relative obscurity until he died in 1809.1

After Dunmore’s War, John Connolly returned to Pittsburgh, where he resumed his reign of terror against the Pennsylvanians.2 His regime, like that of his master, was destined, however, to fall within a year. In the summer of 1775, while Connolly was trying to hold the planned Indian council in Pittsburgh to formally ratify the Camp Charlotte treaty, St. Clair and the magistrates finally mustered the necessary manpower to overthrow the commandant and remand him to jail. He escaped and became an ardent loyalist, engaging in numerous subversive activities. He was finally captured by the Pennsylvanians again, and imprisoned for five years. After the revolution, he wandered throughout the former colonies and engaged in a various shady schemes to undermine the new American government. He was finally deported out of the United States in 1789, and retired to the Bahamas where he died in 1813.3

Andrew Lewis joined the patriot cause after returning from the Ohio Valley. In 1776, he was promoted to Brigadier General and was responsible for Dunmore’s final defeat at Gwynn’s Island. Soon after, he helped Washington organize the Virginia Continental Line, but allegations of cowardice at Point Pleasant, all baseless, hindered any chance of

future promotion and higher command. Washington even had to defend his friend against the persistent charges, writing, “For notwithstanding the odium thrown upon his conduct at the Kanawha, I always looked upon him as a man of spirit and a good officer; his experience is equal to anyone we have.”4 Despite Washington’s endorsement, the House of Burgesses later refused to promote Lewis to Major General, leading him to resign his commission and return home in disgust. He died in 1781.

Other officers involved in one way or another with Dunmore’s activities in the Ohio Valley met with various fates. George Washington went on to greater fame and glory as the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, and later first President of the United States. After he retired from public life, he lived comfortably during his remaining years on the wealth he accumulated from his land speculation activities, before dying in 1799. His friend William Crawford had no such luck. Crawford ultimately became a major general in the Continental Army, and in June 1782, he led a disastrous expedition into the Sandousky Valley against the Delawares, who had been agitated by Indian Agent turned loyalist Alexander McKee. Crawford’s force was destroyed, and he was captured and slowly burned to death by the Indians. Pennsylvanian Arthur St. Clair, the inveterate enemy of Dunmore and Connolly, also became a major general under Washington. He later became the first General of the United States Army and governor of the Northwest Territories. In 1791, he led his own expedition deep into Ohio against a mixed force of Shawnees and Miamis under Blue Jacket and Little Turtle, respectively. Like Crawford, he suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Indians, but escaped with his life. His reputation was destroyed, however, and he died in poverty in 1818.

In Southwestern Virginia, William Preston, Major Arthur Campbell and Colonel William Campbell would all become noted patriot leaders. Preston was particularly active in suppressing Loyalism in the Upper Shenandoah Valley before dying in June 1782.

William Fleming also embraced the patriot cause, but his wounds from Point Pleasant prevented him from seeing active service in the Continental Army. Instead, he became county lieutenant of Botetourt County after Lewis’ death, and actually served for several months as the acting governor of Virginia during Cornwallis’ invasion in 1781. Fleming died in 1795 from complications of his old battle wounds.

Cornstalk met with a tragic and undeserved fate. After working hard to maintain the peace after the Treaty of Camp Charlotte, he was brutally murdered by drunk militiamen under Captain Mathew Arbuckle in November 1777. Ironically, the Shawnee chief was killed while on a peace mission at the fort at Point Pleasant, the scene of his defeat three years earlier. Also killed in the incident were Cornstalk’s son Elinipsico and another chief called Red Hawk. These rash murders would result in renewed hostilities between the Shawnees and the whites, which would last until the Shawnees’ final defeat at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794.

After Dunmore’s War, John Logan suffered a torturous existence, descending further into melancholia and chronic drunkenness. He raided again during the Revolution, and wandered through the Ohio wilderness before settling near Detroit. Various Indian reports recounted that he incessantly lamented that “Life had become a torment to him: he knew no more what pleasure was: He thought it had been better if he had never existed.” The reports also indicated that “he became in some measure delirious,” and repeatedly “declared he would kill himself.” Also, he “did not seem to

---

5 “Sketch of William Fleming,” in Dunmore’s War, 428-9.
6 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
care what he did, and what became of himself.\textsuperscript{10} In the fall of 1780, he reportedly engaged in a drunken brawl with four other Indians, and was killed in what could only be called a tragic end for a tragic figure.\textsuperscript{11}

Dunmore’s War was the last colonial war in North America before the Revolution. The lasting results of this conflict for Virginia are difficult estimate due to its proximity to the Revolution. However, it can be safely said that the war hastened to a considerable degree the settlement of the trans-Allegheny region and Kentucky, which saw a veritable deluge of settlers after the terms of the Camp Charlotte treaty became known. Also, the Virginia backcountry was becalmed for two precious years. This breathing space gave Virginia's political leaders time to consolidate their meager forces and focus solely upon the British threat when hostilities commenced. Moreover, the two-year peace on the frontier allowed the militiamen to devote a good deal of their attention toward fighting the British instead of the Indians. Indeed, many of Dunmore's veterans felt secure enough to leave their backwoods settlements to join the fledgling Continental Army. The background and experience that this group offered to the patriot cause gave George Washington and his subordinates an edge in organizing the Virginia Continental Line. For example, Andrew Lewis first commanded all Continental forces in Virginia and was the officer chiefly responsible for driving Lord Dunmore out of the colony in 1776. Similarly, Point Pleasant veterans Alexander McClennahan, Abraham Bowman, George Mathews, James Wood, and William Russell all received high level commissions in the army, respectively commanding the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Twelfth and Thirteenth Virginia Regiments during the Revolutionary War.\textsuperscript{12} Daniel Morgan, after briefly commanding the Eleventh Virginia Regiment, recruited his corps of Virginia riflemen

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{11} Mayer, \textit{Logan and Cresap}, 139-40.

from backwoodsmen who, like himself, had "served an active campaign" under Lord Dunmore against the Indians.\textsuperscript{13} This outfit later played conspicuous roles in the siege of Boston (1775) and the battles of Quebec (1775), Saratoga (1777), and Cowpens (1781). Colonel Adam Stephen, who led the Berkeley County Regiment in Dunmore's Northern Division, initially commanded the Fourth Virginia Regiment before being promoted to major general in the Continental Army. George Rogers Clark, another of Dunmore's former officers, likewise recruited veterans of the royal governor's Northern Division for his Illinois Regiment, and later overwhelmed in British at Kaskaskia and Vincennes in the Northwest Territory (1778-79).

After its return from the Ohio Valley, Virginia’s backcountry militia itself became a solid framework for systematic resistance to British influence on the Southern colonial frontier. Those expedition veterans who did not join the army were instrumental in suppressing British instigated Indian activity in the south. In July 1776, a contingent of militiamen under Point Pleasant veterans James Thompson, James Shelby, William Cocke, and John Campbell routed a Cherokee force, agitated and encouraged by British Indian Superintendent Captain John Stuart, at Long Island Flats (near present-day Kingsport, Tennessee).\textsuperscript{14} Three months later, a much larger force of militiamen under William Christian, Evan Shelby, and William Russell, in a march reminiscent of Dunmore's Expedition, invaded the Tennessee River Valley and burned the Cherokee towns.\textsuperscript{15} In 1779, Shelby marched further south to finish the job by destroying eleven

\textsuperscript{13} Daniel Morgan to Richard Henry Lee, n.d., in \textit{T. B. Meyers Collection} in the Manuscript Division of the New York Public Library, 1084; also quoted in \textit{Historical Magazine}, June 1871, p. 379; and in the \textit{Pittsburgh Gazette}, July 10, 1878.

\textsuperscript{14} Force, \textit{American Archives}, 5\textsuperscript{th} Series, i, 464.

\textsuperscript{15} Wilson, \textit{Great Valley Patriots}, 87-8.
towns of the militant Chickamauga faction, thereby ending the Cherokee threat once and for all.\textsuperscript{16}

Backcountry Loyalists also found the veteran militiamen to be dangerous adversaries. Walter Crockett and William Campbell used their high-ranking positions as militia leaders during the Revolution to ferret out Loyalist plots and guard the valuable Lead Mines at Fort Chiswell.\textsuperscript{17} Campbell, in particular, became a noted opponent of Loyalism, breaking up substantial insurrections in the New River Valley in 1779, and again in early 1780. When news reached Campbell in September 1780 that a large, predominantly Loyalist army under British Major Patrick Ferguson was marching through North Carolina toward Virginia, the militia colonel reacted quickly. Joining forces with fellow Point Pleasant veteran Isaac Shelby and following the model of Dunmore's Expedition, Campbell marched his militiamen southward to meet the threat. On October 7, 1780, Campbell's veterans destroyed the Loyalist army at King's Mountain, South Carolina. Ferguson was killed during the hour-long battle, and southern backcountry Loyalism suffered a fatal blow.

Dunmore's War was also occasioned by an emerging American nationalism in the Virginia backcountry. Evidence of this can be found scattered throughout the correspondence of Dunmore's militia officers, who repeatedly invoked the powerful nationalistic theme of 'Country' to justify the expedition. For example, William Preston wrote Colonel William Christian that "the eyes of the Country will be upon you: So that I have no doubt but every person in his station will exert himself to answer the wishes & expectations of his Country, and serve it as much as in his power lies."\textsuperscript{18} Likewise,

\textsuperscript{17} Patricia Givens Johnson, \textit{William Preston and the Allegheny Patriots}, (Pulaski, Virginia: B.D. Smith & Bros., Inc., 1976), 223
\textsuperscript{18} "Colonel William Preston to Colonel William Christian, June 27, 1774," in Thwaites, \textit{Dunmore's War}, 55; \textit{DSS SQQ47}. 
Captain William Russell explained in a letter to Preston that "my only Inducement was my Country" in accepting a commission in the militia. Russell's compatriot Anthony Bledsoe proudly noted during the expedition that he "at all Times shewed a Willingness to Serve my Contrey in any Station hereunto I was call'd." Most eloquently of all, Colonel William Fleming characterized Dunmore's Expedition to his wife as "an honourable Cause, a cause undertaken for the good of his Country in general," and assured her that if he "should fall…in the Service of & in the defence of his Country," he "dies in an Act of Religion…and dies the death of the Rightious."

Another manifestation of this nationalism was the so-called Fort Gower address. At the close of Dunmore's campaign, word reached the militiamen still in the Ohio Valley of the momentous events occurring in the east. In a resolute demonstration of provincial solidarity, Dunmore's entire corps of militia officers in the Northern Division held an impromptu meeting on November 5 at Fort Gower, and resolved to "exert every power within us for the defence of American liberty, and for the support of her just rights and privileges." Additionally, Dunmore's officers were keenly aware that in the eyes of their colonial compatriots, a well-armed veteran force of backwoods militiamen commanded by the governor might represent a possible threat to the rising revolutionary fervor in Williamsburg. To calm the fears of their "countrymen" who "may be jealous of the use such a body would make of arms in their hands at this critical juncture," the officers openly affirmed their "real sentiments…at this very alarming crisis," and promised to "solemnly engage to one another, and our country in particular, that we will use them [their weapons] to no purpose but for the honor and advantage of America in

19 "Captain William Russell to Colonel William Preston, July 13, 1774" in Ibid., 89; DSS 3QQ64.
20 "Captain Anthony Bledsoe to Colonel William Preston, August 28, 1774," in Ibid., 169; DSS 3QQ86
21 "Colonel William Fleming to Nancy Fleming, September 27, 1774" in Ibid., 213-14; DSS 2ZZ5.
general, and of Virginia in particular.” Daniel Morgan wrote of this declaration that "we as an army victorious formed ourselves into a society pledging our word of honor to each other to assist our brethren of Boston in case hostilities should commence.”

Finally, it is important not to disregard its ramifications for the Shawnees who had fought so hard to halt the Virginians at the Ohio River. After the Battle of Point Pleasant and Treaty of Camp Charlotte, the Shawnees were still a force to be reckoned with for sure, but their influence in Virginia was seriously diminished. In 1777, they would take up the hatchet again and resume their raiding. But, significantly, most of the Shawnee attacks were against white settlements in Kentucky instead of Virginia. After the Revolution, they would continue to fight stubbornly as they were pushed further west. In 1791, the Shawnees joined with the Miamis and won a stunning victory against the infant United States Army under General Arthur St. Clair, which had marched deep within the Ohio Country. Roughly two-thirds of St. Clair’s force, numbering fourteen hundred soldiers, were casualties. More than six hundred were killed outright. Three years later, however, the army, now under General Anthony Wayne, returned and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Shawnees in the battle of Fallen Timbers. After Wayne’s victory, the Shawnees finally gave up all pretenses to Kentucky and ceded nearly all of their land in Ohio and southern Indiana to the United States in the treaty of Greenville in 1795. Afterwards, most of the surviving Shawnees migrated across the Mississippi. Those Shawnees who chose to remain east of that river lived on two separate reservations in northwestern Ohio, but they were ultimately forced to move to a new reservation in Kansas in 1832 and 1833. The Shawnees made one last gasp when a few warriors under

---

24 Thwaites, *Dunmore’s War*, xxv.
the chief Tecumseh and his brother, known as The Prophet, allied themselves with the British in the War of 1812. American General William Henry Harrison fought and vanquished them at the Battle of the Thames in 1813. Four years before, Tecumseh, whose father Pukeshinwau was killed at Point Pleasant, had concisely summed up the Indians’ plight to Harrison with the exclamation, "Once a happy race. Since made miserable by the white people, who are never contented, but always encroaching."28 His lament is a fitting epitaph for Dunmore’s War.

Appendix I

Royal Proclamation of 1763

Purpose

Whereas We have taken into Our Royal Consideration the extensive and valuable Acquisitions in America, secured to our Crown by the late Definitive Treaty of Peace, concluded at Paris the 10th Day of February last; and being desirous that all Our loving Subjects, as well of our Kingdom as of our Colonies in America, may avail themselves with all convenient Speed, of the great Benefits and Advantages which must accrue therefrom to their Commerce, Manufactures, and Navigation, We have thought fit, with the Advice of our Privy Council, to issue this our Royal Proclamation, hereby to publish and declare to all our loving Subjects, that we have, with the Advice of our Said Privy Council, granted our Letters Patent, under our Great Seal of Great Britain, to erect, within the Countries and Islands ceded and confirmed to Us by the said Treaty, Four distinct and separate Governments, styled and called by the names of Quebec, East Florida, West Florida and Grenada, and limited and bounded as follows, viz.

First--The Government of Quebec bounded on the Labrador Coast by the River St. John, and from thence by a Line drawn from the Head of that River through the Lake St. John, to the South end of the Lake Nipissing; from whence the said Line, crossing the River St. Lawrence, and the Lake Champlain, in 45. Degrees of North Latitude, passes along the High Lands which divide the Rivers that empty themselves into the said River St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Sea; and also along the North Coast of the Baye des Châleurs, and the Coast of the Gulph of St. Lawrence to Cape Rosières, and from thence crossing the Mouth of the River St. Lawrence by the West End of the Island of Anticosti, terminates at the aforesaid River of St. John.

Secondly--The Government of East Florida, bounded to the Westward by the Gulph of Mexico and the Apalachicola River; to the Northward by a Line drawn from that part of the said River where the Chatahouchee and Flint Rivers meet, to the source of St. Mary's River. and by the course of the said River to the Atlantic Ocean; and to the Eastward and Southward by the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulph of Florida, including all Islands within Six Leagues of the Sea Coast.

Thirdly--The Government of West Florida, bounded to the Southward by the Gulph of Mexico, including all Islands within Six Leagues of the Coast; from the River Apalachicola to Lake Pontchartrain; to the Westward by the said Lake, the Lake
Maurepas, and the River Mississippi; to the Northward by a Line drawn due East from that part of the River Mississippi which lies in 31 Degrees North Latitude, to the River Apalachicola or Chatahouchee; and to the Eastward by the said River.

Fourthly--The Government of Grenada, comprehending the Island of that name, together with the Grenadines, and the Islands of Dominico, St. Vincent's and Tobago. And to the end that the open and free Fishery of our Subjects may be extended to and carried on upon the Coast of Labrador, and the adjacent Islands. We have thought fit, with the advice of our said Privy Council to put all that Coast, from the River St. John's to Hudson's Streights, together with the Islands of Anticosti and Madelaine, and all other smaller Islands lying upon the said Coast, under the care and Inspection of our Governor of Newfoundland.

We have also, with the advice of our Privy Council, thought fit to annex the Islands of St. John's [now Prince Edward Island] and Cape Breton or Isle Royale, with the lesser Islands adjacent thereto, to our Government of Nova Scotia.

We have also, with the advice of our Privy Council aforesaid, annexed to our Province of Georgia all the Lands lying between the Rivers Alatamaha and St. Mary's.

New Governments to have General Assemblies and Make Laws

And whereas it will greatly contribute to the speedy settling of our said new Governments, that our loving Subjects should be informed of our Paternal care, for the security of the Liberties and Properties of those who are and shall become Inhabitants thereof, We have thought fit to publish and declare, by this Our Proclamation, that We have, in the Letters Patent under our Great Seal of Great Britain, by which the said Governments are constituted, given express Power and Direction to our Governors of our Said Colonies respectively, that so soon as the state and circumstances of the said Colonies will admit thereof, they shall, with the Advice and Consent of the Members of our Council, summon and call General Assemblies within the said Governments respectively, in such Manner and Form as is used and directed in those Colonies and Provinces in America which are under our immediate Government: And We have also given Power to the said Governors, with the consent of our Said Councils, and the Representatives of the People so to be summoned as aforesaid, to make, constitute, and ordain Laws, Statutes, and Ordinances for the Public Peace, Welfare, and good Government of our said Colonies, and of the People and Inhabitants thereof, as near as may be agreeable to the Laws of England, and under such Regulations and Restrictions as are used in other Colonies; and in the mean Time, and until such Assemblies can be called as aforesaid [see Campbell v. Hall (1774), 1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045], all
Persons Inhabiting in or resorting to our Said Colonies may confide in our Royal Protection for the Enjoyment of the Benefit of the Laws of our Realm of England; for which Purpose

We have given Power under our Great Seal to the Governors of our said Colonies respectively to erect and constitute, with the Advice of our said Councils respectively, Courts of Judicature and public Justice within our Said Colonies for hearing and determining all Causes, as well Criminal as Civil, according to Law and Equity, and as near as may be agreeable to the Laws of England, with Liberty to all Persons who may think themselves aggrieved by the Sentences of such Courts, in all Civil Cases, to appeal, under the usual Limitations and Restrictions, to Us in our Privy Council.

Grants for Settlement

We have also thought fit, with the advice of our Privy Council as aforesaid, to give unto the Governors and Councils of our said Three new Colonies upon the Continent, full Power and Authority to settle and agree with the Inhabitants of our said new Colonies or with any other Persons who shall resort thereto, for such Lands, Tenements and Hereditaments, as are now or hereafter shall be in our Power to dispose of; and them to grant to any such Person or Persons upon such Terms, and under such moderate Quit-Rents, Services and Acknowledgments, as have been appointed and settled in our other Colonies, and under such other Conditions as shall appear to us to be necessary and expedient for the Advantage of the Grantees, and the Improvement and settlement of our said Colonies.

Soldier Settlement

And Whereas, We are desirous, upon all occasions, to testify our Royal Sense and Approbation of the Conduct and bravery of the Officers and Soldiers of our Armies, and to reward the same, We do hereby command and impower our Governors of our said Three new Colonies, and all other our Governors of our several Provinces on the Continent of North America, to grant without Fee or Reward, to such reduced Officers as have served in North America during the late War, and to such Private Soldiers as have been or shall be disbanded in America, and are actually residing there, and shall personally apply for the same, the following Quantities of Lands, subject, at the Expiration of Ten Years, to the same Quit-Rents as other Lands are subject to in the Province within which they are granted, as also subject to the same Conditions of Cultivation and Improvement; viz.
To every Person having the Rank of a Field Officer—5,000 Acres.

To every Captain—3,000 Acres.

To every Subaltern or Staff Officer,—2,000 Acres.

To every Non-Commission Officer,—200 Acres.

To every Private Man—50 Acres.

We do likewise authorize and require the Governors and Commanders in Chief of all our said Colonies upon the Continent of North America to grant the like Quantities of Land, and upon the same conditions, to such reduced Officers of our Navy of like Rank as served on board our Ships of War in North America at the times of the Reduction of Louisbourg and Quebec in the late War, and who shall personally apply to our respective Governors for such Grants.

The Indian Provisions

And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the Security of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds—We do therefore, with the Advice of our Privy Council, declare it to be our Royal Will and Pleasure, that no Governor or Commander in Chief in any of our Colonies of Quebec, East Florida, or West Florida, do presume, upon any Pretence whatever, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass any Patents for Lands beyond the Bounds of their respective Governments. as described in their Commissions: as also that no Governor or Commander in Chief in any of our other Colonies or Plantations in America do presume for the present, and until our further Pleasure be known, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass Patents for any Lands beyond the Heads or Sources of any of the Rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the West and North West, or upon any Lands whatever, which, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us as aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any of them.

And We do further declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure, for the present as aforesaid, to reserve under our Sovereignty, Protection, and Dominion, for the use of the
said Indians, all the Lands and Territories not included within the Limits of Our said Three new Governments, or within the Limits of the Territory granted to the Hudson's Bay Company, as also all the Lands and Territories lying to the Westward of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea from the West and North West as aforesaid.

And We do hereby strictly forbid, on Pain of our Displeasure, all our loving Subjects from making any Purchases or Settlements whatever, or taking Possession of any of the Lands above reserved, without our especial leave and Licence for that Purpose first obtained.

And We do further strictly enjoin and require all Persons whatever who have either wilfully or inadvertently seated themselves upon any Lands within the Countries above described, or upon any other Lands which, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are still reserved to the said Indians as aforesaid, forthwith to remove themselves from such Settlements.

And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great Prejudice of our Interests, and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians: In order, therefore, to prevent such Irregularities for the future, and to the end that the Indians may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent, We do, with the Advice of our Privy Council strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do presume to make any purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said Indians, within those parts of our Colonies where We have thought proper to allow Settlement: but that, if at any Time any of the Said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our Colony respectively within which they shall lie: and in case they shall lie within the limits of any Proprietary Government, they shall be purchased only for the Use and in the name of such Proprietaries, conformable to such Directions and Instructions as We or they shall think proper to give for that Purpose: And we do, by the Advice of our Privy Council, declare and enjoin, that the Trade with the said Indians shall be free and open to all our Subjects whatever, provided that every Person who may incline to Trade with the said Indians do take out a Licence for carrying on such Trade from the Governor or Commander in Chief of any of our Colonies respectively where such Person shall reside, and also give Security to observe such Regulations as We shall at any Time think fit, by ourselves or by our Commissaries to be appointed for this Purpose, to direct and appoint for the Benefit of the said Trade:
And we do hereby authorize, enjoin, and require the Governors and Commanders in Chief of all our Colonies respectively, as well those under Our immediate Government as those under the Government and Direction of Proprietaries, to grant such Licences without Fee or Reward, taking especial Care to insert therein a Condition, that such Licence shall be void, and the Security forfeited in case the Person to whom the same is granted shall refuse or neglect to observe such Regulations as We shall think proper to prescribe as aforesaid.

And we do further expressly conjoin and require all Officers whatever, as well Military as those Employed in the Management and Direction of Indian Affairs, within the Territories reserved as aforesaid for the use of the said Indians, to seize and apprehend all Persons whatever, who standing charged with Treason, Misprisions of Treason, Murders, or other Felonies or Misdemeanors, shall fly from Justice and take Refuge in the said Territory, and to send them under a proper guard to the Colony where the Crime was committed, of which they stand accused, in order to take their Trial for the same.

Given at our Court at St. James's the 7th Day of October 1763, in the Third Year of our Reign.

GOD SAVE THE KING
Bibliography

Primary Sources:


"By the King, A Proclamation, George R.", The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politicks, and Literature, For the Year 1763. London, 1764.


Clark, George Rogers. George Rogers Clark Papers, edited by James Alton James, volumes XIX. Springfield: 1912 and 1926.


"Deposition, June 3, 1777," *Calendar of Virginia State papers and Other Manuscripts*.


"The Early Westward Movement of Virginia, 1722-1734, as Shown by the Proceedings of the Colonial Council" *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, volume XIII, number 1 (July 1905), 1-16.


Howe, Henry. *Historical Collections of Ohio; containing a collection of the most interesting facts, traditions, biographers, anecdotes, etc. relating to its general and local history.* Cincinnati: Bradley and Anthony, 1848.


*Journals of the Virginia Council, 1726-1774.* Manuscript located in the Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia.

Kegley, Mary B. *Soldiers of Fincastle County, Virginia 1774*. Dublin: Mary B. Kegley, 1974.


293

Roland, Kate Mason, Life of George Mason: Including his speeches, public papers, and correspondence, 2 volumes. New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1892.


Sparks, Jared, ed. The Writings of George Washington. Boston, 1834.


"The Treaties of 1768 and 1770, Between Virginia and the Cherokees, & c.," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, XIII, number 1 (July 1905), 20-36; and number 2, (October 1905), 139-41.


Newspapers:

The Maryland Gazette, 1745-1839.

The Virginia Gazette, 1736-1780.

The Pennsylvania Gazette, 1729-1778.

Manuscripts and Microfilmed Collections:


T. B. Myers Collection. New York: Manuscript Division of the New York Public Library.


Unpublished Theses & Dissertations:


Secondary Sources:


_______. Western Lands and the American Revolution. New York: University of Virginia Institute for research in the Social Sciences, 1937.


______. *Thomas Cresap, Maryland Frontiersman.* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1944.


Mayer, Brantz. Tah-Gah-Jute; or Logan and Cresap. Albany: Joel Munsell, 1867.


Withers, A.S. Chronicles of Border Warfare or, a History of the Settlement by the Whites, of North Western Virginia and of the Indian Wars and Massacres in that State. Clarksburg, VA: Joseph Israel, 1831.
Vita

James Phillip Rife was born on January 18, 1971 in Richlands, Virginia. He graduated Valedictorian from Hurley High School in 1989, and subsequently attended Southwest Virginia Community College, where he earned dual Associate of Applied Science degrees in Electronic and Electrical Engineering Technology in 1991. In 1993, he graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering Technology from Bluefield State College. After a couple of years working in various jobs, he decided to return to college and further his education. Accordingly, he graduated magna cum laude from King College in 1997 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in History, specializing in Russian and Modern European History. In the fall of 1997, he enrolled in the Graduate History Program at Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University to pursue an advanced degree in American History, graduating in 1999. Currently, he is attending the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, where he is working toward a doctoral degree in American History.