

THE ROLE OF FEEDBACK IN STATE SUPPORT AND SPONSORSHIP OF
TERRORISM: FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

by

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

State support and sponsorship of terrorism is a growing tactic among states unable or unwilling to achieve their international goals using the more traditional means of foreign policy: diplomacy, propaganda, economic statecraft, and military statecraft. This has brought about a new dilemma in the field of foreign policy: How does one state deal with another state as terrorist? As states react to incidents of terrorism, it is equally likely that the terrorist states will react to these responses. Therefore, this thesis considers the following question: How does a state's reaction to state supported or sponsored terrorism affect future terrorism?

In order to answer this question, a case study of Cuba was performed to trace the flow of terrorist support and sponsorship by the state since its inception in 1959. Periods of high and low support for terrorism by the Castro regime were contrasted with responses of the target states, the United States, the Soviet Union and China using a cost/benefit formula. The value of material costs, rhetorical costs, material benefits and rhetorical benefits were compared in an attempt to determine a pattern of events that either consistently increased or decreased Cuba's use of the tool of terrorism in response to feedback from other states.

The case study was inconclusive. Evaluation of terrorism is highly subjective. It became clear that it was impossible to determine the relative weight given to the various costs and benefits accrued through support of terrorism by the Cuban government. The projection of the goals and motivations is only speculation. The only clear pattern that emerged was a decrease in support activity in response to the imposition of significant economic costs on Cuba. However, this only has an effect in situations where no other state was able or willing to fill in the economic gap created by sanctions.

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Introduction

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. In its various forms of assassination, kidnap and ransom, and seemingly random destruction terrorism has affected the internal political structures of states for centuries. What has changed is the international nature of the violence, and the fact that states have begun to use terrorism as a weapon against each other.

This change in the instigator of terrorism brings forth new policy questions that need to be addressed. How does one state deal with another state as terrorist? As the incidence of state use of terrorism grows, it becomes increasingly important to have a coherent, consistent policy to apply to these situations.

Effective and valuable policy cannot be formulated in a vacuum. As states react to incidents of terrorism, it is equally likely that the terrorist state will react to these responses. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the following question: How does a state's reaction to state supported or sponsored terrorism affect future terrorism?

The answer to this question is the key to policy formulation that will effectively decrease state support and sponsorship of terrorism. The goal of this thesis is to provide an answer through a study of Cuba. Cuba has been

both an overt and covert sponsor of terrorism since the overthrow of the Batista government by Fidel Castro in 1959. Its terrorist support and sponsorship has been a particular problem in notoriously unstable countries of Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa and has affected the relations of those regions with the United States. The evaluation will trace Cuban support and sponsorship in these regions using a cost/benefit form of analysis. Periods of high and low support and sponsorship will be contrasted with the various costs and benefits accrued by Cuba from other states in reaction to terrorist act. For the purposes of this study, only the responses of the 'victim' state, the United States as a major actor in Latin America, China as an ideological ally and the Soviet Union as both a representative of the communist bloc and an ideological ally will be considered. The results should provide a basis for concluding which responses to terrorist acts provide the best deterrent for future use of terrorism on the part of states.

Chapter One

Terrorism has always been, and probably will remain, an essentially contested concept due to the lack of consistency and theoretically driven analysis. This fact has led to the creation of a large body of literature dealing with a subject upon which there is little agreement. There is no universal definition for 'terrorist' or 'terrorism.' There is no agreement on the motivation for terrorism. The majority of the literature focuses on the terrorist as an individual, ignoring regime and state support and sponsorship. There are no systematic empirical analyses of the goals of terrorism and why terrorists and terrorist supporters believe their methods will accomplish these goals. There is no attention given to the audience of these attacks; the people the terrorists are attempting to influence or coerce. The foreign policy implications of state support of terrorism remain unexamined. Purely descriptive in nature in spite of numerous attempts to create functional typologies, the literature is an inadequate base for analytical research. The following is a review of the present state of the literature.

DEFINITION

Although terrorism has been the subject of a large literature, a universally acceptable definition of the term

has yet to be established. As Joyner has commented; "In a real sense, terrorism is like pornography: You know it when you see it but it is impossible to come up with a universally agreed-upon definition."¹

Connotation

The crux of the problem is that the term has acquired a pejorative connotation over the years. Its use evokes such a strong emotional response that labeling a person, group, or action as 'terrorist' is equivalent to passing a moral judgement. A review of the literature upholds the statement of Charles W. Kegley, Jr., that "terrorism is used often not to analyze, but to attack and advocate, that is, to voice disapproval or approval."² The popular phrase 'one man's freedom fighter is another's terrorist' exemplifies this dilemma. To which group does one attach the stigmatic label? On what basis is this decision made? Who participated in asserting a judgement?

If one group can successfully attach the label 'terrorist' to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral and political point of view, or at least reject the terrorist's view. Terrorism is what bad guys do. The drawing of boundaries between what is legitimate and what is illegitimate, between the 'right' way to fight and the 'wrong' way to fight brings high political stakes to the task of definition.³

Operational Definitions

There is no denying that operational definitions are a mirror of their creator's viewpoint. Every government agency that has to deal with terrorist threats in some capacity maintains its own definition.

Department of Defense

The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political purposes.

FBI

The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

Department of State

Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents.

All of these definitions help to illuminate the nature of the organizations supplying them. The use of the phrase 'revolutionary organization' by the Department of Defense, the assumption of political motivation by the Department of State, and the inclusion of 'criminal conduct' by the FBI demonstrate the institutional bias that is intrinsic to a definitional attempt. The ideological base of each institution defines the way in which the acts will be viewed and judged. The institutional definitions need to explain

the concept of terrorism in such a manner that the institution is equipped to deal with it.

Scholarly Definitions

Scholarly research also has a tendency to invent definitions that are compatible with its purposes. Scholars have provided a plethora of definitions that are applicable to specific situations but do not cover the full spectrum of terrorist actors, behavior, or goals. One of the most simplistic definitions is offered by Richard Rubenstein. He says that "I use the term 'terrorism'...to denote acts of small-group violence for which arguable claims of mass representation can be made."⁴ (emphasis in the original). The flaws in this definition stem from the fact that it is so broad that non-terrorist guerrilla warfare could easily fall into the category, yet the inclusion of 'small-group' makes it so specific that it totally excludes the possibility of regime terrorism. G. Holton defines terrorism as "a method of coercion of a population or its leadership through fear or traumatization."⁵ For this definition to be correct, the target population or leadership must also be the victim, or they would not necessarily be traumatized by terrorist activity. Martha Crenshaw proposes that "terrorism is the deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence to coerce changes in political behavior. It involves symbolic

acts of violence, intended to communicate a political message to watching audiences."⁶ This definition contains two arguable assumptions: one, that all terrorism is necessarily political in nature; and two, that there is a direct connection between the victim and the intended target of coercion. In a similar vein, Chalmers Johnson defines terrorism as "political, goal-oriented action, involving the use or threat of extraordinary violence, performed for psychological rather than material effect, and the victims of which are symbolic rather than instrumental."⁷ This definition overlooks the fact that terrorism is indeed performed for material effect in the form of kidnapping for the reason of financing.

There is of course, a terrorist's perspective. According to Carlos Marighella, world-renowned terrorist and author of the Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, terrorism "is an action the urban guerilla must execute with the greatest cold-bloodedness, calmness and decision."⁸ This best describes the essence of terrorism more than it defines.

The most widely applicable definition uncovered is offered by F. M. Watson, who states that terrorism "can be defined as a strategy, a method by which an organized group or party tries to get attention for its aims, or force concessions toward its goals, through the systematic use of

deliberate violence."⁹ This definition acknowledges that terrorism can be perpetrated by groups outside and inside the government, and concentrates on the goals of terrorism rather than the means.

The Confusion of Low Intensity Conflict

Scholars can be quite liberal in applying the term terrorism. As William Waugh has said, "promiscuous use of the label 'terrorist' has acted to confuse both popular opinions and government policies concerning the phenomena of terrorist violence."¹⁰ The heading 'low intensity conflict' has often been borrowed from military language by terrorists intending to promote their actions as a legitimate military conflict and contains a mixture of similar events that need to be examined in their own context. Low intensity conflict is intended to refer to open military hostilities between governments short of conventional war. Grouping them under the same heading creates the situation in which the terms terrorism, guerrilla warfare and revolution are often used interchangeably, adding to the definitional confusion.

THEORIES OF TERRORISM

Theories of terrorism abound in the literature of terrorism. All focus on the terrorist individual, ignoring the presence of regime terrorism and state supported and state sponsored terrorism. The majority of the attention is

given to the outside forces that shaped the terrorist, not on how the goals of the terrorist made the selection of terrorist means possible.

Social Theories

There is a group of scholars who attempt to analyze terrorism as a social phenomena. These scholars concentrate their analysis on the terrorist as an individual actor. The theories range from those who consider the actors to be misguided at best and irrational at worst to those who consider them to be rational, calculating but disaffected political actors.

Exponents of one sociological theory express the belief that terrorism arises as a response to legitimate grievances with the inability to participate in the governing process. Scholars who perpetuate this thesis include Franco Ferrotti, Edward Hyams, and Conor Cruise O'Brien. O'Brien claims that "the terrorist is a misguided idealist, an unsublimated social reformer. He has been driven to violence by political or social injustice or both."¹¹ The basis of this theory is best expressed by Hyams, who concludes: "I can find no single case in which recourse to terrorism was not forced on the organization in question by denial of all other means of fighting against social injustice."¹² It then follows that terrorism should be most frequent in situations of political oppression. In such cases,

"terrorism is morally justified whenever there is no other remedy for an intolerable situation."¹³ These scholars accept the terrorist's rejection of alternative forms of protest as useless, allowing the terrorists themselves to be the judge of the legitimacy of their actions. The logical conclusion of this school's belief is that the elimination of the terrorists' grievances would eradicate the need for terrorism. According to this theory, providing a legitimate effective means to participate in the governing process that would be acceptable to the terrorists would end the need for terrorism.

The critics of this particular viewpoint take exception to the justification of terrorist acts as a legitimate form of social protest. They reject the legitimacy of terrorist acts regardless of the rationalizations or causes. Their argument is succinctly expressed by Michael Stohl: "while one may wish to argue that the particular ends justify particular means, that does not alter what those means are."¹⁴ In a Department of State bulletin Ambassador Anthony Quainton concurs, declaring that the acts themselves violate the basic principles of human decency. Walter Laqueur provides the best refutation of the previous school's arguments with the statement:

On the level of abstract reasoning it is, of course, true that there would be no violence if no one had a grievance or

felt frustration. But in practice there will always be disaffected, alienated, and highly aggressive people claiming that the present state of affairs is intolerable and that only violence will bring a change.¹⁵

As William Waugh Jr. points out, "the difficulty of determining the 'justness' of terrorist violence involves a political question for which there is no one answer and on which there is never likely to be consensus."¹⁶ It is a return to the terrorist/freedom fighter cliché.

However, these comments do not actually challenge the veracity of the social theory. Francis Watson takes a more analytical approach to refutation in Political Terrorism. As a result of his analysis, he claims that "indeed, statistics show that today's terrorists do not strike where oppression is greatest...They show no inclination to exhaust the possibilities of legal methods. They hit societies that are already open to legal struggle."¹⁷

Psychological Theories

In his monograph Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr incorporated the psychological frustration-aggression theory of John Dollard into a macro level theory of political science. According to Gurr's interpretation, there is a gap between what he terms relative deprivation and rising expectations. The presence and increase of this gap creates frustration, frustration leads to anger, which in turn leads to aggression

and violence. This theory of political violence is supported by Ivo Feierabend, Rosalind Feierabend, and James Davies. Davies expands on this theory with the addition of the J-curve, a heuristic device illustrating the development of violence over time.

In spite of its popularity, other scholars dispute the usefulness of expanding the amended frustration-aggression theory to a macro level. Peter Lupsha notes that it was intended to explain individual behavior, and the jump to a societal level may not be justifiable; one must accept that society is no more than the sum of its individual parts. In the words of Zeckhauser, "Groups should no more behave like individuals than should baseballs behave like the atoms of which they are composed."¹⁸

Proponents of another psychological theory of terrorism express the belief that terrorists are necessarily mentally unbalanced individuals. Observations relating to this theory range from the bizarre to the possible. At one end is R. S. Frank's conclusion that "grave political violence can be found especially in those countries where fantasies of cleanliness are frequent."¹⁹ Continuing across the spectrum you find Jonas' assertion that "inconsistent mothering plays a role in the making of a terrorist"²⁰ to Wilhelm Kasch's belief that "terrorism is an urge to destroy oneself and others born out of radical despair, a new form

'disease unto death."²¹ It is emotionally satisfying to identify the terrorist as morally depraved. Emma Goldman avers that: "The ignorant mass looks upon the man who makes a violent protest...as upon a wild beast, a cruel heartless monster, whose joy it is to destroy life and bathe in blood, or at best, as upon an irresponsible lunatic."²² Brian Jenkins and other scholars repeatedly refer to terrorist violence as 'mindless,' 'senseless,' or 'irrational,'²³ as if the perpetration of such acts are proof enough of mental instability.

Walter Laqueur refutes this viewpoint in his list of myths regarding terrorism.

A second myth, one that finds a particularly warm reception in the American media and in government statements concerning terrorism, is that terrorists are mentally unbalanced. The position taken in such statements and commentaries takes the form that only madmen would resort to many of the actions that terrorists have taken.²⁴

Laqueur is supported in his opposition by Martha Crenshaw, who states that "what limited data²⁵ we have on individual terrorists suggest that the outstanding common characteristic is normality."²⁶ The stereotype of irrationality is detrimental to the field of terrorism because it effectively negates the need for serious research and analysis.

THE CONCEPT OF AUDIENCE

While the creation and motivation of terrorists have been overanalyzed, the concept of audience is virtually ignored in the literature of terrorism. More attention has been given to the role of the media in reaching this amorphous audience than to whom the intended audience actually is. According to Rushworth Kidder, the "ultimate target"²⁷ is "the public at large."²⁸ Brian Jenkins makes a similarly unenlightening observation with the statement that "terrorism is violence aimed at the people watching."²⁹ The CIA sheds little more light in its definition of international terrorism, identifying the audience as "a target group wider than its immediate victims."³⁰

Martha Crenshaw goes a step beyond most treatments of audience by identifying three types "distinguished by degree of receptivity to the terrorist message."³¹ These categories are: 1) an audience "predisposed toward sympathy for the terrorists' aims,"³² such as an ethnic group toward a terrorist separatist group, 2) an audience "indifferent or ignorant of the terrorists' appeal,"³³ such as people who will be sympathetic to a previously unknown cause publicized through terrorist acts and 3) an audience "predisposed toward hostility to the terrorists' aims,"³⁴ such as the Irish Republican Army in Ulster. While the categories she

derives are informative, they lack the element of change that is intrinsic to terrorist motivation. The sole objective of terrorism is not to gain sympathy. These categories define people who might become sympathetic to the terrorist groups, not people who are in a position to bring about the changes espoused by the groups. There is no mention of government or political structures that would need to be influenced to bring about change.

Overall, the actual intended audience of terrorist acts, the people the terrorists hope to influence or coerce, has unaccountably been deprived of the attention it deserves. Nowhere is there a clarification of who the target group may be among the wide range of recipients of the terrorist message. Yet terrorism, especially political terrorism, has the purpose of creating change through the influencing of this unknown group. The audience and its relationship with terrorists and terrorist organizations is a crucial element to understanding the perpetuation of this activity and it has largely been ignored by the scholarly community.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

There has been an attempt to examine terrorism in a more quantitative manner. Edward Heyman and Edward Mickolus devoted a great deal of effort to the creation of ITERATE, a data base intended for use in quantitative analysis. Heyman

and Mickolus compiled the ITERATE data through a survey of the existing literature on terrorism, the media and governmental reports, using each recorded terrorist incident as a data point. It is intended to fill "a critical gap in terrorism research by providing a comprehensive and detailed data source on terrorist incidents."³⁵ Unfortunately, any analysis based on the ITERATE data would be inherently flawed, a case of 'garbage in, garbage out.' This is not a slur on the ability of Heyman and Mickolus, but on the integrity of their sources. The scholars depended on the variables their sources used to describe, explain and predict terrorist activity. This review has amply demonstrated the problems of definition and theoretical explanation that are rampant throughout the literature. By what standards did these scholars judge their material? If they accepted all events labeled terrorism as accurate, they have included the biases of the competing theories in their data base. If not, they have inflicted biases of their own through the selection process. The vagaries of their sources limit the data set's usefulness to researchers.

TERRORIST THREAT: HOW REAL?

There is considerable disagreement among scholars over the threat posed by terrorism. Terrorism is either viewed as a minor threat compared to other modes of violence, or as a major threat of the world today. Few scholars adopt a

position in the middle.

Walter Laqueur is a prominent representative of the thesis that the threat presented by terrorism is overrated. Media coverage and public reaction magnify the importance and peril of terrorism far beyond the actual danger posed to individuals and society. He attempts to put the threat of terrorism into perspective saying:

Terrorism is, of course, a danger, but magnifying its importance is even more dangerous. Modern society may be vulnerable to attack, but it is also exceedingly resilient. A plane is hijacked, but all others continue to fly. A bank is robbed, but the rest continue to function. All oil ministers are abducted, yet not a single barrel of oil is lost.³⁶

These scholars concede that although able to embarrass and disrupt short term normal government activities, terrorism has not had a major impact on the international system compared to other disruptive forces such as food shortages, inflation and conventional war. Brian Jenkins concurs with Laqueur, adding that "no governments have fallen solely due to the activities of domestic or foreign terrorists."³⁷

As an advocate of the extreme seriousness of the threat posed by terrorism, Paul Johnson is at the other end of the debate. In Johnson's view, terrorism is highly threatening to civilization as a whole because there is no effective means of containing it. Terrorism has been increasing

steadily through time because it has not received the serious attention given to other generators of world crises. The current situation creates great furor with each terrorist incident that fades into obscurity until the next incident revives public awareness. These scholars would like to see that change in favor of making terrorism a foreign policy priority.

There appears to be universal agreement on the lack of success of terrorism as a strategy in all but a few exceptional cases. Walter Laqueur explains that "seen in historical perspective, it has hardly ever had a lasting effect. Guerrilla wars³⁸ have been successful only against colonial rule, and the age of colonialism is over."³⁹ The strategy of forcing a government to become increasingly more repressive in the face of terrorism, thereby arousing the populace to protest the repressive regime has only been effective when the regime was imposed by a foreign power. The prevailing attitude is summed up by Adam Roberts, saying: "overall, the record of terrorism in the past two centuries is not one to inspire confidence in it as a method."⁴⁰

STATE SPONSORSHIP AND SUPPORT

There is a growing body of literature in the field of terrorism dealing with the phenomena of state sponsorship and support. Although these terms are often used

interchangeably, there is a subtle distinction that separates the two. State support of terrorism is comprised of the provision of funds, weapons, training, political endorsement or other logistical assistance to assist terrorist organizations in the completion of their goals. While state sponsorship of terrorism incorporates all of the possible elements of state support, it has an additional element. According to Rushworth Kidder, "it [the term state sponsorship] is usually reserved for cases in which the sponsoring nation uses the terrorists to further its own policy goals,"⁴¹ implying an ability to direct the goals of the terrorist organization in some situations that is not present in state support.

Like other areas of terrorism studies, the state support and state sponsorship literature is purely descriptive. There have been no attempts to analyze the use of terrorism as an extension of foreign policy options or to derive models explaining or predicting its selection from among other options. Returning to the statement by Charles W. Kegley Jr., state support and state sponsorship have become two more labels used "not to analyze, but to attack and advocate."⁴²

Network Theorists or Conspiracy Theorists?

The majority of the state support/sponsorship literature has been authored by the self-named network

theorists, more widely known as the conspiracy theorists. The aim of the conspiracy theorists is to link all support and sponsorship to some outside power. The majority attempt such a linkage to the Soviet Union. This is a very popular theory in the United States, especially among government officials.⁴³ In 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig accused the Soviet Union directly of training, funding, and equipping international terrorists. A former deputy director of the CIA, Ray S. Cline, is quoted as saying: "what they [the Soviets] do is supply the infrastructure of terror: the money, the guns, the training, the background information, the communications, the propaganda that will inspire individual terrorist groups."⁴⁴ Neil Livingstone and Terrell Arnold concur, adding that "the Soviet Union has found the present pattern of terrorism to be a cost effective and low-risk policy for disrupting the West and challenging the United States for control of key populations, vital straits, raw materials, strategic minerals, and markets."⁴⁵ One of the most famous conspiracy theorists is journalist Claire Sterling, author of The Terror Network, a book attempting to prove that international terrorism can be traced to the Soviet Union through networks supported by Cuba and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The conspiracy theory also exists in the converse. A

minority group of scholars absolve the Soviet Union of all blame. According to these authors, it is the United States who is the source of international terrorism. Edward S. Herman is the most prolific spokesman of this viewpoint. In his book The Real Terror Network, a direct response to the Sterling book, Herman puts the blame for international terrorism firmly on the shoulders of the United States. In a joint study with Noam Chomsky, Herman claims "that if we cut through the propaganda barrage...[the] United States is the power whose quite calculated and deliberate policy and strategy choices have brought about a system of clients who consistently practice torture and murder on a terrifying scale."⁴⁶ Herman's thesis is supported by Philip Agee, a former CIA employee in his book Inside the Company: CIA Diary, an account of CIA involvement in Latin America in the 1960's. In his book, Agee says that "after twelve years with the agency I finally understood how much suffering it was causing, that millions of people all over the world had been killed or had had their lives destroyed by the CIA."⁴⁷

Anti-Conspiracy Theorists

There is a great deal of criticism aimed at the conspiracy theorists, both from the general scholarly community and from the opposing sides. According to the anti-conspiracy authors, the concept of state-supported terrorism (read Soviet-supported terrorism) is a product of

anti-communist radicals verging on McCarthyism.⁴⁸ The anti-conspiracists interpret their opponents arguments as an attempt to present international terrorism as an organized global network.

Some analysts are drawn hastily to the reassuringly simple theory that international terrorism is the product of a conspiracy orchestrated by state sponsors, who are alleged to direct and manage terrorism worldwide through an elaborate network of terrorist organizations.⁴⁹

The critics exaggerate the concept of state-support or sponsorship with the implication that their opposites are describing an underground headquarters manned by Soviet KGB agents coordinating the world's terrorist activities, handing out assignments to the appropriate terrorist organization, and closely monitoring the activities of what are little more than Soviet puppets.⁵⁰

The anti-conspiracists often dismiss the research of those they criticize as circulating CIA-inspired propaganda. "Alexander Cockburn contends that the terrorist network was essentially the product of 'the rumor mill of a few Western propagandists talking to one another about a fantasy concocted by the CIA.'"⁵¹ Claire Sterling's book The Terror Network has been singled-out for special attention by the critics. James Cory claims that "The Terror Network is essentially a rightwing fairy tale,"⁵² and James Adams adds that "one of the deputy directors pointed out that the book

was largely a product of the CIA's disinformation department."⁵³

The anti-Soviet conspiracy theorists claim that the anti-conspiracy theory literature falls victim to its own criticism: their work is often "dependent on prejudice for their starting point rather than on dispassionate analysis."⁵⁴ Network theorists accuse their critic of ignoring all evidence that links the Soviet Union to terrorist sponsorship, no matter how compelling.

As sophisticated and divisive as their approach may be, Soviet sponsorship, funding, training and political indoctrination, and supply of false documents facilitating acts of terror are, in part, documented. But whether through ideological affinity or political naivete, many choose to accept the assurances of non-complicity from the Soviet Union, its client states, and proxies--despite the evidence provided by defectors, captured subversives, and Western intelligence services.⁵⁵

Although ideological affinity may operate in some cases, the network theorists tend to focus on the political reasons. "Either the evidence is downplayed because of the difficulty of proving the connections and of the difficult political consequences which may ensue..."⁵⁶ "Robert Moss of the Economist has spoken of a 'conspiracy of silence' about the evidence of Soviet involvement in terrorism, which operates in order to preserve the appearance of detente."⁵⁷ Former Senator Jeremiah Denton summed up the situation with

his statement; "Those who are critical of the conclusion that the Soviets and their surrogates feed international terrorism apparently subscribe to the smoking gun theory...you must find a Soviet with a smoking gun in hand, or at least in close proximity to the body."⁵⁸

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR FOREIGN POLICY?

The real significance of state support of terrorism lies in its ramifications for foreign policy. This crucial aspect of state support has been neglected in foreign policy studies. Terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy needs to be examined as closely as the more traditional means. Otherwise, foreign policy analysts will fail to appreciate the full significance of this phenomenon and its implications for international relations theory.

Scholars have outlined four basic types of foreign policy instruments: diplomacy, propaganda, economic statecraft, and military statecraft.⁵⁹ Terrorism is a variation on the traditional instrument of military statecraft that breaks the established rules. It is a highly flexible political instrument available to the weak who cannot or will not follow the rules established by the strong.

The variety of foreign policy instruments available to a nation for influencing others is partly a function of the quantity and quality of capabilities. What a government seeks to do--the type of objectives is

formulates--and how it attempts to do it will depend at least partially on the resources it finds available.⁶⁰

In the words of Peter C. Sederberg, "the presumed weakness of groups that resort to terrorism refers mainly to the resources they control in relation to the ambitions they possess"⁶¹ (emphasis in original). "With the monopoly of conventional power in the hands of the major states, it will seem logical to some less important state and to non-state actors to seek other means to effect their foreign policy goals."⁶² Terrorism, often referred to as 'warfare on the cheap,' has become a means for some states to do exactly that. The possibility of influencing a group to behave in a certain manner leading to the enhanced prestige of the sponsor state through sub-systemic, deniable means makes support and sponsorship an attractive alternative to the conventional forms of foreign policy for a state of lesser status. It has the potential to accomplish a state's goals abroad without the obligatory retaliatory response from other states that direct overt aggression would bring. It has come to be viewed as a viable option, a weapon for the weak.

Notes:

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11. C. C. O'Brien, "Thinking About Terrorism," The Atlantic Monthly 257 p. 63.
12. E. Hyams, Terrorists and Terrorism, (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1974), p.
13. Kegley, International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, p. 71.
14. Ibid. pp. 89-90.
15. Kegley, International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, pp. 69-70.
16. Waugh, International Terrorism, p. 2.
17. Watson, Political Terrorism, foreward.
18. cited in P. A. Lupsha, "Explanations of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories Versus Indignation," Politics and Society, (1971): p. 91.

19. R S. Frank from a paper presented at Edinburgh conference, 1976.

20. cited in E. F. Mickolus, The Literature of Terrorism, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 361.

21. cited in R. Kupperman and D. Trent, Terrorism, (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1979), p. xvi.

22. Laqueur, The Terrorism Reader, p. 194.

23. Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, p. 3; M. Slann and B. Schechterman, Multidimensional Terrorism, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1987), p. 20; P. C. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths, (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989), p. 74.

24. Kegley, International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, p. 87.

25. Various scholars have developed a similar profile of the average terrorist which describes him as being a male of 20 to 24 years of age from a middle income family and having some higher education, usually a college degree.

26. Kegley, International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, p. 120.

27. Ibid. p. 107.

28. Ibid. p. 107.

29. Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, p. 1.

30. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths, p. 27.

31. M. Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power, (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), p. 27.

32. Ibid. p. 27.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Alexander and Gleason, Behavioural and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, p. 178.

36. Kegley, International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, p. 73.

37. Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, p. 14.

38. Lagueur uses the terms 'terrorism' and 'guerilla warfare' virtually interchangeably.

39. Kegley, International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, p. 70.

40. R.J. Vincent, ed., Terrorism and International Order, (Worcester, UK: Billing and Son Ltd., 1986), p. 18.

41. R. M. Kidder, Christian Science Monitor, April 18, 1986, p. 12.

42. Kegley, International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, p. 3.

43. The prevalence of this theory can be found in such sources as the Report for the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee of the Judiciary, US Senate, State-Sponsored Terrorism (1985), State Department Bulletins such as International Terrorism: A Long Twilight Struggle (1984), Terrorism and the Modern World (1984) and The New Network of Terrorist States (1985) and the writing of a former CIA deputy director in Terrorism: The Soviet Connection, Cline and Alexander (NY: Crane, Russak, 1984).

44. cited in S. T. Francis, The Soviet Strategy of Terror, (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1981), p. 42.

45. N. C. Livingstone II and T. E. Arnold, eds., Fighting Back, (D.C. Heath and Company, 1986), p. 12.

46. N. Chomsky and E. S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, vol 1, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, (Nottingham: Spokesman, 2979). pp. 16-17.

47. Agee. P. (1975). Inside the Company: A CIA Diary. NY: Stonehill Publishing Co. p. 8.

48. U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Terrorism: Origins, Direction and Support, before the subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Senate, 97th Congress, 1st session, 1981, p. 65; D. C. Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 239.

49. Kegley, International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, p. 98.
50. J. Adams, The Financing of Terror, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 2; Kegley, International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, p. 164.
51. Kegley, International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, p. 174.
52. E. S. Herman, The Real Terror Network, (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p. 50.
53. Adams, The Financing of Terror, p.3.
54. Adams, The Financing of Terror, p. 3.
55. Livingstone and Arnold, Fighting Back, p. 65.
56. Rapoport, Inside Terrorist Organizations, p. 239.
57. C. Horner, "The Facts About Terrorism," Commentary 69 (1980): 40.
58. U. S. Congress, Terrorism: Origins, Direction and Support, p. 74.
59. K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 4th ed., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 161-310.
60. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, p. 159.
61. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths, p. 68.
62. Rapoport, Inside Terrorist Organizations, p. 247.

Chapter Two

In line with the traditional thought of terrorism as the tool of the weak, the focus of research has been on the sub-state actor rebelling against established authority. However, the face of the terrorist has changed from the individual or the group to the state itself in a new variation of the "terrorism as the tool of the weak" theme.

A great deal of effort has been expended to develop a profile of the characteristics of the individual terrorist and of terrorist groups so that they can be categorized and their behavior described. It follows that there should be a typology available to serve the same purposes in terms of state supported terrorism.

In fact, there are several typologies available for the categorization of this type of terrorism. These typologies vary greatly in detail and sophistication of definition and terminology. Unfortunately, they all lack the ability to be expanded into an analytic tool. Without this capability, the study of state supported and sponsored terrorism can go no further.

Crozier

One of the most simplistic typologies is provided by Brian Crozier in his 1975 testimony on international terrorism before the Subcommittee to Investigate the

Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws. In his testimony, Crozier presented a glossary differentiating between actors related to terrorism and a typology to distinguish the motives of terrorists. (See Appendix A). The glossary contains the terms Terrorism, Terror, Extremist, Subversive Centers and Guerrillas to distinguish between the perpetrators of violence.

Problems emerge immediately upon examining the glossary Crozier provides. Terrorism and Terror are presented as two distinct entities although the definition of Terrorism is equally applicable to Terror. Terror is called "the converse of Terrorism,"¹ apparently meaning the distinction is only whether the government or a sub-national organization is the generator of violence. I believe that the addition of this ambiguous statement adds confusing possibilities to an already imperfect definition.

In further examining the glossary, the distinction between Extremist and Terrorist is unclear. If an Extremist "is prepared to break the law, with particular reference to political violence,"² and Terrorism is "motivated violence for political ends,"³ then for the two to be distinct entities it must be inferred that those who engage in Terrorism are not prepared to break the law. This is clearly not the case, as in his typology Crozier describes

coercive terrorism as including the use of "torture and/or death,"⁴ activities known to be illegal in all states.

In addition, the definition of Guerrillas in the glossary is trivial. The circularity of "groups or individuals practicing guerilla warfare,"⁵ making the term part of its own definition, is an incomprehensible negligence on the part of a scholar. As it stands, the inclusion of the term in the glossary is unnecessary.

It appears that the glossary was presented to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence that are inferred to be 'acceptable' whereas terrorism is not. The attempt is not very successful, partially because the glossary is not well-constructed. In the cases where the definitions are comprehensible, they are almost synonymous with the definition given for Terrorism. There is no explanation of 'acceptable' political violence, surely a contradiction in itself. Crozier does not create the differentiation that he intends.

Crozier does not carry the equality of use of violence present in the distinction between Terrorism and Terror through to his typology. The typology deals only with organizational Terrorism, relegating state Terror as a response to provocation, as exemplified in the statement under disruptive terrorism where he refers to "official expenditure in arms, lives, and money"⁶ as

"counteraction."⁷ Crozier's typology is very basic, containing only one distinction. Terrorism is either disruptive or coercive in nature. This ignores the violence regimes perpetuate against their populations without provocation and the support of regimes for violence against the populations of other states. As these appear to be the primary sources of state and state supported or sponsored terrorism, their exclusion creates a distressingly large void in this field of study according to the Crozier typology.

Crozier recognized the inadequacy of his own glossary and typology. Intrinsic to his whole thesis is the idea of terrorism and "motivated violence for political ends."⁸ Without a political motivation, the violence is technically not terrorism, but instead merely common vandalism or crime. He comments on that deficiency, pointing out that "one of the most striking and curious aspects of the contemporary wave of terrorism, however, is that in a number of cases there appears to be no discernable ultimate political objective."⁹ This is more of a methodological than definition problem, one that confronts any study that attempts to infer motives from behaviour.

Barring all other inadequacies of Crozier's conceptualizations, a typology hinged upon the presence of political motivation for violence is not applicable to

situations of violence as and end in itself, one he recognized as existing. In his one remark on this 'curious aspect,' he destroyed the entire basis of his typology. The glossary and typology have so many deficiencies that they are not salvageable enough to be used as analytic tools.

Gross

A better, more sophisticated attempt at a typology was undertaken by Feliks Gross. In a report to the national Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Gross presented a typology of terrorism consisting of five major strategic types. According to Gross, terrorism can be categorized as tactical, mass, random, focused random terror and dynastic assassination. (See Appendix B).

As Gross defines them, the categories are highly descriptive and specific. This can be beneficial for separating data, but a high degree of specificity runs the danger of eliminating some events that would ordinarily be considered terrorist. In the category of tactical terror, Gross gives no explanation as to why it is only directed against regimes of foreign domination. The "punishment, intimidation, weakening or slow disintegration of government"¹⁰ can describe the goals of terrorists working against an indigenous government equally well. The implication is either that terrorism is not "justified in the eyes of the revolutionaries"¹¹ if it is against

oppression by a native regime, or that violence against a native regime is not terrorism.

The obvious differences between tactical and random terror lie in the targets and the methods. Tactical terror is highly selective and random has, as the name suggests, limited selection. The distinction between targets is in the ruling regime. Gross openly states that tactical terror is directed against foreign rule, and parenthetically mentions democracy in the definition of random terror. For some unexplained reason, Gross implies that terrorism against indigenous governments cannot be strategic, and terrorism against foreign-imposed governments is exclusively strategic. This is a totally insupportable insinuation.

The most serious criticism of Gross' typology is its concentration on the domestic applications of terrorism. Once again, state support and sponsorship has been ignored. there is no place in the five categories for terrorism sponsored by a state outside its borders against its own citizens or those of another state.

Waugh

In his book International Terrorism, William Waugh Jr. creates a typology with an unusual perspective: that of the responding government. Waugh puts forward a typology of three primary types of international terrorism: Spillover, Integrated internal, and External. (See Appendix C).

Immediate confusion begins in the description of Integrated internal terrorism when Waugh determines the distinguishing characteristic to be "the difference in the nationalities of the terrorist and the victims, one group being indigenous to the host state."¹² (emphasis added). Which group? Surely there is a great difference in concerns depending on whether the terrorist is a national or the victim is a foreign national, the need to protect foreign nationals is still applicable. However, if the terrorist is a foreign national and the victim is a national, the sole concern should be the protection of constituents.

According to Waugh, the only distinction between Spillover terrorism and Integrated internal terrorism is whether the perpetrator is a foreign national or a national of the state in which the incident occurs. This seems very straightforward. However, the concern of the responding government changes dramatically based on this distinction. Under Spillover terrorism, Waugh stresses that the only consideration of the responding government should be its responsibility "for the protection of foreigners traveling or residing within its territory, and their property, and for the maintenance of public order."¹³ For Integrated internal terrorism, the government must consider "the lives and property of its own constituents and of foreign nationals within its territory."¹⁴ Does this mean that

governments do no need to consider the safety of their own citizens in cases where foreign nationals are acting against foreign nationals? What about the destruction of property of the host state in a terrorist attack on foreign nationals by foreign nationals? Does this change it from Spillover to Integrated internal terrorism? There does not seem to be any logical reason for dismissing concern for nationals in Spillover terrorism while including it in Integrated internal.

History has proven the concern Waugh outlines under external terrorism to be false. The Entebbe raid and the failed rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran demonstrate instances in which target governments do not "seek the consent and cooperation of the government having jurisdiction"¹⁵ because the government with jurisdiction was in cooperation with the terrorists. Waugh does not seem to take this situation into account at all. In addition there have been no serious repercussions to a government "having its agents operate outside its borders,"¹⁶ with other governments not directly involved in the terrorist situation providing assistance for just such a maneuver.

Waugh's concept of classifying terrorism on the basis of foreign or national and responding government is inadequate for the subject. There are many instances of terrorist organizations being composed of foreign nationals

and nationals and attacks against victims of many countries with only a few nationals of the target government. There is far more to be considered than whether the terrorist and victims are foreign or not.

Wilkinson

In Terrorism and the Liberal State, Paul Wilkinson expands on the typology developed in Political Terror. The original typology contained the following categories of Sub-revolutionary, Revolutionary, and Repressive. (See Appendix D).

The goals and aims of Sub-revolutionary and Revolutionary terrorism are very straightforward. It is in the category of Repressive terrorism that the first problem arises. The way Wilkinson explains it, Repressive terrorism is instigated by the leader of a totalitarian regime, possibly as "the vehicle of the leader's paranoia."¹⁷ This psychological evaluation has no empirical basis whatsoever. There have been many cases where repression has been the result of previous terrorist activity in an attempt to control the situation. Forcing the government to adopt increasingly repressive measures is a time honored tactic of terrorists to show the ineffectiveness the government or create that appearance.

In his elaboration, Wilkinson adds the category of Epiphenomenal terrorism. Its explanation is deliberately

vague; Wilkinson obviously intends it to act as a 'catch-all' category for acts not covered by the original categories. However, the effort is not entirely successful.

As is common in most typologies, Wilkinson's does not include the phenomenon of state support of terrorism. He has confined his study to domestic applications of terrorist violence , severely limiting the usefulness of the typology. It is impossible to systematically analyze a subject while ignoring a crucial component.

As I have demonstrated in both Chapter One and the previous typologies, the state as terrorist supporter is an area that has been severely neglected in the fields of terrorism and foreign policy studies. What attention there is has been provided mainly by the self-styled 'network theorists,' using a relatively simplistic theory and journalistic approach. There is a need for systematic analysis of a subject with such prodigious foreign policy implications.

Shultz

The nearest a scholar has come to undertaking the necessary systematic analysis is found in the framework provided by Richard Shultz in an article entitled "Conceptualizing political terrorism: a typology." In this article, Shultz derives a typology based on the three categories outlined by Paul Wilkinson in Political Terror

and in Terrorism and the Liberal State by reconceptualizing them and selecting a set of variables that can be operationalized to obtain consistency within and among the three categories. (See Appendix E).

To create his typology, Shultz selected seven variables that he considers relevant to each of the three categories to assist cross category comparison. These seven variables are: Causes, Environment, Goals, Strategy, Means, Organization, and Participation.

The problems with the typology arise in his list of seven variables selected to support and define the categories. Shultz claims that "the typology draws attention to the complex nature of political terrorism, and the various pertinent factors involved in such activity."¹⁸ This claim is only partially supported: it does present the complexity of political terrorism and some factors involved in it, but it does not prove the pertinence or the validity of the seven variables. At no point does he clarify whether the variables were intuitively selected or derived through a rigorous research process. He offers up a menu of variables with no justification or explanation of their inclusion. This offering constitutes more of a "pre-theory" than the foundation of a functional typology.

Selection of variables aside, there are problems with the variables themselves. In the explanation of the

variable Causes, Shultz says that "Causes may be broadly conceptualized as any one or array of observable economic, political, social, and/or psychological factors."¹⁹ This can be interpreted to mean that everything is relevant, severely limiting the usefulness of the variable. What possible explanatory use can a variable serve when it has no apparent discrimination? His next statement is that the "conditions underlying the decision to resort to the use of extranormal political violence are quite varied and complex."²⁰ This is obviously true, and his inclusion and explanation of the variable Causes does nothing to assist in the unraveling of this complexity.

Under the variable Strategy, Shultz makes the statement that "with regard to political terrorism, the issue to be determined concerns whether it constitutes the primary or secondary tactics in the overall strategy."²¹ Why? The importance of terrorism as a strategy does not lie in whether it is a primary or secondary tactic, but in the fact that terrorism has become a tactic at all! The issue to be determined is how terrorism came to be included in the list of viable strategic options.

A similar problem arose within the variable of Participation. Shultz offers up "pertinent factors to be examined"²² with no insight into how he arrived at this

list. He fails to provide any supporting data for the determination of these pertinent factors.

Shultz makes the claim that "this typology is...more than simply a device for pigeonholing data."²³ Unfortunately, this claim is unsubstantiated. The typology provides an excellent framework for organizing data, but no more. Any explanatory power that the typology might have developed is lost through the absence of a model giving relative weight of importance to the variables. To evolve this typology into the powerful explanatory tool he intended, Shultz needs to do several things. First, he needs to justify the selection of his variables in a meaningful way. Second, he must be more critical in the conceptualizations of the variables; specificity will also enhance their categorizational function. Third, he must produce a testable model including relative weights for each variable to determine the importance of each in the selection of terrorism as an option. If all these can be done, he has provided the groundwork for a valuable analytical tool.

Notes:

1. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Terrorist Activity: International Terrorism, part Four, before a subcommittee to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Senate, 94th

Congress, 1st Session, 1975, p. 180.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. p. 181.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. p. 180.

9. Ibid. p. 181.

10. Gross in Kirkham, J. F., Levy, S. G. and W. J. Crotty (Eds.) Assassination and Political Violence, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970): p 534.

11. Ibid.

12. W. L. Waugh Jr., International Terrorism, (Salisbury NC: Documentary Publications, 1982), p. 60.

13. Ibid. p. 57.

14. Ibid. p. 60.

15. Ibid. p. 63.

16. Ibid.

17. P. Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 2nd ed. (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1986), p. 58.

18. R. Shultz, "Conceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Typology," Journal of International Affairs 32 (1) (1978): 13.

19. Ibid. p. 10.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid. p. 11.

22. Ibid. p. 12.

23. Ibid. p. 13.


Chapter Three

Reviewing the literature on terrorism demonstrated the inadequacy of the various approaches to explain the phenomena of state support and sponsorship of terrorism as tools of foreign policy. There is not enough agreement on what terrorism consists of or who employs it to advance its study beyond the descriptive to the explanatory.

The key may be to turn away from the individual acts and actors toward a broader examination of purpose. The basic purpose of the acts and actors is to publicize a viewpoint or message; to communicate. Terrorism has long been recognized as a form of communication, a way for the violent dissenter "to maximize significance without getting caught."¹ Terrorist strategy, communiqués, and acts have as their goal the coercion or influencing of a certain group; a target audience. "Purpose and audience are not separable. All communication behavior has as its purpose the eliciting of a specific response from a specific person (or group of persons)"² (emphasis in the original). The target audience may or may not have a relationship with the actual victim of the violence. The value of the victim is not in his person, but in his symbolic vulnerability and subsequent ability to influence the target audience. Therefore examining and quantifying the specific acts by

type of violence, nationality and number of victims, and terrorist group forms an inadequate picture of state supported and sponsored terrorism; this only focuses on disparate pieces. There is a need for a method to bring all of these separate but vital pieces together to recreate the entire puzzle of motives, purposes, and means of state sponsorship. From this perspective, a more appropriate way to analyze state support and sponsorship of terrorism as a tool of foreign policy may be through focus on one aspect of the classic communication model: feedback.

In their 1949 book The Mathematical Theory of Communication, Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver presented a linear communication model that detailed the nature of electronic communication. Their model and its subsequent adaptations form the basis of present day communications theory.




The Shannon and Weaver Model

The Shannon and Weaver model breaks down the process of communication into a simple linear sequence of events. At the beginning of the sequence the information source gives a message to the transmitter. The transmitter encodes the message into a signal, which then passes through a noise source en route to the receiver. The noise source is any possible interference to the signal which may cause the received signal to be a variation of the original signal transmitted. The receiver then decodes the signal, presenting the potentially altered message to the destination, the end of the sequence.

While the Shannon and Weaver model is an accurate and valuable tool in the study of electronic communication, in this particular form it does not accurately depict the process of human communication. Human communication is not a linear event. The reception of the message by the destination is not the final occurrence in the sequence of events. There is some additional outcome as a result of the reception of the message, a response on the part of the destination that is returned to the information source for analysis.

The same is true for state to state communication. There is always a response to the different activities of one state by another. The addition of a feedback loop to the Shannon and Weaver model will correct this deficiency.

Incorporation of a means to return the response of the destination provides for the process of state learning, a way for the source to gauge the reception of the initial message and make appropriate changes according to the effectiveness and appropriateness of the transmitter.



The intention of this is to highlight the importance of feedback and the role it plays in interstate communication. Feedback has the potential to alter the behaviour of the initiating state based upon its interpretation of that response. State learning, the process of a state becoming cognizant of what is acceptable and effective, revolves around feedback.

It is within feedback that the negative effects (costs) and positive effects (benefits) of state support/sponsorship of terrorism are weighed by the sponsor and the decision is made concerning the usefulness and value of this particular tool for accomplishing the source's foreign policy goals, from continuation of the policy of state support or

sponsorship of terrorism to the rejection of its future use. It is an understanding of this relationship and relative weighting on the part of sponsoring and supporting states that will allow other states to respond to terrorist support and sponsorship with policies of action appropriate to curtail any possible benefits received by sponsor states, thereby reducing the incentive to utilize this particular foreign policy tool in the future.

The key to understanding the effect of feedback is to break it down to its most basic elements. As previously mentioned, there are two types of feedback, negative and positive. Negative feedback contains the costs to the sponsoring state associated with utilizing terrorism to achieve certain foreign policy goals. Positive feedback contains the benefits received by the sponsoring state, the most significant of which is compliance. Within these two categories are two more basic elements described as follows:

Negative

- A. material costs (mc): loss of state income through cessation of trade and economic assistance by states objecting to the support and sponsorship of terrorism;
- B. rhetorical costs (rc): loss of international prestige, denial of access to international forums as a symbolic form of punishment and verbal and

written condemnation of activities by states objecting to the support and sponsorship of terrorism;

Positive

- A. material benefits (mb): gain of state income through increased trade and assistance from states sympathetic to the support and sponsorship of terrorism;
- B. rhetorical benefits (rb): gain of international prestige and access to international forums of communication as a symbolic forms of acceptance and verbal and written praise for activities by states sympathetic to the support and sponsorship of terrorism.

There are four possible combinations of negative and positive feedback (costs and benefits derived from engaging in support of terrorism) revealed by this disaggregation: 1) material costs/material benefits (mc/mb); 2) material costs/rhetorical benefits (mc/rb); 3) rhetorical costs/material benefits (rc/mb); and 4) rhetorical costs/rhetorical benefits (rc/rb).

From these four combinations of the basic elements of feedback, the following hypotheses emerge:

Hypothesis #1: If mc is less than mb , then the behavior should be reinforced and support or sponsorship of terrorism should continue at the same or an elevated rate.

Hypothesis #2: If mc is greater than mb , then support or sponsorship of terrorism should decrease or cease.

Hypothesis #3: If mc is less than rb , then the behavior should be reinforced and support or sponsorship of terrorism should continue at the same or an elevated rate.

Hypothesis #4: If mc is greater than rb , then support or sponsorship of terrorism should decrease or cease.

Hypothesis #5: If rc is less than mb , then the behavior should be reinforced and support or sponsorship of terrorism should continue at the same or an elevated rate.

Hypothesis #6: If rc is greater than mb , then support or sponsorship of terrorism should decrease or cease.

Hypothesis #7: If rc is less than rb , then the behavior should be reinforced and support or sponsorship of terrorism should continue at the same or an elevated rate.

Hypothesis #8: If rc is greater than rb , then support or sponsorship of terrorism should decrease or cease.

In order to test these hypotheses, the relative weight of material costs, rhetorical costs, material benefits and rhetorical benefits must be known. Since it is impossible to know how these are weighted by Fidel Castro as leader of the Cuban government, I am forced to estimate and see if

there is any correlation to my predictions. Based upon this subjective utility, I predict that there will be no situations of Hypotheses #3 and #6. It is highly unlikely that rb will ever outweigh mc or that rc will ever be greater than mb. All other hypotheses are within the realm of possibility and therefore to be tested accordingly.

Knowledge of how sponsoring states react to these forms of feedback can be of enormous value to states that truly desire to create a policy that is appropriate and useful to stop terrorist support and sponsorship. The key is to discover what the supporters themselves consider to be too high a price, what will make terrorism too costly a tool of foreign policy.

Notes:

1. cited in P. A. Karber, "Urban Terrorism: Baseline Data and a Conceptual Framework," Social Science Quarterly 52 (3) (1971): 527.
2. D. K. Berlo, The Process of Human Communication, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 16.

Chapter Four

In this chapter, the concept of feedback will be further explored through examination of the negative and positive feedback in the forms of material cost, material benefits, rhetorical costs and rhetorical benefits from the relevant countries as outlined in the Introduction to the Cuban policy of support and sponsorship of terrorism. A case study of the country of Cuba under the Castro regime should reveal discrete periods of responses to state supported and sponsored terrorism and the supporter/sponsors's behavior as a result of this feedback. This is the key to reducing or eliminating terrorism as a foreign policy tool in the future: identify those responses that have caused an actual decline in terrorist support in the past, utilize them and make this particular tool too costly for the future.

The Castro government's use of state support of terrorism has been well documented since its very creation in 1959. Because of this activity, the United States has regularly included Cuba on its annual list of state sponsors since it began publishing its report on international terrorism. Castro has never denied Cuba's role in inciting violence in other states, openly asserting that "the Cuban revolution will consistently and decisively support any

revolutionary process carried out by any Latin American country."¹ This declaration provided the cover for Castro to pursue his foreign policy objectives using the unconventional tool of sponsorship of terrorism.

1959

The success of the revolution in January of 1959 in Cuba was only the beginning of Castro's ambitious plans for the year. He immediately instituted his scheme to export revolution to neighboring Latin American countries by sending Cuban guerrillas abroad to 'incite the masses.' In the course of the year, he sent an unknown number of 'revolutionary' expeditionary forces to Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the hope of creating the proper climate to duplicate the Cuban revolution. This was overt sponsorship of terrorism on foreign soil.

The Cuban program to export revolution in this manner was a failure. The suspected alienated and dissatisfied peoples did not rally to the revolutionary call and take up arms against their oppressors as intended. Response from these suspected peoples was apathetic at best. Analyzing this feedback in terms of the disaggregated responses, there were situations of loss only. There were material costs in the men and arms sent on these expeditions (the actual amount of which will never be known), and rhetorical costs in the condemnation by the states targeted by the operation.

The Organization of American States' (OAS) 1960 Declaration of San Jose condemned "intervention and totalitarianism," thinly veiled references to the Cuban government and its policy of supporting terrorism in other states. Cuba received no benefits whatsoever, not even rhetorical support to counteract the effects of the OAS condemnation. In view of this negative feedback, it was only logical that Cuba chose to discontinue the direct export of revolution.

1960-63

This failure did not cause Castro to abandon the use of terrorism, only to change the manner of its support for the early 1960's. Rather than sponsorship through the provision of the actual terrorist fighter, Cuba refocused its goals into setting up revolutionary cells in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela to provide the 'indigenous' discontent necessary to call for Cuban assistance in revolution. Small groups of highly trained Cubans were sent to form the locus of these indigenous groups, then recruit members from the local population. Cuba would then provide training and weapons to these indigenous movements rather than do the fighting for them. In the early 1960's, Cuba began to provide training and weapons to guerrillas in other states such as the Sandinista

National Liberation Front (FSLN or Sandinistas) of Nicaragua, guerrillas in Venezuela, violent extremist groups in Colombia, and radicals in Honduras. In 1961, Cuba sent a shipload of Cuban weapons to the West African coast, returning with guerrillas for training in the methods of terrorism, euphemistically called 'urban warfare' by its proponents. By 1962, Cuban terrorist training camps were instructing over 1,500² Latin American guerrillas a year.

Cuban confidence was high and state support for terrorism was surging forward with little opposition. In fact, there was strong positive material and rhetorical feedback for the Cuban behavior. In material benefits, from 1961 to 1963 the tonnage of Soviet military deliveries peaked at 250,000 tons.³ The escalation of the Cuban Missile Crisis of July-October 1962 can account for the dramatic increase in the Soviet build up of Cuba, but the fact remains that an initial build-up was responsible for the Crisis. In other words, while the Cuban Missile Crisis may have increased the Soviet build-up of Cuba far beyond its initial intentions, there was an intention to increase the capabilities of Cuba. Another material benefit was Cuba's acceptance into COMECON. In 1962, Cuba gained all the benefits of membership without full integration. (Full integration came in 1972).

Cuba received rhetorical and material benefits from another communist source in the early 1960's. Ernesto Che Guevara visited Beijing in 1960. In 1961, Cuba and China issued a communique declaring the friendship of the two countries to be everlasting and unbreakable. To support this new friendship between like-minded nations, China began to supply Cuba with rice, a staple in the diet of both countries.

The only rhetorical costs to Cuba in this period were the unilateral actions of the United States. The United States, Cuba's major sugar market, began an embargo of that import in June of 1960. Formal diplomatic relations were broken in January of 1961. In April of the same year, the United States sponsored a spectacularly unsuccessful covert military operation known as the Bay of Pigs.

The year 1963 saw the increase of Cuban activity in Africa. In Zaire, then known as the Congo, Cuba gave full support in the form of terrorist training and weapons to Pierre Mulele in his attempt to overthrow President Mobutu Sese Seko's government starting in 1963. In the fall of 1963, the Venezuelan government uncovered a large cache of Cuban weapons sent to arm guerrillas attempting to overthrow the government. This discovery was a catalyst for widespread negative feedback. In rhetorical costs, the OAS termed this covert support "an aggression" against Venezuela

and an 'intervention' in its internal affairs,"⁴ triggering public condemnation of the Cuban government and its policy of terrorist support. The OAS followed this condemnation by imposing some material costs. Fifteen of the member countries supported a resolution imposing sanctions against Cuba, with Mexico, Bolivia, Uruguay and Chile opposed. The material costs of the OAS reaction included the severing of diplomatic relations, suspension of all trade except food and medicine, and the interruption of all sea transportation to and from Cuba by the members of the Rio Treaty. As a member of the Rio Treaty, the United States continued its embargo on Cuban sugar, continuing to deprive that country of its major market at that time. In what could be seen as a loss of positive feedback rather than negative feedback, the material support by the Soviet Union took a dramatic downswing from 1963-64, a drop in approximately 220,000 tons of military deliveries. However, after a trip by Castro to the Soviet Union the government did promise to purchase 24 million tons of sugar from Cuba between 1965 and 1970 at prices above the world market price.

1964-65

It comes as no surprise that from 1964 to 1965 there was little evidence of Cuban support for terrorism. Weapons and training continued in isolated pockets such as for

Pierre Mulele in the Congo, but the dramatic outpouring of Cuban support in the preceding three years froze in its tracks. Cuba no longer enjoyed purely rhetorical costs on the part of its victims and tremendous military support from its supporters. Soviet military deliveries to Cuba dropped to an all-time low of only around 10,000 tons, as compared to over 250,000 tons at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

1966-79

At the end of 1965 and early 1966, the Soviet Union resumed its previous high support for Cuba in the form of military deliveries. With the rising Soviet support came rising Cuban terrorist activity.

1966 was an extremely influential year in regard to the Cuban policy of state support of terrorism. After two years of virtual silence in this area, Cuba reactivated its policy of support for terrorism in a surge of activity. In January, Cuba hosted the Tricontinental Conference which brought together over 500 representatives of 83 groups from all over the Third World to Havana. While billed as a conference to increase economic and political cooperation in the Third World and promote solidarity, the delegates were not necessarily legitimate representatives of the governments of states, but in many cases of terrorist

organizations within states. This conference greatly increased Cuba's contact and influence with terrorist groups throughout the world. In addition, although not necessarily as a direct response to the conference, the Tupamaros of Uruguay, widely acknowledged by scholars and terrorists themselves as the model for countless terrorist organizations throughout the world, arranged training for its members in Cuba in this year.

Soviet military deliveries peaked again in 1967. During this year, the Soviet Union supplied approximately 38,000 tons of military supplies to Cuba, a country that had yet to engage in an overt military struggle. While this figure does not begin to compare to the support of the 1961-63 period, it is a significant amount of supplies for a state the size of Cuba that is not engaged in any overt military activities.

With these increased military supplies, Cuba expanded its scope of terrorist support again in 1968, opening its training facilities around Havana to European terrorist organizations. This gave Castro access to groups within Italy, France and West Germany along with the Spanish Basques and the IRA before the split. In 1969, this expansion of useful terrorist groups included the Venceramos Brigades and the Weathermen of the United States.

1969 saw the first crack in the stance of the OAS, a material and rhetorical victory for Cuban terrorist support. In 1970, in violation of the OAS agreement, Chile reestablished economic relations with Cuba, bringing about a cessation of terrorist activity in the country. The Chilean government signed a 2-year agreement to sell Cuba \$11 million worth of foodstuffs, "asserting that well-fed Cubans will be less troublesome than lean and hungry ones."⁵ The capitulation of Chile to reestablish relations in order to decrease Cuban activity in that country only bolstered the policy choice. In short, the feedback to Cuba encouraged it to proceed with its support of terrorism.

In 1972, after receiving terrorist training in Cuban camps for six years, the Tupamaros of Uruguay succeeded in bringing about the repressive government they strove to create in order to arouse the masses and to spark a popular revolution. A revolution of sorts occurred, but it was led by the armed forces and resulted in a military government that drove the Tupamaros from the country. They were cordially invited to establish a formal headquarters in Havana. From this time the Tupamaros participated in Cuba's so-called 'internationalist brigades,' groups of Cuban and Cuban trained and equipped terrorists that used their expertise in other states with other terrorist organizations at the direction of the Cuban government.

Chilean support for Cuba was evident in 1972. In December of that year, Cuba and Chile issued a joint communique denouncing the United States. Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens offered substantial rhetorical support for Cuban anti-imperialist policies.

In addition to the rhetorical support of Chile, Cuba received more evidence of support from communist states and some significant material benefits. 1973 brought a credit agreement with Czechoslovakia for industrial development in Cuba. It also saw an agreement with the Soviet Union to defer Cuban debts to that country until 1986.

The fall of President Allende in 1973 ended the unwritten Cuban-Chilean truce. In the face of condemnation by the new government, Cuba soon reactivated its revolutionary campaign in Chile, supporting the MIR with training and arms.

In 1975, Cuba again received positive feedback for its policy choice. The government of Colombia followed the 1969 example of Chile and reestablished full diplomatic relations with the government of Cuba. This policy reversal was materially and rhetorically beneficial to Cuba: Colombia was no longer a vocal opponent of the Cuban government, it restored Colombia as a trading partner and as a result of these underscored the potential of state support for terrorism as a form of foreign policy. In response to that

policy change on the part of the Colombian government, Cuba reduced its support for the April 19 Movement (M-19) which it had begun to support only the year before.

The years 1975-76 saw the deployment of 36,000 Cuban troops to Angola to assist the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the most overt terrorist support to that date. As early as August 1975, the first Cuban advisors to the MPLA had arrived. "In late September the first Cuban ships, carrying no fewer than 480 military personnel, ...25 mortar and anti-aircraft batteries, 115 vehicles, communications equipment and medical supplies"⁶ sailed into Angola from Cuba. By November 8, the scheduled date of Angolan independence, there were approximately 1,100⁷ Cuban military personnel in place. For all of Cuba's interest in fomenting and supporting revolution, this is the only example of Cuban assistance playing a decisive role in the outcome of the struggle. The Cuban troops with Soviet logistics and materiel in place at the time of independence assured the supremacy of the MPLA over its rivals for power after the Portuguese withdrawal. It served as an immeasurable rhetorical victory for the Cuban policy of terrorist support. The rhetorical cost of the Cuban assistance was from Zambia. Bilateral ties declined after Cuba intervened in the Angolan civil war. The material and rhetorical costs to Cuba from this activity increased in

1977. Zaire's President Mobutu suspended relations with Cuba after accusing Cuban military personnel of assisting a Katangan invasion force into Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province from Angola.

However, the years 1977-78 held an unprecedented success for Cuba in Latin America, its main point of interest from the beginning. Solely through the influence of Cuba, with that country acting as negotiator and advisor, the three major factions of the FSLN in Nicaragua were united under one command. Also in 1978, Cuba expanded its support for terrorist groups in the Caribbean. Cuba began to provide assistance to radical opposition groups in Guyana and Jamaica. Castro had taken a special interest in Puerto Rico, supporting the Armed Forces of National Liberation. This terrorist organization advocates Puerto Rican independence, and consequently directs most of its violence against the United States. Cuba had also increased its already sizeable support for rebels in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala. The Montoneros of Argentina were permitted to relocate their terrorist headquarters to Cuba.

Shortly after the Montoneros move to Havana, in 1979, they participated in a Cuban directed and equipped internationalist brigade expedition with the Tupamaros in Nicaragua. Also in 1979, when the fragile unity of the FSLN was threatened, "Castro met personally with Leaders of the

three FSLN factions to hammer out a renewed unity pact."⁸ In addition to internal problem solving, Cuba aided the FSLN with training, arms, and members of the internationalist brigade to fight alongside the terrorists. After the FSLN's victory in 1979, President Reagan viewed Nicaragua as "a state created by state-sponsored terrorism directly sponsoring further terrorism around it."⁹ These events can only be viewed as the strongest of positive rhetorical feedback for Cuban terrorist support. One of Cuba's most vociferous critics, the United States, openly acknowledged the success of its policy decision to support terrorism in other states. The rhetorical benefits of such statements are beyond measure. The acknowledgement of the effectiveness of the Cuban policy of support and sponsorship of terrorism by an enemy as imposing as the United States can only bolster the mechanisms that brought forth this foreign policy option.

It was no surprise that the Cuban government attempted to duplicate its Nicaraguan success in El Salvador. In this state, Cuban influence brought together the Farabund Marti Popular Liberation Forces, the Peoples Revolutionary Army, FARN, and the PCS. At one point this Cuban-supported and trained terrorist coalition was believed to control up to one-fourth of El Salvador.

1980-The Present

In 1980, the tide of positive feedback to the Cuban policy of state support for terrorism finally began to turn. More states outside of the OAS began to reject Cuba in the face of growing evidence of Cuban terrorist activity. In 1980, Peru removed its ambassador from Cuba as did Venezuela. Jamaica expelled the Cuban ambassador from its state, and formally broke off relations in October of 1981 also terminating the 'brigadista' program and recalled Jamaican students from Cuba. In November the government publicly detailed the terrorist training available to Jamaican rebels under the defunct program. Ecuador removed its ambassador from Cuba in May of 1981. Colombia reversed its earlier move and again suspended relations in March of 1981. The United States Congress recodified laws that prohibited the export or reexport of materials, goods or technical information of US origin to Cuba.

On the positive side, Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev met with Castro in February of 1981 and assured him of the Soviet Union's continuing support in the face of this anti-Cuban campaign. Soviet support has been a continuing policy, with 1980 aid worth more than \$3 billion, approximately 25% of Cuba's gross domestic product. The Soviet Union continues to subsidize Cuban sugar production, buying at about 42% above the world market price. In

addition, it has been selling Cuba oil at about 40% below world market price, effectively masking Cuba's true financial dependence on Soviet aid. In fact, in 1983 Soviet economic assistance to Cuba reached approximately \$4.2 billion, providing over 90% of Cuba's total requirements. More than 80% of Cuban Trade was with the Soviet Union and other communist countries.¹⁰

The year 1984 also brought positive feedback to Cuba. In May, Cuba signed an industrial cooperation agreement worth approximately \$400 million with Mexico. Mexico agreed to provide minerals, industrial equipment for steel production and machinery and part for the railroad system and the sugar industry, significant material benefits for the country. In the same year, Cuba was accepted into the International Coffee Organization.

During the 1982 Falkland Islands War, Argentina reached toward Cuba as a possible reaction to the United States' alignment with Great Britain. Argentina's Foreign Minister attended a conference in Havana that has led to warmer relations between the two countries. Venezuela also appeared to soften its stance toward Cuba in the spirit of Latin American solidarity brought on by the war, although it had removed its ambassador only the preceding year.

In June of 1986, Brazil reestablished relations with Cuba in an act of self-preservation. Cuba had been sending

terrorist trainers into Brasilia thinly disguised as diplomats and the government chose the course of least resistance. The Brazilian government was frank in its bargaining for the cessation of Cuban terrorist support in its country in exchange for diplomatic recognition.

In view of the recent upheaval in the Soviet Union, I predict that there will be a sharp decrease in Cuban support and sponsorship of terrorism in the 1990's. Soviet underwriting of the Cuban economy is being halted, and without the continuous influx of economic and military aid it is unlikely that the Castro government will be able to maintain the current level of international terrorist activity.

Notes:

1. The New York Times, "Cuba Pledges Aid in Latin Revolts" July 15, 1969, p. 5.

2. Witnesses and former trainees have pinpointed camps in Pinar del Rio Province and near Guanabo specifically designed to provide guerrilla training to several hundred trainees at a time.

3. U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee on the Judiciary, The Role of Cuba in International Subversion and Terrorism, p. 88.

4. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, State-Sponsored Terrorism, report prepared for the subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Senate 99th Congress, 1st session, 1985, p. 89.

5. H. Raymont, "US Urges Latin Countries not to Relax Boycott of Cuban Regime," NYT, July 13, 1970, p. 13.

6. J. Dominguez, To Make A World Safe For Revolution, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 131.

7. Ibid.

8. U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs, Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America, 1981, p. 6.

9. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, State-Sponsored Terrorism, p. 89.

10. K. N. Skoug, Jr. Cuba as a Model and a Challenge, (NY: The Cuban American National Foundation, 1987) p. 10.

Conclusions

The problem of state support and sponsorship of terrorism is one of growing prominence on the foreign policy agenda of many states. The incidence of state use of terrorism is growing and victim states are becoming increasingly aware of the need for a consistent policy to address this crisis. In order to implement an effective policy, one which will decrease or eliminate future use of terrorism by one state against another, it would be reasonable to conduct a historical examination of state support and sponsorship of terrorism tracing its ebbs and flows through time in reaction to the responses of other states. This was the goal of Chapter Four. Cuba's documented support and sponsorship of a variety of terrorist organizations throughout Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa have provided an adequate base for evaluation of the changes in use of terrorism by a state as a response to the reaction of other states.

In order to evaluate the changes in Cuba's support and sponsorship of terrorism as outlined in Chapter Four, the hypotheses of Chapter Three will be restated.

Hypothesis #1: If m_c is less than m_b , then the behavior should be reinforced and support or sponsorship of terrorism should continue at the same or an elevated rate.

Hypothesis #2: If mc is greater than mb , then support or sponsorship of terrorism should decrease or cease.

Hypothesis #3: If mc is less than rb , then the behavior should be reinforced and support or sponsorship of terrorism should continue at the same or an elevated rate.

Hypothesis #4: If mc is greater than rb , then support or sponsorship of terrorism should decrease or cease.

Hypothesis #5: If rc is less than mb , then the behavior should be reinforced and support or sponsorship of terrorism should continue at the same or an elevated rate.

Hypothesis #6: If rc is greater than mb , then support or sponsorship of terrorism should decrease or cease.

Hypothesis #7: If rc is less than rb , then the behavior should be reinforced and support or sponsorship of terrorism should continue at the same or an elevated rate.

Hypothesis #8: If rc is greater than rb , then support or sponsorship of terrorism should decrease or cease.

As described in Chapter Four, the year 1959 was a prime example of sponsorship of terrorism. Cubans were sent abroad to wreak havoc in other countries expressly at the request and in the interest of the Cuban government. There were no material or rhetorical benefits of this action. Instead there were material and rhetorical costs involved in this behavior: there was the loss of men and arms involved in these expeditions and criticism from the OAS for this

activity. This year serves as an example of Hypotheses 2 and 8: $(mc > mb)$ and $(rc > rb)$. The projected outcome of both of these hypotheses is that the behavior should be invalidated and sponsorship should decrease or cease. In fact, this was the case. Evidence shows that Cuba did cease direct sponsorship of terrorist activity.

Unfortunately, rather than abandoning the use of terrorism entirely, Cuba merely changed its tactics from direct sponsorship to support. From 1960 to 1963, this support took the forms of training and weapons to groups throughout Latin America and Africa. The evidence provided in Chapter Four suggests that there was support for Cuba from 1960 to early 1963: there were the material benefits of the exceptionally large tonnage of Soviet military supplies (recognizing the role of the Cuban Missile Crisis), acceptance into COMECON and rice supplies from China. Opposition took the form of the material cost of the United States embargo and the military expenses of the Bay of Pigs. This time period serves as an example of Hypothesis 1: $(mc < mb)$. The projected outcome of this hypothesis is that the behavior should be reinforced and support should continue at the same or an elevated rate. Again, this proved to be the case. Support for terrorism began in 1960 and continued through and increased in 1963. However, in 1963 the situation changed. The discovery of a cache of

Cuban-supplied weapons in Venezuela triggered rhetorical and material costs for Cuba. Rhetorically, Cuba faced widespread condemnation by the OAS. Materially, the OAS followed this condemnation with a resolution imposing sanctions against Cuba that included the severing of diplomatic relations and suspension of trade except food and medicine. The most economically damaging result of this was that the United States, a member of the Rio Treaty as well as Cuba's major market for sugar, followed the sanctions and stopped importing Cuban sugar. In addition, the Soviet Union significantly decreased its military deliveries to Cuba. There was one corresponding material benefit: the Soviet Union agreed to purchase Cuban sugar in the future at an elevated price. The year 1963 serves as an example of Hypotheses 2 and 6: $(mc > mb)$ and $(rc > mb)$. In Chapter Three, I expressed the belief that there would be no examples of Hypothesis 6. I still believe that rhetorical costs alone would not outweigh material benefits, but in conjunction with the material costs accrued in 1963 the hypothesis deserves to be included. The projected outcome of the two hypotheses is the same: the behavior should be invalidated and support for terrorism should decrease or cease. The hypotheses were supported by Cuban behavior in the next few years. 1964-65 saw little evidence of Cuban support of terrorism, and no new support.

Beginning in 1966, Cuba returned to support of terrorism. Hosting the Tricontinental Conference in 1966 brought both rhetorical and material benefits to the support of terrorism that evidently outweighed the existing costs. The rhetorical benefit was the acknowledgement of Cuba as a hub for guerrilla training and arms and praise from the recipients. Materially, Cuba increased its access to terrorist organizations and trained them at an unknown (but most likely expensive) price. In addition, Soviet military deliveries peaked again in 1967. These two years serve as an example of Hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and 7: $(mc < mb)$, $(mc < rb)$, $(rc < mb)$ and $(rc < rb)$. The material and rhetorical costs of earlier years remained in place. In Chapter Three, I expressed the belief that there would be no examples of Hypothesis 3. I still believe that rhetorical benefits alone will not outweigh material costs, but in conjunction with the material benefits derived in 1966 and 1967 the hypothesis deserves to be included. The projected outcome of the four hypotheses is the same: the behavior should be reinforced and support should continue at the same or an elevated rate. This proved once again to be the case. Cuban support of terrorism expanded steadily from 1969 through 1979. There were numerous material and rhetorical benefits to Cuba throughout this decade. In 1970, Chile reestablished economic relations in violation of the OAS

agreement. The Tupamaros of Uruguay moved to Havana in 1972 providing more manpower. Czechoslovakia signed a credit agreement in 1973. The Soviet Union agreed to defer Cuba's debts in that same year. In 1975, Columbia reestablished relations in violation of the OAS agreements. 1976 saw the first victory of Cuba-sponsored terrorists in Angola. The Montoneros of Argentina moved to Havana in 1979, providing more manpower. The material and rhetorical costs were far fewer. As a result of Cuban activity in Angola, bilateral ties with Zambia decreased. In 1977, Zaire suspended relations with Cuba.

This decade serves as an example of Hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and 7: (mc<mb), (mc<rb), (rc<mb) and (rc<rb). Once again Hypothesis 3 is included because its effect cannot be separated from that of the other hypotheses. The projected outcome of the four hypotheses is the same: the behavior should be reinforced and support should continue at the same or an elevated rate. The hypotheses were supported by Cuban activities through the decade and into 1980. In 1980, material and rhetorical costs to Cuba support of terrorism began to mount. Peru and Venezuela removed their ambassadors from Cuba. Jamaica expelled the Cuban ambassador and formally broke off relations in 1981. Colombia again suspended relations in 1981. The United States tightened prohibitions on the export and reexport of

materials, goods and technical information of United States origin to Cuba. However, there were also several material and rhetorical benefits. In 1981, the Soviet Union assured Cuba of its continued support and continued providing over 90% of Cuba's economic requirements. Mexico signed an industrial cooperation agreement in 1984; the International Coffee Organization accepted Cuba's membership that same year. Brazil reestablished relations in 1986.

This time period continues to serve as an example of Hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and 7: $(mc < mb)$, $(mc < rb)$, $(rc < mb)$ and $(rc < rb)$. Hypothesis 3 is again included due to the impossibility of separating its effects from those of material benefits. The projected outcome is the same: the behavior should be reinforced and support should continue at the same or an elevated rate. If the hypotheses continue to hold true, my prediction for the early 1990's is the continuation of support of terrorism by Cuba.

At the beginning of Chapter Four, I noted that the key to reducing or eliminating terrorism as a foreign policy tool in the future is to identify those responses that have caused an actual decline in terrorist support in the past, utilize them and make this particular tool too costly for the future. As has been demonstrated by this evaluation using a cost/benefit form of analysis, there are few things costly enough to halt state support and sponsorship of

terrorism. Throughout the thirty year period of Cuban support, there is only evidence of that support being affected by pressure from outside the country one time: at the end of 1963. This was the time of the imposition of sanctions by the OAS, cutting Cuban off from its major historical trading partners and the major market for its only cash crop, sugar. In the years after this, the Soviet Union took over as the market source for sugar and Cuba returned to its earlier support.

The conclusion is rather obvious. In order to stem the tide of terrorist support and sponsorship, other countries must impose significant economic costs on the nations who engage in this activity. It has been proven by the preceding evaluation that condemnation (rc) has little or no effect on the level of state sponsorship or support. In addition, it is necessary to keep other countries from filling in the gap created by the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions will only be effective if there is a mechanism for imposing material costs on the countries who aid terrorist supporters as well as the supporters themselves.

As has been amply demonstrated throughout this thesis, there are numerous obstacles to completing a meaningful study of terrorism. The first hurdle to overcome is the definition of the terms 'terrorist' and 'terrorism' to make them and the work containing them widely applicable. This

is usually accomplished, as in my own study, by side-stepping the issue and allowing the reader to superimpose his own definition. Those who valiantly attempt to create an accurate definition fall victim to the criticism in Chapter One.

A related hurdle is the available data. The inclusion of people or events into the categories terrorist and terrorism depends on the definition used. This makes data sets, where available, inherently unreliable due to the biases imposed through their selection. The general rule of 'garbage in, garbage out' illustrates the problem of quantitative terrorist research.

In addition, evaluation of terrorism is highly subjective. It is impossible to know the actual thoughts and motivations of terrorists and terrorist supporters and sponsors. The projection of the goals and motivations, while educated speculation, is still only speculation.

Having discussed the difficulties of doing this research, I can offer little hope for overcoming them. The study of terrorism would become immeasurably more reliable with the creation of an objective, fully inclusive definition. However, efforts to improve the field should not be discarded until such time as that definition is available. Terrorism is an increasing threat to the international order and the acts and perpetrators of the

acts need to be thoroughly examined and evaluated for a better understanding of the phenomena and possible future policy guidelines. The importance of the study of terrorism should not be overshadowed by the difficulties of the research.

APPENDIX A: CROZIER

Glossary

Terrorism: motivated violence for political ends (a definition that distinguishes terrorism from both vandalism and nonpolitical crime).

Terror: measures of extreme repression, including torture, used by states to oppress the population or repress political dissenters (the converse of terrorism).

Extremist: prepared to break the law, with particular reference to political violence.

Subversive centers: countries that provide assistance, whether with money, training arms or various facilities to extremist movements engaged in challenges to the security of other states.

Guerrillas (urban or rural): groups or individuals practicing guerilla warfare. The term "urban guerilla" is often a misnomer for "urban terrorists."

Categories

disruptive

The aims of disruptive terrorism are: self-publicity; to build up the movement's morale and prestige; to discredit and demoralize the authorities; to provoke the authorities into taking excessively harsh repressive measures, likely to

alienate the population and force a rising spiral of official expenditures in arms, lives and money, resulting in public clamour for the abandonment of counteraction.

coercive

The aims of coercive terrorism are: to demoralize the civil population, weaken its confidence in central authority, and instill fear of the terrorist movement; to make an example of selected victims by the torture and/or death to force obedience to the leadership of the movement.

APPENDIX B: GROSS

Tactical

Tactically, the objective of terror has been the punishment, intimidation, weakening, or slow disintegration of government... Thus tactical terror in the past was directed against the representatives of a foreign rule that was oppressive and cruel...Terror in most cases combined with at least beginning or full-scale guerrilla warfare. It was justified in the eyes of the revolutionaries as a national war, even more significant than "regular" warfare, because, as a rule it was the last resort of those who were oppressed and sometimes abandoned by the civilized world.

Mass

In contrast to ordinary terror, mass terror is a political tactic of the "ins." It is an effort to consolidate power, and usually to eliminate groups of innocent people defined as a class, race, or a nation...Mass terror is a detailed, well-thought-out plan of threat and punishment by which the regime bends a population to its absolute will. The rule of mass terror was usually in the past, and still is, a government of a minority that maintains its power primarily by manipulation of fear, no by consensus...Society slowly splits onto three groups: (1) those who command and control

the elements of violence or identify themselves with the latter; (2) the passive mass of obedient, predictable "subjects" or "citizens" manipulated frequently into manifestations of emotional and symbolic expressions of loyalty and love for their tormentors; and (3) a rapidly declining, divided group of those who are either indifferent (but not manipulatable) or opposed.

Random

Random terror, in its strategic and tactical objectives, is more related to the individual than is mass terror. Random or indiscriminate terror has as its goal the weakening of government, erosion of institutions (this is especially true in the case of a terrorist struggle against a democracy), and intimidation of the decision-makers. The technique is simple: explosives are placed in places where men congregate--post offices, cafes, railroads or bus stations, banks, etc...Death, mutilation, suffering are directed indiscriminately, victimizing entirely innocent people, accidental bystanders, children, women, workers, office clerks--whoever happens to be at the scene.

Focused Random

As described by Gross, focus random terror is merely a variation on the theme. It is random terror in that the

victims are not pre-selected, the terrorist has no prior knowledge of their identities when selecting a cafe, railroad or bus station, etc.

to destroy. The violence becomes focused through the selection of a target where members of the opposed group are known to congregate.

Dynastic Assassination

Dynastic assassination is conceptualized as assassination as a means of changing dynasties and political orientations associated with a ruling dynasty, a type of assassination related to sultanism.

APPENDIX C: WAUGH

Spillover Terrorism

The principle characteristic of spillover terrorism is the use of violence by foreign nationals against foreign individuals or property. The terrorist threat is not directed at the responding government, and the responding government is not directly involved in the political conflict, except to the extent that it is responsible for the protection of foreigners traveling or residing within its territory, and their property, and for the maintenance of public order.

Integrated Internal Terrorism

The distinguishing characteristic of integrated internal terrorism is the difference in the nationalities of the terrorist and the victims, one group being indigenous to the host state. The responding government may or may not be the target of the terrorist threat. In dealing with this type of terrorism, the responding government had the twin responsibilities to protect the lives and property of its own constituents and of foreign nationals within its territory. The government may abrogate either of these responsibilities, but each will likely be considered in the selection of response.

External Terrorism

The distinguishing characteristic of external terrorism is that the terrorists are located or the act is committed outside of the territory of the target government, i.e., in the jurisdiction of another government. To respond to such attacks, the target government must either seek the consent and cooperation of the government having jurisdiction or deal with the legal and political ramifications attendant with having its agents operate outside of its borders.

APPENDIX D: WILKINSON

Sub-revolutionary

Characteristics: Typically committed by small groups, though individuals may act alone; highly unpredictable; often difficult to distinguish from psychopathological and criminal violence.

Aims: Political motivation short of fundamental revolutionary change.

Revolutionary

Characteristics: Always a group phenomenon, however tiny the group, with a leadership and an ideology or programme, however crude. Develops alternative institutional structures. The organization of violence and terrorism is typically undertaken by specialist conspiratorial and para-military organs within the revolutionary movement.

Aims: Revolution, or to achieve tactical revolutionary objectives.

Repressive

Characteristics: Often highly sanguinary, developing into mass terror. Typically a specialist terror apparatus, the secret police, is developed to perform this task, though it

often involves other organs such as the ruling party and the army. Its archetypal technique is torture. In the totalitarian ideological regime terror, fear and mutual suspicion can become all-pervasive and all-consuming, and may become the vehicle of the leader's paranoia.

Aims: Suppressing or restraining groups, individuals or forms of behaviour deemed to be undesirable by the repressor, or simply chosen for liquidation.

Epiphenomenal

Characteristics: Random rather than deliberately planned and organized: occurs in the context of highly sanguinary struggles in which systematic terrorism may be an accompanying element.

Aims: No specific aim: a by-product of large-scale intra-specific violence.

APPENDIX E: SHULTZ

Revolutionary Terrorism may be defined as the threat and/or employment of extranormal¹ forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of successfully effecting a complete revolutionary change (change of fundamental political-social processes) within the political system. Such means may be employed by revolutionary elements indigenous to the particular political system or by similar groups acting outside of the geographical boundaries of the system.

Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism may be defined as the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of effecting various changes in the structural-functional aspects of the particular political system. The goal is to bring about certain changes in the body politic, not to abolish it in favor of a complete system change.

Establishment Terrorism may be defined as the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms of political violence, in

¹ Shultz defines extranormal violence as being of a very extreme and brutal nature, going beyond the conventions of declared war.

varying degrees, by an established political system, against both external and internal opposition.

Specifically, such means may be employed by an established political system against other nation-states and groups external to the particular political system, as well as internally to repress various forms of domestic opposition/unrest and/or to move the populace to comply with programs/goals of the state. (emphasis added).

Causes

Causes may be broadly conceptualized as any one or array of observable economic, political, social, and/or psychological factors. Conditions underlying the decision to resort to terrorism are quite varied and complex. These generalized causal factors may be sub-divided into two categories: long-term factors (pre-conditions extending over a lengthy period of time), and short-term factors (igniting events).

Environment

This concerns the various forms political terrorism can take within the typology's three general categories.

Conceptualized on the basis of geographic spheres, these environmental variations may be broadly classified into internal environmental (within the nation-state) and external environmental (global, or systemic levels) categories.

Goals

Goals are the objectives at which terrorism is directed, categorized in terms of long range (broader strategic objectives) and short term (specific tactical objectives) political ends. Political terrorism may be directed towards both types of objectives simultaneously.

Strategy

For our purposes, this may be conceptualized as the overall plan--all necessary actions, policies, instruments, and apparatus--for the achievement of one's goals. It entails the deployment of men, materials, ideas, symbols, and forces in pursuit of these goals.

Means

Means are categorized as any and all capabilities and techniques utilized within the broader strategic framework to achieve the goals projected. Capabilities available may include the most primitive or the most sophisticated forms of weaponry, mobility, electronic media manipulation, tactical communications, etc. The techniques utilized can range from kidnapping, barricade and hostage, bombing, armed assault or ambush, hijacking, incendiary attack or arson, assassination, chemical, bacteriological or radiological pollution.

Organization

As a fundamental adjunct to political terrorism, organization provides the formalized structure utilized for the planning, coordination, and application of extranormal forms of political violence.

Participation

This variable is broadly conceptualized to refer to the type of individual who takes part in political terrorism, as well as the various types of political leaders who employ terrorism to achieve their particular goals. Thus, with regard to the profile of the terrorist, pertinent factors to be examined include: age, social background, occupation, education, ideology, personality, and belief system.

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