Surrendering Supremacy in the Western Hemisphere
Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1965

by

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IN

HISTORY

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SURRENDERING SUPREMACY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1895-1905

by

Richard Keith Lilly

Ronald J. Nurse, Chairman

History

(ABSTRACT)

The turn-of-the-century was a crossroads in the histories of Great Britain and the United States. Britain was experiencing relative decline. Though the greatest empire in history, Britain was overextended and weaker than the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Conversely, the United States was taking the world stage and establishing its dominance in the Western Hemisphere. At this crossroads, the two nations formed an entente.

The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, which secured the American right to an interoceanic canal and the settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute in 1903 ushered in Anglo-American friendship. In both issues, however, the United States gained extremely favorable agreements. The relative power imbalance enabled American leaders like Theodore Roosevelt to bargain from a superior position. Britain, thus, had no choice except yielding to American demands.
Acknowledgments

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I warmly thank my parents and my brother Derek for their support. The rest of my family and friends have all been valuable sources of encouragement. Space does not allow me to list them all. Therefore, I thank them as a group.

Most tender thanks goes to my wife Teresa and my son Jameson. The two most important people in my life, they have sacrificed and encouraged way beyond the call of duty. It is with love, that I dedicate this thesis to them. Above all, I thank Almighty God for his grace and strength.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: British Relative Decline and American Expansion

As the twentieth century draws to a close, Americans are continually concerned with the condition of their nation. Political candidates lament about economic, moral and political decline. In world affairs, the United States is involved in the difficult task of attempting to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the trade imbalance with Japan and protectionism versus free trade are issues. Aside from Japan, American policy makers must ponder the economic effects of a united Europe. Although the strongest military power in history, the United States' strength and role in the world is in question.

Only a century ago, the United States was the ascending power and Great Britain was in the midst of a long period of relative decline. British statesmen had the unenviable task of maintaining their supremacy in a world of rising competitors. Spurred by navalists like Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, the United States built an impressive navy. In 1898, the Americans defeated the Spanish in a short, but important, war that ushered in an era of overseas expansion. The United States even directly challenged the British on several issues: the Venezuelan border, an American canal in Latin America, and the Canadian-Alaskan boundary. In all three instances, the upstart nation emerged in a superior position.
By the mid 1890's, the British people looked at their empire with considerable pride. Many facts argued that British power was beyond challenge. The British Empire was composed of fifty colonies covering over eleven million square miles.¹ In addition to covering a full quarter of the earth's surface, Queen Victoria was sovereign to a quarter of the world's population. It was the most extensive empire in human history. Much of this British leaders attributed to the Royal Navy's mastery of the sea, a dominance that enabled British trade interests to prosper without hindrance. Free trade economic theory assured Britons that British economic success meant world economic success.² Yet, economics was only one method of justifying their power.

British missionaries from various churches prospered under imperial protection. In particular, the Anglican Church combined with the wealthy devout to set up churches and schools to Christianize and educate the peoples of Queen Victoria's far flung colonial possessions.³ At the turn-of-the-century, British imperialists saw it as their duty as a superior people to bring the benefits of British rule. This racist benevolence extended beyond religion to economic improvement and the process of civilizing those who, Britons felt, were uncivilized. In March 1897, the most prominent of a new breed of imperialists Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain echoed these sentiments in a speech before the Royal Colonial Institute:

We feel now that our rule over their territories can only

³Ibid, 23.
be justified if we can show that it adds to the happiness
and the prosperity of the people, and I maintain our rule
does, and has brought security and peace and comparative
prosperity to countries that never knew these blessings
before. In carrying out this work of civilization we are
fulfilling what I believe to be our national mission, and
we are finding scope for the exercise of those faculties
and qualities which made us a great governing race.\textsuperscript{4}

British imperialists saw their empire as great and benevolent. As shall be discussed later,
the merits of Anglo-Saxons were easily adapted by Americans.

The epitome of British pride in the Empire came with the Diamond Jubilee of
Queen Victoria. This spectacular event was staged to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of
Victoria's accession to the throne and to unite Britons as never before in appreciation of
their Empire. Before the Jubilee, Britons saw the Empire as "a vague and ill-explained
appendage to sea power, scattered somewhere beyond the horizon, and sporadically
growing." With the Jubilee, more Britons became increasingly interested in things imperial.
Tales of exploration, adventure and exotic lands under British control filled the pages of
newspapers and books.\textsuperscript{5}

At the same time other powers were involved in imperial activity. Germany, Japan
and the United States were well underway in the creation of formidable navies. France and
Russia, Britain's more traditional rivals, were still important imperial and naval powers.
Germany and the United States presented special challenges in trade and the advancement
of industrial technology. These challenges insured that British leaders would not chose an

\textsuperscript{4}Joseph Chamberlain, "Chamberlain's Speech at the Royal Colonial Institute, 31 March
1897", in David C. Douglas, \textit{English Historical Documents} (New York: Oxford
\textsuperscript{5}Morris, 37-39.
insular path in national policy. Yet, in nearly every sense, Britain was in absolute terms still the greatest power in the world.

Nevertheless, in the mid 1890's, several statesmen were beginning to realize that Britain's strength was largely a deception. Beneath the surface, these individuals identified chinks in the imperial armor. These statesmen would be resisted by those in and out of power unwilling to acknowledge that Britain was losing ground. Still, perceptive statesmen continued to deal with areas of British decline. One such was economic competition.

Table 1. Iron/Steel Production of the Powers, 1890-1913
(millions of tons; pig iron production for 1890, steel thereafter)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1913</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though Great Britain continued to flourish, the United States and Germany were beginning to gain ground in important areas of production. As Table 1 demonstrates,

6Ibid, 24-25.
8Ibid, 27.
steel production was one of those areas. By 1890, Britain was already behind the United States in steel production. Germany pulled ahead of Britain by 1900. For industrial and military strength capacity to produce steel was of obvious importance. Coal was another area where Britain found herself continually losing ground to other powers. In 1870, Britain produced three times the coal of Germany, which was the number two producer. From 1890 to 1900, the United States increased its coal output from 143 to 244 million tons. In the same time frame, Britain went only from 184 to 228 million tons. And, on the eve of the first World War, German coal production was practically equal that of British.¹⁰

In percentage of shares of world manufacturing production, Britain was passed by the United States in the 1880's. From 1896 to 1900, Britain had 19.5% of world manufacturing production. In the same period, the United States produced 30.1%. Germany was close behind Britain with 16.6%. By 1906-1910, Germany produced 1.2% more than Britain. Meanwhile, the American lead grew.¹¹

Leaders like Chamberlain were alarmed by such figures. In the late nineteenth century, many Britons feared the expansion of large states like the United States, Germany and Russia. They felt that Britain, even with its massive empire, was unable to compete with the geographically extensive nations. Giant states possessed huge populations and vast supplies of natural resources, helpful assets in the event of war. The United States and Germany were already showing what such large nations could do in terms of steel production and manufacturing. Potentially, such strong states could engulf weaker neighbors, thus, creating huge trading blocks. Without a viable system of free trade, many

¹¹Friedberg, 26.
markets would be closed to the British. In response, imperialists such as Chamberlain suggested that all of Britain's white English speaking colonies should form one commonwealth. This concept of imperial unification went back earlier into the nineteenth century to the writings of Charles Dilke and James Froude, from which Chamberlain drew in his advocacy of a Greater Britain. This unification, for Chamberlain, promised the size and advantages of a larger state. The Empire would give its colonies preferential treatment in trade.\textsuperscript{12}

Protectionism was a concept opposed to the established doctrine of free trade. A Great Depression from 1872 to 1896 caused the continental powers to impose heavy tariffs in order to protect their domestic producers and industries. These actions provoked discussion within the British government concerning the merits of free trade. To Chamberlain's chagrin, government studies were often narrowed in order to present a more optimistic view of the British economy.\textsuperscript{13}

In 1895, Lord Salisbury's government was a coalition between conservatives and liberal unionists, who were committed to free trade. The liberal unionists, however, broke with the liberals on the issue of Irish home rule. Thus, Lord Salisbury was in no position politically to accept any of Chamberlain's protectionism program, for to advocate protection would have been suicide to his government.\textsuperscript{14} Free trade orthodoxy was too strong for Chamberlain's intense minority to overcome. Tradition and politics helped doom protectionism and imperial unification. Yet, the major factor was probably the fact that Chamberlain and protectionists failed to demonstrate that Britain's economy was in bad

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid, 31-34.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid, 35-41.
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid, 143.
enough trouble to merit their imperial program. Opponents of protection could point to the fact that in raw terms Britain still was ahead in many areas like shipbuilding. Still, in relative terms, Britain was falling behind.

More disturbing than possible economic decline was any doubt about British naval supremacy. The British Empire was largely based on the Royal Navy's capacity to control the seas. In the 1890's, British leaders measured the comparative strength of navies in terms of numbers of capital battle ships. British adherence to the theories of American navalist Alfred Thayer Mahan was responsible for the preoccupation with battle fleets. Mahan's historical writings provided an intellectual basis for blue water strategy. In Mahan's scheme, no power could become a world power without sea power. Therefore, British strategists and statesmen paid close attention to the naval building programs of other powers.

<table>
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<th>Table 2. Capital Battleship Programs of the Powers</th>
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<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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As Table 2 demonstrates, in the 1890's, Britain's navy had considerably more battleships than its competitors. In terms of real naval power, however, tonnage was quite deceptive. Many of the Her Majesty's ships were outdated. More importantly, British ships were dispersed over a vast space. This brought British naval supremacy in particular areas into question. The German navy was concentrated mainly in the North Sea. In the Caribbean and Pacific, British naval superiority was challenged sufficiently by the United States and Japan. A major re-enforcement of one region created weakness in another.\textsuperscript{18}

The emergence of Japan and the United States as naval powers presented Great Britain with a special dilemma. For centuries, command of the seas meant control of the narrow European seas. Such control enabled Britain to keep continental powers landlocked. As long as no peripheral powers built substantial navies, British control of the world's oceans was secure. When, in the 1890's, Japan and the United States built navies, Britain was forced to allocate some naval strength to protect British interests in the Pacific and Caribbean. As European navies became more formidable, British leaders realized the grim need of yielding supremacy in Asia and the Latin America. Through alliance with Japan and concessions to America, British leaders hoped to maintain their interests in the two regions.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, warm relations with Japan and the United States were of great importance to turn-of-the-century British policy makers.

Between 1895 and 1905, Britain lost its primacy in terms of sea power. With that loss, Great Britain's status as a detached arbiter of international affairs also disappeared. Its vaunted traditional isolation also passed with the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902.

\textsuperscript{19}Friedberg, 137-138.
Admitting the loss of global sea control was difficult for British statesmen. Instead, they redefined the concept of command of the seas in terms of controlling European waters. This self-delusional course had precedent in the traditional two-power standard. The two-power standard held that Britain maintained supremacy if she had as many capital ships as the two nearest continental naval powers combined. Conveniently, the old standard left out the peripheral naval powers. 20 But, as the century drew to a close, many naval analysts questioned whether the two-power standard was enough.

The impetus for these questions came initially out of fear of the Franco-Russian alliance. Naval strategists warned that collaboration between France and Russia could threaten British sea power in the crucial Mediterranean Sea. Since the 1880's, France had been increasing its presence in the Mediterranean. At the same time, Russia continued to cast lustful eyes upon Constantinople. 21 Later Germany became Britain's primary concern. Before the triple entente, however, Britain's lack of allies highlighted its weakness.

During the Boer War, concerns about a possible massive German-led continental alliance against Britain, also caused policy makers to doubt the effectiveness of the two-power standard. The panic over the continental coalition passed. But British naval and government leaders continued to fear possible overwhelming opposition. 22

By 1901, surrender of supremacy in Asia and the Caribbean enabled British naval strategists to withdraw ships and garrisons from those areas. Bulking up the home fleet was a major objective of this naval realignment. 23 By 1904, British naval power rested on

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20Ibid, 152-169.
22Friedberg, 156, 159.
23Ibid, 177-180.
appeasement with foreign powers, though public opinion prohibited Arthur Balfour, Salisbury's successor as Prime Minister, from admitting this fact.

What is best not to say is that we believe that the idea of opposing the navy of the United States . . . close to its bases must be abandoned. This has naturally altered some strategic aspects of this part of the world. In years not far distant, we shall be quite unable to oppose the navy of Japan in its own waters. It is best to recognize facts but not always to proclaim them from the housetops.24

Britain's attempt to remain navally superior was doomed. One power could not hope to out build and outspend the rest of the world, and, as historian Aaron Friedberg stated, "from the moment Britain surrendered naval supremacy, its empire was on borrowed time."25

Meanwhile, the British army also suffered from relative decline. In 1899, Britain entered into war with the Dutch Republics in South Africa. The Boer War embarrassed the British military establishment considerably before its eventual victory in 1902. The hardy Boer frontiersmen were holding off the forces of the greatest empire in human history. In one week in December 1899, the British lost three engagements. Britons could no longer feel themselves "unquestionably the masters of the earth."26 British difficulty in subduing the Boers easily raised questions about the efficiency of the army and fear of a possible German led coalition against Britain. Discussion within Lord Salisbury's government concerned the military's ability to defend the Empire. Even with eventual

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24Arthur Balfour, quoted in Friedberg, 204.
25Friedberg, 300.
victory over the Dutch Republics, these doubts persisted.\textsuperscript{27} Besides South Africa, other areas presented problems for the British military.

Sea power had, for centuries, provided potency for the British military. But by the 1890's, technology was making many of Mahan's principles outdated. Railroads provided land forces with much greater mobility and security for internal lines of communications. Consequently, amphibious assault, an option the Royal Navy historically gave the British military, was no longer feasible. British planners worried also about the modernized continental armies drawn from huge trained populations. The traditional British fear of standing armies prevented advocates of compulsory service from making much headway.\textsuperscript{28}

Imperial defense seemed nearly hopeless to strategists. The loss of naval supremacy insured, for example, that Canada could never be defended from an American attack. Defense of any part of the Empire would draw huge quantities of limited British manpower away from the defense of the home islands.\textsuperscript{29} But it was India in the period 1895-1905, that concerned planners the most.

The great powers, in the decades before World War I, as Henry Kissinger described it, were "intoxicated with the new technology of railways and mobilization schedules, [and] were constantly engaged in military preparations out of proportion to any of the issues being disputed."\textsuperscript{30} In this, Great Britain was no exception. The greatest worry was the defense of India. Russia, from the British perspective, seemed to possess incredible military strength. Having completed several railway lines, with Russia's geographical position and history of expansion, it appeared a major threat to defense of the

\textsuperscript{27}Friedberg, 209.
\textsuperscript{28}Ibid, 213-215, 222.
\textsuperscript{29}Ibid, 195-196, 223.
Empire's crown jewel, India. Over half of the Committee for Imperial Defense's meetings, after 1902, dealt with Indian defense. More pessimistic members of the General Staff envisioned the massive Russian juggernaut lumbering across Afghanistan on its way to conquering India. As Russia's position continued to strengthen, the Indian government asked London for a reinforcement of 120,000 men. The cabinet, under the advice of Field-Marshall Lord Wolseley, refused the request. Such a reinforcement would drain troops from the home islands. The staggering costs of such a force, the political impossibility of conscription and public fear of a German invasion stymied efforts to reinforce India. Fears concerning India were likely unfounded. The wargames played by top planners tended to simplify Russian logistical problems in a possible assault on Afghanistan. Still, the problem of Indian defense demonstrated that Britain was unable to realistically defend its Empire on its own. In any event, Balfour remained committed to giving naval problems preference to army concerns.\(^{31}\)

By 1905, British concern with Russia in the Far East eased. In 1904, Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. To British delight, at the battle of Tsushima, Russia's navy was practically decimated. At this point, Balfour and the government moved to extend the Anglo-Japanese treaty to include the defense of India. Before concluding the agreement with Japan, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne informed the American President Theodore Roosevelt. Lansdowne's actions were almost a request for Washington's consent. The extreme courtesy toward the peripheral powers demonstrated the importance of appeasing them in British policy.\(^{32}\)

\(^{31}\)Friedberg, 229-246.
\(^{32}\)George Monger, *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900-1907* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1963, 182-185, 199-201.)
Russia's misfortune eased two of Britain's premier problems. With Russia effectively out of the naval arms race, Britain was free to concentrate on the increasingly ominous German naval buildup. In addition, defense of India was no longer a major concern. As with naval affairs, Britain traded appeasement with peripheral powers in exchange for relief for military problems.\textsuperscript{33}

Naval and military problems contributed to another major dilemma, that of national finance. The costs of Empire were astronomical. From 1880 to 1900, the British government's average annual expenditures went from 76.7 million pounds to 89.2 million pounds. In 1889, total gross expenditures were 87 million pounds. Ten years later, the figure was 117.7 million pounds. The amount of national income spent on civil and military programs rose 5\% in the first decade of the twentieth century. Granted, the increase in spending did not exceed the government's capacity for payment. But, the increases were close to ceiling in an era where deficit spending was not an option. The price for such a massive naval and military establishment, to protect the huge empire, concerned Sir Micheal Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor to the Exchequer. In 1901, Hicks-Beach made it a point to inform Lord Salisbury of a possible financial crisis resulting from the Boer War.\textsuperscript{34}

The conflict lasted over two years, much longer than expected. Keeping an army in the field at such a distance increased the British government's spending to unprecedented levels. As a result, the government raised taxes dramatically. As the crisis dragged on, the

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34}Friedberg, 89-91.
government debated over more tax increases. However, politically orthodoxy held further increases to be fool hardy.³⁵

Yet, the naval building increases of other powers compelled Britain to increase naval spending. Lord Salisbury’s government was faced with the challenge of finding a source of revenue that liberals could not label protectionism. At the 1897 colonial conference, Hicks-Beach suggested that the colonies help with naval expenditures. In 1902, Salisbury and Hicks-Beach both retired, leaving the financial dilemma to Balfour and his Chancellor Austin Chamberlain.³⁶

In 1902, at another colonial conference, Joseph Chamberlain lamented the financial weight of empire. In a speech the Colonial Secretary echoed Hicks-Beach, as he described Britain as "the weary titan [which] staggers under the too vast orb of its fate. We have borne the burden too many years. We think it is time our children should assist us to support it."³⁷

The Admiralty supported a heavier colonial contribution, but would not entertain the idea of sharing naval control with colonials. Consequently, colonials fought the proposal. In fact, the Canadians refused altogether, declaring their intention to build an independent navy. Other colonies, namely New Zealand and Australia, agreed to heavier concentration only if a squadron were stationed permanently in their region. In all, the government obtained barely half as much money as the Admiralty wanted.³⁸

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³⁵Ibid, 99-103.
³⁶Ibid, 105-116.
³⁸Friedberg, 116-117.
Charles Ritchie, president of the Board of Trade, suggested cutting army spending, rather than the vital naval expenditures. The new Chancellor of the Exchequer Austin Chamberlain acted on this idea. With the Boer War over and appeasement eliminating the need for many garrisons, the younger Chamberlain extracted considerable cuts from the army. Balfour’s government recognized that heavy military expenditures would seem abnormal with the South African war completed. Balfour was willing to make cuts in many civil and military programs, for he also recognized the importance British society placed on fiscal responsibility. Some of this responsibility (military cuts) was possible only through appeasement with the United States and Japan. The peripheral powers were given sway over areas the British could no longer afford to directly control.\(^39\)

As Britain entered the new century, the weight of empire proved too much. With patriotic fervor, however, Britons largely ignored their own decline. They could point to their position in absolute terms, rather than relative ones. Great Britain still possessed the largest empire known to history. Furthermore, Britain’s formal empire continued to grow. At the same time, ironically, Britain’s more valuable informal empire dwindled. None of Britain’s colonial acquisitions in the 1890’s were places where no interests had existed before. Formalizing empire meant trying to preserve existing interests. The result contributed to many other aspects of British decline.\(^40\)

The British Empire was a classic example of strategic overextension. Spread out over the globe, defense of such an empire was a nightmare for strategists. In addition, the costs in terms of treasure and manpower were nearly beyond what England could bear. As other powers expanded, Britain’s interests were inevitably threatened. As a result, the

\(^{39}\)Ibid, 121-134.
\(^{40}\)Porter, 56-59.
Empire, or at least parts of it, suffered from insecurity. Those attempting to advocate solutions to these problems were a small, but sometimes powerful minority. Aside from an end to isolation, the new imperialists failed to enact the major components of their program. Owing to traditional fears related with large standing armies, an imperial commonwealth and compulsory military service were simply too politically risky. More importantly, they could not prove the need for these programs. Britain's problems were not bad enough in raw terms to convince Britons of the need for such changes. Only the old policy of expansion was politically acceptable. Unfortunately, for Britain, this only increased the problems.

THE UNITED STATES AND EXPANSION, 1895-1905

For the United States the turn-of-the-century was a coming out period. In 1898, the American nation triumphed over a weary Spain. The main issue of contention was Spain's inability to deal with native insurrection in Cuba. The short conflict resulted in ascension to the family of colonial powers, acquiring the Philippines, Puerto Rico and some other former Spanish islands. Cuba, though escaping the fate of becoming a colony, was an American protectorate with the war's end. In the same year, Hawaii also became a part of the United States' formal empire.

On July 7, 1898, just three days after the United States Navy destroyed the Spanish Squadron under Admiral Cervera, John Hay, the American ambassador to London, wrote President William McKinley. Hay joyfully confided that "we have never in all our history had the standing in the world we have now ...."41 To Hay, a continually big player in

American policy, the British opinion was the world's opinion. In any event, the United States was a growing power to be dealt with by all nations.

Historians differ on the reasons for the United States' emergence on the world stage. Some contend that forces beyond American control cast this status upon the United States. Ernest R. May, for example, wrote that "some nations achieve greatness; the United States had greatness thrust upon it." This view implied that the American desire for expansion did not exist before 1898.

On the contrary, American policy makers had pursued an expansionist program throughout the nation's history. In 1784, for instance, the Continental Congress proceeded to administer "the western lands won in the revolution." After all, the British attempt to limit the spread of colonists beyond the Alleghenies was a cause of the war itself. Thomas Jefferson, among others, felt that continued westward expansion was essential to the new nation's success.

In 1823, President James Monroe proclaimed the preeminence of the United States in the western hemisphere. It would be some time, however, before the United States had enough military might to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. It is little wonder that late nineteenth century imperialist Henry Cabot Lodge compared American expansion in the 1890's to American aggrandizement after the Mexican War. Where expansion under Polk

carried the United States to the Pacific, imperialism under McKinley took the nation beyond the lines of contiguous territory. \(^{46}\) Nonetheless, as Frederick Jackson Turner stated, "American history has been in large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West." \(^{47}\)

Westward expansion aside, some important Americans desired an overseas move for the United States long before Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. Cuba, the point of contention in 1898, had interested American leaders generations earlier. John Quincy Adams asserted that Cuba would eventually become part of the United States. \(^{48}\) The Ostend Manifesto of 1854 was an attempt by southern slave interests to acquire Cuba. Of course, the benefits that the South would have gained at that time insured northern resistance. \(^{49}\)

On a grander scale, Lincoln’s Secretary of State William H. Seward saw the American Empire not only covering the continent, but extending its trade influence into the Far East. In fact, Seward dreamed of one great nation in North America which would be the seat of empire owing to its geographic position between Europe and the vast Asian market. \(^{50}\)

United States foreign policy was not limited to theory and grand dreams. According to Howard Zinn, "A State Department list ... shows 103 interventions in the affairs of other countries between 1798 and 1895." The list includes direct American

\(^{46}\)Dobson, 89.  
\(^{47}\)Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier In American History", \textit{A Documentary History of the United States} (New York: Mentor, 1956), 178. \(^{48}\)Dobson, 95.  
involvement in the affairs of, among others, Argentina, Nicaragua, Japan, Ryukyu, Bonin Islands, Uruguay, China, Angola and Hawaii. "Thus by the 1890's, there had been much experience in overseas probes and interventions."  

With the American past in mind, the words and actions of turn-of-the-century imperialists are not surprising. After all, Jefferson had considered acquiring Cuba. The only reason John Quincy Adams delayed annexation of the island was that he felt the time was not right. However, in 1898, Spain's troubles in Cuba convinced imperialists that then was the time to pick ripe fruit in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Besides, as Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge contended, "when the Nicaraguan canal is built, the island of Cuba ... will become a necessity."  

Clearly, scholars like May overlook the greater part of American diplomatic history. American acquisition of territory and intervention in the affairs of others was by no means a new policy. Likewise, intervention was a standard tool of American foreign policy. Presidents since U. S. Grant had threatened intervention in Cuba if Spain were unable to maintain sufficient order for American interests. Yet, the American past was merely one of the forces driving the United States to overseas expansion in the 1890's.

Economic considerations played a part in expansionist policy. Many Americans believed in the glut theory, which hoped that foreign markets could solve economic

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One must take into account the tendency of New Left historians like Zinn and William Appleman Williams to seek out evidence with which to vilify American expansion.  

53 Henry Cabot Lodge, quoted in Zinn, 291.

problems. According to this theory, foreign markets could siphon off excess production and provide cheap sources of raw materials. Therefore, it is not surprising that the depression of 1893 sparked considerable imperialist rhetoric. The 1893 depression, according to historian Walter LaFeber, created a consensus among business and political leaders "that foreign markets were necessary for the prosperity and tranquility of the United States."\(^{55}\)

For the rest of the 1890's, the United States experienced two serious fiscal problems. First, an excessive amount of gold left the country. Second, the nation's economy was flooded by European securities. Consequently, the Treasury Department agreed with business leaders that acquiring foreign markets for disposal of domestic excess production would allow full productivity and employment. At this point, the hope of overseas markets restoring domestic fiscal health became the official position.\(^{57}\) Indiana Senator Albert Beveridge articulated this position. In 1897, Beveridge stated that "American factories are making more than the American people can use ... Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours."\(^{58}\)

The 1890's was also a time of great social tension. Labor unrest was pervasive. Debtors were clamoring for the free coinage of silver. The culmination of this movement for economic change was the formation of the populist party. In 1896, William Jennings Bryan led the Democratic party by stealing the populists' thunder. Armed with the silver issue, Bryan forwarded the interests of southern and western farmers against the eastern

\(^{55}\)Dobson, 89.
\(^{56}\)LaFeber, 150.
\(^{57}\)Ibid, 176.
\(^{58}\)Albert Beveridge, quoted in Zinn, 292.
economic elite. Members of that elite, like Theodore Roosevelt, saw in Bryan fiery speeches "the tumbrils that had carried the victims of the French Revolution to the guillotine." Business leaders turned to foreign markets to restore prosperity and order. But, they also feared the results if that solution failed. In any event, with William McKinley's election, imperialists attained positions of influence.

Strategic considerations were also factors in America's effort to take the world stage. The chief articulator of American strategic needs was naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan's classic work *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* received acclaim around the world, especially in Britain. One American admiral declared that Mahan was to naval theory what Jomini had been to land power.

Mahan emphasized a strong navy capable of defeating an enemy at sea. A big two ocean navy and an isthmian canal would help secure the foreign markets so many Americans wanted. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge wanted it. He became the primary Mahanist on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Complete with naval maps and charts, Lodge argued passionately for naval expansion and an isthmian canal. American leaders agreed. In accordance with Mahan's theories, Congress appropriated the funds to build the new armor plated navy that soon proved so useful in war with Spain. The exuberant Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, wrote in 1897: "We need

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61 LaFeber, 184. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, became the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
63 Tuchman, 151.
64 Ibid, 155-156.
a large navy . . . A full proportion of powerful battleships able to meet those of any other nation . . . It is not economy it is niggardly and foolish shortsightedness to cramp our naval expenditures.\textsuperscript{65}

Mahan and the expansionists looked to gain coaling stations that would serve as stepping stones to foreign markets.\textsuperscript{66} In order to derive economic benefits from market expansion, investors had to be assured of protection. This required military, more specifically naval, power. Thus there was a need for stability in areas providing possible sites for American investment. Then, as one historian suggested, "once their [American investors] roots had sunk somewhere abroad they would require their government's uninterrupted support."\textsuperscript{67} Much of that support would have to come from naval power. But, many Americans did not see expansion in such interests orientated terms.

A sense of humanitarian mission provoked the urge to expand in many American hearts. After an emotional and ideological recovery from the Civil War era, late nineteenth century American religious and secular leaders advocated reform in both domestic and foreign policy. As William Appleman Williams put it, "the revived urge to save and reform, if not transform, the world appeared among businessmen, church people, politicians, intellectuals, and even naval officers. Reform at home justified empire abroad."\textsuperscript{68} This theme in foreign policy had a twofold nature.

First, humanitarian minded expansionists, much like British imperialists, espoused the spread of their own justice and political institutions. Such exponents of this theme felt

\textsuperscript{65}Theodore Roosevelt quoted in Miller 253.
\textsuperscript{66}LaFeber 90-91.
\textsuperscript{68}William Appleman Williams, \textit{Empire as a Way of Life} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 119.
that the American commitment to idealism and representative government would produce a morally superior form of empire. In essence, like their British counterparts, American imperialists hoped to civilize the uncivilized people's of the world. During the Spanish-American War, one Atlantic Monthly article contended that American imperialism would not be tyranny because American institutions insured eventual self-government for the colonized. As a result, after the war, dominion over people could be justified on the grounds that the United States intended at some point to grant self-government. Ironically, one argument made by anti-imperialists was that the United States should avoid including other races in the polity.69

Christianization was a second aspect of this humanitarian impulse. Prominent author and clergyman Josiah Strong predicted that the Anglo-Saxon race, owing to its possession of Protestant Christianity, would within a hundred years have Anglo-Saxonized the world.70 Strong stressed a connection between missions and markets: "the world is to be Christianized and civilized . . . commerce follows the missionary."71 John R. Mott, another advocate of evangelistic empire, described the United States as "a Christian nation which is at the same time a great lighthouse and a base of operations for enterprise of universal evangelization."72 Clearly, these evangelistic imperialists could never view Spanish Catholicism as true Christianity. Especially with Strong, the mission to evangelize the world combined with feelings of racial superiority to become a "very real and present and powerful element of the developing imperial way of life."73

69 Dobson, 92-93.
70 Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964), 279.
71 Josiah Strong, quoted in Lafeber, 78.
72 John R. Mott, quoted in Pratt, 282.
73 Williams, 29.
President McKinley appealed to evangelical imperialists when, after the defeat of Spain, he told a Methodist delegation that God had given him the answer concerning the annexation of the Philippines. After a night of prayer and anguish, McKinley felt led by God "to take them all [Philippine Islands], and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them." 74 Economics, strategy and Christ's great commission moved Americans to consider a larger place on the world stage.

Still, policy makers needed to take into account the aspirations of the other great and regional powers. In fact, American imperialism was the result of the above factors and the international situation. In acquiescing to the imperialistic impulse, the United States was simply following the pattern of nearly all European countries. In the late nineteenth century, the European powers were swept up in a frenzy of expansion. The American nation, in so many ways European, became a part of that aggrandizing impulse. 75 The Victorian earth, was as one scholar put it, a "world of empires." 76 Clearly, the late nineteenth century was a time of unprecedented imperial activity. The globe was being divided among the great European powers. They partitioned Africa and carved spheres of influence in Asia. L. S. Stavrianos described it. "The greatest land grab in human history ended with the spectacle of one Eurasian peninsula dominating the rest of the world." 77 This surge of expansion frightened American policy makers. As Europe cast lustful eyes upon Latin America, imperialists became increasingly concerned. The weakness of Latin American nations combined with massive European investment and British diplomatic

74 William McKinley, quoted in Millis, 384.
75 Dobson, 13.
76 Healy, 9.
influence to raise "the specter of a colonial scramble in the New World to parallel that in the old." 78

Great Britain especially alarmed American policy makers with its naval might and numerous Caribbean possessions. The fact that England itself was so far from the western hemisphere in the steam age hardly reduced their potential threat to the Monroe Doctrine sphere of influence. 79 In 1895, Britain challenged Washington by intervening militarily in Nicaragua to collect an indemnity. Of more importance, as will be discussed later, Britain came close to war with the Cleveland administration over a boundary dispute in Venezuela. Although Secretary of State Richard Olney's invocation of the Monroe Doctrine was unimpressive to Lord Salisbury, the firm stand by the administration garnered support from imperialists and increased American prestige abroad. 80 But American relations with Britain improved when Germany made overtures to American interests. Salisbury, consequently, found himself accommodating the United States at the expense of British Guyana. 81 Increased German activity in the Pacific also inclined British leaders to concede to American demands. In Washington, however, German encroachment in Asia was seen as a threat to a resulting partnership known in British-American relations as the Open Door. 82

With the fall of Bismarck in 1890, Imperial Germany was set on a more aggressive course. Kaiser William II announced that Germany "had great tasks to accomplish outside of old Europe." 83 In the years before the Spanish-American War, Germany, with Russian

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78Healy, 22.
80Dobson, 77-85.
82LaFeber, 320-323.
83Kaiser William II, quoted in Kennedy, Great Powers, 211.
help, attempted to expand its Asian foothold at the expense of Britain, Japan and the United States.\textsuperscript{84} In 1898, when Admiral Dewey defeated the Spanish at Manila Bay, a full squadron of German ships moved into the Philippines. The British and the French also had a presence in the islands. But, the Kaiser made it clear to Berlin's ambassador in Washington that any German opportunity to seize maritime territory would not be ignored. Therefore, both God's will and German aspirations guided McKinley when he decided to annex the Philippines. The subsequent struggle to make that annexation good was set against the backdrop that, if the United States could not hold the islands, someone else would.\textsuperscript{85}

The United States also had to reckon with Japan in the Pacific and Latin America. Japan was the only non-western nation able to escape the exploited status brought on almost all non-western people by European imperialism. With the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the balance of power in the Pacific favored Japan.\textsuperscript{86} Japan's victory caused the European powers to take "drastic steps to check the claims Japan made on China."\textsuperscript{87} Japan threatened the American canal project by displaying unsettling interest in Hawaii, long an American protectorate.\textsuperscript{88}

Other foreign powers made imperial advances in Latin America and, especially, in the Far East. However, Britain, Germany and Japan concerned American expansionists the most. Foreign expansion created, as one historian stated, a "growing advocacy of a sort of prescriptive imperialism, a conviction that the United States should seize desirable areas

\textsuperscript{84}LaFeber, 284.
\textsuperscript{85}Millis, 330-332, 384.
\textsuperscript{86}LaFeber, 284.
\textsuperscript{87}Ibid, 308.
\textsuperscript{88}Ibid, 141.
before a rival power got them." Prescriptive imperialism applied most easily to Hawaii. But, this argument was a part of every discussion in the United States about the acquisition of new territory.\textsuperscript{89} For example, another reason McKinley, after his night of prayer, gave the Methodist for annexation of the Philippines was the certainty that foreign rivals wanted the islands. By annexing the Philippines, the United States could put its foot into the Open Door. To allow another power to gain control of the islands would have been, in McKinley’s words, "bad business and discreditable."\textsuperscript{90}

Concern for foreign expansion affected the economic aspect of expansionist thought. Widespread support for market expansion failed to solve the problem of how to achieve this goal. Anti-expansionists pointed out that American business interests were able to benefit already from the free markets in the Pacific and Latin America. However, there was no way to guarantee the continued free status of those markets. After all, the great powers were in a feeding frenzy when it came to colonies. Little could stop them from seizing free markets and sealing them off from American interests. This possibility, made clear to expansionists the need for American colonies.\textsuperscript{91}

More obvious was the effect of foreign action on strategic interests. The big navy that Mahan advocated was supposed to secure American interests through battle or maneuvering. An isthmian canal, to enhance American naval might, was the primary strategic objective for big navy advocates. The canal would make it imperative for America to control the Caribbean and much needed Pacific coaling stations like Hawaii. If

\textsuperscript{89}Healy, 28. 
\textsuperscript{90}William McKinley, quoted in Millis, 384. 
\textsuperscript{91}Dobson, 89.
another power could threaten the canal passageway, its strategic and economic benefits would remain precarious.\textsuperscript{92}

International competition was part of even the humanitarian mission theme. The European powers and Japan were almost all monarchies of some form or another. Consequently, most of them lacked the benevolent representative institutions of which Americans were so proud. In addition, several foreign powers were Catholic, for instance, Spain and France. Evangelical expansionists longed to open up colonial areas to Protestantism. The Japanese, on the other hand, did not practice any form of Christianity. Missionary-minded Americans felt that abandoning misguided souls to Japanese rule would have eternal consequences.\textsuperscript{93}

In any event, as the United States was on the verge of expansion at Spain's expense, it had numerous advantages over other nations. Paul Kennedy listed some of these advantages in his landmark work \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers}:

\begin{quote}
With the Civil War over, the United States was able to exploit the many advantages . . . rich agricultural land, vast raw materials, and the marvelously convenient evolution of modern technology . . . the lack of social and geographic constraints; the absence of significant foreign dangers; the flow of foreign and, increasingly, domestic capital - to transform itself at a stunning pace. Indeed, given the advantages listed above, there was a virtual inevitability to the whole process.\textsuperscript{94}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{92}LaFeber, 147.
\textsuperscript{93}Healy, 136-137.
\textsuperscript{94}Kennedy, \textit{Great Powers}, 242.
With these capabilities, the United States was ready for the world stage. This move and the American imperialistic impulse reached its zenith in the Spanish-American War and its aftermath.

The 1898 war with Spain, was largely the result of Spanish inability to maintain civil order in Cuba. The press stirred public opinion, in the years before the war, with horrific accounts of Spanish atrocities. More important in Washington, however, was the fact that the Cuban revolt had cost American investors one hundred million dollars per year in direct business lost and a considerable amount in destroyed property.\footnote{LaFeber, 387-388.} There was also a strategic need to stabilize an area so close to the American coast and the proposed canal zone.\footnote{Zinn, 291.} These factors, of course, could not be ignored. McKinley, although touched by the plight of the Cuban people, realized the need to stabilize Cuba for American economic and strategic interests. Like Cleveland before him, McKinley's policy was to bring an end to the conflict between the Spanish colonists and Cuban insurgents.\footnote{Dobson, 103.} Yet, McKinley hoped to stop short of war in accomplishing this goal.

In August 1897, the new liberal Spanish government instituted autonomy with a set of reforms. American Ambassador Stewart Woodford assured Madrid that they would prevent American intervention "if the autonomy . . . should be such as would give the Cubans actual and honest self rule in local affairs."\footnote{Stewart Woodford, United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898), 511.} But American Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee in Havana informed Washington that with insurgents still demanding independence and loyalists unwilling to share power the autonomy reforms were doomed.
With violent riots in Havana, the DeLome letter scandal and the mysterious destruction of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor, finally convinced McKinley that Lee was right. These events moved McKinley to demand total independence for Cuba. The Spanish government, unable to meet these demands owing to fear of revolution in Spain, continued to insist that autonomy was workable right up to the outbreak of war.  

The war itself was of short duration and minimal casualties. The victorious United States had to decide what to do with Cuba and the Philippines. The Teller Amendment, passed before the war, excluded outright colonization of Cuba. The peace treaty, ratified in early 1899, forced Spain to give up all claims of sovereignty over Cuba. It also provided for an indefinite period of American occupation. In 1901, the Platt Amendment authorized, in L. S. Stavrianos' words, "United States military intervention under almost any circumstances, virtual United States control of Cuban diplomatic and fiscal matters and establishment of a major naval base at Guantanamo." Thus, the Cuban constitutional convention was forced by the United States to accept American domination.

The acquisition of the Philippines launched American politics into a imperialist versus anti-imperialist debate. The McKinley administration supported making a colony of the islands. The Great powers also played a role in the Philippine matter. Britain and Japan strongly supported American annexation in order to prevent Germany or Russia from extending their power in the Pacific. The United States was the only nation capable of taking over the Philippines without significantly shifting the balance of power in Asia.

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99 Morgan, 49.
101 Stavrianos, 383.
102 Pratt, 333.
Imperialists won the American debate over foreign policy. In 1898, the United States annexed Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Yet, the American nation, as with expansion across the North America, would have to conquer the Philippines from the native inhabitants. The guerrilla war lasted nearly four years, well into Theodore Roosevelt's first administration. With Lodge's help in the Senate, Roosevelt pursued a policy of expansion in the Philippines and one of assertion of American authority in Latin America. Consequently, Roosevelt was the first American president to be seen by the other powers as a world leader.

By 1905, the North American nation had proven that it was capable of considerable military effort in a short period of time. With a formidable navy, American policy makers pursued political and commercial interests in both hemispheres. The United States, with colonies in the Caribbean and Pacific, was acting like a great world power in nearly every respect. Although a great power, the United States seemed outside of the great power system. Geographical isolation and the nature of its polity kept the American nation out of the endless mass of alliances that characterized European diplomacy. Yet, the United States had considerable power. For other nations, the potential of this industrial giant must have seemed limitless. Under Roosevelt's leadership, the United States was poised to assert itself in the twentieth century.

ANGLO-AMERICAN CONNECTIONS

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103 Zinn, 305.  
104 Wiebe, 242-243.  
105 Dobson, 122.  
106 Kennedy, Great Powers, 248.
In recent years international historians, beginning with Akira Iriye, have attempted to identify the cultural elements behind expressions of national power. This line of thought sees nations as cultures, not just powers with political, economic and military interests. Cultural connections between the United States and Great Britain were and are many. Some are quite obvious, such as the English language. Common language can be an invaluable connection when two nations are attempting to negotiate difficult issues. In their book, *An Ocean Apart*, David Dimbleby and David Reynolds wrote that "America had more in common with Britain than with the countries of continental Europe, similarities that were to help the two countries build a closer, more equal relationship as the twentieth century dawned and that laid the basis for their cooperation in two world wars." Dimbleby and Reynolds went on to cite ideological links: preferences for individual liberty, private property and common law. The American Empire was certainly based on the British Empire. Mahan and the navalists obviously saw Britain as their model. As mentioned earlier, both societies used common justifications for their empires. Out of all their common justifications Anglo-Saxonism was probably the deepest connection.

Theodore Roosevelt certainly embraced Anglo-Saxonism, according to which only English speaking peoples experienced a common history. The expansion of the Anglo-Saxon race, for Roosevelt, was a subject of pride. Roosevelt wrote, "There have been many races that at one time or another had their great periods of race expansion - as

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109 Ibid, 30, 38.
distinguished from mere conquest, - but there has never been another whose expansion has been either so broad or so rapid."\textsuperscript{110}

Nor, were these feelings limited to the American side of the Atlantic Ocean. Joseph Chamberlain, an advocate of Anglo-Saxon union, refused to "speak or think of the United States as a foreign nation. They are our flesh and blood . . . Our past is theirs. Their future is ours. . . . Their forefathers sleep in our churchyards."\textsuperscript{111}

Britain's influence on America was in the area of empire building. The United States, on the other hand, influenced British popular culture in numerous ways. The foods Britons ate, the fashions they wore, fads like the soda fountain, all of these were part of America's influence.\textsuperscript{112} Yet, the most significant exchange took place between the two nations' elite groups.

The British aristocracy enjoyed considerable social status. By the late nineteenth century, however, many of these families were in financial difficulties. America's new plutocracy possessed tremendous wealth but lacked comparable social status. For both groups, dynastic marriages seemed beneficial. By 1903, more than seventy American heiresses were married to British nobility. At the start of World War I, the number was up to at least 130.\textsuperscript{113} One of the more famous unions was Consuela Vanderbilt and the 6th Duke of Marlborough. Vanderbilt's family apparently forced her to marry the Englishman for the title. Their unhappy marriage ended in divorce. Other more successful

\textsuperscript{111}Joseph Chamberlain, quoted in Massie, 239.
\textsuperscript{113}Ibid, 347.
Anglo-American marriages included Joseph and Mary Chamberlain and Winston Churchill's parents.\textsuperscript{114}

Although wealthy American families married their daughters to other European nobilities, the British peerage was the preferred stock of son in laws. In the United States, public opinion was critical of such dynastic marriages.\textsuperscript{115} In Britain the view was similar. A critical poem of the time stated that "envy of our unrivaled race, may prompt the Alien's vulgar sneer. It is her fortune, not her face that captivates the British peer."\textsuperscript{116} For many on both sides of the Atlantic, the fad went too far. For example, personal ads placed by wealthy American families offered to richly compensate those willing to introduce heiresses into English society. For the British, it amounted to a social invasion that refinanced the British peerage, enabling them to live well.\textsuperscript{117}

It is difficult for one to identify where these marriages influenced specific policy decisions. Yet, the implications for foreign policy were plain. America's wealthy elite certainly influenced the actions of statesmen. Bankers like J. P. Morgan were the individuals behind economic expansion. They invested in transportation, mining, manufacturing and even governments. Washington was unable to ignore their wishes.\textsuperscript{118} As they drew close to Britain, logically, the United States must as well.

Still, these connections should not be overstated. Theodore Roosevelt and John Hay certainly felt racially akin to the British. But, at the same time, they always made

\textsuperscript{114}Dimpleby and Reynolds, 45-46.
\textsuperscript{116}Quoted in Heindel, 346.
\textsuperscript{117}Ibid, 346-348.
\textsuperscript{118}Wiebe, 231.
goodwill toward Britain conditional. American interests and power were foremost in their hearts and minds.\textsuperscript{119}

As we shall see, the United States was not just the beneficiary of British decline. The American triumph in the Venezuelan dispute, the canal issue and the Alaskan boundary had as much to do with American strength as British weakness. Weakness was a necessary component. But it is by no means sufficient to explain the advantages the United States gained from Britain.

\textsuperscript{119}Dimbleby and Reynolds, 47-48.
CHAPTER TWO
The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty: Latin American Supremacy

On December 26, 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt signed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. This Anglo-American agreement abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, which had required joint control of a possible inter-oceanic canal in Nicaragua. The new treaty gave the united States "all the rights incident to such construction, and the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal." In exchange, the United States was obligated to maintain the neutrality and free access of all nations to a possible canal.\(^1\) Five days later, Roosevelt wrote his British friend Arthur Lee to proclaim the mutual benefit for both nations in the treaty. "I must say how pleased I was by the ratification of the treaty. Really I think it is as much to your interest as to ours."\(^2\)

Despite Roosevelt’s warm statement, the treaty heavily favored the United States. In essence, Britain had granted the United States dominance in the Western Hemisphere. The proposed canal would enhance the power of the United States Navy. With the

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This source will hereafter be referred to as Correspondence.

growing power of Imperial Germany, Britain needed friends. Yet, the growth of American power made it difficult for Britain to avoid making concessions. In the canal matter, the threat of American unilateral abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty limited British resistance to American demands. This threat was effective primarily for two reasons.

First, Britain was involved in other areas of the world, most notably in South Africa. Britain was in the midst of the Boer war, a conflict which proved unpopular with the British people and led to reverses that internationally embarrassed the government of Lord Salisbury.

Second, although Great Britain possessed the world’s largest navy, it was spread out over the globe. Therefore, Britain was stronger in theory than in reality. The vast majority of the German high seas fleet was stationed in the North Sea, a threat to the United Kingdom and its home fleet. Although, in the West Indies and the Pacific, Britain had considerable naval presence, the navies of both the United States and Japan were stronger regionally. If the United States unilaterally abrogated the old treaty, Britain would lose prestige. Consequently, British policy makers strained to avoid the display of British weakness. On the other hand, Washington willingly used the threat of unilateral action to gain a favorable treaty.

The United States first challenged the British Empire in the Latin America during the Venezuelan boundary dispute. For years in the late nineteenth century, the Venezuelan government attempted to persuade the United States to urge arbitration on Great Britain.

5 Massie, xxiv-xxv, 462.
The dispute itself dated back to 1814. Once gold was discovered in the basin of the Orinoco river, the British sought to expand the border of British Guyana. In 1895, the issue came to a head.

President Cleveland understood that the dispute was at a critical point. Ready to intervene, the United States issued a challenge. In July of 1895, Secretary of State Olney sent a dramatic note. In this dispatch, Olney cited the Monroe Doctrine as a basis for American arbitration of the dispute. However, Olney failed to convince Prime Minister Lord Salisbury concerning the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the Venezuelan controversy.

Waiting four months to reply, Lord Salisbury firmly rejected Olney’s use of the Monroe Doctrine. Salisbury wrote, "as far as I am aware, this doctrine has never been before advanced on behalf of the United States in any written communication addressed to the Government of another nation." Only in America, asserted Salisbury, did the Monroe Doctrine have any credibility. The dispute itself appeared to the Prime Minister as a "controversy with which the United States have no apparent practical concern." From London’s viewpoint, the dispute was between two American powers, not a European and an American power.

Salisbury’s stern response provoked a war scare. Cleveland conceded that force was not an impossibility. If Britain attempted to force their view on Venezuela, it would "be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power as a willful

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6United States Department of State, Correspondence in Relation to the Boundary Controversy Between Great Britain and Venezuela (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), 1-23.
7Mr. Olney to Mr. Bayard, July 20, 1895, Foreign Relations 1895, 545-562.
8Lord Salisbury to Sir Julian Pauncefote, Nov. 26, 1895, Foreign Relations 1895, 563-567.
aggression upon its rights and interests the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or
the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which . . . belongs to
Venezuela." For Cleveland, by no means an expansionist, to back down was unacceptable.
"There is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a
supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self respect
and honor beneath which are shielded and defended a people's safety and greatnes."9

The firm stand of the Cleveland administration garnered the anti-imperialist
President the support of imperialists. American prestige also increased in the eyes of other
powers, especially Germany. Britain was certainly a threat to American aspirations in the
Caribbean.10

In the Venezuelan issue, Britain was unable to remain firm. Salisbury soon found
it necessary to reverse his position. The German Emperor William II offered his support to
American interests. The possibility of a German-American entente disturbed Salisbury,
and Britain ultimately accommodated the United States at British Guyana's expense.11

The war with Spain in 1898 further solidified the American position in Latin
America. It also drew attention to the advantages of an isthmian canal. Navalists like
Mahan had long advocated a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Prominent
expansionists Henry Cabot Lodge saw Cuba as strategically important to a future canal.12

After war, canal advocates pointed to the fact that the U.S.S. Oregon's long voyage
around Cape Horn had nearly kept the ship out of the fighting.13 In any event the time

9Grover Cleveland, Dec. 17, 1895, Foreign Relations 1895, 545.
10Healy, 22.; Dobson, 77-85.
11Jonas, 54-55.
12Zinn, 53.
13Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915 (New
was right for action. Expansionists feared the success of a rival French canal plan. At the same time, American leaders resented the Clayton-Bulwer treaty restrictions. The Spanish-American War proved to navalists that American naval might was divided between the two oceans. For optimum naval power, this situation had to be changed. The only way to move forward with a canal without exciting controversy with Britain was to supersede the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850.\textsuperscript{14} The Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901 accomplished this goal.

The Hay-Pauncefote treaty predated the Roosevelt administration. In December 1898, President William McKinley, in his state of the union address, urged Congress to pass a bill for the construction of an inter-oceanic canal.\textsuperscript{15} The threat of unilateral action in defiance of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty deeply disturbed British policy makers. Consequently, the British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury instructed Sir Julian Pauncefote, ambassador to the United States, to determine Washington's position. Pauncefote obtained assurances from Secretary of State John Hay that the McKinley administration had no intention of unilaterally abrogating the 1850 treaty. Both parties acknowledged, however, the need to negotiate a new isthmian treaty.\textsuperscript{16} Still, the possibility that the United States might proceed without regard to the old agreement affected British actions.

Hay began the negotiation process. In a dispatch dated December 7, 1898, Hay instructed the American charge d'affaires Henry White to call on Lord Salisbury. Hay urged White to ascertain Salisbury's feelings toward a new treaty and determine if the


\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Foreign Relations 1898}, xxi-xxii.

Prime Minister would be willing to conduct negotiations through Pauncefote. White wired the State Department two weeks later. "Prospects of agreement promising. Principal secretary of state for foreign affairs favorably impressed ... He willingly assented to negotiations being conducted through you and Pauncefote." The cooperation continued. By January 11, 1899, the first draft of a new treaty was completed. This document gave the United States the right to construct and manage an inter-oceanic canal. But, it also preserved "the 'general principle' of neutralization established in Article VIII of the Clayton Bulwer Convention." The rules of neutrality called for the canal being open in both war and peace. Also, the treaty banned fortifications. Article III stated that after both parties exchanged ratifications, they were to "bring it to the notice of the other Powers and invite them to adhere to it." At this point, negotiations came to a halt because British leaders hoped to acquire concessions in another matter.

In 1898, Pauncefote devised a Joint High Commission to settle major disputes between Britain and the United States. The commission's main task was negotiating a sensitive dispute over the Alaskan boundary. By the end of 1898, talks with Lord Herschell and the British panel had made little progress toward an agreement. Meanwhile, the canal treaty lingered in the British Foreign Office. White, under instruction from Hay, pressed Salisbury for a possible time of response on the treaty. Salisbury's reply was cool. The Prime Minister wrote "that he could not help contrasting the precarious prospects and

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17 Correspondence, 1-2.
18 Mr. White to Mr. Hay, Dec. 21, 1898, Correspondence, 2.
One should note that Lord Salisbury, at this time, was both Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign affairs.
19 "First Hay-Pauncefote Treaty", Correspondence, 289-91.
slowness of the negotiations which were being conducted by Lord Herschell with the rapidity proposed in the matter of the Convention."\(^{20}\) Salisbury explained to Pauncefote that the cabinet "felt that the force of the U.S. navy would in war be doubled by the project."\(^{21}\) Salisbury had consulted the military before arriving at his view concerning the canal treaty. One strategist, Sir John Ardagh, Director of Military Intelligence, argued that American control of a canal would be a major strategic problem.\(^{22}\) Ardagh advised that the canal being built under any circumstances was contrary to British interests. The cabinet agreed. But, both Adragh and the Cabinet realized that the canal was most likely an inevitability.\(^{23}\) Relations between the United States and Britain were not so warm as to eliminate any possibility of future military conflict. As news of the Boer war filled American papers, the Irish and other anti-English groups applauded Boer resistance. More importantly, on February 10, 1900, the United States Senate passed a resolution expressing sympathy for the Boers and urging mediation on the part of the United States.\(^{24}\)

Concerning the boundary issue, Pauncefote warned his government that the United States would never allow London to connect the canal issue to the Alaskan dispute.\(^{25}\) Hay, in fact, was outraged at the British attempts to gain concessions in Alaska. "I think it deplorable that the British Government insists on making the arrangement in the Clayton-Bulwer matter depend on the successful issue of the Canadian negotiations." For Hay, the

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\(^{20}\)Quoted in Mowat, 274.
\(^{23}\) Bourne, 347.
\(^{25}\)Mowat, 274.
two questions were unrelated. The Secretary of State deemed it impossible that any "intelligent" Englishman did not realize the mutual benefit of abrogating Clayton-Bulwer. In his view, Britain obtained access to a canal without the costs of building or protecting it.\textsuperscript{26}

More than a year passed as London declined to approve the convention. No British policy maker except Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain continued to believe that the Americans would make concessions in Alaska in exchange for diplomatic freedom to construct an isthmian canal. On January 18, 1900, a congressman introduced a bill in Congress to build a canal, ignoring the restrictions of the 1850 treaty. The next day, Pauncefote warned Salisbury that the United States would likely proceed with canal construction without London's approval. Hay contended that a British attempt to prevent American unilateral action would shatter relations, possibly leading to war. With embarrassing troubles in the Boer War and Imperial Germany's growing power, Britain could ill afford a rupture with the United States. If Salisbury's government refused to compromise, it would mean a choice between war or allowing the United States to openly repudiate British rights. Salisbury realized that war would mean weakening British naval presence elsewhere with no assurance of victory. As a result London stepped back from the brink. On February 5, 1900, London finally instructed Pauncefote to sign the convention.\textsuperscript{27} But, as it turned out, the treaty's critics were not all in London.

Hay had for some time been irritated by the Senate's right to ratify treaties. Constitutionally, he felt that the Senate's power concerning treaties was a mistake. In


\textsuperscript{27}Perkins, 176-77.
addition, he resented the pressure to "find offices for friends of Senators when there are none." As senators initially looked at the treaty, opinions were not unanimously favorable. Senator Morgan of Alabama agreed with many naval officers concerning the undesirability of a neutral canal. Senator Elkins of West Virginia opposed building a neutral canal at American expense. For Elkins, such a canal was too generous an action for the United States. Other senators felt that since Britain had secured the Suez canal since 1850, they no longer had any rights to Latin American canal. Thus, in this view, only Nicaragua and Costa Rica needed to be dealt with to any degree. The American nation appeared determined to possess a canal across the Latin American isthmus. As debate among Senators intensified, Hay advised that the matter be delayed for further consideration. Apparently, Hay felt that once the treaty was carefully examined the Senate would see its wisdom. Prominent Senators agreed to the delay to give the press and the government time to evaluate the treaty.

Meanwhile, the United States moved forward with canal plans. An Isthmian Canal Commission was sent by the Federal government to examine the best route for a possible isthmian canal. On April 13, 1900, in Trenton, New Jersey, the Interocceanic Canal Company was incorporated with an authorized capital of $100,000,000.

In the fall of 1900, the United States Senate considered the canal treaty. The convention's failure to fully abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer agreement appalled imperialists like Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Consequently, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

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assaulted the provision requiring the neutrality of the canal in peace and war. To the expansionist-minded, this restriction negated a prime objective of inter-oceanic canal, strategic security. Likewise, with the clause forbidding fortifications, the convention granted the United States the right to build a canal that was not defendable. Imperialists also opposed Article III, which invited other nations to participate in the agreement. This invitation, senatorial opponents asserted, undermined the Monroe Doctrine.\textsuperscript{32}

For the British the rift between the State Department and the Senate was a shock. Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since November 1900, expressed deep concern over the Senate's actions. Although he urged that cool heads prevail, Lansdowne informed Pauncfote that the cabinet desired to resist attempts to fully abrogate the 1850 convention. Lansdowne also requested that Pauncfote put off retirement, stay in Washington and help bring the canal issue to a close.\textsuperscript{33} For Pauncfote "the bitter contest . . . over the Nicaraguan Canal Treaty has been a surprise . . . The language held by certain Senators reveals . . . a complete disregard of the obligatory force of treaties."\textsuperscript{34}

In the meantime, the Isthmian Canal Commission reported to the President its approval of a Nicaraguan route for a canal. The Commission estimated the cost at

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This collection comprises fifteen reels of microfilm. The Foreign Office reference number \textit{F.O. 800} refers to the entire collection. \textit{F.O. 800/116} is the reference for those reels containing Lord Lansdowne's personal papers. \textit{F.O. 800/144} is the reference for Foreign Office correspondence in the collection dealing with the United States. These reference codes will hereafter be used to identify this collection.

\textsuperscript{34} Lord Pauncfote to Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 18, 1900, quoted in Mowat, 283.
$200,540,000 at a ten year period of construction. McKinley approved the estimate and released the study's results to Congress. Immediately clamor for a canal bill that moved ahead without regard to the Clayton Bulwer treaty arose in Congress. The British press asserted that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was the reasonable limit to British compromise. Interested parties in both nations awaited the British cabinet's reaction to the Senate's version of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.\textsuperscript{35}

In the end, the Senate amended the treaty before ratifying it. The Senate version passed on a vote of fifty-five to eighteen. Not even a lesser power, much less Great Britain, could accept it without losing much prestige.\textsuperscript{36} The Senate placed a clause in Article II that removed the teeth from the neutrality restrictions. "It is agreed, however, that, none of the immediately foregoing conditions and stipulations . . . of this article shall apply to measures which the United States may find . . . for securing by its own forces the defense of the United States and the maintenance of public order." In addition, the Senate struck out Article III, which invited other powers to take part in the convention.\textsuperscript{37} In these revisions Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had been instrumental.\textsuperscript{38} An outraged Hay realized that the new conditions would be unacceptable to London. As a matter of protest, Hay tendered his resignation. McKinley refused to accept the resignation and somehow persuaded Hay to remain.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{36}Collin, 169-70.
\textsuperscript{37}"First Hay-Pauncefote Treaty", \textit{Correspondence}, 291.
\textsuperscript{39}\textit{Foreign Relations 1900}, 243.
In Britain, the British press and many government expressed the opinion that the United States might move forward with a canal regardless of British rights. One British official told the press that the United States would probably pass a canal bill "even if the treaty fails."40

Pauncefote informed his government that the canal issue was the one problem between the two nations of a "serious character". The ambassador hoped that the excitement in the Senate and nation would die down. For the time being, he advised Lansdowne and the cabinet to delay in reacting to the amended treaty. The delay would provide time for the "hot heads" in the Senate to cool down. Pauncefote felt that most senators would prefer to wait for a reply before unilaterally abrogating Clayton-Bulwer. It was clearly the administration's position to work something out with Britain. Still, he warned that "there is always the danger that he [President McKinley] would give way to popular clamor for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty."41

Pauncefote, in fact, hoped the canal would never be built. He informed Lansdowne of his opinion that the "political hooligans in Congress" would probably attempt to dispose of Clayton-Bulwer themselves if no agreement could be reached. Meanwhile, Pauncefote sought solutions from Nicaragua. "The Nicaraguan Minister assures me that his government will stand firm & refuse to permit the canal to be built except on the conditions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. If so that will simplify matters."


This British official's quote was reprinted from an article in the Daily Chronicle (London).
41Lord Pauncefote to Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 21, 1900, F.O. 800/144, 17-18.
42Lord Pauncefote to Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 25, 1900, F.O. 800/144, 21-25.
Without British support, of course, Nicaragua was hardly capable of resisting American interests.

At that point, Hay vainly attempted to sell the revised treaty to the British. Hay saw the problems with the Senate coming before it amended the treaty. In a private letter to White, Hay wrote, "I wish I could believe that Lord S would let the . . . Convention go through, independent of . . . matters."43 With this dim ray of hope, the Secretary of State informed Joseph Choate, Ambassador to Britain, to inform the Foreign Office of the amendments. In addition, Choate was to "express the hope that they will be found acceptable to it."44

The British and American presses soon announced that the treaty removed the provision against fortifications. Realizing its possible impact, Hay instructed Choate to denounce this notion as "erroneous."45 In the most technical terms, Hay was correct. The prohibition against fortification was still in the treaty. However, the Senate nullified the clause by insuring American ability to fortify for defense or public order. Thus, as London fully knew, the prohibition was useless.

As the new year dawned, Lansdowne felt apprehensive about Anglo-American relations. He feared that the new year would be "a rather troublesome one" when it came to the United States.46 British leaders including Lansdowne knew by this time that American local superiority made the canal and its American control an eminent occurrence.47 Pauncefote reported that the Senate would not have time for any more

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43 Hay to White, Sept. 9, 1899, Hay, 167.
44 Mr. Hay to Mr. Choate, Dec. 22, 1900, Correspondence, 7.
47 Bourne, 348.
legislation on the canal issue. Therefore, he continued to advise Lansdowne to wait for the sessions end before giving the State Department an official reply. Pauncefote realized that this would give Hay and the British until December 1901 to arrive at an agreement. Thus, the possibility of the Senate abrogating Clayton-Bulwer on its own could be avoided. If Britain rejected the treaty before the congressional session's close, "there will be an immediate effort to pass a resolution abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer treaty."  

As the weeks went by, Hay grew concerned. "I am extremely anxious that the British Government may see their way clear to accepting the treaty as amended. We should have the greatest difficulty in getting any new or modified arrangement through the Senate."  

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, through Henry White, had expressed a similar view to Arthur Balfour. Lodge wrote that if Britain refused to come to an agreement, eventual unilateral abrogation of Clayton-Bulwer was a certainty. "The American people mean to have the canal and they mean to control it. Now England does not care enough about it to go to war to prevent our building it, and it would be ruinous if she did make war on us."  

Lord Lansdowne held a similar view of American public opinion. "I am afraid that public opinion in the United States runs so high in favor of an American canal defended by whatever means... that we shall be unable to stem the tide. If so, and we refuse... it seems probable that congress will pass a bill... virtually abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty."  

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48 Lord Pauncefote to Lord Lansdowne, Jan. 18, 1901, F.O. 800/144, 41-42.  
49 Mr. Hay to Mr. Choate, Jan. 25, 1901, Correspondence, 10.  
50 Lodge to White, Dec. 18, 1900, quoted in Gelber, 56.  
51 Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 13, 1900, quoted in Grenville, 64.
Yet, Salisbury and the cabinet felt that Britain had too many grievances to give up so easily. Although unwilling to break relations over the issue, British rejection, Salisbury hoped, would move Washington to present a more favorable treaty. 52 Pauncefo te continued to urge the British government to wait until after Congress adjourned to make this rejection public. Britain, in Pauncefo te view, had to offer a solution, not just a rejection of the amended treaty.

I do not believe that the majority of Senators would allow on the Treaty until the reply of H.M.G. has been received. Nevertheless, as the 5th of March approaches I expect a violent effort on the part of Senator Morgan to force his Hepburn Bill to a vote or call up his "abrogation" Resolution. There is no doubt a danger of his succeeding if in the meanwhile no offer is made on our part to re-open the negotiation & to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by mutual consent & on such conditions as will preserve the general principle [neutrality] applicable to all trans-isthmian canals . . . 53

For the British government, abrogation of the 1850 convention was an eventuality. The Senate amendments were an affront to British prestige, coming at a time in which London could not afford such a blow to honor. The amendments, Lansdowne stated, "have been thrown down upon the floor with an intimation that we are expected to pick them up and swallow them." Had the United States approached the total abrogation less defiantly, with assurances of neutrality, the whole episode could have been avoided. Public opinion, the Foreign Secretary argued, could not allow the Cabinet to approve the amended treaty, owing largely to American attitude. British compromises had gone "as far as we could be

52 Grenville, 64-65.
expected to go without loss of self respect." Lansdowne was anxious to maintain good relations with the United States, but he felt that Britain had a right to have their position examined with "temperance" before the United States moved forward with a canal in violation of Clayton-Bulwer.\textsuperscript{54}

After continual pressure from Choate for an answer, Lansdowne unofficially replied for the British government.\textsuperscript{55} In a lengthy dispatch, Lansdowne outlined London's position on the canal treaty. Since Lansdowne instructed Pauncefote to deliver a copy to Hay, the dispatch actually addressed the State Department. Lansdowne, beginning in 1898, narrated all the events involved in the issue, including London's persistent efforts to avoid "embarrassment . . . caused by an enactment opposed to the terms of the proposed convention and in direct violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty." The British government objected to the treaty largely on grounds dealing with neutralization and open access to the canal. Lansdowne charged, with considerable grounds, that the U. S. Senate was attempting to totally abrogate the 1850 treaty without consulting London.\textsuperscript{56}

Also, the total abandoning of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty would grant a greater freedom of action for the United States in Latin America than British leaders felt wise. If the United States annexed land for the canal, it could claim that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was of no effect on its own territory. Consequently, Britain would lose access to a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific. Most importantly, Lansdowne objected to the amendment allowing the United States to ignore the neutrality rules in matters of defense and public order. Such a clause, to Lansdowne, prevented true neutrality of the canal, a

\textsuperscript{54}Lord Lansdowne to Lord Pauncefote, Feb. 19, 1901, \textit{F.O. 800/144}, 49-51.
\textsuperscript{55}Lord Lansdowne to Mr. Choate, March 8, 1901, \textit{F.O. 800/144}, 54.
\textsuperscript{56}Lord Lansdowne to Lord Pauncefote, Feb. 22, 1901, \textit{Correspondence}, 11-18.
"principle which has until now found acceptance with both governments." The result would be restriction upon Great Britain and freedom, under the name of national interests, for the United States. Although Article II section seven outlawed fortifications, Lansdowne argued that the defensive measures amendment would allow the United States to build fortifications.57

Article III's removal also disturbed the British government. By keeping the agreement strictly between the two contracting powers, Lansdowne felt that Britain would be restricted while other powers were not. Considering British interests in the Americas, the Foreign Secretary deemed this unfair. With all of this in mind, Lansdowne stated that "His Majesty's Government feel unable to accept the convention in the shape presented to them . . . and . . . prefer . . . to retain unmodified the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty." In concluding, however, Lansdowne sought to keep communication open and "would sincerely regret a failure to come to an amicable agreement on this important subject."58

Nearly a month later, the British rejection was officially announced. In London, *The Times* praised the decision. Describing Lodge and Morgan as a "violent faction", the paper criticized the Senate for not looking objectively at British interests in Latin America.59

American expansionists like Roosevelt and Lodge took the British rejection as a challenge. Now Vice-President, Roosevelt wrote Lodge stating that "we should tell Great Britain that we wanted to be friendly and would like a treaty that would keep their self

57Ibid.
58Ibid.
respect as well as ours [the amended Hay-Pauncefote treaty] . . . If this is impossible, I would then abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty anyhow." 60 Feelings in the Senate were identical to Roosevelt's view. Lodge wrote, "If we can not make a treaty with England which will pass the Senate next December nothing in the world, in my opinion, will be able to stop the passage of a canal bill." 61 Hay believed the same thing and was willing to keep this fear in the minds of London policy makers. 62

Yet, Lansdowne had left the door for negotiations open. The Foreign Secretary hoped for a better deal. At the very least, Lansdowne wanted to help Britain save face by mustering some resistance. 63

Hay prepared a new draft. This time, the Secretary of State conferred with Senate leaders. On April 25, 1901, Pauncefote sent the new draft to London. It used the 1888 Constantinople convention, which insured the neutrality of the Suez Canal, as its basis for neutralization. There was no clause reserving the right for American defensive action. In addition, the treaty also included no clause banning fortification of the canal. Similarly, the convention included no provision inviting the adherence of other powers. 64 Hay's solution was to remain silent on all the controversial aspects of the first treaty. In essence, the new treaty contained all the elements of the amended treaty. But, as Hay expressed to Choate, "in a form which I hope will not be objectionable to the British Government." Hay also informed the ambassador that Pauncefote would arrive that summer in England for a visit.

60 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, March 27, 1901, Henry Cabot Lodge, Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918 Vol. 1, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), 485.
61 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 30, 1901, Lodge, 486.
62 Gelber, 99.
63 Correspondence, 35.
64 Ibid, 19-21.
Choate was to feel free to consult with Pauncefote on the canal matter. Hay hoped that together they might be able to convince Lansdowne and the cabinet to accept the treaty. Also, the State Department head expressed a need for Lansdowne to understand the "political situation in Washington." That situation, of course, was the threat of American unilateral abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.\textsuperscript{65}

In a private letter accompanying Hay's new draft, Pauncefote made several observations concerning the proposed document. The new draft, according to Pauncefote dealt with neutrality in an acceptable manner, but no stipulation dealt with the possibility of the United States obtaining sovereignty over a canal route. The restriction against fortifications was also omitted. Pauncefote intimated the need to deal with these issue in order to assure success. Hay apparently showed the British diplomat proposed treaties with Nicaragua and Costa Rica that insured neutrality and the observance of Suez Canal rules. Pauncefote, however, was unimpressed. The Senate, he pointed out, could alter those treaties as well. Finally, Pauncefote suggested that neutrality could be dealt with by making the canal available only to those powers observing the regulations.\textsuperscript{66}

Both powers resumed work on the treaty in the summer of 1901. After Lord Pauncefote's arrival in England, Choate soon learned that Lansdowne and the cabinet had prepared an alternative draft to Hay's. Meanwhile, Henry Cabot Lodge was also in England. Lunching with Lansdowne and Arthur Balfour, Lodge frankly related the senatorial view.\textsuperscript{67} Given Lodge's past statements, the Senator almost certainly broached

\textsuperscript{65}Mr. Hay to Mr. Choate, April 27, 1901, \textit{Correspondence}, 21-22.
\textsuperscript{66}Lord Pauncefote to Lord Lansdowne, Apr. 25, 1901, \textit{F.O. 800/144}, 71-73.
\textsuperscript{67}\textit{Correspondence}, 22-24.
the subject of American unilateral nullification of the 1850 treaty. Meanwhile, the State Department kept such a possibility on British minds.

In a private letter, Hay praised Henry White. "They [the British] ought to know, and I am very glad you told him [Balfour], that if we cannot agree on a treaty before December, nothing can prevent a violent legislative abrogation of the C-B Convention." 68 From the start, Hay's goal had been to avoid violation of Clayton-Bulwer. Hay's diligent work to this end had thus far been rewarded with frustration. Initially, he and Pauncefote defined American needs as falling short of total abrogation of the 1850 agreement. By the summer of 1901, Hay was desperate for a treaty. Thus, he was willing to use the threat of unilateral action without compunction.

In July 1901, Lansdowne briefed the Cabinet on the canal issue. The Foreign Secretary presented the government with Hay's canal treaty draft and American proposals concerning the Alaskan boundary. Lansdowne contended that abrupt abandoning of the strong position Britain took in rejecting Hay-Pauncefote would be impossible. Britain would have to allow abrogation of Clayton-Bulwer. But, self respect dictated that the United States needed to gain its goal by "well established national usage." In essence, Lansdowne's true complaints were to a degree a matter of "form." 69

On August 3, 1901, Lansdowne forwarded a British alternative draft. In his proposal, Lansdowne attempted to insert a phrase requiring other nations to observe the neutrality rules in order to insure access to the proposed canal. In addition, Lansdowne created a new Article III-A. It stated that the neutrality rules would "govern all inter-oceanic communications across the isthmus . . . and that no change of territorial

68Hay to Henry White, June 18, 1901, Hay, 211.
69Lord Lansdowne, Memorandum to Cabinet, July 8, 1901, F.O. 800/144, 88-90.
sovereignty, or other circumstances, shall affect such general principle [neutrality] or the obligations . . . under the present treaty." Therefore, Lansdowne and the cabinet sought to secure British access to the canal even if the United States conquered a land route in Latin America. Given American expansion during the Spanish-American War, Lansdowne's concern was not unreasonable.

In a meeting with Lansdowne, Choate expressed apprehension about two points of the British draft. First, Article III-A extended the rules of neutrality to all possible canal routes. Choate pointed out that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty only mentioned a Nicaraguan route. Therefore, the American ambassador argued, Lansdowne's draft strengthened the old treaty. For Choate, American interests required the nullification of the old agreement, not its re-enforcement.

More importantly, Choate objected to a new clause requiring other powers to agree to the neutrality restrictions to enjoy access to the canal. This proposal, Choate explained, was stronger than the original invitation to adherence in the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which would certainly be opposed by the Senate. Choate argued that the Lansdowne draft would never make it through the Senate. The ambassador wrote Hay that "I told him [Lansdowne] that he had no idea of the intensity of feeling in the Senate and the Nation against intervention of other nations in our affairs." Americans, in Choate's view, were unwilling to compromise on the Monroe Doctrine. Consequently, Lansdowne's draft could not survive "without modification." Choate later suggested changing the phrasing in the treaty to allow other powers "observing" the neutrality regulations to have access to the

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70 Correspondence, 29-31.
71 Mr. Choate to Mr. Hay, Aug. 16, 1901, Correspondence, 31-34.
72 Ibid.
canal. Thus, the convention bound other powers by the neutralization rules without including them as parties in the treaty. 73

Lord Lansdowne continued to push for his Article III-A. The Foreign Secretary insisted on the need for it in meeting Parliamentary opponents. Lansdowne felt he could justify giving up Clayton-Bulwer if neutralization was secured permanently. Meanwhile, the British waited for Hay's response. Pauncefote hoped to return to Washington in October with a mutually acceptable treaty. 74

Before making his reply, Hay consulted with President McKinley. Both the President and the Secretary of State agreed with Choate. Hay wanted as concise a document as possible. "The briefer and simpler the treaty can be made the better." Nonetheless, Hay optimistically felt that the issue was near its end. The Secretary wrote that "even with all Lord Lansdowne's suggestions accepted it would be a great success to have gained such a treaty. But, we must do our best to improve it still further." 75 Hay then wrote Pauncefote.

For Lansdowne's Article III-A, Hay offered a new article. The new American article stated that "It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of the international relations of the countries traversed by the . . . canal shall affect the general principle of neutralization or the obligations . . . under the present treaty." 76 Hay's article met with approval in London. Lord Lansdowne extolled the new article for covering "the

73Mr. Choate to Mr. Hay, Aug. 20, 1901, Correspondence, 34-35.
74Ibid.
75Mr. Hay to Mr. Choate, Sept. 2, 1901, Correspondence, 36.
point in a brief and simple way."²⁷ British and American policy makers were close to reaching an agreement.

Diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic endeavored to smooth out the remaining difficulties. The main dilemma delaying the agreement was London's lingering fears concerning the security of the neutrality principle. Lansdowne and the cabinet needed some assurance that the United States could never deny England access to the canal. London was concerned, that the United States might acquire land to build the canal. If that happened, Salisbury's cabinet contended that, despite Hay's new article, the United States might proclaim the treaty irrelevant. Lansdowne approved of the way Hay's proposed article preserved neutrality. However, the Foreign Secretary pressed the State Department for more explicit wording securing freedom of passage and equity of terms.²⁸

In a letter dated September 9, 1901, prominent Senator Henry Cabot Lodge wrote to Lord Lansdowne. Accompanying the most cordial letter was a soon to be published article by Lodge on the treaty making powers of the United States Senate. Lodge hoped to inform London in a way that would secure a treaty before violent abrogation of Clayton-Bulwer.²⁹

By the middle of September 1901, owing to the assassination of McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt was in the White House. Roosevelt retained McKinley's cabinet. Consequently, Hay continued to receive the full support of the executive branch.³⁰ The upheaval arising from McKinley's death distracted Washington. But, the final phase of

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²⁷ The Marquis of Lansdowne to Mr. Lowther, Sept. 12, 1901, Correspondence, 39.
²⁸ Correspondence, 41-42.; Lord Lansdowne to Lord Pauncefote, Sept. 13, 1901, F.O. 800/144, 113-114.
²⁹ Henry Cabot Lodge to Lord Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1901, F.O. 800/144, 100-108.
³⁰ Hay, 233-34.
negotiations proceeded smoothly.\textsuperscript{81} Given Roosevelt's ardent navalism and imperialist inclinations, the canal treaty attracted the President's immediate attention. Swept suddenly into the White House, the former Rough Rider found his first chance to get directly involved in the canal issue. Roosevelt immediately approved Hay's draft. At the same time, the President authorized Hay to negotiate the phrasing of the new article to suit the British.\textsuperscript{82}

Lodge, Roosevelt's best friend, soon made another visit to Britain. This time, Choate fully enlisted him to aid in negotiations. The goal of both parties was to work out mutually acceptable wording. Senate opposition would meet anything that involved other powers as contractors or hindered American ability to defend the canal. For the British, Lansdowne insisted on an explicit statement of the canal's free access to all nations. Lansdowne agreed to the addition of these words to Hay's new article: "or the freedom of passage of the canal to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations on terms of entire equality and without discrimination as provided by Article III." This addition eliminated Lansdowne's controversial Article III-A. Choate wrote, "It still looks to me most propitious for a satisfactory conclusion being reached."\textsuperscript{83}

At this point, Pauncefote reintroduced the issue of an alternative route. Rumors that the United States might build in Panama and ignore Clayton-Bulwer disturbed the British cabinet.\textsuperscript{84} Hay consulted the President. Roosevelt replied that "As regards our treaty with England, it is unnecessary to say that we intend to have it cover any possible

\textsuperscript{81} Greenville, 68.
\textsuperscript{82} Correspondence, 42.
\textsuperscript{83} Mr. Choate to Mr. Hay, Sept. 21, 1901, Correspondence, 40-42.
\textsuperscript{84} Correspondence, 44-45.
canal across the isthmus."\textsuperscript{85} Therefore, Hay wired Choate with this reassurance. Choate and Paunceforte added wording that framed the treaty to apply to any canal that connected the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Finally, the draft was ready to be presented to Salisbury and the cabinet, who were to meet in November. Lansdowne approved the draft without any substantive questions. Choate impressed upon the Foreign Secretary the need to have a treaty before the Senate convened in December. Lodge, a member of the Foreign Relations committee, assured the State Department of his support.\textsuperscript{86} The haste of negotiators to get the treaty to the Senate reflected the desire to avoid unilateral abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

Roosevelt, not surprisingly, immediately approved the final draft. In a letter to Hay, the President wrote, "The treaty does seem to be in fine shape; one can never prophesy with the Senate, but I think we can get it through. In my judgment we should get it in as soon as the session begins; delay will give time for quarrels which will lessen our chances."\textsuperscript{87} Roosevelt did his share to encourage its passing. Two days after writing Hay, Roosevelt invited key senators to lunch at the White House, and used the opportunity to encourage support for the canal treaty.\textsuperscript{88} Years later, Roosevelt cited the importance of the treaty to securing an isthmian canal, which he felt was his greatest single accomplishment.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{86} Correspondence, 45-48.
\textsuperscript{87} Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, Oct. 5, 1901, Morison, 160.
\textsuperscript{88} Lodge, 507.
As the cabinet prepared to meet in November, Lansdowne suggested that the two
governments prepare a history. Lansdowne proposed that the State Department and the
Foreign Office give this history, composed of documents, to both Parliament and Congress
to inform both bodies on how the treaty came about. Hopefully, this would help insure the
passage of the treaty, by illuminating how the negotiators resolved such difficult issues.90

In November 1901, the cabinet readily approved the treaty. Pauncefote returned to
Washington to help finish the process. He informed Lansdowne that it was expedient to
secure the Senate's approval as quickly as possible. Roosevelt intended to have the treaty
before Congress on the opening day of the session. Therefore, the canal treaty took
"precedence of other business and anticipate notices of resolutions which have been
threatened all along in relation to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty."91

On November 18, Hay and Pauncefote signed the treaty. In early December, as
Congress prepared to meet, Roosevelt sent a message stressing the need for a stronger
navy. The American people, Roosevelt asserted, were committed to the United States' new
status as a major power. A canal was "fast becoming one of the matters which the whole
people are united in demanding.92 With his message, the President sent the final draft of
the treaty. The treaty was immediately read and referred without comment to the Foreign
Relations Committee. The Washington Post, at the same time, reported that the treaty now
had little opposition. In fact, the writer stated, "it is confidently expected that the treaty will
be ratified before the holidays."93 The next day the same paper reported that "the

90Correspondence, 51-52.
91Lord Pauncefote to Lord Lansdowne, Nov. 5, 1901, F.O. 800/144, 119-120.
document is now free from all objectionable features."94 Furthermore, Senator Morgan's bill attempting violent abrogation of Clayton-Bulwer was not going to be acted upon. The majority preferred to wait on the status of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.95

Less than a month later, on December 16, the Senate ratified the treaty without mishap on a vote of seventy two to six. Roosevelt signed the convention the day after Christmas. On January 20, 1902, Parliament followed the example of the Senate by ratifying the treaty as well. Finally, on February 22, 1902, Great Britain and the United States officially proclaimed the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Once the treaty came through, bills authorizing the government to build a canal were ready for consideration.96

The final treaty completely superseded the Clayton-Bulwer agreement. It granted the United States the right to build, control and manage an inter-oceanic canal. Also, the convention guaranteed the neutrality and freedom of access of all nations to a canal no matter how the United States obtained the route. The United States could build fortifications and defend the canal from hostile forces.97 More long range, Roosevelt would have no diplomatic obstacles in 1905, when the project began in Panama. Also, the treaty removed a thorny issue between Britain and the United States. American naval supremacy in the Caribbean was insured by the treaty. As one historian put it, the treaty was "a landmark in Anglo-American relations."98 Britain moved closer to securing a relationship with America that would prove so useful when, some years later, England found itself at war with a powerful Germany.

97"Hay-Pauncefote Treaty", Correspondence, 292-94.
98Grenville, 69.
However, American policy makers clearly obtained a superior position. The right to fortify and defend the canal left the United States in unquestionable control. British leaders could do nothing more than simply trust the United States not to exclude them from the canal after it was fortified. Again, British interests were dependent on the good will of others. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty was another example of appeasement.

The British did resist the American advance to a degree. Yet, when the threat of American unilateral abrogation of the Clayton Bulwer treaty emerged, the British backed off. Consistently, the British delayed or resisted. But, the possibility of the United States building a canal without regard to Clayton-Bulwer, always brought London back to the table. With problems elsewhere and the yearly growth of the German military machine, England could not afford war with the United States. The embarrassing Boer War had produced fear of a coalition against the British Empire.\textsuperscript{99} Conflict with the industrialized, heavily populated and distant American nation could produce considerably more problems than the worrisome struggle with the provincial Boers. The British navy, though the most powerful of its day, was too weak to compete with the American navy in the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{100} Still, London could ill afford the international embarrassment of having its rights under Clayton-Bulwer ignored. Thus, one can interpret British resistance as merely an attempt to save face. The treaty certainly favored the United States. This fact did not escape Pauncefote's British colleagues in Washington, who refused to congratulate him on the final treaty.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{99}Friedberg, 156, 159.
\textsuperscript{100}Massie, 463.
\textsuperscript{101}Lord Pauncefote to Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 19, 1901, \textit{F.O. 800/144}, 131-133.
No doubt, Britain found the world in the fifteen years before World War I a difficult, if not hostile, place. Certainly, she needed friends. In the case of the United States, however, the British Empire, owing to a lack of power, had little choice. Leaving the Western Hemisphere to the United States would allow Britain to strengthen its naval forces elsewhere in the strategically overextended empire. Also, Britain theoretically obtained access to the future canal for mercantile purposes without the expense of building and protecting it.

For the United States, the Hay-Pauncefote treaty granted sole dominance in Latin America. Further, control of the region and the ability to build the strategically important canal demonstrated the United States' new found status as a world power. The American navy's power would be doubled by the canal.\textsuperscript{102} Hay-Pauncefote demonstrated that the United States was powerful enough regionally to make the threat of unilateral action effective. In fact, Britain could have done little to stop the United States if American policy makers had decided to abrogate Clayton-Bulwer on their own. Thus, American leaders were able to force the world's premiere power to acquiesce to American interests.

By 1901, even the British admiralty realized that in Latin America, the United States was dominant. Thus, British leaders began to understand that this local supremacy, not fortifications would determine control of the canal. For British interests, it was better to allow the United States concessions on the canal than to suffer a demonstration of Britain's relative weakness.

\textsuperscript{102}Perkins, 175.
CHAPTER THREE
The Alaskan Boundary Dispute: Full Supremacy In the Western Hemisphere

Lord Pauncefote's life's work was a constant search for Anglo-American friendship. In the last years of his life, the respected British diplomat worked closely with his friend, the American Secretary of State, John Hay. Together, they led the movement toward what diplomatic historians call the Anglo-American rapprochement. Still, despite the effort toward friendship, the road to rapprochement was filled with major and minor obstacles. On Christmas Day 1900, Lord Pauncefote wrote to his superior in London, Lord Lansdowne, citing the two most glaring obstacles to better relations between the United States and Great Britain. The ambassador hoped to dispose "of the two important and difficult questions (the only two happily) which threaten to disturb the entente cordiale - namely Alaska and Nicaragua [the canal treaty]."¹

By early 1902, the United States gained diplomatic victory in the final version of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Though, foreign policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean still continued to wrestle with the boundary dispute between Alaska and Canada. Since the discovery of gold in the Klondike region in 1896, the boundary question was a high stakes issue between Washington, London and Ottawa. Furthermore, for Americans and Canadians, it was a question that aroused considerable emotion and nationalistic

¹Lord Pauncefote to Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 25, 1900, F.O. 800/144, 21.
fervor. From London's perspective, the dispute was a prickly issue filled with danger and little hope of escaping undamaged. The capable Pauncefote helped guide Britain through the canal question. However, the Alaskan boundary problem would outlive him.\textsuperscript{2} The result, however, would largely be the same as with the canal treaty. The United States scored diplomatic success at the expense of the most important territory of the British Empire.

The dispute itself concerned the southern panhandle of Alaska (See Appendix A). In 1825, the boundary was codified in the Anglo-Russian treaty. When the United States purchased the distant territory from Tsarist Russia in 1867, the boundary definitions of the 1825 treaty were included in the cession agreement between Russia and the United States. The complexity of the issue merits extensive quotation. Therefore, the Russian-American convention of 1867 defined the Alaskan boundary as follows:

\begin{quote}
Commencing from the southernmost point of the island called the Prince of Wales Island, which point lies in the parallel of 54 degrees 40 minutes north latitude, and between the 131st and the 133d degree of west longitude, (meridian of Greenwich,) the said line shall ascend to the north along the channel called Portland channel, as far as the point of the continent where it strikes the 56th degree of north latitude; from this last-mentioned point, the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast as far as the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude (of the same meridian;) and finally, from the said point of intersection, the said meridian line of the 141st degree, in its prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean.

IV. With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the preceding article, it is understood-
1st. That the island called Prince of Wales Island shall belong wholly to Russia, (now, by this cession to the United States.)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{2}Mowat, 293.

Lord Pauncefote's death in May of 1902, nearly a year and a half before the close of the Alaskan boundary matter.
2nd. That whenever the summit of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude shall prove to be at the distance of more than ten marine leagues from the ocean, the limit between the British possessions and the line of coast which is to belong to Russia as above mentioned (that is to say, the limit to the possessions ceded by this convention) shall be formed by a line parallel to the winding of the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom.\(^3\)

Strictly defined as ten leagues from salt water in Alaska's southern panhandle, this definition excluded Canada from access to the sea along the five hundred mile strip. Canada would argue that their border extended to the head of the crucial Lynn Canal and the Taiya estuary. On the other hand, Washington would argue that its boundary extended from the Chilkoot Pass down to Lake Bennett.\(^4\)

The year 1869 marked the first American attempt to locate the boundary. An American army officer led the survey. After ascending the Yukon to the Porcupine River, the American expedition discovered through rough observations that Fort Yukon, a Hudson Bay Company outpost, was on American soil. In 1883, a second American expedition found the line at "Boundary Butte at the mouth of Mission Creek". Four years later, a Canadian survey under William Ogilvie located the boundary nine miles east of the 1883 survey. Since Ogilvie's line favored the United States, Washington sent a third

\(^3\)"Convention for the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America to the United States", United States, Department of State, Treaties and Conventions Concluded Between The United States of America and Other Powers Since July 4, 1776. Containing Notes With References To Negotiations Preceding the Several Treaties, to the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial Construction of Them, and to the Causes of the Abrogation of Some of Them; A Chronological List of Treaties; and an Analytical Index (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 939-942.

American team to confirm Ogilvie's results. In 1889, a two man expedition from the Coast and Geodetic Survey defined the line east of Ogilvie's 1887 line.5

For two decades after the American purchase of Alaska, Canada did little to adjust the boundary in its favor. Then, suddenly, the southern Alaskan border became very important. In 1896 and 1897, mammoth gold discoveries were made in the remote Yukon region. Quickly, thousands of ambitious miners flooded the region. The lack of law and order produced outlaws like Soapy Smith. But the ambiguity of authority also created a situation ripe for dangerous controversies between the United States and Great Britain's territory, Canada. As gold poured out of the region, Washington, London and Ottawa realized that the nation that controlled the Lynn Canal's headwaters could dominate the gold country. To Canada's dismay, the United States had well established settlements at the Lynn Canal headwaters, namely, Dyea and Skagway (See Appendix B). From these ports, the United States imposed duties on British and Canadian goods.6

Canada asserted that the boundary was further west. Several issues concerning the boundary as defined by the Anglo-Russian treaty and the 1867 Cession agreement concerned Canadian leaders. First, was the body of water referred to in the treaties as the Portland Channel, the Portland Canal of the 1890's. The second, and more valid, question was whether the boundary curved around the heads of the inlets or did it cut across them. If the former were true, ten marine miles from the ocean meant ten marine miles from any salt water. This particular contention was the American claim. And, by it, the United


Owing to Canadian protests, the United States began exempting Canadian goods from duties in March of 1898.
States possessed Dyea and Skagway at the headwaters of the Lynn Canal. If the latter were the case, then Canada had a right to possess the headwaters of the Lynn Canal, with its access to the sea. Since goods and miners entered the gold country much easier by water transportation than by crossing the treacherous mountains, ocean access was very profitable. Third, the United States contended that the coastal winding of the boundary followed every contour of the coast, including the deep incision of the Lynn Canal. Britain and Canada deemed this irrelevant. Under the treaty, they argued, a coastal mountain range determined the boundary's penetration despite the ten marine leagues clause. The United States, on the other hand, questioned the existence of this coastal range.  

It did not take very long for the dangerous situation to produce incidents. In October 1896, while the major gold discoveries were being made, Canadian mounted police moved into the disputed region. This police force set up a post at Togish Lake in order to collect customs for the Ottawa government. More notable, another force of mounted police made several, at about the same time, to establish a customs house at Skagway. These efforts were thwarted by the settlers, who complained fervently to Washington about the presence of the armed men.  

In the months to come, complaints reached Washington concerning the activities of Canadian police. American miners argued that they were charged a two cent per pound duty on mine supplies while on United States soil. Pressure grew from American miners and traders for a United States military force. In the mid winter of 1897, the United States War Department sent four army companies of one hundred eight men and four officers each to the head of the Lynn Canal. The force arrived at a fortunate time. Upon arrival in

7Ibid.
8Satterfield, 111-113.
Skagway, Lt. William Conrad discovered the local citizens organizing a militia in order to drive out Canadian police encamped in the nearby passes. Luckily, Conrad was able to avert this situation. Demands by the American command for an explanation as to why Canadian police were enforcing law on United States, or at least disputed, soil went unheeded.9

In December 1897, the United States Congress enacted a law appropriating $200,000 to purchase "subsistence stores, supplies, and materials for relief" of people in the Yukon region of Alaska. The Secretary of War was instructed by the bill to manage the entire humanitarian mission. Congress, at the same time, made it clear that Canadians in the region could also receive relief if the Canadian government gave its consent to the operation.10

Accordingly the Secretary of State John Sherman contacted Pauncefote about obtaining such approval on December 20, 1897. The aid itself could provide little friction. However, as Sherman disclosed, the War Department intended to conduct the supplies "accompanied by military escort, over Canadian territory to the Yukon River country and other mining regions of Alaska." The need for a military escort in a region filled with outlaws is not surprising. But, some concern existed over whether Canada could acquiesce to an additional armed force marching through their territory and operating within the disputed region. In exchange for Ottawa's approval, Sherman offered assurances that relief would be provided in Canadian territory as well. The State Department also requested that the relief supplies enter Canadian land duty free.11

9Ibid, 137-139.
10Foreign Relations 1898, 359.
The Ottawa government wasted little time in approving the plan. Permission was granted for the American convoys to pass through Canadian territory. The supplies would also be exempt from Canadian duties. Yet, the Dominion government required that each convoy also be accompanied by a Canadian military officer.\textsuperscript{12} All seemed to be going fairly well, but London showed considerable concern over the expedition.

Lord Salisbury instructed Pauncefote to obtain from Washington the basis for the American request to allow an armed escort for the supplies to cross Canadian territory. Pauncefote informed Sherman that London felt that there existed an "unofficial understanding" that the Dominion government would provide "escort for the expedition after reaching the summit of the pass, beyond which point no United States armed force should proceed."\textsuperscript{13}

The State Department's reply was pointed. Washington insisted that the armed escort of fifty-five soldiers with needed officers was absolutely necessary to protect the supplies from "disorderly persons." Without such an escort the expedition would be too dangerous. The United States gave no explanation as to why the proposed Canadian escort was unacceptable. But, without the American force, "it might become necessary to select a route to Alaska entirely within the territory of the United States, which would in part defeat the object of the expedition." The dilemma needed urgently to be resolved. Because Ottawa had initially gave permission, the American force was already on its way to the Lynn Canal.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12}Sir Julian Pauncefote to Mr. Sherman, Dec. 27, 1897, \textit{Foreign Relations 1898}, 360.
\textsuperscript{13}Sir Julian Pauncefote to Mr. Sherman, Feb. 4, 1898, \textit{Foreign Relations 1898}, 360.
\textsuperscript{14}Mr. Day to Sir Julian Pauncefote, Feb. 16, 1898, \textit{Foreign Relations 1898}, 361.
Before things became dangerous, Pauncfote forwarded a compromise. The British offered to allow the American force to proceed under certain conditions. First of all, the force would be under the same regulations that Canadian mounted police observed, namely, "that the men shall not be under arms, and that arms and munitions of war shall go through Canadian territory as baggage." In addition, the expedition would also be accompanied by an escort of mounted police.\textsuperscript{15} Anxious to begin the expedition, Washington agreed to the conditions.\textsuperscript{16} Yet the whole episode demonstrated the sensitivity of all parties when it came to the disputed area. Meanwhile, events continued to irritate that sensitivity.

In January 1898, an American Commissioner attempted to claim disputed area near the southern extremity of Lake Bennett where Canadian mounted police where camped. Apparently, the official raised the American flag. After protest from Canadian officials, the American party hauled their flag down. To both sides, the need for a settlement was becoming increasingly obvious. In London, The Times reported that "the incident has created unpleasant feelings in the [American] Far West."\textsuperscript{17}

A few weeks later, a group of American miners refused to pay Canadian duties at Lake Bennett on the grounds that it was American land. When Dominion customs officials insisted, the miners produced papers from nearby United States officials confirming that the area around Lake Bennett was United States territory. The Canadian government assured its public that it would enforce its authority around at Lake Bennett. Meanwhile,

\textsuperscript{15}Sir Julian Pauncfote to Mr. Sherman, Feb. 17, 1898, Foreign Relations 1898, 361-362.
\textsuperscript{16}Mr. Day to Sir Julian Pauncfote, Feb. 21, 1898, Foreign Relations 1898, 362-363.
\textsuperscript{17}"Canada and the United States", The Times (London) 15 January 1898, 7.
western members of the Dominion Parliament clamored for an all Canadian railway to the Yukon.\textsuperscript{18}

In Canada, internal politics was pushing the moderate Laurier government to take a firmer stand on the boundary issue. The leader of the conservative opposition, Sir Charles Tupper, led the clamor for action. In a move that would certainly alienate the United States, Tupper called for the government to restrict United States miners from working in Canadian mines. Tupper asserted that the United States restricted Canadian miners. Premier Sir Wilfred Laurier was of the opinion that such a harsh measure would bring with it some kind of reprisals from Washington.\textsuperscript{19} The United States did not claim to possess a right to the Yukon gold fields. Instead, the American claim was to the sea access to that remote region. This in mind, Tupper’s assertion of American restriction of Canadian miners seems unrealistic. Tupper’s statement, therefore, was likely little more than political bravado.

Meanwhile, concern over the tense situation prompted the diplomatic establishment to action. On April 18, 1898, Pauncefote sent a memorandum to the State Department. The British ambassador argued that until the issue could be settled a provisional boundary should be set. Such an agreement, would be made "without prejudice to the claims of either party." However, he realized that the United States would never concede to even a temporary line excluding them from the head waters of the Lynn Canal. Consequently, with at least tacit Canadian agreement, Pauncfote suggested that the provisional boundary

\textsuperscript{18} "The Yukon Goldfields", \textit{The Times} (London) 1 February 1898, 3.
\textsuperscript{19} "Canada", \textit{The Times} (London) 7 February 1898, 5.
be placed "at the watershed at the first summit north of Dyea. Such a provisional boundary would be at distance from the coast of considerably more than 10 leagues."\(^{20}\)

The State Department, on May 9, 1898, replied in the affirmative. Secretary of State William R. Day suggested that commissioners from both sides erect monuments in three key areas above Dyea and Skagway. However, Washington wanted to make it clear that this agreement was "not to be construed as affecting in any manner rights under existing treaties for the ultimate consideration and establishment of the boundary line in question."\(^{21}\) From the American perspective the Alaskan issue waned in the face of coming war with Spain.

Ottawa continued to concern itself with a possible railway to make the Yukon more assessable. It was possible for gold seekers to reach the Klondike entirely through Canadian territory. To do this, however, the travelers were compelled to brave rugged terrain and find their way through confusing passes. Difficult any time of the year, in the winter this route was almost impossible. Not surprising, the vast majority of miners, both Canadian and American, entered the gold country from Alaskan ports.\(^{22}\) This fact spurred western Canadians to demand a railway into the Kondike.

Meanwhile, the disputed territory remained a powder keg. In early 1898, a sudden influx of American miners made the issue more urgent. Preoccupied with the Spanish war, Washington was slow to act. By the summer of 1898, Canada and the United States


\(^{21}\)Mr. Day to Sir Julian Pauncefote, May 9, 1898, *Foreign Relations 1899*, 320.

readily agreed to limit troop activity around the Lynn Canal.\textsuperscript{23} Pauncefote, at this point, arranged a Joint High Commission to resolve the outstanding issue between the United States and Canada.\textsuperscript{24}

To Canada's delight, Salisbury's government appointed two Canadian commissioners to the Joint High Commission. Lord Herschell, the one British member, turned out to a blessing rather than a curse to Ottawa. As Pacific Northwest shipping interests lobbied Washington for no compromise on the boundary, Laurier also resolved to refuse an agreement on other issues without a concession from the United States on the Alaskan boundary.\textsuperscript{25}

Before the Joint High Commission’s first meeting in Quebec, Lord Salisbury instructed the British and Canadian representatives. After a lengthy review of the dispute's history, Salisbury notified the commissioners that they were to view the provisional boundary as a "temporary recognition" of the status quo. The Prime Minister argued that the provisional line, which excluded Canada from the coast, was designed to minimize the dangers resulting from the sudden influx of gold miners. Thus, this "temporary recognition" did not mean Britain had already surrendered to American claims. More importantly, Salisbury contended that the final boundary must give Canada a port on the Lynn Canal. Britain needed such a port for two reasons. First, there were considerable customs to be collected at the entrance to the gold fields. Second, the discovery of gold in the disputed region itself was a possibility, making the Lynn Canal region even more valuable. Thus, Salisbury instructed the commissioners to interpret the 1825 Treaty in

\textsuperscript{23}Campbell, 76.
\textsuperscript{24}Mowat, 273-274.
narrow terms. In other words, the boundary should follow any mountains and never at any point exceed ten marine leagues from the ocean proper. Salisbury's instruction indicated the purely economic motivation of British and Canadian contentions concerning the boundary.

Meeting in Quebec on August 22, 1898, the Commissioners from both sides spent their initial time getting acquainted and seeing the sights in Quebec. In general the commissioners were all very optimistic about a viable settlement to the issues blocking a betterment of Anglo-American relations. Senator Fairbanks headed the American delegation, while Lord Herschell presided over Her Majesty's commissioners.  

Early on, Northwestern timber interests were grieved by erroneous reports of compromise on the boundary issue. In fact, on September 1, *The New York Times* reported that the issue would be submitted to arbitration. The report stated that either all the arbiters would be foreign or each side would have one arbiter and one foreign arbiter would act as referee. American timber and shipping interests, in fear of losing their near monopoly, petitioned the Joint High Commission with a barrage of arguments. The same Northwestern interests were outraged a month later when the Canadian commissioners demanded a cession of territory including Dyea and Skagway. The

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27 "In Session At Quebec", *The Washington Post*, 24 August 1898, 1.

adamant opposition of timber and shipping interests, however, would make compromise on the Alaskan issue impossible. 29

Lord Herschell argued fervently for the Canadian view of the boundary. His tactics were largely designed to move Washington to compromise on the boundary line. At the State Department, Hay was outraged. In a letter to Henry White, Hay stated that he would have liked Pauncefote to be the British commissioner. The Secretary also failed to understand how the British could dream of attempting to connect the boundary dispute with the canal issue. Realizing the critical nature of the negotiations, Hay was less than hopeful. Lord Herschell's attitude, felt Hay, "has been throughout that of the keen lawyer intent on making a case against an adversary, instead of that of a man of affairs seeking to find a transaction which would be advantageous to both parties." All the other issues seemed resolved, but Hay thought that Lord Herschell insisted "on making his point on the Alaska boundary even at the risk of all the rest." 30

The boundary dispute proved sufficient to destroy the Joint High Commission. On February 20, 1899, the Commission adjourned. Supposedly, the Commission would reconvene on August 2, 1899. However, most observers acknowledged that the break up was permanent. The cause of the adjournment was clearly an inability to come to terms on the boundary issue. American Commissioners, tempted to cede some area to Canada, were met by stern resistance by Western interests. Lord Herschell's delegation then refused an offer of a customs house. Herschell apparently urged the Americans to accept arbitration along the lines of the Venezuelan dispute two years earlier. Such a scheme would provide for two arbiters from each side with the King of Sweden or a neutral arbiter

as referee. The United States refused to accept arbitration unless the referee was from Latin America. Realizing a Latin American arbiter could never vote against the United States, the British panel rejected the plan. Fairbanks then suggested a tribunal of six jurists, three from each side. In Fairbanks' proposal the United States sought assurance of maintaining the settled areas on the Lynn Canal. Laurier, unwilling to settle any of the issues without concessions on the Lynn Canal, suggested adjournment to which Herschell concurred. 31 Hay wrote that his "explanation of their [British commissioners] obstinate refusal to agree to close up matters is that they preferred to stand before the Canadian Parliament in the attitude of stout defenders of Canadian rights and interests, rather than as signers of a treaty which would not meet the views of their advanced supporters." 32

Herschell revealed his real reasons for terminating the Joint High Commission in a dispatch to Lord Salisbury on February 21, 1899:

Americans were very anxious that there should be no rupture in the negotiations but only an adjournment. I think they entertain a hope that by diplomatic negotiations a solution of this difficulty [the boundary] might be found after which the other matters could probably without serious difficulty be adjusted. I should have been prepared to continue negotiations and still press for a settlement but for the following reasons: no settlement could be expected but after considerable delay, and the return of my Canadian colleagues to Ottawa had become imperatively necessary; moreover I thought a more favorable result was to be hoped for outside rather than through the Commission. My accident [a fall on an icy street] which proves a serious one will detain me here many weeks. I shall endeavor if Your Lordship approves to utilize this detention by direct personal negotiations to which I have reason to believe the United States Government might not object. 33

33 Lord Herschell to Lord Salisbury, Feb. 21, 1899, quoted in Campbell, 118.
Thus, Herschell may have been attempting to shock the American delegation into a more agreeable settlement by threatening a rupture. The fact that the ploy failed indicated the importance of the boundary to American interests. Herschell's plan for personal negotiations was approved by Salisbury and Hay. Herschell's untimely death a short time later, however, ruined this plan.34

The break up of the Joint High Commission provoked an intense anti-American campaign in the Canadian press. Public opinion in Canada held that the American attitude was "undignified" concerning the Alaskan boundary. In London, The Times reported that Canadian "newspapers of all shades of politics urge the government to take an independent stand towards our neighbors, and impose export duties on ores, wood pulp, and timber, on which several great American industries are dependent." Not surprisingly, Laurier's chief political opponent, Sir Charles Tupper, was in the forefront of the demands for a Canadian-American trade war.35

Playing on Canadian resentment of the Joint High Commission's break up, Tupper made more radical suggestions of reprisals against the United States. In the Canadian parliament, the opposition framed legislation to restrict American miners from the Atlin Lake gold fields. As tensions rose, one clear possibility was that the United States cede to Canada a port on the Lynn Canal. Pyramid Harbor was ideal, because at that point it was unsettled by American miners. Another option, London suggested, was that the United States grant Canada a customs house on the coast at Skagway. In this scheme, the Canadian railway over the Skagway Pass could be internationalized. Without the option of fortifying the pass, Canada could never deny the United States access to the railway. No

34Campbell, 119.
matter what the United States did, Great Britain wanted arbitration along the lines of the Venezuelan issue of 1895-1896. In addition, Great Britain expected the United States to make concessions, in return for British concessions on the canal issue.\footnote{The Anglo-American Commission and the Alaskan Boundary, The Times (London), 27 February 1899, 8.}

Soon after the Joint High Commission's failure, London attempted to press arbitration along the lines employed in the Venezuelan boundary dispute. British diplomats realized that the British and Canadian commissioners had failed to persuade American commissioners to accept arbitration. Still, they could "see no reason why the Alaska boundary question should not be referred to arbitration", as Britain had allowed the Venezuelan matter to be settled.\footnote{Mr. Villiers to Mr. Choate, May 13, 1899, A.B.T. Vol. IV, 124-125.} Washington realized that arbitration meant a compromise between each sides' claimed line. Consequently, the Americans refused to agree to arbitration unless they were guaranteed to retain the ports on the Lynn Canal. Salisbury found this unacceptable. As a counter offer, Salisbury suggested that the United States could be guaranteed Dyea and Skagway, only if Britain was allowed to create a port at Pyramid Harbor.\footnote{Lord Salisbury to Mr. Choate, May 17, 1899, A.B.T. Vol. IV, 125.}

Acting on instruction from Washington, Choate informed Salisbury that the issue could still be settled by "direct negotiations." If not, then another possibility, suggested Choate, was a judicial tribunal. The American members of the Joint High Commission recommended such an arrangement before that body's break up. Choate explained that the proposed tribunal would be composed of six jurists, three from each side. Their decision would be totally final and based on majority vote. For the United States such an arrangement had one great advantage: a stalemate was the worst outcome. Besides
arbitration held the possibility of the United States losing "territory upon which under its authority cities and towns have been built and valuable interests and industries established without protest or objection from either Her Majesty's Government or the Canadian authorities." Choate found no justification for insuring that Pyramid Harbor be granted to Britain. To his knowledge, no Canadian or British settlement existed there. Dyea and Skagway were a different matter. Owing to the well established nature of the two ports, Choate argued that their remaining American was the only logical outcome.

Having "worked on this miserable Alaska question for six months", Hay was becoming distraught. The Secretary spent weeks dealing with Pauncefote and consulting with Senators about a possible arbitration agreement. Then, Choate informed the State Department that Salisbury would not agree to exempt Dyea and Skagway. Hay blamed counter pressure from Canada for the failure of his scheme. He lamented that "everybody dissolves to mush, the moment you want them to do anything."

At this point, Hay and Pauncefote set to work establishing a modus vivendi. The agreement between the two governments would fix a provisional line without prejudice to the claims of either party in the permanent adjustment of the international boundary." Apparently this was attempt to re-enforce the line fixed two year before for the purposes of law and order.

London forwarded the modus vivendi proposal to the Ottawa government. The Canadian Privy Council found the provisional line unacceptable. At one point the provisional line was 30 miles from the shore. Laurier's government desired a provisional

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42 Mr. Hay to Sir Julian Pauncefote, March 20, 1899, Foreign Relations 1899, 321-322.
boundary more in line with the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1825. In other words they insisted that the line follow any mountain range and never exceed ten marine leagues from the ocean.\footnote{Enclosure - Extract from a report of the committee of the honorable privy council approved by his excellency on the 30th March 1899, \textit{Foreign Relations 1899}, 323.}

Hay in a memorandum explained that to move the line as the Canadian privy council suggested would place a large number of Americans under Canadian authority. This possibility, Hay argued, would "violate the intention of the entire negotiation." The Secretary, therefore, urged the British government to accept the provisional boundary "as a temporary arrangement, without prejudice to the claims of either government."\footnote{Memorandum, July 24, 1899, \textit{Foreign Relations 1899}, 323-324.}

By summer 1899, Salisbury was continuing to insist on arbitration. The British cabinet possessed "a strong impression that no effective progress will be made in coming to an agreement . . . without the assistance of arbitration." Not surprisingly, the Prime Minister again proposed that the "Treaty of Arbitration adopted between this country and Venezuela, with the assent and largely at the insistence of the United States, shall be applied to the determination of the Alaska boundary which is now under discussion." London clearly expected the United States to accept the same sort of compromise Britain did in 1896. In the Venezuelan Arbitration agreement, Salisbury could not "find in its terms anything which is inapplicable, or which would be inconsistent with an equitable and conclusive solution of the Alaska controversy."\footnote{Lord Salisbury to Mr. Choate, July 1, 1899, \textit{A.B.T. Vol. IV}, 128-129.}

More than a month later, Choate replied for his government. In a letter to Salisbury, he maintained that the Alaskan and Venezuelan disputes were completely divergent. Britain's assertions concerning the Alaskan boundary were of a rather recent
nature. The Venezuelan issue, on the other hand, originated over one hundred fifty years before its arbitration. Choate pointed out that Great Britain and Canada at no time protested the establishment of Dyea and Skagway by the United States. Conversely, Venezuela invariably protested the establishment of British settlements on disputed land.\textsuperscript{46}

Pre-1867 Russian maps, contended Choate, placed the boundary around the heads of the inlets. At no point, he argued, did London dispute this with the Tsarist government. American, British and Canadian maps had usually marked the boundary in the same manner. Also, in the 1830's the British Hudson Bay Company, with help from the British government, leased part of the narrow strip of land from Russia. Choate found it unbelievable that a government would allow a company to lease land it felt was its own from a foreign power. Furthermore, until the late 1890's, the Alaskan boundary was the subject of diplomatic correspondence on only two occasions. All of this indicated to Choate that London and Ottawa's claims were recent to the Klondike gold rush.\textsuperscript{47}

London disagreed. Salisbury felt that the United States placed too much emphasis on the Lynn Canal region. He stated that the whole boundary from Portland Channel to Mount Saint Elias was actually undetermined. To support this, the Prime Minister pointed to various evidence. Among this, Salisbury cited President U. S. Grant's 1872 state of the union address. In the speech, Salisbury asserted, Grant intimated that the Alaskan boundary was not fully determined. Salisbury felt, officially at least, that the issue existed, but that the gold rush made its settlement necessary.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{46}Mr. Choate to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 9, 1899, \textit{A.B.T.} Vol. IV, 129-132.
\textsuperscript{47}Ibid.
In terms of arbitration, the length time concerning the dispute seemed irrelevant to Salisbury. Also, the Prime Minister deemed settlements at Dyea and Skagway as irrelevant. He argued that the settlers who settled the two ports where fully aware that they were occupying disputed territory.\textsuperscript{49}

Choate responded that, since the Alaskan issue was a matter of the interpretation of an existing treaty, arbitration was inappropriate. Then Choate returned to the American proposal of a tribunal of six jurists, three from each side, who would arrive at a final decision by majority vote. He reiterated that both Russia and Great Britain negotiated a treaty in 1825 for the purpose of excluding British access from the sea along the Alaskan panhandle. In fact, Choate pointed out, this was Russia's primary goal in the agreement. As for Salisbury's contention that the boundary had always been in dispute, Choate offered another view. Correspondence between the two nations proved that the line had yet to be properly surveyed. Washington's position was that Britain's first attempt to contest the boundary occurred after the Klondike gold rush.\textsuperscript{50} Choate's arguments were very sound. London would make no official reply for nearly two years. American policy makers knew they had the upper hand. Their settlements on the Lynn Canal were already there.

On October 20, 1899, the two governments finally agreed to re-enforce the provisional boundary with a modus vivendi. London agreed to Hay's proposal with only slight modifications.\textsuperscript{51} Meanwhile both parties concentrated more on the canal issue. By late 1900, Paunceforte was able to assure London that the boundary issue was not a

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50}Mr. Choate to Lord Salisbury, Jan. 22, 1899, \textit{A.B.T.} Vol. IV, 138-156.
\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Foreign Relations 1899}, 329-331.
pressing matter. "As regards Alaska", wrote Pauncefote. "We have breathing time thanks to the modus vivendi."\(^{52}\)

In late 1901, however, Britain and Germany embarked on a joint blockade of Venezuela. The action of the two powers was intended to force the Venezuelan government to pay their external debts. The blockade proved unpopular with both the British and American public. Opposition to the blockade by the Roosevelt administration moved Lansdowne to hasten the action's end. British foreign policy makers seemed to regret the blockade simply for the complications it caused with the Roosevelt White House. Pauncefote and Lansdowne, from this point on, attempted to negate any negative effects the blockade had on the informal entente.\(^{53}\)

With Roosevelt's entrance into the White House, Ottawa's hopes of gaining a port on the Lynn Canal began to dwindle. Roosevelt was certainly unlikely to surrender one inch of land with American settlements. Laurier realized that the war weary British, desirous of American friendship, would not stand by Canada for a "strip of frozen coastline."\(^{54}\)

With the conclusion of the canal issue, in late 1901, Pauncefote felt that the time to resolve the boundary dispute was at hand. He realized that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty created good feelings between the two countries, strengthening the unofficial entente he had done so much to construct. Bringing the Alaskan dispute to a close, would give Pauncefote the "clean slate" he desired for Anglo-American relations. Thus, he wrote Lansdowne that he "was disposed to think that it would be wise not to delay much longer

\(^{52}\)Lord Pauncefote to Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 25, 1900, F.O. 800/144, 21.


\(^{54}\)Schull, 399.
taking up the Alaska boundary." Washington was favorably disposed toward Britain because of "the Canal Treaty which has led to so happy a result." He assured Lansdowne that Roosevelt and Hay would "strain every nerve to accomplish a settlement", thus, wiping the "slate clean". Pauncfote's colleagues in the diplomatic community were nervous about the "entente cordiale". Other powers had opposed the canal treaty, hoping that it, and the rapprochement, would end with Senate rejection of the original treaty. To act at this point, according to Pauncfote, would solidify the entente before the other powers could mobilize against it. In any event, the ambassador, now in ill health, hoped to get the boundary issue settled before ending his diplomatic career.55

Lansdowne agreed fully with the British ambassador in Washington. "The conditions", Lansdowne wrote, "are favorable and indeed may never be more so." The Foreign Secretary considered the prospect "delightful" that Pauncfote could obtain a "clean slate" before the ambassador's retirement.56

Pauncfote, however, was working against time and his ever deteriorating health. By late February 1902, it was necessary for him to "take a cure" at a springs in Virginia. Extreme illness, in fact, compelled him to seek an excuse not to travel to Britain for the coronation of King Edward VII. After receiving Lansdowne's views on taking up the Alaskan issue, he intended to "resume private negotiations with Mr. Hay on the subject as soon as possible."57 However, serious illness forced Pauncfote to his bed. On May 24, 1902, the Ambassador died in his sleep of what was likely a heart attack. Lady Pauncfote received sincere letters of condolence from President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay. And,
the diplomatic community and Washington society paid their respects to the departed ambassador's family. Thus, one of the major players in turn of the century diplomacy passed from the scene.58

In July of 1902, Lord Salisbury also died. On July 29, 1902, Hay wrote a letter of congratulations to Arthur Balfour, the new Prime Minister. The letter was tempered with solemn remembrance of Balfour's uncle the departed Lord Salisbury.59 Salisbury's death, however, gave Lansdowne even more authority and freedom in the Foreign Office.

On August 18, 1902, Lansdowne finally made London's response to Choate's letter of January 22, 1900. Lansdowne explained that London had delayed because of hope that Hay was prepared to make a different proposal. It was explicitly Lansdowne's purpose for Britain's position not to appear weak compared to Choate's arguments. Lansdowne stated that the Canadian government had protested the boundary before 1898. As evidence, he cited several letters concerning such dispute laid before the Britain's Fisheries Commission. Arbitration, Lansdowne hinted, was still Britain's favored method of settlement.60

By November 1902, Lansdowne was convinced that the United States would not consent to arbitration along the lines of the Venezuelan dispute. Therefore, he was willing to push for the American scheme of a tribunal of eminent jurists. A judicial tribunal "could not do any harm." In addition, Lansdowne hoped conceding to the American scheme for a solution would divert attention from the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela.61

As 1902 drew to a close, Hay worked closely with the Senate on a treaty for a judicial settlement of the Alaskan boundary. In Washington, Herbert viewed the tribunal

58Mowat, 294-295.
60Lord Lansdowne to Mr. Raikes, Charge, Aug. 18, 1902, A.B.T. Vol. IV, 156-161.
61Lord Lansdowne to Mr. Herbert, Nov. 3, 1902, F.O. 800/144, 172-173.
plan as favorable. However, he was concerned about the composition of such a tribunal. Consequently, Herbert made his view known to the Foreign Office. Herbert strongly suggested that at least two of the American jurists should be Supreme Court justices. In addition, the idea of an all Canadian selection for the British side was to Herbert unacceptable. He suggested, in fact, that "at least two English jurists" be selected by London. In his view, the tribunal was to be a purely legal entity, invoked to impartially determine the true meaning of the 1825 Anglo-Russian treaty. Canadian feelings on the boundary issue, for Herbert, carried "no weight". Rather, the Canadians should depend on the British government to settle the issue in acceptable fashion. Following in the footsteps of Lord Pauncefote, success to Herbert meant an agreement that helped the unofficial entente. He felt the tribunal's decision should be final and acceptable to the American Senate. Thus, for Herbert, the one thing that should take precedence over the judicial approach was Anglo-American rapprochement.62

Herbert found Hay quite anxious to settle the boundary dispute. Having prepared an agreement for the settlement of the agreement by joint tribunal, Hay consulted with key senators to ensure the treaty's safe passage. Consequently, Hay felt confident of success in the Senate. Herbert wrote Lansdowne that "for the first time he [Hay] has taken all the principal Senators into his confidence beforehand, a proceeding which he admits with shame, and which he states is a bad precedent for future Secretaries of State." Feeling that the British were desperate for a settlement, Hay, despite his shame, agreed with Herbert that the best time for a settlement had arrived. On the issue of the tribunal's composition, Hay, in general, agreed with Herbert. However, Hay felt that one member for each side could be a prominent diplomat. Apparently, the he envisioned the appointment of

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62 Mr. Herbert to Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 12, 1902, F.O. 800/144, 187-190.
Ambassador Choate to the commission. Herbert again urged that the tribunal should be composed solely of eminent judicial figures. To Lansdowne, Herbert suggested extensive use of the telegraph to expedite London's approval of Hay's tribunal convention.63

Meanwhile, London seemed intent on preventing a disturbance with the United States. The Foreign Office continued to assure the Roosevelt administration of Britain's peaceful intentions in the Caribbean. Lansdowne made it a point to inform the British embassy in Washington more completely. On the boundary question, the Foreign Secretary, agreeing with Herbert, preferred a totally judicial tribunal. To Herbert, he wrote that "I agree with you in considering that it is above all important that the Tribunal should be strong in Judicial authority. He lamented that the Colonial Office would not allow them to completely exclude Canadians from the tribunal. However, he informed Herbert that it was his intention to limit the Canadians to one position on the commission.64

With the Senate's approval of Hay's treaty at hand, Herbert moved to gain the compliance of Canada. Having missed Laurier while the Canadian Prime Minister was in Washington, Herbert sent the agreement to Ottawa. Laurier sent a letter of reluctant approval. Laurier's letter urged London to appoint three Canadians to the tribunal. However, Herbert strongly pushed Lansdowne to "insist on at least two of the judges being English." If necessary, Herbert suggested that London appoint one Canadian judge and the French Canadian Sir Louis Davies. Apparently, Herbert felt Davies would be less inclined to be swayed by western Canadian economic interests. In any event, Davies knew "the case well & Canada would then have no ground for complaint."65

63Mr. Herbert to Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 19, 1902, F.O. 800/144, 196-197.
64Lord Lansdowne to Mr. Herbert, Jan. 2, 1903, F.O. 800/144, 209-211.
65Mr. Herbert to Lord Lansdowne, Jan. 7, 1903, F.O. 800/144, 214

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The Foreign Office was as anxious as Hay to get a settlement under way. Lansdowne gladly received Canada's official approval. Though he desired two British jurists, the Foreign Secretary did not want to risk losing a chance to settle the issue by pushing for at least two British tribunal members.⁶⁶

By February 11, 1903, Hay's tribunal agreement received the Senate's official ratification. Lodge's work behind the scenes insured it passage without significant alteration. Hay and Herbert were sure of the votes for the treaty's passage. However, both had feared "obstruction tactics" on the part of Pacific northwest Senators, who feared losing the exclusive shipping monopoly on the Lynn Canal to diplomatic compromise.⁶⁷

In setting up the tribunal, Washington dealt directly with London, ignoring Canada as usual. Laurier was forced by his superiors in Britain to agree to the scheme. Not surprisingly, he held little hope for his own nation's success. "It is suggested," stated Laurier, "that the American jurists will never agree to any decision which would cause loss of the disputed territory to the U.S. That may be, but this is no argument against the treaty itself. It is rather an argument against the honesty of American jurists and I can only hope that it is a slanderous insinuation."⁶⁸

On February 14, 1903, Hay informed Herbert of Roosevelt's choices as jurists. The men selected could hardly have been less judicial in temperament. First, Roosevelt selected his own Secretary of War Elihu Root. Root was an eminent judicial mind. But, his position in Roosevelt's cabinet left him little room to be impartial. Roosevelt's other two choices were even less likely to show impartiality: Roosevelt's good friend Senator Henry

⁶⁶Lord Lansdowne to Mr. Herbert, Jan. 15, 1903, F.O. 800/144, 217.
⁶⁷Mr. Herbert to Lord Lansdowne, Feb. 12, 1903, F.O. 800/144, 266.
⁶⁸Sir Wilfred Laurier, quoted in Schull, 421.
Cabot Lodge was as adamant an imperialist as the President, thus unlikely to give up any American land. Roosevelt's third choice, Senator George Turner of Washington, represented the timber and shipping interests that most vehemently opposed any compromise on the Alaskan boundary. Both Lodge and Turner were on record as stating that the Canadian argument concerning the boundary was without merit. Despite the obvious problems with these nominees, Roosevelt seemed intent on securing a favorable boundary at all costs.69

Roosevelt's selections brought on criticism. In a letter to Lansdowne, Herbert expressed displeasure, "I am naturally very sore over the President's appointments... which are not what the Secretary of State had led me to expect." When confronted by Herbert, Hay explained that Roosevelt actually believed that Root, Lodge and Turner would serve as impartial jurists. Herbert, upon hearing this, "of course had nothing more to say." Despite his sense of betrayal, Herbert laid full blame not on Hay, but on Roosevelt and the "political element". The Secretary of State, in Herbert's view, was unjustly overruled by the White House expansionists and northwestern shipping interests. Though, he deemed the appointments unjust, Herbert recommended no action on London's part. Protests by Britain or Canada, in Herbert's view "would be useless & inadvisable". In addition, he advised that London appoint legitimate impartial jurists without regard to American bad faith.70

Upon hearing about Roosevelt's appointments, Laurier was, at first, inclined to consider them a bad rumor. After confirming the information, the Canadian Prime Minister was outraged. His anger was compounded by London's insistence that Lord

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69Campbell, 310-311.
70Mr. Herbert to Lord Lansdowne, Feb. 19, 1903, F.O. 800/144, 273.
Alverstone, the Chief Justice of England, be a member of the tribunal. Laurier charged that Herbert's official correspondence indicated that American Supreme Court justices would be appointed. Though Root was clearly an eminent jurist, Laurier objected to his appointment on other grounds. Root, as Secretary of War, was a member of Roosevelt's administration. This fact, argued Laurier, confirmed that Root could not be impartial. Lodge and Turner, in Laurier's view, were politicians with long standing anti-Canadian views on the Alaskan issue and, thus, totally biased. Laurier strongly urged Herbert to protest the appointments. If the United States did not reconsider their appointments, Laurier deemed it impossible "without any share of our dignity" to "proceed at all with the case." 71

In his reply to Laurier, Herbert denied that he had "put forth" that the American jurists were to be Supreme Court justices. In this, asserted Herbert, Laurier was "not quite correct" to charge that he had misled the Canadians. Clearly, Herbert was being economical with the truth. The fact that the correspondence would be seen by Lansdowne was an indication of how little London was concerned with Ottawa's opinion. In Herbert's defense, it is hardly his fault that the Supreme Court justices refused to sit on the tribunal. Yet, Herbert was less than sympathetic with Ottawa's position. 72

As for Canada's suggestion of breaking off negotiations with Washington, Herbert was opposed. To stop the settlement process, Herbert argued, would be detrimental to the interests of all parties. He wrote that "such action on the part of Canada would create a political outcry against her throughout the United States and make the President more popular than ever." He went on to predict that the United States would unilaterally annul

71Sir Wilfred Laurier to Mr. Herbert, Feb. 20, 103, F.O. 800/144, 289-291.
72Mr. Herbert to Sir Wilfred Laurier, Feb. 23, 1903, F.O. 800/144, 285-287
the modus vivendi. In all the result "would be too grave to contemplate." Thus, in Herbert's view, Canada should acquiesce to the powerful southern neighbor for mother country's broader interests.

Privately, Herbert still felt betrayed by "men in whom I believed." To Lansdowne, he stated that "all my illusions are gone." Against hope, the diplomat sought assurances of impartiality from Lodge concerning the Senator's position on the tribunal. Lodge stated that his speeches concerning Alaska, in which he denigrated Canada's case, were of a pure political nature. Herbert was unconvinced. He knew that Lodge was an intimate friend of Roosevelt and would act in the administration's favor. Root, as a member of Roosevelt's cabinet, would certainly do likewise. Turner, Herbert reported, was likely appointed in exchange for his support for the Alaska treaty. From the state of Washington, Turner was unlikely to sell out the interests of the people he represented. All of this meant that Canada's claims were doomed. At worst, owing to a tie vote, the United States would be able to maintain the status quo. To back out of the tribunal scheme, argued Herbert, would be merely throwing away the best chance for a settlement, which for the diplomat was the "paramount" concern. The United States had acted against "the spirit of the treaty". Yet, in Herbert's view, there was little that Britain could do except show "good faith" themselves and save face in the process.  

In London, Lansdowne also was extremely dismayed by Roosevelt's selections. Unlike Herbert, he was not inclined to be so magnanimous as to suggest a more legitimate set of appointees for Britain's side. Instead, he recommended "an ex-judge, a politician of the Asquith type or Haldane type & a Canadian." Still, like Herbert, for the good of the

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73 Ibid.
74 Mr. Herbert to Lord Lansdowne, Feb. 26, 1903, F.O. 800/144, 293-297.
unofficial entente, he advocated no action to be taken to protest strongly Washington's selections. When questioned by Lansdowne concerning the appointments, Choate responded that all three men selected were lawyers and, therefore, eligible to be jurists. Lansdowne found Choate's answer rather dubious, but was unwilling to press the issue beyond a mere mention. Laurier suggested to Lansdowne that the use of espionage techniques might gain some useful "backstairs information from Washington."
Lansdowne had contempt for the idea, which he also felt would produce little of any value for the British case.\textsuperscript{75}

By March 1903, London was convinced of Roosevelt's determination to obtain a favorable settlement in the issue for the United States. Political circles in Washington displayed attitudes toward the dispute that were "more violent. Herbert was of the opinion that Roosevelt was politically unable ever to submit the boundary to "foreign arbitration."\textsuperscript{76} Consequently, Britain had reason to be concerned that the United States might establish the boundary unilaterally on American terms. As with the canal issue, the possibility of being ignored meant a serious loss of prestige. By July, Britain would have withdrawn much of its regular land forces from Canada. Increasingly, the Admiralty and the General Staff were unable to provide any hope for the defense of Canada from an attack by the United States. Thus, London policy makers were left to rely on appeasement of Washington for the existence of Canada.\textsuperscript{77}

Lodge and Turner's presence on the tribunal from Ottawa's perspective was "a direct violation of the treaty which says that impartial jurists shall be appointed."\textsuperscript{78} Still,

\textsuperscript{75} Lord Lansdowne to Mr. Herbert, Feb. 20, 1903, \textit{F.O. 800/144}, 277-278.
\textsuperscript{76} Mr. Herbert to Lord Lansdowne, March 12, 1903, \textit{F.O. 800/144}, 301-304.
\textsuperscript{77} Friedberg, 194-195.
\textsuperscript{78} Sir Wilfred Laurier, quoted in Schull, 421.
London was willing to accept the controversial appointments for the sake of gaining American friendship. To Laurier's chagrin, Chamberlain pushed through acceptance of Lodge, Root and Turner. Canada was represented by Quebec's Sir Louis Jette and A. B. Aylesworth of Toronto. The British tribunal member was Lord Alverstone, the Chief Justice of England. Both sides presented elaborate briefs with many antiquated maps to support their positions.  

Soon the press reported that Laurier was openly charging the Canadian jurists to approve only a boundary favorable to Canada. Roosevelt took the opportunity to do the same. Roosevelt instructed Root, Lodge and Turner to "of course impartially judge the questions that come before you for decision." However, in what seemed to be a charge of his own, Roosevelt laid out to the jurists his own views:

The claim so roundly asserted by Mr. Laurier - and therefore presumably to be upheld by the Canadian Commissioners that is, the claim to Skagway and Dyea, and therefore of course Pyramid Harbor, is not in my judgment one of those which can properly be considered open for discussion. The treaty of 1825 between Russia and England was undoubtedly intended to cut off England, who owned the hinterland, from access to the sea . . . There is entire room for discussion and judicial and impartial agreement as to the exact boundary in any given locality - that is as to whether in such locality the boundary is to be pushed back ten marine leagues, or whether there is in actual fact nearer the coast a mountain chain which can be considered as running parallel to it . . . In the principle involved [American monopoly on access to the sea] there will of course be no compromise.

79 Schull, 431.
80 Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge and George Turner, Members of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, March 25, 1903, Lodge, 4-5.
Thus, Roosevelt actually instructed his jurists on how far they could go in dealing with their British and Canadian counterparts.

In July, Lodge reported to Roosevelt about a favorable discussion with Alverstone. Meeting at the American embassy in London, Lodge found Alverstone "entirely obliging and not only willing but anxious to forward matters as much as possible." Clearly, Alverstone would not be the asset to Ottawa that Lord Herschell was at the Joint High Commission. Likewise, Lodge obtained assurances from Chamberlain. "The fact is", Lodge wrote, that there is no trouble at all with the English part of it. The whole difficulty comes from the Canadians . . . I think there is a strong desire [on the British part] to comply with our wishes."81

Yet, Lodge was convinced that Britain might be attempting to delay a final decision. A delay would prevent Lodge and Turner from returning to Washington for the extra session of Congress in late October. Such a delay, Lodge argued, was designed by London to gain "more amenable" terms from the United States. Lodge urged Roosevelt to threaten London with an indefinite postponement. This, according to the Senator, would bring the British back to the table.82 However, Roosevelt felt that the possibility of a favorable agreement was too great to abandon the tribunal.83

Roosevelt still made it clear to Britain that his administration would not tolerate a delay. The President did not want the Alaskan boundary to be an issue in the 1904 campaign. If an agreement could not be reached, Roosevelt was prepared to break off negotiations, appeal to Congress and "run the boundary as we deem it should be run."84

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81 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, July 30, 1903, Lodge 41-42.
82 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, June 23, 1903, Lodge, 32-33.
83 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, June 27, 1903, 34-36.
84 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, June 29, 1903, Lodge, 36-37.
Less than a month later, Roosevelt informed Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain that he was willing unilaterally fix the boundary in the event of no agreement.85 British leaders were forced to determine if standing firm was worth the costs of war or loss of prestige.

Meanwhile, Lodge wrote Lansdowne to complain about the possible delay. Lansdowne replied that he was "sure, moreover, that our representatives would not, so far as the recess is concerned, allow their private convenience to stand for moment in the way of the great public interests which are at stake." With this, Lansdowne vowed to help "expedite matters."86

As Lodge continued to negotiate with the British, Roosevelt remained continually willing to threaten London with an American unilateral settlement of the boundary. If Britain was unwilling to break with the Canadians, Roosevelt vowed "to say that the effort at an end and that the whole territory in dispute is our own; that we now occupy it; that we shall not surrender it; or hereafter discuss its surrender."87

In September, as Lodge wanted, the tribunal met for the oral arguments. Throughout the process, Lord Alverstone seemed more concerned with diplomacy than points of law. Jette and Aylesworth informed Laurier that the British jurists constantly discussed compromise with the Americans in side rooms. The Canadians also were convinced that the British were secretly pressuring Alverstone to give in the American position.88 Disgusted, Jette and Aylesworth considered quitting the tribunal. Laurier was opposed to their leaving. Instead the he suggested counter pressure on Alverstone. "Our commissioners must not withdraw", wrote Laurier. "If we are thrown over by Chief

85 Allen, 612.
86 Lord Lansdowne to Henry Cabot Lodge, Aug. 3, 1903, F.O. 800/144, 328-329.
87 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, Aug. 16, 1903, Lodge, 44-45.
88 Schull, 431.
Justice, he will give the last blow to British diplomacy in Canada. He should be plainly told this."\(^89\)

In Washington, Roosevelt caught wind of this attempt to pressure Alverstone. In a letter to Hay, Roosevelt wrote that he wondered:

> if the jacks realize that while it may be unpleasant to us, it will be far more unpleasant to them, if they force the alternative upon us; if we simply announce that the country is ours and will remain so, and that so far as it has not been reduced to possession it will be reduced to possession, and that no further negotiations in the matter will be entertained.\(^90\)

Roosevelt's statement was most likely meant for British leaders as well as the Secretary of State. Clearly, the President, facing election in his own right in 1904, had no intention of losing on the Alaskan boundary issue. To Root, he confided, that he would take "sharp issues in my message to Congress." Roosevelt felt the Canadian case was absurd. He informed Root that one could base an American argument on the "maps submitted by the British commissioners themselves." In any event, if the British failed to see it his way, he was confident that the United States could make it "a thousandfold more unpleasant for them."\(^91\)

However, Lord Alverstone was willing to agree to most of the American interpretation of the boundary. In private consultations with Lodge and Root, Alverstone negotiated a possible compromise. Namely, he was inclined to vote with the American jurists on the issue of the line running around the heads of the inlets, which left Canada without access to the sea. Still, Alverstone wanted Washington to accept the British

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\(^89\)Sir Wilfred Laurier, quoted in Schull, 431.
\(^90\)Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, Sept. 21, 1903, Morison, 603.
\(^91\)Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, Oct. 3, 1903, Morison, 610-613.
interpretation of the Portland Channel. Though a compromise, the plan heavily favored the American view of the boundary.

Though still quite bombastic, Roosevelt was willing to compromise on non essentials. The President informed Lodge that it was fine to agree with Alverstone on smaller matters as long as the Englishman upheld the main American contention that the boundary went "around the heads of the inlets." Roosevelt felt the British had "no case whatsoever." Therefore, a small concession would help Alverstone "save his face and bring an adjustment." Still, on the essentials, Roosevelt felt that no compromise could be made. Nothing, in the President's view, was going to keep American interests from its monopoly access to the sea.

On October 20, 1903, the tribunal handed down its final decision, which heavily favored the American interpretation of the 1825 treaty (See Appendix A). Lord Alverstone's vote swayed the decision in Washington's direction. Reaction in Canada was immediate and furious. Outraged Canadian officials and the public accused the British of selling them out to Roosevelt in exchange for American friendship.

The Alaskan boundary issue was much like the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. In both cases, British leaders finally relented for two reasons. First, the basic strategic and diplomatic need for the best possible Anglo-American relations. As in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, Britain even proved willing to sacrifice the interests of others in order to solidify the unofficial entente. Second, Britain had no choice but to give in. The British Admiralty and General Staff were well aware of the Empire's inability to defend Canada.

92 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, Sept. 24, 1903, Lodge, 57-59.
93 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, Oct. 5, 1903, Morison, 616.
94 Schull, 431-432.
Thus, as Roosevelt threatened independent action, Britain was faced with either acquiescence or being ignored by the United States. Weary from the Boer War, London was in no position to force its view of the boundary issue. It was, therefore, in Britain's interests to see things Washington's way. Certainly, Britain resisted. British foreign policy makers hoped this resistance would gain some significant concession from the United States, as well as save face. Yet, at the moment of truth, Britain surrendered the diplomatic struggle to the United States.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1895-1905

With a settlement in the Alaskan boundary controversy, Britain and the United States sealed their unofficial entente. The friendship between the two powers, established at the turn of the century, laid the foundation for cooperation in two World Wars. By 1905, the association was stronger than ever. The unofficial nature of the entente was largely the result of the proclivity of both nations to avoid alliances with other powers. Furthermore, Roosevelt worked hard to keep the tie discreet. Some evidence indicates that he likely would have sought a more concrete agreement, as did Japan, but feared backlash from Irish and German-American voters and interests.¹ Still, the younger expansionist generation had considerable veneration for the British example. This anglophile constituency potentially represented resistance to the will of anti-British factions in the American electorate. Most scholars cite an array of reasons why the Anglo-American entente was never formalized in a military alliance. It appears probable that neither party

had much to gain from a formal alliance at the time. The Anglo-Japanese agreement was aimed at Russian expansion in Asia. No other power besides Britain and the United States was poised for dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, no threat existed that would merit such a concrete alliance.

Another major factor was likely Roosevelt's obsession with secrecy. At a time when he was expanding executive power, Roosevelt felt the need to conduct most of his diplomacy on a personal basis, leaving few paper trails.\(^2\) This, of course, presents problems for historians studying his foreign policy. A formal alliance would meet opposition in the Senate on the basis of its break with the American tradition of no entangling alliances.

In 1904, the British aided the Roosevelt administration in settling peace between Russia and Japan. Yet, as Bradford Perkins described it, the settling of the two great issues, the canal and Alaskan boundary, "opened the way to steady, almost silent relations from 1903 until Sarajevo."\(^3\) Great Britain benefited from good feelings in many ways. Dependence upon American naval power enabled British strategists to allocate more force for other areas of the globe. Britain could focus its attention more on the European powers, including the rising force of Imperial Germany. Less money spent securing interests in the Western Hemisphere relieved Britain's financial woes. Yet, all of these benefits required a heavy price.

Around 1900, British naval leaders were compelled by other world fleets to redefine mastery of the seas. At this point, the Royal Navy no longer could guarantee superiority over all foreign navies in all oceans and seas. Germany's growing North Sea

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\(^2\)Ibid., 37-38, 43-44.
\(^3\)Perkins, 7.
fleet was a threat to the home islands. Russia and France were spending huge sums to
build more modern navies. On the other side of the globe from Europe, Japan and the
United States were also building formidable naval forces. Japan's victory in 1896 over
China marked its emergence as a military and naval power. Likewise, the United States
scored a stunning victory in its war with Spain in 1898. These powers had one advantage
over Britain. They could concentrate their naval might in one or two crucial areas. But
Great Britain had naval obligations all over the Earth. Therefore, Britain, with its focus on
Europe, could no longer afford conflict in the Pacific or the Atlantic. Without the means
to build an even greater navy, London adopted a policy of appeasement. In this, Britain
recognized Japanese and American relative superiority in the Pacific and Western
Hemisphere. With Japan this policy resulted in actual alliance in 1902. With the United
States necessitated giving in to American demands on several issues, most notably, the
American's desire for their own canal and an Alaskan boundary favorable to American
interests. Britain's willingness to sell out colonies to American interests demonstrated how
far London's appeasement would go. On that basis, the United States and Great Britain
entered into an era of unofficial entente.

But the friendship between Britain and America was far more than the result of
British neediness. The turn-of-the-century discussed in this study marked a massive rise in
American power capability. As a trading nation, the United States, along with Germany,
was at forefront of challenging Britain, the first industrial power, in terms of manufacturing
and commerce. Likewise, the American nation was emerging as a colonial, naval and
military power. The upsurge of American power was something Britain was in no position
to ignore. Anglo-American relations drastically changed from 1895 to 1905.
In many areas of the globe, Britain and the United States had similar, if not identical interests. In the Pacific, for instance, both nations desired a balance of power that would insure free trade. In the Western Hemisphere, however, Britain and America were contenders for supremacy.

In 1895 and 1896, the United States first challenged Britain over the Venezuelan boundary dispute. American victory in that issue, however, was largely the result of German intervention. With the Hay-Pauncefote treaty and the Alaskan boundary variance, the resulting American triumph was of a quite different nature. In both cases, American power, not a combination of the United States and another power, proved responsible for Britain's inability to resist American ultimatums. The threat of American unilateral abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was real because Britain did not possess the strength to prevent it. Preoccupied by her strategically overextended empire and, more particularly, the Boer War, Great Britain's appearance was stronger than her reality.

The United States was also in a superior position when it came to the Alaskan boundary. American settlements at the head of Lynn Canal were an established fact. The British military establishment stated clearly to London that Canada could not be defended from attack by the United States. Armed again with the threat of ignoring Britain, Washington held the trump card. In neither instance could Britain afford to have their rights blatantly disregarded. Nor could London muster the needed strength, militarily or diplomatically, to fully resist the United States. Anyway, London's policy makers realized the price was not worth the possible benefits. The Salisbury and Balfour governments were compelled by the Roosevelt administration to relinquish supremacy in the Western Hemisphere.
Britain's role in the two dramas was to resist enough to possibly gain better terms, without incurring a break in Anglo-American relations. Both the Salisbury and Balfour governments were concerned with the domestic political repercussions that appeasing the United States could bring about. Likewise, no resistance to the Americans would mean a distinct loss of prestige among the other great powers. Note that when Salisbury's government rejected the amended version of the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty, they were sure to encourage new negotiations on the matter. Likewise, when the Joint High Commission adjourned in 1899, Lord Herschell received approval from Salisbury to continue negotiations with Washington on a personal basis. At no point, in either issue, did London consider just simply rejecting the United States' policy goals. So British policy makers had to strike a balance between resistance and acquiescence to American demands.

Conversely, the American role was largely that of an aggressor. American policy makers, in both issues, continually used the threat of unilateral action to move London toward the American point of view. John Hay personally desired not to see the Clayton-Bulwer treaty unilaterally abrogated. Still, the Secretary of State was not above using the threat to move London back to the table. Theodore Roosevelt made extensive use of this tactic. The robust President threatened, for instance, to run the boundary of Alaska the American way, without reference to London's opinion.

Like the British, Washington's leaders were affected by domestic political concerns. The Senate Foreign Relations committee was dominated by imperialists like Henry Cabot Lodge. Therefore, any treaty that passed the Senate had to re-enforce America's new role as a world power. It is no surprise that the Senate amended the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty so heavily. Without the right to fortify a potential canal, American expansionists and navalists could see little reason to build one. In a rare alliance with imperialists, anti-
imperialists also helped reject the canal treaty. Yet, when the treaty met American expansionist standards, the imperialist voice in the Senate proved overwhelming.

In the boundary dispute, Washington had to reckon with shipping and timber interests in the Pacific North West. American shippers and timber men benefited greatly from the Klondike gold boom. These economic interests were opposed to any compromise that would threaten their near monopoly in access to the Lynn Canal. Senator Turner's presence on the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal represented the voice of this powerful set of interests.

In both issues, interests seemed to be the major factor, not moral or legal advantage. American advocates of a interoceanic canal had little moral or legal justification for unilaterally abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. These advocates and Roosevelt, in particular, placed more emphasis on American strategic and economic interests. They were willing to go forward without a British concession because it was the best thing, in their view, for the United States.

Though Washington possessed the moral and legal high ground during the Alaskan boundary dispute, interests still were the prime motivators. Canada and Great Britain made little effort to adjust the boundary across the heads of the inlets until the gold rush of 1896. Even with more legal and moral ground, it would be difficult for one to imagine the United States giving up lucrative settlements long established on the Lynn Canal. As with the canal issue, American interests were unlikely to be compromised. Britain proved unable to either gain arbitration in the Venezuelan mold or a concession on the boundary in exchange for abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This failure demonstrated Washington's unwillingness to compromise on economic and strategic interests. Unfortunately for London, the United States was in a position to be so recalcitrant. Britain
did not possess adequate power to overwhelm the American position. The United States, on the other hand, held ample power and position to secure supremacy in the Caribbean and North America in general.

For the most part, the major players seemed aware of this relative power imbalance. In Washington, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge clearly felt the United States could unilaterally abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and run the Alaskan boundary their way without consequence. Though not desiring a diplomatic rupture, Hay knew that unilateral action, especially in the canal treaty, was a distinct possibility. Having several English friends, including Lord Pauncefote, Hay may have wanted to avoid such a dishonorable outcome. Still, the Secretary used the threat of unilateral action very effectively, owing to its real potential.

Clinging to splendid isolation, Lord Salisbury was among the least willing to accept reality. His departure in 1900 from the Foreign Office left the more realistic Lord Lansdowne as Britain's primary foreign policy maker. Private letters between Lord Lansdowne and Lord Pauncefote indicate a clear awareness of Britain's weak position. As noted in Chapter One, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour strongly desired to keep Britain's naval weakness in the Western Hemisphere a secret. Privately, British leaders discussed their power imbalance with the United States. This has probably caused historians to underestimate the role of American power in the making of Anglo-American rapprochement. The fact that no major historian, to this writer's knowledge, has made use of the F.O. 800 series of Foreign Office private and secret correspondence is at least partially responsible for this simplification. Granted, many scholars wrote their work before the collection was discovered or made available by London's public record office.
Scholars tend to put more emphasis on Britain's fear of Germany and, resulting need of friendship. Though there is considerable merit to this interpretation, Germany's role is often overestimated. Imperial Germany's creation in 1871 certainly altered the balance of power in Europe. At the turn of the century, however, British leaders were considering an alliance with Germany. Kaiser William II possessed the premier land force on the globe. But as Aaron Friedberg pointed out, until near the end of this study's period, Britain was primarily concerned with the naval might of Russia and France. Near the end of the new century's first decade, two factors changed this scenario. First, France and Russia became partners in the grand entente. Second, Germany increased its naval build up and began construction of Dreadnought class battleships. In the period 1895-1905, leaders in Washington and London could not have foreseen either of these occurrences. Most likely, historians have looked at turn of the century Anglo-American relations with too much an eye toward cooperation in the first World War. Historical inquiries should never ignore the role of the growing strength of other powers and Britain's over extension. Still, to largely ignore the power and position of the United States is equally simplistic. In fact, it falls into the trap of viewing the United States from a European perspective as peripheral.

The other simplification that scholars have fallen into is to portray relations as too friendly during the period. Certainly, there was some cooperation. For example, the United States, despite factions supporting the Boers, stayed neutral during the Boer War. Britain returned the favor when the American nation declared war on Spain in 1898. Still, relations between the two powers were quite rocky at times. Ironically, some scholars portray the period as enormously friendly. These writers blame the complexity of the

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4Friedberg, 189-190.
diplomatic issues for the time period it took the powers to resolve the issues. In *An Ocean Apart*, Dimbleby and Reynolds described the American effort to secure its goal as working through "an atmosphere of good will to solve its . . . outstanding disputes with Britain." This view contrasts sharply with American actions in the period from 1895 to 1905. One could hardly depict the American threats of unilateral action in both major issues as examples of good will.

Surely, the United States experienced great success in wresting these two concessions from Great Britain. The victories in the canal and Alaskan questions demonstrated the United States' arrival as a world power. And, that success was gained from a position of relative strength. Britain's failures to obtain better agreements were the result of relative weakness in the Western Hemisphere. Certainly, this weakness was the result of both American power growth and Britain's overextension. Interestingly, the British sources used in this study reveal leaders, namely Lansdowne and Pauncefote, who credit relative American strength with their nation's inability to resist American demands.

One could easily see the canal and boundary issues as failures for Britain. Yet, in light of the relative power imbalance, British leaders probably did the best they could to save face. Furthermore, with American friendship, Britain obtained a valuable asset. At the risk of looking too far ahead, this asset enabled them to concentrate naval force elsewhere and eventually provided a basis for aid in the struggle with Germany.

Of the two issues, the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was the most crucial. The Alaskan dispute was largely the result of the gold rush. It had considerable impact on Canada's economy. But, Britain had little to gain if they were able to resist American will. By the British estimate, the canal would double the strength of the American navy. Furthermore,

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5Dimbleby and Reynolds, 35.
as Pauncefote pointed out, the other powers were adamantly opposed to such a strategically acute concession being made by Britain. In essence, Britain resolved to depend on American good will to maintain their interests in the Western Hemisphere.

Though strategic and diplomatic factors largely compelled Britain to defer to the United States, other forces aided the push toward friendship. On a personal level, both John Hay and Lord Pauncefote, considerable admirers of each other's nations, were dedicated to developing friendly Anglo-American relations. In addition, the United States and Britain were fortunate to possess certain cultural affinities, namely a common language. In the process of written diplomatic discourse, one would be hard pressed to overestimate the value of a common language. It most likely aided in avoiding many possible misunderstandings. Other cultural factors are less tangible. Many leaders on both sides probably agreed with Chamberlain's view of the British and American people as the same "flesh and blood." Roosevelt and Lodge certainly adhered to Anglo-Saxonism. And, marital alliances were being formed between the American economic and the British noble elites. Still, American policy makers were clearly more concerned with the real interests involved when it came to formulating foreign policy.

For Americans like Roosevelt, the British offered a model of how to build a strong navy and empire. Appreciation of this example, did not prevent Washington from asserting its own goals. Roosevelt, in particular, seemed to be aware that the time had come for the United States to supersede its elder, at least in the Western Hemisphere.

In conclusion, rapprochement occurred at an interesting crossroads in the histories of both powers. The Spanish-American and Boer wars demonstrated respectively American strength and British weakness. In addition to the rise of the United States, the

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6Joseph Chamberlain, Quoted in Massie, 239.
ascension of Japan and Germany made London even more aware of their relative decline. The United States, a nation of several cultural affinities and a common language, presented London with a challenge to supremacy in the North and Central America. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty and the Alaskan boundary dispute were the most serious aspects of that challenge. In both cases, the United States bargained from a position of relative strength. Britain had no choice but to recognize the reality of American supremacy, and her need for friendship in a hostile world.
APPENDIX A

(Source: Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903, 67.)

The Alaskan Boundary Dispute
APPENDIX B
(Source: United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations 1899.*

Lynn Canal Region
APPENDIX C

The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901
(Source: United States, Department of State, Correspondence, 292-294)

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN TO FACILITATE THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SHIP CANAL.

Signed at Washington, November 15, 1901; ratification advised by the Senate, December 16, 1901; ratified by the President, December 20, 1901; ratified by Great Britain, January 30, 1902; ratifications exchanged at Washington, February 22, 1902; proclaimed, February 22, 1902.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas, a Convention between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to facilitate the construction of a ship canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by whatever route may be considered expedient, and to that end to remove any objection which may arise out of the Convention of the 19th April, 1850, commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, to the construction of such canal under the auspices of the Government of the United States, without impairing the "general principle" of neutralization established in Article VIII of that Convention, was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at the city of Washington on the 18th day of November, 1901, the original of which Convention is word for word as follows:

The United States of America and His Majesty Edward the Seventh, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, and Emperor of India, being desirous to facilitate the construction of a ship canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by whatever route may be considered expedient, and to that end to remove any objection which may arise out of the Convention of the 19th April, 1850, commonly called the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, to the construction of such canal under the auspices of the Government of the United States, without impairing the "general principle" of neutralization established in Article VIII of that Convention, have for that purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States, John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States of America;

And His Majesty Edward the Seventh, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, and Emperor of India, the Right Honourable Lord Pauncefote, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—
ARTICLE I.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the present Treaty shall supersede the aforementioned Convention of the 19th April, 1850.

ARTICLE II.

It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of the Government of the United States, either directly at its own cost, or by gift or loan of money to individuals or Corporations, or through subscription to or purchase of stock or shares, and that, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, the said Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal.

ARTICLE III.

The United States adopts, as the basis of the neutralization of such ship canal, the following Rules, substantially as embodied in the Convention of Constantinople, signed the 28th October, 1885, for the free navigation of the Suez Canal, that is to say:

1. The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these Rules, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable.

2. The canal shall never be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within it. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder.

3. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not receive nor take any stores in the canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the Regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service. Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same Rules as vessels of war of the belligerents.

4. No belligerent shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the canal, except in case of accidental hindrance of the transit, and in such case the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch.

5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to waters adjacent to the canal, within 3 marine miles of either end. Vessels of war of a belligerent shall not remain in such waters longer than twenty-four hours at any one time, except in case of distress, and in such case shall depart as soon as possible; but a vessel of war of one belligerent shall not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a vessel of war of the other belligerent.

6. The plant, establishments, buildings, and all works necessary to the construction, maintenance, and operation of the canal shall
be deemed to be part thereof, for the purposes of this Treaty, and in time of war, as in time of peace, shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents, and from acts calculated to impair their usefulness as part of the canal.

**ARTICLE IV.**

It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of the international relations of the country or countries traversed by the before-mentioned canal shall affect the general principle of neutralization or the obligation of the High Contracting Parties under the present Treaty.

**ARTICLE V.**

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by His Britannic Majesty; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington or at London at the earliest possible time within six months from the date hereof.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and thereto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Washington, the 18th day of November, in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and one.

John Hay [seal]

Edwin D. Morgan [seal]

And Whereas the said Convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratification of the two Governments were exchanged in the city of Washington on the twenty-first day of February, one thousand nine hundred and two.

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, have caused the said Convention to be made public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-second day of February, in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and two, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-sixth.

[seal]

By the President:

Theodore Roosevelt

John Hay

Secretary of State.
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Vita

Richard Keith Lilly was born in Pearisburg, Virginia on June 30, 1968. He is the son of Thomas L. Lilly of Beckley, West Virginia and Linda M. Lilly of Jumping Branch, West Virginia. As a child, he began his life long interest in history. A 1986 high school graduate, Mr. Lilly worked in a family business until continuing his studies in 1989.

In 1993, he graduated summa cum laude from Concord College with a Bachelor of Arts degree in History and Political Science. In the fall of 1994, Mr. Lilly began graduate studies at Virginia Tech. While at Virginia Tech, he performed research in a variety of diplomatic, military and political topics, including the Western Virginia Campaign of 1861, Hessian plundering in the American Revolutionary War, the origins of the Spanish-American War and the Divine Right of Kings. On June 17, 1996, Mr. Lilly completed his Master of Arts degree by successfully defending his thesis, a study of turn-of-the-century Anglo-American diplomacy.

Mr. Lilly is a member of the Southern Historical Association and the Riverview Baptist Church. Currently, Mr. Lilly lives in Giles County, Virginia with his wife Teresa and son Jameson.

Richard Keith Lilly