The Indian Neutral Barrier State Project:
British Policy Towards the Indians
South and Southeast of the Great Lakes
1783-1796
by
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Introduction

The American Revolution caused drastic changes not only in America but also in Great Britain. The period 1783-1796 was in fact a pivotal time in British history. According to traditional accounts, the Peace of Paris of 1783 marked the end of the first British Empire and the beginning of the second. How Great Britain dealt with imperial questions during this period strongly influenced whether the British Empire would survive the loss of its American colonies. Besides facing European problems like the French Revolution, Britain had to determine the kind of relationship it wanted with its former colonies, the United States of America. The political decisions of this period established precedents for future relations between the mother country and its colonies and for the later dissolution of such bonds.

In treating Anglo-American diplomacy during the years 1783-1796, such respected American historians as Samuel Flagg Bemis and Bradford Perkins have paid only lip-service to the seriousness of the British attempts to retain the frontier posts along the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain.\(^1\) In 1792, British officials proposed a dual-purpose plan, the Indian neutral barrier state project, to serve as both their colonial policy regarding Canada and their foreign policy towards the United States. The barrier state project consisted of the creation of a barrier state between Canada and the

United States. This state would be reserved for Indian use only--no white settlements would be permitted--and the Indians would remain self-governing. All of the territory for the barrier state would come from the territory that Great Britain had ceded to the United States in the Peace Treaty of 1783. Bemis and Perkins view this British plan as a subterfuge, although it exercised a strong influence over Anglo-American relations between the 1783 Treaty of Paris and the execution of the Jay-Grenville Treaty in 1796.

British historians of the years 1783-1796, such as Richard Pares and J. Steven Watson, have devoted more attention to home affairs than to imperial matters because of the changing of the political balance between the King and Parliament and because the prime minister of that period, William Pitt the Younger, emphasized domestic rather than imperial policy.\(^2\) In addition, other historians of those years, such as R. K. Webb, William B. Willcox and Walter L. Arnstein, have focused on Britain's reaction to and involvement in the Wars of the French Revolution.\(^3\) Because most British historians have concentrated their research on either domestic policy or European affairs, no one has yet made a serious study of the Indian neutral barrier state from the British perspective.

One of the more important aspects of the British interpretation of the barrier state plan was the split between the British officials in Canada and the imperial government at London. Canadian officials whole heartedly adopted the barrier state plan. Control over the fur trade and the safety of Canada from Indian raids were their primary concerns. They believed the United States could be forced to accept the barrier state project in exchange for Great Britain's absolving American citizens from their pre-1783 debts to British merchants. The home ministry, however, was not as serious about the barrier state project as the Canadian officials. London politicians desired America's compliance with the Peace Treaty more than continued control of the North American fur trade and the Indians.


This thesis emphasizes the British perspective in order to balance the traditional American interpretation of Great Britain's refusal to abdicate its control over the trans-Appalachian region. The purpose of this thesis is to trace the development of the barrier state plan, to explore the political decisions behind Britain's use of it, and to explain why the United States never agreed to the proposal.
Chapter I: Confusion and Indecision

By the Peace of Paris of 1763, Great Britain obtained French Canada, including territory between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. At the same time that Britain assumed responsibility for the wealth of the region, Britain also acquired responsibility for the area's native and immigrant peoples, red and white alike. For the next sixty years, the question of how best to provide for French and British Canadians and Indians between the Great Lakes and the Appalachians troubled British politicians at Westminster.

Before 1763, French settlement in Canada had never reached the level of British settlement in the Atlantic seaboard colonies. For the most part, Britain continued the French policy of

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4 Present day Canada and the trans-Appalachian region were, at the time Britain obtained them, considered one region, and not two distinct regions. This conception changed during the 1780s.

5 Throughout this work "Indian", unless otherwise noted, will refer to all the Indians living in the region around the Great Lakes, south to the Ohio River, west to the Mississippi River, and east to the Atlantic slope of the Appalachian Mountains. This region includes western New York and western Pennsylvania. For simplicity, "Great Lakes/ Ohio River" will refer to the above defined region throughout this work, unless otherwise noted. "Six Nations" and "Eastern Indians" refers to those Indians, living in western New York and western Pennsylvania and after the American Revolution along the Grand River in Canada, who belonged to the Iroquois Confederacy. These tribes were the Mohawks, the Senecas, the Oneidas, the Onondagas, the Cayugas, and the Tuscaroras. "Western Indians" and "Northwestern Indians" refer to those Indians living north of the Ohio River, south of the Great Lakes, east of the Mississippi River, and west of New York and Pennsylvania. These tribes included the Shawnees, the Miamis, the Hurons, the Ottawas, the Delawares, the Sauks, the Foxes, the Kickapoos, the Wyandottes, the Winnebagos, the Pottawatomies, the Illinois, the Menominees, and the Eries.

maintaining commercial ties with the Indians and making large profits from the fur trade.7 The British utilized the extensive network of river trade routes throughout the Great Lakes/Ohio River region but allowed the Indians to handle their own local affairs.

Great Britain’s continuance of French policy conflicted with the previous British policy of white settlement. On the one hand, the Indians were a necessary link in the fur trade. On the other hand, British colonists were eager to settle Indian lands west of the Appalachian Mountains. The British Proclamation of 17638 tried to avert a clash between the Indians and the colonists. Between 1763 and 1776 the colonists protested their exclusion from the rich lands west of the Appalachians.9 Theoretically, British troops enforced the law that colonists remain east of the Proclamation Line.10 In practice, however, many colonists ignored the Proclamation Line. The British home government’s determination to keep the two cultures apart was an underlying cause of the American Revolution, since it caused deep resentment on the part of colonists who wished to settle west of the Appalachian Mountains.11 The Peace Treaty of 1783, ending the American

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7 Throughout this work “fur trade” will refer to the exchange of agricultural and/or manufactured goods for furs between merchants and trappers. The merchants were usually Europeans but some were half-breeds. The majority of trappers were Indians but a few were Europeans.

8 The Proclamation of 1763 set up four new colonies: Quebec, East Florida, West Florida, and Grenada, from the territory assigned to Great Britain by the Peace of Paris of 1763. The Proclamation also established an Indian reserve between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River and to the south of the Great Lakes. White settlers could no longer buy land directly from the Indians; only the government in London had the authority to purchase land. Those settlers who had already moved west of the mountains had to return to the eastern colonies and only those traders with a government license could trade with the Indians. A. Shortt and A. G. Doughty, Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada: 1759-1791 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1914), pp. 163-168. See also, Report 1889, pp. 77-79.

9 The Quebec Act of 1774 annexed the part of the Indian reserve, created by the Proclamation of 1763, north of the Ohio River to Quebec.

10 See Appendix C.

Revolution, assigned the area between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River and to the south of the Great Lakes to the new American republic. Although Great Britain formally ceded this territory, it retained possession of the region until 1796 because neither the Americans nor the British fully complied with the Peace Treaty. Britain's influence with the Indians of this area continued until after the War of 1812.

The loss of Britain's Atlantic seaboard colonies dealt a severe blow to her colonial policy and British politicians did not know how to proceed. The formulation of policy towards its remaining North American colonies caused particular problems because of the close proximity of the United States. Fearful that revolutionary ideas from the United States might contaminate Canada and the British West Indies, officials at London and Quebec decided to limit the colonials' contact with the American republic. At the same time, British officials encouraged refugee Loyalists to settle permanently in Canada. Eventually, British leaders achieved a pragmatic solution to this contradiction by limiting commercial interchange with the United States and by insisting on oaths of loyalty to the British crown from all immigrants. The Indians posed more intractable problems.

During the American Revolution most of the Indian tribes of the Great Lakes/Ohio River region sided with Great Britain. British promises of care and protection and the land-hunger of the seaboard colonists reinforced the Indians' loyalty during the hostilities. In an admitted violation of the 1783 Treaty, Britain retained actual control of the region, declining to surrender to the United States the major forts along the Great Lakes. These forts were located at Niagara, Detroit, Michilimackinac, Oswego, Oswegatchie, Point au fer, and Dutchman's Point. The Indians had helped Britain maintain her position of strength during the war in the west and expected rewards with the coming of peace—even though Britain lost the conflict. As early as September 1781, the Indian nations south of Lake Erie solicited British support in repulsing the advance of American

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13 See Appendix C for the location of each of the forts.

Chapter I: Confusion and Indecision
settlers. Determined to keep their lands at any cost, these Indians warned the British that the Americans would not be content until they possessed all the Indian lands.\textsuperscript{14}

The months between the end of hostilities and the conclusion of a peace treaty were confusing ones on the frontier. The delay in communications between Quebec and London often caused a three-month lag during which colonial officials in British North America were unsure of London’s Indian policy and of what should be their own response to reiterated Indian requests for support against American settlement. Because the fur trade depended upon Indian trappers, the Indians had a powerful economic lever. Although profits from the fur trade declined during the war, traders expected them to revive with the peace.\textsuperscript{15} Whoever guided the Indians politically would also govern the fur trade. Since the British and French Canadians wanted to reserve the fur trade for themselves, they were anxious to formalize their control over the Indians and the area. British North American officials worried that the peace negotiators, working in Europe and unfamiliar with the Canadian situation, would not give sufficient consideration to Britain’s Indian allies. The commanders of the northwest posts feared Indian reprisals if Great Britain handed the Indians over to the jurisdiction of their American enemies.\textsuperscript{16} The political situation in London justified these fears.

The British defeat during the War of the American Revolution caused serious political repercussions in the British Isles. Lord North’s administration of 1770-1782 came to an end because of his supposed mismanagement of the war.\textsuperscript{17} The new prime minister, the Marquess of Rockingham, managed to form a ministry on March 27, 1782, out of divergent groups. The peace negotiations became the responsibility of William Petty, Earl of Shelburne, Rockingham’s principal


\textsuperscript{17} William Cobbett, Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803 (London: T.C. Hansard, 1816; reprint ed., New York: Ams Press, 1966) 22: 985-999, 1114-1150, 1170-1211, 1214-1241. Another repercussion of the defeat was the abolition of the office of Colonial Secretary in 1782. At the same time, the two Secretaries of State became the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary. In addition, the duties of the Colonial Secretary were transferred to the Home Secretary.
Secretary of State. Shelburne professed himself to be adamantly opposed to American independence, but the preliminary peace talks at Paris eventually convinced him that independence was the only basis on which the Americans would be willing to sign a treaty.\textsuperscript{18}

Shelburne sent James Oswald as the British agent to conduct the peace talks at Paris. Historians have generally condemned the selection of Oswald as the main British representative in Paris. Although Oswald was not a top level diplomat and had no personal knowledge of the Canadian situation, information about the situation in Canada was readily available through Governor General Haldimand's dispatches detailing the general state of Canada, the fur trade, and Indians affairs.\textsuperscript{19} While there is no evidence to indicate that Oswald used these dispatches, it is reasonable to assume that during negotiations of such importance these papers would have been made available to him. Certainly, the Earl of Shelburne, as Home Secretary and therefore the minister in charge of the peace negotiations, had access to them.

The Earl of Shelburne, unlike the Canadians, did not consider the fur trade important. The prime minister considered only the profitability of the fur trade for Britain and not its importance for the Canadian economy. According to Shelburne, the fur trade produced an annual revenue of £50,000 on yearly expenses of £800,000.\textsuperscript{20} Neither did he consider Britain's obligations to her defeated Indian allies nor the safety of Englishmen living on the Canadian frontier.

When the Marquess of Rockingham died on July 1, 1782, Shelburne succeeded him as prime minister even though he did not command a majority in the House of Commons. His archrival, Charles James Fox, promptly resigned his position as the second principal Secretary of State in order to lead the opposition. Because Shelburne enjoyed the confidence of the King, George III refused to heed the House of Commons' demand for Shelburne's resignation.\textsuperscript{21} In this atmosphere

\textsuperscript{18} Parliamentary History 23: 193.


\textsuperscript{20} Parliamentary History 23: 409.

\textsuperscript{21} King George III's insistence on keeping the Earl of Shelburne as his prime minister is an example of the continuance of the royal power. Parliamentary History 23: 135-139, 152-201.
of political antagonism, Shelburne introduced the terms of the preliminary peace treaty with the United States.

The preliminary peace negotiations in Paris got off to an uncertain start. The French foreign minister, the Count de Vergennes, tried to block a rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain. France did not want the United States to gain the lands west of the Appalachians because it wanted the United States to remain dependent on it. If Great Britain gave the United States the Mississippi and Ohio river valleys and western New York and Pennsylvania, the Americans might be able to capture the trade of the region from France's ally Spain. An enlarged United States would also be better able to develop its own economy, thereby making it a less dependable market for French goods. In addition, France did not want to run the risk that the United States would become a strong political rival. On their part, the American commissioners decided to conclude a treaty with Great Britain behind France's back—a direct violation of their instructions from Congress. Fortunately for their political and diplomatic future, they were able to arrange advantageous terms once removed from France's manipulations. France was informed of the concluded treaty immediately after the preliminary articles were signed on November 30, 1782.22

The Definitive Treaty of Peace of 1783 confirmed the Preliminary Peace Treaty. It attempted to remove obstacles to a rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain by addressing the five main differences: American independence, the U.S.-Canadian border, compensation to Loyalists for goods confiscated by American Patriots during the war, return of or compensation for slaves, and payment of American debts owed to English merchants. The clauses of the preliminary peace of greatest interest to the Canadian officials responsible for dealing with the Indians were Articles II and VII.23

Article II stipulated that the boundary between the United States and Canada extend

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from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia... formed by a line drawn due north, from the source of St. Croix river to the Highlands... which divide those rivers that empty... into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic ocean, to the north-westernmost head of Connecticut river; thence... to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude; from thence... due west... [to] the river Iroquois or Cataraquy; thence... [to] lake Ontario;24

thence through each of the Great Lakes in succession to the Lake of the Woods; thence due west to the headwaters of the Mississippi River; down the Mississippi River to the thirty-first degree latitude; thence to the Apalachicola river; thence to the source of the Saint Mary's river; thence to the Atlantic Ocean.24 Because of the immense territory awarded the United States, the latter theoretically gained jurisdiction over Britain's Indian allies, over the river routes of communication, and the traditional fur routes. Article VII specified that the British monarch,

with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any negroes, or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets, from the said United States, and from every port, place, and harbor within the same, leaving in all fortifications the American artillery that may be therein...25

This meant that Britain must transfer ownership of the frontier posts to the United States, something it was reluctant to do.

The preliminary terms of the peace treaty caused an outcry when revealed to the House of Commons. Charles James Fox took the lead in condemning Shelburne for the treaty. One member after another attacked the prime minister for sacrificing Britain's honor by being overly generous to the United States in order to secure a peace settlement. Many accused him of forgetting Britain's faithful American supporters, the Indians and the Loyalists. Most complained that American independence was too high a price to pay for peace. They declared that some sort of reunion was still possible and that little effort had been made to conciliate the Americans. Despite


25 The source of the Mississippi River was not to the west of the Lake of the Woods, as the commissioners mistakenly believed, but far to the south. Hence this last provision of the Treaty was impracticable. Many in Canada were aware of this geographical mistake and regarded it as proof that a Canadian official should have been sent to negotiate the boundary.

26 Parliamentary History 23: 358.
opposition, the prime minister rammed ratification of the Peace Treaty through Parliament. However, opposing factions soon united to force the resignation of Shelburne's ministry, they did not remain united long enough to form a new ministry of their own.

On April 5, 1783, the Duke of Portland announced the formation of a coalition ministry with himself as First Lord of the Treasury and Fox and North as the principal Secretaries of State. Thomas Townshend became Home Secretary. Fox held the real power in this ministry. Fox recognized the necessity of granting American independence and the improbability of negotiating more favorable terms for Great Britain than stated in the preliminary draught. David Hartley, following orders from the Portland-Fox-North ministry, signed the definitive treaty of peace on September 3, 1783 at Paris. Parliament did not debate the definitive treaty, but nevertheless ousted the ministry responsible. This ministry was distasteful less for its support of the definitive treaty than because it was such a hypocritical alliance of political adversaries. Fox and North's sole common ground was their loathing of Shelburne. Parliament saw their coalition as an abomination and refused to place any confidence in them. After inconclusive political maneuvers during the fall of 1783, William Pitt the Younger, formed a ministry in December of 1783 in which Thomas Townshend, now Lord Sydney, remained as Home Secretary.

The political problems of the home government influenced the formulation of colonial policy. Governor General Frederick Haldimand anxiously awaited instructions from London. Meanwhile he ordered his subordinates to prepare the posts against possible American or Indian attacks. In 1782, once actual fighting in the area ended, Haldimand instigated strict financial reforms and attempted to reduce expenditures in the Indian Department with a plan in April 1783 to reduce the

27 King George signed the preliminary peace on January 20, 1783. His signature officially began the armistice between the United States and Great Britain as far as the latter was concerned. The United States ratified the preliminary peace on April 15, 1783. For the Parliamentary debates on the peace treaty see Parliamentary History 23: 305-322, 345-361, 373-498.


30 Parliamentary History 24: 226-239.

31 Haldimand to Shelburne, July 17, 1782, Report, 1885, p. 362.
number of men at each of the frontier posts. The costs of the Indian Department had risen to extraordinary levels during the war in order to secure Indian loyalty. Despite plans to reduce expenditure, Canadian officials at the frontier posts continued to give gifts to the Indians to encourage them not to attack British or American citizens. The commanders of the forts achieved little success, however, in dissuading the Indians from continuing the war with America. The Indians did not consider the cease fire between Great Britain and the United States to pertain to them.

Governor General Haldimand had long maintained a “wait and see” attitude towards America’s requests that he surrender the forts. Rumors of the peace settlement preceded the copies of the treaty to Canada. The Indians pressed British colonial officials for confirmation of the Peace Treaty provisions regarding the boundary. The commanders of the posts, following Haldimand’s orders, repeatedly stopped American commissioners sent to deal with the Indians. Haldimand wanted to keep the Indians uninformed of the potential boundary in order to keep them from attacking British traders. Copies of the preliminary peace treaty arrived in Quebec on May 17, 1783. Its contents shocked Governor General Haldimand. To Haldimand it seemed the Indians had been sold out to their American enemies and the fur trade was lost. The safety of Europeans along the frontier became Haldimand’s immediate concern.


36 Haldimand to Thomas Townshend, October 23, 1782, Report, 1885, p. 363.

37 Townshend sent the copies on February 14, 1783. Townshend to Haldimand, February 14, 1783, Report, 1885, p. 284; Haldimand to Townshend, May 17, 1783, Report, 1885, p. 364. The definitive peace treaty reached Quebec on September 30, 1784, over a year after it had been signed. Haldimand to Sydney, Report, 1885, p. 358.
The Indians complained that Great Britain had abandoned them to their enemy. They saw the treaty as unjust. The Indians did not believe Great Britain had the power to sign away their lands. According to the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1768, Great Britain had the right to establish forts within Indian territory, but this did not give her legal title to such lands.38

On February 28, 1783, Thomas Townshend finally sent Haldimand general orders to work for peace between the United States and the Indians and to facilitate Loyalist immigration into Canada. The home ministry gave Haldimand wide discretion, particularly with regard to the treatment of the Indians.39

After the American Congress debated the acquisition of Indian lands by peaceful means in April of 1783, its Committee for Indian Affairs decided "that although the hostile tribes of Indians in the northern and western departments are seriously disposed to a pacification; yet they are not in a temper to relinquish their territorial claims without further struggles." The members then went on to discuss the possible outcome of an Indian war. Either the United States would win and push the Indians off their lands, or the Indians could triumph and prevent white settlement of the Great Lakes/Ohio River region. Congress agreed that if the United States won, controlling the Indians would require expensive forts. If the Indians lost, they would most likely seek asylum within the borders of Canada. Congress feared this last possibility because it would strengthen the British control over the Indians in the event of another Anglo-American war. Furthermore, if the Indians migrated to Canada, Americans could not participate in the fur trade.40

Despite the dangers of open or covert war, Congress expected to extend its control over the Indians' land. Congress had promised war veterans homesteads in reward for their services and needed millions of acres for this purpose. The individual states relinquished claims to western lands


40 Report of the Duane/Lee Committee to Congress, April 21, 1783, issued as a broadside by the Continental Congress, Philadelphia, Evans #18262; Broadside issued by the Continental Congress, 1784, Annapolis, Evans #18832.
on the basis that the war veterans would receive the land. The Congressional Committee for Northern Indian Affairs recommended that, since Congress did not have the money to buy the Indians' lands, the United States seize the Indians' lands without compensation. The Committee laid a basis for land confiscation by rationalizing that the Indians should pay for all damages they had inflicted during the war. In addition, Congress should avoid a future conflict because the treasury could not stand the added strain of financing an extended Indian war. However, Congress, in its plans for the Northwest Territory, made a point of specifying that the plans pertained only to those territories purchased from the Indians. Because the national government did not want individual states or citizens to interfere with the Indians' lands, Congress passed a resolution giving General Josiah Harmar the authority to forcibly eject any Americans north of the Ohio River. The American government could not actually prevent Americans from crossing the Ohio River, however, since the Articles of Confederation gave Congress only weak powers of enforcement.

In October of 1783 the Indians formed a confederation of all the tribes to the east of the Mississippi River. This was in direct response to armed conflicts along the frontier. The United States, trying to avoid both a costly Indian war and the expense of paying the full value for Indian lands, negotiated three treaties with the Indians between 1784 and 1786. However, neither the general Indian Confederacy nor the respective tribes authorized the Indian signers of these treaties.


42 Report of the Duane/Lee Committee to Congress, April 21, 1783, issued as a broadside by the Continental Congress, Philadelphia, Evans #18262.

43 Ibid.


45 Ibid.

The United States wanted to avoid dealing with the general Indian Confederacy. If the Indians signed separate treaties there was a greater opportunity for the United States to obtain more land. By the same token, if the Indians remained firmly united and only signed treaties jointly, they stood a better chance of retaining their lands. The Confederacy refused to recognize the treaties as legitimate and accused the United States of getting the Indian signers intoxicated and forcing them to sign treaties they did not understand.\(^\text{47}\)

The first of the three treaties negotiated with the Indians was the Treaty of Fort Stanwix\(^\text{48}\) of 1784. By this treaty, representatives of the Six Nations relinquished their claims to lands west of Pennsylvania and Lake Erie.\(^\text{49}\) The combined council of the Six Nations immediately repudiated this treaty. The United States hoped to drive a wedge between the Six Nations and the Western Indians, thereby making both more malleable.\(^\text{50}\)

The Treaty of Fort McIntosh of 1785\(^\text{51}\) between the United States and the Wyandots, Delawares, and Ottawas, continued this policy of separating the northeastern and the northwestern Indians. The treaty confined the northwestern Indians to a relatively small reservation of the southern shores of Lake Erie. The Indian Confederacy denied the legitimacy of this treaty.

The Treaty of the Great Miami of 1786\(^\text{52}\) concluded the U.S. War Department’s plan to confine and divide the Indians. This treaty created, west of the Wyandots and Delawares, a reserve for the Shawnees, the tribe most hostile to the advancement of American settlers. Originally the Shawnees’ hunting grounds lay along both shores of the Ohio River. Although the 1774 Treaty


\(^\text{48}\) Present day Rome, N.Y. See Appendix C.

\(^\text{49}\) See Appendix B for the boundary description; See Appendix C for a map showing the boundary.

\(^\text{50}\) Instructions to the Governor of the Northwest Territory, October 26, 1787, State Papers, Indian 1: 9; Governor of the Northwest Territory [Arthur St. Clair] to the President of the United States, May 2, 1788, State Papers, Indian 1: 10.

\(^\text{51}\) See Appendix B for the boundary description; See Appendix C for a map showing the boundary.

\(^\text{52}\) See Appendix B for the boundary description.
of Camp Charlotte restricted them to the north shore of the Ohio River, the Shawnees fought battles along the frontier throughout the 1780s to preserve their traditional rights. Most of the Indian raids against white settlers involved the Shawnees. The United States hoped that the Treaty of the Great Miami would end frontier fighting by restricting the Shawnees to the reservation, and would generally loosen frontier tensions. However, the Shawnees, like the other Indian nations, repudiated the treaties on the grounds that the Indian signers had no authority to deal for the whole tribe.

The United States acquired the Indians’ lands on paper but were unable to obtain them in reality. The general Indian Confederacy repudiated the treaties. The United States’ policy of refusing to deal with the Indian confederacy as a whole and negotiating the treaties with unauthorized tribal members caused the Indians to be suspicious of American intentions. Indeed, U.S.-Indian treaties of the 1780s neither improved American-Indian relations nor brought peace to the frontier.

Haldimand’s policy towards the Indians from 1783 until 1786 was a dual one. He believed it was in Great Britain’s best interest to help her Indian allies and to provide them a refuge within Canada. He sent a survey party to search the north shore of Lake Ontario for a suitable tract of land which he purchased as a Loyalist/Indian refuge. He also ordered the construction of Fort Cataraqui54 to serve as a trading center. The second element of his plan was the retention of the frontier posts until the resolution of American-Indian differences.55

The Mohawks were the first tribe to agree to relocate on the lands north of Lake Ontario. Decimated during the Revolution, they could not withstand the advances of New Yorkers moving, with or without legal title, onto their lands. One of the few Mohawk warriors who had survived the conflict, Joseph Brant, lobbied effectively in England and Quebec for British assistance. In

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54 Present day Kingston, Ontario.
November, 1783, Haldimand wrote to North expressing the views of the Indians with regard to the peace and offering his dual plan. Lord Sydney replied in April, 1784, giving the ministry's approval. Throughout the summer of 1783 and the winter of 1783-1784 Haldimand's dispatches to London related the widespread Canadian dissatisfaction with the territorial boundaries set by the Peace Treaty, but the confused political situation at Westminster caused the ministry to neglect his warnings.

In the early summer of 1783 two American commissioners, Douglas and McCully, arrived at Detroit to arrange for the transfer of the fort and to consult with the Indians. The British commandant, Major Arent S. De Peyster, refused to permit them to go among the Indians and informed them he had no orders to surrender the fort. De Peyster took the commissioners into custody and sent them to Fort Niagara to await General Haldimand's wishes. In due course Haldimand directed all his subordinates to keep American commissioners or agents away from the Indians until specific instructions could arrive from London. Congress subsequently sent General the Baron von Steuben to Quebec in July, 1783 to confer with Governor General Haldimand about the transfer of the posts and other matters relating to the peace treaty. Haldimand insisted that he could do nothing without instructions from home.

In August, 1783, Lord North, in his capacity as Home Secretary in the Portland-Fox-North coalition, answered Haldimand's pleas for instructions. Giving a general endorsement to all Haldimand's actions, he gave specific sanction to the settlement of the Loyalists and Indians north of Lake Ontario.

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56 Leavitt, p. 155; Haldimand to North June 2, 1783, Report, 1885, p. 364.
57 Lord Sydney (Thomas Townshend) to Haldimand, April 8, 1784, Report, 1885, p. 286.
61 North to Haldimand, August 8, 1783, Report, 1885, p. 285.
In 1786, Haldimand travelled to London to confer in person with the ministry about a range of Indian problems. Lord Dorchester, a close associate of William Pitt, replaced Haldimand as Governor General of Canada in April, 1786. His instructions made it clear that the ministry at London would control Indian policy at the expense of the discretionary powers of the Governor General and military commandants.

In Anglo-American diplomatic negotiations between 1783 and 1796, enforcement of the Treaty of Paris, control of the frontier posts and the Indians were important issues in their own right. But they were also pawns to secure the United States' help in gaining payment of prewar debts and Loyalist claims to compensation. Britain's refusal to evacuate the western forts seemed to justify American fears of punitive Indian attacks on western settlers. Reciprocally, Great Britain believed that it was justified in retaining an area it had formally ceded to the United States because of continued American non-compliance with the Peace Treaty. The Indians were convinced that Great Britain had their best interests in mind and that the Americans were their real enemies. Fear of Great Britain's continued presence and influence in the Great Lakes/Ohio River region influenced many Americans to adopt a stronger national government in 1787-1788. Because the Federal Constitution strengthened the United States, it had the power to satisfy its financial obligations under the Treaty of Paris. Would the stronger American national government cause Great Britain to abandon the forts and the Indians?

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62 King George III created the office of Governor General of all the American Colonies in April 1786. He selected Sir Guy Carleton as the first Governor General and raised him to the peerage as Lord Dorchester. Sydney to Lt. Gov. Hope, April 6, 1786, Shortt & Doughty, pp. 810-11.

63 Drafts of Instructions, Shortt & Doughty, pp. 811-15, 827.

64 Frederick W. Marks III, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), pp. 3-51. Marks attributed the movement towards a stronger national government to the Confederation Congress' lack of control over foreign affairs and its inability to raise funds for defense.
Chapter II: Development of the Indian Barrier State Plan

In 1789, two events led to changes in Great Britain’s North American policy: revolution erupted in France during the summer, and the new American form of constitutional government went into effect.

The effect of the first French Revolution was not limited just to France herself but caused two contradictory reactions in Great Britain. On the one hand, it created a heightened sense of security in Britain since many politicians believed France’s involvement in domestic problems limited the possibilities of its launching a cross-channel military invasion or attacking British colonies. On the other hand, it also caused a feeling of panic because of the danger of a sympathetic revolution breaking out in Britain. In addition, revolutionary ideas were known to be spreading in the United States, Canada’s closest neighbor.65

Many British monarchical constitutionalists feared America’s republican, pro-French leanings. They questioned Canada’s ability to defend herself against an American assault, even if the attack consisted of ideological rhetoric and not military maneuvers. Conservatives in London worried about the loyalty of French Canadians. These politicians wanted to strengthen the military

forces stationed in Canada in case the French Canadians decided to return Canada to France or the American army attempted an invasion. Other politicians, such as Charles James Fox, disagreed.66

The ministry believed, on the one hand, the potential French threat to England and her colonies remained strong despite France's internal problems. France could use foreign wars of conquest to redirect attention away from domestic issues. In addition, the Franco-American alliance of 1778 linked the United States to the French cause in the event of an Anglo-French war. The United States could attack the British West Indies and Canada before reinforcements arrived from Britain. William Pitt and the government's supporters were unwilling to take such risks. On the other hand, the French Revolution nullified the threat from the Family Compact that linked French and Spanish foreign policy together. Spain was not strong enough to fight Great Britain without French aid. The chance of a stalemate on the European continent gave Britain the time to deal with its problems on the North American mainland.67

A new American government, established by the Constitution of 1787, came into existence in 1789. Hoping that the strengthened American national government would be able to enforce the terms of the Peace Treaty of 1783, Great Britain became more open to negotiation offers from the United States.68 As one of his first official acts, President George Washington sent Gouverneur Morris as his personal agent to London to explore the possibility of an agreement about the Peace Treaty differences.69

The Nootka Sound Crisis of 1790 placed the United States in an enviable bargaining position. Early in 1790, Spanish authorities captured two British fishing vessels along with two unidentified vessels off the Northwest American coast at Nootka Sound. Spain maintained that the Pacific coast of North America was a Spanish possession and that only Spanish citizens had the right of

66 Ibid.
navigation in Spanish waters. Spanish authorities in Mexico sold the captured cargoes and held the ships' crews briefly. Great Britain took exception to Spain's action since it maintained the right of free navigation along the Pacific coast. Pitt went to Parliament on May 5 and asked for an increase in military forces to prepare for a possible war against Spain. The Nootka Sound Crisis proved the recent sense of security Britain felt because of France's internal involvement to be a false one. Spain appeared willing to tangle with Britain without French aid.

The United States, situated between British and Spanish spheres in North America, was in a position to play one country against the other. Each country, if planning to attack their enemy's colony, would have to move forces across American territory. According to international law, such an action required the consent of the owner nation. Defiance of an American refusal to permit foreign troops to cross its territory would justify an American declaration of war on the invaders. Yet Spain and Great Britain both possessed assets that the United States wanted: Spain controlled the navigation of the Mississippi River while Great Britain held the frontier posts. The United States could simply wait for a lucrative offer.

The threat of an Anglo-Spanish war and the disturbing effect of the U.S.-Indian war on the fur trade caused the British government to open negotiation with the United States concerning the Peace Treaty differences. In order to salvage the fur trade for itself, Great Britain needed to resolve the frontier posts question with the United States. If Great Britain owned the frontier posts, it would not need the United States' permission to cross the territory between Canada and Louisiana. Further, the possibility that Spain would receive permission to cross this territory would cease to be a danger.

Gouverneur Morris arrived in London in April, when the ministry was more approachable for American agents. Morris entered into discussions with the Duke of Leeds, Secretary of State

70 *Parliamentary History* 28: 763-782.


for Foreign Affairs,73 and William Pitt, the prime minister,74 on May 21, 1790.75 President Washington instructed Morris to demand that Britain end its occupation of the frontier posts as provided for in the Peace Treaty.76 Leeds countered with the argument that the United States violated the peace treaty first since several states had enacted laws against Loyalist compensation and recovery of American debts by British merchants. Leeds explained that Britain was holding the forts as collateral against continued American non-compliance with the Peace Treaty. When Morris directly questioned Great Britain’s intention to keep the posts indefinitely, Pitt, according to Morris, casually answered: "perhaps we may." Pitt defended this statement by pointing out the improbability of America’s fulfilling its obligation after so many years had passed.77

Ten days after Morris met with Leeds and Pitt, Haldimand had an interview with Lord Grenville78 to discuss the possible repercussions on the fur trade if Great Britain surrendered the posts. Haldimand recommended giving them up because he believed the fur trade could be kept under Britain’s control if it built fortifications on the north shores of the Great Lakes. Canadian merchants could recover any lost profits by selling supplies to Americans.79

The ministry continued to solicit opinions about turning over the posts to the Americans.80 Dorchester conveyed Indian reports of Spanish efforts to entice the northwest Indians to move west of the Mississippi River.81 Dorchester ordered his agent in America, George Beckwith, to learn how much support the U.S. government would give in the event of a British conflict against France and

73 See Appendix A.

74 Ibid.

75 Morris had an audience with the Duke of Leeds in April but their first indepth conversation took place on May 21. Morris to Washington, April 7, 1790, Dip. Cor., pp. 369-370.

76 Washington to Morris, October 13 1789, Writings 30: 440-442. See also, Dip. Cor., p. 40.


78 See Appendix A.


81 Dorchester to Grenville, June 7, 1790, Report 1890, p. 253.
Spain. Beckwith was also to find out if the U.S. and Spain were holding joint meetings with the Ohio River Valley Indians and to discover the strength of the American army along the frontier. At London, Parliament voted to increase military expenditures in preparation for war, and appointed special ministers to Spain. By late November, Spain decided that it could not fight Great Britain without France and conceded free navigation of the Pacific coast. The end of the Nootka Sound Crisis also lessened the urgency of Great Britain's need to solve its American problems.

During the summer of 1790, the Duke of Leeds, because of his involvement in the ongoing Parliamentary elections, was unable to meet with Gouverneur Morris. Once Parliament confirmed the new ministry in November, Leeds was better able to address the peace treaty settlements. Great Britain's appointment of a Minister to the United States was another objective of Morris' mission. The United States declined to appoint a minister to the Court of St. James unless the British appointed a minister to the United States. The British had treated the last American minister to London, John Adams, poorly. Without formal diplomatic relations at the ministerial level, there was no hope for a resolution of the unfulfilled peace treaty problems. Britain appointed George Hammond as minister plenipotentiary to the United States in May 1791. Although, Hammond did not arrive in America until the fall, his appointment freed the U.S. to appoint its own minister.

In the meantime, the home ministry made plans to divide Canada into two provinces, Upper and Lower Canada. Dorchester received a draft of Grenville's Quebec Bill in February 1790. The

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82 Dorchester to George Beckwith, June 27, 1790, Report 1890, "Note E", p. 144.
83 Parliamentary History 28: 784, 794-813, 815-824.
84 Parliamentary History 28: 914-918; Bemis, Dip. Hist., p. 88.
85 King George prorogued Parliament on June 10, 1790. Morris to Washington, July 3, 1790, Dip. Cor., p. 378; Morris to Washington, September 10, 1790, Dip. Cor., p. 379; Leeds to Morris, September 10, 1790, Dip. Cor., p. 380. Morris and Leeds had a brief meeting on September 18, but the Duke was unable to commit himself to anything.
86 Writings 30: 440-442.
87 Grenville to George Hammond, May 24, 1791, Simcoe 1: 25.
draft deliberately left the boundary between the United States and Canada ambiguous. As Grenville explained in the cover letter accompanying the draft:

There will . . . be a considerable difficulty in . . . describing the Boundary between the District of Upper Canada and the Territories of the United States. As . . . the Line mentioned in the Treaty with America would exclude the Posts which are still in His Majesty's Possession, and which the infraction of the Treaty on the part of America has induced His Majesty to retain, while on the other hand, the including them by express words within the Limits . . . [of] the Province . . . would probably excite a considerable degree of resentment . . . [in] the United States, and might perhaps provoke them to measures detrimental to Our Commercial Interests. Possibly the best solution . . . [would] be to describe the Upper District by some general words such as "All the Territories &c. &c. &c. possessed by and subject to His Majesty, and being to the West or South West of the Boundary Line of Lower Canada, except such as are included within the present Boundaries of the Government of New Brunswick."88

The Pitt ministry appointed John Graves Simcoe as Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada in June 1790, even before Upper Canada officially existed. Lord Dorchester had earlier recommended Sir John Johnson for this position, but the home government believed that appointing a native Canadian as Lieutenant Governor would compromise their control over the province. They felt that a native Canadian would act first in the interests of the province and second in the interests of the mother country.89 In his plans for Upper Canada, Simcoe emphasized the military. He sought more troops under his, not Dorchester's, command. Simcoe's plans for the development of Upper Canada included fortifying new towns of Loyalists resettled on the Ontario peninsula with roads to connect them.90

Simcoe's concern with military security was instrumental in the development and acceptance of the Indian neutral barrier state plan. Haldimand's previous resettlement of Indians along the

88 Grenville to Dorchester, October 20, 1789, Shortt & Doughty, quote, pp. 988-999. Draft of the Quebec Bill, Shortt & Doughty, pp. 992-1002. In the actual draft of the bill Grenville left a space for Dorchester to fill in his idea for the boundary line. Dorchester to Grenville, February 8, 1790, Shortt & Doughty, pp. 1002-1006.

89 Grenville to Dorchester, June 3, 1790, Simcoe 1: 13. This dismissal of Dorchester's advice and wishes caused a wariness between Simcoe and Dorchester that rapidly led to Simcoe's trying to work his way around Dorchester by reporting and complaining directly to the home ministry. By 1794, Simcoe was in open revolt against Dorchester; constantly questioning his authority and his orders and in general trying to personally govern Upper Canada. Because of Simcoe's personal relationships with various important home politicians, Dorchester's effectiveness as Governor General and his political standing suffered.

north shore of the Great Lakes undermined Simcoe's colonization plans. The Indians' professed need for large unspoiled tracts as hunting lands conflicted with Simcoe's vision of white settlement and civilization of the frontier. Although the Indians were a barrier to Simcoe's plans, he did not want to lose the revenue they generated through the fur trade. Therefore, one of the most critical problems facing any Indian policy was how to retain the Indians' loyalty and the fur trade. The plan for the Indian neutral barrier state evolved slowly between 1790 and early March 1792. In 1792, the British North American officials eagerly adopted this plan as the solution to the above problem.

In 1790 and 1791 the Indians won two major battles against the U.S. Army in the Great Lakes/Ohio River region. When the U.S. Army under General Arthur St. Clair and Colonel Josiah Harmar advanced north of the Ohio River in September, 1790, British traders along the Great Miami and Wabash Rivers feared for their lives and property. The U.S. refused to recognize the neutrality of the British traders because it believed that British North American officials supplied guns and ammunition to the Indians. Contrary to American opinion, British officials refused to supply the Indians with weapons. St. Clair assured the British commander at Detroit that the U.S. Army did not have orders to attack the posts. In October of 1790 the American forces established a fort at the Miami Towns, south of Detroit and close to where the Indians were gathering. At the end of October the Indians defeated an expeditionary force under General Harmar. Despite this victory, the Indians threatened to relocate across the Mississippi River if they did not receive British support against the Americans. Canadian officials managed to convince the Indians to stay while they appealed to London for directions.

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Sir John Johnson, Superintendent and Inspector General of Indian Affairs, suggested that the merchants urge the government to get the Americans to adopt the Ohio River line, as delineated in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1768. On December 28, 1790, the Montreal merchants in their memorial to Dorchester offered a five-year plan for the United States and British North America to temporarily share rights throughout the Great Lakes/Ohio River region, giving British traders time to withdraw their goods from the territory. Afterwards the region would become "neutral ground" and a free-trade zone. Dorchester thought enough of the plan to send a copy to Grenville in January of 1791, not knowing that solution of the Nootka Sound Crisis lessened the need for negotiations between the United States and Great Britain.

In February of 1791, Dorchester, interested in ending the U.S.-Indian war, asked Sir John Johnson to discover

... the specific terms, on which the confederated Indian Nations may be disposed to establish a general tranquillity ... with the United States, together with ... those claims and pretensions on which they may think it expedient, and incumbent on them to insist, for their honor and interest.

Dorchester also instructed Johnson to reassure the Indians that Great Britain did not want to force its ideas on the Indians; rather the Indians' opinions would determine what offer would be made to the United States if Dorchester ever had the chance to mediate.

In March of 1791, while the U.S. Army prepared for yet another campaign in its Indian war, Henry Knox, the Secretary of War, offered to train the Miami Indians in agriculture and the ways

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95 See Appendix A.
99 Ibid.
of white civilization. He invited the Western Indians to attend peace talks at Fort Washington.\textsuperscript{100} At the same time, he issued instructions to General St. Clair, Governor of the Northwest Territory, to establish forts along the Ohio and Wabash rivers, by force if necessary. Knox, knowing that the general Indian confederacy would accept only the Ohio River line, ordered St. Clair to negotiate a boundary along the Ohio River to the Wabash River; then up the Wabash to the Miami River; and finally from the Miami River to Lake Erie. If the Indians persisted in their hostilities and St. Clair's army defeated them, St. Clair was to drive the Indians out of the territory and across the Mississippi River.\textsuperscript{101}

Meanwhile Simcoe's plans to remove the Indians from the north side of the Great Lakes met with resistance from the Indians. During the winter of 1790-1791, the various land boards concerned with the Indian territories met to consider the possibility of buying back the Indian reservations. The Mohawk Indians, still on their lands south of the Lakes, tried to obtain permission to relocate to the Mohawk reservation along the Grand River. The Canadian officials denied this request. The Canadian government then began to investigate the validity of Haldimand's grants to the Indians. The Mohawks demanded confirmation of their ownership of the Grand River reservation. In May 1791 the Canadian government acknowledged its obligation to proceed with Haldimand's plans for Indian reservations along the Grand River and confirmed the Mohawks' ownership of the Grand River reservation.\textsuperscript{102}

On May 4, 1791 the Six Nations met with Chapin, the American Indian agent to the Six Nations, at Buffalo Creek\textsuperscript{103} to explore the possibility of an agreement with the United States to accept the Muskingum line in lieu of the Ohio River line. The Six Nations hoped that if they could get the United States to agree to the Muskingum line they could then convince the other members

\textsuperscript{100} Present day Cincinnati, Ohio. Henry Knox to Miami Indians, March 11, 1791, \textit{State Papers, Indian}, 1: 146-147.


\textsuperscript{103} The eighteenth century spelling for this creek was "Buffalo Creek".

\textbf{Chapter II: Development of the Indian Barrier State Plan}
of the Indian confederacy to compromise. The United States did not want the breach within the Indian confederacy to be healed. It was easier to wear down the Indians' objections to the takeover of their land when each tribe stood by itself.104

In June of 1791 the Six Nations, after deciding that the United States would not agree to the Muskingum line, rejoined the Indian Confederacy. They were determined to help repel the American advance on the Miami Towns.105 However, the American army defeated the combined forces of the various western Indian tribes before the Six Nations could travel to the Miami.106

At a general council held from July 1 to 3, 1791, the Indian Confederacy agreed to seek peace terms based on the Muskingum line.107 They informed Dorchester of their decision on August 14, 1791 at Castle St. Lewis in Quebec.108 Dorchester in his opening speech to the Indians on August 15, expressed the opinion that American aggression along the Ohio River foretold an intention to attack the frontier posts and precipitate an Anglo-American war.109 The Americans interpreted Dorchester's speech as an attempt to incite the Indians against American frontiersmen.110

Canada was officially divided into two provinces plus the maritime region on August 24, 1791 by an Order-in-Council.111 As in the draft of the Government of Quebec Act, the southern boundary of Upper Canada was deliberately kept vague.112 On September 1, 1791, Lord Grenville ordered Hammond to propose British mediation between the United States and the Indians

104 Knox to Governor George Clinton of New York, May 11, 1791, State Papers, Indian, 1: 168.
105 Brant to Johnson, June 4, 1791, Report, 1890, p. 295; McKee to Major John Smith, June 4, 1791, Report, 1890, p. 295.
110 Beckwith to Dorchester, October 5, 1791, "Note E", Report, 1890, pp. 174-175.
112 Constitutional Act of 1791, Shortt & Doughty, pp. 1031-1051.
whenever he thought best. On September 16, 1791, Home Secretary Henry Dundas wrote to Dorchester expressing the ministry’s opinion that the Indians’ needed firm ownership of their traditional lands. The boundaries of these lands had to be clearly defined.

In November, 1791 the Indians again defeated the U.S. Army, this time the main force under General St. Clair. The Indians’ confidence was slightly improved by this second victory over the Americans, and the Confederation reiterated its demand for the Ohio line. The U.S. refused to agree to this condition, nor would it accept the Muskingum line. The proposed peace talks never took place. In December, 1791 the Montreal merchants once again expressed their opinions on the necessity of retaining some control over the Indian country. This memorial, written to Simcoe, offered several possible boundaries in order of preference, from complete retention of the frontier posts to complete surrender of them along with construction of new fortifications on the Canadian side of the border.

The American attitude had changed by January 1792. St. Clair’s defeat convinced them that acquiring control of the Northwest Territory by force of arms would be too costly and would take too long. Instead of forcing the Indians to leave, the United States decided to try to buy the land. Spain’s offer of asylum across the Mississippi River would provide the Indians a place to go after selling their land to the Americans. The American desire for peace was known in Canada. Charles Stevenson, a loyalist living in New York, proposed using the American desire for peace to obtain the frontier posts. The Indians, according to Stevenson, should insist on the posts as part of the peace settlement. Or they should request Great Britain’s help with the treaty.

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114 Dundas to Dorchester, September 16, 1791, "Note E", Report, 1890, pp. 172-174. See also, Simcoe 1: 66-68.


117 Charles Stevenson to Simcoe, January 3, 1792, Simcoe 1: 95-97; Stevenson to Simcoe, January 7, 1792, Simcoe 1: 100-101; Stevenson to Evan Nepean, January 11, 1792, Simcoe 1: 102.
Simcoe wrote to Dundas on February 16, 1792 and suggested that St. Clair's defeat presented an ideal opportunity for George Hammond to offer Britain's services as mediator between the Americans and the Indians. Simcoe argued against the surrender of the frontier posts at this time but recommended stationing a stronger military force in Upper Canada in the event Great Britain had to surrender the posts. Simcoe also proposed a new line for the boundary between Canada and the United States. The line would begin at the disputed territory at Lake Champlain and end at Lake Oswego. Simcoe's dispatch did not influence the ministry's plan for the Indian neutral barrier state until after the initial plans had been laid, because it did not arrive in London until April 14, 1792.118

On March 16, Dundas ordered Simcoe to provide Hammond the services of a man knowledgeable in Indian affairs and the Indian territory. This man was to assist Hammond in determining the boundary line for the proposed barrier state. Dundas recommended Alexander McKee for this important role.119 On March 17, 1792, Lord Grenville transmitted the proposed plan for the barrier state to Hammond. The home ministry now believed "the present Circumstances . . . to be favorable for entering more directly and particularly into the Business, and for . . . " combining the threatening Indian-U.S. war with the subject of the posts. Hammond was ordered to offer British mediation between the Indians and the United States on the following terms:

... the securing to the different Indian Nations, along the British and American Frontiers, their Lands and hunting Grounds, as an independent Country, with respect to which, both His Majesty and the United States shall withdraw all Claims or Possessions whatever, shall agree never to establish any Forts within the Boundaries to be expressed in such Agreement, and shall bind themselves to each other not to acquire or to suffer their Subjects to acquire, by purchase, or otherwise, from the Indians, any Lands or Settlements within the said Boundaries... But it should, as early as possible, be stated, as the Ground and Foundation of such Interference on our part, as no other Mode of terminating the Business seems to afford so fair a Prospect of a satisfactory Conclusion with a View to the permanent Interests of this Country, in that part of the World... supposing the course of the Negotiation should lead to such a Step, to offer, that His Majesty will abandon the Posts still occupied by His Troops to the Southward and Westward of the Lakes supposing that the Americans should consent, on their Part, to renounce all claims of theirs to those Posts, and to leave them, in common with the rest of that Country, in the undisturbed and independent Possession of the Indians.120


Chapter III: Attempts to Form the Indian Barrier State

On the same day that Grenville wrote to Hammond delineating the barrier state project, Morris informed President Washington of rumors of a British plan to offer mediation between the United States and the Indians. Morris believed that Great Britain’s offer was connected with William Pitt’s plans for St. Domingo and the recent division of Canada. The ministry notified Dorchester, living in London at the time, of the barrier state project and solicited his opinion about the placement of boundaries for an Indian state.

Dorchester thought the plan an ideal solution to Britain’s North American problems. He recommended the Muskingum line, described in his dispatch No. 102, but was unsure of a northeastern boundary. For the project to be successful, the Indians had to be involved; their opinions needed to be solicited, especially in deciding on the proper boundary to request. He advised that there was no reason for the United States to disagree with the proposal since the posts would be of little value to it. On the other hand, Dorchester did envisage that Canada might find it difficult to surrender the posts, but he suggested that the sacrifice would be small enough in

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121 Morris to Washington, March 17, 1792, Dip. Cor., pp. 393-394.

Chapter III: Attempts to Form the Indian Barrier State 31
exchange for frontier peace with both the Indians and the United States. In early April, Morris reported that rumors concerning an American request for help with the Indians and the ministry’s support for the Ohio River line overran London.

In fact, the atmosphere in North America had changed since the beginning of the year. The United States craved the posts and pressed Hammond for the date they would be handed over to the American Army. Stevenson wrote to Lieutenant Governor Simcoe in late March and again in April, 1792, that the U.S. desire for the posts was so strong that Britain’s only chance of negotiating an advantageous boundary depended on maneuvering the Indians into requesting Britain’s mediation.

In late January, 1792 the United States invited the chiefs of the Six Nations to attend a meeting in Philadelphia. Puzzled at how to respond, the Indians questioned British officials about whether they should go. Colonel Andrew Gordon advised them not to trust the American overture because the invitation did not extend to all the Indian tribes, which suggested that the Americans did not truly desire peace. Nor did the Americans offer to hold the meeting at any of the traditional places for important councils. Gordon suspected an American plot to drive a wedge between the Six Nations and the other Indian tribes. Thereupon the chiefs decided not to attend, at least not until they discussed the invitation with their warriors at the upcoming Buffalo Creek Council.

American attempts to convene a separate peace conference with the Western Indians reinforced Gordon’s suspicions. The recent defeat of the U.S. Army did not affect the U.S. War Department’s stance on this important matter. On April 3, 1792, James Wilkinson summoned the Western Indians to a peace conference. Assuring them that the U.S. desired peace with them, he warned that peace was possible only if they gave in to American demands, since the U.S. was too

124 Morris to Washington, April 6, 1792, Simcoe 1: 168.
125 Stevenson to Simcoe, March 27, 1792, Simcoe 1: 124; Stevenson to Hammond, April 5, 1792, Simcoe 1: 117; Stevenson to Simcoe, April 5, 1792, Simcoe 1: 128.
strong for the Indians to resist. Secretary of War Knox repeated Wilkinson's invitation and warning the following day.127

At the end of April, the home ministry ignored Hammond's warnings that peace between the United States and the Indians was improbable since each side refused to compromise. Hammond's report about the American treaty infractions and the recent Indian victories, the ministry hoped, would convince the American government to accept the barrier state plan. Hammond believed that the Americans would continue the war until they pushed the Indians across the Mississippi River. Hammond maintained that the U.S. would never accept Britain's offer of mediation because the Americans feared Britain's influence over the Indians.128

In a memorial in late April, the Montreal merchants declared that Canada's safety depended on possession of the posts. They suggested that the U.S. Congress exercise its constitutional right and give Canada the posts as payment for American infractions of the peace treaty.129 The merchants' memorial convinced Hammond of the importance of the Northwest Territory for the fur trade but did not overcome Hammond's reluctance to offer Britain's mediation.130

In May, Dundas continued to push the barrier project, believing that prospects for American acceptance of the plan had improved. The recession of 1792 following great speculation in the stock of the Bank of the United States misled Stevenson to predict the failure and dissolution of the Union.131 The United States, according to Stevenson, could not afford to continue the Indian war.

Ignorant of the delicacy of the American political situation, the Western Indians did not trust internal problems to halt American advances. They prepared to move farther up the Miami River in order to avoid the American Army.132 Joseph Brant informed Alexander McKee that if Great

128 Hammond to Simcoe, April 21, 1792, Simcoe 1: 130; Grenville to Hammond, April 25, 1792, Mayo, Instructions, pp. 27-28.
130 Simcoe to Dundas, April 28, 1792, Simcoe 1: 138-144.
131 Stevenson to Simcoe, May 8, 1792, Simcoe 1: 155.
132 Western Indians to Elliot, May 16, 1792, Simcoe 1: 157.
Britain did not aid the Western Indians, there was a good chance they would turn towards the
United States. Indian raids on Canadians would then become a distinct possibility. The situation
along the frontier convinced Brant to accept the United States' invitation to discuss the problem
in Philadelphia.

Simcoe did not receive the home ministry's plan for the barrier state until May 27, 1792.
He agreed with it in principle but doubted whether the Americans would agree. Indian
Department officials resisted the ministry's recommendation of McKee as the best man to assist
Hammond because they could not easily spare his services. In late June, Simcoe and McKee
met to discuss possible boundaries for the proposed barrier state. They decided that the

Boundary should be settled upon the following Terms. 1st The Indian Territory to form a Line,
separating the British Territory and that of the States. 2d. The Posts of Niagara, Oswego & Detroit
to be demolished & not held by either, & included in the Indian Territory. 3d Michillimackinac to
be evacuated. 4th The Genesee Territory but no Post to be continued to the United States, & as a
proper Balance, Great Britain, To possess the following Territory. 5th From the Rapids of the
Miami River, or from the River St Clair, on the west, & two Leagues deep to the South, this seems
to have been the original allotment of Congress, therefore more reasonable to presume that they
would admit it.

Furnished with these recommendations, George Hammond would have been able to, but in
fact did not, broach the project with the Americans. He believed, rightly, that the United States
would not accept Britain's offer. President Washington considered the Indian war a domestic
problem and, as such, not open to foreign intervention. The United States, according to
Washington, had to convince the Indians that all the Americans wanted were the lands they had
bought or acquired by treaty. Before submitting the proposal to the Americans, Hammond
decided to continue his policy of waiting until either the U.S. defeated the Indians or the Indians

134 Simcoe to Dundas, May 28, 1792, Simcoe 1: 160.
Coll. 24: 426. See also, Simcoe 1: 173-174.
137 Hammond to Simcoe, July 11, 1792, Simcoe 1: 175-177.
138 Washington to Morris, June 21, 1792, Writings 32: 60-64. See also, Simcoe 1: 168-169.
sought Britain's intervention on their behalf. At Westminster, Grenville approved Hammond's decision.

In Canada, Lieutenant Governors Clarke and Simcoe tried to stimulate an Indian request for help. Until one was forthcoming, Clarke proposed that Great Britain cite the Indians' request of 1791. During the summer of 1792, both the home ministry and the British North American officials remained optimistic that the United States would accept the barrier state project.

By the end of August, however, Simcoe became discouraged by Hammond's delay in raising the plan with the United States government. Furthermore, he feared that America's refusal to cede any territory to the Indians and its rejection of hinted British offers of mediation were portents of doom. Simcoe urged the ministry to order Hammond to open negotiations regarding the peace treaty differences. Hammond could then approach the barrier state project by a back door. The possibility of the Indians turning to the Americans frightened Simcoe, for in that event the Indians might turn on Canadian settlers.

The various Indian tribes of the Great Lakes/Ohio River region held a general conference at the Auglaize River in late September and early October, 1792. At this meeting the Indians reformed the general Indian confederacy. They decided that peace with the United States was imperative and called upon the United States to send representatives to meet with them at Sandusky in the spring of 1793 to discuss the border. The Indians also invited the British to attend the Sandusky Council in order to act as interpreters and to help protect the Indians interests. Simcoe happily accepted the Indians' invitation.

At a council at Buffalo Creek, the Six Nations, in accord with the general confederacy's demand for the Ohio River line, told the American agents that they would sell their territory to the

139 Clarke to Simcoe, August 7, 1792, Simcoe 1: 188.
140 Simcoe to Dundas, August 20, 1792, Simcoe 1: 199; Simcoe to Clarke, August 20, 1792, Simcoe 1: 199-204; Simcoe to Hammond, September 27, 1792, Mich. Hist. Coll. 24: 478-482. See also Simcoe 1: 214-217.

A river in northern Ohio that branches off of the Miami River (present day Maumee River).


east of the river in return for a clear title to their lands to the west. The Six Nations conveniently
ignored the fact that the Shawnees, who had a better claim to West Virginia and Kentucky, had
surrendered their lands to the east of the Ohio River to Virginia in 1775.\textsuperscript{144} Also, the Six Nations
had sold to the Americans in earlier unauthorized treaties most of the lands in western New York
and Pennsylvania they were willing to exchange.\textsuperscript{145}

When Hammond mentioned to Alexander Hamilton the Indians' request for British
participation at the Sandusky Council, Hamilton was scornful. Hammond received a similar
response from Thomas Jefferson. Both Hammond and the U.S. officials bypassed the question of
British mediation.\textsuperscript{146} The United States gave neither protest to nor acknowledgement of British
agents present at Sandusky.\textsuperscript{147} The precise location of the spring council was inaccurately reported
to the U.S. government. The Americans thought the council was to be held at the Miami Rapids.
Both the Indians and the British interpreted this misunderstanding as an attempt to manipulate the
Indians. Eventually the Western Indians corrected the confusion over the location for the council.
They decided to hold a general meeting of all the tribes before the Sandusky meeting to determine
the terms they would offer to the Americans. In this way the Indians would be able to portray a
strong, united front to the U.S. Commissioners.

The United States approached Simcoe during the winter for permission to obtain supplies for
the spring council from Canada. Simcoe refused them on the grounds that their supplying the
Indians during the negotiations would put the Indians under too much American influence. Even
though Simcoe refused to cooperate, the U.S. Cabinet decided to proceed with the council.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{144} Abernethy, \textit{Western Lands}, pp. 138-139.
\textsuperscript{146} Hammond to Simcoe, November 27, 1792, Simcoe 1: 267-269.
A U.S. Cabinet meeting on February 25, 1793 authorized American Commissioners to be present at Sandusky. Although Washington’s Cabinet reasoned that the President had the power and the right to retrocede to the Indians territory acquired by treaties, if peace depended on it, the instructions to the U.S. Commissioners did not reflect that view. Instead, the government ordered the Commissioners to insist on the boundaries established by the Treaties of Fort Harmar. The United States offered to pay for any disputed lands, and to acknowledge the lands west of the Great Miami and north of the Ohio as belonging exclusively to the Indians. The Cabinet ordered the Commissioners not to recognize British agents attending the council and to avoid dealing with the Indians as a confederacy.

If the United States of America seemed uncompromising the Indians were not less so. The Indians were determined to remain unified. They promised one another to accept only the Ohio River line as the legitimate boundary and to refuse any monetary offers for their lands. They wanted a homeland not money. Although President Washington held out little prospect for any agreement at Sandusky, he and his Cabinet believed that it was desirable to demonstrate to the world that the United States was willing to negotiate with the Indians. Once the United States had demonstrated their liberality, the Americans could revert to war to get their own way. During the winter and spring of 1793, French affairs preoccupied the British ministry so it did not have time to advise British North American officials about a proper course of action.

Before the end of May, 1792, when the Indians gathered at the Miami Rapids to decide on their terms for peace, they sent delegates to Niagara to ascertain the extent of the U.S. Commissioners’ authority and to complain of the aggressive advance of the American Army. By the time the delegates returned, the tribes had divided over the location of the boundaries. The

149 Cabinet Opinion on the War, Simcoe 1: 297.
150 See Appendix B.
151 Instructions to . . . , Commissioners Appointed for treating with the Indians Northwest of the Ohio, April 26, 1793, St. Papers, Indian 1: 340-342.
152 Stevenson to Simcoe, April 27, 1793, Simcoe 1: 319-320; Washington to Governor Henry Lee, May 6, 1793, Writings 32: 448-450. See also, Simcoe 1: 329; Stevenson to Simcoe, June 18, 1793, Simcoe 1: 358-359.
Six Nations and the Lake Indians, more than half the tribes, wanted to negotiate for the Muskingum line. The rest of the Indians were determined to accept nothing less than the Ohio River line. The Indians sent a new delegation to the American Commissioners to determine if they had the authority to accept the Ohio line as the basis for the council.

The Americans replied that the boundary should be the topic of the council and stressed that both sides would have to compromise. The American suggestions for compromise were (1) acknowledgement that although the peace of 1783 gave the United States sovereignty over the Indians, it did not give the Indians lands to the U.S., and (2) a specific pledge to pay for all disputed lands. The Indians contended that such American concessions were worthless because the U.S. had never owned the lands it claimed to give to the Indians. They maintained that Great Britain could not have given to the United States what she did not own. Besides, the Indians claimed that the Americans had already acknowledged that they did not own the Indian lands. The Indians declared that money was useless to them since they received everything that they needed from the land.154

The Commissioners' reply to these complaints angered the Indians. After several notes passed between the Indians and the Commissioners, the Indians broke off negotiations in late August, 1793 because the Americans refused to recognize the Ohio line. The Indians insisted that what the United States claimed were treaties between the U.S. and individual Indian tribes were invalid since the whole confederacy had not agreed to them. They suggested that the Americans use the money assigned to pay for Indian lands to pay off the settlers north of the Ohio.155

During the fall of 1793, Simcoe, while still supporting the barrier state plan, prepared to defend the Canadians against Indian hostilities. After the failure of the Miami Council, the Six


Nations met at Buffalo Creek with the American Indian agents and formally proposed the Muskingum line. In a casual conversation with the American Commissioners, Simcoe discovered that even the Muskingum line was now unacceptable to the Americans.

In mid-October, Simcoe received reports about a newly discovered means of communication between York and Lake Huron. Development of this new route would lessen the fur trade’s dependence on the Great Lakes. Furs from the more valuable northwest trade could be shipped to market faster on the new route. If the lands along the new route were settled, their agricultural produce could supply Michilimackinac and the northwest fur depots at lower cost than if the supplies were sent from Montreal or Quebec. Should this waterway fulfill its promise, retention of Detroit would no longer be necessary. Establishment of this easy access to the northwest fur trade would lessen the economic argument for the barrier state.

The year 1794 was one of tension and rumors of war between the United States and British North America over the Indian question. The failure of the Sandusky Council combined with the strong American presence along the Miami and Wabash Rivers created an explosive atmosphere. Three events in February increased this tension.

In the first, on February 7, the United States responded to the Six Nations’ proposed Muskingum line. The Americans proposed a new council at Venango for mid-May to discuss boundary lines because the Muskingum line would return to the Indians land that previous treaties had given over to the U.S. White settlers now occupied this land and could not be displaced. Disliking this response, the Six Nations debated whether another council would be worthwhile.

Second, on February 10, Dorchester met with the Chiefs of the Seven Nations of Canada. He stated that American aggression made an Anglo-American war seem inevitable. American

156 Brant to Chew, September 26, 1793, Simcoe 2: 68; Proposed Boundary, October 10, 1793, Simcoe 2: 86. See also Mich. Hist. Coll. 24: 616.


160 Dorchester to Seven Nations, February 10, 1794, Simcoe 2: 149-150.
newspapers, quoting this speech, accused Dorchester of inciting the Indians against the United States. After Secretary of State Edmund Randolph released to the press his complaint to George Hammond, Dorchester's speech caused an international incident. Although the British government denied ordering its North American officials to rouse the Indians against the United States, Americans were skeptical.161

The third event, the reoccupation of Fort Miami, reinforced American skepticism. After persistent rumors of a forthcoming American attack on Detroit in the spring, the British decided that its defenses were not strong enough to repel an assault supported by cannon. Simcoe advised that the best defense for Detroit would be to block its land approaches. Dorchester ordered Simcoe to reconstruct Fort Miami south of Detroit.162 In the opinion of the United States government, the rebuilding of Fort Miami directly violated American sovereignty.

Most of the Eastern Indians, disheartened by the failure of Sandusky, decided to migrate north of the Great Lakes, but a large minority elected to remain in United States. Most of this minority decided to move to Buffalo Creek. The Oneidas asked the British for permission to relocate to the shores of the Bay of Quinti.163 The British denied this request. Part of the barrier state plan depended on the Indians themselves, not just the land, serving as a buffer between the Americans and the Canadians. Besides, revival of the Great Lakes/Ohio River fur trade depended upon the Indians living south of the Great Lakes.

The Six Nations held an unproductive council with the American agents at Buffalo Creek on April 21. Although the Eastern Indians revealed their disgust with their Western cousins, they declared that the United States' refusal of the Muskingum line precluded another conference to discuss borders. Weary of bearing peace proposals between the Western Indians and the

161 Edmund Randolph to Hammond, May 20, 1794, Dip. Cor., pp. 66-68. Randolph informed Hammond that Dorchester's speech had appeared in print and formally protested this speech in this letter.

162 Simcoe to Baron de Carondelet, April 11, 1794, Simcoe 2: 200-201.

Americans, the Six Nations professed indifference to whatever happened. Nonetheless, they did hold another council with the Americans at Buffalo Creek on June 18 and once again proposed the Muskingum line. The Americans turned it down a second time. On July 4, the Six Nations issued an ultimatum to the United States: either accept the Muskingum line or prepare for war.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1794 the British garrisons in the frontier posts reinforced their defenses. Since retention of the posts had been a year-to-year decision, officials had spent so little money on repairs that all of the posts were barely defensible. Military engineers recommended tearing Fort Michilimackinac down and building anew. Even the newly reconstructed Fort Miami did not have the fire power to survive a determined American offensive.

Ironically, while British North American officials prepared for war, the home ministry opened negotiations for peace. President Washington nominated, and the U.S. Senate promptly confirmed, John Jay as Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of St. James. On his arrival at London in June 1794, Lord Grenville received him at once. Their negotiations rapidly became so productive that by mid-July both expressed optimism about a successful outcome.

Until the finalization of the negotiations, Jay and Grenville agreed to abide by the principle of *uti possidetis* except for the recent British reoccupation of Fort Miami. Dundas issued a formal reprimand to Dorchester for the reconstruction of Fort Miami. He declared that Fort Miami could in no way be considered within the jurisdiction of Detroit and abandoned the contention that protection of land approaches to one of the King's outposts was valid. Dundas also informed Dorchester that Great Britain would probably give up all of the posts as a consequence of the negotiations with Jay. Dundas ordered the establishment of posts on the north side of the lakes in

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164 Six Nations to Knox, April 21, 1794, Simcoe 2: 214-216.
165 Proceedings of the Buffalo Creek Council, June 18 to July 4, 1794, Simcoe 2: 272-277.
order to retain the Indians' loyalty. By omission Dundas indicated that the barrier state project was a lost cause.

The American-Indian war continued throughout the spring and summer of 1794. In July the Western Indians attacked the Americans and forced them to retreat to Fort Recovery. The Americans repelled the Indian assault on that fort, so the battle remained inconclusive. American reports that British officers directed the assault on Fort Recovery were probably false. Neither Simcoe nor Dorchester had ordered British military aid to the Indians, and officials denied several requests from the Indians for such aid.

However, on August 20, 1794, volunteers led by Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell slipped away from Fort Miami and joined the Indians in fighting the next major battle. The Americans defeated the Indians after a surprise attack. The Indians, confused by the outcome, fled north past Fort Miami. The U.S. Army followed and camped across the river from Colonel McKee's house.

Colonel John Campbell, the British commander of Fort Miami, sent a note of protest to General Anthony Wayne. Wayne responded with a demand for the British garrison to surrender Fort Miami and leave the area. Campbell’s refusal prompted Wayne to lead American troops to within pistol range of the fort, whence he shouted insults and abusive language at the fort’s garrison. Prudently, Colonel Campbell did nothing, thus averting an incident that might have become cause for an Anglo-American war.

Discouraged by their recent defeat, the Indians could not be relied upon to fight the Americans. Therefore, after the Fort Miami incident, Simcoe ordered reinforcement of both Turtle Island and Detroit. Many tribes considered moving west of the Mississippi River in order to escape from both the British and the Americans. Remarkably, the Indians interpreted the

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172 Orders, August 1794, Simcoe 3: 7; England to Simcoe, September 8, 1794, Simcoe 3: 48.
altercation between Campbell and Wayne as proof that the British were in league with the Americans.\textsuperscript{173}

Although until this time there had been frequent lapses of communication between England and Canada, there had been a general harmony between the policy of the Home Department and the actions of the colonial administration. On October 13 Simcoe issued the order that marked a definite policy split between the British home government and British North American officials. Simcoe issued general orders to the commanders of the frontier posts, including Fort Miami, to open fire on any armed American force approaching the post.\textsuperscript{174} Fortunately for Anglo-American relations, Wayne left the vicinity of Fort Miami before that order reached the commander.

Shortly before Jay and Grenville signed the final articles in November, Portland ordered Dorchester to remain out of any U.S.-Indian war. The ministry did not want an incident along the frontier to jeopardize the treaty.\textsuperscript{175}

The most important provisions of the Jay-Grenville treaty with regards to the frontier were Article II through IV, VI, VII, and IX. Article II provided for the surrender of the frontier posts, which were to be handed over to American garrisons by June, 1796. The details of the surrender were left to the Governor General of Canada and the United States government. Americans could settle the backcountry so long as they did not settle in the vicinity of the posts. British traders retained ownership of their property even after America gained sovereignty over the posts. Article III permitted Americans, Indians, and Canadians alike free passage across the American-Canadian border. This article also delineated the duties on goods taken across the Canadian-American border. Article IV created a commission to explore and survey the boundary line in the vicinity of the Lake of the Woods and the source of the Mississippi River. Articles VI and VII made arrangements for the settlement of debts owed to British merchants since the Revolution and those owed to American merchants from the British seizure of American ships during the Anglo-French war.


\textsuperscript{174} General Orders, October 13, 1794, Simcoe 3: 120.

\textsuperscript{175} Duke of Portland to Simcoe, November 19, 1794, Simcoe 3: 185-186.
The Jay-Grenville Treaty of 1794 ended for more than a decade any possibility of the barrier state project. The closing lines of the treaty\textsuperscript{176} provided for later additions to it on subjects the negotiators could not then agree upon. The British offer to mediate a peace settlement between the United States and the hostile Indians was one of these subjects. Jay considered it a reasonable offer but lacked the authority to accept.\textsuperscript{177} President Washington had always maintained that the Indian war was a domestic problem and, as such, not open to foreign intervention. The chances of the United States government agreeing to an article being appended to the treaty concerning mediation were slim to none.

With the signing of the Jay-Grenville Treaty, British North America’s Indian policy took a new direction in an effort to retain the loyalty of the Indians once the posts were in American hands. The Canadian Indian Department bought lands at Chenail Ecarte to serve as an Indian reservation to which it invited the Western Indians to relocate.\textsuperscript{178} On March 30, 1795 at a meeting at Newark, British officials informed the Senecas of the treaty provisions affecting the Indians and expressed the hope that they would remain in the King’s service. The Senecas decided to remain on the American side of the border.\textsuperscript{179}

Relations between the Indians and the United States improved in 1795. In February the Western Indians signed Preliminary Articles of Peace initiating a cease fire.\textsuperscript{180} By the end of the month rumors about the Jay-Grenville Treaty caused confusion among the Indians. Some of the Indians wanted to wait until the spring to hold a council with the Americans; others hoped to negotiate peace immediately. Many Indians felt betrayed by Great Britain and thought the Americans might now demand anything from the Indians.\textsuperscript{181} The council of Greenville\textsuperscript{182} was held

\textsuperscript{176} Article XXVIII.
\textsuperscript{177} Grenville to Hammond, November 20, 1794, Mayo, \textit{Instructions}, pp. 68-70. See also, Simcoe 3: 188-189.
\textsuperscript{179} Proceedings of a Meeting Held at Newark, March 30, 1795, Simcoe 3: 338-339.
\textsuperscript{180} Preliminary Articles of Peace, February 11, 1795, Simcoe 3: 290-291.
\textsuperscript{182} This was Wayne’s main camp on the Wabash River. The British called it Grenville.
from late June through early August, 1795. In this treaty the Western Indians sold most of the Northwest Territory to the United States, retaining only a comparatively small tract.\textsuperscript{183}

The U.S.-Indian Treaty of Greenville conflicted with part of the Jay-Grenville Treaty. Article VIII of the Treaty of Greenville gave rights in the Northwest Territory only to those Indian traders who had licenses from the United States. Article III of the Jay-Grenville Treaty had permitted the Indians, British, and Americans alike free passage across the border. Great Britain protested this new development in January, 1796.\textsuperscript{184} The United States agreed to append a separate article to the Anglo-American treaty in an attempt to reassure the British that the Treaty of Greenville did not negate Article III of the Jay-Grenville Treaty.\textsuperscript{185}

Dorchester and the American government co-ordinated the British withdrawal from the outposts during the winter and spring of 1796. During the summer, all the forts were transferred to the American army without incident. After thirty-three years the period of British control ended quietly.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{183} See Appendix B for a copy of the treaty and Appendix C for a map showing the Indian reservation.

\textsuperscript{184} Grenville to Phineas Bond, January 18, 1796, Mayo, \textit{Instructions}, p. 111; Bond to Timothy Pickering, March 26, 1796, \textit{Dip. Cor.}, pp. 466-468.

\textsuperscript{185} Certification by Timothy Pickering, October 6, 1796, \textit{Dip. Cor.}, p. 100.

Conclusions

Understanding the British policy towards the Indians of the Great Lakes/Ohio River region gives a clearer understanding of British attitudes and objectives in Anglo-American relations as well as in imperial policy during the 1780s and 1790s. The accepted historical view of Britain's involvement in this area is that British North American officials, directed by the home ministry, incited the Indians against the United States. This view is incorrect. Neither the British nor the Indians wanted a frontier war. The United States' desire for the Indians' land and the methods the American government used to try and acquire it from the Indians caused the American-Indian conflicts of this period.

What historians have seen as British attempts to incite the Indians was actually Great Britain taking advantage of the situation. In 1783, it was in Britain's best interest to continue its control over the Great Lakes/Ohio River region. Retention of the frontier posts not only insured the continuation of the British participation in the south of the lakes fur trade but also excluded the American fur traders. Since the fur trade depended upon the Indians being free to hunt on their vast unspoiled homelands, Great Britain supported the Indians' desire to keep these lands. Great Britain, however, had ceded the Northwest Territory to the United States in the Peace of Paris of 1783. The Americans were naturally enraged by what they saw as Great Britain's refusal to honor the Peace Treaty.
The United States' opinions did not hold great weight among the European powers during the 1780s. Many believed that a republic of the size of the United States could not last, or if it did last, could never be strong enough to threaten European decisions regarding the North American continent. The European states abided by Machiavellian political principles. Each state looked out for its own interests and took advantage of the weaknesses in other states. Despite the United States' recent victory over Great Britain, it was not strong enough to force Britain to evacuate the frontier posts. When the Constitution of 1787 strengthened the American national government, Great Britain had to reevaluate its frontier policy.

Since the new American government had the power to fulfill the Peace Treaty obligations, the British excuse for holding the posts was no longer valid. In addition, the French Revolution and the Nootka Sound Crisis made Britain eager to resolve its differences with the United States. By 1792, Great Britain's best interest no longer lay with the retention of the frontier posts. The largest profits in the fur trade were no longer being made in the Great Lakes/Ohio River region; the center of the fur trade had shifted to the Canadian northwest. Britain also wanted to avoid a war with the United States over a region that was rapidly losing economic importance. The Indian neutral barrier state would have insured the continuation of Britain's influence in the Great Lakes/Ohio River region without the expense of permanent occupation and without armed conflict with the United States.

After 1792 the objectives of Canadian officials began to diverge from those of the home ministry. The Canadians eagerly adopted the Indian neutral barrier state project as the answer to all their problems. With the barrier state acting as a buffer between Canada and the United States, officials would no longer have to worry about a possible American invasion of Canada. Since the barrier state would satisfy the Indians demand for clear title to their lands, they could return to peaceful trapping, thereby reviving the fur trade to the south of the lakes. Also, officials could relax their watch against Indian attacks on Canadian settlers. The Canadian authorities wanted to use America's non-compliance with its Peace Treaty obligations to force the United States to agree to the Indian neutral barrier state plan.
The objectives of the home ministry were one hundred and eighty degrees opposite to the objectives of the Canadian officials. The home ministry wanted to use the barrier state plan to force the United States to fulfill its Peace Treaty obligations. They considered the payment of prewar debts and Loyalist compensation more important than continuing Britain's influence over the Great Lakes/Ohio River region. The adoption of the home ministry's view in the Jay-Grenville Treaty negotiations demonstrates the continuation of mercantilist policy in mother country-colony relations. Benefits for the mother country continued to outweigh the perceived needs of the colony, and the opinions of home officials continued to overpower the opinions of officials more intimately involved in the colony's affairs.
# Appendix A: Governmental Officials

## Great Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Position and Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry Dundas</td>
<td>Secretary of State for the Home Department, June 8, 1791 to August 1794; Secretary of War, August 1794 to March 1801.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles James Fox</td>
<td>Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, April to December, 1783.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William W. Grenville</td>
<td>Speaker of the House of Commons, January 5, 1789; Secretary of State for the Home Department, June 5, 1789 to June 1791; Created Baron Grenville, 1790; President of the Board of Trade, 1790; Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, June 8, 1791; Negotiated the Jay-Grenville Treaty of 1794; Head of the government party in the House of Lords after Lord Thurlow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Hammond</td>
<td>Great Britain's Minister to the United States, August 1791-1795.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke of Leeds</td>
<td>Francis Osborne, Marquess of Carmarthen; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs December 23, 1783 to March 21, 1791.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick North</td>
<td>Known as Lord North; Prime Minister during the American Revolution, February 1770 to March 1782; Secretary of State for the Home Department, April 2 to December 18, 1783.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Pitt</td>
<td>Chancellor of the Exchequer, July 6, 1782 to March 31, 1783; Lord High Treasurer of Great Britian, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and prime minister, December 23, 1783 to March 1801.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl Shelburne</td>
<td>William Petty; Colonial Secretary, March 1782; Secretary of State for the Home Department, April 15, 1782; July 17, 1782 became prime minister on the death of Lord Rockingham; remained as prime minister until April, 1783. The most important act of his ministry was the peace negotiations with the lost thirteen colonies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Sydney</td>
<td>See Thomas Townshend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward, Lord Thurlow</td>
<td>Lord High Chancellor, 1783 to June 15, 1792. Government leader in the House of Lords during this period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Townshend</td>
<td>Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department under Shelburne, July 17, 1782 to April, 1783; Home Secretary for the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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second time under Pitt, December 23, 1783 to June 5, 1789; President of the Board of Trade and the Committee of Council for Trade and Plantations, 1784; Created Vicount Sydney, 1783.

Duke of Portland
Prime minister, April to December, 1783; Real power lay with Charles James Fox and Lord North; Secretary of State for the Home Department August 7, 1794.

James Oswald
Great Britain’s minister in Paris for the peace negotiations with the United States; Shelburne’s agent; Negotiated the preliminary peace treaty

David Hartley
Great Britain’s minister in Paris for the peace negotiations with the United States; Fox’s agent; Came in between the preliminary and definitive treaties.

British North America

Joseph Brant
Mohawk Indian Chief; Captain in the British Army; fought on the British side during the American Revolution; influential leader and spokesman of the Six Nations and the general Indian confederacy.

Joseph Chew
Secretary of Indian Affairs, July 6, 1774 until his death, September 24, 1798.

Sir John Johnson
Superintendent General and Inspector General of Indian Affairs, March 1782 until the office was abolished in 1828. Loyalist during the American Revolution, he lost extensive holdings in New York. Commander of the King’s Royal Regiment of New York during the war.

John Campbell
Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Lower Canada, July 3, 1773 until his death June 25, 1795.

John Graves Simcoe

Sir Alured Clarke
Lt. Gov. of Quebec under Dorchester October 8, 1790 to December 25, 1791; Administrator August 25, 1791 to December 25, 1791. Administrator of Lower Canada December 26, 1791 to September 24, 1793; Lt. Gov. of Lower Canada December 26, 1791 to January 21, 1796. Commander-in-Chief of Canada.

Lord Dorchester
See Sir Guy Carleton.

Sir Guy Carleton
Governor of Quebec September 1774 to June 1778. Governor-in-Chief of British North America, 1782-1783. Oversaw the evacuation of New York City in 1783. Governor of British North America, 1786 to 1796.

Frederick Haldimand
Governor of Quebec 1777, arrived in Quebec, June 1778. Sailed to England November 16, 1784. Replaced as Governor in 1786.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role and Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir George Beckwith</td>
<td>Fought in the American Revolution; Lord Dorchester's agent in the United States, 1787 to 1791 when there was no official British Minister to the United States; held several important discussions with Alexander Hamilton; Adjutant General of British North American Forces 1791 to 1794.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathew Elliott</td>
<td>Trader with the Western Indians; Captain in the Indian Department 1777-1784; assistant agent at Detroit, 1790-1795; Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs 1795-1799.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Hamilton</td>
<td>Lt. Gov. Quebec under Haldimand; Administrator November 16, 1784 to November 2, 1785. Opponent of Henry Hope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Hope</td>
<td>Lt. Gov. and Administrator November 2, 1785 to October 23, 1786. Opponent of Henry Hamilton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander McKee</td>
<td>Loyalist during the American Revolution, influential among the loyal Indians; Deputy Agent for Indian Affairs at Detroit at the end of the war very influential among the Western Indians especially those along the Miami River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Adams</td>
<td>U.S. Minister at the Paris Peace Negotiations, 1781 to 1783; Special envoy to Great Britain, 1785 to 1788; Vice President of the United States, 1789-1796; President of the United States, 1796-1800.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Butler</td>
<td>Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Middle Department; U.S. Commissioner at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784; General St. Clair's second in command; Killed in action November 4, 1791.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Franklin</td>
<td>U.S. minister to France, September 1778 to May 1785; U.S. minister at the Paris Peace negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Harmar</td>
<td>Commander of the U.S. Army in the Northwest Territory until March 1791; Defeated by Indians on the Maumee River, October 22, 1790.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Jay</td>
<td>U.S. peace commissioner; Secretary of Foreign Affairs, July 1784 to March 1790; Special envoy to Great Britain, 1794.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Jefferson</td>
<td>Minister to France, 1785 to October 1789; Secretary of State in 1789 until his resignation December 31, 1793.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Knox</td>
<td>American Patriot during the Revolution; Secretary of War March 8, 1785 to December 28, 1794.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Laurens</td>
<td>Peace commissioner, May 1782; Died December 8, 1792.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Lincoln</td>
<td>Secretary of War, 1781 to 1783; Lt. Gov. of Massachusetts, 1788; U.S. Commissioner to Sandusky Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Pickering</td>
<td>U.S. Commissioner to the Senecas, September 1790; Postmaster General August 12, 1791; Secretary of War, January 2, 1794; Secretary of State, August 1795 to May 10, 1800.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Pinckney</td>
<td>Governor of South Carolina, 1787 and 1788; Minister to Great Britain, January, 1792; Special Commissioner and envoy to Spain, April 1795.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverly Randolph</td>
<td>Governor of Virginia, 1788 to 1791.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund Randolph</td>
<td>Secretary of State, January 2, 1794 to August 19, 1795.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur St. Clair</td>
<td>American Patriot during Revolution; President of the Continental Congress February 1787; Governor of the Northwest Territory October 5, 1787 to November 22, 1802; Led a force against the Indians November 1791; Defeated by Western Indians on Wabash River, November 4, 1791.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Wayne</td>
<td>U.S. General commanding Northwest Territory forces during 1794; led attack at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, August 20, 1794.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: American-Indian Treaties

TREATY OF FORT STANWIX: OCTOBER 22, 1784

ART. 2. The Oneida and Tuscarora nations shall be secured in the possession of the lands on which they are settled.

ART. 3. A line shall be drawn, beginning at the mouth of a creek about four miles east of Niagara, called Oyonwayea, or Johnston’s Landing Place, upon the lake named by the Indians Oswego, and by us Ontario; from thence southerly, in a direction always four miles east of the carrying path, between lakes Erie and Ontario, to the mouth of Tchoseronon, or Buffalo creek, on lake Erie; thence south, to the north boundary of the State of Pennsylvania; thence west, to the end of the said north boundary; thence south, along the west boundary of the said State, to the river Ohio; the said line, from the mouth of the Oyonwayea to the Ohio, shall be the western boundary of the lands of the Six Nations; so that the Six Nations shall and do yield to the United States, all claims to the country west of the said boundary; and then they shall be secured in the peaceful possession of the lands they inhabit, east and north of the same, reserving only six miles square round the fort of Oswego, to the United States, for the support of the same.

TREATY OF FORT M'Intosh: JANUARY 21, 1785

187 Directly transcribed from a copy of the complete treaty in State Papers, Indian 1, p. 10.
ART. 3. The boundary line between the United States and the Wyandot and Delaware nations, shall begin at the mouth of the river Cayahoga, and run thence, up the said river, to the portage between that and the Tuscarawas branch of Muskingum; then down the said branch to the forks at the crossing place above fort Lawrence; then westerly to the portage of the Big Miami, which runs into the Ohio, at the mouth of which branch the fort stood, which was taken by the French in one thousand seven hundred and fifty-two; then along the said portage to the Great Miami or Omie river, and down the southeast side of the same to its mouth; thence, along the south shore of lake Erie, to the mouth of Cayahoga, where it began.

ART. 4. The United States allot all the lands contained within the said lines to the Wyandot and Delaware nations, to live and to hunt on, and to such of the Ottawa nation as now live thereon; saving and reserving for the establishment of trading posts, six miles square at the mouth of Miami or Omie river, and the same at the portage on that branch of the Big Miami which runs into the Ohio, and the same on the lake of Sandusky, where the fort formerly stood, and also two miles square on each side of the lower rapids of Sandusky river, which posts, and the lands annexed to them, shall be to the use and under the government of the United States.

ART. 6. The Indians who sign this treaty, as well in behalf of all their tribes as of themselves, do acknowledge the lands east, south, and west, of the lines described in the third article, so far as the said Indians formerly claimed the same, to belong to the United States; and none of their tribes shall presume to settle upon the same, or any part of it.

ART. 7. The post of Detroit, with a district, beginning at the mouth of the river Rosine, on the west end of lake Erie, and running west six miles up the southern bank of the said river, thence northerly and always six miles west of the strait, till it strikes the lake St. Clair, shall be also reserved to the sole use of the United States.

ART. 8. In the same manner, the post of Michilimackinac, with its dependencies, and twelve miles square about the same, shall be reserved to the use of the United States.

188 Directly transcribed from a copy of the complete treaty in State Papers, Indian 1, p. 11.
TREATY AT THE MOUTH OF THE GREAT MIAMI: JANUARY 31, 1786

ART. 2. The Shawanee nation do acknowledge the United States to be the sole and absolute sovereigns of all the territory ceded to them, by a treaty of peace, made between them and the King of Great Britain, the fourteenth day of January, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-four.

ART. 6. The United States do allot to the Shawanee nation, lands within their territory, to live and hunt upon, beginning at the south line of the lands allotted to the Wyandots and Delaware nations, at the place where the main branch of the Great Miami, which falls into the Ohio, intersects said line; then, down the river Miami, to the fork of that river, next below the old fort which was taken by the French in one thousand seven hundred and fifty-two; thence due west to the river De la Panse; then, down that river, to the river Wabash; beyond which lines none of the Shawanees do relinquish to the United States, all title, or pretence of title, they ever had to the lands east, west, and south, of the east, west, and south lines before described.

ART. 7. If any citizen or citizens of the United States shall presume to settle upon the lands allotted to the Shawanees, by this treaty, he or they shall be put out of the protection of the United States.

TREATY OF FORT HARMAR: JANUARY 9, 1789

ART. 3. The United States of America do, by these present, relinquish and quit claim to the said nations respectively, all the lands lying between the limits above described, for them, the said Indians, to live and hunt upon, and otherwise to occupy as they shall see fit; but the said

189 Directly transcribed from a copy of the complete treaty in State Papers, Indian, 1, pp. 11-12.

190 Directly transcribed from a copy of the complete treaty in State Papers, Indian, 1, p. 6. This treaty was between the United States and the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Chippewa, Pattawatima, and Sac nations. The United States also signed a separate Treaty of Fort Harmar with the Six Nations, except the Mohawks, on this day. This second Treaty of Fort Harmar reaffirmed the earlier Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784.

191 See the preceding Treaty of Fort McIntosh for a description of the boundary line.

Appendix B: American-Indian Treaties
nations, or either of them, shall not be at liberty to sell or dispose of the same, or any part thereof, to any sovereign Power, except the United States; nor to the subjects or citizens of any other sovereign Power, nor to the subjects or citizens of the United States.

ART. 4. It is agreed, between the said United States and the said nations shall be at liberty to hunt within the territory ceded to the United States, without hindrance or molestation, so long as they demean themselves peaceably, and offer no injury or annoyance to any of the subjects or citizens of the said United States.

ART. 7. Trade shall be opened with the said nations, and they do hereby respectively engage to afford protection to the persons and property of such as may be duly licensed to reside among them for the purposes of trade, and to their agents, factors, and servants; but no person shall be permitted to reside at their towns, or at their hunting camps, as a trader, who is not furnished with a licence for that purpose, under the hand and seal of the Governor of the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio, for the time being, or under the hand and seal of one of his deputies for the management of Indian affairs; to the end that they may not be imposed upon in their traffic. And if any person, or persons, shall intrude themselves without such licence, they promise to apprehend him, or them, and to bring them to the said Governor, or one of his deputies, for the purpose before mentioned, to be dealt with according to law: and that they may be defended against persons who might attempt to forge such licences, they further engage to give information to the said Governor, or one of his deputies, of the names of all traders residing among them, from time to time, and at least once in every year.

ART. 15. And whereas, in describing the boundary before mentioned, the words, if strictly constructed, would carry it from the portage on that branch of the Miami which runs into the Ohio, over to the river Auglaize; which was neither the intention of the Indians, nor of the commissioners; it is hereby declared, that the line shall run from the said portage directly to the first fork of the Miami river, which is to the southward and eastward of the Miami village; thence down the main branch of the Miami river to the said village, and thence down that river to lake Erie, and along the margin of the lake to the place of beginning.
Be it remembered, that the Wyandots have laid claim to the lands that were granted to the Shawnees at the treaty held at the Miami; and have declared, that, as the Shawnees have been so restless, and caused so much trouble, both to them and to the United States, if they will not now be at peace, they will dispossess them, and take the country into their own hands; for that the country is theirs of right, and the Shawnees are only living upon it by their permission. They further lay claim to all the country west of the Miami boundary, from the village to the lake Erie, and declare that it is now under their management and direction.

SEPARATE ARTICLE.

Whereas the Wyandots have represented, that within the reservation from the river Rosine, along the strait, they have two villages, from which they cannot, with any convenience, remove; it is agreed, they shall remain in possession of the same, and shall not be in any manner disturbed therein.

TREATY OF GREENVILLE: AUGUST 3, 1795

ART. 3. The general boundary line, between the lands of the United States and the lands of the said Indian tribes, shall begin at the mouth of Cuyahoga river, and run thence, up the same, to the portage between that and the Tuscarawas branch of the Muskingum; thence, down that branch to the crossing place, above fort Lawrence; thence westerly, to a fork of that branch of the great Miami river running into the Ohio, at or near which fork stood Loromie’s store, and where commences the portage between the Miami of the Ohio and St. Mary’s river, which is a branch of the Miami, which runs into lake Erie; thence, a westerly course to fort Recovery, which stands on a branch of the Wabash; thence, southwesterly in a direct line to the Ohio, so as to intersect that river opposite the mouth of Kentucky or Cuttawa river. And, in consideration of the peace now established, of the goods formerly received from the United States, of those now to be delivered, and of the yearly delivery of goods now stipulated to be made hereafter, and to indemnify the

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192 Directly transcribed from a copy of the complete treaty in State Papers, Indian, 1, pp. 562-563. This treaty is between the United States and the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanese, Ottawas, Chippewas, Pattawatamies, Miamies, Eel Rivers, Weas, Kickapoos, Plankeshaws, and the Kaskaskias Indian tribes.
United States for the injuries and expenses they have sustained during the war, the said Indian tribes do hereby cede and relinquish, forever, all their claims to the lands lying eastwardly and southwardly of the general boundary line, now described, and these lands, or any part of them, shall never hereafter be made a cause or pretence, on the part of the said tribes, or any of them, of war or injury to the United States, or any of the people thereof.

And for the same considerations, and as an evidence of the returning friendship of the said Indian tribes, of their confidence in the United States, and desire to provide for their accommodation, and for that convenient intercourse which will be beneficial to both parties, the said Indian tribes do also cede to the United States, the following pieces of land, to wit: 1. One piece of land, six miles square, at or near Loromie's store, before mentioned. 2. One piece two miles square, at the head of the navigable water or landing, on the St. Mary's river, near Girty's town. 3. One piece six miles square, at the head of the navigable water of the Auglaize river. 4. One piece six miles square, at the confluence of the Auglaize and Miami rivers, where fort Defiance now stands. 5. One piece six miles square, at or near the confluence of the rivers St. Mary's and St. Joseph's, where fort Wayne now stands, or near it. 6. One piece two miles square, on the Wabash river, at the end of the portage from the Miami of the lake, and about eight miles westward from fort Wayne. 7. One piece six miles square, at the Ouiatanon, or old Wea towns, on the Wabash river. 8. One piece twelve miles square, at the British fort, on the Miami of the lake, at the foot of the Rapids. 9. One piece six miles square, at the mouth of the said river, where it empties into the lake. 10. One piece six miles square, upon Sandusky lake, where a fort formerly stood. 11. One piece two miles square, at the lower rapids of Sandusky river. 12. The post of Detroit, and all the lands to the north, the west, and the south of it, of which the Indian title has been extinguished by gifts or grants to the French or English governments; and so much more land, to be annexed to the district of Detroit, as shall be comprehended between the river Rosine, on the south, lake St. Clair, on the north, and a line, the general course whereof shall be six miles distant from the west end of lake Erie and Detroit river. 13. The post of Michilimackinac, and all the land on the island on which that post stands, and the main land adjacent, of which the Indian title has been extinguished by gifts or grants to the French or English governments; and a piece of land on the main, to the north of
the island, to measure six miles on lake Huron, or the strait between lakes Huron and Michigan, and to extend three miles back from the water of the lake or strait; and, also, the island De Bois Blanc, being an extra and voluntary gift of the Chippewa nation. 14. One piece of land six miles square, at the mouth of Chicago river, emptying into the southwest end of lake Michigan, where a fort formerly stood. 15. One piece twelve miles square, at or near the mouth of the Illinois river, emptying into the Mississippi, 16. One piece six miles square, at the old Peorias fort and village, near the south end of the Illinois lake, on said Illinois river. And whenever the United States shall think proper to survey and mark the boundaries of the lands hereby ceded to them, they shall give timely notice thereof to the said tribes of Indians, that they may appoint some of their wise chiefs, to attend and see that the lines are run according to the terms of this treaty.

And the said Indian tribes will allow to the people of the United States, a free passage by land and by water, as one and the other shall be found convenient, through their country, along the chain of posts hereinbefore mentioned.\textsuperscript{193}

\textbf{ART. 4.} In consideration of the peace, now established, and of the cessions and relinquishments of lands made in the preceding article by the said tribes of Indians, and to manifest the liberality of the United States, as the great means of rendering this peace strong and perpetual, the United States relinquish their claims to all other Indian lands, northward of the river Ohio, eastward of the Mississippi, and westward and southward of the Great Lakes, and the waters uniting them, according to the boundary line agreed on by the United States and the King of Great Britain, in the treaty of peace, made between them in the year 1783. But, from this relinquishment by the United States, the following tracts of land are explicitly excepted. 1st. The tract of one hundred and fifty thousand acres, near the rapids of the river Ohio, which has been assigned to General Clark, for the use of himself and his warriors. 2d. The post of St. Vincennes, on the river Wabash, and the lands adjacent, of which the Indian title has been extinguished.

\textsuperscript{193} A detailed description of the water routes to each of the forts and places assigned to the United States in the preceding paragraph closes this article of the treaty.
Appendix C: Maps
Joined to Quebec by Act of 1774

Proclamation Line of 1763

Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Of 1768

Quebec Act of 1774
THE PEACE TREATY OF 1783

Quebec
Montreal
Michilimackinac
Detroit
Oswego
Oswegatchie
Niagara

Boundary Line -----
Undefined Areas //////
AMERICAN-INDIAN TREATIES 1781-1789

Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1784

Treaty of Fort M'Intosh of 1785

x-x-x-x-
THE PROPOSED INDIAN BARRIER STATE AND CANADIAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS
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<th>Description</th>
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<td><em>Early American Imprints</em>, a microcard collection of primary documents on early American history. Many of these documents are untitled and can only be located by their Evans numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
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Writings


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Refers to the volume number.
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The vita has been removed from the scanned document
The Indian Neutral Barrier State Project:
British Policy Towards the Indians
South and Southeast of the Great Lakes
1783-1796

by
Karen N. Rogers
Michael A. Alexander, Chairman
History

(ABSTRACT)

Great Britain’s policy towards British North America between 1783 and 1796 reflected the confusion caused by the loss of the thirteen Atlantic seaboard colonies. Britain proposed the Indian neutral barrier state project in an attempt to solve post-American Revolution British imperial and Anglo-American problems. According to the plan the American 'Old Northwest' would have become an Indian neutral barrier state between Canada and the United States. With the barrier state project, Great Britain hoped to regain limited control over the vast territory she had ceded to the United States in the Peace Treaty of 1783. Britain desired control over this region for two main reasons: 1) the protection of Canada from both Indian and American raids, and 2) control over the fur trade. This work traces the development of the barrier state project from the conclusion of the American Revolution until the end of the British presence in that region in 1796.