The Limits of Perestroika

by

Matthew Thomas Hall

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APPROVED:

__________________________
Timothy W. Luke

__________________________  ____________________________
Ilja Luciak  Arnold Schuetz

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(ABSTRACT)

This study examines Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of perestroika, or restructuring. The analysis begins by defining the political-economic "structure" (termed "neo-Stalinism") of the Soviet Union. The study evaluates Gorbachev's policies and results. Though the internal reforms to date have been politically bold, they have been modest and non-structural. Gorbachev's external reforms, primarily military reductions, have been more successful. However, it can not be determined whether or not they are structural reforms. The study concludes that while perestroika is likely to succeed sometime in the long term future of the Soviet Union, it is unlikely in the short term.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Already much has been written about Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of perestroika, or "restructuring". Indeed, the importance of Gorbachev's program, both domestically and internationally, should not be underestimated in as much as Gorbachev proposes to restructure entirely the nature of Soviet society. In order to properly determine what "restructuring" is, a definition of what is to be restructured is essential. The "structures" will be referred to as "neo-Stalinist". "Neo-Stalinism" is a less extreme derivation of Stalinism. According to Zaslavsky,

"The Stalinist regime used systematic terror for the mobilization of social resources to accomplish rapid industrialization and property transfers. A centrally administered and planned economy replaced the market economy. Control over social production and distribution was exercised by the highly centralized party-state apparatus, which monopolized political, economic, and ideological power. The elimination of mass physical terror as a means of government by Stalin's successors signified the transition to a new phase. The new regime still preserves many essential features of the old Stalinist state (notably the centralized one-party-state system)."¹

Stalin's policies were designed to modernize and strengthen the Soviet Union. The chief priority of Stalin's moderniza-

tion program "was the expansion of heavy industry."² Stalin used central planning, with an emphasis on heavy industry and the military.³ Externally, he aggressively pursued security against what he considered capitalist aggression through military build-up, threat and force. He also employed collectivization to "extract all the food he could, as cheaply as possible to feed the growing work force he was building up in the city."⁴ According to Goldman,

"This strategy worked well. Stalin and his successors found that the central control of the country's resources was a particularly effective way of building up not only the Soviet Union's heavy industry but a very powerful military force as well."⁵

Soviet industry and agriculture achieved high growth for many years, especially in the 1930's.⁶ Stalin did not introduce the centralization of the political and economic spheres to Soviet society. This existed in Soviet, and Russian, history before Stalin. He merely increased them for the purpose of accomplishing his own modernization program. Nove states that under Stalin the planned economy "was no longer a plan-forecast or plan-guess-timate (dogadka), this was a compul-

³ Ibid, 10.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
sory, directive plan, with the force of law." 7 According to Lane,

"Parallel to the economic policy of industrialization and collectivization in the political sphere, the Soviet Party became more centralized, dictatorial and evolved around the General Secretary, Joseph Stalin." 8

Lane qualifies this statement.

"We have seen that a one-party state was introduced in Russia under Lenin. It was not Stalin's invention. ... It would be incorrect, therefore, to describe the political regime under Stalin as something new and foreign to the preceding state." 9

Thus, "neo-Stalinism" is an authoritarian political-economic system which was created by Stalin, but whose main characteristics were not without precedents in Russian and Soviet history.

1.1 WHY PERESTROIKA?

To properly determine what perestroika is, one must first understand what caused perestroika to happen. There are several reasons for the existence of perestroika. In the words of Bialer,

"Although the transition in leadership was a necessary cause of the changes, it was far from sufficient. Six

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9 Ibid.
major factors combined to bring them about: the domes-
tic performance of the Soviet system in the Brezhnev era; the new requirements for Soviet economic growth;
the changed nature of Soviet society and the conditions for its stability; the character and consequences of
the technological revolution in capitalist societies;
the deterioration of the international position of the
Soviet Union; and finally, the ascent not only of a new individual but of an entire new political generation to leadership."  

A more explicit analysis of these six factors is necessary to fully understand the movement.

The domestic performance of the Soviet system in the Brezhnev era had reached crisis or near-crisis levels. Politically and culturally, the population had been alienated from a corrupt regime. "Political stability was achieved through coercion, mass political apathy, and a lack of civic spirit."  

Bialer states that the Stalinist model of the economy and the model of growth had become out-dated. The new leadership, even before coming to power, believed that some form of market oriented model had to replace the Stalinist command mode of the economy. The model of economic growth is based upon extensive, rather than intensive, expansion. The ex-

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10 Seweryn Bialer, "Gorbachev's Program of Change: Sources, Significance, Prospects", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 103, no. 3 (Fall 1988): 404.

11 Ibid, 405.

12 Ibid, 405-406.

tensive model is characterized by "ever increasing contributions of labor, capital and land into the process of production".\textsuperscript{14} An intensive economy would

"rely on productivity of labor and capital through technological progress and better incentives, declining relative costs of production, conservation of raw materials, improved quality of products, and a build-up of the infrastructure."\textsuperscript{15}

Soviet society has changed greatly over the past thirty years, and the current political-economic system many be incompatible with these changes. Modern Soviet society can be characterized in the following ways: it is younger, its citizens are higher educated, its workers are higher skilled, a new middle class has emerged, as well as an enormous professional class.\textsuperscript{16} Lewin agrees that society has changed remarkably. He states,

"Since the 1950's the country has continued to become increasingly urbanized, educated, professionally differentiated, and politically, ideologically, and culturally diversified. The political facade of monolithic uniformity can no longer be taken seriously by anyone. Complex urban networks shape individuals, filter official views, and create an infinite welter of spontaneities. Baffled, the conservative leaders were left with the choice of trying to control the uncontrollable or disregarding, and thereby mishandling, the spontaneous. Either recourse would inevitably produce great downturns and put the entire state system under crippling pressure."\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 407.
\textsuperscript{17} Moshe Lewin, \textit{The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical In-}
Lewin argues that the Soviet political economic structure is being forced to change to accommodate a changing society.

"Soviet society needs a state that can match its complexity. And in ways sometimes overt, sometimes covert, contemporary urban society has become a powerful "system maker," pressuring both political institutions and the economic model to adapt. Through numerous channels, some visible, some slow, insidious, and imperceptible, Soviet urban society is affecting individuals, groups, institutions, and the state. Civil society is talking, gossiping, demanding, sulking, expressing its interests in many ways and thereby creating moods, ideologies, and public opinion. At the same time, the impersonal, structural features of the social system create hard facts, define reality, and set limits. Both the personal and impersonal factors disregard controlling devices such as censorship, police controls or the nomenklatura (nomination process). As we have seen, when politicians are inattentive, they soon reach a dead end."

The modern age has been called several things: the age of high technology, the computer era, the service age, the 4th industrial revolution, the 5th industrial revolution and the informational era. Whatever one calls this new time period, it has become clear that the Soviet system is not capable of becoming economically competitive. According to Kaiser, "What is left is a brontosaurus empire, one unfit for survival in a new environment - today's world."

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18 Ibid, 146.

This age emphasizes "electronics, computers and advanced biotechnology." It has three main characteristics which make it incompatible with the Soviet economic and political systems. It is based upon high-technology, which changes rapidly. High-tech emphasizes quality over quantity much more than the previous industrial age, which Stalinism was designed to accommodate. Third, high-tech is informational based. That is, information becomes commodified. Because information becomes a product, bought and sold according to the "laws" of supply and demand, an open-information society founded upon laws of free speech is necessary. The Soviet Union, and Tsarist Russia before it, have long relied on state controlled imitation to remain competitive, or semi-competitive, in technological-industrial production. What is required by the modern era of high-tech and informationalism is market controlled innovation.

21 Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge, 86.
22 Ibid, 91-117.
23 Ibid, 108.
25 Ibid.
According to Bialer, the Soviet international position had declined by the early 1980's.

"While detente with Western Europe was still alive, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 put an end to Soviet-American detente. American defense policies in the late 1970's, and particularly in the early 1980's, ended the deterioration of the strategic balance against America. The Soviet deployment of SS-20's in Europe backfired by bringing the Atlantic Alliance closer together. ... The Soviet Union found itself overextended. Its international commitments were a drain on Soviet resources and held no promise of short-term victories. Indeed, the so-called national liberation movements that in the 1970's were a symbol of increased Soviet influence, became by the early 1980's anti-Soviet forces. The Soviet Union found itself without major friends abroad and with a troubled empire at home."26

The combination of these two problems, internal and external instability, makes perestroika even more necessary.

A new generation has taken control of the Soviet system. The turnover of top positions has been high during the Gorbachev tenure.27 These new leaders have been described as,

"Less ideological and more interested in efficiency in domestic policies. They believe that the economic system should be improved by reforms that will stress increased managerial rights, greater efficiency, and technological progress, more rational methods of planning, and the use of pricing and cost-effectiveness considerations. But they do not believe in changing the fundamental principles of the system. They seem to think that a thorough overhaul of the system with its existing structures, conducted by the new Party and state managers, will exploit enormous reserves of pro-

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26 Ibid, 413.
27 Ibid, 415.

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ductivity that were left fallow by the old, tired, and complacent leadership."²⁸

What has emerged is a reform oriented leadership that believes that reform is necessary.

1.2 GORBACHEV'S BACKGROUND

A brief analysis of Gorbachev's background helps to better understand perestroika. Most importantly, his past shows him to be a reformer, within limits. According to Weickhardt, Gorbachev has

"long favored improved economic incentives and organizational forms to harness entrepreneurial instincts and energy at the enterprise (factory and farm) level. He did not, however, publicly support any alterations in the Soviet macroeconomic structure of centralized planning, price administration, materials allocation, and directive targets for enterprises. While he was one of the most outspoken Party leaders urging improvements within the framework of the current system, he never clearly endorsed the views of Soviet economists who publicly advocated devolution of power and responsibility from the bureaucratic superstructure of the Soviet economy to individual enterprises."²⁹

Reform efforts to date have been for the most part attacks upon parts of the system, not the system itself. Gorbachev's past reform experiments have been politically cautious. This


can best be illustrated by Gorbachev's off and on support of the "autonomous link".

"A link is a group of five to twelve workers, sometimes only one household or extended family. The brigade, the prevalent work unit in Soviet collective farms at the time, contains several times as many individuals. Under the autonomous link concept the collective farm assigns each link a piece of land for cultivation on a more or less permanent basis. The link leases equipment and buys supplies from the collective farm, often under a contract which also protects the link from reassignment of its members and its land. Left free to organize and schedule its own work, an autonomous link operates without direct supervision from the collective farm chairman or the brigade leader."30

Gorbachev was showing political boldness by reinstituting the link in his home area of Stavropol, where he was the regional party first secretary, in the mid-70's.31 The link, which was experimented with by Khrushchev, had become politically unpopular under Brezhnev. He later displayed his cautious side by switching to a more politically favorable agricultural practice, which was incompatible with the link.32 According to Weickhardt,

"Two aspects of his background are worth noting here. First, he originally established his reputation as an agricultural expert. ... Second, Gorbachev received a law degree in 1955 from the USSR's finest law faculty at Moscow University, and his is the first lawyer to serve on the Politburo since the Lenin era."33

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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid, 256.
33 Ibid.

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Not surprisingly, many of his reform efforts have been agricultural and legal reforms.34

1.3 GORBACHEV'S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER WITHIN THE PARTY

Within the Party, and especially in the Politburo, Gorbachev has consolidated his power quite quickly and extensively. According to Bialer,

"The turnover of the leadership and top and intermediate level political elite during Gorbachev's short tenure in office has been very high. At the Twenty-seventh Party Congress that convened one year after Chernenko's death about 40 percent of the Central Committee members were replaced. ... In the entire Secretariat of the Central Committee there remains only one person who occupied the same position in the Brezhnev era."35

This consolidation is not the limit of Gorbachev's problems, or even a sign of certain success. However, it will be a necessary first step if Gorbachev is to be successful in accomplishing his goals.36 For example, the vast majority of the "Old Guard", predicted by many to be a conservative offsetting factor, are no longer remaining. Thus it is important to show how extensively Gorbachev has been successful in this area.

34 Ibid.
35 Bialer, 416.
36 Brown.

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Comparisons are often made between the era of Khrushchev's ill-fated reform efforts and Gorbachev's era. However, Gorbachev has nearly completed his upper-level consolidation tasks, whereas Khrushchev never came close to this.38

"No one, not even Lenin or Stalin, was able to establish himself as the sole head of the Soviet Union in less than three months, as did Gorbachev. When he purged Grigorii Romanov from the Politburo, in June 1985, and kicked Andrei Gromyko upstairs to be president of the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev effectively removed his major rivals. After he added several new supporters to the Politburo a few months later, he had assured himself of a solid base of support."39

Furthermore, Gorbachev has proven himself a tactful politician, whereas Khrushchev did not. Gorbachev seems to know when to speak and when not to speak. It has been argued that "impulsiveness" was one of Khrushchev's deficiencies.40

At the September 30th Plenary Gorbachev won further victories. Andrei Gromyko was forcibly retired from the post of chairman of the Presidium and removed from the Politburo; Mikhail Solomentsev was removed from the Politburo; Anatoly Dobrynin, Vladimir Dolgikh, and Petr Demichev were removed as candidates; and several Gorbachev reformers were


38 Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge.

39 Ibid, 3.

40 Brown, 1059.
promoted. Later, Yegor Ligachev was demoted from his position as the Secretary and head of Ideology, where he was the highest ranking opponent of reform, and was replaced by Vadim Medvedev. The end result of these changes was a reform oriented, upper-level leadership. Although Gorbachev does have strong sections of opposition in the Soviet Union, one will no longer find them in the Kremlin.

1.4 GORBACHEV'S OPPOSITION

There are many people with vested interests in Gorbachev's failure. However, who these people are and how strongly they are opposed to Gorbachev's reforms is debatable.

Undoubtedly the infamous Soviet bureaucracy is the most powerful opponent of Gorbachev. According to Goldman, this is so because it has much might which is being directly threatened by Gorbachev. Gorbachev has in effect declared war on the bureaucracy, and bureaucrats are not likely to roll over and play dead. The bureaucrats wield considerable power in the Soviet Union. Reform initiatives are likely to become purposefully bogged down or lost in paperwork, as

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41 Pravda, October 1, '88.
42 Goldman, "Economic Change in the Soviet Union", 67-68.
43 Bialer and Afferica, 623.
happened during the Khrushchev reform era. Yet Gorbachev possesses one weapon that can be potentially effective. Ministerial consolidation has the effect of reducing the total amount of bureaucratic resistance. Gorbachev has already done this, and in fact quite early in his term.

The speed that these changes occurred at shows a few things about Gorbachev's struggle against the bureaucracy. One, the bureaucracy is not omnipotent, and in fact seems to be quite vulnerable if attacked directly. Second, the centralizing nature of this type of change may be merely surface level. Gorbachev is obviously using this strategy as a precursor to decentralization. It is too early to attack the bureaucracy with more risky measures, so these type of changes are the logical place to start. Gorbachev's second main weapon against the bureaucracy, and all other opposition for that matter, is the media. The media, the main organs of which are the newspapers Pravda and Izvestiia and the television newsprogram Vremya, have traditionally been important communicators for the views of the ruling regime. Gorbachev's continuing consolidation of power already includes control of these weapons. Because of his policy of

44 Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge.
45 Gorbachev.
46 Brown, 1055.
47 White, 83.
glasnost, Gorbachev is able to continually attack the evils of bureaucracy. This is a power which the bureaucracy has very little access to.

Another source of opposition to Gorbachev is the "Old Guard". In this category can be included conservative Stalinist relics, whether in upper levels of leadership or not. Gorbachev and his supporters have made a considerable dent in the reduction of these people in the higher levels of leadership. Thus, their power has been significantly lessened. However, there are still many remaining throughout the nation that are opposed to liberalization and anti-Stalinism. Benn describes the conservatives as intolerant and anti-pluralist, and states that they exist both within the bureaucracy and at the grass-roots level. Furthermore, Russian nationalists can often be found clinging to this movement. Often reactionary and anti-Semitic, this group is quite vocal and would relish a removal of Gorbachev and his supporters. Whereas an event like this is unlikely, it can be argued that the more Gorbachev attempts to reform, the stronger the reaction will become.

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48 Katsenelinboigen; and David Wedgewood Benn, "Gorbachev's Progress II: Confronting the Conservatives", *The World Today*, vol. 44, no. 6 (June 1988).

49 Benn, 94.

50 Ibid.
The military is another sector of Soviet society that may be an opponent to restructuring. Goldman argues that Gorbachev's foreign policy, which focuses on reduced conflict, reduced military spending, better relations with the West and nuclear arms control agreements such as the INF treaty, is quite unappealing to the upper echelons of the Soviet military.51 According to Goldman,

"Soviet generals would most likely come to fear that the Soviet Union would lose its status as the military equal of the United States."52

Undoubtedly, this is true to a certain extent. There will surely be military strategists who see this kind of behavior as Soviet suicide. However, it can be argued that there will be an equally powerful faction of military elite who realize the need for perestroika in the military sector. Because of the imperative for technological change in the military, the military would be best served by support for perestroika.53

According to Bova,

"The central planning system, which once served Soviet military might so well, now constitutes an obstacle as the USSR attempts to counter the threats posed by the latest in Western technology. ... In the light of these developments Soviet military leaders are likely to become increasingly receptive to economic reform ideas

51 Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge, 248.

52 Ibid.

53 Bova; and David R. Jones, "Gorbachev, the Military and Perestroika", International Perspectives (May/June 1988).
as a way of ensuring economic vitality and, consequently, military strength."\textsuperscript{54}

Which ever argument is strongest, Gorbachev is currently winning this battle. He has been able to change Soviet foreign policy, even if the change is only temporary; and has succeeded in reducing the amount and type of military influence on the Kremlin.\textsuperscript{55}

Another sector that may be opposed to reform is the KGB. The KGB is a powerful force which Gorbachev seeks to curb. Thus far Gorbachev has sought to limit the KGB's internal and external activities. He has not yet, nor is he likely to, attack their right of existence. Many accusations have been made, particularly in the West, of the KGB's independence and uncontrollability.\textsuperscript{56} Although these reports probably exaggerate the KGB's power, it is uncertain how much power they do wield. Thus, it is uncertain how many limitations Gorbachev can place on the KGB. The fact that one of the most powerful reformers, Eduard Shevarnadze, is from the KGB, is a sign that even the KGB may support some reform. It is extremely doubtful that the KGB's power will work beyond the level of protecting their own power. Gorbachev's program of

\textsuperscript{54} Bova, 401-402.

\textsuperscript{55} Brown, 1060-1061.

\textsuperscript{56} For an extreme example, see Ticktin.
perestroika should not be in danger specifically from the KGB.

Yet another sector that may prove a serious impediment to perestroika is the Soviet citizenry. Ironically, this is the sector Gorbachev seeks to attract - the workers and farmers, i.e., the majority of Soviet citizens.\textsuperscript{57} The masses thus far have been skeptical of Gorbachev's promises and have not yet endorsed him fully. Furthermore, they are not likely to do so until the standard of living for the average Soviet citizen increases. Despite their skepticism, the Soviet people are seeing changes that are being attempted, that if implemented may be very beneficial and popular to the people. Some of the changes, such as increased agricultural privatization, will have positive results for those who take advantage of them. There are reasons why some would not welcome the changes. A less relaxing work atmosphere in which the workers are not allowed to pretend to work, may be a difficult change for many Soviet workers.

The final faction of potential opposition to Gorbachev and perestroika is what has been termed the new radical left in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{58} These are the people, many of them Soviet youth, who see perestroika either as a sham or simply too

\textsuperscript{57} Battle.

limited. This "group" pursues "an alternative socialism", and consists of "radical Marxists, neo-populists, greens, hippies, punks, rockers, and a slice of the intelligentsia pursuing discreetly unorthodox lifestyles."\(^5\) The former faction will not participate, while the latter may be quite vocal in support of more radical reforms. However, the Soviet leadership will not allow the radical reforms sought by these people. Examples of such reforms would be national autonomy for the Baltic Republics, abolition of the KGB and the establishment of a multi-party system including non-socialist alternatives. These movements will be, and have already been, used by conservatives as ideological firepower against perestroika. Recently approved legislation to limit public protests and demonstrations was introduced by Gorbachev.\(^6\) However, since then there have been official promises to reduce the impact of this legislation.\(^7\) This shows the difficulty and the unpredictability of the current situation.

The above list appears formidable. Indeed, the opposition to perestroika within the Soviet Union may prove insurmount-

\(^5\) Ibid, 19-21.


able to Gorbachev. However, the changed nature of Soviet society should be reiterated. Each of the above groups, with the exception of the bureaucracy and possibly the Old Guard, has an arguable interest in modernizing the Soviet Union. Furthermore, one should be careful not to treat these groups as mutually exclusive. Even within the bureaucracy, the most homogeneous obstacle, there are likely to be people excited by certain aspects of perestroika.

1.5 THE CORNERSTONE OF PERESTROIKA: "DEMOCRATIZATION"

In his book, Perestroika, Gorbachev states that perestroika will be built around "democratization". This democratization can be defined as the process of creating and expanding, within limits, certain democratic institutions. Gorbachev writes,

"The main idea of the January Plenary Meeting - as regards ways of accomplishing the tasks of perestroika and protecting society from a repetition of the errors of the past - was the development of democracy. It is the principal [sic] of the guarantee of the irreversibility of perestroika. The more socialist democracy there is, the more socialism we will have. This is our firm conviction, and we will not abandon it. We will promote democracy in the economy, in politics and within the Party itself."

Gorbachev's strategy has changed since March of 1985. It is important to examine the evolution of his strategy, including

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62 Gorbachev, 63.
a wider range of sources. Gorbachev is emphatic about the importance of democratization in *Perestroika*, however this emphasis has not been consistent throughout his short reign. Shlapentokh shows how Gorbachev's ideological strategy evolved from a socio-economic platform which stressed the need for economic restructuring at the April Plenum in 1985, to a socio-political platform which stressed the utility of democratization at the XXVII Congress in February of 1986.\(^6\)\(^3\) Originally perestroika was intended to be a largely economic movement. However, as time went by, Gorbachev and his supporters began to theorize that such economic reform was not possible without democratization that increased participation among the Soviet citizens, especially the workers. Opposition, from the Party, the bureaucracy and Soviet society, was stronger than Gorbachev had apparently earlier believed.\(^6\)\(^4\) According to Battle, there were two reasons for the choice of a socio-political strategy to counter this opposition:

"First, Soviet economists could not agree on a blueprint for reform that would initiate qualitative changes without jeopardizing political stability. And second, Gorbachev and his allies began to realize that


\(^6\)\(^4\) Battle, 370.
the country's economic malaise was intrinsically linked to a deeper moral, social and cultural crisis. To decrease the alienation gap between government and society, a prerequisite of economic reform, Soviet reformers understood that they must first overcome public apathy and inertia. This could only be accomplished by promoting popular participation in the daily life of the country."65 Not only did Gorbachev believe that the participation of the masses was a vital mechanism of perestroika, but he also felt that their support would be an important part of his consolidation and maintenance of power.66 He has proven himself to be an adaptable politician.67 Thus, one should not assume that Gorbachev's strategy will remain constant. However since the publication of Perestroika, he does not seem to have shifted his strategy greatly. In fact Gorbachev seems to be pursuing democratization, as an ideological program, with increased fervor.68 The specific reforms that he proposed at this time are for the most part being attempted. This will be explored in the following chapters.

This study will examine perestroika as a structural revolution. Chapter two will analyze Gorbachev's policies thus far towards economic restructuring. Chapter three will

65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Brown; and George G. Weickhardt, Gorbachev's Record on Economic Reform", Soviet Union/Union Soviétique, 12, no.3 (1985).
68 Battle, 376-381.
evaluate his approach to political restructuring. The conclusions will determine whether or not Gorbachev's reforms have been structural, and what this will mean for the Soviet Union in the short and long term future.
2.0 ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING: GORBACHEV'S STRATEGY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Included in this chapter will be an analysis of what Gorbachev has done thus far to the economic structure, what he proposes to do in the future, and why he is taking this approach. Specifically, this study will analyze Gorbachev's reliance on what he calls "democratization". Also included will be an analysis of decentralization, industrial restructuring, agricultural restructuring and foreign affairs. As Gorbachev states in Perestroika, there are "no ready made formulas."69 One reason for this, undoubtedly, is the need to change policies as the political and economic environment change. Gorbachev's main goal of modernization has remained constant, while the means to achieve this have altered. These changes will be examined below.

2.2 WHY DEMOCRATIZATION?

Gorbachev's policy towards the economic structure is to be built around "democratization". This democratization is based on a program to increase participation of the workers,

69 Gorbachev, 65.
farmers and intelligentsia. Most scholars agree that the economic structure that has developed in the Soviet Union, primarily under Stalin, is a formidable obstacle. According to Kontorovich, there are two causes of past economic reform failures: one, bureaucratic resistance; and two, the rejection of decentralizing changes by a centralized system. Bureaucrats, described as "enterprise managers, ministry officials, and the local party apparatus, secretly smother reform." The top priority task of balancing is argued to be the main reason for the rejection of decentralizing reforms.

It has been argued that structural change will require exhaustive, simultaneous changes rather than piece-meal alterations. A leading proponent of this theory, American economist Marshall Goldman, states:

"Because the Soviet economic system has gone so long without economic reform, Gorbachev's task is particularly complex and challenging. ... But it will not be enough for him simply to improve the efficiency of the existing system. He must dig at the root problems, and because the roots have been allowed to run so deep, that entails a fundamental restructuring of the system,

For examples, see Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge; Birman; and Vladimir Kontorovich, "Lessons of the 1965 Soviet Economic Reform", Soviet Studies, vol.XL, no.2 (April 1988).

Kontorovich, 311-312.

Ibid, 311.

Ibid, 313.
something he himself has called for. If Gorbachev de-
cides to undertake that structural upheaval, he will
find it necessary to stand the existing Soviet economic
system on its head."

Indeed, perestroika is a program that is designed prima-

rily to modernize an outdated economic system. At first,
economic restructuring took priority in Gorbachev's campaign.
However, he soon realized that bureaucratic, party and public
opposition (not mutually exclusive categories) to perestroika
was much stronger than he originally thought it to be.
Gorbachev's strategy gradually evolved into one which viewed
all sectors of Soviet society as linked.75 Thus, he needed a
reform mechanism that would cure interrelated ills with
interrelated solutions. "Democratization" was seen as a na-
tural linking mechanism. Ideologically, democratization is
sound because it is based on the lofty idea of creating the
ture "socialist democracy", free from the capitalist contra-
dictions of Western liberal democracies.76 In practice, it
is merely a program designed to benefit Gorbachev in two
ways.77 One, to increase public awareness and activism
against an outdated system he is trying to alter. Two, to
attract the devotion and support of the people. The most

74 Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge, 11.
75 Shlapentokh.
76 Battle.
77 Ibid.
important aspect of this support would be an increased work ethic. Gorbachev realizes that positive economic results are
not possible without a lessening of apathy and increased
competitiveness at the workplace. This is best evidenced by
his rehabilitation of the Stakhanov legend.\textsuperscript{78} The specifics
of political democratization, and their implications will be
discussed in chapter 3. In theory, specific aspects of
democratization in any one sector of Soviet society will have
positive effects in all sectors. For example, increased
\textit{glasnost}, on the surface primarily a political phenomenon,
will increase economic reforms. Increases in openness in the
press and at the operational level will foster a more crea-
tive atmosphere, and will enable Gorbachev to publicly attack
the bureaucracy.

In the economic sector democratization should take several
forms: increasing participation of the people at the lower-
level; from the farmers, to the workers, to the firm and
plant managers; maintaining and increasing \textit{glasnost} so that
problems in the economic sector can be properly debated and
resolved; externally, of increasing autonomy of dependent
nations, especially in their reform efforts. This is par-
ticularly important because previously begun reform exper-
iments of "state socialist" nations, especially those in
Hungary, East Germany and the People's Republic of China, may

\textsuperscript{78} Goldman, 23.
be worthwhile examples to be examined and subsequently bor-
rowed from. Also included in this section will be an anal-
ysis of Gorbachev's policy towards reforms in the non-Russian
republics, especially areas such as the Baltic Republics
where nationalism is strong.

2.3 DECENTRALIZATION AND THE "FREE MARKET"

Decentralization is often seen as the key to economic re-
structuring. Gorbachev has proclaimed himself a
decentralizer, within certain limits. Yet there is some
criticism that his program has actually been centralizing in
nature. Thus, it is vital to understand exactly what "de-
centralization" means. Ultimate decentralization of the
economy would involve complete abandonment of state control.
This would require not only the abolition of all government
rules and regulations, an end to the planned economy, an
abolition of all ministries and agencies, but also the es-
tablishment of an unfettered free market based upon the con-
cept of laissez faire free enterprise. But such a
capitalist's Nirvana is unlikely in the "capitalist world",
let alone the Soviet Union. Thus any decentralizing aspects
are likely to be somewhere in between the two extremes and
must be analyzed accordingly. Three vital aspects of decen-

79 Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge, 148-226.
tralization will be focused on here: the planned economy, management, and privatization.

Like most analysts, Gorbachev has been critical of the negative effects of the planned economy. However, he has not yet attacked the right of existence of this crucial aspect of Soviet society. In fact he has said that reform will be within the planned system.80

"There was an opinion, for instance, that we ought to give up planned economy ... We can not permit this, however, since we aim to strengthen socialism, not replace it with a different economy."81

Yet he has been willing to attack the grossly inadequate incentive system and certain aspects of the planning system by pursuing a policy that would have all economic institutions perform on the basis of economic accountability.82

"Those plans must be based not on numerous detailed assignments set by higher bodies, but on direct orders placed by government organizations, self-accounting enterprises and trade firms for specific products of appropriate quantity and quality. Enterprises must be put in such conditions as to encourage economic competition for the best satisfaction of consumer demands and employees' incomes must strictly depend on end production results, on profits."83

So far what we have seen is a recognition that the traditional form of planning is a fetter towards economic develop-
opment, and must be altered. The planning system has the Politburo giving general quotas to be filled in time to the Ministries to work out the specific balances to be reached. Thus, most of the decision making occurs at the top (the Politburo) and the middle levels (the Ministries), while the lower levels are left with unfulfillable balances. Furthermore, the incentive system, VAL, rewards quantity over quality in a most inefficient way. Gorbachev plans to change this in two ways. One, by altering the incentive system to one which rewards quality over quantity. Two, by giving more planning responsibility to the lower levels where practicality and experience of the managers and workers will naturally be more conducive to the promotion of cost accounting. It should be noted that this reform strategy is not new in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's reforms attempted both of these approaches, both of which were rejected. How much success Gorbachev will have with the same strategies will be dealt with in the conclusions of management.

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84 Birman.
87 Kontorovich.

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In the area of management, Gorbachev suggests giving much
greater decision making powers to the firm and plant manag-
ers. This is done to battle the bureaucracy. He proposes
to begin the decentralization campaign with this type of
grass roots approach, instead of beginning at the center of
the planning mechanism. His strategy seems to be to re-
structure the lower-level enterprises. In theory this would
yield positive results that would enable the movement to ad-
vance towards the center. In practice this strategy has been
chosen because a policy that started at the center or with
the ministries would be political suicide. Ministers and
bureaucrats are less likely to implement such experimental
plans than the managers are. Thus far, Gorbachev has at
least attempted to restructure management. The enacted Law
on the State Enterprise, which went into effect January 1,
1988, deals largely with giving economic accountability pro-
cedures to managers.

Gorbachev has attempted to expand privatization in the
Soviet Union. Again, as he has consolidated his power,
Gorbachev has increased his attempts in this area. To date
far emphasis has been placed on the agricultural sector, ef-
forts in other areas are increasing. By officially sanc-

88 Ibid, 80-88.

89 Daniel Franklin, "Gorbachev's Progress 1: is the Perestroikamobile Still Moving", The World Today, vol.44, no.6 (June 1988).
tioning some private and semi-private ventures, he is legitimizing the black market. This benefits the participants and would-be participants, and it benefits the state by bringing the second economy under state control. In fact, laws have already been formulated to extract state revenue from these activities. Gorbachev is privatizing within limits, because the state still ultimately controls these private ventures. The amount of liberalization has increased as time has passed and will likely continue to increase. Ideologically, Gorbachev is masterfully using Lenin's NEP as a precedent for privatization and the introduction of legalized private property. Bialer states,

"In two respects the current reforms seek to move beyond the NEP. The New Economic Policy initiated by Lenin and ultimately destroyed by Stalin permitted private farming, small private enterprise in industry, craftsmanship, and services. The industrial, construction, mining, transportation, finances, and foreign trade areas were, however, highly centralized and based on the principles of strict planning and state distribution of goods. Today these sectors are all being decentralized in varying degrees and are gradually being exposed to market forces. Moreover, the NEP moved in the direction of stricter limits and higher taxation of private economic activity. Gorbachev's reforms, of course, seek to encourage such activity." 

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90 Pravda, October 12, '88.
91 Gorbachev, 25-26.
92 Bialer, 435.
Gorbachev has even admitted to tolerating some unemployment and inflation.93 This proposal is a definite switch from Gorbachev's earlier tough stand against these aspects.94 Indeed Gorbachev seems quite willing to accept unemployment and inflation, but realizes that he must proceed slowly because of the controversial nature of these crucial effects. He also seems eager to institute wage and price deregulation, thought by many to be vital to perestroika.95

Judging by the above, Gorbachev has not yet wholeheartedly condemned the notion of a planned economy. One of the more recent ideological phrases, "market plus plan", is evidence of Gorbachev's approach towards the economic structure.96 Instead he has chosen to focus on an attack of management in the individual factories designed around the principle of economic accountability. The intention is that this movement will trickle up towards the highest levels of management. He is also devoting much energy into some free market characteristics rationalized through the appeal to the NEP policy of Lenin. One aspect that Gorbachev has been blamed for is his reduction of the number of agencies and ministries. This

93 Pravda, January 19, '88.
94 Kingston-Mann.
95 See Gorbachev; Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge; Birman; and Victor Zaslavsky, "Three Years of Perestroika", Telos, No.74 (Winter 87-88).
96 Izvestia, August 25, '88.
has been criticized as a centralizing trend because it is combining more and more power and duty in fewer agencies.97 This is certainly true. This type of change, however, at such an early stage of reform would seem a logical place to start.98 According to Brown,

"While it could be argued that so far he has not gone beyond rhetoric, personnel changes and some organizational restructuring, it is important to recognize that these were the logical places to start."99

Although one can pin down Gorbachev's attitudes on different areas of decentralization, he does not seem to have an organized blueprint for economic decentralization.

2.4 INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING

The current Soviet industrial structure is inherited from the period of Stalin. It is a system favoring heavy industry at the expense of all other aspects of production. In fact, it can be argued that Stalin's entire policy was designed for the purpose of intensive production of heavy industry, especially in the military sector. Not only did the system favor heavy industry at the expense of light industry, consumer goods, the agricultural sector and the standard of living of

97 Nove, 49-74.
98 Brown, 1055.
99 Ibid.

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the masses; but it also favored quality over quantity. This policy helped Stalin reach his goals. The amount and speed of Soviet industrialization was great. Whether or not this policy could have been done otherwise with fewer costs, as some suggest such as dissident Soviet historian Roy Medvedev, is debatable and not entirely relevant at this point. What is relevant is the widely accepted notion that Stalin's system soon became out-moded and a fetter to further advancement. Gorbachev, like Khrushchev thirty years before him, recognizes this problem and apparently seeks to change it.

The economic structure has become a problem for several reasons. Years of virtually ignoring the needs of the people and quality products has caught up with the Soviet Union. Much criticism has focused on the negative aspects of this policy. A neglected consumer sector is an unhappy producer sector. It has been argued that this plays a big role in the low performance rates of Soviet workers. Furthermore, the emphasis on quantity is outdated in the face of the modern-day world. In the past the Soviet Union has been capable of

100 Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge.
102 Bialer, 433.
103 Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge.
keeping up, or of staying consistently slightly behind, the Western world in science and technology through various means. But it has become clear that rapidly changing and greatly sophisticated technology will no longer wait for the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{106} In the words of Hough, "The problem with the Soviet economy is technological backwardness."\textsuperscript{105} The Soviet political-economic system, which encourages imitation rather than innovation, will fall farther behind the capitalist core nations as informationalism advances.\textsuperscript{106}

Furthermore, these criticisms are applicable to the military sector as well.\textsuperscript{107} Whereas an emphasis on heavy industry and quantity was appropriate in the past, it no longer is. The dominance of high technology affects the military. Under the threat of technological advances by the West, the Soviet Union is in danger of falling behind and thus runs the risk of decreasing its security. Whether this superpower-style xenophobia is appropriate or not, it does exist in the minds of Soviet leaders; and therefore demands change. Gorbachev places much emphasis on advancing the USSR to the front of

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{105} Jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Strategy", \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol. 64, no.1 (Fall 1985): 39.

\textsuperscript{106} Luke, "Technology and Soviet Foreign Trade: On the Political Economy of an Underdeveloped Superpower".

the powers. 108 For example, in his book, Gorbachev states that the goal of perestroika is to bring the Soviet Union up to par in "world technological standards". 109 Further down, he explains this,

"Then we took a look at what equipment we had and whether it met world standards. It was discovered that only a lesser part of it met world standards. The conclusion suggested itself: rather than preserve our technological backwardness for many years, we would do better to pass through the pains of developing new equipment now and then, through advances in machine-building, make a breakthrough to the newest technologies." 110

2.5 AGRICULTURAL RESTRUCTURING

Gorbachev faces an outdated agricultural sector. Born out of Stalin's brutal collectivization drive, the Soviet agriculture system was and is unique. Whatever Stalin's reasons were for collectivization, his goals were reached and the collectivized agriculture structure which developed is the system which Gorbachev inherits. There seems to be general agreement outside of the Soviet Union that this system must be changed. 111

108 Gorbachev, 92-95.
109 Ibid, 92.
110 Ibid.
111 Goldman, *Gorbachev's Challenge*; Brown; and Hough.
Collectivized agriculture in the Soviet Union has serious faults. Soviet agriculture is unable to produce the quantity or quality of food that is currently needed.\textsuperscript{112} The Soviet Union is an enormous nation with a large amount of arable land, yet agricultural production is far below that of most developed nations. The inherently inefficient nature of the system should take the lion's share of the blame. Because of the lack of incentives, the collective workers have little reason to work hard to produce a wide variety of quality produce and livestock. Although the estimations vary, it is true that proportionally, the private sector of agriculture accounts for much higher quality and quantity of Soviet agricultural output than does the collectivized sector.

The Stalinist overemphasis on heavy industry which led to an neglect of agriculture, among many other things, created problems. Starting in the 60's, however, this was realized by Soviet leaders who attempted to reduce the agricultural inefficiencies. However, this was done by pumping more money and resources into the system, instead of changing the system itself.\textsuperscript{113}

Gorbachev has placed much emphasis on the agricultural plank of the perestroika platform. According to Brown, "Some of the most clear-cut innovation has been in agricul-

\textsuperscript{112} Goldman, \textit{Gorbachev's Challenge}, 32-41.

\textsuperscript{113} Goldman, \textit{Gorbachev's Challenge}, 38.
tural policy.\textsuperscript{116} He has also made it quite clear that structural change is necessary, not just increased spending. For Gorbachev, this structural change comes in the form of altering the two problems mentioned above by increasing incentives. First and foremost, he is attempting to bring incentive into Soviet agriculture by encouraging private and semi-private ventures. These ventures come in various forms such as contracts for family and other workers groups, the right for farms to make a profit, and price and credit flexibility.\textsuperscript{115} Many of these ventures have passed the planning stage, but it is too early to properly evaluate the results.\textsuperscript{116}

\section*{2.6 Restructuring External Economics}

This section will include an analysis of the effects of perestroika on the "non-socialist" and "socialist" worlds. The latter category will analyze Soviet economic policy towards the socialist camp, primarily through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but will focus largely on the reformist experiments in Hungary, PRC and the German Demo-
cratic Republic, and their respective influences on perestroika.

Gorbachev's liberal economic policy towards the non-socialist world should not be regarded as unrelated to the rest of perestroika. As with any other sector of perestroika, it can not be viewed in isolation, operating separately from the other aspects of reform. The desire and ability to conduct a relatively liberal economic policy towards the West stems from the rest of perestroika, and can even be viewed as effecting the rest of the movement itself. For example, a more open economic policy yielding significant benefits for the Soviet Union, such as joint business ventures with the West, will benefit Gorbachev's drive for modernization. Yet these benefits could hardly be possible without the rest of the movement, especially domestic economic liberalization. For example, increased economic ties with the West would be less likely without domestic leniencies such as increased privatization.

Towards the socialist bloc, Gorbachev has shown a more relaxed side than is typical for the Soviet Union. Thus far Gorbachev has supported increased independence for the nations of the CMEA.¹¹⁷ Reform movements in various countries are not only allowed, but are actively being encouraged. There are two main reasons for this. One, Gorbachev and the

¹¹⁷ Gorbachev, 166-170.

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Soviet Union do not have much choice. The days of a monolithic communist bloc, in which the Soviet Union controls all aspects of their neighbors internal affairs, are over, if they ever in fact existed.\textsuperscript{118} Two, the Soviet leadership has no reason to prevent reform. Soviet leaders have always been willing to tolerate some economic deviations, as long as it was not off the "road to socialism".\textsuperscript{119} Of course, what constitutes being on this road is arbitrary and changes with time. It is in the current leadership's best interests to tolerate as much reform as possible. In effect these reform experiments can be used as guinea pigs, or laboratories, for perestroika.\textsuperscript{120}

The Hungarian and East German models are relatively tame experiments. The Hungarian model has sought to modestly change the system within the system. It has sought to reduce bureaucracy and central planning somewhat, but not wholeheartedly.\textsuperscript{121} The East German model, thus far, has attempted mainly to tinker with such things as ministry consolidation (previously noted as a centralizing tendency), rather than

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Christopher Bertram, "Change in Moscow - Continuity in Europe?", \textit{The World Today}, vol.44, no.'s 8-9 (Aug/Sep 1988): 137.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Goldman, \textit{Gorbachev's Challenge}, 148-262.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid, 148-173
\end{itemize}
system reconstruction.\textsuperscript{122} The Chinese reform model under Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, has been more far-reaching. It has introduced many market characteristics.\textsuperscript{123} In this sense the Chinese experiment has been structural in nature.

To date, Gorbachev has sent mixed signals about which model of reform he wishes to pursue. The East German model would be the most politically safe for Gorbachev to undertake. He has implemented some aspects of this model, primarily the ministry consolidation. However, the capitalist reform measures Gorbachev has implemented, albeit limited, place the still young Soviet model closer to that of Hungary. Yet, Gorbachev has been quite outspoken about taking his reforms even farther, thus bringing into play the possibility of a Chinese-style reform. Only time will tell which of the above three models the Soviet reform will eventually resemble the most.

Non-Russian nationalities are currently posing Gorbachev one of his biggest problems, both politically and economically. In this section the economic sector is dealt with. But, as it will be explained in the conclusions, the two sectors are especially interrelated in this way. Areas such as the Baltic republics are demanding a much quicker and ex-

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.

tensive perestroika than the top Soviet leadership is currently willing to give them. These movements are useful in that they give Gorbachev a laboratory within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, as opposed to the Eastern bloc nations. However, Gorbachev is finding that these guinea pigs are not so easily controlled. Gorbachev has proven himself a politician capable of attacking and defending at the most appropriate times. Yet, these nationalities are experimenting much more than Gorbachev is politically willing to accommodate. However, as will be shown later, the economic demands of these regions are much less risky than the political demands. While wholesale privatization will cause worry and likely not be allowed, calls for extreme political demands (such as national autonomy) will not be allowed. Moreover, such extreme political actions will require extreme measures to stop, with the possibility of military involvement. It is hard to imagine troops being sent to Estonia to crush an unruly farmers' market, for example. A possible side effect of extreme political demands would be the ouster of Gorbachev. He has recognized this possibility and has made it clear that there are limits to political reform in the


126 Aron Katsenelinboigen, "Will Glasnost Bring the Reactionaries to Power?", Orbis (Spring 1988).
non-Russian republics.\textsuperscript{127} Thus, one can see the close relationship between the political and economic sectors. Gorbachev would very much like to continue to support movements such as the economic reform in Estonia, but the current political turmoil may bring this situation to an abrupt end.

\section*{2.7 CONCLUSIONS}

In the search for modernization, efficiency and strength, Mikhail Gorbachev proposes to restructure the Soviet economic system. This modernization includes changing the system to one which is capable of producing competitive science and technology, and of competing in world markets. Gorbachev has already changed Soviet ideology to benefit his cause, especially with the term "democratization". This change, bearing remarkable similarities to Lenin's New Economic Policy, stresses increased privatization through such terms as "social proprietor." It also stresses appeals to the Soviet workers to increase their productivity. However, it is yet too early to make a final judgment on whether or not this restructuring deserves its name. In practice, in some areas, the movement is slow and modest. In fact, certain problems have actually gotten worse, such as food shortages.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{128} Franklin.
Moreover, the limited decentralizing reforms have caused social displacement. According to Bialer,

"Yet, every major reorganization is bound to produce disorganization. Restructuring the planning and management system and immediate increases in consumer good production may, in the short run, be incompatible goals."

But one should not conclude from this that perestroika is doomed to failure. Because of his skill as a politician, one can certainly argue that Gorbachev is biding his time until his consolidation of power is complete. Gorbachev recognizes that in many ways the Stalinist economic structure has outlived its usefulness. This system, which stresses quantity over quality and heavy industry over everything else, simply has its priorities misplaced.

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129 Bialer, 449.
3.0 POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING: GORBACHEV'S STRATEGY

This chapter will focus on internal as well as external policies. In the internal section will be a detailed analysis of Gorbachev's policy of "democratization". Also included will be an examination of glasnost, in the media, education, and cultural spheres. The internal section will end with an analysis of Gorbachev's view of the term "human rights". Externally, this chapter will look at Gorbachev's foreign policy. This section will examine Soviet policy towards the United States, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Third World.

3.1 INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING

3.1.1 "Democratization" and the Legal System

Gorbachev has promised to base perestroika upon "democratization". In theory Gorbachev includes within the context of the term such liberal introductions as competitive voting institutions, fixed terms for office holders, more input for the people at the grass-roots level. All in all, he has promised a restructuring of the term "democratic centralism". He proposes to change the top to bottom deci-
sion making process to a more bottom-up style. These changes would be significant if implemented, but perhaps would not qualify as structural reform. By themselves they appear insufficient, because state power is not being drastically reduced. For while these "decentralist" alterations are made, Gorbachev continues to centralize power upon himself. As Lane has noted, the term "democracy" in the Soviet Union is based upon output participation. People are encouraged and expected to participate in the implementation of decisions, not the actual decision making process. Input participation, such as voting, is more ritualistic than effective; although the nominating and voting procedure in the Soviet Union is largely underrated and misunderstood by the West.

By proposing such changes, Gorbachev is in effect promising a decentralization of politics as well as economics. This decentralization implies a significant shift of power from the top to the bottom. In Perestroika, he states that the "revolution from above" will be accompanied by a "revolution from below" to incorporate the "human factor". However, thus far Gorbachev has significantly centralized

\[130\] Gorbachev, 55-59.


\[132\] Gorbachev, 55-59.
power upon himself and his immediate supporters. Skeptics will argue that Gorbachev is merely consolidating his power to benefit his modernization program, with no real intention of "democratization" beyond what is necessary for his political purpose. For example, even if Gorbachev is able to implement Presidential elections, he will still be in charge after all is said and done.

Once Gorbachev shifted his strategy to "democratization", he became quite emphatic about the need for certain institutional changes in the Soviet political structure. He pushed for these changes, and they were approved at the 27th CPSU Congress. Subsequently they were reapproved at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. Then, these proposals were legalized under the Supreme Soviet action. Specifically, these changes include: multi-candidate elections (although multi-party elections are still taboo), raising the real power of the Soviets above the level of a "rubber stamp" body, the establishment of a new congress of USSR People's Deputies, and the legal limitation of state and party officials to two terms of five years each. These are indeed significant resolutions and are further evidence of Gorbachev's power and the possibilities of perestroika.

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134 Pravda, December 1, '88.
135 Ibid.
Since July 1988, more modest advances have been made. Recent Soviet legislation has actually yielded dissenting votes on certain resolutions.

Gorbachev discusses legal improvements somewhat in his book, but the subject has been emphasized of late. In *Perestroika*, Gorbachev states,

"It is especially important to enhance the role of courts as an elective body very close to the population, to guarantee the independence of judges, and to observe most strictly democratic principles in legal proceedings, objectiveness, contested election, and openness. ... Law and legality are not just concomitants in the deepening of our democracy and acceleration of social progress. These are working instruments in the restructuring and a reliable guarantee of it being irreversible."

Two basic proposals have been discussed. Gorbachev is attempting to give the people more of a say in lawmaking. Thus, he is proposing to "democratize" the legal system. This democratization would take the form of removing at least some of the power of law drafting from the Party apparatus, and giving it to "public guided" legislative bodies. In reality, this public guidance could become anything from what the press claims it should be to a complete sham that exists only on paper. He also proposes to make more just and effective laws; in other words, to give civil liberties and civil rights legal backing.

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136 Pravda, September 7, '88; and Izvestia, October 6, '88.
137 Gorbachev, 109-110.
3.1.2 Glasnost and Gorbachev

Gorbachev has been very supportive of freedom of speech and press. The official Soviet and Party press, traditionally propagandistic and supportive of the status-quo, have been transformed into proponents for change. Gorbachev is using these democratic advances as weapons against the status-quo. Gorbachev sees the current Soviet structure as incapable of competing in the modern age, and therefore it must be changed. Glasnost becomes a problem for Gorbachev when the radical left becomes too vocal or ambitious. In effect, by unleashing glasnost upon the public, Gorbachev is opening a Pandora's box. Gorbachev is learning that openness must be handled with care. Yet, when used with caution, glasnost has proven a very effective means of rallying support.

Glasnost plays a major role in Gorbachev's education strategy, and it seems to have three main goals. Gorbachev is encouraging the expansion of glasnost at all levels of the Soviet educational system. In the past the school system has been one of the most relied upon methods of ideologically

138 Howe.

139 Flaherty

140 Mark Beissenger, "Political Reform and Soviet Society", Current History, (October 1988); and Powell.

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creating the "new socialist man". Be it good or bad, the school system has largely been a tool of propaganda. According to Leonhard,

"The fact that Marxism-Leninism in an obligatory subject in all Soviet institutions of higher education has not stopped the erosion of ideology; on the contrary, it has actually contributed to ideology's decline. Courses are one-sided, schematic, boring and irrelevant to everyday concerns. Students have to memorize the supposedly infallible theses and concepts of the official ideology and are not allowed to take an active interest in independent varieties of Marxism - the study of Trotskism, Chinese and Yugoslav communism, or the Frankfurt school and Eurocommunism is still forbidden. All of this has led most people in the Soviet Union to the conclusion that Marxism-Leninism is little more than a means for the regime to legitimize its continued rule and its policies."142

Gorbachev has encouraged an extension of glasnost to the school system. This can be seen as a decentralization process, because it is reducing the state's propagandistic role in education. However, because glasnost benefits Gorbachev's goals, this current decentralization may be only a means to an end. The logical extension to this is that when Gorbachev, or a like-minded predecessor, sees the need to establish a new ideological line, he will do so. It seems likely that if his regime becomes better supported, that his ideological program will be pushed upon the school system by the state.143 Ideological terms such as "social proprietor",

141 White, 113-143.
142 Leonhard, 404-405.
143 Michael E. Urban, "Political Language and Political Political Restructuring: Gorbachev's Strategy"
"demokratizatsia" and "glasnost" may replace worn out language tools such as "imperialism" and "monopoly capitalism" in the educational sphere. Despite appearances that Gorbachev is promoting openness, promotion of official state ideology in the educational system is not likely to end.144 Thirdly, by reducing the tendency to stifle initiative, Gorbachev seeks to create positive advances in other areas, especially in science and technology. In fact, Gorbachev states this purpose in *Perestroika*.

"The main direction of efforts is training young people for future work with a view to meeting the requirements of scientific and technological progress and getting rid of everything of secondary importance which gives people little except unnecessary burdens."145

It is unclear what Gorbachev intends for the long term future of the Soviet school system. It is clear that Gorbachev presently seeks to change the content of state propaganda in the educational system. He is encouraging glasnost in the schools for two reasons. He is using it as a political tool. Because Gorbachev is fighting Stalinism, he is encouraging glasnost so the evils and inefficiencies of Stalinism will become topics of discussion. Also, he realizes that an open

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144 Leonhard, 405.
145 Gorbachev, 99.
society, part of his modernization plan, includes the educational system. It can be argued that an open educational system will be a prerequisite for scientific and technological innovation.

The new cultural thaw has thus far attracted much attention. This thaw is a logical and necessary extension of glasnost. The promise of encouraged openness in all sectors of society naturally includes that of culture. Gorbachev is attacking the structure of Soviet society. In this sense cultural glasnost is a political resource available to Gorbachev and his supporters. Cultural glasnost is being used as a political tool to publicly attack Stalinism.**6

In the words of Kagarlitsky,

"The editor-in-chief of Moskovskie Novosti, Yegor Yakovlev, considers that the most important task of the day is criticism of Stalinism and, possibly, the rehabilitation of Bukharin. Yet an ever larger number of people are inclining to think that, instead of exposures and rehabilitations, what we need is a full, many-sided and objective interpretation of our historical past in all its contradictoriness. Society must find its memory again: not a selective, but a complete memory."**7

Cultural openness has been purposefully selective. This is anti-Stalinism attack is being accomplished in two ways. Censorship of current and recent culture that takes an anti-Stalin stance is being relaxed. "Socialist realism" is no

**6 Medvedev, "Cultural Revival in the Soviet Union", 17.

longer an artist's requirement, in fact, it is being attacked. According to Medvedev,

"The failure of the Soviet arts has helped launch a painful examination of many fixed dogmas and customs; it means refusing to treat the official dogma of "socialist realism" as the only acceptable method." Medvedev states,

"In 1986 the most visible changes occurred in film and theater. Only now, however, are we seeing the release of several excellent films that had for many years been banned for various absurd and stupid reasons."

Also, critics of Stalin, and their works, from the past are being reestablished. Gorbachev is adhering to the Soviet tradition of changing the official view of history by rehabilitating these people. Political figures who were destroyed by Stalin, such as Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamesov, have been reinstated. Literary figures such as Pasternak, Grossman and Rybakov, have had their works published. However, political and cultural figures, and their works, that are not anti-Stalinist have been left out. Kagarlitsky condemns this policy as "selective rehabilitation" and theo-

148 Ibid, 16.
149 Medvedev, 16.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
rizes that until culture is open as an end in itself, instead of a political means, then Gorbachev will face the same historical treatment that his predecessors have.\textsuperscript{153}

As glasnost as a whole may be a political Pandora's Box, cultural glasnost may be also.\textsuperscript{154} He will have to examine carefully the extent to which this thaw is taken advantage of by critics and dissidents. Cultural glasnost is a significant departure from Russian, as well as Soviet, history. A society in which free expression of art and literature are encouraged or even allowed is more alien than familiar to the Russians. Khrushchev experimented with his own cultural openness during his ill-fated regime. Culture was once again restricted during the Brezhnev years. Yet, Gorbachev's wishes combined with the nature of contemporary Soviet society, will make probable the continuance of the current cultural thaw. The Soviet Union is naturally more open to the west than ever before. For example, modern technology now makes it possible for Estonians to view Soviet, Finnish, British and even some American television programming.\textsuperscript{155} For this reason an end to glasnost and the current cultural thaw

\textsuperscript{153} Kagarlitsky, 19.

\textsuperscript{154} Powell; and Beissenger.

would be much more difficult for a current or future Soviet regime than a regime of the past.

Thus far Gorbachev has taken steps towards cultural glasnost. As with many other aspects of perestroika, the early returns are positive, but not conclusive. There are limits to the amount of anti-Soviet criticism that will be allowed. Extreme criticism, such as the denial of the Soviet Union as a legitimate regime, would only hurt Gorbachev. It is unlikely that the themes of the cultural "thaw" will stray away from anti-Stalinism. There are exceptions. Arkadii Arkavov's "Solomon", which depicts Gorbachev and perestroika in a sarcastic light, has been allowed. Whereas the extreme of a return to complete isolation is improbable, so is the opposite.

3.1.3 Gorbachev and "human rights"

The Soviet definition of the term "human rights" has always been at odds with the traditional view of the Western-liberal democracies. The latter have always placed emphasis on civil rights and liberties, such as religious freedom,
freedom of dissent, freedom to live where one wants, etc.\textsuperscript{158} Whereas the former places emphasis on basic needs, such as the right to housing, food, clothing and health care.\textsuperscript{159} In theory, both versions seem incomplete. In practice they are at least partially ignored, especially by the superpowers.\textsuperscript{160} However, Gorbachev appears to be attempting to alter the Soviet view of human rights. Indeed, Gorbachev has made promising headway in traditionally criticized areas. Freedom of speech is a vital component of glasnost and is being pursued within limits. Freedom of religion has expanded at least somewhat.\textsuperscript{161} Emigration procedures have been liberalized, and many dissidents and refuseniks have been allowed to leave the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{162} Needless to say, the Soviet Union has a long way to go to satisfy western human rights critics, but Gorbachev's strategy in this area seems to be progressive.\textsuperscript{163}


\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{161} Shulman, 514.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
3.2 EXTERNAL RESTRUCTURING

3.2.1 Introduction: Gorbachev's "New Thinking"

Post-World War II Soviet foreign policy has been dominated by militarism, and the Cold War. Be it unfounded imperialism or necessary security precautions, Soviet militarism dominated its foreign policy, significantly contributed to the cold war and the arms race, regularly devoured enormous portions of the GNP and even shaped the Soviet industrial infrastructure. It has become clear that the Soviet Union is being dragged down by this emphasis. Since becoming General Secretary in March of 1985, Gorbachev has consistently shown a desire to change Soviet foreign policy. His slogan, "military sufficiency", has been backed up with action.164 He has sought a less aggressive world-wide attitude evidenced by concessions to the U.S. in arms negotiations, unilateral troop reductions, the decision to pull-out of Afghanistan, and the continuing of an active dialogue with the Western nations.165


3.2.2 Relations with the U.S.

Gorbachev has placed much emphasis on the need for better relations with the U.S. Soviet-U.S. relations have improved during the era of Gorbachev. Relations had deteriorated since the end of détente, culminating in a virtual cold war renewal. The end of détente, which began with Carter and was completed by the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, marked the renewal of the Cold War. According to Rubinstein,

"As we move into the latter part of the 1980's, Soviet-American relations are at an all-time low. When Ronald Reagan entered the White House in January 1981, he brought with him a profoundly hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union, which he characterized as an "evil empire." Within days of taking office, he said that the only morality Soviet leaders recognize "is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat in order to obtain that.""16

Since 1985, Gorbachev has pursued diplomatic negotiations with enthusiasm. Perhaps the turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations occurred at the October 1986 Summit in Reykjavik, Iceland. The summit at Reykjavik was an important event not because of its results, but because of the proposals made by Gorbachev. The first was for a fifty-percent reduction in all strategic arms. The second was for the total elimination of all intermediate nuclear forces (INF), sometimes referred to as the zero-option, in Europe. The last was to freeze

16 Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, 330.
short range nuclear weapons and to agree to hold talks to decide what to do with them.

The most noteworthy product of these proposals is the INF treaty. The majority of credit belongs to Gorbachev and the Soviets for the signing of this treaty, for three reasons. One, at Reykjavik, Gorbachev brought back to the table the idea of the zero-option, which was to become the foundation of the INF treaty. This was a significant proposal because it had previously been developed by the U.S. and turned down by the Soviets. Two, the Soviets conceded not to include French and British owned nuclear weapons in the agreement. This was a reversal of Soviet policy. Three, relatively strict verification procedures were agreed upon by the Soviets. Highly structured, short notice, on-site inspection procedures have traditionally been vetoed by Soviet negotiating teams. It remains to be seen how effective these procedures will be. Gorbachev has been quite eager to reach further nuclear arms reduction agreements. He has proposed the "third zero option", which would eliminate short range nuclear weapons, and he has worked hard to reach an agreement on the START proposal, which would reduce both superpowers'
nuclear arsenals by 50%. The last major policy of Gorbachev is the decision to cut military forces by 500,000. While a half-million is a relatively small percentage of Soviet troops, it is a significant move because it is unilateral. Keeping in line with his policy of "military sufficiency", Gorbachev has pushed for a conventional force which would rely more on defensive weapons than on offensive weapons.

3.2.3 Relations with Western Europe

Gorbachev seems quite enthused about the idea of a "common European home", which he pursues in Perestroika. 

"Europe is indeed a common home where geography and history have closely interwoven the destinies of dozens of countries and nations. Of course, each of them has its own problems, and each wants to live its own life, to follow its own traditions. Therefore, developing the metaphor, one may say: the home is common, that is true, but each family has its own apartment, and there are different entrances, too. But it is only together, collectively, and by following the sensible norms of coexistence that the Europeans can save their home, protect it against a conflagration and other calamities, make it better and safer, and maintain it in proper order."

He has achieved better relations through diplomacy and military reductions. He has used his political charisma to in-

169 Ibid.
170 Gorbachev, 190-209.
171 Ibid, 195.
crease diplomatic contact with West European leaders. This charisma is enhanced by the fact that Gorbachev is the first modern leader the Soviet Union has had, capable of tapping into the potential utility of Western media. By making military reductions, specifically the INF Treaty and the unilateral conventional force reduction, Gorbachev is endearing himself to both Western European publics and leaders.

According to Rubinstein the Soviet Union has traditionally used a wide variety of approaches including "blandishment, pressure, bargaining, and growing military power" to achieve specific goals. Rubinstein states that these goals are:

"(1) to sow and exploit discord between the countries of Western Europe and the United States and among NATO members, and not to dominate Western Europe as it does Eastern Europe; (2) to foster its security, which it believes lies in a weakened West and retention of a favorable balance of power, rather than physical expansion of Soviet power beyond the present confines of the Warsaw Pact; (3) to improve relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, while maintaining control over the German Democratic Republic; (4) to increase the political, economic, and military leverage that it can bring to bear on concrete issues; and (5) to induce docility rather than strike for dominion." 

Gorbachev's policies seem fairly consistent with these goals. Certainly by using the notion of the "common home", he is attempting to sow discord in NATO, especially between the U.S. and Western Europe. By pursuing better diplomatic re-

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172 Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 112.

173 Ibid.
lations with West Germany, eliminating INF's in Europe, and reducing conventional forces, the Soviets are improving relations with West Germany. Economically, such a move would open markets to the Soviet Union; a possibility which Gorbachev relishes as a nicely fitting piece of the perestroika puzzle. Politically, it would reduce tensions, a goal which Gorbachev seems to seek throughout the world. The military reductions and Gorbachev's use of the term "sufficient defense" indicate that the Soviet leadership, including military, feel that their nation is at least temporarily secure.

3.2.4 Relations with the Socialist Bloc

Relations with the socialist world under Gorbachev are mixed, primarily because of the heterogeneous nature of the socialist world. Gorbachev seems to be pursuing a more relaxed attitude towards Eastern Europe. According to Lowenkron,

"To date, Gorbachev's policies in Eastern Europe have gone over well. Jaruzelski and Gorbachev have revived Polish-Soviet relations from the nadir of the early 1980's. In Czechoslovakia the transition from Husak to Jakes went smoothly, although Jakes's record does not suggest someone likely to implement perestroika. Honeker can afford to resist glasnost as long as the

174 Shulman, 500.
175 Ibid.
East German economy is benefiting the Soviet Union. Public focus in Hungary is less on Janos Kadar and the party than on Prime Minister Grosz and efforts at managing reform. Zhivkov's Bulgaria has fallen into line over perestroika - not too far in front, not too far behind the Soviets. In Romania, Gorbachev received a warm public reception from a population that, in the words of one commentator, is being asked by Ceausescu to freeze to death in their bedrooms.\(^{176}\)

However, Bertram disagrees. He argues that perestroika will be "potentially destabilizing in Eastern Europe, for a number of reasons."

"1. Eastern Europe has been the traditional region of postwar European unrest, the only one where Soviet military force (or any other military force, for that matter) has been used in Europe since 1945. . . . The second reason for future East European instability is, paradoxically, in the Soviet reforms. They are likely to be seen as a threat by the local leadership and as an encouragement to the people. In all, personnel changes in Eastern Europe may turn out to be more cautious and traditional than in the Soviet Union. . . . This will be reinforced by the fact that the peoples of Eastern Europe have begun to claim Gorbachev as their ally in asking for glasnost at home. Charter 77 in Prague, Solidarity in Warsaw, the young demonstrators in East Berlin - all put their hopes in Gorbachev. . . . The days are long gone when Soviet leaders could dictate what East European regimes do. How reluctant even the new Soviet leadership is to give orders is exemplified by the case of Rumania, where the Soviet Union continues to tolerate a ruthless, corrupt and nationalistic dictator."\(^{177}\)

He concludes that "Eastern Europe will offer the most dangerous challenge to Mr. Gorbachev and his team, and one which he may well fail to meet."\(^{178}\)

\(^{176}\) Lowenkron, 95-96.

\(^{177}\) Bertram, 137.

\(^{178}\) Ibid.
Soviet relations with China under Gorbachev are of importance.179 The hostile relationship between the two nations, which climaxed in 1969 in the border conflict, has been a sore spot for both nations. According to Rubinstein

"The root cause remains nationalism, and precisely because the split derives from rival national interests and conceptions of security, each side view the other as a long-term threat, which geography has confirmed in perpetuity. In international relations, neighbors are rarely friends. Political and ideological considerations are more significant than military ones, though the USSR and China each fear that its geographic and economic vulnerabilities may tempt the other. Each seeks to enhance its prestige by denigrating the backsliding of the other. The Soviet Union sees China as a competitor for leadership in the international Communist movement and among radical groups."180

Gorbachev apparently seeks to change this, by pursuing friendlier diplomatic relations. According to Shulman,

"Vague Soviet schemes for a comprehensive system of security and economic cooperation in Asia now seemed intended not to isolate China, as in earlier iterations, but to draw it into closer functional relationships. By encouraging Mongolia to diversify its diplomatic contacts, by pursuing a political solution in Afghanistan and by encouraging the Vietnamese to consider diplomatic solutions in Cambodia, the Soviet Union seemed to be taking steps toward meeting conditions laid down by China for an improvement of Sino-Soviet relations."181

Economically, this type of relationship would help legitimate Gorbachev's usage of the "Chinese model" of reform. Politi-

179 Goldman and Goldman, "Soviet and Chinese Economic Reform".

180 Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, 148-149.

181 Shulman, 501.
tically, it falls in line with Gorbachev's strategy to pursue reduced tensions throughout the world. Strategically, it disables, at least in part, the United States ability to "play the China card."

The remaining country that needs to be discussed here is Afghanistan. When Gorbachev referred to Afghanistan as "a bleeding wound" in February 1986 at the 27th Congress, he set in motion the Soviet withdrawal.182 This withdrawal was completed on schedule, thus ending the Soviets' nine year war.183 Gorbachev's decision to pull out of the costly nine year war is one of his biggest successes as Soviet leader.184 According to Rubinstein,

"The Soviet withdrawal is a momentous development. For Soviet Communist party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, it marks the apparent end of three years of searching for an alternative that would have permitted the Soviet Union to remain, in the hope of consolidat- ing the power of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul."185

Besides its incredible costs both in money and in human lives, the war contradicts Gorbachev's self-proclaimed status of peacenik. Afghanistan had become the Soviet Union's biggest foreign policy problem, thus the pull-out should not be

182 Speech to 27th Congress.


185 Ibid.

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surprising.\textsuperscript{186} According to Rubinstein, Gorbachev has made this decision for several reasons: his desire to concentrate on economic perestroika, the unpopularity of the war, the inability to defeat the Mujahadeen, to improve international relations, and ideological and practical differences with the Afghan Communist party.\textsuperscript{187} It remains to be seen what will happen in Afghanistan.

\textbf{3.2.5 Relations with the Third World}

Gorbachev is altering the Soviet strategy in the third world. The Soviets seem to be replacing the strategy of supporting revolutionary struggles in small nations around the world, such as Angola, Mozambique and Nicaragua; with the strategy of emphasizing events in larger nations.\textsuperscript{188} According to Fukuyama,

"The radical "socialist-oriented" states - regimes like Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua and Afghanistan that came to power with the help of the Soviet Union and its allies in the 1970's - must, according to the party program, develop their economies "mainly through their own efforts." The Soviet Union will provide economic aid, training and defense assistance (in that order), but only "to the extent of its abilities." The document then leaves the subject of Moscow's Marxist-Leninist

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\textsuperscript{187} Ibid, 333.

\textsuperscript{188} Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World", \textit{Foreign Affairs}, vol.64, no.4 (Spring 1986).
\end{flushleft}
allies altogether and suggest that "real grounds exist for cooperation [between the Soviet Union and] young states which are travelling the capitalist road," that is, countries like Argentina, Brazil, and the oil-producing nations of the Persian Gulf with market-oriented economies and strong political ties with the West."18

These nations, including nations such as Mexico, Argentina and India; are not in the middle of revolutionary struggles, but are deemed much more strategically important. The above mentioned revolutionary struggles will be de-emphasized, but probably not abandoned. This gives the Soviets a chance to publicly support reduced conflict by de-emphasizing revolutionary movements.

3.3 CONCLUSIONS

Gorbachev seeks to redefine "democratic centralism" to allow much more grass-roots decision making participation. Certainly he has made some attempts, and even progress, to institute these aspects. However, it has also been argued that the Soviet political structure is inherently stable because of the reinforcing nature of the Politburo and the rest of the upper Party hierarchy.190 Besides these institutional beginnings, thus far Gorbachev has been the epitome of the

189 Ibid, 715-716.


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Grand Centralizer; not decentralizer. According to Bialer, political power is still extremely centralized, concentrated in the Politburo and the high-level party apparatchiki. Bialer continues, "The traditional view is that one does not fight against the Party, and Gorbachev is the Party. It remains to be seen if this will continue, or if Gorbachev will fulfill his promise to significantly modify Soviet "democratic centralism".

There are three main reasons for Gorbachev's kinder, gentler foreign policy. One, it gains time and resources for economic perestroika. Two, it wins international support for the USSR, which is strategically and economically vital. If Gorbachev can further back up his rhetoric with more action, the international community will be even more eager to deal with him.

191 Goldman and Goldman, "Soviet and Chinese Economic Reform".
192 Bialer, 441, 454.
193 Ibid, 455.
194 Shulman.
4.0 CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS FOR PERESTROIKA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Has Mikhail Gorbachev begun to systematically restructure the Soviet Union, or has he only tinkered with the system? This study has attempted to shed some light on a largely misunderstood reform movement within a greatly misunderstood nation. This chapter will try to answer the above question and from this, analyze what is likely to happen to Gorbachev, perestroika and the Soviet Union in the future.

4.2 INTERNAL PERESTROIKA

Thus far Gorbachev has not been successful in restructuring the neo-Stalinist internal political-economic system. Gorbachev finds himself caught in a Catch-22 situation. Politically he can not afford to change the structure entirely through decentralization. However, he may not be able to achieve enough positive gains without complete decentralization. Gorbachev has chosen a strategy that mixes political caution with bold, but not overly risky, reforms. By refusing to attack the planned economy and political centralization, he is dooming economic perestroika to mediocrity and mixed results.
If all were to go as Gorbachev plans, neo-Stalinism would be changed significantly. The worker would take glasnost seriously and publicly and privately join in the battle against bureaucratic inefficiency. Moreover, they would begin to participate in Gorbachev's economic decentralization by becoming active in private and semi-private ventures. This, along with an increasingly open school system, would build a precedent for innovation and creativity. The end result would be a mixed economy and one-party democracy capable of both innovation and guaranteeing minimum basic needs for its people. The other extreme would be a continuation of the lack of economic results from perestroika, bureaucratic suffocation of reforms and social dislocation and suffering caused by reform.

More than likely the internal results of perestroika will fall somewhere between these two extremes. While early indications would place perestroika closer to the pessimistic extreme, there are hopeful factors that should be considered. Gorbachev's skill as a politician may prove invaluable. He has shown an uncanny ability to mix caution and boldness. Moreover, the need for perestroika in order to keep up with the changed nature of Soviet society and the world makes successful perestroika more likely in the future. Much depends on two factors: participation of the Soviet citizenry, especially the workers, and economic results. An increase in one will cause a proportional increase in the other.

Conclusions: Prospects for Perestroika
Likewise, a decrease in either will have similar effects on the other.

4.3 EXTERNAL PERESTROIKA

The external economic policy of Gorbachev has not produced many positive results. If Gorbachev's strategy were to work, the Soviet Union would become an economic superpower capable of competing in the world economy, especially in high-technology, with special ties to Europe as a member of the "common home".

The other extreme would have the the situation remaining as it is presently, with the Soviet Union remaining the most developed of the semi-peripheral economies. Because of the rapidly changing nature of high-technology, the Soviet Union would fall further behind the West by having to rely on imitation rather than innovation.

The most likely outcome, again, lies somewhere in between the two extremes. Gorbachev's diplomacy mixed with his military concessions are gaining him international support from publics and from leaders somewhat. While the Soviet Union will likely continue expanding its role in international markets, it is unlikely that they will become a first rate core economy anytime in the near future.

Gorbachev's external political policies have produced the most impressive and hopeful results. Whether or not these
changes will prove to be structural remains to be seen. To qualify as structural, a long term reduction in militarism and imperialism, which have dominated Soviet foreign policy since Stalin, would be necessary. However, the limited reductions, both nuclear and conventional already agreed upon; coupled with the possibility of a large nuclear reduction, bring hope to a world threatened with nuclear annihilation.

4.4 CONCLUSIONS

To date international support for Gorbachev has been more enthusiastic than domestic support. For centuries the Russian people have been lied to by their leaders. This has created an apathetic, cynical citizenry not easily won over, even by the smoothest of orators. International enthusiasm has been heightened somewhat because Gorbachev has given them results, in the form of military reductions. If the Russian people are given something to believe in beyond recycled ideology, perhaps enthusiasm will replace apathy.

The Soviet Union, like every other nation, is a constantly changing society. It is only logical that the political-economic structure will be forced to adapt if the regime is to survive. Thus, perestroika, or restructuring, is probable sometime in the future.
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