ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND THE SPANISH STATE:
A COMPARISON OF THREE REGIONS IN SPAIN

by

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(ABSTRACT)

Modernization theory hypothesizes that ethnicity and ethnic activism will diffuse and dissipate following industrialization because in industrial economies class will replace ethnicity as the basis for individual and group identity. However, the persistence of ethnic activism, including autonomist and separatist movements in Western European countries, challenges the validity of that hypothesis. Equally significant, many attempts, historical and contemporary, to suppress ethnicity and ethnic activism have failed. Neither class consciousness nor nationalist consciousness has transcended or displaced ethnic and regional identity. Such is the case for Spain.

This study attempts to show that suppressive action by the state, not change in the economy, is the independent variable that explains contemporary ethnicity and ethnic activism. Suppressive action is defined as any policy, repression, or other activity by the state aimed at suppressing ethnic identity and autonomy. The study
hypothesizes that ethnic demands for autonomy or independence will intensify rather than subside if the ethnic group enjoyed privileges, rights, and liberties before a superordinate group, controlling the apparatus of the state, tried to limit or abolish regional autonomy and repress or subordinate, short of genocide, the ethnic group in that region.

To make this case, this study compares three regions in Spain: Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country. It analyzes the state's suppressive actions and pursuit of policies detrimental to regional interests and then analyzes the responses of those regions to state action. The study shows that state actions, in the form of repression of regional languages, the abrogation of regional rights, and other actions against ethnic and regional autonomy, heightened and politicized ethnic identification and provoked militant ethnic activity in Spain. However, for a movement to emerge and maintain itself, the ethnic groups needed effective leadership, a compelling program for action, and social and cultural institutions in which the movement could survive and grow.
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CHAPTER ONE

ETHNO-NATIONALISM: HYPOTHESES AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

Modernization theory hypothesizes that ethnicity and ethnic activism will dissipate following industrialization because in industrial economies class will replace ethnicity as the basis for individual and group identity. However, the persistence of ethnic activism, including autonomist and separatist movements in Western European countries, challenges the validity of that hypothesis. In France, Spain, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland modernization has not dissolved ethnicity. Equally significant, many attempts, historical and contemporary, to suppress ethnicity and ethnic activism have failed. Neither class consciousness nor nationalist consciousness has transcended or displaced ethnic and regional consciousness and identity. The persistence of regional ethnic group challenges to the legitimacy of modern Western European nation-states is especially intriguing because they are among the world’s oldest centralized states, and, presumably, have had more time to develop a nationalist consciousness.

This study qualifies modernization theory and shows that suppressive action by the state rather than change in the economy is the independent variable that explains contemporary ethnicity and ethnic activism. Suppressive
state action in the context of this study is defined as any policy, repression, or other activity by the state aimed at suppressing the consciousness and expression of ethnic distinction or limiting or abolishing privileges, rights, liberties and autonomy of an ethnic group. The hypothesis examined in this work is that ethnic demands for autonomy and independence will intensify rather than subside if the ethnic group enjoyed privileges, rights, liberties, and autonomy before a superordinate group, controlling the apparatus of the state, revoked those privileges, rights, and liberties and instituted policies designed to limit if not abolish regional autonomy and repress and subordinate, short of genocide, the ethnic group in that region. Drawing on the specific examples of autonomist and separatist movements in the Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque Country, three regions in Spain, this study illustrates that hypothesis through a micro-sociological analysis of those movements and regions. By comparing these regions, this study explains why support for ethno-nationalist and regionalist movements varies among distinct groups.

Before presenting the evidence for the hypothesis, it is appropriate to define key terms and conceptual parameters associated with its theoretical foundations. Those terms include nationalism, sub-nationalism, ethno-nationalism, ethnicity, and ethnic identity. The theoretical basis for
this study derives from modernization theory. The key conceptual parameters relevant to this study are modernization, division of labor, ethnic competition, social institutions, cultural institutions, and oppositional subculture.

THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND DEFINITIONS

In this study secessionist movements that seek to form a separate, sovereign, and independent nation-state will be referred to as nationalist or sub-nationalist movements. To distinguish between nationalist and sub-nationalist movements, Charles C. Ragin argues that while both "... national and sub-national identities ..." are "... large-scale, collective identities that are politically and historically defined ...", nationalism is different from sub-nationalism. Nationalism led to the creation of modern nation-states "... first in the West, and, more recently, in the Third World." Sub-nationalism, Ragin argues, represents an internal challenge to "... modern nations and modern nationalisms." Some argue that


2Ibid.

3Ibid.
nationalism has historically tried to suppress ethnic diversity to develop nationalism and a nation that transcended ethnic diversity. There is, however, a more recent phenomenon called ethno-nationalism, a type of sub-nationalism which derives its legitimacy and support from an ethnic base and seeks to create a separate nation-state for an ethnic group. If a movement is willing to gain greater autonomy and more privileges or rights within the state in return for remaining within that state, and thus tie the movement more closely to the state, then the movement may be considered autonomist or regionalist but not nationalist, even if its members claim to be nationalist.  

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*E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Hobsbawm points out that the modern nation state tries to suppress ethnicity and is not to be equated with ethnicity. Numerous scholars discuss the concept of nation in a way that is problematic. For example, Karl W. Deutsch provides an example of French people having the same views on dress, style, etc. as an illustration of how people identify themselves as part of a nation in Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1969). This almost seems to imply that France was founded on the basis of common taste in food, values, and modes of behaving and communicating with each other. If this is what he is implying, he is wrong. The French state imposed the nation-state from above. One part of France sought to impose its culture on the rest of what is now France. Moreover, Deutsch's illustration is disturbing because it omits ethnic minorities, both indigenous and immigrant, who may not share all of the "French" cultural traits. Not all nationalisms are based solely on ethnicity or culture.

*Ragin, "Celtic Nationalism," 251. Ragin points out that sub-nationalist movements often claim that their ultimate goal is to create a nation-state of their own, but once the state from which they seek separation recognizes them or grants them some
regionalism is an ideology that demands special privileges within the state whereas ethnic nationalism seeks separation from the state. More significantly, ethnicity can be "re-created" by ethnic activists as a justification for autonomy or separatism. In order for this claim to impress people, however, there has to be a sense of shared interests and grievances among the people. Such a claim is more likely to succeed in impressing people if a sense of common identity has already existed. A definition of ethnicity is needed to clarify ethno-nationalism and its appeal.

ETHNICITY DEFINED

Ethnicity is a subjective identification properly defined by the members of an ethnic group. It should not be defined by outsiders. Davydd J. Greenwood argues that

privileged, the sub-nationalist movements accepts this, even if it ties them closer to the state.


8 See for example, Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), 16. She adds that self-perception is partly a reaction to outsiders'
ethnicity has been used in the place of culture and that such usage is vague because culture can be anything that distinguishes humans from other animals. Thus, Greenwood offers a more specific definition: "Ethnicity is that part of the culture of a group that accounts for its origin and character, thereby differentiating it from other groups within large-scale political units and . . ." affecting ". . . its relationships with those groups and with the government." The concept is only applicable to " . . . large-scale institutional systems." Thus, he argues, " . . . the symbols of ethnic identity and the institutional contexts in intergroup relations must be studied together as they develop over time." In other words, how ethnic groups define themselves changes over time within the context perceptions. E. Francis argues that an ethnic identity is formed when a group of people believe that they are descended from common ancestors. See Interethnic Relations: Essays in Comparative Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 382. This may be too limiting a definition, however, since some Basques claim that anyone who learns Euskera, the native language of the Basque Country, is Euskaldun and a true Basque, more so than one who does not speak the language but is descendant of inhabitants of the region for generations. (Roslyn Frank of the University of Iowa pointed this out in a conversation. She pointed out that Euskal Herria, or Euskalherria, the old name for Euskadi means Euskera-speaking people. There is no reference to the land.)


1Ibid.
of inter-group relations.

Greenwood argues that history, especially a people’s perception of its own history, influences present-day behavior. Second, he argues that ethnic identities are developed and changed through "... interactions with larger institutional systems which establish the bases for cooperation and conflict." Third, "... ethnic identities are formed vis-à-vis other ethnic identities that compete with them." An ethnic identity is as much a definition of who you are not as who you are." Fourth, "... once ethnic identities have become sharply defined as a result of experience within particular institutional contexts, the combined force of group solidarity and remembered affronts may..." complicate "... institutional resolution of the conflicts..." Examples could be loss of privileges or rights, repression, or war.

Pierre van den Berghe argues that ethnic differences are culturally based. William R. Beer lists "... dress, diet, and especially language..." as

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\(^1\)Ibid., 82.

\(^2\)Ibid.

\(^3\)Ibid.

characteristics of ethnicity, though he acknowledges that not all ethnic groups are linguistically distinct.\textsuperscript{15}
Language, Beer points out, is an ambiguous criterion of ethnic identity because many people who claim to belong to an ethnic group may not speak the language of that group.\textsuperscript{16} Although Beer is correct that "... dress, diet, and especially language ..." can be salient markers and defining characteristics of an ethnic group, Greenwood's definition and points are more applicable to this study because of evidence that urban Spanish Basques are generally indistinguishable from non-Basque Spaniards in terms of religion, language, education, and other traits.\textsuperscript{17} Although many Basques seek to learn their traditional language, and claim it to be central to their ethnic identity, other Basque nationalists are not as concerned about language. Moreover, Basques have based their claim to ethnic distinction on other criteria as well. These will be discussed below.

Fredrik Barth has made a major contribution to


\textsuperscript{16}ibid., 143.

understanding ethnicity. Barth disagrees with the view that ". . . geographical and social isolation have been the critical factors in sustaining cultural diversity." Barth argues that boundaries and ". . . categorical ethnic distinctions . . ." persist despite the movement of people. Ethnic groups ". . . entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership" during individuals' lifetimes. Also, ethnic distinctions are often the base of social systems. ". . . [I]nter-ethnic contact and interdependence" does not necessarily erode cultural differences.20

Barth supports the view that ethnicity is defined by the group itself: ". . . ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristic of organizing interaction between people." The social relations between ethnic groups ". . . across such boundaries . . ." is often based on ethnic differences. Barth criticizes the traditional

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2Ibid., 10.

3Ibid.

4Ibid.
view that ethnic groups evolved in isolation, separating themselves from each other through linguistic and other barriers. The important differences between ethnic groups are not objective, but those which the "... actors themselves ..." deem significant? The boundary between two ethnic groups is more important than internal characteristics of the group, because ethnic groups can be distinguished in this way even though the ethnic groups change internally. If people declare that they belong to a certain group and are willing to be judged as member of that group, then they are members of that group, even if they seem to an outside observer to belong to a different group. Outsiders should respect a group's claim to membership in a certain group even if this group appears to the outsider to be different from the group to which it claims to belong.

One of the most important points that Barth makes, for the purposes of this thesis, is that even as ethnic groups' cultures come into contact and cultural differences between ethnic groups diminish in industrial societies, boundaries

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22Ibid., 10-11.
23Ibid., 14.
24Ibid., 14.
25Ibid., 15.
between ethnic groups can persist. There is no simple correlation between cultural convergence and ethnic distinction. This is a critical challenge to the modernization assumption that homogeneity will inherently dissolve ethnicity.

According to Barth, for ethnic elites who have greater contact with and dependence upon the industrialized society to participate in the "wider society," ethnic groups can choose to emphasize their ethnic identity and use it to find ways to participate in new economic sectors that had not previously existed in a pre-industrial society. This strategy can lead to nationalist movements, among other types of ethnic movements. This idea will be developed below.

Why does ethnicity sometimes form the basis for a political movement? R.D. Grillo argues that ethnicity becomes a politically salient form of identification not because this is a "natural" grouping, but because nation-states acted in ways that threatened ethnic identity. To wit, ". . . nation-states created the rules of the game by

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2Ibid., 32-3.

7Ibid., 33.

making identity, culture and language salient markers of
difference. The regional minorities respond in kind.²⁹
In order to create and instill in the people living within
the "national" territorial boundaries a sense of common
national identity and unity, centralized states sought to
impose a single language and culture to symbolize and define
the national identity and serve as the bases of
communication and cultural understanding. In order to
protect their autonomy, regional minorities adopted the same
methods or strategies adopted by the state (i.e., played by
the same "rules of the game" established by the state) to
create a separate national identity: the use of a different
language and culture to distinguish themselves from the
superordinate linguistic group and to instill a sense of
common national identity within the regional minority
population. The case of regional ethno-nationalism in Spain
studied in this thesis illustrates this point. Catalans,
for example, sought to protect their language from the
spread of Castillian and to promote a separate identity in
order to prevent the erosion of their autonomy at the hands
of the increasing dominance of Castille.

²⁹Ibid., 18.
LANGUAGE

Historically, the leaders of Spain, and other European countries, sought to impose one language on all the peoples within their state and even eradicate minority languages. These policies were designed to create a national identity and a single functional medium of communication. Sub-nationalist leaders have considered their language a basis for the right to form a separate nation. For these and other reasons discussed below, language is central to many ethno-nationalist conflicts. As discussed above, language is often, though not always, a characteristic of one's ethnicity and even a key defining characteristic. Since language, contends Deutsch, is part of the identity of the person who speaks it, when a person who moves from the countryside to the city must learn a new language and abandon her/his own, s/he can become further alienated.30 This point implies that language issues can become a source of conflict. Similar problems can befall the young student who must learn a new language in school, abandon the language spoken at home, and learn to should be ashamed of her/his old language.

William J. Beer asserts that "language differences" per

3Deutsch, Nationalism, 24.
se do not lead to challenges to national unity. Nor does the unequal distribution of status, income, or political power by itself lead to conflict. When, however, a subordinate group ascends, then conflict becomes more likely. Conflict can ensue when the rising, previously subordinate group is not attaining what it wants quickly enough, or if the superordinate group feels threatened by the ascendant elites from the subordinate group. If elite members of a linguistic minority are unable to achieve socio-economic and political mobility because they belong to that group, then such minorities could use their language as a symbol of protest. An aspiring ethnic elite, it is argued, uses its language as a way to identify itself as a different group. The elite may try to revive the language and learn it as a way to legitimize a sense of ethnic identity.

There are other reasons why groups mobilize over the

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3Ibid.

3Ibid.

3Ibid., 219-20.

issue of language. The social use of a language in rituals and daily life may be a key reason that a linguistically subordinate group mobilizes. Preserving the language and literary traditions may be a way to instill confidence and pride in a group so that it can confidently pursue other political goals. Activists may combat the trauma experienced by students trying to learn a new language while being pressed to reject their native language. Some members of the Basque group Euskadi eta Askatasuna (ETA), for example, joined because of painful experiences as Euskera speakers in Spanish-speaking schools. As Deutsch observed above, language is an integral part of one's personality. Some Basque nationalists thought that language molded thought and that to think like a true Basque and reach her or his full potential as a human, s/he needed to learn Euskera. Another motive of language preservation is that it may also be the means by which groups maintain their uniqueness and "purity" in order to exclude others. Such was the point of view of early Basque nationalists. Language preservation, therefore, can be an end in itself, or, according to Jacob and Beer, a means to other ends, such as social and economic equality.\[36\]

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\[36\] Jacob and Beer, "Introduction," in Beer and Jacob, Language Policy, 4.
SYMBOLS, CEREMONIES, MYTHS, AND LEGENDS

How do nationalists, who want to form and maintain a nation-state where none had previously existed, and sub-nationalists, who want to form a new nation-state from part of the territory of an already established nation-state, try to compel enough people to believe that they are part of a vast community, encompassing people who have never met each other? One way leaders try to accomplish that task is by "inventing traditions," that is, creating or reviving symbols, rituals, myths, and legends which may instill in people a sense of nationhood and national community. Nationalist symbolism make nationalist ideas meaningful to people. It gives "... nationalist ideas definite shape and force, by projecting certain images..." and by providing people something around which they can rally and join together to express their allegiance to a nation. Nationalist symbolism is particularly effective, according

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3Benedict Anderson argues that nations are "... imagined communities..." because their members will never meet all the members of these communities yet they sense that they belong to a single community. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Editions and NLB, 1983), 15.


to John Breuilly, because it is less abstract than other symbolisms, referring to the members of the nation themselves. "NATIONALISTS CELEBRATE THEMSELVES RATHER THAN SOME TRANSCENDENT REALITY." 

States and nationalist movements often try to build popular support for their attempt to create a modern nation-state by appealing to a popular feeling of having a common identity based on a common religion, language, culture, or ethnicity. E.J. Hobsbawm calls these "feelings of collective belonging" or "bonds" which existed before the state or nationalist movement "popular proto-nationalism." This thesis has found that just as nationalists appeal to proto-nationalist feelings, ethno-nationalists appeal to proto-sub-nationalist feelings. The proto-sub-national feelings are based on the ethnic identity as a whole and the attributes believed to characterize the ethnic group and distinguish it from others. Hobsbawm agrees that ethnic identity can tie people together into "proto-nations" but argues that "proto-nations" are different from modern nations, because the former does not seek to create or maintain a modern nation-state, while the


latter does. To take an example from this thesis, many Basques may have shared a proto-sub-nationalist feeling of common identity, but this feeling did not lead Basques to advocate the creation of a modern Basque nation-state. The state-led suppression of the Basque ethnic group or "proto-nation" led Basques to attach a greater political significance to their proto-national ethnic identity, and to support ethno-nationalism. Thus, ethno-nationalism, the aspiration of creating and maintaining a modern nation-state for an ethnic group, is not the same as "proto-sub-nationalism," even though the appeal to popular proto-sub-nationalist sentiment is central to the ethno-nationalist attempt to gain support.

TERRITORY

By definition, a nation-state requires juridically defined territory, so even a group that is not concentrated in a particular geographic area will have to claim some sort of territory as its own. The territory which sub-nationalists and regionalists claim to be theirs is a region. A region may be defined, albeit vaguely, as a "... group of political units that belong together more

\[4\text{Ibid., 64.}\]
thoroughly than others. There are several ways that people may link themselves to a particular region.

1) If the region had already been a separate kingdom or state or enjoyed some form of autonomy before being absorbed into a greater state, or before losing some autonomy, then this history will reinforce the sense of distinction of the conquered from those who had conquered the region.

2) If the region has historically been occupied by a distinctive ethnic or linguistic group, or thought to be, this may give the group a basis for claiming a region as its home.

3) If the people in such a region have grievances over economic, linguistic, and other policies, then activists may use the above criteria to justify their claim to distinction.

It is difficult to conceptually separate the region from the group that inhabits it. The existence of a region might precede the perception of the region's inhabitants that they form a distinct group, if they have such a perception at all. Conquerors may establish political boundaries around an area of land and give it a name before the people in that area considered themselves a single people or before they had any ties to each other. The inhabitants of this new region and subsequent immigrants to it may come to identify themselves as members of this region and name themselves after it. Conversely, a group of people

*Deutsch, Nationalism, 95.*
may consider themselves to be distinct from others and thus define the area in which it lives as a distinct region. Or outsiders may define a region according to the inhabitants who perceive themselves to be a distinct group.

The issue more central to this thesis is the relationship between regions and sub-nationalism, especially ethno-nationalism. It is argued in this thesis that if a significant part of an ethnic population is highly concentrated within an autonomous region, then state actions that limit regional autonomy are likely to provoke ethnic regionalism and nationalism. If the ethnic group is concentrated in a region in which autonomy is not being revoked, then members of the ethnic group will be less likely to make regionalist or ethno-nationalist demands. In Spain, there is a high concentration of each ethnic group studied in a particular region. Therefore, when the central state acted to limit the autonomy of Catalonia and the Basque Country many Catalans and Basques living in those regions saw these actions as an affront to their respective ethnic group. By limiting regional autonomy, the state was limiting ethnic autonomy for those living in those regions. Moreover, the assertion by ethnic activists of ethnic and linguistic distinction was in part a way to justify and protect their distinct regional rights. Issues of taxation, investment, and in-migration, like issues of autonomy,
affected the members of the ethnic group living in the region, not the members of the ethnic group living outside the region. Thus, ethno-nationalism in the cases studied was largely concerned with regional issues. Members of an ethnic group living in a region whose autonomy is being threatened by the state, and who want to protect the special rights, privileges, and liberties that constitute that autonomy are more likely to support an ethno-nationalist movement than members of an ethnic group who are concentrated in a region which does not enjoy autonomy. The lack of precedent of regional autonomy does not necessarily preclude demands for it, but the activists might have more trouble convincing others that they have a right to autonomy or would benefit from it.

Although the limitation of regional autonomy and the effects of state policies on the regional economy are important to many ethno-nationalist movements, state policy toward the ethnic group itself is still central to these movements. Not all the issues behind ethno-nationalism concern regional autonomy. Moreover, members of a state who do not consider themselves to be ethnically, linguistically, or culturally distinct in any significant way from the ethnic group that controls the apparatus of the state are less likely to believe that the region in which they live should be more autonomous or separate from the state. They
will be less responsive to proto-national appeals and will continue to see themselves as part of a modern nation. If the people in this region speak the same language as the dominant group, then their language will not be repressed and they will be less likely to become sub-nationalist.

According to Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, autonomist and separatist movements against the state are most likely to occur when three situations occur: (1) The group is highly concentrated in a clearly defined territory; (2) there are few links of "... communication, alliance, and bargaining experience" toward the center and more links with people outside the state; and (3) the region is only minimally economically dependent upon the center. This study will suggest that the relationships between the state and various groups within the regions studied varied from group to group and do not completely fit the model just described. Contrary to the model, the Basque provinces and Catalonia bargained and communicated with Madrid over taxes, tariffs, conscription, infrastrucute, and other issues, yet many Basques and Catalans favored independence or greater autonomy.

RELATIONS WITH THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The nation-state has sought to suppress and make obsolete primordial ties to kin, clan, tribe, and other states and replace them with loyalty to the state and a sense of nationalism. It has sought policies designed to industrialize the nation-state, and, in doing so, caused problems for certain sectors of the economy. To integrate the economy further and unite the country, states such as France and Spain have sought to compel their subjects to learn one standard language and abandon traditional regional languages and dialects. States often have employed repression, even war, to achieve the goal of forming a highly centralized, integrated nation-state. These efforts have contributed to ethnic and regional resistance. Early protests were not really nationalist, but such protests and the repression of them often have been mythologized by nationalists as nationalist movements.

Violent repression of a nationalist group and the people for whom the group is fighting is critical to understanding hostility toward the center, because the violence can lead to bitter animosities and memories, thereby heightening nationalist hostility toward the state, reinforcing nationalist feelings, and provoking desires for revenge. While repression may effectively destroy a movement, acrimony, rage, resentment, and memories can
nevertheless endure. Eventually, these feelings can lead to nationalistic, retributive violent action. Violence by the state, therefore, can beget violence from a resurgent movement, and thus a vicious spiral of retribution. The hypothesis advanced here is that separatist nationalist demands for an independent nation-state will be most intense when an ethnic group enjoyed privileges, rights, liberties, and autonomy before a superordinate state revoked them and repressed the group.

**ORGANIZATION OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS**

The subsequent chapter surveys the theoretical perspectives and approaches concerning ethno-nationalism. Chapter Three attempts to place the cases of ethno-nationalism and regionalism studied within the context of Spanish history. Chapter Four explores the case of Galicia. Chapter Five is about Catalonia. Chapter Six explores the Basque Country and Navarra, comparing the two in order to explain differences in popular support for Basque nationalism and comparing the three provinces within the Basque Country in order to analyze the variation in support for nationalism within it. Chapter Seven, a "Summary Conclusion," discusses how the evidence presented does or does not support the hypothesis about the relationship between state action and ethno-nationalism. It also
attempts to predict, based on historical and contemporary evidence, some developments in the future of the regions and the ethno-nationalist movements studied and attempts to make some modest generalizations about ethno-nationalist movements by suggesting how the findings and conclusions of this study might apply to other ethno-nationalist movements.
CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND APPROACHES

Within the context of modernization theory, the cultural or ethnic division of labor explains ethnic antagonisms and reactive ethnicity. The cultural or ethnic division of labor, however, cannot explain the vibrancy of ethnic social movements, institutions, and oppositional subcultures. More importantly, class analyses and macrosociological approaches have failed to predict the dynamism of ethno-nationalist movements. Alternatively, this study adopts an historical micro-sociological approach to explain and predict ethno-nationalism. As mentioned previously, fundamental to this work and approach is the analysis of state policies and actions.

The term "modernization" refers to a variety of processes that detach groups and individuals from traditional kith and kin bonds and attach them to the global, cosmopolitan "civilized" world. "Modernization is a process based upon the rational utilization of resources and aimed at the establishment of a 'modern' society." A modern society uses technology to control the environment and tap resources for energy. Members of modern society are

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highly interdependent. In a modern "polity," which is a "subsystem" of a modern society, the populous identifies with the "... history, territory, myths, and national identity ..." of the state. The state subordinates, but does not necessarily eradicate, tribe, caste, village and other pre-modern institutions. Many of the social integration functions of those traditional groupings simply cease as "... new voluntary organizations, such as trade unions and political parties," take over these functions. The "most important characteristic" of modernization is its "... core belief in rational scientific control."

Characteristic of modern society is a "value system" that purports that the ability to control the environment yields desirable outcomes. Also key to modernization is a diffusion of a "world culture" which is "... based on advanced technology and the spirit of science, a rational view of life, a secular approach to social relations, a feeling for justice in public affairs, and, above all else,

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1Ibid.


5Welch, Political Modernization, 3-4.

6Ward, "Political Modernization," 570.
on the acceptance in the political realm that the prime unit of the polity should be the nation-state." This study shows that the legitimacy of the Spanish nation-state has been challenged during the process of modernization and that some of the challengers have sought their own nation-state. This suggests that the concept of nation-state has had great influence, even when a vision of a particular nation-state has been rejected.

The nature of ethnic identity and its challenge to the state is discussed by Clifford Geertz. He argues that there is a conflict between primordial attachments and civic attachments. By "primordial attachments," Geertz means attachments to ". . . immediate contiguity and kin connection . . ." and the attachments that come from ". . . being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices." Geertz asserts that primordial attachments are not merely based on ". . .


9Ibid., 199.
personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation . . ." but largely on ". . . some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. 80 These attachments ". . . seem to flow more from a sense of natural -- some would say spiritual -- affinity than from social interaction. 81 "Primordial discontent" centers around "assumed blood ties," or "quasi-kinship," race, language, region, religion, and custom. 12 Civic attachments are attachments to the state.

At first, political modernization tends to "quicken" primordial feelings instead of "quieting" them. 3 Geertz argues that the conflict between primordial and civic sentiment can probably only be "moderated," not "dissolved." This is because territory, language, and other "givens" affect the way people identify, deep down, who they are and to whom they belong. These feelings of identity are embedded in the ". . . non-rational foundations of personality." Thus, Geertz counsels leaders to incorporate these differences into the framework of the state without "belittling" or failing to acknowledge the existence of

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80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 201-2.
83 Ibid., 206.
these differences.\textsuperscript{14} When states do this, they end up "modernizing" ethno-centrism by raising the significance of ethnic and other primordial "antagonisms." Nevertheless, modernizing these antagonisms makes them more manageable. The existence of primordial sentiments within the state will not threaten the state.\textsuperscript{15}

This study finds that ties to the ethnic groups studied were historically based largely on "common interest"; many Basques, for example, wanted to preserve the rights they enjoyed, codified in the \textit{fueros}. Collective nobility, however, long argued to be the basis for Basque rights, was based on blood-ties. This study also found that ethnic activism can be based on "civic ties" that challenge "civic ties" to the state. Basques and Catalans, for example, had civic ties to autonomous provincial and regional government and institutions.

During the process of modernization, ethnic affinities are said to become less salient while class becomes more salient. This hypothesis has been argued by modernization theorists, also called developmental theorists.\textsuperscript{16} The process of modernization is described in the diffusion

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 214.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16}Ragin, "Celtic Nationalism," 253.
model, which argues that a modern mode of production spreads geographically and displaces pre-modern modes of production in peripheral regions. According to this model, states develop in three stages. In the first stage (pre-industrial) the core and internal periphery have very different modes of production and have little or no interaction with each other. In the second stage of development, which begins with industrialization, the core interacts with the internal periphery. The core’s mode of production is more efficient and begins to displace the peripheral society as the core’s mode of production spreads or diffuses into the periphery. At first ethnic groups will react to the "... massive social dislocation associated with industrialization ..." and to the diffusion of core values, institutions, modes of production, and so on by "clinging" to their customs ... as a refuge ..." from rapid, disruptive social change. The social changes may "... heighten the sense of cultural separateness in the periphery ..." Eventually, however, this reactive behavior will pass as the people in the periphery come to prefer the new society to the traditional one. In the third stage, the cultures of the core and periphery become homogenized. The social institutions and values of the peripheral society become replaced by core institutions and values. Status achieved through merit or "performance
centered values'" is supposed to make obsolete the status attained by birth. Ethnicity, previously a basis for social position and economic advancement, according to the diffusion model, loses its importance to "functional" groups such as classes and to individualism. Industrialization leads to "structural differentiation": status is no longer ascribed, rather it is achieved. The process of industrialization and the need for specialization within an industrialized economic system can provide the opportunity for the "... inclusion of previously excluded groups into the society... " since statuses are "achieved" rather than "ascribed." Patron-client relations become more impersonal. To sum up, the core will triumph over the periphery; the state will become homogenized; and ethnicity will lose its importance. Other forces of modernization, described by Karl W. Deutsch, who points to the role of social communication via mass media, are transportation and communication networks, such as roads and telephones, which

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2Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 8.

homogenize language,\textsuperscript{20} tastes, habits, etc. Also, when rural dwellers move to the city they come into contact with other people.

Critical to the success of national integration is a balance between "social mobilization" and "cultural and political assimilation."\textsuperscript{21} By social mobilization, Deutsch implies the integration of people into modern nation-states. Deutsch lists eight phenomena or "aspects" of social mobilization which he contends integrate societies into nations?\textsuperscript{2}

1) the "demonstration effect," i.e., the exposure of modern technologies and consumer goods to rural villagers;\textsuperscript{22}

2) the "mass media," which reaches those not yet part of modern society;\textsuperscript{24}

3) "monetization of the economy;"

4) the diffusion of "literacy;"

\textsuperscript{2}An earlier form of technology to diffuse and codify standard national languages was the printing press. (See Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism.)

\textsuperscript{2}Deutsch, Nationalism, 21.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., 21-22.


\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., 22.
5) "... the shift into nonagricultural occupations;"

6) "urbanization;"

7) the spread of wage labor;

8) internal migration which brings rural villagers into contact with each other, thereby contributing to feeling of common ground and creating a national consciousness.²⁵

These factors make those uprooted from their traditional life insecure, Deutsch argues.²⁶ They lack control of the alien new economic system in which they work and are far from their kin.²⁷ This implies that some people will resist the process of national integration.

Deutsch argues that "national minorit[ies]" may revolt even if they have assimilated because though they can share the same aspirations as the dominant culture, they may be frustrated by discrimination when trying to fulfill the promise of merit-based advancement or achievement as the basis of status and economic well-being.²⁸ If people are more socially mobile than they are assimilated, then they

²⁵Ibid. 22.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid. In contrast, Basques who migrated to the cities in recent times formed social networks that saved the migrants from isolation. Zirakzadeh cites this evidence to suggest that feelings of being uprooted and isolated in urban settings does not explain Basque ethno-nationalism. See Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, 43.

²⁸Ibid., 26.
can become alienated from the society and nation-state.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{DIVISION OF LABOR AND REACTIVE ETHNICITY}

An alternative view of the effect of modernization, often called "reactive ethnicity,"\textsuperscript{30} argues that modernization can preserve allegiances and identification with ethnicity because particular jobs are allocated to particular ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{31} Michael Hechter disputes the "diffusion model" and offers a reactive ethnicity model which he calls internal colonialism. According to this model, the spread of the core's mode of production and social organization leads to the social stratification and differentiation which in turn leads to a cultural division of labor. The ethnic groups in the periphery do not merely react to social change and then accept the new society, but rather are placed on a lower strata of the division of labor, specializing in subordinate, menial jobs, causing them to remain hostile because they are denied access to the means of achieving status and economic well-being.\textsuperscript{32}

\footnotesize{
\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{30}Ragin, "Celtic Nationalism," 253.
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In the internal colonialism model, the core dominates and exploits the periphery. The two do not converge. National development, i.e., the creation of a national consciousness and integration of the state, results from industrialization. A "... spatially uneven wave of modernization over state territory creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups." The unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups crystallizes and the "superordinate" group tries to consolidate its position by trying to institutionalize the "stratification system." The core group tries to preserve its "roles," jobs which are deemed superior, for itself, denying the subordinate groups access to these "roles." Such a reinforced "stratification system" creates a "cultural division of labor," according to Hechter, that contributes to "distinctive ethnic identification in the two groups." The subordinate and superordinate groups "come to categorize themselves and others according to the range of roles each may be expected to play." Distinguishing features ("... visible signs, or cultural markers ...")

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3Ibid., 9.
3Ibid. See also Gellner, Thought and Change, 166.
3Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 9.
3Ibid.
perceived to characterize both groups facilitate
categorization. At this stage people in the core do not try
to acculturate the people in the periphery because such
efforts would run counter to the core institutions’
interests.\footnote{Ibid.}

The core enjoys a diversified industrial economy while
the periphery’s development is limited by the core. Any
industrialization that exists (it may not) is highly
specialized and oriented toward export. The peripheral
economy is more sensitive than the core to price
fluctuations in the world market.\footnote{Ibid.} Investment, credit and
wage decisions are generally made in the core. Thus, the
periphery "... lags behind the core." Class could become
a basis for mobilization instead of ethnicity if the state-
wide labor organizations support the grievances of the
ethnic group.\footnote{Ibid., 9-10.} The concept of a cultural division of
labor, based on ethnic or territory is useful in
understanding the persistence of ethnicity because the
concept implies that class and ethnicity are not necessarily
incompatible bases for identity and political movements.
People working in the same jobs from the same locality or

\footnote{Ibid., 309.}
region may support a regionalist or sub-nationalist movement for tactical reasons. They may also consider themselves part of such a group because they see their job-related interests and identity as overlapping their ethnic and/or territorial identity.

Thus far, division of labor has been described as hierarchical: a superordinate core group has the jobs of higher status and pay, while the subordinate peripheral group has the lower status, lower wage jobs. Hechter has since argued that a "segmental division of labor" also can explain ethnic activism. In a segmentally divided labor force an ethnic group will hold a lesser diversity of jobs and thus its members will develop common interests and outlooks. When division of labor is segmental, the higher status group will persistently seek to improve its status. When an ethnic group's jobs are not higher paying, that group's members may develop a common sense of ethnic or territorial identity because they have similar jobs. Similarly, class can also form a parameter of nationalist movements.

The argument is made in this study that different occupational groups may support or sympathize with the same ethno-nationalist movement for different job-related

"Levi and Hechter, "Ethno-regional Political Parties," 131-33."
reasons. Farmers, for example, may align themselves with ethno-nationalists because they think that ethno-nationalists are fighting for their farm-related interests. Factory workers also may support the ethno-nationalists because they think that the same ethno-nationalists have a good program to address their needs. In the case of the Basque Country, for example, not all ethno-nationalist sympathizers have had the same grievances.

ETHNIC COMPETITION

Still another modernization perspective on ethnicity is that economic and political modernization reduces ethnic diversity by penetrating and changing small territorially bound ethnic identities. However, penetration can increase the cohesiveness of widespread ethnic identity by forcing competition with another group for political or economic resources. Such competition can lead to ethnic mobilization.41 Ragin argues that this theory addresses ethnic mobilization but not nationalism or sub-nationalism because it does not address the issue of territory.42


4Ragin, "Celtic Nationalism," 254.
MODERNIZATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

As discussed above, modernization theory argues that industrialization, urbanization, migration, mass communications, increasing contacts though modern infrastructure and other factors will lead to cultural assimilation, which will be conflated with the erosion of ethnicity, and the obsolescence of ethnicity as a basis for group identity. Modernization theory tries to explain ethno-nationalism as a desperate attempt by some members of an ethnic group to stave off the forces that threaten to crush their world view and sense of self. This section discusses in more detail how modernization theory tries to explain ethno-nationalist movements. Doug McAdam describes the attempt by modernization theorists to account for social movements as "the classical model of social movements." The model contends that social movements arise from individuals' psychological discomfort, stress, and alienation produced by rapid social change in the face of urbanization, secularization, commercialization of the economy, and industrialization.\(^4\) Psychologically distressed, alienated people turn to social movements, defined as extrainstitutional activities, in order to strike back at

the forces of modernization. According to this model, extrainstitutional activities are not oriented toward a tangible goal, but rather serve as an outlet for emotional anguish, because "emotional fervor" and "chiliastic zeal" set the "... psychological tone of these movements." The model assumes an incompatibility between emotional fervor and concrete aims. The findings of this study, however, suggest that people can strive for tangible goals with "fervor" and "zeal."

There are essentially three criticisms of the classical model. First, there is little research evidence that supports the notion that social transformation leads to social movements. Second, there is considerable evidence that tangible goals guide the participants of social movements. They set concrete goals and are not aimlessly lashing out in frustration. Third, the classical model ignores the role of social institutions which mediate


protest and enable people to mobilize." With this final criticism, we turn to the situation of social and political mobilization.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Institutional settings, such as churches, schools, clubs, and other social networks, can mediate rebellion by providing a setting in which people can come together to discuss issues, ideologies, and strategies. Such institutions can also facilitate and shape rebellion. 4 Local institutions can mediate rebellion in three basic ways. First, they provide organizational resources to launch "... planned and coordinated action." Second, institutions provide tactical models for activists from other movements. Third, a movement's actions can inspire


and embolden other movements to take action." Zirakzadeh shows how even friendship networks can encourage people to think similarly, join the same organizations, and communicate with one another. This study argues that the strength and use of institutional settings has shaped ethno-nationalist movements, and contributed to their strength. The presence of social networks, other protest movements, and other institutions helps explain why ethno-nationalism has been more successful in the Basque Country and Catalonia than in Galicia, for example.

OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURES

Hank Johnston, who believes that theories such as diffusion (modernization) and reactive ethnicity rely too heavily on macro-sociological data and not enough on microsociological levels of analysis, that take into consideration the "... private, the primary, the mundane and quotidian..." has developed the concept of a "... subculture of opposition." This concept implicitly

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"Ibid., 49-54."
incorporates the study of institutions and goes well beyond it. Johnston is critical of approaches that simply examine "... groups, organizations, and enabling conditions." He argues that in order to study social movements, researchers must not limit their focus to "middle-range" variables such as "... material resources (finances, buildings, and equipment), and nonmaterial resources (expertise, coalitions, preexisting group networks, access to power centers, and organizational strategy)." Such approaches neglect the "... production of meaning." In other words, they do not explain how people change their attitudes and develop perspectives that make up the content of social movements. Studying this requires asking the participants how they formed their attitudes and ideas. The researcher needs to analyze the discourses of the people interviewed.

To improve the study of social movements, and how they take shape, Johnston offers the concept of the subculture of opposition. Attitudes, beliefs, and values developed over time through one's environment at home, among friends, in schools, churches, and other settings, which are "... at

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52Ibid., 4.
53Ibid.
54Ibid.
odds with the values embodied by a regime, constitute the core parameters of an oppositional subculture. A process of socialization occurs within families, among friends, and within "secondary agencies," such as churches. The attitudes which emerge from an oppositional subculture are not explicitly political, but they have serious political implications when a state represses cultural expression. Institutions such as churches, clubs, and choral groups in reaction nurture attitudes that can become culturally nationalistic. Familial ties and friendship networks can also play this same role. Oppositional subcultures do not create ideologies; they coalesce because of the complex web of beliefs and attitudes that come from daily experience in various familial and institutional settings. Memories of abuses and outrages suffered by an oppressed people can shape their thinking in ways that influence political action and political tactics. The values that the subculture embodies can also influence those growing up in it to become politically active, for our purposes, in nationalist movements.

\footnote{Ibid., 50.}

\footnote{Johnston discusses this in greater detail in \textit{Tales of Nationalism}, Chapter Four, 49-64. He also discusses the institutional shaping of oppositional subculture in his section "Voluntary Organizations", 43-47 of the same work. This will all be discussed in depth in subsequent chapters.}
There are three components to the subculture of opposition. The first is the cultural component, "... typically a mix of political, national, and religious symbolism." The second component includes the myths and stories and the "... processes by which the cultural content is passed and refined between generations." The "... primary socialization that occurs in the family..." is a major aspect of this. The third component is the "... social organization of the culture," which usually takes place within and through the family. Families are "... linked through friendship and common membership in the secondary organizations." The Church, as will be discussed, is one such social organization that has enabled people to meet and interact.

A MICROSOCIOLICAL APPROACH

Hechter has recently acknowledged that a "microsociological" approach is needed to better understand the relation between division of labor and nationalism. The existence of a division of labor alone does not explain or predict ethno-nationalism. Rather, people's perception of their economic circumstances and options for changing them

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57 Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 50.
58 Ibid.
and their decisions to take action explain ethno-nationalism. Hechter recognizes the importance of the ability of a collective to induce individuals to contribute to the movement instead of being free-riders who enjoy the gains made by those who pay the costs and take the risks of participation in movements. He suggests that compliance comes from dependence on the group and the ability of it to monitor the individual.\(^5\)

The "cultural division of labor" may not lead members of that division of labor to form political organizations unless common work sites, meeting places, or neighborhoods exist to bring people together where they can communicate, organize, and mobilize. For example, Hechter argues, factory workers can more easily communicate and mobilize than peasants isolated on their plots of land who only meet occasionally at a "distant market."\(^6\) Jack A. Brand argues further that institutional settings might explain the formation of a common outlook, but not the choice of a


nationalist outlook. Other "bases of interaction" may be lay religious organizations, churches, language societies, and various types of clubs that bring people together on the basis of shared culture. This is precisely how many Catalans and Basques have interacted and mobilized during the second half of the twentieth century. These "bases of interaction" were crucial to the growth and survival of Basque and Catalan nationalism. A micro-sociological approach to studying ethnic-nationalism in Spain greatly contributed to an understanding of how ethnic-nationalism grew and survived.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE EMERGENCE OF SPAIN

"Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities." The historical and political circumstances that explain why Spain is a state but not a nation "for important minorities" date back more than two millennia. Indo-Europeans began migrating into the Iberian Peninsula during the Bronze Age. Celts migrated into northwestern Iberia. Greeks, Etruscans, and Phoenicians established settlements along the eastern Mediterranean. Then Roman legionnaires conquered the peninsula and Rome annexed and colonized the area during the first and second centuries B.C. Roman colonization generally explains the roots of romance languages, provincial boundaries, civil law, politically vibrant urban centers, and, eventually, Catholic Christianity in Iberia. Subsequently, the collapse of the Roman empire and the invasion and migration of the Visigoths during the fifth century A.D. led to political and economic disintegration and further cultural diversification.

For several centuries scattered agricultural communities and estates that supplied small, weak cities characterized the economic life of the peninsulars. The Christian cities such as Toledo in Castille lacked the potency to challenge the African Berbers, then Moors, who from the eighth to the fifteenth centuries occupied and ruled the southern half of the peninsula. Not until after the 1469 marriage of King Ferdinand of Aragón and Queen Isabel I of Castille and León and 1479 joint rule did militant Christian efforts to dominate the peninsula finally come to fruition. The Catholic Kings, as they are referred to, incorporated Galicia during the second half of the fifteenth century and conquered the last Moslem center in Grenada in 1492.

The process of peninsular unification, accomplished through diplomacy and war, was not accompanied by political and cultural standardization. The Kingdom of Aragón retained ancient privileges and rights. Similarly, when Navarre became part of the Crown of Castille in 1515, it was

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\(^4\)Ibid., 2.
allowed to preserve its Cortes (parliament). Simultaneously, the conquest and colonization of the western hemisphere brought grander prestige, wealth, and greater power to the Crown of Castille and Aragón. United in perpetuity following the deaths of the Catholic Kings, the Spanish imperial centers annexed Portugal in 1580. Castille, the dominant political power on the peninsula, did not, however, enjoy absolute authority. Various provinces and cities retained ancient rights and privileges (fueros) and traditional constitutional charters. Castillian efforts to impose absolute rule led to resistance during the seventeenth century. Catalans rebelled in 1640 when Castille billeted troops in that region. While suppressing that revolt, however, Castille was unable to prevent Portugal from seceding. These were not to be the last regionalist challenges to the authority of the center.

A more centralized state structure emerged under the Spanish Bourbon monarchy during the eighteenth century. Catalans, fearful losing their rights and privileges under the House of Bourbon, fought against the Bourbons' claims to the throne in Madrid during the War of Spanish Succession

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5Ibid.
6Ibid.
(1701-1713). The Bourbons tightened their grip on Spain after subduing Catalonia in 1714, then incorporated Catalonia into their new system under the Nueva Planta.³ Navarra and the Basque provinces maintained the most formal autonomy in return for supporting the House of Bourbon during the War of Succession.

THE IMPACT OF COLONIZATION OF THE AMERICAS

The conquest and settlement of the Americas opened up a new opportunity for the Basque provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa. The metal work shops in Vizcaya supplied weapons and iron tools, while Guipúzcoa and Andalusia produced ships and experienced mariners. Navarra, which lacked a metallurgical base and had no coastal industries, did not profit from imperial expansion and fell further behind the other regions.⁴ In the Basque provinces imperial expansion gave rise to classes whose interests were linked to the Castillian center. Isolated regional autonomy, except in certain circumstances, was generally against the interests of the Basque economic elite, after 1492. Catalonia, linked commercially to the circum Mediterranean

⁴Ibid.
⁵Robert P. Clark, The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond (Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press), 17.
trade, did not benefit initially from imperial expansion into the Americas, because the Madrid government made Seville in Andalusia the exclusive port of entry and exit for the Americas trade well into the eighteenth century. Andalusia most assuredly benefitted from the business of trade and along with Galicia provided unaccounted New World settlers. The impact of that regional out-migration, only partially analyzed to date, remains a topic for future research.

STATE VERSUS REGIONAL IMPERATIVES

The government in Madrid met repeated resistance to its Castillian efforts to raise revenues, conscript soldiers and sailors, and carry out other goals. One of those goals, economic industrialization, was designed to enrich and strengthen a modern Spanish state. The state protected Spanish industry from imports by erecting high tariffs around its "national" boundaries while eliminating customs duties within Spain. Thus Spanish state-builders wanted to standardize and rationalize fiscal programs, taxes, and import/export duties. This "liberal" effort encountered resistance from people who wanted to preserve their **fueros** in various provinces and regions.

The highly autonomous Basque provinces presented a formidable challenge to the state's efforts to achieve
uniformity throughout the peninsula. Under the system of 
fueros, the provinces had the authority to raise their own 
taxes. Madrid had to ask the provincial assemblies for 
taxes and conscripts. The provinces were allowed to place 
customs collection stations on the border between the Basque 
provinces and the rest of Spain. The Basque provinces 
consistently resisted efforts by Madrid to weaken Basque 
fueros and flouted Spanish central authority by not 
complying with decrees that limited fueros.

Within the Basque provinces, however, Basques were 
divided over opposition to Madrid’s efforts to establish its 
authority. A tax imposed by Madrid on imported salt 
provoked peasants and artisans to rise up violently against 
it in 1631. Although the authorities finally suppressed the 
revolt, they repealed the tax in 1634.11 The fueros that 
allowed the customs duties to be collected at the Ebro 
River, dividing the Basque provinces from the rest of the 
Iberian peninsula, were an issue of contention. For the 
rural Basques the location of the customs collection points 
was beneficial because peasants could purchase duty-free 
imports. For the coastal urban classes, however, the fueros 
were an impediment to their ability to develop industries

1Drtzi, (pseud. Francisco Letamendia), Historia de Euskadi: 
El Nacionalismo vasco y ETA (Barcelona: Ibérica de Ediciones y 
Publicaciones, 1977), 45-46.
that could be competitive with other peninsular industries. They wanted the customs stations moved to the coastal boundaries so that they could protect their industries from international competition and become domestically competitive. Coastal customs stations, though, while benefiting the urban business and industrial interests would harm the peasants and other consumers by increasing the prices of the international goods they purchased. When the central government declared the customs collection points to be moved to the coastal boundaries in 1717, with the intention of creating a single, protected market, the peasants responded violently in an uprising known as the matxinada in 1718. The government backed down and returned the stations to the Ebro River in 1722.\(^2\) Although not a nationalist revolt, the uprising demonstrated how standardization, centralization, and the reduction of autonomy were detrimental to the peasants' perceived interests and how such policies could provoke antagonisms between Madrid and the Basque provinces.

The rural population felt the effects of the goals of

the state and Basque elites in other ways also. Urban elites purchased vast tracts of land and forced those who worked it either to migrate to the cities to work, or to work on the land as tenants rather than small landowners. By creating these conditions for migration, the elites hoped to expand the demographic base for industrialization.

THE DECLINE OF THE EMPIRE AND THE RISE OF LIBERALISM

Spain had tried to hold on to its Atlantic empire, which was linked to the world economy but not integrated into it, into the late eighteenth century. Madrid's grip on its American colonies was beginning to loosen, however, and by 1821, Spain would lose nearly all of them. With the aim of preparing Spain for the challenge of integrating itself into the economy and avoiding decline, Spanish liberals sought to restructure Spanish society. Their agenda to commercialize land, labor, and capital; replace the corporatist organization of society with an individual/class-based organization; and to standardize and rationalize the structures, policies, and programs of the state were incompatible with the interests of many corporate groups whose positions had not been weakened as much as such groups in France and England -- in part because of the closed imperial economy that for three centuries benefitted peninsular interests. As the old order began to erode,
these corporate groups put up a stiff and bloody resistance in civil wars that divided peninsular society well into the nineteenth century. The privatization of land and abolition of *fueros* met formidable resistance among peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, clergy, and others in the Basque provinces.

**THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1812**

The War of Independence (1808-1813) accelerated the transition from traditional to liberal Spain and sharpened the political divisions on the peninsula between those who opposed the transition and those who supported it. This division led to a series of civil wars between the two sides. To the extent that foral autonomy was an issue among Basque traditionalist, these civil wars influenced future regional nationalisms.

From the late eighteenth century until the war Madrid had become increasingly subordinated to the status of a satellite of France.¹ Napoleon found an opportunity to strengthen its hold on Spain during a period of internal unrest. When Charles (Carlos) IV was forced to abdicate following his son Ferdinand's attempt to seize the throne, Napoleon deported both and installed his own brother Joseph

(José I) as king of Spain. The new regime imposed Napoleon's Bayonne Constitution of 1808 on Spain, a document that mandated various liberal reforms which traditionalist fiercely opposed. The French abrogated regional governing institutions, replacing them with French-style institutions. For example, by 1810 the French abolished the Vizcayan Diputación (legislature) and replaced it with French-style institutions. Subsequently, the French taxed the Vizcayans to pay for the occupation, outraging Vizcayans who were accustomed to tax exemptions under the fueros. The French-imposed regime aggravated its relations with the commercial interests, the peasantry, and the clergy by establishing customs offices on the coast, seizing imports prohibited by the continental blockade, seizing Church properties without compensation, and "... encouraging the sale of commons by communities to meet their tax allotments." The discontent over the abolition of autonomy and fueros by the French worked to the rebels'

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"Ibid., 420-421.

"Ibid., 421.


"Ibid., 27.
advantage.\(^{18}\)

The war to rout the French troops, which enjoyed overwhelming popular support, was mainly a guerrilla war waged by peasants throughout Spain.\(^{19}\) French troops looted, raped, and executed thousands.\(^{20}\) The cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals by the Spanish populace and the French occupiers made the war costly and brutal.\(^{21}\) All over Spain local juntas sprang up to govern, raise revenues, and direct the resistance.\(^{22}\) The Vizcayan rebels, for example, developed "... an effective politico-military organization..." collected taxes and secured supplies and recruits.\(^{23}\)

The war spawned a modern Spanish nationalist

\(^{18}\)Ibid.

\(^{19}\)Payne, Spain and Portugal, vol. 2, 422-423.

\(^{20}\)Ibid., 423.

\(^{21}\)Barahona, Vizcaya, 26-27.

\(^{22}\)Carr, Spain 1808-1975, 90. Carr asserts that these juntas acted like sovereign states. See Ibid., 90-91. This study offers no evidence that experience with juntas inspired ethnic regionalism. Indeed Carr asserts that ". . . the conservatives who manned the Juntas were not provincial separatists . . ." See Ibid., 91. Galicia ". . . behaved like a kingdom" during the war, according to Xosé R. Barreiro Fernández. See Barreiro Fernández, "Historia política," in Los Gallegos, ed. Barreiro Fernández, et. al. (Madrid: Ediciones ISTMO, 1976), 132.

\(^{23}\)Barahona, Vizcaya, 27.
consciousness²⁴ and produced new cadres of middle-class officers who became supporters of Spanish liberalism after the war. Yet the guerilla warfare was also to provide a tactical model and "training ground," especially in the Basque provinces,²⁵ for revolts such as the First Carlist War in which combatants defended regional autonomy against the Spanish nationalist effort to centralize state authority and universalize rights and obligations to all Spaniards.

The war devastated the economy. French troops had plundered Spain of its wealth and dealt a blow to industries, such as the Vizcayan iron works;²⁶ and shipbuilding.²⁷ The war led to famines²⁸ because of the destruction, the mobilization, which required farmers to abandon the fields,²⁹ and the need to feed troops, during and after the war, which strained grain supplies.³⁰ Adding to the crisis, the Spanish colonies refused to aid the

²Ortzi, Historia de Euskadi, 68-69; Carr, Spain, 1808-1975, 105; Barahona, Vizcaya, 30.

²Barahona, Vizcaya, 30.

²Ibid., 29.


²Ibid., 610-11.

²Barahona, Vizcaya, 32.

³Ibid.
peninsulars during the war. Vicens Vives has called this refusal the "... real American secession." The war accelerated the eventual loss of nearly all the American colonies, which was to aggravate the economic decline. For example, the secession of the American colonies was to deal a major blow to the naval industries. The deterioration of the economy sharpened the social divisions on the peninsula.

During the war, delegates from different parts of the peninsula met to decide upon the political system for post-war Spain at Cádiz between 1810 and 1813. At the newly established Cortes of Cádiz, the liberal delegates, over-represented in proportion to their numbers in society, pushed though the Constitution of 1812 over the objections of the outnumbered conservative delegates. Designed to empower the bourgeoisie, the constitution mandated the standardization and uniformity of rights, obligations, and legislation throughout Spain, and the subordination of

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3Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain, 611.
3Barahona, Vizcaya, 30; Carr, Spain 1808-1975, 105.
3Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain, 667.
3Payne, Spain and Portugal, 425-427.
3Carr, Spain 1808-1975, 98.
provinces and regions to the central authority of Madrid. This meant the abolition of the *fueros*. Among the reforms authorized by the Constitution of 1812, were the disentailment of commons and church-owned lands, an overhaul of the tax code so that no region had special exemptions;\(^3\) and the transfer of all customs stations to the coast and frontiers. The traditionalists, who wanted to restore the Ancien Régime, which respected the *fueros* and organized society around corporations, vociferously opposed the constitution.\(^7\) It is ironic that while French reforms outlined in the Constitution of Bayonne incensed traditionalist segments of peninsular society and fueled the flames of rebellion, liberals at Cádiz had drafted similar reforms in the Constitution of 1812.

The war to rout Napoleon's troops from the peninsula united liberals and traditionalists against the French but did not erase the divisions between them. By 1812, the mainly anti-foral, centralist, liberal Spanish nationalists and the mainly pro-foral, regionalist, conservative traditionalists;\(^8\) though allied against their common French enemy, divided over the liberal reforms outlined in

\(^3\) Carr, *Spain 1808-1975*, 98.
\(^7\) Ibid., 93 and 98.
the Constitution of 1812. The liberals had to respect Vizcayan autonomy to maintain the alliance. After France was defeated, many Vizcayans refused to cooperate with attempts by the liberals to impose the governing institutions mandated by the Constitution of 1812. The liberal Spanish nationalists managed to replace Vizcaya’s autonomous Diputación General with the Diputación Provincial, which was subordinate to the Spanish central government for six months, but in 1814 King Ferdinand VII, returning to Spain, abolished the Constitution of 1812, thus undoing the liberal institutions, and allowing the Basques to restore their fueros and autonomous institutions. The abolition of the Constitution was not the end of Spanish liberalism, however; a series of struggles between liberals and traditionalists had begun.

The War of Independence had a tremendous impact on Spain. It instilled Spanish nationalism in many of the people; devastated the economy; accelerated the loss of nearly all of the American colonies, which exacerbated the economic disaster; accelerated the transfer of church-owned

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3Ibid., 28.

4Barahona, Vizcaya, 29; Carr, Spain 1808-1975, 118-119.
lands and commons to private ownership;* made the liberals more prominent in peninsular politics; sharpened divisions between sectors of society; and left many peninsulars seasoned in combat and ready to fight in future civil wars over their interests. These developments would shape ethno-nationalism in the future.

THE FIRST RESTORATION, THE LIBERAL TRIENNIAL, AND THE OMINOUS DECADE

Although the War of Independence was over, combat between traditionalists and liberals continued in the form of pronunciamentos and civil wars. In a sense, the War of Independence was just one phase in a larger struggle between these two sides. Like other peninsulars, traditionalist Basques continued to resist commercialization of land, conscription, the assault on the fueros, and other institutional changes.**

Although Ferdinand abrogated the Constitution of 1812 and undid many Spanish and French liberal policies, such as the relocation of customs stations, and restored autonomous

*By the war's end the French had succeeded in privatizing church and communal lands, leading to a dramatic economic and societal transformation.

**Traditionalists saw parallels between the Triennium and the Napoleonic Era and saw their combat against the liberal regime as similar to the war against Napoleon. See Barahona, Vizcaya, 65.
Basque institutions," the First Restoration (1814-1820) did not represent a complete return to the pre-war relationship between the central government and the regions; the regime pursued numerous initiatives attempting to centralize state authority and challenging the foral autonomy of the Basque region. Moreover, tensions between the Basque provinces and Madrid developed concerning the billeting of troops from outside the provinces, who were straining the grain supply." Nevertheless, the post-war economic crisis contributed to popular opposition or indifference to the regime, allowing the liberals another opportunity to restore their programs."

Disgruntled middle-class veteran officers of the War of Independence, who had lost the respect they had enjoyed during the war and now found themselves demoted, without assignment, underpaid, or even unpaid became opponents of the regime and supporters of the liberal opposition. During the First Restoration army officers staged pronunciamientos (limited military uprisings) in which they declared their support for the return of the Constitution of 1812." A

"Barahona, Vizcaya, 29; Ortzi, Historia de Euskadi, 72.
"Barahona, Vizcaya, 32.
"Payne, Spain and Portugal, 429-430.
liberal cadre rebelled in 1820 and successfully forced
Ferdinand to restore the Constitution of 1812, marking the
end of the absolutist First Restoration and the beginning of
the constitutionalist Liberal Triennium (1820-1823)."

Under the restored constitution, church and common
lands were disentailed, customs stations were moved to the
coast and Spanish frontiers, and the Basques lost tax
exemptions. These and other actions provoked a civil war in
1821. The opponents of the constitutional government in the
Basque provinces were led by priests and supported by
peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, smugglers, and others
adversely affected by the liberal policies. Except for a
few wealthy rural land-owners, military officers, and
bureaucrats with a vested interest in reclaiming their
former position in the autonomous institutions, the middle
and upper classes supported the constitutionalist regime."

In hilly northern Catalonia, traditionalists revolted
in 1822, adding to the crisis faced by the liberals. By
1823 the uprising had ended in victory for the
traditionalists, or royalists. The royalists abolished the
Constitution of 1812 and attempted a counter-revolution

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"Payne, Spain and Portugal, vol. 2, 429-430; Carr, Spain
1808-1975, 129-146.

"Barahona, Vizcaya, 64, 66-68.

during a period known as the "Ominous Decade" (1823-1833). During this period, the new regime began a campaign of repression, which included executions. In Vizcaya the legislature organized Brigadas de Paisanos to repress liberals and carry out the program to undo the policies of the Triennium. These brigades later supported the Carlists during the First Carlist War. 

THE CARLIST WARS

Divided by class, region, corporate affiliation, culture, and economic and political values, peninsulars during the nineteenth century fought among themselves to preserve the past or create a new future. The old imperial order, no longer viable in the industrializing, expanding, modern world economy did not disappear quickly. Much like the French fought among themselves, the Iberians during two deadly civil wars, the First Carlist War (1833-1840) and the Second Carlist War (1873-1876) pitted proponents of status quo against others who had come to believe that cultural prosperity and material progress were inherently linked to the industrialization of a liberal state.

Among the complex web of issues involved in the First

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Payne, Spain and Portugal, 435-436.

Barahona, Vizcaya, 136-37, 146-166.
Carlist War those related to class and regional interests are most relevant for this study. The superficial issue of the war was who would inherit the throne of the deceased Ferdinand VII. In the Basque provinces the urban liberals supported the young Isabella while the rural traditionalists favored Don Carlos. The liberals preferred Isabella because they thought that a government under her reign would support the nineteenth century liberal policies of centralization and rationalization, which would enable the central government to standardize the system of tariffs, taxes, education, and conscription, which, the liberals hoped, would enable Spain to become a wealthy, modern nation-state and best serve their interests. The traditionalists supported Don Carlos as heir to the throne because they wanted to preserve the authority of the provincial juntas and resist an increase in the power and authority of the central government. This issue revolved around the preservation of the provincial fueros.52 A major motivation for the peasants and small farmers of Navarra, Alava, and the interior of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya to support the Carlists was the desire to preserve the traditional ownership of the land and social relations.

Historiographically, the Carlists have most frequently been

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labeled conservatives because of their desire to conserve corporatist characteristics of the Spanish imperial state. The liberals of the coastal cities had acquired vast tracts of land in Alava and Navarra. More pointedly, the government had helped them attempt to modernize agriculture by disentailing Church-owned lands, thereby antagonizing the most ideologically potent traditional Iberian corporation. Disentailment of ecclesiastical and communal lands was one of the reasons that the Church sided with the Carlists against the Spanish liberal government and the Basque liberals of Vitoria, San Sebastián, and Bilbao. The merchants of San Sebastián, Guipúzcoa and Bilbao, Vizcaya loaned money to Madrid during the First Carlist War. These loans marked the beginning of the ties between those regional commercial interests and the Spanish state. By loaning the money, these merchants, like others in Spain, needed a liberal victory. The relationship expanded when the victorious liberal government invested in railroads and public works.

Scholars have debated the importance of the fueros in the Carlist Wars. Payne contends that they were an issue,

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5Clark, The Basques, 37.
though not the only issue. The war in the Basque Country and Navarra ended in 1839 and in Catalonia in 1840. For the Basque Country and Navarre the terms of the cessation of hostilities were outlined in the Accord of Vergara. After the Accord of Vergara was signed, Basques in some areas of the region revolted in what was known as La Octubrada (1841) against the conditions imposed on the recognition of the fueros. After suppressing this revolt, the government revoked the foral guarantees. In practice, the foral structure was not re-negotiated and it persisted in an only slightly modified form until 1876.

Conservative Carlism was not as popular among Galicians because Galicia lacked the fueros so important to Catalans and Basques. The absence of traditional fueros, therefore, contributed to the marginality of any regionalist movements in Galicia. In the Basque Country, in contrast, the restoration of the fueros was a rallying cry of Basque nationalists.

After the First Carlist War Basque industry was growing. During the 1850s the Basque Country experienced

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Payne, Basque Nationalism, 42.
Payne, Basque Nationalism, 48.
Payne, Basque Nationalism, 52.
development in the banking industry and in the construction of railroads, thanks to liberal legislation, permitting foreign investment.⁵⁹ These investments aided in the development of mining.⁶⁰ The disentailment of common lands, the purchase of forests by jaunxtos and commercial interests, and other actions made possible by liberal policies hurt the rural Basques. Rural industries "disappeared" because they could not afford imported materials that were slapped with tariffs. Subsequently, a new liberal constitutional monarchy, established in 1869, tried to increase Madrid's authority and power, provoking a brief Carlist revolt in 1872 which was quickly snuffed out in the Basque Country. The establishment of the anti-clerical Federal Republic of 1873-1874 provoked the second major Carlist War (1873-1876). Payne contends that this war had less to do with the fueros than the previous conflict.⁶² The new pretender to the throne, Don Carlos "VII," did not advocate independence for the Basque Country or other regions; he did, however, support autonomy for them

⁵⁹Ortzi, Historia de Euskadi, 93-96.
⁶⁰Ibid., 96.
⁶¹Ibid., 98-99.
⁶²Payne, Basque Nationalism, 53.
within the Spanish state. Once again the small farmers and peasants sided with the Carlists, and the bourgeoisie of Bilbao and San Sebastián sided with the Spanish government. In Alava, though, almost all Carlist officers were urban middle-class; one-third of the Carlist recruits were urban; and the "threatened" artisans seemed more supportive of Carlism than the rural population. Key to urban Alava's support was the position of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and parish priests who vocally supported tradition. The liberals in Alava were more supportive of the fueros, than the Carlists, because the liberals were not distracted by the religious and dynastic issues.

When the war ended in 1876 with a liberal victory, the central government sought to limit the fueros in Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Alava, but preserved the status of Navarra. This preservation of Navarra's status, plus the increased economic development of the three provinces compared to Navarra, marked major differences between the Navarra and the three Basque provinces. The Basque

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6Ibid., 54.

6Ibid., note 32, 59-60. Ortzi attributes peasant support to the conditions described above. See Ortzi, Historia de Euskadi, 99.

6Ibid.

6Ibid.
provinces were finally formally incorporated into "liberal" Spain in May 1877. However, the provincial governments refused to cooperate with the new reconstituted monarchy's proposed changes of the *fueros*. Madrid ultimately got its way and abrogated most of the *fueros*. The Basque provinces still maintained fiscal autonomy in the form of *concierios económicos*, the first of which was promulgated in 1878. Under these agreements, the provinces established their own systems of levying and collecting taxes. Each province was to negotiate with Madrid how much in taxes was to be remitted to Madrid. Significantly, the abrogation of the *fueros* lifted the ban on foreign investment, enabling British firms to mine iron rich Vizcaya and invest in infrastructure and industry, such as railroads and ship building. By moving the customs duties from the Ebro River (as provided under the *fueros*) the Basque commercial sector increased the price of imports and compete with those products throughout the previous "tax-free zone". Under the *concierios económicos*, taxes on industry were "slight" and the cost of government was passed on to consumers in the

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6Ibid., 55.
7Clark, *The Basques*, 35.
form of "regressive" sales taxes."\(^7\) Taxes on farmland and livestock, the most heavily taxed items, made up 66 to 69 percent of the tax revenues.\(^2\) "Highly regressive" sales taxes on salt, flour and other staples contributed ten to twelve percent of tax revenue; and regressive sales taxes made up 88 to 90 percent of tax revenue raised.\(^3\) Industry contributed only five to seven percent of the tax quotas. There was no income tax or tax on wealth. The new fiscal policies, in brief, favored the industrial sector over the agricultural and consumer sectors.

The Spanish government actively protected Basque industry and mining with high tariffs, helping the Basque Country industrialize.\(^4\) Vizcaya, in particular, grew considerably. Iron production from 1875-95 increased "twenty times over."\(^5\) "[M]ore than eighty percent" of it was exported to Great Britain.\(^6\) The rapid

\(^7\)Ibid., 31.
\(^2\)Ibid., 36.
\(^3\)Ibid.
\(^4\)Ibid., 31.

\(^5\)Payne, Basque Nationalism, 51. Payne consulted La economía siderúgica española (Madrid, 1945), 221-22 and, for metallurgical industry at the turn of the century, Pablo de Alzola y Minondo, Informe relativo al estado de la industria siderúgica en España (Bilbao, 1904).

\(^6\)Clark, The Basques, 35.
industrialization led to differentiation among classes, pollution, and mass migration, which ethnic Basques resented. During the era following the abrogation of the fueros, slums, pollution, sweat shop conditions and other social ills plagued the Basque Country because of rapid industrialization. Meanwhile, a "... modified form of agrarian capitalism..." began to emerge. As small farms were absorbed into larger estates owned by "outsiders or absentee landlords" young people moved off the land to work in the cities, disrupting traditional family life. Basque workers were thwarted in their strikes for better working conditions and higher pay because of Spanish state policies and competition from migrants from outside the Basque country who were willing to endure these conditions.

REGIONAL CULTURAL REVIVALS

A significant challenge to the liberal Spanish state, the cultural revivals swept the Iberian peninsula during the early and middle 1800s. Part of a phenomenon that was sweeping Europe at this time, this cultural awakening led to regional renaissances in which intellectuals wrote regional histories, revived old literary traditions, published literature in their regional languages, and wrote grammars. These revivals often took on political tones. Called the
"Discovery of the Region" by Stanley G. Payne," these cultural revivals have become part of the myth and legends of the late twentieth century ethno-nationalist movements, as will be outlined in subsequent chapters.

THE LOSS OF COLONIES IN 1898

A major blow to Spain and a major boost to Vizcayan nationalism and Catalanism was the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to the United States in 1898. Nationalists in the Basque Country and Catalonia pointed to this event as evidence of the disadvantages of being part of Spain, or so tightly integrated into the Spanish state. Catalan businessmen became more supportive of regionalism, as they saw fewer incentives in being closely linked to a defeated, declining Spain which had lost an important market. Nationalists and regionalist made electoral gains, though they were more short-lived in the Basque Country.

THE DICTATORSHIP OF PRIMO DE RIVERA

Regional tensions provoked Primo de Rivera, who seized power in 1923, to suppress Basque and Catalan nationalist political activities. Because of labor unrest, particularly among the anarchists, Catalan industrialists, who had been

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the vanguard of Catalanism, supported Primo de Rivera. The dictator's repression led to a radicalization of Catalanist movements and politicized many Catalans. Some lower-middle class people, alienated by the industrialists' support of the dictatorship, supported left-leaning groups. In the Basque Country, the wave of repression led to organizational innovations in the form of mountaineering clubs, which kept organized nationalist activity alive.

THE SECOND REPUBLIC AND THE CIVIL WAR

Primo de Rivera's regime was toppled in 1930 and the following year the Second Republic was established. The rise of the second Republic in 1931 gave Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country the opportunity to win autonomy. The regionalist and nationalist parties were represented in the Cortes and in 1936 voters in each region voted for autonomy statutes in referenda. They were diluted by Madrid, but nevertheless granted co-official status for the regional languages; and Madrid extended fiscal and political autonomy. This status was short-lived, however. Army general Francisco Franco led an uprising against the Republic in July 1936, thus beginning the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Part of Franco's ideological motive for leading the rebellion was to revoke the autonomous status of Galicia, Catalonia, and Euskadi. He wanted to destroy
autonomist and separatist political expression, which interfered with his project of establishing a "one, big, free" Spain. To Franco, the destruction of minority cultures and languages was essential to this policy, because he saw such expressions as the basis for distinction and thus a threat to Spanish unity. Franco also wanted to stop communism and liberalism, restore the power and influence of the Catholic Church, and eventually re-establish an absolutist monarchy. Although Franco was not a fascist (indeed, his pro-clerical, anti-modern, and monarchist views were incompatible with fascism), he enjoyed the support of the fascist Falange led by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, related to the former dictator. Franco and the falangistas shared a desire for imperial glory, ardent opposition to communism and liberalism, and an extreme hatred for regional separatism. Thus, the falangistas became major allies of Franco during the civil war. The civil war intensified as foreign volunteers and governments became involved. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were Franco's most important allies. Although the Republicans received help from the Soviet government and other governments, as well as help from thousands of volunteer brigades from the United States and other countries, Franco and the other nationalist generals had the advantage. Germany provided bombers which razed Spanish town and cities, such as Guernica. Both sides
inflicted atrocities such as mass executions. The Spanish Civil War was a formative experience for many Basques and Catalans. Although Franco had not yet seized the state, his attack on the Basque provinces that had failed to be loyal to Spain profoundly affected a new generation of Basques who felt Basque for the first time or came to distrust Spain. The German bombing of Guernica had a particularly acute effect not only because of the death and destruction it inflicted, but because Guernica was the site of the symbolic Tree of Guernica, where Castillian and, later, Spanish kings came to swear to honor the **fueros**.

**THE FRANCOIST STATE**

After seizing power, Franco undertook the most brutal effort in Spain's history to centralize Spain and destroy regional autonomy, unleashing a massive repression against the political and cultural expressions of regionalism and nationalism within the three regions, indeed all of Spain. He also cracked down on the labor movement and dismantled Republican institutions. His bloody repression left thousands dead, banned the languages, dances, and other cultural expressions peculiar to Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country, radicalizing the nationalist movements in these regions. Activists, intellectuals, and others fled into exile. Regional leaders established governments-in-
exile. Some of the exiles, including Basques and Catalans, participated in World War II, and after part of France was liberated from the Germans in 1944, guerrillas managed to evade Allied troops, who were ordered to stop any possible provocation of Spain, and cross into Spain to lead a short-lived uprising. Minor guerilla activity continued during the 1940s and 1950s. After World War II, Spain was ostracized for its dictatorship and aid to the Axis powers during the war. Spain was barred from United Nations Organizations. By the early 1950s, however, the anti-Franco opposition began to lose hope of international support against Franco, as the Vatican signed a Concordat with Franco in 1953; the U.S., in order to secure Spain as an ally in the Cold War, signed a military base agreement later that year; and the UN finally admitted Spain into the organization in 1955. Spain’s industrialization policies under Franco during the 1950s and ’60s especially led to strains and disruptions in Basque and Catalan society. The repression of labor eventually led the labor and nationalist movements to ally against Franco as the regime began to liberalize.

The Vatican played an important role in encouraging anti-Franco opposition in general, and ethnic-regional activity in particular in 1959. In what is known as Vatican II, Pope John XXIII called for organizing workers and
virtually mandated the use of vernacular languages in religious ceremonies and mass. In his Christmas message, the Pope took note of national minorities fighting for their freedom. These pronouncements on the social question and the national question encouraged Galician, Catalan, and Basque clergy to say mass and other ceremonies in regional languages. This also encouraged the regional clergy to help the opposition and organize workers. Moreover, the middle classes in Catalonia felt more encouraged to engage in protest and oppose the regime because it was being done in the name of Christian justice, putting the regime in an awkward position, given its avowed support for the Church and its image as the protector of the Church from liberalism and Marxism.

Economic liberalization, which theoretically requires fewer government regulations, and the desire to enter the European Economic Community, which stipulated democratic government and respect for human rights as a condition for membership, may have contributed to the regime's decisions to relax its grip on cultural and political expression and activity. These developments helped pave the way for a constitutional monarchy and autonomy for Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country.
SPAIN AFTER FRANQUISMO

The constitutional monarchy that followed the Franco regime has provided greater recognition of various minority languages in Spain and has granted greater autonomy to the regions in Spain. There is much more freedom and autonomy for the regions and more progress in reviving the minority languages. Nevertheless, each region wants more autonomy and industrial decline has beset the Basque Country. Nationalist movements in other states have encouraged some Catalan and Basque nationalists. Thus, ethno-nationalism persists, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

In summary, what is now Spain evolved from a loosely allied grouping of regional provinces into an increasingly centralized state. Efforts to repress the regional institutions and cultures, even with economic modernization, have failed to destroy regional sentiments. To the contrary, those efforts have provoked ethno-national reaction. Policies designed to revoke regional rights and privileges created conditions which eventually led to ethno-nationalism. Policies of industrialization, made possible in part by revoking regional institutions that hindered industrialization, alienated social groupings, thus providing a social base for ethno-nationalism.
CHAPTER FOUR

GALICIA: A CASE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

Ethnic identity persists in Galicia, a northwest region in Spain. Militant ethno-nationalism does not. Galicians, also called Gallegans (gallegos in Castillian, galegos in Galician), have "... their own language and literature, a distinct social structure, important economic peculiarities, a different tradition and psychology," according to Díaz López. Some Gallegan intellectuals during the twentieth century have sought greater autonomy and even independence. A few have even resorted to violence. Yet, Galicia's autonomist and nationalist movements have been and continue to be weak. Gallegan nationalism was slower to emerge and "... acquire political maturity ..." because there was no "... strong process of industrialization ..." in Galicia in the nineteenth century, and thus no indigenous industrial bourgeoisie or influx of in-migrants. An indigenous industrial bourgeoisie might have supported Galician

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¹Galiza is the Gallegan term for Galicia.


³Ibid., 241.
nationalism or regionalism and had the efficacy and resources to launch a formidable movement. Instead, the urban classes of Galicia have depended on Madrid for jobs in the civil service or military. Therefore, there was no incentive for urbanites to preserve Galician, which was useless in Madrid, or sever their ties to Madrid. Had there been in-migrants from different regions, there might have been frictions between the Galicians and the in-migrants, which might have contributed to a strong nationalist movement.

For centuries, Galicia has not had autonomous regional institutions or enjoyed special recognition, except as one of the historic regions of Spain; it is very much a part of Spain. Thus, there were no historic rights around which Galicians could rally and build a regionalist or nationalist movement. The persistence of ethnic identity in Galicia does not contradict modernization theory because rapid industrialization, urbanization, commercialization, commodification, and the in-migration that industrialization and urbanization attract do not characterize the socio-economic landscape of Galicia. The rural areas remain predominantly Galician-speaking because of the isolation of

* Franco, the champion of a centralized Spanish state with no autonomous regions, was typical of Galicians when he served in the Spanish army.
these areas. Except for a few expropriations in recent times, which provoked protest, most minifundistas, small landowners, have not suffered disruption from the modern world and thus have not been moved to militancy. Although there continue to be activists and intellectuals who want to preserve Gallegan and institute autonomous economic development for Galicia, these activists and intellectuals remain largely isolated.

ECONOMY

Galicia, often described as an "internal colony" or "under colonial exploitation," has not experienced extensive "modernization." Its socio-economic landscape is mainly rural minifundista, small landholdings, are the main source of agricultural production. Basic sectoral employment figures reveal the traditional structure of Galician society and economy. According to figures for 1970, forty-nine percent of the Galician labor force worked in the primary sector (consisting of agriculture, livestock, and fishing) compared to twenty-four and eight-tenths

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5Carles Gispert and Josep María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional (Barcelona: Editorial Blume, 1978), 140.
6Ibid.
7Gispert and María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 140.
percent for the rest of Spain. Data for 1975 shows similar results.

TABLE 4.1 EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR IN GALICIA AND SPAIN, 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Galicia</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 4.2 INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1975.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Galicia</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income</td>
<td>110,464</td>
<td>144,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(pesetas)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary work force (%)</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary work force (%)</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary work force (%)</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Per capita income figures from Banco de Bilbao, Renta Nacional de España y su Distribución Provincial, (1978), 85. Regional percentages came from Carles Gispert María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional (Barcelona: Editorial Blume, 1978), 134-36 and 140-141. Percentages for
Spain came from Alfonso Magariños, ¿Quiénes somos los gallegos? (Barcelona: Epidauro, 1979), 112.
Adapted from a table in Gunther, et. al., Spain After Franco, 314.

Note: The primary sector includes agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing. The secondary sector includes industrial manufacturing, mining, construction, and energy. The tertiary (service) sector includes transportation, communications, and other services.

The minifundistas barely subsist on their small plots of land. Among the crops cultivated are corn, potatoes, rye, grapevines, and legumes. Livestock (sheep, cattle, and pigs) are an important sector. "Fishing is one of the oldest and most traditional Galician resources" and the primary region of this sector in Spain. The fishing industry has suffered from the widening of international maritime boundaries and pollution, which has contaminated mollusks and crustaceans. Bans on fishing have been imposed during these periods of contamination. Galicia is heavily endowed with energy resources, such as

\[\text{\textsuperscript{8}}\text{Gispert and María Prats, Españ\'{a}: un estado plurinacional, 140-141.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{9}}\text{Ibid., 147.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{10}}\text{Ibid.}\]
hydroelectricity, 70 percent of which was exported in the 1970s.\footnote{Ibid., 141.}

Gunther, Sani and Shabad argue that the economic underdevelopment of Galicia has limited "... extensive mass mobilization of any kind ... \footnote{Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad, Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 314.} Rapid industrialization could lead to stratification, disrupt agrarian life, challenge status that is ascribed rather than achieved through specialization and competition, and create a bourgeoisie that could articulate regional interests. Moreover, the migration of job seekers could heighten the sense of difference, or lead to ethnic competition. These processes are not characteristic of the socio-economic dynamics of Galicia.

Galicia's small industrial economy is linked to Castillian industry. It is "not tied" to the rural sector. This sector complicates integration between the Galician economy and the rest of Spain's.\footnote{Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism, Informe Preliminar: situación actual diagnóstico: Plan Director Territorial de Coordinación de Galicia (Madrid: Dirección de Ordenación y Acción Territorial, 1978), 13, cited in Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 398.} Galician industry, conditioned by outside industries, has grown at the expense
of the rural sector, leading to a widening gap between the coastal and interior areas of Galicia. The rural areas around Galician cities cannot produce enough food for the cities, so Galicia must import food from outside the region. The industries, meanwhile, export their products outside the region.

Galician ethnicity among the minifundistas remains unpolticized. Their desire to maintain and preserve their status quo has not impelled a desire for sovereignty or even autonomy within the Spanish state. The absence of modernizing features, hence, has permitted Galicians in the interior to live their lives in relative isolation. The lack of communication and transportation networks, and the limited migration to Galician cities has meant that Castillian Spanish nationalism has not constituted a threat to Galician identity.

Galicia remains one of the least developed regions of Spain, whose resources and industries service the markets of the rest of Spain. Its people are ethnically and linguistically distinct. Their language has been replaced by Castillian as the higher status language. Consequently, some Galicians have experienced discrimination and ridicule.

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1Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 398.
2Ibid., 400.
The term "internal colonialism" has been used to describe this situation. Although such problems have contributed to regionalist movements, nationalism and regionalism have been considerably less potent and persuasive in Galicia than in the Basque Country and Catalonia.

Political and economic relations between Galicia and the Spanish state can shed light on the absence of a vigorous, prominent nationalist movement in Galicia. The absence of sustainable development and the presence of various institutional relations help explain the existence of Galician nationalism and its relative weakness. In Galicia ethnicity has been the basis for nationalism among relatively few people, and may not even be the major basis for the small nationalist movements. Minifundistas have lacked the interest and possibly the efficacy necessary to rebel except when their land has been expropriated. Whether the minifundistas associated increased Galician autonomy or Galician national sovereignty with the preservation of their land, or were simply glad to receive whatever help they could from nationalists or other activists, is unclear. In any case, support for nationalism has been relatively weak.

LANGUAGE, CULTURE, IDENTITY

Most Galicians today are bilingual, but Galician society is not bilingual. A bilingual society is one in
which the two languages share equal status and prestige.\textsuperscript{6} Galician society is characterized by a 'diglossia,' according to Eduardo Gutiérrez.\textsuperscript{7} This means that there is a "... scission or socio-linguistic superimposition between a high language ..., used in formal communication -- literature, religion, teaching, etc. -- and a ... low language ... used in conversations of a non-formal or familiar character."\textsuperscript{8} This is roughly the case in Galicia, where Castillian has long been the high language and Galician the low language.\textsuperscript{9}

A key nationalist and regionalist strategy is to revive the native language and culture. In Galicia native language and culture have been subordinated ever since Castille conquered Galicia in the second half of the fifteenth century. Many contemporary Galician activists, like their less radical predecessors, believe that a linguistic, cultural, and historical revival will empower Galicians to assert themselves politically. Galician activists blame Castillian Spain's domination over Galicia for Galicians'
alleged sense of inferiority and consequent political inaction. Galicians have been and are the objects of ridicule and negative stereotypes. Nationalist intellectuals lament the fact that many Galicians are ashamed of their own language. This motivates the intellectuals, but, if these activists are correct, is one of the reasons that the Galician movements are weak, compared to nationalist movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia.

The Galician language has traces of Celtic influences but became predominantly influenced by Latin, as did the other Romance languages.² Being on the fringe of the Roman Empire in Iberia, Galicia took longer than the rest of the peninsula to become Romanized. Galaecia became a Roman province that covered a territory spanning from the Cantabric Sea to the Duero River, i.e., present-day Galicia and part of present day Portugal north of the Duero River in 212 BC. By the sixth century its population spoke Latin.²¹ During the next 200 years Galicians developed a Galician-

²César E. Díaz López, 390. See also Meic Stephens, Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe (Gomer Press, 1976), 665 for a more detailed discussion.

Portuguese language. Between 1200 and 1350 Galicians developed their own "lyrical poetry" known beyond Galicia's linguistic border.

Linguistic evidence suggests that by roughly 1400 Galician and Portuguese became two different languages. Portuguese became an official state and imperial language while Galician became an "... oral, rural language." Galician became increasingly different from Portuguese and increasingly similar to Castillian, principally because Portugal became independent and Galicia became increasingly reliant on the Kingdom of Castille. Before Castille dominated Galicia, there had been no conflict between Galician and Castillian, as Galician was predominant, though an unstandardized language with different dialects. The Castillian monarchy, which intervened as peasants and feudal nobles persistently fought town councils, sent the first massive contingent of non-Galicians to Galicia, the

Francisco Rodríguez, "La Lengua," 219, 224. See also Stephens, Linguistic Minorities, 667.


Ibid. According to Díaz López, Castillian and Galician have become more comprehensible as they have continued to exist in the same region since the Middle Ages. See Ibid. Stephens, however, claims that Galician remains more similar to Portuguese than to Castillian. See Stephens, Linguistic Minorities, 667.

Trastámara dynasty, which spoke only Castillian and imposed the first external "diglossic nucleus," i.e., making Castillian the high language.7

After Castille conquered Galicia, the "second diglossic nucleus" among the Galician nobility was established. It was "autochthonous" and bilingual, since the nobles did not abandon their native language immediately.8 Later, royal decrees created the Royal Audiencia, which was in charge of administering justice and centralizing public administration. After that, Castillian became the official language and all official documents and unofficial public documents had to be in Castillian.9 The nobility, as noted above, did not abandon Galician immediately, but were the first to abandon Galician because of the "... penetration of Castillian functionaries."10 By the early fifteenth century, Galician had disappeared as a literary language and become a colloquial language. Two important events contributed to the decline in the use of Galician. First, with the introduction of the printing press circa 1490 Castillian became the only printed language. Second,

7Ibid.; Rodríguez, "La lengua." 225.
8Ibid.
9Ibid., 391-92.
at the University of Santiago de Compostela, founded in 1506, only Castillian was used for "... transmitting the written culture."¹ (The first notable book written entirely in Galician was not printed until 1863.) The four hundred year absence of written Galician can be attributed, according to some, to the lack of "... cultural production centres," a result of Castillian political and religious centralization.² The pace of "de-galicianization" in the cities quickened as Catalanian fish canners began immigrating to Galicia in the eighteenth century.³

When the Ancien Regime collapsed in the nineteenth century, Galician was the subordinate language. The constitutional monarchy strengthened Castillian dominance in Galicia by abrogating the personal privileges and señoríos (feudal states) and bringing in more and more Castillian speaking bureaucrats, especially after 1833.⁴ The monarchy divided Galicia into four provinces which, according to Díaz López, had no natural links and were dependent on the central government of Madrid. The Catholic

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¹Ibid.


⁴Ibid.
Church also worked to Castillianize Galicia.

Another blow to the Galician language was the establishment of a Castillian language unitary school system. All these factors contributed to the decline of Galician.\textsuperscript{35} Díaz López asserts that Madrid wanted to establish linguistic and administrative uniformity, "indispensable" to the free circulation of goods and labor and ". . . fundamental pillars of the liberal system.\textsuperscript{36}

Provincialists, who began trying to redeem the Galician heritage during the nineteenth century, took note of the view that Galician was a "ridiculous language" that lacked "harmony" or "taste."\textsuperscript{37} As early as the 1840s in their efforts to promote pride and knowledge of the Galician heritage, provincialists observed attitudes toward Galicians that may have affected self-esteem: Galicians were the ". . . object of sarcasm and derision.\textsuperscript{38} Despite Galicia's history of nobles, cities, cathedrals, and eminent people," many thought that Galicians had not produced

\textsuperscript{35}Díaz López, \textit{Madrid, los militares y la escuela general}, pp. 290-302.

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., 392.

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., 421.

\textsuperscript{38}Xosé R. Barreiro Fernández, \textit{El Levantamiento de 1846 y el Nacimiento del Galleguismo} (Santiago de Compostela: Editorial Pico Sacro, 1977), 84.

\textsuperscript{39}Barreiro Fernández, \textit{El Levantamiento}, 84.

\textsuperscript{40}El Porvenir, p. 9 cited in Xosé R. Barreiro Fernandez, \textit{El Levantamiento}, 84.
anything good. Galicians were perceived to be "... the most stupid, the most ignorant and barbarous ..." by nature. Their customs were perceived to be "coarse." Non-Galicians mocked Galicians' "... customs, inclinations, and dress." Such insults were aimed at Galician speakers.⁴

The Galician bourgeoisie, save a few intellectuals, did not embrace the provincials' Rexurdimiento, Renaissance, of the nineteenth century.⁵ Four newspapers even wrote against the use of Galician during a discussion in 1876-1877.⁶ The first novel in Galician was not published until 1880. As novelist Emilia Pardo Bazán remarked in 1888, even the intellectuals who wrote Galician literature tended to speak Castillian, and those who spoke Galician

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⁴El Pueblo, 9, cited in Barreiro Fernández, El Levantamiento, 84. These negative stereotypes of Galicians appear to have endured not only in Spain, but elsewhere. The author met a Venezuelan citizen who told a group of friends a joke that meant to imply that Galicians are "brutos" (stupid, brutish), a quality, he said, for which they are reputed. The joke relates the story of a Galician who met Zorro. Seeing the "Z" on Zorro's chest, the Galician thought that Zorro was "Zuperman," pronounced "Thuperman."


generally could not read it." Language was simply not on the agenda of many leading activists, including leaders of Liga Acción Gallega and Solidaridad Gallega, who addressed their audiences in Castillian and never raised the Galician language as an issue."

During the twentieth century language did become an issue. Between 1916 and 1936 the language issue attracted enough concerned Galicians to create a new cleavage in Galician politics." Unlike their provincialist and regionalist predecessors, the twentieth century activists, who formed the Irmandades de Fala (Brotherhood of the Language) in 1916, emphasized the language as central to Galician salvation and autonomy and considered the goal of preserving and diffusing the language to be a means to legitimize their demand for autonomy." Autonomy was deemed synonymous with language. Activists wanted to communicate with the vast majority who expressed themselves in Galician." They organized cultural activities in Galician and these cultural events were not only about

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"Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 401. Díaz López did not cite the work containing Bazán's remark.

"Ibid., 401-402.

"Ibid., 402.

"Ibid.

Galicia. The activists wanted to establish the language as a cultural language which could be used and cited to discuss many topics.\textsuperscript{49} Their demand for co-official status of Gallegan and Castillian was met in the Autonomy Statute, which was approved in a referendum in 1936. However, before the Cortes could ratify it, the July 1936 uprising, marking the beginning of the Civil War, had begun.\textsuperscript{50} The linguistic and cultural activities were also interrupted by the Francoist rebellion.\textsuperscript{50}

After the military defeat of the Spanish Republicans, Franco banned political parties, revoked the Autonomy Statute, murdered hundreds of activists, and forced others to flee.\textsuperscript{51} Falangista slogans admonished and exhorted Galicians: "Don't be barbarians, speak the language of the Empire!\textsuperscript{52}" and "Don't be a country bumpkin, speak

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50}Rodríguez, "La lengua," 231.

\textsuperscript{51}Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 402. The rebels had defeated the Republicans in Galicia the same month the rebellion had begun.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., 404. See also Stephens, Linguistic Minorities, 672-3; Gispert and María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 111-112.

Spanish! Simply communicating in the language was a political act under a regime which strove to eradicate non-Castilian speech. Cultural resistance took various forms. The Partido Galegista and the Partido Comunista de España collaborated in the Unión de Intelectuales Libres, but, according to Gispert and María Prats, pressures from the Cold War led to the organization's dissolution in 1950. Sympathizers of the Partido Galegista, which by this time had dissolved itself, established publishing houses, the most notable of which was Galaxia (1951) and cultural groups such as O Galo and O Facho. Isolated artists such as the poet Celso Emilio Ferreiro contributed to a modest literary renaissance.

During the 1960s the Gallegan church, influenced by

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5Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 405.

5Gispert and María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 112.

5Ibid.; and Ortzi, Historia de Euskadi, 295.

5Gispert and María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 112.
Vatican II, allowed Galician to be spoken in mass.\textsuperscript{58} The ban on Galician was relaxing; more books were being published in Galician.\textsuperscript{59} Simultaneously, Marxism became more influential in some nationalist circles. Going further than the Irmandades, who had sought co-official status of the two languages, the new left-wing nationalists hoped that after a transition, Galician would become the dominant language.\textsuperscript{60}

The diffusion of Castillian in the schools and, more recently, mass communication through radio and television has elevated Castillian and further subordinated Galician.\textsuperscript{61} Simultaneously, the imposition of Castillian in the schools has led to stresses, difficulties, and feelings of inefficacy that have hindered the academic progress of Galician students, leaving them behind others in the peninsula. Students learn to view Galician as incorrect and uneducated rather than a different language.\textsuperscript{62} According to a 1970 government report, only approximately

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60}Ibid., 405.
\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., 393. Elementary education became widespread during the twentieth century. See Rodríguez, "La lengua," 227.
\textsuperscript{62}Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 393. Refer to example above.
eighteen percent of Galician children between the ages of seven and thirteen achieved an academic level "... corresponding to their chronological age ..." while another thirty-two percent were behind by as many as six years."

Many Galicians today disassociate the language and culture. In this diglossic society, Galician is seen as backward and ignorant, while Castillian is seen as the educated language. Not surprisingly, a party activist recently observed that Galicians today are ashamed of their native language." The rejection of one's language as uncultured and useless has also affected the Galicians' self-concept, according to some. With rejection of one's language comes rejection of one's self, the nationalists argue. Some argue that this self-rejection explains Galicians' alleged reluctance to rebel against injustice, a

"Ministry of Education and Science, "Education Planning in Galicia," (Madrid, 1970) cited in Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism, Informe Preliminar: situación actual diagnóstico: Plan Director Territorial de Coordinación de Galicia (Madrid: Dirección de Ordenación y Acción Territorial, 1978), 107 cited in Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 421, n. 3. There may be a typographical error in this third-hand account because the report was quoted as saying "the other" thirty-two percent instead of "another" thirty-two percent. The figures provided only add up to fifty percent. Perhaps the percentage of children behind in school is supposed to be eighty-two, which would bring the total to one hundred percent.

"Gutner et. al., Spain After Franco, 331.
reluctance reflected in popular Galician sayings. Ramón Piñeiro contended that Galicians must use their native language to "... combat injustice ..." Madrid's domination of Galicia has taken its toll on the Galician language. Galician is threatened, according to Díaz López. He claims that fewer people are speaking Galician in the countryside. Galician peasants are teaching their children to speak Castillian for the first time. Conversely, Galician has begun to gain acceptance in the cities. Linguists have been trying to standardize the language and spread it. Contrary to the unsubstantiated claims of linguistic decline, a survey conducted in 1979 shows that 94.2 percent of the Galicians surveyed said that they spoke Galician. The language is used primarily orally, however. Only 49.5 percent said that they read Galician, and only 22.1 percent said that they wrote Galician.

Still, it remains widely understood or spoken in the rural

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"Piñeiro, Olladas no Futuro (Vigo: Galaxia, 1974a) 248-49. That assertion fails to explain occasional rebellions by Galicians.

"Piñeiro, Olladas no futuro, 258-59.


"Ibid., 395. See also Rodríguez, "La Lengua," 237-240.

"Eduardo López Aranguren, La conciencia regional en el proceso autonómico español (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1983), 147.
areas, where it apparently has not been threatened among the 
minifundistas, who have been left alone in their
"backwater." Galician schoolchildren allegedly grow up 
thinking that Galician is an uneducated variant of
Castillian because their teachers do not teach them how to
read or write Galician and correct them when they speak
Galician. Those who do not learn to write Galician and are
not taught in Galician allegedly disassociate it from
Galician culture.⁷

Many do not seem to care whether or not Galician
disappears. Nevertheless, Galician is the "... basic mode
of communication in nearly all political gatherings," even
among the Spanish branch parties. Electoral literature is
widely written in Galician.⁸ The mayor of La Coruña finds
showing off his knowledge of Galician beneficial,⁹ even
though this city is the most Castillianized in Galicia.¹⁰

⁷This way of explaining the relative absence of nationalism
in Galicia was put to the author by Rosylyn Frank, a specialist
in Basque affairs at the University of Iowa.

⁸Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 393 & 421, n. 3;
Cutíérrez, A Língua, 82, cited in Díaz López, "Galician
Cleavages," 421, n. 3; and Anaya Santos, La depresión cultural,
40-42.


⁹Le Monde (March 11, 1980), cited in Jaroslav Krejci and
Vitezslav Velimsky, Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe

¹⁰Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 419.
The Autonomy Statute, adopted under the constitutional monarchy, has given a boost to the status and preservation efforts of Galician.75

Galician society is presently undergoing a transformation in which Standard Galician is increasingly used in formal, public, and official settings, and Castillian in more informal settings. Standard Galician is being used to create distance between and a sense of authority over others.76 Vernacular, oral Galician is now subordinate to the Standard form; still, the Standard form remains subordinate to Castillian.77 Standard Galician is being taught in the high schools. Alvarez Cáccamo reports that Standard Galician is now becoming a means of social advancement. Reliance on the transformation view has problems, though. A conflict between vernacular, oral Galician and Standard Galician has emerged, as rural speakers of the former feel that Standard Galician is not real Galician; and high school students now learning the Standard Galician "... often censure their own parents'.


7Ibid., 64.
speech as 'not proper Galician.'

Whatever the implications of these recent developments for the future of Gallegan regionalism or nationalism, most Gallegans today seem indifferent to the concerns of language activists and Galician nationalism.

An important lesson to be learned from the case of Galicia is that people will not necessarily support extensive autonomy or independence for their region simply because they consider themselves to be territorially, culturally, linguistically, or ethnically distinct from the other peoples of their country. Galicians see themselves as a distinct people. They have a territorial base from which to form a state if they wanted to do so. Most of them know the language of their region, which was once a kingdom. These facts have not led to an emergence of a strong regionalist or ethno-nationalist movement.

CLASS INTERESTS AND RELATIONSHIPS

Since this study attempts to explain support for ethno-nationalism, it is important to understand why ethno-nationalism and regionalism have not been strong in Galicia, especially when Galicianist movements emphasized language. This section discusses why, by exploring (1) inter-class

\[7\text{Ibid.}, 64.\]
relationships; (2) relationships among classes, the Church, and the Spanish central state; (3) institutions and actors, such as parishes and caciques, through which relationships are mediated; and (4) issues that matter to most members of various classes.

Galicia has been linked to Castille for centuries. "Class relationships reinforce this historic tie. The "... generally commercial or functionary" urban sector was allied with elites in Madrid on whom they depended for their income." The middle classes relied on its ties to Spain for opportunities in the bureaucracy, military, and professions." Francisco Franco, who led a war and a repressive campaign against autonomist and separatist challenges to his vision of "One, Big, Free" centralized Spain, was a Galician who became an officer and rose through the army. The urban population ". . . such as it is either state-employed or businessmen who act as intermediaries between the industrial bourgeoisie of the rest of Spain . .

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8Linz, "Early state building," 90-91.
" and the Galician people. In order to do business outside Galicia or work in the government one had to know Castillian, which explains why most urbanites did not support the Galicianists.

To show their loyalty to Spain, the urban sectors worked during election times through the caciques (local bosses), civil governors, mayors, and other officials to influence the minifundistas. An alliance of lawyers and small landowners, who had bought church lands and had connections in Madrid, dominated local politics. The network of caciques were similar to political machines which revolved around patrons who distributed state resources to dependent clients. Caciquismo kept minifundistas from being politically active. During the Franco regime, corporate unions played the same role as caciques.

The Catholic Church worked and continues to work through the parish priests to influence the mainly small

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land owning rural population. The clergy also works with the state school system to bring Galicia "... into line with Castile." The rural clergy, however, has been involved in many causes. Priests have championed the rural Gallegans' fights for agrarian reform and one leading agrarian anarchist was a priest. Also, however, the Church opposed the liberal, secular regimes. Nevertheless, they did not champion separatism.

The relationships among the classes, the Church, and the state explain why regionalists and nationalists, who have been mainly urban intellectuals and professionals, have been isolated from the urban bourgeoisie from which they came and why they have been unable to ally with the rural sector, mainly small land owners (minifundistas), whom they sought to help through their promotion of the language. This ",... explains the relative weakness of Galician nationalism until recently,..." and shows that regional nationalists "... make effective inroads only when the urban bourgeoisie takes an active role -- something which

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6Ibid., 241.


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has yet to happen in Galicia.\textsuperscript{9}

As noted above, the Galicianist intellectuals failed to attract rural Galicians to their cause. The \textit{minifundistas} were more concerned with making a decent living off the land, and thus seemed to be more impressed by the agrarian organizations that were forming in 1907 and 1908, than by the \textit{Irmandades}. The agrarian organizations struggled for tax-free ownership of the land for those who worked it, while the \textit{Irmandades} spoke more abstractly about the need for the preservation and diffusion of Gallegan, a language which the peasantry already spoke. Regardless of whether communicating in Galician would have helped activists more effectively reach the rural population, as the linguistic nationalists insisted, the agrarian activists' call for agrarian reform in Castillian seemed to impress the \textit{minifundistas} more than did the \textit{Irmandades}' call for a linguistic revival;\textsuperscript{10} because agrarian reform mattered more to the \textit{minifundistas} than linguistic revival. Apparently, calls for agrarian reform sounded good to the rural population, whether in Castillian or Galician.

In order to expand their appeal, Galicianists adopted the positions of the agrarian activists who had been forming

\textsuperscript{9}Díaz López, "Centre-Periphery Structures," 241.

groups since the early twentieth century. Besides demanding autonomy, "... co-official status of the two languages ..." and "... the teaching of Galician ..." the Galicianists now called for tax-free ownership of land to the tiller. After the Republic replaced the monarchy in 1931 the Galicianist movement was able to form a political party. This "centrist, inter-class" party, Partido Galeguista (PG), combined language claims and agrarian demands to broaden their appeal. They advocated free trade so that the cattle ranchers could import cheap corn and the canning industry could import cheap tin. They claimed to champion the rural and fishing sectors as the "true" Galicians. Although the PG won sixteen seats in 1936 and led a successful referendum for the Autonomy Statute in 1936, Franco abrogated the statute and all political parties while he bloodily repressed the opposition.

The program of the next generation of Galicianists also

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9Ibid.

9Ibid.

9Benjamin Martin, _The Agony of Modernization: Labor and Industrialization in Spain_ (Ithaca: ILR Press, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1990), 299.
incorporated socio-economic issues as well as linguistic issues. Like Basque students activists, students at the University of Santiago de Compostela blended their predecessors' ideology with a Marxist, class-based ideology during the 1960s. Influenced by the contemporary anti-colonial movements, students sought to liberate Galicia from what it described as "interior colonialism."8 They critiqued "Spanish capitalism" and the Galician elite and championed the rural people, primarily minifundistas, fishermen, and workers." This new generation of leftist-Galician nationalists addressed issues that mattered to rural people and had a program for autonomous development.9

One of the complaints issued by autonomists is that industrialists from outside Galicia are taking Galician savings through banks controlled by the Spanish state.9 Another issue which the leftists nationalists seized was the lack of control of Galicia's own natural resources, such as


9Ibid., 413.

9Ibid., 413. See also Gispert and María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 113, 142.

9Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), 243. See also Gispert and María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 141-42.
its water resources for hydroelectricity. Galicia produced ". . . 20.5 percent of all Spanish electricity at one time while consuming less than the average." Some Galicians still lack electricity. The dams required for the generation of this hydroelectricity flooded some minifundias. The leftists and the small landholders clashed with the police on this issue of expropriation. Nationalist leftists also marched, demonstrated, boycotted, and fought against the Guardia Civil over the announcement of construction of a nuclear power plant, a plant perceived to be unnecessary in a region which could be using its hydroelectric energy generated by others. Nationalists also demonstrated against the expropriation of minifundias to construct a toll highway. The highway eventually linked the industrial areas along the coast, which has not helped the rural interior and might even have contributed to widening the gap between the interior and the coast.

Another issue was Spanish renovation of the deep sea fishing

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100 Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 413 and Carr and Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, 243; Gispert and María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 141.

101 Ibid., 413.

102 Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 413-14; Gispert and María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 140-41.

103 Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 413-14; Gispert and María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 140-41.
fleet in 1968. That renovation did not include the "smaller craft fleet" important to the rural, coastal municipalities.\textsuperscript{104} Research for this thesis did not find data on whether minifundistas participated in all these clashes or whether fishermen protested their plight. Moreover, whether the minifundistas who did rebel with the nationalist leftist activists saw greater autonomy or independence as necessary for their well-being or simply wanted to protest the loss of their land is not clear. What is clear is that the protests made no difference.

The leftist nationalist organization Unión do Pobo Galego (UPG),\textsuperscript{105} which had formed in the mid-1960s, collaborated with the Basque nationalist organization Euskadi eta Askatasuna (ETA) to form an "armed front." That was a short-lived group; the police killed a leading UPG militant in 1975 and broke up the group that year.\textsuperscript{106} The failure of this group to overcome repression and become an enduring, formidable force in Galicia may suggest that it

\textsuperscript{104}Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 413-14.

\textsuperscript{105}This group was involved in minifundia riots in Castelo do Miño and a rally in July 1968 called the "Concentración Nacional" in Santiago de Compostela (Stephens, Linguistic Minorities, 673). When the riots took place and whether they were the same incidents described above is unclear. The riots may have been in the 1960s.

\textsuperscript{106}Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 412; Gispert and Maria Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 113.
lacked ties to a supportive community willing to hide the group's members from the authorities or provide recruits for the cause. Also, the UPG may not have had the benefit of strong protest movements and social institutions from which to recruit members, tap resources, discuss strategy, develop ideology, and organize.

Although radical nationalism failed to make significant gains, a movement for greater autonomy had more success. Hundreds of thousands demonstrated their support for autonomy on December 4, 1977.107 Also, according to Gispert and María Prats, UPG's agitation did lead most political parties to include "Galicia" or "Galician" to their names.108 Still, Galician nationalist have been minor in the low-turnout regional elections, as we will see below.

Even when regionalists and nationalists offered programs which addressed socio-economic issues of concern to minifundistas they were unable to attract a strong following among them. Many minifundistas, according to Díaz López, fear that leftists would socialize their land.109 Thus,

108Gispert and María Prats, España: un estado plurinacional, 113.
they may be suspicious of the leftist bent of some Galicianist parties. Also, the rural populations have traditionally been conservative and devoutly religious. A less leftists regionalist movement might attract more support. Another possible reason for the lack of support is that, according to the results of some surveys, most Galicians do not think that greater autonomy or independence would alleviate the discrimination that they have experienced or reduce economic inequality. Another explanation could be that most of the minifundistas are isolated from each other, meaning that they may not have communication networks necessary to hear about, discuss, or form a social movement. Also, they may be too preoccupied with their own survival to become involved in political activities, unless their livelihood becomes directly threatened. Most of them have not lost land and do not face the threat of losing land.

**POLITICAL PARTICIPATION**

Another explanation for quiescence and the lack of support for nationalism has to do with the patronage that the caciques offer in return for votes, as well as the implied threats to terminate the subsides and pensions if clients supported a cacique's opponent. Recent voter turnout in Galicia is the lowest in Spain and all of Western
Europe.\textsuperscript{12} The rate of abstention is high in legislative elections in the rural areas and in municipal elections in the urban areas. In some places more than half of those eligible to vote have not. Díaz López offers the following explanations: "deficiencies in registration," the "high percentage" of emigrants who encountered "administrative difficulties in voting,"\textsuperscript{11} i.e., difficulty in reaching polls in the rural areas, because of the dispersed population;\textsuperscript{12} an aged population, and finally, voter apathy.\textsuperscript{13} According to Díaz López, the apparent irrelevance of two referenda and three elections in three years, which, he contends, did not affect their lives, may have contributed to this apathy.\textsuperscript{14}

\footnote{Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 417 and 419. The rate of abstention rose from 39 percent in 1977 to 50.3 percent in 1979 (Ibid., 417).}

\footnote{Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 419. Similarly, Gunther, et. al., Spain After Franco, 485, n. 50, cite the high number of emigrants from Galicia who work and reside outside Galicia. They interpret this as evidence that the absentee rate is exaggerated.}

\footnote{Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 419. Gunther, et. al., Spain After Franco, 350, say that over 40,000 isolated communities exist, contributing to low turnout. They also suggest that lack education "... and familiarity with democracy ..." is a factor.}

\footnote{Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 419.}

\footnote{Ibid. The turnout, however, may not be as low as it appears, because of outdated registration lists. See Gunther, et. al., Spain After Franco, 485, n. 50.}
A patron-client relationship has existed in Galicia in which the client has depended on the local boss for help in return for supporting the boss or his designated candidate. The boss had "personal influence" and had connections to Madrid or the provincial delegate.\textsuperscript{115} The Francoist agrarian, fishing, peasant and cattle-breeders' corporate unions were linked to Madrid and were able to deliver the goods to constituents. This helped the Alianza Popular (AP) and the Unión Centrodemocrático (UCD), which had franquista officials.\textsuperscript{116} Civil servants with ties to Madrid threateningly implied to minifundistas that they would no longer receive subsidies if they voted for the communists or socialists.\textsuperscript{117} A member of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) asserts that caciques, mayors, and officials control the distribution of subsidies and pensions, thus reducing support of the leftists and nationalists, and contributing to low voter turnout.\textsuperscript{118}

Among those who have voted in the post-Franco elections, support for Galicianist parties has been low. The Unidade Galega (UG), a fusion of liberals, socialists, 

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., 420.

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{117}Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 422, n. 16.

\textsuperscript{118}Interview in 1978 in Gunther, et. al., Spain After Franco, 350-1 and 485 n. 51.
and communists, and the leftist Bloque Nacional Popular Galego (BNPG), a fusion of the UPG and another group, received a total of 6.49 and 11.44 percent of the votes in the Spanish elections of 1977 and 1979, respectively. The number of votes for these parties did rise, so the increase in percent of votes received is not solely attributable to the increase in abstention. Moderate centrists formed a Galicianist party called Coalición Galega (CG) in 1982 which captured thirteen percent of the votes in autonomous elections in 1985, while the left-wing Galicianists won ten percent of the votes that year. In 1989 CG did worse than in the previous regional election. The BNG (formerly BNPG) won only five seats in the autonomous elections, trailing far behind the right-wing Spanish party Alianza Popular, the most centralist of the major parties. Galician nationalism remains only a minor force in Galician politics.

**RECENT NATIONALIST VIOLENCE**

A few Galician nationalists have recently resorted to violence. A separatist group called Exército Guerrilheiro

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do Pobo Galego Ceibe (Guerilla Army of Free Galician People) became active in early 1987\textsuperscript{21} and claimed its first victim, a Civil Guard, in February, 1989.\textsuperscript{122} EGPBC was responsible for six bombings on October 11, 1990. Three people, including two suspected members of the separatist organization, were killed and forty-nine injured when a bomb exploded at a discothèque in Santiago de Compostela.\textsuperscript{123} Later five bombs destroyed buildings in coastal areas of the Galician province of Pontevedra. The targets included a cafe, a factory, a car showroom, and a bank. The group claimed responsibility only for the bombings in Pontevedra.\textsuperscript{124} This study has found no information on whether this group still exists and, if so, whether it has managed to carry out subsequent attacks since 1990. The apparent lack of activity since 1990 suggests that Galician nationalism continues to pose little threat to the Spanish state.

\textsuperscript{121}Paul Heywood, \textit{Spain's Next Five Years: A Political Risk Analysis} (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991), 56.


\textsuperscript{124}\textit{The Times of London}, Oct. 12, 1990.
CONCLUSION

Galicia is a culturally and linguistically distinct, diglossic, and economically underdeveloped region. Its people tend to see themselves as Galician and perceive that they suffer from discrimination and economic inequality. These facts have not led to a prominent regionalist or nationalist movement in Galicia. Although there have been and are Galician regionalists and nationalists concerned with the region's diglossia and poor economic conditions, they have not had wide support. A major explanation for the weakness of Galicianist movements is that Galicia has historically been closely tied to Spain. Galicians' door to opportunity and advancement has been the civil service and military. Fighting for the revival of Gallegan and the independence of Galicia was doubtless unthinkable to Galicians who needed to know Castillian in order to work in state positions. The Catholic Church, influential in Galician society, was also against Galician autonomism and separatism. Caciques influenced or implicitly threatened Galician minifundistas to vote in the caciques' interests. The minifundistas have generally voted for the Spanish right, if they have voted at all.

An absence of modernization in Galician society appears to be a major reason that some Galicians have advocated regional autonomy and even national independence, yet also
the root explanation for the marginality of these autonomists and separatists. Most rural Galicians have not had to face changing modes of production or expropriations that would threaten their livelihood. Rural Galicians live in isolated hamlets and thus lack transportation and communication networks that would allow Galicians from the different hamlets to form a mass movement. The poverty of the region prevented mass in-migrations of non-Galicians whose presence might have been resented for placing a strain on services or for competing for jobs. Unless these facts change, Galician regionalism and nationalism is likely to remain the cause of a few.
CHAPTER FIVE
SPANISH CATALONIA: ETHNIC IDENTITY, SUBCULTURE, AND AUTONOMY

Spanish Catalans have resisted Castillian and Spanish central authority since becoming subordinate to Castille. Industrialization, urbanization, and Spain’s constant grip, varying in firmness over the centuries, have been unable to dissolve a distinct and politically charged Catalan identity and desire for preserving or increasing Catalan autonomy. Rather, the economic development of Catalonia and periods of repression by Madrid have tended to intensify the conflict between Catalonia and Madrid rather than diminish it.

Catalonia, a group of counties loosely unified under the Count of Barcelona by the twelfth century, had its own governing institutions within the Kingdom of Aragón and had dynastic links to the Crown of Castille.¹ From their principal port in Barcelona, Catalans led a Catalan-Aragonese maritime empire, which flourished during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, extending from Majorca to Athens.² During the sixteenth century, however, as Castille grew in prosperity and power because it claimed, conquered, and exploited the Americas, the Kingdom of Aragón

²Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 3-4.
began to decline. Several factors also led to Catalonia’s decline. These included a depression in the Mediterranean and the Black Plague, which spread rapidly through the rural areas, depopulating agricultural zones.

With Castille’s help, Catalonia began to recover economically, but Castille and Aragón remained "... unequal partners." Castille had become wealthier and more populous. Besides the difference in wealth and population, the two kingdoms had different political institutions. The Catalan-Aragonese federation’s economic relations linked it with the Mediterranean ports, while Castille’s economic relations linked it with the Americas. Politically, the Cortes (Corts in Catalan) for the territories of Aragón, including Catalonia, had more power than Castille’s and was rooted in long-standing traditions designed to limit arbitrary use of royal authority. The only basis for unity between the two kingdoms was the dynastic marriage of Ferdinand and Isabel. The two kingdoms had little if anything else in common that might have

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*Ibid., 5-6.*

*Ibid., 6-7.*

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promoted harmonious merging into one state.\footnote{Ibid.}

Because the Crown of Aragón was increasingly unable to "... meet its obligations ..." to Castille, Catalonia "... began to assert its claims to autonomy ..." and thereby annoy the king and his advisers. For example, the Catalans, citing their constitutions, demanded payment before transporting grain to the troops who were garrisoned to defend the province. An exasperated Conde Duque Olivares, the prime minister, declared, "The devil take the constitutions!"\footnote{Ibid., 375.} When rural Catalan workers revolted in 1640 "... against the tax increase and the billeting of Castilian troops ..." during a war against France,\footnote{Johnston,\textit{ Tales of Nationalism}, 31.} Olivares was angered that Catalans expected to be treated differently from any other subjects under Castille's domain.\footnote{Elliott,\textit{ Revolt of the Catalans}, 401.} Catalans rebelled against the Castillians in 1705 during the War of Spanish Succession. The British and the Dutch eventually abandoned Catalonia during the war and on September 11, 1714, after formidable resistance, Barcelona fell to the Castillians. Castille tightened its grip on Catalonia by abrogating the Catalan charters, the
Corts, the university, and local control over finances.\textsuperscript{11} September 11 is still celebrated as a holiday when Catalans praise their heroic ancestors who bravely resisted, though unsuccessfully, the Spanish enemy. The Catalan nation, Johnston contends, is partly "... defined in terms of the cycle of reprisals against its politics and culture."\textsuperscript{12} Spain issued the \textit{Nova Planta} in 1716, which repressed culture by banning the teaching of Catalan in schools or the official use of the language.\textsuperscript{13} Although the incorporation of Catalonia into Spain dealt a blow to its cultural institutions and political autonomy, it helped the Catalan bourgeoisie on the eve of the industrial revolution in Catalonia by permitting Catalan goods to enter the rest of Spain and the empire.\textsuperscript{14} Spain promoted industry and highway construction, which benefitted the Catalan bourgeoisie. Spain's territories in the Americas also provided the Catalans access to the raw materials and markets needed for Catalonia's finished products. By 1790 only England produced more cotton than Catalonia. In the 1830s and 1840s Catalanian textile businesses imported the

\textsuperscript{11} Johnston, \textit{Tales of Nationalism}, 31.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 31 and 34.
\textsuperscript{14} Jordi Solé-Tura, \textit{Catalanismo y revolución burgesa} (Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1974), 24.
mechanical loom and steam engine, introduced the automatic spinning frame, and used water and steam power, enabling Catalans textiles to become the fourth largest in the world. after English, French, and United States textiles.¹⁶

The Catalan bourgeoisie allegedly supported Catalanism in order to have some influence in Madrid.¹⁶ By the end of the nineteenth century Catalanism took shape in a center-right, urban middle-class and bourgeoisie party called the Lliga Regionalista.¹⁷ Johnston contends that support for Catalanism was not limited to the bourgeoisie; working-class Catalans also expressed Catalanist sentiment in numerous popular uprisings between 1837 and 1873.

Besides the economic basis for Catalanism, there were vague assertions of "... language identity and autonomy against Castilian centralism."²⁸ According to Johnston, Catalanism existed among Republicans, Socialists, and

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²Pierre Vilar, Catalunya dins l'Espanya moderna (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1979); and Solé-Tura, "Catalanismo y revolución," cited in Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 32.

³Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 32.

⁴Tbid., 32.
anarchists but took a back seat to class demands.\textsuperscript{19} Working-class organizations could not unite on the basis of Catalanism because of sharp ideological and economic differences with industrialists. Thus, the Lliga remained the principal Catalanist group.\textsuperscript{20}

The Lliga's call for autonomy within Spain was eclectic, influenced by Carlism, federalism, and nineteenth century romanticism.\textsuperscript{21} Carlism represented a way to resist Spanish centralism and to regain lost fueros. The First Carlist War between the rural population and clergy on one side and the urban, anti-clerical Spanish Liberal Party on the other was over the issue of Madrid's authority and power. The Bishop Torras i Bages led the Church in preserving sentiments of pàtria, language, family, and religion in the rural areas,\textsuperscript{22} long after Carlism had been defeated.

The romantic period of the nineteenth century also contributed to Catalan and other cultural nationalisms. Intellectuals promoted the language, literature, folklore,

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{21}Johnston, \textit{Tales of Nationalism}, 32.

\textsuperscript{22}Benjamin Oltra, Francesc Mercadè, and Francesc Hernández, \textit{La ideología catalana} (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 1981), 43-49.
and history of Catalonia.²² Beginning in the 1840s,²⁴ this cultural renaissance (renaixença) saw the publication of books in Catalan extolling the pátria, the revival in 1859 of the poetry competitions called Jocs Florals (Floral Games) dating from the Middle Ages, and the study of Catalan history, which related stories of Catalan glories and Castillian subjugation of Catalonia. This, according to Johnston, aggravated resentments toward Castille.²⁵ The renaissance is said to have been popular, not limited to intellectuals.²⁶ A left-leaning Catalanist founded a group called La Jove Catalunya (Young Catalonia) in 1870. In 1871 a newspaper called La Renaixença, which lasted thirty-five years, was founded.²⁷

During the Second Carlist War in 1873 the Catalan

²²Ibid., 33
²⁵Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 34.
²⁶Susan M. DiGiacomo, "The Politics of Identity: Nationalism in Catalonia," Ph.D. diss., (University of Massachusetts, 1985,) 53, cited in Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 34. Carr, Spain, 541, contends that Jocs Florals constituted the formal beginning of the Catalan renaissance, whose informal beginnings date back to the 1840s. The 1833 book Ode to the Fatherland, Carr contends, marked only the symbolic beginning of the period.
²⁷Ferran Soldevila, Síntesis de la historia de Cataluña (Barcelona: Ediciones Destino, 1978), 289; and Josep Termes, Federalismo, anarcosindicalismo y catalanismo (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama 1976), 78.
industrialists and traditionalists formed an alliance against Madrid and adopted a conservative brand of Catalanism. The apparent contradiction of an alliance between rural traditionalists and urban, industrial liberals was resolved in three ways, according to Oltra, et. al.: First, capital from the countryside enabled Catalonia to industrialize. Secondly, the "agrarian, backward" rest of Spain was seen as acting as a "brake" on the Catalan bourgeoisie. Thus, this social class needed to form an alliance with the rest of Catalonia against the Spanish state. Finally, both groups shared reactionary moral and religious values.28

Federalists supported autonomy from a different perspective and base of support. The Spanish Republicans championed a federal system whereby regional minorities could "... reclaim lost liberties."29 Federalists envisioned a Catalan state "independent" within a federal Spain, with ties to each region.30 The federalists opposed free trade in part to win the support of Catalan workers and industrialists.31 The Catalan bourgeoisie, however, was

28Oltra, et. al., La ideología catalana, 44-45.
29Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 33.
30Josep Termes, Federalismo, anarcosindicalismo y catalanismo (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama 1976), 71-74.
31Termes, Federalismo anarcosindicalismo y federalismo, 54.
alienated by the Republicans and their working-class supporters because of local uprisings under the Spanish Republic of 1873-1874.²²

The devastating defeat of Spain at the hands of the United States in the Spanish-American War (1898) in which Spain lost Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines was pivotal for Catalanism because it gave the movement the chance to achieve a "mass following" among the middle-class and become electorally potent. This was because the "... moribund Castilian state ..." had conscripted young Catalans into the losing war and "... had lost Catalonia her best market ..."³ In Catalonia the economic effects of the loss of the colonies were severe. Now that the Cuban market for Catalan textile was gone, exports plummeted from 11,700 tons to 4,400.¹⁴ The defeat led to the "Generation of ´98," writers throughout Spain who lamented the Spanish decline and critically evaluated Spain.

The Lliga Regionalista won parliamentary seats in the 1901 elections and sought the implementation of its plan, proposed by Enric Prat de la Riba, for regional control of

²²Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 33.


³Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 34. Johnston did not cite this source. Nor did he discuss the price of the exports.
its affairs, while allowing Spain to continue managing international relations. Despite the view that Spain was Catalonia's enemy, this plan did not truly advocate the formation of a separate nation-state. Rather, it proposed that Catalonia remain in the state and recognize certain aspects of Madrid's authority. Nevertheless, all internal affairs should be decided by an autonomous Catalonia. The implementation of this proposal would have been a significant step away from Spanish domination.

The Lliga was led by big businessmen. Francesc Cambó, the successor to Prat de la Riba, was the president of CHADE, the largest power company in Spain, and director of a bank, a publishing house, a hotel, and other businesses. Another leader, Joan Ventosa i Calvell, was vice-president of CHADE and president of Luz y Fuerza de Levante (Light and Power of Levante) and numerous manufacturing companies. There were others with similar backgrounds. The coalition was unstable, however, because the "haute

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3Maximiano García Venero, Historia del Nacionalismo Catalan, Vol. 1 (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1967), 439-444 summarizes the plan proposed by the Catalanist leader Prat de la Riba. He advocated that Catalonia should stay within Spain but weaken its ties to it.

3Jesus Pabón, Cambó (Barcelona: Editorial Alpha, 1969), cited in Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 34.

bourgeoisie," which led the regionalist coalition, identified with the monarchy, while the middle classes were not as conservative. In 1907 the Lliga led a coalition, called Solidaritat Catalana, of Carlists, Socialists, and Republicans. It won 41 of the 44 Catalan seats, but broke apart, because of the labor revolts of the Tragic Week of 1909.  

Pursuing its class interests, the Lliga formed a government with the monarchist parties in return for an agreement to end debate on a war profits tax in 1917. The Lliga lost nationalist support, though, when it supported General Primo de Rivera's dictatorship in 1923 with the aim of curbing labor unrest. Between 1923 and 1930 his regime outlawed all nationalist parties, repressed the Catalan language by banning its use in official documents, dismissed all mayors, replacing municipal governments with military tribunals, dismantled the semi-autonomist

38Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 35.


administration called the Mancomunitat, which the Lliga had established in 1914, prohibited the flying of the Catalan flag, suspended newspapers, and dissolved "Catalanist cultural clubs". He also prohibited activities by the CNT. These policies led many middle-class autonomists to turn to the republican left. After Primo de Rivera fled in 1930 and the monarchy collapsed in 1931, new Catalanist parties emerged. New leftist parties, the Unió Socialista de Catalunya (USC) and the Unió Socialista de Rabasaires (USR) also emerged and from the Lliga, the more moderate Acció Català, whose supporters were middle-class. Francesc Marcíà's Estat Català attracted those who advocated complete separation from Spain. This party and others formed a bloc called Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia).

Esquerra coalesced with the USC to win 47 percent of the votes in Barcelona and prevailed in other municipal elections in 1931. The coalition defeated the Lliga and all fourteen of its candidates were elected. Meanwhile, the Spanish Republican party was elected and created the Second Republic, thanks to the support of the cities and provincial

4Alba, Catalonia, 101-102.
5Ibid., 105.
6Ibid., 35.
capitals, despite the monarchists in the countryside.⁴⁵ Honoring the Pact of San Sebastián, which they had signed eight months before taking power, the Republicans supported regional autonomy. These gains were to be erased by Franco, whose forces began a war against the Republic in 1936. When Franco finally conquered Catalonia in 1939, he launched a wave of repression that left thousands dead. In Barcelona, for example, the new regime executed 300 per week during July 1939, the first month of occupation.⁴⁶ He targeted Catalan culture and language with a wrath unequalled by previous Spanish regimes.

**CATALAN IDENTITY**

There is disagreement over who should be considered Catalan. Some say that to live and work in Catalonia is to be Catalan.⁷ A legal definition of a Catalan was written in the 1932 Statute of Autonomy and has been restated in the Statute of 1979 (Article 6). Any Spanish citizen who "... has administrative residence in any municipality of

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⁴⁵Ibid., 35-36.


Catalan . . ." defines the " . . . political condition of Catalan . . . ." Some reject this legal definition. During the 1979 and 1980 elections the Socialist Party of Andalusia and the Socialist Party of Aragon unsuccessfully sought a clause granting Andalusians and Aragonese political citizenship in the region of their birth. Officially, residence continues to define regional political citizenship.

The other criteria for defining Catalan identity are "birthplace," " . . . descent, sentiment/behavior, and language." Language, according to Woolard, is the " . . . most commonly used and most powerful." From interviews, conversations, and reading commentaries and letters to editors of newspapers, Woolard found that in-migrants tend to identify themselves according to their birthplace and identify their children born in the Barcelona area as Catalan. While the children concur with this definition, Woolard contends that they tacitly identify themselves in other ways, suggesting that they may not have incorporated this definition into their outlook. The in-migrants' children sometimes distinguish their 'castellano' behavior

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*Woolard, Double Talk, 37.

* Ibid.

* Ibid., 38.
from that of catalán behavior. Many who are linguistically and culturally Catalan disagree that birthplace is a sufficient criterion and therefore exclude the children of immigrants from those who should be deemed Catalan.

Generally, Woolard's findings suggest that people consider themselves Catalan if they are of Catalan descent. Although occasionally a Catalan will contend that "so and so" is not "really Catalan" because one of her/his parents was not Catalan, generally the Catalans do not place as exclusive an emphasis on lineage, as do many Basques. Rarely do Catalans refer to their Catalan grandparents to demonstrate how Catalan they are. Some may only point to their long lineage to show how deeply rooted their identity is, but not to imply that those whose lineages are shorter are not Catalan.

Many Catalans welcome assimilation from people outside the region and incorporate outside influences into their own culture. "Many very Catalanist informants proudly point to an immigrant grandparent who learned Catalan and was absorbed into the Catalan family, and Catalan nationalists with Castilian last names are numerous." Many nationalist leaders believe that Catalans have traditionally

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5Woolard, Double Talk, 39. Sabino de Arana, the founder of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, made this observation to contrast his own nationalism with Catalan nationalism.
"... absorbed peoples and ideas from other lands."

The sentiment/behavior criterion is met, according to some Catalans, when a Catalan feels an emotional loyalty to the "... language, customs, and institutions" of Catalonia. No matter how far back one's Catalan lineage goes, such a person is not a Catalan according to the sentiment/behavior criterion if s/he fails to demonstrate this dedication to Catalan institutions. For example, one who comes from a Catalan family may once have been deemed Catalan but no longer if this person has started speaking Castillian and has social and political contacts with Madrid. This behavior describes the upper bourgeoisie of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Some nationalists accuse the "upper bourgeoisie" of having always been Spanish instead of Catalan. Conversely, anyone, including an in-migrant, who meets the third criterion can qualify as Catalan, according to those who stress this criterion of Catalan identity. Some in-migrants consider themselves Catalan because they are loyal to Catalonia.

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52Ibid.

53Josep Termes, "La immigració a Catalunya: Política i cultura," in Reflexions crítiques sobre la cultura catalana, Pierre Vilar et. al. (Barcelona: Departament de Cultura de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 1983), 284.

54See, for example, Miquel Sellares "Constituir Catalunya sin electoralismos," in Mundo Diario, June 12, 1980, quoted in Woolard, Double Talk, 39.
Much nationalist rhetoric supports their claims.\textsuperscript{55} Language is the most important defining aspect of being Catalan. In common conversation, anyone who uses Catalan like a native as a "... first, home, and/or habitual language ..." is Catalan. People may not directly put it that way, but Woolard asserts that this attitude consistently comes out in people's conversations.\textsuperscript{55} Even those with whom she conversed who considered themselves Catalan because they were born in Catalonia distinguished themselves from "Catalan Catalans," meaning according to Woolard, those who use the Catalan language almost exclusively. Catalan persists as a way to distinguish Catalans from outsiders and to exclude people who do not learn the language. Those who learn it, and acquire a strong Catalan accent are admired and welcomed into the community.

By learning Catalan, in-migrants can enter a new network of friendships and make connections. Woolard

\textsuperscript{55}Ramon Vinyals i Soler, "Un cierto patriotismo," Mundo Diario, June 26, 1980b, cited by Woolard, Double Talk, 39; and Manuel Cruells, Els no catalans i nosaltres (Barcelona: Edicions d’aportació catalana, 1965), 15. Below is a quotation of a Catalan who lauds "... great Catalanist fighters ..." who did not speak a word of Catalan. They were Catalanist fighters because they were politically dedicated.

\textsuperscript{6}Woolard, Double Talk, 40.
documents cases of in-migrants who take this option. Woolard documents a case in which a boss turns down two job applicants because they were immigrants. The boss, however, had not objected to the other in-migrant whom he had hired; he considered this employee "different" because she had learned Catalan and preferred to assimilate. Switching ethnicity and language, therefore, is economically advantageous. Moreover, Catalans think that to learn Catalan suggests hard-work and initiative.

CULTURE, POLITICS, AND CLASS

Core values in Catalan culture are manifested in

\footnote{Woolard, Double Talk, 47.}

\footnote{Ibid.}

\footnote{Ibid. and above. Recently, however, extremely violent "ultra-Catalanist skinheads" and ultras, who consider themselves to be more Nazi than the skinheads, seem to have different notions about Catalan identity. They despise the in-migrants from other parts of Spain and from Africa. Said one Catalan skinhead, "We are for a free, sovereign, and white Catalonia and that's why we hate to death blacks, moros [Moors], and Andalusians." One of the skinheads interviewed, of Castillian origin, wants a "Catalonia for Catalans and whites." Thus, this movement seems to accept certain whites of different origins, but is violently white supremacist and opposed to recent in-migrants. See Maria Josep Sangenis, "Violento odio racial de los cabezas rapadas," Cambio 16 (January 10, 1990). While these groups are recent, their antipathy for in-migrants is nothing new and may simply be a more extreme form of prejudice held by many Catalans toward unassimilated in-migrants. Why these new groups have emerged merits further investigation.}
various festivals and rituals.60 For example, the sardana dance is said to reinforce Catalan bourgeois values. The counting of steps and the ritual of placing purses and briefcases in the center of the circle are supposed to serve as recreation for accountants.61 According to Laitin, "[c]ore aspects of this culture, though with important Castilian elements, were fashioned intentionally in the mid-sixteenth century, as part of a political bargain between Catalan nobles and Barcelona's urban citizenry.62 In order to have job opportunities and authority, the nobles wanted to ally with the merchants, who had profited from rents on the properties they owned and had become Barcelona's oligarchs. To realize an alliance, the nobles could no longer justify their domination on the basis of their birth. Instead, they had to use the criterion of "... learning, etiquette, and culture..." as constructed by the merchants and nobles.63 In some respects, in other words, upper-class membership and Catalan ethnicity overlapped. Catalanism is said to have existed among the

6Stanley Brandes is cited for this point in an oral presentation at the university of California, San Diego, in 1984. This was cited by Laitin, "Linguistic Revival," 298, footnote 8.
6Ibid.
working class, too, who demonstrated this sentiment during the Carlist uprisings in 1837 and 1873. Politically, one of the first major Catalanist parties was the Lliga Regionalista (founded at the end of the nineteenth century,) headed by wealthy capitalists and supported by the middle-class Catalanists. It viewed the working-class as a threat to Catalan unity, Catalan industry, and commerce. Republicans, Socialists, and anarchists had some Catalanist strains in their ideology. The Republican Party, which advocated federalism, had broad support from the working-class. Although the party’s federalist ideology provided a way for Catalans to gain autonomy and previously revoked liberties, the bourgeois Catalanists feared the Republicans’ radical elements. When the majority of the working-class was still native Catalan, several working-class organizations were nationalist.

Since the turn of the century Iberians from other regions migrated, leaving rural poverty for low paying unskilled jobs in urban centers. The working conditions that they encountered led to tensions between the in-migrant

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6Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 33. See the discussion above.

6Ibid., 36.
workers and the Catalanists. This tension led to the infamous Tragic Week (Semana Trágica) in 1909, when workers rioted for five days. The rioting started in response to a call up of Catalan reservist troops to be sent to Morocco, a burden falling mainly on the working and lower-middle classes. The anti-Catalanist feelings of the rioters were manifested in the burnings of twenty-two churches and thirty-four convents. One-hundred and seventy-five rioters were shot by police and firing squads. The anti-Catalanist feelings were encouraged by the leader of the Radical Republicans, who, since 1901, had been railing against the Catalans.⁶ The violence by rioters and police doubtless complicated any efforts to form an inter-class autonomist alliance. Also significant is that Esquerra was not as radical as other working-class parties. Marcià, the leader of the party, offered only a vague program for the workers and preached the need for education of workers. Although his successor was more radical, the main bases of support for the party were the lower-middle classes and

left-leaning Catalanist peasants.  

A mass migration of 547,000 Iberians from other regions to Catalonia between 1910 and 1930 created an "immigrant" working class. Although there is evidence of early working-class support for Catalanism, the workers who migrated from outside the region were often antagonistic toward Catalanism, which they perceived as bourgeois oriented. The in-migrants encountered menial, low wage jobs in workshops directed by the "paternalistic patró," where working conditions were poor. This experience turned many workers toward the left and against Catalan nationalism. The Socialists feared that the working-class would be dominated by the Catalan middle-class if Catalonia won autonomy.  

The anarchist Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) and the splinter group Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI) contributed to these class animosities when they terrorized the bourgeoisie. The Generalitat responded with police repression, which cost the Esquerra working-class support. In response to the labor unrest the Lliga Regionalista subordinated its professed Catalanist interests to its class interests by supporting Primo de Rivera in 1923, in hopes that he would repress labor and bring stability to Spain and

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69 Ibid., 115.
Catalonia. Then, Primo de Rivera’s government was overthrown in 1930 and the Second Republic replaced the monarchy the year after.

Under the new republic during the early 1930s Catalonia gained autonomy, but labor unrest, especially by the anarchist CNT and its splinter group FAI, which attacked the bourgeoisie led the bourgeoisie to support the anti-Republican uprising led by Franco in 1936, just as they had supported Primo de Rivera in 1923 during previous labor unrest. The ecclesiastical hierarchy, mindful of the radical left’s history of violence against the Church, even declared Franco’s war a holy crusade. The Spanish Communist Party also earned resentment from supporters of autonomy, (thereby aggravating antagonisms between the working-class left and the middle-class Catalanists.) When the PCE gained control of Catalonia in 1938 during the Civil War, it rejected autonomy as treasonous to the Republic and dismantled Catalan autonomy.\(^7\)

The Communists were excluded from clandestine Catalanist groups during the 1940s in retaliation for their anti-autonomist activities.\(^1\) Even the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (FSUC), some of whose leaders were

\(^7\)Johnston, Tales of Nationalism. 38.

\(^1\)Ibid., 41.
Catalan and most of whose literature was in Catalan, was ostracized for the same reason that the Partido Comunista de España (PCE) was ostracized. Though a Catalan party, separate from the PCE, it followed Moscow's line, which opposed ethnic separatism. Another reason for this ostracism may have been pressure from the United States and other countries during the Cold War, as was the case in other regions, though this study does not produce evidence of this.

Despite these past antagonisms, the middle-class youth and the lower clergy of Catalonia, not the suffering working-classes, were responsible for a new Marxist movement which became important to anti-Francoist, pro-democratic, and even nationalist activity during the 1960s. Arguably, Marxism did not serve the middle-class youths’ class interests; still, it attracted them. Many students, troubled by the social disparities in Spain and able to afford to travel to France, had seen a better alternative. Becoming introduced to Marxist ideas, they found its rhetoric an attractive way to address social concerns. They equated Marxism with the fight against Franco, the fight for democracy, and the fight for autonomy. Some saw leftism as

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"Ibid., 41-42.

"Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 70."
a way to make nationalism more attractive to working classes. Those middle-class students bought smuggled books from France and learned of the ideas coming from that freer society. Also from France came worker-priest movements, encouraged by Vatican II, that combined the Christian concern for the poor with leftist ideas. They impressed many students and young clergy in Catalonia.

The Catalan Church, moreover, provided the only place where people could organize in relative safety, thanks to the immunity of the Church from surveillance. The Church had a privileged relationship with the Franco regime and sponsored organizations to teach working-class children and provide other services. The Church also combined social issues with nationalism by taking students on pilgrimages to the symbol-laden Montserrat monastery. One year the theme of these trips was the "social question." The next year it was the "national question." These were the questions raised by Vatican II. Also, young leftist priests participated in the university movements and the Workers' Commissions. Friendship networks often led students to join a radical group.7

7For a fascinating account of how this developed, read pages 68-81 and Chapter Six in Johnston, Tales of Nationalism. Besides discussing the institutional settings and movements, Chapter Six discusses how individuals reconciled their Catalan identity with their left-leanings, or immigrant identities with Catalanist leanings.
The long-standing ideological incompatibilities perceived by many leftists between Marxist-Leninism and any nationalist or regionalist movement, especially Catalanism, with its clerical and bourgeois influences, had often been a source of trouble between many leftists and Catalanists. Memories of the bitter rift between the Communists and the Catalanists during the Civil War remained an obstacle to cooperation between the working-class and the Catalanists. Another obstacle was that the working-class increasingly consisted of Castillian speaking in-migrants. This group became difficult to assimilate because so many had come so suddenly. Between 1951 and 1970 1.16 million in-migrants entered Catalonia. The population of Barcelona was roughly 39 percent Castillian in 1975. The percent of the total population adult population of the dormitory towns of Cornellà and Santa Coloma, around Barcelona, was approximately 78 percent. Most of the jobs available to these newly arrived in-migrants were unskilled or semiskilled. The children of these in-migrants can live in

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76Ibid., 260, cited in Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 104.

77Miquel Strubell i Trueta, Llengua i població a Catalunya (Barcelona: Edicions de la Magrana, 1981), 75.
these enclaves without ever hearing a word of Catalan for
days, thus putting these newcomers at a disadvantage and
closing them off to the larger Catalan society.

Today in Catalonia a linguistic division of labor
exists in which the in-migrants usually occupy the unskilled
or semiskilled jobs. By the 1960s the percentage of
Catalans in the working class declined and today most
working-class residents of Catalonia are "non-Catalan,"
which in this context means unassimilated in-migrants.
White-collar jobs and skilled jobs, in contrast, are
occupied by Catalans. Still, many in-migrants recognized
that Catalan was the language of the upper-classes, who
attached considerable importance to their high-status
language. So, despite massive Castillian in-migration
problems, much of the in-migrant working-class has become an
ally in the struggle for Catalan autonomy.

In order to explain the working-class support for
autonomy, a discussion of the working-class movement is
necessary. Faced with economic hard times, despair and the
state’s repression and infiltration of working-class

7Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 104.

7Carlota Solé, La integración sociocultural de los
inmigrantes en Cataluña (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones

8Woolard, Double Talk; and Johnston, Tales of Nationalism,
105.
organizations, the working-class movement was ineffectual and practically helpless after the Civil War. By the 1960s, a time of rapid economic growth and inflation, a new working-class movement began to emerge throughout Catalonia and Spain. The movement was led by a new type of organization: the Workers' Commissions (Comisiones Obreras; CC.OO.). These developed spontaneously after a law adopted in 1958 allowed workers to elect their own representatives in collective bargaining. In 1963 the PSUC, which had been ostracized for its anti-autonomist actions earlier, entered the CC.OO and soon dominated them. The movement initially focused on wages and workplace representation. Soon, however, it became an impressive anti-Francoist force. It criticized the regime,

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8By 1947 police infiltration had affected all but the most clandestine activities. See José M. Maravall, "Modernization, Authoritarianism, and the Growth of Working-Class Dissent: The Case of Spain," in Government and Oppositions (1973), 8: 432-454, 437, cited in Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 103.


8Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 104. See Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, PSUC: Per Catalunya, la democràcia i el socialisme, with an introduction by Gregori López Raimundo (Barcelona: Editorial L'Avenç, 1976), 70 and 103 for the PSUC perspective on the Comisiones Obreras.

8Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 104.
defied the ban on strikes, and demanded democracy. The other opponents of Franco's regime, "... especially militant students and intellectuals," recognized the Workers' Commissions as allies.66

One explanation for the alliance between working-class organizations and the autonomists was that these working-class groups perceived a tactical opportunity to gain an ally in the fight against Franco. By replacing Franco with democracy, the workers could strike, the ban on the Workers' Commissions could be lifted; and working-class parties would stand a better chance in elections under an autonomous Catalan government than in Spain as a whole.67 For example, a PSUC flyer distributed in 1968 called on workers to participate in the events to be held on September 11, Catalonia's "national" holiday. This was designed to show solidarity with all the forces of democracy. The flyer urged all workers to fight for Catalan and Spanish liberties.68

66Ibid., 103.

67Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 106.

68Centre d' Estudis Històrics Internacionals (CEHI), Secció de Fulls i Butllets, 1968 (F/B, 1968), cited in Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 106. Other working-class groups assumed a different attitude. The FOC, for example, issued a statement acknowledging a link between economic exploitation and national oppression, primarily in the form of repression of the language, but maintaining that "... the national question has a different meaning for the bourgeoisie and for us [the working-class] ... ."
The tactical pursuit of working-class interests contributed to the alliance, Johnston has argued that there were other reasons. On the one hand, conflict between the working-class and nationalists in the 1980s suggests that class interests motivated working-class support for Catalanism. Nationalists and workers had different long-range goals in the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, according to a survey, only five percent of the respondents stated that they had attended the Catalan holiday events in 1977 because of party directives.8

Johnston interviewed a working-class activist who exemplifies many working class in-migrants in their effort to reconcile Catalan nationalism with socialism. That activist was born and raised in rural Galicia, where he grew

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The national question, the statement continued, was "... not above the class struggle but part of it." Quoted in Norman L. Jones, "The Catalan Question Since the War," in Spain in Crisis: The Evolution and Decline of the Franco Régime, ed. Paul Preston (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 258.

8Solé, *La integración sociocultural*, 292. Solé considers the percentages "indicative" even though he acknowledges their statistical insignificance because the sample of those who attended the rally was only 108. It is reasonable to believe that some workers would not want to admit that they were following party directives, if those surveyed thought the interviewer was ethnically Catalan; such an interviewer might deem tactical considerations cynical. Conversely, if the interviewers were of in-migrant origin, the people surveyed might consider the claim that they were following party directives a more socially acceptable answer. Regardless, the survey may support Johnston's contention that at least some workers were motivated by reasons other than tactics.
up speaking Gallegan as his first language. After serving the military in Spanish Africa he migrated to Barcelona. At first he was opposed to "bourgeois" Catalan nationalism, deeming it incompatible with his socialist beliefs. Later, however, he decided that the labor movement and the nationalist movement were inseparable. "Today the nationalist struggle can't be separated from the class struggle here in Catalonia." His support seems to have been expedient. During the interview he confided that he was "furious" that he had to give up his Galician culture and class identity and adopt Catalan culture. He considered Catalan culture exclusive and inaccessible to those who wanted to assimilate. He discussed the frustration of being less educated than the Catalans. Those negative comments notwithstanding, he appeared to be proud, according to Johnston, that his son is "fully integrated" into the culture and speaks Catalan. He pointed out the indispensability of being able to speak Catalan in order to ascend the social ladder and acquire higher status jobs. As Woolard points out, having a strong Catalan accent earns one even more status. The labor activist claimed that

90Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 108.

91Ibid., 115.

92Woolard, Double Talk, 119.
Catalan culture is freer and offers mobility to those who assimilate. Both Johnston and Woolard found that many in-migrants rejected their own culture to achieve higher status. To do this, in-migrants would establish friendship networks with Catalans and shun their native region's identity in order to learn the language. Most of the in-migrants want their children to learn Catalan. Most of the migrants never participated in a nationalist demonstration, but those who did impressed the Catalans. One Catalanist claimed that he knew "... great Catalanist fighters ..." in the PSUC and CC.OO. who "... didn't speak a word of Catalan." Johnston provocatively concludes that the migrants have used the "... utilitarian logic of political nationalism ..." to justify individual pursuit of advancement. The public rationale for supporting nationalism enables them to participate without appearing to betray their original culture, or to climb the social ladder. This suggests that many migrants from outside the region turned away from perceived class interests or

9Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 114-115.

94Ibid., 117; Woolard, Double Talk, 123.

9See for example, Solé, La integración sociocultural, 292.

9Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 121.

9Ibid., 119-120.
ideologies that disdained movements not based on class, and
toward bourgeois values that cherish social mobility. There
is, then, an economic rationale to identifying with
Catalonia or trying to become Catalan: social mobility.

THE REPRESSSION OF LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

Ever since the union of Castille and Aragón, Castillian
spread in Catalonia. As Castillian gained prominence, the
Council of Tarragona tried to stave off the linguistic
invasion by agreeing in 1636 that all preaching in Catalonia
should be in Catalan. Still, because Castillian was
increasingly used by the Catalan upper classes, Castillian
expressions increasingly found their way into the Catalan
language. Books by Castillian authors were being published
in Castillian by Barcelona publishers. Clergy were
delivering Castillian sermons in some churches. Elliott
contends that no Catalan literature of distinction was
produced into the sixteenth century, and some Catalans began
to feel contempt for their native language. Catalans and
Castillians believed that if Castillian spread, Catalonia
would be dominated by Castille. The Castillians saw

98Elliott, Revolt of the Catalans, 321.

99Ibid., 43, 321-322. As an example of Catalans who looked
down on their native language, Elliott cites Alejandro de Ros,
Cataluña Desengañada (Naples, 1646), 241.
castellano as the language of the Empire and the perfect tool for imperial domination.\textsuperscript{100} Madrid made further efforts to repress Catalan by issuing the Nova Planta in 1716 after defeating Catalonia in the War of Succession in 1714. The Nova Planta repressed Catalan culture by banning the teaching of Catalan in schools or the official use of the language.\textsuperscript{101} Spain continued this practice whenever Catalonia rebelled.

The dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923–1930) suppressed political and cultural activity in Catalonia in an effort to unify Spain.\textsuperscript{102} Among the forms of resistance to the dictatorship was the use of Catalanist cultural and sporting institutions. Cultural expression became a form of resistance. There was an increase in books published in Catalan, Catalan plays performed, and schools which taught in Catalan. The Barcelona Club soccer team became popular. Catalans celebrated the success of Catalans in competitions, business ventures, and other successes, which were seen as victories for Catalonia. An "enormous" crowd gathered for the funeral of a Catalan playwright who had written a song

\textsuperscript{100}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{101}Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 31 & 34.

\textsuperscript{102}Alba, Catalonia, 101–103.
banned by the government. By resisting the dictatorship, more and more Catalans became Catalanists. Under the six year dictatorship, Catalans "... Catalonia advanced further toward recovery of its national consciousness than in the previous century." Cambó wrote an ironical work thanking Primo de Rivera for his contribution to Catalanist consciousness.

The Franco regime's attempts to unify the country under Castillian were the most draconian. The regime severely repressed the Catalan language once the Falangists occupied Catalonia. It prohibited all publications of books and periodicals in Catalan. All Catalan language dailies were closed. The regime banned the use of Catalan on the radio. No signs, advertisements, or business cards in the Catalan language were permitted. Franco's nationalists banned the names of businesses and advertisements that referred to Catalonia, even if in Castillian. All Catalan names of plazas and other public places were banned.

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103 Ibid., 102-103.
104 Cited in Ibid., 101-103.
105 Benet, Catalunya sota el règim franquista, 256, 261, 265, 297.
Slogans demanded that everyone speak Castillian.\textsuperscript{107} "If you are Spanish, speak Spanish." "Speak the language of the Empire," the slogans exhorted. 
Falangistas admonished Catalans in public: "Speak Christian, Catalan dog!" This alluded to the anti-clerical attitudes of Catalan workers and words that sounded guttural in tone to Castillians. Catalan was prohibited in any kind of public discourse.\textsuperscript{108} "Civic declarations" were required to be made in Castillian. People had to use the Castillian equivalent of their Catalan names. Children were not allowed to be christened with Catalan names. Catalan was banned from religious services and mortuary notices. Catalan names were purged from all maps and replaced with Castillian names. Only Castillian was allowed to be used in theatrical or choral presentations.\textsuperscript{109} To eradicate Catalan culture on a different level, the franquista regime prohibited any use of the language or references to Catalonia's history in textbooks or schools.\textsuperscript{110} The regime purged the schools of Catalan teachers in mass dismissals, and replaced them with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{107}Ibid., 149, 153, 244.
\item \textsuperscript{108}Ibid., 184, 383.
\item \textsuperscript{109}Ibid., 376, 377, 379, 380, 382.
\item \textsuperscript{110}Ibid., 355.
\end{itemize}
Francoist loyalists from outside Catalonia. The Ministry of Education in Madrid assumed local administration of the schools. A new administration assumed control of the Autonomous University of Barcelona. The Spanish authorities closed the Institute of Catalan Studies, founded in 1907, and replaced it with the Spanish Institute of Mediterranean Studies.

Besides these attacks on Catalan "cultural institutions," Catalan "popular culture" was also under assault from Madrid. Among the seemingly innocuous aspects of the popular culture sardanes, a traditional dance, the pastorets, traditional nativity pageants, and the Jocs Florals, traditional poetry festivals, were banned by Madrid. And Madrid outlawed, removed, and destroyed symbols of Catalan national identity. These included the Catalan flag, the national hymn, statues and portraits of Catalan heroes, and the celebration of the national

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111 Benet, Catalunya sota el règim franquista, 328-329. An interesting area of research would be how these dismissed teachers responded. Perhaps they developed a politicized identity based in part on their economic interests.

112 Ibid., 359-360

113 Culture in this instance does not mean culture in its broad, anthropological sense, which encompasses a wide range of human behavior and attitudes. Rather it refers here to folklore, dance, music, symbols and other examples of culture.

114 Benet, Catalunya sota el règim franquista, 376, 386, 387.
holidays.\textsuperscript{115}

Madrid repressed Catalonia's culture and language with vengeance because the Catalan Generalitat had been loyal to the Second Republic in return for the Republic's recognition of Catalan autonomy. Also, Catalonia's social institutions, "... stronger than those of other regions ..." and the widely spoken language were fundamentally incompatible with Franco's brand of Spanish nationalism, which refused to recognize minority cultures.\textsuperscript{116} Significantly, the repression of Catalan culture alienated initial supporters of Franco. There were religious, middle-class Catalans, for example, who supported Franco's pro-clerical politics. When Franco launched his political assault on Catalan language and culture, however, they changed their minds about him.\textsuperscript{117}

INSTITUTIONS, SUBCULTURES, AND MOBILIZATION

How did Catalanians manage to preserve their culture and launch a massive ethno-nationalist movement in the face

\textsuperscript{115}Benet, Catalunya sota el règim franquista, 369, 387.

\textsuperscript{116}Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 30. For numerous examples of Falangist hatred of things catalan, especially the language, see Benet, Catalunya sota el règim franquista.

\textsuperscript{117}Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 58; Even refugees fleeing from Republican territory to Spanish Nationalist territory were persecuted by Francoist rebels during the occupation. See Benet, Catalunya sota el règim franquista, 149.
of Franco's violent effort to eradicate Catalan culture, language, and institutions? Part of the answer lies in the social and cultural institutions of Catalonia, which helped create a subculture of opposition. More effective than political parties, which had to function clandestinely under great danger, various groups and secondary associations, some legal and some illegal, provided an alternative. They were not blatantly anti-regime groups, but "... ostensibly social or cultural." Still, their actions had serious political implications under a regime which viewed such activities as subversive. Moreover, these groups were more accessible than clandestine parties. According to Johnston, the social and economic development of Catalonia (which enabled some Catalans to earn enough income and acquire technologies to enjoy leisure time), allowed this region to enjoy a tradition of "... civic, cultural, and recreational organizations . . ." that provided a foundation for opposition. Among these were "... Boy Scout and Girl Scout troops, excursionist clubs, glee


119Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 43.

120Ibid.
clubs, chorales, Catholic organizations, theater groups, literary groups, small orchestras, and dancing clubs.\footnote{\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., 44.} Small towns organized "local athenaeums" where people could read. There were 1,200 Catalan language periodicals published in 1936.\footnote{\textsuperscript{122}Ibid.}

The Catholic Church was able to provide cover for many of these groups. It was able to do this because of the ties between the Catholic Church and the Franco regime.\footnote{\textsuperscript{123}Hank Johnston and Josef Figa, "The Church and Political Opposition: Comparative Perspectives on Mobilization against Authoritarian Regimes," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 27 (1): (1988) 32-47.} The social, recreational, intellectual, and cultural activities of these groups seemed innocent but were Catalanist in theme. These "uniquely Catalan" activities included excursions in the Catalan Pyrenees, dancing the sardanes, and "... expressing cosmopolitanism in music, art, or theater ..."\footnote{\textsuperscript{124}Johnston contends that the musical societies, choral groups, cinema clubs and outing clubs which expressed this cosmopolitanism, were "... vehicles for oppositional sentiment."\footnote{\textsuperscript{125}Ibid.}}

Most choral groups and excursionist clubs, which had
been popular before the Civil War, were closed down by Madrid. The few remaining were highly regulated and had to purge themselves of references to Catalonia. Surviving choral groups were limited in the songs they were allowed to perform and when they could perform them. The Falangistas considered the excursionist groups anti-Spanish because they celebrated numerous aspects of Catalan heritage.\textsuperscript{126} Nationalists and anti-Francoists could meet safely when choral groups performed and the excursionist groups secretly celebrated Catalonia.\textsuperscript{127}

Intellectual groups resisted the assault on Catalan heritage by secretly teaching Catalan literature, history, economics and language. Teaching small groups in private homes and some private schools, the former members of Institute of Catalan Studies, the main group of this type, braved "extreme harassment" and the threat of detention or fines if caught teaching.\textsuperscript{128} Other intellectual and cultural groups were affiliated with the Institute, or were literature groups which illegally published poetry and literary reviews.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{126}Estanislau Torres, \textit{Excursionisme i Franquisme} (Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia Montserrat, 1979), 57.

\textsuperscript{127}Johnston, \textit{Tales of Nationalism}, 44-45.

\textsuperscript{128}Ibid., 45.

\textsuperscript{129}Ibid. 45-46.
The Church was allowed freedom of assembly under the Franco regime. This enabled the parishes to pursue nationalist activities. The Catholic schools became the settings for the development of an oppositional subculture. Priests fromMontserrat, the monastery of great national significance, would sneak in a Catalan sentence from time to time. Children sang songs ridiculing Spain. The Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts represented another example of how groups influenced children to adopt Catalanist attitudes. The Boy Scouts, for example, had formative experiences, such as fights with Falangist youths and Civil Guards breaking up their outings.

Secondary organizations and other institutional settings helped facilitate the development of an oppositional subculture. They not only provided opportunities for direct and indirect political activity, but socialized people in ways which affected how they mobilized, with whom, and in what kind of activities. Nationalism might not otherwise have become a basis for mobilization.

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130Johnston, Tales of Nationalism, 61.

131Ibid., 62.

132The author met a Catalan studying at Virginia Tech. In an informal conversation he described himself as a left-leaning, progressive nationalist. He says that there was no single event in his life which triggered his Catalanist feelings and he is not
VIOLENCE: A MINOR PART OF THE CATALANIST MOVEMENT

There was a violent separatist group called Front d’Alliberament Català (Catalonian Liberation Front; FAC) "...directed from the French Catalan province of Rousillon..." claimed responsibility for bombings in 1971 and 1972, including the destruction of a monument to the Falangists in Barcelona’s center. Said to have "no support," it apparently tried to emulate ETA. Two alleged militants were sentenced in 1972 to 30 and 20 years for bombings in Barcelona. The police claimed to have broken up the group by 1974 and FAC’s members were allegedly tortured.\(^{13}\)

What motivated the recourse to violence and the timing of that decision is uncertain. The Burgos trial of etarras in 1970 (discussed below) served as positive publicity for ETA and provoked demonstrations and appeals for clemency throughout the world, including Catalonia. If FAC was indeed trying to emulate ETA, then it is plausible that the Burgos trial and the events surrounding it had an impact on FAC’s founders. FAC was probably short-lived because of its politically involved, yet familial ties and the university may have played roles similar to those analyzed under the concept of oppositional subculture. He learned that German planes bombed his mother’s town. His leftism came from his years in a university.

\(^{13}\) Jones, "Catalan Question," 263; and Stephens, Linguistic Minorities, 628; "Jail for Catalanians," Times of London, September 27, 1972, 6c.
lack of support. Violence was insignificant to the Catalanist movement.

Some separatists took the recourse to violence again by forming the group Terra Lliure (Free Land) in the mid-1980s. The group is said to have links to ETA. An "... extreme right wing anti-separatist ..." group called Milicia Catalana (Catalan Militia) was established in 1986 to combat Terra Lliure.¹³⁴ Terra Lliure claimed its first victim in September 1987. The Generalitat was reportedly negotiating with this group by mid-1989. Other nationalist groups include Movimient de la Defensa de la Terra (MDT; Movement of the Defense of the Land) and Ejército Rojo Catalán de Liberación (ERCA; Catalan Red Army of Liberation).¹³⁵

Movimient de Defensa de la Terra and Terra Lliure have vociferously opposed construction of a dam to create a reservoir that would force the abandonment of several towns and the re-routing of a highway. Moreover, the area of the proposed dam is on a seismic fault, leading to fears that a tremor could lead to flooding. Whether the groups were responsible for the sabotage of some earth-moving machinery is unknown, but they have nevertheless militated against the

¹³⁴Paul Heywood, Spain's Next Five Years, 56.

¹³⁵Europa Year Book 1991, 2407; Paul Heywood, Spain's Next Five Years, 56.
Although making headlines, these groups appear to be minor.

CONCLUSION

Modernization and repression in Catalonia did not erode ethnic identity as a salient marker. Indeed, Catalans have asserted their ethnic identity, especially their language, which is central to it, to exclude those who do not acquire knowledge of the language. Moreover, not all migrants seem willing or able to assimilate. Those who do assimilate are giving up one ethnic, linguistic, or territorial identity for a Catalan identity. In either case, ethnic affinities persist in Catalonia. The case of Spanish Catalonia partially confirms and partially refutes the hypothesis that as societies modernize ascribed status, including ethnicity, is made obsolete and replaced by achieved status. For the natives, Catalan identity is ascribed, not achieved. This status helps them maintain high status jobs and excludes others from taking them. On the other hand, for migrants, there is the possibility of achieving the status of being Catalan by learning the language. In modernization theory, ethnicity is an ascribed status, but in the case of Catalonia, ethnic identity can be achieved.

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"Jesús Conte, "Un nuevo Riaño moviliza a siete pueblos catalanes," Cambio 16, March 13, 1989."
Some of the definitions offered by Catalan nationalists, however, such as the claim that one who works and lives in Catalonia is Catalan, suggests that when a state, or a region seeking greater autonomy or independence from a state, contains more than one ethnic, cultural or linguistic group, this state or region must at some point form a consciousness that transcends ethnic, cultural, and linguistic distinctions in order to gain broad based support. Moreover, many participants in the Catalanist movement did so as a tactic in the strategy to oppose Franco and to support democracy, liberties, and workers’ rights.

The evidence is strong in support of the hypothesis that repressive measures by the state to suppress an ethnic group’s autonomy or sense of distinction by revoking privileges, rights, liberties or whatever an ethnic group believes belongs to it can eventually provoke ethno-nationalist resistance. The abrogation of Catalan institutions and the repression of the language and culture led to animosities between Madrid and Catalonia which persisted and led to Catalan regionalist and nationalist movements. The state’s repression can raise issues that take priority over other issues. For example, Franco’s clerical, anti-communist attitudes were well received by religious, middle-class Catalans, but once Franco assaulted the Catalan language and culture, which were part of

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Catalans' daily lives, Franco lost these initial supporters. This suggests that ethno-nationalism cannot always be explained in terms of one's class. It can have an importance of its own, independent of class interests. Finally, social and cultural institution helped nurture a subculture that was crucial to the survival of Catalan culture and enabled the Catalonians to rebound from Franco's severe repression with a strong nationalist movement. Without these institutions, it is reasonable to speculate that Catalans would not have been able to act against the assault on their culture.
CHAPTER SIX
SPANISH BASQUES:

POLITICIZATION AND ETHNO-NATIONALIST MILITANCY

The Basque Country in Spain consists of three or four provinces, depending on how one wishes to define this territory. To nationalists, Navarra (Nabara) is part of the Basque Country, (Euskadi). Many Navarrese reject this inclusion of themselves into Basque nationalist conceptions, although there is some support for Basque nationalism in northern Navarra. Officially, Spain recognizes only three provinces as part of the Basque autonomous community: Vizcaya (Bizkaya), Guipúzcoa (Gipuzkoa), and Alava (Araba). Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa are on the coast of the Bay of Biscay. Alava and Navarra are inland and have no coastline. The Ebro River divides the Basque Country from the rest of Spain to the south and the Pyrenees Mountains and the Spanish-French border separate the Spanish Basques from three French Basque provinces, Labourd (Lapurdi) on the Bay of Biscay, Basse Navarre (Nabara), and Soule (Xuberoa or Zuberoa). The present border between France and Spain, almost unchanged since 1512, ran through the Basque region. The provinces of

This name, invented by the founder of Basque nationalism, Sabino de Arana y Goiri, was originally spelled, and often is still spelled, Euzkadi. Certain Basque nationalists have replaced the "z" with an "s" to symbolize the rejection of racism in Sabino de Arana's nationalist doctrines.
Labourd and Soule are on the French side. Navarra split into Navarra and Basse Navarre in 1530 when the king decided to withdraw from what had been part of Navarra on the northern side of the Pyrenees Mountains because of the difficulty in defending it. Since then, Basse Navarre has been a French province.

In an attempt to destroy Basque nationalism by dissolving Basque ethnicity Franco violently repressed Euskera in all spheres of life, including saying a simple word in Euskera; and he repressed symbols, games, dances, literature, and any other manifestations of cultural or national distinctiveness. Instead of dissolving Basque ethnicity, these actions politicized ethnicity by pushing a new generation of nationalist activists into militant and even violent activity against the state. The emergence and persistence of political violence in the Basque Country, by the group Euskadi eta Askatasuna (ETA; Basque Country and Liberty) against the Spanish state is one of the most significant issues in Basque nationalism.

**BASQUE IDENTITY**

Who is Basque has been a point of debate among nationalists. As the conceptualization of Basque identity has expanded, the bases for support and participation in nationalists movements have expanded. The concept of
"collective nobility" is a key element of Basque ethnic identity. Written about since 1053, Basques have frequently cited collective nobility to support claims of their unique status. Importantly, the Castillian regimes recognized Basque collective nobility because the Basques had resisted the Berbers and Moors, preventing peninsular conquest and limiting Moorish domination to the southern half of the peninsula. As original old Christians and non-conquered peoples, the Basque thought that they were free of the taint of Moorish and Jewish blood.

Greenwood calls collective nobility the "... moral core of the Basque sense of ethnic uniqueness ..." and "... the prime point of contention between the Basques and successive Spanish regimes in the endless negotiations over provincial autonomy and rights." Moreover, the concept of collective nobility (hidalquia colectiva) makes Basques unique among ethnic groups "... in conflict with the central government." Any Basque who could prove to have Basque parents from Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa or certain valleys in Navarra or Alava was "... automatically recognized as a


3 Greenwood, "Continuity in Change," 86.

4 Ibid.
noble by virtue of purity of blood" (limpieza de sangre). Greenwood argues that this was highly significant in a country that had been dominated by Moors for seven hundred years, had expelled the Jews, and subjected many to the inquisition. In the rest of Spain one had to prove nobility through exclusive genealogical research because proof of "purity of blood" was a criterion for positions in the government and Church. Those born in the Basque country, whether "... a butcher, shoemaker, charcoal burner, scribe, or soldier -- rich or poor ..." were automatically eligible for such upwardly mobile appointments.

For centuries Castillian regimes recognized and swore allegiance to Basque fueros, the codified, traditional, and customary law under which the Basque provinces ruled themselves. Basques consistently brought up the issue of collective nobility in support of their "legal and fiscal autonomy" whenever they had disputes with the Spanish state.

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 87.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
A Basque author, Bachiler Juan de Zaldibia, argued in 1564 that Basques were noble by virtue of birth and therefore the crown could only recognize their collective nobility, not confer it. This assertion was a response to the increasingly persistent efforts by the monarchy to centralize its authority and weaken Basque autonomy.\textsuperscript{10} In his work, de Zaldibia saw no incompatibility between being Basque and Spanish, and even considered Basques to be the best of all Spaniards because of their pure blood and other alleged virtues.\textsuperscript{11} The notion that Basques were born noble and were superior Spaniards was repeated in 1607 by Baltazar de Echave.\textsuperscript{12}

Two changes in the peninsula led to a significant reformulation of Basque identity during the eighteenth century. First, as the Spanish empire became stronger, the central government was less dependent on Basque militias to defend the frontier from invasion, and therefore less obligated to recognize or confer the \textit{fueros}. Their role as a front-line against invasion having diminished in importance, the Basques could no longer bargain as

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., 93.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 94.
effectively for respect for the *fueros.*

Second, the importance of nobility was beginning to decline in Spain and wealth alone was becoming sufficient to achieve social status and political power. Nevertheless, collective nobility, an integral part of Basque identity, was still an issue. Padre Manuel de Larramendi wrote a work in which he de-emphasized the alleged purity of Basque blood and military valor of the Basques as the basis for their nobility. Instead, he argued that collective nobility arose from the principles of equality of men, regardless of social status. Furthermore, Basques were different from other Spaniards, Larramendi argued, because their Christian values led them to believe that all men were equal. Larramendi made these assertions during a time when ideas of democracy and equality were gaining currency. Larramendi considered Basques to be different from Spaniards and Castillians the worst of all Spaniards.

The perception of collective nobility and the central government's recognition then nineteenth century rejection of it politicized Basque ethnicity. Basque ethnicity, so tied to regional autonomy, became the basis for ethno-

\[1\] Ibid., 96-97.

\[2\] Larramendi did not seem to apply this principle of equality to groups outside the Basque Country.

nationalist sentiment when Madrid began to suppress autonomy. The increasing centralization of the state, which demanded the curtailment of collective nobility, repression of institutions, and attacks on symbols, heightened Basque ethno-nationalist feelings.\textsuperscript{16}

Basque ethnic identity was not nationalist in character until the late nineteenth century. Sabino de Arana y Goiri and his brother Luis, the founders of modern Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) pioneered modern Basque nationalism. Sabino de Arana y Goiri, influenced by Catalan nationalism during his days as a student in Catalonia, developed an ideology that took the concept of Basque identity to a new level. Although his movement originated as a Vizcayan movement, he soon articulated a modern Basque nationalism that went beyond the Carlist vision of autonomy under a decentralized kingdom, or the demands for a restoration of the provincial \textit{fueros}, though that was part of his program. Arana dedicated himself to promoting a sense of common identity which would unite Basques throughout the Basque provinces of Spain and France under one banner and government.

The basis of this nationalism was a nineteenth century concept of race. Sabino de Arana y Goiri distinguished

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 102.
Vizcayan nationalism from Catalan nationalism, asserting that Catalans welcomed other Spaniards to learn Catalan and become Catalan. By contrast, Arana rejected outsiders and resented non-Vizcayans, writing that "... purity of race is, like language, one of the bases of the Vizcayan banner." He argued that the language can always be restored, but that racial purity (limpieza del sangre) could not be restored once lost.17 Arana derogatorily called in-migrants to the Basque Country maketos and chinos. During more recent waves of migration to the Basque Country, Basques have referred to migrants as coreanos, also intended to be derogatory.

Most Basques have probably not been influenced by the ideological debates among nationalist intellectuals. Significant events in the lives of individual Basques have led them to feel Basque. Memories of wars, repression, the abrogation of ancient rights, and other affronts can affect how people identify themselves. Robert Clark interviewed a veteran of the defense of Bilbao in 1937 against advancing forces. He claims that as he waited, listening to a recorded message of the president of the Basque autonomous government exhorting Basques to defend their nation, he felt

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Basque for the first time. Another event during the civil war that helped shape or reinforce Basque identity was the bombing of Guernica. Of particular consequence of this bombing may have been the fact that Guernica had been the site at which Spanish kings traditionally pledged to uphold the fueros.

ETA's ideology has modified Sabino de Arana's doctrine of race as an essential defining element of Basque identity, replacing the concept of race with the concept of ethnicity. That is, according to Jáuregui, ETA's intellectuals have replaced the biology and genetics with language and culture as basic to the Basque community. Early on, the new generation of activists continued in the earlier nationalist tradition and contended that the Basques were a distinct group (Pueblo Isla, literally "Island People"): Basques were no more similar to the French or Spaniards than to Javanese or Chinese; they were "... as much Spanish or French as could be the Norwegians or Russians." Moreover, ETA continued to see Basques as superior in culture.

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1Robert P. Clark, The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond (Reno, Nevada: The University of Nevada Press, 1979), 76.

1Greenwood, "Continuity in Change," 100, suggests this.

character, and idiosyncracies; as had its sabiniano predecessors. More recently, ETA has not based this claim on race. Jáuregui contends that despite its rejection of "biological racism," ETA "... established a kind of ethnocentric racism" as a defense against foreign elements of the Basque community. Language became the new criterion. Leading activists argued that to be Basque one had to know Euskera, and those who did not had a duty to learn it. As part of the tactic of developing closer ties with the in-migrants and recruiting them, an ETA activist wrote an open "Letter to a Korean" in the nationalist publication Zutik. The letter asked for forgiveness and promised that Basques would stop insulting the in-migrants with pejorative terms. If the immigrants came as friends and brothers, to work together to advance the Basque interest, then they were welcome. However, if they came as an "arm" of the alleged colonizers, then they would be considered the same as the capitalists who came to exploit the Basque Country.

The issue of who is Basque has played significantly in the effort to build a coalition in favor of Basque

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2Ibid., 134.

22Ibid., 134-35.


24Jáuregui, Ideología y estrategia, 183.
nationalism. ETA's decision to abandon the racial criteria from its ideology has helped it attract some in-migrants and people of in-migrant origin into the organization. Some have become celebrated martyrs for Basque nationalism. At least some of these martyrs never learned Euskera.\textsuperscript{25} Robert Clark compiled a sample in which 16.6 percent of the etarras sampled had no parents with Basque surnames and 28 percent and 12.1 percent of the etarras had only a father or mother, respectively, with a Basque surname. A report by the Guardia Civil claims that ETA has been recruiting more "non-Basques."\textsuperscript{26}

The Spanish state failed to dissolve Basque ethnic identity. Rather, actions by Madrid reinforced and politicized Basque ethnic identity and affected how Basques defined it. Anecdotal evidence even suggests that some


\textsuperscript{26}Robert P. Clark, Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980 (The University of Wisconsin, 1984), 147-148. These results should be taken with caution, because methods of the Guardia Civil study were not discussed, and Clark's sample does not appear to be random. Thus its statistical significance is limited. Moreover, Clark placed some etarras into the sample of "Father only" or "Neither parent" because he did not have information on the mother's surname. Regardless, that there are any in-migrants in ETA, including important leaders, is remarkable, given the original anti-in-migrant posture taken by early Basque nationalists, and the attitudes of many Basques today toward in-migrants.
Basques felt Basque only after they suffered at the hands of Spanish state.

ECONOMY AND CLASS IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY

The Basque Country in Spain is the site of iron and coal mining and heavy industries such as ship building and metallurgy. It is also the home of major banks. The rapid industrialization of the region has yielded growth, but also overcrowding, pollution, a strain on social services, product and job obsolescence, a decline in small scale farming, and an unstable economy which expands and contracts periodically with the rise and fall of prices on the international market on which the Basque County greatly depends? Rapid industrialization and later economic decline have had a profound impact on Basque nationalism.

The abrogation of the fueros after the last Carlist war created conditions which led Basques to adopt and embrace a nationalist cause. The higher prices of imports and the rapid industrialization made possible in part by the abrogation of the fueros fractured Basque society by luring youths away from the farm, by luring workers from outside the region to come and seek jobs, and by making certain products, technologies, and jobs obsolete. In this context,

\[\text{Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, 18-24.}\]
liberal professionals such as Luis Arana and Sabino de Arana, who had come from a Carlist background, became nationalists. They and their contemporaries sought to legitimize their nationalism on the basis of primordial traits such as "race." Their resentment of the in-migrants reinforced this view. The nationalist leaders seemed to be responding to the decline of their families' fortunes and status in the face of competition from an ascendant oligarchy. They were also reacting to the strength of socialist labor unions. Some nationalists lamented the effects of industrialization and discussed alternative visions of the future. Others, however, cited industrialization as evidence of Basque superiority.

Four socio-economic groupings emerged in the Basque Country. These were the peasants and farmers, the capitalist oligarchy, the petite bourgeoisie and lower middle classes, and the labor movement. According to Robert Clark the upper bourgeoisie exploited the fuerros issue ". . . among the lower classes, particularly as regards taxation and military service outside their community . . ." Nevertheless, this class favored neither separatism or autonomy. They maintained representatives

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2Clark, The Basques, 36.

2Ibid., 37.
in Madrid and exploited the threat of Carlist revolt to pressure the monarchy. Basque businessmen "... learned to use foreign credit, joint-stock financing, and industrial banking, and were closely associated with Madrid and London." Their "frame of reference" was Spanish and global. The Basque upper bourgeoisie (ship builders, bankers, metallurgical industrialists and others) considered their interests best served by supporting the Spanish state. They saw no advantages in gaining greater political autonomy, much less independence. The Spanish state allowed them to keep the conciertos económicos, provided high tariffs, and subsidized industries, especially the ship building industry. Although they had "little interest" in nationalism, they zealously defended the conciertos económicos in order to preserve autonomy. Fiscal autonomy was their main concern. For example, Basque businessmen in 1916 joined their Catalan counterparts to defeat an attempt to impose a "modest" excess profits tax on Spanish manufacturing and exports. The industrialists favored

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^xVicenç Vives, An Economic History of Spain, 691, cited in Payne, Basque Nationalism, 78.

^2Payne, Basque Nationalism, 78.

^3Ibid., 103.

^4Ibid., 94.
preserving "regional freedoms" in order to prevent the Spanish central government from intervening in labor disputes in a way that might favor labor.\textsuperscript{35} During a labor dispute in late nineteenth century the Spanish government arbitrated the dispute and reached a settlement. Once Spanish troops who had been enforcing the agreement left, however, the employers reneged and the workers were faced with same conditions over which they had struck.\textsuperscript{36}

Some scholars have argued that businessmen supported Basque nationalism to divide the working-class. In any case, even if they manipulated or exploited perceptions of differences between Basque and non-Basque nationalists, most large-scale capitalists of the Basque Country favored nothing beyond fiscal autonomy and opposed national independence. There were exceptions, such as Ramón de la Sota, a ship-builder. He was not an extreme nationalist, but favored greater autonomy. Beltza speculates that Ramón de la Sota may have parted with other industrialists and allied with Sabino de Arana because he was one of the industrialists whose industries were not dependent on Spanish tariffs. De la Sota is said to have wanted a liberal, autonomous region that would be more like other

\textsuperscript{3} Clark, \textit{The Basques}, 37.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 39.
Western European countries."

During the time of rapid industrialization after the Second Carlist War some of the juantxos ("little lords") who had been tied to the center began to decline as they were out-competed by the smaller liberal oligarchy's large firms which were supported by state intervention and British investment. The upper classes divided into two groups, according to Clark. One consisted of the industrial and financial giants discussed above. The second was the "lesser bourgeoisie, who resented the rising industrialists backed by the Spanish government and British capital. Because of the decline of this segment of the upper classes, these businessmen's sons took to the professions. They filled the roles needed for managing the administrative and informational requirements of industrial society. "They were lawyers and doctors, journalists and teachers, artists, composers, and writers, the providers of services such as transportation, communication, design, and planning." Sabino de Arana y Goiri and his brother Luis, the founders

\(^3\)Beltza (pseud.), _Nacionalismo vasco y clases sociales_ (San Sebastián Editorial Txertoa, 1976) 100-103, n. 9, especially 101. He also seems to have wanted to bring "patronos," technicians, and workers under a nationalist tent (Ibid., 103, n. 9).

\(^3\)Clark, _The Basques_, 36.

\(^3\)Ibid., 38; García Venero, _Historia del nacionalismo vasco_ (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1969), 239-251; and Beltza, _Nacionalismo vasco y clases sociales_, Chapter 4.
of modern Partido Nacionalista Vasco, were the sons and
grandsons of ship builders who "... had begun to
experience hard times by the period of the Second Carlist
War." Sabino de Arana de Gcoiri had flirted with law but
never completed a degree. He was a journalist. Sabino's
brother Luis had received his training in architecture.
Such professions were "apparently typical" of the early
nationalists. Beltza calls these the liberal
professions. Although the first Basque nationalist
leaders were professionals, their followers were largely
lower-middle class, who were suffering from the high
tariffs.

After the Second Carlist War a wave of migrants came
from outside the Basque Country to work in the iron mines
and factories for low paying jobs. The Spanish Socialist
Party, founded in 1879, and trade union UGT (Unión General
de Trabajadores) meaning General Union of Workers), founded
in 1882, grew in Bilbao. There, in 1890, iron and steel
workers struck for a reduction in the work day to ten hours,
the elimination of the company-owned stores and barracks,
and better compensation for job-related injuries. When the
strike turned violent, troops, acting under the authority of

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*Clark, The Basques, 38.

*Ibid.
martial law, put down the strike and mediated the dispute. After the troops withdrew, however, the owners rejected the settlement that had been achieved. In 1903, the workers struck for the same benefits that they had demanded in 1890.\footnote{Clark, The Basques, 39; García Venero, Historia del nacionalismo vasco, 259-262; and Carr, Spain 1808-1939, 447-449.}

The **Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos**, founded in 1911, attracted native, ethnically Basque workers. They were mainly white-collar workers. According to Beltza the union organized skilled workers, small shop keepers, and peasants. It made no attempt to organize the workers in heavy industry such as ship building and steel. Later the SOV was renamed the ELA-STV (Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna - Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos.

During the period before and during the Civil War, Basque nationalists, manifested in such groups as the PNV, were generally anti-socialist, and perceived socialism as an immoral Spanish import and regarded the in-migrant workers as enemies of the Basque nation. Even the more left-leaning Acción Nacionalista Vasca (ANV) wanted native Basque workers to be favored in hiring over in-migrant workers and their children. Because most Basque nationalists were anti-socialist and confessional, some native Basque workers supported socialists instead of Basque nationalists. Other
native Basques chose their ethnicity as their form of solidarity. They may have felt and been receptive to nationalists claims that the in-migrant workers were to blame for low wages and bad living conditions. Thus, if perceived economic interests were in any way involved in native Basque workers' decisions to align themselves with the nationalists, they apparently thought that their interests were best served by aligning themselves with Basques nationalists instead of workers. The native Basque workers were often part-time peasants and highly skilled. Instead of joining the Socialist UGT, the native Basques joined the SOV (Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos), later called STV-ELA. The "maketo" workers were identified with the Spanish Socialists, Anarchists, and Communists and distrusted the Basque nationalists in the PNV, who resented the presence of the "maketos."

During World War I steel production increased because of the demand for the steel to make weapons. After World War I the demand for Basque iron and steel decreased. Exports of ore and metal products declined, and forty percent of miners in Bilbao were laid-off. Later in the 1920s the economy boomed again.

Before the mid-1920s nearly all baserria, farmsteads,

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"Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, 23.

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in the mountains merely provided for family consumption. They produced most of what they used or consumed. A "family stem" of four to six members lived on the baserría. Markets available to the farmstead were very few. The production was labor intensive and at the level of subsistence, because they could not afford machinery and grew a diversity of crops. Before 1925 nearly all farmers in the Cantabrian Mountains had to work with "hand tools and rudimentary equipment." The farmers had to do everything. They lacked electricity, plumbing, or motorized equipment. Contact within this society was limited almost exclusively to the baserría themselves.

The farmers suffered from the tariffs, taxes, and effects of rapid industrialization. Though not expressed as a "defense of rural interests," the nationalists did have a ruralist ideology. The farmers and the countryside were seen as emblematic of a pre-industrial life. The countryside was seen as a "counter-position" to the negative cultural, economic, and social effects of conflicts in the industrial and mining zones. Rural life was romanticized or mythologized. According to Antonio Elorza, the small farmer

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"Ibid., 39.

"Ibid., 38-39.

"Ibid.
was seen as an "archetype" who was "... confronting the loss of national qualities" as a result of urbanization.\footnote{Antonio Elorza, Ideologías del nacionalismo vasco (San Sebastián: Editorial Luis Haranburu, 1978) 174-75.}

The rural people favored the traditionalist-Basque nationalist alliance during the 1931 elections "without reservations."\footnote{Elorza, Ideologías, 203.} Industrialization was much more rapid in Vizcaya than in Guipúzcoa, where industrialization was "softer." Thus, the ruralist ideology was not as strong there.\footnote{Jáuregui, Ideología y Estrategia, 42.} Also, many Guipuzcoans worked in factories and their farms. They slept in their caseríos (farm houses) and kept their language, folklore, and culture.\footnote{Beltza, Del carlismo al nacionalismo burgés (San Sebastián: Editorial Txertoa, 1978), 171, cited in Jáuregui, Ideología y Estrategia, 42.}

The conservative ruralism of the PNV constituted a rejection of industrialization, socialism, Marxism, and social democracy of the workers in these industrialized zones.\footnote{Jáuregui, Ideología y estrategia, 43.} The PNV’s mythological rhetoric of a Basque rural "paradise lost" fell on deaf ears in the poor rural zones, because farming was a hard life and being Basque and not knowing Spanish were disadvantageous. By the 1920s, however, the PNV began to attract the baserritarak (farmers) by offering concrete
programs to help the farmers purchase their farmsteads. PNV activists establishing "... mutual insurance schemes, consumer cooperatives..." and emphasizing the need for increased expenditures on roads and schools.\(^5\)

During the next phase of industrialization, after World War II, the Franco regime supported investment in the Basque Country but did not provide funds to address housing problems, pollution, psychosis, education, and other needs and ills produced by industrialization and the increase in population due to migration from outside the region.\(^6\) Moreover, migration to the cities, industrialization in the small towns, and roads which brought in new competition disrupted rural life. Rapid industrialization and economic development policies pursued by the central government in Madrid contributed to the decline of traditional agriculture in the Basque Country. Mechanization and urbanization came to the rural areas where the baserris were situated during the Franco years. New highways enabled farmers to the south to transport their goods and compete with the mountain farmers.

Another blow to the farmers during the Franco regime was the use of zoning laws that curbed agricultural activity

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\(^6\)Clark, *The Basques*, Chapter Nine.
and promoted industrialization. Family farms in the mountains and coastal hills began to disappear. In the mountain village of Murelaga there were 131 farmsteads in 1950 and 121 in 1966. In the area around coastal Fuenterrabia, 256 inhabited farmsteads existed in 1920 and only 168 existed in 1969. In the mountain village of Echalar the number of farms dropped from 114 in 1955 to 95 in 1966. From 1962 until 1972 the number of farmsteads in the mountain region of Itziar-Deba dropped from 307 to 220 respectively.

The migration of the young to the cities manifests a rejection of the parents' culture and way of life of the parents who identify so "intimately" with the farm. The issues involved in the decline of traditional small-scale agriculture are not merely economic, but cultural. Some Basques have been living and working on a farm that has been in the family for 200 years. The farm is so intertwined with a family's identity that it is often named for the farm, not their surnames.

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5Zirakzhadeh, A Rebellious People, 42.

5Cited in Zirakzhadeh, A Rebellious People, 39.


5Ibid., 10.
thus both economically and psychologically devastating for the farmer. This probably helps explain why Basque nationalist groups were more popular than other radical groups. With in this context, farmers protested during the 1950s against the decline of their way of life. Demonstrators and jeering onlookers clashed.

A strike in 1951 which involved the working-class and initiated the youth had significant ramifications for Basque nationalism. The UGT joined with the STV (formerly SOV) and nationalists activists of the PNV and others in mobilizing 250,000 workers. In Navarra, 35,000 workers joined in the strike, to the surprise of nationalists. Housewives marched to protest food prices. Police used armed force against the strike.\(^6\) There seems to be some to be some truth in Clark's statement that Basque nationalism had demonstrated an ability to transcend class divisions,\(^6\) in the sense that different classes participated in a strike in which Basque nationalist and non-nationalist groups cooperated. It appears, however given the attitudes of the Spanish-oriented workers' movements toward nationalism and the Basque-in-migrant cleavage, that the in-migrant workers and workers of in-migrant origin were simply protesting economic

\(^6\)Clark, The Basques, 105.

\(^6\)Ibid., 106.
conditions and Franco. On the other hand, as discussed below, some in-migrants and those of in-migrant origin have tried to gain acceptance in the Basque community by supporting nationalism. Basque nationalism had not taken a more tolerant stance at this point, however.\textsuperscript{60} It may make more sense to say that some non-Basque workers were trying to gain acceptance in the community and protesting Franco and economic conditions.

Farmers were marching in the early 1970s against the competition from farmers in the south against the baserria created by the opening of new highways that enabled the southern farmers to transport goods for sale in the Basque country. The most outspoken protesters were arrested.\textsuperscript{61} The church organized youth groups such as Baserri Gaztedi to counter the deteriorating conditions of farmers through literacy campaigns, educating young farmers in new farming techniques, and encouraging the formation of cooperatives. Young members of church sponsored groups such as Herri Gaztedi were influenced by literature condemning capitalism and advocating socialism. After the groups dissolved, some of the youths joined such groups as the Maoist ORT, the

\textsuperscript{60} A PNV official wrote pejoratively about "Korean" (non-Basque) workers after World War II.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
Trotskyist LKI, and ETA.62

The backgrounds of members of an ETA cell in the small town of Itziar is illustrative of the relationship between rural decline and militant nationalism in the Basque country. Of the four ETA members from Itziar studied by Joseba Zulaika, one of them had to move to a new house because the old one was demolished for the construction of a new highway. Another had to move because the land was sold for the construction of an apartment complex. Another lost a brother to suicide because he, like many others, could not find a wife.63 These facts are evidence of the motives that led many youths to join ETA. Robert Clark notes that a certain region of Guipúzcoa, called Goierri, is the principal area of ETA recruitment and activity because of the relatively high percentage of Euskera-speakers and because of the decline of the farmsteads. Besides the disruption of the baserria communities, Euskera is widely spoken there.64 ETA lamented and wanted to resist the disappearance of "traditional values" due to the


63Ibid., 118 and 121.

proletarianization of the "baserritarras," or farmsteaders.⁶⁶

The mid-1970s, was marked by an oil crisis. During the oil crisis, steel making and naval construction suffered a depression. The historically unstable heavy industry sector experienced a slump beginning in the mid-1970s.⁶⁷ Fishermen rarely, if ever, struck, until the 1970s when strikes erupted in several villages.⁶⁸ Fishermen participated in anti-government demonstrations and burned trucks in protest against the government's unwillingness to take steps to alleviate the plight of the fishermen and others in the industry brought about because of rising oil prices, and the EEC's exclusion of Basque fishing boats from waters traditionally navigated by these fishermen.⁶⁹ The rising oil prices led to rising fuel costs for the boats, and the purchase of government subsidized fishing boats that were fuel-inefficient aggravated this problem. The European Economic Community extended its territorial waters in places where the Basques had fished. The navies of countries belonging to the EEC fired upon boats that raided these

⁶⁶Jose Mari Garmendia, Historia de ETA, vol. 2 (L. Haranburu - Editor, 1979), 72.

⁶⁷Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, 24.

⁶⁸Ibid., 35.

⁶⁹Ibid., 36-7.
waters.

The Spanish government refused to regulate the price of fuel, or blockade Gibraltar, or ban the importation of EEC fish, as the fishermen demanded. The fishermen circulated and signed petitions and burned trucks transporting produce from France and other EEC member countries. "These marches, petitions, traffic blockades, and truck burnings, ". . . which continued into the 1980s failed to induce the government to acquiesce. One journalist contended that villagers were beginning to suffer ", . . . authentic psychoses."³⁰

Because of the decline in sales, there have been many bankruptcies, cutbacks in production and high unemployment. By the early 1980s almost twenty-five percent of all coastal workers were officially unemployed.¹ Among the explanations for this are that raw materials are no longer abundant, or in demand, the market has poor links to rest of Spain, and that prices are fluctuating.⁷²

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¹Ibid., 37.
²Cited in Ibid., 38.
³Ibid.
⁴Ibid., 23-4.
### TABLE 6.1. BASQUE BANKRUPTCIES, 1974-80.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Registered Bankruptcies</th>
<th>Workers Affected</th>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>7,369</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>26,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>21,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2,169</td>
<td>50,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3,553</td>
<td>106,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,922</td>
<td>127,792</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 6.2. ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF THE BASQUE GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT AND OF SPAIN’S GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1975-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate, Basque Gross Regional Product (%)</th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate, Spain’s Gross National Product (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In summary, different classes supported nationalism or regionalism for different reasons. The farmers and some urban liberals wanted lower tariffs and favored the old *fueros* which had enabled the Basques to set customs at the Ebro River and thus buy imports cheaply. Industrialists who supported the high tariffs at the ports, which protected their industries, supported moderate nationalists and regionalist in order to gain higher tariffs. Sabino and Luis Arana and their followers lamented the mass migration of workers from outside the Basque provinces while the industrialists wanted these workers to come to fill their labor shortages. Some native Basque workers supported the nationalists against "maketo" workers from outside the region, whom they believed to be inferior, and responsible for low wages and the loss of jobs to Basques. Some of the in-migrant workers and their children favored Basque nationalism because they perceived that some nationalists were accepting them and addressing their class interests. Others favored nationalist groups because they thought that those same immigrant workers were a threat to Basque society.
and culture. Contrary to modernization theory, ethnicity did not dissolve; it became more political and became the basis for Basque nationalism. Still, economic interests were part of the basis for ethnic solidarity.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS

Social and cultural institutions were critical to the survival and growth of nationalist movements in the Basque Country. They provided opportunities for political acts of cultural preservation and renovation; resources, such as recruitment; communication networks; models which organizations could follow. These institutions enabled activists to make the move from peripheral protest against the central government's policies to a nationalist movement. They also enabled activists to sustain the movement when it was repressed. On the other hand, some aspects of certain institutions led to divisions in nationalist organizations and movements and contributed to the inability of Basque nationalism to have broad base. Some of these institutions were established by activists. Others were already in existence and were used by activists.

The Catholic Church may have played the most important role of any institution in the development, survival, and growth of Basque nationalism. The clergy was respected and thus had an impact on the politics of its congregation. It
also provided refuge for activists, meeting places that were relatively immune to state scrutiny, and other resources. The church won supporters for the early Basque nationalists because they were pro-clerical. The Church’s influence prevented aconfessional nationalists movements from gaining support. The main force of the Basque nationalist movement was the pro-nationalist clergy."

During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, which launched a campaign of repression against regionalism, mountain-climbing societies, called mendigoitzales, provided Basque nationalist activists a haven for their movement and kept nationalist resistance alive. These clubs, originally founded either in 1904 or in 1908, had long existed for sporting purposes. They became political in nature during the dictatorship. In the mountains club-members could discuss politics without fear of police surveillance. The mendigoitzales began to "... resemble paramilitary groups; they would become the core of

"Payne, Basque Nationalism, 109.

"Clark, The Basques, 50-51 & 154; Clark, Basque Insurgents, 209; Payne, Basque Nationalism, 104-5.

"Zulaika, Basque Violence,

"Payne, Basque Nationalism, 105.

"Clark, The Basques, 51.
mountain guerilla forces in the years ahead." Beginning in 1921, radical nationalists "infiltrated" the mountain-climbing societies and took them in a more political direction. These societies, contends Clark, were "... practically the only nationalist groups ..." able to "... survive and grow ..." during the period of repression by Primo de Rivera. Future nationalists would learn from the experience of the mendigoitzales under Primo de Rivera. This helped the PNV survive more successfully than the more moderate Comunión Nacionalista Vasco during the period of clandestine activity. The mountain climbing groups became "bastions of orthodox, radical nationalism." In 1933 some members of the mountaineering association formed an ideologically orthodox journal called Jagi (Arise) in response PNV's shift from demanding independence to settling for autonomy. By 1935 the uncompromising federation of mountaineers practically broke

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7 Ibid., 51.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 51.
8a Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, 12. This may have put the CNV in a weaker position after the repression, if indeed the CNV really did reunite with the PNV on the PNV's terms, as Sullivan contends.
8b Ibid., 11. See also Zulaika, Basque Violence, 15.
8c Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism, 16.
away from the FNV, because of the PNV's new moderation. The organizational structure of these nationalist mendigoitzales provided a model for ETA's structure of small cells called comandos. Small cells were important after the Civil War and especially after World War II, Clark contends, to the maintenance of underground resistance to Franco. After 1952, Ekin (To Act), a group of students that was to become ETA in 1959, adopted a five-person cell structure. Many ETA members are said to be recruited among the mountaineers. ETA activists tried at Burgos note the importance of mountain-climbing excursions in their activism. Like their predecessors, etarras can find safety in the mountains.

The Church provided the only safe-haven for Basque cultural practices, indeed, "... one's self identity and

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6 The function of mendigoitzales after World War II is illustrated by the example of a PNV activist interviewed by Robert P. Clark (The Basques, 117-18). In 1948, on one of the romerias (retreats) in the mountains taken by the mendigoitzales to discuss political activities, PNV activist friends recruited the activist, who was then 17, to take part in marginal political activities.

Clark, Basque Insurgents, 209 and 311, n. 3. Clark bases this account on "... several contemporary news reports, including ..." "Así es la organización de ETA(m) y sus dirigentes," Deia, May 5, 1981; "La gran redada," Cambio 16, no. 370 (January 7, 1979); and "Todos Contra ETA," Cambio 16, no. 487 (March 30, 1981).

6 For a fascinating discussion of the mountaineers and the significance of mountains in Basque culture see Joseba Zulaika, Basque Violence especially, pp. 256-259.
cultural pride . . . " during Franco's regime." The lower clergy helped sustain Basque nationalism in this way. They were often advocates of human rights. Many priests were active in helping farmers and were involved with ETA. They often sponsored the ikastolas, the schools which taught Euskera. Labor unrest, though not as severe as in other areas, occurred in the Cantabrian Mountains. Social institutions played an important role in this. The parish became an important setting for the shaping of labor protests because the clergy would speak about social issues there. The clergy established seminaries in which youths read Marxist literature.

Youth gangs called cuadrillas were another social institution which had an impact on Basque nationalism. Clark has called the cuadrilla "[o]ne of the most important social institutions in small Basque villages . . . ". These close-knit groups of five to ten friends often developed similar outlooks. They also served as communication networks which facilitated the contact,

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8Zulaika, Basque Violence, 78.
8Sullivan, ETA, 33.
8Ibid.
8Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, 147.
8Clark, Basque Insurgents, 162.
recruitment and training of youths into political organizations. If the cuadrillas were made up of members from one class, they might develop animosities toward members of other classes in rival youth gangs. If, on the other hand, people from the same cuadrillas were from different class backgrounds, then they would become socialized into living harmoniously with people from other classes. These groups were active in the mid-size mountain towns and sometimes, during Franco's rule tried to defend their perceived turf from police who wanted to control residents' behavior. Clark reports that sometimes members of cuadrillas engaged in such acts as throwing stones at a passing car of Civil Guards.

Young people's membership in cuadrillas affected their decisions on which organizations to join. They would tend to follow the "dominant" member of the group. Many young people, for example, in deciding whether to join the PNV or ETA did so on the basis of which organization their friends were going to join, rather than on an ideological basis.

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9Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, 27.
9Ibid., 27.
9Ibid., 27-8.
9Clark, Basque Insurgents, 162.
9Sullivan, ETA, 33, from an interview with Mario Onaindia.
The cuadrillas often seemed indistinguishable from ETA groups, according to Sullivan, and ETA cells were "... not infrequently based on cuadrillas." On the one hand, it seems that these youth gangs, or cliques, provided nationalists opportunities and advantages. On the other hand, as Sullivan contends, the loyalty to friends made political consensus nearly "impossible." An activist who commanded the respect of his friends would lead them into forming a splinter group. Thus, the formation of a larger group was precluded. Contacts with friends and neighbors seemed to serve as an institutional setting. Etarras could depend on their friends, family, and neighbors in their rural communities to hide them. The PCE, in contrast, was socially isolated and ostracized by these communities.

Zirakzadeh argues that "... three sets of Basque institutions that engaged in local political struggle ... indirectly affected the emergence and evolution of ETA between 1960 and 1980." "They are (1) social protest movements in non-urban areas that appeared in the 1970s, (2) the long-standing Basque labor movement, and (3) the urban-

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97Ibid.

98Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, 149.

99Sullivan, ETA, 33.
neighborhood association movement. By providing resources such as recruits and communications networks, by inspiring a "socialist" vision, and/or by encouraging etarras to believe that the "times were ripe" for a revolution, these institutions contributed to ETA.

Without the social and cultural institutions such as the Church, the mendigoitzales, and the cuadrillas the survival of Basque nationalism would have been more difficult to achieve. Without the presence of labor and other movements, ETA would not have been influenced to try a revolutionary strategy. Thus social and cultural institutions were critical for the survival and direction of Basque nationalism.

Basque nationalism was able to survive in part because of the private and familial efforts to preserve the Basque language and culture. Families came together, speaking Euskera, celebrating nationalist festivals, internalizing nationalist sentiment and preserving the memory of their past autonomy in the privacy of their homes, thereby socializing a new generation of political activists. The church, clubs, dance troupes, and other organizations

100Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People, 34.
101Ibid.
102Sullivan, ETA, 22 n. 77, interview with Mario Onaindía; and Clark, The Basques, 129.
and institutions played an important role in influencing subsequent generations of activists.

Sabino Arana and the nationalists in the PNV who were influenced by him believed that cultural activities were directly political acts.\textsuperscript{103} Arana believed that during times of repression, when open political activity was difficult, nationalists could quietly resist their oppressors by speaking Euskera, celebrating Basque art and literature, and acting in other ways to preserve their heritage.\textsuperscript{104} The Basques demonstrated a strong cultural "resilience"\textsuperscript{105} and "insularity"\textsuperscript{106} which enabled them to preserve their culture. Under Franco's regime, speaking Euskera, celebrating Basque national holidays, or dancing a Basque dance were deemed subversive and punishable by law. Therefore, these simple acts were important in preserving the culture and socializing a young generation of Basques to become politically nationalist.

\textbf{LANGUAGE AND CULTURE}

Basque identity has been shaped and politicized by

\textsuperscript{103}Sullivan, ETA, 31.

\textsuperscript{104}Clark, The Basques, 47-50.

\textsuperscript{105}Sullivan, ETA, 22.

\textsuperscript{106}Clark, The Basques, 128.
state policy. For most ethnic, native Basques living and working in the Basque Country is not enough to be Basque. Ethnic, as opposed to territorial or national, identity is still a major part of Basque identity. Language and culture have become the rally points for the nationalists.

The Basque language, Euskera, a written language by the fourteenth century, was not widely written until the nineteenth century. Thus Castillian easily became the dominant language of the Basque Country. Still, for over a century the native language of the Basque Country has been a key issue of Basque nationalism. Basques have debated the importance of the language to their identity. To many Basques, especially rural Basques, Euskera was and is a central defining element of their ethnicity and key marker of differentiation from non-Basques. In the past, among early nationalists, the language was merely a way of excluding non-Basques from Basque society and thereby preventing them from assimilating. However, many Basques nationalists and regionalists in the past and today consider themselves Basque even though they do not speak Euskera. There were four factors contributing to the decline in the use of Euskera during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, all having to do with social and economic "modernization" and state policy. First, to achieve upward mobility, Basques needed to know Castillian. In order to
find urban employment and upwardly mobile opportunities rural/urban migrants had to learn Castillian. Basques who joined the military and civil service had to know Castillian. Similarly, in order to achieve social status and mobility Basques had to learn Castillian. Euskera was seen as the backward language of the countryside, while Spanish was seen as the cosmopolitan, sophisticated, modern language. Basque middle-classes discouraged their children from speaking Euskera.\textsuperscript{107} Second, industrialization attracted an influx of Spanish speaking migrants in search of jobs. This reduced the percentage of Euskera speakers in the Basque provinces. Third, the central government/Spanish state pursued policies which accelerated industrialization, which, in turn, accelerated the decline of Euskera for the reasons discussed above. Fourth, the central government in Madrid enacted policies which spread Castillian and reduced the use of Euskera, such as the establishment of schools which taught Castillian exclusively, and the prohibition of the use of Euskera.

García Venero argues that during the 19th century Madrid did not try to repress the language, and even decreed that Basque was a legitimate regional language:\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{107}Clark, \textit{The Basques}, 134.

\textsuperscript{108}García Venero, \textit{Nacionalismo vasco}, 435-436.
Nevertheless, the Spanish government adopted a Public Education Law in 1856 which proclaimed that all teachers in all regions would be appointed by the Ministry of Education in Madrid and, despite Basque objections, that teachers would not be required to know or teach regional languages.\textsuperscript{109} Although the Basque provincial governments were allowed to establish programs of study in Euskera, they were unable to appoint teachers who would be sure to implement such a policy because the central government in Madrid appointed teachers. Whether acting on official policy or not, the Madrid appointed teachers "systematically" discouraged Basque children from using Euskera in the class-room.\textsuperscript{110}

After the last Carlist War ended in 1876, industrialization took off. This led to increasing numbers of non-Basques who migrated to the Basque Country in search of jobs, especially in Vizcaya. This led to a decrease in the percentage of inhabitants of the Basque Country who spoke Euskera.

In response to the decline in Euskera, the Basque nationalist Arana dedicated himself to reviving and codifying Euskera because he thought that the language could

\textsuperscript{109}Linz, "Early State-Building," 76.

\textsuperscript{110}Clark, The Basques, 135.
be used by Basques to distinguish and separate themselves from the in-migrants from the rest of Spain. Still, he did not consider Euskera to be as important as race and behavior in defining Basque identity. If Euskera disappeared, Basques could learn a new language. Euskera was more functional than essential. He considered the idea of in-migrants learning Euskera as an abhorrent threat to the Basque "race." He even suggested that if the "maketos" were to learn Euskera, the Basques would have to learn another language to prevent the non-Basques from assimilating.¹¹¹ Arana advised Basques to learn and preserve the language as a form of resistance when repression made open political activity difficult or unsafe.

The use of Euskera increased from the late 1800s until the period of the Second Republic (1931-1939).¹¹² Literary journals and periodicals were published by organizations dedicated to the revival of Basque language and culture. Such organizations included the Academy of the Basque Language (Eusko Ikaskuntza) of San Sebastián and Euskalzaleen Biltzarra of Bayonne, France, dedicated to the


¹¹²Franco's troops occupied Bilbao by 1937 and defeated the Republic throughout Spain by 1939.
preservation of Basque culture.\textsuperscript{113} There were, according to one estimate, some forty periodicals, including newspapers and magazines, by the 1930s.\textsuperscript{114} Euskera seemed to be adapting to modern society, as evidenced by its use in discussing art, science, and literature. The number of Basques (in Spain and France) who spoke Euskera rose from 400,000 to 570,000 between 1931 and 1934. According to Clark this meant that about half of the population spoke Euskera.\textsuperscript{115}

The severest repression of the Basque language and culture began under Franco. Franco thought that by eradicating linguistic and cultural distinctions, he could destroy the movements for autonomy and independence that existed in the Basque Country and elsewhere. Robert Clark has divided the history of Franco's policies toward Basque language and culture into three periods: 1937 to the mid-1950s, the harshest period, beginning with the occupation of Bilbao; the mid-1950s to Franco's death in 1975; and since 1975 when the regime began to liberalize its policies toward the language and culture.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{113} Clark, \textit{The Basques}, 135-6.

\textsuperscript{114} Beltza (pseud.), \textit{El nacionalismo vasco: 1876-1936} (San Sebastián: Editorial Txertoa, 1976), 220.

\textsuperscript{115} Clark, \textit{The Basques}, 136.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 136-139.
During the first period the regime closed the Basque university created by government of Euskadi in 1936. Armed forces occupied the libraries of social and cultural associations. The government burned books written in Euskera and banned the use of Euskera in schools, public and private, including rural schools where most students did not speak or understand Spanish. The government prohibited the use of Euskera in all public gatherings and publications, including religious publications and publications unaffiliated with political organizations, and on the radio. As in Catalonia, cultural societies were suppressed, "... including the international Society of Basque Studies, its magazine, and the Academy of the Basque Language." The government also forbade the use of Euskera in the celebration of the Mass and other religious ceremonies. The government decreed that all names in the civil registries and other official documents had to be translated into Spanish. No Basque proper names were allowed in baptismal or other official documents. All inscriptions in Euskera had to removed from tombstones and funeral markers and replaced with Castilian names.\(^{17}\) A startling example,

\(^{17}\)Letter from José Antonio Aguirre, president of the autonomous Basque government-in-exile, to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1952, when Franco was requesting Spain's admission into the organization. Reproduced in Beltza (pseud.), El nacionalismo vasco en el exilio, 1937-1960 (San Sebastián: Editorial Txertoa,
cited by Clark of the extent of repression of Euskera is the case of a Basque who was imprisoned for saying "agur," Euskera for "good-bye," on the street.\textsuperscript{116}

Despite these measures, the use of Euskera persisted. By the end of the 1940s books and magazines written in Euskera began to reappear. Ikastolas, the Euskera language schools, were beginning to operate clandestinely. A new Basque studies program began in 1955 at the University of Salamanca. Language academies were allowed to re-open during this time, and the government loosened the ban on sermons in Euskera.\textsuperscript{119} After Vatican II (1962-63) allowed the use of vernacular in the celebration of the Mass, Basque priests began to say Mass in Euskera.\textsuperscript{120} Some radio stations that were owned or used by the Church were allowed to broadcast in Euskera.

Franco and his falangistas, unable to eradicate Euskera and ethno-nationalism in the Basque Country, adopted repressive measures that provoked Basques into supporting and participating in ethno-nationalist movements. The act of denying people the right to express themselves in their

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\textsuperscript{116} Clark, \textit{The Basques}, 117.  
\textsuperscript{120} Clark, \textit{The Basques}, 138.  

1977), 134-6.
native language thus became a political issue. Some Euskera speaking children became leading etarras because of the painful experiences of going to school not knowing Spanish, being punished by instructors for not knowing it, struggling with the subjects that were taught in Spanish, and feeling isolated in the Spanish-speaking environment. The imprisonment of the person mentioned above who said "good-bye" in Euskera, contributed to the militancy of that persons's nephew, a future PNV activist. Another member of ETA struggled to teach himself this outlawed language in secret. Many nationalist leaders, including those who had to teach themselves Euskera later in life, championed the issue.

The repression of Basque culture and symbols also radicalized young Basques. Youths were frustrated by government repression of Basque songs and musical instruments, for example. One of the sixteen etarras sentenced at the Burgos trial remembered a group of youths being driven out of town by the Guardia Civil and the mayor

121 Interviews with major etarras or their relatives conducted by José María Portell, Los hombres de ETA (Barcelona: DOPESA, 1974), 147-48; and Miguel Castells, El mejor defensor el pueblo (San Sebastián: Ediciones Vascas, 1978), 50. It was common for rural children to only know Euskera at age five. See Greenwood, "Continuity in Change," 100.

122 Clark, The Basques, 117.

123 Ibid., 153.
for playing a Basque musical instrument without seeking official permission.\textsuperscript{124} A cousin of another famous ETA militant remembered being seized by police in 1967 for wearing ribbons of the colors of the Basque national flag in his cap. They took off the ribbons and seized his identity card, ordering him to report to the police station the next day. They made him return to retrieve his cap. After returning to the station the police berated him, roughed him up and fined him 500 pesetas.\textsuperscript{125}

The third phase of Franco's policy toward Euskera represented a more lenient policy. In 1975 the government decreed that the updated the regulation of teaching in regional languages. Euskera could be taught in state supported schools after regular school hours at the discretion of the principal. Later that year, the government issued a decree designed to protect regional languages, but to insist that Spanish be the only official language in government offices, assemblies, and courts.\textsuperscript{126}

In spite of the politicization of language Euskera has become a minority language in the region. One study estimated that the percentage of Euskera speakers in all

\textsuperscript{124}La actualidad española, no. 1,326 (May 30-June 5, 1977): 34, cited in Clark, Basque Insurgents, 153 and 307, n. 20.

\textsuperscript{125}Castells, El mejor defensor, 63.

\textsuperscript{126}Clark, The Basques, 138.
four provinces was 19.42 per cent in 1970.\(^{127}\) Post-Franco policies, however, seem to have led to an increase in the use of Euskera. According to a survey taken in 1979 in the provinces of Alava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, 31.3 percent of the respondents in the sample said that they spoke Euskera. Twenty-three percent said that they read Euskera. Of those surveyed, seventeen percent claimed to write Euskera. The highest percentages claiming the ability to speak, read, or write were found in Guipúzcoa, and the second highest percentages were found in Vizcaya. The lowest percentages of those surveyed who claimed an ability to speak, read or write were among the people of Alava.\(^{128}\)

**ETA AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE**

Repression of the Basques led youths to turn to militancy. Frustrated by the inability to effect change, and becoming hardened by their clashes with the authorities, many youths were attracted to more radical, violent means.

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\(^{128}\)Eduardo López Aranguen, *La Conciencia regional en el proceso autonómico español* (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1983), Tabla 4.1, 147. There may very well have been respondents who lied or exaggerated their skills and knowledge of Euskera because knowledge of Euskera is politically correct.
This political environment helps explain how a ETA emerged and evolved into a violent group. The development of ETA's ideology and strategy was also influenced by the history of guerrilla warfare in the Basque Country, the loss of hope for the Western countries to help the opposition, and by revolutionary and anti-colonial movements occurring in Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam.

The first act of violence by an ETA cell was the unsuccessful attempt to derail a train of Franco supporters in the early 1960s. The bomb was small in order to limit casualties. The bomb provoked a wave of arrests, and ETA leaders decided to call their First Assembly to discuss the incident. Some argued that ETA lacked the support it needed before it could adopt such tactics. From 1968 until the present, however, ETA has killed hundreds, some deliberately, some accidentally. Estimates vary, but according to Robert Clark, ETA was responsible for 287 deaths and 385 woundings from 1968 until 1980. Hundreds more have been killed since.

The economic conditions of the 1960s and 1970s and the labor movement offered Basque nationalists a chance to gain new supporters. However, bitter ideological and strategic

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129See for example, Robert Clark, *Basque Insurgents*, 154-55.

130Clark, *Basque Insurgents*, 125-126.
arguments led to rifts in the militant nationalist movement. Spanish leftists infiltrated ETA during the 1960s when it was becoming more formidable and leftist. The Spanish leftist, as noted above, considered the Basque nationalists to be bourgeois and considered the ethno-nationalist issue a distraction from the more important issue of advancing working-class interests. This position was advanced by ETA-Berri (new ETA). Their opponents were ETA-Zarra (old ETA). At the Fifth Assembly, in which ETA delegations met to discuss strategy and ideology, ETA-Berri was expelled from ETA. It eventually joined with other groups to form the Maoist Movimiento Comunista Español. The victorious ETA called groups that wished to work with Spanish groups as españolista or sucursalistas ("branch-office-ist"). They feared that Spanish groups would not want the Basque Country to become independent, because Spanish leftists would lose an important base of support. Thus, ETA V, the group that dominated the Fifth Assembly, believed that political independence had to precede social revolution. ETA-Sexta, named for the Sixth Assembly, separated from ETA V because of a dispute over the emphasis on class politics.\(^3\)

The social origins of ETA members reveal much about

\(^3\)Clark, The Basques, 160-163; Clark Basque Insurgents; Jáuregui, Ideología y Estrategia; Sullivan, ETA and Basque Nationalism; and Zirakzadeh, A Rebellious People.
Basque nationalism's social origins. Robert Clark has calculated that 30.9 percent of *etarras* from the sum of a sample of arrest records from 1978-1980 and a sample of case studies were from the working class, while 29.6 percent were from the lower middle class. Different Basque nationalists have had different ideological perspectives and different visions of what Basque economy and society should be. Some were and are anti-capitalist, others pro-capitalist. Some were and are socialist, others not. There have been a variety of leftisms advocated by various activists. Some considered left-wing ideology to be "*españolista,*" particularly when it placed less emphasis on independence, or when it suggested that anyone who "sold" his or her "labor" in the Basque Country was Basque. Since many Marxists often see ethnicity as a less rational form of solidarity, which distracts the working classes from their "real" interests and see nationalism as contrary to an international class struggle, there were many schisms within ETA over this issue. The old guard of ETA favored concentrating on the effort to revive the culture and language. They rejected Marxism and class struggle and thus

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132Clark, *Basque Insurgents,* 145, Table 6.2. The sample may not be statistically significant, but is nevertheless indicative of some of the backgrounds of some members of ETA.

133Sullivan, *ETA and Basque Nationalism.*
voluntarily resigned to form their own group called Branka. The various factions of ETA and the abertzale (patriotic) left parties continue to seek a balance between championing the working-class within the Basque Country and all Basque ethnics.

The cell structure of ETA is modeled after the mendigoitzales, guerilia units during the 1940s, and the cuadrillas. These cells of a few militants are able to operate independently and effectively even when the leadership is arrested. This helps explain the persistence of ETA.

ETA’s actions managed to provoke the Spanish state to react to the attacks with a generalized repression of Basques in the form of mass arrests, detention, searches, torture. These repressive actions were allowed under a series of States of Exception from 1956-1975. Almost as drastic as martial law, these states of exception enabled the police to detain and torture thousands for weeks without informing lawyers or families of the detained, and without filing any charges, search mail, and otherwise suspend basic rights officially guaranteed Spaniards. The reaction made the Basque Country seem like the occupied territory that ETA claimed it was. The Burgos trial of 1970 worked to the advantage of ETA by publicizing the organization and its cause and provoking demonstrations.
The decision by many in ETA to take violent action may have cost Basque nationalism the ability to gain broad support. Some ETA members argued that violent acts were no substitute for developing ideology, organizing, recruiting, etc. Premature violence was a mistake. Some factions of ETA complained that ETA militar was making other activities difficult because ETA militar would escape to "Euskadi Norte" in France while the rest of ETA suffered state reprisals. This allegedly thwarted ETA's efforts to develop their organization and expand the movement through propaganda and other activities.

**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

ETA threatened to bomb the Olympics in Barcelona and the Expo in Seville. It claimed responsibility for detonating a car bomb in Madrid in June 1992, suggesting that the recent arrests and seizure of documents by Spanish and French security forces have been ineffectual in preventing ETA violence. Experts fear that the cell structure of ETA will remain intact despite these arrests. ETA has been suspected or claimed responsibility for the bombing of Spanish targets in Rome, and of other targets. It has been unable to penetrate the tight security around the Olympic Games. Nevertheless, ETA remains a force with which to be reckoned.
CONCLUSION

Madrid, and Franco’s actions during the Spanish Civil War before he seized the state, failed to dissolve Basque ethnicity. Instead, these actions played a significant role in politicizing Basque ethnicity and leading people to establish and participate in an ethno-nationalist movement, which Spanish governments have been unable to eradicate. One of the crucial factors in the survival of Basque nationalist movements during periods of repression has been the presence of social and cultural institutions which provide activists with tactical and organizational models, recruits, resources, protection from surveillance and repression, and opportunities to preserve and diffuse Basque language and culture. An oppositional subculture developed through these institutions and through the privacy of family. By speaking Euskera, celebrating national holidays, and taking part in other activities, Basque families contributed to the political socialization of their children.
CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY CONCLUSION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL RESPONSES TO THE STATE

This thesis has argued that ethno-nationalism arises from a situation in which the state represses the language and culture of a group; revokes privileges and rights that this group has enjoyed for a long time; and pursues policies which create, exacerbate, or fail to mitigate economic and social problems. Such actions politicize and strengthen ethnic identities, and possibly help create a sense of ethnic identity where none had existed before, at least in the minds of some individuals. Such a situation does not by itself lead to a nationalist movement. There have to be leaders who offer a program or ideology that impresses people to support it. There have to be institutions and groups which will support the movement and protect it from repression. The history of regionalism and nationalism in Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country supports the hypothesis advanced in this study. The three regions studied, Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country, all have been and are sites of regionalist and nationalist movements. The strength and nature of these movements, however, have varied from region to region. Reviewing the key parameters discussed throughout this study will offer insights into the theoretical implications of this work.

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IDENTITY

Galicians consider themselves to be a distinct people, but most are not nationalist. Many nationalists considered the Galician language to be critical to Galician identity. Galicians have said in surveys that they feel discriminated against; nevertheless this "feeling" has not led to a politicization of identity comparable to Catalan and Basque identity. Significantly, there was no massive in-migration which might have heightened a sense of distinction.

The slogan that whoever lives and works in Catalonia is Catalan may have attracted some in-migrants to support Catalan autonomy, though this study does not provide conclusive evidence for this. Catalans have tended to identify themselves primarily by their language: Catalans consider anyone who wants to be Catalan a Catalan so part of being Catalan is learning the language. Moreover, those who learn the language are seen as hard-working, a trait considered by many to be a valued Catalan quality. The function of the Catalan language has been to distinguish Catalonia from the rest of Spain and thereby legitimize its claims to autonomy or independence. It has also functioned to exclude non-Catalans from the social status and jobs that Catalan speakers enjoy. Catalans have been more successful in gaining the support of in-migrants and people of in-migrant origin, some of whom have become Catalans, according
to the language criteria. However, most Catalans disagree with the slogan that whoever works and lives in Catalonia is Catalan. To be Catalan one has to assimilate. Moreover, many in-migrants and Catalans perceive Catalan identity as bourgeois. This alienates many immigrants, most of whom are working-class. These facts have limited the support for nationalist and regionalist movements.

An important component of Basque identity is Basques' historic rights and privileges before the abrogation of the fueros because the abrogation of the fueros politicized Basque identity. The attachment to a way of life seems to have been a criterion of ethnic identity among the farmers and the farm is part of the Basque farmer's identity. The basis for Basque identity has been conceptualized in different ways. The first Basque nationalists said that race, which they defined by blood type, moral character, religiosity, behavioral traits, and language, was the criterion which distinguished Basques from non-Basques and which legitimized nationalist claims to national sovereignty. For more recent nationalists, however, Euskera defined Basqueness. Those who did not know it had a duty to learn it. Non-Basques, including immigrants, could learn Euskera and become Basque. However, Basques by and large seemed to reject assimilation of non-Basques. Some activists have claimed that anyone who lives and "sells his
labor" is Basque, but most nationalists and apparently most ordinary ethnic Basques reject this view. The view that anyone who "sells his labor" is Basque suggests a conceptualization of a national identity that transcends ethnic identity. Rejecting this view seems to be a strictly ethnic definition of Basqueness. Basque nationalists have been able to attract some immigrants, but only a few. The divisions among Basque nationalists over the question of who is a Basque has thus far thwarted the possibility of a united movement. Too many immigrants and their descendants have apparently perceived certain definitions of Basqueness to be too strict and exclusive for them to support Basque nationalism.

Most Galicians see themselves as Spanish, too. Many Catalanists consider their Catalan identity compatible with a Spanish identity, even though they are distinct from other Spaniards. Basque nationalist, in contrast, consider their identity incompatible with being Spanish.

Contrary to modernization theory, the process of modernization does not erode or make obsolete ethnic identity and affinity during the process of modernization. Nor have states been able to repress these ethnic affinities. Rather, modernization and state action have sharpened and politicized this identity.
LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

There are important similarities among the cases studied with respect to the relationship between language and nationalism. Each region studied is the home of a language other than Spanish. Each regional language, Galician, Catalan and Euskera, has been a defining element in the identity of the natives of these regions; has been an issue of the movements in these regions; and has become subordinate in some way to Spanish ("Castillian"). There are also important differences among the cases studied. Galician and Catalan are Romance, Latin languages. Euskera is a distinct language and one of the oldest surviving languages in Europe and the world. Perhaps this made assimilation more difficult. Although Galician was a literary language, Castillian became the dominant language and Galician declined as a literary language centuries ago. Galicians had to learn Castillian in order to seek work in the public sector. Unlike the Catalanian bourgeoisie who supported the Renaixença -- the Catalanian renaissance -- which embraced Catalan, the Galician bourgeoisie, save a few intellectuals, did not embrace its Rexurdimiento. Some newspapers even wrote against the use of Galician and even the intellectuals who wrote Galician literature tended to

\[1\] Díaz López, "Galician Cleavages," 401.
speak Castillian. The rural population was largely illiterate, as were most monolingual Galician speakers, so Galician remained mainly an oral language. This led intellectuals to fear the loss of their literary heritage. Regionalists have tried, though unsuccessfully, to link linguistic revival with the Galician people's efficacy and ability to fight for their rights.

The Galician language has been a central concern to Galician regionalists and nationalists, but not to most Galicians. On the one hand, gallego is spoken by a higher percentage of the population than Euskera in the Basque Country or Catalan in Catalonia; and Galicia has not experienced significant in-migration of non-Galician speaking migrants. On the other hand, rural Galicians are teaching Spanish to their children and trying to cast off their native language. Moreover, lower percentages of Galicians can read or write their language compared to residents of the Basque Country and Catalonia. To the extent that a threat to Galician exists, it does not concern most of its speakers.

Gallegan could become even less significant a political issue if Standard Galician continues to achieve higher status and if it becomes universally spoken and written

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2Ibid., 401.
throughout Galicia. On the other hand, perhaps some activists will try to teach people the oral dialects, or codify them, or include the vocabulary in dictionaries, so that they do not become mere museum pieces or vanish altogether. If Galician is to become a national language, however, all will have to know a standard grammar, even if they choose to use a local grammar in a local or familial setting. Even if Standard Galician becomes universal, it will not become the superordinate language in Galicia unless knowledge of it becomes necessary for commerce and obtaining good jobs. This will only happen if Galicia’s upper-classes find job opportunities in Galicia that are more attractive than jobs in the central government and more Galicians earn enough money to have the leisure to enjoy Galician literature.

The Basque language, Euskera, was an oral language until the fourteenth century when missionaries wrote a bible in Euskera. Castillian thus easily dominated in law, literature, and commerce. Euskera is not as important an issue to some Basque nationalists as Catalan is to Catalan nationalists or Galician is to some Galicians. On the other hand, to Basques who consider Euskera central to Basque identity and feel it imperative to preserve, there is a greater sense of urgency in the Basque Country than in Catalonia or Galicia because Euskera is used and understood.
by such a small percentage of the population. Thus, Catalans may feel more secure about the future of their language and thus may not be involved in Catalanist politics, while many Basques may be supporting and participating in nationalist causes in order to preserve language. The question of how to codify the language has been another source of dissension among nationalists, thwarting the formation of a united movement.

In Galicia and the Basque provinces the native languages were viewed as backward. In order to gain employment by the state or be successful in industry and commerce, Galicians and Basques have had to know Spanish. They stopped using their native language, which symbolized their native, rustic roots. In the Basque Country, however, learning Euskera seemed to be a way to return to mythic roots, preserve Basque identity and unify as a people against the assault by the state on Basque institutions. Unlike learning Galician or Euskera, learning Catalan was and is a means of social upward mobility because the leading industrialists spoke and speak Catalan. Catalans were not as dependent on Spain for jobs in the Spanish state. To this day, people in Catalonia are discriminated against in hiring on the basis of their ability to speak Catalan.

Although cultural and linguistic revivals took place in all the regions studied, these efforts have been more
successful in the long run in Catalonia and the Basque country than in Galicia. This is for a number of reasons. First, there were more people with the money and time necessary to undertake and support efforts to revive and preserve language and culture. To establish and sponsor literary journals and native language newspapers required money and their survival required subscriptions and patrons. Organizing and participating in discussion groups, poetry readings, art exhibits, and clubs required leisure time, which required money. The study of one’s history, folklore, and language required time and money. So does the effort to codify a language. Moreover, there were more journalists, educators, and scholars in the Basque Country and Catalonia than in Galicia. In the Basque Country a new generation of such professionals arose when their fathers’ businesses were failing. Generally, people from relatively well-off and educated families, unless financially supported from an outside source, are more likely to enter such professions than people who come from poorer, less educated families. Although intellectuals established publishing houses, promoted art exhibits, and wrote literature in Galician, these people were a small and isolated group within a larger, highly Castillianized class that had little economic or psychological interest in learning Galician. Moreover, the literacy rate was lower in Galicia than in the other
regions, so the demand for Galician literature was lower than the demand for Basque and Catalan literature. Finally, the Catholic parishes in the Basque Country and Catalonia were more supportive of cultural and linguistic preservation and revival efforts than the Galician parishes. Basque clergy participated in ikastolas, the schools that taught Euskera; and Catalan priests used Catalan illegally in Catholic schools. The Galician church was not interested in such efforts, although more priests said mass in Galician after the Vatican II approved masses in employing the vernacular. In Catalonia and the Basque Country nationalists claimed that because their regions were homes of languages other than Castillian, they had the right to form their own nation-states.

Another impetus behind linguistic revival is to aid schoolchildren whose first or only language is a minority language and whose scholastic performance and psychological state are harmed by the Castillian curriculum. In Galicia and the Basque Country rural children whose Spanish skills were poor or nil were punished by their instructors for their poor Spanish and for speaking in their native tongues. These traumatic experiences of struggling to learn Castillian and being pressured to reject native languages and other experiences involving the repression of Euskera led some Basques to join ETA. It is reasonable to
hypothesize that such experiences led others to become nationalist and take part in nationalist activities of some form or other, such as hiding etarras from Spanish authorities or voting for abertzale (patriotic) parties. The author found no evidence of Galicians who suffered similar experiences supporting nationalist or regionalist parties, though the possibility should not be discounted. If such experiences did not drive Galicians into nationalist or regionalist politics, it may be because Galicians did not perceive independence or increased autonomy as attainable or beneficial, or because nationalist and regionalist activists failed to make contact with other Galicians or impress them with their programs. Repression of the native languages in Catalonia and the Basque Country provoked people to become involved in nationalist politics. This may have been the case in Galicia as well.

A lesson to be drawn from studying these regions is that an ethno-nationalist attempt to preserve a native language can be an end in itself as well as a means to another end, such as social mobility. For some Galician intellectuals, the effort to revive gallego, tied to a desire for improving the social, political, and economic position of Galician, is less direct than the issue of access to certain resources. Psychologically, the advocates of linguistic revival want the members of this minority to
be proud of their language as a literary and cultural language and thus feel proud of themselves. Some Basque activists considered knowledge of Euskera essential to achieving true Basque thoughts and values; and learning Euskera was essential to their development as human beings.

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT**

Galicia has been the least economically developed of the three regions studied. Its economy is mainly agricultural and the rural interior of the region is largely isolated from the urban areas. The agricultural system is predominantly minifundia. Although some farmers have been displaced from their plots because of flooding from hydroelectric projects, most have been left alone to work on their minifundia. The lack of rapid industrialization in Galicia has also meant that rural Galicians have not had to compete with in-migrants for low-paying jobs and poor industrial working conditions. The absence of an influx of non-Galician migrants has also meant that there are not cultural clashes that might provoke intolerance. Moreover, Galician speakers are not becoming outnumbered by Spanish speakers, so the language is not threatened.

In contrast to Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque Country experienced rapid industrialization. In Catalonia, an industrial class arose and demanded more regional
autonomy over economic matters. The arrival of migrants from other parts of Spain led to tensions between the native and migrant population. The migrants tended to support non-Catalanist parties and tended to take the least skilled, lowest paying jobs. In the Basque Country, conflict between Basques and immigrants also broke out over the same issues. The migrants took lower paying jobs and were blamed for low wages in the Basque Country. Another consequence of rapid industrialization in the Basque Country is that farmers’ livelihoods have been gravely threatened. Rural Euskadi has been disappearing, motivating many to protest and join ETA.

**SOCIAL BASES OF NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS**

In the cases of the Basque Country and Catalonia, class identity became an important basis of solidarity, but it politicized or reinforced ethnic identity as a basis of group solidarity instead of displacing it. Artisans, shopkeepers, and traditional farmers have been important supporters of Basque nationalism. In the Basque Country the working class divided along ethnic lines, but the working class was highly differentiated, with the lower paying jobs concentrated among the in-migrants.

Today, the left-wing is divided by a Basque patriotic left and a Spanish left. In Catalonia ethnic conflict overlapped class conflict; and in-migrant workers had the
lowest paying jobs. Class conflict, however, did lead the Catalan movement and, to a lesser extent, the Basque movement to divide. Also, the class interests of the upper bourgeoisie took priority over their ethnic identity when their class interests were threatened and loyalty to the Spanish state was necessary to protect their interests. Galicianism has a history of concern for the minifundista, small-scale fishing communities, and, more recently, the working-class.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS

Social and cultural institutions, organizations, and protest movements play an important role in enabling nationalist movements to survive and grow. They also influence the tactics and strategies of the movements. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, clubs, choral groups, dance troupes, and other groups helped preserve language, literature, folklore, and culture in those regions. These activities influenced future generations of activists. Groups of friends, called cuadrillas and mountain-climbing clubs called mendigoitzales in the Basque Country influenced the organizational structure of ETA and provided a source for recruitment. In Catalonia choral groups, dance troupes, and Boy Scouts were among the kinds of cultural institutions which helped preserve Catalan culture and nationalist
sentiment. The parish, as in the Basque Country, was also an important institution for direct and covertly indirect political activities. In Galicia regionalist publishing houses and cultural groups existed but were relatively insignificant; relatively few Galicians were receptive to nationalist themes so the few who organized Galicianist activities were unable to strike a responsive chord among the people.

The Catholic parishes in Galicia were less autonomous and more closely tied to the Spanish Church than were the Basque and Catalan parishes. The Church in Galicia did not encourage nationalism; the Basque and Catalan parishes did, providing safe havens, relatively immune from police surveillance, for cultural activities and political meetings. The Basque and Catalan priests identified with Basques and Catalans and the support given by priests to nationalism helps explain why nationalism has been a stronger force in the Basque Country and Catalonia than in Galicia.

STATE ACTION AGAINST THE ETHNIC GROUPS AND REGIONS

The actions by the Spanish state that contributed to the formation of politically charged ethnic and regional politics in Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque Country included repression of language and culture, war against
regional autonomy, abrogation of ancient rights and privileges, measures short of repression that threatened native languages, and fiscal and economic policies that adversely affected the economic interests and ways of life of many of the inhabitants. Tariff policies, for example, increased prices for consumers and businesses and helped spawn rapid industrialization and urbanization.

The role of schools in trying to create a Spanish nationalist consciousness and impose Castilian as the single, hegemonic, unifying language deserves special comment. This study has shown that public education helped spread Castilian throughout Spain. Yet the spread of Castilian did not lead to a spread of modern Spanish nationalism. Instead, classroom repression of minority languages led some members of the regional-ethnic minorities to become militant ethnic activists. Moreover, some ethnic activists whose schooling or the schooling of their parents had prevented them from knowing their ancestral language and who were not necessarily motivated to become activists because their language was dying, nevertheless led efforts to reverse the decline of the language in order to create and promote ethnic consciousness.

In the Basque Country and Catalonia, activists were able to counter the state education system by teaching minority languages in schools outlawed or unsupported by the
state. This study did not turn up evidence of such schools in Galicia. Nevertheless, Galician remained widely spoken. A comparison of literacy rates and school enrollment in Galicia and the other regions needs to be done in order to learn how extensive schooling was in the three regions.

IDEOLOGY OF MOVEMENTS

In the Basque Country, nationalism of Sabino de Arana y Goiri seemed to be as much against the upper bourgeoisie and the immigrant workers as against the Spanish state, if not more so. Arana also placed a great deal of emphasis on preserving the culture. Even if independence were not achieved for hundreds of years, at least Basques could be independent from Spanish influences by preserving their culture. Arana even claimed that holding on to religious values was more important than independence; Basque society was better off "religious" and part of Spain than secular and independent of Spain. Although Arana did want the Basque Country to be independent, he was willing to postpone this goal and demand autonomy within Spain as a first step, in order to broaden the support of his movement. Sabino de Arana and Ibero el Evangelista based their claims to legitimacy of the establishment of a Basque nation on race. In Ami Vasco, Ibero el Evangelista thought that the Basque claim to the nation was legitimized by nature: All races
were entitled to their own nation. Language was the defining criterion. ETA insisted on political independence more forcefully than did Arana. ETA has also insisted that all Basque provinces have to be united.

Catalanism was generally an autonomist movement, although separatism was a significant part of the movement. Economic regionalism, political autonomy, and preservation of the regional language and culture were more prominent among Catalanists demands than outright independence. The minor Galicianist movements generally focused on linguistic and cultural preservation and regional autonomy within a federal state. The more recent independence movement, seeing itself as an anti-colonial movement, was even smaller. With the minor exception of the ineffectual independence movement, Galicianism has been the most moderate regional movement. Catalanism has been more radical than the Galician movement, and Basque nationalism the most radical of all, with the most prominent independence movement and a sense of identity least compatible with Spanish identity.

MODERNIZATION AND ETHNICITY

In the Basque Country and Catalonia "modernization" has failed to erode ethnicity as the basis for mobilization, as modernization theory would predict. On the contrary,
ethnicity has been the main basis for a persistent nationalism and regionalism, especially in the early Basque nationalist movement. In Galicia the majority of the citizens did not participate in Spanish politics; they were not politically mobilized; and the economy did not experience rapid industrialization. Thus, while Galicians do perceive themselves to be a distinct group, it is not the basis for political action for most Galicians.

Modernization theory is partly right when it says that in modern societies status is achieved, not ascribed. Basques, for example, lost their ascribed status of nobility as society modernized. Nevertheless, discrimination against in-migrants suggests that ethnicity remains an important ascriptive status in the Basque Country and Catalonia. In Catalonia, ethnicity has become an achieved status, as in-migrants can become Catalan by learning Catalan. Some recent Basque nationalists, who have rejected Arana's racism, claim that immigrants and natives can achieve status as Basques by learning Euskera.

According to modernization theory, voluntary associations such as political parties and trade unions assume importance. In Catalonia and the Basque Country ethnic and "modern" political affiliations overlapped. The Basque Nationalist Party, for example, became a "modern" means of mobilizing an ethnic group. Thus, ethnicity can
co-exist in modern society and become "modernized."

THE FUTURE OF ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN SPAIN

Galicianist parties will not pose a serious challenge to the Spanish state. The movement will remain weak and those who demand independence will remain marginalized. Although a recently formed Galician nationalist group has recently committed violent acts, it is least likely to receive much national or international attention. Catalan regionalism and nationalism will remain strong. It is likely that branches of the movement will continue to be encouraged by the success of nationalist movements in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the secession of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia. The prestige that they will receive from the Barcelona Olympics could affect the movement in two ways. On the one hand, it could renew pride in Catalonia and support, which might help pure nationalists who want to achieve independence for Catalonia. On the other hand, the cost of war suffered by the former Yugoslavian republics, conflicts in some former Soviet republics, and the memory of the Spanish Civil War, may cause some Catalans to fear the possibility of war if Catalonia tried to break away from Spain. Moreover, Catalans might be more content to be part of Spain, which has, after all, provided funds for the expansion of the
airport and has taken other steps to help Barcelona absorb tourists. Catalans might support increased regional autonomy on matters such as taxes, but may decide that staying in Spain is in their interest. Also, the repression of the culture and language was one of the issues that led many Catalans to become Catalanist. Now that Catalan enjoys a high status and cultural expression is uninhibited, political independence does not seem necessary for the survival and growth of Catalan language and culture.

Finally, whether Catalonia could join the European Community could affect any future decision concerning independence; if a sovereign Catalonia were denied membership in that organization, access to markets and capital subsidies could be restricted dramatically.

Basque nationalism will continue as long as some Basques see in nationalism a solution to industrial decline, high unemployment, and diglossia. ETA's organizational structure remains in tact and has continued to recruit members. The hard-core etarras know of no other life than violent resistance and will continue their fight. The recent wave of arrests of leaders, known as the "decapitación" ("decapitation"), will likely hurt ETA, but will not stop ETA 'militar' from surviving and continuing to fight. Although ETA has so far failed to disrupt the Olympics in Barcelona and Expo '92 in Seville, the cells did
manage to carry out several bomb attacks during the summer in Spain and against Spanish targets abroad.

As with Catalonia, Basque nationalists have been emboldened by the independence movements in the former Soviet Union and may have been encouraged by the independence gained by Slovenia and Croatia and by the referendum on Slovakian independence. On the other hand, the devastating cost of independence in Croatia, much of which is still occupied by armed Serbs, the continued fighting, starvation, and "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the continued denial of international recognition of Macedonia; and the bloody attempt by ethnic Russians to secede from Moldova may discourage many Basques. Some may fear that Spain would act as did Serbia against secessionist movements. Therefore, some Basque nationalists may decide to press for autonomy and language revival rather than political independence, at least for the time being, in the same way Sabino de Arana y Goiri decided to advocate autonomy instead of independence after reflecting on the fact that Cuba did not become independent.

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3 Greece fears that Macedonia would claim Greek Macedonia as part of the former Yugoslav republic. Like Macedonia, Euskadi is divided by international boundaries. Perhaps France would take a stance similar to Greece's if "Euskadi Sur" won independence.

4 Ethnic Russians will be allowed to vote on whether to secede from Moldova if that country decides to re-join Romania.
from Spain until the United States intervened militarily. ETA militants and other Basques may draw from the Yugoslav experience the conclusion that the Basque Country would have to be prepared for military resistance against Spain in the event of a declaration of secession. Basques may also conclude from the resistance by ethnic Serbs in the former Yugoslav republics and by Russians in Moldova, as well as the refusal of Russian troops to withdraw from Estonia and Latvia until these Baltic states grant ethnic Russians living in those countries full citizenship, that ethnic Basques will have to come to terms with the in-migrant population.

THE RECURSE TO VIOLENCE

Radical Basque nationalists decided to take violent action against the state to gain independence before radical Catalan and Galician nationalists attempted this course of action, largely inspired by ETA. Moreover, Catalan nationalist violence lasted only a few years while the Galician effort, despite help from ETA, was quickly quashed. The inefficacy of FAC and UPG was apparently attributable to the lack of popular support for violent radicalism. Why Basque violence began earlier, enjoyed more support, and has persisted, while Galician and Catalan violence was negligible during the Franco years and only recently re-
emerged in the form of relatively minor organizations requires serious investigation. A major reason is probably that the goal of independence was more popular in the Basque Country than in Catalonia and Galicia. Galicians and Catalans were able to increase their autonomy without resorting to violence.

Political violence in Galicia during the Francoist regime was insignificant in part because of the lack of support for Galician nationalism, whether violent or non-violent. Most Galicians were either loyal to Madrid, or too busy trying to subsist on their minifundia to involve themselves in politics. Moderate Galicianists did not seek independence. Lack of popular support for radical Galician nationalism also helps explain why recent violence by a Galician separatist group is minor compared to violence by ETA.

FURTHER RESEARCH

In order to better understand varying levels of support for ethno-nationalism in Spain and elsewhere, there are several interesting avenues of investigation that might be taken. Díaz López suggests that Galicianism is becoming stronger. Whether this is the case and, if so, why, should be discussed. Has the socio-economic landscape in Galicia begun to change? If more Galicians are able to find jobs
outside the Spanish government and inside Galician businesses, then perhaps a new class is emerging with different interests.

A comparison of French state action in the French Basque Country and regional response with Spanish state action and regional responses is necessary to understand differences in support for Basque nationalism on both sides of the Pyrenees. The same kind of comparison of Spanish and French Catalonia would also be useful. This method of comparison might be useful in studying Kurdish nationalism, since Kurds have been trying to establish a state from parts of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, and in studying Macedonian nationalism, since part of Macedonia is in Greece and, until recently, was in Yugoslavia.

To further test the hypothesis advanced in this study, investigators should also study the state policies and responses to those policies within African states, such as Nigeria and Ethiopia, and Asian states, such as Sri Lanka and India. Studying how Indians from different parts of the country have responded to India’s language policy could improve our understanding of how language can become an issue of contention. The issue of language could become increasingly important if significantly more Indian children enroll in school in the future. Why Kashmiris and Sikhs are fighting for independence while other groups in India are
not needs to be investigated. Why these groups have turned to violence to achieve independence is especially important to study. Such studies may improve our understanding of the role that religious identity, economic interests, and state actions play in separatist movements.

EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING ETHNO-NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

Explaining and understanding the emergence of an ethno-nationalist movement is more realistic than predicting one because movements depend largely on the emergence of leaders, the occurrence of significant events, and institutions that might influence the direction of or encourage the emergence of a movement. There are, in any case, a number of things which this study suggests about such movements. Ethnic distinction does not by itself lead to grievances and a desire for greater autonomy or independence; Galicia, for example, has had only a small movement for greater autonomy or independence, and, except for the goal of reviving Galician, the former can be seen as little different from movements for devolution or federalization among groups whose ethnic identity is relatively similar to the group or groups that control the state. Moreover, among ethnically distinct groups, leaders whose families became culturally or linguistically assimilated with the core group generations ago, thus losing
distinguishing traits of an ethnic group, may become militants or leaders for an ethno-nationalist movement. Such leaders also may try to learn the language of their ancestors. Others, such as certain Basque nationalists, may not even try to learn their old language or adopt old customs. Also, significantly, someone with no ancestral ties to an ethnic group may choose to become part of it and become a leading figure in the movement. The Basque Country and Catalonia have examples of this phenomenon. Although most ethno-nationalists had ancestral or territorial bases for their identity and were among ethnic groups concentrated in those regions, the mere fact that they engaged in ethno-nationalist militancy was insufficient to gain a large following. Moreover, the mere the existence of widespread, popularly perceived ethnic grievances was insufficient for the existence of ethno-nationalist militancy, much less a significant ethno-nationalist movement, as the case of Galicia suggests.

To understand the existence of an ethno-nationalist movement, or perhaps predict one, one has to examine and reflect upon the rights or autonomy that a group enjoyed previously and the history of the state's suppression of those rights. Also, a researcher must explore the economy of the region. Has a region's economy developed autonomously? Does it have trade links predominantly
outside the state? If so, these conditions might suggest the orientations and resources of an ethnic group. Is the region poor or rich? Either case could be the basis for an ethno-nationalist movement. More importantly, however, the researcher must look at the particular classes and occupational groups themselves. Aggregate measures of the economy or its trading patterns do not capture the history and present life of people within the region. A particular group of people may lose livelihoods or jobs because of changes in the economy unleashed or accelerated by state policy. A declining class may launch a movement in response to its decline. These events occurred in the Basque Country.

The fact that the ethnic group's language was repressed or its autonomy had been limited explained why an ethno-nationalist movement became the choice of certain Basques, and can explain why individuals in other regions of the world may choose ethno-nationalism instead of another ideology. It must be conceded that the existence of linguistic or cultural differences can influence these decisions: however, again, unless this group's identity has been suppressed; unless people can persuade others that the distinctiveness of the group is a basis for separation; unless people are antagonized and disadvantaged by the abrogation of special rights; linguistic or cultural
distinctiveness will not lead to an ethno-nationalist movement. Also, in the case of linguistic differences, one may find a society of many different languages geographically concentrated in certain areas where there are no ethnic tensions. This could be because no single language has been imposed upon all the people, or universal education, which might impose a single language, is not widespread.

The existence of grievances, even among people who identify themselves as a distinct group of people with special rights, does not guarantee the existence of an ethno-nationalist movement, or any kind of movement. Leaders have to articulate programs that appeal to the people and organize the movement. There have to be social institutions and organizations, either already in existence, such as a church, school, or youth gang, or created by nationalists, in order to ignite a movement and preserve it. This was the case in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Communication networks, crucial to an effective movement, are most effective in societies where the infrastructure is extensive and sophisticated and technology is high. This may help explain the strength of ethno-nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia and its weakness in Galicia.

To understand why a movement becomes violent, or correctly predict that one will, one must consider the
tactical models that leaders have as a guide. Are leaders most impressed with Martin Luther King Jr., Mao Xedong, Ernesto "Che" Guevarra, or Ho Chi Minh? Since individual militants will assess their chances for success, the desperation of their situation, and the options available to them differently, one cannot predict why a group in the future may choose to pursue the politics of violence. Nevertheless, certain circumstances may allow the researcher to understand why some people might consider violence as an option. Extreme repression of a group and the absence of institutional alternatives to respond to that repression can lead to a decision to employ violent tactics. However, a comparison of Galicia and the Basque Country suggests that while people may suffer some of the same grievances and have the same limited options to respond, those individuals will not respond in the same way.

The most important conclusion with which the reader should leave is that actions by the state, whether repression, or economic policies, or the imposition of a non-native language, or the abrogation of privileges, rights, and liberties enjoyed by a group can politicize ethnicity rather than dissolve it. Whether the ethnic group survives and launches a strong ethno-nationalist movement depends largely upon the social and institutional context in which an ethnic group lives and a social movement develops.
Catalans and Basques have endured state repression and have emerged with strengthened ethnic identity.
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