James Mill and Dugald Stewart on Mind and Education

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Abstract
Late 18th Britain was experiencing the beginnings of social unrest fueled in part by the American and French Revolutions. The established two class social system was being challenged by the emergence of a middle class seeking something more than traditional agricultural work. While they subscribed to very different philosophies of mind, both Stewart and Mill saw the solution to potential social chaos in a revised educational system that would open the doors to a peaceful development of that middle class. What the new educational system should look like was a direct function of the theory of mind held by the two protagonists. Employing an enlarged Foucaultian framework, this dissertation examines the various forces at work in transforming British society as it prepares for the unanticipated forthcoming industrial revolution.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Empiricist Philosophy of Mind and the Problem of Social Order in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain

In the opening decades of the 19th century, Britain’s tradition of empiricist philosophy of mind was on the cusp of a major transition. This transition, however, was not merely a matter of narrow academic interest for it was inextricably linked to broader socio-economic developments within Britain. In particular, a series of key events that included a prolonged period of warfare, structural economic changes and hardships, and the appearance of a radical political regime in neighboring France during late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries generated both actual and perceived changes in class relations in Britain. From the point of view of British economic and political elites, the growing political self-awareness of the laboring poor, both in actuality and in the perception of the elites, constituted a grave threat not only to the status quo but also to the possibility of orderly social progress in the future. As both official and unofficial allies of the ruling elites, some philosophers of mind also looked upon the shifts in class relations with concern. In addition to the fears of their patrons and allies, these philosophers of mind also faced the possibility that social upheaval might challenge their views of human nature, and could even undermine the very legitimacy of the entire philosophical enterprise.

At issue was the capacity of philosophers of mind to propose philosophically grounded educational projects that would serve the cause of promoting the ruling elites’ intertwined goals of social order and orderly social progress. Among the many instruments that philosophers and other intellectuals of the time suggested as remedies for

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1 See Wahrman Imagining the Middle Class. Also, Smout, History of the Scottish People, pgs. 440-448. here…
the dangerous proclivities of Britain’s laboring poor, education was generally deemed both an effective and an ‘enlightened’ technique for harnessing the otherwise supposedly unruly energies, both physical and psychic, of the poor for the purposes of social stability and orderly social improvement. Some philosophers of mind sought to promote these ends by eliminating the mixture of ignorance, superstition, and radicalism that disordered the minds of many impoverished individuals and thereby, as proponents of education argued and the British ruling elites feared, imperiled social order and orderly social progress by leading the poor into personal vice and political subversion. Insofar as philosophers of mind were able to address these problems, therefore, they had not only a critical role to play in the governance of Britain, but also a powerful proof of the practical utility of an otherwise esoteric field of study – a proof that was believed necessary by the philosophical community in order to demonstrate the validity and intellectual legitimacy of philosophy of mind.

The political, social, economic, and cultural upheavals that reverberated through Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries called into question, however, the ability of philosophers of mind to make the leap from abstract theories about the mind to practical schemes for transforming the laboring poor into compliant instruments of social stability and orderly social progress. As the laboring poor themselves began to acquire new characteristics and ambitions, the matrix of epistemological, ontological, and methodological norms that guided and governed philosophical analysis began to unravel. Previously indisputable normative commandments that had long demonstrated their effectiveness in generating explanations across diverse domains of phenomena now

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3 See Chisick, Limits of Reform
seemed inadequate when they had to contend with the newly emerging social landscape of the early nineteenth century. This challenge to the epistemological, ontological, and methodological norms of philosophical analysis threatened both to undermine the accepted protocol for conducting philosophical investigations, and more crucially, to call into question the intellectual legitimacy of the philosophy of mind as a branch of philosophical inquiry.

Impelled by the need to produce appropriate educational projects in the context of major social change, two of the most influential philosophers of mind in early 19th century Britain, Dugald Stewart and James Mill, proposed radically different versions of the philosophy of mind. Indeed, Stewart and Mill’s respective philosophies of mind generated diametrically opposed theories of the mind’s operations. Nevertheless, both philosophies of mind shared a common onto-epistemological and methodological foundation, and, despite the differences between their respective versions of the philosophy of mind, both Stewart and Mill displayed an overriding concern to demonstrate the utility of their educational projects. In both cases, this concern took the form of an insistence that philosophically grounded educational projects could produce not only well-ordered minds, but also well-ordered societies.

The increasingly vocal ambitions of the poor, and the potential consequences of those ambitions, provided a particularly compelling motivation for demonstrating the effectiveness of educational schemes for maintaining social order during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Both Stewart and Mill conceived of society as bifurcated into two distinct socio-economic spaces that were inhabited by the laboring poor, in the one case, and, in the other, by a ruling elite that provided not only leadership
but also the creative energies that propelled social, cultural, economic, and political
development. For Stewart and Mill, this social architecture was not merely an accident of
time or place. Instead, the division of society into two functionally distinct, yet
complementary, realms was an essential precondition for the very existence of any
complex social order. Given the time-consuming, but materially necessary character of
labor, human development in all of its dimensions was only possible if some individuals
could be freed from onerous labor in order to pursue intellectual vocations; conversely,
no the pursuit of intellectual vocations would be impossible without the material
foundation produced by labor.

Thus, the laboring poor of Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries was emerging as simultaneously the foundation of the social order and a threat
to that same order. On the one hand, the poor supplied the labor that was necessary for
the continued existence of society; moreover, by providing the necessities of life, the
labor of the poor also created a social space of leisure in which the cultural pursuits
necessary for the advancement of society could take place. On the other hand, new
political ideas and economic developments also appeared, from the perspective of the
ruling elites, to be encouraging the poor to seek improvements in their station in life at
the expense of the existing social order.

What the ruling elite feared more than socio-economic change, which is always
accompanied with considerable uncertainty and danger, was the potential that the
laboring poor would attain a previously unheard of degree of class autonomy that would
allow them to act on their multifarious desires without restraint. The possible emergence
of a politically autonomous laboring class, clamoring ever more assertively and
successfully for sweeping socio-economic change, presented the ultimate threat to the complementary relationship between the zones of labor and leisure that both Stewart and Mill regarded as indispensable to the very existence of advanced social regimes. Stewart and Mill both conceived, though in disparate ways, that philosophically grounded educational projects might temper the troublesome desire of the poor for social improvement and thus preserve the binary social architecture. Consequently, in their efforts to defend the intellectual legitimacy of philosophy of mind, Stewart and Mill inevitably involved themselves and the philosophy of mind in the creation of educational techniques that served the dual purpose of imposing order both upon individual minds and upon social relations as a whole.

Juxtaposing the philosophical works of Stewart and Mill thus creates an opportunity for delineating the links between the abstract ruminations of the philosophy of mind and the structural changes that were affecting the majority of the British population in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Stewart and Mill are especially effective examples of these links between the philosophy of mind and its wider social context since their works on the philosophy of mind and on education display their struggles to comply with the normative demands of philosophical analysis at a time when those same normative foundations were increasingly being stressed by a changing social setting. Furthermore, Stewart and Mills’ works also display the difficult transition between one epistemological, ontological, and methodological normative matrix and a subsequent configuration of norms as we move from Stewart’s more conventional form of philosophical analysis to Mill’s efforts to negotiation tensions between key norms in order to accommodate (and even to create) new social arrangements.
In addition, the act of aligning these two bodies of philosophical analysis raises several important historiographic issues, the responses to which have potential implications for other philosophical discourses that were produced during the Enlightenment period. Long-standing modes of addressing these historiographic issues have, I contend, imposed a particular structure on the intellectual terrain of the Enlightenment in Britain. This structure has of course granted an important degree of coherence to the intellectual history of Britain, but it has also impeded alternatives lines of investigation. Two historiographic frameworks in particular have dominated studies of the Enlightenment in Britain; strict adherence to either framework would seriously obstruct that sort of comparative study that is pursued in this dissertation.

On the one hand, the history of philosophy in Britain in the eighteenth century is typically treated as the unfolding of an intellectual lineage that begins with John Locke and stretches through Berkeley to Hume. While there is certainly an intellectual connection among all three figures and all three were certainly significant philosophers, this historiographic framework obscures both the roles of less famous philosophical figures that worked within the same philosophical tradition of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume as well as the existence of other contemporaneous philosophical traditions that rejected the Lockean tradition.

Secondly, the intellectual history of Enlightenment Britain has also been cast in geographical terms that replicate, in the intellectual sphere, the political divisions of the island. The two largest ethnic communities on the island of Britain, the Scots and the

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4 Indeed, there has even been the suggestion that, as opposed to Scotland, there was no Enlightenment in the 18th century in England in particular, despite the apparent absurdity of such a suggestion. Roy Porter addresses this issue by arguing for a temporally expanded understanding of the concept of the Enlightenment in the English context.
English, have long been treated as separate, and almost alien cultures, by historians and philosophers. While there is considerable justification in pointing out the differences between the intellectual traditions of the Scots and the English, the general failure to consider the interactions between these geographically contiguous communities has omitted an entire dimension of the intellectual history of both Scotland and England.

A comparative study of the philosophical work of Dugald Stewart and James Mill that attempts to delineate the commonalities that motivated and guided the analyses of both philosophers can only succeed by blurring these neatly drawn boundaries between intellectual communities and philosophical traditions. If the standard historiographic framework is rigorously obeyed, then it would seem that neither philosopher has much in common. For example, Mill’s associationist philosophy of mind incorporated key explanatory elements of the Lockean tradition, while Stewart’s so-called Common Sense philosophy of mind adamantly rejected those same explanatory elements as contrary to good philosophical practice. From a certain perspective, then, Mill’s associationism and Stewart’s Common Sense stood in absolute opposition to one another. Moreover, Stewart, even in his own lifetime, was an icon of the Scottish Enlightenment and a key figure in Scottish intellectual life; Mill, though Scottish by birth, produced the bulk of his philosophical work in England as a member of the philosophical and political circle that grew up around Jeremy Bentham. Consequently, any comparative study of Stewart and Mills’ philosophies of mind would seem to be limited to pointing out the ways in which they stood opposed to one another.

Drawing on Michael Foucault’s analysis of the structures of knowledge, as well as on explicit statements of both Stewart and Mill themselves, indicates, however, that
the traditional historiographic framework has neglected a critical dimension of the intellectual territory of the early nineteenth century. Cutting across the social, doctrinal, and political differences that separated Stewart and Mill was a matrix of epistemological, ontological, and methodological norms that bound them together. Viewed from the perspective of the normative requirements of philosophical practice, it becomes evident that Stewart and Mill’s philosophies of mind were the end products of their efforts to comply with a shared set of norms from within differing social and political contexts. By focusing on the normative dimension of philosophical practice, therefore, the traditional historiographic map that so sharply separated Stewart’s Scottish Common Sense from Mill’s English associationism will be redrawn so that new connections are highlighted between the works of important exemplars of the two leading schools of the philosophy of mind in early nineteenth-century Britain.
Chapter 2
The Historiographical Setting of the British Tradition of Empiricist Philosophy of Mind

Historical writing, and indeed any academic writing, always has a double focus. On the one hand, analysis of a particular object or of a set of objects in order to determine its internal properties and external relationships with other objects obviously constitutes one of the foci. The other focus, however, possesses a more complex character; this focus comprises the body of commentary that has been built up around the object of study. Consequently, the academic writer finds herself or himself entering into the middle of an on-going conversation between the object of study and its commentators. In some instances, the terms of the conversation are explicit and well defined so that the entry into this conversation is a relatively straightforward matter of judging where one stands in relation to the established lines of argument and counterargument. In other cases, however, the rules of the discussion are not so clear or have not even been explicitly articulated. In these cases, consideration of the body of commentary can take on as great or sometimes greater importance than analysis of the object of study itself.

The relationship between the philosophies of mind of Dugald Stewart and James Mill falls into the latter class. Both Stewart and Mill have received only limited and sporadic attention from scholars in the last two centuries. This relative neglect is surprising from one perspective, because both philosophers were significant academic and public figures in the early nineteenth century. Even though other thinkers have long superseded their philosophical authority, their intellectual influence was sufficiently extensive that historians, if not philosophers, might easily find them worthy of study. From another perspective, however, the failure of scholars to show more interest in
Stewart and Mill might be attributable less to their intrinsic philosophical or historical value, but more to the manner in which a body of commentary has (or in this case, has not) been built up around Stewart and Mills’ philosophies of mind as objects of study. The limited and sporadic nature of the scholarly commentary has meant that the dialogue between their philosophical works and scholars has been feeble and fragmentary, and this has made it difficult for successive scholars to get their bearings with the philosophical works of either Stewart or Mill; even more daunting is the prospect of treating Stewart and Mill as in dialogue (if only in a virtual rather than actual sense) with each other. In this case, there is no available commentary at all to suggest a point of departure for a comparative study of two apparently very dissimilar bodies of philosophizing.

The historical and historiographical reasons for the general neglect of Stewart and Mill are likely complex and will not be addressed here completely; however, there is one obstacle that is obvious and must be dealt with if a convincing case is to be made both for the significance of Stewart and Mills’ works as well as for the possibility of treating their works as two sides of a dialogue. This obstacle takes the form of two bodies of commentary that have grown up around the general intellectual milieu in which both Stewart and Mill lived and worked. In particular, Stewart and Mills had connections to intellectual and ethnic communities that overlap each other to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, the division of British philosophy between these two bodies of commentary has obscured these connections and, as a result, both has devalued the contributions of Stewart and Mill to British philosophy and has obstructed the possibility of seeing commonalities that unite their bodies of work.
The first of these bodies of commentary to be considered is the scholarship on the British empiricist tradition of philosophy that grew out of the works of John Locke; in this case Stewart, despite his empiricist credentials, is excluded from consideration because of his rejection of key Lockean doctrines. Mill on the other hand, while not a canonical figure of this tradition, is nevertheless accorded a minor position in the historiography of empiricist philosophy of mind because of his doctrinal links to Locke. The exclusion of Stewart from the British empiricist tradition thus forecloses on the possibility of treating him as a participant with Mill and the rest of the empiricist philosophical tradition in the construction of a discourse on the nature and functions of the human mind.

In the second body of commentary, Stewart emerges as an underexamined but widely acknowledged member of the eighteenth century cultural and intellectual complex in Scotland that has been labeled the ‘Scottish Enlightenment.’ The body of commentary that has grown up around the Scottish Enlightenment has, however, treated the Scottish Enlightenment in narrow geographic terms by limiting its significant figures mainly to those intellectuals who remained resident in Scotland for the majority of their lives. Consequently, Mill, who was a native Scot but who produced most of his work after relocating to England, receives almost no attention in the scholarship on the Scottish Enlightenment. By erasing the boundaries between these two bodies of commentary new pathways will be opened up that will allow the works of Stewart and Mill to be

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5 Stewart’s rejection of the tabula rasa for example.
6 Bain and Halevy perhaps
juxtaposed and the manifold continuities and discontinuities between their philosophies of mind and educational projects to be thereby viewed from a new perspective.

**The Curious Historiography of British Empiricist Philosophy of Mind**

The British empiricist tradition of philosophy of mind has had a curious historiography\(^8\). In particular, the trinity of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume has long defined a particular trajectory of development in the philosophy of mind. In the typical textbook synopsis of the emergence of British empiricist philosophy of mind, these three figures have been granted canonical status as the founders and developers of both an empiricist approach to the investigation of mental phenomena and as the defenders of empiricism as the basis of mental processes as such. Locke and Hume in particular have been the objects of a voluminous secondary literature in the disciplines of both history and philosophy. Nevertheless, this clear cut historiographic narrative and the massive scholarship on Locke and Hume have obscured the complexity of the British empiricist tradition by marginalizing or even excluding a plethora of contributors and viewpoints that were actively engaged in the empiricist project of constructing a “science of the mind” in the time period from the late 17\(^{th}\) century through the 19\(^{th}\) century. During this time, empiricism informed a rich, and sometimes contentious, set of traditions of theorizing both about mental processes themselves and about the analysis of mental

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\(^8\) The term “historiography” will be used here in order to designate what historians often refer to as ‘secondary sources.’ The term “history” will refer to the events of the past itself.
phenomena. These numerous contributors and traditions, however, have received little sustained or systematic attention from either historians or philosophers.

The reasons for this neglect of the British empiricist tradition outside of the Locke-Berkeley-Hume triad are complex and worthy of detailed investigation in their own right. Here, I will only suggest a few possibilities that might have led both philosophers and historians to take such a narrow view of British empiricism. Among the more likely reasons that led many historians and philosophers to ignore the complexities of this tradition, is a persistent presentist attitude that both the history of science and the history of philosophy have only begun (incompletely) to shrug off in the last quarter century. This presentist attitude has typically taken a very narrow view of the historical development of empiricist philosophy. In particular, insofar as figures like Locke and Hume have been seen as the only significant contributors to the development of recent philosophical and psychological concerns, other figures in the British empiricist tradition have been treated as unimportant or even irrelevant to the development of the contemporary disciplines of psychology and philosophy. Presentism can even obscure figures like Stewart and Mill who were clearly important and well-known in their own temporal and cultural settings if they have been judged as insufficiently significant to later developments.

In addition, the appearance of both philosophy and psychology as disciplines within the modern university system might have accentuated this presentist

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attitude. As Graham Richards has recently argued, the practitioners of psychology have long employed historiography, and more precisely, historical rhetoric, as a method for both legitimating psychology as a valid intellectual enterprise and for distinguishing their aims and interests from those of such philosophical subdisciplines as epistemology. Consequently, the practitioners of psychology have constructed numerous historical narratives that have come to play an important role in defining past efforts to analyze mental phenomena. A key characteristic of these narratives has been a intensely presentist perspective in which these narratives retain only those elements that seem to be predecessors of what the practitioners take to be a ‘properly scientific’ psychology. Richards concludes that these narratives have tended to act as filter on the past, and their sheer number and influence has permeated historical consciousness regarding the development of analyses of mental phenomena.10

Moreover, as Edmund Reed has suggested, the differentiation of psychology and philosophy in the modern university system may have also contributed to the historiographic neglect of broad swathes of British empiricism. In this case, the issue is the institutional compartmentalization of psychology and philosophy that began to occur in the late 19th century. Reed reverses the standard historiographic account by arguing the epistemology (and, indeed, all of academic philosophy) as it is currently practiced appears in the aftermath of the emergence of experimental psychology. In the standard version of events, philosophy is taken as the offspring

10 Graham Richards…..
of an ancient western philosophical tradition that is more or less continuous from the time of Socrates to the present. Ultimately, then, contemporary academic philosophy is the remnant (or more positively, the essential kernel) left behind after psychology and the other social sciences have been hived off. Reed rejects this account in favor of one that posits contemporary academic philosophy as an invention of the late 19th century as some scholars attempted to retain a separate institutional place in the modern university for a set of concerns and issues (including investigations of mental phenomena) that were being rapidly parcelled out to a slew of new social sciences. In this scenario, modern academic philosophy follows, rather than precedes, the emergence of social science and is therefore a byproduct of the emergence of the social sciences rather than original ground from which these sciences arose and then went their separate ways.11

The relevance of Reed’s argument to the story of Stewart and Mill lies in the potential explanation it offers for the partial neglect of British empiricism by both historians and philosophers. Specifically, Reed’s account of the relatively recent emergence of academic philosophy and the social sciences in the context of the modern university system holds crucial implications for the way in which these disciplines are remembered by both their practitioners and by their historians. Rather than treating the history of analyses of human life and behavior as a continuous narrative of differentiation from a common intellectual ancestor that took the form of a self-conscious philosophical tradition, Reed’s account suggests, instead, a more discontinuous pattern of development.

11 Edmund Reed, From Soul to Mind
that threatened the intellectual legitimacy of modern academic philosophy. If it were merely reduced to a response to the newly emerging intellectual terrain of the social sciences, modern academic philosophy would lack both the authority and the autonomy that is conferred by the accumulation of discourses and the prolonged establishment of jurisdiction over the adjudication of a well-defined set of knowledge claims. Moreover, Reed’s argument also deprives modern academic philosophy of its political role as the foundation of all of the human sciences. Thus, cut adrift from its historical and political moorings and deprived of an uncontested claim to a specific intellectual domain, academic philosophy might well have been destined for irrelevancy as the new social sciences extended their dominion over virtually all aspects of thought and action.12

As a partial solution to the plight of academic philosophy in the wake of the breach with psychology, both philosophers and historians of philosophy sought to grant academic philosophy institutional legitimacy within the regime of the modern university. The strategy that these scholars devised to achieve this end consisted of defining some set of problems that would be unique to philosophical discourse and addressable only by means of philosophical methods. Perhaps unsurprisingly, some of the most important problems -- the problems that rendered academic philosophy indispensable and thus at least partially legitimate -- were issues and concerns that predated the rise of experimental psychology. By looking back to its ‘glory days’ prior to the emergence of psychology as an alternative disciplinary framework for investigating mental phenomena, modern academic philosophy found a way to secure itself an institutional niche in the modern university system. The British empiricist tradition represented one set of

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concerns that were deemed of no interest to ‘scientific’ modern psychology, while representing a major development in the philosophy of mind. Accordingly, a truncated account of the history of British empiricism, which consisted of only those versions that seemed to represent the analytical successes of philosophy at their highest level of development, came to occupy a prominent place in the consciousness of both philosophers and historians of philosophy.\textsuperscript{13}

Whether either of these two arguments provides a sufficient explanation for the blind spots of the secondary literature on British empiricist philosophy of mind is, of course, arguable. Nevertheless, even a cursory survey of bibliographic resources reveals some striking omissions in the secondary literature. Aside from Locke and Hume, British empiricism has drawn only limited attention from historians and philosophers.\textsuperscript{14} Although there is evidence of a growing interest in other figures and facets of British empiricism, this development is very recent; moreover, this literature is tightly focused on specific facets or individual figures of the history and philosophy of empiricism. Efforts to create general frameworks for interpreting these seemingly disparate facets and figures are few and number and often quite old. For example, the last general survey of the associationist branch of British empiricism that attempts to delineate its development in the works of contributors other than Locke or Hume appeared, in English, in 1915.\textsuperscript{15} Common Sense has fared somewhat better, but even here the neglect of much of the British Empiricist tradition other than Locke and Hume is evident. The last effort to

\textsuperscript{13} Edmund Reed, \textit{From Soul to Mind}
\textsuperscript{14} Halevy, \textit{The Philosophical Radicals}
\textsuperscript{15} Halevy, \textit{The Philosophical Radicals}
assess the philosophical contributions of Common Sense as a general philosophical
movement and as philosophical standpoint is over 40 years old.\textsuperscript{16}

Even more damningly, a recent study by James Buickerood has argued that
contemporary historians’ and philosophers’ view of British empiricism is so skewed and
inadequate that even the basic elements of eighteenth-century philosophy of mind have
been seriously misunderstood. In particular, Buickerood sets out to demonstrate that

\[\text{we know very little about this eighteenth-century mental geography, neither its purposes, nor its cartographic details, nor even its relations with its widely supposed inspiration in what is called with quite illusory familiarity the Newtonian method of natural philosophy.}\textsuperscript{17}

Buickerood traces these misunderstandings about the character of Enlightenment studies
of the mind to a pervasive presentist sentiment that tends to blur the conceptual and
practical distinctions that marked out the intellectual landscape of the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{18}

More specifically, Buickerood rejects what he sees as facile characterizations of the role
of Newton’s legacy in the philosophy of mind. These characterizations, Buickerood
contends, ignore more nuanced deployments of Newton’s conceptual and methodological
apparatus in eighteenth-century investigations of mental phenomena.\textsuperscript{19} Due to this failure
to grasp the complexities of Newton’s legacy, much of the existing scholarship has forced
the eighteenth-century study of the mind to conform to modern expectations about
scientific investigations rather than to the intellectual imperatives of its own time. As a
result, Buickerood concludes, modern scholarship has undermined its own ability to

\textsuperscript{16} Buickerood, 1.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 1-3.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 1-3.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 2-8
comprehend the actual methods and objectives of eighteenth-century philosophy of mind.\textsuperscript{20}

This general neglect is especially surprising when one considers that a variety of empiricist philosophies of mind were considered to be of especial importance to the intelligentsia of Britain and North America during the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries.\textsuperscript{21} For these intellectuals, and even for many key social and cultural leaders, empiricist philosophy of mind was regarded as a much more than a rarefied academic concern. In the 18\textsuperscript{th} and early 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, philosophy of mind held a central place in the efforts to construct a unified ‘science of man’ and addressed directly a wide range of social, cultural, and political issues.\textsuperscript{22} This perceived importance alone justifies an effort to investigate British empiricism and the complexities of its socio-historical development. Such an investigation is also critical for reevaluating key problems within the received version of British empiricism. Though Buickerood’s critique of the inadequacies of modern views of empiricist philosophy of mind, which was mentioned above, may be hyperbolic (or even if one regards it as such), it is not at all controversial to note that present-day understanding of the canonical figures of British empiricism may be subject to revision if their work is reframed in the context of a philosophical tradition that is recognized as far more complex and diverse than previously accepted.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 11-13
\textsuperscript{21}
\textsuperscript{22}
Empiricist Philosophy of Mind in Britain: The “Scottish Enlightenment” and British Empiricism

In order to produce a more nuanced understanding of the socio-historical dynamics of British empiricism, therefore, much basic work needs to be done. This work will have to proceed on two levels if it is to begin to remedy the inadequacies of the existing historiography. First, extensive investigations of hitherto neglected figures must be undertaken with the goal of delineating their respective contributions to British empiricism. Next, these various contributions will require a concerted effort to connect both the intellectual content of these various contributions to one another as well as linking the contributions to their larger economic, social, cultural, and political environments. If this second task is not undertaken, the overall historiography of British empiricism will certainly be enriched, but it will come to resemble a catalogue of contributors rather than leading to an understanding of the socio-historical dynamics of British empiricism as a general philosophical stance.

A number of assumptions that have limited efforts to analyze British empiricism will also have to be scrutinized, modified, or even rejected. Among the most prominent of these assumptions is the tendency to treat developments in Scotland in near isolation from developments in England under the heading of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment.’ Generally, analyses of British empiricism have bifurcated the British empiricist tradition along national lines. Specifically, historians and philosophers have designated one strand of British empiricism as the Scottish Enlightenment and have treated it as largely separate and distinct from English
developments. Although a strong case can be made for some distinctive features of the Scottish approach to philosophy of mind, an overly rigid adherence to the category of the Scottish Enlightenment has tended to isolate English and Scottish developments from each other. Given the frequent intellectual contacts between Scottish thinkers and their English counterparts as well as the dissemination of Scottish intellectual achievements throughout Britain, a compartmentalization of these two sides of the British empiricist tradition would seem only to limit any efforts to understand the dynamics of the tradition as a whole.

In addition, as a historiographic instrument, the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ is problematic for at least three geographic and temporal reasons. First, by geographically circumscribing the philosophical environment of Scotland, the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ has tended to emphasize the autonomy and unique character of Scottish intellectual history; this image of a self-contained Scottish intellectual community has, in turn, promoted two potentially misleading views of Scottish intellectual developments. On the one hand, a geographically limited understanding of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment,’ overlooks the wide influence that Scottish intellectual life had on the many non-Scots who passed through the Scottish universities, which served as key institutions for both Scottish intellectual life in particular and British intellectual life in general.24

In addition, by limiting the “Scottish Enlightenment’ to Scotland itself, the development of Scottish intellectual life in the British Empire (and even beyond) tends to be overlooked. Scottish natives, in the form of a Scottish Diaspora were active in a wide

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23 “The System of the North”

24 “The System of the North”
range of cultural, economic, and political activities from the time of the Act of Union in 1707 that had widespread effects throughout Britain and its empire and the rest of the world. Even within the specific realm of philosophy this influence is visible. In Europe and North America, for example, the Scottish philosophy of Common Sense remained an influential academic philosophy well into the nineteenth century. While it is certainly arguable that there were special characteristics that distinguished the Scottish intellectual environment from its southern neighbor, a fuller picture of Scottish intellectual development, as part of the British intellectual scene more generally, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries requires a more porous conception of the boundary between Scottish and English intellectual environments. Not only will such a perspective enhance historians’ understandings of the interactions between the Scottish and English intellectual communities, the character of the relationship between the cultural productions of England and Scotland became, as I will describe, an explicit issue in the early 19th century and provoked both consternation and criticism on both sides of the geographical and intellectual divide.

Next, the concept of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ has been circumscribed within very narrow temporal limits. In particular, the typical account of the development of the Scottish Enlightenment makes it appear that Scottish intellectual history came to a rather abrupt, and largely unexplained, end in the early 19th century. This appearance, however, is illusory. Scottish productivity in philosophical matters did not cease at that point. Indeed, Scottish natives continued to produce important philosophical works throughout

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26 Cockburn, mill, peter’s letters
the 19th century.27 Some efforts to justify the early nineteenth century as the end point of a specifically ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ that represented a special period in the cultural life of Scotland have posited such factors as the failure to create a plausible sense of national consciousness28 or that the conflicts of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras led to a retrenchment in tolerance for provocative intellectual work.29 Another thesis suggests that a decline in quality in the Scottish universities crippled the ability of Scottish thinkers to engage in innovative work.30 These explanations of an alleged decline of Scottish intellectual productivity in the early nineteenth century are difficult, however, to reconcile with the demonstrable continuation of Scottish intellectual productivity.

Moreover, there is considerable irony in the omission of cultural interchange both as a possible factor in the decline of the Scottish Enlightenment in particular and as a feature of the Scottish Enlightenment more generally. The irony lies in the paramount role that the 1707 Act of Union has been alleged to play in the subsequent cultural development of Scotland. Indeed, a robust line of historical research has even attributed the very existence of an eighteenth-century Enlightenment in Scotland explicitly to its politically and economically enforced interactions with England after 1707.31 Nevertheless, this interaction is often treated as a rather one-sided event; the Act of Union might have triggered the Scottish Enlightenment, but it apparently had few

27 One has only to mention Sir William Hamilton or Alexander Bain in order to challenge the impression of a sudden halt to Scottish intellectual life at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
28 Colin Kidd
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sustained intellectual effects on England. Additionally once the Act of Union is cited as the causal trigger of the Scottish Enlightenment, there is little further concern with the intellectual relationship between Scotland and England.\textsuperscript{32} As a result, an argument that initially invokes cultural interaction as the primary mechanism of the intellectual growth of eighteenth-century Scotland ends up only further separating the English and Scottish intellectual communities by neglecting to examine the consequences of ongoing interaction between the two communities.

Possibly, an end to the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ can be demarcated not through a decline in philosophical productivity but in terms of the loss of a distinctive Scottish cultural identity; in other words, while native Scots continued to produce abundant and high quality philosophy research but their work was no longer qualified as an exclusively \textit{Scottish} philosophy. Linda Colley’s work on British political identity in the French Revolutionary period provides an argument for just such a development. According to Colley, the conflicts between Britain and France in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries created the conditions in which the inhabitants of the island of Britain began to define themselves as ‘British’ rather than as the inhabitants of particular regions.\textsuperscript{33} Although Colley does not consider philosophical pursuits in her study, her thesis might plausibly be extended to include Scottish intellectual life. In particular, the emergence of a common British identity throughout the island could also have diluted other localized markers of cultural affiliation. Such a development might have plausibly eroded away any actual or perceived distinction between Scottish philosophy and English philosophy and subsumed both cultural types under a new ‘British’ identity. Thus, the

\textsuperscript{32} Nicholas Phillipson review in the THES decrying “Scottish exceptionalism.”
\textsuperscript{33} Linda Colley, \textit{Britons: Forging the Nation}
Scottish Enlightenment did not come to an abrupt end so much as it was assimilated into a new politico-cultural collective that erased the stark boundaries that had served to highlight it and set it apart.

More generally, Linda Colley’s thesis that Scottish and English identities merged in the early nineteenth century into a more inclusive ‘British’ identity has much evidence to recommend it as a corrective to the tendency to split apart the English and Scottish cultural communities. In particular, Colley’s conception of a growing sense of British unity, unlike the more exclusive geographic models noted above, explicitly acknowledges that Scotland and England were engaged in cultural interchange. Her thesis is especially useful if it is taken as a statement about the general collapse of barriers, including barriers to the circulation of knowledge, which had long separated the two regions. New ideas, including ideas about political identity, were no longer regionally compartmentalized such that other notions of political identity could be excluded. If a general British identity was to be established throughout the country, then enclaves of alternative identities could not be allowed to remain in place. Such enclaves would have to be, to extend the fluid metaphor, flushed out.34 Taken in this sense, Colley’s thesis is also well supported by perceptions and observations made in the early nineteenth century about the general intellectual relations between Scotland and England. From the perspective of some Scots, the greater fluidity of intellectual movement signaled a decline in the intellectual dynamism of Scotland as the key ingredients of Scottish intellectual life became diluted both by the influx of new ideas and new thinkers as well as the discharge

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of established ideas, thinkers, and institutions into the intellectual ocean of the British empire.\textsuperscript{35}

Noted Edinburgh lawyer, jurist, and meticulous diarist, Henry Cockburn, decried the effects of this larger, freer circulation of knowledge upon the intellectual life of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth- century Scotland. Remarking upon the changes that a generation of war and political turmoil had brought, Cockburn contrasted the pre-war condition of intellectual life in Scotland’s capital city with its apparent decline in the early nineteenth century: “The society of Edinburgh has never been better, or indeed so good, since I knew it as it was about this time. It continued in a state of high animation till 1815, or perhaps till 1820. Its brilliance was owing to a variety of peculiar circumstances which only operated during this period.”\textsuperscript{36} Behind the factors that Cockburn cites to account for both the rise and fall of Edinburgh’s intellectual prominence lurks an implicit metaphor of fluidity. In particular, he seems to frame the history of the intellectual life of Edinburgh as a hydrological event in which, for a brief period, a range of factors converged in such a way as to block the circuit of knowledge so that outflow became difficult and, and, as a result, Edinburgh began to fill with the intellectually gifted. Although he cites factors to account for Edinburgh’s reputation as a major intellectual center that do not obviously rely on a metaphor of fluidity, Cockburn leads off his discussion of the causes of Edinburgh’s by noting that the flow (or in this case, the suppression of the flow) of knowledge was a critical part of Edinburgh’s intellectual preeminence. He lists

\textsuperscript{35} Henry Cockburn, \textit{Memorials of His Time}, p. 197.
the survivance of several of the eminent men of the preceding age, and of curious old habits which the modern flood had not yet obliterated; the rise of a powerful community of young men of ability; the exclusion of the British from the Continent, which made this place, both for education and for residence, a favorite resort of strangers…37

as key factors that account for the convergence of so many talented individuals in Edinburgh at the same time – a convergence that gave rise to an exceedingly high density of talent and learning and made possible the vibrant intellectual community of enlightened Edinburgh.

This convergence of talent, however, was only a temporary phenomenon. Just as the tide comes in, so too does it eventually recede. Even as late as 1811, Cockburn claims, the socio-political barriers to the circulation of knowledge that had benefited Edinburgh’s intellectual life remained in place. In particular, war still channeled resources to Edinburgh:

Napoleon’s continental padlock still sent us good English youths and families…London had not absorbed the whole of our aristocracy either of wealth or of rank; and notwithstanding several important emigrations, we still retained far more native talent and reputation than could be found in any other town in the empire, except London.38

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 255-256.
By 1815, however, this situation was rapidly changing. Cockburn remarks upon this recession as the contingent barriers that had channeled so much talent to Edinburgh began to fall in the second decade of the nineteenth century. Aside from the biological transitions that eventually replaced one generation with, according to Cockburn, a less capable new generation of intellectuals, Cockburn also notes that socio-political restrictions on the movement of intellectual talent began to fall. As these barriers began to fall, Cockburn observes, two groups that had been drawn to Edinburgh and had played important roles in the intellectual life of the city began to leave. In particular, Cockburn notes that declining quality of the newest generation of intellectuals was exacerbated when “London drew away several of our best young.”  

Moreover, non-native Scots also began to leave the city and its intellectual community in droves as “[p]eace in 1815 opened the long closed floodgates, and gave to the Continent most of the strangers we used to get.” Within a few years, Cockburn concludes sadly that the Edinburgh intellectual community “was much worn out, and there was no new thing, of the same piece, to continue or replace it.” While he concedes that Edinburgh was hardly destitute of intellectual activity, he nevertheless concludes that a major change had occurred such that “the exact old thing was not.”

Across the Tweed River in England, the literary critic John Gibson Lockhart observed the intellectual intercourse between England and Scotland and drew the opposite conclusion; rather than noting a flood of intellectual refugees from the north, Lockhart instead, decried what he perceived as the continued provincialism and insularity
of Scottish intellectual life. In a trenchant critique of enlightened Scotland’s major intellectual organ, *The Edinburgh Review*, Lockhart denounced what he viewed as the cultural poverty of the Scottish intellectual scene. Lockhart laid blame for this intellectual poverty on the attitude of the Review’s editors, who Lockhart accuses of imposing “intellectual subjection” upon Scotland.\(^43\) Allegedly, the contributors and editors of the *Review* accomplished this cultural crime by through two mechanisms. On the one hand, Lockhart claims that the diffusion of knowledge has been thwarted by the editors’ and contributors’ derogatory commentary on all ideas that they found objectionable.\(^44\) More significantly, Lockhart also claims that Scotland’s cultural impoverishment is due to a conspiracy on the part of the editors to deprive Scottish readers of contact with a range of (English) intellectual developments. While Lockhart concedes that this deliberate effort to restrict access to a variety of intellectual influences includes native Scot intellectuals, he is especially incensed at what he perceives as the exclusion of English cultural figures from Scottish intellectual life. He charges, in particular, that “they [the *Review*’s editors and contributors] have entirely prevented them [the works of English cultural figures] from ever coming beyond the Tweed. [The *Review*’s editors and contributors] have willed [major English cultural figures] to be unknown, absolutely and literally unknown, and so are they at this moment.”\(^45\) Although Lockhart does not employ the hydrological metaphors that Cockburn does, he nevertheless still conceives of the relationship between Scottish and English intellectual scenes in terms of the movement (or in, this case, the lack of movement) of intellectual

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\(^43\) John Gibson Lockhart, *Peter’s Letters to His Kinsfolk*, p. 85.
\(^44\) Ibid., p. 81-84 for examples from several fields.
\(^45\) Ibid., 85.
products across boundaries. Thus, despite the apparent difference between Lockhart’s polemical characterizations of Scottish intellectual life as hostile to and nearly hermetically sealed against English culture and Cockburn’s wistful mourning for a rapidly dwindling population of intellectual companions, both observers share a similar general conception of the character of the relationship between England and Scotland. What separates them is their perspective on the movement of intellectual products between the two regions and the importance that they place on the two respective flows between Scotland and England.

Even James Mill himself apparently addressed the debate regarding the state of intellectual relations between England and Scotland. 46 Mill lays some of the blame for the lack of fertile cultural interaction between Scotland and England on the lack of “taste there still is for profound and accurate thinking in England…[and on] the indifference of the [English] people to what may be either thought or said upon” the Scottish philosophical tradition. 47 More specifically, Mill accuses one Englishman in particular, Joseph Priestley, of impeding the philosophical dialogue between England and Scotland. According to Mill, Priestley’s main crime lay in his inept attempt to attack Common Sense – an effort so clumsy that it “afforded a colour to Dr. Reid and his followers for treating [Priestley’s] book with contempt, and holding themselves exempt from the obligation of answering its objections.” 48 Mill concludes that Priestley’s ill-conceived critique had cost both English and Scottish philosophers a valuable opportunity for a

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46 I say ‘apparently’ because the article in question was authored anonymously. Nevertheless, a circumstantial case has been constructed for Mill’s authorship. See…. Ultimately, the authorship of the article is immaterial to the argument being made here; the significance of the article derives from its enunciation of a critique of English-Scottish intellectual relations.


48 Ibid, pg. 175.
critical dialogue, and more seriously, had ended any such dialogue for almost forty years.49

Nevertheless, Mill adds that the Scots have also contributed to the breakdown in philosophical dialogue. While Priestley’s blunder interrupted philosophical interchange between the two ends of the island, the Scots took active measures to exclude external influences. Echoing Lockhart’s condemnation of Scottish cultural parochialism, Mill attacks what he perceives as the insularity of the Scottish philosophical scene. In particular, Mill charges that Reid and the subsequent adherents of Common Sense have willfully attempted to block scrutiny of their philosophical doctrines under the guise of claiming to have produced an authoritative response to Hume. According to Mill, this scheme began innocently enough when “[a]n alarming system of skepticism was raised. The sect of [Common Sense] philosophers in question erect a fortification against it….”50 So far so good, but then, Mill continues, the Common Sense philosophers began to “loudly boast, as if it were impregnable…” despite the fact, Mill asserts, that “this fortification of theirs is so little calculated to answer its purpose, that it has not strength to resist the slightest attack.”51 Such unwarrantedly confident declamations of an authoritative refutation of Hume, Mill claims, “deceive mankind, and prevent the anxiety which would otherwise be felt not to have a danger without a remedy.”52 Through its rhetorical exaggerations Common Sense philosophy has illegitimately insulated itself

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., pg. 192.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. The phrase “the anxiety which would otherwise be felt not to have a danger without remedy,” seems at first glance a rather odd statement here. After all, if no threat exists, then the lack of a response (to a nonexistent threat) would hardly constitute a crisis. In context, the statement makes no sense. Mill’s intent in making this statement, as it can be discerned from his later admonition “that the learned world should begin to be aware [of the failure of Common Sense to adequately address skepticism]; and that new attempts should be speedily made to provide a real, instead of an apparent antidote to the subtle and perplexing principles of modern skepticism,” seems to indicate that he believes that the actions of the Common Sense philosophers have in fact masked a crisis for which there has been no response. Consequently, I conclude that the inclusion of the word “not” in the phrase must have been a printing error.
from the critical scrutiny that is essential to philosophical progress. As a result, Mill concludes that philosophy has stagnated in both Scotland and England.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

Regardless of the accuracy of these perceptions of Scottish and English cultural interchange, a further, and final, feature of the historiography of British empiricism has tended to occlude the intellectual relationship between Scotland and England. In particular, the naturalization of the category of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ has rendered efforts to find connections between intellectual developments and events in the two ends of England difficult. Although there were many eighteenth-century commentators on Scottish intellectual history who were well aware of the fact that Scotland was an important center of intellectual production, this awareness is not necessarily synonymous with the historiographic concept of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’. Equating the historiographic concept of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ with the self-awareness of eighteenth-century commentators can easily lead to the mistaken belief that present-day historians who refer to the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ are employing the categories and idioms of historical actors when they are writing about the eighteenth-century Scottish cultural scene.

Moreover, the assumption that the concept of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ can be taken as an unbiased and totally inclusive designation for the intellectual productions of eighteenth-century Scotland has been revealed as erroneous. In particular, Michael Brown has argued that Dugald Stewart himself gave shape to the notion that a particular subset of scholars in eighteenth-century Scotland
constituted a genuine intellectual community that shared a common outlook.\footnote{Michael Brown, “Creating a Canon: Dugald Stewart’s Construction of the Scottish Enlightenment,” p. 135, in History of Universities, vol 16, pt. 1, 2000.} According to Brown, Stewart established the boundaries of this alleged community not from any ‘natural’ or self-evident evidence of internal coherence, but in response to his perception that his views were controversial among the elite of Scottish politics and society. In self-defense against such suspicions, and against especially the dire consequences that might follow if these suspicions of his views congealed into a widely accepted conviction that he actually endorsed deviant political or moral stances, Stewart implicitly claimed membership among a group of key Scottish intellectual figures, whom he portrayed as possessing political, social, and religious credentials that were beyond reproach.\footnote{Ibid., 139-141.} Thus, Stewart attempted to shield his reputation from attack by emphasizing the continuity between his views and those of other respected members of Scottish culture so that any attempts to impugn his philosophical or political stances would have either to justify singling Stewart out from a like-minded community or to risk rejecting a substantial swath of Scotland’s recent intellectual heritage.\footnote{Ibid., 144-148.}

Although Stewart’s objectives might have been personal and local, the effect of Stewart’s wide promulgation of his view of the Scottish intellectual community has had long-lasting consequences. As Brown argues, Stewart’s portrayal of the Scottish intellectual community and its philosophical and political commitments “provides the reader with a complex and intricate paradigm for understanding what
came to be termed ‘the Scottish enlightenment’...” The local utility of the template that Stewart created, however, does not, by itself, adequately explain the role it would play in shaping the notion of the Scottish Enlightenment over the ensuing two centuries. Just as important, if not more so, was Stewart’s position as the teacher of a generation of Scottish (and English) cultural and political leaders who encouraged the broad dissemination of his, originally very personal, portrait of the Scottish Enlightenment. In the early nineteenth-century, many of Stewart’s former students left the classroom for a wide range of endeavors and took with them his philosophical methods, goals, and, more generally, his vision of the eighteenth-century Scottish intellectual community.

Similarly, Paul Wood argues, Dugald Stewart played a central, though not solitary, part in the creation of the concept of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’. Like Brown, Wood also argues that the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ as a historiographic concept is largely the invention of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century philosopher of mind Dugald Stewart who imposed very specific boundaries on the membership and concerns of the Scottish intellectual community.

Indeed, Wood argues that the majority of scholarship on the Scottish Enlightenment has mainly endorsed Stewart’s view of Scotland’s intellectual history without seriously challenging his main claims regarding its origins, membership, and achievements.

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57 Ibid., p. 150.
58 Ibid., 150-151. Brown also suggests here that “[Stewart’s] relationship to James Mill might also repay specific examination.” (p.151) This dissertation will attempt just such an analysis, though at the level of a shared methodological, epistemological, and ontological framework rather than in terms of personal interaction.

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More generally, Wood charts the complex development of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ across the last two centuries within the parameters initially laid out by Stewart. As a consequence, the over use, and especially the naturalization, of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ seems a dubious analytical move that is likely to block investigation of a philosophical movement that clearly has linkages across national boundaries.

This critique of the historiographic concept of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ should not, however, be taken as a total rejection of the concept: there is, after all, abundant evidence to support the demarcation of the eighteenth century as a special period in the cultural history of Scotland. Nevertheless, the recognition that the concept of a ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ is not simply a historical “given” whose reality must be simply acceded to but is, instead, an instrument that has been purposely created and deployed, for local and contingent reasons, in order to highlight a period in Scotland’s cultural history, marks a first step towards creating a more flexible set of conceptions for gaining new perspectives on a truly remarkable time and place.61

Once the rather arbitrary and overly rigid division of 18th and 19th century Britain into Scottish and English cultural sectors is addressed and ameliorated, it becomes evident that numerous intellectual linkages exist between the two regions. An underlying supposition of this dissertation is the axiom that an identifiable pan-Britannic empiricist tradition, composed certainly of a number of regional variants, was taking shape during

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61 Another limitation might also be noted that is not immediately relevant to this dissertation: the definition of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ as encompassing only moral philosophy. Many notable Scots and their achievements, however, are almost never subsumed under the heading of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment.’ Instead, this concept is used to designate, almost exclusively, those intellectuals who contributed to moral philosophy. Just why any conception of the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ ought to be limited to these individuals, however, is less than clear. Scotland in the eighteenth-century was the scene of an array of significant achievements across virtually the entire range of intellectual endeavors. Surely, these efforts should be integrated into any evaluation of the Scottish cultural scene?
the early modern period. Even the relatively narrow canonical narrative of the empiricist
philosophy of minds development implicitly acknowledges this point. After all, of the
three major figures of the empiricist canon, one (Locke) was English by birth, another
(Hume) was Scottish, and the third (Berkeley) was from Northern Ireland. More to the
point of this dissertation, was the widespread acceptance of a Newtonian-Baconian
epistemo-methodological viewpoint, along with the insistence on the paramount
importance of the production of useful knowledge, among the British empiricist
community. This emphasis on adopting the methods of natural philosophy to the analysis
of mental phenomena united the intellectual efforts of British philosophers of mind far
more than the Tweed River separated them.

The Normative Matrix of Early 19th Century British Philosophy of Mind

Addressing the limitations and obstacles that the traditional historiographic
frameworks have placed on many accounts of the development British empiricist
philosophy of mind represents only a partial remedy, however. Once the boundaries that
have split British empiricism geographically and intellectually have been erased, or at
least rendered more porous, it then becomes necessary to lay out a new coordinate system
in which the various contributors and their works can be located and related to each other.
In the traditional historiographic frameworks, the terrain of British empiricist philosophy
of mind was organized genealogically according to doctrinal and ethnic affiliation; in the
new map being proposed here, the basic organizing principle will be instead be derived
from the fundamental normative structure of philosophical analysis in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. Given the general agreement upon the normative
foundations of philosophical analysis during this period, this approach will elucidate a pattern of connections that cut across both ethnic and doctrinal boundaries.

Identifying and cataloguing every possible normative injunction, whether explicit or implicit, is not the intention here. Rather, the focus will be on three norms of philosophical analysis that commanded wide assent among philosophers, including Stewart and Mill, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as critical to the success of the philosophical enterprise. By attempting to express the imperatives that each of these three norms demands, both Stewart and Mill were forced to wrestle with a host of epistemological, ontological, and methodological issues. At times, one norm could simultaneously have implications for all three of these domains and require a complex set of adjustments and reconciliations between all of the norms in order to produce a coherent and consistent analysis. In their simplest forms, the three norms required the following of all legitimate philosophical analyses: first, all analyses had to derive their data from observation alone; second, all analyses had to take for granted that the identities of all observable entities remained fixed throughout time; and third, all analyses ultimately had to prove their utility by informing practical action.

Michael Foucault’s *The Order of Things* vividly describes the character and function of the first two of these norms, observation and the permanence of identity, in philosophical analysis. Foucault temporally situates these two norms during a distinctive period in the development of European knowledge that he designates as the “classical episteme.” Stretching from about 1600 to the early decades of the nineteenth century, the “classical episteme” was characterized by a set of ontological, epistemological, and

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methodological norms that served as benchmarks for guiding inquiry and for validating
the results of inquiry.⁶⁴ It is important to note that for Foucault, these norms are not
transcendental in nature; rather they are historical entities that are bound to particular
time periods.⁶⁵ Philosophers who worked during the classical episteme, like Stewart and
Mill, however, frequently wrote about, and clearly conceived of, the norms of
philosophical analysis as foundational and indisputable commandments that could be not
be ignored or discarded at will.

One of these key norms was the requirement that all evidence be derived from the
act of observation. For the philosophical investigators of the “classical episteme,”
observation, and the related act of experimentation, operated as the primary mode of
gathering information about both natural and human phenomena. By the late eighteenth-
century, most philosophers who had become famous and influential (as well as many
lesser enthusiasts and dilettantes) subscribed to observation as the central method of
philosophical analysis and placed themselves in a methodological genealogy that
stretched back in time to the two intellectual founders of the classical episteme, Isaac
Newton and Francis Bacon.⁶⁶ The role of Bacon was particularly important in
underwriting both the necessity and the validity of observation as the preeminent method
of philosophical investigation. So significant and pervasive was Bacon’s influence on
philosophy in Scotland, that one historian of the Scottish Enlightenment has dubbed the
community of scholars that emerged in that country during the eighteenth century as “the
Bacon-facing generation,” for their allegiance to Bacon’s methodological prescriptions.⁶⁷
Furthermore, the emphasis on observation during the classical episteme also promoted the acceptance of induction as the preferred method for constructing explanations of natural and human phenomena. Although the emphasis in this dissertation will be on the use and consequences of observation for the philosophical work of Stewart and Mill, induction, nevertheless, deserves some mention because of the overwhelming endorsement given to it by “classical episteme” philosophers as the best possible method for generating explanations and because of its epistemological consequences. As they had with observation, many of the most influential philosophers of the “classical episteme” viewed the effectiveness of induction as authorized by the pronouncements of Bacon and as confirmed by the natural philosophy of Newton. Beyond these exemplary exponents of induction, however, the process of generating general explanations by accumulating and scrutinizing examples of a particular phenomenon seemed to be the most reliable method for creating explanations that accorded with objective reality and that permitted the acquisition of genuinely new knowledge.68

Acting on this normative requirement that all evidence must be gathered via observation and experimentation entailed epistemological and ontological ramifications for philosophical research. In particular, as, Foucault notes, the restriction of evidence gathering to the visual modalities of observation and experimentation produced an epistemological paradox by simultaneously expanding and limiting the range of possible phenomena that were open to investigation. On the one hand, new instruments such as the telescope and the microscope greatly expanded the possible realms of observable

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entities and processes. The new emphasis on observation, in combination with these new instruments, produced a flood of new phenomena for philosophers to contend with in the early phases of the “classical episteme.”

At the same time, however, strict adherence to the requirement of observability also cast into doubt the very existence of wide range of phenomena that had held an accepted place in medieval and Renaissance philosophy. Entities or processes that were in principle non-observable, such as the so-called occult forces that had played a considerable role in Renaissance natural philosophy, or unobserved hypothetical entities that are invoked in order to facilitate explanation, were immediately rejected as inappropriate explanatory mechanisms; Stewart, in particular, rails at length against the use of such non-observable explanatory elements in his attacks on his medieval Aristotelian predecessors on the grounds that the existence of hypothetical or occult entities and forces, since they are not observable, cannot be objectively confirmed. Therefore, he advised philosophers scrupulously to eschew the use of any terms or concepts that do not refer to specific observable objects or processes.

This methodological insistence on observation also had ontological and epistemological consequences. At the level of ontology, a strict adherence to the norm of observation tended to encourage the philosophers of the “classical episteme” to treat objects of study as collections of observable properties that have converged in space and time to a particular point rather than as temporally and spatially autonomous bodies that possess a underlying substrate in which the observed properties inhere. Since these
substrates were either unobservable in principle or simply proved difficult to observe, they obviously ran afoul of the norm of observation. At best, any such postulated substrate would have the status of a ‘hypothetical’ substance and would be treated by most orthodox philosophers as a gratuitous term if it were introduced as part of an explanation. Philosophical analysis during the “classical episteme” thus largely disdained any overt search for, or the theoretical invocation of, essences, substances, or other hidden levels of reality that might serve as ontological skeletons for the observable qualities of objects.72

Although other factors were in play, one of the most obvious causalities of the normative rejection of non-observable entities or processes were materialist doctrines.73 During the “classical episteme,” materialism, taken as an ontological doctrine, violated the prescription of observation, at least from the perspective of many orthodox philosophical practitioners. This violation appeared most obviously in materialist doctrines that proposed materiality as the ultimate cause of all observed phenomena. While it might just be barely conceivable under the norms of the “classical episteme” that some observable phenomena owed their existence and qualities to an underlying material substrate, the effort to reduce all phenomena to a material substrate ran head on into serious difficulties. In particular, the observable properties of the mind, for example, seemed to defy any effort to reduce them to a purely material cause, and, in any case, materialism could not produce convincing empirical evidence that the observed properties of the mind were specifically and directly related to the observed material properties of the brain. At best, as Stewart notes, all that can be observed is a general

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correlation between the observed properties of the mind and the observed properties of the brain. Consequently, the normative structure of the “classical episteme” forbade reductionist materialism as a legitimate ontology on the grounds that such reductions could not be demonstrated adequately through observation.

Despite periodic attempts to ground observable phenomena in a material substrate during the “classical episteme,” therefore, most of these efforts attracted only minimal support within the philosophical community. For the most part, supporters of materialist doctrines were pushed to the margins of the philosophical community, and they tended to be excluded from many of the community’s supporting institutions. Further marginalization could also occur since religious and nominally secular political authorities linked reductionist materialism to socially disruptive ideologies. Under these circumstances, Stewart and Mill, although they had rather different goals for their philosophies of mind, both rejected reductionist materialism in favor of a more acceptable ontology that divided phenomena into material and spiritual categories on the basis of distinctive observable characteristics. Given that both philosophers ultimately aspired to prominent public positions, their rejection of reductionist materialism was not only endorsed by methodological, ontological, and epistemological norms of the “classical episteme” but also by the social and political norms that governed the philosophical community, and indeed, the broader societies in which they lived.

Out of this methodologically-driven epistemology that firmly rejected unobservable entities or processes as a form of evidence, a subtle but crucial shift in the
orientation of philosophical inquiry emerged during the “classical episteme.” Limited to
the purely observational qualities of objects and sensitive to criticisms that earlier
philosophical traditions had undermined intellectual progress by unjustifiably fabricating
hypothetical entities that could not be demonstrated to exist, philosophers of the
“classical episteme” tended to shift the focus of their inquiries from determining what
entities are to a preoccupation with what can be known about entities. In other words,
philosophers of the “classical episteme” tended to engage in what Graham Richards has
called “epistemization.”78 According to Richards, the strict requirements of empiricism
discouraged overt discussion of, or appeal to, the ontological dimension of phenomena
and encouraged, instead, a self-reflective attitude towards the defining the limits of
knowledge as an explicit part of philosophical inquiry.79

Whereas, prior to the advent of the “classical episteme,” philosophers might have
been comfortable with introducing hypothetical entities into their theoretical work if
those entities served a logically justifiable explanatory function, by the seventeenth
century, such use of hypothetical entities had come to be seen as an impediment to
theorizing and explanation.80 Stewart is especially critical of what he views as his
philosophical predecessors’ tendency to fabricate hypothetical entities whenever
empirical evidence was lacking. While these hypothetical entities might have produced a
satisfying explanation, it is not at all clear, Stewart contends, that the result of
unrestrained hypothesizing was a correct explanation. However superficially rigorous
and plausible the arguments of medieval and Renaissance philosophers might appear to

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be, Stewart concludes, the frequent invocation of unobservable elements undermined the
veracity of their theories by requiring belief in nondemonstrable elements.81

The proliferation of such theories and explanations, furthermore, inhibited
genuine intellectual progress, which Stewart understands as the discovery and
accumulation of previously unknown facts, by creating pseudo-controversies over the
significance of theoretical terms that refer to unobservable entities.82 Bogged down in
disputes over the meaning of terms that had no direct reference to demonstrable entities,
medieval and Renaissance philosophers expended vast amounts of time and energy
pursuing intellectual phantoms. Since these theoretical terms did not and could not be
linked to any demonstrable entities, any debate over them was, in short, an utter waste of
time. Without a methodological norm like the requirement of observation, medieval and
Renaissance philosophers had no means for distinguishing between fruitful evidence and
futile hypothesizing. As a result, Stewart argues, the presence of a methodological norm
that overtly recognized the limits of human knowledge was crucial to intellectual
progress because it would encourage efficient theorizing by preventing irresolvable
disputes over nondemonstrable theoretical entities.83

Keith Baker, in his study of the French Enlightenment figure Condorcet, has also
noted this feature of philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Baker refers
to this self-reflexive concern with the limits of knowledge as “epistemological
modesty.”84 Once again, as was the case with Richards’ notion of “epistemization,” there
is an acknowledgement of a fundamental limit to human knowledge. {Baker quote about

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the ‘plumbing the depths of the Ocean of Being’}. The knowledge that is obtained from observation is thus knowledge of the surface of reality. While philosophers of the “classical episteme” acknowledged, as Baker’s quotation implies, that objective reality almost certainly encompassed more than observation revealed, they also insisted that knowledge of the unobservable was both epistemologically and practically denied to human beings. Access to the “Ocean of Being” was denied epistemologically since its qualities were not perceptible via the senses; access to the “Ocean of Being” was denied practically since any statements about its qualities were inherently speculative and thus injurious to process of creating accurate characterizations of phenomena.

The notion of “epistemization” that Richards advances and that Baker implicitly supports also addresses a concern that is raised in S.A. Grave’s philosophical study of Common Sense philosophy. In particular, Grave examines in detail the double insistence by Common Sense philosophers like Dugald Stewart that their philosophical investigations, and really all knowledge, should rely upon observation, as the most secure methodological technique, but that knowledge was also grounded upon a set of beliefs that were certainly observable but whose truth was not demonstrable by the methods of philosophical analysis. These beliefs were taken by Common Sense philosophers as essential if any knowledge at all was to exist; among many others, Common Sense philosophers cited a belief in one’s own existence, the belief that effects follow causes, and the belief in the existence of an external objective world as absolutely necessary if...

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85 Grave’s study remains the only account of Common Sense that attempts to synthesize the works of its major eighteenth-century proponents.

86 Grave’s study remains the only account of Common Sense that attempts to synthesize the works of its major eighteenth-century proponents.
anyone was to be able to organize the flood of sense experience that continually assaulted the senses. 88

Denial of beliefs such as these would completely undermine, Common Sense philosophers argued, any claim to possession of knowledge of any sort. Rejection of the beliefs of Common Sense would result not just in erroneous knowledge, which of course could still be well-organized and systematic, but in the complete impossibility of a coherent understanding of experience. Indeed, Common Sense philosophers asserted that it was not even genuinely possible for a cognitively normal person to deny these beliefs; even if verbal denials were issued, it was virtually certain that all cognitively normal people would nevertheless continue to act as though they believed the fundamental truths of Common Sense. Only cognitively disordered individuals might display both speech and acts that violated the dictates of Common Sense beliefs – and the consequences of their behavior would certainly present a convincing proof not only of the utility of Common Sense beliefs but also the necessity of them as the foundation of both knowledge and, ultimately, of appropriate action.89

Grave’s study however raises critical questions about the status of these beliefs of Common Sense. Grave is especially concerned with the compatibility within Common Sense between the assertion of the necessary existence of a body of foundational, but non- demonstrable, beliefs and the insistence upon a strictly empirical methodology that restricts itself to observation.90 For example, Common Sense philosophy demands that the acquisition of knowledge requires unquestioning assent to the belief that individual
identity persists over time; in other words, a coherent understanding of reality requires the existence of a knower whose own existence as a specific, self-identifiable knower remains stable for some measurable span of time. Observation, however, cannot confirm the claim advanced by this belief. As many empiricist philosophers (perhaps most famously was David Hume) had pointed out, observation of one’s own identity reveals that the self is constantly in flux and appears to lack a solid foundation for a belief in a fixed identity. Although cognitively normal people might believe that they possess a fixed identity and act accordingly, empiricist philosophy cannot provide any proof that belief in the fixity and persistence of individual identity is warranted. On the contrary, empiricist philosophy actually seems to show, though does not prove, just the opposite position is more likely to be true. Consequently, the assertion of these non-demonstrable beliefs by Common Sense philosophers seems in tension with a strictly empiricist methodology.91

If Common Sense is to be regarded as consistent philosophy, then the status of Common Sense beliefs will have to be clarified. In his effort to achieve this goal, Grave argues that the foundational beliefs of Common Sense possessed a double nature. On the one hand, the beliefs of Common Sense can be viewed as simply straightforward empirical claims about human experience. Whether cognitively normal human beings believe that such statements as “there exists an objective reality that is ontologically independent from subjective mental events” or that “individuals, despite undergoing constant change, retain a fixed identity that is temporally invariant” are true can be treated as a series of hypotheses that are open to testing. Individuals can be presented

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with such statements and asked to affirm or deny them. From such a scenario it should be possible to determine whether or not cognitively normal individuals universally hold the beliefs of Common Sense philosophy to be either true or false.\footnote{92} Note that the issue here is not whether there actually is a realm independent of subjective experience or that there actually exists some form of permanent individual identity. The only claim that is being tested is whether cognitively normal people would universally either assent to or deny the truth of statements with particular ontological implications.

Conversely, Graves contends that Common Sense, despite its avowed commitment to a strictly empirical methodology, left room for consideration of certain non-empirical aspects of its fundamental beliefs. In particular, Graves argues that Common Sense beliefs possessed a non-empirical character that supplemented their empirical form as testable hypotheses.\footnote{93} Here Graves is distinguishing between ascertaining, on the one hand, that a certain set of beliefs is both universally held and is necessary for knowledge, and, on the other hand, that the content of the beliefs is true in actuality. In Grave’s words,

\begin{quote}
if for common sense, being there when no one is there is \textit{being} there, the word stubborn against any hypothetical paraphrase, then common-sense belief in the existence of material things when they are not perceived includes what we are calling a ‘metaphysical’ component.\footnote{94}
\end{quote}
So, according to Grave, Common Sense was not merely cataloguing subjective notions about objective reality and their function in making experience comprehensible; it was also making affirmative claims about objective reality as it exists independently of any subjective perspective. It is this feature of Common Sense that Grave denotes as the “metaphysical component” of the set of Common Sense beliefs.

According to Grave this (alleged) feature of Common Sense philosophy proved both helpful and problematic to its proponents. Common Sense claims such as the existence of a fixed and persistent personal identity and the independent existence of an objective reality played a key role in addressing the arguments of contemporary philosophical skeptics, many of which tended to be associated with the rival Lockean philosophical tradition. Without a set of claims about objective reality itself, Grave argues, Common Sense would have faced two interrelated problems. First, in the absence of set of propositions that affirmed the actual existence of an objective reality that was independent of any subjective perspective, Common Sense would have devolved into a simple set of claims about the subjective mental states of cognitively normal humans and the role that those claims play in creating a coherent subjective map of experience. Although addressing these issues would illuminate some aspects of the subjective landscape, no indication whatsoever could be offered either of the character of objective reality or of the relationship between subjective mental events and objective reality. At the very least then, Common Sense would fail to achieve the capacity for linking subjective mental experience to objective reality that it claimed to provide as the antidote
against the skeptics who claimed that human beings could have no knowledge of objective reality.\textsuperscript{95}

Secondly, and more seriously, the lack of what Grave has called a “metaphysical component” would, he contends, have left Common Sense philosophy unable to differentiate itself from its skeptical Lockean opponents. In this case, Common Sense would have done worse than simply to have failed to reach its stated goal. Without some mechanism for connecting the subjective realm to the world of objective reality, Common Sense would itself become a form of skepticism.\textsuperscript{96} Grave makes this claim on the basis of his observation that contemporary skeptics like David Hume were arguing that that it is impossible for human beings to know anything about objective reality that exists independently of subjective mental states. Nevertheless, as Hume concludes so eloquently at the end of Book I of his \textit{Treatise of Human Nature}, this inability to escape the subjective realm in no way means that human beings need despair that they will be unable to function effectively, or even at all, in the world. On the contrary, Hume observes that a lack of direct knowledge about objective reality ultimately matters little to human life since human beings seem compelled both to believe and to act as though subjective experience accords with objective reality.\textsuperscript{97} If Common Sense remained limited simply to the empirical question of the character and function of the beliefs of cognitively normal human beings, then it would find itself arriving at exactly the same conclusion that Hume had already reached that most human beings assent to the same set of beliefs that are purely subjective in character, yet treat these beliefs as perfectly

\textsuperscript{95} \textsuperscript{96} \textsuperscript{97} Hume...
representative of objective reality. In this sense, Graves contends, a Common Sense philosophy that could not make unquestionable assertions about objective reality would have merely reinforced the skeptical conclusion that actual knowledge about objective reality was impossible.98

Finally, then, despite its avowed rejection of nonobservable entities or processes, Common Sense was forced to make affirmative claims about objective reality that were not open to empirical analysis in order to stave off skepticism. Grave’s account does not criticize Common Sense for this apparent violation of the “classical episteme’s” normative order; rather he argues for its necessity. Otherwise there is no way for a purely empirical philosophy to avoid the inevitable skeptical conclusions that forever separates the subjective realm from objective reality. The only concern that he does raise about Common Sense’s strategy of affirming metaphysical claims as a means of thwarting skepticism regards the interaction of the empirical and metaphysical content of Common Sense beliefs. In particular, he argues that Common Sense philosophers neither integrated these two dimensions of Common Sense into a coherent philosophical system nor did they fully appreciate the that the beliefs of Common Sense did in fact possess a two-sided character.99

The failure by Common Sense philosophers to acknowledge the empirical and metaphysical character of Common Sense beliefs created two difficulties for Common Sense philosophy as it attempted both to address challenges from critics and to analyze the properties and functions of the mind. When critics challenged the beliefs of Common Sense as being either false or illusory, the failure of Common Sense philosophers to
identify and integrate the empirical and metaphysical dimension of their beliefs often led them to misperceive the goal of the critics’ complaints. Some critics, especially skeptical critics, would attack the assumption of access to objective reality as an unwarranted metaphysical assumption; according to Grave, all too often Common Sense philosophers would treat such a criticism as a challenge to the empirical, rather than to the metaphysical content, of Common Sense beliefs. Consequently, they would talk past their opponents by providing an empirical defense of Common Sense belief rather than defending their metaphysical commitments or by challenging their opponents’ own metaphysical assumptions.100

While the failure to distinguish and integrate the empirical and metaphysical dimensions of Common Sense generated a great deal of confusion and miscommunication between Common Sense and its opponents, a greater problem lurked within Common Sense philosophy itself. Specifically, Graves contends, an inadequate analysis of the internal structure of Common Sense hamstrung attempts by Common Sense philosophers to resolve incoherencies with Common Sense. Lacking a clear delineation between the empirical and metaphysical dimension of their foundational beliefs, Common Sense philosophers found themselves constantly running into inconsistencies that were generated by their simultaneous commitment to the norm of observation and to their necessary and inevitable metaphysical commitments. Since the norm of observation, if applied rigorously and consistently, seems to rule out any *empirical* justification for the metaphysical commitments of Common Sense, it becomes imperative that Common Sense philosophers clearly distinguish the empirical and

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metaphysical content of their beliefs so that each dimension can be articulated and
defended by the appropriate methods. If there is no such clear distinction in place, then it
is likely, and indeed was the case, Grave argues, that Common Sense philosophers will
end up inadvertently undermining the foundations of their philosophy by deploying
inappropriate forms of evidence and argumentation to the two facets of their beliefs.101

The “epistemization” of ontological problems that Richards notes, and the
existence of which Baker implies, casts Grave’s concern over the metaphysical and
empirical dimensions of Common Sense philosophy in a new light. Specifically, the
tendency of philosophers in the “classical episteme” to translate ontological problems,
which were technically beyond their purview, into epistemological problems that, so long
as they are restricted to observable entities or processes, were methodologically
accessible, resolves Grave’s concern over the incoherence of Common Sense. Rather
than treating Common Sense philosophers as confused about the internal structure of
Common Sense, the notion of “epistemization” permits a new understanding of Common
Sense as a developing philosophical system in which new domains of phenomena were
increasingly being brought under its gaze. What Grave sees as the blurring of
metaphysical and empirical dimensions of philosophical investigation was thus the overt
and ongoing translation of ontological phenomena into epistemological phenomena under
the “classical episteme’s” norm of observation.

While Baker’s view of the limits of human knowledge accords with Richards’
similar notion about the epistemological boundaries that must be imposed in order to
effectively theorize, Baker’s quotation points to another feature of the norm of

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observation. Specifically, the methodological norm of observation not only encouraged an intensely self-reflective epistemological stance among “classical episteme” philosophers, but was also intertwined with a particular view of the structure of knowledge, and ultimately, of reality itself. These views on knowledge and reality will appear, implicitly and explicitly in Stewart and Mills’ works, but Foucault’s *The Order of Things* provides a detailed summary of these features of the “classical episteme” and their consequences for the act of theorizing.

Observation, as the initiatory act of theorizing in the “classical episteme,” did not occur randomly; rather, as Foucault points out, observation was conducted with the goal of producing a structure for knowledge that took the form of “natural history”. Just as the ordinary sense of the term indicates, the philosophers of the “classical episteme” sought to identify and organize entities according to their properties. This definition of natural history however, is less helpful than it might first appear since the procedure for constructing natural histories is not self-evident. There are, and historically have been, multiple protocols for identifying and classifying entities that are internally consistent and that derive their validity from the numerous iterations of underlying epistemological, ontological, and methodological norms across a range of phenomena. Accordingly, the answer to the basic question of natural history (which features of entities are sufficiently distinctive so as to identify entities conclusively and to distinguish them unambiguously from other types of entities?) has varied widely depending upon the configuration of the intellectual normative matrix in which efforts at natural history took place.
The notion that the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment were engaged in the construction of a natural history is not unique to Foucault. Other scholars have also noted the presence of a natural historical perspective in the works of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. Paul Wood and Roger Emerson, for example, have both examined the role of natural history in the Scottish Enlightenment and have contributed significantly towards establishing its presence and utility for the philosophical work of the era. Nevertheless, both works suffer from a limited view of the character of natural history that reduces its value as an explanatory instrument. In particular, most of Emerson’s effort is devoted to establishing that a natural history paradigm actually informed Scottish Enlightenment philosophy by identifying and examining in detail the work of an advocate and practitioner of natural history. Certainly, this is no small contribution, since it confirms the presence of natural history in the methodological toolbox of the Scottish philosophers; however, while Emerson’s exposition broadens our knowledge of what at least one philosopher claimed to be doing, it does not tell us very much about what the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment more generally were actually doing with the natural historical paradigm.

Moreover, neither Emerson’s nor Wood’s article has much to say about the character of the natural historical paradigm. Neither scholar provides a contextualized discussion of natural history that delves into its methods and norms. The concept of natural history is also extremely underdeveloped in both scholars’ works. Even Wood, who makes more extensive arguments for the presence and the importance of the natural history paradigm to the Scottish Enlightenment than does Emerson, provides only a
general definition of natural history – and this definition first appears on page 25 of his essay on natural history in the Scottish Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{104} Essentially both scholars seem to have simply treated natural history as a historically neutral process of classification. Although natural history is the practice of creating classification schemes, it is not all self-evident that either the criteria for classification or the process by which these criteria are articulated and elevated to the status of guiding principles are ahistorical in character.

The value of Foucault’s work in \textit{The Order of Things} lies in its sensitivity to the changing character of classification over time. By offering a detailed analysis of the practice of natural history that identifies the norms, Foucault opens up the possibility of teasing out the specific natural historical structure of the philosophical works of the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers.

The utility of Foucault’s analysis of the normative structure of the “classical episteme” appears, for example, in his discussion of the role that the norm of observation plays in the process of assigning identities to objects. In particular, the “classical episteme’s” insistence on the methodological norm of observation tended to produce a natural history in which entities were related in a negative association. In this kind of association, entities are distinguished from one another through variations among a select set of observable characteristics that are presumed to obtain across the entirety of all entities. In other words, the natural history scheme of the “classical episteme” identified, and subsequently classified, entities by a process of eliminating observable characteristics that a given entity held in common with all other entities until only a residual set of unique characteristics remained. Thus, the primary method of classification sought out a
minimum degree of observable difference as the basis for designating the boundary between one type of entity and other types of entities.¹⁰⁵

Moreover, the importance of observation, and its attendant epistemological and ontological features, also shaped the abstract space in which the natural history of the “classical episteme” arrayed observable entities. Since the rigid insistence upon observation ruled out the invocation of nonobservable entities or processes as legitimate forms of evidence, the basic organizational principles of natural history could obviously only rely upon observable features, but here the full implications of the criterion of observability become apparent. That is, if observable characteristics are to serve as the means for identifying and distinguishing entities from each other, then those characteristics must be permanently observable, and they must be a set of characteristics that can be observed across the entirety of objective reality. If these two criteria are not met, then any natural historical scheme will map, at best, only a portion of objective reality and likely do a very poor job of it.

For instance, if the passage of time could alter distinguishing characteristics, then entities could become unidentifiable. Similarly, if the chosen set of characteristics could not be extended to all entities, then the natural historical scheme would only be able to partially catalog objective reality; thus rather than a single catalog organized around a single classificatory protocol emerging from philosophical analysis, there might of necessity have to be multiple incommensurable natural histories devised in order to organize rationally all observable phenomena. In the context of an intellectual period that
sought a unified understanding of objective reality, such an outcome was, not surprisingly, generally regarded as intolerable.106

Taken in combination with the epistemologically inspired aversion to ontological speculation, the apparent requirement that the organizational scheme of natural history be founded on fixed and universal attributes of entities would confront Stewart and Mill with two onto-epistemological constraints that would seriously affect their ability to adapt the philosophy of mind to newly emerging social and political demands. Both of these constraints grew out of the role, or rather the lack of a role, for an autonomous conception of time in the “classical episteme.” In particular, as Foucault points out, by deemphasizing the ontological realm, the “classical episteme” produced a structure of knowledge that tended to give priority to spatial relations as the primary organizing principle of natural history. Entities were scaled according to their relative dissimilarity – dissimilarities that were gauged according to a set of observable characteristics that appeared across all entities. Immediately juxtaposed entities in the natural historical catalogue were therefore most similar, while the distance between entities determined the degree of differentiation. The end result of this scaling was a continuous ranking of entities that admitted no gaps or discontinuities between adjoining entities in the natural historical catalogue. Even infinitesimal differences in the established set of key characteristics would serve, at least in theory, to distinguish one entity from another.107

In the context of the “classical episteme,” this scaling of entities represented a version of the so-called “Great Chain of Being” that had long been a part of the European

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{106}}} \text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{107}}}\]
conception of the order of knowledge and of nature and in which all entities were
hierarchically related according to their position in a continuous succession of entities.108

Moreover, the spatial metric that differentiated entities from one another in the
natural historical scheme of the “classical episteme” also implied that the identity of
entities had to be temporally fixed. Since the identity of a particular entity depended
upon a specific spatial relationship to all other entities in the natural historical catalogue,
it was essential that the position of all entities remain fixed. The basis of this fixed
spatial relationship between all entities was, to reiterate, a universal set of observable
characteristics that also had to remain fixed if distinctions between entities were to be
maintained. At the foundation of the natural historical order of the “classical episteme”
then, was the normative requirement that entities could not be conceived in such a way
that they would undergo changes in their essential identifying characteristics lest the
entire order of the natural historical catalogue disintegrate into chaos.

For individual entities, the normative requirement that they be conceived of as
possessing a minimum number of fixed and unalterable defining characteristics also
meant that the “classical episteme” could not entertain a robust concept of development.
Here the concept of development refers to the process by which entities can alter their
forms in dramatic ways according to an underlying set of imperatives that are typically
expressed across time. Since these underlying imperatives are expressed across time,
they are typically not observable at any given instant, but are only evident by comparing
a current manifestation of the entity with a past one in order to establish a temporal link
between what might be radically dissimilar entities at the level of observation at any
given moment. In short, what the “classical episteme’s” normative matrix could not effectively grapple with was the concept of a series of continuous changes through time in which the observable features of an entity would undergo a radical metamorphosis and yet retain a continuous identity across the entire sequence of changes. Under the normative requirements of the “classical episteme” such radical change would destroy the basis for identifying an entity and for securely distinguishing it from other entities. If all characteristics could change over time, then, a “classical episteme” philosopher might ask, how could the identity of entities ever be established?

The answer to this question would be provided in the nineteenth century by the rise of developmental ontologies that established an autonomous role for time in producing the identities of, and the distinctions between, entities. Rather than the spatial metric that characterized the “classical episteme’s” natural history catalogue, the natural history of the later nineteenth century would be grounded upon a temporal metric that would link observationally disparate entities together as momentary expressions of an unfolding process that existed, and was only apparent, as a purely temporal phenomenon. By the middle of the nineteenth century, a host of theories would emerge that would rely heavily upon temporal processes as the foundation of their explanations in both the natural and the human domains. Among the two most influential would be Darwin’s work on natural selection and Marx’s political economy. In both cases, the primary problem centered on the delineation not only of types of organisms and social structures, but more importantly, on the continuous transformations that life and society had undergone through time. Such temporal phenomena, in which a sequence of
temporally linked transformations, rather than an atemporal fixity, provided a basis for identity and classification that would be nearly inconceivable in the context of the “classical episteme,” which insisted upon fixity of key characteristics as the foundation of all knowledge.

In Foucault’s account of the “classical episteme’s” normative structure, temporal phenomena are treated in purely negative terms as the absence of a norm. While this is strictly correct, such a treatment makes it rather difficult to talk about how “classical episteme” philosophers attempted to reconcile the normative methodological, epistemological, and ontological requirement for fixed observable characteristics with the observations of changes in the features of entities. Instead of noting a concept that these philosophers did not possess, Foucault’s indication of an absence of a norm will be here converted into the positive expression of a norm that rejected temporality as an autonomous factor in the formation of entities’ identities. Consequently, the “classical episteme’s” normative requirement of fixed, universal characteristics as the foundation of its natural history catalogue will from here onward be referred to as the norm of ‘ontological stasis.’ This phrase will be used to capture the positive requirement that the defining characteristics of entities remain fixed across time if they are to serve as adequate markers for identification and classification.

In combination, the norms that endorsed observation and ontological stasis tended, Foucault contends, to produce not only a particular structure of knowledge, but also an image of that structure that influenced how philosophers of the “classical episteme” understood and treated knowledge itself. Specifically, the interaction of the
two norms overall produced what Foucault has described as two-dimensional “grid of knowledge” in the “classical episteme.” The structure of knowledge is imagined as two-dimensional because of the limited, and ideally non-existent, role of ontological speculation in “classical episteme” theorizing. Since non-observable terms are not permitted in “classical episteme” theories, knowledge is limited to the observable surfaces of entities. The result is an image of knowledge that is depthless since appeals to underlying, and thus non-observable, forces or entities is forbidden by the norms of the classical episteme. There is, in other words, no philosophically accessible realm ‘beneath’ or ‘behind’ the observable surfaces of entities that can be invoked as reputable evidence.

Additionally, the spatialization of the “classical episteme’s” natural historical catalogue endows it with a grid-like character in which distinguishable entities are pigeon-holed in precise locations with respect to their relative degree of dissimilarity from one another. Once again, this image of the structure of knowledge leaves little room for development over time. Since the identity of each entity in the grid relies in part on the ability of observers to distinguish it from even the most similar neighbor, the identities of all entities ultimately are tied to each other. Consequently, there is little room for the temporal development of one entity; such a transmutation of one entity would inevitably affect all the adjoining entities in the grid as well by shifting the basis for comparison and contrast of key characteristics. Not only would development disturb the relationship between adjoining entities, its disruptive effects would ripple across the entirety of the grid and destabilize all relations of identity and dissimilarity throughout
the grid of knowledge. Rejecting the possibility of development, or more accurately not conceiving of it at all, was, therefore, the only way for philosophers of the “classical episteme” to retain a stable set of relations between the key identifying characteristics of entities. Without this stable, temporally fixed relationship between entities, and more precisely between the sets of identifying characteristics of entities, it would be impossible to sustain a clear, or even coherent, image of the organization of knowledge.113

The lack of a notion of development does not mean, however, that the “classical episteme” lacked notions of time or of change. Rather, the “classical episteme” conceptualized time and change in terms of spatial metaphors that denied an autonomous status to time as an ontological feature of entities. Time (as well as related notions like change) was conceived of as being analogous to observable motion in space. Time could thus be measured, in the same way that motion could, as increasing distance from a designated starting point.114 Moreover, just as mere motion did not change the essential identifying characteristics of entities, so too, the mere passage of time was not capable of altering those same essential features. Ontologically, this conception of time as a form of motion ruled out the possibility of the temporal creation of, or the annihilation of, essential identifying characteristics. To the extent that change over time was even possible, such change could only occur by the reorganization of the existing constituent parts of an entity. Such reorganization might produce a superficial change in the appearance of an entity, but it would not fundamentally alter the entities’ identity since the set of defining characteristics would be left intact.115
Although time was conceived of in spatial metaphors during the “classical episteme,” and thereby denied ontological autonomy from spatiality, the culture of the “classical episteme” nevertheless included a temporal dimension in many of its intellectual productions. Historical research, for example, emerged as an important area of investigation during the “classical episteme.” Along with its many other achievements, the Scottish Enlightenment produced numerous historical works, and both Stewart and Mill, in particular, made significant historiographic contributions.116 Furthermore, the Scottish Enlightenment made important contributions to social analysis via so-called “stadial” theories of human socio-economic development. Scottish philosophers such as Adam Smith, devised schemes that attempted to classify human societies into distinct types according to their level, or stage (hence the name) of social and economic organization. While the “stadial” classification system was applied synchronically to extant societies, it was also applied diachronically as well to describe the various socio-economic conditions that have existed since the origins of humankind.117 This latter use of stadial theories resulted in a form of historical analysis that Stewart labeled “conjectural history.”118 According to Stewart, “conjectural history” introduces a classificatory schema into historiography that permits the orderly presentation of the empirical data retrieved from historiographic research.119

Whatever, its designation, the main objective of “classical episteme” historiography was often the description of the progressive removal of impediments to rational understanding and action. History, as a process, was portrayed as progressive,
though not as creative: rather than bringing new forms of social, cultural, economic, and political life into being, history merely made possible an inherent capacity for rationality that various accidental events and forces had thwarted.\textsuperscript{120} Even the “stadial” theories that classified past societies according to levels of complexity were only superficially developmental in character. Unlike robustly developmental theories of social growth, the “stadial” theories presented only a static classification of past societies that described the succession of social types. The “stadial” theories lacked causal mechanisms that could explain how a society could transform itself into a fundamentally new form, such that its previously defining characteristics at specific points in time were utterly annihilated, but without creating a discontinuity in its identity with its previous organizational structure.\textsuperscript{121}

In order to clarify this point, a comparison with the superficially similar stadial theories of Karl Marx will reveal the difference between a developmentally-based episteme and a non-developmental episteme. More specifically, Marx’s claim that human societies can be categorized, both spatially and temporally, into a finite number of socio-economic types appears, at first glance, to be simply a reiteration of Smith’s stadial theory. Nevertheless, this first impression is misleading; unlike Smith’s presentation of discrete typology of socio-economic forms, Marx links the appearance of different socio-economic types through time by means of “the dialectical movement of history.”\textsuperscript{122} Marx argues that appearance of specific socio-economic forms is the visible, epiphenomenal expression of a largely invisible process that is thoroughly temporal in character. Like

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Smith, Marx locates the defining characteristic of specific socio-economic forms in the unique system of economic production that each socio-economic form possesses. In Marx’s view, however, these unique systems of economic production do not remain temporally static as they do in Smith’s stadial theory. Instead, Marx proposes that the explanation for the appearance and disappearance of successive socio-economic forms is the result of the buildup and then the resolution of “contradictions” with the system of production that are produced by the operation of the system of production itself. Over time, the operation of the system of production begins to undermine its own ability to function, even as the production system’s operation remains crucial for the maintenance of a particular socio-economic form.

The ultimate resolution of these self-inhibiting, and indeed, self-defeating, contradictions within the system of production, takes the form of the creation of a new, fundamentally different system of production. This new system of production, however, does not emerge from a simple reconfiguration of the existing system of economic production. According to Marx, such a reconfiguration would not genuinely resolve the contradictions that inhere in a particular system of economic production since the source of contradiction arises from the operation of the totality of the system of economic production. Hence, the elements that are responsible for the contradictions will remain in place so long as the system of production continues to operate. A popular saying captures the futility, from Marx’s perspective of attempting to resolve the internal contradictions of a faltering system of economic production. In particular, the comparison of such efforts to ‘rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic’ colorfully illustrates Marx’s point regarding the efficacy of mere reform of the system of production: no matter how much
effort is expended in such reforms, collapse of the entire socio-economic form under the weight of a growing number of contradictions remains inevitable so long as the system of production as a whole remains on the same operational trajectory.

The contradictions are resolved not by compromise but by the creation of a new means of production that both obviates the contradictions of the former stage of development and, ultimately, creates the conditions for new types of contradictions to emerge. In this case, history, conceived of here as a temporal process is creative, and it produces new kinds of socio-economic organizations that did not previously exist. Nevertheless, present and former socio-economic forms still remain linked because such forms are taken as observable expressions of a temporal process that is itself nonobservable at any given moment. Only by observing a succession of otherwise apparently disconnected socio-economic forms, does it become possible to infer the action of this non-observable force. Such an inference was not permissible within the normative matrix of the “classical episteme,” which limited itself to immediately observable phenomena. Consequently, the “classical episteme’s” temporal classification schemes manifested themselves in the form of the temporally ordered but static “stadial” theories. Because the dialectical process is revealed only by extrapolation from its observable expressions and cannot be observed directly, Marx’s developmentalism is not available to the “classical episteme.”

The third norm, which does not appear in Foucault’s examination of the “classical episteme,” requires that the process of philosophical analysis does not terminate with the creation of a theory; instead, philosophical analysis must unite theory with practice in order to produce some useful outcome. This norm of the “classical episteme” has its roots
ultimately in Francis Bacon’s methodological revolution. In addition to advocating both a wide-ranging form of empiricism and induction as the only valid investigatory techniques, Bacon also insisted that the ultimate purpose of philosophical investigation was to alter the world itself so as to make it more amenable to human control. In his pithy aphorism, “knowledge is itself power” Bacon summed up this prescription. No longer would knowledge be taken as purely contemplative in character as it had been, according to Bacon, during the medieval and Renaissance eras. Under the influence of Bacon, philosophers of the “classical episteme” sought to define a new role for both knowledge and for philosophers.

This new role sought to carry out Bacon’s dictum in order to tap into the potential of empirically and inductively derived knowledge to expand the human capacity for action in the world. Acting on Bacon’s prescription not only opened up new possibilities for understanding the character of knowledge and the role of philosophers, Bacon’s prescription also altered the epistemic and social character of philosophy itself. In particular, philosophers could not simply justify the social value and epistemic validity of philosophy by demonstrating that their investigations resulted in theories or representations that were veridical in character. Instead, the legitimacy of philosophy had also had to demonstrate its utility by using theory as a guide for action in pursuit of some recognized practical goal. In the case of Stewart and Mill, demonstrating the utility of philosophy emerges as a concern that was equal, if not greater, in importance than producing valid theories through the scrupulous employment of appropriate methodologies. Failure to demonstrate the utility of philosophy would reduce their
theories on the mind’s character and operations, however correct they might be, to the status of purely contemplative exercises. In such an event, Stewart and Mill, as well as many of the philosophers of the “classical episteme” would judge their work to have been, at best, a partial success, if not an outright failure. Philosophical work that failed to find a useful purpose would be regarded as an extravagance that deserved neither intellectual nor material support in its furtherance.

Dugald Stewart and James Mill both grappled with all three norms in their efforts to construct and justify their respective philosophies of mind. For both philosophers, the norms of the “classical episteme” simultaneously sustained and restrained their efforts. On the one hand, the norms organized the chaos of phenomenal experience and provided a set of methodological protocols that were sometimes ambiguous and simplistic, but always powerful at extracting data from the world. At other times, the struggle to carry out these norms seriously obstructed Stewart and Mills’ ability to construct both a coherent theory of mind and an educational practice that would address the changing social context of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Britain. While all three norms were enmeshed in the matrix of the “classical episteme’s” normative system, their demands were not always perfectly reconcilable. These tensions and conflicts in the normative structure of the “classical episteme” would stimulate the most creative efforts of Stewart and Mill to produce a theory and a practice that was compatible with all of the demands of the “classical episteme’s” normative matrix; this struggle, as the rest of this dissertation will show, both accounts for the diametrically opposed doctrines of their respective philosophies of mind as well as unites them as deploy the same set of tools in pursuit of the same goals.
British Empiricism in the Early 19th Century: Dugald Stewart, James Mill, and the Philosophy of Mind

In the early 19th century, Dugald Stewart and James Mill became quasi-official representatives of contending schools of thought in British empiricist philosophy of mind. Neither figure has received much attention, which is a bit surprising considering their importance in the intellectual life of early 19th century Britain. Stewart was an academic luminary of the first rank in Scotland, and Mill, a short time later, served as chief intellectual of a major political movement. Both are also intriguing, beyond this scholarly neglect as representatives of two important philosophical schools at a key moment in the development of the human sciences, and, especially of the Enlightenment goal of creating a comprehensive ‘science of man.’ Specifically, the preponderance of Stewart and Mill’s philosophical writings appeared just before a double rift shattered the apparent unity of the human sciences. This double rift took the form of both a new conceptualization of the epistemological foundations of the human sciences as well as new imperatives that redefined the utility and purpose of these sciences. On the level of discourse, these changes ushered in a plethora of specialized and autonomous social sciences that focused on specific features of human life and society.124

Stewart and Mill are particularly apt subjects for exploring the development of the human sciences at this crucial juncture in their development. Specifically, the prelude to the transition from the unified science of man to the discursively fragmented domain of modern social science can be traced out by comparing the philosophical projects of

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Stewart and Mill. Of the two philosophers, Stewart was more firmly rooted in the
Enlightenment’s project to create a comprehensive ‘science of man. He was the
proponent of the most prominent philosophical school of the time, the so-called
‘Common Sense’ philosophy that originated in the mid-eighteenth century in the works
of Thomas Reid. Common Sense had emerged as a deliberate response to the problem of
philosophical skepticism; at the heart of Common Sense lay two key propositions that
Reid and his followers intended as the ultimate cure for skepticism. The first of these
propositions, and the one that leant its name to the entire philosophical school, was the
claim that a specific set of beliefs ground all knowledge claims, and indeed, make
knowledge itself possible. These Common Sense beliefs were taken by Reid and his
followers to be the unfathomable foundation of all knowledge. Although these beliefs
were necessary for the coordination of raw sense experience into coherent patterns of
thought, Reid insisted that Common Sense beliefs themselves were not accessible to
scrutiny and had simply to be accepted as true as a precondition for the possibility of
generating valid, or even comprehensible, accounts of experience.

In addition, Common Sense discarded the concept of the idea, which had long
taken as a key element of mental processes, as a purely hypothetical entity whose
existence was unsupported by proper methodological procedures. Shorn of the ‘idea’ as
an explanatory element, Reid argued that Common Sense eliminated a not only
unjustified but also pernicious hypothetical entity from explanations of perception.
According to Reid, the explanatory invocation of ‘ideas’ treated perception as a mediated
process in which the mind knows neither the external world nor even itself directly but
only through the intermediation of representations of sensory experience. Consequently,
Reid concluded, virtually the entirety of the philosophy of mind since the ancient Greeks had divided mind from its environment (and from itself) and had forced it to reckon with all experience through mere representations rather than through immediate interaction with both internal and external sensations. For Reid the key epistemological problem here lay in the reliability of ideas as representations of experiences: what guarantee is there that ideas are exact replicas of experiences? Reid concluded that there was in fact no such guarantee; therefore, any philosophy of mind that relied on ideas as explanatory elements for the process of perception were implicitly arguing for the intractable unreliability of perception itself. With these two intellectual maneuvers, Reid and his followers argued that they had decisively answered the challenge of philosophical skepticism by creating a model of mental processes that rested on sound analytical procedures and on a set of indisputable epistemological and ontological principles.

In the hands of Reid’s intellectual heir and academic successor Dugald Stewart, Common Sense had become established as the predominant academic philosophical school in Scotland by the beginning of the nineteenth century. As such, Common Sense was the central fixture of the philosophical education of all of the young men who passed through Stewart’s classroom. Given that Stewart was the teacher of virtually an entire generation of British cultural, political, and economic leaders, it is not surprising that the Common Sense perspective insinuated itself throughout almost the entirety of the British elite. Moreover, the cultural predominance of Common Sense rested not only on a coincidence between Stewart’s teaching and the preference of the British elite for his home academic institution. Common Sense fit in well with the cultural values of this elite. It combined an overt support for and application of the Newtonian-Baconian
scientific worldview that represented one of Britain’s most prized cultural developments. Common Sense combined this with a stout defense of the principles of Protestant Christianity that rendered the philosophical system immune to charges of religious irregularity or moral subversion. In short, Common Sense was a near perfect fit with the values of a ruling elite that saw itself as both the defender of traditional modes of cultural practice and social control as well as champions of rationality and science.

The preeminence of Common Sense had eclipsed but not obliterated a rival version of British empiricism known as Associationism. This perspective on the philosophy of mind had a complex, and, for many intellectuals, a decidedly dubious intellectual heritage. Appearing as a central feature of John Locke’s philosophical work, associationism initially enjoyed considerable acceptance among intellectuals in part because of the manner in which its description of mental phenomena resonated with the ontology of Newtonian physics. Specifically, Associationism invoked an extremely parsimonious machinery for describing and explaining mental phenomena; this machinery consisted largely of two parts: first, ideas as basic cognitive units and, second, a set of associative laws to explain how the myriad of ideas that arise from sensory experiences are sorted and arranged into the coherent patterns of thought. Such a simple system held out the possibility that associationism might be able to render mental phenomena as accessible to analysis as physical phenomena had so far proven to be.

Unfortunately for the proponents of Associationism, the cultural and political authorities of Britain found it most unsuitable for wide dissemination. Already by the early 18th century, Associationism had become closely connected with a number of philosophical doctrines that Britain’s religious and intellectual authorities had deemed as
injurious to the social and spiritual welfare of the general public. This elite particularly abhorred materialism, which a number of associationists espoused.\textsuperscript{125} For academic philosophers, materialism violated a cardinal tenet of Baconian methodology that required all postulated entities and processes to be observable; materialist accounts often relied upon the hypothesized existence of a number of entities and processes that defied direct observation even if they seemed to offer compelling tools for explanation.

Moreover, materialist doctrines possessed a long and, from the viewpoint of both religious authorities and religiously-minded intellectuals, dubious link both to heterodox religious beliefs and to degrees of unbelief. In an era that recognized neither a general right of individual religious freedom nor the political neutrality of religious belief and practice, even obscure and esoteric philosophical doctrines received close scrutiny for their possible religious and political consequences. Although there was no official legal suppression of questionable philosophical doctrines throughout most of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, advocates of controversial epistemologies and ontologies faced, nevertheless, deeply entrenched social and cultural prejudices and were generally excluded from positions of influence within crucial institutions. Perhaps the most famous instance of this was David Hume’s unsuccessful bid for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. Despite his relatively high status among the intellectual elite, Hume’s enunciation of a thoroughgoing skepticism, which employed key associationist doctrines, disqualified him in the eyes of the religious and academic authorities. Since the holder of the philosophy chair would be charged with instruction of impressionable youths (many of whom were the sons of Britain’s elite),\textsuperscript{126} only a religiously dependable candidate had any hope of being

\textsuperscript{125} David Hartley, for example, united associationism and materialism in his philosophical analyses.

\textsuperscript{126} See “The System of the North”
successfully selected to fill such an important position. From the point of view of the ruling elite, inappropriate instruction would undermine the development of the students’ moral character and threaten both social and political stability. Despite his social and intellectual popularity, Hume was thought to be a dangerous influence on impressionable minds and therefore unsuitable for an academic position.

A connection with perceived, and sometime actual, political subversion also tainted Associationism’s reputation. By the late eighteenth-century, associationism formed the philosophical backbone of a number of political theories that advocated large-scale changes in the exercise and distribution of political power in Britain.\textsuperscript{127} Even under the best of circumstances, in the relatively open political climate of Britain, such ideas would have aroused suspicion among the ruling authorities. In the late 18\textsuperscript{th} and early 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, however, the events of the French Revolution coupled with the subsequent struggle against Napoleon’s regime drastically reduced tolerance for political dissent. Consequently, even a rather abstruse philosophical doctrine like associationism could draw unwanted and hostile attention from the authorities if it were perceived as aiding and abetting political subversion.

Not surprisingly then, proponents of associationism tended to remain marginal to official centers of knowledge creation and propagation. Indeed, the political atmosphere of the era was so poisonous that even a paragon of the establishment such as Dugald Stewart found his position constantly under threat due to his affiliation with the mainstream opposition Whig party. Stewart was the subject of a protracted whispering campaign among the ruling authorities regarding his political and moral suitability as a

\textsuperscript{127} List several examples; also thesis about the implicit conservatism of associationism: clearly not always the case.
university professor. Opposition to Stewart exploded into the open in 1804 when his political and moral credentials were questioned during a session of Parliament.

Stewart repeatedly fended off such attacks, both overt and covert, during his academic career and insisted that he was a loyal and trustworthy British subject who sought to instill in his students the proper respect and obedience to established social, cultural, and political standards.

While the ruling authorities strictly policed the officially designated institutions of knowledge creation and dissemination, there did exist other possible venues for philosophical and political dissidents to develop and circulate their ideas. Wealthy individuals, whose social and economic positions offered some protection from wrath of the authorities, could, and did, provide private patronage to dissident thinkers and intellectuals. In addition, a new arena for dissidents began to take shape in Britain in the early 19th century in the form of a growing market for periodical literature. A relatively free press in Britain, even during the politically difficult times of the French Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath, combined with a substantial literacy rate, opened up the possibility for an alternative site of knowledge creation and circulation.

Periodical literature was hardly new in the early 19th century; however, the rapid expansion of a literate public with a desire for a variety of reading materials created, both quantitatively and qualitatively, a new intellectual environment that allowed dissident thinkers the opportunity not only to develop and circulate their ideas, but also provided an economic base for the sustained propagation of dissident thought. The rapid growth of

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the periodical literature readership meant financial support for knowledge creation and
circulation no longer required the assent of sympathetic, but ultimately conservative,
members of the ruling elite. Instead, knowledge was now for sale in the marketplace and
the survival and growth of dissident doctrines rested increasingly on the collective
choices of a diverse reading public rather than on the prerogatives of a small,
conservative ruling elite.

It was in this growing periodical market, that James Mill sought a career. Mill’s decision to pursue free-lance periodical writing, and the circumstances that made
his actions rather less a matter of pure free-will than one of economic necessity,
represents a key moment not only in the socio-economic fortunes of a single individual
but also in the development of British empiricism. After a fleeting career as a
Presbyterian minister, Mill sought employment in a variety of tutoring jobs. Finally at
the age of 29, Mill left Scotland for London and the promise of a potentially lucrative
writing career. In pursuit of this career, Mill made the acquaintance of Jeremy Bentham
in 1808 and soon allied himself with Bentham’s political and philosophical projects.
Associationism, and its various politico-philosophical ramifications, formed the
framework for Bentham’s vast and ambitious plans for social and political reform. Soon,
Mill would also take up associationism as a fundamental tool for a number of
philosophical and political projects of his own.

James Mill’s work has suffered even greater neglect than Stewart’s. Although
Mill would ultimately become the key intellectual defender of a political movement
dubbed “philosophical radicalism’ and the major proponent of associationism in the
early 19th century, Mill has attracted only scant attention from historians and
philosophers. Any of the explanations outlined above could probably be used to account for this neglect, but it is also important to emphasize the role that the invocation of a distinctive Scottish Enlightenment is likely to have played. While there is no documentation by historians and philosophers that could be drawn on to make a case that the historiographic division of British empiricism into two distinct cultural zones is responsible for the neglect of Mill's work, there is a circumstantial case that can be made on the basis of Mill's ambiguous status as a member of the Scottish Enlightenment.

In particular, Mill represents a difficult case for proponents of a rigid separation between the English and Scottish versions of empiricism. On the one hand, Mill was undoubtedly Scottish: he was born there, he was educated in the Scottish school system through the university level (indeed, he even attended Stewart's moral philosophy lectures as a student), and he did not leave Scotland until he was an adult at the age of 29. Moreover, even after his departure from Scotland, Mill maintained a residence in his homeland and frequently returned to it. On the other hand, Mill made his fortune, published most of his writings, conducted his political activities, and officially resided for a substantial portion of his life in England. Consequently, Mill does not cleanly fit into a strict cultural dichotomy that cleaves Britain into autonomous Scottish and English halves. This problem of categorization has perhaps led to Mill 'falling through the cracks' of a historiography that has tended to overlook interactions, whether purely intellectual or demographic, between the English and Scottish versions of empiricism.
Timing is everything: Why the works of Stewart and Mill provide an important entry point into the development of British empiricism

Beyond the historiographic problems presented by the neglect of Stewart and Mill, as well as the questionable use of the Scottish Enlightenment as a historiographic device, there are important historical issues that make Stewart and Mill’s works important both for examination individually and for comparison. Three issues in particular will provide the context for this examination of Stewart and Mill’s versions of British empiricism. One of these issues relates to the epistemo-methodological norms that structured the investigations of both Stewart and Mill. The other two issues revolve around the timing of Stewart and Mill’s investigations. Specifically, Stewart and Mill were carrying out their projects at a crucial historical moment when the purposes of scientific investigations were changing. And these changes intersected with changing perceptions of the social and economic structure of Britain.

First, Stewart and Mill’s works were among the last efforts to construct a comprehensive ‘science of man’ before the analysis of human behavior and institutions fragmented into the multidisciplinary zoo of the social sciences. Unlike their intellectual successors, neither Stewart nor Mill specialized exclusively in the study of mental phenomena; instead, they both examined a wide range of human experiences and treated these experiences as part of a single discourse. Moreover, both Stewart and Mill conducted their investigations within the limits set by a shared set of epistemo-methodological norms. Shortly, however, this broad perspective would be displaced by a
plethora of autonomous discourses that dissected humanity along a number of axes as new epistemological and methodological norms began to take shape. This new epistemological-methodological configuration would produce the matrix in which the now-familiar academic social science disciplines would take shape.

That both Mill and Stewart shared a quest for a unified ‘science of man’ was not a coincidence. Indeed, the pursuit of a comprehensive science of man had been a signal feature of the Enlightenment. The singularity of Enlightenment discourse on the phenomena of human life arose from a defining set of epistemological and methodological norms that were explicitly endorsed, to varying degrees, by virtually all Enlightenment intellectuals. Investigations of the phenomena of human life and experience occurred within a well-defined field of inquiry that had particular epistemological boundaries as well as explicit goals.

For Stewart and Mill, the Baconian commandment to produce useful knowledge produced efforts by both philosophers to create a conception of educational practice that drew upon the discoveries and theories of the philosophy of mind. Not surprisingly, these educational practices differed both in their content and in their prescriptions. Some of the difference can be attributed to the assumptions that distinguished Associationism from Common Sense. These intellectual differences however, do not fully account for one key distinction between Mill and Stewart’s educational practices. In particular, Mill and Stewart differ dramatically on the question of the extent to which education should be made available to the population at large. From Stewart’s perspective only a relatively small percentage of the population can be educated beyond minimal literacy. Mill, on the
other hand, devises a sweeping and radical plan for extending the widest possible education to the largest number of people.

These differences in the extent to which education can be extended to the population at large were symptomatic of a larger change that was occurring within the intellectual realm in the early 19th century. Both are writing at a time that has been identified by Michael Foucault as a moment when the purposes behind the analysis of human life was changing from what Foucault calls a regime of social control that involved the management of conflicts and undesirable elements through direct oppression or exclusion to one in which conflicts and undesirable elements would be controlled by keeping them under constant surveillance. Both Stewart and Mill’s works are late developments in the former regime of social control, and both Stewart and Mill saw PM as displaying its usefulness not just by grounding an educational practice. Rather, their conceptions of educational practice entailed the specific social objective of maintaining social order by using education to shape minds that perceive and react in appropriate ways so as to support a desired model of social relations.

Moreover, this discursive change intersected with another discursive change that was also emerging at the same time. Specifically, Britain was in the midst of social and economic upheaval in the early 19th century as the changes wrought by the French and Industrial Revolutions began to alter the socio-economic order and to undermine long standing discourses on the relations between socio-economic groups. Working within the Enlightenment’s norms and still under the influence of the regime of management, both Stewart and Mill struggled to adopt their philosophies of mind and educational practices to this rapidly changing world. In this process of adaptation, Stewart remained firmly
planted in the earlier discursive formation; however, Mill attempted to modify key elements of the Enlightenment’s discourse so as to accommodate these changes while still remaining within the limits prescribed the normative matrix of the “classical episteme.” In this comparison, therefore, we witness a key moment in the development of the Enlightenment’s discursive field, when, under the strain of a changing socioeconomic, its boundaries began to be breached and new forms of discourse became possible.
Chapter 3

The architecture of mind and society in early 19th century Britain

Part I: James Mill, Dugald Stewart and the structure of the mental space

In the early 19th century, Dugald Stewart and James Mill could still formulate comprehensive theories of human life that bound together a wide range of social, economic, political, and cultural phenomena. These distinct domains were integrated with one another such that descriptions and explanations of one facet of human life transferred to other domains as well. This was the case with the descriptions and explanations that Stewart and Mill offered for both mental phenomena and socioeconomic relations. In particular, both Stewart and Mill produced philosophies of mind and philosophies of the social realm in which the structures of mind and the structures of social relations complemented each other. In this sense it is appropriate to speak of a philosophy of ‘common sense social relations’ and a philosophy of ‘associationist social relations’ as well as common sense and associationist philosophies of mind. The appearance of this complementary relationship is not at all mysterious since Stewart and Mill applied the normative matrix of the Classical episteme to both domains of phenomena. In doing so, they created, despite their doctrinal differences, spacialized
representations of mind and society that shared similar fundamental structures. In particular, the architectures of mind and society manifest, in the works of both philosophers, five crucial shared features: a rigid hierarchical structure that divided the socioeconomic space into two distinct sectors; a restriction of all analysis, whether social or mental, to visible events and entities; the absence of a concept of development through time for either social or mental phenomena; a clear rejection of fundamental alterations of socioeconomic structures; and, ultimately, an insistence that the efforts invested in philosophical analyses pay off in policies that address socioeconomic ills.

These parallels between Common Sense and associationist representations of mind and society are not, however, merely incidental to an understanding of Stewart and Mill’s projects. By treating both mind and society as subject to the same basic methodological and onto-epistemological norms, Stewart and Mill bridged the gap between the mental capacities of individuals as isolated thinking entities and the aggregation of individuals at the level of social interaction. This shift between levels of organization is a critical, though not explicitly addressed, problem for both Stewart and Mill, who both appear to assume that such a crossing is not only compulsory but also unproblematic. If individual minds, considered as discrete entities, and the aggregation of these discrete minds into groups, cannot be analyzed according to the same underlying set of discursive and practical norms, then Stewart and Mill would find themselves unable to transfer any utilitarian insights
between the individual and social levels of organization. In terms of the norms that govern the Classical episteme’s analysis of mental phenomena, the failure to bridge this divide would severely hamper Stewart and Mill’s efforts to realize the norm of utility in a robust fashion. Although improving the cognitive capacities of individuals in a way that produced neither collective benefit nor collective harm would perhaps minimally fulfill the norm of utility, such a limited result would constitute a poor demonstration of the utility of the philosophy of mind. Consequently, the norm of utility compelled Stewart and Mill to cross the divide between individuals and groups so as to demonstrate the practicality of their analyses throughout the entire realm of human activities and relations.

Before they could demonstrate the utility of their philosophies of mind, however, Stewart and Mill had to generate representations of mind and society that would allow them to propose practical applications of their work. As chapter three indicated, both Stewart and Mill undertook their representational efforts within a particular onto-epistemological matrix. This matrix tended to produce a spatialization of knowledge that in turn dictated an implicit architectonic of phenomenal reality. Specifically, the classical episteme treated all observable entities as resident within a two-dimensional epistemological space that was successively clarified and organized through the appropriate application of Bacon’s methodological protocols. The two-dimensional character of the epistemological space, and by extension of phenomenal reality as well, flows directly from Bacon’s
insistence upon restricting investigation solely to observable entities. For Bacon, and for his intellectual heirs, investigation must be confined strictly to the realm of the immanent; Baconians rejected transcendental phenomena as beyond the scope of philosophical investigation. Accordingly, phenomena presented themselves to investigators as detached from transcendental or other non-observable foundations. There was nothing “below” or “above” observable phenomena that could be invoked, or indeed even detected, by investigators operating within a properly philosophical mode of investigation and, ultimately, explanation. Consequently, phenomenal reality as a whole appeared as a screen upon which discreet observable entities were organized and distinguished according to their relative distances from each other.

Phenomenal reality, moreover, is not merely a random collection of property-less entities. The two-dimensional space of phenomenal reality, and more precisely the entities that reside within it, is, under the classical episteme, are taken to be arranged according to a set of immanent principles. Although the number and character of these principles vary from investigator to investigator, they are all ultimately expressions of a basic notion that entities are spatially distinguished according to their degree of similarity or dissimilarity from each other. Given their reliance on similarity and dissimilarity as a metric for distinguishing entities, the

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133 The pioneering 1960’s African-American comedian, and underappreciated Baconian methodologist, Flip Wilson, offered perhaps the best summary of the Baconian research program’s, and indeed the entire classical episteme’s epistemological and ontological commitments when he famously declared that “What you see is what you get.”
philosophical investigators of the classical episteme founded their researches on an onto-epistemological norm that demanded both that entities must possess a fixed set of invariable characters and that philosophical investigators should restrict their efforts to identifying and classifying these characteristics. Without such a set of rigidly fixed characteristics, the task of separating entities according to their degree of similarity or dissimilarity would be quickly thrown into chaos. Thus, the normative structure of the classical episteme included what I have called *ontological stasis* as a necessary onto-epistemological norm.

In addition to ontological stasis, the Classical episteme also placed great emphasis on the epistemological and methodological norm of observation. Specifically, philosophical investigators such as Mill and Stewart were required, as matter of course, to restrict their representational efforts to entities and processes that were, in some way, observable. The notion of observation employed in the Classical episteme could be quite broad. It included not only direct sensory experience of entities and processes but also instrument mediated observations as well. Indeed, with regard to the phenomena of the mental realm, the practice of observation was extended even to entities and processes that were available only through introspection and that were, therefore neither publicly accessible nor observable through the physiological sense organs. However broadly the practice of observation was construed, it was widely understood during the period of the Classical episteme that representations and explanations could most definitely not
appeal to forces, entities, or processes that could not be rendered observable in some fashion. The invocation of hidden or occult factors was regarded by classical episteme investigators like Stewart as both contrary to good philosophical practice and as an impediment to an accurate understanding of the behavior of understanding. Both Stewart and Mill endorsed the necessity of observation, and a delimited range of observable entities and properties, as a central methodological and epistemological norm.

At first glance, these two norms appear to be mutually reinforcing. In the one case, ontological stasis insures that observable entities remain observable by insisting that their identifiable characteristics do not change over time. Observability, in turn, implies the permanence of the observed entities. Nevertheless, it is not at all a given that these two norms will always operate in harmony. The norms of the classical episteme emerge as the result of a welter of contingent historical events. Indeed, Foucault has likened the appearance of these norms to “mutations”: that is, they are random and unpredictable events. Consequently, there is no necessary reason why any two (or more) onto-epistemological norms ought to be harmoniously related. Rather, as the following analysis will strive to show, discursive and practical norms must be made to work together to produce a functional and well-integrated representational, explanatory, and practical scheme. It is this struggle to make these norms work together, and the effort to overcome tensions between them, that constitutes the basic narrative of the development of,
and the relationship between, Stewart and Mills’ philosophical projects. In the case of the norms of observability and ontological stasis, the tension emerges when Stewart and Mill insist upon the structural fixity of mind and society that obstructs their ability to observe phenomena in crucial regions of the social and mental spaces.

Stewart and Mill were not ignorant of this tension between observability and ontological stasis. On the contrary, as the following discussion will indicate, both philosophers invest a great deal of intellectual effort into reconciling these two norms, and more specifically, into attempting to overcome the limitations that ontological stasis imposed upon their ability to observe some sectors of the mental and social spaces. Their responses to the obstructions that are thrown up by the collision between these two norms differ notably in the degree to which barriers and obstacles in the social and mental spaces could be breached. Although the schematics of the social and mental spaces are broadly similar in the discourses of Common Sense and Associationism, Stewart tends to be far more insistent upon maintaining clear boundaries between some sectors of these spaces and for organizing the contents of the spaces rigorously. Mill, in contrast, adopts a far more lenient attitude towards the structure of the mental and social spaces; in both, he is willing to reduce tensions between the discursive and practical norms by granting a greater permeability to boundaries. Nevertheless, Mill too insists upon the
importance of upholding boundaries in similar locations, even if he allows greater movement of entities throughout the mental and social spaces than Stewart does.

**Structure of the Mental Space: James Mill and Associationist Discourse**

Stewart and Mills’ philosophies of mind share numerous significant features. They both endorse a methodological stance that emphasizes the primacy of empiricism and that draws upon a Baconian heritage. Both philosophers also abide by the onto-epistemological norms of the Classical episteme in explicit and implicit ways. Finally, Stewart and Mill also see their philosophies of mind as part of a larger theoretical and practical enterprise that links analyses of the mind both to other domains of human life and to questions of social policy. Despite these many similarities, however, the actual discourses on mind that the two philosophers construct are radically dissimilar. They analyze the mind into distinctly different sets of constituent parts and produce divergent descriptions of the interactions of those constituent parts. Of the two philosophers, Mill’s discourse on mind is arguably the more accessible to a modern reader. Mill deploys a machinery of mind in a language that is so familiar to the early 21st century that it might appear, ironically, as ‘common sense.’ In contrast, Stewart’s discourse on mind, though referred to as ‘common sense,’ would likely seem to be anything but that from a modern perspective. Consequently, the following exposition of Stewart and Mills’ discourses on the structure of the mind will begin with Mill’s hopefully more
comprehensible account of the mind’s character and then proceed to a discussion of
the implications of his philosophy of mind for the relationship between an
individual mind and the social environment. Stewart’s discourse on mind will then
take the stage and demonstrate its striking differences by comparison with Mill’s
philosophical efforts.

Although Mill draws upon the associationist tradition for the language of his
discourse on mind, his deployment of that language is firmly fixed by the normative
matrix of the classical episteme. He describes the structure and content, and
explains the processes, of mind by invoking only ‘observable’ entities. In this case,
‘observable’ of course does not refer to entities that are visible in the same sense
that external objects are, but to entities that appear to the mind during
introspection. This emphasis on observation rules out the possibility of legitimately
appealing to occult, transcendent, or otherwise non-observable entities, processes,
or forces in either descriptions or explanations of mental phenomena. The
rejection of such factors has two significant consequences. First, the absence of non-
observable factors leaves Mill with few resources for describing and explaining
temporal processes among mental phenomena. To the extent that he is able even to
conceptualize mental phenomena as possessing a temporal dimension, Mill is forced
to describe change over time in terms that are purely observational and spatial in
character. Secondly, the normative requirement that rejects all non-observable
factors produces an image of the mind as a space that shares the flattened, two-dimensional properties of the abstract space of the classical episteme.

Within these sharply drawn onto-epistemological limits, Mill’s associationist discourse proposes a minimalist framework for representing and explaining mental events and entities. In particular, Mill reduces all mental life to two basic mechanisms. First, he devises a scheme that permits an interface between mind and the external world. Next, he proposes a means by which mental contents can be organized into authentic representations of externally generated sense experiences. These two systems encompass all that is necessary for a philosophically well-grounded investigation of all observable mental phenomena. Between them, these two systems represent and explain the totality of accessible mental phenomena. Moreover, a number of consequences flow from the operation, and interaction, of these two mental systems. Of especial importance here are the implications of Mill’s associationism for three related issues: the structure of the mental and social spaces, the relative permeability of boundaries within the mental and social spaces, and finally, the efficacy of education in reaching and in remedying individual and social ills. This chapter will focus on the first issue, while the other two will be taken up in Chapter 5.

*Mill: The Interface Between the Mind and the External World*
Mill begins his associationist discourse on mind with the fundamental problem of the origins of mental contents. In keeping with the long-established tradition of empiricism in Britain, Mill identifies sense experience as the source of the mind’s contents. Mill, however, rejects the notion that the mind is directly constituted by actual sense experience. It is not the case that the mind operates like some sort of cognitive vacuum cleaner that simply absorbs and stores immediate sensory experiences in their original state. Rather, the constitution of the mind is a process by which raw sense data is transformed into representations of that sensory experience. As Mill points out, “the sensations which we have through the medium of the senses exist only by the presence of the object, and cease upon its absence.” Nevertheless, Mill continues, “[i]t is a known part of our constitution, that when sensations cease, by the absence of their objects, something remains.” (51) Exactly how the mind retains this “something” is, however, never properly explained by Mill. Like many of his fellow British empiricists, Mill proposes no physiological mechanisms to mediate this transformation since his version of associationism eschews virtually all references to material or physiological causes of mental phenomena. For Mill, the goals of philosophy are attainable simply by observing that such a transformation does in fact take place, and then preceding to an analysis of the mental products that are generated when external events stimulate the sensory organs. Mill thus brackets any materialist discussions of sensory perception and treats the replication process as an opaque event that is neither accessible to
philosophical inquiry nor presents any philosophically problematic, or even significant, issues.

Despite the absence of any explanatory account of the effects of sensory experience, Mill insists that the event of sensation is accompanied by the creation of a subsidiary event that is clearly observable through introspection. He offers the following example as evidence that, whatever the mechanism, sensory experience does alter the mind in an unmistakable way: “After I have seen the sun, and by shutting my eyes see him no longer, I can still think of him. I still have a feeling, the consequence of the sensation, which, though I can distinguish it from the sensation, and treat it as not the sensation, but something different from the sensation…” (51-52). Sensory experience thus creates a change within the mind itself—a change that persists, as Mill has noted, even when the original source of sense experience no longer impinges upon the sensory organs. Furthermore, this alteration of the mind’s constitution has, Mill declares, a crucial characteristic. Sensory experience not only causes a lasting alteration in the mind’s constitution that persists long after the original experience has faded away, it also produces an alteration that “is yet more like the sensation, than anything else can be; so like, that I call it a copy, an image, of the sensation; sometimes, a representation, or trace, of the sensation.” (52)

Mind is thus constituted by, and is a repository for, replicas of actual sensory experience. Drawing upon common usage, Mill labels these replicas “ideas.” The
concept of the idea, as it is presented in Mill’s philosophy of mind, has been a commonplace of empiricist, and indeed virtually of every, philosophy of mind. In Mill’s philosophical investigations, ideas, those replicas of sensory experiences, serve as the basic cognitive units of the mind. Mill does not present ideas as material objects, and, in fact, gives no description or analysis of the nature of ideas that is not purely functional; however, his philosophy of mind depicts the mind as a distinctly ‘corpuscular’ system in which can be subdivided into discrete and fundamental units. For Mill, no entities exist in the mind below the level of ideas, nor can unit ideas be further subdivided.

Ideas exist in two basic forms that are distinguished by whether they are discrete or aggregated into thoroughly unified wholes. At the lowest level, “simple ideas” are exact replicas of discrete sense experiences. Mill does not clearly address the issue of whether simple ideas are in fact simple because they reproduce the discrete character of sensory experience (that is, simple ideas are discrete units because sensory experience also occurs in discrete units that ideas faithfully replicate) or because of some property inherent to ideas themselves. Mill also does not investigate the possibility that sensory experience is transformed into discrete unit ideas in the passage from sense data to internal ideas. Mill focuses exclusively on the mental space and its contents, and in that space the contents appear, at the lowest level of organization, as discrete units. Nevertheless, Mill does not
specifically identify some subset of simple ideas as foundational to all other
cognitive events. Rather, he emphasizes the constant flux of sense stimuli and ideas
as his primary concern.

*Mill: The Framework of the Mental Space*

The population of the mind by ideas is not a random process, however, in two ways.
On the one hand, because ideas ultimately originate in sensory experience, and
because ideas are replicas of sense experience, the contents of the mind are a
faithful representation of the perceived external environment. It is important to
emphasize the qualifier ‘perceived’ here; as Mill indicates, the process by which
ideas are created from environmental influences is actually a mediated one because
“ideas are not derived from objects, [so] we should not expect their order to be
derived from the order of objects.’ (78). Instead, Mill notes, since sequences of ideas
“are derived from sensations, we might by analogy expect, that they would derive
their order from that of the sensations; and this to a great extent is the case.” (78)
The event of sensation thus stands between ideas and the external world that they
supposedly replicate, and this gap between ideas and the external world introduces
a potential source of error into the formation of mental contents. In particular,
certain kinds of social relationships can distort the formation of ideas by
misdirecting the pattern of sensations that an individual’s mind is exposed to. As a
result, an individual mind can become filled with ideas that do not represent a
faithful transcription of reality but, instead, deviate from the objective character and occurrences of events. This socially distorted perception of the environment will figure prominently in Mill’s educational projects as a major impediment to effective education.

In addition to the formative process, individual ideas organize themselves within the mind into regular patterns according to affiliative principles to produce what Mill calls “complex ideas.” (pg#) Indeed, philosophies of mind such as Mill's are designated ‘associationist’ precisely because of the central explanatory function that is accorded to the aggregation of ideas according to these affiliative principles. The process of aggregation, or the “Association of Ideas” as Mill and likeminded philosophers referred to it, consists, according to Mill, of a direct correlation between sensory stimuli and the resulting ideas that are produced in the mind. Of special importance for Mill, and indeed the defining characteristic of the association of ideas, is the ideational preservation of the spatial and temporal sequences in which sensory stimuli impinge upon sense organs. (78). These two types of sequences, whether sensational or ideational in character, define for Mill the basic structure of mental space. Specifically, the ideational preservation of temporal and spatial sequences of sensory stimuli produces assemblages of simple ideas that are arrayed in mental space in two distinct ways. Curiously, Mill characterizes the assemblage of simple ideas into complex ones as an apparently temporal process. This is curious because Mill, like other intellectuals of the Classical episteme, lacked
a robust conception of developmental processes. Nevertheless, temporal considerations play a key role in organizing the mental space for Mill since it is the timing of the arrival of sensory stimuli at the sense organs that differentiates the mental space into distinctly temporal and spatial dimensions. Various sensory stimuli that impinge upon a sense organ at the same time constitute, Mill says, “[t]he synchronous order, or order of simultaneous existence, [which] is the order in space.” (71) If the sensory stimuli arrive at separate intervals, however, the complex ideas thus formed constitute “the successive order, or order of antecedent and consequent existence, [which] is the order in time.” (71)

Despite Mill’s use of a temporal metric for distinguishing the two fundamental outcomes of the association of ideas, Mill does not here break with the Classical episteme’s non-developmental paradigm. Time in the Classical episteme, as Foucault notes, is itself treated in spatial terms as simply a form of extension that is analogous to spatial extension. That is, time has no special definitive property that sets it apart from space under the onto-epistemological regime of the Classical episteme. Instead, objects ‘move’ through time in just the same way that they ‘move’ through space; moreover, that movement through time is characterized and measured within the same onto-epistemological idiom as spatial progression. Unlike later conceptions of time that incorporate development, the time dimension of the Classical episteme does not reveal the sequential manifestation of previously latent characteristics of objects. Time in the Classical episteme, is thus, like space, a
static framework that is external to objects in the sense that objects display their manifold forms of existence within time rather than, in the case of development, through time.

Consequently, the two fundamental axes of mental organization, the “synchronous order” and the “successive order,” that form the basis of Mill’s conception of mental space are both ultimately spatial in character. The temporal dimension of the association of ideas serves as a metric for distinguishing between the movements of ideas in relationship to each other rather than as a signaling the appearance of changes in the properties of those ideas. Mill’s examples of both types of orders reveal the profound spatialization of time that was characteristic of the Classical episteme. For example, Mill describes the “synchronous order” by invoking his immediate surroundings: [t]hus the various objects in my room, the chairs, the tables, the books, have the synchronous order, order in space.” (71) In this case, the ideas that represent these various objects all result from sensory stimuli that appear to impinge upon the sense organs at the same, or nearly the same, instant. The result of this temporal measurement, however, indicates the spatial relationship between these ideas rather than revealing any specifically temporal quality of these ideas beyond their simultaneity in arriving at Mill’s retinas.

Similarly, even the explicitly temporal “successive order” is really only a spatial analog of a temporal event. In particular, Mill differentiates the “successive order”
from the “synchronous order” by listing the sequence of events in the ignition of an explosive: “The falling of the spark, and the explosion of the gunpowder, have the successive order, order in time.” (71). In this case, a sequence of discrete ideas is formed as the sensory stimuli that give rise to them reach the sensory organs one after the other. What is crucial here is that the temporal metric is employed to separate the individual units within the sequences of ideas. That is, the “successive order” is characterized by the presence of gaps between the reception of specific sensory stimuli, rather, than as is the case with the “synchronous order,” with the absence of gaps between the reception of specific sensory stimuli. Mill employs time as an instrument that registers (or fails to register) the presence of these gaps between incoming sensory stimuli and the resulting ideas. This conception of the temporal dimension, although marking the passage of time, does not grant time any distinctive characteristic or function that clearly differentiates it from space. Indeed, time here is presented as a measure of abstract distances analogous to the concrete distances that constitute space.

Furthermore, Mill’s conception of the process of ideational aggregation also displays the key role that the norm of observation plays in the Classical episteme. In an apt analogy, the historian of associationism, Elie Halevy, compares Mill’s scheme of mental associationism to chemical reactions. As the principles of chemical composition either permit or prohibit the creation of compounds, so too do the principles of association either facilitate or inhibit conjunctions between ideas.
Although Halevy does not expressly attribute Mill’s conception of the association of ideas to a normative injunction, his analogy between chemical reactions and the association of ideas does implicitly indicate the presence of the norm of observability at work in both domains. In both cases, these ‘principles’ are verbal descriptions of observable and consistent patterns of conjunctions and refer neither to external forces that act upon elements and ideas nor to any hidden quality that lies within those entities. Ideas and chemical elements form aggregates only upon the basis of their observable properties, and general conclusions about them arise only from observations of the routine consequences of their interactions. For Mill, then, explanations regarding the phenomenon of ideas forming into aggregations are restricted merely to cataloguing the observable linkages that emerge between ideas and cannot appeal to any non-observable causal agent.

A striking illustration of this insistence that descriptions of the association of ideas must rest on observable entities and processes appears in Mill’s discussion of the role that the recurring conjunction of ideas plays in the formation of complex ideas. In particular, Mill indicates that the linkages between ideas differ notably in their intensity; that is, not all linkages, however they are formed, are of similar intensity. For example, the ideas ‘blue,’ ‘sky,’ and ‘daytime’ are so intensely combined with each other such that any other answer than ‘blue’ to the question, ‘What color is the daytime sky?’ would usually be regarded as an obvious joke, as evidence of mental derangement, or as a genuine observation of highly exceptional circumstances. In
all three cases, an unexpected answer would signal a disturbance of the expected, and normal, connections between these ideas – an expectation, it important to note, which arises solely from the intense bonds between the three ideas. Indeed, as Mill points out, the linkage between ideas like these is so intense as to give the (misleading) impression “that whenever one exists in the mind, the others immediately exist along with it, seem to run into one another, to coalesce, as it were, and out of many to form one idea...,” rather than to appear as an aggregated complex idea. (91) In contrast, ideas that only rarely come into successive or synchronous conjunctions will generally fail to produce complex ideas that are universally accepted as such, much less aggregated clusters of ideas that are so tightly bound that the unit ideas appear to lose their distinct identities.

Mill attributes the existence of such enduring and widely accepted complex ideas to the principles of “frequency, or repetition” with which ideas become linked in either successive or synchronous order. In fact, Mill asserts that this principle of “repetition...is the most remarkable and important cause of the strength of our associations.” (87) Here, Mill is not asserting any ‘metaphysical’ or occult power or mechanism. Instead, the terms “frequency” and “repetition” serve as linguistic markers for a recurring pattern of events that is evident in observable phenomena. In other words, Mill is not proposing that simple ideas possess an unobservable quality that predisposes them to engage in recurring relations with other simple ideas. All that Mill means when he identifies “frequency or repetition” as
responsible for the intensity of bonds between is simply the observable fact that tightly bundled clusters of ideas tend to form in the aftermath of recurring juxtapositions. More specifically, Mill is not establishing causation here but only an observable regularity in the juxtaposition of entities and processes that can be distinguished from the flux of phenomenal experience.

Mill’s examples of how “frequency or repetition” tends to produce intense bonds between ideas illustrate the norm of observation in action. Specifically, all of the examples that Mill cites involve the acquisition of proficiency in the manipulation of certain ideas (mathematics and language) or material objects (musical instruments). All of these examples involve the spatio-temporal juxtaposition of sensations and the consequent ideas. In the case of language, for example, Mill describes the process of learning a new language as simply the outcome of recurring juxtapositions between sensations that ultimately produces an intense bond between ideas. For language learning the key sensations are the written images or spoken sounds that comprise the vocabulary of the language. Since the language is unfamiliar, however, there is no strong bond between those images and sounds and their denotations. Consequently, as Mill notes, “it is not joining the word and its meaning once, that will make the word suggest its meaning to us another time.” (89). Instead, fluency in a new language occurs only when “[w]e repeat the two in conjunction, till we think the meaning so well associated with the word, that whenever the word occurs to us, the meaning will occur along with it.” Eventually,
Mill concludes, "[b]y force of repetition the meaning is associated, at last, with every word of the language, and so perfectly, that the one never occurs to us without the other." (89). Multiple juxtapositions of the sounds and images that comprise a language with their denotations, therefore, nearly obliterate the discrete character of these sensations so that they appear not as an aggregate of distinguishable ideas but almost as a single idea. Nevertheless, however important this illusion is to the acquisition of certain skills, it is still necessary to treat all complex ideas as reducible to their component ideas. No matter how convincing the illusion, nor how useful.

No other factor is involved here other than this juxtaposition and the observation that recurring juxtaposition normally results in enhanced proficiency in these activities. Moreover, this proficiency is ascribed to the intensity of the bonds between ideas – as Mill has already noted, very strong bonds can appear to erase the distinctions between the component ideas of complex idea. Proficiency itself is simply the rapid juxtaposing of discrete ideas to form an apparently seamless whole in which there the gaps between ideas are reduced below the level of perception.

Nevertheless, Mill insists, it is crucial that all complex ideas can in principle be analyzed into simple constituent ideas. Although Mill does not explain exactly how this possible in every case, he nevertheless takes it for granted that there are no complex ideas that can resist decomposition.
So, all complex ideas, regardless of the degree of complexity, all originate from observable events. There are no complex ideas per se that contain or are held together by non-observable entities. Nor, by implication, do complex ideas exceed the sum total of their component ideas. According to Mill, the complex ideas are nothing more and nothing less than compilations of discrete simple ideas that have been produced by sensory stimuli. Mill emphasizes that the meaning of complex ideas is reducible to the sum of its component simple ideas. In other words, complex ideas do not express a level of meaning that transcends the totality of its constituent parts.

There is no higher or lower here levels here with regard to complex ideas; what now might be called “emergent properties” do not exist for Mill, at least with regard to mental phenomena; there is nothing in a complex idea that cannot be traced back (at least in principle) to a specific sensory stimulus. In the case of repetition, complex ideas are built up by the repeated experience of a particular sequence of sensory stimuli that are so prevalent as to attach an additional, compelling, though false idea, of permanence. Indeed, a main point of Mill’s analysis is ultimately to dispel that last false idea, which is gained from incomplete experience of the idea formation process, through experience itself by urging that the relations that sustain all complex ideas are environmentally produced and contingent.

*Mill’s image of the mind: Mind as a nominal designation*
In the course of his exposition of mental phenomena, Mill constructs a model of the mind that accords with the Classical episteme’s agnostic stance towards materialism. More specifically, Mill does not identify mental phenomena with any physiological structure such as the nervous system or the brain. Instead, he engages with the ‘mind’ as a nominal designation that subsumes observable entities and events whose similarities allow them to be classified as belonging to a distinguishable domain of phenomena. By following this track, Mill presents an implicit image of the mind as an abstract space rather than as a concrete entity that manifests itself at an objectively verifiable location in a material substrate.

This implication, for Mill, that mind is essentially to be viewed as an abstract space, emerges most clearly from his discussion of consciousness. Here, only at the end of a lengthy analysis of the mind’s contents, does Mill address the nature of mind itself as something that might be considered to possess an ontological autonomy from its contents. According to Mill, the capacities for perceiving externally generated sense experiences, for transforming sensory data into ideas, and for the various mental operations that can be performed internally on ideas, are not distinct actions from the awareness of the occurrences of these events. All mental events, as well as awareness of those events, reduce to single type of experience. Mill achieves this reduction by establishing a chain of identities between mental events that begins
the moment that sensory stimuli impinge upon the sense organs. Specifically, Mill contends that

[h]aving a SENSATION, and having a feeling, are not two things. The thing is one, the names only are two. I am pricked by a pin. The sensation is one; but I may call it sensation, or a feeling, or a pain as I please. Now, when, having the sensation, I say I feel the sensation, I only use a tautological expression: the sensation is not one thing, the feeling another; the sensation is the feeling.” (224)

So, whatever the event may be called, it is, according to Mill, in fact a singular thing.

Moreover, Mill continues, the identity between a “feeling” as the registration of mental event and the mental event itself extends beyond the moment of contact between sensory stimuli and sense organs to the product of that contact:

“Sensations, and Ideas, are both feelings. When we have a sensation we feel, or have a feeling; when we have an idea we feel or have a feeling.” (224) Additionally, awareness of ideas (and sensations) is also, Mill asserts, identical to a feeling as a signal of a mental event. Mill’s analysis that equates awareness of sensory experience with a “feeling”

will easily be seen to apply to IDEAS. Though, at present, I have not the sensation, called the prick of a pin, I have a distinct idea of it. The having an idea, and the not having it, are distinguished by the existence or non-
existence of a certain feeling. To have an idea, and the feeling of that idea are not two things; they are one and the same thing.” (225)

Here too, then, the presence of a mental event, in this case the appearance of an idea, is identical with an experience of that event’s presence according to Mill. Thus, for Mill the words, “feeling,” “sensation,” and “idea,” when considered as signals of mental events, are all perfectly identical in meaning. This is true Mill claims, despite the apparent dissimilarity of the events and processes that produce “feelings,” “sensations,” and “ideas.” Juxtaposing any pair of these words, according to Mill, results, therefore, not in an explanation of the process by which the mind achieves either an awareness of mental event or the occurrence of a mental event, but merely in the creation of a “tautological expression” that possesses no explanatory power at all (224).

All of this rather complex maneuvering through a thicket of terms for the registration and awareness of mental events is not merely an unnecessary indulgence, however. The point that Mill is driving towards through this process of clarifying the semantic relationships between a variety of terms that designate mental events and the awareness of them is that the mind has a particular ontological property that follows from his associationist commitments. Specifically, Mill resolves these various terms for the act of sensation, for the formation of ideas, for internal mental operations, as well as for the awareness of these events into a single term that comprehends all mental events as well as the awareness of these
mental events, first as the experience of having a “feeling” and then as the condition of being “conscious.” Just as there is a semantic equivalence between “sensation” and “feeling” that renders any explanatory relationship between the two terms tautological, so too, Mill says,

[w]hen, instead of the word feeling, I use the word conscious, I do exactly the same thing, I merely use a tautological expression...to say that I am conscious of a feeling, is merely to say that I feel it. To have a feeling is to be conscious; and to be conscious is to have a feeling.” (224)

Mill’s analysis of the semantic relationships between the various terms that denote the registration and reflexive awareness of mental events leads him to two significant conclusions. First, he concludes that all of these terms (feeling, sensation, consciousness, etc.) are semantically equivalent. Although this reading of Mill is straightforward, it is important here to clarify an aspect of Mill’s analysis that is rather ambiguous in the text. In particular, Mill lays great emphasis on the identity between the various terms for mental operations; however, this identity cannot be understood as being total. If all “feelings”, are semantically identical, then it would be impossible to separate linguistically or cognitively between different mental events. All mental events would be represented and labeled as specific kind of occurrence that would differ in no fundamental way from any other such occurrence. Mill has already made it clear he believes that differentiation between mental events, both linguistically and cognitively, is both possible and necessary for
awareness of mental events to occur. Ideas and sensory stimuli are both feelings, for example, but they can still be differentiated by their relative permanence (ideas) versus their evanescence (sensory stimuli). Accordingly, the exact relationship between the various terms for mental events can only be one of identity at a certain level and not one of total identity if Mill's mental machinery is not to come to a grinding halt.

Near the end of his analysis of consciousness, Mill seems to recognize this problem by declaring that the equivalence between the various terms for mental events is more complex than simple and total equivalence. He does not explicitly state that a more complex view of the relationship between “feeling” and its synonyms is necessary, but he does conclude that

[i]t was of great importance, for the purpose of naming, that we should not only have names to distinguish the different classes of our feelings, but also a name applicable equally to all those classes. This purpose is answered by the concrete term Conscious; and the abstract of it Consciousness.” (225)

The terms “conscious” and “consciousness” are thus apparently equivalent in meaning to “feeling” and its synonyms and, moreover, stand in relation to those synonyms as genus does to species. He confirms this appearance immediately by describing conscious and consciousness as “GENERICAL marks, under which all the
names of the subordinate classes of the feelings of a sentient creature are included.

“(225-226) Thus, the state that is denoted as consciousness is composed of a variety of distinguishable mental events that are nevertheless linked by virtue of their similarities as species of “feelings.”

Mill’s conception of consciousness as standing in a genus-to-species relationship with all other mental events, as well as with the awareness of those events, leads him to a second major conclusion. Since sensations, ideas, mental operations and the awareness of them are all feelings, and, moreover, since the term “feeling” is, on a semantic level, identical with the term “conscious,” and is also a classificatory subset of “conscious,” then consciousness denotes both the entirety of the mental machinery that Mill has described as well as the awareness of the operations and effects of that machinery. In making this move, Mill thereby rejects the notion that consciousness possesses any ontological autonomy from other mental constituent parts. According to Mill, “[t]hose philosophers, therefore, who have spoken of Consciousness as a feeling, distinct from all other feelings, committed a mistake....”

(225) Here, Mill rejects the “homunculus” theory of mind in which some organ or capacity of the mind provides for reflexive awareness of mental events while itself remaining external to those events. For Mill, there is no ontological division between mental operations and events, and the awareness of those operations and events, except in the purely linguistic and classificatory sense that links consciousness to other mental operations and events in a genus-species
relationship. In other words, the term “consciousness” is a collective designation for a wide range of interrelated mental phenomena and is not the indicator of the existence of a discrete and concrete function or entity within the mind.

Mill’s treatment of the label ‘consciousness’ as a linguistic rather than as an ontological designation has a two-fold significance for his theory of mind. On the one hand, his rejection of consciousness as ontologically distinct from other mental phenomena renders mind into a flattened abstract space of differences similar to the Classical episteme’s characterization of being as a whole. This representation of the mind arises implicitly from the two types of linguistic relationships (semantic and classificatory) that Mill establishes between ‘consciousness’ and other mental events. In both cases, “consciousness” as a signifier encompasses all other mental events while simultaneously sharing in the same defining quality as all other mental events. As Mill proclaims, there is no ontological difference between consciousness and other mental events and operations. “Consciousness” is merely a descriptor of mental functions and phenomena taken as a whole.

By treating mental events and operations as linguistic entities that are linked by linguistic, rather than material, relations, Mill portrays mind as remarkably text-like in character. In the course of philosophical analysis, the phenomena of the mind are read and interpreted; adhering to the normative demands of the Classical episteme requires that phenomena must be observable if they are to be counted as legitimate
elements of representative or explanatory schemes. Since we cannot read what we cannot see, the mental phenomena that Mill invokes must not include any “hidden” entities or processes that are not directly observable in the mental “text.” Accordingly, the mind takes on a depthless quality in which there is no “hidden” text that underlies and supports the operation of the observable mental “text.” The observable mental “text,” is, in the context of the Classical episteme, the totality of accessible phenomena, and there is no other phenomenal level that can be invoked for reading and interpreting mental events and operations.

Mill: The Abstract Space of the Mind and the External World

Additionally, by treating mind as a site of linguistic entities and relations, Mill’s associationist discourse on mind ultimately leads to an extreme form of psychological environmentalism. At its simplest, the concept of psychological environmentalism locates the origins of mental contents in external sensory stimuli. That Mill would arrive at such a conclusion regarding the relationship between mind and environment might seem to be the logical endpoint of his adherence to the normative demands of the Classical episteme. By strictly employing the norm of observability, Mill argues for a limited set of mental entities that trace their origins back to external sensory stimuli. Although the mind certainly does carry out active operations on ideas, the formation of these basic cognitive units is wholly the result
of environmental stimuli. Mill’s analysis thus summons up a conception of the mind as a passive receptacle for replicas of sense experience.

Mill’s conception of the mind’s relationship to the external world, however, takes the passivity of the mind to even greater lengths. In particular, mental contents are not merely produced by external sources according to Mill. Counter-intuitively, they possess a considerable degree of autonomy as well. That is, Mill declares, our ideas are not wholly under our control despite their residence ‘within’ our own minds. Mill appeals to ordinary experience in order demonstrate this seemingly extraordinary claim. He points out that mental contents are in a continuous state of flux. “Our ideas come and go,” Mill says, and adds that

   [t]here is a perpetual train of them [ideas], one succeeding the another; but we cannot will any link in that chain of ideas; each link is determined by the foregoing; and every man knows, how impossible it is, by mere willing, to make such a train as he desires. Thoughts obtrude themselves without his bidding; and thoughts which he is in quest of will not arise. (131-132).

The mind, then, is not only text-like in that it can be treated like a linguistic entity, it is also a text that is being written and revised beyond the control of the individual who supposedly ‘possesses’ the mind. In this sense, then, Mill appears to be advocating an extreme form of psychological environmentalism in which mental contents are not only wholly formed by sensory stimuli but also in which individuals have no control over the ideas that result from sensory stimuli. Individual minds
appear merely as localized groups of specific clusters of ideas rather than as active organs of cognition.

Indeed, the dependence of mental contents on sensory stimuli, combined with the functional autonomy of the ideas that result from sensory stimuli, raises the possibility that Mill’s theory of the mind will be unable to fulfill the norm of utility. It appears, according to Mill, that individual minds are little more than sites that are traversed freely by autonomous ideas. If this is so, then, as Mill himself notes, there is little hope of controlling and manipulating mental phenomena (or any other phenomena) in order to achieve specific ends. Without some means of controlling the flow of ideas within and through the mind, Mill contends, we would be unable to learn from and adapt to experience because “it is only by our ideas of the past, that we have any power of anticipating the future.” (130). Deprived of this ability, Mill continues, “we should have no principle of action, but the physical impulses, which we have in common with the brutes.” (130). This capacity for learning from and applying the lessons of experience ultimately rests, Mill indicates, on a very specific relationship between the ideas that are formed by a particular event and any ideas that are formed by a subsequent occurrence of the same type of event. Specifically, the human capacity for foresight rests on the ability to call up and to compare different groups of ideas in order to verify “[t]hat the order, in which events have been observed to take place, is the order in which they are expected to take place.”
Foresight, then, is only possible if the behavior of ideas can be controlled; however, such control appears impossible given the autonomy of ideas.

Nevertheless, Mill contends, the behavior of ideas can be indirectly manipulated. Here again, Mill makes a counter-intuitive move by insisting that, unlike in the case of ideas, “we have an extensive power” to control the occurrence of sense stimuli. According to Mill, “[w]e can command the smell of a rose, the hearing of a bell, the sight of a tree, the sensation of heat or of cold, and so on.” (131) Upon an initial inspection, this claim may seem a bit odd; after all, what could be more uncontrollable than the torrent of sensations that continually buffets our sense organs? Even the most sedate setting abounds with sensory stimuli. At the very least, the inevitable auditory and tactile sensations that one’s own body produces furnish a steady, if meager, stream of sensory stimuli that would seem to be impossible to shut out. Contrary to Mill’s claim, it seems that there are a lot of sensory stimuli that are beyond individual control. A careful parsing of Mill’s words, however, points to another reading of the text. In particular, Mill does not deny, and in fact never addresses, the issue of whether there are some forms of uncontrollable sensory stimuli. Rather, Mill only asserts that there are in fact situations in which it is possible for individuals to seek out specific kinds of sensory stimuli. In the examples that Mill gives, this ability to seek out specific sensory stimuli appears to consist of bringing the appropriate sense organ into proximity with a potential source of stimulation. In this manner, individuals do appear to have considerable
control over the types of sensory stimuli that impinge upon sense organs. For example, the visual stimuli that are now appearing to me on the computer monitor as I type these words are wholly under my control. I can, at will, choose to experience, or not to experience, these stimuli by either looking at the monitor or by averting my gaze.

The deliberate production of specific sensations, Mill claims, is the key to establishing control over the behavior of ideas. Specifically, Mill claims that the behavior of ideas can be indirectly controlled by tying ideas (and sequences of ideas) to their counterparts in the realm of sensory stimuli. In Mill's words, this control is achieved

by the power...which we have over the occasions of our sensations, we can make sure of having a train of sensations exactly the same as we have had before. This affords us the means of having a train of ideas exactly the same as we have had before. (132)

This mechanism for controlling the behavior of ideas follows directly from the relationship between sensory stimuli and ideas: as external sensations impinge upon sense organs, they produce copies of themselves, in the form of ideas, within the mind. With the assistance of these designated sensory stimuli, Mill continues, “we can ensure any succession which we please of the sensible objects; and, by the association between them and the ideas, a corresponding succession of the ideas” and thus create techniques for manipulating mental contents. (132) Simply put, if
the flow and pattern of sensations can be controlled, so too can the flow and pattern of ideas be controlled.

The only question that remains is the one regarding the instrument for producing the desired sequence of sensory stimuli. In a general sense, the solution is straightforward. Mill has already posited a direct connection between sensory stimuli and the creation of ideas. From this basic position he has drawn the conclusion that controlling the behavior of ideas is then simply a matter of “choos[ing] a number of sensible objects, and mak[ing] use of them as marks of our ideas.” (132) Nevertheless, the translation of this general conclusion into a practical method for controlling the behavior of ideas presents Mill with further problems. If Mill’s conclusions about the structure and properties of the mind are correct, then the control of mental contents becomes entirely a matter of controlling environmental conditions. Obviously, great difficulties would arise if the instruments for controlling sensory stimuli and the resulting ideas had to take the form of material objects. Individuals would either have to restrict themselves to a fixed and well-ordered environment in order to ensure that they could arrange and control their ideas in a desirable manner, or they would have to transport bulky objects with every change in physical location.

As a result, the only suitable instrument is language since its immateriality allows it a degree of transmissibility that is significantly greater than is usually than case
with material objects. Language performs its function as an instrument for controlling the behavior of ideas, according to Mill, primarily through the act of “naming” entities and events. (128-129).\textsuperscript{135} Mill’s main focus in this exposition is upon the utility of language for inter-subjective communication so that, as he says, otherwise isolated minds can transmit and coordinate their thoughts and thus be capable “of accomplishing, by the united efforts of numbers, what could not be accomplished by the detached efforts of individuals.” (128-129) Nevertheless, this objective can be accomplished, Mill notes, only if we use language to “secure to ourselves the knowledge of what at any preceding time has passed in our minds.” (128) “Naming” consists of using written or spoken symbols as visual or auditory sensations in order to invoke specific sequences of ideas.

Guided by the methodological and onto-epistemological norms of observation, ontological stasis, and utility, Mill treats the mind as a depthless two-dimensional abstract space in which ideas aggregate into regular patterns according to characteristics and events that can be observed through introspection. As a passive receptacle that lacks any structure, or even existence, prior to the first moment in which the first sense datum impinges upon a sensory organ, the mind is, in Mill’s discourse, wholly a creation of its social environment. This extreme psychological environmentalism not only explains the mind’s functions and content for Mill, it will also form the core of Mill’s proposed educational practice and will allow Mill to

\textsuperscript{135} And also, of course, language permits intersubjective communication; however, this is not a critical issue here.
propose a combination of educational and social reforms so as to meet the critical demand that philosophy of mind demonstrate its utility.

*Dugald Stewart and the structure of the mental space: Common Sense discourse on the Mind*

Mill’s associationist philosophy of mind, with its highly asymmetrical relationship between passive mind and all-powerful environment, resonates powerfully with both modern scientific and conventional images of the mental space. Nevertheless, it is not the only possible discourse on mind that can be derived from the Classical episteme. By drawing upon the concepts and language of Common Sense, Stewart presents a more complex portrait of the interaction between the mind and the social environment while still abiding by the normative requirements of the Classical episteme. Specifically, Stewart views individual minds as open to sensory experience but (at least potentially) far less susceptible to external, social influences than does Mill. Individual minds in Common Sense possess an inherent structure that opens up a gap between the mind and the surrounding environment. Although Stewart still insists that sensory experience is the foundation of all mental processes, the existence of mental structures that are ontologically prior to any sensory experience grant the mind a degree of autonomy from the environment that is inconceivable in Mill’s associationist discourse. Mind is itself an active player in the formation of its own contents according to Common Sense discourse and not
simply a passive receptacle. Thus, Common Sense discourse endows the (properly trained) mind with a capacity for judgment and reflexive self-awareness that frees it to a degree from the influx of sensory experience.

The potentially greater resistance to the social environment that Common Sense discourse ascribes to the mind arises from the defining features of Stewart's philosophical analysis. Following in the intellectual footsteps of his predecessor and mentor Thomas Reid, Stewart vehemently rejects the existence of ideas as the fundamental unit of cognition. Indeed, Stewart rejects the very existence of ideas in any form or in any function. This sweeping condemnation of what Stewart terms the “ideal theory” of the philosophy of mind produces a radical result; specifically, Stewart’s condemnation of the “ideal theory” guts the entire Western philosophical tradition prior to Thomas Reid. It was only with the appearance of Reid’s work in the middle of the eighteenth century, Stewart claims, that philosophy of mind both identified the flaws that compromised the descriptive and explanatory power of the “ideal theory” and replaced this crucial component of all previous representations of mental phenomena with a methodologically, ontologically, and epistemologically sound theory of mind and its contents.

*Stewart’s Critique of the “ideal theory” (I)*
Stewart himself advances at least three specific arguments against the assumption that the mind contains entities called ideas that serve as replicas of sense experience. First, Stewart points out that the very concept of the ‘idea’ as a mental vehicle of external sensory experience is dubious. He claims that most proponents of philosophies of mind that posit the existence of ideas tend to treat ‘ideas’ as though they were equivalent to or translations of visual images. In fact, Stewart contends, philosophy of mind is so permeated with dubious visual metaphors “that the greater part of the metaphysical language, concerning perception in general, appears evidently, form its etymology, to have been suggested by the phenomena of vision.” (65) This tendency to describe and to explain all mental contents and events in visual metaphors, Stewart argues, arises from the privileged position of the sight among the senses. As Stewart notes, sight is the most compelling of all human senses because of “[t]he variety of information and of enjoyment we receive by it; the rapidity with which this information and enjoyment are conveyed to us; and above all, the intercourse it enables us to maintain with the most distant part of the universe.....”(64) Nevertheless, the powerful influence of sight, whatever its virtues, can lead the unwary philosopher into a trap; in particular, philosophers of mind have tended to equate mental phenomena with the phenomena of sight while ignoring the characteristics of other, non-visual sense experiences. This misleading equivalence between the phenomena experienced through sight and the totality of mental contents and events, Stewart concludes, has seriously skewed the understanding of mental phenomena. On the one hand, the use of visual metaphors distorts an analysis of mental phenomena “even when applied to [visual sensory
experience]...” since such metaphors “can at most amuse the fancy, without conveying any precise knowledge.” (65) Moreover, Stewart continues, the use of visual metaphors offers us no assistance in analyzing non-visual experiences because visual metaphors are irrelevant to such experiences. (65)

Next, Stewart advances two further and interrelated arguments against the ideal theory by attacking the origins of the concept of the ‘idea’ from what he sees as a flawed analogy between material and mental phenomena. This flawed analogy, which is derived from an attempt to apply the evidently successful concepts of natural philosophy to the human realm of the philosophy of mind, has promoted the popularity of the ideal theory by granting it an undeserved plausibility. The key problem here, Stewart indicates, is the conflation of two distinct types of causation. On the one hand, Stewart states, “[w]hen it is said, that every change in nature indicates the operation of a cause, the word cause expresses something which is supposed to be necessarily connected with the change; and without which it could not have happened....such causes may be called metaphysical or efficient causes.” (72) On the other hand, Stewart distinguishes another manner of conceptualizing causation that is employed specifically in natural philosophy. This conception of causation is derived from the Classical episteme’s onto-epistemological norms and treats causation as general statement about phenomena that is inferred solely from observation.
Consequently, Stewart indicates, with regard to this conception of causation as “physical,” that “when we speak of one thing being the cause of another, all that we mean is, that the two are constantly conjoined; so that, when we see the one, we may expect the other. These conjunctions we learn from experience alone...” (72). Causation in this sense, therefore, is a purely observational term concerning the predictable behavior of observable entities. Causation, as a term, does not, in other words, denote the presence of a concrete thing that fills the gap between cause and effect. Indeed, Stewart adopts an agnostic stance with regard to the nature of causation as a physical process and even speculates that “it is possible, for anything that we know to the contrary, that this connexion, though a constant one, as far as our observation has reached, may not be a necessary connexion; nay, it is possible, that there may be no necessary among any of the phenomena that we see....” (71) In any case Stewart concludes, the whole issue is moot: the prevailing norms of the Classical episteme indicate that even “if there are any such connexions existing, we rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them.” (71)

Making this distinction between physical and efficient causation is critical for Stewart because he cites a persist confusion between these two types of causation as an important source of the erroneous ideal theory. Specifically, Stewart argues that two powerful impulses tend to promote the belief that efficient, rather than physical causation, is in fact the correct conceptual understanding of the causal relationship in general. He traces this persistent confusion to two processes that are
inherent in human mental operations. The first of these processes, Stewart characterizes as “that law of our nature which leads us to refer every change we perceive to the operation of an efficient cause.” (73). Here Stewart is arguing that human beings are endowed with an inherent and inexplicable tendency to conceptualize causation as a concrete event that occurs between two objects, or in other words, as efficient causation. Moreover, Stewart treats this tendency as pre-cognitive in that it does not originate from any natural action taken by or upon the mind. This inherent tendency to think of the world in terms of efficient causality is, Stewart claims, “not the result of reasoning, but necessarily accompanies the perception....” (73) As a result, Stewart continues, “when we see two events constantly conjoined, we are led to associate the idea of causation, or efficiency, with the former, and to refer to it that power or energy by which the change was produced....”(73). Proper philosophical investigations, however, strive to thwart this inherent tendency to ascribe efficient causation to all events by taking an agnostic stance on the fundamental character of causation and by restricting its pronouncements to observation statements of phenomena. Unfortunately for philosophy, the inherent tendency of the mind to grasp the world in terms of efficient causality often overrides the norms of good investigatory practices and promote the introduction of illusory entities into philosophical explanations. (73-74)
But this inherent tendency of the mind to favor efficient over physical causation is not the only obstacle that thwarts the deployment of good philosophical practices. Philosophers encounter another difficulty in that investigatory practices are based upon a shaky linguistic foundation. In particular, Stewart observes, “[o]ur language, with respect to cause and effect, borrowed by analogy from material objects.” (74) What is problematic here for Stewart is the conceptualization of causality as if it were a material event. Too frequently, this assumption is not critically examined, Stewart believes, and, as a result, the concept of causation becomes contaminated with notions that are not appropriate to it. The most important of these inappropriate notions, Stewart claims, involve our untutored and uncritical experiences, and the conclusions that we draw from them, regarding the relationships between material objects. From a purely phenomenological standpoint, Stewart says, we experience the relationships between material objects in two basic ways. On the one hand, when we encounter material objects, “[s]ome of these we see scattered about us, without any connexion between them; so that one of them may be removed from its place, without disturbing the rest.” (74) On the other hand, our experience also seems to tell us that “[w]e can, however, by means of some material vinculum, connect two or more objects together; so that whenever the one is moved, the others shall follow.” (74) As simple example of these experiences, consider two balls. In one case, the two balls can be experienced as separate, unconnected objects that never come into contact and thus never influence each other’s behavior. In another case, the two balls could be tied together with a piece of string. If this is done, then our experience of the relationship
between the two balls is quite different. Instead, of being autonomous, the two balls and their behavior are now mutually interdependent. Either ball can only move the length of the string before affecting the position and motion of the other ball. On these points, Stewart is content to accept the appropriateness of the conclusions as reasonable statements regarding with our general experiences of material objects.

These uncritical phenomenological conclusions about the relationships between material objects, however, can elide the distinction between efficient causation and physical causation, Stewart contends. If these ordinary experiences of the behavior of objects inform judgments about causality, then the philosophically crucial agnostic position with regard to the fundamental character of the causal relationship might be abandoned in favor of a belief in the existence of an epistemologically accessible linkage between cause and effect. As Stewart repeatedly emphasizes, however, the positing of such a knowable link is philosophically unjustifiable. Although causal relationships might be a reality, Stewart reminds the reader that

[I]t seems now to be pretty generally agreed among philosophers, that there is no instance, in which we are able to perceive a necessary connexion between two successive events; or to comprehend in what manner the one proceeds from the other, as its cause....it is possible, that there may be no necessary connexions among any of the phenomena that we see; and if there
are any such connexions existing, we may rest assured that we shall never be able to discover them. (71)

Stewart’s confidence that efficient causation is a philosophically untenable concept is so great that he is even willing to take two uncharacteristic steps to combat the pernicious influence of the concept of efficient causation. First, he cites his philosophical nemesis as a source of support. Specifically, Stewart indicates Hume as an authority on the epistemological limitations that nullify the possibility of apprehending the fundamental nature of the causal relationship. (72-73).

Moreover, Stewart, who is usually cautious about challenging established conceptual and linguistic practice (see 74) even tentatively suggests an alteration in terminology so as to avoid the use of language that implies an epistemologically accessible conception of causation. (75)

Despite all of the warnings against making uncritical extrapolations from raw sensory experience, efficient causation has crept into a wide variety of discursive domains. A particularly pernicious example of one of these misapplications of phenomenal experience, Stewart argues, appears in the unfortunate fact that “philosophers, in every age, seem to have considered the production of motion by impulse, as almost the only physical fact which stood in need of no explanation.” (77) According to Stewart, it is a common, and perhaps universal, human trait to understand contact between objects as the cause of motion. So intense is this trait that
when we see a body begin to move in consequence of an impulse which another has given to it, we inquire no further; on the contrary, we think a fact sufficiently accounted for, if it can be shewn to be a case of impulse. (77)

Stewart rejects this conclusion, however, as a failure to abide by the norms of philosophical investigation. A properly conducted philosophical investigation prohibits such a conclusion by restricting itself to purely observational entities. Observation, as Stewart has repeatedly insisted, reveals neither the character of linkage that apparently impels one object into motion when another makes contact with it nor even if such a linkage exists at all. The only conclusion that can be drawn from observation is that a discrete sequence of events might reliably occur (and recur) given certain initial conditions. Whatever the causal linkage that might create such reliable sequences is not ascertainable. The introduction of an (often) unrecognized form of efficient causation into philosophical investigations, and ultimately into an explanation of those phenomena, therefore distorts any understanding of material phenomena by erroneously positing a non-demonstrable entity as central explanatory mechanism. (77)

Moreover, the problematic assumptions regarding the character of the events that surround the direct interaction of two entities have consequences for both physical and mental explanations. In particular, Stewart points out that the erroneous understanding of the causal relationship between contact and motion has been carried over to the much more complex problem of action at a distance. The
thoughtless introduction of efficient causation into explanations of action at a distance enters into considerations of this type of motion, according to Stewart, via “[t]he maxim, that nothing can act but where it is, and when it is...” (75). Stewart contends, however, that although

this maxim should be admitted with respect to causes which are efficient...there is surely no good reason for extending it to physical causes, of which we know nothing, but that they are the constant forerunners and signs of certain natural events. (75)

When the two species of causation are muddled together, the result is philosophically catastrophic. Stewart observes that failure to differentiate the two types of causation has tended to promote “an unwillingness, even in physics, to call one event the cause of another, if the smallest interval of space or time existed between them.” (76) In other words, the (erroneous) assumption here, which follows from an understanding of causation as efficient rather than as physical, is that causality actually exists as onto-epistemologically accessible process when conditions of temporal and spatial simultaneity between antecedent and consequent entities obtain.

Once efficient causality has crept into explanations of both allegedly contact-induced motion and of action at a distance, the result is a chain reaction of misleading assumptions and conclusions about the nature of motion. The most fundamental and far-reaching of these assumptions, from Stewart’s perspective, is
the apparent belief that the ultimate nature of motion, and more particularly its efficient causal foundation, can be established through the methods and ontological norms of philosophical investigation. Indeed, as Stewart points out, the clearest sign that something is amiss is the sheer incoherence of explanations of motion. On the one hand, Stewart notes, the uncritical acceptance of an efficient causal explanation of contact-induced motion is so commonplace that there is “no scruple to call the impulse the cause of the motion…” (76). On the other hand, the same community of investigators that thoughtlessly employs efficient causality as an explanatory linchpin in the case of contact-induced motion fails to construct a symmetrical mode of explanation to account for action at distance. Instead, Stewart indicates that many philosophical investigations “will not admit that one body can be the cause of motion in another, placed at a distance from it, unless a connexion is carried on between them, by means of some intervening medium.” (76)

That is, Stewart argues, investigations of one species of motion (contact-induced) employ an unobservable, and thus unwarranted, explanatory element while implicitly rejecting any consideration of a different unobservable explanatory element in action at a distance. The rejection is implicit because of the assumption that the causal nature of contact-induced motion is knowable through the methods of philosophical investigation. This mistaken assumption is then illegitimately taken to be an observable fact and used as the basis of explanation of action at a distance. Consequently, action at a distance is treated as if it is the result of multiple instances
of contact-induced motion propagating linearly across space rather than as the outcome of a distinct causal mechanism. If efficient causality can be established by the methods of philosophical investigation, however, then it is not at all self-evident that contact-induced motion and action at distance should operate through the same causal mechanism. It is entirely possible that action at distance is produced as the result of a very different form of efficient causality that permits the initiation of motion across space without direct physical interaction. This then raises the problem of an ever-expanding catalogue of efficient causal relations for every specific instance of motion that Stewart and other Baconian methodologists hoped to avoid by restricting the domain of explanatory elements solely to observable entities.

Once the door is opened to one species of efficient causation, it becomes very difficult to justify limitations on the use of non-observable entities and processes for explanations of observable phenomena. Since efficient causal mechanisms are unobservable, they are neither verifiable nor falsifiable. Without a method for justifying or rejecting the adoption of efficient causality, philosophical investigations that employ efficient causality must either apply a presumed causal mechanism to seemingly related phenomena or multiply the number of causal mechanisms to account for every distinguishable phenomenon. The employment of efficient causal relations would seem, in fact, to demand such a proliferation of causal mechanisms for each distinctive type of phenomenon. Stewart’s critique of the use of efficient
causation ultimately comes down to an insistence for consistency in the assumption of this conception of causation. Thus, if it is permissible to invoke an unobservable, and therefore non-demonstrable, causal process to explain one kind of motion, then it should be permissible to invoke other unobservable causal processes to explain other types of motion. Since efficient causal relations of any kind are not demonstrable, there is also no justification for assuming that the efficient causal relations that are presumed to obtain in one form of motion have any relevance to any other form of motion. As a result, there is, for example, no particular reason to believe that the efficient causal mechanism that governs contact-induced motion between two juxtaposed entities pertains in any way to motion that is initiated in one entity by another spatially separated entity. These are different phenomena and there is no logical requirement that different phenomena must be governed by the same kind of causal relationship – especially since those causal relationships are non-demonstrable in any case.

These rather abstruse ruminations on the role of efficient causation in explanations of motion have had, according to Stewart, a pernicious influence not only in natural philosophy but also in philosophy of mind as well. In part, this pernicious influence stems from rhetorical features of efficient causality. More specifically, efficient causality has tended to produce intuitively compelling pseudo-explanations of natural phenomena. In the terms in which Stewart discusses the confusions that surround explanations of motion, it seems more appropriate to designate the
explanatory consequences of the introduction of efficient causality as ‘pseudo’
rather than as simply false for reasons that Stewart has already given. In particular,
while it is strictly speaking correct, from the perspective of the classical episteme, to
label explanations that rely upon efficient causation as false, it is also evident from
Stewart’s account that such explanations are also so superficially convincing that
their falsity is not readily apparent. On the one hand, explanations that rest on
notions of efficient causality follow in form, if not in content, the methodological
dictates of the Classical episteme. These explanations appear to limit themselves
only to observable entities. In the case of contact-induced motion, the conclusion
that contact causes motion seems little more than a simple observation statement of
the interaction of two colliding bodies. Moreover, the tendency to insert efficient
causation between the antecedent and consequent events, Stewart claims, is an
observable, if ineradicable, feature of human cognition.

Although the introduction of efficient causation into explanations of material
phenomena is ontologically and epistemologically problematic for any philosopher
operating under the normative dictates of the classical episteme, such a move is
fatal to the philosophy of mind in Stewart’s view. (79) Misled by the seductive lure
of pseudo-explanations of motion, the philosophy of mind has fallen into serious
errors “that have taken rise from the same prejudice, which I [Stewart] have already
remarked to have had so extensive an influence upon the speculations of natural
philosophers.” (79) That is, the philosophy of mind has also adopted efficient
causality as a key explanatory element. In the case of the philosophy of mind,
efficient causality manifests itself in a manner that is parallel to the role that it plays in explanations of action at a distance. In particular, Stewart claims,

[t]hat, in the case of the perception of distant objects, we are naturally inclined to suspect, either something to be emitted from the organ of sense, or some medium to intervene between the object and organ, by means of which the former may communicate an impulse to the latter; appears from the common modes of expression on the subject, which are to found in all languages. (79)

In other words, the assumptions here rest on the notion that the interface between the mind and external world is identical in its general character to motion that results from action at a distance.

Stewart suggests that such assumptions arises from an uncritical commonplace examination of phenomenal experience and that “[n]othing, indeed, can be conceived more simple and natural than their origin. When an object is placed in a certain situation with respect to a particular organ of the body, a perception arises in the mind: when the object is removed, the perception ceases.” (80) “Hence,” Stewart concludes,

we are led to apprehend some connexion between the object and perception; and as we are accustomed to believe, that matter produces its effects by impulse, we conclude that there must be some material medium intervening.
between the object and organ, by means of which the impulse is communicated from the one to the other other. (80).

So, in this conception of the interface between the mind and the external world, the mind receives information from the external world only indirectly; rather than directly perceiving the actual characteristics and properties of entities that are spatially separated from it, the mind receives a simulacrum of those properties and characteristics that are transferred to the mind via a sequential relay of information similar to manner in which action at a distance is conceived of as a chain of contact-induced events that transfers motion between spatially separated entities.

This use of efficient causation in the philosophy of mind violates, of course, the methodological and onto-epistemological norms of the classical episteme by uncritically assuming the verifiable existence of a ‘cause’ where no such thing can be demonstrated. But this role of efficient causality in explanations of the mind/external world interface is only the beginning of its pernicious effects on the philosophy of mind. Far more serious is the role that efficient causal explanations have played in accounts of the origins of mental contents. Once again, Stewart claims, “[philosophers] have imagined that the impression on the organ of sense is communicated to the mind” as a result of an efficient causal relationship between an external sensory stimulus and the mind. (80-81). The introduction of efficient causality at this crucial point occurs, Stewart notes, via a presumed analogy between the behavior of physical entities and the formation of mental contents that underlies
virtually all philosophies of mind. In particular, Stewart describes a reasoning process that begins by positing an unproblematic (and dare we say, ‘commonsensical’) efficient causal relationship between non-mental entities that assumes that “one body produces a change in the state of another by impulse....” (81). From this ultimately unwarranted assumption, Stewart continues, “it has been supposed, that the external object produces perception, (which is a change in the state of the mind,...”) 136 (81) Finally, Stewart concludes, supporters of the notion that sensory reception produces its effects by transforming the mind generally suppose that this perception occurs “first, by some material impression made on the organ of sense; and, secondly, by some material impression communicated from the organ to the mind along the nerves and brain.” (81)

It is here that the substitution of efficient for physical causality produces the key error that has distorted the conclusions of the philosophy of mind since the time of the ancient Greeks. Specifically, the main consequence of treating the formation of

136 The efficacy of this analogical leap between the physical and the mental requires that physical interactions between material objects and mental processes be equated in terms of their basic causal mechanisms. While Stewart does not directly address this point, the conflict with the norms of the Classical episteme that is inherent in this assumed identity between these two different types of events is quite clear. If both events are produced in the same manner, that is, if both physical interactions and perceptual phenomena arise from the same causal process, then the difference between internal mental events and external physical events becomes rather blurry. Although some distinctions might still be made between mental and physical entities, this muddling of these types of events creates the very real temptation of concluding that there is in fact no meaningful distinction between the domain of the non-mental objective realm and the subjective realm of phenomenal experience. This move threatens the classificatory stability that the norm of ontological stasis attempts to ensure by allowing the objective and subjective to bleed into each other. It is also dangerously similar to the positions advocated by both Berkeley and Hume and an important buttress of the skepticism that both these philosophers advocated. As a protégé of Reid, such a blurring of the objective and the subjective, along with its skeptical consequences, would almost certainly be anathema to Stewart.
mental contents as akin to action at a distance has been the assumption that perception must be the end result of a *mediated* chain of interactions between the external world and the mind. Just as the final particle in a chain of collisions receives the motion transferred from the initial collision through a subsequent series of collisions, so too, the reasoning goes, perception is the final event that results from a sequence of transfers of sensory stimuli. Moreover, the transfer of motion from initial to final particle or the transfer of information from initial sensory stimulus to final perception, seemingly requires, as Stewart has noted, some substrate to act as a vehicle for the transfer of the otherwise intangible qualities of motion and information. In the case of action at a distance, the supposed sequential physical interaction of a chain of particles is regarded as the unproblematic material substrate that transfer the intangible quality of motion from particle to particle. Perception is similarly made possible by a substrate that carries the essential qualities of sensory stimuli across the interface between the mind and the external world.

This hypothetical substrate of perception, the assumption of which originates from the erroneous substitution of efficient for physical causality, is, Stewart claims, none other than the entity commonly referred to as an ‘idea.’ Stewart sums up the ‘ideal theory’ and its alleged explanation of the perceptual process by citing Malebranche’s claim “that everyone will grant that we perceive not external objects immediately, and of themselves...the immediate object of the mind is not the thing perceived, but
something which is intimately united to the soul; and it is that which I call an idea....” (84). Perception, then, requires mediation; however, the basis for claiming that perception is a mediated event rests on an argument that is parallel in structure, Stewart has argued, to the argument that action at distance is really just a sequence of contact-induced motions. If this is the case, then the ideal theory of perception recapitulates the error that undermines explanations of action at a distance. Specifically, the notions of the idea and of contact-induced motion derive their plausibility by substituting efficient causality for physical causality. Consequently, to say that ideas are copies of sensory experiences, and, moreover, that ideas form the basis for perception is ultimately to subscribe to efficient causality as an explanation for the process of perception, just as assuming that the event of contact is in fact the cause of motion propagating among a series of particles. Since Stewart has already disavowed efficient causality as a legitimate element of explanation for any phenomenon, there is only one logical conclusion left: the theoretical structures that include the concept of the ‘idea’ as a basic unit of mental functioning, and in particular, as the substrate of perception, are seriously and fundamentally flawed. Their primary flaw lies in the uncritical acceptance of ideas as demonstrably existing entities when no such demonstration is in fact possible. Despite the widespread acceptance of the concept of the idea as an indisputable component of the mental space, there is, Stewart concludes, absolutely no methodological or ontologo-epistemological justification for assuming that ideas exist.
Stewart’s Critique of the Ideal Theory (II): the norms of the Classical Episteme and the Ideal theory

Stewart’s rejection of the concept of the idea is a radical and controversial philosophical move. As Stewart is careful to note, the idea has been an important philosophical concept since the time of the ancient Greeks. Moreover, Stewart suggests that the ideal theory has become an even more prominent feature of the philosophy of mind since the seventeenth century. Prior to the seventeenth century, Stewart claims, the fundamental postulates of the ideal theory “were...rather implied than expressed” but since the seventeenth century, these same postulates “have been stated in the form of explicit propositions.” (81) By citing the works of such seventeenth-century intellectual luminaries as John Locke, Isaac Newton, and Samuel Clarke, Stewart emphasizes that his immediate predecessors have therefore not been immune, despite the supposed superiority of their methodological tools, to the allure of the ideal theory. Indeed, for all of their radical advancement of knowledge in other domains, these thinkers, as well as virtually all of the other philosophical figures that followed them, have actually produced a regression in the philosophy of mind by uncritically seizing upon a fatally flawed doctrine as the linchpin of their explanations of mental phenomena. Only in the mid-eighteenth century did Stewart’s predecessor and mentor Thomas Reid finally identify and isolate the rotten doctrinal core of the philosophy of mind. By asserting a rigid and almost fundamentalist understanding of Bacon’s methodological prescriptions, Reid
laid out what he believed to be a sound foundation for further investigations of mental phenomena. Stewart sees his own work as the continuation of Reid’s efforts in this matter by both elaborating Reid’s conclusions and by establishing Common Sense discourse as the dominate investigative framework among philosophers of mind.\textsuperscript{137}

From Stewart’s perspective the demolition of the ideal theory is but a means to an end. Like Reid before him, Stewart’s primary concern is not simply to correct an abstruse feature of the philosophy of mind. For both philosophers, there is much more at stake. In particular, the persistence of efficient causality as an explanatory element within the philosophy of mind threatens to undermine the very possibility of acquiring any knowledge at all regarding the properties and functioning of the mind. Even the methodological revolution inaugurated by Francis Bacon has proven vulnerable to the pernicious influence of efficient causality. By the seemingly innocuous act of accepting the existence of ideas, even the most methodologically sophisticated investigations of mental phenomena have endorsed explanations that rely on efficient rather than physical causation. In doing so, the post-Baconian philosophy of mind has unwittingly surrendered what the natural and moral philosophers of the classical episteme regarded as the chief advantage of Bacon’s methodological program over earlier conceptions of both philosophical method and

\textsuperscript{137} Whether Stewart was successful in attaining this ambitious goal, and to what extent various factors aided or hindered him, will be taken up in Chapter 5.
knowledge: the elimination of non-demonstrable entities and processes that granted only the appearance, and not the reality, of a well-grounded explanation.

When philosophers of mind deviate from Bacon's methodological criteria and employ unsubstantiated entities or processes as explanatory elements, the results are false and misleading explanations of mental phenomena. The falsity of such explanations, however, is often not immediately evident. Human nature tends both to obscure the presence of non-observables in explanations and to resist efforts to purge them once they are discovered. As Stewart argues, violations of the Baconian methodological prohibition of non-observables tends to produce explanations that are rendered persuasive “[b]y a specious solution of insuperable difficulties....” (91) The easy, but deceptive, success that the use of non-observables provides is alluring because, as Stewart has previously argued, human nature itself is predisposed to accept the existence of certain non-observables. (82) In addition, the apparent success of such explanations “flatter the pride of man, and increase his power,” thereby gratifying two of the baser, yet all-too powerful, motives of human action. (89). Under the influence of bad instincts and driven by a fundamental, though faulty, perceptual habit, it is no surprise to Stewart that philosophers have generally attempted to find a short cut to explanatory success by employing non-observables that required no effort to confirm or deny their existence
In contrast, the Baconian restriction of the domain of evidence renders explanation a difficult and often frustrating task. Very often there is simply not enough accessible evidence at hand in order to draw firm conclusions about many of the major operations of the mind. In particular, Stewart announces, “that one of the most valuable effects of genuine philosophy, is to remind us of the limited powers of the human understanding.” (88). Further, Stewart, in a stirring call for what historian Keith Baker has called “epistemological modesty,” builds upon that pronouncement by declaring that

[t]he most profound discoveries which are placed within the reach of our researches, instead of laying open to our view the efficient causes of natural appearances, lead to a confession of human ignorance...and which, by evincing to him the operation of powers, whose nature must for ever remain unknown, serve to remind him of the insufficiency of his faculties to penetrate the secrets of the universe. (89)

Rather than granting omniscience, then, Baconian methodology actually places severe restrictions on inquiry. For Stewart, the onto-epistemological austerity of Baconianism, far from being a liability, is actually its greatest strength; the constant acknowledgement that it provokes of the fallibility and of the boundaries of the human capacity for knowledge aids philosophical investigators in overcoming their ingrained tendency to assume the existence of non-observables explanatory
elements and forces them to confine themselves strictly to observable entities and processes. In doing so, Baconianism offers the opportunity for a more accurate appraisal, Stewart believes, of the objective world that lies beyond the realm of subjective experience.

Whatever the logical and evidentiary merits of Stewart’s critique of the ideal theory, it is clear that he launches his attack from the methodological and ontological territory marked out by the Classical episteme. In the language of Stewart’s time, the ideal theory fails because it violates a key tenet of rigorous Baconian methodology. More particularly, the ideal theory assumes the existence of an event, as a critical explanatory element, that cannot be demonstrated by observation. Against such an easy, yet unwarranted presupposition, Stewart juxtaposes his mentor Thomas Reid’s strict insistence on a methodology that produces nothing other than observation statements. According to Stewart, Reid’s essential contribution to the problem of perception can be reduced down

[m]erely to this; that the mind is so formed, that certain impressions produced on our organs of sense by external objects, are followed by correspondent sensations; and that these sensations, (which have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter, than the words of a language have to
the things they denote,) are followed by a perception of the existence and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions are made; that the steps of this process are equally incomprehensible; and that, for any thing we can prove to the contrary, the connexion between the impression and the sensation, may both be arbitrary...."(92)

Stewart’s distillation of Reid’s work on perception holds up a fundamentalist reading of Baconian methodology as the only appropriate foundation of the philosophy of mind. In doing so, Stewart reveals his unyielding allegiance not only to Bacon (and to Reid) but also, more specifically, to the Classical episteme's onto-epistemological norm of observability. Stewart’s critique of the ideal theory, and by extension, of discourses like associationism that rely upon the concept of the idea, does not, therefore indicate a break with the Classical episteme. Instead, Stewart’s grounds his critique upon the Classical episteme's norms and insists that the explanatory superiority of Common Sense discourse over discourses that employ the ideal theory lies precisely in the greater adherence of Common Sense philosophy of mind to the onto-epistemological dictates of the Classical episteme.

*Implications of Stewart’s critique of the Ideal theory for Associationism*
Stewart published his first sustained critique of the ideal theory almost a generation before Mill’s *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* appeared in print. Although David Hume was Stewart’s main target, his critique of the ideal theory, nevertheless, holds important consequences for Mill’s version of associationism. Since Mill’s entire philosophy of mind, and most especially its explanation of perception, deploys the ideal theory as a foundational component, Mill’s work is susceptible to the criticisms that Stewart develops. If Stewart has correctly characterized and critiqued the ideal theory, then Mill’s associationism faces a serious problem. Specifically, Stewart’s critique indicates that associationist discourse is only possible because of an illegitimate methodological strategy that elides the distinction between two types of causation so as to permit the introduction of a hypothetical entity into explanations of mental phenomena. This hypothetical entity, otherwise known as an idea, plays an irreplaceable structural and functional role in Mill’s philosophy of mind. Consequently, Stewart’s demolition of the ideal theory also guts Mill’s associationism by depriving it of the concept of the idea.

For his part, Mill hardly appears to be aware of critiques of the concept of the idea and of associationism more generally. He neither names any particular critic nor does he genuinely address any critiques. As for David Hume, whose associationist doctrines triggered Thomas Reid’s initial efforts to combat the ideal theory and to replace it with an alternative philosophy of mind, Mill makes a number of approving
comments before cryptically remarking that “[Hume] was mislead by the pursuit of a few surprising and paradoxical results, and when he had arrived at them he stopped.” (Education, 150) Hume’s philosophical difficulties, however, do not mark, for Mill, the beginning of a historical rupture that led to a revolution in the philosophy of mind, as they did for Reid and Stewart. On the contrary, Mill treats Hume’s work as little more than a prologue to the history of associationist philosophy of mind. Whatever the limitations of Hume’s philosophy mind might have been, Mill confidently brushes them aside since “[a]fter [Hume], and at a short interval, appeared two philosophers, who were more sober-minded, and had better aims. These were Condillac and Hartley.” (Education, 150) From there onward, Mill describes the emergence of an associationist philosophy of mind that seemingly had no notable critics. Indeed, Mill addresses his Common Sense opponents directly and at length, in only one publication. In an anonymous article that is commonly attributed to him, Mill takes issue with the alleged intellectual dominance of Common Sense philosophy of mind and calls for an aggressive challenge to the role of Common Sense in British intellectual circles. Beyond this statement, however, Mill proceeds with his project with apparent confidence in the philosophical soundness of the concept of the idea.

From Stewart’s perspective, and from any perspective within the Classical episteme’s normative matrix, the two discourses of Common Sense and Associationism stand opposed. If one views the intellectual contest between
Common Sense and Associationism at the level of their respective statements on the nature of perception, then the prospects for coexistence are bleak. The ideal theory is either supportable, in which case Associationism is tenable, or the ideal theory is in fact fallacious and Associationism accordingly collapses. Given his absolute rejection of ideas as appropriate explanatory elements, Stewart has left no room for compromise between Common Sense and Associationism on the central problem of perception. Mill, on the other hand, does not so much rebut the charges leveled by Stewart as essentially ignore them. He also offers no defense of the concept of the idea except for its explanatory utility; for Mill the concept of the idea offers a handy instrument for achieving his theoretical and practical goals, and Mill considers this sufficient reason for adopting the concept. Nevertheless, if Mill’s acceptance of the idea is justifiable, then Stewart’s Common Sense philosophy of mind, while not necessarily refuted, will find itself on much shakier philosophical ground since its theoretical claims are partially justified by the rejection of the concept of the idea.

Moreover, the opposition between the two discourses would also appear quite natural from within the normative framework of the Classical episteme. Both Stewart and Mill are claiming that their respective discourses are expressions of the same onto-epistemological norms and that their discourses represent and explain mental phenomena to the highest humanly-possible degree. From within the framework of the Classical episteme, such a situation would inevitably produce contention between Common Sense and Associationism. Since the goal of Baconian
philosophical analysis is, to put it most simply, to derive the best attainable explanation of a given domain of phenomena, there should ultimately be only one ‘true’ account that genuinely fulfills the episteme’s normative demands. Prior to the attainment of this omega-point of explanation, numerous explanatory accounts will appear that all approximate the best possible explanation. Proponents of these various explanations will contend with each other in order to demonstrate the superiority of their respective accounts through a wide range of argumentative, rhetorical, and political maneuvers.

What these proponents of contending explanations will tend not to do is to challenge the onto-epistemological norms themselves. As Foucault characterizes it, this maneuver would produce a “rupture” or radical discontinuity in the (apparently) smoothly functioning normative system of the episteme. From a perspective within the episteme, this discontinuity between the norms would actually impede the formulation of explanations by removing guideposts for establishing and validating theoretical claims. The existence of this normative matrix casts the opposition between Common Sense and Associationism in a new light. The point here is that the relationship between Stewart and Mills’ discourses on mental phenomena cannot be taken at face value. The seemingly absolute philosophical opposition between them is made possible only within the normative matrix of the Classical episteme and by the further expectation of a singular explanation for mental phenomena. These normative demands and methodological
expectations tie together the theoretical and observational statements that comprise the distinctive features of each discourse. Other normative demands or expectations could well lead to a different conclusion about the relationship between Common Sense and Associationism because these would tie the constituent parts of the discourses together in different patterns and produce new possibilities for conflict or reconciliation. From an external perspective, the seemingly exclusive relationship between Common Sense and Associationism loses much of absolutist character as it becomes clear that the same onto-epistemological norms and methodological expectations mediate their differences. For all of their many and significant discursive differences, then, Stewart and Mills’ philosophical analyses of mental phenomena share a substantial infrastructure. One of the key constituent parts of this infrastructure, the normative requirement of observability, will present Stewart with both a guide and an obstacle in his efforts to construct a philosophy of mind just as it did for Mill.

*Stewart: The External World and the Mind’s Contents*

If Stewart is correct in his claim that ideas cannot be shown to exist, and therefore cannot be incorporated into explanations of mental phenomena, then how is the mind constituted and structured? Although Stewart breaks radically with the associationist conception of mind, he remains, nevertheless, within the matrix of the
Classical episteme. Accordingly, he confronts two critical tasks. On the one hand, Stewart must specify the source of the mind’s contents. In addition, he must locate in the mind structures or entities that he can plausibly construe as observable under the regime laid down by the Classical episteme. This latter objective will lead Stewart to posit a model of the mind composed of functional units whose coordinated activity produces the internal mental world revealed by introspection. As for the former objective, Stewart reveals himself to be a committed empiricist, but one who, unlike Mill and the associationists, conceives of the mind as an active participant in organizing sense experience.

Stewart’s acceptance of the onto-epistemological norms of the Classical episteme also leads him to accept the basic empiricist proposition that the mind’s contents are derived from sensory stimuli. Nevertheless, Stewart expresses some reluctance to accept this proposition in the same straightforward manner that Mill does. In particular, Stewart rejects the passive image of mind that emerges from Mill’s account by declaring “[t]hat the mind cannot, without the grossest absurdity, be considered in the light of a receptacle which is gradually furnished from without, by the materials introduced by the channel of the senses....” (98) Moreover, Stewart also reiterates that the common empiricist mechanism for translating sensory stimuli into mental contents relies upon the discredited theory of ideas. Consequently, Stewart objects to that the sort of empiricism that underlies Mill’s association in which the mind is treated as “tabula rasa, upon which copies or
resemblances of things external are imprinted....” (99) Stewart in fact offers a vision of the mind’s contents that differs so much from the standard empiricist account that he even revises the usual order in which topics in the philosophy of mind are presented. At first glance, the obvious place to begin an account of the philosophy of the human mind would naturally seem to be at the point at which mind and its contents first come into being. Stewart, however, believes that his revision of empiricist philosophy of mind renders this arrangement so problematic “that the inquiry concerning the origin of human knowledge cannot possibly be discussed at the commencement of a such work as this....” (98) Instead, Stewart indicates that considerable preliminary analyses must be completed before this problem can be addressed. (98)

Ultimately, Stewart, at this point in his analysis, limits his statements regarding the source of the mind’s contents to a bare endorsement of the empiricist viewpoint. Whatever the limitations of empiricism might be, Stewart still agrees with the view that “we should acquiesce in the conclusion, that, without our organs of sense, the mind must have remained destitute of knowledge....” (99)

Stewart proceeds to recast the transformation of sensory stimuli into mental contents from a universally accepted ‘given’ that requires neither explanation nor justification into a highly problematic event that requires careful scrutiny and a rigorous application of the norm of observability in order to avoid the introduction of unwarranted assumptions. Thus, when Stewart poses to himself “the general
question, Whether all our knowledge may be ultimately traced from our sensations?...” (98), he can only provide an answer that is exclusively expressed in observation statements. As a rigorous Baconian, and as a practitioner in particular of Common Sense, Stewart’s analysis of the event of perception reveals nothing more than that the impressions made on our senses by external objects, furnish the occasions on which the mind, by the laws of its constitution, is led to perceive the qualities of the material world, and to exert all the different modifications of thought of which it is capable. (99).

In short, what Stewart’s Baconianism provides is not so much a full-blooded explanation of perception as a description of the events attendant upon the interaction between one observable occurrence (the arrival of a sensory stimulus at a sense organ) and a subsequent observable occurrence (the various operations of the mind upon that initial sensory stimulus). Beyond this, the only thing that a careful observer can, contingent upon repeated observations, reasonably infer is the apparent regularity of these events: at the point of spacio-temporal coincidence between a sensory stimulus occurring on a sense organ and a human mind, there will likely occur a predictable and delimited (because they too are observable) sequence of events. This, according to Stewart, is all that good philosophical method can tell us about the process of perception.

Stewart provides an illustration both of the perceptual process itself as well as the proper application of good method in a thought-experiment regarding the role of
sensory stimuli and the emergence of self-awareness. Stewart first asks his readers to “suppose a being formed in every other respect like man; but possessed of no senses, excepting those of hearing and smelling.” (100) Stewart’s primary goal here is to demonstrate the distinction between mental and material phenomena; nevertheless, his analysis lays out just exactly what an investigator who earnestly sought to abide by the norm of observability would be permitted, and implicitly forbidden, to do. Although Stewart does not explicitly distinguish between different stages of the perceptual process, his thought-experiment implies a distinction between initial sensory stimulus and subsequent mental operations. If there did in fact exist a creature such as Stewart describes in which only two the sensory modalities of hearing and smelling were possible, the normative requirements of the Classical episteme would first generate “the knowledge of two facts at once: that of the existence of the sensation; and that of his own existence, as a sentient being.” (101) Strikingly, the result of a spacio-temporal coincidence between a registered sensation and a mind is not the creation of a copy of the sensation in the form of an idea. Instead, once the sensation is registered, the result is a change in the state of the receptive mind. Specifically, the receptive mind is now aware of the existence of entities, processes, or states of being that it did not, prior to the event of sensation, acknowledge as existing. There is no new entity created in this process that transports the sensation into the mental realm; indeed, as Stewart claims, the mind/environment interface operates through direct contact between the mind and the external world. Stewart’s conclusion here is in accord with his previous statements regarding the proper application of Baconian methodological precepts:
since no intermediate carrier entity (such as the idea) is observable, proper analysis cannot introduce such entities.

The registration of the sensory stimulus and the subsequent state change of the mind represent only the preliminary stage of the perceptual process. Next, Stewart continues,

[a]fter the sensation is at an end, [the hypothetical creature] can remember he felt it; he can conceive that he feels it again. If he has felt a variety of different sensations, he can compare them together in respect of the pleasure of the pain they have afforded him; and will naturally desire the return of the agreeable sensations, and be afraid of the return of those which were painful. If the sensations of smell and sound are both excited in his mind at the same time, he can attend to either of them he chuses, and withdraw his attention from both.... (101)

What Stewart is describing here is a series of mental operations that have become possible as a result of the mental state change that was triggered by the initial sensory stimulus. Once a mind has achieved a state of awareness of a previously unknown event, entity, or condition of being, that mind can then begin to interact with and manipulate the experience itself in a variety of ways. Here again, Stewart presents his conception of mind in terms of observation statements regarding
particular actions of the mind as it encounters sensory stimuli. Restricting himself purely to observation statements, he can only note that these mental events are spacio-temporally coincident with a given stimulus in an apparently regular fashion. The specifics of how these interactions occur does not appear in Stewart's conception of the perceptual process – and, barring an observation of a mediating mechanism, Stewart’s interpretation of Baconian investigative practice prevents him from proposing any solution to the problem of how perceptions make the transition between external sensory stimuli and internal mental event.

**Stewart: The Functions of the Mind**

Although Stewart presents his model of mind in a less rigorous manner than Mill does, several key difference between Associationism and Common Sense are evident in Stewart’s exposition. One of the more obvious differences between the two philosophies of mind appears in Stewart’s characterization of the mind as a whole. Specifically, Stewart envisions the mind as a site at which sensory stimuli coincide in space and time with a set of observable mental operations.

This is quite different from Mill’s model of the mind in two ways. First, Stewart portrays the mind in terms of its functioning and the outcome of that functioning, rather than, as Mill does, a collection of discrete objects. What are observable for Stewart are not entities in the mind, but the mind’s actions. Given Stewart’s
rejection of the ideal theory, this is really the only option left to him. To a certain extent, the difference between Associationism and Common Sense can be understood in terms of the distinction between form and function with the two schools emphasizing one or the other as the key to explaining mental phenomena. For Mill, mind is defined by its constituent parts certainly, but even more by the arrangement of those constituent parts. It is the organization of ideas that creates consciousness. For Stewart, on the other hand, function is central. Since Stewart’s interpretation of the Classical episteme’s normative demands leads him to reject the ideal theory, his model lacks the discrete corpuscular entities that are central to associationism – Indeed, Stewart’s model rejects, on observational grounds, any sort of corpuscular structure. When the mind is observed, Stewart argues, we do not see any particle-like structures; instead, what introspection reveals is the mind performing a range of actions when in is in the presence of sensory stimuli. We don’t see what the mind is; rather we see what the mind does.

Additionally, treating the mind in terms of its functions rather than its structure highlights a second feature that differentiates Stewart’s Common Sense from Mill’s Associationist philosophy of mind. This second feature involves the active participation of the mind in the process of perception. Mill’s model presents an image of the mind as passive in its relations with the external world. Any specific mind is no more and no less than the total of its idea-encoded sensory experiences and the arrangement of those coded experiences. The mind appears in Mill’s
account as little more than a recording device that transcribes environmentally derived experiences. Against this model of the mind as passive recipient of external stimuli, Stewart presents a far more active conception of the mind. While Stewart grudgingly admits the foundational role of external experiences in making mental activity possible, he also asserts that mental contents are very much the result of the mind’s own capacities for manipulating sensory stimuli. Stewart’s accounts of these capacities, which he refers to as “faculties,” generally focus on their observable activities. So, Stewart’s “faculties” are not presented as capacities that can be spatially localized in the material substrate of the brain, nor are they themselves viewed by Stewart as merely the outcome of the arrangement/relationships of corpuscular cognitive units as is the case with associationism. Rather, the “faculties” are linguistic entities that denote mental activities that are detectable and distinguishable through observation.

Stewart himself never defines a faculty, and it is mostly implicit in his work beyond a few mentions. But this seems to fit with Stewart’s typical approach: identify some distinguishable function, label it, then talk about how it contributes to the formation of mental contents and interacts with other functions. There is no comprehensive list of faculties either, just the ones that he has observed.

*Stewart: Structural Features of the Mental Space*
Although Stewart focuses most of his attention on the functions of the mind, he does not entirely neglect to consider some structural features that grant coherence and stability to, and thus create, mental space. One of the structural features that Stewart examines is, surprisingly, the association of ideas – surprisingly, because Stewart has, of course, rejected the ideal theory. Nevertheless, Stewart retains a structural role for the association of ideas in his philosophy of mind. He justifies his use of this seemingly inappropriate structuring mechanism on two grounds. On the one hand, introspection reveals that mental contents are linked to one another and to external experiences in regular and predictable ways. Moreover, Stewart argues that retaining the particular phrase ‘association of ideas’ avoids confusion so long as the term ‘idea’ is understood to denote the product of mental functioning rather than a discrete mental entity.

In good Baconian fashion, Stewart leads off his discussion of the association of ideas by pointing out that a review of subjective experience demonstrates that the procession of mental events is both an exceedingly common feature of mental and life that it follows discernable patterns. Rather than being a random swirl of events, even the slightest observations of subjective experience reveal “[t]hat one thought is often suggested to the mind by another; and that the sight of an external object often recalls former occurrence, and revives former feelings...”(274-275). These linkages,
Stewart notes, can occur in a multitude of settings and can manifest an enormously diverse content. Stewart points to such a range of situations as

passing along a road which we have formerly traveled in the company of a friend, the particulars of the conversation in which we were then engaged, are frequently suggested to us by the objects we meet with... The connexion which is formed in the mind between the words of a language and the ideas they denote; the connexion which is formed between the different words of a discourse we have committed to memory; the connexion between the different notes of a piece of music in the mind of the musician, are all obvious instances of the same general law of our nature. (275)

The linkages that order the procession of mental events can also produce complex and sensitive webs of association. Even a small stimulus can sometimes unleash a deluge of associated memories and emotions as he illustrates with a poignant tale about the reactions of homesick British soldiers serving far from home who happen upon a humble implement that was manufactured in England:

a solitary, half-worn pewter spoon... attracted our attention; and, on examination, we found it stamped on the back with the word London. I cannot pass over this circumstance in silence, out of gratitude for the many pleasant thoughts, the anxious hopes, and tender remembrances, it excited in us. (277)
In addition, the association of ideas, Stewart argues, is not only a ubiquitous feature of subjective life, but it is also an important facilitator of social interaction. In support of this contention Stewart cites the conventions that require individuals to avoid in conversation all expressions, and all topic of discourse, which have any relation, however remote, to ideas of an unpleasant nature, we plainly proceed on the supposition that there are certain connexions among our thoughts, which have an influence over the order of their succession.

(279)

Sometimes, Stewart continues, rather than avoiding undesirable associations altogether, it is possible to take advantage of the association of ideas to create deliberate linkages in order to communicate indirectly. In particular, when we are under a necessity of communicating any disagreeable information to another, delicacy leads us, instead of mentioning the thing itself, to mention something else from which our meaning may be understood. In this manner, we prepare our hearers for the unwelcome intelligence. (280)

Moreover, this form of indirect communication through association also serves to mark, Stewart indicates, “[t]he distinction between gross and delicate flattery....” (280) Given Stewart’s contention that “nothing is more offensive than flattery which is direct and pointed...” (280), the lack of a mechanism for appropriately
communicating approbation would undoubtedly mar social relations. Indirect communication through the manipulation of associations, however, can smooth over any awkward exchanges since "praise is considered as happy and elegant, in proportion to the slightness of the associations by which it is conveyed." (280)

The enormous number of easily verifiable examples of the role that the association of ideas plays in mental and social life therefore compels Stewart to acknowledge its existence in some sense. But acknowledging the reality of the association of ideas presents Stewart with some unique problems. One problem, obviously, is the plain fact that Stewart’s entire philosophical project rests on the absolute rejection of the concept of the idea. Accordingly, if Stewart retains associationism in some form as an essential part of Common Sense, then he will have to decide what exactly is being ‘associated’ if ideas are not onto-epistemologically permissible. Furthermore, regardless of Stewart’s formulation of the character of associationism in Common Sense, he faces, as he acknowledges, a terminological problem. In particular, the general acceptance of the ideal theory combined with the equally general acceptance of the principle of the association of ideas is liable to generate confusion if he either adopts a new designation for the ubiquitous linkages that structure the mental space, or if formulates a new conception of the associative process under the received name. Stewart especially fears that his contributions to the philosophy of mind might be dismissed if his critics perceive him as attempting to gloss over difficulties or weaknesses by engaging in linguistic obfuscation. Stewart anticipates
such criticism by declaring that “I would not wish... to expose myself to the charge of delivering old doctrines in new form.....” (280). Stewart’s caution at this juncture of his argument is quite reasonable. Under the Classical episteme, such behavior was seen as one of the primary flaws of pre-Baconian natural philosophy and as one of the primary obstacles to progress. Indeed, by Stewart’s time, the accusation of linguistic obfuscation carried with it an allegation not only of methodological incompetence but also the implication of unethical conduct in that linguistic obfuscation could be seen as a deliberate attempt to disguise a weak argument in misleading language or to claim undeserved credit for novelty by giving the mere appearance of originality.

Stewart addresses both issues in a deft maneuver by simultaneously redefining the term ‘idea’ and by acknowledging the philosophical and historical significance of the phrase, ‘the association of ideas.’ He disposes of the latter issue by falling back on a terminological conservatism that seeks to preserve long-standing philosophical locutions and to avoid the multiplication of terms by declaring his unwillingness “excepting in a case of necessity, to depart from common language....” (280) Stewart, despite some misgivings about the phrase ‘association of ideas’ bows to the weight of philosophical tradition and concedes that he “shall continue to make use of the same expression.” (280) As for the former issue, Stewart alleviates some of the difficulties that the phrase ‘association of ideas presents by insisting that “the word idea must be understood in a sense much more extensive than it is commonly
employed in.” (280) In particular, Stewart cites his mentor Thomas Reid’s expanded definition of the concept of the idea. “It is very justly remarked by Dr. Reid,” Stewart says,

‘ that memory, judgment, reasoning, passions, affections, and purposes; in a word, every operation of the mind, excepting those of sense, is excited occasionally in the train of our thoughts: so that, if we make the train of our thoughts to be only a train of ideas, the word idea must be understood to denote all these operations.’ (280)

Stewart’s borrowing from Reid thus drastically reorients the concept of the idea by shifting its fundamental identity from that of a specific entity within in the mind to a collective designation that subsumes a set of integrated mental processes. In other words, Stewart (and Reid) changes the idea into a functional unit of mind and deprives it of the structural role that (they claim) it plays in other philosophies of mind. These maneuvers allow Stewart to escape the possible allegation of linguistic obscurantism and to capture a venerable concept for his own purposes.

Stewart: The Limitations of the Association of Ideas
Stewart’s recognition of associative processes in the mental space does not mean, however, that he concedes a significant place in Common Sense to a key element of associationist discourse. Unlike the associationists, Stewart expresses considerable skepticism regarding the advisability of attributing so many of the mind’s activities to the association of ideas. In the first place, for Stewart the association of ideas constitutes only one of the several mental functions that collectively compose the mental environment. In contrast, for Mill the association of ideas is the mechanism by which consciousness is constituted and organized. Additionally, Stewart is especially concerned about the reliability of the association of ideas, which he fears can produce distorted perceptions and, further, distorted conclusions about both external and mental realms. While associationists like Mill certainly realized that associative processes could go wrong and produce distorted perceptions, they tended to see this outcome as the result of environmental influences that interfered with associative relationships between ideas. Under the right environmental conditions, associative relations would produce accurate perceptions of the external world. The problem, therefore, did not lay in associative relations per se but in the interplay between associative processes and the external world. Stewart, on the other hand, views the associative process itself as rife with possibilities for erroneous perceptions.
Stewart identifies three particular instances in which the mind’s ubiquitous propensity to connect mental contents and sensations in complex webs can give rise to inaccurate perceptions. Notably, he explicitly attributes the origins of these erroneous perceptions to the associative relations themselves and not to any other factors by flatly declaring at the outset that

[t]he Association of Ideas has a tendency to warp our speculative opinions in the three following ways: FIRST, by blending together in our apprehensions, things which are really distinct in their nature...SECONDLY, by misleading us in those anticipations of the future from the past...THIRDLY, by connecting in the mind erroneous opinions with truths which irresistibly command our assent.... (340-341)

In the course of discussing each of these instances, Stewart will note some social conditions that exacerbate the flaws of associative relationships; however, according to Stewart, in each case, inaccurate perceptions arise directly and primarily from an essential feature of a given associative relationship and are thus endemic to cognitive processes. Despite this rather grim conclusion, which immediately raises questions regarding the very possibility of obtaining reliable knowledge, there is, Stewart concludes, a corrective measure that can avert the perils of flawed associative relations. Returning to methodological fundamentals, Stewart holds that rigorous and thorough forms of observation can be used to regulate associative relations.
The key to understanding the nature, as well as the proper corrective, of the flaw identified by Stewart in the first type of associative relationship lies in the assumption that is embedded in his characterization of it. Specifically, Stewart here takes for granted two onto-epistemological ‘facts’: first, his explicit statement assumes there actually are “things which are really distinct in their nature,” and second, implicitly, that it is possible to determine that such a state of being exists. Stewart offers no account of how either of these alleged facts can be demonstrated; nevertheless, his exposition of cases in which perceivers fail to keep discrete entities separate, as well as means for preventing the elision of discrete entities, hints at the Classical episteme’s key norm of observation.

In the case of the failure to keep discrete entities separate, Stewart offers only the barest description of the process by which presumably discrete entities can become blended together. He refers obliquely to “our habit of combining the notions of two things...” as the ultimate cause of this type of deceptive associative relationship but offer no explanation of this tendency. (343) The act of creating links between entities is not, of course, a problem in itself, and is indeed a crucial event in the exercise of numerous mental functions; however, in some cases, a linkage emerges between ontologically discrete entities and, through repeated experiences of this association, the link “becomes so strong, that we find it impossible to think of the one, without thinking at the same time of the other.” (343) Thus, frequent repetition
of experience can embue the mind with a penchant for perceiving an association
where none should exist. From within the normative matrix of the classical
episteme, such an association is illegitimate because it violates the necessary
ontological boundaries that define the identity of entities. The associative process
possesses no safeguard to prevent this kind of illegitimate association from
occurring and from being accepted as a well-grounded fact. On the contrary, the
association of ideas encourages ontologically inappropriate association as it permits
ideas (in Stewart’s sense) to be combined indiscriminately.

Stewart cites, as a particularly vivid example of this kind of illegitimate, yet nearly
indissoluble, link “that which exists in every person’s mind between the notions of
colour and of extension.” (341) These two things are ontologically distinct, Stewart
argues because they rightfully belong to phenomenologically discrete realms in that
“[t]he former of these words [colour] expresses...a sensation in the mind; the latter
[extension] denotes a quality of an external object; so that there is, in fact,
no...connexion between the two notions....” (341). Nevertheless, Stewart concludes,
this association is nearly universal, despite its evident falsity, because “in
consequence of our always perceiving extension, at the same time at which
sensation of colour is excited in the mind, we find it impossible to think of the
sensation, without conceiving extension along with it.” (341) Consequently, the
experience or the idea of a non-spatialized color or of a non-colored space appears
nonsensical even though such an association is, philosophically speaking, illegitimate since it violates the ontological distinction between color and spatiality.

The blending of ontologically incongruous entities through associative processes also violates the norm of observability. Although Stewart does not address the issue in terms of the consequences for observability that are raised by the association of ideas, the whole problem can easily be reframed as problem of observation. In particular, associative processes can lead perception astray by creating an illusion of unity among entities when no association should, or can for that matter, actually exist. In other words, the association of ideas, if it is taken for granted as a process that merely mirrors the structure of phenomenal reality, is liable to generate perceptual artifacts that masquerade as observable entities. The apparent unity of color and space, as in Stewart’s example, produces seemingly observable entities in the form of colored spaces. But, as Stewart has explained, whatever our senses seem to report, there cannot be actually be any such entity as a ‘colored space’ that exists as a discrete entity whose identity is founded upon a spatially ordered gradient of similarities and differences. The association of ideas, though it is a ubiquitous and normal mental process, can thus create unreliable perceptions.

Stewart’s proposed corrective to such illegitimate blending implicitly supports the contention that reliable observation is an underlying issue when the consequences of associative mental processes are being considered. In short, if the association of
ideas undermines reliable observation, Stewart prescribes an intensified form of observation as the corrective. Stewart cites the origins of Common Sense philosophy as an example of just the sort of intensive observation that is necessary in order to ‘see' reality as it is truly arranged. The observation that Stewart singles out as especially important to the establishment of Common Sense is the one that reveals the existence of ideas to be an illusion by demonstrating a categorical difference between “[t]he sensations, for instance, which are excited in the mind by external objects, and the perceptions of material qualities which follow from these sensations....” (343) Overcoming the powerful tendency of the association of ideas to blend these two mental events is, however, extraordinarily difficult and is made possible “only be long habits of patient reflexion.” (343) Disciplined introspection, which is the observational technique characteristic of philosophy of mind, is the only corrective to the tendency of the association of ideas to violate ontological boundaries. Stewart emphasizes the critical role of disciplined introspective investigation by asserting that “our progress in the philosophy of the human mind depends much more on that severe and discriminating judgment, which enables us to separate ideas which nature or habit have intimately combined, than on acuteness of reasoning or fertility of invention.” (343-344).

Similarly, Stewart indicates the essentially treacherous nature of the association of ideas in two other sets of circumstances in which associative relations prove themselves to be problematic. In the first of these circumstances, Stewart states
that “[t]he association of ideas is a source of speculative error, by misleading us in those anticipations of the future from the past....” (345) Just as Mill addressed the importance of foresight as a distinctively human quality that granted human beings considerable power over their destinies, so too Stewart assigns this ability to extrapolate from previous experience the role of “the foundation of our conduct in life.” (345) Moreover, Stewart continues, this capacity for foresight is so essential to human welfare that “nature has not only given to all men a strong disposition to remark, with attention and curiosity, those phenomena which have been observed to happen nearly at the same time; but has beautifully adapted to the uniformity of her own operations, the laws of association in the human mind.” (345-346) For Stewart, the capacity for foresight thus fulfills its function as the preserver of human welfare by serving as a perceptual portal that allows the mind to grasp accurately events as they are reported to it via both the sensory organs and self-reflection.

Stewart identifies the particular associative relationship that governs foresight as “contiguity in time,” which, he says is “one of the strongest of our associating principles....” (346) By the phrase ‘contiguity in time’ Stewart is referring to the “tendency of the mind to associate together events which have been presented to it nearly at the same time....” (346). In other words, in this type of association, temporal juxtaposition provides the basis for assuming the existence of an ontological-epistemological relationship between otherwise dissimilar, and therefore seemingly unrelated, perceptions.
Stewart credits the inherent mental inclination to assume the existence of an ontological-epistemological relationship between perceived entities on the basis of the temporal juxtaposition of those perceptions as the origin of the power of foresight. This synchronization between events in the realm of mental functions and an initial stimulus in the realm of sensation or self-reflection insures that the mind will acquire accurate and reliable information both about the external world and about its own workings. As Stewart puts it,

[nature] has conjoined together in our thoughts, the same events which we have found conjoined in our experience, and has thus accommodated (without any effort on our part) the order of our ideas to that scene in which we are destined to act. (346)

It is this congruence between the contents of the mind and patterns of stimuli (whether external or self-reflective) that enables individuals both to recognize recurrences of similar patterns of stimuli and to apply that knowledge to present and future repetitions of past occurrences and which constitutes the operation of foresight.

Nevertheless, foresight, Stewart warns, “may occasionally be a source of inconvenience...” (346) Foresight can produce inaccurate extrapolations because, quite simply, there is no meaningful temporal relationship between most of the
sensory or self-reflective stimuli that converge on the mind at any given instant. In other words, the mere spacio-temporal coincidence between multiple stimuli does not mean that those stimuli should be viewed as somehow interconnected solely because they arrive at the mind contemporaneously. Stewart cautions that “[a]mong the various phenomena which are continually passing before us, there is a great proportion, whose vicinity in time does not indicate a constancy of conjunction....” (346) If such erroneous connections are made between stimuli, the result, Stewart concludes will necessarily be inaccurate perceptions and false extrapolations such “our unenlightened experience of the past, will fill the mind, in numberless instances, with vain expectations, or with groundless alarms, concerning the future.” (347). In logical terms, the assumption that temporal associations exist between random or independent stimuli generates post hoc fallacies in which mere antecedence is granted causal efficacy. The post hoc fallacy that results from erroneous associations, Stewart argues, “is one great source of popular superstitions.” (347)

Moreover, Stewart notes that although erroneous instances of foresight appear “in a great measure to uncultivated and unenlightened minds; or to those individuals who, from nature or education have a more than ordinary facility of association,” he also indicates that that “there are other accidental combinations, which are apt to lay hold of the most vigorous understandings....” (347-348) This version of the post hoc fallacy, Stewart states, “is the natural and necessary result of a limited
experience, [such that] no superiority of intellect is sufficient to preserve a philosopher, in the infancy of physical science.” (348). All Stewart is doing here is acknowledging the “epistemological modesty” and the commitment to empiricism that is characteristic of the Classical episteme. When, as he points out, a new phenomena is first encountered there is no way to determine its causal antecedents or its consequents with any certainty. Since, as Stewart has already argued in his critique of the ideal theory, explanations must eschew any use of efficient causation and rely only upon observable physical causes, any attempt to establish a causal explanation of a set of seemingly associated phenomena when

in the course of our experience, the same combination of circumstances is always exhibited to us without any alteration, and is invariably followed by the same result, we must for ever remain ignorant, whether this result be connected with the whole combination, or with one or more of the circumstances combined…(348)

Thus, if raw and immediate familiarity is the only means of analysis, then it is impossible, to distinguish the causal lineage of any given set of phenomena,

The qualification of ‘raw and immediate familiarity’ is important here because Stewart does offer at least a partial corrective to both the confusion and the outright falsity that can be produced by these temporal associative relationships. Once again the corrective for Stewart is rigorous disciplined observation. With regard to the
difficulties of delineating the causal lineage of a set of seemingly associate phenomena, Stewart argues that at least some progress can be made

only where we have an opportunity of separating such circumstances from each other; of combining them variously together; and of observing the effects which result from these different experiments, that we can ascertain with precision, the general laws of nature, and strip physical causes of the their accidental and unessential concomitants.” (348)

Here Stewart outlines not only the basic features of philosophical analysis but also implicitly indicates the key role of observation; after all the whole point of dissecting phenomena is to render their obscure characteristics observable. In the case of causal relationships, the sheer multiplicity of phenomena converging at the same temporal point both obscures any causal relationships that might exist among them and creates the illusion of causation where none actually exists. The kind of analytical procedure that Stewart describes represents an effort to establish, as far as possible, the reality of actually existing causal connections by isolating possible links from the swarming mass of temporally convergent phenomena. In doing this, the philosophical investigator has at least some hope of clarifying the observational field in order to determine if, in fact, causal linkages do exist. Otherwise, the only guide for determining the existence of such causal connections is the unreliable inclination to create and then to assume the existence of causal connections among temporally convergent phenomena.
In addition to the specialized techniques of philosophical analysis, Stewart also advocates another form of disciplined rigorous observation as a corrective to the inappropriate extrapolations that are encouraged by uncritical inspection of temporally convergent phenomena. In contrast with his previous discussions, Stewart here does allude to environmental influences as a clear causal agent in the formation of, as well as the correction of, erroneous perceptions. Specifically, Stewart notes that

the most arbitrary and capricious institutions and customs, by a long and constant and exclusive operation on the mind, acquire such an influence in forming the intellectual habits, that every deviation from them not only produces surprise, but is apt to excite sentiments of contempt and of ridicule,” (350-351)

This kind of reaction is particularly likely to afflict someone “who has never extended his views beyond that society of which he himself is a member....” (351) As a result, these groups and individuals would have to rely on a very narrow observational field for the totality of their perceptions. Under such conditions, erroneous perceptions are nearly guaranteed since only partial information about complex social, cultural and political institution is available. Stewart further contends that, paradoxical as it might seem, the “two classes of men who have more particularly been charged with this weakness, [are] those who are placed at the bottom, and those who have reached the summit of the scale of refinement....” (352)

He also attributes their erroneous perceptions to apparently different sources;
according to Stewart, the sources of perceptual error originate for lower group “from ignorance” while for the higher group, the errors are traceable to “national vanity.” (351)

Despite the drastic difference in cognitive attainment exhibited by the opposing ends of the social spectrum, Stewart’s descriptions of them implicitly point out a common feature that ties together both the least and the most cognitively endowed groups. In particular, both groups appear to suffer from restrictions of their observational fields such that they are deprived of numerous sources of perception. For individuals and groups that occupy the lower end of the cognitive attainment hierarchy, Stewart’s explanation for their lack of mental endowments is unproblematic, especially if these groups and individuals are also economically deprived. This is a point that Stewart will return to in his later work on education, but it is worth a brief mention here in that Stewart does draw a connection between economic status and cognitive endowment. Put most directly, the corrective that Stewart proposes for the expansion of the observational field is quite expensive, and the poor lack the economic resources to take advantage of it. The other group, which Stewart characterizes as at “the summit of the scale of refinement,” are much more anomalous. Since the attainment of a high level of cognitive endowment implies the prior access to the economic resources necessary for an expansive observational field, how then can Stewart account for the limited range of
perceptions that he claims appears among those with the (potentially) widest observational field?

Stewart's account indicates that this perceptual impoverishment arises from a self-imposed cognitive disability that is expressed as “national vanity.” By this phrase, Stewart means an individual’s or group’s excessive attachment to the experiences and perceptions of their local environment in preference to other social environments. Taken to an extreme degree, such an allegiance can figuratively blind individuals and groups by encouraging a disdainful, and even openly xenophobic, attitude towards foreign social environments. Not surprisingly, individuals and groups that find unfamiliar social environments to be repellent are likely to avoid any contact, either direct or indirect, with alien societies. Consequently, xenophobia sharply restricts the scope of the observational field and thereby limits the range of possible perceptions. Unlike the socio-cognitively poor, whose economic and perceptual impoverishment is often imposed upon them, the socio-cognitive elite chooses to restrict its observational field. Xenophobic individuals and groups nevertheless suffer the same perceptual impoverishment as the socio-cognitively deprived do, and fall into similar kinds of errors, when they attempt to make extrapolations from their limited knowledge base.

Stewart's corrective to both environmentally induced and xenophobic perceptual impoverishment is straightforward: if a restricted observational field is the
problem, then the solution is to expand the range of the observational field. Accordingly, Stewart advises the use of instruments and activities that are intended to expand the range of the observational field either through direct or indirect means. In Stewart’s words, “[f]or curing this class of prejudices, the obvious expedient which nature points out to us, is to extend our acquaintance with human affairs, either by means of books, or of personal observation.” (351) Both of these methods will not only expand the temporal and spatial dimensions of the observational field but will also expand the temporal and spatial dimensions of the mental space. When Stewart states that “[t]he effects of traveling, in enlarging and in enlightening the mind, are obvious to our daily experience...,” (351) he is not merely deploying clichéd metaphors for the supposedly enriching effects of contact with new and unfamiliar locales. In the context of the Classical episteme’s spatialized conception of being, coupled with an insistence on empiricism, Stewart’s prescription results in an actual increase not only of the number of entities that are experienced, but also in an increase in mind’s more abstract dimensions as well. By encountering more stimuli, the mind itself must be conceived of as greater in expanse as the number of perceptions it operates on increases as well. The mind’s capacity for organizing itself temporally, by spatially arranging perceptions from present to past can be enhanced, Stewart counsels, “from a careful study of the manners of past ages....” (351) In both cases, whether through direct contact or virtually through the written word, observation provides a corrective to the erroneous extrapolations that can result from inadequate perceptions.
Despite the role of environmental influences in producing and in alleviating the ill effects of perceptual impoverishment, Stewart makes it clear that the associative process itself remains problematic. Principally, the problem lies in the predisposition for temporally convergent stimuli to overwhelm the efforts to expand the observational field. If the mind remains focused on a small subset of phenomena, then the stimuli provided by those phenomena risked being fixed in the mind’s perceptions. Stewart therefore warns that a narrow focus on some subjects, times, or places could actually substitute one form of perceptual impoverishment for another. As a corrective to this Stewart recommends that individuals should “vary, to a considerable degree, the objects of our attention...” (351) Otherwise, Stewart contends, a narrow and persistent focus on a limited range of topics holds the “danger of our acquiring an exclusive preference for the caprices of any one people...,” and as a result, even observation, if it is applied incorrectly, can generate the very ailment that it is supposed to alleviate. (351) Only a conscientious effort to vary the number and types of stimuli will prevent the associative relationship of contiguity in time from inevitably producing illusory and erroneous conjunctions of perceptions.

A final manner in which the associative process generates illusory and erroneous perceptions presents Stewart with special difficulties. In particular, Stewart (and before him, Reid) founds Common Sense philosophy on a core of assumptions about human nature. Perhaps the most important of these assumptions is the existence of
the ‘common sense,’ from which the philosophical school derives its name. As Stewart takes great pains to explain, ‘common sense’ is a collection of convictions that underlie cognitive processes and that inform all human activities. Indeed, these convictions, Stewart argues, are indispensable for both cognition and for meaningful action. Without these convictions, thought and action would not merely succumb to error but would actually become incoherent and meaningless. Moreover, these convictions are resident in the mind prior to all sensory experience. Consequently, Stewart claims that every rational person accepts the truth of the convictions without empirical evidence.¹³⁸

The problem, however, is that these indisputable and indispensable convictions are involved in every mental event -- including the association of ideas. Given the absolute necessity of these convictions to the process of cognition, it is virtually inevitable that these necessary constituents of thought will become mixed with erroneous, environmentally induced perceptions. As Stewart notes, “there are some truths, which are inseparable from human understanding, and by means of which, the errors of education, in most instances, are enabled to take hold of our belief.” (357) Once again, Stewart makes clear that he views the essential flaw of the associative process to be located in the moment of association itself and not primarily in the environmental setting. Certainly, as Stewart acknowledges in the passage just quoted, the external environment can set the stage for all sorts of

¹³⁸ These conviction, however are not innate ideas. This distinction will be elaborated on in the following section.
erroneous perceptions. Nevertheless, the main cause of erroneous perceptions in this case is the tenacious connection that associative processes establish between indispensable assumptions and accidentally encountered sensory stimuli. Once such a connection is made, erroneous perceptions become all the more difficult to purge from the mind since the unavoidable truth of the conviction seems to validate the entire perception. Such powerful associations between indispensable assumptions and accidental stimuli are particularly evident, Stewart indicates in religious beliefs. Since, Stewart claims, religious faith is an integral component of the human mind,

so, whatever tenets and ceremonies we have been taught to connect with the religious creed of our infancy, become almost a part of our constitution, by being indissolubly united with truths that are essential to happiness, and which we are led to reverence and to love, by all the best dispositions of the heart. (355)

Despite the tremendous staying power of these combinations of indispensable assumptions and accidental sensory stimuli, the resulting erroneous perceptions, like the previous two types that Stewart has detailed, can also be corrected. Although Stewart spends much less time on the specific corrective measures that are necessary to overcome these errors than he did on the previous two cases, he clearly indicates that the proper corrective is, once again, a disciplined and rigorous practice of observation. In particular, Stewart indicates that there are two
circumstances that require sustained scrutiny. The first of these situations involves
the learning process by which a variety of experiences become conjoined to the
indispensable assumptions that ground cognition and action. Stewart warns that
his analyses “show, how necessary it is for us, in the formation of our philosophical
principles, to examine with care all those opinions which, in our early years, we
have imbibed from our instructors; or which are connected with our own local
situation.” (356-357)

Stewart’s admonition is noteworthy because he is here implicitly casting the
problem of erroneous perceptions as, more fundamentally, a problem of the extent
of the observational field. His references to the potentially pernicious influences
childhood learning and of the immediate environment make sense within the
context of the Classical episteme and its empiricist methodology. In the latter case,
Stewart is simply reiterating a point that he made early about the stultifying effects
of rigidly restricted social experience. The corrective then, as well as in this case, is
an expansion of the observational field so as to include the widest possible range of
experiences in order to resist the formation of illusory or erroneous associations. In
the former case of childhood education, the principle is the same. Although Stewart
here focuses on the temporal rather than spatial dimension of the learning process,
the key issue remains the scope and diversity of the observational field. The earliest
experiences are likely to be quite limited but nevertheless exceptionally influential.
Only additional experiences gained later in life and scrupulous analysis can offer any hope of dislodging associations that have been formed in childhood.

Careful observation also eliminates another trap that is laid by associations between accidental sense experience and indispensable assumptions. As Stewart has already pointed out, the indisputable and indispensable nature of the indispensable assumptions can lend an unwarranted validity to erroneous or illusory perceptions. Moreover, the apparent validity of erroneous or illusory perceptions can be further amplified by confusions regarding the identity of the indispensable assumptions themselves. Since indispensable assumptions are indisputable and indispensable to all cognition and action, they are also ubiquitous in all minds. Consequently, it is very easy to assume that any conviction that receives unanimous assent must therefore be an essential conviction. Stewart, however, rejects this conclusion. It is not the case, he argues, that “the universality of an opinion among men who have received a similar education, afford any presumption in its favour....” (357)

Although indispensable assumptions are ubiquitous and unanimously assented to, the simple popularity of any given conviction is thus not by itself decisive evidence that the conviction is an essential conviction. The identity of an essential conviction depends not on its mere popularity, but, instead, rests on its function as a foundation for cognition and action. A test of a conviction's true nature would address its capacity to support and facilitate rational thinking and acting. Some widely popular convictions are in fact erroneous and enjoy unanimous approval.
only as result of “fashion or authority,” according to Stewart. With regard to any such deceptive conviction, Stewart firmly pronounces that “a wise man...certainly owes it no respect...” (357) Although Stewart does not spell out the intellectual qualifications of this “wise man” it is not difficult to guess that disciplined and rigorous observation plays the leading role in identifying those convictions that truly are essential both to cognition and action and to differentiating them from popular convictions that only appear essential because of the effects of adventitious forces.

Whatever the usefulness, and however inescapable the association of ideas may be as a mental event, then, Stewart clearly grants it a lesser place in his conception of the mind than Mill does in his associationist account. Unlike Mill, who saw the association of ideas as the grand organizing principle of the mental space, Stewart treats the association of ideas as a potential nuisance and, accordingly, reduces its importance in the philosophy of mind. Strikingly, both philosophers acknowledge its actions on the same grounds. Despite their dissimilar evaluations of the role and significance of the association of ideas, both Stewart and Mill reach their respective conclusions by starting from a set of onto-epistemological and methodological norms that make the act of observation a central feature of philosophical investigation.
b. The Structural function of the “Fundamental laws of belief”

Stewart’s effort to downplay the significance of the association of ideas as a structural feature of the mind ultimately rests on an accusation that associative processes introduce an element of uncertainty into perception. There is no guarantee that any given set of associations will accurately mirror the external world, and as Stewart has pointed out, all too often, associative processes actually generate erroneous or illusory perceptions. Accordingly, the association of ideas, though a real phenomenon for Stewart, fails to provide a stable and reliable framework for cognition. This conclusion, however, does not mean that Stewart treats the mind as an amorphous mass. On the contrary, Stewart’s Common Sense philosophy will represent the mind as a highly structured entity that possesses clearly delineated functional subdivisions. In particular, Stewart argues that careful introspection of the mind reveals the existence of a set of essential convictions that are necessary for accurate perceptions and a collection of specialized mental faculties whose interactions produce the complex terrain of subjective experience.

The first of these features, the essential, indisputable, and indispensable convictions that ground all cognition and action, have already been partially discussed above. Nevertheless, the nature and function of these convictions require further exploration because of the central role that they play in Stewart’s representation of the mind. Before proceeding to an examination of the nature of these convictions, much confusion can be avoided by clarifying what these convictions are not. To
begin with, these convictions are not innate ideas, despite Stewart’s description of them as pre-empirical constituents of the mind. Although Stewart does not directly address this issue, his descriptions of these indispensable assumptions tend to undermine any efforts to treat them as innate ideas. An obvious objection to the contention that Stewart is referring to innate ideas is Stewart’s adamant rejection of the ideal theory. Whatever else they might be, these indispensable assumptions cannot be replicas of sense experience without creating a devastating inconsistency in Stewart’s philosophy of mind. They can be denominated ideas in a manner that is consistent with the rest of Stewart’s arguments only if they are understood in terms of the expansive definition of the term ‘idea’ that Stewart offers in his discussion of the association of ideas. In that definition, Stewart accepted the continued use of the term idea if it was understood as denoting the totality of mental operations upon a particular subject and not as indicating a discrete entity that existed within, but distinct from, the mind itself that served as a replica of a sensory stimulus.

Even with the aid of Stewart’s expanded definition of ‘idea,’ however, his indispensable assumptions serve a function that seems to grant them a rather different identity. In order to fully explicate the function (and thus the identity) of these indispensable assumptions, it is necessary to examine first Stewart’s notions regarding the character and grounding of rational cognition. Stewart’s initial move in his discussion of rational cognition is to clarify the identity and relationships of the constituent parts that are necessary to the process of rational thought. In doing
so, Stewart dissects rational thinking into two interconnected sets of constituent parts. On the one hand, rational thinking requires what Stewart refers to as “principles of reasoning.” (V2.36) According to Stewart, this phrase “denote[s] an assumption, (whether resting on fact or on hypothesis,) upon which as a datum, a train of reasoning proceeds; and for the falsity or incorrectness of which no logical rigor in the subsequent process can compensate.” (V2.36) Stewart illustrates the character and function of such principles by pointing to their use to solve problems that arise in natural philosophy. For example, in one situation “gravity and the elasticity of the air are principles of reasoning in our speculations about the barometer.” Similarly, “[t]he equality of the angles of incidence and reflexion; the proportionality of the sines of incidences and refractions, are principles of reasoning in catoptrics and in dioptrics.” (V2.36).

Stewart’s description of the “principles of reasoning” endows these constituents of rationality with two important features. In the first instance, they serve a critical function in the reasoning process as the argumentative building blocks of the reasoning process. What Stewart is describing in his examples is basically the hypothetical-deductive method of philosophical reasoning in which empirical propositions (of varying degrees of certainty) are assembled according to the rules of logical argumentation in order to derive valid (if not always sound) conclusions. In Stewart’s conception of them, the “principles of reasoning” serve as individual propositions in the movement towards a conclusion. Moreover, as Stewart says a
That is, established knowledge (once again to varying degrees of certainty), in the form of propositions can be used to generate new knowledge about events and phenomena that were previously mysterious. Additionally, the “principles of reasoning” are, as Stewart calls them, “data.” In other words, they are statements regarding observable events and phenomena. As such, they can be, as Stewart’s definition implies, either true or false statements about those events and phenomena. In accordance with the tenets of Baconian methodology, further investigation might well reveal certain “principles of reasoning” to be false, or in need of modification, or it might actually lend more support to an already accepted finding. In any case, the key point here is that “principles of reasoning” are contingent statements that must be subjected to empirical investigation before they can attain any degree of assent, however conditional that support might be.

In opposition to the “principles of reasoning,” stands, Stewart continues, the second component of the rational thinking process. This component, which Stewart labels the “elements of reasoning,” serves a quite different function than the “principles of reasoning” do. According to Stewart this second component of the rational thinking process comprises

those elemental truths (if I may use the expression) which are virtually taken for granted or assumed in every step of our reasoning, and without which,
although no consequences can be directly inferred from them, a train of reasoning would impossible." (V2. 37)

Thus, the “elements of reasoning” differ from the “principles of reasoning” in several ways. First, the “elements of reasoning” do not enter directly into the movement from propositions to conclusions; unlike the “principles of reasoning” they have no bearing on the validity or soundness of the conclusion’s content, since “no consequences can be directly inferred from them...” Moreover, Stewart indicates that they “are virtually taken for granted or assumed...,“ and so they are not subject to the same process of empirical investigation that is essential to the “principles of reasoning.” Rather, the “elements of reasoning” are treated as self-evident propositions in no further need of verification.

Despite these striking differences, the “elements of reasoning” are necessary constituent parts of the process of rational thinking. Otherwise, as Stewart states categorically, “a train of reasoning would be impossible.” From his description of the “elements of reasoning,” it is clear that they serve as the hidden scaffolding that hold together the “principles of reasoning” so as to allow the apparently smooth movement from propositions to conclusions. He, for example, identifies one of these “elements” as “a belief...in the evidence of memory.” By this expression, Stewart means that memory must be taken, at least in general, to be an accurate record of past events, if rational thinking is to occur at all. (V2.37) Stewart presents the function of the “evidence of memory” in the rational thinking process as a bond that
operates behind the scenes in order to permit the temporal movement from
proposition to proposition and, ultimately, to conclusion:

I shall only take notice farther, under this head, of the confidence which we
must necessarily repose in the evidence of memory...when we are employed
in carrying on any process of deduction or argumentation, -- in following out,
for instance, the steps of a long mathematical demonstration. In yielding our
assent to the conclusion to which such a demonstration leads, we evidently
trust to the fidelity with which our memory has connected the different links
of the chain together.... (V2. 44-45)

If the recollection of the prior steps in the reasoning process is not taken as infallibly
reliable then, in this example, “you [will] destroy the foundations of mathematical
science...” (V2.45) since it will no longer be possible to move from proposition to
proposition while retaining awareness of previous propositions. Without such
awareness, the structure of the argument, which determines its validity as much as
the content of the propositions do, will disintegrate.

Thus, the “elements of reasoning” have a purely structural function insofar as their
content is regarded as self-evidently true and not open to analysis or dispute.
Moreover, Stewart emphasizes this pure structural function by treating them as
epistemologically sterile in that their content cannot form the basis “for the further
enlargment of our knowledge.” (V2.45) Accordingly, Stewart describes the function of the “elements of reasoning “as the vincula which give coherence to all the particular links of the chain [of reasoning]….“ That is, the content of the so-called “elements of reasoning" does not enter into either the propositions or the conclusions of any argument but serves only to join together the segments of an argument. (V2.39) He also claims that they might be appropriately called “compound elements”(V2.39); however, this term seems less appealing in that it does not capture as vividly the function of the “elements of reasoning” in supporting and structuring the process of rational thinking.

Although the function of the “elements of reasoning” might be clear to Stewart, he, nevertheless, struggles in his efforts to specify their character. As the indispensable and indisputable assumptions that underpin all rational processes, the “elements of reasoning" prove to be a slippery category that is hard to define and delimit. Their first Scottish enunciation in the works of Thomas Reid provoked immediate controversy because of his designation of these “elements of reasoning” as the tenets of “Common Sense.” Almost immediately, critics seized upon his choice of designation as an indication that Reid was grounding his philosophy of mind upon the unanalyzed rude prejudices that presumably characterized the thought processes of the poor and uneducated rabble. Even Stewart, who strenuously and explicitly resisted this implication, found himself the target of criticisms that insisted that his philosophy of mind was nothing more than an appeal to the vulgar
authority of the mass of humanity. As a result of these attacks and misunderstandings, Stewart sought a new designation that would clearly indicate the character of the elements of reasoning without inciting attacks on his philosophical integrity. He offers several suggestions, but seems to have settled upon the phrase, “Fundamental Laws of Human Belief” as the best designation for the indispensable and indisputable assumptions that comprised the “elements of reasoning”. (V2.45)

Judging from the examples that he gives, it appears that Stewart conceived of the “Fundamental Laws of Human Belief” as statements of a metaphysical character that asserted the existence of entities and events that cannot, in principle or in practice, be empirically demonstrated. Among the many possible examples of such beliefs, Stewart lists “such propositions as these – I exist; I am the same person to-day that I was yesterday; the material world has an existence independent of my mind; the general laws of nature will continue, in future, to operate uniformly as in time past….” (V2.45) Stewart also cites religious beliefs (358-361) and even some political doctrines (357-358) as (to use Stewart’s expression) “original and immutable laws of the human mind.” (359). Nevertheless, Stewart, like Reid before him never offers a comprehensive inventory of the “Fundamental Laws of Human Belief.” This lacuna in Common Sense philosophy of mind will provide fodder for the critics of Common Sense who will argue that it should not only be possible, but also a matter of considerable importance for the philosophy of mind, to articulate all of the
metaphysical assertions that are necessary to explain the function of the rational thinking process. Without such a list, any explanation of the rational thinking process will be, at best, incomplete and, more likely, erroneous, since it will omit features of rationality that are absolutely necessary for rational thinking to occur.

In spite of this limitation, Stewart demonstrates how the onto-epistemological and methodological norms of the Classical episteme can be deployed to reveal the existence of the “Fundamental Laws of Human Belief.” While the Laws themselves are not directly accessible structures or entities whose existence can be revealed through empirical investigation, the presence of other, observable, phenomena provides indirect, but convincing, evidence that rational thought processes depend upon a substrate of indisputable and indispensable metaphysical assumptions. Much as present-day astronomers infer the existence of unobservable entities like black holes from their effects on the behavior of neighboring observable entities, so too, Stewart indicates, the ‘presence’ of one (or more) of these Laws of Human Belief will produce observable effects on the operations of the human mind. The most striking and relevant effect, Stewart argues, is the universal acceptance of some convictions. Frequently, a superficial diversity of opinions will camouflage this universality of convictions; nevertheless, Stewart insists, careful analysis will reveal that all of these varying opinions are merely different expressions of a single conviction. Indeed, the very diversity and extent of opinions across time and space on a particular subject signals for Stewart, the existence of a “fundamental law of
human belief.” From the observation that human beings in all times and all places express a concern with the same particular subject, however that concern might be expressed, Stewart infers the existence of a Fundamental law of Human Belief as the motive that propels the concern.139

As illustrations of this method of inferring the existence of non-empirical Laws of Human Belief from the observations of diverse behaviors and convictions, Stewart cites two distinct realms of human concern. The first example that Stewart presents seems far removed from the kinds of metaphysical concerns that are typically associated with the philosophy of mind, but it does illustrate rather clearly both the role of observation and the technique by which Stewart establishes the existence and the common, if usually implicit, acknowledgement of the Fundamental Laws of Human Belief. In this example Stewart points to the diversity of political arrangements and doctrines among human societies. As he observes, “[i]n one situation, we find good men attached to a republican form of government; in another to monarchy....” (358) Nevertheless, this diversity is misleading, Stewart contends. While it is true, he admits, that “in all situations, we find [people] devoted to the service of their country and of mankind, and disposed to regard with reverence and love, the most absurd and capricious institutions which custom has led them to connect with the order of society” he adamantly rejects the notion that this initial observation of political diversity represents either the actual state of
political arrangements or conclusive evidence of the supremacy of environmental factors in the shaping of human thought and action. Instead, he argues that the initial observed diversity of political arrangements actually point to a different set of interpretations. In particular, Stewart concludes that

[t]he different appearances, therefore which the political opinions and the political conduct of men exhibit, while they demonstrate to what a wonderful degree human nature may be influenced by situation and early instruction, evince the existence of some common and original principles, which fit it for the political union, and illustrate the uniform operation of those laws of association, to which, in all the stages of society, it is equally subject. (358)

In other words, Stewart warns that initial observations of immediate phenomenal experience must be subject to further critical interrogation before inferences are drawn. The initial observations that reveal the existence of a diversity of political arrangements reveal, upon reflective observation, to indicate, in fact, a unity of phenomena that is, moreover, causally independent of immediate environmental forces. In this case, the inference to be drawn from the initial observation of political diversity is the universality of political organization itself. Although Stewart concedes that the diversity of arrangements is likely due to environmental forces, the universal existence of political arrangements in some form points to an
inherent principle in human nature to construct governing systems to manage their communities.

Stewart extends this mode of investigation to argue for the universality of religious belief, and, accordingly, for the belief in the existence of a supernatural realm as one of the fundamental laws of human belief. Stewart resists, just as he did with regard to political diversity, seeing the enormous diversity of religious doctrines and practices as the terminal point of analysis. Rather than concluding from an initial act of observation that religious beliefs exist in multiplicity of unrelated forms, or that such multiplicity indicates the action of idiosyncratic and localized environmental influences on the mind, Stewart construes these immediate phenomenal experiences as evidence “that here must be some principles from which [the multitudes of religious beliefs] all derive their origin.” (359) Thus, the diversity of immediate phenomenal experience indicates, upon further observation and reflection, a point of unity that creates the very possibility of the initially observed diversity. Stewart even goes so far as to proclaim that ‘[i]n truth, the more striking the contradictions, and the more ludicrous the [religious] ceremonies to which the pride of human reason has thus been reconciled; the stronger is the evidence that religion has a foundation in the nature of man.” (359-360)

Obviously, at least from Stewart’s perspective, the existence of a wild diversity of religious doctrines and practices is only possible if there is some underlying stable
mental substrate to sustain a conviction in the existence of a supernatural realm. Without such a substrate, religious doctrines and practices would emerge only in response to environmental pressures. While environmental explanations might perhaps suffice to account for the diversity of religious practices and doctrines, environmental influences alone, Stewart implicitly argues here, cannot account for the omnipresent appearance of religion everywhere in human societies; if some environments produced religiosity, then other types of environments might just as easily produce atheism. Since environment is not identical everywhere and moreover since atheist societies (as of Stewart's time) were non-existent, then it follows that the phenomenon of universal religious belief must not be solely environmental in origin. At least to some degree, the originating impulse for religiosity must be autonomous from environmental factors. Otherwise, the observed ubiquity of religiosity would not exist.

It is this omnipresence of religion Stewart ultimately regards as the key demonstration of religion's place as one of the “Fundamental Laws of Human Belief.” Stewart's line of argument here runs in the opposite direction from that of associationism. Whereas associationists like Mill interpreted the diversity of practices, beliefs, and institutions as evidence that human character lacked any unifying substrate and was wholly subject to the vicissitudes and caprices of the local environment, Stewart, by contrast, argues that diversity is a manifestation of, rather than a refutation of, a unifying structure.
Stewart’s insistence on disciplined, comprehensive reflection as philosophical investigation as the special role of the philosopher and that it is what lifts the philosopher’s vision above immersion in immediate experience and is the indicator that the mental space is structured by principles that interact with, but are ontologically separate from the environment. Both the principles and the methodology here grant the mind a separate structure from the environment and thus render the mind at least partially autonomous from its surroundings. The ascent from ordinary cognition of the bulk of the population to the heights of philosophical inquiry consists precisely in recognizing and actualizing this structural autonomy so as to escape the tyranny of the environment.

\textit{c. The Structural Function of the Faculties}

Mind, for Stewart, is therefore possessed of a greater degree of autonomy from its environmental setting. Knowledge and self-awareness require sensory stimuli, but once these are provided, the mind itself is capable of a number of functions that are not themselves dependent for their existence on the environment. This is because the limitations of association of ideas requires thorough self-scrutiny and the Fundamental Laws of Belief equip the mind with a set of absolutely necessary beliefs that can serve as the standard for evaluating external sensory stimuli and internal mental constructions.
Stewart’s method here veers towards a quasi-developmentalism in that he seems to be advocating the existence of an unseen and unobservable ontological level that produces observable ontological effects. But it is clear from his exposition that Stewart is not actually advocating a truly developmental framework. In the first place, Stewart’s loyalty to Bacon is not absolute; at points he does question overly literalistic applications of the norm of observation that would limit observation to an accounting of immediate phenomenal experience. While he neither systematically explores the limitations of observational methodologies nor justifies his deviation from literalistic Baconian prescriptions, he does explicitly grant himself some latitude in interpreting the results of his observational efforts. He rejects for instance, a naïve cataloguing of immediate phenomenal experience that uncritically disregards patterns of interactions between phenomena. This latitude is quite narrow, however, and Stewart still insists upon a robust observational practice prior to any act of inference.

Moreover, his inference of the existence and general acknowledgement of the fundamental laws of human belief takes the form of what might be called a secondary observation. That is, the fundamental laws of human belief are not ‘hidden’ in some inaccessible stratum 'below' the level of ordinary phenomenal experience; rather, direct observations of these Laws are only obscured by the sheer diversity of immediate phenomenal experience that are registered in initial or primary observations. Nevertheless, disciplined and comprehensive observation of the entirety of phenomena that are revealed by primary observations exposes the operation as well as the constant, though usually implicit, acknowledgement of the
laws. What Stewart is doing here is really no more, as he says himself, than applying Baconian induction to the multitude of human thoughts and actions in order to illuminate the observable commonalities that bind them together in an orderly manner. Much as the fable of Isaac Newton and the falling apple illustrates the genesis of the law of universal gravitation from a plethora of observations of seemingly unrelated events in immediate phenomenal experience, so too the enunciation of the Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior is the end point of an observational and inferential process that links apparently dissimilar bits of immediate phenomenal experience into persistent patterns that can be summarized in the form of propositions. Only a perspective change that treats immediately phenomenal experience as a collection of interacting entities and events allows this observation to be made; a simple cataloguing of immediate phenomenal experience as merely a swarm of discrete entities and events will obscure the persistent patterns that are observable under the right conditions within the field of immediate phenomenal experience.

**Part II: Dugald Stewart, James Mill and the architecture of the social space**

Crossing the divide between the individual and social levels of organization presented Stewart and Mill with their first serious challenge to the intellectual
legitimacy of the philosophy of mind. This challenge, and especially its significance, cannot be addressed by treating Common Sense and associationism as simply two contending solutions that were more or less successful in creating a comprehensive philosophy of mind and society. Instead, the key to understanding the dynamics of these two philosophies of mind lies at a deeper level. Certainly, Stewart and Mill did not cross the gap between individual minds and social relations in precisely the same way. They responded to the norms of the classical episteme by producing distinctly different images of mind and society. Nevertheless, both philosophers found their efforts simultaneously promoted and frustrated by these same onto-epistemological norms. On the one hand, the norms of the Classical episteme supported a rigorous analytical enterprise that opened up the social and mental spaces to intensive investigation. On the other hand, the same onto-epistemological norms also limited the scope of Stewart and Mills’ inquiries in dramatic ways. Navigating these limitations, as well as exploiting these advantages, also meant overcoming a key obstacle generated by the Classical episteme’s normative matrix. In particular, as Stewart and Mill deployed the Classical episteme’s norms of observability and ontological stasis to guide their analyses, their use of these norms, which held the promise of clarifying and uniting complex and heterogeneous phenomena, began to generate resistance to their efforts to smoothly unite both norms.
Nevertheless, both Stewart and Mill encountered a set of potentially crippling limitations when they attempted to extend their analyzes to the social domain. This limitation grew out of the very structure of their inquiries epistemological and practical implications. Specifically, the norms that governed their analyzes hindered both the acquisition of knowledge about society and any effort to alter the social space in order to apply the findings of their philosophical investigations of mental phenomena. Neither Stewart nor Mill for example, conducted empirical investigations of the conditions and relationships of social groups. Both relied upon investigations of others that were empirical only in the broadest sense of the term, relying on received wisdom and anecdote, as well as selective observations by the investigators and statements by established authorities. Stewart and Mill had no direct contact with, and limited experience of poverty and generally adopted their own socio-economic position as neutral vantage point from which to survey the social space.

Material necessity erected a nearly insurmountable barrier that sharply divided society and blocked both the outward flow of information as well as the inward flow of knowledge. Although Stewart and Mill often used equivocal language, it is clear that they saw most social divisions as superficial distinctions when compared to the fundamental division that was created by the necessity of labor.
Also of critical importance here is the absence of any sense of developmentalism. Without this doctrine, cognitive or social reform was going to be tightly constrained in terms of what outcomes could be achieved. Both Stewart and Mill saw their aims as the establishment of a socio-cognitive architecture that would best exemplify the norms of philosophical investigation and practice. Implied in this is a static notion of both mental and social structures: there is, it is implied, a best possible structure, which can be potentially achieved if only all of the impediments are removed. What is not possible, either to conceive or to create, are alternative structures which do not now exist in any visible form. For all of its faults, existing (visualizable) society and mind is at least a rough approximation of the best possible outcome.

It is important to specifically consider the norms of visualization and temporal stasis in both the theories of mind and society because these norms presented key limiting conditions on the philosophy of mind’s possibilities for representation. The collision (see Foucault here- the productive character of such collisions) between the practical demands placed on Stewart and Mill and these norms was not merely a negative feature of their philosophies of mind; that is, these norms did not simply prevent expression, but also the tension between the commandment of practicality and the imposed limitations of visualization was also productive in that it could encourage reformulations of the content of the philosophy of mind in order to satisfy the tensions between visualization and temporal stasis on the one hand, and the practical utility on the other hand.
A key feature that distinguishes Stewart and Mill's respective bodies of work on social and mental structure is the relative flexibility that each philosopher grants to these two types of structures. Flexibility in this context has a two-sided meaning that depends upon the domain in which it is invoked. For the philosophy of mind, flexibility refers to the facility with which mental contents can be altered. Although both Stewart and Mill were psychological environmentalists, the degree to which the mind is receptive to external influence varied greatly. Stewart, while acknowledging sensory experience as the sole mechanism by which the mind obtains information about its environment, insisted that the mind must have a structure that is independent of sense experience in order to effectively make use of sensory data (organization into distinct and well-demarcated faculties as well). Mill, on the other hand, explicitly rejected any pre-given structure for the mind and equated the mind’s structure and contents entirely with accumulated sensory experience.

Both Stewart and Mill subscribed to the same basic plan of social structure that divided society between those individuals whose lives were dominated by the need to perform manual labor and those who were so positioned so that they did not have to support themselves by manual labor. These latter individuals were conceived of as possessing both the leisure time necessary for advanced education as well as the vocational requirements to pursue it. Both Mill and Stewart saw few
alternatives to this arrangement since both groups, they believed, played vital roles not merely in the maintenance of the existing order but in the continued existence of society per se. Neither philosopher was particularly given to wholesale alterations of the existing social structure that would radically depart from the existing scheme (even though Mill was labeled a “radical” even he believed that this basic socio-economic architecture was necessary and unavoidable). Note here as well that social structure and the possibility of social change was understood in spatial terms – how does one find leisure time within this architecture within the zone of labor? Specifically, how can the component elements of the social structure be arranged such that one can make room in the zone of labor for advanced education?

The particular architectures that are developed by both Stewart and Mill are not simply free products of either their imaginations or the inevitable result of a rigorous collection of data that is freely gathered. Instead, both philosophers are operating within a set of norms that required, among other things, that investigations be limited to identifying entities that are in some sense, visualizable. In their efforts to derive useful applications from their philosophies, both Stewart and Mill conceptualize visibility in variant ways. Visualization and the architecture of the social space became central concerns of both Mill and Stewart; without the ability to visualize the social space, no information could be gathered about the social space.
Both Mill and Stewart confronted a major obstacle to visualizing the social space. There were limitations on their ability to visualize the social space adequately that overwhelmed the available methodologies – neither Stewart nor Mill suggested what would now be called ethnographic studies of the poor, nor even efforts simply to gather basic information about the poor. The poor inhabit a seemingly forbidden region of society that neither Stewart nor Mill attempt to traverse.

Epistemologically, the realm of manual labor is also foreclosed to them – it presents what they perceive as a nearly insuperable barrier. Nevertheless, the command that their work issue in some form of practical demands that they grapple with this barrier in some manner. Their conception of this barrier and its characteristics carries important consequences for the application of their philosophies of mind. For Stewart, this meant that he believed that a rigid separation of the two classes must be maintained; Mill, on the other hand, argued that it might be possible to penetrate this barrier to some extent and thus manage the lower class by enrolling it in the projects of the upper class, rather than attempting to manage it solely by strict segregation and containment.

*The Socio-economic Structure of Early 19th Century Britain*

Discussions of the socio-economic structure of early 19th century Britain must contend simultaneously with two historically distinct, but nevertheless related, analytical discourses. One of these discourses, of course, is the voluminous
historiography of present-day historians regarding the development and effects of
the industrial revolution in Britain. The other comprises the motley collection of
self-reflective analyses produced by early 19th century political economists, social
reformers, and religious authorities as they contended with the complex economic
and social changes that attended the early phases of industrialization in Britain.
These two bodies of literature are lineally related on several dimensions: both
bodies of literature spring from the discursive revolution that accompanied the
emergence of modern science. They both claim a degree of objectivity with regard
to their subject matter, and both deploy a form of rational analysis that traces its
origins to the founders of the modern scientific worldview. Unlike pre-analytic
discourses on social phenomena, these two bodies of literature do not appeal
(overtly at least) to authority for intellectual validation, nor do they embed their
observations in a mythological or theological framework in which supernatural
forces constitute the bedrock reality that shapes and supports the ephemeral
phenomena of ordinary experience. Consequently, these two bodies of literature
resonate with multiple, and comforting, similarities even if their conclusions are
vastly different.

This resonance, however, can be misleading; despite the methodological and
even attitudinal similarities between the two bodies of literature, reading early 19th
century political economy, for example, as a strictly linear predecessor of modern
economics creates a seductive but intellectually dangerous temptation to substitute
present-day conceptual categories for early 19th century language. In the context of
this project, two such present-day categories are particularly important to examine:
the concepts of class, and the related concepts of the working and ‘middle’ class. None of these concepts appears with any sort of rigor or consistency in the socio-economic discourses of the early 19th century. Indeed, as E.P. Thompson has famously argued, ‘class,’ and especially its expression as the ‘working class’ as an actually lived form of socio-economic identity, took shape only during the opening decades of the 19th century; class and ‘working class’ thus were (and are) developing concepts that exist within history, and are not a priori concepts that can be applied to any instantiation of social relations at any time.

A similar problem arises from the much-used, but deeply problematic phrase ‘middle class.’ Dror Wahrman’s work on the rhetoric of socio-economic relations in late 18th and early 19th century Britain indicates that the concept of the middle class has a complex and decidedly non-linear history. Wahrman documents the evolution of the notion that there exists a middle class between the wealthy ruling elite and the impoverished masses, and the notion that this middle class plays a crucial role in the governing and stabilization of Britain. According to Wahrman, the middle class as socio-economic concept, appears as a rhetorical device in the writings of a number of political reform groups during the French revolutionary period.

Nevertheless, the concept of the middle class does not develop in a straightforward manner. Instead, it appears and disappears periodically, depending upon its rhetorical usefulness in a given situation. In fact, it is a bit misleading to refer to this concept as describing a middle class per se, since the concept of class is itself a later development. Rather, the writers at the beginning of the 19th century in Britain tended to refer to a ‘middle rank’ or even to ‘middle ranks.’ This is an important
distinction since many writers of that era, including Mill, do not cleanly separate what now would be called social status from the idea of economic function in their analyses of Britain’s socio-economic structure.

Another, more subtle, issue regarding the development of the concept of ‘class’ in late 18th and early 19th century Britain is taken up by Sandra Sherman’s recent work on the origins of the related concept of poverty. According to Sherman, the social and economic upheavals of the late 18th and early 19th century began to focus attention on the problem of material inadequacy among the lowest ranks of society. When these analyses begin to appear in great numbers at the end of 18th century, however, they generally identified the least materially endowed members simply as the ‘poor.’ In these analyses, the ‘poor’ were simply those individuals who were unable to provide for their own basic material needs. The ‘poor’ were thus a motley assortment of individuals who for various reasons found themselves in a state of material deprivation. Significantly, the plight of this diverse assortment of individuals was not conceived of as explicable in terms of some more general, and abstract, socio-economic condition. Instead, the state of being poor, in late 18th and early 19th century Britain, was conceptualized in a purely empirical manner as simply the set of those individuals who suffered intractable material deprivation. Sherman argues that this empirical conceptualization of the poor and their condition eventually gave way to a more abstract concept of ‘poverty’ as social critics and observers began to think about social problems in statistical terms. By using statistics to describe the victims of intractable material deprivation, Sherman concludes that the ‘poor’ were depersonalized and stripped of their individualized
characteristics. Statistical analysis of social problems, therefore, permitted early 19th century social critics and observers to treat the ‘poor’ (who were often a rather motley collection of individuals) as a unified group in which all the members shared a single salient characteristic that was identified as ‘poverty.’

Sherman’s work provides a complement to the analysis of the classical episteme that will be presented here. Specifically, both Stewart and Mill employed the concept of the ‘poor’ to designate their object of study rather than the more abstract formulation of ‘poverty.’ For Mill and Stewart, the ‘poor’ emerges as the operative concept because of their dedication to observation in general and to nominalism in particular. In chapter 3, nominalism and an exclusive reliance on observational methodology were shown to be closely connected in the works of Stewart and Mill: observational methodologies tend to promote an ontology composed of discrete individual entities. Furthermore, the naming of these entities also presupposes that there are no underlying (and invisible) connections between entities. Names that indicate general or non-visible entities are, at most, convenient fictions that do not represent any actually existing entities. Under nominalism, therefore, neither Stewart nor Mill can appeal to a concept like ‘poverty’ in either their explanations or in their management schemes. Poverty is an unobservable abstraction that pertains not to any specific entity but is derived only from intangible relationships among a collection of discrete poor individuals. Granting an abstraction such as ‘poverty’ epistemological and ontological independence from discrete observable entities is anathema to Mill and Stewart’s brand of nominalism. Stewart and Mill expressed their nominalism by using the abstract notion of the
‘poor’ as a handy fiction that designates an actually existing collection of discrete entities but does not indicate the existence of some entity apart from the observable properties possessed individually by each member of a defined set of objects.

Stewart’s analysis of the domain of labor

In keeping with the demands of the regime of management, Stewart devotes relatively little time to a critical analysis of the leisured sector of society. Instead, his focus is on the structure of the laboring sector of the population and the necessity of finding an adequate method of monitoring and stabilizing its social position. The key objective of Stewart's analysis is to create channels of visibility that connect both the affluent and the poor. Whatever form this channel of communication takes, it must provide reciprocal visibility: the poor and the affluent must both see each other simultaneously so as to maximize the affluent class’ degree of control over the poor. It is here that the requirement of visibility collides with the demand for ontological stasis by severely limiting Stewart’s options. Indeed, Stewart can only satisfy the demands of both norms by falling back upon a traditional, pre-industrial system of social relations as the only viable solution to the problem of maintaining an effective regime of management.

Stewart begins his analysis of the poor with three moves that are characteristic of virtually all of his philosophical writings. First, he carefully defines
the object of investigation. In this case, he defines, the poor as “that unfortunate
class of men, who, in consequence either of the imperfections of our social
institutions, or of the evils necessarily connected with the present constitution of
humanity, are left dependent upon the bounty of their fellow citizens.” (LPE V2,
254) Additionally, Stewart sharply delineates both the limits of interventions to
relieve the plight of the poor, as well as spelling out the necessity of a thoroughly
analytical approach to the problem of material want. In both cases, the guiding
principle is always to avoid “the danger of multiplying unnecessarily the objects of
law, by attempting to secure artificially, by the wisdom of man, those beneficent
ends which are sufficiently provided for by the wisdom of nature.” (LPE V2, 255).
Here, Stewart expresses the norm of utility quite plainly by insisting that action in
the world should, if it is to be effective, rest upon a careful, philosophical
investigation of the relevant phenomena in order to uncover their true properties
and relations. Or, to invert the procedural arrow, a well-grounded philosophical
analysis should precede any action in the world, since such an investigation will
provide a more secure foundation for effective action than the immediate, but
unreflective, deployment of resources on the basis of human wishes or desires.
Without disciplined, rigorous investigation, he concludes any efforts to address the
needs of the poor will almost certainly fail and might, indeed, even exacerbate the
problem. (LPE V2, 255)

Stewart’s third characteristic move reveals the norm of ontological stasis in
action, and more significantly, draws out a major boundary of the discursive field in
which he is operating. As he frequently does in his work, Stewart lays out an
historical account of the object of study prior to any actual analysis of it. In this case, he outlines the emergence of ‘the poor’ as an identifiable social group in Britain. Calling this an historical account, however, is misleading and anachronistic. Specifically, Stewart does not provide a causal account of the emergence of ‘the poor’; rather, what Stewart presents is simply an empirical account of legislative pronouncements and their effect on social relations. Changes in social relations are explained by reference to the appearance of legislation; however, the appearance of the legislation is not explained with reference to any underlying causal factor. Stewart presents the reader with a series of politico-social events inscribed in a narrative of ‘progress’ in which members of the laboring class move from a condition of absolute servitude to become free wage labor. Although this story is seen as ‘progressive’ by Stewart, in the sense that the laboring class is now free to sell its labor under market-like conditions rather than being compelled to provide labor, Stewart provides no explanation for the emergence of free wage labor other than to link it to contemporary legislative pronouncements. Here Stewart is obeying the norm of visualization: he appeals not to hidden causal mechanisms, but, instead, limits himself to purely observable phenomena. Historical records register two events: first the promulgation of legislation intended to change existing labor relations, and then, second, the appearance of a new social group. Stewart appeals only to visible, surface phenomena. And his story of progress is one in which the new group (free wage labor) appears not as a novelty, but as the result of the steady removal of hindrances to the unencumbered sale of labor. There is, in short, no process of development in time being argued here. The movement from one state to
another is being described rather than explained. (This is not a criticism of Stewart – but only an indication of the parameters that both limited and enabled him to generate discourses)

Moreover, Stewart also reveals the tale tell signs of his natural historical foundation in the way in which he characterizes the poor as a group. At first glance, Stewart seems to have a rather confused notion of the poor; in particular, he speaks frequently of the “laboring classes” without elaboration. More narrowly, he clearly indicates that the ‘poor’ as a category comprehends a number of distinct conditions of material deprivation. Nevertheless, Stewart offers no systematic account of these subdivisions of the ‘poor’ other than noting and, from time to time, offering some different antidotes to their plight.

What seems to lacking, in short, is an abstraction that would give distinct form to this amorphous group; an abstraction like the concept of “poverty” that would characterize the poor not as a simple empirical phenomenon, but, rather, as the outward manifestation of an underlying and systematic set of causal factors that may not be immediately visible. In explaining the existence of the poor, Stewart relies exclusively on immediately visible phenomena. He does not, for example, seek an answer for poverty in structural economic changes; instead, he sees it as the regrettable, but necessary outcome of particular legislation. He also sees it as the result of certain deplorable personal habits that the poor seem to display.
More significantly, he does not see the ‘poor’ as a group that can be eliminated through appropriate policy. Indeed, the very existence of the poor, as Stewart defines them, is a natural, inevitable, and unavoidable outcome of the creation of free wage labor. Stewart reaches this conclusion through his comparison of early medieval British social relations and the subsequent changes in social structure. Specifically, Stewart argues that master-slave relationships represented the primary social arrangement in medieval England. In this relationship, the members of the laboring class were compelled to surrender their labor to a ruling elite. Despite the obvious oppressiveness of this social system, the laboring class could claim a portion of the master’s resources. As Stewart explains, “the obligation to serve another for life, implies a reciprocal obligation on the master to supply the slave with the necessaries of life....” (LPE V2, 256). In addition, Stewart continues, masters’ “own interest will usually secure a fulfillment of this obligation...” (LPE V2, 256) and thus insure the continuity of the master-slave relationship.

It is crucial to point out here that this arrangement surely does not guarantee that slaves will lead materially comfortable lives. Almost certainly, even in the best of times, slaves will remain at or near subsistence level. Nevertheless, slaves in that era were not ‘poor’ in the same sense that individuals of Stewart’s time were ‘poor.’ As Stewart makes clear, merely existing in a state of material deprivation is not synonymous with being ‘poor.’ Even under the worst imaginable conditions, the slaves of the medieval period still could legally claim support from their masters,
however meager their portion might be. This claim on the master’s resources could be actualized because of the spatial proximity of masters and slaves. In the medieval period, slaves were bound to specific plots of land and were therefore directly under the view and control of their masters. In turn, however, this geographic fixity also allowed slaves to monitor their masters and be aware of the existence and extent of their masters’ resources. As Stewart already noted, the ever‐present threat of slave rebellion provided a compelling incentive for masters to meet the slaves’ legal claims for subsistence. Moreover, masters had little hope of evading these claims, since a substantial portion of the masters’ resources were visible to the slaves as the direct products of their own labor.

For Stewart, it is this dual economic‐epistemological relationship that distinguishes material deprivation in the medieval period from the state of being poor at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The static character of the spatial relationship between masters and slave insured that both groups had direct access to the economic situations of the other. And it was this direct access to knowledge that stabilized relations between the two groups, both by creating the legal claims of the slaves and by creating incentives for the masters to address these claims. Regardless of the low state of economic development, barring a total catastrophe that destroys the economic productivity of the land, slaves will always be able to obtain some portion of the masters’ resources in order to support themselves.
In Stewart’s time, however, new legislation has severed the economic-epistemological link that sustained and stabilized medieval English society. The legalization of free wage labor has, theoretically at least, set the slaves free. Freedom in this case means that individual members of the laboring class are no longer compelled a priori to provide their labor unconditionally to a single master. Instead, the laboring class now sells its labor in a market setting to a number of potential employers. His new arrangement has significant consequences both for the conditions of employers and laborers as well as for the relationship between the two groups. In the first place, the legalization of free wage labor, according to Stewart, literally mobilizes labor; members of the laboring class released from the static spatial arrangements that bound them to a particular plot of land and a particular master. Laborers are free to seek new economic arrangements with a variety of employers. In gaining this freedom, laborers must relinquish their earlier situation in which they possessed a permanent legal claim on the resources of their masters. Now, as free wage labor, their claim on their employers’ resources is only temporary and contingent. Conversely, employers no longer recognize any fixed, permanent claims by laborers on their resources. Any claims that do exist now arise from a negotiated agreement between particular laborers and particular employers, rather than as an imposed, socially a priori relationship that binds all members of society from birth until death.
Moreover, the emergence of free wage labor also severs the fixed epistemological link that had previously bound masters and slaves. In the labor market, employers and laborers encounter each other as absolute or near strangers. Neither party has any fixed socially *a priori* channel of information about the other.

Although Stewart believes that the appearance of free wage labor is beneficial to both employers and laborers, and indeed, represents a form of socio-economic progress, it also creates new forms of social and economic misery. In particular, the appearance of free wage labor is accompanied by a new economic condition that is characterized not only by historically familiar forms of material insufficiency, but by a new condition of absolute material deprivation. This condition is neither accidental nor incidental to the contemporary economic conditions; instead, it is both a direct product of the legalization of free wage labor and is an unavoidable consequence of it. It results from severing the ties between masters and slaves – ties that insured that slaves would have a legal claim on the master resources, and, furthermore, would almost inevitably insure that the vast bulk of the laboring class would, from birth, be tied to a master. This would insure some degree of support for the slave class. But in a market environment, there is no guarantee that the demand for labor will equal the supply. In fact, it will very rarely be the case that the two are equally matched. Sometimes of course, demand will outstrip supply, but also there will be times when the opposite holds true. In such cases, some members of the laboring class will fail to obtain employment, and thus lack the means to acquire
basic subsistence. These excess members of the laboring class, who possess no means of support other than their labor, will then fall into a state of absolute material deprivation as result. Those who are unable or are unwilling to freely sell their labor thus constitute the ‘poor’ for Stewart. Other members of the laboring class might suffer from degrees of material want and hardship, but these are not the ‘poor’ in Stewart's analysis.

The key question for Stewart is whether excess labor has a legal claim on the possessors of wealth for support in way analogous to the relations between master and slaves. Stewart’s answer is a qualified ‘no.’ Nevertheless, Stewart’s answer although it is, despite his qualifications, a straightforward rejection of a legal claim for support by the laboring class, is considerably more complicated than it first appears. Moreover, Stewart is not rejecting such a claim purely out of his political ideology, or because of his class position, or even out pure hardheartedness. Instead, his rejection of a legal claim to subsistence by the laboring class is a direct outcome of the discursive matrix that frames his analysis of the poor. He concludes that no such legal should exist on two grounds. First, his analysis of subsistence claims that have been established by statutory law indicates that such legal measures are socially disruptive. Furthermore, the source of this disruption lies in the manner in which statutory claims for subsistence obscure the visible economic and epistemological links between those who must labor and those who are not required to do so. Given the importance of the norm of visualization in Stewart’s
discourse, the inability of the two classes to see (in a figurative sense) each other creates a series of legal, economic, epistemological, and practical difficulties. Establishing visualization between the two classes on a number of dimensions is the problem for both Stewart and Mill. Modern social arrangements have disrupted these links; consequently, the practical task is to reestablish them.

The creation of free wage labor introduces a rupture into the social structure; under feudalism, the master-slave relationship necessitated a considerable degree of direct contact between slaves and masters, or at least regular contact between slaves and their ‘virtual’ masters in the form of the masters’ agents. Management of the slave class thus rested on these direct, and often face-to-face relations between slaves and masters. The legalization of free wage labor destroyed this relationship; in doing so, the statutory creation of free wage labor produced two results. First, it ended direct, visible, and fixed relations between laborers and employers. Management, which is implicitly presumed by Stewart to have been operative as a political regime in feudalism is thereby undermined as a discourse of social control. Without direct contact through fixed relations, employers can no longer exert permanent control over laborer. Also, the appearance of free wage labor renders both laborers and employers anonymous to each other; both, potentially can conceal critical information from the other. Although it is of course possible for laborers to have long-term relationships with their employers (and vice-versa), the stability and permanence of these relationships is greatly undermined by legalization of free
wage labor. Laborers are not, typically, joined to employers permanently; consequently, they can voluntarily seek relationships with other employers. In addition, the uncertainties of the labor market can sever the laborer-employer relationship involuntarily and unexpectedly. A downturn in demand can produce sudden and undesirable unemployment and force laborers involuntarily into a state of absolute deprivation.

The problem then becomes (for Stewart), one of how to reestablish a relationship of mutual visibility between the laboring class and the employer class so as to allow for a regime of management to function. This is the reason why the statutory claims (as well as other types of solutions like workhouses) are ineffective: statutory based claims in a free wage labor environment produce two, equally disruptive effects. First, they establish a right to subsistence even among those laborers who willfully withhold their labor from market, and thus encourage free-riders. Given the anonymity of laborers, free wage labor not only permits, but can actually encourage this if laborers gain a right of subsistence. Equally distressing, is the fact that a right to subsistence under conditions of free wage labor nullifies the role that the employer class should play in maintaining social order. This happens for two reasons. First, statutory claims to subsistence are administered not by the employer class as a whole, but by specialized agents of the state. For the most part, these specialized agents are anonymous factotums who have no organic relationship to the laborer class. Consequently, the employer class is displaced from its ‘natural
role’ under a regime of management; however, the specialized agents, are even more anonymous, from the perspective of the laboring class, than are the employers since there are fewer of them, and they make contact only to dispense aid. This only exacerbates the visual decoupling of the two classes and creates an even larger epistemological void between the laboring and working classes. Furthermore, the creation of a statutory claim to subsistence also alienates the employer class by forcing them to surrender resources over which they have no direct administrative powers. Thus, the employer class might be encouraged to withdraw from its ‘natural’ role as the managers of social relations not only because they have become superfluous, but out of spite over their powerlessness to carry out a traditional function. This is why “compulsory relief” is anathema to Stewart: it only seems to solve the problem of absolute deprivation. However, rather than solving it, it actually worsens the problems by exacerbating the situation (the breaking of the economic and epistemological links) that made a new system of subsistence for the laboring class necessary in the first place.

Moreover, it is strongly implied that the ‘poor’ will always be a recurring problem. Stewart’s solutions in no way eliminate the factors that create the ‘poor’; they exist only reactively as a response to the inevitable existence of the poor under the conditions of free wage labor. For Stewart then, the existence of the poor is simply a brute empirical reality. Absolute deprivation is not a correctable problem that emerges from the failure of socio-economic system – it is an ever-present problem.
that can only be addressed more-or-less successfully with the tools at hand.

Moreover, Stewart doesn’t even conceptualize the appearance of the poor as a failure; indeed, the very inevitability of absolute destitution under a regime of wage labor is celebrated by Stewart as a sign of progress. In short, Stewart views the appearance of absolute destitution as a necessary evil. Stewart is not attempting to remove the underlying conditions that have given rise to the poor; in fact, there are no ‘underlying’ factors to correct since such a conception does not exist for Stewart. The (empirical) existence of the poor is simply the result of an (equally empirical) historical event. The choices then are simply two: either repeal the legislation that made free wage possible and return to an earlier type of socio-economic system, or find some way to reestablish the econo-epistemological relationship between the laboring and employer classes so as recreate social order. The first choice is unthinkable for it would represent a reversal of progress through the reaquisition of regressive social and economic characteristics. Progress for Stewart is not the creation of new entities, but the removal of inhibiting or retarding characteristics in order to maximize a desirable quality. The creation of free wage labor is the stripping of the (economic) being of the laboring class to its most essential component – to return to an earlier state would mean regaining regressive characteristics. So, there is no where for Stewart to go, analytically speaking, except towards an acceptance of the inevitability of the existence of the ‘poor’ as the price of progress.
Stewart’s analysis of the ‘poor’ reveals its position within a regime of management most clearly in his discussion of the use of workhouses as a technique for providing for the ‘poor.’ At first glance, the concentration of the poor within workhouses might seem to be the perfect solution: in the workhouse, the poor would be given a means to participate in the economy effective in a sort of virtual employment that would take up the slack in the market place. Moreover, by concentrating the poor in the workhouses, the poor could be made visible to the elite more effectively than under schemes that distribute aid to scattered individuals. Nevertheless, Stewart firmly rejects the workhouse scheme as ineffective and, indeed, concludes “that, in fact, they have proved the worst of all the methods that could have been devised for remedying the evil in question.” (LPE V2, 300). Stewart rejects the workhouse scheme primarily because it does not, within the framework of management, create a stable economic-epistemological connection between employers and laborers. Thus, despite the apparent ability of workhouses to make the poor more visible to the members of the leisure class, workhouses in fact produce just the opposite result.

In defense of this position, Stewart argues for three distinct consequences of workhouses. Two of these consequences concern the behavior of the ‘poor’ in workhouses. According to Stewart, workhouses will fail to establish the dual economic-epistemological link in many cases because of the undesirable working environment that workhouses create. Many of the poor who suffer absolute
material deprivation because they are unable to labor, and hence, are worthy objects of charity, will reject the workhouse because they will view it as unfair and harsh punishment. They may even go so far as to attempt to conceal their degree of material deprivation to avoid incarceration in a workhouse and to avoid voluntary residence. In the case of incarceration, the deserving poor will be treated as criminals and subjected to a sanction that is tantamount to imprisonment. In the case of voluntary workhouses, they will simply avoid them altogether. Therefore, a significant, and deserving sector of the poor will either not be helped at all, or will be treated as quasi-criminals in the same moral category as shirkers and malingerers. From an epistemological perspective then, many poor, both deserving and undeserving will evade or escape the attention of the elite.

Another consequence that relates to the poor is the deleterious effects of forced concentration into workhouse. In a sense, no matter the working conditions in the workhouse, the situation that will obtain there is one of forced labor. Thus, workhouses are regressive economically. They resemble structurally the situation under feudalism and result in resentful sullen laborers who will do as little as possible. The great advantage of free wage labor is its greater motivation to work. This motivation arises from the laborer’s perception that he/she owns her/his labor outright and is not compelled by any human authority to surrender it in perpetuity to another. By forcing the poor into workhouse, this feudal system is recreated in miniature. The poor will be compelled to work at a specific enterprise by a specific
set of authorities. This reversion to an earlier form of socio-economic relation will, Stewart claims, have two interconnected deleterious effects. First, laborers in the workhouse will feel themselves virtually enslaved and exhibit the disadvantageous work behavior of the enslaved. That is, they will resist work that appears forced upon them, and they will generally work in a sloppy and inefficient manner. In addition, the leisure class will not gain any greater access to more labor; rather than taking up the slack in the labor market, and thereby increasing the amount of the labor input, workhouses, because of their inefficiency, will tend to cost more than they produce. Here the reestablishing of the economic link is thwarted by necessity of efficiency and profit considerations. These necessities are new to the regime of free wage labor in which both buyers and sellers of labor haggle for the best possible economic relationship. Ideally, this is one in which the buyer of labor seeks the cheapest and most efficient labor so that profit can be generated. If profit cannot be generated, then the economic link cannot be sustained, and possibly not even established in the first place. (See Stewart here on the nature of commercial societies and why they are economically superior)

Finally, workhouses are objectionable to Stewart because they provide no motivation for the leisure class to maintain and improve them. Such establishments seem to fail to live up to their initial promise because they require an effort that is outside of the ordinary circuits of their founders. As extra effort, therefore, they do not fit into the established social architecture of the leisured class.
Mill on “class”

Upon an initial inspection, Mill seems to deviate in a substantial way from Stewart’s discourse on the poor. Specifically, Mill’s discussion of class relations breaks rather obviously with Stewart’s broad, two-class model by introducing a tripartite model of social and economic relations. Moreover, Mill not only creates a middle-class that inhabits the space between the realm of manual labor and the realm of leisure, he also grants this middle-class a special, and indeed preeminent, role in the socio-economic structure. Nevertheless, Mill’s model of the socio-economic order, while innovative in its creation of a mediating space between the spaces of labor and leisure, represents less of a decisive break with the two-class model of socio-economic relations than it might appear at first glance. Instead, Mill’s tripartite model is a normatively inadequate effort to reconstruct the two-class socio-economic space in order to accommodate the demands of a regime of management. In doing so, Mill creates an unstable pseudo-space for the middle class that clashes uncomfortably with the basic norms of the classical episteme.

Mill’s discourses on the architecture of the socio-economic space appear in numerous places in his writings, but the most sustained and significant portraits are laid out in his Essay on Government and in his Elements of Political Economy. In both works Mill endeavors to create a socio-economic space that will separate the realms of leisure and labor. The purpose for creating this space is to designate a population
that possesses the necessary characteristics for insuring social stability by simultaneously avoiding the corruption, dissipation, and abusiveness that is endemic to the leisured class while also taming, controlling, and ultimately transforming, the unruly passions and shortsightedness of the laboring class.

In the *Essay on Government*, Mill attempts to create this space by dissecting power relations among groups and individuals in society. Mill frames his analysis with a critique of the traditional scheme that identifies three basic forms of government: Democracy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy. Mill argues that all three forms are all merely distinguishable forms for accomplishing the same purpose of creating a “union of a certain number of men, for protecting one another.” The three forms of government are simply three schemes for transferring power to a ruling group that will have the responsibility of protecting individuals from the self-interested desires of others. The distinguishing characteristic among these three governing forms (that is, that feature that grants these systems an identity) lies in the size of the representative group that holds the responsibility for securing the wellbeing of each individual against one another. Democracy is simply a governing scheme in which the representative class is co-equal with the inhabitants of a particular polity. As Mill understands the term, then, in a Democracy, individuals collectively govern themselves. By contrast, in the other two governing schemes, representation is limited to a subset of the inhabitants of a polity. Aristocratic systems set up a group
of individuals as the representatives of the polity as a whole, while under Monarchy
a single individual represents the entire polity.

Mill’s subsequent analysis of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy offers a
number of reasons why all three, and especially Monarchy and Aristocracy, are
liable to misuse by the polity’s representatives. Two key objections to the three
systems, however, arise from both the manner in which subsets of the polity are to
be distinguished as representatives of the whole and in what characteristics of these
subsets render the representatives trustworthy in their positions. In the latter case,
trustworthiness is important because of Mill’s rather pessimistic view of human
nature. According to Mill, human beings have an infinite lust for self-
aggrandizement – a lust so powerful that individuals cannot be expected to
routinely suppress it on their own. Government, of whatever form, exists primarily
to curb this lust in order to establish social order. As the wielders of political power,
the polity’s representatives are, therefore in a precarious position as individuals.
Elevating them to positions of political power does nothing to check their lust for
self-aggrandizement, and, indeed, aggravates this situation by giving them immense
powers to act on that lust. Thus, the problem of restraining human desire and self-
interest is compounded for the polity’s representatives, and, in a classic example of
the problem of ‘who watches the watchers?’ the representatives, as well as the
inhabitants of a polity, require restraining mechanisms.
The former issue of distinguishing a subset of the polity to occupy the role of representatives also presents Mill with difficulties. Primary among these difficulties is the problem of distinguishing the appropriate number of representatives from the rest of the inhabitants of the polity. Mill summarily rejects democracy as a possibility because of the complex and ungainly character of a government in which each inhabitant of the polity is at once both governor and governed. Consequently, any effective government will employ some number of representatives that is less than the total population of the polity. For Mill, the problem here is not merely a quantitative one defining of a particular numerical level, for which an argument can be made that establishes a workable ratio between the number of representatives and the total population, but the more difficult issue of epistemologically distinguishing the representatives from the general population. In other words, what fixed and definitive characteristics separate appropriate (and trustworthy) representatives from their unacceptable neighbors?

It is at this juncture between the ethical problem of trust and the epistemological issue of distinguishing a population of representatives that Mill attempts to carve out a social space for a middle-class. In order to construct this social space, Mill must do more than simply identify the supposed merits of a particular group. In keeping with the norms of the classical episteme, he must establish that this middle group is characteriologically different from either the leisured class above it or the laboring class below it. This characteriological difference must rule out any
possibility of establishing a relationship of identity between the middle class and the other two classes if the middle class is to be granted ontological status. Otherwise, Mill’s proposed middle-class will collapse back into an amorphous conglomeration of similar individuals that might belong either to the labor class or to the leisure class or, potentially, to both.

Crucially, the social spaces themselves are implicitly treated as coequal with their inhabitants. It is the inhabitants who fill out a social space; abstract, or potential social spaces don’t, and can’t exist apart from their inhabitants. To suggest otherwise would imply the possibility of the development of new social groups that might fill these empty spaces. Since development in time is prohibited by the classical episteme’s foundational norms, Mill cannot propose new social spaces *ex nihilo* nor can he propose the future appearance of new social spaces that are currently unobservable. Instead, the restraints on his discourse compel him to demonstrate he has discovered a previously unobserved social space, occupied of course by a set of inhabitants, and to identify a previously unnoticed set of fixed, definitive characteristics that unambiguously distinguishes this social space from all other observable social spaces.

Mill thus sets out, as a primary task, the identification of a set of fixed, definitive characteristics that establish the middle class as a space that cannot be absorbed into either the realm of the leisured class or of the laboring class. He immediately
eliminates women and children as unable to inhabit this social space, and therefore as lacking those fixed, definitive characteristics that demarcate the boundaries between ontologically distinct entities. Children are eliminated as possible representatives because of their lack of mental capacity. In both cases, moreover, Mill argues that the interests of these two groups are identical with those of their male caretakers; consequently, the norms of the class episteme indicate that, with regard to the purposes of acting as representatives in the polity, women and children, regardless of their class, are identical to those members of the polity who do possess the additional characteristics that suit them to play the role of representatives. This being the case, Mill concludes that only men are suitable as representatives of the community.

Moreover, the electors and their representatives must in some way share the basic interests of the polity. If they do not, Mill argues, the polity will once again find itself in danger of being exploited by leaders who will have no incentive to obey the will of the electorate and, in fact, compelling reasons to ignore the popular will. Consequently, the pool of potential electors and representatives must be further subdivided so as to create a electoral-representative subgroup that will possess a continuity of interests that will unite all adult males of this subgroup against any differences that otherwise divide them. Mill raises, as one possibility, the limitation of the electoral-representative group by age. In addition to the exclusion of children, Mill argues that setting an age limit that excludes some adults could
narrow the electoral-representative subgroup sufficiently in order to insure a continuity of interests between representatives and polity. Mill basis this proposal on his claim that there is little or no conflict between the interests of different adult generational groups; in particular, familial bonds between generations virtually guarantee that the electoral-representative group will tend to act in the interests of excluded adult males. Although he presents no particular age limit for political participation, he does raise the possibility that such a limit might be considered.

Having pared the potential pool of candidates down by age and gender, Mill then is ready to focus on the single dimension of socio-economic class. Some care must be taken here, however, because of the ambiguous manner in which Mill uses socio-economic categories. In particular, Mill uses the term “Aristocratic” to denominate both a form of government and a particular social group within a polity. Clarification of this point is essential since Mill contrasts the suitability of members of the Aristocracy to act as representatives of the polity with his newly created middle class. In this case, Mill’s “aristocracy” denotes a particular social group, or in the conceptual setting of the classical episteme, a social space that is arranged relative to other social spaces. This is particularly important to note because Mill’s designation of the middle rank as in fact in the ‘middle’ is more than simply a convenient metaphor that relies upon an implicit spatial image in order to organize relations. In the classical episteme, the ‘middle’ rank was indeed in the middle, between the non-laboring aristocrats and the laboring groups. That Mill was relying
here on an explicitly spatial relationship that he intended to be taken as more than a convenient rhetorical device can be demonstrated from his statements about the relations between the middle rank and the laboring groups. In these statements, Mill spatially juxtaposes the social position of the ‘middle’ rank with that of that of the laboring ranks.

Mill takes up the issue of socio-economic position as a final consideration for creating a trustworthy electoral-representative pool. Specifically, Mill addresses the prospects and value of limiting the franchise and the right of office-holding according to property-ownership. Mill endorses a property requirement for political participation; however, the implementation of this requirement will be a complex undertaking. It is complex because Mill sees the determination of a property requirement as essential to defining the parameters of a representative-electoral body that is trustworthy in the sense that it will genuinely represent and work for the general good of the polity. Mill’s reasoning here is that the property threshold must be such that the electoral-representative body will include at least a minimal majority of the total adult male population of the polity. According to Mill, a representative-electoral body delimited by a property qualification, and composed entirely of men over a specified age, would constitute a sub-group of a polity that would most closely reflect the interests and welfare of the polity as whole. Moreover, such a representative-electoral body would be the least likely sub-group to subvert and abuse its position once it had attained political power.
Mill even briefly outlines a mathematical argument to demonstrate how a property qualification that granted the right of political participation to a majority of a polity's adult male inhabitants would reduce the likelihood of corruption or abuse of power. Mill argues that the potential for corruption exists in the degree to the numerical proportion in which members of the representative-electoral class stand in relation to the size of the politically-excluded sector of the population. He seems to envision the propensity to abuse that power for the purposes of illegitimate self-aggrandizement to be related to opportunity of each single representative to acquire power over the desires of particular individual members of the polity who are excluded from political participation. The greater the number of potentially exploitable individuals that there are, the more likely that the representatives will succumb to this basic human impulse. According to Mill, the ratio of representative-electors to non participants should be no smaller that 1:1; preferably the ratio should be even smaller, since that will reduce the number of exploitable individuals to less than one per elector-representative and thus further reduce the appeal to each individual member of the representative-electoral body of expropriating the desires of the non-participants. Mill concludes that the reduction of corruption, as the reverse-side of the more positive goal of creating a continuity of interests between the participatory members and the non-participatory members of the polity, depends upon creating a body of representative-electors that comprises at least a minimal majority of the total property owning, adult male population of the polity.
The property qualification that Mill places on the representative, electoral body is especially important because, in Mill’s analysis, the criterion of property-ownership implicitly grounds his tripartite socio-economic system. If Mill is to carve out a space for the middle ranks, it is important that be able to distinguish this group from the existing models of governance.

Mill attributes to the ‘middle’ rank a host of intellectual and moral qualities that, he asserts, qualify it to serve as the representatives of the polity as whole. Mill is not here simply glorifying this group; indeed, as he points out, any representative group is liable to abuse its power and must be restrained. The special character of the ‘middle rank’ does not lie, therefore, in some kind of unique resistance to corruption that is not possessed by any other socio-economic group. Instead, he argues that the middle rank possesses two special qualities that will distinguish it from all other ranks and grant it both a distinctive identity and the capacity within an appropriately structured set of institutional norms to avoid, or at least to mitigate, the danger of abusing their power.

Mill clarifies the position of the ‘middle rank’ within his socioeconomic scheme. According to Mill” the ‘middle rank’ “[are] wholly included in that part of the community which is not the Aristocratical.” This group, therefore, lies within the realm of labor; however, as Mill further describes, it is clearly distinct from other sectors of the laboring realm. In particular, Mill juxtaposes the ‘middle rank’ above
and next to "that class of the people, who are below the middle rank...." The spatial character of this relationship is elaborated in the characterization of the interactions between the middle rank and those below them. Mill sees the middle rank as the natural leader of the lower ranks of society, and the qualification for leadership grows directly from their spatial relations with these lower groups. In terms that leave no doubt about the scope of its influence on the lower classes, Mill asserts

that the opinions of that class of the people, who are below the middle rank, are formed, and their minds are directed by [the middle rank] who come the most immediately in contact with them, who are in the constant habit of intimate communication with them, to whom they fly for advice and assistance in all their numerous difficulties, upon whom they feel an immediate and daily dependence, in health and in sickness, in infancy and in old age; to whom their children look up as models for their imitation, whose opinions they hear daily repeated, and account it their honour to adopt. (p. 41)

Mill leaves not even a scintilla of space between the middle and lower ranks here; this is not surprising in the context of the classical episteme in which continuous relations between juxtaposed entities is an onto-epistemological norm. Nevertheless, the seamless connection between the middle and the lower ranks creates another issue for Mill. Specifically, Mill has to justify his distinction of a middle rank within the realm of labor.
Mill attempts a defense of his carving out of a new socioeconomic space by appealing to both the functions and characteristics of the middle rank. In addition to being the natural leaders of those people below it, the middle rank is also distinguished from adjacent groups by its unique achievements. In particular, Mill cites the allegedly widespread belief that the middle rank is “the most wise and most virtuous part of the community....” Mill credits the emergence of such a middle rank to “the diffusion of knowledge, under the present state of education....” Moreover, this highly educated class is also an energetic contributor to society and culture through since it “gives to science, to art, and to legislation itself, their distinguished ornaments, the chief source of all that has exalted and refined human nature...” In these glowing terms, Mill concludes by anointing the middle ranks as the natural leaders, not only of the lower ranks, but of all society. It is only in the hands of such talented, educated, and accomplished men from the middling ranks that government can and should be trusted.

**Macauley’s critique of Mill’s Essay**

Mill’s designation of a distinct middle rank in the realm of labor solves a number of important problems for him. First it creates a space (and a group) that can take on the task of fulfilling Mill’s political agenda. A middle rank that possesses moral virtue and the latest knowledge is the best candidate, in an imperfect world, to hold
the reigns of political power. Although the middle rank is not perfect in its virtue, it does fulfill Mill’s dictum that “if the powers of Government must be entrusted to persons incapable of good conduct, they were better entrusted to incapables who have an interest in good government, than to incapables who have an interest in bad.” Insofar, as all human beings are constitutionally unable to resist the allure of power and are naturally impelled to abuse it, the middle rank, through its acquired knowledge and virtue, is best qualified to occupy positions of political power. Moreover, the position of the middle rank in the social space provides Mill with a mechanism for the social control of the poorest members of society. No longer are the poorest members separated, in his scheme, from the control of a socially powerful group, by the yawning gulf that separates the space of labor from the space of leisure. The middle rank originates within the laboring space and exists in a relation of spatial contiguity with the poorest members of society. Consequently, the middle rank is ideally positioned to serve as an instrument of social control.

There is however, a large gap between proposing the existence of a useful new entity and demonstrating that such a new entity actually exists. The problem becomes even more complicated because claims for the existence of any such entity can only be justified to the extent that the onto-epistemological matrix of the existing episteme supports both the claims for the entity's existence, and the method of investigation that led to its discovery. This is essentially Mill’s greatest
difficulty: can Mill’s ‘middle rank’ actually exist as a distinct social space under the classical episteme?

In a famous critique of Mill’s Essay on Government entitled Mill on Government, Thomas Macaulay responded with a decisive “no”—at least with regard to Mill’s version of the middle rank. Although Macaulay himself was a proponent of the concept of a middle rank in the socio-economic hierarchy, he launches a blistering attack on Mill’s efforts to carve out a social space for a distinct middle rank. Without using Foucault’s analytical language, Macaulay nevertheless, expresses his critique in terms that accord with the norms of the classical episteme. Of particular importance here is the degree to which Mill has successfully differentiated the middle rank from both the lower and higher divisions of the socio-economic hierarchy by providing it with a political role identity as the representative of the interests of the entire polity. It is this role and identity that Macaulay calls into question by challenging the alleged continuity of interests between the middle rank and the lower socio-economic divisions. Macaulay argues that Mill’s efforts to create a social space that can accommodate a distinctive middle rank founders on just this issue:

Will the people act against their own interest? Or will the middle rank act against its own interest? Or is the interest of the middle rank identical with the interest of the people? If the people act according to the directions of the middle rank, as Mr. Mill says that they assuredly will, one of these three
questions must be answered in the affirmative. But, if any one of the three be answered in the affirmative, his whole system falls to the ground.

Macaulay reaches this conclusion by holding Mill to his original set of principles regarding human nature. In particular, he draws out the consequences of Mill’s claim about the irresistible and limitless power of self-interest for the role and identity of the middle rank. The key problem for Mill was to prevent the representative group from exploiting its position and power to give free reign to its self-interest at the expense of other social groups. According to Mill the middle rank is distinguished by characteristics that should obstruct this otherwise powerful impetus towards collective aggrandizement. Macaulay, however, concludes Mill characterization of the middle rank fails to prevent it from playing the role of a non-exploitative representative body because Mill’s model of socio-economic relations leads Mill to either repudiate his initial assumptions about self-interest, or it fails to distinguish the middle rank from the aristocracy.

If Mill tries to distinguish the middle ranks from the lower orders, then he is confronted with the problem of continuity of interests between the two groups: if they have the same interests, then what distinguishes them? The identity of interests would seem to eliminate a key principle for carving out a space for the middle rank.
In the first place, Mill has designated minimal property-ownership as a key qualification for membership in the electoral-representative body. This property distinction, Macaulay argues, undermines the continuity of interests between the middle ranks and the lower ranks and establishes a continuity of interests with the aristocratic class. Even if there is an initial continuity between the interests of the middle and lower ranks, Mill's insistence on even a minimal property qualification will inevitably lead the middle ranks to play a political role that is indistinguishable from that of a property-owning aristocracy that (potentially) rules benevolently over the lower classes. But of course there is no guarantee that an aristocracy will always maintain an identity of interests with those it rules since the principle of self-interest will come into play. Once in power, the middle ranks will acquire opportunities to define themselves as different from the lower ranks and will thus develop new interests that are no longer continuous with those of the poor. Consequently, the middle ranks will begin to behave like any other aristocracy and seek collective aggrandizement. Here Macaulay undercuts Mill's claim that the middle ranks somehow possess both a separate identity from the from the aristocratic and laboring classes while simultaneously sharing a common interest with the laboring classes. Within the classical episteme there is no justification for establishing a group in between the aristocracy and the laboring classes on the basis that Mill has offered. A continuity of interests destroys the possibility of establishing the differential character that is the foundation of classification under the classical episteme. Mill's middle rank could only possess an ontological distinctiveness if it could maintain a set of interests that differed from those of an
aristocracy. The very act of owning property, however, once property ownership is combined with political power, instantly redefines the middle rank and makes it indistinguishable from the aristocratic rank. Accordingly, Macaulay draws the (to him) self-evident conclusion that the middle rank, at least as Mill characterizes it, cannot provide his sought after barrier against political corruption since it is virtually indistinguishable from a corrupt and power hungry aristocracy.

The alternative situation in which the middle rank and lower rank possess different interests also fails to help Mill in his quest to establish the existence of a distinctive middle rank. In fact, if the middle rank and the lower ranks have different interests then Mill’s entire analysis collapses, Macaulay argues. Given that Mill has founded his analysis upon the principle that self-interest is the driving force and defining characteristic of human nature, a difference of interests between the middle rank and the lower orders would inevitably prevent the middle rank from exercising the benign political leadership that Mill assigns it.

Macaulay insists the he is only analyzing the weaknesses of Mill’s proposal for representative government. Indeed, Macaulay himself was a proponent of a ‘middle class’ that would be the natural leader of the polity. Nevertheless, Macaulay concludes, Mill’s proposed social architecture figuratively collapses; the ‘middle rank’ that Mill proposes cannot exist according to the terms that Mill has laid out. In particular, Mill has not adequately distinguished the ‘middle rank’ from either the
leisured aristocratic class over it or from the laboring groups below it. According to the classical episteme, the ontology flows from epistemology in two specific ways: first, the proposed entity must be observable in some way, and second, the entity must possess (observable) characteristics that demarcate it from adjacent entities in the chain of being. Although Macaulay obviously does not use Foucaultian language in his critique of Mill, he nevertheless holds Mill to the norms that Foucault describes. In short, Macaulay argues that Mill cannot posit the existence of a ‘middle rank’ that serves as the natural leader of polity because Mill has failed in the epistemological task of establishing its existence according to the epistemological norms of the classical episteme. More specifically, Mill has failed, in Macaulay's critique, to adequately differentiate a ‘middle rank’ from other socio-economic groups. This failure to distinguish a ‘middle rank’ in the social space also means that Mill’s proposed group is, therefore, unobservable.

Mill’s failure to abide by the epistemological norms of the classical episteme thus, in Macaulay’s critique, prevents him from establishing the existence of a social space for a new socio-economic group that could potentially play a stabilizing political role. Mill’s effort, however, is more important to this dissertation, than his failure. What Mill’s effort shows is the limits of the classical episteme: whatever the socio-economic reality, the socio-economic discourse generated by the classical episteme, in Mill’s case, seemed unable to create a stable social space for a group that was neither aristocratic nor common. Macaulay’s critique is very clear on this point.
Mill’s middle rank is a kind of chimera in which characteristics of the laboring class are grafted onto what is essentially an aristocratic group. In the matrix of the classical episteme, Mill’s middle rank is an ontological monster that combines apparently irreconcilable characteristics. This ‘middle rank’ possesses on the one hand, the leisure for education and cultural production that are customary traits of the aristocracy. On the other hand, the middle rank also labors in productive pursuits that materially benefit the polity. In the middle rank, therefore, the two essential functions for the preservation of society are melded in one group. This theoretical entity thus represents, for Mill at least, the natural leader and natural stabilizing force of society. It is the nexus at which opposed functions and interests meet and are reconciled.

Despite its obvious utility, Mill’s proposed ‘middle rank’ violates in some manner all of the other norms of the classical episteme. On the nominalist dimension, Mill’s middle rank therefore, designates no actually existing entity. It is an empty signifier that refers to an imaginary entity that possesses no more reality than a unicorn.

Although Mill is able to propose the existence of a separate ‘middle rank’, the parameters set by the classical episteme severely limit his ability to justify his claims for its existence. In addition to his inability to make the ‘middle rank’ jibe with such onto‐epistemological norms as visibility, etc., Mill does not, and more significantly, cannot justify the existence of a ‘middle rank’ as a natural outgrowth of
socio-economic development that has emerged to fulfill some function. The requirement of temporal stasis drastically limited Mill’s ability to introduce a new social space. In this case, Mill’s proposal for a ‘middle rank’ actually obeys a normative commandment of the classical episteme even as it violates the episteme’s other strictures. Specifically, Mill offers no case for the development of a ‘middle rank’ that accounts for its temporal appearance and its acquisition of an important socio-economic function. Instead, the ‘middle rank’ is simply posited as being in existence, and Mill offers no account of how it came to be. The kinds of seemingly obvious justifications for a proposed ‘middle rank’ such as a call to recognize its contemporary relevance in the face of changing socio-economic conditions, is absent from Mill’s work. Such justifications are only ‘obvious’ within an episteme that includes a notion of development. In the classical episteme, there is no mechanism for bringing a new social space into existence, and no mechanism by which an existing mechanism can acquire a new function. Presumably, then, the ‘middle rank’ that Mill installs as the centerpiece of his representative systems must have always existed, even if it has not actualized its potential as the natural leader of a representative polity.

Also playing a role in the ahistorical presentation of the ‘middle rank’ is Mill’s peculiar choice of a deductive methodology in the Essay on Government. By taking this approach, Mill eschews any developmental, or even loosely historical, framework in his proposal of a ‘middle rank.’ Rather, Mill seeks to establish
fundamental principles from which he will deduce the type of government best suited to all polities. There is no indication that the fundamental properties of the polity change over time: indeed, any such alterations of these fundamental principles would undermine the security of Mill’s deductions from his basic assumption of the universal and unchanging character of human nature. In order to achieve the central goal of the Essay, by showing that representative government is compatible with selfish human nature, Mill must ultimately deduce the existence of some group like his ‘middle rank’ that is capable of both representing the interests of the polity as whole while simultaneously serving its own interests. Nevertheless, Mill’s ahistorical and non-developmental portrayal of the ‘middle rank’ is not solely the result of his deductive approach; in fact, the deductive approach serves Mill’s purposes so well precisely because he does not have to take developmental change into account. His deductions simply make the case that a presumably existing group is ready and appropriate for leading a polity that is based on a representative system. Whatever this group’s past is largely irrelevant, except insofar as it has been improperly denied its appropriate function in the polity.

Mill and Relations between the Domain of Leisure and the Domain of Labor
Whether Mill is judged as successful or not in his efforts to create a new social space for the ‘middle rank’, it is clear that Mill is no egalitarian. Despite Mill’s well-documented hostility towards the prerogatives and presumptions of the aristocracy, and his support for representative government, his proposed polity would still manifest a radical split between those who would lead and those who would follow. In particular, the social function of Mill’s proposed ‘middle rank’ is to shape and guide the opinions and behavior of the laboring classes. Mill most certainly takes for granted the continued existence of a socio-economic group that is primarily, and indeed almost exclusively, engaged in manual labor. In this manner, Mill’s analysis of class relations closely resembles that of Stewart. Moreover, the same epistemological problems that confronted Stewart also confronted Mill: how are the ‘middle rank’ and the laboring classes able to observe each other? Answering this question is vital for Mill, just as it was for Stewart, because an epistemic discontinuity between the ‘middle rank’ and the laboring classes would undermine the whole regime of management. See Chapter 5.

Mill addresses this problem in two ways that we have already seen. First, he proposes a synchronicity between the interests of the ‘middle rank’ and the laboring classes. As a sub-group of the laboring classes, the ‘middle rank’ is naturally allied with the rest of laboring classes and shares many of its interests. In addition, Mill attempts to overcome the problem that arises from his efforts to simultaneously retain the laboring class identity of the ‘middle rank’ while also giving it a special
function that is denied to other members of the laboring classes. His strategy here is to invoke the spatial character of onto-epistemological relations between entities that founds the classical episteme. In other words, Mill relies upon the contiguous spatial relationship between the ‘middle rank’ and the laboring classes as the primary means by which both groups maintain a reciprocal epistemological link. Mill characterizes the ‘middle rank’ and the laboring classes as being in regular intimate contact with each other. Mill does not elaborate upon the character of this contact but argues that its frequency and intensity provided the epistemological conduit that is necessary for the mutual transmission of information between the two groups. As a result of this direct contact, the laboring classes imbibe the opinions and emulate the behaviors of the ‘middle rank.’

Conclusion:

The architecture of society and mind is static, grid-like and spatial in character. It is not something that evolves over time either in a non-teleological or teleological
manner. Reform (alteration—and education is a type of cognitive reform) occurs only through reorganization of constituent parts, and not through the development of either novel forms or functions. There is no causal mechanism that drives social change that is buried below the level of visible phenomena. This is very much in line with the mechanistic vision of nature that was implied in the Enlightenment – if all of the variables can be specified, the behavior of a system can be predicted with high precision. In such a scenario, there is no space for truly novel entities to emerge unpredictably (see Enlightenment views on chance here – Hume’s notion that “chance” is just a marker for “unknown causation”). Associationism takes advantage of the idea as the primary unit of cognition in order to maximize the possibility of rearranging cognitive elements and effecting the maximum degree of possible change. Stewart’s vision of the mind as divided into interactive faculties reduces the range of possible permutations by reducing the number of basic cognitive elements. This is further restrained by the “fundamental laws of belief” which delimit the acceptable types of combinations that can be built up by the actions of the cognitive faculties.

So, reform (either cognitive or social) is ultimately about the rearrangement of visualizable constituent parts. But not just any rearrangement is permissible. Rearrangements must preserve certain limiting structures -- in the case of social reform that two-class structure must be preserved. Indeed, this is the very
definition of utility in the cases of both Mill and Stewart – how education can create individuals who will reinforce this structure.
When Dugald Stewart and James Mill constructed their discourses on mind and society, they did so within a normative matrix that both limited and enabled their efforts. Specifically, they both acted within a discursive field that was governed by a regime of management and structured epistemologically, ontologically, and practically by the requirements of visibility, ontological stasis, and utility. These governing and structural features simultaneously provided a set of instruments for generating discourses as well as defining the limits of legitimate discursive constructions. The discursive field of the “classical episteme” generated, in particular, discourses that sought to guide the manipulation of directly observable entities that were presumed to possess at least some temporally invariable properties. Only discourses of this sort could be considered legitimate contenders for the attention of the intellectual elites of the “classical episteme.”

The features of this discursive field, however, were not necessarily in harmony with each other. Indeed, tensions between the governing regime and its structural components were frequent and almost certainly inevitable
since any discursive field is a contingent historical construction that has emerged from the flux of historical events.\textsuperscript{140} This tension between the structural norms of their discourses obstructed the pursuit of a number of seemingly obvious trajectories for their applications of philosophy of mind to the practice of education. These trajectories are, however, only ‘obvious’ from the outside of the classical episteme. From within that episteme, the normative structure also acted as an inducement for seeking new arrangements of discursive elements in order to overcome, or at least minimize, tensions between onto-epistemological norms of the episteme.

The tension that specifically confronted Stewart and Mill, and the motor that thus drove their efforts to create an effective form of social management through mass education, lay in their efforts to reconcile the shifting relationship between the leisured and laboring classes with an onto-epistemological framework that they both took as universal and fixed.

For Stewart and Mill, a serious difficulty arose in their quests to construct a socially useful discourse on mind when they attempted to obey

\textsuperscript{140} Thus, the analysis that is presented here is not a functionalist one: there is no presumption that each component part of the whole is organically related to all of the others. Instead, the relationships between the governing regime and its structural components are made compatible and stabilized (or not stabilized) temporarily through the efforts of both those individuals who construct discourses and the mass of other individuals who employ, modify, or reject that discourse. In creating discourses, the component parts must be fitted, as best as possible, to one another and worked into the governing regime with as few seams as possible. This process is always inexact and incomplete, and the tensions between elements of a discursive field will tend to resist efforts to smooth out inconsistencies and points of friction; nevertheless, the resistance is itself crucial to the generation of discourses.\textsuperscript{140} Without the counter pressure of resistance, and without the inevitable failure to overcome this resistance, there would be little possibility of discursive variation. The proliferation of discourses, then, is the outcome of various, and ultimately doomed, efforts to produce an organic whole from the disparate structural components of a given discursive field.
simultaneously the norms of visibility and ontological stasis while also creating an educational practice that could serve as an instrument of social control. The crux of the problem lay in the restrictions that each norm placed upon the ability of the two philosophers to invoke and manipulate entities and processes in order to fulfill the imperative of utility. On the one hand, the requirement of visibility ruled out, in principle at least, the invocation of hypothetical processes and entities as explanatory agents while, on the other hand, the norm of ontological stasis demanded that any visible entities or processes be temporally invariant in their defining properties – and thus not susceptible to radical manipulation. Taken together, these two norms sharply delimited the domain of methodologically acceptable phenomena that Stewart and Mill could deploy as instruments for the practical application of the philosophy of mind. This radically delimited field of phenomena, in turn, steered the efforts of Stewart and Mill to translate the philosophy of mind into an educational practice that could serve as an instrument of social control. In particular, Stewart and Mill found themselves struggling to overcome socio-economic barriers that hampered the effectiveness of education, as it was structured by the “classical episteme” as a technique of social management. If that were to occur, they would have failed to carry out the normative imperative of utility and thereby threatened the philosophical legitimacy of their discourses on mind.

The efforts of Stewart and Mill to produce a harmonious relationship between the norms of visibility and ontological stasis constantly ran up
against a central socio-economic presupposition shared by both
philosophers. Specifically, Stewart and Mill conceived of the social space as
divided by a nearly impenetrable barrier that separated the leisure and
laboring classes. The barrier itself was created by the economic necessity of
manual labor in a (largely) pre-industrial society. Both Stewart and Mill
believed that the overwhelming majority of the population of their society
would be forced by material necessity to participate in a labor-intensive
economy. This mode of life is not only highly burdensome in the amount of
labor that it extracts from individual laborers, but it is also, and more
importantly, extremely time consuming. Most laborers in such a society will
find themselves forced to devote virtually all of their waking hours to manual
labor. Consequently, little room will be left in the day or in the lifespan for
even such basic biological functions as eating and sleeping, much less
activities like education that require extensive and regularly scheduled
periods of leisure time. For both Mill and Stewart, the barrier created by the
need for most of the population to be dedicated wholly to manual labor
appeared as a permanent obstacle to the extension of education to the vast
majority of the population.

Stewart and Mill were not alone in finding their educational reform
efforts stymied by the socio-economic structure of late 18th and early 19th
century economies. As Harvey Chisick's study of contemporary educational
reforms in France reveals, Stewart and Mill's French counterparts also found
themselves unable to avoid the temporal restraints that an agricultural
economy imposed on their educational schemes. Despite a superficial rhetoric that often appeared to support educational opportunities for all of the inhabitants of France as an unqualified good, Chisick argues that most of the proposed French educational reform projects in fact placed sharp restraints on the quantity and quality of education that would be made available to the laboring poor.

Chisick cites two basic reasons for the reluctance of French educational reformers to promote advanced universal education for the laboring class. First, Chisick points to the widespread beliefs among the educational reformers that the existing social structure was both the best possible arrangement and also essentially static in character. In the eyes of the French reformers, these two assumptions made it not only unlikely that universal educational access would be successful but also rendered any effort to alter substantially the intellectual condition of the illiterate poor likely to disrupt the established social order by stimulating inappropriate and unattainable aspirations for individual and social change among the poor. Since, however, there was no conceivable alternative to the existing socio-economic order, any reform project that fundamentally challenged the social structure would inevitably lead to social chaos. Consequently, Chisick concludes, French educational reformers proposed educational reform
schemes that would restrict the laboring poor’s access to forms of education that would either be harmless to or supportive of the status quo.

Secondly, Chisick points out that the French educational reformers saw manual labor as the inescapable destiny of the laboring poor. Only a small minority of the population could ever hope to possess either the wealth or the sustained leisure time necessary for a substantial formal education. In an agricultural society in which the ability of machine-power to alleviate toil was highly limited, this is not at all a surprising perspective. Low agricultural yields combined with a limited energy supply tend to generate an economy that produces just barely beyond the subsistence level in good years. In bad years, the entire society can teeter on the brink of, and actually fall into, a state of famine. Under such conditions the overwhelming majority of labor power, which is mostly human effort supplemented by animal and machine power, must be fully dedicated to cultivation. This perennial necessity of intensive manual labor presents any would-be educational reformers with few options for addressing the economic and intellectual deprivations that the laboring poor suffer. Moreover, educational reformers’ general acceptance that the socio-economic structure has been and will continue to be static rules out the radical changes that might free more human beings from labor. For example, even though both Mill and Stewarts’ writings are contemporary with the beginnings of industrialization in Britain, neither
philosopher suggests that machine-power might displace human labor and thereby increase the amount of leisure time that would be available to the laboring poor. As Chisick trenchantly notes, such a notion was also, except for a few visionaries, largely absent from educational reform proposals in eighteenth-century France. A lifetime of hard labor, the majority of French educational reformers concluded, was, is, and always will be the lot of most human beings. On this point, Stewart and Mill appear to have agreed with their French counterparts.

Stewart and Mill's encounter with the necessity of manual labor, however, presented difficulties for both of them that go beyond the limitations imposed by the structure of the socio-economic order. In particular, the educational consequences of a manual-labor driven socio-economic order are closely intertwined with the onto-epistemological norms of the classical episteme. Both Stewart and Mill found that the necessity of manual labor obstructed the possibility of advanced universal education for the laboring poor by interrupting the circuitry of knowledge production and distribution in the social space. In the terms of the classical episteme, manual labor reduced the possibilities of direct contact between the knowledge-rich leisured social space and the knowledge-poor laboring social space. Since the laboring poor would spend virtually all of their time engaged in manual work, they would have few, if any opportunities to enter social spaces where
knowledge was created and distributed. The necessity of manual labor would thus render the providers of knowledge, who dwell in the leisured social space, invisible to the laboring poor; moreover, the providers of knowledge, though in a somewhat better position than the poor, would also find that their ability to interface with the laboring poor was obstructed by the time demands of manual work.

If Stewart and Mill are to satisfy the norm of utility, they must find a way, compatible with all of the norms of the classical episteme, to penetrate the barrier that the necessity of manual labor presents. Specifically they must create an educational practice that can accommodate the necessity of manual labor while, at the same time, serving as a tool of social control. So long as the poor and affluent leisured are unable to achieve direct contact with each other, and hence are unable to clearly visualize one another as distinct individuals involved in a face-to-face knowledge exchange relationship, education will be unable to live up to its promise as a technique for controlling the actually and potentially disruptive tendencies of the poor. This objective, furthermore, cannot be attained by either the postulation of unobservable socio-economic processes or entities, nor can it involve the radical transmutation of existing socio-cultural structures. Despite these strictures, it was essential that Stewart and Mill construct some form of effective educational practice. A failure to breach the barrier created by
manual labor will seriously undermine the credibility of the philosophy of mind as both the foundation of educational practice and as an intellectual endeavor in its own right. Without a practical application that achieves some significant purpose, the philosophy of mind, under the norms of the classical episteme, will be reduced to a merely speculative, and thus pointless, enterprise. Clearly, the educational projects of Stewart and Mill were not merely adjuncts to their more ‘serious’ philosophical investigations; rather, the formulation and execution of educational reform projects founded and justified philosophical investigations into mental phenomena.

**Defending the Boundary Between Labor and Leisure: The Challenges of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries**

Although Stewart and Mill each achieved a considerable degree of concordance between the discursive norms of visibility and ontological stasis in their philosophies of mind when they considered these norms in terms of mental phenomena alone, their discourses on the condition of the poor revealed considerable tensions between these two norms. Specifically, changes in social and political relations in early 19th century Britain were straining the discursive resources of both Stewart and Mill. Unlike the philosophy of mind, which was not yet being directly challenged at the time by powerful intellectual forces, material events were undermining the
foundations of extant social discourses. These changes posed a significant problem for Stewart and Mill; neither philosopher could simply disregard these events since the norm of utility required both thinkers to take these changes into account so that their discourses will remain relevant to actually existing conditions and thus provide plausible strategies for addressing social problems. The difficulty, however, was that the social and political events of the early 19th century not only demanded new discourses, but new discursive norms as well. In the face of this challenge, Stewart and Mill struggled to integrate these changes into the only discursive framework that was available to them.

For both Stewart and Mill, the events of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that most affected their ability to produce coherent social discourses were the twin political and economic events of the French and Industrial Revolutions. Although it is arguable as to which event was more significant, it is clear from their writings that Stewart and Mill were more conscious of the political, and related social, ramifications of the French Revolution. In both cases, a central concern was the perception that the French Revolution had upset a long-standing social and political equilibrium between the two main socio-economic groups that both philosophers acknowledged as the basic constituents of the social order. Both Stewart and Mill subscribed to a model of social relations that bifurcated the social space into two distinct halves. The dividing line that separated the two groups
marked a boundary between a zone of society in which individuals were compelled to perform manual labor in order to support themselves and another, much smaller zone, which was free of the necessity of manual labor. Despite the rather vague descriptions of class structure offered by Stewart and Mill, as well as their frequent and poorly defined references to subdivisions within classes, the bifurcation of society between those who must perform manual labor and those who are able to escape that necessity marks a fundamental social division. Even Mill’s effort to carve out a space for the ‘middle ranks’ as a distinctive social class does not redraw this schematic of the social space. Regardless of how many classes actually exist, humanity will necessarily be divided between those who must perform manual labor and those who are free of that necessity. The question for both Stewart and Mill is whether this boundary, which both philosophers accept as essential for proper social order and functioning, will remain intact or will be breached under the influence of the French Revolution. Defending and redefining this crucial boundary during a period of political, economic, and social upheaval becomes, thus, a primary task for both Stewart and Mill, and their defenses of this primary socio-economic division reveal the growing strains and tension between the norms visibility and ontological stasis in the early nineteenth century.

*The Circulation of Knowledge in the Late Classical Episteme*
In order to illuminate how Stewart and Mill sought to use education as a technique of social control, it will first be necessary to delineate the circuitry of knowledge creation and transmission in late eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Britain. Both Stewart and Mill recognized that the survival, and more especially the augmentation, of knowledge require that knowledge be free to circulate in the social space. However, knowledge creation and transmission does not occur in a void; knowledge traverses an often-complex landscape of minds, institutions, and technologies that channel knowledge production and transmission into particular routes and trajectories. In its journey across the social landscape, knowledge is distributed to multiple sites, joined with other knowledges, or even fragmented and reassembled into new configurations. Deprived of the opportunity to interact with a variegated social landscape, knowledge quickly becomes limited and parochial and may be lost, if its repositories are few in number and vulnerable, or even discarded as outdated and inadequate. Since Stewart and Mill tended to view education primarily as matter of knowledge transmission (rather than production), the architectural structure of the social space will thus partially determine the success of their projects. Specifically, their efforts to manage the behavior of the poor through education immediately raised issues regarding the intellectual permeability of the social space and the limits of knowledge transference between the realm of leisure and the realm of labor.
Within the realm of leisure, the circuitry of knowledge in early nineteenth-century Britain was undergoing significant alterations. Both Stewart and Mill were conscious of a range social and technical structures and entities that could either hamper or aid the creation and transmission of knowledge. This awareness informs their analyses and proposals. On the technical side, Stewart sings the praises of the printing press, for example, as an important technological mechanism for promoting and maintaining the circulation of knowledge. Before the advent of printing, Stewart argues, knowledge was fragile and localized: the limited ability of hand-copyists to reproduce large numbers of accurate and cheap copies meant that books and other written sources of knowledge were few in number. The dearth of written materials had direct consequences for the circulation of knowledge. At the most obvious level, the limited supply of written materials hindered the circulation of knowledge by limiting access to recorded information. At any given time, only a few individuals could make use of this knowledge, since use of written materials was limited to the number of available copies.

More seriously, as Stewart notes, the paucity of written copies also endangered the circulatory process itself. As the carriers of information, written documents had a serious drawback in that they were highly perishable. The perishable character of written documents, combined with their scarcity, raised the ever-present danger that whole bodies of knowledge could be lost if all extant copies of a particular document were
destroyed. For Stewart, as well as other European scholars, such a catastrophe was not merely a theoretical concern; indeed, the beginnings of European civilization had been marked by the near-total loss of the intellectual heritage of Greco-Roman civilization. The result, Stewart observes, had been a loss of cultural vigor in Europe and sharp decline in social sophistication. Only the invention of printing put an end to the possibility of any future disastrous collapses of the knowledge circuitry. Printing had made possible the dissemination of large numbers of copies of all significant written materials throughout the world. Under these conditions, it was highly unlikely that any disaster, short of the total destruction of the world, would result in the complete loss of any important (and therefore extensively printed) documents. By expanding the circulation of written materials to the whole globe, and by producing vast numbers of copies, printing had both secured the circulation of knowledge indefinitely and had produced a global knowledge circulation system.

Although Stewart was quite aware of the existence and the importance of the circulation of knowledge, his understanding of the production and transmission of knowledge was antiquated almost as soon as he recorded it in his first major publication. By the beginning of the nineteenth century two new developments would emerge that had profound implications for the creation for the production and creation of new knowledge and, by extension, for education as well. The first of these developments involved the
breaking down of socio-cultural barriers that had tended to promote and maintain distinctive intellectual regions within Great Britain. Under the relentless twin pressures of war against, first revolutionary, and then Napoleonic, France, and of the corrosive social effects of French political ideas, some members of the intellectual and political elites of Great Britain began to fashion a new, and they hoped, more cohesive, political identity for the island. These elites feared that the parochial cultural and political orientation of much of the population of Great Britain might, under the stress of war and subversive ideas, undermine the ability of the leadership to muster resources to meet external threats. In some cases, there was even concern that political and cultural parochialism might act as a centrifugal force and encourage separatism in some regions. If Great Britain was to remain an intact polity, therefore, it was believed that parochial attitudes had to be overcome, or at least subordinated to, a larger, all-encompassing national identity.

The desire for a greater degree of political and cultural unity on the part of some elites was facilitated by larger structural changes that had been underway for decades. The creation of Great Britain under the Act of Union of 1707 had brought Scotland under English political authority and had linked the economies of the two countries. Although the Union was certainly advantageous to England in a number of ways, an observer in 1707 might have reasonably wondered whether England had in fact gotten a good deal.
Scotland, poor and remote, seemingly had little to offer in the way of economic resources, even in the best of times – and the early eighteenth century was certainly not the best of times for the Scottish economy. Indeed, Scotland’s problems were so severe that its rulers had taken the extraordinary step of surrendering their sovereignty in order to rescue the floundering Scottish economy. This decision is even more remarkable given the long history of conflict between Scotland and England. In fact, periodic Scottish armed resistance to the Union persisted almost until the middle of the eighteenth century. Despite these severe problems, Scotland, as it turned out, did possess one key resource that was to prove invaluable to the British Empire; specifically, the Scottish tradition of education turned out to play a significant role both in enhancing the political and economic fortunes of both Scotland and England and, in the long-term, of helping to dissolve the cultural barriers that separated both groups.

The Scottish population itself proved to be such an important resource because of a peculiar and almost unique feature of Scottish society. In particular, Scotland possessed one of the few widely accessible educational systems in Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth century. This educational system produced, at least among the lowland Scots, one of the highest literacy rates in Europe. In addition to basic schooling, the Scots also boasted a genuinely world-class university system that embraced the Enlightenment and its rational and pragmatic outlook. The universities would prove valuable not only to the Scots but would also serve as
instrument for breaking down the parochial orientation that later British leaders would come to decry. Drawn by the intellectual vigor of the Scottish universities, a truly political, social, cultural, and economic British elite would begin to emerge as both Scots and English began to be educated together in the Scottish university system. Moreover, mere physical proximity was not the only force at work; the universities tied both groups together by inculcating them with the values and goals of the Enlightenment. With access to the economic opportunities of a global empire and possessing the intellectual skills that would prove crucial not only to the running of an empire but also to the emerging process of industrialization, university-educated Scots and English were well-suited to take important roles in political and economic systems of the British Empire. By the early nineteenth century, Scots, as well as Scottish-educated English, were central figures in Britain’s bureaucracy, military, economy, and cultural life.

By the early nineteenth century, therefore, these two forces were converging and that tended to promote a more unified sense of British political identity. At the same time, another socio-cultural development was taking shape that further eroded the cultural barriers that promoted parochial attitudes among the elite in Britain. This took the form of an explosion of periodical literature that massively increased the dissemination of knowledge, opinion, and analysis throughout Britain.
The emergence of a periodical market in the early nineteenth century had direct consequences for the circuitry of knowledge. For the intelligentsia, periodicals occupied a niche in between academic books that were meant for the intellectual elite and ephemeral forms of printed media such as pamphlets and broadsheets that typically addressed a wider audience. Periodicals were a kind of hybrid of these two forms and joined many features of both forms of media that enhanced the production and dissemination of knowledge: access, speed of production, speed of circulation, low cost, opportunities for quick public response, (pamphlets) and intellectual credibility (because of the authors’ credentials—they were an alternative for scholarly-minded university graduates who had neither the desire nor opportunity for a university career). Often written and published outside of traditional centers of knowledge production, these hybrid media also created new pathways in the circuitry of knowledge both by creating new centers of production/dissemination and by challenging the traditional circuitry.

In fact, it was the emerging periodical market that brought the discourses of Common Sense and Association into direct contact in the early nineteenth century. For the most part, these two philosophical schools had had limited interaction despite the fact that Common Sense originated in a critique of
Associationist doctrines. By the early 19th century, the dialog between these two discourses had become meager and indeed largely one sided as Common
Sense emerged as the primary academic philosophy. The periodical market, however, created a new site for the expression of Associationism and allowed Associationists like Mill to confront both philosophical orthodoxy and the existing circuitry of philosophical knowledge production and transmission.

Stewart and Mill stand on opposite sides of the divide in the emergence of the periodical market. For the most part, Stewart published works circulated in the form of books intended, as Stewart himself prescribed, for an intellectual elite as part of liberal education designed to inculcate the values and perspectives of largely static and traditional ruling elite.\textsuperscript{141} Mill, on the hand, published both books and periodicals that he intended to partially destabilize the existing political order. Accordingly, he sought a wider audience than Stewart, as well as an audience that perceived its social role in different terms. Rather than stabilizing the existing order, Mill’s readers (or at least the approving ones) sought to change it in significant ways -- but change it in ways that accorded with the norms of the classical episteme.

The 1815 article attributed to Mill critiques a supposedly closed loop of philosophical discussion in Britain and demands the opening up of

\textsuperscript{141} Stewart did note the importance of periodical literature in the transmission of knowledge. He also believed, however, that there were distinct limits to its usefulness as a tool for educating the poor.
philosophical discourse in Britain. Notable in this is the imagery that he calls up; not only is it military, but it harkens back especially to the medieval era with its invocation of castles and sieges in which the military aristocracy attempts to hold off outside threats to their dominance over land and resources. It is also notable in how static this imagery is; this is a view of Common Sense as impeding the flow of knowledge, as damming it up and keeping it out of circulation. Of course, in a very real sense, this has not happened. On the contrary, the dissemination of Stewart’s work, and of Common Sense continued apace in the early 19th century. What seems more at issue is Mill’s access to the center of production of philosophical discourse. He is implicitly critiquing the inability of non-academic commentators to participate in the creation of philosophical knowledge by engaging in direct dialogue with academic centers of knowledge production.

Howsoever Stewart and Mill might have evaluated these changes in the leisured space’s circuitry of knowledge, they were essentially in agreement on the challenge that confronted them in their roles as educational reformers. Of particular concern to both Stewart and Mill was the potentially insurmountable barrier that separated the space of leisure and the space of labor. This concern over the intellectual permeability of the social space, and especially of the permeability of the boundary that marked the transition between the space of leisure and the space of labor, had been a concern to
would-be educational reformers throughout the Enlightenment. The essential problem was as difficult to overcome as it was simple to express; in particular, education required time -- in fact, a great deal of time. In a socio-economic order that relied upon manual labor for its survival and that required most of the population to be devoted entirely to manual labor, the prospects for widespread educational reform that would impart even basic literacy to most people thus seemed limited even to the most enthusiastic proponents of educational schemes. The dawn-to-dusk labors of most people left little time, much less mental energy, for any sort of sustained program of education. Although childhood was beginning to be recognized during the Enlightenment as a distinctive period in the human lifespan in which a sustained period of education was both possible and crucial, even children typically had little time for education. In agricultural communities, and increasingly in emerging industrial centers, children represented an indispensable source of labor power. Sheer material necessity, therefore, crowded out any space in the day, or in the lifespan, for even basic education for most people, despite the good intentions of educational reformers. If laborers cannot be educated because of a lack of sufficient time, then there is obviously no hope of using education as a tool of social control.

Consequently, Stewart and Mill’s educational proposals must find some method for transmitting knowledge across the leisure/labor divide if they are to fashion a useful educational practice from the philosophy of mind.
The temporal restriction that blocked the circulation of knowledge in the space of labor was a particularly troublesome problem, however. In order to fulfill the requirement of the norm of utility both philosophers would have to reconcile apparently contradictory goals. On the one hand, they would have to find some way to extend the circuitry of knowledge transmission into a social space that lacked the social and cultural infrastructure to support it. Even if there had been time to devote to education, much of Britain (with the partial exception of Scotland) lacked a system of primary schools that was suited to the social and economic condition of the laboring poor. In addition, the effort to build up a literate population among the laboring poor would be hampered greatly by the relative expense and intellectual inaccessibility of most printed materials. The first cohort of the laboring poor to attain basic literacy would, therefore, have few opportunities for expanding and maintaining the reading skills with extracurricular reading materials.

Educational reform might well stall at the point of a barely adequate level of literacy since the writings of Stewart and Mill strongly imply that most learning, whether practical or inspirational, occurred during independent reading and studying. Complicating educational reform efforts, of course, were the ever-present temporal restrictions: in the busy life of the typical member of the laboring poor, where was the time for sustained independent study? In terms of the spatialized onto-epistemology of the classical episteme, a critic of ambitious educational reformers might legitimately ask ‘where’ such education would take place. There did not exist, after all, either
a sufficient number of physical spaces, in the form of schools, to provide opportunities for instructions or an adequate expanse of socio-economic spaces in the working day and working lifetime.

The very act of answering this hypothetical critic, however, would create a complementary problem for Stewart and Mill. The obvious reply to any potential critic would be to suggest that the boundary between the two social spaces be blurred, either by creating physical spaces (i.e., schools) in the laboring space or by reducing the amount of time required by manual labor or through some combination of the two. Stewart and Mill applied both solutions to varying degrees, but they found themselves repeatedly limited in the extent of the changes that could be applied. Neither Stewart nor Mill could propose to eliminate or even to markedly blur the distinction between the laboring and leisured spaces. While some of the reluctance to open the social space so that the circuitry of knowledge could be expanded to include the entirety of the space of labor might be attributable to entrenched class interests or even to pure snobbery and disdain for laborers, a more fundamental cause lies in the intersection of the onto-epistemology of the classical episteme with the socio-economic structure of early nineteenth-century Britain. Since radical changes in either area held grave consequences for the other, neither Stewart nor Mill could propose major reforms that threatened the stability of either the socio-economic structure or the classical episteme’s normative matrix.
The Cognitive Condition of the Laboring Poor and the Stability of the Socio-economic Order

Nevertheless, Stewart and Mill felt enormous pressure to propose some sort of educational reform plan in order to contain the perceived danger posed by mass illiteracy among the laboring poor. Although neither Stewart nor Mill spends much time directly observing (despite the normative requirement of the classical episteme) the cultural and psychological characteristics of the poor and illiterate, it is evident from their remarks that both philosophers regard the poor in general and the illiterate poor, in particular, as chaotic and disruptive entities that lack the capacity for self-initiated reform. Stewart, for example, decries what he views as prevalence of self-destructive habits among the poor and illiterate. Drinking and financial indiscretion are cited by Stewart as particularly devastating vices among the inhabitants of the social space of labor. While such shortcomings were hardly unknown among the elite, Stewart pays no attention to the possible doleful effects of intemperance, either in drink or in spending, among the leisured class. Mill also treats the laboring class as a rather ineffectual bunch who are eager to emulate their betters and who appear incapable of self-imposed discipline or initiative. He takes it as self-evident that his ‘middle-rank’ possesses, in contrast, an abundance of these qualities.
In contrast with the leisured class, Stewart and Mill’s analyses thus portray the laboring poor as gripped by a kind of anti-onto-epistemology that lacks not only any clearly defined norms for intellectual and practical projects but even the properties necessary for sustaining any well-structured normative matrix. The space of labor appears to Stewart and Mill as the social antithesis to the space of leisure. Locked behind the barrier of manual labor, the laboring poor languish in intellectual stagnation and indolence. More seriously, from the perspective of Stewart and Mill, the absence of the classical episteme’s normative structure also renders the laboring poor entirely subject to the vicissitudes of environmental influences. Although both Stewart and Mill, to different extents, recognize the importance of the socio-cultural environment on all human beings regardless of their location in the social space, the plight of the poor presents an especially pressing problem for both philosophers. In particular, the unavoidable necessity of manual labor deprives the space of labor of an architecture that can structure experience and channel it into forms that support the social and political status quo.

In both the cases of education and economic assistance, care has to be taken not to provide the poor with a group identity that could cause them to gain some kind of self-consciousness: Stewart sees this as a positive problem in the case of state-run economic assistance: centralized and anonymous it
could give rise to “class consciousness” among the poor as they come to see themselves as possessing a collective legal claim against a distant in-human bureaucratic other to whom they owe no moral or emotive duties. In the case of education, the isolation of the poor from the circuitry of knowledge threatens to give rise to a collective identity through a negative process – without the proper education, the poor are likely to become a monstrous collective called the “mob.” The mob can act collectively, or be used collectively, through its ignorance of the proper order of things. In both cases, the poor are energized as a threat to the social status quo by in effect violating the basic norms of the classical episteme. When they do not see their social betters (through lack of education, or are blinded by anonymous bureaucratic structures) they begin to attempt to violate the limits of ontological stasis (by seeking to change their place in the socio-economic chain of being) and to attribute to themselves a collective identity that exceeds their individual identities and acquire a coherence that allows them to act together.

For Mill, the danger that the cognitive impoverishment of the poor will disrupt the social order grows very directly from his philosophy of mind. The associationist conception of mind traces all mental contents back ultimately to sensory experience. As Mill declares, there is no mind apart from the sum of the sensory experiences (which have been transformed into
ideas) that an individual has been subject to over the course of time. There is no independent buffering mechanism that can sort and judge experiences so that individuals will have some assurance of creating useful or appropriate conjunctions between ideas. Even the principles of association that delimit the domain of possible connections between ideas operate in a purely functional, and not normative, manner. Ideas are conjoined merely according to their formal properties; the content of ideas plays, at most, only a minimal role in the formation of strands of ideas. Unlike Stewart’s Common Sense, Associationism lacks an intrinsic organizing mechanism that will assure, if it is properly used, that ideas drawn from experience will accurately mirror external reality. Consequently, Associationism leaves individual minds vulnerable to the flux of random experience with no guide save any that might be provided by environmental sources. For Mill this is indeed the central problem: the poor and illiterate possess no reliable guide for testing veracity of their cognitive contents.

This is important in considering both Stewart and Mill’s educational proposals: they are resistant to, or seemingly unaware of, solutions that from our standpoint, appear to be as sensible, just, and obvious resolutions of the problems of material deprivation and ignorance. However, to implement these schemes would mean employing methods or creating representations of mind and society that would violate the specific norms and rupture the
perceived order that supposedly links the norms and is revealed during their applications during the process of philosophical investigations. Thus, the disorder produced by the poor/illiterate is not merely an emotive reaction, nor is it simply a selfish desire by an elite to eliminate a possible threat to its privileges; instead, the horror that Stewart and Mill perceive in the poor/illiterate is also onto-epistemological in character. If the poor/illiterate succeed in overturning the political/social order, they will also over turn the general onto-epistemological order of knowledge production itself. Knowledge production and transmission is itself intimately linked to the existing socio-political order and is dependent on it. Therefore, disruption of the knowledge circuitry disrupts socio-political order; conversely disruption of the socio-political order disrupts the circuitry of knowledge.

And there is a real danger that the poor/illiterate will in fact attempt to act on their desires. Both Stewart and Mill have only to look to the recent past to impress upon their listeners and readers that the poor/illiterate represent a mortal danger to both the politico-social and onto-epistemological orders that have been established by the leisured class.

**Stewart and Mill: Changing relations between the two classes**
Further amplifying the sense of urgency for Stewart and Mill were the radical upheavals of the early nineteenth century that tested the stability of socio-economic structure. In Stewart’s works, for example, the character of the laboring class seems to undergo an important shift in the 1790’s. In his first published work (1792), Stewart presents an optimistic picture of improving social conditions that includes a general increase in the “enlightenment” of all sectors of society. But by 1800, Stewart is increasingly tending towards a view of the laboring class as potentially dangerous and in need of control. In between, of course, was the French Revolution and Stewart’s own complex relationship with that event. A supporter of the early moderate phases of the Revolution, Stewart found himself under increasing pressure as the revolution took a more radical turn. This pressure further increased after Britain found itself at war with France. The situation came to head in 1794, when Stewart found himself being denounced in Parliament and his loyalties publicly questioned. In the context of the times, this was not a minor issue: Stewart was a very visible public figure and his position as a university professor required him to be above all suspicion of either moral turpitude or political subversion. Further complicating Stewart’s case was his widely known connection with the minority Whig party and the suspicions and accusations of disloyalty and subversion that were repeatedly hurled at the party. Indeed, much more was at stake here than either Stewart’s job or reputation. Treason during time of war was a capital offense, and even the lesser crime of sedition carried with
it a fourteen-year sentence in an Australian penal colony. Under the pressure of the Parliamentary accusations, Stewart backpedaled rapidly on his early support for the French Revolution and repeatedly asserted his political loyalty to Britain by emphasizing his dedication to the traditional English constitution and pointing to the emphasis that he gave to it in his lectures.

Stewart escaped his brush with the ruling powers with little harm, but the experience seems to have left an impression. Though there is no textual evidence of an evolution in his views on class relations that was inspired by this incident, nevertheless, Stewart, by 1800, is presenting a much more adversarial portrait of the relations between the two classes than in his earlier work. Rather than seeing a general unfolding of a process of Enlightenment throughout the social space, Stewart now qualifies the reach of the Enlightenment in the social space and the limits the goals of any efforts to extend Enlightenment ideology to the laboring class. Specifically, Stewart, by 1800, begins to note explicit structural limitations on the ability of the leisure class to improve the intellectual conditions of the laboring class. Stewart proposes that the laboring class cannot be enrolled into the project of enlightenment on an equal footing with the leisure class; instead, the tools of the Enlightenment must be used to control and manage the unruly masses that inhabit the space of labor.
By 1816, Mill was also beginning to note the limitations of schemes to improve the cultural and social conditions of the laboring class. His analysis of human nature led him to more specific and more pessimistic views of human nature than those held by Stewart. While Stewart offered no arguments or observations that concluded that human nature was inherently bad, Mill had presented claims that human beings naturally tend seek to dominate and exploit each other. The establishment of a happy society thus required that this feature of human nature be reigned in by cultural practices and socio-political institutions. Despite this rather dark view of basic human motivations, Mill possessed a much less alarmist view of the disruptive propensities of the laboring class. Although it was certainly true that the laboring class, driven by the same lust for power that lurked in the hearts and souls of all human beings, could be a force for chaos and disorder, Mill tends to view the laboring class as, in fact, rather passive. In his analysis of the political and social role of the 'middle ranks' Mill treats the laboring class as basically dependent upon the cultural and social leadership of their betters in the 'middle ranks.' According to Mill, the members of the laboring class eagerly imitate and defer to the authority of the 'middle ranks' and are thus open to direct control and management.

Stewart and Mill redeploy versions of the “two-class” model in their efforts to fulfill the norm of utility. Nevertheless, their respective prescriptions for
education do not precisely replicate their political and economic policies for containing the disruptive potential of the laboring class. Specifically, the entire laboring class, rather than some portion of it, represents the object of their educational proposals. The expansiveness of their educational proposals is deemed necessary because of the socio-economic conditions that affect virtually the whole of the laboring class. Unlike exclusion from the political process (for Mill) or the experience of absolute material deprivation (for Stewart), these conditions form a common, and inescapable, background for almost all members of the laboring class. These conditions create, from the perspective of Stewart and Mill, a dual danger for the socio-political status quo. On the one hand, they leave most of the laboring class in a state of total ignorance; on the other hand, these same conditions render the laboring class vulnerable to demagoguery. For both Stewart and Mill ignorance and demagoguery are inseparable and ever-present dangers that pervade the social space of labor and threaten the stability of the entire social space.

Although Stewart and Mill offer rather different prescriptions for the twin ills of ignorance and demagoguery in the realm of labor, they share a number of central assumptions regarding the cognitive characteristics of the laboring class. The assumption that thoroughly pervades both philosophers’ analyses is the conviction that the members of the laboring class possess little if any effective knowledge. Even worse, as Mill points out, what the members of the
laboring class believe they know is largely erroneous; indeed, the disparity in knowledge levels between the two realms is so large that neither Neither Stewart nor Mill advocates even the empirical study of the cognitive capacities and contents of the laboring class. From the perspective of the leisure class, the laboring class is so bereft of legitimate knowledge and sunk so deeply in ignorance that it has nothing of value to teach the leisured class, either in terms of practical benefit to the leisured class or in terms of empirical studies to ground educational practices. Stewart and Mill take the utter intellectual impoverishment of the laboring class as simply a self-evident and indisputable fact in no need of defense or proof.

Accordingly, both Stewart and Mill advocate a ‘top-down’ approach to educational reform. The education of the laboring class will be conducted through a transfer of legitimate knowledge from the leisured realm to the realm of labor. Although Mill differs from Stewart in arguing that the space of labor provides for educational opportunities prior to any reforms, Mill nevertheless insists that these opportunities, more often than not, lead to a kind of mis-education by inculcating the laboring class with false beliefs and misinformation. From Mill’s perspective, it could even be argued that opportunities for education that are wholly contained within the space of labor are actually a net disadvantage for the laboring class. After all, these unguided and misdirected episodes of mis-education produce erroneous
convictions and beliefs in the minds of the laboring class that not only generate a wide range of unfortunate outcomes but also complicate the process of establishing legitimate knowledge and effective institutions for knowledge transference. Pure ignorance would undoubtedly be much easier to correct than massive miseducation.

Finally, the tension between the norms of observation and ontological stasis emerges as a critical problem for both Stewart and Mill. In particular, these two norms limit sharply their ability to act upon the norm utility. The limitation for both philosophers lies primarily in the difficulty that the material barrier places on gaining access to the minds of the laboring class. This barrier effectively rendered the minds of the laboring class invisible to Stewart and Mill. Being unable to observe these minds, Stewart and Mill were equally unable to manipulate them. Moreover, the norm of ontological stasis sharply limits the mechanisms that Stewart and Mill can invoke in order to render the laboring class’s cognitive processes observable. Stewart and Mill cannot, for example, call for major changes in social structure without risking both socio-cultural disapproval and even legal sanctions. They must find a way to visualize the laboring class, that is, to open up a social and cognitive channel between the two realms of the social space so that knowledge transfer can occur. If they cannot discover such a channel within a static social structure, then they will be unable to deploy education as an instrument of social control. Their proposals for reconciling the
tensions between observation and ontological stasis, in an effort to breach the barrier of material necessity between the leisured and laboring spaces, ultimately required an analysis and restructuring of the basic circuitry of knowledge production and distribution in order to produce a relationship between the two social spaces that simultaneously upheld the normative imperatives of the classical episteme and also maintained a clear distinction between the spaces of labor and leisure.

**Education as Technique of Social Control: Reaching Across the Barrier of Material Necessity**

It is important at this point to distinguish between the notion of social control as it is being deployed here and possible misunderstandings that might arise from the argument that Mill and Stewart were engaged in efforts to manage the poor and illiterate. First, neither philosopher's project was merely a megalomaniacal effort to achieve power for its own sake. Although 21st century eyes (some at least) might well view their educational projects as patronizing and oppressive, neither Mill nor Stewart saw themselves as arbitrarily or selfishly seeking power. Rather, both philosophers justified their management schemes on the necessity of maintaining a social order that would benefit all people, rich and poor alike. Certainly, some individuals would have greater freedom and access to education under these schemes;
However, in the context of the classical regime, the ideological and institutional reinforcement of a hierarchical society in which economical and intellectual resources were inequitably distributed was a necessary, if regrettable, policy if total social chaos was to be avoided. The onto-epistemological framework of the classical episteme itself tended to generate this outcome. Given that this framework defined the horizon of thought for Stewart and Mill, alternative social arrangements that violated these norms would almost certainly have appeared implausible to either philosopher. More egalitarian visions of social order might have been entertained as hypothetical by Stewart and Mill, but in the classical episteme, such a designation would have denoted merely unwarranted speculation.

In addition, a major part of the influence that Stewart and Mill possessed depended to a large extent on their reputation among powerful benefactors. This is obvious in the case of Stewart who was essentially a public official who served at the pleasure of the ruling elite and whose actions were closely scrutinized and subject to official sanctions. Cultivating powerful benefactors was, however, also crucial for the success of Mill’s projects. Despite Mill’s reputation as a "philosophical radical," Mill nevertheless had to develop a network of well-connected, if politically disaffected patrons, if he was to actualize his projects for social and political reform. Such patrons would not be likely to support projects that would significantly undermine their privileged social and political positions. Indeed, Mill’s political projects
would have only marginally enhanced the power of those in the working class through the extension of suffrage. For the most part, political and social power was intended by Mill to remain in the hands of one segment of the leisured class, the 'middle ranks,' who he viewed as the natural leaders of the political and social order.

These efforts by Stewart and Mill to transform their respective philosophies of mind into social reform projects also raise the question of the political character of Associationism and Common Sense. This is a difficult question to address for two reasons. First, present-day terminology for specific political positions does not map onto the political landscape of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain. From the perspective of the early twenty-first century, both Stewart and Mill would appear to be quite conservative in their social and political opinions. Stewart, for example, adamantly defended the political status quo and the necessity of maintaining the existing social hierarchy; for his part, Mill endorsed an economic program that, today, would be regarded as neo-liberal and anti-statist.

Nevertheless, both Stewart and Mill held opinions that caused consternation among some sectors of the ruling elite. Contrary to the expectations of twenty-first century observers, both philosophers endorsed social and political policies that, in the context of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, could be construed as radical and subversive. This was especially true for Mill whose political opponents dubbed him and his associates the "Philosophical Radicals."
Moreover, attempts to classify Stewart and Mill’s political commitments in terms of an ahistorical system of terminology are further complicated by the fact that neither Associationism nor Common Sense possessed any essential political orientation. Indeed, both philosophical systems were linked to a range of political positions at different times and places. For example, the form of associationism that figures so prominently in Hume’s philosophy of mind coexisted with his rather conservative views of the British political scene. By the time of Mill, however, associationism had taken on a markedly left of center orientation in the view of some sectors of the ruling elite. In fact, both Stewart and Mill’ political views were widely regarded as left of center – Mill’s much more so than Stewart’s. As for Stewart, the well-documented struggles that he had with the more conservative elements of the British ruling class appeared all but forgotten in post-Napoleonic France when Common Sense was adopted as an intellectual bastion against revolutionary ideals. There is, thus, no “essential” politics, much less an essential “policy” in either of these discourses on mind and society. They were of course put to use by Stewart and Mill in particular ways that had potential consequences both for the distribution of power and status as well as for the articulation of specific policies. However, neither philosopher can be neatly pigeonholed into such prefabricated categories such as “conservative,” or “left-wing.”
Nevertheless, there is a critical political dimension to be considered in the educational reform projects of Stewart and Mill. More specifically, underlying both Stewart and Mill's educational projects is a generalized regime of political power. This regime of power has been identified as the basis for what Michel Foucault has called the "disciplinary society." This a social order in which efforts are made to bring rationalized, scientific discourse into the service of the sovereign political power in order to maximize the sovereign authority's potency. Consequently, subjects in a "disciplinary society" become the focus of an intensified system of investigation that attempts to treat them as objects whose behavior is explicable in terms of a naturalized discourse that parallels the discourse of the physical sciences. A key feature of this naturalized discourse of subjects is the effort to control and manipulate subjects for the benefit of the sovereign political power.

This regime rules in accordance with the basic onto-epistemological norms of the classical era. In particular, power extends through the social space and connects individuals and even non-human entities through relationships that rest upon reciprocal visibility between observers and observed. The specific mechanism of control that was the outcome of the norm of utility took the form of direct, face-to-face contact between the sovereign political authority
(or its proxies) and the mass of individuals that the authority sought to control. Critically, this method of social control required the identification and enumeration of specific entities within the field of power. Consequently, the sovereign political authorities exercised power by direct identification and classification of those discrete individuals who were subjected to their power. In order to maintain this power those entities had to be conceived of as possessing fixed, temporally-invariant identities. If the identity of entities could change over time, the ability of the sovereign political authorities to locate that entity in the social space would be compromised. At the very least, shifting identities would require the expenditure of vast resources in order constantly to resurvey the social space and would introduce an irreducible element of uncertainty into the policy-making process. More seriously, if entities could autonomously shift their identities, they might become effectively invisible to the sovereign political authorities and escape their control altogether. Under the “classical episteme,” then, the efficacy, and even the possibility, of political power, both as a discourse and as a practice, was tied to the same norms that informed other discourses and practices.

Scholars who have studied social reform projects in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries have also commented upon the distinctive features of the “disciplinary society.” For example, Carol Sherman has
characterized the reform projects of this era as, collectively, projects of "management" that were designed to regulate the behavior of the poor in the interest of social stability. Sherman offers no specific definition of management as regulatory mechanism; however, she argues that these projects were "paternalistic" in nature. Sherman argues that these paternalistic techniques that relied upon direct contact between individual members of the poor and of the elite began to fade away in the early nineteenth century as new analytical tools were brought to bear on the problem of material and financial deficiency. Specifically, the poor increasingly became the objects of statistical analyses that treated them as members of, or perhaps more precisely, as contributors to an aggregate rather than as discrete individuals.

When this occurred, the character of the problem of material and financial deficiency began to change and, consequently, the definition of the 'poor' underwent a double revision. In the first place, the condition of material and financial deficiency was reinterpreted in collective and abstract terms. The state of being poor was no longer an irreducible empirical fact about discrete individuals and their material and financial condition; instead, the material and financial deprivation of individuals came increasingly to be viewed as the observable symptom of an underlying and mostly invisible process that was labeled poverty. In turn, this transformation of the understanding of the character of material and financial deprivation also promoted changes in the
objectives of socio-economic reform projects. As the empirical, and visible, condition of material and financial deprivation was transformed into the abstraction of poverty, and as the poor became just so many individual manifestations of the abstract condition of poverty, socio-economic reform projects that were designed to alleviate material and financial deprivation began to shift their focus from establishing face-to-face contact between the poor and the elite toward projects that treated the poor as an anonymous aggregate that was serviced by an equally anonymous state power.

In a similar vein, Foucault describes the British and French social reform projects of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as undergoing a crucial transition in their methods, instruments, and goals. Rather than describing this transformation in terms of a shift from paternalism as an instrument of social control to an anonymous and bureaucratic system, however, Foucault describes the key transformations as occurring in the emergence of new socio-economic forms and relations and the consequent changes in the organization of the social space (69). Specifically, Foucault argues that new discourses began to emerge in response to these socio-economic changes that took note of some disturbing new trends. Chief among these trends, according to Foucault, was the growing vulnerability of the elite and its assets during political and economic developments at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. As a
consequence, these elites began searching for solutions to nullify this potential threat.

In general, Foucault argues, the solution to elite insecurity was sought in what Foucault terms "attachment." The key feature of "attachment," as its very name suggests, was the effort to create bonds that would link members of the laboring class to the leisured class. By "attaching" the members of the potentially dangerous laboring class to the political and productive mechanism that were controlled by the leisured class, members of the leisured class, and its reformist allies, endeavored to disrupt the possibility of an independent and united laboring class from being created that would have the power to resist, or even subvert, the established social order. While it is well established that elites have always feared the 'lower orders' and have often used duplicitous and brutal methods to maintain their privileges, Foucault argues that the character of "attachment" differs markedly from the mechanisms of social and political control that both preceded and followed it. Prior to the late eighteenth century, Foucault contends, mechanisms of social control tended to function by excluding dangerous or disruptive elements from society. By the late eighteenth century, however, political and socio-economic changes began to render this mechanism of social control less effective. New political ideas, especially after the French Revolution, began to radicalize the poor in Europe by providing an example of an apparently
successful example of major social change; moreover, the industrialization process had also generated new problems and new needs for the elite. One of the most important of these new problems was the increased need for a large, disciplined workforce to provide labor for the growing factory system.

Both of these developments made it increasingly difficult for the leisure class to spatially marginalize disruptive social elements among the laboring class. Access to politically radical ideas and influences rendered exclusion a dangerous tactic for dealing with troublesome individuals or groups.

Banished from the social space over which the leisure class exercised power, excluded groups and individuals were effectively beyond the control of the leisure class. Prior to the late eighteenth century, such banishment served as a quite effective mechanism of social control by limiting contact between the alleged trouble-makers and any socio-economic resources that they might draw upon, either purposefully or not, that would enable them to threaten social stability. In the late eighteenth century, however, the wide diffusion of new and radical political ideas undermined the basic mechanism that had made exclusion so work well: excluding disruptive and subversive element still cut them off from socio-economic resources that might assist them in challenging the established order, but it could not counter the catalyzing effects of new political doctrines that might trigger the formation of self-conscious and highly motivated groups of social and political subversives.
On a more pragmatic plane, the general policy of exclusion of potential or perceived disruptive elements also reduced the potential labor force. By shutting these elements out of the social network, the ruling elite discovered that it was also eliminating access to labor power. In the pre-industrial era this was of little consequence, Foucault’s analysis implies, perhaps because the troublemakers were relatively few in number or because they could be deployed into socially marginal but economically significant activities. With the emergence and growth of an increasingly industrial economy, however, labor supply became a more serious problem; in Britain, the shortage of workers to operate the new industrial machinery became so acute that factory owners hired virtually anyone who could perform industrial tasks (including very young children). Many of these new industrial workers had formerly comprised the troublesome rabble that had often been excluded from the socio-economic network. Now that they were necessary for the economic development of the newly emerging factory system, the ruling elite found it necessary to keep disruptive, or potentially disruptive, social elements firmly enrolled in the network.

Simply employing these sectors of the laboring class in factories was not, however, enough to end their threat to the socio-economic hierarchy. On the contrary: by concentrating large laboring populations in factories and towns, the ruling elite of the leisure class actually increased the possibility that
members of the laboring class would rebel. The factory system created a dense social network that had the potential to transform a disorganized mass of ex-rural laborers into a disciplined, well-organized work force that could deploy both its numerical advantage and crucial economic role against the ruling elite. In addition, the new radical political ideas in circulation at the time amplified the danger by giving the laboring class a focal point for their resentments and a scheme for acting on these resentments. In order to tap into this necessary source of labor power while, at the same time, keeping the laboring class under control, required, Foucault concludes that the ruling elite reconfigure the social space so as to "discipline" these new factories so that their continued presence in the 'legitimate' portion of the social space would be beneficial to the new factory system. "Attachment" was precisely how this feat was accomplished. The deviant and disruptive sectors of the laboring class, and, in fact, the laboring class as whole as it became increasingly to be viewed by the elite as inherently disruptive, were to be altered in their behavior and thinking so that they would view themselves as naturally a part of the new factory system and the new socio-economic space that was emerging as industrialization developed and spread. "Attachment" allowed the ruling elite greater control over the laboring class, as members of the class were drawn into factory employment and underwent a fundamental transformation in their self-perceptions.
Although Foucault’s analysis focuses on the *economic* motivations for the creation of a regime of “attachment,” his insights into the spatial relations between classes in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Britain also illuminate the primarily social and political analyses offered by Stewart and Mill. In particular, Stewart and Mill seem either unaware of, or are uninterested in, the consequences of economic changes for the status of class relations and knowledge production. Instead, the issue that looms large for both philosophers is the continuing fallout of the French Revolution. From their perspectives, the obvious structural changes that threaten to undermine the “classical episteme’s” descriptive and prescriptive regime were intellectual in character. That is, the radical ideas of the philosophes, coupled with the successful example of a revolution based upon those ideas, appeared to open up an opportunity for destabilizing the “classical episteme” and the social and political arrangements that were derived from it.

As a strategy for countering the supposedly pernicious effects of the French Revolution, “attachment” served as a technique for shoring up the authority of the “classical episteme’s” onto-epistemological norms of visibility and ontological stasis against the corrosive effects of the radical philosophical ideas of the revolutionaries. Ironically, of course, these radical ideas were derived from the same basic onto-epistemological norms that gave rise to both Common Sense and Mill’s variant of Associationism. Indeed, insofar as
the Revolution can be viewed as an expression of the Enlightenment, it was perhaps the ultimate example of the norm of utility in action. Nevertheless, this is a judgment that can apparently only be made from beyond the “classical episteme;” for Stewart and Mill, the Revolution, and its ideological foundation, appeared as an alien intrusion that jeopardized the whole fabric of the “classical episteme.”

The primary objection of both Stewart and Mill to the influence of the French Revolution lay precisely in its violent reconfiguration of the social space and the consequences of that reconfiguration for the flow of knowledge. While both philosophers sought new channels between the social spaces of labor and leisure in order to facilitate the flow of knowledge, they utterly rejected any radical democratization of access to knowledge. Both Stewart and Mill viewed knowledge as a tool for the control of the laboring poor – a tool that had to remain firmly under the control of the leisure class. Hence, the contacts between the two spaces, though necessary in order to accomplish the goals of Stewart and Mill, had to be regulated and carefully limited. In contrast, the French Revolution had eliminated the possibility of such measured regulation by flooding the space of labor with an ocean of radical ideas. Consequently, the (presumably) ignorant mass of poor laborers became suddenly, and catastrophically, radicalized. Without any guidance, the poorly formed minds of the poor were incited by this inrushing torrent of new ideas to discard all norms, intellectual as well as political in search of an ultimately illusory improvement in their condition.
Stewart voices the need for caution when creating attachments to the laboring poor through education. Although education can open up links between the spaces of labor and leisure, and thereby provide a mechanism for the leisure class to take actions to stabilize the status quo, it can also erode the necessary boundary between the two sectors of the social space.

Educational policy is, therefore, a complex balancing act that seeks to augment the structure of the social space without radically changing its identity. Of special concern, Stewart points out, is the necessity of preserving certain traditional knowledge claims that insure the stability of the social structure. Although these traditional knowledge claims are frequently unsound, Stewart nevertheless defends their retention among the poor; he declares that “[i]t cannot be disputed, that there are various prejudices, both political and moral, which seem to be favourable to the best interests of mankind, and which a philosopher who wishes well to the world, would touch with a very cautious and timorous hand.” (PE, vol. II, 347) The need for taking such care in challenging these unsound traditional knowledge claims arises, Stewart argues, from their relationship to knowledge claims that are verified through normatively sound philosophical investigations. In particular, Stewart conceives of traditional knowledge claims as becoming entangled with verifiable knowledge claims such “that every prejudice derives its utility from some mixture which it involves of important truth.” (PE, vol. II, 347) In other words, a close association
emerges between the two types of knowledge claims and binds them together. Stewart only discusses this process in abstract terms and offers no specific examples to illustrate the process. He merely states that “[t]he truth probably was, in the first instance, suggested by its congeniality with the principles of human nature, and served to protect the prejudice.” (PE, vol. II, 347) Thus, unsound traditional knowledge claims persist because of their intimate association with verifiable knowledge claims.

This association between unsound traditional knowledge claims and philosophically well-grounded knowledge however, poses serious problems for any would-be reformer. So long as the verifiable knowledge claims held a position of epistemological preeminence over the traditional beliefs, the association between the two types of knowledge claims is either harmless or even, as Stewart has already pointed out, beneficial. Nevertheless, Stewart asserts that “frequently, this order of things comes to be reversed, and the prejudice has the appearance of being essentially necessary for the support of the truth.” (PE, vol. II, 347) Consequently, traditional knowledge claims acquire an equal or even superior status to philosophically verifiable knowledge claims. When this happens, would-be reformers face a delicate situation: on the one hand, a commitment to sound methodology should require the ruthless unmasking of all traditional forms of knowledge that analysis reveals as fallacious; on the other hand as Stewart notes
there is the utmost danger in attempting to loosen the foundations of
established opinion, lest we should weaken the influence of what is true
and salutary, in a greater proportion than we correct what is hurtful or
erroneous, or as it is expressed in the sacred writings, 'lest in pulling up
the tares, we root up the wheat also. (PE, vol. II, 347)

The influence of traditional knowledge on the minds of the laboring poor is
thus so strong that an overly zealous effort to eradicate it might well
eliminate whatever traces of sound knowledge exist in the space of labor as
well.

Although Stewart does not spell out that exact consequences of such
misguided reform efforts, it is might well be the case that he fears that the
result would be the encouragement of a skeptical attitude among the poor. If
an aggressive introduction of philosophically grounded knowledge swept
away most of the laboring poor's traditional knowledge base, then it would
not be surprising if the poor treated the remnants, no matter how justifiable
acceptance of them they might be from the perspective of philosophical
analysis, as equally suspect. Given that Common Sense originated as a
response to what its founder Thomas Reid perceived as a particularly
corrosive form of skepticism among the intellectual elite, it does not require
a large stretch of the imagination to see that Reid’s protégé, Stewart, might
also have been concerned about much more dire effects of skepticism on the
poor. After all, if skepticism was judged an intellectually and morally
debilitating threat to the cognitive elite of the space of leisure, how much more dangerous to the whole of society would epistemological and moral nihilism be should such a stance come to characterize the outlook of the laboring poor? All manner of dangerous nonsense, from Stewart’s perspective, might become acceptable to the poor since they would lack all guidance in separating truth from falsehood. Perhaps because of this fear, Stewart ultimately finds himself endorsing a very limited version of philosophically directed educational reforms that must accept, at best, only gradual, and possibly incomplete, renovation of the traditional knowledge base of the laboring poor.

**Education as an Instrument of Social Control**

For Mill the solution lies in identifying key points in both the social space and in the lifespan of individuals that will allow for information transfer between the two realms. In laying out a plan for overcoming the limits that material necessity places on the education of laborers, Mill offers a much more elaborate portrait of the social space than the one that appears in the *Essay on Government*. In that essay, Mill suggests that the transfer of vital knowledge to laborers occurs through direct contact with the ‘middle rank.’ Although Mill’s claim for such an intimate relation between the ‘middle rank’ and laborers is fully in accord with the norms of the classical episteme in that it requires knowledge transference between two mutually observable entities that are in direct contact, Mill leaves a number of crucial questions
unanswered. Specifically, Mill does not describe in the *Essay on Government* how knowledge transfer either does or should occur. Mere proximity, by itself, seems unlikely to stimulate knowledge transfer even if laborers tend, as Mill claims, readily to emulate the ideas and behaviors of the ‘middle rank.’ The key problem for the ‘middle rank’, or, more precisely, some segment of the ‘middle rank,’ is ensuring that laborers not only imitate their superiors to some degree, but instead acquire modes of life and thought in a systematic and sustained manner. (This follows from his associationist philosophy of mind – ideas are only arranged in two ways: sequentially in time and space). Otherwise, mere imitation through causal and irregular, if frequent, contact could lead to an incomplete or distorted education.

In order to maximize the effectiveness of education as a social control mechanism, Mill divides the social space into four distinct regions that comprehend the totality of spaces and moments in which learning typically occurs. Specifically, Mill argues that crucial instances of learning, and possibly, of supervised education, occur 1) within the family, 2) during formal schooling, 3) through day-to-day social interactions, and, 4) under the influence of the state. Locating these times and places in the social space opens up critical opportunities for transferring knowledge to the laboring class by creating breaches in the barrier of material necessity. Mill’s division of the social space of labor does not however represent a break with the classical episteme; indeed, Mill’s work here is a textbook example of classical
analysis in which he simply isolates and names previously unidentified components of the social space. Accordingly, the view that Mill appears to be proposing a radical model of social reform—is correct only from within the framework of the classical episteme and of the socio-political context of the early nineteenth century. There, Mill seemed to be arguing for sweeping and radical changes that threatened the stability of the status quo by opening the barrier of material necessity. Outside of this framework, however, Mill's analysis appears far more modest in its consequences. Mill is not claiming innovation here; there is no assertion of fundamentally altering social structures or of introducing new social relations. In all four cases, Mill is simply identifying already existing, but previously unnoted or unappreciated, entities in order to facilitate the educational process.

The first potential site of education occurs within the family unit. This is an especially important site of education since Mill's extreme environmentalism encourages him to support that idea that education is possible even before the first moment of sentience. Mill designates this site of education as “domestic education” and accords it a wide influence on the human mind. In particular, Mill defines “domestic education” as encompassing “all that the child hears and sees, more especially all that it is made to suffer or enjoy at the hands of others, and all that it is allowed or constrained to do, in the house in which it is born and bred....” Given the breadth of experiences that Mill subsumes under the heading of “domestic education,” coupled with the
cognitive vulnerability of children, it is unsurprising that Mill simultaneously views this type of education as both a fertile site for instruction as well as the source of considerable mis-education. The untrained mind of the infant is singularly suited to efficient instruction since it is a blank slate that does not need to be cleared of erroneous ideas. Moreover, Mill asserts, as a brute empirical fact, that the human mind is peculiarly sensitive to new experiences. These new experiences, Mill contends, make a deep, and often indelible, impression on the mind. Consequently, the untested minds of infants are particularly susceptible to the force of experience.

Although this susceptibility to experience renders the infant mind highly educable, it also opens up the possibility of gross miseducation. At this stage of life, children’s education is largely dependent upon the economic and intellectual resources of the family. Since most children will be reared in laboring class families, their educations will be shaped and limited by the characteristics of that part of the social space. As Mill has already made clear, that social space suffers from a dearth of resources of all sorts. Consequently, laboring class children are often deprived of the necessary time for education. Moreover, even if enough time should exist, laboring class children have few, if any, sources for appropriate education. Complicating this situation even more is a general and powerful tendency, Mill claims, for the family itself to undermine the educational process by shielding children from the full range of experiences in the guise of
protecting children from both real and perceived harm.

Mill denotes the second proposed site of education by the term “technical education.” Here Mill is referring to formal schooling or training. Moreover, this type of education is subject to two restrictions that do not apply to Mill's other proposed sites of education. In particular, “technical education” is both more limited in its cognitive and social objectives than the other sites of education and is tightly constrained by the available quantity of time. It is limited in its objectives in two ways. First, technical education focuses primarily on the development of the quality of intelligence. Unlike the other sites of education, “technical education” concerns itself with achieving only two cognitive goals: for Mill, “technical education” encompasses only those subjects and methods of instruction that communicate “a knowledge of the order of those events of nature on which our pleasures and pains depend, and the sagacity which discovers the best means for the attaining of ends.” (184) Although Mill argues that “technical education” ought to made available to everyone and not restricted to a chosen few, he also acknowledges that class-related time restrictions will dictate different courses of instruction for the two major social realms. After all, Mill announces, the necessity of labor means that the bulk of the population must seek a balance between work and formal schooling since “only a portion of time can be given by them to the acquisition of intelligence, as can be abstracted from labour.” Thus, Mill concludes, the distribution of
opportunities for schooling, and hence for the development of intelligence, will be inequitably distributed across the social space such that “there are degrees, therefore, of intelligence, which must be reserved to those who are not obliged to labour.”

Even though Mill explicitly insists that the expansion of educational opportunities to the greatest possible proportion of the population is essential both for the well-being of individuals and for social stability, even he pulls up short when confronted by the barrier of material necessity. Mill’s endorsement of formal schooling for the laboring class and his reimagining of the social space to accomplish this end reveals here the deep structural tension between the onto-epistemological norms of observation and ontological stasis. In particular, the creation of opportunities for formal schooling requires that individual minds be reciprocally visible to the leisured class; as the possessors of knowledge, the leisured class can engage in educational reform, and most especially formal schooling, only if there is a clear circuit of knowledge that connects the two realms of the social space. The necessity of manual labor acts as barrier to the free flow of knowledge between the two realms; indeed, from Mill’s perspective it presents a nearly insuperable barrier to the establishment of any knowledge circulation at all between the two social realms. Mill’s reimagining of the social space allows him to bypass this barrier partially; nevertheless, it is clear that for some sectors of the laboring class the flow of information is going to be little more
than a trickle.

Mill is left with this limited solution to the problem of providing formal schooling because the onto-epistemological norms of the classical episteme prevent him from proposing any significant changes to the social structure. It is important to point out that Mill’s resigned acceptance of the existing social structure is not simply traceable either to a particular political ideology or to a pragmatic political strategy. Instead, it arises from the norms of the classical episteme or, more precisely, from Mill’s efforts to assemble a discourse on mental operations from these norms. As Mill is compelled to describe mental processes in such a way as to render this representation the basis for an educational practice, he runs into internal tensions that emerge both from the possibilities for action that these norms open up as well as from his inability to merge all the norms perfectly into an organic whole. Most of the norms, indeed, create the real possibility for not only describing the mind, but for creating a discourse that opens real possibilities for manipulating mental contents. The classical episteme radically naturalizes and simplifies the mental machinery so that Mill is able to formulate entry points into the minds discursively and locate points of connection between individual minds and the environment.
The norm of utility then appears compatible with the rest of the norms. And it is to a certain degree; however, as each norm is expressed maximally, tensions inevitably begin to arise – and the norms begin to clash with each other in doing so. As normative pronouncements, each norm is taken as absolute: there are no guidelines for proportionately pursuing each of the norms. Consequently, there are points where analysis and practice grind to a halt as conflicting normative demands prevent the further expression of the episteme’s commandments. The limitations of formal schooling during the 18th and early 19th century are an illustration of such a halting pointing within the discourses of educational reformers. While it might be on some level conceivable to Mill and other classical reformers that a restructuring of the social space could lead to the universal access to formal schooling, such a claim, in context, could not be treated as anything more than wild, unsupported, and unsupportable, speculation since it would likely contradict the requirement of ontological stasis. Of such a proposal, Mill might legitimately ask, ‘From where would such a new social space, in which universal education could take place, emerge?’ A developmental answer that took the form of indicating that such a space is not now observable but will become observable in the future through a presently unobservable process that expresses its characteristics sequentially in time could only be treated as hypothetical under the classical episteme – and in this case ‘hypothetical’ would almost certainly be understood as ‘unjustifiably speculative.’ There is, thus, no mechanism for creating a social structure in which the necessity of
manual labor would not be a serious, and in some cases, impassable barrier to certain types of formal schooling.

There is but a bare hint of any notion of developmentalism in Mill’s educational proposal: his suggestion that childhood education is preferable because children are not yet properly suited to heavy labor. But he offers nothing more than an observation, and gives no explanation that might account for this period of life being less advantageous for labor and consequently more advantageous for education beyond convenience; if children cannot (or should not) work, then why not use this time to educate them?

Nevertheless, Mill offers little in the way of any notion of developmentalism. While the process of education clearly demonstrates that the mind’s contents can be altered over time, Mill gives no indication that he attaches anything other than a practical value to the teaching of children. In other words, childhood does not appear in Mill’s educational proposal as a period in which latent, unexpressed (and presently unobservable) capacities can be elicited in time through education. He offers no age- or developmentally specific curriculum for children’s education, for example. Indirectly, evidence can be gathered from Mill’s educational “experiment” on his own son, John Stuart, that Mill did not possess a developmental perspective with regard to
education. Young John Stuart’s studies focused on and made use of “adult” level materials rather than learning tools that were tailored to a specifically childhood level of learning. As John Stuart recounts in his Autobiography, his education, which apparently began at the age of three, focused mainly upon classical literature, the major historical works of the time, and some mathematics and science. Virtually all of the books that young John Stuart read during his ‘education’ were intended for adult readers: “Of children’s books,” John Stuart himself recalls, “any more than of playthings, I had scarcely any…” (7)

By the time that John Stuart began writing his Autobiography in 1853, the concept of developmentalism was clearly operative and accessible to him. For example, John Stuart pointedly remarks that “[t]he education which my father gave me, was in itself much more fitted for training me to know than to do.” In the published version of the Autobiography, John Stuart fails to spell out specifically the negative consequences of his father’s non-developmental education practices, and merely notes that “[w]hatever qualities he himself, probably, had acquired without difficulty or special training, he seems to have supposed that I ought to acquire as easily.” (23). John Stuart offers, here, no particular clue as to what these “qualities” were that his father’s educational practice deprived him of. An earlier draft of the Autobiography, however, reveals that John Stuart’s education failed to include age-specific instruction in basic manual, social, and language skills. The focus on providing him with an adult education drawn from adult-level materials
deprived John Stuart of key experiences during childhood and left him, “with
great inaptness in the common affairs of every day life. I was far longer than
children generally are before I could put on my clothes. I know not how
many years passed before I could tie a knot. My articulation was long
imperfect; one letter, r, I could not pronounce until I was nearly sixteen.” (23-
24, note 12). These “qualities” that Stewart was so slow to demonstrate
would now be view by educational psychologists as age-specific,
developmental characteristics that emerged only at specific points, and
under appropriate environmental conditions, in the lifespan. That Mill gave
no thought to inculcating these skills and abilities at the appropriate time in
his son but, instead, treated them as non-educational characteristics that
were simply present, or should be present, in his son combined with his use
of adult-level educational materials, indicates that Mill either lacked or did
not employ a strong sense of developmentalism in his educational
philosophy.

While the family, and more variably, formal schooling provide important
spaces for education, they are both, Mill indicates, primarily opportunities for
conditioning and ordering the minds of individuals. Mill acknowledged that
any effort to promote social stability that only conceived of the conditioning
of individual minds, or that treated those minds as atomized and isolated
would seriously limit the prospects of education as a technique of social
control. Human beings are social creatures, Mill asserts, and as such are subject to powerful forces that exist beyond individual minds. Accordingly, these forces, as well as the individual minds that are subject to them, must be analyzed if effective social control techniques are to be developed. In particular, Mill claims, individuals do not exist in a state of self-sufficient solipsism; instead, Mill claims every individual burns with a passion to dominate other individuals and to make use of those individuals. It was this claim about human nature that underlay Mill’s entire political program for creating a stable form of representative government and it was also the main feature of human nature that perpetually threatened the stability, and even existence, of representative government.

From an educational standpoint, the key objective then is to modify and restrain this feature of human nature by de-linking the ideas that lead human beings to seek dominance without restraint. Otherwise society will quickly disintegrate into either civil war or tyranny. Moreover, this feature of human nature is also problematic because miseducation can create a sense of obedience to tyranny in that individuals will actively support exploitative and tyrannical social relationships in the belief that such relationships are in fact admirable and desirable expressions of social order.

Finally, Mill concludes his survey of educational sites with a brief overview of what he calls “political education.” By this term, Mill indicates that the members of a polity rely heavily upon the state as the overseer of the distribution of resources. While this may seem irrelevant to education, Mill
transmits that access to essential resources is central to the very existence of any educational project. Resources such as food, for example, form what Mill calls the physical basis of education.

**Transforming the Mind: Mill’s Associationist Educational Project**

The essence of the norm of utility is explicitly expressed at the beginning of Mill’s treatise on education. Specifically, Mill flatly declares that "the fact is, that good practice can, in no case, have any solid foundation but in sound theory." (141) Mill then immediately reemphasizes the norm of utility by defining theory as being virtually inseparable from practice. According to Mill, theory is "the whole of the knowledge, which we possess upon any subject, put into that order and form in which it is most easy to draw from it good practical rules." (141). Indeed, for Mill, theory and practice are mutually reinforcing. In the particular case of the relationship between philosophy of mind and education, Mill declares that "the whole of human nature is, therefore, but a branch of the science of the education. Nor can education assume its most perfect form, till the science of the human mind has reached its highest point of improvement." (142).

It is one thing to situate theory and practice in a reciprocal relationship; it is quite another to demonstrate that theory can actually inform practice in any particular instance. Mill’s definition of the reciprocal theory/practice
relation requires theory to inform practice, but, crucially, it does not require that "practical rules" be explicitly stated by the theory. Instead, these educators must "draw from [theory] good practical rules." In other words, the transition from theory to practice involves an act of interpolation in order to join the two functions. Mill supplies this juncture by implicitly drawing upon a basic utilitarian formula. That is, he views the transition from theory to practice as a matter of linking means to ends. In the case of the philosophy of mind/education relationship, Mill formulates the transition between theory and practice as a matter of "how the mind, with those properties of which it possess can, through the operation of certain means, be rendered conducive to a certain end?" (142) For a utilitarian like Mill, the "certain end" is the singular and indubitable goal of maximizing happiness. Thus, the main issue for Mill centers on how the theory of mind can assist educators in manipulating the mind so as to produce, if not maximum happiness, then at least greater happiness. If Mill cannot link knowledge of the mind's characteristics to the ability to produce greater happiness, then his work will fail to abide not only by the basic utilitarian imperative, but, even more seriously, will fail to obey an even more fundamental norm of the classical episteme.

Mill traces the solution of the problem of translating theoretical terms into rules that will ground the educational practices necessary for increasing happiness to the proper application of methodology. In the simplest terms,
Mill insists that a smooth transition between theory and practice relies very heavily on the quality of the analysis that produced the theory. The quality of the analysis rests, in turn, on the degree to which proper method has been recognized and applied by the investigator. From Mill’s perspective, methodological errors that could hamper the inference of rules of practices can occur through 1) an incomplete analysis of phenomena that fails to identify the fundamental unit of the phenomena in question, 2) a failure to produce a thoroughgoing induction of all relevant facts, and 3) a premature application of any results from the first two flawed procedures to the investigation of other phenomena. Any or all of these flawed procedures can distort an investigator's understanding of the phenomena under investigation. More precisely, poor methodology will lead to the misidentification and misclassification of phenomena. (145)

In the case of mental phenomena, these methodological dicta impose a particular trajectory of investigation for Mill. The appropriate application of well-defined methods reveals, Mill concludes, that "all our experience, then, of the human mind, is confined to the several occasions on which the term I feel can be applied." (143) Furthermore Mill continues, proper deployment of methodology generates two specific kinds of information regarding mental phenomena:

And now, what does all of this experience amount to? What is the knowledge which it affords? It is, first, a knowledge of the feelings
themselves; we can remember what, one by one, they were. It is, next a knowledge of the order in which they follow one another; and this is all. (143)

Beyond identifying and labeling the specific events of the mental and realm and in addition to determining sequences of these events, a proper application of methodology should perform one further function. In particular, a methodologically well-grounded analysis should also decompose the events of the mental realm into their fundamental units. In the case of mental phenomena, this means, as Mill says "that all of our complex feelings should be accurately resolved into the simple ones of which they are composed." (145)

Thus, a properly conducted analysis of mental phenomena should highlight three significant features of mental phenomena. First, it should identify the key events that occur in the mental domain. In Mill's analysis, the key events are what he designates as "feelings." Next, analysis must determine whether these feelings are the fundamental phenomenal unit in the mental domain by attempting to decompose them into their constituent parts. Indeed, some "feelings" are actually composites of other "feelings." A proper analysis will take note of this fact and separate complex feelings into their constituent parts. Finally, methodologically sound analysis will also recognize that mental phenomena occur over time. In the course of analysis, the
investigator will not only identify events and their component parts but will also trace out the temporal order in which events occur. In the domain of mental phenomena, this means noting the sequence in which "feelings" occur. At the end of the analysis then, the investigator of mental phenomena will discover that feelings are the key events in the mental domain, that some feelings are composite in character, and that feelings occur in determinate temporal order.

These conclusions about the character of mental phenomena provide Mill with the "solid foundation" that he called for as the necessary prelude to generating the "practical rules" that will direct his educational proposals. Since "feelings" occur in a determinant order, and since one of the key objects of a methodologically well-founded analysis is the determination both of the existence and identity of those feeling and of their order, Mill argues that "it is upon a knowledge of the sequences which take place in the human feelings or thought, that the structure of education must be reared." (147) Determining the order of feelings as they occur in consciousness, (and concluding that consciousness is nothing other than the succession of feelings) opens up for Mill the possibility that the contents of mind might be directly manipulated. Indeed, Mill sums up his educational proposals by bluntly stating that "the business of education, is to make certain feelings or thoughts take place instead of others. The business of education, then is to work upon mental successions." (147) In equating education with the
manipulation of my mental phenomena that are revealed in the course of a methodologically well-grounded analysis of the contents and processes of the mind, Mill here fulfills the normative requirement of utility. He does so by linking the theoretical conclusions of philosophy of mind with an educational practice that is intended to alter mental contents according to principles that are derived from an understanding of the actual behavior and properties of those mental contents.

*Managing the Poor: Restructuring the Architecture of Mind and Society*

Although both Stewart and Mill proposed somewhat different architectures for both mind and society, they both relied on a very similar technique for transforming their onto-epistemological commitments into a practice. This movement was particularly important because the translation of their onto-epistemological representations into a practice was the key way in which they hoped to fulfill the norm of utility. Nevertheless, it is crucial to point out that the classical episteme shaped the practice that both Mill and Stewart proposed. Given the linkage between the various structural norms of the classical episteme, neither philosopher could simply fabricate a practice out of thin air. Any proposed practice had to be in accord with those norms; consequently, a useful practice not only had to fulfill the norm of utility specifically, it also had to abide by the norms of observation, and ontological stasis. In doing so, this practice had to be exercised moreover, within a socio-cognitive field that was conceived of in spatial terms. Moreover, the particular
concerns of Mill and Stewart entailed the creation of practices that were directly intended to function as techniques of social control – techniques that were to quell the potentially disruptive desires of the laboring classes and sustain the existing social order.

Foucault, as well as other historians of this era, has labeled the set of social control practices that emerged during the classical era as techniques of “management.” In the context of early nineteenth-century Britain, “management” took the form of just the sort of face-to-face methods of social control that both Stewart and Mill proposed. In this respect, what Stewart and Mill viewed as “management, Foucault calls “government”.

Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government. This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. "Government" did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. It did not only cover the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection, but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others. The relationship proper to power would not therefore be sought on the side of violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking (all of which can, at best, only be the instruments of power), but rather in the area of the singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government. (Foucault 1983, p. 221)

Mill presents a much more ambitious plan of socio-cognitive engineering than does Stewart. He proposes not merely the inculcation of a limited fund
of appropriate knowledge in order to encourage political and social docility, but the radical restructuring of the mental contents of the laboring poor so as to replace their limited knowledge and flawed understandings with an objectively correct view of themselves and their world. Mill's confidence in the eventual success of his educational project arose directly from his philosophy of mind and its associated educational practice. In particular, by reducing human cognition merely to a flow of distinct feelings, Mill concludes that the educational transformation of the illiterate and poor is, in principle, a simple task. Whatever may be the practical difficulties of carrying out his ambitious educational program, there is no fundamental obstacle to educating the vast bulk of the poor to a fairly high level since the apparent cognitive inequities between human beings, and especially the inequities between the leisure and labor classes, do not result from characteristics that inhere in particular individuals or groups, but are strictly the result of external circumstances. According to Mill, the cognitive "difference which exists between classes or bodies of men is the effect of education, will, we suppose...be readily granted." (147). Consequently, cognitive inequity is remediable by the extension of a philosophically informed educational practice to as many people as practical limitations will allow.

In fact, Mill's educational proposals faced two immediate practical limitations. Any effort to improve the welfare of the illiterate poor was likely to provoke concern, and perhaps hostility, among the leisured elite. Primary
among their concerns was the possibility that educating the poor and illiterate would actually backfire as a tool of social control. That is, rather than undercutting the ability of the poor and illiterate to resist the authority of the leisured elite, education would provide additional ammunition for resistance to traditional authority. Moreover, there was the fear that Stewart had addressed that 'excessive' education of the poor would undermine the illiterate poor's ability and desire to work by giving them unrealistic expectations of bettering their conditions, and thus undermine the entire socio-economic order. Mill addresses these related fears by insisting that a properly conducted educational program would not merely convey information to the illiterate poor, but would also seek to shape their cognitive structures so as to guarantee that they would be a benefit to and not a threat to the socio-economic hierarchy. Indeed, he insists that mass ignorance undermines happiness and is a greater threat to social order than is mass education.

Stripped to its bare essentials, education, according to Mill, endeavors to organize the contents of the mind so as to promote both individual and collective happiness. Nevertheless, Mill recognizes that achieving this goal is more difficult than it first appears. The major difficulty appears in the fact that the process of creating and linking ideas is not limited to formal schooling. A constant association of ideas is always occurring in the mind and on many occasions, as he observes, these association most certainly do not lead to happiness. Quite often, the association of ideas creates a mental
sequence that terminates in an erroneous idea or in an idea that actually undermines the attainment of happiness. Clearly, effective educational programs must take this all too frequent occurrence into account and counter it if they are reliably to produce individual and collective happiness. But Mill's plans for educational reform still face a serious obstacle. A torrent of experiences buffets the minds of even the most educated individuals, and the number of such experiences will vastly outnumber the idea sequences that are carefully established by formal schooling. Indeed, these environmental experiences are so powerful and pervasive that they can undo the careful work of even the most rigorous educational practice.

Education, thus must do more than simply provide a protected space in which the contents of the mind can be organized artfully. Successful educational practice must equip individuals to evaluate and, at times, resist the flood of experiences that they will encounter beyond the realm of a monitored and directed education. In order to preserve the gains of formal schooling, certain intellectual and ethical characteristics must be developed in the process of formal schooling. Armed with these characteristics, individuals, Mill argued, could be trusted to confront the totality of experience and still make the correct linkages between ideas that are necessary for individual and collective happiness. According to Mill, the key characteristics that can assure the cognitive independence and success of individuals are intelligence, temperance, justice, and generosity.
In order to maximize happiness both for individuals and for society, Mill splits these characteristics into two groups. The first group, which comprises intelligence and temperance, are qualities that will enhance individual happiness by insuring the creation and stabilization of efficacious sequences of ideas. For there to be any hope of creating such sequences, individuals will have to find some way of coping with the torrent of experiences that constantly wash over them. Consequently, Mill indicates that “[a]mid the vast variety of known things, there is needed a power of choosing, a power of discerning which of them are conducive, which not, to the ends we have in view.” (154) Without the capacity to make such judgments, individuals would have little hope of joining the ultimate end of happiness to the means that are appropriate for achieving it in a reliable manner. Cultivation of intelligence, which is understood here as a faculty for determining the instrumental efficacy of ideas as contributors to happiness, is, therefore the foundational trait that good educational practice strives to cultivate in individuals.

Intelligence, nevertheless, is not, by itself, an adequate safeguard against the creation of erroneous and disadvantageous sequences of ideas. If individuals are to succeed reliably in maximizing their happiness, they must, Mill emphasizes, do more than think about happiness. They must, obviously, transform these sequences of ideas into correlated actions that will lead to a
happy outcome. Mill points out, however, that even the most well considered scheme for maximizing happiness can fail to be fully actualized. All too frequently, an intrinsic human tendency to seek immediate pleasure can thwart efforts to achieve happiness. Rather than patiently waiting for sequences of ideas to come to fruition in action, many individuals will seize upon the first, and usually illusory, advantage that appears to them. In cases such as these, intelligence alone is helpless to prevent the sacrifice of a more capacious and enduring happiness for the comforting illusion of immediate, but ultimately inadequate, gain. As result, Mill insists that intelligence must be complemented with a capacity for restraining the desire for illusory forms of happiness. Appealing to what would, in our time, probably be referred to as ‘delayed gratification,’ Mill argues that good educational practice must encourage temperance in individuals if they are to maximize their happiness.

Temperance, according to Mill, consists of

[a] perfect command, then, over a man’s appetites and desires; the power of restraining them whenever they lead in a hurtful direction; that possession of himself which insures his judgement against the illusions of the passions, and enables him to pursue constantly what deliberately approves, is indispensably requisite to enable him to produce the greatest possible quantity of happiness. (155)
Once such forces are under control, individuals will possess the discipline to forego easily obtainable, but limited, pleasures in favor of a form happiness that Mill regards as superior.

Mill's educational reform program rests on two broad assumptions that immediately open up possibilities for transmitting knowledge across the barrier of material necessity. Both of these assumptions grow out of Mill's radical version of psychological environmentalism in which all cognitive contents originate from external experience. The first of these assumptions involves the extensiveness of educational opportunities in the socio-cultural environment. Mill does not limit education to episodes of formal schooling. Instead, his psychological environmentalism leads him to conclude that education, which is really no more than the establishment of sequences of ideas in the mind according to the principle of association, occurs constantly throughout the lifespan. Since every mind, like a stone in a stream, is constantly awash in experiences that are converted into sequences of ideas, Mill notes that

[i]t has been remarked, that every thing from the first germ of existence to the final extinction of life, which operates in such a manner as to affect those qualities of the mind on which happiness in any degree depends, come within the scope of the present inquiry. (140)

Mill seems even to regard education, as the formation of sequences of ideas, as occurring before birth as he states, “that, as soon as the infant, or rather,
embryo, begins to feel, the character begins to be formed...” (176). By expanding the possibilities for education throughout the lifespan, and by advocating an extreme form of psychological environmentalism that creates numerous sites of actual and potential education, Mill’s educational reform project offers many more opportunities for cognitive transformation than would be the case if he had limited his definition of education merely to formal schooling.

Also, Mill’s radical psychological environmentalism allows him to treat all human beings as initially equal in their cognitive endowments. If mind is simply accumulated experience and possesses no innate and heritable structures or contents, then all human beings will begin life in state of cognitive equality. Although Mill does grant the possibility of individual variation in cognitive ability, he emphasizes that the emergence of differences and even inequalities in cognitive contents and capacities must therefore be solely the result of environmental influences. Since Mill equates environmental influences with education, this means, as Mill states,

that, at least, all the difference which exists between classes and bodies of men is the effect of education, will, we suppose, be readily granted; that it is education wholly which constitutes the remarkable difference between the Turk and the Englishman, and even that still more remarkable difference between the most cultivated European and the wildest savage. (147)
Mill sums up his comparisons of collective cognitive endowments with the sweeping declaration that “[w]hatever is made of any class of men, we may then be sure is possible to be made of the whole human race.” (147). If the leisured class can be effectively educated at various sites, then the laboring can also, in principle, be educated with equal ease.

**Dugald Stewart: Education as a mechanism of social control**

Stewart’s views on the importance of education are unambiguous: illiteracy among the poor, he repeatedly contends, is an immediate causal agent of social and political disruption. Therefore, education must play an important role in maintaining social and political order. He goes to considerable lengths to make his case for the invidious effects of illiteracy by citing numerous examples, both domestic and foreign, of both the baleful consequences of illiteracy and the anodyne effects of education. Indeed, Stewart leads off his discussion of education with a lengthy quotation from Adam Smith on the dire effects of excessive labor and deficient education and ratifies Smith’s endorsement of education by exclaiming “what an accession would be gained to national character, and what a security would be added to public tranquility and order!” (328) Within Britain, Stewart attributes the social and political stability of his Scottish homeland to an accessible educational system and a relatively high literacy rate among the members of the laboring class. He avers that “the means of a literary education, and of
religious instruction, were in Scotland placed within the reach of the lowest orders of people ... and the consequences have been everywhere favourable to their morals and industry....” (330) Stewart advances his claims for a link between high levels of literacy and civil peace by comparing the rates of crime and literacy between Scotland’s poor to the recorded level of criminal activity illiteracy among the poor in its English neighbor to the south. Such a comparison reveals, Stewart argues, that the Scottish poor, who are more literate than their English counterparts, are much less likely to commit crimes.

The relationship between literacy and criminality among the poor, Stewart continues, is not a peculiarity of Great Britain. Even in countries as dissimilar as the United States and Switzerland, the presence of an accessible education system is correlated with low crime rates. The United States constitutes in Stewart’s view, a particularly noteworthy example of the salutary effects of accessible education. The promotion of education there has, he argues, played a key role in reducing not only criminality, but also in thwarting the ability of the poor to effectively challenge the socio-political status quo. Education has achieved this remarkable in the United States by removing one of the few collective instruments available to the illiterate poor who wished to challenge established authority. This institution, often derisively referred to as the “mob” by leisure class observers, struck fear into hearts of all
traditional authorities that perceived it as an irrational and almost demonic force that lurked in the space of labor awaiting an opportunity to plunge society into violence and chaos by smashing the social hierarchy. The United States, however, stands out as a model of the efficacy of education in preventing such challenges to established authority. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that “In America, such is the effect of instruction, combined with abundance, that Mr. Adams mentions it as the peculiar happiness of his countrymen, that they are quite unable to form an idea of that class of men which in Europe we denominate the mob.”

Nevertheless, despite the obvious beneficial effects of education in restraining the criminal impulses of the poor, these examples are more the exception than the rule, Stewart concedes. “If we turn our eyes to other parts of Europe,” Stewart declares, “we shall everywhere find bad morals and a spirit of insubordination accompanying general ignorance.” Stewart does not have to look far or long to find an example to support this contention. For Stewart, the recent convulsions of the French Revolution provide both the most egregious example of the consequences of widespread illiteracy among the poor, and the event that seems to best exemplify the role of education in maintaining the social and political status quo. In opposition to unnamed critics who have contended that illiteracy, and not education, is an effective tool of social control, Stewart points to France and to

[t]he facility with which the people of that country have been led to the commission of enormities of the most atrocious nature by the shallowest
artifices of political intrigue, affords a sufficient answer to those who consider the ignorance of the lowest classes as the surest pledge of their submission to established authority...” (334)

Rather than hoping that illiteracy will disable the disruptive impulses of the laboring poor, Stewart prefers a more positive form of social control that will ensure the stability of the social hierarchy by creating an educational system that will permit the leisured class to transmit their values to the poor. Here, Stewart’s concern is motivated not only merely by a class-based anxiety over the potential threat to his rather privileged position in the social hierarchy but is also rooted in the onto-epistemological norms of the classical episteme. In particular, Stewart is implicitly drawing the attention of the leisure class to a serious gap in the regime of social control that is posed by the absence of an accessible educational system. By denying the laboring poor access to literacy, the leisure class might be more or less successful in thwarting the threat that radical social and political ideas posed to the social hierarchy; however, this same act of scission also shut off an important conduit by which the leisure class could transmit its preferred knowledge to the laboring poor. After all, illiteracy is certainly a significant obstacle, but hardly a complete impediment, to the diffusion of knowledge. If the leisure class’ blockade on the circulation of unacceptable ideas into the space of labor is ever breached, then these undesirable ideas will have uncontested influence on the poor since the leisure class has no mechanism for circulating its preferred ideologies. Creating an accessible educational system is
therefore, more than a humanitarian gesture: from Stewart's perspective, it is a means for the leisure class to gain access to the space of labor and direct the circulation of knowledge there more effectively than would otherwise be the case.

Notably, Stewart bluntly calls for State intervention in the education of the poor. Interestingly, this is in almost direct contradiction to his highly reluctant acceptance of state intervention in cases of severe material deprivation; for the most part, Stewart championed voluntary and paternalistic measures on the part of the wealthy combined with self-help programs for the poor. Stewart had rejected routine state intervention in the alleviation of material deprivation largely on two grounds. First, the anonymous character of state intervention loosened the very social links between rich and poor that Stewart was trying to strengthen. Receiving economic assistance from distant anonymous strangers undermines the moral and emotive bonds that Stewart saw in need of strengthening in order to protect social order. Moreover, state intervention in cases of material deprivation could, Stewart feared, be viewed by the poor not merely as a temporary, emergency matter but rather as a contractual obligation that bound the state to support the poor continuously in all situations of material deprivation. Indeed, this had been the case prior to the establishment of free wage labor. Stewart's proposed measures are intended as a political
alternative to a legalistic relationship between the two social classes – a legalistic relationship that might give the poor considerable moral and political power if the wealthy failed or refused to fulfill a perceived obligation for providing material support and assistance.

Paternalistic approaches to education that would have individual aristocrats either directly teaching or providing for the education of the laboring class neighbors also have serious limitations. Efforts to financially assist the poor through direct action by the aristocracy serve to reinforce the bonds between spatially adjacent groups of aristocrats and laborers. In keeping with the dictates of the classical episteme, these measures allow for direct contact between the two groups and permit individual members of each group to observe each other. Although paternalistic forms of education might appear to replicate this feature of poor relief by bringing the two groups into immediate and sustained interaction, the practicality of this arrange might be suspect from Stewart’s point of view. In particular, the same problems of skill and motivation that undermined the workhouse model of poor relief and education would also be apparent if all members of the aristocracy were charged with the responsibility of educating the laboring class.

Additionally, the advantages to the aristocracy of a paternalistic educational system are less clear than in the case of paternalistic poor relief; although the aristocracy could use a paternalistic educational system to manage the laboring class, such a level of management would be far more burdensome, and provide a far less effective restraint, than paternalistic poor
relief. Paternalistic poor relief required some effort and resources of course; however, administration of poor relief involved very little day-to-day administration. In Stewart’s overview of poor relief, the organizing of a relief structure and the disbursement of funds entailed no more than a few days effort several times each year. An educational system would, in contrast, would necessitate committing a substantial portion of each day throughout the year to education. In return for this investment the aristocracy would acquire a social control mechanism with distinct limits to its power to compel obedience. After all, the consequences of cutting off poor relief would present the poor with a much greater inducement to comply with the authority of the aristocracy than would the suspension of educational opportunities. It would, therefore, not be surprising to see the aristocracy balk at the suggestion that they should be compelled individually to provide education for the laboring class.

Caught between the dangers of state intervention, on the one hand, and the inadequacy of traditional paternalistic institutions on the other, Stewart ultimately chooses the state as the primary instrument of education and educational reform. Indeed, Stewart does not appear to be troubled in the least that state intervention in educating the poor could produce similar potential sources of social disruption arising from legal claims by the poor. If the poor begin to insist that the state has a contractual obligation to provide
education, then this, from Stewart’s standpoint only reinforces his objectives: unlike the case of economic support in which the wealthy occupy the position of someone being blackmailed, i.e., being forced to purchase protection for the socio-political status quo, a demand by the poor for state provided education allows the elite to maintain the social hierarchy even more effectively than would otherwise be the case. Demanding education from the state doesn’t necessarily give the poor any leverage over the wealthy; instead, it only leads to the creation and extension of effective mechanisms of social control. Demanding direct economic support, however, drains the financial resources of the wealthy without creating any effective institution that could insure continued control over the poor. At the first sign of failure to provide support, the poor could threaten socio-political disruption. There is no enduring mechanism of social control here that can be augmented to tip the balance of power to the wealthy. But the extension of educational systems can allow the wealthy to undermine the poor’s efforts’ to disrupt the social order in numerous ways.

In fact, Stewart’s approval of the so-called ‘Virginia Plan’ for educational reform indicates that the creation of a state-run educational system is incredibly effective in depriving the poor of the ideological means of generating resistance to the elite and to the social hierarchy. It achieves this not simply through explicitly inculcating loyalty to the status quo (though this would play a part as well), but even more effectively by deploying the
onto-epistemological norms for creating a social technology that would analyze, classify, and separate the members of the poor from each other. A divide and conquer method that would stratify the poor/illiterate and grade them according to their level of educability. The most educable could even be admitted to the elite.

Stewart offers no plan himself for an accessible educational system; however, he heartily endorses a plan that has been proposed for the state of Virginia in the United States. Stewart’s summary and presentation of the Virginia plan is notable not only for what it emphasizes but for what it omits. Specifically, it gives little attention to the curriculum that will be taught. Presumably, the curriculum would be an especially important feature of any education reform program – especially when the reform program is designed explicitly to combat the influence of undesirable ideas. Whether this omission is due to Stewart’s focus on other aspects of the plan or is a feature of the plan itself is unclear from Stewart’s presentation. Nevertheless, the features of the plan that Stewart praises confirm both his view that education can and should be a mechanism of social control and the pervasive influence of the onto-epistemological norms of the classical episteme.

Stewart’s presentation of the Virginia plan for the creation of a broadly accessible educational system highlights the plan’s utility for transmitting
knowledge across the barrier of material necessity. In doing so, the plan opens up the possibility of reciprocal interaction between the two main social spaces. The Virginia plan attempts to accomplish this goal by creating an educational system that is widely accessible to all of the poor and illiterate. At the lowest level, the laboring class would be permitted general access and accorded the rudiments of an education. The most capable students would be identified and separated out from promoted to more advanced educational opportunities.

This winnowing of the laboring class on the basis of individual academic achievement would continue until, in the blunt language of the plan cited by Stewart, “twenty boys [in Virginia] of the most promising talents will be raked annually from the rubbish.” Thus, this reform plan will allow the leisure class not only to enroll the laboring class within a social institution where it can be inculcated with the proper ideas, but also to analyze and thereby make visible the cognitive strata of the laboring class.

Beyond the obvious desire to employ education as a technique of social control,

Stewart grants no insight in the specific reasons for his support of this particular plan. Consequently, it is very difficult to infer, with any confidence, what those motives might have been. It is, however, striking that one effect of the Virginia plan for educational reform that Stewart emphasizes would be
to explicitly create a meritocratic social hierarchy for the laboring class in which good academic performance would be materially rewarded by the leisure class. Those members of the laboring class who had demonstrated their willingness to meet the cognitive demands of the leisured class would not only gain access to more advanced education but also could hope for socio-economic advancement and improvements in their standards of living. As Stewart himself points out, the very highest achievers in the laboring class could even cross over into the leisure class. Rather obviously this opens up another avenue by which the labor and leisure classes could reciprocally visualize each other.

In addition to the onto-epistemological imperatives of the classical episteme, Stewart may plausibly have been attracted to the meritocratic provisions of the Virginia Plan because of its ability to “attach” the laboring class to the goals and general perspectives of the leisure class. The Virginia plan creates a series of powerful incentives that would tend to promote an attitude of cooperation, rather than conflict between the two main socio-economic divisions. The laboring class, or at least a significant portion of it, might be persuaded to adopt a less antagonistic stance toward the leisured class if the reward of socio-economic advancement was dangled in front of it. Moreover, the hierarchical structure of the educational system might also have beneficial effects from the leisured class’s perspective in that the highest
achieving members of the laboring class would be co-opted by the leisured class. In this way, at least some of the laboring class’s more ambitious and cognitively talented members, who might be a risk for successfully organizing resistance to the leisure class, could have their energies directed towards supporting rather than opposing the socio-economic status quo.

Despite the apparent accord between the onto-epistemological norms of the classical episteme, and the potential opportunities for management of the space of labor that the Virginia plan would provide, Stewart acknowledges the possibility that there will be opposition to the plan. Primary among these criticisms is the perceived danger of raising expectations among the laboring class. In particular, Stewart postulates hypothetical critics “who admit the reasonableness of extending among the poor, a knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic…,” but who also “will be startled at a plan which they may suppose calculated to inspire the labouring orders with views of literary ambition unsuitable to their condition.” (PE, VII, 337-338) Stewart interprets this criticism not as a rejection of some education for the laboring class but as a rejection of overeducating the laboring class. The particular danger here, in Stewart’s reading of the hypothetical criticism, is the possibility that access to educational opportunities will convince too many members of the laboring class that they are really gentlemen scholars who are constitutionally unsuited for manual labor. Once under this
misapprehension, these members of the working class might begin to refuse
labor and thereby reduce the labor supply.

Although Stewart does not offer an analysis of the onto-epistemological roots
of this hypothetical criticism, the clear implication of this criticism is that the
overeducation of the poor will potentially upset the natural hierarchy of
society; by exposing the poor to a wider cognitive world than they would
ordinarily experience within the space of labor, the poor might be
encouraged to cross the barrier of material necessity in order to reconcile
their social and cognitive conditions. Given the classical episteme's
insistence upon ontological stasis, however, such a move would be disastrous
because it would require an identity-destroying transformation of the social
hierarchy that would offer no clear substitute for the necessity of a well-
regulated and extensive space of labor. Stewart confirms this worry by citing
unnamed critics, who take this position “that [educational schemes for the
poor] have the effect of withdrawing all men too much from the laborious
would undermine the ability of the socio-economic system, dependent as it
was on a ready supply of manual labor, to meet society's basic material
needs.
Stewart rebuts this criticism on three grounds. First, Stewart argues that the Virginia plan itself is so structured that it rules out the possibility of overeducating the poor. Indeed, Stewart insists that “[t]he truth, however, is, that so far as [the excessive education of the poor] is an evil, the plan in question has a tendency to correct it...” (PE, Vol. II, 338) The Virginia plan Stewart contends, is immune to the threat of overeducating the poor because “it discourages that preposterous vanity which crowds the learned professions with men who were obviously intended for other occupations.” (PE, Vol. II, 338) Presumably, though Stewart does not spell this out, the key mechanism at work here is the system of sorting through the population of students as they advance through the stages of their education that Stewart has already noted. Along the way, students would be steered towards educational and occupational niches that would be considered suitable for them. As a result, passage through the system would distribute students along a carefully scaled education and occupational grid in the socially and economically appropriate numbers.

Additionally, Stewart intertwines another response to his hypothetical critics into his defense of the Virginia Plan. If the features of the Virginia Plan provide an insufficient number of safeguards against the disastrous effects of overeducating the poor, then Stewart invokes human nature itself as a more secure defense of the social order. In particular, Stewart declares that
“surely a disinterested love of science and of literature is not to be numbered among the predominant passions of the present age.” (PE Vol. II 338). Instead, Stewart asserts that the vast majority of people tend to be inherently disinclined to pursue advanced education, much less genuine scholarship; is it not plainly evident, Stewart asks rhetorically, that most people would reject rarefied realm of scholarly inquiry for other occupations such as “the scramble of political intrigue, or the solid earnings of commercial industry?” (PE Vol. II, 338). Although Stewart makes no clear distinction here between the poor and the affluent, the examples of alternative, and more desirable careers, that he cites suggests that this disinclination to advanced education cuts across class divisions since it is unlikely that the bulk of the poor would ever have the opportunity to participate in politics or to prosper in commerce. Such an implication would also provide further support for Stewart’s larger point that human nature itself provides an obstacle against the potentially pernicious effects of education. After all, if the privileged classes of people, with their advantages of time and money, seem disinclined to over saturate the market for scholarly occupations, then it is even less likely that educating the poor, whose disinclination for scholarship is bolstered by material barriers, would either generate a flood of unemployable scholars and intellectuals or, conversely, begin refusing manual labor en masse.
Finally, Stewart anticipates the (implicit) objection that even human nature might be an insufficient safeguard against the dangers of overeducating the poor. Without spelling out such a criticism, Stewart nevertheless shores up his argument by defending the fixity of human nature. Clearly, such a move is necessary; if human nature is variable with either time or circumstance, then Stewart’s conclusions about the security of the social hierarchy would also become contingent and, hence, unreliable. A hypothetical critic might ask whether the aversion to education and to scholarship that seems so evident to Stewart at the turn of the nineteenth century in Scotland is really an invariable feature of human nature. Perhaps, the disinclination to learning as a vocation that Stewart claims to observe is merely a local peculiarity. In that case, it becomes at least imaginable that an alternative state of affairs is possible; maybe in some other time or place, conditions could obtain that would inspire a general attraction towards learning and scholarship – and attraction that is sufficiently powerful so as to erase the necessary division of the social space into realms of leisure and labor.

In addressing this hypothetical and implied criticism of his defense of the Virginia Plan, Stewart makes what might at first appear to be a philosophically inappropriate appeal to divine intervention in order to justify his confidence in the stability of human nature. More specifically, Stewart seeks assurance for the efficacy of the salient feature of human nature (a general aversion to extensive educational and scholarly pursuits) by
removing its origins from the realm of contingency altogether. Against his would-be critics, Stewart simply notes that

[i]t is, indeed, wisely ordered by Providence, in every age and state of society, that while a small number of minds are captivated with the delights of study, the great mass of the people are urged by much more irresistible motives, to take a share in the active concerns of human life.” (PE Vol. I, 338)

Thus, Stewart concludes, there is no need for concern that the Virginia plan, or some similar educational project, would produce anarchy by destroying the essential and necessarily static relationship between labor and leisure. Stewart moves to bolster the reader’s confidence in the presence of divine intervention, as well as in its reliability, in the maintenance of this balance by appealing to the fact that another necessary condition of human survival, the reproductive division of labor, is also remarkably unaffected by contingency. Divine intervention, Stewart emphasizes, “preserves invariable that balance of the sexes which is most favourable to human happiness....” (PE, Vol. I, 338)

From this example, Stewart then supposes that the same divine influence also “mingles, in their due proportions, the elements of those moral and intellectual qualities in the character of different men, on which the order of society depends.” (PE, Vol. 338) By tying the origins of the necessary divisions of the social structure to a transcendent source that is immune to the vicissitudes of material existence, Stewart attempts to comply with the onto-epistemological norm of ontological stasis, which demands, in this case,
that the social structure remain temporally invariant in its essential identifying characteristics regardless of environmental influences.\footnote{Although I will not attempt to defend the philosophical legitimacy of Stewart’s appeal to divine intervention, I will point out that it is consistent with Common Sense philosophy as whole since one of the few explicitly stated tenets of Common Sense is the necessary belief in the divine and its role in ordering the world. So, Stewart’s appeal to divine intervention is not simply ad hoc. Additionally, this is at least in keeping as well with the norms of the classical episteme more generally since Stewart must address the problem of social stability without invoking some “external” and unobservable element that can neutralize the force of contingency – the only legitimate alternative from within common sense must come from the foundational belief in Providence as a necessary condition of understanding itself.}

Chapter 5

Conclusion: The Varieties of British Empiricism

In the preceding 300 pages, I have analyzed and compared the mental and social philosophies of two major figures of the British empiricist tradition in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Although they are often regarded as minor historical figures by early twenty-first century scholars, both Dugald Stewart and James Mill were well regarded philosophers in their own times. Beyond their reputations, however, Stewart and Mill’s works are important examples of two distinct schools of thought within a larger tradition of empiricist philosophy that originated in Britain in the seventeenth century. Informed by the methodological works of Bacon and inspired by Newton’s successes in the physical and mathematical sciences, the British empiricist tradition sought to rework philosophy
in the image of the new natural philosophical movements that have come to be known collectively as the “Scientific Revolution.” Associationism, which is the older of the two philosophical schools, made its first significant appearance in the works of John Locke; Mill’s analyses of the mind’s functions builds on the foundations that Locke laid down and thus mark him as Locke’s direct intellectual descendent.

Stewart’s Common Sense philosophy represents an important fork in the development of the British empiricist tradition. First developed in the mid-eighteenth century in the writings of Stewart’s intellectual predecessor and mentor Thomas Reid, Common Sense philosophy was inspired by Reid’s concern with the apparently skeptical conclusions of Associationism. Driven by the fear that the British empiricist tradition had been led to an intellectual dead-end, Reid proposed a new framework for the philosophy of mind that sought to retain the powerful explanatory methods of that had been adopted from Baconian and Newtonian natural philosophy while simultaneously avoiding the skeptical traps that those same methods seemed to have laid for the philosophy of mind.

Frequently, philosophers and historians of philosophy have treated these two philosophical schools as if they were largely unrelated developments. At first glance this seems an entirely reasonable conclusion; apart from providing the initial impetus for Reid’s reaction against Associationism, the Lockean tradition of philosophy seemed to share few features with Common Sense. Indeed, Reid, and later Stewart, overtly rejected the central tenet of Associationism. Specifically, they both denied the existence of the ‘ideas’ as replicas of sensory experience that serve as the basic unit of cognition. In place of associationism’s molecular model of the
mind as an entity built up from the aggregation of unit ideas according to fixed principles of association, Reid and Stewart proposed that the mind is an integrated system of functions whose coordinated actions produce the phenomenal experience of an interior mental world out of sensory experience. Furthermore, Reid and Stewart’s Common Sense insisted that cognition itself was possible only on the condition that certain basic beliefs, the so-called principles of Common Sense, are accepted as true despite their fundamentally non-demonstrable character. By founding their philosophy of mind on such beliefs, both Reid and Stewart sought to avoid the skepticism that they saw in associationism willingness to trace the origins of all thoughts, including the most important beliefs, to the vicissitudes of experience.

Given these dissimilarities between associationism and Common Sense, it is not surprising that the Lockean associationist tradition of philosophy and Common Sense are rarely seen as interrelated in anyway. This conclusion is not surprising, however, only if the analysis of these two philosophical schools begins and ends with an examination of their conclusions about the philosophy of mind. Combine this focus with a tendency to divide British cultural geography along national lines such that Common Sense is treated as a ‘Scottish’ philosophy while Associationism acquires an English identity and the result is a severely limited view of the doctrines and historical development of British empiricism.
By deploying the theoretical tools developed by Michael Foucault in his studies of the development of the human sciences, I have endeavored to expand the domain that is currently designated by the label ‘British empiricism’. Foucault’s work has proved especially useful for its ability to reveal some of the common discursive structures that shaped both Associationism and Common Sense in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Particularly useful in the course of this analysis were discursive norms that Foucault identified that required legitimate philosophical discourses to restrict their explanations and descriptions to specific types of phenomena and to certain features of those phenomena. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these discursive norms, which I have referred to as the norms of visibility and ontological stasis, constituted part of the structure of a particular regime of knowledge that Foucault calls the “classical episteme.” As the name itself suggest, the discursive norm of ‘visibility’ required philosophical analyses to be based only upon entities or properties of entities that could in some sense be observable. Moreover, the field of entities or of the properties of entities that could be invoked as part of genuine philosophical investigations was further delimited by the norm of ‘ontological stasis.’ In this case, philosophically accessible entities or their properties were conceived of as temporally invariant. Consequently, the norm of ‘ontological stasis’ ruled out the invocation of developmental processes or other forms of change that would radically alter the identities of entities and their properties over time if those alterations occurred via processes that were not directly observable. Change, per se
was not ruled out; however, any changes in the properties of entities had to be observable.

By limiting philosophical investigations to entities and to the properties of entities that were observable and temporally invariant, the “classical episteme” provided a discursive context for the relationships between entities and their properties that both enabled the organization of otherwise disparate knowledge claims in some ways while restricting the range of organizational schemes in others. As a result of the requirements that these norms imposed upon philosophical investigations, philosophers of the “classical episteme” operated with a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit model of the structure of knowledge that conceived of knowledge as spatially organized in a two-dimensional grid. In particular, during the “classical episteme” knowledge was organized around the relative degrees of similarity and difference between entities and the properties of the entities. The result was a scale of difference and similarity in which entities could be graded and arranged. This organizational scheme for knowledge is expressed most clearly in the classificatory methods of natural history; in this case, individual entities are identified according to observable and invariant features and then both distinguished from and related to other entities in sequential order. Foucault has likened this model of knowledge to a “grid” in which an abstract space of knowledge is subdivided into specific compartments. Each compartment ‘holds’ a place for a distinctive entity, and the character of the relations between entities are defined by their distances from one another in the sequence. The discursive norm of ‘ontological stasis’ insured the stability of this arrangement by fixing the identities
of entities and thus maintaining their relationship to similar, but not identical entities. Moreover, the requirement of visibility enhances the static nature of the grid by ruling out the invocation of non-visualizable, hidden, or hypothetical entities or properties of entities. The grid of knowledge is thereby metaphorically flattened out; by restricting philosophical investigations to observables, the norm of visibility limits analyses to the superficial features of entities. The identity of entities is no more and no less than the sum of their observable distinguishing features. For the philosophical investigator, this is the epistemological horizon for analyses.

In addition to the first two discursive norms that Foucault identifies, another norm, also figures prominently in the “classical episteme.” This norm rejected abstract philosophical speculation as a pointless indulgence and insisted that legitimate philosophical discourse possess the capacity for direct application to the improvement of human existence. In an effort to act upon Bacon’s aphorism that “knowledge is itself power” the architects of the “classical episteme” discourses did not remain content with the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake; rather, they sought out, and indeed, demanded, that their analyses and investigations lead to solutions for practical problems. This norm of utility thereby played a key role in the socio-cultural legitimation of philosophical investigations during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by offering a (admittedly, potential in most cases) demonstration of its social value. During the “classical episteme,” the norm of utility also served as a metric for assessing veracity of philosophical claims.
that was equal to efforts to demonstrate the veridical character of philosophical conclusions through empirical means.

Foucault’s theoretical and historical work also provides a political framework in which to understand the practical deployment of, and the interactions between, discourses within the boundaries of the “classical episteme.” In particular, Foucault argues for the appearance of a specific political form, which he calls “attachment” during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. “Attachment” was essentially a strategy employed by the ruling elites of Europe as a means for containing the social and political ambitions of the poor – an increasingly pressing problem for the ruling elites during this period as the basic political and economic structures underwent dramatic transformations that encouraged the poor to question traditional authorities and forms of life. Essentially, the strategy of “attachment” can be understood as the political application of the “classical episteme’s” discursive norms. That is, the ruling elite attempted to sustain its authority over the poor by effecting an alignment of interests between the two groups such that the poor would see no alternative but to acquiescence to the authority of the ruling elites. The means by which “attachment” was to be carried out reveals the role of the discursive norm of visibility in action: the ruling elites would insure that they maintained control over the poor by making the poor constantly visible through the creation of multiple face to face relations between the elite and the poor. In this way, the elite would have direct access to the poor and
thus be able to acquire knowledge about the activities and beliefs of the poor.

Armed with such knowledge, the elite could take both reactive and proactive steps to insure the stability of the established socio-political hierarchy.

Beyond Foucault’s analytical tools, I have offered a contextualization of Stewart and Mill’s philosophical works. It is significant that Stewart and Mill created their discourses at the times and places that they did, and those works are marked by the events surrounding their creation. Most obvious to both philosophers was the socially and politically destabilizing events of the French Revolution. At a subterranean level, the emerging industrialization of Britain, as Foucault points out, was also undermining the existing social, economic, and political order. In terms of the events that were immediately visible and accessible to Stewart and Mill, these profound structural changes were beginning to alter patterns of knowledge production and social relations. In particular, the traditional two-class model of the social hierarchy that divided society into two zones or spaces based the inhabitants’ need, or lack of need, to engage in manual labor. This model of social organization was beginning to break down as the laboring poor began to agitate for a greater share of social, economic, and political power and as the ruling elites took (sometimes counterproductive) actions to suppress the growing demands of the poor. Additionally, during this time, Britain was undergoing a period of increasing political and cultural integration, drawing together the various regions of the island and opening up new opportunities for the movement of people and ideas.
throughout Britain. When this cultural and political integration combined with the booming market for the distribution of printed materials, which was stimulated both by the French and Industrial Revolutions, new circuits for the production and distribution of knowledge were created.

Both Stewart and Mill were conscious of at least some of these developments, and their respective philosophies of mind and society were, in part, efforts to respond to the vast structural changes that were occurring in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Britain. Especially important here are their educational writings. In the cases of both Stewart and Mill, education was seen as an outgrowth of their philosophies of mind, and, in accordance with the norm of utility, as an important means for granting validity and legitimacy to their endeavors. By elucidating the discursive norms that both enabled and constrained their ability to produce discourses on these subjects, it becomes apparent that these statements of a linkage between the highly abstract philosophy of mind and the practical business of education are more than wishful thinking or pious boilerplate rhetoric about the supposed benefits of basic research to the solution of practical problems. Furthermore, both Stewart and Mill display a similar perception of the architecture of the social space and the obstacles that the necessity of manual labor creates to an effective educational practice. Specifically, the goal of education, for both philosophers, was ultimately the stabilization of the traditional two-class social hierarchy. Although Mill was willing to modify that hierarchy somewhat by
attempting to create a new set of ‘middling ranks’ that would mediate between the ruling elite and the laboring poor, neither Stewart nor Mill attempt to overturn the basic distinction between manual labor and leisure that had long divided the social space. Identifying the roles of the discursive norms of visibility and ontological status in the “classical episteme” permits a better understanding of just how Stewart and Mill perceived their social environments and why they sought to carefully balance the need for education of the laboring poor with their concerns about the destabilizing effects of education.

Taken together, Foucault’s analytical tools and the contextualization of Stewart and Mill’s works permit a sustained comparison and evaluation of Associationism and Common Sense. Despite a host of apparently irreconcilable differences in philosophical doctrines, important links can be drawn between different parts of their respective discourses on mind and society. Even when their doctrines seem to be contrary, as is the apparent case with Stewart’s rejection of the associationist ‘theory of ideas,’ both Stewart and Mill operated with a shared methodological and onto-epistemological universe that simultaneously restrained and enabled their ability both to construct discourses on mind and society and to apply those discourses for practical ends. The fact that they were able to generate distinctive doctrines with a shared discursive universe illuminates the complex workings of the normative structure of the “classical episteme” and the fundamental conflicts
between the normative demands imposed on discursive productions by the
requirements of visibility, ontological stasis, and utility.

In conclusion, the preceding analysis of Dugald Stewart and James Mill’s respective
philosophy of mind yields three salient points. First, it offers a glimpse into the
diversity of the British empiricist tradition of philosophy. Even from this very
limited perspective it should become clear that British empiricism is far more
complex than the ‘standard account’ suggests. In particular, British empiricism
comprises much more than the trinity of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. This tradition
also includes dissenters from that lineage as well descendents who built upon the
Lockean tradition in creative ways. Although there are substantive differences
between the dissenters and the heirs of Locke’s original intellectual contributions
(as well as important differences between Locke and his intellectual descendents),
both groups retained much of the Lockean ethos, in the form of the normative
requirements of the “classical episteme,” even as they altered and sometimes
rejected some of Locke’s key doctrines.

Second, the use of Foucault’s analytical tools and the contextualization of the works
of Stewart and Mill delineates the linkages that connected Associationism and
Common Sense to one another as well as the links between the various problems
that Stewart and Mill investigated from within their respective philosophical
systems. Despite their doctrinal differences, at both the levels of ‘internal’ discourse
and ‘external’ socio-political relations, both Stewart and Mill shared very similar perspectives, methods, and goals. Far from being isolated from each other and their environments, both Associationism and Common Sense were in constant, if often indirect, interaction with one another. Via a shared discursive and socio-political environment, then, Associationism and Common Sense can be analyzed and evaluated in juxtaposition. Moreover, these same discursive and socio-political relations can be discerned within Associationism and Common Sense. The same discursive and socio-political forces that created the linkages between Associationism and Common Sense also motivated Stewart and Mill to investigate a wide range of human phenomena. As a result, both Stewart and Mill set out to create an integrated set of statements about the phenomena of human life and society that attempted to unite the most abstract discussions of mental phenomena to the most concrete efforts to address practical problems through the establishment of economic and educational policies and institutions.

Finally, the story of Stewart and Mill’s efforts to generate discourses on human life and society casts light on features of the discursive process itself. In particular, the very existence of two doctrinally distinct philosophical systems within the same discursive and socio-political setting suggests that forces that generate discursive products do not operate in a deterministic manner. Rather, the circulatory process that gives rise to discourse is filled with turbulence and eddies that can dramatically alter the trajectory of development of a given discourse even as it nurtures and
supports discursive development in general. Often the various discursive norms themselves are in conflict; there is after all, no reason *a priori* why an historically generated set of norms like visibility, ontological stasis, and utility should complement each other seamlessly. Discourse production is an active process in which these norms are fitted, as best as possible, to each other. Given the complexity of human phenomena and almost certain conflicts between discursive norms, efforts to construct discourses that conform perfectly to all normative demands will inevitably fail.

Nevertheless, it is this irreducible tension between discursive norms, and the inevitable failure to generate perfectly normative discourses, that plays a major role in the proliferation of discourses and ultimately accounts for the construction of doctrinally dissimilar discourses in similar discursive and socio-political environments. If discursive norms could be perfectly adhered to, then only one discursive statement would be permissible. All other discursive statements could only be constructed by violating the norms or by failing to fully express their demands. The philosophical fecundity of the “classical episteme” as well as the fecundity of any episteme, rests, therefore, upon its essential failure to circumscribe unambiguously the range of permissible discourses.
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