Violent Actors and Embedded Power: Exploring the Evolving Roles of Dons in Jamaica

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ABSTRACT

The Jamaican don is a non-state actor who wields considerable power and control inside that nation’s garrison communities. A don is a male figure, usually from the community in which he plays a leadership role. Garrisons in Jamaica have often emerged as neighborhoods that are don-ruled shadow versions of the official State. These are poor inner city communities characterized by homogeneous and, in some cases, over-voting patterns for one of Jamaica’s two major political parties: the Peoples National Party (PNP) or the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP). This dissertation explores the major roles dons played in Jamaican garrisons. It focused on one community in the downtown metro area of one of the nation’s cities. Additionally, it investigated the factors that account for the evolution of such roles performed by dons from the 1960s to the present. I used governance theories and the concept of embeddedness as an analytic framework to interpret the power and authority dons have in garrisons. Dons, as it turned out, perform four central roles in garrisons: security/protection, social welfare, partisan mobilization and law, order and conflict resolution via “jungle justice” measures. Different types of dons perform alternate mixes of these roles. The case study described here led me to develop a taxonomy of these informal community leaders by separating them into Mega, Area and Street Dons. I argue overall that dons are embedded governing authorities in Jamaican garrisons based on the socio-economic and political roles they carry out. By examining the responsibilities of dons in Jamaica, this analysis contributes to the literature on the activities of non-state criminal actors and their forms of influence on governance processes. The study suggests that it may now be appropriate to re-think the nature of governance and the actors we broadly assume are legitimate holders of power and authority in developing nation contexts.
Dedication

To my parents, brothers and the people of Brown Villa, Jamaica.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
DONs: DESPOTS OF JAMAICAN GARRISONS

Introduction

Since its independence in 1962, Jamaica’s democratic system of government and governing has not had a reversal or collapse. The country’s democracy however, has been dogged by rampant corruption (especially among the police), political and gang related violence. The country’s political history reveals an unholy union between elected officials and informal community leaders known as dons. The status and control dons tend to have in Jamaican garrisons are broadly analogous to the power of a dictatorial ruler.

Such informal community leaders, today typically have partisan ties, have benefitted financially from the narcotics trade in the Americas, and on occasion have used the material wealth they acquired thereby to provide socio-economic services to garrison residents. A don has significant power based on his command of a gang and his access and willingness to use guns and violence as a means of creating fear and acquiring respect inside garrisons. The term ‘garrison’ was first used in the Jamaican context by Carl Stone (1985) to describe inner city communities characterized by bounded political partisan loyalties among residents for either the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) or the Peoples National Party (PNP). Violence of various sorts has long characterized these communities.

To date, dons have been male and have usually hailed from the communities in which they play governance roles. I did not read about or learn during interviews of any female
dons. This fact raises the important issue of masculinity and violence in Jamaica, but also the wider Caribbean and Latin America region (Baird 2012; Chevannes, 2002; Moser and Bronkhost, 1999). Boys and men in Jamaica especially in urban and some rural communities are socialized differently from girls and women in the nation. Many Jamaican boys are acculturated to the use of force and to the perceived significance of exercising control over the home to “become men” (Chevannes, 2002).

The use of force and violence against women and other men are also features of the male masculinization process in other Latin American and Caribbean countries. Jamaican boys are allowed to go onto the streets and the “corner” to interact with other boys and men who are considered dominant in their communities while girls are expected to stay inside the home. On the streets and in the “yards”\(^1\) of Jamaican garrisons young boys and men learn social codes of bravado and machismo. The don is often viewed as the consummate male, the “real big man\(^2\)”; he controls his gang, several women, has financial power and demonstrates physical violence and prowess as a marker of his hegemonic position. This background of masculinity and gender is important to attaining a full understanding of who dons are, the status they have in garrisons and the roles they perform in such communities.

During the first decade of Jamaica’s independence, 1962-1970, elected representatives used dons as agents of political enforcement and mass mobilization inside garrison communities (Sives, 2002). By the 1980s, however, the roles dons performed in

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\(^1\)A yard in Jamaica refers to the physical living space of a home(s). In some inner city and garrison communities, several families share one yard.

\(^2\)This phrase is used in Jamaica to refer to men considered to be dominant males on account of their sexual prowess, financial strength and the respect they have among their peers and within their communities. The phrase is popular among the lower middle and working class.
their neighborhoods changed and expanded beyond the realm of partisan politics. This study investigates the multiple roles that different types of dons play today in Jamaica’s garrison communities. It also develops a fresh interpretation of “who” dons are, how they evolved over time and the different sources of funds they use to finance themselves and the gangs they lead. I use the example of one Jamaican garrison community, Brown Villa,\(^3\) to investigate the theoretical and empirical targets of this study.

The Jamaican don role has evolved over time and the functions these community figures perform in garrisons symbolize how the state can lose its central authority and legitimacy within localities. There is no single sort of don. Instead, there are different types of dons, and they play different roles in the garrisons in which they are active. In a Jamaica Gleaner article entitled “The origins and roles of Dons,” Rattary (2001), for example, noted:

The word “Don” is of Spanish origin (1523). It is from the Latin 'dominus', which means master or lord. When prefixed to the Christian name, it becomes a title for a Spanish nobleman, gentleman, and a person of consequence, or university professor. We, however, are more familiar with the term as it refers to an Italian Mafia boss, a respected, powerful leader in that (originally) Sicilian secret criminal society (Rattary, 2001).\(^4\)

Garrisons in Jamaica have often emerged as don-ruled shadow versions of the official State. These are shanty inner city communities characterized by homogeneous and, in some cases, patterns of over-voting for one of Jamaica’s two major political parties, the PNP and the JLP. Over-voting refers to fraudulent patterns of voting in which there is more than a 100 percent voter turnout in a constituency; ballots sometimes are cast for dead persons and one party tends to dominate electoral results, typically gaining more

\(^3\)Brown Villa is a pseudonym used to protect the confidentiality of respondents I interviewed during the research for this effort, conducted between August 1 and December 31, 2011 in Jamaica.

than 70 percent of total votes reported. Garrisons, the sites of this phenomenon, are characterized by governmental neglect, while at the same time containing populations with deep partisan identities. These ghettos, in the classic sense of that term, often experience violence related to gang turf rivalries, partisan warfare and contests concerning the dominance or relative status of a don or multiple dons. Many residents in these communities live below the poverty line and experience economic and social squalor.

International human rights watchdog agencies, such as Amnesty International, consider Jamaica--like other countries in the Americas region including Honduras, Colombia and Mexico--to be a high violence society in which a large percentage of crime is linked to drug trafficking, gang wars and political violence. High homicide rates, poverty, growing levels of inequality, high youth unemployment, judicial systems that fail to work effectively and corrupt systems of law enforcement have paved the way for non-state criminal actors to embed themselves within the nation’s garrison communities. Homicide statistics from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNOC) place Jamaica among the 10 top countries with the highest homicide rates per 100,000 people. Violence and crime related to drug trafficking, extortion rackets, human trafficking and a gang culture that fuels turf warfare across neighborhoods has had a destabilizing impact on democratic governance and the authority of the state. Indeed, in some instances, non-state actors have overtaken local garrisons and developed independent spheres of legitimacy, power and control. Non-state community actors are at the center of the high

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5 See the UNOC 2010 report. It notes that Honduras had an 82.1 % homicide rate, Cote d ‘Ivoire (Ivory Coast) had a 56.9 % based on 2008 data, and Jamaica had a 52.1 % homicide rate. Taken from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html
homicide rates, gang culture and pervasiveness of violence in these societies. The Jamaican don is a prominent example of this sort of non-state actor, who also appears to exist in other Caribbean and South American nations experiencing similar conditions.

According to governance scholars, the nation-state now exists in a transnational environment in which non-state actors are playing economic and political roles within its local communities (Briquet, 2010; Holston, 2008; Strange, 1996). These participants come from the private sector (market), civil society organizations and trans-national governance bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In addition, non-state entities include influential local and transnational organized criminal networks that exert considerable political and economic pressure of their own (Bowling, 2010; Briquet, 2010; Schendel, 2005). Indeed, Duffy has argued that the state in many developing nations is becoming increasingly criminalized and “shadow versions” of it are being created via globalization processes (2010). She has investigated, for example, how the drug trade, money laundering and offshore banking services have contributed to the criminalization of the Belizean state (Duffy in Briquet, 2010). The academic literature on dons and the nature of their relationship to garrison residents has received limited coverage, especially within the context of these larger trends. A central objective of this inquiry is to contribute empirically and theoretically to the fledging literature on Jamaican dons per se. By examining the roles they play in Jamaica, my work also contributes to the overall literature on the activities of non-state criminal actors and their influence on governance processes. My inquiry addressed the following questions:

i. (a) How have dons emerged and evolved over time in Jamaica [1960s-2012]?
(b) What factors account for the evolution of dons’ roles?
ii. What socio-economic and political roles do don(s) play inside the garrison community of Brown Villa?

Research Approach

I employ a qualitative research design, which describes the realities of life in one of Jamaica’s garrison communities and the role(s) that dons play inside it. Qualitative research is one form of social investigation that pays attention to the perspectives of people in a particular social setting. The single instrumental case of Brown Villa provides an opportunity to examine the roles dons have played and the influence they wield in garrison communities across Jamaica. Chapter 3 details the research site and the rationale for choosing it. However, I will say here Brown Villa offered a distinctive opportunity for analysis of several key concerns under investigation. The community is comprised of five smaller districts that exhibit variations in the character of and the roles that dons perform.

Background and Rationale

The Jamaican don is a non-state actor who wields considerable power and control in garrisons. These individuals contribute to the social instability that characterizes these inner-city neighborhoods as they are at the center of organized crime, such as drug and gun trafficking, extortion rackets, robbery, international lottery frauds and even human trafficking. In the Jamaican garrison context, dons/gangs often commit violent acts associated with political conflicts and turf warfare. Some also, however, perform social welfare and economic roles in their communities that afford them legitimacy and a measure of authority among residents. The problem that confronts the Jamaican state is that dons have enjoyed almost complete dominance in garrison communities across the

\footnote{Derived from information gathered from the Jamaica Constabulary Force [JCF] as well as from respondents interviewed within the JCF, NGOs and residents who work with community-based organizations (CBOs) in the research site under study.}
Kingston and Metropolitan Area (the parishes of Kingston, St. Andrew and St. Catherine) from as early as the late 1960s. Dons’ dominance is reflected in the strong popular support they receive in garrisons, especially among youths. Dons, as one respondent said during an interview session, “decide who lives and who dies, they decide when the war starts and when it should end” (Interview, August 8, 2011: VT021). Dons emerged out of the politically polarized periods of national independence in Jamaica and the proxy ideological and political conflicts of the Cold War. Scholarship and interviewee responses indicate that dons are creatures of Jamaica’s polarized partisan history. They tend to dominate garrison communities that suffer from poor infrastructure development, limited social services and inadequate delivery of public goods, such as sanitation and roads. In several garrisons, dons have filled a vacuum left by the state. In Brown Villa, for example, residents interviewed pointed out that when they want recourse to justice for criminal acts, such as rape or robbery, they are more willing to turn to dons than to the police. With regard to employment opportunities, residents contend that they often receive jobs from dons to work as task laborers on construction sites or to be workers for dons’ transportation (taxi/bus services), grocery and retail clothing businesses. However, developments since May 2010 in Jamaica indicate that the state is now making a concerted attempt to re-establish its control over garrisons. The operation to extradite Coke spurred an island-wide joint military and police campaign to uproot gangs and dons

—I use pseudonyms to identity those I interviewed. A full list is provided in Chapter 4.

8In May 2010 the Jamaican state sent a joint military-police group into Tivoli Gardens, a garrison community in Western Kingston. The incursion was carried out to serve an extradition warrant request by the United States for then accused ‘drug-lord’ Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke on gun and drug trafficking charges. Coke was subsequently extradited to the U.S. and is now incarcerated in the state of New York. Dudus became don of Tivoli Gardens in the 1990s. He took over as the don from his father Jim Brown, who had previously led the notorious ‘Showa Posse.’
in garrison neighborhoods. The national initiative led to a decline in Jamaica’s homicide and violent crime rates. However, the incursion into Tivoli resulted in the death of 73 persons and the recovery of only four weapons. Scores of residents and several local human rights groups, including Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), decried what they considered the inhumane tactics of the police and military units. According to the JFJ, the national government’s respect for human rights has plummeted since the May 2010 incursion. In 2010 alone, the police and military accounted for one fifth of Jamaica’s violent deaths (Gomes, April 7, 2011). I address the issue of police brutality and state violence more fully in chapters 2, 4 and 5 below.

The politico-social historical setting

Edie (1991) argues that to understand the deeply interconnected relationship among Jamaica’s elite classes, political parties and urban inner city communities, analysts must first understand the nation’s colonial and post-colonial political history. British colonialism in the Caribbean had the effect of producing political systems based on patronage, a polarized partisan political culture and the monopolization of power by economic and political elites. Edie maintains that a patron-client relationship characterized politics in the decolonization and post-independence [after 1962] periods in Jamaica. In From Manley to Seaga: The Persistence of Clientelist Politics in Jamaica, Edie argued that political violence in Jamaica resulted from a patronage system in which both patrons and clients made material and non-material exchanges. Officials of either major political party, the Peoples National Party-PNP or the Jamaica labor Party-JLP, served as patrons and they received political support and assent from their community

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clients who in turn gained access to state largesse and political “pork.” With citizens receiving benefits from the patron, they engaged in violent confrontations with rival and opposing groups in order to maintain access to those resources. “JLP or PNP” membership entailed social connotations and forged communal identities. One’s political affiliation could not be detached from the community in which one resided or from one’s trade union affiliation; they were inseparable (Edie, 1991). Partisan politics became a part of the identity of many Jamaicans, especially those who resided in garrisons, and the identifications those ties forged helped to foster the development of political tribalism.

Anthony Payne (1994) has argued that by 1980, groups participated in violent confrontations in which “both political parties organized their own-armed gangs as the means to defend their supporters’ access to state patronage” (1994; p.2).

As this argument suggests, dons in Jamaica have played the roles of political enforcer and area leader for one of the two major political parties in garrison neighborhoods. During the 1960s and 1970s, dons functioned in these central roles on behalf of their party bosses. For their efforts, these individuals received public contracts and spoils; that is, the reward of government contracts for the dons’ support of party bosses. They also received protection from police investigations and arrest as political party leaders ensured their compensation for services rendered. However, a change took place in 1980 as the two main parties in Jamaica reacted to global economic changes. The economic ideology of neo-liberalism\(^{10}\) and the resulting structural adjustment policies of

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\(^{10}\) Neo-liberalism is a particular understanding of governance and what constitutes an appropriate relationship of capitalism and democratic institutions in a mixed political economy, which first attained prominence in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It argues for market-driven economies with minimal state involvement. In this research, I hypothesize that neo-liberal programs of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPS) facilitated the embedding of dons in garrisons as the Jamaican state ‘hollowed out’ and grew increasingly weaker in its capacity to provide social and economic opportunities for its citizens, especially those residing in garrisons.
the International Monetary Fund [IMF], for example, meant that the Jamaican state had to scale back on its social welfare programs. Since the late 1970s (1978-80) successive governments in Jamaica, as elsewhere in the Americas, have curtailed or otherwise sought to minimize their footprint in governing the country (Harvey, 2005). Consequently, the two major political parties have enjoyed a much-diminished stock of patronage to extend to their surrogates and enforcers.

In response, by the early 1980s, dons began to engage in a range of other legitimate and illegitimate activities that enabled them to reduce their dependence on their traditional partisan bosses. With their involvement in the drug trade between South America and North America/UK, for example, dons became wealthier and had access to more guns and arms. The money and weapons they acquired from drug trafficking allowed some of them to play social welfare and community security roles; they now had the capacity to arm their neighborhood turfs with hired militia and supply them with handguns and high-powered weapons.11 The emergence of these new roles facilitated the don’s increasing standing in garrison communities. Some of these informal community leaders filled the vacuum left by the retreating neo-liberal Jamaican state and began to play roles and perform functions the state was either unwilling or unable to perform. Rattary (2001) has commented on the socio-economic embeddedness12 of these non-state actors in their “home” garrisons by arguing that dons, “are the by-products of our country’s socio-economic and bio-political transgressions. The Dons have flourished

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11 See Anthony Harriott’s Inaugural Professorial Lecture, The Challenge of Controlling Violence in Jamaica and the High Violence Societies of the Caribbean (Arawak Publications, April 24, 2008). Harriott argued that a “subculture of violence” exists in Jamaica in which the gun is glorified. Similarly, several interview respondents pointed out that the gun is a symbol of power and control for the don and his foot soldiers (gang members) in garrisons.

12 This concept forms part of the analytical approach I use to interpret the power that dons have wielded in Jamaica’s garrisons.
because the inner-city people have chosen to symbolically co-exist with them as a means of survival” (Gleaner, December 11, 2001).  

Dons became the new hegemonic figures in garrisons during the 1980s and that trend continued in succeeding decades. The ‘neo-liberal turn’ in governmental policies and governance across the Americas in the 1980s and 1990s and the simultaneous rise of the Colombian cocaine trade, fostered this turn of events. Johnson and Soeters (2008) have observed that the “radical shifts in the global economy after 1980 had the effect of further shifting the power dynamics in Jamaica’s slum dwellings.” Neo-liberal shifts, they have argued, made “way for the consolidation of a notorious dynasty of dons and the retreat of civil leadership” in Jamaica’s garrisons (2008; p. 173). Jones (2002) and Sives (2002) have also reported an increase in drug related-gang and gun violence in the same period. This research builds on these analyses by investigating the connections between the political and economic evolution of dons and the functions they now perform, and how these align with the roles of specific types of dons.

The Jamaican Garrison Environment

Figueroa (1996, 2004) has argued that Jamaican garrisons are “totalitarian space[s]” overseen by dons, also referred to as ‘area leaders’ or ‘strong men.’ I distinguish in this research, however, between an area leader, or strong man and a don. My work suggests that garrison residents’ view dons as evolving from area leaders. It is important to see these as overlapping categories as, in some communities, residents accept the don as an area leader. A signature characteristic of the Jamaican garrison community is its

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14 The title “area leader” has a distinctly political partisan character; that is, these men have traditionally acted as intermediaries between the state (political parties) and residents of garrisons.
homogenized party affiliation expressed through community member bloc voting behavior and partisan mobilization (Figueroa & Sives, 2004). Chapter 2 explores the similarities and differences among Jamaican garrisons and other urban slum communities in Latin America. The partisan ‘roots’ of garrisons is a distinguishing feature that sets Jamaican urban slum communities apart from other similar neighborhoods in the Americas.

A report from the National Committee on Political Tribalism (hereafter referred to as the Kerr Report, 1996), for example, identified the garrison as a political as well as socio-cultural problem in Jamaica. The Committee’s report concluded, “The most dysfunctional manifestation of the process of political tribalism has been the development of the garrison within constituencies (p.5).” It noted further, “a garrison as the name suggests, is a political stronghold, a veritable fortress completely controlled by a party” (Kerr Report, 1996, p.5). Garrisons are politically manufactured communities that arose from:

- The development of housing districts (in the 1960s and 1970s) by different governments in Jamaica to secure party support;
- The homogenization of voting patterns by pushing out opposition (minority) party supporters. Gang leaders (sometimes dons) under the orders of political officials; cleansed communities of residents that did not support the party of the elected representative for that neighborhood;
- The ongoing use of strong-arm tactics and violence to secure a solid block of votes for one party in a particular community.

**Drug Trafficking and the Transformation of Jamaican Dons**

Crime groups traffic drugs and small arms through the porous national borders of the Caribbean region along three main routes: 1) Western Colombia to Central America and Mexico, 2) Mexico into the United States and 3) Colombia to Jamaica to the
Bahamas and into the United States (U.S). The main transshipment points for cocaine, marijuana and small arms in the region are Puerto Rico, the Bahamas and Jamaica (Tulchin and Espach 2000). Consequently, the Caribbean is a crucial geographic corridor for the United States ‘war on drugs’; it is the ‘transit zone’ between South America and North America. Griffith (1997, 2004) and others, including S.H Decker and M.T. Chapman (2008), maintain that the Caribbean is, “an important area for understanding drug smuggling because of its proximity to source and destination countries as well as its long history as a site for smuggling illegal goods and for piracy” (Decker & Chapman 2008, p. 55).

Along with its long history of illegal transshipment and piracy, the Caribbean has small and vulnerable economies that offer opportunities for drug smuggling. For example, a 2008 study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNOC) reported that despite successful interception measures, the Caribbean remains a significant corridor for drug trafficking and gun smuggling because of its historical, language, commercial and tourist ties to consumer countries to the North. Central and South America (especially criminal elements in Colombia and Mexico) are the dominant drug trafficking players across the Americas. The Caribbean corridor is important to the ‘producer state’ (producers in countries that grow and manufacture illicit drugs such as marijuana and cocaine) traffickers. Drug dealers transshipped an estimated 10 tons of cocaine through Jamaica in 2005 and the United Nations Office on Drugs ranked the nation in the top six ‘source countries’ for cannabis resin [marijuana] from 2004 to 2006 (UNODC, 2008). The Dominican Republic, meanwhile, according to a 2008 UNOC Report, “is being used as a command, control and communications center for drug
operations in the Caribbean…It is a place to store drugs before its onward shipment to Puerto Rico and the United States.”

Drug trafficking in the Caribbean region connects Jamaica to a larger transnational political economy. Dons in Jamaica have engaged in drug trafficking and transshipment enterprises from as early as the 1980s. Sives (2002) has argued that the drug trade between South and North America and Europe has allowed Jamaican dons to enrich themselves. Their involvement in the drug trade facilitated a shift from their near complete dependence on political parties for status and resources to a more self-reliant and autonomous standing. According to Sives (2002), dons have changed from being ‘political’ in their orientations to being much more drug focused (pp.66-89). Drug trafficking helped to enrich and empower dons through the money and guns they were able to acquire from dealing with producers, such as the Colombian drug cartels for whom they served as protectors of cocaine coming through Jamaican ports in route to North America and the United Kingdom.

The 2000s saw a new development as a “gun for drugs” trade emerged between Jamaica and Haiti. According to Jamaican police reports, that exchange has increased the stockpile of guns available to criminal groups and gangs. The advent and impact of the Haitian-Jamaican drugs for guns trade is an important research finding. Chapter 5 provides evidence concerning the influence of drug and gun trafficking on the power of dons in garrison communities. The association among drugs, dons and garrisons in Jamaica highlights the transnational impact of organized crime on diverse and dispersed

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15 See the United Nation’s Office on Drugs and Crime October 2008 publication entitled, “The threat of Narco-trafficking in the Americas,” pp.11-12.
borders across the Americas region. As one senior police interviewee remarked, “Crime today has no borders” (Interview, October 13, 2011: VT023).

The Don’s Power: Evolution, Typology and Roles

Weber (1978) has defined power as “the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action” (p.926). Power then, implies one’s or a group’s capacity to exercise control and domination over another. One has power when he/she has the capacity to get another person to act in a particular way; this ability is supported by the use of sanctions—whether negative or positive. In some cases, a person may have legitimate grounds upon which to exercise power; the state using law enforcement, for example, has the ‘right’ to undertake that responsibility. Hindess (1996) has grappled with the concept of power and suggested that it involves both the capacity and the right to exercise control. Power involves both elements of coercion and consent. In this regard, Hindess concludes, “social power, then, is a matter of domination on the one hand and collective organization on the other” (1996; p.7). I argue that Jamaican dons are embedded governing figures that have acquired power and a measure of authority in their communities over time. They have been in some cases entrusted with power with the active consent of garrison residents.

Raven and French (1958) developed a five-point basis for evaluating ‘social power’ several decades ago: reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power and expert power. Their analysis of coercive and legitimate power applies to the analysis of dons and garrisons in Jamaica. In their view, coercive power results from one person’s ability to sanction another negatively for non-compliance with their orders or wish (wishes). They contend legitimate power emerges when a person or group is
believed to have the right to exercise control over another. The use of force by those who possess legitimate power is appropriate and in some cases necessary (for example, by the police to protect the public). Dons have power in garrison communities; they sometimes use violence or its threat to compel residents to comply with their orders and to respect their status. Over time, some dons have managed to build a relationship with the residents of “their” garrisons based on reciprocal trust; they provide welfare benefits to neighborhood inhabitants and in return, those residents accord dons legitimacy and authority. William Gorgan (2012) has argued that the case of Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke neatly reflected the social power of Jamaican dons. He has contended that, “years of Coke's patronage to the community had given the don an intensely loyal following among some of Tivoli's residents, at the same time creating an atmosphere of dependency on the gangster which permeated the garrison” (Gleaner, 2012).16

Types of Dons

I develop a typology of Jamaican dons below that distinguishes among Mega Dons, Area Dons and Street Dons. This taxonomy is important since it is imperative to be clear that not all garrisons have the same kinds of dons. The category of ‘don’ is not homogeneous and its appropriate identification requires contextual analysis. A Mega-Don is able to perform a wide range of roles in his garrison because of his access to large sums of money, resources, personnel and an arsenal of weapons. Many residents view this kind of don as a savior to fatherless boys, to single mothers and to young men and women who find it difficult to gain employment. The Mega Don has strong partisan connections, and is very rich and operates multiple businesses, both legitimate and illegitimate. These

16Article can be retrieved from the Gleaner’s website at http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20120112/lead/lead3.html
individuals receive political contracts from the state to repair roads, build bridges and construct homes. His power transcends any single garrison and he enjoys strong network connections with law enforcement officials (especially the police), the business community and usually has transnational associations as well. Internationally, the Mega Don accesses overseas markets for drugs and gun trafficking. These individuals exercise geographical jurisdiction in more than one garrison community; Christopher Coke, for example, controlled several satellite communities in addition to his garrison “headquarters,” Tivoli Gardens.

The Area Don, meanwhile, also has strong partisan ties and considerable wealth, usually gained from drug trafficking, and from legitimate sources, including government contracts. The principal difference between the Mega and the Area Don is that the latter tends to control a specific community or territory. The Area Don does not have the strong transnational links and resource base (money and guns) that the Mega Don can access and activate. In fact, the data gathered for this research suggest that some Area and Street Dons report to Mega Dons. That is, some Area Dons have network associations and partnerships with Mega Dons. In Brown Villa, interviewees pointed out that one don in their community (I classify him as an Area don) had business connections with a Mega don from an adjoining community. I say more on the relationships among different types of dons in Chapters 4 and 5. Area dons often have dominance over one geographic location.

Finally, the Street Don is, as the name suggests, a lower level community leader. These individuals control a street or streets in a garrison community. The site chosen for

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17 See the National Report on Political Tribalism (1996) as well as the Task Force on Crime Report (2002). These accounts point out that ‘political contracts’ are a major source of funding for dons and their organized criminal gangs.
this study had Street Dons who played minimal welfare roles in their communities in comparison to the community’s past and current Area dons. I want to be clear in noting that Mega dons differ primarily from Area dons in their ability to exercise cross-community power. The Street Don, meanwhile, has limited funds and very few guns at his disposal. One interview respondent observed, ‘gun-sharing’ and ‘renting’ is prominent among street gangs and dons (Interview, September 1, 2011: VT006). These gang leaders have partisan connections, but their interaction with political actors such as Members of Parliament (MPs) is episodic and intensifies as elections near. Street dons have associations with, and are in most cases appointed by, more senior Area or Mega Dons to control specific turf. These territories can be of economic significance, such as bus parks and business districts. They can also have political importance, as dons still provide services to partisan actors in exchange for government contracts and minimal surveillance from law enforcement officials (police).

I have introduced this typology here because it represents a conceptual and empirical addition to the literature on garrisons and dons in Jamaica. I address how such non-state actors in slum communities have been able to attach and entrench themselves below. Colak and Pearce (2009) in their examination of communities in Brazil and Guatemala have labeled inner city neighborhoods that reflect similar patterns of violence and poverty to that evidenced in Jamaica’s garrisons, “parallel communities” (pp.4–6). They argue that such communities can emerge where there is a strong state (Brazil) or a weak one (Guatemala). The key characteristic of these areas is that residents do not rely on the state for their security or protection. They contend:

In these communities, the State is normally not capable of providing basic services, including security, and its intervention is often intermittent, reactive and
disciplinary rather than protective. One of the characteristics of these parallel communities is that State institutions such as the police are not the main, or best equipped, or even desirable providers of protection. Alternative actors normally connect to lucrative illegal or informal economic activities, and to facilitate these, they replace the State and often act interchangeably as coercive ‘protectors’ for some sectors of the population creating protection rackets\(^{18}\) (Colak & Pearce 2009; p.5).

The Jamaican case, based on the findings in Brown Villa, reveals that dons play similar roles of protection and security in their garrison neighborhoods. I view garrison communities as shadow versions of the state rather than parallel communities as Colak & Pearce contend. These communities are mini states with localized systems of welfare, dispute resolution, law, order and security. The issue of a hollowed state (that is, the state’s decision to retreat and not to provide these services) is a major theme that emerged from this research. Below I describe the main roles dons in the Brown Villa and neighboring garrisons perform, according to my interviewees.

**Don(s) Roles**

The current literature on ‘Jamaican dons’ per se is limited; there is more work on the socio-economic and political characteristics of garrisons (Figueroa, 1992; Harriott and Sives, 2004; Stone, 1973, 1980). Previous studies reference dons as a part of their larger garrison environment. While I provide a contextual analysis of the garrison, my central focus is the evolution of dons’ roles and how they influence the communities in which they live and operate.\(^ {19}\) Electoral mobilization and political intimidation (two functions traditionally undertaken by dons) are comprehensively examined in the don-garrison literature (Edie, 1990; Sives 1996, 2002, 2010; Stone, 1986). However, other

\(^{18}\) In their article, the authors argue that ‘security from below’ (from non-state actors) is deemed more effective and legitimate than from above—the State.

\(^{19}\) See the works of Johnson & Soeters (2008); and Rapley, J. (2003). These studies are among the few that make the don the central unit of analysis.
roles this inquiry found to be significant for some dons, including provision of social welfare and dispute resolution, have received much less attention in existing scholarship. My research identified four central roles that dons carry out in the garrison community of Brown Villa:

- Community Welfare;
- Security and Protection;
- Partisan Mobilization; and
- Law, Order and Conflict Resolution via Jungle Justice*

At the research design stage, I proposed that dons perform the first three listed roles inside garrisons. I found out, as I conducted the field research, that only some dons performed those roles. I discovered the extent and character of their involvement in these activities through the data collection and analysis process. I did not originally expect dons to play roles in law, order and conflict resolution via jungle justice. As I show in chapter 5, this role has enabled dons of all types to use force and fear as a means of embedding themselves in community governance. Not all types of dons perform all four roles. The Street Don, for example, rarely performs welfare roles in his community, unlike his Area or Mega-Don counterparts.

Roles refer to the social, political and economic functions carried out by individuals, groups or organizations. Scholars note that roles are contingent upon social situations and that they are in many ways socially constructed. Historical forces shape roles and they evolve over time (Montgomery 1994; 1998). Dons in Jamaica derive their legitimacy, popularity and power from their capacities to deliver material and immaterial ‘goods’ to garrison residents. According to Rapley (2003), dons’ roles and functions are
shaped in part by a necessity to please community inhabitants. He believes that the power of the garrison don must be “set against the fact that his constituents demand much for their loyalty…more than anyone, the don fears his own people” (2003; p.27). The research findings support this view in part as some dons, especially the Mega and Area Dons, are highly invested in securing their legitimacy and popularity among residents as a means of ensuring their longevity.

**Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical anchor of this study is embedded governance. Governance refers to the process and act of ruling. It is not solely government-centered, but instead involves also the actions of non-state entities such as non-governmental (NGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and industries in delivering public goods and services (Kitthananan, 2006; Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 2000; Rosenau, 2000). Governance and governing also involves the input of perverse and criminal (or criminalized) players. Several scholars, especially those that study Latin America, include the influence of criminal actors on the processes of governance within and across the borders of the state (Arias, 2006; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007; Jones and Rodgers, 2009). Other scholars, such as Gambetta (1993), Gounev and Ruggiero (2012) and Volkov (2002), have investigated how organized criminal groups have influenced the structure of politics and governance in Europe (especially in Italy and Eastern Europe). The literature on the Caribbean region minimally explores the impact that such criminal actors have on governance, especially at the local community level. This study on Jamaican dons addresses that lacuna in the literature.
The neo-liberal turn in international politics created what some scholars refer to as ‘governance voids’ in the developing world (Koonings & Kruijt, 2007). The ‘hollowing out’ of the Jamaican state via the economic and political changes that accompanied neo-liberal structural adjustment policies [SAPS] reduced the material leverage of the nation’s government to provide its garrison constituents satisfactory public services. It was not business as usual for the Jamaican political elite, and they began to lose the firm grip they had enjoyed over their garrison clients in the 1960s and 1970s. The governance literature (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009; Stivers, 2008; Matthews, 1998) suggests that a ‘power shift’ is taking place at the national and international levels, in which the state is losing its monopoly of control over its national borders. Pierre (2000) argues that state-centric analyses of power and authority within the nation-state are not as potent as they used to be. Economic globalization has given rise to non-state actors from the market and civil society that now influence decision-making and governance at the international, national and sub-national levels.

Strange (1996) has argued that globalization has diffused state power among non-governmental actors. She posits that the state is retreating from its position of authority and control in the economy, public service delivery, and security. She has concluded that, “criminal organizations have stepped in to fill states’ regulatory and governance roles through marketized and informal systems of control” (see Strange in Arias, 2006; p. 41). The ‘legal–illegal nexus’ spurred by the changes resulting from neo-liberalism (Ruggiero, 2002, 2012) highlights the interface between organized criminal actors and institutions of the economy and the state. Ruggiero and others, including Volkov (2002) and Tilly (1985), contend that organized criminal groups/actors are social organizations that
engage in multiple ‘transactions’ with various legitimate actors. These authors encourage analysts to view groups such as the Russian or the Italian Mafiosi as criminal networks that include several actors from both the legitimate and the illegal world. Ruggiero refers to them as “fuzzy criminal actors” (2002). Reflecting on the Nicaraguan case with the Pandillas (non-state criminal gangs) Rodgers (2009) concluded these actors, “constitute a form of sub-political social structuration in contemporary urban Nicaragua, rather than the source of chaotic disorder they are generally perceived to represent (2009; p.41). The roles that dons perform in Jamaican garrisons mimic the “subpolitical social structuration” Rodgers observed in Nicaragua.

The porous nature of the Caribbean\(^{20}\) and the governance voids among governments in the region gave rise to criminal non-state activities and actors. It is not a coincidence that dons began to engage in cocaine trafficking in the 1980s around the time the Jamaican state began to experience neoliberal ‘shocks’ (Klein, 2007) of a minimized welfare program and greater exposure to free market capitalism. Neoliberal shocks created governance voids, especially in local communities in the region. Jamaican garrisons were no exception. Dons then began to provide garrisons with services, including security of property and human safety in the absence of action, or the inefficient response of the local police. Jamaican dons slowly attained embedded status, derived from a confluence of political, social and economic factors. Chapters 2, 4 and 5 probe these influences.

\(^{20}\) Griffith (1997&2004) contends that the Caribbean region’s geography facilitates the rise of drug and gun trafficking. In his view, the mountainous topography of states like Haiti and Jamaica facilitates clandestine drug operations (planting of marijuana and the construction of concealed airstrips). See Griffith (1997, 2004).
Montgomery (1998) has argued that embeddedness aims to describe and explain social relationships built on, “mutual cooperation and calculative trust” (p.93). He posits that actors are not atomized individuals, but rather are locked into social networks that shape their actions. As he has argued, “embeddedness typically involves long-term relationships characterized by mutual cooperation and trust in spite of the potential for opportunism… I trust you because I calculate that your short-run benefit from an opportunistic defection is outweighed by your long-run benefit from continued cooperation” (Montgomery, 1998; p.93). Calculated trust (though in some measure perverse, some may argue) is an important dimension of the embedded power base dons developed among garrison residents, with elected officials and other agencies of the state (e.g. police). Based on the roles dons address in garrisons over-time, most residents learn to invest their trust in these individuals who feed them, provide economic opportunities and help to ensure their survival. They invest trust in the don who protects them from outsiders considered threats to themselves and to their community’s security. Garrison residents endow their dons with “legitimate power” as a form of reward to them (dons) for helping to address their basic needs. Nonetheless, I argue below that this is not always the case in all garrisons. Some dons have to rely more on ‘coercive power’ in whole or in part to embed themselves in their communities.

I use the concept of embeddedness to describe and interpret the relationship between dons and the residents of Brown Villa. It explains the popular appeal some dons have among people living in garrisons. Originally posited by Karl Polanyi, the concept of embeddedness is used by sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists seeking to analyze criminological phenomena. Ghezzi and Mingione (2007) argue that it takes into
account the conditions and contexts within which social action takes place: “embeddedness expresses the notion that social actors can be understood and interpreted only within relational, institutional and cultural contexts and cannot be seen as atomized decision-makers maximizing their own utilities” (2007; p.11).

According to Ghezzi and Mingione, embedded modes of social behavior and relationships are connected to specific spatial, historical and cultural elements. This observation highlights the empirical as well as analytical value of an embedded analysis of the study of the roles played by Jamaican dons. Chevannes (2002) has argued that these informal community leaders sometimes serve as role models and are cultural icons, particularly among inner city youth. Dons personify the glamour and prestige associated with ‘ghetto’ life²¹ (the term used in the Jamaican lexicon to describe garrisons). He contended that in many ways dons are folk heroes to some garrison residents. Dons, such as Christopher “Dudus” Coke and Donald “Zeeks” Phipps, enjoyed strong cultural appeal and connections to the communities in which they played important governance roles.²²

It is important to note that not all urban inner city communities in Jamaica are garrisons. The political and gang-related violence that often characterize such communities are specific to some neighborhoods in the parishes of Kingston, St. Andrew and St. Catherine particularly. That is, dons do not exist and exercise power across all of the 14 parishes of Jamaica. These informal community leaders have localized authority and hegemony in garrisons in the parishes named. I believe, however, and information

²¹ The ‘glamor of ghetto’ life in the Jamaican context involves the ownership of expensive cars, motorbikes, fashionable clothing, and jewelry and for men, the “possession” of several women.

²²These men were the infamous area leaders and dons of the Western Kingston garrison communities of Matthews Lane (Zeeks) and Tivoli Gardens (Dudus). Both men are now incarcerated on drug, gun and murder related charges. They were both feared and loved by residents of the garrisons they governed and each had strong associational ties to the two major political parties in Jamaica—Zeeks: PNP and Dudus: JLP. I classify Zeeks as an Area Don and Dudus as a Mega Don.
from police reports indicates, that the don-garrison phenomenon is spreading to other urban areas in rural parishes of the country.\textsuperscript{23} That said, I caution readers and scholars (who wish to conduct further research concerning dons and garrisons in Jamaica) not to overgeneralize the don and garrison phenomenon, but instead to examine the conditions prevailing at each site investigated in order adequately to contextualize their findings.

\textbf{Chapter Outline}

This chapter has provided an overview of the problem that I sought to investigate, describe and interpret during the field research I conducted from July 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. By viewing dons as embedded governance actors inside Jamaica’s garrisons, this study sheds light on how non-state actors in the absence or weakness of the State can accrue cultural, political and economic power and authority. Chapter 2 reviews academic literature and public documents relevant to this study’s main concerns with governance, transnational organized crime and the State. The chapter elaborates on the theoretical framework introduced here. The community roles of dons changed along with the Jamaican state’s evolution. As such, I offer a critique and theorization of the state in chapter 2. Besides secondary sources, I also included information from newspaper articles (\textit{Gleaner} and \textit{Observer}) and reports of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNOC), national reports on crime and violence in Jamaica and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports on crime, violence and human rights issues in Jamaica and the Americas (for example, reports from Amnesty International) in the literature reviewed.

\textsuperscript{23} The parish of St. James, for example, located at the western end of the island, contains several rural farming communities. There are, however, some urbanized districts and neighborhoods in the city of Montego Bay that have been affected by gang related violence and street gangs and dons.
Chapter 3 describes the research site and the rationale for choosing it. In an effort to protect the confidentiality of those interviewed, I have employed a pseudonym as the name of the neighborhood I studied. I discuss this and other issues of confidentiality and limitations encountered during the field research in this chapter. In chapter 3 too, I outline and discuss the data collection strategies I employed. I also describe the types of interviews and sampling techniques I utilized. Finally, chapter 3 offers an overview of this study’s data analysis and interpretation procedures and strategies. Chapters 4 and 5 present the main analytic findings and interpretation of the research. I suggest a typology to describe and make sense of the roles dons play and the standing they enjoy in their communities. These chapters empirically underscore the aptness of the theoretical framework introduced in Chapters 1 and 2. In addition, chapter 4 provides an historical contextualization of Jamaica’s transition from its independence (1950s-62) to its post-independence period (after 1962) and how that historical experience fostered the rise of garrisons and dons. Scholarship on non-state criminal actors and their impacts on the state and on communities within nations is growing and these chapters (especially Chapter 5) represent my contribution to this ongoing discourse.

Chapter 6 offers a suggested road map for further development of the literature on the impact of non-state criminal actors on local governance at the community and sub-state levels. The chapter summarizes my research findings and suggests several policy options the Jamaican state might adopt to address the challenges associated with dons, gangs and garrisons. Breaking the partisan ties between different types of dons and elected officials is a first step in the process of dis-embedding these criminal leaders from garrisons. The process requires as well the cooperation of NGOs, INGOs and the state to
assist residents of Jamaica’s garrisons and to provide them suitable living spaces and employment opportunities.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE STATE:
POWER, LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL ACTORS

Introduction

Dons are governance figures embedded in garrisons. Previous studies have approached the issue of the power of Jamaican dons by contending that these roles arose from political leader–client relationships during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Edie, 1991, 1994; Sives, 1998; Stone 1986). Nonetheless, in my view, clientelism does not fully capture the temporal shifts in the relationship that dons have had with the state and with garrison residents’ in the post-1970s period. While not denying the role of clientelism, I seek to describe the dynamics of this phenomenon more completely by employing governance theories and the concept of embeddedness. I add to traditional governance frames the concept of embeddedness to describe and interpret how dons have managed to retain their spheres (economic, political and social) of power and control inside garrison communities, despite attempts by law enforcement agencies to remove them.

Harriott (2008) has suggested the Caribbean region has a sub-culture of violence that manifests itself in its high homicide rates, strong gang cultures and prevalence of organized crime. Dons long have used violence to instill fear among residents as a tool for sustaining their power in garrisons (Clarke, 2006; Rapley, 2003). Unbridled force and local versions of extreme justice (called jungle justice by garrison residents) are examples of coercive power that dons employ to intimidate residents and ensure their support (Levy, 2009). In Chapter 1, I mentioned the works of Raven and French (1958) and
Hindess (1996) on power. In particular, I singled out ‘coercive power’ and ‘reward power’ as appropriate ways of viewing the legitimacy, control and authority that dons tend to amass and exercise in Jamaica’s garrisons. Jones and Rodgers (2009) and Moser and Mellwaine (2001) have argued that in some Latin American countries gangs, such as the Maras in Guatemala and the Pandilleros in Nicaragua, have gained economic and military-style powers by engaging in drug trafficking activities. Like Jamaica’s dons and their associated gangs, the Maras and Pandilleros exercise considerable influence on the urban inner city communities in which their leaders and members reside.

Several scholars (Chevannes, 1992; Edie, 1991; Figueroa, 1992; Stone, 1985, 1986) have comprehensively addressed the political and socio-economic evolution of garrison communities in Jamaica. However, to date, only a handful of researchers have systematically studied how dons emerged and how their roles have evolved over time. Accordingly, this chapter explores the literature that examines the historical development of garrison communities in Jamaica with an eye to what it may suggest specifically concerning the evolution of dons. The history behind Jamaican dons begins with the political context (1960s into 1970s) of a deeply polarized and confrontational partisan democratic system (Edie, 1991).

A review of the scholarship on the garrison don contextualizes the rise of these leaders and the important temporal points and processes that facilitated significant changes in their social power and the different roles they perform over time. Dons’ roles have shifted from functions locked in a top-down dyadic relationship with partisan officials to becoming embedded powerful actors that have a variety of relationships with garrison residents. As their power base expanded, dons and partisan actors increasingly
came to act more as equals in their relationships. This change, which occurred in the 1980s, signaled that dons no longer simply were taking orders from elected officials (Sives, 2004). Instead, the relationship of these local figures with governmental and party leaders shifted in practice from a unidirectional form to a bi-directional one. Rapley’s (2003) research especially has suggested that the ‘tail is now wagging the dog’ as dons have become autonomous powerful figures to whom partisan actors now often defer. In some cases, dons and the gangs they lead literally have gained territorial control over garrisons from the official arms of the state (police and elected representatives). According to Rapley:

The dons, in short have carved out small fiefdoms for themselves where they can operate pretty much with impunity. … The problem for the police is not that law and order have broken down in garrisons, quite the contrary. It is that they (police) are trying to reclaim a role for their law and to restore or preserve what they can of their relevance (2003; p.28).

In Rapley’s view, the Jamaican state lost its capacity to “impose its sovereignty” in garrisons and had to “negotiate” such standing. Given this circumstance, the police often found themselves bargaining with dons to reassert the lost authority of the state (Rapley, 2003; pp.28-29).

Additionally, previous scholarship on the political history of Jamaica suggests strongly that the nation’s civic history has long been tied to polarized partisan identities and political violence. These have contributed to the creation of the urban spaces now called garrisons (Gunst, 1995; Lacey, 1977; Levy, 1996). The don emerged in these communities and their titles/roles evolved from being ‘rude bwoys’ in the 1960s to ‘area leaders’ during the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1980s, the term don described men who had significant, but informal leadership roles inside the inner city neighborhoods of the
Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA). Beyond their community leadership status, dons have long also been associated with garrison violence, gang culture, organized criminality and the inculcation of fear among residents (Headly, 1994; Harriott, 2002, 2004, 2008). The concept of embedded governance actors provides theoretical support to the proposition that dons are not merely pawns within patron-client networks. Instead, they have evolved into governing players themselves, who often operate outside the realm of patron-client associations and relationships alone.

The capacity of the state is closely associated with the literature on governance (Tilly, 2007), democracy, power, neo-liberalism, violence, and organized crime (drug and gun trafficking in particular). These topics are important to the concerns and objectives of this research; therefore, they form an important part of the literature reviewed. Studies on the state inform our collective understanding of the functions it performs and the constraints it faces in providing education, health care and security. Perspectives on power and democracy are important to the aims of this study too as they help to explain the sphere of control and authority that individuals and groups have within the borders of the state. Providing security to residents in garrison communities, granting them access to welfare support by sending children to school and giving cash allotments to household heads are functions built on democratic principles of governance (Dahl, 1999; Diamond and Morlino, 2005).

Violence and organized crime must be central concerns if one is to understand dons and garrisons. A review of the literature on violence, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, helps to contextualize the ‘roots’ of gang warfare and organized criminality such as extortion, drug and gun trafficking. I use these different literatures to
present the case that Jamaican dons, as have other non-state criminal actors elsewhere in the world (for example, the Italian mafia) become involved in local and international illegal activities as a means of prolonging their tenure as community power brokers.

The governance literature suggests that in situations such as that in Jamaica characterized by a failing, weak or absent state, other actors outside its official structures will emerge and perform its functions (Arias, 2006; Tilly, 2007). A similar phenomenon has occurred in other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in which the retreat of the state has given rise to criminal non-state actors assuming governance or governance-like roles inside local communities. These include Nicaragua, Guatemala and Mexico (Briquet, 2010; Jones and Rogers, 2009). In settings where social, economic and political forms of exclusion preclude the realization of desirable societal goals such as security, employment and proper housing via legitimate means, criminal networks and activities become viable paths to social mobility and inclusion (Harrell and Peterson 1992; Young 1999).

I have organized my review of works pertinent to understanding the historical evolution of the “don phenomenon” in Jamaica around the following headings: Theory of the State; Governance, the Neoliberal State and Embedded Power; Violence, Drug trafficking, and Organized Crime in the Caribbean.

**The State, Governance, Neoliberalism and Embedded Power**

**The State**

By investigating the influence of informal community leaders such as Jamaica’s dons, I am, in part, offering a critique of the state and its capacity to govern in the era of neoliberal globalization. But what is the state, and what functions is it expected to
perform? Weber (1970) has defined the state as a social community in which force and violence are legitimated in the relationship of governments and their citizens. It is a, “human community that claims the monopoly of legitimate use of force” (Weber, 1970; p.78). Liberal scholars, including Nozick (1974), have argued that the state’s main function is to provide security and to protect the individual rights of its citizens to exercise their liberty. Nozick argues for a minimal state. The state from this perspective has the main prerogative to ensure the safety of its citizens from external attacks and also the responsibility of refereeing and settling internal conflicts. The state also is responsible for creating an environment that promotes the economic rights and opportunities of those it governs. How best to do this, is where Nozick and other theorists part company. Barzel (2002) concludes that the creation of market space and networks of roads are crucial ways in which the state can promote the economic livelihood of individuals. In his view, “designating a central space to serve as a market is likely to further promote trade. What characterizes a market is the free access to it and the common-property nature of its space” (2002; p.189).

Elite theorists of the state (e.g., Domhoff, 1967; Michels, 1959; Pareto, 1976) have argued that only the interests of small powerful elite groups and individuals are responded to by the state. They go further to argue that these in fact control the state. In their view, the state and its agencies are governed by a few. Marx (1967) and others (Miliband, 1983; Poulantzas, 1978) go a step further in arguing that the state is essentially the ‘executive committee of the bourgeoisie’ and that power resides in the hands of the ruling elite class. The state, when viewed from this perspective, is a form of elite class social control and hegemony executed through the institutions of government (for
example law enforcement). Hall (2007) has suggested meanwhile that the state is, “self-regulating, serving to constrain and limit human action externally just as market laws constrain and limit economic agents” (2007; p.110).

Garrison residents often perceive the Jamaican state, especially its judicial (courts) and law enforcement (police) institutions, as oppressive and predatory (Gray, 2004). In terms of economic opportunities and social welfare, growing levels of inequality and poverty have alienated and isolated the blue-collar working and so-called lumpen-proletariat classes in Jamaica. The neoliberal era, starting in the late 1970s, weakened the Jamaican state and thereby increased poverty and social inequality, as I have noted above. This created a socio-economic environment and political space into which dons could emerge as serious governing actors.

Governance

Governance is essentially about ruling. Person(s) or institution(s) shape public policies and help to provide essential services such as healthcare, security, education and housing. Khaler and Lake (2004) have defined governance as “that subset of restraints that rests on authority” (p. 409). For them, governance involves the exercise of authority in which decisions are made by one actor and other actor(s) are “expected to obey” (2004, p. 409). Kitthananan (2006), meanwhile, has argued that governance is about “governing,” where the state plays a steering and partnering role in the processes of “improving public sector capacity” in the economy and society (p. 2). Other writers (Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 2000) have suggested that governance points to the capacity to get things done without relying on the power of government or its centralized authority alone. Rosenau (2000) has posited that governance refers to a system of ruling, which can
encompass a wide range of agencies and institutions, including NGOs, non-profit groups and INGOs such as the Red Cross, public and private for profit institutions and other players (Pierre, 2000, p.171).

Scholars, including Young (1999) and Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), have argued that the capacity to exercise authority is an important feature of governance. These authors have recognized in their works that governance can occur at multiple scales and sights; trans-national, international, national, sub-national and local. With globalization, especially its neo-liberal phase, sites of political authority have transitioned and migrated from the realm of the state alone. Other actors now share in the “delegation of authority” within the borders of the nation-state (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). The literature is clear in contending that governance is not confined to government and its authority, but rather is about how power and public decision-making are shared among different state and non-state entities.

Governance perspectives are important to this study as they provide a tool for analyzing political institutions as well as the national and global linkages among state and non-state actors. Pierre and Peters (2000) have argued that theories of governance should focus on the state; that is, on how the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ has influenced the functions the state performs. They contend the state is a central player in society. Several scholars (Clarke, 2006; Chevannes, 1992; Gray 1994; Henry-Lee, 2005; Johnson, 2005; Levy, 2009; Sives, 2002; Stone, 1985; Witter, 1992) have suggested that the Jamaican state failed to maintain itself as an active player in society in the decades after its independence (1960s onwards), especially in providing public services to its urban inner city communities.
The state in most developing countries suffers from what Tilly (2007) has termed “low capacity.” He has contended that where there is a weak economy and poor bureaucratic structures for public service delivery (in areas such as transportation, healthcare and security) the state’s ability to govern is handicapped. He contends that where the state has a low capacity to govern, ‘democratization’ processes are negatively affected. For Tilly democratization is a process oriented in time and space, in which a state, depending on its capacity (whether ‘high’ or ‘low’), can move toward or away from that state: “A regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad equal, protected and mutually binding consultation” (Tilly, 2007; pp.13-14). A low capacity democratic regime in Tilly’s analysis is one in which the rights extended do not cover a wide “breadth” of citizens and “public politics” is exclusionary in character (2007; p.14). In such nations, inequality among citizens is rife and there is minimal protection from the arbitrary use of force by the state (especially by the police and military). Tilly cited Jamaica as an example of a low capacity democratic state. The limited capability of the Jamaican state to govern garrison spaces effectively, especially by the 1980s, allowed dons to garner socio-political power and to embed themselves in these communities. During this period (1980s and 1990s), dons began to accept responsibility for some of the functions that the state was either unwilling or unable to perform.

Khaler and Lake (2004) and their colleagues have employed the concept of authority in a politically legitimizing sense. I employ governance similarly here. However, I use the concept of power to describe the capacity dons exercise in Jamaica’s garrisons. Power, while it may include the application of authority and control,
sometimes occurs without the political legitimacy with which it is often joined and that often is presupposed for states. Criminal non-state actors, such as Jamaica’s dons or members of the Russian Mafia, do not possess legitimate political authority. Nonetheless, they are powerful actors who use force and material rewards to gain authoritative standing (perversely, some may argue) and control.

Criminalized Governance

The governance literature on the Caribbean region pays limited attention to criminal non-state actors as important brokers of power within and across the borders of the nation-state. Khaler and Lake (2004), in their analysis of the effects of globalization on governance, focused on roles played by state and intergovernmental institutions; they did not take into account the impact of non-state individuals and groups. They suggested that globalization has had the effect of migrating authority upwards, from the state to the international level among global economic and political institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). I argue here that globalization and the neoliberal policies of a minimal state have had a similar effect in Jamaica’s garrisons of migrating authority downwards to non-state criminal actors. The case examined here explores one example of the characteristics and impact of this downward migration of authority to illegal actors (in this case Jamaican dons). While I do not examine it here, relevant scholarship suggests that the phenomenon I probe in Jamaica has also obtained in other Caribbean and Latin American nations (Arias, 2006; Baird, 2012; Rodgers, 2009).

Strange (1996) and Arias (2006) have offered governance conceptualizations that include criminal and perverse actors. Arias (2006) has suggested that criminals must be
fitted into the “political picture” when analysts examine governance structures in developing countries. To this end he argues, “in developing countries, violent non-state actors operating through networks with civic and state actors play increasingly important roles in the control of space, people and resources” (2006; p.10). This point is particularly significant here. Jamaican dons are important players in the organization and control of garrison spaces. Indeed, as I show below in the section on historical context, dons were central players in the exercise of political authority by the Jamaican state in garrison areas even before they acquired independent sources of funding and armory. Dons assumed responsibility for controlling and distributing state largesse to politically loyal residents in garrisons beginning in the late 1960s (Edie, 1984; Figueroa, 1992).

In *Organized crime and states: The hidden face of politics*, Briquet et al. (2010) advance the thesis that a “criminalization of the state” is taking place in certain nations all over the globe. This perverse process accompanies the international flow of business, ideas and capital. Crime, according to these authors, is becoming more transnational in character and interwoven with the administrative structures of the state in some developing nations. Favarel-Garrigues (in Briguet, 2010), has pointed to the interconnectedness between the Mafia and politicians in Russia. He observed that, “relations between politics and the Mafia derive their meaning less from parasitism than from commensalism, a term that acknowledges the state of symbiosis uniting two partners in a lasting association that presents no underlying threat to either party” (2010; pp.154-155). In the Jamaican context, Arias (2006) has argued that such a connection exists between elements of the criminal underworld in Kingston and certain political leaders and state actors (p.182). For her part, Duffy (in Briquet, 2010) has suggested that
“developing states have not been marginalized or left behind by globalization, rather they are inextricably linked to the global system, often through transnational illicit trading networks, [that] become deeply embedded within the formal state apparatus and the legal trading system” (Duffy in Briquet, 2010; p.98).

Gambetta’s (1993) analysis of the Sicilian Mafia offers a provocative perspective on the ties of illegal/criminal actors to the state’s formal economy. He contended that the Mafia provides a particular service, that of ‘protection’ in the market space of the Sicilian economy. In his view, both legitimate and illegitimate actors seek to provide protection, which is essential for industry and commerce to flourish. Gambetta describes the Mafia as a, “specific economic enterprise/industry” in which the protection they provide represents an essential catalyst of economic exchange (1993; pp.1-5). Gambetta’s work is important to studies of governance as it pushes interested analysts to re-think the nexus between what is legal and what is illegal. The Sicilian Mafia emerged and became embedded actors inside the state during the nineteenth century because of a persistent lack of trust in official government agencies to offer needed services to local businesspersons and landowners.

Volkov (2002) has referred to criminal non-state actors such as the Russian Mafia, as “violent entrepreneurs,” who use organizational methods that allow force/violence to be transformed into valuable commodities, including money (p.27). He argues further that, “the concept of violent entrepreneurship is applicable not only to certain outlaw groups, but also to legitimate agencies and even the state” (2002; p.27). Volkov concluded that as private business multiplied and transactions in the market place increased, the need for partnerships between legitimate and illegal actors also rose.
Ruggiero (2012), summing up the influence that non-state criminal actors have in Italy on the state and the process of governance, has argued:

Organized crime enjoys strong links with civil society… It can offer occupational opportunities to professional criminals on the one hand, and a variety of goods and services to purchasers, on the other. It may be highly integrated in the institutional arena, where it can forge partnerships with economic and political actors (2012; pp.11-12).

Ruggiero’s comments echo what I have already discussed about the strong links forged between elected officials of the PNP and the JLP and garrison dons.

In the developing world, neoliberal globalization paved the way for non-state institutions and other players to emerge and eventually to influence governance processes. Dons exercise governance at the local level in Jamaica. As Held (2000) has noted in today’s globalized international politics, “the locus of effective power can no longer be assumed to be national governments—effective power is shared, bartered and struggled over by diverse forces and agencies at national, regional and international levels” (p.52).

**Neoliberalism**

Neoliberalism continues to reshape and transform the political economies of the globe, with far reaching effects on the societies it has touched. David Harvey (2005) has described neoliberalism as a,

Theory of political and economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms. It embraces the harnessing of entrepreneurial freedom and skills within the broader institutional rubric of strong private property rights, free markets and free trade (Harvey, 2005; pp. 2-3).

He notes further that within this institutional framework, the state has a minimalist and specialized role to play in providing security for private property (via police, military,
and legal structures) and promoting the full and free functioning of the market. Rowden (2009) has summarized the principal impacts of neoliberal claims since the 1980s for global health by contending that neoliberalism has had “deadly” effects on public health and the fight against HIV/AIDS, especially in the developing world, as such policies reduced public expenditure on health challenges and thereby often hobbled HIV treatment and prevention efforts. This peculiar form of development economics has led to an incremental withering away of health policies, which supported budgets that helped doctors, nurses and other healthcare workers address a number of critical infectious diseases (Rowden, 2009; pp.1-5).

Similarly, neoliberalism has had the “deadly” and perverse consequence of weakening state capacity in other sectors besides health in many developing countries. Neoliberal policies in Latin America and the Caribbean have undermined the capabilities of states located in those regions to provide education, job opportunities and human welfare services to their residents (Klak, 1996, 1999). Data provided by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its Caribbean Human Development Report, 2012 (hereafter Report, 2012) indicate that the level of human development in the region has been undesirably low. During the period of the late 1970s into the 1980s, adoption of neoliberal policies in Jamaica caused the government to cut back on state-sponsored welfare and social programs. State funding for human development initiatives in the areas of literacy and skills training was hard hit by the neo-liberal market-driven approach. In the Jamaican case, as with other countries in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region, the situation worsened because of an escalating debt owed to international lending agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. National
budgets in the LAC region were overwhelmed with servicing international debt and that meant that several social and economic programs geared towards poverty reduction were side tracked (Harris, 2005). The Report, 2012 argued that violence and high homicide rates in the region are associated with its low levels of human development; the absence of legitimate and strong institutions as well as a dearth of inclusive systems of governing (2012; p.8). Caribbean national leaders inherited at the time of independence (1960s in the English Caribbean) states with weak capacities and social institutions that did not make alleviation of the suffering of the poor a priority. The neoliberal policies of structural adjustment (1980s-1990s) these states adopted did not strengthen the affected nations’ social institutions; nor did they improve the various states’ capacities to provide public goods (income opportunities, education, healthcare and housing) to their populations, poor and non-poor alike (UNDP, 2012).

The political and economic changes wrought by neoliberalism provided a nurturing environment for Jamaican dons to embed themselves in garrisons as governance figures. In Jamaica as well as in other developing countries in the Caribbean and Latin America, the prominence of non-state (criminal and otherwise) actors intensified as states adjusted and in many cases scaled back health, education and community development programs and more general efforts to improve the overall economic and social security of their citizens. Rowden (2009), among other scholars (Giroux, 2008; Davis 2007), has referred to the 1980s as the “lost decade” during which the policies of privatization, liberalization, deregulation and budget-cuts had disastrous effects on the political economies of developing countries. Neoliberal reforms led to “stagnation or decline in GDP growth, an increase in unemployment, a drop in wages,
reductions in public expenditure on social services, and an aggravation of poverty” (Rowden, 2009; p.78). Many developing countries suffered from declining economic growth rates during this heyday of neo-liberal claims. Across developing regions of the globe GDP and per capita incomes fell by 6.6 and 16 percent from 1980 to 1988 (p. 78). Developing states in the Americas and on the continent of Africa took heavy economic blows from stagnating growth in those same years.

Johnston and Montecino (2011), analysts associated with The Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), have pointed out that from 1992 to 2010 in Jamaica, “the exceedingly large debt burden has effectively crowded out most other public expenditure” (2011; p.4). They have argued that the nation’s service debt-related expenditures during the 1990s into 2010 impeded capital investment in education and infrastructure. It also had a negative effect, they conclude, on growth in ‘human capital.’ Based on information they provide, in 1991-1992, Jamaica’s total public debt (external and domestic) stood at 194 percent of its GDP; this number declined to 125 percent in 2002-2003 and stood at 129 percent in 2009-2010 (2011; p.3).

The neoliberal order made it more difficult for political party leaders in Jamaica to provide state largesse to their constituents in local communities (Sives, 2002, 2010). Neoliberalism resulted in an even greater marginalization of the poor, working and ‘under classes.’ Deregulation of markets, privatization and the hollowing out of the welfare state resulted in increased social exclusion of the poor; it enriched the bourgeoisie and capitalist classes while wreaking economic hardship on those at the margins of society (Davis, 2007; Harvey, 2005). This was the situation in the 1980s and 1990s in many countries in the developing world, including Jamaica (Arias, 2006). It is
within this context that dons (Mega and some Area) assumed both increased and a greater variety of social, economic and political roles in their garrisons, moving from being solely party agents to serving as community welfare and social security providers to inner city residents hardest hit by the new political economic order. The neo-liberal turn produced the “governance voids" these dons filled. Arias (2006) has observed that international debt crises and structural adjustment programs have forced many countries in the developing world to scale back on the social services they provide, especially to urban residents. In addition, governments find it fiscally difficult under neoliberal policies to train police and security officials to deal with the challenges of criminality that have accompanied globalization (Arias 2006; pp.11-14).

Neo-liberal globalization has also resulted in the addition of new transnational actors in state governance. As Bevir (2010) has posited, governance has reframed the state not as a unified entity, but as a complex arrangement of interacting networks (p.62). Neoliberalism creates significant security, healthcare, education, employment and social welfare voids. The works of Briquet (2010) and Arias (2006) have examined the environments in which criminal non-state actors can emerge and embed themselves as parallel and in some cases alternate sources of governance in Jamaica’s garrisons.

Embedded Power

The weakening of the Jamaican state, coupled with the rise of alternate sources of illegal revenue that globalization offered, facilitated the embedding of the rule of dons. Montgomery (1998) has contended that embedded people are not atomized individuals, but are instead members of social networks that shape their actions:

Embeddedness typically involves long-term relationships characterized by mutual cooperation and trust in spite of the potential for opportunism. … I trust you
because I calculate that your short-run benefit from an opportunistic defection is outweighed by your long-run benefit from continued cooperation (Montgomery, 1998; p.93).

Based on the roles dons carry out in garrisons, it appears residents have learned over time to invest their trust in them. Community members view these individuals as helping to feed them, provide economic opportunities and protect them from outsiders whom they consider threats.

The Jamaican Garrison Environment

This section focuses on the garrison; that is, its infrastructure and socio-economic and cultural character. Describing the Jamaican garrison helps one to understand better some of the factors that facilitated the embedding of dons as governance figures. These neighborhoods emerged out of a political as well as a socio-cultural context in which members of the urban working class (both employed and unemployed) exist on the margins of Jamaican society (Johnson & Soeters, 2008). These communities arose from the development of large-scale affordable housing projects (apartments) provided by the political elite through the state. Residents in these communities as early as the 1970s, received homes because of their partisan alliances (Chevannes, 1992; Witter, 1992). The Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism (1997, hereafter referred to as the Kerr Report) described Jamaica’s garrisons in the following way:

The hard-core garrison communities exhibit an element of autonomy in that they are a state within a state. The Jamaican State has no authority or power, except in so far as its forces are able to invade in the form of police and military raids. In the core, garrison disputes have been settled, matters tried, offenders sentenced and punished, all without reference to the institutions of the Jamaican State (1997, pp.6-7).
These communities are characterized by urban blight, high rates of unemployment, poverty, high homicide rates and violence related to polarized political identities/loyalties and ongoing gang warfare.

Extreme poverty and violence are two dominant features of the garrison environment. Henry-Lee (2005) has studied closely the extent and character of poverty in Jamaica’s garrison communities. She has argued that garrisons are characterized by high levels of both “private and public poverty,” defined as people’s ability to enjoy a certain standard of living (private poverty) and as the geographical infrastructure related to housing, sanitation and public utilities (public poverty). Henry-Lee has presented both dimensions of poverty as defining factors that predispose garrison communities to the influence of dons. She used data from the Planning Institute of Jamaica: Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC), for the years 1992, 1996 and 2001 to support her claims. Based on this information Henry-Lee pointed out that although poverty declined in the overall Kingston and Metropolitan Area (KMA) from 18.8 percent to 15.0 percent and then to 7.6 percent in 2001, the quality of life of garrison residents did not improve (pp. 90-94).

The living conditions of some of the people in most of the ‘tribalized’ communities reek of abandonment and neglect … problems of poor waste management, inconsistent electricity supplies and abandoned structures; these abandoned structures provide some evidence that people leave during outbreaks of violence (Henry-Lee, 2005; pp.94-95).

This noted analyst approaches the question of poverty in a multi-faceted way. She explored the public and private poverty of garrisons in several parts of Kingston, St. Andrew, where she found that residents had low levels of the “essentials” that Sen (1999) has outlined are critical to basic human subsistence and which are outlined below. Henry-
Lee tied the level of private and public poverty in the garrison communities she examined in part to the roles played by and the influence of dons within them. In assessing the standards of living of garrison residents Henry-Lee pointed out,

Their quality of life depends on their degree of social capital that they enjoy with the don … the residents’ movements in and out of the communities and their access to the social goods considered valuable in society, are based on the closeness of their links to the don (2005; p. 96).

Similarly, Sen (1999) has examined how geographical, human, material and psychological factors affect the level of poverty in urban areas. He has posited that a condition of poverty is characterized by a lack of basic resources and opportunities. He argues that income alone is not a sufficient indicator of poverty because poverty has the effect of reducing the developmental capabilities of citizens. For Sen, the following are essential necessities to ameliorate poverty:

- Acquisition of sufficient food and clothing
- Freedom from ill health, ill treatment and disease
- Access to a good education
- Social inclusion
- Participation in community life

Chapter 4 explores the issue of poverty in the garrison environment and provides data on employment and the physical infrastructure of Brown Villa. The primary analytic point in that chapter is that the deep and sustained poverty that has characterized Jamaica’s garrisons has helped to legitimize the roles dons play in helping residents to survive. Garrison poverty facilitated the embedding of dons.

Violence, drug and gun trafficking in the Caribbean

Violence Another dominant feature of the garrison environment is violence. Different scholars (e.g., Harriott, 2004; Lacey, 1977; Levy, 1996) have observed that fighting
related to gang warfare, homicides, jungle justice (local community system of punishment and discipline) and politically motivated conflicts are consistent features of garrison life. Harriott (2002, 2004, 2008) has observed that Jamaican garrisons are “high violence” communities and that this characteristic manifests itself in their frequency of homicides, multiple and mass murders. Henry-Lee (2005) has contended, meanwhile, that violence in garrisons negatively influences residents’ capabilities to lift themselves out of poverty. Similarly, the Kerr Report (1997) highlighted how violence in garrisons affects both private and public poverty by arguing that border wars between garrison communities affect law and order, disable social infrastructure (roads, water, garbage disposal, utilities, and supermarkets), restrict human movement to jobs and employment opportunities and preclude businesses and capital investment in these neighborhoods (1997; p. 6).

Violence, as any physical act of inflicting injury, involves both bodily and psychological trauma. Acts of aggression are often identified with certain geographic areas (Vigil, 2003). Moser and McIlwaine (2001) have analyzed the perceptions of working class residents concerning urban life in Guatemala. They conducted focus group interviews in nine urban and poor communities and found that residents in each place perceived violence to be the most pressing problem they faced. These scholars reported that robberies and gang wars were the top two sources of violence in the communities they examined (pp. 26-27). Violence, particularly among youth, according to Moser and Bronkhorst (1999), has four “interrelated levels of causality, structural, institutional, interpersonal and individual” (1999; p.9). At the ‘individual level,’ a lack of life-skills and low self-esteem were catalysts of youth related violence. At the ‘interpersonal level,’
inadequate parenting strategies and the overall poor socio-economic status of the family unit were responsible for youth engaging in violent activities/associations. Moser and Bronkhorst also suggested that low-levels of access to quality education and skills training are identified with youth violence in the LAC region. Additionally, they argued that violence-prone neighborhoods and the absence of employment opportunities in these areas were key factors behind the high incidence of violence in the region.

Policing strategies, which citizens often perceived as predatory, and a lack of trust among residents in the system of justice also encourage violence. At the structural level, the influence of the media, a ‘culture’ that legitimizes violence (especially among young men) and years of social exclusion and inequality are also triggers of violence in the region (Moser and Bronkhorst, 1999; pp.9-16). My examination of the field data I collected in Brown Villa (Chapters 4 and 5) supports the analysis offered by these authors. I go a step further, however, by arguing that that these factors in the Jamaican garrison context have facilitated the anchorage of dons/gangs. The overall environment in garrison spaces (in this case Brown Villa) fostered the rise and subsequent embedding of dons as despotic governing actors whom residents both love and fear.

In the specific Caribbean context, community violence has structural roots related to colonial history and, in the Jamaican case, as outlined above, a polarized partisan culture. Within the region, as Moser and Bronkhorst (1999) have argued, violence is also the result of the area’s developing socio-economic status. Economic inequality, high levels of poverty and communities affected by social exclusion, government neglect of social welfare, housing and education often result in the emergence and escalation of violence and organized crime (Headley, 1994, 2002;
Harriott, 2008). In a later work, Moser (2006) indicated that after the 1970s, with the influence of neo-Marxist theories of dependency, scholars began to recognize that violence is affected by institutional and structural factors. Using evidence from Latin America, Moser concluded, “inequality and exclusion (unequal access to employment, education, health, and physical infrastructure) intersect with poverty to precipitate violence” (2006; p.4). Moser’s work demonstrates that at least in the context of Latin American developing countries, violence is the outcome of multiple influences, which are often associated with political and economic disputes over turf, and the distribution of resources. Developing states in the region, for example, have a weak record in protecting the lives and property of citizens. Moser (2006) identified economic violence related to extortion rackets, perpetrated by criminal gangs, as a growing problem in Latin America. This reality is also true for the Caribbean. In specific reference to Jamaica, Harriott has observed:

Violence is a business. It is organized and marketed to yield a regular return as in the case of extortion and protection rackets. Violence brings social success. Violence validates and elevates status. Violence brings political success. It may be used to acquire and consolidate political power as ‘safe seats’ in the parliament. It has therefore become self-perpetuating (2009; p.5).

The Report (2012) pointed out that violence related to high homicide rates, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking threatens the human security and future development goals of countries in the Caribbean region, “prior to the 1990s, the homicide rates within the region were below the global average. By 1990 however, Latin America and the Caribbean had an average homicide rate of 22.9 per 100,000 citizens and the region was ranked first in the homicide rate among regions of the world” (p. 21). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNOC,2005) and the World Bank
(2007) have reported that the Caribbean as a region ranked first in the world for homicide rates (30 per 100,000); the South/West Africa region ranked second with a homicide rate of 29 per 100,000 and South America ranked third with 26 per 100,000. Jamaica’s homicide rate has routinely ranked in the top five countries of the world (UNOC, 2010). The Report (2012) revealed that in 2009, Jamaica’s homicide rate was approximately 62 per 100,000, and in 2010, it declined to about 50 per 100,000 citizens (p. 21). The high rate of violent crime, especially homicides, has led regional scholars such as Harriott (2008), to conclude that there is a sub-culture of violence in the Caribbean, especially in Jamaica. He contends that this phenomenon manifests itself in six ways:

- High rate of homicidal violence
- An affinity for guns
- Predatory and conflict-related violence
- Hypersensitivity to insults (especially among gang members/dons)
- Revenge seeking/retributive violence and overt violence/killings in plain sight (pp. 29-36).

This subculture of violence perspective suggests that it is a normative mode of behavior for criminal groups to endorse and condone such behavior (Wolgang & Ferracuti, 1967).

Gunst (1996) has examined how Jamaican dons and gangs in the 1970s and 1980s carried out acts of violence related to political partisan contests between the PNP and the JLP. She has also investigated the role of dons in inter-gang rivalries over drug trafficking between cities in the United States and Jamaica. She tells the story of one Jamaican don, “Chinaman,” from a PNP garrison, McGregor Gully. “Chinaman” used the revenue from his drug running in the U.S. to “buy clothing, Walkmans (portable cassette recorders), VCRs and guns for the McGregor Gully sufferers” (Gunst, 1996, p. 186). She noted further that “Chinaman” said the guns he sent to his community in Jamaica were “vote getters.” They were also useful to “Gully residents” to protect themselves against
rival garrison gangs and the police (p. 186). According to reports from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), Harriott (2004, 2008 and 2009) and the Jamaican Gleaner, the availability of guns in Jamaica is linked to the easy access to U.S. markets for small firearms. The Report (2012) blames the trafficking of narcotics across the Americas, and the weak capacity of governments in the Caribbean region to secure their borders for the widespread availability of illegal weapons.

Drug and gun trafficking

Drug trafficking is a transnational activity that runs along the fault lines of the world’s political economy connecting producer, transit and consumer zones. Drugs according to Paul Gootenberg (2009) are “psychoactive substances and commodities that for a variety of reasons since 1900 have been constructed as health and or societal dangers by modern states, medical authorities and regulatory cultures.” Gootenberg argues that drugs (heroin, cocaine, marijuana, opium, LSD, ecstasy and methamphetamine) are commercialized products and trafficking in these substances often challenges the effective regulation of Caribbean states’ borders. Three main drug trade routes exist in the LAC region: Western Colombia to Central America and Mexico, Mexico into the United States, and Colombia to Jamaica to the Bahamas and into the U.S. The main transshipment points for cocaine, marijuana and small arms through the Caribbean are Puerto Rico, the Bahamas and Jamaica (Tulchin and Espach, 2000).

The Caribbean is a crucial geographic corridor for the United States ‘war on drugs’ because it is the ‘transit zone’ between South America and North America. Decker and Chapman (2008) maintain that the Caribbean is “an important area for understanding drug smuggling because of its proximity to source and destination countries as well as its
long history as a site for smuggling illegal goods and for piracy” (p. 45). A 2008 UNOC study reported that despite successful interception measures, the Caribbean remains a competitive corridor for drug trafficking and gun running. The region remains an important site for smuggling because of its historical, language, commercial and tourist ties to consumer countries to the North. Central America [Colombia especially] and Mexico are the dominant drug running players in the Americas. The Caribbean corridor nonetheless is still active and important to ‘producer’ state traffickers from Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. In 2005, drug traffickers transshipped an estimated 10 tons of cocaine through Jamaica, with 20 tons moving through Haiti and the Dominican Republic. As a recent Report of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) observed, “drug trafficking organizations have increased their operations in Central America and the Caribbean, posing a serious threat to human security and affecting everyday life, in the region” (2011, p. 51). Drug trafficking in Central America and the Caribbean has contributed to the high levels of homicide, youth violence and drug-related corruption of national criminal justice systems in countries in that region (INCB, 2011; pp. 51-55).

Along with a long history of illegal transshipment and piracy, Caribbean nations have small and unstable economies that offer opportunities for drug trafficking to take root. Harriott (2009) has observed that the rise in the “commercialization of crime” and its transnational and organized nature have facilitated the “development of an illegal opportunity structure that extends beyond our (Jamaica’s) national borders” (p.33). Griffith (1999) has argued that drugs in the Caribbean involve the varied dynamics of production, consumption, money laundering and corruption. In his view, the region offers an ideal geography and geology in which drugs (marijuana and cocaine) can be cultivated
and transshipped. Clandestine narcotic operations are possible because of the sea routes that connect the various islands of the region, and the hilly terrain of some countries, including Jamaica, which facilitate the growing of marijuana, that often goes undetected by law enforcement authorities (Griffith, 1999).

Agozino et al. (2009) have suggested there is a relationship between the drug trade and gun trafficking in the West Indies. Drugs and guns have a “systemic link,” and in the Caribbean and Latin America, “firearms appear to follow drug shipments both large and small along established seaborne routes; in such instances they are mostly brandished in the context of protecting illicit economic transactions” (Agozino et al., 2009, p.294). Gunst (1995) has analyzed how Jamaican posses (gangs) and their dons snuggled and sold drugs on the streets of major U.S. cities in the 1980s. According to Gunst, they (dons/gangs) used the money they made from selling crack, heroin and ganja to buy assault weapons, including AK-47s, the Israeli-made Uzi and other handguns. Dons and gang members sent these weapons home to their Jamaican garrisons to ensure that upon their return from overseas they had a “safe place” from rival gangs/dons. The case of “Chinaman” and the McGregor Gully garrison (presented above) illustrates this ‘systemic’ nexus between drugs and gun crimes.

One key entry point through which guns and drugs enter the Caribbean is via the sea trade routes. Agozino, et al. (2009) have highlighted the existence of drugs for guns trading among Caribbean nations. The authors posited, “There are also inter-island transit links fostered by small fishing boatmen. The islands of Haiti and Jamaica are reportedly linked in this fashion with Jamaican fishermen meeting in open waters close to neighboring Haiti in order to exchange drugs for AK47s” (p. 295). This trade involves the
exchange of Jamaican grown marijuana (ganja) for guns from Haiti. When the Haitian army was disbanded in 2004, its streets and towns became awash with assault rifles and handguns. Jamaican fishermen took ganja to Haiti in exchange for these weapons, which they then sold to gangs back home, especially in the urban areas of Montego Bay, Kingston, St. Andrew, Clarendon and St. Catherine. The Gleaner has published several articles regarding the illicit sea route connection between Haiti and Jamaica. According to a Gleaner report, "two thousand and sixty-two pounds of compressed ganja, a 30-foot go-fast boat and two-boat engines" were seized in a joint operation between the United Nations Security Forces and the Operation Kingfish unit of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), on June 12, 2009 (Gleaner, 2009).24 A senior official in the Operation Kingfish unit, according to the Gleaner report, “said the operation may have prevented more than 200 illegal guns and thousands of rounds of ammunition from entering Jamaica, as approximately seven pounds of ganja could be exchanged for a gun” (Gleaner, June, 12, 2009).25 Nick Davis in a BBC report entitled, Haiti and Jamaica’s Deadly Trade, noted the security threat that the guns for drugs trade poses for Haiti and Jamaica.

Police say marijuana has traditionally been destined for markets in the U.S. and Europe but increasingly traffickers are heading to Haiti where they trade weed for guns, a valuable commodity on the streets of Kingston. ‘The trade between Jamaica and Haiti is very significant,’ says Glenmore Hinds, Assistant Commissioner of Police. ‘The firearms that come from Haiti are mainly handguns, revolvers, pistols and a few shotguns (Davis, BBC, 2008)’26.

24 Article can be retrieved from http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20090612/lead/lead9.html

25 Ibid.

26 A copy of the report is retrievable at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7684983.stm. The BBC published the account online on October 25, 2008.
These ganja and cocaine ‘pick-ups’ and ‘drops,’ whether on land or by water routes, involve the exchange of guns, drugs and money. The drugs for guns trade between Jamaica and Haiti came up in this research during the interviews I conducted with police personnel. In addition, on a visit to a fishing village in the parish of St. Catherine, I encountered a local fisherman who told stories of how drugs and guns enter the island of Jamaica via trips boatmen make to Haiti. I provide more information on this in Chapter 5 where I investigate the influence of drug/gun trafficking on the roles dons have assumed in garrisons.

Drugs and guns have served to empower dons/gangs in garrisons. Notably, these two are important, but not the only sources of income to which garrison leaders have access. Political contracts, racketeering schemes, extortion and contract killings are other means by which they finance themselves. Gunst (1996), in *Born fi dead: A journey through the Jamaican posse underworld*, has argued that by the 1980s, Jamaica’s partisan political culture collided with the emergence of a drug and gun culture in the nation’s garrisons. Dons and their posses became powerful figures in the Jamaican criminal underworld, which had very significant international associations.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has reviewed the relevant academic literature on Jamaican dons and garrison communities. It also examined relevant works on governance. I argued that governance as a theoretical construct takes into account discourses on the role of the state, the influence of neo-liberal globalization on governmental policies and the impact that non-state actors have within and across national borders. The nation-state in the global neoliberal era, beginning in the late 1970s, began to play a steering role in the
affairs of public governance. The Caribbean literature, however, pays limited attention to the influence of criminal actors on the processes and structures of governance. This research addresses this gap in the literature by exploring the influence and roles that non-state criminal actors such as Jamaica’s dons have within the borders of the nation-state. The literature suggests that governance is multi-level in character and the case of Brown Villa provides a localized example of how individuals (dons) and groups (gangs) gained and sustained control over people, resources and spaces.

Violence, drug and gun trafficking are associated with the influence that dons wield in Jamaica’s garrison communities. Some countries in the Caribbean appear to have communities inside their territories that are ‘high-violence’ and that exhibit a ‘sub-culture of violence’ (Harriott, 2008). In the Jamaican case, partisan violence from the 1940s through the 1970s contributed to the development of just such a sub-culture, especially in garrison areas. When cocaine trafficking grew in the 1980s, coupled with increases in economic inequality from neoliberal policies, violence shifted from being solely partisan in character, to battles for gang and don supremacy/control over the streets and neighborhoods of the garrisons of urban Jamaica.

With the government’s determined May 2010 Incursion into Tivoli Gardens to apprehend and extradite its don, Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, a dis-embedding process now appears to be under way in the nation’s garrisons. This decline may be temporary, however. Since the start of 2012, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) has reported an increase in violence and homicides related to conflicts between rival dons and gangs. Chapters 4 and 5 present my findings and interpretation of the current state of the
power/influence of dons in garrisons. I next turn to a presentation of the research approach and methods I employed in this analysis.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Introduction

This is a single case study of one Jamaican garrison community, which has several smaller districts. The research site selected offered an opportunity to examine and describe the role(s) that dons play in garrisons. Brown Villa is comprised of five smaller districts, all of which have Street-level dons. The community has also had two Area Dons since the 1990s. This situation allowed me to examine the variation in roles performed and governance styles among different types of dons. The research was guided by the objective of learning about the roles don(s) perform and their implications for governance at the local level in Jamaica.

The first section of this chapter explores the rationale for selecting Brown Villa as a research site. I conducted interviews, collected government documents and newspaper articles and gathered information through on-site observation as sources of data. I provide an explanation of how this information was gathered and the basis for its collection. The study’s main limitations, issues of confidentiality and ethical considerations that arose during the field research, are also discussed in this chapter. The final section summarizes the strategies used to analyze the data collected.

Research Design

I employed a qualitative research design, with the aim of providing a localized and contextually rich description and interpretation of the several roles dons play in Brown Villa. Additionally, this research framework allowed me to capture the multiple
constructed realities / perceptions that residents of the community have of dons in a ‘naturalistic setting’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Marshall & Rossman, 2010). Qualitative research focuses on attaining understandings and devising an interpretation of matters under scrutiny rather than making predictions about those concerns.

As Denzin (1998) has observed, several strategies of inquiry may be employed in a qualitative research design. A single-case study was well suited to this research as it allowed me to capture the social realities of the residents of Brown Villa and show how dons fit into those conditions. This strategy made it possible to identify how different interviewees perceive the dons who are inside a sample garrison. I interviewed numerous people during the field research conducted from July 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. I chose to use the term ‘interviewee’ as opposed to ‘informant’ given the nature of the study. ‘Informer/informant’ is a loaded term in the context of Jamaican garrison communities. Most garrison residents believe that to be an ‘informant’ is a negative, even unwise, thing to do. In local parlance, residents often observe, “informa (informants) fi dead (should die).” As I show in Chapters 4 and 5, to be a police informant (and be discovered as such) in a garrison neighborhood, for example, is often punishable by death or violent eviction from the community on the orders of the don.

This study is an example of what Yin (2009) has called a “representative or typical” single-case. He argues that, “the lessons learned from these cases are assumed to be informative about the average person or institution” (p.48). Stake (1998) has suggested there are three types of case studies: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. An instrumental case analysis provides insights into a broader phenomenon or helps to refine a theory, “the case may be seen as typical of other cases or not” (Stake, 1998; p.88).
Stake’s instrumental case design is similar to Yin’s single representative case. Although this study’s main purpose was to provide a localized and contextually rich study of one garrison community, several broader inferences and analytical generalizations can be made about other similar communities in Jamaica. This is especially so because some of the interviews conducted were with persons who either live or work in garrisons external to Brown Villa.

**Why Brown Villa?**

Selection bias is a frequent criticism of case study research. George and Bennett (2005) argue, however, that the statistical researcher’s view of selection bias is not the same as how that concern should be viewed in case research. As they have noted, “selection with some preliminary knowledge of cases … allows much stronger research designs; cases can be selected with a view toward whether they are most-likely, least-likely, or crucial for a theory” (p.24). I selected Brown Villa as a case of the Jamaican garrison and don phenomenon. Some inferences about the activities of dons and the nature of garrisons in Jamaica can be drawn based on this single case, given the garrison’s history as a politically divided community (since the 1970s). Different types of dons have operated inside Brown Villa from the 1970s to the present; this makes it a suitable venue to examine the roles that, for example, a Mega Don performs as opposed to a Street Don.

I chose the site primarily because of its geography. That is, Brown Villa is located in a garrison constituency in a Jamaican Metropolitan Area. Many Jamaican metro areas contain communities that have undergone what Figueroa (1996) calls the “garrison process.” Brown Villa is a geo-political electoral division, in which, as would
be expected of a garrison there often is fraudulent over-voting and where one party tends to dominate at the polls (Figueroa & Sives, 2004). This community also evidences other socio-economic and infrastructural features of the “garrison process.” These characteristics include political violence, dilapidated buildings, poor housing and sanitation, high crime rates, and the presence of dons and their criminal gangs.

Dons and garrisons are important fixtures in the history of political violence in general elections in Jamaica. The Brown Villa community evolved over time as a place with strong polarized partisan interests among residents, political violence related to those identifications and the presence of some of Jamaica’s most notorious dons and gangs. The community is divided into five districts and each of these areas has had its own gangs and dons that have played governance roles in providing community services and ensuring security, engaging in peace management, conflict resolution and mobilizing partisan support for their favored political party. While undertaking preliminary research, I encountered multiple non-governmental (local and international) associations engaged in social intervention and violence prevention programs in Brown Villa. I had an interest in evaluating the progress made in their intervention and preventative programs. I learned that many of these organizations had in fact worked with dons to resolve conflicts among rival gangs. Through their longstanding involvement in the community, representatives of these NGOs knew garrison life well, and they knew the dons and how local residents regarded them. Owing to this fact, I targeted members of such groups for interviews.

The results of online searches of the archival databases of Jamaica’s two major newspapers; the Gleaner and the Observer, using the key words ‘garrison,’ ‘dons,’ ‘drugs,’ ‘guns,’ ‘violence,’ ‘gangs’ and ‘political tribalism’ repeatedly mentioned Brown
Villa. This area is among the most volatile in Jamaica and police and newspaper reports frequently highlight the high level of gun related crimes and homicide in the metro region. Many of the community’s problems associated with homicide and violence have connections to dons and gangs.\(^{27}\) As one respondent from the JCF remarked, “Brown Villa’s police division is tough to patrol and police because of the guns, gangs and dons” (Interview, October 4, 2011:VT018).

Additionally, a qualitative single-case design suited my analytic purposes. This study’s exploratory character often allowed me access to interact with different individuals who lived or worked in a garrison community in Jamaica. The closeness of the respondents interviewed to the realities of garrison life provided rich insights into the power of dons and the roles they play. This is significant because, as I noted above, there is limited documentation concerning the community roles these leaders play and how different types of dons have performed those functions. Available statistical and secondary source data on homicide rates, gang violence and the socio-economic environment of garrisons do not provide ‘thick’ and rich descriptions on the dons and their activities per se. The dangerous and sensitive nature of the issue may partly explain the relative paucity of information and analyses of what dons do and how they do it.

**Data sources and sampling strategies**

I approached each data source—interviews, documents and observation—by making choices concerning how to employ it. Rossman and Rallis (2003) have observed that sampling strategies in qualitative research are largely ‘purposeful’ in contrast to quantitative analysis that often employs random sampling procedures (pp.135-138).

\(^{27}\)This has been a consistent finding of the annual crime statistics and reports published by the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) since the 1990s. Copies of such reports can be retrieved online at http://www.jcf.gov.jm/
Qualitative inquiry involves different strategies for deliberate selection of cases, events, processes or individuals (Patton, 1990, 2002). I sampled interviews and documents using Patton’s strategies of ‘intensity sampling’ and ‘snowball or chain sampling’ (1990, 2002). Intensity sampling strategies allowed me to tap into a small number of potential interviewees who had expert and prior knowledge on the subject of garrisons and dons in Jamaica. This method proved particularly useful in the early stages of the field research as it allowed me to obtain access to relevant sources of information with minor challenges. The deliberate use of these different forms of data collection allowed for triangulation within a specific type of data (for example, among different interviewees) and across different data sources (interviews and documents) so as to maximize internal validity.

**Interviews**

I conducted 42 semi-structured interviews with individuals from community-based organizations (CBOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political representatives (members of Parliament and councilors), the police (Jamaica Constabulary Force-JCF), officials from the Ministry of National Security (Community Policing Unit: Citizens Security and Justice Program-CSJP), journalists, academics and clergy who work in garrisons, Jamaica’s Political Ombudsman and residents of Brown Villa (some of whom were part of CBO groups inside the community). As part of analyzing the interviews, I cross-matched and triangulated the information they contained with relevant data collected in documents and newspaper articles.

Rubin and Rubin (1995) have observed, “Qualitative interviewing is a way of finding out what others feel and think about their worlds” (p.1). Interviews constituted
the primary data source for this research. I used in-depth, semi-structured interviews to collect information from key informants and experts. Addressing my research questions required that I spoke with individuals from the targeted population and research site to enhance the credibility of my findings. In seeking information concerning who Jamaican dons are and what they do in the country’s garrisons, I talked with people who had experience living or working in one of those communities. Rossman and Rallis (2003) refer to key informants as important sources of relevant information; these scholars use the word ‘gatekeepers’ instead of ‘informants.’ They contend that gatekeepers can influence the “quality and quantity” of data collected, and they conclude, “Gatekeepers can make or break your study” (2003; p.163).

The “elites” (or knowledgeable experts) I interviewed included four categories of individuals: journalists, academics, NGO and community-based organization representatives, and state officials (police officers and members of Parliament). I first conducted interviews with journalists, non-governmental organization staffers working in garrison communities and law enforcement officials from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). Next, I employed a snowball or chain method in which I asked experts to recommend other potential interviewees who could provide information on dons and garrisons, particularly Brown Villa. These early interviews helped to lay a solid foundation for conversations with other experts and with other key informants from the Brown Villa community.

I was able to identify and contact several potential respondents at the beginning of the field research by obtaining their personal cell phone numbers. My prior familiarity with journalists, academics and members of locally-based non-governmental
organizations provided me access to these individuals. This medium of recruiting (calls to cell phones) potential interviewees proved to be the most effective strategy of obtaining their involvement. Several respondents refused to be interviewed. For example, some academics and elected members of parliament declined my request to talk with them on the issue of dons. I found that these two categories of potential interviewees were the most unresponsive and inaccessible. Two academics turned down my request, citing busy schedules as reasons for their choices. Elected representatives proved very difficult to access as well. Several of them turned down my request for an interview; one elected representative observed that he had nothing to say on the issue, and that “there are no more dons in Jamaica” (Telephone conversation, September 16, 2011).

Documents and Observation

Documents constituted another important data source and these helped me to understand better the social organization, context and structures of power within the community settings I was exploring. Prior (2003) has categorized documents as, “fields, frames and networks of action” (p.2). She has argued further that documents are not “stable and static artifacts.” Rather, they are functional elements of research in action. Prior urges the social scientific researcher to look beyond the content dimension of documents and to see them as things that humans have “produced” in “socially organized circumstances.” In her view, “a document is a product” (Prior, 2003; p.4).

I also analyzed national reports on crime and violence in Jamaica and community profiles created by the Social Development Commission of Jamaica (SDC). These documents provided a historical context to the subject of dons and garrisons in Jamaica. That is, they were valuable published data on the phenomenon of dons in the nation. Such
materials were relevant to a macro-level analysis of the crime and violence in Jamaica and the influence of dons in creating and sustaining this social problem. In cases where respondents did not know or were unwilling to shed light on the historical context (particularly the deeply divisive political partisan period of the 1960s and 1970s) within which garrisons and dons emerged, these documents were used as a check on my research findings and analysis. I analyzed and interpreted the following documents:

- Wolfe Report 1993
- Kerr report 1996
- PERF- Police Executive Research Forum 2000
- Crime and Violence Report 2002
- Road Map to Peace 2006
- Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke’s personal letter to a New York judge 2011.

Law enforcement and national security policy makers have not used the findings from these reports consistently to inform central government policy initiatives concerning development and social intervention programs in garrisons. Chapter 6 discusses several recommendations that could help devise national policies aimed at assisting the residents of garrisons and weakening the control that gangs and dons have in them.

I used an intensity sampling strategy to select documents for scrutiny. As I have noted, the documents I collected and reviewed provided context-rich and relevant information on the nature of Jamaica’s garrisons and how dons emerged in them over time. The documents I used also provided data on issues related to gun violence, inner-city poverty, organized crime (extortion rackets, drug and gun trafficking) in Jamaica and the broader Caribbean Basin.

I also used observation as an important data collection method. As Marshall and Rossman (2010) have argued, “Observation is central to qualitative research… It is used to discover complex interactions in natural social settings” (pp.139-140). In my visits to
Brown Villa to conduct interviews, I paid special attention to the infrastructure—roads, drainage systems, and housing stock available in the community. On a tour of one district in Brown Villa, a respondent pointed out places where gang members hung out and the homes of dons and their family members. I recorded such observational data in field notes.

**Confidentiality, Ethical Concerns and Limitations**

**Confidentiality**

Siedman (1998) has recommended that researchers consider carefully the ethical issue of confidentiality in field research: “Participants have a right to know in what form material from their interview will be shared with the public” (p.55). Similarly, Yin (2009) has offered a strong case for the ethical and professional necessity of gaining informed consent from those participating in research. He also has urged researchers to make every effort to protect their respondents’ privacy and confidentiality. The literature (e.g., Bailey, 2007; Yin, 2009) highlights the innately problematic nature of efforts to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. Such steps sometimes run counter to the essence of social scientific research, which is to make research procedures and findings public. About 35 percent of those I interviewed were very concerned about how the information they provided would be reported. They cautioned me to be careful with where and in what format I share and publish their views. This is both an ethical issue and a limitation of this study.

Some distinctive features (such as the names of districts within Brown Villa) could not be reported because these and landmarks within the community are unique identifiers of its location. The district names have political import as they reflect
Jamaica’s political transitions during the last decade of the Cold War. Accordingly, in an effort to secure the confidentiality of interviewees, especially those who currently live in Brown Villa, I omitted the names of the community’s districts. As I have noted, I conducted interviews with residents and leaders of community-based groups and churches who live or work in Brown Villa, but to protect their identities I excluded the names of the organizations and churches they represent. A clergy member in one of the districts of Brown Villa commented while being interviewed, “you must be careful with how you call names of the organizations and people you speak with, many persons have died in this community because of a book that was published on political violence, gangs and dons” (Interview, October, 11, 2011: VT020). Indeed, I happen to know the work to which he referred and agreed with its sad significance. This kind of advice shaped the way I have presented this study’s findings. Protecting the identities of interviewees played an influential role in how I reported information about dons and their relationships with Brown Villa residents.

I took the following steps to protect interviewee confidentiality. I provided respondents with an informed consent form that outlined the purposes of the research, named the institution with which I am affiliated and how the information they offered would be used. Interviewees were given consent forms to sign prior to the start of each interview. For some, particularly those who live in the community, whom I often could not contact by email before meeting them in person, it was the first time they had seen such a form (see Appendix). I gave them ample time to read the consent document and to agree (or disagree) before I began interview sessions. The consent document informed potential interviewees that a digital tape recorder would be used during the interview.
sessions to capture fully what would be said. Some of the respondents, especially residents of the community, voiced apprehension at being recorded. Some of those I interviewed (fewer than 5 percent) refused to be recorded, while others asked that parts of the interview not be recorded, particularly when they recounted sensitive events or referred to particular dons and gangs. Those who refused came from the interviewee category of residents, CBO representatives who live in the community as well as some clergy members. Others (two CBO and one elected representative) at various points in the interview session requested that the recorder be paused as they recounted sensitive information, or when they provided the names of dons. Some of these interviewees also asked for the recorder to be put on pause when they recounted the names of some notable elected representatives. I assured interviewees that the recorder could be paused or turned off at any point during the interviews to ensure confidentiality. I received the go ahead from interviewees to use the information that was given “off the record.” They did not want it stored on my digital recorder, however. I wrote what respondents said when the recorder was off in my notebook and later transcribed it for analysis. I made sure to get the permission (verbal consent) of the respondents to use this no-recorded information as part of the written report.

Some respondents’ refusal to be recorded was a limitation to the study, as I had to balance taking notes while simultaneously ensuring that interview questions were asked at appropriate times. When I could not record, I confronted the possibility of losing some of the information that the respondents imparted. Some individuals (about 10 percent) I contacted questioned my ability to protect their identities and therefore refused to sign their names to the consent form because they believed it might pose a threat to
their safety. Instead, they dated and signed the form using an “X” as an indication of approval to be interviewed. Marshall and Rossman have pointed out that some respondents may perceive signing their names to a written document as dangerous and I encountered just such a scenario (2010; pp.125-128).

In what follows in chapters 4 and 5, I use pseudonyms in an effort to protect the identity of interviewees. I thought this measure especially important in light of the fact that Jamaican communities have a strong oral tradition and information within them is disseminated quickly (Levy, 2009). Very often, dons and gang members obtain information by word-of-mouth concerning who has entered a community, who has exited and which residents are talking to the police. Levy has argued that Jamaican inner cities (of which some are garrisons), “all tend to be closed to outsiders, very suspicious of strangers … their people knowing everyone else in a web of family and friend relationships” (Levy, 2009; p.26). I was aware before I arrived of the close-knit character of the Brown Villa community. Therefore, as a way of protecting respondent safety and identities, I did not discuss information gathered from interviews with any other individuals. I did not share the names of either the community associations I observed or the individuals I interviewed from Brown Villa and neighboring communities with any other respondents.

**Ethical Considerations**

Being an academic researcher allowed me to gain access to the selected community and to interviewees. In general, most respondents interviewed appeared to feel comfortable talking about dons and their connections to organized criminal activities. In some cases, interviewees did not work or live inside Brown Villa, but possessed
knowledge of the structure of garrison communities and the roles that political parties and
don play in governing them. This access facilitated the collection of otherwise sensitive
information, albeit on terms interviewees set. Denzin and Giardina (2007) contend that
qualitative research entails relationships of ‘power’ between the researcher and those

My access to respondents, especially those who live in Brown Villa and other
garrisons, was assisted by the contacts I made with non-governmental organizations that
conduct social intervention programs in those areas. As I noted above, as a Jamaican who
had worked in the media, I had an advantage in obtaining contact information for
potential interviewees. I also attained access to several NGO and Community-Based
Organization (CBO) respondents and was able to recruit them to be a part of this study
from past connections I had developed as a radio co-host in Jamaica. These ties helped
me gain the trust of the persons I interviewed. In particular, those connections allowed
me to assure each respondent that I had been referred by someone they knew.

Gaining trust and access to research subjects raises ethical concerns. I was
persistently aware of my position as a researcher and the responsibility I had to protect
the confidentiality of those I interviewed and to safeguard the reputations of my contacts.
In conducting interviews with members of community-based organizations and churches
in Brown Villa, I recognized in the early stages of my research that when I asked
interviewees direct questions about dons and gangs early in our sessions, they became
less responsive. Consequently, I decided not to offer specific inquiries about dons and
gangs early in the interview sessions, Instead, I allowed respondents to speak freely about
the challenges they faced as residents and workers in the community. After I perceived I
had gained their confidence in sharing sensitive information with me, I then asked more specific questions about who the dons were as well as the sorts of activities in which they were engaged. I found this to be a more effective and sensitive approach to obtaining information concerning dons and gangs. Most of these interviewees had themselves experienced or knew someone who had experienced traumatic violence or oppression linked to the presence of dons and gangs in their communities. The word “don” evoked a sense of fear and unease for many I interviewed. Those who agreed to speak with me informed me that dons live in their communities and have established strong communal ties with residents. Interviewees made me aware of the power and influence dons enjoy and exercise. Simply mentioning these figures evinced a change in the mood of many respondents. Overall, I came away believing that interviewees were genuine in the things they said about garrisons, the impact of elected officials on these communities and the relationships that dons have with both community residents and political actors.

Chapters 4 and 5 detail my observations concerning what I experienced while collecting data for this research. These observational data are important, as the interviewees’ reactions to questions helped me to understand better how garrison residents view dons. There was no need to readjust the order of interview questions in the sessions with experts from NGOs, the police department (JCF), journalists and elected representatives (MPs). In most instances, I asked them about dons early in the interview session. I did not observe emotional reactions among these individuals similar to those I noticed among community-based interviewees. These individuals were nonetheless careful and reserved in how they mentioned the names of dons and the elected representatives purportedly associated with them.
Limitations

Yin (2009) has argued that single-case study research often is weaker on external validity but stronger on internal validity, because the researcher is able to provide thick descriptions and interpretations about the concerns under study. Other qualitative researchers (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) have argued that tests for internal and external validity refer specifically to the soundness of the research. They point out the terms internal and external validity are more appropriately conceived as credibility and transferability when these concerns are considered in qualitative research design. Credibility is related to “believability, authenticity and plausibility of results” (Bailey 2007, p.182).

Given the sensitive nature of the research questions and the potential security risks to the researcher and participants, I decided before entering the field that current dons would not be recruited for interviews. This proved a very real limitation when some presently active dons expressed their willingness to talk with me. However, I declined their offers for security reasons.

Aberbach and Rockman (2002) have pointed to the potential difficulties that researchers can encounter as they seek to “get in the door” to conduct interviews with bureaucratic and political elites (2002; p. 674). Getting through to these individuals to obtain an interview can be time consuming and setting up a specific time to do so that fits their schedules can be even more difficult. Indeed, some sessions with experts interviewed for this research were scheduled weeks in advance. Moreover, in some cases, I could not interview specific individuals due to scheduling difficulties. Some of those I contacted refused to participate. My attempts to schedule interviews with elected
representatives from the then JLP-led government of Jamaica, especially those that had representational responsibilities in the metropolitan area which includes Brown Villa and other garrison neighborhoods were unsuccessful. Several members of Parliament I contacted said they were too busy to sit for an interview, while others declined my invitation on learning the nature and topic of my research. I also contacted several senior politicians (both current and former elected officials) who have been in representational politics in Jamaica since the nation’s independence in 1962. One former Jamaican prime minister who played an important role in the creation of a garrison community refused to be a part of the study. The former prime minister’s explanation for not participating was his resolution to stop talking about the past as it relates to issues of political tribalism, garrison politics and dons. He opined that the media, in particular, have consistently sensationalized his views and so he has decided to deny interviews on the topic. This was a limitation, as this individual’s perspective could have had a significant impact on the data gathered for analysis. His insights could have shed light on the politically volatile era especially, in which partisan enforcers played central roles in the practice of representational politics on the streets of Jamaica’s key cities.

Another limitation encountered in carrying out this inquiry concerned the difficulty of gaining access to the relatively small group of local academics who have examined dons and garrisons in Jamaica. As I have argued, only a few scholars have addressed the issue of dons in Jamaica (Gunst, 1995; Johnson & Soerters, 2008; Sives, 2010; Stone, 1980). In general, I found it difficult to schedule times to talk with these academics whose works have examined some aspects of the issues related to garrisons, violence, gangs and dons. When I contacted them, all of them indicated that teaching and
research responsibilities limited their availability. One professor, who has conducted anthropological work regarding gang violence, homicide and inner city social relations in Jamaica and the broader English speaking Caribbean, declined my invitation for an interview, citing several research and professional priorities as reasons for not being available. This person’s views could have helped to shape my analysis and interpretations since s/he has a wealth of experience researching and working in inner city and garrison neighborhoods in Jamaica.

Bureaucratic procedures and protocols posed limitations to the research as they slowed, and in some cases hindered, my efforts to gain access to potential interviewees. A number of the respondents I targeted for conversations were employees of state agencies and government ministries. In other cases, potential respondents were CEOs and directors of state agencies, non-governmental organizations or corporations. Scheduling for these interviewees had to go through their front desk receptionists or administrative assistants. This meant in many cases that I had to make several calls to the offices of prospective interviewees. On occasion, I believe I missed the opportunity to interview potential respondents because of poor scheduling on the part of office assistants. Fortunately, I was sometimes able to circumvent this limitation by making direct calls to the cell phones of potential interviewees.

Jamaica was engaged in a general parliamentary electoral campaign from the middle of October 2011 until December 29, 2011, when the election occurred. The campaign coincided with the final two and one-half months of my field research and it affected the availability of some potential respondents, especially those from the Police Department (Jamaica Constabulary Force-JCF), residents and members of community-
based organizations in Brown Villa and adjoining communities. Members of the JCF were put on high alert for the campaign, thereby limiting their availability and making it difficult to schedule interviews with them. As mentioned above, Brown Villa is located in a garrison constituency, which meant that policing demands rose as the campaign season progressed and the department worked to prevent an escalation of partisan tension and violence. Chapters 1 and 2 referred to the rancorous partisan history of Jamaica’s garrison communities. That history and context convinced me to avoid the garrison as Election Day neared. I made this choice to minimize the risk of danger to my intended interviewees and to me. In short, the political climate toward the end of the research period constituted a limitation on data collection.

Data Analysis

Analyzing qualitative data is an ongoing process. It is iterative and starts from the time the researcher begin collecting information concerning the population or phenomenon she/he is studying (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003; Creswell 2007). I followed a three-step process in examining my data: (a) immersing myself in the information gathered and reducing it for manageability, (b) probing the data collected for recurrent themes and (c) linking those themes to the theoretical bases of this study (governance and embeddedness). I employed a constant comparative analysis strategy developed by Strauss and Corbin (1998) to analyze the information I gathered. My concern throughout the analytic process was to ascertain whether and how the data supported the theoretical proposition that Jamaican dons function as embedded governance actors in garrison communities. The following section details the strategies of data analysis I used.
I sought to organize the data in order to make it more manageable. Creswell (2007) has argued that an important part of qualitative analysis is ‘winnowing.’ That is, such examination demands extracting the most relevant parts of the data (in this case, text) and identifying major themes, categories and associations among them. Strauss and Corbin (1998) refer to this stage of the data examination process as ‘open coding.’ I transcribed each interview into a Microsoft Word document and stored each electronically. The transcribed data files were password encrypted to ensure the confidentiality of the stored information. I took field notes at the research site and during interview sessions and labeled those by date and theme. For example, on a visit to one of the districts in Brown Villa I observed the community’s infrastructure (housing/drainage/sanitation) and recorded my observations at the time in a notebook for later analysis. To increase the manageability of the data, I sorted it into separate files for transcriptions, observations, field-notes and documents. I immersed myself in these by reading and re-reading the interview transcripts and replaying the recorded interviews as I went through the corresponding text. Similarly, I read and re-read analytic memos and field notes of observations as I matched the raw data to the research objectives. I also subjected the documents to this process of data condensation and winnowing. I used Microsoft Word’s ‘Review’ function to identify relevant excerpts and passages from the transcribed interview texts. I selected excerpts based on their relevance to the theme under examination. For example, in looking at the topic the ‘roles dons play,’ I chose passages from interview transcripts that expressed how interviewees defined such roles (such as community security, for example). In some cases, I used key words and phrases to identify relevant quotations for use. Words such as ‘violence,’ ‘gangs’ and ‘protect’ or
phrases such as ‘dons provide’ are examples of key search terms I used. Given the volume of the data collected, I used the NVIVO9 qualitative software program to store and extract passages from the documents, following a process similar to manual coding of the interview transcripts.

After immersion in and examination of interview transcripts, observation notes, analytic memos and documents, I identified themes and categories that related to the issue of dons and the roles they play in Brown Villa through a coding process. Marshall and Rossman (2010) posit that coding is where the real analytic thinking of producing ‘categories and themes’ takes place (p. 212). In coding the different textual documents, I used both preset (a priori) and emergent (NVivo) codes to identify major categories and themes. Examples of the preset codes I employed included violence in garrisons, authority of dons, funding sources for dons and gangs and the capacity of the state. Emergent codes included peace promotion by dons, leadership, social trust and sexual exploitation of women in garrisons and garrison mentality (low self-esteem).

In coding the interview transcripts, I placed such phrases in the margin of the text to identify relevant parts of the respondents’ views that reflected the codes. The use of NVIVO9 qualitative software facilitated the process of coding the interview transcripts. A similar process of coding was carried out with the documents using the software program. I completed this process several times, as I searched the data for ‘repeating ideas’ and themes that matched or contravened the main concerns and objectives of the research (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; pp. 54-55). My analysis of the data yielded 25 coding labels, which I then grouped into categories and in which I identified major themes and sub-themes (see code list in Appendix).
After coding the transcribed interviews and documents separately, I grouped them into larger categories that expressed major themes and sub-themes (Creswell, 2007). The process of category and theme generation allows the researcher to uncover patterns within and among data sources. For example, I grouped the codes gun crimes, gang warfare and jungle justice into the category of garrison violence. This category (violence) was linked to the general theme concerning the major problems that plague garrison communities. Several individual interview transcripts and documents highlight the recurrent patterns related to violence in Jamaica’s garrisons. In analyzing the data, I looked for correspondence among different categories and themes.

I developed interpretations across all the sources of data collected, for example, about who dons are and how they manage to maintain control over garrison residents. I did this by probing the relationships between the themes of Garrison Environment and the Roles of Dons. As stated above, NVIVO9 supported my analysis of the data collected. After reading the interview transcripts and manually coding them I established major themes (parent nodes), such as “roles of dons,” and “roles of NGOs” using NVIVO9. At the second and third stages (described above) of analyzing the data, I identified subthemes/child nodes and classified each under a parent node. In some instances, I illustrated the relationships between parent and child nodes (major themes and sub themes) by models created using NVIVO9. I exported these models/concept maps and saved them as images. In other instances, where I found that a word was used frequently, I performed a search query for it. For example, the word “protect” trended among respondents. I therefore used a search query to create a pictorial overview of the varying ways interviewees used the concept “protect”
I prepared analytic memos throughout the study to identify main themes. Patton (1990, 2002) has contended that analytic memos represent a form of inductive data analysis by which the researcher ‘discovers’ dominant themes and patterns as he/she probes their collected data. I kept field notes in which I evaluated the appropriateness of the theoretical bases of the research. Memoing helped in assessing whether I was addressing my primary research objectives and questions. This effort helped me to generate new insights about dons and garrisons. The typology of dons presented in Chapters 1, 4 and 5, for example, emerged from analyzing analytic memos I had prepared.

Conclusion

Conducting field research on sensitive and potentially dangerous topics requires that the researcher plan carefully ahead of time before the actual collection of data is undertaken. A qualitative research design was ideal for the nature of the topic under study and it was most appropriate to address the research questions I posed. This chapter has presented the overall research design and strategies I used to collect information. Chapters 4 and 5 describe and interpret the information I collected from interviews, observation and document analysis undertaken during the fieldwork for this study.
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA FINDINGS PART I:
BROWN VILLA: THE GARRISON CONTEXT

Introduction

I have organized my findings and analysis into two parts; the first part (chapter 4) examines the socio-economic and political context of Brown Villa. The second component, meanwhile, (chapter 5) probes in detail the roles performed by different types of dons. I have employed major themes/sub-themes to organize the substance of these chapters and used relevant excerpts from interview transcripts, documents and newspaper articles to inform my discussion of each. These materials provide insight into the conditions and dynamics of Brown Villa and by extension, of other garrison communities. They also assist in presenting a robust description of the influence dons have in such spaces. The following three major themes are examined in these chapters: (i) the principal challenges confronting garrison residents (ii) the roles performed by dons and (iii) the impact of drug trafficking on the roles of these community leaders. This chapter describes the garrison environment and explores the first theme, challenges in garrisons.

I used a constant comparative analytical strategy to identify and categorize themes and patterns in the interview and secondary data I employed and a combination of concept maps, figures and tables to present and interpret that information. The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) and the Social Development Commission of Jamaica (SDC) provided key secondary data. The first section of the chapter describes the social and economic environment of Brown Villa. It
examines the community’s demographic composition and residents’ education, employment, income and training levels as well as their perceptions of safety. My analysis of Brown Villa’s socio-economic status and demographic features represent an important finding. The garrison environment helps to contextualize the predisposition of its residents, especially those under age 25, to behaviors of dependency, delinquency and the adulation of dons.

As I suggested above, I have given interviewees code names to protect their confidentiality. VT refers to Virginia Tech while the accompanying numbers constitute a distinct identification for each respondent. I assigned the numbers in ascending order: lower numbers, e.g., VT001, VT002, refer to those interviews conducted earlier chronologically and higher numbers, such as VT032 and VT040, represent later interviews (see Table 1.0).

Table 1.0: Interviewee list by VT number and Category

| VT001-Journalist | VT002-NGO Director | VT025-NGO |
| VT003-Academic | VT004-NGO Director | VT026-Senior Police |
| VT005-Journalist | VT006-NGO | VT027-Former Gang Member |
| VT007-Clergy/CBO | VT008-Resident/CBO | VT028-NGO |
| VT009-Police | VT010-Clergy | VT029-Elected Official |
| VT011-Resident | VT012-NGO Director/CBO | VT030-State Official |
| VT013-Social Worker | VT014-Elected Official | VT031-Police |
| VT015-Resident/CBO | VT016-NGO | VT032-Resident/CBO |
| VT017-Elected Official | VT018-Police | VT033-NGO |
| VT019-Resident | VT020-Clergy/CBO | VT034-Ret. Police |
| VT021-Resident/CBO | VT022-Senior Police | VT035-Resident/CBO |
| VT023-Senior Police | VT024-Clergy | VT036-Police |
| VT025-Resident/CBO | VT037-Resident | VT038- Senior Police |
| VT039-Academic | VT039-Academic | VT039-Academic |
| VT040-Former Gang Member | VT041-Ret. Police | VT042-Former Gang Member |
In the next section I place the emergence and evolution of Jamaican dons into a more textured historical context.

**Historical Context**

**Clientele Relationships-Trade Unions, Political Parties and Garrisons**

As suggested above, democracy and governance in Jamaica have a patron-clientele foundation. Beyond Jamaica, scholars have used clientelism to explain the relationships among the state, non-state actors and citizens in both the developing and developed world (Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 1981; Kawata, 2006; Schmidt, 1977). Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) for example, have argued that patron-client relations describe the structure of social exchange(s) between many governance actors or groups of actors. They have suggested that patron-client relations are a “paradoxical set of elements combining inequality and asymmetry in power” in which actors are locked in mutual relations of obligation. According to these scholars, moreover, these relationships involve “combinations of potential coercion and exploitation” (1980; pp.42-77). Edie (1984, 1991) has noted that the historical evolution of democracy and its institutions in Jamaica specifically (political parties, trade unions and state agencies), differed from other former British colonies. In the wider British Caribbean, issues linked to class, race or ethnic conflicts were primary shapers of relationships between political institutions and citizens. The Jamaican case stands out because in that nation political parties served simultaneously as unifying agents and as polarizing catalysts that dominated the evolution of the country’s politics and its public institutions. Citizens, especially the disaffected urban poor, were mobilized along clientelistic lines. Edie (1984) and Stone (1985) have observed that Jamaican political parties and trade unions engaged in dyadic
relationships with their members and supporters to remain in power and maintain strong mandates to govern.

The clientele relations among trade unions, parties and their supporters during Jamaica’s colonial era supported a smooth democratic transition after the island gained its independence (Edie, 1984; Munroe, 1990). Indigenous political elites emerged following independence and took control of the administrative structures of the Jamaican state; they had at their disposal a range of material benefits and access to state largesse. Motivated largely by political power on the one hand, and material considerations on the other, patron-client ties soon developed between Jamaican state leaders and an array of social groups. At the community level, political parties appointed local political enforcers known as area leaders who engaged in transactional relationships with political elites (Witter, 1992). These individuals ensured mass support for political parties in the form of guaranteed votes in general elections; this backing drew disproportionately from Jamaica’s urban poor (Gray, 1994, 2004). In return, area leaders received preferential access to state largesse in the form of contracts to repair roads, bridges and verges in the metropolitan areas of Kingston, St. Catherine and St. Andrew. They also received privileged permits from the state to manage and control the proceeds from waste/garbage disposal. They soon became the local administrative arm of the ruling party in Jamaica’s garrisons, when their preferred party gained office. As Chapter 1 noted, it is from the ranks of area leaders, that dons first emerged during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

This research departs slightly from the clientelism school of thought embraced by previous scholars who have considered the issue of dons. I rely primarily on the theoretical lens of governance and embeddedness as outlined above. Clientelism serves
the purpose, however, of contextualizing the genesis of the rise of dons in Jamaica. These local leaders emerged out of vicious socio-political conflicts between the two major political parties in Jamaica (JLP and the PNP) and their associated trade unions.

**Trade Unions and Political Parties**

Political violence in Jamaica began first with turbulent conflicts between the nation’s two major trade unions: the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) during the 1940s and 1950s. Indigenous political leaders, Norman Manley (TUC) and Sir Alexander Bustamante (BITU), used the trade unions to rally mass support from the working class (skilled and unskilled) in the parishes of Kingston and St. Andrew to ensure the popularity of their respective parties. The union leaders shared a desire to form a new governmental administration once British colonial rule ended. The urban poor gained access to limited material resources and labor representation through their connections with either of the two trade unions; they were loyal to “their” unions and the leaders who helped them survive the tough economic conditions of a developing colonial society (Gray, 1994; Hart, 1999). As matters evolved, in the early 1940s, prior to independence, the trade unions had aligned themselves formally with each of the two leading political parties in Jamaica- the JLP and the PNP.28

Violence in the 1940s into the 1960s took the form of street battles among individuals who wanted to ensure that their respective union and party would rise to and remain in power after British colonial rule had ended. Under British Crown Colony administration, Jamaica’s local political parties and trade unions had legislative rights and opportunities to participate in governance processes. The violence intensified as the two

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major parties competed for state power in Jamaica’s first general elections in 1944 (Hart, 1999). The street clashes between JLP-BITU supporters and PNP-TUC supporters intensified in Kingston and St. Andrew in the post-1944 election years. This period of turmoil saw the emergence of party/union political enforcers, the escalation of ongoing conflicts concerning political turf and the deepening of polarized clientele relationships. Large numbers of the urban poor and members of the working class became locked into relationships with one or the other of the two major parties. Each party strove to supply its partisans with material benefits to secure its ongoing political support. At least one of the competing groups (the JLP) sought to secure monopoly political status. As Gray (2004) has argued:

The practice of political discrimination had unleashed an orgy of political violence and industrial strikes as the PNP-TUC resisted Bustamante’s bid to monopolize power, dominate trade union and political activity in Kingston, and distribute jobs on a purely partisan basis…This PNP-TUC resistance and the JLP effort to subdue it found partisans of the parties and rival unions battling in the streets of Kingston (p.27).

After 1944 (the year universal adult suffrage was attained in Jamaica), party violence became a feature of local politics in the nation. The hostility grew primarily out of competition for partisan distribution of government contracts and jobs. Members of the “out” group (in this case the party and trade union that were out of governmental power, the PNP-TUC) grew increasingly militant because the “in” group (the JLP-BITU) starved them of resources. Violence was used to intimidate the party in power into distributing state largesse on a more equal basis. Gray (2004) has suggested that Jamaica’s indigenous political elite had strategic interests in controlling Kingston, the nation’s capital. Control
over the PNP-TUC and JLP-BITU organizations allowed those leaders to ensure their geo-political hegemony over Kingston and its communities.

Jamaica’s capital city garrisons offered both PNP and JLP party leaders the opportunity to use street thugs and gangs as tools to secure electoral victories and political power. The PNP-TUC alliance recruited a group of Kingston men to constitute a gang of political activists, the so-called Group 69, whom party leaders used as enforcers to ensure the opposing JLP-BITU did not gain popular support in the city. The group’s name arose from its origins at 69 Matthews Lane, in the western part of Kingston (Gray, 2004; p.29). Die-hard PNP-TUC loyalists dominated Matthews Lane. The JLP similarly recruited men to serve as political enforcers and street fighters. These men came from Kingston’s dockworkers, unionized laborers and the unemployed. Group 69 members adopted a platform based on socialist principles. Participants obtained these ideas from political party initiated study groups held in the Matthews Lane neighborhood. Scholars have noted the ideological influence of Western political philosophy on both parties (Gray, 2004; Munroe, 1990; Sives, 2010). Loyalty to one of the two major political parties and trade unions shaped the social identities of the urban working classes in Jamaica from the 1940s to the 1960s. These in turn came to define different urban neighborhoods across Kingston and St. Andrew. As Gray (2004) has explained:

In urban Jamaica of the 1940s and 1950s, political identity and cultural identity were being fused, and party politics had become the cement that bonded both. To the combatants ensnared in the politico-cultural development, individual social worth and prospects for group social honor or disrepute now depended on political affiliation. Depending on which side of the social divide the combatants stood, the assumption of a partisan identity became either a badge of honor or a stigma of devilry. Party and union affiliation had therefore become not unlike an ethnic identity in these early years of contestation, and the embrace of this proto-national sensibility had launched the black poor into an internecine, destructive war for political advantage… The intensity of this early antagonism therefore
found sections of the urban poor arrayed against each other like two hostile “national” communities. Each became a “proto-nation”, determined to hold onto its sacred exclusivist rights, ready to demonize its opponents, and poised to back up this antipathy with naked violence (pp. 33-4).

From the late 1960s into the 1980s, political polarization intensified between the two dominant political parties in Jamaica. The ideological effects of the Cold War had seeped into the Caribbean region and the PNP embraced the Socialist “Left,” while the JLP adopted the political economic policies of the ‘Right.’ Eastern European socialism appealed to the political elite in the PNP and North American (U.S.) capitalism took root in the JLP. Political violence institutionalized in Jamaica by the 1970s. The establishment of garrisons or what some authors defined as “political enclaves” (Figueroa, 1992; Witter, 1992) emerged as a direct result of the institutionalization of political violence. The creation of garrisons led to the further division of Jamaicans into distinct “political tribes” and entrenched identity politics more deeply in the nation’s political culture. Even though the use of violence in political contestation existed prior to independence, gunmanship did not become a part of that phenomenon until the late 1960s.

Harriott (2008) has suggested that the “gun” has a symbolic meaning for some Jamaican inner city youths (especially males). This type of weapon signifies power and its possession commands respect. He has posited that the gun is a central feature of the subculture of violence that has long gripped inner city communities in Jamaica. According to the Caribbean Human Development Report 2012, “the LAC region is disproportionately affected by small arms violence. This type of violence accounted for 42 percent of all firearm related deaths worldwide” (p.22). Agozino, Bowling, Ward and St Bernard (2009) have suggested that a process of ‘pistolization’ accounts for high homicide rates in the British Caribbean. Guns have become the weapon of choice in acts
of violence in Jamaica and other countries in the region. For these scholars, “pistolization, or weaponization more generally, refers to the process whereby handguns and other small arms become embedded in significant sectors of a particular civil society” (Agozino et al., 2009; p.287). According to Vigil (2003), urban violence intensifies and street gangs grow because of the availability of “sophisticated weapons” (p.226). The “gun” allows dons to conduct partisan enforcement, ensure security and protect the provision of welfare services inside their local communities.

The political elite introduced guns during the late 1960s to protect political turf across parts of Kingston (Gray, 2004). As a result, the partisan identities of the JLP and PNP communities became sharper and more dangerously adversarial. The weaponization of the political process led to increased violence and the rise of the political ‘bad man’ who transformed into the dons of the 1970s and later. Indeed, by the close of that decade, the garrison phenomenon had become a central feature of urban politics and culture in Jamaica.

The socio-economic realities of the Brown Villa garrison

Garrison residents daily confront a range of challenges, including high levels of poverty and unemployment. Charting those concerns provides a lens into the political, economic and social context in which dons have emerged and entrenched themselves. This section relies on information from the Social Development Commission (SDC) Community Profile 201129 for Brown Villa as well as interviews with individuals who

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29 The Jamaican government established the SDC in 1965 as a state agency geared towards the development and self-governance of communities across the country. The SDC’s approach to community development is built on research and social intervention. The agency works with several local and international groups such as the UNDP, USAID and the World Bank. In 2007, the SDC published community profiles of the neighborhoods with which it is involved. For more information on the SDC, see http://www.sdc.gov.jm/home/.
live or work in the community. The SDC Community Profile outlines the main demographic, employment and educational features of Brown Villa. The Report noted six major developmental challenges the neighborhood’s residents identified as critical in 2007 and 2011. Figure 1 tracks the shift in concerns among residents over time regarding the pressing challenges their community faces. Insecurity from crime and violence was a major concern in 2007, while high unemployment, especially among youth, is a serious developmental challenge the community continues to confront (SDC, 2011; p.59). As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Sen (1999) has argued that the lack of certain basic resources contributes to poverty and hinders development. These critical attributes or elements, including access to good education and employment, are in short supply in Jamaica’s garrisons generally, and in Brown Villa particularly.

**Figure 1**: Brown Villa Residents’ Perception of Community Challenges 2007 and 2011

(Numbers are Percentages)

Demographic Information

The community is a youthful one, with the bulk of the population between 10 and 30 years old and more than 62 percent of the population under 30. (See table 1.1.) A large percentage of residents are children under the age of 15. Along with limited state-sponsored social services, relatively high dropout rates from school for a small community, poor parenting skills and supervision, the “youthfulness” of the garrison environment is an ideal location for non-state actors, including criminal types such as dons, to emerge and embed themselves in the life of the community. A police officer from the Community Policing Unit in Brown Villa, pointed out in an interview, for example, that “dons use the community, especially its high schools, as recruiting grounds for gang membership” (VT009 Interview, September 16, 2011). Dons emerge in these contexts due to these communities’ diminished stock of political trust in the state, low levels of human capital and limited employment opportunities. Garrisons also evidence, as several interviewees observed, low self-esteem among residents (Henry-Lee, 2005). The poor quality of education and training and low-income levels of residents are specific manifestations of poverty and of a more generalized dearth of economic development at the macro level in Jamaica.
Table 1.1: Age and Sex of Brown Villa Residents 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort (yrs.)</th>
<th>Percentage Male</th>
<th>Percentage Female</th>
<th>Percentage Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64+</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>52.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Education and Training**

According to the 2011 SDC report, 74.5 percent of Brown Villa’s household heads have no academic qualifications; that is, no high school diploma or post-secondary training. A mere 2.8 percent possessed an associate’s degree or post-secondary professional qualification (2011; pp.5-6). The SDC data also indicated that 9.8 percent of household heads had at least some vocational training, while only 5.1 percent of them had passed one or more subjects at the CXC General or GCE ‘O’ Level. SDC data reveal that 62.7 percent of other household members had no academic qualification (that is, no official certification in a field of study). Interviewees noted the neighborhood’s limited educational opportunities and frequent poor quality of secondary schooling as a major problem in the garrison (see Figure 2).

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30CXC, the Caribbean Examinations Council, is a regional body in the English Caribbean that oversees and administers exams to secondary level students. The CXC covers subjects in the humanities, arts and sciences [inclusive of Math and English], GCE ‘O’ Level is the British counterpart to CXC exams. Students are required to pass exams in five or more subjects including Math and English in order to be eligible to matriculate for post-secondary education and training.
Employment and Income

Sixty-six per cent of Brown Villa household heads were employed in 2007. This figure dropped to 55.2 percent in 2011. The 2011 SDC survey found 38.5 percent employment, with 64.1 per cent of the labor force in Brown Villa aged 14 to 64 unemployed (SDC, 2011; pp.37-45). The unemployment rate, based on the 2011 survey, was highest (21.2%) among those aged 20-24, and it was higher among women. Thus, unemployment, especially among younger people, is a serious problem in the Brown Villa garrison. The SDC has reported similar figures in other Metropolitan Areas in the nation. For the entire country, the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) reported a 25.7 per cent unemployment rate for the age group 20-24 in October 2010; this figure rose to 27.4 per cent in the following year.31

Among household heads in Brown Villa, 46.5 percent earned less than 30,000 JMD (equivalent of USD 350) per month (SDC, 2011, p.38).32 This income level places them in poverty. These data capture income only for those classified as ‘household heads.’ Income from other members may also be a factor in the overall income level of the entire household. On average, residents live on less than $11U.S. dollars a day (calculated at the first quarter 2012 USD to JMD exchange rate). These data echo Henry-Lee’s (2005) analysis of the levels of private and public poverty in garrison communities. She argued that while poverty levels declined in the KMA area between 1989 and 2001,


32 The USD to JMD currency exchange rate stood at approximately 85.5 JMD to 1 USD in 2011 and in the first quarter of 2012 (Jan-March it was approximately 87JMDto1USD. Please see the World CIA Fact Book data at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jm.html and the Bank of Jamaica website at http://www.boj.org.jm/foreign_exchange/fx_rates_monthly.php
the quality of life of the residents living there did not improve. Such seems to be the continuing reality for Brown Villa residents.

**Crime and Perceptions of Public Safety**

Nearly two-thirds of SDC report respondents in March 2011 suggested it was unlikely they would be a crime victim in the next twelve months, while 14 percent said it was likely and 7.9 percent suggested it was “impossible” (2011, p. 53). In the interviews I conducted, respondents who live and work in Brown Villa and similar garrison communities observed that since the May 2010 Incursion into Tivoli Gardens, their communities felt safer. The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) have since stepped up policing operations by targeting garrison gangs and dons in many urban inner cities in the KMA. Interviewees (residents of Brown Villa and Tivoli Gardens) did point out, however, that prior to Coke’s arrest, they experienced periods of violence in their communities related to gang warfare, including reprisal killings and sexual assaults. It is possible that a general drop in the crime rate in the country in late 2010 and early 2011 influenced SDC respondent perceptions in March 2011. In the interview sessions I conducted with residents of Brown Villa and neighboring communities, when I asked individuals to share their perceptions of their community’s safety early in the interview, they spoke cautiously and reservedly. Later in the interview, however, these respondents tended to speak more openly and freely about the nature of the problems, they had experienced. According to Brown Villa residents, these concerns included drive-by shootings by rival community gangs, firebombing of their homes as acts of reprisal and the restriction of their movement across community borders into neighboring town centers. Table 1.2 suggests that despite the relatively ‘safe’
perception respondents reported to the SDC concerning daily life in Brown Villa, they nonetheless also shared several perceived major continuing threats to public safety. Gang warfare was residents’ top concern linked to public safety.

Table 1.2: Major Public Safety Threats in Brown Villa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Safety Issues</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gangs and Gang warfare</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overgrown Lots</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derelict Buildings</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw sewage in the streets</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No street lights</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate Street Lights</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate disposal of solid waste</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed Infrastructure</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In what follows, I present the major challenges to community safety, welfare and order that garrison residents identified in my interviews with them. I triangulated what the interviewees revealed with the data contained in the documents I examined. An analysis of the major problems (outlined in Figure 2) faced by garrison residents helps contextualize the socio-economic environment in which dons have operated.

Theme One: Major Challenges Facing Garrison Communities

The failure of the Jamaican state and private businesses to provide services such as healthcare, decent housing and proper training for garrison residents to take advantage of employment opportunities created openings for dons to emerge and for them to play several social roles. STATIN has reported that between 2006 and 2009 an average of 176,000 persons were employed for the first three quarters of each year. Many garrison

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33 The Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) publishes the annual total employment by industry in large establishments for the entire country. These sectors are mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, construction, trade, hotel and restaurants, transport, storage and communications, financing, insurance, real estate and business
residents do not qualify to have access to employment in these industries named by STATIN.

Garrison residents perceive dons as “ghetto governors who help them to survive” (Interview, September 16, 2011:VT011) given this reality. Residents view some dons as providers, protectors, arbiters of social justice and facilitators of their economic survival. Meanwhile, they view others, particularly Street Dons, as predators who extort from the community and sexually oppress residents, especially young women. The interviews I conducted suggested strongly that garrison daily life exposes residents (the young in particular) to violent behaviors and gang cultures. Residents, police and NGO/CBO interviewees pointed out that poor parenting values and a lack of social trust for those considered outsiders to the realities of garrison life characterize these communities. This cultural/sociological analysis is important as it helps interested observers to understand the material and non-material factors that prompt residents to support or reject dons’ governing roles. I address these issues below.

The challenges that garrison residents’ face highlight, on one level, the weak capacity of the Jamaican state. Residents look to dons as alternative sources for economic survival, leadership and security. Tilly (2007) has suggested that when state capacity is low, democratic governments are threatened by “higher involvement of semi-legal and illegal actors in public politics” (p.20). Since its colonial beginnings in the 1930s with the formation of trade unions and political parties, the Jamaican state has never enjoyed a strong economic base. When Jamaica became independent in 1962, local political leaders

services, community, social and personal services (including public education). STATIN data is available at http://statinja.gov.jm
confronted a growing and restive poor urban and rural working class since the economy was too small to provide jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities to most of the nation’s newly independent citizens. The largely agriculture-based economy depended on foreign importation of locally produced sugar, citrus and bananas. Jamaica also offered bauxite as part of its externally driven export economy.

By 1970, Jamaica was almost completely reliant on foreign trade and had become an import dependent economy. This situation had its roots in the nation’s colonial history of dependence on Britain. Beckford (1972) has argued that third world economies such as Jamaica’s, inherited plantation-based economies that have contributed to their conditions of ‘persistent poverty’ and underdevelopment. Interviewee VT014 (an elected representative) recalled that the Jamaican state was unable to provide economic opportunities for its growing urban population in the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s, a series of economic crises and the consequent drying up of political contracts and largesse from the government positioned solidified the position of dons in the nation’s garrisons. According to VT014, “Dons emerged within the context of weakening political officialdom” (Interview, September 23, 2011). In short, a weak economic base at the macro (state) level is one key factor that facilitated the rise of these criminal actors in Jamaica’s garrisons. When there are limited available sources of earning legitimate income and sustainable means of economic survival, people are predisposed to create their own solutions or attach themselves to those that appear able to provide them.

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34 In *Persistent poverty: Underdevelopment in plantation economies of the third world* (1972), Beckford has argued that the plantation economy model instituted and adapted by most of the developing regions of the world serves to perpetuate poverty and underdevelopment. He contends that the plantation model is totalitarian, shaping not only the economy but also the political structure and social relations in society.
Figure 2: Theme 1: Problems Facing Garrison Residents

Produced from interviewees’ responses to the question, “What are the main challenges faced by residents in garrisons?” Figure generated using NVIVO; the size of bubbles indicates the frequency and ranking of problem as identified by interviewees.

Unemployment

Unemployment was a significant and recurrent sub-theme among those I interviewed. Interviewees cited a lack of job opportunities as a major problem that affected residents, especially youth in the community. One interviewee (VT021), who has lived in Brown Villa for more than 40 years and directs a community-based organization, maintained that a lack of education and job creation are the two most critical problems garrison residents confront. In his view, dons and gangs would have less influence if residents had greater access to these needs. As he remarked,

For me what I think is the greatest challenge in this community is education and job creation, because if people had jobs, if people had education, they would know how to control and conduct themselves. Because I’ve seen people work inside of this community, men who would normally deh pon (be on the) corner as gangsters and dem (they) get a job and dem (their) job is only night job, suh (so) in the days they can only sleep cause (because) them (they are) tired and then at the night they’re off to work. So you see where job creation and education can make a difference in these communities (Interview, October 12, 2011:VT021).
Another interviewee (VT007), a clergyman who has worked in Brown Villa since 1999 leading a nonprofit organization aimed at dispute resolution among rival gangs in troubled inner city communities, connected unemployment, poor parenting skills and violence in Brown Villa as central social challenges.

Probably the first thing I would say is that the reputation of Brown Villa and the reality are two different things. Often the name of Brown Villa evokes fear, dread, and those kinds of things. There have been and still are some dangerous elements in the community. But the number one challenge is unemployment. A lack of employment, a lack of family cohesiveness, young people growing up finding their way in life at a very, very young age, very little parental supervision and investment, and parents having grown up the same way not having the sense of esteem to invest in their children. So you get all of these problems like teenage pregnancy, high dropout rates in school, and as a result of that you do have family breakdown, very poor sense of conflict resolution skills and as a result of that, yeah, violence (Interview, September, 6, 2011:VT007).

Later in the interview, VT007 noted that the high levels of unemployment and the stigma of living in a garrison community made basic economic survival difficult for the residents of such neighborhoods. He opined that there is a basic need for “survival in the community and [that] a general lack of hope” pervades the area, where most people are “trying to do the best they can.” Residents have great difficulty getting jobs if it is known their home address is in a garrison neighborhood. Potential employers tend to fear the perceived criminality popularly associated with garrisons. External stigmatization of urban inner city communities by potential employers, state officials, the police and others has often hindered residents’ opportunities to obtain legal employment.

The need for youth employment and other opportunities to secure a sense of economic survival came up in most of the community-based organization representatives’ interviews I conducted. According to interviewee VT010, a clergyman who has worked with local and international NGO groups in Brown Villa since 1994, the community
needs “alternatives,” “if there is no strong economic base, it can breed crime and violence.” Many “idle youths” in the community are not employed, and “when youths are not occupied it leads to problems” (Interview, September 14, 2011: VT 010). There are no branch plants in Brown Villa, and residents are desperate for employment opportunities. When I toured sections of the garrison, I observed that the only signs of economic activity were small corner shops and some street vendors who sold their wares (chewing gum and other confectionaries) to students attending neighborhood high schools. The 2006 Report of the Special Task Force on Crime, *Road Map to a Safe and Secure Jamaica* (hereafter referred to as Road Map, 2006), highlighted the high rates of youth unemployment and social inequality in Jamaica’s urban inner cities. The Report noted that the high rate of violent crime in Jamaica, especially in garrison neighborhoods, has its “roots” in this reality of youth unemployment and social inequality. It concluded, “A high proportion of violent crimes are committed by young males who are unemployed and underemployed” (Road Map, 2006; p. 8).

The 64.1 percent youth unemployment rate of Brown Villa, when viewed in the context of the Road Map’s analysis provides a picture of the relationship between unemployment and criminality. A former ‘foot soldier’\(^{35}\) to a don (Interviewee VT027), who lives in one of the districts of Brown Villa, decried the functions played by the Jamaican state in his community in securing basic economic survival among residents. He contended that successive governments have given minimal support to the development of his neighborhood. In his view, residents support dons because they help

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\(^{35}\) The term ‘foot soldier’ describes a lower ranking ‘lieutenant’ in a don’s gang. Often, these individuals carry out the don’s orders such as disciplining or punishing a community member deemed to be delinquent. They also execute robberies, extortion, murders, shootings and kidnapping on behalf of dons.
people in the community survive during hard times. According to this Interviewee (VT027), a young person who opts to be a member of a don’s gang does so most often because of the financial remuneration and social status such a role can bring. It pays to be a worker for the don; it provides an income as well as social power and respect (whether out of fear or adoration) from garrison residents:

That is why you always have to have a don in Jamaica; they provide certain things you won’t get from the government. They provide a form of safety that the police will not provide. They provide jobs and pay the youths weekly just for being in the thing (gang). They provide a lot of things even though they go about the wrong way doing it” (Interview, October 25, 2011: VT027).

On May 21, 2012 the Jamaican prosecutors who won a court battle to extradite drug kingpin and don of Tivoli Gardens, Christopher “Dudus” Coke, presented a cooperating witness (CW-1) statement to the US Southern District Court of New York. The witness told the court that he was a part of the Shower Posse gang that operated in Jamaica and the U.S. In his statement, he declared that he served as a bodyguard to Lester Lloyd ‘Jim Brown’ Coke (head of the Shower Posse and Christopher Coke’s father) during the 1980s. CW1’s statement highlighted his role in the community and beyond, “I became, in essence, a trusted senior counselor to the Organization. Jim Brown periodically paid me for my services, in amounts up to 40,000 Jamaican dollars at a time.” Interviewee VT027 and CW-1 are examples of scores of young males inside Jamaica’s garrison communities who have found employment working for dons.

The Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997 (Kerr Report36, 1997) described the socio-economic conditions of garrison communities. In its

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36 The Committee, comprised of elected officials, police, military, academic, business and civil society members, met in 1996 to discuss the problem of violence and political tribalism in Jamaica’s garrison communities. The Honorable Justice James Kerr chaired the Committee.
findings, the Committee decried the absence of governmental support, poor sanitation and high unemployment in these inner city areas:

The slum communities around the parish capitals, particularly, Kingston, St. Andrew, and St. Catherine continue to grow as unemployed and under educated youths migrate from rural communities in search of a better opportunity...It is very clear that poverty and illiteracy provides the opportunity for politicians to create and nurture political tribalism (Kerr Report, 1997; pp.15-16).

These conditions also have provided the opportunity for dons to nurture a gangster culture and to organize criminality. Nonetheless, the Kerr Report did not pay specific attention to dons. Harriott (2008) has contended that violence in Jamaica’s urban communities is attributable to three factors: economic strain and the rate of youth unemployment; social disadvantage and inequality; and the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system (2008; pp. 53-63). Moser, Bronkhorst and the World Bank (1999) have suggested that institutional factors such as one’s neighborhood environment contribute to the escalation of youth violence and their membership in gangs. Moser et al. have explored the potential root causes of youth violence in Latin America and the Caribbean and concluded that economic and cultural factors predispose inner city young people to violence and organized criminal organizations. My interview findings indicate that there is indeed a strong link between youth unemployment, the overall garrison social environment and gang violence in Brown Villa. The influence of dons is a part of this association; residents (especially those aged 14 to 30) often receive employment opportunities from dons. VT032, who sits on the executive board of several CBOs that provide social services in garrison communities, summed up the link between
unemployment and the power/role(s) of dons.\textsuperscript{37} Asked if it was possible to diminish the power of dons in garrisons, he responded:

It’s possible and it’s one thing that can get rid of the dons; economics. If everybody in a community can get a job then they will not need anyone to do anything for them. It is simple, simple economics. Whatever label you want put it under, economics is the bottom line because if people are not able to gain employment then the don won’t go out of business (Interview, November 9, 2011: VT032).

Gang warfare

Interviewees frequently emphasized the presence of gang warfare in the garrisons and consequently, that factor emerged as a dominant sub-theme in my analysis. Lacey (1977) has noted the strong connection between violence and politics in Jamaica in the 1960s. The 2011 SDC reported that residents named gang warfare as the major threat to their sense of public safety. Community-based interviewees lamented the many lives lost because of gang feuds over turf, reprisal killings and politically motivated violence. A gang emerged in the 1990s in one of Brown Villa’s districts, for example, when a group of young men decided to avenge the deaths of their fathers, killed during the turbulent politically motivated wars of the 1970s and early 1980s. This gang, according to my police interviewee (VT018), remains involved in violence related to robberies, extortion, murders, turf wars, shootings and reprisal killings.

Those interviewed noted the evolution of gang warfare in Jamaica’s garrisons. They uniformly reported that such violence during the 1970s was politically motivated and typically erupted over partisan differences. However, by the early 1980s, with the introduction of cocaine transshipment between Colombia and Jamaica, the character of

\textsuperscript{37}Interviewee VT032 lives in a garrison community outside Brown Villa. In fact, the community in which he resides is located outside the Kingston and St. Andrew metropolitan area. His views echo my own findings concerning dons and garrison communities in Jamaica.
gang violence shifted into battles over drugs and gun trafficking. Gunst (1995) has demonstrated how drug and gun trafficking within and beyond the borders of Jamaica influenced gang violence in Kingston. Jamaican posses fought on the streets of New York and Miami in the 1980s over which would control what areas of turf for drug sales. The streets of Kingston and its surrounding region overflowed with guns and gangs thereafter, in part because of the wealth Jamaican dons acquired in North America.\(^{38}\) As McKinley reported (1990) in the *New York Times*:

> For a decade, the gang of illegal aliens from Jamaica, known as the Gulleymen, operated a network of crack houses and heroin dealers that at its high point took in more than $60,000 a day in profits, agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation said. The profits went into real estate in Brooklyn and on Long Island or were shipped back to Jamaica, some to boost the campaign war chests of Jamaican politicians, the agents said (McKinley, 1990).\(^{39}\)

Violence linked to partisan identities and gangs continued during the 1970s and 1980s. However, my findings indicate that by the late 1980s and early 1990s, politically motivated violence had begun to decline. I attribute this decrease to a rise in organized crime and a gradual process of separation between party officials and dons. Most interviewees (35 of the 42) for this study maintained that after 1980 or thereabouts, garrison dons and gangs gained wealth and power via their participation in illicit international trade in guns and drugs, rather than principally through patronage from political leaders.

By the late 1990s and early 2000s, gang warfare began to occur over turf linked to drug sales and to partisan identity inside garrison communities. A divisional ground

\(^{38}\)Gunst (1995) in *Born Fi’ Dead* explores how partisan battles between the Jamaican Labor Party and the Peoples National Party in Jamaica coincided with the trafficking and selling of cocaine and marijuana in several U.S. cities in the 1980s, to create violent gangs and dons.

commander in the Brown Villa police department (JCF) argued in an interview with me that the major gangs in the area and other adjoining communities have political-partisan identities that sometimes filter into conflicts over territory and the ascension to power of dons (October, 4, 2011:VT018). The acquisition and control of swaths of urban territory have material benefits for dons as they use garrison communities (their ‘safe zones’) to carry out illicit activities clandestinely, including car theft and gun and drug trafficking.

A major gang war erupted during the mid-1990s between the leading posse in Brown Villa and that of a neighboring garrison. Every interviewee that lived or worked in the community (residents/police/NGO) discussed this conflict in their interviews with me. The violence arose in part because of deeply divided partisan loyalties between JLP and PNP sympathizers, and in part from turf battles. Interviewee VT015, a resident of Brown Villa for more than 30 years and a member of a local youth social intervention CBO in the area, recounted what she experienced during the crisis in an interview with me. She became very emotional as she pointed out that the dust up arose when a don from a neighboring community wanted to annex parts of Brown Villa to increase his geographic control. She lamented,

I would never want to experience anything like that again, not ever. Persons were forced to do things and say things to each other. I don't want to go back to when that was happening. It was awful to see how people were treated like animals. It wasn't police who were dealing with people like that; it was civilian to civilian, don to don (Interview, September 28, 2011: VT015).

Another interviewee, who also lives in Brown Villa and administers an early childhood basic school (kindergarten), discussed the connection between turf and politically motivated gang violence in our interview session. She also addressed the inter-community war of the mid-1990s and observed that local gang members and the don in
her community provided security and protection against the “invasion” of the opposing
don and his posse from a neighboring community. According to VT011, “This was a four
year war; people were killed along the border, in the downtown market place, and at bus
stops. ... It was hell. Children got killed and old people in wheel chairs got killed”
(Interview, September 16, 2011: VT011). She noted further that the don in her
neighborhood sent his foot soldiers to collect money to buy bullets to protect the
community. When asked if the area’s residents collaborated with the don and gang
members, VT011 responded: “You give the money because you know it’s for a worthy
cause. Even though you know, it will kill women and children. It’s really for a worthy
cause” (Interview, September 16, 2011).  

**Gun culture and violence**

Guns are important to the power and control dons exercise in garrison areas.  
Dons and their foot soldiers use guns to protect turf, to commit crimes that bring in
revenue to pay gang members and to provide some social services to residents of their
home garrisons. Figure 3 shows the high use of guns in Jamaica’s homicides.

A ‘gun culture,’ based on interview responses from NGO directors, journalists
and senior police officers, first took root in the nation’s garrisons in the 1970s when
politicians began to issue guns to their political enforcers to maintain partisan power in
the urban enclaves of Kingston and St. Andrew. With the trafficking of drugs and guns in
the 1980s to and from the United Kingdom and the United States, dons began to buy their

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40 Gunst (1995) has noted that this particular battle between the gangs from the two communities arose because of one
don’s anger over not receiving a construction contract.

41 I agree with Harriott (2008) who has argued that Caribbean countries, including Jamaica, have developed sub-
cultural values that normalize acts of violence, where the gun is glorified as a tool of power and respect among gang
members.
own weapons, and it was that turn that caused state legislators to begin to lose control over the borders of garrison communities. A senior officer, Senior Superintendent of Police (VT022) in the police division in which Brown Villa is located, pointed out in an interview that 28 gangs currently operate in the 16 communities that make up the division. He noted that the two main posses in the detachment’s jurisdiction each have alliances with either the Jamaica Labor Party or the Peoples National Party. He suggested that both gangs have surrogate (smaller, affiliated) posses also operating in the division, observing: “The choice of weapons used by these gangs are rifles, the M16 and AK 47s; some gangs use pistols, revolvers and the two major gangs are equipped with rifle grenades” (Interview, October 12, 2011: VT022).

Table 1.3 provides an overview of the agents of homicides in Jamaica during 2009, 2010, and 2011. The graphic suggests that a high percentage of the nation’s murders during the sample period were gang related. Gang-related murders fell in 2010, due in part to the government’s sustained efforts to remove and prosecute dons following its May 2010 extradition of Dudus Coke. Figure 3 supports interviewees’ claims that dons and gangs use the “gun” disproportionately to extend their power and control in garrison communities.

Table 1.3: Murders by type, 2009-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context (Murder Assessment)</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reported</td>
<td>% Rep</td>
<td>Reported</td>
<td>% Rep</td>
<td>Reported</td>
<td>% Rep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang Related</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal (Not Gang)</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mob Killing</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not yet established</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1442</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1683</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lack of Education Training and Skills

As I argued in my general description of Villa conditions above, of the 26 community-based persons (NGO/CBO/residents/clergy/police) I interviewed, 20 pointed out that limited opportunities for education and training are closely associated with the high unemployment rates in Jamaica’s garrisons. The high rate of youth unemployment in garrison communities, including Brown Villa, facilitates their dependence on partisan and non-state actors for job opportunities. According to the SDC Report 2011, Brown Villa youth aged 14-24 accounted for “9.7 percent of the total percentage of employed household members, which was below the national youth employment rate of 14.6%” in 2007 (2011, p.41). The Kerr Report 1997 argued that the low educational and skill levels of garrison youth make them prime targets for partisan manipulation. According to the Report, “jobs are regularly tied to political affiliation. The sources of work are also limited by the high concentration of persons who have no skills and therefore form part of a very large group of common laborers” (1997; p.16). What the Report did not mention was that dons routinely distribute government jobs in garrison communities.

Figure 3: Weapons used in Murders in 2011

![Pie Chart showing Implements Used in Murders in 2011](http://www.jcf.gov.jm/crime-stats)

Elected representatives channel construction, drain cleaning, garbage disposal and landscaping contracts through garrison dons, who in turn give selected residents access to these posts. In describing the ongoing symbiosis between elected representatives and dons in providing employment opportunities to unskilled/under-educated residents in garrisons, Interviewee VT005 (a journalist) observed,

There needs to be a way to share the spoils. Now the person that emerges as the area leader, the community leader, or don is the person who shares the spoils. There is no way the economic benefits can be thrown on the ground and everybody just grabs what they want, there is no order. There has to be someone he (elected representative) delegates to. Therein comes the emergence of what we’ve begun to call a don (Interview, August 11, 2011).

The low level of skills and education in garrison communities facilitates the embedded status of dons and their performance of governing functions. Madden (2011) summed up the impact that the socio-economic environment of garrisons have on residents’ choices to get involved in illicit activities. She has argued that given the harsh economic realities, many garrison residents aspire to migrate to the U.S. or the United Kingdom, which residents refer to as “foreign” for a better life. Those who decide to remain inside garrison engage in buying and selling “both legal and illegal goods” (2011; p.8). She went further to point out that young women in garrisons engage in relationships with older “dominant” males for financial gain. Some young men according to Madden “saw access to a gun as an option for power and economic gain as exemplified by those who had gone this route (such as the “don”) and who appeared to have gained social mobility (Madden, 2011; p.8).

42 Frances Madden’s (2011) book “It’s not about me: Working with Communities: Processes and Challenges, presents some of her action-research work on life inside Jamaica’s garrisons. She has more than 30 years of experience working with residents in these neighborhoods and has devised and employed several dispute resolution strategies to engage some of the nation’s dons and gangs.
As I argue below, dons (particularly Mega Dons and to a lesser extent Area types) fill the vacuum left by the Jamaican state in garrison communities by providing residents with assistance in healthcare, employment, housing, education and skills training. They also make drug trafficking opportunities available to those interested and thereby entry to the Jamaican criminal underworld. Table 1.4 shows the qualification of household heads for occupations in construction, beauty care, machine and appliance, secretarial, clerical, professional /technical skills, computing and information technology in Brown Villa. Only 9.8 percent of household heads had training in professional/technical skills, while 1.3 percent had training in computing and information technology. The highest proportion of those with training, 16.6 percent, were skilled in the provision of beauty care and related services (hair dressing, barbering) (SDC, 2011, pp. 23-24).

**Table 1.4: Qualification/Training by gender in Brown Villa 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Received</th>
<th>Sex of household head</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%) Male</td>
<td>(%) Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty care and services</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretarial and office clerks</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitality skills</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art and craft</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and cabinet making skills</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine and appliance</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computing and information technology</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparel and sewn product skills</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial and sales skills</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and technical skills</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture/farming</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other skills</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills not stated</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, such occupation training as is available is often informal in character. Table 1.5 below shows that 57.6 percent of household heads received training informally without certification.
Table 1.5: Level of Training/Qualification for Household Heads Brown Villa 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Qualifications</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learn from more experienced person</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Job</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional or Technical: With certificate</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational: with certificate</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational: without certificate</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional or Technical: Without certificate</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Conclusion

The challenges of high unemployment and limited access to education and training, coupled with poor housing and sanitation, contribute to poverty and under-development in Jamaica’s garrisons. They also produce, as the data show, volatile communities characterized by periods of high insecurity. Taken together, these factors suggest that the garrison environment serves as a catalyst for dons to embed themselves in these communities and play several welfare, security and quasi-judicial roles. I address these concerns in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE
DATA FINDINGS PART II:
DON ROLES: FROM PARTISAN ENFORCERS TO EMBEDDED GOVERNANCE ACTORS

Introduction

As I argued in Chapter 2, a process of transformation in the don’s roles began to occur beginning in the 1980s. This shift, influenced by global economic factors as well as national changes in development policies, created several transnational non-state actors such as the don in the Jamaican case and the drug cartels in the South American countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. These new participants were involved in illicit markets and other criminal activities and were or became members of organized criminal groups. This chapter argues that dons are now governing actors embedded in Jamaica’s garrison communities. The roles these informal leaders play vary by type of don—Mega, Area or Street—and each governs in particular ways.

Theme Two: The Role of Dons in Garrisons

Based on the interviews I conducted, I have identified four central roles dons perform in garrison communities. They provide community welfare; security and protection; partisan mobilization/enforcement and law, order and conflict resolution via “jungle justice” measures. These are social, political and economic functions. Roles often are contingent upon social situations and are in many ways socially constructed. Theorists (Granovetter, 1983; Moody, 2003) have contended that historical forces shape roles and that they evolve over time. Dons in Jamaica derive their popularity, power and legitimacy from their capacities to deliver material and immaterial ‘goods’ to garrison residents. Figure 4 depicts the major roles dons perform in garrisons.
As I conducted my field research, I saw that I needed to define exactly who was a don. In wrestling with the concept of ‘don-manship,’ I found it necessary to differentiate among and classify these leaders. The interview responses suggested that not all dons behave in the same manner and that a garrison community could have different types of dons over time and across its geographic terrain of streets and districts. To address this finding, I developed a typology to describe the varying roles different dons perform in garrisons. For example, some interviewees who live in Brown Villa observed that the don (Don “Z”--a street type) in their district provided few community welfare services. However, he did offer security and protection and community members reported feeling safe from robberies and external attacks from neighboring garrison gangs because of the presence of the don and his foot soldiers. Chapter 1 introduced a tripartite classification of dons.

**Mega Dons** perform a wide range of roles in the garrison because of their access to large sums of money, resources, personnel and a stockpile of weapons. These individuals exercise influence and power across different garrisons and have
strong connections to local and international businesses (both legitimate and
criminal).

**Area Dons** also play a range of roles in their communities, but these leaders do
not have the strong transnational links that Mega dons evidence. Area dons
usually control a specific garrison and they often report to a Mega-don. Brown
Villa has had two such dons (Dons “X” and “Y”) from the 1990s to the present.

**Street Dons** are lower level community leaders. These individuals control a street
or streets in a garrison community. Interviewees indicated that several Street Dons
might function in a single garrison. Street Dons typically have limited resources
(money) and very few guns at their disposal. Since they do not possess large
resources, they are not as well equipped to perform welfare roles in their
communities, as are Area or Mega dons.

**Community Welfare**

The community welfare role that dons perform sheds light on the low capacity
(Tilly, 2007) and/or willingness of the Jamaican state and private businesses to provide
for the economic security of citizens residing in garrisons. This role relates to the
contribution dons make to the physical infrastructure of the community as well as to the
household well-being and economic survival of residents. As already noted,
unemployment is a serious problem in Brown Villa. Interviewees (especially clergy,
NGO/CBO members) suggested that most garrison residents are constantly engaged in a
search for ways to improve their economic status. Not trusting elected officials to assist
them in such efforts, citizens often turn to dons as alternate sources of welfare provision.
At the household level, interviewees noted that some individuals receive cash assistance
from dons to buy food, and the elderly often receive funds to purchase medication. Mega Dons offer this kind of support routinely. In Brown Villa, there is evidence of one of its Area Dons performing such roles too. Interviewee VT024, a garrison resident and clergywoman, remarked that in the community:

You may have an old lady that might be diabetic or have high blood pressure, when she goes to the doctor and come home with a prescription, she will go and look for him (the don), and explain that she does not have the money to pay for her medication. The don will go into his own pocket and pay the cost (Interview, October 20, 2011).

All categories of respondents observed that some dons provide employment opportunities to garrison residents and financial support to families, especially to mothers to send their children to school. Interviewee VT004, an NGO director who works in several inner city Jamaican communities, described how residents become dependent on a don to help them take care of themselves and their families:

There is no legitimate source of supplying basic needs, the state has failed and you have an economic structure that creates this dependency on the don. If you have two sons and you have no breakfast to give them, if you walk over to the don and say my kids have no food to eat, he will say ok, go over to the supermarket and get some bread and things for your kids. You then are thankful to this guy because he allows your family to eat; when the police come to arrest him for any charge you don’t testify against him because you know you will need bread and butter another day (Interview, August 30, 2011:VT004).

Rattary (2001) has argued that dons are by-products of Jamaica’s weak economy and the influence of its polarized partisan culture. I have echoed that argument above. Referring to one of Kingston’s reputed Mega Dons, Donald ‘Zekes’ Phipps, Rattary sketched the social welfare roles that residents associate with dons. Rattary described a 1998 protest in downtown Kingston staged by residents from the community in which ‘Zekes’ was the don who took to the streets to protest the leader’s arrest by JCF police officers; four persons including two police officers were killed in the altercation.
Unabashed demonstrators praised his magnanimity. They openly related how he fed, sheltered and protected them. They said that he schooled their children and did for them what the security forces and the politicians were either unable or unwilling to do. However, nobody broached the taboo topic of the source of the great wealth needed to feed, clothe school and protect most of the downtown community (Rattary, 2001).  

This article revealed and questioned the sources of funding that dons use to build their gang networks, to purchase weapons and to make monetary and other contributions to garrison residents. Table 1.6 details the various strategies that dons use to accumulate money, weapons and other material resources. Later in this chapter, I examine how dons use drug trafficking and other criminal and non-criminal means to acquire wealth and build their capacities to perform different socio-economic and political functions in garrisons. According to JCF reports, Zekes had a lucrative criminal empire that involved drug trafficking and robberies. He was reported to have been the mastermind behind extortion rackets in the Downtown Kingston business districts and public transportation networks (bus parks and taxi services) in the late 1990s.

Zekes and Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke are examples of what I term Mega Dons; their wealth and influence over several geographic areas in the KMA were unparalleled in the 1990s and 2000s. Not all dons, however, are willing or able to perform the community welfare role. A clergyman who has lived in Brown Villa for more than 30 years and who runs a CBO in one of the community’s districts, pointed out that the don in the area (Don Z-street type) in which his organization operates is very rich. However, he does not provide any welfare services to the community or its residents. Instead, that individual employs force and violence to maintain his control over “his” territory in the community (Interview, October 11, 2011: VT020). Based on information gathered from

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residents, this individual purchased his don-manship and had very little support among community members. His decision to provide minimal social welfare assistance to his district, even though he had the capacity to do so, indicates that dons’ personalities may influence how they choose to define their social roles. While a psychological assessment of dons is not an objective of this study, I believe future research on Jamaican dons could profitably focus on these concerns.

**Table 1.6: Dons’ Sources of Wealth and Weapons by Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Don by Type</th>
<th>Strategy of Resource Accumulation (Weapons &amp;money)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mega Dons</td>
<td>- International illicit markets (drug/gun trafficking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Local illicit markets (drugs/guns/contraband such as cigarettes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Local legal markets (entertainment/construction/retailing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Government Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Extortion Rackets (Large businesses—supermarkets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mega Robberies (banks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Contract Killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Dons</td>
<td>- Local illicit markets (drug—marijuana based/contraband)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Local legal markets (entertainment/construction/retailing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Government Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Extortion Rackets of Transportation systems (buses/taxis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Contract Killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Gun renting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- International remittance and gun smuggling from overseas contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Dons</td>
<td>- Robberies on city transport systems (buses/taxis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Sporadic extortion inside home garrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Robberies of other urban and sub-urban communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Contract Killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Working for Mega or Area Dons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Extortion of small businesses in the metro-area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- International remittance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed from field notes and interview data

Dons use both force and material resources to secure the support of garrison residents and to establish themselves as ‘legitimate’ holders of authority and power.
Interviewee VT001, a journalist, described how dons use the proceeds from narcotics trafficking to embed themselves in garrisons by providing needed services:

With the retreat of the state and the vacuum created, yeah, the don acted as an economic player/stake-holder. He did so not out of any goodwill for the community but for personal selfish economic reasons, he was benefitting handsomely from the illegal drug trade, the illegal guns and ammunition trade, the illicit contraband trade. Yeah! Those activities generated millions of dollars for them. They were then able to use that source of economic wealth to supplant the politician in respect of buying the loyalty and support of community members who were largely unemployed, under employed or unemployable. They were able to support them, to ensure that children got lunch money, school fees were paid, and food was on the table through the drug link (Interview, July 26, 2011: VT001).

As a general proposition, providing social benefits to their garrison communities is particularly important to Mega and Area Dons as the garrison provides them with a necessary base for their broader criminal enterprises. In several interviews with residents from Brown Villa, I asked what dons wanted with these communities. I asked why gangs engaged in bitter battles over spaces that seem to have very little to offer. Garrison neighborhoods are poor communities, with little infrastructure in the form of housing stock, public buildings and business office space. For example, according to the 2011 SDC Report, there is only one financial institution in Brown Villa. On visits to the community, I observed that the public buildings, schools, the police station, and the community centers were in desperate need of repair. The neighborhood reflects Henry-Lee’s (2005) neatly descriptive condition of “public poverty.” NGO leaders, journalists and senior police interviewees with whom I spoke confirmed that similar situations exist in other garrison communities in Jamaica.

Dons assist residents and attend to the community’s welfare as a means of integrating themselves into the social and cultural fabric of the community. Christmas
and Easter treats, for example, have cultural significance in Jamaica, and dons recognize this tradition. These celebrations have taken root within the context of a Jamaican environment that embraces Christian mores and values. European colonizers transplanted these celebrations to the Americas under the system of plantation slavery and colonization from the 17th to the 19th centuries. During plantation enslavement, Christmas celebrations (food and entertainment) were important markers of communal dignity and belonging among enslaved Africans. At Christmas time in particular, slaves were allowed time off from the rigors of plantation work—laboring from dusk until dawn planting and harvesting sugar cane. In the post-emancipation period after 1838, Christmas celebrations remained and intensified as culturally entrenched activities in Jamaica. Of the 42 interviews undertaken, 18 interviewees (clergy, CBO members, and residents) praised dons for promoting a positive “vibe” in the community through Christmas and Easter gift giving, supporting public concerts, and hosting dances and other amusements for the garrison’s children.

Community street dances, for example, constitute a culturally significant activity that dons provide for garrison residents. Community members dress in the latest dancehall\textsuperscript{44} clothing, dance and enjoy popular melodies. Dancehall music and its accompanying street concerts and exotic dress are important features of the cultural make-up of garrison communities. This genre of music also has significant appeal in wider Jamaican society. Public street dances in garrisons also provide employment and other economic opportunities to residents. When dons host these events, residents are

\textsuperscript{44} Donna Hope in her work, \textit{Inna di dancehall: popular culture and the politics of identity in Jamaica} (2006), has explored how dancehall culture, music and attitudes of masculinity and femininity are expressions of cultural identification in Jamaica, especially among its urban poor population.
able to sell wares such as alcohol, cigarettes, gum and other confectionaries. Males from the community get jobs providing security and young women often serve as bartenders. A journalist (VT005) noted that some dons self-consciously use the proceeds from street dances to contribute to the welfare and development of garrison communities. Area and Mega Dons also use such events as a means of laundering drug money, directing some of the profits to host ‘back to school,’ Christmas and Easter treats.

Residents develop a dependent economic relationship with their Mega and Area Dons, and they learn, as one interviewee noted, “not to bite the hand that feeds them” (Interview, November 17, 2011:VT033). This finding supports Montgomery’s (1998) analysis, who has argued that social actors learn to “calculate trust” with each other based on roles performed. Dons and garrison residents evidence a bond of trust, one held together in large part by people’s desire to ensure their economic survival in conditions of urban squalor. Interviewee VT024, a clergywoman, commented that residents frequently develop an attachment to their community dons out of economic necessity. She said that dons provide garrison residents with a sense of communal belonging and well-being, in addition to material assistance. In her neighborhood, the don hosts gatherings for distribution of the Christmas and Easter community treats for residents to which I alluded above. At these events, children and adults are entertained and receive gifts and food items, all courtesy of the don’s patronage. VT024 described the ways in which the don in her community attends to resident welfare:

In this community and not only this community, they have Christmas treats where they would get things, get the children out there and they would give them ice cream, give them a little doll. For back to school treats, if you as a mother have five kids going back to school, school fee, lunch money, the bags, the books, so forth, and you know that this man is keeping a treat you can send your kids and they come home with a bag, a few books, and a few pencils. You have young
people who would say I want to start up a small business but they don’t have the money, the don would say ok, I will give you a start. He (don) put a 5,000 JAS dollars (U.S. $60) in the hands of the youngster so they can start a business. People in the community view this man (don) as a king; he cannot do any wrong in their eyes (Interview, October 10, 2011:VT024).

Brown Villa residents consistently pointed out in interviews that dons provide families with school materials for their children, such as composition notebooks, pens, pencils, and even money to pay tuition and fees. Whatever else might be said of the perhaps cynical underpinnings of such gifts, these forms of support also indicate that some dons at least, recognize the importance of education to the future development of garrison youth. In one interview, a resident (VT015) explained that some street dons in her community ensure that young children go to school, sometimes by use of force. She also suggested that in her garrison, dons often chastise children who skip classes.

In short, however mixed their motives, dons perform governing roles in their communities. Providing opportunities for human development through educational access has the potential to improve the living conditions of people in garrison areas. This is an accepted function of government and of governance. Some dons, based on the views of several interviewees (residents, police and NGO respondents), also contribute to the infrastructural development of their communities (for example, road repair, and construction of community walls). VT015 summarized some of the governance-related services that dons provide in her district of Brown Villa:

Not all dons want to tear down the community some of them want to build it, because they know they have their kids and families there. A few dons now are into development, they build up places (example, local grocery stores) and get youth employed, who can cook the don will say ok go to HEART45 and get a certificate in training in cooking and he will pay for the certificate. If the wall in

45 HEART is a national training agency in Jamaica that offers several skills training certification courses in the areas of business, computer technologies, and auto-engineering.
the community need fixing they (dons) will do it and not wait on any one to come do it. They host fundraising events (such as street dances) and use some of the proceeds to fix the wall (Interview, September 28, 2011: VT015).

Early in our interview, Interviewee VT015 (resident/CBO member) had noted that not all dons contribute to their communities. Some leaders, including many street dons, are simply fiscally incapable of doing so, while others are less altruistically inclined as individuals. This is the case for the Street Don “Z,” alluded to above. Some dons simply do not regard it as their role to offer welfare services of any sort. Street Dons carry out sporadic robberies to take care of themselves and their corner crews (loosely organized small gangs). They are not involved in organized crime, such as drug trafficking or large-scale extortion rackets, so they have limited resources to offer residents in the territories they control in garrisons.

Street Dons tend to use violence and intimidation against garrison residents more frequently than Area and Mega Dons as a means of signaling their authority. Providing social services is not the foundation of their power in the community. Instead, they gain support and assent from garrison residents principally for the security and protection roles they perform during periods of inter and intra-garrison conflicts between/among rival gangs. Interviewee VT015 shed light on the mixture of fear and goods-and-services provision that Street Dons use to establish and maintain their power in garrisons. When asked how these leaders manage to remain in good stead with residents, despite having little economic patronage to offer, Interviewee VT015 explained that these types of dons operate,

Sometimes not by force directly, but some of the parents like when their children are with don(s), so they defend them, because she [child] gets to go to school and money comes into the household, even if he breaks the daughter's hand she has to stay with him (don) because that’s how the money comes into the household. So
you will find that sometimes they [dons] drive fear into residents, even when the people do not want them, they drive fear (Interview, September 28, 2011: VT015).

I learned of two leaders in Brown Villa whom I classify as Area Dons ("X" and "Y"). Both had tremendous influence across the five districts of the community, and both enjoyed the loyal support of at least some Street level dons. Both individuals operated in the community from the 1990s into the 2000s. However, one is now dead and the other has lost much of his influence to Street Dons. Each of these dons operated differently in Brown Villa. One had a stronger welfare approach to the community. He gave financial support to several residents and sponsored community-based projects (sports, entertainment and the building of recreational parks). The other don was more interested in building his cocaine business. He supported his foot soldiers and close associates and showed little interest in providing community-oriented services or activities. Interviewee VT007 commented on the differences between the two men,

There are some dons who are very much doing things for their own interests and there are some who are geared towards community, one dealt with cocaine primarily. He had some legitimate businesses, he had a wholesale up there, he had a couple of legitimate businesses, but it was well known that he would sell cocaine in the area (Interview, September 6, 2011: VT007).

Dons, depending on type and their personal predilections, perform welfare tasks that help residents survive the often-harsh economic realities of garrison life. My interview data indicate that the more resources a don has and the stronger his association with the international illicit drug market, the more likely it is that he will possess the capacity to offer services and make welfare contributions. Whether they do so, however, also appears to depend on their psychological orientation, personal calculus and
proclivity. To put it succinctly, in Jamaican garrisons, Mega and Area Dons often perform this sort of governing role but Street dons appear to do so to a far lesser extent.

Security and Protection

Residents associate dons with security and protection. All residents interviewed as well as several police and NGO members argued that dons provide garrison inhabitants protection against external threats through their gangs/crews. As I have recounted, Brown Villa has a long history of violence and insecurity related to partisan conflicts and battles between rival gangs. As early as the 1970s, residents in the community suffered from politically motivated shootings, arson, and violence linked to reprisal killings by gangs from neighboring garrisons. Violence also occurs among rival gangs over turf and power inside the community. In most cases, these gangs battle over drug (marijuana and cocaine) distribution and business districts where they extort, while in other cases, the conflict may arise from interpersonal tiffs between contending dons or gang members (Levy, 2009; Madden, 2011). Violence takes place in households as well. All female residents interviewed noted that dons sometimes have defended them against domestic violence and abusive men.

Community interviewees (15 residents/CBO members) indicated that dons’ provision of security and protection represents an important role they perform in garrisons. The information I gathered indicates that all types of dons provide protection to garrison communities. Residents trust their dons to protect their personal property from robbery and arson and to provide security from the externally generated violence perpetrated by rival dons/gangs. Interviewee VT011, explained that dons,

Protect the community; what I mean by protection is that sometimes you have internal war in the community or war from other communities. They protect the
community from men who will come in to kill, rape, or whatever in the community (Interview, September 16, 2011: VT011).

In short, dons and their gangs have often filled the vacuum left by the Jamaican state in the arena of security. Nevertheless, ironically, those interviewed (residents and police) uniformly contend that the major threat to people’s sense of safety in garrisons has been political violence and inter-gang rivalries. Dons serve as local ‘police’ or ‘militia’ in their neighborhoods. I observed streets in Brown Villa blocked with junk cars, logs and refrigerators. Dons order gang members to use such debris as defense measures against drive-by shootings and reprisal attacks from rivals.

Security is a basic function of the modern nation-state. Strange (1996) has argued the state is losing its sovereignty and sphere of power to transnational and local non-state actors. In this area, at least for the garrison neighborhood I examined, Strange’s argument holds true. Dons perform security functions in garrisons because of the unsuccessful strategies employed by the Jamaican state to create a secure space for residents of these neighborhoods to move freely and to protect them as equal citizens before the law.

The hollowing out of the state (Rhodes, 1994; Strange, 1996) has grave implications for citizen security. In the Jamaican context, this process manifests itself in the low levels of confidence and trust garrison residents exhibit in law enforcement and the judicial system. In 2002, the Jamaican government named a committee (The National Committee on Crime and Violence) to find solutions to the high rate of murders and violence in Jamaica’s garrisons. The group ultimately offered several recommendations including a call for “re-establishing legitimate leadership” in inner city communities, putting a stop to the influx of guns into the country, the “dismantling of gangs” and the
improvement of “police effectiveness and community/police relations” (2002; p.2). These recommendations indicate that a security crisis existed in Jamaica. Recent statistics on homicide rates, gang related killings and shootings reveal that the crisis has not abated, particularly in urban areas in the KMA. That metropolitan area has several garrison communities inside its municipal borders. Jamaica has 14 parishes, of which three (Kingston, St. Andrew and St. Catherine) have consistently registered relatively high rates of violent crime since the 1990s (Harriott 2004).

According to data from the Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica [ESSJ], violent crimes are committed at elevated rates in the parishes of Kingston, St. Catherine and St. Andrew (KMA). Violent crimes of murder, shootings and rape in these parishes were the highest in the nation from 2000-2010. In 2002, the KMA accounted for 68.2 percent of the total murders committed in Jamaica. By 2008, this figure had fallen to 59 percent of the total murders committed (ESSJ, 2008). Reports from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) indicate that most murders and shootings in Jamaica are the result of reprisal killings and gang-related violence. In 2004 then Commissioner of Police Francis Forbes argued, “Gangs in Jamaica have increased from 35 in 1994 to 85 in 2004, approximately 12 percent are rated as highly organized. Today's gangs are much more structured with global links reaching far across international borders” (Sinclair, October 20, 2004). Harriott (2004), using data gathered from the Jamaica Constabulary Force

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47 Taken from the Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica [ESSJ], an annual report on the performance of different sectors such as National Security and Justice, Energy and Mining, Health, Education and Training. The Planning Institute of Jamaica [PIOJ] produces and publishes the ESSJ.

(JCF) for the period 1983-1997, has highlighted a marked increase in murders linked to gang control/rivalries. In 1983, the rate of murders per 100,000 inhabitants in Jamaica caused by gang control/rivalry stood at 3.12 percent, or 30 murders per 100,000 citizens; this figure had risen to 14.1 percent, or 340 murders per 100,000 residents, by 1997.\footnote{Harriott in his work, \textit{Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy} (2004), used statistical data from the JCF to support his arguments about the sources and character of violent crimes in Jamaica.}

Data gathered from the JCF and the ESSJ on the breakdown of murders from 2000 to 2011 similarly indicate a proliferation of gang control/rivalry related murders (See Table 1.7). The other causal factors for murder include, “domestic, other criminal acts (unintentional or unknown), drug related.”\footnote{See JCF crime statistics at http://www.jcf.gov.jm/crime-stats-pre-2011, as well as the ESSJ annual reports.}

Table 1.7: Gang-related Murders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of Murder</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18.8 (31.7 Reprisal Killings)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>20.3 (27.9 Reprisal Killings)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010*</td>
<td>27.6 (May 2010 Incursion)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from \textit{Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica (ESSJ)} statistical data on National Security. After 2004, the ESSJ did not disaggregate reprisal killings. However, according to the JCF, major garrison and corner gangs are most often responsible for these murders. Retrieved in 2012.

In 2006, Powell et al. conducted a study in Jamaica that found that 45.7 per cent of respondents in a national survey “strongly disagreed” that the “war against crime and delinquency is being won” and 39.7 per cent “disagreed” that such was occurring (2007; p. 58). In the context of a crisis of insecurity arising from a sub-culture of violence (Harriott, 2008), a proliferation of rival gangs and the failure of the state to protect human life and property, dons emerged and thrived. Garrison residents (community
interviewees) call them “ghetto people defenders” and “protectors.” According to an Amnesty International Report on violence and insecurity in Jamaica’s inner cities, “the worst violence was reported during clashes between rival gangs for control of communities and territory. During these confrontations, the entire population is held hostage, literally shut in by barricades” (2008; p. 5). Under such conditions, schools are closed, residents prevented from going to their jobs, and obtaining access to health care is difficult. One resident, a former member of a gang during the 1970s, described how he, under the orders of a don, fought to protect a section of Brown Villa during the politically violent period of the late 1970s. According to interviewee VT042, the don he worked for allowed the “community to stay alive and survive, we had to hold off men from neighboring rival communities, it was a matter of survival against the invasion of these politically motivated paramilitary groups” (Interview, December 5, 2011:VT042). In describing garrison violence in the late 1970s, he said “every day you see gunshots and dead bodies. I lost many friends in the 1970s…many people lost their lives during this time over politics. … In those days people died left, right and center, it was very bad” (Interview, VT042). While these intense political wars are no longer taking place inside Brown Villa, 16 of the 26 community-based interviewees with whom I spoke, suggested that periods of extreme gun violence among disparate dons and gangs persist. In addition, political identities continue to contribute to such acts of gang and don violence.

By protecting their garrison communities from external attacks, dons help to promote internal peace. In three interview sessions, residents agreed that one of Brown Villa’s dons provides few community services. However, they argued that because of the don and his gang, the community has experienced a period of internal security and
protection from rival garrison posses since 2000. This buffer against attacks and threats to the community’s security comes at a cost as dons use extreme violence to maintain control. Interviewee VT020, a clergyman who has lived in the community for more than 30 years and now administers a local social intervention association, noted, “We have a good relationship with the dons and gangs. They look out for us, they protect us.” Later in the interview, however, as he got more comfortable talking about the issue of dons and gangs, he observed:

In *district name omitted*, was… is a very oppressive structure … although for the past 10 to 12 years, people on the outside you know, will tell you that *district name* has been the most peaceful community. From where I sit, I think that donmanship and what that represents is probably the most devastating thing that this community has to deal with. ... No question about it (Interview, October 11, 2011:VT020).

Such a view suggests that residents often make calculated decisions to accept the collateral damage that comes with the security and protection that dons provide. I noticed a similar response in another district of Brown Villa. A resident (VT011) there suggested that during an inter-community war (the same event that another community respondent mentioned above), Street Dons played important roles in safeguarding the community from reprisal killings and attacks from a neighboring garrison don and his foot soldiers. The interviewee later remarked, “Some dons are by force, sometimes the people don't like them [dons], but it’s by fear, because they (dons) kill the most people, they are callous so people fear them; they get power by fear” (Interview, September 16, 2011). The use of oppressive measures and fear mongering are essential for many dons to maintain their positions of dominance inside garrison neighborhoods. Interviewee VT011 offered that some public displays of support for dons are a result of fear. This view is
consistent with those suggested by the police, NGO/CBO officials and journalists I interviewed. VT011 argued,

People have to pretend like they like them (dons), because sometimes you see residents go and protest and pretend like they like them, you think they want to do it? They don't want to do it. It’s because of fear. (Interview, September 16, 2011: VT011).

Along with the fear that residents have for dons/gangs, they also appear to develop a survivor’s trust for those informal criminal leaders who promote their human security. In periods of conflict, or when there is a threat of loss to their personal properties such as cell phones, money and or home appliances (radio, television or laptop), garrison residents often rely on their area dons for protection and support.

Thirty-one of 42 interviewees (residents, CBO/NGO officials, journalists, academics and one retired police officer) observed that excessive use of force by the police and their unwillingness to patrol garrison neighborhoods have reduced residents’ trust and confidence in the JCF to protect them. A police officer in charge of the Community Policing Unit in Brown Villa remarked that residents perceive the police to be “the enemy” and that only the don can “create a safe haven in the community” (Interview, September 16, 2011:VT009). He noted that before the May 2010 Incursion into Tivoli Gardens and the resultant increase in police patrols in KMA garrisons, residents seldom gave the constabulary information about violent crimes, robberies, and domestic violence or gang rivalries. Another police interviewee, VT022, argued that the constabulary suffers from labor and resource constraints in carrying out their duties. In his view, to provide security for garrison residents against gang attacks, drive-by shootings and reprisal killings,
You would have to establish a police force inside there; you would have to have a police presence on every street to get the type of trust that is required from residents. Yeah, because in truth and in fact the police is not able to give them that sort of security. If a rival gang /don enter the community the police is not always there to respond (Interview, October 12, 2012: VT022).

In April 2008, Amnesty International published a report\(^5\) in which it contended that residents in Jamaica’s inner city areas have very limited human security protection from the state. The organization provided harsh residents’ accounts concerning the realities of garrison “gang rule” and the violent policing methods used by the JCF and how each contributes to inner city insecurity and violence (April 2008, p.2).

Perceived corruption within the police force adds to residents’ distrust of the law enforcement agency. Goldstein (1977) views police corruption as the misuse and manipulation by police officers of their authority for personal desires (p.188). These aspirations range between the material and the immaterial such as power and status. In the Caribbean context, specifically in relation to Jamaica, Harriott (2000) has argued that police brutality is one strand of corruption. In his view, viciousness occurs to achieve “socially valued” ends. Harriott offered the following rationale for police excess; “in the face of disrespect from young males or displays of any disregard for police authority, police brutality often becomes an exhibition designed to demonstrate the total power, including the power of life and death” (Harriott, 2000, p.50). Garrison residents often complain that they receive little respect from the JCK, which provides limited safeguards of their civil rights.

All residents and NGO director interviewees (17 individuals in total), one retired policeperson and two senior police interviewees contended there are nefarious links

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\(^5\) This report provided views of Kingston garrison residents on the nature of insecurity in Jamaica’s inner city communities. It concluded that the state only weakly protects citizens’ rights to human security. See “Jamaica: Gang and Police Violence in the Inner-cities” April 2008.
among dons, their foot soldiers, and some members of the police responsible for protection efforts in Brown Villa. Some members of the police force grew up in garrison communities, and so have childhood and communal ties to dons and gang members. One journalist (VT005) suggested why residents are reluctant to invest their trust in the police: “There’s an East Kinston don who the rumor was his bodyguards were four members of the police force who follow him to the gym every morning, follow him to the supermarket every day.” (Interview, August 11, 2011: VT005). VT035, a resident of Brown Villa for more than 33 years, stated, “Police are not trusted in these communities, well this is changing now, but the police have had deep links with dons. When there is going to be a curfew and raids the police would call dons beforehand and warn them” (Interview, November 14, 2011: VT035).

In 1993, a National Taskforce on Crime concluded,

The link between police and the criminal element has resulted in a loss of confidence in the police. Numerous persons appearing at the public fora across the island expressed unwillingness to supply information to the police, as they feared there would be a breach of confidence, which could result in reprisals (1993; p.42). \(^5\)

Similarly, in 2006 another national report on crime and violence, *Road Map to a Safe and Secure Jamaica* noted that residents have low levels of trust in JCF members because of rampant corruption within its ranks. The *Road Map* suggested that corruption within the police force is one of the ‘roots’ of Jamaica’s violence and that it facilitates the perpetuation of serious crimes. Some reported corrupt practices of JCF members included “sale of ammunition, advising criminals of planned police interdiction, planting and stealing evidence, providing bodyguard service for dons and contract killings or ‘murder

\(^5\)This National Taskforce on Crime also referred to as the Wolfe Report (1993), was convened to address the growing problem of violent crimes linked to inter-gang rivalries and political violence.
for hire’” (2006; p.8). In this view, police corruption facilitates an environment of insecurity, often leaving citizens with limited choices concerning whom to trust to protect them. As VT024 (resident and clergywoman) reported, people in the garrison,

Support the system that they feel is protecting them. Because we know that everybody have a right to life, the right of everyone to protect themself in whatever they can and the majority of the people in the garrison are not able to protect themself so if there is a system by which they feel protected then they are going to support that system and that’s how the dons get their glory (Interview, October 20, 2011: VT024).

Security is an essential function of the state. Several theorists of democracy (Barber, 1984; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1971; Sandel, 1996) have noted the state’s central role in providing protection for its citizens and securing its borders. Scholars have noted that the state in the face of local and global challenges of organized criminality and terrorism is receding in its security roles (Colak & Pearce, 2009). In recent decades, several states in Latin America and the Caribbean—for example, Jamaica, Haiti, Guatemala and Honduras—have failed to keep their residents safe from drug and gang related violence (Arias, 2006; Moser, 2006). In these cases, criminal non-state actors such as the Maras in Guatemala and El Salvador have, albeit in ad hoc and sporadic ways, filled the vacuum left by the state.

In the Jamaican case, the interviews I conducted and the documents I analyzed suggest that garrison residents often rely on dons to protect their personal property, homes and lives from rival gangs and other criminal actors. All types of dons perform this role. Possession of weapons and especially guns, enable dons to provide security to garrison communities. Performing such functions invariably involves the use of force and violence. The following section explores how dons use force to maintain (their versions of) social order.
Law, Order and Conflict Resolution via Jungle Justice

Jamaican garrisons operate as de facto shadow states of the official Jamaican state. That is, they constitute “states within the state.”53 Residents of such communities often depend on dons and their foot soldiers to provide them recourse to justice. For them, the state’s official law enforcement and court systems seldom guarantee justice. Dons promote order inside “their” garrisons by overseeing local systems of rules and an indigenous judicial system referred to as jungle justice by interviewees (especially residents and the police). According to the residents of Brown Villa I interviewed, don-ordered justice in garrisons is swift and direct, and it prevents individuals or groups from disrupting the social order and stability of the community. Jungle justice, as the name suggests, is a radical local version of law and order. Although perceived as ‘fair’ by residents, it invariably involves violent measures of discipline and punishment. The don, with his council of foot soldiers, is in many instances, the judge, juror and executor of “justice” in garrisons.

Several interviewees, across all categories of respondents, claimed that garrison residents perceive jungle justice to be more accessible, quicker and more results-oriented than that provided by the Jamaican state. Jungle justice involves strict “rules of engagement” for residents. For example, an unwritten ‘law’ prohibits committing robberies within one’s own garrison, disrespecting the elderly or the don, and sexually abusing women in the community unless sanctioned by the don. Interviewee VT005 (a journalist) maintained that dons provide:

53Several scholars have advanced this conceptualization, including Figueroa (1992) Garrison Communities in Jamaica 1962-1993: The growth and Impact of political culture; Witter (1992) Patron Clientelism: Implications for Garrison Communities. In 1992, the Kerr Report similarly portrayed governance of these communities as shadow versions of social ordering existing apart from and within the larger central authority of the state.
A system of justice which our justice system doesn't provide for so many persons in the inner-city communities. If two persons have a dispute the don will listen and he will determine that one person was wrong and will decide the punishment (Interview, August 11, 2011: VT005).

Interviewee VT021, a long-time Brown Villa resident and CBO director, described the thought process that takes place in the mind of a parent whose daughter has been raped. The police will take time to investigate, to ask questions of the rape victim that will likely further traumatize her, and in many cases, the perpetrator will go unprosecuted. The don, on the other hand, usually makes an immediate decision, and he often knows how to find the perpetrator. In his words, “Jungle justice is swift and sure. You don’t go to the police if a man rapes your daughter, you just don’t. The don can decide the mode of punishment on the spot” (Interview, October 12, 2011: VT021). Actions like these elicit residents’ trust and admiration for dons; they know that the official state system will not give them the same swiftness of action they desire.

Whatever its emotional attraction among residents, the danger of this form of “justice” is that it foregoes due process in the name of swift retribution. Several residents, NGO and police interviewees informed me that people are indeed often wrongly accused and subsequently unfairly punished.

Jungle justice takes place when infractions are committed inside a don’s home garrison. In Brown Villa, the police and residents reported that dons set up a kind of judicial “tribunal” that tries people for “crimes” they commit in the community. Different punishments are imposed for different types of crimes: dons order a hand or leg broken for stealing, public beatings with pick axe sticks (baseball bats) for disrespecting or harming the elderly in the community and the loss of an eye, a gun-shot in the foot or even death, for sexual molestation or rape. If a don is disrespected, challenged or a
resident becomes a police informant, the punishment is often death, and the person’s body is dumped in the open to serve as a public example. A member of the community gets a “road sentence” if s/he is wanted by the police. This means that he or she has to leave the community until the police investigation is complete, or the person has served the equivalent of their jail time. Such sanctions reduce sporadic visits and raids on the community by the police.

According to Interviewee VT004 (a NGO/CBO director), a “gathering of the brothers to make decisions about the affairs of the community” occurs periodically inside garrison communities (Interview, August 30, 2011:VT004). ‘Brothers’ refers to the don and his top ranking lieutenants. Dons administer a system of “fowl coop justice” as a strategy of keeping garrisons under their control. Fowl (chicken) coops are common in rural communities of Jamaica; residents in urban areas also use fowl as a means of subsistence for their families. Some city residents also raise chickens for commercial purposes as a modest source of income for their households. Interviewee VT004 noted that in the garrison communities in which she works, dons/gangs often use fowl coops as holding cells for persons who have committed infractions inside the garrison. Such ‘prisoners’ are denied food and water for specified periods, depending on the severity of their ‘crimes.’ One resident (VT015) suggested in an interview that if a person steals in the community, he or she could spend up to two weeks so incarcerated. In Brown Villa, an old sewage treatment building in one of the community’s districts serves as the don’s makeshift prison. Residents refer to it as the ‘cell.’

Since garrison residents perceive the official state system of law and justice as corrupt and from their perspective ineffective, they have little confidence in it and
consequently, use it very little. Data from the ESSJ show that between 1999 and 2008, on average Jamaica’s police cleared a little more than half of reported cases of carnal abuse and rape each year. In 1999, of all such reported cases, 41 percent were closed; in 2002, fewer than half (49 percent) were cleared, and in 2008; the ESSJ reported that police had closed 46 percent of such investigations. The documents I collected and analyzed underscored these low rates of success and community perceptions and suggested that Jamaica’s judicial system simply is not working adequately. For example, one report I examined, the Road Map for Peace 2006, noted, “Justice is a key component for the delivery of governance and the reassurance of the citizenry about the value of equity and fair play. Decay in the system throws governance out of kilter and fosters corruption” (2007; p.25). Garrison residents often perceive the judicial system, which includes the police, judges and the courts, as a “Babylonian system” that treats the poor unfairly and unequally.

Often, when garrison residents speak of law and order, they are referring to the don’s law and order rather than to that nominally offered by the state. Jungle justice is another tool used by dons and their foot soldiers to entrench themselves in their communities. In the face of the failure of the police and the state judicial system to act swiftly or to act at all in too many cases, residents frequently feel compelled to use a “system” they perceive listens and will punish those who have wronged them. At the root then of garrison residents’ support of jungle justice is their perception that they are an ‘out group’ within the larger Jamaican society. They view the official judicial system as

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54 The reference to ‘Babylon’ is an analogy to the oppressive regime of the Babylonian Empires first founded in 1876 BC. Garrison residents frequently use “Babylon” to describe the oppressive and unequal treatment they receive from “official” Jamaican law enforcement officials.
one in which they possess, from their point-of-view, no real stake and in which they will never be treated as equal citizens. Interviewee VT018 (police) observed that the poor urban class in Jamaica will always have limited access to legal redress and justice from the nation because in his view, “The legislators have played with our constitutional rights from time immemorial. … You have to leave it squarely on our legislators. A speedy trial was never embedded in the constitution for the man who can't afford an expensive lawyer” (Interview, October 4, 2011: VT018).

Jungle justice is important to both dons and residents. On the residents’ side, it is part of a “system” that they can rely on to protect them, and when necessary bring those who have wronged them or their families to a local ‘court,’ for justice to be served. For dons, playing this role allows them to maintain territorial dominance and control in garrisons. A former foot soldier of an Area don in Brown Villa (VT027) remarked to me that through jungle justice, the don sends a signal to residents and other lower ranking dons that he has the power to punish and discipline anyone who breaks his rules; the interviewee termed these “garrison codes.” This role is as much about delivering a perceived service to garrison residents as it is about dons/gangs exacting fear, intimidation and violence against residents and their rivals. Dons/gangs employ jungle justice as a strategy to keep residents in line with garrison codes and dependent on them. Interviewee VT030 (NGO and clergyman) argued that dons sometimes are perceived as “godfather” figures in garrison communities: “they are all-powerful guys who gained their legitimacy in garrisons first from politicians. Every don wants to remain powerful and try to keep people poor to keep them dependent on them for welfare resources and protection” (Interview, October 16, 2011: VT030).
Community-based interviewees (22 in total: police, NGO/CBO and residents) argued that dons help to maintain order and peace in the various districts of Brown Villa. Sociologists, including Durkheim and Mannheim for example, have debated the nature of human societies and the importance of order to the maintenance of co-operative social relations (Wrong, 1994). Although jungle justice is often violent, it has become a system in which residents place their confidence. Dons of all types perform this role and it neatly illustrates their governing capacities to discipline, punish and maintain social order.

**Partisan Enforcement/Mobilization**

The following section explores the symbiotic relationship between elected officials (from the PNP or the JLP) and criminal non-state actors in Jamaica. This relationship spans more than five decades while exhibiting several different patterns of power relations between dons and politicians during the period. Ian Boyne, a renowned Jamaican journalist, has contended, “The links between Jamaican politics and criminality are well established and the transaction costs of these links are incalculable” (*Gleaner*, February 8, 2004).\(^55\) He has further asserted that both political parties have been guilty of closely embracing political thugs and gunmen to secure electoral victories and intimidate opponents. He pointed to the PNP’s embrace of “Burrey Boy” and the JLP’s association with “Claude Massop” as specific examples.\(^56\) Commenting on the relationship that dons and partisan actors in Jamaica have developed over the years, interviewee VT012\(^57\)

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\(^{55}\) Retrieved from *Jamaica Gleaner* at [http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040208/focus/focus1.html](http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040208/focus/focus1.html)

\(^{56}\) These men were dons in garrison communities in the West Kingston area during the 1970s; they were strongly aligned with and supported by officials from the PNP or the JLP.

\(^{57}\) This interviewee operates a business in Brown Villa and is also the director of a social intervention CBO in the community. In his view, the don evolved from being a political enforcer in the 1970s, to playing a central role as a “chief community welfare officer” in the decades after the 1980s; this role as chief welfare officer has become largely the province of Mega and Area Dons. As noted above, Street Dons rarely have the local and transnational network links
observed that in the early days of the nation (the 1960s/1970s) the main role of a don was to ensure “political purity, he was the guy who would do the political cleansing” (Interview, September 21, 2011:VT012).

Today, while dons perform this role, they do so to a lesser extent than their predecessors did in the 1960s and 1970s. Ensuring that a particular party had popular support through assent or force was a central function of dons up to the mid-1980s in garrison neighborhoods. Although they still perform partisan roles in 2012, dons have expanded the range of their social and economic capabilities, as their roles have allowed. For example, I examine the impact of their involvement in gun and drug trafficking in the next section of this chapter.

Figure 5 depicts the shift in the structure of power and control in garrisons from the pre-to the post-1970s era. Initially, the political class drafted dons into the operational structure of their parties and used them to aid in governing. The relationship started as a patron-client one, with dons dependent on politicians. However, the association later changed markedly as the social and economic power of dons increased and their augmented power base allowed them to serve as alternative sources of governance for garrison residents.

to licit and illicit economies (such as drug trafficking, extortion rinks and mega robberies) to garner sufficient resources to play this role on a large scale.
By performing enforcement and mobilization duties, dons were able to establish their political and economic credentials among partisan actors and with garrison residents. An elected representative who has served in the Jamaican parliament since the late 1970s, Interviewee VT014, observed that dons “secure social legitimation by being of ‘value’ to political leaders and to their communities” (Interview, September 23, 2011:VT014). Dons initially served as vote-getting agents for party officials of the JLP or the PNP, who employed them to ensure electoral victory and the maintenance of political power in Kingston and Metropolitan Area constituencies.

By the late 1970s, dons had become important brokers of political and economic services in garrisons and residents perceived them as local arms of the state. The don was the person who possessed the external relationships necessary to bring essential services such as garbage disposal, street cleaning and even unskilled job opportunities to garrisons. Area and Mega-dons used their political connections not only to assist residents, but also to enrich themselves. Interviewee VT004 (an NGO/CBO official)
described how elected representatives liaised with dons (Area and Mega) to ensure their party’s popularity and power. Dons,

Get some money from the Member of Parliament, which is to run the community, so that the streets sweep up and that kind a thing. They get any contracts that come whether through the Solid Waste Agency to clean up and that kind a thing. Remember they are now the community contractor, UDC58 all those places run (administer) contracts and the foot soldiers are now the main employees because they work for dons and they get cheap pay (Interview, August 30, 2011).

Previous research (Figueroa, 1992; Sives, 2002, 2010; Stone 1985) and national reports on crime and violence in Jamaica have cited the relationship between dons and elected officials as one of the primary roots of garrison instability, insecurity and violence. Dons received weapons to protect turf from partisan rivals and to intimidate residents whose support waivered for the party that controlled their community. The Gleaner reported during the 1980 general election, for example, that approximately 800 persons were killed in politically motivated violence.59 A decade or so thereafter, as noted above, the Wolfe Report observed that the partisan roles dons played in garrison communities routinely contributed to insecurity and violence in those jurisdictions. The Report recommended, “Politicians must not only pay lip service to, but must also become actively involved in the eradication of a political arena where gun slingers establish and operate tribal boundaries” (Wolfe Report, 1993, p.18). Interviewee VT014 (an elected official) argued the gun became a feature of political violence in the 1960s. Prior to that

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58 The Urban Development Corporation (UDC) is a government agency established in 1968. Its primary responsibilities include overseeing and granting contracts to build and maintain public infrastructure, develop new townships and solve problems related to urban settlement. One of the major projects that the UDC oversees is the Inner city Renewal Program NGO activists and other non-state actors have criticized the Jamaican Private Sector Organization (PSOJ), which grants public contracts to carry out infrastructure work, for corruption and impropriety since the agency was created. See the UDC’s website at http://www.udcja.com/ The PSOJ’s website is accessibly at http://www.psoj.org/.

59 See the Jamaica Gleaner archives for articles and reports on the intensity of political violence during the 1980s. The following link from the Gleaner sheds some light on the political and social events of 1980 particularly, in Jamaica: http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20010913/cleisure/cleisure1.html
time, weapons primarily were sticks, stones and the knife: “It [the gun] became the main vehicle of violent contention and shifted the link with politics and violence. (Interview, September 23, 2011).” By 1966, the connection between the nation’s political parties and its “rude bwoys (boys)” had solidified. The rude bwoys, largely urban unemployed youths, apathetic and social deviants, my interviewee argued, had moved from being knife carriers to gunslingers.

The latter half of the 1960s to the 1970s was a politically violent and divisive period in Jamaica’s history. The same elected official called 1966 the “tipping point” for the escalation of political warfare between communities that supported either the PNP or the JLP. In 1967, Jamaica held its first general parliamentary elections since independence. Chapter 2 noted the rapid development of political gangs across the communities of Kingston as partisan identities radicalized. According to Lacey (1977), “the most important feature of political violence during the 1960s was the development of open political warfare between rival party groups in Kingston in 1966-67” (1977; p.82). The national government declared a state of emergency in October 1966 because of urban street battles and violence linked to polarized partisanship. VT004 (an NGO/CBO official) suggested to me that the dons and their foot soldiers continue to this day to carry out “door to door” mobilization and campaigning in garrison areas. They conduct pre-election day audits to assess the party’s popularity. The auditing process is dangerous because it is the point at which intimidation takes place, as it requires residents to declare their support for the dominant party in his/her garrison. On the day of elections, the don and his foot soldiers ensure that people actually vote for the political
candidate that represents whichever party is dominant in that community (Interview, August 30, 2011:VT004).

In Brown Villa in the 1970s and 1980s, interviewees recalled a close relationship between the Member of Parliament (MP) and the don of the community. According to an elected representative (VT017),

The then MP brought a particular style of leadership that I don’t think has ever been repeated and a lot of persons want to distance themselves from it. A lot of strong-arm tactics were used of course in developing what you have in some of the housing arena and so on (Interview, October 3, 2011).

Frequent reports in the *Gleaner* during the 1970s confirm that violent strategies of forced migration and firebombing homes took place often in Brown Villa and were politically motivated and carried out by the don’s foot soldiers. The aim of these atrocities was to ensure that the garrison remained aligned to one party.

This picture began to change in the 1980s as dons became more autonomous and dons began to sponsor and give monetary support to elected officials who wanted to maintain political power within garrisons. Some scholars argue that dons became the new patrons and politicians their new clients in the decades after the ‘coca explosion’ (Rapley, 2003; Sives, 2002). The data I collected lead me to conclude that although dons have increased their power inside garrisons, they still partner with elected officials, rather than treat them as a client in a patron-client relationship. Responding to the question, “are dons, since the 1980s pulling away from their political associations?” Interviewee VT012 (a businessman/NGO) observed, “It’s not that they are pulling themselves from politics, the don was always aware of the importance of political power. They were always aware” (Interview, September 21, 2011:VT012).
Interviewee VT008 (resident/CBO) noted that one of Brown Villa’s Area dons (Don Y) “was a different kind of don, less of an area or community leader; he engaged more in his drug running business, had cocaine shops in the area, hosted street dances and entertainment” (Interview, September 8, 2011). I asked the interviewee to say more about ‘Don Y.’ What she described reflects the general shift that took place in the power structure of Jamaica’s garrisons in the 1990s and 2000s. In her words, “he was more into a flashy lifestyle, ‘big cars,’ ‘big bikes’ and had a lot of money to spend on his crew and foot soldiers” (Interview, September 8, 2011:VT008).

Stone (1990) has argued that the “one party constituency model” of Jamaica’s political parties is destructive to democracy. In his words, “democracy was being raped at gun point” in the garrison constituencies of Kingston and St. Andrew during the 1970s and up to the 1980 election as the two main political parties fought for supremacy (Stone, 1990). By the mid-to-late 1980s, dons were no longer so strongly politically motivated, as their activities had diversified. They now participated in racketeering schemes, drug trafficking overseas, legitimate businesses in construction, entertainment and mining as well as extortion, robberies and contract killings. In the post-1970s era, dons were able to deepen their embedded power in garrisons because they had more wealth and more high-powered weapons. Dons use these to influence residents to ‘buy into’ their spheres of power and control. It is clear that at times, they employed fear and violence to reinforce their status as the “don of dons” or the “real ghetto governors.”


61 “Don of dons,” “real bad man,” or “ghetto governor” are terms garrison residents used to describe their community leaders. These titles indicate the admiration and fear that residents have for these non-state actors. Obeika Gray, in Demeaned but Empowered: The Social Power of the Urban Poor in Jamaica (2004), argued that inside Jamaica’s

As I have emphasized, the mid-1960s into the 1970s was an intense period in Jamaica’s political history. The two major political parties found work for the idle and often violent hands of Kingston’s “lumphenproletariat.” The violence of the 1970s was more widespread than the 1960s, fueled by battles between major political gangs. The ideological currents of the Cold War also influenced these posses and the dons that ran them. The PNP, a left-leaning party, was strongly influenced by socialist ideas during the 1970s. In fact, Prime Minister Michael Manley (PNP) was a close associate of Fidel Castro of Cuba. Manley’s governments from 1972-1980 embraced a political model labeled Democratic Socialism. Under Manley, the Jamaican government engaged in community-based development and self-reliance programs and sought to increase Jamaica’s trade with Non-Aligned countries. Manley’s governments sought to base the nation’s economy on state ownership of industries including the railway, power and water, agriculture and mining. The JLP, a right-leaning party, formed Jamaica’s government in 1980 under the leadership of Edward Seaga. The Party and its leader were pro-capitalist and supportive of the U.S./UK neo-liberal policies of the 1980s. Seaga was a close ally of the Ronald Reagan administration and a prominent leader of the U.S.-

62 Terry Lacey (1977) and later Obeika Gray (1994, 2004) have used the Marxist term “lumphenproletariat” to describe the urban poor who were social deviants and engaged in anti-system behaviors such as vandalism, looting and street rioting. Members of the elite class, or what Lacey termed the national bourgeoisie in Jamaica in the 1960s, referred to many of the urban poor as the “hooligan” or “criminal” element of the urban working class.

63 This refers to the Cold War non-alliance movement in which some states took a stance of neutrality. The non-aligned countries mostly were states in the developing regions of the world.
sponsored Caribbean Basin Initiative in 1984. Sives (2002) has contended that rumors of CIA destabilization initiatives against the PNP and Manley made the political and social environment in Jamaica ever more precarious in the late 1970s. Interviewee VT028, a director of several community-based social intervention groups and a senior advisor to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Jamaica, commented:

In the mid to late 1970s the ideological divide sharpens, the U.S. is backing the JLP and other such, the JLP is increasingly arming its people, and the PNP decides that it has to match them. So by 1978 to 1979 you had an, essentially all out undeclared civil war… the Patronage Politics was at its height, and so between 1979 and 1980 the streets became awash with guns and ammunition (Interview, October 25, 2011:VT028).

During the 1970s, Jamaica became a high debt economy; its debt-to-GDP ratio since that decade has remained among the highest in the world. In 2011, the World Bank, in “Jamaica: Country Economic Memorandum: Unlocking Growth,” concluded, “Jamaica was one of the world's slowest-growing economies in the last four decades. In the 2000s, Jamaica's average real GDP growth ranked 180th out of 196 countries. Jamaica's ranking in terms of average real GDP growth continuously deteriorated during 1960-2008.”

The decade of the 1970s left in its wake well-armed dons who now lacked past sources of political and fiscal support. It also left behind urban communities polarized by a divisive political culture fed by violence and antagonistic social identities. The combination of violence and slow or negative economic growth led to deterioration in living conditions in the nation’s garrisons in the 1980s. Meanwhile, and for the reasons

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64 Edward Seaga first proposed the idea in 1979. The Caribbean Basin Initiative was a ‘Marshall Plan’ tailor-made for the Caribbean and Central America. It united the two regions into a single strategic area. The objectives were that the region would benefit by having liberal access to U.S. markets, stronger economic assistance, and greater incentives for investing capital. See too Anthony Maingot, (1994), The United States and the Caribbean: Challenges of an asymmetrical relationship.

just outlined, the state was economically constrained and unable to respond to the needs of Jamaica’s urban poor. This socio-political and economic context provided the conditions for a new breed of dons and gangs to emerge. Figure 6 traces my view of the impact of drug trafficking on the evolution of and the roles played by dons in Jamaica’s garrison communities.

**Figure 6: Impact of drug and gun trafficking on roles of dons (1970s-2012)**

Source: Produced using Microsoft Word applications. Information based on field notes and interview data.

1980 Onwards: Drugs and the ‘New Breed’ of Jamaican Dons

One of Jamaica’s deputy commissioners of police who was once in charge of Jamaica’s transnational and organized crime unit (Operation Kingfish⁶⁶) discussed the shift dons made from financially depending on political clientelist associations in an interview with me.

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⁶⁶ This is a multitask force comprised of Jamaican police and military personnel. Launched in October 2004, its main objective is to target the leaders of organized crime in Jamaica. The agency works closely with law enforcement allies in the United States, Canada and the UK.
Jamaica was targeted as a transshipment point. With Dons not getting what they were used to getting from the political process, they turned to drugs, so then these South Americans would come to Jamaica and form associations with local dons or vice versa. So the trade developed where loads of cocaine would come up out of Colombia and it would be secured by some of our local dons, and as payment, some of the dons were paid in small quantities of cocaine (Interview, October 13, 2011: VT023).

Drug trafficking became a new and more lucrative source of funding for garrison dons. *The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (INSCR) has suggested that Jamaica remains the largest supplier of marijuana to the United States (2011; p.325). In fact, Jamaica was a major supplier of marijuana to North American markets (USA/Canada) long before the 1980s (Campbell, 1987). Cocaine also was significant. Figure 7 shows the importance of the Caribbean region to cocaine trafficking into the U.S. in the 1980s. By 1981, the Caribbean corridor was a significant supplier of cocaine to the U.S. Drugs, transshipped through the region passed through the hands of local traffickers and dealers. Cocaine trafficking from South America was a game changer for the local gangs and dons in Jamaica’s garrisons in the 1980s.
Dons and gangs struck ‘white gold’ in cocaine; they were able to set up drug selling networks across the United States and in the United Kingdom. With the transshipment of cocaine through Jamaican seaports and the ‘courier drug trade’ via the airline industry (Air Jamaica, in particular) in the 1980s, criminal gangs and organized crime grew strongly, particularly in the West Kingston region. Beyond their own nation’s shores, Jamaican dons and gangs developed operations on the streets of Brooklyn and the Bronx in New York, and Miami, Florida, shipping and selling cocaine and marijuana (Gunst, 1996). Trafficking and selling drugs at home and especially abroad financially empowered Mega dons to provide social services to residents of their home garrisons. They also used some of the proceeds of their drug running to contribute money to the

political parties aligned with their garrisons. Additionally, they used their wealth to co-opt and ‘pay-off’ (and thereby corrupt) police, military and coast guard officials. Gunst (1996) has detailed in her work, Born fi Dead, that a gang from the Southeast St. Andrew community of McGregor Gully in Jamaica called the ‘Gulley men’ led by a Mega don, Eric ‘Chineyman’ Vassell, had a strong drug selling network across the state of New York in the 1980s. Using proceeds from that operation, the ‘Gully men’ sent barrels of clothing and food, weapons and money transfers to McGregor Gully. Interviewee VT006, a resident of a garrison community and a senior social worker in a state-funded inner-city intervention agency, argued that drugs in the 1980s-1990s played a significant role in creating a “new breed” of Jamaican dons. Dons, he stressed, were no longer partisan puppets; they participated in several local and international businesses (criminal and legitimate). After 1980, dons were:

Involved in buying and selling of weapons, drug trade, and extortion, involved in major high profile robberies. These dons have access to significant resources, their contacts and influence stretch overseas so they have access to significant resources and they use the community as a vehicle to further the development of their own business empire and criminal network (Interview September 1, 2011: VT006).

As Sives (2002) has contended, after the 1960s and 1970s dons no longer had control over communities via political support and resources. Instead, “the flow of hard drugs through the Caribbean during the 1980s and 1990s combined with the tightening of state resources has provided another, more lucrative avenue for income generation” (2002; p.84). The trafficking of marijuana and cocaine through the Caribbean into U.S. and UK markets took place despite U.S. efforts to wage a ‘war on drugs’ as demand for these substances outpaced authorities’ capacities to interdict their supply.
In 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon declared drugs to be ‘public enemy number one’ (Baum, 1996). The U.S. targeted ‘producer’ states in South America as the problem and directed funds and law enforcement to eradicate the drug “scourge” at the source. The real problem, however, especially in the 1980s, was increased demand for cocaine in the U.S. Americans during this period had a seemingly insatiable appetite for crack-cocaine, marijuana and heroin (Marez, 2004). According to data from the UNOC 2010 report, the United States remains the “single largest national cocaine market” (p.72). The report notes that in 1981 an estimated 10.5 million people in the U.S. used cocaine (UNOC, 2010; p.72). Along with the huge market for cocaine and marijuana, consumption in the U.S. encouraged the rise of the Medellin cartel in Colombia. Drug-kingpins, Pablo Escobar, Carolos Lehder, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha and the Ochoa family formed an alliance to manufacture and traffic cocaine into the United States. VT023 (a deputy commissioner of police-DCP) told me that local dons developed alliances with the Colombians to transship loads of cocaine into the United States. For the first time during this period, Jamaican elected officials began to view dons not as allies, but as threats to their hegemony in garrison neighborhoods. The DCP stated that scores of dons migrated during the 1980s to the U.S. as the local economic and political climate changed. With the help of the police, party officials from the PNP and the JLP sought increasingly to prosecute or exterminate the dons with whom they had previously worked closely. Dons who migrated, according to Interviewee VT023,

67 ‘Producer states’ are those countries in the South American Andean Ridge that cultivate the coca plant, which is used to manufacture cocaine powder. These nations include Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.

68 Document can be retrieved online from the UNOC’s website at http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/1.3_The_globa_cocaine_market.pdf

69 Newspaper and online reports from the BBC and NPR. See also the work of William O. Walker III. (1994). Drug Trafficking in the Americas.
Were providing support to gangs, they were receiving the loads of cocaine; they were converting it, selling it and sending guns down or money down. So what it means they were also paving the way that if deported, then they have a family—a gang family to come back to (Interview, October 13, 2011:VT023).

In a statement to the Southern New York U.S. District Court, co-operating witness one (CW-1) in the Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke case offered a vivid picture of the influence of drug trafficking on the power of dons from as early as the 1980s onwards. The witness testified that Dudus had network connections with Jamaicans who lived in and sold drugs in New York City and Miami. In exchange for the cocaine that Christopher Coke sent them, the Mega Don received guns. As CW-1 stated,

Dudus said, in substance, that he needed to obtain more high-powered weapons because through having “heavy machines” such as rifles, he could have more power. I understood this to mean both power within the Organization (the Shower Posse) but also within Jamaica” (Written Court Statement, May 21, 2012).

One interviewee from Brown Villa remarked, “The more guns a don has, the more powerful he is” (Interview, October 25, 2011:VT027). The drug trade made Coke wealthy and very powerful inside the Jamaican criminal underworld. He was also an entrepreneur and developed legitimate businesses in construction and the retail industry (clothing and food). Coke exemplified the new breed of Jamaican don, embedded deeply inside his Tivoli Gardens garrison. Interviewee VT001 (journalist) in commenting on the influence of the drug trade on the changing nature of the power and roles of dons, remarked,

The turn of the 1970s and 80s, and the rise of the drug culture in Jamaica [was] where we shifted from the traditional ganja production and export to hard drugs; what you had emerging was a different kind of don. There are those early dons who did not have the business acumen of a Coke (Dudus). They simply

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70 CW-1 declared himself a senior member of the Shower Posse gang in the 1980s-1990s. The gang had its headquarters in the garrison of Tivoli Gardens, but it also had network branches in cities in the U.S. Northeast. He said he worked as a personal bodyguard to the gang’s leader and then don, Lester Lloyd ‘Jim Brown’ Coke and later he performed the same role for Christopher Coke.
commanded influence and authority through sheer violence, the will to perpetrate violence on behalf of the politician. He (dons) has evolved over time from being a mere political organizer/enforcer, to one who is a major political and economic player (Interview, July 26, 2011).

Several other Brown Villa interviewees (nine CBO and clergy members in total) suggested that two major dons emerged in the community from the early 1990s into the 2000s because of their involvement in drug running (the same Area Dons X and Y mentioned above). According to VT007 (an NGO/CBO director), one don in Brown Villa had strong control over a large segment of the community. He attributed that individual’s power in Brown Villa to his involvement in drug trafficking and to his political connections that gave him major contracts to fix roads and collect garbage in the community. The don also was a record producer and a major investor in one of the community’s football (soccer) teams and sports complexes. This don is an Area don; he has strong business acumen and he has long considered Brown Villa home. Several interviewees called him a “community don.” That is, he was perceived as having made considerable contributions to the garrison’s welfare and development.

The other Area Don who emerged in the 1990s (Don Y) used parts of Brown Villa, as I have noted, as an outlet to sell cocaine. Interviewees saw him less as a “community don” and more as someone focused on his drug running enterprise. Although he had political connections, this don focused more on selling and trafficking cocaine; he also was a music producer and had several retail businesses. This don also exemplified the new breed of dons: self-interested businesspersons who use the garrison communities in which they operate as outlets and administrative headquarters. Don Y was a powerful Area don. However, what distinguished him from Don X was his relative lack of concern to “give back” to his community. In talking with interviewee VT028, the
issue of personality differences among dons arose. She observed that dons have distinct individual personalities and that a garrison could have dons with similar financial power, but divergent approaches to community welfare, for example. Some dons tend to have more autocratic and violent means of exercising their authority, while others employ less punitive measures and styles of governing. According to VT028,

My experience with the dons now is that they come with different degrees of ‘wickedness’ and they also come with different degrees of quote-end-quote progressiveness. There are the men that will support the community development programs in the organizations that I have been a part of. And when you establish for example a school program in the evenings, this kind of don will say to a ‘would be shotta’ (potential gangster) make sure you go to the school). At the bottom of the same street, you have a pathological, I mean real ill, sick, sick, sick type of don; beheads people, real sick, and then brags about it (Interview, October 25, 2011:VT028).

Residents from another section of Brown Villa mentioned that the don for their area acquired control because of his wealth and ‘fire power’ (arsenal of weapons). In describing this individual, interviewee VT020 stated, “Don ‘Z’ grew up in the community and went away to Canada, he was into drug selling and when he came back to Jamaica he bought his don-manship from another don for U.S. $100, 000” (Interview, October 11, 2011:VT020). This information is difficult to verify. However, a senior superintendent of police (VT022) in the West Kingston police division mentioned that “Don Z” was wealthy from his drug running and that it was very likely that he exchanged cash for control of the Brown Villa district in which he operated. That particular district of Brown Villa has a strong partisan connection to the community and don where “Don Z” allegedly purchased his don-manship. This method of becoming a don in the post-1970s era supports the view that Jamaican dons are now enmeshed in complex economic and political enterprises and networks. They have become involved in activities that have
further enriched them and are able to exercise force and distribute material resources among garrison residents. The evidence I collected indicates that drug trafficking proceeds accelerated dons’ rise to prominence in garrison neighborhoods.

This new breed of dons has embedded itself in garrisons by using the community as centers for their economic operations (both criminal and legitimate). In these areas, they are able to buy the loyalty of residents; they get cheap labor from unemployed youth, and they serve as benefactors to residents to the degree it furthers their hegemonic position and/or personal predilection. Interviewee VT023 (the DCP) suggested that dons/gangs have managed to embed themselves in garrisons because of their ability to co-opt several groups, including the church, NGOs, politicians and the police. In his view,

Dons are so powerful that they are able to co-opt the churches and NGOs in the area. They also co-opt the media as well, just look at the entertainment industry and how DJs and street dances are sponsored and supported by gangs, dons. They work well with peace management initiative groups; they have co-opted the entire process (Interview, October 13, 2011:VT023).

A gun and marijuana trade between Jamaica and Haiti developed in the early years of the 2000s. This was a significant finding; it provides one explanation for the emergence of several corner gangs and Street Dons across the KMA. I found evidence (from interviews conducted) that Street Dons are active across the five districts of the Brown Villa community.

**The Haitian Connection: Drugs, Guns and Jamaican Dons**

Interviewee VT023, a senior police officer, described how the guns for drugs trade between Jamaica and Haiti started.

It came about, but it also coincided with the de-stabilization in Haiti, where the Haitian army was disbanded, and so the Haitian streets were awash with guns.
This was in late 2002 into 2003. Because of the fishing route between Jamaica and Haiti, our fishermen run to Haiti, and a few of them discovered that in Haiti the demand for good quality ganja was very high, and Haiti was a major transshipment point for drugs going to the Bahamas and then the United States. The fishermen now sold the ganja to the Haitians, who paid them with guns. So when the fishermen came back they had to sell the guns because they had no real use for them (Interview, October 13, 2011:VT023).

The trade between Jamaica and Haiti fostered another shift in the characteristics of ‘donmanship’ in Jamaica’s garrisons. In 2008, then-Assistant Commissioner of Police in Jamaica Glenmore Hinds stated, “The trade between Jamaica and Haiti is very significant. The firearms that come from Haiti are mainly handguns, revolvers, pistols and a few shotguns” (BBC News, October 25, 2008).71 The increased availability of guns from Haiti meant that lower ranked gangs/dons could arm themselves and provide security and protection services to different corners and streets inside the larger garrison space. Street gangs and the Street-dons evidently emerged out of the desire of some lower status gang members (‘shottas’ or ‘foot soldiers’) to challenge the power and hegemonic positions of community-wide dons. In consequence, the post-1990s era has seen a decline in the domination of single dons over entire garrison communities. Coke was among the last cohort of dons to have complete control over an entire garrison space. Figure 8 suggests the impact that the gun-for-drugs trade has had on the availability of illegal guns, and the changes it has created in the features of don hierarchy and control in Jamaica’s garrisons.

71 Nick Davis, “Haiti and Jamaica’s deadly trade,” available online news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Americas/7684983.stm
The Brown Villa case illustrates the broader shift that has taken place in the power structure of dons and gangs in Jamaica’s garrisons. The community has had several Street level dons since the 2000s and two Area Dons from the 1990s onwards. Interviewee VT005 (a journalist), when commenting on the impact of the trade between Jamaica and Haiti on the don structure in garrisons, averred:

Christopher [Coke] is the last of Jamaica’s great (Mega) dons that have controlled a wide area, community with economic and military might. The access to cash by smaller people has led to this. The access to guns also contributes to this as well. … The drugs for guns from Haiti opened up access to guns to communities. This access to guns and ammunition means that no one is now waiting on one single man or politician to get a gun; they can get their own guns (Interview, August 11, 2011:VT005).

Similarly interviewee VT023 argued that the guns for drugs trade had contributed significantly to the spread of guns and gun-related crimes to the rural parishes of Jamaica since 2005. Prior to 2005 up to “70 to 80 percent of our gun related crimes” were committed in the KMA in the parishes of Kingston, St. Andrew and St. Catherine.
VT023 noted that in the rural parishes of the island, wherever there are fishing villages, fishermen depart from those areas to go to Haiti and “exchange ganja for guns” (Interview, October 13, 2011:VT023). In rural parishes such as Clarendon in south central and St. James in western Jamaica, the senior police officer claimed that since “2006 there have been an increase in gun related crimes—shooting, robberies and murder.” One retired senior superintendent of police (JCF) pointed out in an interview with me that local garrison dons from Kingston and St. Andrew, travel to rural farming and fishing districts in Jamaica to engage in drug and gun smuggling (Interview, 19 Dec. 2011:VT041).

On a non-research visit to a restaurant in a fishing village, I encountered a local fisherman who described how guns and drugs are trafficked through the borders of Jamaica via the Caribbean Sea. The angler (“Yellow”) told me that at night fishermen take loads of compressed marijuana to the Pedro Cays\(^2\) and from there they make their way using fishing boats to Haiti. According to Yellow, the Pedro Cays sometimes serve as a holding area where anglers exchange marijuana for money with other fisher folk who make the journey to Haiti. Guns, especially handguns and sometimes rifles, are taken back to Jamaica. When I asked him about the risks involved in trafficking guns and marijuana, he responded that the greatest risks come from other anglers whom he called “pirates.” One risks having their “boat load of food, weed or guns robbed by these vicious pirates.”\(^3\) Yellow also told me that sailors from the Jamaican Coast Guard sometimes receive cash to allow the free passage of guns and drugs. With regard to

\(^2\) The Cays lay outside the parish of Kingston Jamaica’s National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA) has designated the area as a special habitat for several species of birds and sea turtles.

\(^3\) This conversation took place on November 16, 2011. I did not tape record the conversation; however I used the information received to help inform my field notes memo. I wrote down what he said verbatim. As it turned out, “Yellow’s” story cohered with information I collected from senior police interviewees and from newspaper articles.
cocaine, Yellow noted that the “Colombians have some very fast boats, and they pay big money to fishermen to take cocaine to drop points near the Bahamas, Cuba and even Haiti”.74

Yellow’s information is consistent with that a police officer provided in an interview (VT023): “Haiti is a major transshipment point for drugs going to the Bahamas and then the United States” (Interview, October 13, 2011:VT023). According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INSCR) of March 2012, “Haiti remains a transit point for cocaine originating in South America for transshipment to the United States, Canada, Europe, and elsewhere in the Caribbean”(INSR, March 2012).75 The Report also suggested that marijuana originating from Jamaica is a “concern” of the U.S. and other hemispheric authorities.76 The guns that Yellow said enter Jamaica via fishing villages end up in the hands of gangs and dons. Yellow remarked that sometimes anglers sell the guns to “powerful men.” He refused to say what he meant by ‘powerful men’ but he indicated that buyers came from different parts of the metropolitan area (Kingston, St. Catherine and St. Andrew).

Evidence on the number of guns that have entered Jamaica via the ‘Haitian corridor’ is at present inconclusive. However, officials from the Transnational Crime and Narcotics Division and Operation Kingfish units of the JCF maintain that since the early 2000s significant amounts of guns and ammunition have entered Jamaica via Haiti.

74 Ibid.
75 The report is online at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol1/184099.htm#Haiti.
76 Ibid.
The main source of illegal guns and ammunition in Jamaica, however, continues to be ship containers carrying food, appliances and motor vehicles. The JCF reports that very substantial shipments of illegal guns to Jamaica originate from the United States. In his sworn statement to the U.S. District Court, CW-1 described how Coke trafficked guns into Jamaica in exchange for cocaine,

Dudus explained that firearms sent from the United States are packaged in appliances, refrigerators, deep freezes, and that handguns and ammunition could also be sent down in foodstuffs, including rice and flour, as well as in soap boxes. I have seen the ‘shotters’ and high-level members of the Shower Posse, in Dudus’ presence, dismantling these appliances and taking apart the foodstuffs to retrieve the firearms (Written Court Statement, May 21, 2012).

Gangs and dons use various means of acquiring wealth, weapons and control over geographic turf inside garrisons and the business districts of town centers like Kingston. A senior police officer in narcotics asserted that “gangs must be resourced and narcotics are one of the main ways of getting money and funds…They will depend on narcotics to maintain their lifestyle and power” (Interview, November 7, 2011:VT031). The proceeds from drug selling and trafficking facilitated the creation of new types of dons in Jamaica. The money and guns gave them the capacity to play several roles inside garrisons. They are the ghetto ‘governors’ in neighborhoods where the state’s power is anemic and its elected officials devoid of political will to serve their constituents.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the main roles dons have performed over the last several decades and how their activities have allowed them to establish often-favorable

77 Article is online at http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110614/lead/lead2.html. See also the work of Agozino, O., et. al (2009). Guns, crime and social order in the West Indies; in it the authors made note of the influence the Haitian-Jamaican trade had on the ‘weaponization’ of the West Indies.

political, socio-cultural and economic relationships with garrison residents. Contributing to the social welfare of residents and providing protection to their community members’ lives and property are key governing roles that dons (predominantly Mega and to a lesser extent Area dons) have performed. It is not surprising that garrison residents, including those from Brown Villa, perceive dons as ghetto governors. The evidence also suggests that apart from supporting these leaders out of a sense of gratitude, garrison residents also support dons out of fear. Residents consent to the inherently violent hegemony of their dons as a deliberate strategy to secure their survival. They evidently consider the violence of jungle justice measures to be legitimate because of its swiftness and responsiveness to their pleas for justice.

Nonetheless, as Figure 6 indicates, May 2010 likely constituted a watershed moment in the control that dons have in garrison communities. The capture and extradition of one of Jamaica’s last remaining Mega-Dons, Christopher Coke, exposed the deeply embedded status that these men have nurtured since the late 1960s in Jamaica’s garrisons. But it also signaled the demise of this particular type of community leader. Recent evidence indicates that the title of ‘don’ is increasingly unpopular. Towards the end of all interviews I conducted, interviewees pointed out that dons were shunning such labels, and in fact many were making themselves less visible inside their garrisons.

Sharply increased police patrols in inner-city communities and the targeting of dons and gangs after May 2010 have allowed the state to embark on a process of reasserting its authority in Jamaica’s garrisons. However, whatever the ultimate outcome of these national efforts to remove and/or supersede the dons may prove to be, the
conditions that facilitated their emergence and evolution remain. Garrison communities such as Brown Villa suffer from poor infrastructural development, high rates of unemployment and ineffectual political representation. The Jamaican state remains weak in providing essential governance services to garrisons, and new types of dons have stepped in to fill the vacuum, even as the nation seeks to remove them. If it is to succeed, the Jamaican state through its law enforcement and social services branches of government must reposition itself as an active player in governing garrison communities. As this case study shows, today’s Jamaican dons are criminal non-state actors whose roles have evolved with the shifting tides of the global political economy as well as that in the neighborhoods in which they are active. Their influence on Jamaica’s governments and local communities requires more attention in the literature on governance in the Caribbean.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION:

RE-THINKING GOVERNANCE AND DIS-EMBEDDING GARRISON DONs

Introduction

Dons have performed security and social welfare functions in Jamaica’s garrison communities at different times in recent decades. These individuals tend to carry out roles associated with provision of social welfare, security/protection, political partisan mobilization and the maintenance of law, order and control using “jungle justice” measures. They have been able to embed themselves in garrison neighborhoods, which are usually steeped in poverty and prone to violence, by gaining the trust and support of residents, who often perceive dons as protectors and providers. I have argued that dons’ performance of such roles allows them to serve as embedded governing authorities in garrison communities. I used data derived from close study of Brown Villa to support my argument. These findings concerning the roles of violent non-state actors suggests it may be appropriate to re-think the nature of governance and the actors we view as legitimate holders of power and authority.

The power of the Sicilian mafia, like that of Jamaica’s dons, sheds light on the influence that violent groups and individuals have in contexts where the state’s capacity to govern is weak or weakening. Aside from the issue of fragile state capacity, political corruption provides a fertile environment for such actors to play influential roles within and across the borders of the state. Some Jamaican dons, for example, have been involved in local and global economic markets (both licit and illegal) and in some communities; they have served as active players in delivering public services, such as
garbage disposal and transportation. This research suggests that the academic community, particularly Caribbean scholars, and policy makers would do well to explore critically what lessons can be learned about the state and governance by focusing attention on the actions of criminal entities. At least some states do not possess a monopoly over popularly legitimated authority. The roles dons have developed in Brown Villa provide strong illustrations of that reality.

It is worth restating that the violence and criminality associated with dons and their gangs are not uniform across Jamaica. The epicenters of drug, gang and politically charged violence are in the urban inner city communities in the parishes of Kingston, St. Andrew and St. Catherine. Likewise, not all of Jamaica’s inner cities are garrison communities. As I have argued, dons and garrisons alike first emerged as a result of deliberate attempts by the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and the Peoples National Party (PNP) to secure support and electoral victories. Both phenomena (garrisons and their informal leaders) should be carefully analyzed in context so as to safeguard against over-generalization.

This chapter briefly restates the major objectives of this study and reviews its principal findings. I comment on what I learned theoretically and empirically from undertaking this inquiry. Additionally, I offer some reflections concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the research process in which I engaged. The chapter is organized into two parts, a summary of findings followed by recommendations. The latter section is in turn divided into two parts. First, I outline the prospects for future academic research on the roles dons play in other communities in Jamaica, particularly in rural areas. The sub-fields of comparative politics and the disciplines of anthropology, sociology and
criminology should benefit from continued exploration of the impact of popular criminal community leaders on the reach and character of government authority in weak-capacity states in developing nations. Dons also have influenced international governance processes and institutions. The second part makes several policy proposals aimed at creating conditions that would mitigate and begin to eliminate the authority and power of dons/gangs in Jamaica’s garrisons.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In May 2010 the Jamaican government used military and police units to enter Tivoli Gardens to arrest and extradite to the United States drug-lord and garrison don, Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke. Tivoli residents staged a large public protest in response to the state’s action. Female garrison residents marched in white t-shirts around the community crying for “justice,” and many neighborhood men erected barricades at the major entrances to the community. One female resident had a placard that read, “Jesus died for us, we will die for Dudus.” Like many interested observers, I was particularly struck by this statement, which became a national headline. Indeed, many Jamaicans who live outside the confines of garrison communities were outraged at the blatant disregard shown towards the state, law and order. The impasse between the security forces and criminal gangs loyal to Coke sparked my initial interest in understanding better the reasons that might underpin such a public display of support for a drug-lord and garrison don. I became interested in finding out more about who figures such as Coke really are, and what kinds of things they do inside garrison communities to earn such standing and popular support. I wondered if dons were in fact predators who employ fear to exercise autocratic rule over garrison residents; but given the popular displays of support for
Coke, I also wondered whether dons might indeed enjoy the voluntary backing and loyalty of garrison residents, and if so, why? Linked to these questions, I also wanted to find out what factors might account for the emergence and then the gradual transformation of dons over time from serving as enforcers for political parties in Jamaica (1960s/1970s) to their most recent role as violent entrepreneurs\(^79\) (late 1980s onwards). The national government’s Tivoli incursion made me question as well the legitimacy and power of the Jamaican state inside garrison areas. To address these questions I developed a qualitative research design that employed field observation, interviews and documents analysis as primary methods of inquiry.

I turn now to a discussion of the primary findings of this research, organized by specific topics. The first section addresses the concept of embeddedness and its usefulness to criminology and governance studies. I also offer my conclusions concerning the character of legitimate public authority and power in this section. The following section outlines the major lessons learned in this analysis concerning the character and different types of dons that exist and the roles they play. I offer some conclusions about garrison spaces in Jamaica based on the Brown Villa example. The final section outlines how non-state actors have used sales and trade of illicit goods (guns and drugs) and services to enlarge their social, economic and para-military powers inside garrisons.

Embedded Governance and the Question of Legitimacy

At the research design and data collection stage of the study I formulated the proposition that dons are embedded governance actors inside the garrisons in which they operate. Borrowed from the work of Vadim Volkov (2002). *Violent entrepreneurs: The use of force in the making of Russian capitalism.* Volkov contends that criminal groups, private security firms and the state have all used ‘organized force’ and ‘managed violence’ to create a new market-driven economy in post-Soviet Russia. His analysis illustrated how non-state criminal groups may be integrated into the political economy of the state and society.

\(^79\) Borrowed from the work of Vadim Volkov (2002).
live and operate. As it turned out, my proposition indeed offers one explanation for the popular support some dons receive from garrison residents in Jamaica. Despite their despotic style of rule and frequent use of violent force, dons have been given titles such as “community godfathers,” “ghetto governors” or “chief welfare officers”\(^80\) in garrisons. Viewing dons as embedded governing actors allowed me to reassess the pillars upon which legitimate authority and control rest. That is, I began to examine the source, character and foundations of legitimate authority. Does it derive from the masses or does a smaller group, such as the economic and political elite who wield power within the state, instead legitimate it? The Brown Villa case suggests that the community roots of legitimacy and authority are tied to residents’ ‘calculated’ assent or disapproval of governing actors, including dons.

In Chapter 2, I examined the work of Ghezzi and Mingione (2007) who have argued that embeddedness describes the interaction among social actors within relational, institutional and cultural contexts. It is within these settings that individuals and groups develop mutual trust (or distrust). Other scholars have noted that social capital\(^81\) tends to increase (or decrease) among actors in such relationships (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 1993, 2000). Analysts and policy makers have used the concept of social capital to describe the shared values, norms and understandings that facilitate interaction and collaboration among members in groups, organizations and communities.

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\(^{80}\) Interviewees used these phrases to describe garrison dons. Respondents included community residents, journalists and directors of local NGOs that work in the garrison (including Brown Villa).

\(^{81}\) Putnam’s (2000) work *Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American Community* helped to popularize the concept. In that volume he posited that Americans were no longer working together and collaborating with each other as frequently or deeply as they once had done; they were now often essentially ‘bowling alone’ as opposed to working in concert to achieve shared goals.
Governance scholars have argued that social capital is vital to civic engagement, political stability and the development and maintenance of democratic political culture. Likewise, embedded relationships are based on mutual cooperation and “calculative trust” (Montgomery, 1998). The length of time a don is associated with a garrison, the frequency with which he distributes material resources within that garrison, and his provision of security and protection to residents and involvement in entertainment, infrastructure development and social projects within the community foster embeddedness. As this process unfolds, garrison residents learn to rely on and invest their trust in community dons to help to secure their economic survival and personal safety. This reliance developed in the face of the absence or evanescence of the state’s authority in garrison communities.

On one level, the garrison environment itself may be said to facilitate the embedding of dons and gangs. The conditions of high unemployment, more than 65 percent in Brown Villa in 2011 (SDC, 2011), insecurity from frequent gang related rivalries and poor educational attainment among the youth allow dons to acquire and maintain high social rank and legitimacy among residents. In Chapter 4, I contended that the social, economic and political setting of Brown Villa made it possible for a series of different types of dons (Area and Street dons particularly) to emerge and establish relational ties with residents. Each district of Brown Villa has its own street don, and the northern section of the community still has an Area don (Don Y mentioned in Chapter 5). In most cases, residents see the don more than they see their elected representatives. If there is a problem with sewage or garbage pollution, for example, the don sometimes directs his

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local trucking company to clean the debris from the streets of the community, while the public authority remains distant and at least apparently unresponsive.

Brown Villa, like other garrison communities in Jamaica, is comprised of lower income households with limited access to education and training. Given the low human capital (skills and training) among residents, especially the young (ages 14-25); dons/gangs are able to recruit fresh members. Dons, especially Mega and Area types, have come to symbolize wealth and power; this attracts the younger as well as other older residents. Women find some dons attractive because of the symbolic riches, prestige and authority associated with “donmanship.” In some cases, recruitment is not required. As one interviewee, a former member of a gang (VT021) in the 1970s and now a leader of a CBO in Brown Villa, pointed out to me, many youths in the community do not wait to be approached; they often volunteer to join the dons’ “system.” Many of these young people (generally men) find it difficult and apparently less alluring to enter into the official structures of the Jamaican economy. Additionally, many young men, often lacking clear alternative role models in their communities, see dons and gang leaders as masculine prototypes, as supposed “real men,” whom they wish to emulate. Jamaican garrisons, like other urban inner city communities in other nations in the Caribbean and Latin America, including Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela (Jones and Rodgers, 2009), are characterized by socio-economic conditions that encourage the embedding of rogue actors.

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83 Barry Chevannes’ (2002) work, What you sow is what you reap: Violence and the construction of male identity in Jamaica provide more insight into the ways in which Jamaican manhood and masculinity have been defined within urban inner city garrison contexts. He argued that boys often view dons and gang members as folk heroes and community icons. Adam Baird (2012) in his article, “The violent gang and the construction of masculinity amongst socially excluded young men” has also explored the connection between masculinity and youth involvement in violence. His work chronicles the phenomenon in Colombia.
If political and economic settings are initially conducive, the roles dons perform surely facilitate their social embedding within garrisons. This process takes place at the individual, household/family and communal levels. The failure of successive governments to alleviate grinding conditions of poverty, both private and public (Henry-Lee, 2005), in places such as Brown Villa has resulted in the loss of residents’ confidence in the capacity of the state to undertake efforts to help to improve their living conditions. Since the late 1970s, the Jamaican state has failed to assert and maintain its version of law and order in garrisons (Rapley, 2003). The state has in effect lost its centralized authority and legitimacy inside many poor inner city communities. Dons have stepped into that vacuum and filled the social welfare gaps left by the invisible or retreating (neo-liberal) state. Garrison residents, as those in Brown Villa exemplify, have often been reluctant to collaborate and engage in dialogue with representatives of the Jamaican government, especially the police. An important capacity that the state is expected to possess is the ability to provide security to its citizens. As the work of Peter Evans et al. (1985) has suggested, the state needs to reassert its role in the governance process. This rings true in the Jamaican context, if the primary reasons for the rise of the legitimacy of dons are to be overcome.

Dons demonstrate their governing capacity best in the crucial area of community security and protection. Residents, clergy officials and approximately 65 percent of CBO interviewees noted that in times of inter-gang warfare, the police often have not been present and the don and his gang have ensured the community’s security. Nonetheless, the equation is hardly one-sided. The don and his gang members have systematically used organized violence and force to embed themselves in their communities. As a result,
violence, social instability and a crippling culture of fear usually exist simultaneously among garrison residents. As I suggested in Chapter 5, dissenters to the don’s authority and system of control receive severe punishment.

Nonetheless, violent actors or not, dons also appear to develop affective or social bonds with the residents of the garrisons in which they operate. The examples of dons such as Eric Vassell from McGregor Gully, Christopher Coke from Tivoli Gardens and Don “X” from Brown Villa, illustrate the socio-cultural influence and ties to their communities such informal leaders may develop. Sponsorship of Easter and Christmas gatherings and providing gifts to children and adults, especially at Christmas, are culturally symbolic and significant efforts that these dons have undertaken and that have endeared them to garrison residents. Easter and Christmas festivities date to the era of plantation slavery in Jamaica and the rest of the Anglo-Caribbean. Dons’ hosting of community reggae concerts and dancehall street-shows inside garrison communities offers residents opportunities to earn sporadic income by selling their wares (cigarettes, gum and marijuana) or serving as bartenders (women) or informal security (men). These musical events are important features of Jamaican popular culture and they resonate with garrison residents.

**Typology of Dons and Garrisons**

The altercation between criminal thugs loyal to Christopher Coke and Jamaica’s security forces impressed me. Coke was able to marshal the support and respect of many of his community’s residents, even as he and his supporters had amassed sufficient weaponry to confront the state’s police and military units. I was still more struck as I reflected on the 1998 street protests launched by residents loyal to Matthews Lane don
Donald “Zekes” Phipps, who was arrested by police on criminal charges. That neighborhood’s residents demanded that the state release “their” don as he provided for them and ensured their safety. I initially expected that the don role was everywhere the same and that all such individuals were wealthy, involved in drug trafficking and offered social services to their garrisons that Jamaican governments were unable or otherwise unwilling to deliver. It turned out that I was wrong so to expect.

Instead, as I examined the phenomenon of Jamaica’s dons, I found they took on a range of roles at different levels and with different areas of influence, and I determined it necessary to categorize them into different types: Mega, Area and Street. Placing dons into different categories may have analytical value as it provides a strategic frame for the study of similar criminal groups and violent actors in the wider Latin American and Caribbean region. Not all leaders and groups operating illegally (in this case dons and their gangs) are the same. Contextual analysis is important in order to identify disparities in organizational structures, ideologies and the variety of activities they perform. Thinking of non-state criminal actors such as dons as reflecting various types can assist scholars in the fields of comparative politics and criminology by sensitizing them to the possible differences in authority and governance activities that these leaders manifest.

I determined the Mega don was the most powerful don type. These individuals tend to have strong criminal and financial network connections, both locally and internationally. According to those I interviewed, Brown Villa does not currently have such an individual in its midst. Indeed, I learned in my interviews that the garrison’s last

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84 Matthews Lane is a community in the West Kingston division of the capital city, Kingston. I consider Donald ‘Zekes’ Phipps to have been a Mega Don comparable to Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke. In fact, during the 1990s, these individuals divided the Downtown Kingston business district between themselves for purposes of extortion and protection rackets.
Mega don was killed in the early 1980s during the intense gun battles between JLP- and PNP-endorsed thugs. Christopher “Dudus” Coke (1990s-2010), his father Lester Lloyd “Jim Brown” Coke (1980s-1990s) and Donald “Zekes’ Phipps (1990s) are the most recent examples of what I have termed Mega dons to operate and control territory in the Kingston metropolitan area. Mega dons exhibit strong business acumen and depend on narcotics and gun trafficking as their main sources of wealth. They also engage in legitimate businesses in the construction, transportation, entertainment and sports industries. I have argued that the Mega don fits the definition of a “violent entrepreneur.” These dons, like their Area counterparts, are willing to take risks to develop commercial and trade prospects. This area of initiative opened for them as they transitioned from being partisan enforcers for the JLP/PNP to becoming strong and independent business and political leaders of their communities.

Area Dons tend to have fewer material resources at their disposal than Mega Dons can command, and they do not have inter-community (and beyond) reach, as Mega Dons do. Police, NGO officials, journalists and residents indicated when I spoke with them that Brown Villa then had two Area Dons and that these had been in place since the 1990s. And, as I have noted, one of those is now dead. Area dons generally control single communities or neighborhoods within them, and they often work as surrogates for Mega dons as they conduct their licit and illicit business affairs. Both types have the resources and strong community support among residents to perform social welfare roles, such as paying school tuition fees for children or distributing household supplies to neighborhood residents. Additionally, they have ties with the major political parties in Jamaica. The Brown Villa case suggested that both Mega and Area dons still rely on elected
representatives to provide them with government contracts and political ‘cover’ to legitimate their presence in garrisons. Political parties in Jamaica first gave rise to the dons, and even today (2012), the umbilical cord between elected officials and dons remains intact.

As of November 2012, there is no active Mega Don in the KMA. Coke seems to have been the last of this don type, at least for the moment. However, more dons of Coke’s reach and stature will emerge if the socio-economic conditions of garrisons (discussed in Chapter 4) remain and elected officials continue to give succor to such actors for partisan ends. Criminal actors will take advantage of the opportunities that the global trafficking of illicit goods offers. The Caribbean region, as I have shown in Chapters 2 and 5 is still an active corridor through which contraband such as cocaine, illegal cigarettes and marijuana are transshipped (UNOC, 2012). If these conditions remain unchanged, future Mega Dons appear likely.

I learned in this research that the Street Don is a recent development, dating only to the late 1990s or early years of the present century. These dons, unlike their Mega and Area counterparts, lack the financial resources to perform social welfare as an ongoing role. In fact, in some cases, they are known to have extorted resources from community residents. I found this category of dons to be the most volatile sort. They usually are less committed to their community’s development and much more involved in intra-garrison gang battles to secure or maintain control over turf. Street dons assume responsibility for the security of the turf they control. Residents of Brown Villa I interviewed largely viewed them as a necessary evil, particularly during periods of intensive intra-and inter-gang feuds. Street dons tend to be younger, have limited partisan loyalties and often
exhibit interest in challenging the control of their more powerful Area don counterparts for leadership.

In general, one becomes a Mega or Area don if one has the following “qualifications.” He:

- Is able to develop and maintain widespread influence and appeal with community residents (Christopher Coke had such a connection)
- Possesses capacity to instill fear and deference among residents, usually through jungle justice measures
- Enjoys a monopoly over access to political spoils in the form of governmental contracts (construction/road maintenance/drain cleaning)
- Has complete control (in the case of Mega dons) over the access and distribution of weapons and ammunition inside home garrisons and across other neighborhoods as well. For their part, Area dons usually are shareholders in the access/distribution of weapons and they tend to work within a specified territory.
- Is able to ensure a constant influx of cash from various sources such as; narcotics trade, extortion rackets, illicit contraband trade (cigarettes). The don may also glean such resources from overseas remittances from satellite groups/individuals, usually from the U.S. and the UK.
- Demonstrates willingness (present and past) to kill rival gang members/dons and to use extreme force on individuals and families who have not obeyed his orders or honored his status in the community.
- Is able to exert influence across geographic jurisdictions if he is a Mega don; that is, in satellite communities outside his home garrison. Area Dons, on the other hand, tend to control a single community, while Street Dons exercise influence over avenues inside a single garrison.

To become a Street don one has to exhibit, using the exact observations several former street gang members shared with me:

- Access to guns (at least three guns are typically necessary to control a particular corner/avenue)
• Possession of cash, usually obtained from overseas contacts, to lure others to join gang. Be able to get cash from robberies of transportation networks (bus/taxis) that run across the city of Kingston and adjoining areas.

• Show the willingness (and evidence of having done so in the past) to murder rivals and the capacity to instill fear among residents.

Based on the roles dons (Mega, Area and Street) perform and the relationships they have forged with their communities, residents and people who work inside garrisons have formed impressions of who they really are. Figure 9 shows the interviewees’ perceptions of all types of dons. Table 1.8 summarizes the major roles different dons play in garrisons. As I noted in chapters 1 and 3, law, order and control was a role that I discovered while conducting the field research. I did not anticipate it at the proposal stage.

**Table 1.8: Major Roles of Dons by Types**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Don Type</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Geographic Jurisdiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mega Dons</td>
<td>Welfare/Security/Partisan Mobilization/Law, Order and Control via Jungle Justice</td>
<td>Cross-Garrison/Parish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Dons</td>
<td>Welfare/Security/Partisan Mobilization/Law, Order &amp; Control</td>
<td>Single-Garrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Dons</td>
<td>Security/Law, Order &amp; Control via Jungle Justice</td>
<td>Avenues within a single garrison</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed from field-notes and interview data
As I noted above, I began this field research with the expectation that the phenomenon of garrisons was a uniform one, but I found something altogether different. Brown Villa had six Street Dons, two Area Dons and a fragmented community structure. That division resulted from the influence of a polarized partisan culture/identity and the authority and claims of its dons. In contrast, Tivoli Gardens, for example (not a part of this study), was centrally organized and administered by Christopher Coke and his father before him. That community has had a tradition of a single Mega Don and a uniform political alliance with the JLP. Some Brown Villa residents meanwhile demonstrate political allegiance to the PNP while others are aligned with the JLP. For analytic convenience, I have labeled these community forms central authoritative and fragmented authoritative. I believe there is need and scope for further comparative research on the evolution and characteristics of these two garrison types in Jamaica.

Both of Jamaica’s political parties deliberately developed opportunities for these leaders to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s in order to help mobilize their political
supporters. Garrison residents are ‘underserved’ and often neglected by their elected officials. This has been the case for several decades and the Brown Villa example illustrates the governance voids that exist in such neighborhoods. In general, gangs operating in the nation’s garrisons are prone to inter- and intra-gang rivalries over turf. These communities also evidence high rates of domestic violence, rates of homicide, limited economic opportunities and inadequate infrastructure maintenance and development (dilapidated buildings, roads and broken sewer systems). Brown Villa is an example of a fragmented authoritative Jamaican garrison.

**Drug and Gun Trafficking through the Caribbean Corridor**

Four central factors gave rise to Jamaica’s dons. These are a deeply polarized partisan political culture; economic instability exacerbated by a neoliberal shift in state policy from the late 1970s onwards; the hollowing out of the state by neoliberal reforms (structural adjustment programs) that opened up space for dons; and the introduction, rapid growth and wild profitability of cocaine and gun trafficking. The Colombian cocaine trade from the 1980s onwards created a transnational market that connected South America, the Caribbean corridor and North America. A new breed of dons emerged during the 1980s as this illegal commerce grew. The cocaine trade gave these criminal leaders greater financial resources and paramilitary capabilities. They used those resources (money and guns) to cement their control in garrison communities across the Kingston and Metropolitan Area (KMA). A don such as Eric “Chineyman” Vassell, for example, was able to send barrels of clothing and household appliances to residents of his garrison community because of the drug selling empire he operated in New York City.85

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85 The *New York Daily News* article by Helen Peterson (May, 1, 1997) “Drug suspect’s run ended” gives a snapshot of the enormous wealth Vassell and his ‘Gullymen’ gang acquired from the narcotics trade. It also shows the violence
Without the wealth from drug running and absent the weapons these dons were able to purchase, most of these leaders would not have had the ability to perform governing roles and in so doing acquire authority in places such as Brown Villa.

The Caribbean corridor during the 1980s was a central supplier of cocaine to the United States (UNOC, 2011). The Mexican-U.S. border is now the main trade route for cocaine entering the U.S. market. Drugs and guns are still trafficked, however, through the Caribbean with disastrous effects at the individual and community levels. This study has argued that Jamaica remains one node in the larger narcotics trade across the Americas. Moreover, Jamaica has been negatively affected by its role in the narcotics trade. It has provided wealth and other resources to criminal groups such as dons and enables them to co-opt and buy-out local residents and to pay off corrupt law enforcement officials. Political corruption in Jamaica and several countries across the region continues literally to be fed by the proceeds of drug trafficking.\(^{86}\)

The guns for drugs trade between Jamaica and Haiti has had a direct impact on the types of dons active in garrisons. The Street Don emerged and multiplied in the 2000s in large part because of the access street gangs and corner crews\(^{87}\) had to cheap weapons. Some of these guns, small pistols and revolvers, enter Jamaica illegally via fishermen who traffic marijuana from Haiti. The trade between the two Caribbean states exemplifies the transnational nature of organized crime and the ingenuity of weapons and drug

\(^{86}\) See the work of Michael Collier (2005) *Political corruption in the Caribbean basin: constructing a theory to combat corruption*. He explores in depth the causal mechanisms for and results of political corruption in the Caribbean region.

\(^{87}\) Horace Levy (2009), in his work *Killing streets and community revival* used this term to differentiate among garrison-type gangs, which tend to be more organized than street gangs and usually have a distinct chain of command in terms of leadership. Street gangs and corner crews are lower down the social scale of Jamaican gangs, with corner crews being loosely organized groups of young men with limited access to weapons.
dealers. Guns and drugs move with ease across the porous national borders of the Caribbean. The relatively weak capacities of governments in these states to protect their borders and minimize corruption among customs officers, the coast guard and other law enforcement agency officials permits, even if it does not encourage, gun and drug trafficking. The Haitian-Jamaican gun for drugs trade is a relatively new development that warrants further research. Perhaps, the flow of drugs through the region is shifting, moving laterally as opposed to vertically from the South to the North.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Reflections for Academics

This study was based on one case, Brown Villa, but there are garrisons and dons outside the geographic confines of the KMA where the garrison I studied is located. As I have noted, based on interviews I had with members of NGOs, CBOs, the police and with individuals who live and work outside Brown Villa, not all garrison communities have the same dynamics of don power and control as those I explored. Additional research could investigate the specific characteristics of these community leadership roles in other communities in Jamaica, especially in the tourist city of Montego Bay in the western section of the island. Police reports indicate that gangs and dons in that area use the proceeds of a lottery-scam industry to fund their criminal enterprise. This phenomenon should be of interest to scholars of transnational organized crime and international political economy.

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88 In recent years (since 2006), lottery-scams have developed in Jamaica, involving the country’s call center database to defraud U.S. citizens of cash. See David McFadden’s article, “Jamaica lottery scam: 8 fraud suspects arrested” (May 17, 2012) in the Huffington Post at the following online link for some background information: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/17/jamaica-lottery-scam-fraud-suspects-arrested_n_1525498.html
I made Jamaican dons the central unit of analysis in this study. While others have investigated the influence of dons on political, gang and garrison-related violence and homicides, dons seldom receive particular attention. I hope this analysis encourages other scholars with an interest in Jamaican politics and society to undertake detailed research on the specific phenomenon of dons. Previous scholars (Edie, 1984, 1994; Sives, 1998, 2002; Stone, 1985; Witter, 1992) of comparative politics have explained the relationship among Jamaica’s political parties, local dons and garrison communities from the perspective of clientelism. My findings suggest it may now be useful to employ other analytic frames and theories to examine the influence these criminal non-state actors have had on the state and Jamaica’s communities. This study employed the concept of embeddedness and theories of governance to interpret the status and localized authority dons have enjoyed in Jamaican garrison communities. I believe embeddedness has utility for scholars (particularly criminal anthropologists and comparative political scientists) conducting research in other geographic areas in the Americas. They may find it useful in interpreting the social, economic or political relationships that criminal actors have with residents of local communities, the market and with state officials in other nations in the broader region.

**Illicit markets, the state and governance**

In addition, this study suggests the need for more research on the Caribbean region concerning the impact that illicit markets and rogue actors have on the processes of community development and governance. Violence tends to accompany drug and gun trading, extortion rackets and human trafficking. These problems confront all states in the region in different ways. Scholars need to know more about these varied contexts. It is
also important that more comparative work be undertaken within the region as well as in nations just beyond it (especially in Latin America) that face similar challenges. The Haitian-Jamaican guns for drugs trade is an area that offers scope for future research on the influence that transnational crime and violence have on the prospects for Jamaican (other developing nations as well) state building, community level governance and democratization processes.

More research on the social and economic impacts of neoliberal policies on developing countries, particularly those related to structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and the conditionalities of loan arrangements with institutions such as the International Monterey Fund (IMF) is needed. While I have focused on concerns arising from neoliberalism as they relate to the garrison environment and the embedded power of Jamaican dons in these communities at the micro level, these policies have also had macro and structural implications as well. Chapters 2, 4 and 5 critiqued the Jamaican state for its low capacity to provide security and to safeguard the constitutional rights of all of its residents (access to equitable justice) and to assist the market to create an environment conducive to economic growth and opportunities for employment. Neoliberal policies have weakened the Jamaican state’s capacities to respond to its citizens’ needs. If Jamaica’s continuing challenges of low economic growth, social inequality and a fragile state are not addressed; illicit markets and violent non-state actors will continue to be embedded within the nation’s governance processes.

89 Jamaica continues as of November 2102, to engage the IMF for a fiscal bailout. Several regional economists including Barbados’ minister of finance and economic affairs Christopher Sinckler, has argued that the austerity measures and tax cuts conditions have not worked well for the regions’ economies (Jamaica in particular) in the last 47 years. Sinckler recommends that Caribbean nations make a complete shift from depending on the IMF. See http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20121117/lead/lead71.html
Masculinity, violence and organized crime

In chapter 1 I pointed out that I came across no female dons in my research. However, some residents I interviewed pointed out that women played important roles as caregivers to dons and their children. Women, I suspect, do assume important responsibilities inside the organizational structures of dons’ gangs. Police interviewees noted that dons often use women as drug mules (couriers) to transship cocaine using international commercial flights from Kingston to various destinations in the U.S. and the UK. I did not systematically seek to understand the roles women play in garrisons vis-à-vis dons and their gangs. Violence, organized crime and gang activity are often portrayed as male-centered. I wish here to encourage future scholars to probe the connections between processes of masculinization and violence to uncover the ways in which women contribute to and are affected by the embedded power and authority of dons and gangs in Jamaica’s garrisons.

Reflections for State Officials and Policy Makers

Dis-embedding dons from Jamaican garrisons such as Brown Villa will require collaboration among state officials, international and local non-governmental organizations (INGOs & NGOs), community-based associations (church/youth groups), the business sector and residents, who after all, are the central stakeholders. Added to this collaborative effort is the need for the state to re-assert its authority. This means increasing police patrols, setting up command posts and checkpoints at strategic locations inside identified garrison communities. Dismantling the power of dons will require strategies of sociological, economic, infrastructural and political reform.
Jamaica at its independence adopted and then adapted the British Westminster Parliamentary model of democratic government. One area that requires urgent reform is the electoral model that accompanies that framework, which is based on a majoritarian first-past-the-post formula (FPTP). This approach embraces a “winner-takes-all”\(^{90}\) outcome for general elections for the winning political party (Ryan, 1999). As I have argued in chapters 4 and 5, elected officials depend on dons and their thugs to secure electoral victory by ensuring the relevant party receives the necessary votes to win. I believe the current electoral formula FPTP encourages the polarized and adversarial partisan political culture that obtains in Jamaica. Policy-makers should revisit the Jamaican constitution and amend it to shift the FPTP formula to a proportional one.

The following are additional important steps (at the micro-level) in my view to initiate and strengthen the likelihood of success for governmental policy programs and social intervention tactics.

- **Business and entrepreneurial training** and opportunities for residents in these areas. As one respondent remarked, “as long as a man is hungry and dependent he will forever support garrison politics and don-ship” (Interview, November 9 2011:VT032) Brown Villa has no factories or commercial buildings. The private sector and businesspersons must be central actors in this initiative by locating local offices in these communities. The market must be visible inside garrisons; this can have financial and psychological impacts on residents. Those interviewees who live in Brown Villa point out that they feel isolated from the business world in Jamaica. Any such initiative will have to be accompanied with relevant educational and skills training efforts for community residents.

- **Sports programs and facilities** should be a strong dimension of social intervention initiatives. These can have the effect of building the values of teamwork, discipline and help to lift the self-esteem of residents, especially the

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\(^{90}\) In his work Ryan critiques the experience English speaking Caribbean territories have with the British Westminster Parliamentarian model.
youth. More than 80 percent of my respondents said that low self-esteem is a major problem among residents in garrisons.

- **Counseling seminars** for residents on a sustained basis. I recognized as I conducted interviews with some residents that there is a need for “grieving” and an avenue to react to the trauma associated with living in garrisons beleaguered by violence. As one respondent pointed out, “we just bury the dead and go to funerals, but there is no grieving” (Interview, November 14, 2011:VT035). Mothers have lost two and three sons to gang-related violence; young men witness their fathers murdered; such experiences breed attitudes of resentment, hatred and reprisal attacks.

- **Community councils** comprised of NGO and CBO groups, the police, elected officials, former gang members and residents. NGO groups that are embedded in the community and have the trust and respect of residents should spearhead the councils. I found the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) group to be a critical player in forging talks with rival gangs, dons and residents in Brown Villa and other neighboring garrisons. Policy makers should listen to the advice of organizations like the PMI and collaborate with them.

- **Increase funding/training for community policing** initiatives now under way in Brown Villa. However, residents still are reluctant to collaborate fully with and trust the police. The Jamaican state needs to dedicate more human and capital resources to this initiative. Residents interviewed complained that the community-policing unit is not visible in the community. The police officers attached to this unit require more training to deal with the social problems linked with garrison life.

- **Public audit**

  David Beetham is one of the pioneering scholars who have written on the issue of democratic auditing. He contends that democracy ought to be audited by focusing on issues of justice, social equality, free and fair elections, accountable government, the promotion and protection of individual rights, civil and political liberties. This recommendation is an adaptation of the democratic audit principle, especially as it pertains to ensuring more accountable government. See the edited work of Beetham and Boyle (1995) *Introducing democracy: 80 questions and answers.*
Final Comments

Since its independence in 1962, Jamaica has not had any major threat of democratic reversal or collapse. However, its adversarial partisan politics has had a deleterious effect on the institutions and culture of democratic governance. It is out of this insidious aspect of Jamaican politics that dons first emerged. In the decades after independence, dons have evolved into powerful governing actors. In many communities, they have supplanted or undermined the authority of the state. Jamaica’s dons have managed to embed themselves within the socio-economic, cultural and political fabric of life in garrison communities. The state along with market institutions and civil society groups must re-habituate and re-habilitate members of these communities. The social isolation and economic inequality so characteristic of garrison communities must be addressed and reversed. Although dons receive significant assent and popular support from residents, they rule with an iron fist that often militates against those individuals’ civil and political rights and freedoms. If dons remain embedded, garrison residents should be prepared to accept the collateral damage of fear and violence that accompany the often-limited social welfare and security roles they offer. The state also should be prepared to operate inside these communities on terms set by dons/gangs if they are not dis-embedded.
REFERENCES

Journal and newspaper articles, reports, published and unpublished Theses/Dissertations:


http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20121117/lead/lead71.html


**Book Publications:**


Appendix A: Consent Form

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is Damion Blake (PhD student at Virginia Tech University) and I am the primary investigator of this research. My research explores the roles “Dons” play in Jamaica’s garrison communities. I would like to interview you to learn about your experiences working with residents from garrisons, your views on ‘who’ dons are and the power they purportedly have. During our interview, I will take note of the things that you say, and also use an audio tape so that I can have a record of everything that we both say. There are no risks to you in this study and you may choose to not have your identity revealed. I will ask you again at the end of our interview if you would like to keep your identity confidential.

Please note that the results of the study will be published in my PhD dissertation and some of its findings will also be published on the Social Science Research Council’s (SSRC) website as well as in academic journals. If you would like a copy of the study, please provide me with an address (email for electronic version) and I will send you a copy when the study is completed. Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate at any time with no penalty. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me at anyone of the following email addresses; damionkblake@gmail.com or damion27@vt.edu.

If you agree to participate in this research project, please give your verbal consent before or at the beginning of the interview. Thank you in advance for your kind co-operation and willingness to participate.

I am over 18 and eligible to participate in this study without parental consent

[Circle one]: Yes/ No

I agree to be interviewed for this project.

[Circle one]: Yes /No

I agree to be audio taped during this interview.

[Circle one]: Yes/ No

Participant’s name and signature: ________________________________

Date: ________________________________________________________
Appendix B: Examples of Interview Questions

1. How do you understand the Don and garrison phenomenon generally?
2. How would you characterize employment possibilities in garrisons (Brown Villa if you know it)? How would you describe the relationship(s) between residents of garrisons (Brown Villa in particular if you know it) and advocacy organizations such as the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) and other community development organizations?
3. How, in your view, do residents of garrisons [Brown Villa] perceive their elected representatives?
4. How, in your view, do residents of garrisons [Brown Villa] view Jamaican government agencies including, for example, the members from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (police?
5. How would you describe the relationship [if it exists] between dons and law enforcement agencies, such as the Jamaica Constabulary Force- police?
6. DO you know of any gangs that operate in the Brown Villa area? How long have they existed? Are these gangs run by a don or different dons? How do you understand this issue of “don rule in garrisons”?
7. How would you describe the relationship between any garrison gangs and residents in garrisons [Brown Villa]? Has the character of that relationship changed over time? If so in what ways and when?
8. How do (Brown Villa in particular if known) residents view their garrison’s don generally? [Do most of the neighborhood’s population share that view? If not, which sub-groups have a different perspective? Why? How does it differ from the prevailing general view?
9. What kinds of activities does the don undertake or oversee in garrisons (), as you understand his involvement? Why do you think the don is engaged in the activities you have shared? Who would you say those efforts benefit and how?
10. How would you describe the relationship [if it exists] between dons and governmental actors, such as Members of Parliament? Is it: Is the don involved in garrison or sub-garrison level community development projects? If so, what do you understand the character of his contribution(s) to those efforts to be?
11. How is the don involved (if at all) in peace management initiatives inside Brown Villa?
12. How does a don become a don? What are the sources of his power, in your view?