


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Occasional Paper Series Vol 1 No. 4 2003



**REFUGEES AND THE
PROLIFERATION OF ILLEGAL
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT
WEAPONS IN KENYA**

Edward O. Mogire

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MOI UNIVERSITY
PRESS 

Moi University Press, Moi University, Eldoret Kenya

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Acknowledgement

The author is grateful to the Centre for Refugee Studies, Moi University and the Ford Foundation for supporting the research and publication of the study

ABSTRACT

The devastation brought by the worldwide trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons- man-portable weapons like assault rifles, mortars, and grenades- has overtaken landmines as the major problems facing governments and other interested groups in the non-governmental world and academia. Regional organisations in Europe, Latin America, and Africa as well as the UN (including, increasingly the Security Council) have taken up some aspect of small arms control.¹ A major aspect in the discourse of small arms relates to the “illicit” or “illegal” arms trafficking, by which is usually (but not always) meant stocks of weapons already in circulation outside of government control. Increasingly new stocks of small arms from various sources including government transfers (both overt and covert), grey and black markets are finding their way to African conflict theatres, which eventually, are diverted, into illegal markets. For Kenya, the major problem issue with small arms relates to the trafficking and proliferation of illegal arms into the country. Although researchers and policy makers alike acknowledge that one way in which refugees threaten security is through the trafficking of illegal arms, little research has been done in this area. It is common practice in Kenya particularly among politicians and government officials, to attribute illegal weapons in the country to the presence of refugees. This paper aims at contributing to the small arms discourse by analysing the role of refugees as an external factor in the trafficking and cross border movement of illegal arms into the country. This analysis also contributes to the new scholarship in refugee studies which now considers refugees not only as victims (humanitarian issues) but also as capable of causing conflict and insecurity.

INTRODUCTION

The trafficking and cross border movement of illegal weapons has become a high political issue in the Horn of Africa attracting the attention of governments, donors and civil society organisations. In March 2001 the Kenya government organised a major regional conference on the trafficking of illegal weapons, which culminated in the signing of the ‘*Nairobi Declaration*’.² The Declaration, ‘on the problems of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa’, reaffirmed the rights of states to self defence and identified the problems as relating to illicit trade, cattle rustling, conflict, refugee movements and ineffective customs

and border controls. Kenya has also participated in other regional initiatives dealing with the proliferation and trafficking of illicit arms.³

Although the exact number of illegal arms in circulation in Kenya is not known, the US State Department the problem has reached “crisis proportions.”⁴ Stating that, “seventy-five percent of the country is awash with illicit arms” Mr. Stephen ole Mpesha, the Chief Firearms Licensing Officer, Kenya, noted the problem had reached “uncontrollable proportions.”⁵ Illegal arms are widespread among criminal organizations, private security forces, vigilante squads, and individual citizens. This has made the illegal arms a threat to security by exacerbating communal conflicts particularly in the arid and semiarid pastoral regions of the country, fuelling of violent crime, undermining political stability, economic development, abetting terrorism, cattle rustling and other serious crimes.⁶ According to Interpol Sub-regional Bureau in Nairobi, firearms are identified as the common denominator in all the major crimes in the region include, terrorism, cattle rustling, firearms trafficking, drug trafficking and motor vehicle theft.⁷ Records at the police department indicate that, the major weapons found in the country are AK-47 assault rifles, Ceska and Browning pistols, Colt revolvers, Baretta 10-millimetre submachine guns, German-made G3 sniper rifles, and American M-16 rifles. In some instances police have recovered rocket launchers and bazookas from local herdsmen.

Available police figures indicate that between 1995-1999, 3,551 firearms were recovered from criminals⁸ in the country. This, according to a study by South Africa’s Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is much lower than the estimated 11,000 guns sold in black markets annually in the country).⁹ A report by the United States State Department in mid 2000 indicate that, although police were recovering between 1,800 and 2,000 unlicensed guns per month in Nairobi, there still were an estimated 5,000 illegal firearms circulating in city, or one illegal weapon for every 560 Nairobi residents.¹⁰ The situaion in Northern Kenya is worse with North Eastern Province having an estimated 40,000 illegal weapons.¹¹ This situation prompted a local leader to comment thus, “illegal arms are so common that guns are being used like walking sticks. Every community owns guns.”¹² Security sources estimate illegal weapons in West Pokot and Marakwet districts of North Western Kenya at about 9000, though independent sources put the number at more than 20,000 in West Pokot and Baringo districts.¹³

The cost of buying illegal weapons in the region is so low that virtually anyone who wants to own a weapon can afford to buy one. According to an Oxfam report, the trafficking in small arms and light weapons along the Uganda, Sudan and Kenya borders is thriving, so much so that the cost of an AK-47 assault rifle has dropped from 10 cows in 1986 to two.¹⁴ Smith and Vines (1997) have also noted that in northern Kenya an AK-47 can be procured for the cost of a goat.¹⁵ Other studies indicate that in north Eastern Kenya guns can be obtained for as little as Ksh.5,000 (\$64) while the cost of ammunition ranges between Ksh.80 (\$1.02) to Ksh.120 (\$1.53).¹⁶ As a result a politician from the area told Kenyan Parliament, “after the collapse of Somalia all sorts of firearms including AK-47, G3, Bazookas and other makes found their way into Garissa district – (in north Eastern Kenya) “making the price of an AK 47 cheaper than a goat or a bundle of firewood.”¹⁷ In Nairobi arms are available for rent. According to an arms dealer in Nairobi, most people rent weapons because it is cheaper. For example, he says that, three-day rental charges range from around \$20 for a .38 calibre police-issue handgun to \$130 for a submachine gun. An AK-47 is rented at \$30. Bullets cost extra and surprisingly expensive: \$2.60 for what the man calls “sharp-edged bullets” and \$1.90 for “ordinary bullets”.¹⁸

There are both external supply and internal demand factors responsible for the proliferation and trafficking of illegal weapons in Kenya. Internally, illegal arms are demanded by criminals, particularly organised criminals involved in cattle rustling, motor vehicle hijacking, bank robberies as well as drug trafficking (gun-related incidents rose by 200% in 1995¹⁹), vigilantes and individuals who are forced to acquire arms for protection (privatisation of security) as a result of the government’s failure to provide security for all. In the pastoral communities a deep-rooted gun culture has created a demand for illegal firearms. The internal sources of illegal arms include loss of arms by security forces, provision of firearms to ‘home guards’ - vigilante groups armed by the government in to supplement security forces in protecting pastoralists from cattle rustlers, and local fabrication. The government has also issued guns to police reservists to augment its security efforts in the more remote parts of the country. The aim is to allow local citizens to be involved in ensuring their own security. The problem, however, is that often, guns issued hastily to the reservists, who are not trained, paid and usually illiterate find their way into the illegal markets. There is potential danger in arming a large number of unpaid, ill-disciplined reservists as they can easily be hired and turned into

private militia by unscrupulous politicians. In addition to this, the *shifita*²⁰ secessionist movement, which waged a secessionist war from independence until 1977 in the then Northern Frontier District (NFD) with the material support of the Somalia government created the first serious internal market for illegal firearms. Although the government carried out a mopping up exercise to rid the area of illegal weapons after the defeat of the *shifitas* the exercise did not completely rid the area of the illegal arms problem. Once the *shifitas* failed to achieve their political goals of seceding and the subsequent retraction of Somalia's irredentist claims on Kenya, they (*shifita*) transformed themselves into 'mercenaries' fighting alongside Somalia during the Somalia-Ethiopia war of 1977. Since then they have established a protection racket in the region protecting khat traders as well as engaging in smuggling along the common border. For these reasons the demands for weapons still exists.

Externally, the major sources of illegal weapons are the war-torn neighbouring countries, illegal arms brokers who use the country as a transit centre for trafficking arms to the various conflict zones in Africa and, and the presence of rebel groups engaged in armed opposition in the country. Refugees are also said to play a major role in illegal arms proliferation and trafficking in the country.

The civil wars devastating the countries of the Horn of Africa made Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia the major sources of illegal arms in Kenya. Weapons intended for various factions in conflict have filtered far beyond armies and police forces to irresponsible groups, criminal organisations private security forces vigilante squads and individuals.²¹ According to President Daniel arap Moi, the regional conflicts have "implications well beyond the borders of the conflict areas, due to the circulation of illegal arms and refugees into neighbouring countries."²² Security sources also indicate that, "due to the frequent conflict within the region, there has been a significant rise in the number of illicit firearms recovered by Kenyan police during the last five years."²³ Kenya is also a destination for refugees, fleeing soldiers as well as profit-making guerrillas.

Until the end of 1980s, Uganda was an important supplier of illegal weapons that originated from the long, devastating civil war of the 1970s, under the dictatorship of Amin Dada (1971-1979), as well as in the difficult years of transition during the Museveni regime (1980-1986). Ethiopia became an important source of illegal weapons when the Mengistu dictatorship was

overthrown in 1991. Under Mengistu, gun possession laws were liberalized as large quantities of weapons were distributed to citizens, self-defence, and government militias²⁴. When Mengistu was deposed the weapons remained in the hands of citizens and were available for re-circulation, both within the society and regionally. From that time, the new Ethiopian army contributed further to the violence pervading Northern Kenya. Although the government of Somalia supplied arms to the *shifita* secessionist movement, it was not until 1991, after the collapse of Somalia that the country became a major source of illegal arms. Between 1960 and 1977, the USSR had supplied half a billion dollars worth of weapons to Somalia. The US exceeded this amount, supplying US\$ 550 million worth of weapons to Somalia between 1982 and 1989, making that country the third largest recipient of American aid after Egypt and Israel.²⁵ When Somalia collapsed, over 500,000 weapons were circulating in that country some of which came under the control of warlords while others fell into civilian hands some of which moved into arms trafficking networks in the region. Sudan is also an important source of illegal weapons. An illegal arms market in southern Sudan exists which supplies weapons to the pastoral communities in northern Kenyan as well as Uganda.²⁶

THE REFUGEE FACTOR

At the height of the refugee crisis in Kenya, the number of refugees grew from 15,000 in 1991 to over 492, 000 by 1992. Kenya has hosted refugees from Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi. Despite repatriation and resettlement in third countries, there were still about 230,000 refugees in the country under the care of humanitarian agencies by the end of 2000: an estimated 160,000 from Somalia, over 55,000 from Sudan, about 8,000 from Uganda and nearly 5,000 from other countries. In addition to these, the Kenyan government claims that as many as 100,000 refugees and asylum seekers live without humanitarian assistance in urban areas.²⁷

Gamba and Chachia have identified the massive flow of refugees from one country to another during conflict situations as a major external factor responsible for cross border movement of illegal weapons.²⁸ The Addis Ababa conference highlighted the links between refugees and trafficking in arms, especially as a result of the militarisation of camps, and refugees crossing the border to take part in military activities. It stated that, refugees are becoming 'the second supply line' of small arms and light weapons in the Horn.²⁹

Similarly the Nairobi declaration and the Kampala meeting also identified refugees as key major contributory factors to the problem of illegal arms in the region.³⁰ Both identified the need for legal mechanisms to deal with the problem of combatants who have infiltrated refugee camps and agreed that a comprehensive approach to the problem of SAIW in the region should consider capacity building of law enforcement agencies in refugee camps among other things.

Refugees have played different roles in the proliferation of illegal weapons into Kenya. First, refugees moving across national borders move with illegal arms which they either sell or use to commit crime in the host countries. It is commonly believed that some refugees from neighbouring countries, particularly from Somalia, have carried weapons with them which they have then sold to criminals, cattle rustlers, drug traffickers, and car jacking syndicates in Kenya. According to Eliphaz Barine, a small arms co-ordinator in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kenya, the refugees fleeing into Kenya from their war-torn countries to the north and east have lost their homes, their animals and their crops. But many carry the most portable, valuable item that they still possess, a firearm. When American peacekeeping forces scrambled out of Somalia during a few chaotic days in 1993 they took only their luggage. They left the stores behind. From those stores, thousands of U.S. made Colt pistols began filtering westward. Until 1997 nearly 70 percent of weapons used in crimes in Nairobi were Colts.³¹

There is a strong belief among the political leadership that refugees are largely responsible for the illegal proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country. While addressing a public rally in Wajir district, north eastern Kenya, a region awash with illegal firearms, President Daniel arap Moi accused refugees for being responsible for the proliferation of illegal arms into the country and asked³² Speaking in Parliament during a debate on the impact of refugees on the infrastructure in the country, Professor George Saitoti, Vice President and leader of the government business in the house stated, "without doubt a number of refugees who came into the country did so with arms, which they sold in the country."³³ Refugees are involved in the trafficking, cross border movement and re-circulation of weapons. After many years in Kenya refugees have established relationships with the local population, and after gaining knowledge of the local society have used the same routes to traffic weapons into the country. Even after repatriation some of the refugees have used the networks created during the exile to execute both legal and illegal trade deals.

In this case the influx of Somali refugees has enabled a massive inflow of illegal weapons into the Kenyan society, adding to rising levels of armed crime levels.³⁴ Professor George Saitoti, Vice President and leader of the government business told the House:

... There is no doubt that a number of those people (refugee) who came, did so with arms. This is a fact. It is nothing against the Somalia as a people, but it is a fact. Some of these people came here with no money, no means of livelihood and the only thing they could peddle were the guns. Those guns have gone into the hands of these criminals.³⁵

Secondly, some refugees in Kenya are engaged in illegal arms trade. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some of the arms dealers in Nairobi, particularly in Eastleigh, a poor suburb dominated by Somalis (both local and refugees) are refugees or masquerading as refugees. Eastleigh is commonly referred to as an 'arms bazaar' and is the centre of illegal arms trade. According to a local administrator, "buying a firearm in Eastleigh is as easy as buying a cup of tea"³⁶ and blames this situation on the presence of Somali refugees. One such Somali refugee who has made a decent living for nearly six years trading illegal guns in Nairobi from a back alley in Eastleigh, says, "in a very good month I can make between \$1,500 and \$2,000." As a refugee without working papers, he opted for the most profitable occupation – trading in arms - to support about 12 family members, most of who have lived for a decade in refugee camps. He has not experienced any shortages as the collapse of Somalia opened an arms bonanza for illegal dealers.³⁷

In addition to this, refugee camps are used as illegal arms trafficking centres by illegal arms networks. The camps, because they are usually poorly policed and are remote, are ideal places for storage and distribution. Usually traffickers from Somalia and Sudan walk on foot across the national borders through the many unmanned crossing areas and deposit the weapons into refugee camps in Dadaab³⁸ and Kakuma³⁹ respectively. From these camps a distribution network of brokers transports the weapons to Nairobi and other major cities in the country. The local pastoralist communities in which these camps are hosted are also a major consumer of illegal weapons. Other major local consumers are bandits who run protection rackets for khat⁴⁰ traders in North Eastern Kenya, cattle rustlers, and local militias who protect their clans or attack opposing clans. In addition the Dadaab-based gangs are involved in smuggling arms to Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the Sudan. The weapons

traffickers operate a sophisticated radio network linking Somalia, the refugee camps and Nairobi.⁴¹

Fieldwork carried out in Dadaab and Nairobi indicates that there is evidence to support claims that arms traffickers and brokers use the refugee camps. According to information obtained from refugees, many gunrunning brokers and militias are based and operate from within the camps, sometimes with the compliance of the police who do nothing to stop the illegal trade. Armed groups, including arms-trafficking networks, ethnic militia and bandits, are based in the camps making the security in the camps desperate. These armed groups threaten the security of the local host population and humanitarian aid workers as well. Much of arms trafficking and violence in the Dadaab camps can be linked to various clans that have been fighting for supremacy within Somalia and for control over the smuggling routes from Somalia into Kenya.⁴² As Mr. Farah Maalim, Member of Parliament from North Eastern region, stated in Parliament, “as it is now, I have no doubt in my mind that a lot of arms do cross the borders, come through the refugee camps and end up in other parts of the country.”⁴³ Peter Kimanthi, the Kenya Police spokesman, also stated that there was a very strong possibility that the camps were being used to traffic arms charging that a number of people in the Dadaab camp were not genuine refugees but had come in the first place with the intention of carrying out attacks in the area. “Insecurity can be explained by the number of refugees around who are not genuine.”⁴⁴

A field study in Dadaab by Kathi Austin, of the US-based Fund for Peace, also concluded that the refugee camps in Dadaab have become a nerve center for arms trafficking in and from the region. Weapons smuggled into and out of the camps were making their way to the four corners of Kenya, contributing to the growth of violent crime.⁴⁵ As Solomon Ayalew, an Ethiopian refugee in Hagadera camp, stated, “the camps have become a hub for armed gangs who freely prey on minorities, political targets and opposing clan members among the camps’ refugee population.”⁴⁶

Thirdly, the presence of ‘refugee warriors’ in Kenya territories and refugee camps engaged in armed opposition against the home governments partly explains the role of refugees in the proliferation of illegal weapons into the country. Kenya, for example, is home to members of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) which is both based in Kakuma refugee camps and surrounding areas with its leadership in major urban centres, principally

Eldoret and Nairobi, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) whose supporters are not only in camps but operate in the vast region of North Eastern and various Somali militias who operate from both inside and outside the camps. Because these groups are engaged in armed opposition they are armed and sometimes import arms some of which end up in the local market. Arms destined to the various factions and groups have contributed to a proliferation of illicit small arms in the region.⁴⁷

In addition, fleeing soldiers and rebels make strategic withdrawals into the camps to regroup or re-arm before returning to the battlefield. When the fighters withdraw into the camps, they are unlikely to surrender their arms. While in the camp some combatants sell or rent their weapons leading to further influx of illegal arms in the country. As ole Mpesha stated, "many refugees immigrating from neighbouring war-torn countries carry with them all manner of firearms. Since the majority of them are former uniformed officers, they cross the borders with the weapons and sell them for subsistence."⁴⁸ Thus the military character of a refugee population and camps contributes to the proliferation of illegal weapons into the country.

Two significant factors facilitating refugee involvement in the trafficking and cross border movement of weapons are the location of the camps and the porous borders. The camps are located in remote areas where the activities of some refugees are not properly monitored. They are also close to borders with countries of origin where civil wars are still going on and weapons are easily available. Thus the refugees still continue with their illegal trades even long after settling in the host countries. The situation is aggravated by the humanitarian sympathy which shields refugee camps from strict control and international scrutiny.

Kenya as a host country is also not effectively managing and controlling refugees. Ideally the host government (Kenya) is supposed to control the camps, provide security for genuine refugees and humanitarian workers as well as ensuring the humanitarian and civilian character of the camps. The refugee camps are under the sole management of UNHCR. The Kenya government on provides policemen who at best are too few to manage the camp and at worst collude with the arms dealers.

Interviews with some refugees indicate that the police do not arrest known bandits engaged in the arms trade and when they do, no action is ever taken

as they are normally released to the detriment of those who reported them. Furthermore, the camps are open; this allows those refugees engaged in illegal traders to move in and out as they wish. There are no patrols or manning of borders and the government does not control what kind of business refugees engage in. Within the camps all sorts of business transactions occur, including illegal ones such as trade in weapons.⁴⁹

The long porous borders have enabled the traffickers and weapons to move into Kenya undetected. Border security posts, where they exist, are underfunded and often understaffed. The 1200 kilometre Kenya–Somalia border with many illegal crossing points is exceptionally porous making the movement of armed Somalis into Kenya very frequent and difficult to detect.⁵⁰ As one Somali refugee arms dealer stated, ‘this is not the Berlin Wall; it is bush. You can cross back and forth as you please.’⁵¹ President Moi has also blamed the leaky borders for the easy movement of weapons into the country.⁵²

Gun traffickers from Somalia walk across the un-patrolled stretches on the Kenyan side of the border where they then pass weapons to couriers, hired by brokers who then transport them to either to refugee camps or Nairobi. The most effective people for that task are Somali women, who strap guns to their upper thighs under their ankle-length robes. The police usually never check them. “If police see she is religious [Muslim] they will not dare to search her. When she reaches her destination either in eastern Kenya or Nairobi she is paid about KShs.5,500, (about \$73, for the job).”⁵³

Usually the guns are transported in cattle trucks, relief vehicles, public transport vehicles and khat transporters. For example, the light aircraft they used to transport khat carry weapons on their return routes. The police are also said to be engaged in transporting weapons from North Eastern Kenya to Nairobi.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I set out to examine the role of refugees in the trafficking and cross border movement of illegal weapons into Kenya. This paper has shown that Kenya faces an acute illegal arms problem. Illegal arms have affected the country’s political, social and economic sectors. Insecurity is the most obvious impact as seen in the breakdown of law and order, rise of violent crimes, armed cattle rustling, and a rise in gun-related deaths. Government authority has been brought into question as most parts of northern Kenya are under

armed groups. The government's internal sovereignty, controlling territory and monopoly over violence, is under severe threat or has been lost completely in other areas. It is for these reasons that the problem of illegal weapons in Kenya is high up in the political agenda. The issue then is how to control or stop the illegal arms from reaching the country. The problem, as the government sees it, has more to do with the cross border movement of illegal weapons from neighbouring countries or the diversion of arms meant for the various fighting groups into the local market. Herein lies the problem concerning refugee contribution.

It is evident from this paper that many people including security personnel, government officials, politicians and academics agree that refugees play a crucial role in the proliferation, trafficking and cross border movement of illegal weapons into the country. They argue that refugees contribute to the proliferation of illegal arms in the country in four major ways: they move with the illegal weapons into the country which they then sell, illegal arms networks use refugees for trafficking the weapons, the refugee camps are used as transit points by illegal arms trafficking networks and the presence of refugee warriors also contributes to illegal arms proliferation.

We may also conclude from this analysis that despite the general belief that refugees are responsible for illegal arms proliferation, there is actually little authoritative evidence to support these claims.

The number of illegal arms in the country is not known because there are no statistics from the police to show the number of weapons specifically seized from refugees. Mainly anecdotal evidence exists to support such claims. This therefore makes it difficult to determine with certainty the extent of refugee involvement in the illegal arms trade with any certainty. Nevertheless, within the government circles there is a strong perception that refugees are involved. This may be important for decision making since it is perceptions held by policy makers that affect policy outcomes. There is also no doubt that the problem of illegal arms went out of control in the 1990s, corresponding to the period of mass influx of refugees. Whether this is attributable to the refugees or to collapse of the states in the region is open to debate. But independent observers are of the opinion that refugees have played a major role in the proliferation, trafficking and cross border movement of illegal arms.

There are also divergent opinions on the relationship between refugees and illegal arms in Kenya. Some people argue that illegal arms proliferation and insecurity are problems of governance, economic underdevelopment, poverty and a corrupt police force, and that refugees are just a convenient scapegoat. They argue that although some refugees may be involved in the illegal arms trade, their contribution is not as big as is usually presented by the government. This paper has suggested that while the available evidence may be weak and variable in quality, there is sufficient of it to indicate that refugees have indeed played a role in the proliferation, trafficking and cross border movement of illegal weapons. What is not known is the extent of their involvement and as already said there is no firm evidence to support assumptions of rampant involvement.

While talking about refugees it should be borne in mind that refugees, like any group of people, are not a homogenous group but are made up of many different groups including victims of conflicts, ex-combatants, active fighters, political exiles, women children, the disabled and any other group that exists in any society. It is true that some refugees are arms dealers and traffickers and refugee camps are used for this illegal business. However, it is not enough just to say that they are solely responsible for illegal arms proliferation. The circumstances and categories of those involved be considered also. This is necessary to avoid making generalisations, which might have been partly responsible for the erosion of refugee rights, including physical protection in Kenya.

What essentially can be drawn from all these is that the problem of illegal weapons is multi-faceted and cannot be explained by any single factor. It is possible that refugee may have been blamed disproportionately for the illegal arms problem, perhaps because of the propensity of the Kenyan government to blame foreigners for any problem. But for the problem to be tackled effectively all relevant factors, including refugee problem, should be considered 'objectively'.

NOTES

¹ Lora Lumpe, “Controlling Small Arms: Progress and Priorities”. *Disarmament Diplomacy*. Issue No 32

² The 14-16 March Nairobi Conference on “The Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa” was attended by participants from Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. 23-25 March

³ Between January 10-12, 2000 experts from 17 African countries including Kenya and representatives from the United States, Canada, Norway and Belgium met in Kampala; May 7-8, 2000 senior police officers, government officials, representatives of regional organisations and non governmental organisations met in Dar es Salaam on “Tackling Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa: Strengthening the Capacity of Regional Organisations”; small arms was one of the major items on the agenda discussed in the East African Police Chiefs conference in Zanzibar, February , 2000; the International Resource Group (IRG) and the East African Co-operation (EAC) hosted a meeting in Arusha on 23-25 March to discuss how to tackle illegal arms in the region

⁴ U.S Department of State, Fact Sheet, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, (Washington DC 1 July 2001)

⁵ *Daily Nation*, 14 February 2001, pg. 14

⁶ Project Ploughshares, ‘East Africa and small Arms’ *Ploughshare Monitor* March 2000. The Nairobi Declaration was signed by Foreign Ministers from Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania attending a conference on “The Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa” Nairobi, 14–16 March 2000; The meeting of African Experts, “Towards a Regional Action Programme to Tackle Small Arms Proliferation in East Africa’ Kampala 31-1 February 2001, attended by participants from Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania ,Uganda and representatives from East Africa Co-operation, Interpol Regional Bureau (Nairobi),and the Inter- Governmental Authority and Development (IGAD)

⁷ Andrew McLean, "Tackling Small Arms in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa: Strengthening the capacity of subregional organisations", Meeting Report 7-8 May 2000 p. 47

⁸ Ibid., p.17

⁹ United States Department of State, op. cit.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Lt. Col. A. I. Hussein, Department of Defence, "Small arms effect on banditry in Northern Kenya'

Paper Presented at a conference on Curbing the Demand Side of Small Arms in the IGAD States: Potentials and Pitfalls", Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 26 April 2001 organised by UNCECA and IRG

¹² *Daily Hansard*, (Kenya National Assembly Parliamentary Debates, official Report), 26 June 1996 pp. 1198-1199

¹³ *Daily Nation* 16 March 2001

¹⁴ 'Kalashnikovs for Chickens: Small arms boom in East Africa' *IANS Africa News*. 7 May 2001

¹⁵ Chris Smith and Alex Vines. *Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa*. (London: Brassey's 1997) p. 9

¹⁶ Lt. Col. H. I. Hussein, op. cit.

¹⁷ *Daily Hansard*, Vol. 9 No. 14 17. April 1996 p. 370

¹⁸ Simon Robinson, 'Kalashnikovs for Hire' *The Times*, Vol.158 No.5 July 30, 2001

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State op. cit

²⁰ *Shifita* refers to an armed Somali group which engaged the Kenyan government in armed conflict to secede and join Somalia

²¹ Godana Bonaya, "Godana Clarifies Kenya's Policy on Somalia," *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* Vol. III No .3 August 2000 p.3, also opening statement at 'regional Ministers meeting over illegal arms', *Inter Press Service*, 14 March 2000

²² President Daniel arap Moi, "Statement to the press on the Situation in the Horn", *Foreign Affairs Bulletins Monthly Bulletin*, Vol. II No. 9 February 2001 p. 3

²³ MacLean op. cit., p. 17

²⁴ The policy of arming militias to fight the rebellion in the south has continued under the government of Heskias Zenawi. These militias have been responsible for cross border raids in northern Kenya.

²⁵ Maec-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, "The proliferation of Light Weapons in Pastoral Northern Kenya" <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/No30/Sectionone.html>

²⁶ 'Kalashnikovs for Chickens: Small arms boom in East Africa' *IANSA Africa News* 7 May 2001

²⁷ United States Council for Refugees, "Country Report-Kenya" <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/kenya.htm>

²⁸ Final Meeting Report, 'International Consultation on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking in small Arms and Light Weapons'. Addis Ababa 22-23 June 2000

²⁹ Addis Ababa Conference report, op. cit.

³⁰ Nairobi Declaration, op. cit.

³¹ Quoted by Vivienne Walt, 'Small Arms Big Trouble' *Ford Foundation Report* Fall 2000

³² BBC News/Africa/East Africa: the Week in Review http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/hi/English/world/africa/newsid_336000/336141.stm

³³ *Daily Hansard*, Vol. 12 No. 15 October 1996 p.2333

³⁴ Virginia Gamba and Martinho Chachiu, 'Small Arms Trade in Africa' *New People Africa Feature Service* Issue No. 89 August 1999, <http://www.peacelink.it/users/npeople/ago99/primaagoust99.html>

³⁵ *Daily Hansard*, Vol. 12 No. 15 October 1996 p.23333

³⁶ Interview with local administrator, Eastleigh, Nairobi May 2000

³⁷ Walt, op. cit.

³⁸ Dadaab refugee camps - Ifo, Hagadera and Dagahaley- in Garissa district, North Eastern Kenya hosts mainly Somali refugees though other nationalities-Eritreans, Ugandans and Sudanese are also hosted in these camps

³⁹ Kakuma refugee camps, in Turkana district north Rift Valley hosts mainly Sudanese refugees with a substantial number of Somalis and Ethiopians.

⁴⁰ *Khat*, or qhat or chat refers to the leaves and young shoots of *Catha edulis*, a species of the plant family Celastraceae. *Catha edulis* grows in eastern Africa and southern Arabia and more specifically in Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Yemen Arab Republic. *Khat* users seek out the freshest plant material, usually the leaves and young shoots, which are chewed to permit buccolingual or enthal absorption of soluble ingredients. The pleasurable, stimulating and euphoric effects obtained following absorption of *khat* constituents are reported to be similar to the effects of amphetamine and its congeners states

⁴¹ *Daily Nation*. 18 November 2000

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ *Daily Hansard*, Vol. 9 No. 20 April 1996 p. 485

⁴⁴ UN *Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN)* (Nairobi) 2000

⁴⁵ Kathi Austin. Open Letter to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako

Ogata, 13 November 2000 <http://www.fundforpeace.org>

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Godana op. cit.

⁴⁸ 'Gun running is out of Control, admits state' *Daily Nation* 14 February 2001

⁴⁹ Interview with a senior UNHCR official in charge of security, Dadaab refugee camp