An Experimental Hope: The Case for Emergent Pedagogy

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation will make the case that education at the post-secondary level must be reimagined. Rather than being organized around abstract bodies of information, it must be centered on moments of transformation out of which teaching, learning, knowing and – in fact – democratic individuals emerge. This reconstruction of education takes place through two primary moves. First, I make the case that contemporary schooling is grounded in a flawed model of knowing, which draws together mistakes in thinking about the nature of the self, of knowledge, and of the world, which are contained in the epistemological proposition: “S knows that p.” In doing so, I argue that the German conception of Bildung must replace “S knows that p” as the guiding paradigm of knowing within educational practice. In doing so, I develop a theory of creative inquiry in order to claim that knowledge emerges from embodied, social action and is a form of artistic practice. Second, I develop a pedagogy, which I call emergent pedagogy, based on the theory of inquiry articulated in the first half. Here, I argue that post-secondary pedagogy must emerge out of the contexts, situations, and communities in which students and faculty are embedded. In this way, pedagogy must be considered a kind of artistic practice in which methods are adapted to and intuited from unique problems experienced by the university community. Ultimately, I show that pedagogy must shift from being viewed as a kind of telling and hearing to a form of participatory making.
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This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Catherine, without whom none of this would be possible. Eleven years ago, we were married, loaded up everything we owned into a truck, and drove into the desert. Your dedication to me has taught me that life is truly an experimental hope.

On a rainy Blacksburg day in October, Ben invited me to share a cup of coffee on the couch in his office. He asked me how I might explain the concept of Bildung to a university administrator. This is my reply.
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Learning

One of the guiding myths of the American University is that it exists for the purposes of the creation, preservation, and transmission of knowledge. Inside this mythos, it is imagined that the university and its faculty sit as a kind of beacon where the rest of culture might go to know what is true. Here, faculty are engaged in deep discovery processes via disciplinary methods which allow them to lift truth from the soil of chaos and unknowing. Students come to the university so that they also might know something true, becoming small rays of light that will carry true knowledge forward into the world. Here *knowledge*, conceptualized as data points, facts, or generalizable information that is both objectively true and personally available, is both the currency and goal of the institution.

This data-driven imaginary also serves as the guiding principle for the university’s conceptual structure and physical design. Tenure and promotion processes hinge almost singularly on the production and distribution of research, where the quality and value of faculty research projects are essentially meaningless within a process driven exclusively by the quantity of data produced and prestige of publications in which it is housed. Teaching, as a category within tenure and promotion, is almost so unimportant that it not be mentioned but for the fact that teaching ability is reduced to the average of data points taken from student course evaluations. University departments are arranged in terms of what is considered to be the logical division of data (i.e. disciplines), regardless of the emerging problems which concern researchers in each department. Curricula and course syllabi also follow this pattern of logical division, which assumes that students are a kind of data absorbing *tabula rasa* who will be certified as competent knowers after successfully passing a series of pre-designed courses.
The physical arrangement of most traditional universities is no different, with campus architectures slicing up dimensions of the student experience into perceived logical divisions, leaving little public space where the parts might coalesce. Administrative buildings, quite reminiscent of Foucault’s description of the Panopticon, often sit high on a hill overlooking the campus. Academic buildings are almost always separated from residential facilities, which themselves are cordoned off from student services such as campus health, the women’s center, the gymnasium, dining facilities, etc…What results is a Fordist view of education with its ringing bells, time clocks, and absence of public space where the embers of revolutionary ideas might begin. Here, free expression and free thought have been so deeply domesticated there is little chance of having any impact on the actual problems facing the world.

It is my contention that this guiding mythos hinges upon a particular view of knowers, knowing, and knowledge expressed logically as “S knows that p,” (SP) which is both the paradigmatic model of knowing of analytic epistemology and is embedded within a larger, technocratic rationality, which characterizes Modern thought (Shuford, 2010).

This rationality is committed to a Substance Realist metaphysics in which the knowable world includes only those things which are both empirically available and measurable. In this account, knowledge is reduced to those abstract and foundational principles which correspond to this measurable reality, and which may be manipulated technologically to yield prediction, stability, and control.

Bertrand Russell’s (1905) “On Denoting” was a key essay outlining this form of rationality for modern philosophy, and where he articulated the notion of a propositional function, which attempted to reduce reality to a set of linguistic principles expressed logically. There, he argued that “the subject of the denoting is of very great importance, not only in logic
and mathematics, but also in the theory of knowledge” (p. 479). Its importance is in its perceived ability to allow philosophers to sort truth (i.e. that which corresponds with reality) from fiction (i.e. that which does not correspond). In the essay, Russell argued that there are two modes of knowing, with the latter being reducible to the former: either through “immediate acquaintance” or, more often, via denoting phrases which must track back to the original thing (pp. 492-3). For epistemologists, following Russell, the act of knowing is reducible to the logical formula “S knows that p.”

Frank P. Ramsey (1931/2013) noted that Russell’s theory of descriptions, introduced in “On Denoting,” was “that paradigm of philosophy” (p. 293). More recently, Peter Ludlow (2013) argued that, “Frank Ramsey was certainly correct, some eighty years ago, when he spoke of Russell's theory of descriptions as ‘that paradigm of philosophy.’ He might just as easily have said ‘the paradigm of philosophy.’” This is because, as Ludlow (2013) argues, “the allure of the theory of descriptions remains its promise of metaphysical austerity, its ability to untangle numerous semantical puzzles in the theory of meaning, and its role in making sense of the epistemic status of our knowledge claims.” In short, in its ability to provide that which technocratic rationality demands: a complete and certain picture of the world.

There are four dimensions of the “S knows that p” model, which are uniquely problematic in terms of education. These are in its generic and essentialist account of the knower (“S”); in its Substance Realist account of knowledge, where “p” is foundational, value-free, metaphysically present, and corresponds to reality; in its misrepresentation of the relationship between the two and, in particular, the assumption that this relationship is purely cognitive (“knows that”); and in its bracketing of the biological, cultural and temporal context of inquiry (“S knows that p”). This model results in what might be called a metaphysics of knowing which
takes the given world to be stable, foundational, and analytic, and the goal of knowing - much like the work of a jigsaw puzzle player - as being the construction of a complete and certain picture of the world.

The SP paradigm presents a threat to those who believe that the university should be focused on both transformational learning and democratic formation. This is precisely because the SP model and the larger technocratic imaginary in which it is nested increasingly imagines knowledge as facts, knowers as human data processors, and knowing as a cognitive act of reproduction. In doing so, it confuses data with information, and knowing with understanding. It seeks, then, to create uncritical consumers who will serve a supporting role within the larger economic production function of society.

If maintained, SP thinking also will lead to the traditional university system becoming obsolete entirely or only accessible to the economic elite. This is because if schooling is conceived as simply a space in which data is stored and disseminated to generic consumers, then it must confront the bold and deeply pressing question posed by a freshman in my introduction to philosophy of education course: “why should I pay for school when I can get knowledge online for free?” In other words, the data-driven imaginary of education functioned quite well in a historical and technological era where knowledge emerging from research was difficult to obtain, but in the age of widespread open-access information this view of the university as the sole conduit of knowledge is untenable. Models like The University of the People and Occupy University, both of which are tuition-free, online, open-access post-secondary systems, along

\[1\] At the time of this writing, the University of the People in process of receiving accreditation through the U.S. Department of Education, and received a $500,000 from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to ensure its success.
with open-access publishing, threaten the idea that traditional university is the arbiter of knowledge in culture. The current recession and increasing shift to a globalized and post-industrial economy further threaten the idea that a university education is somehow the foundation and guarantee of economic success.

Many faculty and administrators, quite aware of the danger facing the institution, have reacted similarly to the Christian church when faced with the increasing encroachment of experimental science on its cultural authority. Rather than using the erosion of cultural impact as a way of reconstructing or revisioning of the purpose and role of the institution, we have – quite like a petulant child – engaged in a louder assertion of the same basic premises.

This mode of assertion is expressed most clearly in the increasing culture of assessment in higher education, which begins with the acceptance of the increasing cultural irrelevancy of the university. In other words, assessment in a system is unnecessary until there is a perception of lack, instability, or failing. Of the many areas of revision available to it, the assessment movement has exclusively taken its target to be the formal event of teaching. This approach is not surprising given the long and storied tradition in American history of blaming teaching in education for emerging economic and political problems. This occurs because schooling is understood, quite rightly, as the place where culture reproduces itself. Therefore, the logic goes, if there are problems in culture, its root must be at the place of reproduction (i.e. the classroom). Further, if we are able to find a way to guarantee “good” teaching, then those cultural problems will eventually and naturally be ameliorated.

The irony is that rather than concluding that the data-driven imaginary is, itself, the problem creating the institution’s cultural irrelevancy, we’ve chosen to go further in to that imaginary. In other words, it’s not that measurement, itself, that is the problem, but we’ve
imagined that the problem is that *our measurements haven’t been precise enough*. Here, technocratic solutions, understood since the Enlightenment to be ahistorical and progressive, again become the salvific force which will move the university back to its exceptional place in culture and history.

The danger, in this case, is self-evident. By engaging in deeper and more aggressive ways in the very behavior creating our irrelevancy, there is little option but self-destruction. Further, and perhaps even more harmful, is that university’s irrelevancy is imagined not as a problem with the way the system is conceived and designed, but instead perceived as a lack of intelligence of its graduating students, who increasingly bear the emotional and intellectual scars of a system designed to hold them responsible for its problems.

This move toward an ideology of data is really not something new, but simply a shift from the covert to the overt. The longstanding myth has now become the real, to which all dimensions of the university must conform. The university has become, now undeniably, a Procrustean bed.

Yet, this need not be the start of a dystopian account of education. It is, to the contrary, an opportunity or invitation for reconstruction, which itself must begin with the world becoming unstable. In other words, disharmony - far from being the antithesis of hope - is actually the space where hope resides, because it is the beginning of a reconstructed situation.

In other words, we are entering a powerful cultural and historical moment which has the potential to redirect the university toward a more substantial, more authentic and, certainly, more important aim for education than traditionally conceived. The opportunity is that most of our colleges and universities already contain the resources necessary for the kind of reconstruction
for which I will argue. The danger is that the “S knows that p” model views those resources as a kind of distraction from the data-driven account of the university.

This dissertation, then, intends to make the case that education, specifically at the post-secondarily level, must be reimagined. Rather than being organized around abstract bodies of information, it must be centered on moments of transformation out of which teaching, learning, knowing and – in fact – democratic individuals emerge.

This project will be divided into two main parts. The first section will focus on learning and knowing and will consist of three chapters. In the first chapter, I will make the case that contemporary schooling is grounded in a flawed model of knowing, which draws together mistakes in thinking about the nature of the self, of knowledge, and of the world. It will begin by describing the philosophical underpinnings of the SP model and then articulate its presence within contemporary educational theory and practice. Lastly, it will describe the German conception of Bildung and argue that it must replace SP as the guiding paradigm of knowing within educational practice. In the second chapter, I will argue that while the Bildung tradition provides a strong conceptual vehicle to replace and overcome the dehumanizing effects of the SP tradition, one of the dangers is that the concept retains some of the pedagogical baggage of the neo-humanist tradition. To avoid this, I will reconstruct the traditional notion of Bildung in four dimensions in order that it takes on the character of a process of embodied, communal and justice-driven inquiry, rather than imagined as an individual being cognitively enculturated. In the third chapter, I will develop a theory of creative inquiry, arguing that knowledge emerges from action and is a form of artistic practice.

The second section will focus on the infrastructure of educational space and, in particular, on teaching. This will develop through two chapters. Chapter four will focus on the notion of the
learning community, and will articulate a nodal-process view of education, paying particular attention to the lifeworld of the university and to contexts and situations out of which teachable moments might develop. The fifth and final chapter will articulate the notion of emergent pedagogy. Here I will reconstruct the traditional view of pedagogy, such that it must be considered a kind of artistic practice in which methods are adapted to and emerge from the unique communities of inquiry. In particular, it will argue that teaching and learning must shift from being a kind of telling and hearing to a form of shared making.
1. Bildung and the Hidden “S knows that p”

“The principle of indeterminacy thus presents itself as the final step in the dislodgement of the old spectator theory of knowledge. It marks the acknowledgement, within scientific procedure itself, of the fact that knowing is one kind of interaction which goes on within the world. Knowing marks the conversion of undirected changes into changes directed toward an intended conclusion.” John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*

The Hidden “S knows that p”

The SP model is based on what John Dewey labeled *the spectator theory of knowing*. For Dewey, the spectator theory was not located one philosophical stance or school, but is a generalized approach to knowing which is grounded in a long-standing human impulse to create certainty in the world via true, foundational knowledge. As Georges Dicker (1976) wrote, “the Spectator Theory of Knowledge is shared by the Greeks, Rationalists, Empiricists, Kantians, Realists, Dualists and Idealists alike…[and Dewey’s] attribution of this conception to many major philosophers is not essentially a distortion. For philosophers, when they have tried to say what knowing is, to describe a state of affairs which constitutes *knowing* …have persistently relied on the visual model that underlies the Spectator Theory” (p. 4). In other words, Western culture is committed to the idea that knowing is a kind of causal, cognitive act, which takes the form of a viewer or spectator who has the ability to purely “see” the cognitive object. Here, knowledge is not only antecedently embedded in the natural structure of the cosmos, but also exists as a thing in-itself.

In *Quest for Certainty*, Dewey (1929/2008)argued that this view of knowing was grounded in the Western obsession with ultimate foundations, having its origins in the precarious
position of a self-reflective organism living in an unstable universe. He argued that “man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for security. He has sought to attain it in two ways” (p.3). Those two ways were to either turn to religion to try and supplicate the forces in the universe, or attempt to manipulate the universe in order to protect against peril. In both cases, there is a turning away from, or devaluing of the world, which originates in a fundamental fear of the chaos and uncertainty, which is characteristic of the universe and our place within it. He (1929/2008)argued that “hence the things forming their subject-matter were felt to be lower in rank. Familiarity breeds a sense of equality if not of contempt. We deem ourselves on a par with things we daily administer. It is a truism to say that objects regarded with awe have perforce a superior status” (p.13).

Dewey sees this devaluing or rejection of the natural, tied to a fundamental fear of change and the unknown, as the source of the creation of the supernatural and the two-tiered universe. He (1929/2008) argued that:

herein is the source of the fundamental dualism of human attention and regard. The distinction between the two attitudes of everyday control and dependence on something superior was finally generalized intellectually. It took effect in the conception of two distinct realms. The inferior was that in which man could foresee and in which he had instruments and arts by which he might expect a reasonable degree of control. The superior was that of occurrences so uncontrollable that they testified to the presence and operation of powers beyond the scope of everyday and mundane things. (p. 13)
This primary dualism (i.e. natural/supernatural, or process/foundational) is part of a larger paradigm of dualistic thinking in the West, including body/mind, self/other, subject/object, etc…

Importantly, for Dewey the spectator theory assumes a Cartesian ontology and a Newtonian mechanistic universe, which are understood as being only causally related. The former is a static essentialism with regard to human beings, which is most notably ascribed to Rene Descartes, though can be traced back to Greek philosophy. Through applying the method of philosophical skepticism to his own nature, Descartes concluded that although he was able to doubt the fact that the world existed and that he had a body, he could not doubt that he had a mind. Descartes (1637/1965) concluded that “…after having thought well on this matter, and after examining all things with care, I must finally conclude and maintain that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true every time that I pronounce it or conceive it in my mind” (p. 82). The mind was, then, res cognitans or a “thinking thing” and the essence of the self. This self was understood to be static, unchanging at its core, and essential. The resulting conclusion was the body/mind dualism, which is built upon the idea of the essential self: a Cartesian ontology. The latter is a static essentialism with regard to the universe. In this view, the universe is understood as type of mechanical system. Much like the functioning of a watch, from which Deism draws its divine watchmaker analogy, the universe is viewed as both substantively complete and in motion according to an ordered, predictable mathematical pattern which are understood as the laws of

2In the Republic, Plato’s argument for the body’s separation from and inferiority to the mind is stated in terms of his theory of the state. There, “Plato divides the soul into three parts: the appetites (desires, wants, emotions), the will (the spirit), and the rational part (the mind). The rational part is ranked the highest” (Thayer-Bacon, Transforming Critical Thinking, p. 27).
nature. Isaac Newton’s laws of motion provided the groundwork for classical mechanics and this metaphysical view of the universe. Traditionally, the interaction between self/world or body/mind has been explained via different forms of a causal principle, in which two ontologically distinct substances interact, with one being the cause the other an effect.

The spectator theory of knowing results in what Dewey calls the philosophical fallacy, which is the assumption that the products or outcomes of inquiry, exist antecedently to those process of doing or making taking place. Dewey (1929/2008) argued that the two-tiered view “bequeathed the notion, which has ruled philosophy ever since the time of the Greeks, that the office of knowledge is to uncover the antecedently real, rather than, as is the case with our practical judgments, to gain the kind of understanding which is necessary to deal with problems as they arise” (p.17). For Dewey, the philosophic fallacy occurs when those created meanings are read back into the situation and imagined to have existed at the very beginning, prior to inquiry. In other words, they are imagined to have been discovered by or taken by the inquirer rather than made as a process of construction.

The most profound impact of this mode of thinking is the view that the goals of knowing are to uncover this buried, objective reality, as illustrated in the SP model. In other words, SP thinking separates that which is a “universal” truth from that which is constructed or made.

It is my contention that SP thinking is not located in one, abstracted dimension of experience, but grounds and directs the guiding technocratic rationality of Modern education. SP thinking is not simply an epistemological problem but, as Dewey argued, “all of these notions about certainty and the fixed, about the nature of the real world, about the nature of the mind and its organs of knowing, are completely bound up with one another, and their consequences ramify
into practically all important ideas entertained upon any philosophic question. They all flow - such is my basic thesis - from the separation (set up in the interest of the quest for absolute certainty) between theory and practice, knowledge and actions” (p.24). Therefore, the problem “cannot be attacked in isolation, by itself. It is too thoroughly entangled with fundamental beliefs and ideas in all sorts of fields” (p. 24).

The purpose of this project is, then, not simply to argue for a different model of knowing, or a small shift in pedagogical practice, but instead requires a reconstruction of the very ground on which post-secondary education stands. This consequently demands a wholesale reconstruction of the breadth of educational practices designed to parse education and the student experience into discreet, analytic categories.

**SP Thinking and the Fragmentation of Learning**

The challenge of articulating the way in which current educational practices manifest SP thinking is two-fold. The first is that comprehensively identifying all current practices which are philosophically problematic is a literal impossibility. This is partially because post-secondary education is carried out differently within the context of each campus, but more importantly because SP thinking does not simply produce practices, but manifests in particular dispositions and logics toward education. It is more like what Thomas Kuhn labeled a paradigm, in that this kind of educational thinking is related to, but not contained within, educational practices. The second, and more difficult, is that with all philosophy, so much depends upon definition. In other words, much of the vocabulary employed in educational discourse and the practices generated on
first glance appear to be generic, or could generally support multiple philosophical paradigms. Yet, behind those words and actions lies a nearly impassible gulf of meaning.

It is my contention that SP thinking gives birth to what Henry Giroux (1997) claims is a culture of Positivism in education. Here, educational theory and practices promote a:

form of positivist rationality in which it is assumed that: (1) The natural sciences provide the ‘deductive-nomological’ model of explanation for the concepts and techniques proper for social science. (2) Social science ought to aim at the discovery of lawlike propositions about human behavior which are empirically testable. (3) Social science modes of inquiry can and ought to be objective. (4) The relationship between theory and practice in the social science domain is primarily a technical one, i.e., social science knowledge can be used to predict how a course of action can be best realized. (5) Social science procedures of verification and falsification must rely upon scientific techniques and ‘hard data,’ which lead to results that are value free and intersubjectively applicable. (p. 18)

Giroux argues that at the core of this thinking “is a preoccupation with the instrumental use of knowledge. That is, knowledge is prized for its control value, its use in mastering all dimensions of the classroom environment” (p. 18). Further, “in this perspective, technical rationality eschews notions of meaning that cannot be quantified and objectified” (p. 18).

This paradigm is borne out, for example, in the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Postsecondary Education (DOE) determination that all colleges and universities must maintain “standards requisite for its graduates to gain admission to other reputable institutions of higher
learning or to achieve credentials for professional practice” (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). Here, we see the presence of SP thinking, as the goal of education is purely utilitarian, and reducible to credentialing. Further, it articulates the “goal of accreditation” as ensuring “that education provided by institutions of higher education meets acceptable levels of quality” (U.S. Department of Education). Yet, here the notions of acceptable levels and quality remain undefined. In both instances, students are assumed to be generic consumers of a kind of knowledge-product.

Further, in order to gain accreditation, universities must be approved by bodies such as the Southern Association of Colleges and Universities (SACS) whose mission “is the improvement of education in the South through accreditation.” The SACS (2010) process “provides an assessment of an institution’s effectiveness in fulfillment of its mission, its compliance with the requirements of its accrediting association, and its continuing efforts to enhance the quality of student learning and its programs and services. Based on reasoned judgment, the process stimulates evaluation and improvement, while providing a means of continuing accountability to constituents and the public” (p. 2). Left undefined are the following important terms: assessment, effectiveness, enhance, quality, learning, reasoned judgment, improvement, accountability, constituents. In other words, SACS (2010) requires all institutions engage in “ongoing, integrated, institution-wide research-based planning and evaluation processes” (p. 16). Here, again, research-based is left undefined, though it is not a difficult leap to claim that accreditation and accountability processes emerge from the specter of SP thinking.

Similarly, within formal pedagogical environments, SP thinking creates space for the “conduit metaphor,” where it is imagined that “psychic entities (e.g., ideas, schemata, and
scripts) are conducted from one talking head to another by means of physical symbols and sounds” (Garrison, 1995, p. 727). In other words, teachers, students, and administrators begin to view knowledge as a collection of factoids that are dispensed from expert to novice, in the same way that “S” knows that “p.” Here, schooling becomes “a type of input–output system, [which most often] is reduced to and serves an economic production function” (Olssen, 2005, p. 324).

As McEwan (2000) argued this approach, which views the teacher as a guide through the landscape of information, dominates curriculum theory and is informed by strands within epistemology, psychology, and recapitulation theory:

> What is the source of this metaphor? It is, I think, related to the idea of mind as a representational system. …[T]his notion introduces a problem…the temptation is to extend this problematical view of mind: first, by conceiving of a map of the mind; secondly, by embracing the idea of the map as a functional entity that can be applied as a blueprint for the development of other minds. (p. 261)

In this model, the learner becomes a consumer of context-free and objective factoids, and emphasis is placed on the ability of the learner to reproduce those factoids as the sole marker of educational success. Paulo Freire (1970/2000) labeled this the banking model of education, and argued that “education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat. This is the ‘banking’ concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only so far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits….in the last analysis, it is the people themselves who
are filed away through lack of creativity, transformation, and knowledge…” (p. 72). The banking model is not only incorrect in its thinking about teaching and learning, but also – and more importantly - actually harms students who are alienated from their own creative capacities (i.e. dehumanized) in the very process of schooling.

Yet, SP runs much deeper than pedagogical design or university mission statements, but is embedded in the very conceptual and physical architecture of colleges and universities. In particular, based on the embedded dualism in SP thinking, universities have fragmented the lived experience of students into particular categories and attempted to attend to them individually and independently of one another, rather than as a unified whole.

On a global level, most universities are divided into loosely two categories: faculty and academic administration, and student affairs administration. The former are concerned with those things related to disciplinary knowledge and research, while the latter grounds its work in an interpretation of human development theory. The former understand their role as disseminating subject-knowledge, while the latter understands its role as attending to the “whole student” (see also: Bloland, Louis and Stamatakos, 1994, pgs. 2-14).

While it is clear that most faculty understand that education is larger than the formal instance of the classroom, this has very rarely translated into any sort of formal reconstruction of colleges and universities to match this line of common-sense thought. In other words, most academics understand their role as being primarily concerned with the creation, preservation and transmission of information and only secondarily, and anecdotally, about student transformation. This leaves most faculty to conceptualize their educational responsibility exclusively through the
vehicle of what is considered the “academic” (i.e. information-based, cognitive, and formal) experience of students, which is imagined as separate from the social or emotional.

To their credit, student affairs administrators have historically recognized the fallacy of reducing education to a cognitive, formalized achievement, and have sought to, “proactively identify and address student needs, design programs, develop policies, and create healthy...environments that encourage positive growth in students” (Evans, Forney, and Guido-DiBrito, 1998, p. 5). While the developmental line of thinking may appear to move one step closer to holism by attempting to supplement the in-class learning experience and with an out-of-class developmental environment, it is still grounded SP thinking. In other words, it does not develop synthetic environment, but instead creates a kind of loosely functional dualism, based on a model of human identity which takes the mind/body split as a given.

The impact of the dualisms emerging from SP educational thinking is so common that we hardly notice them as such and includes practices like informal and non-formal learning being viewed as invalid forms of pedagogy; the faculty-student relationship understood as the only educationally valid learning relationship; the silencing of student identity and emotion within the classroom; the carnival-like culture of collegiate athletics; contemporary assessment efforts designed around learning outcomes; curricula organized around pre-determined and disciplinarily bounded information sets; the architectural planning of most campuses which separates the mind (academics, classroom space) from the world (real/social life, residential quarters); the tenure and promotion process being reduced to a mathematical formula; the very existence of the co-curriculum and student affairs as something separate and necessary, etc.…. 
Ultimately, we cannot imagine that the philosophical mistake of SP is contained simply within the pedagogical relationship of professors and students. While this may be a special form of educational relationship, SP thinking is encoded within the very conceptual infrastructure of our institutions. In order to overturn it will require a massive reconstruction of institutional design and practice.

**Bildung and Transformation**

In this section, I will present the German notion of *Bildung* as an alternative to the SP model as the guiding paradigm of education. The former draws together, rather than separates, the community in which we inhabit, what we know of the world, and our very selves as acts of construction. In particular, it shifts the emphasis in education from being organized around “objective” facts to which learners serve as containers and, instead, elevates the unique and continual reconstruction that the self undergoes as part of the process of education as the guiding force of education. It is an act of doing or making, which is ultimately transformational of both the self and the world.

**Defining Bildung**

The concept of *Bildung* is difficult to conceptualize in English, partially owing to the fact that the term loosely translates into “education,” which gives a mistaken impression that the German and American concepts are equivalent. Ovind Varkoy (2010) notes this distance in saying that “the fact that the German term *Bildung* has no direct counterpart in English has certain consequences for international educational discourse” (p. 86). Those consequences stem
from the fact that Bildung is a more complex and robust term than the SP paradigm in the United States. In fact, the concept of Bildung is better conceptualized via the English term enculturation.

Bildung originates from the German Bild meaning “form” or “image.” In other words, broadly, Bildung means to form an individual and make them into a human being. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960/2004) defines Bildung as “the properly human way of developing one’s natural talents and capacities” (p. 9).

Here, again, a distinction must be made with the American conception of personhood and citizenship, and what we find embedded in the notion of Bildung. A traditional American view of the individual is built on a Cartesian ontology, which views the mind as the res cognitans or a “thinking thing” and the essence of the self. This self is understood to be static, unchanging at its core, and essential. In other words, it the self is complete, in and of itself, prior to interacting within culture. Further, the self is not formed by culture, but the self forms culture, as implied in the American image of the “self made” person.

To the contrary, according to Bildung, persons are not born as cultural individuals, but are born into a culture and must work to become cultural and social, where becoming cultural and social means not only to appreciate the culture, but also to be able to read the culture, act on the culture, and make decisions from within an informed cultural framework. Most importantly, it means to see one’s existence as intertwined with that culture, and to understand that culture in the context of other cultures.

Therefore we might say that Bildung is “an ongoing process of both personal and cultural maturation. A harmonization of the individual’s mind and heart and a unification of society evidence this maturation. Harmonization of the self is achieved through a wide variety of
experiences that challenge the individual’s accepted beliefs…” (Good & Garrison, 2010, p. 53).

Bildung stands at the intersection of teaching and learning, the cultivation of the individual, as well as the process of knowledge creation. Bildung disrupts a view of education which holds that knowledge is an object which is statically preserved and cognitively transmitted. Instead, it begins with the idea that knowledge is intrinsically tied to and generated out of unique human experiences and contexts, and ends in knowledge as a communally constructed, freely available practice.

While the goal of knowledge in the American sense is self-reliance, where the self is set in contrast to culture, in Bildung the cultivation of knowledge has no goal outside itself, but its goal is simply the process of more education. Knowledge transforms the individual and the larger community in an ongoing, ever-present dialogical motion. As a result, in Bildung, knowledge does not free the individual from the world, but opens the individual to the world, as they understand their interdependence with it and ability to become co-creators within it. As Biesta (2003) argues, “the modern conception of Bildung articulates an educational ideal that, through the Enlightenment, has gained a political significance in that it has become intimately connected with an emerging civil society and with a specific conception of the ideal citizen in such a society…The process of Bildung is itself understood in terms of a relationship that goes beyond the present and the particular. It is a relationship, in other words, with something that is general” (p. 64). Rather than the American view of education being about “self-actualization” – a concept built on a Cartesian ontology – Bildung is about the continuous emergence of self-in-society. It is focused, instead, on becoming.
Yet, this reaching toward the universal is not a transcendental, “true” foundation for which the individual strives, but in fact means the ability to distance oneself from the immediate, to think critically and creatively, as well as develop the capacity for empathy. Gadamer (1960/2004) argues that the nature of the transformation which occurs through Bildung reaches toward the universal, when the universal is taken to mean the primary “task for man. It requires sacrificing particularity for the sake of the universal. But, negatively put, sacrificing particularity means the restraint of desire and hence freedom from the object of desire and freedom for its objectivity” (p. 11). This is what is required to become an informed person, while in contrast, “whoever abandons himself to his particularity is ungebildet (“unformed”) – e.g., if someone gives away to blind anger without measure or sense of proportion” (Gadamer, 1906/2004, p. 11).

While it is impossible not to absorb some dimension of a cultural heritage simply by the process of living within that culture (i.e. rituals, language, histories, morals, etc…) Bildung attempts to describe a way of becoming enculturated which is far deeper and transformative than a brutally instrumental inheritance, as framed by traditional American schooling. It requires that persons not only recognize their cultural heritage, but also develop the capacity to make it their own: the culture transforms them and they, in turn, transform the culture. Ilan Gur-Ze’ev (2003) argues that, in this way, Bildung serves as a counter-education which “can contribute greatly to the reconstruction of current processes of subjectification and to the exposure of, and resistance to, the production of dehumanization” (p. 89). In this way Bildung is not about primarily about the person conforming to the world, but about a dialogical encounter which transforms both the individual who must live within the world, and the world which must be uniquely changed by the
individual. Yet this moment of transformation in Bildung does not mean history is erased, but it is carried forward and transformed into something which is new. Gadamer (1960/2004) writes that “everything that is received is absorbed, but in Bildung what is absorbed is not like a means that has lost its function. Rather, in acquired Bildung nothing disappears, but everything is preserved” (p. 10). Bildung, therefore, is a kind of creative action in the world.

A Metaphysics of Experience

The concept of Bildung challenges the metaphysical principles in the SP model by replacing the Substance Realism grounding SP with a metaphysics of experience. This happens in two primary moves: first, the Bildung tradition dissolves the Substance Realist assumption of foundational truth by giving a constructive account of knowledge; second, because foundational truth is no longer possible, the Bildung tradition argues that metaphysics should instead focus on the way in which one comes know, rather than focusing on (imagined) essential categories of knowledge. Stated another way, as Good and Garrison (2010) argue, “…the Bildung tradition rejects the pre-Kantian metaphysics of being for a metaphysics of experience that disdains speculation about timeless realities. Learning requires a passionate search for continual growth tempered by reason that is developed through intense study of one’s cultural history. Fulfillment comes through practical activity that promotes the development of one’s talents and abilities as well as the development of one’s society. Rather than acceptance of the sociopolitical status quo, Bildung requires the ability to engage in immanent critique of one’s society, challenging it to actualize its own highest ideals” (pgs. 53-54). Stated another way, Bildung replaces traditional epistemology with a rich theory of learning.
Dissolving “S knows that p.”

While it is clear that in *Truth and Method*, Gadamer did not intend to replace Substance Realism with a metaphysics of hermeneutic experience, but only create justification for the latter. I maintain the *implications* of Gadamer’s conclusions, which I will explicate here, actually undermine his own ontological distinction and make a successful case for hermeneutic experience as universal, thereby dissolving the metaphysics of “S knows that p.”

Gadamer takes as a given that the human condition, which emerges through language, is one of alienation from the immediate flow of the world. This condition of alienation produces a number of assumed dualisms in our thinking about the structure of reality, such as subject/object, knower/known, etc…

While Gadamer believes these dualisms are not part of the actual structure of reality, but are produced by the condition of alienation, scientific thinkers grounded in a Substance Realist metaphysics assume the basic structure of reality to be this very objectified world, which is divided into ontologically dualized parts. Substance Realism, then, takes overcoming this condition of alienation as its goal, which it intends to accomplish through the production of universalized facts which create stability and certainty within an uncertain, alienated world. It also believes that the scientific method, itself, is elevated above the condition of historicity, as evidenced by the results of knowledge beingrepeatable facts about the world. This universalized repeatability, then, gives scientific knowledge both its justification and its goal.

Yet, Gadamer argues that while *method* might produce particularly stable facts, it can never recover ontological wholeness, which is the goal of hermeneutic experience.
Gadamer (1960/2004) denies the dualistic ontology of Substance Realism, arguing that “The alienation of the interpreter from the interpreted by the objectifying methods of modern science…appeared as a consequence of false objectification. My purpose [in Truth and Method]… is to help us realize and avoid this” (p. 312). In other words, the metaphysical infrastructure on which scientific knowledge is built allows it to say nothing about the value of knowledge and, therefore, its relatedness to and relationship within the world. This is why, for Gadamer, scientific knowing can neither be a universalized model of knowing, nor recover ontological wholeness lost in the condition of alienation.

Another and, in fact, more important key to understanding Gadamer’s critique of the Substance Realist account of truth comes in the form of the distinction he makes between two concepts: subjective or immediate experience (Erlebnis) and hermeneutic experience (Erfahrung). Here, he ties the former to a Substance Realist view of truth and the latter to a hermeneutic view of universalized historicism.

In Part 1: 2.B of Truth and Method, Gadamer sketches the history of the concept Erlebnis. In particular, he argues that it began as meaning a kind of immediate experience of having lived through a moment, but was later reconstructed as a kind of subjectification of experience which ultimately became the cult of genius in post-Kantian aesthetics.

Stated another way, Substance Realism has no capacity for dealing with, including, or understanding aesthetic experience, because aesthetic experience falls outside its own, constructed principles of justification. Yet, aesthetic experience is an undeniable part of human experience which can neither be erased nor ignored. Therefore, the way in which substance metaphysics made sense of immediate aesthetic experience was to view art as reaching into a
kind of timeless, transcendental truth which was transmitted through the artistic genius via the work of art. In his preface to *Truth and Method*, Joel Weinsheimer writes that “according to this view, *Erlebnisse*, ‘experiences,’ seen as the enduring residue of moments lived in their full immediacy, are the material artistic genius transforms into works of art. The artwork begins in ‘experiences,’ but rises above them to a universal significance which goes beyond history” (p. xiii). In this way, Substance Realism transforms art and the aesthetic into a kind of meaningless scientific object. It is ‘scientific’ because it is viewed in the image of scientism, being both transcendental and universalized, and meaningless in the sense that it provides no useful content to a scientific worldview built on Substance Realism. Gadamer called this reductive motion *aesthetic differentiation*.

To the contrary, hermeneutic knowing (*Erfahrung*), rooted in Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, begins with a synthetic/temporal (rather than dualistic/foundational) view of the world. Hermeneutic knowing takes as a given that there is no such thing as an object as a thing-in-itself, but everything known always exists for some purpose and within the context of a dynamic horizon of understanding. Gadamer (1960/2004) argued that “Heidegger’s thesis was that being itself is time. This burst asunder the whole subjectivism of modern philosophy – and, in fact, as was soon to appear, the whole horizon of questions asked by metaphysics, which tended to define being as what is present…*Understanding* is not a resigned ideal of human experience adopted in the old age of the spirit…[it] is the original characteristic of the being of human life itself” (pp. 248-250, emphasis in original).

This metaphysics can be unpacked by looking at what Gadamer says regarding *Erfahrung*, as primarily outlined in Part II: 4.3.B in *Truth and Method*. Here, Gadamer begins by
arguing that “this is precisely what we have to keep in mind in analyzing historically effected consciousness: it has the structure of experience (Erfahrung)” (p. 341). Here, he critiques science for overreaching itself, arguing that science “takes no account of the inner historicity of experience,” and further “experience [in the “S knows that p” model] is valid only if it is confirmed; hence its dignity depends on its being in principle repeatable” (p. 342).

The clue to the universality of and justification for a metaphysics of hermeneutic experience is grounded in the productive account knowing Gadamer offers in his analysis of Francis Bacon’s description of the scientific method. Here, Gadamer(1960/2004) says “this is precisely why [Bacon] interests us, for he expresses, albeit with a critical and exclusionary intention, elements in the experience that are not teleologically related to the goal of science” (p. 344). In other words, by arguing that hermeneutic prejudice is universal even within scientific knowing, Gadamer concurrently dissolves foundational truth and replaces it with a constructive account of knowledge. Stated another way, by showing the universality of historical prejudice and reconstructing the notion of prejudice so that it is a productive and necessary part of knowing, Gadamer has both dissolved “S knows that p” model of knowledge and Substance Realism, and replaced it with Bildung as a model of knowledge, built on a synthetic and dialogical metaphysics of experience.

There is, then, absolutely no form of knowing which stands outside the boundary of hermeneutic experience. In making this claim, Gadamer maintains the impossibility of the Cartesian ontology on which the “S knows that p” model develops, accepting instead what Heidegger calls thrownness (Geworfenheit), which is to claim that subject and object are unified, and that existence precedes essence. In other words, SP thinking accepts that the self is a static,
essential object which is transcendental and ahistorical. Gadamer, following Heidegger, rejects this view and replaces it with a historically emergent subject. The importance of this claim cannot be understated. Gadamer (1960/2004) argued, “In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live” (p. 278). Consciousness, then, is not given transcendentally, but emerges as a dynamic process of transacting in the world. That process of emergent knowing and consciousness, then, grounds in the model of Bildung, in contrast to the essential ontology of SP.

**The fusion of the ontological and the epistemic.**

The paradigmatic case of how knowing occurs for all hermeneutic experience is a reader attempting to understanding “the truth” of a text. In the case of Bildung, the reader/text relationship can be substituted with persons in cross-cultural encounters, in relationship to history, while inquiring into the natural world, etc. …

Gadamer (1960/2004) frames the reader/text relationship by asking “Does [truth] emerge because we ‘read’ the classics with an eye that is trained by historical science, reconstructing their meaning, as it were, and then considering it possible, trusting that they are right? Or do we see truth in them because we ourselves are thinking as we try to understand them – i.e. because what they say seems true to us when we consider the corresponding modern theories that are invoked?” (p. 532). By invoking these questions, Gadamer is highlighting three primary concepts which are critical to the structure of embedded, hermeneutic knowing: the relationship of the knower to the thing known, the limitations of knowing that relational positionality sets up, and
the goals of knowing established by the previous two. In his former question, Gadamer represents the traditional structure of knowing as articulated by Substance Realism and its correspondence theory of truth, while in the latter question, he articulates the hermeneutic position.

The SP tradition imagines that the structure of knowing is both linear and unilateral. In this model, which can be conceptualized as the “authorial intent” model of literary theory as expressed by thinkers like E.D. Hirsch, the “truth” is given by the author, encoded in the literary object, allowing the reader to extract it through a rational and cognitive process. The reader is “correct” and justified when s/he is able to recapitulate the author’s intention in writing the work.

To the contrary, Gadamer’s hermeneutics set up a circular and dialogical (rather than linear and unilateral) structure of coming to know a text. He does this by reconstructing the reader’s positionality to and relationship with the text. In the words of Buber, Gadamer rejects the “I-It relationship” imagined by “authorial intent” models, replacing it with a triadic structure: the I-Thou-We. (In Buber’s writing, the ‘We’ function is expressed as ‘the between.’) For Gadamer(1960/2004), this triadic structure is not simply an abstracted philosophical model, but is a fundamental building block to the structure of human relationship, arguing that “the I-Thou-We relation, as it is called in modern thinking, is known in classical political philosophy by a quite different name: friendship” (p. 532, emphasis in original). Knowing is, then, a relational act.

So, here, Gadamer posits that triadic structure of knowing is a dialogical motion that takes place when two things – a reader and a text – arrive at a third place: knowledge or truth. This is not only the motion of the hermeneutic circle, but also the structure of Bildung, as it
concerns the relationship between a person and culture. This moment is what Gadamer terms the
*fusion of horizons* which takes place through the act of translation.

It is important to keep in mind that this act of meaning making, as Gadamer describes it,
is taking place in and through time. In other words, it is part of the event-structure of history, and it always already involves knowers *and knowledge* embedded in history. In other words, the “authorial intent” (i.e. “S knows that p”) model views knowledge as a static, foundational object which is context free. To the contrary, Gadamer’s triadic, dialogical structure embeds both knowers and produced knowledge to the particular historical circumstances of its creation.³

Here, Gadamer draws on Husserlian phenomenology in developing his concept of the horizon of understanding, which serves as the background to all experience. He (1960/2004) argues that “Husserl calls this phenomenological concept of the world “life-world” – i.e. the world in which we are immersed in the natural attitude that never becomes an object as such for us, but that represents the pregiven basis of all experience” (p. 239). Further, Gadamer(1960/2004) writes that “the concept of the *life-world* is the antithesis of all objectivism.

³Here, I want to clarify some potential ambiguity in my language. By “embedding knowledge in the historical circumstances of its production” I am not arguing in favor of the hermeneutic model expressed by Dilthey, which is that “knowing” history comes from accurate reproduction of the context of history. In arguing this view, Dilthey appealed to the same correspondence theory of truth which Hirsch does in his “authorial intent” view of literary theory. What I mean, instead, is that knowledge is constantly being produced and reproduced, and that the process of reproduction is tied to the historical and cultural context of the knower, and their unique horizon, which includes a unique set of problems to be worked out. Therefore, both the knower and the knowledge are embedded within history and part of an ongoing dialogical motion which Gadamer terms “effective history.” Knowing history, in this way, is not accurately reproducing it, but entering into dialogue with it to make it useful for our problems or, in the language of Gadamer, to listen what it has to say to us.
It is an essentially historical concept, which does not refer to a universe of being, to an ‘existent world.’ In fact, not even the infinite idea of a true world can be meaningfully created out of the infinite progress of human historical worlds in historical experience (Erfahrung)” (p. 239). The difference between the Husserlian concept and Gadamerian concept is that the latter is grounded in the individual, while the former is distanced from the individual and located in culture.

In Gadamer’s metaphysics of hermeneutic experience, life is always already embedded, emergent, and relational. In other words, there is no such thing as non-embedded knowing, making truth always already emergent and conditional. As Reichenbach (2003) argues, “we can admit that there are no goals of Bildung, and no characteristics of the transformation and learning processes that are identical for all…this is due to the simple fact that experimenters are not social atoms detached from social reality and contingent culture. Rather, they are always situated selves, that is, selves who try to make sense in what they do and say” (pp. 96-7). Therefore, knowing requires not the removal of prejudice, but in fact the taking up of prejudice in both the process and aims of knowing.

Gadamer (1960/2004), drawing on Heidegger, argues that “a person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there” (p. 269). Ultimately, Gadamer(1960/2004)argues that “the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being” (p. 278).

As is often a misinterpreted in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and critical to a notion of embedded knowing, is that coming to understanding or the fusion of horizons does not mean that
translation resolves in a single, homogenous understanding, nor is this its goal. As Ryan and Natalle (2001) argue, “When dialogue is entered into as hermeneutic practice, participants are not engaged in changing each other's mind, but are interested in gaining a better understanding of the self and the other, which might lead to transformation” (p. 78). Therefore, in the Gadamerian sense, to understand something includes the ability to imagine and articulate multiple standpoints on a single topic, with the potential to transform disparate understandings into a heterogeneous, yet functional stance on an issue. This bears a strong resemblance to Donna Haraway’s (1988/2004) conception of situated knowing which “…is partial in all its guises, never finished,…is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another” (p. 90). Similarly, Gadamer(1960/2004) wrote that “…the translator must translate the meaning to be understood into the context in which the other speaker lives. This does not, of course, mean that he is at liberty to falsify the meaning of what the other person says. Rather, the meaning must be preserved, but since it must be understood within a new language world, it must establish its validity within it in a new way” (p. 386). In this way, translation serves to both enlarge each partner’s horizon, while integrating their unique perspective into a functional stance which, itself, is always subject to revision.

**Bildung and Transformation**

Unlike SP thinking, *Bildung* is centered on transformation in which the knower, the process of knowing, and the knowledge produced are all unified and reconstructed through the act.
Michel Foucault’s work in *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* is helpful here. In that text, Foucault argued that since Descartes, *gnothi seauton* (know thyself) has served as the guiding paradigm of philosophy. To the contrary, he argues *epimeleia heauton* (care of oneself) not only was historically the guiding premise of philosophy, under which ‘know thyself’ was a sub-function, but should remain as its paradigmatic concept. Foucault (2005) sees, then, “the care of the self and knowledge of the self [as] a crucial axis for understanding the…connection between the subject and truth” (p. XXI).

Foucault describes the *gnothi seauton* as the “philosophical” attitude, contrasted against *epimeleia heauton* as the “spiritual.” There are three dimensions of the spiritual which set it apart from the philosophical: the spiritual presumes that the subject is capable of having direct and immediate access to the truth; to access the truth, the subject must undergo a conversion or transformation; when the subject does access the truth, his being is transfigured in some way (pp. XXIV, 10-17).

For Foucault, the spiritual view guided philosophy until the modern “Cartesian moment.” Foucault (2005) wrote, “I think the modern age of the history of truth begins when knowledge itself and knowledge alone gives access to the truth. That is to say, it is when the philosopher (or the scientist, or simply someone who seeks the truth) can recognize truth and have access to it in himself and through his acts of knowledge alone, without anything else being demanded of him and without his having to alter or change in any way his being as subject” (p. 17). In this moment, the self is disqualified, or discounted in the act of knowing. Here, knowing as expressed by “S knows that p” becomes a Gnostic concept, disconnected from and to the subject.
A major concern for Foucault (2005) was the “experimental attitude,” which is the testing of oneself, or one’s mode of being, in and through concrete practices (p. XXVII). In other words, in order to know something one must be transformed, because knowledge exists differently for different persons. Foucault (2005) wrote that “In short, I think we can say that in and of itself an act of knowledge could never give access to the truth unless it was prepared, accompanied, doubled, and completed by a certain transformation of the subject; not of the individual, but of the subject himself in his being as subject” (pp. 15-16). Yet, in order to be transformed, one must undergo an experience which allows one to, in the words of Proust, see the world with new eyes.

Foucault, then, establishes knowing as a fusion of the knower with the known. In other words, the knower operates under certain a number of received assumptions which holds the world together. To access to a different truth is to do the difficult work of reconstructing the self. In doing so, we are not simply learning facts or certain premises, but are examining and reconstructing core doctrines, systems, foundations which are the way the world hangs together. As Davidson writes in his introduction “that is why Foucault’s relentless pursuit of knowledge revolves not around the mere acquisition of knowledge, but around the value of losing one’s way for the subject of knowledge, a losing one’s way which is the price of self-transformation” (p.XXVIII). As Foucault (2005) wrote, “…in ancient philosophy there is the idea of a conversion, for example, which alone can give access to the truth. One cannot have access to the truth if one does not change one’s mode of being” (p. 190). Here, education becomes as much a kind of growth as pruning. It is a kind of spiritual death and rebirth, which is profoundly transformational.
If we take Foucault’s description as a basic outline of the transformative goal of Bildung, there are four dimensions of the Bildung model which separate it from SP thinking, particularly as it serves as a model of knowledge in education.

**A methodology without a method; a teleology without an end.**

The first is that, while there is the ability to differentiate between those who have been educated in the way described by Bildung and those who haven’t, Bildung contains neither a precise method for its development, nor a fixed endpoint where a person might finally arrive. This is because the process is grounded in the unique circumstance of each individual experiencing, acting within, and reconstructing the world. Gadamer (1960/2004) argues that if Bildung is taken seriously, “what is in question is not a procedure or behavior but what has come into being” the general characteristic of which is “keeping oneself open to what is other – to other, more universal points of view” (p. 15). In this way, Bildung – as with hermeneutic understanding - is far more like a developed habit, ability or perspective, than a teleology of facts known. In educational terms, this view rejects the outcomes-based paradigm which unilaterally and uniformly defines growth for all students in favor of growth as organically articulated by the student actually experiencing educative process.

**The hermeneutic circle.**

Embedded within Bildung is both the content and process of the hermeneutic circle, which is a central component within the overall project of hermeneutics. This circle is typically framed as a relationship between the whole and the parts. For example, as one begins to read the
first few lines or paragraphs of a text, one has to immediately project a view in the imagination of how the rest of the text might appear. In other words, one takes for granted a kind of wider continuity and then imagines the way in which that continuity takes shape. As one encounters more of the text, one’s expectations are most often defeated or undermined by new information, which one then uses not only to reconstruct the imagined whole, but also to reinterpret the history of what one has already encountered. A core dimension of this motion is the notion of alienation and return.

Gadamer(1960/2004)writes that “to recognize one’s own in the alien, to become at home in it, is the basic movement of the spirit, whose being consists only in returning to itself from what is other” (p. 13). Further down in the passage, he reiterates that “thus what constitutes the essence of Bildung is clearly not alienation as such, but the return to oneself – which presupposes alienation, to be sure” (p. 13). So, here we find both the motion and content of interpretation. The major educational implication here is that learning is neither linear, personally distant, nor efficient. Instead, it functions more like a constant entering and returning into situations of alienation, confusion, and unknown which reconstruct the entirety of the student’s horizon of understanding.

The role of tradition.

Bildung begins in the assumption we are immediately thrown into a historically and culturally conditioned world, but we must also struggle for understanding. Gadamer(1960/2004)argued, “In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it.” (p. 278). Further, “the history of ideas shows that not until the Enlightenment does the concept of
prejudice acquire the negative connotation familiar today. Actually ‘prejudice’ means a judgment that is rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have been examined” (p. 273). As opposed to the Enlightenment assumptions, Gadamer didn’t believe that it is possible to remove human knowers from the condition of historicity expressed in hermeneutic prejudice. Instead, prejudice is simply part of the fore-structure of understanding and a necessary part of knowing. Therefore, the goal of understand is not to rise above or remove oneself from tradition, but instead to understand one’s self as a transactional being within tradition, and to seek out more distant and divergent views in order to clarify and expand one’s own understanding. Here, the educational consequence is that each student’s history must be brought into and in some way center the pedagogical moment. This is opposed to the factory-like curricula and syllabi which typically characterize university environments, and which take no account for the unique personhood of students entering into them.

Translation and the fusion of horizons.

The goal of understanding, for Gadamer, is what he called the fusion of horizons, which is literally a transformation of the knower and the known, in which individuals are bound together and reconstructed. Gadamer(1960/2004) wrote that to “reach an understanding…is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one’s own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were” (p. 371). The moment of fusion is difficult work in which individuals create and are co-created by the community of knowers who undergo a mutual process of discovery and transformation. The resolution of the event is always more than each partner understood before the event took place
because it is both the growth and extension of one’s horizon, as well as its revision. Here, the *Bildung* rejects a view of education as the ability to recollect factoids in particular testing circumstances in favor of education as an unmeasurable process of personal transformation.

For Gadamer, then, *Bildung* is grounded both within the notion of effective history and in the motion of the hermeneutic circular motion - alienation and return – is established via attempting to understand tradition and, reciprocally, the self in relationship to tradition. This becomes the paradigmatic motion for all knowing. Gadamer(1960/2004)writes that “To recognize one’s own in the alien, to become at home in it, is the basic movement of spirit, whose being consists only in returning to itself from what is other” (p. 13). At the center of this process is a nonteleological motion between alienation or self-distancing, and return. Further this motion requires transaction with the world, rather than distancing from the world.

Here, the notion of memory is intimately connected to the circular motion of *Bildung*. Gadamer constructs his view in opposition to information-processing models of mind in which memory is conceptualized as storehouse of facts. For Gadamer (1960/2004), memory is an active, productive process: “whoever uses his memory as a mere faculty – and any ‘technique’ of memory is such a use – does not yet possess it as something that is absolutely his own. Memory must be formed; for memory is not memory for anything and everything” (p. 14).Memory is central to the way in which one’s horizon of understanding takes shape. It is a fluid concept, which not only includes, but in fact *requires* the notion of forgetting as necessary for the process of *Bildung* to occur. Memory is not an additive concept like the increasing of cold storage in a computer, but is more like the process of writing a narrative.
Gadamer (1960/2004) wrote that “only by forgetting does the mind have the possibility of total renewal, the capacity to see everything with fresh eyes, so that what is long familiar fuses with the new in a many leveled unity” (p. 14). It is through forgetting and remembering new values and meanings are created through reinterpretation. This is a central dimension of the motion of alienation and reinterpretation within Bildung, which includes not only new phenomena, experiences and events, but also the constant reinterpretation of previously evaluated meanings and values in one’s own history.

Out of the process of Bildung, persons learn what Gadamer, drawing on Hemholtz, calls “tact.” Gadamer (1960/2004) defined this as “a special sensitivity and sensitiveness to situations and how to behave in them, for which knowledge from general principles does not suffice” (p. 14). This is the dimension of Bildung which concerns the ability to read the culture – the situations in which one finds oneself – and to take appropriate action within it. He distinguishes the notion of tact from manners and draws a parallel between intuition in both aesthetics and history: “thus someone who has an aesthetic sense knows how to distinguish between the beautiful and the ugly, high and low quality, and whoever has a historical sense knows what is possible for an age and what is not, and has a sense of the otherness of the past in relation to the present” (p. 15). Ultimately, then, Bildung reconstructs the relationship between knowers and knowledge as being one of active production and dialogical engagement, rather than view knowing as a brute psychological state of a cognitive object.
2. Bildung Reconstructed

“The meaning of what we are saying is the tendency to respond to it.” G.H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*

One of the major claims of this dissertation is that pedagogy must be reconceptualized, such that it shifts from being understood as a form of *telling* and *hearing* to a collaborative form of *making or doing*. This claim is grounded in the idea that knowing or learning emerges from transactional experience in the world. Here, the model of knowing is expressed by the concept of *Bildung*.

While *Bildung* provides a strong conceptual vehicle to replace and overcome the dehumanizing affects of the SP tradition, one of the dangers is that the concept retains some of the pedagogical baggage of the neo-humanist tradition, which is to conceptualize learning as an individuated, cognitive activity which is not primarily a communal and embodied act of reconstruction.

To avoid this danger, this chapter will reconstruct the traditional notion of *Bildung*, such that it takes on the character of a process of embodied, communal and justice-driven inquiry, rather than imagined as an individual being cognitively enculturated. This reconstruction is contained in four parts: first, I will make a case for the naturalization of *Bildung* such that knowing is understood as an embodied way of inhabiting the world; second, I will argue for an intersubjective view of the self organized around action as the ground of *Bildung*; third, I will claim that intelligence is a communal concept, such that achieving *Bildung* requires a rich community of inquiry; fourth, I will claim that *Bildung* is a justice-oriented concept and must include the categories of democracy, freedom, and justice in its conceptualization. This
reconstructed notion of *Bildung* will then serve as the ground for theory of creative inquiry as active, productive inquiry.

**Bildung Naturalized**

Like Gadamer and Hegel, Dewey rejected the dichotomies embedded in the analytic tradition and instead argued in favor of the basic interrelatedness between person and world found in both Schiller’s *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* and Hegel’s philosophy (Lovlie, 2003, p. 5). Yet, as Good and Garrison (2010) argue, Dewey reconstructed Hegel’s theory of organically evolving universals and his notion of identity-in-difference into a naturalized metaphysics which took an organism adapting to its environment as its starting point.

Dewey’s 1920 work *Reconstruction in Philosophy* argued that two major historical moments made space for this new conception of philosophy. The first was the emergence of the process of experimental inquiry as the primary guide to knowing. The second was what he calls “psychology based on biology” by which he means Darwinian naturalism, which allowed us to conceptualize ourselves as biological organisms.

In other words, his metaphysics began with the notion that life, by its very definition, is active. Life is not a static essence, but an event which is constantly adapting to and anticipating changes in the environment in order to not only to survive, but also thrive. Dewey (1920/2008) argued that “the effect of the development of [Darwin’s] biology has been to reverse that [older] picture. Wherever there is life, there is behavior, activity. In order that life may persist, this activity has to be both continuous and adapted to the environment” (p. 84). Yet, the implications of Darwin reach deeper than this, because advanced life is more active in the reconstruction of its
environment than less developed forms, and Dewey (1920/2008) argued that “the higher the form of life, the more important is the active reconstruction of the medium” (p. 85).

Dewey described this reversal of traditional epistemology in *The Quest for Certainty*. The subtitle of the text is as important as the lead: *A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action*. Here, Dewey both dissolved Western foundationalism and developed a synthetic account of metaphysics - a metaphysics of experience - which unifies the traditionally distinct philosophical categories of metaphysics, ontology and epistemology, by grounding them in human action in environment. In other words, he shifts the basic metaphysical “unit” from atomized essence to coordinated action between transactional partners. The result is the totality of what we know, including ourselves as persons, is an emergent property of our transactional relationship with the world. It is a property of experience.

Dewey’s notion of experience is grounded in a reconstructed and naturalized view of the Hegelian concept of negation and reintegration. As Good and Garrison (2010) argue, “Dewey understood that Hegel’s dialectic is the pattern of a universal (for example, the self) breaking itself up (particularization) through alienation and estrangement when it encounters obstacles to action that are sublated (*Aufhebung*) by an emergent universal habit as a unity in diversity” (p. 55). This Hegelian motion is retained in Gadamer’s notion of the motion of the hermeneutic circle, central to his conception of *Bildung*. For Gadamer (1960/2004) the world is continuous until our expectations are broken, as he argued:

> If we thus regard experience in terms of its result, we have ignored the fact that experience is a process. In fact, this process is essentially negative. It cannot be
described simply as the unbroken generation of typical universals. Rather, this generation takes place as false generalizations are continually refuted by experience and what was regarded as typical is shown not to be so. (p. 347)

Understanding begins with an event or evidence that our current horizon of understanding is incorrect. This triggers the process of interpretation, or of translation, which is entrance into authentic dialogue with unique partners. In doing so, we allow ourselves enter into alien horizons and become alienated from our own horizon as we interact with multiple perspectives, examining the object, idea or event through disparate views until we have recreated our own horizon in light of our alienated experience.

Like Gadamer, Dewey understands this motion as a universal condition of experience, yet he locates it within biological naturalism. Dewey (1938/2008) argued, “living may be regarded as a continual rhythm of disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium. …The state of disturbed equilibration constitutes need. The movement toward its restoration is search and exploration. The recovery is fulfillment or satisfaction” (p. 34). For both Gadamer and Dewey, this act of reconstruction and movement back toward a state of harmony is not a forwards-backwards motion, but a transformation. Dewey (1938/2008) argued that “the form of the relationship, of the interaction, is reinstated, not the identical conditions. Unless this fact is recognized, development becomes an abnormal or an unusual matter rather than the normal feature of life activities” (p. 35). For Gadamer, this transformation is centralized in his concept of effective history and primarily takes the form of a cognitive transformation. For Dewey, this is a literal transformation, a making or doing, within language, tools, or labor.
The Emergent Body-Mind

Dewey’s naturalized account dissolves all ontological dualisms in the world, including the body/mind dualism, which has so deeply characterized Western thought particularly after Descartes. This is a vital component of a naturalized account of Bildung, as it shifts the “seat” of knowing from cognition to embodied habits in order that learning and knowing become sub-functions of making or doing.

One of Dewey’s (1896) most notable critiques of the body/mind dualism is located in his essay “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology.” There, he argued that the traditional, reflex arc model on which cognitive psychology is based was flawed, in part, because it drew on a flawed metaphysics and therefore developed a mechanical view of life. In other words, it relied on a static Cartesian ontology which viewed human beings as essential, brain-governed bodies which causally interacted with the world. Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that “much so-called scientific psychology (has) been pretty thoroughly infected by the idea of the separateness of mind and body. This notion of their separation inevitably results in creating a dualism between ‘mind’ and ‘practice,’ since the latter must operate through the body” (p. 267).

Yet, for Dewey (1934/2008), the “mind is primarily a verb. It denotes all the way in which we deal consciously and expressly with the situations in which we find ourselves. Unfortunately, an influential manner of thinking has changed modes of action into an underlying substance that performs the activities in question. It has treated mind as an independent entity which attends, purposes, cares, notices, and remembers” (p.268). This philosophical leap from verb to noun has a further implication, which is that it implied that the mind was something
outside experience, or a transcendental essence located in an essentially dependent body. To the contrary, Dewey viewed the mind as an emergent part of the body and, reciprocally, that the body was an active part of the process of thinking. In fact, he typically referred to the mind as the “body-mind” in order to distinguish his views from traditional conceptions. Dewey’s emergent view of the body-mind was critiqued as being a kind of reductive materialism that would dissolve the idea of individual agency. His most powerful response to the critique of being a reductive materialism was located in a 1945 essay “Are Naturalists Materialists?”

In that essay, Dewey argues there are two different forms of materialism. The first form, which Dewey (1945) calls “brute” or “reductive” materialism, is the idea that the mental is “nothing but” the physical (p. 518). In this view, everything is a purely physical substance. It assumes, according to Dewey (1945), that because red appears when a particular electro-magnetic occurrence takes place, therefore red has the same meaning as “an electro-magnetic vibration having a wave-length of approximately 7100 Angstroms” (p. 518). The second form of materialism - naturalistic materialism - which Dewey supports, shares characteristics with, but is different from reductive materialism. It is similar in that it believes the mental is contingent upon the physical. In other words, pain, emotion, experiences of beauty all depend upon physical changes in the body. Yet, it is different in that it maintains the quality of “pain” is more than the physical ordering of particles, but is an emergent property of the physical. In other words, “pain” neither the physical ordering of particles (objective), nor the internal feeling of that ordering (subjective), but is intersubjective: a meaning attached to the transactional experience of that ordering. In other words, to emerge, “pain” requires both the circumstance and the response
within transactional experience. This is how Dewey argues that “pain” is an emergent property of the physical: it is dependent on, but not reducible to, the physical.

Dewey then argues that the crux of the mind/body issue is whether we believe the mental to be “wholly at the beck and call” of the physical (p. 520). The problem, as Dewey sees it, is that Western philosophy has given us only basic two options for dealing with the mental: either we are reductive materialists, in which we believe we have no free will and are simply reduced to physical causality, or we are transcendent idealists, in which we believe our minds are imported from a supernatural realm.

Dewey disagrees with both of these positions, and takes the substance water as a way to explain his view of the mental. He asks whether a chemist would argue that water is at the “beck and call” of hydrogen and oxygen. Dewey says that a chemist would never argue this because the claim is nonsensical. Instead, the chemist “would maintain that the existence of water and its properties is contingent upon the combined presence of certain elements interrelated in definite ways. But he would call attention to the fact that when these elements are so related, a distinctive mode of behavior is exhibited by the structured unity into which they enter” (p. 521). The crucial point here, like Dewey’s view of an emerging situation, is that water is neither something ontologically distinct from (transcendental idealist) nor determined by (reductive materialist) hydrogen and oxygen. Instead, the naturalistic materialist takes a third path: water is an emergent property of hydrogen and oxygen. In other words, to understand the properties of water, the chemist doesn’t isolate hydrogen and isolate oxygen to see what they do independently. Instead, she tries to account for what they do in relationship to one another through time. In other words, what emerges from their interrelationship is water. In the
relationship, the thing itself is made manifest. Dewey, therefore, argues that water “in behaving in the way it does behave under given circumstances is simply manifesting the behavior of its constituents as related in that structure under those circumstances” (p. 521). In other words, the qualities and behaviors of an organized whole (water) are neither dependent on nor distinct from the brute elements which constitute it.

Dewey believes the same thing is true of what we call mental. We are capable of thought, feeling, action because of the relational organization of our physical bodies, but this does not mean the mentally is dependent upon (meaning reducible to) the brute physical properties of our bodies. The mind is an emergent property of the body, or a manifestation of the relational ordering of the physical makeup of our bodies. In this way, the mental has its own set of unique characteristics and behaves in ways which cannot be predicted purely by isolating and examining each of its elements.

Here we see how Dewey, in 1945, resolves problems which are still under debate today regarding the relationship between the body and the mind, as well as questions regarding human agency. By constructing a transactional metaphysics and emergent ontology, those problematics are entirely dissolved. This is because those questions are already based on the assumption of a two-tiered universe and a causal-based metaphysics in which different essential, substances (mind/body, reason/emotion, object/subject, world/person) interact dialectically and mechanically. So, the question starts far too late into the problem, and the resulting debate is focused on how those substances interact (i.e. in what proportion) rather than asking whether those logical separations are also ontologically separated. Dewey, of course, argued that they are
not ontological distinctions at all, but simply useful distinctions for the purposes of refining action.

Yet Dewey goes further in his concept of embodiment by arguing that those meanings which emerged from transactional experience do not return to cold, psychical storage, but are encoded in the body-mind in the form of habits.

**Embodied Habits and the Structure of Experience**

What this view body-mind sets up for Dewey is the ability to develop a rich theory of embodied knowing, because from the very foundation there is a deep and continuous relationship between these two dimensions of knowing which are traditionally imagined to be distinct: the body and the mind.

His embodied epistemology, then, is fully developed in his notion of habits, which are the very way in which transactional experience is structured. Thomas Alexander (1987) argues that “habits primarily refer to the organizing abilities of the organism to reconstruct its environment; they ‘incorporate an environment within themselves. They are adjustments of the environment, not merely to it’” (p. 142). Thus, they become generalized responses to particular classes of situations, which expresses a wide view of knowing that accounts not just for content-knowledge, but also capacities to respond to situations or act. It is, in this way, the ability to functionally coordinate thought, feeling and action through habits.

Yet, even here, there is a sense in which a “capacity to act” is like a cognitive tool which is waiting outside experience in order to be imposed on it from without. This is not the case in Dewey’s view. Instead, habits are part of the fluid motion of lived experience. In other words,
habituated responses emerge, recede, overlap and are coordinated within the course of experienced problems. Yet it is also the case that habits are always already acting within and structuring experience such that the problems encountered also emerge from the way in which our habits structure our experience. This is the transactional nature of lived experience, and how habits are also the way in which experience is structured. In *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey (1922/2008) wrote that “we may think of habits as means, waiting, like tools in a box, to be used by conscious resolve. But they are something more than that. They are active means, means that project themselves, energetic and dominating ways of acting” (p. 22).

Of primary importance is that habits are encoded in the body-mind, rather than being purely cognitive. As Alexander (1987) argues, “because habit establishes the context, it transforms the basic biological nature of the act into a situation capable of taking on meanings…[therefore] the capacity of the body to respond and act, to be disturbed and to organize, to feel itself threatened with disconnection and to generate strategies of reconnection with the world provides the condition from which communication emerges” (pp. 150-151). As Shannon Sullivan (2006) describes them, “habits are not “in” the world like water is in a plastic cup. Because humans are habituated beings, the world inhabits us as much as we inhabit it” (p. 2). Instead, habits are “dispositions for transacting with the world, and they make up the very beings that humans are. If the self can be understood as a complex tapestry of woven fibers, habits are the various threads that make up the tapestry itself. Or, to stretch the metaphor, habits are the various threads that help constitute each other as they also make up the tapestry as a whole” (Sullivan, 2006, p. 2). In other words, and importantly, the body (taken as a logical
distinction) plays a necessary and active role in thinking, when thinking is not separated from action-in-environment. This, itself, is the very process of inquiry and structure of action.

**Bildung and the Intersubjective Self**

While the Gadamerian account of *Bildung* moves away from the transcendentally subjective view of the self, as expressed both by the Cartesian and Husserlian traditions, toward an intersubjective view, Gadamer’s view retains a conceptualization of the self which is grounded entirely in language and is, therefore, purely cognitive. In this section, I will present the action-centered intersubjective view of the self held by both G.H. Mead and Dewey, who were close collaborators, as an alternative to the linguistically-grounded self of the Gadamerian tradition retained in the *Bildung* tradition. Dewey’s understanding of the self drew on the thought of his longtime friend and collaborator G.H. Mead, who is generally considered to be a founder of social psychology. Mead’s view of the self contrasts with the essential view, which serves both as the starting point not only for SP thinking, but much of cognitive and behavioral psychology.

In his own time, Mead’s position was articulated against the behavioral psychology of James B. Watson. Watson argued that scientific study must limit its work to only those things which are externally observable and measurable. In doing so, it must reject a view of psychology which does anything more than measure and observe brains and nervous systems as they respond to external stimuli. Mead agreed with Watson that Freudian-style, phenomenological psychoanalysis relied too much on speculation about mental states which could never be
experimentally tested. In other words, he agreed with the general trajectory of psychological behaviorism, which was to give a behavioral account of action.

Yet, Mead disagreed with Watson’s view of what constituted action. Watson believed that concepts like *the mind* and *the self* were scientifically unobservable, and therefore metaphysically outside behavioral analysis. In other words, it began with the assumption that the relationship between person and world is merely a causal relationship, which the psychologist investigates for its relational structure. Here, Watson solved the mind/body or physic/psychological dualism by becoming a reductionist materialist, and reduced the complexity of action to a simple stimulus-response mechanism.

To the contrary, Mead believed that there were dimensions of action which belonged uniquely and dynamically to the organism, itself, rather than simply being a mechanical output of a stimulus-response on the organism. His thesis also required a rejection of dualism between the social and the natural, or facts and values, because the two are always already dynamically interrelated. In other words, for Dewey and Mead, there is no such thing as *a mind* as an essential property of human beings, but *to have a mind* means to be able to take the attitude of another toward a third thing. In other words, to have a mind means to be able to participate in meaningful social practices by coordinating our behavior with a community, and to have a self means to be able to embody culturally assigned roles and respond to others in their roles (Garrison, 1997, p. 140). Stated another way, if having *a mind* means taking the attitude toward another toward a third thing, having *a self* is taking the attitude of another toward one’s self. It is self-reflexive, intersubjective, and constructed.
Further, for Dewey and Mead, knowledge, meaning, and the self are all part of the same transactional, intersubjective world. Dewey (1925/2008a) argued, “meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behavior, and secondarily of objects. But the behavior of which it is a quality is a distinctive quality; [meaning is] cooperative in that responses to another’s acts involves contemporaneous response to a thing as entering into the other’s behavior; and this on both sides [sic]” (p. 141). For Dewey, then, knowledge – including knowledge of the self – was dependant on the coordinated behaviors of people in community for its construction, meaning and significance (Garrison, 1995, p. 719).

As Dewey argued, understanding and identity cannot be understood apart from the conditions in our lives out of which it arose. Further, the process of inquiry and discovery is process-relational, embodied, and holistic. The self is one dimension of meaning construction among others. It is therefore not a private, essential substance, but an ongoing process connected with our past and present choices, future hopes and dreams, and unique abilities and desires. It also emerges from the communities in which we find ourselves. In other words, what we know emerges from who we are, and who we are - the self - is literally our greatest hermeneutic achievement.

Mead’s view of the intersubjective self offers a stronger account of Bildung which is grounded in both action and community, primarily because it grounds the self in intersubjective meanings and knowings, which emerge as sub-functions or properties of coordinated behaviors and actions in environment. This bears a family resemblance to Gadamer’s account, but differs in important ways.
It is clear that Gadamer, Mead, and Dewey all reject the transcendental self-conception expressed in the Cartesian essential self. Mead, Dewey and Gadamer also share the idea that language is that which births human consciousness. In other words, it is not that there is an essential self for whom language becomes a conduit of expression, but instead language gives rise to consciousness.

Gadamer (1960/2004) famously claimed, “being that can be understood is language” declaring that selfhood is, in fact, language incarnate (p. 470, emphasis in original). The implications of that claim reveal another agreement: that there is no ontological difference between, as Gadamer would claim, thought and language, or as Dewey would claim, self and action. As Gadamer (1960/2008) argued, “experience is not wordless to begin with, subsequently becoming an object of reflection by being named, by being subsumed under the universality of the word. Rather, experience of itself seeks and finds words to express it. We see the right word—i.e., the word that really belongs to the thing—so that in it the thing comes into language” (p.417). In other words, thought and language emerge continuously. They further and importantly agree that the intersubjective self exists within time and is, therefore, a property of relationships and experience. For Gadamer, language is not that which exists in dictionaries or grammar books, but emerges through use. Joel Weinsheimer (1985) wrote that for Gadamer “truth belongs to discourse. That truth is not found to be in a dictionary says nothing against its presence in language, for language is not to be found there either but instead in speaking and writing” (p. 231). The same holds true for Dewey, for whom being emerges as a form of action.

They do, though, diverge in locating what precisely constitutes language. For Gadamer, language is language proper: the world of a cultural discourse. As Joel Weinsheimer (1985)
argued, “Gadamer concurs that truth is not to be found in individual words or even in all the words in a language, but form him this admission does not require the abandonment of language as the locus of truth in favor of a wordless logos. As letters first become meaningful when they are linked to words, so words first become capable of being true when they are organized in discourse” (p. 231). To the contrary, for Dewey and Mead, language is anything which might be considered a significant symbol is linguistic, but only insofar as it is a property of and related specifically to behavior. Mead (1967) argued that it is “the relationship of this symbol, this vocal gesture, to such a set of responses in the individual himself as well as in the other than makes that vocal gesture what I call a significant symbol” (p. 71). In other words, significant symbols are similar to Gadamer’s view of language, but broader, more explicitly social and embodied. This notion reaches beyond language proper to include includes embodied gestures, or relationship-specific forms of communication, such as between a mother and child. It also includes and is grounded in the behaviors (i.e. gestures and reactions) connected to the symbols.

The implications of this difference reveal another difference, which is that for Gadamer the self is a purely rational, cognitive concept, precisely because it is structured linguistically, as a mental act. To the contrary, for Dewey the self is an emergent property of the body-mind in which cognition serves as a sub-function. For Mead, as well, the self includes the notion of embodiment, though this is less well treated than in Dewey’s writings. Mead (1967) argued that “the line of demarcation between the self and the body is found, then, first of all in the social organization of the act within which the self arises, in its contrast with the activity of the physiological organism” (p. 186n). In other words, Mead does draw a logical (not ontological) distinction between self and body as being between social acts (e.g. gestures, postures, sounds,
etc…) and physiological ones (e.g. breathing). Further, he says “the legitimate basis of distinction between mind and body is between the social patterns and the patterns of the organism itself. Education must bring the two closely together. We have, as yet, no comprehending category. This does not mean to say that there is anything logically against it; it is merely a lack of our apparatus or knowledge” (p. 186n).

Therefore, while they both hold an intersubjective view of the self, their understanding of intersubjectivity is distinctly different, with Gadamer’s being grounded in language, and Mead and Dewey’s in functional action, in which language serves as a constituting element, along with labor and tools.

In Gadamer’s (1960/2004) account, intersubjectivity emerges from a kind of linguistic “to-and-fro movement”: one partner poses a question from his/her own horizon; the other interprets the question through the lens of their horizon; both question their assumptions (revision) and expand the boundary of possibilities (expansion); and the roles are reversed (p. 104). Partners do not engage in dialogue to remove their prejudices, to find objective truth, but instead to put their horizons in motion. Gadamer (1960/2004) wrote:

… the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we become involved in it. The way one word follows another, with the conversation taking its own twists and reaching its own conclusion, may well be conducted in some way, but the partners conversing are far less the leaders of it
than the led. No one knows in advance what will "come out" of a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a good conversation or that it was ill fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it—i.e., that it allows something to "emerge" which henceforth exists. (p. 385)

In Mead’s and Dewey’s account, it is the consequences of \textit{functional intersubjective action} which ultimately organize the interpreter and the interpreted. In other words, from a Meadian perspective, one of the dangers of Gadamer’s dialogical view is that it retains that notion that the self, while it is an event-process, is still stable, central, and primarily logical. Stated another way, in Gadamer’s account, the interpreter ultimately organizes the interpretation of intersubjective, or co-constituted objects. The self, while developing out of dialogical intersubjectivity, is itself the signifier of meaning.

To the contrary, within Mead’s action-grounded self, meanings (including the self) are always under negotiation and resolved through action, in which language is a sub-function. Mead characterizes this as the “I” and the “Me,” in which the “I” represents the unique response of the individual that “appears experientially as part of a ‘me’,” where the “me” is the attitude of the other. This is not simply an internalizing of Gadamer’s view of dialogically intersubjectivity, though it bears a family resemblance to it. In part, this is because for Gadamer the self can never completely take the attitude of the other, which is always already hermeneutically interpreted. For Mead, the “me” attitude is intersubjectively, and therefore objectively, available.
Further, and more importantly, is the notion of intention. While Gadamer’s hermeneutic self is always molded by historical prejudices which are not purely at the level of consciousness, the self is always acting intentionally. In other words, *conscious decision* (thought emerging continuously in language) is prioritized before action taken. *Conscious decision* is made, which then gives rise to action. *Conscious decision* is also where the self emerges, who then acts on and through the world. This could not be further from Mead’s position, and this difference will be critically important in grounding the next chapter, where I will argue that doing is prioritized before knowing.

Mead (1967) draws an analogy between the I/Me and “the situation of a scientist solving a problem, where he has certain data which call for certain responses”:

> The action of the self is in response to these conflicting sets of data in the form of a problem, with conflicting demands upon him as a scientist. He has to look at it in the different ways. That action of the “I” is something the nature of which he cannot tell in advance. The “I,” then, in relation of the “I” and the “me,” is something that is, so to speak, responding to a social situation which is within the experience of the individual. (p. 177)

For Mead, what is worked out dialogically is the “Me,” but the “Me” emerges as an “I” in and through continuously coordinated *action*, which is not conscious, but embodied, and transactionally experimental. The “I” becomes itself *in response to* action performed in an environment, including linguistic action taken. Stated another way, the “to and fro” motion in
Gadamer has a place in Mead, but it is prior to the emergence of the self. The self, then, is not a
dialogical motion between telling and listening, but a transactional, or shared, making or doing.

Further, because Gadamer’s account is grounded in conscious cognitivity, which is a kind
of always already intentionality, space is not made for serendipity inside the act of
intersubjective constitution, which is a form of creation. In other words, in Gadamer’s account,
while there is always residual mystery and never pure unconcealment of being, the hermeneutic
motion is always an intentional act. Mead’s view, on the other hand, being grounded in intuition
and literal action, of which intentional cognitivity serves as a sub-function, more concretely
grounds the intersubjective constitution of individuals, meanings and knowings. In other words,
emergence is not simply that which is unexpected in an intentional act, but is instead those
dimensions of the world acting on us in a developing situation. This idea will be taken up more
significantly in chapter three.

**Bildung as a Social Capacity**

The notion of social intelligence, which is grounded in an intersubjective view of the
self, shifts the view of knowing and learning at the center of Bildung from an individual to a
social concept. Stated another way, Gadamer’s notion of Bildung is conceptualized as a unified
self developing ability within an available cultural meaning-field in order to find one’s home
within it. In this view, the self as an organizing unit is taken as a given, and hermeneutic
dialogue becomes the mode of individual acculturation to a pre-existent meaning-field, or
cultural horizon. Here, Gadamer rejects the SP idea that meaning is a property of things-in-
themselves, and therefore knowing is not holding objectively available meanings in a kind of
psychic cold storage. Instead, meaning is intersubjective and the process of knowing is participatory and changes the interpreter. Yet, Gadamer still retains the idea that intelligence is an individual pursuit.

To the contrary, from a Meadian and Deweyan standpoint, all knowing and learning are social concepts and, therefore, require a social, participatory medium to facilitate growth. In other words, Bildung should not be conceptualized as a singular individual adapting to the demands of culture, or a private reconstruction of the self, but instead knowing and learning are a very public reconstruction of the world. This will open space for the next section which will claim that there are better and worse social conditions in which knowing and learning occur, and that Bildung must include the notion of justice and cultural critique.

The Existential Matrix of Knowing

Dewey’s view of social intelligence is grounded within what he calls the existential matrix of inquiry, which includes a continuity between the biological and the cultural as a ground for all experience. Dewey (1938/2008) wrote that “Of distinctly human behavior it may be said that the strictly physical environment is so incorporated in a cultural environment that our interactions with the former, the problems that arise with reference to it, and our ways of dealing with these problems, are profoundly affected by the incorporation of the physical environment in the cultural” (p. 49). The implication is that all experience depends upon an emergent and transactional continuity between the biological and the social, the organism and the environment. For example, language is not a priori thought, but is shaped through gestures and sounds which are themselves embodied habits overflowing with cultural meanings. In other words, as Dewey
(1938/2008), “to speak, to read, to exercise any art, industrial fine or political, are instances of modifications wrought within the biological organism by the cultural environment…this modification of organic behavior in and by the cultural environment accounts for, or rather is, the transformation of purely organic behavior into behavior marked by intelligent properties with which the present discussion is concerned” (p. 49).

As Charlene Haddock Seigfried (1996) argued, the conduit view of learning which is based on the SP model assumes that meanings arise from sensory impact and, in doing so, entirely ignores the existential matrix which dictates that meaning arises from use. As Seigfried wrote “to have an idea of a thing means to be able to foresee the probable consequences of its action on us or of ours on it” (p. 95). In this way, the social view of intelligence is also grounded within the intersubjective view of the individual previously articulated. One dimension of Dewey’s view of the self, which is critically important here is his creative ontology and, in particular, its reconstruction of the notion of environment as expressed in his critique of the reflex arc.

The Emerging Environment

Dewey’s view of the individual begins in the idea that species are not fixed, but are always undergoing transactional change in their environment. For Dewey (1925/2008a), “every existence is an event” (p. 63). Further, “nature is viewed as consisting of events rather than substances, it is characterized by histories, that is, by continuity of change proceeding from beginnings to endings” (pp. 5-6). In other words, Dewey held a creative and holistic ontology in which human beings already have genuine, innate needs as a result of being live beings in the
world. It is the ongoing, transactional emergence of the universe and human beings as part of the universe which lies at the heart of Dewey’s naturalism. As Garrison (1994) argues:

For Dewey scientific inquiry (thinking) was a process engaged in by some natural existences, including human beings. For Dewey human nature was a seamless part of nature. This brings us to what I feel is the font for understanding Dewey’s philosophy of science and research: As Dewey saw it, we are participants in an unfinished universe rather than spectators of a finished universe. That is why our actions, our behaviors, our social constructions, deconstructions, and reconstructions have ontological significance. (p. 8)

Dewey’s metaphysic, then, was process-relational, embodied and holistic, rather than causal and analytic. For Dewey, knowing was predicated on the fact that life occurs not simply within an environment, but in interaction within that environment. As Dewey (1925/2008a) wrote, “the striving to make stability of meaning prevail over the instability of events is the main task of intelligent human effort” (p. 49). The live creature interacts with its environment, is required for survival to react to the unique conditions of that environment, to ultimately recover and adapt to those conditions. Knowledge, then, cannot be understood apart from the lived conditions out of which it arises.

Dewey’s ontology allowed him to overcome what William James called the psychological fallacy, which is to assume that persons in the same space inhabit the same environment. Dewey first outlined the framework to his thought in the 1896 essay “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology.” In that essay, he argued what would later become SP was grounded
in a metaphysical mistake, which was to imagine that action or learning is a simple reflex arc: a
person is stimulated and s/he responds.

In other words, SP begins with the premise that people are effects which are motivated by
particular sets of reducible and causal conditions. Darwinian naturalism instead argues that as
organisms acting within an unstable environment, people are always already motivated to action
by the very fact that they are living beings. This motivation includes the constant construction
and reconstruction of the environmental situations in which we find ourselves. Dewey
(1916/2008a) argued, “the words ‘environment,’ ‘medium’ denote something more than
surroundings which encompass an individual. They denote specific continuity of the
surroundings with his own active tendencies” (p. 15). In other words, for Dewey the environment
is not something given by one’s surroundings, but constructed by the desires and habits of the
person inhabiting a spatio-temporal moment. For example, when observing the Golden Gate
Bridge, while the artist, the engineer and the city planner all look at the same object, they all see
something different. Dewey (1922/2008) wrote that:

Observation and foretelling. The more flexibly they are, the more refined is
perception in its discrimination and the more delicate the presentation evoked by
imagination. The sailor is intellectually at home on the sea, the painter in his
studio, the man of science in his laboratory. These commonplaces…mean nothing
more or less than that habits formed in this process of exercising biological
aptitudes are the sole agents of observation, recollection, foresight and
judgment…Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving and reasoning that is done. (pp. 123-124)

This is because the artist, the engineer, and the city planner all come to the object with a different set of concerns, interests, and habits of mind. A metaphysics of experience, then, begins with the idea that the live creature already has genuine, innate needs, which sediment into habits of living. We all see things differently because we are all born with genuinely different needs which give rise to desires, and we all have learned to inhabit different environments.

For Dewey persons are co-creators of the situations in which they find ourselves. This further means that the basic psychological unit cannot be an arc of the physical environment pressing upon the person, but that unit is dyadic, it is a dialogical circle which we ourselves co-construct. Dewey (1896) argued that “the reflex arc idea, as commonly employed, is defective in that it assumes sensory stimulus and motor response as distinct psychical existences, while in reality they are always inside a co-ordination and have their significance purely apart from the part played in maintaining or reconstituting the co-ordinations” (p. 360). The implication of both a creative ontology transacting with and emerging from the existential matrix of inquiry is that the very notion of knowing and learning is a dyadic concept which is intersubjectively brought into being from within a distributed field.

**The Communal Emergence of Meaning**

For Dewey, then, meaning emerges from communally engaged action. Dewey (1927/1998) wrote that, “associated or joint activity is a condition of the creation of community.
But association itself is physical and organic, while communal life is moral, that is emotionally, intellectually, consciously sustained” (p. 296). In other words, Dewey draws a distinction here between a group of biological beings and a human community, with the former being that which is infused with meanings and knowings. The significant feature which breathes life into a community as community is intelligence. In other words, intelligence is an entirely a social phenomenon.

Secondarily, and importantly, the self doesn’t exist prior to involvement in community, but in fact emerges from and is contingent upon participation in community. Here, Dewey (1927/1998) argued that the “‘I’ and ‘mine’ appear on the scene only when a distinctive share in mutual action is consciously asserted or claimed” (p. 296). What we might say, then, what we know – of objects and of the self - is entirely contingent both on the kind of communities we emerge from and exist within, but also our level of meaningful participation within those communities.

The major implication here is that, grounding the self within cooperative, transactional action shifts the very notion of intelligence shifts from being a generic individual ability (“S”) for the containment of objectively available facts (“p”) to a social capacity which brings together the individual, as well as the social and natural world. Charlene Haddock Siegfried wrote (1999) wrote that “intelligence is social…because meaning arises from use… And it is by observation and participation in how others around us use things, the recognition of the instrumentalities through which they reach their ends, that intelligence is developed from the earliest years of life” (p. 211).
Here, the intersection between personal habit and social meaning become pronounced. As Dewey (1927/2008) argued, habits “are formed for the most part under the customs of a group” (p. 334). In other words, habit isn’t predictive and doesn’t dictate intelligent thought, but habit “determines the channels within which [thought] operates…Thinking itself becomes habitual along certain lines; specialized occupation…Hence the idea that men are moved by an intelligent and calculated regard for their own good is pure mythology” (p. 335). Habit, then, becomes a way of internalizing intelligence, which is a social construct. It is how social norms, customs, interests, concerns, become inscribed within the embodied self. Dewey (1927/2008) goes on to say that “even if the principle of self-love actuated behavior, it would still be true that the objects in which men find their love manifested, the objects which they take as constituting their peculiar interests, are set by habits reflecting social customs” (p. 335-336). Stated another way, the notion of social intelligence flips the question at the center of Bildung from “how does the self become an informed citizen within culture?” to “how can selfhood and freedom emerge from culture?”

**Intelligence as Social**

From the perspective of the dualistic metaphysics on which SP thinking is based, the concept of social intelligence is illogical. The dualistic notions embedded in the Substance Realist metaphysics are committed to the notion that knowledge is a detached object which always already exists independently in the world. Reciprocally, it conceives of intelligence as an individual psychological capacity to reproduce those facts.

The notion of social intelligence, then, begins not simply in a reconceptualization of knowing or learning, but of reality. It begins instead in Dewey’s transactional metaphysics and
creative ontology, in which organic beings are constantly reconstructing their environment. The basic metaphysical unit, here, is not the same as the essentialized units of the Substance Realist account, but the event of experience. Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that:

[Sense material] cannot be opposed to action, for motor apparatus and ‘will’ itself are the means by which this participation is carried on and directed. It cannot be opposed to ‘intellect,’ for mind is the means by which participation is rendered fruitful through sense; by which meanings and values are extracted, retained, and put to further service in the intercourse of the live creature with his surroundings…Experience is the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of organism and environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into participation and communication. (p. 28)

Therefore, in understanding intelligence as social we have to begin, on one hand, with the idea of the distributed self which is organized through cooperative action and, on the other hand, with the notion that meanings are dyadic and intersubjective. While it is possible to speak of analytic concepts like intellect, mind, knowledge, or world as logical divisions, in the synthetic flow of lived experience they are unified within transactional reconstruction.

Yet this does not mean that we have no ground on which to stand, or that the world is simply reducible to differing discourses, as the post-structural account might contend. Instead, intelligence is the capacity for a real, undertaken experience to yield meanings. Here, Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that “An experience has pattern and structure, because it is not just doing and undergoing in alternation, but consists of them in relationship. To put one’s hand in the fire that
consumes it is not necessarily to have an experience. The action and its consequence must be joined in perception. This relationship is what gives meaning; to grasp it is the objective of all intelligence” (p. 51). The implication of this claim is two-fold. On the one hand there is a very real structure embedded in moments of experience. In other words, there are relationships between things that can be wrought out of an undertaken experience, which are meanings and knowings. On the other hand, experience is not a private affair. It is not private not only because it takes place in transaction with the world, but also because that realization of relationship emerges from habitually conditioned thinking, both in its formation (i.e. the problem developing) and its conclusion (i.e. the use/interpretation settling) which itself is conditioned by prior, public experiences.

The work of intelligence is, then, consists in the “perception of relationship between what is done and what is undergone” ultimately yielding a new understanding of both self and world, or a new capacity for future reconstruction and meaning making (Dewey, 1934/2008, p. 52). In other words, intelligence is a kind of spectrum of hermeneutic interpretation, but one which is publicly reconstructive and transactional. This includes as much mathematical formulations or chemical notations, as it does aesthetic or moral meanings.

The notion of social intelligence opens up important avenues in thinking about the role and scope of education. The first is that intelligence is not a psychological capacity which is reducible to pure genetics, but emerges from and is enacted within the social realm. Dewey (1920/2008) wrote that “Intelligence is not something possessed once and for all. It is in constant process or forming, and its retention requires constant alertness in observing consequences, an open-minded will to learn and courage in re-adjustment” (p. 135). In other words, intelligence is
not the recollection of factoids, but instead is a capacity to act which always already takes shape within a social and intersubjective world - a habit which his always undergoing formation and reconstruction.

This also entails that intelligence can both grow and shrink with practice. Intelligence also is not a capacity which transcends context, but something which is borne out differently in different environments. The educational implication here is that intelligence cannot be teleologically prescribed. Dewey (1920/2008) argued that “in contrast with this experimental and re-adjusting intelligence, it must be said that Reason as employed by historic rationalism has tended to carelessness, conceit, irresponsibility, and rigidity – in short absolutism” (p. 135). This is nothing short of a complete rejection of the view of learning and knowing on which the SP is developed.

Thirdly, the notion of social intelligence is not limited to cognition as in SP thinking, but encompasses the intuitive, affective, and emotional. Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that:

Any idea that ignores the necessary role of intelligence in production of works of art is based upon identification of thinking with use of one special kind of material, verbal signs and words. To think effectively in terms of relations of qualities is as severe a demand upon thought as to think in terms of symbols, verbal and mathematical. Indeed, since words are easily manipulated in mechanical ways, the production of a work of genuine art probably demands more intelligence than does most of the so-called thinking that goes on among those who pride themselves on being ‘intellectuals.’” (p. 52)
This concept will be important in the next chapter which develops an account of learning as an act of creative inquiry. In Dewey’s account, intelligence is more broadly conceived than pure cognition, which opens up space not only for conceptualizing knowing in terms of the intuitive and affective, but also in terms of the relational and empathetic. He (1934/2008) wrote that:

intellectual relations subsist in propositions; they state the connection of terms with one another. In art, as in nature and in life, relations are modes of interaction. They are pushes and pulls; they are contractions and expansions; they determine lightness and weight, rising and falling, harmony and discord. The relations of friendship, of husband and wife, of parent and child, of citizen and nation, like those of body to body in gravitation and chemical action, may be symbolized by terms or conceptions and then be stated in propositions. But they exist as actions and reactions in which things are modified. (pgs. 139-140)

Lastly, social intelligence is grounded in communal transaction and in struggle. In other words, traditional SP thinking imagines that the best possible pedagogical model is one in which knowledge is most efficiently distributed to learners. Yet, social intelligence understands resistance, struggle and failure as absolutely essential to learning, which is a creative act. Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that:

The factor of resistance is worth especial notice at this point. Without internal tension there would be a fluid rush to a straightaway mark; there would be nothing that could be called development and fulfillment. The existence of
resistance defines the place of intelligence in the project of an object of fine art.
The difficulties to be overcome in bringing about the proper reciprocal adaptation of parts constitute what in intellectual work are problems. As in activity dealing with predominately intellectual matters, the material that constitutes a problem has to be converted into a means for its solution. (p. 143)

Therefore, the removal of experienced struggle via ambiguity and difference is, in essence, the removal of development and growth from education.

**Bildung as an Act of Justice**

So far I have argued that the concept of *Bildung* must be grounded in a naturalized metaphysics of experience and, in particular, take up an embodied view of both the individual and knowing. I have also claimed that the view of the self as traditionally understood within the *Bildung* tradition must be viewed as both intersubjective and grounded in embodied action in environment. Lastly, I have argued that *Bildung* must be viewed as a social capacity which breaks into a public reconstruction of the world. This section will now claim that *Bildung* must be tied to and emerge out of an orientation toward justice, paying particular attention to the nature of freedom, democracy, and justice.

**Freedom**

Educational practice grounded in the SP model of knowledge develops into what Paulo Freire characterized as the banking model of education. In this system, the teacher-student
relationship is viewed as top-down and one-directional. Knowledge is viewed as a collection of dislocated facts which are “deposited” by the expert-teacher into the student via rote memorization, repetition and drilling. Freire (1970/2000) wrote that in this model “[e]ducation thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat” (p. 72).

Freire saw several fundamental problems with this model. Primary among them was that this system reinforced hegemonic systems: “Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry” (p. 72). For Freire, the banking model virtually eliminated the dialogue and relationality necessary for developing the critical consciousness and hope in students, which would allow them to become aware of the hegemonic structures of domination. The banking model, then, does not simply keep students from becoming aware of hegemony, but it actively reinforces systems of domination and oppression. Students are “alienated like the slave in the Hegelian dialectic…” (p. 72). Freire believed that the banking system didn’t simply trap students, but it dehumanized them, by taking away their critical and creative capacities and, in turn, their agency.

For Freire, like Jane Addams and John Dewey, there was no ontological separation between self, schooling, and society, and therefore pedagogy was always already a political act: an act of justice. Where traditional schools forced students to conform to the structures of the world, critical pedagogy was an act of reconstruction, which empowered the student to transform the world according to their own experience and the experiences of their communities.
If this is the case, then education is ultimately about the freedom of persons in an ongoing search for global justice. Here, freedom is not the neoliberal, negative view of freedom, but freedom viewed positively and productively. This view is expressed by Maxine Greene (1988) who argued that “there is general agreement [across philosophical positions] that the search for some kind of critical understanding is an important concomitant of the search for freedom. There is also agreement that freedom ought to be conceived of as an achievement within the concreteness of lived social situations rather than as a primordial or original possession…we might think of freedom as an opening of spaces as well as perspectives, with everything depending on the actions we undertake in the course of our quest, the praxis we learn to devise” (pp. 4-5). In opposition to the banking model of education, Freire proposed a praxis-oriented, dialogical form of education which would ultimately lead to the transformation of both students and the communities in which they lived.

While Freire did not write specifically in the Bildung tradition, his concept of critical pedagogy did develop out of Hegelianism and therefore shares the dialogical and transformational outlook of Bildung. Freire’s concept of a limit-situation is helpful in conceptualizing both the motion and goal of Bildung within the context of a justice-orientation. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire (1970/2000) outlines what he calls limit-situations, which bear a family resemblance to Gadamer’s notion of horizon of understanding, and Dewey’s concept of habit.

For Freire, one of the markers of the nature of humanity is the ability to abstract one’s self from the flow of the world, in the form of objectifying the world. This objectification constructs particular limit-situations, which are culturally received structures, or truths about the
way in which the world operates. Freire argues that limit-situations bear no value in themselves, but simply emerge from the process of human consciousness. Yet, what matters is how these structures are perceived – in other words, whether they are perceived as given restrictions on the world (i.e. natural truths), or whether they are viewed as constructions which bind culture, but are open to reconstruction or removal. Freire (1970/2000) argued that “once perceived by individuals as fetters, as obstacles to their liberation, these situations stand out in relief from the background, revealing their true nature as concrete historical dimensions of a given reality” (p. 99). The goal of the educator, then, is to first identify these limit-situations within and among communities. Secondly, to become a catalyst to the self-awareness of these limit-situations as cultural constructions by placing students in to dialogical problem-situations which will disrupt their perception as received truths. Thirdly, to empower students to take action (praxis) which will dialogically reconstruct both self and world.

In this way Bildung is both a disruption and reconstruction, which serves as a form of resistance to the increasing neoliberal economic rationality guiding American schooling. As Roland Reichenbach(2003) argues, “as economic rationality continues to “colonialise” (Habermas) the Lebenswelt (life-world), the old modern project of moral betterment of humankind is buried in the graveyard of great human ideas” (p. 94). This condition of colonization is also described by Freire as the condition of oppression which is both submersion in limit-situations created by the banking model of education and internalizing the paradigm of oppression. Here (1970/2000), the oppressed exist in a kind of “living death” in which “they prefer the security of conformity with their state of unfreedom to the creative communion produced by freedom and even they very pursuit of freedom” (pp. 132; 48).
The emergence of freedom and humanization, for Freire, was not simply a state of mind, but requires a literal engagement with the world in a struggle for justice. This is expressed in his concept of praxis as necessary for transformative education. Freire (1970/2000) wrote that the oppressed “must acquire critical awareness of oppression through the praxis of this struggle [against oppressors]. One of the gravest obstacles to the achievement of liberation is that oppressive reality absorbs those within it and thereby acts to submerge human beings’ consciousness. Functionally, oppression is domesticating. To no longer be prey to its force one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can be done only by means of the praxis: reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it” (p. 51). Stated another way, Bildung cannot be simply a moment of personal realization or transformation, because the personal is always already interpersonal, or intersubjective. For transformation to occur, consciousness raising must be tied to action-reflection (praxis) in the world. Bildung is, then, always already a movement toward justice.

**Democracy, Community, Justice**

The claim that education as expressed through the Bildung is particularly is aimed at cultivating free individuals, begs the question of what kind of schooling conditions might support this goal. One of the ideas at the center of the educational philosophy not only of Dewey and Jane Addams, but also Freire and Myles Horton, was that education is not preparation for life, but is life itself. Dewey (1893/2008) articulated this in “Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal” in writing that “if I were asked to name the most needed of all reforms in the spirit of education, I
should say: ‘Cease conceiving of education as mere preparation for later life, and make it the full meaning of the present life’ (p. 50).

What this means is that it is quite possible to be theoretically correct, but pedagogically wrong. If schooling does not embody the very idea of the society and citizenry it intends to develop, it is already educationally bankrupt. Dewey (1916/2008a) wrote that “any education given by a group tends to socialize its members, but the quality and value of the socialization depends upon the habit and aims of the group” (p. 88).

For Dewey and Addams, as for Freire and Horton, that model of society and education was a democratic one, because it was only in a democratic environment that individual freedom was possible. Dewey (1916/2008a) wrote that “a democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give pint and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity” (p. 93). In other words, it was only in a democratic environment that there could be recognition of mutual interest, collaboration, and continuous recreation of both self and world through encountering new problems and new situations. Democracy, as a social construct, was the only form of life which secured the free commerce of ideas, values, and knowledge to such a degree that there might be a shared stake in the common good.

Reciprocally, Dewey (1916/2008b) warns that against both the Platonic ideal of a teleological style education in which outside interests prescribe ends and values for learners, as
found in SP thinking, as well as against the pure individualism of Rousseau (pgs. 94-99). Instead, he claimed that “the emphasis [in educating for democracy] must be put upon whatever binds people together in cooperative human pursuits and results, apart from geographic limitations” (p. 105).

While Dewey’s ideal of democratic education is a strong starting place for reconstructing Bildung as an intersubjective, communal and justice-driven concept, Charlene Haddock Siegfried (1996) argued that it was Addams’ work at Hull House which is responsible for the “emancipatory emphasis” of pragmatist thinking about democracy and democratic structures. In particular, her model of “social democracy” shifts pragmatist thinking from a “detached theory of knowing to an engaged theory of understanding [which] differentiates it from both liberal individualism and communitarianism” (p. 207). In fact, Seigfried argues that Democracy and Education, Dewey’s major work in philosophy of education, was drawn primarily on his experiences with Hull House. It was there that “the traits of Dewey’s ideal democratic community – namely, that it is ‘a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience’ – were actually instantiated at Hull House. It went beyond the merely physical and organic ‘associated or joint activity [that] is a condition of the creation of a community’ to embody the moral dimension necessary to a genuine community, namely, one that is ‘emotionally, intellectually, and consciously sustained’” (Seigfried, 1999, 213). Here, I agree with Siegfried, but would also include Myles Horton’s work at Highlander Folk School as another model of this kind of participatory and justice-driven education necessary for Bildung. In other words, it was in Hull House and Highlander Folk School that democratic education came into full bloom.
In her 1996 essay, “Socializing Democracy: Jane Addams and John Dewey,” Charlene Haddock Seigfried outlines several of the ways in which Addams’ work at Hull House extends basic notions in pragmatic philosophy through the lived experiences of women.

Hull House developed a model of education which extended the pragmatic philosophy of both Dewey and James which claimed that knowledge is not grounded transcendentally, but is justified through its ability to resolve problems in actual, lived experience. Therefore, the women of Hull House were organized into groups which developed around shared problems or experiences for the intended purpose of developing knowledge through engaged action and reflection (Seigfried, 1996, p. 214).

Further, for both freedom and democracy to develop, people must develop the capacity for empathy, not only in order simply see claims from another’s point of view, but also to be able to effectively and charitable communicate beliefs to them in order to ameliorate problems through collective action. In other words, as Seigfried (1996) wrote:

Addams (1981, 40) begins Twenty Years at Hull-House with the observation that earlier generations of Americans, like her father, still confidently believe they possessed “a fund of common experiences.” They also held to the belief that if the American experiment in democracy was to work, “it must be brought about by the people themselves.” But by moving to the poorest part of the inner city with the intention to contribute to the social good, Addams put herself in the way of experiences that radically changed these beliefs. She demonstrates over and over the mistakes made by the Hull House residents in their assumption that they drew
on the same fund of common experiences as the immigrants they worked with. Only by questioning their assumption of transparent access to reality through immediate observation and painfully replacing it with a recognition that all understanding is perspectival and value laden could they begin to take from their experiences something that would be of value in future experiences. (pp. 224-5)

In other words, education must emerge from the belief that each member of a learning community not only has a unique set of experiences, but that those experiences are of value. Freire shares this sentiment in his notion of *naming the world*, in which a core dimension of his pedagogy of the oppressed is empowering oppressed people to claim their experience as being of value and a valid way of understanding the world. This leads both Freire and Addams to the conclusion that rather than learners conforming to the world, they should work to remake the world based on their experiences.

This view of the validity of all experience grounds and directs Addams social ethics and communal view of knowledge, which is at the core of her view of education. Seigfried (1996) wrote that it was “only by bringing [marginalized] perspectives into a community’s search for understanding and resolution of shared problems can intelligence be effectively employed. This is why Addams insists on the importance of experience and sympathetic understanding as necessary prerequisites for knowledge” (pp. 225-6). Critical here is the notion that education becomes a much wider and deeper concept than simple cognitive competencies or technical skills. Instead, persons should be empowered, not just filled with facts or techniques, and should be able at the same time “to sympathize with the work and activities of others and to cooperate
with them in the carrying on of the common life. Such a common life is not a preexistent state of affairs but a working, explicitly pluralistic ideal” (Seigfried, 1996, p. 226).

It must be made overt, here, that this requires a very different way of conceptualizing the not only pedagogy, but in particular the role of the teacher than in SP thinking, which imagines teaching as a distribution of value-neutral factoids. This will be treated in the final chapter on emergent pedagogy.
3. A Theory of Creative Inquiry

“...the expression of the self in and through a medium, constituting the work of art, is itself a prolonged interaction of something issuing from the self with objective conditions, a process in which both of them acquire a form and order they did not at first possess.” John Dewey, Art as Experience

In the previous two chapters, I argued that the SP thinking in education must be replaced with Bildung as its guiding model. Further, I made the case that the Bildung tradition must be reconstructed in particular ways in order that it might shift pedagogical thinking from a kind of hearing or telling, to a shared doing or making.

In this chapter I will develop a view of knowing as a form of active, productive inquiry. In doing so, I will describe the generic traits of inquiry, arguing that it is a form of doing or making. Second, I will argue that inquiry is not merely a form of cognition, but a form of making which is closer to artistic production. Lastly, I will argue that inquiry conducted in this fashion yields a different kind of understanding which is deeper than brute cognition, but is closer to what artistic communities have termed maker's knowledge, which attempts to draw together both cognitive knowings, moral and aesthetic meanings under a form of habit: a capacity to act. Knowing is not simple cognition, but is the capacity to make meaning and enlarge experience through making and doing.

Knowing as an Act of Inquiry
Rejecting SP thinking in favor of a theory of creative inquiry is concurrently a rejection of the traditional correspondence view of truth in favor of an instrumental, or creative one. This shift is also a reconstruction of pedagogy, which shifts from being the distribution of factoid truths to the masses, to the cultivation of maker’s knowledge in unique individuals. Before moving directly into Dewey’s theory of inquiry as a way of producing maker’s knowledge, it is important to articulate the beginning of this shift in the notion of truth made by pragmatists, as it will frame the articulation of and possibilities for knowing within a theory of creative inquiry.

Pragmatism emerged in the wake of Positivism, which retains an active legacy in common conceptions of knowledge both within Western culture and within much of the scientific community. Positivism assumes both a Substance Realist metaphysics and a correspondence view of truth. As Alexandra Shuford (2010) argued, Substance Realism, “is an ontological commitment to the idea that what exists does so irrespective of all human perception, interaction, or symbolic rendering” (p. 58). It is the argument that the world exists as a set of bare facts which are independent of our representations of it. Further, “a standard epistemological implication of realism is that true beliefs are discernable by how well they correspond to the facts of the world. In other words, a theory is true or false, better or worse, by reference to the way the world is” (p. 58).

The Positive method imagines that in order to gain certainty or truth in inquiry, investigation must be reduced to the objective facts which lay in front of researchers. This basic concept was expressed by E.L. Thorndike who stated that everything that exists, exists in some
quantity, and can therefore be measured. The intent, then, was to dissolve all speculative theory and to create foundational certainty via method. At the core of the view, then, are not only questions about knowledge, certainty and truth, but also the assumption that empirical method will allow direct knowledge of objects under investigation.

Counter to this view of truth, C. S. Peirce articulated a dyadic concept of knowing, which grounds pragmatic instrumentalism. From his practical work at the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Pierce came to the conclusion that we come to know things in a way that is already pre-determined by the practical goals that brought a researcher to study an object in the first place. For Peirce, there is always an object that exists, but that object is not precisely what is under investigation in scientific study. For Pierce, to have an object was already a symbolic construction which was conceptually represented for practical purposes. Peirce (1906) argued that:

now thought is of the nature of a sign. In that case, then, if we can find out the right method of thinking and can follow it out — the right method of transforming signs — then truth can be nothing more nor less than the last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately carry us. In that case, that to which the representation should conform, is itself something in the nature of a

4Specifically, Thorndike (1918) argued that “Whatever exists at all, exists in some amount. To know it thoroughly involves knowing its quantity as well as its quality” (p. 16). The assumption Thorndike makes is that it is only possible to know those things which can be measured and, therefore, measurement is the ground for understanding everything which exists in the universe. Here, measurement serves as Thorndike’s transcendental signifier.
representation, or sign — something noumenal, intelligible, conceivable, and utterly unlike a thing-in-itself. (CP 5.553)

On the other hand, Peirce did not conclude that what we know is merely a construction – a kind of fiction - because reality, for Peirce, does exist. He (1868) argued that “the real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you” (p. 69). So unlike the Idealist, Peirce argued that the world does exist and acts on us. Unlike the Substance Realist, Peirce claimed that what is real in the world does not appear to us directly, but is mediated through our purposes in action. The world exists and forces us to respond. Yet, when in attempting to determine the essence of the real, what we are really doing is concentrating on a kind of abstracted concept we, ourselves, have created for our purposes.

Peirce rejects the idea that there is such a thing as an individual observer or an individual object, which exist independently. Peirce’s critique, in one motion, dissolved both the idea of pure objectivity and ontological essentialism. Instead, the object and the observer exist simultaneously and bring each other into existence. Stated another way, everything exists in and through emergent, dyadic relationships. In articulating this view of the emergent cosmos, Peirce laid the groundwork for Dewey’s metaphysics of experience and creative ontology, which are central to his theory of inquiry.

There is a strong family resemblance, here, between the pragmatic view of truth and Hegel’s account which undergirds the Bildung tradition, both of which begin in a metaphysics of experience, such that the individual is always already engaged in a transaction with the
environment. The self is in transactional unity with that environment, rather than ontological
duality. As Good and Garrison (2010) argued, “For Hegel, truth cannot be a static
correspondence of subject and object because they are functional distinctions rather than markers
of discrete metaphysical realms. Truth is a conceptual activity through which we comprehend the
world together with a realization that our concepts contour it” (p. 51). Therefore, “rather than a
type of knowledge, Hegel developed a theory of learning, and philosophy became the
philosophy of education” (pp. 49-50). For Dewey, this was no different. His theory of inquiry,
as a rich theory of learning, dissolves any need for the traditional project of epistemology.

Knowledge in Action

Dewey’s theory of inquiry, then, begins in a rejection of the traditional epistemological
models which separate knowledge (i.e. pure, objective truth) from action (i.e. making and
doing). The core framework for this reconstruction was first outlined in his 1896 essay “The
Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” but is more fully developed in his 1920 work
Reconstruction in Philosophy, where Dewey not only articulates his metaphysics of experience
but, in particular, reconstructs the relationship between experience, reason, and the mind. There,
Dewey (1920/2008) argued “how and why it is now possible to make claims for experience as a
guide in science and moral life which the older empiricists did not and could not make for it” (p.
84). Dewey argued that reason is an emergent property of experience, or knowledge is emergent
from reflective action (i.e. inquiry) in the world.

Dewey (1920/2008) claimed that after Darwin, “experience becomes an affair primarily
of doing….The organism acts in accordance with its own structure, simply or complex, upon its
surroundings. As a consequence the changes produced in the environment react upon the organism and its activities. The living creature undergoes, suffers, the consequences of its own behavior” (p. 86). The two-tiered cosmos is no longer possible, but only a singular environment which is constantly undergoing change and reconstructing itself. Further, when we act, we become creative contributors in this unfinished universe.

The major implication for philosophy, as it concerns this chapter, is that knowing and knowledge, rather than being foundationally embedded in a static universe, are now emergent properties of cooperative, transactional behavior. Here, Dewey (1920/2008) argued that, “the interaction of organism and environment, resulting in some adaptation which secures utilization of the latter, is the primary fact, the basic category. Knowledge is relegated to a derived position, secondary in origin…knowledge is not something separate and self-sufficing, but is involved in the process by which life is sustained and evolved” (p. 87). Transactional experience - which is both biological and cultural - becomes the ground of reason and knowledge. Further, if knowing is now transactional, then a rich theory of active, productive inquiry – of making and doing – is far more than a sideline of educational practice, but stands at its very core.

The Structure of Inquiry

In his 1938 text *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Dewey argued that inquiry is the basic process by which meanings and knowings emerge from within the transactional experience of persons. Of critical importance, and in contrast to traditional epistemological views that draw ontological separations between types of knowledge (e.g. science from art), is the idea that “inquiry, in spite of the diverse subjects to which it applies, and the consequent diversity of its
special techniques has a common structure or pattern” (Dewey, 1938/1998, p. 169, emphasis added). Knowledge – all knowledge – exists on a spectrum of making, which shows a common pattern: the process of inquiry.

In chapter 6 of that text (“The Pattern of Inquiry”), Dewey (1938/2008) argued that the general motion of inquiry is easier to conceptualize when thinking about an endeavor such as law or art where “the subject-matters of everyday experience are trans-formed by the development of forms which render certain products of doing and making objects of fine art” (p. 105). Laws are constructed out of resolving particular situations and serve as guides for future ways of operation in similar instances. They are not fixed, eternal, and universal, but are contingent, emerge from the particular, and serve to guide and direct behavior in future instances. Yet, the same holds true for processes typically imagined as foundational, such as logic, mathematics, and natural science, which are also constructions.

In this way, inquiry is embedded within and part of the fluid, emergent structure of experience. This fluid emergence begins by understanding that doing and thinking are part of the same, unified process. Dewey (1938/2008) argues that the “usual interpretation is in terms of the difference between the psychological and the logical, the latter consisting of ‘norms’ provided from some source wholly outside of and independent of experience” (p. 107). Instead, he (1938/2008) argues that the way people “think” is “simply the ways in which men at a given time carry on their inquiries” (p. 107). Therefore, Dewey (1938/2008) termed inquiry “the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into
a unified whole” (p. 108). In this way, we might conceptualize all inquiry as simply the emergent process of reconstruction for the purposes of growth.

In explicating the structure of inquiry, I am going to follow Dewey’s explanation of inquiry as it develops through chapter 6 in *Logic*. It is important, here, to note that Dewey did not intend to prescriptive about how inquiry takes shape, but only attempted to describe the generic traits by which it might emerge. Yet, in the flow of actual, lived experience inquiry is neither linear nor prescribed.

**The antecedent conditions of inquiry: the indeterminate situation.**

Of critical importance to Dewey’s theory of inquiry and his entire metaphysics of experience is that the starting point of an experienced problem is the immediate non-cognitive, temporal and transactional relationship between person and world. Dewey struggles in describing this relationship because the nature of the English language is pregnant with the baggage of traditional Western metaphysics. This baggage includes both the idea that our relationship to the world is spatial (i.e. non-temporal and causal), and that it is primarily cognitive. Dewey claims otherwise: that it both exists within time and it is mostly guided by the non-cognitive, intuited “feel” of emerging situations, and structured by embodied habits.

He (1938/2008) states that “a variety of names serves to characterize indeterminate situations. They are disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc.” (p. 108). The challenge here is that to understand a developing situation and emergent inquiry, one must first understand his metaphysics, which begin inside the fluid motion of functional, transactional coordination. Situations are, then, events which are neither subjective
(i.e. in the person), nor objective (in the world), but transactionally (or intersubjectively) emergent. He (1938/2008) writes that “it is the situation that has these traits. We are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtful” (p. 108).

More difficult to express is the fact that an emerging situation, like first noticing an approaching storm, is not cognitive, but intuitive. Dewey (1938/2008) argues that “the indeterminate situation comes into existence from existential causes, just as does, say, the organic imbalance of hunger” (p. 109). The example Dewey gives (i.e. hunger) is not simply a metaphor, but is a case study for what he means in describing an emerging process of inquiry. Hunger is not first experienced as cognitive, but is existential – it is felt. Therefore, the birth of inquiry – all inquiry - is not cognitive unknowing, but runs much deeper into the affective, non-cognitive “background” of inquiry, which is both qualitative and aesthetic. For Dewey, it is this affective background which supports and directs the cognitive “foreground” of understanding (Garrison, 1997, pp.86-87).

When the rhythm of life is disrupted, the disruption is initially accompanied by feelings. These feelings are not the disruption, itself, but provide the ground for the experience to take shape. Dewey wrote that “This contextual setting is vague, but it is no mere fringe. It has a solidity and stability not found in the focal material of thinking. The latter denotes the part of the road upon which the spot light is thrown. The spatial context is the ground through which the road runs and for the sake of which the road exists” (Dewey, 1931/1998, p. 212). Later, as inquiry takes shape, feelings become emotions cognized through reflection, ultimately leading to the restoration of habits and the creation of meanings and values. Yet, as Jim Garrison writes,
“the cognitive phase of the inquiry remains perpetually qualified by the non-cognitive background, or what Dewey also called 'the context of thought’” (Garrison, 2007,p.87).

The very structure of human experience, then, is characterized by a rhythm moving from equilibrium to disequilibrium, which is predicated on the fact that life occurs not simply within an environment, but in transaction within that environment. Dewey wrote that “the direct material of every reflection proceeds out of some precedent state of affairs in reference to which the existing state is disturbed or problematic or to which it is an 'answer' or solution” (Dewey, 1931/1998, 213). That transactional relationship, though, is not primarily cognitive, but is habitual and intuited: it is embodied, and emerges from our embodied relationship with the world.

As Dewey (1938/2008) writes “the immediate locus of the problem concerns, then, what kind of responses the organism shall make” (p. 111). Traditional epistemology imagines that responses to problems are purely cognitive in both their evolution and resolution, but Dewey argues that cognitivity only plays a small part in the overall structure of an experience, which – while it has cognitive phases – includes both a felt beginning and ending, and hangs together as a result of a transactional making or doing within the context of the emerging situation. So, Dewey (1938/2008) argues, “It is a commonplace that in any troubled state of affairs things will come out differently according to what is done. The farmer won’t get grain unless he plans and tills; the general will win or lose the battle according to the way he conducts it, and so on. Neither the grain nor the tilling, neither the outcome of the battle nor the conduct of it, are ‘mental’ events…resolution of the indeterminate situation is active and operational” (p. 111).
This non-cognitive ground is, then, the beginning of a complete experience and follows it through to the resolution. In this initial moment, then, there is a functional disequilibrium which is deeper than cognition. For Dewey (1930/1998), “intuition precedes cognition and goes deeper” (p. 198). Here, functional coordination of thought, feeling and action is lost. When we turn toward the environment for survival and growth, we are met with a host of things which enhance or inhibit our ability to complete the experience of inquiring. How we make use of them is ultimately the test of the arc of an experienced of inquiry.

**Institution of a problem.**

Dewey reminds us that we have already run up against another problem with language in conceptualizing inquiry. He (1938/2008) wrote that “the unsettled or indeterminate situation might have been called a problematic situation. This name would have been, however, proleptic and anticipatory. The indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected to inquiry” (p. 112). What he means here is that the very notion of a problem is, itself, an existential moment of synthetic indeterminacy which has already been analytically cognized. So to call an emerging situation problematic is to impose something analytically constructed (the constituent parts which constitute it as a problem) and impose them onto a situation which, inside the event, simply feels as though it no longer hangs together.

This notion is a critical dimension of knowing which can be expressed, as Dewey (1938/2008) does, in saying that “a problem is not a task to be performed which a person puts on himself or that is placed upon him by others – like a so-called arithmetical ‘problem’ in school work. A problem represents the partial transformation by inquiry of a problematic situation into a
determinate situation” (pp. 111-112). Stated in educational terms, students are cheated of their own learning when they are not allowed the experience of turning an indeterminate situation into a problematic one. Students must encounter the very existential process of an emerging problematic if they are to learn how to creatively solve problems and reconstruct their environment.

This capacity to develop a problematic is of primary importance because “without a problem, there is blind groping in the dark. The way in the problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; what data are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p. 112). So, the second step in inquiry is, then, to construct an emerging problematic, which draws together the cognitive (thought), emotional (feeling), and habitual (action) dimensions of an experience into a developing situation for the purposes of deliberation and reconstruction.

The determination of a problem-solution.

This emerging problematic is a highly important component of an experienced problem, because it will determine not only which parts of the environment which are attended to during the course of the inquiry, but also will impact how successfully the process of inquiry is resolved.

Because learners are existentially embedded in an already existent life-world (which is where problems emerge in the first place), there is “no situation which is completely indeterminate” (Dewey, 1938/2008,p. 112). Dewey (1938/2008) argues, then, that “the first step
is to search out the *constituents* of a given situation which, as constituents, are settled” (p. 112). Stated another way, there are always dimensions of an emerging situation which have been previously cognized and can help us determine which course of action we might choose to take in the situation.

Here is where the process of experimental action begins to fully emerge. Dewey (1916/2008a) argued that “the first stage of contact with any new material, at whatever age of maturity, must inevitably be of the trial and error sort. Any individual must actually try, in play or work, to do something with material in carrying out his own impulsive activity, and then note the interaction of his energy and that of the material employed” (p. 160). The problematic emerges as a process of unified, yet indeterminate experimentation within the developing situation.

Importantly, here we find the root not only of emergent knowings and meanings, but also of the capacity for thinking. The ability to mold this developing situation into something useful is the primary quality of strong thinking. Dewey (1916/2008a) argued that “the data *arouse* suggestions…but suggestions run beyond what is, as yet, actually *given* in experience. They forecast possible results, things *to* do, not facts (things already done)….In this sense, a thought (what a thing suggests but is not as it is presented) is creative, - an incursion into the novel” (p. 165). In other words, “a possible relevant solution is then suggested by the determination of factual conditions which are secured by observation.” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p. 113). The solution, then, presents itself as an idea: “ideas are anticipated consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are executed under and with respect to observed conditions” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p.113).
We are, then, presented with the hermeneutic circle in which “observation of facts and suggested meanings or ideas arise and develop in correspondence with each other” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p. 113). We project certain relationships, or wholes, on to the parts; our ability to mold the parts and their response, then, revises the whole. This back and forth between ideas (projections) and facts (consequences in action), “represent logical divisions of labor” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p.115). This motion, which is a hermeneutic one, is the basic form of reason and, “as a result we are able to appraise better than we were at the outset” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p. 115).

**Reasoning.**

Dewey embeds a short section on the nature of reasoning within his description of the pattern of inquiry, which places emphasis on the need for the process of inquiry to run its full course in order for reasoning to take shape. He writes that “when a suggested meaning is immediately accepted, inquiry is cut short. Hence the conclusion reached is not grounded, even if it happens to be correct” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p. 115). From the interplay between ideas and facts moving toward a possible resolution, meanings (which are intersubjective relationships between parts of experience) emerge taking the form of symbols. This process is what Dewey calls reasoning. To the contrary, “in many familiar situations, the meaning that is most relevant has been settled because of the eventuations of experiments in prior cases so that it is applicable almost immediately upon its occurrence” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p. 116). This could be that we have already cognized solutions to problems, so that they don’t occur to us as problems. In educational terms, though, this represents a danger point because unless students experience inquiry in its full course it is likely that they will apply a solution *meaninglessly*. They will be
able to perform an action, but that action is logically ungrounded, because they have not made connections between that action and other parts of experience. Stated another way, no reasoning – which is a hermeneutic motion of action and reflection - has taken place.

**The operational character of facts-meanings.**

This emergent motion toward the creation of meaning works because both facts and ideas are operational. They are *not complete in and of themselves*, as imagined in the SP model, but are intersubjective and part of distributed matrix of relationships that exist in experience. As Dewey notes, it is easier to conceptualize ideas as operational (i.e. incomplete) in that “they instigate and direct further operations of observation; they are proposals and plans for acting upon existing conditions to bring new facts to light and to organize all the selected facts into a coherent whole” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p. 116).

Yet, the traditional view of objective facts, rooted in Substance Realism, imagines they exist as essentially complete. To the contrary, Dewey argues they are “selected and described…for a purpose, namely statement of the problem…” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p. 116). Further, facts are “not merely results of operations and observation…but they are the particular facts and kinds of facts that will link up with one another in the definite ways that are required to produce a definite end” (Dewey, 1938/2008, pp. 116-117). In philosophical terms we can say that, here, Dewey rejects the fact/value distinction of Substance Realism and replaces it with a pragmatic view of facts finding meaning in use. In other words, “some observed facts point to an idea that stands for a possible solution” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p. 117). Further, “the operative force of both ideas and facts is thus practically recognized in the degree to which they are
connected with *experiment*. Naming them “operational” is but a theoretical recognition of what is involved when inquiry satisfies the conditions imposed by the necessity for experiment” (Dewey, 1938/2008, p. 117). Meaning, then, always emerges out of a kind of doing or making which is both existential and emergent: in short, it is experimental.

**The resolution of inquiry.**

Taken as a whole, Dewey names the process of inquiry an experience, which is an attempt to differentiate the everyday process of experiencing the world, from the pregnant, meaningful view of this particular process of undergoing inquiry. Dewey (1916/2008a) argued that “experience as trying involves change, but change is meaningless transition unless it is consciously connected with the return wave of consequences which flow from it. When an activity is continued *into* the undergoing consequences, when the change made by action is reflected back into a change made in us, the mere flux is loaded with significance. We learn something” (p. 146). What Dewey is describing here is the idea that inquiry is transactional process of reconstruction of self and world. It opens when there is a disequilibrium between the cognitive (thought), emotional (feeling), and habitual (action): when our everyday mode of operating in the world no longer hangs together. The process of inquiry, then, is a process of reconstruction which not only reconstructs the situation, such that we can functionally coordinate *following* the moment of inquiry, but is also a reconstruction of the self, which is the *reason why* we can functionally coordinate following an inquiry. Stated another way, the *existential, intersubjective situation* (i.e. neither subject (internal) nor object (external)) has been reconstructed and loaded with new significances that did not exist before. This includes the
cognitive (thought), emotional (feeling), and habitual (action), which have all themselves been reconstructed, including their functional relationship to each other and the world. Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that:

…an experience has pattern and structure, because it is not just doing and undergoing in alternation [i.e. the causal view], but consists of them in relationship. To put one's hand in the fire that consumes it is not necessarily to have an experience. The action and its consequence must be joined in perception. This relationship is what gives meaning; to grasp it is the objective of all intelligence. The scope and content of the relations measure the significant content of an experience. (p. 50)

There is growth across the entirety of experience. In this way, inquiry results in a particular kind of transformation which is as much cognitive, as emotional, as habitual. Here, importantly, Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that “what is true of this simple instance is true, as to form, of every experience. The creature operating may be a thinker in his study and the environment with which he interacts may consist of ideas…but interaction of the two constitutes the total experience that is had, and the close which completes it is the institution of a felt harmony” (p. 50, emphasis added). It is the feltness or the intuitive, which ultimately provides the resonant arc holding the situation together and allowing meaning to emerge.

**Inquiry as the Foundation of Knowing**
For Dewey, then, all knowing is a form of inquiry and exists on a spectrum of making. Dewey’s theory of inquiry is not a subset of a larger epistemology in the way that educational theorists often consider “inquiry based learning” to be one form of learning. Instead, it was Dewey’s contention that inquiry was, in fact, a replacement for the longstanding philosophical obsession with epistemological foundationalism. In educational terms, there is no learning that is not inquiry-based, since life itself is an experience of inquiry. As Larry Hickman (1990) argued, the successful experience of inquiry yields the development of a tool, the purpose of which “is to reorganize experience in some way that will overcome its disparity, its incompatibility, or its inconsistency” (p. 21). Yet, the concept of tool need not be limited to physical objects, but “in this sense [is] a theory, a proposal, a recommended method or course of action” (p. 21). Several ideas are worth noting here.

The first is that the tool produced, whether it be the formula $2+2=4$ or the ending line of a poem, is not universally Truth in the traditional sense, but only “only a proposal…because it must be tested against the problematic material for the sake of which it has been created or selected” (Hickman, 1990, p. 21). Dewey preferred the term “warranted assertability” in describing those scientific or mathematical tools which were stable and predictive within the context of their making.

The second is that the situation which produces a tool is not the same for all inquirers. Hickman (1990) uses the example of a faulty light switch, which is a problematic situation requiring attention (pp. 21-22). As Hickman (1990) describes, “the experience of repairing the switch hangs together by means of certain qualities, but those qualities are not the subject of inquiry. An electrician may carry on a spirited conversation about baseball with his assistant as
he locates the trouble and repairs the switch. To someone not accustomed to such matters, however, what is habitually done by an experience electrician may constitute a dangerous situation” (p. 21). For both a master electrician and a novice homeowner, the problem still exists in the same reality. Yet context of the situation (which includes the person and the environment) co-determine the depth and method of inquiry, the action taken, and the tools employed and created.

The third is that, as Hickman (1990) argued, “the manner in which we judge the appropriateness of our chosen tools is by means of their concrete and overt application to the specific problematic situations for which they have been chosen. They do not stand apart from a situation, but enter into it” (p. 22). Maker’s knowledge has very little to do with being able to articulate a set of possible tools at the beck and call of a teacher’s prompt, but is the ability to select the correct tool for the job of resolving an actual, experienced situation. This includes both physical tools, as well as conceptual tools (e.g. math, logic, chemical notation, language) which we may retool to fit the present situation. Yet, there is no way to predict the form a problematic situation will take until after it has been undergone and resolved. Therefore, learning is less about knowing all available tools, and more about being able to functionally solve problems with available resources – even if those resources are neither the most efficient or most traditionally chosen tools for the job.

The fourth is that the process of inquiry and knowing are not simply occurring within the frontal cortex, but are events in which the entire person is involved (Hickman, 1990, p. 36). As Dewey (1917/2008) argued, “hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as changes in the brain. Since these physical operations (including the cerebral events)
and equipments are a part of thinking, thinking is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of what physical acts and appliances do: the distinctive purpose for which they are employed and the distinctive results which they accomplish” (p. 328). Inquiry is not simply a form of thinking, but is not resolved until the situation, which is exists in reality, is resolved.

The fifth is that every inquiry yields meaning beyond itself and, therefore, opens the world to further inquiry. As Hickman argued (1990), “we more often than not find that the control we have exercised gives us more than we bargained for, that there come to be added intrinsic meanings that we could not have anticipated, and that those intrinsic meanings may be the occasion for the construction for further extrinsic meanings” (p. 41). Stated another way, successful inquiry yields new meanings and therefore growth. It is cyclical, expansive, and emergent.

**Creative Action**

For Dewey, the paradigmatic model of knowing is the act of artistic construction: the creative act. For Dewey (1934/2008):

Art denotes a process of doing or making. This is as true of fine as of technological art. Art involves molding of clay, chipping of marble, casting of bronze, laying on of pigments, construction of buildings, singing of songs, playing of instruments, enacting roles on the stage, going through rhythmic movements in the dance. Every art does something with some physical material,
the body or something outside the body, with or without the uses of intervening tools, and with a view to production of something visible, audible, or tangible. (p. 53)

In this section, in order to claim creative action as the paradigmatic form of knowing, I will clarify what, precisely, I view as artistic practice. In doing so, I will reconstruct the traditional view of art as a kind of transcendental act which is ontologically distinct from other forms of knowing. I will need to naturalize artistic practice. In doing so, I will argue that art making is a valid and necessary form of knowledge creation and meaning making, and continuous with all other forms of knowing. Further, I will show how that process of art making is an embedded and embodied experience within a community of inquirers. Art making is communal and dialogical, rather than individual. Lastly, I will articulate three dimensions of the artistic process that are particularly illustrative of orchestrating an experienced process of inquiry, which must be accounted for in educational thinking.

**Naturalizing the Artistic Process**

One of the challenges of placing art making at the center of epistemology is that the philosophical baggage of post-Kantian aesthetics is always in the background. Specifically, as Gadamer articulated, this baggage is the view of art as a kind of transcendental experience (*Erlebnisse*) which is embedded via the artistic genius into a work of art. Gadamer called this *aesthetic differentiation*. In addition to the kind of meaninglessness art acquires after this philosophical move, art become extracted from the concept of community. Art is separated from
history because its value is understood primarily in its being a container to a certain type of
transcendental experience. Art is also separated from culture, as it is viewed as having no real
value or implications and is therefore placed into galleries and culturally deified. Further, and
most importantly, the artistic process itself is separated from communal construction, and its
production is viewed as a kind of a moment of transcendental and individual subjectification.
This subjectification of the artistic process is further exacerbated by a misunderstand of
creativity, which is viewed primarily as a cognitive act: an act of transcendent novelty.

To the contrary, from a naturalized standpoint, what is often called inspiration or artistic
genius is not some transcendental gift extolled on a unique cluster of people, but instead is a type
of disposition. It is both an openness to the qualitative flow of life, and the developed habit of
self expression. As Dewey (1920/1988) wrote, “[a]rt is not the possession of the few who are
recognized writers, painters, musicians; it is the authentic expression of any and all
individuality” (p. 226). Artistic creativity only appears as a type of unique transcendental
inspiration because we cannot explain it using traditional analytic categories. But as poet Jane
Hirshfield (1998) writes, art is not created ex nihilo, but instead is closer to the way “geological
pressure transforms ocean sediment to limestone” (p. 5). It is “through such tensions, physical or
mental, the world in which we exist becomes itself” (p. 5).

The act of creating is both embodied and emergent. It is also transactional, representing a
unity of thought and action (Garrison, 2003, p. 405). Critical here is an idea found in the
philosophy of John Dewey and William James, which is a reconstruction of the traditional view
of the emotions. Traditional views of the emotions placed perception and cognition before action
in environment. To the contrary, both James and Dewey reprioritized action as being prior to, but

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not distinct from, the emergence of thought and meaning. Dewey, in particular, resisted any
dualism separating action from thought. As Garrison (2003) wrote, “[m]eanings, including
meaningful emotional expressions, emerge from physical and biological activity without breach
of continuity” (p. 413).

This inversion, which placed action before reflection, is absolutely essential to dissolving
the transcendental view of creativity and reconstructing a view of artistic practice as both
communal and emergent. For example, in most creative writing pedagogies, young poets aren’t
taught to think, but are taught to mimic, through copying, their artistic heroes. Like an athlete
developing muscle memory, artists attempt to recreate the embodied practice of a master
craftsperson.

This common practice for developing artists actually goes against a longstanding view of
creativity in the West, which draws heavily on the image of the transcendental artistic genius and
believes the essence of creativity is novelty. Here, the value of the creative act has all to do with
the artist being self-consciously interpretive or distinctly cognitive, while faithful copying is
merely servile and passive is therefore “bad.” Novelty, in the traditional view, is a form of
ontological exceptionalism – a transcendental miracle imposed on experience.

However, the traditional view mistakenly prioritizes meaning before doing, or reflection
before action, where cognitive intention is imposed onto the act of making. To the contrary, it is
my contention that copying is neither servile nor passive. In mimicking, the young artist is
developing the habits of artistic action, while also constructing their own unique voice because
even the most faithful copies produce unique, unexpected variations. Essayist Adam Gopnik
(1988) wrote that copying is the way the young artist “represents not an isolated ideological
position but something discovered in the latent possibilities of some other artist's invention, and therefore still bears the traces of its quirky, unpredictable evolution... These copies suggest that every “why” is just the accumulation of a thousand particular “how's.”” (pgs. 61-65, emphasis added). The mark of a master artist is not novelty, then, but habitual “readiness to take advantage of those variations, created in the act of making” (p. 65).

By placing action prior to (but not distinct from) reflection, we can see not only how creativity is always communal, and always already draws on the social, cultural and historical resources of the world in order to reconstruct the world. T.S. Eliot (1920/1998) wrote that “we dwell with satisfaction upon the poet’s difference from his predecessors, especially his immediate predecessors; we endeavour to find something that can be isolated in order to be enjoyed. Whereas if we approach a poet without this prejudice we shall often find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of his work may be those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality vigorously. And I do not mean the impressionable period of adolescence, but the period of full maturity” (p. 38).

**The Creative Spectrum of Making**

For Dewey, then, art is a naturalized form of making which is continuous with all other forms. As Dewey (1925/2008a) wrote, “the striving to make stability of meaning prevail over the instability of events is the main task of intelligent human effort” (p. 49). This striving includes as much the construction of scientific principles, as it does aesthetic values and moral meanings.

For Dewey, all forms of knowing exist on a kind of spectrum of creative action in which artistic practice becomes the paradigmatic case of knowledge creation and meaning making. In
*Art as Experience*, he (1934/2008) argued that “the existence of art is the concrete proof…that man uses the materials and energies of nature with intent to expand his own life” (p. 31). For Dewey, all human experience is guided by an end-in-view and is creatively transformative of its environment. Dewey (1925/2008a) wrote that “art – the mode of activity that is charged with meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession – is the complete culmination of nature, and that ‘science’ is properly a handmaiden that conducts natural events to this happy issue” (p. 269). All knowing and meaning making, therefore, is an art form.

One of the problems Dewey saw originating from traditional epistemological accounts was the separation of types of knowledge, what he called the separation of the fine arts from the practical or useful ones. In Dewey’s view this distinction was not an ontological, but a logical one having to do with the scope of the meaning emerging from inquiry, rather than its perceived correspondence to essential truths.

The ontological distinction which Dewey rejected exists even within Gadamer’s hermeneutic epistemology. Dewey and Gadamer share the idea that within the act of knowing and knowledge creation, there is a unity of the knower, the process of knowing, and the thing known. Yet, Gadamer maintains a distinction between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*. Gadamer (1960/2004) argued, “This is of great methodological importance for specifying the nature of the human sciences. Here the concept of the given has a basically different structure. Characteristic of the given in the human, unlike the natural, sciences is that one has to discard all ideas of anything fixed or alien, which are appropriate to images of the physical world. Here, the given is something made” (p. 222). Dewey, correctly, rejects this distinction in favor of knowing viewed as existing within the context of production and
experimental inquiry. To the contrary, for Dewey (1929/2008) “knowing is itself a mode of practical action and is the way of interaction by which other natural actions become subject to direction” (p. 85-86). For Dewey, knowledge is neither narrowly cognitive, nor governed by philosophical norms. Instead, Dewey held that knowledge is generated through embodied inquiry and justified by its consequences.

For Dewey, creative inquiry results, in the words of Larry Hickman (1990), in knowing as a kind of technological artifact. Hickman (1990) writes that when a meaningful inquiry is undergone, “there is a search for a tool with which to operate on the unsettled situation. The tool becomes a part of the active productive skills brought to bear on the situation. The purpose of the tool is to reorganize the experience in some way that will overcome its disparity, its incompatibility, or its inconsistency. A tool is in this sense a theory, a proposal, a recommended method or course of action” (p. 21). Therefore, “inquiry is a technological activity because where inquiry takes place there is a shift from passive acquiescence toward the beginnings and endings of nature, its contingencies, to the active construction of artifacts to effect their control” (Hickman, 1990, p. 45). In this way, Dewey’s theory of inquiry “makes knowing a technological activity, a kind of pro-duction and con-struction at their most fundamental levels” (Hickman, 1990, p. 55).

Here we find one of the most important dimensions of Dewey’s reconstruction of epistemology: if viewed as an artistic act, it is impossibility that the objects of knowledge exist antecedently. Dewey (1938/2008) argues that “the name objects will be reserved for subject matter so far as it has been produced and ordered in settled form by means of inquiry; proleptically, objects are the objectives of inquiry” (p. 122). Instead, knowledge and meanings
are molded and sculpted as tools which help establish and resolve particular problems. As Larry Hickman (1990) argues, “ideas, knowing, and active engagement with experiential contexts are artifacts of inquiry in just as important a sense as are works of art that are made of canvas and paint, stone, metal, plastic, steel, or shoe leather…For Dewey, buttons are no more or less technological artifacts – that is, no more or less works of art – than are sonnets, logical objects, or scientific theories. In each case, ends and means are bound up interactively and meaningfully if the artifact works” (p. 70). As Dewey (1925/2008a) argued, “the idea is, in short, art and a work of art. As a work of art, it directly liberates subsequent action and makes it more fruitful in a creation of more meanings and more perceptions” (p. 278). Jim Garrison and Bruce W. Watson (2005) describe the artistic process of inquiry this way:

In Dewey’s theory of inquiry (i.e., logic) the inquirer does not discover antecedently existing essences; rather she uses tools, techniques, and skilled habits of inquiry to transform the potentials of existence until they achieve essences that satisfy her purposes. Grapes existentially grow. Through a series of operations involving many tools, including the grape press, we may extract grape juice from grapes. Further refinement transforms grape juice into wine. In Dewey’s theory of inquiry, grapes are the existentially given subject matter, “data,” or grape juice, are themselves artifacts that are “subject-matter for further interpretation . . . . They are indication, evidence, signs, clues to and of something still to be reached; they are intermediate, not ultimate . . . not finalities” (LW 4:79–80). Unlike grapes, data are taken, not found, while wine is the essence of
the grape for our purposes, the final potable product. All of this is easy to follow if we keep Dewey’s distinction between metaphysical existence and logical essences firmly in mind. (p. 247)

Dewey believed that maintaining an ontological distinction between types of knowledge was far from harmless, but presented dangers to both individuals and communities. Primary among them was that by viewing practical and fine arts as separate results in the avoidance of consideration for the full range of consequences of the thing produced. As Hickman (1990) argued, one of Dewey’s primary goals “was to argue that the traditional separation of the arts into those that are ‘fine’ and those that are otherwise – whether they are called ‘useful,’ ‘practical,’ ‘industrial,’ or ‘vernacular’ – results in an impoverishment of experience by obscuring the ways in which meanings can be expanded and developed” (p. 62). In the practical arts, this disconnection holds them from the full range of possible aesthetic meanings and moral significances and, to the contrary, the fine arts become disconnected from the human condition for which they served as a mode of expression. This disconnection reduces and even dissolves the deep meanings and values possible in the course of human experience. Rather than enriching experience, it – quite literally - makes human life less meaningful.

Dewey often employs the term mechanical to describe the kind of meaningless, habituated action which emerges from this philosophical separation of factual content from aesthetic and moral values. Dewey (1916/2008a) articulates the difference between mechanical and meaningful action in Chapter 16 of Democracy and Education, where he wrote that “nothing is more striking than the difference between an activity as merely physical and the wealth of
meanings which the same activity may assume” (p. 215, emphasis in original). He compares an astronomer and a child looking through a telescope. In both cases, there exists the same physical activity: a person gazing through an arrangement of glass and metal. While the amazement of looking might be the same for both, for the former, there is a wealth of meanings which fill and expand the experience, such as his understanding of the solar system, his knowledge of physics and of history, his aesthetic sensibility. It is this larger enrichment of experience, which Dewey (1916/2008a) also called growth, makes the astronomer’s “education something else than the manufacture of a tool or the training of an animal. The latter increase efficiency; they do not develop significance” (p. 215).

In educational terms, meaningless action is produced through systems of training, as opposed to enriching forms of education. Dewey (1916/2008a) argued, for example, that a “horse does not really share in the social use to which his action is put…[the horse] is not a partner in a shared activity. Were he to become a copartner, he would, in engaging in the conjoint activity, have the same interest in its accomplishment which others have. He would share their ideas and emotions” (p. 17). Yet, rich education makes “the individual a sharer or partner in the associated activity so that he feels its success as his success, its failure as his failure…as soon as he is possessed by the emotional attitude of the group, he will be alert to recognize the special ends at which it aims and the means employed to secure success” (p. 18). It was Dewey’s contention, then, that this increasing growth of and capacity for meaningful significance was possible for all human life and, in fact, was the purpose of education. He (1916/2008a) wrote that “when information is purveyed in chunks simply as information to be retained for its own sake, it tends to stratify over vital experience” (p. 216). To the contrary, “it is the business of educators to
supply an environment so that this reaching out of an experience may be fruitfully rewarded and kept continuously active. …To “learn geography is to gain in power to perceive the spatial, the natural, connections of an ordinary act; to “learn history” is essentially to gain in power to recognize its human connections” (p. 217). While factual content plays a role in education, the goal of education is not to transmit content. It is instead to enlarge the capacity for meaning-making via the development of habits of inquiry. It is the cultivation of creative making.

**Maker’s Knowledge**

In this chapter I have made the case that knowing is a form of active, productive inquiry. Further, I argued that inquiry is not merely a form of cognition, but a creative action: a form of making or doing which is closer to artistic production. In this section, I will argue that inquiry conducted in this fashion yields a different kind of understanding which is deeper than brute cognition, but is closer to what artistic communities have termed *maker’s knowledge*, which attempts to draw together both cognitive knowings, moral and aesthetic meanings under a form of habit: a capacity to act. Knowing is not simple cognition, but is the capacity to make meaning and enlarge experience through making and doing.

**Creative Capacity**

The focal point of educators, therefore, has much less to do with content-knowledge than it does with the cultivation of creative capacity. This capacity casts a much wider net than simple cognition, but includes both the fusion of cognition and intuition, as well as factual
content with aesthetic and moral values, under the form of a habit of action. I term this capacity *maker’s knowledge*.

SP thinking is developed on a flawed model of mind which isolates rational processes and cognition from the totality of experience. Education to this end is ultimately, and quite literally, meaning-less, because it separates cognition from intuition, fact from value, education from life. As Alexander (1987) argued, “when we select rational consciousness as the criterion against which all other experience is measured and set it apart from its functional locus in the world, not only is the world of meaningful but non-cognitive experience dismissed as ‘meaningless’ emotive ejaculations, but the nature of reason itself is rendered opaque and mysterious” (p. 111). To the contrary, Dewey argues that knowing and knowledge are processes of doing and making (i.e. transacting) which emerge from within the experience of inquiry.

The phrase *maker’s knowledge* is commonly used in artistic communities to describe the way in which an artist knows her subject and her craft. It attempts to describe a mode of knowing, which has close connotations with the English term *understanding*, but which is deeper and more intimate than cognition. As a philosophical term, it reaches back to classical Antiquity, suggesting that there is an intimate relation between objects of cognition and objects of construction. Here, knowing is understood not as a mental state, but as a kind of making or capacity to make (Perez-Ramos, 1988, p. 48). It implies, therefore, not only that knowledge is a creatively emergent product of a process making (i.e. an action performed in environment), but also that the act of knowing is much deeper, embodied and habitual than simply cognition.

Maker’s knowledge includes the category of content-knowledge, but is more specifically focused on the capacity to inquire, to reconstruct, and to create. As Dewey (1916/2008a) argued,
“knowledge, grounded knowledge, is science; it represents objects which have been settled, ordered, disposed of rationally. Thinking, on the other hand, is prospective in reference. It is occasioned by an *unsettlement* and it aims at overcoming a *disturbance*” (p. 336). It is as much a transformation of the world, as it is a transformation of self. Here, goal is not for students to know a disconnected grouping of facts from history, but to be able to *think like a historian* in order to solve particular types of encountered problems.

**Creative Transformation**

One of the most misunderstood dimensions of Dewey’s theory of inquiry is its transformational nature. In Dewey’s account, inquiry not only yields the creation of emergent meanings and knowings which can then be abstracted and employed again as a kind of guide to perform operations, but it also *transforms the existing situation* – including the person and the world - as part of the process.

For Dewey, *the* philosophic fallacy occurs when those created meanings are *read back into* the situation and imagined to have existed at the very beginning, prior to inquiry. They are imagined to have been *discovered by* or *taken by* the inquirer rather than *made* as a process of active production. Dewey (1938/2008) writes that “As undergoing inquiry, the material has a different logical important from that which it has as the outcome of inquiry” (p. 122). By the time *an idea* has become *a fact* it has undergone a transformation. Stated another way, all knowing originates as a disrupted, synthetic, existential situation and only secondarily (and as a result of operations performed) becomes an object. Dewey (1938/2008) argued here that “things exist as objects for us only as they have been previously determined as outcomes of inquiries”
(p.178). So within the process of inquiry, a transformation takes place and, as I have previously argued, that transformation is of the entire, intersubjective breadth of the emerging situation. Dewey (1934/2008) writes of this process that:

the expression of the self in and through a medium, constituting the work of art, is itself a prolonged interaction of something issuing from the self with objective conditions, a process in which both of them acquire a form and order they did not at first possess. Even the Almighty took seven days to create the heaven and the earth, and, if the record were complete, we should also learn that it was only at the end of that period that he was aware of just what He set out to do with the raw material of chaos that confronted Him. Only an emasculated subjective metaphysics has transformed the eloquent myth of Genesis into the conception of a Creator creating without any unformed matter to work upon. (p. 71)

It is in this misunderstanding of the transformational nature of creative inquiry that Dewey finds one of the most pernicious problems in education. In Democracy and Education, Dewey (1916/2008a) wrote that “failure to bear in mind the difference in subject matter [i.e. tools] from the respective standpoints of the teacher and student is responsible for most of the mistakes made in the use of texts and other expressions of preexistence knowledge” (p. 190, emphasis added). Teachers often make a massive mistake in imagining that subject matter represents the plain solution to the problem at-hand, or a fact. From the vantage point of the student, who has not taken action on the problem, the subject matter represents suggested courses of action: potentialities ready to be formed into ideas and only later sculpted into facts. Dewey
(1916/2008a) suggested that the “remoteness [of educational content] from the experience of the young is not, however, seeming; it is real” (p. 190). It is not simply an imagined mental distance, it is an intersubjective, experienced distance. *It is a distance which exists in reality.* Further, by restricting their ability to test out paths in practice or develop new paths, particularly in light of the unique problematic being developed based on their circumstance and perspective, teachers restrict the transformational potential of pedagogy. Stated another way, experienced creative inquiry *always* yields a transformation of both person and world.
Teaching

In the previous three chapters, I focused on a reconstruction of the model of knowing and learning which grounds traditional American views of education. In the final two chapters, I will reconstruct the notion of pedagogy for higher education.

I have articulated the problem of developing pedagogy on the SP model of knowing, arguing to replace SP thinking with Bildung as a form of creative action. There is a further problem which I have yet to address, which is that pedagogy, as traditionally conceived, is viewed a context-less event. In other words, it is imagined as beginning from within and beholden to a body of disciplinary knowledge-content, rather than the lives of students.

This view of pedagogy, which governs most colleges and universities, is an unintended consequence of SP thinking, where both knowledge and persons are viewed as essentialized units which are ontologically separated from their environment. In other words, SP epistemology assumes that the context of the knower and the known is irrelevant to the act of knowing. Knowing, and therefore learning, is a simply a cognitive relationship (“knows that”) between a generic knower (“S”) and a value-neutral, objective fact (“p”). As Lorraine Code (1992) argues, SP thinking “…presuppose[s] a universal, homogenous, and essential ‘human nature’ that allows knowers substitutable to one another” (p. 16). Further, “such beliefs derive from conceptions of detached and faceless cognitive agency that mask the variability of the experiences and practices from which knowledge is constructed” (p. 26).

Teaching, therefore, is a kind of transaction in which value-neutral, objective facts are dispensed from the knowledgeable teacher to the ignorant student. The result is a form of
pedagogy which Freire (1970/2000) described as the banking model of education in which “the teacher talks about reality as if it were motionless, static, compartmentalized, and predictable….His task is to ‘fill’ the students with the contents of his narration – contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them significance” (p. 71). Pedagogical concepts such as individual transformation, social construction, and creative co-creation, which are fundamental within an emergent pedagogy, are not simply viewed as unnecessary within traditional pedagogy, but are actually invisible within its guiding logic.

Here it is important to clarify that this is not a critique of the traditional classroom lecture, although that pedagogical method often embodies the problems of the banking model education. In fact, it is not a critique of any particular pedagogical method, but instead is a critique of the guiding logic of the system which produces pedagogical methods. The issue, then, is with a view of knowledge as a body of static data-sets, and knowing as a kind of mental state which allows for the reproduction of those facts. In other words, it is a problem both with the disconnection of knowledge from inquiry, and knowing from embodied action. The problem, as Dewey (1916/2008b)argued, is that:

…”knowledge,” in the sense of information, means the working capital, the indispensable resources, of further inquiry; of finding out, or learning, more things. Frequently it is treated as an end in itself, and then the goal becomes to heap it up and display it when called for. This static, cold-storage ideal of knowledge is inimical to educative development. It not only lets occasions for
Thinking go unused, but it swamps thinking. No one could construct a house on ground cluttered with miscellaneous junk. Pupils who have stored their “minds” with all kinds of material which they have never put to intellectual uses are sure to be hampered when they try to think. They have no practice in selecting what is appropriate, and no criterion to go by; everything is on the same dead static level. (p. 165)

Yet, in traditional schooling, learning is understood as a generic act of cognition, having nothing to do with inquiry, transformation, or change because, as in SP thinking, knowledge (“p”) is a reified object, universally available to all learners regardless of their contexts, goals, or capacities. Knowledge (“p”) is also the end-goal of education, rather than transformation emerging from action.

Traditional pedagogy is far from harmless. Instead, as Freire (1970/2000) argues, in traditional schooling “knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry” (p. 72). The banking model of education, viewed from this perspective, is not simply the distribution of information, but becomes a form of ideology. Students become “alienated like the slave in the Hegelian dialectic” because their education is essentially a meaningless process of data identification and recapitulation. They are alienated from the act of creation and dehumanized in the process.
Freire (1970/2000) argues that “the more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of that world. The more completely they accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited them” (p. 73). That fragmented view of reality is, itself, SP thinking and the very ground on which tradition, banking-style education rests.

Traditional pedagogy results in a kind of gap in the theory and practice of post-secondary education. This gap is precisely that while universities should be imagined as rich inquiry-based, communal, and participatory structures grounded in pressing problems, they are most often designed as cold storehouses of data. In other words, with their aim being the creation, preservation, and transmission of knowledge (i.e. data).

Further, the primarily mode of relatedness within the system is that of person to the data, rather than persons to each other. Stated another way, the priority for students is to perform academically (i.e. reproduce data) in order to be certified as knowledgeable; the priority for faculty is to create and transmit data (i.e. research and teach); and the priority for administrators is to ensure the quality of data-transmission (i.e. assessment). This is both the theory gap of the university and the data-driven imaginary described in the opening section.

The gap, in other words, is that no one within the university is thinking pedagogically about the environment as a space in which emergent inquiry might occur. Rather than being a rich community of inquiry, the university community is reduced to a loose conglomeration of data-driven monads. This monadic view of the university is premised on SP thinking: the idea that knowledge is an objective, value-neutral commodity which is exchanged through the
structures of the university, rather than something socially constructed for the purposes of growth.

This gap manifests throughout the entire physical and conceptual architecture of most colleges and universities, and develops into a kind of anti-intellectualism in much of faculty and administrative life, as well as student culture. What I mean by anti-intellectualism is that there is no space within university life which values and cultivates understanding education in terms of larger cultural and social problems. Anti-intellectualism means that knowledge is neither personal nor political, but is simply a consumable good to be paraded on an administrator’s PowerPoint, or certifying a student as ready for the marketplace.

I contend that this gap exists because pedagogy is imagined as context-less: a simple exchange between the ignorant and the knowledgeable. Yet, if SP thinking is rejected in favor of creative inquiry, then pedagogy must not simply account for context, but actually emerges from the unique contexts of students and communities. The very thing which university pedagogy has long ignored is, in fact, its most central dimension: the rich, synthetic environment in which students find themselves. It is here – and only here - that creative inquiry both begins and ends.

While I contend this claim holds for all pedagogy, it is particularly true for pedagogy at colleges and universities. This is because traditional students in these environments exist in a kind of liminal space, which is unaccounted for in traditional pedagogical theorizing. Traditional university students are neither children, nor adults; they are neither living at home, nor completely on their own. They are, in fact, in a rich residential environment which serves as a kind of in-between space both physically and temporally. The liminality of this space is
absolutely rich with pedagogical potential, and yet is entirely ignored in educational thinking at the post-secondary level.

The first of my final two chapters will describe the potentiality of this space, which has remained invisible and unaccounted for in educational thinking. The second and final chapter will articulate a vision of pedagogy for this space which emerges from the rich environment in which we, as administrators, students, and faculty, have already made our home.
4. The Communal Context of Pedagogy

“...I’m less interested in methodology or techniques than I am in a process that involves the total person, involves vision, involves total realities...I think our job is to try to figure out ways to help people take over their own lives.”

Myles Horton, *We Make The Road By Walking*

Most colleges and universities imagine they have vibrant communities. In fact, many devote significant amounts of financial and human resources to community building and diversity initiatives. They also collect mountains of assessment data to empirically prove that students and faculty alike attend cultural programs, participate in clubs, and follow sports. Yet, I contend that what most universities believe qualifies as deep community is, in fact, simply a flurry of meaningless activity, because it is disconnected from a shared experience of being part of a community of inquiry.

This chapter, then, will follow two main lines of argumentation. In the first section, it will problematize the notion of community at colleges and universities, arguing that rich community rarely exists within a university environment. Further, it will claim that the absence of community is not a social problem, but a pedagogical one. In the second section, it will reconstruct the concept of pedagogy to include the notion of community. In particular, it will argue that a participatory community of inquiry is the platform required for deep inquiry to occur.

**Community Problematized**

If teaching is the construction of environments in which learning occurs, then it was Dewey’s contention that the best environment for deep learning was a democratic one. His (1916/2008a) grounding for this claim was deceptively simple, arguing that the standard for any
society might be boiled down to two characteristics: “How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?” (p. 89). It was a democratic environment, taken as a social arrangement rather than strictly a political structure, that Dewey believed had the most potential for cultivating and releasing human capacity, as it allowed each person to understand their lives as interconnected with one another, and to take stances which benefit the group.

For Dewey, that democratic arrangement was radically participatory, diverse, and just. This was more than just the free interplay of concepts, but it allowed each person to have a shared emotional stake in the direction of the group. Dewey (1916/2008a) argued that “A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in the interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity” (p. 93). A social arrangement of this type was far from perfect, as Dewey himself admits, but it is the most likely one to allow a mutual development of individuals and a continual reconstruction of the group, taken as a whole.

What Dewey argued, then, was that the concept of democracy serves as a kind of platform through which individual and communal growth happens. His major work on education, titled Democracy and Education, can be understood as an extended argument for the fact that democracy and education, far from being ontologically distinct, are versions of the same thing: an intersubjective arrangement in which diverse individuals are mutually bound by intellectual
and emotional ties allowing for mutual growth and meaning making. It is through this structure that creative capacity emerges.

In that text, Dewey makes a move which was not only radical for its own time but is quite radical for pedagogical thinking today. That move is to begin the entirety of his thinking about education from within the context of experience. This does not mean that he begins with a kind of psychologizing of learning, which is a way of essentializing unique learners to develop “silver bullet” approaches to pedagogy. Instead, he begins his major work in education with the experience of persons living in the world, and his philosophy of education is developed inductively and concentrically. It develops, in other words, emergently. The first chapter of *Democracy and Education* (1916/2008a) is titled “Education as a Necessity of Life.” The first paragraph is worth noting in its entirety here:

The most notable distinction between living and inanimate beings is that the former maintain themselves by renewal. A stone when struck resists. If its resistance is greater than the force of the blow struck, it remains outwardly unchanged. Otherwise, it is shattered into smaller bits. Never does the stone attempt to react in such a way that it may maintain itself against the blow, much less so as render the blow a contributing factor to its own continued action. While a living thing may easily be crushed by superior force, it none the less tries to turn the energies which act upon it into means of its own further existence. If it cannot do so, it does not just split into smaller pieces (at least in the higher forms of life), but loses its identity as a living thing. (p. 4)
Dewey is here demarcating that education begins within the human experience, and the human experience begins within the course of an emergent cosmos. His second chapter discusses the emergence of the individual from within a social context. The next four chapters discuss the way education has historically been conceptualized, culminating with the seventh chapter in which Dewey argues for the conceptual unification of democracy and education. In chapters 10-14, Dewey discusses the generic traits of learning and thinking, as tied to an overarching process of inquiry. It is not until chapter 14 that he begins to discuss educational content, which he calls subject matter, to which he devotes three chapters (14, 16 and 17) out of twenty-six chapters total.

The implication is partially that critical and creative capacity, rather than subject matter, is the goal of education. More importantly, the point is that pedagogical thinking should begin and end in the overarching experience of learning, for which a rich, democratic community is the necessary platform.

The problem of establishing a deep, participatory community at most universities is not simply the problem of moving from a college environment where there is no community, to one in which there is a diverse, engaged community. In fact, most colleges have plenty of what might be called community, but it is not of the right kind. The second half of this chapter will describe dimensions of a participatory, democratic community. In this section, my goal is problematize the notion of community as it exists at most colleges and universities: to show how it is actually devoid of opportunities for deep learning and meaning-making.

**A Tale of Two Cultures**
One of the difficulties in constructing a rich community of inquiry is that most universities have cultures which are deeply active, but devoid of participatory meaning-making. Instead of a richly engaged, democratic group, what exists are atomized persons (i.e. faculty, staff, students) with no shared stake in the educational mission of the whole.

This kind of institutional culture begins within and is directed by professional culture, which itself is partitioned into faculty and administrative life. For faculty, university life is organized around research production, curriculum planning, and (occasionally) teaching, rather than developing a rich inquiry-based community with students. This leaves the student experience of university life to either be self-constructed (i.e. focused on socializing, party culture, sports, and academic credentialing), or administrated by student affairs professionals who have no direct connection to the educational and scholarly mission of the university. It is not surprising, then, that so few students are invested in their own educational process.

Claiming that universities need more community is nothing new. In fact, in most university life, the call for deeper community and larger emphases on diversity has become standard boilerplate language. Very rarely, though, have the pedagogical goals of the institution and the cultivation of community been linked. Most often, the richness of the student community is assessed by the number of events students attend, or their participation in clubs. Reciprocally, the diversity of the community is gauged by the number of minority or first-generation students attending the university. On the faculty side, community is gauged by inter-departmental collaboration, multi-disciplinary grants, faculty participation on university committees, and the barrage of annual teaching and impact awards. The call for greater community, then, is a
domesticated one which simply translates to some tangible sign that university stakeholders are coming into contact with one another on a routine basis.

One of the clearest assessments of the profound alienation on college campuses and its impact on learning is Rebekah Nathan’s ethnographic account of student culture, *My Freshman Year*. Nathan, a cultural anthropologist, took her sabbatical year to conduct a year-long anthropological study of student culture at her own university. She literally lived the year as a first-year student, including applying for admission to the school, living in a freshman dormitory, taking classes, going to parties, etc… In supporting my claim that most colleges and universities are devoid of meaningful community, I will pull significantly from Nathan’s work because I am not an anthropologist, and yet her research supports and extends my own experiences working across the university. Over the last fifteen years, I have been an undergraduate and graduate student, held a graduate teaching assistantship and an assistantship as a graduate residence hall director, have been employed professionally in student affairs and in academic administration. In all that time, I have interacted with students from variety of standpoints: as a teacher, advisor, mentor, conduct officer, admissions counselor. I have seen students through the highs and lows of academic problems such as paper preparation and forming and developing study groups, as well as graduate and fellowship admissions. I have also worked with immensely complex personal and social issues often invisible to faculty, such as unexpected pregnancies, parent deaths, drug addictions, hate crimes, and student suicides. Nathan’s text is also significant in that it is one of the few pieces of scholarship which addresses the student experience at universities in any way.
Nathan describes her first week as a student at university as a true immersion into a foreign world. Nathan (2005) wrote that unlike in faculty life where her world existed within one or two familiar buildings, “from my new purview, the buildings and general geography looked completely different to me, so much that I could not tell exactly where I was on campus, much less identify the building or door I was supposed to find” (p. 11). On her first night, Nathan (2005) describes going through the old, familiar habit of making dinner, opening a beer, and sitting down to the news in the common lounge, only to find herself being cited for a conduct violation by the RA for having an alcohol container open in a public space (p. 12). Nathan was immediately thrust into a world which is not a singular space with a singular set of rules, but more like a massively atomized system with each node holding its own set of rules and expectations to which students are expected to conform. In this case, Nathan had no knowledge of the alcohol policy, but was told it was her responsibility to find the literature and know it as an entering student.

Also of note is that Nathan’s ethnography does not begin in the world of the classroom, but it begins as the student experience begins: outside the classroom. Like most other freshmen she finds that she knows no one, that her first friend is an upperclassman Resident Assistant, and that her experience and socialization to life on campus begins significantly earlier than the first day of classes. Her first contact with a faculty member did not come until days after her arrival to campus.

Nathan (2005) quickly discovered that there were two cultures at the university: “if the formal culture stressed advice, academics, and warnings, informal culture stressed sociability, fun, and humor” (p. 23). Oddly, there was no space in which a rich in-between, the life of the
mind, existed. Instead, she simply moved between two worlds: obedience to administrative and faculty authority, on one hand, and disconnected free time, on the other. Nathan (2005) wrote that “whereas careful forethought and the consideration of consequences are primary messages in the formal sector, informal student culture emphasizes spontaneity” (p. 25). Nathan (2005) noted that:

besides RAs, the only authority figure ever mentioned in the dorm meetings was the residence hall director, and a student saw the [Residence Hall Director] only if there was a problem or issue that needed handling. Unless one did something outrageous or unluckily public, most of student life flew under the radar of university-level authorities, whom...few students could even name. The deans, provosts, and vice presidents, so important to faculty, remained part of an amorphous university structure that had little to do with students unless they really bungled their lives. In college culture the rules are perceived to come from ‘outside,’ and it was the job of an astute college student to keep his or her real life private and ‘inside,’ certainly behind closed doors. (p. 29)

This dichotomy between the public and private is a theme which radiates through Nathan’s “freshman” experience: at no place in the university does there exist a space where rich, meaningful democratic dialogue occurs. The life of a student simply fluctuates between the private, inner life which is un-tethered to learning or knowing, and the public, outer realm which is externally imposed and governed by administrative rules. Rather than active, democratic involvement, the cultural goal for the student was to keep these two realms as distant as possible.
Nathan noted that the distance between the faculty and student culture at universities could not be farther. Students were completely unaware of the culture, expectations, or hierarchy of faculty life, but the same was the case for her faculty colleagues’ views of the student experience. She (2005) wrote that “the idea of becoming a student in a residence was such a stretch for most colleagues that three individuals (two professors and one administrator), in different conversations, responded with the same extraordinary comment that my project sounded just like *Black Like Me*, John Howard Griffin’s classic 1960 book about a white man who…lived as a “Negro” in the deep South” (p. 133). Nathan (2005) concluded that it was a complete ignorance of each other’s roles at the university that “leads to misperceptions and sometimes intolerance at both ends….It is easy to see students as irresponsible, deceitful, and self-indulgent, just as it is easy to see teachers as officious, unkind, and self-important” (p. 134). This speaks volumes to the distance between cultures, and particularly to the cultural assumption that faculty and students have nothing in common, including any sort of shared stake in the common mission of the university.

One of the more pedagogically significant cultural norms surfacing during her year as a freshman was the difference in faculty and student perceptions of assigned course reading. She (2005) wrote that as a professor, “it always comes as a surprise to me that students appear clueless about what happened in the last class, that only a minority of them have done the reading assigned, and that almost no undergraduates ever show up for my office hours unless perhaps they are failing” (p. 136). To the contrary, after her (2005) experience, “I see now what I didn’t see before. In the time between …classes…I have taught only one other class…By contrast, my students have had at least four other classes in between, maybe more, and they have
completed many other reading and writing assignments in the interim, in addition, perhaps to working a job and attending residence hall or club programs” (p. 136). In addition to the flurried life of a student, Nathan (2005) identified a series of cultural norms which guide whether or not students at her campus actually completed the assigned reading for the course. They were as follows (p. 138):

- “Will there be a test or quiz on the material?”
- “Is the reading something that I will need in order to be able to do the homework?”
- “Will we directly discuss this in class in such a way that I am likely to have to personally and publicly respond or otherwise ‘perform’ in relation to this reading?”

As Nathan (2005) moved deeper into her semester, there was a moment when a professor recommended an additional reading to “amplify the subject” of the following week’s lecture. Nathan (2005) wrote that “as he began reciting the Web address, I found myself chuckling, realizing that I had no intention of doing this reading and would not even copy down the information. It was immediately clear to me why students had not read articles for my class: there was no strong signal from me that I would use the article – in a quiz or an assignment or even a guaranteed discussion – and, apart from the exceptionally interested student, I had [been] given no reason to prioritize these readings from obligations for other classes” (p. 138). Within a few short weeks Nathan herself had transitioned from a faculty member who was actively interested in the courses to becoming socialized into a utilitarian educational culture. This transition had little to do with her own characteristics as a learner, but a system which was designed to educate in a utilitarian way. Nathan (2005) wrote that, “most professors and
administrators overestimate the role that academics play in student culture, and as a result they magnify the impact of teachers and classes on student life and decisions. …there is no doubt that special professors do make a difference in the life of specific students, but overall, I’d suggest, student-teacher relationships play a relatively minor role in the experience of undergraduate life in a large university” (p. 140). Nathan’s experience bears out the atomized and often frustrating distance between faculty and student life on college campuses. Nathan wasn’t a bad student, but became alienated from her own learning by her immersion into the culture guidelines established for her by the pedagogical infrastructure of the present system.

The Student Experience

The third chapter of Nathan’s ethnography is devoted specifically to her experience matriculating into the university community as a student. Nathan (2005) describes student culture as being held together by little more than “age, pop culture, a handful of (recent) historical events, and getting a degree” (p. 42). In response to this cultural vacuum, administrators took one of two approaches.

The academic administration attempted to infuse scholarship into the life of the community via a mandatory freshman introductory course. The goal was to begin the careers of students having “the entire freshman class…engaged in the same reading, and thus have a common basis for debate and dialogue” (pp. 42-43). The distance between intellectual ideal and pedagogical execution could not be further from one another. While the intention was good, Nathan (2005) guessed that less than 30% of the students did the reading. Students described hating the seminar because they had no choice in taking it, because it was abstract, and because it
was unrelated to their interests (p. 43). Rather than developing a scholarly direction from within the student experience or investing resources in cultivating mentoring relationships between students and faculty, the academic administration attempted to force learning upon students by fiat.

Reciprocally, Nathan (2004) describes how student affairs units translated “meaningful community” into offering an abundance of events, clubs and experiences offered to students who became consumers of a vast array of choices. Nathan (2005) wrote that there were a dizzying amount of activities and, further, that dropping out of those activities are clubs was also incredibly easy. This created a kind of social consumer-culture where there was very little deep investment from students in those activities. Layered on top is that “every decision not to join but to keep one’s time for oneself is interpreted as ‘student apathy’ or ‘program irrelevance,’ and ever more activities are designed to remedy them” (p. 45). Nathan (2005) describes this as a kind of vicious circle of involvement: “a multiplicity of voluntary activities, a handful of participants at each, and renewed efforts to create new activities that were more relevant and attractive, resulting in an even greater proliferation of choices and fragmentation of the whole” (p. 47). The resulting culture was one which valued high numbers of activities, which in themselves required no commitment and were devoid of meaning and growth potential.

As part of a larger push within student affairs for “community development,” Nathan’s RA was required to hold a hall-wide meeting in which the students completed an individual interest inventory and collectively brainstormed what it meant to be in a community. Nathan (2005) noted that “what I saw in student responses, as well as in student behavior, was a profound ambivalence about community life, resulting in a tentative, often conflicted
relationship to the collective life of the university. Not only did campus participation suffer from this conflict, but also it was difficult to create mutual commitments and agreements among people whose connection to community was so hesitant” (p. 50). Students entered into the university without any sense of why community might matter to their education. Rather than challenging this view, it was actually reinforced by the system, itself. Students were encouraged to view their role from the framework of a consumer: classes, activities, social events, clubs, completing assignments were all market-driven, and students had internalized a system of risk, reward, and personal utility.

Through her experience, Nathan (2005) discovered that “community in the American university is a paradoxically a private and an individual decision. As Robert Putnam documents in his history of community in the United States, *Bowling Alone*, the private decision to participate in community life is one that individuals in recent U.S. history are making less and less. From civic and religious life to political participation and informal social connections, there is an increasing individualism in American life that is evident in our universities as well” (p. 52). These cultural norms, which undermine deep community, increasingly govern university life and are reinforced by the conceptual and physical infrastructure at most universities. Nathan noted that this phenomenon is reflected within larger trends in dormitory architecture which focus on lower density occupancy, private space, and heightened personal amenities. Nathan (2005) wrote, “it is no longer considered a viable model of campus life to have a hall full of people sharing a communal bathroom, lounge, and washing machine. The old blueprint of collective living has given way to much more individualized and opulent arrangements” (p. 52). This trend
doesn’t simply impact the individual student rooms, but the relationship between public and private space as well.

After she settled in, Nathan noticed that the lounges scattered around the buildings were rarely used. She (2005) noted that:

…with the exception of the cleaning staff on their lunch breaks, I never saw students bring food and eat together, sit and socialize together, or even watch television together in our local lounge…My observations of lounges in other dormitories were not significantly different. These spaces often sat empty. During the day, no one used them at all. On most nights, the overstuffed couches and chairs in our largest lounge would be draped with one to three students who had positioned themselves as far as possible from one another. (p. 53)

It wasn’t just that students didn’t use them or know about them, but that:

..interviews with the few students who were in the lounges during my observations revealed that the majority came there to ‘get away’ – from a gathering in their room, music blasting on the hall, or a roommate with a guest. In other words, the community spaces were often a retreat from social interaction, a way to create more private options. They were no longer, as their builders had probably envisioned, primarily a place for people to come together and participate in joint activities. (p. 53)
Nathan described the irony of a Super Bowl party thrown by the RA. She imagined that due to the excitement on the hall for the upcoming game she would find at least several dozen students in the lounge, eating the free pizza and wings, and watching the game on the two big screen TVs which were rented by the staff. Instead, there were four students total, one of whom had turned the TV to another program. Yet, “on my corridor along, where there were two open doors, I could see clusters of people in each room eating and drinking as they watched the game together on their own sizable television sets. It seemed telling to me that so many dormitory residents were watching the same game in different places, the great majority preferring to pass the time with a carefully chosen group of personal friends in their own private space” (p. 54).

Nathan (2005) concluded that:

Rather than being located in its shared symbols, meetings, activities, and rituals, the university for an undergraduate was more accurately a world of self-selected people and events. The university community was experienced by most students as a relatively small, personal network of people who did things together. This ‘individual community’ was bolstered by a university system that honors student choice, as well as a level of materialism in the larger society that, by enabling students to own their own cars, computers, TV sets, and VCRs, renders collective resources and spaces superfluous. (p. 54)

The picture of the communal life of students, as described by Nathan’s ethnography, is one which is bound together, on one hand, by academic assignments and, on the other, a flurry of
depthless activities, all of which serve as the ground for the formation and creation of insular self-directed groups.

**Diversity and Democracy**

As previously articulated, Dewey held that there were two primary criteria necessary for a democratic community: a diversity of people, and a system which cultivated *meaningful* interplay between them. Nathan wrote that while the concept of diversity has become a kind of buzzword within campus life, there is rarely any sort of actual emphasis placed on cultivating diverse communities within the university. Nathan (2005) wrote that “what makes diversity a ‘success’ in a state university…is not…that the university population reflects the diversity of the general population but also that students become more involved in the lives and issues of that diverse population” (p. 58). This was Dewey’s position, as well. From a pedagogical perspective, there are two problems within the infrastructure of most colleges and universities. The first is that the concept of diversity has been conceptualized purely in terms of racial diversity. The second is that cultivating diversity has been executed as a kind of statistical exercise. To the contrary, cultivating a diverse and engaged community is deep and difficult work. It must be tied to an ongoing and communal process of reflective inquiry. It also requires acknowledging that knowing is a political act, as well as an act which is personally and socially disruptive. This is the alienation-return contained within the concept of Bildung. Unfortunately, as Nathan’s ethnography will attest, this is not the kind of diversity which exists on most campuses.
In fact, Nathan found that her qualitative data conflicted with the results gathered on the popular (and frequently touted) *National Survey of Student Engagement* (NSSE), which is a survey which captures information regarding the frequency and depth of student engagement with diversity. Nathan found that while the NSSE data indicated nearly 50% of students had frequent conversations with students of a different race or ethnicity, her research indicated that the depth of such an interaction would be surface-level, at best. As opposed to the NSSE, she (2005) found that while many students did have acquaintances of different races or ethnicities, the vast majority of “white students I interviewed…had no members of another racial or ethnic group in their close social circle” (p. 59). More troubling is the fact that while racism, sexism and homophobic behavior are all very much present on college campuses, these are “typically ignored as a topic of conversation in mainstream college culture, treated as an invisible issue and with silence” (p. 60). Contrast this with the fact that “despite the general invisibility of the subject of race in informal student culture,” there was not a single minority student Nathan interviewed who hadn’t experienced racism (p. 60). Nathan concluded that while community and diversity remain ideals at the university, neither is realized in university culture.

There is one other, more subtle, dimension of Nathan’s project which is extremely illuminating in terms of this cultivation of a richly diverse community of inquiry: in neither her research studies, nor in her definitions of either community or diversity did Nathan include *the faculty* at the university. While her findings present a massive amount of evidence that the student experience is devoid of community, it is striking that Nathan did not imagine that the concept of community within university life should or could include *both* students and faculty. They are assumed to be ontologically separate, rather than dyadic parts of the ecosystem of the
university. While it is clear that her project was intended as an ethnographic description of student culture, the very fact that the notion of culture could and should be separated into distinct classes is a kind of pedagogical problem in itself. I contend that while Nathan’s project is extremely useful for understanding the atomization of student culture, it is this gap within her own research that points to a major deficiency within post-secondary pedagogy.

What we can conclude, then, is that while most stakeholders within the university community imagine that university is driven ultimately by learning and knowing, this could not be further from the case. At best, most undergraduate students are driven by performing academically which is quite different than wanting to know something. For many undergraduates, even performing academically is only a minimum priority. They typically only invest as much time as it takes to continue progressing toward their degree. Reciprocally, for many faculty the life of the mind is transformed into a tidy formula of the quantity of research production, teaching evaluation scores, and required service. The result is not a strictly cultural problem, but it is a pedagogical problem – one which actively undermines not only deep community, but the shared process of inquiry required to solve societal problems. It is this pedagogical problem to which I will now turn.
Community and Inquiry

Learning Fields

The virtual absence of authentic community on most college campuses is at least partially a reflection of the increasing neoliberal emphasis within American culture and it devaluing of the role of communal life. Within the context of institutions of higher learning, I maintain it’s also a reflection of SP thinking and its insular view of pedagogy.

Jan Nespor’s (1994) text Knowledge in Motion frames the basic problematic of contemporary pedagogical thinking well. His work is concerned with “a simple question: how is activity in one setting (such as a classroom) related to activity in settings distant in space and time (other classrooms or workplaces)?” (p. 6). He argues that, within traditional pedagogy, knowing and learning have been imagined as atomized, localized, and spatialized events, which all take place within the context of the classroom. In this model, students are information processors for whom learning is a cognitive recapitulation of objective, value-neutral facts (i.e. SP thinking).

To the contrary, Nespor argues, knowledge exists in flows: “we live in a global world system and no analysis of knowledge and learning will suffice that cannot take this into account: that my activity writing this and yours in reading it cannot be explicated without understanding how we’re linked to one another, to those around us, to world economies, and global flows of culture that shape and provide resources for everyday practice” (p. 6) For Nespor, then, knowledge cannot be imagined without taking communal context into account. Further, knowledge is not a static object to be produced and reproduced, but is in motion – it is temporal
– because knowers are constantly encountering new situations and contexts which expand, refine and cause reimaginings and reconstructions of the known.

From a Deweyan standpoint, knowledge is in motion because it is not simply a cognitive affair, but is encoded in and reconstructed by the body in the form of habits of action. In other words, thinking, knowing and, in fact, persons are subfunctions of temporal action. This, itself, is the foundation of creative inquiry. Extending Nespor’s argument, then, knowledge is in motion because human life is in motion and structured through action-in-environment.

From the perspective of knowledge-in-motion, the pedagogical problem is that colleges and universities are not designed around knowledge flows, emerging from persons and worlds, but instead they are exclusively organized around static bodies of knowledge taken as stable givens or Truths. This is the impact of SP thinking. Nespor argues that we typically imagine pedagogy as a limited and spatialized event, which occurs in a singular space: the classroom. For example, faculty imagine students as information processors who ingest particular bits of information, which they retain objectively across all environments. Yet, learning is neither limited to the localized event of the classroom, nor is it administrated exclusively by faculty. This claim is not a philosophical ideal, but is the basic structure of human experience. Yet, the breadth of that lived experience is unaccounted for within contemporary thinking about pedagogy. If it is the case that knowledge is in motion, then pedagogy is not simply a classroom-based event, but is a distributed event-structure which emerges from within and is supported and extended by a rich communal context.

Traditionally, pedagogy has been imagined on a spectrum from the formal to the nonformal, with *formal pedagogies* being imagined as school-based learning, *informal*
pedagogies imagined as field trip and museum experiences, and nonformal pedagogies as being adult and community learning. The basic spectrum is one which describes the range of formal structure within a given pedagogical space. Yet, within the context of higher education, there are two significant problems within this way of conceptualizing pedagogy.

The first problem is that it still does not account for what Nespor calls knowledge-in-motion, which is how learning moments interact, and how knowledge is developed and reconstructed. This is because it takes stable knowledge to be a given, and imagines that pedagogy is simply a kind of method or conduit. Here, pedagogy is not the holistic, emergent structure of creative inquiry, but is simply the mode of dispensing stable facts. Stated another way, it views knowledge as spatial and objective, and therefore the pedagogical question only concerns how that knowledge is communicated. As previously articulated, Dewey views the separating of form from content as the philosophical fallacy emerging from the spectator theory of knowing. Instead, pedagogical thinking must not only account for the learning moment, as it exists in space and time, but it must also account for the interconnections between learning moments, which Nespor calls flows. Pedagogy, then, concerns both the emergent moment of inquiry and the interrelationship between that moment and other moments within the wider structure of inquiry. Pedagogy is the student experience in the community.

The second problem is that post-secondary schooling is taken to be a singular, stable kind of space, as it is imagined and described within the majority of K-12 educational literature. Yet, the traditional university context is a different kind of learning space with different kinds of learners. Here, not only do we have the deep potential of a rich residential learning community, but also a young adult learning community (i.e. neither child learners, nor adult learners). In
other words, there are a host of elements present within the context of most university communities which make them ripe for the development of a rich community of learning. Yet, this potential is abandoned within SP thinking.

There are three primary dimensions of the post-secondary environment worth noting, which typically remain unaccounted for within pedagogical thinking. The first is that, as Nathan’s ethnography attests, the majority of the student experience of college exists outside the classroom and, for many, within a residential context. This physical and social proximity presents an opportunity to cultivate a truly rich democratic environment, which most often is dismissed as educationally valid and abandoned to the whims of student life. The second is that colleges and universities are not simply places where knowledge is disseminated, but also (at least in the ideal) are places in which knowledge is generated. This presents a unique opportunity for shared knowing and the communal construction of knowledge: for a rich community grounded in making and doing. The third dimension is that the traditional student at a university is either a young-adult or adult learner. They are capable, therefore, of independent and self-directed projects, and of articulating their own goals, identities and values – however much they may still be in motion.

While the traditional college student has been socialized into an overly administrated learning environment and therefore has become a kind of passive, dependant learner who understands education as a kind of performance, this need not be the case. The vast majority of colleges and universities have all the necessary ingredients for a pedagogically democratic space, and yet they have been mis-conceptualized and therefore mis-designed. Rather than pedagogy as a kind of spectrum of formality, I contend it would be more helpful to imagine pedagogy as a
kind of overlapping series of contexts. This will require, as I will describe in the next section, a
reconstruction of the concepts of teacher and learner, moving from imaging them as independent,
autonomous agents unilaterally acting on one another, to dyadic, shifting and interwoven event-
identities which emerge within situations. Pedagogy becomes, then, a series of micro-
pedagogical (i.e. mentoring relationships, research groups, reading circles, classrooms) and
macro-pedagogical (i.e. residential communities, departmental structures, architectural layouts)
contexts, each of which has a profound impact on the flow of learning and inquiry within the
student experience. Further, the overlapping fields are organized around the emergent process of
inquiry of persons and communities within the distributed field of a larger, integrated community
of inquiry.

The immediate problem which presents itself is that an extended and integrated
community of inquiry is vastly different from a series of atomized spaces designed for content-
distribution. Here, I will argue this shift requires a reconceptualization of four particular
dimensions of the university: the role of students and teachers; the relationship between power
and pedagogy; the value of knowledge; and the definition of community.

The Teacher-Student Dyad

In this section, I will examine the concept of the teacher and the student, both of which
are traditionally imagined as being mutually exclusive and stable identities which are located
within persons. To the contrary, I will argue that teacher/student identities are contextual,
intersubjective, and in motion. Further, a more appropriate way of conceptualizing teachers and
students within the context of higher education is expressed by the concepts of beginning,
intermediate, or master learners. I acknowledge that this is perhaps not the ideal phrasing, but the concept is an attempt to get at the idea that within the context of a learning community, all participants are learners who seek to know something. Further, each learner has the capability of expressing something unique and valuable. The difference between a faculty member and a student has something to do with the content-knowledge which they can access and apply, but more to do with the habits of learning they have cultivated through a lifetime dedicated to reflective inquiry.

Gert Biesta’s work is helpful in reimagining the role of students and teachers from being an ontological, to simply a logical difference. Of particular interest is the way in which Biesta conceptualizes pedagogy as being a form of what he calls practical intersubjectivity. Biesta (1994) argued that his concept “forms an alternative for the subject-centered philosophy of consciousness that has dominated the philosophical discourse of modernity ever since this came into existence” (pp. 301-302). The educational implications of his notion could not be more important or more radical for the development of post-secondary pedagogy because, in pedagogical terms, the philosophy of consciousness grounds the traditional conceptualization of the role of the student and teacher. Biesta’s concept, then, replaces an essentialist view of students and teachers with an intersubjective view which is grounded in communal action.

Biesta intends his concept to present a challenge not only to the philosophy of consciousness on which traditional views of education are based, but also to the structures which emanate from them. In particular, Biesta challenges “four of the key presuppositions of the ‘traditional’ understanding of education. These are (1) the alleged asymmetrical character of education; (2) the paradox of education; (3) the relationship between individuality and sociality;
and (4) the way in which the agency of the subject is understood” (p. 302). It is the first presupposition which is important here.

A Cartesian ontology, which is taken up into the philosophy of consciousness assumes that the “individual subject is…the unproblematic unit of analysis. Education is therefore understood as an interaction between [autonomous and essential] subjects” (p. 302). Yet, according to Biesta, traditional educational theory views the child (i.e. student) as lacking “the characteristics of full subjectivity, [and therefore s/he] is treated as not yet a subject. As a consequence, the educational relationship is seen as inherently asymmetrical” (p. 303). The goal of education, as in SP thinking, is for those fully formed (i.e. filled with content-knowledge) to act on those unformed learners (i.e. without content-knowledge) until they transform into knowers. Biesta further argues that “because this transition is thought of as the outcome of the efforts and influences of those who already are subjects (the adults), the educational process is seen as a paradoxical endeavor, the paradox being that the adult can only make the child into a free, self-responsible subject by denying its freedom and responsibility during the process of education” (p. 303). Here, the concept of practical intersubjectivity between learners makes space for dealing with power in pedagogical contexts, which will be treated in the next section. Important here is that Biesta argues that the teacher and student, viewed as practical intersubjective selves, are engaged instead in a symmetrical relationship.

Here, pedagogy begins to shift from a telling and hearing to a shared making and doing. Biesta (1994) wrote that “understanding education in terms of practical intersubjectivity means that pedagogical action is not considered to be a one-way process in which meaning is transferred, understanding education as practical intersubjectivity entails that pedagogical action
is thought of as a co-constructive process in which meaning is produced…education is considered to be a *symmetrical* relationship” (p. 312). Pedagogy, then, is a form of cooperative action in which learners seek to examine and solve common problems.

Importantly, Biesta ties his notion of practical subjectivity to *Bildung*. He wrote that “practical intersubjectivity considers education to be a process of acculturation…[yet it is not] a one-way process in which culture is transferred from one (already enculturated) organism to another (not yet enculturated) organism, but as a co-constructive process, a process in which both participating organisms play an active role and in which meaning is not transferred but produced” (pp. 311-312). *Bildung*, then, cannot be achieved through a unilateral act, but only activates through a mutual process of discovery, a co-construction of meaning. Biesta wrote (1994) that:

> the issue now no longer is whether the child is able or not to supply rational arguments for his interpretation of the world; *the crucial issue is that meaning is the outcome of social cooperation*. For education this means that the collective activities of child and adult, of student and teacher, constitute the meaning of what is learned. It is not the case that the one offers meaning and the other receives it. Both child and adult, student and teacher, are factors in the eventual outcome. It is with respect to this insight that practical intersubjectivity holds that child and adult, student and teacher, are equal. (p. 315)

Teachers and learners are not only equal, their roles are co-constituted and constantly shifting depending on the context of active inquiry taken.
Biesta (1994) concludes that “at first sight it seems as if practical intersubjectivity goes against some of our basic intuitions and convictions about education. It sees the educational relationship as symmetrical, it understands the content of education as the outcome of cooperative action, and it treats the child as a competent partner in this cooperative action. Besides this, it also suggests that the identity formation of the child is not dependent upon the strategic activities of adults” (p. 317). The realization that individuals in a learning community are all learners at different stages in an ongoing, ever-present, and conjoined process of inquiry is the ground of emergent pedagogy. Yet, in recognizing this conceptual ground, the educational infrastructure of colleges and universities which appear capable of educating from the perspective of SP thinking, are now clearly bankrupt of opportunities for deep learning.

**Power, Pedagogy, and the Agency of Learners**

Traditionally, the teacher is viewed as holding all power in the teacher/student relationship. Grounded in a false philosophy of consciousness, the teacher is able to exert a kind of unilateral power onto the student in the form of knowledge dissemination and performance assessment. Biesta’s reconstruction of the relationship between teachers and students destabilizes this view. Yet, symmetry between teachers and students is not an equalizing or ignoring of the ever-present power dynamic within the student-teacher relationship. In fact, he (1994) argued “it might even be the case that the perspective of practical intersubjectivity may be able to specify in more detail and with more clarity where and how power plays a role in the co-construction of meaning, and where and how power plays a role in the co-construction of meaning, and where and how it does not. In order to point out power and inequality, at least an adequate idea about
how and where equality does play a role in education is needed” (p. 316). The challenge of an emergent pedagogy, then, is not to ignore power, but to account for it in a way that makes power mutually generative, rather than oppressive. Stated another way, the question is how to move toward a mutual learning relationship which is based on mentorship and friendship, and thereby away from the aristocratic and unilateral power-structure created by traditional classrooms.

It is important here to note that the concept of emergent pedagogy is intended specifically for post-secondary education which, I contend, is an environment virtually untreated within educational literature. What I mean is that all pedagogical theory is grounded a particular set of assumptions regarding the learning space in which that pedagogy will be enacted and, as a result, assumptions about the roles and expectations of students within those spaces.

For example, Dewey is most often writing about young children arbitrarily grouped into traditional, American K-12 classrooms, whereas Paulo Freire is focused on adult learners engaged in nonformal educative settings within oppressed communities. This difference leads Dewey to place far more agency within the role of the teacher, who is more narrowly responsible for the construction of learning environments and scaffolding information. On the other hand, Freire views this kind of environmental scaffolding as indicative of an untenable power dynamic between teacher and student and, instead, equally distributes agency in educational space (if not giving slightly more to the student). I believe both approaches are justifiable considering the pedagogical contexts in which these two are operating and, therefore, I do not find it surprising that while both Dewey and Freire diverge on some issues within pedagogical design, they still share many assumptions about the nature of learners, the process of inquiry, and the aims of education.
Within the context of post-secondary education and, in particular, concerning issues of power and agency in pedagogy, critical theory has a tremendous amount to offer here. This is because, while emergent pedagogy draws deeply from hermeneutics and pragmatism, those bodies of literature run into dead-ends within the pedagogical context of the American university.

One of those dead-ends concerns the relationship between and agency of teachers and learners within the classroom. Critical pedagogy challenges the view that the role of the student is one of passive consumer and education is something enacted upon them. To the contrary, if one is interested in developing a participatory democracy or participatory versions of pedagogy, such is the goal of emergent pedagogy, then all participants must be empowered to have a voice and active role in all decisions which affect them. This requires that students be given opportunities to take participatory stances within their own educative process, including things like course and curriculum development, participatory research opportunities, and support (and credit) for activities outside the boundaries of formal systems.

Freire, for example, advocated for the development of a critical pedagogy, which concurrently sought the removal of hegemony, while developing a transformative, praxis-focused system of education. Freire described the pedagogy of the traditional school as being built on “the banking system” of education. In this system, the teacher-student relationship is viewed as top-down and one-directional. Knowledge is viewed as a collection of dislocated facts which are “deposited” by the expert-teacher into the student via rote memorization, repetition and drilling. Freire (1970/2000) wrote that in this model “[e]ducation thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of
communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat” (p. 72). This is the result of SP thinking.

Freire (1970/2000) saw several dangers with this model. Primary among them was that this system reinforced hegemonic systems: “Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry” (p. 72). For Freire, in the banking model students become “alienated like the slave in the Hegelian dialectic…” (p. 72). This approach didn’t simply trap students, but also pulled in teachers, as it erased the dialectical relatedality which led to critical consciousness and continued growth for both students and teachers.

To the contrary, then, teachers’ “efforts must coincide with those of the students to engage in critical thinking and the quest for mutual humanization. His efforts must be imbued with a profound trust in people and their creative power. To achieve this, they must be partners of the students in their relations with them” (p. 75). Here we see the deep resemblance between Biesta’s concept of practical intersubjectivity and Freire’s view of the teacher. A praxis-based pedagogy requires a change both in teachers and students because pedagogy is no longer unilateral, but participatory.

In We Make The Road By Walking, Myles Horton (1990) defines this connection between critical pedagogical practice and its goals, arguing that “The more people participate in the process of their own education, the more the people participate in the process of defining what kind of production to produce, and for what and why, the more the people participate in the development of their selves. The more the people become themselves, the better the democracy” (p. 145). In that text, Horton and Freire wrestle particularly with the difference between educating
and organizing within democracy, as a vehicle to discussing power within pedagogy. Horton makes the case that an educator should never offer an answer, or tell people what to do, but instead to construct an environment around which people conceptualize their intuitions and experiences in deeper, more nuanced ways. He (1990) argues that, “An organizer’s job is not to educate people as a prime consideration. His job is to accomplish a limited, specific goal” (p. 127). To the contrary, he argues that “…an educator should never become an expert…” (p. 128). So, in this way, he views an educator more like a master learner in the process whose duty it is start with people’s experience and then start to offer resources (but never solutions) “when people’s experience runs out” (p. 128). This redistribution of power is, though, a two-way street and, as Freire (1970/2000) argues, “it is essential for the oppressed to realize that when they accept the struggle for humanization they also accept, from that moment, their total responsibility for their struggle” (p. 68). Education, then, does not erase power but reconstructs it as a generative force because it is located and distributed in a participatory, community of inquiry.

The Powerladenness of Knowledge and Knowing

Pedagogical power is deeply interrelated to the relationship between power and knowledge. For critical theorists, the creation of an expert culture, including the hierarchy of expertise, is antithetical to the goals of deep democracy and critical pedagogy. Further, the creation of such a culture is, in many ways, intertwined with the emergence of the modern research university and the nature of increasingly narrow disciplinary cultures. So, there is a kind of double-barreled process which occurs in the modern era of industrialized knowledge
production, where, on the one hand, knowledge became a specialized practice placed in the hands of authorized knowers, or experts. On the other hand and as a result, knowledge was divorced from its wider social context, and ethically sanitized so that it appeared neutral and without cultural consequence.

Freire (1990) conceptualizes the educational problem this way: “What I want to know is whether it’s possible to teach biology without discussing social conditions…is it possible to discuss, to study the phenomenon of life without discussing exploitation, domination, freedom, democracy, and so on” (p. 104). Further, Freire says that this is ultimately a question intended to “clarify the role of the teacher…it has to do with their competency, with their political clarity, with their constituency and their understanding of the very process. It’s not a question for the biology teacher to impose on the students his or her political ideas…but it is a question for the teacher to discuss the issue in a broader way and even to express his or her choice. Do you see, then? It is a problem of not being neutral, but of how to be different” (p. 104). Knowledge in community cannot, then, be imagined as value-free because it functions in that community. Knowledge has deep ethical, cultural, social, and political impacts which radiate out throughout the community.

Further, the participatory view of inquiry at the heart of emergent pedagogy requires that teachers include students in the process of knowledge creation, to develop their own creative capacities and, as a result, dissolve the culture of expert knowers. As a result, it also exposes students to the cultural and social implications of knowledge, requiring them to participate as stance takers within that process.
This bears a family resemblance to the work of Henry Giroux (2001) who argued that school is a “site for creating a critical discourse around forms a democratic society might take and the socioeconomic forces that might prevent such forms from emerging” (p. 116). Therefore, critical pedagogy must “connect learning to social change, scholarship to commitment, and classroom knowledge to public life” (p. 117). Giroux calls, then, for a pedagogy for the opposition. He (2001) argued that:

[r]ather than celebrating objectivity and consensus, teachers must place the notions of critique and conflict at the center of their pedagogical models. Within such a perspective, greater possibilities exist for developing an understanding of the role power plays in defining and distributing the knowledge and social relationships that mediate the school and classroom experience. Critique must become a vital pedagogical tool not only because it breaks through the mystifications and distortions that "silently" work behind the labels and routines of school practice, but also because it models a form of resistance and oppositional pedagogy. (p. 62)

Giroux (1997) argues for a reconstruction of the view of teachers as those who dispense knowledge to a view of “teachers as transformative intellectuals who occupy specifiable political and social locations” (p. 224). This does not simply transform the notion of teaching as an activity within formal classroom space, but (particularly as it concerns faculty at universities) “on the contrary, it is a call for teachers to undertake social criticism not as outsiders but as public intellectuals who address the social and political issues of their neighborhood, their
nation, and the wider global world” (p. 224). Further, “in this perspective, teachers would be involved in the invention of critical discourses and democratic social relations. Critical pedagogy would represent itself as the active construction rather than the transmission of particular ways of life” (p. 224).

As it concerns the notion of emergent pedagogy, the central idea is that knowledge is both personal and political: it has value and social implications. If a community of learners is to develop, then this requires that teachers and learners take participatory stances within the context of the process of inquiry. Further, that stance taking is not simply a meaningless exercise, but is the way in which beginning learners develop the capacity and confidence to act within democratic communities. The goal, then, is not to dissolve power, but to make it generative and justice-directed. Pedagogical power is distributed between all learners and enacted within the course of knowledge creation and meaning-making.

**Dialogue, Community, and Artistic Practice**

In this chapter, I have argued for a distributed view of knowledge, and claimed that knowing is an ongoing and emergent process within the flow of continuous experience. I have further claimed that teachers and students are identities-in-motion which emerge as part of the process of inquiry and knowledge creation. In the final section, I will define the kind of rich, participatory community of inquiry which emergent pedagogy requires.

Within Biesta’s (1994) articulation of practical intersubjectivity he glosses a deceptively simple, yet radical, conclusion which is that “education requires by necessity a personal relationship” (p. 312). As I have previously articulated, inquiry is predicated on the notion of
community because it is grounded in intersubjective action. Yet, as Matthew Lipman (2003) argued, while all inquiry emerges from community, not all community is grounded in inquiry (p. 83). Lipman (2003) wrote that an authentic community, unlike the one described by Nelson, “is not aimless. It is a process that aims at producing a product – at some kind of settlement or judgment, however partial or tentative this may be. Second, this process has a sense of direction; it moves where the argument takes it. Third, the process is not merely conversation or discussion; it is dialogical. This means it has a structure” (pp. 83-4). This is precisely the danger of the perceived presence, yet absolute absence, of meaningful community within colleges and university life.

Lipman argued that every meaningful community of inquiry contains two basic parts, taken from Dewey and Mead. From Dewey, it must have “the Gestalt quality of the unique, immediately experienced inquiry situation, and we learn from Mead that the educational community of inquiry actively discusses the subject matter under investigation” (p. 86). Another way of conceptualizing this is that it needs to hold in tandem both a centrally experienced problem, as well as the resources to inquire into that problem. I would additionally add that the depth of the relationship of the community not only increases the capacity for meaning in the process, but that it also expands the depth and scope of the communal process of inquiry. With deep relationships come deeper likelihoods of experimentation and, therefore, of knowing.

We can contrast this with Nelson’s description of the student experience, which includes none of those three pervasive qualities: increasingly deepening and meaningful relationships, an engaged central problem, or the resources to begin to inquire. Instead, the community process
was disconnected from meaning and growth, and the academic process was disconnected from meaningful engagement and was reduced to an academic performance.

Of critical importance for Lipman (2003) is the contrast between the merely conversational and deep, community dialogue. He wrote that “when we speak of a community of inquiry, we cannot help noticing the contrast between the emphasis on the personal in the concept of community and the emphasis on inquiry on a logic that transcends the personal. So in contrasting conversation and dialogue, we cannot help seeing in conversation a process in which the personal note is strong but the logical thread is weak, whereas in dialogue just the reverse is the case” (p. 87). Lipman notes that in conversation, there is a kind of mutual reciprocity, but no movement or transformation: “a conversation seesaws between the protagonists; it contains moves, but the conversation itself does not move” (p. 87). Whereas in dialogue “disequilibrium is enforced in order to compel forward movement” (p. 87). Further, “a conversation is an exchange: of feelings, of thoughts, of information, of understandings. A dialogue is mutual exploration, an investigation, an inquiry” (pp. 87-8). For Lipman, then, conversation can lead to dialogue, but not all conversation is dialogue.

What distinguished conversation from dialogue is that rich dialogue is a form of wholeness that rejects the ontological dualism between the academic and social as often imagined in traditional views of colleges and universities. Instead, dialogue is an intersubjective concept, which grounds the growth of the individual, and of the community. It is where knowledge is generated and where friendships are cultivated. Dialogue is the very ground of a participatory community of inquiry.
Here it might be easy to imagine that in advocating for a dialogue-based community of inquiry as the ground of post-secondary pedagogy, I am undermining my own thesis that pedagogy must be reimagined from a kind of telling or hearing, into a kind of shared doing or making. Yet, this is only case if one first accepts a Cartesian ontology and the philosophy of consciousness. In other words, what Lipman describes as conversation is a form of telling nor hearing, whereas deep dialogue is already a making or doing because, as Biesta argues, it is a form of practical intersubjectivity.

Another way to argue that dialogue is a form of artistic practice would be to begin with the notion and the process of art making is not the transcendental act imagined by the post-Kantian cult of genius. Instead, art making is a communal process, which is not only constructed communally, but also returns to the community for its justification. Here, the family resemblance between Dewey’s view of transactional art making, Freire’s conception of praxis, and Gadamer’s view of the fusion of horizons within hermeneutic dialogue becomes transparent. In other words, Dewey, Gadamer and Freire share several views related to the moment of creation, which is inherently a dialogical process.

The first is that they hold a similar view of the creative act, which is dialogical, transactional, and emergent. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire places dialogue tied to praxis at center of libratory education and critical pedagogy. He (1970/2000) argues that “as we attempt to analyze dialogue as a human phenomenon, we discover something which is the essence of dialogue itself: the word. But the word is more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; according we must seek its constitutive elements. Within the world we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed – even in
part – the other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not the same time a praxis. Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world” (p. 87, second emphasis added). Contrast Freire’s comments on dialogue and inquiry with Dewey’s view of intelligence. As Thomas Alexander (1987) argues, for Dewey “all experience involves both phases of doing and undergoing, and, when these are done in relation to each other, experience is mediated by intelligence” (p. 26). The result is a transactional reconstruction of the world.

Second, this dialogical relationship becomes paradigmatic for all forms of knowing, rather than simply interpersonal relationships. In hermeneutics, the dialogical relationship between reader-text is not strictly literary, but was ontological and is therefore the paradigmatic case for knowing. The same is true of Dewey’s account of transactional inquiry, and of Freire’s view of dialogue and praxis. For example, in We Make the Road by Walking, Freire (1990) argues that “what fascinates me in reading good books is to find the moment in which the book makes it possible for me or helps me to better my understanding of reality, or concreteness. In other words, for me the reading of books is important to the extent that the books give me a certain theoretical instrument with which I can make the reality more clear vis-à-vis myself, you see. This is the relationship that I try to establish between reading words and reading the world” (p. 31).

Third, each establishes that there are characteristics - described by Freire with respect to praxis, Gadamer with respect to the fusion of horizons, and Dewey with respect to the construction of a work of art - which distinguish an authentic from a superficial process of dialogical making. Gadamer describes an authentic experience as reaching a fusion, Dewey discusses the act of inquiry leading to an experience, and Freire speaks of praxis. Of the three,
Freire is the most misunderstood when his view, translated into pedagogical practice, is viewed as simply “getting students to talk,” which is not the same as dialogue.

Fourth, this dialogical relationship exposes and overturns dynamic power relationships between dialogical partners. For Gadamer, an act of translation can only be entered into freely and if both partners are open the possibility of their horizon being revised. For Freire (1970/2000), “dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world and those who do not wish this naming – between those who deny others the right to speak their word and those whose right to speak has been denied them” (p. 88). Similarly, for Dewey describes the Western epistemological project as being tied to a larger quest for certainty, or domination over the world. In contrast, the act of aesthetic creation is not an act of domination on the world, but instead is dependent upon our dynamic and precarious participation with the world through the act of creation.

Lastly, this act of dialogical making is ultimately one which is bound to love of and hope for the transformation of the world. For Gadamer, the concept of hope is the future-directedness of the hermeneutic circle, which always projects a type of continuity or hope for the harmony of the future. For Dewey, hope expressed as the movement toward harmony contained in his cosmology and therefore embedded in his transactional metaphysics and the act of creation. For Freire, this is the core of praxis. He (1970/2000) argued that, “dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for people. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love. Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. …no matter where the oppressed are found,
the act of love is commitment to their cause – the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical” (p. 89).

The development of a rich community of inquiry is not only difficult, it’s also counter-cultural within the context of a social structure and educational system which is built on a view of learners as essential, autonomous agents, learning as a private, cognitive capacity, and achievement as a competitive structure. In order to create such communities, there is far more to be done than might be outlined in the context of this chapter, yet it is absolutely necessary if emergent pedagogy is to develop.
5. Emergent Pedagogy

“The teacher is of course an artist, but being an artist does not mean that he or she can make the profile, can shape the students. What the educator does in teaching is to make it possible for the students to become themselves” Paulo Freire, *We Make The Road By Walking*

This dissertation began with a claim that the traditional university structure is based on the “S knows that p” model of knowing, yielding a view of knowledge as data and view of knowing as being the capacity to reproduce that data in a kind of generic cognitive performance for a teacher. It then made the claim that the SP model should be replaced by the notion of *Bildung*, when *Bildung* is reconstructed from being a purely neo-humanist form of enculturation into a form of action which is both individually and socially transformational. I further argued that if education was reconceived as the cultivation of this type of *Bildung*, its justification and goal would no longer be in the recapitulation of cold factoids, but in the cultivation of *maker’s knowledge* in which knowing is viewed as a kind of creative capacity: the capacity for reconstruction.

The second section of this dissertation is an attempt to reconceptualize university pedagogy based on this claim about learning and knowing. Chapter four is an argument for expanding the notion of pedagogy to include the entire context of the university such that pedagogy becomes aimed at the cultivation of an engaged democratic experience of inquiry by, for, and with students. Here, pedagogy becomes a communal process that begins and ends within a diverse, just, and participatory democracy. It also shifts the role of the teacher from being the arbiter of meaning to a master learner, mentor, and creative partner in the act of making.

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Chapter five focuses more specifically on the micro-context of pedagogy and will make four moves. First, it will reconceptualize the object of knowing (“p”) from being a static, object-in-itself to being a logical-artistic object, thereby opening epistemology to an aesthetic critique. Second, it will reconstruct pedagogy as a form of creative action: of making and doing. Third, it will outline a particular set of values which must be held if emergent pedagogy is to occur. Lastly, it will articulate pedagogy as an artistic practice. Here, it will argue that the emergent context of inquiry is goal-directed and yet non-teleological, developing out of particular contexts and situations which present themselves within the event-structure of lived experience. It is the goal of educators to catalyze these temporal moments as opportunities for learning, inquiry, and transformation. Lastly, it will argue that post-secondary pedagogy should be organized around these teachable moments: moments where experience is creatively reconstructed and learners are transformed.

Pedagogy and Logical-Artistic Objects

One of the major claims of this dissertation is that educational theory is built on what I have characterized as SP thinking, which includes both a Substance Realist metaphysics and correspondence theory of truth. It assumes that “p” in SP thinking is an object-in-itself, independent of the knower or the process of knowing. Dewey called such objects of thought (“p”) logical objects, and rejected that the notion that they were essential, unchanging units. Instead, Dewey claims that logical objects were nothing more or less outcomes created during the processes of inquiry.
He articulates his views on the status of what he calls “logical objects” or “logical entities” directly in a 1916 address he gave to the philosophy club at Columbia University. In that talk, Dewey (1916/2008b) argues that “logical objects are things (or traits of things) which are found when inference is found and which are only found then” (p. 90). In other words, logical objects do not exist prior to the act of experimental inquiry, but emerge as functional relationships to serve a particular end only after the inquiry has been carried out.

There are three critical dimensions of Dewey conception of logical objects. The first is that a logical object emerges as a result of an inference. He (1916/2008b) defines an inference as “the use of things as evidence of other things” (p. 92). Stated another way, an inference is the emergence of an understanding of interrelationship: it is relational and dyadic. Secondly, a logical object emerges as result of transaction in the environment, between the knower and the known, rather than existing a priori. He (1916/2008b) argues that “it belongs in the category where plowing, assembling the parts of a machine, digging and smelting ore belong…” (p. 91). A logical object is, then, an emergent result of a process of felt inquiry undertaken by a person in a situation. Lastly, a logical object is a property of behavior-in-environment, or a sub-function of action: “in being a fact of behavior it is an outdoor fact, an observably identifiable fact, something verifiable in the same way as are the existence and peculiarities of walking or skating, or hoeing a garden” (p. 91). A logical object is not simply a social phenomenon, but emerges for the knower only after the knower has taken part in some dimension of creative action.

In the lecture, Dewey (1916/2008b) calls on his audience to “consider the bare possibility that tools and works of art give the key to the question in hand: that works of art are precisely the sough-for alternative to physical, psychical, and metaphysical entities” (p. 92). Dewey argues
that while all logical objects exist on this spectrum of making, it is easier to understand how an artwork or a hammer might be creatively made and employed than a number or a chemical notion. Yet, for Dewey, all “manufactured articles do not exist without human intervention; they do not come into being without an end in view. . . . They are simply prior natural things reshaped for the sake of entering effectively into some type of behavior” (p. 97). This claim is not surprising in the context of Dewey’s Darwinian naturalism. For him, all inquiry is a result of an organism reconstructing its environment to create a stable, functional harmony. Logical objects, then, become a tool which serves that end, allowing us not only to create a functional stasis in our unstable world, but also to reach toward higher meanings and values. To the contrary, as Larry Hickman (1998) argues, to treat logical objects as essential, static units or things-in-themselves as characteristic of SP thinking “would be to make the same type of mistake that a biologist would commit if he or she were to infer from the conditions of a fish in water the conditions of a fish out of water” (p. 172). Logical objects, then, are products of an active, process of construction and emerge from transactionally creative action in environment. They are contextual, interrelated, and dynamic.

Hickman calls logical objects “technological” and in doing so opens traditional epistemology to an instrumentalist and functionalist critique. In a similar vein, I contend that logical objects are artistic, creative constructions and, in so doing, intend to open traditional epistemology to an aesthetic critique. My goal in this section, then, is to problematize the stability of, and therefore the knowers inter-relatedness to, logical objects from the vantage point of aesthetics. In the same way that Dewey substituted the word body-mind for the concept “mind,” in an attempt to reject the latter’s metaphysical baggage, here I contend that the term
logical objects might better be understood as logical-artistic objects to help clarify the distinction between SP thinking and my own. I will problematize SP assumptions regarding logical-artistic objects by highlighting three fundamental philosophical questions regarding works of art: presence, interpretation, and truth.

In opening this critique, one of the challenges immediately faced is that most of the tradition of philosophical aesthetics belongs to the same Platonic tradition which produced both SP thinking. In other words, it is concerned with a priori analytic categories which attempt to categorize art, thereby turning it into the same kind of logical object as is represented by “p” in SP thinking. Yet, if logical objects are the results of acts of construction, than knowing is an artistic act. There are three alternatives to the analytic tradition – the pragmatic, the phenomenological, and the post structural – which are all helpful to problematizing and illuminating the notion of logical-artistic objects, and which I will engage here.

**The Presence of the Work**

One of the most basic problems of philosophical aesthetics is the question of where a poem exists. In other words: Is it the series of marks on the page? Is it contained in the book? Does it exist as an electronic file to be read on a computer? Is it a mental object? While this question is deeply related to our relationship to and understanding of a work of art, it is often one ignored as obvious and unhelpful to the task of interpreting a work’s content or meaning, which is the goal of art theory and criticism.

Analytic theories of art and literature, grounded in the mimetic tradition, imagine the work as a kind of idealized, stable object, which exists to be analytically decoded. They take it as
a given that the artwork is that thing which hangs on the wall of a museum, and that literature is stored on library shelves. In this way, art not only has an essence, but that essence is pre-given and locatable.

To the contrary, Heidegger rejected this notion and called for a return to the question of looking at the work as a mode of presencing which takes on a mode of being in relationship to the participant-observer, rather than as an essential, static unit. In *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger (1971) argues that “the question of the origin of the work of art becomes a question about the nature of art…Art is present in the art work. But what and how is a work of art?” (p. 18). Heidegger rejects the idea that art requires a categorical mediator and the notion that “art” is located purely within that physical object which lies in front of the interpreter. Instead, he argues that works of art function more experientially and exist as an emergent property of their relationship to the reader. For him, the work of art is a relationship which becomes a kind of revelation.

Further, understanding a work of art goes well beyond the cognitive and analytical into a kind of sensing of the work. Heidegger (1971) writes that, “if we consider moreover what we are searching for, the thingly character of the thing, then this thing-concept again leaves us at a loss. We never really first perceive a throng of sensations…as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen” (p. 26). This differs from Dewey’s argument that cognition is grounded and directed by the affective and intuitive, but there is a family resemblance which emerges between the two. Heidegger attempts to move beyond a
purely epistemological understanding of art to a deeper, more ontological view. In other words, Heidegger wants to de-objectify the work as a thing-in-itself which we can easily know.

Like Dewey, Heidegger is also opposed to the form/content distinction, which Heidegger understands as a categorization of the work which conceals the presence of the work. He writes that “the distinction of matter and form is the conceptual schema which is used, in the greatest variety of ways, quite generally for all art theory and aesthetics” (p. 27, emphasis in original). The danger, for Heidegger, is that we can name the plot of a novel, but it is not really the work of art. There is, in fact, a danger in imposing analytic categories onto a work, as they often become a hindrance to feeling and ultimately understanding the work.

Heidegger, then, makes the case that logical-artistic objects take on a kind of self-presence, which he calls the work’s “self-subsistence.” This view of art is an explicit rejection of the work as a kind of clean, logical object, and instead an argument in favor of work as a dyadic, relational entity. In fact, for Heidegger, assuming that a work exists as a stable object and that analytic categories are essential givens, yields a kind of primitive mode of approaching the logical-artistic object. It does not allow the knower to construct or to feel or to question the work because it attempts to overly administrate the experience of knowing and reduce it to pure cognition. Heidegger (1971) argues, instead, that “the dominant thing-concepts are inadequate as means of grasping the thingly aspect of the work…[and] what we tried to treat as the most immediate reality of the work, its thingly substructure, does not belong to the work that way at all” (p. 38). Ultimately, it essentializes the object, and restricts the capacity for growth, rather than acknowledging it as a structure emerging through action.
The Question of Interpretation

Another effect of the analytic view of the act of knowing or interpretation is that it assumes that logical objects exist in the same way for each person because logical objects are believed to be mind-independent. Yet, when understood as a logical-artistic object, this understanding of the knower’s relatedness to the object of knowing is dissolved.

The knower-known relationship is at the very heart of hermeneutics, and embedded within the very structure of hermeneutic understanding and of Bildung. As Gadamer’s position on these issues have already been discussed at length, and will be taken up again in the penultimate section on pedagogy as a form of artistic practice, here the work of Susan Sontag provides an important window to resisting an analytic understanding of how one interprets logical-artistic objects.

Like Heidegger, Sontag rejects the form/content distinction and identifies it as a product of the history of Platonic thinking and mimetic tradition within art theory and criticism. She (1966) argues that this mode of thinking has produced the strange notion that the meaning and value of art need to be defended at all (p. 4). Further, “it is the defense of art which gives birth to the odd vision by which something we have learned to call ‘form’ is separated off from something we have learned to call ‘content,’” and to the well-intentioned move which makes content essential and form accessory” (p. 4). The mimetic tradition, then, created the content/form dualism and then elevated content to the superior position. Sontag (1966) argues that distinction and valuation, taken as a given, underpins the entirety of academic art theory and criticism: “though the actual developments in many arts seem to be leading us away from the
idea that a work of art is primarily its content, the idea still exerts an extraordinary hegemony” (p. 5). Sontag argues, to the contrary, that art is never completely interpretable. She (1966) argues that “in most modern instances, interpretation amounts to the philistine refusal to leave the work of art alone. Real art has the capacity to make us nervous. By reducing the work of art to its content and then interpreting that, one tames the work of art. Interpretation makes art manageable, conformable” (p. 8). In pragmatic terms, we might say that art criticism is an attempt to domesticate the work art to serve the purposes of the quest for certainty. In this way, “interpretation, based on the highly dubious theory that a work of art is composed of items of content, violates art. It makes art into an article for use, for arrangement into a mental scheme of categories” (p. 10).

Sontag partially grounds her claim in her experiences in the artistic community, which at the time of the essay, was experimenting with forms and genres unrecognized within the academic community. In the essay, she becomes one of the first critics to imagine film theory, to call for queer art as a genre, and to name what would later emerge as language poetry: all of which, she argues, “may be understood as a motivated by a flight from interpretation. To avoid interpretation, art may become parody. Or it may become abstract. Or it may become (“merely”) decorative. Or it may become non-art” (p. 10). She calls, then, for a kind of criticism which attends to the logical-artistic object on its own terms and, in particular, pays “more attention to form in art. If excessive stress on content provokes the arrogance of interpretation, more extended and more thorough descriptions of form would silence” (p. 12). Even further, would be a criticism which would be capable of allowing the public to experience “the liminuousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they are” (p. 13).
Importantly, Sontag argues this is not simply a kind of widening of the cognitive, but must be an embodied notion because the history of interpretation proves that it “takes the sensory experience of the work of art for granted, and proceeds from there” (p. 13). Ultimately, she argues, “what is important now is to recover our senses. We must learn to see more, to hear more, to feel more….in place of a hermeneutics we need an erotics of art” (p. 14). Sontag, then, is not simply critiquing the conclusions of literary criticism, but the academy, itself, which has drifted so far afield from communities of artists and artisans that it is conducting analysis and criticism from a kind of categorical simulation which the academy, itself, has created and now expects the art world to conform.

Sontag’s argument, then, presents a tension within the notion of interpretation which is tied to the question of method. In other words, she questions the very way in which academic interpretation happens, arguing that analytic thought does little more than objectify and dissect logical-artistic objects, turning them from having embodied and emergent value to analytic propositions which serve the purposes of the academy’s grand narrative.

Sontag argues that art criticism has collapsed into an interpretive paradigm that believes that in order to have value the logical-artistic object must be reducible to empirical, measurable constructs. This concern is not unwarranted, as literary criticism often reduces the meaning of literary works to the socio-historical context in which the work was produced. In other words, understanding art becomes the quest for right meaning, where meaning is reduced to a kind of historical context. Here, the danger is that art is objectified and reduced to a priori categories.

Sontag, then, represents the opposite paradigm: that the logical-artistic object is a completely individuated experience of knowing. She wants the logical-artistic object to be
experienced individually and on its own terms. This also means that Sontag is taking the position that the logical-artistic object is not paraphrasable in any way and that critics have committed a kind of heresy of paraphrase in that they have reduced the breadth of art to some other kind of non-aesthetic, category-laden thing. Instead, she wants art to be a sort of individuated, non-translatable experience.

Here, Sontag lays out the basic motion of the hermeneutic circle, which is at the center not only of the interpretation of logical-artistic objects, but also pedagogy. She argues that projecting a stable meaning onto the artwork is problematic, at best, and disingenuous to the mode of being of art, at worst. Yet, within the context of pedagogy and culture, there is also the need to discuss one’s experience, to create social meaning and value, as well as ensure the aesthetic does not become purely a kind of narcissistic or relative activity which is determined by each individual.

This is where Gadamer becomes a very important resource and, in particular, in his view of the act of translation, which is an attempt to both take the work on its own terms and to be able to place the work into a kind of cultural dialogue. Gadamer’s position, which bears a resemblance to Sontag’s, is that the work has the capacity to transcend the context or the moment. Works aren’t interpretable only in a specific time or place, but they transcend context and take on new meanings as context and peoples shift over time and space. This, itself, becomes part of the work of understanding which is always inbreaking and in motion.

**The Truth of the Work**
Finally, SP thinking is premised on a correspondence theory of truth, which also lies at the heart of the mimetic theory of art. Here, the assumption is that logical-artistic objects ontologically distinguishable between those which are truth and those which are fiction, which itself is premised on the idea that there is a transcendental truth to be discovered in the object. The work of distinguishing truth from falsity is, in fact, the working out of method.

Postmodern aesthetics raises deep questions about both the assumption of foundational truth, and our relationship with those things perceived as true. Walter Benjamin was instrumental in developing a postmodern aesthetics, grounded in a revision of Marxist thought and, in particular, Marx’s notion of spectrality.

Marx was interested not only in the idea that the modes of production produce commodities, but also in how these commodities take on a kind of spectral nature. In other words, he was interested in the idea that material objects take on a kind of presence in and of themselves, and that people not only place importance on objects, but also become attached to them. This quality of objects was embedded in the capitalist system, which produces objects which take on a greater importance than the human beings producing the objects, themselves.

Benjamin takes this notion and frames it as an aesthetic question, looking at both the question of the technological reproducibility possible in the industrial age, but also developing his theory of the aura. Benjamin understood that in an industrial culture, artistic objects are stripped of their uniqueness due to standards of reproduction and mass production. Benjamin (1936/2007) wrote that “the uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being imbedded in the fabric of tradition” (p. 222). This sense of uniqueness, which Benjamin calls an object’s aura, is what is lost as an effect of mass production.
Yet Benjamin also believed that mass production gave objects and culture back something else: reproducibility has the effect of bringing a community into a kind of strange relationship with itself because it participates in a kind of common aesthetic experience. He (1936/2007) wrote that “the mass is a matrix from which all traditional behavior toward works of art issues today in a new form…the greatly increased mass of participants has produced a change in the mode of participation” (p. 233). The result for Benjamin was that the notion of reproducibility doesn’t simply change the way society produces and uses objects, but it also changes the way in which people interact with objects and, in turn, with one another.

This was a kind of double-barreled effect: not only has “mechanical reproduction emancipated the work of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual” (p. 222) but also, particularly due to new media such as film, art takes on a new social functioning, which is to rehearse the interplay between technology and humanity. In other words, Benjamin argues, the thesis that art-objects and technologies are ontologically distinct and have no effect on societies, no longer holds. Benjamin (1936/2007) argued instead that “during long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence. The manner in which human perception is organized, the medium in which it is accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstances as well” (p. 221). Technological reproduction has shown us that new logical-artistic objects don’t simply exist in-themselves, providing us with helpful tools to subsist. Instead, the very arts and technologies we constructed tools deeply shape our modes of perception. This claim both dissolves the notion of a transcendental truth in the object, as well as the ontological distinction between knower and known.
At the heart of Benjamin’s critique, then, is the idea that culture and, in particular, cultural technologies, can transform society. SP thinking, like the mimetic theory, assumes that the logical-artistic object is ontologically separated from the knower. Here, Benjamin argues the opposite: artistic technologies and society work reciprocally and transactionally. Logical-artistic objects - and here I include artworks and artistic technologies - profoundly shape the way we are socially, emotionally, and intellectually knit together. Stated another way, truth is not contained in the object which we come to know, but instead is a kind if interdependent functioning of logical-artistic objects, selves, and societies.

Embedded in this reciprocal relationship are a number of opportunities and dangers. On one hand, Benjamin (1936/2007) argues that “film has enriched our field of perception” (p. 231). On the other, as reality and artistic technologies collapse, “mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order” (p. 236).

As contemporary postmodern critics such as Jean Baudrillard have pointed out, this effect of technological reproducibility reduces meaning into a repertoire, a flood of simulations. Baudrillard (1981/2013) argues that “we live in a world where there is more and more information, and less and less meaning” (p. 79). In this view, our experience of reality is so mediated by the simulation it has now, in fact, become the simulation. This includes not only our view of objects, but our view of other selves, reducing or eliminating our capacity to empathize as a member of a community. He (1981/2013) argues that, “the neighborhood is nothing but a protective zone – remodeling, disinfection, a snobbish and hygienic design – but above all in a
figurative sense: it is a machine for making emptiness” (p. 61). The result is that for something to appear real it must now be mediated by the virtual.

Postmodern thinkers like Baudrillard, then, dissolve the hermeneutic question of who bears the obligation to make meaning. For them, there is neither an aesthetic or moral obligation to make any meaning at all. Andy Worhol, for instance, was not interested in the work of art, but only its modes of production and its technological reproducibility.

Yet, unlike many postmodern philosophers, what makes Benjamin’s critique important within the context of this project is that he does not take an anti-Modern, or anti-machine view, but instead is arguing that these modes of production produce their own kinds of feelings of spirit and have their own kind of authenticity. They have some capacity to collectivizing people, but in a way which has yet to be defined.

Benjamin maintains within the postmodern some sense of what T.S. Eliot would call the objective correlative. Eliot (1919/1975) wrote that “the only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an ‘objective correlative’; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked” (p. 48). Benjamin, then, dissolves the notion of meaning as a transcendental signifier, but retains the idea that for the artistic object to have some sense of meaning or functioning there has to be something that grounds it. For Benjamin, this isn’t a recapitulation of mimetic theory, but a kind of aura which is produced and exists within the work itself as a result of new modes of production. It is a functional view of meaning.
The question of truth which remains for logical-artistic objects is, then, not really a question of the meaning of work of art, as an object-in-itself. It is, instead, a question of relatedness, social meaning, and function. It is a question of how we relate to one another, what the objects of our construction give us the capacity to do, and what we hope to achieve. By dissolving epistemology into aesthetics, we have opened up space for an aesthetic interpretation not only of the act of knowing, but also of the act of pedagogy.

**Pedagogy and the Creative Act**

Pedagogy is not a kind of cognitive distribution, but is a form of artistic practice: a creative act. I have previously articulated this by arguing that the SP view, which conceptualizes teaching as a kind of telling and learning as a kind of hearing, is incorrect and should be reconstructed to understand both teaching and learning as a shared making, resulting in a shared process of creative construction and of praxis in which something new emerges. Yet this claim embodies more than just a reconstruction of knowing, but reaches into the ground of lived experience to argue that teachers must be present in the pedagogical experience in ways which are deeper than simple cognition. Instead, teaching is a practice which intuitive, felt, and relational. It is also a practice which is holistic, acknowledging that the form and content of inquiry are co-determinant of emergent meaning. The view of teaching as artistic practice, then, draws together a number of critiques of SP thinking, which include not only its view of knowing, but also its conceptualization of teaching, learning, and of being.

If it is the case that the aim of education is to catalyze students develop the creative capacity of reconstruction, than learning via the conduit metaphor or banking model of education
is impossible, because developing creative habits of action requires participation in *actual experiences of felt inquiry*. Here, I am employing *inquiry* and *experience* in the pregnant sense of the terms as described in chapter three of this project. In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey (1916/2008a) wrote that:

> mere activity does not constitute experience...experience as trying involves change, but change is meaningless transition unless it is consciously connected with the return wave of consequences which flow from it. When an activity is continued *into* the undergoing of consequences, when the change made by action is reflected back into a change made in us, the mere flux is loaded with significance. We learn something. (p. 146)

Pedagogy, like creative action, is centered on a shared form of making rooted in the experience of inquiry. The primary goal of educators, therefore, is to construct micro- and macro-contexts which have this experience as their end-in-view.

For Dewey the goal of knowing, in general, and philosophy, in particular, was not to search for *a priori* foundations embedded in and underpinning the cosmos, but to render the qualitative, temporal flow of experience intelligible. He (1934/2008) wrote that “knowledge is instrumental to the enrichment of immediate experience through the control over action that it exercises” (p.294). One of the dangers of SP thinking, from Dewey’s standpoint, is that it removed knowledge from flow and context of lived experience, which is where it finds its value and use. This view yields what Dewey called *the* philosophical fallacy, which is the belief that the products of the act of inquiry exist prior to that creative action taking place.
Dewey (1938/2008) saw art-making as a place where this fallacy might be overturned because in all fine arts, the “subject-matters of everyday experience are [quite literally] transformed by the development of forms which render certain products of doing and making objects of fine arts” (p.105). Rather than artistic creation being peripheral to issues of knowing, artistic creation instead offers a *paradigmatic case* of meaning making, precisely because it is a temporally emergent process of action in the environment (Alexander 1987, p.119).

Western views of knowing, grounded in Greek and Medieval thought and retained in the Positivist legacy of modern science, maintain a dangerous obsession with immutability, which Dewey labeled the quest for certainty. That quest is not simply about knowing the world, but is also about dominating it through measurement, prediction, and control. It is expressed through traditional educational models, grounded in SP thinking, as they narrowly focus on the recapitulation of cognitive content which is believed to be both measurable and repeatable. Under the guise of cognitive behavioral psychology (CBP), pedagogy is also believed to be increasingly predictable. In SP educational models, de-naturalized certainty, rather than dynamic making, becomes both the justification and goal of pedagogy.

Yet, on Dewey’s account, the quest for certainty was not only a massive philosophical mistake, it also removed all possibility for meaning and value because it effectively de-naturalized the world. Dewey (1925/2008a) wrote that outside of flow of experience, the world “possess[es] neither truth nor falsity, since without application [it has] no bearing and test” (p.325). Without the process of lived experience there is no participation, no precariousness, and consequently no meaning or value. Reciprocally, accepting transactional temporality is an
explicit acceptance of our embeddedness in the instability and serendipity of the cosmos, which is so fundamental to making meaning.

Schooling systems, conceptualized as storehouses of unchangeable, objective, fact-content, are rendered useless as vehicles of individual and cultural growth because they exist in an imagined world which has little to do with the issues, ideas, and events which constitute the horizons of students. Rather than knowledge becoming instrumental to the process of living, in traditional SP models, the horizons of students are expected to conform to pre-determined data sets, which are imposed like transcendental signifiers onto unique student experience.

The paradigm of art making represents an entry point into overturning this view of schooling because, unlike researchers bewitched by SP thinking, artists and artisans cannot maintain the illusion of dominion over the world, but instead are aware that their relationship with the world is always already contingent precisely because of its transactional temporality. While traditional epistemological models have maintained the illusion that knowledge exists prior to the act of making, artists and artisans are keenly aware that meanings and knowings are emergent properties of a process of making. This is because artists cannot fully predict the outcome of an act of creation, but can merely engage within the act of construction with the goal of creating something meaningful.

The pedagogical impact of this concept cannot be understated. While SP thinking is committed to the notion that knowledge precedes action, for artists inquiry begins with the act of creation and emerges into instrumental meanings, knowings, and values. This concept reverses the basic relationship at the heart of traditional schooling. Traditional pedagogy is imagined as the place where fact-content is distributed so that students could, at some undetermined future
point, engage in the act of making. Here, I am claiming the exact opposite. Knowing and meaning are *emergent properties* of the act of making, and so pedagogy must begin in the experienced problems, ideas, and issues of students and their communities. Further, fact-content (i.e. instrumental solutions to previously experienced problems) enters into pedagogy only in direct relationship to an emergent process of inquiry.

Dewey understood this inversion of action and knowing as true not simply for fine artists, but for all forms of inquiry. All forms of making and doing exist on a kind of spectrum of creative action. In *Art as Experience*, Dewey (1934/2008) argued that “the existence of art is the concrete proof…that man uses the materials and energies of nature with intent to expand his own life” (p.31, emphasis added). To the contrary:

…‘science’ signifies just that mode of statement that is most helpful as direction. To take the old standard case…the statement that water is H2O is primarily a statement of the conditions under which water comes into existence. But it is also for those who understand it a direction for producing pure water and for testing anything that is likely to be taken for water. It is a ‘better’ statement than popular and pre-scientific ones just because in stating the conditions for the existence for water comprehensively and exactly, it sets them forth in a way that gives direction concerning the generation of water. Such, however, is the newness of scientific statement and its present prestige (due ultimately to its directive efficacy) that scientific statement is often thought to possess more a signboard function and to disclose or be ‘expressive’ of the inner nature of things. (p. 91)
Both science and art are forms of contingent action – of making – within the context of an unstable and dynamic environment. The difference is that “science states meanings; [while] art expresses them” (p.90). The goal of scientific creation is to produce formulas which signify potential actions yielding relatively stable consequences within particular natural and social contexts. Scientific artifacts are tools which bring our lives relative stability and moderate predictability. Artistic creation attempts to deepen our experience of and relationship with the world. Aesthetic experience brings our lives deep meaning and immediate value. For Dewey, then, all human experience is guided by a dynamic end-in-view and is creatively transformative of its environment. All knowing and meaning making is a form of artistic production, and its goal is not to find cognitive certainty, but to create meaningful harmony.

The goal of pedagogy, then, is to draw students into a process of inquiry, which is embodied, contingent, and emergent. In doing so, pedagogy is transactional, representing a unity of thought and action (Garrison 2003, p. 405). Both Dewey and James were revolutionary in reconstructing the traditional view of the emotions, which had placed perception and cognition before action in environment. To the contrary, both James and Dewey reprioritized action as being prior to, but not distinct from, the emergence of thought and meaning. Dewey, in particular, resisted any dualism separating action from thought. For him, as Jim Garrison argued, “[m]eanings, including meaningful emotional expressions, emerge from physical and biological activity without breach of continuity” (Garrison 2003, p.413).

This inversion of action and reflection is a temporal notion, which places lived experience before abstracted thought. It is also part of the collective wisdom of working artists and of practicing teachers who understand knowing as an emergent property of making.
Within poetic pedagogy this is a kind of double-barreled process. On one hand, it guides poets as they undergo the act of creative inquiry to construct a poem. On the other hand, it guides them as they revise their work to draw readers into their own artistic engagement with and experience of the poem.

In terms of the former, in a poetry workshop, young poets aren’t taught to think a meaning, but are taught to mimic, through copying, the voice of their artistic heroes. The goal is to recreate the embodied and temporal action of a master craftsperson. Essayist Adam Gopnik (1988) wrote that the act of copying has deep historical roots in communities of artists and artisans, where “copying was [done] to emphasize that making comes before meaning. Through the act of faithful copying…the artist would produce small alterations that could yield new symbolic forms. And yet this process of variation through copying, far from leading only to small, incremental change, had revolutionary effects; a saint who was all feet could suddenly float on air” (pp.61-65). Traditional Western notions, drawing heavily on the image of the transcendental artistic genius, are committed to the idea that in order to be creative one must be novel. Here, the value of the creative act has all to do with the artist being self-consciously interpretive or distinctly cognitive, making the poet’s relationship to the world a purely noetic one. The traditional view concurrently holds that copying, which begins in and is directed by a felt, anoetic relationship with the medium, is merely servile and passive, and therefore holds no capacity for meaning. However, the traditional view of creative action mistakenly prioritizes transcendental meaning before doing, or space before time, where cognitive intention is imposed onto and ontologically distinct from the act of making. This is the same move made by SP
models of knowledge which isolate rational processes and cognition from the qualitative flow of lived experience.

Good artists know that the practice of copying is neither servile nor passive. In mimicking, the young artist is developing the habits of creative action, while also constructing their own unique voice because “no matter how faithful, [each copy] produces subtle variations” (Gopnik 1988, pp.61-65). Gopnik writes that copying is the way the young artist “represents not an isolated ideological position but something discovered in the latent possibilities of some other artist's invention, and therefore still bears the traces of its quirky, unpredictable evolution... These copies suggest that every “why” is just the accumulation of a thousand particular “how’s.”” (Gopnik 1988, pp.61-65).

Contemporary poet Jane Hirshfield (1997) wrote that originality is not a moment of transcendental novelty, but is more like “altering the course of a tradition’s river: broadening its banks through new usage...” (p. 40). T. S. Eliot was famous for saying that a poet’s originality was in her ability to reconstruct new relationships out of subject-matter which was already available. According to Eliot (1997), “[o]ne of the surest tests [of a poet] is the way in which a poet borrows. Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good poets make it into something better, or at least something different. The good poet welds his theft into a whole of feeling which is unique, utterly different than that from which it is torn” (p. 72). As E.M. Forster (1985) wrote: “how can I tell what I think till I see what I say?” (p. 101).

Artistic making, then, has less to do with right meaning than it does with right practice. The mark of a master artist is not novelty, but as Gopnik (1988) argues “readiness to take
advantage of those variations, created in the act of making” (pp. 61-65). In the creative act, making always comes before meaning. This prioritizing of making before meaning, or understanding meaning as an emergent property of a process of making, is the logic of artistic action.

In terms of the latter, this logic is also the principle which guides poets as they revise their work: they want participant-observers to undergo a making out of which they might construct meanings. In pedagogical terms, we might understand learning as the phenomenological process of creative inquiry, while teaching bears a family resemblance to the logic which guides poets as they revise their work.

In my own experience in a practicing poetic community, during the revision process I rarely (if ever) heard poets concerned with transmitting a singular, objectified meaning, but instead they were concerned about providing an opportunity for the undergoing of an experience which might exhibit particular types of aesthetic qualities. Poets are far more concerned with how spatio-temporal resources like image, sound, line breaks, and white space contribute to the possibility of a future, lived experience. Poets don’t speak of pure intent, but instead about how a poem draws in a reader, or pushes them out. They are concerned word choice, but mostly because of a word’s cadence rather than its definition. Poets are obsessed with line breaks because of the way they affect rhythm and voice. In the process of revision, poets are, then, deeply aware that a poem is not thought, but physically moved through. Hirshfield (1997) wrote that:
…saying a poem aloud, or reading it silently, if we do so with our full attention, our bodies as well as our minds enter the rhythms present at that poem’s conception. We breathe as the author breathed, we move our own tongue and teeth and throat in the ways they moved in the poem’s first making. There is a startling intimacy to this. Some echo of a writer’s physical experience comes into us when we read her poem…. (p. 8)

Poetic practice, then, embodies Dewey’s (1925/2008a) claim that “[v]ital and conscious events exhibit actualization of properties that are not fully displayed in the simpler relationships that are by definition termed physical” (p.92). Stated another way, a poem is not what physically lies before a reader’s eyes on the page, but is the temporal experience she might undergo when carrying out the embodied action of reading aloud, or listening to the cadence and breath of an experienced reader. The same holds for the pedagogue who attempts to construct an environment in which an experienced process of making might occur. The poem, or the lesson, is not a stable object, but is the symbolic transcription of an imagined form of action which attempts to bring a kind of meaning and value which resonates throughout lived experience.

This placing of action as prior to, but not distinct from, reflection is not the removal of intelligence from experience, but in fact serves as the bedrock for meaning and knowing. Traditional SP thinking would claim that non-cognitive dimensions of experience, including both action and emotion, are concurrently non-intelligent. In other words, only pure cognition can yield intelligence. Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that “the odd notion that an artist does not think and a scientific inquirer does nothing else is the result of converting a difference of tempo and
emphasis into a difference in kind…[Yet] the artist does his thinking in the very qualitative media he works in, and the terms lie so close to the object that he is producing that they merge directly into it” (p. 21). Thinking is not ontologically distinct from doing. To the contrary, intelligence is an emergent property of action, when undirected action becomes intelligent action, or making. Poetry, like good pedagogy, then, is not an object of thought, a storehouse of pre-determined meanings, but an invitation to enrich experience through participation in creative action.

The physical object of art, like a pedagogical lesson, is only the spatialized outcome of the process of intelligent making, but it is not the work of art. Instead, the work of art is the temporal undergoing – the acting and the doing – which ultimately (and hopefully) resolves in meanings and wisdom. Art making, as understood by artists, has never been about transcendental genius, creation ex nihilo, but instead is about participating as an agent in the emergent meaning of the world.

Young poets, then, are attempting to cultivate maker’s knowledge, a phrase which attempts to describe a mode of knowing which has close connotations with the English term understanding, but which is deeper and more intimate than cognition. As a philosophical term, it reaches back to classical Antiquity, suggesting that there is an intimate relation between objects of cognition and objects of construction. Here, knowing is understood not as a mental state, but as a kind of making or capacity to make (Perez-Ramos, 1988, p. 48). It implies, therefore, not only that knowledge is a creatively emergent product of a process making (i.e. an action performed in environment), but also that the act of knowing is much deeper, embodied, and habitual than simple cognition.
Dewey (1940/2008) wrote that “[t]he artist in realizing his own individuality reveals potentialities hitherto unrealized. This revelation is the inspiration of other individuals to make the potentialities real, for it is not sheer revolt against things as they are which stirs human endeavor to its depths, but vision of what might be and is not” (p.114). For Dewey, every act of making is concurrently an act of reconstruction: a participation with the world in the co-construction of the world. To think of the object of art as a final thing is to believe the illusion of SP thinking which mistakes the model for the real. Artists already know this. It is part of their collective wisdom and they self-consciously seek to break down that illusion, to recreate the self and, in so doing, recreate the world.

**Pedagogical Values**

While outlining *a priori* methods for pedagogy is a contradiction in terms, it is possible to distinguish some pedagogical values which must guide educational design if deep learning is to occur. Several of these values are adapted from Helen Longino’s (1994) criteria for feminist epistemology, where she attempts to construct a set of values for the project of epistemology which open it up to the critique of alternative philosophical approaches.

**Heterogeneity**

The first value is that pedagogy must strive for heterogeneity. Longino (1994) writes that this is a kind of double-barreled concept which maintains the intentional inclusion of difference within communities of knowers and theories of understanding. More importantly, in a world where “difference must be ordered, one type chosen as the standard and all others seen as failed
or incomplete versions,” instead we must understand that “difference in resources not as failure” (p. 477). Rather, the value of heterogeneity “permits equal standing for different types, and mandates investigation of the details of such difference” (p. 477). Here, there is an overt rejection of standardized forms of schooling which force unique students into generic forms. Instead, pedagogy must include a diversity of voices within the development of the process of inquiry, and recognize multiple experiences with and approaches to problem solving.

Charlene Haddock Seigfried (1993) sees this concept as one which resonates between pragmatism and feminism in that both strive for a kind of “principled pluralism.” For Dewey (1925/2008b) the view that knowledge is stable and universal, “demands a rationalistic temperament leading to a fixed and dogmatic attitude. Pluralism, on the other hand, leaves from for contingence, liberty, novelty, and gives complete liberty of action to the empirical method, which can be indefinitely extended. It accepts unity where it finds it, but it does not attempt to force the vast diversity of events and things into a single rational mold” (p. 8). It is important, here, to keep in mind that Dewey was not trying to conform all things into a kind of brute empiricism, but instead make a case that knowledge is experimental, contingent, and must contain a diversity of perspectives in both its goals and methods.

For Seigfried, the practical application of this value requires a delicate balance between, on one hand, a kind of functional, productive unity and, on the other, the construction of pluralistic environments where multiple views are given voice. She (1993) writes that “a central problem investigated by pragmatists over the years is how to preserve diversity in unity and how to develop unity out of diversity, for if either aspect of this unstable equilibrium becomes dominant, then the conditions for democracy are eroded to just that extent” (p. 2). Yet, in order
to create generative pedagogical environments this balance, as much as possible, must be maintained and bring forward, rather than silence, the deep difference already embedded in classrooms and the wider university community.

**Complexity**

A second pedagogical value is that it should strive for complexity within the pedagogical environment and learning experience, rather than efficiency and simplicity. Longino (1994) argues that empirical science is dominated by single-factor causal models of explanation, which should be replaced with “models that incorporate dynamic interaction, models in which no factor can be described as dominant or controlling and that describe processes in which all active factors influence the others” (p. 478). Educational thinking is also dominated by single-factor models, particularly via cognitive behavioral psychological (CBP) accounts which view teaching and learning as a kind of causal input-output relationship. This view yields schooling models and pedagogical methods which strive for efficiency and predictability in teaching and learning.

Like CBP, Dewey viewed meaning as a property of behavior. Yet, for Dewey (1925/2008a), “meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behavior, and secondarily of objects. But the behavior of which it is a quality is a distinctive quality; [meaning is] cooperative in that responses to another’s acts involves contemporaneous response to a thing as entering into the other’s behavior; and this on both sides [sic]” (p.141). For Dewey, then, knowledge – all knowledge – was dependent on the coordinated behaviors of people in community for its construction, meaning and significance (Garrison, 1995, p. 719).
This notion is critical in understanding the value of complexity in experience, which rejects the linear input-output view of teaching and learning, expressed by CBP. For Dewey, knowledge is behavioral, but only when behavior is understood as a complex, intersubjective, and embodied phenomenon. The creation of meanings and values through the inquiry and experimentation begins in a dynamic and complex meaning-field, which Dewey grounds in habits and Gadamer terms the horizon of understanding. This meaning-field, as Sandra Rosenthal (1996) argues, “both sets the context for the activity and limits the directions which such activity takes, for such meaning structures are constituted by possibilities of acting toward a situation” (p.402). While the process of inquiry is grounded in the complex phenomenon of experience, it also goes beyond it, resulting in a transactional unity between the knower and known. Finally, the validity for all meanings and values generated through inquiry are borne out through current and future consequences within lived experience.

Complexity of experience acknowledges that the process of creative inquiry is difficult, intuitive, and often frustrating, and includes a number of environmental and non-cognitive dimensions. Ultimately, pedagogy aimed at simplicity and efficiency removes learners from the experience of synthetic inquiry and democratic participation.

Applicability to Need

Pedagogy must also demonstrate clear applicability to human and environmental need. Longino expresses this value in terms of the role of science in culture. She (1994) argues that, “scientific inquiry directed at reducing hunger (by improving techniques of sustainable agriculture, soil preservation, etc.), promoting health, assisting the infirm, protecting or reversing
the destruction of the environment, is valued over knowledge pursued either for political domination, i.e. science for ‘defense,’ or for knowledge’s sake” (p. 478). In pedagogical terms, this is a double-barreled concept. It includes both the notion that cultural critique must be embedded within systems of education, and the active connection between schooling and the experienced problems of the communities in which students find themselves.

Just as Dewey understood knowledge as emerging from the lived experiences of human beings in the world, he also believed that whenever any theory was separated from the entrenched realities of lived experience, it fundamentally misunderstood the problem on which it was focused.

Knowledge is, then, rooted in the lived experience of human beings transacting in their environment. It is also distributed across multiple ways of understanding and making meaning. This diversity becomes actualized in a democratic system. In Democracy and Education, Dewey (1916/2008a) wrote:

A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer to his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men [sic] from perceiving the full import of their activity. These more numerous and more varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond; they
consequently put a premium on variation in his action…. Obviously a society to which stratification into separate classes would be fatal, must see to it that intellectual opportunities are accessible to all on equable and easy terms. (p. 93)

Knowledge emerges out of and is fundamentally connected to human and environmental need. The goals of knowledge and the goals of democracy are, then, one and the same: to serve the world.

**Justice**

Applicability to human need can only be held as a value within a pedagogically just environment, which encourages the diverse expression of experience grounded in meaningful relationships. The notion of pedagogical justice, then, merges two concepts. The first concept is Longino’s (1994) notion of diffusion of power in which she supports “models which incorporate interactive rather than dominant-subordinate relationships” (p. 478). This is, then, a call for inclusivity which I would like to push further to include the notion of friendship.

It was Dewey’s contention that meaning, knowing, and, in fact, being were all intersubjective concepts which take shape within the context of a just community. This kind of relational structure was not simply cognitive, it was intuitive, emotional, and felt. In other words, it is grounded not simply in justice viewed as the reduction or redistribution of power, but also constituted by authentic friendship.

Charlene Haddock Seigfried (1996) argues that friendship is embedded Dewey’s view of knowing and meaning, “since meaning is acquired in the first place by intentionally pursuing
ends-in-view and reflecting on the outcomes of such environmental interaction, an interaction that includes *other persons* as well as the physical environment…” (p. 97, emphasis added). Seigfried, then, argues that education must foster “awareness that our actions affect others and theirs affect ours in ways that can be helpful or harmful to the well-being of each as members of a community. The next step is to take account of the consequences of our behavior and that of others in order to intentionally foster a community in which everyone flourishes” (p. 97). Often, justice is conceptualized as the reduction or elimination of power within the event of the classroom, such that students have some role in the construction of a syllabus or increased curricular choice. This stance is helpful, but only partially correct. Imagining justice purely as a negative concept – the elimination of power – is only the beginning of a relational structure which must then blossom into authentic friendship between students and teachers. Only in this way will pedagogy lead beyond cold knowing to empathy, compassion, mutual understanding, and justice.

**Process-Orientation**

Learning must also be viewed as continuous with the process of living, and the event of the classroom must be contextualized within this larger flow of emergent growth. As Garrison (1994) argues, “as Dewey saw it, we are participants in an unfinished universe rather than spectators of a finished universe” (p. 8). What this means is that education, including schooling, must be conceptualized as one node within an ongoing process of growth and reconstruction. Dewey (1916/2008a) argues that since “in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education”
(p.56). Therefore, educators must view learning as a continuous and ongoing process of inquiry which is larger than their classroom, their curriculum, and their school. Schooling is, in fact, embedded within the wider lives of students and it is to these lives it should turn for both its justification and goal.

Placing the emergent process of life as central to pedagogy also blurs the boundaries between the roles of students and teachers in the context of the schooling environment by raising a challenge to faculty who know almost nothing about the students constituting their pedagogical communities. Yet, it is the very lives of students and their communities which are the starting point for a process-oriented pedagogy, yielding a schooling environment that is the very extension of a student’s emerging democratic self.

**Failure**

One of the dangers of traditional schooling models is that they take cognitive certainty as both their starting point and goal. They embody the SP assumption that knowing is an additive property and cognitive state, rather than understanding it as an act of transformational reconstruction. Dewey argued that the unwillingness to take account of risk and failure was all too common within this form of pedagogical thinking. He (1937/2008) wrote that even within the home:

the negative aspects of behavior and failure are apt to be stressed with the result that fear to try new modes of action is induced, while, if failures are passed over lightly and a line of action, involving some measure of difficulty, is provided in
which the child can make progress and have the glow of positive achievement, he
will be better enabled to develop his own intimate standards of achievement.
Standards of external accomplishment tend to the laying of stress on failure which
breeds lack of confidence, while stress on external good accomplishment fosters
conceit and pride, which also arrest development. (pp.240-241)

Refusing to allow failure within pedagogy is a multi-layered mistake which not only robs
students of the experience of working through an experienced problem, but also causes them to
rely on external sources as both the justification and goal of learning.

Ironically, the very structure of human experience is characterized as much (if not more)
by failure than success. Gadamer (1960/2004) argued that:

if we thus regard experience in terms of its result, we have ignored the fact that
experience is a process. In fact, this process is essentially negative. It cannot be
described simply as the unbroken generation of typical universals. Rather, this
generation takes place as false generalizations are continually refuted by
experience and what was regarded as typical is shown not to be so. (p. 347)

Failure is predicated on the fact that life occurs not simply within an environment but in
transaction within that environment. A mark of a well-adapted creature is the ability to overcome
a unique set of conditions, returning both to harmony as well as reaching beyond toward higher
meanings and values.
This is the hermeneutic circle of existence, which we are always attempting to harmonize. Deep failure becomes profoundly educative if we understand that underlying all effort is an impulsion toward a relatively stable harmony, and if we look at the teachable moment not simply as a way to revision the meaning of one’s efforts but also to cultivate and foster students’ unique creative capacities for future action. Without risk, failure, and accident, creatively imaginative solutions are impossible, because newness always involves uncertainty and unknowing which involve some amount of experienced failure.

**Imagination**

The pedagogical value of imagination is a reconstruction and extension of Longino’s (1994) concept of novelty. In the previous section, I critiqued the concept of novelty, paying particular attention to the dangers of viewing novelty viewed as a distinctly cognitive moment of originality. Yet, the trajectory of Longino’s articulation of the concept still holds pedagogical value. She (1994) argues that “treating novelty as a virtue reflects a doubt that mainstream theoretical frameworks are adequate to the problems confronting us, as well as the suspicion of any frameworks developed in the exclusionary context of modern European and American science” (p. 477). The critical dimension of this concept is the notion that the subject matter presented represents solutions to problems which have existed in the past, and which may no longer hold for the inbreaking contexts in which they may be deployed.

Dewey’s concept of imagination takes this core idea and goes beyond it, arguing that imagination includes not only the contingency of all knowing, but is also a way of seeing beyond the situation in ways that are divergent, inventive, and unique. Imagination is also the quality
which allows us to transform the emergent situation and, though the situation, the self. Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that imagination, “designates a quality that animates and pervades all processes of making and observation. It is a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole. It is the large and generous blending of interests at the point where the mind comes in contact with the world. When old and familiar things are made new in experience, there is imagination” (p. 271). This going beyond means that, “there is always some measure of adventure in the meeting of mind and universe, and this adventure is, in its measure, imagination” (Dewey 1934/2008, p. 271). The notion of adventure within an imaginative situation is embodied and existential, representing a unity of thought, feeling, and action, meaning that the sense of adventure is not illusory or supplementary as CBP suggests, but exists in reality.

Further, imagination is born in transactional resistance. Dewey (1934/2008) argues that, “there is a conflict artists themselves undergo” during the process of creation which is born of the transactional nature of creation, which includes both infinite possibilities and infinite restrictions (p. 272). Imagination, then, is not simple divergent thinking, which is a way of seeing future possibilities. Instead, it is actually going beyond a situation through the painful act of reconstruction.

In chapter 12 of Art as Experience, appropriately titled “The Challenge to Philosophy,” Dewey wrote that his articulation of imagination is not a view of purely of artistic acts, but instead, “all conscious experience has of necessity some degree of imaginative quality” (p. 276). Alexander (1998) wrote that, “through imagination, experience becomes expressive. In art, unlike mechanical production, ends and means are thoroughly integrated; through this
experience, the self grows” (p. 4). Learning is, then, not simply experimental, but is a kind of experimental hope. It is experimental because it includes and supports risk, failure, uncertainty, accident, joy, suffering, and pain as central dimensions of the process. It is hopeful because the anticipation and expectation of restorative harmony is always already contained within an emerging situation.

**Pedagogy as a Form of Artistic Practice**

If the goal of pedagogy is to catalyze students into an emergent process, such that they might undergo an experience yielding new meanings and values, then what remains is to describe some of the generic traits of the pedagogical task. The danger, as in Dewey’s articulation of the generic traits of inquiry, is that interpreting these traits as a kind of linear formula would be to commit the same mistake as SP thinking. Instead, these generic traits are to be viewed in the same way as Dewey’s articulation, which is not as a kind of proscriptive transcendental signifier laid onto experience, but as a description of the circularity and complexity of the pedagogical process.

**Puzzles and Problems**

From a pedagogical standpoint, the act of making only occurs if students have a shared stake in the outcome of the process of inquiry in which they are participating. This is because, inquiry and creative expression only occur in resistant environments. As Dewey (1934/2008) wrote “an impulsion cannot lead to expression save when it is thrown into commotion, turmoil. Unless there is com-pression nothing is expressed. The turmoil marks the place where the inner
impulse and contact with environment, in fact or in idea, meet and create a ferment” (p.72). Yet, that turmoil cannot be imagined, but must exist in reality. By the term reality, I do not mean the imposed pressure of testing or grades, which creates an artificial power structure for the purposes of obedience. Instead, students must have a meaningful and emotional stake in the shared outcome of a process of inquiry. This is deeper than a mere cognitive attachment to a problem, but reaches into the qualitative, felt dimension of experience. Here, education becomes the very act of growth for intersubjective beings. Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that, “to generate the indispensable excitement there must be something at stake, something momentous and uncertain – like the outcome of a battle or the prospects of a harvest. A sure thing does not arouse us emotionally” (p.72). If students do not feel as though their action inside a problem may determine the problem’s solution or some anticipated future course of action, then the problem is not an actual problem: it is an imagined problem, or what I call here, a puzzle.

Pedagogically, this means that students must not only be engaged in an actual, experienced problem, they must also be allowed to articulate the problem to which they would like their education to be an end-in-view. This is one of the mistakes contained in the current notion of problem-based learning. While problem-based learning might appear to be a better form of pedagogy than the conduit or banking model, it still recapitulates the same underlying power structure, the overly administrated environment, and the pre-determined analytic path to solution-generation. Stated another way, problem-based learning presents puzzles rather than problems in the first-order sense.

This is not to say that puzzles and problems do not share some pedagogically similarities. They both require learners to exhibit some form of critical and creative thinking; they both
require a structure or trajectory; they both involve bodies of knowledge applied to generate solutions. Yet, the two concepts could not be further from one another existentially and educationally. Puzzles are abstracted from players’ lives; puzzles have very low stakes for the students, outside of some external reward; puzzles are have pre-determined solutions or solution-trajectories, which players are required to recapitulate; puzzles are highly formal and structured, allowing a minimum of divergence; puzzles begin and end with the designer rather than the player. Ultimately, puzzles belong to teachers rather than learners.

Problems, on the other hand, are existentially weighty because students have a shared emotional stake in their design and outcome. Problems exhibit real, rather than manufactured, forms of resistance. This is a critical dimension of pedagogy and the act of inquiry because, as Dewey (1934/2008) wrote, in the process of art-making:

the factor of resistance is worth especial notice…Without internal tension there would be a fluid rush to a straightaway mark; there would be nothing that could be called development and fulfillment. The existence of resistance defines the place of intelligence in the project of an object of fine art. The difficulties to be overcome in bringing about the proper reciprocal adaptation of parts constitute what in intellectual work are problems. As in activity dealing with predominatingly intellectual matters, the material that constitutes a problem has to be converted into a means for its solution. (p. 143)

Problems, then, do not engage learners, but haunt them. They disrupt functioning. They constitute an existential disruption that our habits of action cannot readily resolve so as to relieve
the discomfort of doubt. They are complex and ambiguous, holding real consequences for learners and their communities. Stated another way, puzzles are engagement in analytic game playing, while problems are engagement in the world.

The impact on puzzle playing for learners could not be more detrimental: not only do they learn to solve puzzles instead of problems, but also they begin to approach the world as though it were a series of puzzles. In other words, puzzle playing becomes the guiding metaphor in students’ horizon of understanding. The university is consequently filled with students who have developed a sophisticated capacity to navigate the game-structure of the university (e.g. curriculum, particular courses) in order to most efficiently achieve the desired external reward (e.g. grades, accolades and certifications) leveraged for personal gain. Conversely, they have also learned to disengage from education when the game playing has ended.

The shift from puzzle-based to problem-based education is a radical one, which requires a shift in the way faculty and students conceptualize education, scholarship, and research. It grounds the work of the university, including pedagogy, in a form of participatory learning which is continuous with the democratic context in which it already exists. The result is that the educational process becomes an expression of a student’s lived experience, which is similar to the act of artistic expression.

**Pedagogical Holism**

Another dimension of pedagogy as a form of artistic practice is that the form or methods of experienced inquiry are as (if not more) important to learning than the content encountered. Actually, this statement is only partially correct because it still implies a dualism between
pedagogical form and content. Instead, it would be more correct to say that, within inquiry, there is no separation between content and form. In other words, they are co-constituting dimensions of a singular process, so that what a student comes to know, or learns, emerges as a result of the experience they undertake. For example, in Freire’s banking model, students learn to become uncritical subjects not simply because of the content they are taught, but also the form of schooling they undergo, which is dehumanizing and alienating. He (1970/2000) argued that, “projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry” (p. 72). Conversely, Freire says one cannot overturn oppressive structures by simply offering liberating content, while employing the form of those structures, but liberation only occurs through an alternate form of education, which he describes as dialogical and leading to praxis.

The notion of pedagogical holism rejects the idea that the content of inquiry (i.e. knowledge) can be divorced from the emergent form that inquiry takes. There are three dimensions of the artistic process that are particularly illustrative of orchestrating an experienced process of inquiry, which must be accounted for in pedagogical thinking.

The first is that the form and content of a process of inquiry are unified and co-determinative of emergent meaning. In Art as Experience, Dewey (1934/2008) argued that “this is what it is to have form. It marks a way of envisaging, of feeling, and of presenting experienced matter so that it most readily and effectively becomes material for the construction of adequate experience…. Hence there can be no distinction drawn, save in reflection, between form and substance…Yet the act itself is exactly what it is because of how it is done. In the act there is no distinction, but perfect integration of manner and content, form and substance” (p. 114). The
pedagogical implication, here, is that different experiences result in different understandings, even of the same central concepts. This is because the form of an inquiry is always interdependent with its use. Conversely, the traditional or banking view of standardized learning via curriculum, courses, or tests is a kind of fiction that rests on the idea that knowledge (viewed as content) is ontologically distinct from the experience of learning (the form of inquiry). The result is that teachers must deeply consider the context of learners, their unique perspectives, and their goals when designing pedagogy.

The second is that the methods by which an inquiry takes shape are themselves an emergent part of the process of inquiry. Here, Dewey (1934/2008) argued that “since the physical material used in production of a work of art is not of itself a medium, no rules can be laid a priori down for its proper use. The limits of its esthetic potentialities can be determined only experimentally and by what artists make out of it in practice; another evidence that the medium of expression is neither subjective nor objective, but is an experience in which they are integrated into a new object” (p. 292). In other words, there is no way to entirely predict precisely what form, method, or approach inquiry should take before the process has begun. Instead, the process must be worked out “on the fly,” and emerge as part of communal engagement with the problem. The further pedagogical implication here is that it requires teachers to develop a keen aesthetic sensibility. Just as an artist is taught to practice her craft, we can’t imagine that pedagogy can be accomplished with an abstracted content delivered via a technocratic solution, but operates more like a combination of developed taste, unique preferences, and abilities.
The third is that the process of inquiry is transactional, affecting the people carrying out the process as much as that substance which is undergoing change. Stated another way, the emergent process of inquiry depends as much on the inquirer, as it does the problem. The learner and the world are part of the same dyadic cosmos – all of which is reconstructed in the process of inquiry. Dewey (1934/2008) argued:

…every experience is the result of an interaction between a live creature and some aspect of the world in which he lives. A man does something; he lifts, lets us say, a stone. In consequence he undergoes, he suffers, something: the weight, strain, texture of the surface of the thing lifted. The properties thus undergone determine further doing…The process continues until a mutual adaptation of the self and the object emerges and that particular experience comes to a close. (p. 50, emphasis added)

In other words, inquiry is not a static person cognitively grasping a static object, but a continual and dyadic process of active reconstruction between organism and environment. Therefore, pedagogy must be directed at the transformation of the inquiring subject and the reconstructed situation, rather than the transmission of some imagined cognitive object.

**Contexts and Situations**

Unlike SP thinking, pedagogy or curriculum is not bound together not by educational content-matter, but by acts of creative inquiry. Those acts cannot be prescribed, limited, or contained but are emergent dimensions of experience which take shape within contexts and
situations. The goal of pedagogy, then, is to find a way to cultivate situations in which creative inquiry might develop.

Returning to Gadamer’s notion of hermeneutic dialogue is helpful in understanding how learning situations develop and take shape within the course of experience. One of the major fallacies of traditional educational thought, emerging from the reflex arc concept, is that learning is a unilateral and causal act which is initiated by the teacher and performed on the student. If we understand Gadamer’s notion of fusion of horizons as the act of learning, this cannot be the case.

Authentic hermeneutic dialogue does not occur by accident, but requires mutual intention, willingness and trust on the part of all partners – including students and teachers – if it is to occur. It also requires a kind of conceptual gap in the course of lived experience, which develops into reflective inquiry. For Gadamer, this centering point to this process is the question, which opens the hermeneutic space in preparation for the event of play and fusion of horizons. This might also be framed in Deweyan terms as a kind of problematizing or de-stabilizing of that which appears to be functional and foundational, which establishes an environment in which inquiry might take shape. Gadamer (1960/2004) wrote:

The openness of what is in question consists in the fact that the answer is not settled. It must still be undetermined, awaiting a decisive answer. …It has to be brought into this state of indeterminacy, so that there is an equilibrium between pro and contra. The sense of every question is realized in passing through this state of indeterminacy, in which it becomes an open question. Every true question requires this openness. (p. 357)
The problem is that destabilizing questions, or gaps in experience, are only anecdotally present within the context of higher education. The space outside the classroom is considered a non-pedagogical environment and ignored as an educational space. Within the classroom, even those classrooms which claim to focus on dialogue and discussion often do not include the type of questions Gadamer intends. As Bingham (2005) argued: “Gadamer writes of the difficult, but possible, practice of asking what he calls a ‘true question’...[which is] to question in such a way that the question itself, while sowing the seeds of its own answer, drives right for that spot where the answer is truly unknown to both the questioner and the respondent. In such a case, the questioner will ask something which she really does not know...” (p. 555). In many classroom contexts, questions are only questions in the grammatical sense. They do not function as true questions in the Gadamerian senses because they are searching for a rigidly defined response, which results only in destroying the tenor of dialogical space, marking it not as a space for play, but for correctness.

While it may not be the case that teachers can ask purely open-ended questions, or what Gadamer calls ‘true’ questions, Bingham (2005) argues that teachers can still ask truthful questions, which serve the purposes of breaking open dialogic space, even if they have some end-in-view:

[w]hile it may be a fact that a teacher cannot have bias-free intentions...[s/he] can indeed ‘break open’ an object. This is because a teacher’s intentions do not completely determine the outcome of a dialogic interaction. In Gadamer’s analysis, the notion of the ‘true question’ becomes confused with the more
subject-centered notion of asking a question with true intentions. …Teaching intentions will never be pure, it is true, but that does not mean that pedagogical questions will not break open the subject matter at hand. Teachers can pose true questions. (p. 557)

McEwan (2000) argued that education is dominated by the metaphor of teachers as guides and subjects as landscapes. In this environment, asking “true” questions remains an impossibility, as no authentic discovery process can ever occur. To the contrary, McEwan (2000) suggested teaching and learning be modeled on the idea of “confrontation with the strange or the stranger — with ideas that do not fit in or with a person who is not obliged to think the way we do or view the world from our perspective,” asking “How can learners be invited to leave the nest, to court the unfamiliar and strange?” (pp. 263, 264). In this case, the instructor’s end-in-view is not the answer, but the environment. Here, teaching becomes the cultivation of difficult and ambiguous opportunities for discovery, inquiry and creativity – play-spaces – in relationship to foundational concepts. Here, where there is dialogical leveling, uncertainty, and trust, asking ‘true’ questions is not only possible, but necessary to the task-at-hand.

Part of the goal of pedagogy, then, is to recognize that within the context of a larger learning field disharmonious situations will emerge. These are the bedrock to learning and knowing. As Findling (2007) argued “…‘conditions have to be right’ to enter such moments. Gadamer warns, though, that we cannot plan on these moments, but by being open to the experience we can present opportunities for them to emerge” (p. 122).The difficulty is that while we might, on reflection, identify some markers which are part of the structure of inquiry, the
process of cultivating a deep learning space is neither automatic, nor methodological. It is, in fact, delicate, fragile and ambiguous. It is also as varied as the personalities present in the room.

**The Cultivation of Play**

For Gadamer, deep learning occurs when these disharmonious situations develop into the event of play. Therefore, a primary goal of a pedagogy should be cultivating play spaces in which partners struggle to discover and revise gaps in their understanding, mutually determine meaning, and co-create dynamic and unique futures. Findling (2007) argued that, according to Gadamer, “…we find meaning and understanding *precisely* through these experiences. …This is not to imply that one’s horizon is reconciled with another’s; rather that an extraordinary learning experience occurs when we acknowledge and affirm the other’s horizon” (p. 121).

In an experience of play we are taken up into the world of the play-space, of the game. Gadamer (1960/2004) argued that “[p]lay fulfills its purpose only if the player loses himself in play” (p. 103). This notion bears a strong family resemblance to Dewey’s notion of undergoing an experience. In this moment our being is invested completely and outlying concerns must be bracketed in order for the game to establish itself as a world. In order for it to emerge as a playful space, students must enter the pedagogical environment placing primacy on it over other contexts: they must be ontologically invested.

This notion of bracketing might imply the same sort of thing Gadamer critiqued with his notion of aesthetic differentiation: that it is set aside, discontinuous, imaginary. Yet, this is not the case. In fact, it is radically continuous and meaningful because, as Gadamer (1960/2004) argued, “…all playing is a being-played” (p. 106). Players attend to real emotions, use logic to
inquire, engage in sense- and meaning-making, suffer and experience joy, and - most importantly - invest their unique ontological horizon in the play-event. When players are taken up into the game, they transform others and are transformed down to the very core; the game-space becomes a dynamic process-relational event and the knowing that occurs is radically personally meaningful to learners.

In his description of play, Gadamer (1960/2004) argued that the game takes over the players: “[t]he real subject of the game…is not the player but instead the game itself. What holds the player in its spell, draws him into play, and keeps him there is the game itself” (p. 106). While this might initially appear deterministic, this is not the case. Play-spaces are not static but dynamic and players remain active agents in the game. As Lebech (2006) argued:

The player does not stand isolated, opposed to the game, but in their participation they are absorbed, and cannot act towards it as if towards an object. If more players are participating, they are mediated with another as parts of the game as they carry out its movement. However, the mediation of play also means that there is a mutual relation between the game and the players. Once the player has decided to play, their participation is not simply a passive ‘being played’ but, at the same time, an active engagement, necessary to carry out the movement of play, and thus necessary for its presentation. (p. 235)

In fact, it is this activity and investment by a community of players which gives the game life and meaning. Further, the participant becomes a player, and the event becomes a game when
persons transform from considering the game as something distant and allow themselves to enter into it.

There is a tangible feeling which occurs when one shifts from learning a game to playing it, or from looking at art to participating in the event of art. In the former, ontological distancing is maintained, in the latter, it is dissolved. Gadamer (1960/2004) wrote: “I call this change, in which human play comes to its true consummation in being art, transformation into structure. Only through this change does play achieve ideality, so that it can be intended and understood as play. Only now does it emerge as detached from the representing activity of the players and consist in the pure appearance (Erscheinung) of what they are playing” (p. 110). This moment might be described as a “flow moment.” Baurain (2010) argued that the notion of flow “…includes the merging of awareness and action, or of thinking and doing…. the burden of self is laid aside temporarily, opening space and enabling clarity and freedom of thought. Finally, another major component of flow is the transformation of time… so that an experience can appear faster or slower than it was in “clock time” “ (p. 59). As it relates to the teaching and learning experience, Baurain (2010) found that in an exploratory study on flow among ESL teachers:

…flow in this context is manifested most often in situations involving high interest and involvement, authentic language use, spontaneity or unpredictability (closely connected with a sense of teacher autonomy or freedom to go outside the set materials), and genuine teacher-student interaction or dialogue that made the relationship intrinsic rather than instrumental. (pp. 59-60)
The difficulty for many educators, administrators, and legislators is that play is not a predictable and repeatable rule structure, but is a dynamic, unique happening: an event. When a game transforms into structure, the players are taken up into it, their horizons become part of its meaning. This is the moment when ontological distancing between knowers, the process of knowing and the known is collapsed. Learners become fused with their own process of knowing and with their past, present and future horizon. They become part of the moment of inquiry, context dissolves, means/ends are and a moment of holism is achieved.

In a fusion of horizons there is literally a transformation which takes place, as individuals are bound together and reconstructed. Gadamer (1960/2004) wrote, “in a successful conversation [both partners] come under the influence of the truth of the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community. To reach an understanding…is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were” (p. 371). The concept of a fusion is literally a synthesis, a union of two or more things. To claim that a fusion takes place between horizons is, then, to claim that players, learners are ontologically joined and mutually constructed in the event of play. Their horizons are left open and vulnerable to reconstruction, just as they reconstruct the players around them.

Yet, this fusion is neither arbitrary, nor meaningless, as for Gadamer (1960/2004), “[t]he transformation is a transformation into the true…it is itself redemption and transformation back into true being. In being presented in play, what is emerges. It produces and brings to light what is otherwise constantly hidden and withdrawn” (p. 112, emphasis added). The moment of fusion, of transformation into play, is difficult work in which players create and are co-created
by the community of knowers who undergo a mutual process of discovery and transformation through the game. The resolution of the event is always more than each player understood before the event took place because it is both the growth and extension of one’s horizon, as well as its revision.

Therefore, the event of play is a deep, ontological striving for awareness, for knowledge, and for meaning - and where the possible emerges from the actual. Play-spaces matter because in them learners come to consciousness about their limits and through them, learners actualize their unique potentials by constructing a future world.

What we can say, then, is that a playful dialogical space requires that all participants engage in a mutual process of discovery, with the true question providing resistance and rhythm. This is the “to-and-fro movement” Gadamer (1960/2004) describes: one partner poses a question from his/her own horizon; the other interprets the question through the lens of their horizon; both question their assumptions (revision) and expand the boundary of possibilities (expansion); and the roles are reversed (p. 104). Partners do not engage in dialogue to remove their prejudices, to find objective truth, but instead to put their horizons in motion.

In a pedagogical space, this motion must include the instructor, as authentic dialogue requires every partner to also be a participant. As Ryan and Natalle (2001) argued, hermeneutic dialogue requires, “…the qualities of openness, offering, willingness to yield, and here we will add Foss and Griffin's third feminist principle of equality…” (p. 80). Gadamer (1960/2004) wrote:
… the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we become involved in it. The way one word follows another, with the conversation taking its own twists and reaching its own conclusion, may well be conducted in some way, but the partners conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led. No one knows in advance what will "come out" of a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a good conversation or that it was ill fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it—i.e., that it allows something to "emerge" which henceforth exists. (p. 385)

It is here that the true question finds its power by dissolving the binary between self/other, subject/object, ontological/epistemic. Partners formulate questions and responses and, reciprocally, are constituted by questions and responses so that every person is ontologically bound in the process of discovery. This is precisely when the dialogic moment becomes the playful one.

The Teachable Moment

Therefore, the ultimate goal of any pedagogical encounter is the teachable moment, which can be conceptualized within Dewey’s description of an experience – the aesthetic
moment of creation – in which the parts and whole of the work, the encountering subject, and the world collide into a unified and intensified moment of harmony and meaning making. It can also be viewed within the framework of hermeneutics, in the form of Gadamer’s fusion of horizons, or within critical pedagogy as Freire’s description of dialogical praxis. Dewey (1934/2008) wrote that:

In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without seam and without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At the same time there is no sacrifice of the self-identity of the parts. A river, as distinct from a pond, flows. But its flow gives a definiteness and interest to its successive portions greater than exist in the homogenous portions of a pond. In an experience, flow is from something to something. As one part leads into another and as one part carries on what went before, each gains distinctness in itself. The enduring whole is diversified by successive phases that are emphases of its varied colors. (p.43)

Similarly, Jim Garrison (1997) described the teachable moment as “perhaps the most sought-after pedagogical prize. All teachers know what it feels like even if they cannot name its characteristics. It is as wonderful as it is elusive. Teachers long for the moment when their class has that special quality of intimacy, openness, and creativity that provides the almost ineffable experience of getting through to students, of connecting and of students learning and not just getting ready to take a test” (p. 115).

Dewey argued that art is relegated to galleries because the intensity of the harmonizing aesthetic moment is understood as being outside everyday experience. In this same way, the
The concept of the teachable moment is often subjugated to a private domain within the technocratic and rational structures of the university. In other words, the traditional schooling environment relies on epistemological certainty, on a productive account of history and knowledge, on an objective distancing of people in community and students from teachers. The teachable moment is quite the opposite: intimate, vulnerable, uncertain, emotional, beautiful, and profound. As in art, creating critical and personal meanings within a process of experienced inquiry not only opens up the possibility of individual growth, but also cultivates critical and creative abilities within students.

The result is that, unlike traditional pedagogies often focused on a recapitulation of cognitive factoids, here students develop maker’s knowledge, which includes the category of content-knowledge, but is more specifically focused on the capacity to inquire, to reconstruct, and to create. Art making is not simply related to education, but in fact stands at its very core. Education is not an act of skill building, or something which is “found in charts and statistics,” but instead an act of meaning making, and of actualizing one’s unique potential for the purposes of growth (Dewey, 1934/2008, p. 352). It is this creative capacity which sets us free.
Coda: Bildung, Pedagogy, and Artistic Practice

“Our question, by contrast, is how hermeneutics, once freed from the ontological obstructions of the scientific concept of objectivity, can do justice to the historicity of understanding.” Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method

It would be a mistake to read the idea of emergent pedagogy as student-centered pedagogy which emerges out of and is designed around the individualized interests of autonomous learners, just as Bildung is not the same as the “self made” person. In this way, emergent pedagogy and Bildung share the same starting point: a view of the individual as both intersubjective and capable of growth. That process of growth, in the context of both emergent pedagogy and Bildung, does not happen by accident, but is an active, productive process which requires the action of both teachers and learners.

Growth, in both cases, is also an unending process that is, as Gadamer outlines, both circular and disruptive. In other words, understanding begins with a disruptive event, which triggers the process of interpretation, or of translation, or (in Deweyan terms) inquiry. Roland Reichenbach (2003) draws an analogy, here, between Dewey’s view of experimental inquiry and Bildung in arguing that “in accordance with John Dewey one could view processes of Bildung as ‘experiments’. There is one common feature to all experiments: their outcome is not clear” (p. 96).

An implication of this view, which is quite important in the increasingly overregulated, standardized culture of education, is that emergent learning structure is non-teleological. As Reichenbach (2003) further argues, just as in Deweyan experimental inquiry “we can admit that there are no goals of Bildung, and no characteristics of the transformation and learning processes that are identical for all…this is due to the simple fact that experimenters are not social atoms
detached from social reality and contingent culture. Rather, they are always situated selves, that is, selves who try to make sense in what they do and say” (pp. 96-7). Therefore the structure of the process entered into is essentially dialogical and creative, and resembles Gadamer’s triadic hermeneutic structure. In other words, it involves a circular motion which is both a doing and an undergoing, yielding (if successful) a making. For Gadamer, the paradigmatic example of this process is hermeneutic dialogue, grounded in friendship. My paradigmatic case is art-making.

Gadamer was clear that without authentic translation there is no fusion of horizons, no coming to know, just as in Dewey’s account of inquiry there is always the possibility of inquiry to either misfire or end too quickly. Therefore, not all dialogical situations necessarily lead to translation and the fusion of horizons. The result, in pedagogical terms, is that there must be treatment given to the conditions necessary for authentic learning or inquiry to actually occur, and learning cannot be presumed simply because of the schooling context in which students find themselves.

In authentic translation, those involved in the interpretive event struggle toward hermeneutic awareness of the gaps, limitations and prejudices in their own horizons of understanding. Further, they understand that in order to arrive at a more authentic knowing about the common object of investigation they must adjust their meanings, knowings and vocabulary to fuse it with the other horizon they hope to understand. If done authentically, the process of translation includes running up against and expanding the limits of our language, knowings and meanings. Here, Gadamer’s notion of the act of translation issues a challenge to traditional pedagogical models, which can be articulated this way: do instructors teach subjects or students? My claim is that the answer can never be the former if true learning is to occur.
The task of teaching, then, is not rigidly methodological or quantifiable, but is process-relational. It consists in creating environments in which students mutually resonate around common objects of discovery though a dialogic process of questioning. Gadamer (1960/2004) wrote that “…in genuine dialogue, something emerges that is contained in neither of the partners by himself” (p. 458). This is precisely the motion of Bildung and of the emergent pedagogy I am attempting to describe.

The goal of emergent pedagogy is transformation of all dynamic parts of the interwoven structure of experience. This is the moment when ontological distancing between knowers, the process of knowing and the known is collapsed. Learners become fused with their own process of knowing and with their past, present and future horizon. They become part of the moment of inquiry, context dissolves, means/ends are and a moment of holism is achieved. The challenge faced by both Bildung and emergent pedagogy is that it is not a predictable and repeatable rule structure, but is a dynamic, unique happening, an event, which is both its process and its goal.
Bibliography


