

Why Is There No Green Party In America?
Environmental Politics and Environmental Consciousness
In the United States and West Germany

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(ABSTRACT)

The present paper attempts to explain the absence of a Green Party in America by means of comparison with the country that gave birth to the most successful Green Party so far: West Germany. In the first section it will be shown, that neither the electoral system nor other legal barriers prevent new parties from emerging in the United States. Then, the two countries will be examined from two different perspectives. First, through comparison of the politics of environmental protection it will be shown how a dialogue between the state and interest groups could be established in America, while it could not in Germany. The conclusion will be drawn that different opportunity structures define different incentives to founding a Green Party. From this finding the hypothesis will be developed that the conflictual environmental politics in Germany caused environmental concern to merge with other New Politics concerns and visions of a new state. It is from this ideology that the Green Party drew its electoral success. Due to aggregation of the environmental issue in

institutional politics, this potential Green electorate did not emerge in the United States. The hypothesis will be tested empirically using survey data. Three operationalizations of the Green ideology will be employed: postmaterialism, the New Environmental Paradigm, and support for protest movements. The results deliver strong support for the hypothesis. The electoral resources for an American Green Party are weak.

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INTRODUCTION

More than eighty years ago a German visitor to the United States noticed in surprise the absence of a social phenomenon the existence of which he had come to take for granted in his home country. His reaction was the only one possible to a committed social scientist: he wrote a book entitled Why is there no Socialism in the United States?.¹ By referring to Werner Sombart I do by no means intend to compare the present endeavor to the writings of a professor at the University of Berlin. Instead, the purpose is to draw the picture of a tourist startled by the differences he encounters across the Atlantic. Since I am not a Professor at the University of Berlin, I write a Master's thesis rather than a book as an attempt to solve the riddle I am wrestling with. I genuinely wish to know why there is no Green Party in America.

Any research question in the social sciences could be approached in numerous ways, which only too often might lead to different results. The starting point of this paper is constituted by the trivial observation that Americans do in some respects differ from Germans. While by and large a human being is a human being regardless of borders, one or two subgroups may show peculiarities which are unique to a certain culture. After having been in the United States for only a few months, I came to believe that the specimen of the Green voter, who is such a common appearance among the academic youth in Germany, is a rather rare species in America. Here in America, people whom I had expected to ignore environmental problems spoke

¹ Sombart, 1906.

to me about their membership in the Sierra Club. Others, in turn, whom I after brief visual inspection had classified potential Green voters, turned out to be apolitical. It is from these and similar observations that the hypothesis stems that there is no Green electorate in the United States. It is this hypothesis which this paper is set out to test.

A number of questions need to be asked in order to tackle this task. First, a picture of the Green voter as perceived by political scientists has to be drawn. As will be pointed out, this understanding puts much emphasis on social and economic conditions. This paper will have to adopt a simpler notion of the Green vote. A second chapter will examine how the issue of environmental protection has been dealt with in the two countries. If there really is no Green electorate in the United States, there must be a reason for this. I suspect this reason to be in the realm of environmental politics. From that exposition of political procedures a more precise formulation of the hypothesis will be drawn. Using survey data, this hypothesis will then be tested empirically. First, however, the question if the electoral system in the United States renders the emergence of a Green Party impossible, however strong the demand for one may be, needs to be answered.

One fundamental problem is associated with the term party, which does not have the exact same function in both countries. Due to the personalization of American electoral campaigns, parties other than Republicans and Democrats rarely develop a lasting organization. Challenges of the two party system are identified by the personality of the candidate in America, while the image of the party assumes the central

role in Germany. Therefore, the term party as used here must not be interpreted in a narrow sense. The absence of any kind of significant electoral challenge of the two party system that has been based on a Green issue agenda constitutes the topic of this paper.

1. ELECTORAL LAWS AND NEW PARTIES

The dependence of the party system on electoral laws probably is the variable that has most frequently been pointed out when foundations of new parties were to be explained. Two aspects of the regulations governing elections are of significance in this context. First, the rule employed for translating a certain number of votes into the composition of the body to be formed by the election have severe impact on the chances of specific parties. This argument will be examined by discussing Duverger's Law. Second, certain requirements for active participation in an election may impose on the success of a new party.

1.1. Duverger's Law

In 1951 Duverger formulated the common wisdom about the consequences of the plurality system for the first time as a sociological law: "The simple-majority single ballot system favors the two party system. Of all the hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches the most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law."² Indeed, it cannot be denied that countries which employ the majority rule in single member districts are ruled by two dominating parties, which alternately form the cabinet. However, the fact that two parties are dominating does not necessarily imply that they are alone in the political system. Major

² Duverger, 1959, p.217.

For earlier accounts of the same idea see Rikers, 1982.

parties in Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada all have to put up with some company despite their use of the plurality system. Table 1.1 shows the results of the 1987 and 1988 elections to the Houses of Representatives in Australia, New Zealand and Canada and to the British House of Commons.

Tab. 1.1: Percentage of votes in most recent election in countries which use the plurality system		
Country	Major Parties	Minor Parties
Australia	Electoral Alliance of Liberal Party & National Party: 46% Labour Party: 46%	Australian Democrats: 6%
New Zealand	Labour Party: 48% National Party: 44%	Democrats (formerly: Social Credit Party): 6% Values Party: 0.1%
Canada	Progressive Conservative Party: 43% Liberal Party: 32%	New Democratic Party: 20%
United Kingdom	Conservative Party: 42% Labour Party: 31%	Alliance of Liberal and Social Democratic Party: 20%
Sources: Mackie, 1988, p.571, 581, 584; forthcoming.		

There is one exception that is generally accepted by advocates of the plurality system/two party system rule: parties, the supporters of which

are geographically concentrated are able to win seats in this area even though they are a clear minority party in terms of their share of the national vote. This applies to parties of ethnic minorities in the first place. In order not to distract from the point at stake here, ethnic parties have not been included in table 1.1. The only party among those included which owes much of its electoral success to regional concentration is the Australian Democrats, which is largely based on a middle class clientele in rural areas.³ Between 1977 and 1987 it has consistently polled between 5% and 9%.⁴ New Zealand's Democrats developed from a farmer's protest party to a nationwide alternative to the Labour Party in the seventies. In former elections it gained considerably more votes than the 6% in 1987, when major party vote was unusually high (1981: 21%).⁵ However, it did not recover from the defeat of the 1984 elections, when another third party, the New Zealand Party, had its single election triumph (12%), largely at the expense of the Democrats and Labour.⁶ Of particular interest in the context of this paper is the Values Party in New Zealand. The main issue of this party was the environment. Far from true electoral success, it still polled a considerable 2% in 1972 and 1978.⁷ In Canada, the socialist New Democratic Party has substantial support everywhere except for Quebec. Its share of the vote usually ranges

³ Parkin, 1983, p.48-49.

⁴ Rydon, 1989, p.129.

⁵ Finichell, 1983.

⁶ Rydon, 1989, p.130-131.

⁷ Finichell, 1983, p.728.

from 15% to 18%.⁸ The Alliance of the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party in Britain also is a nationwide alternative to the major parties, though most its representatives usually are drawn from certain regions. It has done increasingly well since the seventies.⁹ The Britons recently have added another example to the list: the Green Party gained 15% of the votes, but not a single seat, in the elections for the parliament of the European Community in 1989. Under these circumstances, the argument that the plurality system leads to a two party system is hard to maintain. Duverger himself today regrets having chosen such a strong wording for his hypothesis.¹⁰

To save the lawlike relationship between electoral system and party system, Sartori redefines the term party system by restricting it to parties which have some probability of forming a government of their own or participate in a coalition government. Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia then are back to two party systems.¹¹ However, this produces a spurious correlation. It is to a large extent the tradition of one party government, according to which minority governments are preferred to coalition governments, which precludes the third parties in the named countries from participating in the formation of the government. This tradition is strong in the former British colonies - the same countries which employ the plurality system. The fact that the German FDP

⁸ Quinn, 1983, p.150.

⁹ Heath et.al., 1985.

¹⁰ Duverger, 1986, p.69-71.

¹¹ Sartori, 1986, p.57.

permanently is part of the government while the British Liberals never are is due to different traditions of government, not to different electoral systems. Indeed, in 1974, the Britons held a second election in fall rather than forming a coalition after the spring election, which did not produce a majority for any single party. The relationship between the plurality system and the two party system, then, is an artifact of the definition. For the purpose of this paper, the electoral success of any party is at stake, regardless of its government participation. This is guided by an earlier definition of party relevance, also by Sartori. A party without coalition potential "qualifies for relevance whenever its existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and particularly when it alters the direction of the competition ... of the governing oriented parties."¹²

In order to explain the relationship between party system and electoral system one has to look at the theory on which Duverger based his hypothesis. He presents two factors as the cause of the claimed relationship. The first is a technical point: parties which fail to achieve a certain minimum level of electoral support simply fall short of the plurality in any district, thus gaining no seat at all. The second factor is psychological in nature. When the past success of a party makes it seem highly unlikely that it will win the contest, its supporters will consider casting their ballot for it a wasted vote and therefore switch to the less despised of the two major parties. In this reasoning, voting

¹² Sartori, 1976, p.123. (emphasis original)

for a new party always is a wasted vote.¹³ The same line of argument, including the concept of the wasted vote, can be found in Downs' self interest approach to politics. It rests on a certain understanding of the functions of elections in a democratical system: "...we are interested in elections solely as means of selecting governments..."¹⁴ Other motives of the voter, e.g. the will to express support for a certain cause or dissatisfaction with both major parties, are excluded from the analysis - explicitly in Downs', tacitly in Duverger's case. Because the third parties described above obtain far less seats than their percentage of votes would suggest and hence are unlikely to play a role in the formation of the government, the votes for them are wasted according to this view.

The point at stake here is if there are differences in the political systems of the United States and Germany which sufficiently explain the absence of an American Green Party. The idea behind pointing out the electoral system is that a 5% of the votes means government participation in Germany, while it does not so in America. True, the Green party made it into the parliament. However, it was clear from the very beginning that its representatives would not actually participate in the process of governing. This is because of two factors. First, every party, including the SPD, rebuffed any coalition with the new party, and they did so credibly. Second, the "party discipline", which virtually precludes individual representatives to vote deviant of their party line, ensures a majority for the government's position in any parliamentary vote. Unlike

¹³ Duverger, 1959, 224-226.

¹⁴ Downs, 1957, p.48.

the situation in the United States, individual behavior is not a relevant matter in the German Bundestag. Under these circumstances, it appears impossible that Green representatives ever get the decisive vote. Indeed, an empirical studies of the impact of the Greens upon the output of the parliament reveals it is close to nil: every single one of the 58 bills introduced by Green members of the parliament between 1983 and 1987 failed; motions sponsored by the Greens had very slim chances of being passed, unless they were cosponsored by another party.¹⁵ The presence of the Green representatives in the Bundestag was of symbolic rather than of practical political importance by the time they first entered it. And it continued to be so until the SPD shifted to a strategy more sympathetic to a coalition with the Greens. Under these conditions, the vote for the Greens in 1983 was as much a wasted vote as the vote for a potential green party in the United States would have been: it was not a choice between realistic political outcomes.

The reason for voting the German Greens, then, was not necessarily the hope for actual political change. But when all major parties hold similar stands on a number of issues which are considered utterly important by part of the electorate, i.e. environmental protection, nuclear energy, and nuclear arms, each party may seem equally despicable, thus rendering the Downsian search for the lest despicable party absurd. Then, elections loose their function as means of influencing the composition of the government. Participating in the election despite this fact means that another function has been attributed to them: the articulation of support

¹⁵ Frankland, 1988, p.111.

for a cause which is not part of the policies of any major party. This function can be fulfilled by plurality system elections equally as well as by those executed with proportional representation. The recent success of the British Greens, which gained 15% of the votes in the European elections without obtaining a single seat may serve to illustrate this point. The practical importance of the electoral success being nil, it is the fact that a significant share of the electorate is dissatisfied with all three groups in parliament which bothers the incumbents. In numerous political systems a part of the electorate continues wasting votes in order to express dissatisfaction. Elections apparently serve more functions than just the formation of a government. This conclusion is important for the present matter, because the mode of translating the electoral outcome into the composition of the body to be formed is of minor importance when functions other than the formation of the government are concerned. Elections held under either system, proportional or plurality rule, are equally well suited for the display of dissatisfaction with the major parties or the expression of support of the cause campaigned for by a minor party.

1.2. Prior to the Election: Accessing the Ballot

A number of further regulations restricting third party activity have been mentioned in the literature. In particular, advantages the major parties are given with respect to financial support have been pointed out. However, the regulations of this matter are very similar in Germany and America. Public financing is granted to parties that gain more than five percent of the votes; payments prior to the election depend on past success of the party.¹⁶ A major difference, though, is constituted by how access to the ballot is governed.

In Germany, running a new party in a federal election takes relatively little effort. Some formal requirements which are meant to ensure a democratic decision making process within the party have to be met: The party needs a statute and a programme, a certain minimum of independent bodies, local chapters, and has to make its decisions by means of a vote instead of fiat of a leader.¹⁷ If these conditions are met, the organization can request acceptance as a party and name candidates for the ballot.¹⁸ Moreover, a politician who does not have the support of a party can launch an independent campaign for parliament, provided he furnishes 200 signatures from his precinct.¹⁹ In the United States, the obstacles for

¹⁶ Rosenstone et.al., 1984, p.25-26.
German "Party Law," paragraphs 18 and 20.

¹⁷ Paragraphs 6-9, 14, 15 of the "Party Law."

¹⁸ paragraph 18 of the "Election Law."

¹⁹ paragraph 20 of the "Election Law."

running a campaign have been mounted considerably higher. The regulation of the election procedures is part of state jurisdiction, and this has led to considerable variation and confusion. For instance, in the state of Washington, any party which manages to draw 100 registered voters to a convention or primary is granted inclusion in the ballot. However, this is a very lenient example of pre-election requirements. Commonly, a certain minimum of signatures is necessary, which varies between a total of 25 and ten percent of the electorate.²⁰ Nationwide, for the 1980 presidential election, 1.2 million signatures were needed in order to gain access to the ballot in each state.²¹ The preeminent challenger of the two party hegemony in the 1980 presidential election, John Anderson, spent most of his resources for overcoming these hurdles.²² Clearly, American election laws contain the potential for discouraging any election campaign from outside the two party system. There is no equivalent for these obstacles in Germany. The nature of these obstacles is such that they constitute considerable nuisance and therefore might preclude weakly determined candidates from running a campaign with little effort. It should be noted, though, that the game of politics requires full-hearted determination on the part of the players anyway. Perhaps, the campaigns which never have been run because of these regulations would not have been the most successful examples of major party challenge.

²⁰ See Scott and Hrebentar, 1979, p.63-66.

²¹ Rosenstone et.al., p.21.

²² Crotty, 1985, p.44.

1.3. Conclusion

The practical significance of these differences between the two countries seems to be limited. Four third post war party candidates obtained a significant percentage of the votes in America: both J. Strom Thurmond and Henry Wallace got 2.4% in 1948, George Wallace's campaign yielded almost 14% in 1968; 6.6% voted for John Anderson in 1980. All of these cases can be explained with the failure of the major parties to address certain issues and to ensure prosperity, besides other factors.²³ In contrast to the four examples in America, only two new parties were this successful in Germany. The NPD obtained 2.0% and 4.3% in 1965 and 1969; the electoral success of the Greens started in 1983 (5.6%). Certainly, the political development of the post-war Germany was exceptional, and the evolution of the party system is part of this wonder. Nevertheless, the point that the American political system prohibits third party activity, while it is an easy endeavour in Germany, is hard to make. The difference between the two countries with respect to new parties apparently lies in their maintenance rather than in their emergence. Therefore, a significant Green Party campaign in America is not impossible.

²³ Rosenstone et.al., p.162-168, 181.

2. THE GREEN VOTE AS A RESPONSE TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES

The dominating theories of the Green vote in Germany explain support for the new party in terms of the economic and social conditions of a new class. In this approach, the Greens express new social grievances the three party system failed to integrate. Three different versions of this approach will be sketched in the following pages. First, however, an article that provided the groundwork for this mode of thinking will be briefly summarized: Cotgrove and Duff's examination of support for the environmental movement in Britain.

2.1 Middle-Class Radicalism: Cotgrove and Duff

Cotgrove and Duff's starting point is the observation, that concern for the environment is not unique to members of the environmental movement but widely spread in the society. However, the members of the environmental movement can be distinguished by a set of opinions and social variables, which show them to be to a high proportion members of the new, service rather than production oriented middle class. Moreover they are shown to hold anti-industrial and anti-establishment attitudes.²⁴

Based on these findings, the authors hold alienation to be the primary cause of membership in an environmental movement. Cotgrove and Duff describe the new middle class as being alienated from the process of

²⁴ Cotgrove and Duff, 1980, p.334-338.

decision making, which is dominated by the antagony of the old classes. This position "at the periphery of the institutions" causes it to oppose elements of the "Dominant Social Paradigm" of the old classes, above all, industrial growth. The new middle class expresses its commitment to the "counter paradigm" by joining non-established political organizations.²⁵ In this account membership in an environmental group is partially accidental. Any non-established organizations with a reasonable case could have fulfilled the same functions. "It is the use, to which the environmental beliefs are put, which is the key to the political significance of the environmental movement"²⁶ rather than the environmental cause itself.

Cotgrove and Duff do not comment on the durability of the observed changes. However, the fact that they base their explanation on attributes of a class which is unlikely to disappear, renders it rather easy to conclude a persisting significance of the movement.

1.2. Frustrated Academicians: Alber

Alber is among those authors who transfer the idea of a link between a certain social-economic situation and participation in the environmental movement to the context of the Green Party. His starting point is the high correlation between both high levels of education and relative youth and the Green vote. Unlike Inglehart, who explained this fact with young

²⁵ Cotgrove and Duff, 1980, p.339-342.

²⁶ Cotgrove and Duff, 1980, p.339.

postmaterialist generations and the positive influence of education on postmaterialism,²⁷ Alber focuses on the postgraduate occupational opportunities. High birth rates in the 1960s and the trend toward higher levels education led to an overabundance of university graduates, particularly in the Arts and Sciences. This resulted in the development of a group of unemployed, or not appropriately employed, highly educated individuals, and to frustration among those who still attend university. According to Alber, this frustration expresses itself in the desire for more political participation, more equality of life chances, and further redistribution.²⁸ The empirical evidence he cites shows that both candidates and supporters of the party are concerned about these issues. However, unemployment, an issue that in my opinion should be of high salience for the Green electorate if this theory is correct, ranks only third of the most important problems among Green vote, after environmental protection and peace, while it ranks first among the public as a whole. The distribution of concern for the broad range of economic issues is similar.²⁹ Explaining the Green vote with issues that are rooted in an economic situation should be accompanied by evidence that suggests high salience of economics in the party, on the levels of both leaders and supporters.

However, Alber concludes that the future success of the Greens depends on the ability of the Social Democrats to represent the interests

²⁷ see Inglehart, 1977, p.72-84.

²⁸ Alber, 1985.

²⁹ Alber, 1985, p.221-223.

of the frustrated academicians and on the smaller size of the succeeding age cohorts. Hence, it is very likely to decrease.

1.3. Deprivation of the Non-integrated: Wilhelm Buerklin

Buerklin offers the most elaborate account of the Green vote. The closeness of his explanation to Alber's suggests intellectual interdependence.³⁰ According to Buerklin, Green voters suffer from lack of integration not only in terms of employment, but with regard to several social criteria: To a large proportion they lack church affiliation; they are usually unmarried and without children, have no independent income, rent flats, rather than own them, and are young. For Buerklin, these facts are not a mere reflection of the high proportion of students in the Green electorate. Rather he considers them joint causes of deprivation of the non-established.³¹ Similar to Cotgrove and Duff, he argues that the single issue success of the Greens "can only be understood if the interest in questions of environmental protection is put into the context of a conflict between economics and ecology. Involvement in environmental issues must be understood as a reaction against the achievement-oriented principle of distribution...The young educated class has rejected the legitimacy of this principle, which is perceived to exclude them from social integration."³²

³⁰ see Buerklin, 1985a.

³¹ Buerklin, 1987, p.113-117.

³² Buerklin, 1987, p.118.

His empirical evidence supports the claim of a connection between Green vote and rejection of features of the current economic system. Applying factor analysis, he constructs a "modus of distribution" scale. Among those who prefer social solidarity the Greens obtain 35% of the vote, as opposed to 2% among those who are achievement oriented, and 9% among the category mixed, which contains two thirds of the sample.³³ It is further confirmed by the often presented left self-placement of Green supporters. The German public traditionally associates redistribution with left policy, and hence perceives the redistribution stands of the Greens as left. The German left, then, is split in an established part promoting redistribution in favor of the working class and represented by the Social Democrats, and the non-established Green Party which fights for redistribution in favor of the non-integrated.³⁴ The future success of the Greens, again, depends largely on the ability of the SPD to integrate the demands represented by the Greens as well as on the economic development. Buerklin concludes their decline is "inevitable."

In this account, it appears to a lesser degree as a mere coincidence that the new party is an ecology party. This is because the cause of the ecology necessarily conflicts with economic interests, at least in the short range. Hence, serious environmental concern is hardly possible without anti-industrial, anti-growth, or anti-business attitudes. Identification with the environmental cause therefore is rational for those who hold these attitudes in the first place. Thus, Buerklin infers

³³ Buerklin, 1987, 119-120, tab.4 and 5.

³⁴ Buerklin, 1985b.

from the systematic correlation between anti-establishment and pro-ecology attitudes that anti-establishment orientation is the cause of environmentalism. In this account, it makes obvious sense that a party which emphasises predominately environmental issues, rather than any other anti-establishment movement's issues, gained electoral success.

1.4. Ecologist Postindustrials: Chandler and Siaroff

Chandler and Siaroff's view constitutes the mediating position between the explanations based on social structure and the approach taken in this paper. Applying a revised version of Goldthorpe's scale of social classes, they locate the "postindustrials" with their declining feeling for responsiveness of elites and efficacy as the stronghold of Green success. Thus, their theory is again based on class attributes in the first place.³⁵ However, the identification of those individuals among the postindustrials who actually vote Green is done by using the two variables environmental concern and attitudes toward nuclear missiles. Part of the explanation of the Green vote thus is the sensible reaction of a social group to what is commonly considered the most salient Green issue rather than the reflection of "system values."³⁶ This is particularly remarkable because an earlier article by Buerklin considered the nuclear issue an anti-establishment issue, instead of genuine concern about the consequences of

³⁵ Chandler and Siaroff, 1986, p.303-325.

³⁶ Chandler and Siaroff, 1986, p.321.

the use of nuclear energy.³⁷

1.5. Conclusion: a Naive Approach

In contrast to the approaches summarized above, variables describing the voter's social background will not be in the focus of this paper. Instead, the analysis will rest on the predominant issue of the Green Party: environmental protection. It will be attempted to describe the emergence of the Greens in Germany and the lack of a similar party in the United States by means of analyzing patterns of the politics of the environment in the two countries. The assumption of this procedure is that the environmental issue did have some importance for the rise of the party. The claim is made that, if it was not for the emergence of widespread environmental consciousness, the Green Party would not have gained the strength it now has. However, this does not imply any assertion concerning the rise of a fourth party in general. The socio-structural approach to the Green vote explains support for a new party rather than for the Green Party in particular. In contrast, the focus of this paper is on the Green vote as the choice of environmentalists. Therefore, no attempt whatever will be made in the framework of this paper to explain the lack of an American ecology party with differences in the social structure of the two countries.

Treating the Green Party as an ecologist party in turn raises the question for the causes of environmentalism. While this question has been

³⁷ Buerklin, 1985b.

overshadowed by interest in the Green Party in the German scientific community, the literature addressing this question has grown to a considerable body in the United States. Even so, theories attempting to explain environmental concern often closely resemble the explanations of the Green vote outlined above. In particular, the role of social class as an explanation of environmentalism has been debated. The clarity of the discussion, however, suffers from the variety of indicators of environmental concern in usage. When membership in environmental groups is under scrutiny, environmentalism appears as a mere middle class phenomenon. The opinion that environmentalism is an expression of middle class interests draws from this finding.³⁸ Contrary to this hypothesis, the fact that middle class dominance is not a phenomenon peculiar to environmental organizations, because membership groups in general depend on the middle class, has been brought to attention. Indeed, among supporters of public interest groups attitude measures of environmental concern discriminate members of environmental groups from those of other organizations.³⁹ However, attitude measures of environmental consciousness frequently supported the notion of environmentalism being a middle class issue, too. This view, in turn, has been challenged by the finding that the correlation between social class and environmentalism depends to a large degree on the question wording.⁴⁰ The question for the causes of environmental concern, then, cannot be answered to full satisfaction.

³⁸ See Tucker, 1982; Andrews, 1980.

³⁹ Mohai, 1985.

⁴⁰ Buttel and Flinn, 1978, p.437-438, 445.

Be that as it may, it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the causes of environmental concern. Therefore, this paper takes environmental concern as a socially relevant fact without implying any claim concerning the ultimate cause of its rise. I hope, a later paper will be able to address the question what it is that causes an individual to develop consciousness about pollution, overpopulation, or the extinction of species. The topic of this paper is limited to the political consequences of the fact that people actually are concerned. The reasoning of the following pages, then, should be compatible with different models of environmental concern and the Green vote. Though they are not made the basis of the argumentation, the socio-structural explanations may well be compatible with the reasoning of the following chapters.

3. THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: ISSUE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION

3.1. The United States

For a considerable time the conservation movement has been part of American society: It shares its roots with the progressive movement. Motives to join it were twofold. First, conservation could be triggered by the belief that natural resources should be used more wisely to prevent their exhaustion. Nature, in this approach, is just a reservoir of resources - and a limited one. The alternative motive for conservationism is valuation of a certain part of nature in itself: a scenic river, canyon or forest is considered worth protecting regardless of its economic utility. The battles over the creation of natural parks in public ownership and the protection of certain species were fought by a number of interest groups. The National Wildlife Federation and the Izaak Walton League sought public lands to be set aside for recreational purposes, while the oldest of the conservation groups, the Sierra Club, pursued a more rigorous approach to conservation, which rejected the multiple use doctrine of the recreationists. Certain species rather than sites stood in the center of the attempts of the National Audubon Society.⁴¹

During the sixties, the U.S. experienced the rise of a broader perspective of natural protection: environmentalism. A number of events helped foster an understanding of the complexities of the creation, which

⁴¹ Rosenbaum, 1973, p.75-79.

can not be effectively protected when the attention is limited to one or two scenic sites. In particular, stimulants for the rise of environmentalism were the consequences of DDT abuse, brought to public attention through Rachel Carson's controversial book Silent Spring published 1962, bothersome air pollution in the cities which reminded of the deadly London smog of the fifties, 235,000 gallons of crude oil on Santa Barbara's white beaches in 1969. During this period, people came to believe humankind depends on an intact ecological system not only for the sake of resources for the economy. The rise of environmentalism was carried by an outdoor recreation boom, concerns about personal health and increasing insight in ecological interdependencies. Environmentalism sees the entire ecological network as being affected by human development, and, in its most consequential version, includes humankind in the list of endangered species. The goal of environmentalism therefore is to protect and improve the environment all over the country, not only in particularly scenic areas. During the sixties, environmentalism penetrated the political arena, demanding government action.⁴²

The traditional conservation groups responded to these demands differently. While the Wildlife Federation and the Izaak Walton League essentially stuck to their established focus, the National Audubon began to campaign for a broader spectrum of environmental goals. It was the Sierra Club, though, which adopted the new perspective of environmentalism most completely. As early as 1959 discussions of non-conservation issues,

⁴² On the shift from conservationism to environmentalism see Hays, 1987, p.13-39; Mitchell, 1985, p. 5-8.

like overpopulation and pollution in urban areas, were instigated within the Club, and in 1969 its Board adopted its "first comprehensive policy on air pollution."⁴³ The use of nuclear energy for power plants and military purposes later was added to the issue list.⁴⁴ However, even though the Club kept fighting for this broadened issue range, it still is inclined to give preservation, namely, Alaska's wilderness, "top priority."⁴⁵ New groups, founded in the late sixties and early seventies, are free from this inclination. The Friends of the Earth, a 1969 faction of the Sierra Club, and the League of Conservation Voters, in turn a faction of the Friends of the Earth (1972), promote the entire field of environmental protection.⁴⁶ Other groups tend to concentrate on specific fields, e.g., the Environmental Defense Fund, which was founded in 1967 to encourage litigation against DDT use, still specializes, among others, in toxic chemicals.⁴⁷

The broadened ideological spectrum was accompanied by an upsurge of attention for the environmental movement. While 17% of the American population included the reduction of pollution among the three problems the government should predominately be concerned with in 1965, three times as many, 53%, did so five years later.⁴⁸ This is reflected in the

⁴³ Sierra Club, 1989, p.32.

⁴⁴ Mitchell, 1985, p.10.

⁴⁵ Sierra Club, 1989, p.33-35.

⁴⁶ Rosenbaum, 1973, p.75-79; 1985, p.71-73.

⁴⁷ Mitchell, 1985, 12-14.

⁴⁸ Rosenbaum, 1973, p.14.

membership boost which the environmental groups experienced. The Sierra Club, which in 1960 had 15,000 members on file, counted 135,000 in the early seventies. Similarly, 232,000 held membership rights in the Audubon Society in 1972 - seven times the total of 1960.⁴⁹ Membership in the five largest environmental and conversation groups rose 33%, or 400,000, in a single year from 1970 to 1971.⁵⁰ As to the new groups, 30,000 had joined the Environmental Defense Fund by 1972, while 8,000 joined the Friends of the Earth.⁵¹ The groups apparently were accepted as attractive organization of interest in environmental protection.

When the ideological range represented by the groups and their public support expanded, so did their political activity. While the primary targets of the conservation movement had long been state governments, attempts to influence shifted more and more to the federal level. Mitchell estimates that the number of full time lobbyists in Washington increased from one in 1954, to two in 1969, about forty in 1975, and 88 in 1985.⁵² Environmental activists quickly acquired the scientific and political expertise necessary to provide legislators and administrators with information on environmental issues.⁵³ Pressure is exercised through the socialization of conflict in order to change the power balance, a tactic

⁴⁹ Mitchell, 1985, p.25.

⁵⁰ Enloe, 1975, p.145.
Rosenbaum, 1973, p.75-76.

⁵¹ Mitchell, 1985, p.25.

⁵² Mitchell, 1985, p.37-38.

⁵³ Hays, 1987, p.458-479.

described by Schattschneider.⁵⁴ Grass roots involvement in the formulation of environmental legislation has been shown to have some effect on the outcome.⁵⁵ Moreover, cooperation with non-environmental groups was sought to render it more difficult for officials to ignore the pressure.⁵⁶ Litigation was employed on a large scale to stop individual polluters.

With this background, state and federal governments could not disregard that environmental protection had become a salient issue awaiting governmental activity. Governments on both levels reacted to the new issue, in compliance to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of absorbing demands in the institutionalized political system before they assume threatening character. Numerous legislative and administrative steps to tackle specific problems were taken, an act designed to control oil-spills that had languished in Congress before the disaster of Santa Barbara and a shift in the dam building plans in the Pacific Northwest being among the most prominent ones. More significant, though, was the willingness of the federal government to treat environmental protection as a top priority issue. After having taken advantage of public concern for the environment in the election campaign, Nixon's first official act was to sign the 'National Environmental Policy Act' (NEPA); an executive order created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by the end of the same year. The symbolic function of these measures was underscored by proclaiming the seventies the "environmental decade." A number of laws targeting air,

⁵⁴ Schattschneider, 1960, p.1-43.

⁵⁵ Fowler and Shaiko, 1987.

⁵⁶ Rosenbaum, 1985, p.72-73.

water and marine pollution, waste disposal, misuse of pesticides, noise, and extinction of species were enacted until 1973, indicating the true will to tackle the problems.

There is some disagreement in the literature as to the importance of partisanship for the legislation of the environmental decade. A standard procedure to address this question is an analysis of the roll call behavior of the members of Congress on bills concerning environmental protection. An often used data source for this kind of analysis is furnished by the publications of the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), which rate each legislator's record on environmental issues. This rating denotes the percentage of roll calls relevant to the environment in which a Congressman or Senator votes the environmentalist's position. Thus, a score of 100 constitutes a perfect environmental voting record. Table 1 compiles the average scores for members of the House broken down by party membership.

Table 3.1: Average LCV-scores for members of the House, 1973 - 1986								
	Year							
	73-74	75-76	77-78	79-80	81-82	83	84	85-86
Democrats	58	58	57	n/a	67	n/a	68	64
Republicans	39	32	30		33		36	31
Difference	19	26	27		34		32	33

Sources: Kenski and Kenski, 1980, 1984.
LCV, 1985, 1987.

Throughout the time span covered in this table, Democrats on average obtained higher ratings than Republicans did. Based on this evidence, early commentators on environmental legislation concluded that the Democrats were the environmentalist party. However, there is a drawback to this analysis: the LCV scores do not take into the account the importance and public exposure of the individual bill. Therefore, different evaluations of the parties result even if both parties agreed on major legislation and disagreed only on the less relevant bills. A profound judgement on the importance of the individual elements of the large body of environmental legislation requires policy analysis to an extent that goes far beyond the scope of this paper. It can be said, though, that of the 20 bills Vig and Kraft list as the most significant environmental protection bills, none was opposed by the majority of either

one of the parties.⁵⁷ In fact, the pattern of environmental roll calls is that of bipartisan support for the legislation. In hardly any case did the opinion of the majority of Democrats differ from that of the majority of Republicans. In particular, when Nixon vetoed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments in 1972, Congress overrode this veto by a margin which was close to being unanimous. The conflict over the pace of environmental protection, which gained salience after the oil-crisis of 1973-74, apparently was predominantly a conflict between the White House and Congress rather than a conflict between the congressional parties. Those who concluded that partisanship was an important variable for explaining support for environmental legislation in the seventies, then, argued in the fringes of the legislation.⁵⁸ The face validity of this assertion is enhanced by the reaction of some of those scholars to their own results. For example, Ritt and Ostheimer start their analysis with the hypothesis that the Republican party is the one which is more environmentalist.⁵⁹ Therefore, the edge the Democrats actually had on environmental legislation can not have been very distinct. Even more important, Kenski and Kenski had published an article demonstrating the Democratic lead on environmentalism in the seventies. Nevertheless, in a

⁵⁷ Vig and Kraft, 1984, p.10-13.

Authors analysis of the Congressional records as published in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac.

⁵⁸ This is true in particular for the study by Dunlap and Allen (1976). Their analysis is based only on the roll calls which resulted in a split of at least 90/10, thus excluding the vast majority of quasi unanimous votes.

⁵⁹ Ritt and Ostheimer, 1974, p.461.

later publication which includes a retrospective of the seventies, they quote an article in a law journal which simply states that environmentalism was dealt with in a bipartisan manner, instead of referring to their own study, which concluded the opposite.⁶⁰ It is safe to conclude that the environmental legislation was supported by both parties. This also holds true for the periods where the main effect of environmental legislation was the softening of regulations enacted earlier.

Two patterns of American environmental politics in the seventies are to be kept in consideration during the later chapters of this paper:

i) The issue was brought forward by citizen's movements. The state's environmental measures constitute an answer to the pressure exercised by those groups. Effective organizational structure of the groups and their willingness to collaborate despite diverging ideologies rendered them capable of continuing the dialogue with the authorities throughout the decade. The institutional setting, in turn, provided adequate negotiating partners for these groups (congressional committees, individual Senators and Representatives, EPA).⁶¹ Though this dialogue did by no means ensure environmentally conscious legislation, it certainly guaranteed the integration of the environmental issue into conventional politics.

ii) Partisanship was mostly avoided. Even though Nixon's reluctance to keep Congress' pace in environmental legislation might have given the Democrats a slight edge in the eye of the environmental movement,

⁶⁰ Kenski and Kenski, 1980; 1984, p.113.

⁶¹ Mitchell, 1985, p.29-31, 37-38.

bipartisan support for the legislation in Congress kept environmental protection a cross-cutting issue.

Ironically, the environmental decade lasted exactly ten years: Reagan's hostile approach to environmental protection changed the patterns described above. Though environmental pressure succeeded in the realm of clean air legislation, prevented oil and gas leasing in wilderness areas, and maintained the protection of a fish species in Tennessee, the environmental lobby was largely dissatisfied with the way the new administration addressed environmental issues.⁶² Being confronted with Anne Gorsuch, who agreed with Reagan's cuts of the environmental budget and his deregulation program, as head of the EPA, and James Watt in the Department of the Interior the "trembling"⁶³ environmentalists initially made them the target of criticism. In early 1982, though, they attacked Reagan personally, thus exposing the waning of the dialogue between state and environmental groups to the public. "Environmentalists were reluctant to criticize the President during his first year. We concentrated instead on Interior Secretary James Watt. But, let's face it, Mr. Reagan is the real James Watt. It's time to say so," read a full-page ad by the Friends of the Earth.⁶⁴ Nine other leading groups, among them the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society and the Environmental Defense Fund joined this strategy shortly after that by publishing an "indictment," which accused Reagan of having "broken with the faith of the American people on environmental

⁶² Symonds, 1982.

⁶³ Holden, 1980.

⁶⁴ New York Times, 2/2/1982: A13.

protection."⁶⁵ Moreover, the groups announced plans to increase their engagement in electoral campaigns in order to compensate for lost access to the administration. Two million dollars and an unassessable amount of volunteer work were spent before the mid-term elections of 1982 in this first national level attempt to make the "green vote" a factor in American politics.⁶⁶

When the pattern of dialogue was affected by the new constellation, so was the pattern of bipartisanship. In February 1982, House Speaker O'Neill charged Reagan with the demolishing of this tradition and declared that the Democrats were prepared to make environmental protection a major campaign issue.⁶⁷ Five months later, Russell Peterson, president of the Audubon Society, joined congressional Democrats, who launched an attack on Reagan's management of the EPA. The administration and congressional Republicans replied in equally political terms. They accused environmentalists of a "political witchhunt," aimed at helping to elect Democrats to Congress.⁶⁸ Earlier the same year, Anne Gorsuch had said that the criticism of the environmental groups were "not over environmental issues, it's politics... Some of the groups are running against the Reagan administration."⁶⁹ This rhetoric was reflected in actual congressional

⁶⁵ Friends of the Earth et.al., 1982, p.6.
see also New York Times 10/31/1982: A22.

⁶⁶ New York Times, 02/07/1982: A36; 11/07/1982: A36; see also 10/31/1982: NJ32.

⁶⁷ New York Times, 02/05/1982: A21.

⁶⁸ New York Times, 22/07/1982: A17.

⁶⁹ New York Times, 04/24/1982: A10.

politics. The Democrats increasingly made use of the instrument of oversight in order to promote the enforcement of environmental laws.⁷⁰ Moreover, the difference between the parties with respect to roll-call behavior increased (see table 3.1).

It has to be pointed out that bipartisan support for environmental protection, though affected by the occurrences described above, did by no means vanish. Congress' effort to increase the budget of the EPA, which was supported by both parties, should be noted in this connection.⁷¹ Furthermore, Kenski and Kenski's observation that on two-thirds of the roll calls on matters of the environment the majority of the Democrats opposed the majority of the Republicans leaves one third of the votes with bipartisan agreement.⁷² Regional differences, moreover, add to the picture, as Republicans in the East hold a stronger environmental record than Southern Democrats in both House and Senate.⁷³ Nevertheless, it can rightfully be stated that the shift to the Reagan administration diminished the dialogue between state and environmental groups and increased the overall Democratic lead on environmental protection.

⁷⁰ CQ 1983, p.325.

⁷¹ New York Times, 03/07/1982: A30.

⁷² Kenski and Kenski, 1984, p.113.

⁷³ *ibid.*: p.115 (table 5-3).

3.2. West Germany

In stark contrast to the United States, the environmental issue in Germany was not brought up by an outraged public, but by established political parties searching for new ways for winning electoral support. To begin with, the public was not even responsive: "Blue Skies over the Ruhr," a campaign slogan of the Social Democrats in 1961, did not convey the expected success.⁷⁴ It was not until the junior party in the newly founded left-middle coalition of 1969, the FDP, pushed for environmental legislation in order to obtain a distinguished political profile that environmental protection became an issue.⁷⁵ Though public awareness about environmental problems had risen considerably during the sixties, a public movement that could in its strength be compared to that in the United States clearly was not present. Even without an outraged public, the prosperous early seventies enabled parties and parliament to formulate environmental programs and to enact laws designed to curb air and water pollution without meeting major opposition. In fact, business pursued a cooperative strategy, criticizing details of certain regulations but acknowledging the need for environmental legislation in general.⁷⁶

Things worsened after the depression caused by the 1973/74 oil-crisis. From now on, business spokesmen continuously portrayed environmental

⁷⁴ Hucke, 1985, p.160.

⁷⁵ Wey, 1982, p.162-163, 201.

⁷⁶ Wessels, 9-15. See also Papadakis, 1984, p.90; Wey, 1982, p.203-204; Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983, p.160.

protection as a luxury. The new Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, thought of the issue as secondary to international security and economy. The flow of environmental legislation halted, some regulations were even eased.⁷⁷ The rising number of "citizen initiatives," however, documents that in the meantime part of the population had become concerned about environmental matters, now demanding that environmental protection policies be carried on.⁷⁸ Above all, nuclear power plants concerned a considerable portion of the population.⁷⁹ Though this confrontation between a social movement fighting for the sake of ecology and the state reminds one of the American situation in the late sixties, the institutional setting and traditions of government led to a completely distinct development in the German case.

First, a dialogue between the state and environmentalists could not be established. Unlike the United States, where legislative acts are initiated within Congress, it is the large bureaucracies of the different departments where most of the drafts for legislation originate in West Germany. Therefore, whereas Congress is a main forum of lobbying in America, interest group influence in West Germany concentrates largely on the executive branch. When trying to enter these processes, environmental interests have to cope with an obstacle business interests are not exposed to: environmentally relevant competencies are spread over a number of different departments.⁸⁰ The "Umweltbundesamt," designed to heal this

⁷⁷ Hucke, 1985, 161-162.

⁷⁸ see Andritzky and Wahl-Terlinden, 1978, p.32-39.

⁷⁹ See Papadakis (1984), p.64-70.

⁸⁰ Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983, 142-151.

shortcoming by approaching environmental protection in a broader perspective, falls far short of the EPA in terms of competencies and hence is a far less attractive negotiating partner.⁸¹ Moreover, it is located in Berlin, some 400 miles from the center of the power game. Other institutions, like the "Council of Experts on Environmental Protection" (SRU) and the semi-official "Society for Environmental Questions," have not shown to be very effective in influencing legislation.⁸² Finally, the fact that in Germany the administration of federal laws generally is among the responsibilities of the state government enhances the dispersion of environmentally relevant competencies over the political system.⁸³ For these reasons it is hard to find a target for pressure on behalf of the environment in Germany.

This institutional shortcoming is reflected by the situation on the environmentalists' side. Organized largely in local citizen initiatives, which were stimulated by an environmental problem close by, the German environmental movement lacked the centralized, effective organization that the environmental groups provided in the United States. The oldest nationwide organization, the "German Ring for Protection of Nature" (DNR), whose original goals were similar to that of the American conservation organizations, broadened its scope to environmental protection in general in the early seventies. However, it refrained from large scale political

⁸¹ Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983, p.132-133.

⁸² Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983, p.133, 139.
Andritzky and Wahl-Terlinden, 1978, p.161.

⁸³ Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983, p.132-133.

activity.⁸⁴ The other nationwide organizations, the "BUND" (federation for protection of environment and nature) and the "BBU" (federation of citizens initiatives for environmental protection), were insufficiently funded and lacked administrative structure and political proficiency that characterize a successful interest group.⁸⁵ Then, with neither side having constituted a body to initiate and maintain a negotiation, it is hardly surprising that a dialogue between state and the environmental movement could not be established. The German environmentalists did not gain the influence in the realm of policy formulation that the American environmental organizations had in the seventies. The different development in Germany was probably due to the ideological setting: German governmental tradition emphasizes the disjunction of society and politics and therefore tends to treat social movements with despise. Similarly, the German population is less favorable toward reforms than Americans are. In a 1981 survey reported by Inglehart in a different context, 73% of the American respondents supported the statement "our society must be gradually improved by reform," while only 59% of the Germans did. 38% of the Germans think that "our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces," as opposed to 22% in the American sample.⁸⁶ In turn, the environmental movement was highly suspicious of centralized organization - a necessary condition for successful dialogue with the

⁸⁴ Wey, 1982, p.168-170.

⁸⁵ Hucke, 1985, p.168.
Hartkopf and Bohne, 1983, p.164-165.

⁸⁶ Inglehart, forthcoming, chap.1, table 1-2.

state.⁸⁷

Without any say in the formulation of policies, the environmental movement had to target on policy implementation. The second half of the decade witnessed demonstrations of every size against plans to build industrial plants with suspected negative impact on the environment, above all nuclear power plants. Thus, the instrument that was used to express environmental concern was protest behavior.⁸⁸ While in the United States the central stage of environmental activism was Capitol Hill, it was the street in Germany.

The protesting environmentalists merged with other social movements without access to the governing elite, e.g the women's and the peace movement. However, circles for whom protest was a goal rather than means hooked in also. This, in turn, influenced the original composition of support for the environmental movement: Large parts of the middle class, which had played an important role in the rise of environmentalism, left the radicalized coalition.⁸⁹ This accumulation of protesting groups gave birth to the Green Party.⁹⁰

So far, it has been shown that the pattern of dialogue, which characterized environmental politics in the United States, did not develop

⁸⁷ The argumentation of this paragraph draws from an unpublished manuscript authored by an anonymous graduate student with H.-D. Klingemann at the Free University Berlin.

⁸⁸ On the influence of citizen's movements see Andritzky and Wahl-Terlinden, 1978.

⁸⁹ Langguth, 1984, p.4, p.10-11

⁹⁰ Papadakis, 1984, p.70-88, p.158-178.

in Germany. However, the countries differ with respect to bipartisanship also. First, the fact that environmental protection was initiated by the left/middle coalition must have given the SPD credit in the eyes of environmentalists as compared to the CDU. Second, after the shift of the Social Democratic policy away from environmental protection, there was a strong minority in the party opposing this change. That 40 per cent of the delegates of the 1979 party congress voted against the party's nuclear energy program might illustrate this claim.⁹¹ Furthermore, a number of well known party officials, among them Peter Glotz, Volker Hauff and Erhard Eppler attempted to develop ties between the movements and the party and to shift the party toward a more sensitive treatment of environmental protection.⁹² Although the compromise they reached with Chancellor Schmidt on nuclear energy policy fell short of satisfying the anti-nuclear movement, it still showed a willingness within a minority of the party to address environmental issues.⁹³ Therefore, even though CDU and SPD did not differ that much with regard to their actual treatment of some issues, above all nuclear power, the fact that the SPD was openly divided over them rendered it more attractive to the environmentalist. Moreover, analysis of the parties' statements and actual behavior shows that, though the CDU/CSU gave the issue the same amount of attention in their programmatic publications as the SPD, both in quantitative⁹⁴ and

⁹¹ Papadakis, 1984, p.91.

⁹² *ibid.*, p.92-101.

⁹³ Braunthal, 1983, p.256-260.

⁹⁴ see Klingemann, 1987, p.303, tab.14.1.

qualitative terms, the CDU was far more reluctant to take the side of the environment in a situation of actual conflict.⁹⁵ These three factors should lead to a considerable edge of the SPD over the CDU among those who are environmentally concerned.

3.3. Conclusion

The predominant conclusion which is to be drawn from this presentation of the politics of environmental protection fits the theoretical framework developed by Kitschelt in his comparative study of anti-nuclear movements.⁹⁶ According to Kitschelt, the United States and West Germany provide different "opportunity structures" for social movements. Specifically, the political system of the United States is more open in three respects:

- i) The legislature's capability to develop and control politics independently of the executive is higher in the United States. This renders it more attractive an addressee of social movements.
- ii) Patterns of intermediation between interest groups and the executive branch differ. That is, in addition to the higher acceptance of the idea of lobbying altogether, the organizational structure of the administration provided natural negotiating partners for American environmentalists.
- iii) As demonstrated in the preceding sections, the American political process not only offered opportunities for the articulation of

⁹⁵ Wey, 1982, p.163-164.

⁹⁶ Kitschelt, 1986.

environmental demands, but to a fair extent achieved the aggregation of these demands in a consensus, which did produce some effective policies in an early stage. However, this point does not hold true to an equal extent for the policies of nuclear power.⁹⁷

Those opportunity structures determine which strategy the movement chooses to apply. The American environmental movement could rely on "assimilative strategies," like lobbying, petitioning government bodies, referendum campaigns and partisan involvement in electoral contests. In contrast, its West German counterpart had to rely on a "confrontational strategy" composed primarily of public demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience.⁹⁸ In a later stage, the movement decided to complement this confrontational strategy, which the setting had forced it to adopt, with a strategy of changing the setting itself: The Green Party was founded. This is a way to explain the emergence and success of the German Greens without referring to variables of economic conditions or sociostructural changes. Doing so means assuming a position on the fringe of the growing body of scientific literature on the Greens in particular and parties of the New Left in general. However, nothing in this paper proves the theories that rest predominantly on concepts of economic or political deprivation wrong. Nevertheless, these theories in turn fall short of demonstrating the inadequacy of accounts which stress the actual issues involved in a conflict instead of the social background of the actors. It seems as though political science has not yet developed the tools for

⁹⁷ Kitschelt, 1986, p.63.

⁹⁸ Kitschelt, 1986, p.66-67.

irrefutably describing the nature of the Green vote. This being the case, answering the question for the causes of the electoral success of the Greens is a matter of assessment rather than a scientific decision. This paper tends to take politics at face value, thus equalling the apparent content of a conflict with its underlying nature: Environmentalism is interpreted as genuine concern for nature rather than as a mixture of other, not expressed interests, e.g., redistribution. Be that as it may, in order to make the results of this study acceptable not only to the small circle who shares this view, it will be attempted to draw as little as possible from this presumption during the following analyses.

4. IS THERE A GREEN ELECTORATE IN THE UNITED STATES?

4.1. Hypotheses

The line of reasoning from the preceding section can be characterized as inferring changes in political structures from how well the structures work. However, the main target of this paper lies outside the realm of institutional politics. Its major concern is in the ideological correlates of environmentalism and the extent to which these are impacted upon by the way environmental demands are dealt with by the political elite. In particular, the question is asked how far confrontational politics on environmental issues led to a different type of environmentalist than did emerge under conditions of assimilationist settlement of the conflict.

Various theories, which are to be outlined below, hold that strong environmental concern is associated with a tendency to embrace broad visions of societal change. Although these theories diverge substantially in their accounts of the causes of this connection, they converge in large part with respect to the actual content of the utopia which is envisioned by environmentalists. The clamor for more participation, deemphasis of economic growth, and a certain range of substantive New Politics issues reaching beyond environmental protection are part of the postmaterialism debate as well as of social movement theories and of the New Environmental Paradigm. Numerous empirical studies support the idea of ideological correlates of environmental concern.

This study will attempt to investigate if the political structure can have a reinforcing or weakening impact on the blend of environmental concern and other political goals. That is, the extent to which this correlation is 'natural' instead of a utilitarian reaction to necessities posed by the political system will be put under scrutiny. It is hypothesized that the way the political system reacts to demands for environmental protection shapes the attitudes individuals concerned about the environment hold toward the political system. If the political structure allows productive interaction between the environmental movement and political elites, there is no intrinsic need for environmentalists to embrace visions of a new political structure. In turn, where this interaction can not be developed and the political institutions fail to adopt environmental demands, the cry for a reformation of the entire political system becomes a logical reaction.

By the same token, the environmentalist's inclination to espouse substantive political goals other than environmental protection, e.g. equality of the sexes and nuclear disarmament, can be described as in part being a function of the behavior of the political elites. In political systems which exile the environmentalists on the periphery of the decision making process the environmental movement finds itself in a 'community of outlaws' with other social movements. It is hypothesized that this shared destiny enhances the mutual assimilation of the causes. Under these conditions, even a single issue environmentalist might be turned into an adherent of the broadest notion of New Politics. Regardless of the initial strength of the association between environmental concern and other New

Politics issues, it is likely to be reinforced by non-responsiveness of the political system.

The preceding section has provided the framework for the translation of these general propositions into precise hypotheses regarding the two countries. As to the American case, it was shown that the state's reaction to the environmental movement produced a fruitful dialogue. The prevailing view of the roots of the environmental movement is that it derived its strength from the protesting youth of the late sixties, which after the Vietnam war was eager to embrace a new cause.⁹⁹ Environmental concern, however, quickly left the realm of general protest and became a valence issue. With Congress and President supporting the environmental cause, environmental protection could be absorbed into the conventional politics. Then, there is relatively little need for environmentalists to put forth clamors for a new political process. Similarly, a political coalition with other New Politics causes is of comparatively little necessity.

Things are different in West Germany. The environmental movement was treated as a protest movement rather than as a group pushing for a reasonable cause. The call for different political procedures, above all for more citizen participation, then becomes a necessary attribute of any convinced environmentalist. Likewise, a political coalition with other political movements which are barred from access to the political elites appears to be the logical reaction. There seems to be a consensus in the literature that the ideological profile of the Green electorate can be described in terms of sympathy for a number of social movements and the

⁹⁹ See e.g. Andrews, 1980, p.23.

call for a greater extent of citizen participation in politics, despite the different theories concerning the ultimate cause of membership to this group. Green voters can rightfully be seen as a group pushing for a broad notion of political change. The hypothesis here is that the existence, or at least the size of this group is in part a product of the political system.

In order to investigate this claim, different notions of the association of environmental concern and political change will be presented. Then, for each one the hypothesis will be tested if the core group described by them is larger in West Germany than it is in the United States. This is thought to be the search for a potential electorate for a Green Party in America.

The premise of this reasoning again is to take politics at face value. No sociostructural theories which explain membership in the environmental movement in terms of an underlying conflict about redistribution of material chances or the alignment of political institutions with certain social groups are included in this framework. However, this argument does not depend on the assertion that these theories are inaccurate. Regardless of the ultimate cause of environmentalism, the mechanisms described above continue to make sense.

4.2 Methodology

Some methodological remarks are required after this presentation of the major hypothesis. To begin with, this paper consists of two case studies, because it outlined environmental politics in the two countries and will investigate some correlates of environmentalism separately for each country. However, it reaches beyond a case study in as far as it attempts to find statements of a somewhat wider scope. This is the case when it comes to the causal claim which is implied in the hypothesis. It has been argued above that environmental politics has a causal influence on the development of a green electorate. In this sense, the study to be undertaken here is truly comparative. The choice of the two countries follows the logic of the "most similar systems" design.¹⁰⁰ Two countries which resemble each other as closely as possible with respect to every variable which could be relevant for the present analysis were chosen in order to limit variation across the systems. This procedure minimizes the number of variables which can possibly be the cause of the observed variation of the dependent variable. The United States and West Germany show a high degree of similarity with respect to their economic and political systems and their value systems. True, one could rightfully argue that among the western democracies a number of countries could be found which resemble the United States more closely than Germany does. Then, West Germany and America fail to meet the conditions of a most similar systems design. However, within the body of relatively similar

¹⁰⁰ Przeworski and Teune, 1970, p.32-34.

countries, America and Germany offer the most apparent difference with respect to the dependent variable, the existence of a Green party. It is this variation of the dependent variable which is the precondition for any fruitful comparative endeavor.¹⁰¹

The logic underlying this understanding of comparative research is that of quasi-experimentation. Specifically, this paper constitutes an example of ex-post-facto analysis.¹⁰² This design can be described as the comparison of the values of a dependent variable between two groups which differ with respect to an independent variable. Little means for controlling for rival hypotheses are available. Indeed, the individuals were not randomly assigned to their respective groups (=countries), and nor have any other procedures taken care of differences in the political setting and traditions. The single attempt to limit the number of rival hypotheses is the choice of similar countries. Unfortunately, this design provides a rather weak base for causal inference. When a concomitant variation is found, nothing ensures that it is not a spurious one, that is, one that is caused by an extraneous variable that has not been controlled for. Be that as it may, this paper is conceived as an exploratory project. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to offer controls for each plausible rival hypothesis. In case this paper will find a relationship between environmental politics and the emergence of a potential green electorate, it cannot furnish evidence to falsify the claim that this relationship is due to different political cultures in

¹⁰¹ Przeworski and Teune, 1970, p.78.

¹⁰² Cook and Campbell, 1979, p.98-99.

ways which have not been considered. Even more so, in case a causal claim is made with respect to the emergence of a Green Party, not every potentially important variable which describes the political systems can be investigated.¹⁰³ Any causal conclusion that will be drawn therefore rests on arguments of plausibility rather than on sufficiently scrutinized relationships. Therefore, provided the results are promising enough, future research will address a broad spectrum of rival hypotheses.

¹⁰³ The preeminent rival hypothesis, which holds the electoral system to be the decisive factor, has been discussed in section 1.

5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN AND ITS MEASUREMENT

Prior to investigating the ideological correlates of environmentalism, the concept of environmental concern itself has to be put under scrutiny. The following pages are devoted to two tasks in this connection: First, an attempt to provide the groundwork for a proper definition of the concept will be made; second, a device to measure environmental concern empirically will be developed.

5.1. Concepts of Environmental Concern as Found in the Literature

Certainly, this paper would like to apply a one-dimensional concept of environmental concern. Such a concept would be defined as the belief that the ecological situation requires improving measures taken on humankind's behalf. Past studies, however, have shown that this one-dimensional understanding of environmental concern lacks empirical support. To my knowledge, only one article investigating the measurement of environmental concern suggests the possibility of a single scale.¹⁰⁴ However, in the factor analysis applied in this study a mere 16 of the over 30 items originally entered form a single dimension. This should alert the researcher to the possibility that the items which were not included in the scale tap one or several relevant dimensions other than the one presented.

The literature is far from a consensus on the question what exactly

¹⁰⁴ Weigel and Weigel, 1978.

these dimensions constitute. Three criteria can be applied to classify the measures that are in use:

i) The measures differ in the substantive area environmental concern is directed to. Survey questions may address any of the sub-problems the environmental problem is composed of, e.g. air-pollution, water-pollution, overpopulation, resource-scarcity. If environmental concern is in fact one-dimensional, measures based on any of these sub-problems should be highly correlated and produce the same results. Van Liere and Kent find similarity of measures based on pollution and resource scarcity while overpopulation appears to tap a different dimension.¹⁰⁵ This suggests that concern for one environmental problem does not necessarily imply concern for all the others. Since Van Liere's and Kent's study includes only three items addressing different substantive areas, the relationship between concern for a single issue within the environmental problem and a broader concept of environmental concern should be subjected to further empirical investigation.

ii) Second, the measures differ with respect to the underlying theoretical concept, that is, in the manner environmental concern is expressed.¹⁰⁶ Survey questions can measure the respondent's support for government action, his awareness of environmental problems, the relative importance of the issue and so on. All of these can be considered measures of environmental concern. However, it is not certain if each measure produces the same results. Mohai offers two categories to classify these

¹⁰⁵ Van Liere and Dunlap, 1981.

¹⁰⁶ Van Liere and Dunlap, 1981, p.653-654.

questions.¹⁰⁷ "Issue intensity" focuses on the strength of the concern. It can be measured by using scales on which the respondent is asked to quantify the seriousness or importance of problems of the environment. The "centrality" of the issue describes its relative importance with respect to other domains, for example, the economy.¹⁰⁸ This can be tapped by asking the respondent which of two conflicting goals, e.g. economic growth and environmental cleanup, should be given priority, or by having him choose a certain number of most important problems from a list. In the factor analysis applied by Mohai the items tapping centrality and those tapping intensity form two factors, thus supporting this distinction.¹⁰⁹ While intensity questions are appropriate for measuring the degree of public awareness of a problem, centrality questions offer a means for investigating which priority the demand for actual reform has.¹¹⁰

Mitchell offers a third category. Centrality and intensity, which he merges into the category "strength," are to be distinguished from the "saliency" of the issue. An individual who considers environmental protection a problem that needs to be dealt with can nevertheless think of other problems as more urgently requiring action. For example, when environmental protection is strongly desired, but the actions taken by the government are considered satisfactory, another issue might become more salient. An open-ended question addressing the most important issue(s) is

¹⁰⁷ Mohai, 1985, p.822.

¹⁰⁸ see Converse, 1964, p.208.

¹⁰⁹ Mohai, 1985, p.828.

¹¹⁰ Lowe et.al., 1980, p.429-430.

an example for measure of salience.¹¹¹

iii) There remains a final distinction to be made: Some questions tap environmental concern on a national level without referring to the respondent's individual situation. Others measure directly the degree to which the respondent is personally a victim of any environmental problem, e.g. if the air in his town is particularly polluted. Using a 1982 Eurobarometer, Rohrschneider finds that questions tapping victimization form a factor distinct from the questions relating to a broader geographical area.¹¹² For the United States, Tremblay and Dunlap state that it is "crucial to differentiate between concern for environmental problems on the state (or national) level and the community (or local) level."¹¹³

From this short exposition of the measures of environmental concern found in the literature one conclusion is drawn for this paper: The number of different measures renders the interpretation of the individual question and its relationship to others somewhat difficult. Therefore, after exploring and classifying the items available in the datasets that are to be used, several different measures will be used for the analyses in order to prevent the conclusions from relying too heavily on the choice of the measurement.

¹¹¹ Mitchell, 1984, p.54-55.

¹¹² Rohrschneider, 1988.

¹¹³ Tremblay and Dunlap, 1978, p.485.

5.2. Exploring Environmental Concern

The data to be used for this part of the analysis were collected under the direction of Lester Milbrath from the Environmental Studies Center at SUNY, Buffalo, for the American sample and H.-J. Fietkau from the Science Center in Berlin for the German sample. An identical questionnaire was mailed to a random sample of the general public in the respective countries in spring 1982. While a response rate of 60% yielded 1129 respondents in the German case, there is one drawback in the American sample. This is because the addresses used stem from a 1980 version of a similar study. Those recipients of the questionnaire who declined cooperation in 1980 did so again in 1982. The completed questionnaire eventually was received from 53% of those who had already completed it for the 1980 study. Therefore, the American sample consists of only 694 respondents, all of which had already participated in the 1980 study. Unfortunately, a mail questionnaire has the same inherent problems as a panel does: Individuals who are interested in the subject under study are more inclined to complete the questionnaire than those who feel indifferently about it. This is particularly relevant in the case of a study which concentrates on a single topic, such as the one in question. Indeed, the questionnaire used here must have been extremely tiring to the respondent unless a certain interest in environmental issues was present. For these reasons the American sample cannot be considered representative with respect to the overall distribution of environmental concern, and it will therefore not be used for assessing the level of concern for

environmental issues in the population. Be that as it may, these weaknesses do not inhibit the use of the sample for investigating the structure of environmental concern. If there are different types of environmental concern, all of them should be overrepresented in the sample. As a result, it can be used for studying those different types.¹¹⁴

The questionnaire contained nineteen items meant to tap environmental concern. After a first inspection, five different types of questions can be distinguished. The first group is the largest one, encompassing nine questions. Respondents were asked: "How urgent are the following environmental problems?" This was followed by a list of the items: noise, air pollution, water pollution, over-population, solid waste disposal, toxic wastes, nuclear wastes, destruction of land- and townscape and depletion of natural resources (trees, minerals, wildlife). Answers were to be marked on a seven point scale running from not urgent to very urgent. The second group consists of four questions and is somewhat similar to the first one. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree to a number of statements. The four statements taken from this list share the common characteristic of expressing an environmental issue in the form of a threatening scenario. Specifically, these are the approaching of the limits of population earth can support, a nuclear accident, dangers resulting from the storage of nuclear waste, and dangerous levels of

¹¹⁴ One might wonder, why the larger 1980 sample has not been used for this analysis, because it would have posed less problems. Quite frankly, I would have loved to. It was hard enough, though, to obtain the 1982 data.

pollution.¹¹⁵ Turning to a third group, two pairs of questions seem to tap the centrality of environmental concern, though in different ways. First, there are two questions addressing the appraisal of government activity in environmental matters, namely, the actions taken and the amount of taxes spent.¹¹⁶ Two items directly force a decision between environmental protection and conflicting goals. The first of them asks if economic growth or environmental protection should be emphasized more, and the second if protecting jobs is more important than protecting the environment.¹¹⁷ Since increased governmental involvement in environmental protection would have its price, the call for more tax money to be spent and more time to be devoted to environmental protection should be accompanied by the will to make economic sacrifices. Buttel and Flinn,

¹¹⁵ "We are approaching the limit of the number of people earth can support."

"A nuclear accident resulting in the contamination of the environment is increasingly likely."

"The storage of nuclear wastes is too dangerous."

"Pollution is rising to dangerous levels."

¹¹⁶ "Do you think that governmental actions in dealing with environmental issues have been adequate?"

"Is the amount of tax money that government is spending on each of the following problems too little, about right, or too much?" This is followed by a list of 25 problems, number eight of which is environmental protection.

¹¹⁷ "The following are contrasting statements about emphases or directions our society should be taking. Please mark the box with the number indicating the extent of your preference for one or the other emphasis." The 12th choice was between "a society that emphasis economic growth over environmental protection" and "a society that emphasizes environmental protection over economic growth".

"Some people have suggested that protecting the environment could result in some people losing their jobs. Assuming that we have to settle for somewhat higher unemployment in order to protect the environment, is it more important to protect jobs or to protect the environment?"

though, present evidence for the proposition that the connection between environmental protection and prosperity is not recognized by a majority of Americans, in part because the parties fail to make this junction clear to the public.¹¹⁸ In a more recent article, Gillroy and Shapiro report that in 1985 51% of Americans believed that "we can have growth and a clean world."¹¹⁹ It was Converse who pointed out in a broader context that the belief systems of the majority of the American public lack consistency.¹²⁰ This gives rise to some doubt concerning the assertion that the call for more environmental activity is held by individuals who also assign priority to environmental protection over economic growth. The empirical section of this chapter will attempt to investigate this question.

The remaining two items do not fit into any group. The first reads "How is the quality of the environment where you live?" The second one asks to agree or disagree with the statement "We need nuclear power". All the variables are coded on a seven point scale such that '7' always denotes the environmentalist's position.

Based on the evidence found in the literature, the hypothesis is that these items fail to measure a single concept which could be labeled environmental concern. Being more specific about how the items relate to each other seems difficult, however. In particular, it is hard to predict how far the theoretical concept applied in a question impacts upon the response. Also, the relationship between opposition to nuclear power and

¹¹⁸ Buttel and Flinn, 1976.

¹¹⁹ Gillroy and Shapiro, 1986, p.277.

¹²⁰ Converse, 1964, p.209-214.

environmental concern can not be formulated in a precise hypothesis. Hence, the following analysis is to a fair extent exploratory in nature.

The statistical tool for investigating the structure of environmental concern as measured with these questions is factor analysis (principal component analysis). Strictly speaking, it requires the variables to be measured on a ratio scale and to be normally distributed. The relationship between the variables and the factor is assumed to be linear. As so frequently in social research, none of these prerequisites is guaranteed to be met. Factor analysis, however, has proven to be sufficiently robust. I therefore have some confidence that the following analysis is not too tedious an endeavour.

In a first step, the null hypothesis that all items represent the same concept will be tested. This is done by limiting the number of factors to one and then examining the loadings of the individual variables. No differences are expected between the two countries.

Table 5.1: environmental concern as a single concept:
factor analysis 1

Variable	USA	Germany
urgency: noise	.49	.52
urgency: air pollution	.75	.74
urgency: water pollution	.76	.70
urgency: overpopulation	.60	.38
urgency: solid waste	.71	.58
urgency: toxic waste	.71	.67
urgency: nuclear waste	.73	.67
urgency: destruction town- and landscape	.73	.67
urgency: depletion of natural resources	.76	.68
threat: population growth	.47	.24
threat: nuclear accident	.56	.50
threat: nuclear waste	.58	.51
threat: pollution	.64	.57
government: actions	.51	.49
government: taxes	.53	.53
conflict: economic growth	.46	.23
conflict: jobs	.44	.43
quality local environment	.20	.34
nuclear power not needed	.37	.43
valid n	562	1044

Based on the correlation matrix, factor analysis extracts the single factor yielding the highest average communality, which equals the percentage of variance explained. From how well this succeeds with respect to both the individual variables and the overall variance, it is possible to assess if an one-dimensional understanding of environmental concern

squares with the empirical evidence. The judgement has to be based on standards developed in the literature. These seem to be such that a variable with a factor loading above .70 is considered well represented, and a variable that loads above .60 fairly represented by the factor. Loadings in the range from .40 to .59 are viewed as having some variance in common with the factor, while scores below .40 are considered insufficient.

Applying these standards, the case of the United States will be considered first. The factor extracted here is predominantly based on the items which measure how urgent a specific problem is considered to be. Seven of the nine items load higher than .70, despite the wide range of problems covered. Noise and overpopulation, the two items which load below the .70 margin, are not a permanent part of the discussion of environmental problems, and thus it is hardly surprising that they fit the factor less neatly. As a matter of fact, it is rather surprising that their loadings (.49 and .60 respectively) indicate that concern for them tends to vary with concern for the other issues. Thus, by considering only the urgency questions a one-dimensional view of environmental concern could be defended. The remaining items, though, fail to support that conclusion. With the single exception of threatening pollution, which scores .64, none loads above .60. The quality of the local environment does extremely poorly at .19. Though three items tapping the dangers of nuclear energy load .56, .58 and .73, the straightforward question for the need of nuclear power yields a mere .37. The conflict measures load .44 and .46, thus supporting the conclusion that the willingness to label

environmental problems urgent does not imply priority for environmental protection over economic issues. Apparently the various items designed to measure environmental concern do not form a single factor.

This picture is even more clearcut in the German case, although the overall pattern is very similar. In general the variables tend to yield lower loadings in the German case than in the American sample. Only two items load higher than .70. Again, the factor is dominated by the urgency items, which load mostly between .60 and .70, while the remaining scores range from .23 to .57. The most striking difference between the countries is represented by the two overpopulation variables. Their loadings of .38 and .23 suggest Germans do not connect this problem with the other environmental problems in the way Americans do. Clearly, these items bear the potential for a the formation of a new factor.

The conclusion that can be drawn from table 5.1 cannot be such that the urgency variables should be considered the best measurement device for environmental concern. They were the most numerous in the analysis, and therefore dominated the factor. Rather, one has to conclude that environmental concern is a more complicated concept than a one-dimensional approach could adequately describe. In order to get a grasp of the dimensions environmental concern is composed of, a second factor analysis was run, now limiting the number of factors by the only requirement that their eigenvalue (the sum of the squared factor loadings) be larger than 1.0 (Kaiser-criterium). Varimax, a method of orthogonal rotation, is applied to obtain the final factor locations. This time the analysis will start out with the German case.

Table 5.2: the dimensions of environmental concern in Germany: factor analysis 2

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
urgency: toxic waste	.81	.07	.09	-.10
urgency: water pollution	.79	.16	-.01	.08
urgency: air pollution	.78	.16	.09	.13
urgency: nuclear waste	.72	.03	.30*	-.10
urgency: town-, landscape	.66	.32*	.05	.03
urgency: nat. resources	.63	.34*	.05	.11
urgency: solid waste	.59	-.06	.17	.37
urgency: noise	.57	-.05	.13	.26
government: action	.14	.71	.16	.04
conflict: jobs	.05	.65	.19	.11
government: taxes	.17	.57	.32	.08
quality local environment	.05	.55	.13	.03
conflict: growth	.09	.46	-.12	.02
threat: nuclear waste	.18	.07	.81	.05
threat: nuclear accident	.11	.13	.80	.12
nuclear energy not needed	.04	.45*	.57	-.11
threat : overpopulation	.00	.11	.07	.75
urgency: overpopulation	.21	.09	.04	.74
threat : pollution	.23	.35	.45	.22

Factor analysis extracts four factors. Factor 1 is very similar to the factor shown in the preceding analysis. All of the urgency measures, except for overpopulation, load substantively on it, with noise (.57) marking the lower and toxic waste (.81) representing the upper boundary. This factor seems to represent the most widespread form of environmental concern. It consists of questions which ask for nothing but awareness of a problem. The relation to other problems is not included, nor is any

reference implied to the cost of tackling the problem. Since every single item loading on the factor represents a recognized environmental problem, one would expect that the reason for factor analysis to cluster them on one factor is that public awareness of all of those problems is high. This will be demonstrated in the following table, which gives the average distribution of those items on the seven point urgency scale on which the answers were coded.

Table 5.3: average distribution of eight urgency measures in Germany (%)							
urgency scale	problem not urgent			problem very urgent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
%	2	2	4	8	13	18	54
total %:	101						

Table 5.3 shows that on average more than half of the respondents place the problem at stake in the category 7, indicating the highest urgency. 86% chose one of the three categories closer to the urgent pole of the scale. In only two of the eight cases category 7 was picked by less than 50%. These variables are noise (26%) and solid waste (25%), the items that load weakest on the factor. Nevertheless, even in these cases the three most urgent categories are chosen in two thirds of the cases (67% and 66% respectively). Clearly, these items picture environmental concern as a valence issue which encompasses a broad range of subproblems.

The interpretation of the second factor is less straightforward. The four items which imply the consideration of concerns other than the

environment have their highest loadings on it, suggesting that this factor represents the concept of centrality of environmental concern. It demonstrates that preference of environmental matters over economic issues tends to vary in connection with approval of the actions taken by the government and the percentage of the tax money spent on environmental protection. It is these items, of course, which most clearly tap the demand for action on behalf of the environment. The table also gives some indications as to who is most likely to put forth these demands. This is because the perception of the quality of the local environment also shows its highest loading on this factor (.55). In addition, the question asking for the need of nuclear power loads at .45. A good part of the individuals who emphasize environmental protection in a political conflict apparently oppose nuclear power. This is particularly striking because the other items addressing issues related to the use of nuclear power, namely nuclear waste and the threat of a nuclear accident, are not related to the factor at stake here. The considerable relationship opposition to the use of nuclear power seems to have with centrality of environmental concern then must be due to bothersome effects of nuclear power other than the accumulation of waste and the possibility of an accident. These must be concerns related to the normal function of the plant, namely the large clouds that the cooling device produces as well as fears of radiation. It seems reasonable to conclude that these concerns are correlated with how an individual assesses the quality of the local environment. This latter argument also applies to the destruction of town- and landscape, which is correlated at .31 with the factor under consideration. Similarly, since

two of the examples given in the questionnaire for the depletion of nature depict problems with a local focus, namely forests and game, the correlation depletion of nature shows with the factor (.33) can hardly surprise. Then, a way to make sense of this factor is to interpret it as being based on two concepts. Exposure to certain environmental problems causes negative perception of the local environment, the first of the two concepts. Negative perception of the environment, in turn, leads the individual to stress the importance of environmental protection even at the cost of economic issues. If this interpretation is correct, issue centrality is caused by the vapor of nuclear plants, shrinking forests and ugly industrial sites rather than by smokestacks, polluted water, and nuclear waste. However, it has to be kept in mind that these conclusions are based on comparatively weak loadings. A good deal of variance remains unexplained.

The two remaining factors are based on specific issues which are part of the environmentalism debate. Thus, the third factor shows high loadings of three of the four items tapping nuclear power. A fact that is striking here is that the fourth item related to nuclear energy, the urgency assigned to the problem of nuclear waste, correlates at only .30 with the factor, despite the high loading the item tapping the threat the same problem shows (.82). Indeed, the bivariate correlation between the two variables is a mere .36. It appears as though the different question wording makes a considerable difference with respect to the distribution. However, this observation is too weakly based to support a claim on the effect of the different operationalizations.

A glance at the fourth factor broadens this base. This factor clearly represents awareness of the problems posed by a steadily growing population. Both items addressing this problems load highly (.74 and .75) on this factor. However, since only these two items form the factor, and since they address the same problem, one might have expected the factor to be virtually equal with the items, i.e. the loadings to be even higher. The fact that they do not load higher once again can be explained with the bivariate correlation: .31.

A third environmental problem that has been addressed with two different operationalizations is pollution. Two urgency questions address air and water pollution, while one threat item refers to pollution in general. Nevertheless, air pollution and water pollution apparently are perceived as a single problem dimension: the urgency measures tapping the two problems correlate at .71. It therefore appears legitimate to consider them concurring measures of pollution which can be compared to the threat measure. Again, the threat measure does not cluster together with the related urgency measure. As a matter of fact, threatening pollution fails to reveal clear connection to any of the factors. Moreover, it again is only moderately correlated to the urgency measures it is related to: the correlation with urgency: air pollution is .31, that with urgency: water pollution is .26. For the third time, then, the correlation between an urgency measure and a threat measure which address the same problem is about .30. The two operationalizations apparently have considerable impact on the result of the question.

Generally speaking, things are very similar in the American case.

Table 5.4 presents the results of this factor analysis. The quality of the local environment has been excluded from this table for reasons explained later.

Tab. 5.4: the dimensions of environmental concern in America: factor analysis 3

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
urgency: toxic waste	.84	-.02	.29	-.04
urgency: nuclear waste	.80	.03	.38*	-.04
urgency: water pollution	.77	.29	.07	.09
urgency: solid waste	.74	.04	.18	.22
urgency: air pollution	.66	.35*	.09	.21
urgency: town-, landscape	.65	.28	.06	.32*
urgency: nat. resources	.65	.33*	.12	.28
urgency: noise	.55	.18	-.21	.25
government: taxes	.20	.72	.12	.04
government: actions	.18	.70	.11	.05
conflict: growth	.11	.61	.27	.02
conflict: jobs	.08	.51	.22	.20
threat: nuclear accident	.16	.19	.77	.19
threat: nuclear waste	.18	.20	.75	.20
nuclear power not needed	.06	.34*	.58	-.12
threat : overpopulation	.11	.06	.21	.84
urgency: overpopulation	.41*	.12	.02	.73
threat : pollution	.27	.36	.42	.34

After what has been said about West Germany the interpretation of this table is pretty straightforward. The urgency measures besides overpopulation once again form the first factor. With a loading of .41, though, overpopulation is more closely related to this factor than it is

in Germany (.21). Generally, the distribution of these items is less skewed than in the German case. Although the wide majority of the sample calls any of the problems urgent, the minority who does not is larger in America than in Germany.

urgency scale	problem not urgent			problem very urgent			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
%	4	4	7	12	17	21	36
total %:	101						

From six of these eight questions an urgency index will be constructed. Noise will be excluded because of its low correlation with the factor, whereas nuclear waste will not be used because the substantive matter it taps should not be part of a scale designed to measure environmental concern, when three other items relating to nuclear power do not load on this factor. Since in both countries the category '7' is by a considerable margin the largest one, the urgency index will rest solely on it. The individual score on this index is computed by adding how often the respondent picks a '7' to assess the urgency of a problem. The assumption behind the construction of this index is that concern for the environment rises proportional to the number of environmental issues the individual is conscious about. This might well be a mistaken assumption, because of the distinct possibility that one single problem produces as

much environmental consciousness as a whole bunch of issues. Therefore, the urgency index will only cautiously be used.

The second factor is based on the centrality measures and the appraisal of government activity. Again, the loadings on this factor are comparatively low (.51 to .72). Some substantive measures, namely all three items tapping pollution, depletion of natural resources, destruction of town and landscape and the need for nuclear power show moderate correlations with this factor (.28 to .35). Fewer substantive items did so in Germany. The third and the fourth factors comprise items addressing a single environmental problem, nuclear power and overpopulation respectively. Again, the urgency question addressing nuclear waste loads only modestly on the nuclear power factor (.30). Just like in Germany, threat: pollution fails to join any single one of the factors.

Things get more confusing when the quality of the local environment is reentered. Principal component analysis then adds a fifth factor which barely meets the minimum eigenvalue of 1.0. It splits the centrality factor in two, leaving the remaining factors virtually unchanged. The following table contains only the two new factors. Variables not loading above .30 on at least one of the factors were omitted from the table.

Table 5.6: issue centrality measures, government and the local environment in America: factor analysis 4

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2
quality local environment	.86	-.17
government: actions	.65	.34
government: taxes	.47*	.51*
conflict: jobs	-.08	.75
conflict: growth	.09	.69

Issue centrality and government action no longer form a single dimension. Rather, more government action and, to a lesser extent, spending seems to be called for predominantly by those who view the state of their local environment as poor. However, these individuals do not seem to be willing to pay a price for that: their willingness to sacrifice percentages of economic growth or jobs for the environment's sake is just about average. Unlike their German counterparts, Americans who are dissatisfied with their immediate natural environment and for that matter demand government involvement do not take the step of accepting economical cutbacks.

Increased government activity is also claimed by those who value the environment prior to economic goals. Apparently, varimax deflates the degree of covariance between government appraisal and centrality in this table in order to decrease the correlation between the factors. The

preceding table already has shown how close these two concepts go together. Americans, then, show ideological consistency in so far as part of the variance of the demand for government action is related to centrality of environmental concern with respect to economic issues. However, they show less ideological constraint when this call for government action is based on the quality of the local environment. Because of these confusing results, the index to tap centrality will not include the government measures as originally had been planned. Instead, a three point scale based on the two centrality questions has been constructed. A individual is of an environmental type, when it favors environmental protection over both economic growth and job security, whereas an economic type rejects the environment twice. A mixed category comprises those who chose the environment one time and reject it another, and those who pick the middle category twice. When an individual is undecided on only one of the two questions, the other question counts for the categorization. The correlation the two government questions show on the second factors in both tables 5.2 and 5.4 justifies combining them into an index also. Respondents who wish more taxes to be spent on environmental protection and consider past government activity inappropriate fall into the category 'dissatisfied' on this government index. 'Satisfied' denotes the opposite pole on this scale. Similar to the Centrality index, those who chose the middle category twice or give opposing answers on the two questions are coded 'undecided'. Table 5.7 summarizes the distributions of the urgency, the centrality and the government index.

Table 5.7: the distributions of the environmental concern scales (%)								
urgency scale								
# very urgent:	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	total
USA	33	14	12	11	10	8	13	101
Germany	12	9	12	15	16	20	16	100
centrality index								
Goal preference:	economy	mixed		environment			total	
USA	23	28		49			100	
Germany	28	33		40			101	
government index								
	satisfied	undecided	dissatisfied		total			
USA	22	22	57		101			
Germany	10	20	70		100			

5.3. Conclusion

As was expected, it is hard to obtain a conclusive picture of environmental concern. Some patterns emerge, however. First, in both countries, overpopulation and nuclear power form dimensions distinct from

the other subject matters. Also, issue centrality stands apart from issue intensity. Since this dimension implies a check of the seriousness environmental concern is held with, it definitely will be the special focus of the later sections. Issue intensity as measured in the urgency questions is hard to distinguish conceptually from intensity as measured in the threat questions. Both produce heavily skewed distributions, which nonetheless do not correlate as unclouded as one might have expected. However, the small number of threat questions inhibits their use for the construction of an index similar to the urgency scale. Threat: pollution will not be used in the analyses to be performed later, despite the uncertainty about what exactly it is that is excluded by doing so.

Overall, environmental concern measures cluster closer together in America than they do in Germany. In both the one-dimensional and in the four factor version, some six percent of variance more can be explained in America. Americans, though, show a slightly lesser degree of issue consistency than Germans do. In particular, the quality of the local environment, which apparently produces high centrality and demand for government action in Germany, does less clearly so in the American case.

6. ENVIRONMENTALISM AND VISIONS OF A NEW SOCIETY

The rise of a new issue is frequently presented as part of a broader pattern of political change. In particular, environmentalism has been implanted in models which describe the ascent of a type of citizen who rejects some of the foundations of the 20th century society. The most prominent among those theories are Inglehart's conceptualization of value change in terms of the materialism/postmaterialism dimension, and notions of a new environmental paradigm which is thought to oppose the dominant social paradigm.

6.1. The New Environmental Paradigm

Dunlap and Van Liere were the first to propose a detailed description of a set of beliefs that characterizes environmentalists. This set of beliefs encompasses attitudes toward nature as well as ideas about society. Specifically it rests on four pillars: the idea of limits to growth, promotion of a steady state economy, the belief in a certain balance of nature which needs to be sustained, and the idea that mankind is part of this natural balance, not its master (rejection of anthropocentrism).¹²¹ Dunlap and Van Liere chose the notion of competing paradigms to describe the conflict of different set of beliefs. According to this notion, a society is based on a paradigm, which contains its basic creed. Similar to Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigms, a 'Dominant

¹²¹ Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978.

Social Paradigm' (DSP) may be challenged, and perhaps eventually replaced by a new paradigm, which demands the formation of a different society. This challenge of the DSP is exactly what the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) constitutes in this view. The adherents of the NEP hope to replace it for the DSP and its emphasis on the fundamental difference between people and other creatures, its trust in man's capabilities, and its thrive for progress and growth.¹²²

Unlike postmaterialism theory, the NEP is not associated with a single author. Instead, its description has been done by several scholars. This fact renders the NEP theory less coherent with respect to what exactly its causes are, which beliefs are part of it, and how its relationship to the postmaterialism model can be described.

As to the cause of the emergence of the NEP, three ideas can be distinguished. The original one considers the environmental problem itself the ultimate cause. Increasing insight in the disturbing effects which human development has on nature fosters demands to protect nature. When the mechanisms developed under the DSP prove unfit to effectively meet these demands, the insistent call for environmental protection implies the call for new mechanisms, for a new paradigm. Environmentalists then fight for a new philosophy of economics, for increased modes of participation, for a new ethic toward nature.¹²³

The second account of the cause of the NEP's rise is more skeptical about human ability to switch paradigms simply because it appears to be

¹²² Milbrath, 1984, p.8.

¹²³ This view is best presented in Milbrath, 1984, p.7-14.

a necessity. Dunlap, Grieneeks and Rokeach assert that a certain value orientation is prerequisite to support for the NEP. The value types they describe are essentially that of the materialist/postmaterialist dimension, with postmaterialists being far more likely to develop adherence to the NEP.¹²⁴ The rise of the NEP, then, is in part accidental. Postmaterialists, who are by definition inclined to challenge the DSP, hooked into environmentalism because it was the problem at hand. They would as readily have supported any other cause which implied a challenge of the DSP. As to the third theory of the rise of the NEP, it is Cotgroves' "middle-class radicalism" theory, which has already been described in an earlier part of this paper.¹²⁵

The actual content of the paradigms also has been described in different ways. Three approaches have been taken. Dunlap and Van Liere use twelve items which should indicate adherence to the new paradigm. Factor analysis indeed reveals that they can be considered at least closely related, if not even a single concept. However, there is one problem in this analysis: The majority of Americans give answers which support the NEP. It makes little sense, however, to assume that the DSP is held by only a minority of the population.¹²⁶ The problem probably is rooted in a divergence of self-image and actual personality. The NEP items certainly sound 'nice' and therefore are likely to be approved even if they do not actually guide the individual's thinking. In a later study Dunlap and Van

¹²⁴ Dunlap, Grieneeks and Rokeach, 1983.

¹²⁵ see pp.1.

¹²⁶ Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978.

Liere therefore take a different approach: they define the NEP negatively by measuring support for the DSP. Low support for the DSP in this approach indicates adherence to the NEP. Specifically, Dunlap and Van Liere use questions which constitute eight dimensions of support for the DSP: support for laissez faire government, support for the status quo, support for private property rights, faith in science and technology, support for individual rights, support for economic growth, faith in material abundance, and faith in future prosperity.¹²⁷ Support for the NEP is seen in terms of the extent to which it challenges the DSP rather than in terms of its actual goals. The fact that those eight factors explain 32% of the variance of a measure tapping the demand for pollution control and 39% of a question addressing the demand for environmental regulation creates some confidence in this method.¹²⁸

A third way of describing the paradigms is that of synoptical contrast as employed by Milbrath.¹²⁹ To any stance that is considered to be associated with the NEP, the opposite opinion is made part of the DSP, and vice versa. In its thrive for opposites, however, this leads to some assertions which are only a little short of rendering the DSP ridiculous. For example, the "generalized compassion toward other peoples" and "other generations," which according to Milbrath is part of the NEP translates into "unconcern for other people" and "concern for this generation only" as characteristics of the DSP. This is hardly an appropriate account of

¹²⁷ Dunlap and Van Liere, 1984.

¹²⁸ Dunlap and Van Liere, 1984.

¹²⁹ Milbrath, 1984, p.22.

the ethics guiding western societies. Likewise, it might be too strong an assumption that the DSP contains the belief that humans are "not seriously damaging nature." Rather, the DSP fosters the belief that those problems can be dealt with without major societal change. Apparently, finding items which allow a clearcut classification into the two paradigms is not an easy task. This is the reason why an index similar to the materialist/postmaterialist index designed by Inglehart has not been constructed yet. The best achievable approximation seems to be the method of measuring support for the DSP dimension as presented by Dunlap and Van Liere.

Be that as it may, this study depends on data which rely on Milbrath's definitions of the paradigms, which have been obtained by contrasting them. Unfortunately, the shortcomings in the definition of the paradigms can also be found in their operationalization. The stylistic pattern of contrasting individual elements of the paradigms has been applied in the majority of the questions. In general, respondents were presented a seven point scale with opposing opinions marking both ends. The position of the NEP, however, frequently reveals a good deal of sympathy for it on the part of the authors of the questionnaire. Too often, opposition to the DSP has been phrased such that some respondents had to perceive it as the 'right answer.' Consider the following examples:

The following are contrasting statements about emphases or directions our society should be taking. Please mark the box with the number indicating the extent of your preference for one or the other emphasis.

- | | | |
|---|---------------|--|
| A society which emphasizes work which is humanly satisfying. | 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 | A society where work is controlled mainly by economic needs. |
| A society with many chances for citizens to take part in political decisions. | 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 | A society with few chances for citizens to take part in political decisions. |
| A society that saves its resources to benefit future generations. | 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 | A society that uses its resources to benefit the present generation. |

These items prove to be inappropriate for tapping the dimensions they are designed for. In the American sample they yield distributions with means of 1.5, 2.3 and 1.4 - all toward the NEP pole of the scale. Overall, of the twenty questions considered here, nine produce distributions which average on the NEP side of the spectrum, and in four cases, the mean is located in proximity to the middle category. This is hardly the picture of visions of a new society promoted by a vanguard against the opposition of longstanding elites and dominant values. Milbrath's comparison of the members of environmental organizations to the general public shows that environmentalists lean consistently even more toward the pole which is meant to denote adherence to the NEP than the general public does.¹³⁰ However, this reflects the fact that neither Joseph McCarthy nor Jesse Helms are members of environmental groups rather than the breeding of a new paradigm in those organizations. As for this analysis, it will draw

¹³⁰ Milbrath, 1984.

from the seven distributions that lean toward the DSP.

The questionnaire apparently was designed to cover seven sub-dimensions of the NEP. Those are: reservation toward growth, deemphasis of individual responsibility, desire for more political participation, mistrust in technology, deemphasis of law and order, satisfying work instead of mere profit orientation, and acceptance of nature as a value in itself. Of those seven dimensions, only four contain at least one item that yields an acceptable distribution. As a result, the operationalization of the NEP rests on attitudes toward law and order, modern technology, achievement orientation, and economic growth.¹³¹ In a first step, factor analysis will be employed to investigate if it is accurate to apply the term paradigm to the four variables. The elements of a paradigm should exhibit a reasonable amount of intercorrelation, and thus load substantively on a single factor. Even so, the standards to be used here for evaluating the loadings have to be different from those applied when the concept of environmental concern was subject of the analysis. Higher interrelationships should be expected from hypothesized indicators of a single concept than from elements of a paradigm, which by definition consists of a number of concepts.

¹³¹ Preference of "a society that emphasizes economic growth" over "a society that limits economic growth";

of "a society which attaches relatively less importance to law and order" over "a society which attaches relatively more importance to law and order";

of "a society that emphasizes economic rewards for initiative and achievement" over "a society that ensures a minimum standard of living for everyone".

Agreement or disagreement with the statement: "Science and technology are our best hope for the future."

Table 6.1: the elements of the NEP: factor analysis.

Variable	USA	Germany
law and order	.50	.43
science and technology	.62	.68
achievement orientation	.55	.63
economic growth	.71	.67
% variance	36	37

For both countries this table clearly supports the notion of a paradigm encompassing the four variables. In the United States, none of the items loads below the .50 margin, and the .43 the law and order question yields in Germany can be considered sufficient for acceptance into the paradigm. Hence, opposition to various aspects of the DSP clusters together.

In a next step the relationship between adherence to this paradigm and environmental concern will be subject of scrutiny, the hypothesis being that it is weaker in the United States than in Germany. The standard methodology would consist of constructing an index from the four items and correlate it to the measures of environmental concern developed earlier. However, the correlations between the individual items and environmental concern already convey some support for the hypothesis: contrary to the idea of an environmental paradigm, deemphasis of law and order is negatively correlated (-.12) to the centrality index in America, while it yields a positive correlation in Germany (.29). Since the centrality index captures preference of environmental protection over economic issues, it

is certainly this measure of environmental concern which has the closest theoretical relationship to the idea of a paradigm questioning the creed of the contemporary society. When it is negatively correlated to one of the items describing this value cluster, this gives rise to some skepticism concerning the significance of the paradigm in American society.

As to the construction of a NEP scale, any scale that included the law and order item is bound to show lower correlations with the environmental concern indexes in America as compared to Germany, regardless of the relationship the other elements of the NEP have with environmental concern. Therefore, in order for the remaining part of the analysis not to depend on the characteristics of a single item, the law and order variable will not be made part of the NEP index which is to be used further on. Instead, the three remaining items have been collapsed into an index running from -3 (straight support for the DSP) to 3 (straight support for the DSP). The distribution of this index is shown in table 6.2.

Table 6.2: the DSP/NEP dimension (%)								
	DSP			NEP				
	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	total
USA	50	8	27	3	9	2	2	101
Germany	33	4	35	5	15	4	4	100

This index is expected to be less associated with the environmental concern scales in the United States than it is in West Germany. Special

attention is given to the centrality index because of its close theoretical relationship to the NEP/DSP- dimension.

	USA	Germany
Urgency	.18	.16
Government	.11	.24
Centrality	.19	.30

Indeed, the data provide support for the hypothesis. Of the three indexes designed to measure environmental consciousness, two correlate higher with the NEP scale in Germany than they do in the United States. The third index, the urgency scale, yields about the same r in the two countries. Environmental concern, then, is stronger related to adherence to the NEP in Germany than it is in America. It has to be noted, though, that the maximum correlation of .30 is rather weak. Even with the law and order item included in the index it rises only to .39 in Germany. Also, the multiple correlation obtained with a regression of environmental concern on the individual NEP items rather than on the scale is barely larger, thus confirming the validity of the index. Hence, support for the NEP is not a strong predictor of environmental concern.

Be that as it may, a different approach to the data might result in stronger support for the idea of an environmental paradigm. Strictly speaking, hypothesizing about a "vanguard" of environmentalists which

fighters for a new society does not imply any claim about correlations in the general public. Instead, it is a claim concerning the mere existence of a group within the general public which intensely advocates both environmental protection and societal change. The overall distribution of the two indexes might confuse the intensity of the relationship within this core group.

The existence of this group can hardly be doubted for either one of the countries, whatever the data say. However, the hypothesis of this paper implies that it is of significantly larger size in Germany than it is in America. Moreover, the electoral success of the German Greens should be considerably higher in this group than it is in the rest of the population.

In order to describe this core group, a number of somewhat arbitrary decisions has to be made. First, due to the ambiguity concerning its meaning, the urgency scale is excluded from this crucial part of the analysis. Second, since environmental concern as used in this part of the paper should signify unambiguous favoring of state involvement in environmental protection, only those individuals will be considered who hold the environmentalist's position on both the centrality and the government index (environmentalists). Third, as to the NEP scale, the three categories which are closer to the pole indicating support for the new paradigm are used, even though only the rightmost position denotes backing of all three NEP-items.

In a first step, it will be investigated how close the relationship between sympathy for the NEP and vote for the German Greens is. Table 6.4

contains the evidence. It constitutes a crosstabulation of NEP and Green vote among those who give the environment the priority over the economy and demand more government activity. The percentages are given on the basis of the individual cell (left column) and on the basis of the Green electorate (right column). Thus, it is possible to judge the significance of the NEP for explaining the Green vote from two perspectives: first, the support the Greens get in the group under consideration can be compared to the 11% they obtain in the entire sample; second, by considering the structure of the Green electorate, it can be examined to what extent the Greens rely on supporters of the NEP.

Table 6.4: the Green vote by NEP and environmentalism in Germany		
degree of support for NEP	% Green vote among environmentalists in respective category	% of Green voters who are environmentalists and belong to respective category (n=120)
1 moderate (n=65)	26	14
2 (n=25)	44	9
3 high (n=33)	47	13
1-3 (n=123)	35	36

This table reveals that there is indeed a strong connection between environmentalism, NEP and the Green vote. 47% of those who support all

three NEP items, demand more government action on environmental protection and favor the environment over economic issues report the plan to vote Green in the next election. This group alone accounts for 13% of the Green vote. Among those environmentalists who score between one and three on the NEP scale, 35% have a Green vote intention - more than three times the percentage of the sample as a whole. 36% of the Green voters fall into this group. Given the problems with finding clear relationships in survey data, this table delivers strong support for the assertion that NEP-environmentalism describes a core group of support for the Greens.

According to the hypothesis of this paper, this core group should be of considerably smaller size in the United States than it is in Germany. Table 6.5 compiles the evidence about the group sizes as percentages of the entire sample. A probability of the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the countries is included.¹³²

¹³² The formula for this z-test is given in Sahner, 1982, p.94-103. There is some disagreement as to the conditions of applying the normal distribution to percentages. While according to Sahner (*ibid.*, p.91) no percentage should be below 10, Blalock (1979, p.197-198) applies a different criterium: Np should not be below 5. The latter criterium is met in each case except for the 0.8% in category 3 in America ($Np=4.1$). Be that as it may, the significance levels are such that they produce some confidence in the conclusions, however the exact requirements of the test may be.

Table 6.5: environmentalism and NEP: group sizes in the United States and Germany (% of sample)			
NEP	environmentalists falling into respective category		p
	USA (n=510)	Germany (n=926)	
1	3.7	7.0	.005
2	1.0	2.7	.014
3	.8	3.7	.0001
1-3	5.5	13.4	<.0001

Clearly, this table delivers strong support for the hypothesis of this paper. The group which has been found to be the heart of the electoral success of the Greens in that it conveys a third of the party's electorate is about 2.5 times larger in German sample than it is in the American sample. In particular, those environmentalists who support all three NEP items constitute a more than four times larger group in Germany. This is important because nearly every second member of this group supports the Greens in Germany. Each of the groups included in this table is of smaller size in the United States, and each of these differences is statistically highly significant. Then, the statement that a potential Green electorate in America is considerably smaller than the actual electorate of the Germans Greens can be maintained. However, it is limited to an understanding of this electorate as supporters of the New Environmental

Paradigm.

6.2 Environmentalism and Protest Movements

An alternative, even though closely related interpretation of the Green Party, sees its rise in connection with an upsurge of a number of protest movements addressing different New Politics concerns. Clearly, sympathy for movements such as the peace movement, the women's movement and the anti-nuclear movement can easily be detected among Green activists, and thus it is only reasonable to expect the party's electorate to share these sentiments. Indeed, Pappi has shown that supporters of these movements frequently are also supporters of the Green party.¹³³ This view emphasizes the most salient issues which accompanied the rise of the Greens, while the viewpoint of the NEP is directed toward a broader understanding of the demanded change.

The environmentalism study contained two questions which are useful in this context: one addressing approval for the peace movement, the other one asking for the necessity of nuclear power.¹³⁴ Unfortunately, sympathy for the women's movement had not been included in the questionnaire. The next step of the empirical analysis therefore will rest on the two items mentioned above and the centrality index. Two slightly different approaches have been taken, which vary in the definition of sympathy for

¹³³ Pappi, 1988.

¹³⁴ "Generally speaking, how strongly do you favor or oppose the peace movement (those who openly oppose weapons buildup)"
The nuclear power item has already been used in chapter 4.

the respective movement. Sympathy toward the movement is assumed when the respondent picked one of the three categories which lean toward approval of the peace movement or rejection of nuclear power, while choosing the extreme category will be considered an indicator of strong sympathy. Again, the hypothesis which is to be tested is that the core group described by the three variables is larger in Germany than it is in the United States. Also, a high percentage of support for the German Greens is expected in this group.

Indeed, the Greens do very well among supporters of the protest movements. 42% of those who support the cause of both the anti-nuclear and the peace movement and favor the environment to economic considerations report Green party preference. This percentage rises to 53% among strong supporters of the movements. In turn, the Green electorate consists to 46% of individuals with high centrality of environmental concern and sympathy for the named movements. 25% of the Greens feel strong sympathy for the movements (data not shown). Apparently, the Green party has rightfully been interpreted as an offspring of the protest movements of the late seventies and early eighties. Table 6.6 contains the information about the group sizes in Germany and the United States.

Table 6.6: support for protest movements in the United States and Germany (% of sample)			
	USA (n=642)	Germany (n=1092)	p
supporters of movements with centrality of environmentalism	8.3	12.6	.004
<u>strong</u> supporters of movements with centrality of environmentalism	3.9	5.3	.17

Once again, the potential for a Green electorate in the United States is of smaller size than the actual Green electorate in Germany. The difference is tiny and below the standard limit of significance in the case of strong supporters ($p=.17$ two-sided), which constitute 25% of the Green electorate. However the gap is distinct and its statistical significance beyond doubt when supporters of every level of intensity are considered. This finding is supported by the bivariate correlations between the variables, all of which are higher in Germany. As a result, the hypothesis of this paper has been supported using two different accounts of the Green vote.

6.3 Some Further Explorations into the Green Vote

Though it is somewhat off the basic line of argumentation, the data will be used for further investigation into the nature of the Green vote in West Germany. It will be tested how well variables which describe the socio-economical situation of the respondent do as predictors of the Green vote. The results of this analysis will be compared to equations which are based on the NEP. One appropriate statistical method to be applied for predicting a dichotomous variable from a set of variables which have been measured on a ratio scale is discriminant analysis. Not unlike factor analysis, discriminant analysis combines the independent variables to a number of dimensions, which are defined by the correlations of the independent variables with a certain function. In contrast to factor analysis, the criterium which determines the situation of those functions, however, is not the percentage of the variance of the independent variables they explain, but how well they uniquely discriminate the observations into the categories of the dependent variables. The functions then can be used to predict values of the dependent variable. Discriminant analysis requires that the covariance matrices are equal for each group and a multivariate normal distribution in the population (homoscedasticity of every pair of variables). Certainly, these requirements are not very likely to be met. This will affect the goodness of the prediction and the significance tests. Nevertheless, discriminant analysis seems to be the best tool at hand, since non-parametric methods can not be used.

In a first step, five characteristics regarding the social situation

of the individual will be used as independent variables. The most important ones are age, years of formal education, subjective social class identification and sector of employment. Social class has been dichotomized into "lower and lower middle class" and "upper middle and upper class." Sector of employment is coded into the two categories "new third sector" and "others." Consistently, Greens have been described as relatively well educated, young individuals from a non-working class background. They have predominantly been found in the new third sector, which is constituted by industries like health, education, arts and entertainment and the public sector. The last independent variable is family income. However, hypotheses are contradictory concerning this variable. While the fact that Green voters are comparatively well off has frequently been pointed out, Alber's and Buerklin's theory of deprivation of the Green voters implies that they should be located in the lower income strata. All variables have been forced into the functions, though optimizing procedures are available. The dependent variable has been dichotomized into Green vote and vote for other parties. Since the number of discriminant functions can not exceed the number of groups minus one, only one function will be extracted.

The prediction obtained by this analysis is very poor, therefore the function will not be presented here. 99.6% of those who reported vote intentions other than Green could be correctly predicted. However, the function predicts 99.1% of the Green voters inaccurately. As a matter fact, only 4 individuals were predicted Green voters; one of them actually was so. After these disappointing results, the analysis now turns to the

NEP as a predictor. The independent variables are the NEP scale and the three environmental concern indices. Also, approval of the peace movement and support for nuclear energy are included. Moreover, two variables which have not been made part of the comparative sections, but which may be of importance as predictor of the Green vote will be used. These are assessment of the quality of the local environment and support for demonstrations as a mode of political participation. The inclination to direct action has frequently been mentioned both in connection with the NEP and the Green vote. The procedure is identical to the one applied in the preceding analysis.

Table 6.7: the NEP as a predictor of the Green vote

	correlations with the discriminant function		
nuclear power needed	.84		
approval of demonstrations	.80		
approval of peace movement	.60		
NEP scale	.50		
centrality	.40		
government	.35		
urgency	.32		
significance of Wilk's lambda	<.0001		
canonical correlation	.52		

	classification summary		
actual vote	predicted vote		n
	Green	other	
Green	51%	49%	100
other	5%	95%	682
Tau (PRE) .52			

The classification results by predicting the Green vote from the function are indeed promising. The number of errors made using the discriminant function is 52% smaller than it is when the vote is predicted proportionally without prior knowledge of the individual's score on the function. 51% of the Green voters are predicted in the correct group, 60% of those who were predicted to have a Green vote intention actually had so (not shown in table). This is quite an accomplishment considering that due to the unequal group sizes the probability of a Green prediction being wrong is unusually high. The discriminant function derived here indeed

offers some help in predicting the Green vote.

As to the function itself, it allows to a certain degree the comparison of the importance of the individual variables. However, this comparison cannot be done in the same detail as it is possible with multiple regression, because the function constitutes an attempt to optimize prediction by reducing the independent variables to a small number of factors. In order to obtain this function, discriminant might well omit a certain amount of discriminating power which is associated with a specific variable. With these precautions in mind, it can be stated that the function is predominantly based on the variables which directly accompanied the rise of the Greens. It correlates highest with opposition to nuclear power and the approval of demonstrations (.84 and .80). Approval of the peace movement and the NEP follow at a lower level (.60 and .50). The four environmental concern items yield the lowest scores (.32 to .43). One might conclude that this runs counter to the approach of this paper, which considers the Green party an environmentalist party. On the contrary, I think the opposite is true. It has repeatedly been argued that environmental politics in Germany lead to a dissatisfaction on the part of environmentalists, which in turn shifted a certain percentage of the environmentalists in proximity to protest groups. The Green party derived its support from this melting pot of New Politics issues. Since undoubtedly a large proportion of those who are highly conscious about the environment are repulsed by certain features of the image of the Green party, no measurement device of a broad understanding of environmental concern can be a sufficient predictor of the Green vote.

Indeed, I am rather surprised, that a substantive problem related to the environment, nuclear energy, correlates highest with the factor, not a variable expressing opposition to the political system. An inspection of the values of Wilk's lambda of the individual variables, which estimate the bivariate discriminating power, supports the results of this brief discussion of the discriminant function. The canonical correlation of .52 and the significance of Wilk's lambda of the function indicate that the function indeed explains some variation of the dependent variable.

6.4. Postmaterialism and New Politics

The postmaterialism theory is based on the writings of Inglehart. Inglehart sees the western societies divided in individuals of materialist and those of postmaterialist value type. Materialists tend to stress the importance of economic and military security in a political dispute, while postmaterialists are more concerned about goals like participation, freedom of speech and aesthetic needs. According to Inglehart, the number of postmaterialists is growing in the long run, posing a threat to materialist politics. Inglehart offers two different theories as to what caused this development, the first focussing on individual psychology, the other one arguing on an aggregate level.

The individual level explanation is based on socialization experiences in connection with Maslov's hierarchy of needs. According to this model, an individual whose physiological (=material) needs of safety and sustenance are not met or are endangered is unlikely to develop concern

for social and self-actualization (=postmaterial) needs, which include desires for belonging and esteem as well as aesthetic and intellectual ideas. The extent to which an individual experiences scarcity in connection with material needs during his formative years determines the emphasis he puts on these needs throughout his life. Thus, an individual who did not suffer from lack of food, shelter or safety while growing up is likely to develop postmaterialist values. In turn, who was raised under less affluent conditions will stress material concerns further on even if things have improved. Because younger generations were not exposed to war or post war suffering in the way their parents were, younger generations are to a higher extent of the postmaterialist value type. Briefly summarized, the incident of value change is caused by changing scarcity patterns, the dependence of value change on socialization causes the time lag between changing economic conditions and the actual rise of the new values.¹³⁵

In his more recent writings Inglehart presents an alternative explanation of the rise of postmaterialism, which is based on aggregate level observations. In modern society, so he states, even the least wealthy strata have become so affluent, that the marginal value of income redistribution is diminishing. Therefore, political demands, particularly from the left of the political spectrum, increasingly assume non-material character. This is how Inglehart explains the rise of new social movements and political parties from within former strongholds of left-wing

¹³⁵ Inglehart, 1977., p.19-71; forthcoming, chap.2: p.2-5.

parties.¹³⁶

Inglehart developed two devices for measuring the postmaterialism dimension. The first one is based on a ranking of four goals. Respondents are asked to choose the two most important goals from maintaining order in the nation, giving the people more say in important political decisions, fighting rising prices, and protecting freedom of speech. People emphasizing order in the nation and rising prices are considered materialists, those mentioning say in political decisions and freedom of speech as the most desirable goals are regarded postmaterialists, any other combination falls into the "mixed" category.¹³⁷ This is how postmaterialism has most frequently been measured. The alternative operationalization works similarly, but it is based on twelve items. Though both indices are highly correlated (.6 to .7), the twelve item index has shown to measure the dimension more accurately.¹³⁸

Postmaterialism has frequently been used to explain both environmental concern and the Green vote. As to the relationship between postmaterialism and environmental concern, Inglehart includes environmental issues among the aesthetic needs.¹³⁹ Therefore, postmaterialists should be more concerned about pollution than materialists are. A similar position has been developed by Dalton. For him, postmaterialists provide the basis of the call for New Politics. Along with social-needs economy, grassroots

¹³⁶ Inglehart, 1987; forthcoming, chap.8.

¹³⁷ Inglehart, 1977, p.27-29.

¹³⁸ Inglehart, 1977, p.39-53; forthcoming, chap.4: p.2-6.

¹³⁹ Inglehart, 1977, p.41-43.

democracy, nuclear disarmament, personal freedom, and equality of sexes, environmental quality is a New Politics goal.¹⁴⁰ In an earlier study, he showed that postmaterialism is the strongest predictor of environmental concern - although still a modest one.¹⁴¹

The item intended to tap these aesthetic needs, however, fails to correlate with postmaterialism in Inglehart's analysis on 1973 data. In Europe, this item was represented by the goal: "trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful," while "protect nature from being spoiled and polluted" was used in the American Survey. Inglehart treats those two questions as equivalent. In the pooled sample consisting of nine European countries and the United States this item correlates only marginally with the materialist/postmaterialist dimension extracted by using factor analysis (.075). The situation is similar in the German sample. This item thus is cross-cutting the materialist/postmaterialist dimension. Inglehart goes to some length explaining why this item behaves not as expected. The finding that the American question correlates fairly (.28) with the materialist/postmaterialist factor, though, is not elaborated upon.¹⁴² This considerable variation between the two countries can be explained by one of the following:

i) The two different items are equivalent indicators of environmental concern. In 1973, environmental concern was moderately associated with

¹⁴⁰ Dalton, 1989, p.116-119.

¹⁴¹ Dalton, 1984a, p.9-11.

¹⁴² Inglehart, 1977, p.40-48; identically in forthcoming, chap.4: p.2-6.

postmaterialist value orientation in the United States, while it was not so in Germany.

ii) The American item taps environmental concern, whereas the European item does not. There was no difference concerning the relationship between environmental concern and postmaterialism between the two countries in 1973.

As to postmaterialism as a determinant of the Green vote, a conditioning variable has been introduced by Inglehart. Only postmaterialists who are "cognitively mobilized" translate their value priorities into support for the new party. Cognitive mobilization is measured as the degree to which the individual discusses politics with friends and tries to convince them to share his opinions.¹⁴³ Dalton offers a slightly different view of the Green vote. For him, the Greens are only in part sign of the New Politics orientation of this part of the electorate. To the other part, they draw from a mere protest vote against poor economical achievement of the established parties.¹⁴⁴

Whenever the materialism/postmaterialism dimension is made part of a causal statement, one important systematic detail has to be kept in mind. Postmaterialism can only assume the place of a necessary condition, not that of a sufficient condition. Postmaterialism by itself explains neither the Green vote, nor environmentalism, nor participation in a social movement. When this kind of conclusion is at stake, the argument should be reversed: instead of stating that postmaterialism triggers

¹⁴³ Inglehart, forthcoming, chap.11, also chap.10.

¹⁴⁴ Dalton, 1984b, p.108-112, p.131-133.

environmental concern, the hypothesis should read that materialism tends to prevent an individual to turn environmentalist. In no country, the assertion that postmaterialists necessarily assume a certain New Politics position could be maintained. Hence, international comparisons of the percentages of postmaterialists do not constitute the quest for potential Green electorates. A conflict needs to arise, one position on which particularly appeals to postmaterialists. This is because the concept of postmaterialism addresses a layer in the human mind which is situated underneath the one which hosts the NEP. While the NEP describes a specific set of beliefs, postmaterialism constitutes the mere inclination to develop beliefs of a certain kind. The NEP was used to picture the potential for a Green party in the United States. Conversely, the concept of postmaterialism could serve for an estimation of the potential for a potential of a Green party. For this reason, it would have been of major interest to examine the relationship between postmaterialism and the NEP. The data used so far, however, include neither version of the postmaterialism index. Imitation of the index using similar questions certainly was considered, but no satisfactory solution could be found. Therefore, the analysis has to shift to different surveys, a fact which is especially lamentable because no other data could be found that include direct translations of the same questions in both countries. Moreover, the question of the relationship between the NEP/DSP dimension and postmaterialism is excluded from examination.

The surveys to be employed in this section are the Euro-Barometer 18 for Germany, and the crosssection of the Political Action Study 2 for the

American part of the analysis. The latter data were collected in 1980 in the United States, the Netherlands and West Germany. Unfortunately, the German sample was not asked the various questions tapping environmental concern which had been included in the other questionnaires. This is why Eurobarometer 1982 has to be used for the German part of the analysis. As a result, the following analysis has to cope with questionnaires which are not identical in the two countries. The power and validity of this part of the paper is severely affected by this fact. This is in part due to the way environmental concern can be measured with the data. It has been the procedure of the preceding sections to employ rather restrictive indicators for environmental concern in order to distinguish convinced environmentalists from the 'opinion poll environmentalist.' Now, the measurement of environmentalism has to be based on a single question which addresses preference of environmental protection or economic growth. In both countries, this question yields an overwhelming majority of environmentalists (Germany: 75%, USA: 76%). Needless to say, this does not allow to differentiate the hard-core of environmentalists. Therefore, only a very tentative test of the hypothesis is possible. The hypothesis is that because environmental protection has not convincingly been approached by political institutions in Germany, postmaterialists have adopted environmental concern to a high degree. In terms of the poor measurement of environmental concern employed here, this means that virtually every German postmaterialist is expected to emphasize environmental protection over economic growth. In turn, American postmaterialists are expected to deviate to a smaller degree from the general public with respect to

environmentalism than German postmaterialists do, because environmental protection was not predominantly dealt with as an issue reserved to adherents of New Politics in America. Table 6.8 summarizes the skinny evidence. It contains the univariate distributions of both the environmental concern question and postmaterialism. The postmaterialism index used here is the original three-point scale, which does not include any question tapping environmental concern or aesthetic needs. Furthermore, the table shows the strength of environmentalism among postmaterialists, and how large the proportion of postmaterialists who prefer the environment over the economy is in the two countries. Finally, the percentage of the Green vote of this latter group is provided.

Table 6.8 environmentalism, postmaterialism, and the Green vote		
	USA (n=1073)	Germany (n=762)
% postmaterialists	15.3	15.8
% environmentalists	76	75
% environmentalists of postmaterialists	80	90
Pearson's r environmentalism/postmaterialism	n.s.	.16
% environmentalist post-materialists of population	12	14
% Green vote of environmentalist postmaterialists (n=112)	-	37
Sources: Political Action 2; Eurobarometer 18		

The United States and West Germany differ with respect to neither postmaterialism nor environmentalism as measured here. The Green Party indeed depends to a large extent on the postmaterialists: instead of the 10% they obtained in the entire sample, 37% of the environmentalist postmaterialists supported it. Also, 90% of the German postmaterialists report preference of environmental protection over economic growth, 15%

more than the general public. Considering that the two distributions are heavily skewed in opposite directions, a Pearson correlation of .16 cannot be dismissed as substantively insignificant. The data support the connection of postmaterialism, environmentalism and the Green vote in Germany. This connection, however, is a lot less clearcut in the United States. American postmaterialists are only slightly more inclined to prefer environmental protection over economic growth than the general public is. With 80%, the percentage of environmentalists is only 4% higher among postmaterialists than it is in the sample as a whole. The correlation between postmaterialism and environmentalism is way beyond the common significance level of .05. As far as can be judged with the available data, environmentalism is not a postmaterialist issue in the United States, whereas it is so in Germany. Apparently, the conflictual setting on environmental issues spread environmental consciousness among those who by their very value preference are apt to adopt a political stance which implies a challenge of the political system. A similar thing did not happen in the America. Once again, this conclusion implies that a potential Green electorate did not develop in the United States. However, the poor measurement of environmentalism leaves some doubt on the accuracy of this account. I strongly hope that comparative data which include all three concepts discussed so far - environmental concern, NEP and postmaterialism - will be collected in the near future.

CONCLUSION

The preceding chapter addressed the potential for an American Green Party on three different layers of the human mind. The deepest layer is constituted by the dimension of value types as described in the materialism/postmaterialism dimension. Here, the analysis showed equivalent levels in both countries. However, the connection between this value dimension and the preeminent Green issue, environmentalism proved to be weaker in the United States. A second layer is given by the New Environmental Paradigm, a dimension which may rightfully be labeled an ideology, because it promotes precise goals which fit into a consistent framework. Here the findings delivered unambiguous support for the hypothesis: the NEP has fewer adherents in America than it does in Germany. The most shallow layer put under scrutiny is given by the most salient issues which accompanied the rise of the Greens. Those have been interpreted in terms of support for the anti-nuclear and the peace movements paired with environmentalism. Again, the evidence was straightforward support for the hypothesis: fewer Americans than Germans support the Green's stand on all three issues. Since the three operationalizations of the interconnections of New Politics and environmentalism proved to be accurate descriptions of the Green electorate, one may rightfully conclude that the potential support for a Green party in America is smaller in size than the actual electorate of the German Greens is. It has to be pointed out that no proposition whatsoever is made about the weight of the environmental issue in American

politics, in particular in elections. The claim made is merely that the issue has been represented by the major parties to an extent that renders it an unattractive base for a third party movement.

The significance of this finding for the research question "Why is there no Green Party in the United States" lies in the importance of a potential electorate for the question whether a party will be founded. This is because it constitutes part of the description of the resources available to the American environmental movement. Recent theory in social sciences has put strong emphasis on the resources for a social movement organization in order to explain its emergence, size and structure.¹⁴⁵ Resource mobilization theory attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the classical models of social movements, namely relative deprivation theory, by shifting the focus from the grievance which is represented by a movement to its leadership.¹⁴⁶ The managers of a certain movement attempt to mobilize as many resources, i.e. money and time, as possible in order to achieve the goal, thereby shaping the ideology and clientele of the movement. An important choice in this connection is that of the best strategy to gain government attention. This is the realm of proper resource usage rather than resource mobilization. The impact the opportunity structure of a political system bears on the strategy of a social movement has already been discussed in the second chapter of this paper. As for the resources available for the environmental movement in

¹⁴⁵ see McCarthy and Zald, 1977.

¹⁴⁶ For an excellent overview of the competing theories see Morris and Herring, 1987. See also Cohen, 1985 and Kitschelt, 1989.

America, considerable willingness to spare time and money on the part of involved individuals have proven interest group pressure to be an effective strategy of environmentalism. The resources for a more radical strategy, the launching of a party designed after the image of the German Greens, seem to be considerably slimmer. If the findings presented in this paper are accurate, an American Green Party would hardly have gained electoral success under the present conditions. Of course, these conditions could be altered. If the leadership of the environmental groups decided to run a joint media campaign proclaiming that the dialogue between environmental organizations broke down due to behavior on the part of the government, some highly environmentally conscious citizens might be rendered hostile toward the political system. This might lead to an increase of the number of adherents of the NEP. If, in addition to that, environmental activists achieve a coalition with other movements without access to the political institutions, a public which is sensitized on an issue range that is broad enough to justify a challenge of the two party system might be the result. Using these tactics of social movement engineering, the resources for a Green Party might be created. Under those conditions, an American Green Party might obtain considerable electoral support. However, there are no indications for a such an inversion of the strategy of the environmental movement. The environmental organizations continue pushing the political institutions for more environmental legislation, successful or not. Consequently, citizens who wish more environmental protection continue accepting the environmental groups as a representation of the environmental cause.

Certainly, this is not a complete answer of the research question. The conclusion of this paper is that because the environmental issue was dealt with by means of dialogue, a Green electorate did not rise to a size comparable to that it has in Germany. Therefore, a necessary condition for the rise of an American Green Party is not met. A concomitant variation between the pattern of environmental politics, the emergence of a Green electorate, and the existence of a significant Green Party has been discovered. However, as pointed out in the section describing methodological issues (4.2.), the design is too weak for safely concluding causality. Other variables vary between the two countries, offering the basis for a number of plausible rival hypotheses. Those are predominantly ones which emphasize restrictive features of the American political system, instead of the elements which render the system accessible. The latter have been in the focus of this paper. The dialogue between the environmental groups and the major parties constitutes an example for the strategy of cooptation of an issue of potential challenging character.¹⁴⁷ The importance of the primary as a tool to change policies of the major parties has been mentioned in this connection.¹⁴⁸ The common spirit of these arguments is that new parties do not arise because they are unnecessary. In contrary, the arguments pointing to restrictive elements of the political system in America assume that new parties would not arise even if there was sufficient public demand for them. Two of the obstacles

¹⁴⁷ see Rosenstone et.al., 1984, p.43-44.

¹⁴⁸ Galderisi and Ginsberg, 1986.
Scarrow, 1986.

faced by new parties have been discussed in the first chapter: the plurality system and barriers which exhibit their restrictive impact prior to the election. Due to the limits inherent to a thesis, other variables of utmost importance cannot be examined. In particular, claims that politics in America by its very nature is non-ideological and therefore hostile to the concept of a New Politics party cannot be made subject to critical investigation. Nor is it possible to elaborate on the proposition that the two party system is a natural element of American society.¹⁴⁹ Both these latter propositions accept certain features of American politics as a given, while the line of reasoning of this paper assumes that they are not. Certainly, future research will have to address these questions in order to render validity to the conclusion of this paper. For now, all that can be done is expressing the conviction that the variables considered in the different sections of this paper are the ones that are significant.

¹⁴⁹ see Sabato, 1988, p.39.

Appendix 1: German Question Wording

Urgency questions:

"Wie dringend sind Ihrer Meinung nach die folgenden Probleme?"
(Laerm, Luftverschmutzung, Wasserverschmutzung, Bevoelkerungswachstum, Hausmuell, giftige Industrieabfaelle, Atommuell, Zerstoerung von Stadt und Land, Ausbeutung der Natur (Waelder, Mineralien, Wildbestand)
Answers were to be marked on a scale ranging from 1 (nicht dringend) to 7 (sehr dringend).

Threat questions:

"Im folgenden finden Sie einige Aussagen ueber unsere Gesellschaft und Umwelt. Bitte kreuzen Sie die Zahl an, die den Grad Ihrer Zustimmung oder Ablehnung zu der jeweiligen Aussage am besten ausdrueckt."
"Die Lagerung des Atommuehls ist zu gefaehrlich."
"Die Zahl der Menschen, die die Erde versorgen kann, ist bald erreicht."
"Die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Atomunfalls, der zu Umweltbelastungen fuehrt, nimmt zu."
Answers were to be marked on a scale running from 1 (lehne stark ab) to 7 (stimme stark zu).

also in this group:

"Wir brauchen Kernenergie."

Centrality questions:

"Im folgenden finden Sie einige Aussagen darueber, wie unsere Gesellschaft in einigen Jahren aussehen koennte. Oft wird es so sein, dass jede der beiden Ansichten etwas positives hat. Entscheiden Sie sich bitte immer fuer die Ansicht, die Ihnen am guenstigsten erscheint. Wenn Sie die "3" auf der linken Seite ankreuzen, so bedeutet das, dass Sie der linken Meinung voellig zustimmen, und wenn Sie die "3" auf der rechten Seite ankreuzen, so bedeutet das, dass Sie der rechten Meinung voellig zustimmen. Markieren Sie bitte Ihre Entscheidung durch Ankreuzen der entsprechenden Zahl."

"Eine Gesellschaft, die Umweltschutz ueber Wirtschaftswachstum stellt."

"Angenommen, dass wir etwas hoehere Arbeitslosigkeit akzeptieren muessten, um die Umwelt zu schuetzen: Waere es Ihnen wichtiger, Arbeitsplaetze zu sichern oder die Umwelt zu schuetzen?"

Answers were to be marked on a symmetric scale running from 3 on the left (wichtiger, Arbeitsplaetze zu schuetzen) to 3 on the right (wichtiger, Umwelt zu schuetzen).

"Wie sind Sie mit der Umweltpolitik der Bundesrepublik einverstanden?"

Answers on a scale from 1 (unzufrieden) to 7 (zufrieden)

"Bitte kreuzen Sie an, ob ihrer Meinung nach fuer die folgenden Ausgaben

des Staates zuviel, zuwenig oder annaehrend genug Steuergeld ausgegeben wird."

"Umweltschutz"

Answers were to be marked on a scale running from 1 (zuwenig) to 7 (zuviel).

NEP questions:

(See the introduction to the first set of centrality questions)

left : "Eine Gesellschaft, die Wirtschaftswachstum foerdert."

right: "Eine Gesellschaft, die Wirtschaftswachstum begrenzt."

left : "Eine Gesellschaft, in der Polizei und Justiz relativ wenig zu kontrollieren haben."

right: "Eine Gesellschaft, in der Polizei und Justiz relativ viel zu kontrollieren haben."

left : "Eine Gesellschaft, in der der Lebensstandard des einzelnen in erster Linie von seiner Leistung abhaengt."

right: "Eine Gesellschaft, die bestrebt ist, den Grundbeduerfnissen des einzelnen unahaengig von seiner Leistung gerecht zu werden."

Other predictors of the Green vote:

"Was halten Sie von Buergeraktionen (z.B. Demonstrationen) zur Beeinflussung der Planung von Flughaeften, Kernkraftwerken und Strassen?"
answers on a seven point scale running from "sehr dagegen" to "sehr dafuer".

"Wie stehen Sie zu Gruppen, die sich gegen weitere Ruestung einsetzen, wie z.B. die Friedensbewegung?"

seven point scale from: "lehne sie ab" to "begruesse sie"

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