The Political Impact of the Rising Salafi-Wahhabi Influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines the political impact of Salafi-Wahhabism in contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) since the El Mujahed Brigade of mujahedeen introduced this puritanical Saudi form of Islam during the 1992-1995 War that broke apart the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFROY). This study employs tenets of the English School of International Relations and utilizes a historical analytic approach to identify durable features of Bosnian Muslim religious economic activity, Bosnian education, and Bosnian political processes to answer the research question: what kind of influence has Salafi-Wahhabism had on BiH society and government since the end of the 1992-1995 Balkan War? Emergent evidence captured by these variables suggests a momentum of Salafi-Wahhabism influence is developing that may undercut the sovereignty of BiH and possibly impede its European Union membership bid. As a result of this rising Wahhabi influence in several facets of Bosnian society, the aggregate level of Islamism in the country is also likely increasing.
DEDICATION

I dedicate my thesis work to my loving and supportive family and friends. I enjoyed and benefited from your perspectives as I formulated and wrote this thesis through three international moves, two deployments, and most importantly, the birth of our two children.

I am extremely grateful to my Papou who, as a brave young man, boarded a freighter in Greece to earn a better life in America. My Dad built on that same work ethic and extraordinary belief in family and has always been my greatest example of what a Dad should be. Thank you Mom for raising your sons to be a strong men and helping plant the seeds for a lifetime of exploration and learning.

To Anna and Christopher, you are both incredible children and though you might not fully grasp that yet, you will someday. You have embraced the positive changes in your lives with a brilliant resiliency that makes me so thankful and proud to be your Dad. This work is for you in the hope that you will grow up looking for ways to serve others as you continue to explore our wonderful world. Finally, to my beautiful wife Betsy, thank you. We are on quite a journey together.
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I would like acknowledge and thank the Political Science Department at Virginia Tech for this innovative and forward-thinking program that allows students to learn and excel regardless of their physical location. This program is enabled by a superior administrative staff in both the National Capital Region and in Blacksburg, Virginia. Students depend on these professionals for all manner of assistance. I would like to thank Ms Karen Nicholson, Graduate Coordinator for Political Science and International Studies, in particular for her help throughout the program.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ArBiH – Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
BiH – Bosnia-Herzegovina
ERIS- European Regional International Society
EU – European Union
FBiH- Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GFA – The General Framework Agreement
IEBL – Inter Ethnic Boundary Line
IZ – Islamske Zajednice
KSA – Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE – Office for Security Cooperation in Europe
RS – Republika Srbska
SFROY – Socialist Former Republic of Yugoslavia
SHC – Saudi High Commission
SIPA – State Investigation and Protection Agency
TIKA – Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refuge
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The political environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) remains a complicated mixture of ethnicity and religion. The violent breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFROY) left BiH as a weak state dependent on foreign aid and struggling to form a coherent government and society. Researchers have previously revealed the effects of the strong mobilizing and demobilizing factors leading up to the 1992-1995 war.¹ These studies largely focused on the population demographics in the years preceding the conflict. However, during the war, mujahedeen from other conflict zones moved to the area and altered the makeup of the BiH Muslim population by reifying and then expanding Salafi-Wahhabism² in Bosnia, an alternative sub-global international society animated by a missionary-based belief system intent on replacing existing belief systems with sharia law,³ a system at odds with many European laws. Coreligionist monetary support from international Wahhabi sources flowed to the Bosniak cause during the conflict and continued unabated following the war until 2002, most notably

² Among these mujahedeen were Khalid Mohammed, mastermind of the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2011, and two of the terrorists who carried out the attack using American Airlines Flight 77: Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States; p145-147, p155, p488.
from the Saudi High Commission for Bosnia.⁴ Since the end of the kinetic conflict in 1995, major Salafi-Wahhabi Islamic charities for BiH have been shut down following international investigations.⁵ Multiple Wahhabi villages have been targeted by large BiH police forces⁶ and anti-Wahhabi websites and periodicals abound even though the number of Wahhabi adherents currently in BiH is only estimated at 3,000.⁷ Such a numerically small subset of a population typically would not normally demand such effort. Do these religiously motivated, transnational actors warrant this type of attention? Further, what kind of influence does their animating belief system have on the formation of a coherent society in BiH as the country hopes to join the European Union (EU)? It does appear the activities of Salafi-Wahhabi adherents, both mainstream and extremist, in BiH are influencing a wide range of activities in BiH.

The war of the mid-nineties mobilized Salafi-Wahhabi fighters who left their areas of origin for battlefields in BiH. Drawn to the side of the Bosniaks, upwards of 4,000 mujahedeen militants migrated to BiH and since the war some have clustered in villages that reject BiH society writ large. They did not at that time, however, successfully graft a

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⁴ “Saudi Arabia: History of a Civilization”
[http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/history/](http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/history/), last accessed on October 31, 2013.

⁵ “Saudi Arabia: War on Terrorism. Banking and Finance”

⁶ “Joint Patrol in Bocinja Donja”
[http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/119/p08a/t0108a.htm](http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/119/p08a/t0108a.htm), last accessed October 31, 2013.


Salafi-Wahhabi conception of jihad onto the war\textsuperscript{8} and actually clashed theologically with many other Muslims in the Army of Bosnia Herzegovina (ARBiH).\textsuperscript{9} On arrival, these extremists served soldierly functions and attempted religious policing functions within the ARBiH.\textsuperscript{10} After the war, some put down roots by adopting Slavonic names and marrying Bosniak women.\textsuperscript{11} These Salafi-Wahhabi adherents, previously unknown in Yugoslavia, established communities in the post war chaos, even though the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA) required all foreign fighters to leave BiH.\textsuperscript{12}

Today, the Salafi-Wahhabism in BiH is a lightning rod of controversy. Dr Mustafa Ceric, Grand Mufti of Bosnia from 1993-2012, speaks of “old” and “new” Muslims in the region, and nearly two decades after the 1992-1995 War, the Wahhabi influence shows signs of a growing impact on BiH society. In a few extreme cases, the authority of these actors is superseding domestic social and legal structures. In small villages under Salafi-Wahhabi control, domestic civil laws are ignored in favor of their interpretation of Sharia. In a much more prevalent and wide spread case, wealthy Salafi-Wahhabi patrons abroad

\textsuperscript{9} Ina Merdjanova, Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans Between Nationalism and Transnationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p60-63.
are influencing Bosnian society via the Bosniak population even though their theology is at odds the Islamska Zajednica (IZ), the centuries-old and legally recognized Bosnian Islamic Community.\textsuperscript{13}

The Wahhabi influence in BiH is indicated in multiple ways. In a conspicuous affront to Bosnian sovereignty, an \textit{imperium in imperio} exists where language, religious practices, and the state apparatus of BiH are ignored in villages scattered in remote areas. The village Gornja Maoca under the leadership of Nusret Imamovic exemplifies this condition. The Imamovic administration controls physical access to the village, enforces Sharia law, and has set up a religious hierarchy that does not acknowledge the authority of the IZ or the Reis ul-Ulema, its elected leader. This is just one example; it is reported that 17 villages are in a similar situation and the number is growing.\textsuperscript{14} These extremists have proven adept at networking with other extremist, hard line, and at times violent

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{14} Multiple news media outlets from across the globe and region have reported “Wahhabi” villages in BiH. 17 villages are listed here: “Bosnia Police Raid Conservative Muslim Village,” BBC, February 2, 2010. \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8493855.stm} (October 27, 2013).
Smith, Jeffrey, “A Bosnian Village’s Terrorist Ties; Links to US Bomb Plot Arouse Concern About Enclave of Islamic Guerrillas,” \textit{Washington Post}, March 11, 2000. Article lists Bocinja as Wahhabi village though later conflicting reports indicate it may or may not have been shut down by a joint BiH/NATO action.}
Islamists in Europe.\textsuperscript{15} Muhammed Porca is the head of the hard-line Al-Tawhid Mosque in Vienna, Austria. OSA, the Bosnian intelligence service, believes Porca is the main source of financial and ideological support for the separatist Bosnian Salafi-Wahhabi movement.\textsuperscript{16} According to the Bosnian State Prosecutor’s Office, “Porca organized and financed the creation” of the Gornja Maoca Wahhabi village with funds from the Saudi High Commission for Aid for Bosnia.\textsuperscript{17} These settlements are still relatively minor when weighed against the overall Bosnian and Bosniak populations, however, a second and significantly larger source of Salafi-Wahhabi influence flows from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This more widespread influence and the ways it may complicate Bosnian EU accession are the primary focus of this thesis.

Saudi Prince Selman Abdul-Aziz established the Saudi High Commission for Bosnia-Herzegovina (SHC) in 1993. As an instrument of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia\textsuperscript{18}, the SHC has mixed direct spending of over $600 million USD and missionary work to influence Islam in BiH.\textsuperscript{19} The impact is widespread and exhibited in many ways such as the establishment of new Salafi-Wahhabi supported Islamic faculties in Bosnia.

\textsuperscript{18} \texttt{http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1127811912376}, last accessed September 11, 2013
proliferation of Wahhabi religious texts in the Bosniak dialect, and reconstruction of war-damaged Ottoman mosques in a Wahhabi style. These developments make it necessary to evaluate the current strength and future trajectory of the Salafi-Wahhabi influence in BiH. The handful of Salafi-Wahhabi villages in Bosnia make sensational headlines and spur Bosnian authorities to action since they are breaking multiple laws, however it is the external influence, primarily from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that appears to have the largest and most significant Salafi-Wahhabi influence on BiH. This much more prevalent, Saudi influence ignores Bosnian norms, rules, and institutions in favor of foreign ideologies and it is potentially quite hazardous for a fledgling country since BiH has a weak, ineffectual government with marginal ability to enforce its own sovereignty.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Conceptual Framework}

Since 1995, Bosnian political institutions have been directly shaped by member nations of the European Union (EU) and the United States of America through the GFA, also known as the Dayton Accords. The GFA ended the kinetic hostilities of the 1992-1995 war and established a new Bosnian constitution.\textsuperscript{21} Since the end of the war, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the EU have continually played prominent roles in nearly every

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] Wolfgang Koeth, (2012) \textit{Bosnia, Kosovo and the EU: Is Accession Possible without Full Sovereignty}? EIPAScope, 2012 (1). pp. 31-36. ISSN 1025-6253.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
facet of Bosnian government. Scholars of the English School of International relations name these organizations as components of a sub-global international society, dubbed the European Regional International Society (ERIS), a grouping characterized by certain values due to its foundation on a “common civilization.” The EU explicitly states its values: “freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.”

Besides the direct influence mechanisms on BiH by this sub-global international society during and since the 1992-1995 War, the values and principles of a different sub-global international society anchored in the Middle East also appeared. The Salafi-Wahhabi El Mujahed Brigade of jihadis introduced puritanical Salafi-Wahhabism, the religious orientation of an international society based in literalist, puritanical, and absolutist Islamic values and principles of coexistence. My thesis will investigate and characterize the rising influence of this alternate sub-global international society and its potential impacts using tenets and primary institutions of the English School of

International relations including concepts of an international system and an international society.

**Methodology**

**Research Question:** What kind of influence has Salafi-Wahhabism had on BiH society and government over the past two decades since the end of the 1992-1995 Balkan War? Emergent evidence captured by the following variables suggests a momentum of Salafi-Wahhabism influence is developing that may undercut the sovereignty of BiH and interfere with a possible EU bid.

**Dependent Variable:** This thesis seeks to identify the Salafi-Wahhabi Influence on BiH society and government.

**Independent Variables:** The following are possible variables that may trigger change in the dependent variable.

- **Religious Economic Activity.** Bosnian Waqf composition is a measurable indicator of religious economic activity. Waqf is an Islamic trust supported by group religious economic behavior. For centuries, Bosnian Waqf has been supported by Bosniaks and directly overseen and administered by the IZ in accordance with its Ottoman heritage that has left lasting ties to modern Turkey. Since the 1995 war, changes in Bosnian Waqf attributable to Salafi-Wahhabism can be observed.

- **Formal Education.** Bosnian education evolved over many centuries and developed durable structures in ways similar to European and Turkish formal education development. Since 1995, possible Salafi-Wahhabi influence has been exerted via Muslim religious education.
Political Processes and Institutions. As a result of both Tito-era attempts at “unity” and the Dayton Peace Accords, BiH politics are a complex process that can privilege governmentally defined ethnicity over simple, voter-defined representation. For this thesis, I will examine three measurable indicators. The first indicator is voting rates and election results. The second measurable indicator is the outcome of the 2012 election for Reis Ul-Ulema, the leader of the IZ. The third measurable indicator is joint cooperation activities between FBiH and RS political institutions.

**Working Hypotheses**

If Bosnian Waqf and its associated functions are being assumed by domestic or international Salafi-Wahhabi networks outside the historic bounds of the IZ, then Wahhabi influence within BiH is increasing.

If BiH formal education is found to shift away from traditional structures and towards a Salafi-Wahhabi model, then Salafi-Wahhabis have an increasing influence on this aspect of Bosniak society governed by the state.

If political processes and political institutions migrate towards Salafi-Wahhabi norms in both function and form, or if the result of the processes ushers in Salafi-Wahhabi leaders where previously none existed, and if this change can be traced to Salafi-Wahhabi actors, then Salafi-Wahhabi influence on the state is increasing.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable Category</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Working hypothesis</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Economic Activity</td>
<td>Waqf Value: Waqf is articulated in the Hadith and is an Islamic religious endowment that includes all types of alms. Mosques, madrasas, prayer rooms, financial assets, and other property willed to the endowment under strict Islamic rules are classified as Waqf. Waqf can be supported by Zakat, an explicit Quranic financial obligation for all Muslims and one of the five pillars of Islam.</td>
<td>If Bosnian Waqf and its associated functions are being assumed by domestic or international Salafi-Wahhabi networks outside the historic bounds of the IZ to facilitate change, then Wahhabi influence within BiH is increasing.</td>
<td>Waqf tied to Salafi-Wahhabi sources as a relative percent of total Waqf value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Curriculum: Education is compulsory in BiH under a state approved curriculum.</td>
<td>If BiH formal education is found to shift away from traditional structures and towards a Salafi-Wahhabi model, then Salafi-Wahhabis have an increasing influence on this aspect of Bosniak society governed by the state.</td>
<td>Number of pupils studying Salafi-Wahhabi curriculums.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Processes</td>
<td>Joint political actions: Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Federation have been unable to form a coherent national government and fail to cooperate on basic issues of governance.</td>
<td>If Salafi-Wahhabis mobilize cooperative targeting by Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Federation, they are influencing the course of governmental policy and action in BiH.</td>
<td>Trends in joint police or military actions, whether proactive or reactive, aimed at Salafi-Wahhabi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Processes</td>
<td>Electoral Participation: Voter participation that has largely broken along ethno-religious lines for two decades in BiH. Salafi-Wahhabi doctrine largely rejects neo-liberal ideals.</td>
<td>If Salafi-Wahhabis are dissuading coreligionists from voting or are successfully putting coreligionists in in elected office, their influence in BiH is increasing.</td>
<td>Voter participation by Bosniak BiH citizens and election results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Processes</td>
<td>Reis Ul Ulema Election: The office of Reis Ul Ulema was created in the Hapsburg era to be the Bosnian Muslim spiritual leader. Dr Mustapha Ceric has been Reis Ul Ulema for 19 years but is retiring. He has been a leader known for interfaith dialogue initiatives and for Bosniak nationalism.</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia has tied its significant financial support to BiH over the past two decades to its missionary Salafi-Wahhabi ideology. If after two decades of direct monetary support and proselytizing from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the Bosnian Ulema elects a Salafi-Wahhabi as Reis Ul Ulema, the Salafi-Wahhabi influence on Bosniak religious leadership is increasing.</td>
<td>Elected Reis Ul Ulema.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sources

Multiple transnational and supranational organizations collaborated to end the 1992-1995 War and impose a system of governance in the newly formed Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This situation attracted significant scholarly attention and academic production in the English-language press. Stephen Burg and Paul Shoup’s *The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman’s *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and its Reversal*, and Marko Attila Hoare’s *How Bosnia Armed* were valuable sources that examine the conflict and, to varying degrees, aspects of its aftermath. Press reporting and other periodicals from the era are also valuable augments.

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 on the United States and their significant linkages to Saudi nationals, a lot of attention was paid to Saudi Arabia’s prevailing form of Islam, its foreign policy, and militant jihadism in general. Natana Delong-Bas’s *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival to Global Jihad*, John L. Esposito’s *Islam: The Straight Path*, and Stephen Schwartz’s *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Saud from Tradition to Terror* focus on Saudi propagation of their form of Islam. Gilles Kepel’s *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* was also particularly useful because it positions the conflict in the Balkans among the many other violent conflicts both with and within the worldwide Muslim community since the 1960’s.

Finally, reports from the OSCE, the EU, the UN, and other transnational organizations along with governmental reporting were all invaluable sources for analyzing current events in BiH. Ethnic chauvinism was a contributing factor to the 1992-1995 War and regional media outlets still largely break along ethnic lines with varying apparent degrees
of sensationalism. Rigorous reports from agencies such as the OSCE helped separate well-researched factual reporting in local media from cheap journalism.

Limitations to this Study

Language will be a surmountable barrier during my research. I do not speak Serbo-Croatian, Arabic, or French. However, a number of books originally published in these languages have been republished in English. Google translations also had some utility for basic translation help. I used a multi-source approach to verify data reliability and accuracy. This inevitably limited the volume of data available but had a beneficial effect on my ability to draw accurate conclusions. Cross-referencing data to verify its worth disqualified some data sets all together and greatly increased the time necessary to analyze others. This is naturally an issue for any research project but this was especially problematic in an area with so many contentious issues where agenda-driven “fact” abounds. It is also possible that not all Salafi-Wahhabi influence can be documented, since present research is based on available information about the measurable indicators from the media and published sources. That does not mean they are complete or extensive.

Expected Findings

Together, if BiH religious economic activities, education structures, and political process are being impacted by Salafi-Wahhabi ideology, then the Salafi-Wahhabi influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina is growing in both size and scope and the unsuccessful attempt to graft jihad onto the Balkan War of 1992-95 could become a credible threat to the sovereignty of contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina and its attempt to join the EU.
CHAPTER 2: UTILIZING THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Martin Wight, a leading member of the English School, named three traditions of international thought, Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism, to define English School theory. Wight’s “Realism” is also known as Machiavellian or Hobbesian theory and posits war as a “perpetual possibility” requiring state political action to avert such an end. Barry Buzan further explains Realism as “power politics amongst states.”

Wight’s “Revolutionism” is Kantian or utopian; a “civitas maxima…proclaim(s) a world society of individuals which overrides nations or states, diminishing or dismissing this middle link.” Buzan describes this orientation as universalist or cosmopolitan.

Wight’s “Rationalism” follows the Grotian tradition and is a via media between Hobbesian/Machiavellian anti-progressivism (Wight’s Realism) and Kant’s utopian progressive moral theories (Wight’s Revolutionism). Rationalism gives primacy to

32 “Western Values in International Relations,” in Butterfield and Wight, 1966, p89-131.
“shared norms, rules, and institutions” amongst states. In the European case these shared norms gave rise to both an international system and an international society. This is an effective analytical framework for my thesis examining the rising influence of Salafi-Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).

The English School of International Relations is concerned with order which Hedley Bull defined as “a pattern or disposition of human activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole;’ Bull further defined international order as order “among states.” In Bull’s basic configuration, this order among European states can be described as an international system that began developing in the fifteenth century and whose units, the states themselves, interacted via “war, diplomacy, trade, migration, and the movement of ideas.”

On the western European continent, an international society developed from these near-constant interactions over the course of several centuries and some states now participate in a dense structure of commonly recognized norms and rules. According to Bull, international society

maintains order via common interests, rules, and institutions.\footnote{Ibid., pp 62-71.} Building on Bull’s definitions of international systems and international societies, Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman explain that an international system “operates more or less mechanically and by necessity, international society represents the conscious effort to transform and regulate relations amongst its constitutive units.”\footnote{Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman, 2001, “Analysing (sic) European Integration, Reflecting on the English School: Scenarios for an Encounter.”} In international society, modern states themselves are responsible for maintaining the efficacy of rules and institutions.\footnote{Barry Buzan, 1993, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School.” International Organization, 47 (3): 68-69.}

Referencing Adam Watson’s \textit{The Evolution of International Society}, Diez and Whitman note that these relations are dynamic and may be found to shift over time.\footnote{Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman, 2001, “Analysing (sic) European Integration, Reflecting on the English School: Scenarios for an Encounter.” p5.}

It should be noted that some scholars find the boundaries between an international system and an international society problematic and some question whether both categories exist. Alan James and others see shortcomings in Bull’s work; James calls the division between an international system and an international society a “distinction without a difference”\footnote{Alan James, 1993, “System or Society*.” Review of International Studies, 19 (3): 272.} and makes the case that only international society is a useful concept. Arguing in favor of an international society paradigm free from discussion of an international system, James’ reasoning runs from the seemingly simplistic “grammar” to the more abstract “humanity.” Fortunately there has been some consensus among English School scholars. Georgeta Pourchot and Yannis Stivatchitis help alleviate this
discord by pointing out “the system/society debate within the English School has resulted in an agreement that the international system represents a weak form of international society.”\textsuperscript{43} This is a more widely accepted view among English School scholars who are also “unanimously in favor of the division of the world into sovereign states.”\textsuperscript{44} These states are the constituent parts of sub-global organizations.

Wight indicates sub-global organizations are formed by agreed upon institutions and values because they grew out of the same civilization.\textsuperscript{45} This is an example of a Gemeinschaft based international society. The base words of the German Gemeinschaft are Meinung meaning “opinion” or “viewpoint” and Schaft, a term meaning a “grouping.”\textsuperscript{46} Taken together, this grouping of shared views is properly understood in English as a community. Within the English School of International relations there is a nuanced difference between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft whose etymologic base is Gesellen “to join” and Schaft “grouping.” Gesellschaft comes from Ordnung, laws, rules, or ordinances, and does not necessarily spring from a common culture. Buzan postulates that in this case, “as ruling elites recognize the permanence and importance of the economic and strategic interdependence among their states, they will begin to work out

\textsuperscript{44} Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 2006), p 80.
\textsuperscript{46} Note that Schaft can also mean “team” as in Die Deutsche Nationalfussbalmannschaft or German National Football Team
rules for avoiding unwanted conflicts and for facilitating desired exchanges.”\[47\] Both Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft describe formations of international society, but a Gemeinschaft formulation is generally understood to be “thicker” or stronger because of its roots in a deep, common culture and not only the shared viewpoints of elites legally brought together by self-interest.

In the context of my thesis, the ERIS represents one of these thick Gemeinschaft sub-global organizations rooted in a common civilization, Europe, and holding common concepts of civility. The OSCE in particular is an example of these common concepts and exhibits most of the elements of an international society.\[48\] According to the OSCE, its shared ideals amongst member and affiliated states are focused on “improving the lives of individuals and communities” namely through security.\[49\] The OSCE goals seem consistent with Wight’s argument that the fundamental political task at all times “[is] to provide order, or security, from which law, justice and prosperity may afterwards develop.”\[50\] Under the goal of enhanced security, the OSCE maintains expert units and field operations to address arms control, security, terrorism, good governance, energy

security, human trafficking, democratization, media freedom, and minority rights.\textsuperscript{51}

English School scholars also note that “democracy encompasses associated concepts of respect for human rights, the rule of law, and liberal economic development.”\textsuperscript{52} OSCE youth projects focus on human rights, environmental, tolerance, and gender education.\textsuperscript{53} Leading contemporary English School scholar Barry Buzan examines works by Wight, Bull, Holsti, James and Jackson to show the primary institutions on which the English School orientation rests.\textsuperscript{54} A primary institution “defines both the base character and purpose of any society.”\textsuperscript{55} Buzan’s collection of primary institutions in \textit{From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation}, listed below, are an effective tool for examining society.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., pXVIII.
\end{flushleft}
The Classical “Three Traditions” Model of English School Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Institutions</th>
<th>Secondary Institutions (examples of)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master</td>
<td>Derivative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Non-Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Law</td>
<td>UN General Assembly, Most regimes, ICJ, ICC, Some PKOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territoriality</td>
<td>Boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Bilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocates</td>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great power management</td>
<td>Alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of People</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Trade liberalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Self-determination, Popular sovereignty, Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental stewardship</td>
<td>Species survival, Climate stability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Buzan acknowledges that this list is not definitive, but the primary institutions listed here can help characterize an international society and are directly applicable to a project investigating the rising influence of Salafi-Wahhabism in BiH. Western neoliberal ideals and aspirations such as these are widely accepted as “enlightened” in Western scholarship.

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56 Ibid., p187.
and discourse. In direct opposition, influential Salafi philosopher Sayyid Qutb labels these same ideals *jahiliyyah*, an Arabic term meaning “of a state of ignorance.” My thesis will examine impacts on Bosnian sovereignty, territority, differing views on the equality of people, impacts on the marketplace, and nationalism by Salafi Wahhabism employing tenets of the English School Theory of International Relations.

Returning to Bull’s concept of “elementary and shared goals,” it is important to note that this theory is viewed as “underdeveloped” since, as Hidemi Suganami observes, Bull does not clearly articulate what the “elementary and primary goals” of social life are.

This is an important gap in theory since “the expansion of international society” now means persistent engagement between sub-global organizations whose inherited concepts of civility are dramatically different.

In the Middle East, the Salafi-Wahhabi sub-global international society’s strong ideology counters Western modernity and arises from an alternate environment. As a region, the Middle East has felt a stronger attachment to the Islamic *Umma* vice any territorial, Westphalian state. *Umma* is an Arabic word meaning the worldwide

60 Linklater, Andrew. 2013. “Civilizations and International Society.” System, Society, and the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations,
61 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Non Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on Asia and Beyond, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (New York: Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2010), p189.
Muslim community. As a concept, *Umma* was first articulated in Muhammad’s farewell sermon in Mecca three months before his death when he preached “Know ye that every Moslem (sic) is a brother unto every other Moslem (sic), and that ye are now one brotherhood.” In practice, the *Umma* at large may be viewed as a Gesellschaft or thin international society; a cursory glance shows Iranian, Indonesian, Nigerian, Saudi, and Turkish Islam exhibit a wide degree of variance. However, the Salafi-Wahhabi international society likely fits the form of a *Gemeinschaft* international society since its constituent members (modern Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and to some extent the United Arab Emirates) spring from a common culture and participate in a dense structure of relations and shared ideals.

The Salafi-Wahhabi Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now a chief proponent of Pan-Islamism, a contemporary attempt to claim leadership of the *Umma* that has been politically fractured since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the imposition of national boundaries by Western imperial powers. In the Sunni traditions of Islamic jurisprudence, the Caliph, as head of the Caliphate, is responsible for Islamic society. That society is properly maintained by enforcing Islamic law, or *Sharia*, preaching the faith, protecting the lives, property and faith of all believers, and inviting others to the

63 Ibid, p 11.
64 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Non Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on Asia and Beyond, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (New York: Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2010), p189.
65 Ibid, p190.
“universal” creed of Islam. This invitation is called *Da’wa* in Arabic and it is properly understood as missionary work to convert non-Muslims. Pan-Islamism seeks further Islamization of state and public life, education, and laws. This movement values the omniscience of God, *Allah* in Arabic, and the “unity of religious and political authority in Islam” above all else through the totality of Sharia.

Clearly, intractabilities exist between the values of the secular ERIS and the Pan-Islamism championed by the Salafi-Wahhabi Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The ERIS values security, democratization, and minority rights. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia demonstrates that it values its own security as a sovereign state among other nations with its robust military and various defense alliances, notably with the United States of America. However, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has scant use for the principles of Western democracy and its associated concepts such as respect for human rights, the role of secular law, and liberal economic reform. I will develop these points in a later description of Salafi-Wahhabism. In the context of a theoretical framework for my thesis, the English School examination of components of a sub-global, international society is


67 Ibid.

68 Shahrbanou Tadbakhsh, Non Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on Asia and Beyond, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (New York: Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2010), p181.


centrally important. My analysis of these components, their values, and their influence on the institutions of BiH will be aided by four English School tenets.

First, the Grotian or Rationalist mindset of the English School focuses on order and its particular limits.\textsuperscript{70} Hedley Bull defines the international system, also identified as a weak international society by the contemporary English School, as one that “is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave—at least in some measure—as parts of a whole.”\textsuperscript{71} International society differs from an international system because it “only exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”\textsuperscript{72} This international society can be formed in a \textit{Gemeinschaft} or \textit{Gesellschaft} model. World society, by contrast, is a “totality of social interaction” beyond the concept of state, built upon a “sense of common rules and institutions”\textsuperscript{73} among individuals, states and non-state actors.

James gives a valuable description of non-state actors, calling them “pressure groups” whose influence is “deployed on an ad hoc basis.”\textsuperscript{74} This is particularly relevant in the case of BiH. First the El Mujahed Brigade was equipped by Salafi-Wahhabi “pressure

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p13.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p269.
groups” during the 1992-1995 war and Salafi-Wahhabi patrons currently support coreligionist actors within the country.

Buzan offers a useful diagram (Figure 1, below) showing the English School’s theoretical relationship between the Hobbesian International System, the Kantian World Society, and the Grotian International Society and how these three traditions overlap at points.

“Three Traditions” Model of English School Theory

Second, by identifying the different characteristics and boundaries that separate an international system, an international society, and a world society, the English School recognizes several “theaters of operation” in the modern society of states that display

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very different levels of political development. To analyze those theaters of operation, the English School approach is “penetrating the minds, and uncovering the assumptions and motives, of its key actors…as part of historical analysis.” I will show how, in the centuries preceding the 1992-1995 War, BiH and Salafi-Wahhabism developed in their own theaters of operation, the former under many different political systems and the latter in an isolated “wasteland.” By investigating aspects of historical BiH political institutions since the introduction of Islam following the Ottoman conquest of the area to establish norms at the end of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I will be able to evaluate changes in those institutions since the introduction of Salafi-Wahhabism during the 1992-1995 War and discern whether those changes are due to a Salafi-Wahhabi influence based on the demonstrated motivations of key Salafi-Wahhabi actors.

Third, Richard Little argues the English School is committed to “methodological pluralism” and does not privilege any single dimension of world politics. For my thesis, this is an important facet of English School thought. It sets the terrain for a broad examination since English School scholars do not believe order and society in international relations can be understood in isolation from geopolitical rivalries and cosmopolitan attachments. I will demonstrate how four centuries of Islam in BiH under

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77 Ibid., p114-115.
80 Richard Little’s geopolitical rivalries
the Ottoman Empire have left a BiH with durable structures attributable to a different Islamic school of jurisprudence than the Hanbali Salafi-Wahhabists. Further, I will use Hedley Bull’s description of the Revolt Against the West\textsuperscript{81} to show how if the Salafi-Wahhabi influence in BiH is indeed changing BiH, those changes are contrary to the goals and requirements of the EU and this will certainly complicate any Bosnian accession to this regional international society.

The English School (and Hedley Bull in particular) advances the concept of “new medievalism (sic)” that asks whether inroads made by “other associations” are undercutting state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{82} Bull describes new medievalism as a situation where shared authorities are the hallmark of a “system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalties.”\textsuperscript{83} Bull uses Western Christendom in the Middle Ages as an example of such a scenario. In that era, no ruler or political body had absolute authority over specific territory or people. Instead, authority was shared among sovereigns, vassals, the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. In its contemporary incarnation, Bull postulates a modern secular form of these shared loyalties may be emerging and offers as a brief example a case where the United Kingdom has to share its authority with authorities in Scotland, a European authority in Brussels, and world authorities in both New York and Geneva.\textsuperscript{84}

For Bull, this scenario could have either positive or negative outcomes. On the positive side, overlapping loyalties could hold people together in a “world society” thus avoiding

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., p245.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p245-247.
some of the pitfalls of a system of sovereign states. Buzan develops a definition of a world society by dropping the “assumption that states are the dominant units and inter-state society the dominant domain” and notes that this concept is close to Bull’s “neomedieval idea.” However, Bull also notes that a positive outcome is far from certain and references the “precedent of Western Christendom” that contained more “ubiquitous and continuous violence and insecurity” than the modern state system. The essential nature of individual state sovereignty is situated here along with examinations of transnational solidarity and conflicts that cut across divisions among states. For BiH, a muddled loyalty system whereby a faith group within a fledgling nation owes allegiance to foreign patrons whose animating ideals are contrary to the political aims of BiH would seem to undercut BiH’s sovereignty and participation in the ERIS and organizations such as the EU.

To this last point, Bull offers five examples of how the state system may be “giving place to a secular reincarnation of the system of overlapping or segmented authority” embodied in medieval Europe. Bull’s first point of inquiry is “the regional integration of states” and this point has proven prescient since Bull published The Anarchical Society in 1977. NATO is a frequently cited example of this point in Bull’s time and since this

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87 Ibid., p254.
work was published, there has been a significant “thickening” of the ERIS.\textsuperscript{88} For example, the European Union has expanded into areas previously reserved for individual states, such as monetary and security policy, through the Treaty of Maastricht.\textsuperscript{89} In English School theory, “thickness” of shared values is best understood as a continuum. On the minimalist Gesellschaft end of the spectrum, only leaders of involved states share a value. On the maximal Gemeinschaft end of the spectrum, a shared value is diffuse throughout political elites and ordinary citizens.\textsuperscript{90} According to Mosler, the whole of international society can be viewed as a “legal community” regardless of where it falls on the aforementioned spectrum and that it “regulates members’ relations with one another and which organizes institutions by rules and principles and maxims of conduct.”\textsuperscript{91}

Bull’s next point of inquiry is the “the disintegration of states.” This point too has proven prescient. Since 1977, there are multiple examples of weakening or disappearing states in Europe. Great Britain, Spain, and to a lesser extent France are grappling with diminishing national coherence in areas such as Scotland, Catalonia, and Basque territories. Germane to this thesis, Yugoslavia has ceased to exist altogether and broke

apart into the states of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

Bull’s third point of inquiry is “the restoration of private international violence.” For the case of Yugoslavia, private international violence and the aforementioned concept of disintegrating states seem linked since privately sourced forces were used to hasten the state’s demise. It is now commonplace for corporations such as Academi, the company formerly known as Xe Services LLC and Blackwater, to conduct kinetic operations that were previously the sole domain of the state. States no longer maintain a monopoly on legitimate violence. International terrorism is also part of this inquiry. The El Mujahed Brigade was not resourced from a nation-state’s army. These men were mobilized by a sense of communal religious responsibility not related to national citizenship or ethnicity.

“Transnational organizations” comprise Bull’s fourth point of inquiry. Here, Bull observed the proliferation of many different organizations ranging from companies to religious organizations, with increasing powers that diminish the role and power of the state. Non-governmental organizations have a great capacity to influence societies as

93 “Company Once Known as Blackwater Ditches Xe for Yet Another New Name,”
94 Wolfgang Wodarg, “Private Military and Security Firms and the Erosion of the State Monopoly on the Use of Force,”
pressure groups, especially in areas where local governments can not provide necessary services.

Finally, Bull’s fifth point of inquiry is “the technological unification of the world.” This has meant wider boundaries for social cooperation across a number of sectors brought on by advances in communication and transportation. Bull wrote in an era of Internet infancy when this commerce and communication medium was largely confined to a few academic and government institutions. Since The Anarchical Society was published in 1977, this point has grown even stronger.

The influence of regionally integrated European states such as the OSCE and EU on BiH is clear but it is Salafi-Wahhabism, a different regionally integrated influence that is the subject of my thesis. The ongoing influence of the animating religious ideology of the private Salafi-Wahhabi combatants who fought in the violent disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is my focus. As Yugoslavia was violently disintegrating, the El Mujahed Brigade of transnational actors took up arms in support of the Bosniaks, though they were not fully subordinate to any state-recognized standing army; they fought alongside the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBiH) but were not fully subordinate to its commanders. As indicated by their unit’s name, these foreign

fighters were active jihadists, acting in defense of their conception of the Islamic faith.\textsuperscript{99} and with private funding streams independent of formalized national defense structures.\textsuperscript{100} These privateers took up arms in support of coreligionists and the defense of their faith, not of a nation state, and in doing so reified a Salafi-Wahhabi community in BiH.

In the course of my discussion, it will become clear how since that initial footprint of Salafi-Wahhabism when the El Mujahed brigade arrived, transnational organizations such as the Saudi High Commission for Bosnia have made a concerted effort to expand the Salafi-Wahhabi orientation of Islam in BiH. Of course, technological advances across many sectors have made this possible. I will discuss the physical and theological origins of Salafi-Wahhabism later in my thesis, but a brief example of the way its animators leverage advances in technology is appropriate here.

Salafi-Wahhabism’s initial theater of operation was the Najd region of the Arabian plateau, an inhospitable wasteland left outside of the Ottoman Empire. In the decades since its first oil exports in 1938, however, Saudi Arabia has become one of the wealthiest countries on earth per capita through petrochemical exploitation. The Al Saud family has modernized the country’s infrastructure to such an extent that Riyadh, once a

\textsuperscript{100} Testimony of Steven Emerson with Jonathan Levin before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, “Terrorism Financing: Origination, Organization, and Prevention: Saudi Arabia, Terrorist Financing, and the War on Terror.” July 31, 2003.
small oasis town in Najd, is now the country’s capital and a city of 5.2 million people.\(^{101}\)

In that time, the total length of paved highways has tripled, power generation is up 28 times and seaport capacity, the main enabler for oil exports, has increased tenfold.\(^{102}\)

Technological advances led to this transfer of wealth to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) from previously industrialized nations and the Kingdom now has the world’s twentieth largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\(^{103}\)

The English School of International Relations examines order in the Rationalist/Grotian tradition. By using this conceptual framework, I believe my examination of Salafi-Wahhabism, a religious ideology rooted in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its influence on BiH institutions, the ways this potentially violates Bosnian sovereignty, and how this could obfuscate BiH accession to the EU will properly reference and contribute to the English School theory of international relations. The Grotian tradition qualifies progress in world politics and is exemplified by a society of states that facilitates international cooperation and sets standards for legitimacy that distinguish between permissible and impermissible behavior. The English School examines order through the rubric of international society’s institutions and seeks to explain what goes on internationally by penetrating the minds and uncovering the assumptions and motivations of its key players.

This thesis will examine the key facets of the rising influence of Saudi-origin Salafi-Wahhabism in BiH and will measure this influence relative to established historical norms and then describe its effect on a Bosnian government attempting to align itself with international standards in order to join the European international society.\(^{105}\)


CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

Many researchers have analyzed the worldwide revival of Islam in the 1970’s, a decade that notably culminated with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the takeover of Islam’s holiest mosque by Islamic militants in 1979.106 The religious underpinning of each event is a vastly different Islamic orientation. In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to install a Shiite theocracy after the Shah’s overthrow. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, itself already a theocracy, the “ultra-Wahhabi” radicals that took over the mosque at Mecca were mobilized by a revivalist Sunni Islamic orientation.107 In their view, the country had strayed from its Wahhabi roots to the point of becoming a “royal clique of infidels.”108 After crushing the revolt with the help of French commandos, the Kingdom set about boosting its Sunni Islamic bona fides at home and abroad via a broad range of missionary activities.109

Under the strict governmental controls of the Tito regime, however, Bosnian Muslims did not demonstrate an overt increase in religious fervor or political behavior during this time period. By the violent breakup of Yugoslavia thirteen years later, a well-developed network of violent extremists motivated by the twentieth century writings of Sayyid Qutb was active from the Maghreb to the Philippines. At the end of the Tito regime, both

Bosnia and the civil war itself became new terrain for this extremist ideology. Money, men, and materiel poured into the conflict to aid the Bosniaks. In the century-old struggle for hegemony among Muslims following the end of the Ottoman Caliphate, Iran and Saudi Arabia assumed leading positions.

In separate works, Stephen Schwartz, John L. Esposito, and Natana J. Delong-Bas situate Saudi Salfi-Wahhabism as a particular orientation of Islam that differs theologically from other orientations. In *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival to Global Jihad*, Delong-Bas characterizes Salafi-Wahhabism as a modernizing movement in its time and seeks to show how today, two different versions of Salafi-Wahhabism exist and are divided in their view of offensive and defensive *jihad*.\(^\text{110}\) John L. Esposito positions this neo-revival movement among the many orientations of Islam in *Islam: The Straight Path* and describes it as the key element of the “reliquiopolitical movement” that first violently subdued the Arabian peninsula and then set its sights on destroying the supposed apostasy of other Muslim orientations, especially Shiism and Sufism.\(^\text{111}\) Stephen Schwartz expounds on these themes in *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa’ud From Tradition to Terror*. Schwartz’s analysis shows both the absolutist and missionary nature of contemporary Salafi-Wahhabism and how the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is seeking to dominate the teaching and practice of Islam worldwide using this theology.

I would be remiss if I did not address a possible negative perception caused by referencing these three works together. Indeed, many critics have negatively assessed

Delong-Bas’ work for an “apologist” stance and Schwartz himself is highly critical of some of her conclusions in *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad.* These heated differences primarily involve Ibn Wahhab’s intent regarding the concept of jihad, modern themes such feminism, and certain intractabilities between Salafi-Wahhabism and the “West.” However, this important debate is beyond the scope of my thesis. There is significant agreement between these three sources that is germane to my analysis of Salafi-Wahhabism’s rising influence in BiH. Specifically, these common themes are the historical roots of Salafi-Wahhabism in the Najd region of the Arabian plateau, Salafi-Wahhabism’s hegemonic role in the contemporary Saudi Arabian theocracy, and *da‘wa*, its aggressive missionary character. All three works make some reference to BiH but their focus is on Salafi-Wahhabism. Scholarly works by other researchers directly address Salafi-Wahhabism in BiH and show how the Salafi-Wahhabism conception of jihad, a point of contention between Delong-Bas and Schwartz, is not a factor in contemporary BiH.

Gilles Kepel in *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* notes the 4,000 Islamic militants who flocked to the Balkan conflict zone but failed to graft the principles of jihad onto the war. Kepel positions the 1992-1995 war within the context of a larger, global, and violent jihad and demonstrates the conflict’s importance to the worldwide *ummah*. In 1992, the Afghan jihad was largely complete and the Algerian civil war was being

contested between Muslims meaning there was no existential threat to Islam in Algeria. Bosnia, by contrast, was perceived as a group of Muslims facing extinction due to their faith. Kepel situates the 1992-1995 war here within the greater conflicts related to jihad and the wide array of actors bidding for leadership of the ummah. Kepel shows how the Saudi attempts at hegemony among Muslims had been somewhat successful over the previous sixty years, but had been shattered by the House of Saud’s response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  

\[114\] Saddam Hussein’s somewhat successful appeal to the global Muslim community was one cause of significant discord in both the Sunni ummah and among the ulema; Saudi Arabia’s appeal to and subsequent hosting of Western, non-Muslim armies was the other. These events seriously called into question the House of Saud’s religious legitimacy just as the war in the SFROY was beginning. In this new conflict zone, Kepel names Saudi Arabia and Iran as “poles of influence” in the conflict; for the House of Saud, this represented an opportunity to recoup some of its eroded leadership of the ummah by supporting coreligionists facing annihilation.

Of particular importance to my examination of the rising influence of Salafi-Wahhabism in BiH, Kepel points out that Saudi support to Bosniaks was through the lens of Da’wa, or the Salafi-Wahhabi view of the propagation of faith. \[116\] However Kepel clearly indicates Saudi largesse and foreign jihadi participation on the Bosnian battlefield did not

\[114\] Ibid., Ch 9.  
\[115\] Ibid., p238.  
\[116\] Ibid., p249.
transform the conflict into a holy war largely due to the conflict’s nationalist framing and
the lack of a devout Muslim middle class.\textsuperscript{117}

Marko Hoare, Steven Burg, and Paul Shoup works reinforce Kepel’s premise that
despite some Islamist fighters joining in kinetic operations, they did not turn the war into
a religious conflict. In \textit{How Bosnia Armed}, Hoare details how the Army of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (ARBiH) grew from the realignment of the Tito-era defense apparatus,
international aid, and domestic politics. Hoare shows the foreign mujahedeen that
formed the El Mujahed Detachment during the war were but a small subset of the
conflict’s belligerents both numerically and philosophically.\textsuperscript{118} They participated in both
conventional armed conflict and the war’s atrocities at a level proportionate to their
modest numbers relative to the overall size of the conflict.

In \textit{The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (sic): Ethnic Conflict and International
Intervention}, Steven Burg and Paul Shoup’s thesis matches analysis done by Kepel and
Hoare. Burg and Shoup evaluated BiH before the war, paying particular attention to
issues of power and special interest, and utilized databases and translations from the BBC,
Agence France Presse, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service to reveal the
origins of the conflict, and the major developments of the war that led to international
intervention.\textsuperscript{119} Burg and Shoup caution against characterizing the conflict solely using
nationalist antagonisms since economic and political issues were also primary

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., Ch10.
contributors. In this more complex view, they show how the international community left BiH unstable since the GFA failed to resolve international norms of state sovereignty and territorial integrity with appeals to ethnicity as a basis of state formation. The presence of foreign fighters did not establish an Islamic republic or de facto caliphate, but they highlight the instability that left terrain for motivated ideologues.

Kepel, Shoup, Burg, and Hoare all agree that the 1992-1995 war did not become a religious struggle in the sense sought by foreign fighters despite Salafi-Wahhabi jihadists joining the battlefield and an influx of economic aid from Salafi-Wahhabi sources. These works show the initial impact of Wahhabism in the region and how its current influence on the regular ARBiH military apparatus is now negligible. The durable Salafi-Wahhabi influence that persists must be drawn from other sources. Among the many projects examined by Anthony Cordesman in *Saudi Arabia Enters The Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions*, he shows the extreme and varied largesse of Saudi officials towards Bosniaks. In Cordesman’s accounting, Saudi Arabia has donated over $600 million USD to rebuild the thousands of mosques, masjids (small prayer halls), mektebs (buildings for education), and Waqf (endowment) buildings destroyed in the conflict. The Saudi government has also supplied missionaries to ensure that a Salafi-Wahhabi interpretation of the Quran is taught. Writing in *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Harun Karcic shows how these structures are now springing up outside the auspices of the Islamic Community (IZ) of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

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120 Ibid.
the official theological apparatus for Bosnian Muslims that has existed in some form for centuries.\textsuperscript{121}

All of these factors (religious extremists, foreign money, foreign missionaries) now exist in the politically unstable environment examined in \textit{Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal} by Gerard Toal and Carl Dahlman. Toal and Dahlman have a much wider focus than the influence of Salafi-Wahhabism in the region, but they effectively quantify both the number of people still displaced in the country and myriad challenges BiH faces implementing the GFA stemming from attempted ethnic cleansing during the 1992-1995 War. They conclude, in part, that the violent dissolution of SFROY follows the trend of increasing ethnic homogeneity in Europe during the twentieth century facilitated by a “hybrid” of two “defeated” systems: fascism and communism.\textsuperscript{122} Their methodology includes discourse analysis, historical census data, current ethno-territorial mapping, survey data, and field research to show the challenges left by ethnic cleansing during the 1992-1995 War now confronting a relatively small nation with 113,000 officially recognized internally displaced persons. Toal and Dahlman conclude that it is too early to tell if attempted ethnic cleansing will ultimately succeed in this formerly heterogeneous area, but offer powerful assessments showing how “ethnically mixed communities…have been transformed into far more homogenous communities” unlike anything Bosnia has ever seen.\textsuperscript{123} Coupled with evidence of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p307.
\end{flushright}
ineffective government structures, this analysis shows how an opportunistic group could find ample open space in BiH. Increasing separation of faith groups means Bosniaks can more easily be directly targeted with economic aid.

The works described here provide data and analysis that will help me determine the current trend of Wahhabi influence in BiH using the theoretical framework established by the English School. Schwartz, Delong-Bas, and Esposito characterize Salafi-Wahhabism and show how it is enmeshed with the Saudi political apparatus. Works by Kepel, Hoare, Burg, and Shoup establish the environment and initial effect of the Salafi-Wahhabi philosophy on the conflict zone. At the cessation of open violence, Wahhabism did not dominate BiH. Toal, Dahlman, and Cordesman look at post-war years in BiH from different angles. Toal and Dahlman show the political disorder in BiH and the rich terrain for opportunist ideology. Cordesman shows how Saudi Wahhabism enters the fray. These sources collectively show how a few thousand foreign fighters failed to stamp their animating ideals on the 1992-1995 war in BiH but how Wahhabism influences contemporary BiH.
CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND MODERN CONTEXT OF SALAFI-WAHHABISM

The narrow segment of the Muslim faith called Salafi-Wahhabism is a different strain of Islam than the Hanafi Islam practiced for centuries in BiH by the Bosniak population.

Local, sensationalist media in the former Yugoslav republics routinely publish inflammatory headlines and articles that conflate “Muslim” and “Wahhabi.”\textsuperscript{124} A Wahhabi is not properly understood as simply a “pious Muslim” nor is it possible to apply the label to an individual based upon their attire or grooming standards.

Wahhabism is a particular orientation of Salafism and it emanates from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,\textsuperscript{125} its initial theater of operation and development. It is true that a Wahhabi can be an Islamist or what a Western observer might label a fundamentalist.\textsuperscript{126} The reciprocal association cannot automatically be made since Islamic fundamentalism is not homogenous.\textsuperscript{127}

It is grossly inaccurate to apply the terms to a Muslim man simply because he has a beard or a Muslim woman simply because she wears hijab or abaya. By this reasoning, certain Shia and Sufi Muslims who have beards could be called Salafi-Wahhabi. This is

\textsuperscript{124} As one of many examples, see Lana Rizvanovic, “Radoncic Promised to Settle Scores with Wahhabis, Kelmendi,” \textit{Oslobodjenje}, March 09, 2013. Trans. BBC Monitoring International Reports.


clearly not the case as Wahhabi beliefs are strictly a strain of Sunni Islam. Ibn Wahhab, the Islamic scholar whose Islamic interpretation is the bedrock of Salafi-Wahhabism, rejected all other forms of Islamic belief and practice even going as far as to personally destroy objects and places venerated by Shia and Sufis as part of his concept of jihad against apostasy.\textsuperscript{128}

**Ibn Wahhab and Wahhabism**

The Wahhabi movement first appeared during the Abbasid Dynasty (750-1519 A.D.) and was a reanimation of the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence. The movement was centered in Najd in what would become the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In Najd, Wahhabism developed as a “hardening of the Islamic fiber.”\textsuperscript{129} Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab led a reformation that was hostile to Shia and Sufi Islam and anything not strictly contained in the Quran and Hadith.\textsuperscript{130} His movement rejected anything construed to be of this world and attacked *bid’ah*, the “heretical” innovations in Islam. Wahhab’s orientation was puritanical, revivalist, and absolutist.

Ibn Wahhab’s alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud became the basis of the Saudi state and was sealed with an oath. In 1744 A.D., Saud greeted Wahhab with the words “The oasis is yours, do not fear your enemies. By the name of God, if all of Najd was summoned to throw you out, we will never expel you.” Wahhab responded “You are the settlement’s chief and wise man. I want you to grant me an oath that you will perform

\textsuperscript{128} Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p
jihad against the unbelievers. In return, I will be imam, leader of the Muslim community, and I will be leader in religious matters.”\(^{131}\)

This arrangement gave Saud a form of religious legitimacy and access to the associated wealth generated from *Zakat*, the mandatory religious tax that is one of the five pillars of Islam. *Jihad* gave him a religiously grounded reason for expansion. Wahhab gained substantial power as the head imam of an ascendant religious-political apparatus. These families became the foundation of what would become, after periods of violence, reconquest by the Ottoman Empire, and defeat of the Hijazi by the Najdi, the modern Saudi state. Today both families remain eminent in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

With Ibn Wahhab’s particular view of Islam inextricably linked to the power of Saudi Arabia’s political apparatus, it is not surprising that Wahhabi Islam has risen in stature along with the Kingdom’s international clout. The Kingdom possesses 17% of the world’s proven oil reserves and is the world’s largest petroleum exporter, which is primarily responsible for its $921.7 billion Gross Domestic Product.\(^ {132}\) Saudi Arabia’s economic climb to global prominence through petrochemical exploitation over the past 80 years has indeed given missionary Wahhabism a previously unimaginable platform via Saudi Arabia’s well-funded government apparatus.

To a non-Muslim, there is a wide spectrum of belief encompassed by the term Islam. To a Wahhabi, there is only one true Islam; it was revealed in the Arabian Desert to

Muhammad and restored by Ibn Wahhab’s interpretation of “pure” order. The order is labeled Salafism.\textsuperscript{133}

**Salafism**

Salafism was the Islam preached by Ibn Wahhab and his descendants and remains the dominant form of Islam in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Salafism portends to recuperate an “authentic Islam” free from “corrupting influences.”\textsuperscript{134} The term “Salafi” is derived from the Arabic *al-salaf al-salih*, translated as the pious forbears. These people are generally understood to be the first generations to follow Muhammad. The *salafi ‘ulama*, therefore, follow a rigid view of the Quran and Hadith that is unmediated by medieval Islamic jurists.\textsuperscript{135} The Saudi Salafi-Wahhabis have, however, found space to utilize modern Salafist, Islamist philosophers.

**Wahhabism, BiH, and the Ottoman Empire**

BiH was under Ottoman control for centuries before the rise of puritanical Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula. During this time, Ottoman Islam based on the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence took deep root in the region.\textsuperscript{136} By the time Ibn Wahhab rose to prominence in Najd, prevailing technological, environmental, and political conditions precluded any measurable Wahhabi influence reaching BiH. Ibn Wahhab and Al Saud began their theocratic state building project on the chaotic, fragmented Arabian Peninsula


\textsuperscript{135} Ibid; p19.

on the opposite side of the Ottoman Empire relative to BiH. Najd was largely seen as a desolate backwater isolated by barren desert and not worthy of military conquest. Largely for this reason, the Ottoman Empire never conquered the Najdis and Ibn Wahhab’s ideology remained independent and outside the Ottoman sphere.\textsuperscript{137}

In this environment, the Saudi state building project focused on fighting to consolidate a series of quasi-independent oasis towns first. Wahhabi forces from Ad Diriyah fought a total of thirty six battles against forces from Riyadh between 1746 and 1773.\textsuperscript{138} This process took over twenty five years and contained Wahhabism to traditional Najdi areas in the central Arabian Peninsula. With the area subdued and their stronger power base established, Saudi forces set forth to capture the holy cities of Mecca and Medina from the Ottomans and attacking what they saw as “apostasy” as in the sacking of the Shiite city of Karbala. Karbala was home to shrines of prominent early Muslims venerated in Shia Islam, religious behavior that is anathema to Salafi-Wahhabism.

Wahhabi fighters did briefly gain control of Mecca and Medina, then part of the Ottoman Empire. This is significant since one of the five tenets of Islam requires Muslims, with some limited exceptions, to complete a pilgrimage called \textit{hajj} to these cities. Wahhabi Saudis presumably held sway over these pilgrims, called Hajjis, during that time, but the control was fleeting as Ottoman Viceroy Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha was immediately ordered to drive out the Najdis. In that military campaign, ‘Ali Pasha’s troops reached all the way to the Najdi ancestral homeland of Ad Diriyah in 1818 and

\textsuperscript{138} Mark Weston, Prophets and Princesses: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2008), p94-96.
virtually wiped out the Saudi family.\textsuperscript{139} The remaining members of the Al Saud family were relegated to reconstituting political power for over a century before an influx of foreign currency from petrochemical exploitation. During that time, BiH had passed out of the political control of the Muslim Ottoman Empire and into the fold of the Roman Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empire and then into the direct control of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Though there was interaction between the Ottoman Empire and Wahhabi-dominated areas, the interaction was limited to kinetic military offensives and counter offensives, not theological exchange.

\textbf{Sayyid Qutb}

The greatest ideological influence on contemporary Islamist movements continues to be the Salafist philosopher and activist Sayyid Qutb.\textsuperscript{140} Qutb sought a renewed Muslim society achievable by refocusing on a literalist Quranic reading. His writings followed the catastrophic, from a Muslim perspective, downfall of the Muslim Ottoman Caliphate and the rise of Arab Nationalism propagated by repressive, socialist, and statist regimes. Qutb’s philosophy yearns for the divine order dictated in the Quran and Hadith. For Qutb, the world had fallen away from these teachings and into a state of ignorance, or \textit{Jahiliyyah}. “It is therefore necessary that Islam’s theoretical foundation-belief materialize in the form of an organized and active group from the beginning. It is necessary that this group separate itself from the jahili society and, becoming


independent and distinct from the active and organized jahili society whose aim is to block Islam.”

This rejection of the prevalent mechanisms of political Europe appropriated by the Arab nationalists of the day is a significant feature of Salafi-Wahhabism. Qutb’s Salafism stands against political movements that are of man and therefore placed above the perfect order designed by God and passed to earth through Muhammad.

In his native Egypt, Qutb’s writings were closely linked to Hassan al Banna’s Ikhwan, or The Muslim Brotherhood. The socialist Nasser Regime suppressed the Brotherhood, the organization was officially disbanded and Qutb was executed. However, many Muslim Brothers were welcomed into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where the University of Medina became the school of choice for the Brothers driven out of Egypt. Sayyid Qutb’s brother Muhammad was one of the Muslim Brothers who relocated to Saudi Arabia once they were released from Egyptian prisons under a general amnesty in 1972. Within a year, Muhammad Qutb had a teaching position at the King Abd Al-Aziz University where he edited and published his brother Sayyid’s works and became an effective instrument of the Salafi-Wahhabi Sheiks. Muhammed Qutb incorporated his brother’s thoughts with those of the Sheiks who had been largely apolitical to that time.

Muhammed Qutb’s relocation to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was useful for the ruling Al Sauds who continued to seek legitimacy through religious association and sponsorship. In return for state sponsorship, Muhammed Qutb revised Sayyid’s universal application of *jahili* society to reveal how elements of true Islam were manifest in the Kingdom. This was acceptable and useful to the Wahhabi sheiks since doctrinally they had put those elements in place and practice. These modern restatements were in line with the simple and direct language Sayyid Qutb used to reach his readers. He wrote in an Arabic that was accessible and largely free of the complex didactic of *ulema* manuscripts, meaning his philosophy could be read and understood by a much wider swath of the population. Through his teaching and publishing, Muhammed Qutb injected Sayyid Qutb’s Salafism into the modern Wahhabism, itself meshed with the state apparatus of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Wahhabism Situated

To a Salafi-Wahhabi, the Islamic tenant of Tawhid, the oneness of Allah described by Ibn Wahhab in *Kitab al-Tawhid*, means the unitary system of the universe is proscribed. Salafism is the belief system on which Wahhabism rests. Wahhabism is the bedrock of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Its religious legitimacy allows its ruler the honorific title

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144 Ulema is an Arabic word used to describe the educated class of Islamic scholars and clerics who hold authoritative religious power.


of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” The Saudi state apparatus is enjoined to Wahhabism in both form and function as its interpretation of Sharia dictated by the Quran and Hadith forms the civic code. Wahhabism allows Saudis in general, and Najdis in particular, to view themselves as Custodians of Islam and this is the correct description and understanding of Wahhabism. It is a Saudi form of puritanical Islam that subsumes, via the conception of Tawhid, what elsewhere is called politics.

Driven by Da’wa and funded by petrochemical wealth, Salafi-Wahhabism is the animating theology of an international society growing in stature. Historical analysis reveals that it developed in its own theater of operation and but is now the animating ideology of a regionally integrated society whose reach extends well beyond its area of origin in the Middle East. Modern banking mechanisms, modes of transportation, and digital connectivity are among the many ways that Salafi-Wahhabism is being propagated and fit what English School scholars refer to as the technological unification of the world.

146 “Saudi Arabia: History of a Civilization.”
http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/KingAbdullah.aspx accessed on December 14, 2012
CHAPTER 5: BOSNIAN ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Introduction

Waqf and Zakat are prominent economic features of Islam related to one another by Ottoman Islamic jurisprudence. Zakat is a tax and is a religious obligation proscribed in the Quran as one of the five pillars of Islam. Rules for the assessment and use of this tax are precisely articulated throughout the text. Waqf is an economic activity based on passages in the Hadith. “After the death of man, his traces are disappearing in the world except in three cases: If he leaves durable goods; if he leaves knowledge that others will use; if he leaves a child who will pray for him.” In BiH, some elements of Waqf and Zakat have radically shifted over time while certain elements have remained constant in form and function. In this chapter, I examine how Waqf and Zakat came into being in BiH with the introduction of Ottoman Hanafi Islam and how they changed through different Bosnian political eras that included state control over both activities before the breakup of SFROY. Through these eras, localized structures developed for Bosnian Waqf and Zakat that are unique for both Europe and greater Islam. For these reasons, the English School of International Relations Primary Institutions of

148 There are more than 30 references to Zakat in the Quran. The spelling Zakat is the most typical English transliteration for the Arabic word. In Bosnian, it is spelled zekat.
149 Waqf is the most common English transliteration. In Bosnian it is spelled Vakuf.

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Territoriality and Sovereignty are useful to this examination of Bosnian religious economic activity to determine Salafi-Wahhabi pressure groups’ influence.

As the only Muslim majority-minority state in Europe, Bosnian law addresses religious economic activity for Muslim, Orthodox, and Roman Catholic faith groups. Since present Waqf falls under the laws of a pluralistic Bosnian state, Waqf holdings are legally part of BiH territory. Hanbali Salafi-Wahhabism, a sub-global organization very different from the legacy Hanafi form of Bosniak Islam, is influencing Bosnian Waqf and potentially violating both Bosnian territoriality and sovereignty while fomenting the overlapping or divided loyalties typical of the English School concept of new medievalism. This is a situation that could facilitate an expanded Salafi-Wahhabi narrative in conflict with ERIS ideals.

**Ottoman Era**

Waqf is a religious trust but in the Ottoman Empire its function was not solely associated with religious ritual. Waqf endowments ranged from bathhouses, inns, and public lands to mosques and Muslim prayer rooms called mektebs. Waqf is, however, properly construed as an Islamic Trust because Sharia law governs how it is formed and used. Under these rules, Waqf is best understood as an unincorporated trust established to provide social services in perpetuity and whose revenue-bearing assets are forever inalienable.\(^\text{152}\) Ottoman Waqf was divided into five categories: religious purposes, educational purposes, charity, social purposes, and commercial purposes. For example,

endowed property could be used as common grazing area and supported by Zakat or rented out with the proceeds supporting the community. Following their military conquest of the Balkans, the new Ottoman Rulers in BiH set about replicating Turkish-style towns in BiH by levying Zakat and using Waqf as economic bedrock for new Muslim communities such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, and Banja Luka.¹⁵³

During this period, grand projects undertaken by notable personalities tended to remain under bureaucratic, centralized control in Istanbul and were well-ordered while individual Waqfs were established “haphazardly.”¹⁵⁴ Under Ottoman Hanafi Sharia law, a family member of the donor was designated by the donor to administer the Waqf for public good and called a mutavelli. This family member would be salaried and was prohibited from using the endowed property for personal gain. By the nineteenth century, however, the Waqf system’s legitimacy was questionable throughout the Ottoman Empire and extraordinary examples of Waqf revenue used for personal gain were rampant.¹⁵⁵ The Ottoman Empire’s Beneficant Reform of 1839 or Tanzimat-I Hayriye placed all Waqf under control of a secular administration directly responsible to the Waqf Ministry.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p842 and p887.
These reforms were meant to end the corruption, bribery, and incompetent management that were perceived as widespread. The reforms also abolished *dhimmitude*, a designation for non-Muslims that bore with it some diminished freedoms, and *jizya*, the poll tax levied against Non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{157} *Dhimmitude* and *jizya* remain features of contemporary Salafi-Wahhabi.

By the time of the reform’s attempted implementation in BiH, however, Ottoman political power was waning in the area. It is not surprising that the elimination of certain taxes like *jizyah* were met with ready compliance. *Jizyah* likely became unenforceable since Muslims were about to become the minority confessional group under a largely Roman Catholic Austro-Hungarian monarchy. However, the implementation of certain aspects of the law such as a more robust, enforceable control mechanism with external oversight would have to wait until the annexation of BiH to Austria-Hungary. At the end of the Ottoman Era, nearly one third (33\%) of the land and most religious buildings in Bosnia were Waqf.\textsuperscript{158}

**Hapsburg Era**

When the Hapsburgs annexed BiH, there were more than 5,000 Waqfs in BiH that existed largely outside the taxation sphere. The bureaucracy set to work enforcing Ottoman reforms and codifying what was actually part of the endowment to further

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develop a centralized, equally applied method of governance. While operating outside the realm of government, a number of Waqfs had been corrupted and were functioning solely to provide tax-free revenue streams to well-heeled families. This arrangement clearly violated Sharia law and diminished state tax revenue. To bring Waqfs within the state apparatus, the State Waqf Directorate was established in 1894.

After public outcry from Muslim Bosnians because the Waqf was now under state control and that state was Roman Catholic, the Statute for Autonomous Administration of Religious and Waqf Affairs established a Waqf Parliament to manage Waqf throughout BiH. The board had eight members: the newly created office of Reis Ul-Ulema, the Waqf Director, and six “religiously educated men.” This effort was in keeping with a shift away from the largely local, privately administered trusts in favor of government-coordinated systems for delivering public goods. These acts pertaining to confessional governance and religious economic activity were done in coordination with the Grand Mufti of Istanbul and represented devolving power and governance from what would become Turkey to BiH.

Though the period of Austro-Hungarian rule of BiH was relatively brief, the pretext of gradualism seen throughout the area was also applied to Waqf because this Ottoman

159 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
policy directly benefitted the Austro-Hungarian state apparatus. As previously mentioned, Muslims in BiH went from being part of the dominant religion in the Ottoman Empire to an extreme minority religious group in the largely Roman Catholic Austro-Hungarian empire. These two factors, gradualism and religious standing, became the basis for an important shift in BiH Waqf along with other long-ranging impacts such as the office of Reis Ul-Ulema.

By quantifying and cataloging Waqf and putting it under the Waqf Parliament, the Hapsburgs affirmed Waqf’s status as a religiously protected legal device that would be under Bosnian control and administration. This was not a unilateral action or particularly unique political situation. Lands conquered by Muslim armies in Europe had, for centuries, been re-conquered by Christian empires and kingdoms. A well-established body of medieval Islamic jurisprudence had developed whereby a non-Muslim ruler had a legitimate governmental claim over religious affairs of the realm. Dating to the Moorish expulsion from Spain, Muslims living in “lost lands” could expect to have a Mufti who served at the pleasure of the government and also regulated the enforcement of Sharia law.\textsuperscript{164} This applied to matters of personal, family, and religious affairs for Muslims and, importantly to this thesis, Waqf and Zakat. These historical developments are especially noteworthy because they are radically divergent from Salafi-Wahhabism; they were brought about by medieval Islamic jurists. These structures also indicate a Bosniak participation in an international society where hierarchical religious structures

\textsuperscript{164} Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germaine, Islam in Interwar Europe (London: Hurst, 2008), p253-256.
similar to the Roman Catholic Church’s organization were established in coordination with Turkish religious authorities.

Before the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Hapsburg administration had finalized the Waqf project begun by the Ottoman Empire. Waqf was formally administered by Bosnians in Bosnia under supervision of the government according to local Hanafi Sharia customs and traditions. The State Waqf Directorate notes that after the end of the Hapsburg Era, 27.6% of the lands of BiH were designated Waqf, a 5.4% decrease from the estimated 33% Waqf in Bosnia at the end of the Ottoman era. Both Waqf and Zakat collection and redistribution were firmly within the sphere of the IZ.

**Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes**

Waqf persisted in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes but the amount of endowed agricultural property was diminished by King Aleksandar’s land reforms during the political instability following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Now entrenched as a political office, the Reis Ul-Ulema continued to oversee the Waqf Parliament during an era of political reformulation where vestiges of large-scale, feudal agrarian estates were targets for destruction by both the state apparatus and violent mobs. This short-lived and chaotic political entity, however, was bookended by WWI and WWII meaning there was little time or appetite for significant change in the Waqf system. Waqf reforms begun in the Ottoman period and largely completed during the Hapsburg Era were further

fixed in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes but its value would be diminished by state seizure of productive land following WWII.

Waqf in Yugoslavia

Field Marshall Tito’s Land Reform Act of 1945 began reconfiguring the economy of BiH, now a part of Yugoslavia. It nationalized 25,000 hectares of Roman Catholic Church property in Croatia and Slovenia. In a related, politically-motivated act to consolidate power under the Politburo, Aloysius Stepinac, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Zagreb was tried on multiple charges relating to wartime activities and sentenced to 16 years confinement.\(^{167}\) It should be noted that the largest faith group in Yugoslavia was Orthodox Christian but also that these parishioners were part of a localized, national church structure. Roman Catholics, by contrast, were theologically subservient to a foreign Pontiff in Rome. The Tito regime took aim at the powerful organization within its borders and subjugated it to the Communist party. During this time, Tito’s regime also cut off financial support to the IZ. The political aims of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were clear; it would be absolute hegemony where outside influence was only allowed by explicit permission.

Noting the fate of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, the IZ capitulated and, in exchange for restored state financial support, gave up significant political autonomy.\(^{168}\) This arrangement seems to have been both economically necessary and convenient.

Turkey, the legal successor of the Ottoman Empire, was not in a position to support the

\(^{167}\) Duncan Wilson, Tito’s Yugoslavia (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p41-44.

\(^{168}\) Ibid., p43.
coreligionist remnants of its former Empire nor were the Muslim countries of the Arabian Peninsula whose petrochemical wealth had not yet arrived. The uneven compromise between the Yugoslav state and the IZ would turn out to be brief. The Yugoslav government closed the Waqf office in 1958 and nationalized most of its property leaving only recognized physical religious structures untouched.¹⁶⁹

Field Marshal Tito’s split with the Kremlin in 1948 meant the economies of Cominform countries and Greece, because of Yugoslavia’s support to the unsuccessful Greek partisan movement, were largely closed to Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁰ By the 1960’s, the Tito regime looked to remittances and tourism as sources of foreign currency.¹⁷¹ Certain Yugoslav citizens enjoyed liberalized travel restrictions and opportunities to work abroad. Bosnian Muslim Gasterbaiter, or guest workers, primarily in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland helped maintain and rebuild mosques and masjids with their remittances.¹⁷² These individuals helped reconstitute a Bosniak form of Islam by supporting Waqf through Zakat and other donations remitted to the IZ. These donations and state support persisted through the next three decades until the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia crumbled.

¹⁶⁹ “The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Waqf Fund.”  


¹⁷¹ Duncan Wilson, Tito’s Yugoslavia (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p 176.

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were particularly turbulent in BiH. The area bounded by Bosnia’s borders had been part of the Muslim Ottoman Empire, the Roman Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and an officially atheist communist republic. It suffered two World Wars and savage occupations. All of this happened over a century and saw Islam go from favored majority to extreme minority and finally recognized constituency.173 Here, at the end of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the war that ended the country’s political existence, it is possible to evaluate Waqf and identify its durable features as a means of establishing its form prior to the dawn of Wahhabism in BiH during the 1992-1995 war.

First, the office of the Reis Ul-Ulema as head of the IZ practicing Hanafi Islam is a recognized and permanent feature of Bosnian Islam. The office was granted religious sanction by the Mufti of Istanbul and followed Islamic legal precedent established in areas no longer under Muslim control such as Spain. It is important to reemphasize the Reis Ul-Ulema’s authority in both matters of Waqf and Zakat. Second, Bosniaks’ Zakat, a religious obligation, has always supported Bosnian Waqf with external assistance emanating from Istanbul. Under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire, there was fluid population movement between modern Turkey and Bosnia. Muslim Bosnians paying Zakat wherever they were during the Eid festival that follows Ramadan would essentially be paying into a fund that also supported Waqf in Bosnia. Fourth, Waqf following a half-century of communism was a shadow of what it once was. Social planning and nationalization meant Waqf was primarily relegated to administering physical religious

173 Muslim Bosnians, or Bosniaks, are legally acknowledged “constituent peoples” of Bosnia-Herzegovina
structures and it was both beholden to and dominated by the state. Waqf land holdings which once covered 33% of Bosnia’s land mass were reduced to zero. However, Waqf holdings at the end of the Yugoslav period were firmly under the Reis Ul-Ulema and included 1706 mosques, 1425 buildings besides mosques, Muslim mausolea and some Dervish lodges.  

Waqf in Contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina: Recoupment and Wahhabism

Following the nationalization of most Waqf holdings under the Tito regime, the endowment’s size was considerably smaller than at any time since its establishment under Ottoman rule. The damage done to what was left of the formalized Waqf during the 1992-1995 War was extraordinary. Fully 69.52% (1,186 of 1,706) of dzamije and mesdzidi mosques were destroyed or damaged. 38.88% of Waqf buildings (554 of 1,425) were damaged or destroyed. Similar levels of destruction for mausolea (48.89%) and Dervish lodges (60.00%) were also observed.  

The economy of BiH was also thoroughly destroyed. Extreme unemployment and remittances from the Bosnian Diaspora remain prominent features of Bosnia’s current economy, as table 1 below shows.

175 Ibid., Note that these figures differ somewhat from others sources but the intent here is to show the wide scale destruction of what was left of the Waqf in BiH after both the Yugoslav era and 1992-1995 war.
Remittances have been a feature of the Bosnian economy since the *Gasterbaiter* programs of Yugoslavia but have since become an even more crucial support to this very weak economy. In the most recent data available, remittances account for over 10% of the economy meaning economic goals of all kinds are likely only possible via substantial external support. BiH is an economically vulnerable state.

Under these difficult economic circumstances, the Waqf Directorate was reconstituted in Sarajevo under the Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997 as the legitimate legal successor to the institution shuttered by the Tito regime in

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176 “The World Bank: Migration & Remittances Data.”
1958.\textsuperscript{177} As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, constitutionally the IZ is “based on the religious (Islamic) legitimate and legal institutions of Bosnian Muslims from the time of the Ottoman administration in Bosnia.”\textsuperscript{178} Under Article III and Article IV, the IZ is further constituted as an “inseparable” part of the Gesellschaft world Islamic community (Article III) whose institutions are derived from the Quran, Sunnat (i.e. Hadith), the “Islamic traditions of Bosniaks,” and the “requirements of time.” Article VIII clearly establishes the IZ as part of the Hanafi tradition, an extremely important feature of the cosmopolitan form of Bosniak Islam.

Articles XXVIII-XXXIII deal directly with the property of the IZ. The articles claim for the IZ all Waqf property including real estate and movable property of the IZ, regular fees, Zakat, revenue generated by Waqf, and future endowments or gifts. Responsibility for Waqf is clearly assigned to the Rijaset as well as Zakat collection. The Rijaset further develops the Waqf Directorate’s constitutional responsibilities. The directorate has broad responsibilities including protection and affirmation of Waqf as lasting property, establishing new Waqfs, legal assistance to the Islamic Community in matters relating to Waqf, appointing mutavellis, supervising their administration of Waqf property, and seeking restitution for lost Waqf property.\textsuperscript{179} This project is as ambitious as it is daunting.

\textsuperscript{177} “Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Hercegovina (sic).” \url{http://www.rijaset.ba/english/images/stories/Constitution.pdf}, last accessed on February 16, 2013
\textsuperscript{178} Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article II, November 26, 1997
Despite the challenges of a dysfunctional state apparatus and stagnant economy, the IZ has three major efforts underway to recapitalize the BiH Waqf using authorities of its constitution. These measures clearly reflect both Bosnia’s centuries of Ottoman heritage and a resumption of the confessional economic reformation project interrupted by Titoism. First, a number of destroyed facilities are being rebuilt by the IZ. Second, there is a legal movement afoot to reclaim property that was confiscated by the state over the past century. Thirdly, new Waqfs are being established. For the IZ, this is an ongoing process that is largely following traditional norms including Zakat collected locally and remitted from Bosniaks abroad, funds from existing Waqf, and support from Turkey as the legal successor the Ottoman Empire.

The Republic of Turkey has stepped up support for Bosnian Waqf since the end of the 1992-1995 war, particularly focusing on legacy items from the Ottoman period in Bosnia. The Turkish Waqf Directorate is funding a 200,000 Euro ($266,000 USD) project to digitize, transcribe, and translate Bosnian Waqf records maintained in Istanbul and a 2m BAM ($1.3m USD) restoration of the Isa-Beg Hammam in Sarajevo. The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) has pledged to support 100

Bosnian schools of “Ottoman heritage.”

TIKA maintains a center in BiH and assists with “social infrastructure development, economic infrastructure development, production sector development, and emergency and humanitarian aid.”

In coordination with the local government in 2012, TIKA devoted 1.3m EUR to a BiH hospital in Goražde.

Turkish support to Bosnia continues to grow and was reported at $20m USD in 2009.

Alongside this Turkish support, a much larger Salafi-Wahhabi financial influence is also evident.

In response to the 1992-1995 war, several Sunni Muslim countries offered aid through Non Governmental Organizations and Saudi Arabia was chief among them. The Islamic NGO list included The Society for the Renewal of the Heritage of Islam (Kuwait), The International Islamic Relief Organization (Saudi Arabia), The Saudi High Commission for Relief (Saudi Arabia), Third World Relief Agency (Sudan), The Egyptian Humanitarian Relief Agency (Egypt), and the Muwaffaq Foundation (Saudi Arabia).

182 “Turkey Supports Bosnian History with “100 Schools Project.””

183 “Turkish International Development and Cooperation Agency.”

184 “TIKA Invests 1,3 Million Euros in Reconstruction of the Cantonal Hospital Goražde.”


Due to its extreme wealth from petrochemical exploitation and its naturally influential position in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia has by far led the effort.

Founded in 1993 under the auspices of Prince Salman Ibn Abdulaziz Al-Saud, the Governor of Riyadh, the Saudi High Commission (SHC) rebuilt Bosnian mosques, schools, cultural centers, and orphanages. In a lawsuit seeking to tie the SHC to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Southern District of New York Judge Richard Conway Case ruled the SHC “was formed by order of the Kingdom's governing body, it provides the Kingdom's aid to Bosnia, it is governed by a Saudi official and its employees are civil servants, it is an organ of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” and therefore was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. A later ruling reversed part of this decision and is allowing the lawsuit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to proceed. The SHC was dissolved in April 2002 just ahead of an investigation scheduled to begin that May but it had already provided over $600,000,000 USD in aid to Bosnia. In 2008, analysts put this figure at over $700,000,000 USD, even though the Saudi High Commission had been forcibly disbanded due to links to

187 “Saudi Charity Dropped from Suit of Sept. 11 Attacks.”
188 Jonathan Stempel, “US Court Revives Victims’ Case Against Saudi Arabia.”
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/us-usa-saudiarabia-sept-idUSBRE9BI0ZX20131219, last accessed March 1, 2014.
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=4f1e0899533f7680e78d03281ff07410&wit_id=4f1e0899533f7680e78d03281ff07410-1-1, last accessed October 10, 2013.
international terrorism. Other reporting substantiates these numbers and indicates the money was spent to sponsor 10,000 Bosnian war orphans, and 3,300 pilgrims for Hajj. Saudi money also built or restored 160 mosques, including the King Fahd Cultural Center in Sarajevo. Compared to the pre-War estimate of 1,700 mosques, nearly 10% of Bosniak mosques have received Saudi-origin funds. This number could be substantially higher. The Saudi Government itself reports funds from the SHC have been channeled to 400 Bosnian mosques; that would represent 24% of the pre-war Bosnian mosque total. The King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Center in Sarajevo is the showpiece of this project and remains under direct Saudi administration notably outside of the IZ organization.

When Saudi money pays to rebuild a mosque, it is rebuilt in an Arabian style. Ottoman architecture is distinct from Arabian architecture. With its broken arches and other arabesque features, the King Fahd Mosque is distinctly Arab. It is the biggest mosque in Europe and can accommodate 5,000 worshippers. Its imams are funded by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and many of those imams have gone there to study. This represents a significant shift in a durable structure that goes back for centuries. Whether centralized or disaggregated, Waqf in BiH has been locally controlled and administered according to an Ottoman Sharia. Both new and reconstituted structures under Wahhabi control stand in opposition to religious and administrative norms of BiH.

In a more extreme example of rising Wahhabi influence over Waqf in BiH that defies Bosnian territoriality and sovereignty, entire villages have also been established outside the authority of the IZ in much the same way Waqf was used to build Muslim towns in Ottoman BiH. Balkan press reports indicate there are now 17 such communities and numbers the inhabitants at 3,000.192 The communities have been called a “violation of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territorial integrity; attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s constitutional order; and generation of ethnic, racial, or religious hatred, discord, and intolerance.”193 Analysis of these communities’ impact on constitutional order will be conducted in a later chapter, but it is appropriate here to note how whole Muslim towns are outside the authority of IZ. Their religious buildings are not part of the Bosnian Waqf Directorate nor is Zakat paid to the IZ. These towns and the 10-24% of mosques rebuilt by KSA are part of the geopolitical rivalry between Saudi-led Salafi-Wahhabism, the historical societal norms of Bosniaks, and the ideals of the ERIS.

Conclusion

Bosnian Waqf goes back to the establishment Ottoman rule and Muslim culture in the region. At its inception, Bosnian Waqf was either locally generated or supported from what would become modern day Turkey, especially in the cases of extreme public largesse. Near the end of five centuries of Ottoman Rule, a new project was undertaken

to bring Waqf within the bounds of a modernizing, technocratic government and the project continued through Hapsburg rule.

The reconfiguration of European politics following WWI introduced a new government and new land reforms under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. During that tumultuous time, King Alexander’s reforms began nearly a full century of BiH Waqf decline. Following WWII, Field Marshal Josip Broz Tito’s rise, and the establishment of a socialist state apparatus, Bosnian Waqf was subject to further regulation and confiscation. By the time BiH emerged as a politically fractured but independent republic, Waqf was much smaller than in the Ottoman or Hapsburg eras, but the IZ was unquestionably the Bosniak hegemony with all facets of the remaining Waqf firmly under its authority. Just like the Orthodox and Roman Catholic hierarchies in BiH, the IZ and its associated Waqf holdings fall under Bosnian state laws that respect each constituent faith group unlike many Sunni-majority countries.¹⁹⁴ That changed beginning in the 1992-1995 War and the introduction of Salafi-Wahhabism, a sub-global society outside the bounds of the IZ and Istanbul, its traditional benefactor. This authority of an alternate sub-global society clashes with the established IZ authority, undercutting Bosnian sovereignty and in some cases even its territoriality, a Buzan-identified English School Primary institution.

Bosnian Waqf Value is an indicator that shows an unmistakable increased Wahhabi influence since the end of the 1992-1995 War. Part of $600-800USD million from the Saudi High Commission has gone to build or restore at least 10% of the physical buildings administered by the IZ. Other reporting indicates the figure may be as high as 24%. Some Saudi-origin funds built structures such as the King Faud Mosque outside the parochial jurisdiction of the IZ. On average, Salafi-Wahhabi influence on Waqf was between $53.8 million USD and $46.2 million USD per year during the era of the SHC. This is nearly two times the reported $20 million dollar annual Waqf contribution from Istanbul and represents a significant change in centuries old practice towards a competing sub-global society.

In the most extreme example of Salafi-Wahhabi influence, separatist Salafi-Wahhabi villages now exist entirely outside of the IZ infrastructure, which is an element of new medievalism. From an initial cadre in the El Mujahid brigade to 17 villages with an eye towards more, Wahhabi extremist influence on Waqf is undoubtedly increasing. These 17 settlements each have a mosque that does not fall under the IZ and therefore for is not part of the Bosnian Waqf. Their holdings are not administered by legally recognized mutavelli. These 17 settlements collect their own Zakat independent of the IZ. In this most extreme practice in BiH, Wahhabism is diminishing the holdings, both real and potential, of the Bosnian Waqf Directorate under the IZ. These extreme cases, however, have a relatively insignificant impact on the overall value of Bosnian Waqf.

Even if there are 17 fully functional settlements inhabited by 3,000 people as is widely reported in regional media, this number is a mere 0.07% of the 1.5 million total Muslim
population of Bosnia. There would presumably be an even smaller loss to Bosnian Waqf value since the religious buildings in the villages do not, to my knowledge, include any substantial Ottoman-era or revenue generating structures. These villages are primarily closed to outsiders which in turn precludes a revenue stream available to IZ Waqf holdings.

I do not mean to imply coreligionist financial support through charity or outside state community is inherently destructive to the recipients. In this particular instance, however, it seems clear that previously durable facets of Bosnian society pertaining to religious economic activity such as the hegemony of the IZ and ties to Turkey are being altered by Salafi-Wahhabism’s rising political influence.

As demonstrated, this influence’s impact is spread across a wide spectrum. At one end, there is the support for orphans and Bosniaks performing Hajj, a religious pilgrimage to Mecca that is one of the five pillars of Islam. At the midpoint of this spectrum, we find the injection of Saudi religious culture and architecture into Bosnian life where none previously existed. The King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo, due to its size and architectural style, is a grand example of this physical and symbolic intrusion. The King Fahd Mosque and associated complexes, like any other contemporary Bosnian mosque, would normally be expected to be part of the IZ. It is not. At the extreme end, the IZ is completely ignored by Salafi-Wahhabi villages whose Waqf, Zakat, and associated administrators are

195 “Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html, last accessed October 16, 2013. Note that the CIA World Factbook indicates 48% of 3,875,723 Bosnian citizens identify as ethnically Bosniak but only 40% as Muslim. The 0.07% figure is based on the 40% figure of Bosnian Muslim citizens. Also note that there has not been an official BiH census since 1991.
all outside the IZ. These arrangements stand in stark contrast and sometimes conflict with the IZ but remain relatively insignificant. The largesse from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is orders of magnitude greater than the impact of a few breakaway settlements and now influences 10% of Bosnian Waqf. Herein lies the problem.

ERIS ideals and Salafi-Wahhabi ideals are in many areas intractable, meaning Salafi-Wahhabism is a barrier to thickening shared norms, rules, and institutions both within Bosnia and between Bosnia and other ERIS countries. Salafi-Wahhabi Waqf holdings are physical inroads for proselytizing by this strongly missionary orientation of Islam. Waqf mosques or other structures outside the IZ are places to preach and distribute literature that counters ERIS ideals such as democratization, human rights, and liberal economic reform that would otherwise be transmitted to aspirant countries via terms of association. Waqf mosques still within the IZ that received Salafi-Wahhabi origin have been stripped of their physical Ottoman characteristics and supplied with similar religious materials. These structures can reasonably be seen as instruments for use by actors whose core beliefs would, if adopted by enough of Bosnia’s population, prevent it from aligning with the norms of European international society and the EU in particular.
CHAPTER 6: FORMAL EDUCATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Introduction

The long history of formal education in BiH has been significantly shaped by topography, religion and geopolitics. The rugged terrain suitable for farming predisposes the country towards small agrarian communities that are somewhat isolated because of their difficult approaches. Historically, this difficult topography kept population density low and complicated formal education before an era of reliable, easy transportation. Even after a century of Ottoman rule, regional population densities at the beginning of the seventeenth century were less than half of France and Italy and perhaps less than one third of the Low Countries, all areas with established higher education at this point. \(^{196}\)

This low population density persisted during the early Ottoman period due to the chaos of war and plague meaning it would take the resources of the empire to increase access to and availability of schools.

As Christian Europe entered a period of modernity, so too did the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Porte administered public education to consolidate imperial power, strengthen his own power base, and modernize Ottoman society. During certain epochs, this was necessary to match European military improvements resulting from a professionally educated, full-time army. At other times, education became an instrument of enticement whereby an ambitious non-Turk could climb the rungs of Ottoman society to the benefit of both the individual and the state apparatus.

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Using education in Bosnia for state building was certainly not unique to the Ottoman Empire. The Hapsburgs, King Alexander, Field Marshal Tito, and the modern political entities within Bosnia-Herzegovina still regard education as a state-building apparatus. This diverse legacy has, however, left Bosnian education with a unique and complicated formulation. Unlike modern Turkey and much of Western Europe where religion’s role in education has receded over the past four centuries, religion persists as an important and powerful feature in BiH education. Religion has become an important ethnic marker in Bosnian society to differentiate “constituent” peoples.

Contemporary BiH faces significant and persistent challenges dating to the 1992-1995 war. A fractured political environment makes implementation of any changes difficult through official channels, but has still managed to legislate standards in accordance with ERIS standards like the Bologna Process and Lisbon accords. This is significant as a possible move towards Gesellschaft EU membership since ruling elites have legislated this shared norms for the institution of education. However, an extremely weak economy means BiH is still utterly dependent on foreign aid. Together with the difficult terrain that can isolate some communities, multiple fault lines are open for potential exploitation in the BiH. Education is likely susceptible to influence by actors that have the resources to overcome these challenges.

Unlike my previous analysis of Waqf in BiH where the subject had a centuries-old norm that I could reference as a baseline and thereby measure Wahhabism’s impact against, education in BiH has evolved over the centuries. In the midst of this dynamism, however, religion’s prominent position in education has persisted and it has fed both nationalism and societal division. My continued examination of the influence of Wahhabism in BiH
will now focus on the obligatory, state-funded education system in contemporary BiH using the English School of International Relations Primary Institutions of Nationalism and Equality of People. I will also narrow my focus to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) vice including the Republik Srpska (RS) that is largely under Serbian Orthodox hegemony. FBiH, however, is home to the majority of Bosniaks and most of the Wahhabi settlements in the region. Whereas the RS has a unitary school board, the Federation is divided into 10 different cantons, each with its own school board.  Still, BiH ruling elites have attempted to align Bosnian education with greater ERIS standards in an attempt to fully join European society. Under the influence of Salafi-Wahhabism, however, schools could be indoctrinating generations of Bosniak pupils into a belief system contrary to the ERIS that derails or delays Bosnian EU accession.

Ottoman Era: Empire and Caliphate

Once fully incorporated into the Ottoman Empire, BiH education of all kinds benefitted from the stability of Pax Ottomana. The same geographic challenges stemming from rugged terrain impacted education, but Ottoman resources established institutions closely linked to their capital. Christian parochial education persisted while the Ottoman government established parallel Muslim institutions of higher learning. Under the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire, individuals were neither classified by race nor ethnicity but by their religion. Non-Muslim Ottoman subjects were granted the

197 “Overview of Higher Education System in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
right to organize under their own ecclesiastical heads. In this way, confessional groups remained responsible for some education structures but there were initially significant exceptions to fulfill the needs of the expansionist Ottoman Empire.

Across the empire, the Ottoman Turks implemented the devşirme system that took young boys from their families, forcibly converted them to Islam, and educated them to become janissaries. In its two centuries of existence, over 200,000 Bosnian children were conscripted under the devşirme system. As men, many of these Istanbul-educated janissaries were sent back to govern Bosnia while some remained in Istanbul producing nine Grand Viziers in the sixteenth and seventeen centuries. This system established long-lasting ties between Istanbul and the Bosnian reaches of the Ottoman Empire, but it was a relatively small part of the Ottoman contribution to education in the region.

Ambitious university construction projects are better examples of education in BiH during the Ottoman period. In Sarajevo, Gazi Husrev Bey Madrassa was established in 1537. Shortly after, Karadoz-bey Madrassa was founded in 1557 in Mostar. Behram-bey Madrassa followed in Tuzla in 1626. After an extended lull, Elci Ibrahim Pasha

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Madrassa opened in 1706 in Travnik.\textsuperscript{202} The Gazi Husrev Bey Madrassa is a good example of both the physical architecture and curriculum typical of the period. It was built in an Ottoman style meaning it has an interior courtyard accessible through an arched doorway and a dome-covered lecture room called a \textit{dershana}.\textsuperscript{203} The initial curriculum was set to model those in Istanbul and covered seven fields called Calligraphic, Oral, Rational, Spiritual, Practical-Rational, Theoretical-Religious, and Practical-Religious.\textsuperscript{204} In this curriculum, students were taught in the local vernacular, Turkish, and Arabic. It is also important to note that religion and religious education in the Muslim world will always be closely related to the Arabian Peninsula. In Islam, the Quran is believed to be the literal word of Allah transmitted through the intermediary Muhammed. A Quran is only considered authentic if it is written in Arabic. For this reason, it is quite reasonable that an Islamic institution would incorporate a significant amount of Arabic into its curriculum. This should not be misconstrued as a Wahhabi influence since the founding of Gazi Husrev Bey Mosque and Madrassa far predated Ibn Wahhab’s birth. Islamic religious instruction in this time period followed the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence in BiH and throughout the Ottoman Empire. Formal and informal education evolved and modernized in BiH during its centuries under the Ottoman bureaucracy. Before the Ottoman conquest of BiH, the Roman


Catholic Church was largely responsible for education in medieval Bosnia while Herzegovina was primarily Eastern Orthodox. It is important to note that in largely agrarian BiH, few people were literate in any language.\textsuperscript{205} As in the rest of Europe, education was primarily the domain of wealthy and noble landowners. Just as Waqf and Zakat were reformed by the Beneficent Reform or \textit{Tanzimat-I Hayriye} beginning in 1839, education changed to reflect the rise of modernity.\textsuperscript{206}

**Hapsburg Era: Formalization and Modernity**

Following the Berlin Congress of 1878, the BiH transition from Ottoman rule to the Austro-Hungarian Empire was at first glance cataclysmic for a predominantly Muslim area that had been part of a majority Muslim empire. Muslims were now the minority religion in a Roman Catholic Empire to whom Roman Catholic Croats had long looked to for coreligionist support. The Hapsburgs introduced German, Hungarian, and Czech; popularized new cultural activities such as theater, ball, and horse racing; and introduced new religious rites to the region.\textsuperscript{207} More remarkable, however, was the cosmetic nature of many of these changes. These were customs and leisure pursuits primarily to satisfy the newly arrived bureaucracy who would ultimately return home after their terms of service were complete. Army postings were a prime example of this fluid social dynamic. Army postings in Bosnia were primarily Hungarian while Bosnian conscripts were sent to


Hungary. Unlike in the Ottoman Era when government institutions at all levels were
drawn close to the Ottoman capital, BiH under the Austro-Hungarian Empire maintained
and strengthened its own character. Substantive social change continued but as part of a
gradualized process.

Hapsburg rule maintained civic divisions and religious institutions from the Ottoman
period. For this examination of education in BiH, it is important to note what changes
Hapsburg rule brought and what structures endured. Each ethno-religious community
maintained its own state-subsidized school system and the Muslim community also
maintained shariat schools to train Islamic judges.\(^{208}\) Traveling Imams and small
immigrations of limited consequence did impact Muslim religious practice including
education in the region before the fall of the Ottoman Empire and through Hapsburg rule,
but Balkan Islamic religious hegemony was headquartered in Istanbul. Still, an extreme
minority of children actually attended school despite the 200 new primary schools, three
high schools, technical training school, and a new teacher college in the region.\(^{209}\) It is
important to note here that for centuries to this point, religious matters had been handled
separately for Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, and to a lesser extent Jewish
inhabitants of what would become BiH.

As previously discussed in regards to Waqf, Hapsburg rule in many ways formalized,
advanced, and in some areas completed a modernization system begun under Ottoman
rule in BiH. This included the education system that continued to break along ethno-

\(^{208}\) Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press,
1996), p143.
\(^{209}\) Ibid., p 144.
religious lines. Hapsburg administrators set up a free education system and separate instruction was given by each religious community’s clergy. Hapsburg rule also set the stage for the continued modernization in Bosnian education that followed World War I and the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

The turbulent and fractious political environment fraught with extreme nationalism following World War I did not allow for functional government, much less a functional education system. Universities did continue to function across the region with varying success. In this time, however, fewer than 10% of pupils advanced beyond the fourth grade and refugees from the Bolshevik Revolution could be found teaching across the Balkans though they did not speak Serbo-Croatian.

A basis for a modern, unified school system did not exist in the region until January 6, 1929 when King Alexander proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the mantra “One State, One Nation, One King!” To this point, there had not been any national laws governing education but in that same year six were passed. The laws were wide-ranging and covered elementary and secondary education as well as teacher’s schools. Regulations also covered textbooks and religion and both would be subject to a Chief Education Council. Geography, literature/grammar, religion, and history were

210 Ibid., p 143.
211 Ibid., p103.
national subjects. The goal was a centralized system that would teach *narodno jedinstvo* or Yugoslavism.²¹³

Education was a key facet of this organization. The Great Madrassa of King Alexander I in Skopje was founded by the king himself on April 28, 1929. The school’s vision was to educate religious officials for Southern Yugoslavia with an eye towards continuing higher education for graduates. The official language of instruction was Turkish and many courses were taught in Serbo-Croatian. This is significant because the Ottoman period was over at this time and without any serious possibility of a hegemonic return in the region thanks to the Great Powers of the time. This indicates how deep-rooted the ties with Turkey remained through two massive social and political upheavals. The curriculum also reflects both the modernity of Europe and the regional Islamic tradition directly from the Ottoman Empire.

The Great Madrasa’s balanced education was divided into three parts: religion, language, and a secular curriculum. The religious portion was to last for two years of the overall eight-year program and represented 11.5% of the course of study. This module focused on the Quran, law (*fiqh*), introduction to Islamic sciences, Islamic inheritance law, Quran commentary, and history of Islam. These Islamic religious courses were all taught according to the Hanafi tradition. The language module accounted for 40% of the course and focused on Serbo-Croatian, French, Arabic, Turkish, German, and Latin. Finally, the secular module covered contemporary European courses in math, history, physics, and chemistry.

King Alexander’s Yugoslavism was a first step towards universal education and accreditation. Unfortunately for the project, the same nationalist competition between ethnic groups that would later bedevil the formation of coherent government also stifled this first awkward attempt. Muslims claimed discrimination by omission in the history books. Croat and Serb council members argued over language in grammar books. Slovene politicians agreed to education using either Latin or Cyrillic alphabets but were constantly on guard against being “Serbo-Croatized.” King Alexander’s attempted Yugoslavism ended with his assassination but the system was not without achievement. Alexander recognized education’s role in creating and propagating a nation. Teachers were charged with developing citizens and as such their activities would be closely regulated. His attempted rule by decree stood little chance of success due to marginal funding and strong centuries-old historical narratives. Field Marshall Tito learned and applied several lessons for an education system in a constituted Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after WWII. Serbian Chetniks, Croatian Ustashe, the Red Army, the Wehrmacht, and Tito’s partisans all fought for control of parts of what would become BiH. It is not surprising to note that Bosnians fought on all sides of the complex war. It is also not surprising to see that wide-scale formalized education could not exist during this time. In the post-war era, Tito set forth a major nation-building project and just as for Alexander, education was intended to be an instrument of the state apparatus to create “Yugoslavians.” Tito, however, had little use for many of the religious traditions in the region.
“Yugoslav” Education

Field Marshal Tito’s Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia was an attempt to build a nation on the demolished territory known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes following WWII. Education reform was central to Tito’s platform and his Communist party saw education as an instrument to establish a strong base of future communists who could build the nation literally and metaphorically. Well-educated economists and engineers would rebuild and advance infrastructure destroyed during years of war. Well-indoctrinated communists would adhere to Tito’s tenets of “unity and brotherhood.”

As a prime instrument of state creation, education received 25% of Tito’s early budgets.

The federal government still faced the legacy problems from Alexander’s era, especially regarding politicized history books. Educational committees had the unenviable task of balancing polarizing national historical narratives at a time when the central government was inadvertently codifying a new “nation” of Bosniaks. Additionally, the government also had to address a new problem. The wars had stunted matriculation for an entire generation and physically destroyed infrastructure. Tito’s central planning committees used these two circumstances to largely sidestep issues that crippled Alexander’s attempt to rule by decree.

Under Field Marshal Josip Broz Tito, 22 of the 23 madrassas dotting Yugoslavia were closed. Only the Gazi Husrev-bey Madrassa in Sarajevo received official government sanction. Tito’s ambitious nation-building project did not necessarily aim to diminish Islam in the area that is now BiH. Rather, it was to consolidate power in a central government that would lead “Yugoslavs” regardless of ethnic markers, including religion. The goal was a central, consolidated and local political power base with personal allegiances from all citizens.

Tito’s Yugoslavia inherited several legacy institutions of higher learning and established two new universities at Sarajevo and Skopje in 1949. A 1952 United Nations report shows five primary institutions of higher learning in the country. These schools were in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Skopje, and Sarajevo and the ascendant communists set to formalizing admission procedures, evaluation standards and curriculum content. The University of Sarajevo was a typical Yugoslav institution of higher learning and had faculties of Law, Medicine, Agriculture, Forestry, Engineering, and Law. Stalinist communism heavily regulated all these institutions.

Just as in King Alexander’s Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, teaching practices were centrally planned and dictated. Education in Law would reflect the new dictums of the state that had suppressed Islamic law in 1946 and banned hijab in 1950. Yugoslavia


also shut down all mektebs and criminalized teaching children in mosques.\textsuperscript{218} This secularization also applied to the Roman Catholic and Orthodox faiths; parochial school systems were also subsumed by the state. All education institutions were state-controlled and adhered to the unique challenges of balancing federalism, regionalism, and nationalism within a single government. For example, the communist party abolished Muslim cultural societies but established an official Islamic association. The Islamic publishing house in Sarajevo was closed and “Muslim” textbooks were banned. This changed in 1964 when a state religious textbook was published and included as part of the approved curriculum in BiH.\textsuperscript{219}

As documented in the 1952 UN Report “The Organization of Higher Education in Yugoslavia,” education would focus on creating “specialists” who would possess the skill to physically build the country’s social and physical infrastructure. The reorganization of the country’s school system emphasized subjects for this purpose such as engineering, law, and teaching. It also capitalized on the extreme backlog of potential students. University enrollment soared from 17,247 in 1938-39 to 52,480 in 1949-50.\textsuperscript{220} As in previous eras and in keeping with prevailing socialist models, primary education remained compulsory and free with significant state subsidies for students of no means to attend university.

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., p 195
By 1952, Tito’s government had set in motion a completely reformed education system that had previously broken along religious lines for 400 years. This certainly did not end private religious practice, however. Concealed religious instruction continued in homes, church halls, and mosques. The same difficult physical terrain that had always facilitated some freedom from outside centralized state control benefitted these unofficial practices. Just as the Bosnian Church operated on the fringes of Rome’s control in medieval Bosnia, education in Bosnia could be heavily influenced but not completely run from Belgrade.

After the Yugoslav split with the USSR, Tito’s non-aligned movement allowed some students to study abroad. In the 1970s and 1980s, some of the same policies that allowed guest workers to work abroad allowed students to study abroad. Many Bosnian Muslims took the opportunity to study at non-aligned nation universities in the Middle East. Some of these international students learned “local Muslim (Bosnian) practices were not considered Islamic by the more scripturalist Islamic instructors and were modified through preaching and education.”

For my analysis of education, it is simply important to note that several hundred Bosnian Muslims were educated in Wahhabi-dominated institutions during a period of fervent pan-Islamic revival.

At the end of the Yugoslav period, universal formal education was administered by the country’s republics under a federal system. In some instances, formal education could be viewed as breaking along religious lines since some republics exhibited very low levels of heterogeneity. However, in socially diverse BiH, religion was largely pushed out of

the public sphere for four decades. This would change following the 1992-1995 war and
the impact on formal education was severe.

Contemporary Bosnia

During the 1992-95 war, the centralized Tito-era education system disintegrated along
with the rest of the Yugoslav political entity. In its place, the “The GFA left a chaotic
legacy for education, creating an institutionally complex structure that has made the task
of educational reform exceptionally challenging.”222 While the GFA managed to halt
major kinetic military operations in the former Yugoslavia and provided the space to
resume some state functions, it fundamentally failed to resolve a key factor directly
contributing to the 1995-1995 war: competing visions for the role of the state.223 Today,
BiH is dealing with both a post-war and a post Cold War transition.224 Formal,
nationwide education administration is proving exceedingly difficult due to bureaucratic
barriers erected by the GFA.

The GFA established 13 different school boards in BiH for a potential student
population of less than 250,000. First, the BiH school system is divided between the
FBiH and RS and a special district-level board has been established for Brcko. Within
FBiH there are 10 cantonal school districts. Of those ten districts, five are largely
Bosniak, three are largely Croat, and two are ethnically mixed.225 Section III, Article IV

222 Clare Magill, Education and Fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Paris: Institute
for Educational Planning, 2010), p13.
223 Ibid.
224 May Shatzmiller, Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in
225 Clare Magill, Education and Fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Paris: Institute
for Educational Planning, 2010), p21.
of The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes FBiH cantons responsible for education policy, regulation, and provision.  

The Dayton Accords acknowledged and protected Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian as the languages of BiH. BiH is signatory to the European Convention on the Rights of the Child which guarantees that a child is educated in their native tongue. In the ethnically mixed cantons and in combination with the rights of children to be educated in their own language, the result has been the “two schools, one roof” phenomenon where Bosniak and Croat children attend classes separately using the same building even though “Bosniak” and Croatian are mutually intelligible. The largely homogenous RS, by comparison, has a single school board that administers all education.

In an attempt to overcome these strong social divisions that break along ethno-religious lines, the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced a common core curriculum that attempts to develop a broad subject matter expertise and produce graduates with the necessary skills to fuel competitive economy. Education at either a public or a legally recognized private

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school is compulsory in both RS and the FBiH from ages 6 to 15.\textsuperscript{230} Education law, like
the Constitution of BiH, is explicitly written for recognized “constituent peoples” of BiH
meaning Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. It is particularly sensitive to religious instruction,
language of instruction, and student mobility. Joining European international society is
also a prominent feature of the law. Under the Framework Law on Primary and
Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 1, the basic principles in
education are 1) Rights of children to an education, 2) Importance of Children’s Rights,
3) Enhancing human rights adherence, and 4) Freedom of Movement.\textsuperscript{231}

\textsuperscript{230} Clare Magill. “Education and Fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina” International
Institute for Educational Planning, Paris, France, 2010
\textsuperscript{231} Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and
accessed April 17, 2013.
Model of Framework Curriculum for the Nine-Year Primary School in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Weekly Lesson Timetable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>First Cycle</th>
<th>Second Cycle</th>
<th>Third Cycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language and literature*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First foreign language</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second foreign language</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of nature</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biology</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>My environment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture of living</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology of ICT</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Science</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical education and health</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory electives**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Bosniak, Serbian or Croatian

**Religious education and another subject in grades 8 and 9

An examination of the table above indicates a national curriculum consistent with European standards for education regarding math, physical science, and humanities. This is attributable to the stated BiH desire to join the European Union as well as the

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continued presence of stabilizing forces under the GFA.\textsuperscript{233} Adult literacy stands at 97.9\% of the overall population and 96.5\% of the female population. Total school expectancy stands at 14 years (13 male, 14 female).\textsuperscript{234} Music, European art education, and certain aspects of both History and Biology appear in line with a modern, secular education.

Pupil progression falls off beyond primary school. The most recent data available shows the mean expected years of school stands at only 8.7 years since enrollment falls from a primary school net enrollment of 96\% to 77\% for secondary school and 7\% for tertiary school.\textsuperscript{235} A large portion of BiH society takes part in neither the education system nor the employment sector. These factors are attributable to the political instability in the region and are not likely related to a rejectionist religious influence on the education sector.

The international community plays a major role in elevating education in BiH. In 2011, BiH received $750 million USD in grant and loans through the Donor Coordination Forum for Bosnia-Herzegovina. As with past years, 2\% ($15 million USD) of this budget was dedicated to education according to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of

\textsuperscript{233} “EU Enlargement: The Next Seven.” BBC. \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11283616}, last accessed April 17, 2013. BiH signed the Stabilization and Association agreement in June 2008 and is currently an EU candidate state.


Finance and Treasury Donor Mapping Report. Donations from Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States are all detailed in the report. Multiple supranational organizations are also included such as the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Commission. These countries and institutions focus on improving education standards, availability, and relevancy to future employment in various technical sectors. Even with such international support, taken together, high unemployment, a complicated educational bureaucracy, and extremely high unemployment form significant seams in the weak state apparatus that can be easily exploited.

Sanctioned Islamic Education in BiH

Official Muslim religious education in BiH operates under the auspices of the IZ which means, constitutionally, IZ Islamic education follows the Hanafi tradition. Under Article IX and LXIX of the Constitution of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the IZ is responsible for Islamic education. Under Article XXVII, members of the IZ have an obligation to receive an Islamic education and upbringing. Subordinate to the Reis ul-Ulema, the Grand Mufti is responsible, by Article XLV to interpret Islamic teaching and by Article XLVII conduct the Mufti Council comprised of the Grand Imams


and principles of Islamic Formal High schools. Article LII gives the Rijaset authority to appoint, transfer, and dismiss these Imams and make decisions concerning Islamic educational institution registration. This article also makes the Rijaset responsible for teacher certification and selection for the Faculty of Islamic Teachers’ Academies.238

In line with these responsibilities, the IZ develops and approves textbooks for instruction on Islam in FBiH and trains accredited Muslim religious teachers. For older students, the IZ also operates six private Islamic high schools that are authorized by the state and are funded by the state, IZ, and private donations. The high schools meet the national-level standards for education and are in line with the Bologna Process. For continuing higher Islamic education, three of the eight BiH public universities have Islamic faculties; there are no private universities.239 The universities with Islamic faculties are Sarajevo, Bihac, and Zenica.240

The IZ also operates 1,400 mektebs to educate approximately 60,000 elementary aged children in Islam practice outside of state schools. These private religious schools are meant to teach children how to be Islamic where as instruction in state sponsored schools tends to teach children about Islam. These complimentary school systems are rooted in

the aftermath of the 1992-1995 war and courses called Culture of Religions which were fostered by the Inter-Religious Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  

### Salafi-Wahhabi Education in BiH

Of the three FBiH Islamic faculties, only Sarajevo is completely operated by the IZ as a Waqf institution funded by Zakat. Of note, it was established in 1977 when Yugoslavia was a stable political entity and well before the introduction of Wahhabism during the 1992-1995 war. It is well regarded within Bosnia and may one day be developed into an international Bosnian Muslim university. Most of the faculty was educated at other Yugoslav universities or their successors.

The other two universities, Zenica and Bihac, were founded in the era of the 1992-1995 war with Saudi Arabian funding and now show a high degree of Wahhabi influence. The faculty of these schools was educated almost exclusively in Saudi Arabia where only the Hanbali tradition of Islamic jurisprudence is legally taught. The recommended reading lists are replete with Hassan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi. This tradition draws very strict, gender-specific lines that are incompatible with the ERIS principle of the equality of people.

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Additionally, both universities are heavily engaged in translation work for religious texts originally in Arabic to Bosniak. Some of these works are typical Islamic texts such as the Quran or works by Al-Gazali. However, much of the translated work is from the aforementioned Salafi writers on the schools’ reading lists. As an example, of the 513 Arabic texts translated into Bosniak over the twenty-year period 1990-2010, 26 were religious works by al-Qaradawi. Arabic texts translated into Bosniak are overwhelmingly religious and are being translated at a rate five times greater than Turkish to Bosniak texts.

The University of Zenica Islamic Pedagogical Faculty Undergraduate Program offers Bachelor of Arts in Islamic Religious Teaching and Bachelor of Science in Social Pedagogy degrees. The University of Bihac Islamic Faculty of Education offers only a Bachelor of Arts in Religious Teaching. As noted in the table below, together these schools have slightly fewer students than the Faculty of Islamic Studies at the University of Sarajevo but they are producing graduates at a much higher rate.

244 Ibid.
Major Institutions of Islamic Higher Education in the Balkans, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>City/Country</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
<th>Number of Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty of Islamic Studies</td>
<td>Sarajevo, BiH</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty of Islamic Education</td>
<td>Zenica, BiH</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty of Islamic Education</td>
<td>Bihac, BiH</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though the Saudi Wahhabi influence on both Islamic faculties at Zenica and Bihac is unmistakable, it is not absolute. For example the main website for the University of Zenica shows pictures of women unveiled engaged in activities consistent with any typical university setting. The Islamic Faculty of the University of Bihac maintains its own website apart from the main university website and shows women participating in university life, albeit wearing abaya and niqab, but their faces are exposed while exercising on a stair climber or studying. The website even shows a brief interview clip of a female student discussing life at the campus. These displays certainly contrast

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greatly with Saudi Arabian norms where women have only recently been allowed to appear on television with exposed faces and advertisements in store windows obscure human faces.251

There are other, less prevalent Wahhabi influences on mainstream BiH religious education. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia still provides scholarships for Bosnians to study in Saudi Arabia and supports the publishing industry for free religious texts typically handed out at mosques or mektebs. As noted in the Waqf chapter of this thesis, the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Center operates outside the control of the IZ courtesy of funds and personnel from Saudi Arabia. A center for Islamic religious education is part of the complex. In contrast to other established structures such as the Gazi Husrev Bey Madrassa, the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Center is built in an arabesque style. The mosque is the largest in the Balkans and Islamic militants have reportedly chosen it as their place of worship.252 In FBiH, however, there is a far more drastic form of Wahhabi education rooted in the Wahhabi settlements discussed in my examination of Bosnian Religious Economic Activity.

In Gornja Maoca, Nusret Imamovic has altered the state approved curriculum to match his view of Islam. The immediate impact is on the children of the 20 families in the village. At Imamovic’s direction, the local schools have reportedly eliminated music

251 Aryn Baker, “In Saudi Arabia, Women’s Voices are Starting to be Heard.”
252 Vivienne Walt, “Bosnia’s Islamic Revival.”
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1902746-2,00.html, last accessed April 30, 2013
instruction after labeling it *haram*, or forbidden, in Islam. He has also introduced instruction in Arabic and is teaching Ibn Wahhab’s version of Islam. This instruction is happening in a geographically isolated area. In earlier eras of Bosnian history, geographic isolation had a detrimental effect on Bosnian education since the rugged terrain kept population density low and was a significant barrier to movement. Today traditional physical barriers to movement in the region are easily overcome with modern transportation and digital technology. It is Imamovic’s choice to remain isolated by restricting physical access to the village. The isolation is not complete, however. Imamovic and his Wahhabi cohort are prolific Internet users for Islamic education to include sermons. Imamovic’s curriculum is presumably used at the other 16 Wahhabi-dominated villages in BiH; this is clearly in violation of Bosnian law, the GFA, and many European accords. It is important to note that this extreme circumstance is relatively insignificant. Even if each settlement operates its own primary school, those 16 schools would pale in comparison to the 2,300 other primary and secondary public schools throughout the country. Only 0.69% of schools would be operating in this extreme environment.

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253 “Who is the Wahhabi Leader Nusret Imamovic?” E-novine. [Link](http://translate.google.ae/translate?hl=en&sl=sr&u=http://www.e-novine.com/region/region-licnosti/34618-vehabijski-voa-Nusret-Imamovi.html&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dnusret%2Bimamovic%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dsafari%26tbo%3Dd%26rls%3Den&sa=X&ei=PAHjUMvUCpOS0QWZ-IBo&ved=0CFcQ7gEwCA) last accessed January 1, 2013.

Conclusion

The overwhelming majority of students in BiH attend schools whose state curriculum conforms to greater European society standards under the Bologna Process and Lisbon Accords. This seems to indicate that Bosnian elites have backed up a publicly expressed desire to join the EU by aligning the Bosnian education system with EU standards and could positively contribute to Bosnia’s *Gesellschaft* accession to the EU. However, these seemingly shared norms are certainly more complex than a simple curriculum review reveals.

Unlike the most of Europe, diverse religious education that breaks along Roman Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Muslim confessional lines has resumed a privileged position in BiH education. In some ways, this is a historical norm dating back over six centuries. However, current ethno-religious chauvinism between the Croat, Bosniak, and Serb school systems reflected in social science instruction is indicative of the deep social fault lines left by 1992-1995 war.255 In some ways, GFA-legislated social divisions and a stagnant economy have left the school system quite vulnerable to outside influence and ideologies and this could be detrimental to Bosnia’s EU aspirations.

The Bosnian state apparatus is still heavily dependent on foreign aid. Most international aid flows through supranational organizations to benefit broad swaths of the country, but Saudi Arabia has been able to specifically target Bosniaks via donations to Islamic religious projects in Muslim majority cantons because of GFA-legislated social divisions.

There are many ways this is happening in the education sector. Saudi Arabian funds built and still support the Islamic Faculty at Bihac. Most professors at the Islamic Faculties of both Bihac and Zenica were educated in Saudi Arabia and these universities are heavily involved with translating religious, Wahhabi texts from Arabic into Bosnian. Both universities are also producing Islamic religion teachers at a rate roughly equivalent to the Hanafi tradition of the Islamic Faculty at the University of Sarajevo. Salafi-Wahhabi theology does not support the equality of people, an English School Primary Institution and bedrock of the ERIS; gender is a primary example of how in Salafi-Wahhabi theology treats people differently under Sharia, its legal code.

The communities founded by Nusret Imamovic and the remnants of his Active Islamic Youth (AIO) organization are at the extreme end of the spectrum indicating the Wahhabi influence on formal education in BiH. The settlements are likely breaking both national and international laws by teaching pupils in unapproved schools, by an unapproved curriculum, and in a foreign language. Their continued operation is one of myriad indicators showing how weak the BiH government remains, but the students affected remain statistically negligible.

Before the 1992-1995 war, formal education in BiH had a near-continuous tradition of breaking into confessional groups. After a four-decade interruption by policies of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, religion across all “constituent people” faiths has resumed its privileged space in education. This has likely been fueled by nationalist antagonisms and this is particularly problematic since Salafi-Wahhabism would move Bosniaks farther away from cooperation with their Croatian and Serbian compatriots.
For the first time, Islamic pedagogical students are being taught by a system showing a Salafi-Wahhabi influence.

Pedagogical universities have been built by Saudi funds, are staffed by Saudi educated professors, are currently translating Wahhabi books into Bosnian, and they are graduating teachers at a high rate relative to Bosnia’s traditional Hanafi pedagogical university. For these reasons, the previously negligible Salafi-Wahhabi influence on formal education in BiH is small but postured for future growth.

Approximately 50% of indigenous Bosnian Muslim religious teachers each year are earning degrees from the faculties at Zenica and Bihac, schools closely associated with KSA and Salafi-Wahhabism. These inroads are potentially problematic since the teachers have the potential to propagate the Hanbali tradition of Salafi-Wahhabism in direct competition with the traditional Hanafi, Ottoman-era Islam of BiH. This has the potential to undercut BiH sovereignty, another English School Primary Institution, and turn Bosniaks away from European integration since the views are outside the IZ, the supreme and localized Muslim religious authority of BiH. Salafi-Wahhabism is the theology of a different international society from a very different theater of operation.

Bosnia already lacks the deep common cultural roots typified by members near the center of the EU since Bosnia was firmly within the Ottoman Empire when these roots were developing. This is not to imply that integration cannot or will not happen, especially since as James pointed out, states tend to react to their needs at present and this can mute the impact of an alternate cultural background. As previously discussed, Bosnia seems likely join European international society in a Gesellschaft vice Gemeinschaft formulation. However, it is conceivable that Salafi-Wahhabi teacher
production could inhibit this association by turning teachers, who are influential elements of state formation, away from ERIS norms. Teachers and texts are instruments being put into place to influence a new generation of Bosniaks with a theology whose teaching runs contrary to the values of the ERIS, especially regarding gender equality.
CHAPTER 7: BOSNIAN POLITICAL PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS

Introduction

In stark contrast to my examination of religious economic activity and education in Bosnia, there is no long-standing tradition of representative democracy in BiH. In the six centuries preceding Yugoslavia’s formation while the European Gemeinschaft was developing, BiH was primarily under the Ottoman imperial system that imposed order without a substantial representative democracy. The Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire both had different ways for Bosnians to enter the political process but none involved direct election. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did have some types of participatory democracy, but these were largely tied to means of production in the “worker self-management” system under Tito’s brand of socialism.\(^{256}\) For these reasons, it is not possible to look back in Bosnia’s history prior to 1990 for a meaningful baseline data set, since political order was imposed by Istanbul, Vienna, and Belgrade.

In the decade following Tito’s death, nationalism supplanted socialism and caused a significant shift in Yugoslav political power. Ethnic chauvinism in the largely homogenous Yugoslav republics was manifest in calls for independence. In heterogeneous BiH, wildly different political aspirations became apparent. BiH experienced its own brand of ethnic chauvinism and ethno-religious political parties rose

to prominence in the resulting fervor. This was directly indicated by the elections immediately preceding the 1992-1995 War.

In the decades following the war, BiH has faced significant challenges while emerging from both four decades of single party rule and the destruction of the 1992-1995 war that broke apart the SFROY. During this period, free and fair elections were becoming the norm across Western Europe with Spain under the Franco Regime and Greece under a military junta being notable exceptions. It is worth noting that democracy is a relatively recent political phenomenon in Western Europe and most members of the ERIS have a much longer monarchical history than their current democratic systems. However, this Gemeinschaft grouping evolved from a common culture and now holds democracy as a central tenet. ERIS members maintain institutions like the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and enshrined representative democracy in the Bosnian Constitution via the GFA.

Under the GFA imposed by a regional integration of states and with significant assistance from associated international forces, BiH has managed six nation-wide elections since the end of the war. Voter laws in BiH are ethno-territorially based and extremely restrictive since in effect they ban ethnic minority participation. For example, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, as “constituent peoples” of BiH, vote for different candidate lists to be part of the three-person rotating presidency. One elected official from each group occupies their group’s seat. These Bosnian electoral laws governed by the GFA will have to change prior to EU membership and these changes could prove exceedingly difficult if the Bosniak constituency is pulled apart or a the Serb and Croat blocs perceive an Islamist threat and turn to parties with ethno-nationalist agendas.
Bosnian ruling elites negotiated the GFA to halt the kinetic conflict. They have adopted resolutions to align Bosnian education with ERIS requirements and instituted laws governing religious economic activities that are closely aligned with European standards vice any Sunni theocracy. However, these acts were primarily accomplished at the negotiating table on Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. Those legacy Bosnian laws will have to change to enable a successful EU candidacy and that means EU ideals such as freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law must be diffuse among the population to make this transition. Sovereignty, Nationalism, Impacts on the Market Place, and Equality of People are the English School Primary Institutions relevant to my examination of how BiH is may align itself with European political standards and how Salafi-Wahhabism factors into this process.

Wahhabism and Participatory Democracy

In The Bitter Harvest: The Brotherhood in Sixty Years, Ayman Zawahiri flatly calls democracies, elections, and parliaments jahiliyya, or belonging to the state of ignorance described in great detail by Sayyidd Qutb. Zawahiri quotes extensively from Qutb, a fellow Egyptian and influential Muslim Brotherhood member, as well as other luminaries of Salafi-Wahhabi thought. He quotes former Saudi Mufti Sheikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim to assert that the “most obvious and severest of blasphemies when the accursed (secular) law is established-though it was never revealed to the heart of Muhammad by the faithful spirit.” It is worth noting that one of bin Ibrahim’s sons was Saudi


258 Ibid, p127.
Minister of Justice from 1975-1990 and again from 1993-2009 before moving to the Majlis Ash-Shura. Slightly to the left of Zawahiri is fellow Egyptian Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. Among Wahhabi theorists, there is a broad spectrum of stances on democracy. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi is the most prominent contemporary Hanbali scholar and imam. He reaches millions of Muslims through his website Islam Online. Though an avowed Islamist who has preached under the patronage of the Salafi-Wahhabi House of Al-Thani, rulers of Qatar, since the early 1960s, Al-Qaradawi has offered numerous, resounding endorsements of a democracy conducted by Muslims that does not “contravene God’s commands.”\(^{259}\) For Muslims living as minorities in Europe, Al-Qaradawi also encourages participation because “even if we leave politics alone, it doesn’t leave us (Muslims) alone.”\(^{260}\)

Al-Qaradawi should not be mistaken for espousing views completely compatible with Western democracies. He endorses suicide attacks by Palestinians against Israelis and labels them Sharia-permissible “martyrdom operations” since, in his view, Israel is a militarized state where all men and women serve in the armed forces. He differentiates this from the attacks on America on September 11, 2001 labeling them impermissible because he does not see these attacks as “self-defense.”\(^{261}\) Al-Qaradawi is an Egyptian Islamist, has maintained informal ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, and is under the

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\(^{260}\) Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Al-Din wa’l-siyasa: Ta’sil wa radd shubahat. (Cairo: Dar Al-Shuruq, 2007).

patronage of the Qatari government, itself a Wahhabi family organization closely linked to the Saudi royal family.²⁶²

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) itself does afford its citizens a few opportunities for participatory democracy however there is no true form of representative democracy. In September 2011, the third election in KSA history was held to elect half of 300 municipal officials while the government appointed the rest.²⁶³ The elected officials are advisory or other low-authority positions and voter turnout for that particular election was extremely low with an estimated 300,000 ballots cast from a population of 18,000,000.²⁶⁴ Women are slated to begin voting in these limited elections within the next three years.²⁶⁵ Wahhabi interpreted Sharia is the unquestionable law of the land and the King of Saudi Arabia is the final appeal authority for the judiciary in addition to being the head of government and the armed forces.²⁶⁶

₂⁶² “Qatar Embraces Wahhabism to Strengthen Regional Influence.” http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=49555, accessed on January 12, 2013. As an example of Qatar’s Wahhabism, Emir Sheik Hamad Khalifa Al-Thani inaugurated the massive Imam Muhamad Abdul Ibn Al Wahhab Mosque in Doha on December 10, 2011. It can accommodate 12,200 worshippers (11,000 men and 1200 women) and is part of the Emir’s continuing efforts to “bring Islam (i.e. Wahhabism) to the world.”


There is a wide spectrum of thought within contemporary Wahhabism regarding democracy. Al Qaeda extremists fully reject democratic processes and representative governance. It is necessary to consider this since Wahhabism took root in BiH because of the El Mujahid brigade of jihadis ruling the 1992-1995 war. KSA has allowed limited democracy during this same period. This too must be considered since the KSA influence in BiH has been significant for several decades as demonstrated in both my examination of Bosniak religious economic activity and education. In short, a Wahhabi influence on Bosniak voting patterns could take two forms. First, it could be manifest in an outright rejection of democratic political processes. Alternately, the Salafi-Wahhabi influence could be indicated by Salafi-Wahhabi candidate successful elections to a number of offices, especially Reis Ul-Ulema. In this case, I would expect to see an increased number of Salafi-Wahhabi politicians chosen by an apathetic electorate. This result would likely fracture the Bosniak electorate, trigger ethnic retrenchment among Serb and Croat nationalist parties, and inhibit changes to Bosnian laws necessary to join the EU.

**Early Twentieth Century Regional Elections**

Before communism, BiH was under the rule of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. Under both imperial political systems, there was no representational government rooted in a fairly conducted, popular election. After World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Serbs, Slovenes, and Croats had an elected parliament but the country’s existence was short and politically chaotic. From its formation, the Kingdom was in tension between centralizing and decentralizing forces.
based on ethnicity. War and unresolved issues from the Treaty of London further compounded the political instability.\textsuperscript{267}

The polity was all male and elected an utterly dysfunctional parliament wherein a Montenegrin deputy grew irritated during interruptions to his parliamentary speech, drew a gun, and shot several MPs.\textsuperscript{268} King Alexander then dissolved parliament, reorganized political territories into Bannates that broke with Ottoman tradition by cutting across ethnic lines, and named the Bannates after rivers. He also assumed a number of absolute controls while there was no parliament.\textsuperscript{269} This brief democratic period in the region was chaotic, anomalous, and short-lived. It did not establish durable democratic structures in Bosnia so it is not an appropriate point of comparison for modern BiH governance.

Notable elections in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia happened in 1945, 1950 and 1953 as noted in the table below.\textsuperscript{270}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Total Vote</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>VAP Turnout</th>
<th>Voting Age Population</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Invalid Votes</th>
<th>Compulsory Voting?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>89.37%</td>
<td>9,455,980</td>
<td>10,580,648</td>
<td>84.32%</td>
<td>11,214,060</td>
<td>16,991,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>91.94%</td>
<td>9,061,780</td>
<td>9,856,501</td>
<td>85.82%</td>
<td>10,559,250</td>
<td>16,245,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>88.66%</td>
<td>7,432,469</td>
<td>8,383,455</td>
<td>73.16%</td>
<td>10,158,550</td>
<td>15,629,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{267} Vladislav B. Sotriciv, The Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Vilnius, Lithuania: Vilnius University Press, 2007).


These elections had a suspiciously high turnout given they were boycotted by the opposition to Tito’s National Front. At the time of the first election, Tito was serving as the prime minister for the provisional parliament. His party went on to sweep all 354 seats in a bicameral parliament. The election allowed all men and women over 18 to vote, except for those labeled “traitors.” Given the opposition boycott, the murky disqualification process for the electorate, and the dubious outcome, it is not possible to describe these elections as fair and representative of the will of the people throughout Yugoslavia or in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Yugoslav political process during this period is also not a useful touchstone when discussing contemporary Bosnian democracy.

Beyond the 1953 elections, democratic elections were suspended in favor of outright single party rule. Field Marshal Josip Broz Tito assumed an indefinite presidency in 1953 and suppressed any opposition.\(^\text{271}\) Tito’s death led to the next significant, contested voting events in November and December 1990 as Yugoslav communism was disintegrating. In that plebiscite, voting broke along ethnic lines and the election results were characterized as little more than “those of an ethnic census” where 75% of the electorate voted for nationalist parties.\(^\text{272}\) Bosniaks voted for the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije or SDA) founded by Alija Izetbegovic, Serbs for the Serb Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka or SDS), and Croats for the Croat Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Aajednica or HDZ). 202 out of 240 Bosnian


parliament seats went to these three ethnically based parties and Alija Izetbegovic became the first of an intended collective presidency. This new form of governance was highly dysfunctional though its various republican institutions did not immediately collapse. Indeed, they persisted for a short time and key personalities both fueled and became fodder for an ethnically charged conflict.

Alija Izetbegovic

In the hyper-charged nationalistic environment immediately preceding kinetic hostilities in the 1992-1995 War, Alija Izetbegovic became a lightning rod of controversy, primarily among ethnic Serbs who were led by Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic. Ethnic provocateurs seized on Izetbegovic’s time imprisoned under Tito and his own writings as “proof” that he was an “Islamic fundamentalist.” Note that in the parlance of that time, this term was the slang for what is now commonly but inaccurately called “Wahhabi.” This is not an accurate characterization of Izetbegovic, though taken out of context elements of his public life could be construed as extremist.

Izetbegovic did spend time in prison following WWII for his wartime activities. He was a member of the Young Muslims, or Mladi Muslimani, a group that was greatly influenced by the pre-reformation Muslim Brotherhood and fought against Tito’s

\[273\] Ibid, p2-3
\[275\] “Alija Izetbegovic.” [http://www.economist.com/node/2155212](http://www.economist.com/node/2155212); last accessed May 10, 2013; this is an example of phrase extraction implying a militant Wahhabi-tinged Islam

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After the war, Izetbegovic served three years in prison. His religiously aligned group was clearly at odds with Tito’s socialist nation-building project and it was banned by the Yugoslav government in 1947. However, in the complex wartime environment of what would become Yugoslavia, Izetbegovic’s sentence was probably politically motivated by a victorious, officially atheist state apparatus. It is noteworthy that after he served his sentence, Izetbegovic remained in BiH, studied law at the University of Sarajevo, and eventually worked for the communist state apparatus. It is also important to note that he was never a communist party member though many other Bosnian Muslims did join the party.

In the 1960s, Izetbegovic wrote but never published *The Islamic Declaration*. In 1983 this work was used as the primary evidence to convict and sentence him to 14 years in prison for “hostile and counterrevolutionary acts derived from Muslim nationalism.”

*The Islamic Declaration* shared a number of themes with works by Sayyid Qutb. Specifically, Izetbegovic states Islamic government cannot exist unless there is already an Islamic society made up of devout Muslims. “Without this majority, the Islamic order is reduced to mere power (because the second element, Islamic society, is lacking) and can turn into tyranny.” The Islamic Declaration did not ever directly mention Bosnia and

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277 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p 208. On appeal, the sentence was reduced to 11 years.


279 Alija Izetbegovic, Islamic Declaration (Sarajevo: 1990), p37. Please note that Izetbegovic himself did not publish this work that he completed from 1969-1970.
was written referencing the pan-Islamism, but not necessarily Salafi-Wahhabism, last
embodied in the caliphate of the Ottoman Empire. However, The Islamic Declaration
was reprinted in 1990 and used as “proof” by Serb nationalist provocateurs of
Izetbegovic’s allegedly devious intentions.

In 1988, Izetbegovic published Islam Between East and West which showed both an
evolution and localization of his political thought. His writing was similar to that of
contemporary Salafi philosopher Tariq Ramadan, who himself embraces participation
and integration in European political systems while maintaining a strict personal
adherence to Islam.280 Islam Between East and West is a contemplation on Islam in the
modern world and does not advocate for a return to the medieval religious form
advocated by hard-line Salafi-Wahhabi scholars.

Alija Izetbegovic’s public life shows he was both a devout Muslim and ardent Bosniak
nationalist.281 He wrote extensively on Islam through a lens showing characteristics
firmly rooted in the Ottoman Empire, a polyglot multi-faith empire. Prior to the war, he
founded the Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action or SDA) in May
1990 along with a group of Bosniak intellectuals. The party was established to be the
ethno-territorial nationalist party for Bosnian Muslims.282 During the 1992-1995 war he
did appeal directly to Saudi Arabia for help. However, he also cut across geopolitical

280 “Tariq Ramadan.”
10, 2013.
281 Steven L Burg and Paul S Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict
282 Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman, Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its
rivalries to develop a close relationship with Iran and the United States. In his private life, he married a Turkish woman who now, as his widow, lives in Turkey and he chose a public education in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  

Wahhabism, nationalism, and Shia Islam, the Islam practiced in the Islamic Republic of Iran under its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, are mutually exclusive belief systems. The intractability between Salafi-Wahhabism and Shia Islam dates to the violent death of Imam Ali. Wahhabist doctrine describes Shia Islam as a heretical, polytheistic cult. As previously discussed, Salafi-Wahhabism is also incompatible with nationalism and Western Style democracy, labeling both an invention of man that contradicts the perfect order passed in the Quran and the Hadith. Since Izetbegovic studied secular law and sought alliances with both Iran and the United States to form a Muslim republic in a European tradition, it is inaccurate to call him Salafi-Wahhabi.

Bosniak voters did not elect a Wahhabi politician in Alija Izetbegovic when he was elected as part of the intended shared presidency preceding the 1992-1995 war. His writings showed a particular aspiration for a pan-Islamic state, but his actions in the waning days of Yugoslavia showed him to be a Bosnian nationalist not willing to forgo Bosnian sovereignty. This ambiguity led the Clinton administration to rapidly recognize his new government in the hopes he was in fact a moderate. That question was never


fully answered but it was absolutely clear he was no Salafi-Wabbabi that would end democracy in Bosnia.

**Contemporary Political Participation**

BiH is an emerging federal democratic republic whose constitution is contained in the Dayton Peace Accords. The constitution privileges ethnicity and delineates a complicated mixture of direct election and positional time-sharing for BiH “constituent peoples.” For example, one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb act as president on a rotational eight month basis and each member of the presidency is elected by a plurality of their particular ethnic group. It is notable that these elections laws are incompatible with ERIS voting standards since in effect they disenfranchise non “constituent” minority voters. It is also notable that Wahhabism had taken root in BiH by the time of the first elections in 1996 meaning two different international societies were at work in the fledgling country.

Under the guidelines of the GFA, BiH has universal suffrage open to citizens 18 and older. The country is broken into two political entities so Bosnian Serbs vote in the RS while Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats vote for candidates of their respective ethnic group in the FBiH. Freedom of movement factors prominently into the law and enables internally displaced persons to vote in precincts where they intend to live.

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At the time of the 1996 countrywide elections, there were still hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees within BiH and spread across 63 different countries. These refugees all had the right to vote in accordance with the GFA but absentee ballots and procedures were unevenly followed. Internally displaced persons numbering in the hundreds of thousands were entitled to vote but through the convoluted ethno-territorial voting laws put in place by the GFA, disorganization was the election’s dominant feature resulting in long lines, ballots in the wrong language for the local polity, and some serious vote count discrepancies as noted in the figures below.\(^{287}\)

**Maximum BiH theoretical 1996 electorate:** 2,920,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters who did not cast ballots</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees who failed to register:</td>
<td>259,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP voters who failed to cross IEBL:</td>
<td>135,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb refugees in FRY who failed to return on the day:</td>
<td>24,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee voters who failed to vote:</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Maximum Theoretical Voter turnout:** 2,241,100

**Number of voters who cast ballots:** 2,431,554

**Turn-out as proportion of maximum electorate:** 103.9%


Soloway, Colin. “Bosnian Election Tally: Voting Early and Often.” [http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-09-21/news/9609210087_1_person-on-election-day-nicole-szulc-osce](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-09-21/news/9609210087_1_person-on-election-day-nicole-szulc-osce), last accessed May 11, 2013; article reports UN estimates showing voter turnout may have been as high as 135% of eligible polity
The Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) noted these obvious discrepancies. “The general climate in which the elections took place was in some cases below the minimum standards of the OSCE Copenhagen commitments.” The OSCE Second Statement of the Co-Ordinator (sic) for International Monitoring further expressed “the problems associated with registration, the media, the campaign, and freedom of movement were serious shortcomings to the overall process.” In certifying the results, Robert Frohwick noted that they were “neither free nor fair, but provided a mechanism to help overcome the centrifugal forces unleashed by the (1992-1995) war.” By allowing the results to stand, the Great Powers clearly hoped that the GFA electoral process would lead to political development and maturity in the Bosnian theater of operation.

The irregularities in this election mean the 1996 election in BiH is not suitable for examining Bosnian voting behaviors. Since those first elections, voter participation has tended to lag somewhat behind the European Union voter participation standards of 83%, though in the BiH case these numbers must still be viewed with skepticism.

### Voting Statistics in Bosnia-Herzegovina

#### BiH Presidential Elections Since 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Total Vote</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Voting Age Population</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Invalid Vote</th>
<th>Compulsory Voting?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>56.49%</td>
<td>1,769,249</td>
<td>3,132,231</td>
<td>3,010,376</td>
<td>4,621,598</td>
<td>7.22%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>54.94%</td>
<td>1,513,597</td>
<td>2,755,207</td>
<td>3,539,921</td>
<td>4,498,976</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>55.45%</td>
<td>1,298,827</td>
<td>2,342,141</td>
<td>3,178,427</td>
<td>3,964,388</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>63.70%</td>
<td>1,597,805</td>
<td>2,508,349</td>
<td>3,053,221</td>
<td>4,269,483</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>70.74%</td>
<td>1,879,339</td>
<td>2,656,758</td>
<td>3,256,197</td>
<td>4,022,835</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Parliamentary Elections Since 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Total Vote</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Voting Age Population</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Invalid Vote</th>
<th>Compulsory Voting?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>56.46%</td>
<td>1,768,573</td>
<td>3,132,231</td>
<td>3,010,376</td>
<td>4,621,598</td>
<td>7.98%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>54.48%</td>
<td>2,755,207</td>
<td>3,539,921</td>
<td>4,498,976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>55.45%</td>
<td>1,298,811</td>
<td>2,342,141</td>
<td>3,178,427</td>
<td>3,964,388</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>70.74%</td>
<td>1,879,339</td>
<td>2,656,758</td>
<td>3,256,197</td>
<td>4,022,835</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant irregularities still persist in the conduct of Bosnian Elections. The 2006 elections were a landmark event since they were the first elections completely administered by BiH instead of the UNHCR. A decade after the dubious 1996 election, the OSCE report on countrywide 2006 elections remained negative, though not as severe as in 1996. Many basic legal requirements were met to conduct the election including the advanced notification period and female candidate participation. However, OSCE

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reported 24% of election observers labeled the event “bad” or “very bad” and there were multiple serious incidents of procedural irregularities pertaining to vote counting.\(^{293}\)

For at least a decade, voting statistics in BiH have been suspect. From the outright corruption of the 1996 election to the poorly administered 2006 elections, I have found Bosnian participatory voting statistics to be an unreliable and could not extrapolate a Wahhabi influence in BiH. I have necessarily set aside this indicator but certain anecdotal evidence can be gleaned from the officials elected in this flawed environment. Amra Babic is a widow whose husband was killed in the 1992-1995 War. She wears hijab, is a well-educated economist, and was most recently elected mayor of her rural Bosnian town, Visoko\(^{294}\) where she has prioritized job creation, education, and good, secular governance.\(^{295}\) Some Saudi media outlets have pointed to the fact that she is the first ever hijab-wearing Bosniak elected to public office as an example of rising Islamic (i.e. Wahhabi) influence. Ms Babic, however, self-identifies as a European who is Muslim and reflects a limited return of the hijab in public Bosnian space after forty years of repression under communism and a traumatic war largely predicated on ethnic markers.\(^{296}\) Ms. Babic’s choice to wear a headscarf is enabled by a more permissive

Bosnian society and is part of an overall trend among Bosniaks who turned to religion following the 1992-1995 war. A closer look at the Bosniak community through the election of a new Reis Ul Ulema can provide insight into what that Bosnian Islamic trend means, especially as an instrument of predictive analysis for Bosnia’s trajectory in an ecumenical international order.

Reis Ul Ulema Election and Transition

The hierarchical nature of the Bosnian form of Islam is unique among the Sunni *Umma* and can provide significant insight into the religious leanings of the Bosniak community. The Reis Ul Ulema and Rijaset spiritually lead local Bosniaks and have authority over the significant Bosniak Diaspora. Recognizing the role religion plays to differentiate Bosnian Muslims from Croats or Serbs in BiH, it is then worthwhile to examine the trajectory of the IZ and Reis Ul-Ulema.

Dr Mustafa Ceric’s second term as Reis Ul Ulema ended in 2012 after 19 years.\(^{297}\) Dr Ceric was a moderate who routinely participated in broad religious coalitions and discursive forums. Dr Ceric was an active member of the Common Word Initiative to encourage both interfaith dialogue and understanding and he was routinely ranked as one of the world’s most influential Muslims.\(^{298}\) As prescribed in the IZ constitution, his successor was chosen by an election among the IZ *Ulema*. This small-scale political

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\(^{297}\) Dr Ceric served as Reis Ul Ulema for five years prior to serving two consecutive seven year terms.

event could have been a barometer of a growing Wahhabist influence within the Ulema however the outcome counter-indicated a rising Wahhabi influence, even after decades of direct financial support to the IZ from Wahhabi sources in the Middle East.

With 94.5% of the vote or 240 votes out of a possible 254, Tuzla Mufti Hussain Kavazovic was handily elected. Kavazovic is widely seen as a sound replacement for Ceric. He was educated in Bosnia and pursued doctoral studies at the ancient and respected Al Azhar University in Cairo. One of his first official acts was to visit Turkish President Abdullah Gul, just as Dr Ceric routinely did. Professor Hussein Alibasic, professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Sarajevo thinks Kavazovic "will continue the current politics of interreligious engagement and reconciliation the way Grand Mufti Mustafa Ceric did it."

After two decades of direct Saudi monetary support to the Bosniak community, the transition to a new Reis Ul Ulema could have certainly swung in a more conservative

299 “BH: Kavazovic New Reis Ul-Ulema.”
http://translate.google.ae/translate?hl=en&sl=hr&u=http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.300.html:398165-BiH-Kavazovic-novi-reis-ul-ulema&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dreis-ululema-kavazovic-biography%26client%3Dsafari%26rls%3Den%26biw%3D1258%26bih%3D605; last accessed May 12, 2013.
300 “Reis Ul-Ulema Kavazovic.”
http://translate.google.ae/translate?hl=en&sl=hr&u=http://www.rijaset.ba/prev=/search%3Fq%3Drijaset%2Bbosna%26biw%3D1920%26bih%3D851; last accessed May 12, 2013; note that as of this writing the English language version of the Riyaset webpage is significantly out of date.
direction. Instead, Bosnia’s Muslim learned men in the Ulema elected a man seeking social harmony through religious tolerance. Dr Ceric had previously stated “My sultan isn’t in the East. My Sultan is in Brussels.” It appears his successor was chosen to continue his efforts towards integration into the European community while maintaining the Bosnian Muslim community’s deep cultural and religious links to Turkey. The transition from Dr Ceric to Reis Ul Ulema Kavazovic marks a continuation of leadership for the dominant form of BiH Islam that is actively engaged in civil and ecumenical life throughout the country. In short, there was no discernible Wahhabi influence on the Kavazovic’s election and he continues to lead the IZ in the Hanafi tradition as he continues to strengthen historical bonds with the Republic of Turkey.

Inter-Entity Cooperation and Joint Actions

Since the cessation of kinetic hostilities and the implementation of the GFA, BiH has been wracked by ineffectual government hamstrung by ethno-religious antagonisms. Former UNHCR Paddy Ashdown wrote in The Times of London in 2011 that Western Powers had been distracted by Afghanistan and Iraq and left much of the Bosnia nation-building project unfinished. Ashdown sees a distinct possibility that BiH will disintegrate and once again fall into armed conflict. In a contrasting statement, Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative does not see an imminent conflict but still

303 Ibid.
304 Paddy Ashdown, “We Must Stop Bosnia Becoming Another Libya.” http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article2981526.ece, last accessed May 18, 2013.
acknowledges paralyzing governmental gridlock.\textsuperscript{305} There are myriad examples of these significant hurdles besetting BiH.

In 2000 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed six initiatives designed to consolidate Bosnian federal power and stimulate growth. Those initiatives remain: addressing barriers to investment and clarifying roles of investment promotion; accelerating the process of privatization, using revised, more transparent procedures; introducing a modern, open system of tax administration, taking steps to address observance of the rule of law; and reform of the “infrastructure” of the financial sector.\textsuperscript{306} The goal dates for each reform implementation was no later than 2002. As of 2013, there has not been significant process and separate tax systems remain in place between the RS and FBiH.\textsuperscript{307} This has put the Bosnian market, a primary English School institution, at odds with the ERIS. Change has been extremely difficult; revenue allocations among constituent ethnic groups mean government jobs are now a sort of ethnic patronage system.

In 2006, envoys from the EU and United States attempted to break the governmental stasis and push through a series of constitutional reforms requiring major concessions from both entities. Instead, the ethno-religiously aligned parties chose to simply walk

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{305} “Bosnia’s Gridlock: Two Visions for Bosnia.”
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/04/bosnias_gridlock,
last accessed May 18, 2013.
\textsuperscript{307} Paul Suchar, “KPMG, Cutting Through Complexity: Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
\end{flushright}
away. More recently, 15 arduous months passed before an unexpected coalition government was finally formed on December 28, 2011. This inefficient political environment led Haris Silajdzic, former Bosniak representative to the BiH tripatriate presidency, to remark “The state cannot block the entity, but the entity can block the state.”

There are, however, a few notable exceptions to this entrenched governmental inactivity where inter-entity cooperation has prevailed. In particular, police forces from both FBiH and RS cooperated to conduct Operation Svjetlost. In February 2, 2010 the joint police action targeted Gornja Maoca, the Wahhabi village led by Nusret Imamovic, in the biggest police action in BiH since the 1992-1995 War. Police targeted Gornja Maoca again a year later, though this action was significantly smaller.


These joint events were possible because of 2005 agreements between the State Investigative and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\footnote{Memorandum of Understanding Between the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina on Cooperation in the Field of Criminal Investigations of Serious Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law} Since its founding, SIPA has acted as a multi-agency coordination entity and continues to facilitate inter-entity law enforcement coordination.\footnote{“Legal Cooperation: Cooperation With Domestic Institutions.” Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina. \url{http://www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba/?opcija=sadrzaj&kat=5&id=10&jezik=e}, last accessed August 28, 2013.} In addition to the police action, this civic cooperation has led to at least two militant convictions. Mevlid Jasarevic was sentenced to 18 years in prison for attacking the US Embassy in Sarajevo with an AK-47.\footnote{“Bosnia U.S. Embassy Gunman Mevlid Jasarevic Jailed for 18 Years.” \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20629893}, last accessed August 28, 2013.} The widening SIPA investigation has shown Jasarevic spent time in Gornja Maoca and that, along with the investigation into the bombing at Bugojno, has provided the pretense for potentially targeting other Wahhabi villages. The primary suspect in the Bugonjo bombing, Haris Causevic, was sentenced to 45 years in jail.\footnote{“Bosnia Jails Police Bomber for 45 Years” \url{http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/12/bosnia-jails-police-bomber-45-years-20131220155134582994.html}, last accessed March 21, 2014.}
Conclusion

The trauma of the 1992-1995 war and the ethno-religious antagonisms that preceded the war remain predominant features of both elections and inter-entity cooperation in BiH. Corruption also remains a troubling feature of the Bosnian political process meaning the sample sets available to examine Bosnian participation are largely unreliable reference points to evaluate a possible Salafi-Wahhabi influence on elections. Ethnically oriented parties remain the de facto centers of power among all BiH constituent groups. I cannot say with any certainty that a Salafi-Wahhabi influence either directly from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or from the Salafi-Wahhabi settlements in BiH is influencing Bosnian voter participation rates.

A Wahhabi influence could have been manifest in diminished Bosniak voter participation relative to Bosnian Serb or Croat participation since a significant thread of Wahhabism rejects democracy. It is not possible to meticulously evaluate voter participation since at least part of the data set has clearly been corrupted beyond research use as shown by the OSCE analysis indicating 103% voter turnout in an early BiH election. It is encouraging that aside from the egregiously corrupted election in 1996, voter statistics no longer strain credulity. Instead, overall participation rates do seem realistic, albeit with persistent unresolved irregularities.

The elected officials in this electoral environment do not show a Salafi-Wahhabi influence at any level. The IZ itself has maintained a now two decade old course of interfaith engagement and reconciliation by choosing Reis Ul Ulema Karadzic to succeed Dr Ceric, a proponent of Bosnian European integration. It is groundbreaking that a hijab-wearing woman has been elected as a mayor but Amra Babic’s public expression of her
religious ideals must not be misconstrued as Salafi-Wahhabism since she is a secular economist and does not don an abaya. In Saudi Arabia, Mayor Babic could not legally drive. Unlike formal education and religious economic activity, voting processes and resulting forms of government do not seem to demonstrate a quantifiable Wahhabi influence.

Cooperation between entities remains extremely poor for a variety of reasons but police actions mobilized against Wahhabi settlements and key personalities remain notable exceptions. Here, at least the perception of a rising influence seems to be mobilizing factors. Real or imagined, the threat posed by Wahhabi settlements has been enough to drive consistent inter-entity cooperation that far predates even the formation of a national government. The FBiH and RS have not yet streamlined procedures for needed liberal economic reform that will spur necessary economic growth, a tenet of the OSCE, yet can agree to empower SIPA, a national organization that has effectively carried out joint police and judicial actions against Salafi-Wahhabi villages. The Bosnian market may be mired in regulations at odds with the ERIS and EU, but SIPA certainly seems to be an attempt to reassert some sovereignty in response to an extreme form of Salafi-Wahhabi rejectionism in Bosnia. There is no discernible influence on the rate of Bosnian voter participation since even with a corrupted data set, it does appear the rate of participation is similar to certain other European democracies. Among Bosniaks, the Rijaset elected Mufti Hussain Kavocovic by a wide margin. Kavacovic clearly follows in the footsteps of Dr Mustafa Ceric and both men have shown a commitment to interfaith dialogue and the established Bosnian form of Islam devoid of Wahhabi markers. SIPA has been a notable exception to the
animosity between FBiH and RS and has achieved inter-entity cooperation when Salafi-Wahhabi settlements or individuals are the target.

Overall, there is no quantifiable evidence showing increased Wahhabi influence on Bosnian political processes, but a perceived Wahhabi threat has mobilized at least one Bosnian political institution. This could be an area of similarity between states near the center of the ERIS and BiH since both have demonstrated a dedication to fighting religious extremism but there is a different, complicating factor to consider regarding Bosnian political processes. As noted earlier, aspects of the Bosnian constitution will have to change for Bosnia to join the EU. Electoral laws must recognize the equality of people and cannot disenfranchise minority voters. Changes in the constitution will require significant inter-entity cooperation and in a region where ethnic chauvinism is still a powerful force, it seems clear that a real or imagined threat of Islamic extremism could be a stumbling block.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Competing national ideologies remain the biggest barrier to successful government formation and policy implementation in many areas of the Bosnian political sphere. Divisions based on ethno-religious identity are the most prominent feature of Bosnian politics. My aim in this thesis was to identify Salafi-Wahhabi influence in this tense climate. As an extreme faction of Islam, far removed from the centuries old Bosnian form of Islam, Salafi-Wahhabis as a pressure group in BiH could easily be an additional societal factor that pulls apart the Bosniak community and complicates progress in a country whose citizens’ identities and legal standings are closely aligned with their confessional group. Salafi-Wahhabi ideals, indeed its vision for the human community, cannot be reconciled with the European Union regional international society and could be a barrier to Bosnia joining either a Geimshchaft or Gessellschaft type of European international society.

Bosnia and Herzegovina bears the imprint of multiple empires and previous political systems. The 1992-1995 war was catastrophic for every facet of Bosnian life. Millions of casualties and displaced persons, a collapsed economy, destroyed infrastructure, and lingering ethno-religious tensions made BiH utterly dependent on the outside intervention of NATO to first halt kinetic violence and then facilitate some sort of political apparatus and rebuilding effort. First through NATO and then through the European Union

Military Force (EUFOR), contemporary Great Powers imparted elements of liberal democracy through the GFA and brought in a stability force through the UN High Commissioner for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Efforts by this sub-global international society were meant to set the conditions to build a Bosnian society, but in some ways the resulting political form absolutely codified ethno-religious separation contrary to EU ideals. As an unintended consequence, it has made it easier for Salafi-Wahhabi actors to target Muslims in Bosnia.

Ethnicity is privileged in the electoral process since voters are classified by ethno-religious group and are only eligible to vote for presidential candidates in that ethno-religious group. It is important to note that this is completely incompatible with the EU’s voting standards. Though speaking a mutually intelligible, some would say identical, language; Bosnian children are separated by confessional groups for school in FBiH. Ethno chauvinism remains a prime facet of both the for-profit media services and political process. If successful, outlier extreme versions of Islam could reasonably be expected to move Bosniaks away from participating in a government that can make the necessary changes to conform to EU standards.

In this dysfunction, I have found demonstrable levels of Salafi-Wahhabi influence on both Bosnian Religious Economic Activity and Bosnian Education Structures. At least 10% of Bosnian mosques and physical religious structures that are part of the IZ Waqf have received support from Saudi Arabia, though the Saudi government puts the number closer to 24% of the pre-1992-1995 war total. Saudi money has also built mosques that exist entirely outside the purview of the IZ Waqf such as the 5,000-person King Faud Mosque in Sarajevo. A reported 17 Salafi-Wahhabi villages now exist, also outside the
bounds of the IZ Waqf. In these extreme cases, *mutavellis* outside the IZ are administering Waqf and presumably collecting Zakat during the Eid season. This type of phenomenon falls largely in the conceptual framework of the English School new medievalism, where non-state actors create realities that have potential to threaten the authority of the legitimate state and have the potential to confine Bosnia to the International System of “Europe” vice the International Society, be it in the *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft* model, of the EU.

There is a similar trend in Bosniak higher education where two of the Bosnia’s three Islamic pedagogical universities receive Saudi funds. Together, these institutions at Zenica and Bihac are producing Islamic teachers at a much higher rate than the older Faculty of Islamic Studies at Sarajevo. These schools are also translating a high volume of Salafi-Wahhabi texts into Bosnian. These pedagogical universities certainly have the potential to shape the trajectory of Bosnian Islam since their Salafi-Wahhabi supported pupils will themselves be molding Bosnian Muslims for generations to come. The 17 Salafi-Wahhabi villages aligned with Nusret Imamovic are again an extreme form of deviant educational institutions where the Bosnian national curriculum has been corrupted, but they remain fringe elements.

I was not able to accurately measure a Salafi-Wahhabi influence on Bosnian voting trends. Corrupted data sets prevented any substantive conclusions regarding voter participation, however I did find evidence that a perceived Salafi-Wahhabi influence is a mobilizing factor for Bosnian political institution formation and action in the case of SIPA. Some Bosniak political behavior did not show any direct or reactionary Salafi-
Wahhabi influence. A Bosniak moderate committed to interfaith dialogue was elected Reis Ul Ulema to replace an equally moderate, retiring incumbent.

To answer a question that has shaped my research, yes; it does appear that the ideology of an alternate sub-global organization is animating a currently small subset of Bosnian society and does in fact warrant significant attention from the Bosnian government and other international institutions. There is an observable Salafi-Wahhabi influence in Bosnian Religious Economic Activity, Bosnian Political Institutions, and Bosnian Education and this influence is incompatible with EU membership. The aggregate level of Islamism is likely rising in a country where the influence of Salafi-Wahhabism, a strongly missionary-oriented confessional group, is demonstrably rising. In its most extreme form, this influence is a direct affront to multiple Primary Institutions of the English School. In its most prevalent form, the influence is growing and positioned for expansion and this could greatly complicate the task of Bosnia’s ruling elites who have significant reforms to push through to achieve EU membership.

If BiH is to join the ERIS, it seems likely that membership in this international society will be via a thinner Gesellschaft since during the centuries that the thicker European Gemeinschaft, was developing, BiH was firmly within the Ottoman Empire. BiH will have to change it laws away from ethnically based voting and provision of public services to align with EU norms and these constitutional changes to the GFA will absolutely be harder for elites to accomplish when a Salafi-Wahhabi influence pulls Bosniaks away from “European” ideals for the human community. The exceptional role of the Great Powers will remain necessary but Bosnian political entities must assume a more
constructive, proactive role to achieve institutional control and national sovereignty, especially as BiH pursues EU membership.

Looking Ahead

Since the international military actions that ended kinetic fighting in BiH, the country has been continually acted upon by the community of nations as part of the international system. In light of both the relative Bosnian state political maturity and the Salafi-Wahhabi influence in Bosnia, it is particularly important to examine the limits of this progress as defined by systemic forces, societal principles, and competing visions for the human community. The overwhelming majority of Bosnian citizens show an inclination towards European cosmopolitan modernity while an extreme minority exhibit attachments to the Salafi-Wahhabi conception of Tawhid. Two different international societies seem to clash here. After nearly two decades, BiH may well be poised to transition into the society of nations since on some levels, BiH is acting according to international norms. BiH interaction with Salafi-Wahhabi extremist elements seems to meet this paradigm.

The joint RS/Federation police force in Operation Svjetlost surrounded Gornja Maoca, made arrests, and then retreated to their barracks. This restrained action kept with international norms and the action was acceptable for the stabilization forces that remain in the country. The joint BiH forces certainly had the technical capability to simply annihilate the small settlement but relied instead on state power to apply the law. This is an example of the English School’s unique focus on how sovereign states learn to control violent tendencies by agreeing on certain universal moral and legal principles. BiH did
not seek a shared moral, Kantian solution with the Salafi-Wahhabi residents and at this point has not demonstrated any intent towards that end.

A continued transition into the ERIS will require structural changes and these changes may very well appear to be destabilizing in the short term. Hedley Bull notes the U.N. charter gives peace and security primacy over human rights.\(^{320}\) This is clearly evident in the GFA with its myriad laws privileging “constituent” ethno-religious groups in an attempt to ensure peace and security. The resulting form, however, has also severely restricted the rights of minority, non “constituent” groups as well as freedom of conscience and expression. In this particular theater of operation and under these laws, it appears that BiH is near the limit of its political development. It seems impossible that ethno-religious tensions will recede when they are part of the legal code. It also seems plausible that a Salafi-Wahhabi influence on BiH society will reinforce these tensions because this outlying belief system could move the center of Bosniak society away from the compromises or resolutions necessary for Bosnia proper to transition into the ERIS.

Removing reference to ethnicity and citizens’ faith practice would have many, many consequences that are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the rising influence of Salafi-Wahhabism in the country in such a scenario does warrant consideration here. Bernard Lewis astutely observes that without monitoring from the state, religious teaching favors those “with the fewest scruples, strongest conviction, and most

money.”  

As a strongly missionary faith, backed by petrochemical dollars and a near-medieval outlook, Salafi-Wahhabi Islamism certainly falls into this category. However, the IZ, as a Bosnian apparatus, is a natural fit to resume its full function as the religious home for Bosniaks. In this case, the remedy to the rising influence of Salafi-Wahhabism in BiH could come from within the IZ. The IZ must reassert its primacy in the religious affairs of Bosniaks yet still find a way to back away, like all other Bosnian ethno-religious organizations must, from the public sphere.

Ethno-religious provocateurs are still successful in Bosnian politics. When a major Muslim ethno-religiously aligned organization steps away from the bidding market, another more fervent Muslim-oriented ideology could step in. If elected, a Salafi-Wahhabi party could be disastrous for Bosnian politics. As a poor country dependent on remittance and foreign aid, Bosnia and the IZ need assistance countering international Salafi-Wahhabi resources. The English School privileges the role of the Great Powers in world affairs and their roles in establishing acceptable state behavior and facilitating international cooperation. The Great Powers have vast law enforcement, intelligence, and financial resources that will be vital instruments to overcome the growing internationally sponsored ideological Salafi-Wahhabi foothold in BiH. Reporting


indicates that, through SIPA, the RS and FBiH are effectively handling certain local physical footholds.

The European Union represents a regional international society, a grouping BiH aspires to join as a full member meaning its common interests, rules, and institutions must match the EU. The current political structure of the Bosnian state under the GFA in conjunction with the rising influence of Salafi-Wahhabism will make it difficult for the country to be part of this European international society. BiH laws will have to change in order for EU membership to happen. The electorate cannot be divided based on religion or ethnicity. BiH must have a unified tax code and justice system. In a way, BiH must have full sovereignty before ceding elements of this sovereignty to the EU. A rising Salafi-Wahhabi influence could dramatically inhibit these structural changes by further dividing an electorate that still has not come together after two decades to form a fully functional Bosnian state. To the delight of European internationalists and chagrin of hardline Islamists, Former Reis Ul-Ulema Mustapha Ceric famously quipped “My sultan isn’t in the east; my sultan is in Brussels.” Salafi-Wahhabism is a threat to this European orientation within the Bosniak community and also a direct challenge to a Bosnian political system that must conform to the ideals of neoliberal governance that characterize the EU.

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