

*Euroscepticism: A Cross-National Perspective: Germany, The Netherlands, and The United Kingdom*

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## ABSTRACT

This master's thesis examines public euroscepticism in three case studies: Germany, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It argues that relevant literature lacks consistency and continuity because of the narrow scope in which the phenomenon has been observed in terms of the factors related to euroscepticism. The aim of this thesis is to solve this problem by performing a more holistic examination; by marrying previously accumulated knowledge on euroscepticism, public opinion data provided by the Eurobarometer and European Union Parliamentary Election results all in an effort to demonstrate the variability both in the factors related to euroscepticism and relevant attitudes over time.

This thesis examines euroscepticism from a multidimensional perspective. It does this by performing a cross-national longitudinal trend study, observing factors related to euroscepticism: political parties, economics, migration, national identity and national sovereignty from 1994 to 2014. Compiling and observing this body of data, it is expected, will confirm or reject the argument that the causes and degrees of euroscepticism fluctuate over time and amongst member states. Having confirmed this fact may spur further investigation of the phenomenon and encourage the European Union to identify policy areas which could nurture closer relations with its European citizens in an effort to gain further legitimacy.

Democratic legitimacy also means a Europe which listens to the expectations of its citizens and addresses their concerns through adequate policies. For any of its policies, including enlargement, the EU has to win the support of its citizens.  
European Commission, Enlargement report (2006: 23)

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## **List of Abbreviations**

EEC	European Economic Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EMC	European Monetary Commission
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EUP	European Parliament
MEP	Member of European Parliament
UK	United Kingdom

## *Chapter 1:*

### *Introduction and Literature Review*

#### *1.1 Chapter Introduction*

The purpose of this chapter is to provide readers with a brief introduction into the European Project prior to the birth of what we know today as the European Union. This leads into an introduction and discussion about the political phenomenon known as euroscepticism with a justification of why research in this area is needed. Following this discussion relevant literature shall be presented and the chapter ends with an overview of proceeding chapters.

#### *1.2 Background:*

Examining the historiography of European integration and relevant literature relating to the political phenomenon of *euroscepticism*, the majority of the texts on the subject matter perceives the emergence of skepticism occurring in the 1970s. However, Kaiser, Leucht, and Gehler argue that this is inaccurate. In their collaborative work *Transnational Network in European Integration Governance: Europe 1945-83*. According to the authors, political scientists are making the mistake of assumption and are not looking at the phenomenon broadly. Kaiser et al. suggest that the emergence of euroscepticism most likely began in the early 1950s with the introduction of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community all of which were formed in 1957-1958; though the range, scope and impact over time is unclear. For nation-states such as Great Britain and Germany the line between national and supranational governance became blurred. The power and autonomy these states once exercised were subjugated as they were integrated into the European Community (Kaiser et al., 2010). Therefore, it is reasonable to deduce that the Eurosceptic attitude first appeared roughly around the same time as these EC organizations were being formed.

Since that time and with the expansion of the European project, euroscepticism like a disease has spread across the United Kingdom and the continent of Europe. This thesis intends to demonstrate that both the definition and factors related to euroscepticism can vary by state over time. Sofia Vasilopoulou writes that there are three main periods of European integration: the first period ranges from the early stages of integration until the late 1980s, as previously identified. The second starts at the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and lasts broadly until the debate over the Lisbon Treaty (2007); and the latest phase which Europe has recently entered with the eurozone crisis. The latter will be discussed in the proceeding paragraphs (Vasilopoulou, 2013). This periodization points to the importance of the time factor in the study of euroscepticism.

Consider the early 1990s, several pro-European states decided to put the Maastricht Treaty [the founding document of the European Union] to a referendum amongst their citizens as a demonstration of confidence in the desire of their citizens to commit to a united Europe. In France, the 1992 referendum produced a marginal favorability with a fifty-one percent [51%] approval, Denmark saw only forty-nine percent [49%] of its populace in support of further European integration and in Great Britain, the citizens were never given a vote on the Treaty. Rather, it was voted on and signed by the House of Commons in that same year (Sczcerbiak and Taggart, 2008).

The 2000s have experienced an increase in critical discourse amongst European citizens; precipitating events have demonstrated that euroscepticism has become integral to the process of European integration. To support this claim consider the following: In 2005, the Dutch electorate rejected the project for a European Constitution thus impacting the process of European integration and arguably negatively effecting the perception of the EU by other member states and their citizens (Aarts and Kolk, 2006), (Taggart, 2006).

In 2007, The Financial Times conducted an opinion poll of five of the largest member-states within the EU, approximately forty-four percent (44%) of those polled felt that life became worse after their country joined the EU (Britain 52 percent, France 50 percent, Italy 47 percent, Germany 44 percent, Spain at 24 percent) (Parket, 2007). Since 2007, financial crises, budget cuts, bailouts and the loss of national sovereignty have contributed to the rise of euroscepticism across the EU. A 2008 report by the European Council on Foreign Relations, which was not released until 2013, illustrates an even greater dissatisfaction amongst Europeans. The report revealed the following shifts in public opinion as it relates to trust in the European project. In France trust has gone from +10 to -22%; in Germany from +20 to -29%; in Italy from +30 to -22%. Perhaps the most discouraging and worrying data is that from Spain where they have gone from a +42% to a -52% (Torreblanca and Leonardo, 2013).

As of 2014, member states to the European Union (EU) have held elections for their respective representatives to the European Parliament, an overwhelming majority of representatives elected have come from political parties situated to the far right of the political spectrum; thus signaling a deepening of euroscepticism into both the political and social fibers of member states (Hargitai, 2013). These points will be discussed at more length in the proceeding pages.

### *1.3 Justification of the Problem:*

Academic research related to the phenomenon of euroscepticism has for the most part treated the phenomenon as a peripheral issue amongst European studies. Yet, euroscepticism has increased both its' presence and influence since the founding of the EU in 1993. With the implementation of the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht the research surrounding euroscepticism emerged as researchers observed the range of policy areas in which the EU expanded into. Furthermore, the 1992 Danish 'no' vote to the Maastricht Treaty and the French's inability to mobilize voters in favor of the Maastricht Treaty was unanticipated. These examples highlight the reality that in fact not every state within Europe is in consensus about European integration. Thus, euroscepticism has become an identifiable phenomenon that has since required research to understand what it is, what factors cause it, and how it has evolved over time.

An overwhelming majority of the literature on the topic relates specifically to euroscepticism and its existence amongst political parties. According to Vasilopoulou (2013) because the literature has spent the majority of its energies focused on this area, it has placed less emphasis on forms of euroscepticism found in different elements of society, including the media, EU institutions themselves, non-party groups, civil society organizations and how these groups interact and impact political parties and public opinion.

The material available on the topic remains fragmented lacking consistency and consensus on the specifics: *what is euroscepticism, why does it exist, when and how it arises, and how it changes over time*. There is no denying that each component of the European Union is dependent on the other. Public interests are linked to policymaking through their national representatives who deliberate European Policy in the European Council and Council of Ministers. Second, citizens have direct control over integration in member states that require national referendums on integrative reforms. Thirdly, the public is directly connected to EU policymaking through the European Parliament, which is popularly elected (Gabel, 1998).

In November 2010, Herman Van Rompuy (European Council President) claimed that euroscepticism could "lead to war" in Europe. Van Rompuy asserts that euroscepticism spurs nationalism to unhealthy levels within Europe (Euractive, 2013). Therefore, it is worth further research and investigation to explore the phenomenon which has been identified as a spreading issue and may pose serious complications to both the function and success of the European Union and the global community.

Taking into account these gaps in the literature, it is the aim of this paper to investigate how different societies define euroscepticism as well as the emergence and evolution of euroscepticism in the three case studies: Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It is not the goal of this paper to identify a single definition or single factor. Rather, it is the argument of this work that the phenomenon of euroscepticism is so complex that it is impossible for the phenomenon to mirror itself exactly from one state to the next; but perhaps there exists commonalities which can be addressed by the European Union in an effort to alleviate the symptoms of euroscepticism.

To summarize, the current literature on euroscepticism, although insightful, has yet to address a number of important questions that would allow us to better understand the phenomenon. As a result, the aim of this thesis is to put forth a comparative holistic approach that will examine euroscepticism beyond party politics and organizational structure. Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) asserts that the polarization of Europe is independent of the left–right dimension (previously discussed) rather it is linked to nationalism and feelings of cultural identity. Themes that will be discussed in the proceeding sections; Halikiopoulou’s findings are revolutionary because they seemingly acknowledge the power euroscepticism has in terms of altering the climate of Europe at the state level and the supranational level.

## 1.4 Literature Review

### 1.4.1 Conceptualization and Typology of Euroscepticism:

Preceding investigations have identified and put forth a variety of conflicting definitions and arguments relating to what euroscepticism is and its causes. This thesis intends to argue that euroscepticism cannot be constrained to one succinct definition or explanation for what euroscepticism is and how the phenomenon arises. For the reason that no two states share a collective history, political culture, or a similar vision for how the European Union should function.

The term and concept of euroscepticism is a relatively new term in European Integration studies and has only become part of popular language and political science in the last two decades. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term first surfaced in print via *The Economist* on 26 December 1992 and has gained momentum and clout since then. The earliest definition of the term defined a Eurosceptic as, “*A person having doubts or reservations regarding the supposed benefits of increasing cooperation between the member states of the European Union*” (Simpson, 1986).<sup>1</sup> The term has assumed different meanings over time and geography. In Britain in the 1980s, the term euroscepticism was used interchangeably with the term “*anti-Marketeer*” (Spiering, 2004). In France it has been used as a synonym of the word “*souverainism*” meaning ‘preserving a state’s sovereignty.’ Harmsen and Spiering (2004) argue that the definition of euroscepticism must be understood “...relative to the different national political traditions and experiences of European integration which frame those debates.”

Contemporary researchers such as, Richard Katz defines the term as, “*Opposition to the development of any form of supranational European institutions that would or do impinge on national sovereignty and the traditional European state system*” (Katz, 2002). There seems to exist a level of agreement amongst scholars that *euro* in euroscepticism refers to the European Union and its predecessors as well as towards specific cooperation(s) proposed by the European Union. Correspondingly, *skeptic* is interpreted as, “...*an attitude of doubt or a disposition of disbelief*” Hooghe and Marks (2007). However, definitions such as these seem to be black or white not allowing for a grey area to exist.

The following two scholars provide what could arguably be considered the most plausible definitions which account for the grey areas of euroscepticism. First, Paul Taggart in his article entitled, *A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary West European Party Systems* 1998, defined euroscepticism in a three tier definition: 1. Those who oppose the idea of integration and therefore the EU; 2. Those who do not oppose integration but are skeptical

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<sup>1</sup> The earliest citation in the Oxford English Dictionary is from June 1986. However, *The Times* used the word some months earlier, November 1985.

that the EU is the best way to achieve it. 3. Those that are not opposed to integration but think that the EU is not the best way to achieve it because it is too exclusive (Taggart, 1998).

Similar to Taggart, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) have put forth an alternative definition of the term incorporating diffuse and specific support for European integration, which has led to the emergence of the four type’s position. The authors define diffuse as, “Support for the general ideas of European integration,” whereas specific is, “Support for the general practice of European integration.” This framework has led to a two-by-two matrix to determine the probable party positions. The axes are labeled: Europhobe/Europhile and EU-optimist/pessimist. These include: “Euroenthusiasts” those who support both the ideas of European integration and the general practice of integration; “Eurorejects” who do not accept the idea or practice of integration; thirdly, the “Eurosceptics” those who support the idea of a united Europe but disagree with the general practice of integration; finally, the “Europragmatists” who are against the idea of the EU but support the practice of European integration (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002).

Lastly and still related to this concept of multiple definitions, Hartleb (2011) cites a simplistic and concise table which has been replicated here:

**Table 1:** Hartleb: Categories of EU Alignments

<b>Categories of EU Alignments</b>	
Maximalists	Pushing integration as far and as fast as is feasible towards the practical realization of a chosen model.
Reformist	Endorsing the advance of integration, subject to remedying deficiencies in what has already been achieved.
Gradualist	Accepting some advance of integration, as long as it is slow and piecemeal
Minimalist	Accepting the status quo, but wanting to limit further integration, as far as possible
Revisionist	Wanting to return to an earlier state, usually before a treaty revision
Rejectionist	Outright refusal of integration, coupled with opposition to participation

Taggart, Kopecky, Mudde, and Hartleb’s definitions have the advantage of categorized definitions for the meaning of euroscepticism. Their definitions are broad and unassuming, they seemingly recognize that there may exist varying degrees, types and causes for the phenomenon of euroscepticism from state to state; factors that will be considered in the proceeding pages.

While this terminology (euroscepticism) has gained a degree of legitimacy amongst researchers, there has been criticism that the discussion is one sided ignoring the pro-European argument. In response to this concern of imbalance as it relates to the discussion of euroscepticism, Nicolò Conti (2003) expands the Taggart and Szczerbiak categories in a positive direction. Conti identifies two types of pro-EU attitudes, “functional Europeanism” under this category, there is no principled support for European integration, but rather pragmatic approval of the EU, and “identity Europeanism” which is a principled commitment to European integration. An additional criticism is that euroscepticism is a term coined by the media and not an idiom of political science. Therefore, it should not be understood as a direct opposition to the euro-optimism sentiment but rather as an opposition movement opposed to the European project (European Sources online, 2013).

The following section will present the previously identified, five factors related to euroscepticism. The first factor, *political parties* will directly relate to this discussion on conceptualization and typology of euroscepticism and will be elaborated on further in the discussion found in chapter 3.

#### *1.4.2 Factors Related to Euroscepticism:*

The phenomenon of euroscepticism goes well beyond the complexities of its conceptual birth and meaning. There is still the lack of clarity relating to how it arises in a society. The proceeding section is a brief review of relevant literature on factors related to euroscepticism to date. It is worth mentioning that these factors may or may not apply to the three case studies in this paper. Instead, these are generalized factors which have been identified by scholars, several of which will be utilized in this study.

#### *Political Parties:*

As the EU has expanded so have Eurosceptic political parties throughout Europe. Many of these parties have incorporated eurosceptical positions to their party platforms. According to the 2004 and 2009 EU Parliamentary elections these parties have experienced noteworthy success and thereby have gone on to serve at the supranational level. For example, the United Kingdom's Independence Party (UKIP), which has continually expressed its goal of withdrawing the UK from the EU had thirteen members of its party elected as MEPs in 2009 (Sutchliffe, 2010). In Germany, the German People's Party and the Netherlands' Center Democrats Party have also been identified as right leaning anti-European Union parties.

According to Taggart (1998), euroscepticism is most likely adopted by protest-based parties that stand at the fringes of the existing party system. Thus, euroscepticism may be part of a more generalized opposition; therefore these groups may utilize the anti-EU stance as a means of securing greater electoral support. Taggart (1998) further argues that these parties are likely to be "parties for whom the EU issue is a secondary issue which can be appropriated to strengthen their claims to be alternatives to the political centre."

In an effort to be more concise and illustrate political parties as a factor, Ray (2004) presented the following table in his 2004 presentation at the Comparative Euroscepticism Workshop in Syracuse New York. Ray drew on the work of an expert survey conducted by Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (1999) and conducted a direct comparison with Taggart and Szczerbiak's categories from 2002. The table below presents the catalog of Eurosceptical parties according to the Taggart and Szczerbiak categorization and the expert survey scale into hard and soft ranges of values. Almost all of the parties classified as Eurosceptical by Taggart and Szczerbiak also fall into the Eurosceptical range on the expert survey, with only the UK Greens, Dutch Green Links, and Greek Political Spring scoring above 4 on the expert survey scale. With few exceptions, the parties classified as hard Eurosceptics fall below 2, and the soft Eurosceptics above that cut point.

**Please see table on proceeding page.**

**Table 2: EU 15 Eurosceptics according to expert survey and/or Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002)**

	Taggart and Szczerbiak's Hard Eurosceptics	Taggart and Szczerbiak's Soft Eurosceptics	Not listed by T&S
Expert Survey score $\leq 2$	<u>Communist (GR), 1.0</u> <b>UK independence (UK), 1.0</b> <u>People's Movement (DK), 1.0</u> National Front (FR), 1.14 Unity List (DK), 1.14 <u>Worker's Struggle (FR), 1.29</u> Green/ environment (SV), 1.33 <u>Left (SV), 1.33</u> National Movement (FR), 1.33 Progress Party (DK), 1.43 <b>June Movement (DK), 1.43</b> <i>Danish People's Party, 1.43</i> German People's Party (GE), 1.57 Republicaaner (GE), 1.75	Socialist Party (IRL), 1.4 True Finns (FIN), 2	Center Democrats (NL), 1.44
2 < score $\leq 4$	National Front (B), 2.14 Flemish Block (B), 2.22 <u>Communists (FR), 2.71</u>	Conservatives (UK), 2.15 Green (IRL), 2.33 <u>Socialist People (DK), 2.57</u> <b><i>Rally For France, 2.57</i></b> Reformed Political Fed (NL), 2.57 <u>Socialist Party (NL), 2.67</u> Freedom Party (AU), 2.67 Sinn Fein, 2.67 <b>Political Reformed Party (NL), 2.82</b> <u>Democratic Social Party (GR), 3.14</u> Northern League (IT), 3.17 Reformed Political League (NL), 3.18 <u>Party of Dem. Socialism (GE), 3.20</u> Centre Party (SV), 3.67	Social Movement (IT), 2.17 <b>Chasse Peche (FR), 2.33</b> Pensioners Party (FIN), 2.5 <u>Left Block (POR), 2.5</u> KIPU-Ecology (FIN), 2.5 Dem Center Union (POR), 2.6 Finnish Christian League, 2.6 EH- Basque Citizens (SP), 2.9 <u>Ref Communists (IT) 3.00</u> <i>National Alliance (IT), 3.67</i> <u>Left Unity (SP), 3.67</u> <i>CDS (POR), 4.00</i>
Expert Survey score > 4	Green (UK), 4.44	Green Links (NL), 4.45 Political Spring (GR), 5.43	<i>Fianna Fail (IRE), 5.83</i>
Missing from 1999 expert survey	German National Dem. Party Communist Party of Finland Democratic Unionist Party (UK) (and factions within parties)	Movement for France (FR) Movement des Citoyens (FR)	Emma Bonino List (IT)

Key:

Numbers after party names indicate that party's placement on the 7 point pro-anti-European integration scale in 1999.

EP groups:

**BOLD** = Member of the **EDD** group of the EP

*ITALIC* = Member of the *UEN* group of the EP

Underline = Member of the GUE/NGL group of the EP.

Pale = Member of the NI group of the EP

Examining the table above, it is evident that euroscepticism is imbedded in a number of EU member state's national party systems. Many of the states experiencing heightened levels of skepticism also have at least one party that falls in the < 2 category. More specifically, the three case studies of this thesis: Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In Germany, The German People's Party received a 1.57 and Republicaaner a 1.75, the Netherlands' Center Democrats Party received a 1.44, and in the United Kingdom the UK Independence Party received a 1.0.

To illustrate the impact and perhaps influence these periphery parties are having, consider the most recent 2014 European Parliamentary Elections. The German People's Party holds 35% of the 96 seats held by Germany in the European Parliament, the Dutch Center Democrats Party holds 15.46% of the 26 seats held by the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom's UK Independence Party holds 26.7% of the 73 seats held by the United Kingdom (European Parliament, 2014). Thus, it would seem that these Eurosceptic parties are gaining momentum amongst the electorate.

### *Economy:*

Gabel (1998) argues that citizens of any given state inside the European Union evaluate the advantages of membership based on an economic cost benefit analysis. The underlying assumption is that citizens evaluate membership based on the economic effects and the benefits provided to the state and its' citizens on the part of the European Union. Gabel asserts that the cost benefit analysis is further fueled by political elites who utilize the 'benefits' aspect of membership as a marketing tool to promote further expansion. Thereby increasing the expectations of citizens on the European Union; and if citizens' expectations are not met this could potentially spur or increase feelings of skepticism. To illustrate this argument, the Economist recently published an article in its August 2013 issue; according to the article, Mark Rutte, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands "...has been pitching voters a mixed message: on the one hand, the EU is the key to solving the economic crisis, on the other, the EU's excesses must be tamed." Thus, supporting Gabel's argument that perhaps political elites over sell the benefits of EU membership (The Economist, 2013).

Despite the negligence of political elite in over selling the potential benefits of EU membership, the reality still remains that in 2007-2008, the EU and the respective member states have felt the effects of the global economic crisis. It is argued by contemporary writers that the rise in skepticism is directly associated to the economic crisis and the EU's lack of competency to handle such a situation. However, Torreblanca and Leonardo (2013) assert that, "... while it is true that the financial crisis has enhanced euroscepticism, it is unwise to think that once economic growth starts to pick up in the Eurozone, this movement will recede." In addition, the European Council on Foreign Relations states, "...the collapse of trust in the EU runs deeper than that [the economic crisis] and enthusiasm for the European project will not return unless the EU profoundly changes the way it deals with its member states and citizens' (Torreblanca and Leonardo, 2013).

### *Migration/Immigration:*

Directly related to economics is the issue of migration. Citizens of the twenty-eight member states which make up the EU have the liberty to live anywhere they choose within the twenty-eight member states. This has created a point of great contention. Since 2004, the year of the EU's most recent and largest expansion; citizens from less affluent states have migrated to more affluent states in search of employment and other benefits. The Christian Science Monitor referred to this practice as "benefit tourism" essentially people who move to another state to reap the benefits granted to residents of that state (Llana, 2014). Following the 2004 EU expansion and the proceeding influx of migrants to more affluent member states such as Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom the native citizens of those states have experienced a shift in the job market, particularly in areas of trade.

### *National Identity:*

With the development and expansion of the European Union, the free travel of goods, services and persons within the EU; there has occurred a gradual unification of cultures, tastes and life styles (Mair, 2004). When such cultural changes arise, often skepticism to some degree follows. The fear of an emerging pan-European identity suffocating the long tradition of national identity evokes fear within a society. A third factor of euroscepticism to consider has been put forth by McLaren (2007) who suggests identity as a factor. Citizens of a given state may feel that their national identity is being threatened, perhaps not in the literal sense but rather the process of integration may diminish what it means to be German, Dutch, British and so forth. This argument can be both observed and supported by the introduction and adoption of the euro, unlike its' EU member counterparts, the United Kingdom from the beginning and still today remains adamantly opposed to dismantling the pound in favor of the euro. For the British, the pound is a symbol of national identity. Wessels notes that forty-one percent [41%] of citizens across the EU-28 express feelings of neutrality or negativity with respect to European identity, a third of whom can be described as hard-core Eurosceptics (2005). In an article by Hargitai, he identifies freedom of labor and relaxed immigration policies of older member states as being two additional factors threatening this sense of identity. According to Hargitai, "...New immigrants and laborers from Eastern Europe will impact the Dutch, German, French cultural traditions" (2013). A more detailed discussion on labor and migration can be found in the case studies section on this chapter.

### *National Sovereignty:*

Sovereignty is understood as the capacity of the people to decide what they want for their country. Few in Europe feel that they are still sovereign at the national or supranational levels. According to Torreblanca and Leonardo, Europeans feel as though democracy within their respective countries has vanished and the EU has failed to recreate and preserve democracy for the whole of Europe (2013). Many states have argued that as the European Union expands so does its' reach over policy matters; matters which had previously been left to each respective state. According to Borzel and Risse (2003) policy issues such as environment and agriculture, reached a degree where more than eighty percent [80%] of existing policies are made at the European level. In the United Kingdom many people perceive this action as a threat to national sovereignty. Thereby, many British cite these far reaching grabs at power as reasons for their skepticism. The British see continental Europe as something else, culturally and historically (The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 2013). According to a paper written by Bovens and Yesikagit, EU member states are opposed to the one size fits all directives such as agricultural directives, where environmental conditions may differ from one state to the next (2004).

To conclude this discussion of factors related to euroscepticism, please consider the last factor, self-inflicted skepticism which was identified during data collection and further investigated through relevant literature. The relevant literature on self-inflicted skepticism demonstrates yet another complex dimension of euroscepticism and illustrates that the phenomenon may be two directional.

### *Self-Inflicted Skepticism:*

Lastly, to put forth one final factor, which is a seemingly ironic argument; political scientists Harmsen and Spiering (2004) argue that euroscepticism is perhaps a self-inflicted ailment. According to the authors, "The European Union's progressively expanding competence has, correspondingly, multiplied the potential sources of friction which may give rise to forms of Euroscepticism."

Moreover, professor John McCormick from Indiana University stated in a keynote address to the Jean Monnet Conference held in Brussels, in 2013 that there are five major reasons why the EU has faced so much hardship in its' history: 1. The EU is a project without precedent –it has demanded new thinking and a new way of doing political and

economic business, to which many people are not yet attuned. 2. The EU has been made up on the fly, with only a general idea about the end goal. There has been no broad agreement on what it is or how it might best evolve. 3. In this vacuum of uncertainty, it has been easy for the critics to encourage myths and misconceptions and to promote a climate of pessimism. 4. We have seen an ongoing struggle between the national interests of the member states and European interests. But the latter have been hard to define. 5. Because people feel less sense of attachment to the EU than to the member states of which they are citizens, it is easy and tempting to blame the EU when things go wrong at home— (McCormick, 2013). All of which demonstrates that to some degree perhaps the phenomenon of euroscepticism is self-driven by the organization itself.

In addition, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso spoke to the Brussels think tank in 2013, in his speech he stated, “Today, facing the economic and social crisis, we need them [engaged European citizens] more than ever. We need to fully engage them in the European process” (Barroso, 2013). As the literature has indicated to this point, there exists a lack of information sharing between the EU and the people. The lack of transparency by the European Union has created a culture of mistrust and uncertainty across the EU.

Considering all of these potential factors, one might question whether or not they are interrelated, according to McLaren (2002)—no. Instead she suggests that there may be distinct paths to euroscepticism: one rooted in the perception of cultural threat and one in perceived economic loss. Further, institutional distrust motivates euroscepticism. While the direct effect of institutional trust runs through EU institutions, distrust of EU and national institutions tend to go together. An assertion supported by Nik de Boer and Maarten Hillebrandt of the Amsterdam Centre for Law and Governance who say, “The European member states have never really sought to involve their citizens in the EU. The political debate about the goal of the EU and the way to reach it has largely taken place behind closed doors” (Euractive 2013). Hooge and Marks (2007) assert just the opposite. These authors assert that one of the far reaching problems surrounding euroscepticism is the misconception that the phenomenon only exists amongst political elites. Instead, Hooge and Marks argue that euroscepticism is the shared realization that European integration is no longer determined by insulated elites but by public opinion.

Therefore, in an effort to demonstrate the diversity of euroscepticism throughout Europe, in terms of what it looks like [how it is defined] and how it arises [its factors] the following states shall serve as case studies in this investigation: Germany, The Netherlands, and The United Kingdom. The purpose here is to first highlight pertinent literature relating to each case study relating to the phenomenon of euroscepticism; followed by an independent evaluation.

### *1.5 Variation of Skepticism:*

Scholars offer a variety of explanations as to why euroscepticism varies between member states. One group of researchers assert that it is not just the national government, but the ideological orientation of the political parties present at the national level who provide the most important cues which directly influence the level of support for the EU. Scholars argue that evidence demonstrates that extremist parties tend to be more Eurosceptic, but for different reasons—leftist parties fear the negative influence European integration might have on the welfare state (economic opposition) and rightist parties fear the loss of national identity and sovereignty (cultural opposition) (Brinegar & Jolly, 2005; De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Taggart, 1998).

A second perspective on public attitudes towards the European Union is the relinquishing of sovereignty. More and more sovereignty is being transferred from the member states to the EU beginning with the Maastricht Treaty. McLaren contends that identity as an explanation is the notion that the European integration project poses a threat to the nation-state and to national identity (2006). The literature tends to focus on national identities at the country level; many authors hypothesize fluctuating causes for this connection in different member states (De Vries 2009; McLaren 2006; Medrano 2003). Medrano argues that a country’s historical development of national identity is imperative. Medrano notes that British euroscepticism comes from its legacy as an imperial state, while Germany tends to be less Eurosceptic because of a desire to modernize and because of guilt over World War II (2003). McLaren finds evidence that those

member states where the population still identifies strongly with their nationality and feels that the EU poses a significant threat to national symbols, tend to display lower support for European integration on average (2006).

Leconte puts forth yet another theory of variance, she refers to this explanation as policy-based skepticism. Leconte states the following, “The influence of the country context on attitudes towards the EU is not limited to general perceptions about EU membership; however, it also applies to citizens’ preferences as to the desired scope of the EU’s power” (2010). Pertinent literature on the subject matter notes that policy-based euroscepticism not only differs by country but also by the type of policy. Leconte cites that Nordic countries want to limit the EU’s power over matters relating to the welfare state and environmental protection. In contrast, the UK and the Netherlands would like to limit the EU’s power over immigration policy. Therefore, the level of euroscepticism in a country may be influenced by the reach the European Union has in a given policy area.

Janssen argues that European integration is complex and too abstract for the majority of EU citizens to understand. Therefore, it is difficult for citizens to form independent and informed attitudes about the EU (1991). In response to this assertion, Anderson believes that people “compensate for a gap in knowledge about the EU by construing a reality about it that fits their understanding of the political world” (1998). Anderson argues that the lack of knowledge and information causes citizens to use “proxies,” in their evaluations of the EU, based on perceptions of the national government, rather than the performance of the EU (1998). Furthermore, Anderson and Franklin cite literature that has emerged around a “second-order thesis” which argues that citizen attitudes to European integration are likely to reflect their feelings about the domestic political climate (Anderson, 1998; Franklin et al., 1994).

### *1.6 Presentation of the Case Studies*

#### *Germany:*

Historically, Germany has always maintained an above average positive opinion regarding the European project. According to Bush and Knelangen (2005) Germany’s lack of skepticism is “...the exception”. According to Noelle-Neumann and Petersen (2002) in 1953, 41% of Germans felt positive about the integration of Europe; and in 1979 following the EEC crisis polling revealed that 31% of Germans still felt positive about European integration.

A 2001 analysis conducted by the OPTEM S.A.R.L on behalf of the European Commission studied the attitudes of citizens within fifteen member states. Germany being one of the fifteen, it was determined by the report that, “Germans {are} aware of the original political aim behind the construction of the Community (The European Union) developing cooperation to avoid the risk of new wars – also clearly support the ideal of a European integration process heading in the direction of a united Europe and a closer alignment of its countries in all spheres.”

According to a report released by the European Council on Foreign Relations, Germans level of skepticism has increased since the euro crisis emerged. “Germans see themselves as the victims of the euro crisis; they feel they have been betrayed and fear that they will be asked to pay higher taxes or accept higher levels of inflation in order to save the euro” Torreblanca and Leonardo (2012). In 2012, one-hundred and seventy-two (172) German economists signed an open letter to protest what they considered to be the German government’s misguided policy of “socializing debt” in the euro zone (D.S., 2012). According to Eurobarometer data sixty-one percent (61%) of Germans have “no trust” in the EU while only thirty-one percent (31%) have a “fairly positive” view of the EU (European Commission, 2012). As the euro-zone crisis enters its sixth year, it is evident that Germans are not only growing in skepticism with regard to the economic crisis but they are showing signs of mistrust in both national and supranational institutions.

In addition to the euro crisis, Ulrike Guérot, senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Berlin cites a declining jobs market for German blue-collar workers. According the Guérot, the German labor market is becoming more globalized which has spurred greater competition in a multitude of labor markets (Taylor, 2006). Relevant literature on the topic argues that many Germans feel that cheaper labor markets in other EU member states may

endanger growth and enlargement of Germany's economy and thereby decreasing a competitive market (Bush and Knelangen, 2004).

Perhaps the most interesting characteristic of German skepticism is how it is dissimilar to its EU member state counterparts. According to Bush and Knelangen (2004), Germany seemingly directs its skepticism towards specific EU projects, for example the adoption of the single currency system. Rather, they are not skeptic towards the EU as a whole.

#### *The Netherlands:*

The Dutch have long since been seemingly ardent supporters of a *community model* form of governance within Europe. The Netherlands has been active members of the Western Union (1948) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949). However, the Dutch were resistant to multiple international agreements, for example, the Schuman Plan, which was a trade agreement with Benelux, France, Germany and Italy. The Dutch were uncomfortable with the supranational aspects of such agreements and viewed them as infringing on their national sovereignty. A second example of Dutch hesitation towards further European integration is their reluctance to join the European Defense Community. According to the literature, the Dutch government was initially opposed to the creation of the EDC for fear of domination by its larger neighbors, France and Germany. It was only under extreme pressure from the United States and bowing to the international balance of power, that the Dutch government accepted the EDC (Van der Harst, 1990). Van der Harst argues, "Considering the EDC story, it is remarkable that in the literature on post-war European history, the Netherlands is often mentioned as the champion of European federation. The history of the negotiations on the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defense Community and the European Political Community are witness to the fact that in reality, the opposite was true. The Dutch were prepared to sacrifice small pieces of national sovereignty for the benefit of the country's economic and more precisely, commercial interests; however, in general, the government's attitude was strongly anti-supranational" (Van der Harst, 1990).

This skeptic attitude continued well into the late twentieth century, in 1992 the Delors II financial package emerged, thereby shifting the Netherlands from a net beneficiary of EU spending to being a net contributor. Critics within the Dutch government have been critical of the high cost and loose financial management of the EU; and by extension Dutch mainstream political voices have argued that the process of integration has gone far enough, voices which have increased in both volume and frequency since 1992 (Harmsen, 2004). A recent report by the European Council on Foreign Relations stated that the Dutch support for the EU has fallen from +44 percent in 2007 to -8 percent in 2012. The council cites the following as explanations for the rise in skepticism, "...the perceived weak performance of both the EU and Eurozone countries in dealing with the crisis. In particular, the Dutch see the EU as part of the problem rather than the solution" (Harmsen, 2004).

The Dutch perception that the EU is part of the problem may also be linked to the lack of communication on behalf of the EU to the European people. Adriaan Schout from the Clingendael Institute of International Relations in the Netherlands criticizes the lack of public debates and lack of information about the EU: "Public debates about the EU have come too late and been conducted with insufficient depth. As a result, the public has remained ill-informed and has been left with uncertainty, for example about whether their taxes are being wasted on Greece and on an ineffective EU budget... Such uncertainties create a fertile breeding ground for discontent" (Harmsen, 2004).

Similar to its EU counterpart— Germany, the Dutch deputy premier and social affairs minister, Lodewijk Asscher has cited, "negative consequences" of unprecedented levels of labor migration within the EU. Asscher has argued in multiple interviews that the influx of migrants from less affluent EU member states to Western more affluent member states has created a labor market gridlock in the Netherlands. For example, those who work in the field of construction are likely to be apprehensive towards Eastern Europeans, in the Netherlands, the Dutch are particularly apprehensive about the Polish and the Romanians who can do similar kinds of work (illegally), do not need the language skills, and will do the job for a fraction of the price they (the Dutch) ask (Hargitai 2013).

A third factor being expressed by the Dutch according to Reuters is the persistent weak Dutch economy, an economy which remains in recession while the rest of the euro zone is returning to growth. Unemployment in the Netherlands hit a record high of 8.7 percent in July 2013 and remains around 6.8 percent as of August 2014 this is in comparison to Germany whose unemployment rate as of August 2014 was at 5 percent (European Commission, 2014). *The United Kingdom:*

Historically speaking, Britain's renegotiation during a 1975 referendum concerning the EEC (Common Market) demonstrated the depth of euroscepticism which existed in Great Britain at the time. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's famous 1988 Bruges speech at the College of Europe called for the preservation of different traditions. Thatcher warned against relinquishing British national identity. Europe should be, "...a family of nations..." rather than a super state; Thatcher adamantly opposed a unified political and foreign defense policy with the continent of Europe. She was most concerned with preserving British national interest. Thatcher's negotiations during the Single European Act impacted the development of European integration.

Moreover, states such as Germany and the United Kingdom have illustrious histories of influence in Europe and abroad. Now that Europe has dedicated itself to the unification of Europe, skepticism could potentially threaten any real influence these influential states might have within the European Union. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair of the UK is quoted as likening euroscepticism to a "virus". He said, "The Right have got it bad on the Europe thing", adding that if the UK left the EU it would be "hugely destructive of Britain's interests" (Euractive, 2013).

Unlike its European counterparts, the United Kingdom has experienced less dramatic shifts towards euroscepticism in contemporary society due to its lengthy and well known skepticism relating to the European Project. The British have always expressed negative feelings about Europe let alone becoming part of Europe. As of 2012, eighty percent [80%] of British polled identified themselves as "tend not to trust" the EU (Euractive, 2013). Evans and Butt (2007) investigate the changing face of euroscepticism in the United Kingdom, whose public support for European integration has remained lukewarm at best. Evans and Butt demonstrate that euroscepticism in Britain has become less driven by economic insecurity and more so by concerns about British identity.

A second dimension of euroscepticism in the United Kingdom according to relevant literature is the state's concerns over the infringement of their national sovereignty. They have subscribed to a conditional membership with the European Union. Meaning they have negotiated several "opt-outs" which were agreed upon during the Thatcher Administration and under the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. Some of which include opting out of the Eurozone and maintaining control over Justice and Home affairs measures (Bogdanor, 2007). Since the first round of opt-outs almost a decade ago, members of the British government have advocated for further opt-outs. Phillip Hammond, Britain's Foreign Secretary stated, "...we're all in government in the same place on Europe. We all believe that the status quo is not an acceptable way to run Europe in the future" (Euractive, 2014). If the EU is not amiable to Great Britain's opt-out demands it is likely the British government will put the fate of its' EU membership to a referendum as early as 2017.

As this literature review has demonstrated, there is a lack of consensus and continuity in both the meaning and conceptualization of euroscepticism. This is reflected in the relevant literature. Scholars have not yet arrived at a consensus on a precise definition neither for the phenomenon nor concrete factors related to euroscepticism to be applied universally. This gap in research is the focal point of this work. The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that it is illogical for scholars to seek a single definition or list of factors which spur euroscepticism to be applied cross-nationally. Instead, we must look more broadly at each state on a case by case basis in order to understand what it means to be Eurosceptic because the ailment is varied and lacks consistency.

Usherwood and Startin's (2013) work supports this assertion. The authors claim that the research surrounding euroscepticism has focused too narrowly. "Many studies have adopted this narrow focus on political parties and to a lesser extent public opinion... At the same time, referendums and EP [European Parliament] elections have reinforced this sense of embeddedness as euroscepticism has taken on new levels of salience. We have entered an era where Euroscepticism has become an increasingly transnational and pan-European phenomenon. These developments have been

somewhat neglected by the academic community, which has over-focused on divisions in the literature based largely around the role of political parties.”

In order to determine the level of mass skepticism amongst the public in each case study; this thesis shall draw from Eurobarometer data and European Parliamentary Election data to be discussed in the proceeding chapter. From these findings, this thesis will then try to ascertain what the different trends in these countries have been over time; what factor(s) are fueling skepticism, why skepticism exists, and how skepticism has or has not changed over time.

### *1.7 Structure of the Thesis:*

This section will briefly outline the structure of the remaining sections of this work in order to provide the reader with a guide as to the sequence of the discussion. The following chapter, chapter two, shall outline the methodological framework of this study. Further, chapter two will present data collected from the Eurobarometer and European Parliamentary Elections and offer initial observations. Chapter three will offer a discussion based on the analysis from chapter two and will end with a conclusion.

## Chapter 2:

### Methodology and Presentation of Data

#### 2.1 Chapter Introduction:

This chapter shall present the research questions, hypothesis followed by the plan of inquiry, methodological framework and present the data acquired from the Eurobarometer and European Parliamentary Election results.

#### 2.2 Research Question and Thesis Statement:

*Can multiple definitions be applied to the concept of euroscepticism? Can euroscepticism be considered a multidimensional phenomenon which differs in terms of factors between European member states over time? Do these attitudes change over time?*

#### Thesis Statement:

*Although many researchers of euroscepticism have argued that the phenomenon can be defined under a single definition and that factors related to euroscepticism can be universally applied, closer examination shows that multiple definitions can be applied to the phenomenon and that factors related to euroscepticism vary over time.*

#### 2.3 Plan of Inquiry:

This study shall conduct a cross-national longitudinal trend analysis utilizing three case studies: Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom over a twenty year time perspective [1994-2014]. These three case studies have been selected in an effort to illustrate the variation within the concept (euroscepticism). The case study method has been selected to avoid basing findings on one case study which may serve as an anomaly to the broader picture. These three specific case studies have been deliberately selected because they are three of the original member states to the EU and thereby could be considered to be more settled in their attitudes towards the EU. Further, each of these respective case studies has had differing experiences both in their national histories and with the EU as a member state. The proceeding paragraphs offer a brief synopsis of each of the selected case studies.

#### 2.4 Data:

##### 2.4.1 European Parliamentary Election Results:

Below are data tables which present the electoral data of the European Parliamentary elections in each of the case studies. More specifically, the focus here is the political parties which received at least one percent of the majority vote.<sup>2</sup> Based on the articulated party platform for each identified party, one is able to identify whether a party is pro-European or anti-European (Please see Appendix: A on page 51). Based on the election results, one will be able to determine whether political party rhetoric is influencing the perception of voters in each case study towards Europe in either direction.

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<sup>2</sup> The European Union requires a political party seeking a seat in the European Parliament to capture at minimum four percent (4%) of the electoral vote. This study has chosen to incorporate political parties that have won at least one percent (1%) of the electoral vote due to an identified trend of multiple Eurosceptic parties increasing their voter percentages to four percent and in many cases well beyond the four percent threshold.

**Please see proceeding pages for tables**

**Table 3: *European Parliamentary Election Results by Country:***

**Germany**

	<b><u>1994</u></b>	<b><u>1999</u></b>	<b><u>2004</u></b>	<b><u>2009</u></b>	<b><u>2014</u></b>
Party:					
Christian Democratic Union	32.04%	39.30%	36.50%	30.70%	30.00%
Social Democratic Party	32.60%	30.70%	21.50%	20.80%	27.30%
Christian Social Union	6.76%	9.40%	8.00%	7.20%	5.30%
Alliance '90/The Greens	10.06%	6.40%	11.90%	12.10%	10.70%
Party of Democratic Socialism	4.72%	5.80%	6.10%	--	--
Free Democratic Party	4.07%	3.00%	6.10%	11.00%	3.40%
The Republicans	3.92%	1.70%	1.90%	1.30%	0.40%
Confederation of Free Citizens	1.09%	--	--	--	--
The Left	--	--	--	7.48%	7.39%
Alternative for Germany	--	--	--	--	7.04%
Free Voters	--	--	--	1.68%	1.46%
Pirate Party	--	--	--	--	1.45%
National Democratic Party of Germany	--	--	--	--	1.03%

**The Netherlands**

	<b><u>1994</u></b>	<b><u>1999</u></b>	<b><u>2004</u></b>	<b><u>2009</u></b>	<b><u>2014</u></b>
Party:					
Christian Democratic Appeal	30.80%	26.94%	24.43%	20.05%	15.00%
Labour Party	22.90%	20.11%	23.60%	12.05%	9.40%
People's Party for Freedom & Democracy	17.90%	19.69%	13.20%	11.39%	12.00%
Democrats	11.70%	--	--	--	--
Political Ref. Party, Ref Political Fed. & Ref. Political Alliance	7.80%	8.74%	--	--	--
Green Left	3.70%	11.85%	7.39%	8.87%	6.90%
The Greens	2.40%	--	--	--	--
Socialist Party	1.30%	5.04%	6.97%	7.10%	9.60%
Centre Democrats	1.00%	--	--	--	--
Democrats 66	--	5.80%	4.25%	11.32%	15.40%
Europe Transparent	--	--	7.30%	--	--
Christian Union Reformed Political Party	--	--	5.87%	6.82%	6.80%
Party for the Animals	--	--	3.22%	3.46%	4.20%
Party for Freedom	--	--	--	16.97%	13.30%

## The United Kingdom

	<u>1994</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2004</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>2014</u>
<b>Party:</b>					
UK Independence Party	1%	6.96%	16.10%	16.50%	27.49%
Labour	44%	28%	22.60%	15.70%	25.40%
Conservative	28%	35.77%	26.70%	27.70%	23.93%
Green	3%	6.25%	6.30%	8.60%	7.87%
Scottish National Party	3%	2.68%	1.40%	2.10%	2.46%
Liberal Democrats	17%	12.66%	14.90%	13.70%	6.87%
An Independence From Europe	--	--	--	--	1.49%
British National Party	--	1.13%	4.90%	6.20%	1.14%

\*Results presented as the % of the voting electorate for each country.

\*UK figures do not include Northern Ireland as it has a separate electoral system to the rest of the UK.

Source: Steinbrecher, Marcus. "Germany: European Parliament Election: University of Bamberg. Der. 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 <http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/>. (Accessed December 2014). The Electoral Commission. "Dataset: United Kingdom: European Parliament Election" 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk>. (Accessed December 2014). Lefeber, Algie. Statistics Netherlands (CBS). 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 <http://www.cbs.nl/> (accessed December 2014).

Observing the data above, it is evident that political parties that identify themselves as Eurosceptic whether hard or soft skeptics are increasing their presence in each case study. From 1994 to 2014, Germany has had thirteen parties capture at least one percent of the vote, six of which identify somewhere on the Eurosceptic spectrum. Perhaps the most notable being the *Alliance '90/The Greens* which have fluctuated in popularity over twenty years but have fluctuated between the number three and number four positions [in terms of popularity] each election cycle. Still, the pro-European parties in Germany have managed to hold firmly to the majority vote and in some instances have outlasted the Eurosceptic leaning parties.

With respect to the Netherlands, parties which identify as anti-European actually comprise the majority of the parties over the twenty year perspective. Nine of the fourteen parties capturing at least one percent of the vote identify as Eurosceptic. An interesting observation with respect to the Dutch Eurosceptic parties noted, is the lack of longevity and sustainability, of the nine Eurosceptic parties identified from 1994-2014. Only four of the nine have lasted through more than two election cycles.

Studying the election results of the United Kingdom, there is little surprise that six of the eight political parties gaining at least one percent of the vote in the last twenty years have been Eurosceptic, five identify as hardline Eurosceptics and one identifies as soft Eurosceptics. The election data asserts that euroscepticism is alive and well in the United Kingdom. There are two pro-European parties, the Liberal Democrats and the *Labour* party. The Labour party held the majority of the vote in 1994 but has since been on a fluctuating decline with the *UK Independence Party* and the *Conservative* party assuming the majority of the vote to date.

Evaluating the election data as a whole, it is interesting to note that Eurosceptic parties account for almost half of the parties in Germany and account for the majority in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom at any given time. However, in the cases of Germany and the Netherlands, these Eurosceptic parties have been unable to seize the overwhelming majority of the vote to date. In 2014, Eurosceptic parties accounted for twenty percent (20%) of the vote in Germany and thirty-four percent (34%) in the Netherlands. The picture in the United Kingdom looks a bit different with sixty-four percent (64%) of the vote going to Eurosceptic parties.

#### *2.4.2 European Common Market:*

Examining the data available today, the twenty-eight member states which makeup the European Union are also members of the European Common Market or the Single Market. To clarify, this market system functions separately from the Eurozone. Although, the United Kingdom is not a member of the Eurozone, it is a member of the Common Market. The Common Market in summation addresses movement: the movement of people, goods, capital and services; this section shall deal with the economic factor. Since the economic factor encompasses a broad range of interrelated topics, we shall first address the Common Market followed by economic topics related to prices and the general economic situation, each of which are addressed in the table on page 21.<sup>3</sup>

**Please See Proceeding pages for tables.**

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<sup>3</sup> The table on page 21 encompasses a variety of economic factors which will not be discussed here because they are economic areas that the European Union does not have direct influence or policy making decision over.

**Table 4: EBQ: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that [your country] has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community [Common Market]?**

**Germany**

date:	<u>Benefitted</u>	<u>Not benefitted</u>	<u>DK - Don't know</u>
1994	50%	30%	20%
1995	--	--	--
1996	33%	43%	23%
1997	33%	44%	22%
1998	39%	36%	25%
1999	37%	39%	24%
2000	37%	42%	21%
2001	44%	34%	21%
2002	43%	33%	24%
2003	36.50%	36.50%	27%
2004	49%	42%	9%
2005	46%	46%	8%
2006	49%	41%	10%
2007	58%	32%	10%
2008	58%	33%	9%
2009	57%	32%	11%
2010	49%	41%	10%
2011	48%	42%	10%

**The Netherlands**

date:	<u>Benefitted</u>	<u>Not benefitted</u>	<u>DK - Don't know</u>
1994	69%	17%	14%
1995	--	--	--
1996	69%	15%	15%
1997	64%	25%	11%
1998	66%	21%	12%
1999	65%	20%	15%
2000	65%	20%	15%
2001	67%	18%	15%
2002	67%	14%	18%
2003	53.60%	34.30%	12.10%
2004	59%	33%	9%
2005	61%	32%	7%
2006	62%	29%	8%
2007	74%	21%	5%
2008	76%	19%	5%
2009	74%	20%	6%

2010	67%	25%	8%
2011	67%	26%	7%

**United Kingdom**

date:	<u>Benefitted</u>	<u>Not benefitted</u>	<u>DK - Don't know</u>
1994	38%	45%	16%
1995	--	--	--
1996	34%	47%	19%
1997	36%	43%	20%
1998	37%	42%	21%
1999	29%	42%	29%
2000	25%	44%	31%
2001	36%	39%	25%
2002	36%	35%	30%
2003	30.30%	45.30%	24.40%
2004	39%	45%	16%
2005	37%	47%	17%
2006	39%	47%	13%
2007	37%	47%	16%
2008	39%	46%	15%
2009	36%	49%	15%
2010	27%	60%	13%
2011	35%	54%	11%

Source:  
from European Community.

Brussels: European Commission, May 1994, 1996-2011.

**Eurobarometer. Benefited**  
Standard Eurobarometer.

Observing the Eurobarometer data above, it is interesting to note that German survey respondents have a fluctuating opinion of the benefits or a lack thereof of the Common Market. Twelve of the eighteen years respondents expressed an opinion that their country had benefited from the Common Market, on two occasions, in 2003 and 2005 respondents were equally divided on whether Germany had benefited or not with a thirty-six percent and forty-six percent equal spread respectively. Moreover, Germans only expressed an opinion of not benefiting four of the eighteen years.

With regard to the Netherlands, Dutch respondents overwhelmingly expressed an opinion of benefiting from the Common Market every single year when asked. Thus, it can be concluded that the Common Market is without a doubt not a factor for the Dutch.

The United Kingdom stands in stark contrast to its Dutch counterpart, seventeen of the eighteen years British respondents were surveyed expressed an opinion of not benefiting from the Common Market and 2002 was the only exception, with a one point differential between thirty-six percent and thirty-five percent of the opinion of not benefiting. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that the Common Market under the umbrella of the factor of economics in the United Kingdom.

### 2.4.3 Broader Economic Concerns:

The Common Market is only one dimension of the economic factor, please consider a second Eurobarometer data set which poses the question: *What do you think are the two most important issues facing [OUR COOUNTRY] at the moment?* This includes responses related to economic factors: the general economic situation, rising prices and inflation, unemployment, taxation, and government debt. Below is a Eurobarometer table which captures the responses of citizens in the case study countries on a variety of issues that are expressed areas of concern to respondents. This table shall be referenced both in this economic discussion and in proceeding sections of this thesis.

**Please see table on proceeding page.**

**Table 5: EBQ: What do you think are the two most important issues facing [OUR COUNTRY] at the moment?**

Germany																							
date:	Economic Situation	Defence/Foreign affairs	Housing	Pensions	Public transport	Healthcare System	Crime	Rising prices/inflation	Taxation	Unemployment	Terrorism	Educational System	Protection the Environment	Other	DK-Don't Know	Immigration	Energy Related Issues	None	Government Debt	The Environment	Energy Supply		
1993	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1994	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1995	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1996	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1997	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1998	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1999	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
2000	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
2001	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
2002	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
2003	41.40%	0.50%	0.20%	14.50%	0.70%	17%	17.50%	14.30%	9.20%	63.40%	2.70%	7.20%	1.10%	0.40%	1%	6.70%	--	--	--	--	--		
2004	42%	1%	0%	12%	1%	13%	18%	9%	7%	75%	4%	8%	1%	1%	0%	7%	--	--	--	--	--		
2005	43%	1%	0%	14%	1%	8%	11%	12%	6%	74%	4%	12%	2%	2%	0%	8%	--	--	--	--	--		
2006	29%	1%	0%	9%	--	20%	13%	14%	9%	70%	7%	12%	1%	1%	1%	7%	2%	--	--	--	--		
2007	14%	1%	0%	17%	--	15%	35%	8%	44%	11%	18%	6%	1%	0%	6%	6%	--	--	--	--	--		
2008	34%	2%	1%	12%	--	21%	11%	42%	9%	24%	3%	17%	3%	1%	0%	5%	9%	--	--	--	--		
2009	19%	4%	0%	13%	--	29%	12%	18%	7%	30%	19%	16%	5%	2%	0%	16%	6%	0%	--	--	--		
2010	19%	4%	0%	13%	--	29%	12%	18%	7%	30%	19%	16%	5%	2%	0%	16%	6%	0%	--	--	--		
2011	27%	2%	1%	12%	--	22%	14%	34%	7%	18%	10%	21%	--	1%	0%	6%	--	0%	--	4%	14%		
2012	22%	--	3%	15%	--	9%	12%	29%	5%	22%	3%	18%	--	1%	1%	8%	--	0%	34%	15%	--		
2013	13%	--	7%	19%	--	12%	12%	25%	7%	20%	2%	20%	--	1%	0%	16%	--	1%	23%	15%	--		
2014	11%	--	6%	21%	--	12%	15%	18%	9%	16%	2%	22%	--	2%	1%	22%	--	1%	24%	12%	--		
The Netherlands																							
date:	Economic Situation	Defence/Foreign affairs	Housing	Pensions	Public transport	Healthcare System	Crime	Rising prices/inflation	Taxation	Unemployment	Terrorism	Educational System	Protection the Environment	Other	DK-Don't Know	Immigration	Energy Related Issues	None	Government Debt	The Environment	Energy Supply		
1993	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1994	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1995	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1996	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1997	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1998	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
1999	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
2000	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
2001	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
2002	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
2003	40.40%	1.40%	2.40%	5.30%	3.10%	32.80%	51.50%	4.50%	2.90%	31.60%	3.50%	6.10%	1.10%	1.80%	0.30%	8.80%	--	--	--	--	--		
2004	53%	2%	1%	25%	2%	29%	30%	3%	1%	19%	12%	8%	2%	4%	0%	7%	--	--	--	--	--		
2005	35%	1%	1%	6%	3%	37%	32%	3%	2%	15%	40%	5%	2%	2%	1%	10%	--	--	--	--	--		
2006	34%	4%	2%	8%	--	33%	24%	9%	2%	12%	26%	16%	4%	4%	1%	16%	3%	--	--	--	--		
2007	16%	7%	3%	3%	--	34%	33%	13%	8%	4%	9%	24%	16%	4%	1%	15%	5%	--	--	--	--		
2008	64%	3%	6%	5%	--	25%	26%	18%	2%	4%	6%	13%	6%	2%	0%	11%	5%	--	--	--	--		
2009	50%	1%	2%	19%	--	26%	21%	7%	4%	32%	3%	11%	7%	2%	0%	8%	3%	0%	--	--	--		
2010	46%	1%	5%	17%	--	32%	24%	7%	4%	16%	3%	13%	7%	3%	0%	17%	2%	0%	--	--	--		
2011	65%	1%	4%	21%	--	38%	12%	13%	3%	15%	1%	9%	--	1%	0%	11%	--	0%	--	4%	1%		
2012	55%	--	6%	8%	--	46%	7%	10%	7%	32%	0%	7%	--	1%	0%	1%	--	0%	14%	5%	--		
2013	53%	--	3%	11%	--	31%	10%	7%	6%	48%	1%	7%	--	1%	0%	4%	--	0%	13%	4%	--		
2014	38%	--	3%	6%	--	43%	12%	5%	5%	46%	2%	12%	--	2%	0%	10%	--	0%	8%	6%	--		
United Kingdom																							
date:	Economic Situation	Defence/Foreign affairs	Housing	Pensions	Public transport	Healthcare System	Crime	Rising prices/inflation	Taxation	Unemployment	Terrorism	Educational System	Protection the Environment	Other	DK-Don't Know	Immigration	Energy Related Issues	None	Government Debt	The Environment	Energy Supply	Climate Change	EU Interference in the World
1993	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1994	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1995	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1996	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1997	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1998	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1999	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2000	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2001	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2002	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2003	8%	4.50%	4.60%	10.40%	5.60%	21.30%	48.30%	5.10%	9%	11.90%	16.60%	11.60%	2.80%	2.40%	1.50%	31.70%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
2004	8%	8%	7%	24%	3%	24%	27%	5%	7%	9%	28%	10%	5%	1%	2%	29%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
2005	8%	5%	7%	19%	3%	30%	31%	3%	7%	11%	14%	15%	9%	0%	2%	31%	--	--	--	--	--	--	
2006	5%	6%	6%	9%	--	20%	34%	3%	4%	11%	35%	6%	9%	0%	1%	40%	5%	--	--	--	--	--	
2007	5%	4%	12%	9%	--	26%	44%	8%	7%	9%	17%	8%	7%	1%	1%	39%	3%	--	--	--	--	--	
2008	34%	1%	14%	7%	--	10%	34%	21%	7%	16%	9%	4%	5%	0%	1%	23%	8%	--	--	--	--	--	
2009	28%	5%	8%	6%	--	10%	36%	8%	5%	38%	6%	6%	2%	1%	29%	6%	0%	--	--	--	--	--	
2010	33%	2%	6%	7%	--	9%	24%	16%	7%	36%	12%	9%	3%	1%	0%	27%	3%	0%	--	--	--	--	
2011	36%	1%	6%	8%	--	10%	18%	20%	4%	48%	5%	5%	--	1%	1%	21%	--	0%	2%	4%	3%	7%	
2012	30%	--	6%	7%	--	10%	21%	18%	6%	40%	3%	6%	--	1%	1%	24%	--	0%	18%	4%	--	--	
2013	23%	--	10%	8%	--	15%	15%	18%	6%	35%	4%	7%	--	1%	1%	33%	--	0%	14%	6%	--	--	
2014	--	--	17%	8%	--	17%	12%	15%	6%	29%	3%	11%	--	2%	1%	41%	--	0%	7%	5%	--	--	

Source: Eurobarometer. *Problems Facing our Country*. Standard Eurobarometer. Brussels: European Commission. April 2003-2014 (accessed December 2014).

Observing the data as it relates to economic factors on a case by case basis, one is able to recognize that for each year this question was asked of respondents from 2003-2014, German respondents continuously cited concerns related to economics each year. Although the specific concern varies; one of the farthest reaching concerns of German citizens has been the issue of unemployment from 2003-2006 and 2009-2010 this was the primary concern of German respondents in these years. The second concern for Germans has been rising prices and inflation in 2008 (the beginning of the global economic crisis), 2011 and 2013. It is common knowledge that the cost and inflation of goods on average directly correlates to levels of unemployment. Thus, it is reasonable for respondents to express concern over both of these factors. Two factors which are impacted by the European Monetary Commission (EMC). The final two economic factors which gained the most recognition in terms of being areas of concern for the Germans were taxation in 2007 and government debt in 2012 and 2014; these two economic factors are not governed by the EU or the EMC and were only cited three of the twelve years this Eurobarometer question was asked.

In the Netherlands, Dutch respondents expressed a variety of concerns over twelve years. However, similar to their German counterparts, nine of the twelve years Dutch survey participants also expressed economic concerns. 2004, 2006, and 2008-2013 the Dutch expressed being in general concerned about the *economic situation*. It is understood that this survey answer is both broad and vague. Still, this far reaching concern does relate to the economic climate. The second economic concern expressed by the Dutch has been unemployment in 2014 with forty-six percent of respondents expressing this as their far reaching concern.

With regard to the United Kingdom, as previously noted, they are not members of the Eurozone, therefore the degree to which the British economy is impacted by the EU and the EMC is somewhat different. This is not to say that the British economy is not influenced by the EU but rather the impact is different. Economic factors do merge as far reaching concerns for British respondents, six of the twelve years when asked. In 2008, British survey participants expressed being concerned with the *economic situation* and from 2009-2013 British respondents conveyed being concerned about unemployment in their country. Despite the United Kingdom not being directly impacted by the fluctuation of the Euro, the United Kingdom like the other two case studies is vulnerable to the rising prices and inflation of goods and services because they are members of the European Common Market. In comparison to the German and Dutch respondents, economic factors do not appear to be the overwhelming concern for the British.

Immigration may not seem naturally like the most appropriate factor to follow the previous discussion on economics, but ironically it is; as previously cited in the discussion on the Common Market, which allows for the free movement of people. To clarify, such movement includes travel for recreation, but also movement for work and residency. Meaning any citizen living in the twenty-eight member states of the EU can without restriction live and work in any of the twenty-eight states they wish. This topic has become a point of great contention for many EU countries, particularly those in the west. This section shall utilize the data from the previous table to be found on page 21 relating to the concerns of citizens in our three case studies.

#### 2.4.4 Immigration:

Observing the data for Germany under the survey answer *Immigration* as an issue of concern, the responses have fluctuated over the twelve year survey period. From 2003-2009 responses were in the single digit percentile. Yet in 2009, a dramatic increase can be observed from five percent to sixteen percent of respondents citing immigration as a concern for their country. This response remained the same the following year but then dipped back down to single digit respondents in 2011 and 2012; but by 2013 the sixteen percent levels reemerge and in 2014 the data reflects a six percent hike in concern over immigration in Germany.

The Netherlands has also seen fluctuating responses to the concern over immigration. The highest level of concern expressed by Dutch respondents did not exceed seventeen percent in 2010. Five of the twelve years saw single digit responses of concern on the matter of immigration in 2003, 2004, 2009, 2012, and 2013. The remaining survey years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2014 saw double digit responses but these were low percentile value.

The picture looks strikingly different in the United Kingdom, in fact four of the twelve years this survey was conducted immigration was *the* primary concern amongst British respondents. 2004-2006 and 2014 were the years, respondents expressed that immigration was one of the most important issue for the survey year. The remaining years saw double digit responses with the exception of 2009 when only six percent of respondents expressed immigration as a concern.

Reflecting on the low survey percentages under the column of immigration in the early half of this survey as it relates to Germany and the Netherlands, one cannot argue that this factor has been a primary contributor to Euroscepticism in those two case studies. However, it does appear to be emerging as a factor for Germany and immigration as a factor is certainly a viable argument as a consistent factor in the United Kingdom.

#### *2.4.5 National Identity*

A great deal of an individual's perception of the world is linked directly to his or her identity, meaning does the individual feel more: German, Dutch or British or does the individual feel more European. The way one feels ultimately will determine how one identifies oneself. It can be argued that an individual will identify themselves as what they feel most comfortable or familiar with. Below is a Eurobarometer survey which asked respondents the following questions: *People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to [Our Country]?*

**Please see proceeding pages for data table**

**Table 6: EBQ: People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to [Our Country]?**

**Germany**

<b>date:</b>	<b><u>Very attached</u></b>	<b><u>Fairly attached</u></b>	<b><u>Not very attached</u></b>	<b><u>Not at all attached</u></b>	<b><u>DK - Don't know</u></b>
1994	29%	43%	15%	9%	--
1995	34%	11%	0%	7%	--
1996	59%	0%	0%	14%	--
1997	47%	33%	9%	6%	--
1998	49%	35%	7%	5%	--
1999	37%	0%	0%	29%	--
2000	45%	39%	8%	4%	--
2001	40%	43%	9%	4%	--
2002	39%	43%	10%	6%	--
2003	34%	45%	12%	6%	--
2004	41%	47%	10%	1%	--
2005	38%	49%	12%	2%	--
2006	41%	47%	10%	2%	--
2007	49%	41%	9%	1%	--
2008	--	--	--	--	--
2009	--	--	--	--	--
2010	--	--	--	--	--
2011	--	--	--	--	--
2012	--	--	--	--	--
2013	27%	0%	0%	71%	--
2014	20%	0%	0%	79%	1%

**The Netherlands**

<b>date:</b>	<b><u>Very attached</u></b>	<b><u>Fairly attached</u></b>	<b><u>Not very attached</u></b>	<b><u>Not at all attached</u></b>	<b><u>DK - Don't know</u></b>
1994	33%	50%	9%	6%	--
1995	34%	9%	0%	4%	--
1996	67%	0%	0%	16%	--
1997	42%	48%	5%	4%	--
1998	45%	46%	6%	3%	--
1999	47%	0%	0%	24%	--
2000	38%	53%	7%	1%	--
2001	45%	45%	6%	3%	--
2002	41%	48%	7%	2%	--
2003	46%	43%	7%	3%	--
2004	42%	41%	16%	2%	--
2005	40%	43%	15%	2%	--
2006	38%	43%	16%	3%	--
2007	41%	42%	15%	2%	--
2008	--	--	--	--	--
2009	--	--	--	--	--
2010	--	--	--	--	--
2011	--	--	--	--	--
2012	--	--	--	--	--
2013	39%	0%	0%	39%	--
2014	35%	0%	0%	65%	--

### United Kingdom

<b>date:</b>	<b><u>Very attached</u></b>	<b><u>Fairly attached</u></b>	<b><u>Not very attached</u></b>	<b><u>Not at all attached</u></b>	<b><u>DK - Don't know</u></b>
1994	49%	34%	7%	7%	--
1995	53%	0%	6%	6%	--
1996	71%	0%	0%	15%	--
1997	57%	29%	3%	6%	--
1998	60%	25%	5%	5%	--
1999	57%	0%	0%	18%	--
2000	64%	27%	4%	2%	--
2001	71%	22%	4%	2%	--
2002	62%	28%	4%	4%	--
2003	64%	24%	4%	3%	--
2004	55%	36%	6%	2%	--
2005	47%	40%	9%	2%	1%
2006	53%	36%	9%	2%	1%
2007	48%	40%	9%	3%	--
2008	--	--	--	--	--
2009	--	--	--	--	--
2010	--	--	--	--	--
2011	--	--	--	--	--
2012	--	--	--	--	--
2013	51%	0%	0%	49%	1%
2014	46%	0%	0%	52%	2%

Source: Eurobarometer. *National and European Identity*. Standard Eurobarometer. Brussels: European Commission, May 1994-2007 and 2013-2014 (accessed December 2014).

For each of the three case studies in this thesis, citizen respondents to this specific Eurobarometer question overwhelmingly reported feeling either *very attached* or *fairly attached* to their respective country. This is not to say respondents did not respond feeling *not very attached* or *not at all attached* or *don't know*. On average these responses did not account for the majority of responses. This is from 1994-2007; then from 2008-2012 this question was omitted from Eurobarometer surveying; but reappeared in 2013 and 2014.

Prior to the January 2004 expansion, the majority of respondents in each of the case studies felt more attached than not to their country: Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Calculating the averages before 2004 and after 2004 one is able to see that for each of the three case studies this feeling of attachment declines. In Germany, prior to 2004 an average of forty-one percent of respondents conveyed feeling *very attached* to their country, after 2004 this average drops to thirty-six percent feeling *very attached*. A similar trend can be observed in the Netherlands, prior to 2004 forty-three percent of Dutch respondents expressed feeling *very attached* to their country; following 2004 this number declines to thirty-nine percent feeling *very attached*. In Germany and the Netherlands there are small differentials of five and four percentage points respectively. Perhaps the most interesting observation made on this point can be seen in the United Kingdom, prior to the 2004 expansion an average of sixty percent of respondents conveyed feeling *very attached* after 2004, this average drops to fifty percent which is a ten point differential.

A second shift in feelings can be observed in the data, in each of the case studies there is an apparent shift in feelings of attachment from 2007 (the last time the question was asked) to 2013 and 2014. In Germany, in 2007 forty-nine percent of respondents reported feeling *very attached* to their country. This is in comparison to 2013 when just twenty-seven percent responded feeling *very attached* and seventy-one percent reported feeling *not at all attached*. These numbers shift slightly in 2014, just a year later, a mere twenty percent of German respondents reported feeling *very attached* to their country and seventy-nine percent of respondents replied feeling *not at all attached* with just one percent reporting that they *did not know*.

The data from the Netherlands tells a striking story, between 2007 and 2013-2014. In 2007, forty-one percent of Dutch respondents cited feeling *very attached* to their country. Yet in 2013, thirty-nine percent of respondents reported feeling *very attached* and another thirty-nine percent of respondents reporting feeling *not at all attached*. In 2014 thirty-five percent of Dutch respondents again reported feeling *very attached* to their country and sixty-five percent reported being *not at all attached* to their country. From 2013 to 2014 the *not at all attached* answer jumped twenty-six percentage points that is a significant increase in detachment by Dutch respondents.

Finally, in the United Kingdom, the British respondents seem to convey a somewhat divided front in their responses, yet present less wavering in opinion from 2007 to 2013-2014. In 2007, forty-eight percent of respondents reported feeling *very attached* to their country and in 2013 the data reflects a three percentage point increase with fifty-one percent of respondents expressing feeling *very attached* to their country. However, in 2014 the feelings of *very attached* drops to forty-six percent and for the first time in the duration of this specific survey question being asked of UK respondents the *not at all attached* response receives the majority answer with fifty-two percent. Therefore, it can be concluded that prior to 2014, attachment to one's country and a sense of national identity was a strong sentiment held by the majority of British citizens but that trend is ostensibly moving away from the feelings of attachment and by extension a majority held view of national identity.

#### 2.4.6 Sovereignty:

Citizens of any country want to feel that they have some control over their lives and to a greater extent that their country has a greater say over the policies and laws which govern that country than the supranational government—for our purposes, the European Union. In reality, any member of the European Union must relinquish a degree of sovereignty to the EU. This does not mean a country has lost its power to run an effective democracy by surrendering some of its sovereignty and it stands to be seen whether a supranational government is able to effectively run a democracy with the sovereignty that has been yielded to it. Once again this thesis shall examine the public opinions of citizens in the three case study countries via Eurobarometer data. Below are two tables, the first is a Eurobarometer survey question referencing democracy at the country level: *On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [your country]?* The second table is another Eurobarometer survey question dealing with democracy at the European Union level: *On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union? Would you say you are...?*

**Please see proceeding pages for data tables.**

**Table 7: EBQ: *On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [your country]?***

**Germany**

<u>date:</u>	<u>Very Satisfied</u>	<u>Fairly Satisfied</u>	<u>Not very Satisfied</u>	<u>Not at all Satisfied</u>	<u>DK-Don't Know</u>
1994	8%	51%	31%	7%	1%
1995	12%	51%	28%	7%	1%
1996	--	--	--	--	--
1997	5%	40%	37%	15%	3%
1998	6%	44%	37%	11%	2%
1999	9%	50%	29%	9%	3%
2000	11%	60%	23%	4%	2%
2001	8%	53%	27%	9%	2%
2002	--	--	--	--	--
2003	--	--	--	--	--
2004	8%	43%	35%	13%	2%

**The Netherlands**

<u>date:</u>	<u>Very Satisfied</u>	<u>Fairly Satisfied</u>	<u>Not very Satisfied</u>	<u>Not at all Satisfied</u>	<u>DK-Don't Know</u>
1994	4%	60%	28%	6%	2%
1995	9%	60%	24%	4%	2%
1996	--	--	--	--	--
1997	7%	64%	23%	4%	2%
1998	11%	64%	20%	3%	1%
1999	10%	66%	20%	2%	1%
2000	32%	59%	8%	1%	0%
2001	13%	58%	21%	5%	4%
2002	--	--	--	--	--
2003	--	--	--	--	--
2004	9%	56%	27%	7%	1%

## United Kingdom

<u>date:</u>	<u>Very Satisfied</u>	<u>Fairly Satisfied</u>	<u>Not very Satisfied</u>	<u>Not at all Satisfied</u>	<u>DK-Don't Know</u>
1994	5%	46%	34%	12%	3%
1995	5%	43%	36%	11%	4%
1996	--	--	--	--	--
1997	8%	55%	18%	7%	11%
1998	9%	52%	20%	10%	9%
1999	12%	50%	19%	9%	11%
2000	26%	58%	12%	4%	0%
2001	11%	57%	20%	6%	6%
2002	--	--	--	--	--
2003	--	--	--	--	--
2004	10%	48%	23%	13%	7%

Source: Eurobarometer. *Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU*. Standard Eurobarometer. Brussels: European Commission, May 1994-1995, 1997-2001 and 2004. (Accessed December 2014)

**Table 8: EBQ: *On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union? Would you say you are...?***

**Germany**

<u>date:</u>	<u>Very Satisfied</u>	<u>Fairly Satisfied</u>	<u>Not very Satisfied</u>	<u>Not at all Satisfied</u>	<u>DK-Don't Know</u>
1994	4%	35%	41%	13%	8%
1995	6%	39%	36%	11%	8%
1996	--	--	--	--	--
1997	1%	27%	39%	14%	18%
1998	2%	30%	37%	12%	17%
1999	3%	32%	35%	12%	17%
2000	8%	45%	32%	10%	3%
2001	3%	38%	32%	9%	17%
2002	--	--	--	--	--
2003	2.90%	36.10%	31.60%	10.20%	19.10%
2004	3%	43%	33%	9%	11%
2005	3%	43%	33%	10%	12%
2006	3%	39%	35%	11%	11%
2007	7%	45%	33%	7%	8%
2008	--	--	--	--	--
2009	7%	50%	32%	3%	8%

**The Netherlands**

<u>date:</u>	<u>Very Satisfied</u>	<u>Fairly Satisfied</u>	<u>Not very Satisfied</u>	<u>Not at all Satisfied</u>	<u>DK-Don't Know</u>
1994	1%	38%	41%	12%	8%
1995	2%	43%	36%	10%	9%
1996	--	--	--	--	--
1997	2%	33%	39%	11%	15%
1998	2%	40%	35%	8%	15%
1999	4%	39%	33%	8%	16%
2000	10%	70%	14%	3%	2%
2001	4%	43%	27%	9%	17%
2002	--	--	--	--	--
2003	3.10%	36.70%	34.50%	13.10%	12.70%
2004	1%	43%	37%	7%	12%
2005	2%	39%	41%	8%	9%
2006	3%	44%	36%	8%	9%
2007	2%	42%	41%	6%	9%
2008	--	--	--	--	--
2009	2%	51%	33%	5%	9%

## The United Kingdom

<u>date:</u>	<u>Very Satisfied</u>	<u>Fairly Satisfied</u>	<u>Not very Satisfied</u>	<u>Not at all Satisfied</u>	<u>DK-Don't Know</u>
1994	1%	28%	33%	15%	24%
1995	1%	29%	32%	15%	23%
1996	--	--	--	--	--
1997	3%	13%	--	12%	29%
1998	4%	29%	23%	14%	23%
1999	4%	27%	22%	17%	30%
2000	9%	48%	19%	12%	12%
2001	4%	35%	23%	13%	25%
2002	--	--	--	--	--
2003	3.20%	27.20%	25.10%	17.10%	27.40%
2004	2%	37%	26%	9%	27%
2005	3%	38%	24%	11%	25%
2006	3%	37%	24%	11%	24%
2007	2%	31%	26%	13%	28%
2008	--	--	--	--	--
2009	3%	37%	25%	11%	24%

Source: Eurobarometer. *Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU*. Standard Eurobarometer. Brussels: European Commission, July 1994-1995, 1997-2001, 2003-2007 and 2009. (Accessed December 2014).

In order to observe and compare both sets of data the columns *very satisfied* and *fairly satisfied* have been calculated together for each year for each table, as have the columns *not very satisfied* and *not at all satisfied* for each year for each table. The proceeding discussion shall address both tables.

Examining the data from Germany, German respondents reported being satisfied seven of the eight years the country level survey question was asked of them. During those same years, respondents reported not being satisfied with how democracy worked at the EU level. Three of the eight years both survey questions were asked, produced interesting responses. In 1997, German citizens reported dissatisfaction with how democracy was working in their country and were also not satisfied with how democracy was working within the EU. In 2000 and 2004, survey respondents reported being satisfied with both Germany's and the EU's democracy. Perhaps most interestingly, in 2001, Germans reported being satisfied with how democracy operated in their country and expressed feeling both satisfied and dissatisfied equally with how democracy functioned in the EU. The EU level survey continued for four additional years after the country level survey discontinued: 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009. Three out of the four years German respondents reported being satisfied with democracy in the EU, in total the EU survey was posed to participants for thirteen years, five of the thirteen years respondents reported being satisfied with the way democracy worked at the EU level.

The picture in the Netherlands is somewhat different. For each of the eight years the country level survey was conducted, Dutch respondents overwhelmingly reported being satisfied with the way democracy worked in their country. With respect to responses to the EU survey, four of the years which correspond with the country survey, Dutch respondents reported not being satisfied with democracy in the EU. The other three years, Dutch respondents stated that they were not satisfied with how democracy worked at the EU level, and in a single year, 2004, Dutch participants responded that they were equally satisfied and dissatisfied with the way democracy worked at the EU level. Concerning the continued EU level survey which last four years longer than the country survey; -two of the four years respondents reported being satisfied with the way democracy was carried out at the EU level. Of the thirteen years the EU level survey was conducted, only five years received positive feedback in terms of citizens' satisfaction with how democracy worked at the EU level.

While Germany and the Netherlands respectively provide their own picture of citizen satisfaction as it relates to national and supranational workings of democracy, the United Kingdom brings to the table a third perspective. Comparing the two data tables from 1994-2004 and 1994-2009 respectively, the British express eight out of the eight years being satisfied with how democracy worked in their country. This is compared to the EU table in which case four of the eight comparable years received answers of dissatisfaction amongst British respondents, three years of satisfactory responses and oddly one year where respondents *did not know* whether they were satisfied or not with how democracy worked at the EU level. With respect to the continued EU level survey, three of the four additional years, British respondents reported being satisfied with the way democracy worked at the EU level. Moreover, the United Kingdom is the only one of the three case studies to have double digit responses under the: *don't know* response column for both the national and supranational surveys. When this column was averaged for the national survey, an average of 6.375% of British respondents over the course of eight years did *not know* if they were satisfied or not with how democracy worked in their country. At the supranational level, the average for those surveyed [all thirteen years] is 24.7% of British respondents once again not knowing whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with how democracy worked at the EU level.

Finally, please consider the last factor which was alluded to in the literature as self-inflicted skepticism and more clearly identified during the research process of this study as perception of European Parliamentary protection.

#### *2.4.7 Self-Inflicted Skepticism:*

While examining EU Parliamentary elections, the following data pertaining to whether or not European citizens felt their best interest(s) were protected by the European Parliament (EUP) presented itself. Despite relevant data only being available from 1994 to 2001, the data is relevant to the broader examination of factors relating to euroscepticism. This factor is interesting because it demonstrates that euroscepticism can be a two directional phenomenon. Meaning that euroscepticism could be triggered by environmental factors or it could be triggered at the organizational level. It can be argued that if European citizens do not feel protected by the EUP, or lack certainty about that protection, then by extension, they may not trust the EUP. This may signal a factor that is an internal one or self-inflicted, meaning that it may be possible that the phenomenon of euroscepticism is being nurtured at the institutional level. Therefore, this newly identified factor is worth further examination.

**Table 9: EBQ: As a European citizen, do you think that the European Parliament protects your interests...?**

**Germany**

date:	<u>Very Well</u>	<u>Fairly Well</u>	<u>Not very well</u>	<u>Not at all Well</u>	<u>DK- Don't Know</u>
1994	3%	35%	27%	8%	27%
1995	4%	27%	36%	11%	22%
1996	--	--	--	--	--
1997	1%	28%	27%	10%	35%
1998	2%	33%	24%	8%	33%
1999	3%	32%	27%	8%	29%
2000	2%	34%	23%	8%	34%
2001	2%	34%	26%	7%	31%

**The Netherlands**

date:	<u>Very Well</u>	<u>Fairly Well</u>	<u>Not very well</u>	<u>Not at all well</u>	<u>DK-Don't Know</u>
1994	0%	40%	22%	8%	30%
1995	2%	37%	32%	6%	24%
1996	--	--	--	--	--
1997	1%	38%	28%	10%	24%
1998	1%	35%	31%	8%	24%
1999	1%	36%	28%	8%	27%
2000	1%	37%	28%	6%	27%
2001	1%	32%	27%	7%	32%

**United Kingdom**

date:	<u>Very Well</u>	<u>Fairly well</u>	<u>Not very well</u>	<u>Not at all well</u>	<u>DK- Don't know</u>
1994	2%	39%	27%	13%	18%
1995	3%	36%	30%	15%	16%
1996	--	--	--	--	--
1997	2%	36%	19%	12%	31%
1998	1%	33%	20%	13%	33%
1999	2%	34%	21%	10%	33%
2000	2%	29%	20%	12%	37%
2001	1%	30%	21%	14%	33%

Source: Eurobarometer. *Interests Protected by the European Parliament*. Standard Eurobarometer. Brussels: European Commission, December 1994-1995 and 1997-2001. (Accessed December 2014).

One of the far reaching themes of this data for all three case studies is the expression of uncertainty. Each year this Eurobarometer question was asked of survey respondents, the results under the *Don't Know* column were between sixteen and thirty-seven percent. A second commonality all three case studies share as it relates to the *Don't Know* column is the fact that in multiple years this column either measured equal or greater than the combined totals of the *Very well and fairly well* columns and/or the *Not very well and Not at all well columns*. In Germany, this occurred only once in 1998, thirty-five percent of respondents expressed feeling protected whereas another thirty-five percent reported not

knowing. In the Netherlands, this occurrence also appeared, in 1994 thirty percent of respondents expressed that they did not feel protected by the EUP and another thirty percent expressed not knowing if they were protected or not. Whereas in the United Kingdom, this occurrence appeared on three separate occasions. In 1997 thirty-one percent of respondents reported not feeling protected and an additional thirty-one percent reported not knowing if they were protected. In 1998 a similar trend is seen, except the percentage was two points higher at thirty-three percent respectively for the not feeling protected column and the not knowing column. Lastly, in 2000, the respondents reporting uncertainty or feelings of not knowing if they were protected by the EUP were at thirty-seven percent, this total was higher than either of the combined columns in that same year at thirty-one percent and thirty-five percent respectively.

At the individual case study level, German respondents expressed a feeling of being protected four out of the seven years when asked whether or not they felt protected by the European Parliament. The United Kingdom presented the same results and the Dutch conveyed positive feelings five of the seven years, slightly higher than Germany and the United Kingdom. It is worth noting that the margins between feeling protected verses not feeling protected were marginally slim, with a single digit differential eighty-five percent of the time.

Taking all of these observations into account while recognizing the absence of more recent data, it is arguable that the level of confidence European citizens in the three case studies have in the European Parliament's ability to protect their interests is not firmly situated in the positive. Therefore, internal factor(s) could be a valid factor at least in Germany and the United Kingdom.

Therefore, in an effort to demonstrate the diversity of euroscepticism throughout Europe, in terms of what it looks like [how it is defined] and how it arises [its factors] the following states shall serve as case studies in this investigation: Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The purpose here is to first highlight pertinent literature relating to each case study relating to the phenomenon of euroscepticism, followed by an independent evaluation.

## Chapter 3:

### Discussion and Conclusion

#### 3.1 Chapter Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present a deeper discussion about the data, present unexpected findings, acknowledge shortcomings of this study and articulate both the contribution of this research as well as potential avenues for further investigation on this topic. The chapter ends, with a conclusion of this investigation summarizing the study and its intent.

#### 3.2 Discussion:

At the beginning of this examination, three questions were put forth regarding the phenomenon of euroscepticism: *Can multiple definitions be applied to the concept of euroscepticism? Can euroscepticism be considered a multidimensional phenomenon which differs in terms of factors between European member states over time? Do these attitudes change over time?* Observing the data from the previous section the short answer to each of these questions is: Yes: with respect to differing definitions, Germany and the Netherlands seem to maintain pro-European definitions; however, in more recent years, trends reveal these definitions may be on the verge of shifting and thus redefining what skepticism looks like for each of these countries twenty-one years after the EU's inception. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has continued on a steady pace towards hard-skepticism. The following discussion will elaborate further on these questions of definition, factors related to euroscepticism and time. Considering the remaining two questions for this examination, yes, the factors related to euroscepticism differ to some degree amongst the case studies and yes, the factors related to euroscepticism change over time; whether that change is in terms of level of importance or relevance.

Euroscepticism and its corresponding definition(s) can be linked to the nature of the political parties for each of the given case studies. Referring back to previous literature, Paul Taggart's work identified three different types or definitions of what euroscepticism could look like (1998). Similarly, the work of Kopecky and Mudde that put forth the idea of diffuse and specific skepticism and who also created the two-by-two matrix as a method of determining the Eurosceptic position or lack thereof of any given political party (2012). In addition, Hartleb who presented his six point definition model (2011). Therefore, if one examines the party platforms for each party in each of the case studies, in correlation with where the majority of the electoral votes fall (for our purposes, the EUP elections), it is possible to ascertain what type of euroscepticism exists at any given time in that country and by extension one could attribute a definition of euroscepticism for that country.<sup>4</sup> In Germany, for each year EUP elections have been held, the majority of votes have been designated to pro-European parties, such as the Christian Democratic Union. However, this trend is on a gradual decline with soft-Eurosceptic parties (Social Democratic Party for example) growing in popularity. At present, one should define Germany as a pro-European country. In the Netherlands, again, the majority of the Dutch electorate has supported pro-European parties like the Christian Democratic Appeal. In terms of voter trends, the Netherlands differs somewhat from Germany. The Dutch have experienced a steeper shift away from pro-European parties in favor of soft-Eurosceptics such as the Socialist Party and as of 2014; hard-skeptics were also gaining momentum in EUP elections. For now, the pro-European definition is most appropriate. In the United Kingdom, the picture is different; in 1994 pro-European parties such as Labour and the Liberal Democrats secured the majority of votes and again in 1999. In 2004, pro-European parties secured the majority vote narrowly. Then in 2014, a sharp shift away from pro-European parties in favor of hard-Eurosceptic parties (UK Independence Party) occurred and these hardline parties picked up the majority of the vote. Therefore, due to this significant shift a hard-Eurosceptic definition should be applied to the UK.

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<sup>4</sup> Please refer to appendix for party descriptions

Being able to identify the type of euroscepticism which exists in a country is only one component towards better understanding euroscepticism. It is the argument of this work that in order to gain a deeper understanding, the phenomenon must be observed from a holistic point of view, by examining factors related to euroscepticism over time, root causes may be identified. During the literature review, five factors related to euroscepticism were identified: *Political Parties, Economics, Migration, National Identity and National Sovereignty*; with a sixth being identified during the course of research relating to the feelings of being protected by the European Parliament. Observing the data over time for any of the three case studies, one is able to observe fluctuations in the level of importance and/or relevance relating to these factors based on Eurobarometer respondent feedback and European Parliamentary election results.

Consider Germany, it is historically a pro-European country, yet, emerging data suggests that there may be a trend towards soft-euroscepticism on the horizon. Analyzing available data on the six related to euroscepticism previously identified, German respondents in the early 1990s expressed feeling strongly about their national identity, yet were displeased with the way sovereignty worked at the supranational level and did not feel protected by the European Parliament. Despite these factors during the formative years of the European Union, Germans overwhelmingly expressed being pro-European in their voting behavior. As one might expect, the factors related to euroscepticism shifted over time, around 2013-2014, fewer German's expressed a sense of national identity. From 2003-2006 Germans were concerned about unemployment rates and in 2008, 2011, and 2013 Germans have become increasingly concerned over economic factors related to rising prices and inflation. Further, Germans are growing increasingly concerned over immigration and have become less concerned and more satisfied with sovereignty at the supranational level and express feeling protected by the European Parliament. Thus, a shift can be seen from identifying very strongly as German to barely identifying as German, to growing increasingly concerned over the economy and immigration, to being less concerned about sovereignty at the supranational level and feeling more protected by the European Parliament. Of course, this is only one of three case studies in this examination.

Examining the Netherlands, the Dutch seem to fluctuate quite a bit more in opinion than their German counterparts with a couple factors remaining static over the twenty year observation. Regarding national identity, the Dutch are steadfast in their feelings of connectedness to their country. Economically speaking, Dutch respondents express being consistently satisfied with the common market; but in recent years have grown concerned over other more broad economic matters and unemployment has risen in relevance and importance. Concerning sovereignty, in earlier years, Dutch respondents reported being satisfied with how democracy was carried out at both the national and supranational levels, but in the early 2000s their satisfaction with both levels appears to be dwindling. Finally, on the topics of immigration and being protected by the EUP, the Dutch seem to fluctuate year to year. In recent years, it appears that the factor of immigration is increasing in relevance as an expressed concern whereas protection by the EUP is unclear as the margins are extremely narrow by one or two percentage points.

Similar to the Dutch, the United Kingdom has experienced factors which remain consistent while others have fluctuated. In terms of national identity, the British have remained constant in their attachment to their country. However, in 2014 there has been a shift by six percentage points in the direction of feelings of *not at all attached*. With respect to the economic factor, British respondents consistently report being dissatisfied with the common market. In terms of national and supranational sovereignty, the British again are consistent in their satisfaction with national sovereignty but in the 1990s expressed dissatisfaction with sovereignty at the EU level. Although, starting in 2000, the data available indicates a shift in British opinion in favor of supranational sovereignty. The United Kingdom is the only one of the three case studies that identifies immigration as a factor of *great* concern. As for the British feeling that their interests are protected by the EUP, that is a factor which has experienced some fluctuation, the 90s saw a reasonable amount of consensus that British citizens felt protected by the EUP in the early 2000s that sentiment has since shifted in a more negative direction.

### 3.3 Variation amongst the Case Studies:

It is understood that euroscepticism differs in terms of what factors relate to the phenomenon. However, it remains to be seen why variation exists amongst the case studies. Based on previous literature and observations drawn from the data, one could draw several conclusions. The literature cites the imperative link between a country's history and its identity. The data reflects that Germans are more inclined to identify themselves as European whereas the Dutch and the British identify strongly with their national identities. The variation in identity may be linked to the histories of the case studies. Germany seems to linger in the shadows of its dark history from World War II; therefore the birth of the European Union is a fresh start for the German people metaphorically speaking and a chance at a new identity as a people. In contrast, the Dutch and the British both have national histories that they are proud of and feel less inclined to identify themselves as *just* European. Furthermore, the political elite of the United Kingdom are noted as saying that the United Kingdom is '...with Europe but not of Europe. We are linked, but not compromised. We are interested and associated but not absorbed' (Katz 2002). Such rhetoric may further explain the variance as it relates to euroscepticism and identity in the UK.

A second observation noted which is seemingly unrelated to the discussion of identity but may in fact contribute to a better understanding of variance, is the factor of immigration. Overall, the Dutch are least concerned about immigration, perhaps this is due to their strong attachment to national identity. The Dutch do not feel that their culture is threatened by immigration. Yet in the UK, immigration is a far reaching issue and as of 2014, the UK has experienced a slight decline in citizen's attachment to their country. Therefore, one could hypothesize that the British are overwhelmingly concerned about immigration's perceived threat to national identity.

A third observation noted which might further explain variance relates to the differing lenses in which the case studies view the direction of the European Union. Concerning how economic and immigration factors correlate to the discussion on policy-based euroscepticism in the literature review. Based on the data, each of the case studies expresses concern over the economic situation in Europe; however, these concerns deal with differing policy areas. It is fair to say that each of the case studies have been adversely impacted by the 2008 global economic crisis. Germans are unhappy with the overall economic situation, previous literature notes that Germans have been displeased with the EU's handling of the crisis specifically as it relates to economic bailouts. The Dutch have shifted from a net beneficiary to a net contributor forcing the Dutch government to make large financial contributions to the EU and the British are unhappy with the Common Market specifically the policies which govern the free movement of goods i.e. trade. In general the stringent regulations (ex: emissions regulations) placed on the member states of the EU have stifled economic growth and have not promoted job growth.

With respect to immigration, in Germany, immigration is becoming an issue of great concern; because identity is not a far reaching issue for the German people one may assume that for the German people, immigration has become a policy concern. The European Union permits citizens of the twenty-eight member states to freely live and work within any of the EU member states. In the case of Germany, there may exist negative feelings because of the impact immigration is having on the employment levels of native German citizens.

A final variation observed during this study pertains to the factor of sovereignty. Each of the case studies has fluctuated on their approval and disapproval of the European Union in terms of sovereignty. This variation may be due to the European Union's ever growing presence and continued reach for greater power. The United Kingdom unlike the other two case studies has the advantage of having "opt-outs" (one such example is the eurozone, the UK opted not to participate in the adoption of Euro and by extension do not participate in the Eurozone) which were agreed upon in the earlier years of the UK's membership, these "opt-outs" have offset some of the power grabbing by the European Union. Regarding Germany and the Netherlands, it would seem that their approval or disapproval is linked to European Union activities. Consider, the 2008 economic crisis the table asking the satisfaction with democracy in the European Union was last asked immediately after 2008, in 2009, Germany expressed feeling dissatisfied with the European Union whereas the Netherlands felt satisfied but only by minimal margins.

Therefore, as stated, euroscepticism can differ between countries and by the factors which perpetuate the phenomenon. Furthermore, euroscepticism may differ because the case studies do not share the same histories, the same vision for the future of Europe, or the same degree of membership. Today, it seems as though the European Union is trying to operate from a one size fits all model, as the literature and data reflect, this approach has created dissatisfaction amongst the people and their levels of euroscepticism will vary as will the reasons for those feelings until the EU changes its approach.

### *3.4 When Euroscepticism becomes a Legitimate Concern:*

Euroscepticism is a phenomenon which has quickly spread across Europe. The degree of euroscepticism and the factors that relate to the attitude differ by country, the levels and the relevance of the factors may change over time; thus, one might question at what point does euroscepticism shift from simply being an attitude shared by segments of a population into a real concern? Considering relevant literature, it could be argued that euroscepticism becomes a legitimate concern for the European Union when the number of European citizens who do not trust and/or approve of the Europeans Union makeup the majority opinion. If the majority of citizens do not trust or approve of the supranational government, it ceases to be legitimized by the people thereby the EU could no longer be considered a legitimate governing body. If the European Union loses legitimacy it is likely the organization would be dismantled and replaced by something else or the countries which comprise the continent of Europe may return to their pre-European Union status. Of course, the European Union has not reached this point in its history, there is still time for the union to do an about face and redirect its present course.

### *3.5 Unexpected Findings:*

These observations have revealed some unexpected findings concerning political parties. It was interesting to note that the Netherlands is experiencing a shift away from pro-European parties in favor of soft-line-Eurosceptic parties. This observation is unexpected because the founding document which established the European Union is the Maastricht Treaty named after the town of Maastricht in the Netherlands. Therefore, it is reasonable for one to believe that the Dutch would unequivocally be pro-European since their country participated in the founding of the European Union.

A second unexpected finding is that during the founding of the European Union, German citizens reported being dissatisfied with supranational sovereignty and not feeling that their interests were being protected by the EUP, yet, Germans overwhelmingly supported pro-European parties during the EUP elections in the 1990s. A third unexpected finding is that British citizens are beginning to feel less attached to their country as of 2014 and simultaneously have shifted their opinions in a positive direction towards sovereignty at the supranational level in 2000 all the while the majority of British citizens have voted for hard-Eurosceptic parties during the 2014 EUP elections.

A final unexpected finding is the discovery of one common factor that all three case studies share as a factor of increasing relevance and concern, that factor being immigration. This finding is unexpected because the European Union prides itself in the ease of free movement of its citizens to travel, work and live. Nevertheless, immigration has emerged as an increasing concern amongst citizens in each of the three case studies presented. It is reasonable to assume that the concerns over immigration are linked to the broader issues of economics and national identity.

### *3.6 Shortcomings & Weaknesses:*

The study of euroscepticism is challenging in a number of ways. As illustrated here, euroscepticism changes and adapts itself according to current events, the climate of the European Union and the national context of each EU member country. Consider EUP elections, an article released by the European Parliament cited that European Parliamentary election turnouts have been on a steady decline since 2009, with the lowest being in May of 2014 at 42% (Euroactive 2014). This is in comparison to much higher voter turnout at the national level. Such a decline could skew the election results for the EUP elections. The data available at the European level implies Eurosceptic political parties in Germany and the Netherlands are on a gradual yet steady increase and in the United Kingdom hardline skeptics seemingly have a firm foothold in EUP elections; however, the observations drawn from EUP election data could provide an inaccurate portrayal of what euroscepticism looks like in a given country.

A second shortcoming of this study relates to the discussion on immigration. Both the literature and the data available do not make a clear delineation between immigrants from EU member states and immigrants from non-member states. Therefore, one is left to assume that when reading literature related to Euroscepticism and examining data from the Eurobarometer which is administered by the European Commission when immigrants are being referenced discussed, the source is offering commentary about immigration of European citizens who are citizens of one of the twenty-eight member states.

Although causes related to euroscepticism have been identified in this study, this is not to imply new triggers will not be identified in the future. Furthermore, the Eurobarometer utilizes the Moreno Scale; the scale is purely comparative between two extremes. For example, when observing questions relating to identity, it does not account for expressions of varying strengths of identity. Meaning, one could feel very European or not at all, a center point of view in many of the question-answer options is lacking. Lastly, data is not available for each consecutive year of this study, therefore in some cases it is difficult to determine the direction the trend may or may not have taken.

### *3.7 Contribution of Research:*

The objective of this research has been to demonstrate that euroscepticism can look different country by country and that factors related to euroscepticism fluctuate over time. Researching and confirming this trend is worth understanding because it may reflect the degree to which the European Union is or is not connected with the people. In the abstract of this paper a quote from the European Commission was cited, in summation it asserted the need for legitimacy by the people in order for the European Union to succeed. Being able to examine factors related to euroscepticism over the course of twenty years illustrates whether the EU has grown in legitimacy or is it losing legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Ultimately the perception by the people could dictate the future of the European Union.

### *3.8 Future Investigation:*

Euroscepticism is a complex phenomenon, with hard to predict features: when does it arise, what factors trigger the phenomenon and so forth. For that reason, there are a number of areas that would benefit from investigation. During the process of writing this thesis, I have identified a number of areas for future examination. One could investigate euroscepticism in Eastern Europe to see whether the factors related to euroscepticism identified in the west through previous literature and this study apply in the east. Another area of inquiry could be to do a comparative analysis between “old” EU member states and “new” EU member states to determine in what ways euroscepticism is similar or differs between these two groups.

Beyond geography, there are sociological and demographic elements to consider: age, gender, educational attainment, income level, and so on. All of these may contribute to the level of euroscepticism in a society. In other words, one could investigate if particular societal groups are more prone to skepticism than others.

A final area of examination is contingent on the impending 2017 British referendum and their future membership to the European Union. If the United Kingdom decides to leave the European Union it would be interesting to investigate how the United Kingdom's decision would affect the remaining twenty-seven members and how such a departure would impact current levels of euroscepticism.

Lastly, as the thesis has mentioned, a great deal of the literature relating to the discussion of euroscepticism focuses on party-based euroscepticism. It could make an interesting study to investigate the different factors of euroscepticism from this thesis on the different European parties and which results one would gain.

Certainly, one could suggest other areas for further investigation into euroscepticism especially at a time when further integration of new members lays in limbo, the potential departure of the United Kingdom looms and the European Union as a whole continue to grapple with the latest economic crisis. It is undeniable that the political elite of the European Union must be diligent in their efforts to understand what factors drive support and what factors drive skepticism, this thesis believes this point to be vital to the future success or failure of the European Union.

### 3.9 Conclusion:

This study was based on an interest to gain a deeper more holistic understanding of the complex phenomenon of euroscepticism. In order for a government to thrive and to effectively govern, that government must be granted legitimacy by the people. It is essential that the European political system and the political elite understand what spurs euroscepticism towards the European Union. This thesis has argued that euroscepticism is a multidimensional phenomenon both conceptually and in its factors related to euroscepticism.

Based on the existing literature, the thesis was able to define euroscepticism in more flexible terms. Euroscepticism can be defined as the disapproval of the entire European Union or specific policy areas. Furthermore, this thesis did not simply want to understand euroscepticism as a concept but also what factors contribute to the onset of the phenomenon. The literature provided possible factors related to euroscepticism: political parties, economics, immigration, national identity and national sovereignty; and suggested the possibility that euroscepticism could be a self-inflicted condition.

Taking its point of departure in the literature, the thesis was able to further examine the conceptual ideas and factors related to euroscepticism through a longitudinal cross-national analysis. Over a twenty year perspective (1994-2014) the thesis observed the European Parliamentary election data for each case study to identify which parties were capturing the majority of the vote at any given time and where each of those parties fall on the Eurosceptic spectrum. The thesis also utilized Eurobarometer public opinion survey data related to the three case studies: Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and the five identified factors related to euroscepticism. Each factor was observed to determine its relevance and whether it fluctuated over time.

Based on the analysis of both election and Eurobarometer data, the picture proved to be varied. Concerning political parties and elections, the German population appears to be the least skeptic of the three case studies and the United Kingdom is the most Eurosceptic of the three. The Netherlands fluctuates somewhere in the middle of the two extremes. In terms of factors related to euroscepticism, each case study fluctuates in terms of relevance of the factors related to euroscepticism over time. Germany in the early 1990s felt strongly about their national identity as did the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. During that same time, German and British citizens expressed being dissatisfied with sovereignty at the supranational level, whereas the Dutch were satisfied with supranational sovereignty. Economically, Germany and the Netherlands were content with the Common Market whereas the United Kingdom was discontent. Finally in terms of feeling the EUP protected the interest of each case study's country, Germany and the Netherlands did not feel that their interests were protected, while the British did in fact feel protected by the EUP. As this thesis argues, the relevance of these factors did shift. Starting in the 2000s, both Germany and the United Kingdom have expressed feeling less connected to their respective national identities. German and British citizens reported feeling more

satisfied with supranational sovereignty. The Dutch on the other hand remained constant in their connection to their national identity; they've grown less satisfied with both national and supranational sovereignty. With respect to feeling protected by the EUP, Germany now felt their interests are being protected, while the United Kingdom does not feel their interests are being protected and the Netherlands remains uncertain.

Today, all three case studies do share some factors related to euroscepticism in common. Each case study has become increasingly concerned about matters relating to economic situation, immigration, and unemployment. It will be interesting to see if these factors develop into greater areas of concern over time or will new factors emerge.

The comparative analysis of these countries helps to explain the differing trends. The variation in the levels of skepticism has a great deal to do with history, differing lenses as it relates to the direction of the European Union and economics. Historically, each country has had its own experience with the European Community prior to and including the European Union and they have all felt the woes of the most recent economic crises.

Euroscepticism is a phenomenon which is shaped by history, the human element and ever changing events. These variables can pose certain limitations to a study. Despite these challenges, this thesis believes that it has successfully demonstrated that euroscepticism is a multidimensional phenomenon which changes in definition and in the factors related to euroscepticism over time. It is apparent that euroscepticism is increasing its foothold in Europe, if this trend continues; it will be interesting to see in what direction the European Union will go.

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## APPENDIX A

### German Political Parties

Party:	Abbreviation:	Party Position:
Christian Democratic Union	CDU	Pro-Europeanism
Social Democratic Party	SPD	Pro-Europeanism
Christian Social Union	CSU	Pro-Europeanism
Alliance '90/The Greens	B'90/GDR	Soft Euroscepticism
Party of Democratic Socialism	PDS	Soft Euroscepticism
Free Democratic Party	FDP	Pro-Europeanism
The Republicans	REP	Hard-Euroscepticism
Confederation of Free Citizens	BFB	Pro-Europeanism
The Left		Pro-Europeanism
Alternative for Germany	AFD	Hard-Euroscepticism
Free Voters	FWG	Soft-Euroscepticism
Pirate Party		Pro-Europeanism
National Democratic Party of Germany	NPD	Hard-Euroscepticism

### The Netherlands Political Parties

Party:	Abbreviation	Party Position:
Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA	Pro-Europeanism
Labour Party	PvdA	Pro-Europeanism
People's Party for Freedom & Democracy	VVD	Pro-Europeanism
Democrats	D	Pro-Europeanism
Political Ref. Party, Ref. Political Fed., & Ref. Political Alliance	SGP	Hard-Euroscepticism
Green Left	GL	Soft-Euroscepticism
The Greens	G	Soft-Euroscepticism
Socialist Party	SP	Soft Euroscepticism
Centre Democrats	CD	Hard-Euroscepticism
Democrats 66	D66	Pro-Europeanism
Europe Transparent		Soft-Euroscepticism
Christian Union Reformed Political Party	CU	Hard-Euroscepticism
Party for the Animals	PvdD	Soft-Euroscepticism
Party for Freedom	PVV	Hard-Euroscepticism

### United Kingdom Political Parties

Party:	Abbreviation:	Party Position:
UK Independence Party	UKIP	Hard-Euroscepticism
Labour		Pro-Europeanism
Conservatives		Soft-Euroscepticism
Green		Hard-Euroscepticism
Scottish National Party	SNP	Hard-Euroscepticism
Liberal Democrats		Pro-Europeanism
An Independence from Europe		Hard-Euroscepticism
British National Party	BNP	Hard-Euroscepticism