

The phenomenon of a single line
An architect's approach to the dissolution of Form and Meaning
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ABSTRACT

Beauty is another word for Phenomena.

An architect's approach to the dissolution of Form and Meaning

dedicated to my parents

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will never know the extent of influence their work had on me.

Sal Choudhury challenged my talents.

Olivio C. Ferrari gave me encouragement.

Hans C. Rott had faith in me.

Robert J. Dunay spoke a few nice words to me.

*In the technical preparation of this book, I would like to thank
for the typesetting, for the printing and the
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silkscreening supplies, and for the
photographic work.*

*I would also like to thank for helping me to learn the
meaning of tragedy.*

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PREFACE

An Architect's Approach

Architecture is not concerned with societal needs. Only culture speaks to Architecture. Culture sees Architecture as one of the arts. Like culture and the other arts, Architecture is a phenomenon.

From culture, the individual desires his being. Only the individual desires Architecture, never the vulgar mass. An individual confronts Architecture in solitude.

The architect gives of himself. From his genius, Architecture is created. If the architect knows himself, he knows man.

PART I An Aesthetic Framework based on phenomena

CHAPTER 1 - A phenomenon is an event or occurrence.

There is a difference between art and philosophy. The aim of philosophy is knowledge. From Socrates to Husserl, knowledge has been idealized as the proper pursuit of philosophers. An artist does not want to know, he just wants to become aware. What an artist does not know would properly be called Beauty. An object that was completely known would be called truth which is the goal of every philosopher.

Here I am at a critical decision, do I want to search for beauty? Or do I want to search for truth?

Poets and writers are the fortunate ones. A poet searches for truth and finds beauty. A writer searches for beauty and finds truth. (1)

An architect is a maker of objects. All objects are within his reach; written, painted, drawn, performed, and physical objects. Yes, physical objects or things . . . objects one can feel, touch, lift, move, carry and see. The realm of physical objects or things separates architecture from all the other arts and other disciplines. Sculpture is only concerned with the representation of visual objects or images.

Through the manipulation of things, an architect searches for beauty. Other artists, such as a sculptor, search for beauty through the manipulation of images.

Knowledge may be defined as a collection of statements about the structure of the mind. The differences in philosophies involve the definitions used for the structure of the mind as well as the methods employed for this search of knowledge. The father of Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl took the stand that a phenomenon is the “object of consciousness.” (2) For Husserl, if the structure of the mind, or in other words, the essence of consciousness is found, “being” would be known. This is accomplished by taking the reflective attitude to employ the transcendental reductions.

Quentin Lauer in **The Triumph of Subjectivity** elaborates on Husserl’s definition of the structure of the mind (3):

*As early as the **Logical Investigations**, Husserl sought to discover the essence of consciousness — understanding it as an act of being conscious, rather than a **faculty** for being conscious. And he came to the conclusion that all consciousness is necessarily “consciousness — of” something. In speaking thus, he was saying that the “of” is inseparable from every act of consciousness, which was but another way of saying that consciousness is essentially oriented toward an object. Now, this orientation, which is to be found in every act of consciousness, is its **intentionality**, which is discovered, not by some impossible analysis of what is outside consciousness, but simply from the analysis of consciousness itself. Thus, without emerging from the reflexive circle, Husserl is convinced that he can discover all that is to be discovered regarding both subjectivity and objectivity — neither of which has significance without the other.*

This investigation into the essence of consciousness can only begin by returning to experiences. Husserl and his followers submitted experiences to analysis in order to discover the life-structures of the experiences. Consciousness was purified by the transcendental reductions. The relationships of consciousness to the life-structures would then be analyzed under the reflective attitude. Bit by bit, using this method knowledge would be gained. Lauer comments, “if all knowledge could be guaranteed by recourse to transcendental subjectivity, then the universal a priori science he [Husserl] sought was a fact, even though explication its implications might be the work of generations (or centuries) for scholars applying the phenomenological method.” (4)

The first transcendental reduction is the epoche. The experiences of all human enterprises are made pure through the epoche. In Husserl’s words, the epoche is described as follows (5):

*What must be shown in particular and above all is that through the epoche a new way of experiencing, of thinking, is opened to the philosopher; here, situated **above** his natural being and **above** the natural world, he loses nothing of their being and their objective truths and likewise nothing at all of the spiritual acquisitions of his world-life or those of the whole historical communal life; he simply forbids himself — as a philosopher, in the*

uniqueness of his direction of interest — to continue the whole natural performance of his world-life; that is, he forbids himself to ask questions which rest upon the ground of the world at hand, questions of being, questions of value, practical questions, questions about being or not-being, about being valuable, being useful, being beautiful, being good, etc. All natural interests are put out of play. But the world, exactly as it was for me earlier and still is, as my world, our world, humanity's world, having validity in its various subjective ways, has not disapproved; it is just that, during the consistently carried-out epoche, it is under our gaze purely as the correlate of the subjectivity which gives it ontic meaning, through whose validities the world "is" at all.

*This is not a "view," an "interpretation" bestowed upon the world. Every view about . . . , every opinion about "the" world, has its ground in the pre-given world. It is from this very ground that I have freed myself through the epoche; I stand **above** the world, which has now become for me, in a quite peculiar sense, a **phenomenon**.*

If art is a phenomenon, it could be studied by using Husserl's Phenomenology. Because of the epoche, the philosopher takes a position above the contingent elements of art. The enterprise of art includes the following elements: the artist, the work of art, and his audience. To analyze this enterprise of art, none of the viewpoints of the artist, the work of art, or the audience are used by the philosopher. Each of these elements are analyzed using the phenomenological method. These elements depend on each other for their "essence" and structure.

Using Husserl's mandate which is for one to return experiences, the artist takes on a privileged view of the world. This view is opposed to the unbiased objectivity of a philosopher, i.e. Husserl. An artist does not find "essence" or structure of the world. Unlike the philosopher, he only sees the world through his own eyes and is actively involved in the world.

The privileged view of an artist places him and objects in a confrontation. An artist confronts objects through perception. Thus, the aim of an artist is to become aware by the awakening of the senses. Instead of the reflective attitude, an artist takes on the

aesthetic attitude in which all objects are accounted with aesthetic value from Einstein's Universe to God. The search for beauty is the on-going activity of perceiving all objects as phenomena. A restatement of this would be: Beauty is another word for Phenomena.

Out of the artist's experiences of the world, he chooses a phenomenon to study. His experiences are measured against boundaries that are set up by his culture. The product of this study is art. In my case, I have chosen the phenomenon of a line. The investigation of a line is carried out by perceiving it through the different manners of its appearances. Different ways of grasping a line have been documented (See Chapter 3).

The grasping of Beauty is the nearness of one toward a phenomenon. This brings on a psychological condition commonly referred to as the aesthetic feeling. Actually, this feeling is a metaphysical response to an act of perception. I call this metaphysical response the aesthetic moment. The excitement brings on a quickening of the breath and an increased heartbeat. The sudden loss of the soul from the rest of being; mind, body, — this schism, — Yes, I am alive — that thing that I am infatuated with, it could be the Parthenon or Michelangelo's "David," that phenomenon is. I measure my consciousness against that phenomenon. Even though other people do not see or register the phenomenon or if I did not see it — the phenomenon is. It is not the introduction of the phenomenon but the intervention of myself with the phenomenon — Being aware of myself, "oneself."

According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty⁽⁶⁾, we perceive phenomena through our bodies. In the chapter "The theory of a body is already a theory of perception," of **Phenomenology of Perception**, Merleau-Ponty describes the perception made by the body and the body itself⁽⁷⁾:

Every external perception is immediately synonymous with a certain perception of my body, just as every perception of my body is made explicit in the language of external perception. If, then, as we have seen to be the case, the body is not a transparent object, and is not presented to us in virtue of the law of its constitution, as the circle is to the geometer, if it is an expressive unity which we can learn to know only by actively taking it up, this structure will be passed on to the sensible world. The

theory of the body image is, implicitly, a theory of perception. We have relearned to feel our body; we have found underneath the objective and detached knowledge of the body that other knowledge which we have of it in virtue of its always being with us and of the fact that we are our body. In the same way we shall need to reawaken our experience of the world as it appears to us in so far as we are in the world through our body, and in so far as we perceive the world with our body. But by thus remaking contact with the body and with the world, we shall also rediscover ourselves, since, perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception.

The process of perception is set within the ambiguous situation known as a body. The contact of an object by part of the body such as the hand, the relationship of the hand with the rest of the body, and the internal workings of the hand are all at work simultaneously. The subject uses the body or it could be said that the subject is the body. The thing outside of the body such as a wall is the object. There is a transcendent interaction between the subject and the object. The product of this transcendent interaction is the “event or occurrence.” The subject in perception becomes aware of “the event or occurrence” as a phenomenon.

For an artist, the world as a phenomenon may not be said to be an example of mediocrity. There must be a check in order to say that the world possesses beauty. The world is constructed in terms of Form and Meaning by an artist. By doing this, aesthetic value is given to the world. My position is that ambiguity of the world disappears with the distinction of Form from Meaning. To exemplify the phenomenon, Form and Meaning are constructed with care and clarity. Form and Meaning dissolve with the attainment of the phenomenon. A construction of the world in this way is called an aesthetic framework based on phenomena.

Because I take on the aesthetic attitude, the world is not seen objectively. In other words, objects outside of me are not given absolute status. Form and Meaning are not absolutes. They are constructed terms or expressions of the world. I can only say, “A phenomenon is.” This is said only after a subjective act of perception.

Husserl’s Phenomenology “is the ‘science of science,’ since it

alone investigates what all other sciences either take for granted or ignore — the very essence of their own objects.”⁽⁸⁾ This ‘science of science’ can only be accomplished if subjectivity is defined objectively and objectivity is defined subjectively. Husserl could not have subjectivity without objectivity.

Art is not objective, Beauty is not objective. Art and Beauty are subjective through the act of perception. An approach toward art through perception would be called Phenomenological Aesthetics, a viewpoint of an artist as opposed to the Phenomenology of Aesthetics, a viewpoint of a philosopher.

It would not be hard to see that I have a prejudice against the word “essences.” This word always connotes basic qualities that are constituted in both Form and Meaning. These basic qualities, essences, are given an objective status in philosophy. Philosophical doctrines state that all things have essences. The search for essences leads to truth. From my confrontations with objects, I have perceived Form and Meaning dissolve to reveal phenomena. I did not find essences.

Merleau-Ponty comments in “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences” on the subjective act of perception⁽⁹⁾:

The certainty of ideas is not the foundation of the certainty of perception but is, rather, based on it — in that it is perceptual experience which gives us the passage from one moment to the next and thus realizes the unity of time. In this sense all consciousness is perceptual, even the consciousness of ourselves.

Merleau-Ponty’s Existentialism is laden with the concept of “essences.” Existentialism has overt meanings that are derived upon essences. Since I do not accept essences, it would be proper to speak of my interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology. Perception having the body as its agent is the action between the subject and the object. Perception completes the transcendence, since “all consciousness is perceptual.”

This type of transcendence is what Merleau-Ponty identified as an active transcendence. As given below, Merleau-Ponty describes this active transcendence⁽¹⁰⁾:

The acts of the ‘I’ are of such nature that they outstrip themselves leaving no interiority of consciousness. Con-

*consciousness is transcendence through and through, not transcendence undergone—we have already said that such a transcendence would bring consciousness to a stop—but active transcendence... What I discover and recognize through the **cogito** is not psychological immanence, the inherence of all phenomena in 'private states of consciousness,' the blind contact of sensation with itself. It is not even transcendental immanence, the belonging of all phenomena to a constituting consciousness, the possession of clear thought by itself. It is the deep-seated momentum of transcendence which is my very being, the simultaneous contact with my own being and with the world's being.*

Every moment, one searches for beauty. The ambiguity of Form and Meaning are present continuously. ⁽¹¹⁾ One tries to break this flow of mediocrity. Each moment has the opportunity for the dissolution. When Form and Meaning are so arranged in which there is a clear distinction, the phenomenon is present; "being" may be felt.

The subject, the object, and the relationships of the subject with the object are independent of each other within the perceptual field of the body. ⁽¹²⁾ This ambiguity of the body is inherent in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. My aesthetic framework strips away this ambiguity. The aesthetic check provides a backdrop for these independent elements to come together in the construction of Form and Meaning. The backdrop becomes transparent at the appearance of the phenomenon. An artist constantly brings about this backdrop; thus the phenomenon, perceived moment to moment, fluxes with the continual attempt to dissolve Form and Meaning. The active transcendence underlies all of these moments.

A philosopher can live with ambiguity (i.e., an observation of Merleau-Ponty on how things are). ⁽¹³⁾ An artist can not live with ambiguity; he desires "being" (an affirmation of oneself).

CHAPTER 2 - The aesthetic control over Form and Meaning is the distinction between these two constructs.

What are you frightened of?
Going Mad? _____ Heights?
_____ Beauty? _____
Lucky we live in a flat country?

from the play "Fen" by Caryl Churchill.

There are different approaches to the search for "Beauty" in the endeavor of art. In his studies, the artist is immersed with the question of "Being". These different approaches struggle with the relationships of "Being" to "Beauty" within the different definitions or descriptions given to art. The artist takes up the question of "Being" according to his philosophy.

I divorced art from philosophy. I search for Beauty; truth is not my concern. My philosophical inclinations are directed toward the Phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology is a starting point for me in my search for beauty. I take up the mandate of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty: "One should return to experiences." From my experiences, I have confronted phenomena. Because of my prejudices against the objectivity of Husserl's Phenomenology and the essences of Merleau-Ponty's Existentialism, art and philosophy are autonomous endeavors. After these confrontations of phenomena, I acknowledged that truth may not be found.

The work of art is a record of the "otherness"; the resulting feeling of the artist from the confrontation with a phenomenon. By contrasting the phenomenon with oneself, the artist's senses are awakened. This can only occur if one is not looking for truth.

Under this description of art, the search for beauty entails the artist placing the self in subjectivity; oneself to one. The one is not a static universal one or a whole consisting of all the basic qualities of the world. The one is a singularity, a point of observation. The phenomenon is perceived from the Heraclitean flux.⁽¹⁴⁾ The world is continuously changing, transforming, evolving. A point of confrontation makes the event or occurrence from the stream of change, stream of ambiguity. One is the constant, an opposition to the Heraclitean flux. With the awakened senses, the one is the creation of the world at every moment.

The objective viewpoint of Heraclitus according to Arius Didymus is that the one (the soul) is continuously reawakening⁽¹⁵⁾:

Concerning the soul. Cleathes, putting the views of Zeno beside other natural philosophers for comparison, says that Zeno calls the soul a sensitive exhalation, like Heraclitus. For he, wishing to make the point that souls continuously become intelligent by being vaporized, compared them to rivers, putting it like this: Upon those who step into the same rivers different and again different water flow. And souls are exhaled from moist substances.

For Heraclitus, the one is part of the universal one which contains the fluxes of individual things. The universal one checks these fluxes, Day will always change into Night. Heraclitus took a stance outside the one and the universal one enabling him to make an objective observation.

The investigation of the one, **ego cogito cogitatum** in Husserl's Phenomenology involves subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Husserl places the one into the Heraclitean flux or life-world to discover the structures of the life-world. The one is inherently tied to subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the circumnavigation of the life-world.⁽¹⁶⁾

My subjective position of observation as an artist is at the moment of creation. The objective position of observation of Heraclitus and Husserl is at the structure of these moments of creations with the world.

The aesthetic framework based on phenomena, which also can be called the Heraclitean framework, sets up the conditions that allows for phenomena to be grasped. The artist becomes aware of his point of observation in terms of Form and Meaning.⁽¹⁷⁾

The work of art is an expression of two categories, Form and Meaning. The object is manipulated in these terms. Form gives a one to one relationship between one object to a similar object. Meaning gives a one to other relationship between one object to a dissimilar object in which the dissimilar object is exchanged with the object. In the formal relationship, the two objects are always distinct from one to another, one is measured against another, i.e. model. In the relationship of meaning, the object is intended to transform into the dissimilar object, i.e. metaphor.⁽¹⁸⁾

A description of Form and Meaning using terminology from semiotics can also be given. In semiotics, a sememe is defined as a semantic unit of a sign-vehicle. ⁽¹⁹⁾ An example of a sign-vehicle is the word, “cat”. The semantic unit of the word, “cat” is a “small furry creature that meows.” ⁽²⁰⁾ A model is a substituted sememe (for the given sememe) having a set of similar characteristics (with the given sememe). From the similarities of the sememes, the expressions of Form is abstracted. A metaphor is a substituted sememe (for the given sememe) having a set of different characteristics (with the given sememe). Meaning is derived from the differences of the sememes. ⁽²¹⁾

*A cat is furry like a field of seeded dandelions in the wind.
A cat is white as snowflakes in February morn.*

The above demonstrates the use of simile in figurative speech. The terms furry and a field of seeded dandelions have similar tactile characteristics. Not only the same color but also the similar degree of white are common to both my cat and snowflakes. A simile is a comparison of similar characteristics of objects. The white of snowflakes are a model for the white of a cat.

*My cat is a drop of salt on the cold marble floor.
The cat answers with a whisper.*

The cat is compared to an essential nutrient for man, salt. A pinch of salt is good luck. The cat acknowledged its importance by the use of a whisper — this is a humanization of the cat. The metaphor is the transference of good luck with the cat.

Form and Meaning is evident in figurative speech as a simile and a metaphor. Can model and metaphor be abstracted from graphical elements? Examples of graphical elements are the square and the rectangle. A square is a rectangle with equal sides. The similar characteristics of the rectangle and the square, parallel sides and right angles are within the model of geometry. A square is perfection. This is a metaphorical statement. A square has the characteristics of symmetry, equal sides and is also an icon of perfection.

The set theory may be used to demonstrate Form and Meaning, see PLATE I Relationships of Form and Meaning, Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 1 represents a Set of Form, having a square and a rectangle. Objects of Form have similar characteristics, i.e.

geometrical constructs. Figure 2 has two different Sets of Meaning, a Set having a square and a Set having the concept of perfection.

A single Set of objects is a Set of Form. The elements of a Set contain similar objects. The relationships between similar objects are of Form. Two different Sets of objects may have correspondences between them. An object of one Set is transposed into the other Set. The relationships of objects between the different Sets are of Meaning.

An example of my work that shows the distinction between Form and Meaning is PLATE VIII Diagram (Two Circles and Two Lines). The field of orange breaks up into discreet lines. In the formal sense, this is an interference pattern. The serpentine black squares make two circles, resulting in a sine wave. The graphic is a diagram or idea-picture of two circles and two lines. A diagram viewed in this way speaks of its formal characteristics. The models are the geometric constructs of circles and lines. The imposition of the idea, “a river flowing through tree trunks” makes the diagram a metaphor. Meaning comes from another set of objects, namely physical objects that flows or changes. This set of physical objects could include rivers and mountains. The graphic may enlightened the feel for “a river” with a discovery of river turbulence around the tree trunks. This could suggest the struggle of the river of life.

Form and Meaning is a study of comparisons and differences. This is only stating facts. To express with the use of comparison is to measure. To express with the use of differences is to transform. Comparisons and differences enable an artist to study the relationships of self with the world.

Charles W. Morris in **Sign, Language and Behavior** developed the terms of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics as areas of study within semiotics. Morris defined these terms as follows ⁽²²⁾:

***pragmatics** is that portion of semiotic which deals with the origin, uses, and effects of signs within the behavior in which they occur; **semantics** deals with the signification of signs in all modes of signifying; **syntactics** deals with combinations of signs without regard for their specific significations or their relation to the behavior in which they occur.*

In the study of semiotics, these terms may be described as below by taking the sign as the primary device/element. Syntax is the formal quality of a sign. Semantics is the expression plane of the sign. Pragmatics is the relationship of the sign toward man. In art, the semantic plane or expression plane is dominate. The other terms, syntax and pragmatics are the two halves of the semantic plane. The side of the syntax gives Form. The side of pragmatics gives Meaning. (23)

This primary device/element, the sign is defined by Umberto Eco in **A Theory of Semiotics** (24):

*I propose to define as a sign **everything** that, on the grounds of a previously established social convention, can be taken as **something standing for something else**. In other terms I would like to accept the definition proposed by Morris [**Foundations of the Theory of Signs**, 1938] according to which “something is a sign only because it is interpreted as a sign of something by some interpreter . . . Semiotics, then, is not concerned with the study of a particular kind of objects, but with ordinary objects insofar (and only insofar) as they participate in semiosis”. I suppose it is in this sense that one must take Peirce’s definition of the ‘standing-for’ power of the sign “in some respect or capacity”. The only modification that I would introduce into Morris’s definition is that the interpretation by an interpreter, which would seem to characterize a sign, must be understood as the **possible** interpretation by a **possible** interpretation by a **possible** interpreter.*

The sign has the capacity of content according to this definition. The “standing-for” or replacing another object is the function of the sign. An interpreter approaches a sign to uncover the content of the sign: “What is the other object that this sign is representing?” The act of communication is not complete without this semiosis. The sign is considered as a container. The interpreter empties this container of its content — the represented object. The container has importance only as a vehicle toward the content. This concept of content is accurate for an act of communication. Art is not a product of communication.

The artist works in the expression plane. The expressed sememes from the work of art and the given sememes that are found within the artist’s culture have equal status. A relationship is constructed having the expressed sememes at one end and the given sememes at the other end. Unlike communication, this study is not a one-way flow of information. The artist contemplates sememes at each end of the relationship. The relationship makes a reverberation of the sememes: the artist contemplates the expressed sememes, then the given sememes, then back to the expressed sememes. This relationship could be a measurement or a transformation, the sememes reverberate by Form or Meaning.

The reverberation of Form can easily be seen in PLATE VI Object-Visual Line (Figure Drawing). The eye catches the dynamic line, then the muscularity of the prone male figure. The reflection of the body gives the back of the head, shoulder, half arm, flank of the side, round buttock, length of the leg, end of the foot. The proportion of the body dictates the dynamism of the line.

The work of art is not a representation of the world, it is a reflection of the world. An artist gropes with “Being” according to “how” he reflects on the world.

How can the world be a representation of itself? A representation of the world is called science. A reflection of the world is called art. The concept of content is useful in other disciplines like science; but it has no value in art. The viewer approaches a work of art according to the reflections discovered by the artist.

Man reflects upon the world through his culture. From the primitive world to the modern world, each culture manipulated Form and Meaning in response to the question of “Being”. In other words, “How is man located within his culture?” addresses the different cultures and the various manipulations of Form and Meaning.

For primitive man, the world is animated. It would be incorrect to say that primitive man saw “Forces” dominating the world. The word, “Forces” is an objective name for impersonal agents acting upon the world that is inhabited by man. The world is not only inhabited by man but also by gods, spirits, demons, animals, the sky, the earth, the sea, the wind, and the celestial bodies.

The world is one. In the eyes of primitive man, Form and Meaning are not identified as separate expressions. The objects of primitive man were made for the one of the world—the indissolubility of Form-Meaning. The animated beings are reflected for the good of the tribe by the rituals, masks, and tokens. The tribe is an animated unit of man placed within the realm of the other animated beings of the world.

J. L. Herder delineated on the primitive roots of Ancient Greek culture in the discussion of the evolution of language. He “emphasized the mythic aspect of all verbal and propositional conceptions.”⁽²⁵⁾ Herder elaborates⁽²⁶⁾:

*As all nature sounds; so to Man, creature of sense, nothing could seem more natural than that it lives, and speaks, and acts. A certain savage sees a tree, with its majestic crown; the crown rustles! That stirring godhead! The savage falls prostrate and worships! Behold the history of sensuous Man, that dark web, in its becoming, out of **verbis nomina**—and the easiest transition of abstract thought! For the savages of North America, for instance, everything has its genius, its spirit. That is was likewise among Greeks and orientals, may be seen from their oldest dictionary and grammar—they are, as was all nature to their inventor, a pantheon! A realm of living, acting creatures . . . The driving storm, the gentle zephyr, the clear fountain and the mighty ocean—their whole mythology lies in those troves, in **verbis** and **nominibus** of the ancient languages; and the earliest dictionary was thus a sounding pantheon.*

This “genius, spirit” pervades all aspects of primitive life. With the evolution of language and the formation of myths, a record was made of the primitive permeating atmosphere—living as one spirit.

Vincent Scully in **The Earth, The Temple And The Gods** noted Form and Meaning in the architecture of the Ancient Greeks⁽²⁷⁾:

In that architecture [Greek Sacred Architecture] the action of buildings and landscape was fully reciprocal in meaning as in form, and this too is an essential fact, that the form and the meaning were the same. Therefore, no study of Greek temples can be purely morphological, of form without theme, nor purely iconological, of theme

regardless of form, since in Greek the two are one. The form is the meaning, and indeed the classic Greek mind, with an integrity of perception lost by later cultures which separate the two, firmly indentified them Possibly we can also expect something more, because so far as the essential “being” of the gods is concerned, where, as Otto notes, “all is inexplicable,” the temples in their landscapes, if correctly read, should help us more than any other form of Greek visual or literary art can be expected to do. Because here the gods, as the hard wrought facts of nature and of human life which they were, are more complete than they can be anywhere else, since here their mysterious beings were made determinate, localized, through the unique union of the nature and the man-made.

Scully acknowledged that the Ancient Greeks used both Form and Meaning. For every expression of Form, there is an expression of Meaning. According to Scully, Form and Meaning was the same expression, “the two are one” to the Greeks. The difference between Ancient Greece and a primitive culture is that the expressions of Form and Meaning were given explicitly by the Greeks, in contrast, a primitive man did not recognize the expressions of Form and Meaning from his rituals, masks, and tokens.

The Ancient Greeks had mythology. They used mythology as the balance between Form and Meaning. The Homeric myths codified Form and Meaning into the Greek culture.

The Ancient Greeks awakened intellectually through their primary characteristics of naiveté and directness.⁽²⁸⁾ The poets, playwrights, sculptors, and the craftsmen of the temples—those who follow “opinions” worked the balance between Form and Meaning. For them, this balance was forthright and evident by their perception of man toward nature. Man is a separate entity apart from nature. Man is subjected to the fate of nature. The Greeks recasted the forces of nature into the image of man. The pantheon of the gods is the personifications of the forces of nature. With the maturing of their culture, the Greeks become poetic, the pantheon reflected the vices and the virtues of man.⁽²⁹⁾

Susanne Langer observed, “only a mind which can apprehend **both** a literal and a ‘poetic’ formulation of an idea is in a position to

distinguish the figure [Form] from its meaning.”⁽³⁰⁾ The Ancient Greeks emerged from their primitive roots by placing Form and Meaning out of the one, “spirit, genius”. Their mythology distilled Form and Meaning into distinguishable expressions and yet played Form and Meaning upon each other.

In the balance of Form and Meaning, “Being” is revealed. The passing of Classical Greece is the passing of this balance in western civilization. The epitome of the realization of the balance is the Parthenon.

A reconciliation beyond thought between the old and the new, and between the earth and man, her temple is above all else the soundless moment of the opening of a people's heart. Therefore the sum of the energy harnessed and the assertions made upon the Acropolis is stillness... There is only being and light. Time lies dead in the white and silver light of the outdoor room between the Parthenon and the Erechtheion. It dies upon the Parthenon's white and golden columns, so that Athena takes one step forward and outward forever. — Vincent Scully⁽³¹⁾

A discontent was felt for the “traditional view” of mythology by the latter Greeks, the philosophers. The Roman writer, M. Terentius Varro categorized three types of theology: the mythology of gods by the epic poets; the official state religion practiced by the institutions and cults; and the natural theology of the philosophers.⁽³²⁾ The philosophers were searching for “the theory of the nature of the divine as revealed in the nature of reality.”⁽³³⁾ The balance so delicately worked by “those who follow opinions” was distrusted. Mythology was construed as an affront to reason. The philosophers constructed schemes or ways to uncover “the nature of reality.” The boundaries of Greek culture was enlarged to include the metaphysical.

The two most successful schemes are by Plato and Aristotle. Plato defined reality as an absolute state or an order of things. Plato searched for ideals. Aristotle stated that reality is the element of a thing that is differentiated from another element of a different thing. Aristotle searched for essences. Different things may have similar characteristics like the same color or the same height, i.e. a wheat field and the rising sun or a house and a tree; but things have their own essences. The ideals of Plato are few while the essences of Aristotle are many as there are different things in the world.

In the above schemes, things or physical objects are set in contrast to non-concrete objects like ideas, feelings, and images. These non-concrete objects are constructs, reactions, or appearances of the subject. They are considered as not being outside of man. These objects are subjective experiences in an objective world.

An artist who takes up the question of “Being”, through the search for ideals is using the aesthetic framework based on ideals or the Platonic framework. An artist who takes up the question of “Being” through the search for essences is using the aesthetic framework based on essences or the Aristotelian framework.

All objects may be expressed in terms of Form and Meaning. An artist manipulates Form and Meaning according to his philosophy. This is accomplished by the placement of emphasis. In the Platonic framework, one of the expression is made an absolute and the other expression is subservient to the absolute, for example, Form over Meaning or Meaning over Form. The absolute is considered as the ideal. The Aristotelian framework sets up a correspondence between Form and Meaning. From this correspondence, essences are discovered. Essences are constituted within Form and Meaning.

The Heraclitean framework makes a distinction between Form and Meaning in such a way that these expressions are seen as constructs. Unlike the Aristotelian framework, these constructs do not reveal essences. These constructs are the abstracts of a phenomenon.

For the Platonic framework and the Aristotelian framework, a phenomenon is considered as an appearance of the underlying ideal or essence. Within the Heraclitean framework, a declaration is made that the world is an appearance with the dissolution of the constructs.

The Platonic, Aristotelian, and Heraclitean frameworks position the self to the outside world differently. The Platonic framework places the self toward objectivity. The Aristotelian framework places the self in the middle of objectivity and subjectivity. In the Heraclitean framework, an attempt is made to divorce subjectivity from objectivity, thus, the self is placed toward subjectivity.

The Set Theory may be used to review the above discussion, see PLATE I Relationships of Form and Meaning, Figure 3 to Figure 7. In a primitive culture, Form and Meaning are inseparable within the

one spirit, Figure 3. The Ancient Greeks balanced Form with Meaning in the identification of these expressions, Figure 4. The Platonic framework idealizes one of the expressions and diminishes the value of the other expression, Figure 5. The intersection or correspondence of Form and Meaning by the Aristotelian framework produces essences, Figure 6. With the distinction of Form from Meaning within the Heraclitean framework, the phenomenon becomes manifested, Figure 7.

The twentieth century opened with a new outlook, the rejection of the old “traditional” styles. Freedom was given to the artist with the release of abstraction as a tool. Before the twentieth century, abstraction had a potential limited by the recognizable style of the day. Picasso was the master of this new tool.

Picasso always dealt with the essences or the ideals of things, see PLATE II References, Figure 1 to Figure 3. Through his life, Picasso transcended one aesthetic framework to another. In his youth of the Blue and Rose Period (1901-1906), Picasso longed for essences within the Aristotelian framework. The sensuality of the flesh is recorded by the fluid line of a sketch of a male youth, Figure 1. With the subtlety of the color blue and red, Picasso enlivened the circus people and the common peasants. With the age of Cubism (1907-1917), Form dominated the perceptions of Picasso. The female nude is abstracted into geometrical volumes, Figure 2. Using the Platonic framework, things were abstracted to reach an ideal not of a perfect shape, but the potential of Form. The painting **Guernica** (1937) directed the Platonic framework toward the ideal of Meaning. The anguish of mankind is forcibly drawn in a study sketch for the paintings **The Rape of Sabines** (1962).

The sketches are from Picasso’s sketchbooks where he recorded his daily observations. From these sketchbooks, paintings evolved. The top row of PLATE II could be taken as the life of an artist; the youthful Aristotelian, the middle-age Platonist of Form, and the matured Platonist of Meaning.

Picasso did not represent reality, he reflected reality. His observations are abstracted by analysis according to the framework chosen to reflect reality. These sketches of Picasso are line drawings. The Blue Period sketch has fluid, flowing lines. The

Cubism sketch is composed of simple lines enclosing geometric shapes. The sketch of **The Rape of Sabines** contains deformed lines defining rupture forces. Picasso abstracted the line using the different frameworks of his life.

In architecture, the Aristotelian framework, the Platonic framework of Form, and the Platonic framework of Meaning are demonstrated by three architects, Le Corbusier, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and Aldo Rossi, respectively. Le Corbusier is the man of essences. At the Chapel of the Couvent-Sainte-Marie-de-La-Tourette, France (1960), the walls interplay with geometrical forms through light. The feeling of humanity is reflected from the walls. Mies van der Rohe intersected two horizontal planes with vertical lines composing the Farnsworth House at Plano, Illinois (1945-1950). The simplicity of geometrical elements is the program for this building. Aldo Rossi juxtaposed the fabric of the city, Venice to the stage of the Teatro del Mondo (1979). This theatre of primal forms was floated against the eclectic monuments of Venice. See PLATE II References, Figure 4 to Figure 6.

The Heraclitean framework was interpreted by Frank Lloyd Wright as **Organic**. The phenomenon that Wright studied was Nature. For him, Nature became a mythology. From this mythology, linear horizontal walls were built. An example is the Robie House, Chicago, Illinois (1906), see PLATE II References, Figure 8. In architecture, the phenomenon of a line is translated into the phenomenon of a wall.

Erich Mendelsohn and Carlo Scarpa were followers of Wright. Their work is not necessarily organic, however they investigated the phenomenon of a wall, see PLATE II References, Figure 7 and Figure 9. The Einstein Tower at Potsdam, Germany (1920-1924) is the realization of Mendelsohn’s expressive sketches. The expressive wall of the Einstein Tower twists and turns to the life that Mendelsohn willed to it. The walls of Scarpa are built upon the Italian tradition. The static points of this tradition are rooted in the Italian soil but also transverse geometrically to other points. These points are seemingly isolated places that relate back to other places. An example of this static wall is the Chapel of Brion Tomb, San Vito d’Altivole (Treviso), Italy (1969).

The hierarchy of these three walls is Mendelsohn—energetic, Wright—continuity, and Scarpa—movements of static points. The bottom row (Figure 7 to Figure 9) of PLATE II References illustrates the three levels that can be carried out using the aesthetic framework based on phenomena. The first level, Mendelsohn's expressive wall is closely related to the Aristotelian framework in that phenomenal qualities are important in both. An example is the dynamism of the Einstein Tower and the reflection of light on the walls of La Tourette. The second level, Wright's organic wall is compared to the Platonic framework of Form. The Robie House is a composition of a geometrical form, rectangular solid. Continuity appears from the layering of rectangular solids. The third level, Scarpa's static wall is made from the Italian tradition, an object of Meaning—a base for the Platonic framework.

Imitators of Wright who tried to relive the feel of Organic Architecture are between Mendelsohn and Wright. This group of architects borrowed Wright's clichés and added a dash of chaos, their view of nature. My architecture is somewhere between Wright and Scarpa. I have re-examined the elements of Wright's architecture. Some are thrown out, others altered and re-invented to the program of Form and Meaning, not Wright's Form and Meaning, but the Form and Meaning that I have taken under consideration.

PLATE II References can be considered as a table of Abstraction. The center square (Figure 5, Mies's Farnsworth House) is Form abstracted to an ideal. Above the center square, Picasso's Line of Form (Figure 2), the ideal of Form becomes a potential. Below the center square, Wright's Robie House (Figure 8), Form is dismantled of its ideal state and is used as a device to produce a phenomenal effect, continuity. In the left column (Figure 1, Figure 4, and Figure 7), Form is a material that is molded by a phenomenal effect. In the right column (Figure 3, Figure 6, and Figure 9), Form is minimized as an expression with the advent of Meaning taking on the stronger position.

The Greeks reconciled Form and Meaning in the Parthenon and their mythology. Since the philosophers, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the Western world has been struggling with Form and

Meaning. At the end of the twentieth century, after the works of Picasso, Wright, and Scarpa, a large gap has pervaded Western thought. It is called Post-Modernism. The question was asked, "What do we do next?" I have accepted that Form and Meaning are unreconcilable and I have turned my full attention to phenomena. Our mandate is to struggle with phenomena.

PART II A Line

CHAPTER 3 - The artist perceives a line in terms of Form and Meaning.

An artist confronts a phenomenon through perception. Perception is not a one sided behavior of the body hitting or touching the outside world. The mind and body are one, a point of confrontation. Perception is cognition. With each act of perception, there is a corresponding act of cognition.

Rudolf Arnheim, speaking as a psychologist in **Visual Thinking**, asserts this point—perception and cognition are not separate psychological acts ⁽³⁴⁾:

By “cognitive” I mean all mental operations involved in the receiving, storing and processing of information: sensory perception, thinking, learning. This use of the term conflicts with one to which many psychologists are accustomed and which excludes the activity of the senses from cognition. It reflects the distinction I am trying to eliminate; therefore I must extend the meaning of the terms “cognitive” and “cognition” to include perception. Similarly, I see no way of withholding the name “thinking” from what goes on in perception. No thought processes seem to exist that cannot be found to operate, at least in principle, in perception. Visual perception is visual thinking.

Analysis is an example of a cognitive activity that is considered independent of perception by “many psychologists”. Analysis is comprised of the separating, evaluating, putting together, and making different arrangements of objects. How do we separate objects without the act of perception, i.e. a circle into half circles? Do we not visualize these concepts in the act of separation, using the mind’s eye? Cognitive and perceptual activities work in unison, thus, perception is coupled to analysis. Perception with analysis is the process of abstraction. From the object of confrontation, the artist welds abstraction to construct Form and Meaning.

The different modes of perception involve the experiences of the body. Outside of the body, visual objects and physical objects are encountered. Within the body, states of being, the mind and

the emotional self are encountered. Specific areas of the body dictate the objects that are encountered. The areas of the body are referred to as domains. The emotional self gives the Domain of Emotions. Viewing objects, things or images is within the Domain of Eye-Object. Visualizing concepts or ideas is within the Domain of Ideas. Manipulating physical objects or things is within the Domain of Hand-Object.

The phenomenon of a line is recorded by four different lines. Each line is perceived within its own domain, The Impression Line in the Domain of Emotions, the Object-Visual Line in the Eye-Object Domain, the Diagram Line in the Domain of Ideas, and the Object-Material Line in the Hand-Object Domain. Examples of these lines are illustrated by my work, see PLATE V to PLATE XVI.

There are two different types of perception, direct and indirect. The distinction between these two is in the different ways that the artist uses analysis. In direct perception, an object is examined. In indirect perception, an object is translated. Perception and analysis occur simultaneously in both direct and indirect perception. Analysis is used as a filter in direct perception and as a tool for indirect perception.

As an illustration of direct perception, we shall examine how a figure drawing is made. A figure drawing is an example of an object-visual line, see PLATE VI. The artist sets in front of a nude model. The serigraph of PLATE VI was made from a drawing having a single line. At one setting with the model, the artist produces many drawings having a single line. The eye is fixed upon the model as the hand draws a single line without lifting the pen from the paper.

A diagram of how the figure drawing is made is given in Figure 1 of PLATE IV Perception with Analysis. At left is the model. In the middle is the image of a line that is recorded on the paper. The analytic frame used by the artist is to the right. The artist projects a line upon the analytic frame constructed with the expressions of Form and Meaning.

This is direct perception. The artist looks at an object, in this case, a model straight on. Having the analytic frame cultivated, the artist makes a clear distinction of Form and Meaning; the phenomenon of a line appears.

A model's body is described by planes, volumes, and edges. Through placing the image of a line on paper, these geometrical constructs—planes, volumes, and edges are abstracted from the flow of a line.

If the artist isolates a part of the model's body, a hand and rotates it, then indirect perception is at work. The manipulation of objects entails analyzing objects—what does a hand look like when it is rotated? In the rotation of a hand, the models of Form or the metaphors of Meaning are used as references to establish the rotated hand. A diagram on this process of the manipulation of objects is given in Figure 2 of PLATE IV Perception with Analysis. The model is at the left. The catalyst of references is represented by a circle. The different rotations of the hand as recorded on paper is shown as products of the analysis of the hand by using the catalyst of references.

In the making of a building, the architect uses indirect perception. This diagram of the manipulation of a hand may be translated. Instead of a nude model, a wall will be manipulated. The part of a wall that is isolated and rotated is a brick. From the study of a wall, the object-material line may be recorded. After lifting the object (in this case, a brick) with the hand and rotating it, the manipulation of a wall will begin.

The building that I chose to design is a restaurant. The name of the restaurant is *Le Mélange*, an interaction of different forces or a place where the best of life meet. The former of these two descriptions on the name "*Le Mélange*" is given in terms of Form; the latter is given in terms of Meaning. In this project, a wall travels linearly and grows toward the sky. Monumentality is expressed by the massive character of the wall. As the wall opens to enclosed a field (as a great hall) light and air penetrates. The wall breaks up into partitions which gradually diminishes into the terrace of a river. A wall reflects a mountain as a terrace reflects a river. The contest of a river and a mountain is *Le Mélange*. For this object-material line, *Le Mélange* see PLATE IX to XVI.

The site chosen for *Le Mélange* is located within the vicinity of Charleston, West Virginia. The mountains of Kanawha Valley roll gently. The horizon settles upon the hills. The mountain and the river are in a continuous struggle for the acquisition of the valley. To the east, the mountain recedes away from the southern river bank allowing for the settlement of South Charleston. The

mountain strikes ground, moving forward upon the river. The southern bank narrows as the mountain reaches its full height. On this thin strip of land between the mighty Kanawha River on one side and a four lane highway, a railroad and the mountain is the site of *Le Mélange*. This is only a momentary point in the struggle of the river and the mountain, for in the west the river reclaims the bank known as St. Albans. See PLATE IX Object-Material Line (Site Map of "*Le Mélange*," Charleston, West Virginia).

A unit to "construct" the wall is the Norman brick. The dimensions of the Norman brick are two and one fourth inches in height, three and one half inches in thickness, and eleven and one half inches in length. With the mortar joint of one half inch, the Norman brick is a one foot unit. A brick is a rectangular solid, a geometrical entity given the constructs of dimensions. The Norman brick was used to emphasize the linear dimension—horizontal. By rotating the brick, different faces are made evident. The two faces that were used are the stretcher, the length is laid out against the height and the header, the thickness is laid out against the height. The vertical dimension of the brick is the same in both of these positions. The header is one third in length as compared to the stretcher. When a header is placed on top to one side of the stretcher, the length of the stretcher seems to move in the opposite direction from the header.

This horizontal movement of the eye is called upon to construct a wall. The shifting brings on an uneasiness, a dislocation of the environment. The observer has to confront the phenomenon of a line to reorientate himself.

The brick wall has a one third running bond, a stretcher overlaps one third of another stretcher or one header. At locations where the triple wythe wall is tied together, the stretchers dissolve into three headers or sometimes four headers. The segments of stretchers move back and forth between headers, points of momentary pauses. See PLATE XV Object-Material Line (Oblique View of the Wall — "*Le Mélange*").

The objects of confrontation during the recording of an object-visual line and an object-material line are exterior to the body. These objects, images and things are independent of the body. Objects that are dependent on the body are ideas and emotions. Ideas are objects of the mind and emotions are objects of the

emotional self. Through indirect perception, the artist handles ideas in the production of diagram lines. The artist grabs himself, his own emotions; direct perception is used in the making of impression lines. See PLATE V Impression Line and PLATE VIII Diagram Line (Two Circles and Two Lines).

The lines may be grouped by the type of perception employed to record each line. Direct perception is used to grasp an impression line and an object-visual line. The objects of an impression line, emotions are within the interior of the body, in contrast, the objects of an object-visual line, images are exterior to the body. Indirect perception is used to grasp a diagram line and an object-material line. The objects of a diagram line, ideas are within the interior of the body, in contrast, the objects of an object-material line, things are exterior to the body.

The typology of the lines is a hierarchy of the dissolution of Form and Meaning to reveal the phenomenon. The first or lowest level is consisted of the impression line. With the encounter of the emotional self, the impression line is an easy access to Meaning. The object-visual line makes up the second level. In the viewing of an object, constructs are transfer to the visual medium. The third level is consisted of the diagram line. The diagram is made within the realm of constructs. The constructs are easily seen, but the dissolution of the constructs is difficult to obtain. The well developed constructs have to be crisp with edges, so that the phenomenon may appear. The fourth or highest level contains the object-material line. Physical objects are given "characteristics" according to Form and Meaning. The formation of constructs is complex, from geometrical constructs and physical characteristics to functional concerns and metaphorical statements. Physical characteristics are the greatest constructs to overcome.

The object-material line of a building is recorded in three drawings; plan, section, and elevation. These drawings are the result of orthographic projection. An imaginary visual box is constructed over the building. Lines are projected from the building onto the sides of the box. The front, back, right, and left sides of the box are the elevations of the building. The box is cut horizontally at about four feet above the floor of the building. The plan of the building is this horizontal cut of the box. The box is cut vertically from the front to the back; this cut is the section of

the building. The method of orthographic projection is a construction of Form. The use of plan, section, and elevation lends itself to the formal manipulation of the building as planes. With the introduction of the unit brick, the planes are distorted.

In the making the object-material line, *Le Mélange*, the three other lines were used as references. I started with all four lines, all rough sketches. From relating one line to another, making comparisons of lines, differences and similarities, the feelings and ideas expressed from one line to another, the object-material line was reworked and refined.

The building did not come from an envisagement of a finish product. Vague images of what I wanted were recorded at first. For the selection of geometrical constructs and the development of metaphors, I jumped from one level to another level. The highest level to the second level, or the first level to the third level are examples of the relationships of the lines. Homing on the intentions involved in the project, this multiplicity of lines was manipulated to make the finish product. See PLATE III Typology of Lines.

The building is finished when I can make an object-visual line from it, see PLATE VII Object-Visual Line (Building Sketch "*Le Mélange*" / "*Taliesin West*"). (The building sketch of *Le Mélange* is the burgundy red line; the building sketch of Frank Lloyd Wright's *Taliesin West* is the slate gray line). The phenomenon of a line is perceived in all appearances. The circle is complete, from naive emotions, non-concrete ideas, illusive images of other objects (buildings) to the constructed plan, section, and elevation, and then reflects back to the image of a line. A wall is a reflection of a line. A line is a reflection of a wall.

CHAPTER 4 - Yes, I am a line.

Emotion

quiet, yet repressed
ease - anger reposed
pinnacle of passion

Figure

round of breast
against hip
smooth leg reclines

Idea

displacement pattern
square station points
stream of field diverges

Building

corbeled brick wall
pilasters with copper roof
piers stand as ends

NOTES

1. Truth of a poet and a writer is commonly called human truth, a truth on the condition of being human. Philosophical truth or essential truth is usually referred to the way things are. To me, the difference between these two truths is a matter of degrees because philosophical truth can refer to how man is. Heidegger takes philosophical truth as human truth. The question that besets an artist is not on the How or the What of man? but the Where of man? The contact of man with that object outside of him is the starting point for the search for Beauty. (H. Elizabeth Boone modified my description of the concerns of art from the awareness of the mind to the Whereness of the mind. Ms. Boone would probably say that human truth is Beauty in which I vehemently disagree.)

2. Quentin Lauer, *The Triumph of Subjectivity: An Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1978 [1958]), pp. 2-5.

3. Lauer, pp. 37-38.

4. Lauer, pp. 66-67.

5. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970 [original German ed. 1954]), p. 152.

6. Merleau-Ponty believed that his Phenomenology followed Husserl in making an analysis of psychology. Where Husserl acknowledged the other states of consciousness besides perception, i.e. cognition, dreaming, subconscious, intuition, etc., Merleau-Ponty made perception the only state of consciousness. The other states of consciousness are just different types of perception. From the standpoint of an artist, I agree with Merleau-Ponty. Whether or not, Husserl's Phenomenology or Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology is closer to the "truth", I can not make a judgement. In no way should it be construed that I take up the "philosophy" of Merleau-Ponty because as stated previously, philosophy is the search for truth. I use Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology as an aid to my description of the "search for Beauty." This description is my prejudiced inclination toward art.

7. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974 [1962]), p. 206.

8. Lauer, pp. xvi-xvii.

9. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences," trans. James M. Edie, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception And Other Essays of Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics*, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1969 [1964]), p. 13.

10. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. 376-377.

11. See note 13 on the ambiguity of Form and Meaning.

12. This statement may seem ambiguous or confusing. If there are relationships between the subject and the object, then is not the subject depended upon the object and vice versa? The relationships are "things" apart from the subject and the object. In observation, these relationships are seen as being many and varied. Out of this multiple of relationships direct causal correspondences can not be identified within the perceptual field of the body; thus these relationships are incidental.

13. A semiotician (a scientist of communication) like Umberto Eco acknowledges ambiguity. Eco believes that the aesthetic experience results from the ambiguous readings of a work of art. See Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1979 [1976]), pp. 261-276.

Unlike an artist, a viewer of a work of art does not cultivate aesthetic prejudices. In the reading of a work of art, the aesthetic text is a juxtaposition of different signs that are interpreted by codes not only of the artist but by codes that the viewer brings with him from his culture. In other words, the work of art would be successful if it is rich with ambiguous readings of the aesthetic text. A work of art is composed of many different layers that the artist has to deal with. The layer that excites me is the one revealing the line. My study of the line involves other studies that are ancillary to the line. If someone finds pleasure in these other studies, then my art is fruitful.

The ambiguity that is under consideration results from taking Form for Meaning and Meaning for Form. Where there is not a clear distinction between these two constructs, there is confusion. Eco's theory does not make a stand of what Beauty is. The aesthetic text may very well be confusing which is alright with Eco.

14. Guthrie and Burnett held the traditional interpretation of Heraclitus. The Doctrine of Flux is the "mechanism" of the physical world. Following the Milesians, Heraclitus did not distinguish between the physical world and the metaphysical world. Hussey and Kahn took a broader or more general outlook on Heraclitus. The transformations of the world go from one extreme to another, Day into Night. The change is regulated by entities, opposites. The cosmic cycle defined the unity of these opposites: a renewal of the world, cosmogony and a destruction of the world, conflagration.

The traditional interpretation of Heraclitus - Doctrine of Flux is used by Plato and Aristotle as an opposing viewpoint to their philosophies. The Stoics advanced the general interpretation of Heraclitus - cosmogony and conflagration as a forerunner to their philosophy.

I favor the Doctrine of Flux over the cosmic cycle. The concept of fluxes allows for appearances - the changing flower has many appearances: a bud to a full bloomed flower. The cosmic cycle dismisses appearances and objectified the two opposites of a flower: life and dust. The appearances of the flower is taken as phases or checkpoints in the life-cycle of the flower. A moment is considered trivial in comparison to the cosmic cycle. For the concept of fluxes to be taken valid, the moment has to be given an important status.

See William K. C. Guthrie, *The History of Greek Philosophy: Vol. 1 The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 486-492; John Burnett, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed. (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968 [1st ed. 1892]), pp. 143-149; Edward Hussey, *The Presocratics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), pp. 43-55; and Charles H. Kahn, *The art and thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the fragments with translation and commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 132-153.

15. H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th ed., 3 vols. (Berlin, 1951-52) quoted in Guthrie, p. 491.

16. See Husserl, *The Crisis*, Part III and Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, *The Structures of the Life-World*, trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 4.

17. An alternate viewpoint that is similar in the arrangement of thought is voiced by Mark Alan Blizzard in *FACE OF THE NEW*, [Master of Architecture thesis of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University] (Blacksburg, Virginia, 1988), p. 9:

“Order, sensed before it is understood, cannot be the determinant of a singular passage, but must allow points of confrontation — giving man opportunity for decision. They are again fragments: those places where man can evolve an understanding of his position in space and time or relative to man and God.”

18. In art criticism, the dichotomy of form-content is used. “Form” is relegated to the technical aspects, the so-called ‘style’ of a work of art. Content denotes “What does the work of art represent.” In architecture, content denotes “What is the function of the building.” Used in this way, form and content are empty statements; the level of art appreciation is at a surface level. My description eliminates content and extends the field of form. Form and Meaning are both terms of expression in that they both set up relationships between objects. The relationships of Form and Meaning are not opposites but they are distinguishable.

19. See Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics*, pp. 92-93, for a discussion on semantic marker, syntactic marker, and sign vehicle. For Eco, content of an expression consists of semantic markers of the sign vehicle. The syntactic markers are descriptive characteristics (of the sign vehicle) that are not contained within the content of the sign vehicle. The expression is the conveying unit transmitted from the receiver to the addressee in an act of communication. The content is the shared meaning or message held by the participants of an act of communication after the expression is given. Because of this boundary of semiotics, syntactic markers are all the descriptive characteristics that are not necessary for the content to be delivered but are necessary for the expression to be given.

Eco comments on the independent use of syntactic markers in *A Theory of Semiotics*, p. 106: “Syntactic marker, along with the subcategorization rules that they imply, pertain to the expression, not to the content; thus a sentence like /a gloop is a bloob/ is syntactically correct, even if you don’t know what it means, provided that /gloop/ and /bloop/ are equally marked as Noun+Masculine+Singular (in the same sense, a flagpole with a green square flag in which three yellow circles are inserted, is syntactically correct, outside verbal signs, even though no registered nation, state or association can be identified with this type of symbol.”

See below for a discussion of Eco’s definition of a sign, my description of the expression plane, semantics and the elimination of the concept of content.

20. Peter Eisenman used the word “cat” as an example of “a fixed relationship within the structure of the letters and a fixed relationship between that particular fixed structure to an object” in “Architecture and the Problem of the Rhetorical Figure,” *a + u* (July 1987), pp. 18-20.

21. This description of a metaphor is developed from the definition of a metaphor given by Eco in *A Theory of Semiotics*, p. 109:

“a metaphor is nothing more than the substitution of one sememe for another, through the innovative amalgamation of one or several markers. When the metaphor becomes customary, a *catachresis* takes place: two sememes acquire the same corresponding lexeme (that is: two content units possessing some components in common accept the same expression).”

22. Charles W. Morris, *Signs, Language and Behavior*. (New York: G. Braziller, 1946), p. 219.

23. Eco made “an attempt to relate pragmatics to semantics.” See Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics*, pp. viii, 4, 56, 110-113, 143, and Chapter 3.

24. Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics*, p. 16. The references that Eco used are Charles W. Morris, *Foundations of the Theory of Signs* (International Encyclopaedia of United Sciences 1-2, University of Chicago Press, 1938) and Charles Sanders Peirce, *Collected Papers* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958).

25. Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth*, trans. Susanne K. Langer (New York: Dover, 1953 [1946]), p. 84.

26. J. G. Herder, “Ueber den Ursprung Der Sprache,” *Werke*, (ed. Suphan), V, p. 53 quoted in Cassirer, *Language and Myth*, p. 85.

27. Vincent Scully, *The Earth, The Temple And The Gods: Greek Sacred Architecture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963 [1962]), p. 6. Scully quoted Walter F. Otto, *The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion*, trans. Moses Hadas (New York, 1954), p. 287.

28. R. W. Livingstone discussed the directness of the Greeks in Chapter III “The Note of Directness” of *The Greek Genius And Its Meaning to Us* (London: Oxford University Press, 1915 [1912]), pp. 74-109.

Gisela M. A. Richter commented on the naivete of the Ancient Greeks. Their “background was simpler and the human mind had the freshness of youth,” Gisela M. A. Richter, *The Sculpture and Sculptors of the Greeks*, 4th ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970 [1st ed. 1929]), p.18.

29. See Chapter VII “Life-Symbols: The Roots of Myth” of Suzanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957 [1942]), pp. 171-203.

30. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 149.

31. Scully, *The Earth, The Temple And The Gods*, p. 185.

32. M. Terentius Varro, (“lived in the last days of the republic,” 116-27 B.C.), the second part “Antiquitates rerum divinarum” of *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum*, cited in Werner Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968 [1947]), p. 2

33. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, p. 2.

34. Rudolf Arnheim, *Visual Thinking* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 13-14.

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Fig. 1, 2, 3: Picasso, *Je Suis Le Cahier*; Fig. 4: Biot, *Le Corbusier et l'architecture Sacrée*; Fig. 5: Futagawa, *Mies van der Rohe: Farnsworth House*; Fig. 6: Arnell, Aldo Rossi: *Buildings and Projects*; Fig. 7: Zevi, *Erich Mendelsohn: Opera Completa*; Fig. 8: Wright, *The Early Work of Frank Lloyd Wright*; Fig. 9: Dal Co, Carlo Scarpa: *The complete works*.

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
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
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PLATES



SET OF FORM

FIGURE 1



SETS OF MEANING

FIGURE 2




PRIMITIVE CULTURE

FIGURE 3




ANCIENT GREEKS

FIGURE 4




PLATONIC FRAMEWORK

FIGURE 5



ARISTOTELIAN FRAMEWORK

FIGURE 6



HERACLITEAN FRAMEWORK

FIGURE 7



FIGURE 1 LINE OF ESSENCE

Pablo Picasso
Sketch from the Rose
and Blue Period, 1901-1906.

FIGURE 2 LINE OF FORM

Pablo Picasso
Sketch from the Cubism
Period, 1907-1917.

FIGURE 3 LINE OF MEANING

Pablo Picasso
study sketch for the oil
paintings, *Rape of the Sabines*, 1962.

FIGURE 4 ESSENCE

Le Corbusier
Chapel, Couvent Sainte Marie de
La Tourette, France, 1960.

FIGURE 5 IDEAL/FORM

Ludwig Mies van der Rohe
Farnsworth House
Plano, Illinois, 1945-1950.

FIGURE 6 IDEAL/MEANING

Aldo Rossi
Teatro del Mondo
Venice, Italy, 1979.

FIGURE 7 EXPRESSIVE WALL

Erich Mendelsohn
Einstein Tower
Potsdam, Germany, 1920-1924.

FIGURE 8 ORGANIC WALL

Frank Lloyd Wright
Robie House
Chicago, Illinois, 1906.

FIGURE 9 STATIC WALL

Carlo Scarpa
Chapel, Brion Tomb
San Vito d'Altivole, Italy, 1969.

PLATE II REFERENCES









PLATE II REFERENCES






FIGURE 1 DIRECT PERCEPTION




FIGURE 2 INDIRECT PERCEPTION

PLATE IV PERCEPTION WITH ANALYSIS



PLATE V IMPRESSION LINE



PLATE VI OBJECT-VISUAL LINE *Figure Drawing*




PLATE VII OBJECT-VISUAL LINE *Building Sketch ("Le Mélange" / "Taliesin West")*




PLATE VIII DIAGRAM LINE *Two Circles and Two Lines*




PLATE IX OBJECT-MATERIAL LINE Site Map of "Le Mélange", Charleston, West Virginia




PLATE X OBJECT-MATERIAL LINE *Perspective View of "Le Mélange"*




PLATE XI OBJECT-MATERIAL LINE *Plan of "Le Mélange"*




PLATE XII OBJECT-MATERIAL LINE *Mountain Elevation of "Le Mélange"*




PLATE XIII OBJECT-MATERIAL LINE *River Elevation of "Le Mélange"*




PLATE XIV OBJECT-MATERIAL LINE *Transverse Section (Looking Northwest) of "Le Mélange"*




PLATE XV OBJECT-MATERIAL LINE *Oblique View of the Wall - "Le Mélange"*




PLATE XVI OBJECT-MATERIAL LINE *Column, Door, Chair of "Le Mélange"*

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