

**IMPROVING FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COORDINATION:  
A MODEL BASED ON MICRO-LEVEL INTERACTION**

by

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(ABSTRACT)

Public institutions are becoming ever more dependent upon one another due to their complexity and specialized programs. There is a growing potential for duplication and/or overlap. It is in the context of an increasing need for coordinated action--especially among Federal agencies--that this dissertation is written.

This dissertation posits a model for Federal interagency cooperation that moves beyond traditional interorganizational coordination literature and its exchange-based concepts of cooperation. Drawing from the principles of authentic management founded in humanistic psychology and the negotiation literature, it suggests that such interorganizational cooperation is developed and nurtured at the micro level. Only through contactful engagement of the principals can the interests of the parties be revealed and dealt with to completion. In addition, this dissertation recognizes the unique character of such engagement when it takes place in pursuit of the public interest, as opposed to more

traditional private settings.

This dissertation examines this model in the context of a unique interagency organization--the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG). This IRLG was formed by the chief executives of the five Federal health and safety regulatory agencies in 1977. It operated for four years with their personal involvement and enthusiasm until its charter expired in 1981. Involving hundreds of employees from the five agencies, it stands as a unique organizational experiment in cooperative activities.

This dissertation applies the IRLG experience, as seen through in-depth interviews with the agency heads and staff, to the micro-level model. The IRLG experience illustrated the model concepts of contactful engagement and integrative bargaining at the Federal interagency level. It showed the importance of the agential perspective on the part of the chief executives as they worked together on joint projects. It also illustrated the essentiality of building a lingua franca--a common language--for discussion and resolution of interorganizational differences. Finally, the emphasis in the model on maintaining both the substantive and process aspects on on-going interagency coordination is shown in the IRLG.

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I am indebted to those interviewed for this research for their enthusiasm, candor, and reflection. Their commentary made this study especially meaningful.

I would like to thank

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I am also indebted to the Environmental Protection Agency for the sabbatical that permitted me to devote time to this research.

## DEDICATION

To \_\_\_\_\_ , for their patient and enthusiastic support over the years.

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## CHAPTER 1 -- PROBLEM STATEMENT

One of the most significant problems with large social systems is their complexity. As the number of functions to be performed by public and private institutions increases and as the population grows, there is an inevitable tendency towards specialization and division of responsibility among the organizations serving the public. Unilateral, independent action by a public or private organization to establish, alter, or cease its operations or services is virtually impossible. Dependency is the norm. Checking with another entity, clearing with another organization, or coordinating among several agencies has become an essential part of the operating livelihood of most organizations.

Headlines about day care center operators or school teachers who are known child molesters leaves the public wondering about the coordination of local government human services agencies. For example, dealing with child abuse and neglect cases involves reporting systems in the schools or social services agencies, prosecution of cases in the courts, patient treatment through mental health services agencies, and, possibly, follow-up through school employment or business licensing systems.

Attempts to provide employment for welfare recipients is another example where the complexities of coordination are enormous. Such programs require the



cooperation of state and local public welfare agencies, employment security, unemployment, and job training agencies, food, stamp and public health agencies, and, possibly, housing subsidy agencies. Often, Federal categorical grant programs targeted at specific needs tend to complicate the coordination problems by affecting the financial "stakes" held by each agency.

In other policy arenas at the state level, bans on drinking water from wells or eating fish contaminated with pesticides raise questions as to the coordination existing among state agricultural, health, and natural resource agencies. While enhanced agricultural production through pesticide use is an interest in one agency, the health and ecological effects from excessive pesticide levels is an issue for the others. The public expects intelligent coordinated responses to the dilemmas posed by these circumstances.

At the Federal level, highway construction has embraced the environmental impact statement process to allow consideration of options and a coordinated approach to development, conservation, and preservation. But many more programs require on-going cooperation. "Federal programs are not comprehensively rational, and inconsistencies between, and even within, agencies manifest themselves most directly on the operating level, where the various organizational missions are interwoven

in response to natural resource problems and local needs. For example, one federal agency has a program to install drain tiling in agricultural land and make marshy areas available for cultivation. At the same time, it participates in a wildlife habitat program to preserve wetlands for wild fowl and other game. Strains and inconsistencies between conservation, preservation, and wise use of natural resources often were thematic sources of conflict between federal agencies."<sup>1</sup>

These brief illustrations are meant to highlight the essentialness of interorganizational coordination in complex technical societies in which specialized institutions have grown up. The charters of public agencies are becoming increasingly specific and directive as legislatures and the public demand specific accountability and detailed oversight of executive branch activities. Funding constraints also mean that the specifics of the purposes for which the money is appropriated are more often spelled out in detail to assure that the public "gets what it pays for." The collective impact of all of these forces is a heightened need for understanding of and tactics for interorganizational cooperation in the public sector.

#### Health and Safety Regulation

One specific context in which to examine interorganizational coordination is the protection of

public health and the environment by Federal health and safety regulatory agencies. This research operates in the context of these agencies and the necessity for their joint interaction to carry out their respective missions.

Federal statutes in the health and safety arena have proliferated since the 1970's. In addition to laws on occupational safety and health and consumer products, new environmental protection mandates for clean air, safer toxic substances and pesticides, and the clean up of abandoned waste sites have been enacted. Each law is targeted at solving perceived problems. Implementing agencies dutifully attacked those problems with the required guidelines, regulations, enforcement, and waste clean-up.

While each action is focused on solving a problem in a specific environmental or occupational health context (e.g. cleaner air or a healthier workplace), the cumulative effect of those actions may be incomplete or inefficient because the problems are not compartmentalized in the same way that the agencies or their enabling statutes are. For example, common industrial solvents can, at one and the same time, become occupational work contaminants, outdoor air pollution problems, water pollutants, and waste disposal problems. Each type of emission or release poses a different risk to the worker and to the public and the environment. Reduction of these

different emissions or releases carries with it different costs.

Thus, a piecemeal, uncoordinated regulatory approach by Federal agencies causes, at best, an inefficient allocation of societal resources for regulation development and compliance. At worst, there is the potential for a waste of resources in complying with risk reduction regulations that have little merit in one "compartment," while more severe risks go unaddressed in another.

These regulatory inefficiencies are a motivating factor behind the need for better coordination between Federal executive branch agencies. Finding mechanisms or principles that can facilitate and enhance coordinated action among Federal agencies would allow more rational and effective joining of the Congressional mandates; such mechanisms would reap the additional benefit of more efficient government operations.

#### A New Model in a Federal Context

This research proposes to elaborate on the existing theories of interorganizational relations by reaching down to the micro level of interaction between Federal agency heads and exploring a new model for interagency coordination. Unlike previous literature, this model is grounded in the negotiation literature and some of the principles from humanistic psychology. This model

contrasts with more traditional approaches to interagency cooperation, such as those based upon exchange theory or resource dependence.

The newly constructed model will be examined in the context of a specific case study of interagency cooperation. During the Carter Administration, the chief executives of five Federal health and safety regulatory agencies created and chartered in the Federal Register the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG). The agencies were the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the Food Safety and Quality Service of the Department of Agriculture, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Its purposes were to coordinate Federal regulatory action, facilitate information exchange among agencies, and provide a forum for joint problem resolution and action.

The IRLG was not simply another interagency committee. For several reasons, it stands as a unique research opportunity with the possibility of special insights. First, it was the spontaneous creation of the chief executives of the several agencies; it began with and was sustained by their personal involvement over a period of four years. Second, it was formally chartered by them in the Federal Register with a detailed statement of objectives; in fact, it became an ad-hoc

executive branch organization without a statutory charter. Third, as a further manifestation of its status as an organization, it operated on a several hundred thousand dollar annual budget for joint projects.

The five agency heads held monthly breakfast meetings to direct the work of the organization. Each named two "surrogates" to manage the day-to-day interagency interactions. The work of the IRLG was carried out through committees composed of employees from the several agencies. The work products of the IRLG over its four-year life embraced projects such as a joint referral and inspection program for industrial plants, data base exchange projects, a joint directory of experts, and proposed guidelines for Federal assessment of risk from carcinogens. While views may vary as to the success of these joint projects, they were implemented jointly by the several agencies, i.e. coordinated action resulted.

#### Outline of This Research

Coordination itself is cited as one of the seminal concepts in the management literature of the 1930's. For example, Urwick describes Henri Fayol's characterization of it as truly an executive function to be exercised intra-organizationally to correlate the activities of individuals. Coordination is one of the essential "PODSCORB"<sup>2</sup> functions in the repertoire of the public administrator as defined by Gulick. Yet, for this early

attention and its growing essentialness to the operation of complex organizations, the organized research tradition for interorganizational relations awaited the 1950's to flower. Chapter 2 outlines the several lines of research that compose this work. Chapter 3 then constructs an enhanced model for interagency cooperation. Following a brief recounting of the history of the IRLG in Chapter 4, an in-depth examination of the model (Chapter 5) is undertaken in the context of detailed, recorded interviews with 12 individuals--including six agency heads--about the IRLG. Chapter 6 contains conclusions and observations regarding improved interagency cooperation by recognizing the micro level of interaction as an integral part of designing such relationships effectively.

#### Overview of Methodology

In order to develop an in-depth understanding of the relationships and degree of contact that was created among the five agency heads of the IRLG, in-person interviews were conducted with seven former agency chief executives. Because there was early turnover in the Chairmanship of CPSC and the FDA Commissioner changed half-way through the life of the IRLG, two additional chief executives were interviewed. Although five surrogates were interviewed, one had served as a surrogate in two different agencies, while two had different periods of involvement at CPSC. Figure 1 is a timeline showing the names of the agency

heads and surrogates that were interviewed for this research and the approximate duration of their involvement with the IRLG.

Interviews were conducted in-person (with one exception) using a open-ended conversational style; however, certain topical areas, which focused on the nature of the interaction between the principals, were covered using an interview outline. Appendix A describes the interview content as well as my approach to setting up the interviews and my feelings toward those interviewed. These autobiographical data permit the reader to make informed judgments about my interests in the IRLG and, therefore, to better evaluate the conclusions and observations.






FIGURE 1  
TIMELINE OF INTERVIEWEES' INVOLVEMENT IN IRLG

## FOOTNOTES

1 Joseph J. Molnar and David L. Rogers, "A Comparative Model of Interorganizational Conflict," Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (September 1979):421

2 PODSCORB stands for Planning, Organizing, Directing, Staffing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting. The acronym was coined by Luther Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in Papers on the Science of Administration, ed. Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, (Clifton, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley Publishing Co., 1937), pp. 1-45.

## CHAPTER 2 -- INTERAGENCY COORDINATION LITERATURE

This chapter reviews the literature most directly associated with interagency cooperation and coordination. In the context of the public sector, there are three main streams of scholarship that relate to collaborative endeavors between and among agencies. The first is the empirically-based research--usually carried out at the local or sub-state level examining the interrelationships between health, welfare, job training, planning, social service, or education agencies. Many of the theoretical underpinnings and much of the terminology for current interorganizational theory arose from this early work. The citations in some of this work indicate on-going research sponsorship by health agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services and a concern for the lack of integrated health services by the consumer.

The second closely related literature stream is composed of theoretical works or articles which summarize and attempt to organize the research in the field. These authors deal with such issues as the levels of analysis, the factors that impact, and the preconditions that affect, interorganizational cooperation. It is often noted in this literature that the bias of the researchers is toward the necessity for and the factors that will assure successful interagency cooperation.

The final literature stream is drawn from the

public administration practitioners' works. As early as the 1940's, with the formation of a more extensive Executive branch, concerns arose about the coordination of efforts between and among the Federal departments. This literature treats the more practical issues of interagency committees and cooperation.

The empirical, theoretical, and pragmatic work in the area of interagency cooperation principally approaches the issue of such coordination using an exchange perspective. Whether expressed in terms of a calculated cost-benefit view, a trading of resources for other valued concessions, or a more personal friendship, most of the research on the source and causation of interagency cooperation utilizes the spirit of trading or bargaining as a starting point. The literature also treats a number of levels of analysis--the organization and its relationship to the larger society, the organization as a focal point in a set of relationships with other organizations, the network of transactions between a specific set of organizations, or the organization as an "actor" rationally examining alternatives in its relationships.

A persistent bias of omission in examining interagency cooperation in the context of exchange at these several levels is a lack of consideration of the micro-level of interpersonal dynamics. The literature

characterizes interorganizational relationships as formalized, mechanistic interconnections with considerable attention to tabulating the numbers of, directions of, and intensity of interactions between organizations, but no treatment of the micro-level contact that may or may not be made between agency members or administrators. There are passing references to professional norms and ties as well as friendships resulting from employment in or professional contact with other agencies. However, there is no detailed recognition of the role that in-depth personal engagement may or may not have on interagency cooperation.

### Empirical Research

There are two seminal works in interorganizational coordination which virtually every author cites in discussing the field. Based on an empirical study of 22 voluntary and governmental health-related agencies, Levine and White posited exchange as a conceptual framework that was built upon the definition used by George Homans in small groups. Their version, however, was broader than the individualistic, economic calculus of that time. "Organizational exchange is any voluntary activity between two organizations which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals or objectives."<sup>1</sup> Although they discuss exchange in longer time frames and with unequally empowered

organizations, organizations are still treated as actors.

They introduce the necessity of interorganizational cooperation due to resource, labor, or client scarcity, and define the degree of interdependence between such organizations as a function of (1) access outside of the health-related system to elements necessary for its maintenance, (2) organizational objectives and functions which it supplies, and (3) degree of domain consensus among the organizations. This latter term, which refers to the consistency of definitions of the organizational goals and the functions to be provided among the participating organizations, is defined as crucial to the conduct of a productive exchange-based relationship. It is carried on in the subsequent empirical literature. Finally, Levine and White go on to develop the dimensions of exchange in terms of the parties involved, kinds and quantities of entities traded (i.e. resources, clients), nature of the agreement underlying the cooperation, and direction of exchange.

The second widely cited work is Litwak and Hylton's treatment of the role of coordinating agencies at the local level. Grounded in their work with community chest-type agencies, they develop and evaluate three factors which they argue constitute a matrix of the kinds of mechanisms for coordination. Based on the assumption that there is eventually conflict between agencies because

they all seek autonomy, the three factors are partial interdependence, awareness of interdependence, and transactions capable of being defined in standardized units of action (i.e. funds, prices of goods, cost of living indices). They also comprehend the study of interorganizational relations in the context of unstructured authority and liken it to the study of international relations--at one extreme of the spectrum.

Based on studies of community planning organizations in Boston and two other cities, Warren develops a structural description of the four types of relationships among such community decision organizations (CDO's). They are: unitary, federative, coalitional, and social choice. Focusing on the unitary and federative contexts, he sees their function as working out (possibly by satisficing) the conflicting values held by the various interest groups and agencies represented in these contexts.

In another widely cited work, Aiken and Hage develop and test five hypotheses as to the joint behavior of agencies based on data from 16 health and welfare agencies dealing with rehabilitation programs. Again, anchoring the need for interorganizational cooperation in resource scarcity, they identify several factors--from both the environment and the internal operations of the organizations--as affecting successful joint programs. They use joint programs as the indicator for

organizational interdependence. Aiken and Hage argue that the more complex agencies (those with a higher degree of professionalism), those with active internal communications linkages, and those that are more innovative tend to be involved in joint programs. They were unable to correlate the degree of formalization or greater decentralization in organizations with the level of joint programs with other agencies.

In a 1974 study based on interviews with 116 top administrators of community development agencies, David Rogers developed and tested a multiple indicator, scalar measure of the intensity of interorganizational relations. Intensity refers to the type and amount of resource investment between agencies. The six variables which were measured as indicators of level of intensity were: director acquaintance, director interaction, information exchange, resource exchange, overlapping boards of directors, and written agreements. He found the variables to be a cumulative intensity scale with director acquaintanceship at the low end of the intensity spectrum building to written agreements at the high end. When these variables were posited as explanatory of the number of joint programs conducted by the agencies (a measure suggested by Aiken and Hage), the correlation was .55--suggesting other variables are important as well. Of relevance to the present research is their selection of



parameters related to the directors or chief executives of the agencies. He measured the quantitative parameters of acquaintance or lack of acquaintance and number of meetings with other directors, however.

Paulson explored a different aspect of the Aiken and Hage's parameter of joint programs by attempting to hypothesize the reasons for interorganizational cooperation as being grounded in the structural and performance characteristics of the agency. This view is in contrast to other work focusing on the interorganizational field (Warren) and the organizational set (Evans), which focuses on the agency, as driving the interrelationship.

He modestly correlated a higher degree of attainment of each of six parameters with a higher number of joint programs. That is, higher degrees of complexity, innovation, centrality, formalization, and internal communications correlated with larger numbers of joint programs. He suggested the need to consider systems characteristics (outside the organization) to further account for the joint program efforts.

In a study based on interviews with 20 local health and social service agencies supplying services to the elderly, Aram and Stratton explore two concepts that are related to the present research. First, they speak of the convergence of interests of the several agencies and their

understanding of the needs of the elderly at a specific site. Second, they suggest four factors which were important in developing these joint agency meetings--individual leadership, agency leadership, meeting behavior (attendance and contribution by leaders at meetings) and near-term perceived goals. While acknowledging the work of exchange theorists, they are unable to tie this interagency cooperation to that concept. Instead, they conclude, "The observations concerning 'convergence of interests' and key persons who perceive their agency goals as immediate, recent, and numerous suggest that the effort at cooperation met the interests or needs of relevant persons. It is not possible to say that the origin and progress of the planning activity was a result of these factors. However, it is reasonable to understand the process in terms of activities which are consistent with or instrumental in satisfying individual and agency requirements."<sup>2</sup> (emphasis mine) These observations are a precursor to the present research which explores these interests or needs of relevant persons.

Analyzing interorganizational relations from a different level and perspective, Benson critiqued interorganizational theory as characterized by confusion and overlap and insufficiently concerned with the macro structures of society. In his article, "The

Interorganizational Network as a Political Economy," he takes a "systems resource" view of interorganizational cooperation. He posits the dependence of these relationships on the control of and flow of money and power among the agencies. He offers the network of organizations as the basic unit of analysis and investigation as contrasted with Evan's organization set (to be discussed later). Taking this political economy view of interorganizational relationships, he uses four previously defined components of such cooperation: domain consensus, ideological consensus, positive evaluation of others, and work coordination. These components of interorganizational relations are in equilibrium, but each is delimited in its variability by the resources resulting from political economic forces. He devotes considerable attention to the environment of the network of agencies and to the four kinds of strategies that cause social change in networks: cooperative, disruptive, manipulative, and authoritative. Again, he visualizes these strategies from a more global viewpoint of overall impact on the network of agencies. For example, a disruptive strategy which impacts the resources of a target agency can be caused by invasion of its domain in order to force change. Benson's research establishes a higher level of analysis--the interorganizational level--as opposed to the organization-

environment or organization set.

Davidson introduces a framework or regimen to allow planners to determine if a coordinated approach among social service agencies is feasible. He bases this ordered analysis upon a review of the relationship established between six local agencies and one county social service agency in providing services for the elderly. He posits a continuum of increasing possible interorganizational cooperation: communication, cooperation, coordination or confederation, federation, and merger. He also argues that organizations can progress through these stages and begin at the lowest level anew in a broader field of organizations.

He divides his planning framework into three stages: Stage 1, the environment; Stage 2, organizational characteristics; and Stage 3, interorganizational process factors. A number of the factors at each stage comprehend the thrusts of previous literature. Stage 1 requires an analysis of the economy, political pressures, legislation, availability of funds, and demographic trends. Stage 2 includes an assessment of resources, domain, and interdependence. Stage 3 includes a review of the structure of the interorganizational group, the history of the interorganizational group, the role conflict of the interorganizational group, the behavior of individuals in groups, and leadership. Of note in the discussion of

behavior is the characterization of both problem solving and bargaining situations in which the group member must participate; in his view, both are governed by the rational economic man, although he acknowledges the importance of interpersonal relations.

Related to this model, which was built on experience with local service agencies, is Hooyeman's case study of three sheltered workshops in Minnesota. In this article, she reviews her efforts as a consultant for these agencies and identifies the four generic variables that must be attended to in order to coordinate across agencies. They were: existing relationships (i.e. facilitative or competitive interdependence and domain consensus or dissensus), awareness of partial interdependence, resource asymmetry, and type of tasks to be coordinated (i.e. complex vs. support services).

Aldrich's 1976 empirical study of 19 local employment service offices and a sample of the over 2900 social service agencies to which they relate was designed to explore the validity of a resource dependence model for interorganizational relations. He cites the validity of authority and intervening organizations as forces which increase the level of interorganizational coordination. He also saw support for the resource dependence model's prediction that a desire for routinized transactions grows with higher resource flows between organizations.

Although the resource dependence model places values and sentiments in a secondary role, "I have found evidence that the sentiment of "perceived cooperation" has an impact on the course of subsequent interorganizational transactions... Theorists must look for ways of integrating values and sentiments into the resource dependence model."<sup>3</sup> This allusion to the affective dimension of cooperation is one of few in the literature.

Schmidt and Kochan build on Aldrich's work by attempting to integrate the resource dependence model for interorganizational relations with the exchange-based approach of Aiken and Hage--one in which resource shortages promote cooperation. In a study of 23 local employment service offices, Schmidt and Kochan test hypotheses that explore the validity of both models. Their focus on the resource dependency situation (i.e. in which one agency is dependent on the others) showed the frequency of interaction being higher when the agency seeing low benefits from cooperation views the other organizations as (1) having compatible goals with its own, (2) being important for its own functioning, and (3) having greater influence over its organization. Interaction was not higher when such an agency saw other agencies using conflict-oriented tactics for influence. The authors conclude that the exchange and power dependency models are important for explaining

interorganizational relations.

Hall et al. use the context of data from local youth services agencies in 12 cities to explore the usefulness of the exchange model in explaining interagency coordination in three different situations. The three different bases for coordinated activity were voluntary, mandated, and voluntary, but standardized through formal agreement. They found the exchange model valid as a perspective in explaining voluntary cooperative relationships, but not sufficiently explanatory for the other two types. They made two major assumptions which seem noteworthy; one is that interorganizational relationships are not singular in nature--that is, more than one of these types of relations can be carried on at once between the same organizations. The second assumption concerns the evolutionary nature of relationships, i.e. one kind of relationship can serve as a basis for another.

A study of 67 manpower agencies by Whetten and Leung posed four hypotheses relating the establishment of interorganizational linkages to the instrumental value to the focal organization's effectiveness. They found strong support for the likelihood that organizations with small budgets and/or broad ranges of services will relate to organizations with high instrumental value for them. Other variables which they explored--small organization

sets, staff members' professional acquaintance, frequency of internal communications, and centralized authority structures--were more modestly supported as variables explaining the relationship to organizations.

Boje and Whetton investigated 17 manpower referral networks in a study to test eleven propositions related to the attribution of influence in the networks associated with different variables. These propositions relate to three broad parameters of interorganizational relations: (1) the centrality of the organization in the network (i.e. more client referral, greater joint program activity, and more strategic communications), (2) organizational strategies (e.g. cross placement of administrators on boards of directors, services for less difficult clients), and (3) contextual constraints (e.g. local administration, geographic proximity, increased size, interpersonal ties). Although the path analysis methodology employed could not show the relative contribution of the various factors to attribution of influence, some of the factors correlated significantly with referral centrality and attributed influence. One of the authors' major conclusions was the value of embracing organizational strategies and environmental constraints in future models of interorganizational relations

An empirically-based article by Galaskiewicz and Shatin deals with the impact of leadership on the



networking among neighborhood human service organizations. Using data from 181 such public and non-profit agencies in Chicago, the authors turn to the extraorganizational loyalties and personal networks among agency executives as variables of interest as opposed to classic resource exchange. They also examine differences by comparing turbulent and less turbulent neighborhoods. Because of the small number (four) of networks studied involving these agencies, the authors suggest that more rigorous research designs are needed. However, they found that similar racial and educational backgrounds of leaders correlated with greater interorganizational cooperation in more turbulent neighborhoods. This research is significant in that it raises the issue of individual leaders and their potential impact on interorganizational relations.

O'Toole and Montjoy take an implementation perspective on interagency cooperation and explore mandated coordination as expressed in a survey of 20 out of 191 General Accounting Office reports on Federal agencies. They develop a model for interagency implementation based in part on J.D. Thompson's three part typology of intraorganizational structure--pooled, sequential, and reciprocal interdependence. They posit the lack of resources, especially at the start-up stage of cooperation, as a predictor of failed interagency efforts.

They differentiate between pooled (and competitive sequential) and sequential (and reciprocal) interdependence, as increasing and decreasing the likelihood of action, respectively.

A 1987 article by Weiss completes the review of empirically based literature with a case study of nine educational service agencies in five states. She organizes the data on cooperation among school districts into six factors with concerns for exchange dominating three of them (financial resource trading, gratification of norms, and political consequences). The other three factors were problem solving, uncertainty reduction, and legal mandates.

She then develops a process model for cooperation among public agencies which is constructed around three necessary preconditions. They include perceived problem shared across agencies, resource availability to handle problem cooperatively, and institutional capacity to mount cooperation; she argues that these preconditions must be coupled with external forces exerting demands on agency performance. One of her conclusions concerns the inadequacy of cost/benefit-type calculations to try to understand cooperative agency behavior; efficiency alone cannot fully explain such activities.

#### Theoretical Constructs and Summaries

The second major literature stream consists of work

by the conceptual scholars who use the empirical literature to develop or elaborate upon models or to synthesize generalizations from the field of interorganizational relations. Guetzkow defined three ways in which organizations relate to one another--interpenetration of groups, specialized roles to handle interaction across boundaries, and interactions through supraorganizational processes. These latter arrangements range from joint committees and trade associations to joint regulation by commissions. He recognizes both competitive and facilitative relationships in which coordination can be accomplished operationally in three ways: tacit coordination through domain consensus, domination by one organization, and the proliferation of new organizational entities. He recognizes Levine and White's exchange-based model in which each organization assists the other towards its goals in the course of output exchanges.

Lindblom's 1965 typology of the four kinds of cooperation in a democratic society gives broad bounds to the mechanism for coordination. The two poles of the spectrum are central coordination and mutual adjustment or negotiation. In between these, he posits coordination through agreed-upon rules and the cooperative investigation of mutual problems. This latter category typifies much of the empirical work cited above.

Evan's principal contribution to interorganizational research was defining the concept of "organization set" as the focal organization and the interactions it has with other organizations in its network. He then defines seven dimensions of such sets, such as size, concentration of input resources, overlap in membership, overlap in goals and values, and boundary personnel, as fruitful parameters for future empirical research. He also suggests possible research hypotheses related to these parameters focused on predicting the behavior of the focal organization. For example, he argues that cooperative action is more likely with complementary functions between the focal organization and its set, while similarity of function leads to competitive behavior. His focus in this paper is very broad, covering economic, religious, political, and educational organizations and their respective interrelationships.

Litwak and Rothman synthesized research to date in 1970 to move towards a theory of coordination between organizations. They begin by differentiating between intra- and inter-organizational contexts in terms of the lack of centralized decisionmaking and the mechanisms which maintain distance between organizations typically found in interorganizational studies. Their explicit model for interorganizational analysis in this work is the confederation.

Of particular interest is a description of the types of linkages and conditions under which formal and informal interorganizational relations are effective. They suggest a continuum of such relationships ranging from rules and procedures (such as those governing interlibrary loans) to coordinating organizations, like community chests, to informal contact among primary groups in different organizations. They introduce several factors which, when viewed collectively, help define the precise nature of the interorganizational linkage. The factors include awareness of interdependence, standardization, number of organizations, consistency between internal structure and the linkage it permits, and organizational resources.

Finally, they hypothesize detailed mechanisms for coordination in the context of three independent parameters: degree of formality, whether the linkage is competitive or facilitative, and the degree of autonomy of the organization. For example, in cases of a large number of organizations, with high organizational awareness and high standardization, the degree of formality that results is rule-based interaction. In the exact opposite situation, with a small number of organizations, low awareness, and low standardization, personal friendships constitute the interorganizational linkage and the degree of formality is low. Finally, they suggest that organizations that are sequentially linked in their

activities (versus those with pooled or homogeneous activities) will differ in their views of interdependence.

Focusing on cooperation for mutual ends, Marrett synthesizes the empirical research in interorganizational relations as of 1971 into five main interest areas: interorganizational properties (including variables like innovation, nature of laws and rules, complexity), comparative properties (including similarities in goals, structures), relational properties (including formality, intensity, symmetry), formal contextual properties (such as size of set, history of interlocking relations) and non-organizational properties (such as demographic structure, community support). In reviewing these research traditions, the author selects the dimensions of degree of formalization, intensity, reciprocity, and standardization as informing the future investigation of two distinct interorganizational models. The first, characterized by a low degree of attainment of each of the four parameters, is the most typical in the social welfare interagency milieu. The second, in which each parameter is at the heightened end of its scale, occurs much less frequently, according to Marrett, and deserves increased research attention.

A major work which operationalizes the nature of the collaboration by local health organizations is Lehman's Coordinating Health Care: Explorations in Interorgan-

izational Relations. He fully embraces the concept of the economic self-interest of the organizational units and defines three broad patterns of control in interorganizational relations--laterally linked, mediated, and guided interorganizational relations. He develops and elaborates upon these three major patterns for interagency interaction in the health arena. He describes the feudal configuration, the mediated organization, and the empire (or corporate) model--the latter recognizing member elitism (or system elitism). He concludes that in the health area, "The problem, in other words, is to find a way of organizing the plurality of health care units in such a way as to avoid the drift toward social entropy springing from feudalism, as well as to steer clear of the disruptive effects of skewed power that stems from empires. What we need, to put it succinctly, are empires without imperialism. Empires are valuable because systemic power becomes crystalized in one or a few units, while the pitfalls of overbureaucratization are minimized. What is required are mechanisms of checks-and-balances that set limits on the power of the imperial center and open it up to the input of demands from other units."<sup>4</sup>

White reviews the nature of intra- and inter-organizational studies and analyzes whether separate conceptualizations are needed. His conclusion is that many of the same analytic dimensions are relevant to both

kinds of investigations. He uses decisionmaking on the allocation of resources as the organizing concept for both fields and suggests three broad analytic dimensions. The first is characteristics of the organization itself, which includes exogenous factors, structural dimensions, decisionmaker constraints and the motive or inferred dynamic (i.e. exchange, reciprocity, altruism). The second dimension is the relationship to the resource controlling environment which includes knowledge about the environment, evaluation of it, and existing agreements with other decisionmakers. The final dimension for analysis relates to decisionmaking on resource allocation and the participation in it as well as the rules by which it is conducted.

While attesting to the validity of these dimensions for analysis, White classifies the interorganizational relations literature into four categories based on the relational states of the organizations. These are cooperation (which includes both networks and coordinating councils), competition, avoidance, and conflict. Referring to the literature on coordinating councils, he mentions primarily political tradeoffs. But in reviewing the literature on conflict, he makes an interesting observation about public sector cooperation which is relevant to the present research. "In general the bulk of the writers on conflict refer rather explicitly to



decision-making with respect to the allocation of resources. In the interorganizational literature, the decision-making process tends to be singled out as conflict only when an impasse is reached and rancorous conflict results. In the intraorganizational literature, however, even peaceful bargaining and the settling of disagreements over allocations, are often referred to as conflict. Therefore, perhaps bargaining or trading off cooperation in the nonprofit interorganizational setting has been largely interpreted as cooperation, and in the profit-making intraorganizational setting as conflict."<sup>5</sup>

Van De Ven, Emmett, and Koenig critique the state of interorganizational analysis and define a new, broader framework for such analysis using the concept of the interorganizational collectivity (IC). They suggest that the existing research examines interorganizational relations either from the perspective of the organization as a unit of analysis in a constrained environment or as a collectivity of interacting organizations--a network of relationships. Drawing on Parsons conception of a social system, they argue that the IC needs to be analyzed at three levels: Level I deals with the primary organizational units and the functions of adaptation and pattern maintenance, Level II deals with coordination, control, and procurement or the integration function, and Level III embraces goal attainment and external

legitimation which deals with attaining objectives, decisionmaking process, and characteristics of the decisionmaker. This conceptual scheme parallels Parsons' technical, managerial, and institutional perspectives, respectively, for social organizations.

Schemerhorn's 1975 synthesis of the literature on interorganizational cooperation (IOC) recognized three factors which motivate such engagements: resource scarcity, cooperation itself taking on positive value, and when powerful extra-organizational forces demand it. He posited several factors which positively relate to the likelihood of IOC. They include boundary permeability, common operating goals between organizations, organizational norms or environmental support for IOC, and physical opportunity. His special insight as it relates to the present research is the recognition of the role of the individual as an important mediator in causing IOC. "The challenge to be met by theory-builders in utilizing this frame of reference is to specifically conceptualize interorganizational cooperation as the outcome of a process in which organizational decision-makers decide on cooperation as a preferred action strategy, and then ultimately achieve implementation of this strategy in organizational behavior."<sup>6</sup>

Van De Ven poses a theory of why and how organizations create and maintain interorganizational

relationships. Beginning with the definition of interorganizational relationship involving resource transactions (taken from the local human services context), he uses the social action system dimensions to analyze such relationships. The framework embraces the concept of self-interest and the attainment of goals by the interorganizational cooperative, which are unattainable by the individual organizations. To attain these goals, the joint arrangement assumes structural attributes of formalization, centralization of decisionmaking, and complexity. Process attributes of the joint efforts include resource and information flows.

He cites two primary reasons for the creation of interorganizational relationships--resource dependence or commitment to a problem or opportunity. Both of these reasons have applicability to the principal models behind interorganizational relations--resource dependence or systems change. He asserts that the maintenance, growth, and dissolution of interorganizational relationships is a function of resource flows. He defines a life cycle of resource needs, interagency communications and consensus, resource trading, and structural adaptation and maintenance. Dissolution is related to the attainment of self-interest objectives.

Aldrich and Whetton approach interorganizational relations from the perspective of network analysis. They

state that the researcher-constructed paradigm of relationships (the network) offers more ability to theorize about important attributes of connectedness, reachability, density, and centrality of organizations than do the organization set (focal organization) or action set (all the organizations acting with an organization) approaches. They define network stability as an important past and future characteristic of interorganizational relations. They examine previous literature which relates the structural characteristics of redundancy and dependence relations as important forces for network stability.

Whetton's synthesis of the field of interorganizational relations cites the research traditions in public administration, marketing, economics, and sociology. He asserts that the first two tend to explore dyadic relationships and improvement in coordination, while the other two tend to focus on larger networks. The economic/business-oriented research tends to be concerned with inappropriate collaboration. He reviews the just-mentioned forms of coordination--dyadic, organization sets, actions sets, and networks--and groups the structural forms into three categories. They are mutual adjustment, alliance, and corporate forms of interorganizational relations. He defines the five conditions (flowing from the literature) that must be met

to achieve voluntary coordination--positive attitude towards coordination, recognized need for coordination, awareness of potential partners, assessment of compatibility and desirability, and capacity for maintaining the coordination process. When coordination is mandated, two of the factors--recognized need and assessment of compatibility--are not necessary preconditions for the relationship. He reviews a practical model for creating coordination by Klonglan et al. (to be discussed later) and focuses on four dysfunctions resulting from interorganizational coordination--impact on adaptive potential, program innovation, service quality, and costs.

Provan comprehensively reviews the federation as an interorganizational linkage in his 1983 article. In his view, federations are formed when a large number of organizations are involved, which have a large discrepancy between their expertise and goals and that of the the federation management, and there exists considerable external pressure for creation. He defines three basic types of federations--participative, independent, and mandated--as falling between types of coordination at the two ends of the spectrum--coalitions and owned systems. Examples of the three types of federations are some multi-hospital systems, the United Way, and professional sports leagues, respectively. He offers several

hypotheses as to the relationship of strategic decisions to the fact of network affiliation and the level of sophistication of the federation management organization.

A final theoretical synthesis by Schopler in 1987 develops a typology of groups based on their origin--mandated or voluntary--and their external task structure. Arguing from the literature, she suggests that these two parameters are important predictors of efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in interorganizational groups. She develops and evaluates six hypotheses relating to group formation, operational problems, effectiveness of outcomes, external perception of effectiveness, and accountability to external constituencies using citations from open systems, exchange theory, and small group literature.

#### Practitioner Literature

The final literature stream related to interagency cooperation comes from the commentary and work of public administrators and researchers of operational interorganizational arrangements. John Pearson begins by emphasizing the executive or institutional level responsibility for interagency coordination.

Far from being a natural by-product implicit in the law and generating itself from administration, cooperation by public agencies can easily remain more of an objective than a fact. The responsibilities of the administrator in his own field may occupy every available moment of his time. He may also be reluctant to

exceed those responsibilities or to give any appearance of setting himself up as a negotiator in matters over which another agency has authority and prestige at least equal to his own. A no man's land is thus found to lie between many public agencies even though their work may be vitally related; everybody's business is nobody's business...The main reason why at least a measure of success may be expected is that scarcely any public agency would enunciate a policy of non-cooperation. By its deeds and attitudes an agency or government unit might appear to be indifferent to any team effort, but its formal position would necessarily be that it welcomed any chance to cooperate with all and sundry. Thus, given reasonable grounds and a demonstrable mutual need, the administrator who seeks cooperation runs a good chance of getting what he wants.<sup>7</sup>

Speaking in the context of Federal agency field coordination, Fesler notes the operational importance of coterminus field districts and even co-location in the same physical building. He highlights operating program knowledge and personal acquaintanceship as major facilitators for interagency cooperation:

The soil for inter-agency coordination must be prepared by promotion of familiarity by each agency with related agencies' program and operations and by promotion of personal acquaintanceship and informality among officials of related agencies...And two-way cooperation can flourish only among officials who are familiar with one another's activities and problems and can deal with one another on a personal and informal basis, instead of as embodiments of the majesty of their respective agencies. Put in different words, I am saying that two-way cooperation (and, by implication, triangular coordination) is conditioned by that central problem of public administration--effective communication.<sup>8</sup>

He also points out that the coordination of field activities among agencies necessitates headquarters

coordination efforts even more than on-location cooperation.

Although empirically grounded, Guetzkow's 1950 study of interagency committees is as notable for what it did not find as for what it did. While concluding that frequency and length of meetings, preciseness of agenda, and the type of secretariat service were associated with committee effectiveness, he concluded that 55 to 60 per cent of the effectiveness is attributable to other factors. "It probably is necessary to go beyond the formal characteristics of committees to observational studies of committees in operation to locate factors which are more clearly related to their effectiveness."<sup>9</sup>

A major work in the health services area is the in-depth case study by Mott of the New York state Interdepartmental Health and Hospital Council. Operating over a number of years through several administrations, this council was viewed as an important voluntary mechanism for coordination by the participants, who were often the agency heads. Mott views the purpose of the council as fourfold: a mechanism to explore areas of mutual interests, a way to deal with the external environment (especially interest groups) and to manipulate it, a method to monitor other agencies' bureaucratic behavior, and an aid in helping each agency head control his staff. This latter point deals particularly with the isolation of the agency



head and the ability to get insights from other agency heads. He suggests two alternatives to the coordinating council if better cooperation is desired: managed competition (through policy option papers circulated to other agencies) or a reformed council with the governor chairing to assure decisions. Mott grounds his work in the basic exchange notion of mutuality of benefit for participation.

Emmerich deals with coordination in the sense of bureaucratic power and defines it as another form of consent. Since bargaining must take place to facilitate coordination, the other actor's consent must be obtained. "Telling another person to coordinate, therefore, does not tell him what to do. He does not know whether to coerce or bargain, to exert power or secure consent. Here we have one aspect of an apparently desirable trait of antibureaucratic administration that covers up the very problems--conflict versus cooperation, coercion versus consent--its invocation is supposed to resolve.<sup>10</sup>

He further observes the complexities involved in the coordination process and the necessity to understand the issue:

Even when participants appear to agree with the substantive merits of a proposal, they can still oppose it or, at least, not do very much to help carry it out. One can believe that a program has merit but still think that others are more desirable...One can agree with the program but believe that the wrong people are controlling the decisions or that faulty procedures have been

followed. The regional organization may think that it should make critical decisions, though these might be no different from those made by its local or national affiliate. Guardians of the larger organizations's integrity may believe that it will suffer if its existing procedures are violated. Full of agreement, bursting with goodwill, they may yet not take the actions required to expedite the program. Still other participants might agree on the program if they were interested in it, but they are not; for them the issue has to do with their programs and not with what the initiators think is at stake. Obtaining agreement, therefore, means first securing a meeting of the minds that the issue is what the main proponents say it is.<sup>11</sup> (emphasis mine)

Pressman and Wildavsky define coordination in conflictual terms:

The word "coordination" has a deceptively simple appearance. Policies should be mutually supportive rather than contradictory. People should not work at cross-purposes. The participants in any particular activity should contribute to a common purpose at the right time and the right amount to achieve coordination. A should facilitate B in order to achieve C. From this intuitive sense of coordination, however, two important and possibly contradictory meanings emerge. Participants in a common enterprise may act in a contradictory fashion because of ignorance; when informed of their place in the scheme of things, they may be expected to behave obediently. If we relax the assumption that a common purpose is involved, however, and admit the possibility (indeed, the likelihood of conflict over goals, then coordination becomes another term for coercion.<sup>12</sup>

A practitioner-oriented planning guide to creating coordination produced by Mulford and Klonglan focused primarily on the context of local level agency cooperation. It typifies cooperative agency mechanisms as voluntary, voluntary with formal agreements, and mandatory. It

discusses the elements of coordination as resources, programs, clients, and information (after Aiken and Hage). Facilitators for cooperation are listed as: domain consensus, comparable objectives, funding, small number of agencies, interdependence, standardized activities, crises, informal ties, common clients, and service failures. In their ten step guide to creating interagency cooperation, they list the three generic structures for such coordination: authority, negotiation (e.g. coordinating council), and influence (e.g. informal committee).

Seidman devotes a chapter in Politics, Position, and Power to the issue of coordination among Federal agencies, which he likens to the search for the philosopher's stone. His principal thrust is that coordination of implementation is never possible in the absence of agreement on priorities and goals. He cites numerous examples of failed cooperation due to attempts to delegate the priority setting decision to the coordinating entity. He argues that interagency committees suffer from a number of problems as does the concept of a lead agency convenor among a joint agency effort. Specific problem-oriented committees, such as one dealing with recovery from an Alaskan earthquake, and agency convenors on technically-oriented issues (i.e. those not involving policy choices) have been effective, he asserts.

An unpublished study of Federal integration and

coordination efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency surveyed over 1200 interagency agreements involving over 75 agencies. Drawing on a subset of 20 of case studies in the health and safety regulatory area, the study lists six factors which tend to facilitate successful interagency cooperation: interest of the agency heads, national visibility or interest of outside parties, individual dedication and interest, agency commitment to integration, specificity of purpose, and lack of serious jurisdictional conflict. Five factors impeding cooperation were: lack of adequate resources, monitoring, control of the effort, lack of substantive focus and incompatible schedules.

A final practitioner's reference comes from The Presidential Appointee's Handbook and its advice to the new political executive:

New executives often underestimate the importance of personal relationships in government. They are rarely provided with the authority necessary to accomplish important objectives on their own, no matter how wise their ideas or ample their efforts. Hence they have to work with and rely upon others. The early days of their appointments are crucially important in this, for they are a time when working relationships are established and reputations emerge...

Central to effective consultation is a sense of other people's agendas. Experience teaches appointees to try to see issues as others see them. Self-interest is one of the great driving forces of government, and understanding someone else's self-interest is an important step in tailoring an initiative that will win that person's support. Policy debates are rarely won by presenting a single vision of the public interest and then trying to force doubters and dissenters to capitulate to it. Much more often

policy emerges from a delicate and often prolonged process of negotiation in which a shared vision of the public interest is forged from a variety of individual self-interests.<sup>13</sup>

### Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed the empirical research, the theoretical work which has synthesized the on-going research, and the practitioner literature related to interagency coordination. These three lines of research are interrelated in that the vast majority of them are based on the concept of exchange as both a touchstone and a foundation. However, the multiple definitions and the richness of the empirical research illustrate the diversity of levels, conditions, formats, and timing through which the concept of exchange can be interpreted. In addition, a number of authors point to the need to supplement the more rationalistic, bargaining perspective on interorganization cooperation with other explanatory dimensions that explore the causation and maintenance of interagency relationships. While some authors refer to the personal characteristics of agency administrators, such as leadership, awareness of peers, and demographic attributes, the micro level of interpersonal connections is largely ignored. It is the purpose of the present research to extend and elaborate on that dimension of the principal participants in interorganizational cooperation and, thereby, more fully represent the richness and vitality of

such cooperation. In addition, such cooperation conducted in the public sector requires recognition of the importance of the principal participants' stakeholding in the legitimacy of the mission of the agency. The model developed in Chapter 3 embraces these principles.

## FOOTNOTES

1 Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships," Administrative Science Quarterly 5 (March 1961):588.

2 John D. Aram and William E. Stratton, "The Development of Interagency Cooperation," Social Service Review 48 (1974):419.

3 Howard Aldrich, "Resource Dependence and Interorganizational Relations: Local Employment Service Offices and Social Services Sector Organizations," Administration and Society 7 (February 1976):449.

4 Edward H. Lehman, Coordinating Health Care: Explorations in Interorganizational Relations (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 232.

5 Paul E. White, "Intra- and Interorganizational Studies: Do They Require Separate Conceptualizations?" Administration and Society 6 (May 1974):140.

6 John R. Schermerhorn, Jr., "Determinants of Interorganizational Cooperation," Academy of Management Journal 18 (December 1975):852.

7 John Pearson, "Teamwork," in Public Management in the New Democracy, ed. Fritz Morstein Marx (New York: Harper and Bros., 1940), pp. 68ff.

8 James W. Fesler, Area and Administration (University, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1949), p. 88.

9 Harold Guetzkow, "Interagency Committee Usage," Public Administration Review 10 (Summer 1950), p. 196.

10 Herbert Emmerich, Federal Organization and Administrative Management (University, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1971), p. 134.

11 *ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

12 Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1973), p. 133.

13 The Presidential Appointee's Handbook, Project Director G. Calvin Mackenzie (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, n.d.), pp. 41 and 43.

### CHAPTER 3 - A MODEL FOR INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION

This chapter describes a model for interagency cooperation that extends beyond existing interorganizational coordination literature in that it embraces (1) applied principles from the tradition of humanistic psychology concerned with authentic relationships, and (2) the concepts and practical tactics found in the literature of principled negotiation. Rogers and Whetton define a four-level taxonomy for the interorganizational research literature that identifies the supra-interorganizational level (e.g. the network), the relationships within the network, the nature of the dyadic linkages between the units, and the "characteristics of the micro, interpersonal, linkages"<sup>1</sup>. This latter category refers to the inter-personal communication, role conflict, and boundary spanning literature. What has not been recognized in the empirical or normative literature is a further extension of this fourth level to recognize the richness of the micro level of interpersonal interaction derived from the principles of contact and engagement. This is what is added in the model set out here.

In organizations, the concepts and dynamics of organization development at the micro level are often viewed as limited to "touchy-feely" exercises because the organization development consulting practice apparently



cannot deal with two major aspects of interorganizational relations. First, the context of control is not as absolute in the world of real organizational entities and relations. That is, the ability of a single actor (such as a change agent or facilitator) to isolate and work with the affected parties, to manage the number and intensity of interactions between individuals, and to control the physical environment does not easily translate into the day-to-day world of interorganizational life. A second difficulty is in translating the affective nature of the principles of humanistic psychology into the often rationalized world of organizational relationships. Witness the lack of literature from the organizational development world focused on building relationships between organizational units as opposed to between individuals. Notwithstanding these two differences, the organizational development principles can be brought to interorganizational contexts when the participants themselves are aware of them and choose to apply them. So, this model addresses the linkage between the cognitive world of interorganizational relations and the affective characteristics of authentic relationships to form a richer view of interorganizational cooperation in an operating context.

The model deals at the margins of two worlds--that of institutional relationships and of personal contact.

Thus, the major actor in the model is obviously not the organization nor is it the traditional individual robed in the mantles of rationality or power broker or bureaucrat (in the Weberian sense)--to name a few. The individual actor (who will be discussed more specifically later) is framed as a human being responding to and acting in an environment which happens to be that found around a person titled "senior manager" at an executive branch agency. The traditional organizational behavior concepts of roles, norms, and the impact of organizational structure are not assumed within this concept of "program manager."

The second research tradition that informs not only the framework for this model, but also many of its specifics, comes from the negotiation literature. The varied connotations of the term "negotiation" derive from the diverse settings within which it has been used and researched: labor relations, legal settlements, market trading, international diplomacy, family counseling, environmental mediation, to name only some.

Strauss notes that negotiation theory suffers from a narrow topicality of application, a focus on prediction of outcomes (versus operating principles), and a lack of linkage with the larger setting or social conditions (i.e. outside the specific negotiating context). He goes on to offer a very useful perspective on the scope of the concept of negotiation.

First, he notes that the fundamentally broad dictionary definition of the term--"'to treat for, obtain, or arrange by bargain or conference, or agreement' and 'to deal or bargain with another or others...to confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter'"<sup>3</sup>--helps very little in specifying its meaning. In fact, he argues that researchers have unduly narrowed the applicability of a term that has broad applicability to many social and organizational contexts. A second contribution that he makes is defining four broad modes of action involving two or more entities. These modes--persuasion, appeal to a higher authority, coercion, and negotiation--are a very helpful typology for elevating the term "negotiation" to application to social and organizational contexts other than the making of "deals", arranging contracts, etc. It is this broader context which is a backdrop for the model for cooperation posited in this research.

This model also honors Strauss' imperative to have an operational focus, not just an outcome perspective, as well as to provide a link to the larger setting. A particularly relevant observation by Strauss concerns an empirical study of interorganizational relations which he cites that would have benefited greatly from a theoretical framework grounded in negotiation. He laments: "The [interorganizational]

analysis does not deal directly with negotiations, but negotiation processes lie at the heart of the phenomena studied."4

Zartman parallels Strauss' broader framing of the concept of negotiation, but from the viewpoint of a political scientist. He argues that in the context of joint decisionmaking, there are limited choices--coalition activity, which is a zero-sum game based upon voting; adjudication, which is the decision by a higher authority; and negotiation, which is a positive sum game--the only one with the prospect of two "winners."5

Thus, from the viewpoint of joint decisionmaking between organizations, a model grounded in negotiation addresses one of the ways in which collective work can be accomplished. This conceptual base, conjoined with the earlier concepts from micro-level interaction, offers the framework for a model that is not only specific and applied, but also likely to allow interorganizational work that endures and is of substance. Robert Dahl notes that democratic majority rule, which occurs in coalitions, does not deal with the possibly intense feelings of the minority (or the affective dimension generally). He observes, "...we cannot hope to establish any potential rules to deal with problems of sensate intensity, ethically desirable as such rules possibly might be."6 So also with the loser in a situation whose

loss results from coercion or persuasion. Further work or relationships cannot be carried on easily with a residue of dissidence. More than a simple resolution or decision is required for continued action--it is necessary to deal with and resolve the affective dimension of issues.

A final conceptual concern in developing a model for interagency cooperation is being explicit about the definition of cooperation (especially versus coordination). Coordination is defined as both an act of or a state involving "...harmonious adjustment or interaction".<sup>7</sup> Cooperation is the act of "...work[ing] together for a common purpose"<sup>8</sup>(emphasis mine). Thus, the model defined here assumes as a minimum condition that what is desired is joint activity together between organizations. It further embraces the notion, implicit in the definition of cooperation, that joint interaction may well connote some common purpose. Not that commonality of purpose is a presumption, but the term recognizes the potential for jointly agreed upon objectives between the representatives of organizations.

### The Setting

This model is designed to address the matter of Federal interagency cooperation. Thus, its focus is executive branch agencies that have a statute or mission enunciated in law. It applies at the state level if the circumstances parallel those at the Federal level. That

is, in addition to the statutory mandate, the state executive agency should be truly constrained only by its legislative, judicial, budgetary, and interest group influences--not be merely a Federal agent. Thus, for the model to apply, the chief executive officer of the state agency must be its chief operating officer, not the "regional office" manager of a Federal program. Although the convention throughout the remainder of this paper will be to refer to the Federal program manager, the term embraces the state official outlined above.

The model developed here is one of unique relevance to the conduct of joint cooperation among institutions of governance. This model is not just about tactics for improved and contactful negotiation among any of society's numerous private, public, and third-sector organizations. It is a model for the enhanced dialogue and cooperation that is carried out by executive branch agents of the public interest. These Federal managers see their work not only as the heads of efficient bureaucracies and competent public institutions (in the best senses of these terms), but also with an "agential perspective."<sup>9</sup> This view is defined by Walmsley as one which operates to carry out the legitimate public interest as defined by Congress in a policy subsystem community that goes beyond the mere juggling of powerful interests to reach decisions and implement the agency's statutory mandate. The

agential perspective rests on a Constitutional foundation of responsibility to the Congress, the courts, the President, and the public--not solely the management "employee" of the President. This perspective means not only reading and understanding a statutory obligation, but exercising vision and leadership in searching out the public interest from those with affected interests and those whose interests are unrepresented as well as those stakeholders yet unborn.

Thus, the scope of this model covers all matters of governance--policy and operational--that can come before Federal agencies. That is, its design is as equally applicable to the development of collaborative policy initiatives as it is to furthering joint operations at the service delivery level. But all of these activities are conducted in the context of these agencies' missions to act in the public interest, which serves to both inform and energize the nature of the interagency cooperation.

The primary focus for this model is on the on-going engagement between agencies for the conduct of joint business. While its concepts are not inapplicable to the one-time engagement between agencies for traditional market bargaining transactions (e.g. agreements to conduct laboratory work on a reimbursable basis), the level of energy and effort needed to set up and sustain such an interagency arrangement may not be worthwhile for one-time

engagements.

Seidman establishes the need for interagency coordination by citing the duplication and overlap of ambiguous statutes and/or the compartmentalized nature of mandates and agencies. While duplication and overlap carry their own inherent negative connotations in government that demand action on the grounds of efficiency, compartmentalization is perceived slightly less negatively. Nonetheless, the fragmented implementation implicit in compartmentalization implies no less waste or uninformed decisionmaking. This model is targeted on making arrangements between Federal agencies more productive so as to eliminate these negative outcomes of Federal activity. Even worse, compartmentalization may mean a lack of awareness of information that leads to inaction, when activity is statutorily warranted or demanded by adverse environmental circumstances.

### The Model

Figure 1 outlines the model of interagency cooperation. The model is labeled Contactful Collaboration to reflect its touchstone principles in the micro-level, interpersonal literature and the traditions of principled negotiation.

The model recognizes an on-going dichotomy between the substance and the process of cooperation. The substance of the negotiation is the actual technical



subject matter being dealt with; it is the issues to be jointly decided, the technical information being shared, the regulation to be written, etc. Seidman notes the likely success of interorganizational committees that have a substantive, specific mission as opposed to a general instruction to coordinate.<sup>10</sup> This model comprehends the necessity to be convening about specific matters as a precondition to operations. The process of cooperation is based in interpersonal contact among the participants that is achieved by using the tenets of principled negotiation developed by Fisher and Ury, that will be elaborated upon later.

In addition to the dichotomous nature of the on-going cooperation, Figure 1 portrays it as dynamic (and possibly changing) over time. That is, the precise substantive work over time may change (e.g. projects are completed, and new projects are begun) as may the stages or cycles of negotiated involvement (i.e., problem definition, options development, closure in Fisher and Ury's version of principled negotiation).<sup>11</sup>

The model is not only dynamic in time, but it comprehends "life-stages" in the development and sustained operation of effective interagency cooperation. As shown in Figure 1, there are Preconditions which affect the applicability of the model and Preparations to be undertaken by at least one of the participants. In

addition, there is a crucial Conception stage which launches the cooperative venture on the proper path with either active participation or adequate advocacy by the appropriate organizational participant. Finally, there is the operation or sustenance of the cooperative mechanism. Table 2 lists in abbreviated form the principal characteristics of these several aspects of the model which are outlined below.

#### Preconditions

As noted earlier, this model of interagency cooperation is designed primarily for application when there is a perception of duplication and overlap of activities of the executive agency with others and/or there is a need to know about the plans, programs, or activities of another agency. Such a need often arises from public, press, or Congressional/legislative initiatives or contacts that describe areas of converging or diverging activity by agencies with apparent inefficient, wasteful, illogical, or harmful results. The legitimacy, public awareness, strength, and imperative nature of these initiatives or contacts determines the degree of interest in cooperation by agencies.

The most legitimate type of cooperative initiative is a statute directing that two agencies jointly work on a given problem. O'Toole and Montjoy suggest that this is one of the essential preconditions to effective

interagency cooperation.<sup>12</sup> Statutes can also be less prescriptive in directing consultation by one agency with another. Less formal, but often as potent preconditions arise from complaints by regulated industry to entities such as the Office of Management and Budget or Congressional committees that oversee executive agency activities. Immediate need to cooperate can result from press investigations of embarrassing overlaps or exposes of wasteful program implementation of statutes. In the health and safety regulatory area, two interviewees for this research cited the same example of conflicting regulatory requirements. In this case, regulations mandating skid-proof floor grating in meat processing plants (to provide for worker safety) were in conflict with sanitation requirements from the agriculture regulatory agency.

Thus, a state of apparent homeostasis for an agency in implementing its activities, either because of a lack of perceived problems or ignorance of them, is a not a precondition for cooperation. An apparent convergence of activities with another agency or divergent, inefficient implementation of a mission provides a necessary, but often not sufficient, condition for cooperation to take




FIGURE 2  
FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COORDINATION  
OVERVIEW OF MODEL OF 'CONTACTFUL COLLABORATION'

TABLE 1

## OUTLINE OF MODEL FOR CONTACTFUL COLLABORATION

## PRECONDITIONS

1. Convergent or divergent activities between two or more agencies often arising from duplicative or overlapping mandates/activities or fragmented implementation in compartmentalized settings.
2. Legitimacy of the mandate for cooperation
3. Not a one-time transaction--a continuing engagement
4. Lack of available common authority
5. Nature and extent of affected publics

## PREPARATIONS

## Identify:

1. interested agencies
2. participant from the agency
3. "interests" to be negotiated--both agency and personal
4. "interests" of other agency participants
5. Establish a lingua franca

## CONCEPTION

1. Program manager "contact"
2. Determine mechanism; create appropriate administrative processes to support contactful collaboration
3. Program manager activate the mechanism

## OPERATION

1. Conduct principled negotiation or integrative bargaining
2. Support duality of the model bargaining
3. Attend to administrative processes

place.

A second precondition for interagency cooperation has to do with the legitimacy of the mandate. As noted above, a variety of mandates are feasible and their context can set a tone for the cooperative engagement. A statutory mandate for timely consultation by agencies over the course of two years while developing a regulation places a different context around contactful collaboration than does responding to insistent reporters or an angry Congressional committee. There is a difference in approach toward the possible cooperation between agencies when the idea for collaboration emanates from one agency's needs rather than a statutory direction. Thus, the legitimacy of the mandate can be more or less facilitative of setting up an ongoing cooperation process.

A third precondition for the application of this model is the likelihood of continuing engagement. While a one-time problem between agencies could well benefit from the preparatory work outlined below, this model is designed to meet the needs for on-going cooperation that are typified in the negotiation literature as repeated, serial, sequential, or linked.<sup>13</sup> These are four classifications of negotiation organized by the frequency and timing of the interaction between the parties.

A fourth precondition is the lack of available authority for the making of decisions or the resolution

of problems. In terms of Strauss' or Zartman's more global characterizations of the generic types of negotiations, appeal to a higher authority or adjudication, respectively, are not available or are not feasible. An example of the latter case is the fact that Federal executive branch appointees hold some allegiance to their appointing President and his Executive Office. Yet, they are not available on a routine basis to decide or settle issues of joint interest between agencies.

A final precondition is the nature and extent of the affected publics. In terms of the negotiation literature, Lewicki and Litterer and others devote extensive attention to the effect of the audience of the negotiation. Whether there are external publics who affect each participant in addition to the internal (to the organization) publics is important. If the same publics are affected by more than one agency, this can have a bearing on the tone of cooperation. This precondition is not offered in the context of a condition for cooperation, but a context that must be recognized and taken into account.

### Preparations

The preparations required for contactful collaboration are extensive and involve both cognitive as well as affective dimensions. First, all the interested agencies must be identified. Nirenberg notes that knowing

all of the affected parties in a negotiation situation is essential. The evolution of contactful relationships with the other collaborators is difficult to reconstruct when others join the on-going cooperative venture mid-stream. In addition, small group researchers point to the changed dynamics of introducing additional members into a relationship. Thus, time spent on making sure the right agencies are represented from the beginning of a cooperative venture is saved many times over in comparison to "catch-up" work that needs to be done with a late arriving, but essential, actor.

The second important set of preparatory activities is the identification of the agency's representative or participant in the cooperative venture. Many times this is not an after-the-fact process; it is indeed the agency official who is experiencing or feeling the consequences of the preconditions outlined above who is the participant-to-be in the interagency cooperation. The model demands that the participant in the Conception stage (see further definition below) of the collaboration, if not the on-going operation, be a national program manager at the Federal level. This is the official who responds to Congress, the public, the Department head, and others as the responsible program implementation official for a given statute. With this level of responsibility, he/she possesses the appropriate "agency" and perspective to



negotiate for his/her agency and to understand its interests. Although the level of on-going operations for interagency cooperation may not require the constant personal participation of this official, his/her cognizance and affective involvement with a similarly situated official(s) in the other agency is essential.

The third and most conceptually difficult element of the Preparatory stage is the identification of interests--both personal and agency--for the cooperative engagement. This activity stems directly from the theory of "negotiation on the merits" (or "principled negotiation") as outlined by Fisher and Ury. They describe interests as desires, concerns, needs, and fears. "The most powerful interests are basic human needs..security, economic well-being, sense of belonging, recognition, control over one's life..."<sup>14</sup> Interests carry the affective and emotional dimensions of human engagements. Nirenberg also emphasizes in an even more pragmatic way the necessity to recognize human needs--regardless of which psychological school one embraces. He speaks about the importance of listening to oneself--the inner voice--as well as the cognitive aspects of the surrounding situation.

Despite the appealing logic of this approach, the point of departure for many interpersonal negotiations is from positions rather than interests. According to Fisher

and Ury, positions are things decided on versus those that express needs. Positions are the result of overly cognitive responses, responses that have insufficient engagement of the affective dimension of the person. Positions are points of view to be defended, while needs are to be met. Personalized statements beginning with "I need ..." are the most direct expression of needs.

What is conceptually novel for this model is translating these prescriptions into program manager and agency terms for the practitioners. Herman and Korenich offer some helpful procedural advice:

In general, the most frequent obstacle to recognizing our needs is our cognitive or mind-model of how we believe we should feel, think, and be. We have in modern life placed so much emphasis on what is logical and rational that we have become preoccupied with "figuring out the right answer" in our heads rather than seeing, hearing, and feeling what is really going on inside and around us, and responding to it according to its demand and according to what we have to do to meet our needs.

If you can learn to take a step or two down the ladder of abstraction and generalities to the more specific and concrete conditions of your environment, you may develop a greater sense of power and potential for what you can do to make your life space more potentially satisfying.<sup>15</sup> (emphasis mine)

For the Federal program manager-participant specified above, the articulation of personal interests may well be interwoven with the agency and statutory mandate which constitutes his/her immediate world. The identification of agency interests may well reflect the personal needs of the participant, while the articulation

of the personal interests can be colored by his/her perception of the agency's fiscal, status, or legitimacy needs.

Here again the nature of the Federal program official's "agential perspective" becomes relevant. No amount of statutory prose or investigative reporting will facilitate program action--let alone interagency cooperative activity--in the absence of the leadership and vision connoted by the concept. Seeing the necessity to write fair regulations protective of public health and the environment (as in the case of the Administrator of EPA) and, to do so with a broad sense of the interests of present and future publics, is a prerequisite to perceiving the fruitfulness of doing so cooperatively and jointly with other agencies. Only if the participants have engaged their Constitutional duties seriously will they be able and willing to be engaged by their peers about specific needs and interests in their policy realm.

Whether the source of the mandate for interagency cooperation is statutory or hortatory, it is possible to give some examples of personal and agency need statements to further elaborate this concept. Table 2 lists two illustrative preconditions taken from the context of Federal health and safety regulatory agencies. They are each followed by contrasting "position" and "need statements" expressed in the words of the national program

## TABLE 2

## ILLUSTRATIVE PRECONDITIONS, POSITION, AND NEED STATEMENTS

1. Statutory mandate for consultation--The Administrator of EPA is to develop a set of regulations that govern the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, and disposal (from "cradle-to-grave") of industrial hazardous waste within 18 months. The Administrator of EPA is directed to consult with the Secretary of Transportation on the development of the transportation regulations for hazardous waste. The Secretary of Transportation regulates the labeling, packaging, placarding, and transportation of all hazardous materials.

Potential "positions" for EPA participant:

I(my agency) must develop these regulations within 18 months; we'll let DOT comment on our proposed regulations.

I'll keep them informed; we'll send a letter with our working draft of the regulations for their comment.

I haven't got time to wait for them to learn all about the hazardous waste business.

Potential statements of "interests" for EPA participant:

We're(I'm) under pressure here to meet the Congressional deadline. This regulation is only one piece of the regulatory "set"--and not a primary one, at that. I need to have it fit neatly with the other pieces of waste management regulations; I can't afford the time to educate another agency in the intricacies of these other regulations. Frankly, I find their regulations confusing.

We're(I'm) a little worried that these transportation regulations might be redundant with DOT's. It would be unprofessional for me not to check with them to see if our first draft is inconsistent with their regulations from an implementation viewpoint. I don't want to be criticized for looking stupid either before or during the public comment period.

We're (I'm) not really interested in learning all the DOT requirements. As far as I know the generators of hazardous waste haul most of the waste; they're the regulated community I need to reach an accomodation with. Transportation companies are not an interest group that I'm hearing from; I can't please everybody.

TABLE 2 (CONT.)

Potential "positions" for DOT participant:

Our mission is regulate all hazardous materials in transportation--it makes no difference if it's waste or valuable product. We'll write these regulations to fit our current regulatory framework--it's what the transportation community has learned and it's enforceable.

Transportation regulations is our expertise; what does EPA know about them?

We're a very small office and don't have the horsepower to work on these regulations right now.

Potential statements of "interests" by DOT participant:

Why in the world did Congress ask EPA to regulate transportation? It's our (my) job--our area of expertise. We've (I've) got plenty of regulatory business on my plate as it is; I don't need this work. I'm not feeling any pressures from the regulated transportation community to work on this problem. Our (my) Congressional oversight committee and staff have made no inquiries about this issue, so I feel it's a very low priority.

We (I've) been regulating the transportation of hazardous materials for a number of years. I'm a transportation expert, and we (I) have designed a regulatory framework that fully recognizes the economics and technology of dangerous materials regulation. I'm not interested in tweaking a well-running machine to accomodate a marginally important issue--from a transportation viewpoint. Frankly, I find the EPA issue confusing.

We (I) don't want to spend our (my) resources on regulations that aren't even in my statute. I am accountable for the regulations and the budget that supports them; I need to focus on my job. I think these guys are real novices in the hazardous materials regulation arena. Do they know what they're doing?

2. Statutory mandate with duplication--The statute authorizing the clean-up of abandoned industrial waste sites--the Superfund law--requires the Administrator of EPA to consider the health risks by conducting a risk assessment at every site planned for clean-up using the Trust Fund. The statute directs that the Administrator of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registries (ATSDR) conduct a health assessment at every Superfund site. The statutory definitions of risk assessment and health assessment are in many respects identical.

TABLE 2 (CONT.)

Potential "positions" for EPA participant:

Our mission is to clean up waste sites and we have a statutory mandate to have 175 under construction within 36 months. This risk assessment requirement needs to fit into our forced march schedule and not cause any delays. EPA through its contractors can routinize these assessments using the Agency's risk assessment guidelines. We need to fold these assessments into our normal operations.

Potential statements of "interests" for EPA participant:

Our (my) job is to meet the deadline of having shovels in the ground at 175 places by October, 1989. While public health protection is a prime concern, I feel most of our engineered clean-ups will more than protect to background levels. The risk assessment, except in a few hot spots, will be "icing" to verify the adequacy of the solution that otherwise meets existing standards.

We have a vested public interest in following EPA risk assessment guidelines because they were developed after much internal agency debate and announced to the public as the basis for EPA's regulatory decisions across-the-board. We (I) need to make sure that these assessments comport with EPA's practices or our program (I) will be accused of undermining the investment we have all made. I think these HHS assessments are too loose--too seat-of-the-pants--and, as a result, they'll be indefensible.

Potential "positions" of ATSDR participant:

As part of the Federal health establishment in HHS, our mission is to protect public health. Our health assessments are complex, evolutionary documents--the work of public health practitioners interacting with citizens at sites.

Our Congressional mandate is to prepare health assessments for each site. As we have limited resources, we'll be as responsive as the individual site situations allow.

TABLE 2 (CONT.)

Potential statements of "interests" for ATSDR participant:

We're (I'm) unclear as to why Congress would task EPA to conduct a task, i.e. risk assessments, for which the expertise lies in our Department. I really don't need EPA to conduct the normal business of assessing health risks--it's our "bread and butter". Admittedly, we have little experience with such assessments at waste sites, but over time the public health fraternity can develop such a capability--we have before. Our professional judgement is an important key to good health assessments.

What Congressional staff tell me they want us to do is to make sure EPA is not throwing away money on inadequate solutions at sites. Our health assessments will be done as the necessary data becomes available--if it isn't available, then it will be a partial assessment. We (I) have a professional responsibility to the physician and broader health communities as well as to the citizens at sites not to make premature statements nor to hold back on assessments of data that make the site appear of concern.

manager or his/her counterpart in each agency that is to be engaged in contactful cooperation.

The "position statements" and corresponding "interest" statements are intended to provide a translation of the general concepts furthered by Fisher and Ury, Nirenberg, and Herman and Korenich into the context of the participant in public agency activities. They are reflective of specific cognitive concerns of such Federal managers as well as exemplifying the possibilities to express affective and emotional dimensions of implementing the public's business.

These statements are derived from the duplication and overlap preconditions. Such interest statements are necessary, and probably even more crucial, in cases of fragmented activities with no statutory pressures for coordination. Conditions of ignorance of another agency's activities or honest confusion about the facts benefit even more from specific, personalized, affective statements of needs. This is because there is no statutory text prescribing cooperation (with its implied legitimacy) to which all parties may refer.

"Need" statements by participants under the precondition of compartmentalization or fragmentation might fall under the following typology: (1) data to help identify or judge the importance of problems, (2) scientific or technical expertise to give perspective to



one's own scientific or technical evaluations, (3) policy perspectives on affected groups not previously encountered, and (4) definition of extent of jurisdiction of another agency's program.

Thus, the detail and specificity of the identification of interests by potential agency participants in an interagency cooperative venture can embrace a variety of subject areas and personal concerns. Needs such as those for information to better define a problem, understanding of jurisdictional boundaries between agencies, the specific denotations of regulatory definitions, standards, and guidelines, and understanding of agency actions (or lack thereof) must be coupled with statements about personal circumstances. Whether such feeling statements describe disinterest in another's dilemma, personal pressures to produce, sympathy, confusion about the situation, or imperial arrogance, they are much better at grounding the upcoming cooperative relationship than over-generalized position-taking.

Seidman lends the practitioner's endorsement to these concepts by pointing to the success of interagency committees with a specificity of purpose. "[Interagency] Committees can perform effectively when they are assigned appropriate tasks which are within their competence... Problem-oriented [interagency] working committees have been extremely useful."<sup>16</sup> Also, Seidman cites Charles L.

Schultze when he was Budget Director, "'coordination is best done when it is done with respect to specific identifiable problems on a case-by-case basis.'"17

The fourth element in the Preparatory stage for contactful collaboration between agencies follows logically from the third factor, i.e. identification of the "interests"--both personal and agency--of the other identified participants. Here both cognitive research and affective speculation play a role.

What is required is some considered reflection about the other agency participants' corporate world views and, if possible, insight into their personal contexts, paralleling what was suggested above. Obviously, neither effort is a calculated balance sheet-type exercise; reflection about the other participants' affective dimensions will be much more sketchy until they are actually encountered. Nonetheless, one particularly valuable bit of research is to determine whether or not the other agencies or participants had been previously encountered or engaged in activities with one's own agency or with each other. This history of involvement, if any, will surely be the source of insight about both substance and process concerns remaining in one's own agency and, perhaps, lingering with the others.

The statements of "interests" and "positions" in Table 2 are reflective of the personal statements of the

agency participants themselves. The secondary "statements" from the other agency participants exemplify their "positions" and "interests". The more that one participant can reflect on the others' perspectives, the easier the initial encounters may be. On the other hand, this reflection should not inhibit the honest, contactful engagement of the other persons at the next stage.

The final step in the Preparatory stage is to develop a common language for interorganizational coordination. What is meant here is not whether English will be spoken at the meetings with others, but at a more structural level, whether the participants will be utilizing signs and symbols carried by the language in the same way. While only a preliminary assessment based upon statutes, legislative history, press reports, reporters calls, Congressional letters, etc. can be made before a face-to-face meeting, work should begin as early as possible to establish a lingua franca among the participants. A lingua franca is "any hybrid language used as a medium of communication between peoples of different languages."<sup>18</sup>(emphasis mine). The issue is whether or not the use of supposedly specific English language terms, in fact, have identical meanings for the participants.

Kuhn discusses this problem in the development of scientific theory among opposing viewpoints. "Two men who

perceive the same situation differently but nevertheless employ the same vocabulary in its discussion must be using words differently...Taking the differences between their own intra- and inter-group discourse as itself a subject for study, they can first attempt to discover the terms and locutions that, used unproblematically within each community, are nevertheless the foci for trouble for inter-group discussion."<sup>19</sup>

Pondy elaborates upon this problem:

One source of not-sharing [a language] is having a different lexicon or vocabulary, that is, different words appear in two different languages. This is the less troublesome type of not-sharing (or language mismatch) because it carries its own signal of mismatch; it generates the question, "What does that mean?" A second and more serious type of language-mismatch is when the lexicons are identical but the "semantics" differ, that is, when the meanings attached to the words are different. In this case the signal of mismatch is implicit in the way the words are used, and thus much more difficult to detect than lexical mismatches. The meaning of a word is the set of ways in which it is used.<sup>20</sup>

To illustrate these concepts in the arena of social services, several agencies dealing with a handicapped person could use the term "client" in different ways. To the rehabilitation agency, the person presents an opportunity to help with growth and development, while, at the hospital, the person may be a patient with special transportation needs. At the welfare department, he/she may represent a special workload due to monitoring requirements. In the arena of health and safety

regulation, there is a lingua franca called "chemical risks" that encompasses a wide vocabulary of commonly used terms and parameters. Such terms as hazard assessment, exposure assessment, risk assessment, and risk management are part of this language used by those who speak "chemical risks". However, at a deeper structural level, much discussion has, and is, necessary to fashion mutually understood semantic, let alone lexical, meanings for these terms in different agencies. For example, at the Environmental Protection Agency, the term risk assessment is automatically assumed to include a quantitative evaluation of the risk, while it is the policy of the Department of Health and Human Services that chemical risk assessments are qualitative in nature. These differences in the available lingua franca had to be discovered through conversation and discussion.

Another example of a lingua franca from the negotiation perspective is from the labor relations realm in which what is being discussed are "wages, hours, and benefits". Within that context there are a large number of ways to define the specific words and concepts to be discussed, but the boundaries of the discourse are set.

In this Preparatory stage, a judgment is needed as to whether common terms are available in order to create a lingua franca which will allow scoping out the nature of the Conception stage. If there are, discussions will

center on developing the shared meanings of pre-existing terminology. If terms are not shared, time will first have to be spent in developing these common terms and then developing shared meanings for them if the environment is to be jointly acted upon.

### Conception

The next stage specified in the model for interagency cooperation involves the activation of the relationship. The first step is personal program manager contact. This preliminary engagement by the previously defined participants can occur on a one-to-one basis or as a small group. The purpose is to have meaningful conversation that attempts to (1) establish "contact," (2) understand the personal world-view of the other on the issue at hand, (3) investigate the mutuality of perceptions, especially regarding the concepts of convergence, divergence, and/or fragmentation, and (4) appreciate the emotive or personal "chemistry" of the others. Herman and Korenich define both sensory and emotional awareness as essential for good contact:

....when two people are in contact, they are really seeing, hearing, and experiencing each other, and what is going on right here, right now. When you are in good contact with another person, there are minimum interferences with your sensing processes.

When you are not in good contact, your senses are being interfered with--you are worrying, thinking of something other than what's going on here and now, making assumptions in your mind about what the effects of your

words will be on the other person, and so on....

Good contactful conversation is usually characterized by a personal quality--the people conversing are involved with one another and the conversation contains excitement, presentness, and liveliness. Signs of non-contact or poor contact include boredom, impersonal discussion, a droning voice, talking about others, the distant past, or the far future, etc.<sup>21</sup>

They go further to explain that intellectual discussion and self-neutralization are two important examples of non-contactful engagements. In the interagency cooperation context, broadly framing problems as "Congressional creations" (with no easy recourse for solutions) or in the manner of the "position" statements (as in Table 2) are signs of intellectualized non-contact. Self-neutralization refers to a situation in which excuses or reasons are offered for the other participant's point of view or circumstance before he/she has a chance to speak. This can occur when too much of the cognitive preparation gets in the way of being open to the actual conversation of others.

The principal substantive outgrowth of this contact between the agency participants is to determine "what to do next." One crucial aspect of that outcome is to decide whether or not these agency participants will be personally involved in the operating future of this interagency collaboration. More will be said about this aspect of the cooperation later.

The second major aspect of the conception stage is

the determination of a mechanism for cooperation. Here much variability and flexibility can be expected. Individual or joint staff work on options for agency cooperation may be needed. Designated agency representatives may be appointed for specific subject matter, a committee of agency persons other than the program managers is possible, etc. What is to be determined is (1) the nature of the mechanism (individual negotiation by the program managers, multiple individual engagements on specific subject areas, single or multiple committees, etc.), (2) who the participants will be, and (3) the time horizon for the cooperation.

To the extent that the program managers are not personally participating day-to-day after the conception stage, the selection of the agency's designees is of extraordinary importance. (They will be referred to as the collaborators for the remainder of this dissertation.) Although these individuals may be either line managers or staff assistants to the program managers, they need to be vested with the importance and the meaning of this collaborative task as it is understood by the program manager. In other words, if the principal agency participants are not the collaborators themselves, the nominees must understand the nature of the contact developed between the program managers on an on-going basis. A second characteristic of the collaborator must



be the control of or access to the relevant agency knowledge and resources to participate meaningfully in the collaboration. While it is easiest for a line manager to have this organizational authority, the program manager can "vest" his authority for the purpose of implementing this interagency cooperation in a staff person.

Lewicki and Litterer speak of the problems of "audience" in the negotiation context. They define three kinds: fellow team members, the constituency (agency) represented, and bystanders. His commentary on the second type is most relevant here:

Audiences influence negotiators through two different routes. One way is that negotiators desire positive evaluations from those who are in a position to observe what they have done. The other is that audiences can (and do) hold negotiators responsible for the outcomes of negotiations. They can reward negotiators by publicly praising them, and punish negotiators by firing those who represent them.<sup>22</sup>

The interagency collaborators should feel a direct tie to the preferences and desires of the program managers creating the cooperative venture. Thus, while the collaborators may feel some peer or even subordinate pressures during the collaborative enterprise, it is the program manager "audience" that needs to be most visible (and available) to the collaborator to insure successful cooperation.

A final aspect of the mechanism is the determination of the duration of the cooperation. Whether done in the

context of reportable milestones from the collaborators, a written agreement between the program participants, or a fixed "sunset" for the effort, available research and negotiation practice suggest the value of time dimensions to enhance the likelihood of results--either the desired joint effort or agreement to disengage the collaboration.

Lewicki and Litterer summarize the results of research studies and treaty experiences with regard to the effect of a time deadline and the passage of time in this way:

1. Time deadlines lead negotiators to soften demands. Bargainers are less likely to have high bargaining aspirations, to bluff, and more likely to make concessions under high time demands than low time demands.

2. Time deadlines increase the pressure to reach agreement. Bargainers appear to move their negotiating positions more rapidly under high time pressure.

3. Under time pressure, the softening of demands and the desire to seek agreement are less likely to be perceived as weakness. Thus, both bargainers and audiences can explain and justify concession-making on the basis of an external source of pressure--the time deadline--rather than pressure from the opposing negotiator....

...time has a second critical role: the more time people spend on a negotiation, the more effort they invest and the less willing they are to sacrifice the agreement and walk away empty-handed. Further, as a result of devoting time and energy to negotiations and making significant progress toward an agreement, negotiators generally feel more committed to the final agreement. Conversely, they are also less willing to abandon a negotiation due to minor impediments to achieving a solution.<sup>23</sup>

While the citation about time pressures alludes to a less integrative-type bargaining situations than may be

the goal with this model, nevertheless, the value of the deadline still remains useful in the conception stage. Also, the passage of time needs to be balanced with this deadline dimension in order to allow sufficient engagement by the collaborators--especially in arenas lacking an obvious lingua franca.

The final aspect of the Conception stage of interagency cooperation is the activation of the contactful collaboration. Depending on the decisions to participate by the program managers, this activity has a more or less convocational quality. If they do plan to regularly engage each other either as individuals and/or with staff, the activation step is more like the first formal negotiation session or business meeting to deal with the substance of the cooperation. If they only plan to oversee the work of the collaborators, then the convocation is very important. What is meant here is not a traditional "laying on of hands" or fifteen minutes of opening remarks by the principals followed by quick departures. While such behavior is traditional in government, it would signal that the program managers had indeed concluded not to engage in contactful collaboration.

In large and complex institutions, establishing the pivotal coordination mechanism as a group of close associates to the program managers, who share the

managers' vision for collaboration, will probably not be sufficient in terms of knowledge and capacity to deal with all the issues of interest to the several agencies. Thus, it is necessary to form working parties across agencies or within individual agencies to develop and discuss issues to be acted on by the collaborators. Setting up as well as supervising the linkages between the collaborators and more typical agency or interagency administrative processes requires some careful reflection as these groups may not fully share in the contactful nature of the core process.

The activation step involves a gathering of the program managers with the designated collaborators to set the tone and transmit the personal expectations of the program managers in the presence of each other and the other collaborators. Obviously, the program manager/collaborator(s) from each agency can share views and expectations as suggested above. The value of all the participants and collaborators conversing about and describing a joint vision cannot be underestimated. This is especially true if additional work within, and support from, the agency is needed by the collaborators to continue their efforts. They need to appreciate the views and needs of the other participants as well as their own agency and program manager's intentions.

As this activation step launches the cooperative

activities that follow, it can and should set the appropriate tone of formality or informality. To the extent feasible, the meeting context should achieve the minimal level of formality consistent with the cooperative venture. This approach reinforces the ability to engage in as contactful behavior as possible. Smallness of the group of program managers and collaborators is noted by practitioners like Seidman and researchers like Lewicki as being most helpful to the collaborative process; it obviously increases "air time" for each participant. Attention to the physical surroundings and their look of openness as well as the possibility of refreshments before or during the sessions--both at this activation step and subsequently--can also help set a tone of potential collaborative trust.

A final item for the initial conception of the group is the explicit statement of a timeline for action or a timeframe for completion. As discussed earlier, the discussion and setting of these time parameters sets an action-oriented tone for the collaborators.

### Operations

The operational stage of the model involves the carrying out of the interagency cooperative venture in the context of the preconditions leading to its establishment. While the agencies' collaborators may be coming together under circumstances of duplication and overlap or

compartmentalized fragmentation, the Conception stage is meant to at least convey what Lewicki and Litterer describe as their state of interdependence. "Interdependent relationships, those in which people are mutually dependent, are complex. Each party knows that they can influence the other's outcomes and that their outcomes can, in turn be influenced by the other....Behavior in an interdependent relationship is calculated behavior--calculated on the premise that the more information one has about the other person, the better will be the calculation."<sup>24</sup>

While the calculus image of this statement belies the necessity to address the affective dimension of the relationships, the citation captures the crucial connectedness of the collaborators. The authors go further to address the two levels at which the cooperation will take place:

Two efforts in negotiation help create trust and feelings of being treated fairly: one is based on perception of outcomes, while the other is based on the process. The former attempts to change a party's estimation of the perceived importance or value of something...In contrast, efforts based on the negotiating process help to convey images of equity, fairness, and reciprocity in proposals and concessions...This pattern of give and take is not just a characteristic of negotiation, it is essential to joint problem solving in an interdependent relationship. Parties' satisfaction with a negotiation is as much determined by the process through which an agreement is reached as with the actual outcome obtained.<sup>25</sup>(emphasis mine)

The two-level nature of the collaborative process is echoed by Fisher and Ury: "The game of negotiation takes place at two levels. At one level, negotiation addresses the substance; at another, it focuses--usually implicitly--on the procedure for dealing with the substance...This second negotiation is a game about a game--a 'meta-game.' Each move you make within a negotiation is not only a move that deals with rent, salary, or other substantive questions; it also helps structure the rules of the game you are playing.<sup>26</sup>

At the same time, while the contactful collaboration occurs at two levels, it can fall into two broad classes of negotiation activity. Deutsch originated the terms of contrient interdependence and promotive interdependence to capture the polar nature of conflictual strategies. These two terms describe the adversarial versus collaborative types of interdependencies, respectively. Lewicki and Litterer among others use the terms distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining to contrast the two basic categories of negotiation. While distributive bargaining connotes the competitive, win/lose, and "fixed-pie" images of conflict resolution, integrative bargaining captures the collaborative, win/win essence being sought in the operation of this model. Fisher and Ury's terms are principled negotiation or negotiation on the merits.

Regardless of the label, the contactful collaboration inherent in this model follows the principles suggested by Fisher and Ury and Lewicki and Litterer for integrative bargaining. Of note are the parallels between duplication and overlap preconditions and the potential for distributive bargaining and between the compartmentalized scenario and the potential for integrative bargaining. The goal of the Operation mode of the model is to conduct principled or integrative negotiation, and because of the contactful nature of the relationships, to convert any potential distributive situation into an integrative one. Lewicki and Litterer are careful to note the "mixed-motive" nature of the bargaining situation, which reminds the practitioner of the unlikelihood of a single type of bargaining situation.

As to the conduct of the actual interagency cooperation, Fisher and Ury's basic outline is most adequate. Their first two normative rules--separate people from the problem and focus on interests, not positions--were dealt with in the Preparatory and the Conception stages of this model. As the interests become articulated and explicated by the collaborators, they then turn their attention to (1) the generation of options to meet the needs of the collaborators and (2) the development of objective criteria to be used in evaluating the options.



The generation of options needs to be broad-ranging and non-judgmental in nature. Fisher and Ury suggest four principles to avoid being too narrow in the construction of options: (1) do not judge prematurely, (2) do not "close" prematurely--there is more than one answer, (3) do not assume that the "pie" is fixed, and (4) don't ignore solving the problem (i.e., meeting the interests) of the other participants.

To the extent that the participants are in contact and engaged in collaborative behavior (or in Fisher and Ury's parlance, flexible firmness), they will avoid the other less affectively and cognitively satisfying behaviors outlined by Lewicki and Litterer--contending (competing), accomodating (yielding), compromising (splitting the difference), or avoiding (inaction). "Bridging" is the term used by the authors for solutions to integrative bargaining situations that parallel the principled negotiation solutions outlined by Fisher and Ury. Commenting on the nature of collaboration process, Lewicki and Litterer assert, "...the best options and bridging solutions are usually attained by virtue of hard work and pursuit of several related processes: information exchange, focusing on interests rather than positions, and firm flexibility...Firm flexibility means that the parties must be firm with regard to the ends they want to achieve (i.e., interests), while remaining flexible on the means

by which they are achieved...It is rare that negotiators will find that they truly disagree on basic interests."<sup>27</sup>  
(emphasis mine)

As to the second major aspect of the conduct of principled negotiation, Fisher and Ury suggest that any method of negotiation may be judged by three criteria: a wise agreement, if agreement is possible; efficiency; and improvement or at least no damage to the relationship between the parties. Their definition of a "wise agreement" is particularly helpful. It is "... one which meets the legitimate interests of each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is durable, and takes community interests into account."<sup>28</sup> To arrive at such a desired outcome, the joint development of objective criteria by the participants is essential. Such criteria, they suggest, should not only be practical and appear legitimate to all of the collaborators, but must also be viewed as independent of the will of any individual person. Agreement on such criteria allow the cooperative activities to proceed and to be protected from lapses into distributive bargaining when options selection might turn toward traditional power-based tactics.

The other major aspect of the operations stage of the model is sustaining the duality of the model. This activity will require the participation of the program managers if they are not also the collaborators. Keying

off the substantive and process aspects of the interagency cooperative venture, the program managers need to monitor the substantive accomplishments and take "readings" on the process interactions. Whether following milestones on a time line or reviewing completed products of the cooperative venture, engagement of the substantive material is necessary because some of the original "interests" are those of the program manager. In addition, as needs are met through collaborative means, a decision on continuation or cessation is necessary. A check is needed as to whether the commitment of the other program managers remains given the progress, or lack thereof, to date. Similarly, program manager attention to the nature of the interaction is useful. Is contact being maintained so that results, while cognitively valid, have affective value as well? To the extent possible, is integrative bargaining the approach versus distributive? Continued reinforcement of firm flexibility while carrying on negotiations based on merit is necessary. Again, the decision to terminate the cooperative venture--even prior to its planned date--should be legitimately and easily discussable among the program managers.

At the same time the operational aspects of the negotiations and collaboration among the program managers (or their collaborators) needs attention, so do the inner workings of the more traditional administrative processes

that support their collaboration. The program managers do need to monitor and enforce an ethic of joint agency action within their agencies in order to ensure that staff-developed concepts and programs are potentially negotiable in the collaborative forum at their level. This ethic, as it operates and is, thereby, realized at the level of agency action, serves to reinforce and further actualize the collaborative effort at the agency head level. Each sphere of action reinforces and helps "make real" the other, and both are necessary for completing the chain of policy action.

#### Summary

This chapter outlined a model for interagency cooperation grounded both in the principles of contactful engagement of others and in the practical tactics of principled negotiation. Conjoining these two sets of concepts in the framework of interorganizational relations provides a more personalized, pragmatic paradigm for productive collaboration between agencies. The emphasis on Preconditions--especially convergent and divergent activities--and Preparations--notably operational examples of interest statements and the concept of the lingua franca--distinguish this model from related constructs in the negotiation literature. These aspects make it particularly relevant to the Federal interagency setting.

## FOOTNOTES

1 David L. Rogers and David A. Whetton and Associates, Interorganizational Coordination: Theory, Research, and Implementation (Ames, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1982), pp. 101ff.

2 Notable examples of this diversity are the following: I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1982), Max H. Bazerman and Roy J. Lewicki, ed., Negotiating in Organizations (Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications, 1983), Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Bert R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining (New York, Academic Press, 1975), Gerard I. Nierenberg, The Art of Negotiating (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1981), Roy J. Lewicki and Joseph A. Litterer, Negotiation (Homewood, Ill., Irwin, 1985), Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving," University of California Law Review 31 (April 1984), Diane B. Bendahmane and John W. McDonald, Jr., ed., International Negotiation: Art and Science (Washington, D.C., U. S. Department of State, 1984), Timothy J. Sullivan, Resolving Development Disputes through Negotiation (New York, Plenum Press, 1984), and Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1981).

3 Anselm Strauss, Negotiations: Varieties, Contexts, Processes, and Social Order (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978), p. 1.

4 Ibid., p. 3.

5 I. William Zartman, "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process," Journal of Conflict Resolution 21 (December 1977):621ff.

6 Robert A. Dahl, A Preface To Democratic Theory (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 118.

7 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. (1971), s.v. "Coordination."

8 Ibid., s.v. "Cooperation."

9 Gary Walmsley, "The Public Administration and the Agential Perspective," in The Role of the Public Administrator in Governing America, edited by the author. (Chatham, N.J., Chatham House, forthcoming)

## FOOTNOTES (CONT.)

- 10 Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour, Politics, Position, and Power: From the Positive to the Regulatory State (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 235.
- 11 Fisher and Ury, pp. 17-98.
- 12 Robert S. Montjoy and Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr., "Toward a Theory of Policy Implementation: An Organizational Perspective," Public Administration Review 39 (September/October 1979):466ff.
- 13 Strauss, p. 237.
- 14 Fisher and Ury, p. 49-50.
- 15 Stanley M. Herman and Michael Korenich, Authentic Management: A Gestalt Orientation to Organizations and Their Development (Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 15 and 17.
- 16 Seidman and Gilmour, pp. 233 and 237.
- 17 Ibid., p. 236.
- 18 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1971), s.v. "Lingua Franca". In addition, credit goes to Dr. Donald Kennedy for suggesting this label for the dialogue being conducted in the IRLG.
- 19 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed.), (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 200 and 202.
- 20 Louis R. Pondy, "Leadership Is a Language Game," in Leadership: Where Else Can We Go? ed. M.W. McCall, Jr. and M.M. Lombardo (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1978), p. 93.
- 21 Herman and Korenich, pp. 57 and 58.
- 22 Lewicki and Litterer, p. 236.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 152 and 154.
- 24 Ibid., p. 25.
- 25 Ibid., p. 27.
- 26 Fisher and Ury, p. 10.

## FOOTNOTES (CONT.)

27 Lewicki and Litterer, pp. 121-122.

28 Fisher and Ury, p. 4.

## CHAPTER 4 -- THE INTERAGENCY REGULATORY LIAISON GROUP

This chapter describes the origin, operating character, and the activities of the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) from its chartering in 1977 through its dissolution in September, 1981. It also highlights some of the distinctive features of this interorganizational arrangement as contrasted with other such agreements. The chapter is based primarily upon documents and reports of the activities of the IRLG; this chapter further defines and explicates the nature of the development and operation of this group. As such, this chapter seeks to provide an objective backdrop to the multifaceted picture of the same story that emerges from the interview data.

### Origin and Background

In August, 1977, S. John Byington, Chairman, Consumer Product Safety Commission; Donald Kennedy, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now Department of Health and Human Services); Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency; and Eula Bingham, Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration held a joint press conference to announce the formation of the IRLG. Its purposes were described in an interagency agreement signed by the agency heads published October 11 in the Federal Register. While



acknowledging existing interagency cooperation between pairs of agencies, the agreement focused on their regulation of toxic and hazardous substances and sought "to make the most efficient use of resources, achieve consistent regulatory policy, and improve the protection of public health and environment."<sup>1</sup>

While recognizing the limits of the statutory authorities of the four agencies, the memorandum of agreement listed 9 areas in which consistency, commonality, and compatibility would be sought:

1. Testing protocols, criteria for interpretations, quality assurance procedures, and other policies relating to the testing of toxic and hazardous substances;
2. Epidemiological practices and procedures;
3. Approaches to the assessment of risk presented by a toxic or hazardous substance and to the estimation of benefits associated with a substance;
4. Methods of obtaining, analyzing, storing, and exchanging information which might be of mutual interest;
5. Research and development policies, possibly including methods of sharing costs and facilities;
6. Regulations and regulatory development activities where a hazard can be most effectively controlled by joint participation or by use of the statutory authorities of more than one agency, e.g. joint public hearings or rulemaking action;
7. Compliance and enforcement procedures and policies;
8. Public communication and education programs, and informational services to industry;
9. Other activities as may be applicable<sup>2</sup>

The formal agreement was the result of informal contacts between the agency heads during the late spring

and summer of 1977, which grew out of their successful joint announcement of the regulation of aerosol chlorofluorocarbons in April 1977.<sup>3</sup> Two staff people were selected by each agency head to analyze what joint agency work had gone on in the past and what made it successful as well as to develop proposals as to how the agencies might work together in the future.<sup>4</sup>

On July 22, 1977, the agency heads met with their principal staff to review this staff effort and to develop the concept of the IRLG. The staff study of interagency activities over the preceding two fiscal years enumerated 49 agreements between two or more of the agencies.<sup>5</sup> It cited four conclusions regarding these efforts. In addition to finding varying degrees and depths of management oversight of these agreements, "In the instances where the effort has the continuing support of top management as well as needed resources and where a requirement for accountability exists, the efforts work well."<sup>6</sup> The report also found no one guideline to help determine the kind of coordination to be conducted, and that inconsistent participation and productivity is typical of the more informal arrangements.

Regarding possible joint initiatives, the staff outlined seven of the eight substantive areas (not including epidemiology--number 3) listed in the agreement cited above. The staff recommended that the principals

select three of these initiatives and commit to perhaps a 90 day time frame to begin activities. "They [agency heads] responded to these suggestions by adding an eighth initiative (the accelerated and intensified use of the science of epidemiology), selecting all seven initiatives, and requiring some demonstration of progress and announcement of the process within 30 days."7 This urgency is reflected in the fact that the date on the signed interagency agreement is September 26, 1977, while the press conference was held in August.

### Operations

The agency heads (also called "principals") decided to formalize the group of eight staff persons (also known as "surrogates"--see Chapter 5 for further discussion of this term) by selecting a Chairman and Vice-Chairman on a rotating basis with a six month term. The surrogates met on approximately a bi-weekly basis to see to the operations of the IRLG; they met jointly with the principals once a month in a decision-oriented meeting.

In addition, the principals took a direct interest in the operations of the eight selected work areas. As Colin Church explained:

As a result, eight Work Groups were created and each agency Principal has assigned himself or herself to two of these Work Groups. The members of each Work Group are selected from all four of the agencies. The Work Groups meet once or twice a week. They have developed on-going Work Plans which have been published and have served as a

basis for public meetings. The charge given to the Work Group Chairpersons was "divide your work into three categories. First, develop and do what is do-able now. Show some progress early. Second, identify the problems which need regulatory repair to bring the approach of the four agencies into some degree of consistency. Third, and last, identify the places where differences in the statutes prevent further progress." The Work Groups were also cautioned not to produce a product which merely made recommendations. They were asked to pilot-test their product within the institutions of the four agencies and to present the product in road-test condition. This means that the Work Groups will have to follow the process of getting four-agency approval for needed changes in policy from beginning to end. Work Plans for each Work Group have been published in the Federal Register. Public meetings on the work plans were held in March [1978].<sup>8</sup>

In fact, this early involvement by the principals in being cognizant and involved in the eight issue areas was carried further. In the only Congressional hearing explicitly on the IRLG and its role in environmental research and development issues, each principal testified and each discussed the activities to which he/she had been directing his/her attention.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the work groups in the eight areas, "the four agency heads asked their regional leaders in the various regional cities to find their counterparts and develop plans to take advantage of the new spirit of interagency cooperation within the field."<sup>10</sup> They also created what later came to be called "counterpart groups" among their general counsels, legislative officers, and personnel officers to discuss areas of coordination and

cooperation.

The IRLG conducted all of these activities using the employees of the agencies involved in a work group or task force-type mode of operation. A full-time executive assistant was hired to assist the rotating Chairman of the surrogates by arranging for meetings, answering correspondence, maintaining files, and preparing briefing materials. Because the IRLG was not an entity itself, this person was a CPSC employee. EPA supplied a clerk position during the early years as well.

In time, the IRLG developed a budget ranging from \$900,000 to \$1 million per year. The budget was created by contributions from the several agencies and then allocated to projects proposed by the work groups and approved by the principals. In fiscal year 1980, about \$800,000 was expended on joint projects. The fiscal year 1981 budget, while not fully expended, indicates the level of contribution by each agency as ranging from 15% at the low end to 33% at the high end.

On June 15, 1979 a Supplementary Agreement to the original IRLG agreement was published in the Federal Register.<sup>11</sup> This notice reaffirmed the previous agreement in all respects and announced the addition of a fifth agency to the IRLG. Signing on behalf of the newest agency, the Food Safety and Quality Service of the Department of Agriculture, was Carol Tucker Foreman,

Assistant Secretary. She began attending meetings as a participating agency head in January, 1979.

The agency heads representing the Carter Administration held their last formal meeting in December, 1980. The surrogates continued to meet regularly through September, 1981. Two meetings of the agency heads or their designates from the Reagan Administration were held as briefings in June and September, 1981. The IRLG charter expired in September, 1981 and was not renewed.

#### Activities and Results

In a joint publication, Working Together, in March, 1979 the five IRLG agencies enumerated the 25 different statutes which prescribed the broad range of public health and environmental concerns under their jurisdiction. "Through the coordinated application of these laws, IRLG's objectives are to: improve protection of public health and safety from toxic and other hazardous materials; provide consistent regulatory policy; share information; minimize any duplication of effort; and lessen the administrative burden on regulated industries, the public, and the agencies themselves,"<sup>12</sup> the pamphlet continued. IRLG accomplishments were grouped into three categories--those that were a specific product, those that were establishment of procedures for coordination on a regular basis, and those that involved closer routine coordination.

The eight specific issue areas provide a useful

framework to discuss the breadth and depth of the joint work among the agencies. The risk assessment guideline work was among the most visible due to its use of the Federal Register for notice and comment and the amount of industry interest in this joint agency work. The most controversial product was the 20 page publication (in the Federal Register) for public comment of the "Scientific Bases for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks"<sup>13</sup> by the five agencies. This document, as is discussed in Chapter 5, was the first bringing together of the principles of risk assessment (as opposed to the presumption of banning) for carcinogens on behalf of the Federal government's health and safety regulatory agencies. Over 75 comments were received, mainly from industry, and this document became the basis for another broader government initiative from President Carter's Regulatory Council.

In the area of chemical testing guidelines and standards, the agencies jointly published five standards for testing of chemicals--four for acute effects and one for teratogenicity. By the closing year of the IRLG, the agencies were at work on common testing standards for 12 additional health effects and nine environmental effects. In addition, all five agencies adopted uniform guidelines for Good Laboratory Practices (affecting the operation of laboratories testing toxic substances) and the Public

Health Service's guidelines for handling carcinogens and for protecting human subjects in toxicity studies.

In the area of compliance and enforcement, the agencies published in March, 1980 an implementation plan<sup>14</sup> for a joint referral and inspection program. This program, which involved the development of joint training manuals and the training of several thousand inspectors from the five agencies, allowed for an inspector from one agency who perceived a violation of another agency's rules to routinely refer that observation to the second agency for follow-up. In addition, arrangements were made among the agencies for them to be notified of and included in efforts to respond to emergency situations involving hazardous substances; this system was formerly only a DOT/EPA arrangement.

In terms of joint regulatory development, the agencies created work groups around 27 chemical substances in which two or more of the agencies were interested. These work groups were to explore the possibility of sharing research results and regulatory analyses, conducting such projects jointly, sharing health and environmental effects information, and insuring consistent and, if possible, joint regulatory actions including such things as joint hearings and rulemakings. Beginning in early 1979, the agencies published a consolidated listing of multi-agency regulatory activity (past and future) for



24 substances; this publication was updated semiannually. Later, six of these substances were selected for special coordinated regulatory coordination due to the extensive amount of activity by the agencies on these chemicals. In June, 1981, a three-day industry-government conference was co-sponsored by the IRLG agencies to examine the sources, health effects, uses for, and health research needs for a chemical family--phthalates.

In the area of epidemiology, the work group compiled a computerized list of all epidemiological studies underway in the IRLG and selected other agencies. It also prepared guidelines jointly subscribed to by the IRLG agencies dealing with documentation of epidemiological studies, so that future studies released to the public meet some minimal standards for content when published.

The joint information exchange activities dealt largely with studies of joint data and information sharing projects. In several cases, the studies pointed to some existing data systems that would serve joint data needs such as one for chronic toxicity data. In other cases, work was begun on building links between agency data files by developing common codes, a consolidated listing of journals used by the agencies, and a joint interagency employee skills inventory.

The public information and education activities included holding six public forums--four in regional cities

and two in Washington--to explain and take comment on the joint efforts of the IRLG agencies. In addition to the IRLG descriptive pamphlet mentioned earlier, a joint annotated bibliography on toxic substances was published and a health and safety curriculum resource guide was developed for grades 7-12 and distributed to over 22,000 schools.

The research planning work of the regulatory agencies had implications beyond the agencies themselves. A first project was to compile a listing of on-going toxic substances research supported by the original four agencies--an inventory of some 300 projects costing about \$39 million. By extending this inventory to several of the research agencies in the (then) Department of Health Education and Welfare, the total doubled to 600 relevant projects valued at over \$97 million. The IRLG agencies identified a number of unmet needs and that challenge led to the establishment of another major cross-government program in 1979. The National Toxicology Program was established by the Department of Health and Human Services and the IRLG agencies became members of its Executive Committee. (Several of those interviewed for this research referred to the National Toxicology Program as the "daughter of the IRLG.") The IRLG research planning effort also compiled other specialized inventories of toxicological research.

Other areas of coordinated activity among the agencies dealt with the conduct of economic analyses and the measurement of regulatory benefits, a sharing of laboratory facilities, methods, training, equipment, and analytical capacity, and extensive regional office cooperation among the five agencies in terms of information exchange, internal management and training, and external relations as well as the aforementioned compliance and enforcement and laboratory activities. These work group oriented activities were supplemented by the so-called "counterpart groups" which involved joint meetings of similarly situated officials in each agency, e.g. general counsels, personnel officers, and budget officers to name only some.

#### Distinctive Features

The IRLG distinguishes itself in several ways from the usual picture of an interagency coordination group. First, the high organizational level of the interest in this group and the continuous engagement of these chief executive officers makes it unique. Not only did the agency heads understand and track the progress of the major work groups personally, but also they were, in several cases, scientifically qualified to make technical contributions to the work of these groups. In other words, the work of the groups engaged the sphere of important issues in which the agency heads felt interested and/or

involved. A related observation is the task-oriented nature of the whole IRLG concept. From the memorandum of agreement to the overseeing of the work groups, the efforts which the various agency members exerted was to be focused and productive in substantive areas of their expertise. Joint "products" and outputs were first priority; coordination and recommendations came second.

Another distinctive feature of the IRLG was the pervasive, all-encompassing nature of its coordinative work. The preceding discussion shows how the coordinative activities cut across the length and breadth of the agencies' activities--from information gathering to regulation writing to enforcement, both in the field and in headquarters. This was not a single purpose interagency arrangement, but a broad-based engagement across all of the agencies' operations.

This pervasive nature of the coordination activity along with the change in the agency heads at FDA and CPSC during the Carter Administration, as well as its continued operation into the early Reagan Administration, indicates that the IRLG became institutionalized within the agencies. It was not just the personal creation of the original agency heads and dependent on them alone for its existence.

Another aspect of the IRLG was its unpublicized or "invisible" role. While to the agency heads and the agency members interviewed, it was of considerable importance, it

was the subject of only one Congressional hearing. And, while it apparently spawned the National Toxicology Program and the larger Carter Administration initiative for regulatory reform, the Regulatory Council, it is described by Landy and his colleagues as, "a relatively small coalition within the larger game of Executive branch pluralistic politics."<sup>15</sup> A testimonial to this might also be the lack of public debate over its demise when its charter expired.

Finally, from the perspective of operations, it was unique in the lack of a centralized staff (save the administrative assistant and clerk) and its jointly contributed budget. These factors again demonstrate the commitment of agency staffs and resources to the considerable list of joint projects and work outlined above.

### Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the history and operations of the IRLG from its creation in 1977 to its demise in 1981. This recounting is based primarily upon the written record of both public and internal IRLG documents and publications. Its purpose is to provide a backdrop for the following chapter in which those interviewed reflect upon the nature of the interagency coordination from a more personal perspective.

## FOOTNOTES

- 1 Environmental Protection Agency, "Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Substances: Interagency Agreement," Federal Register 42, no. 196, 11 October 1977, 54356-7.
- 2 Ibid., p. 54357.
- 3 Consumer Product Safety Commission; Environmental Protection Agency; Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Food and Drug Administration, "Fully Halogenated Chlorofluoro Alkanes: Proposed Prohibitions and Notice of CPSC Action," Federal Register 42, no. 93, 24535-24550.
- 4 Colin B. Church, "Cooperative Action: The Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group," address before the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Washington, D.C., 1978. (Typewritten.) p. 2.
- 5 Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, "Existing Cooperative Ventures Between Two or More of the Four Agencies," in Minutes of Meeting of Principals and Surrogates, Meeting of 22 July 1977. (Typewritten.)
- 6 Ibid., p. 1.
- 7 Church, p. 1.
- 8 Ibid., p. 4.
- 9 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology, Environmental R. & D. Issues Related to the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Environment and the Atmosphere. 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 25 April, 1978.
- 10 Church, p. 5.
- 11 Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, "Supplementary Agreement," Federal Register 44, no. 117, 15 June 1979, 34648.
- 12 Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, Working Together (Washington, D.C.: March 1979), p. 5.
- 13 Consumer Product Safety Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Quality Service, "Scientific Bases for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks: Requests for Comments on Reports," Federal Register, 44, no. 131, 6 July 1979, 39857-39879.

## FOOTNOTES (CONT.)

14 Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, "Implementation of Referral and Inspection Program," Federal Register, 45, no. 62, 28 March 1980, 20637-20641.

15 Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen R. Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions: Environmental Protection During the Carter Administration, (New York, Oxford Press), forthcoming.

## CHAPTER 5 - THE MICRO MODEL APPLIED TO THE IRLG EXPERIENCE

This chapter takes the framework set out in the model for interorganizational coordination outlined in Chapter 3 and juxtaposes the details of the dynamics of the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group that were expressed in the oral interviews with six of the agency heads and six of their surrogates. The purposes are (1) to illustrate the aspects of the model, (2) to gain insight into practical questions raised by specifying a model for these relationships, (3) to find directions--suggested at any places where there is an insufficient fit between the model and the case--for further research. This comparison between the model and the case will be done by recalling the elements of the model and presenting the case data illustrating those elements.

### Preconditions

The Preconditions outlined in the model were convergent/divergent activities, legitimacy of the mandate, a continuing relationship, no common authority, and nature of affected publics. The case preconditions were more variegated, complex, and interwoven than these distinct categories, but the following discussion evidences aspects of all of them.

Virtually all of those interviewed described the late 1970's as the era of chemicals--with a threatening



new "chemical of the month" being thrust upon the public with regularity. John Byington captured the essence of the era with, "...these [chemicals] were things that nobody knew how to pronounce. They didn't even know where they were--you couldn't see them--and they also served as a great political boogeyman because they were that. I mean how in the world--Tris was a perfect example--how in the world could you possibly defend a chemical that potentially altered the genetic structure of a baby at night while it's sleeping in its crib as this substance moved from the pajamas through the skin into the body of this child? I mean that's Stephen King stuff, and it's great for developing public hysteria!"<sup>1</sup> Chemicals like saccharin and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) were on their minds at FDA, according to Tom Grumbly, while Doug Costle recalled discussing with Don Kennedy, "We started talking about the kinds of problems that we were really worried about in society...we've got a whole new emerging set of problems that are related to the legacy of the chemical revolution, that are toxics related."<sup>2</sup>

Coupled with this public perception of chemical problems was both a public impatience and a perceived confusion on the part of the Federal agencies. Byington describes the dilemmas graphically:

...one of the things that was happening was that the various groups who, for whatever reason, had some reason to be upset about x, whether they were an environmental activist

group, or they were a consumer activist group or they were somebody stirring up a product liability lawsuit or whatever, or a concerned consumer who was very upset about something, or a labor union that felt that they had a real problem in some kind of a factory ...very legitimate to highly questionable...making no difference. The fact of the matter was that most of these agencies had some kind of a petition process, and CPSC sure did and the other guys [IRLG agencies] in one form or another did. So you had the people who were interested in the xyz situation going into each of the different agencies through a different door or window or under a different kind of cloak. Each of those agencies were either "looking at it" or weren't, you know what I mean. They were all looking at it, but with varying degrees of intensity. And how much resources? And how concerned are you? But I mean all those kinds of issues.

And what was happening is that you were coming up with very, very different, and not only politically embarrassing results, but results that were very confusing to the public. Where, all of a sudden, Agency A was looking at xyz and Agency B was also looking at xyz, let's say for the moment...let's say all four of them were looking at it with varying levels of intensity. During that time frame, none of the other four...none of the other three would have any idea that any of the others were looking at it. So, all of a sudden, A is about to come out with an announcement, after being beat up on the Hill and in the press and everywhere else, that xyz is not a serious problem. And, in the meantime, completely unbeknownst [to Agency A], Agency B--they have decided that on the basis of one test that there might be a problem. We ought to spend some resources and see. And let's say at Agency D or C, you got somebody in the agency that is absolutely convinced in the agency that this thing is a very serious problem. Now...there was no way at that point in time for any of the other agencies to know that either the other was looking at it, much less had even begun to form an institutional opinion, much less was prepared to say something about it. And there were periods back then where within a 30 to 90 day timeframe, each of those three different agencies might announce or have leaked or something else what their

position was and their positions would be at the variance I just suggested. And the guy stands up for A, and says xyz is not a problem. "We have taken a look at it, and there's nothing that we see that supports the problem." In the meantime, B says, stood up a week later, and hardly even knew that anybody even said anything, said, "Well, there might be a problem here from our point of view. We're going to take a look at it in greater detail."

And some guy in C leaks to some Hill staffer a memorandum from Joe to Bill that says this thing is an incredible time bomb, and so the Hill staffer goes to the network guy and says, "Look at this." The network guy shows up with camera in hand at each of the other two agencies who had said it's no problem or it might be a problem, and says how do you deal with this fact when your other agency over here says this sucker is a time bomb?

...And those things that were going on all over the place, and everybody was getting killed. And so many of the people were playing that thing like a piano, and whole thing was in disarray.<sup>3</sup> (emphasis mine)

Thus, it was not only a time of public concern and confusion, it was a time of public interest group activism. That coupled with access to the agencies via petition or lawsuit made the disconnected nature of Federal activities felt at the agency head level. Costle also experienced the convergence with other agencies, "Virtually the next weekend, as I remember it, after the chlorofluorocarbon experience (where we proved that two Federal agencies, three Federal agencies, can actually coordinate their actions), a lead issue came up. I just innocently asked the question, 'Isn't OSHA regulating lead? If we keep it from going into the atmosphere, does that mean it just goes back into the plant and poisons the

worker? Is there a trade-off here? Can anybody give me the answer to that question?' And, of course, nobody had thought of that question."4 Susan King remembered it as a time of enormous uncertainty about chemicals and their effects as well as of considerable public concern.

While feeling this compartmentalization, the agency heads were beginning to see and hear about the negative consequences of the regulatory burden being placed on industry. Carol Foreman recalls the letters from industry citing the FSQS requirement to have a sanitary floor in a meat packing plant, while the OSHA inspector is demanding a non-skid surface for worker safety. She continued, "We came in at a time when the agencies had been subjected to and were being increasingly subjected to attacks, effective attacks from industry for...costing too much money."5 Susan King speaks of her arrival, "The bloom was off the rose. And the industry was getting much more effective in their question of, 'Wait a minute, how much can we do here? What are the cost/benefit analyses? Do you people know what you are doing?' and the heat was being turned up very considerably."6

Costle felt the reactions to the uncoordinated activity as well:

You know if OSHA is going to go into General Motors and going after them on one of their paint shops, and EPA is going to go in and go after them for volatile organic hydrocarbons, then, damn it, the two efforts ought to be coordinated. I mean the one thing that we

couldn't tolerate is GM coming back and saying, 'Hey, Mr. President, the right hand doesn't know what the left hand's doing. EPA told us to do this, but look at what those clods at OSHA just told us to do, and they are inconsistent.'<sup>7</sup>

Kennedy echoes his peers in summarizing the era and the felt needs they had:

Regulation was plainly getting a bad name. You know, it was the middle and late '70's when the sort of anti-regulatory sentiment began to build up. And poor Charlie Schultz who, in a sense, was a good man in the wrong place at the wrong time, kind of had to be the point for getting the regulators under control in the White House. And they were playing to an increasingly sensitive political audience. And so one of the reasons was that we needed to create a good image for regulators trying to make regulations more efficient and less burdensome--not having duplicative testing requirements, not having duplicate inspections for similar purpose and so forth and so on--and we were careful to bill it extensively as an efficiency promoter and a burden reducer. Here's a voluntary way to get regulatory agencies to act in the interest of the regulated. And I think we plainly hoped we could make a kink in the negative trajectory of public opinion.<sup>8</sup>

So, not only were the resulting agency regulations criticized by the affected industries as overlapping, the Administration--several regulatory review bodies, the Office of Management and Budget, and others--were also questioning the logic and rationale of regulations that cut across agencies. Speaking from the point of view of the smallest, newest agency least able to deal with the scientific and regulatory support demands posed by toxic chemicals, Susan King felt the White House pressures and saw the IRLG connections as an aid to her dialogue, "But

every time we needed or wanted some attention at the White House, it was enormously helpful to invoke the IRLG as the requester. We got in a bruhaha with the folks in the White House over the ...when we first started looking at formaldehyde...and we were able to get the IRLG, and OSHA, CPSC, and, probably EPA, to respond when the White House says, 'What in fact are you doing?' and they start asking political questions. It's not the little bitty agency [CPSC] getting knocked down by some junior staffer in the White House trying to roll you over, which they could do. They might have been able to do this; wait a minute, we've got the IRLG to deal with here."<sup>9</sup> Costle continued in a matter-of-fact portrait of the White House realities:

...part of the underlying political logic in this was my notion that if the White House did take us on in isolation and kill us...And I kept saying to myself they may be, I may be strong enough to fend them off, but I look at the rest of these health and safety regulators, and they're in deep shit. And so my notion was, are they going to take on all of us at once? I mean, if, say, we're formulating a cancer policy, you mean to tell me the White House is going to have the nerve to take on the combined intellectual weight of the federal health and safety regulators and do something that doesn't make sense, doesn't make scientific sense? No way, Jose, we've got them! We've got them!<sup>10</sup>

Even in this more political statement about the other entities in the Administration, Costle returned to the scientific and technical nature of the task at hand and the importance of intellectually credible results from the agencies.

Thus, the public spotlight on chemicals and their control led to regulatory and enforcement activities that were viewed by the agency heads as fragmented and uncoordinated. Industry, in particular, was beginning to raise questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of what was being done. New organizational entities including the Regulatory Analysis Review Group and others were being established in the Administration to review the effects and purposes of regulations, including health and safety regulations.

While this context speaks to several of the Preconditions of the model, e.g. convergence/divergence of activities as evidenced by overlapping activities, not a one-time transaction relationship, and the substantive nature of affected publics, three additional aspects of the context for the IRLG bear mentioning. They are: the "newness" factor, the agency heads' perception of their mission, and the chlorofluorocarbon legacy.

All of these agencies and their statutes were products of the early 1970's. Newly arrived on the Federal agency landscape, they were still developing and evolving their missions, unlike long-standing Cabinet departments or older service-delivery agencies. Coupled with their infantile organization status, President Carter was elected as "...the outsider, the consumer advocate as he strongly viewed himself, who is going to bring outsiders

in to make the government work for the little people who hadn't been served by it before."11 Susan King captured the sense of new beginnings with:

It may have been as much a function of the fact that the agencies or the issues were relatively new. CPSC was new. It was the youngest of the agencies. OSHA is not an old entity. Now FDA is, EPA was not either. So you don't have the same vested interest or territorial protection, certainly FSQS was also new. All that was a function of the, you know, the political interest in environmental health and safety, just human health and safety in a different way--a different sense that had expressed itself legislatively. So, the issues were new. In some cases, the organizations were new. All of the people were new. There wasn't a professional bureaucrat or inner-and-outer among them. Most were young, really all of them. Late 30's, early 40's--late 30's to mid-40's, Eula may have been a couple of years older. So, historically, there's an interesting combination of things that were occurring...We all had limited resources both technically, politically, but financially; and certainly as opposed to say the chemical industry, the drug industry, whatever. No core of that kind of long historical expertise or the ability to go get it.12

Jere Goyan personalized the plight of the new agency head and echoed similar comments by Eula Bingham:

It took me a good year to get to the point where I felt I knew where the handles of power were in the place. I mean it takes a long time to get your hands around an agency that big, to get to the point where you start to feel at least partially comfortable. The first few months is just hell. I mean, I spent, I would get up in the morning about 5 o'clock, get to the agency between 6 and 7...and get home around 8 o'clock, have a drink, microwave something for dinner, basically, do a little reading, and get to bed and get up the next morning and do it again. I was doing it basically seven days a week, because I went there knowing a little about the Bureau of Drugs--coming from a



pharmacy background, but practically nothing about the rest of the agency, and not nearly enough about the Bureau of Drugs. So, I just was spending all my time trying to do something that I suspect is the number one priority of every political appointee--not to look like a damn fool. You really want to be able to have information at hand, so you can move forward and look like you're doing what you should do in a reasonable fashion.<sup>13</sup>(emphasis mine)

### Agential Perspective

Jere Goyan's remarks offer a transition to the second aspect of the context of the IRLG--the agency head's view of their mission. Susan King put it most simply, "Yes, we were all committed to what was, the closest you can get to it, the black letter of the law. I can't imagine FDA and EPA and OSHA sitting down and saying how can we make sure we don't interfere with the ability of industry and market forces to work? How can we not read our statutes or [how can we] all sit on our hands?"<sup>14</sup> Carol Foreman describes their activist bent, "But so in the early 70's with the birth of EPA and OSHA...the one period in there where you have a group whose candidate ran for office in strong support of this kind of regulation and then went out and found people whose whole reputations were built on active enforcement of health and safety regulation in order to protect the public."<sup>15</sup> Eula Bingham elaborates on their perspectives:

...how we perceived the agency's mission that we were running. She [Carol] perceived it as being a mission having to do with consumers. I perceived mine as a mission protecting

workers. That was, consumers also were, that was the mission of the Consumer Product [Safety Commission], consumers at FDA, all kinds of constituents at all of the above at EPA. So, that's how we perceived ourselves, and that's how we perceived the mission of the agency, and we were...perhaps that orientation had a great deal to do with us getting together--prevention of disease. I mean there was this common thread of prevention of catastrophies, disease, injury.<sup>16</sup>

Doug Costle summarized the more structural reasons for their belief in the the mission of their agencies:

Yes, I think the reality is that politically we needed each other. It was also the right thing to do. And I don't want to say one of those was more important than the other because I really...but I think it was good because we all had a kind of common view of what we were about which was a very positive view of the, I mean, let's face it, if we didn't have an EPA, we'd have to invent one. If we didn't have a Food and Drug Administration, we'd have to invent one. Clearly, we would have to invent a health and safety agency to monitor the work place. I mean the way the free enterprise system works, the free enterprise system does not automatically create clean air, clean water, health and food and a safe work place. In fact, the pressure of free competition tends to mitigate against those things. Otherwise, we wouldn't have created regulatory agencies in the first place. Only the government is big enough to come in and arbitrate and say, "Look, there's a broader social contract here."<sup>17</sup> (emphasis mine)

One way to anchor these references to the activist implementation of statutes is to tie it to a particular political agenda. Carol Foreman asked this rhetorical question during her interview, "Could you have an IRLG if it were my successor, Bill McMillan, who came from the National Cattlemen's Association, and were USDA to move

meat inspection into marketing and out of consumer protection?"<sup>18</sup> Similarly, Susan King in discussing her successor offered, "I don't think he is interested in or concerned and, maybe, doesn't even understand the statute in terms of the, you know, mission of the agency. Probably disagrees with much of the intent of it."<sup>19</sup>

Susan King offered examples of two current opportunities for interagency cooperation that weren't happening to distinguish the nature of the IRLG agency heads commitment:

Does NIH [National Institutes of Health] and the Bureau of Alcohol and Drug Abuse coordinate with the Department of Transportation...a big public campaign on drunk driving? No. Is it clearly within the interest of both and a major public health issue? Yes. Do they do it? Why? They don't feel the need to...

...Yes, but in an organization as large as a given Presidential administration, the diversity of views, the absence of information, the narrowness of one's focus, the overwhelming burden of your job, and the inadequacy of the resources to do it, you don't often have time to step back for a better understanding and a broader perspective except as it affects whether or not you're going to be in that job a year from now, so it essentially becomes a political question, an elective question. A tremendous interest in education right now, you know, all over the country. Are all the education people in the Federal establishment talking to each other? I doubt it...the way they will look at it is, Oh criminy, who's going to be the next president? They don't say, "We've only got nine months left to get anything done in terms of public, the agenda for public education. What can the...Department of Education do that is most useful? What can HHS [Department of Health and Human Services] do that is most useful?" and sit down and talk about it. So, it's this group of people [IRLG agency heads], I think, uniquely

shared a value system as well as a political objective.<sup>21</sup> (emphasis mine)

Thus, while not denying political interests by the IRLG members, she pointed to the felt need to work at the statutory agenda facing them collectively.

Toby Clark's analysis of the agency heads' work and their involvement in coordination activities amplifies the importance the agency heads ascribed to the IRLG and speaks to the sense of similar views mentioned by Susan King:

I think interagency coordination is hard. I think coordination is hard and...often resisted by those being coordinated. Well, it's true with anything, coordination or anything else. If you really want to make a movement, the agency head has to get personally involved to do it. It can be getting a regulation out of your own agency--the coordination. Sure, the agency head has to be involved if you want to substantially change momentum...You want to change the momentum, which includes a particular change in direction, so you want to pick those things that are most important where you have the best chance of doing them. That would be my choice and have somebody else worrying about the rest of it.<sup>22</sup>(emphasis mine)

Clark's analysis suggests that sense of mission of the agency heads had to do not only with reading the letter of the statutes (as suggested by Susan King), but also with according that reading a priority that necessitated working with the heads of the other health and safety regulatory agencies. Don Kennedy's perspective was: "It's a piece of leadership that anybody can take and that succeeds quickly in a climate where people are looking for

an opportunity to praise the deliberate improvement of government efficiency, looking for an opportunity to praise it...It think it's kind of a slam dunk. If you get one of these going, and it clearly does produce some good results, the media are very anxious to write good stories about it. And people are very anxious to give you credit for it. It's a very easy area in which to improve the public image of government."23

#### Previous Joint Activity

A final aspect of the pre-existing conditions leading to the IRLG was the legacy of chlorofluorocarbons. As discussed in Chapter 4, a joint regulation to ban non-essential aerosol uses of CFC's was proposed by EPA, FDA, and CPSC in May, 1977. This proposal and an associated international conference on CFC's provided opportunities for the agency heads to appear together and announce their joint work. This was a "slam dunk" in terms of the public reaction. Although none of the others mentioned this aspect of the Preconditions, John Byington recalls sending information to the new Carter appointees:

And by using my interagency guy, I sent to their key staff people kind of some background on what this whole thing [joint CFC regulation] was all about, and my interest in continuing to work with them and seeing that this initiative was carried forward if they were, because I didn't think it was a political initiative, political Republican or Democratic. I mean I thought it was good government, not an R[epublican] or D[emocratic]. And that if they were interested, I was interested. Well, I got

signals back that they were, so I called each one of them, talked to each one of them, individually....

...the only one I might not have had an individual meeting with was Eula, but I'm not sure...But I did with Don and I did with Doug and then the press conference [for CFC's] came and all four of us were together for the first time. We did the press conference together for the first time, and it went very well. And the fact of the matter is, I think, we all became very good friends after that point in time. And that's when we then started moving along not only on this, but agreed that there were a number of other issues that we ought to do...24

So, by virtue of the ongoing work within their agencies on CFC's prior to their appointments, three of the four agency heads had a ceremonial occasion to be exposed to one another. Two of them had some brief dialogue with John Byington on the convergence of their interests--at least with regard to this one chemical. And, finally they experienced the positive press and public feedback to this modest, but specific joint regulatory initiative. The events put in place the preceding year set up the opportunity to be exposed to one another.

### Preparations

The Preparations called for in the model for interagency coordination deal with identifying the parties and the individual participants and their interests as well as establishing a lingua franca to facilitate the relationship.

## Agencies and Participants

While the preceding discussion of mission and the on-going agency work on CFC's offers some logic for the original agencies involved in the IRLG, as discussed in Chapter 4, the Food Safety and Quality Service (FSQS) joined the IRLG in 1979. Although the official notice amending the interagency agreement appeared in June, 1979, Carol Foreman began attending the monthly principal's meetings in January, 1979. There is no record nor was there interview commentary offered about a systematic search for agencies outside the original group of four. There are two perspectives on the introduction of FSQS and of Carol Foreman into the group.

On one hand, there are clearly examples of regulatory overlap by FSQS, such as that with OSHA regarding working conditions in meat packing plants. Another, mentioned by Carol Foreman, was an encounter with EPA over the banning of polychlorinated biphenyl-containing (PCB) transformers from food warehouses when EPA argued for a greater risk due to inadequate disposal capacity. These plus the working relationship between FSQS and FDA in which FSQS monitors and enforces compliance with chemical residue levels in meat and poultry that are set by FDA, might well argue for an early IRLG involvement. Kennedy observed, "I think that it was sort of an oversight at first that FSQS was kind of left

out because not all their responsibilities overlapped with this. And Carol had, you know, developed a bit of a reputation for being a tough hombre about cooperation...I then got to know her and really liked her and decided that everybody else [other agency heads] ought to get to know her and that it was foolish not to have an agency that logically had an overlapping mandate in here."<sup>25</sup>

Tom Grumbly, who worked for both Kennedy and Foreman, gives a more bureaucratic political perspective on her agency's absence:

Anybody who was kept out kind of felt jealous. I mean Carol was. And the reason why she was kept out the first time was that she was at war when this thing started with Kennedy, trying to steal all of his food regulatory power, and so they [agency heads] said...we don't want this to be that kind of club...I mean we [FDA and FSQS] expended so many executive resources in both agencies fighting with each other about turf. Just remember this is the President's reorganization program. Boy, what a disaster that was because there was so much time spent internally over months and months. There wasn't enough time spent on, hey, what are we supposed to be doing here? So, she was never, she did fit in, ultimately, I think it worked fine, but, you know, in the same way that anybody who joins late in the club or in a company never has exactly the same relationship as the founders do.<sup>26</sup>

Regardless of the bureaucratic organizational issues, both Jim Pierce and Eula Bingham reflected on the lack of congruence between FSQS and all the other agencies. When he was asked about the FSQS relationship to the regulation of chemicals and the inspection of meat and poultry, Pierce responded, "I think you used just the



right word in "inspectors". And I think that's the way most of us viewed that activity as meat inspectors, meat and poultry inspectors, and I guess we [surrogates] kind of felt a little bit of protectionism among our group and then, all of a sudden, we had a new player that we didn't, in our minds, put at the level of quality of EPA, FDA, OSHA, and CPSC...we just don't think they fitted.<sup>27</sup> In Eula Bingham's terms, "...in some ways she dealt with toxics, but she never dealt with toxics quite as much as the rest of us...I guess Doug and I were in the center of the toxics swirling controversies more than anybody else...she was not at the center of that technical swirl."<sup>28</sup> Costle said that FSQS diluted the work of the IRLG, while Carol Foreman herself characterized her agency as, "...an agency full of veterinarians, that did almost nothing by regulation, and everything by letters of instruction out to the inspectors in charge, [that] had zero science."<sup>29</sup> Or, putting the substantive chemical issues in perspective, Foreman observed, "...but with the exception of the PCB one, none of the things that we ever talked about at IRLG were absolutely gut issues to me."<sup>30</sup>(emphasis mine)

Thus, the early evolution of the IRLG as the joint venture of the four agencies occurred without the benefit of a systematic collective attempt to involve other agencies--to the benefit of its early development,

according to some of those interviewed. The later addition of FSQS changed the agenda and the character of what the organizations were doing together through the IRLG.

The participant selection process has been recounted above and, as will be discussed in the recounting of their "interests," the agency heads saw value in their own personal participation. For the initial four agency heads and, also, later with Susan King, there was an early and continuing commitment to be with one another and work together--for these were indeed "gut" issues for them. They also saw themselves as day-to-day decisionmakers in "line" operating functions of the Federal health and safety establishment. Thus, in terms of the model definition, they were a very appropriate, if elevated, level for involvement in interorganizational arrangements.

In fact, even as the IRLG structure grew and was elaborated (and even with the turnover in agency heads), no deputies or alternates were allowed in the monthly principals'-only meetings. An added footnote on Carol Foreman's different kind of participation was that she committed a "no-no", as Don Clay called it, by sending her deputy to one of the principals' meetings. Thus, as described in Chapter 4, the principals stayed personally involved from mid-1977 until the end of the Carter Administration in December, 1980.

## "Interests"

The next element in the Preparations portion of the model is the expression of one's own, and the drawing out of others' interests, as opposed to their "positions."

The principals shared fully a number of common interests due to the nature of their congruent perception of the existing Preconditions outlined above. They had substantive, technical concerns about the lack of data and information about chemicals and their effects, the inconsistencies between and among the agencies in testing for the effects of chemicals, the fragmented way in which chemical control might be conducted in ignorance of each others' activities, and the disjointed enforcement and implementation of their respective mandates in the field. Don Kennedy led off his interview volunteering his primary interests:

"We then quickly arrived at two or three areas in which it was plainly necessary to have more interagency cooperation than we had. One of them was that we were producing horrendously duplicative good laboratory practice standards to toxicology testing...but then there was a wonderful opportunity to create some regional cooperation because we all had regional apparatuses, just one set of federal districts, so you're located side-by-side, and they weren't having much to do with each other. In fact, in the case of EPA and FDA, which were the biggest national organizations, they were fighting some of the time...FDA always had the view that EPA's regions had too much autonomy and independence and that they were always flying off on their own. And they were giving us problems by making big regional assertions and going to the papers in Boston, if we're talking Region 1, and saying

here's this hazard--lead in tin cans--and then we have to kind of pick up the pieces. And we're doing it centrally and they're doing it peripherally. And I hoped that we could get a little better control of that sort of thing. If we got the agencies working well together regionally, that there would be a little buffering, and, at least, I hear about that stuff before reading it in the Boston, the clips in the Boston Globe the next day. So, that was my motive for supporting that..."<sup>31</sup>

Costle reflected on his discussions of the chemical revolution with Kennedy (cited earlier):

We have probably [a] very common research agenda when you get right down to it. In other words, there are certain kinds of data that you've got to have to make regulatory policies, to make regulatory decisions. And it was clear to all of us that we were operating within a limited budget and limited resources. I could see all kinds of problems trying to leverage the necessary public resources to bear on trying to develop a better science base for regulatory policy. In any event, both Don and I recognized right away that the Consumer Product Safety Commission had very little scientific staff or capacity to underpin its decisions. And one of the reasons Byington was so interested in this was that we did have those resources. Kennedy had the NIH [National Institutes of Health] resources, but he had to leverage them within a much broader institutional umbrella of HEW where he was just one among many players. EPA, on the other hand, looked attractive to both of them because we were standing out there as sort of our own show with a substantial research budget and very significant regulatory authority and the glamor of being the new regulatory creation in Washington. It was just common sense as much as anything.<sup>32</sup>(emphasis mine)

In addition to these substantive technical "interests" which they jointly shared and cited in their interviews, they understood their own and each others' situations from the point of view of resources to support

their respective mandates. John Byington emphasized his situation at CPSC and the need to share resources:

But here sat this agency with a nice budget, and a huge petition process, and an ability to take all kinds of action, and so, all of a sudden, it started to get petitions as it related to chronic hazards under the umberage(sic) of the Hazardous Substances Act. And the agency was, and is, ill-prepared to deal with those kinds of subjects. I mean [if] I testified five times or I testified once that it didn't make any sense at all to have CPSC in the middle of the thing. And as I said at one hearing, CPSC's five rats and six syringes are not going to solve the cancer problem. We aren't. Now we can use our jurisdiction; we can use our statutory authority to participate, which is the whole concept of IRLG, but you don't have to go back and restaff CPSC. And especially in a time when everybody is trying to look at resources, and all that type of thing. Why don't you give the resources to the agencies that already have a base? We don't have any organic chemists, so don't give us one, what's he going to do or she going to do? If FDA and EPA and OSHA and those guys have already got scientific departments, you know, if you need some more toxicologists, put them with the other toxicologists that are doing certain things, and then let's all share the data... And the IRLG provided that kind of mechanism because that was the beginning of the era of declining resources.<sup>33</sup> (emphasis mine)

Costle perceived the resource situation at OSHA as not much better:

You know, Eula Bingham's problem was that she didn't have the scientific horses to turn to. She had to pretty much do it herself and use a handful of outside advisors...Really, she was trying to take OSHA into a modern mission, but with antiquated battleships. She just, she inherited a staff that was knowledgeable in workers' safety, not in occupational, not in toxics...so she had a massive job to reorder the priorities, and she didn't have the resources to do it right. I think that was her problem, and so to a certain extent Kennedy and I both felt a

certain sense of obligation to try to help her with our resources or at least to the extent that we had people who knew something about these subjects. It was important that we be in the game. And I suppose you could look at it from a pure self interest point of view--cotton dust [regulation] embarrassments didn't help us any.<sup>34</sup>

Jim Pierce reaffirmed this situation almost word for word during his interview on the circumstances at OSHA.

In addition to these substantive technical, resource, and scientific needs which they jointly held, Costle earlier mentioned the political need--the "common defense in terms of the Carter Administration's regulatory policy."<sup>35</sup> Kennedy and King's earlier commentary on the oversight of regulation in the Administration meant that they shared this perceived need for a common front.

Costle articulated an additional "interest" of his own that related to his work on the Ash Council to reorganize and create EPA in the late 1960's. "...and we were perfecting our regulatory authorities to surround the problem. That was kind of the way I looked at it. If anything, I felt strongly about regulating in order to do a complete job of looking at the whole problem, the total body burden. If I needed the cooperation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, I was reasonably assured I was going to get it because they were very much a part and parcel of this and the quid pro quo, you know, was that we could supply the science...terrific, and more power to it, they'd do a better job."<sup>35</sup> (emphasis mine) This need for

a holistic approach to toxics control was not based first in a need to use EPA authority or to "trade off" to get CPSC regulatory jurisdiction, it was dictated by the chemical problem the seeking of a unified solution, an integrated solution.

Eula Bingham reflected on Costle's additional needs for insight and perspective on the scientific issues, while at the same time describing her interests in learning more about the Washington political scene:

We realized that we would be facing some of the same kinds of decisions. And Doug would say to me, "Well, you know I'm going to depend on you and Don to give some advice because people in the agency will have this point of view or that point of view. I'd like to hear what you think about it because you have no vested interest in what we do." And I knew Doug had been on the Hill, and I knew he was much more politically astute than I was. I was a babe in the woods politically. I had absolutely no political connections. I may have turned out to be one of the most political ones by the time it was all over...he [Costle] looked to Don and myself to help give him technical, scientific advice, and sometimes he would ask us very simple questions, that perhaps he never asked some of his other people and advice on things, not that he just took our advice, but I believe he felt he could trust us.<sup>36</sup>

Organizational status and location were mentioned as the source of "interests" felt by Byington and Kennedy in both their own interviews and those with others. John Byington made a special point in his interview of wanting to discuss his frustrations as chairman in the commission form of organization:

It's inherent that the other commissioners

don't trust the chairman or that there's at least a, there's an institutional friction between other commissioners and a chairman in any kind of a regulatory agency. And the stronger willed the chairman, the greater the possibility for institutional friction. Well, I had my fair share of that for lots of reasons, but as it related to the IRLG, what these people were deathly afraid is that I was going to "give away" some of our jurisdiction, or, worse yet, that I was going to be making some kind of commitment with these other agency heads that they might not like. And that I had to remember that, you know, the policy of the agency was made by the commission, not by the chairman... ..And I agree that the commission set policy; I don't agree that we have five COO's [chief operating officers]. And so I operated on the basis that the commission was the board of directors and I was the chairman, COO of that board of directors, and the board set policy. If we were moving down a particular path, regulatory path, and, obviously, you didn't want it all over the street because it was premature to where you were yet, those people [IRLG agency heads] were in pretty decent shape because the could keep it relatively closed and keep things moving and see data and decide where you were going to go. I had a separate problem. I had to get at least two more votes to get the five, so I'd have a majority of the five to go along with whatever it was that we wanted to do. And we had an interpretation of the sunshine law that was second to none, and that's why I said before that that agency confused openness with nakedness.

So, when you find out that you're in the middle of a situation where you've got that kind of openness, and then you're working within a group that doesn't know how to spell "collegiality". Each one had a different constituency, each one was trying to get themselves in the the paper on behalf of their constituency. And my argument consistently was that they often times did it to the detriment of not only the other commissioners, but of the overall agency. It made it difficult then sometimes as to how far I could go before I had to go to the commission.37

So, John Byington had a unique organizational context in which he was trying to exercise leadership and cooperative



support with other agencies. Costle recognized John as an "enthusiast" for the joint effort to regulate CFC's--"...doing that made him feel, I think, like he was part of the big leagues. I mean the Consumer Product Safety Commission is a small little outpost in government. It had neither staff nor a whole lot of focus at the time...It was also a true commission, regulatory commission, as opposed to the single agency head. So, I got the impression that Byington probably felt that this was one area where he could be an executive. It was a kind of higher level collegial decisionmaking, maybe."<sup>38</sup>

Don Kennedy's situation in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was different, but affected his needs and interests. In Don Clay's words, "Kennedy was layered down a lot. Keep in mind that the Commissioner of Food and Drug [Administration] was not a political appointee, a PSA--I mean nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. You see, the Assistant Secretary of Health is, but not Food and Drug; so this is a way for Food and Drug to get exposure without being, see they are part of HHS. This is an independent way out for them.<sup>39</sup> (emphasis mine) Tom Grumbly was more specific in outlining this need to engage the other agencies:

Secondly, very quickly we recognized that since we were buried three levels down in the HHS bureaucracy, or HEW bureaucracy at that point, and Doug was a Cabinet officer in the Carter Administration--had Cabinet rank--that there were substantial advantages to doing

business with him in terms of access to more senior level officials outside of the Department of HEW than we would perhaps have ourselves on a day-to-day bureaucratic basis. That was, of course, unspoken outside because Califano [Secretary of HEW] wouldn't have liked it. So, there was enough in the straightforward reasons which Califano agreed with when Don talked to him about it--Califano and Hale Champion--to make it go in and of itself. I mean there were sort of prima facie reasonableness to the argument that, you know, government ought to try to speak as much with a common voice as is possible on matters...40

Kennedy confirmed this perspective, "I think Joe Califano was suspicious of it, but he didn't spend much time thinking about it. He was just vaguely uncomfortable. Well, it looked like an orthogonal thing with respect to his own authority. I mean, he's a very authority-conscious guy. You know, it gave me a kind of different avenue to work with."41

Eula Bingham and Carol Foreman operated with the permission or support of their bosses in the their respective hierarchies, while Costle, as noted above, had no intervening layer between him and the President. These observations were made not only by the principals about themselves, but also offered by several of the other agency heads.

A final area of shared "interests", and perhaps one which contributed to the on-going personal involvement of these agency heads, was their sense of isolated or insulated decisionmaking. The IRLG gave the principals a chance for hands-on involvement in Toby Clark's view.

John Byington elaborates:

It's lonely in the sense that you don't have the opportunity to do very much hands on. You only get the decisions that nobody else is willing to make, you only get, and you also get them late because reasonable timeframes have all expired by other people deciding they are not going to make them...They're usually much more macro than they are micro. And you're usually being given little time, as I said, because much of the timeframe has been utilized before it gets there. And you have a very difficult time finding either people that will talk to you frankly, and take the chance that they're going to say something that you don't like or didn't want to hear. And so trying to get any level of divergent, legitimate opinion is tough. And because there's too many people who come in and tell you what they think it is that you want to hear, regardless of the fact that you may very well not have the reputation of shooting the messenger. I mean I don't think that was my reputation, and I don't think it was the reputation of any of the others. But that part, I mean if you want to call it lonely, it's more in terms of isolation from reality than it is...And I think that what happened...is that all four of us were incredibly open and frank and at ease and unassuming...with each other individually and as a group. That we were able to get some differences of opinion and some reality into what we were doing because we each had different groups where we were getting whatever it was that got strained up to that level...

It allowed for compass checks. It allowed for whatever you wanted to call it. Not only checking your compass, but also checking exactly where you are on the map, and making sure that other people all agreed that that's generally in the vicinity where you are and that they don't have information that suggests that that isn't where you are or where you might want to be.42

Costle echoes this same sense of being at the end of the administrative process:

Well, one thing that we all had in common, we were all having to make regulatory decisions day to day to day. And so you can actually sit

down with somebody who's having to do the same job you were doing. They presided over a different regulatory world, but basically the component of the decisions that were being made were very similar. And so you had somebody you could share, you know, let your hair down, share your experience with them...In my case, I remember at breakfast, these are the kinds of discussions we'd have. I'd say, "Let me tell you my experience this week." I had ten rules coming in here to be signed this week, and I realized that I hadn't had anything to say how the rules were formulated. It all comes to me so late in the process. As a practical matter, I can't get into the early stages of every rulemaking, but I ought to know far enough in advance of major rulemaking, so I can opt in and influence the outcomes before it gets to me. You know--how you ask the question, what studies you ask to be done--can be the whole ballgame. You know, if you're being asked to sign something at the end of this process...what have you really done except to keep the damn...things moving.<sup>43</sup>

Eula Bingham felt the utility of talking, "...about what contaminants we're going to regulate or what our problems were and what we intended to do. We realized that we would be facing some of the same kinds of decisions."<sup>44</sup> She hearkened back to her and Don Kennedy's scientific training rather than management anchors for her enthusiasm. "...I suspect from the point of Kennedy and myself, collegiality had something to do with it. I was used to working in a team in terms of research, and suspect Don was in a collegial relationship."<sup>45</sup>

So, each of the principals had "interests", related to their role as chief operating officials, to reach out beyond their own organizations for perspective, insight, and advice as it related to their substantive

decisionmaking.

### Lingua Franca

The final element of the Preparations element of the model is the establishment of a lingua franca. As discussed in Chapter 3, the creation of a jointly understood language whose terms have the the same semantical meanings to all the parties is essential to the conduct of fruitful coordination. The absence of such mutually developed, jointly-held meanings for terms inhibits the conduct of meaningful collaborative choicemaking because of semantic confusion over the fundamental issues at stake; agreement may be falsely arrived at because participants literally don't know what they are negotiating about.

The IRLG interorganizational relationship offers one of the most compelling illustrations of the importance of and the impact of having a language of common currency among the participants. Heard over and over again during the interviews, permeating the list of projects and accomplishments outlined in Chapter 4, and in center stage in the discussion of the Preconditions, the lingua franca of chemical risks (as it was labeled by Don Kennedy) pervades this relationship. To recapitulate:

Costle: This is at a time when EPA's agenda shifted...from conventionals [pollutants] to toxics.<sup>46</sup>

Byington: ...the government was not doing an effective job in regulating or dealing with

this whole issue of potential carcinogens. In that block is carcinogens, mutagens, teratogens...we were not doing an effective job as a federal government in dealing with these supposed chronic hazards.<sup>47</sup>

Kennedy: ...the convenient lingua franca of chemical risks, that without that, it would have been hard to put together.<sup>48</sup>

These statements along with Eula Bingham's reference to being in the swirl of controversy over toxic chemicals meant that the principals brought many of the same terms to their meeting table at the beginning. Together, they then worked through and developed shared understandings--a lingua franca--drawing on their commonality of interests and their contactful engagement with one another.

Toby Clark reflected that, "They all had similar concerns...I doubt if it would have gone on as long or been as active if they weren't dealing with the same issues. It happened to be that those issues were chemicals. If the issues had been fighter planes, I would have guessed, nevertheless, they might well have gotten together. Chemicals qua chemicals, I don't think is it, but there had to be a common interest--a common set of issues that they were dealing with."<sup>49</sup> Another specific example of the work on a common language was one of the interviewee's recollection that Don Kennedy would conduct mini-lectures on chemical testing issues and uncertainties to help the others reach a common understanding of these concepts as they relate to chemical risk.

The earlier discussion by Pierce and Bingham about the lack of "fit" between FSQS and the IRLG highlights the importance of building a lingua franca. Carol Foreman's own statement about having only one chemical "gut" issue and the absence of scientific capability in FSQS no doubt hampered her interest in and ability to fully engage the other agency heads. She even observed, "And I wasn't there for the Byington part, but I saw how the absence of Kennedy and the coming in of Goyan, and, perhaps, my coming in which tended at least to dissipate the concentration on some of the key chemicals, of chlorofluorocarbons. That was pretty much gone by then."50

John Byington offered some additional insight into the development of a lingua franca in reflecting on Susan King's earlier "hypothetical" regarding Federal agencies with a common interest in alcohol, not coordinating:

...but you had more than just the common currency. You had a pressing problem directly related to that common currency. Now, I'm not suggesting that you don't have a pressing problem with alcohol and driving, but...alcohol is not an unknown substance, and the effects of alcohol are not unknown even to the "un-chemically" educated. You do not have to be a nuclear physicist to understand the basics of what is going to happen with alcohol...

...Now, the MADD, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, have begun to put the kind of pressure and to raise the kind of, elevation and other activities like that. And when the pressure is great enough for the government to do something, if you get to that level, then there will probably be some level of discussion or coordination. But this thing didn't happen just because chlorofluorocarbons were there.51

Byington's commentary describes a common currency for discussion between federal agencies that is not only available for them to use, but thrust before them at the national level. He also differentiates the well-understood language of the effects of alcohol abuse from that related to chemical effects. While partially addressed in the Preconditions discussion in terms of the public's interest in coordination itself, his concept is that the language under discussion also carries public interest and concern.

### Conception

The IRLG provides deep and rich insights into the nature of the term "contact" as well as the other two steps--determining the mechanism and activation--in the Conception stage of the interagency coordination model.

### Program Manager "Contact"

As a backdrop to the concept of contactful engagement, all of those interviewed confirmed that none of them had known one another prior to coming to Washington except that Susan King and Carol Foreman had met politically before. The early principals spoke of the personal chemistry, the personalities that meshed well, and the sympatico, in Toby Clark's terms. In Costle's words, "...personal chemistry made it a pleasure to do it."<sup>52</sup>

Eula Bingham's recollection of their initial



involvement enriches this perspective:

Well, there was no IRLG--we created it. And I think we created it, it grew out of discussions that Doug Costle and I had, and that I think Costle and Kennedy had. And Doug said to me, "Gee, you really ought to get together with Don Kennedy--he's a biologist". And so Don and I met for lunch over in one of those restaurants along the river; and I remember us talking about our backgrounds and interests and the things that we had to deal with. And it became apparent that the three of us ought to get together and meet. And I recall the three of us were planning to meet, and I believe that--I didn't initiate the CPSC connection--Doug initiated that connection. And I don't really recall whether we met as a threesome, and then invited, I believe we did, and then invited CPSC to meet with us.

I would say the group began in some ways because of the personalities. It was, I felt at ease with Doug, and we communicated well, and the same with Doug and Don. And I felt at ease with Don, and communicated well with him. And we saw some usefulness for the three of us getting together. And I think it was probably Doug that perhaps knew John Byington. And I must say it was not EPA, OSHA, FDA, CPSC at the beginning; that's how it became the IRLG, and we emphasized the agencies. But at the beginning it was Doug, Don and Eula. And Doug had known John Byington since he, Doug, had been around Washington, and suggested that John Byington join us. So, it was very personal, in my estimation, at the beginning, a collegial kind of thing...there was something that made it jell and click. There was a chemistry, and when I would think about the IRLG, I never talk, even today, I don't think of OSHA, EPA, CPSC, etc. I think of Costle, Kennedy, myself, either Byington or Susan, and then Carol Tucker Foreman. I don't know how the other people describe it, but for me that was the most important part of it.<sup>53</sup> (emphasis mine)

Susan King apparently shared fully in this contactful engagement of one another. While she called it a "like and respect" for one another, her peers were even

more positive in their recollection of her arrival. Kennedy spoke of her as "so quick and bright and sensible" and of their principals meetings--"It went better, I thought...I don't think functionally we missed a step. I just enjoyed them more."<sup>54</sup> Eula Bingham also felt the rapport, "...I think though the difference Susan made was she probably fit in even better than John did in terms of chemistry."<sup>55</sup>

Tom Grumbly recalled her initial arrival and the nature of her engagement:

She was, as I recall, initially skeptical--didn't know what was in this for her. She was very political, first of all. I mean, her first question was, "What's in this for me?" I mean--except maybe she wasn't so political because she just said that. They basically just said to her, "Well, nothing really, but we're real nice people." And so she was skeptical at first, but then she went to one of the meetings. I think she also feared, like all these people, that, "God, somebody is after my turf," and CPSC used to be part of FDA, and some sense that Kennedy was trying to--but she changed dramatically. She went to one meeting, and you would have thought that they gave her some kind of conversion shot or something like that. She became one of the big boosters of the thing. In part, again I think, because she liked the people who were involved in it. I mean there's no question there was a chemistry among that four, that group of four, that wasn't there when Byington was there nor was it there as much when Carol was there because one guy [Byington] was an outsider, at some level, because of the partisanship thing. And the other person [Foreman] was considered the junior partner to the club who fought to get in. And, yes, they let her in because there was no compelling reason to keep her out. But Don and she had developed a good working relationship, but Foreman was a real feisty person, I mean super feisty person. More than feisty, it was like,

"Hey, wait, this is a club, come on, don't pound the table."56

Grumbly's position as a surrogate at both FDA and FSQS gave him several perspectives to observe the principals' relationships. He too saw the enhanced engagement of Susan King, and also the lack of a similar involvement by Carol Foreman suggested earlier in the discussion of Participants.

Some further insight into the nature of the "contact" between the principals comes from Eula Bingham's comment on the trust that developed between them. "There was a lot of trust. For me, there was total trust with those people."57 Susan King echoed this feeling with, "I don't have a science background. I don't have a product safety background, and, you know, was more that glad to have some people that I could trust and be comfortable with in terms of the principals at the IRLG."58

Kennedy explained their commitment to one another in not allowing alternates and not missing meetings, "We all agreed to give scheduling priority to those meetings, and so people would move other things and delay trips and stuff like that. I mean we really sort of make a promise to each other that we were going to put that first."59 (emphasis mine) Commenting both on Carol Foreman's involvement and the others' commitment, Don Clay observed, "...Foreman was never part of the group, never really, it wasn't nearly as good. She didn't come regularly. The

others were pretty religious about it. They would just come."<sup>60</sup>

Another insight into their personal engagement comes from their explanation of the value of the individual interaction and availability to one another. Byington described a typical scenario:

And we would talk about what was happening on [Congressional] oversight, and what they were after me on. And, you know, I'm going up there, and I'm going to get killed on acetamaphyn [for example], and if anybody's got anything on acetamaphyn, God, I'd sure like to have it before next Wednesday because I'm going up to get killed! And I don't have it, and I've asked Colin or whatever it is to be checking with your people, but, God, if you've got something--let me know. Each of us would go back and find out, make sure of that, that the guys who had asked the right questions. I mean this just wasn't something that somebody put on their desk someplace that they'll get to next month or whatever, two weeks after poor Byington's testimony or after Doug has testified. And I'll go back and find out if we've got anything. Do we have any data or do we have any correspondence or do we have any requests? What have we got in this place? Well, I'll call back, him or his person, and say, "I've checked everyplace, and we don't have a thing. No, we have never received a petition..."<sup>61</sup>

Costle used a similar example, "I needed to get a line on a researcher at Cornell. I called Don or I called Eula up and said, 'Do you know this bird?' This is the kind of problem I've got, who have you got over there who can help me understand this one a little better. Have you ever had any experience with this person?"<sup>62</sup> Goyan as well engaged the others on issues, "It was a wonderful opportunity to

see the other principals, all of them I liked; and it made it a lot easier to pick up the phone and talk with them. I think that should not be underplayed as one of the advantages--is the opportunity that the breakfast together, the chance to get to know each other on a less formal basis where we didn't have a bunch of people around us trying to tell us, 'Don't listen to him, he's from CPSC,' or whatever. It made it possible to then pick up the phone and talk to them in way that you couldn't have done otherwise."63

A final insight into the unusual degree of contact among the IRLG principals comes from the personal effort put into breakfast for their meetings. While not all meetings were in the morning, the vast majority were. Their private meetings together were accompanied by meals that they prepared themselves for each other. This excerpt from the John Byington interview lends some insight:

Byington: Everyone of us cooked.

Kovalick: And you cooked too?

Byington: Absolutely.

Kovalick: I mean you didn't have your secretary bring in rolls. You prepared something.

Byington: No, no, no, I fixed it. Breakfast. I came in an hour early, and I happen to be a very good cook.

Kovalick: I see, a showoff.

Byington: That's what it got to be. I mean each guy was outdoing the other person, and we were going to prove to Costle that just because he had a kitchen, didn't mean that we couldn't serve one hell of a breakfast.

Kovalick: I see.

Byington: And we had really very nice breakfasts. I mean eggs and toast and bacon and/or rolls and juice and milk and coffee and fruit, the whole thing. And each one of us fixed the breakfast.

Kovalick: I know it seems like a little thing, but, but on the other hand, it's kind of interesting.

Byington: Well, it does because, I mean I hadn't thought of it that way, but from the psychological point of view, you know, you are putting something into it yourself for these other people. And they're then sharing the meal, and all that type of thing, that you prepared. And then the next month, you're over at their house sharing his or her meal. And we did that. I mean we did it at least, there were at least two or three times around where we cooked and then the IRLG meetings began to take on larger proportion and, but when it started out, it started out on the same basis, that of the original concept which was no new bureaucracy, no new, none of that stuff. All we wanted was a meeting once a month for the heads of the four agencies to be able to sit down together, break bread, and talk openly and informally about anything, with the major subject on the table that coordinated effort to deal with chronic hazards.<sup>64</sup>

In a similar vein, Eula Bingham cooked breakfast using an electric skillet (which she still has) in the only available space she had--on the vanity in the bathroom adjoining her office. "I used to come home almost every weekend [to Cincinnati]. And when I was going to do the IRLG...I would bring a pound of Kahn's bacon from Cincinnati and eggs from Cincinnati, seriously."<sup>65</sup> Later arrivals among the principals participated as well. Susan King recalls, "It got pretty elaborate for a while...homemade jams."<sup>66</sup> Jere Goyan also remembered, "And, as matter of fact, the FDA took the

first prize as having the best breakfast. The reason being that Sara Kay Addison, who is secretary for the FDA Commissioner downtown...is an individual, who is not only the fastest typist I have ever seen in my life, but she is a gourmet cook who loves to cook, and so she would make these incredible breakfasts. I'll never forget them. I mean they were wonderful, and everybody would say why don't we just have it at down at FDA all the time?"<sup>67</sup>

Tom Grumbly summarized well the import of the eating together, and the level of engagement that resulted from it. "But it was really kind of a studied attempt to introduce a level of informality into the equation and a level of courtesy into the equation among people who didn't know each other. And I'm not sure whether anybody thought about that, but I think it was a great device that ought to be used more."<sup>68</sup>

#### Mechanism for Coordination

The next aspect of the Conception phase of the model is selecting a way in which the agencies can engage one another. In the IRLG, the principal mechanism for coordination was the actual agency head meeting each month and the associated meetings of the surrogates. This is not to discount the importance of the work groups and counterpart groups that were ultimately assembled, but these were the subsidiary entities in overall structure that developed. The principals made an

affirmative decision to keep meeting by themselves, and then to meet with and use the surrogates to see to the operation of the coordination efforts that they wanted. Thus, as described in Chapter 4, the principals met alone over breakfast--once a month--and were joined by the surrogates afterward. The surrogates then met two weeks later, by themselves, in between these larger meetings.

Don Clay remembers this private meeting arrangement of the agency heads posing some implementation problems in the beginning:

They would meet with themselves and then they would come out. And we [surrogates] would have a quick meeting and then go on and pretty soon they would say, "Where's thus-and-so?" Everybody would say, "What thus-and-so?" They would say, "Well, we decided." And we would say, "Yea, but you didn't tell anybody that you decided." They were so used to having people around that when they made a decision, do it. So, the surrogates recognized this as a problem...they would ask for something, and there was nobody there to do it. So, the surrogates said, "Look, suppose we had--we're all trusted people--suppose we had one of us just sit quietly in the corner and write down any action items?" And the answer was, "No." They didn't want to do it that way. What they wanted to do was to, they would have somebody who was the designated debriefer for the day and that person was supposed to tell us what happened in the meeting. This was at this level. Once they had organized the structure, the bureaucracy took over, and there was a lot going on at different levels.<sup>69</sup>

So, the principals-only meeting lasted for up to an hour prior to the joint session with the surrogates. The following descriptions capture the essence of those meetings:



Bingham: And it was not formal. We never had an agenda, and went around the room, and we'd each tell...each of us had a number of questions. Have you heard anything about so and so? Well, we're going to do this. And I don't know, it was an unspoken, people would keep their ear to the ground. And, of course, Doug had--because of his position that he held--had a real ear for the White House. And Don had a real ear for what was going on over in HHS. And I had my sources in HHS or HEW...and Doug was certainly the best connected of anybody in the IRLG at any time. I mean Susan was pretty well connected politically, and Carol was, but Doug certainly had the best connections. He had very good White House connections, and he had very good Hill connection. And he would, you know, play golf with Tip O'Neil, and so those connections were very important, and I think we got a lot from him in that. But he was never aloof with that sort of thing. I mean he never broke confidences, but he shared his impressions of what the tenor was about issues...70

Byington: We talked about the problem, if I had gotten some new petitions on x or y, or we had a bunch of press inquiries, or I was getting inquiries from the Hill or whatever.71

Kennedy: Very often we would talk about what's happening to regulatory policy in the White House. We would talk about whether some broad initiative was succeeding. What about interagency cooperation in the regions? Is that really going well? Where are the problems? What are your people telling you? What are my people telling me? If there's a glitch, like the GLP [Good Laboratory Practice] regulations, that would tend to be brought up on those occasions.72

Thus, it was the joint meeting with the surrogates and their meetings by themselves that were the driving engine for the IRLG. As a biologist, Don Kennedy is credited with creating the label "surrogate". Two were appointed from each agency--generally chosen from the ranks of special assistants to the agency heads, but

endowed with a special mandate. Only Tom Grumbly after his move to FSQS and Toby Clark, later in his term as surrogate, actually occupied line manager positions in their respective agencies. Costle observed, "We just said, 'Look, we got to have some alter-egos here. We're all smart enough public administrators to know that it is fine to come together once a month and have breakfast, issue orders, but somebody has go to see that it gets carried out. That this damn thing just doesn't break down as it gets a couple of layers below us. And, so we really need to designate liaison people to work together as our staff. And they should be very senior people, they should report directly to us, and it should be absolutely clear that they speak for us; they carry the clout. An so they are in fact surrogates. They're not special, they may be special assistants, but they are surrogates, and so we wanted that to be conveyed."<sup>73</sup>

Don Kennedy saw the surrogate role similarly, "...that there was only one face. And that person was directly accountable to his or her chief and that they were supposed to represent us fully and informally in those meetings. And that the surrogates were supposed to develop the same kind of positive chemistry that their bosses had. 'Special assistant' just didn't carry that implication."<sup>74</sup> Jim Pierce reflected on the closeness of the principal-surrogate relationship:

My authority in OSHA was absolutely never questioned. Now, I also have to tell you that a couple of times I made some decisions that Eula did not agree with. However, she never--and I'm sure this would be true in the other agencies too--she never contradicted me or overruled me in any meeting. Even though afterwards, she would say, "I disagreed with that statement you made," or something like that, but always backed you 100 percent.<sup>75</sup>

Susan King saw the surrogates representing not only the agency head's interests, but the whole agency's interests. John Byington recalls that his surrogate would, "...try and give me the macro picture of what was going on, and why he thought our guys [CPSC] were upset. But, by my having that macro picture, I was a hell of a lot more prepared not only to listen to what they [CPSC managers] had to say, but to try to ask some questions as it related to what was going on elsewhere. And to try to come up with some kind of decision that our people could live with, that I could sell at the commission, and that would work within the IRLG."<sup>76</sup>

Toby Clark summarizes the role of the surrogate even more broadly, "This was an individual whom the agency head had sufficient confidence in that this person could act in the agency head's behalf, but outside of the standard chain-of-command. And the person was supposed to act in the agency head's behalf vis-a-vis the IRLG and coordination, which might not always be in the agency heads' interests in terms of their own agency.<sup>77</sup> (emphasis mine) He continued with the example of slowing EPA's

schedule for issuance of a regulation in order to coordinate its content with the other agencies.

So, the central mechanism for interagency cooperation in the IRLG was made up of this two-part monthly meeting with the principals and the surrogates discussing and acting on issues and passing that information back to the working groups. The continued personal involvement of the agency heads on a monthly basis accords this example of cooperation a unique character.

In addition, as described in Chapter 4, a supporting network of eight work groups and counterpart groups operated across the agencies at the staff level to develop ideas for joint agency initiatives and to implement the decisions of the principals and surrogates.

#### Activating the Mechanism

Start-up of the coordinating mechanism was one of the final elements of the Conception stage of the model. While the preceding sections describe the evolution of the IRLG coordinating mechanisms, they don't reflect the agency head efforts to energize the individual work group members in their respective agencies. For example, Colin Church recalled, "At that meeting where they agreed upon the initiatives that they would work on together [eight issue areas], they also instructed the staff to prepare letters to their individual field operations in which they were

instructed to meet with their counterparts [from other agencies] in the regions, and to submit within 30 days a work plan listing those cooperative efforts which seemed appropriate to the field staffs."78

Don Clay capsulized the level of involvement that existed at the work group level and by the managers in the agencies:

CPSC was one of the more enthusiastic members at the staff level because we didn't have much staff. If you look at any one time that, we had more chairmanships [of IRLG work groups]. The idea was there were eight groups, and there should be two chairman lead from each [agency], but CPSC would end up with maybe four. We didn't have resources, but we had people who were committed and were put in leadership, so we had a disproportianate amount of the leadership role. OSHA had the least. You come up with the concept of OSHA being a head of OSHA with two special assistants in a black hole. And it hasn't changed since then. It was very difficult to get OSHA to participate on things. Eula was very committed, but the rest, she wasn't able to sell her bureaucracy. Byington was committed and sold his bureaucracy...

...there was more of a--in FDA--"I'll do it because you order me to do it" rather than because we believe in it. I think there were people at EPA who believed...but I think there were a large number of people who believed it was a good idea, and a large number of people at CPSC that believed. OSHA was just, you reluctantly grabbed somebody and dragged somebody there who said they didn't have time or resources. But they wanted help too.79

Eula Bingham's perspective on OSHA was, "Well, there was a lot of skepticism early. They thought this was just a club getting together, I suppose, for breakfast...some directorates were really, had very little reason to be involved. But the head of health standards became very

interested in the IRLG, saw the usefulness of it, participated fully, really became heavily involved so...you know, it depended on the directorate. The regional administrators, I think, found it useful and became fairly involved."80 So, OSHA appeared to not have the broader cross organizational engagement of EPA and CPSC.

In FDA, Tom Grumbly characterized the attitude of the senior career managers as, "First of all, they were cynical to start with...I mean, everybody has got so much to do on their plate. Here are these guys (IRLG principals), and you all know they're going to be here for a maximum of four years and a minimum of 18 months; they have a half-life of about a year basically. Sure, they want to do all these things, and that's wonderful, but why should I do anything for them. Yes, I'll go to the meetings, but what's in it for me besides more phone calls I have to make, and more people to talk to? And I really think it foundered--to the extent that it did--on that fundamental kind of misreading of what it took to get commitment to carry things out from the senior career people..."81

Thus, the activation of this mechanism had mixed results in the agencies below the level of the surrogates. Several of those interviewed confirmed the significant engagement by working level staff on the work groups; they

had occasions to make useful professional/scientific connections across agency lines as well as the opportunity to work on an important priority of the agency head. The middle and upper manager attitudes varied, perhaps for the reasons outlined by Tom Grumbly.

A final aspect of the model for interagency cooperation in the Conception stage was a concern for a timeframe of the arrangement. While the specification of an overall timeframe did not explicitly come up in the interviews, there was certainly an air of urgency about the issues facing the agency heads and their needs to be better coordinated. Toby Clark facetiously alluded to a concern about project completion in recounting the principals fond remembrance of their first lunch, "One of our embarrassments a year later was that all we could talk about was our lunch...in terms of accomplishments. What have I done? Well, I had lunch."<sup>82</sup> The only other explicit focus on the overall timeframe was the official interagency agreement codifying the IRLG; it set a four year timeframe, which was coincident with the end of the Administration.

### Operation

The operational dimension of the IRLG principal and surrogate meetings offers examples of the kind of contactful collaboration or integrative bargaining suggested in the model. The previous descriptions of the

Preparation and Conception stages--especially with regard to the establishment of contact among the participants--of the IRLG relationship suggest the separation of the people from the issues and the focus on interests (not positions) as suggested by the Fisher and Ury regimen.

### Principled Negotiation

The sense of interdependence is apparent in many of their earlier statements of interest and by their continued advocacy for integrative problem solving or bridging (as opposed to distribute bargaining.) Here are two further examples. Kennedy recalls, "One of the hard things for me to make our people do was to sit down, God damn it, with the EPA, and write one set of GLP's [Good Laboratory Practices]. And they would come back in and say, 'They're unreasonable,' and, you know, the thing would break down. And then Doug and I would talk on the telephone, and each of us would talk to our people and say, 'Look, we want you to go in there and come out with one set of regulations. And if you can't, we're going to find some people who can.' And finally they did."<sup>83</sup> Similarly, Costle spoke of the necessity of his involvement to see progress:

It's [the outcome of normal interagency agreements] called parse and mutual adjustment. You adjust everything back to the status quo. I think the real enemy is the status quo. The interagency agreements are designed to solve specific problems because they need solving. But we have learned from hard experience that



the problems don't get solved unless there's enough clout behind the desire to solve them, and some persistence in follow through...We did not hesitate to knock heads. I mean I got a call from Kennedy one day about something. and it turned out it was EPA screwed up; it was not cooperating, playing bureaucratic games, and I just ripped the shit out of those people. Similarly, when we had a problem Kennedy would do the same thing to his people. But it was a matter of sending a signal that we meant business and that, we didn't want this to have to back to us again. If it did, somebody's head was going to roll, that there was no good reason that this shouldn't get resolved.<sup>84</sup>(emphasis mine)

This kind of strong support for joint solutions through hard work and being conscious of the other party's interests (i.e. solving "the problem", not defending a position) clearly mirrors the principles of integrative bargaining. These principles are manifest in Toby Clark's perspective on the surrogate's role of acting on behalf of the IRLG agencies' interests, not EPA's interest, and in John Byington's comment on the utility of surrogates and making a decision that was best for the agency and the IRLG.

Additional evidence of the collegial nature of their engagement comes from their responses to questions about the effect of their differing appointive status on the nature of their interaction or their decisions. Don Clay referred to the fact that Costle was really "first among equals" in terms of his Cabinet access, with the others at lower levels in their organizations. The responses from the principals, save Carol Foreman, were uniformly

consistent on this issue. They met, dealt with one another, and made decisions collegially. To wit:

Kennedy: No, it didn't (strike me at the meetings that Costle was first among equals). Doug's very sensitive. He really has a knack. I mean he plainly was the highest level person in those meetings. He plainly could have leaned all over people, and he really seemed to believe that this was a group of people among whom reason and logic should be permitted to have full precedence, and that nobody should be allowed to lead because they had rank. I think Doug is a "small d" democrat of the highest order by instinct. He was very sensitive about the issue, whether it was instinct or calculated, I don't know, but he never dominated the meetings.<sup>85</sup>

Goyan: I never had any inferior feelings vis-a-vis Doug. In fact, I liked Doug a lot. I thought he was quite good...As I say, I never had any feeling that he's better than I am or anything of that nature. In fact, I must say, if anything, I kind of felt the other way. I felt I had a better group of scientists overall on balance than anybody else did, so I felt that I was the one that was in the position to give.<sup>86</sup>

Pierce: He was, of course, a quasi-Cabinet member, but that didn't make any difference at all. It was interesting in this group that there was no pecking order.<sup>87</sup>

Carol Foreman was the exception to this collegial perspective and, as discussed earlier, was seen differently by others. She recalled:

He was secretary of the department. It was true, and I think it's part of my irritation. I mean Doug certainly thought of himself, that's an interesting thing, Doug thought of himself that way [first among equals], and I think perhaps it was true that the others did too...my impression was that as long as Don Kennedy was in the room, you had four strong personalities that it was a fairly equal arrangement. Certainly, I didn't feel a full participant. They had two years of lead on me, and I was coming in trying to catch on to

what was happening.<sup>88</sup>

She is the only participant who used the concept of power in her discussion of the principals and their relationships. She also found the principals-only meetings long and unfocused, while seeing the real business getting done at the meeting with the surrogates. While it is true from a cognitive perspective that the IRLG agenda of projects was addressed at the meeting with the surrogates, many of the agency heads' interests were attended to in the principals' meetings--according to the others. Thus, Carol Foreman was the only agency head conscious of Costle's use of his higher appointive status, and none of the others perceived any negative effect on the nature of their interaction.

Another aspect of the Fisher and Ury regimen for principled negotiation that is reflected in the IRLG was the uniform description of the decisionmaking process at the principals-surrogates meetings. They all described their decisionmaking as consensus-based, but not in the sense of "splitting-the-difference" or compromising. Kennedy's earlier commentary on Costle in meetings noted that reason and logic were the main criteria for decisions. Costle too believed that was the way decisions were made, "I think we just plain flat agreed. I think we made a consensus...Yeah, it just made sense. I mean that was the only criteria on the table. Did it make

sense?"<sup>89</sup>

Further insight into this open deliberative decisionmaking comes from Toby Clark:

They all talked. I mean Don was very eloquent, but none of them was shy. All of them were articulate, and, it would vary a bit from issue to issue. Again, I don't remember when John Byington was there, but Susan was not shy certainly. Nobody sat back. They really interacted very well together...

...It was consensus...They would usually, if there was an objection or something, it would be to a small part of it. And so they would say, "Well, why don't we try recognizing...", it was a normal consensus approach...If three of them wanted something, and the other questioned it, usually the fourth person would say, "Well, that's fine, but here are my concerns," and so we would do it recognizing those concerns.<sup>90</sup>

Tom Grumbly saw a similar regard for the views of others in their decisions:

Consensus. It was consensus decisionmaking. They sometimes would not make decisions like all of these groups do. You'd go away frustrated, feeling that, you know, why don't these people decide something. They'd decide "not to decide", they'd decide to bring it back again, they'd decide it needed more work. I mean standard senior level executive decisionmaking in the government with the difference that these people did all treat each other as equals. And I would give Costle an enormous amount of credit for never once letting the fact that he was higher-ranked than these other people and did have something of a personal relationship with the President. I mean he could actually go and see the President unlike current Administrators. He never let that intrude.<sup>91</sup>

Thus, the choicemaking that went on comports with the spirit of the term "wise agreement" suggested by Fisher and Ury in that fairness and community interests were definitely were the hallmark. Yet, each principal was

vocal and appreciated for expressing his/her views as the decision was reached.

#### Support Duality of Model

The final aspect of the model for interagency cooperation is the continued maintenance of both the substantive and process character of the interaction. There is evidence in the IRLG example that both were attended to. However, as the principals changed, there were some changes in the IRLG.

On the substantive issues, the first principals and Susan King clearly gave their energy to the content of their work. Bingham and Byington met regularly and continuously with their surrogates to consider and react to IRLG issues. Toby Clark said his job was to, "...get things he [Costle] was interested in on the agenda. And it was my responsibility to be knowledgeable about what he was interested in and where his interests were.<sup>92</sup> Kennedy recalls the principals-only meetings, "We would develop an agenda. We each had a staff person that was devoted to IRLG matters, and they would get together and sort of develop an agenda for us. We would do some telephoning about that and had our own ideas of issues and would tell our staff people what those were and sometimes tell one another. So that it was in substantial part our own creation, but we had staff people whom we really trusted working on it, and they would give us a list of things for

each meeting."93 (emphasis mine)

With the passage of time, Susan King, Carol Foreman, and Jere Goyan were less personally engaged with the overall agenda and direction of the substance of the IRLG. Susan remembers the joint principal-surrogate meetings:

Well, the committees [the IRLG work groups] would report. I mean there was always something to be said for whatever was going on in each of those areas. I don't remember how they [agendas] were set. I didn't set them. I'm sure Colin would set them, and there was a briefing package as I recall it. At that point, there were a fair number of Federal Register notices and things that were, CPSC and EPA did a joint rulemaking on asbestos and so there would be drafting of those materials so that people had full copies before it went into formal interagency channels, while it was still at the discussion stage, working drafts, things like that, if I remember correctly... But in terms of an agenda that had gotten started two or three years earlier, any specific expertise I brought to it, I didn't, you know, was by no means the driver. I would think Don and Doug were. Don particularly because of his background.<sup>94</sup>

As described earlier, Carol Foreman's engagement of the technical issues was minimal from the beginning. While technically aware of the issues, Jere Goyan described his preparation for IRLG as a response to a question on whether his surrogate would see him between meetings:

Very seldom, but he would usually, I would get briefed before we went. I mean he would send in a briefing paper. I met with him at least a couple of times, but it was not a high priority thing with FDA. There were just too many other high priority issues that one was dealing with and your feeling was that I could, that the IRLG was a reasonable idea, and something that we should be supportive of and try and develop over time, but something that

was going to a long time because of differences of opinion about areas...

...Well, I don't know what stopped it [IRLG]. I don't know what started it. I don't know the history of it because I just didn't. I got there, and the streetcar was going down the street, and I stepped on it...It was kind of defined in as one of those things that the FDA was a part of this, and that the commissioner went.<sup>95</sup>

So, the initial principals did personally attend to the content of the substantive work. Despite her lack of technical background, Susan King appeared to still participate and be accepting of the substantive agenda that had evolved. She seemed to maintain a level of enthusiasm that was recognized by the earlier comments of those interviewed when discussing the participants. Carol Foreman's lesser interest in the substantive, "gut" issues was self-declared. While technically interested in the subject matter, Jere Goyan was not a stakeholder in or an initiator of the broad agenda for the IRLG.

These differing aspects of their engagement of the technical issues in two cases are mirrored in the differing nature of their contact with the original principals. The respect, excitement, and engagement of Susan King by the original three principals comes through very clearly in the interviews. Similarly, the lack of contactful collaboration with Carol Foreman was discussed by the others as well as in her own interview. While there is limited interview data, Jere Goyan comprehended and was interested in the technical agenda and enjoyed the

company of the other principals; yet, the IRLG was not a focus for his energies, and so he did not exercise leadership in maintaining its substantive and process continuity. While he remembers the consensual nature of the decisions, he did not push the process of project execution in the manner of Kennedy, Costlé, and Bingham.

### Summary

In several ways, the efforts of the IRLG principals are congruent with the nature of principled negotiations and the continued support of the duality--substance and process--of the coordination model. The first principals felt and demonstrated a sense of interdependence and behaved in ways that supported firm flexibility in the subsidiary interagency work group deliberations. There was a cognizance of the need for wise agreements that integrated the interests of the other agencies. They were blind to the differences in their appointive and organizational status in terms of reaching decisions, yet supplemented each others' strengths and compensated for weaknesses routinely and unsparingly. Later-arriving agency heads changed the nature of their contact with the earlier principals and held several differing views as to the purpose and relevance of the IRLG to their interests. The resulting collaborative relationship differed as a result. The charter expired before the true impacts of these new agency heads and their involvement could be



seen.

## FOOTNOTES

- 1 Transcript of interview with S. John Byington, Pillsbury, Madison, and Sutro, Washington, D.C., 21 January, 1988, p. 12.
- 2 Transcript of interview with Douglas M. Costle, University of Vermont Law School, South Royalton, Vt., 21 December 1987, p. 1.
- 3 Byington, pp. 9-10.
- 4 Costle, p. 2.
- 5 Transcript of interview with Carol Tucker Foreman, Foreman and Heideprien, Washington, D.C., 5 January 1988, p. 2.
- 6 Transcript of interview with Susan B. King, Steuben Glass, New York, New York, 7 January 1988, p. 4.
- 7 Costle, p. 10.
- 8 Transcript of interview with Donald Kennedy, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, 13 January 1988, p. 2.
- 9 King, p. 2.
- 10 Costle, p. 11.
- 11 Foreman, p. 3.
- 12 King, pp. 1-2.
- 13 Transcript of interview with Jere Y. Goyan, University of California, San Francisco, California, 12 January 1988, pp. 13-14.
- 14 King, p. 16.
- 15 Foreman, p. 3.
- 16 Transcript of interview with Eula Bingham, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, 14 January 1988, p. 19.
- 17 Costle, p. 13-14.
- 18 Foreman, p. 5.
- 19 King, p. 16.
- 20 King, pp. 3 and 16-17.

## FOOTNOTES (CONT.)

21 Clark, p. 14.

22 Kennedy, pp. 2-3.

23 Byington, pp. 4 and 6.

24 Kennedy, p. 8.

25 Transcript of interview with Thomas Grumbly, Clean Sites, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia, 5 January 1988, p. 9.

26 Transcript of telephone interview with James O. Pierce, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 19 January 1988, p. 8.

27 Bingham, p. 17.

28 Foreman, p. 10.

29 Foreman, p. 9.

30 Kennedy, pp. 1 and 7.

31 Costle, pp. 1 and 2.

32 Byington, pp. 13-14.

33 Costle, pp. 14-15.

34 Costle, p. 8.

35 Costle, p. 15.

36 Bingham, p. 3 and 7.

37 Byington, p. 17 and 18.

38 Costle, p. 1.

39 Transcript of interview with Don Clay, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., 10 December 1987, p. 3.

40 Grumbly, p. 1.

41 Kennedy, p. 5.

42 Byington, pp. 30-31.

## FOOTNOTES (CONT.)

43 Costle, pp. 3 and 5.

44 Bingham, p. 3.

45 Bingham, p. 1.

46 Costle, p. 3.

47 Byington, p. 2.

48 Kennedy, p. 3.

49 Clark, p. 8.

50 Foreman, p. 14.

51 Byington, p. 12.

52 Costle, p. 8.

53 Bingham, p. 1.

54 Kennedy, p. 6.

55 Bingham, pp. 15-16.

56 Grumbly, pp. 8-9.

57 Bingham, p. 1.

58 King, p. 11.

59 Kennedy, p. 4 and 5.

60 Clay, p. 9.

61 Byington, p. 29.

62 Costle, p. 3.

63 Goyan, p. 8.

64 Byington, pp. 6-7.

65 Bingham, p. 6.

66 King, p. 5.

67 Goyan, p. 2.

## FOOTNOTES (CONT.)

68 Grumbly, pp. 3-4.

69 Clay, p. 5.

70 Bingham, pp. 6-7.

71 Byington, p. 7.

72 Kennedy, p. 4.

73 Costle, pp. 18-19.

74 Kennedy, p. 4.

75 Pierce, p. 10.

76 Byington, p. 17.

77 Clark, p. 5.

78 Transcript of interview with Colin B. Church, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, D.C., 8 December 1987, p. 5.

79 Clay, pp. 5, 6, and 11.

80 Bingham, pp. 11-12.

81 Grumbly, p. 6.

82 Clark, pp. 2-3.

83 Kennedy, p. 1.

84 Costle, pp. 12-13.

85 Kennedy, p. 5.

86 Goyan, p. 13.

87 Pierce, p. 3.

88 Foreman, p. 9.

89 Costle, p. 9.

90 Clark, pp. 7 and 8.

91 Grumbly, p. 5.

## FOOTNOTES (CONT.)

92 Clark, p. 6.

93 Kennedy, p. 3.

94 King, pp. 11-12.

95 Goyan, pp. 5 and 7.

## CHAPTER 6 -- OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter views the model for interagency cooperation together with the rich detail of the IRLG case study and makes some observations regarding the character of such cooperation among Federal agencies at the national level. It also draws some conclusions about the practical considerations involved in attempting interagency coordination. Finally, it highlights opportunities for further research that would more fully explore this area.

### Overview

The purpose of this research was to suggest a model for interagency cooperation that extended beyond existing work--largely based in principles of exchange--and apply it to a case study of such cooperation among Federal health and safety regulatory agencies. The proposed model relies heavily on two sets of literature--that of negotiation theory and humanistic psychology as it relates to authentic management. The model is clearly grounded in a context of the conduct of the public's business. It recognizes the significance of the function performed by the Federal public administrator as an agent for the public interest.

What was found was that from the perspective of chief executive officers of Federal agencies, effective coordination resulted from the creation of a "cultural enclave" among these individuals. Such an enclave

resulted from a combination of their contactful engagement coupled with their senses of personal vitality, agency mission, and substantive commitment to the issues before them. Their "agential perspective" was one of active commitment and leadership in carrying out their programs--both individually and jointly--with the public interest uppermost in their minds. Their cultural enclave allowed them to work as a collective ad-hoc group and be mutually supportive of each other's needs and interests as well as providing a forum to create and maintain their collective group interest in this extra-organizational association--the IRLG.

This research uniquely shows how the principals supported radical and far-reaching changes in the norms within their respective agencies. These new norms and patterns of behavior moved beyond traditional mechanistic views of interagency cooperation based on exchange, distributive bargaining, and political trade-offs; they facilitated widespread involvement of agency employees with those of other agencies in the development and implementation of numerous joint projects involving information sharing, guidelines, regulations, and enforcement to name only some. These joint projects were both empowered by the principals' collaborative engagement and represented a broad base of substantive interagency involvement among the technical staffs of the agencies.



### Observations

Three aspects of the interagency coordination conducted through the IRLG are especially noteworthy. First, while considered in the model as preconditions needing to be assessed, the IRLG was created at a moment in time when several public and organizational circumstances were distinctive. The combination of overwhelming public interest and media focus on chemical incidents coupled with relatively new agencies coping with even newer mandates presented these recently appointed chief executives with an environment conducive to cooperation. In addition, the growing business and White House concerns with the Federal regulatory burden accompanying these more public concerns also mark the specially charged nature of the situation. As is always true when examining a case study, these distinctive aspects have to be kept in mind when exploring the broader pattern of relationships that emerges from the case.

A second observation arising from the richness of the interview data is the showcase it provides for the concepts of contactful collaboration among agency heads and how this contrasts with the typical persona of the Washington political appointee engaged in political deal-making and bureaucratic politics. The stark contrast noted by the IRLG principals and surrogates, and by Carol Foreman herself, as to the "different" nature of her

engagement of the group and of their feelings about its functioning, attest to this. Beyond their words about being sympatico, having good personal chemistry, and developing friendships, it was possible to see the distinction between their early relationship and the less engaged, less supportive nature of the cultural enclave after Foreman's arrival. In addition, Susan King's full acceptance and engagement by the agency heads offered evidence that it was neither technical unfamiliarity with the issues nor solely "newness" to the group itself that made the difference in Carol Foreman's case. Rather, it was her persona which represented a more bureaucratic politics approach to relationships.

While Carol Foreman found the principals' meetings instructive and worthwhile, she was also impatient with their sometimes unfocused conversation. Her framework for engaging the others was grounded in the bureaucratic foundation stones of proper jurisdiction, program control, and budget size. So, while she was friends with the group of principals, the interviews showed how jarring and alien her presence was to them. This contrast illustrates the significance of the collaboration they had initially achieved.

A final observation about the interview data was the insight that it gave as to the distinctive character of these political chief executives and their relationship to

their own bureaucracies. First, by virtue of their technical training and/or intellectual awareness, they were jointly members of a policy subsystems community around the issues of toxic chemicals. Their shared knowledge and joint learning about these issues gave them a special connectedness that went beyond the boundaries of their specific agencies. Second, juxtaposed to the traditional view of the new political appointee "captured" by his/her organization, the IRLG agency heads formed an executive support group which allowed them to act in and through their own agencies in ways not otherwise available to them.

Typically, the new political chief executive is isolated. Lacking program understanding, emotional support, and a perspective from outside the organizational world of their own agency, political executives are often characterized as being at the mercy of their own bureaucracies. In this case, the principals gained insight, program understanding, and mutual support from each other. This allowed them to be active and decisive in their vision and direction. Specifically, both Costle and Kennedy recalled, after consultation with one another, directing their staffs to work out or negotiate their differences to a mutually satisfactory conclusion or they would find staff who could. Similarly, Byington recollected getting a better perspective on his agency's

issues and what his staff was telling him (as well as directing new work) as a result of his interaction with the other principals. Such events as these illustrate their ability to reach beyond their own agency frameworks to a broader support and information resource. Thus, the IRLG cultural enclave provided them with unique capabilities over those of traditional political appointees.

Of equal significance (for interagency as opposed to interpersonal cooperation) to the empowerment of the principals by their contactful collaboration are the organizational processes which they drew on and managed. The network of work groups and counterpart groups which contributed to and implemented the decisions of the principals stand as a unique attribute of broad-based interagency cooperation. What can be accomplished among agencies (and what was unique about the IRLG) is the set of collaborative projects, joint studies, and other substantive activities that represent the collective work of staff from several agencies. These efforts were made possible in the IRLG by the direct connection of traditional administrative mechanisms to a uniquely contactful central coordination process at the highest levels of the agencies.

#### Practical Considerations

Reflection on the model in the context of the IRLG

case permits the assertion of several operational principles and tactics for successful interagency cooperation. These conclusions are offered from the viewpoint of the manager who seeks to implement such interorganizational arrangements on behalf of his organization.

### Move Beyond Exchange

While the research tradition in the field and common views of human nature may suggest the exchange perspective as a basis for interagency coordination, it is a flawed foundation on which to base and attempt to maintain such cooperation. The broader view of interdependence and the awareness of such interdependence are suggested both by the negotiation literature and Doug Costle's comment relating to EPA's and OSHA's both regulating General Motors inconsistently. Interagency coordination must be conceptualized in terms of an "interest"-based concept of principled negotiation. Discussions of issues in which Don Kennedy's rule of reason and logic prevails, allow the mutual agreement on outcomes that just "make sense", in Doug Costle's words. Again, it is important to note that this logic or sense-making is not a simple calculus of the costs and benefits of these valid interests. Inherent in it is the public administrator's responsible exercise of discretion given his/her vision and leadership in seeking the public interest.

Principled negotiation also requires the separation of the people from the issues. It necessitates dealing separately and fully with the affective and cognitive dimensions of interests. Only by decreasing the separation and distance that lies between individuals can the more mechanistic aspects of traditional bargaining-type negotiations be overcome. Friendship or personal attraction are not necessary, but genuine contact with the other participants is. "Collegiality" is the term used by Eula Bingham to indicate openness, sensitivity of others' views, and respect for the objectives of others, while not necessarily connoting personal attraction.

#### What's Worth Coordinating is Worth Doing Well

If a given situation has the legitimacy and importance to the decisionmaker to warrant an interagency coordinative effort, its execution should be done with thoroughness. Toby Clark pointed out that many issues and problems come to the attention of the agency head, and because time is very scarce, the chief executive has to be careful to choose issues to work on that are "vectors," i.e. that deal with the direction and pace at which he/she wants an agency to move. Perfecting the agency's regulatory authority through coordinated activity with other agencies, as Doug Costle perceived it, is an example of such a vector. In that case, the time and effort is justified for the manager. If coordination is not a major

vector for the agency head, as it was not for Jere Goyan, then its success is hampered by lack of engagement of the principal. Such work is then best left to lower level officials with an appropriately narrowed scope of activities, i.e. those within their control. Thus, while interagency cooperation can easily be a "slam dunk," as Don Kennedy put it, it must warrant the time spent coaching the team.

Assuming this legitimacy and importance of the coordinative effort to the manager, it must also be framed as an on-going relationship. The conduct of a single transaction, unless the stakes are very high, does not necessitate the kind of preparation, both substantively and in a process sense, that is suggested by this research. That does not mean that such a transaction might not profit from using the practical tactics of principled negotiation, but the broader based effort to develop true contactful collaboration seems unnecessary.

Whether or not one can achieve the type of total trust described by Eula Bingham as existing between the four agency heads, considerable effort must be made to identify and contactfully engage the other prospective parties to the cooperative endeavor. While the success of exploratory lunches and self-prepared breakfasts in the IRLG case is obvious in developing and maintaining contact, other devices may be appropriate as well. For

example, especially when cooperation is being mandated, time spent in a more organized retreat or training environment among the principal participants, or even a broader group, may help to speed the process of connecting the affective and cognitive dimensions of the process. Regardless of the forum, time will have to be devoted to learning about and appreciating the other people involved in the coordinative effort. Toby Clark's summation of these preparatory principles was, "Be careful [in the sense of selecting important issues] about who you go have breakfast with."<sup>1</sup>

A final aspect of commencing a coordination effort among agencies is to launch the effort with assurance and the expectation of positive results. Specific subject areas for the IRLG work groups and the direction to develop actionable items first, followed by issues needing longer range or statutory remedies, gave this interagency effort a sense of urgency, product orientation, and, at the same time, a long term view. These tactics are reminiscent of Seidman's assertion that interagency coordination efforts with specific charters work better, and those without policy conflicts work best. This is not to argue that interagency policy coordination will not work, only that the coordination mechanism needs to bring those non-negotiable items back to the management sponsors for a determination as to whether they do indeed fall



within the charter of the group.

Another aspect of execution is the choice of mechanism and participants through which to implement the coordination. The IRLG benefited from the principals' unusual, continued, substantive involvement with surrogates taken from staff (versus line) jobs. Coordination should be possible using only staff with management oversight. However, the burden on the staff to be both informed and empowered by their respective agency managers does not considerably lessen the need for management engagement of the substantive and process aspects of the cooperation. In fact, it may be desirable to reduce the scope of the cooperative charter to fit the sphere of control of the line officials (and/or their emissaries) involved rather than risk the lack of continuous involvement by the most senior officials. In other words, not every interagency cooperative venture must be conducted under the direct supervision of the agency head. They can be scaled in scope to fit the appropriate decision officials in the various agencies.

A final aspect of execution also relates to the degree of mobilization of the respective agency resources to serve the central coordinative process. Due to the numerous areas of potential joint interest in the IRLG, a massive initial commitment of organizational resources across agencies was made to work groups and counterpart

groups. The result was a large, staff-developed agenda of potential joint work in which the principals maintained an active interest. "Sizing" the commitment of organizational administrative processes to match the degree of ambition of the principals' agenda for cooperation is an important aspect of good execution of the cooperative venture.

#### Establish a Lingua Franca

One of the preparatory activities that was facilitated among the principals in the IRLG by the contactful nature of their engagement and their substantive appreciation of the issues was the time and effort needed to develop a lingua franca around chemical risks. Many of relevant terms were common to the original four principals, so they had a ready made starting place for building a shared meaning for that vocabulary. Eula Bingham's recollection of her and Doug Costle being at the center of the toxic chemical swirl, and the description of the counsel the principals gave each other about the scientific aspects of chemicals, suggest that, while they had a head start on a lingua franca in the form of these common terms, shared meanings had to be developed for them. In contrast, Carol Foreman's example of having only one "gut" chemical issue and the others' description of the "lack of fit" between FSQS and the other agencies indicate a lack of a sufficient basis for developing a

common language for discussing problems and concerns.

In other interagency contexts such as human services, multiple terms (e.g. client, patient, beneficiary, and trainee) may refer to the same individual. Coordinating agencies will first have to spend time identifying common terms and then devote time to creating a shared meaning for them. The creation of a lingua franca is founded in contactful engagement of the participants. It requires the creation of new terms or the reconceptualization of existing common language so that shared meanings are available to those involved in the interagency coordination process. Perhaps the largest and most frequently committed mistake in interagency cooperation and related administrative processes is the presumption that terms held in common have the same meaning to all the parties.

In addition to taking time to create a lingua franca within a small group, if the coordinative effort will involve large numbers of people from the agencies, they too will have to share an understanding of and become stakeholders in these mutually constructed meanings.

#### Nurture Day-to-Day Operations

The final observation relates to continued follow-through on on-going interagency coordination regardless of the specific degree of personal involvement by the originator of the venture. As a further application

of the adage that "management gets what it inspects, not what it expects," the originators of the interagency coordination effort must attend to both its substantive and process nature. In the IRLG case, the principals each tracked the progress of two work groups and in several cases made specific technical contributions. A more management-level approach would be to gain agreement about substantive projects of interest with the coordinating officials (assuming no personal involvement by the originator) and getting regular progress reports according to mutually agreed-upon timeframes. Results could be evaluated both by what the in-house agency staff reports and by discussing the progress with the peers in the other agencies. One is reminded of Costle and Kennedy's two examples of checking with one another about reported intransigence on behalf of the other agency. Carol Foreman had a similar example.

Time will also have to be devoted to the nurturing of the emissaries who are acting on behalf of the originator, especially if the latter is serving in an oversight only role. A constant checking of views, realignment of direction, and reinforcement of the congruence between the emissary's perspective and that of the originator will be needed. That also may involve constant visible endorsement of the emissary's activities before the home agency employees to assure appropriate

support and, if necessary, other employee participation. Decisions also need to be made to stop projects or whole interagency relationships--one hopes, when they have been productive and are complete. Only by grasping the original purpose or objectives of the coordinative effort can the originators effectively make a decision on completion.

The process side of the interagency relationship also needs constant probing both internally and with other peers to check that the proceedings reflect the kind of firm flexibility characteristic of integrative bargaining, not the political trading-off typical of distributive negotiation. The admonition to "treat others as if their reputations were at stake" needs to be continually tested to see if the affective dimension of the proceedings is being attended to. Breakdowns in the contactful nature of the cooperation or the introduction of new participants will require a focused effort on the part of the originators, or the participants, to develop a new rapport among themselves and with the new participants.

### Further Research

While it is possible to draw some conclusions from existing literature and practice and their relationship to this case study, there is an imprecise fit between the model of contactful collaboration and the IRLG case. The inexact fit is mainly due to the lack of data to full illustrate all aspects of the model. This indicates

several areas of further research needed for improving understanding of the micro level of interagency coordination.

First, research is needed that will create a fuller understanding, with further examples of (1) how a lingua franca is developed, and (2) the usefulness of having such a common linguistic basis for fruitful interagency cooperation. Cases in which different lexical meanings are used for the problems at issue need to be explored to understand how a common language develops and the impact that success in that effort (or lack thereof) has on interagency cooperation.

Second, research is needed on the impact of other sets of preconditions. In this case, agency cooperation was voluntary, agency missions were newly developed and the convergent issues were fresh, and the agencies themselves were newly created. Research is needed on interagency cooperation in which agencies are mandated by the legislature to coordinate, where they have long-standing convergent or divergent issues that have been unattended, and where they are both older in organizational age and/or the age of their mission. These different sets of preconditions are perhaps more typical of existing problems and would allow testing or investigation of some of the practical tactics suggested in the model. In addition, further research into the

activist agential perspective as an essential context or catalyst for such interagency cooperation would be useful.

Finally, research is needed to detail more fully and describe other possible institutionalization techniques as well as implementation mechanisms to carry on interagency coordination. One of the weaknesses of the IRLG cited by several of those interviewed was a lack of involvement and commitment by senior managers in several of the agencies despite the fact that the principals, surrogates, and the working staffs were stakeholders. Techniques for institutionalizing the interagency coordination at all of the appropriate levels requires further investigation. The IRLG case discusses the support given by agency heads through memoranda, endorsement of the surrogates' roles, and direct involvement in monitoring work group progress. Tom Grumbly suggested that the principles of negotiation need to be practiced between the political appointee and the career managers to increase their stakeholding in such enterprises. To facilitate future interagency cooperation involving political appointees, more research is needed to develop concepts and techniques for institutionalization.

In addition, while this research highlighted the committee/joint work group technique as the operational mechanism, there may be other mechanisms or techniques

that allow contactful engagement for coordination of substantive issues without using the personnel-intensive mechanism of frequent, single location, work group meetings. An example might be greater use of up-front interpersonal training or group facilitation combined with higher tech communication devices involving video conferencing or computer interaction.

### Summary

The following appeared in an article entitled, "Why Reagan is Finally Winning in Foreign Policy," in the Washington Post dated March 27, 1988:

There is another fundamental, if less dramatic, reason for Reagan's foreign-policy success in the twilight of his presidency. It is that the administration has finally achieved a coherent national-security policy process after seven years of exhausting internal feuding and division.

The new atmosphere is reflected in the daily meetings of the three principal players in the national-security process. Every weekday morning when they are all in town, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and national security adviser Lt. Gen. Colin Powell gather together in Powell's first-floor White House office at 7 a.m. to discuss the national-security affairs of the day.

A White House official refers to these sessions simply as "working meetings among three professionals." Aides and notetakers are barred, but one of the participants recently described the meetings as "exercises in practical problem-solving." We start the day by facing the problems."....

...A glimpse of the new spirit of cooperation was provided recently by Carlucci, who casually observed in a public speech that he had submitted a Pentagon analysis of the military costs of the Atlantic alliance to the State Department for its views.



"I almost fell out of my chair," said a former administration official who was in the audience. "That would have never happened in the old days. Cap and George hid things from each other. They didn't trust each other, and they just didn't get along."

Underlying the new cooperative attitude change is a basic change in the national-security process. For most of the past seven years, the NSC system was a machine that didn't work. National Security Decision Directives didn't produce clear decisions; interagency groups didn't provide interagency consensus. NSC meetings didn't resolve key issues. Instead, these bureaucratic institutions added to paralysis....

...These days the Reagan national-security process has less the look of a coalition government. The principal players are able to disagree without being disagreeable and are willing to resolve disputes in an orderly interagency process....

...The personalities and professionalism of the last-year team have helped. Shultz, Carlucci and Howard Baker are, in all probability, playing their final roles in government--and doing it with an historical perspective. They want to leave a good record, for their country, their president and themselves.<sup>2</sup> (emphasis mine)

Together with this research, this citation illustrates the complex work of modern government and the necessity for joint organizational ventures and cooperative policy development among Federal agencies. It is hoped that this research contributes to the understanding of the concept that large scale, formalized models of interorganizational cooperation ignore the essentialness of the generic human processes that drive such cooperation. When these processes are invoked by agency principals who have an agential perspective--a sense of leadership and vision which addresses and balances all of the interests of the

public--success of their cooperative ventures is virtually assured.

FOOTNOTES

1 Transcript of interview with Edwin H. Clark II, Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C., 21 December 1987, p. 14.

2 Lou Cannon, "Why Reagan Is Finally Winning in Foreign Policy," Washington Post, 27 March 1988, sec. C, pp. 1 and 4.

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## APPENDIX A -- METHODOLOGY

This appendix is an autobiographical account of my involvement with the IRLG prior to the conduct of this research, a description of my efforts to set up these interviews, and a reflection on my feelings toward the persons interviewed--both before and after the encounters. It also describes the format of the interview dialogue that I held with each person. The purpose of this appendix is to allow the reader insight into the cognitive and affective dimensions of my interests in the IRLG prior to this research as well as my attitudes and biases towards those persons interviewed. I hope such insight will allow the reader to make informed judgments about my conclusions and observations regarding interagency cooperation.

### Pre-Research Involvement

I became aware of the IRLG in October, 1978 when I became the Director, Program Integration Division in the Office of Toxic Substances at EPA. My work in this newly created organization was to work with other parts of the EPA in relating their programs on toxic chemicals control to the new Office of Toxic Substances and to connect the future work of that new office in gathering information on and regulating chemicals to other parts of EPA. In addition, my division was responsible for implementing one section of the Toxic Substances Control Act related to

joint work with other agencies. This section directed EPA to refer the regulation of chemical risks to other agencies when those risks could be better controlled using the other agencies' regulatory authorities. So, my day-to-day work evolved into information gathering, coordination with, and attempts to integrate chemical regulatory initiatives across EPA. At that time, Toby Clark (one of the surrogates interviewed) was the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances--one organizational level above my boss, Dr. Marilyn Bracken. She was involved as a back-up surrogate to Toby Clark in the IRLG.

In June, 1979 I was asked by Marilyn or Toby to chair the Regulatory Development Work Group of the IRLG. This was one of the eight primary subject areas highlighted in Chapter 4. I was very pleased with this opportunity because of the natural fit with my other interagency and intraagency work on tracking activities on chemicals. I was proud to be asked to take the post because it was important work in the view of my bosses and apparently to Administrator Costle. It made logical and professional sense to me then (and still does) that Federal agencies should be discussing their plans to investigate and regulate chemicals jointly. It appealed to my sense of order and efficiency. Also, because it was so closely related to my work, it was a comfortable

extension of what my staff and I were doing--rather than an add-on assignment.

As chairman, I involved one of my staff deeply in the administration of the work group and in its principal product--production of the Regulatory Reporter. This was the semi-annual publication summarizing the activities of the 20+ individual chemical work groups; it served to explain to the public and industry what was happening across all five agencies in research, analysis, proposed and final regulation for each chemical. This kind of communication seemed very worthwhile to me as evidence that the Federal government had its collective "act" together in terms of being informed about what each agency was doing and offering opportunities for joint action.

#### Interview Subjects-Part I

From my IRLG experience I knew that the surrogates and especially the principals were the crucial driving force in making the organization work. In June, 1986 I wrote to the five of the six principals--Bingham, Byington, Costle, Foreman, King, and Kennedy--and followed up with telephone calls to see if they would agree to be interviewed. Through their secretaries, all agreed to be interviewed except Susan King and Don Kennedy. King had recently changed jobs--a promotion--in spring, 1986 and had moved from upstate New York to New York City. Her secretary said she might be available in about six

months. I found this disappointing, but understandable; in addition, I had a long-standing acquaintanceship with Colin Church--one of the surrogates interviewed--and with Dr. Bracken, both of whom knew her. I felt that these people could provide an entre to her at the appropriate time.

Don Kennedy's response was that he, as president of Stanford University, was very busy in the summer of 1986 and would be taking the fall quarter off to plan for the Stanford centennial celebration. So, his answer (through his secretary) was "no." This was of more concern to me as I had no special contacts to try to intercede for me at that time.

In June, 1986 I was feeling confident enough about five of the principals' interviews to want to proceed with the research. I was frustrated by my apparent inability to get the Don Kennedy interview, which I felt was crucial to portraying the early days of the IRLG.

In terms of the surrogates, I was personally acquainted with Colin Church and at least a professional colleague of Toby Clark's. Don Clay was a former boss in the Office of Toxic Substances at EPA, so I felt access to him would be no problem. I had attended several surrogate meetings with Tom Grumbly and thought he would probably be receptive to being interviewed.

By summer, 1986 it was clear that the time



to do this research was not going to be available, so I put all my plans for interviews on hold.

### Interview Subjects--Part II

In the fall, 1987 I received a paid sabbatical from EPA to do writing and research on interagency cooperation; it began December 1 and was to end May 15, 1988. I knew that I would be able to devote my undivided attention to this project and was eager to arrange for the interviews. In late November, 1987 I began to telephone the principals to see if they were still willing to participate. Although Doug Costle had moved to Vermont, his secretary said he was willing to be interviewed, as did John Byington's secretary. In fact, she speculated that he would need all or more of the one hour to one hour and one-half that I requested for the interview. When Eula Bingham and I had talked in the summer of 1986, she had said that the IRLG principals had "something special" going on among them. So, her secretary reaffirmed her willingness. Her travel schedule required exchanging a number of calls to arrange an exact date for the interview in Cincinnati, but I always felt that these exchanges, while protracted, were in the spirit of accommodation.

These three principals being confirmed, I turned my attention to the others. Because of her travel schedule, I reached Susan King personally only after a number of calls to her office. In one of my messages, I left word

that Marilyn Bracken was familiar with this research--in hopes that her name would help to legitimize the effort in Susan King's eyes.

When I spoke with her, she was concerned that she would have little to contribute or remember very much, but I persuaded her that this project was not a history of the IRLG and that it was her subjective impressions and the affective dimensions that interested me the most. She suggested a telephone interview, but I said that her time spent would be the same in a personal interview and that I had a budget to travel to her office. She agreed to be interviewed over sandwiches in her New York office.

Carol Foreman returned my call personally, and I was able to explain the project to her. During the call, she offered that she joined the IRLG only after "harrassment--they needed to let us in." She said she had to convince the others that a program [FSQS] with so much money needed to be part of the IRLG. I felt that this was quite a different perspective on the IRLG than I had expected--it seemed more like bureaucratic warfare than cooperation.

My call to Don Kennedy's secretary to renew my request was returned by his special assistant to whom I was able to explain the project and the sabbatical. I felt the EPA sabbatical gave more legitimacy to the request as did the fact that I would be willing to travel

to Palo Alto to conduct the interview. After a month of trading calls and uncertainty due to his travel schedule, his assistant agreed to an hour interview in January. I was pleased and excited about this commitment because I felt it would complete the picture of the principals' relationship.

During this time, I realized that Kennedy left the IRLG during 1979 and that I needed an additional FDA perspective. I discovered that Jere Goyan was Commissioner for the bulk of the time after Kennedy left. I called his secretary in San Francisco and suggested an interview to coincide with my trip to see Kennedy; she agreed on the spot. Eula Bingham's secretary then agreed to a date just after the Kennedy-Goyan interviews, so I felt I had a neat, economical way to conduct these out-of-town interviews.

While working on scheduling the principals' interviews, I contacted the surrogates--Church, Clay, Clark, and Grumbly. They were all willing to be interviewed. Conveniently, Grumbly had moved to Washington to head a non-profit organization. In addition, the organization--Clean Sites Inc.--dealt with the issues of cleaning up abandoned waste sites under Superfund, the program I am now involved in at EPA. So, it was easy for me to be open and friendly with Tom Grumbly because of our currently shared professional interests, even though we

did not know each other well. I realized the need for a surrogate from OSHA and obtained Jim Pierce's Los Angeles number from a former OSHA colleague. He was willing to be interviewed, but would be away when I was in California. So, I decided on this one telephone interview in the interest of conserving travel funds and because he was a surrogate and not a principal.

#### Feelings about Interviews

With the exception of my early interviews with Colin Church and Don Clay, I kept notes as to my feelings before going into the interviews with each person. This concept of bracketing my perspective arose after these first two encounters, but I do have some reflections on them as well.

#### Colin Church

I have been having lunch with Colin about every two months for the last two years along with several other members of the former Regulatory Development Work Group. These occasions were a chance for all of us to keep up on personal as well as agency developments. I know Colin to be still committed to the concepts of joint CPSC-EPA work, and I assumed he would be interested and eager to discuss the IRLG. Our interview was my first and I found it to be more of a chat between friends than a more formal interview. I was concerned about spending too much time

on history and accomplishments of the IRLG rather than the interrelationships that I felt made it go. His interview was easy to conduct and allowed me to try out an order in which to ask questions, when the conversation waned (see later discussion of interview format). Afterwards, I felt he had been very open, but precise, in his responses, and that I really needed to talk to the agency heads to truly understand their interpersonal dynamic.

#### Don Clay

As I had worked with, and then for, Don for a time in the Office of Toxic Substances, I knew him as a colleague and supervisor. Therefore, I was comfortable chatting with him about the IRLG. I was unsure of his degree of enthusiasm for it before I saw him. Knowing his sometimes oblique style, I was not sure that I would get direct responses to a number of my questions. It turned out he was a supporter of the IRLG concept, and despite his stream of consciousness approach to recollecting his work as a surrogate, I got several good insights into the relationships among the principals. As my second interview, however, I continued to be worried about getting specific insight into the nature of the "contact" between the principals.

#### Doug Costle

My feelings going into this interview combined eager

anticipation and some apprehension. I was excited about the first principal interview. Because he was a former Administrator of EPA, with whom I dealt largely at a distance, I felt some nervousness. I anticipated his giving me a good overview of the IRLG concept because I perceived him as a major organizer. I also had on my mind two quotations. One was from Don Clay referring to him as "first among equals." The other was one of his own statements in Congressional testimony where he said the IRLG was really all the employees of all the agencies working together. I was curious to explore both of these perspectives.

He was most gracious and friendly in this first out-of-town interview; he made me feel like a colleague, not a former employee. He was animated and made as much time available as I needed to respond to my questions; I felt the interview was candid and reflective of his personal views of the IRLG experience. On my trip home, I was on a "high" in terms of feeling that I had some really good data for this research.

Edwin H. (Toby) Clark

I remembered Toby as a quiet, introverted, and contemplative person, not my stereotype of a manager--even though he was a "boss" at EPA. I thought of him as an intellectual and was unsure of the merit he would attribute to my research, but he seemed open and available

for the interview. Because he was a surrogate, I expected him to be positive about the IRLG, yet I also expected candor due to his thoughtful nature. Also, because he was not mentioned by Costle during his interview, I wondered about his level of engagement with him as a surrogate.

Toby was indeed thoughtful in his answers, and I had the feeling that he genuinely thought that this subject--interagency cooperation--was worth pondering. He was reflective--to the point of my feeling that some of the pauses in the interview were long and awkward. Afterwards, I had two things on my mind. One was the first parking ticket I had ever received for arriving 10 minutes after an expired meter. I also felt that his comments were helpful in filling in some of the interpersonal relationships--especially regarding Carol Foreman.

#### Tom Grumbly

I was feeling open, positive, and expectant regarding my interview with Tom. He was friendly on the telephone, and due to the above mentioned convergence of our current work interests, I thought we had some built-in rapport even though I did not remember him well from the IRLG. I was especially expecting to get insights from him on his two different IRLG principals--Kennedy and Foreman. In addition, he had volunteered on the telephone to intercede with Don Kennedy's office if I had trouble getting an interview. So, I looked upon this as much as a

conversation as an interview.

We talked over tea and coffee in his office, and his animation and interest were evident. He did have specific views on the Kennedy-Foreman differences, their relationship, and the needed mechanisms for interagency coordination based on his past experience as an OMB budget examiner. The interview and the subsequent discussion of Superfund were very positive, and I felt that he gave me very personal and thoughtful reflections on the IRLG.

Susan King

Although I had been concerned about getting this interview, after I had spoken to her personally about it, I felt a much more comfortable anticipation. It was as if I had "won" in the competition to get her to agree to be involved. Because Colin Church and Marilyn Bracken spoke well of her and also because of the very positive view expressed by Doug Costle and Tom Grumbly on her intellectual and personal commitment to the IRLG, I looked forward to drawing out her reflections about the IRLG. This was my second out-of-town interview and the second with a principal; I was feeling more positive and competent about my ability to talk with a former agency head.

The setting on 5th Avenue in New York, as well as her secretary's consideration to make tea while I waited for her, made me feel welcome, and that this was an



important occasion. Susan King was equally charming and open about the project. In fact, she queried me on my views about why certain aspects of the IRLG worked as well as inquired about "life" as a senior civil servant in the Reagan Administration. She was intellectually curious about the research and candid in her reflections on the IRLG relationships. She also inquired about Don Clay and Colin Church. Having this conversation-like interview over sandwiches increased the level of contact. Although she was labeled as a more political and less technically-trained agency head, partisan politics didn't come through in the interview nor did her lack of technical training seem to hamper her appreciation of the chemical regulatory dilemmas of the time.

#### Carol Tucker Foreman

Because she seemed very personable on the telephone when I explained the subject of my research, I was positive and expectant about this interview. I had heard several interviewees' comments about her difficult or brittle personality, so I was especially curious about her manner in handling the interview. I was aware that her two-person firm did political consulting and lobbying, so I was expecting more commentary on the partisan political aspects of the IRLG. As my third principal interview, I was feeling fairly confident about my style of conversation.

We talked just after she returned from the Hill. She ate a brown bag lunch, while I had hot tea. I arrived in her office before she returned, and her secretary had me wait in her office, as there was no waiting room. She was direct and frank about her efforts to get into the IRLG as well as the benefits she realized from sitting together with other political officials and sharing experiences. She was open and elaborated on comments without much prompting. I felt that I had garnered good data that contrasted the latter days of five principals with the earlier days with just four--even with Susan King's substitution at CPSC.

Jere Goyan

This was the first of a trio of out-of-town interviews conducted over a two-day period. I was excited to be going to San Francisco (where Goyan is the Dean of the School of Pharmacy, University of San Francisco), and pleased at the proximity of this interview to the one the next day in Palo Alto with Don Kennedy. I was curious and open about Jere Goyan--having never met him. Two of the previous interviewees had said that the IRLG was not the same after Kennedy's departure, so I was not expecting the level of creativity and enthusiasm from this principal. I was feeling confident about my interview format.

Jere Goyan was congenial and friendly, and used the occasion to help recollect what were enjoyable personal

encounters, but not high priority agency matters. He is still friends with Don Kennedy. My expectation about his lesser level of energy for and interest in the IRLG experience was confirmed.

#### Donald Kennedy

The next day my interview was marked by anticipation and excitement. As several of the interviewees referred to him as a "spark" for the IRLG, and given the respect expressed by Doug Costle for him, I was looking forward to this interview. I was apprehensive about the degree of openness surrounding it given the difficulty I had in gaining his agreement to do it, getting through his secretary, and finally his special assistant, to reach him, and the necessity to get a visitor's parking pass to even be able to park "close" to the president of Stanford's office. Although this pass was a nice gesture, I viewed it as reinforcing the importance of his office and the privilege I was being accorded in this interview. With my previous four principal interviews complete, however, I looked forward with some confidence to getting some fruitful data. I arrived at his office early for a 10 a.m appointment and was told that his Faculty Senate meeting was running over. His receptionist said that they had tried to reach me at my hotel that morning to inform me, but I had left early to have breakfast on campus. The receptionist was very solicitous, and I used the time to

adjust my very "tight" reservation that afternoon to Cincinnati.

He arrived about 20 minutes late, and we had coffee and tea in his office while he reflected on the IRLG experience. Although he was responsive to my questions, elaboration didn't come easily--perhaps due to his rather stiff style. He was the only principal who checked his watch after about 40 minutes (apologizing about a subsequent meeting), which I took as a cue to finish my questions. Although his style was not hurried, I left feeling somewhat unsuccessful in that I didn't sense the degree of rapport with him that I had had with the other principals. This is despite the fact that a number of his comments proved very useful in appreciating the interrelationships among the principals. This was the shortest of all of my interviews.

#### Eula Bingham

This was the third interview in this trip. Because of her statement some months ago about "something special" going on among the principals in the IRLG, I was expectant and positive about the insight she might bring to the relationships. Because of the more "official" nature of the Kennedy interview the day before, I was hoping for a more collegial one this day. Her volunteering to pick me up at my hotel and to take me to her office (due to the parking complexities at the University of Cincinnati),

gave me a sense of hospitality and openness as well.

My expectations were met. We talked over tea and coffee in a conference room undisturbed by interruptions. She listened thoughtfully to my questions, and her responses were both responsive and reflective. As she said, she had thought a lot about the IRLG--even since she had left Washington. I felt that my interview technique was reinforced and effective with such a willing and open person.

James O. Pierce

This interview was conducted at a prearranged time from my EPA office. I felt neutral to positive about it given the enthusiasm I had experienced with Eula Bingham, his former boss. Also, he made positive remarks about the IRLG on the telephone when I talked to him about arranging the interview.

Despite some technical difficulties in getting a telephone through which to record the interview, it went very well. He was very enthusiastic about the IRLG and said he still had his certificate of chairmanship (of one of the rotating six-month, rotating periods) on his office wall. His interview emphasized the success of the National Toxicology Program (mentioned in this research as a "daughter" of the IRLG effort), so I was a little uncertain if my questions focused him sufficiently on the IRLG relationships. He seemed very open and frank in his

views, however.

John Byington

My last interview was with the remaining principal. I anticipated that he would be forthcoming in this interview because of the enthusiasm his secretary suggested as well as the references to his being an activist (vis-a-vis the IRLG) in other interviews. Colin Church had said that he would be a vocal supporter. I was especially curious about his status as the only Republican in the original IRLG group, and what he might have to say about that.

His interview was the longest of all I had. We spent over two and one-half hours together in a conversation over coffee and tea and, later, over Cokes. His enthusiasm was apparent because he felt he had so much to do with setting the stage for the IRLG through the joint work on chlorofluorocarbons begun in the Ford Administration. He was forthcoming and volunteered perspectives willingly; he had strong feelings about the necessity of interagency cooperation and the IRLG as an exemplar. His style was friendly, open, and contagious in its enthusiasm.

#### Interview Content

I used the outline in Table 3 as a guide for conducting the interviews. While I did not slavishly

follow the order of the questions, I wanted to draw the interviewees out on their view of the purpose of the IRLG, the environment around them, the relationships among the principals, the nature of their meetings alone and with the surrogates, how decisions were made, any changes that occurred with the departure of Kennedy and the arrival of Foreman, and thoughts on the possibility of this kind of forum again. I also solicited reactions to industry criticism of the IRLG contained in Congressional testimony from the American Industrial Health Council.<sup>1</sup> In most of the interviews, I also cited a quotation from the Landy et al. book as to the IRLG being a "relatively small coalition within the larger game of Executive branch pluralistic politics."<sup>2</sup> This was discussed in the context of other coordinative bodies such as the Council of Wage and Price Stability and the Office of Science and Technology Policy to name some mentioned by those authors. I wanted to draw the interviewees out on their views of the scope of the IRLG.

Table 4 is a copy of a one-page hand out that I gave to each interviewee (and mailed in advance to Jim Pierce) to jog his/her memory on significant dates associated with the IRLG as well as the major activity areas. I usually handed this out about one-half of the way through the interview, when we discussed the departure of Don Kennedy and the arrival of Carol Foreman.

TABLE 3

## IRLG INTERVIEW TOPICS

Prior to each interview, I discussed my interest in expanding the concept of interagency coordination by recognizing the micro-micro level of interaction and recognizing the negotiation literature and the principles of humanistic psychology. I stated that I was not writing a history of the IRLG. I also obtained the interviewee's consent to record the interview.

1. What was the purpose of the IRLG?
2. What was going on in the Administration or the broader political economy at the time the IRLG was set up (1977)?
3. Did you know any of the other principals prior to the formation of the IRLG? How?
4. How did the meetings get set up? Why monthly? Why breakfast?
5. What was the physical setting? How long did the meetings last? What was the purpose of the private sessions vs. those with the surrogates? Were alternates allowed? Why?
6. How did the group operate? How did it make decisions? Majority, consensus, minority veto? Was there a difference in decisions on the budget vs. other matters? Was there a chairman? How was he/she selected? Was the chairman usually the leader of the group? If not, who was? Was there an agenda? Who created it?
7. How did the group function with the original four members? With the new agency appointees? With the fifth agency member? What were the differences? What happened when Don Kennedy left?
8. What is your reaction to the American Industrial Health Council critique of the IRLG, taken from Congressional testimony?
9. What is your reaction to the Landy et al. citation regarding the IRLG, i.e. "...relatively small coalition within the larger game of Executive branch pluralistic politics?"
10. Is this type of forum possible again? How?



TABLE 4  
 INFORMATION HANDOUT TO IRLG INTERVIEWEES

IRLG CHRONOLOGY

May 1977	International Conference on CFC's
August 1977	Press conference announcing IRLG
September 1977	Interagency agreement in <u>Federal Register</u> ; 4 agencies in "voluntary cooperation"
January 1978	Draft work plans in the <u>Federal Register</u>
June 1978	John Byington leaves
January 1979	FSQS joins IRLG agencies
-----, 1979	Public forums held in Regions 6 and 10 and Washington
July 1979	Don Kennedy leaves
September 1981	Interagency agreement expires

ACTIVITY AREAS

Compliance and enforcement  
 Education and communications  
 Information exchange  
 Regulatory development  
 Research planning  
 Risk assessment  
 Testing guidelines  
 Regional activities  
 Epidemiology

## FOOTNOTES

1 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Statement and Discussion: Importance of Sound Scientific Basis for Health Related Regulatory Decisions. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Government Relations on H.R. 746. 97th Cong., 1st sess., 30 April 1981, pp.441-518.

2 Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen R. Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions: Environmental Protection During the Carter Administration, (New York, Oxford Press, Forthcoming.)

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