THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH EXPERIENCE
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The law hath already precluded your enquiry, and determined where your allegiance is due; under that law you were born; --it hath hitherto afforded you protection; to it therefore, by all the ties of nature and gratitude, is your duty pre-engaged.

--Bentham, Letter to a Young Gentleman
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This paper is directed towards one particular facet of nationalism—its emergence. Our thesis is that the nation-idea and subsequently nationalism emerged during English Revolutionary times. This position argues that the French Revolution was not the birthplace of nationalism, but only the initiator of a significant variety of nationalism. The explanation developed here carefully discriminates between the different social locations where oppositional ideologies come to the fore during times of decline for central political authorities. The resulting distinctions cogently divide nationalism into three principle types: an aristocratic type, an anti-foreign type (xenophobic), and a populist type. However, we will be focusing primarily on the aristocratic and popular varieties as principal developments of the English and French revolutions, respectively; and only touching on the xenophobic variety
or aspects of the American Revolution where it seems instructive.

If the nation-idea could be solidly grounded in a single, commanding, coherent model, then one could reasonably expect the following advancements:

(1) inquiries concerning the fit of the theoretical model with historical data would help refine one's definition of the empirical units of nationalism study—the nation,

(2) the historical developments of these empirical units are more likely to be investigated in a systematic way, regardless of one's theoretical or cultural orientation,

(3) the close parallelisms of these empirical units (i.e., nationality, nationalism, nation-state) are also more likely to be investigated in a systematic way understandable across theoretical or cultural orientations,

(4) and finally, successive nationalism theories could be evaluated by the community of nationalism scholars in a way that reflects an extension of the range of what can be explained and predicted.

All told, without the nation-idea fundamentally captured by an explanation with sufficient merit to be recognized by some consensus as successful, theoretical work in the field of nationalism predictably suffers by
being narrow and insular. Moreover, the task of comparing various theories suffers by there being (1) little or no relation of one theory to another, (2) differing standards of confirming and disconfirming evidence, (3) and pivotal definitions and semantic clusters (e.g., economic nationalism, the nationalism of developing countries) taking on vastly different characteristics for seemingly arbitrary and unsupported reasons. Thus, the state of nationalism theory today removes theorists and serious scholars from any identification with "rational and progressive theory change" (Laudan 1985, 149).

For the majority of academics, both in the social sciences and in history, the French Revolution was the event that became synonymous with the birth of nationalism. Those that have held the Chair of the History of the French Revolution at the Sorbonne have produced significant digressions on nationalism. Meanwhile, even renowned scholars of the English Revolution have added not so much as a farthing's worth to our appreciation of English nationalism or nationalism in general. 1 This is not only true of England's

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1. As for the American Revolution, works by no less recognized scholars than Seymour Martin Lipset and Hans Kohn writing respectively The First New Nation and Readings in American Nationalism would seem to set the American Revolution as the birthplace of nationalism—yet, not only do these authors seemingly have no recognition of the French assertion but there is no specificity whatsoever as to what they mean by nation and nationalism.
seventeenth century scholars but it holds equally well for those specializing in other periods, regardless of their historiographical school—Marxist Old Guard, liberal Old Hat, Whig, Namierite, neo-Namierism, Class of '68, whatever (Clark 1986, 6-23).

Nationalism, in the context of this paper, is a belief in the efficacy of one's nation to intercede with the central political authority on behalf of the populace. From this, a nation becomes defined as any socially integrated group thus promoted into the political arena for its potential to secure the needs of its members. This agrees well with Weber's understanding of nation where he develops its political essence. "In so far as there is at all a common object lying behind the obviously ambiguous term 'nation,' it is apparently located in the realm of politics" (1958, 176; emphasis mine).

It is this political essence that distinguishes a nation from an ethnic group. Weber is acutely aware of the similarity between ethnicity and nations; both often share a belief in common descent and shared customs. Moreover, "all history shows how easily political action can give rise to the belief in blood relationship, unless gross differences of anthropological type impede it" (Weber 1968, 396; quoted in Smith 1983, 32). In Weber's sense, the belief in one's nation and the belief in
common ethnicity both rest on "a sense of common origins" (Smith 1983, 32). But for an ethnic group to become a nation "requires political action" (Smith 1983, 32). My definition differs from Weber's most particularly in one respect: he focuses on the end product of nationalism, its producing "a state of its own" (1958, 176). Conversely, I focus on the nationalistic process of public dissent and struggle, civil military struggle. Thus, mine is considerably more process oriented. Then, concerning "how these groups should be delimited" (Weber 1958, 172), I respond, the nation appears to its members as a reasonable entity to put into the political arena vis-a-vis their central political authority. And, concerning "what concerted action should result from such solidarity" (Weber 1958, 172), I respond, the nation should actively press the political order to satisfy the needs of its members.

In my analysis of the English Revolution as the political process resulting in the emergence of English nationalism, I am focusing on the interaction of both the political elite and the masses (with the significant action taking place from 1640 to 1669). Although this was a "civil war between segments of the dominant landed class" (Skocpol 1980, 141), it was, nonetheless, a struggle: "with each side drawing allies and supporters from all of the other classes and strata" (Skocpol 1980,
Subsequently, there emerged ideas "about limitations on the power of the central executive ... and about a polity based on the consent of a broad spectrum of society" (Stone 1972, 147). And although the benefit of these ideas was not extended to the bottom of English society, nonetheless, "the establishment of these ideas as the common property of the political nation was something quite new" (Stone 1972, 147). This is reflected in the debate (listened to with great attention by Englishmen outside the political elite) between absolute monarchy and limited monarchy in which "objective reason, not will, was the standard of political rightness" (Eccleshall 1978, 76). It was pointedly argued that "the English monarch could not govern in an arbitrary fashion because he or she was hedged about with communally beneficial restrictions" (Eccleshall 1978, 38; emphasis mine). Furthermore, so long as parliament was attentive to this same standard it was believed that "the common good was furthered because politics was a matter of joint effort that involved the representatives of the entire community in parliament" (Eccleshall 1978, 38). The culmination of this was that objective reason came to constitute the ground that all men had the potential "to conduct themselves in an orderly fashion, with an eye to that common good in which particulars were truly integrated" (Eccleshall 1978, 176). In effect, English
nationalism was emerging. That is, it was now a believable fact of life that throughout England all Englishmen constituted an entity, the English nation. Their nation was a viable political entity capable of interceding for their common needs vis-a-vis the political establishment.

This analysis differs considerably from that of elite theorists. In their focus on the elite, their events, and transformations, the masses and their interactive processes with the elite (e.g., mass support of elite causes inspired through propaganda, reverence, self-interest, etc.) become relegated to the backwaters of sovereign politics. In such a distorting frame of reference historically insupportable statements, such as "Elites always need mass support" (Higley and Burton 1989, 22), become routine features. Furthermore, such a framework becomes rigid and isolating. For example, such a statement as "no discernable mass configuration leads inexorably to elite transformations" (Higley and Burton 1989, 22) serves to isolate the elite from the role of the masses in influencing just who the elites are and how radically they may be changed out for others.

The elite view tends to portray the emergence of civil wars as opportunistic timings between disunified elites rather than processes involving a region's popular development. This thesis argues, conversely, that
convulsions within a region's central authority have a historical timing consistent with authoritative crises involving the whole populace and not just a power misalignment with another elite group. Both case studies portrayed here highlight the profound social depth of administrative crises preceding the respective civil wars.

In sum, instead of the formation of nation-states "almost always" resulting in a disunified national elite, I argue that the disunified national elites, sometimes, can—if they fall into a civil war with each other—produce a sense of a nation among all the populace. It is this, the political power of the nation to intercede with the political elites of the reigning order, that radically alters the political order and subsequent political developments. Whether the elites became unified pursuant to their needs, developed in the work of Higley and Burton, is secondary to the involvement of the masses in securing their needs. Moreover, such important considerations for nationalism theorists as "the disintegration of central state authority into multiple sovereignty" (see Aya 1979, 49) or the loss of legitimacy for ruling groups cannot be passed over in silence.

If nationalism is to stand any chance at all of being fully understood, it must not lack such a "genuine political dimension" as the involvement of the masses
pursuant to the needs of various institutions of the political elite (e.g. the military, the bureaucracy, tax revenues, etc.) and the attentiveness of the masses to the quality of political channels associated with their needs.

Where is English nationalism? Some have even reported that there is a training of the Anglo-American historiographical consciousness to be ignorant of any technically meaningful idea of English nationalism (Newman 1987, xviii). The historian Gerald Newman, after having seriously considered English nationalism, felt duly compelled to write:

> It is strange to think how greatly English nationalism has eluded our scholarly attention. [Note that this was published in 1987!] Its nature has not been debated, and its power, though often sensed, has escaped analysis. Its historic creators have not been enumerated or considered as a group,... (Newman 1987, xvii; emphasis mine)

Could it be as J.G.A. Pocock professes, that it is that which we do not understand, whatever it might be, that is of great importance? (1982) English nationalism, for instance.

In the wake of this ignorance of the historic creation of English nationalism there exists no ground to rebut today's eminent historian of the French Revolution, Francois Furet, when he says: "It [the French Revolution] wanted to found society, to create the revolutionary man, but on the basis of what? It had neither Moses nor
Washington, nobody and nothing on which to fix its rudder" (Furet 1988; quoted in Bernstein 1988, 27). The effort of this thesis is concentrated on supplying just what the French found—that constituting the basis of a nation.

It seems remarkable that one of the great dons of nationalism could write almost the very same words about founding a nation in a historical void—and of founding one previous to the French founding! Hans Kohn with Daniel Walden write:

Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* was written by a citizen of the world who saw in the American Revolution an event without any roots in the past, and who turned what had been a constitutional controversy between British Tories and British Whigs into a struggle for the birth of a new freedom and a new nation on universal principles. (Kohn and Walden 1970, 15; emphasis mine)

They, then, at least consider that this "new consciousness" was connected to English nationalism: "It was the 'religion of humanity,' not that of an English or a yet nonexistent American nationalism,..." (1970, 15). Are we to believe that France, America, and England all founded a nation on a historical void!

Furthermore, in the only serious treatment of English nationalism to date, *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740-1830*, the author's grounding of nationalism absents itself entirely from the nation-idea and instead utilizes an inventory "of
theoretical elements which are all considered necessary in some degree to the development of the typical nationalist movement,..." (Newman 1987, 58; emphasis mine).

Following his list, our suspicions are confirmed as to the list's origin: in ad hoc fashion he used the French Revolution in grounding all aspects of nationalism's elaboration in the event's historical development. He writes: "Then add to all this the fact that in Europe the typical nationalist movement is agreed to have begun and been timed with [!] the economic, social and political dynamics of the later eighteenth century,..." (Newman 1987, 58-9; emphasis mine).

Thus we have this prevailing postulation of nationalism--it is the exclusive product of France's most notable historical event (the French Revolution)--being surreptitiously imported into the most blueblooded of English subjects, its nationalism. It has even come to be written, "Nationalism is not a word often used in connection with the English.... [These] are the substitutes."

In the wake of this postulation scholars further err by attributing the form and essence of a "nation" by their examinations of "What did it take for the French to form a nation?" Proposing this as the substantive area out of which to draw nationalism for one's model has long
been the standard practice of nationalism scholars and the understanding of nationalism passed on to others. But the more difficult, more intellectually responsible question is, "What has it taken to instill into the nation-idea that singular essence responsible for its enduring vitality?" This requires an altogether different tack.

In this thesis I draw upon revolutions, beginning with the English, to develop the major forms of nationalism. This accepts K. R. Minogue's "fact" that "the nationalist process is a condition of civil war" (1967, 154). The philosophical underpinning for this position is supplied by Hannah Arendt's depiction of those initiating action requiring the security of community so as not to be found solitary in the uniqueness of their actions. As J. Glenn Gray interprets this: "The principle of individuation that our will discloses is quickly countered by the principle of community as our belonging to others and to the world" (1979, 234). Or simply: action forces the discovery of the "we." In the context of collectivities initiating political redress against secular authorities, it would be unreasonable for activists to seek their community among believers beyond the grave. Their community is among the living. This falls in well with Silvert's description of nationalism as "in a sense,... the
institutionalized power reflection of 'empathy,'..." (1963, 24). And Gellner's saying that "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (1964, 168).

In this thesis I am investigating collectivities for their patterns of civil contention. I make the claim that these patterns are dictated by the structural location of those in active dissent to the political establishment. Moreover, these different patterns of civil contention subsequently produce different forms of nationalism.

In using this structural approach I am avoiding the "woolly guesswork about the hypothetical 'states of mind' of undifferentiated masses toward concern with tangible political issues ..." (Aya 1979, 58). That is, I am staying clear of the likes of James C. Davies' J-curve hypothesis which states that a revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes intolerable. (1969, 690; quoted in Aya 1979, 53)

I am staying clear of Ted Robert Gurr's "strain." Moreover, I am staying clear of Althusser's "over-determined contradiction." And, because my analysis is solidly process oriented, I am staying clear of how one may distinguish factors that lead to revolution from those that "form the grist of political continuity." That
(meaning the occurrence of revolution) is a result that in my analysis is a nationalistic process.

In Rod Aya's work, "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered," all forms of "coercive civilian conflict" are seen in a process orientation. Citing Clausewitz, Aya writes that these are "a mere continuation of politics by other means" (1973, 210; Aya 1979, 68). This political model of civil contention allows lesser forms of conflict to enter into our consideration of emerging nationalism. Moreover, we can begin to see how revolution can become a "genuine political instrument" of nationalists. Aya, in his summarization writes:

"So we see therefore," writes Clausewitz, putting his finger on the nub, "that war is not merely a political act, but a genuine political instrument, a continuation of political dealings, a completion of the latter by other means ... the political intent is the aim, war is the means, and the means can never be conceived of apart from the aim." (1973, 210; Aya 1979, 68-69)

It is from Aya that we begin to carefully study civil contention for revelations concerning "social structure, political pattern, and tactical logic--akin to war, diplomacy, or elections" (Aya 1979, 70). The better nationalistic processes are understood in this framework (away from states of mind), the more nationalism will be better understood.
The Historiography of the Two Revolutions

In view of the evidence presented above as well as throughout the literature on nationalism that the notion of nationalism is very muddled, let us briefly digress to clarify this term. The nationalism I am investigating occurs in association with civil wars (sometimes referred to as revolutionary wars). In so doing, I accept the claim establishing equivalence between nationalistic processes and civil wars. 2 It therefore becomes

2. How interesting this is for a reader is hardly the point of formal explanation. However, Richard W. Miller believes "it is typical of the most interesting scientific theories that phenomena which are connected by way of explanation are also connected, to some extent, by definition" (1984, 203; emphasis mine). The point of this paper is to test the connection of nationalism and revolution historically, having associated them definitionally via "nationalistic processes."

A further point on this line of "definition" is provided by Philip Abrams' discussion of Anderson's definitional strategy in Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974). Abrams writes:

He [Anderson] never,... gives us a definition of the absolutist state which is dissociated from his principal theoretical claim (hypothesis) that absolutism was a form of state characterized by its functional commitment to the defense of feudalism. In other words, his definition of absolutism solves in advance the problem his book as a whole is supposed to be investigating. State forms which failed to perform the crucial function,... were ipso facto so far as Anderson is concerned, not absolutist states. (1982, 154-55)

In the same way, what others might consider nationalistic processes but historically are not a part of civil conflict (e.g., treaty arrangements creating Pakistan,
important to think clearly about the two revolutions singled out by this paper as critical for advancing conceptual clarity on nationalism. Sir Herbert Butterfield, a mentor to many outstanding historians, once wrote, "When our ideas on some large historical theme are in a state of disorder, we may find it useful to make ourselves acquainted with the history of the historiography of that particular subject" (1957).

The French Revolution has always been seen as a revolution. However much different interpretations may disagree on various points, including how many revolutions there actually were, nonetheless, that it was a revolution is quite sacred as an historical fact. But for England's civil conflict we have a quite different historiographical picture.

England's conflict was a "rebellion" for almost two centuries following the event. It was a Frenchman, Francois Guizot, who first used the term "revolution" in place of the traditional "rebellion" for England's civil war action. His Histoire de la Revolution d'Angleterre was published in Paris in 1826-7. In it, consistent with the current practice of interpreting earlier revolutions...
by later ones (e.g., the French by the Russian), he writes: "In a word, the analogy of the two revolutions is such, that the first would never have been understood had not the second taken place."

In contemporary revolution scholarship, this historiographical predilection is beginning to be tempered. Francois Furet, writing in his *Dictionnaire Critique de la Revolution Francaise* describes this century's historical interpretation of the French Revolution as being dominated by the Russian Revolution of 1917. Even their two terrors, the Terror of 1793 that was ushered in by Robespierre and the Stalinist Terror of the 1930s, are often seen analogously as necessary, justified by their ends (to combat counterrevolution). But Furet, in fighting against this interpretation, has brought a new direction to the subject. Reviewing his 1981 work, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, the writer sees it as "a vast liquidation of the entire manner of the Marxists, which was so deeply embedded in the academic culture that historians dealt with the revolution in a Marxist manner without knowing that they were Marxists" (Nora n.d.). 3 Expanding on this, the reviewer above writes about what he sees as a

transformation occurring in the last five years, "For the first time, we were just at the point where the history of the revolution could be written not by militants but by historians" (Nora n.d.; emphasis mine).

The shifting in the historiography of the English civil conflict is not confined to bygone days. Today it is matched by such tumult that J.C.D. Clark can write, "Which was the English Revolution--1642 or 1688?" (Clark 1986, 42) Or even: "In respect of the monarchy as in respect of social structure, the revisionist answer to the question, 'when was the English Revolution?' was a disconcerting one: 'there was no revolution' (Clark 1986, 70-1). Part of the problem was "the unchallenged use of the term 'revolution' to cover many different phenomena ..." (Clark 1986, 42). And then there was the use of "rebellion": "Within a secular and materialist frame of reference, rebellion has long seemed a matter of only minor importance. The issues it raised were seldom explored in an English context" (Clark 1986, 44).

It seems that the Frenchmen as historians have been destined to grapple with how to analyze rapid social change in the form of revolutions and rebellions in a way Englishmen never have--as a way of confronting their identity as Frenchmen. Edmund Wilson gives an empathetic historian's rendering of these historians of the "revolutionary tradition." From Michelet's discovery of
Vico to the final nihilisms of Anatole France we see Wilson's vision of "the circuit of the varying relation of the individual, as writer, to society" become a completed circuit in the French experience (Wilson 1985, 79). My point is that wherever the historian was placed on Wilson's circuit, he had to come to terms with one profoundly personal, historical event: the Revolution. Whether the historian was an entertaining conversationalist of no significant role like the older Anatole France, an exalted Frenchman with a positive political role among the dominant class like Renan, or an anachronistic, isolated misanthrope—they felt a personal solidarity with the Revolution and understood that to develop as person and historian required throwing oneself intellectually at understanding the Revolution.

No such comparable circuit or solidarity exists in the English "revolutionary tradition." As for later English revolutionary historiographical developments, their emphasis—even without a revolutionary tradition—is quite different. Attention has been drawn to their emphasis on stability and gradualism. For instance, England's Glorious Revolution is hailed as preventing a revolution. In contrast to the French tradition, such terms as civil peace rather than terror are heavily emphasized. Peter Lasslet, an American at Oxford in 1961, could be said to illustrate the pastoral ambience of
social change so characteristic of the English historiographical tradition:

All societies, even English society at its stabilest, are liable to break down into conflict, even armed conflict. Conflict is a common enough form of social interaction; there is nothing special about the things which bring it about. (Laslett 1961, x)

And finally, despite the excellent case Clark makes when he writes, "But the war that was actually fought was, in its origins, not English: it was a Scottish and Irish Civil War, which only later spilled over into the English shires" (Clark 1986, 66)—he is illustrating my point but along a different line: All Englishmen are now absolved from being the originators of a self-inflicted disease—domestic violence. Thus English historical continuity along the lines of serene domestic tranquility is preserved in a higher, more rarefied dimension.

What I am driving at here is that the fashions of historiography from which we understand the two revolutions are substantially different. Yes, there may be different motivations behind each national fashion, true enough. However, among the motivations for good historiography common to both, yet differentiating the style of their work is another factor. And that is the different relations of identity and social solidarity facing the historian as a social being. From each characteristic relation there was deposited in historical archives a different kind of stylistic result. What they
personally wanted to get out of history for themselves and their likenesses was never just the truth. Their truth had functional significance for their present personal concerns as well as their hopes for influencing positively present social concerns. The relationship of the French historian to his society had a unity and characteristic difference from that of the English historian to his society.

The Problem of Definition

My perception of nationalism is that it is a functionally cohesive set of intellectual concepts predicated upon the nation-idea. By this, I mean that nationalism maintains a functional unity wherever it occurs. Nationalism acts as an intercessional entity between a central political authority in decline and its populace. In instituting the nation, and there is very wide latitude as to what this could be, a standard of judicial equality is established across any and all mediating boundaries (i.e., social, economic, ethnic, tribal, corporate, linguistic, and etc.). The king is included in with the meanest beggar or most heinous criminal in terms of a social code. However much this social code is reflected in the system of laws of a nation (or region) is more a matter for legal philosophers and sociologists to ponder. My point is that the nation is an institution that functions to establish
one, singular social code over all people of a specific region. Nationality is a term of membership, however arbitrary its inclusivity and exclusivity. And nationalism pertains to those members believing that their position vis-a-vis the central political authority is mediated by the nation-idea.

In our view, nationalism has a way of reconstituting foreign affairs into domestic content. Thus, the entire thrust of the threat of foreign domination is translated into that of institutional decline. Nationalists perceive the military inferiority of their central political authority as evidence of institutional decline. This sometimes elicits from them a fictitious vision of their homeland's international potency. Sometimes the threat is more passive where cosmopolitanism or foreign cultural values are being imported. This, too, becomes translated into evidence of institutional decline. Here the members are perceiving their cultural devaluation in terms of the impotence of their political authorities. They see diminishing capabilities as decline. In brief, it is not the military or foreign threat directly that members, citizens, or nationalists are responding to with surging nationalism, but the meaning this communicates to them that their central political authority is in decline.

Because the locus of nationalism's functioning is largely in the public domain, its form lacks a logical
and clear outline. Furthermore, its development similarly lacks an orderly and logical development. Its functional nature establishes in it a capacity not only for different nationalisms between contrasting regions, but (developing in the context of this thesis) a range of different nationalisms within the same region, even within the same nation-state where that coincidence occurs. Thus, we are freed to investigate the different nationalisms of France over time, or England, or developing nations. We are freed of that unarticulated premise that a region's nationalism is a qualitatively constant entity. Having chosen to name nationalism categories by regional titles, it became absurd to claim the French were now experiencing Dutch or German nationalism—any other nationalism besides French. Or in such categorical references as eastern and western nationalism, the practice was to restrict the west to the west, and the east to the east. But the arbitrariness was hidden in the semantics.

K.R. Minogue brings out another arbitrary feature of nationalism which is equally fatal if succumbed to. It is the portrayal of nationalism in the rhetoric of nationalists. ... the concept of the nation is almost entirely empty of content until a content is—arbitrarily—supplied from local circumstances. This is the reason why there is so much difficulty in trying to define a nation. ... nationalist self-characterization is simply a misleading description of the fact that the nationalist process is a condition of civil war .... Nationalist rhetoric, often used by all parties to this
civil struggle, is a strong card to play. (Minogue 1967, 154)

This functionalist perspective of nationalism calls attention to the quid pro quo arrangement between the governed and the governors. The governors secure their needed tax revenues, soldiers or sailors, and mass adoration. The populace secures a guarantee of the public benevolence of all actions emanating from the political establishment. Thus, investing one's security in the private consciousness of kings or administrators is minimized; after all, the nation, one's own nation at hand, is much more tangible than another's conscience, however kingly. In its place a special "collectivism of ourselves" becomes significant. To understand this special "collectivism" one must understand the social setting in which the political discourse emerges to confront the political establishment. If the setting is among members of the political regime, then the belief in "ourselves" will certainly not stray far from other mainstream aristocratic ideologies. Thus nationalism will reflect a strong paternalistic orientation. If the setting is outside the political realm but within the social order of a region relative to the political establishment, then the belief in "ourselves" will not stray far from other mainstream popular ideologies. Thus nationalism will reflect a strong orientation to the sacredness of "the people." If the setting is both
outside the political realm and outside the social order relative to the regime but within their purview, then the belief in "ourselves" will likely accentuate all differences between the colonists and the imperial regime: habitat, population, economy, cultural sensibilities, administrative ideologies, etc. Thus nationalism here will reflect a strong orientation against foreignness.

Because of this paper's strong emphasis on the structural context of political dissent, it follows that the emergence of nationalism may quite legitimately characterize one of the special forms of nationalism more so than nationalism in the main. Thus, our concern with the English Revolutionary experience interprets it as an elaboration on a special form of nationalism that is largely unrecognizable in the French experience (or the American). Each special variety has its own set of historical conditions in which it emerges. But all nationalism has the same universal set of historical preconditions necessary for its emergence: a central political authority in decline. In J.S. Morrill's study of England we can understand how the absence of the centralization aspect prevented an earlier emergence of aristocratic nationalism, although a functional arrangement around an identification of common interests was developing:
England [by 1600] ... is more like a federated state than a unitary national state. Effective control over the social, political and (to a lesser extent) religious institutions of each county lay with a fairly self-evident and largely self-sustaining group of gentry families, distinguished from the rest of the community by their [wealth, lineage, and education].... The crown could only govern ... through establishing an identity of interest with these county governors. This meant operating an elaborate system of quid-pro-quos, itself a combination of sticks and carrots. (1980, 125; emphasis mine)

Political centralization was to come soon thereafter. It is not of overriding importance that the English crown did not begin to resemble the more monolithic French ancien regime of Louis XVI. What is important is that for the two groups most influential on Englishmen and who seemed to sweep England into the Revolution, the Puritans and the lawyers, the power of their concerns was centralized in the crown. To understand this we turn to John Dykstra Eusden's "Puritans and Lawyers on Political Authority." 4 In it he makes the point that

Among the Puritans and the lawyers the issue was not how much power had been given by the crown to various institutions. God and fundamental law were the bestowers,... One institution could not usurp the function and responsibility of one or more of the others [i.e., church, court, university, inn of court, etc.], as the Stuart crown sought to do. (1968, 142)

Understanding these groups' dispute against the centralization policies of the Stuarts helps in understanding their fight to limit Stuart power overall.

The Puritans and the lawyers proclaimed first of all that governmental power was limited. The Stuart insistence on an unrestrained divine right of kings and on free monarchy [argued otherwise]. (Eusden 1968, 144-45)

The cornerstone of Stuart centralization lay in obedience. If the Stuart regime was not as monolithic as that of the ancien régime of Louis XVI, England's "obedience was monolithic in structure, the sole foundation being the crown" (Eusden 1968, 114).

Later, during the nationalist process of the 1640s (around the Revolutionary War), the "identity of interest" was broadened considerably. The power of financial considerations had come of age. It now included a different, less hereditary collective with a different order of connections. The new order of connections was largely the result of the economic modernization of English society. Guizot recognized the coincidence of the English Revolution and "English society [striving] to take a wide step from the monstrous inequality of the feudal system" (Guizot 1826-7; quoted in Clark 1986, 37).

It is perhaps because of this coincidental coupling of the nationalist process and modernity in the English and French experience that the special "collectivism" of
nationalism often becomes emulated for its ability to stimulate economic power. Thus nationalism becomes a political tool in the fashioning of a modern nation and in the process nationalism becomes conflated with economic nationalization. What becomes recognized in nationalism then is not the functional quid pro quo system of the political theatre but the power of social connections necessary for economic modernization.

The quid pro quo arrangement has served to mediate the excesses of royal and popular power and imperialism. It raises the people's consciousness by educating them to see their region and its needs holistically.

Aristotle, thinking about things being active and being passive, divided the events in a thing's history into those whose moving principle is within the thing and those whose moving principle is outside. What is suggested by this is that something is active as events happen whose moving principle is within it, and passive as events happen whose moving principle is outside it. Harry Frankfurt extended this to distinguish between passions: "passions with respect to which we are active and those with respect to which we are passive.... [In other words] there are some whose moving principles are within ourselves and others whose moving principles are external to us" (Frankfurt 1976, 240-1).
What does this say about the passiveness or activeness of nationalism with respect to the masses and the rulership?

Our thesis treats this question in the following way. Nationalism is an unintended product of the discourse between an oppositional ideology and the apologists or theorists of the existing regime. Thus, by the requirements of our model, nationalism in its final composition is always an indigenous product. However much nationalism may initially be an exotic import supported among the intellectuals, or the cosmopolitan elites, or the foreign educated monarch, nationalism becomes reworked as an "identity of interests for ourselves." It is this domestic political process that blends nationalism among the other collective ideologies of the region. It is this process taking place over the heads of most of the people that gives nationalism its passive character. In the words of Frankfurt, "Then, despite its origin, the passion becomes attached to a moving principle within the person; and the person is no more than a passive bystander with respect to it than if it had arisen in more integral response to his perceptions" (1976, 244). This accords well with Anthony Giddens' observation:

Nationalist sentiments ... tend to be fairly remote from most of the activities of day-to-day social life, except in fairly unusual and often relatively transitory conditions. This is
one phenomenon which a psychological interpretation of nationalism must account for. (Giddens 1985, 218)

In terms of the rulership, their appreciation of nationalism is largely conditioned by their perception of what they are expected to make of their power during their tenure. 5 This encompasses more than what their needs are involving the people. It is easy to confuse the rulership's ideology of what it needs to make good with its power and nationalism. Harold Perkin, writing about the ruling class in his English Society writes about rulership as well:

not only the ruling class but every other represents its interest as the common interest, and universalizes its own ideal. It is not so much that the ruling class imposes its ideal upon the rest, but that the class which manages to impose its ideal upon the rest becomes the ruling class. (1969)

And finally, it can be misleading to impute to every oppositional ideology the design to become the rulership itself. Such a dissenting group not wishing to become the sovereign authority of the people is described for the England of 1660--88 by John Miller. At the Restoration there were the Convention and Cavalier Parliaments.

The Cavalier Parliament abandoned the executive role that Parliament had assumed from the end of 1641 and which had been resumed by the Convention, notably in paying off the New Model Army. From 1661 MPs showed that they no longer

5. "Reality standard" is an apt phrase Basil Willey utilizes in discussing how poetical works resonate with contemporary ideas of just what poets are to make.
wanted the responsibility of governing the country, which was time-consuming and very hard work. They wanted the king to govern and provided him with the necessary revenue. Parliament could then revert to its traditional (and, for most, more congenial) role of criticizing and advising. (Miller 1984, 201; emphasis mine)

But whether nationalism is essentially passive or active for the rulership seems to depend both upon historical conditions and on the particular category of nationalism. Of course, in xenophobic nationalism we can expect the rulership's nationalism to be active. In popular nationalism the rulership's nationalism will be passive and the nationalism of the popular organizations' elite will be active. But in aristocratic nationalism things are more complex. Let us examine the case of England.

During the 1640s in England there is ample evidence for the whole political realm's conservatism, or in Lipset's words, "a conservative respect for the existing pattern of social and political organization, national symbols, and the stratification system" (1967, 86). Eccleshall writes about the opposition theorists propounding the theory of limited monarchy:

in no sense did the theory entail an undermining of traditional assumptions ... They were not advancing claims against the crown but reflecting a felt need for political direction from a centre which included them, but of which the crown was indubitably the apex.... they generally confirmed that it was a functionally stratified structure with a corporate identity
that radiated from the co-ordinated activities of the centre. (Eccleshall 1978, 40)

As it happened,

... the theory of limited monarchy was expressed at a time when the expansion of the royal prerogative was achieved by involving a significant social group in the process of legislation.... The theory, therefore, did not stand as a challenge to the crown. Indeed, it was sometimes conceived as a defense of the monarch in the face of opposition. (Eccleshall 1978, 37-8)

And as for the broader group of the political realms, Eccleshall writes, "More than anything it was the actuality of social disorder, and the threat of worse to come, which persuaded landed groups that their interests coincided with those of the crown,..." (Eccleshall 1978, 31).

My conclusion from having examined the case of England is that aristocratic nationalism is too complex, changing, and subtle to lay any claim to singling out its passive and active nature.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In recent decades there has been a substantially significant increase in the amount of theoretical literature on nationalism. However, even as late as 1983, A.D. Smith, one of the most senior dons of nationalism, was lamenting on the quality of the deed: "Given the state of theory-construction in the social sciences as a whole, it is hardly surprising if few genuine theories of nationalism have emerged; and none have found general acceptance. In this respect, sociology is no exception" (1983, 19).

To better understand how sociological theory could contribute so little to the development of solid work in the scholarship of nationalism, let us begin with the founders of the sociological tradition and come forward into contemporary developments.
Marx-Engels, Durkheim, and Weber

The emergence of the classical sociological tradition owed a great deal to the conditions of European political modernization. By this I mean that the climate of political modernization that seemed to emanate from Revolutionary France partook of the same galvanizing forces motivating the theoretical programs of sociology's founders. We can see the institutional parallels if we take Samuel Huntington's patterns of political modernization separately (1968, 93f).

First, let us take the rationalization of authority. Huntington writes:

In late medieval Europe, law was variously defined in terms of divine law, natural law, the law of reason, common law, and custom. In all these manifestations it was viewed as a relatively unchanging external authority ... (1968, 99)

However, in the seventeenth century the European states themselves began replacing fundamental law as the source of authority. Furthermore, within each state individual entities were becoming authoritatively responsible for certain administrative affairs where many had served before. The language that was underwriting these transformations came increasingly from rational argument. Michael McKeon, although writing more specifically on England, puts this in some perspective: "At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the dominant categories for
describing political conflict were by and large religious categories; by the end of the century this was obviously no longer the case" (1987, 37). What was the category now behind the interest in rational manipulations? Jose Antonio Maravall writes, "Above all, however, the art and politics of the baroque ['from approximately 1600 ... to 1670-80'] were a decipherment, which evidently presupposed an interplay with difficulty and obscurity" (1986, 224). This was substantially different from that prescribed attitude of simply marvelling at the effects of authority since ordinary mortals could never really understand the significance of authority. In sum:

Fundamental law and the diffusion of authority were incompatible with political modernization. Modernization requires authority for change. Fundamental changes in society and politics come from the purposeful actions of men. Hence, authority must reside in men, not in unchanging laws. (Huntington 1968, 101)

The progressive insights of the sociological theorists were to underlie the authority for social changes by supplying scientific laws of society. They sought to influence the modernization of their respective societies by arguing that should these societies respond to their rational elaboration of social laws a beneficent social order would prevail.

Secondly, let us take the differentiation of structure. Above, I mentioned how the arguments concerning authority were regularly becoming demystified
and rational; while authority itself was becoming administratively centralized with individual institutions specialized. "Administrative, legal, judicial, military institutions developed as semi-autonomous but subordinate bodies in one way or another responsible to the political bodies (monarch or parliament) which exercised sovereignty" (Huntington 1968, 109). The inevitable result of these novel alignments was various relations and inequalities of power among these institutions.

Among the founding sociologist, from Comte and Saint-Simon to Marx-Engles, Durkheim and Weber, there was the realization that this new social analytical discourse was what was needed to guide these political developments that were so transforming social life where they occurred. "Weber and Durkheim [even] sought to institutionalize the project as a legitimate academic discipline" (Wardell and Turner 1986, 13).

And third, let us take the expansion of political participation. Huntington writes:

On the electoral level, the expansion of participation in Europe meant the gradual extension of the suffrage for the assembly from aristocracy to upper bourgeoisie, lower bourgeoisie, peasants and urban workers.... Where no assembly existed, the creation of a popular assembly was also at times accompanied by the introduction of universal male suffrage .... (1968, 127)

R.R. Palmer elaborates on the connection between this democratic progress and the dynastic authorities: "the
democratic movement had to be unitary and centralizing, because it had to destroy before it could construct" (Palmer 1959-64; quoted in Huntington 1968, 129). These operational requirements, unity and centralization, must be seen against the background of institutional pluralism inherited from medieval times. "The institutional pluralism ... first encouraged the expansion of political participation and then was strengthened by it" (Huntington 1968, 129). According to Huntington, the democratic movement was "reinvigorating" those subordinate institutions that were accessible to these political newcomers and in time this popular investing of political power began to establish powerful assemblies eclipsing "the monarchs and second chambers of Europe" (1968, 129).

Among the founding sociologists there was an abiding appreciation of this new involvement in political affairs by increasingly larger sections of society. (This is not to deny the conservatism of Comte or to make the founding of sociology into a liberal ideological movement.) Overall, they perceived the climate enveloping their lives as well as the society envisaged in their studies largely in terms of a crisis. This crisis orientation shared among them lent a cohesive unity to their work (Wardell and Turner 1986, 12).
The French Revolution was very close to these European intellectuals both as nationalists and theorists. As scientists, here was the watershed of a new social order that was becoming established all over Western Europe. As such, it was an important feature in understanding the movement of the present into the future. However, as nationalists, the chaotic progress of these social transformations with their highly varying distributions of power seemed to call for their best elaborations of social development. Here was a personal calling for their political values worthy of self-sacrifice. From Comte and Saint-Simon to Durkheim, Weber and Marx, Revolutionary France played a very significant role in their theoretical projects, while uniformly the English Revolution was almost totally absent.

If it is true that "sociological theory at present consists largely of reified conceptual debris from the project of Weber, Durkheim and Marx" (Wardell and Turner 1986, 17), then it is no great extension to see the absence of the English Revolution in macro-sociological literature as part of that unwarranted "reified conceptual debris." The value of its inclusion here, however, rests on its capacity to contrast with the French Revolution.

The pronouncement that conflict was an elementary fact of society in itself did nothing to bring early
Marxism around to focus on nationalism as a significant factor in civil or political struggles. The reason for this was that for Marx and Engels only one type of conflict, class conflict, was historically important. Furthermore, only one type of conflict was required for understanding society; again, class conflict. 1

Perhaps biographical circumstances militated against it. V.G. Kiernan puts it this way: "Emigrants in a foreign land, rationalistic in outlook, it was natural enough for them to have little comprehension of patriotic fervour" (1983, 346).

All political conflicts were interpreted as special forms of class conflict; political power was a special attribute of class power; and political ideologies were bourgeois ideologies. For Marx and Engels the significant associations in connection with national struggles were not gatherings of contentious nationalists but "the workers": they form coalitions against the bourgeois;"they found permanent associations" and then "here and there the contest breaks out into riots" (Marx 1984, 228). The 'real' hostile power confronting workers is not that of a national enemy across some territorial boundary, it is that power submerged in relations of production. This is because the relations of political

1. "Hitherto, every form of society has been based ... on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes." From Marx, "The Communist Manifesto," 230.
domination "are already present in the actual constitution of the relations of production" (Poulantzas 1978; quoted in Wilson 1983, 188). It is here that "the means of administration, political control and violence" are forged, "especially the authority relations associated with these forces..." (Heydebrand 1977; quoted in Wilson 1983, 176-77). If a nationalistic "theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc." comes into being and it is not "the general consciousness of a nation," that is, it is not the manifestation of "existing social relations hav[ing] come into contradiction with existing forces of production"; then, says Marx, "it really represents something without representing something real" (1984, 168).

For those scholars who might focus on the political struggles of nationalists Marx writes, "The exponents of this conception of history have consequently only been able to see in history the political actions of princes and States, religious and all sorts of theoretical struggles, and in particular in each historical epoch have had to share the illusion of that epoch" instead of realizing "'religion' and 'politics' are only forms of its true motives..." (1984,173). That is, bourgeois oppression.

In the "Manifesto" Marx writes about the demise of the individuality of nations. Through bourgeois
exploitation on a world scale "in place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction...." Furthermore, everything seems to belong to everyone: "as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property." Even "from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature." In summary: "National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible. This bourgeois exploitation has made "nations of peasants [dependent] on nations of bourgeois" (1984, 224-25).

Thus, for Marx, the civil society on a universal scale is all that matters. Here is the source of all that happens. Nationalism, "the egotism which has a nation as its content" (1984, 148), cannot survive in a world where "national differences and antagonisms between people are daily more and more vanishing" (1984, 235). And where the nation currently is falsely associated with 'the people' it is in reality synonymous with the proletariat. "Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation..." (1984, 235). In essence: "Only political superstition ... imagines that social life must be held together by the state whereas in reality the state is held together by
civil life" (1984, 149). Nationalism is relegated to a "political or religious nonsense which in addition may hold people together" (1984, 167).

Gradually, the Marxist approach, through Marx and Engels, became more economistic, and placed its emphasis upon stratification within nations and upon economic alienation and development of classes rather than ethnic communities. This in turn meant a devaluation of culture, ideals and the state, precisely those elements without which no sociology of nationalism can be constructed. (Smith 1983, 23)

Durkheim, on the other hand, though he wrote almost nothing directly about nationalism, "became increasingly interested in the subject" (Smith 1983, 29). His contribution to the sociology of nationalism is most profound in his analysis of the roots of community and social identity. In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life he says such things as, "There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality" (1964; quoted in Smith 1983, 30). Yet Smith believes that, in works such as this, where Durkheim is investigating the core of community and claiming to see 'religion'—that his analysis "fits the case of nations and nationalism rather better than the often supernatural religions he sought to encompass" (1983, 30). For example, when Durkheim says, "before all else, a faith is warmth, life, enthusiasm, the exaltation of the whole
mental life, the raising of the individual above himself" (1964; quoted in Smith 1983, 30), is this not more characteristic of modern man possessed of nationalism? And when he speaks of society that it is foremost "the idea which it forms of itself," is he not characterizing how national consciousness functions for an ethnic community? But Durkheim did not apply such ideas directly to modern cases of nationalism as a secular faith or modern nations possessed of a functional self-consciousness.

Nor was he ever to give an account of the emergence of nations and nationalism. For Durkheim, like Marx, saw modern economic life propelling mankind toward a peaceful social unity on a global scale. For Durkheim, the stimulus was the interdependence of modern life whereas for Marx it was the triumph of the proletariat and their values. The state, for both, becomes a moral organization produced by human will. Says Durkheim, "The national will merges with the human ideal" resulting in each state internalizing as its goal "not to expand, or to lengthen its borders, but to set its own house in order and to make the widest appeal to its members for a moral life on an ever higher level." In the end "all discrepancy between national and human morals would be excluded" (1957; quoted in Giddens 1985, 24).
Most destructive to Durkheim's treatment of nationalism is his separation of political power from social authority such that social ideologies cannot effectively strengthen the political state. Within the same area, Giddens complains how Durkheim "underestimates how far the state apparatus can become a source of power independent of the rest of 'society'" (1985, 18). Meanwhile, Smith faults Durkheim for going so far as to posit that social authority not only subordinates, but absorbs political power (1971,47). No wonder, since for Durkheim the principal function of the State "is to think" (Durkheim 1985, 152). That it thinks for the purpose of guiding collective conduct does not seem to rescue it from unreasonableness.

Weber, by most accounts in the literature on nationalism, was much more incisive in his (also sparse) treatment of nationalism and states than either Marx or Durkheim. Like Marx, he understood conflict to be universally important in the affairs of social life. But unlike Marx, Weber believed conflict to be characteristically irreconcilable. Unique values, held alike by individuals as well as groups, were responsible for this. Furthermore, people sought to protect their unique values and quite naturally deposited them in a social entity called a nation. This in turn endowed it with a distinctive individuality (Eigenart). In Weber's
words, "The significance of the 'nation' is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least irreplaceability, of the culture values that can only be preserved and developed through the cultivation of the individuality (Eigenart) of the community" (1968; quoted in Smith 1983, 31-32). The possible sources of this cultural individuality are many: physical type, shared religion, uniform customs, and especially a community of language. None of these alone suffices to define a nation, just as none of these alone suffices to constitute a necessary condition for a sense of nationality. What is required to take an ethnic or culture group to nationhood is political action, and frequently of a political nature. "A nation," writes Weber, "is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own" (1958, 176).

For Weber, the nation is a community while the state is a rational association. Both need each other. The state, because it is dependent upon power being given to it, requires popular support and so must solicit its legitimation and direction from the nation. The nation, on the other hand, is dependent upon the state to protect its unique endowment of values in the general conflict of value-bearing communities. This mutual dependence is also
mirrored between the bearers of the values of the state—bureaucrats and officers of the state—and "specific bearers of culture and the idea of the nation"—artists, teachers, writers.

Weber looked to the preservation of cultural values among nations as a guarantee against the powerful sweep of rationalization overtaking the world. Though he left notes to the effect that he intended to examine the historical development of the national state, what he did leave does not suffice to explain the emergence of the value-bearing community, the nation, nor how it came to be the norm for legitimizing states throughout the world. Smith believes that it was Weber's subscribing to strong national values as a person that "may have deflected his attention away from trying to deal with the many problems raised by the advent of nations and nationalism" as a scholar (1983, 33).

Otto Hintze

If the founding fathers of sociology were giving nationalism something of a vacant stare, Otto Hintze of the "Prussian school" of historians was doing otherwise. Witness this "essential forces" enumeration published in 1927 and how nationalism is not only singled out but how parallel developments seem to surround it:

Politically and economically, the essential forces at work in the history of the last five centuries have been the rise of national
states; the rivalry among the major European nations; the balance of power system; the constitutional forms of parliamentarianism and absolutism; the French Revolution, which replaced the feudal order with modern concepts of state and citizenship; the nationalism of the post-revolutionary period; the development of capitalism with its often related phenomenon of imperialism; and the countermovement of proletarian socialism. (1975, 418)

For Giddens, Hintze's main contribution to the study of nationalism is his seeing the importance of both the consolidation of military power and the expansion of capitalism for the emergence of the nation-states.

But perhaps more importantly is Hintze's ability to surmount just those problems that seem to have sidelined the other theorists. He, too, was a devoted nationalist. He abjures any invitation to find refuge in relativism or quietism; but instead declares for a "healthy decisiveness, to clear cultural aims, to the firm resolution not to surrender the individual, national, and supranational forms of our cultural life, but to stand our ground against all hostile powers and to develop according to our nature" (1975, 421).

Furthermore, Hintze is willing to see the interrelatedness of disparate forces (affecting nationalism) working singly or in combination, something frustrating to scholars trying to explain nationalism—often by poor reductions. But he does seeks limits where possible. And he does expect explanations. In one place he notes the importance of forces working singly:
The elemental forces of politics and economics follow their own laws; they are our fate. We have to understand them and come to terms with them as best we can. A deeper historical understanding is generally not required where they are concerned; in these areas our knowledge need not go back beyond the beginning of the modern age,..." (1975, 419).

But more frequently Hintze is relating the obverse aspect of something to stress the bidirectionality of causal influences. For example, between the development of nations and that of world history Hintze gives no priority to either: "The development of world history is not merely a by-product of national developments but has an independent character; created by nations, in its turn it creates them" (1975, 367). Or between prioritizing the life of the individual or the life of society, Hintze characteristically puts his views this way:

There are in history no events of an entirely general nor of an entirely individual character. Everywhere there is cooperation and conflict between the life of the individual and the life of society, and their relation is varied, depending on the changing strength and compatibility of the two components. Altogether the process is an extremely complicated one; it can be described and analyzed; but there is no way of rationally explaining the whole on the basis of a few simple elements. (1975, 365)

This is especially applicable to nationalism when considering the contribution of those apostles of nationalism like Mazzini, Rousseau, Renan, etc. Or those who were in a position of decision-making and were able to see a national sentiment about the region and exploit it. For however macro-sociological the argument of
explaining nationalism may become, there persist questions pertaining to cultural and political leaders and why such an ideology or political movement like nationalism came to be important for them. And for their followers. Friedrich Engels (whom we might label a macro-theorist) once spoke of how developments dependant upon the conditions of production must first make their way through the minds of men in order to have an effect (Hintze 1975, 362). So, too, is the case for nationalism. It, too, has its individualist component, however shadowy it may be for social theorists.

In another theoretical vein problematic for social theorists here, Hintze is willing to differentiate closely similar phenomena. In studies pertaining to nationalism, where the significance of historical events are often mental states or institutions shifting with ideological currents, a failure in this capacity often renders explanations worthless. Hintze, in looking at modern European history, sees in what many had previously seen as only the emergence of individualistic unities the importance of a continental multi-state system:

We are presented, then, with two closely related phenomena of world-historical nature: the European state system and the modern sovereign state,... We might even go so far as to claim that without this state system and its tendency toward constant rivalry, without the modernization that went with it—that is to say, the consolidation and rationalization of state operations—even the representative
This is an example of Hintze's willingness to stress that the influence of foreign affairs on shaping domestic politics must be a consideration of social theorists. He thus would be conferred accolades from Smith: "You cannot study a given nationalism or nation in isolation from others; for nationalism, like nations, are born out of the interplay and conflict with each other and with other exogenous factors" (1983, 35).

And finally, as if appended to the above, Hintze shows how an important process can also simultaneously stimulate its opposite:

... the peculiar form of nation-building in the West. This produced a constant competition between the individual states for power and prestige, without ever leading to a general unification in a universal empire. Because of this competition the states were prompted toward increasing rationalization and consolidation of their political machine.... On the other hand this process triggered its opposite: a corporate reaction. (1975, 308-9)

Hintze never tires of seeing the complexities and bidirectionalities in social processes. He escapes from another critical failing best summarized by J.H. Hexter:

Stated rather abstractly, the idea is that in a given society the energy expended on a single pair of polar elements is fixed, so that any flow of social energy in the direction of one such pole can only take place by way of subtraction from the flow of energy to the opposite pole.... [Taking] secular and religious as polar phenomena [for example] .... [It would be a critical failure] for the historian who makes the assumption, the
increase in the secular direction is itself sufficient evidence of the decrease in the religious direction. (1961, 40-41)

One of those studying Hintze, Gerhard Oestreich, saw in Hintze's academic development an increasing development toward sociology. He contributed weighty reviews on the works of Sombart, Troeltsch, and Franz Oppenheimer as full-length essays; but, believes Felix Gilbert, "it is evident that in this last period of Hintze's scholarly activity Max Weber was the dominant intellectual figure with whose thought he felt he ought to come to terms" (1975, 21).

According to Gilbert, Hintze saw the chief difficulty of his analytical work in declining "to be satisfied with an aestheticizing description of the appearance of the original and unique in history." For traditional historians, such unique individualities were regarded as having a value all their own without any potentials for generalizing explanations. But for Hintze, "the uniqueness of a historical entity, its 'individuality,' is constituted [only] by the fact of its being different from something else" (Gilbert 1975, 24). In other words, with Hintze's historical focus on groups and institutions, values were broader and more fluid with respect to historical units in comparison to values being confined to conferring uniqueness on a historical entity.
While influenced by Weber's "ideal types," Hintze did not find them entirely satisfactory for the historian's work. Weber's Idealtypen relate well to the general; Hintze believed that historical concepts must relate to the particular as well. He writes that if the utilized concepts "were only concrete and individual they would never lead to insights of wider significance, and if they were only abstract and general they would never have applicability to particular situations or circumstances" (1975; quoted in Gilbert 1975, 25).

At this period Hintze discloses that he values a certain amount of "historical intuition"; something that serves to separate history and sociology where the materials of history flow into explanations to serve particular cases. In the end, his historical work was strictly pragmatist, heavily utilizing a comparative method and advocating a more exacting system of historical conceptualization.

For nationalism theory, Hintze was important for his insistence that history cannot be left out. Historical accident is a reality that leaves a substantial residue in the content of our thinking, the forms of our social life, and the character of our institutions. The impact of the accidents of history are not amenable to the scientific method of sociologists hoping to establish broad generalizations. (Gilbert 1975, 27)
Contemporary Nationalism Theorists

There are a variety of ways of grouping theorists of nationalism. Smith singles out three sociological perspectives: developmental perspectives, communitarian approaches, and conflict approaches (1983, 26-33).

1 Developmental Perspectives: This approach is characterized by the belief that the causes of social change come from within the entity under investigation. This is an 'endogenous' approach in that even if they perceive nationalism as being transported from outside the area under consideration, they feature the process in holistic terms and focus on the process in its internal developments. They are interested in discovering the 'law' which will explain the universality of nationalism in the modern world, rather than involving themselves with a particular geopolitical nationalism. Even the local social groups and institutions distinguished in creating nations "receive rather sketchy and mechanical treatment." They are positivists and evolutionists "true to their pedigree."

The developmental approach is divided into two types: the first is the modernization theories of Smelser, Eisenstadt, Shils, Bendix, Lerner and Deutsch in which nationalism is posited as an essential part of the process in which traditional societies fall apart and
transform themselves into modern ones. For the 'neo-evolutionists' (Smelser, Levy, Eisenstadt, and Shils) nationalism comes about during the period of storm and stress through which modernizing societies must pass. Deutsch works more solidly still in the tradition of the nineteenth century evolutionists, "with their interest in gross temporal sequences and structural changes."

Then there are the uneven development theories of Hechter, Tom Nairn, and Samir Amin. These are highly indebted to the Marxist variant of evolutionism, "with its historicist outlook and concern for qualitative leaps in social change."

2 Communitarian approaches: In these perspectives social cohesion and fraternity, "civil bonds in societies undergoing rapid change" are frequent themes; it is community, not society, that is the central unit of analysis. The source of change, as in the developmental perspectives, is regarded as being internal to that entity being studied. Also, similarly, the theoretical effort is towards a grand 'external' scheme into which nationalism, or particular cases of it, can be inserted. The explanations tend to be functionalist and therefore minimize the historical dimension. They also tend to minimize the darker side of the modernizing process if it occasions nationalism. These accounts remain largely 'external' to the phenomena they study. They have
no intention of following Weber's direction to supply a verstehende soziologie "in which a phenomenon is rendered sociologically intelligible through an analysis of the meanings with which the participants ... endow their actions."

Though Durkheim wrote little about nationalism, his understanding of supernatural religions is often used as a basis for understanding nations and nationalism. In this context he often does better than others directly expounding on nations. And finally, he singles out Ernest Gellner as a recent theorist taking up some of Durkheim's suggestions.

3 Conflict Approaches: In these perspectives social and political conflict are emphasized. Simmel sees conflict as a singularly important cause of social cohesion. Here, competition and conflict represent essential elements in the social bonding of individuals; their clashing values and interests secure a high level of social interaction in their communities.

Weber saw conflict as a necessary and universal attribute of social life. This follows from his reasoning that man, fundamentally a cultural being, is a bearer of specific values; values that are unique and irreconcilable with those of others. In having chosen and bearing some values, the values of others are necessarily excluded, ignored or denied. This sets up a life of
unceasing struggle for everyone. This same reasoning for individuals Weber applied as well for groups. Consequently, the natural place to secure the cultural values of the group is the nation.

If we reflect on Smith's elaborations above, we can see that he is concentrating on two variables: theories committed to historicism (a type of temporal determinism) and theories committed to "roots of community and cultural identity" (a type of local determinism). If we extrapolate on Smith's categories, a diagram can be made as follows:

If we add the axes relating 'endogenous' to 'exogenous'—meaning whether or not a theory assumes the causes of social change to reside within the process or unit under investigation—we can see an emerging consistency to the diagram and the justifiable incorporation of systems theory (a perspective rarely included in nationalism literature).

Because Smith's categories seem more illustrative in their patterns of division and comprehensiveness, I will only briefly summarize John Breuilly's arrangement of the theories of nationalism (1985, 18-36). They are as follows:

1 The nationalist approach: Here, in its strong form, nationalism is simply an expression of the nation. In its weaker version "nationalism is related to some sort of
TABLE I
CATEGORIES OF NATIONALISM THEORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roots of Community and Cultural Identity</th>
<th>Historical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(exogenous)</td>
<td>(endogenous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>communitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>developmental</td>
<td>systems theory</td>
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</table>
national identity." Though the views of the nationalists are put forth in understandable sincerity, "whether anyone else should accept such a view is another matter." Breuilly views the proposition that "nationalism expresses a sense of national identity among the nationalists" as a tautology. "The problem is showing that it invariably expresses a more widespread identity" (1985, 18-20).

2 The communications approach: In this approach the nation "is seen in terms of a developed system of internal communications which creates a sense of common identity." However, that intensified communications necessarily lead to increased solidarity instead of increased conflict remains as a major problem of assumption. For Breuilly, this approach does not build a theory of nationalism: it "simply begs the whole question" (1985, 20).

3 Marxist approaches: Here, the work of Tom Nairn is singled out and discussed. Furthermore, where Marxists concentrate upon "internal class conflict in a particular society," Breuilly believes that Marxists must operate out one of three options:

   It can regard a nationalist movement as the work and expression of a single class, with relatively little involvement by other classes. It can regard nationalism in terms of a set of alliances in which each class has its own special interest. It can regard nationalism as
representing the interests of a particular class but inducing other classes to support nationalism. (1985, 21)

He later concludes: "Nationalism is too pervasive to be reduced to the ideology and politics of this or that class or set of classes.... It is too complex and varied to be understood as a reaction to a particular type of economic exploitation ..." (1985, 28).

4 The psychological and functional approaches: These approaches assume "that people need to identify with some cause or group larger than themselves." Nationalism may provide the best available identity, especially when previously established identities have been undermined. "The whole point of nationalism, it could be argued, is its insistence on the importance of a special cultural group identity as the bedrock of political claims and action." The thesis here is that "rapid change precipitates a breakdown of traditional identity and the coming of modernity points to the shape a new identity can take." Furthermore, Breuilly conjoins these two approaches for the following reasons:

Functionalism can claim to account for the effects of a particular practice (for example, the functional role of nationalism in promoting the transition to modernity) but it cannot account for the appeal of such a practice (unless one argues that people believe in nationalism because of the function it serves). The psychological approach can account for the appeal of nationalism in terms of identity need but not for the effects of that appeal on
larger social change (i.e. helping to usher in modernity). (1985, 31)

He then explains the problem of associating them together as follows:

Political doctrines and policies are not the same thing as psychological states, however plausible the relationships between the two may seem. The failure to find evidence for the identity need argument in specific cases of nationalism is only a symptom of the general unacceptability of this sort of argument in historical explanations. 2 (1985, 33)

More specifically, Breuilly cites the following failings: functionalist theories seem to do more describing than explaining; modernization and "strong nationalist politics" appear to have no necessary historical connection as particular occurrences of either of these are examined; modernization is itself so vague a concept that meaningful applications of it to a society is impossible; and finally, "Not merely is it impossible to relate nationalism systematically to the pursuit and achievement of modernity, it turns out to be impossible to establish what that pursuit and achievement mean" (1985, 35).

In addition to the "three main approaches" Smith has outlined, and the approaches described and criticized by Breuilly, two significant schools of nationalism have

2. Supporting his judgement here, Breuilly draws on R.G. Collingwood's The Idea of History which propounds a highly empathetic style of historical research.
developed around the contributions of a pair of scholars, Hans Kohn and Carlton J.H. Hayes. They seem to have withstood the test of time in many ways—an accomplishment exceedingly rare among nationalism theorists. Even as late as 1985 it was written: "The older works by Hans Kohn ... and Carlton Hayes ... are still among the best historical treatments of the subject" (Breuilly 1985, 402).

Kemilainen writes, "Kohn is one of the most prominent scholars in the field of nationalism" (1964, 115). And Louis L. Snyder reports that Kohn's classification has "served a generation of historians well, and there have been no significant attempts to alter or modify it" (n.d.).

The first step in Kohn's classification is the division of nationalism into two basic types: (1) nationalism in the Western world, confined to England, British Dominions, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland; and (2) nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Asia. In this non-Western nationalism Kohn singles out the nationalistic thinking of Germany.

By Kohn's analysis, in the Western context the origin of a nation was preceded by the formation of a national state; one formed of the people's struggle for liberty and concurrent with the transformation of the existing state into a people's state.
Democracy figures prominently. Most interestingly, in this respect, Kohn writes:

Nationalism and democracy were in their origin contemporary movements, and in many respects sprang from similar conditions; but nationalism had its roots in the order of group feelings and 'natural' cohesion, while democracy was based on the faith in the liberty and equality of each individual—on the divine substance of each human soul which makes man in Kant's words 'an end in himself'—and on the faith in mankind as the bearer of absolute values.... Democracy in its essence and scope was a universal movement; it added to the liberty of every man and to the equality of all men the fraternity of the whole of mankind. The fusion which nationalism gave it, for the time being and under the existing possibilities of geographic conditions and organizational forms, the frame for its concrete realization. (1967)

It then follows that nationalism, being an act of consciousness in which one's supreme loyalty is given to the nation-state or the nation, could only occur since the French Revolution. In his words, "Nationalism was to provide the integrating force of the new era which dawned over France, and through France over western mankind" (1967).

Overall, Kohn's conception is consistent with Smith's 'developmental' approach. In his theorizing Kohn is an heir of the Enlightenment values. Consistent with the 'developmental' approach is his emphasis on the historical development of cultures, his dependence on contracts and plebiscites as manifestations of popular will in place of probing into the local institutions competing as spokesmen of the popular will, and finally,
his emphasis on the insignificance of the group nation while stressing such universal forces as democracy and cosmopolitanism. However, his conception of non-Western nationalism, relying more on the irrational folk-community and the importance of race is more indebted to Romanticism.

However, in Kohn's treatment of Western and non-Western nationalism, Kemilainen complains "it can be stated that they are not actually two examples of one phenomenon, but in fact two different phenomena" (1964, 140). Kohn's treatment of Western nationalism, as we concluded above, displays a 'developmental' approach as he is concerned almost exclusively with the internal political developments of the group nation which can occur only inside states. Meanwhile, his non-Western analysis of nationalism displays something of a 'communitarian' approach as he focuses on the functional development of national peculiarities. However, to some extent, Kohn's non-Western nationalism is taken with the Weber-conflict approach. He emphasizes how nationalities are groups jockeying with other groups and how the external relations of this group of nations is important, especially their depreciation of "cultural contact with alien civilizations."

Even their original impulse to nationalism is from these external cultural contacts, but then they begin to extol
their own heritage. This kind of double spring marking the external and internal impetus to nationalistic ideologies helps make apparent why any categorically pure research style is too restrictive.

Hayes' work, like the non-Western analysis of Kohn, seems to overflow the Weber-conflict approach. He stresses the historical formation of the national state in the evolution of modern nationalism and he has a tendency to see nationalism as an antagonizing force among peoples. This formulation is not inconsistent with Weber's words on the concept of the 'nation' where he says that above all, "one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups" (1958, 172). Hayes had seen this perhaps in the experience of World War I. On the other hand, Hayes believed that the existence of nationality belongs to human nature. This 'state of mind' focus partakes of the communitarian psychological approach often with a functional angle while his belief that nationalism had superseded religion is more straightforward functionalist.

Though Hayes seems to have formed more of a following than Kohn, nevertheless, Kohn's works on nationalism seem to have more vitality among contemporary scholars. In Smith's estimation, Gellner seems to have done the most with the suggestions contained in the
communitarian approach while Weber still reigns preeminently in the conflict approach.

With the emergence of nationalism in the modern world there came to be such a variety of nationalisms that it has been remarked that there are almost as many uniquely individual cases (of nationalism) as there are total occurrences. How distressing this is for serious systematic sociologists can be noted in this from Smith:

None of the sociological taxonomies known to me have been put to any research use.... Hays and Kohn ... have done better.... [They] have related their taxonomies of the ideology to politics and the social structure, in a descriptive manner. No doubt simply to draw attention to the varieties of nationalism by the delineation of significant types, is an advance on a non-analytic approach. But it remains an academic exercise, if it serves no heuristic function. (1971, 209)

I argue that the analysis presented in this thesis has heuristic value. By elaborating on the structural context of emerging dissent displaying significant political proportions, I can explain the significant categorical forms of nationalism. This is because the dissenting voices of emerging nationalism can only relate "structurally" to a declining political establishment in three ways: (1) as an internal dispute among the members of the political realm; (2) as a dispute by outsiders to the political realm but by members of the political state; and (3) as a dispute by outsiders to both the political realm and the political state but subservient
to the control of the political realm. These categories exhaust all domestic zones of political structural context.

It is from understanding how these basic categories have come to be generated that the varieties of nationalism can, in turn, be understood. It is the nationalistic process generating the categories of nationalism that provides the key to understanding the fluctuating composition of a region's nationalism. Thus, historical changes in the nationalistic process changes the qualitative and quantitative character of a region's nationalism. In the end, it is by understanding the categories of nationalism that nationalism itself can be better understood.
CHAPTER III
METHODS AND ANALYSIS

This chapter is initially directed towards understanding one particular facet of nationalism—its emergence. I believe the genesis of nationalism can be explained in terms of a few theoretical conditions and in so doing two significantly positive outcomes are accomplished. First, the emergence of nationalism is given an historical frame for scholars to concentrate upon; and secondly, the quantitative constitution of nationalism is freed to vary over time in the same regional population.

These conditions are (1) the administrative centralization of a region, (2) the decline of the political establishment, and consequently, (3) a measure of public dissent sufficient to attract coordinators among its advocates and such that organizationally it provokes the political authorities.

The second part of this paper is directed towards understanding the categories of nationalism. I believe
the categories of nationalism can be explained in terms of the few possible locations where public dissent can be organized and coordinated. With respect to the political center, there are only three zones where significant public dissent may emerge: within the center, within the state but outside the center, and outside the state but within the jurisdiction of the political center. By explaining the major forms of nationalism by reference to structural context a third positive outcome is accomplished: the qualitative constitution of nationalism is freed to vary over time in the same regional population.

My plan is to take Hirschman's exit-voice conceptual scheme and employ it in a case study analysis comparing the English and French revolutions. These were chosen for the following reasons: first, I argue, these were both bona fide nationalistic processes; second, nationalism study continues to be seriously distracted by the identification of emerging nationalism with the French Revolution; third, English nationalism constitutes a theoretical anomaly for nationalism scholars; and finally, the two revolutions are two very contrasting nationalistic processes. Their elaboration will illustrate how the basic features of emerging nationalisms cohere with our theoretical requirements.
If our hypothesis is correct, then not only will the emergence of nationalism in each case coincide with a political establishment in decline, an obvious requirement of Hirschman's scheme, but the region under analysis will have been administratively centralized, if Hirschman's scheme is to work as creditably in the political context as it has in the economic-market context. In addition, if the structural context of significant public dissent is really central to the nationalist process, then the major categories of nationalism should display good internal cohesion and clear delineations from each other.

Nationalism bears a special relationship to the concept "loyalty." In fact, loyalty to one's politically institutionalized nation is given a special name—allegiance. No other institutional loyalty is singled out in such a way. One work that examines loyalty in a particularly incisive way is Albert O. Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

In terms of economic theory generally, Hirschman's observations on different "exit-ings" (when consumers shift to support other suppliers) and "voicings" (when consumers communicate dissatisfaction with their current supplier) are most interesting. But in terms of
Before going further, let us get some clarity on these concepts. Hirschman defines voice as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion. (1970, 30)

In contrast, though not entirely exclusive from voice, exit is an impersonal act of shifting to new ground. Hirschman insists on the equality of their importance: "two principal actors of strictly equal rank and importance" (1970, 19). However, voice occupies more explanatory space "because it can be graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest ...." With exit, one simply goes or one does not. Schematically, Hirschman gives us this picture (1970, 120):

In terms of our nationalism theory specifically, Hirschman is saying some very important things about the conditions theoretically necessary for the existence of nationalism. That the nation is an organization whose members react primarily to voice while only minimally to exit is only a beginning.

First, let us consider how this closing off of exit as a viable alternative helps demarcate our historical
### TABLE II

**ORGANIZATION BY REACTION MECHANISM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations whose members react strongly</th>
<th>Exit</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary associations, competitive political parties, businesses with few buyers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Family, tribe, nation, church, parties in non-totalitarian one-party systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive businesses in relation to customers</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Parties in totalitarian one-party systems, terror groups, criminal gangs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
boundaries. Hirschman writes, "The presence of the exit alternative can ... tend to atrophy the development of voice" (1970, 43). That is, if European historical research can indicate an epoch of fluid population movements then it would be consistent with Hirschman's thesis that nationalism would not be flourishing.

H.R. Trevor-Roper writes of some European population groups stirring or not stirring depending on whether the Old Order maintained its traditional policy of cosmopolitanism. "Indeed, why should they stir? In Europe their protection lay in cosmopolitanism,..." (1962, 19). The policy of the Old Order underwriting this cosmopolitanism consisted of "tolerance" and a "balance of nationalities." But what about the emergence of nationalism? "Only when the Old Order was clearly foundering [in decline] did ... the Jews, like the Czechs and the South Slavs, turn(ed) to nationalism as a means of their salvation" (1962, 19).

Briefly, moving from the level of multi-group populations during the reorganization of Europe to a more individualistic level, let us press Barrington Moore's overview of Ulrich Braker into our "exit vitiates nationalism" theme. Moore is asking what conditions are necessary for Braker to act as a "revolutionary."

First, the prospect of flight and escape to a traditional form of security would have to appear impossible. There would also have to be experiences along the way ... creating in him a
very different attitude toward figures of authority. (1978, 125)

I recognize that this citation is less persuasive to some than to others. But, nonetheless, Moore is explicitly making exit a crucial explanatory variable for individuals to become revolutionaries. It is Hannah Arendt that allows us to identify revolutionaries with nationalists. "Willing revolutionaries" are dominated by the forces of individuation and so may be quite isolated (i.e. Marx, Engels). But "acting revolutionaries" are dominated by forces driving them to seek the community in we-consciousness. 1

Incorporating this into our paper's account of necessary conditions, I argue for the following interpretation. The "voice" of an oppositional ideology becomes sufficient in "creating in him a very different attitude toward figures of authority" if (1) it is forceful enough to (1) attract coordinators and organizers and (2) provokes the traditional political authorities to react to it. Thus, the organized dissent and ensuing dialogue spills over into the public forum, and (3) tying in with Moore's first condition of impossible flight--it is following the advent of politically maintained boundaries. In other words, the

historical precondition is administrative centralization of a region not because of the requirement for infrastructural power 2, but the requirement for boundary maintenance. It is the satisfaction of these conditions that turn the "we-consciousness" forces of revolutionaries specifically into nationalists and not just communitarian crusaders. 3

Let us now consider the condition of a region's administrative centralization. Numerous nationalism scholars have noted the association of nationalism with this phenomena. Giddens writes, "Nationalism ... does tend to be linked in definite ways to the administrative unification of the state" (1985, 212; citing Armstrong 1982, 9ff). John Breuilly goes into more description in his book Nationalism and the State:

As the state took more and more resources from those it governed, in such forms as increased revenue, conscripts and legal powers, so it reduced the importance of local and provincial institutions as places where decisions were

2. I am using "infrastructural power" in the sense of Michael Mann's "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm" (Archives europeennes de sociologie, XXV (1984), 189.

3. It is important to point out that Spanish anarchists, holding "in particular a deep sense of community," had "no desire to take over the levers" of political power. Moreover, in support of our thesis arguing that civil war is a nationalistic process, Pi-Sunyer writes that "anarchism as a vital political force did not survive the Civil War" (Nationalism and Societal Integration: A Focus on Catalonia, 1983, in Program in Latin American Studies, Occasional Papers Series No. 15).
made and enforced. More and more people realized that it was to the central government that they must direct their attention in order to get things done. (1985, 50)

And Breuilly does associate centralization "with regard to the emergence of national opposition" (1985, 52). But his focus is in terms of "the scope of political conflict and the difficulties of managing it" (1985, 52). This analysis is, however distantly, perhaps the closest another theorist comes to sharing our analytical perspective.

Ernest Gellner begins his enumeration of traits making nationalism explicable--"at any rate ex post"--with "Modern society is politically centralized" (1981, 753). From there he goes into an even lengthier discussion of this point than Breuilly. However, his main thrust is contained in the following logic:

Modern nationalism is a phenomenon connected with the emergence of industrial society. Industrial society is always centralized.... Agrarian societies are usually but not always politically centralized.... But the centralization of industrial society is not optional, and it is far more complete and pervasive, qualitatively and territorially. (1981, 755).

Cornelia Navari sees this centralization in a much more confrontational style: "The progress to the modern nation-state was not simply a tale of the withering away of old institutions" (1981, 35), she writes.

The destructive tendency of the sovereign state on the many authorities of traditional society lay in its claim, where that claim existed, to
be the sole source of authority. The very idea of such a source was antithetical to them; it challenged the claims of traditional customs and rights merely by existing. (1981, 31)

And yet, to ignore Huntington, who consolidates so much political theory in his comparative style, would be remiss. In the following, he expands on political modernization in such a way that as we relate it to the centralization thesis we have been working we can see much more than if we merely continued in the line began.

First, we might be a bit taken back by his observation, "Depending upon one's perspective, one can thus define political modernization to mean either the concentration of power [most consistent with our thesis], the expansion of power, or the dispersion of power, and peculiarly enough, political scientists have indeed defined political modernization in each of these ways (1968, 145). Furthermore, "at one point or another in a country's history, each does constitute 'modernization'" (1968, 145). These historical developments Huntington tends to depict linearly:

Typically, the first challenge of modernization to a dispersed, weakly articulated and organized, feudalistic traditional system is to concentrate the power necessary to produce changes in the traditional society and economy. (1968, 146)

Then, and this is most consistent with our thesis:

The second problem is then to expand the power in the system to assimilate the newly mobilized and politically participant groups, thus creating a modern system. (1968, 146)
This helps our understanding of the changeability of nationalism as it continually responds to changes in political-social integrative challenges.

At a later stage the system is confronted with the demands of the participant groups for a greater dispersion of power and for the establishment of reciprocal checks and controls among groups and institutions. (1968, 146)

In conclusion, there is nothing antithetical in Huntington's pattern of historical linearity to our nationalism work. This is not to deny that a tension exists between calling nationalism a modern phenomenon and coming to terms with modernity in a way that circularity is avoided. But Huntington's contribution to our thesis, I believe, is more in expanding our conception of the setting of centralization than in providing a historical framework for the development of post-emergent nationalism. For that reason, it is worth reproducing his table summarizing how the distribution of power relates to the amount of power.

From this table, we can see that because we have claimed nationalism to require regional political centralization without specifying anything regarding the amount of state power, our thesis is subject to both quantitative extremes. Those political systems established under small and large amounts of power. But, at this point, it would seem that one would be as
acceptable as the other—as long as the condition of decline was met.

**The Framework of Decline**

In Hirschman's work "a clear-cut deterioration in the performance of a firm or organization" is the basis for the first chapters. "The exit and voice options are reactions to this deterioration and, under certain conditions, will arrest or reverse it" (1970, 62). However, Hirschman realizes establishments have other goals than simply minimizing discontent. Thus an establishment's concern with voice would serve to qualify the establishment's concern with these other goals. In other words, there will be some trade-offs and compromises made between these concerns.

One of the compromises made during the nationalistic process involves the problem of inspiring the activists while at the same time converting the undecided ones to the party. The critical element of any balancing equation here involves the perception of the distance between the two. However, to calculate the span of tolerance for the activists to remain engaged, Hirschman's exit-voice comes back into play: will they "go inactive" or worse, secede and work in a more exclusive climate for their narrow base? Or will the undecided, more neutral and larger mass of players exit in such a way that they are inaccessible to either combative party?
### Table III
**Political Systems and Power Configurations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Power</th>
<th>Amount of Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concentrated</strong></td>
<td><strong>LARGE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic empire; absolute monarchy</td>
<td>Totalitarian dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feudalism; &quot;pyramidal structures&quot;</td>
<td>Constitutional democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But suppose that as representativeness moves in one direction, the party exposes itself primarily to exit because those thus antagonized have an alternative party to join while a move in the opposite direction will essentially activate voice of those thus antagonized because they are essentially "captured." Here, the understanding of the options depends critically on the disposition of the organization to respond to one--either voice or exit--over the other. Hirschman provides this summarizing table (1970, 122):

After establishing decline, it will become clear that the Ancien Régime of France was far more sensitive to exit than to voice, but its political style aroused primarily voice. By contrast, in revolutionary England, the political style of the establishment was primarily sensitive to voice and it was voice that was primarily aroused. However, we must first establish that the decline required by Hirschman was an historic reality.

In late eighteenth century France, the decline can be seen in terms of both the fortunes of the peasants as well as the finances of the royal state. Though some analyses might focus on the bourgeoisie--"from 1716 to 1789 the foreign trade of France quadrupled ...," (See 1931) --most contemporary analyses seem to agree with Theda Skocpol that there is just too much that
TABLE IV
ORGANIZATIONAL SENSITIVITY BY MEMBERSHIP PROPENSITY

Decline arouses primarily:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exit</th>
<th>Voice</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Organizations where dissent is allowed, but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is sensitive</td>
<td>is &quot;institutionalized&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>primarily to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Democratically responsive organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>commanding considerable loyalty from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enterprise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enterprise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subject to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competition</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>from an</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alternative</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>mode, lazy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oligopolist,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>corporation-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>shareholder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relations,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inner cities,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
contradicts emphasizing the bourgeois social forces as being of much importance. 4

Among experts, it is commonly estimated that the peasants made up over 80 percent of the French population. Thus, it becomes no small matter that de Tocqueville came to regard their life as "sometimes worse in the eighteenth century than it had been in the thirteenth" (1955, 120). De Tocqueville explains why he believes this: they were "more isolated from the rest of the community than the peasant of any other place or period" (1955, 120), "they were left in a state of ignorance and often destitution worse than the serfs, their forefathers" (1955, 133), and

Even the common people living beside the bourgeois in the towns came to regard the peasantry almost as members of an alien race and often to dislike them. [Relating to:] Most of the local dues levied by the townsfolk were so contrived as to bear most heavily on the humblest members of the community. (1955, 93)

We can begin to see a picture of the hunger that came at the end of a period of economic expansion and rising prices.

Albert Soboul points out the stark contrasts between the prosperity whose culmination came in the late 1760s and early 1770s and the recession culminating in the crisis of 1787 (1977, 30f). For the peasant all this was

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4. See Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 176f.
particularly devastating. His main budgetary item was his purchase of cereals. Between 1775 and 1789 the price of these cereals increased thus: wheat rose 66 per cent and rye rose 71 per cent. In the meantime meat rose 67 per cent and firewood rose 91 per cent. Just prior to 1789, the peasant's purchase of bread accounted for about 58 per cent of his budget while in 1789 this increased to 88 per cent.

To compound their miserable condition "wages tended to move in exactly the opposite direction from prices" (Soboul 1977, 32). These effects were further exacerbated by France's rising population, the agricultural sector's primitive methods of cultivation, the 1785 drought that removed a great quantity of livestock for years to come, and the persistent suspicion that the establishment's collectors of grain were all connected with Louis XV in "the pact of famine."

We now move from the hapless circumstances entrapping 80 per cent of the French population to the hapless circumstances of the French state in terms of royal finances. On 20 August 1786 Calonne, comptroller-general, informed Louis XVI that the state was on the brink of financial collapse. When Calonne took the post in 1783, he described the state's financial condition in retrospect: "All the funds were empty, all public stocks were low, all circulation was interrupted; alarm was
general and confidence destroyed" (n.d.). What Calonne did was inaugurate a massive program of public expenditures—a program of "useful splendor" intended to show that the state had no worries about public finance. In the meantime, having made a thorough assessment of the totality of these financial affairs of the kingdom, Calonne on one August day in 1786 presented the king with his Summary of a Plan for the Improvement of the Finances. This, William Doyle has studied and summarizes thus:

In short, the French state lacked rational organization and uniform principles, and it was not enough to attempt to solve financial problems, as previous ministries had, by exclusively financial means. Calonne believed that it was necessary to reform the economy, government, and to some degree French society itself. (1980, 52)

Despite the king's approval several months later, crisis only too quickly returned. However, the members of the political realm, throughout these times, preferred to dwell in their sacred confidence that the French state had nothing to fear. Finally, this time, things began to be too much. Again, there was the unexpected collapse of the government's finances. But "the government was safe as long as it could borrow money,... [Unfortunately] the government's usual creditors refused to lend, no doubt because their liquidity was restricted by a burgeoning economic crisis,..." (Doyle 1980, 113). But also because of the growing perception that the state could no longer
be trusted with good money. In early August, the comptroller-general informed the first minister that the treasury was empty. Soon, what we today call a bankruptcy occurred--complete with a run on the central banking establishment's caisse d'escompte. With that, the highly esteemed financial genius, Necker, returned. His avowed intention was merely to hold things together, somehow, until the Estates-General met. Doyle sums it all up this way: "Having run out of money, the old monarchy and its servants had also run out of ideas. Here, in the last weeks of August 1788, the Ancien Regime, as a political system, collapsed" (1980, 114).

In seventeenth century England, the decline can be seen in terms only somewhat similar to that of France. Price and wage concerns are always a perennial concern among the broader masses of a region. Maurice Ashley, in writing England in the Seventeenth Century, roughly estimates that while "prices increased fourfold between 1500 and 1640,... wages rose only about twofold" (1970, 23). Derek Hirst also estimates real wages to have been about half their level of a hundred years earlier. He sums up the hapless conditions of the masses thus: "The net outcome was living conditions in the decades 1620-50 which have been called among the worst that England has experienced" (1986, 2; emphasis mine). What later scholars were able to observe in reaction to these
prolonged hardships was that men and women were beginning to marry later and have fewer children. All in all, it seems that there was abnormally high suffering in 1623 and the later 1640s.

Exacerbating their miserable condition, the trust and confidence of these affected masses for their higher-ups was altered radically in Lawrence Stone's estimation by the aristocracy engaging in "rigorous economic exploitation" to recoup losses incurred during the late Elizabethan period. This, Stone believes, was "at the expense of much of the loyalty and affection of their tenants" (1972, 84).

Moreover, "there were now very much larger numbers of ruthless entrepreneurs who were disturbing public order by their thrusting materialist drive for economic gain; and there were now very much larger numbers of helpless and dangerous poor who had nowhere to live, and no work by which to support themselves" (Stone 1972, 87).

In all, England, in the decades before 1640, was investing more and more of herself in the gross commercialization that came with the economic-industrial transformation begun a century before. Even knighthood was being sold as a commercial property. And, in Lacy Baldwin Smith's opinion, England herself: "Not only could
England be bought, but she could be bought by the highest bidder" (1971, 202).

This brings us to the consideration of England's financial condition overall. Was it resembling France's as we described above? Smith brings out strong parallels, writing:

Money was at the root of the government's troubles; without the wherewithal to pay salaries, to play a decisive role in the European family of nations, or even to enforce a policy of paternalism designed to protect less fortunate Englishmen against their more predatory brethren, Charles' eleven year "tyranny" deteriorated into a sordid and petty scramble for money wherever it could be gleaned. (1971, 202)

Stone, too, points out how the administrative capacity of the political realm at this time was overtaxed, and ultimately failed: "What started out as a bold legislative attempt at social engineering ended in a squalid administrative exercise in corrupt exploitation of producers and consumers" (1972, 87). David Underdown quite succinctly puts it this way: "The lure of profit was eroding the older paternalism,..." (1985, 23).

With corruption "growing rapidly at all levels of government, especially the highest," the result was not only a severing of respect and awe from among the masses, but a loss of self-confidence among the political elite as to their capacity to govern England. Once, the elite had been summoned to govern England by the words, "Quod
omnes tangit ab omnibus approbatur." 5 But in forming the Model Parliament of 1295, they had experienced a social cohesion far different from that these governing elite experienced in 1640. The difference, Stone describes as a "crisis of confidence": A "slow but inexorable erosion of [a] sense of trust may be observed in every sector of English governmental institutions in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries" (1972, 79). The most royal coup de grace Smith describes thus; the crown jewels having already been sold:

As a final desperate measure of arbitrary financing, the government confiscated L130,000 of gold bullion kept in trust for the merchants of London, and at the same time Charles sanctioned the purchase, on credit, of L65,000 of pepper which was then immediately sold for L50,000 in cash, a form of deficit financing designed to destroy what little confidence remained in the King's honesty. (1971, 202)

Receptivities of Political Authorities

Now, as promised, what of these governing nobilities? As illustrated in Hirschman's scheme, were they primarily receptive to exit or voice? And what does this mean in our thesis of emerging nationalism? I will argue that the effect of France's mis-match of exit and voice and England's matching voice and voice results primarily in their "demonstration effect." That is, England's nationalistic process was less dramatic than

5. "Let that which touches all be approved by all."
France's, but no less revolutionary for the region as a whole.

One thing Hirschman's scheme says about political systems experiencing decline is that if the establishment is primarily concerned about emigration, and the dissent reaction tends toward voice over exit, the voice reaction is likely to be channelled into sanctioned institutions.

During the French nationalistic process the political system was particularly concerned with exit. The dissent reaction was primarily voice. The sanctioned institution was the cahiers de doleances of 1789. Let's examine this "pathological case" in more historical detail.

In ascertaining the sensitivity of the political realm, let us first focus on the centripetal world-view of the court, beginning with the power of the king to center himself. What began with Louis XIV continued through the reign of Louis XVI. Jurien, writing in 1691, spoke of Louis XIV thus:

Earlier on spoke only of the interests of the state, the needs of the state, the upholding of the state. Today it would be lese-majeste to do so. The King has usurped the place of the state, the King is everything, the state is nothing. He is the idol to which the provinces, the towns, finance, the great and the small—in short, everything—is sacrificed. (1691)

For these kings, according to Norbert Elias writing The Court Society, their own existence was the purpose of the state. This belief was necessarily shared by the nobles
of the court thereby effecting a consensus on the king's monopoly of rule. In effect, "the whole world appeared as an extended court, to be manipulated in the manner of the court" (Elias 1983, 128).

And how did this gathering of nobles manifest a responsiveness to decline over voice? We have this from Saint-Simon, who had resigned from military service, reporting the king to have remarked: "One more who is abandoning us" (1814/15). And then to go so far to avoid voicing his displeasure with Saint-Simon as to honor him his first evening back at the court. Why such behavior? "Because," reports Saint-Simon, "he was vexed with me and did not want to show it. But that was the only thing I received from him for three years.... He did not speak to me, looked at me accidentally, never said a word to me about my resignation from the army" (1814/15).

Could we interpret this as an example of a king who is primarily sensitive to the act of a noble withdrawing from his court while he is asserting through court etiquette that there is simply no sanctioned medium for voice? Elias seems to confirm this: "Etiquette was born unwillingly, but it could not be breached from within, not only because the king demanded its preservation, but because the social existence of the people enmeshed in it was itself bound to it" (1983, 87). Moreover, when Marie-Antoinette began to meddle with these established rules
of social intercourse, "it was the high nobility
themselves who protested" (Elias 1983, 87).

Why, we ask, were they so determined to live bound
like this? Why not withdraw altogether from the court
society? Elias supplies this reply:

The bursting of the chains would have meant,
for the court nobles, the disintegration of
their status as an aristocracy.... [Personally
this would have] meant forfeiting privileges,
losing power, and declining relatively to
others. In short, it meant humiliation and, to
an extent, self-immolation, unless the person
concerned possessed other assurances of his
value and pride, of his self-hood and identity,
in his own eyes or in those of other people.
(1983, 87-88)

The importance of this contrived system of conduct whose
sensitivities largely centered on exit is underscored
even further in the following:

If such a society [meaning the good society of
the court] refused to recognize a member, if he
lost his 'honour', he lost a constitutive
element of his personal identity. In reality a
noble would often enough risk his life for his
'honour', losing it rather than forfeiting
membership of his society, his distinction from
the surrounding mass, without which his life,
as long as the power of the privileged society
remained intact, was meaningless. (Elias 1983,
95)

Thus, "the power of the privileged society" was competed
for by king and nobles, but the requirement that this
power survive dictated that the competition could in no
way be divisive or clamorous. This solution by etiquette,
by all appearances, is identical to what Hirschman was
able to show, albeit in a more modern sense: that
"organizations and firms that are ostensibly competing and are normally sensitive to exit can learn to play a cooperative, collusive game ..." (1970, 124).

And was the king aware of this exit phenomena? He was even able to exploit it in disciplining his nobles: "The king demanded the continual presence of the nobility,... exile from which, however, became the most dreaded of all punishments" (Erlanger 1970, 178).

And was the political realm's treatment of the non-nobility any different? Michel Foucault, studying the general forms of legal punishment up to the time of the Revolution, would likely say no. He reports that a high incidence of sentences involved banishment; and that, "in a court such as that of the Chatelet (which dealt only with relatively serious offenses), banishment represented over half the sentences passed between 1755 and 1785" (1979, 33). Thus, with far ranging effects, it would seem that the political realm consistently manifested sensitivity to exit over voice.

Another thing Hirschman's scheme says about political systems experiencing decline is that if the establishment is primarily reactive to voice, and the dissent reaction tends to be voice, we are likely to witness democratic institutions maintaining "considerable loyalty."
During the English nationalist process the political system was particularly reactive to voice. The dissent reaction was primarily voice. The democratic institution of great loyalty was Parliament. Let us now examine this more quiescent case in more historical detail.

Before investigating the sensitivity of the political realm, let us first begin with the centeredness of English authority in Parliament—a significant contrast from that of the French case. In Samuel P. Huntington’s estimation, the British “authority was centralized but it was centralized in Parliament rather than in the crown.” To which he adds: “This, however, was no less of a revolution than occurred on the Continent and perhaps even more of one” (1968, 96).

Elias indicates the diffuseness of social power located in the English political realm:

... in England the king and court did not constitute a power centre overshadowing all others. The English upper classes therefore did not have a court character to the same degree as the French. The social barriers between the nobility and leading groups of the bourgeoisie,... were lower and more fragmentary in England. (1983, 68)

Furthermore, rather than abandoning their country homes for the court, the English "good" families, namely those of the nobility and wealthier bourgeois gentry, divided their time between their country homes and their town houses in London. Some of these outranking the court as
political and social centers of "good society." The court was merely furnishing one more of these centers.

Hence, the popularity of London was enormous. "London news circulated in the country and London politics found, perhaps for the first time, a national response" (Walzer 1965, 246). London Society was itself a special entity—integrating the country nobility, the court nobility, the landed and urban bourgeoisie. Here in London, Maurice Ashley reports, the House of Commons "had become the centre of influence, fashion, and education" (1970, 20). As to why, L.B. Smith writes:

The growth in the size of the lower house was in itself an indication of the increasing activity of the landed and commercial classes within the kingdom. The gentry flocked to parliament to combine business, pleasure, and politics.... In an age of ferocious litigation, when scarcely a landowner in England did not occasionally have to travel to town to pursue a suit, the member of parliament was in a favored position by his association with privy councillors and courtiers close to the sovereign.... Finally, Commons was the most exclusive family club of the realm, and a gentleman from the shires might expect to find a host of close friends and near relatives. (1971, 174)

And the ties between these two were quite strong. When King Charles determined to charge five members of the Commons with serious crimes against England, and not finding them in the chapel of St. Stephen's where they met, he could not force the City of London to come forth with these members.
Meanwhile, the ties between the crown and the members of London Society had been strained since Elizabethan times. Part of this revolved around salt petre men, search warrants, inspectors and the like invading everyone's home on business relating monopolists to the crown. Parliament united with the outraged Londoners on different occasions. "Unfortunately ... [Elizabeth's] Stuart successors were both less tactful and more dependent on the sale of monopolies" (Smith 1971, 218).

Part of the strain, Ashley believes, was because "those at court or in office were expected to keep up their ... social position and did not always receive,... help from the crown in doing so.... There could usually be found some peers or gentry on the decline,..." (1970, 20). Nor does there appear any evidence that the crown had any misgivings about those exiting thus.

Another source of strain involving London Society and the crown may be said to involve their country guests or family members as well. It has to do with wardship. "Of all the feudal and historic sources of income, wardship was the most profitable and also the most burdensome to the propertied classes" (1971, 200). Through this unpredictable inheritance tax upon property, favored courtiers and royal officials as often as not left him [the ward] in beggary. Under Elizabeth the profits of the Court of
Wards averaged £15,000 a year; by 1640 that figure had jumped to £71,000. The growth of wardship was feared and detested by both peers and commoners, ... As a consequence it was being said that "all the rich families of noble men and gentlemen were exceedingly incensed and even undevoted to the crown." (Smith 1971, 200)

Of a more personal nature, London Society had witnessed the arrival into its Protestant midst of the Catholic Princess of France, Henrietta Maria, as their Queen.

As the years of personal rule lengthened, the influence of the Queen advanced. To the public she represented the most detestable aspects of foreign rule. She was a Catholic who presided over a priestly coterie at court and maintained her own emissary at the Vatican; and she constantly urged Charles to model himself and his government on the French pattern. (Smith 1971, 201)

And only two months before her, their King Charles had arrived. He has been described as "coldly impersonal in human contacts and rigidly narrow in his moral and intellectual approach to life. He made a virtue of inflexibility ..." (Smith 1971, 194). The point here is that Charles was not equipped to galvanize social power to himself; whether owing to a stammer in his speaking, a natural slowness of mind, or just a lack of confidence in himself is debatable.

Thus, we have Parliament emerging as the center of political authority in the English case. During this process "the King lost his active representative functions and the M.P. became 'the representative of the
whole community, as well as of its component interests'" (Huntington 1968, 107; citing Beer 1957). "It also meant," in Breuilly's estimation, that "the major institution through which collaboration was secured for further centralization was a central representative assembly, Parliament" (1985, 54; emphasis mine).

At this point in our paper, we have the French case with no representative assembly providing an institutional focus to capture royal opposition. However, in England "the centrality of a single institution in the collaboration required to increase royal power provided an immediate central focus for subsequent opposition to the crown" (Breuilly 1985, 54).

Here is one example of how it worked. Puritan ministers, "contrary to all custom,... discussed parliamentary affairs in their conferences; proposals and petitions were adopted and sent on to London" (Walzer 1965, 129). Then,

at the London sessions ... "[they] were wont ... to attend the House of Commons door," a contemporary writer reports, "making legs to the members in transitu, praying their worships to remember the Gospel." (1965, 129; citing Morgan 1957)

Furthermore, to create in the minds of M.P.'s the belief in the reality of "spontaneous, widespread discontent" (Neale n.d.), "the clerical conferences compiled a parish by parish survey of the established church, itemizing its supposed deficiencies; they published it for the
parliamentary session ... and circulated it along with numerous petitions from sympathetic gentry" (Walzer 1965, 129).

Michael Walzer concludes, in terms of the voicers of discontent: "These efforts to influence parliamentary decisions and even to organize a following in the Commons represent a major development in English political history" (1965, 129-30). Meanwhile, Breuilly gives his summary in terms of the recipients of this discontent: "Increasingly Parliament could appear as the only effective institution through which to channel grievances against the crown" (1985, 54).

This, I believe, establishes a democratic organization of considerable loyalties as the center of political authority and the receptivity of Parliament in accordance with Hirschman's scheme—to voice.

In contrast to the English case elaborated above, the French parlements tell a very different story. In 1692 free municipal elections were replaced by royal appointment. In 1771 parlements were abolished. In 1787 provincial assemblies were created and invested with broad powers and duties, "subject to the orders of the central government. However, "often a provincial assembly found the provisions of the new laws so baffling and obscure that it sent letters to distant provinces requesting explanations ..." (de Tocqueville 1955, 197).
From the Provincial Assembly of Lorraine "a total stagnation in the conduct of public affairs" was recorded.

It does not weaken the argument that the parlements were composed entirely of nobles; the thinking being that because of who they were, these parlements were effective extensions of royal authority. Brian Singer explains why:

the members of parlement saw themselves as being in opposition, excluded unjustly from positions of real authority. In effect, if a noble status still appeared as a necessary condition for holding power, it was no longer a sufficient condition. Indeed, those institutions originally established for the nobility's participation in the transmission of power but which were not part of the absolutist administration, no longer appeared to partake of the royal authority. (1986, 57)

The Response to Decline

The cahiers de doleances of 1789 were a solicitation for grievances from the entire kingdom by the king's absolutist administration. This royal decree, announced on 5 July 1788, not only contained this historic invitation but also proclaimed that there was to be a convocation of an Estates General. Part of it reads thus:

His Majesty will always try to adopt the forms used in the past, but when they cannot be determined he wishes to supplant the silence of the ancient monuments by asking, before making any decisions, the will of his subjects... (Egret 1977)
These cahiers emanated from legally constituted electoral assemblies. Furthermore, their composition was officially prescribed in the royal regulations (Hyslop 1968, 4).

Thus began a process of voice simultaneously breaking out all over the French kingdom—solicited by a political organization primarily receptive to exit. The framework for this voice experience was expected to constructively channel these opinions for the enhancement of monarchical power.

In England's case, the process of voice is manifest in the activity of political petitions. David Underdown, a noted scholar of popular politics during England's Civil War period, describes their ability to relate the country and Parliament thus:

At the local level, the most effective propaganda weapon was the county petition, designed to demonstrate the maximum degree of public support for the aims of its promoters.... [Yet despite a host of reservations] it is clear that many of them did express the consensus of a wide spectrum of local society.... [And, in the counties Underdown studied, he notices that] by the end of 1641,.... the intensity of political and religious division is reflected in elaborately organized petitions of a far more partisan nature. (1985, 138-39)

Derek Hirst elaborates on this same theme in nearly the same terms:

MPs were subject not just to the agitation of factional leaders but also to lobbying, whether by constituents or by clergy ... [But] most of all they became subject to petitioning. The prominence accorded both by localities and the Commons to petitioning on all manner of
business suggests the importance politicians attached to being able to represent, or to misrepresent, the sense of the country. It also points to the involvement of a wider public in the political process. (1986, 194)

In 1629 Charles decided to rule England without the Commons. This, in itself, is not significant. But not long thereafter, the Commons' most important leaders (Eliot, Wentworth, Coke, and Pym) were either far away or dead. As for Charles' court, its introspection seems dangerously related to his marital bliss with his Catholic queen.

Then, Charles' soldiers were defeated by a Scottish army of Presbyterians upon their invasion. Charles was to finance these troops on a daily basis. "The King had no other way to finance these obligations than to summon the Long Parliament" (Smith 1971, 206).

The 1640 elections were a landmark in their "unprecedented degree of popular involvement and excitement" (Underdown 1985, 133). The electorate was even broader and more independent than in the 1620s. During one election dispute, Sir Simonds D'Ewes was heard to declare "that the poorest man ought to have a voice, that it was the birthright of the subjects of England" (n.d.). "Before 1640 was out petitions were flooding into Parliament ..." (Underdown 1985, 137).
Findings from Hirschman's Thesis

We have found that the formative patterns of the French and English revolutions are amenable to Hirschman's elaboration of exit and voice. In agreeing with those scholars that view the nationalist process as one of civil war, we have taken the initial exit-voice structure of the revolutions and sought to find out how consistent historically they were with Hirschman's theoretical points.

At this point, it might be objected that to have frozen these complexly active phenomenon in this way is plainly simplifying in the wrong way. Certain points might be advanced in support of this objection; some on the side of complexity and others on the side of the chaotic rush of events common to revolutions. For instance, when Jean Egret interprets Louis XVI's amnesty of all booksellers, merchants, and peddlers formerly arrested and imprisoned for views inconsistent with royal thinking as being the Crown's solicitation of the Third Estate for support (Egret 1977)—is this sufficient to establish the King's receptivity to voice with the people as significant to the fundamental pattern of the French Revolution? I think not.

When Turgot submitted to the King his plan for a yearly representative assembly to discuss laws and concluded with:
Thus Your Majesty will be kept posted as to popular feeling without being trammeled by it, and public opinion satisfied without any peril to the State. For these assemblies will have no right to vote against necessary measures, and, even should they overstep their powers, Your Majesty will always have the last word" (n.d.).

Was the intent of this effort sufficient to establish the King's receptivity to voice with the people as significant to the fundamental pattern of the French Revolution. Again, I think not.

And what about the flood of the written word previous to both revolutions? Elizabeth Eisenstein reports that in pre-revolutionary France there was "an outpouring of pamphlets that [even] astonished contemporaries" (1986, 199). While in pre-revolutionary England, surveys reveal a similar pattern:

By 1640 most major provincial towns had a bookseller, often more than one. The number of works printed annually in England between 1600 and 1640 rose from 259 to 577; thereafter it soared. Nor were even a majority of those books manuals of devotion ... [Also, there began] the appearance in the early-Stuart period of salaried newsletter-writers,... (Hirst 1986, 95)

Is it possible to construe these as important examples of voice significant to the nationalist process of civil war but not amenable to Hirschman's framework? While it is true that these examples are outside Hirschman's scheme focusing on cahiers and Parliament respectively, our action theory of nationalism also puts them outside our theoretical context. That is, while the written word and
its influence in the public domain are significant in terms of national consciousness (as are the interest on a region's history), national consciousness does not necessarily translate into nationalism. It is missing that vital component that Arendt terms the we-consciousness of action.

Shafer says: "Men are not by nature nationalist, any more than they are monarchist or republican. They become nationalist, within particular cultures and under certain conditions, and more or less nationalist depending upon the particular situation. Nationalism is a learned sentiment" (1972, 13). This, abstractly, is our position in this paper. But the question is how.

How is it that people become nationalists? By selecting France and England instead of one or more of the modern developing countries the role of national consciousness has not been directly explored. It is taken inferentially into the conceptualization of voice. I am content to assume that the activity of producing voice has enough of a cultural component to it that the Arendtian community sought by the activists will be a regionalized group (i.e. a nation) rather than a class (hence no Marxist revolution), an economic grouping (like I.B.M.), or an occupational grouping (military). From this cultural milieu—to which publications are very significant—I assume that activists have absorbed their
national consciousness. Henceforth, their involvement in opposition or support concerning a central political authority begets nationalism.

If this seems a bit too ad hoc, automatically selecting the regional group for their group identity, I believe Connor helps by pointing to the universal tendency of people to grossly simplify complex attributes of groupings and to subscribe to this simplification a reality it doesn't necessarily possess. He writes,

that people of one nation, as a short-hand method of describing a more complex set of standards by which they distinguish another group, have a tendency to grasp upon a single attribute. (1978, 38)

What this does for setting regional groupings ahead of all other alternative groups is point to the fact that in highly simplified terms, however unrealistic, one sees more of himself in his neighbors, regardless of class, educational, occupational or other differentiating factors because conjointly they all seem to experience the same neighborhood. This sharing experience—as each other experiences it—is what national consciousness is all about.

Michael Walzer sets this point into our appreciation of English history. Beginning with Thomas Taylor's paraphrasing of Arendt's principle of the activist's we-consciousness: "A good heart will walk to heaven alone if
it cannot get company; [but] it would rather have company" (1630). He then finds that he can say:

Might not that company, someday, include all England? During the 1640's, personal and national regeneration were constantly linked together: the individual's covenant with the covenant of a nation reborn,... The career of the lonely heart and of the regenerate nation were rooted in the same structure of feeling and expressed in the same language. (1965, 150)

Then, Walzer links this sharing experience of we-consciousness directly with the nationalistic process of civil war. He writes,

And if this is true, it is not farfetched to suggest that the national covenant and the civil war were there, so to speak, all along, revealed in the imagery of the ministers before they ever became the subject matter of political debate. (1965, 150)

If some would equate nascent nationalism with this pre-civil war national covenant--perhaps; but not nationalism in the full capacity of mature nationalism. But then, of course, Walzer never does.

Providing Demonstration Effects

What is explained by Hirschman's schematic framework in terms of nationalism theory has to do with "providing demonstration effects." Reinhard Bendix highlights this important concept in his book, Kings or People, within its concluding paragraph. He believes that the power of regional grouping is not confined to securing identity relations over other groupings; but, combined with "the desire to be recognized and respected ... men want their
country recognized and respected in the world" (1978, 603). This figures as one of the "root causes of nationalism" both before and after a revolution. Historically, this reference to foreign models has become inescapable since the great intellectual mobilization of the sixteenth century. Several countries have been in the world-historical position of providing demonstration effects. (1978, 603)

Therefore, certain societies, often termed "advanced societies," became focused on as models.

Nor was this model always taken for its positive contributions. For instance, when the American John Adams sized up the English model of government, he was led to remark: "Can one read it without shuddering? A single assembly to govern England? An assembly of Senators for life? If no better system of government was proposed, no wonder the people recalled the Royal Family" (n.d.).

Nor were those concerned with political questions unaware that this modelling would proceed even upon their work. Thomas Jefferson, in 1802, writing to Dr. Priestly describes this self-awareness thus:

We feel that we are acting under obligations not confined to the limits of our society. It is impossible not to be sensible that we are acting for all of mankind; that circumstances denied to others, but indulged to us, have imposed on us the duty of proving what is the degree of freedom and self-government in which society may venture to leave its individual members.
Huntington believes that particular to each historical period a single model among the political systems seems to demonstrate a unique capacity to meet the needs and requirements of that age. "In the era of European state-building in the seventeenth century, the "pattern-state," ... was the Bourbon monarchy of France" (1968, 137). The Bourbon model, Sir George Clark writes, "was consciously and deliberately copied elsewhere ..." (1961; quoted in Huntington 1968, 137).

But the question, from the context of this paper, becomes "Why was the nationalistic process France experienced so demonstrative of nationalism and not England's?"

Both populations produced prominent spokesmen championing the "demonstration effect" of these respective nationalistic processes for all humanity to proudly emulate. On the French side Carlton J.H. Hayes observes

So convinced were the French of the blessings of the new nationalism for themselves that they could not conceive how it could fail to bless all other peoples. It was a peculiarly French mission, they believed, to spread the new gospel--by the sword if necessary. (1926, 45)

While on the English side the Puritan leader Stephen Marshall in 1641 could proclaim that good Englishmen had "great works to do, the planting of a new heaven and a new earth among us, and great works have great enemies."
And Bendix writes, mixing both sides, "As French opposition to absolutism surfaced after 1715, it became pertinent to consider the reasons for England's freedom at home and strength in world affairs" (1980, 342). Among those considerations were those products that emanated from England's own revolutionary war—her nationalistic process.

But while the championing of French nationalism bore fruit among a host of nationalism theorists, the fruit of England's nationalistic process failed to receive acknowledgement. Breuilly has attributed this scholarly silence to England's tradition of "gradualism." In his interpretation, political opposition's claiming only to take England to the next forward step in her progress through history or appealing to universal principles beyond a nation's ideological framework helps explain "the absence of any distinctive English nationalist ideology" (1985, 56).

But this is more a description of England's historical matching of institutional response with opposition's reaction as she went through her nationalistic process. Hirschman continually uses such "gradualistic" terms as recovery mechanism, "alerting management to its failings," improving institutions, remedies, corrective policies, etc. The point is that for the institution in decline, yielding to gradual recovery
mechanisms can be a singularly quiet affair; while yielding to other forms of management—as the succession of managements during the French Revolution—can be extremely dramatic. If the French monarchy had been listening to the voice of political opposition, according to Hirschman, gradualistic events would have followed. Yet precisely because it did not, its place in history as well as in nationalism literature was to become secured.

But does this approach to the study of England mislead us? Is this combining gradualism and revolution in the English case an impossible contradiction? No, I think not.

Hirschman's thesis merely gives an underpinning as to how this gradualism worked through England's revolution while at the same time quieting any demonstration effect. Because of this a scholar like Alan Macfarlane can talk about "the degree to which the non-revolutionary nature of the English past is representative or exceptional when compared to the rest of Western Europe (1986, 163; emphasis mine); and another equally renowned scholar like Samuel Huntington can talk about the "English Revolution of the seventeenth century" as "the forerunner of the modern revolution" (1968, 265). Or a historian and scholar of historiography can write "the revisionist answer to the question, 'when was the
English Revolution?' was a disconcerting one: 'there was no revolution'. (Clark 1986, 71); and another of a similar mold can write, "Many writers refer to England's great crisis of the seventeenth century as the English civil war; others do not hesitate to speak of the English Revolution" (Bendix 1980, 303).

If Macfarlane is believed, then the unease of Hirschman's thesis conforming well with England's quietly non-demonstrative revolution is the fault of historians and not an intuition of theoretical weakness in the application of Hirschman's thesis. Macfarlane writes of "a misleading paradigm of the English past [having] established itself" (1986, 164). It is attributable to those following Sir Herbert Butterfield's direction: "the chief aim of the historian is the elucidation of the unlikeness between past and present ... It is not for him to stress and magnify the similarities between one age and another ..." (1973; quoted in Macfarlane 1986, 162). This leads the hunter of dissimilarities to search out revolutions. Better to follow Lady Rosalind Clay who could instill the view: "if we are concerned to find out how things have come to be as they are, we may well find that for certain societies the 'continuity with change' paradox is the most flexible way of looking at the past" (Macfarlane 1986, 162). Thus, Hirschman's thesis brooks a kind of theoretical peace between "gradualism" and
"revolutionism." Therefore, it comes as no surprise that England's revolution "was officially understood as a restoration, namely as 'freedom by God's blessing restored', as the inscription runs on the great seal of 1651" (Arendt 1986, 43).
CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF VOICE

Hirschman's voice reaction is the predominant reaction mechanism among the members of nations. As such, we now turn our attention to the structural context in which the voice of oppositional ideology emerges.

Upon reflection, one can assign three structural relations between an opposition and an establishment. First, an opposition may emerge from among the members of an establishment, giving it the character of a familial dispute. Second, an opposition may emerge from outside the membership of an establishment but within their domesticity. The character of this relationship is more like factional warring between an "out-group" and an "in-group." And third, an opposition may emerge from outside both the establishment and their regular domesticity. Here, in the colony, both the native establishment and the colonists see themselves undifferentiated, together against the foreign power.
Three Varieties of Nationalism

Nationalism is a phenomenon brought about by the public interaction of a rulership's holding certain 'vital' doctrines and an oppositional ideology developing with sufficient force to seriously challenge those doctrines or, relatedly, what is imputed to be the domain under those doctrines. Thus, nationalism is an unintended consequence of a struggle for political power between the "haves" and the "have nots"--with the "have nots" desiring to change that condition. With this in mind, we can see that there are three social locations where nationalism might emerge.

First, emerging among the uppermost of the social strata is what could be called "aristocratic nationalism." It is characterized by the ethos Weber described as indigenous to patriarchal domination. That is, there is an ever-present strain of a governing class ethic in the relationship between the governors and the governed. And this noblesse oblige tradition survives the modernization process, continuing to hold political power quite close to the traditional political elite and populism quite distantly and distrustfully. K.H. Silvert puts it this way:

In the early stages of national development, when a small socioeconomic and intellectual elite usually holds power, ideology may be expected to be aristocratic in tone and hortatory,... (1971, 653)
Second, emerging among the populace is what could be called "popular nationalism." It is characterized by an ethos in which the People possess mystical qualities. "The distinction between the People and the anti-People appeared early in Roman history ..." (Boas 1969, 43). And although no consensus ever existed as to just whom the People actually were, nonetheless, Vox populi vox Dei has also survived the modernization process. While the powerless have always far outnumbered the politically powerful, this doctrine seeds distrust towards the political elite and establishes the politically powerless as the "in group."

At once we are at odds with Anthony Giddens concerning his elaboration of the relationship between nationalism, sovereignty and citizenship.

There are a series of possible ties and tensions between nationalism, sovereignty and citizenship, depending upon the direction in which these ideas are channelled. Where nationalism is canalized primarily towards sovereignty ... nationalist sentiments may take an exclusivist turn,.... Here citizenship rights are likely to be poorly developed or constricted--especially civil and political rights. Where citizenship rights are more substantially founded or actualized, they tend to influence the connections between sovereignty and nationalism in an opposite direction, stimulating more polyarchic forms of nationalist sentiment. (Giddens 1985, 217-18)

A notable difference is that his binary depiction seems somewhat askew of the themes this paper emphasizes. That is, Giddens, if I am understanding him correctly, would
agree that England was where emerging nationalism was
directed towards sovereignty and France was where
citizenship rights were more substantively actualized in
their emerging nationalism. The early development of
English nationalism in the seventeenth century was
certainly not concerned with "citizenship rights." And
the immortalized cry, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,"
commemorating the emergence of French nationalism would
seem quite distant from the challenges of sovereignty.

This thesis argues that in the English experience,
the triumph of Parliamentary political power over
monarchical sovereignty was of secondary importance to
the more revolutionary, more profound social changes
wrought at this time. That is, the sentiment of oneness
displacing the political quiescence of the English masses
was by far the more important political development of
this period. David Underdown, studying the "popular
politics and culture in England, 1603 - 1660," gives some
substance to my latter point:

... we should not exaggerate the elements of
conservatism and quiescence, for there remained
an important residue from the civil war in the
political consciousness of the lower orders....
The civil war was certainly one of the factors
that encouraged their independence to take
somewhat more political forms. (Underdown 1985,
288)

Meanwhile, Conrad Russell augments my first point: "the
difficulties of the early Stuarts [James I and Charles I]
were not difficulties with their parliaments; they were
difficulties which were reflected in their parliaments" (Russell 1976; quoted in Morrill 1980, 30).

Furthermore, I argue that in the French experience, the so-called triumph of popular sovereignty over monarchical sovereignty was less important to the character of French nationalism than was the struggle of various groups to constitute France's rulership.

Supporting my position is George V. Taylor in concluding that "it was essentially a political revolution with social consequences and not a social revolution with political consequences" (Taylor 1967; quoted in Hunt 1984, 11). Furthermore, as for diminishing the significance of declarations and emphasizing the circumstances of political conflict in shaping the character of French nationalism I find support from Albert Goodwin in his analysis of the Declaration of Rights:

Though article one proclaimed that all men were 'equal in rights', it did not assert their political or social equality. It may be doubted,... whether equality would have been regarded by the authors of the declaration as one of the attributes of human personality .... The natural rights of man and of the citizen, stated in the preamble to be inalienable and sacred, were those derived not from the existence of man in a state of nature, but from human personality. (Goodwin 1966, 74-5)

The development of the character of French nationalism I am proposing underscores George Lefebvre's conclusion that "from the social point of view, there were several
revolutions within what is called the French Revolution ...
[the revolutions of the aristocrats, the bourgeois, the sans-culottes, the peasants]" (Furet 1981, 8). These revolutions not only changed France in terms of forms of government, but they considerably changed France in terms of its "degree of government."

If the king's servants in Versailles and his agents in the provinces did have a great deal of authority over some regions, municipalities and village councils, most ordinary people could still live almost entirely outside the influence of the state. The Revolution came as an unprecedented and often unwelcome intrusion into the lives of many such people. After 1790, the demands the central government made on citizens for attention, activity and loyalty went far beyond the claims of the ramshackle administration of the old regime. (Goff and Sutherland 1976, 29)

And then,

Never since the fall of the Roman Empire had the world seen a government so highly centralized. This new power was created by the Revolution or, rather, grew up almost automatically out of the havoc wrought by it. True, the governments it set up were less stable than any of those it overthrew; yet, paradoxically, they were infinitely more powerful. Indeed, their power and their fragility alike were due to the same causes,... (de Tocqueville 1955, 9)

And this, Samuel Huntington claims, reflects the political community French society achieved. That is, social forces, such as nationalism, can now play a significant part in establishing a coherence between the political community and French society.
Now, for the third major type of nationalism. It is the nationalism that sees the foreigner compromising one's own society. In this category, the rulership that the opposition confronts is outside an identifiable pattern of life that the opposition utilizes to constitute the "in group." Hence, this "xenophobic nationalism" finds no place in Giddens' schematic. Historically, American nationalism as it emerged developed predominately into this type. In *Inventing America* Garry Wills writes:

The Declaration of Independence announced the failure of reform by petition. Even to conclude the petitioning process, Congress had to restate the grievances for which redress had been sought through constitutional channels.... Only two major answers to the Declaration were published on the English side,... (Wills 1978, 65)

Revolutionary France experienced some intermingling of this xenophobic nationalism when it was opined that the French really consisted of two nations with the Franks composing the First and Second estates and the Third estate being descended from the conquered Gauls. And Gerald Newman takes this xenophobia as the cornerstone of his thesis on English nationalism emerging in the period 1740–1830. Previous to this was the Act of Settlement of 1701 attempting to restrain William. The Act provided that

none of his ministers should be foreigners ... that the monarch should not leave the country without the consent of Parliament ... that, if
a foreigner became King, 'this nation be not obliged to engage in any war for the defence of any dominions or territories which do not belong to the Crown of England without the consent of Parliament' [and provided for the] defence of the Church of England against Rome" (Clark 1986, 75).

Aristocratic Nationalism

The aristocratic variety of nationalism was successfully established during the English experience in the seventeenth century. Conversely, this same variety failed to take hold during the German experience in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The difference between aristocratic nationalism's becoming established or not hinges largely on the nature of the establishment's opposition.

George Mosse writes of Wilhelmian nationalism becoming establishment doctrine:

National unity had come from above and not from below, it was the gift of statesmen and the democratic impulse seemed lost. This fact seemed to stifle the official national cult. While national unity had to be achieved against the establishment, the political liturgy of nationalism showed an ideological and dramatic impetus which was lost once nationalism had become established as doctrine. (1974, 46)

The problem this gift giving creates is that the people are stripped of the opportunities of opposition. At the heart of nationalism's appeal to the members of different strata of a society is the concept of reciprocity. Each has something to give as well as to receive. But due to
their unequal placement in the distribution of goods and services the rulership has to be instructed through an oppositional ideology that every domestic thing is not ineluctably theirs. In so doing, as the opposition's ideologists battle the rulership's theorists, a consciousness of identity and power arises, loyalties and political weaknesses get public exposure, and finally, a sense of active participation in something greater than any individual is shared in by a population very much larger than those of just the political realm.

Without the development of an oppositional ideology a country's rulership will have no tangible conception of mutual obligation with the common people. While there may be extensive practices involving cooperation, cooperation can be maintained under extremely authoritative forces of domination while reciprocity cannot. Though reciprocity is frequently utilized as "an ideological cover for exploitation"; nevertheless, "the rhetorical and ideological use of the conception of reciprocity testifies to its widespread appeal, to its possible role as the fundamental idea behind popular conceptions of justice and injustice, fairness and unfairness" (Moore 1978, 508-9). Justice and fairness are at the heart of any quid pro quo arrangement, and the more the products traded and the traders are dissimilar, the more it is natural to scrutinize the whole process.
In a monarchical setting among the English, the Tudor government witnessed the elaboration of the theories of absolute and limited monarchy. Similar to the German attempt to manipulate national unity from above, Eccleshall writes, "The theory of absolute monarchy was a vehicle which served to convey their desire for national unity, while that of limited monarchy originated in the political developments by which a degree of unity was achieved" (Eccleshall 1978, 157). 1

But differences in reciprocity does not take precedence over the fact that the English experienced a civil war. This is critical for the emergence of nationalism. But, I am saying, reciprocity is a special activity. "Activity distinguishes nationalism from national consciousness" (Philip 1980, 2). This activity, we could agree, serves nationalism; but, it takes the process of civil war to initiate nationalism. Thus, lacking both, it is not surprising to hear that among Germans, Wilhelmian nationalism was more dead than alive.

1. The unity achieved was the political nation; that is, "the Tudor experiment in power sharing" had established a broad rulership uniting the crown and the propertied classes. But power sharing went no further: "Both theories judged the rational capacity of each ordinary individual to be deficient... Both, that is, were predicated on the necessity of curtailing individual volition ..." (Eccleshall, 157).
Popular Nationalism

The popular variety of nationalism was successfully established during the French revolutionary experience. And because this experience was not "a homogeneous social and political phenomenon" (Furet) its emerging nationalism developed under complex influences. For instance, the influence of Rousseau on the development was hardly monolithic and singular. Kingsley Martin, in studying the interpretation of Rousseau, writes: "No one can be as fairly quoted in support of opposite theories as Rousseau" (Martin 1963, 214). But more than that, the nationalism that Rousseau contributed to was not popular nationalism, but aristocratic nationalism.

"Rousseau had supplied the populace with the cry of popular sovereignty,... Orators who quoted Rousseau were never tired of reminding their audiences that the people themselves were now sovereign, every common man exercising his share of the divine right of French monarchy" (Martin 1963, 217). Yet, for all of his association with popular ideologies, Rousseau's ideas correspond more fittingly with the patriarchal ethos of aristocratic nationalism. For all his anti-rational teachings, the People was never revered for its innate mysterious good. R.R. Palmer writes of his Social Contract as laying very deep theoretical foundations "that went into the making of later nationalism.... In
all but its terminology it was a handbook for nation-making, for, as he said, the primary problem was to explain how 'a people become a people,'" (Palmer 1940, 106). Rousseau quite distrusted populism, hence we can understand why he "is fairly quoted by authoritarians as a precursor of an extreme collectivism, in which neither private property nor religious liberty is free from the interference of government" (Martin 1963, 215).

The popular nationalism I am elaborating corresponds with that "special version of nationalism" Edmund Wilson attributes to Michelet. It was "the nationalism of which Jeanne d'Arc had been the prophet and the Federations of 1789 the explicit realization" (Wilson 1985, 39). But, as Michelet noted, nationalisms are extremely pliable and capable of developing into forms gravely disappointing to former believers.

George Boas believes that the conception of the People laden with mystical overtones began to become socially significant in the eighteenth century. "The Folk were the aboriginal men from whom either all of us or a nation or a society or a race descended. The Folk contained the residual primitive soul of the group in question" (Boas 1969, 42). In such a setting it is easy to see why reason with its power to dissociate men from one another is anathema. It is fellowship inspired by love, fellowship in the absence of man's critical
faculties that is the fragile venue of popular nationalism. By whatever manner the collective soul inhabits the group—language, race, holdings—one can be made aware that "he is one of the People in the political sense; he can be one of them in the economic sense; but he is not one of them in the social sense" (Boas 1969, 43). In this same sense, popular nationalism is particularly sensitive to social manifestations—national character, cultural treasures, etc.

But the political realm must always be smaller than the social realm attached to it. Whatever the form of government, there are always more governed than governors; correspondingly, more poor than rich; and correspondingly more uneducated than educated. The political solution to this is to rule in the name of the people.

And although Reinhard Bendix asserts that the principle, rule in the name of the people, was first articulated in seventeenth-century England, it lacked the weight to have any bearing upon the emergence of English nationalism. The English political thinkers of this time were more concerned with the results: arguing how public benevolence could be guaranteed or what constituted an effective device for securing the public good did not include either a belief in the superior wisdom of the People or rule in the name of the people. But, the
absence of popular elements of nationalism does not translate to the absence of patriarchal elements of nationalism. Eccleshall gives support to these two points:

So long as the literate members of society were reasonably convinced that justice was being dispensed to all corners of the realm, they were content to articulate a conception of the common good which transcended particular interests. While their interests were relatively secure, they were prepared to declare the moral acceptability of existing institutions. (Eccleshall 1978, 157)

Neither did the elements of popular nationalism have the greatest significant bearing upon the emergence of American nationalism. This is not to say that it did not have considerable import.

The socially unified character of American nationalism at its beginning is succinctly captured by Jonathan Mayhew in his famous Discourse of 1750: "For a nation thus abused to arise unanimously and to resist their prince ... [is] but a reasonable way of vindicating their liberties and just rights ..." (1750). It fell to the "amazing influence" of Thomas Paine's Common Sense to significantly initiate the popular elements in America's just developing xenophobic nationalism. Parrington catches Paine's influence on this development:

The point at issue before the American people, therefore, was whether a more useful arrangement would result from continuing the old connection with England, or from setting up for themselves; and it must be decided, not in the court room or council chambers, but in the
countinghouse and market place, in the field and shop, wherever plain Americans were making a living. Let the common people consult their own needs, and determine the case without regard to legal or constitutional precedents. (Parrington 1954, 335)

And while the Constitutional Convention established "the principle of rationally calculating how to marshal public support for national policy" (Lipset 1967, 36), politics was in reality a narrowly limited endeavor among select aristocrats. The Federalist party, the conservative party of Washington and Adams, "could be described as parallel to those patron parties of Africa that are national but which represent a linking of local notables rather than an organization designed to mobilize the common people" (Lipset 1967, 37). It was not until "the Republicans took advantage of [the] disaffection [centering around the Jay treaty] to organize an opposition based upon popular support. They appealed to social categories that cut across existing political boundaries,..." (Lipset 1967, 37).

Xenophobic Nationalism

The xenophobic variety of nationalism was successfully established during the American revolutionary experience. A.D. Smith, in summarizing this view, illustrates how much this variety of nationalism has effected the whole of nationalism theory:

At the gateway of every nationalism stands a foreigner. Nationalism is simply a collective
grievance against foreigners and a desire to eject them and their influence from the body of the people. (1973, 47)

In rebuttal to the strength of this variety subsuming the whole of nationalism theory Smith gives two responses: (1) "the equation of conquest with slavery is largely theoretical and as such is bound up with the nationalist doctrine itself," and (2) "many an empire testifies to the peaceful intercourse of peoples and the relative absence of acrimony" (1973, 48).

But nationalism does have a strong presence in the literature of anti-colonialism. Breuilly explores some of the conditions for the emergence of nationalism in his excellent chapter, "The Colonial State and Nationalism." First, an ideology of nationalism, perhaps in the realization of national consciousness was "to have achieved some degree of real internal development in order to be able to claim [credibly] that it could form a successor state" (1985, 191). Along this line, and quite conformable with our action oriented viewpoint, he adds: "The lack of specialized political action devoted to the taking over state power also damaged the appeal of nationalist ideology" (1985, 191). The case of the Belgian Congo illustrates his point more precisely.

Where the colonial state was clearly the instrument of particular interests,... it was

difficult to conceive of, let alone practice, politics in terms of influencing the state or seeking to take it over. Rather the colonial state became something to be removed along with the interests which dominated it. Nationalism found it difficult, if not impossible, to develop and operate effectively in such circumstances. (1985, 190; emphasis mine)

In conclusion, one cannot say that all opposition activity in a colonial setting is necessarily nationalist. Nationalism develops from among politics public in character and seeking the reestablishment of central political authority following a native realignment. As such, Breuilly sees nationalism here as "a struggle to express certain ideas" concerning domination and collaboration in respect to political change and social tradition.

Patterns Emanating from Structural Conditions

In the nationalism literature there are a variety of categorical schemes. They serve different functions for their authors. If they appear to be in difficulty with a number of problematic cases, then the general principles upon which they are based seem equally in difficulty. It is in that direction that we now turn. How robust does our categorical scheme appear?

During the times of great civil strife there seems to be a small nucleus of disconcerting questions on which public attention is centered. However inadequate any set of answers may appear to fit these concerns, nonetheless,
almost always there seems to be a framework that accompanies these questions. I believe these frameworks are correlated with the categories of nationalism: in aristocratic nationalism the fundamental questions are seen in a social framework; in popular nationalism the fundamental questions are seen in a political framework; and in xenophobic nationalism the fundamental questions are seen in terms of a cultural framework. There is some evidence that the three case revolutions provide qualified support despite their complexities.

In aristocratic nationalism the state is accepted as a more highly evolved ethical community than the family. It was believed that "the function of political activity was to make an objective moral order communally operative,..." (Eccleshall 1978, 173). As such, the trouble is often over religion. However problematic the relation between nationalism and religion 3, the religious factor is quite significant in the English Revolution.

Ashley points out other social concerns of the political establishment during Charles' "Eleven Years Tyranny" just prior to the recall of Parliament in 1640.

Some concern was shown for the unemployed, for orphans and debtors.... It was exceptional to find places where a poor rate was not levied

while special efforts were made to find or create work for the unemployed. Writing in 1900 a historian of the early English poor law claimed that 'from 1631 to 1640 we had more poor relief in England than before or since'. (1970, 69)

Popular nationalism is frequently the political ideology succeeding aristocratic nationalism. Lipset captures this in the American nationalistic process:

But as is well known, the leadership of the intellectuals in new states does not survive the first revolutionary generation. The change in American political life was associated with the rise of party politics. [By the time of the Jacksonian movement anti-elitism was explicit,] ... followed by the adoption of populist tactics by both major parties,... (1967, 83)

One can catch the mocking tone of one farmer-poet (Joel Barlow writing "Advice to the Privileged Orders in ... Europe," 1792) that it sometimes seems that "the people" have never been told that they have no "right" whatsoever to frame a government for themselves. In their attempt to do so the conservative aristocrats often affix "the idea of 'sacrilege' or 'usurpation,' or any other term of rant to be found in the gentleman's vocabulary" (Barlow 1956; quoted in Kohn and Walden 1970, 43).

In contrast to the aristocratic formulation, "What is best for the good of our people of this beloved region?" the popular formulation is "Who rules?" and "By what means can this best be accomplished?" In xenophobic nationalism the various attributes of aristocratic and popular nationalism find their place, but the overriding
concern is more in terms of the expression of the dignity of one's culture vis-a-vis other acknowledged international units of comparison. Here, the question might be, "How can we secure from our neighbors the principles of social justice that we believe in?" In Moore's chapter, "Moral Relativism" he makes two points important in this matter: (1) the fight is not over the fundamental doctrine constituting social justice but "the application of these principles" (1978, 450) and (2) "it is performance that counts" (1978, 451). Such a society is focusing on "which performances to reward and which one's to penalize, and in what ways and by how much,..." (1978, 451).

It is this focus on comparison that Eric Hoffer catches in this statement concerning "rabid anti-Americanism": "It is not the quality of our policies which offends them but our very existence" (1967, 14). But internally, the demand to act now, for performance at all cost has won many a general the title of "Father of his people" with intellectuals, artists, and politicians throwing laurels.

And it is this focus on comparison that Lipset catches in his work on America, The First New Nation:

On the one hand, the Federalists were saying that America as a nation should be just as powerful as England.... On the other hand, the Democratic-Republicans were saying that America as a nation was already, in its own way, just as good as England. They therefore lauded and sought to maximize what was unique both in American political ideals and in the American economy. (1967, 70; emphasis mine)

Now this small nucleus of disconcerting questions often has a further style besides its accompanying framework--its style of rhetoric. In aristocratic nationalism their public discourse is frequently in the language of virtue-corruption. In popular nationalism public discourse is heavily laden with the language of politics. In xenophobic nationalism public discourse is strongly colored by the language of culture.

In the aristocratic nationalism of England, it is not surprising to find John Milton railing against an evil king for the "blessings of freedom and liberty." Moreover, for Milton, liberty had "a sharp and double edge, fit only to be handled by just and virtuous men" (n.d.).

In England, in the years previous to the revolution, there was the widespread tendency to believe that only individuals were capable of corruption, not political

institutions. As a result, when by 1640 many had come to the conclusion that the law had failed in its prime function, the protection of liberty and property, the angry response of the house of Commons was to accuse the judges of treason rather than to set up a commission to revise the law.... But the intensity with which protagonists of all sorts hunted malevolent agents also reflected the conviction that in an harmonious society upheavals could only originate in ill will. (Hirst 1986, 84)

But the prevailing rhetorical style need not be constrained to public forums exclusively. It was sufficiently strong in James' England in the private messages of diaries and letters to influence later historians. Hirst writes: "The sordid tale of corruption and decay which bulks so large in the gentlemen's diaries and correspondence does not, however, justify those historians who have dismissed the Jacobean years as a steady decline into the crisis of the next reign" (1986, 123).

And finally, "The chief factor in the declining vogue of absolutist ideas was the conduct of the king,..." (Gooch 1959, 288). Henry Parker, "the most persistent and able advocate of the parliamentary cause," in the words of Eccleshall, "specifically invoked the idea of a superior collective reason in order to reveal the moral poverty of absolute monarchy ..." (1978, 159).

But Parker's view is embedded within the larger movement that Huntington emphasizes in his thesis of political modernization: the rationalization of authority. It seems that timed with England's declining
aristocratic supremacy and the genesis of popular elements in their political thought, the rhetorical style of aristocratic nationalism was also on the wane. In Eccleshall's study of political thought in the English Civil War, he writes that politics "was [becoming] less an activity for eradicating sin from public affairs than a mundane mechanism for adjusting competing claims between individuals" (1978, 165).

Parrington describes this transitional process of English society as follows:

The sixteenth century had announced the great doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, and the seventeenth century was engaged in adapting the forms of social and political institutions to that revolutionary principle. It was concerned to discover a new system of social organization that should adjust equitably the rights of the individual to the needs of the political state and to society....

This is the sufficient explanation of the close interweaving of theology and politics that marked the broadening movement of English Puritanism. (1954, 6)

Or more simply: "At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the dominant categories for describing political conflict were by and large religious categories; by the end of the century this was no longer the case" (McKeon 1987, 37).

In the popular nationalism of France, the rhetorical style was quite different from that of aristocratic nationalism because of its political quality and yet quite similar to the popular elements of
England's developing individualist ideology because of its secularism. Hunt analyzes the "rhetoric of revolution" 6 and writes,

Although it was enunciated with religious fervor, revolutionary language was nonetheless resolutely secular in content. As the battlelines with the church became clearer, as they did almost immediately, revolutionaries eliminated most positive references to Christianity from their vocabulary. (1984, 28)

Then there is the aspect of political language taking over broad new territories of social discourse. "In the heat of debate and political conflict, the very notion of 'the political' expanded and changed shape.... French people had learned a new political repertoire" because they "did not just debate the classical questions of government,... they also acted on them ..." (Hunt 1984, 2).

In the xenophobic nationalism of America, the rhetorical style was different still. Here, though many writers were stressing how each individual's interest coincided with the national interest conceived in terms of national power, the pitch of this approach was often vested in the language of culture. Not surprisingly, because this thesis holds that much of America's nationalism before Jefferson was aristocratic, the tone is ethical and hortative. Bernard Bailyn captures both of

6. Chapter one in her Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution is "The Rhetoric of Revolution."
these in his study of the "ideological origins of the American Revolution":

Writings popular in the colonies insisted that the environment of eighteenth-century England was, to a dangerous degree, hostile to liberty: that Jacobite remnants flourished, that effeminizing luxury and slothful negligence continued to soften the moral fiber of the nation, and that politics festered in corruption. (1972, 86)

Bailyn then describes how far this enduring perception was penetrating into American society by citing "the general popularity of periodicals ... which repeatedly excoriated the degeneracy of the age and the viciousness of ministerial corruption, [as well as] the deliberateness with which some of the most vituperative of the English jeremiads were selected for publication in the colonies" (1972, 86). Furthermore, such dread observations were frequently reinforced through the testimony of direct experience--letters from England.

And how were these Americans trying to differentiate themselves from their principally English ancestors? Parrington writes that part of the answer was that they were a new race of a new mixture of blood; but the argument of "environment" was far more potent. Just as it was written:

Men are like plants; the goodness and flavor of the fruit proceeds from the peculiar soil and exposition in which they grow. We are nothing but what we derive from the air we breathe, the climate we inhabit,... (Crevecoeur 1904)
Geologically, horticulturally, zoologically, anthropologically, not to mention opportunistically and socially America was a very different, sometimes startlingly different, place than Europeans had ever experienced before. American life was an adaptation to this unique setting and in many ways their reciprocal relationship was a source of great pride and cultural identity.

Because these "natural" conditions to which those transplanted Europeans (for the most part, Europeans) had adapted to were continent wide, it was not unusual for the cultural unit to also be continent wide. In 1776 Thomas Paine wrote:

I am clearly, positively, and conscientiously persuaded that it is the true interest of this Continent to be so [separate and independent]; that everything short of that is mere patchwork, that it can afford no lasting felicity....

But the most powerful of all arguments is, that nothing but independence, i.e., a Continental form of government, can keep the peace of the Continent and preserve it inviolate from civil wars. (from "On Reconciliation versus Separation," 1894).

Further accompanying the nucleus of concern is the nature of the focus. In aristocratic nationalism the focus is on political output in a way strongly antithetical to social input. In popular nationalism the focus is on social input; they are concerned with political output only in so far as it reconstitutes social input. In xenophobic nationalism the focus is on
the socio-political outcome of the united struggle with foreigners. Hence, the focus on social input concerns the acquisition of power by natives and the focus on political output focuses on cultural dignity.

During the nationalistic process in England the argument between the absolute and limited monarchists both converged on "a public representation of the good life in objectively rational policies" (Eccleshall 1978, 157); while in the struggle between the parliamentarian forces and the crown, an area of contention centered on "parliament's claim to be a more reliable repository of the common good than the crown" (Eccleshall 1978, 164). In both arguments, the object was to take the high ground in terms of political output—"What is good for our people?" In this way I am proposing that the social code became a controlling influence on the political code. 7 Under James the divine aura of monarchy was gravely rent by his violations of the social code 8, but it was not till his son's Catholic violations and his court's distance from the accepted social code of the English that the upholders of the social code struck back.

7. This does not dispute Charles H. McIlwain's view that the main political issue of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was obedience. I am claiming that this factor of social input was secondary to the concerns of political output.

8. See Philippe Erlanger's description of pimps, bawds, astrologers, hucksters, quacks, etc. in his The Age of Courts and Kings, 149f.
During the nationalistic process in France the entire culture of the French came under close scrutiny. Why? Because that is where their entire political realm would come from. In Hunt's estimation, "the chief accomplishment of the French Revolution was the institution of a dramatically new political culture" (1984, 15). For instance, a "patriotic society" was formed in Bordeaux in 1790 of artisans and shopkeepers because "since every man is a member of the state, the new order of things can call anyone to the public administration" (Becamps 1958). In Hunt's view, "the purpose of the society was to educate every man to those potential responsibilities by discussing the decrees of the national assembly and reading newspapers and periodicals" (1984, 72).

This was not confined to Bordeaux. And it did not seem to be confined by the revolutionary distaste of politicians and their practices. "Outside the realm of administration, political activities proliferated ..." (Hunt 1984, 56).

In this way I am proposing that the political code became a controlling influence on the social code. The

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9. Hunt, among others, has been acknowledgably influenced by Furet's recent work, *Penser la Revolution francaise*, which "has the great merit of drawing attention to the importance of 'the political.'"
needs of the political concerns of the day dictated the character of the social code 10.

National regeneration required nothing less than a new man and new habits; the people had to be reformed in the Republican mold. Every nook and cranny of everyday life therefore had to be examined ... (Hunt 1984, 56)

During the nationalistic process in America the cultural code was the influential code. How they described greatness and what kind of man was worth emulating was derived from cultural considerations. Finding a man more opposite than the negative qualities—a lust for domination, ambition, a thirst for sway—than George Washington would be hard. And who better embodied America's cultural commitment to political and social unity, anti-foreign power, and good American breeding? Or was better loved?

We have two more accompaniments to the nucleus of concern festering during nationalistic processes: (1) the basis of emigration and (2) the historical/rational/natural appeal of discourse.

In aristocratic nationalism, emigration seems to be on the basis of social, not political, concerns. Even among the influential political elite this seems to be true. Erlanger writes of Sir John Winthrop having lost his post in the Court of Wards. "He could not bear the

10. See Hunt, 70f., for how scrutinizing, how essential the social code was for "the perfecting of the political machine."
shame of being unable to maintain his servants, so he sold up, and migrated to America" (1970, 135). In a broader sense, when surveys reveal the 2 per cent emigrating in the 1630s and 1640s, when studies estimate as many as 100,000 English and Scots emigrating to Ireland in the century after 1589, it is not because of political persecution. They left for social reasons—which I am claiming subsumes religious life.

In popular nationalism, emigration is seemingly on the basis of political, not social concerns. Where society is turned wholesale into a political culture, to deviate is to invite a charge of political treason and possibly death. Safety, for those cutting a different style of life, is therefore found in exile.

In xenophobic nationalism, emigration is on the basis of national allegiance. Following the loss of the royalists in the American Revolution, the ensuing emigration to Canada can be viewed in terms of national culture. Consequently, America was left with a "leftist" ideology and the Canadians gained a significant number of "rightist" ideologues. 11

And finally, there seems to be some categorical breakdown in the appeal of arguments during the nationalist process. In aristocratic nationalism the appeal is to historical sources; in popular nationalism

11. See Lipset, 98f.
the appeal is to rational principles; and, in xenophobic nationalism the appeal is to natural sources.

It is not unnatural for those in hereditarily vested positions of aristocratic dominance to share a reverence for the past, to feel the very ground of their being shaken at the prospect of change, to proclaim with William Prynne "THE OLD IS BETTER." Nor does it seem surprising that those vested by revolutionary change with positions of political dominance would share a reverence for a-historical, rational arguments legitimating their ascendancy over others. Xenophobic nationalism, intent on cultural dignity, finds the processes of nature unique to their region, including their breed of people, as grounds for their arguments.

In conclusion, these nationalism categories--aristocratic, popular, and xenophobic--are manifestations of the consequences of where in the social structure the voice of an oppositional ideology emerges. There are three categories because there are three locations in the governors-governed relationship where a significant public opposition to the governors might take hold.

Consistent with these categories, there seems to be a clustering of attributes with clean demarcations between categories. However, these were selections. A great deal more historical research would be needed to test their robustness.
Questions arise concerning other factors determining these categorical characteristics. For instance, the fondness of aristocratic nationalists for the past is also paralleled by the fondness of agriculturalists for the past. Also, some would have some hesitation for placing religion in a social context—especially in seventeenth century England. And some might find Theda Skocpol's dichotomy between social and political revolutions both extremely enlightening and seriously compromised by the alignment of the respective revolutions of this paper among a host of political and social indices.

Nonetheless, the attempt to find patterns in the vast array of nationalisms is worth serious effort. And while any categorical forms are as limited in their testability for failure as Weber's ideal types, still, some are more heuristically valuable than others. I believe my categorical forms are valuable. They are more than just descriptive; they are consistent, logical developments of their structural contexts.

In striving to support my thesis, I felt constrained to report the historical record as undistortedly as possible. Only in this way could the truth of the categorical forms be assessed. Yet, to do this pits the researcher's involvement in his own vested interests against his maintaining a position of neutrality towards
those same interests. Realizing this, and that I have based the consideration of these categories solely on the basis of only two case studies, I am reconciled to concluding only that I have points of support for my nationalism thesis. Moreover, how well another set of cases—including "problematic" cases—can be handled by my scheme is what is needed for confirming or disconfirming my thesis. It is this that will test the "failability" of such a categorization as I have proposed.

12. It would seem that Theda Skocpol's elaboration of John Stuart Mill's methods of agreement and difference would hold the appropriate next phase. (Skocpol, ed., "Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology," in Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 378f)
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

The nationalism that we have sought to understand in this paper is not necessarily the nationalism that others see. We have seen its genesis in terms of basic forms rather than one essential core. And yet, we have no argument with Eugene Kamenka when he says, "It is best understood by examining the specific conditions under which it arose and developed and in which it came to differentiate itself from mere patriotism [which I don't consider at all] or national consciousness" (1974, 3). And so we will take our thesis and examine the conditions under which Basque nationalism arose.

Basque Nationalism: A Test Case

The material which I will now investigate concerns testing our general hypothesis. The case selected was chosen because of its unique character. Instead of being a culturally repressed region or an economically depressed population, the Basque region was in fact the
most industrialized region of Spain. No barriers were in the way of Basque advancement in society.

In this case, Basque nationalism is analyzed. Then our theoretical perspective is subjected to tests for categorical consistency.

In brief, if we find that the preconditions of Hirschman's theoretical perspective are satisfied, a political center in a state of decline, and that the emerging nationalism is from a particular structural location, then we should not find two categorically different nationalisms.

First, can we determine that the political center was in a state of decline when Basque nationalism arose? According to Heiberg, Basque nationalism first emerged in the 1890s in Bilbao. The political center of the region at this time was the Castilian regime in Madrid. From sources outside Heiberg we discover that in the 1690s the visiting Venetian ambassador described the reign of Charles II as "an uninterrupted series of calamities."

One text describes this period under the title, "Decline of Castile." Castilian elements of decline include a significantly diminishing population, a reportedly high number of military casualties, recurrent plagues, the "sheer misery of the rural population," the region's industries continuing to fail, until finally: "The nadir was reached in the decades 1677-86, with crop
failures, earthquakes, an epidemic that sharply reversed a slight upward trend in population since about 1650, and on top of these natural disasters, the government's deflation of the coinage" (B.G.K.). The author goes on to say, "For Castile, it is perhaps best to see the problem of decline ... in the depreciation by Castilians of economic activity,..." (B.G.K.)

Now, we must turn our attention to the structural context of political dissent. Was Basque nationalism being generated within the "natural" domesticity of the Castilian regime in Madrid or was it outside their own state but within the purview of their administration?

The Basque regions were permitted local autonomy since medieval times from both Spain and France in quid pro quo arrangements involving allegiances. The privileges granted by charters involved their own courts, parliaments, coinage, militia, customs boundaries, and freedom from outside taxation. In this atmosphere ancient Basque customs developed into institutions and laws.

By the time nationalism was officially launched, in 1894, the tradition of local privileges was gone. Furthermore, they had been dispossessed of local leaders and were being included in the prospect of heavy taxation to help finance Spain's large war debt. And, as part of the government's program to stifle their culture, Basque language was banned in print.
At the time, Basque culture was absent from the city. Rurally, it was only found among small landholding farmers and coastal fishermen. "The urban initiators of Basque nationalism were only vaguely familiar with traditional Basque culture, and history, and almost totally ignorant of the language" (Heiberg 1975, 178).

Such evidence seems to indicate that the Basques around 1894 were firmly a part of the Spanish political state and not, as in bygone historical times, merely within the administrative purview of the Madrid regime. Thus, it follows from our thesis that the emergent nationalism must cohere well with the popular variety.

As such, we should find that the preoccupying questions on the mind of the populace are political in nature. That is, in public discourse the political code seems to have a controlling influence on the social code. The charismatic figures are political leaders, the rhetoric of the day is in the language of politics, and their argument is non-historical with an appeal to rationality.

In fact, with some modifications, I believe that this is what we do find. Let us first concentrate on the political nature which we expect of popular nationalism.

Heiberg believes that "the emergence of Basque nationalism was a response ... to the rising tide of
Spanish socialism which from the 1890s onward was spreading rapidly among the Spanish workers in Bilbao, and was threatening to spill over to the Basque working classes as well" (1975, 184). This socialism directly threatened the institution of private property. In addition, the violence of the Bilbao mining strikes led by Spanish socialist organizers and supported by Spanish immigrants created apprehension for personal safety. In sum, "the content and brand of Basque nationalism can be seen to be geared to the containment of socialism" (Heiberg 1975, 184-85). The nationalist party platform demanded the sanctity of private property among other things.

We must now ask, to what extent have we reduced the outline of Spanish socialism and the Basque response to elements of the political domain as opposed to cultural or social? By returning to Heiberg's study, I believe I can answer--minimally.

It will become clearer that the foundation of Basque nationalism displays a political nature if we separately comment upon, Who were the nationalists? Where did their leaders come from? Who was anti-nationalist? What was the nature of their political position? Was there talk of culture? Where were the cultural leaders? Was there talk of social values? Where were the social leaders?
The nationalists were mainly middle-level industrialists, self-employed skilled workers, merchants, lawyers, students, and the Basque clergy. In short, they were urban, middle class, with sympathies running with the bourgeoisie and catholicism. A most notable stronghold was Bilbao. As for their location in the political context, Heiberg writes that "the Basque middle classes were not ... directly integrated into the Spanish political center ..." (1975, 185). The fact that they were not economically or culturally repressed in terms of upward mobility, yet they were fervent nationalists, would seem to indicate that cultural and social concerns were minimal in comparison to political concerns.

The nationalist leaders typically came from wealthy families among the upper-middle classes of Bilbao. "'Culturally',... they were more Spanish than Basque" (Heiberg 1975, 181). Even the name of the nationalist political party they founded had a Spanish name instead of a Basque name. Why would this group turn to advocating Basque nationalism? Heiberg speculates that they were after personal profit in terms of "increased political power and prestige." Moreover, perhaps "these elites converted the value placed on 'culture' from a mundane sphere to a highly politicized one; and in the process mobilized large numbers of people who were linked by this common culture, however tenuously, into a political
following" (1975, 183). This speculative thinking emphasizing the political nature of the leadership accords well with our ascription of Basque nationalism with a political foundation.

The anti-nationalists came from the top rank of the Basque elite, both financial and intellectual. They "had a powerful voice in shaping both Spain's economic and political policies" and "were well integrated culturally ... into the rest of Spain" (Heiberg 1975, 181). They did not advocate nationalism because they "could fight the threat which socialism may have presented to their position through the exercise of their power and influence within the Spanish central government" (Heiberg 1975, 185).

The farmers and the people in the countryside were generally unconcerned about nationalism. And as for the working classes, they were "not the most ardent nationalists" (Heiberg 1975, 184). Not even the most famous literary giants of the day, including Unamuno, wrote in the Basque language much less advocated Basque nationalism. Heiberg's thesis distinguishing this group from those who were threatened by socialism handles all this very well. It tells why the nationalistic middle class was vulnerable and why citizens of Bilbao particularly.
Our thesis has called attention to the authenticity of the political character of Basque nationalism. This fully corresponds with Heiberg's observation: "The Basque case would lead to the conclusion that occasionally people become nationalists first, culturally distinguishable later" (1975, 188). Consistent with this, our thesis discredits the authenticity of the cultural character of Basque nationalism. "Yet their political platform stressed Basque culture, traditions and language as the symbols of their uniqueness and unity, and as the explanation for the differences between them and other Spanish citizens" (Heiberg 1975, 178).

Our thesis does not rule out the infusion of traits from the other varieties of nationalism, but structural cause must be shown to determine their occurrence. In Basque nationalism, the primary traits were political, indicating popular nationalism. However, there were secondary traits indicating xenophobic nationalism: the presence of an influential cultural code as well as the emphasis on separatism (Euzkadi was to be a separate political unit signifying the Basque Nation). To account for these secondary traits, it must be shown that there was at least a shadowy presence of political dissent from outside the political state centered in Madrid.

This shadowy presence is partly historical. Charters were granted to particular Basque regions in the Middle
Ages which allowed local autonomy in return for political allegiance to the kings of Spain or France. These charters, known as fueros, covered all of Basque life. Through the centuries they developed into institutions and law. The fueros were seriously compromised in 1839 by an act of law which read, "The Fueros of the Basque provinces ... are reaffirmed, unless they are prejudicial to the constitutional unity of the monarchy." Then following the second Carlist war all remaining privileges of autonomy were revoked except a domestic tax arrangement until by 1880 "the rural Basques found themselves without their fueros" (Heiberg 1975, 173).

The first point of this historical digression is that however contrived the revival of the foral tradition was, it had been at the core of Basque life. Their foral institutions were submerged in only a few decades of industrial life; therefore, certainly capable of a shadowy presence in many memories.

The second point is that the advocacy of Basque separatism must be understood within the regional history of Spain. "The sense of an overarching Spanish 'nation' has always been weak in Spain" (Heiberg 1975, 180). During the nineteenth century often times provincial governments were declaring themselves "independent and sovereign nations." Most often, they were simply
protesting against bad government, which in Spain, has abounded.

What I am getting at here is that the regional segments need not be assumed to be integrally knit in such a way that separatism is monumentally significant.

And finally, there seems to be tertiary traits indicating a mix of xenophobic and aristocratic nationalism. In saying this I am focusing on not only what the nationalist political party was advocating but why. The P.N.V. 1 sought to establish Euzkadi "with the complete and unconditional subordination of the political to the religious, of the State to the Church." Descriptively, this is consistent with aristocratic nationalism. The values of religion are played up as their ultimate social foundation. But their purpose in doing so is more in accordance with our description of xenophobic nationalism. It sought to do this for purposes of unity. In Article 9 it is stated "The necessary basis for a solid and durable national unity are: unity of race as far as possible, and Catholic unity." While this brought the Basque clergy into the nationalists' fold, it seems that it was valued for its ability to contrast Basques from the liberals which had historically included the Spaniards, the Basque upper-class urbanites, and the

1. the Partido Nacionalista Vasco
Isabelin regime in Madrid—all foes of Basque nationalism.

The structural context generating these tertiary traits must address our expectations concerning aristocratic nationalism. In so doing we come to Heiberg's most important contribution to nationalism theory: the impact of industrialization. She writes: "In the areas to which it has spread industrialization and modernization have imposed from above and without regard to the raw cultural material involved" its special cultural complex (1975, 190). Consequently, if the evidence indicates that the Basque region was, indeed, industrialized then we can have some understanding as to why it should have some minor traits of aristocratic nationalism.

The level of industrialization between the Basque region and Spain could not have gone unnoticed among the Basques. First, they witnessed "a large influx of Spanish workers." Then, "the first serious strikes in Spain occurred in the 1890s in the mining industry around Bilbao" (Heiberg 1975, 176). Remembering that Bilbao was the stronghold of Basque nationalism, it is important to recognize that Bilbao was the industrial and commercial center for most of the Basque region. By 1900 nearly all of Spain's iron and steel production came from the Basque region with the ore reserves located mainly in Vizcaya,
near Bilbao. And finally, Heiberg records that "with the exception of an occasional Catalan, all the really wealthy industrialists in Spain at the time were Basque" (1975, 176).

In conclusion, there is ample evidence to indicate that the Basque region was industrialized. Coupled with Heiberg's point that industrialization imposes social values from above in the manner of aristocratic regimes, the requirements of designating the appropriate structural context are fulfilled.

Furthermore, this Basque consciousness of their distinct level of industrialization may have further generated strains of xenophobic nationalism. This couples one product of Basque industrialization, economic self-sufficiency, with social solidarity. Heiberg supplies the economic self-sufficiency: "Since the capital for industrial investment came either from foreign or Basque sources, and the market for Basque products was either abroad or in the Basque region, the Basque provinces at this time [in the 1890s] could have existed as an economically viable entity completely independent of Spain" (1975, 176).

This perhaps puts undue pressure on the idea of economic distinctness generating social solidarity. But it does not seem unreasonable to do so, especially remembering the economic and financial roots of the
nationalists of Bilbao. It would be ideological incompatible for this bourgeois group from industrial Bilbao to identify with a program of nationalism advocating personal economic and financial sacrifice or state financial ruin.

In terms of Hirschman's exit-voice thesis, this middle-class group with their leaders from the second order of wealth were too well integrated into the industrial complex to seriously contemplate leaving the Basque region. Nor were they in the position of the top elite who could work their influence in the political center to remedy their discontent. Therefore, the voice of nationalism was their method of dealing with the perceived decline of the political establishment. Their advocacy of political separation reflected their bourgeois roots. That their nationalism was political in nature was reflective of their dissent emerging within the political domesticity of the Madrid regime but outside the regime's integral membership. And the nationalists' opportunistic but disingenuous emphasis on culture was explained by lack of an appropriate structural context generating authentic xenophobic nationalism.

The State of Nationalism Theory

In a very real sense the state of nationalism theory is in a very early stage of development. There is no
overarching paradigmatic framework to support the "mopping-up operations" that Thomas Kuhn characterizes as normal science. In fact, there is seemingly little to none rule-governed inference that a nationalism scholar might utilize for solving some of the "true" puzzles of nationalism. Instead, he is constrained to develop his work by what Margaret Masterman calls "intuitive articulation" (1986, 85). This is also a form of inference, but it is characterized by a "wider sense of inference" than rule-governed inference. In intuitive articulation the scholar does not reproduce the main features of another's work, but instead proceeds more in the style of Wittgensteinian families. That is, his legitimation for passing from one unit of his argument to another is not bound by "mechanized pattern recognition"—it is more intuitive.

This association of science and intuition with a connotation of irrationality has given Kuhn's critics untold ammunition. The putative association of sociology and science—and hence, the sociological investigation of nationalism and scientific method—have also untold numbers of critics. Nevertheless, the multi-paradigmatic nature of nationalism theory, not to mention the absence of any archetypical definition 2, is a very real fact

2. In contemporary social science literature it is common to refer to the world as divided into nation-states. Walker Connor calls attention to the fact that "a
that would be perilously obtuse to ignore. If the much criticized Kuhn has happened upon an insightful representation of this situation, however much the scientific historians detract from his work, it would be folly for nationalism scholars to give these critics carte blanche over their field.

If nationalism theory is to succeed with deepening insights into the nature of nationalism, then scholars cannot successfully proceed as if they are in a highly developed field with a "concrete way of seeing." They must first establish what they believe to be the best way

prime fact about the world is that it is not largely composed of nation-states." He cites a survey of 132 entities "generally considered to be states as of 1971" which produced this breakdown:

(1) Only 12 states (9.1%) can justifiably be described as nation-states.
(2) Twenty-five (18.9%) contain a nation or potential nation accounting for more than 90% of the state's total population but also contain an important minority.
(3) Another 25 (18.9%) contain a nation or potential nation accounting for between 75% and 89% of the population.
(4) In 31 (23.5%), the largest ethnic element accounts for 50% to 74% of the population.
(5) In 39 (29.5%), the largest nation or potential nation accounts for less than half of the population.

[In conclusion:] "Whatever the original reason for the interutilization of nation and state, even the briefest reflection suffices to establish the all-pervasive effect that this careless use of terminology has had upon the intellectual-cultural milieu within which the study of nationalism is perforce conducted." (1978, 53)
of seeing nationalism before they undertake a more specific puzzle-solving activity.

A failure in this first step almost certainly dooms all subsequent elaborations. For example, the most damning criticism of Karl Deutsch's work on nationalism has been the failure of his vision of what nationalism is. His association of intensified communication and its resulting solidarity in terms of nationalism, despite the elegance of his later analyses, is given little credibility among other nationalism scholars. Breuilly criticizes Deutsch thus:

In other words, one still has to construct a theory of nationalism: [Deutsch's] communication theory simply begs the whole question. It can tell us something about the conditions under which nationalist views might be diffused among a given population ... But that does not answer the crucial questions of how and why such doctrines are both produced and enthusiastically received. (1985, 20)

But there are viable methods for proceeding in nationalism theory with valuable expositors of the rights and wrongs of the processes: Skocpol 3, Philip Abrams 4, Robert K. Yin 5, Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy 6, and others. Furthermore, there are valuable examples

3. See Vision and Method in Historical Sociology
4. See Historical Sociology
5. See Case Study Research: Design and Methods
6. See How To Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Research
worthy of serious study and emulation: Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* (1980), Moore's *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966), Eisenstadt's *The Political Systems of Empires* (1963), Anderson's *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (1974), are among those often cited for their excellence. My point is that the merits of this study must first be examined for its vision of nationalism and then the ensuing research for its credibility vis-a-vis the standards attractive to good research.

Our vision of nationalism is action oriented: it depends upon a nationalistic process of civil strife in the context of a central political authority in a state of decline. As such, nationalism can assume no fixed quantity. The merit of this position is that aspects of English society during the Glorious Revolution and afterward can be accommodated by both this vision of nationalism and our categorical scheme. A decline in nationalism was manifested by historical events as well as the changing mix of nationalisms: a resurgence of aristocratic elements of nationalism and the waxing of popular elements of nationalism. 7

7. See J.C.D. Clark's *English Society, 1688-1832*, especially the chapter "Political Hegemony, Patriarchalism and Cultural Hegemony: England as an Aristocratic Society, 1688-1832."
Being action orientated, our vision of nationalism is not disconcerted by pieces such as Koht's (1946) which investigates the "beginnings of actual nationalism" as being at the dissolution of the first kingdoms founded on the ruins of the Roman Empire. Here were centralized political authorities in a state of decline in a distinct setting of civil strife. What is missing is the relationship between the people and the political authorities: the monarchs were not responsible to the people, but to God. Thus the voice of the people's opposition could not stimulate a response. On the other hand, dissatisfied people could easily exit, which they routinely did.

What is valuable about our theory of nationalism is that it does not fall in with studies that prejudge the cohesiveness of a given aggregate of people by some normative value the author espouses. In such cases the group is given either the status in which it is acceptable to pursue nationhood or it is given a status such that regional contention is pejoratively viewed as provincialism (or minority nationalism, trumped-up nationalism, tribalism, sectionalism, etc.). Such studies necessarily see "genuine nationalism" only in terms of those successfully establishing statehood and "inauthentic nationalism" only in terms of groups failing to establish statehood.
The great failing of this nationalism orientation is explicit in, say, America's Civil War scholarship. They equate Northernism with nationalism and Southernism with sectionalism. 8 Their rationale can only be understood from a retrospective orientation in which winners and losers are focused upon. Not only are they always compelled to argue backwards; but the element of sanction becomes the essence of their conceptual orientation. To carry normative sanctions into the heart of the concept under investigation is practicing unrealistic science.

Because our thesis focuses on just the conditions relating to the structural context of public dissent, the judgmental qualities of nationalism scholarship are muted. Any group claiming autonomous powers must be investigated; our theory provides no foundation with which to argue whether two contending groups are part of a single community—or nation—or whether they belong to two separate communities—or nations. This is a virtue and not a liability.

What is a significant problem for our thesis on nationalism is how to account for the qualities of a region's nationalism that are unconnected with the emergence of its major form. But that is a part of all analytical studies featuring the genesis of their

8. See David M. Potter's "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa."
subject rather than the essential functional features of their subject.

Today, with such journalistic lights as Henry Grunwald proclaiming that the world is witnessing the death of Marxism 9, an ideology strongly antithetical to nationalism, we naturally wonder about the future of nationalism in the communist world. And with the United States of Europe just over the horizon, we wonder about the future of nationalism there. Overall, we wonder, does nationalism seems to be flourishing or dying? From the literature, we can find that it all depends upon whom you consult. From this paper, we could ask, what connection does nationalism's future have with its emergence? The answer is that nobody knows.

But if we ask, how likely is it that the conditions we have deemed necessary for the emergence of nationalism will continue into tomorrow? We can say, from the orientation of our thesis, (1) as long as regionally centralized political authorities are capable of decline, (2) and in response the movement of populations to different regions is inhibited, (3) and the reactionary voice of some people is capable of soliciting a significant public response—then the future of nationalism seems assured.

However, as to its qualities, nationalism's future will be as lacking in systematic rationality and planned development as it has been in the past. It develops primarily in the public domain. As such, it is not some idee fixe. There is no reason it could not become altered beyond anything recognizable today. Even its quantity has no fixed levels. Intellectuals, apostles, nationalistic groups and historical circumstances all seem to have considerably more effect upon the make-up of nationalism than the requirements of élegance for a small cluster of nationalism theorists.
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THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH EXPERIENCE

by

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(ABSTRACT)

England has long been an anomaly in the nationalism literature. On the other hand the French Revolution has stood as the event embodying the emergence of all nationalism. Not infrequently, writings on other revolutions or civil wars display the absence of objectivity. This thesis attempts both objectivity and a basic orientation towards nationalism by exploring the structural context of emerging nationalisms in two revolutions. Each case depicts a significantly different context in which emerging nationalism develops.

Next, I develop a test case drawn from the record of emerging Basque nationalism. This analysis draws out the consistency between the multiple characteristics of Basque nationalism and their structural orientations. The success of this test case helps in the refinement of our understanding of nationalism.