AN EXPLORATION OF MORAL ORIENTATION, GENDER AND THE

NATURE OF THE DILEMMA IN MORAL REASONING

OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE PRESIDENTS

by

Rosemary B. Mennuti

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

in

Community College Education

APPROVED:

_____
Don G. Creamer, Chairperson

_____   _____
Margaret A. Eisenhart   David D. Ostroth

_____   _____
W. Robert Sullins   Daniel E. Vogler

June, 1987

Blacksburg, Virginia

AN EXPLORATION OF MORAL ORIENTATION, GENDER, AND THE
NATURE OF THE DILEMMA IN MORAL REASONING
OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE PRESIDENTS

by

Rosemary B. Mennuti

Committee Chairperson: Don G. Creamer

Community College Education

(ABSTRACT)

Moral development as a cognitive process was first presented by Piaget, and then by Kohlberg, who brought together the philosophical and psychological views of morality into a theory of justice reasoning. Some twenty years later, Gilligan, by including women's thinking in theory building, identified two distinct moral orientations: care and justice.

This research was intended to contribute to the evolution of theories of moral development. First, the phenomena of moral develement was examined through a literature review, then semi-structured interviews were used to investigate moral reasoning of community college presidents. Data were analyzed using procedures suggested by Glaser and Strauss. Whether two or more than two orientations to moral problem solving was used by research subjects was investigated by examination of real life dilemmas of community college presidents. An analysis of

findings considered gender of the respondent and the nature of the moral dilemma.

The major findings indicate that when faced with a real life moral dilemma, community college presidents know and use three overlapping orientations--Justice, Care, and Self--which form a pattern for moral decision making. The orientation patterns used in the moral reasoning process were found to vary somewhat by gender, but not by the nature of the dilemma, leading to the conclusion that future studies of moral reasoning and moral development should include a recognition of gender differences and multiple orientations in moral decision making.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the support of all my committee members; Margaret Eisenhart, Dave Ostroth, Bob Sullins, and Dan Vogler. I especially wish to recognize and thank Don Creamer for respecting me, believing in me, and sharing with me his expertise and insights. To all of you, I offer this study as part of me--the part you have molded.

Secondly, a special thanks to my friends who were helpful in their own ways. I thank expecially
for his support during my stay in Blacksburg and

for sharing her positive outlook, whether near or far. I am also grateful to a long-time friend,   ,
who supported me through one more experience; and to a new friend,   , whose acquaintance was a result of a common interest in moral development and whose friendship grew as we worked together.

The community college presidents who so willingly gave of themselves and their time were also important to me. They told their enlightening stories and allowed me to learn about people in an intense way. Although confidentiality prevents me from acknowledging each person, a heartfelt thank you is extended to each of you.

Finally, I thank my family for their support. In particular, I owe the successful completion of my degree to

three long important women to me and my life. First, a thank you to my mother, whose unconditional love and support helped make me who I am; second, to my sister   , who has always believed I could be whatever I wanted to be; and finally, to my daughter   , whose special love, understanding, and insight helped to create this dream.

And a special thank you to my husband, who always respected my need to pursue this goal and who continues to encourage me, hope with me, and help me. Thank you for all this and for all that you are.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF APPENDICES

CHAPTER I

Introduction

Poignant concerns facing American society have led to a renewed interest in the study of morality and moral reasoning. For example, America's role in such contemporary problems as world famine, the nuclear threat, environmental pollution, political and social corruption, and racial and cultural discrimination and unrest serve as a breeding ground for moral dilemmas which increasingly are faced by American citizens. The judgments, decisions, and actions taken by individuals regarding these and other moral issues have far-reaching implications and will help determine the American society of the future.

Perhaps as a direct consequence of the omni-presence of the dilemma-ridden situations facing America, there has been a growing sensitivity to the need for a more comprehensive understanding of moral development in order to facilitate the promotion of moral growth of all people. The ability to promote moral and ethical development is important and may be related to the general welfare of American society.

The most widely accepted description of moral development is that posited by Kohlberg (1969) in which he provided a theoretical framework to explain moral reasoning,

a basic component of moral development. Most scholars have accepted Kohlberg's theory as the best available to explain the moral reasoning phenomena, especially from a justice orientation, and its main tenets remain unchallenged. However, a substantial body of literature is emerging that raises questions about the theory's principle of universality, especially regarding gender issues (Blum, 1980; Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Haan, 1978; Holstein, 1976; Peters, 1971; Simpson, 1974; & Sullivan, 1977). Gilligan (1979, 1982), for example, posed an expanded view of Kohlberg's thinking by integrating the female perspective and the female developmental growth process into what she believed was a more coherent theoretical framework of moral development. Because little research has been conducted to explain the conceptualization of Gilligan, there is a need to know and to understand more about moral development and moral problem solving as viewed from this new perspective.

Background for the Study

The first comprehensive theory of moral development was presented by Freud (1925). Freudian psychology equated moral character with the strength of the superego which was known to develop through the resolution of the Oedipal conflict. Boys strongly repress their Oedipal desires, according to Freud; hence the male superego becomes an internalized and demanding intrapsychic structure. Girls, on the other hand,

never resolve the Oedipal issue--a consequence of what Freud calls "penis envy" (Van Herik, 1982). Freud contended that this unresolved conflict results in a less well developed superego for females, which he maintained leads to inferior moral character development. Concepts such as this remain fundamental to contemporary theories of moral development, including Kohlberg's.

Morality as a cognitive process was first presented by Piaget, a Swiss psychologist, in 1932. His study of moral development began by observing children playing games and by monitoring their use of rules. He noted that female children differed from their male counterparts in their abilities to take another's point of view, to resolve conflict, and to establish and to follow rules (Piaget, 1965). Piaget dismissed his observations of the female children, and described morality merely as having a respect for rules and possessing a sense of justice. Both were qualities which he observed in the male child. In his 1932 reflective analysis of these observations, he concluded that individual differences in moral development favored the male child: "The most superficial observation is sufficient to show that in the main the legal sense is far less developed in little girls than in boys" (Piaget, 1965, p. 77).

Kohlberg, an American psychologist, accepted many of the major tenets of Piaget's theory and built upon Piaget's work to develop a more complex and expanded theory. In keeping

with the male bias of Piaget, Kohlberg used a sample of 84
male subjects over a 20 year life span to design a six stage
invariant sequential model of moral development. In the
conceptualization of Kohlberg, development occurs by
ascending through increasingly complex stages as the respect
for rules and an autonomous understanding of the concept of
justice is formed. His cognitive development theory served
as the basis for assessing the moral development of all
people, males and females.

In the 1970s, women in all fields began to challenge the
traditional thinking demonstrated in the research and
literature regarding female development. Gilligan wrote about
the limitations of human developmental theories in 1977,
illuminating the fact that all-male samples were used in the
studies which shaped psychological theory. This brought to
fore that male thinking and male experiences had been
accepted as truth and were defined universally as the
criteria for human development. According to Gilligan, such
standards alone may not account for women's experiences and
perceptions, therefore, pointing out the need for theoretical
research inclusive of women.

Gilligan conducted research that included women and
sought to address the omission of women's thinking in
cognitive developmental theory (1977). Her conclusions
represent an expanded theory of moral development--one which
views men and women as preferring different, but not

necessarily inferior or superior, bases for their moral decisions.

Findings from Gilligan's research suggest two modes of describing self: separate and connected. The findings also reveal two moral orientations: justice and care. The separate self, defined by Lyons (1983b), is based on "impartiality, objectivity, and the distancing of the self from others" (p. 134). Moreover, it focused on issues of individual achievement and objectivity in relation to others. By contrast, the connected self is based on "interdependence and concern for another's well being" (Lyons, 1983b, p. 134). This self is embedded in a context of relationships and is characterized by a sense of responsibility to others.

Gilligan observed, and Lyons empirically validated, that one's sense of identity is related to one's perspective in moral problem solving. In addition, both self definition and moral orientation are gender related. It was discovered that women tend to describe themselves in terms of their relationships to others, and they seem to resolve moral dilemmas by focusing on concepts of care and responsibility. Men, however, demonstrate concerns relating to independence and individual rights when reasoning about a moral problem. Their self definition is determined by individual achievement. On the basis of these findings, Gilligan proposed a conception of moral reasoning which differed from

Kohlberg's theory. She acknowledged two tracks of moral

development both of which she claims are related to gender.

Recently, research by Johnston (1985) pointed out that

adolescent males and females may use both care and justice

considerations. However, each gender tends to focus on a

predominant mode, and the predominant orientation appears

strongly related, but not exclusively confined to gender.

Other research highlights conflicting results relating

to gender differences. Kohlberg (1984) maintained that no

sex differences in moral reasoning is evident and argues that

the use of orientations discovered by Gilligan is merely

related to the type of moral problem, namely, those of

special relationships.

> we suggested that these orientations were not
> bipolar or dichotomous, but rather that the care
> and response orientation was directed primarily to
> relations of special obligations to family,
> friends, and group members, relations which often
> included or presupposed general obligations of
> respect, fairness and contract. (p. 349)

Kohlberg (1984) also attributed sex differences to

differences in educational level and occupational background.

Further diversity of opinion can be found in Walker's

(1984) review of the research regarding the question of sex

differences in moral reasoning. His findings support a

notion of similarity in the thinking of men and women rather

than differences. Gilligan (1985) refuted Walker's claims

indicating that research based on Kohlberg's theory and the

corresponding system of evaluation cannot serve to determine gender similarity in moral development.

This expanded conception of morality and the recent discussions on gender differences in moral development reveal a need for continued investigation and exploration about moral reasoning.

Statement of the Problem

While the recent research of Gilligan and her colleagues have broadened the theoretical knowledge of moral reasoning, many issues remain unresolved. The issue of gender differences is still an issue for debate. In addition, issues of real life versus hypothetical dilemma resolution remains important when seeking an understanding of both men's and women's moral thinking processes (Gilligan, 1977; Langdale, 1983; & Walker, 1986). It has been suggested by Gilligan that hypothetical moral dilemmas are too abstract and keep people removed from experience. This type of context free, abstract moral conflict situation encourages analytic, justice focused reasoning. In Gilligan's view, this presents a problem, particularly for women who tend to understand moral situations not from a detached point of view, but rather by addressing the relationships involved.

Finally, the impact of the content of dilemma on the moral reasoning process continues to occupy scholars' attention. Kohlberg contended that orientation use depends

upon the moral problem described. Friedman (1985) pointed out how Kohlberg maintained that "moral dilemmas located for example in a family context are most likely to invoke caring considerations from both sexes, whereas, dilemmas located in a secondary institution of society, such as government, are more likely to invoke justice considerations from both sexes" (p. 28).

Because community college presidents are frequently faced with professional situations that call for high levels of moral decision making ability, as well as personal moral dilemmas, many of the aforementioned issues could be observed by studying this profession. Moreover, this group was chosen for study because it includes both men and women of similar educational levels and job responsibilities; thus addressing educational and professional status in examining sex differences. Since both Kohlberg's and Gilligan's theories have been researched and practically applied primarily in educational settings, this research continued in the same tradition. It was also designed to take advantage of the natural situation of the community college presidency to add to the theoretical knowledge about moral development.

Specifically, this study used Gilligan's theory of moral development to investigate the moral reasoning of community college presidents when solving real life moral conflicts. The phenomena of moral perspectives were addressed and questions about gender differences and the impact of the

content of the moral problem upon the moral reasoning process were explored. Thus, a more comprehensive understanding of moral development was sought by this research.

Purpose of the Study

Given that Kohlberg and Gilligan differ in their explanations of moral development, it was the purpose of this study to further investigate moral reasoning. The study was intended to ascertain whether two, or more than two, orientations might explain moral problem solving. It also examined how the use of these orientations relate to gender and to the content of real life dilemmas.

Research Questions

This study was guided by the following questions:

1. What orientations of moral reasoning are evident in the explanations offered by community college presidents when solving real life moral conflicts?

2. Are there identifiable moral reasoning processes used by college presidents to resolve moral conflicts that form a dominant or prevailing pattern?

3. What changes occur in moral reasoning when the gender of the community college president varies?

4. What changes occur in moral reasoning when the content of the real life dilemma varies from a personal to a professional dilemma?

Need for the Study

This study is important for several reasons. First, the greatest significance of this research lies in its contribution to the theoretical knowledge of moral development. Secondly, there are relatively few systematic investigations of adult moral development, particularly from Gilligan's perspective. Finally, it contributed to the knowledge and understanding of moral problem solving of those individuals who are leaders in higher education. This is relevant to educators, since many of the decisions facing administrators today are not merely managerial in nature, but rather, contain moral issues.

Definition of Terms

The technical words and some common terms of this investigation that are used in a limited or unusual way are defined below:

Care orientation - A perspective which persons may take when solving problems they identify as moral conflicts. These conflicts can be either personal or professional in nature. The perspective the person takes, according to Gilligan (1977, 1982) and Lyons (1983) is related to a context of relationships and a sense of responsibility to others.

Focus - A line of thought wherein primary attention is given to one or more orientations when thinking about a moral dilemma.

Justice orientation - A perspective persons may take when solving problems they identify as moral conflicts. These conflicts can be either personal or professional in nature. The perspective, according to Gilligan (1977, 1982) and Lyons (1983) is defined by logical reasoning about rights, rules, justice, and reciprocity when deciding what one ought to do.

Moral judgments or moral reasoning - The way a person thinks through the resolution of moral conflicts in social situations that are either personal and/or professional.

Moral orientation - The perspective a person takes when thinking about moral problems.

Morality - The act of being moral; the common values and moral judgments a person uses.

Real life personal moral conflicts - Those issues that persons spontaneously identify as moral conflicts that arise in their personal lives.

Real life professional moral conflicts - Those issues that persons spontaneously identify as moral conflicts that arise in their roles as professionals.

Semi-structured interview - An interview process in which there are guiding hypotheses embedded in the interview questions. All questions remain open-ended and promote the

discovery of the interviewees point of view and their line
of thought.

CHAPTER II

Literature Review

Theoretical discussions of morality, moral reasoning, and moral development are explored in this chapter to provide background for the research. The review of the literature is divided into three broad sections: the philosophical and psychological nature of morality; theories of moral development; and a review of the issues in moral development research.

Philosophical and Psychological
Nature of Morality

The concept of morality is vague, ambiguous, complex, and subject to argument and disagreement. Hence, the development of morality for individuals is characterized by these same properties. Some clarity can be gained by examination of the philosophical ideas and thoughts from which contemporary psychologists conceptualize theories of moral development.

A traditional image of morality was established by the philosophical descriptions offered by Plato (1970), Dewey (1959), Rawls (1971), and Kant (1949). All shared the philosophy that principles of justice guide the course of development and reasoning. Kohlberg, the most prominent and influential contemporary theorist on moral development,

13

adopted this traditional philosophical perspective. He was influenced by the Platonic view on the nature of virtue in giving meaning to what is moral. Kohlberg (1970) described this Platonic view as follows:

> First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture.
>
> Second, the name of this ideal form is justice.
>
> Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good.
>
> Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs.
>
> Fifth, the good can then be taught, but its teachers must in a certain sense be philosopher-kings.
>
> Sixth, the reason the good can be taught is because we know it all along dimly or at a low level and its teaching is more a calling out than an instruction.
>
> Seventh, the reason we think the good cannot be taught is because the same good is known differently at different levels and direct instruction cannot take place across levels.
>
> Eighth, then the teaching of virtue is the asking of questions and pointing of the way, not the giving of answers. Moral education is the leading of men upward, not the putting into the mind of knowledge that was not there before. (p. 58)

However, in contrast to Plato's definition of a just society as one in which each person has a proper place in the social hierarchy, Kohlberg made a departure from the Platonic view and defined the notion of justice as equality:

> Justice is not a rule or a set of rules, it is a
> moral principle. By a moral principle we mean a
> mode of choosing which is universal, a rule of
> choosing which we want all people to adopt always
> in all situations. We know it is all right to be
> dishonest and steal to save a life because it is
> just, because a man's right to life comes before
> another man's right to property. We know it is
> sometimes right to kill, because it is sometimes
> just. The Germans who tried to kill Hitler were
> doing right because respect for the equal values
> of lives demands that we kill someone murdering
> others in order to save their lives. There are
> exceptions to rules, then, but no exception to
> moral principle. A moral obligation is an
> obligation to respect the right or claim of another
> person. A moral principle is a principle for
> resolving competing claims, you versus me, you
> versus a third person. There is only one
> principled basis for resolving claims: justice or
> equality. Treat every man's claim impartially
> regardless of the man. A moral principle is not
> only a rule of action but a reason for action. As
> a reason for action, justice is called respect for
> persons. (Kohlberg, 1970, pp. 69-70)

Hence, Kohlberg's theory of moral development is embedded in

a tradition of moral thought centered on justice as equality.

This philosophical position commits morality to holding

certain moral beliefs in preference to others. This

perception of morality has been adhered to by psychologists

and educators over many years.

In the past several years, some moral philosophers and

some psychologists have taken issue with the traditional

restricted view on morality, and have begun to create a new

awareness to the idea of what is moral. Philosophers such

as Murdoch (1970), Peters (1974), and Blum (1980) offer new

conceptions of morality.

Blum (1980) pointed out that traditional moral philosophy excluded the altruistic emotions--sympathy, compassion, and human concern. In his theory, he assumed that these emotions played an important and necessary role since his conception of morality is interfaced with friendships and other special relationships. He regards relationships as the arena in which altruistic emotions emerge. Blum (1980) also suggested that "action motivated by altruistic emotions is morally good because it involves direct altruism--a direct concern and responsiveness to the weal and woe of others" (p. 3). He believes that the nature of morality is not unitary; and thus, the altruistic emotions must be included in the moral phenomena.

Murdoch (1970) described the concept of love as central to a moral philosophy. This concept contrasts the notion that

> ...the idea of goodness (and of virtue) have been largely superseded in Western moral philosophy by the idea of rightness, supported perhaps by some conception of sincerity. This is to some extent a natural outcome of the disappearance of a permanent background to human activity; a permanent background, whether proved by Good, by Reason, by History, or by the self. (p. 53)

It must be concluded, therefore, that the concept of morality as justice has been the dominant theme--a theme which has excluded any notion of relationships or concern for others.

Peters (1971) also questions Kohlberg's restricted definition of morality in terms of reasoning about justice. He indicated concern by drawing the following conclusion:

It may well be that some generalizations have been established about certain aspects of moral development, but these may be peculiar to the limited range of phenomena studied. It would be unfortunate if these generalizations were erected into a general theory of moral development without account being taken of the differences exhibited by the phenomena that have not been studied. (p. 237)

Philosophically, Peters believed that the "rational passions"--virtue, habits, and affect (particularly caring)--are essential components to moral development.

Consistent with the philosophical perspective of Murdoch, Peters, and Blum, Gilligan (1977) introduced to moral psychology a conception of morality which was not represented in Kohlberg's theory. Interviews with women discussing real-life moral dilemmas led her to the discovery that women were inclined to focus on care and responsibility to others when resolving a moral problem. This suggested that the conception of morality did in fact include an orientation of care as well as justice.

Directly connected to these philosophical positions are different theories on how people come to know something and in turn how they think and reason about what they know. Moral reasoning is a process by which a person determines how to resolve a specific moral conflict.

One system of thinking is that which Kohlberg described; namely, a stage theory for understanding. In this process one eliminates choices until the most moral point of view is reached; thus, it becomes the strategy employed to resolve the moral problem.

Conversely, Gilligan described another way of thinking relative to females which attempts to integrate all claims and needs. This logic is viewed as a logic of the care orientation to morality. Research conducted by Johnston (1985) revealed that "both male and female adolescents do this kind of reasoning within the context of the fables, but females are more likely to rely on this logic to provide solutions for problems" (p. 82). Johnston discovered that individuals use and understand both the orientation of care and the orientation of justice. Her findings also revealed that the use of the orientation was influenced by the context of the moral problem and the gender of the person, and also that individuals understood and could use both cognitive strategies when resolving a moral problem.

This points to the importance of another concept when studying moral problem solving--context. Once again, opinion varies regarding the relative importance of the context of the dilemma. Within the framework of Kohlberg's theory of moral development, context is not a variable to consider. The definition of moral judgment that Kohlberg (1981) posed is that "moral judgments, unlike judgments of prudence or

esthetics, tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds" (p. 170). In contrast, when Gilligan (1977) examined the thinking of women, the logic employed for moral problem solving was contextual and inductive in nature rather than formal, abstract, and impersonal in style. Johnston (1985) pointed out that the logic of response defined by Gilligan was not confined to females but also was used by males when the situation revealed that relationships seemed possible.

Therefore, by including women in the study of morality, Gilligan discovered a "different voice" in the discussion of moral dilemmas. This revelation of a different voice in the conceptualization of morality led to the recognition of two distinct moral orientations, gender differences in the use of moral orientation, two logics, and the relevance of context in moral problem solving.

Assuming the existence of this distinctive moral voice and the differences in problem solving it generates, one must question what causes the divergence. It appears that just as Kohlberg has presented a universal theory of moral development based on male experiences, universal theories of psychological development can be traced to prominent psychologists including Freud and Erikson. These theorists used all, or primarily all, males in their research samples when formulating theory. Women's perspectives and developmental growth patterns were not recognized or

integrated into the development of these conceptualizations.
However, while acknowledging vague differences between the
sexes, the theories enjoy wide acceptance as theories of
human development, leaving women to be judged deviant from
the norm.

Freudian psychology is claimed to be a psychology of
human beings, regardless of gender. However, major tenets
of this theory include the castration and Oedipal complexes,
which center on the anatomical differences of males and
females. Based on the resolution of these complex conflicts,
it was posited by Freud that the strength of the superego
develops. For boys, the Oedipal desires are easily
repressed, and the male superego becomes an internalized and
demanding ego structure. To assimilate women into his
scheme, Freud created the phenomena of "penis envy." (Hall,
1954) He then speculated that due to "penis envy," females
never resolve the Oedipal issue, and, therefore, a less well
developed superego results. He links this strength of the
superego to moral character and summarizes this view in the
following statement:

> I cannot evade the notion that for women the level
> of what is ethically normal is different from what
> is in man. Their superego is never so impersonal,
> so independent of its emotional origins as we
> require it to be in man. Character traits which
> critics of every epoch have brought up against
> women--that they show less sense of justice than
> men, that they are less ready to submit to the
> greatest exigencies of life, that they are more
> often influenced in their judgments by feelings of
> affection or hostility--all these would be amply

accounted for by the modification in the formation
of their super-ego which we have inferred. (Freud,
cited in Gilligan, 1977, p. 484)

To expand further on the misrepresentation of women in
psychological theory, it is necessary to focus on the
theories of identity and development that project a masculine
image and either state or imply the universality of the male
developmental process. Erikson (1968) charted the normal
developmental path as one in which trust in infancy is based
in experiences of relationships, and subsequent to which
stages mark individual struggles to achieve autonomy and
independence. Erikson did note a difference in female
development, but his life cycle stages remain built upon the
male sequence which has served as a model for all human
development.

Conversely, Gilligan's research resulted in the
discovery that for women, "identity is defined in a context
of relationships and judged by a standard of responsibility
and care" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 160). The men she studied
described themselves differently. "Instead of attachment,
individual achievement rivets the male imagination and great
ideas or distinctive activity defines the standard of self"
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 163). Thus, Gilligan concluded that the
theories of identity formation are more representative of
male development than of female development.

In an attempt to account for and explain the differences which Gilligan found when conducting her research, she looked to the contemporary work of Miller (1976) and Chodorow (1978). They sought to facilitate a more accurate understanding of the development of women by reviewing and analyzing the information women shared about the manner they perceived, organized, and reacted to their own experiences.

The central theme of Miller's (1976) work took into account affiliation and attachment, for she saw "women's sense of self very much organized around being able to make and maintain affiliations and relationships. Eventually, for many women, the threat of disruption of an affiliation is perceived not just a loss of a relationship but as something closer to a total loss of self" (p. 83). Previous psychological literature recognized the characteristics cited by Miller, but viewed these traits as weaknesses which impeded the development of autonomy and independence and not as traits which explained development. Thus, when attempting to fit females' development into masculine guidelines, immaturity and an inherent deviancy prevailed because women failed to complete the developmental task achieved by men. In contrast, Miller (1976) suggested that women could achieve maturity while maintaining a central theme of ongoing attachments, providing it was approached from a different perspective.

Chodorow (1974) supported this position in her study of the construction of gender identity. She argued for the significance of the social role of mothering and its effects on gender identity, rather than accepting biological differences as the foundation of these dissimilarities. She speculated that "feminine personalities come to define themselves in relation and connection to other people more than the male personality does" (cited in Rosaldo & Lamphere, 1974, p. 44). Therefore, unlike Freud who looked to the effects of the anatomical differences to explain male and female development, Chodorow focused on the social role of mothering. She questioned whether there was an impact on human development resulting from the fact that women do the mothering in most families. In her analysis, she stated:

> The crucial differentiating experience in male and female development arises out of the fact that women universally are largely responsible for early child care and for later female socialization. This points to the central importance of the mother-daughter relationship for women, and to focus on the conscious and unconscious effects of early involvement with a female for children of both sexes. The fact that males and females experience this social environment differently as they grow up accounts for the development of basic sex differences in personality. (cited in Rosaldo & Lamphere, 1974, pp. 43-44)

Chodorow identified "mother" as the primary caretaker and nurturer with whom both males and females form their first attachment and identification. Therefore, a girl's gender identification and identity are enhanced by a

continuous attachment, while boys struggle with separation from their mother in an attempt to ground their maleness. Thus "girls emerge from this period with a basis for 'empathy' built into their primary definition of self in a way that boys do not. Girls emerge with a stronger basis for experiencing another's needs or feelings as one's own" (Chodorow, 1978, p. 167). Since male identity formation is based in separation, and female identity is defined in attachment, they experience development and relationships in different ways, according to this view. The struggles each experience later in life reflect this dichotomy: women face the issues of separation and independence, while men spar with intimacy and dependency.

Gilligan contended that female development is different and not necessarily deviant or indicative of failure to develop. She built upon Chodorow's description of female versus male gender identity and related this thinking to issues of morality. Gilligan thus hypothesized that there was an alternative path to moral maturity other than that which was expressed by Kohlberg--a theory which evaluated most women as being impaled at a stage three level of development. Gilligan sought to expand Kohlberg's concept of morality by including women in theory building.

Theories of Moral Development

Developmental theories of morality which emphasize
cognitive processes are exemplified by Piaget, Kohlberg, and
Gilligan. These theorists generally assume that moral
reasoning undergoes a systematic series of changes as one
matures.

Piaget (1965) was the first psychologist to shift the
view of morality from a philosophical phenomena to a
psychological construct which was representative of a stage
theory. He investigated changes in the moral judgments of
children of various ages by observing them playing games
among themselves. During these observations he studied
changes in their attitudes toward play, and he monitored
their use of rules. Through the use of interviews, he also
explored a child's sense of justice by having him/her answer
questions about stories which dealt with children committing
various violations.

The results of Piaget's research revealed that female
children differed from the males in their abilities to take
another's point of view, to resolve conflicts, and to
establish and follow rules (Piaget, 1965). However, he chose
to dismiss the observation he made of the female children and
described morality in a male image--a respect for rules and
a sense of justice.

Piaget held that children demonstrate two successive stages of moral judgment. The first stage is a morality of constraint. This is a period of cognitive maturity and an unquestioned obedience to adults. At this time, children remain egocentric and cannot assume the viewpoints of others. Rules appear absolute and unchangeable; however, they are followed at the insistence of adults. Children later shift to a morality of cooperation when they are able to take the role of others and operate with a degree of flexibility. Rules are seen as mutual agreements and are obeyed out of self convictions. This stage of autonomous morality is thought to be fully developed by adolescence.

The framework promulgated by Piaget served as the foundation for the prominent and widely accepted theory of moral development developed by Kohlberg. He elaborated upon the work of Piaget on cognitive development to build a theory of development of moral judgment. Kohlberg postulated six stages and three levels in the moral development process as it proceeds from childhood through adulthood. The progressive movement through the stages occurs as respect for rules develops.

According to Kohlberg (1984),the description of the three levels can be perceived as:

> ...three different types of relationships between
> the self and society's rules and expectations.
> Level I is a preconventional person, for whom rules
> and social expectations are something external to
> the self; Level II is a conventional person, in

whom the self is identified with or has internalized the rules and expectations of others, especially those of authorities; and Level III is a postconventional person, who had differentiated his or her self from the rules and expectations of others and defines his or her values in terms of self-chosen principles. (p. 173)

Each of the stages within the three major levels are defined as follows:

Preconventional Level

    At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and the labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

        Stage 1. The Punishment and Obedience Orientation

        The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right.

        Stage 2. The Instrumental Relativist Orientation

        Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's need and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are always interested in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours."

Conventional Level

    At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The

attitude is not only one of conformity to personal
expectations and social order, but of loyalty to
it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and
justifying the order, and of identifying with the
people or group involved in it. At this level,
there are the following two stages:

Stage 3. The Interpersonal Concordance or
"Good Boy - Nice Girl" Orientation

Good behavior is that which pleases or
helps others and is approved by them. There
is much conformity to sterotypical images of
what is majority or "natural" behavior.
Behavior is frequently judged by
intention--the judgment "he means well"
becomes important for the first time. One
earns approval for being "nice."

Stage 4. Society Maintaining Orientation

There is an orientation toward
authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance
of social order. Right behavior consists of
doing one's duty, showing respect for
authority, and maintaining the given social
order for its own sake.

Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level

At this level, there is a clear effort to
define moral values and principles that have
validity and application apart from the authority
of the groups or people holding these principles
and apart from the individual's own identification
with these groups. This level also has two stages:

Stage 5. The Social Contract Orientation

Right action tends to be defined in terms
of general individual rights and in terms of
standards that have been critically examined
and agreed on by the whole society. There is
a clear awareness of the relativism of
personal values and opinions and a
corresponding emphasis on procedural rules
for reaching consensus. Aside from what is
constitutionally and democratically agreed

on, the right is a matter of personal "values"
and "opinions." The result is emphasis on the
"legal point of view," but with an emphasis
on the possibility of changing law in terms
of rational considerations of social utility
(rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4
"law and order"). Outside the legal realm,
free agreement and contract are the binding
elements of obligation. This is the
"official" morality of the American
government and Constitution.

Stage 6. The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation

Right is defined by the decision of
conscience in accord with self-chosen
principles appealing to logical
comprehensiveness, universality, and
consistency. These principles are abstract
and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical
imperative); they are not concrete moral rules
such as the Ten Commandments. At heart, these
are universal principles of justice, of the
reciprocity and equality of human rights, and
of respect for the dignity of human beings as
individuals. (Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 17-19)

Kohlberg (1981) noted that these stages have the

characteristics of Piaget's cognitive stages. That is, they

comprise qualitatively different modes of thinking, they form

an invariant sequence; they form a "structural whole" which

represents a thought organization; and the stages are

hierarchical.

Although the order of the stages developed by Kohlberg

are invariant and hierarchical, the attainment of each stage

occurs gradually. Development does not occur automatically

but rather is affected by two primary factors. The first

determinant is reaching appropriate levels of cognitive

development. The second is exposure to appropriate
social/moral experiences which includes role-taking
opportunities in conflict situations (Kohlberg, 1969, 1973).
This moral conflict which Kohlberg (1981) referred to is "a
conflict between competing claims of people. 'You versus
me'; 'You versus a third person.' Where such conflicts
arise, the principles we use to resolve them are principles
of justice. Usually expectations or claims are integrated
by customary rules and roles" (p. 143). Kohlberg believed
that this pattern of moral development is a progression that
could occur in any culture; hence, it exhibits universality.

     The perception of morality and the theoretical
conceptualization of moral development as presented by
Kohlberg is a widely accepted theoretical position.
Researchers, psychologists, and educators tend to use theory
exclusively and without question. However, over the past
several years there has been some criticism of the methods
employed by Kohlberg and of the way he defined morality.

     For example, Simpson (1974) and Sullivan (1977) were
critical of Kohlberg's definition of morality as justice.
They claimed a cultural bias rather than a notion of
universality. Peters (1971), Blum (1980), Murdoch (1970),
and others attacked the Kohlberg model's philosophical
underpinnings which restrict the concept of morality to
justice and which ignore the affective domain. Most
recently, Kohlberg's theory has been criticized as biased

against women (Gilligan, 1978, 1982; Haan, 1978; & Holstein, 1976). Through a longitudinal study of the development of moral judgment on the Kohlberg model, a difference between the sexes was reported.

> In 1969, Kohlberg and Kramer identified Stage Three as the characteristic mode of women's moral judgements, claiming that, since women's lives were interpersonally based, this stage was not only "functional" for them but also adequate for resolving the moral conflicts that they faced. Turiel (1973) reported that while girls reached Stage Three sooner than did boys, their judgements tended to remain at that stage while boys' development continued further along Kohlberg's scale. Gilligan, Kohlberg, Lerner, and Belenky (1971) found a similar association between sex and moral judgement stage in a study of high school students, with girls' responses being scored predominantly at Stage Three while the boys' responses were more often scored at Stage Four. (Gilligan, 1977, p. 489)

Gilligan (1977, 1982) criticized the issue of sex bias, and claimed that Kohlberg's theory reflects an insensitivity to the feminine concerns for welfare, caring and responsibility as demonstrated by his exclusive focus on justice. She also took issue with the fact that "Kohlberg's conception of morality is androcentric in that there is an emphasis (particularly at the higher stages) on traditionally masculine values such as rationality, individuality, abstraction, detachment, and impersonality--an emphasis that is reflected by the assertion that justice is the universal principle of morality" (p. 491).

In recognition of the limitations of Kohlberg's theory, Gilligan proposed an expanded conceptual scheme of moral development--one which she found to be prevalent in women. By including, not excluding, the female experience, Gilligan presented a series of stages which she viewed as more descriptive of women's moral development.

Detailed reviews of the interviews that Gilligan obtained from 29 women who faced the real life dilemma of an abortion choice revealed that the thinking of women on moral conflicts was different than the conception of morality described by Kohlberg. In this paradigm, "the moral problem is seen to arise from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and inductive rather than formal and abstract" (Gilligan, 1977, p. 442). Furthermore, Gilligan (1982) concluded that "this conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules" (p. 19).

Describing the morality of care, Gilligan proposed that women reach higher developmental stages by progressing through a sequence of a more complex and integrated understanding of relationships between self and others. Gilligan (1977, 1982) described the developmental sequence

as three levels and two transition periods in the development

of an ethic of care embedded in a logic of relationships.

Level I: Orientation to Individual Survival

Decisions center on self in order to insure
survival. In this logic, one feels a lack of power
that stems from feeling disconnected and, in
effect, all alone. Relationships are for the most
part disappointing and as a result, women in some
instances deliberately choose isolation to protect
themselves against hurt.

First Transition: Selfishness to Responsibility

The concept of responsibility serves as
the basis for a new equilibrium between self
and others. The issue is one of attachment
to others. The conflict is between connection
and independence and this transitional level
signals an enhancement of self.

Level II: Goodness as Self Sacrifice

The conventional female voice emerges where
self and worth is based on the ability to care for
and protect others. Conflict arises over the issue
of hurting. Where no option is perceived to be in
the best interest of everybody, when
responsibilities conflict and decision entails the
sacrifice of somebody's needs, then the woman
confronts the task of choosing the victim.
Feminine identification of goodness with self
sacrifice clearly indicates the "right" resolution
of the conflict. Goodness is equated with self
sacrifice and the desire to care for others. The
morality of mutual care is embedded in the
psychology of dependence. Assertion becomes
potentially immoral in its power to hurt.

Second Transition: Goodness to Truth

The relationship between self and other
is reconsidered. A recognition for a sense
of responsibility to one's self as well as to
others. This judgement requires honesty, to

be responsible for oneself. The shift from
goodness to truth occurs when the action is
assessed not on the perception and reaction
of others but rather in terms of its intention
and consequence. She strives to encompass the
needs of both self and others, to be
responsible to others, and, thus, be good.
She also tries to be responsible to herself,
and is therefore honest and real.

Level III: Morality of Nonviolence

A reconsideration for what constitutes care
emerges. Obligation extends to include the self
as well as others. Hence the disparity between
selfishness and responsibility dissolves and is
resolved at this level in a principle of
nonviolence. By elevating nonviolence, the
injunction against hurting, to a principle
governing all moral judgements and action, women
are able to assert a moral equality between self
and others. Care then becomes a universal
obligation--the self chosen ethic of a
postconventional judgement that reconstructs the
dilemma in a way that allows the assumption of
responsibility for choice. (Gilligan, 1977, pp.
492-506; Gilligan, 1982, pp. 74-98)

The ethic of care described by Gilligan focused on a

theme of harmony within society, while the rights perspective

presented by Kohlberg emphasized the order of the social

system. It is Gilligan's contention that the integration of

both perspectives by the individual whether male or female

is the precursor to adult moral maturity.

If, in fact, there are two perspectives when defining a

moral conflict and resolving a moral issue, then those who

employ the care orientation logic have been misrepresented

by Kohlberg's model. Because it is a recent phenomena,

empirical evidence to support Gilligan's theory is just beginning to be gathered.

In 1982, Gilligan and others published research which was conducted on a sample of 18 males and 18 females matched for ages, education, and social class. The purpose was to demonstrate empirically what had been implied in her previous efforts; namely, two different conceptions of self and morality and how they relate to gender. Results of this study verified a morality of care and a morality of justice which were distinctive. Moreover, these conceptions of morality were significantly related to, but not confined to, gender. In other words, the conception of morality as justice was predominant in men, while the conception of morality as care prevailed in women.

Langdale (1983) also demonstrated both justice and care orientations to moral reasoning. Her investigation revealed that these orientations are found in the thinking of both males and females. Most males in her study tended to focus on justice issues, yet evidence of consideration of care were indicated. Females, on the other hand, tended to divide between the two orientations. Langdale concluded that if a subject is male, one can predict a justice focus and if the focus is care, the subject is likely to be a woman. She found that there were no sex differences per se in relation to the Kohlberg scale. However, those who demonstrated care as their predominant orientation were the individuals who scored

lower on the Kohlberg scale. Therefore, those individuals who are guided by principles of responsibility and care are penalized by Kohlberg's scoring method.

The most recent findings relating to Gilligan's theory were presented by Johnston (1985). The findings of this investigation were threefold: "1) a support of Gilligan's idea of gender differences in moral problem solving; 2) a support for the idea that two logics of moral problem solving represents two systems of reasoning; 3) demonstrates that both genders can employ both systems of reasoning, although they employ these systems differentially" (p.82).

In contrast to Gilligan's ideas regarding sex differences, Walker (1984) summarized all studies based on Kohlberg's theory as it related to sex differences. Of 31 studies dealing with sex differences in subjects ranging in age from 1-57, only 6 of 41 samples reflected significant differences. Walker claimed that there is little support for the claims of sex differences for this age group. Thirty-five studies on late adolescents and youth revealed significant differences in 10 of 46 samples. Research on sex differences in moral reasoning of adults showed that of the 21 samples studied, four significant differences were evident. Overall, Walker (1984) concluded that the metaanalysis revealed that "moral reasoning of males and females is more similar than different" (p. 687). Kohlberg (1984) suggested that claims of sex differences should be attributed to differences in

levels of education and occupation, not gender. Consensus

on the claims regarding sex differences in moral judgment

remains inconclusive.

Most recently, Gilligan (1982) called into question the

notion of development as a sequence of levels which both she

and Kohlberg adopted. Gilligan proposed a hypotheses that

the developmental questions surrounding the care perspective

may be very different than the justice perspective. She is

giving serious consideration to the development of the care

perspective as a "web" requiring a new mapping as opposed to

the previous conceptualization of a sequence of levels:

> The story of moral development, as it is presently
> told, traces the history of human development
> through shifts in the hierarchy of power
> relationships, implying that the dissolution of
> this hierarchy in an order of equality represents
> the ideal vision of things. But the conception of
> relationships in terms of hierarchies implied
> separation as the moral ideal for everyone to stand
> alone, independent, self sufficient, connected to
> others by the abstractions of logical thought.
> There then is a need to represent in the mapping
> of development a nonhierarchical image of human
> connection, and to embody in the vision of maturity
> the reality of interdependence. (Gilligan, 1982,
> p. 211)

The tracing of development of the care perspective is under

serious consideration by Gilligan. She emphasized that to

trace the developmental patterns it appears necessary to

conceptualize a structure based in human

relationships--mainly the parent-child relationship

(Gilligan, C., Langdale, S., Murphy, M., & Lyons, N., 1982).

In justice reasoning, it is necessary to evaluate the power factor and focus on the inequality of the parent-child relationship. At an early age, children learn that inequality is not fair and appeal to adult power based on the concept of fairness. This tends to override the power differential. Thus, Gilligan contends that the concept of justice is built into the human condition, and that development can be traced as the progression from inequality to equality. The progression is linear in nature, and in time the inequality can be removed and replaced with equality (Gilligan et al, 1982).

Gilligan also looked to the parent-child relationship from the dimension of attachment to describe the care orientation. Attachment, which is a built-in human condition, reflects an interdependency where both the child and the adult have an effect upon each other by virtue of the attachment. Development along this dimension does not fit the traditional invariant stage sequence model. Rather, it requires an additive model which must be capable of expansion and transformation. This scheme may take on a very different mapping than a simple linear progression (Gilligan, 1982). This concept has not been fully developed and will depend on current and future research endeavors.

Gilligan's work has been given considerable attention by psychologists, philosophers, and educators in the past several years, but it has not gone without criticism. The

issues which the critics explore center on the methods
employed by Gilligan in her theory building and theory
verification. Greeno & Maccoby (1984) accused Gilligan of
not providing evidence that women develop differently since
"simply quoting how some women feel is not enough to
establish this claim" (p. 6). The fact that Gilligan's
theory has been based on a study of 29 women who were
confronted with a decision about abortion has also been a
concern expressed by several critics (Greeno & Maccoby, 1984;
Kerber, 1984; & Luria, 1984). Gilligan's study was limited
to female subjects and an issue which would not allow for the
comparison between the thinking of men and women. Finally,
the scoring and coding procedures employed to analyze the
interview data collected in her study have not been available
for review, a fact which has called into question the
reliability of findings.

A Review of the Issues in
Moral Development Research

The moral development literature abounds with studies
that have provided empirical support for Kohlberg's
theoretical claims on moral development. It is important to
understand the research strategies employed by Kohlberg to
build his theory and to evaluate the system for tracing
development.

Both Piaget and Kohlberg began their theory building based on an _a priori_ definition of morality as justice. Piaget, in The Moral Judgement of the Child (1965), clarified that "all morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in respect which the individual acquires for these rules" (p. 13). Beginning with this premise, Piaget, and then Kohlberg, investigated the conception of morality from a justice perspective. They developed the following way to study how people think:

> Our stating assumptions led to the design of a research instrument measuring reasoning about dilemmas of conflicting rights or of the distribution of scarce resources, that is justice concerns. We did not use dilemmas about prosocial concerns for others that were not framable as rights conflicts. Besides, this limitation to justice dilemmas, we focused our probing questions and scoring procedures on eliciting judgements that were prescriptive and universalizable, while ignoring statements of personal feeling and those that attempted to rewrite the dilemma situation in order to solve it. (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 304)

Thus it appears that the instrument developed by Kohlberg was designed for the specific purpose of understanding the justice orientation. This instrument was then used on an exclusively male sample to obtain data. The data analyzed were related only to a justice orientation. Data which did not relate to the specific purpose were set aside and were unaccounted. Based on the data used, Kohlberg traced moral development in a stage theory format.

Once Kohlberg's theory of moral development was available, a great deal of research was conducted to verify his finding. However, Langdale (1983) pointed out that

> ...the a priori definition of morality in terms of a single orientation does not take into account that, as a result of different experiences of interacting with others, people may define that domain differently. Because this is not taken into account in the closed system, only differences in how people think within the justice orientation (e.g. Kohlberg stages) are empirically investigated and theoretically assimilated. (p. 4)

Gilligan, noting the limitations of the methods employed by Kohlberg, sought to conduct research using methods that were open to considerations of other moral orientations and to gender. She restructured the research process by using an open-ended semi-structured interview which allowed the subjects studied to define the moral domain. The restructured methods are described as follows:

> In order to make possible the empirical identification of different moral orientations, a measurement instrument in which the coded units of analysis are not defined in terms of any specific moral orientation is needed. A unit of analysis open to different orientations extends the interaction between theory and data by making it possible to determine whether participants in research have different moral orientations that, in turn, can be theoretically taken into account. (Langdale, 1983, p. 11)

The differences between the methods employed by Piaget and Kohlberg, and the methods employed by Gilligan are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1

A Comparison of the Closed and Interactive
Systems of Research

The closed system	The interactive system
Researcher a priori specifies a particular moral orientation	Specific moral orientations are empirically derived.
Researcher chooses orientation specific dilemmas.	Participants generate dilemmas.
The unit of analysis in the instrument designed for coding data is defined in terms of the researcher's choice of moral orientation.	The unit of analysis in the instrument designed for coding is not defined in terms of any particular orientation.
The categories in which these units of analysis are placed are originally theoretically derived.	The categories in which these units of analysis are placed are empirically derived.
Interaction between theory and data is confined to refining but changing these basic categories.	Interaction between theory and data is open to addition and/or deletion of categories.
Process of data analysis focuses on whether data conforms to theory.	Process of data analysis engages theory, method and data in an interactive dialogue.

(Langdale, 1983, p. 7)

Through the use of research methods not related to a specific moral orientation, Gilligan discovered the existence of two distinctive moral orientations--justice and care--when interviewing a sample of women who were facing an abortion choice. Subsequent research using Gilligan's methods found that care for and responsibility to people rather than rules permeated the moral reasoning processes of women while men tended to employ logical thinking about justice, rights, and fairness. These findings led to debates surrounding issues of gender differences in moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1984) responded to the claims of sex differences in moral reasoning to differences in educational level and occupation, not gender. He also refuted gender differences in orientation use maintaining that "choice of orientation seems to be primarily a function of setting and dilemma, not sex" (p. 350).

Further research which is not related to specific moral orientations appears justified to ascertain if other orientations to moral problem solving exist. It also appears important to explore the issues related to gender in order to expand our understanding of the moral reasoning processes of people, both males and females.

CHAPTER III

Method

A review of the literature on moral development reveals that in comparison to other psychological dimensions of human development, relatively little is known about morality and the process of moral reasoning. This is particularly true as it relates to adult development and behavior as well as prevailing issues surrounding gender. Despite the strides made in the past 15 years in the emergence of a psychology of women, the need to reanalyze previous theories which were insensitive to the validity of women's experiences remains critical to the understanding of people.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the use of the care and the justice orientation in the moral reasoning of adults. Review of the literature indicated that these two moral orientations served as the conceptual framework for understanding the moral reasoning process. While the theories of Kohlberg and Gilligan served as the starting points in data collection, this research was designed to remain open to new information that could emerge from the data relating to orientation use. This research also sought to explore the seemingly unresolved issue of gender differences in moral reasoning.

Another point revealed from the literature review was that of the lack of clarity surrounding the impact of the

nature of the moral dilemma upon the moral reasoning process. Thus, a comparison between professional and personal moral problem solving appeared warranted.

Given the nature of these research concerns, qualitative research methods were employed. A semi-structured interview format which allowed for an in-depth, detailed investigation was utilized. Secondly, a grounded theory research method served as a guide for the data analysis in order to allow for the possible emergence of new important information.

Sampling

Qualitative research methods derive information from natural settings and focus on in-depth, detailed studies of smaller populations. Glaser and Strauss (1967) recommend theoretical sampling when choosing groups or individuals for study. This method of sampling consists of purposeful selection of participants based on theoretical relevance to the area under investigation. In this procedure, it is also suggested that the size of the sample not be predetermined, but, rather, that sample size be determined by theoretical saturation.

> Saturation means that no additional data are being found whereby the sociologist can develop properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is saturated. (Glaser & Strauss, p. 61)

The theoretical sampling methods suggested by Glaser and Strauss guided this study. Based on theoretical relevance, accessibility, and willingness to participate, a sample of female and male community college presidents from institutions in the eastern region of the United States were chosen. This sample included both males and females with similar educational levels and job responsibilities; thus addressing both educational and job status when examining sex differences. An experience level of ten years or less was set as a boundary to ensure that females would not be excluded from the study and that experience in the job would be held constant. This restriction was necessary because the presidency of community colleges was not a position often held by women prior to the mid-1970s.

The names of the presidents included in this research were obtained from the <u>American Association of Community and Junior College Directory</u>. The presidents were called by telephone to request their participation in the project. The study was fully explained and all questions were answered. Follow-up letters regarding the nature of the research and the interview were sent upon request. Individual interviews were scheduled either in the office of the president or in a private setting in Orlando, Florida during the 27th national convention of the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges. Interviews were conducted with individuals

until saturation was reached, and no new relevant information could be obtained.

An Overview of Method

The following section provides an introduction to the various procedures available for gathering data and to the grounded theory method of constant comparison as a general means of data analysis.

Data Collection Strategies

Three principal measures for qualitative research were considered for data collection: observation, participation, and interviewing. Observation and participation, although useful methods, were not included because of the nature of the research. According to Guba & Lincoln (1985), "the ability to tap into the experience of others in their own natural language, while utilizing their value and belief frameworks, is virtually impossible without face-to-face and verbal interaction with them" (p. 155).

Interviewing was selected as the most appropriate technique, since it allows one to understand how a person thinks, feels, and reasons about a life event. Patton (1980) pointed out:

> The purpose of interviewing is to find out what is in and on someone's mind. We interview people to find out from them those things we cannot directly observe. The issue is not whether observational data is more desirable, valid, or meaningful than

> self-report data. The fact of the matter is that
> we cannot observe everything... We cannot observe
> how people have organized the world and the
> meanings they attach to what goes on in the
> world--we have to ask questions about those things.
> The purpose of interviewing, then, is to allow us
> to enter into the other person's perspective. (p.
> 196)

Hence, the interviewing method was planned as the means of
obtaining information. The verbal descriptions offered by
the interviewees served as the data upon which narrative
accounts were developed and presented as findings.

"The fundamental principal of qualitative interviewing
is to provide a framework within which respondents can
express their own understandings in their own ways" (Patton,
1980, p. 205). The form of the interview can vary a great
deal. It may range from a highly structured format to a
completely unstructured process where the interview questions
emerge during the conversation with the informant.

The form of the interview that was used in this study
is basic to the research methods of Gilligan. The
semi-structured interview process, developed and empirically
validated by Lyons (1983b) for use in questioning about moral
dilemmas, served as a basis for the interview format of this
study. A sublist of Lyons' questions were followed and
served as a guide to insure that basically the same
information was explored with each of the participants.
However, based on the participants' responses, the

interviewer remained free to explore topics as they arose in the course of the interview conversation.

The Constant Comparative Method of Analysis

"Analysis is the process of bringing order to the data, organizing what is there into patterns, categories, and basic descriptive units" (Patton, 1980, p. 268). In general, the analysis strategies used in this study are adapted from the process Glaser and Strauss (1967) call "comparative analysis." A logic of comparison is employed to generate categories as they occur in the natural setting. "... The constant comparative method is concerned with generating and plausibly suggesting (but not provisionally testing) many categories, properties, and hypotheses about general problems" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 104).

The researcher begins by collecting information from individuals or groups identified as appropriate for the understanding of the research problems. Simultaneous to the collection of data, it is imperative to code and to analyze the information collected. This process of analysis is known as constant comparative analysis. The intent is to facilitate the identification of categories and their respective properties. A category, as described by Darkenwald (1980), "is a basic theoretical concept that enables the researcher to explain and predict behavior. A

property is a conceptual element of a category that serves to define or elaborate the meaning of the category" (p. 67).

The constant comparative method of data analysis involves four stages which include: (a) comparing descriptions applicable to each category, (b) integrating categories and their properties, (c) delimiting the theory, and (d) writing the theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 105). Each of these four stages unfolds in sequential order and maintains an interdependent relationship throughout the analysis.

The first stage involves the coding of the data into categories. Once this procedures is complete, it is necessary to compare each incident with previously collected data by pointing out similarities and differences. The method is designed to produce the appropriate properties for each designed category. As the researcher reflects on the findings, it is necessary to write theoretical memos. "Memos are the theorizing write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they strike the analyst while coding" (Glaser, 1978, p. 83).

The second phase of analysis is to draw comparisons between incidents and the properties of a category which were identified in the first round of analysis. This constant comparison leads to the integration of the identified categories and their properties.

In the third stage, the researcher sets out to delimit the theory or explanations which emerged. This occurs by identifying similarities in the categories or properties and integrating the details into higher level concepts. Further delimiting occurs through theoretical saturation of all categories. "A category is saturated when continued data collection yields no new information on the properties of the category--the analyst begins to spin wheels" (Darkenwald, 1980, p. 74). This saturation of categories leads to a clear and succinctly captured explanation of the data.

The final stage of data analysis entails the writing of theory. The ideas and concepts which evolved from the data are then integrated to form a logical substantive theory.

This specific grounded theory method was selected as a guide because of its potential for inductively arriving at descriptions of the moral reasoning process and for tracking the interplay of gender and the nature of the dilemma as they relate to the moral reasoning process. It made possible both the assessment of existing theories and the expansion of existing theories based on these data.

Preparation of the Researcher

Prior to data collection, the researcher was prepared in two phases. During the first stage, the researcher participated in a one-week intensive seminar at Harvard University Graduate School of Education during June, 1985.

The Research and Data Analysis Workshop, presented by
Gilligan and Lyons, exposed the researcher to lectures on the
theoretical conceptualizations of moral development as
formulated by Gilligan. It also provided an overview of the
methodology for designing and analyzing moral conflict data.
Emphasis was placed upon conducting semi-structured
interviews and using the Lyons coding scheme for scoring and
analyzing interview data. The purpose of the semi-structured
interview process used by Gilligan and Lyons was to
understand how a person constructed, resolved, and evaluated
real life moral conflicts.

To further develop interview skills, the second stage
of researcher preparation involved an exploratory pilot study
at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University during
December, 1985. A series of six interviews were conducted
over a two week period under the supervision of Don G.
Creamer, the major advisor for this research project. These
interviews provided verification that individuals in
positions of leadership would willingly describe situations
that produce moral conflicts. Conducting the interviews also
served to enhance the interviewing skills of the researcher.
They provided the researcher with the opportunity to learn
how to engage the interviewee in structuring the accounts of
multiple situations defined as moral conflicts. In addition,
they offered experience using the text of the shared
information to formulate relevant follow up questions.

The critiques of these interviews provided practice in identifying points of commonalities and differences found in the data. It also served to develop initial impressions about the appropriate use of gender and context variables.

Data Collection Procedures

Those who volunteered to participate were requested to sign a letter of consent explaining that the discussions would be audio-taped for purposes of a doctoral dissertation, and that the anonymity of all individuals would be maintained (See Appendix A). They were then interviewed by the researcher in an attempt to understand the moral reasoning process the volunteers employed when reflecting on real life dilemmas of their choice. The actual interview took from approximately one to two hours. Upon completion of the interview, the individual was requested to complete a biographical information sheet (See Appendix C).

An interview guide with typical questions used in the interviews is provided in Appendix B. While questions generally followed this format, the interviewer did tend to follow leads from the text that were relevant to the research questions.

Data Treatment and Analysis

The interview data were collected and analyzed simultaneously from the beginning of the fieldwork, and

continued after data collection was completed. Upon the
completion of each interview day, the tapes were sent for
transcription, field notes were reviewed, and memos
reflecting on the data and the interview in general were
written.

Once the interview had been transcribed, specific
systematic procedures were used to analyze the data. At this
stage, the data were coded by the researcher for as many
categories as possible. Through the use of the narrative
accountings obtained during the interview, some of the
categories and properties identified by Gilligan appeared
appropriate. Others, however, did not earn their way into
the developing framework. The researcher also remained open
to new ideas in order to allow for the emergence of
additional categories and properties which might lead to the
expansion of the basic theoretical framework. As the
categories evolved, the basic rule of the constant
comparative method was applied: "while coding an incident
for a category, compare it with the previous incidents in the
same and different groups coded in the same category" (Glaser
& Strauss, 1967, p. 106). For instance, when coding an
incident in which the community college president discussed
a concern for others when solving a moral dilemma, it became
necessary to compare this incident with another of a similar
nature. This constant comparison led to the emergence of
properties of the identified categories. For example, when

comparing an incident identified as a concern for others, it became apparent that this concern was expressed as a concern one had not only for the well being of the individual but also for relationships. Thus, through constant comparison of the responses of the same individual and across individuals, the researcher was able to "think in terms of the full range of types or continuum of the category..." (Glaser & Strauss, 1968, p. 106). By the time data collection and the analytic procedures had been applied to the 16 cases, saturation of the various categories had been reached.

Throughout the coding and analysis, theoretical memos were written to record thoughts about the codes and their relationships, to describe conflicts, and to capture theoretical notions that emerged from the data. These memos served to illustrate an idea and later provide the content behind the categories which became the major themes in writing theory.

Limitations of the Study

The primary limitations of this study are focused on the interview method used in the collection of data. Limitations associated with interviews reflect on the interviewer, the interviewee, and the instrument employed.

First, this method is susceptible to interviewer bias. Subtle cues from the researcher can influence the outcome of the data obtained. Second, the quality of the interview

depends upon the ability and the willingness of the
interviewee to clearly articulate perceptions and to share
accounts of situations which may be personal and
confidential. The quality of the conversation and
interaction between the people involved is contingent upon
the rapport established and maintained by the interviewer.
Finally, the restriction imposed by the semi-structured
interview must also be recognized as a limitation. This
procedure may minimize the amount of knowledge obtained from
the person being interviewed thus limiting the understanding
of the moral problem solving process.

The possible idiosyncratic characteristics of the select
group of people in this study imposes further limitations.
Since little is known about the nature of community college
presidents, the general applicability of the results may be
restricted. It is also important to note that the
participants were drawn from a specific subgroup of
presidents; namely, those planning to attend the American
Association of Community and Junior College Convention. In
addition, all people were chosen based based on a voluntary
response to a phone conversation. Nonrespondents might have
offered different perspectives on problem solving than did
the respondents.

In addition, the research could have been strengthened
by using multiple sources of information. For example, the
observation of presidents as they faced a moral dilemma could

be combined with an interview concerning the reasoning they employed in seeking a solution. It is possible, for example, that rationalized explanations of decisions may have been used given the retrospective nature of the moral reasoning discussion provided by the interviewees. This combination of approaches with an immediate moral dilemma would allow for other than verbal reports and might have provided additional data which could raise potentially helpful questions. These, in turn, might lead to ideas which may need to be entertained and developed.

CHAPTER IV

Findings

Sixteen presidents participated in this research
endeavor. The process included the completion of a
biographical information form that provided demographic data
on the people involved. In addition, a person-to-person,
semi-structured interview relating to moral reasoning was
conducted with each president. The characteristics of the
research population and the findings gleaned from interviews
relating to the moral reasoning process will be presented.

Characteristics of the Research Population

All community college presidents chosen for interviews
were required to have ten or less years of experience as the
chief executive officer of a community college campus. Each
college was located in the eastern region of the United
States. The characteristics of the 16 community college
presidents are summarized in Table 2. The individuals were
classified to review the overall characteristics of the group
and to assess the profiles of the presidents by gender.

Presidents who participated in this study were, on the
average, in their early fifties. The youngest were 43 while
the oldest was 65. Overall, the women tended to be somewhat
older than their male counterparts.

Table 2

Characteristics of the Research Population

	Total	Females	Males
Subjects	16	9	7
Mean age	51.8	53.2	50.0
Highest degree			
PhD	25%	44%	0%
EdD	69%	56%	86%
MA+	6%	0%	14%
Years as a president			
0-3	43%	45%	28.5%
4-7	31%	33%	43%
8-10	25%	22%	28.5%
Years in current position			
0-3	56%	78%	28.5%
4-7	19%	0%	43%
8-10	25%	22%	28.5%
Size of institution by full time enrollment 84			
<1000	13%	22%	0%
1,000 - 3,499	20%	11%	14%
3,500 - 5,999	27%	11%	43%
6,000 - 8,499	27%	22%	14%
>8,500	13%	22%	0%
Undergraduate major			
Liberal Arts	19%	33%	0%
Science/Math	19%	11%	28%
Business	6%	0%	14%
History/Pol. Sci.	31%	33%	28%
Education	25%	22%	28%

As might be expected, the majority (94%) of the presidents hold a doctoral degree. Twenty-five percent hold PhDs and 69 percent hold EdDs. Only one president interviewed had not earned a doctorate, but he had completed all advanced graduate work except a dissertation. However, some differences were noted in the types of doctoral degrees held by females and males. Among the women, 44 percent had a PhD, while 56 percent had an EdD. All of the degrees held by the male presidents were EdDs.

Differences between the genders also were found in the number of years each group had been in their current positions. Although the years of presidential experience were rather evenly distributed across the groupings of 0-3 years, 4-7 years, and 8-10 years, women tended to have less experience in their current position than did their male colleagues. Thus, it would appear that the men tended to remain in their first presidency longer, while 33 percent of the women moved to other colleges.

The size of the colleges which this group administered in the fall of 1984 ranged from as few as 967 full-time students to as many as 14,000. The size of the schools administered by the males were concentrated in the mid-sized grouping, while the colleges of the female presidents ranged in size from less than 1,000 full-time students to more than 8,500 full-time students.

In looking at the educational background of the presidents, it was noted that the greatest percentage of people were concentrated in the History/Political Science area. Liberal Arts was the major of 33 percent of the female presidents but none of the males majored in this area. The majors of the men were evenly distributed among the Science/Math, History/Political Science, and Education fields.

In summary, the 16 people participating in this study, when classified by gender, revealed some similarities and differences in their demographic characteristics. It appears that in age and presidential years of experience, the groups were not very different from one another. The female leaders were more apt to move to another presidency than were their male counterparts, and females seemed to administer institutions with greater variety in size. Both the males and females favored the History/Political Science as an undergraduate major. Some females preferred the liberal arts area, while some males preferred the Science/Math and Education fields.

The Moral Reasoning Interview

The interview focused on discovering the reasoning process employed by community college presidents when faced with a moral conflict. Concentrating on real life moral dilemmas, the interviewer sought to ascertain what situations

led to a moral conflict, what the presidents viewed as moral
conflicts, what thoughts or ideas were examined when
struggling with a way to resolve the conflict, and how one
chose to resolve the problem described.

Each person interviewed was asked to describe specific
situations that led to a moral conflict for them. The
described events then served as the basis for the inquiry.
Subsequent dilemmas were requested and all subjects were
encouraged to share both professional and personal moral
conflicts. Thus, this study elicited responses to questions
regarding (a) the event leading to a conflict; (b) the actual
conflict experiences, (c) factors considered; and (d)
decisions made relating to professional and personal moral
dilemmas.

Nearly everyone interviewed used the confidentiality of
the interview process to openly share matters of concern.
Many expressed appreciation for the opportunity to reflect
on such serious matters. Most were surprisingly unrestrained
and discussed what they considered to be deeply private
moments and poignant life experiences.

Summary of Interview Responses

A presentation of the evidence which corresponds to the
interview protocol will be provided in this section. The
findings were abstracted from the content of the responses
offered by the presidents interviewed. All interviews were

conducted on an individual basis either in the campus office
of the president or in a private setting in Orlando, Florida,
during the 1986 American Association of Community and Junior
College Convention.

Events leading to moral conflicts. In this study, the
relevant situations that led to moral dilemmas were not
predetermined events. Rather, they were experiences
generated by the participants themselves. The key question
asked by the interviewer to develop a basis for inquiry on
the moral reasoning process was, "Could you tell me about a
specific situation you faced, which is still clear in your
mind, that led to a moral conflict?" Overall, 50 events were
described by the 16 presidents. Their statements revealed a
variety of situations, but in many instances the variation
lay in the particulars and scope of the event rather than in
the underlying issues and pressures faced in the daily
operations of the institution and in personal lives. Both
males and females tended to experience the same basic issues.

Personnel matters loomed as the predominant common
professional issue identified and talked about by these
presidents. Relationships with the Board of Trustees was
also an issue for some, and an isolated case of student
behavior was presented. A major component of the personal
issues, deliberated upon, dealt with family matters, while
peer relationships and personal behavior emerged as matters
of secondary importance.

In the professional realm, personnel matters included areas of incompetency and unprofessional conduct of faculty and staff. Sexual affairs, harassment of students, improper use of college monies, and an isolated case of alcoholism were also cited as problems. Examples of personnel situations which were expressed follow:

> "I had one problem in which one of my administrators seemed to be having a romantic liaison with a person he supervised. That situation was causing a morale problem with everybody else in the department."

> "There was a sufficient amount of evidence that a male faculty member was persisting in making sexually explicit comments in classes. These comments were discouraging students, particularly female students, from staying in class."

Dealing with incompetent staff and dismissing employees presented a number of presidents with moral conflicts.

> "I had two administrators I had to dismiss from their positions. They were both well known and had been in the community for a long time. It was tough."

> "I have somebody here who does a very poor job for me. I've spent most of the time I've been here working with this guy, trying to improve his performance. I was forced to make a choice."

Another area of concern regarded the governing boards. Several presidents interviewed indicated that problems occurred when a board member attempted to become involved in the daily operation of the institution. Two of the

presidents discussed conflicts which arose when board members

tried to influence personnel decisions and appointments.

>"One of my concerns was that the Chairman of the
>Board of Trustees wanted us to hire his one of his
>children."

>"There was a very strong board chairperson who was
>a major contractor in the town. On the afternoon
>of the bid opening for the college building
>contracts, my vice president informed me that the
>board chairperson himself was submitting a bid.
>The vice president thought I would want to know
>that information."

An isolated incident centering on several students

"cheating" became an institutional matter at one college and

presented a dilemma for the president. One other person

described a similar situation as a conflict when in a role

other than president.

Moral conflicts which arose in the personal lives of the

people interviewed focused on family matters as the salient

concern. Divorce and concerns centering on children were the

situations which permeated the conversation. One person

discussed care of an aging parent as an important matter.

Some examples of these types of events include:

>"Oh sure! My divorce."

>"One of things that was a terrible dilemma for me
>happened when my daughter who was divorced began
>living with another man. She was living with him
>on a serious basis without being married."

Peer relationships and personal conduct were the other

two areas mentioned. These were, however, much less frequent

in number than were the family matters. Situations involving

interaction with friends led some people to a conflict, while

one's personal behavior was viewed as an issue for others.

Although the content of the events varied, the question of

how to behave presented some people with a moral conflict.

> "I had been contributing money to two types of
> plans for several years without knowing it was
> illegal. It was recently brought to my attention
> and suggested that I continue to ignore it and see
> whether I got caught."

The events which have been reported are characteristic

of the experiences examined and deliberated upon by the

participants. Figure 1 and Figure 2 summarize the situations

leading to a conflict, according to these interviews. These

events shared served as the basis for the inquiry leading to

the understanding of the respondents' thinking, as they

attempted to explain how they came to resolve the problems

and conflicts with which they had been confronted.

Moral conflicts. All of the situations described led

to a moral conflict. In each specific case, the president

was asked to define what was perceived as the conflict.

Thus, for each event, a moral conflict was constructed and

presented by the interviewee. Although individuals may have

presented similar events leading to a moral conflict, the

actual conflict for the persons involved may have varied.

67

Figure 1. Professional situations leading to moral conflict for community college presidents.

Figure 2. Personal situations leading to moral conflict for community college presidents.

For example, two individuals discussed harassment of students

as the event which led to a moral conflict, but each defined

the actual conflict they experienced differently. One

president viewed the following as the conflict:

> " 'Mr. Brown,' a high profile coach, has just
> brought his team back from the national
> championship. Shortly after this accomplishment I
> found out that he has been using abusive and foul
> language on female student security guards. As
> president, it's possible for me to delegate the
> handling of this situation and not get my hands
> soiled with the issue. My conflict is whether to
> delegate it to someone else or to address the
> problem myself."

Another president described a conflict this way:

> "I've known this professor for a long time. He was
> a friend of my husband's, and he really belittles
> women. I'm in a position of authority with him and
> feel an obligation to do something about it. I
> know that there should be some way to approach this
> and take a stand without creating problems in the
> relationships among friends."

The moral conflicts which were constructed were

described in several ways. Both men and women defined the

moral conflict in the various terms for both personal and

professional situations. In all cases, there appeared to be

tension between two opposing viewpoints as the presidents

attempted to articulate their struggles. Women frequently

tended to describe conflicts as a concern regarding the

dictates of rules or duties as opposed to an expression of

concern towards the other people involved. Typically, this

type of conflict was most evident in professional situations.

These individuals demonstrated concerns as they presented their conflicts:

> "A budget had to be met; thus, programs would have to go. If programs were eliminated, good people would have to be asked to leave. This could cause trauma to individuals. My conflict was in reconciling budget constraints while understanding the potential traumatic effects on individual people. I was deeply concerned about this--deeply concerned."

> "I struggled with this problem in the sense that the individual had been close to the institution and was someone for whom I had a lot of respect. I struggled because the bottom line was that the action they took was wrong, but I respected and cared about the person."

> "I had to consider the institution while at the same time, I realized that it was a <u>person</u> who was involved. You know, you just don't write people off."

Conversely, men tended to view the conflict as a situation causing one to struggle with fairness. This was often viewed as a concern over the competing claims of people. Once again, it was mainly the professional issues that were identified in the following manner:

> "The conflict was that it just didn't seem fair that there was a difference between the punishment for the three girls."

> "What this faculty member was doing was not only against the philosophy of the college, but was also illegal. It's not right for our students to be exposed to this. Should I let him go ahead and continue to act this way in order to gather the evidence needed to hang him, or should I deal with him immediately and stop it now? That's the moral dilemma."

Table 3 reflects these various moral conflict
differences by gender.

The conflicts presented surrounding personal issues
tended to form two basic categories: (a) conflicts dealing
with a concern for others versus what might be best for the
individual; and (b) thinking about issues of compromising
one's own beliefs versus a concern for the effect a a
situation may have on oneself. Men often took the
perspective of personal principle and standards against a
concern for the good of self. For example:

> "The conflict is whether you're going to sell out
> on your principles because you know this is an
> issue that could be very uncomfortable and
> unpleasant with the Board Chairman."

> "My dilemma was in deciding what I should do,
> because I am Episcopalian, and the church doesn't
> encourage divorce by any stretch of the
> imagination. Divorce is not common in my family,
> but I could not continue in the marriage and still
> do what I wanted to do with the rest of my life."

If what one saw as best for one's self was in conflict
with what might be best for another person, a struggle then
ensued. This was frequently the way the females viewed their
conflict in personal situations. The moral conflicts
reflecting this type of issue is exemplified by these
remarks:

> "So the moral decision for me was whether I should
> satisfy my own professional ambitions at that time,
> or whether I had to give priority to my family.
> The latter involved straightening my own life and
> my daughter's life."

Table 3

Percentages of Professional Moral
Conflict Definition by Gender

	Rights or duties vs. concern for others	Concern of competing claims
Females	84%	30%
Males	16%	70%

Finally, a situation where one's personal standards versus societal standards or obligations were in opposition was described in a few cases. One president indicated the following concern:

> "You want to believe that everybody is salvageable, you want to believe that, given the right coaching and the right environment, these people can do well. I believe that every person is a gifted person and all you have to do is find out what their gifts are. Well, sometimes you find out that a person's gifts are not what is needed to run a good organization. That's a conflict for me."

In sum, the informants provided strong support for the view that what becomes a moral conflict can be constructed in several different ways by different people in different situations. How these conflicts came to be resolved formulated the subsequent line of inquiry.

Factors considered in moral conflict resolution. Once the moral conflict was clearly identified, the thrust of the inquiry shifted in questioning which would promote understanding of the process leading to the resolution of the prevailing problem. Therefore, the next phase of the process was to explore with the participants the factors contemplated when attempting to reach a decision leading to moral action.

Listening to the explanations offered, it became apparent that the ideas were most salient for the majority of the individuals. However, it was in this portion of the

conversation that the intensity of the struggle appeared to come forth. As the people spoke of the ideas pondered and why each held importance, the factors discussed then took on personal significance and led to the formation of an individual picture of personal commitment and emotional involvement. Thus, the idiosyncratic meaning each person brought to his or her conflict became clear, and it was this meaning that most influenced the final decision about what action to take.

In this instance, the ideas cited composed five major themes: (a) Issues concerned with the people involved; (b) Issues focusing on fairness, rules, and competing claims; (c) Issues primarily addressing a concern with themselves; (d) Issues centering on self-evaluation and introspection; and (e) Issues centering on the appraisal and understanding of others. The nature of each of these facets will be further explained.

Some of the ideas carefully examined by the subjects included attention to the issues relating to a concern for others in a way that reflected a sense of nurturance and a desire to protect others from experiencing physical or emotional pain. Comments frequently accentuated the concern about maintaining relationships between and among people. A documented example of this was expressed by these presidents:

> "I kept looking for positive aspects for the people
> who were affected by this--the people she
> administered as well as herself. I wondered how

we might grow and provide some sort of support for
everyone while helping her find a future or some
other opportunity. I still struggle with trying
to help find the 'right' spot, the 'right'
direction."

"I love my children and my family very much. I
have a very supportive family, and I really thought
about my kids. My children came first, and I
wanted them to be okay. I didn't want to hurt them
in any way at all, but I know divorce can be very
hard on kids. It can affect them in a lot of ways.
Realizing this made the decision difficult."

"It was difficult to say 'no' to this guy. I was
concerned that he would be so angry with me that
we would have problems later. I was afraid I would
end up making him feel badly about himself by
saying 'no'. I really respected him."

Others spoke of a concern for people, but viewed this

as part of a role which become a duty or obligation. An

illustration of duties and obligations as a factor is clear

in this president's thoughts:

"You see, I really care about this person. Since
I see myself as a developer of people in my role
as president, I consider it my responsibility to
encourage them and to explain what is in their best
interest. This woman's behavior is self-defeating
because of a blind spot in her personality. She
is a bright person, with a great future who has so
much except where men are concerned."

Often an expression of duties and obligations to the

institution was mentioned. In the role of president, many

indicated that their first responsibility was to the

institution. Hence, more often than any other factor this

prevailed when professional issues were discussed.

"What is best for the college? Basically, that is
generally what I try to look at. I always have to
keep the best interest of that college in my mind."

"What is best for the institution becomes very
important. That is your responsibility."

"What's the long range impact to the institution?
I am in the unique position of being the guardian
of the college in a way that nobody else is."

Noteworthy attention also was given to following rules

and standards. The factors that come into play in these

situations addressed the rules and laws that prevail when

reaching a solution. Such factors are suggested in these

excerpts.

"My dilemma revolved around the fact that a student
was cheating and everybody knew it. For her to
stay here under those circumstances would be wrong,
because it is an act of dishonesty. You either
stand upon the principle, or you have no stand at
all."

This particular part of his behavior is
unacceptable because it is against our philosophy
and our policies."

"As president of an institution one must always
look at the law and at the legal implications."

"The first thing to consider is that there is a
rule which states that all money collected during
the day is to be deposited at the bank, no matter
whether it is day or night. Nothing should have
been left in the drawer at all."

A concern for the effect on self, or what an action

might mean to the individual could be seen repeatedly. This

became a central issue for some, while for others, it was

merely another aspect that was granted some thought. The

effect on one's status and achievements was one view voiced,

while a concern for the effect on one's psychological and

physical health was another. For example:

> "Well, I just couldn't stay in that marriage. It
> just became something I could no longer do. You
> reach a point when your own preservation is more
> important than anything."

> "I just couldn't live that way. I was going to be
> tossing and turning all night, getting ulcers, and
> having high blood pressure."

> "My conflict was with two people who had
> connections with the board. One of the two was in
> business with a board member. They had invested
> in a business together. I looked at the impact all
> of this was going to have upon me. Because of that
> board member, I was concerned that I would
> jeopardize my position with the Board."

> "They could effectively destroy my reputation so
> that it would be almost impossible to get another
> job."

Some interviewees generated statements which reflected

the way they think about themselves and how they think about

others. These ideas were unsolicited and were merely found

in the dialogue provided by some individuals. However, it

was not found in all cases. These are basically thoughts the

person expressed about the image they held of themselves,

their attitudes, feelings and expectations toward themselves.

Similarly, the image, attitudes, and expectations one has

toward another were also apparent. Evidence of this can be found in these excerpts:

> "It was very obvious to me that he was very good in his job when he was not drinking. But he would seem to fall into real slumps when he was drinking."

> "Other factors to be considered are the personal thoughts you have. I had to stop and say to myself, 'wait a minute, am I reacting this way because I don't like this individual?' I had to raise those questions with myself. Was I being two demanding? Was I nitpicking? I had to look at some of my own characteristics."

> "As I really looked at it, I realized what I had done. I had done everything for my family. I was everything for everybody. I took care o everyone's needs at the same time I carried a full time job and went to graduate school. I was mommy _and_ daddy because he was never around."

> "Whenever I make a difficult decision, I must consider more than whether or not my decision is moral or ethical. I must also think about how I will feel about myself when the next decision comes along. Will I be able to look at myself in the mirror? Can I look squarely at people and say, 'this is the best decision; I've done the best job I can.'"

Basically, all responses to the question "What did you think about or consider when trying to come to a decision about what to do?" led to the type of responses that were cited in this review. Most people discussed several kinds of factors as they came to resolve the problem.

The Decision

The aforementioned factors formed the basis for a moral decision and subsequent action. As people debated and integrated the various factors reflected upon, they reached a point where they made a choice and rendered their decision. Some simply stated what they had decided. Others shared the dialogue they had with themselves in the process of making the final decision. The following responses illustrate the latter situation.

> "When things get difficult, I seem to go back to those standards and values I learned long ago. I always use that as a guide when I face those tough decisions. Yes, that is clearly what I do."

> "I guess I just have to decide that if anyone is going to be upset they will just have to be upset. It wouldn't, as far as I'm concerned, detract from my being a college president, and it doesn't detract from my being a husband or a father, at least in my opinion."

Each person's decision resolved the conflict. For instance, in the situation where one individual's problem was whether to fulfill her own personal career ambitions or to give priority to her family, the moral choice was as follows:

> "I agonized over this for a long time and decided that I could not adversely affect her life. That might have happened if I had made the decision to accept the presidency and all of its demands. I hoped, for me, another opportunity would come along at another time."

All presidents felt positive about the final decision made, but not all decisions were without consequence to the individuals. Although the results of the decisions varied, the consequences of the decisions were, in all cases, discussed as considerations in the process of the moral reasoning process. In other words, no one was totally surprised by the results of his or her decision.

The process leading to moral choice is summarized conceptually in Figure 3.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to organize and describe in detail the responses obtained from interviews with 16 community college presidents as they discussed real life moral dilemmas. These findings reflect the thinking which contributed to the solution of a moral problem.

In the following chapters, the findings will be used to extend the basic ideas discovered and to provide an understanding of the moral reasoning process. Thus, the intent will be to generate and discuss concepts which will contribute to a theoretical description of moral reasoning.

Figure 3. Factors leading to choice in moral reasoning.

CHAPTER V

Discussion and Conclusions

The findings of this research reveal that, when faced with a real life moral conflict, community college presidents use three overlapping orientations in making a moral choice. Also, the use of the orientations was found to vary somewhat by gender, but not necessarily by the nature of the dilemmas. The evidence of a third orientation--the self orientation--represents an important discovery, as do the variations on the overall patterns of orientation use associated with gender.

This chapter is organized to answer the questions posed in Chapter I and will provide discussion of the results in a context of the theories described earlier that undergird this study. Prevailing commonalities and differences in regard to moral orientations in moral problem solving will be highlighted. Finally, the dominant moral reasoning patterns used by the community college presidents will be discussed, and the previously unexplored domain of professional versus personal dilemmas will be reviewed.

1. What orientations of moral reasoning are evident in the explanations offered by community college presidents when solving real life moral conflicts?

The central focus of this research was to ascertain which moral orientations were evident in the explanations

offered by community college presidents when faced with a
real life moral conflict and whether two or more than two
orientations might explain the moral problem solving process.

A careful systematic analysis of the responses obtained
from the interviews resulted in the identification of three
major orientations which were salient in the moral reasoning
process: (a) a concern for justice; (b) a concern for
others; and (c) a concern for self. These orientations
appeared to operate in the shaping of a moral reasoning
pattern which gave rise to a moral choice. In the following
discussion, the researcher will describe each factor and the
discernible properties which prevailed, will explicate the
role of a self perspective in the moral reasoning process,
and will explain the differentiated use of the moral
reasoning patterns demonstrated by the community college
presidents.

Justice

The role of the justice orientation in the moral
reasoning process has been identified and discussed by
Kohlberg and by Gilligan. Kohlberg's concept of morality was
restricted to a single moral orientation of justice reasoning
in which moral conflict was viewed as a conflict of competing
rights or claims of individuals. Overall, one's focus was
on fairness, rules, standards, duties, and obligations.
Thus, a person relied on laws and principles of justice to

resolve the moral conflict. Gilligan also found the justice

orientation to be important in the moral reasoning process.

However, it was not the only orientation.

Findings from this study lend support to Kohlberg's and

to Gilligan's conclusions that the justice orientation and

its properties, as defined in the literature, were evident

and distinguishable. As indicated by Gilligan and Attanucci

(1986), the properties of justice reasoning were found to

center on applying general rules and standards to situations,

as well as on performing the duties and obligations inherent

in certain perceived roles. These concerns are illustrated

here:

> "What you are doing is wrong, and I don't want to
> see it happening here. That's just the rule, and
> rules are to be enforced in order to run a good
> operation."

> "As I see it, this was my professional
> responsibility. It was what I was being paid to
> do. The college would have been liable if I didn't
> do what legally was supposed to be done."

In addition to demonstrating these properties, there

also were statements which appraised others in relation to

the justice consideration. In this study, such information

was incorporated as a facet of the justice orientation. As

he reasoned about a moral conflict, this president described

a member of his staff in the following manner:

> "I wasn't particularly interested in 'hanging' him.
> He's probably average or low average in his

effectiveness as an instructor, but he is not totally ineffective or totally incompetent."

Care

Gilligan discovered the presence of care as an additional orientation, and in 1977, this orientation was introduced as being central to the understanding of morality. The focus of attention of the care orientation includes concern for others and responsibility, rather than concerns of rights and obligations. "The care perspective draws attention to problems of detachment or abandonment and holds up an ideal of attention and response to need" (Gilligan, 1985, p. 5). This perspective emphasizes a concern for the needs of others along with maintaining harmony among people.

In the real life moral conflict experiences shared by the community college presidents, a concern for others emerged as a perspective affecting the moral reasoning process. The properties which distinguished the care perspective were the concerns one has for individuals and the concerns that one has for relationships. People expressed their concern for others by articulating a desire not to hurt or to cause any discomfort. This is illustrated in the following excerpt:

> "What affected it for me was the strain this might cause her. Just the getting up and down during the night that is involved when you have two small children is hard enough. This, added to the financial impact, increased the strain."

A concern for relationships and the maintenance of
harmony is another distinction found in this domain and is
illustrated by the following comment:

> "I thought about many things but I really was
> conscious of the importance of our friendship and
> the comradery we shared."

In addition to statements which demonstrated the
aforementioned properties, there also were statements which
appraised others in relation to the principles of care. This
information was incorporated as a facet of the care
orientation. An example is shown in the following remarks
of one president:

> "He was the kind of kid that everybody loved. He
> cared about everybody, and he was my biggest fan."

Overall, these findings reaffirm Gilligan's recognition
of two moral orientations. Yet, this aspect of her theory
did not fully explain or seem to delineate the influence of
self in the moral reasoning process. The role of a concern
for self as a factor that shaped the moral reasoning pattern
of the individual and gave rise to a moral choice was evident
in this investigation. This finding, a self orientation,
represents a different, but not necessarily contradictory,
conclusion. The findings suggest a more explicit description
of how thoughts about the self influence the process of moral
reasoning.

Self

Kohlberg and Gilligan identified a role for self in their conceptualization of moral reasoning. From their viewpoint, the self is defined as "ego" with respect to levels of judgment embedded within the orientation of care and justice. Kohlberg (1984) discussed his view of self in relation to the three levels of moral reasoning:

> From this point of view, Level I is a preconventional person, for whom rules and social expectations are something external to the self; Level II is a conventional person, in whom the self is identified with or has internalized the rules and expectations of others, especially those of authorities; and Level III is a postconventional person, who had differentiated his or her self from the rules and expectations of others and defines his or her values in terms of self chosen principles. (p. 173)

Gilligan (1977) described a different developmental pattern that portrayed the self in the progression of moral judgments in relation to the care orientation:

> In the developmental sequence that follows, women's moral judgements proceed from an initial focus on the self at the first level to the discovery, in the transition to the second level, of the concept of responsibility as the basis for a new equilibrium between self and others. The elaboration of this concept of responsibility and its fusion with a maternal concept of morality, which seeks to ensure protection for the dependent and unequal, characterizes the second level of judgement. At this level the good is equated with the caring of others. However, when the conventions of feminine goodness legitimizes only others as the recipient of moral care, the logical inequality of self and other and the psychological violence that it engenders create disequilibrium that initiates the second transition. The

relationship between self and others is then
reconsidered in an effort to sort out the confusion
between conformity and care inherent in the
conventional definition of feminine goodness and
to establish a new equilibrium, which dissipates
the tension between selfishness and
responsibility. At the third level, the self
becomes the arbiter of an independent judgement
that now subsumes both convention and individual
need under the moral principle of nonviolence. (p.
492)

Gilligan's recognition of self as being embedded in the

orientations of care and justice is reflected in the

categories developed to distinguish between care and justice

considerations. Lyons (1983b) operationalized the

distinguishable properties of care and justice by devising a

coding scheme for the purpose of determining the care and

justice perspective. The coding scheme consisted of five

corresponding categories representative of care

considerations and justice considerations. The justice

categories included the following: (a) General effects to the

self; (b) Obligation, duty or commitments; (c) Standards,

rules or principle for self or society; or considerations of

fairness (that is, how one would like to be treated if in

another's place); (d) Primacy of the principle over the

situation; and (e) Consideration that others have their own

context. The care category includes these five categories:

(a) General effects to others; (b) Maintenance of restoration

of relationships or response to another considering

interdependence; (c) Welfare/well being of another, the

avoidance of conflict, or the alleviation of another's burden/hurt/suffering (physical or psychological; (d) Primacy of the situation over the principle; and (e) Care of self--care of self versus care of others (p. 144).

The recent works of Gilligan and Attanucci (1986) revealed an important change in the analysis of real life moral conflict data. These changes departed from the traditional use of the Lyons coding scheme in distinguishing between care and justice. The new format suggests that only two (categories b and c) of the five categories are applicable for determining justice and care orientations. In addition, Gilligan and Attanucci proposed that the remaining categories including Care of Self and General Effects to Self should serve to judge a person's level of development rather than serve as distinctive properties of the justice and care perspective.

The findings from this study strongly support the changes offered by Gilligan and Attanucci regarding the Lyons coding scheme when distinguishing between care and justice. However, an interesting aspect of these findings show that the categories related to self which were deleted because they were viewed as irrelevant to justice and care do in fact remain relevant to the moral reasoning process. Thus, the respondent's expressed concerns for self should not be dismissed as developmental only but should be seen as content traits of the reasoning process. When viewed in this manner,

a concern for self remains an integral part of the moral
reasoning process and should be given serious attention as a
perspective of equal importance. This then links morality
to an understanding of rules, relationships, and self since
the understanding of each informs moral choice. Blasi's
(1984) assumptions speak to the incorporation of self in
morality.

> "I assume it is impossible to understand moral
> quality--positive or negative--of an action
> without resorting to the agent's judgment, that
> moral judgments reflect the individual's general
> understanding of himself or herself, other people,
> social relations and situations, and that this
> understanding can and does change as a result of
> the development of one's intelligence and of richer
> and more complex experience with the social world.
> (p. 129)

Gilligan (1980) and Lyons (1983b) further addressed a
connection between self identity and morality. Lyons (1983b)
provided evidence that revealed that moral orientation is
related to self definition. "Individuals who characterized
themselves predominantly in connected terms more frequently
used considerations of response in constructing and resolving
real life conflicts; and individuals who characterized
themselves predominantly in separate/objective terms more
frequently used considerations of rights" (p. 141). Hence,
they have established that self-definition is related to the
manner in which one chooses an orientation. The data to
support these findings were obtained by Gilligan and Lyons

with such self description questions as: "How would you
describe yourself to yourself" and "Is the way you see
yourself now different from the way you saw yourself in the
past?"

The self statements which were evident in this
investigation were spontaneously expressed and embodied in
the text of the real life moral dilemma, as shared by the
interviewees. The concern for the self was viewed as a
separate type of judgment, distinguishable from the care and
justice orientation. The considerations for the self were
evident in the construction of the moral conflict as well as
in the resolution of the problem.

Keeping in mind that these self considerations existed
in the text of the interviews, the discovery of a third
orientation occurred. This has been defined as the self
orientation and reflects how people actually view themselves
in relation to the moral event. The distinguishable
characteristics of the self orientation are expressed as a
concern for the effect on self and a concern for self
understanding. The concern for effect on self was identified
as having two dimensions: (a) the effect on one's status or
achievement and (b) the effect on one's psychological and/or
physical health. Presidents acknowledged the existence of
these concerns as they spoke in relation to the moral
dilemma. For example:

"I just stopped at one point and took a close
look--a look in terms of what this could mean to
me and my job. My reputation could so effectively
be destroyed that it would be almost impossible for
me to get another job."

"I finally decided that, even though others didn't
seem to understand, I would put myself on the line
for him. Then I would be able to live with
myself."

In some cases, a point was reached where people stopped

focusing on a concern for the effect on self. They turned

inward then to appraise and to understand themselves in

relation to the total picture envisioned. Basically, the

expressed thoughts concerned the image held of themselves,

and their attitudes, feelings, and expectations; that is, how

they thought about themselves in relation to the moral

problem. In this context, people articulated views of a

valued self--one seen as the core of who they wanted to be

and what they wanted to call their own. This then became a

factor that influenced how the person arrived at a moral

choice.

"As I put things together, I knew that I must be
satisfied with my performance. I am an achiever,
and I always must do the very best I can. I also
have a strong sense of ethics and morality in
regard to my profession."

Often, for those who voiced this inner dialogue, a sense

of empowerment of the defined valued self then prevailed and

seemed to strongly influence the moral choice and subsequent

operationalizing of thoughts into action. This seems to

imply that the connection between thought and action lies in the empowerment of the self.

Although the self statements can be assessed to determine a level of moral development as defined by Kohlberg and Gilligan, they also must be recognized as a construct separate from the care and justice orientations. Such recognition seems necessary in that while the discussion about self seemed to be significant, it did not fit into the existing categories which distinguished care and justice. The formulation of a third major category was designed to give attention to one's thoughts of self in relation to the experience of the moment and to past experiences; thus capturing the moral reasoning process as it emerged from the point of view shared by the individuals. The different views of self may indicate a sequence of development, but should not be seen as merely developmental.

From the self perspective, that which constitutes a moral problem and considerations given toward resolution differ from those of the care and justice orientations. In the self orientation, self concerns emerge as the focal point. From this perspective, people seek to understand themselves in relation to the event that causes conflict and sometimes seek such understanding in relation to past life events. This appeared as an effort to respond to self in one's own terms.

Since the self statements in this investigation were heard as a perspective which served as part of the basis for a given moral choice, it is implied that the self orientation is clearly influential and plays a prominent role in the moral reasoning process. Therefore, this perspective is critical in a conceptual framework of moral development. Although the results are important, they are somewhat speculative at this time since a great deal more research would be needed.

Theoretically, this finding is important in that it supports Gilligan's identification of a care perspective in the moral reasoning process distinguishable from a justice orientation. In addition, the evidence leads to the speculation that a self orientation must also be included in the conception of morality. Thus two orientations of morality, as defined in the literature, may not be adequate to provide a complete conception of moral reasoning of all people across the life span. Therefore, there remains a primary need to explore and to conduct further investigations in relation to this expanded view of morality that incorporates a previously unexamined portion of theory; namely, a self orientation. Secondly, the practical application of this concept is the recognition of a concern for self as a valid perspective. Such recognition legitimizes consideration for oneself in one's own terms and allows for an acceptance of responsibility to self.

2. <u>Do the identifiable moral reasoning processes used by</u>
   <u>community college presidents to resolve moral conflicts</u>
   <u>form a dominant or prevailing pattern</u>?

The evidence of multiple perspectives in the moral
reasoning process leads to the need not only to examine the
ways in which orientations were used by the interviewees but
also, to determine whether patterns in orientation use
prevailed. As would be expected with any complex phenomenon,
the use of the various orientations in moral reasoning was
an intricate process employed to resolve the uncertainty
faced during moral conflict. The orientations of care,
justice, and self were used by all members of the sample and
were often intricately interwoven. However, all orientations
were not necessarily revealed in all the dilemmas discussed
by an individual. From the analysis of the interview text
obtained in this study, orientation patterns in moral
reasoning were evident. These patterns included: (a) A
single focus of Care or Justice or Self; (b) A dual focus of
Care and Justice; (c) A dual focus of Justice and Self or Care
and Self; and (d) A multiple focus of Care and Justice and
Self. These patterns as they are linked to the moral
reasoning process are illustrated in Figure 4.

Employed by some people, the single focus pattern of
care or self emerged as a pattern in which primary attention
was given to only one orientation as people described and
resolved a moral dilemma. This definition is similar to the

Moral
Orientation

Moral Orientation
Patterns

```
┌──────────┐           ┌───────────────────────────────┐
│          │           │                               │
│  Care    │───────────│  Single Focus                 │
│          │           │  (C or J or S)                │
└──────────┘           │                               │
                       │          OR                   │           ┌──────────┐
┌──────────┐           │                               │           │          │
│          │           │                               │───────────│  Moral   │
│  Self    │───────────│  Dual Focus                   │           │  Choice  │
│          │           │  (C/J or C/S or J/S)          │           │          │
└──────────┘           │                               │           └──────────┘
                       │          OR                   │
┌──────────┐           │                               │
│          │           │                               │
│  Justice │───────────│  Multiple Focus               │
│          │           │  (C/J/S)                      │
└──────────┘           │                               │
                       └───────────────────────────────┘
```

Figure 4. Interactions of orientations in moral choice.

one offered by Gilligan (1986): "A dilemma consisting of 75 percent or more care or justice consideration is labelled Care Focus or Justice Focus" (p. 14).

The dual focus of Care/Justice was a second pattern identified. A dilemma that included careful analysis of both care and justice, but excluded self considerations, is considered to represent this category. Here, people weighed and attended to the intricate considerations of the two orientations simultaneously rather than choosing one orientation over the other. This finding also corroborates the findings of Gilligan.

Another dual focus pattern was exemplified when the self orientation emerged in one's thinking, and aligned with either the Care or the Justice orientations. This pattern is designated as Justice/Self or Care/Self.

A third pattern was revealed when Care, Justice, and Self each were given substantial attention in the reasoning process. This pattern was called Multiple Focus. Here, individuals weighed and considered the intricate components of all three perspectives simultaneously, and a sense of self, care, and justice became interwoven and overlapped in the process.

In general, the relative importance and meaning an individual assigns to his or her sense of care, justice, and self appear to result in the organization of a reasoning

pattern that facilitates and informs a given moral choice.
The crystalized choice then leads to action.

This finding supports the work of Johnston (1985) who
found that adolescent males and females understand and can
use both orientations of care and justice when probed for
alternative ways to solve a moral problem. This research
suggests that adult males and females spontaneously know and
use three perspectives when addressing a real life moral
conflict. Moreover, different people view and solve moral
problems in different ways that are informed by their
perspective. These different reasoning patterns are not to
be judged as "better" or "worse." Rather, they must be
viewed as providing another way to arrive at moral decisions.
Thus, it is important to realize that since there is more
than one way to think about moral problems, other
perspectives are valid and must not be dismissed from theory
or viewed as invalid by practitioners in the psychological
or educational fields. This provides a more comprehensive
understanding of moral reasoning that reaches beyond the
tradition of the discipline.

3.   What changes occur in moral reasoning of the community
     college president by gender?

Gilligan brought to the fore that there existed a need
for new conceptions of morality that would address the
development of women and the relationship of gender to the
systems of moral reasoning. In keeping with this thinking,

the issue of gender as it relates to orientation
understanding and use was closely examined and investigated.
This was done to understand the development of both men and
women to gain equitable knowledge about human behavior.

Gender differences in moral reasoning have been highly
debated over the past decade without consensus. Kohlberg
contends that gender differences do not exist, while
Gilligan's position reflects gender differences in moral
orientation use. She found the Justice Orientation
predominated in males, while the Orientation of Care was
prevalent in females.

Findings from this research did not reveal differences
in individual moral orientations used by the males and
females. There was evidence of substantial use of each
orientation in an overlapping fashion.

Specifically, the Justice Orientation was apparent and
applied by both men and women. Females did use the Care
Orientation somewhat more often than did males, while men
used the Self Orientation slightly more frequently than did
women. Table 4 reflects the moral orientation use by gender.

However, upon a more detailed analysis, an intriguing
aspect arose which revealed differences in the moral
reasoning patterns used by the men and women in the various
dilemmas they presented. In other words, the manner in which
orientations aligned with one another differed for males and

Table 4

Percentage of Moral Orientation Use by Gender

	Justice	Care	Self
Female	43%	30%	26%
Male	46%	18%	35%

females. Patterns of orientation use by gender is reflected in Table 5 and Table 6.

Throughout all the dilemmas presented by males, the Justice Orientation was used in a Single Focus, Dual Focus, or Multiple Focus pattern. The Single Focus of Justice was used only twice. Therefore, men tended to align the Justice Orientation with the Self Orientation (J/S) or to integrate it with Care and Self to form the Multiple Focus (J/C/S).

Conversely, although all but one woman used the Justice Orientation, all the females but one tended to use Justice as a component of the Dual Focus of Justice/Care and Justice/Self or integrate it as part of the Multiple Focus of Justice/Care/Self.

The Care Orientation was used by all the males except one, but it was found in only about half the dilemmas presented. The use of the Care Orientation by the men was almost exclusively evident as a component of the Multiple Focus.

In contrast, women tended to use the Care Orientation when it was aligned with the Justice Orientation and when it was part of the Multiple Focus. The Care Orientation could be found in the thinking of all but one of the women interviewed, and it was apparent throughout the dilemmas.

The Self Orientation was often aligned with Justice or was part of the Multiple Focus for both men and women. All

Table 5

Pattern Trends of Orientation Use by Gender

Orientation	Gender	
	Females	Males
Justice	J/C J/S J/C/S	J J/S J/C/S
Care	J/C J/C/S	J/C/S
Self	J/S J/C/S	J/S J/C/S

Key: J = Justice
      C = Care
      S = Self

Table 6

Orientation Pattern Use by Gender

Orientation Pattern	Females	Males
J	0%	15%
J/S	28%	47%
J/C	39%	0%
J/C/S	33%	37%

Key: J = Justice
      C = Care
      S = Self

of the men and the majority of the women used the Self
Orientation in the moral reasoning process.

Thus, the structure of thought which prevails in the
moral reasoning process of the male participants centered on
the Self as it aligned with the application of principles of
fairness to opposing claims. The responsibility to others
emerged when in concern with the Justice and Self
Orientations, hereby forming the Multiple Focus pattern of
orientation use.

Conversely, a great deal more diversity of orientation
pattern use could be seen among the responses of women. Most
female participants' pattern of thinking centered on a
responsibility and care of others as it relates to principles
of fairness. The predominant use of a concern for self
emerged as part of the Multiple Focus with Justice and Care.
However, one woman did reflect a Justice/Self perspective,
and, in one of the dilemmas discussed, a Care/Self
perspective was evident.

Once again, these findings concur with Gilligan's
research. They reveal that the moral reasoning process for
women may indeed be different from, but not inferior to,
their male counterparts. The contribution of this finding
is to provide information and answer questions that will
facilitate the understanding of the various perspectives in
the moral reasoning process. In so doing, the thinking of
all individuals--males and females--is granted a degree of

worth. Moreover, serious consideration can be given to the needs and conflicts which may be evident for people as they grow and develop into mature individuals. Understanding and explaining the thinking of women, as well as men, may help to eliminate the subordination of women.

4. <u>What changes occur in moral reasoning when the content of the real life dilemma varies from a personal to a professional dilemma</u>?

Since people face moral dilemmas in both their personal and professional lives, it appeared logical to examine the phenomena of orientation use in these two different situations. This study's interview questions were designed to illuminate the reasoning process utilized in real life moral dilemmas as it applied to the same person's professional and personal life. Examination of the data gathered from the community college presidents indicated that the use of the moral orientations and the moral reasoning pattern which evolved was similar for people in both professional and personal dilemmas. Although rarely used, the single focused pattern was confined to professional dilemmas.

Although most of the people interviewed did not confine themselves to the use of one moral reasoning pattern, the majority did seem to prefer one specific pattern as they reasoned about a moral problem. In other words, if an individual used the same pattern in more than 50 percent of

the dilemmas they discussed, a preferred pattern was said to have been established. The use of the preferred pattern by the individual was reflected in both personal and professional conflicts. Therefore, it appears to be clearly indicated that in this study, people seemed to reason about real life moral problems in much the same manner regardless of type of conflict. Providing the moral conflict was a real life dilemma, the nature of the situation did not tend to impact the use of a preferred moral orientation.

CHAPTER VI

Summary and Recommendations

Overview of the Study

At a time when the moral issues facing American society appear to be of greater magnitude than ever before, there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of the moral reasoning process. This renewed interest has prompted important advances in the research of morality. While Kohlberg's theoretical framework of moral development based solely in logical reasoning about rights, justice, and reciprocity remains the most widely accepted explanation of moral reasoning, new ground has been broken recently by Gilligan. Concerned about the awkward position of women in moral development theories, she launched investigations into moral reasoning to challenge Kohlberg's claim of universality; that is, that no differences exist between men and women in the basis of their moral reasoning. By including two orientations to moral problem solving, Gilligan's work provided evidence for a broader conception of morality than did Kohlberg's. While she discovered evidence of the justice orientation that Kohlberg claimed to be universal, she also found a care orientation particularly evident in her female subjects.

Findings such as those of Gilligan have expanded boundaries of research in moral development by raising

questions about several issues in the moral reasoning process. This study was designed to investigate some of those issues by examining the processes of moral dilemma definition and resolution used by community college presidents. Presidents of colleges were believed to be in a particularly sensitive role regarding both the frequency of handling moral dilemmas and the importance of the consequences of their decisions.

The primary interest of this study lay in dilemma definition and processes employed to understand and to resolve a moral conflict; thus, it was believed that a naturalistic approach was most applicable. Interviewing 16 community college presidents, the researcher used a semi-structured protocol which included the asking of leading but open-ended questions. Such questions were designed to allow the participants to describe, from their point of view, a moral dilemma that was either personal or professional in nature. The conflict they formulated served as the basis of further inquiry into the thoughts and ideas processed when attempting to come to a resolution. The verbal responses and descriptions gathered in individual interviews were recorded, transcribed, and subjected to the systematic analysis procedure suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967).

Summary of Major Findings

Unlike either Kohlberg or Gilligan, three orientations to moral reasoning were discovered in this study. Neither Kohlberg's singular view of morality based on principles of justice nor Gilligan's view based on dual concerns of justice and care offered a complete explanation of the findings. A self orientation emerged in this research as a third possible view in the moral reasoning process.

There is, perhaps, insufficient evidence to claim that the self orientation operates discretely from the justice and care orientations. Rather, it tends to align with one or both of the other orientations. Indeed, patterns of orientation to moral decision making were evident in this research, and the presence of these combinations of orientations may offer the best explanation of the moral reasoning of the subjects in this study. Although confined to speculation at this time, further research in relation to multiple perspectives and patterns of orientation use appears warranted.

A third major finding of this research adds support to earlier findings of Gilligan--some gender differences were evident in the dilemma resolution processes employed by community college presidents. Both females and males in this study used all three orientations; however, how the orientations were used seemed to vary. It was found that the

relative importance an individual assigned to the orientations resulted in a moral reasoning pattern which informed a given moral choice. It was in the moral reasoning patterns used by men and women that differences were noted. This finding furthers the understanding of gender differences in moral reasoning.

Finally, this study revealed no differences in a person's preferred moral orientation pattern when solving a real life moral conflict from one's personal life, versus one from professional life. Presidents tended to be consistent in the use of a preferred moral orientation pattern, regardless of the nature of the conflict. Thus, the situation does not seem to influence the moral orientation pattern one chooses to use in arriving at a moral choice. However, it should be noted that these situations may have been qualitatively different from the abortion conflicts initially studied by Gilligan and the hypothetical Heinz dilemma presented by Kohlberg.

Theoretical Implications

The intention of this study was to further explore the concept of morality in order to provide insight into psychological theory about moral development that would include both men and women. This research makes a contribution to the literature of moral development in relation to moral orientation and to the pattern of

orientation use as a function of gender rather than as a function of the nature of the dilemma.

The implications for the existence of a third orientation, the self orientation, may be the most obvious, but despite the strides made in the study of moral development, the intricately interwoven threads have not been fully untangled. Concerns for self as a separate, yet companion orientation to moral reasoning should be viewed as more than an undercurrent developmental process as described by both Kohlberg and Gilligan. The recognition of a distinctive self orientation validates a concern for self as legitimate and normal. This will be of importance for women especially. Women often have been made to feel that making decisions based on concerns for self is unfeminine, since a dedication of their lives to the development of others is the historically mistaken standard.

The claim of universality in how people think is challenged by findings of this study. Admittedly, it was true that no differences were found in the content of dilemmas across gender of subjects, however, differences were noted in the ways conflicts were defined and in the manner of resolving them. The conclusion that orientation to moral problem solving varies by gender and appears not to be a function of the nature of the dilemma seems justified by evidence presented earlier. This implies that moral orientations do exist and that variations in patterns of

orientation use appear related to gender and do not appear to be related to situations. Thus, a full explanation of moral reasoning may be incomplete without taking into account important differences in the perspectives taken by men and women. The most potent explanation may be embedded in the patterns of orientation previously discussed, rather than in the range of separate orientations.

It would appear possible for an analytical reader of Gilligan to arrive at a judgment that her work has focused on the discovery of the care orientation and its discernible properties, but has seemingly neglected to explain the importance of this second orientation and how it interacts with the justice orientation. This study does, in fact, make some contribution to this very point. Support for a care and justice orientation and a modest claim for a third orientation is provided. In addition, the crucial significance of the research conclusions lie in the patterns of orientation use. The interactions of the orientations reflect patterns of moral decision making and the ways in which these orientations are integrated may serve as a basis to describe the mature personalities of both men and women.

Recommendations for Further Research

Although these findings are restricted to a specific group of people, the results certainly give rise to several important issues. First, the continued need for exploratory

research methods in the investigation of moral development seems justified by the emerging nature of theory. This should be investigated with other subgroups across the life span and in other settings. Such an approach could provide a more detailed understanding of the nature of the orientations in moral reasoning and moral development. Further studies should continue to include female and male subjects.

Moreover, the findings of this study suggest that future research should address the developmental nature of the self orientation. Of major concern in such an investigation should be how any developmental process of the self may be linked to existing knowledge related to identity and ego development.

Finally, further investigations into perspectives or orientations in moral reasoning should explore patterns or interactions of orientation use. Questions regarding how these orientations align with one another throughout the development process should continue to be explored.

References

Attanucci, J. S. (1984). <u>Mothers in their own terms: A development perspective on self and role</u>. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Baker, Miller, J. (1976). <u>Toward a new psychology of women</u>. Boston: Beacon.

Beard, R. M. (1969). <u>Piaget's developmental psychology</u>. New York: Basic.

Belenky, M. F., Clinchy, B. M., Goldberger, N., & Tarule, J. M. (1985). Epistemological development and the politics of talk in family life. <u>Journal of Education, 167</u>(3), 9-45.

Belenky, M., McVicker, Clinchy B., Rule Goldberge, N., & Tarule, J. M. (1986). <u>Women's ways of knowing</u>. New York: Basic.

Berkowitz, M., & Oser, F. (Eds.). (1985). <u>Moral education: Theory and application</u>. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Association.

Blasi, A. (1984). Moral identity: It's role in moral functioning. In W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz. (Eds.). <u>Moral behavior and moral development</u>. New York: John Wiley.

Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the literature. <u>Psychological Bulletin, 88</u>(1), 1-45.

Blum, L. (1980). Friendship, alturism and morality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Boyce, W. D., & Jensen, L. C. (1978). Moral reasoning. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.

Bowles, G., & Duelli Klein, R. (1983). Theories of women's studies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Chodorow, N. (1978). The reproduction of mothering. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Chodorow, N. (1974). Family structure and feminine personality. In M. Z. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere (Eds.), Women, culture, and society (pp. 43-46). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Chodorow, N. (1980). Gender, relation, and difference in psychoanalytic perspectives. In H. Eisenstein & A. Jardin (Eds.)., The future of difference (pp. 3-19). Boston: G. K. Hall.

Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1981). Invariant sequence and internal consistency in moral judgment stages. (Report No. 50 014 384). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 223 514)

Costello, T. W., Zalkind, S. S. (1963). Psychology in administration. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Darkenwald, G. G. (1980). Field research and grounded theory. In H. B. Long, Heimstra, R., & Associates (Eds.), Changing approaches to studying adult education (pp. 63-77). San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Dewey, J. (1959). <u>Moral principal in education</u>. New York: Philosophical Library.

Dewey, J., & Tufts, J. H. (1932). <u>Ethics</u>. New York: Holt.

DePalma, D., & Foley, J. (1975). <u>Moral development: Current theory and research</u>. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Association.

Eisenstein, H. (1983). <u>Contemporary feminist thought</u>. Boston: G. K. Hall.

Erikson, E. H. (1968). <u>Identity youth and crisis</u>. New York: W. W. Norton.

Erickson, F. (1986). Qualitative methods in research on teaching. In M. C. Wittrock (Ed.)., <u>Handbook of reseach on teaching</u> (pp. 119-161). New York: Macmillan.

Faherty, J. R. (1979). <u>Moral judgment and the cognitive developmental approach to socialization</u>. (Report No. PS 011 709). (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 191 599)

Friedman, M. (1985). Abraham, Socrates, and Heinz: Where are the women? In C. Harding (Ed.)., <u>Moral dilemmas</u> (pp. 25-41). Chicago: Precedent.

Freud, S. (1961). Some physical consequences to the anatomical distinction between the sexes. In J. Strachey (Ed.)., <u>The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud</u> (Vol. 19). London: Hogarth, (Originally published, 1925).

Gibbs, J. C. (1977). Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment:
A constructive critique. Havard Educational Review,
47(1), 43-61.

Gilligan, C. (1985, January). Exit-voice dilemmas in
adolescent development. Manuscript submitted for
publication.

Gilligan, C. (1984). Marital dialogues. In V. Rodgers
(Ed.)., Adult development through relationships (pp.
28-39). New York: Praeger.

Gilligan, C. (1984). Moral development. In A.W. Chickering
& Association, The modern American college, (pp. 139-157).

Gilligan, C. (1984). The conquistador and the dark
continent: Reflections on the psychology of love.
Daedalus, 113(3), 75-95.

Gilligan C. (1983, July). Female development in
adolescence: Implications for theory. Paper presented
for the Symposium on Gender Conceptions and Developmental
Theory International Society for the Study of Behavioral
Development. Munich, West Germany. (pp. 139-157). San
Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Gilligan, C. (1983). Do changes in women's rights change
women's moral judgments? In Horner, M., Nadelson, C. C.,
& Notman, M. T., The challenge of change (pp. 39-60). New
York: Plenum.

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gilligan, C. (1982). New maps of development: New visions of maturity. American Journal of Orthopsychiat, 52(2), 199-212.

Gilligan, C. (1977). In a difference voice: Women's conception of self and of morality. Harvard Educational Review, 47(4), 481-516.

Gilligan, C., & Attanucci, J. (1986). Two moral orientations. Unpublished manuscript. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Gilligan, C., & Murphy, J. M. (1979). Development from adolescence to adulthood: The philosopher and the dilemma of the fact. In D. Kuhn (Ed.), Intellectual development beyond childhood. New Directions for Child Development, No. 5. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Gilligan, C., Langdale, S., Murphy, M., & Lyons, N. (1982). The contribution of women's thought to developmental theory: The elimination of sex bias in moral development research and education. (Report No. CG 016 494). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 226 301)

Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research. New York: Aldine.

Glaser, B. G. (1978). Theoretical sensitivity. Mill

Valley, CA: The Sociology Press.

Greeno, C. G., & Maccoby, E. E. (1984). How different is

the "different voice": Manuscript submitted for

publication.

Guba, E., & Lincoln, Y. (1985). Effective evaluation. San

Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Hall, C. S. (1954). A primer of Freudian psychology. New

York: New American Library.

Haan, N. (1978). Two moralities in action contexts:

Relationships to thought, ego recognition, and

development. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology,

36, 286-305.

Haan, N., Brewster Smith, M., & Block, J. (1968). Moral

reasoning of young adults: Political-social behavior,

family background, & personality correlates. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 10(3), 183-201.

Harnish, D. (1983). Continuing job involvement of long term

community college faculty members. Unpublished doctoral

dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State

University, Blacksburg, VA.

Harris, S., Mussen, P., & Rutherford, E. (1976). Some

cognitive, behavioral, and personality correlates of

maturity of moral judgment. The Journal of Genetic

Psychology, 128, 123-135.

Hoffman, M. L. (1970). Moral development. In P. H. Mussen
    (Ed.), Manual of child psychology (pp. 261-360). New York:
    Wiley.

Holstein, C. B. (1976). Irreversible, stepwise sequence in
    the development of moral judgment: Longtudinal study of
    males and females. Child Development, 47, 51-61.

Johnston, D. K. (1985). Two moral orientations--two problem
    solving strategies: Adolescents' solutions to dilemmas in
    fables. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Cambridge,
    MA: Harvard University.

Kant, I. (1949). Fundamental principles of metaphysics of
    morals. New York: Liberal Arts Press.

Kerber, L. K. (1984). Some cautionary words for
    historians. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Kohlberg, L. (1966). A cognitive developmental analysis of
    children's sex role concepts and attitudes. In E. Maccoby
    (Ed.), The development of sex role differences, (pp.
    82-173). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage & sequence: The cognitive
    developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin
    (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research.
    Chicago: Rand McNally.

Kohlberg, L., & Kramer, R. (1969). Continuities and
    discontinuities in childhood and adult moral development.
    Human Development, 12, 93-120.

Kohlberg, L. (1970). Education for justice. In Sizer, N. F. & Sizer, T. R. (Eds.), Moral education: Five lectures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1973). The child as a moral philospher. In H. Kirschenbaum & S. B. Simon (Eds.), Readings in value clarifications. Minneapolis: Winston.

Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Kohlberg, L., & Gilligan, C. (1971). The adolescent as a philospher: The discovery of the self in a postconventional world. Daedalus, 100, 1051-1086.

Kurtines, W. M., & Gewirtz, J. L. (1984). Morality, moral behavior, and moral development. New York: Wiley.

Kupperman, J. (1983). The foundations of morality. Boston: George Allen & University Press.

Langdale, S. (1983). Moral observations and moral development: The analysis of care and justice reasoning across different dilemmas in females and males from childhood through adulthood. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Levinson, D. (1978). The season's of a man's life. New York: Ballantine.

Levinson, D. (1986). A conception of adult development. American Psychologist, 41(1), 3-13.

Lickona, T. (Ed.). (1976). <u>Moral development and behavior:</u>
<u>Theory, research, and social issues</u>. New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston.

Loevinger, J. (1976). <u>Ego development</u>. San Francisco:
Jossey Bass.

Loevinger, J., & Knoll, E. (1983). Personality: Stages,
traits, and the elf. <u>Annual Reviews, 34</u>, 195-222.

Luria, Z. (1984). Manuscript submitted for publication.

Lyons, N. (1983a). <u>Research handbook</u>. Unpublished
manuscript, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Lyons, N. (1983b). Two perspectives: On self,
relationships, and morality. <u>Harvard Educational Review,</u>
<u>53</u>, 125-145.

Lyons, N. (1985). <u>Paradoxes: Connecting ideas about the</u>
<u>"self" to ideas about "morality" in moral psychology and</u>
<u>moral philosphy</u>. Unpublished manuscript, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA.

Mahan, E.D. (1978). <u>Organization, leadership, and program</u>
<u>change in community colleges</u>. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation. University of California, Berkeley.

McBee, S. (1985, December 9). Morality. <u>U.S. News & World</u>
<u>Report</u>, pp. 52-58.

McCall, G. J., & Simmons, J. L. (1978). <u>Identities and</u>
<u>Interactions</u>. New York: The Free Press.

McVicker, Clinchy, B., Belenky, M. F., Goldberger, N., & Turule, J. M. (1985). Connected education for women. Journal of Education, 167(3), 28-45.

Miller, J. B. (1976). Toward a new psychology of women. Boston: Beacon Press.

Mishler, E. G. (1979). Meaning in context: Is there any other kind? Harvard Educational Review, 49, 1-19.

Morrill, R. L. (1980). Teaching values in college. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Murdoch, I. (1970). The sovereignty of good. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Murphy, J. M., & Gilligan, C. (1980). Moral development in late adolescence and adulthood. Human Development, 23, 77-104.

Neblett, W. (1981). The role of feelings in morals. Washington, DC.: University Press of America, Inc.

Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Oakes, R., & Quina, K. (1983). The impact of gender and role perspective on moral judgment. (Report No. PS 013 920) (ERIC Document Reproduction Service No. ED 235 908)

O'Connor, M. O. (1982). Sex and leadership differences in moral perspective, field dependence, and moral judgment. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Boston College, Boston, MA.

Patton, M. Q. (1980). Qualitative evaluation methods. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Peters, R. S. (1971). Moral developments: A plea for pluralism. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology (pp. 237-266). New York: Academic Press.

Peters, R. S. (1974). Psychology & ethical development. London: Allen & Uniwin.

Peters, R. S. (1978). Ethics and education. London: Allen & Uniwin.

Piaget, J. (1965). The moral judgment of the child. New York: Macmillan.

Plato. (1970). The republic of Plato (A. Bloom, Trans.). New York: Basic Books.

Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Pratt, M. W., & Royer, J. M. (1982). When rights and responsibilities don't mix: Sex and sex-role patterns in moral judgment orientation. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 14(3), 190-204.

Pratt, M. W., Golding, G., & Hunter, W. J. (1984). Does morality have a gender? Sex, sex role, and moral judgment relationships across the adult lifespan. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 30(4), 321-340.

Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Reimer, J., Paolitto, D. P., & Hersh, R. H. (1983).
Promoting moral growth from Piaget to Kohlberg (2nd Ed.).
New York: Longman.

Rest, J. R. (1979). Development in judging moral issues.
Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.

Rodgers, R. F. (1980). Theories underlying student
development. In D.G. Creamer (Ed.), Student development
in higher education (pp. 10-95). Alexandria, VA: ACPA
Media.

Rosaldo, M. Z., & Lamphere, L. (1974). Women, culture and
society. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Rubin, L. B. (1983). Intimate strangers. New York: Harper
Colophon Books.

Sassen, G. (1980). Success anxiety in women: A
constructivist interpretation of its source and its
significance. Harvard Educational Review, 50(1), 13-23.

Schatzman, L., & Strauss, A. (1973). Field research:
Strategies for a natural sociology. Englewood, Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.

Sherif, C. W. (1983). Needed concepts in the study of gender
identity. Psychology of Women's Quarterly, 6(4), 375-398.

Simpson, E. (1974). Moral development research: A case of
scientific cultural bias. Human Development, 17, 81-106.

Sullivan, E. (1975). Moral learning. New York: Paulist
Press.

Sullivan, E. (1977a). <u>Kohlberg's structuralism: A critical appraisal</u>. Ontario: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education.

Sullivan, E. (1977b). A study of Kohlberg's structural theory of moral development: A critique of liberal science ideology. <u>Human Development</u>, <u>20</u>, 352-376.

Van Herik, J. (1982). <u>Freud on femininity and faith</u>. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Wadsworth, B. J. (1971). <u>Piaget's theory of congitive development</u>. New York: David McKay.

Walker, L. (1984). Sex differences in the development of moral reasoning: A critical review. <u>Child Development</u>, <u>55</u>, 677-691. (pp. 677-691).

Walker, L. (1986). <u>Moral reasoning in personal and hypothetical dilemmas</u>. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association. Washington, D.C.

Weinreich-Haste, H. E., & Locke, D. (Ed.). (1983). <u>Morality in the making</u>. New York: Wiley.

Wilmoth, G. H., McFarland, S. G., & O'Connor, J. (1980). Moral Reasoning. In R. H. Woody (Ed.), <u>Encyclopedia of clinical assessment</u> (pp. 375-389). San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Wolfe, E.C. (1982). <u>Sex-role and moral judgment: A comparison of development in adult professional women</u>. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Boston University, Boston, MA.

Ylvisaker, P. M. (1983). Ethical problems in higher

    education. <u>AGB Reports</u>, <u>25</u>(1), 28-35.

APPENDIX A

Consent Letter

I am conducting research in the area of adult moral development for my doctoral dissertation. I am specifically interested in the reasoning employed by Community College presidents when they are faced with a moral problem. Your willingness to share your thoughts and experiences will be most helpful.

To conduct this study it is necessary to obtain your consent. Your signature below will indicate your willingness to complete a biographical information sheet and to being interviewed by the researcher in an audio taped interview session.

The information you share will be held in strictest confidence, and your anonymity will be maintained. If at any time you choose to do so, you may terminate the interview or withdraw from the study.

Thank you for your cooperation and support. Your willingness to participate is greatly appreciated.

Rosemary B. Mennuti
Doctoral Candidate
Virginia Tech

Date _____

Signature_____

APPENDIX B

Interview Format

Typical Introductory Interview Remarks

The purpose of this interview is to attempt to understand how college Presidents solve problems which they have identified as moral conflicts. During this interview I would like to find out as much as I can about how you think about moral problems.

I will be asking you several questions that are designed to help me understand what you view as a moral conflict and how you resolve such an issue. There are many ways to solve problems, hence, there are no right or wrong answers to these questions. My interest is in understanding how you think about moral dilemmas rather than the actual solution you employ.

The questions I ask may at times appear repetitive. However, in order to insure that I understand the conflict as you see it and understand your decision making process, I may need you to repeat your thinking or to tell me why you said what you did.

First, I will ask you to discuss a specific experience which you considered moral conflict and how you thought through the resolution of the problem. Next, I will ask you to discuss any other situations you have faced that constituted a moral dilemma. Finally, I will need to have you complete a brief biographical information sheet.

What we discuss here today will be strictly confidential. The transcriptions of the interview will be given a number to protect your identity. The session will be taped merely to help me remember our discussion without having to take notes.

Please don't hesitate to ask questions at any time throughout the interview. If at any time you feel uncomfortable for any reason, please let me know.

Do you have questions you might want to pursue before we begin?

Typical Interview Questions

1. Would it be correct to assume that in your experiences you have come across a real dilemma or conflict? Have any been what you would call a moral conflict?

2. What constitutes a moral conflict for you?

3. Could you tell me about a specific situation you have faced that is still clear in your mind?

4. What was the conflict for you in that situation?

5. What did you think about or consider when trying to come to a decision about what to do? Anything else? Anything else?

6. What did you decide to do?

7. What happened as a result of that decision?

8. What do you think about the decision you made?

9. Can you think of another situation you have faced that is still clear in your mind? (Repeat questions #4 - #8) (Continue to ask the person to give accounts of as many situations as they are capable of recalling.)

10. In general, are they any other things that I haven't asked about that you think I should also know in order to understand how you solve moral problems?

APPENDIX C

Biographical Information

1. Job title: _____

2. Sex: _____

3. Age:_____

4. Mother's occupation:_____

   Father's occupation:_____

5. Undergraduate degree:_____

6. Highest educational level:_____

7. Number of years working as a college president:_____

8. Number of years in your present position:_____

The vita has been removed from
the scanned document