Bordering the Mediterranean: Liminality and Regioncraft at the “Center of the World”

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In this dissertation, I theorize that “the Mediterranean,” broadly conceived of as a geo-cultural-political entity and experience, is a locality for the investigation into the processes through which representations of continents and civilizations come into focus. A fundamental argument in this dissertation is that borders (like the Mediterranean) do not represent the limits to territorially fixed entities, but are rather continually ongoing projects that come to be negotiated and reified through political practices that are focused, in this instance, on asserting where the “outside” of “Europe” begins. The arguments of this dissertation are twofold. First, the Mediterranean is theorized as a fluid and porous space. Secondly, and more importantly, the Mediterranean is a key site for an investigation into the (re)production of politically and culturally saturated discourses of belonging and otherness. Thus, this project takes into focus three distinct, yet inextricably interrelated, processes of the “borderization” of the Mediterranean. These processes work to maintain the space as a global axis of sorts, upon which academic and popular discussions and representations of the “East” versus the “West” or the “North” versus the “South” emerge. It is an underlying argument of this study that links the examples of the Barcelona Process, discussions of a “migration crisis,” and Turkey’s accession to the EU as processes of borderization of the European Union. While they are often analyzed as separate phenomena, all are indicative of these spatial and temporal borders represented by “the Mediterranean,” seen together they have the capability of highlighting the interconnectedness of the varying threads of “Mediterraneanism.” To understand how categories like “European,” “Asian,” or “African” come to have such salient political suggestiveness and meaning, one must bring into question how the borders that divide these imagined spaces are complex sites of the convergence of practices and discourses acquire their fortitude and who gets to tell the stories that outline their parameters.
Dedication

In memory of my father, Nicholas, who has never stopped inspiring me.
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Introduction

There is the Mediterranean, the sea itself, not so much as a frontier or barrier between the North and the South, or the East and the West, as an intricate site of encounters and currents (Chambers 2008, 32).

Immense though the Mediterranean was if measured by the traveling speeds of the past, it has never been confined inside its own history (Braudel 2001, 15).

I came about the idea for this project during a curious encounter in southwestern Turkey. Having long been influenced by the work of Edward Said, each visit to Turkey leaves me acutely aware that the specter of “the Orient” is very much present and real in the eastern Mediterranean. During one particular trip in Kaş, Turkey, I took a ferry to the Greek island of Kastelorizo, less than a mile from the shore of Kaş. I was struck by the fact that the “international” portion of the port was physically divided with barbed wire from the rest of Kaş, and although Turks were allowed to work on the ferry, they could not, without a visa, undock on the other side. Covering a distance that many could easily swim, the ferry stopped, changed flags, and continued on to Greece.

While on the edge of the port in Kastelorizo, an island with only 500 permanent residents, I was greeted by a member of the Greek coast guard, who, very matter-of-factly, greeted me in Greek: “Welcome to Europe.” Although the island is four hours from its closest Greek neighbor, and is unable to produce any of its own agricultural supplies, trade with Turkey is explicitly prohibited. Instead, a barge makes a weekly journey from Rhodes (the nearest Greek island), bringing supplies to the residents of the island.

Yet, it was not the isolation of the island, or the frosty relations between Greece and Turkey, that struck a chord of curiosity in me. I became intrigued, instead, by the words of the
coast guard member: “Welcome to Europe.” I realized at that moment that what in practice seemed like a silly and arbitrary division in the middle of a straight of water had, in reality, a direct impact on the lives of Greeks and Turks on either shore. The notion of the “limits of Europe,” which are in this case seemingly geographically arbitrary, has very real consequences.

I began to think about the fact that although western Turkey is technically, by most accounts, “in Europe,” the practices between Kastellorizo and Kas demonstrate the subjective nature of these geo-political categorizations of Europe and Asia. The Mediterranean quite literally bridges these concepts of “Europe” and “Asia,” as both Greece and Turkey, although seen as different continents, remain part of “the Mediterranean.” I began, then, to think about other similar divisions and bridges formed by this historical concept of “the Mediterranean.” I was experiencing, in that particular space, a fluidity and hybridity of the region that ultimately defies the overwhelming amount of energy placed into erecting and maintaining the experience of differentiation between Europe and Asia.

R.B.J. Walker has suggested that international borders can best be understood as complex sites where one can witness “moments of political engagement” (Walker 2010, 6). Political borders are then not merely lines drawn in the sand. Borders, instead, take significant amounts of energy not just to put into place, but also to maintain and uphold. Borders are injected with meaning not simply because of what they represent, namely the designation of the “international,” but also because of their function, they are more than lines that separate “here” from “there.” Moreover, as George Lakoff notes, the processes of border making seek to fill borderless spaces, as “even where there is no natural physical boundary that can be viewed as defining a container, we impose boundaries—marking off territory so that it has an inside and a bounding surface—whether a wall, a fence, or an abstract line or plane” (Lakoff 2003, 29).
As I experienced on that brief but striking ferry ride between “Europe” and “Asia,” perhaps one of the most significant historic geographical border-spaces is the Mediterranean Sea, which has been at the center of narratives about trade, war, and human “civilization” for millennia. The father of history, Herodotus, traveled the Eastern Mediterranean when writing his *Histories*, cataloguing the state of war and peace in the region. Herodotus’ *Histories* is an investigation into the struggle and dynamism between “The East” and “The West” (Herodotus 2007). For the Greek historian, “The East,” signified by the Persian Empire, was representative of war, tyranny, and oppression. He contrasted this to “The West” of the Greek city-states, which signified freedom and “civilization.” Thus, as long ago as the fifth century B.C.E., the Mediterranean was seen as a border, a space that acted as a barrier between different “worlds.”

The immense weight of the symbolism of the Mediterranean has not faded since Herodotus’ cataloguing of the region, and the space has been similarly painted paradoxically as both a nexus, a meeting point of sorts, and as a barrier.

Inspired by the large degree of political and cultural attention paid to the space of the Mediterranean, this dissertation investigates and problematizes the processes through which particular representations of the Mediterranean are invented, insisted upon, and institutionalized. I begin with the premise that “the Mediterranean” is a liminal space wherein one can analyze the processes of border making play out. Often portrayed as an obvious, inert border or axis dividing Europe, Asia and Africa, I contend that “the Mediterranean” is constructed through discursive formations and policymaking. In this project, I highlight particular practices of governance within the European Union, namely the Union for the Mediterranean, mechanisms of immigration and border control, and the EU accession process, that serve to re-produce and attempt to crystalize meanings of “the Mediterranean” as a marker of the presumed geopolitical
binaries of North/South and East/West that Herodotus proposed so long ago. The Mediterranean is a body of water with a dense, complicated history that is bound up in myths about belonging, civilization, and empire. It is a space that divides developed from developing states and separates economic prosperity from economic instability. The Mediterranean has long been viewed as a boundary between civilizations and has been shaped by movement and trade for centuries (Friese 2010; Appadurai 1996; Goody 2004).

I contend that the Mediterranean (or perhaps more precisely particular representations of the Mediterranean) is a space of the production and assertion of presumed geopolitical binaries, which come to be situated along two important dichotomies in the study of International Relations: North/South and East/West. To this end, this dissertation asks how these concepts are deployed in European policy making, for what purposes, and how these representations become politically useful and significant. Instead of taking these two geopolitical binaries independently of one another, I argue that border making on the part of the European Union in the Mediterranean, with particular emphasis on Turkey and North Africa, are demonstrative of the formation of and insistence upon this axis of North/South, East/West.

The European Commission, for example, describes “the Mediterranean neighborhood” in the following way: “to the East and the South of the European Union (EU) lie sixteen countries whose hopes and futures make a direct and significant difference to us” (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011, 1). While these countries are recognized in various contexts as integral to European politics (for instance in the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Union for the Mediterranean, and EU accession), they are still categorically “non-European.” This non-Europeanness is reinforced and reasserted through the same documents that maintain their necessity.
This embodies, in many ways, the name of the Mediterranean, as the “center of the world.” These geographically relational paradigms directly affect how foreign policy is conducted on the part of the European Union, and how distinctions between “us” and “them” are produced within European political discourse. The EU, for example, has developed many programs designed to govern its neighbors, while still maintaining their “autonomy” from the Union, denying them the label of “European” enough to be members, but recognizing that EU legislation should be developed to allow the EU’s neighbors to “benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 4). These benefits come from economic integration, programs to encourage democratic principles, education, as well as other projects (Commission of the European Communities 2003b; Council of the European Union 2011b; Council of the European Union 1995; Council of the European Union 2008). However, in the same document that the EU notes the need to integrate its neighbors into some key aspects of EU governance, it asserts that “the practical issues posed by proximity and neighbourhood should be seen as separate from the question of EU accession” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 5).

In this dissertation, I seek to uncover the connections between discourses and institutions that function to create the Mediterranean-as-border, ones that are often hidden and obscured from view. Without this attention to “metadiscursive issues” (Shapiro 1996, xvi), one cannot have a full understanding of the effects of political discourses.

**The Politicization of Border Making**

Borders are politically and theoretically significant, not just within the discipline of International Relations, but in peoples’ daily lives. Political borders demarcate the frontiers and limits of imagined and real communities. They designate who and what can be made to count as
the “inside” and the “outside.” Yet, although the ways in which borders are talked about all too often makes them appear as stagnant and real, they are not, in fact, self-evident. To understand these effects that borders have on individuals’ lives, one must ask how the borders themselves come to be iterated and reified, and what the mutually constitutive relationship is between discourses of immigration and the making of borders.

Borders are not primordial, nor are they necessarily evident. Their limits are always being negotiated and are characterized by inherent contingency. Roxanne Doty recognizes this messy nature of borders noting these questions of the making of borders are inevitable and necessary, as “one cannot speak of experiences of aporia without raising the issue of borders, the border as limit and threshold and the inherent undecidability of all borders” (Doty 2006, 64).

A critical engagement with a discussion of the politics of border making and remaking has the potential to help expose assumptions about bounded homogeneity in defining the limits of polities. The first step in relaxing the myths about bounded, homogeneous spaces is to understand the processes through which they are imagined; the conditions that make them possible. Such relaxations and contextualizations of the imagined spaces of homogeneity can foster a better understanding of how “in-between” subjectivities come about. In other words, organizing the world through such binaries as Europe/Asia, Asia/Africa, Europe/Africa, or even inside/outside, obscures the possibility of subjectivities that allow for an existence between and across these spaces. Borders, then, function to produce particular subjectivities that affect individuals’ modes of existence in the world. “The border” works dialectically to reproduce these subjectivities, and as such notions like the “migrant” have no meaning without the “border.”
Borders are sites of political contestation—spaces that work to inhibit the flow of objects, individuals, and ideas. International borders work not simply to designate the “inside” from the “outside,” but also to give meaning to the narratives of belonging and difference. The Mediterranean, for example, is a key component of the European Union’s foreign policy, especially with regards to illicit trade, irregular immigration, and other political “threats” like terrorism. The Barcelona Declaration, which was foundational in institutionalizing the relationship between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbors stresses the “strategic importance of the Mediterranean” and that the “peace, stability and stability of the Mediterranean region are a common asset which [the partners] pledge to promote and strengthen by all means at their disposal” (Council of the European Union 1995, 3).

Borders work to create and produce subjectivities. The immigrant, for example, is a subject that has no meaning outside of the context of a border. Indeed any individual can shift between the spaces of “insider” and “outsider” or “native” and “immigrant” depending on which side of the border they are on. Yet, the question is also one of how those borders come into existence in the first place. In other words, it is not simply a matter of understanding how borders affect individuals’ lives, but also how the borders come to be articulated and formed. Borders tell stories about people; they help to define and reproduce categorizations upon which knowledge about the world is built.

The Study in Short

I ascribe political and theoretical importance to the processes through which the Mediterranean is inscribed with meaning, and how these meanings are manifested in institutional structures, mechanisms of governance, and narratives of belonging and Otherness in Europe, Africa, and Asia. With this in mind, this dissertation also takes as fundamentally important the
notion that “the Mediterranean,” despite its historical significance, does not necessarily refer to any specific nature or character.

Thus, in using “the Mediterranean” as a case study, or perhaps more precisely as a set of particular, overlapping case studies, I investigate three specific sites or spaces where one can identify or locate the political effects of the liminality of “the Mediterranean” come to fruition. These sites may seem as though they represent vastly different discourses, but they in fact act as terminals of power that come together to form many discourses in the same narrative. These cases, in other words, are sites where one can witness the tangible effects of power relations in the processes of border making and reification. Moreover, these studies are not simply spaces where borders are made, but they also act as sites where the consequences of the making of borders are manifested.

Chapter 1 serves as the theoretical outline for the dissertation. Specifically, I argue that borders, instead of being static points of delineation from inside and outside, are sites of contestation and representative of processes through which the Mediterranean comes to be instilled with political, geographical, and cultural meaning. This affirmation comes in the form of EU narratives and policy making that attempt to define the parameters of the “inside” of Europe and the “outside” of the Mediterranean “Other.” However, the EU’s outlining of the distinctions between the Mediterranean and Europe is not without inconsistencies. There is a large degree of discord expressed in EU policies towards its southern neighbors, often recognizing both the exclusion of the Mediterranean from “Europe” while simultaneously working to integrate the region into specific EU practices.
The Mediterranean serves as a salient and rich source of reification for particular narratives of belonging and Otherness in the European Union, especially in the acknowledged attempt to assert the boundaries of the organization. Rather than being positioned as an obvious or inert border separating several “naturally” divided “civilizations,” this study argues for a framework for viewing “the Mediterranean” as a space of political and cultural hybridity; a space where the meaning (and difference) of concepts like “Europe,” “Africa,” and “Asia” are created and put into practice. Relying largely on the influence of Michel Foucault, I contend that through an analysis of discursive formations and institutional iterations, it is clear that power practices are manifested in the politics of EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean. This is not to suggest simply, however, that the Mediterranean is an object of governance or hierarchical political practices. Thus, my methodology is one of excavation, whereby I look at practices of statecraft and technologies of border making in the region in an attempt to locate a particular dispositif that maintains the exercise of power in the region.

Additionally, I am indebted to the work of R.B.J. Walker and Nevzat Soguk, both of whom eloquently confront questions of political subjectivity in practices of sovereignty. Walker’s indictment of the too-often taken for granted “obvious” nature of the state and borders provides us with a framework for understanding how “modern affirmations of separation are…also affirmations of certain kinds of relations” (Walker 2010, 52).

Similarly, Nevzat Soguk, in his book States and Strangers, asks us to think about the refugee not simply as a subject of exercises of sovereignty, but as a paradoxically constitutive part of iterations of sovereign statehood. Refugees, according to Soguk, have both “disruptive (problematic) and recuperative (resourceful) [implications for] sovereignty practices” (Soguk 1999, 15). Both of these authors put into question the assumptions that frame not just
international politics, but the study of International Relations, as well. Coming to terms with the tenuous nature of sovereignty means an interrogation of the ways in which borders are iterated and instilled with meaning and symbolism. In other words: how are borders imagined as delineations of separately bound territorially sovereign spaces, and what consequences might this have for governance and political practices?

I suggest that the Mediterranean is representative of a more malleable and fluid notion, rather than one that presents us with the dualities of North/South, or East/West. Specifically, I ask how the Mediterranean-as-borderspace becomes inscribed with meaning, identities, and political value. I extrapolate this theoretical discussion of the significance of the Mediterranean to suggest that borders, in a broader sense, are best understood as a series or set of practices, rather than as static barriers separating “here” from “there.” This framework is ultimately significant because it is this insistence upon the crystallization of borders that are demonstrative of fundamental practices of statecraft and sovereignty.

Chapter 2 is the first in the “case studies” that investigate particular practices of border making in the Mediterranean, where I investigate the geographical imaginations generated by the European Union's (EUs) actions in its Mediterranean neighborhood. I argue that an important institutional site where the liminality of the Mediterranean-as-borderspace is brought forth is in the formation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). In other words, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Declaration (and all its institutional manifestations) push the limits of the EU and “Europe,” and are representative of politics that both demonstrate an attempt to fix borders and integrate the Mediterranean neighbors in some key ways. This is particularly significant because it shows that while over the last few decades the EU’s external neighbors in the Mediterranean have experienced increased
levels of cooperation and integration with European markets and cultural projects, they have also been subjected to increased border securitizations and protection, reinforcing “Fortress Europe.” This paradoxical relationship between simultaneous integration and exclusion demonstrates that the language with which the EU speaks about borders (as finite spaces) does not accurately reflect the reality of the practices of bordermaking, which are much more fluid and complex.

Put differently, the EMP and the UfM do not simply display the impossibility of “fixing” the Mediterranean; they are deeply affected by it. In this way, the political successes and failures of European institutions meant to foster dialogue and relationships with EU neighbor states can be understood not simply as bureaucratic inability to implement policies. The EMP and the UfM function to integrate the Mediterranean into a EU framework for governance, but in doing so work to manage and reify the external borders of the EU. For example, an examination of the five-year anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration has resulted in the EU reasserting the goals of:

1. The creation of an area of shared prosperity through the progressive establishment of free trade between the EU and its Mediterranean partners and amongst the partners themselves, accompanied by substantial EU financial support for economic transition and for helping the partners to confront the social and economic challenges created by this transition.

2. The improvement of mutual understanding among the peoples of the region and the development of a free and flourishing civil society by means of exchange, development of human resources, and the support of civil societies and social development (European Commission 2000a, 1).

Despite recognizing the importance of economic and cultural integration and interdependence in its Mediterranean policies, the EU stops short of integrating the Mediterranean neighbors into the shared market, recognizing the membership is not a future possibility for most of the Mediterranean partners (with the exception of Malta and Cyprus) (European Commission 2000a).
Chapter 3 examines the legal and moral discourses found in current political debates about the “crisis” of migration in the Mediterranean. This issue has come to be a popular one in European politics, particularly in France. The various discussions of the so-called crisis of migration in the Mediterranean are embedded with anxieties not simply about the presence of the immigrant inside the Schengen zone; it is rooted in an anxiety about not knowing where “Europe” ends and where “Africa” begins. The uncertainty and inability to “pin down” the Mediterranean as a clear border is manifested in these discussions within the European Union about the crisis of irregular immigration, and it serves as a reminder that it a border as fluid as the water itself is being crossed.

Moreover, I put forward the idea that the migrant body acts as a space whereby the significance and meaning of borders is inscribed. In other words, the migrant body is symbolically significant for the politics and practices of border making, particularly as it is regulated, managed, and catalogued. It is the act of border crossing in the Mediterranean, then, that garners particular political significance, even though the actual numbers of irregular immigrants entering the EU through its southern borders is less significant than the attention drawn to it suggests.

In Chapter 4, I draw on discourses of “European” cultural belonging to argue that the political effects of Turkey’s ongoing EU membership negotiations are not simply to be found in the inability to meet all of the demands made by the acquis. Here, too, the hybridity and fluidity of “the Mediterranean” is manifested as a political anxiety about where the borders of “Europe” end and where “Asia” begins. The Anatolian peninsula has carried many names and stories about belonging and Otherness as the “gates” of Europe. At the edge of the “Levant,” the Ottoman Empire was, for centuries, a key actor in European politics, yet always remained “at the
edge” (even when it firmly extended into what is now Central Europe). Whether known as Constantinople, Istanbul, the Ottoman Empire, or Turkey, this space is undeniably significant for discussions of the limits of Europe and Asia. Furthermore, Turkey is seen as both Europe and Asia Minor, thus shedding light onto the inherent liminality and hybridity of the borderspace. This significance is manifested in EU accession discussions with Turkey.

In addition to historical narratives of Turkey as a divider between East/West, Turkey is incredibly symbolic in many contemporary discussions of geo-politics in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Specifically, as a predominantly Muslim country with a secular, democratically elected government, Turkey is often cited as providing a “Turkish model” for other predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Yavuz 2009; Mango 1993; Kinzer 2010; Kinzer 2011). That is, Turkey provides “proof,” according to Stephen Kinzer, that Islam and democracy can, in fact, coexist (Kinzer 2010). According to Kinzer, Turkey is one of the only examples of a successful mélange of a predominantly Muslim population and secular, democratic principles. While one could challenge, certainly, the extent to which Turkey can be justifiably be called a democracy (or, for that matter, what democracy can be claimed to entail), this symbolic role that Turkey plays is extremely significant in its geo-political landscape. Yet, the question of the so-called “Turkish model” is not as clear-cut or neat as it seems. Indeed, while “the usual implication appears to be that the republic of Turkey is a model of a secular, democratic, Muslim country, aiming to achieve Western standards, in partnership with the West, by applying liberal free market policies” (Mango 1993, 276), it is not clear that this is a terribly accurate perception of Turkish “reality.”

Ultimately, these three “cases” or vignettes, where I argue that the politics of the making of the Mediterranean come to both be determined and played out, are not simply mechanisms of
borderization. They are all also illustrative of the consequences and effects of the borders that they simultaneously help to reify. I have picked these modules because they are, at the end of the day, illustrative of some of the “real” effects of power. Put differently, these cases discussed in these chapters are not just ways in which “the Mediterranean” becomes seen and reified as an inert border; they also demonstrate some of the political consequences of these bordered representations.

The Significance of Borderizing The Mediterranean

The three case studies examined in this dissertation are all representative of some of the complex intersections between borders and the production of subjectivities. Indeed, these cases cannot be simplified to unidirectional or shallow explanations of political pragmatism. Instead, the articulation of these various “problems” that the European Union encounters draw attention to the complex story telling that is focused around border sites and spaces. In this way, borders are representative of much more than imagined lines that “shall not be crossed.” People and institutions work to continually redefine and rearticulate borders. Moreover, borders are symbols of the relationships that certain individuals have with the state, and in doing so are productive of certain knowledges about the world and political belonging (or lack thereof).

The practice of International Relations, as a discipline, is largely premised on the assumptions that can ever exist in a quantifiable form and that it is confined and outlined by borders and frontiers. As Walker suggests, “sovereignty…can never be simply there. It has to be put into practice” (Walker 2010, 191). For an ontology that is based on the existence of the well-defined parameters of the sovereign state to make sense, there must be a supposition that borders can delineate space into territories. The practice of taking borders to be “facts of nature” or unproblematized prerequisites to the state system renders impossible a realization that borders
exist in a constant state of flux, and are not representative of any “fixed” territory or state spatiality.

Buying into the sovereign state system is predicated on the notion that borders, once in place, are “real” and “fixed,” even if it is acknowledged that borders often come to be drawn through political processes. In turn, many premises held dear in the study of International Relations can only continue to be legible in their contexts if borders are not problematized and positioned as continually flowing spaces that defy crystallization.

For example, one can see with the literature on EU conditionality that the external borders of Europe are not assumed to be pre-determined, primordial, or even unchanging (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2010; European Commission 2004). For example, Romano Prodi argued, while President of the European Commission, that:

But we cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale. We need a debate in Europe to decide where the limits of Europe lie and prevent these limits being determined by others. We also have to admit that currently we could not convince our citizens of the need to extend the EU’s borders still further east (Prodi 2002b).

Similarly, the European Commission notes in the outline of the European Neighbourhood Policy that enlargement literally change the shape of Europe (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 3). It is, ultimately, a decision that the EU recognizes is up to debate, as “any decision on further EU expansion awaits a debate on the ultimate geographic limits of the Union. This is a debate in which the current candidates must be in a position to play a full role” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 5). Indeed, simply the acknowledgment that a country can become a member of the EU is an acknowledgement that the frontiers of Europe can expand. With each round of conditionality and accession, the external borders of the
European Union expand and there emerge new discussions of what can be made to count as European, and what is assumed to be the “outside.” Clearly then, the border spaces that are taken to delineate and distinguish the spatial, political, and cultural limits of categorizations like Europe, Africa, or Asia are not necessarily fixed.

Nevertheless, there are limits to the unspoken acceptance that “Europe” can shift and change. Morocco’s 1987-failed attempt to apply for membership speaks to the assumption that the southern Mediterranean rests firmly outside the possible limits of “Europe.” For example, the EU notes that the neighborhood policy excludes future membership possibilities for all of the neighbors (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 5). And yet, although the European Union operates with a confusing set of suppositions about where the ultimate limits to “Europe” might rest, the southern, Mediterranean border is not as evident and apparent as it is made to seem.

Inevitably, part of this story rests in colonial histories in the Mediterranean. The region has long been a canvas for European colonial projects, and many of the territories along the southern and eastern shores were European colonies into the mid-twentieth century. For example, France’s complicated (and bloody) relationship with Algeria produced fuzzy contours between “European” and “African.”¹ Yet, while the fluctuating of sovereign spaces is implicated in shifting identities and geo-cultural borders and the changing nature of what can count as

¹ Algeria’s colonial history provides an example in its own right for the negotiation of borders and identities. The Algerian experience was integral for the construction of a notion of “Frenchness.” Thus, the theoretical framework in this dissertation could seamlessly be applied to the Algerian/French experience. Algeria, as a département of France, was different than most of its other colonies in that it was integrated into “France proper.” For an in depth discussion of the intricate relationship between French and Algerian identity, see Paul Silverstein’s *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation* (Silverstein 2004).
“Europe,” the southern Mediterranean always existed at “the edge,” on the periphery of the European narrative.

The assertion of a fluid and contentious nature of “the Mediterranean” extends to a discussion of borders more generally. While it is true, superficially, that there is an acceptance that borders change, and the “European project” can shift to include more states, most conditionality discussions remain predicated on the idea that once conditionality is complete, the border has shifted, crystallized, and then attention can be drawn to the next outward movement (unless a “natural” limit is assumed to have been reached, like in the case of the southern Mediterranean border).

However, even these occasionally mobile exterior borders of the European Union are never crystallized, but rather always in the process of becoming. In the context, for example, of discussions and analyses of EU conditionality, even if there is acknowledgement about where the frontier of “Europe” lies, there is still a working assumption that the frontier can ever be crystallized. This sentiment is demonstrated in the EU’s discussion of the parameters of “Europe.” When discussing the future enlargement of the Union, the European Commission notes that although “enlargement has always been an essential part of the European project,” after the 2004 wave of accession, the organization saw “no further enlargement with a large group of countries” (European Commission 2005a, 2). Thus, the debates surrounding where the “actual” border of Europe might be function to divert attention away from the fact that one can never assume that borders can “exist” in any static form in the first place.

Without an understanding of how borders come to be continually re-made, and in turn how they produce particular knowledges and subjectivities, the puzzle of European
conditionality is incomplete. To understand how categories like “European,” “Asian,” or “African” come to have such salient political suggestiveness and meaning, one must bring into question how the borders that divide these imagined spaces are complex sites of the convergence of practices and discourses acquire their fortitude and who gets to tell the stories that outline their parameters.

This project is not one that either asserts or denies any “truth” about the Mediterranean, but rather attempts to locate these discourses within larger political discussions in order to tease out their productive capacity with respects to borders and border making processes. Thus, one can speak to the way in which these discursive formations of the Mediterranean border are “put to work” to translate European border making policies into particular subjectivities. The emerging question that is the focus of this dissertation is: How are the “new” frontiers and limits of the borders of Europe negotiated? What are the processes through which the external borders of the European Union are insisted upon as the borders, each set having been asserted with the same level of certainty, objectivity, and finitude as the last? This point is especially significant because it challenges not just the political and cultural categories that are formed by “Europe,” “Africa,” and “Asia,” but also puts into question the legitimacy of borders that are ultimately human-made entities that are seen as lines that “dared not to be crossed” (Vaughan-Williams 2008).

The questions and problematics interrogated in this dissertation have the potential to open up a new type of dialogue about how borders help to govern populations and construct identities. “Europe” is certainly not a new concept, but it is also not an evident concept. It is, instead, a notion that requires a significant amount of work— to tell and retell the stories about what Europe is and why it should matter. The consequences of this project are of particular concern to
the European bureaucrats, those whose hold a lot of political stake in the salience of a European identity. While it has been argued that the making of political identities are of direct concern to practices of statecraft, this dissertation opens up a space for theorizing region making as an integral part of the formation of political identities and representations of self/Other.

The Mediterranean as a Saturation Point

The questions taken up in this dissertation are focused primarily on the Mediterranean as a border space, yet are transferrable to processes of borderization more broadly. The Mediterranean is positioned as an axis or nexus where the presumably mutually exclusive images of North, South, East, and West coalesce in politics, discourses, and institutional practices. Furthermore, these practices or technologies of borderization are bound up with questions of statecraft, practices of sovereignty, and subjectivities. In this way, this dissertation can be taken as an excavation of the borderization of the Mediterranean in several of its forms. The iterations of the process of borderization that are examined in this study, the Barcelona Process, irregular immigration in the Mediterranean, and Turkey’s dubious accession to the EU, are all illustrative of this nodal point of power that is represented by “the Mediterranean.” As Stetter argues, “the concept of ‘cultural dialogue’, as it becomes institutionalized in the EMP, rests upon the observation and problematization of ‘identity’ as a primary differential reference point –a symbolic border –between the EU and the southern Mediterranean countries” (Stetter 2005, 331–2).

Similarly, the case of Turkey as a Mediterranean political and strategic key player enhances this “Mediterranean model.” The example of Turkey should be taken as representative of larger processes of border making, as it is a very clear example of how borders between
continents, civilizations, or cultures are discursively constructed. The example of Turkey shows that it is impossible to “establish with any precision where Europe stopped and Asia and Africa [begin]” (Pagden 2002b, 36). The notion of Turkey, and the uniqueness that it is taken to represent with its cultural hybridity is, in many ways, not unique at all. Rather, the example of Turkey shows how all nations and borders themselves are narrations (Said 1994, xiii). With regards to the Turkish example, there is an acknowledgment in many discussions of its place (or lack thereof) in “Europe” of the political project that is the making of borders. The European political community chooses not to extend its borders to Iraq, Syria, or Iran.

Thus, in the example of whether or not Turkey should be considered to be part of Europe or Asia, part of the “West” or the “East,” there is a certain amount of awareness that the borders of “Europe” are not necessarily products of geo-cultural determinism but are rather based in many ways on political decisions. The “Turkey as exception” model, although it acknowledges liminality, which is undoubtedly important for combating hegemonic geo-cultural narratives, still works to obviate anxieties about having to deal with the unstable categories with which we are dealing. Put differently, if one were to simply accept the notion that Turkey is “different” or “unique” because it does not obviously fit into representations of what it means to be “European” or “Asian,” then these categories themselves are reified. The acceptance of Turkey as the only, or at the very least the most prominent, example of a state with a “geo-cultural identity crisis” allows for a deferral of the confrontation of the imagined nature of representations of “Europe” and “Asia” as evident categories. This is not to say that this recognition of cultural liminality is not important or useful. Rather, this acknowledgement of hybridity must not be limited to Turkey, but rather should be broadened and extrapolated for its implications for the intrinsic liminality of border spaces more generally. This is to say, one must not assume that “Europe”
(or any other geo-cultural/political categorization) represents itself, but rather inquire into the ways that it comes to be represented and continually reaffirmed.

This project is written in dialogue with a particular field of critical International Relations Theory that draws attention to the apparent ontological crises of the sovereign state system. This thread of critical IR converges with border studies and critical geopolitics to present a framework or paradigm for understanding the importance of processes of borderization, as manifested in discursive and institutional practices. The political landscape of the Mediterranean is in many ways one of nostalgia for the image of a Mediterranean that is the “center of the world,” that both separates and links civilizations. The historical literature concerning “Mediterranean Studies” is both romantic and dramatic about the significance of the sea not just as an ecologically significant space, but as a birthplace of civilization (Braudel 2001; Braudel 1972; Hordon and Purcell, Nicholas 2000; Abulafia 2011; Butor 1986; Carrington 1971; Chambers 2008; Herodotus 2007; Herzfeld 2005). These representations of the Mediterranean are still very much in circulation, and come to pass in political debates, cultural narratives, and the development of mechanisms of governance in the region.

Borders serve a variety of purposes. Historically, borders in Europe were little more than delineations that dictated to whom individuals paid taxes. However, borders came to be infused with meaning about delineation of spaces and identities. Contemporarily, I argue, borders are sites of continual contestation, around which stories about subjectivities come into focus. At times they are porous, filtering populations to allow the “proper” individuals or goods to flow into territories. At other times, borders act as barriers, steadfastly providing logic for “protecting” polities. State and regional borders, then, are not to be understood simplistically as oppressive markers between “inside” and “outside.” There is much at stake in the project of
inverting the hegemonic view of borders as finite, definitive spaces. Reversing the representation of borders as static markers of sovereign territory or naturally occurring delineations between exclusive communities puts into question the way in which the EU is understood and characterized. There is a large amount of attention placed on the ways in which the EU expands its borders and outer limits. However, understanding these limits as fluid and ongoing processes adds another dimension to analyses of how the EU represents and reproduces the outer limits of “Europe.” Therefore, the contribution of this project is twofold.

First, I introduce a critical framework and language for a more complex understanding of the nature of borders within IR. That is, understanding the geo-cultural and political limits of “Europe” as ongoing and unceasing processes puts into question the limited view that all too often portrays borders simply as consequences of historical and political circumstances. That is, borders are not to be taken as secondary points of focus in IR, but rather as primary ones. Understanding the ways in which regional and supranational organizations, like the EU, come to be formed and participate in mechanisms of governance requires a more critical interrogation of the processes of border making.

Secondly, this dissertation introduces the case of the Mediterranean as a beachhead for this critical investigation of border and space making on the part of regional organizations. While a lot of attention has been put into how states form narratives and identities around the myth of the sovereignty and territoriality, much less attention has been focused at the making of politically important regional borders. Thus, the questions taken up by this dissertation are critical for an increased dialogue within IR with respect to the ways in which we come to understand “regions” as imagined entities, as projects that are constructed through discourses and
institutions. This study attempts to shift the focus European Union studies to a broader discussion of how *Europe* has allowed for the (EU)ropean identity to become salient.
Chapter 1: Theorizing Mediterranean Politics as a Site of Border Making

“The reimagination of contemporary political life especially depends on a willingness to think about border les as sites at which very little happens except the separation of one political community, or state, or condition, from another, than as very active sites, moments and practices that work to produce very specific political possibilities of necessity and possibility on either side” (Walker 2010, 32).

Introduction: Situating the External Borders of the European Union

Richard Carrington has claimed that the Mediterranean “forms a great gash between the sophisticated peninsula of Asia we know as Europe and the vast and as yet only half-tamed plateau of Africa to the south” (Carrington 1971, 13). In other words, even as the external boundaries of the European Union expand, they never reach a “static” state, but are rather always in a fluid process of becoming; the EU’s limits are continually being negotiated. This is exemplified and practiced through European enlargement, which, according to the EU:

Is the response to the legitimate aspiration of people of our continent to join the endeavour of a unified Europe. The integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe over the past decade has shown that enlargement benefits the EU as a whole and allows it to be better positioned to address global challenges (Commission of the European Communities 2011, 2).

It is through political, social, and economic negotiations of boundaries, like the dual processes of EU enlargement or neighborhood relations, that borders come to express their productive capacity within “Europe.” The potent spatial and temporal dichotomies of West/East and North/South, that come to form the foundations for political and cultural representations of the world, are actively negotiated through the politics of migration, EU neighbor relations, and EU accession in the Mediterranean. For example, the EU demonstrates specific emphasis on the nexus of North-South/East-West divisions formed by its southern and southeastern borders:
The dramatic events in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as the fragility of the ensuing situations, underline the importance of a pole of stability and democracy in South-East Europe, solidly anchored in the EU’s enlargement process (Commission of the European Communities 2011, 2).

Indeed, categories and subjectivities like the “outsider,” the “migrant,” or even the “Mediterranean,” are products of the flexible discussions about where the outer limits of Europe end and where Africa and Asia begin.

In this regard, the aim of this chapter is twofold. First, the external borders of the European Union represent continual, unending projects, as represented by the duality of EU enlargement and the negotiation of “neighbourhood” relations with the countries that the EU acknowledges fit in a “gray” space. This has particularly significant implications for the ways in which one understands processes like conditionality and accession to the EU. Put differently, one cannot assume that there is a “natural” or evident outer limit to “Europe” that will be reached through accession, but rather must approach these categories as inherently fluid and contingent. Secondly, “the Mediterranean,” understood as a region or an object of policy-making as it has been by the EU, can help to elucidate and demonstrate how these processes of border making work to produce knowledge not simply about “Europe,” but also about its African and Asian “Others.” For example, the Euro-Mediterranean relations, characterized mainly now by the Union for the Mediterranean, work to produce “intercultural dialogue” and “dialogue between civilizations” (Council of the European Union 1995). This chapter suggests, then, that one should not take the political parameters of borders for granted, but rather ask how they are continually negotiated, and consider what this might suggest for how categories like European or non-European come to be articulated. It is in the production of “imaginative geographies” (Gregory and Pred 2007, 2), like “the Mediterranean,” that processes of governance, statecraft, and the negotiation of sovereignty can be exposed more clearly.
This chapter serves as a foundation for the examination of geopolitical practices within the realm of European Union conditionality regimes that work to reinforce and negotiate particular conceptions and representations of what it means to be “European,” and more specifically, how “the Mediterranean” is imagined as a space that delineates and negotiates the geopolitical binaries of North and South, East and West. In other words, “the Mediterranean,” and the EU’s political engagement with the states that border the Sea, act as a text upon which these representations and meanings are inscribed. More specifically, every time the EU engages in negotiations with Turkey about its candidacy, or further develops the institutional arrangement of the Union for the Mediterranean, it is engaging in geopolitical practices that are negotiations over the understanding of the limits of Europe and the Mediterranean.

Goals of the Chapter

The Mediterranean has historically been seen by some, both politically and culturally, as an “obvious” external boundary of “Europe,” separating four presumably mutually exclusive quadrants of North, South, East, and West (Carrington 1971; Braudel 1972; Norwich 2006; Goody 2004; Chambers 2008; Saïd 2005). However, “the Mediterranean,” rather than representing a clean border or binary between “Africa” and “Europe” or “Asia” and “Europe,” can be conceptualized as a fluid, porous space of hybridity. Consequently, and perhaps more importantly, this chapter puts forward the argument that this understanding of “the Mediterranean” allows one to speak to the contingent nature of all borders more generally. Borders are never obvious or static. Instead, borders are formed and re-produced through institutions and discursive formations that allow for a continual insistence upon their presumed obviousness. It has been argued by some that the notion of “Europe” as a confined and bound entity is problematic and dubious (Pagden 2002a; Derrida 1992; L. Wolff 1994; Balibar 2004;
While there is no inherent understanding of the “obvious” locality of the boundaries or borders of Europe, much political discourse presumes the existence of a notion of Europe.

While speaking in 2002 of the then anticipated 2004 enlargement of the EU, Romano Prodi illustrated the anxiety and undecidability of borders, noting that:

The political map of the European continent will be redrawn in less than two years. Next week, at Copenhagen, we shall take a historic step and invite up to ten new members to join our Union. This decision will give Europe a new dimension and impose on us new responsibilities (Prodi 2002b, 2).

Prodi’s remarks demonstrate not only the uneasiness anticipated with (EU)rope’s expanding nature, but also a degree of ease with which the idea of Europe can shift and change. Prodi, for example, does not simply refer to the political and economic evolution of the EU’s borders, but equates the notion of “Europe” with the EU’s shifting borders. Moreover, the geo-political notion of “the Mediterranean” has a powerful ontology that situates it as the subject of countless cultural and political narratives invested in the idea that there must be a categorical distinction between Europe, Africa, and Asia. These differences, it is assumed, must come to a head somewhere, must meet at a point of concentration.

In this way, “the Mediterranean” is actively imagined not simply as a border, but as a crossroads that consists of a series of points of contact between Europe, Asia, and Africa (Kazantzakis 1962, 57). Romano Prodi demonstrates this sentiment by remarking that the integration of the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans into the EU acts as “a sort of bridge” between Europe and its neighbors, and that this integration “will complete the unification of the continent” (Prodi 2002b, 4). By analyzing the political effects and manifestations of the contingency of “the Mediterranean,” one can better contextualize and position the ways in which
the European Union negotiates understandings of “self” and “other” (Toal and Dahlman 2011, 10).

The geopolitical cultures of “Europe,” “Africa,” “Asia” and “the Mediterranean,” according to Toal and Dahlman, are “characterized by population, geopolitical imaginations, and more codified geopolitical traditions that proffer formalized strategic visions of state territory and national interest” (Toal and Dahlman 2011, 12). The EU’s emphasis on policy directed towards the Mediterranean region reflects this sentiment, noting that the “Heads of State and Government [of the European Union] also reassert the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all countries” (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008a, 8). Thus, geopolitical cultures are not given, but are rather imagined and maintained, with the deployment of discursive formations and practices in the realm of international and state politics, where mythical, historical, religious, and cultural narratives are capitalized on to reinforce the geopolitical representations.

For example, the project of securitizing and institutionalizing Euro-Mediterranean relations, which have the expressed intent of creating “an area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean,” (Council of the European Union 1995, 3) are not divorced from the (sometimes militarized) border management of Frontex, or the cultural and geographic aspects involved in Turkey’s accession debates. That is, the seemingly contradictory and paradoxical movements towards the “progressive establishment of a free-trade area” (Council of the European Union 1995, 4) in the Mediterranean by the UfM is met by Frontex’s policies that work to “tighten security at the Union’s external frontiers” (Frontex 2009, 2). Turkey, in a similar way, is both seen as a bridge between Asia and Europe and as representative of a barrier between “civilizations.” Yet, the Mediterranean is a geographic region that is characterized, among other
things, by a certain degree of ambiguity. At times, “the Mediterranean” refers to the whole sea, based on geographic or ecological designation.\(^2\)

Implicated in this paradigm is an assumption that not only is the Mediterranean geographically bound, but also that it shares cultural characteristics as well. Thus, there is an assumption that “the” Mediterranean refers to a geo-cultural space that can be said to share distinctive characteristics, “from which it has been thought to follow that one may extrapolate the importance of social practices and their meanings from one Mediterranean society to another” (Harris 2005, 38). In all of this fluidity of meaning and definition, it is vital to ask how these various understandings of the Mediterranean and its relationship with Europe come to be used and deployed in political discourses about the politics of belonging. Moreover, this difficulty in pinpointing a location of any “true” Mediterranean as boundary to Europe, Africa, or Asia, speaks to a question that Derrida poses when he asks, “to what concept, to what real individual, to what singular entity should this name [of Europe] be assigned today?” (Derrida 1992, 5).

Again, there are two primary modalities through which the Mediterranean is characterized in relation to Europe. First, there is a common assumption that the Mediterranean represents (geographically, culturally, or otherwise), a clear, distinct “divide” between Europe on the northern shore and Africa on the southern shore. Contrasting this characterization, the Mediterranean is alternatively seen as intimately integrated into the history of Europe, a position that sees the people and cultures on either shore as having a history of intermingling, conversing, and communicating for thousands of years (Goody 2004). In reality, these frameworks are not

\(^2\) The various ways in which the Mediterranean is characterized will be explained in greater detail in chapter two.
necessarily always seen as mutually exclusive. Rather, we find in many discussions of the Mediterranean that it is simultaneously seen as both part of Europe and as a “barrier” or frontier, a space that is constitutive of and outside Europe. Moreover, these representations of the Mediterranean are valuable to analyze not for their “truths,” but rather because other discourses gain traction using these particular conceptions of “the Mediterranean.”

Yet, it is important to note that although “the Mediterranean” has taken a place at the forefront of many histories of Europe, and has sparked a whole discipline of “Mediterranean studies” that has even been the subject of works outlining an Orientalism-inspired “Mediterraneanism,”3 it is not exceptional in its ability to shed light upon the fluidity and unsteadiness of borders. Despite its unreliability and inability to be pinned down, “the” Mediterranean “has shown a great deal of tenacity in the face of a “barrage of critiques” that it be deconstructed as an analytical category” (Herzfeld 2005, 46).

The intention here is then to ask why the category of “the Mediterranean” remains so persistent despite its ambiguity and what intentions (political or otherwise) are served as a consequence of this continuing importance. To this, some have argued that the idea of a Mediterranean culture as distinct from “Europe” “has frequently served the interests of disdainful cultural imperialism” (Herzfeld 2005, 48).

The Mediterranean is of particular importance here because of the fact that southern European countries’ borders are, in effect, the external boundaries of the European Union. As

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3 Although this will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, it deserves to be noted here that “Mediterraneanism” is taken to be “the doctrine that there are distinctive characteristics which the cultures of the Mediterranean have, or have had, in common” (Harris 2005, 1). Moreover, these discourses are homogenizing in effect, and portray the Mediterranean as an exaggerated space of cultural and historical uniformity that is taken to “exist” (Herzfeld 2005, 48; Hordon and Purcell, Nicholas 2000, 487).
the mayor of Lampedusa has noted, the southern Mediterranean island doesn’t just represent the border of Italy, but is “considered the frontier of Europe” (Muir 2013). Through the process of deborderization within the European Union through the Schengen Agreement stipulations of free travel and movement, the external European frontiers have become remarked and reinforced in many ways (Driessen 1998, 96). As Frontex notes, “border security and the free movement of people are two issues which cannot be treated separately in the European Union” (Frontex 2009, 27). In this way, this dissertation demonstrates a concern for the development of a theoretical understanding of what happens to articulations of border practices when they are “put into practice” in the “real” world of policy making and statecraft (Soguk 1999, 9, 23). Just as many theorists have noted the impermanence, volatility, and absence of a fixed core or foundation of the nation state (Anderson 2006; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983), this point is extended to the borders of the nation-state as well. In effect, it is not just the idea of the nation-state that is continually the subject of pressures of processes of imagining, but also its boundaries and frontiers, which inevitably span and vary across times and places.

**Structure of the Chapter**

Relying largely on the work of Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and R.B.J. Walker as a theoretical grounding, this chapter asserts that the discursive formations about “the Mediterranean” that circulate in political discussions within the European Union speak to the “power and authority” that comes with border making (Shapiro 1996, xviii). Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, beamed at the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008, noting that the institutional move “will build peace in the Mediterranean together, like yesterday we built peace in Europe” (BBC 2008), demonstrating the power acknowledged in the governance of the region, as well as the reification of the notions of “Europe” and the “Mediterranean.” Teasing out the
understanding of borders as complex and dense sites of power/knowledge relations helps to position the framework for analyzing the Mediterranean as a space of the re-production of meaning and belonging in Europe. Sarkozy’s comments demonstrate that (EU)rope can neither find nor define itself. Similarly, in response to the notion that Europe needs to better define its relationship with its southern neighbors, as put forward by Sarkozy, Angela Merkel notes that “the Mediterranean region is a mission for all of us in Europe” (EurActiv 2012), indicating the ambiguity and incoherency of the EU’s conceptual and physical limits. Indeed, “geographical appellations” have the potential to be transformed into incredibly powerful representations that have a whole host of consequences for policy making and how international relations is understood (Todorova 1999, 7). In order to contextualize power relations in international relations, it is imperative to note the complex and dialectical relationship between geopolitics and discursive and institutional border-making practices.

From this theoretical foundation, this chapter considers the complicated relationship between border making and practices of statecraft. In addition to physical designations of the limits of political sovereignty, borders are an inherent part of the ontology of the state. In this regard, to problematize international borders is also to problematize state making, and this particular section will speak to the role of the “border” within the study of International Relations. That is, there remains a reliance within International Relations, particularly with regards to the ways in which the European Union expansion and conditionality has been understood, to the presumption that borders can exist in a static nature (Walker 1993; Walker 2010; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2010). Enlargement is often seen as the most successful portion of European Union foreign policy, as “the enlargement policy has proven to be a powerful tool for societal transformation” (Commission of the European Communities 2011, 2).
The transformative potential of the accession of the European Union is particularly potent in the realm of democracy promotion. As the Commission notes:

Enlargement is one of the EU’s most powerful policy tools. The pull of the EU has helped transform Central and Eastern Europe from communist regimes to modern, well-functioning democracies. More recently, it has inspired tremendous reforms in Turkey, Croatia and the Western Balkans. All European citizens benefit from having neighbours that are stable democracies and prosperous market economies. It is vitally important for the EU to ensure a carefully managed enlargement process that extends peace, stability, prosperity, democracy, human rights and the rule of law across Europe (European Commission 2005a, 2).

It is assumed, furthermore, that EU accession and neighborhood policies are ways to unify and iron out the differences between “Western” Europe and its “Southern” and “Eastern” neighbors as “through the enlargement policy, the EU extends its zone of peace, stability, democracy, and prosperity” (Commission of the European Communities 2011, 2). In other words, conforming to EU policies is not just presented as a way to become a member of the EU, but rather as a mechanism for becoming “European.” As the European Commission notes, EU enlargement has been particularly successful in cultivating new member states that have “a clear European perspective” (emphasis in original) (European Commission 2013, 4).

There is often a tendency, as John Agnew suggests, to understand the European Union as consisting of a “core” Europe and a “peripheral” one (Agnew 2001, 29). This partition is often taken as positioned alongside the presumed “Western” and “Eastern” divide, which carries with it historical significance as a “clear” point of distinction between two presumably mutually exclusive “Europes” (Mihalikova 2006, 32). Yet, this divide, like the “core” and “peripheral” Europes, is too often taken as representative of some deep, naturalized distinctive parts.
Power Relations, Discourse, and Border Making

Power relations can be analyzed through discursive practices and institutional policies and politics that come to re-produce representations and particular “knowledges” about the world (Foucault 2003a; Rabinow 2010; Foucault 1972; Hall 2001). Foucault notes that “discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (Foucault 1990, 101). According to Michael Shapiro, Foucault’s conception of the relationship between power/knowledge is helpful as it allows for an understanding of the “function of the power and authority resources” (Shapiro 1996, xviii) distributed by discourse. Thus, “discourse” here is taken not just as the use of language that is confined to the individual, but rather as a social practice that has the capacity to produce particular sets of knowledge about the world.

Edward Said gave central attention in his analyses to the role of knowledge production and discursive formations in totalizing and essentializing representations of the West’s “Others” (Said 1979; Todorova 1999). Although Said himself can be critiqued for employing some essentializing tendencies in his pursuit to deconstruct others’ constructed representations, Orientalism provides a framework through which one can challenge discursive formations that have “complicated extratextual and nondiscursive implications and consequences” (Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993, 5). Said himself has noted that his project is a critical engagement with a system of thought that presents “a heterogeneous, dynamic and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint” (Said 1995, 3). This methodology that places emphasis on the power/knowledge nexus brings into focus the ways in which false dichotomies such as us/them, self/other, and East/West are produced, reproduced, and deployed for particular political purposes.
Often, “the Mediterranean” is seen both as a cohesive, bound entity with particular essential characteristics and the location of the Occident/Orient divide. In other ways, the Mediterranean presents us with other sociospatial binaries: it is also the meeting point of North/South, particularly from a Euro-centric mapping of the world. For example, as Maria Todorova notes, “one of the versions of the East-West dichotomy played itself out in the opposition between Greek Orthodoxy and Catholicism” (Todorova 1999, 18). 4 “The Mediterranean world”, like “the Balkans,” has “always evoked the image of a bridge or a crossroads” (Todorova 1999, 15) connecting Europe to its “outside Others.”

This point demonstrates the tenuous and contingent nature of the false dichotomies and essentialized representations of East/West, North/South, or even Europe/Africa/Asia. Indeed, presenting these binaries as natural, clean categorizations does not come easily; rather, there is a lot of work that goes into maintaining them, as they are always eluding any attempt to fix them. To this end, geopolitical practices like the development of the Union for the Mediterranean, the practices of EU conditionality, or the monitoring of the border for “illegal immigrants” are ways in which these representations are reified, reproduced, and negotiated.

*Foucauldian Power Relations and Discursive Practices*

While there are many working definitions of discourse (Howarth 2000; Fairclough 1993; Wetherell, Taylor, and Yates 2001; Mills 2004; Foucault 1972), for the purposes of this project,

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4 Interestingly, this divide, too is contingent and flexible depending on the context in which it evokes. For example, at times Orthodoxy is seen as a necessary and inherent part of “Western” traditions, particular with regards to the rediscovery of the Greeks and the philhellenic movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Gourgouris 1996). From this perspective, Orthodoxy’s common history with Catholicism prior to the Great Schism of 1054 is highlighted as a link that is part of a linear progression or relationship between the Greeks and “Western Europe” (L. Wolff 1994). On the other hand, at points Orthodoxy is seen as a more mystical, Eastern religion that is itself seen as a bridge or point on a continuum between the West and the East (Todorova 1999).
discourse is taken to refer to “different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice” (Fairclough 1993, 3). Thus, discourses help to frame political debates and narratives, and are thus powerful in the production of systems of knowledge. As Mills argues, discourses “construct certain events and sequences of events into narratives which are recognized by a particular culture as real or serious events” (Mills 2004, 53). Moreover, it is important to note that discourses do not work in a unidirectional manner. That is to say, discourses do not create social categories only to produce static, crystallized subjectivities, but rather operate in dialectical relationships; there is always a constant renegotiation and redefinition of meaning and knowledge.

Yet, it “is discourse, not the subject, which produces knowledge” (Hall 2001, 79). Mills notes that through a Foucauldian lens, “power is dispersed throughout social relations, that it produces possible forms of behaviour as well as restricting behaviour” (Mills 2004, 20). The production of knowledge and of the subject is achieved through discursivity, which in turn “form[s] the identities of subjects and objects” (Howarth 2000, 9). Knowledge and truth are inextricably tied to questions of power relations.

Discourses exist not as linear deductions but rather as “concentric circles, moving sometimes towards the outer and sometimes towards the inner ones” (Foucault 1972, 114). Therefore, we can move from the periphery to the core of the circles, but not from the beginning to the end. Neither discourses nor power relations are ever static or fully crystallized, but are rather “series of interrupted segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable” (Flyvbjerg 2001, 123). Nor are discursive formations and practices capable of working in isolation. This point is particularly important for the study at hand, as the “cases” used help to provide an analysis of the discursive and institutional making of the Mediterranean, and how
these seemingly disparate cases in actuality form one narrative. That is, “the Mediterranean” is re-produced through a myriad of different discursive threads, yet they work together to generate a representation of the Mediterranean as the boundary of various presumably bound entities, like “Europe, “Asia,” or “Africa.”

It is important to place emphasis on the study of discourses and how discursive formations operate because analyses of institutions cannot fully unveil deeper systems of power relations (Howarth 2000, 81). For example, as Bent Flyvbjerg argues, analyses that simply focus on institutions have “a tendency to explain the source s of power in terms of institutions, a kind of circular reasoning win which power is explained by power” (Flyvbjerg 2001, 117). Foucault is useful here in his interrogation of the relationship between rationality and power, [and] truth and politics” (Fairclough 1993, 142). As a methodology, the interrogation of discourses and narratives take into account the inherent instability of discursive formations, and works to elucidate mechanisms that discourses come to operate in relations of power, but recognize that discourses can also operate as “starting point[s] for a counterposing strategy” (Flyvbjerg 2001, 124). This power/knowledge dispositif does not “fix” subjects, but creates the “fields of their possible transformations” (Fairclough 1993, 57). Put differently, no truth of “the Mediterranean” exists autonomously, outside of systems of power relations. It would be a mistake, as Foucault aptly puts it, to “imagine the that the world turns toward us a legible face which we would have only to decipher” (Foucault 1984, 127).

For the purposes of this project, the question is not about translating or deciphering how discourses portray “real” entities, but rather how these discursive formations work to produce the idea of the entities in the first place; or more precisely, how the conditions of possibility for “the Mediterranean” come to be formed. Instead of being the pre-existing “origin” of the European
institutional and discursive mechanisms of governance, “the Mediterranean” is very much a function and product of the political and social narratives of which it is a part. Discourses do not just, then, reflect social “truths,” but are made by them and actively construct and navigate them. Yet, Foucault is careful to note that individuals produced by power relations are not simply subject to them, but rather “are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power” (Foucault 2003a, 29).

*Language and Borders as Texts (Why are borders important?)*

“Borders” are not simply physical manifestations of boundaries of polities. Although taken to represent the limits of sovereign practices for the state, borders are deeply expressive sites of power relations. In this way, it is important to understand borders, of all kinds, as sites of expressions of power relations, in order to better understand “the forces behind various social conflicts” (Popescu 2012, 24). This starting point will then produce a framework for analyzing the politics of borders in a much different way. Specifically, it yields a fluid, dynamic understanding of how borders come to be, and how they affect the interactions between individuals, states, and intergovernmental organizations.

Borders are manifestations of complex histories; they catalogue wars, negotiations, and even geographic and topographic features. Yet, it would be a mistake to view borders simply as static, physical relics of past conquerors and defeats. Borders, instead, are fluid and continually shifting; they require work and energy to be maintained, and they are largely discursively constructed (Popescu 2012, 22). As Michael Shapiro notes, borders are reflective of a shape of the world that is imposed by discourses and institutional practices that come to create “spatio-temporal models of identity-difference” (Shapiro 2007, 164).
Moreover, borders are not simply markers of the spatial orientation of difference; they are used to locate the boundaries of “us” and “them,” and designate notions of “inside” from “outside.” Borders act as powerful sites of identity articulation, around which notions of the nation, citizenship, community, or cultural belonging are formed (Bhabha 2004, 2). The designation of “otherness” is a key function of not just borders, but also of statehood, and the interstices created between borders and statecraft cannot be understated. Statecraft is, in many ways, continual expressions of negotiation and difference, whether concerning the limits of sovereign practice, designating the citizen from the “alien,” or deciding what the cultural scope is of any concept of “us.” The cases analyzed in this dissertation, which focus on difference aspects of border making on the outer limits of the European Union, are not simply reflective of the articulation of the physical and cultural frontiers of “Europe,” but also speak to the complex, co-constitutive relationship between border politics and statecraft.

In this way, the experiences that take place on, around, and across borders are limited in their importance to the physical “border space,” but rather “pose particular problems to politics, [which] need to be elaborated” (Rabinow 2010, 385). It is through the continual production and reproduction of notions of borders as markers of difference within EU discourses and policy implementation that allow conceptions of identity, belonging, and difference to be meaningful nexuses of power relations in political practices (Soguk 1999, 18).

While borders work to physically separate polities, they are also productive of other types of meaningful relationships and subjectivities (Walker 2010, 52). It would be a mistake to assume that borders are only repressive, that they simply assert (often violent) means of separating and distinguishing polities. Rather, this dissertation sees borders as being both repressive, but also as productive of particular subjectivities while being reflective of activities of
statecraft. I argue that one can read borders as sources of boundary-producing discourses, and in doing so, can come to terms with some of the ways in which borders are inherently unfinished projects of statecraft.

The Problem of the Bordered State

In order for IR to function the way it does, that is, in order to talk about concepts like conditionality as a “natural” expansion of the European Union and the limits of Europe, there must be reliance upon this faulty premise of the nature of borders. I suggest that borders are never fixed or finished projects, but are forever contingent and in the making; they are never able to fully come to pass.

Border Making as Statecraft

Although recent trends within political science and International Relations point to the dissolving nature of international borders, and thus, so the argument goes, the waning importance of the state (Fukuyama 1992; Friedman 2007; Hardt and Negri 2000; Kaplan 1994; Held 2010), there has been a resurgence of interest in border studies (Diener and Hagen 2009; Brown 2010).

International borders act, very superficially, as “agents of a state’s security and sovereignty” (Wilson and Donnan 1998, 9). Narratives that help to imagine a homogenized nation-state within presumably neatly drawn state boundaries are disrupted by the often messy, inherently diverse nature of border spaces. However, the processes that go into border making, whether it be institutional governance, securitization, or militarization of borders, are fundamental mechanisms through which the state asserts its boundaries and defines what can be made to count as “inside” and “outside.”
These border making processes and their respective politics are not straightforward or simple. Instead, as Nevzat Soguk notes, it is one of the most fundamental problems of the state to navigate:

How to inscribe, stabilize, and render effective a certain figure of the citizen that the modern state would represent and on the basis of which the modern state would claim to effect its sovereignty, its powers, and indeed its right to rule over a territorial inside (Soguk 1999, 39).

Thus, there is a great deal at stake for the legitimacy of the state in the project of border making and articulation. While borders are clearly outcomes of institutions, history, and governance decisions, they are never fully crystallized, and in this way are manifestations of the ongoing, continual process of statecraft. In effect, practices of statecraft rely on and proceed from an assumption that borders constitute a bounded entity, and moreover that they remain unproblematic unless they are actively contended.

Building academic discussions about the processes of conditionality or expansion of the European Union without understanding the contentious nature of borders then runs the risk of positioning academics and policy makers in a “territorial trap,” to borrow a term from John Agnew (Agnew 1994). To assume that the states borders are inherent and unproblematic limits an understanding of the world to the model of the nation-state, and restricts imagination about how sovereignty might be conceived of or understood differently (Diener and Hagen 2009, 1199).

It would be a mistake to position “the state” at the center of some kind of new existential dilemma, with the pressures of globalization supposedly knocking down the secure barriers formed by international borders. This position fails to account for the fact that the state, in many ways, has not found itself in a new compromised position. Rather, as R.B.J. Walker notes,
“clichés about the demise of the modern state…[are] symptomatic rather than analytic. The state has always been in trouble” (Walker 2010, 42). In other words, it is not a matter of understanding the messy future of the state with the demise of the power of borders, as this assumes that “the state” was ever anything but messy and contingent. Sovereignty, and the practices of articulating borders that help to define notions of state sovereignty, must be treated as problems, “rather than [as] condition[s] that can be either confirmed or denied” (Walker 2010, 190).

IR and the Necessity of the Static Border

As many theorists have argued, academic discourses within the study of International Relations are often grounded in an ontology that takes the territorially bounded state for granted (Walker 1993; Agnew 1994; Albert 1998; Diener and Hagen 2009; Connolly 1991). William Connolly speaks to this sentiment, referring to it as a type of nostalgic realism where the idealism of the notion of territorial democracy takes a prominent place in various organizations of the world (Connolly 1991, 463). Both within epistemic literatures and the realm of policy making and governance, practices of statecraft take measures to ensure that this particular Cartesian dualism, within which the bordered state is seen as a designation of a mutually exclusive inside/outside relationship, is disseminated into “a wide spectrum of life activities” (Soguk 1999, 40).

In other words, academic iterations (both within the dominant paradigms of liberalism and realism) of the presumed naturalness of the state are salient outside of epistemic communities. As Gerard Toal notes, traditional conceptions of geopolitics “have long emphasized the determinative quality of location and natural endowment to the fate of a country in international affairs” (Toal and Dahlman 2011, 10). Notions of geographic determinism
position the Mediterranean as a space of convergence of civilizations, one that is “confused” by its lack of clarity of identity. This, it is assumed, has led to a particular history of the Mediterranean, one that Braudel highlights when he appeals to the necessity of ecological constraints in the study of human history (Braudel 1972).

Thus, just as “the Mediterranean world” should not be taken as a direct consequence of its geographical positioning, it is also too simplistic to view the relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean as one of direct, top-down power relations. Conventional paradigms within the study of geopolitics and International Relations often function off of a presumed top-down, unidirectional flow of power and authority. That is, power politics are seen as an issue of size and force differentials between states. However, a critical interpretation of the EU’s operations and relationship with its Mediterranean neighbors underscores the dialectic and dynamic nature to power relations.

According to Agnew, the field of International Relations (IR) itself is a discipline very much built on the foundation of the assumption of the merging of the state with a clearly defined, bounded territory (Agnew 1994, 56). This is an incredibly important point to come to terms with, for it is from this point that all the other narratives that emerge from IR find their grounding. For example, discourses of security, sovereignty, and even conditionality in the European Union (the three that relate perhaps most closely to this particular project) are inherently and fundamentally linked to the assumption that the state both has territorial limits and that these limits can be represented by lines on a map that are taken to be “fact.” Thus, when one speaks about security regimes as processes of protecting the territorial space of the state, there is reliance upon a knowledge about or mapping of the ontology of the state that is firmly positioned within the confines of the international border. Similarly, it is evident that many mainstream
conceptions of sovereignty are intrinsically tied to the assumption of the “domestic-foreign opposition” (Agnew 1994, 71). In dominant paradigms within IR, sovereignty is construed as “a relation of similarity among all states in which differences in political and economic practices are defined and demarcated by state territorial boundaries” (Agnew 1994, 71).

Thus, the geographical division of the world into neatly packaged territories that have exclusive limits and confines has functioned as the bedrock to the field of study of IR and political science. The persistence of claims that the world is organized into geographically limited, bounded states is expressive of a deep anxiety and difficulty with thinking about borders in a more nuanced, transient way. And yet, as Soguk observes, simply theorizing the state or borders do not make them go away, nor does it change the reality of how they operate in the “real world” of international politics (Soguk 1999, 47).

The globe is coded into territorially bound entities that serve as simplified blueprints for organizing and understanding conceptions of inside/outside, self/other, or sameness/difference. These notions, in turn, form the foundation for political practices that govern the lives of individuals and produce political subjectivities. For the purpose of this dissertation, the politics of border making is fundamental for a nuanced conception of European Union expansion and assertion of Europe’s limits, as these are practices themselves that are dependent upon the aforementioned problematic assumptions all too often taken as “fact” in the study and practice of International Relations. In other words, the European Union, and the states within it, secure and ensure their reality through the circulation of representations of a bounded, evident territorial space that is presumably tied to political-cultural characteristics.

*Borders as Contingency: Representations of Ongoing Projects*
Borders are, as Popescu argues, “not mirrorlike reflections of the divisions existing the physical-cultural landscape, but are fabrications people make to legitimate distinctions between them” (Popescu 2012, 22). Borders are composed of discursive instabilities that require energy to maintain. To claim that borders are static or crystallized is to make them “artificial and categorical, and thus to position culture as something to be controlled, dominated, and studies” (Ferguson 1996, 175). These categories, just as the borders themselves, are made, unmade, and remade.

The way out of the problem presented here is not to focus on the idealistic dissolution of borders or to suggest that they are not, in fact, meaningful in political reality. Matthew Sparke suggests that this would leave us “without a critical vocabulary for addressing the ways in which the production of locality in globality works” (Sparke 2005, 26:112). Instead, the aim here is to suggest that borders, or more precisely the processes of border re-production, matter politically to the ways in which the European Union negotiates what can be made to count as the “inside” and the “outside.” This is also to theorize or suggest that there should be more work done to problematize the notion that statecraft, and its projects of border making, can ever assume any sort of an end.

**Positioning the Mediterranean in Historical Discourses**

It is not entirely clear, historically or contemporarily, what can be made to count as “the Mediterranean region.” Surely, geographic placement and climate are factors in the categorization, but even those characteristics cannot be taken as deterministic of any defining, unifying features. Nevertheless, this has not stopped epistemic and popular narratives from emerging that center on trying finding a common Mediterranean thread, a search to find
something that can help constitute the Mediterranean as a bounded region. Despite the lack of a unifying notion of the Mediterranean, the concept remains salient and persistent enough to constitute its own academic discipline (Hordon and Purcell, Nicholas 2000, 9).

Indeed, many books and volumes have been written cataloguing the characteristics of the Mediterranean, perhaps the most famous being Fernand Braudel’s *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II* (Braudel 1972). Braudel, a French historian of the Annales School known for his use of the *longue durée* historiography spent much of his career cataloguing the legacy left by the Mediterranean on European history. Exhibiting incredible attention to detail, Braudel leaves no stone unturned in his pursuit of painting a picture of *the* Mediterranean, claiming that in order to understand the Mediterranean “civilization” and its human history, one must even investigate the geologic history of the region. Braudel remarks, in regard to his methodology:

Should we care that the Inland Sea is immeasurably older than the oldest of the human histories it has cradled? Yes, we should: the sea can only be fully understood if we view it in the long perspective of its geological history. To this it owes its shape, its architecture, the basic realities of its life, whether we are thinking of yesterday, today or tomorrow (Braudel 2001, 3).

According to Braudel, all of the various features of the Mediterranean region, including values and social habits, could be tied in one way or another to the geologic and climatic particularities of the region. Yet, the region, as Braudel notes, was not to be understood as a closed unit, instead, influences from the wealthier plains of the north very much affected the social, cultural, and political development of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean legacy in the narrative of European history was to be characterized largely through its agriculture (especially known for olives and grapes), Catholicism and Islam, and as the birth place of “Western civilization” (Braudel 1972; Braudel 2001). Moreover, its economic and political importance has largely
been influenced by the fact that for much of history, water transportation and methods of communication far surpassed land transport. Thus, the Mediterranean became a space that connected Europe, the Levant, and northern Africa and was transformed into a “milieu of interlocking routes onto which the coastlands and harbours faced” (Hordon and Purcell, Nicholas 2000, 11). The control of the movement of resources and commercial trade routes positioned the Mediterranean as an indispensable piece to the development of trade liberalization and industrialization. This is perhaps one of the clearest aspects where one can see the connection to which Braudel makes reference: the deep intersection between the geographic factors and social development.

The picture painted of the Mediterranean by Braudel is complex and deeply rooted in intricate histories of the region. While his Mediterranean history is geographically deterministic in flavor, for Braudel, the Mediterranean Sea has never acted as a barrier between Spain and North Africa, but rather “as a river that united more than it divided by making a single world of North and South” (Wilson and Donnan 1998, 99). Moreover, Braudel characterizes the Mediterranean not just as a region, but as a center of light and energy, one whose effects radiate out far beyond the shores of the Sea (Braudel 1972, 168). Indeed, he notes that “Mediterranean civilization spreads far beyond its shores in great waves that are balanced by continual returns” (Braudel 1972, 170). This characterization has deep rooted, lasting effects in contemporary narratives about the Mediterranean as the birth place of Western practices of democracy and Western “civilization” (Norwich 2006). To this point, Iain Chambers makes note of the powerful symbolism and representation of “the Mediterranean” as a space “where the Occident and Orient, the North and the South, are evidently entangled in a cultural and historical net cast over centuries, even millennia” (Chambers 2008, 3).
More than just an important development in historical methods, Braudel’s works helped to define an academic field of Mediterranean studies. As influential as the content of his study on the region was, perhaps what is more intriguing for the purpose of this dissertation is the development of a discipline focused on “the Mediterranean” as an object and field of study, in a very interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary sense. This academic preoccupation with the Mediterranean is not new, however, and can be tied to the rediscover of the Greeks with the philhellenic movement in the nineteenth century. Broadly, the field of Mediterranean studies positions the region as a unit that, although is fluid, remains bounded enough to be designated as a space with a particular set of characteristics or a shared sense of meaning.

More important than what is said about the Mediterranean is the productivity of power relations that these narratives carry. For example, the claim that there is some kind of Mediterranean unity often functions to reify, as is the argument within this dissertation, notions of hierarchy between “Europe” and its spatially proximal “Others” of Africa and the Middle East. There is lingering exoticism surrounding the term “Mediterranean” and, as Michael Herzfeld notes, these representations are often appropriated or “put to work” to “shore up the boundaries of existing disciplines” (Herzfeld 2005, 50). Reifying cultural assumptions about what the Mediterranean represents, more often than not with regards to the concept of “Europe,” has led to some authors calling for a critical understanding of “Mediterraneanism” in similar fashion to Edward Said’s monumental discussion of Orientalism (Herzfeld 2005; Chambers 2008; Hordon and Purcell, Nicholas 2000; Said 1979).

More specifically, “the Mediterranean” has come to be associated, within popular narratives, with a character that was “refreshingly classless, unreflective, passionate, open, free of corruption and addiction, light-hearted and pious” (Hordon and Purcell, Nicholas 2000, 29).
These caricatures of “the Mediterranean” remain familiar stereotypes, and find their way into political discourses, as can be shown in the European Union’s various policy-oriented discussions of how to best govern the southern and eastern Mediterranean region. In their detailed compilation of the history of the study of the Mediterranean in *Corrupting Sea*, Hordon and Purcell note that this notion of “Mediterraneanism” works to reproduce hierarchies and cultural totalities and generalizations in much the same way that Orientalist discourses do, especially as “North and South within the region actually have little in common beyond their essentially subordinate status” (Hordon and Purcell, Nicholas 2000, 20).

The crossover between academic and social representations of the exoticism of the Mediterranean transfers to assumptions regarding the political values of the region and work to reinforce presumed hierarchies between regions. For example, Robert D. Kaplan’s book, *Mediterranean Winter: The Pleasures of History and Landscape in Tunisia, Sicily, Dalmatia, and Greece*, reads like a romanticized half-memoir, half-historical investigation into the symbolism of the region (Kaplan 2004). Throughout the book, Kaplan takes the reader on a journey through highly dramatic, romantic imagery of the Mediterranean as a space of shared belonging of the experience of the metanarrative of “Western civilization.” Kaplan claims that there is a certain intrinsic characteristic or essence shared between the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

Yet, Kaplan is quick to note that the Mediterranean, while it is a space of shared experience in his eyes, is also representative of a meeting ground or breakwater “not only of Europe and Africa, but of the Greek and Latin worlds” (Kaplan 2004, 89) as well. In the book, Kaplan invokes imagery of the Mediterranean as an important meeting place, as an intersection of civilizations and divergent worlds. The point here is not to indict Kaplan for capitalizing on
romanticized images of the “Middle Sea.” Rather, this dissertation seeks to investigate and draw attention to questions of how these discourses, ones that so easily crossover between social and academic realms, work to reinforce each other to produce particular sets of “knowledge” about the world. Moreover, these narratives are translated into the production and formation of policies of governance and expansion of the European Union, and in this way are productive of subjectivities with regards to “Europeanness” and political belonging.

The sentiments of mysticism acknowledged by Kaplan are similarly reflected in other academic discourses about the region. The dual themes of uniqueness and cohesiveness of the Mediterranean region are apparent in John Norwich’s account of observing the Mediterranean on the map:

The Mediterranean is a miracle. Seeing it on the map for the millionth time, we tend to take it for granted; but if we try to look at it objectively we suddenly realize that here is something utterly unique, a body of water that might have been deliberately designed, like no other on the surface of the globe, as a cradle of cultures (Norwich 2006, 1).

To be a “Mediterraneanist,” then, is to call upon a set of discourses that work to “insert oneself in a global hierarchy of value, and to calibrate specific moments of experience to that hierarchy” (Herzfeld 2005, 52). One should be careful to take assumptions of the Mediterranean’s unity as geographical “fact.” Even Braudel’s exhaustive cataloguing of the history of the region is not without flaw. Indeed, Braudel reifies and reproduces the notion that there exists a linear, ahistorical space that can be referred to as the “Mediterranean” that travels through homogeneous, empty time (Anderson 2006). Once the Mediterranean is subjected to inquiry as an academic object of study, it is reified and re-produced in popular and political narratives that work to produce politically powerful subjectivities and representations not just regarding “the Mediterranean,” but also speak to the presumed boundaries of Europe, Asia, and Africa.
The Mediterranean has long been an academic playground for historians. Their preoccupation with the “birthplace” of civilizations has led to influential works by historians like Michael Rostovtzeff, Henri Pirenne, Shelomo Dov Goitein, and of course, Braudel (Hordon and Purcell, Nicholas 2000, 30). While many historians have neglected “the Balkans,” Greece has certainly received its fair share of attention, and it is reflective of the investment in the idea that the Mediterranean can be spoken about as a unified historical concept (moreover, one that is distinct from “the Balkans”).

Certainly, sociology, political science, and geography have taken notice of the Mediterranean more recently. However, there is, perhaps, too much consensus in much of the academic discourse on the Mediterranean. More often than not, the region is assumed to exist in some kind of cohesive, “natural” form. Even more interestingly, some historians argue that the Mediterranean question has largely been “put to rest,” suggesting that Mediterranean studies is passé, implying that there are no loose ends or problematic points of contestation in how “the Mediterranean” has been treated academically. Hordon and Purcell argue that Braudel’s work on the region was, in many ways, the magnum opus for Mediterranean scholarship, that the “region as a whole has apparently ceased, at least for the time being, to attract the attention of historians and geographers” (Hordon and Purcell, Nicholas 2000, 39).

It is not the intention here to attempt to add to the historical literature on the Mediterranean. In this regard, much has been said from many different voices. Yet, “the Mediterranean” remains important, and is not “dead”, for perhaps the same reason that Hordon

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5 These historians were among the most influential figures in the height of the interest in the historiography of the Mediterranean. Their collective works represent an almost canonical point of reference for the concept of the “Romantic Mediterranean.” For more information on these authors and their respective influences on the field of Mediterranean studies, see (Norwich 2006).
and Purcell seem content to close the door on it. That is, what is more interesting than what has been said about the Mediterranean is *how* these lingering “knowledges” come to find themselves re-produced and put to work to produce meaningful political definitions, policies, and institutional logics. “The Mediterranean” is both natural and (hu)man made. Its untidiness as a concept should be highlighted, not simply for the intrigue of the processes of region-making and the reification of narratives of sameness and difference, but because “the Mediterranean” has the ability to elucidate the productive capacity of historical discourses, and demonstrates how they are appropriated in political debates that have very real effects and consequences in the re-production and negotiation of borders.

Robert Kaplan notes in *Mediterranean Winter* that perhaps on some level it is inaccurate to talk about a singular “Mediterranean” (Kaplan 2004). While in parts of the narrative about his travels through the region, Kaplan speaks about the Mediterranean as exhibiting a particular set of characteristics, he later claims that “the Mediterranean became for humanity not a single sea but a series of smaller ones: the Adriatic, the Aegean, the Tyrrhenian, and so on, each with its own romantic allure” (Kaplan 2004, 16).

Indeed, Kaplan is correct in his assertion that there are multiple “Mediterraneans.” Although the Mediterranean is understood as a meeting place for three continents, it has no sharp frontiers, and cannot be understood as an “obvious” or self-evident cultural barrier. Any claim of Mediterranean unity is always contingent and is “nowhere tight or smooth…[it] is always subject to qualification” (Hordon and Purcell, Nicholas 2000, 507). Moreover, it is not perhaps as clear as it seems upon first impression where the limits or frontiers of the Mediterranean are. Resisting the assumption that the shores of the Sea provide an obvious boundary to the notions of Europe, Africa, or Asia allows for a more nuanced understanding of how cultural and geographic
borders become transposed and overlapping (Consolo 2006, 14). The political and cultural limits
of “Europe” are too often understood as “naturally” aligning with the physical limits of the Sea.

In this way, it is important to understand that not only does “the Mediterranean” not have
any kind of inherent cohesiveness or bound nature; it is liminal and fluid in nature. Put
differently, it is not only the meanings and usages of the Mediterranean that are contextual and
contingent, but also the representations of the space itself, how it is understood geographically,
historically, and politically. The Mediterranean is not necessarily to be understood as a sea that
can clearly and unproblematically “determine geographical nomenclature” (Bowersock 2005,
175). To abandon a geographically and “geometrically induced logic of barriers to be breached
and differences to be breached” (Chambers 2008, 3) is to produce an understanding of “the
Mediterranean,” and consequently of borders in general, that is less rigid and more open to
understanding borders as fluid, continually ongoing projects rather than static barriers.

The Usefulness of the Mediterranean Model

Just like the Sea itself, the “liquid materiality of the Mediterranean” (Chambers 2008, 3)
demonstrates the volatility of the project of border making. “The Mediterranean” proves to be an
example of a particularly dense “terminal” of the power relations bound up in border making
processes. The Mediterranean provides a powerful representation of the processes of border
making because it is so clearly composed of a “continual interweaving of cultural and historical
currents” (Chambers 2008, 34).

In many historical narratives, the Mediterranean has been characterized as a center of
balance-of-power politics since antiquity. It is within this tightly woven knot of the meaning of
“the Mediterranean” as the center of a particular understanding of “the world” that one can begin
to understand how borders, although continually in the process of becoming, are framed as finished projects. Moreover, on a very practical note, the Mediterranean is a useful case study for understanding border-making politics in Europe because it is, unlike Eastern Europe, assumed to be a “clear” geographic and cultural frontier. To try and establish this, the European Union spends a significant amount of financial and political resources attempting to “secure” and govern its Mediterranean neighborhood. From political projects like the development of the Union for the Mediterranean, the securitization of discourses of immigration in the Mediterranean, to the ongoing debates and negotiations regarding Turkey’s dubious “European” nature, the European Union puts an extraordinary amount of effort into the development of regimes of governance in the region.

These processes of governance and governmentality are directly and deeply tied to practices of border negotiation and reification more broadly. This suggests, then, that one cannot view “the Mediterranean” as a finite or clearly demarcated cultural boundary, but rather one that is re-produced through various regimentations and iterations encompassed by institutions and policy making. By untangling and exploring the effects and implications of border making processes in the Mediterranean, its fluidity and liminality as a geographic region and a representation of difference become more apparent. The consequences of this analysis for the understanding of expansion practices on the part of the European Union are significant. Specifically, instead of positioning conditionality and accession as waves or cycles of border-making and border articulation, it is perhaps more helpful to understand the politics of European Union border-making as a series of ongoing projects that are never able to truly fix the border. These are mechanisms through which borders come to be re-negotiated. They are representative of claims about and insistence upon the fixed and binary nature of the borders between “Europe”
and “North Africa” or “Asia.” Rather than demonstrating an unquestioned clarity of the Mediterranean as a cultural barrier or frontier, these political projects work to re-produce the presumed limits of the three continents that come to intersect in the waters of the Mediterranean.

In other words, “the Mediterranean” is a vital and fundamental object of governance and study in European politics. For example, the European Commission notes in the 2011-2012 enlargement strategy report for the EU that in recent years an increased amount of attention has been given to the development of a comprehensive policy towards the Mediterranean region. This is due mostly to the fact that “the dramatic events [of 2011] in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as the fragility of the ensuing situations, underline the importance of a pole of stability and democracy in South-East Europe, solidly anchored in the EU’s enlargement process” (Commission of the European Communities 2011, 2). The Mediterranean, like all geo-cultural categorizations, continually defies and betrays the political and institutional attempts to freeze it as a homogeneous figure (Chambers 2008, 131). Thus, the Mediterranean is not a point of intersection of mutually exclusive parts or “civilizations,” but rather is an intricate and densely bound site of encounters of power relations expressed through border making processes.

Although the notion of “the Mediterranean” is slippery and eludes all attempts to fix its nature, it has historically provided a powerful representation as the location of identity/difference negotiation for Europe and the European Union. While the Mediterranean has long been an object of study for the historian, it remains an underdeveloped theoretical space in International Relations. A critical investigation of border-making projects in the Mediterranean is not only an intellectual exercise in the deconstruction of seemingly “obvious” categorizations and representations of sameness and difference, but also has the potential to shift how European
Union politics and processes of expansion and accession are understood. In other words, a more nuanced understanding of the fluidity of the making of “Europe,” “Asia,” and “Africa” positions expansion less as a project of creating a “united Europe” (European Commission 2005a, 2) with finite borders and more as a paradigm of regimentation, governance, and management of borderspaces, those that are in the process of “becoming Europe.”

Conclusion

The theoretical framework for this dissertation is one that attempts to map the interconnectedness between seemingly disparate discourses of otherness and belonging in the European Union. It is a perspective that maintains that the formation and reiteration of particular discourses and practices of institutional governance are intrinsically tied and do not uncover or reveal particular truths about political belonging, but rather work to develop and negotiate them. More specifically, the effects of these politics coalesce and come together around the re-making of borders. “The Mediterranean” is regarded as a significant policy area and border zone in European Union politics. It is a space that is assumed to delineate a European “inside” from an “outside” Other and is a site where the meaning of what can be made to count as “European” is negotiated. To this end, this project asks how the political effects and consequences of the formation of the external borders of the European Union come to pass, and more importantly, what purposes they serve.

Borders are representative of much more than just political designations of territory and sovereignty. They are not objective or neutral facts of history, but are rather products of complicated processes and negotiations that designate how individuals are classified, how they understand themselves in relation to others, and how particular subjectivities are produced. In
this way, borders govern how we live, and the politics surrounding the production of borders demonstrate how they become injected with meaning and articulations of identity.

Although borders demonstrate a certain degree of arbitrariness and contingence, this is not to suggest that they are not intimately involved in everyday practices of statecraft. A new understanding of how borders are formed and negotiated through political narratives and institutions making cannot position them as polemic (Rabinow 2010, 383).

“The Mediterranean” is read as a border in different ways in many different contexts. The Mediterranean can refer to the southern state within Europe, to the northern states within Africa, or to some of the states within the Middle East. Yet, the Mediterranean is also often used to draw attention to some notion of a cohesive unit, a cultural, ecological, or historical entity. The term itself is rarely unpacked in popular discourse. It is, in many ways, a concept that rolls off the tongue with easy; it goes without saying. However, when attention is paid to the intricacies bound up in the term “Mediterranean,” it becomes clear that the ways in which it is deployed are more meaningful than one might suspect at first glance.

Contemporarily, the European Union approaches the Mediterranean as a “problem area” that is the subject of modes of governance and regimentation (Commission of the European Communities 2003a). While some frameworks might suggest that the European Union’s relationship with its southern Mediterranean neighborhood can be explained through historical colonial and imperialist projects, these borders are much more than historical vestiges.

The political gymnastics that the European Union undertakes to negotiate its external borders are not simply working to reify notions of inside/outside, but also obscure the fluidity of borders; they present an image of borders as constant, fixed, “clean” spaces. This is politically
significant because functions of statecraft and the premise of territorial sovereignty, expressed both in academic discourses within IR and in the formation of policies, rests on the assumption that borders *can* be “secure,” and that a secure border is a reflection on the homogeneity and boundedness of national or regional identities. Borders, like identities themselves, are points of contention, they are made up of “an elaborate palimpsest of stories images, resonances, collective memories, invented and carefully nurtured traditions” (Pagden 2002b, 33). Understanding this fluid and dynamic nature of borders allow for a more nuanced understanding of how the practices of border making are bound up in statecraft, and furthermore how the ontology of the state is dependent upon a particular image of borders as definitive, finite reflections on notions of “inside” and “outside.”

The categories of inside/outside, European/non-European, and self/other are always in the making, and representative of borders as contingent work to dispel the validity of these binaries. In the literature concerned with European Union accession and conditionality, the borders of the EU are understood as both malleable and “fixable.” In other words, while there is acknowledgement that “Europe” is not a concept that has static geographically or cultural limits for time immemorial, as the EU expands it is assumed that its borders shift then can be taken as static. For example, during a speech in Brussels while president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi noted the need for an active dialogue to assert the boundaries of “Europe” asking:

Where does Europe end? These are the questions we have to answer. The European public is calling for such a debate. I know: This debate will heat up after the accession of new members. Therefore it is our duty to start finding some answers (Prodi 2002b).

In the same speech, Prodi similarly argues that the EU “cannot go on enlarging forever. *We cannot water down the European political project* (emphasis added)” (Prodi 2002b). Prodi’s
comments with regard to the enlargement of the borders of Europe demonstrate the uneasiness with which the boundaries of “Europe” are negotiated, but also speaks to the anxiety with the idea that “Europe” is both an uncertain and bounded concept in the eye’s of the EU.

Similarly, the European Commission forwards the same sentiment and uneasiness with the malleable yet fixed nature of Europe’s borders while outlining the development of a European Neighbourhood Policy. The Commission notes, for example, in the same document that “any decision on further EU expansion awaits a debate on the ultimate geographic limits of the Union” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 5) and that “and European state may apply to become a member of the European Union” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 5). The EU both asserts a qualification for membership based on “Europeanness” while demonstrating an inability to even effectively discuss where the boundaries of that condition may lie. It is assumed, to a certain degree, that “Europeanness” is evident and escapes the need for explicit definition, even though there is simultaneously admittance that there are no definitive institutional limits to “Europe.”

Moreover, “the Mediterranean,” understood as a “natural” limit to “Europe,” is a product of discursive practices and institutions. Braudel acknowledged this tenuous character of the region, when asking himself what the Mediterranean is, answering that it is a thousand things at once, it is a series of superposed civilizations that converge in one space that becomes the subject of and ammunition for narratives about belonging and otherness in Europe, Africa, and Asia (Braudel 1972). By being seen as geographically inextricable, yet culturally distinguished, from “Europe” the Mediterranean “has been able to absorb conveniently a number of externalized political, ideological, and cultural frustrations stemming from tensions and contradictions inherent” (Todorova 1999, 188) to the geopolitical imagining of “Europe.”
Chapter 2: Regimenting ‘the Mediterranean:’ The Barcelona Process, from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean

Introduction

This chapter expands upon the ways in which “the Mediterranean” has come to be constructed as a “policy area” for the European Union. This analysis is pertinent for elaborations of the ways in which the Mediterranean region comes to be imagined as an inert border Europe and some of its various “Others.” Specifically, it draws attention to the regimes and institutions that are built around assumptions that there can be a space that can be definitively referred to as “the Mediterranean,” and that this representation might carry some specific political, economic, and social characteristics. Aside from scenes of tourist-covered beaches, “must see” ruins, and cruise ships, “the Mediterranean” functions as a category with much greater implications and “real world” consequences than simply where the next hotspot getaway might lie. The Mediterranean is an admittedly important area for foreign policy for the European Union, as well as the United States.

For example, the European Union notes that a focus on its “neighbor” states has increased with each wave of accession, particularly with regard to the addition of ten new member states during the 2004 enlargement. A 2003 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, entitled “Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” notes the importance of policies towards the neighbors:

The accession of the new member states will strengthen the Union’s interest in enhancing relations with the new neighbours. Over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its
citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 3).

It is evident within this excerpt that the EU places a significant amount of focus not simply on its borders, but on the space beyond the borders, its wider sphere of influence. In this way, the focus on this chapter, and dissertation more broadly, is to draw attention away from a paradigm that views borders as clean, sharply drawn lines represented by marks on a map or border crossing stations. Instead, the EU approaches its borders as fluid spaces or gradients, where it is not so much a question of simply being on one side of the border or the other, but rather positions European belonging as a relational condition. Put differently, I contend that belonging in the European Union, or “Europe” writ large, is not simply a matter of being a member state or not. Instead, the “neighbor” status of states on the periphery of the EU form a sort of bailiwick, where specific membership benefits are not extended, yet the politics and policies of the neighbor states are recognized as integral to EU governance. Thus, as the communication on Europe’s wider influence on its neighbors makes clear, notions of security and belonging in the EU are directly and intimately tied to the governing and management of the spaces that are “not quite” in the EU.

In addition to European expansion, the focus on irregular immigration and the heightened discourse on international security regimes in the post-9/11 world have drawn attention to the politics of North Africa and the Middle East in a way that positions “the Mediterranean” as a strategic policy area for the European Union in particular. Moreover, “the Mediterranean” is taken as a dividing line that separates the “developed” northern shores of Europe from the “developing” southern shores of Africa and eastern shores of Asia.
“The Mediterranean” functions as a nexus whereby particular discursive formations and power relations come together to form a notion of a bounded, locatable entity that manifests in the politics of belonging in the European Union. In other words, the formation of foreign policy towards the Mediterranean is politically important because it allows for an articulation of inside/outside, threat/defense, and friend/foe. In order to begin to understand what “the Mediterranean” is (or has become) one must tug at the threads in a tightly wound knot of historical and institutional narratives and stories. To effectively unpack that which is call “the Mediterranean,” and to begin to come to terms with the presumptions and “knowledges” that are bound up within it, various (seemingly disparate) emblematic sites must be interrogated, one of which being the institutions that govern relations between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbors.

More specifically, the Barcelona Process, including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) were created, among other reasons, under the auspices of trying to ameliorate relations or mitigate inequality between the states on the shores of the Mediterranean. The European Union outlines the institutional importance of the Mediterranean region, noting that the Barcelona Process is:

A multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the potential for regional integration and cohesion. Heads of State and Government also reassert the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all countries. They stress the need for better co-ownership by all participants and for more relevance and visibility for the citizens (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008a, 1).

Not only does the Union for the Mediterranean emphasize and symbolize the strategic importance of the Mediterranean in European politics, it underlines the fact that the two regions are inherently connected through geography and history (Secretariat of the Union for the
Recognizing the EU’s commitment to peace and stability of the Mediterranean, these institutions of governance and management of the Mediterranean region may be intimately involved in the creation and crystallization of “the Mediterranean” as a border space or a region. Yet, there is a hybridity or liminality that is simultaneously recognized in European political narratives towards the Mediterranean-as-neighbor. That is, while the EU recognizes that its southern Mediterranean neighbors can never be admitted as members, it argues that the close geographical proximity means:

The enlarged EU and the new neighbourhood will have an equal stake in furthering efforts to promote trans-national flows of trade and investment as well as even more important shared interests in working together to tackle trans-boundary threats (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 3).

Put another way, in this chapter I show that these institutions represent mechanisms of governance that contribute to the circulation and reiteration of discourses that position the Mediterranean as a self-evident border between Europe and its “outside,” regions of Africa and/or Asia, all the while illuminating the ambivalent relationship with the fact that the Mediterranean is a fluid and dynamic borderspace.

On the surface, there are some practical reasons to investigate the making of a relationship between the European Union and the Mediterranean area. The success or efficacy of the institutional projects that attempt to “securitize” the southern and eastern Mediterranean have

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6 While discussing its strategic interests in the politics of its neighbors, particularly to the south, the EU notes that: “in some cases the issue of prospective membership has already been resolved. Accession has been ruled out, for example, for the non-European Mediterranean partners. But other cases remain open, such as those European countries who have clearly expressed their wish to join the EU” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 5), thereby closing any discussion of the borders of “Europe” shifting towards the southern shores of the Mediterranean, and reifying the representation of “the Mediterranean” as an indelible frontier of “Europe.”
been brought into question for their political efficacy and their role in producing the image of the region as a source of potential security concerns (Stavridis and Hutchence 2000). The Mediterranean has been subject to debates about the “crisis” on intergovernmental governance in the region. The “physical threats” of trafficking, terrorism, irregular immigration, and political instability in North Africa have all become central security concerns for the European Union.

For example, in early 2012 when responding to the “Arab Spring” movement North Africa, the Spanish Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Spanish Congress stated the revolutions in North Africa have the potential to “topple the invisible wall that separates the two Mediterranean shores” (Duran Lleida 2012). Thus, the attempt to mitigate these threats through political, economic, and social dialogue and development between the European Union and its southern neighbors is manifested in institutions and regimes.

On a deeper level, tracing a history of the boundaries that are fostered between the two shores of the Mediterranean speaks to the relationship between European legislation and the institutional discourses that can actively produce “knowledge” about the world. These “knowledges” that are produced are central to political narratives that work “symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed” (Shapiro 1996, 3). The European Union has, for quite some time, attempted to institutionalize its relationship with what it calls its “Mediterranean neighbors” through “a series of different bilateral and multilateral frameworks: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the advanced statuses and the Union for the Mediterranean” (S. Wolff 2012, 4). In its ten year review, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership notes that the
“Barcelona Process has been reinforced by the European Neighbourhood Policy” (European Commission 2005b, 1).

Goals of the Chapter

The European Union’s institutions and governing mechanisms, specifically the Union for the Mediterranean and its predecessor the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, are representative of institutions and mechanisms of governance through which “the Mediterranean,” an inherently fluid and contentious notion, is attempted to be fixed and definitively situated both geographically and culturally. The various threads of logic of the institutionalization of the Mediterranean is often seen in EU narratives as a way to confront emergent problems and ‘security threats’ in the South (Youngs 2001; Noi 2011; Commission of the European Communities 1995a; S. Wolff and Pace 2007). However, I invert this line of argument, asking not how these institutions help to govern the problems in the Mediterranean, but rather asking how these institutions help to continually construct and reify the Mediterranean itself, and thus how it then comes to be an object of governance. By “revers[ing] the logic of interpretation” in regards to the ways that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean are formed, and what purposes they may come to serve, one can speak to the ‘borderization’ of the Mediterranean, which illuminates larger processes of imagining the politically powerful binaries and divisions that dictate cultural belonging (Soguk 1999, 21). Moreover, as Nevzat Soguk argues, the analysis of the functions of the regimentations of political discourses about the Mediterranean helps to create a better understanding of what the “real life” effects of discourses are, and how they are brought into “circulation in multiple fields of policy and conduct, including national and international security, democracy, economic and social welfare, human rights and humanitarianism” (Soguk 1999, 9).
While there is much study and discussion with the successes and failures of these institutions, there is a gap in the literature with regards to critical investigations of how these institutional frameworks not only govern the Mediterranean, but also how they enable a discussion of and reference to “the Mediterranean” (M. Pace 2006, 2; Philippart 2003, 205; Stavridis and Hutchence 2000). Indeed, the Mediterranean, as well as other geo-cultural regional denotations such as “Europe,” “Northern Africa,” and “the Middle East,” is imagined as a bounded entity, one which is mutually exclusive with others. Asking not how these institutions govern the Mediterranean, but rather how a Mediterranean that needs to be governed becomes re-produced in thought and language is a question that not only inverts the logic of institutional dialogue, but also points to broader discussions of how subjectivities are, rather than being inert and autonomous, intersections and interstices of various discursive formations. The political narratives disseminated within and from the European Union that contribute to the imagination and reification of “the Mediterranean” are important because they open up inquiry into other questions regarding political subjectivity and borders in International Relations (Mills 2004, 22).

The Mediterranean is very much “at once [a category] of social and political practice and [a category] of social and political analysis” (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 4). Indeed, there is an increasing trend within European politics to consider “the Mediterranean” not simply as a historical, cultural signifier, but also as a geopolitical unit that unites the states around its rim, or beyond, with common strategic interests and political and economic concerns (M. Pace 2006). The European Union acknowledges this increasing importance of the notion of the Mediterranean, noting that it is “strategically” important for the EU (Commission of the European Communities 1995a, 2). Moreover, the EU states that “the Mediterranean” represents the intersection of “strategic,” or “practical” concerns for the EU and speaks to its significant
contribution throughout history to “the mutual enrichment of cultures and civilizations,” thus noting the perception that the Mediterranean is a border between “worlds” (Commission of the European Communities 2003a, 13). The construction and development of the Barcelona Process and its resulting institutional manifestations represent one making of the Mediterranean, rather than being a reflection on already existent problems in the region. For example, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), while outlining policy priorities in the region, notes that there are three ways in which the EU engages in the further institutionalization of relations with its southern Mediterranean neighbors:

1. By upgrading the political level of the EU’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners;
2. By providing for further co-ownership to our multilateral relations; and;
3. By making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008a, 13).

It is clear here in the stated objectives of the UfM that the EU continually seeks opportunities to further deepen its institutional relationship with its neighbors. The European Council positions the Mediterranean region as a wholly distinct, bounded entity noting that it “is of strategic importance to the EU. A prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region with an open perspective towards Europe, is in the best interests of the EU and Europe as a whole” (European Council 2000, 1).

An Institutional History of the Mediterranean

Despite prolific discussions of the Mediterranean as the historic “center of the Earth,” the Mediterranean has a relatively short history as an institutionalized policy area. This section discusses the institutionalization of the Mediterranean as an “objective” region that has been the subject of governments’ attention in the twentieth century. Although the Mediterranean is the
source of various narratives of a linear relationship between the “historic greatness” of the Ancient world and modern Europe, it has taken on increased strategic importance for the European Union over the last few decades. Understanding the formation of the role of the Mediterranean as a “region,” which is subject to various policy debates allows for a deeper analysis of how “the Mediterranean,” as a border space, comes to be discussed as if it were an inert fact of nature. This project begins by tracing a history of the shifting significance of the Mediterranean region as a colonial project to more contemporary discussions of a “partnership” between the European Union and its Mediterranean neighbors, in the hopes of better positioning the significance of projects that further develop the institutionalization of the Mediterranean, like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

In much contemporary European political discourse since the development of the Barcelona Declaration in 1995, the Mediterranean has been seen as an area that is of great concern to the geopolitical security of Europe (Council of the European Union 1995; Commission of the European Communities 2003a; Commission of the European Communities 1995a; Hoekman 1999).

When proposing the idea for the creation of a political partnership between the European Community and its neighbors to the south, the Commission argued that “all the member states would benefit from an improvement in the region’s stability and prosperity, as this would greatly increase the opportunity for trade and investment and provide a stronger foundation for political and economic cooperation” (Commission of the European Communities 1995a, 2). In other words, the formation of an institutionalized relationship between the European Community and the Mediterranean was influenced by discourses of pragmatism and strategy—that the Mediterranean was strategically a good place for Europe to invest its economic and political
Similarly, the Paris Summit, which reemphasized the importance of a European policy towards the Mediterranean, underlined the strategic importance of the region for the EU, stating:

The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations. Representing a partnership of 39 governments and over 700 million people, it has provided a framework for continued engagement and development. The Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Euro-Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in constructive dialogue. It represents a strong commitment to peace, democracy, regional stability and security through regional cooperation and integration (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008a, 8).

Furthermore, the Paris Summit emphasized the goals of the EU’s policy in the region towards pursuing a “mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems” (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008a, 10).

*The Mediterranean as a Colonial Space*

In many ways, as Sarah Wolff and Michelle Pace point out, the EU has largely failed to fully discuss the inherited legitimacy of its colonial past and conflicts in the Mediterranean region (S. Wolff and Pace 2007, 432). While a significant amount of political energy is devoted to attempts to democratize or “securitize” the Mediterranean, a lack of attention is given to the role of the EU’s postcolonial legacy from the twentieth century. In the absence of the institutional acknowledgement of the persistent problems of a history of colonialism in North Africa, the EU focuses instead on the authoritarian regimes in the region as the hindrance to democratic development (as if the development of authoritarianism is unrelated to colonial legacies).
This being said, one can identify the shadows of colonialism in the Mediterranean, even among discourses that apparently focus on development, partnership, and democratization in the Mediterranean region. For example, the issue of prospective EU membership, in many ways, is based on more than “objective” geographic characteristics. Indeed, the “geography” of the location of the border space between Europe and the Mediterranean is based largely on the discursive and institutional construction of regions and borders more broadly, rather than on any inherent division.

Any discussion of the formation of the European institutions that attempt to govern the non-European Mediterranean must carry interpretations of the lasting interests in the region, and the historic ties that European states have with the area. The colonial distinctions between Europe and the non-European Mediterranean countries are reflected in the issue of the potential membership status of the neighboring non-EU countries. Morocco’s membership bid attempt in 1987 was rejected due to the fact that the European Community did not consider Morocco to be a European country, and thus made it non-eligible for membership. Yet, the fate of Morocco was set far before 1987. In the Treaty of Rome of 1957, for instance, Article 237 clearly outlines the potential for future membership of the southern European Mediterranean countries (EEC 1957). Even during a period when many southern European states were still struggling with authoritarian regimes, the Rome Treaty ensured a potential membership bid. As is stated in the Treaty, any European state may submit a request for membership in the EEC, which is then subject to approval from the other members (EEC 1957).

At the same time, Article 131 of the Treaty explicitly outlines countries that would have “special relations” with the EC member states (EEC 1957). In effect, the Treaty puts to rest any future membership bids from southern Mediterranean countries, instead arguing that these
countries share “special” relations with Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom” (EEC 1957, 46).\(^7\) This point in particular speaks to this division between “Europe” and “the Mediterranean” that is not just created contemporarily, but rather is deeply rooted in historical matters and political campaigns in the region.

Put differently, the Treaty of Rome recognizes the colonial relationships that exist between European member states and southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, especially considering that many of “these countries, including Morocco and Tunisia, were newly independent former colonies (Del Sarto 2006, 56). Without any prospect of EU membership, the Mediterranean countries continued to exist under the shadow of the colonial legacies of the region (S. Wolff 2012, 3). The distinction that underlined Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome was not only based on historical realities and narratives of difference between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. It reified this division and the inequality between them, solidifying the relationships in legislation (G. Joffé 2007). For example, Morocco’s bid was most certainly influenced by the lack of democratic tendencies and a problem with human rights in the country, yet one should not be quick to write off the seemingly “evident” nature of the classification between Europe and the Mediterranean. Yet, this point also speaks to the dynamic nature of these categorizations. It is possible, then, to “become European,” as Spain was, for much of modern history, not considered by many states, including most notably France, to be sufficiently European.

Moreover, the language used to legitimize the maintenance of this “special” relationship between European countries and their southern Mediterranean neighbors is reflected again in later EU documents concerning Euro-Mediterranean relationships. For example, Article 131 of

\(^7\) Although not explicit, one can gather that this “special” relationship is firmly rooted in colonial legacies of the Mediterranean basin.
the Treaty of Rome states that the purpose of fostering these colonial (or post-colonial, as the case may be) relationships in the southern Mediterranean serves to “promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole” (EEC 1957, 46).

It could be argued that the process of articulating an institutionalized relationship between the post-colonial southern Mediterranean and a European political entity can be traced to the formation of the EEC. Most certainly, the distinction between Europe and the Mediterranean has long been in the making. Herodotus himself questioned the geographic placement of the borders of the three so-called “worlds” in the Mediterranean in his *Histories*, written in from the 450s to the 420s BCE (Herodotus 2007). Yet, Europe’s colonial relationship with the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries certainly influenced the post-colonial categorization of the region, which still has lasting effects in contemporary European politics.

Viewing the discourses of the strategic and lasting importance of the Mediterranean for ‘European security’ carries with it a symbolism of the colonial legacy of the area. It is important to position the creation of institutions which seek to increase European influence in the region in a light that recognizes the potential for the practices of the EU to be seen as “a new form of colonialism/trusteeship” (M. Pace 2006, 110). For the majority of the twentieth century, the southern Mediterranean was a playground for European colonial practices. This is an important history, and although lies outside of the scope of this chapter, demonstrates that the division between “Europe” and “the Mediterranean” that is articulated with the practices of the UfM is historically situated and complex. Without doubt, the positioning of the non-European Mediterranean states as former colonies has not only contributed to conflict and
underdevelopment in the region, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, but has further cast a distinction between the European Union and the former colonies of the southern and eastern Mediterranean.

“The Mediterranean” in the Cold War

During the Cold War, the Mediterranean took on an added level of strategic importance for both the United States and Europe. Even NATO recognized the importance of the Mediterranean as a strategic space and “considered it as Europe’s southern flank, which had to be defended from the Soviet threat as much as Western Europe itself” (Del Sarto 2006, 56). While the Mediterranean gained noted strategic importance for the countries of Europe during the Cold War, the advent of the European Economic Community with the Treaty of Rome spoke to a new age of unified European foreign policy. The Mediterranean came to be one of the main battle lines during the Cold War, and in many ways by the time the EEC was created, there was already a sense of division or frontiers between the European and non-European Mediterranean shores. This fact, along with the historical division that was accounted for by discourses of colonialism and ‘civilization’ allowed for “the Mediterranean” to become a term that spoke not to a space shared by both Europe and Africa, but rather came to denote specifically non-European spaces. The Mediterranean’s transformation into a crystallized policy area or “region” was also influenced by the fact that the southern European countries lobbied to the European Community that “the Mediterranean” warranted greater political consideration and deserves be an area of specific directed policy (Del Sarto 2006, 60). What was previously a loose network of cultural narratives related to the Mediterranean area started to become translated into a language, and logic, of governance with the creation of the Barcelona Declaration in 1995.
Yet, from its inception in 1957 until the emergence of the Global Mediterranean Policy in 1972, the European Economic Community lacked any structured, singular policy towards the non-European Mediterranean (Bicchi 2007, 43; Ginsberg 1989, 119). In other words, “the Mediterranean” had not yet been defined in any institutional way as a bounded region. In an attempt to come to terms with the growing strategic importance of the newly independent states in the Mediterranean, and following wide criticism of the lack of a unified policy towards the Mediterranean, the European Community adopted the “Global Mediterranean Policy” in 1972. The Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) emerged as a way to increase cooperation with and dialogue between non-member countries in the region, and a narrative of stability in the Mediterranean began to emerge in European political discourses (Del Sarto 2006, 57; Stavridis and Hutchence 2000, 37).

In the early 1970s, the EU decided that common interests should inform its foreign relations with its neighbors, rather than simply bilateral economically motivated agreements. One of the results of this shift in policy emphasis was the development of the 1972 concept of a “Global Mediterranean Policy.” The GMP professed a goal of the creation of institutional structures meant to play a central role in integrating the Mediterranean into EU policies. While integration of the Mediterranean into EU policies points towards a political and economic association, it has always stopped short of fully integrating the Mediterranean into European political structures. However, it was not until the late 1980s that the EU deemed it necessary to develop a comprehensive and unified “Mediterranean policy.”

The GMP’s goal to increase European influence in the southern and eastern portions of the Mediterranean was firmly rooted in Cold War politics and was an attempt to create influence
through trade privileges (Del Sarto 2006, 57). The GMP is significant as it was the first attempt for the European Community to create a unified policy framework towards the Mediterranean (Bicchi 2007, 45). In other words, it was at this point that the discursive construct of “the Mediterranean” was beginning to become crystallized as an object of governance.

It should be noted that following its historical influence in the region, France became an important actor in this institutionalization of “the Mediterranean” as a region. In many ways, France was a crucial factor “in turning the passive concern of the other member states for the Mediterranean into an active process of [European foreign policy] formulation” (Bicchi 2007, 86), largely because of its history of political influence as a colonial power in the region. Through the 1980s, an increasing number of European Mediterranean states became members of the European Community. The Mediterranean enlargement occurred after Greece, Spain, and Portugal emerged from their respective dictatorships in the 1970s. As the border of the EU shifted southward, attention was brought to its newly expanded external limits. For example, the EU notes in a document released in 2003 that “geographical proximity increases the importance of a set of issues revolving around, but not limited to, the management of the new external border and trans-boundary flows” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 6). Thus, it is not just the member states along the external borders, but also those states that reside in the ambiguous realm of “neighbors” that garner significant amount of political attention on the part of the EU. Much of this attention is directed towards integrating the neighbor states partially into the shared market or lower tariffs on the movement of capital, while still being restricted from more specific, general membership benefits. In other words, it is not simply an issue of either being a member of the EU, with all the benefits that come from membership, or being “on the
outside” because neighbor states, like those along the southern coast of the Mediterranean, are partially integrated into a hybrid, “pseudo-insider” status. The EU notes, for example, that:

> All the neighbouring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services, and capital. If a country has reached this level, *it has come as close to the Union as it can without being a member* (emphasis added) (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 6).

The Mediterranean neighbors, thus, are within the same document recognized as both within a non-negotiable “non-European” status and yet able to access to some of the benefits or membership. These divisions, instability, and ambiguity are not novel; they are not inventions of the EU era. The difference, instead, that was witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s, was a shift towards the institutionalization of the assumptions of a division or border between the EEC and “the Mediterranean.” Thus, as Europe became increasingly defined as a project of political and governmental coherence, so too did “the Mediterranean.”

One should note here that there is no critical discussion as to what comes to characterize a country as being “European” in the Treaty of Rome, or other EEC documents (EEC 1957). Furthermore, as previously examined, in the initial Treaty of Rome, the division between Europe and the southern Mediterranean was based on the “special” relationships of colonialism, not on any discussion about any geographic or cultural distinguishing claims. For example, however, the EU notes that “any decision on further EU expansion awaits a debate on the ultimate geographic limits of the Union” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 6), yet fails to ever list or indicate what the parameters or definitions are for this qualification of “European.”

Again, as Morocco found out with its membership bid in 1987, the line between Europe and the rest of the Mediterranean had apparently already been clearly drawn. Article 49 of the
Treaty of the European Union states that “any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union” (“Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union” 2010, 31). However, while this condition is asserted, there is no further discussion of where the limits of Europe lie, other than the acknowledgment that there is an imperative to end the “division of the continent” that is built upon the “shared cultural, religious, and humanist inheritance of Europe” (“Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union” 2010, 3).

The fate of Turkey seemed as though it would be different, as it also applied for membership in 1987 and was considered eligible based on the 1963 Ankara Association Agreement. Although it was not until 2004 that Turkey’s official negotiations for membership began, the history of the relationship between the EEC and the Mediterranean shows how borders are articulated and negotiated through, among other things, policy making. The Ankara Agreement, otherwise known as the Agreement Creating an Association Between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community, was created in 1963 and outlined the prospect of Turkey’s accession to the EEC. Turkey first applied for associate membership in 1959 but an interim measure was created before full accession was considered. Thus, the precedent was already set for Turkey’s consideration as “sufficiently European,” which undoubtedly influenced the future negotiations between Turkey and the European community.

The period defined by the Cold War is important for a few reasons. As David Campbell argues, the Cold War was a time where “the figuration of difference as otherness…rendered a contingent identity secure” (Campbell 1998, 195). That is, foreign policy increasingly became articulated through discourses of otherness and insecurity, and the Mediterranean not only became seen as increasingly strategic for Europe, it became an area that was institutionalized.
This institutionalization allowed for “the Mediterranean” to come to be seen as a secure regional identity, one that could be seen as wholly distinct from Europe. Yet, while there was no problematization or critical discussion of what constituted the designations and categorizations of the “Mediterranean” and “Europe,” the Cold War era saw the development, or at least an attempt to begin to develop, a coherent approach toward the Mediterranean.

*From the End of the Cold War to the Barcelona Declaration*

The developments of European policy during the Cold War marked a shift towards addressing “Mediterranean security in a regional and multilateral framework” (Del Sarto 2006, 10). The early 1990s were significant not only for the shifting politics in the post-Cold War era. In 1992, the Lisbon Summit outlined what would become the eventual progression towards the European Union. In discussing the prospect of the enlargement of the community, it is noted in an annex to the summit that the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean are geographic areas that remained of particular interest to the Union in terms of social stability and security (European Council 1992). For example, the Lisbon Summit concludes that the EC expressed:

> Its determination to continue its overall policy of contributing to the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean region, favouring a partnership approach capable of placing relations on a footing commensurate in scale and intensity with the links forged by geography and history (European Council 1992, 9).

Focusing mainly on economic development, this early articulation of the relationships between Europe and non-European Mediterranean states insists on a commitment to avoid a deepening of the North-South gap. Nevertheless, it is made implicitly clear that the divide between Europe and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean is assumed to be meaningful and that the Maghreb will remain a frontier of the Union (European Council 1992, 10). While prior to 1989 the EEC addressed the Mediterranean states largely through bilateral agreements, during the 1990s, there
was an increase in the emphasis placed on multilateralism and collective security regimes, particularly with regards to the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Del Sarto 2006, 2).

It was during the 1990s that “the Mediterranean” took a sharper focus in European Union foreign policy concerns, and attached to it was the now prolific language of security and stability in the region (Kienle 1998; Romeo 1998). The inherited language of European-Mediterranean relations from the Treaty of Rome remained embedded in the new emphasis on political and social security, as well as the sustained focus on economic development of non-European Mediterranean states.

We can see an example of how the Mediterranean took more precedent in EU discussions of external priorities in the Corfu Summit in June of 1994. At Corfu, there was an outline of the commitment to the ongoing EU relations with the Mediterranean states, yet again, the document lacks any discussion of what exactly constitutes the Mediterranean (European Council 1994, 7). In similar language to that expressed in the Treaty of Rome, the Corfu Summit’s conclusions characterize the EU’s ongoing commitment to a “special” relationship with “the Mediterranean” as one that seeks to create “an area of cooperation guaranteeing peace, security, stability and well-being” (European Council 1994, 12).

The Emergence of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

In 1995, the European Union formally institutionalized its relationship with its Mediterranean Neighbors. The Barcelona Declaration was signed in 1995, which led to the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), demonstrating the attempts on the part of the EU to define and govern “the Mediterranean.” The EMP and its successor, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), perhaps represent the most institutionalized mechanism for the
governance and management of the southern border of the EU. Although the Partnership was supposedly created to further the goals of the EU to tackle “emergent” problems of the post-Cold War Mediterranean area, it appears that it in fact marks an important moment in the institutionalization and regimentation of “the Mediterranean.” The Barcelona Process paved the way for a decades of border making projects and processes, all focused on defining the limits of “Europe” and “the Mediterranean.” This shift helps to contextualize the deepening of the institutional discourses that allow for an articulation, and legitimization, of the distinction between what counts as “Europe” and what counts as “the Mediterranean.” The EU recognizes, for example, the importance of the Mediterranean region in European politics, noting that:

All of the EU's Mediterranean partners have close historical and cultural links with Europe. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has provided a means to address many strategic regional questions relating to security, environmental protection, the management of maritime resources, economic relations through trade in goods, services and investment, energy supplies (producing and transit countries), transport, migratory flows (origin and transit), regulatory convergence, cultural and religious diversity and mutual understanding. However, the centrality of the Mediterranean for Europe, the importance of our links, the depth of our cultural and historical relations and the urgency of the strategic common challenges we face, needs to be revisited and given greater political prominence (Commission of the European Communities 2008a, 2).

This excerpt from the Commission communication outlining the transformation of the Barcelona Process into the Union for the Mediterranean highlights the strategic importance that the Mediterranean region has for the European Union. It also, consequently, makes reference to the integration and centrality of the Mediterranean for the idea of Europe. In other words, it is evident here that the EU both simultaneously acknowledges the inherent and interdependent historic and cultural linkages between “Europe” and the “Mediterranean,” while maintain the assumption that they are fundamentally exclusive concepts.
More specifically, the political shift towards the institutionalized “management” of the Mediterranean emphasizes the region’s importance as policy area for the European Union with regards to trade, noting in the Communication to the Commission on “Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” that “the EU and the partner countries have a common interest in ensuring the new external border is not a barrier to trade, social and cultural interchange or regional cooperation” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 6). Yet, the same document notes that “the course of the 20th century saw dramatic changes in geography, politics and culture both on the European continent and in the Mediterranean. These forces have not necessarily led to greater convergence” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 4). These changes are acknowledged by the EU as being important for the future of policy development and implementation, but this quote is significant also because it emphasizes the lack of convergence between “Europe” and the “Mediterranean,” all the while admitting that it would be, according to the institutional logic of the EU, impossible for the Mediterranean to ever “converge” with “Europe.”

Introducing the Barcelona Declaration

Concerned by the initial lack of coherency and structure within the European policy towards the southern and eastern Mediterranean, Spain and Italy drew the attention of the other EU member states to the southern borders (Balfour 2009, 100). The recognition that “the new political, economic and social issues” (Council of the European Union 1995, 2) of the Mediterranean “constitute common challenges calling for a coordinated…response” (Council of the European Union 1995, 2) framed the logic of the Barcelona Declaration and the subsequent Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The eventual Partnership between the European Union and its
Mediterranean area neighbors grew out of an Spanish and Italian proposal for “a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, an avowedly security-focused equivalent of the OSCE” (Youngs 2001, 57). In November 1995, the then-15 EU member states’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs drafted the Barcelona Declaration in an attempt to further institutionalize relations between the European Union and its southern and eastern Mediterranean neighbors. As the document notes, the Barcelona Process has the expressed intent of:

Establish[ing] a comprehensive partnership among the participants the Euro-Mediterranean partnership through strengthen political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension (Council of the European Union 1995, 2).

At the time of the initial 1995 meeting, 14 non-EU member states were included in the conference. At its conception, the EMP included the 15 EU member states, which expanded to include all 27 member states, as well as the “Mediterranean partners” including Algeria, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian territories. Libya was added as an observer, given the EU’s belief that Libya’s potential role in the Mediterranean region could potentially “positively contribute to the strengthening of the Euromediterranean cooperation (sic)” (Commission of the European Communities 2003a, 4). Yet, a question that remains unexplored is what can be made to count as “the Mediterranean,” and why it is so, in the context of the EMP.

The Barcelona Declaration guided the creation of the Barcelona Process, which had the stated intent of creating an alliance across the shores of the Mediterranean to establish the region as peaceful, stable, and prosperous (Council of the European Union 1995). The Barcelona Process paved the way for the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). With an initial budget of 5.5 billion ECU (European Currency Unit), the European Community
acknowledged that it would be a lengthy and costly process to achieve the stated goals of political and social reforms in the non-European Mediterranean states (Commission of the European Communities 1995a, 2).

Objectives of the Barcelona Process

The Barcelona Declaration was designed with the expressed intent of uniting the two shores of the Mediterranean, creating an “area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity” (European Commission 2000a, 2). Moreover, there is a direct recognition that an important aspect of this partnership is “an attempt to extend southwards the zone of peace and prosperity achieved within the EU, through a process of North-South integration” (European Commission 2005b, 4). Despite the achievements of bringing “together all the countries of the region at [the] ministerial level, even in very difficult political circumstances” (Council of the European Union 1995, 2), there were significant challenges posed in the years following the EMP. In its five year assessment, the European Commission noted that the Barcelona Declaration had paved the way for a partnership that intended to demonstrate an increased commitment towards equality with the southern neighbors, and that therefore the Barcelona Process should be considered “a proximity policy” (European Commission 2000a). However, despite making noted achievements the Commission also recognized that “the Middle East peace process [had] run into difficulties and affected the general Barcelona process; progress with the association agreements [had] been slower than expected [and] trade among the partners themselves [was] very low” (European Commission 2000a, 2). Despite downplaying the significance of these setbacks, the failures represent all the aspects of the original Barcelona Declaration.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is organized into three categories, or pillars, focusing on political stability, economic prosperity, and social cooperation for the states on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. In 2005, a fourth focus area, migration was also added, which was meant to address concerns on the part of some EU member that immigration originating from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is “threatening” the security of the EU.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has the stated long-term goal, which in many ways has been achieved, of “turning [the] Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity” (Council of the European Union 1995). The Mediterranean, as previously discussed, shifted in importance and role in European foreign policy in the 1990s, as the Soviet Union collapsed, the geopolitics of the region shifted focus and Europe began to expand its influence in its Mediterranean neighborhood. Increasingly, issues such as immigration, terrorism, trafficking and the source of energy supplies shifted European attention to the southern and eastern parts of the Mediterranean. Yet, the EU’s geographical imagination is generated by the institutionalization of its relationship with its neighbors. The metrics by which “Europe” is bounded are not clear, either. Instead, as the development of the EMP and the UfM demonstrate, the borders of the EU are never (institutionally) evident, they are practiced as a gradient or a spectrum. Mediterranean countries, then, are not simply “inside” or “outside” the EU, they are positioned in a geographically problematic limbo.

**Political and Security Basket**

The first pillar of the Barcelona Process, entitled “Political & security partnership: Establishing a common area of peace and stability,” focuses on the development of political
stability and security with an emphasis on ‘good governance’ practices, the development of
As already noted, the Mediterranean came to be seen as an area of strategic importance,
particularly with relation to political stability, and was outlined as such in the 1995 Commission
communication “Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (Commission of the European Communities 1995a).
Specifically, the EMP focuses the first basket on three complementary parts. There is a desire to
1) increase political dialogue on both bilateral and regional level[s], 2) ensure partnership-
building measures, and 3) develop the Charter for Peace and Stability, which was meant to help
identify areas of friction and disagreement in the Mediterranean (European Commission 2000b).

These parts constitute the largest of the objectives of the EMP. Political integration of
the southern EU member states and the states on the southern shore of the Mediterranean work to
increase interdependence and reduce the inequalities expressed across the Mediterranean, but
stop short of political integration into the EU. In other words, while the political basket focuses
on securitizing the Mediterranean basin, it highlights the ambiguity of the EU’s relationship with
its southern border. The political and security basket provides a logic to monitor and manage
political developments in the southern Mediterranean states, and sets up a “code of conduct” for
the area (Council of the European Union 1995).

Despite the attention and resources dedicated to developing democratic institutions and
political reform in southern and eastern Mediterranean states, it has been argued that “in practice
Mediterranean governments were hostile to funding encroaching upon the political sphere”
(Youngs 2001, 86). The structure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership specifically nested
discussions of political reform and the promotion of democratic governance with issues of
economic development, thus speaking to the role of discourses of democratization in the EU’s foreign policy creation. As Youngs notes, during the 1990s the European Union launched a set of narratives which linked democratization, economic development, and strategic interests in external states (Youngs 2001, 13). The political basket of the EMP, moreover, has perhaps been the least “successful” in terms of achieving stated goals, and has resulted in tensions over the goals of democratization on the part of the EU in the Mediterranean.

Economic and Financial Basket

The second pillar, “Economic & financial partnership: Creating an area of shared prosperity,” emphasizes the purported importance of “sustainable and balanced economic development of the countries of the Mediterranean region” (Council of the European Union 1995). Within the second chapter, the EMP notes three interconnected objectives:

The establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, EU support for economic transition and to help the partners meet the challenges posed by economic liberalization, and the increase of investment flows to the Mediterranean partners which will result from a tree trade and economic liberalization (European Commission 2000a, 10).

Furthermore, this pillar expresses a primary interest in mitigating poverty and lower life expectancy in non-European Mediterranean states, such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt, through an emphasis on development and the creation of a Mediterranean free-trade zone (Council of the European Union 1995; Philippart 2003, 210). With the adoption of the EMP, a large number of free-trade agreements were signed bilaterally between states, although the project of a “region-wide” free-trade area has largely failed (Handoussa and Reiffers 2001). Accordingly, the fight against poverty is a stated goal of the EMP, particularly as the per capita income in the EU is about ten times higher than in the Mediterranean partners (Noi 2011, 39).
The economic and political realms cannot be easily distinguished here, as the EU purports to increase living standards in its Mediterranean neighbor states so as to ease pressure for migration and to ensure political and social stability (M. Pace 2006, 113). Similarly, the EMP focuses on reduction of poverty to ease the pressures for international migration, which is an increasingly popular concern for EU member states. Although the fourth pillar that was added in 2005 speaks specifically to the challenge of migration in the region, the economic link between poverty and irregular migration is an important part of the economic pillar.

Another important part of the economic basket is the development of financial incentives that lead to “free trade” areas. The establishment of the Free Trade Area in the Mediterranean, despite a significant amount of emphasis placed on economic integration by the EMP, is largely seen as a failure. In 2000, however, intraregional trade only accounted for “5% of the 12 Mediterranean partners’ trade volume” while only “a mere 2% of European FDI flow[s] into the Mediterranean region” (European Commission 2000a, 13). As the EU notes, even after its inception, the Free Trade Area did not guarantee greater access to the internal markets of the EU to the Mediterranean partners, but rather focused on the creation of “horizontal exchange of goods, capital and human resources [with the intent of] creat[ing] markets large enough to attract significant foreign direct investment, which in turn are indispensable for sustainable economic growth” (European Commission 2000a, 11). The Mediterranean, in other words, is perpetually kept at an arms length. It becomes a space for the promotion of free trade, trade liberalization, and financial and trade investment, without being integrated into the benefits of the common market of the EU. The financial basket of the EMP emphasizes the economic interconnectedness of the EU and its Mediterranean neighbors, yet more importantly it illustrates the fact that financial interdependence is not an end in of itself, but rather a means. As the European
Commission admits, “free trade is not an end in itself, but rather a means to a much bigger goal: the creation of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean” (European Commission 2000a, 12).

This demonstrates that the non-European Mediterranean acts as an object of governance on the part of the EU. Financial governance and the creation of a zone of free trade in the Mediterranean works to extend the EU’s influence in the region, and is deeply interconnected and tied to political management of the region. The Mediterranean, in other words, becomes both integrated yet kept at an arms length, as the “sphere of influence” of the Mediterranean is extended into the region.

The principle financial instrument for implementing the economic efforts of the EMP is the Mesure d’Accompagnement (MEDA) program and was adopted by the Council in July of 1996. The MEDA program provides a structure through which economic and financial initiatives can be carried out, increasing the interdependence between the EU and its southern Mediterranean partners (Philippart 2001). However, in 2007 MEDA was replaced with a financial instrument of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). Between 2007 and 2013, the program has an estimated 12 billion euro budget for assistance given to the southern and eastern Mediterranean states (Commission of the European Communities 2008a; Noi 2011). It could be argued that the economic and financial pillar of the Barcelona Declaration constructs a regime of neoliberal governance, whereby the non-European Mediterranean becomes more deeply integrated into free trade areas. Similarly, of course, one could ask the question as to whether or not initiatives undertaken through this pillar are beneficial to the citizens of these non-European Mediterranean
states. Indeed, it seems as though this factor is acknowledged by the EU, given that after five years of the implementation of the EMP, the “per capita income in the EU [was still] approximately 10 times higher than that of the Mediterranean partners” (European Commission 2000a, 13), while the:

Combined gross domestic product of the Maghreb States (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia; population: 66 million) is less than that of Portugal (populations: 10 million), while the GDP of the Mashreq States (Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria; population: 86 million) roughly equals that of Greece or Finland (population: 10 and 5 million respectively) (European Commission 2000a, 13).

Although the financial objectives of the EMP have not been fully realized, the logic of economic governance that pervades the institutional logic demonstrates that “the Mediterranean” is used as an extension of European markets in some respects, without fully integrating the Mediterranean partners into the European single market. The Mediterranean region is seen here as both part of the European market and outside of it. In other words, it is demonstrative of the simultaneous integration and exclusion of “the Mediterranean,” illustrating its fluidity and hybridity, as well as the (EU)ropean inability to reinforce the strict borders and parameters of inside and outside.

Social, Cultural, and Human Basket

The third pillar outlines the goals for the EMP with regards to the social and culture objectives. The main objective of this basket is to promote intercultural dialogue, particularly through an emphasis on shared culture between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. The Barcelona Declaration specifically states that the partnership seeks to increase the role of mass media; develop training programs for young people in the area of human resources; improve health and well-being among populations; to establish closer cooperation between states with regards to the problem of irregular migration; and to fight
against drug and human trafficking, to name a few (Council of the European Union 1995). It is acknowledged in this portion of the Barcelona Declaration that the area of human resources and intercultural awareness cannot be divorced from the aims of economic development, and thus the “human” aspect of the Barcelona Declaration becomes important in this way.

This pillar has arguably been the most successful in achieving its goals. The EMP noted during its five year and ten year reviews that the three main projects undertaken by the cultural and social basket have had the most profound impact. These objectives are the development of three particular programs, which have been very successful in achieving their goals:

1. Euromed Heritage for the preservation and development of Euro-Mediterranean cultural heritage. The success of this initiative has encouraged the EU to launch a second phase in 2000.
2. Euromed Audiovisual supporting Euro-Mediterranean audiovisual cooperation projects in the field of radio, television and cinema.
3. Euromed Youth in the field of youth exchange aiming at facilitating the integration of young people into social and professional life and stimulating the democratization of the civil society of the Mediterranean partners in that it improves mutual comprehension and cohesion between young people across the Mediterranean basin (European Commission 2000a, 15).

After September 11, 2001, the states aims of the cultural basket became more highly emphasized, especially as the cultural aspects of the partnership were brought to the fore in discussions of the “incompatibility” of predominantly Muslim cultures in Europe (M. Pace 2006, 117). The EU notes that “one of the main obstacles to the further development of the Barcelona Process has been the inability, on both shores of the Mediterranean, to deal with the growing political significance of Islamist forces in Southern countries” (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2008, 16). While programs launched under this basket include a Euro-Mediterranean University and other youth programs designed to increase intercultural dialogue
and understanding and to overcome the challenges of xenophobia, the language used in the articulation of this basket and its objectives is dubious.

In a mid-term Euro-Mediterranean Conference that took place in Crete in 2003, the conclusions of the conference were that it is of the utmost importance to underline the fact that “the plurality and diversity of cultures is one of the most precious assets of the Mediterranean region to be safeguarded and preserved, as well as those that constitute the common heritage of humanity” (Commission of the European Communities 2003a, 14). Furthermore, the document notes that there is an importance in recalling “the very significant contribution which, throughout history, peoples of the Mediterranean basin have made to the mutual enrichment of cultures and civilizations” (Commission of the European Communities 2003a, 13).

While the Mediterranean acts as a Western hemisphere axis for north/south, and east/west divisions, the societies and regions across this space are hardly unified. Moreover, the EU navigates its borders to the south and the east interdependently, noting that:

Since the 1994 Essen European Council the Union’s ‘proximity strategies’—policies towards its peripheral neighbours—have been based on the concept of a European East-South equilibrium. In practice, this means that any new initiative for the East must be counter-balanced be a parallel initiative for the South and vice versa (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2008, 13).

Putting the practical objectives of this basket aside, one can see that these policy documents are informed by the assumption that “the Mediterranean” is a node where dialogue between “civilizations” works to “bridge” Europe, Africa, and Asia. As the third basket demonstrates, the cultivation of cultural dialogue and interconnectedness, according to the EU, “culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples
closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other” (Council of the European Union 1995, 6).

**New Objectives: The Fourth Basket**

In 2005, a fourth pillar was added to the EMP, with a specific focus on immigration (Portugal Presidency of the European Union 2007; Council of the European Union 2005). Although immigration is mentioned as an area for attention in all three of the other pillars, it became a large enough concern to warrant more concentration and is perhaps one of the most resonant of the EU’s ‘security’ concerns (Youngs 2001, 57). For example, in the original Barcelona Declaration, the third pillar placed emphasis on the fact that the partners recognize the “importance of the role played by migration in their relationships” (Council of the European Union 1995, 6).

With the increasing attention given to the rates of immigration originating from North Africa and the Middle East into the northern shores of the Mediterranean, many EU member states have reconsidered their immigration policies. It is true that political, economic, and social factors all contribute to the rates and flows of migration. The economic disparity between countries that sit along the southern shore and those in the north often provide a stark contrast to the “real” consequences of living on one continent or another. Moreover, the European Union notes that one of the major factors affecting the Barcelona Declaration’s implementation has been xenophobia in Europe, adding that “the process of Euro-Mediterranean inclusion within a single region cannot occur if its human dimension is excluded, especially if the ‘other’ is seen as a problem rather than as an opportunity” (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2008, 18). Thus, while migration has always been a contributing factor to all aspects of the EMP, it
was given even greater emphasis in 2005. For example, the European Union notes in a security report that:

The problem of dealing with immigration in accordance with the principles and values of the Barcelona Declaration has been a major challenge for Euro-Mediterranean relations, particularly now that the issue of migration has gained a central position in European political and security discourse” (European Union Institute for Security Studies 2008, 18).

At the Five Year Work Programme of the Barcelona Summit in 2005 the Partnership called for greater cooperation in the field of immigration and social integration (Council of the European Union 2005). Following this meeting, the first Ministerial meeting on migration was held in 2007, and there was again a renewed call for greater cooperation between EU and non-EU Mediterranean states (Portugal Presidency of the European Union 2007). In November of 2007 in the southern region of Portugal, Algarve, ministers from all Euro-Med countries met to discuss new methods of cooperation in the field of immigration in the region. This particular meeting was of significance because it was intended to reinvigorate the debate called for by the Barcelona Declaration for “enhanced cooperation in the fields of Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security through a comprehensive and integrated approach” (Portugal Presidency of the European Union 2007, 1). The ministers concluded at the end of the two day meeting, that despite the efforts set forth after the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration, by 2007 a new plan of action was needed, including:

1. Projects aimed at better security standards in travel documents, including the introduction of biometry and security services;
2. Training courses for the countries of transit, focusing on detection and identification of illegal (sic) migrants;
Additionally, this particular meeting concluded with the proposition that because migration was taking on more significance in Euro-Mediterranean policy, the ministers should “maintain regular meetings” for the purpose of “implementing the above-mentioned objectives and actions, as well as reviewing achieved progress and report” (Portugal Presidency of the European Union 2007, 7). The conclusions from this meeting illustrate the increased level of attention placed on migration in the Mediterranean region, particularly after 2005.

Specifically, this new pillar places a large emphasis on ways to create legal pathways to migration between the EU and other Mediterranean countries, finding ways to avoid brain drain, and promoting “sustainable return of migrants to their countries of origin” (Noi 2011, 44; Portugal Presidency of the European Union 2007, 2). Within the EMP framework, two major migration-based initiatives have been undertaken, with a combined budget of 7 million Euros (Noi 2011, 45). These two programs, entitled Euro-Med Migration I and II, work to create focus groups between the EU and non-member Mediterranean states to tackle the proposed need for legislative convergence and reform of migration law in Partnership states.

Given the already prolific discussions in European politics of the increasingly emergent “crises” of immigration in Europe, as well as the rising xenophobia and renaissance of far-right politics in Western European states, the EU considers the issue of immigration in the region particularly important (R. Joffé 1996; Del Sarto 2006). Although migration will be dealt with in greater detail in a later chapter, it is important to note that the issue of migration is a large policy concern for the EMP. Specifically, immigration can be seen as a nexus or intersection of the three other pillars of the EMP. It is here where the assumed distinctions, and “real world” consequences of this distinction between “the Mediterranean” and “Europe” come into much sharper focus. That is, not only is immigration seen as a security threat to the EU, it is positioned
as an economic and social “threat” to the cohesion of European member states.\(^8\) As one can see with the discourses of the Mediterranean as an importance space for the development of “civilization,” the articulation of these baskets of the EMP speak not simply to neo-colonial exercises of European dominance in the region. Rather, they are made coherent by relying on a set of presumptions and representations about what the Mediterranean is, and in turn help to crystallize and reproduce these representations, transforming them into the language of policy. Breaking down the structure of the four pillars of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Barcelona Declaration is then not simply an exercise of institutional familiarity, but also is concerned with positioning the discursive field in which “the Mediterranean” can be made into a policy and cultural “reality.”

**Assessing the EMP**

The projected scope of the EMP involved a dense network of institutions and programs between the EU and its southern Mediterranean neighbors, the “partnership” aspect of the Barcelona Process ended up being one of the weakest elements (R. Joffé 1996; Del Sarto 2006). Perhaps one of the biggest problems that the EMP witnessed was not simply with eurocentricity and lack of ability to foster dialogue and feelings of equality amongst partners, but was also a problem of trying to “do too much” with too little structure. On one hand, in 1999 the Commission noted “three and half years after the inaugural conference in Barcelona, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has developed and strengthened considerably and has given clear proof of its viability in sometimes delicate and difficult circumstances” (Commission of the

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\(^8\) This question of immigration as a presumed security threat in the Mediterranean region will be developed further in the next chapter, as another site of contestation in the iteration and articulation of borders along the Europe/Africa, and the north/south binaries.
European Communities 1999). Yet by 2003, almost ten years after the launching of the project, political reform in southern Partner states did not meet the EU’s expectations and the European Commission noted that “political reform in the majority of the countries of the Mediterranean has not progressed as quickly as desired” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 7). Furthermore, despite these mixed reviews on the part of the EU itself, the proposed Free Trade Area was not established by 2010, and there has arguably been “a worsening state of human development” in the region (S. Wolff 2012, 5). As Benita Ferrero-Waldner notes in the Barcelona process’s ten year review, the EMP had until 2005 functioned more as an intergovernmental process and acknowledged that the organization needed to better address “questions that are of the interest of the citizens and should be at the center of [the] concerns in the partnership” (European Commission 2005b, 1).

Among the southern Partners, a lack of cooperation and development on the political front, particularly amongst Israel and the Arab states of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt has contributed to the failures in the economic front. Thus, many of the attempts to create multilateral talks stalled, which left the European Union created bilateral agreements with individuals countries in the south (Vasconcelos and Joffé 2004, 4). The view of the project as mainly an economic one has highlighted the lack of political dialogue between southern partners themselves, as well as within north-south discussions, leading some to conclude that the political basket has perhaps been the largest shortcoming (M. Pace 2006; Commission of the European Communities 2003a; Vasconcelos and Joffé 2004). The EU acknowledged that “a reinvigorated cooperation within the region and with Mediterranean partners should be sought” (Commission of the European Communities 2003a), again emphasizing the political and strategic importance of the region for EU politics.
Returning to Barcelona in November of 2005 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Declaration, the Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government met for the first time since 1995. While a five-year work program was released that reiterated many of the same commitments that the Barcelona Declaration had a decade earlier, the Summit brought attention to the dysfunction of the Partnership, as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan were the only representatives of the non-European Mediterranean countries that were in attendance (Council of the European Union 2005; Youngs and Kausch 2009; Fernandez and Youngs).

The boycott of the Arab states at the 2005 Euro-Mediterranean Summit, along with the disappointing progress towards political and economic reforms and dialogue in the region led some to write the Partnership off, or at the very least allowed many academics and analysts to largely ignore any evaluation or explanation of the EU policies in the region (S. Wolff 2012, 5). However, despite its lack of success in terms of its stated goals, the EMP is largely important and significant for developing an understanding of the EU’s persistence towards trying to establish a meaning of the Mediterranean, in order to articulate a coherent policy towards the region. As Wolff notes, much of the literature on the EMP has focused on the political failures and has lacked any in depth discussion of the symbolic importance of the Partnership, failing to question “the dynamics at hand behind the EU’s governance in the Mediterranean” (S. Wolff 2012, 5). Others have argued that at the end of the day, the Barcelona Process and the EMP remains a neo-colonial mechanism which reinforces “a Eurocentric and dichotomist framework where true dialogue cannot flourish” (M. Pace and Schumacher 2004, 124). Clearly, there remains a large disparity between the southern and northern Mediterranean.
The Union for the Mediterranean

In light of the dubious acceptance of the EMP, in 2008 it was re-launched and shifted to form the Union of the Mediterranean (UfM). The UfM was inspired not solely through the revamping of the EMP, but was also influenced by a proposal on the part of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who envisioned a more institutionally integrated, formal union for the northern and southern Mediterranean countries. Sarkozy made his vision for an integrated Mediterranean Union clear during his acceptance speech after winning the 2007 presidential election:

I want to issue a call to all the people of the Mediterranean to tell them that it is in the Mediterranean that everything is going to be played out, that we have to overcome all kinds of hatred to pave the way for a great dream of peace and a great dream of civilization. I want to tell them that the time has come to build together a Mediterranean union that will form a link between Europe and Africa (“Nicolas Sarkozy: Victory Speech Excerpts” 2007).

Similarly, in a speech given the week after the election, Sarkozy again emphasized the plans for a Mediterranean Union, stating:

Je vais me battre pour une Europe qui protège, parce que c'est le sens de l'idéal européenne, pour l'union de la Méditerranée et pour le développement de l'Afrique, parce que le destin de l'Europe et l'Afrique incontestablement sont liés (“Discours D'investiture de Nicolas Sarkozy” 2007).

Although Sarkozy’s initial bid for an integrated union similar to the EU in the Mediterranean was rejected, the Union for the Mediterranean launched in 2008 and Sarkozy was thrilled,

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9 The original text reads: Je veux lancer un appel à tous les peuples de la Méditerranée pour leur dire que c'est en Méditerranée que tout se joue, et que nous devons surmonter toutes les haines pour laisser la place à un grand rêve de paix et de civilisation. Je veux leur dire que le temps est venu de bâtir ensemble une Union Méditerranéenne qui sera un trait d'union entre l'Europe et l'Afrique (“Le discours de Nicolas Sarkozy” 2007).

10 Author’s translation: “I am going to fight for a Europe that protects, because that is the meaning of the European ideal, for the Union for the Mediterranean and African development, because the destiny of Europe and Africa are incontestably linked.”
adding, “we had dreamt of it. The Union for the Mediterranean is now a reality” (Vucheva 2008).

Although initially facing skepticism from European leaders, namely Angela Merkel who warned of the development of “a Europe of private functions” (EurActiv 2012), the Union for the Mediterranean was created by the 42 Euro-Mediterranean Partners’ Heads of State and Government on July 13th, 2008 at a summit in Paris. The headquarters remained in Barcelona, as the UfM was meant to build upon the statues and goals of the Barcelona Process and the EMP. According to the UfM, the representatives at the Paris Summit demonstrated the shared:

Conviction that this initiative can play an important role in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as economic and social development; world food security crisis; degradation of the environment, including climate change and desertification, with the view of promoting sustainable development; energy; migration; terrorism and extremism; as well as promoting dialogue between cultures (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008a, 8).

In March of 2008, the European Council approved the idea of a Union for the Mediterranean, agreeing to call it “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” (Commission of the European Communities 2008a). The European Commission notes that the UfM is a way for the urgency of the common challenges that Europe and the Mediterranean face to be revisited and given greater political importance (Commission of the European Communities 2008a).

Although based on the goals of the Barcelona Process, the UfM expanded the limits of what could institutionally be called “the Mediterranean” and currently has 43 members. That is,

11 Present at the summit were Nicolas Sarkozy (President of the European Council), José Barroso (President of the European Commission), Javier Solana (Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union). Additionally representatives from the following countries were present: Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Syria, the Netherlands, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
the UfM came to represent, like the EMP, all 27 EU member states, as well as Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Israel, Mauritania, Albania, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and the Palestinian territories. In total, the UfM consists of forty-three states, between the EU and the Mediterranean partners, and one observer, Libya (R. Pace and Stavridis, 92). However, the UfM also added Monaco, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro to the partnership, noting that these states “have accepted the acquis of the Barcelona Process” (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008a, 8).

Rather than replacing the structure of the EMP, the EU acknowledged that the UfM was proposed to build upon the EMP, filling in any areas of weakness and leading to a further regimentation of the Mediterranean area (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008a).

The introduction to the statutes for the UfM display this objective quite clearly:

The participants at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean on 13 July 2008 agreed that the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) will build on the Barcelona Declaration of 28 November 1995, promote its goals...and further reinforce the acquis of the Barcelona Process by upgrading their relations, incorporating more co-ownership in their multilateral cooperation framework, strengthening equal footing governance and translate it into concrete projects, thus delivering concrete benefits for the citizens of the region (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008b, 1).

This change resulted in a further institutionalization of the Mediterranean, and shifted the definition of what was constituted as the “Mediterranean.” The statutes outlined as well the need to “establish new institutional structures to contribute to achieving the political goals of the initiative inter alia through the setting up of a Secretariat with a key role within the institutional architecture of the UfM” (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008b, 1). The Secretariat allowed for a more formalized relationship between the EU and its Mediterranean partners by introducing a Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General and focusing on increasing monitoring of projects funded and conducted by the UfM. Furthermore, the UfM
came with a stated interest in “increasing regional integration and cohesion” (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008a, 8).

By the mid 2000s, the existing European-Mediterranean relationships were being defined institutionally mainly through two pillars: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy. Yet, even with the three baskets set out by the Barcelona Declaration, there was little to no engagement with the underlying issues related to the economic gap and democratic deficit between the two shores of the Mediterranean. One of the outcomes of regimentations like the EMP is the production and reiteration of the border between Europe and the Mediterranean.

First, a decision was taken to establish bi-annual summits to “enhance the visibility of the Barcelona Process” (Gillespie 2008, 281). The new forum differed from the EMP, which used conferences of foreign ministers of each state to come to decisions regarding the partnership (Commission of the European Communities 2008a; Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008b). Thus, as the EU notes, this change was meant to provide more co-ownership to the multilateral relationships formed through the Barcelona Process (Commission of the European Communities 2008a; Balfour 2009, 102). This shift is significant given the criticism that the EMP received for lacking a substantial movement towards political “partnership” between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

Secondly, the relaunching and restructuring of the EMP into the UfM introduced a co-presidency (Commission of the European Communities 2008a; Emerson 2008; Gillespie 2008). This aspect was in the original French plan and survived the discussions and concessions to the final version of the UfM. The dual Presidency consists of one EU member state and a non-EU Mediterranean partner, “with the EU representation prioritizing Mediterranean countries among
its member states” (Gillespie 282). The important aspect of this restructuring of the Barcelona Process resides in the increased institutionalization of the relationship between the EU and the southern and eastern Mediterranean states. The resulting organization can read as an attempt to create a pragmatic, almost technocratic regimentation of relations between the European Union and non-EU Mediterranean states. The hope was that ultimately the failures of the EMP might become successes of the UfM. Again, the EU recommits to the idea that the UfM is an expression of equal partnerships, rather than of a hierarchical relationship between the north and the south of the Mediterranean (Commission of the European Communities 2008a).

As Balfour notes, it is striking that “the whole exercise that led to the creation of the UfM has not entailed a deeper reassessment of the strategy behind the EU engagement with the Mediterranean” (Balfour 2009, 105). Despite the institutionalized language of increased cooperation and partnership, the UfM, much like the EMP, remains first and foremost an area of European foreign policy rather than a “partnership.”

**Whose Mediterranean?**

One of the things that the various, changing attempts to further institutionalize the relationship between the Mediterranean and the EU brings to light is the lack of consistency as to what counts as “the Mediterranean.” Indeed, one could argue that it is hard to create a policy towards something that does not have clearly definable limits, which is what makes “the Mediterranean” such an intriguing aspect of EU foreign policy. In many ways, the articulation of the EMP and the UfM point to particular attempts to define “the Mediterranean,” and to give the term legitimacy as not simply a region, but also as a policy area. The (re)definition of the
region as a policy area allows for an overly simplified, seemingly homogeneous application of foreign policy and judgments towards the Mediterranean.

The question is perhaps not one of thus far unsuccessful bids to try and “quantify” or map the Mediterranean, but rather points to inherent contingencies in the articulation of regional politics and border making. Thus, one can understand the variance and slippery nature of the concept of “the Mediterranean” as not just a weakness in policy, but also as an irreconcilable tension between the making of borders and the creation of institutions, which are often reliant upon attempts to objectively quantify the Mediterranean “Other.” Furthermore, institutional development is seen as the bedrock of “political Europe” and it has been argued that “the Mediterranean cannot move forward without them” (Duran Lleida 2012). As Duran Lleida’s argument implies, there is the idea that “the Mediterranean” as a spatiotemporally bounded unit can “progress” in a teleological way towards “Europe.”

Identifying the Geographical Shifts

As we can see with the different memberships of the EMP and the UfM, there is no objective classification as to what the Mediterranean is. In other words, the fact that the two partnerships both employ the term, and concept, of “the Mediterranean,” yet they differ in definitions of the term shows that there is a large amount of fluidity of the discourses about the Mediterranean region (M. Pace 2002, 196). This is, clearly, not to suggest that it is anything but obvious which states border the Mediterranean Sea. Rather, it is important to note that “the Mediterranean” is never solely a question of which countries come to rest along the shore of the geographic barrier. Thus, as Michelle Pace acknowledges, it becomes evident that “the EU does not seem to have a clear idea of what the Mediterranean represents” (M. Pace 2002, 195).
However, this is not to suggest that the Mediterranean is not maintained as an important policy area for the European Union. The EU notes that it should “capitalise on the cooperation initiated in the Mediterranean to introduce reforms to the judicial system, improve police training and other cooperation in the fight against organised crime” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 12). The EU exhibits a large degree of uncertainty and ambivalence surrounding the “nature” of the Mediterranean in relation to that of “Europe.” This hybridity and inability to definitely draw and maintain static, finite borders is demonstrated by a Janus faced acknowledgment that the Mediterranean is “inherently” outside of “Europe,” all the while building a specific foreign policy of governing and managing the internal affairs of Mediterranean states. By both integrating and maintaining the exclusion of the Mediterranean states from the European narrative, the EU is engaging in politics and practices of border making that attempt to reify and re-codify the presumed distinction between the European “inside” and the Mediterranean/African “outside.”

Yet, the story is never this simple, and as is evident in the ambiguity with which the EU approaches and discusses governance in the Mediterranean, the region inhabits a sort of “in between” space, that is representative of the inherent fluidity of borderscapes. For example, while the EU notes that Mediterranean states are not eligible for EU membership, producing regional “integration is a recognised objective of the EU’s Mediterranean policy” (Commission of the European Communities 2003b, 5).

There is an important geographic shift that occurs in the institutional definitions of the Mediterranean, although at first glance it might seem inconsequential. While the EMP involves the 27 members of the EU, as well as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, as well as the recent additions of Mauritania and
Albania, the UfM expanded this definition. The Union for the Mediterranean added the membership of Monaco, and the Adriatic countries of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro (Commission of the European Communities 2008a; Balfour 2009). Many definitions of these boundaries only ever reside in footnotes, as there is often little institutional discussion within European documents as to what can and cannot be counted, in various contexts, as “the Mediterranean.” Thus, in the UfM’s context, the Adriatic coast is included in the Mediterranean, while in some other definitions of “the Mediterranean,” like that of the EMP, it is not.

From the outset, one can notice a tension between the various expressions of the boundaries of “the Mediterranean.” Obviously, there exists a plurality of conceptualizations of the Mediterranean, as a geographic category, a cultural designator, or as the cradle of “Western” philosophy and democracy. Yet, nevertheless, there is an attempt to deal with the contingency and lack of clarity of the term in the Commission documents. Besides never engaging in a deep debate as to where the limits of the Mediterranean lie (of course one could argue that this just is not the objective of institutions), there exist a multiplicity of vague attempts to outline what can be made to lie within the confines of “the Mediterranean”. For example, in a Commission proposal dealing with financial and technical measures in the Mediterranean, it is stated that the Mediterranean consists of the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, as well as Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey (Commission of the European Communities 1995b). Yet, in another document dealing with the parameters of the EMP, the Commission notes that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is meant to provide peace and stability to all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the southern and eastern Mediterranean (M. Pace 2002, 200; Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008b). At points, the Commission refers to the Mediterranean states as those
on the rim of the Sea plus Jordan, yet the reference can even extend to the Middle East (M. Pace 2002).

For example, even though it does not border the Mediterranean Sea (eliminating the obvious “geographic designation” definition), Jordan has been acknowledged as “by far the best performer in the application of MEDA funding” (Council of the European Union 2005, 14). In other words, the signifier of “Mediterranean” in this context is much less a question of geographic placement and much more one of governance and association, particularly in light of Sarkozy’s assertion that the UfM act as a “bridge” between civilizations. However, more importantly, the UfM comes into focus as a medium through which the EU extends its influence—absorbing its southern and southeastern “Others” into its structures of governance without challenging assumptions of where the limits of “Europe proper” are. For example, the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation of Jordan acknowledged that through MEDA, “the EU emerges as a key player in assisting Jordan’s efforts to face the challenges posed by economic reforms and liberalization” (European Commission 2005b, 15). Rather than resembling a partnership among equals, the Ministry of Planning’s comment reveals that the UfM and MEDA funds are extensions of EU mechanisms of governance.

Similarly, Portugal is considered an “honorary” Mediterranean state primarily “for cultural reasons and because of its geographic proximity to the region” (R. Pace and Stavridis, 105). This boundary can be viewed as even more slippery, as Pace and Stavridis note, as the Mediterranean can also be made, depending on the context, to include some Black Sea states such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia (R. Pace and Stavridis, 105). We have then an ever increasingly ambiguous map of the Mediterranean, as even Mauritania has come to join the UfM, a country that does not rest at all on the Sea. However, the UfM lacks clarity in its definition,
stating simply that membership of the UfM comprises “the 28 EU member states, the European Commission, and 15 Mediterranean countries” as well as the League of Arab States (“UfM Countries” 2013). Similarly, for a long time Albania was not classified as “Mediterranean” yet was eventually admitted to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 2007, becoming one of the first “Balkan” countries to create a formal relationship with the organization. As the Director of the Albanian Media Institute said in 2010, “Albania is not only a Balkan country, but also Mediterranean country” (Lani 2010). These discrepancies are important for contextualizing, more than anything, the fact that the “border” between “Europe” and “the Mediterranean” is fluid and historically contingent. More importantly, however, the Mediterranean becomes a vehicle for EU governance in its southern neighborhood. These policies demonstrate that the EU is far from operating with a clear distinction between “inside” and “outside.” Instead, it cannot escape the fluidity of its own borders, as it both actively excludes and absorbs its “Mediterranean” neighbors.

The ambiguity and hybridity exposed by the EU’s exercise of policy and power in the Mediterranean are simultaneously underscored by a sense of distinction and entanglement. For example, within the same ministerial meeting concluding document, the UfM recognizes that “dialogue between cultures is an essential tool for promoting mutual understanding,” (EuroMed 2008, 3) especially given “the EU’s commitment to enhancing the cultural component of its external relations” (EuroMed 2008, 3). However, within the same document, the Mediterranean is portrayed as a “basin of memories as well as the cradle and crossroads of civilizations” (EuroMed 2008, 1).

Similarly, Spanish Congress Member made a speech in 2012 that was featured on the UfM’s website, stating among other things that “they [the Mediterranean] are our neighbours,
our largest supplier of energy, they constitute the largest source of immigration, we share a sea and the same cultural and natural heritage of incalculable value and, above all, we share an historical destiny” (Duran Lleida 2012). It is clear here that although there are mutual experiences and cultural factors shared between the two shores, there remains a clear distinction between the “us” of Europe and the “them” of the Mediterranean, thus obscuring overlaps between the two regions. In a further display of the inability to maintain clear, secure boundaries between regions, the UfM recognizes that racism and xenophobia have “separated both shores of the Mediterranean” (EuroMed 2008, 1). This distinction, which is politically significant and potent, is preserved and anchored through the discourses emerging from the practices and policies of the UfM.

To be sure, neither the EMP nor the UfM were ever about expanding the European Union (Del Sarto 2006, 13). Rather, by articulating the “wall” between the “Euro” and the “Mediterranean,” the boundaries of the EU come to be protected, or reified, against the backdrop of the Mediterranean ‘Other.’ In other words, these dominant narratives about the Mediterranean are not just discourses reflective of various ‘truths’ or any particular reality per se. Rather, they are mechanisms for the institutionalization of the necessarily ambiguous concept of the Mediterranean, in an attempt to fix it (Bicchi 2006, 288). Thus, the ‘truth’ of the Mediterranean is constructed not just through academic discourses, but also through policy statements and institutional dialogues. “The Mediterranean” is very much a representation that, although cannot be narrowed down to any one definition, undergoes attempts to inject meaning and to crystallize or fix its designation. An analysis of these discourses, therefore, must recognize the interplay of the meanings and ‘truths’ constructed about the area, recognizing how it is that they come to pass.
The Institutional Making of the Mediterranean

Rather than being ways of dealing with these seemingly ‘inherent’ threats and security concerns in the region, perhaps the creation of these institutions is an attempt to get around these geographic inconsistencies. In this way, we can begin to understand the regimentation and institutional definition of “the Mediterranean” as a process of governance that is in effect an attempt to define and construct a region, rather than being a way to “deal” with the problems of one that is already there. The institutional construction of the Mediterranean is a project that at its core is concerned with the production of regional integration. For example, as the Council of Europe makes clear,

The future of the Euro-Mediterranean region lies in improved socio-economic development, solidarity, regional integration, sustainable development and knowledge. There is a need to increase co-operation in areas such as business development, trade, the environment, energy, water management, agriculture, food safety and security, transport, maritime issues, education, vocational training, science and technology, culture, media, justice and law, security, migration, health, strengthening the role of women in society, civil protection, tourism, urban planning, ports, decentralised co-operation, the information society and competitive clusters (Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean 2008a, 18).

Here, the EU demonstrates a strategic importance placed on Euro-Mediterranean relations that encompass a wide variety of institutional integration that is usually associated with EU enlargement. These economic, cultural, and political resources help to form “the Mediterranean” and show how it “consists of particular ways in which demarcations are expressed” (M. Pace 2006, 57). As we can see in the expression of the various meanings of the Mediterranean, even as the notion becomes institutionalized, it remains slippery and fluid, and can shift in differing contexts. For example, after the beginning of the American war in Iraq in 2003, the Barcelona Process was “adjusted” to include larger parts of the Middle East, so as to help develop a
regional strategy for the EU that would also include Syria, Iran, and Iraq in “the Mediterranean” (M. Pace 2006).

It remains evident that these region-building efforts on the part of the EU are not simply about economic integration. This argument, although valid to the extent that it can help to explain the mechanisms of governance in the EMP and UfM, fails to fully integrate a discussion of how “the Mediterranean” becomes a meaningful concept, or how it comes to be an expression of an assumed geo-cultural category. This highlights the concentration of power relations in the discursive nexus of “the Mediterranean.” Simply put, “the Mediterranean” is a geopolitical space, one that embodies power relations in expressions such as North and South, or European or Mediterranean. The discursive and institutional management of “the Mediterranean” should not be viewed as necessarily distinctive from the institutional, regimented forms of policy making in the area. That is, the discursive construction of space is not something that is “lost” in abstractions, as the EMP and the UfM show, it has very real consequences, which work to translate these slippery notions associated with “the Mediterranean” into meaningful geo-cultural categories. In this way, attention paid to the institutional making of “the Mediterranean” can help to elucidate how power relations function to reify the notion of a distinct, inert boundary between “Europe” and “the Mediterranean,” obscuring the contingency and hybridity of these spaces themselves.

However, one point remains clear with the EU’s increased emphasis on regional integration in the Mediterranean basin. The southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean are simultaneously integrated into fundamental EU practices, like economic and trade liberalization, yet remain explicitly excluded from any prospect of European enlargement. Put differently, the Mediterranean is constructed quite literally on the part of the European Union as both an
“insider” and an “outsider.” Euro-Mediterranean relations focus on extending European institutions and practices to the southern Mediterranean, but stops short of integrating the southern Mediterranean into the European political organization. The border, then, is anything but evident or clear-cut, even from the perspective of “Europe.” The ambiguous and seemingly paradoxical nature with which the EU categorizes and politicizes “the Mediterranean” functions, in effect, to problematize the paradigm of “self/Otherness” itself.

The Discursive Construction of the Border Between the Mediterranean and Europe

The institutional expressions of these definitions of “the Mediterranean” are just one example of the terminal forms that the power of discourses takes in the production and reproduction of regions (Foucault 1990). To articulate this relationship between the legislative and institutional discourses of the EMP and the UfM and other, cultural or historical narratives about the Mediterranean, we can look to Foucault’s notion of the dispositif. In essence, the intersection of these various discourses, of which the institutional, regimentation of the Mediterranean is just one, function to produce a dense network or nexus of meanings which come together to form knowledge about “the Mediterranean.” As Foucault argues, the dispositif is representative of “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault 1980, 194).

Thus, we can interpret any meaning of “the Mediterranean” as the intersection between these various elements, the connection between these heterogeneous elements. Foucault goes on to say that “a particular discourse can figure at one time as the programme of an institution,” and
can perhaps shift in another context (Foucault 1980, 194). Examining the production of the Mediterranean as a the myth of a stable and crystallized region must account for the interplay that occurs between both discursive and non-discursive, or institutional elements of this dispositif (Foucault 1980, 195). In short, the making of the Mediterranean through institutional manifestations of power relations attempts to fix any notion of “the Mediterranean” and, more importantly, works in a productive capacity to re-produce a meaningful discourse or narrative about the Mediterranean that may be used for other political or economic ends.

The construction of the Mediterranean is then not simply about furthering neo-liberal policies or perpetuating the specter of the colonial mentality, it functions to pin down this category of “the Mediterranean,” to give it meaning so that it can then be translated into specific political policies, or be deployed as a ‘region’ within narratives of “peace, stability, and development” (Council of the European Union 1995). In this way, we can say that “discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or ‘constitute’ them” (Fairclough 1993, 3). “The Mediterranean” as the object for EU governance regimes cannot be seen then as something that is acted upon by institutional policies outlined in the EMP or the UfM. Rather, “the Mediterranean” is produced in an attempt to secure its meaning through these institutions and the political and economic discourses that are enabled by them. The Mediterranean, then, can be seen as a site that is representative of the effects of power and the productive capacity of power relations, which are firmly rooted in political structures and that emerge from institutional iterations of belonging and “Otherness” (Hindess 1996; Fairclough 1993).

The space of “the Mediterranean” as a regional designation is produced through these discursive formations, which help to “organize, arrange, and redistribute discourses so that
certain privileged meanings can be established” (Debrix 2003, 12). The ways in which “the Mediterranean” is deployed in European political discourses, and thus how it is translated into policy articulations, is bound up with the organization and production of particular knowledges about the ‘region’ and what it means to be ‘South’ of ‘Europe’ (M. Pace 2006). Furthermore, the attempt to “solidify” the relationship between “the Mediterranean” and ‘Europe’ is taken for granted to the point that it becomes translated into policy without ever being questioned. Thus, as Daguzan notes, “the Mediterranean” has become so evident that “nobody raises the fact that the very concept itself is a political invention” (Daguzan 2009, 387). The fact that the Mediterranean ‘goes without saying’ and is reified as a ‘region’ through these institutional logics that underline the creation of the EMP and the UfM functions to reproduce a discursive continuity of categorizations that instill meaning in political entities (Wilmer 2003, 223). In this way, the Mediterranean is very much a story that we tell ourselves, one that refuses to die because it becomes reproduced not simply in narratives about historical greatness, but also through the condensation and translation of these stories into policies and institutions. It is, as Franke Wilmer claims about IR more broadly, as if “the Mediterranean” does not represent a thing or a unit, but is rather representative of a web of stories and meanings that are all woven together to form a story or a fiction that attempts to assert itself as existing within an objective reality (Wilmer 2003, 223).

Yet, the EU maintains a distinction between itself and “the Mediterranean,” noting that the goal of dialogue within the UfM is not “to change ‘the other’ but, rather, to live peacefully with ‘the other’” (Commission of the European Communities 2003a, 14). While acknowledging the distinction between “Europe” and “the Mediterranean,” the UfM also notes that “Europe and the Mediterranean countries are bound by history, geography and culture” (Secretariat of the
Union for the Mediterranean 2008a). The EU operates under the dual assumption that it can neither fully integrate nor exclude the Mediterranean. Acknowledging that it is both bound by history yet distinguished from its Mediterranean neighbors produces a foreign policy that extends mechanisms of governance into this “neighborhood,” illustrating the absence of the clearly defined limits of the notion of “Europe.” Furthermore, these systems of governance and institutionalization, while both recognizing this duality of the EU’s relationship with its southern neighbors, latches onto potent historical narratives that similarly haunt any attempt to close off and isolate the idea of a distinct and obvious “Europe.”

As Diez notes, perhaps the consequences of understanding how these discursive formations come to pass, or how regions are embedded with political and cultural meaning lie in the attempt to “fill the contested concept of European governance with meaning” (Diez 2001, 16). To put it another way, it is around the notion of the “Mediterranean” that other presumably meaningful concepts, like Europe/Africa, North/South, or Self/Other can have a point of reference or fixation. For this to happen, however, there must be an attempt to fix or stabilize the notion of the Mediterranean itself. It is in this space that projects like the EMP and the UfM work to produce meaning, to attempt to consolidate the various slippery, dubious denotations of the “Mediterranean.”

Conclusion

The politicizing and integrating practices of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership are often seen as mechanisms for asserting and reproducing the self/Other dichotomy of “Europe” and “the Mediterranean” (Aliboni and Ammor 2009; M. Pace 2002; Romeo 1998; S. Wolff 2012). Yet, the institutional documents that outline the agenda of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean demonstrate another function. They are representative of a
set of practices that not only illuminate the impossibility of any clear, evident borderspaces and work to produce “fuzzy borders” between the European Union and its surrounding neighbors. The EMP and the UfM simultaneously acknowledge and reject regional, cultural, and economic integration between the “Mediterranean” and “Europe.” Interestingly, with the promotion of “integration projects” in the Mediterranean, the EU simultaneously deepens the real and virtual walls of “Fortress Europe.” Rather than ultimately achieving simply the stated goal of “sharing everything with the Union but the institutions” (Prodi 2002b), the UfM and the EMP demonstrate that borders are fluid in regards to the EU, despite the attention and resources put into “securing” them.

Both the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean demonstrate discursive and institutional iterations that regiment and institutionalize the “Mediterranean region” while exposing the slippery nature of borders. The production of institutional discourses and policies about where the region lies, or where its parameters might be, seek to fix a notion of “the Mediterranean” as an “inert fact of nature” (Said 1979, 4). Yet, these attempts to fix and anchor notions and limits of “Europe” and “the Mediterranean” always fall short, they are representative of a continual, ongoing search for inert borders. Thus, the EU maintains and demonstrates that “securitization” of borders is both a process of integration and divorcing the “Mediterranean” from the (EU)ropean narrative. In a contradictive and Janus-faced directive, the EU both attempts to integrate and isolate its southern Mediterranean neighbors, expending a vast amount of monetary and political energy to pursuing both of these aspirations. What is clear here is that according to the EU, the Mediterranean can neither be made to count as fully European nor fully “Other,” it must simultaneously be brought into institutions and yet excluded from the narrative of full belonging.
Romani Prodi expresses this sentiment during a speech in 2002 while serving as President of the European Commission. Prodi argues that although the Mediterranean and Europe are difficult if not impossible to entangle, they must, for the “survival” of the EU, be seen as inherently separate. As Prodi notes:

At a time when we are building a new Europe, a Europe that covers the continent, when we are trying to work out new ways for peoples and different cultures to live and work together, when we are creating a new diversity within unity, when the frontiers of Europe are stretching out, we must also develop our strategy towards the regions closest to Europe and, above all, be decisive in our Mediterranean policy. To build the new Europe but neglect the “cradle of Europe”, the Mediterranean, would clearly be a grave mistake. But the different situations in this region make the task particularly difficult. We could even ask whether, from a political and economic point of view, the Mediterranean really exists (emphasis added) (Prodi 2002a).

Prodi acknowledges the power of European institutions that purport to establish and draw the boundaries of “Europe.” Yet, Prodi says something else more profound about the Mediterranean neighborhood project. He recognizes that the Mediterranean is both integral to the idea of an integrated, essentialized “Europe” and yet must be the “frontier” of political Europe.

This demonstrates that these institutions are sites of power relations and knowledge production. The different definitions of the Mediterranean throughout the documents of the EMP and the UfM are indicative of two things. First, the plurality of definitions of “the Mediterranean” shows an inherent ambiguous nature of the region. In other words, they show that it is not self-evident as a region, or perhaps even as a notion.

Secondly, the multiplicity of definitions speak to, I argue, represent an attempt to overcome or mitigate this inherent contingency of “the Mediterranean.” Put differently, these institutional practices are exercises not just in policymaking, but also in ‘region’ making, or border making. They produce many ‘knowledges’ about the Mediterranean, which help to
confuse and re-produce boundaries and borders—culturally, politically, and geographically. The borders that are meant to divide regions, that claim to delineate geographically and culturally bound entities never point to regions that are “as cohesive or homogeneous as they might be made to appear” (M. Pace 2006, 103). The construction of “the Mediterranean” is not only the production of a cultural abstraction, but has ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ consequences in the articulation of foreign policy decisions. These institutional discursive formations about where the Mediterranean is made to rest reproduces a hierarchical division between the EU and its southern neighbors, one that speaks not simply to spatial boundaries, but to temporal and cultural ones, as well. In other words, the mechanisms of governance created by these institutions are not simply a question of “governing” the EU’s southern partners, but also work to re-produce socio-cultural boundaries.

To conclude, while the institutions that arise from the Barcelona Process are often the subjects of analyses of EU foreign policy making with respect to its so-called “Mediterranean” neighbors, I contend that these institutions are deeply and intimately involved in the construction and crystallization of a representation of “the Mediterranean” as a borderspace. Thus, the critical reading of the institutional and discursive making of the Mediterranean through the practices of the EMP and the UfM demonstrate one of the ways in which the Mediterranean is made to seem like a self-evident border between Europe and the ‘Other.’ This institutional making of the Mediterranean should then be seen as a central thread in the complex “knot” that makes up “the Mediterranean.” This particular site shows the dense relationship between policy making, borderization, and power relations.
Chapter 3: Mythologies of Migration: The Migrant Body as a Site of Power Relations

Introduction

This chapter demonstrates that the inherent liminality and hybridity of “the Mediterranean” as a border space is manifested in political debates about the “crisis” of immigration in Southern Europe, which is bound up in the production of meaning surrounding the North/South axis that often frames European politics. This chapter begins from the premise that migration is a nodal point, one through which the relationship between discursive formations and power relations can be interpreted as they relate to the processes of border making. The question of immigration in southern Europe is one that is at the center of countless political discussions and policy decisions within the European Union. Irregular immigration in Europe is a complex issue that acts as a nexus for social, economic, and political concerns. The example of immigration debates in the Mediterranean demonstrate the productive capacity of the external borders of “Europe” in the reproduction of the subjectivity of the “immigrant” as the non-European “outsider.” This chapter is an account of the ways in which discourses of immigration and the representation of the migrant body act as sites of power relations in the remaking of the Mediterranean as a border. The goals of this chapter are twofold. First, it becomes clear that the EU engages in discursive and institutional practices that reinforce a narrative of the irregular immigrant as both a societal “security threat” and as a subject in need of humanitarian protection. This bipolarity demonstrates the ambiguity and hybridity of the southern borders of the EU, and ultimately illustrates the impossibility of asserting a self-evident borderspace. Consequently, this chapter also sheds light upon the complex practices through which the EU names and catalogues the “migrant body,” not as a “nuisance,” but rather as a site of the production of meaning.
surrounding the projection of “Europe” through the making of the Mediterranean borderspace.

This chapter is an in depth examination of another way in which “the Mediterranean” comes to be positioned alongside a presumed axis of North/South that comes to distinguish Europe and Africa. Immigration is a powerful site of political contestation, along which the making of this axis is particularly salient. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to begin to understand the ways in which borders work to re-produce concepts of homogenized categorizations without taking into account the symbolic importance of the individuals who cross borders, as the two concepts co-constitute one another (Düvell 2006a, 29). Specifically, I argue that the migrant body is a particularly dense and potent site of border making, as a practice of state sovereignty.

Drawing on narratives produced within European Union documents regarding irregular immigration, I argue that one can both elucidate the ways in which “the Mediterranean” is re-bordered and reified as a North/South axis, separating Europe from Africa. It is within these spaces that the liminality of the Mediterranean plays out in key political and policy debates. The debates about the “crisis” of irregular migration in southern Europe act as a space whereby the politics of the liminality of the Mediterranean are played out, and that these anxieties are obviated through insistence upon the space as representative of an evident border. This analysis

12 There are a number of terms that are used to refer to the act of violating immigration laws. While it is in popular use in some discourses regarding migration, I choose to not use the term “illegal immigrant” because it is politically loaded and is problematic in nature. The term “irregular immigration” refers to the act of crossing borders illegally as well as the act of violating immigration laws by overstaying visas. For the purposes of this chapter, irregular migrants are “non EU-citizens who have no residence status at all, and/or people whose activities would make them liable to expulsion if detected” (Triandafyllidou 2010a, 4). According to the European Commission, irregular migration includes third country nationals who enter a member state illegally, those who enter legally but overstay a visa without authorization, or asylum seekers who do not leave after their request is rejected (Commission of the European Communities 2006).
focuses on discursive formations, as discourse comes “into being through the exercise of power, [and] creates a specific economy of ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ (Togral 2011, 220; Foucault 1980, 93). Discourses and narratives regarding migration in “the Mediterranean” “cannot be detached from the historical and social context in which they emerge” (Togral 2011, 220).

The Mediterranean is an area of key interest in discussions of irregular immigration into the European Union, as it “functions as a main “border” crossed by migrants from North Africa” (Lyons and Huegler 2010, 438). The migrant body is a site where the EU negotiates its southern borders, injecting the symbol of the migrant with meaning about the locality of borders. It is extremely difficult to identify any one factor as the most prominent in analyses of migratory patterns in the Mediterranean region. However, rather than being solely a question of economic or political stability and security for the so-called “welfare” states, narratives about the “threat” of immigration in the Mediterranean area are concentrated sites of the production of meaning and representations of “the Mediterranean.” The “problem” of irregular migration in Europe, particularly with regards to the image of migration in southern Europe, often evokes discussions of the “threat” to European security, economy, or culture. Irregular immigration is an important subject, and is a magnet for discussions of human rights, humanitarian crises, political debates, and economic and social policies. The “plight” of the irregular immigrant in Europe gravitates towards discussions of xenophobia and racism, especially with the public opinion in many member states leaning towards suspicion of irregular immigrants (Lyons and Huegler 2010, 446; Triandafyllidou 2010b, 191).

The real effects of experiences that individuals have at border spaces cannot be understated. As André Simonyi and Jessica Pisano argue, for would-be immigrants, “whether they are mythological expressions of social beliefs about foreigners, borders, and law
enforcement officials or players in real-life dramas – the state border is far more than a line to cross” (Simonyi and Pisano 2011, 222). Moreover, the debate surrounding irregular immigration as a political problem often misses the mark, by drawing attention to the “outsider” within and in doing so distracts from the contentious nature of the frontiers or borders themselves. Thus, while irregular immigration is certainly a source of fuel for political debates in the European Union, one should not take for granted that the immigration “problem” is one that is based solely on numbers or demographic shifts. Instead, I seek to draw attention to the other effects of these discourses, which can be read as symptomatic of deep anxieties about the complex process of trying to imagine the limits of “Europe,” the desire to be able to distinguish the “outside” from the “inside.”

The symbolic value of “the migrant” resides largely in the political attention and energy directed towards it as well as policies that emerge from it. For those that live in border spaces, as well as those individuals who cross or attempt to cross borders, borders are never representative of “obvious” geographic contours of the land (Simonyi and Pisano 2011, 222). Simonyi and Pisano note that the power of borders comes from the fact that “people define and redefine the social meaning of bounded national communities” through reading the meanings of borders (Simonyi and Pisano 2011, 223). Borders are instrumental in the assertion and reproduction of values and differentiations between individuals and groups.

The inability to speak of “the Mediterranean” as a clearly demarcated border that separates “Europe,” “Africa,” and “Asia” is manifested in anxieties about a presumed “crisis” of immigration in Southern Europe. Discourses that position irregular immigration as an important
center to political decisions are reminders that, as Didier Bigo explains, “the territorial framework of the European Union is not stable” (Bigo 2005, 59). As Bigo explains,

The notion of border is very often considered a materialized line between two spaces. Borders are associated with differentiation between inside and outside, with control of who crosses the line. This is important since the notion of border is embedded, as far as common knowledge is concerned, into a theory of the territorial state that inhibits the capacity to understand the passage of frontier controls beyond the national territory and that is blinded by the juridical perception of embassies and consulates as delocalized parts of the nation-state. Borders, control and state are by definition intertwined (Bigo 2005, 52).

Immigration is a central part of these articulations of the relationship between borders and the state. Moreover, “the migrant body” acts as the source of many popular discussions, both within and outside of academia, about the “changing” nature of borders in a “globalized world.”

The political debates about migration often work to obscure the inherent messiness of “the Mediterranean” while still insisting on its obvious nature. Thus, the act of the migrant crossing the assumed threshold of the border is a deeply symbolic act, and has a productive capacity as well. In this chapter I show that the discourses of the crisis of immigration in Europe are not simply about fear of the undefined “Other,” but rather are illustrative of the political manifestation of the hybridity of “the Mediterranean.” Borders are never fixed in space, but are products of continual processes that work to re-produce the notion of a static boundary. These representations of borders as fixed in space fail to account for the lack of clear delineation between notions of any homogeneous “inside” and “outside” spaces of “Europe.”

The “problem” of irregular migration in Europe gathers much political debate within European politics as “national and international press report cases of irregular migration almost every day; and the public, policy makers and experts hotly debate the issue with an intensifying interest” (Gonzalez-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou, Anna 2009, 148). A critical perspective on
the formation of cultural and political spaces emerges not simply from “objective” geographic movements and transitions across state boundaries, but also from a problematization of the relationship between the re-production of state boundaries and the migrant body. One could say, then, that reframing the “problem” of immigration is a necessary puzzle piece to the untangling of the re-production of borders and identity as practices of sovereignty (Fassin 2011, 221).

Structure of the Chapter

This chapter begins by analyzing and contextualizing the European Union’s development of a unified migration policy. Then, it examines many of the current streams of political debate within Europe surrounding the problem of irregular immigration in the Mediterranean. I argue that the “migration debate” is organized around several key stories or threads that manifest in European Union political discourses and policy formations of the supposed “crisis” of immigration in the Mediterranean and Southern Europe. Specifically, this chapter highlights the narratives of the various “threats” posed by migration and the migrant as a security concern, a humanitarian crisis, an economic crisis, and as it manifests as cultural anxieties in Europe. These dimensions of the problem of migration in southern Europe are important to contextualize because they are often intertwined and are interrelated elements in arguments about the need to strengthen border control along the EU’s southern coast.

From the perspective of these “crises,” a picture is often painted of the issue of immigration in Europe as a dire threat to the cultural and political cohesiveness of the European Union. Indeed, reports and assumptions that immigrants strain “local resources available for health care, education, and other public services” become reproduced in cultural narratives about the dangers of unchecked migration (Popescu 2012, 95). While irregular immigration in the Mediterranean is particularly visible in terms of the political and cultural attention that it gets,
especially within discourses of the “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1993) and the increase of predominantly Muslim populations in Europe, this chapter shows that the “reality” of the numbers of irregular migrants in the European Union does not support the extent to which the Mediterranean is seen as the “source” of such a crisis. Put simply, despite the attention given to the migration routes and the “rickety boats” in the Mediterranean, border crossings in Southern Europe represent only a minority of irregular migrants in Europe, a fact which lends itself to a host of questions about the persistence of these models that this chapter situates in a larger framework of border making in Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Situating the “Problem” of Migration in the Mediterranean

From a statistical perspective, travelling across the Mediterranean Sea proves to be an extremely dangerous venture. With this in mind, it is clear that the persistent number of migrants attempting Sea crossings speaks to a degree of economic and political desperation and necessity that drives migration. Put differently, this section contextualizes the problem of irregular immigration in the Mediterranean by outlining the historic and contemporary symbolism of the space as a realm of fluidity and movement of people.

It is sometimes argued that the Mediterranean, unlike the other external borders of Europe, is “apparent” and “has for centuries provided a natural border separating European countries from those of North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia Minor” (Lyons and Huegler 2010, 437). However, it is in fact impossible to characterize the Mediterranean in this way. “The Mediterranean” it is not a “naturally apparent” border, but has rather developed a history of production and reproduction (Popescu 2012, 24).
Iain Chambers notes that the meanings injected into the contemporary notion of the Mediterranean “are evidently entangled in a cultural and historical net cast over centuries, even millennia” (Chambers 2008, 3). The fear of being “flooded” by immigrants is similarly tied to historical characterizations of the Mediterranean as a space of transition and fluidity, or even as the source of historic “invasions” of the “Muslim outsider.” Migration has long had a place in the development of a concept of the Mediterranean and “played a major role in the rise and fall of classical Greek and Roman civilization, and in the expansion of European imperialism” (Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993, 149). Contemporary conceptions of “the Mediterranean” are fundamentally tied to migratory patterns and cultures of migration in the area (Chambers 2008, 123; Lyons and Huegler 2010, 437).

However, within the last century, migration has taken a much more politically charged importance in European politics. After World War II, the southern European countries experienced an increased level of emigration (Lahav 2004, 30). Southern European populations were important sources of migrant labor for western and northern European economies. For example, a high demand of labor needs in Germany in the 1960s led to a guest worker program that drew a large number of Turks migrating from the high unemployment rate in Turkey. The post-World War II labor shortage in Western Europe was filled largely by migrant workers, many of which have now established diaspora communities in Western European countries.

In this context, the Mediterranean was often a source of welcomed immigration, and in many regards still serves that purpose today. Contemporarily, southern Mediterranean countries still serve this purpose, and migration in the region has strong economic motivations. This is particular important, as the European Union’s Third Annual Report on Migration outlines, because of Europe’s ageing population and labor shortages (European Commission 2012a, 4).
Yet, despite the importance of migration from the Mediterranean for labor market purposes, there remains a heavy stigma with regards to the populations themselves, and migration as an issue carries a lot of political significance.

The Agreement signed in Schengen, Luxembourg on June 14, 1985 between the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France worked towards an eventual disintegration of border checks between the states involved. This created a framework for a larger, more expansive “Schengen Area” that now includes 26 EU Member States and has led to complete abolition of passport controls when traveling between the signatory states. While the Agreement has been supported for its economic benefits, encouraging “free” trade of capital and labor, it has been highlighted in political discussions about the “insecurity” it could provide for some EU member states. In particular, the tension surrounding the seemingly disintegrated practices of sovereignty that are performed at state borders have led to anxieties about the inability to detect irregular immigrants traveling between EU Member States.

The Schengen Agreement, which has led to a zone of free movement, has also proved to be a messy process, as “the elimination of the…internal borders has naturally diverted the attention to the EU’s external border, which has become deterritorialized and is under the control of 27 different border law enforcement agents” (S. Wolff 2008, 256). Although, as I highlight in this chapter, the “reality” of irregular immigration in Europe does not seem to warrant the amount of attention focused on marine-based migration attempts in the Mediterranean area, the issue is nonetheless the subject of many political campaigns, policy formation, and cultural “anxieties.” As Gabriel Popescu argues, immigrants themselves have become “political lightning rods and scapegoats for globalization-induced fears” (Popescu 2012, 95). The political
attention given to immigration through the southern borders of the European Union acts to reify the Mediterranean as a clean cut border.

The reality of the humanitarian concerns in the Mediterranean cannot be understated. Amnesty International estimates that some 1,500 people drowned trying to cross the Mediterranean in 2011 alone (Amnesty International Press Release 2012). In fact, just the day after a boat carrying potential asylum seekers sank off the coast of Lesbos, Greece in December of 2012, Italy reported that it was teaming up with NATO to perform a search and rescue mission off the coast of a tiny Italian island Lampedusa, which lies off the coast of Tunisia. As this particular boat neared Italy, it ran into trouble and “crews rescued 56 people and recovered one body, but passengers said dozens more were missing” (Associated Press 2012). From these unfortunately common events, survivors that are not deemed eligible for asylum are returned back to their country of origin, many of who eventually attempt the dangerous journey again, which contributes to what Feldman calls a “peculiar migration policy” (Feldman 2012, 30), whereby the EU both works to save migrants from the humanitarian crisis of sinking boats, only to send them back, many times, to extreme poverty. The ubiquitous stories about the reality of danger that individuals risk to migrant to Europe raise many questions. Indeed, a real concern on the part of organizations like Amnesty International, and even the European Union, is how these migrants’ lives can be saved when attempting to cross the sea.

Just as stories of the sinking of vessels carrying migrants is a common topic in both news media outlets and within humanitarian discussions within the EU, it is not difficult to find news articles cataloguing what seems to be an unending “onslaught” of attempts to “breach” the

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13 The event in Lesbos was so significant that it is now referred to as the “2012 migrant boat disaster,” where a total of 18 individuals drowned after their ship set sail from Turkey and sank off the coast of Greece.
southern borders of the European Union (Pugh 2001, 1). Within the concerns about illegal border crossings, there is particular attention paid to the border between Greece and Turkey as well as entries into Spain and Italy, as they are commonly assumed to be the more “porous” sections of the maritime border (S. Wolff 2012, 122; Council of the European Union 2012; Gonzalez-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou, Anna 2009, 111).

Indeed, it seems as though there is more to the story of the question of irregular migration in Europe than simply learning how to “control the borders” more humanely. Bound up in these debates about safety of migrants, security of the EU, and the physical borders of Europe are narratives about the cultural borders of Europe vis-à-vis the Mediterranean ‘Other.’ This now “classic” image of the North African migrant entering the EU through Spain or Italy is particularly important as it speaks to the liminality of the region. That is, the Mediterranean contains both the source of and “weakness” against unwanted migration into Europe. The shores of the Mediterranean are extremely important in an analysis of the relationship between discourses of irregular migration and the construction of identity, especially given that “since the early 1990s the Mediterranean Basin has been at the crossroads of irregular migratory flows” (Icduygu 2007, 148). The southern shores of the Mediterranean produce the largest amount of sea based attempts to “infiltrate” the borders of “Fortress Europe.” At the same time, the northern shores of the Mediterranean are the last “line of defense” towards curbing entrance into Europe.

It is in this way that the interstices between power and discourse can be illustrated by migration in the Mediterranean. While the questions of international law, obligations on the part of states, and human rights are undoubtedly important concerns with regards to irregular migration into Europe, this chapter proposes a deconstruction of the effects of discourse about
migration on the re-construction and insistence upon borders and sovereign space, and suggests that the Mediterranean is emphasized and constructed as an unquestioned and finite border in the narratives of irregular migration in the EU.

Moving Towards a European Migration Policy

Even though the European Union holds values of political interdependence and integration, the Member States have historically held largely individualized, different immigration, refugee, and asylum policies (Bank 2000). Compared to other areas of integration, movements towards a common immigration policy is a new direction taken for the EU (Ette and Faist 2007, 5; Düvell 2006b, 3). This creates discrepancies not just in how border crossing sites are monitored and enforced, but also puts into question the lack of standardization regarding how irregular immigrants are handled, detained, and deported or integrated.

Perhaps one of the most substantial measures to create a common migration policy in the EU was taken in 2011. The initiation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), which is a new strategic framework developed from an older Global Approach to Migration adopted in 2005. The GAMM is meant to focus specifically on external migration policy and governing the Schengen area and is divided into four pillars, facilitating legal migration and mobility, preventing irregular migration and trafficking, promoting international protection, and maximizing “the development impact of migration” (European Commission 2011c, 7; European Commission 2012a). As is noted in GAMM:

In its Communication of 4 May, the Commission highlighted the need for the EU to strengthen its external migration policy by setting up partnerships with non-EU countries that address issues related to migration and mobility in a way that makes cooperation mutually beneficial…The European Council’s June Conclusions invited the Commission to present an evaluation of the Global Approach to Migration and set a path towards a more consistent, systematic and strategic policy framework for
the EU’s relations with all relevant non-EU countries. This should include specific proposals for developing the Union’s key partnerships, giving priority to the Union’s neighbourhood as a whole (European Commission 2011c, 2).

Citing irregular immigration as one of the EU’s top priorities on its political agenda, specifically with regard to the southern Mediterranean, the GAMM outlines the need to reflect strategic interests of the EU. The GAMM is now largely considered to be “the overarching framework of the EU External Migration Policy” (European Commission 2011c, 5). The GAMM emphasizes the importance of bilateral dialogues with potential candidate countries that are sources of irregular immigrant populations, like Turkey (European Commission 2011c, 8). Yet, despite these developments to address migration and mobility in general, as of 2013, there is still not common asylum or refugee policy for all Member States of the EU (European Commission 2012a).

However, while there is a shift towards increasingly homogeneous immigration policies within Member States, there are still contradictions and discrepancies between policies, especially when it comes to the economic necessity of migrants (Tsoukala 2005, 161). To overcome these discrepancies, the European Commission has recently launched various new projects and partnerships with some Southern Mediterranean countries in the hopes of controlling irregular immigration through bilateral agreements and cooperation. For example, on October 6 and 13 of 2011, Mobility Partnerships were launched with Tunisia and Morocco, respectively, and measures have been put into place to begin a dialogue with Egypt surrounding the topic of migration and security in the Mediterranean region (European Commission 2012a, 9–10).
Perhaps one of the most developed portions of a common immigration policy rests with Frontex, the EU border management agency. Frontex acts as a coordinating organization between Member States, with the particular goal of “reduc[ing] the loss of lives at sea and the number of irregular immigrants entering the EU undetected” (European Commission 2012a, 12). To further expand its operational capacity, the organization’s budget was increased by €30 million in 2012, demonstrating the importance that the EU places on external border management (European Commission 2012a, 11). By Frontex’s own admission, the majority of their activities focus on the Mediterranean:

FRONTEX has started in 2006 organising and co-ordinating joint operations along the external borders of the European Union with special focus on the areas exposed to high risk of illegal immigration, such as the Canary Islands, the Mediterranean, the Eastern land borders and the major European airports (“FRONTEX and RABITS: The European Union Is Stepping up Its Operational Efforts Combating Illegal Immigration” 2007, 1).

Looking forward, the EU acknowledges that it has a far way to go in developing comprehensive immigration policies that can be applied in a standardized fashion across Member States. With this in mind, the Commission hopes to establish a Border Surveillance System in the future, a project that puts particular emphasis on the Mediterranean border (European Commission 2012a, 12).

Despite the attention brought to the issue of irregular immigration as a dire political issue, the EU has largely been unsuccessful in attempts to regulate or control its southern borders. Yet, this fact does not prevent the issue from remaining at the center of important political discourses of belonging and otherness. As I have shown in this section, the EU has only recently developed a policy focus on a unified immigration stance. The push towards a set of European-wide set of policies to combat irregular immigration in southern Europe has left some areas with
contradictions between member states’ migration policies. This fact, in particular, makes it difficult to assess any European set of standards. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the political importance of the issue of irregular immigration in the making of current EU policies.

The Multiple Crises of Migration in the Mediterranean

The European Union notes that it has a “duty to ensure that Europe’s borders are safe and secure with appropriate legal channels for entry” (European Commission 2012a, 17). There are narratives that are used to legitimize the characterization of illicit immigration in the Mediterranean as in need of immediate policy attention.

It would be impossible to fully appreciate the complexity of the “problem” presented by irregular immigration in the Mediterranean without taking into account the various, deeply interwoven aspects to the narratives about the “invasion” of the migrant body. Wendy Brown takes note of the complex relationship between economic, social, and cultural anxieties surrounding borders and the immigrant arguing that:

The dangers what walls [in Europe] are figured as intercepting are not merely the would-be suicide bomber, but immigrant hordes; not merely violence to the nation, but imagined dilution of national identity through transformed ethnicized or racial demographics; not merely illegal entrance, but unsustainable pressure on national economies that have ceased to be national or on welfare states that have largely abandoned substantive welfare functions (Brown 2010, 82).

While the “problem” of immigration is manifested in these different ways, taken alone they all fail to fully contextualize the ways in which these narratives about migration are interwoven and complex in their productive capacity, namely in the reification of “the Mediterranean” as a bounded, neat border separating the “North” from the “South.” Thus, this section dismantles these different logics in the call for controlling international migration in the Mediterranean area, and
attempts to isolate their logic in order to understand the language of immigration in the region, thus helping us to understand the discrepancy between the gravity of the problem that is painted by these narratives and the “reality” of the corresponding numbers.

Migration as a Security Question

This section introduces the perception of immigration as a European “security” threat, arguing that there is much more to the question of the securitization of immigration than illegal breaches of European external borders. Among the many ways that irregular immigration is characterized in political discourse, the image of the migrant as a “security” threat is perhaps the most prolific. Border enforcement is often discursively (and politically) linked to notions of state and human security (Commission of the European Communities 2008b). “Security” and “securitization” are increasingly ubiquitous terms in the study of International Relations, yet it is not always clear what lies within the scope of “security.”

Foucault notes that the notion of security confronts the unanticipated and unwanted arrival of “foreign elements” onto sovereign territory (Foucault 2007, 20). He goes on to directly link notions of security to the attempt to fix movement and fluidity, where the “subject of movement is reduced to an object of analysis” (Feldman 2012, 85; Foucault 2007). As a result, security discourses within European politics often extend to the issue of transnational immigration, and in political discourses immigration is presented as a potential security threat that “must be dealt with” (Kaya 2009, 8). As Gabriel Popescu notes, “the security function of borders is one of the oldest and most basic” (Popescu 2012, 91). Irregular immigration in Europe is often linked to questions of state security14 (Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993, 162).

14 The issue of “security” is an inherently slippery one. Indeed, it is not necessarily evident what comes to count as a security threat. “Security” has been at the center of many debates within
Specifically, in light of the establishment of the Schengen area and the ongoing enlargement of the EU, border policies have become “increasingly seen in the context of security, threat prevention and effective control of immigration” (Gruszczak 2012, 213). A major question of political concern in the European Union regarding the articulation of border enforcement dialogue and policies is based on the assumption that borders “act as sites where transnational mobility can be securitized” (Popescu 2012, 93). “Security” becomes a tool through which issues of prejudice, racism, and bias can be sidestepped. Rather than confronting questions of belonging and difference, attention is drawn to the border through the logic of ensuring social, economic, and political “security.” In this way, security acts as a neutralizing and mitigating term, it becomes a “catch all” term that obscures more pressing questions of how “objective” borders come to be formed and re-produced.

Borders take on an added level of importance in security discourses because borders act as thresholds whereby, upon crossing, “someone or something can become a security risk” (Popescu 2012, 93). While it is debatable what effects regimes of border securitization have on immigration control, as people often find other routes to illicitly cross borders, it is nevertheless...
a dominant thread in political discussions within the European Union (Commission of the European Communities 2008b; Corkill 2010; European Commission 2012a).

As the Mediterranean Sea touches three continents, it is often positioned in the historical role of being central to global migratory patterns (Icduygu 2007, 141). Contemporary discussions of the importance of Mediterranean European states’ border management to European Union security often work off these historical assumptions that the Mediterranean is a space of fluidity and transit (Karyotis 2011, 13; European Commission 2011a, 3). The perception of border insecurities in Southern Europe is discursively linked to the protection of a particular notion of European “purity,” whether it is economic, political, or cultural.

This migration-security complex works to position immigration as an objective “problem” that is void of biases or prejudices; it strips the problem of border security of its subjectivity. As Jef Huysmans notes, during the 1980s migration became increasingly seen through a framework of “policy debates about the protection of public order and the preservation of domestic stability” (Huysmans 2000, 756). Similarly, since the 1980s, the European Union has taken on progressively stricter external border regulations, particularly as political attention has turned to trans-border terrorist networks (Popescu 2012, 96). The relationship between security discourses surrounding external borders, crime and terrorism, and immigration has also become more naturalized in discussions about the “dangers” of lax border security in the European Union (Lazaridis 2011, 1; Tsoukala 2005, 165; Doty 2000, 73). This relationship that is drawn between perceived criminal threats and the migrant works to stigmatize migrants and draw attention to the discourses of securitization of external borders (Doty 2000).
For example, in a report published by Frontex, the Mediterranean is cited as the home for three out of the five European “criminal hubs” identified by the organization. These hubs, according to Frontex, are known for prominent levels of criminal entrepreneurship, human trafficking, and illegal immigration (Frontex 2011b). Frontex explains these hubs as having been “identified based on their proximity to major destination markets, commercial and transport infrastructure, prevalence of criminal groups and opportunities for criminal migration” (Frontex 2011b, 38). Often, “border crossings,” broadly speaking, are painted with a broad stroke, and all forms of transnational migration come to be associated with crime networks (Tsoukala 2005, 170). Thus, migration, or more accurately the act of crossing the border, is criminalized both in discourse and in institution-based policy making.

In a Commission Communication entitled “A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” the European Union groups terrorism, organized crime networks, and irregular immigration together, noting that they are all part of a concern for strengthening “freedom, security and justice” (Commission of the European Communities 2005, 3). According to this document, a focus on these “external threats” is beneficial for internal European affairs, particularly in a post-September 11th world where discourses of security and terrorism have taken on a greater degree of political attention (Commission of the European Communities 2005). In the past decade in particular, international unregulated immigration has

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15 It deserves to be noted the links between organized crime and immigration have not been conclusively (or convincingly) established. While the relationship between the two is often spoken about in a naturalized or “common sense” way, reports and research have shown that more often than not immigrants are not involved in organized crime networks, and the assumed link sits on a faulty premise. As I argue in this chapter, the anxiety on the part of the state, then, is perhaps not with the migrants themselves, but rather with the border crossing that they represent. In other words, what immigrants and organized crime networks share in common is the border, not each other.
come to be (discursively) linked to terrorism (S. Wolff 2008, 255; General Secretariat of the Council 2004, 3; Togral 2011, 219; Karyotis 2011, 13).

The Southern European countries are particularly significant in European border security because of the extensive length of water-based borders. These maritime borders along the Mediterranean garner particular attention because of the difficulty in “securitizing” and securing them as compared to land borders (Gonzalez-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou, Anna 2009, 111). Furthermore, as public attention in Europe is turned toward some of the southern member states and concerns about economic stability, questions are raised about their inability to “protect” the borders of the Union. Due to the nature of the Schengen Agreement, which outlines free travel within European Union member states, the borders of Italy or Spain have de facto become the borders of France or Germany (Benam 2011, 192). This shifting of the border produces insecurities and anxieties about where the limits of the nation-state lie (Togral 2011, 219). Questions about sovereignty in the European Union have led to debates between states trying to negotiate where responsibility rests for the enforcement of borders. It is clear that the question of sovereignty and border control relates not just to physical security, but also to the “protection” of the imagined community.

The concerns over security-related immigration problems have fed an industry of biometric technology at border sites, which speaks to the increased attention to the importance and symbolism of a “secure” border in the European Union (Triandafyllidou and Ilies 2010, 33; Feldman 2012; Maguire 2011, 31; Popescu 2012; Commission of the European Communities 2008b, 13; Broeders 2011, 40; Bigo 2005, 87). The issue of securing the external borders has become such a high priority for the EU that as part of a €330 million (£261 million) proposal to improve border security, the EU is proposing the use of drones above the Mediterranean Sea to
help increase surveillance of border crossing attempts on the part of illegal immigrants (Franceschi-Bicchierai 2012).16

The establishment of Frontex in 2004, as well as the continued emphasis on the importance of the agency, shows a particular emphasis on the attention given to the “securing” and militarization of the EU’s external borders with particular emphasis placed immigration originating in North Africa and elsewhere in the Mediterranean (Vaughan-Williams 2008; Popescu 2012; Council of the European Union 2011a; S. Wolff 2008, 257; Benam 2011, 192). As Sarah Wolff argues, the development of “Mediterranean border management at the EU level is directly related to the reality of irregular migrants risking their lives on makeshift boats” (S. Wolff 2012, 119). This sentiment can be seen in the organizational mission and goals of Frontex, which include:

Joint border patrols at the Mediterranean Sea and the Canaries, deployment of groups of experts seconded from different Member States, assisting in identification of illegal immigrants as well as enhanced exchange of relevant information between Member States’ migration management services (“FRONTEX and RABITS: The European Union Is Stepping up Its Operational Efforts Combating Illegal Immigration” 2007, 1).

Within the European Union, the assumed link between migrant communities and crime is often exaggerated and questionably high, and particular populations of migrants in Southern European states are often profiled and targeted in suspicion of being linked to crimes (Pugh 2001, 5; Campani 2011, 161). For example, the Albanian populations in Greece and Italy, as well as the Romani populations in many European countries, have received particularly high levels of negative attention in this regard (Psimmenos and Kassimati 2006). Clearly, these representations

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16 The issue of biometrics as technologies of border control and surveillance warrants a much deeper discussion, which lies outside the scope and scale of this particular project. It is, however, demonstrative of the symbolic importance of spaces like the Mediterranean, that draw attention not simply to the border itself, but also to the individuals, the bodies, that cross it.
of (particular) migrant communities with crime cannot be fully separated from cultural assumptions and stereotypes in societies (Tsoukala 2011, 182). While it has been argued that the process of European integration has brought about an increased separation between societal security and state security, it is not all together clear that this is in fact in the case (Waever et al. 1993, 71). It seems as those these complex intersections of migration as a “security concern” speak both to societal insecurities and border control anxieties.

Again, the language of “soft security” and border control can often be used to explain away or legitimize xenophobic or racist tendencies (Kirişçi 2003, 99; Pugh 2001, 2). The important thing to note about discussions or representations of the danger of the migrant’s entrance, or existence, in the European Union, is that the narratives that are deployed often have exteriors of policy heavy language that mask their underlying vagueness and easy application to various policy areas (Feldman 2012, 17). Again, this is not to suggest that the problem of the securitization of migration can be written off as unimportant. Rather, I draw attention to the fact that an “acceptable” way to discuss what “must be done” about the impending migration crisis lies in a heavily symbolic language of insecurity. Thus, the fear of irregular immigration is inevitably linked to the discussions (and actions) that focus on security measures, as well as logics of the governance of the migrant and the border spaces (Icduygu 2007, 145). Undoubtedly, the link that is made between unregulated immigration and security concerns shows that political rhetoric “increasingly [links] migration to the destabilization of public order” (Huysmans 2000, 754). As I have demonstrated in this section, the language of “securitization” presents a potent set of discourses through which immigration is continually asserted and reinforced as a “problem” at the physical limits of the EU.

*Migration as a Humanitarian Crisis*
The second framework through which I argue irregular immigration in the Mediterranean is positioned in European political discourse is as a potential humanitarian crisis. Although there are varying numbers and the data remains largely unreliable, by the middle of 2012, an estimated 170 would-be migrants died while trying to reach the southern European shores (Franceschi-Bicchierai 2012). In 2011, Amnesty International estimates that a total of 1,500 people drowned trying to cross the Mediterranean (Amnesty International Press Release 2012).

European Union foreign policy towards the southern Mediterranean and the Maghreb states is intimately related to the image of immigration in the region as both a security and humanitarian crisis. On the one hand, the European Union recognizes a key political importance in border management, particularly with regards to its southern borders. It is commonly assumed that “irregular migration poses difficult challenges for states as well as exposing migrants to insecurity and vulnerability” (Lazaridis 2011, 2). The European Commission has noted that:

The control of the EU’s external border must be continuously improved to respond to new migration and security challenges. Recent events [in the Mediterranean] have shown how quickly a section of the external border considered as low risk can quickly become subject to critical migratory pressure…Weaknesses at some sections of the external border undermine confidence in the credibility of the Union’s ability to control access to its territory (European Commission 2011a, 5)

However, at the same time, the European Union also argues that the organization stands on a firm foundation of “humanitarian traditions” which obligate it to show solidarity with potential refugees and immigrants (Commission of the European Communities 2008b, 2). As the “Common Immigration Policy for Europe” makes clear, the EU sees immigration as a potential humanitarian obligation:

Based on its humanitarian traditions, Europe must continue to show solidarity with refugees and persons in need of protection. Economic differences between
developed and developing countries/regions, globalization, trade, political problems and instability in the countries of origin possibilities to find work in the developed countries are among the main push and pull factors for international mobility of people (Commission of the European Communities 2008b, 2).

This concern for the economic disparity between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean does not transfer beyond EU discourse, and these same individuals are the subject of governance mechanisms and security regimes by agencies like Frontex. The EU emphasizes working towards a “between individual integrity and collective security concerns” (Commission of the European Communities 2008b, 2) but nonetheless presents a Janus faced narrative on the approach to migration in the Mediterranean.

The tenuous nature of the tension between security and humanitarian concerns can best be illustrated by an example. The little known island of Lampedusa, just off the coast of Tunisia, has become the center of a political debate about immigration in Europe. Lampedusa is small, only about eight square miles, and has a permanent population of around 3,000 individuals. Even though it is Italian territory, Lampedusa sits 70 miles off the coast of Tunisia and 109 miles from Sicily. Because the island is geographically closer to Northern Africa than it is to mainland Italy, it has shifted from a little-known, sleepy island to the center of a debate on the rate of irregular immigration in the Mediterranean. Lampedusa is perhaps best known for being a tourist destination, but is now at the center of discussions of the rate of irregular immigration in Europe. Frontex, the EU’s agency for external border security notes the high concern of immigration in the Mediterranean because of the region’s particular geography.17

For example, in 2011, over a two day period, the population of the island grew by an excess of 100% with potential refugees and asylum seekers from the political unrest in Tunisia

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(Amara 2011). This flood of new bodies not only overwhelmed the infrastructure on the island, but the story also created a media frenzy about the highlighted geographic position of the Italian territory so close to the shores of North Africa.\textsuperscript{18} Discussions about how “dangerously” close Lampedusa was to the political unrest along the southern Mediterranean brought the region into forefront of discussions of security, democracy, and the relationship between Europe and its regional neighbors. In the midst of the humanitarian crisis, as Italian authorities were trying to decide what to do with the mass influx of asylum seekers, the Spanish interior minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba said that Italy is the “only the door to Europe,” and a European solution will be needed to solve the problem (BBC 2011b). This led the Italian government to request aid from Frontex, arguing that the “crisis” of infrastructure in Lampedusa was a concern to all EU member states, not just Italy’s (Frontex 2011a). The expanding boundaries of the European Union mean that asylum seeker deaths while trying to reach Greece or Italy are potential political concerns for the EU as a whole.

Similarly, the Italian interior minister, Roberto Maroni, warned that the situation in Lampedusa threatens the “institutional and social structures of Europe” (BBC 2011a). Indeed, as an article in TIME magazine notes, the amount of time that it takes for refugees to reach Italy can be understood as the amount of time it takes for “a rickety, overloaded ship to cross…the Mediterranean Sea” (Faris 2011). The Mediterranean Sea takes on a great deal of symbolic importance in discourses like the ones above. It is assumed to be both a space of historical greatness as well as physical, economic, and political insecurity. The anxiety about the inability

\textsuperscript{18} Interestingly enough, and in a demonstration of the arbitrary nature of regional borders, the fact that Lampedusa is closer to a North African country than to mainland Italy does not bring into question its “Europeanness.” In other words, it has not been suggested that this position in the Sea makes Lampedusa any less Italian or part of Europe, which brings into question the assumed clarity of continental demarcations.
to lock the “door” to Europe speaks to the lack of clear-cut binaries between the inside and the outside. As demonstrated by the example of asylum seekers in the region, as far as the EU is concerned, “the majority of boat people constitute a special humanitarian category” (Pugh 2001, 3). Thus, the positioning of irregular immigration as a concern for the EU is not just framed around “security” concerns, but also constitutes a preoccupation with the migrants’ safety. Regardless of the conditions in countries of origins that compel individuals to make the dangerous trek across the Sea, the EU is explicitly concerned with the safety of migrants’ while attempting to cross into European territory.

These cries for control of the so-called external border control “crises” justified the creation of Frontex as a system for managing and policing the external borders of the EU. However, the institutional logic that led to the creation of Frontex, and has helped launch many Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RaBITs), is placed in direct contrast to a humanitarian “crisis” in the region. Yet, the emergent discourses that position the migrant as a security threat that needs to be the object of technologies of surveillance and management suggest a contradictory logic of governance: one that focuses both on criminalizing the migrant and positions the migrant as a victim of an international humanitarian crisis. This duality can be seen in the EU’s declaration of its stance regarding irregular migration in the Mediterranean, which is, according to the organization, concerned with:

Effectively combating irregular migration. In addition to that, the Partnership would also include a set of measures aimed at ensuring the promotion and respect of migrants' rights, both of nationals of the partner countries and of third-country nationals transiting through their territories (European Commission 2011b, 8).

To achieve this aim, the EU and the UfM have focused economic and military resources with particular density in the Mediterranean. An important development in the securitization and
militarization of immigration in the Mediterranean was the development of EUROSUR in 2008. EUROSUR, which is part of Frontex’s organizational structure, is meant to act as a:

Pan-European border surveillance system having three main objectives: - to reduce the number of irregular migrants entering the EU undetected, - to reduce the number of deaths of irregular migrants by saving more lives at sea, and - to increase the internal security of the EU as a whole by contributing to the prevention of cross-border crime (Frontex 2013).

Frontex goes on to elaborate on this objective, demonstrating the quite literal cataloguing and management of the migrant body in the Mediterranean by establishing “an integrated border management ensuring a uniform and high level of control and surveillance, which is a necessary corollary to the free movement of persons” (Council of the European Union 2011b, 1). Moreover, it is noted that EUROSUR should focus “on the southern and eastern external borders of the EU” (Commission of the European Communities 2008a, 2).

The individuals that become the object of governance and surveillance on the part of EUROSUR, and the European Union more broadly take on a symbolism in policy as well as in popular narratives of belonging and otherness. There are countless stories that litter news cycles about boats full of migrants seeking prospects of a better life in the EU. However, every so often one particular story will stand out and produce a wave of public interest and analysis (including critique) of the EU’s migration policies. For example, on September 6, 2012, a boat carrying dozens of migrants sank on a trip from Ahmetbeyli, Turkey to Samos, Greece. The boat was carrying mostly Palestinian and Syrian asylum seekers, and although 48 people were rescued, the accident resulted in 61 deaths (Reuters 2012). As the story broke, it brought attention to the large number of children and women who died, but unfortunately it is not an unheard of headline. In fact, just the day after the boat sank off the coast of Greece, Italy reported that it was teaming up with NATO to perform a search and rescue mission off the coast of the Italian
island Lampedusa. As this particular boat neared Italy, it ran into trouble and “crews rescued 56 people and recovered one body, but passengers said dozens more were missing” (Associated Press 2012). Any survivors that are not deemed eligible for asylum are returned back to their country of origin.

In his book *The Migration Apparatus*, Gregory Feldman comments on the relationship between the seemingly paradoxical relationship between discourses of the securitization of borders and the humanitarian crises that are often products of these migratory pathways through the Mediterranean Sea (Feldman 2012). As he notes, “the state may alternate between an altruistic and a paranoid stance towards the [migrant] individual” for example, “medical care is available to residents in the holding center, even if it requires their shackling to a gurney” (Feldman 2012, 11). As previously noted, while the Mediterranean might not necessarily be the source of the majority of unregulated migrants in the EU, it does hold a particularly telling record for migrant deaths.

The political instability in many of the countries in North Africa during the so-called “Arab Spring” has produced an increased awareness of the “problem” of refugees and asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean (European Commission 2011c, 6). Specifically, the European Commission noted in the 2011 communication, “A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean countries” that:

The eruption of the conflict in Libya as of mid-February, provoked the displacement of around 800,000 persons of many different nationalities towards the neighbouring countries, in particular Tunisia and Egypt. A number of them have fled towards Italy and Malta across the Mediterranean sea on vessels of fortune, sometimes losing their lives at sea as a result. As of mid-January some 35,000 migrants from Tunisia and Libya have arrived at the shores of the Italian island of Lampedusa and Malta (European Commission 2011b, 2).
The contradiction between discussions of the “fear of invasion” and the humanitarian concerns of unregulated migration attempts culminates in the political and popular discussions of the Arab Spring movements (Frontex 2011b, 52; European Commission 2012a, 2; European Commission 2011a, 3). Interestingly however, while the EU consistently notes that the political instability in North Africa contributed to security and migratory concerns for the Union, in reality “only 4% of those fleeing the civil strife in Libya traveled North to the EU” (European Commission 2012a, 8). This relationship between security and humanitarian narratives is extremely prevalent in discussions not just of the meaning and importance of migration, but also in questions of the symbolism of borders. For example, Frontex, while being a primarily security-based agency, also “deploys a humanitarian narrative about saving migrants from dangerous illegal journeys” (Feldman 2012, 11). The relationship between humanitarian narratives of migrants’ victimhood and discourses of security is complex (Friese 2010, 335). Frontex itself notes that the issue of the dissolution of internal borders of the EU is related to “the impending humanitarian crisis of the ever-increasing number of asylum seekers” entering the EU through its external borders (Frontex 2011b, 73).

The concern for the physical wellbeing of the migrant is important in these contexts, yet so is the importance of preventing their “illegal” entrance into the EU, even though this is paradoxical in nature. What becomes apparent, then, is that even though Frontex focuses on the bodily integrity and human rights concerns for the migrants themselves, once they are saved from the rickety boats on the water, they are either brought to a “holding facility” (which are often overcrowded), or simply returned to the lives of uncertainty that many were fleeing in the first place (Feldman 2012, 11; Friese 2010, 334). The European Commission, demonstrates this concern for the bodily integrity of the same individuals that they recognize as criminals, noting:
Many illegal immigrants and persons in need of international protection are travelling in conditions of extreme hardship and are taking great personal risks in their attempts to enter the EU illegally by hiding in vehicles, on cargo vessels, etc. The recent practice of travelling on board of unseaworthy and overcrowded boats, has multiplied the number of unfortunate migrants who continue to lose their lives by drowning in the Atlantic Ocean between Africa and the Canary Islands and in the Mediterranean Sea. The tragic death toll resulting from this kind of illegal immigration is unacceptable and must therefore be significantly reduced. The capacity to detect small boats in the open sea must be enhanced, contributing to greater chances of search and rescue and thereby saving more lives at sea. However, long-term solutions to the challenges posed by migration management can only be achieved through a comprehensive strategy that includes cooperation with third countries, also on border surveillance (Commission of the European Communities 2008a, 4).

This is to suggest that the different portrayals of the intricacies and complexities of migration in the Mediterranean must be viewed as interrelated. For example, even the EU suggests that since migration cannot be stopped, “it must be dealt with in order to prevent human suffering” (European Parliament 2011). Similarly, the migration problem in Greece, while on one hand being emphasized for its security dimension, holds at its core for the EU a need to respect the fundamental rights of the migrants themselves (European Commission 2012a, 11). The European Parliament report entitled “Migration flows arising from instability: scope and role of the EU foreign policy” argues that immigration in the Mediterranean is both a concern of stability and human welfare for the European Union (European Parliament 2011; Pugh 2001). In contrast to the pragmatic and sometimes militaristic rhetoric associated with upholding the “border security” of the EU in the fight against irregular immigration in the Mediterranean, the concern for the welfare of migrants is paramount to EU narratives about the “need” to control the immigration influx in the region.

Migration as an Economic Crisis
Yet another way in which the “problem” of immigration in Southern Europe is contextualized is through the lens of economic insecurity. Frontex acknowledges that the relational underdevelopment of the countries in the southern Mediterranean compared to those in the northern part of the region is an impetus for irregular immigration networks and will continue to contribute to irregular immigration. Furthermore, the agency notes that “both in the short and the longer term, the EU member states will continue to see similar or increasing levels of illegal migration into the EU through the traditional illegal transit routes from North Africa, Turkey and the Balkans” (Frontex 2011b, 65). The fear of challenges and burdens being placed on the economic stability and institutions of the welfare states of the EU by migrant populations is the source of many debates about the “pragmatic” need for tougher border control regulations. The French example is quite telling in this regard, as Nicolas Sarkozy used the issue of illicit immigration originating from the Mediterranean as a platform during his unsuccessful campaign for reelection in 2012. In July of 2012, Mr. Sarkozy was reprimanded from the Left in France for stating at a rally that France “has too many foreigners on [its] territory” (AFP 2012). For example, at a campaign rally outside of Paris in March of 2012, Sarkozy noted that “unchecked immigration would undermine European efforts to integrate new entrants and would put strains on social safety nets for the disadvantaged across Europe” (“Sarkozy Threatens To Pull France Out of Schengen Zone” 2012).

This portrayal of the economic “problem” of migration in southern Europe is further complicated as it is not simply an issue of the migrant’s “drain” on society, but is also a question of the necessary role that migrant populations often have in the economies of host countries (Commission of the European Communities 2008b, 2). Put differently, while irregular migration is often portrayed as uninvited or unwelcomed, and encompasses these insecurities about border
patrol and the economic health of states, “irregular migrant workers are more or less the motor of [states’] economies” (Maroukis 2010, 107). The European Commission argues that:

In a context of an ageing Europe, the potential contribution of immigration to EU economic performance is significant…the working age population of the EU is projected to fall by almost 50 million even with continued net immigration similar to historical levels and by around 100 million without such immigration. Such evolutions present risks for the sustainability of pensions, health and social protection systems and require increased public spending (Commission of the European Communities 2008b, 2).

The economic interdependence of the member states of the European Union means that migration concerns in southern European states manifest as anxieties across the EU. This has caused political tensions between the northern and the southern member states and has positioned immigration as a primary concern on many European-level political debates (Gonzalez-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou, Anna 2009, 110).

Thus, on one hand, immigration is seen as a potential hazard, if left uncontrolled, to European economic stability and presents a “drain” on many member states’ welfare systems. Yet, on the other hand, the European Parliament also intriguingly acknowledges that the EU needs substantial number of immigrants to support an ageing population and address other social and economic challenges (European Parliament 2011). Similarly, although they are often assumed to be a drain on welfare states’ resources, migrant populations are necessary “if economic growth, the welfare state and high living standards in general are to be maintained” (Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993, 152). It is clear that none of these categorizations or paradigms through which the impact of immigration is characterized exist independently from one another. The question of the economic effects of irregular immigration, whether it is positive or negative, is particularly difficult to quantify. However, the point to be made with
regards to economic impacts, much like those of security or humanitarian concerns, is that there are a multitude of explanations that attempt to rationalize or explain why irregular immigration is to be taken as a societal or structural “threat.”

*The Cultural Crisis of Migration*

One of the most pervasive thread through which immigration in Southern Europe is explained and discussed is as a potential profound cultural influence in host countries (Popescu 2012, 96). Furthermore, I contend that the perceptions of irregular immigration as a cultural threat to some perceived notion of European “unity” deserve a significant amount of attention in terms of the implications for border-making politics.

The presumed “inassimilability” of migrants is cited as being detrimental to identity and cultural cohesion in Member States, as well as being a threat to “societal security” (Bigo 2005, 69; Kaya 2009, 8–9). In the “Common Strategy for Immigration” proposed and outlined by the European Union, immigration is positioned as both a potentially positive and negative factor. This document states that although immigration can enrich host societies, “the positive potential of immigration can only be realized if integration into host societies is successful” (Commission of the European Communities 2008b, 3). This demonstrates the complicated relationship between the “phenomenon” of irregular immigration and the cultural anxieties that are bound up in the issue. Indeed, one can view this is as the narrative that often underlines or ties together the security, humanitarian, and economic concerns. Migration, to put it another way, is a particularly dense site where one can analyze the interconnectedness of these types of cultural anxieties and more “political” concerns about where borders lie, how they come to be, and how they are reinforced.
Following the Cold War, attention began to turn to “North/South” relations, as the model of the “clash of civilizations” grew in importance in cultural narratives within Europe (Huntington 1993). Europe’s attention began to turn “suspiciously towards the Maghreb region” of the Mediterranean area (Coralluzzo 2008, 119). Both shores of the Mediterranean Sea took on a symbolic role in narratives about the potential for a “cultural invasion” presented by the phenomenon of irregular immigration in the European Union. Through the 1990s, these fears about the “danger from the South magnified” (Chambers 2008, 126). For example, Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez and Anna Triandafyllidou note that in Greek society during the 1990s, there was a more marked characterization of irregular immigration as a fear and anxiety producing phenomena, coupled with prevalent assumptions that migration is a “burden to Greek society and economy” (Gonzalez-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou, Anna 2009, 117).

The concerns about migration in the Mediterranean are not limited solely to Southern European states. Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been known to be particular vocal about the role of immigrants in host societies and cultures, noting that France’s immigration laws are far too lax, and that the country has “too many foreigners on [its] territory” (Goundry 2012). It is not unusual for the problem of migration to be discursively tied to an invasion metaphor, whereby the “invaders” undermine national security, but also clash with an assumed way of life on the part of the host society (Pugh 2001). For example, Sarkozy also announced in early March of 2012 that actions are taken to curb irregular migration into Europe through the southern states, France would be forced to consider leaving the Schengen zone, which was met with criticism from European lawmakers (Chrisafis 2012; Armellini 2012). Sarkozy cited worries about the longevity and survival of European culture and identity as the main cause for concern about migration levels (Chrisafis 2012). His suggestion that immigration
into Europe is threatening “European civilization” is not unheard of in French political discourse, however Sarkozy relates the “threat” of immigration directly to the Arab Spring movements of 2011-12 in North Africa and the Middle East, and cites internal border liberalization as the cause for concern (Pignal 2011). There seems to be a fixation with the impending “crisis” on unregulated immigration in Europe among popular culture and media outlets. For example, as Carmen Gonzalez-Enriquez notes with regards to Spanish popular perceptions of migrants, “while in 2001 news relating to irregular immigration took up 20 percent of the total devoted to immigration, the average for the entire 2000-2005 period was 65.2 percent, although only a minimum (eight percent) included estimates regarding the number of irregular immigrants” (Gonzalez-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou, Anna 2009, 263).

This section has given a brief overview of some of the ways in which migration becomes constructed as a social and political concern. While the purpose of this chapter is not to catalogue all of the ways in which migration is spoken about, it is necessary to begin to contextualize how migration becomes seen as a major concern for European policy making. In the next section, I bring into question the “realistic” nature of the concerns expressed by politicians like Nicolas Sarkozy, and argue that rather than being a pragmatic discussion about the negative consequences of immigration, the migrant body itself is a deeply symbolic and meaningful site where borders are re-produced, and where the limits of where the Mediterranean lies, and what it means, are constructed and reified.

The “Illegal Threat”: Fact or Fiction?

In light of this review of the ways in which irregular immigration is positioned or constructed as a “problem” for EU policy making, this section argues that these discussions along cannot explain the incredible political and theoretical importance of the representation of
the “illegal migrant.” Not only is irregular immigration an inherently difficult phenomenon to accurately quantify, Frontex notes that “the situation is rendered even more complex by problems and limitations with data on migration in Europe – these are not harmonised between the EU countries and quite often not available at all” (Frontex 2011b, 25).

Migratory flows and variables in the Mediterranean shift so quickly that data can only stay reliable for a short amount of time (Corkill 2010, 140). Yet, as we can see, it is not simply a utilitarian, pragmatic discussion of unsustainable numbers, as the data do not support these assumptions. The question is rather one of why are these discourses are so prolific and persistent. It is not simply a question of xenophobia, although xenophobic and racist sentiments are politically salient (Kaya 2009, 8). Undoubtedly, all of these “crises” hold kernels of truth in terms of the numbers of migrants and weight on states’ infrastructures (Waever et al. 1993, 131). Yet, we cannot truly understand the “problem” of migration without problematizing the question of the limits and the making of borders, and vice versa. In this section, I argue for a reframing of the questions asked about this emergent “crisis” in Southern Europe, asking how these debates are necessary for, namely, the insistence upon the Mediterranean as an opaque border. The “migrant body” is, in actuality, a site of contestation, a site whereby the power relations and discursive formations act and interplay to construct and reproduce the idea of the Mediterranean as an inert border, a marker between the assumed global, geo-political binary of North/South.

Migration in Numbers

Frontex, although admittedly has a difficult time tracking border crossing attempts in the Mediterranean, focuses much of its effort on “securing” the migration situation on the southern border of the EU. In the 2013 Risk Analysis published by the organization, Frontex notes that the Mediterranean is one of its highest priorities (Frontex Risk Analysis Unit 2013, 6). However,
within the same document, Frontex notes that despite the increased attention, both politically and within the media, directed towards migration in the Mediterranean, detected attempted border crossings in the Mediterranean dropped significantly in 2012 (Frontex Risk Analysis Unit 2013, 22). The information reported by Frontex can be summarized as follows:19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border Crossing Region</th>
<th>Percent of Crossings in 2012</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Mediterranean</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Mediterranean</td>
<td>-82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Italy (Apulia and Calabria)</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Mediterranean</td>
<td>-35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Balkan</td>
<td>+37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Land Border</td>
<td>+52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This decrease in detected border crossings is partially explained by the contraction of the large influx of migration in the Mediterranean in 2011, as a direct result of the political instability in North Africa. However, once again there is a bipolar approach on the part of the EU towards the Mediterranean, where there are equal gains in the pursuit of political and economic integration, all the while stiffening the symbolic and physical barriers to entrance and flow across the two shores.

Thus, while over the past few decades, Southern European states have largely shifted from countries of emigration to immigration (Corkill 2010, 138; Triandafyllidou and Kosic 2006, 107), the southern Mediterranean still does not represent the majority of irregular immigrants in the EU, but garners the majority of the attention. For much of the later half of the twentieth century, Southern European countries acted mostly as transit stations for immigrants heading to Western and Northern Europe, yet more recently states like Italy have shifted in roles to become destinations themselves (Coralluzzo 2008, 124). Thus, irregular immigration has become an

19 Data retrieved from Frontex 2013 Risk Analysis (Frontex Risk Analysis Unit 2013).
important part of the politics of the Mediterranean region (Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993, 163). The European Union recognizes this important relationship between contemporary European politics and irregular immigration in the Mediterranean is an important reality that needs to be faced (Commission of the European Communities 2008b, 2).

However, despite all of the attention given to the symbolism and various crises represented by the “problem” of irregular migration in the Mediterranean, the majority of undocumented migrants in Europe are those who enter the EU legally, but then violate immigration laws by overstaying visas (Icduygu 2007, 152; Friese 2010, 330; Fasani 2010, 173; Frontex 2011b, 52; Gonzalez-Enriquez 2010, 264; Gonzalez-Enriquez and Triandafyllidou, Anna 2009, 111; Düvell 2006c, 175). This fact seems to contradict Nicolas Sarkozy’s suggestion that controlling immigration in the south of Europe is a prerequisite to ensure that European social fabric does not “explode” (“Social Explosion Unless Immigration Controlled: Sarkozy” 2007). Yet, as Didier Bigo explains, even research of migratory patterns often takes for granted the assumption that “migration is a political problem coming from demographic disequilibria” (Bigo 2005, 60).

Despite the prolific nature of the images of clandestine immigrants arriving on the shores of Italy, Spain, or Greece in homemade boats, these types of border-crossing attempts are not representative of much more than a fraction of cases of undocumented migration in Southern Europe. For example, from 2000-2006, the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs estimates that almost three-quarters of the undocumented migrants residing in Italy were visa overstayers (Fasani 2010, 173; Triandafyllidou and Vogel 2010, 294).
Italy is not the exception to the rule in this regard either. For example, in Spain false tourism has become the main source of irregular entry, while illegal entry by migrants on boats from North Africa is much less significant of a contribution to the country’s “immigration problem” (Gonzalez-Enriquez 2010, 264). As Anna Triandafyllidou and Dita Vogel explain, although illegal entry into Spain is often associated with these prolific images of “floods” of migrants arriving on the shores via boats in the Mediterranean, “irregular immigrants [in Spain] typically arrive as tourists…and overstay the maximum legal limit of three months, as regularization records have shown” (Triandafyllidou and Vogel 2010, 294). In the entirety of Europe, it is recognized by Europol that up to 80 percent of immigrants that are considered “illegal” entered the EU with legal visas that later expired (Bigo 2005, 61). The question then becomes one of the symbolism of persistent, politically salient representations of an irregular immigration crisis along the borders. The calls to securitize the external borders of the EU do not account for the reality of the distribution of numbers of irregular migrants in Europe.

Furthermore, although immigration from the Mediterranean Sea is accepted as having increased, it remains an extremely minor type of migration in Europe (S. Wolff 2008, 259). To be sure, the actual cases of sea-based, illicit border crossing attempts do not produce a significant enough amount of migrants to warrant fears of societal destabilization or collapse, yet this does not detract from attention being brought to the external borders of the EU.

While numbers regarding the exact amount of irregular migration in Southern Europe are notoriously difficult to obtain, a look into the reality of some of the data of migration and illegal border crossing attempts in the Mediterranean area reveals that perhaps the political and cultural attention given to the “problem” is out of proportion (Triandafyllidou 2010a, 6). An irregular
migrant can be defined as one who has, at some point in time, violated terms of immigration laws, whether through illegal border crossings or visa overstaying (Triandafyllidou 2010a, 3). The amount of energy and resources that are deployed devoted to “tackling” the problem of immigration in the Mediterranean, particular with regards to border security reflect cultural anxieties more than “actual threats.” Since it is clearly not an issue of an objective, “strategic” reaction to a “crisis” of migration in the Mediterranean, one must ask why this issue carries with it so much cultural importance (Benam 2011, 192). For example, while the cost associated with border security and surveillance has increased markedly, the border crossing detections have decreased or remained stable. This can be seen in Frontex’s 2013 first quarterly report, represented by the following graph:

As this graphic demonstrates, irregular border crossings in the Mediterranean are actually on a decreasing trend, even though budget and political attention is still increasing with relation to the “crisis” of migration. Even though it may seem like an area that can be viewed with neutrality or objectivity, immigration in Europe is an area with an illusion of clarity. On the one hand, some authors argue that it is “well known” that “a majority of the new immigrants to the Southern

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European countries come from the south and east of the Mediterranean Basin” (Icduygu 2007, 154). Yet, at the same time it is not immediately clear that migration in the south of Europe is representative of such large crises for Europe. More than the number of migrants, concerns within the EU are raised about the types of migrants, or rather, more specifically, what “the migrant” comes to represent in political discourses that attempt to denote and outline “the Mediterranean.”

One could argue that perhaps the insistence on the importance of border crossings in the Mediterranean as a source of a European crisis is an issue of political motives. Indeed, the physical crossing of borders is given much more attention than the presence of visa overstaying in discussions of irregular immigration in Europe (Frontex 2011b). As Triandafyllidou and Vogel argue:

The scenario of a large invasion of outsiders who threaten the relative wealth and security in Europe seems plausible to many. It is therefore the case that the media, governments and parties have something to gain by presenting high numbers of irregular migrant inflows (Triandafyllidou and Vogel 2010, 292).

This argument may seem convincing. Indeed, it is probably not a coincidence that Sarkozy’s most controversial remarks about migration occurred in speeches during a re-election campaign. Of course, political motives are undoubtedly involved in the production of these discourses and policies that are related to negative perceptions of migration in Europe (Maroukis 2010, 108). Yet, the assumption that we can understand the productive capability of these discursive formations simply as politically opportunistic motives obscure the “facts” of migration in order to cultivate and feed a cultural xenophobic anxiety about “the outsider” nevertheless misses the mark.
Similarly, it is not just an issue that can be seen as an objective, cost-benefit “risk” calculation for the European Union (Benam 2011, 192). These are perhaps convenient explanations for positioning the attention given to the “problem” of irregular immigration, yet cannot fully explain the depth of symbolism and importance given to the narratives of securing the borders from the migrant’s “invasion.” I contend that there is more to be learned from this insistence upon the symbolic importance of the Mediterranean, and the presence of the migrant body in it, that is fundamental to the discursive re-production of the Mediterranean as a static, obvious border separating the global “North” and “South.” The migrant body is symbolic not simply for the presence of the “Other” in the sovereign space, but in many ways the representations or images of the act of border crossing brings attention to and re-produces the border as inert.

_Reframing the Debate Around the Migrant Body_

The act crossing of the border symbolized by the _presence_ of the undocumented migrant body not only acts as a space upon which the border is re-produced, it also represents a performance of state sovereignty that takes place at the border. In other words, irregular immigration patterns have a paradoxical effect; they at once challenge state sovereignty and provide a legitimized use or rationale for further deepened exercises of sovereign practices. The political narratives, meetings, and institutions that characterize the EU’s attempt to “control” the irregular immigration “crisis” along its southern border take place within a framework that calls for a response to the undermining of the exercise of sovereignty along the border, represented by illegal border crossings, in the form of more articulations of practices of sovereignty. In this way, the EU’s attempt to quantify and respond to the illicit border crossings and breach of sovereignty symbolized by the migrant body work to reproduce and reify the border itself.
The role of the migrant body works in the same way that Nevzat Soğut explains the symbolism of the refugee, noting that both “transgress political, cultural, and socioeconomic borders and boundaries, often in the face of loud protests by those who claim control and mastery over those borders and boundaries” (Soguk 1999, 15). The migrant body becomes a dense site for the making and remaking of borders, and acts as a text through which the meaning and importance of borders is read and reiterated, working as a constant reminder “of the arbitrariness and contingency of identity borders and boundaries” (Soguk 1999, 15).

Given these discrepancies between the cultural representations of the so-called “crisis” of immigration in Europe and the reality of the numbers of illegal border crossings, I hold that attention needs to be paid to the productivity of these discourses of the border crisis in Southern Europe and across the Mediterranean more generally. While the “real numbers” of immigration in the Mediterranean are important, most of the data is unreliable, especially as the “numbers” of the immigration problem in media sources tend to be cited abundantly, with little conceptual backing (Triandafyllidou 2010a, 1). Even the European Union claims, in an ambiguous way, that “a considerable proportion of the European Community’s immigrants is from the Mediterranean region,” yet acknowledges that reliable data do not exist (Commission of the European Communities 1995a, 2). Moreover, as the previous section outlined, the importance of discourses of migration does not lie necessarily with the “validity” of the claims, but rather within their ability to reproduce representations of border spaces.

The existence of the border itself is not problematized in these discursive formations. How do these discourses become privileged through circulation in political narratives? How do they contribute to the making of an image of the Mediterranean as an unproblematic, obvious
boundary between two worlds? The Mediterranean, which is in reality a liminal space that is fluid, is positioned as a static, unchanging border that can be reinforced or securitized.

In light of the discussion of the realities and myths of migration in the Mediterranean, I argue that the theoretical understanding of discursive representations of the immigration “crisis” should not focus solely on the xenophobia or political opportunism, as some have suggested (Waever et al. 1993, 45; Lahav 2004). Instead, this issue should be reframed to ask in what ways these narratives are productive, and how they contribute to the “making” of representations of the Mediterranean as a clear-cut, distinct border between Europe and Africa, reifying the presumed mutual exclusivity between the two geopolitical signifiers.

In a very real way, the persistence of the discursive formations of the crisis of migration in the Mediterranean serve to remind one of the long held characterization of this sea as dividing the Western world in half (den Boer 1995, 23). Yet, this representation of the Mediterranean is not self-evident, it is instead “always contingent, never fully fixed” (Soguk 1999, 7).

The Migrant Body and Power Relations

While these debates about the Mediterranean as a site of security threats and immigration have very real policy implications and are translated into political discussions, they must be interrogated on a deeper level. I forward that the migrant body becomes a site heavy with symbolism about belonging and Otherness, and that it is necessary in the re-production of borders, in this case that of “the Mediterranean” as an axis where the meanings of North/South are negotiated with respect to the notions of Europe and Africa. It is through these discussions surrounding the migrant body that the Mediterranean is reified and re-produced as this border space.
In other words, the migration body is a site where the politics of border creation and affirmation plays out. Moreover, the migrant, or perhaps the act of the migrant body crossing the border illegally, attracts narratives that emphasize the need for policies that assert the finitude and opaqueness of the Mediterranean as a fixed boundary.

Belonging, Otherness, and the Migrant

The relationship between borders and the migrant body culminates in the re-production of the categories of sameness and difference. Borders delineate between inside/outside, they create hierarchies and exclusion, and in the area of immigration, they bring “the human body into the spotlight” (Popescu 2012, 107). The migrant body is then symbolic and instrumental in the production and maintenance of borders as the space of inclusion and exclusion (Benhabib 2008, 162).

Central to this argument is the question of how value is attached to the migrant’s body. If the migrant is instrumental in the articulation of a representation of the Mediterranean as a static border space, then it stands to reason that the migrant body is a site where networks of discursive formations and power relations culminate, a site that embodies the presumed binary nature of the border. The migrant body is inherently and inextricably bound to the production of borders, and her/his “life is given an economic and affective value, a fear is created around this body” (Foucault 2003b, 265). Moreover, as inscribed with the power relations and politics of border making, the body (border) is ubiquitous. As Katja Franko Aas argues, the increasing levels of technological surveillance and monitoring of the external borders of the EU inscribes the body with symbolism and positions the body as a “source of unprecedented accuracy and precision” (Aas 2006, 143).
In this regard, not only is the body becoming increasingly important as a site of governance, but is also an object of border making. Thus, the migrant body is not simply a source of information about migratory patterns and regimes, but is a location of the creation of borders and identities. My argument that the migrant body is an instance where one can witness the making and remaking of the “static” border between Europe, Africa, and Asia represented by “the Mediterranean” is ultimately a question of power and its productive capabilities. The production of the “illegal migrant” as a subject of sovereign power cannot be untangled from the imagining and reification of the “naturalness” of borders, and the migrant body becomes coded with the meaning and locality of border making practices. That is, the subjectivity of the migrant cannot be produced outside of the context of the border. In the same vein, I look to ask how this relationship functions in the opposite direction: how does the migrant body become a dense meeting place for stories and meanings of borders? When one begins to problematize the migrant body, there is also a problematization of the often-assumed binaries between sameness and difference, self and Other, or inside and outside.

The question here is then how power becomes inscribed onto the migrant body and how this relates to these cultural and political discussions of “purification” and the “safety” provided by borders from “strangers.” Gregory Feldman notes this complex relationship between the migrant and political meaning noting that often the migrant “is not policy officials’ primary interest qua policymakers but rather is the object of the political economy that their policy efforts serve” (Feldman 2012, 6).

While “secure” borders are presented as the only solution to curbing the migrant crisis, borders themselves produce outsiders, both of which are foundational to the making of the modern state (Bauman 1997, 17; Friese 2010, 326). The question of the “crisis” of immigration
is then not simply one of “exorcising” impurity from the social body. Instead, the migrant is instrumental in an economy of power in the production of borders. I surmise that the symbolism attached to the migrant body as an “infiltrator” of the southern boundaries of the European Union functions to reify the naturalness of the Mediterranean as a clean-cut, sharp border. Moreover, this “naturalness” applies not simply to the representation of the Mediterranean as a border or gateway to Europe, but also to the notion that the Mediterranean is a dividing line between civilizations.

Reproducing the Mediterranean as a Border

Clearly, the relationship between the dense symbolism entangled in the ‘migrant body’ and the making and crystallization of borders is complex and co-determine each other. As I have argued in this chapter, the migrant body should not be analyzed simply as a question of xenophobia or political opportunism in the European Union. “The migrant” comes to represent yet another site where we can witness an attempt to “fix” a meaning of the Mediterranean as a border between continents, civilizations, or cultures that are painted as mutually exclusive. Just like the processes through which the meaning of “the Mediterranean” becomes regimented with the Barcelona Process and its institutional offshoots, narratives about the impending crisis of migration in the Mediterranean function to reify and crystallize a notion of where the Mediterranean is and what it represents. The discussions about the ‘threat’ of migration are not simply about practical concerns, as we have seen. Rather, they speak to the making of the Mediterranean as a border, where meaning is concentrated in the site and symbol of the migrant’s physical and symbolic border crossing. Attention is brought to the act of crossing the border and is met with political, economic, and social resources and energy that are funneled into focusing attention on the border. Whether it is the biometric governing of the Mediterranean, the
militarization of the Sea, or simply the persistence of cultural misconceptions about the “reality” of migration in the south of Europe, the migrant body is a site that holds meaning in the making of the Mediterranean.

*Pinning Down “the Mediterranean” as a Border*

In this process of articulating and insisting upon the limits of the Mediterranean, the migrant is central. As Feldman notes, irregular migrants should not be viewed as “individuals who have fallen out of the system, as it were, but rather [as] individuals upon whom the system thrives” (Feldman 2012, 43). The migrant body, in other words, is a nexus whereby the meanings of “us” and “them” or “inside and “outside” are negotiated (Doty 2006, 70). It has been argued that the “body has long been a subject of bordering practices” (Popescu 2012, 107). That is, the representation of the migrant body is embedded with the notions and implications of borders and border crossing (Sassen 2006; Tyner 2006).

Thus, I argue that through the retelling of stories and the persistence of these narratives about the looming “crises” that irregular migration presents in Europe, the attention that is drawn to the Mediterranean functions to reify it as a border. Because of the Schengen Agreement, attention has been drawn to the external borders of the European Union, as the EU notes that “in an open Europe without internal borders, no Member State can manage immigration on its own” (Commission of the European Communities 2008b, 2). Through the Schengen Agreement, attention has diverted towards the external borders of the EU, as the internal borders become more liberalized and less controlled (S. Wolff 2008, 256). As Jef Huysmans notes, Article 7 of the Schengen Agreement actually legitimizes the strengthening of external borders, once attention is no longer placed on national boundaries (Huysmans 2000, 759). Thus, “older” immigration countries voice concern about the inability for southern member states to “control”
migration into the Union (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009, 123). Because of the interconnectedness of European space, the perceived inability of southern member states to curb illegal border crossings becomes a topic of discussion and is linked to feelings of “threatened” cultural and social landscapes throughout the EU.

With this increased attention drawn to the southern states of the European Union as the “gateway” or the border to the rest of Europe, the ex-colonies in the Maghreb region have come to make up the periphery and borderlands of Europe (Balibar 2004; Friese 2010). Again, the relationship between the making of the Mediterranean as a seemingly inert border and the attention placed on the migrant body is ultimately a question of power and its productive possibility. Gabriel Popescu makes this point apparent when he notes, “if borders are about achieving power through the ordering of difference in space, then the dispersion of border-making strategies to the smallest and most personal of spaces—the body—appears natural” (Popescu 2012, 107). The use of the migrant body in discourses of cultural and economic crises in Europe is not necessarily dependent on the “reality” of the immigration situation in Southern Europe. “The migrant” is produced as a particular subject for the state as well as the European Union, as the body takes on symbolism and becomes a site of political debate and engagement. In other words, the migrant body acts as a tableau, upon which representations of “the Mediterranean” as a border are painted. The migrant body acts as a reminder of the assumed dichotomy between the inside and the outside, it becomes a space on which the border is inscribed. The migrant body as a site of power relations allows it to act as a symbol for the assertion of the Mediterranean border as a binary between Europe and the African or Asian “Others.”
As discussed in the previous chapter, one would be hard pressed to find any definitive definition of “the Mediterranean,” and yet it is a term that rolls off the tongue, and often “goes without saying.” The important question is then how this lack of certainty in definition of the limits and parameters of “the Mediterranean” is accounted for, and how it can be deployed as a term that seems “natural.” The attention and tension put on the political and cultural importance of the migrant body in the Southern European context speaks to one of the way in which “the Mediterranean” is given meaning. While it is inherently a slippery concept (as all regional designations are), one of the ways in which “the Mediterranean” is reinforced as a borderline is through the insistence that it demarcates a sharp distinction between the “inside” and the “outside.” Drawing attention to the “crisis” of immigration in the Mediterranean allows the notion to be one that is at the forefront of political and media discussions, and the narrative about the rampant problem of immigration in the Mediterranean crystallizes the association between the notion of “the Mediterranean” and various potent binaries like inside and outside, the “illegal alien” and the legal citizen, Europe and Africa, or even the self and the Other.

Thus, if we return to Nicolas Sarkozy’s talking points about the inevitable collapse of European “civilization” without measures taken to curb illegal immigration in the Mediterranean, we can see these narratives as bordering processes. Understood in this way, borders are not fixed geographical lines, they are constructed through discursive “(de- and re-) bordering practices” (Diez 2006, 236).

Speaking about immigration in Southern Europe in terms of crises, or insisting upon the energy that must “secure borders” at the risk of cultural implosion reifies a representation of the border as finite and enforceable. Thus, the issue of irregular immigration in Europe, and the attention it garners, is an observable materialization of the politics of border making in the
Mediterranean. That is to say, the anxieties about irregular immigration that are expressed in European politics and representations about the “crises” of immigration are illustrative not simply of the “real” effects of migrant populations of welfare states’ infrastructure. Instead, the presence of, or perhaps even the representation of, the migrant unearths anxieties about the limits of Africa and Europe, and the inability to pinpoint the borderline between the two imagined entities. By bringing attention to the need to insist upon the border, “the migrant” acts as a localized site whereby narratives of belonging and otherness coalesce to reinforce the notions of “Europe” and “Africa,” and re-position the Mediterranean as a dividing border between the two. In this way, the liminality of the Mediterranean as a border, or indeed the liminality of all borders, is manifested in European politics that focus on “securing” the southern external border of the EU.

Moreover, the difficulty in maintaining border security is a reminder that immigration is not something that can be forcefully stopped or prohibited. In this way, not only does “the migrant” challenge notions of state sovereignty, the issue serves as a reminder that borders are fluid and impossible to fortify and crystallize. The discursive formations about the “dangers” of uncontrolled migratory flows in the Mediterranean not only bring attention to the inability for southern European states to patrol the external borders of the European Union, they actually work to reify the notion of a border that is solid and static. The political power of these different representations of a supposed immigration crisis along the southern borders of the EU provide a point of traction for a deepening understanding of why illegal border crossings, even if they do not produce a level of irregular immigrants that could realistically challenge infrastructure, produce such heightened political and cultural anxiety. Put simply, I contend that anxieties about the illegal border crossings, represented by the idea of “the irregular immigrant,” are anxieties
not simply about the inability to completely close borders, but about the fallibility of the idea of a closed border and a representation of a contained and neat “Europe.”

**Conclusion**

Ultimately, the issue of irregular immigration is manifested in political spectacles that often cite security, economic stability, or even cultural belonging as the reasons for concern in border maintenance. Yet, another key feature of migratory patterns is that they ultimately are extremely difficult to quantify. Although there is much rhetoric about the need to control or securitize borders, it is unclear to what extent this is even possible. As Didier Bigo explains, states are unable to answer some basic questions like:

Does anyone, in these institutions, have a clear picture of cross-border flows of persons and of the methods of control? How is it possible to differentiate between the crossing of the same person many times and the crossing of many persons one time? Very often the statistics given by the authorities deal with crossings and speculate only about the real number of persons. But nevertheless the numbers construct an official truth, either about the increase of arrivals of migrants who want to settle inside the country in order to justify tough measures or to downplay migration by interpreting the same numbers as a rise in transborder activities and economic growth (Bigo 2005, 76).

The question that arises from here is why there is so much attention that goes towards trying to 1) quantify or make a statement with any certainty on the “nature” of the irregular immigrant problem in Europe and 2) why the issue attracts so much political energy? I contend that the attention placed on the migrant can be read as a process through which the border is inscribed and interpreted on the “migrant body.” In this way, the migrant is a politically potent representation of border crossings and the breaching of state sovereignty. The migrant body is a moving border, it embodies the “outside” that is “inside.” The “problem” with irregular immigration may then often be reduced to questions of illegality or security. However, the
relationship between the immigrant and the border is much more complex than simply a changing status of legal to illegal or insider to outsider. Instead, the issue is much more complex, and brings into question assumptions about where the “inside” of the polity begins.

For all of the attention that is placed on the rising problem of irregular migration in Europe, a disproportionate amount of concern is centered on the southern borders of the EU. The Mediterranean is an historical space heavy with symbolism about the greatness of European “civilization,” yet it is also implicated in contemporary narratives of political and economic weakness, and the inability to be a proper “gateway” to Europe. Yet, one should not assume that the prolific nature of news articles concentrating on the migration “crisis” is solely reliant on data. In fact, the attention given to irregular migration and illegal border crossings is disproportionate to the estimates of percentages sources of migration in Europe. In other words, the majority of irregular migrants in Europe originate as “legal” migrants or tourists that eventually overstay visas. While Schengen is often cited as an exacerbating effect with regards to immigration to Southern European states, it appears as though the anxiety is misdirected. The question arises then as to what extent discourses about the “threat” of migration in the south of Europe are solely about migration per se, or whether or not they are productive in other capacities.

In this regard, I argue that the “crisis” of migration in the Mediterranean extends far beyond the practical inability to close borders, or the political and economic consequences of irregular migration. Images abound in European news of young men in rickety boats, trying to clandestinely make their way across the Mediterranean Sea to reach the safety of the European Union (Triandafyllidou 2010a, 296; Benam 2011, 191). These images often evoke visceral and heated political debates, and are the source of many cultural stereotypes and popular outcries for
increased border control throughout the European Union and within its member states. Interestingly enough, the “problem” of the irregular immigration “crisis” in the Mediterranean simultaneously calls for more security measures as well as more humanitarian measures. As Çiğdem Benam argues, the attention given to the problems associated with irregular migration in the Mediterranean “reveal the tragedies taking place in the Mediterranean, the severity of the situation, and the illiberal practices of European security agents” (Benam 2011, 191).

It is clear that the questions of irregular immigration in the Mediterranean Sea become about much more than stopping the illegal crossing of borders. The issue has taken on contradictory tones, becoming both a concern for those discourses centered around securitization of borders, as well as for those focused on human rights. Yet, one underlying factor remains in question: to what extent do these contending discourses about migration contribute to a larger narrative that positions “the Mediterranean” as a borderline? Seen in the light as a cultural threat to some notion of a European identity, migration becomes paired with discourses about the potential “invasion” or “flood” of the migrant “Other” (Kaya 2009, 8). Racial based stereotypes about the “invading” migrant intersect with representations of Southern Europe as a zone of weakness, inefficiency, and has been characterized “as the weak underbelly of the EU control system, acting as ports of entry for huge masses of unwanted immigrants in transit for Northern Europe” (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009, 120).

The language used that positions the migrant as an outsider, or more specifically, speak about immigration as a “crisis” of “invasion” from the outside serves as a point of reference for political initiatives and other discourses that reproduce the representations of an inside/outside articulated by the borderline (Soguk 1999, 16).
The migrant body can then be understood as implicated in the complex processes and projects of “mapping the Mediterranean borders of Europe” (Friese 2010, 326). The body, which becomes inscribed with the symbolism of the border, is then a mechanism for defining the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Migration is often considered an issue associated with legal frameworks, security regimes, or even humanitarian concerns. Similarly, anti-immigrant sentiments are more often than not understood as simply a product of nationalism, racism, or xenophobia. Yet, I show in this chapter that on a deeper level, the prolific discussions of the “crisis of immigration” in the Mediterranean are not only reflective of repressive or negative forces. Instead, the migrant body is injected and inscribed with meaning about the location of borders. The migrant body becomes mediated through policymaking and security practices, and is the object of (re)bordering practices and discourses (Feldman 2012; Foucault 1995).

As we have seen, borders must continually be re-produced. The migrant body then becomes a site for the production of “the Mediterranean” as a boundary or frontier to the limits of Europe. In this way, migration should be seen as a “meta-issue,” one which has deeper implications than simply being about nationalistic policies or the rise of the Right. Migrants come to be understood not just in their status as aliens, but also in their abnormality. This, in turn, begs the question not just of how “the migrant” is produced within discourses, but also how the migrant is symbolic in the continuous insistence upon the locality of borders (Brown 2010, 41).

The Mediterranean Sea is an area that on the one hand defies definition. However, on the other hand, we can see that there exist discursive and institutional processes that function as attempts to “pin down” this inherently fluid concept of “the Mediterranean.” Financial, political, and cultural resources are poured into these concerns about the so-called “flood” of migrants
entering the EU through the Euro-Mediterranean states. For example, the European Union has contributed more than 40 million Euros to the fortification of the “Ceuta and Melilla walls in Morocco to deter Asian and African migration to Europe” (Brown 2010, 32). The ways in which this border comes to be drawn between Europe and the Mediterranean “Other” call for an investigation into how this line is breached, and who is implicated in the process. This is how the migrant body absorbs the symbol of the breaking or crossing of the border. The attention given to the migrant body acts as a reminder that the border exists (even if it is imagined) within narratives that are performative in nature, and act as re-bordering projects.

While all borders are inherently contingent, as “Europe” expands outwards, discourses of crisis of the “invasion” of the ‘Other’ allow for a negotiation of the boundaries of the polity. Moreover, the analysis of the Mediterranean as an inherently fluid and hybrid space “blurs the strict sense of separation between inside and outside that border lines imply” (Popescu 2012, 78). One should not assume that these borders are primordial or self-evident, but rather ask how it is that they come to be presented this way. The representation of “the Mediterranean” as an inert, “natural” border between Europe and Africa is reified discursively through articulations of the “crisis” of migration. Thus, the problem of migration in Europe is not simply one of physical security or concerns about a drain on welfare states. Nor is it clear that the “actual” numbers of migration in the Mediterranean justify the political and cultural attention devoted to elaborating and articulating its associated “danger.” Rather than focusing on the negative representations of migration in the Mediterranean being characteristic simply of feelings of “threat” from the outside, I argue that they are actually productive in that they work to construct and solidify a representation of “the Mediterranean” as an obvious border. Moreover, the politics of discourses of irregular immigration in the southern area of the European Union are representative
of a materialization, or political consequence, of the liminality of “the Mediterranean.” The migrant body is a symbolically powerful site where the politics of border making is played out and transcribed onto the individual body, where the making and remaking of the imagined concepts of “Europe,” “Africa,” and “Asia” are particularly potent.
Chapter 4: Between Two Worlds? The Making of Turkey, the Mediterranean, and the Performativity of Borders

Introduction

Turkey, although it is a product of the twentieth century in its current form, has spent much of Eurasian history at the center of debates about the locality of the boundaries of East/West. Similarly, Turkey is a key player in the EU’s relationship with the rest of the Mediterranean. Initially, Turkey “was a rather reluctant partner” within the EMP because of “anxiety over the fact that Turkey would be confined to the position of being a peripheral southern country inside the EMP” (S. Yilmaz 2003, 2). However, as a report by the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EurMeSCo) makes clear, Turkey is increasingly becoming a major player in Mediterranean politics, especially within the “broader context of its long-standing relations with the Union and its goal of EU membership” (S. Yilmaz 2003, 3). Turkey has very focused security and economic interests in the governance of the Mediterranean, especially within the key areas of the UfM such as the free trade zone, “the Cyprus issue, the Aegean disputes, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and bilateral relations with Israel” (S. Yilmaz 2003, 7).

Turkey’s integral role in European relations with the Mediterranean is not new, either. The Ottoman Empire was, for much of its history, simultaneously acknowledged as an outsider and as an integral part to European cultural and political development, especially at the height of the Ottoman’s occupation of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, seen as connecting Europe to the eastern Mediterranean. This narrative of the Ottoman Empire is especially potent as the Empire itself encompassed an area of territory that stretched from Central Europe to North Africa and to
the Middle East. Thus, the Ottoman Empire became representative quite literally of Eurasia itself. This legacy is very much apparent in contemporary relations between the European Union and the Turkish Republic. As a country that, according to many, has been facing a battle between secularism and faith-inspired political factions since its establishment in 1923, Turkey inhabits hybrid spaces, stuck between narratives of “pseudo-Europeanness” and “pseudo-Asianness” (Yavuz 2009; Kuru and Stepan 2012; Rabasa and Larrabee 2008; Grigoriadis 2009). Perhaps one of the most prolific claims made about Turkey argues that because the Turkish population identifies itself in censuses as 99 percent Muslim, Turkey is not a culturally European country. Yet, the story is much more complicated than an overly simplified categorization of some kind of Orient/Occident divide, located along the banks of the Bosphorus.

Turkey, more specifically, is seen as a “cradle of Western civilization.” Despite discussions within the European Union citing the “lack of evidence” that Turkey is “European,” in 2010, Istanbul was named the European Capital of Culture. According to the European Commission, the European Capital of Culture program was designed to showcase living culture and history of European cities, bring Europeans together, and “foster a feeling of European citizenship.” In order for the Council of the European Union to award the title, a city must

21 Of course, this assumes a direct historical connection and correlation between Christianity and the development of Europe as a political and cultural entity. While this claim has been shown to be faulty and overly simplistic, its popularity in “common knowledge” and political discourses is striking. This question will be dealt with a bit more in later sections of the chapter, but it should be noted that beyond the scope of this project is the investigation and dissection of the historical links between Islam, Christianity, and Europe. For more discussions on this, see (Deringil 2007; Goody 2004).

22 The Bosphorus, also known as the Istanbul Strait, is often cited as forming part of the boundary between Europe and Asia. It is the waterway that divides Istanbul in half, creating the “European side” (Avrupa Yakası) and the “Asian side” (Asya Yakası). The Bosphorus connects the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara.

present its historical and cultural significance for the promotion of a “European identity.”

Walking across the Galata Bridge in Istanbul in 2010, one was met by the giant banners proudly displaying the city’s newly acquired title.

Yet, an obvious question remains: how can Istanbul simultaneously be the European Capital of Culture and be at the core of various debates about the potential “danger” of allowing Turkey into a political and cultural European community? Istanbul certainly has a long history as a symbol of both “European culture” and as Europe’s “Muslim Other.” The legacy of Constantinople remains strong in the articulation of the boundaries and borders of “Europe.” Indeed, Samuel Huntington’s now infamous 1993 article “The Clash of Civilizations?” positions Turkey, and the Mediterranean more generally, as a key fault line of “civilizations.” Turkey, it is clear, is often seen as simultaneously European and Asian. The Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet has even compared Turkey “to the head of a mare ‘galloping from farthest Asia jutting into the Mediterranean’; a country set squarely between Europe and Asia, between the Balkans and the Middle East” (Morris 2005, 7). However, at the same time, the European Commission argues that “the successful inclusion of Turkey in the European integration process would give clear evidence to the Moslem world that their religious beliefs are compatible with the EU’s values” (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 12).

Thus, while Istanbul was named the “Culture Capital of Europe” in 2010, there is an ongoing debate about the “Europeanness” of Turkey. The title of “Culture Capital” positions Istanbul as a focal point of what is presumed to be a unified European culture, heritage, and history. Yet, at the same time, Turkey is often seen as a peripheral space, far from the “true” center of “Europe.” This duality between the “center” and the “periphery” of Europe comes to fruition and is played out in political narratives and policy making within the European Union.
In other words, “Europe” never simply refers to a territorial understanding of Europe. Instead, there are always qualifiers involved in the deployment of the term “European.” The fact that Turkey’s place in Europe is challenged means that Istanbul being awarded the title of “Culture Capital” is incredibly symbolic; it is a label that is intensely debated and rich with historical significance and narratives that are politically potent and powerful. One might be hard pressed to find an opinion piece in a newspaper about the debated relevance of French culture to the European project, or for that matter even one reducing Greece’s “Europeanness” to a set of characteristics. Yet, such discussions about Turkey seem persistent and omnipresent. It is curious, then, that despite the skepticism about Turkey’s place in “Europe,” the Council of the European Union affirmed Istanbul’s integral influence in the construction of the supranational myth of European consciousness.

Yet, at the same time, “Turkey” has come to be an extremely divisive topic in European political culture. The questions about Turkey’s position in the European Union are fed by media portrayals that “tend to paint a rather negative image of [the country], driven above all by its commercial logic whereby stereotypes, sensationalism, and alarmism ‘sell’” (Tocci 2011, 68). “Turkey,” or perhaps more accurately “Turkishness,” remains in a space of fluidity, hybridity, and liminality, where it is often seen as a pseudo-European, pseudo-Asian entity that always remains just on the periphery, barely on the “outside” of both “Europe” and “Asia.” The European Commission reflects this anxiety:

Turkey is situated at a regional crossroads of strategic importance for Europe: the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean; its territory is a transit route for land and air transport with Asia, and for sea transport with Russia and the Ukraine...In economic and demographic terms, Turkey is an important actor...As a Moslem secular country with a functioning democracy, it is a factor for stability in the region. Through its integration in the western alliance, and membership of many economic and regional organisations, it contributes to the
security of Europe and its neighbourhood (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 6).

In this regard, this chapter entails an examination of some common representations of geo-cultural hybridity with regards to the Republic of Turkey. Competing discourses often place Turkey as either European or non-European. Conversely, there is a third paradigm through which Turkey is viewed, one that places the country in a space of hybridity, encompassing both “European” and “Asian” characteristics. Moreover, these debates have very real consequences. That is, it is not the goal of this chapter simply to either purport or call into question discussions of Turkey’s “hybrid” status. Instead, I contend that the political consequences of the ease with which the representation of Turkey as a mélange between Europe and Asia is deployed are markedly important for the analysis of how “the Mediterranean” takes on political and cultural significance within the European Union’s policy making efforts in the region. The question of Turkey’s cultural belonging is something that has been taken on by many authors, and is a tightly bound knot that is difficult to untie, as there are many facets to the rhetoric that affirms a sort of cultural limbo or purgatory for the Turks. My goal in this chapter is not to affirm or deny any particular narrative about how Turkey is categorized. Instead, in what I see as a more nuanced approach in asking what purpose these discourses and narratives serve as larger functions of the reiteration and reassertion of the assumed parts to which the binary of Europe/Asia is made and remade within the Mediterranean region.

Moreover, Turkey is an important site for unpacking the various, complicated meanings of “European,” as it is a candidate state for the European Union. It would be impossible to simply state that Turkey is unequivocally either “European” or “Asian.” Turkey has officially been a candidate for European Union membership since the application for accession, which was made in early 1987. The political and cultural discussions regarding Turkey’s “legitimacy” as a
European state have taken up a lot of energy and have left Turkey, by some accounts, “out in the cold.” The European Commission makes reference to the unique nature with which it has approached Turkey’s potential membership:

Turkey’s accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey’s population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics. These factors give Turkey the capacity to contribute to regional and international stability (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 4).

Understood more broadly, these discussions regarding Turkey’s “rightful place” in the European project require a recognition of “the ‘dormant dilemmas’ embedded in the relationship between religion and politics in Europe” (Tocci 2011, 58).

Turkey is a secular state whose population identifies itself on censuses as predominantly observant Muslims. Istanbul is a city that literally straddles two continents. Taking the ferry across the Bosphorus, visitors and residents are reminded of this duality, and are welcomed by signs that say “Welcome to Asia” or “Welcome to Europe” on the respective banks of the waterway. More than simply being a site where one can witness the arbitrary nature of continental divides, Turkey is an active site for discussions of cultural and political liminality. Turkey is a particularly dense site of discourses of cultural hybridity and the articulation of borders between “Europe” and the “Asian Other.” Using scholarly and popular discourses, I show that Turkey is often characterized in one of three ways, as 1) European, 2) Asian, or 3) as somewhere in between, as a “rogue” nation that defies “traditional” categorization. The first two of these categorizations are fairly easy to challenge, an investigation into the cultural history of Turkey quickly shows holes in any argument that tries to secure Turkey’s position firmly inside or outside that “which we call Europe.” The third category represents a space that is more intriguing and is often called upon by individuals who might not otherwise be seen as sharing the
same arguments, such as Stephen Kinzer and Samuel Huntington, both of whom argue that Turkey falls “in between” any existing structures forwarding bounded civilizations. I surmise that this third category is perhaps the most interesting, as it allows one to put into question the making of cultural, geographic, and political categories themselves. The inability to definitively place Turkey in any one geo-cultural category is met by a compromise—Turkey is constructed as a hybrid, as both European and Asian, representative of the fault line between East/West.

Foreign policy making in the EU is dependent largely upon these categorizations of what can be made to count as European and what is made to exist on the “outside.” It is assumed that Turkey “is exclusively neither Middle Eastern nor European, and currently sits as an insulator between these two civilisational areas” (Buzan and Roberson 1993, 131). These conflicting stories about what Turkey represents for Europe will be fleshed out in the first part of this chapter. After briefly contextualizing the historical importance of Turkey in discourses about “Europeanness,” I introduce a brief history of the institutional relationship between the European Union and Turkey. Although the EU should not be taken as synonymous with “Europe” writ large, there are very important cultural and historical conflations between a political organization of European states and “Europe” within the realm of popular, political, and epistemic discourses. Turkey has a long history of negotiations and institutional affiliations with organizations that are assumed, in both name and function, to be European entities. This point is not just important from a strategic position, but also highlights the categorization of Turkey in many areas as a “European power.”

Then, this chapter will map some of the more contemporary models through which Turkey is positioned vis-à-vis “Europe” and “Asia.” Whether it is seen as a European or Asian country, or if it is seen as an example not possible of being categorized, Turkey is the subject of
many discourses about where the limits of West and East are assumed to be located. What can be seen from this brief explanation of how Turkey is positioned in some discussions of its political or cultural belonging is that there is a deep lack of consensus.

I show that the discourses of Turkey’s assumed cultural hybridity function to circumvent the “problem” of where to position it in prominent discourses of Europeanness. When Turkey cannot be made to “fit” or challenges any representation of what it means to be European, a concession is made. Rather than challenging the perceived homogeneous, yet unstable notion of “Europeanness” itself, Turkey is written off as an exception to the “European” model. Moreover, I propose that one should not view Turkey as an “anomaly,” but rather as an important site of the contestation of the making of the “axis” between notions of a bounded “West” and “East.” Turkey, and the Mediterranean more broadly, quite literally is a space where this binary is negotiated and put into practice politically. The making of the discourses that purport geo-cultural divides to be stable and unquestionable requires much intellectual and political energy. In many ways, these persistent borders that divide assumed civilizations are performative in nature. The apparent need to “make Turkey fit” into any one category, or the decision to write it off as an outlier, obviate anxieties not just about the status of Turkey, but also about the instability of borders more broadly. Discourses that position Turkey as the “bridge between two worlds” speak to a larger project of the reification and insistence upon borders as clean, evident spaces. I argue that one can, and should, extrapolate the example of Turkey’s hybridity to show the volatility and inherent instability of the seemingly neat geo-cultural border of the Mediterranean. Thus, the anxieties about where Turkey does or does not fit do not speak simply to its specific historical and cultural particularities, but also to the fragility of borders that are taken to show exclusivity as self-evident. In this way, I contend that the case of Turkey’s
contentious “Europeanness” should not place it in the category of the anomaly or the “exception,” but rather as the rule. Ultimately, this is a question of power, as power “above all produces identities and meanings” (Tocci 2011, 17).

In this way, Turkey is chosen as a vignette here to illustrate interstices that are applicable to other significant historical and contemporary problems of representation in Europe and its surviving environs. For example, the geopolitical fuzzy zone represented by Turkey which is the subject of this chapter is similarly applicable to the Ukraine, Iberia, or even Algeria. That is, the purpose here is to expose and problematize the conditions surrounding the anxiety within Europe about being “Africanized” or “Asianized” – about “Europe” becoming less “European.” In this way, we can talk about Turkey as symptomatic of larger anxieties about the making of space and regions and about ascribing meaning to borderzones. The spaces that “Europe” came to ignore after 1918 are larger left unexamined. However, it is these spaces where we can learn the most about what it means to be European, rather than looking at the “core.” Drawing attention to these peripheral spaces that are larger left in the dark puts into question the geopolitical value of the anxiety about regional borders.

**The Importance of the Past**

One of the most popular and persistent arguments against Turkey’s potential EU membership relies on the “cultural argument,” of which Islam is often cited as the most glaringly “outsider” element. As Edward Said notes in *Culture and Imperialism*, there is a deep relationship between the making of culture and power to narrate (Said 1994, xiii). Indeed, Said goes on to note that nations, and one could argue “civilizations,” are little more than narrations themselves (Said 1994, xiii). Many have noted the constructed nature of culture and the nation, recognizing that these political and social entities are not primordial or self-evident, but rather
come to be developed and continually reinforced primarily through discourses, practices, and institutions (Said 1994; Said 1979; Anderson 2006; Hobsbawm 1983; Gellner 1983). One cannot understand the making of culture or nations without simultaneously recognizing the fluid nature of borders and boundaries, which allow “us to see the extent to which cultures are humanly made structures of both authority and participation, benevolent in what they include, incorporate, and validate, less benevolent in what they exclude and demote” (Said 1994, 15).

This being said, the peninsula on which the Turkish Republic now lies is a piece of real estate that is embedded with symbolism and historical meaning about the “origins” of stories of what it means to be European. Turkey has long served as a liminal space in matters of geopolitics, philosophy, and Euro-centric discourses on the incompatibility of East and West. Indeed, it seems that while “in 1529 and again in 1683, Turkish armies seeking to conquer Europe were turned back at the gates of Vienna…[now] Turkey would enter Europe by invitation” (Kinzer 2010, 136). The Ottoman Empire was often constructed as an ambiguous “Other,” with a capital city that was at one time the core of the Byzantine Empire, the Ottomans acted as a certain “buffer zone” between a fluid notion of “Europe” and the “Other.” Implicit in any understanding of the Ottoman place in European history is a recognition that it was within the Empire that Christianity and Islam often came into contact. As James Goody notes, Islam and Christianity were very large constituent parts of the making of the Ottoman Empire (Goody 2004, 122). While Islam is often seen as an “outsider,” especially in contemporary debates regarding the European Union’s apparent “Christian core,” the religion cannot be framed as a new presence in Europe, but rather as a tradition that has been based on the continent since the eighth century (Goody 2004, 158). In other words, the tenuous relationship between Christian Europe and the Muslim ‘Other’ are not a product of the twenty-first century. It is important to
contextualize the histories and narratives that contribute, even inadvertently and latently, to contemporary “fears” and warnings about Turkey’s European aspirations.

With the symbolic and literal “conquering” of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottomans, the Patriarchate of the Eastern Orthodox Church shifted hands to become the capital of the Ottoman Empire during the rule of Sultan Mehmed. Furthermore, Istanbul would later became the Caliphate during the reign of Selim I in 1517 (Finkel 2005, 111). The largest Christian church in the world at the time, the Hagia Sophia, gained minarets and was converted to a mosque with the conquering of Constantinople, becoming the first imperial mosque of Istanbul (Finkel 2005, 52–3).

The resulting Turkish Empire came to be a convenient “Other” for Europeans, and was often characterized as “barbaric, oriental, decadent, and on the way to relegation to the colonial world over which “Europe” ruled” (Pocock 2002, 68). The historian Arnold Toynbee, for example, argued that “the Greeks were leaders of civilization in the Ancient World and in the Middle Ages, till the Greek Empire of Constantinople was conquered by the Turks in 1453” (Toynbee 1917, 8).

The Turks never did become a formal European colony, yet the Ottoman Empire was also never seen completely as the “Other,” as the capital and heart of the empire was directly and inextricably bound up in articulations of European history. The prominent Turkish author Orhan Pamuk places a significant amount of importance on the fact that Turkey, unlike most of North Africa, was never a formal European colony. As he notes, “this [history] allowed us later to nurture more freely our dreams of European-style westernization, without dredging up too many bad memories or guilty feelings” (Pamuk 2012). Undoubtedly, there is more to the twentieth
century Westernization campaign headed by Kemalism in Turkey than the lack of historical, European-style colonialism. However, Pamuk’s point reiterates the complicated relationship that the Ottoman Empire, and later, Turkey, has had within representations of “Europe proper.” Despite an at-times rocky relationship with its “Western European” counterparts, notably Germany and France, Turkey has spent a long time existing “on the cusp” of Europe, seemingly trying to become fully European, yet without full acceptance.

Even historically, it was never clear whether or not the Ottomans counted as “European.” In another writing, Arnold Toynbee seems to have no confusion in terms of this question of Turkish belonging in Europe. Writing in 1953, Toynbee notes that the Turks were presented with two incompatible and mutually exclusive choices at the end of World War I; they could either embrace “whole-hearted Westernization [or face]…outright extinction” (Toynbee 1953, 21). Yet, for Toynbee, no matter how much Turkey embraced Westernization, it was on some level doomed to be futile, as the Turk simply had “at heart, no love for the alien Western civilization that they were deliberately introducing” (Toynbee 1953, 25). It is clear that from Toynbee’s perspective, Turkey is not representative of any type of hybridity, but is rather a European menace, a threat to “civilization” itself, and embodies the anti-Western “Other.” For Toynbee, the answer lies in the fact that civilization is more than the sum of its parts. As he claims, one cannot “cherry pick” as civilization is “an indivisible whole in which all the parts hang together and are interdependent” (Toynbee 1953, 26). This is reflective of a sentiment that sees European “civilization” as a homogenized, unified entity, one that must be embraced in its entirety; one that exists independent exclusively from the “East.”

On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire’s story was never so cut and dry. Territorially, the Empire was part of Europe. Even at the height of the Ottoman expansion, the territory of the
empire stretched to current day Hungary, and by the fall of the Empire, it was colloquially referred to as the “Sick Man of Europe.” At the same time, however, Anthony Pagden notes that the Turk was seen as the Asian outsider, specifically “throughout the sixteenth century, when successive Christian intellectuals called upon their rulers to bury their difference and mount a crusade against the Turk, the claim was always that European, Christian, science could never fail against Asian ignorance” (Pagden 2002b, 49–50). Similarly, it is not uncommon to see claims like that made by David Andelman, who argues that “Europe has always considered the Bosporus—the strait that flows past Istanbul and serves as the entrance to the Black Sea—the end of the continent” (Andelman 2010, 92). While some might not look twice at this statement, there is no attempt to contextualize what or where “Europe” is, and the personification of the continent reifies perceptions of it as a primordial entity with “natural” or ahistorical boundaries.

It is clear in the competing discourses of the Ottomans’ place in “Europe” that the relationship between “Europe” and “Turkey” cannot be seen as objective or evident. Indeed, John Goody accurately characterizes this ambiguity and confusion, noting that “Islam was never simply the Other, the Orient, but an element of Europeans, not only part of our past but of our present too, in the Mediterranean, in the Balkans, in Cyprus, in Russia” (Goody 2004, 95). The discursive ambivalence towards the Turk is clearly present in much of European history over the past few centuries. As Selim Deringil notes, in nineteenth century England there was a common characterization of the Turk as being “placed in position where it [was] impossible to ignore him, and almost impossible to endure him” (Deringil 2007, 716).

The duality of European and Asian characteristics in representations of “the Turk” has historically been, and continues to be, popular in both academic and popular discourses. For
example, Michael Butor deploys an Orientalist discourse when speaking about the Turk in his 1986 book, *The Spirit of Mediterranean Places*. In the book, Butor remarked about the ability for one to witness in Istanbul… “people walking by, dressed in European style, except for their fur caps, but mostly with profoundly foreign faces, with olive skin, wide cheekbones, a slow and uncertain gait. The coast of Asia was barely visible” (Butor 1986, 20). In this description of the Turk is a classically Orientalist exoticism and cataloguing of the physical features of the “pseudo-Oriental” Turk. This representation of the Turk as a Euro-Asian hybrid confuses any notion of “Europe” and “Asia” as mutually exclusive entities. While Butor’s language is no longer reflected in mainstream academic discussions of Turkishness, the sentiment largely remains in assumptions made about where “Europe proper” ends and where Asia begins. Authors like Butor demonstrate the disruption that Turkey provides for mappings of the world that attempt to categorically decipher cultures and geo-political spaces. Butor’s is a discourse, like many others, that attempt to make sense of what Turkey represents, and how this contributes to the development of an identity and limits of “Europe.”

While it may seem as though these discussions of historical undertakings of centuries past are anachronistic or irrelevant, one must recognize that “appeals to the past are among the commonest of strategies in interpretations of the present” (Said 1994, 3). The appeal to the past is intimately involved, even if it is implicitly, in the articulation of a European political community. Even in the twentieth century, there was recognition that the Turk was not fully “European.” This ambivalence was personified by the historian Denys Hay when he argued that “if the Turk was not different under natural law, he was certainly different under divine law” (Hay 1968, 113–4). Put another way, these histories and narrations about the historical significance of the Ottoman Empire and the land that we now call “Turkey,” are wrapped up in
contemporary claims to Turkey’s inherent place (or lack thereof) in “Europe.” The historic recognition that the Turk was inextricably bound up with European political and cultural formation, yet remained ambivalently on the “outside” has certainly left a mark on the contemporary discussions of Turkey’s “worthiness” of inclusion in European politics. Much of this difference was attributed to the idea “Christendom” morphed into a notion of “Europe,” which undoubtedly still influences the relationship between the European Union and Turkey (Ayoob 2012, 3).

The Politics of Turkey’s European Union Accession

An important factor within discussions of the historical, cultural, and geopolitical discussions regarding Turkey’s “Europeanness” is how these dialogues materialize in and (re)produce political decisions about European Union membership and foreign policy. How do these representations of Turkey as an in-between space factor into how it the politics of Turkey’s EU candidacy are played out? To what extent do these representations of Turkey come into play when political figures discuss the consequences of Turkey’s membership bid to the EU, for example in arguments that position Turkey’s membership as having “implications for foreign policy in a number of potentially unstable neighbouring regions such as the Mediterranean, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia” (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 11)?

Turkey has been a candidate state for EU accession for decades. While the development of regimes that respect democratic principles and human rights has been an important barrier and lacking development for Turkey’s membership bid, there are inevitably questions of deep cultural contingencies that rest at the center of the debates about Turkey’s membership. Thus, this section highlights the “real” significance for the analysis of Turkish belonging in “European culture,” how these discussions produce meaning, and what political stakes they carry. In other
words, Turkey’s stalled membership bid cannot be reduced to the simple failure to comply with the European Union’s acquis. Moreover, the meaning of “the Mediterranean” is bound up with representations of what Turkey represents, politically, economically, and culturally, for the European Union.

*The History of Turkey’s EU Accession*

In 1987, Turkey applied to join what was then called the European Economic Community and in 1997 it was declared eligible to join the European Union. However, Turkey’s formal relationship with the European Union dates back much further to the 1960s, and has a long history of negotiation and dialogue with European-based international organizations. For example, Turkey was one of the first states to join the Council of Europe in 1949 and was a founding member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1973 (European Commission 2004). Thus, Turkey’s institutional relationship with its European neighbors is not new, and this speaks to the complex and historically rich image of Turkey as a space of negotiation between two different cultural and continental categories. The EU emphasizes this point, noting that “for major periods of European history, Turkey has been an important factor of European politics” (European Commission 2004, 2). Moreover, the history of institutional rapport and association between Turkey and the European Union (and its predecessors) highlights the fact that it is impossible to say, unequivocally, that Turkey “does not belong” in “Europe.” Instead, a much more complicated picture is painted of where Turkey “fits,” which further problematizes the question as to whether or not it is possible to categorically “fit” in bounded cultural, geo-political categories.
Turkey’s relationship with the European Union demonstrates the processes through which borders are constructed, through historical narratives and contemporary policy-making processes. Narratives of the politics of accession often posit that “Turkey and the EU are bound by a curious love affair” (Tocci 2011, 2). This is certainly not a novel sentiment. As Müftüler-Bac shows:

Turkey has always had something of an identity problem with regard to its position within the European system of states. Turkey does not share in the Judeo-Christian cultural tradition, but neither does it belong to the predominantly Arab Islamic culture (Müftüler-Bac, Meltem 1997, 3).

Surely, this qualification could be applied just as easily to any number of states in South Eastern Europe. Could Serbia, Bulgaria, or Macedonia ever be “made” to fit into one of these categorizations? This further highlights not just the problematic nature of these dichotomous categorizations, but more importantly, the work that goes into propagating and disseminating narratives that are founded upon this binary. Official negotiations for Turkey’s accession to the European Union started in 2004, but will likely take more than a decade to complete. In recent years, however, Turkish public opinion has waned in its support for the possible EU membership, as many question the length of time and requests made on the part of the European Union.

*The Current State of Negotiations*

In 2012, the European Union cited a growth in the development of enhanced dialogue between Turkey and the EU (European Commission 2012b, 5). Specifically,

Turkey decided to freeze its relations with the Presidency of the Council of the EU during the second half of 2012 and not to attend meetings chaired by the Cyprus EU Presidency. The European Council expressed serious concerns with regard to Turkish statements and threats (European Commission 2012b, 5).
The EU has recognized the shared interests and goals of the supranational organization and Turkey, yet draws attention to the apparent stalemate in accession talks that occurred in mid-2012, noting that European Council expressed serious concerns with regard to Turkish statements and threats and called for “full respect for the role of the Presidency of the Council” (European Commission 2012b, 5). Although the negotiation between the European Union and Turkey has gone through periods where progress has been delayed, the EU continues to reiterate that regardless of the eventual outcome for Turkey’s accession, it must remain an integral and vital part of European institutions and political structures (European Commission 2004). Ultimately, however, the EU cites progress in the negotiation of Turkey’s candidacy. Despite the set backs in negotiations during the first part of 2012, the European Commission cites that it is “now crucial that Turkey signs the readmission agreement to allow for a proper roadmap to be finalised, effectively starting the process [towards accession]” (European Commission 2012b, 4–5).

Turkish accession represents several key strategic areas for the European Union. Besides the previously mentioned geopolitical benefits for improving relations between the EU and the United States in the region, Turkey’s integration into the European market has the potential to carry great economic gains, especially as “Turkey is the EU’s sixth biggest trading partner while the EU is Turkey’s biggest” (European Commission 2012b, 5). Turkey is a large agricultural producer for the EU, although it has not yet followed through with the development of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Nevertheless, it is clear that the European Union would benefit greatly from a Turkish accession in many key areas. However, the strategic goals of the EU are not the only criteria for membership. Public opinion and a sense of “Europeanness” on the part of the candidate country are undeniably important for this process.
It remains evident, though, that the question of whether or not Turkey is a “European state” is not just important for metaphysical discussions of cultural determinism. Whether or not Turkey succeeds in becoming a member of the EU is dependent on a number of factors, many of which will not be discussed in great depth here, as it remains beyond the scope and scale of this project. However, this chapter in particular is concerned with the historical and cultural paradigms and representations of Turkey as either “European” or “Asian.”

The third category, that of the “hybrid” is the most interesting in its effects. Thus, this is not a question of where Turkey “truly” belongs, but rather one of the effects of these narratives of cultural belonging on policy formation and implementation. Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter, Turkey provides ammunition for discussions of universal Westernization (despite the oxymoronic nature of the statement) and can thus serve as a way to unravel the Orientalized portrayal of the so-called “Muslim world”, encompassing the region from South Eastern Europe to Central Asia, the Arab Peninsula and Northern Africa. Orientalist representations of these regions have heavily impaired the process of cultural exchange, thus being a burden to deepening the cooperation on higher levels.

The “Turkish Model” and Turkey’s place in regional politics

One of the problems with the so-called “Turkish model” is its embodied assumption that the values of Europeanization, Western-style democratic practices, and free market principles are universal and should serve as some type of “goal” to which others should aspire. As Pamuk notes, in the first decade or so of the twenty-first century, public opinion within Turkey was favorable towards EU accession. Many have written “fairytale accounts of the privileges Turkish citizens would finally gain once full membership was secured. Most importantly,
investments would be made and untold treasures would find their way to Turkey from the EU's various funds so that, like the Greeks, we too would collectively take a step up the social ladder and be able to live as comfortably as other Europeans” (Pamuk 2012). The romanticized ideal of Europeanization that often frames debates about Turkey’s EU membership is reminiscent of the drive towards Westernization that led Atatürk’s reforms in the early twentieth century, pointing towards a rise in neo-Kemalism.

Turkey, in many ways, has become a representation of an assumption of universal desire for Westernization and/or Europeanization. Yet, this model is deployed in particular circumstances and for specific reasons. For example, Turkey is looked at as a model for states in the Middle East as a demonstration of what a “Muslim democracy” looks like. The European Commission is blunt about this expectation of the “Turkish model,” arguing that “if Turkey can pursue a path of democracy that combines secularism with a Moslem social and cultural environment, it could offer a good example for other countries in the region” (Commission of the European Communities 2004, 11).

The example of Turkey’s ability to straddle “Western ideals” and “Muslim traditions” provides political ammunition for debates about historical and cultural belonging, and the limits of the ideas of Europe and Asia, the “West” and the “East.” Sitting “at the edge” of Europe positions Turkey as both a regional power within Europe and Central Asia. Many charge that Turkey provides an example of successful Europeanization for other countries in the region, and this has rung particularly salient during the Arab Spring movements beginning in 2011. As the world watched a string of uprisings and revolutions occur throughout North Africa and the Middle East, attention was turned towards Turkey, and the increasingly popular idea of a “Turkish model” that countries like Egypt could supposedly emulate on the path towards
democratic practices. This sentiment is not, however, emergent with the so-called “Arab Springs” themselves. As Chris Morris notes in an attempt to link Turkey with some sort of “role model” for countries in the Middle East:

Countries in the Middle East have been watching Turkey’s internal reforms and its European progress as closely as anyone, aware that these are startling changes which could one day bring the EU to their own borders. Turkey: a bridge between two worlds? It is an oft-repeated cliché, but today it just might be coming true (Morris 2005, 3).

Morris’ claim that attention should be turned towards Turkey for lessons to be learned from Europeanization is not unwarranted. In fact, many authors have cited the importance of Turkey’s potential to help find resolution in conflicts like the Arab-Israeli dispute or the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria.

Turkey is seen as a strategic bridge between the European Union, North America, and the Middle East. All of this points to the strategic and geo-political importance of Turkey not just as a candidate for EU accession, but as a rising regional power. Yet, to fully understand the strategic potential of Europe’s relationship with its Turkish neighbors, one must look to the historical role that Turkey has had in the European narrative. The 2013 protests against the Erdoğan regime and the planned development of Gazi Park in Istanbul have developed into a countrywide movement where all grievances against the government are being aired. As Ankara’s response to the protests comes down with a heavier hand, the familiar debates about Turkey’s “proper” Europeanness have reared their heads once again. These narratives come back into the spotlight, as Turkey is linked more closely with the Arab Spring movements than with Europe’s own recent wave of protests (Hakura 2013; Bandow 2013). Despite all of the discussions, however, of how Turkey is linked to the Middle Eastern states as a potential model for other democratization, there is also recognition that the protests that occurred in mid-2013
throughout the country highlight the deep differences between Turkey and its Middle Eastern and North African neighbors. As Bandow notes, in perhaps an overly idealistic fashion, “there’s a lot of loose talk about the “Arab Spring” coming to Turkey, but Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) was democratically elected” (Bandow 2013).

The fact that Turkey is so often used as a “model” for organizing a vision of International Relations makes it a powerful site of contestation for the often-prolific representations of dichotomies of West/East, Europe/Asia, or even democracy/Islam. With this in mind, the next section turns attention towards the EU’s relationship with Turkey in an institutional capacity.

**Turkey as a Fault Line, Turkey as a Border Space**

Turkey has come under great international attention, both by policy makers and scholars, in recent decades. Due to its historical, geographic, and cultural liminality, as well as its twentieth century history of “modernizing” reforms, Turkey has been highlighted as an increasingly important regional and global actor. Turkey’s candidacy status for the European Union, as well as its strong diplomatic relationship with the United States, makes it a vital actor in twenty-first century international relations. As the Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu has said, modern Turkey is and should be accepted as an actor rather than as an issue, a perception that underestimates the role and the capacity of the country. Yet, more often than not, Turkey is represented as little more than the specter of the “Sick Man” on the Bosphorus.

Attention given to the importance of Turkey as a regional and global actor revolves around its status as a “modernized,” secular (although predominantly Muslim) country.

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24 See interview with Ahmet Davutoglu at: http://video.ft.com/v/110928384001/Turkish-foreign-minister-full-interview-
Journalist Stephen Kinzer argues that “the Turks understand that they can only progress by moving ever closer to Western ideas of modernity and freedom” (Kinzer 2010, 204). While Turkey is watched ever more closely as it inches closer to EU membership, its novelty as a Muslim, “Western style” secular state takes on an increasing focus in scholarly discussions and classifications of difference within the European narrative (Müftüler-Bac, Meltem 1997; Pamuk 2012; Grigoriadis 2009).

Since its application for candidacy as a European Union member state in 1987, Turkey has occupied discourses about Europeanness and the social and cultural implications for including Turkey within the broader narrative of Europeanness (Müftüler-Baç and Stivachtis 2008). In fact, its candidate status in the European Union manifests the long, complicated historical narratives of Turkey as an ambiguously European space. The Ottoman legacy within Europe has produced a multitude of narratives about the “infiltration of Islam” into Europe and in many ways is represented by the image of the Turk (Buzan and Roberson 1993, 131). For example, Arnold Toynbee, writing just before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, argues not only is Ottoman culture completely antithetical to “Western civilization,” but that “where Ottoman rule has spread, civilisation has perished” (Toynbee 1917, 17). Toynbee goes on to note that the Europeans who were unfortunate enough to be subjected to Ottoman rule deserve redemption led by the Allies, as:

The redemption of these innocent peoples from the hell into which they have been case, and where they will remain in agony so long as Ottoman...militarism holds out, is incumbent upon the Allies if they are to redeem their plighted word (Toynbee 1917, 27).

While Toynbee’s words might now seem over-the-top or exaggerated, he was widely acknowledged as an influential historian and one of the heading scholars of international affairs
in the early twentieth century. Toynbee’s rhetoric is noteworthy not just because it seems backwards and Orientalist in such an obvious and overt manner. Toynbee’s narrative positions the Turk as the outsider of Europe, as the danger nipping dangerously close to the heels of the European.

These historical narratives, although not expressed so explicitly in contemporary discourse, serve as the foundations for deeply rooted cultural assumptions and “knowledges” about the relationship between Turkey and “Europe.” Turkey’s status as an EU candidate has crystallized and politicized these discussions and representations of the dubious, “pseudo-European,” dangerous nature of the Turk. Geopolitically, Turkey is seen as an asset to the European Union, as well as to the United States, as it is has good diplomatic relations with the “West,” as well as with countries like Syria, Israel and Iran (Kinzer 2010). Furthermore, during the Cold War, Turkey became a vital element for the anti-Soviet alliance (Todorova 1999, 187). Historical discussions of Turkey as a gateway between “civilizations” have contemporary vestiges in the debates regarding European Union membership and belonging.

Even contemporarily, religion plays a significant, if not always explicitly recognized, role in the debates within the European Union regarding Turkey’s “sufficiently European” status. The negative sentiments surrounding the fact that Turkey, although a secular state, is made up of a population that identifies itself as 99 percent Muslim, is particularly strong from the French and German perspectives (Pamuk 2012). Yet, the “religion question” demonstrates exactly how complicated and interconnected the points of discussion are between culture, religion, and geography. It is not simply the “Muslim” question alone that incites anxiety on the part of some leaders and communities on the Western edges of the continent. The religion question rides tandem with the question of population growth and demographics. Perhaps if either point were
taken alone they would not have so much salience, yet together they invoke anxiety about another rise in the historical “Islamic invasion” in “Europe.”\textsuperscript{25} The fact that Turkey’s population of about 70 million people means that it would represent a significant portion of the EU’s population if it were to join. This apparently unacceptable ratio of Turks to European citizens from other nationalities adds fuel to the paranoid discussion of Turkey’s “invasion.”

For example, in 2004 the European Commission, while assessing the potential problems for Turkish membership, noted “Turkey’s accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey’s population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential. These factors give Turkey the capacity to contribute to regional and international stability” (European Commission 2004, 4). However, at the same time, the EC notes that the “accession of Turkey to the Union will be challenging both for the EU and Turkey. If well managed, it would offer important opportunities for both” (European Commission 2004, 4). In this way, it is impossible to understand Turkey’s contemporary relationship with the European Union without taking into account the dynamic and interconnected relationship and symbolism between population growth and religion (Mango 1993, 731). For example, Pamuk notes that the anxiety and fear associated with the prospect of a Turkish member-status is affected by “the large influx of Muslim migrants from north Africa and Asia into Europe that, in the eyes of many Europeans, has cast a dark shadow of doubt and fear over the idea of a predominantly Muslim country joining the union” (Pamuk 2012).

\textsuperscript{25} This assumes, faultily, that Islam was never a constituent part of what it means to be European, that it always remained on the outside, ready to “infiltrate” or penetrate the borders of a presumably bounded entity. This question of the role of Islam in the European narrative has been thoroughly investigated elsewhere, particularly well by Jack Goody in \textit{Islam in Europe} (Goody 2004).
This is, then, a critical juncture for the questions taken up in this dissertation. Namely, to what extent do the narratives of cultural belonging of a state on the periphery of Europe, like Turkey, intersect with and co-produce the anxieties about irregular immigration from the Mediterranean? More importantly, how do these interstices come to form an axis, represented spatially and temporally by the region that is taken as a zone of demarcation between the dual binaries of North/South and East/West, upon which so many narratives of belonging are constructed? I contend that to begin to understand the political ramifications and implications of policy-making towards “the Mediterranean,” one must take into account the ways in which all of these divergent themes are integrated in actuality. That is, the question of Turkey cannot be separated from that of migration in the Mediterranean, or international governance in the region.

In order to dissect how these cross-sections of the globe are not simply created, but how they continue to command attention and gather political and cultural meaning, their constituent parts must be problematized. “The Mediterranean” acts as a narrative that is made up of other, tightly bound stories that come together to form one discourse. The most important point, however, are the differences that these discourses share, the differences that allow for “a reconceptualization of what it means to think about and manage” the non-European Mediterranean states (Rutherford 2011, xi).

Historically, the notion of “Turkishness” has often come to denote a certain level of exoticism and difference in European popular culture, particularly in the “West(s).” Images of the Istanbul skyline offer the peaks of minarets and the domes of mosques, all the while

26 The term “the West” must be acknowledged as being inherently problematic. It cannot be viewed as a homogenized unit, and certainly does not denote any concrete notion of a unified civilization. Indeed, it is much more accurate to speak of “Wests.” The problems with the term West must be acknowledged, yet regardless of this problematic nature, “West” is a conceptual category that has real world implications and is taken to be a very real notion. Thus, one cannot begin to understand the salience and strength of this term without acknowledging the way in which it is deployed.
surrounded by images of bazaars, women in hijabs, and the omnipresent kebab (Shay and Sellers-Young 2003). Yet, this imagery is contrasted with equally popular conceptions of Turkey as an enigma in the Muslim world; a functioning secular democracy that many hope can act as a model for other countries in the Middle East.

Still, Turkey remains mystified to many, and evokes thoughts of sultans and harems. Writers of Western Europe have long had a relationship with the image of a mystical Turkey. In his memoir *Istanbul*, Orhan Pamuk describes how Charles Baudelaire, “like most western travelers, wheels out his theories about Muslim women—their closed-in lives, their inaccessibility, their mystery” (Pamuk 2005, 226). Being subject to this characterization as having one foot in Europe, one in Asia, has left Istanbullus (residents of the city) with the drive to “Westernize.” This “desire” that was manifested in the early twentieth century with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey and Atatürk’s revolutionary attempts to bring Turkey towards the “West.”

I argue that there are three main models through which Turkey is often viewed. Discussions take place that attempt to “prove” that Turkey is European, Asian, or, when unable to consolidate the differences and inconsistencies and cast it as an anomaly or an exception. In this section, I outline some of the narratives that come to form the “many faces” of Turkey. These discourses, I argue function in two key ways. On one level, these discourses about Turkey circumvent the question of where “Europe” ends and “Asia” begins, which is itself a slippery question. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the case of the Turkish example as an “anomaly” reifies the representations or assumptions of bounded cultural heterogeneity of the “civilizations” to which Turkey is the exception. In other words, the declaration of Turkey as an
anomaly functions to reify the existence and essentialist view of those categories to which Turkey is assumed to not belong.

*Turkey, the European*

As a European Union candidate state, Turkey fulfills some basic “criteria” (at least as far as the European Union is concerned) regarding its “Europeanness,” in as far as the Treaty of Rome is concerned that “any European State may apply to become a member of the Community” (emphasis added) (EEC 1957, 48). Although its population is almost 99 percent Muslim, Turkey has a fairly progressive democratic model and, as mentioned earlier, is obviously taken as integral in European cultural and political history. Contemporary political debates, particularly on the European Union level, and academic debates consider the question of Turkey’s Europeanness to be more complex than an open-and-shut discussion.

Five centuries ago, Constantinople, which is now Istanbul, was considered the largest city in “Europe” and was the capital of the Western Roman Empire, leaving the city embedded with historical significance and importance (Kinzer 2011, 71). In fact, it has even been argued that Turkey has always been a part of Europe’s complex history and geography (Deringil 2007; Tocci 2011). Nathalie Tocci goes on to note that given the Ottoman Empire’s complex interactions with European powers over the centuries of its existence, any notion of European collective memory cannot be understood without contextualizing Turkey’s role (Tocci 2011, 7). It is this central role of Turkey in European history, according to Tucci, that “lies at the crux of European perceptions (and misperceptions) about Turkey” (Tocci 2011, 7).

One would be hard pressed to approach any analysis of contemporary Turkish politics without taking into account the roll that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk played in the formation of the
Republic. Better known as Atatürk (father of the Turks), Kemal was the leader of the Young Turk Revolution that marked the end of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. His administration adopted a policy of assimilating to the West; which included adopting this Swiss Civil Code in 1926, and changing the script of the Turkish language from the Arabic to Latin alphabet (Mango 1999). Atatürk believed that “the Turkish nation had fallen far behind the West [and that] the main aim should be to lead it toward modern civilization” (Kinzer 2010, 32). The assumption that “if Turks were to join the modern world…they must have a modern political system” (Kinzer 2010, 59) was bound up in the export of the European nation-state. Thus, “modernization” was inextricably linked to “Europeanization” for Atatürk’s nation building project. This assumed relationship between modernity and “Europe” speaks more to cultural constructions than geographic ones and shows that Kemal in particular associated all things “modern, secular [and] prosperous” with Europe (Kinzer 2011, 40). It is here that Turkey’s liminality can be best demonstrated. Moreover, Kemalist policies came not only to put a strong value on “Western” traditions and norms, but actively remade society through secularizing reforms and “tried to construct a new Turkish identity and integrate into European civilization” (Yavuz 2009, 24). As will be elaborated further in a later section, this language of “civilizations” came to be incredibly salient, particularly with regards to the work of Samuel P. Huntington and the important space inhabited by Turkey in his theorization of global conflict (Huntington 1993).

Nevertheless, this emphasis on “Westernization” is still present in contemporary Turkish politics. Turkey is assumed to be an anomaly in the Muslim world, a predominantly Muslim country that looks towards integration with presumed Western ideals of democracy and the secular nation-state. At Stephen Kinzer notes, “to every complaint Erdoğan replied with a
simple and deeply resonant refrain: We must change in order to become European” (Kinzer 2010, 135). There is much recent debate surrounding the “Islamist” nature of the current Turkish government. Yet, while Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan has been charged as being anti-secular, the success of the “AKP does not represent the triumph of Islamist politics in Turkey; but precisely the opposite: its death” (Kinzer 2010, 138).

Images of the “half Western” Turk litter European literary and political history, such as in the writing of Arnold Toynbee. Indeed, Turkey’s history is one characterized by tensions between modernity and Islam (as these are often assumed to exist in a false dichotomy). As the boundaries of Europe are dubious at best, Turkish society and culture is portrayed as having “one foot on each continent.” The Turkish author Orhan Pamuk notes a point of tension between the external characterization of Turkey as an “exotic Other” and the Turkish state’s drive towards “modernity.” Pamuk argues that “Western observers love to identify the things that make Istanbul exotic, nonwestern, whereas the westernizers among [Turks] register all the same things as obstacles to be erased from the face of the city as fast as possible” (Pamuk 2005, 242).

As a candidate country of the European Union, and the home to the 2010 European Cultural Capital city, it is clear that Turkey is seen, at least marginally, as sufficiently “European.” The geographic argument is particularly intriguing in this regard, as Turkey, like Russia, is seen as a “torn” country. Yet, while continents come to be taken as homogeneous, vast entities that are perhaps more easily spoken about in abstractions, Istanbul is literally seen as a “fault line” between Europe and Asia. Clearly, this fact makes it difficult to purport that continental divides are culturally based, as there is no discernable difference between the lifestyle of those living on the European side versus the Asian. Istanbul is a (continentally) divided city, and this works to disrupt notions that “Europe” and “Asia” are notions that are
mutually exclusive. Certainly, one can point to the discursive and social production of concepts of continents, noting that by nature “continents” are non-evident, arbitrary designations (Lewis and Wigen 1997). However, in the production of representations of cultural and geographic borders that come to be seen as static and “natural,” Turkey’s place as a European country with the majority of its landmass in Asia remains intriguing. Thus, as this section points out, Turkey is seen in a very real way as a politically, historically, and cultural integral part of the European narrative. In other words, it is not simply historical arguments that position Turkey as a “European” power.

*Turkey, the Asian*

The second model through which I argue Turkey is characterized is as a wholly non-European or Middle Eastern or Asian state. In contrast to those discourses that position Turkey as an integral and inherent part of European cultural history, it has also been argued that “Turkey, despite its most valiant efforts, has never managed to find a way inside [Europe]” (Andelman 2010, 91). The competing view of Turkey rejects any “European roots” and instead notes that Turkey has a historic cultural and political “pull towards both Central Asia and the Middle East” (Casey 2002). The voices in European politics that argue Turkey has no “proper place” in a European political or cultural community are loud. This is representative of the counter-argument regarding Turkey as a European geo-cultural entity. Again, there are many political, popular, and academic discourses that position Turkey as a non-European “outsider.” One of the most salient of these arguments is often formed around the presumption that “Europe” is a political and cultural entity that is dependent upon a conception of a Judeo-Christian past. For example, Mohammad Ayoob has argued that the way in which Turkey’s application for membership for the EU has been considered demonstrates that “the major European powers do
not consider Turkey to be worthy of membership because it is not “European” in the sense that it
does not belong to the Judeo-Christian civilization” (Ayoob 2012, 9).

Similarly, Nathalie Tocci reinforces that the dominant line of argument by many rests on
an idea of the European Union (or a notion of “Europe” more broadly) as a “Christian club” that
will ultimately reject Turkey’s membership bid not because of a failure to accommodate the
accession *acquis*, but because of an inherent and “natural” cultural exclusivity (Tocci 2011, 20).
While some acknowledge a “hybrid” status for Turkey in regards to its “Europeanness,” many
European political leaders flatly deny Turkey’s European influence. Perhaps the most vocal
opponents have come from France and Germany, where some political organizations have
become increasingly vocal about the narrow definition of “Europe” as a cultural, religious
category where Turkey has no place (Pamuk 2012).

This sentiment is especially strong in Germany, where the “problem” of Turkish guest
workers has caused political tension since the 1970s. The debate about the millions of Turks
living in Germany has been the source of violence, hate crimes, and debates within German
politics about what exactly it means to be “European” (Buzan and Roberson 1993, 132).
Immigration is undoubtedly an important factor in how Turks are viewed within Western
European countries, as is the case in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, among others. As
Buzan notes, there is a significant amount of political clout wrapped up in the dissemination of
“stories of tens of thousands of Third World migrants being turned back from Europe’s borders
and hurried moves by European Community member states to strengthen immigration controls”
(Buzan and Roberson 1993, 131).
In 2004 Belgian politician Herman Van Rompuy, who in 2009 became the first full-time the President of the European Council, famously argued during a meeting of the Council of Europe that “Turkey is not a part of Europe and will never be part of Europe” (Phillips 2009), thus further underlining the question of exactly what it means to qualify to be “part of Europe.” Van Rompuy’s sentiment reveals an anxiety that is particularly strong in European political narratives with regards to Turkey. Certainly, one could argue that the Maghreb is not “part of Africa,” yet the question of Turkey garners a deep degree of uncertainty and hostility from politicians like Van Rompuy. Van Rompuy went on speak with an essentialist notion of what it means to be European, insisting that an expansion of the EU that included Turkey would not be like any expansion in the past, but rather that this would put “universal values” of Europe in jeopardy (Tocci 2011, 57; Phillips 2009).

Likewise, Philippe de Villiers, leader of the French Mouvement pour la France, has argued that Turkey is not part of Europe with regards to history, geography, nor by its culture (Tocci 2011, 57; H. Yilmaz 2009, 82). In yet another French politician’s declaration about the cultural “purity” of “Europe,” Nicolas Sarkozy has been recognized for opposition to Turkey’s EU membership bid. For example, in 2007 Sarkozy stated that his desire was one for European political, cultural, and identity unity. This, he argued, could not be achieved if Turkey was allowed to disrupt the borders of Europe as “Europe without borders would represent the death of the great idea of a political Europe” (Tocci 2011, 59).

Perhaps the most well-known, publicly political rejection of Turkey’s “Europeanness” came from former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in November of 2002. Speaking at the convention for the future of the EU, Mr. Giscard d’Estaing claimed that it would be the “end of Europe” if Turkey were to be allowed to join the organization (“Charlemagne: Too Big for
Europe?” 2002; Deringil 2007, 709). Claiming irreconcilable cultural and historic differences, the former French president maintained that Turkey’s “capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population live outside Europe, it is not a European country” (BBC 2002). The argument invoked in d’Estaing’s position on Turkey is interesting because it fuses the geographic notion of Europe with a cultural one. Of course, the same argument can be made for Cyprus, which is a member of the European Union but whose entire land mass lies farther east than Ankara. On the one hand d’Estaing, and others, point to Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population as reason for why it is apparently non-European. Often embedded in this argument, however, is a secondary claim, one that relies on the maintenance of arbitrary geographic designations. Functioning to somewhat neutralize implicit claims about religion and European culture, for which many are criticized, the geographic argument against Turkey raises other interesting questions. Most obviously, there is a complete lack of appreciation in d’Estaing’s claim for the not necessarily clear boundaries of the geographic “Europe.”

D’Estaing’s anxieties are echoed in academic accounts of the “dangers” of the potentially slippery slope of Turkish admittance to the European community. In response and support of d’Estaing’s position on Turkey, John Casey, a lecturer at the University of Cambridge, wrote in The Daily Telegraph that “Giscard said aloud what many European leaders undoubtedly feel” (Casey 2002). Casey goes on to argue that Turkey should never be admitted to any European “club,” cultural or otherwise, as “it is not a matter of time, of Turkey’s adjusting to the political culture of Europe, of economic or legal harmonization” (Casey 2002). In response to claims that Turkey has “Westernized” and has followed a path of Europeanization, John Casey claims that Turkey cannot be “trusted,” claiming that “there is plenty of room for doubting that the mutation is permanent or deep” (Casey 2002). It appears from these arguments that the crux of the case
against Turkey rests on an assumption that “accepting Turkey into the European fold would entail abandoning aspirations to forge a cohesive EU identity, defined through history, culture, and religion” (Tocci 2011, 57).

**Turkey as the Exception to the “Rule” of Civilizations**

The arguments that Turkey either does or does not fit into a European narrative of belonging is met by a third set of discourses that concede that Turkey is a “hybrid” of sorts. Recent political narratives within International Relations, Turkey is no longer seen as simply “on the edge” of Europe (Müftüler-Bac, Meltem 1997; Kinzer 2010). Instead, some analyses now position Turkey as turning away from Europe, instead placing its sights on acting as a regional power in Central Asia (Pierini 2012; Kinzer 2010). Orhan Pamuk, Turkey’s famed Nobel Laureate in Literature, has often made note of the East/West tension that is embodied by Turkishness. Pamuk notes:

> I have spent my entire life at the borders of continental Europe. From the window of my home or office, I’ve looked out over the Bosphorus to see Asia on the other side; and so, in thinking about Europe and modernity, I have always felt, like the rest of the world, just a little bit provincial. Like the many millions who live outside the west, I have had to understand my own identity while observing Europe from afar, and so, in the process of working out my identity, I’ve often wondered what Europe could represent for me and for us all. This is an experience I share with the majority of the world's population, but because Istanbul, my city, is situated just where Europe begins – or maybe where Europe ends – my thoughts and my resentments have been a little more pressing and constant [emphasis added] (Pamuk 2012).

Pamuk’s words sit heavy not simply because they reflect this sense of European purgatory that is too often associated with Istanbul, and Turkey more generally. Pamuk instead speaks to the transitory nature of borders and boundaries, noting that Turkey has never been simply on the “edge” of Europe, but is rather embroiled in a continual exchange and dynamism with the meaning and limits of what it means to be “European” and/or “Asian.” This sentiment is
mirrored in more policy-oriented, strategic discussions within International Relations about Turkey’s “geo-political” potential. As Müftüler-Bac argues, “in geopolitical terms, Turkey was located for many decades at the south-eastern periphery of Europe, but now finds itself at the centre of a new, rapidly evolving geopolitical region of Turkish peoples” (Müftüler-Bac, Meltem 1997, 4).

Any simplified, categorical rejection of Turkey as “European” or “Asian” does little for the production of knowledge of how borders and boundaries come to be negotiated, and such claims cannot be held as representative of any geo-political “truth.” Rather than being seen as necessarily or inherently “European” or non-European, there is a positioning of Turkey as a cultural, geographic, and political space of exception and liminality. On the surface, one might read these discourses as challenging notions of Europe as a homogenized, culturally unified “Christian club.” For example, rather than seeing Christianity and Islam’s geographic boundaries as exclusive, John Goody notes that “Muslims are very much part of the European scene” (Goody 2004, 160). Goody argues that rather than being seen as an “infiltration” or Islamicization of Europe, one must recognize the complicated and interrelated history that the religion of Islam has had with the development of “Europe.”

From this perspective, there are two ways of viewing Turkey. On the one hand, Turkey can be seen as “straddling” Europe and Asia, which are still held as two different, exclusive entities. Thus, when one crosses the Bosphorus, the traveler is welcomed to “Asia” or “Europe,” demarcating the presumed “East” from the “West.” Maps reflect this duality and refer to “Turkey in Europe” and “Turkey in Asia,” as was often seen in map legends, particularly popular from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries (Deringil 2007, 709). This leads Ottoman historian Selim Deringil to ask if Turkey is taken to be “in Europe but not of Europe” (Deringil
This dual nature of Turkey, both seen in historical and contemporary contexts, as Deringil notes, “continues to perplex historians to this day” (Deringil 2007, 719).

On the other hand, rather than straddling two continents, Turkey is also viewed as a hybrid or amalgam of these two “civilizations” of which it is comprised. This has led to discussions of Turkey’s so-called “identity crisis” (Deringil 2007, 719). Deringil notes that this has been manifested in a “strange combination of a sense of being inevitably yoked together co-existing with a feeling of rejection” between Turkey and Europe (Deringil 2007, 716). These discussions of Turkey’s hybrid nature also tend to rely on a teleological understanding of “progress” that positions Westernization as the pinnacle of development. For example, Chris Morris invokes orientalist stereotypes of the Turk that is stuck between two worlds, almost as if she were stuck in time, noting that Turkey is:

A complex country, hard to understand: secular and Muslim, Western and Eastern, all at the same time. It’s modern and traditional, democratic and still authoritarian, a place in a constant state of flux, which seems to have awoken from a deep slumber to find that the rest of the world has moved on and there is some serious catching up to do (Morris 2005, 3).

In Morris’ analysis, Turkey has some decisions to make (as if the decision to be “Western” or not could be a conscious decision) and is experiencing the impossibility of being both Western and Eastern, or both modern and traditional. To “catch up,” for Morris, requires a planned development, a series of choices that must be made to “guide” Turkey towards the “West,” and to finish getting it “unstuck” from its “Eastern” yoke.

Morris’ description of Turkey could, in theory, apply to any number of states that sit along these presumed cultural fault lines. However, there is one specific part of Turkish history that allows Morris’ argument to be intelligible and to make sense in the European context.
Specifically, twentieth century Turkish history is largely characterized by various internal political projects aimed at “Europeanizing” the country. Mustapha Kemal Atatürk made it the mission of his political life to help Turkey “catch up” with “the civilized world” (Mango 1999; Kinzer 2011). Atatürk came to be known for his sometimes-authoritarian fixation on secularism and modernizing politics in Turkey. From adopting a version of the Swiss Penal Code, banning praying in Arabic, or putting into place quotas for women in government, Kemalist policies and politics saw the rise of the Republic of Turkey as a largely Europeanizing project. Contemporarily, Turkish politics are still dominated by this influence of “modernization” and Europeanization, demonstrated best by its bid for EU membership. However, an increasing amount of importance is being placed on the image of Turkey as a nexus, crossroad, or hybrid rather than as a “wholly European” state. For example, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Foreign Minister, has noted that he believes the challenge for Turkey in the twenty-first century “is to redefine its place in ‘Afro-Eurasia’, considering itself at the center of several intersecting geopolitical regions as opposed to an appendix of Europe and an outpost of the West” (Alessandri 2010, 10).

Interestingly, Turkey is seen as such an anomaly that even Samuel Huntington’s model of the “clash of civilizations” is disrupted by his inability to definitively “place” Turkey in any one civilization (Huntington 1993). Huntington posits in his 1993 article “The Clash of Civilizations?” that conflict in the twenty-first century will largely be defined by civilization clashes, which occur along cultural “fault lines.” These fault lines, argues Huntington, reflect cultural, religious, and historical differences that “are not only real; they are basic” (Huntington 1993, 25). Accordingly, much of Huntington’s analysis is dependent on religious differences, which he sees as a source of mutual exclusivity between cultures or “civilizations.”
takes an interesting stance on Turkey, and in many ways his lack of ability to quantify or categorize Turkey demonstrates the holes in his own paradigm. For example, on one hand Huntington seems to claim quite frankly that Turkey, for him, is not part of “the West,” a civilization that he defines through a notion of a shared Judeo-Christian value system, which excludes Turkey’s inclusion (Huntington 1993, 27; Tocci 2011, 20).

However, on the other hand, Huntington positions Turkey as a “torn country,” sitting between two binary-type civilizations that he attempts to map (Huntington 1993, 42). Huntington has been criticized for his overtly simplistic mapping of the world, breaking it up into neatly bound civilizations that share basic, naturalized qualities, and suggesting that these are inherently incompatible sites of conflict. Yet, at the same time, Huntington concedes that Turkey disrupts his categorizations and poses a challenge to the ease with which they are deployed. This can be seen in his rationalization of Turkey’s place in his model of civilizations:

Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another. These are torn countries. Their leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make their countries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypical torn country is Turkey (Huntington 1993, 42).

The most curious part of Huntington’s analysis is his acceptance of Turkey as a “torn country” that straddles two civilizations. Yet, his paradigm in many ways rests on the assumption that these “fault lines” are deep and insurmountable. Thus, while he contends that Islam and the West are incompatible, he notes that Turkey has “abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and attempted to join Europe” (Huntington 1993, 42) and is attempting to carve out a “new identity” for itself.
This view of Turkey as a “hybrid” situated neatly between Europe and Asia extends beyond Huntington’s problematic analysis of the coming fate of world politics. Stephen Kinzer, a *New York Times* journalist who was a long time correspondent in Istanbul, has authored several books about Turkey and Turkish-European politics (Kinzer 2011; Kinzer 2010). Kinzer maintains that Turkey sits between “two worlds” and is “becoming steadily more European” (Kinzer 2011, 187). In many ways, even though Kinzer rejects the notion that Turkey rests outside of Europe, he frames the country as sitting in an ambiguous space, where it is neither Middle Eastern, but is *actively becoming* European. He goes on to argue that Turks will still “never be completely European, and that is also good. They have a different heritage, a different psychology. Like many Europeans they love soccer, but they also have more exotic sporting tastes” (Kinzer 2011, 187).

There are many presumptions and assumptions made in Kinzer’s statement about what it means to be European, what it means to lay outside of Europe, and that role cultural determinism has in any notion of a “Turkish psychology” (if one could even speak of such a thing). What is important to note here, however, is that like Huntington, Kinzer sees Turkey as a slippery space that challenges borders and notions of cultural belonging as constituting a set of inherent, primordial characteristics. Besides reifying the notion that there is a heterogeneous European “character,” Kinzer is effectively reifying and Orientalizing representations of the “Asian Other” that does not fit into his perceptions of what it means to be European for the Turk. Moreover, this discourses actively contributes to the (re)making of the categories of “East” and “West,” which become incredibly politically meaningful.

This characterization of Turkey as “none of the above” acts as a convenient way to circumvent the political questions of whether or not it is European or Asian. The response to not
being able to “place” Turkey is to put it in the “other” category, whether that be that of Asia, the Middle East, or even the ambiguous “Muslim world.” In other words, one cannot claim that it is fully “European,” nor is it clear that it is “Middle Eastern.” The example of Turkey is significant because it is an affront to concepts of political and cultural belonging that rely on as assumption of “clear cut” divisions or fault lines between continents or “civilizations.” Yet, rather than acknowledging that that this example forces one to problematize these categories themselves, Turkey is conveniently written off as an abnormality. However, the engagement with this question should not end there, because the example of Turkey can allow us to put into question the assumption of these bounded geo-cultural categorizations themselves.

**Turkey as a Site of Border Making in the Mediterranean**

This section further contextualizes the political implications to be taken from the example of Turkey as a site of border making and breaking. Certainly, Turkey disrupts characterizations or ideas of borders between civilizations and cultures as being deep-rooted and essentialist. I argue that what we see in all of this energy and all of the discourses that goes into explaining where Turkey supposedly “fits” works to create and reify borders. Moreover, the categorization of Turkey as an “in-between” or hybrid culture works to reproduce and strengthen the re-creation of borders and the presumed binary between “Europe” and “Asia” or “East” and “West.” I contend that the mapping of these different models of understanding Turkey’s position in the European narrative, allows one to more deeply question the “components” that make it up, the “cultural groupings” of which Turkey itself is seen as a compromise. Indeed, I maintain in this chapter that Turkey is an important site of the contestation of borders, that the simultaneous interconnectedness and tension that is recognized in the negotiation of the boundaries of
“Europe” in the Mediterranean is perhaps best seen in the debates surrounding Turkey’s EU membership.

The third categorization of Turkey as an anomaly or an exception to the rule of “civilizations,” as Huntington presents it, is intriguing beyond the contextualization that it gives to Turkey’s cultural landscape. To put it another way, I argue that these discourses about Turkey as an in-between or “rogue” space work to reinforce the categories from which Turkey is assumed to deviate. Thus, by being positioned between “Europe” and the “Middle East,” the model of Turkey as exception to civilizational boundaries functions to reproduce the notion of the civilizations themselves as bound entities. This is particularly meaningful for representations of “the Mediterranean” as a bridge or hybrid zone that both connects and divides different “worlds.” The practical and political dimensions of Turkey’s relationship with the European Union are both produced by and reinforce the characterization of the Mediterranean as a boundary of the limits of “civilizations.” This is relevant, then, not just for a theoretical understanding of how borders come to be taken as deep, seemingly natural entities, but also for the day-to-day playing out of borders in action. Turkey is characterized by and subjected to its assumed cultural limbo, which unfolds in the realm of accession negotiations, academic discussions, and policymaking.

The exoticism that characterizes many cultural investigations of Turkishness is more than simple musings about a European infatuation with the “Orient.” If we take Huntington’s assertion of civilizations as the primary and largest forms of organization of human societies, the Mediterranean (and Turkey) sits inconveniently between two “bounded” civilizations. While it is fairly obvious, as has already been discussed, that this problematizes the assumption of “fault lines” between civilizations, this language also reifies the existence of these so-called
civilizations as homogenized, bounded entities. Thus, even when someone like Stephen Kinzer argues that “Turks are becoming steadily more European” (Kinzer 2011, 187), the narrative that he participates in is one that crystallizes the assumption of the existence of a concept of what it means to be “European.” In some ways, these discourses that recognize Turkey as an “in-between space” can be seen as liberatory in that they recognize that the boundaries between continents and cultures are not necessarily clean-cut or evident.

At a very basic level, Huntington’s clash of civilizations model is an important subject of analysis not because it is novel, but rather because there are understandings and assumptions of the organization of the world that allow Huntington to “make sense.” As Edward Said rightly notes about the significance of culturally or geo-politically essentialist representations of the world, their difficulty and danger lies in the fact that “they give rise to polarizations that absolve and forgive ignorance and demagogy more than they enable knowledge” (Said 1994, 31).

It has certainly been noted that “the geographical frontiers of Europe have always been indeterminate and arbitrary” (Deringil 2007, 710). Surely, it is easy to deploy a language of “Euro-Turkish relations” that implies that this discursivity has a history, when in fact “it is simply not accurate to assume that we are speaking of two separate and irreconcilable entities” (Deringil 2007, 710). However, I suggest that there is a fourth way for looking at the discourses that place Turkey “in the middle” of Europe and the Middle East. Rather than simply seeing Turkey as a space in transition or as a cultural hybrid, I suggest that perhaps one can ask how these discourses function to re-produce the categories to which Turkey is seen as a part. On the one hand, Huntington’s perception of Turkey as a rogue nation is a way to come to terms with a history that defies his larger model of bounded, homogenized civilizations. Since Turkey does not fit into his model, he recognizes that it is a “rogue” entity. However, implying that Turkey is
the exception or the anomaly inadvertently reifies a notion that there is something that the “norm,” a culture that is not rogue; that there is any society which can be anything but indeterminate.

What Huntington’s analysis fails to take into account is that by acknowledging that there is a space for Turkey to be an exception to his rule, a space is opened up for his civilizational categories themselves to be brought into question. On the one hand, the example of Turkey disrupts the “fault line” model. On the other hand, however, being able to write Turkey off as an exception allows for a deferral of discussion about the slipperiness of the categories of “Europe”/“Asia” or “West”/“East” themselves. For example, Huntington’s answer to not being able to reconcile the example of Turkey into one of his civilizations (which again he sees as naturally rooted categories) is to cast it off into its own realm, noting that it does not fit the model can therefore be seen as “rogue” (Huntington 1993). It is at the juncture of these false dichotomies that “the Mediterranean” is particularly potent as an analytical category. While it is often glossed over as a transitory space, the literary and political representations of “the Mediterranean” have the potential to disrupt these proposed binaries, bringing light to their inherent instability, not just in and of themselves, but also as a reflection on the inability to speak of fixed, finished borders.

In this way, I contend that rather than being seen as an “exception to the rule” of cultural boundedness, one should see Turkey as the norm. The hybridity and anxiety that these various politicians and authors accept with regards to Turkey’s cultural belonging is not limited to describing Turkey. Labeling Turkey as both a hybrid and the exception implies that those countries squarely in “Europe” possess some fundamental, “pure” “European” character, and vice versa with regards to the “Asian” side.
Conclusion

I suggest in this chapter that the categorizations across which Turkey is seen to straddle never just *are*, but rather come to be injected and (re)coded with meaning. For Deleuze and Guattari, these flows of identity and culture are constantly breaking free from the boundaries placed upon them (Deleuze and Guattari 2009). Herein lies the role of discourses like those that speak to the hybridity of Turkey. Although they may seem on one level to disrupt a mapping of the world that sees geo-cultural units as static, more deeply by allowing Turkey to exist in a categorical limbo, one is reifying or recoding the presumed basic characteristics of such categories themselves. These discourses, then, function to remap, recode, and enforce the categorizations and boundaries from which the flows are continually breaking free (Deleuze and Guattari 2009).

Huntington’s construction of the world is based on a map that acts as a model. For him, to understand any culture, one must simply align it to the corresponding civilizational category. Cultures and civilizations simply *are* for Huntington, “one must merely apply the correct model” (Ferguson 1996, 171). More specifically, they work to reify a mapping of the world that sees cultural categories as “static, autonomous, and removed from representation, [the belief] that cultures naturally represent themselves” (Ferguson 1996, 175).

The example of Turkey as a cultural outlier, one that defies categorizations that are too often taken as self-evident, has larger implications for understanding processes of discursive mappings the world. Understanding these discursive mappings and their political implications is important because mapping is key in the process of forming representations, and is as much about creation as discovery (Ferguson 1996, 177). More often than not, Turkey is portrayed as a
country that lies on the peripheries of “Europe” and “Asia.” The Ottoman Empire was, at various points in history, characterized as both the outsider knocking on the doors of Europe and the “sick man” of Europe. This has led many to note the cultural and historically hybridity of Turkey, being seen as neither fully “European” nor fully “Asian.” However, in this chapter I have suggested that perhaps from these portrayals of Turkey as hybrid, the categories of “Europe” and “Asian” themselves can be brought into question. Focusing solely on Turkey as an exception to the rule implies that there are bounded, neat characterizations of “Europe” to which Turkey can be compared, or that there are contexts that are not liminal but are self-evidently “European.” One must not, then, simply accept that Turkey is a “hybrid” or a cultural anomaly, one that just challenges the fault lines that may be seen to divide “civilizations.” Rather, to push beyond a simple acceptance of Turkey’s role as an outlier is to question the function of these discourses in the coding of “Europe” and “Asian” themselves. Turkey, much like the migrant body, acts as a canvas upon which the making of borders can be read as a text, where belonging and otherness are negotiated and (re)made. Turkey is assumed to function as an axis whereby the notions and assumed mutual exclusivity of East/West comes to be formed and reified.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

Long taken as an ecologically evident categorization, as I pushed the limits of what can be made to count as “the Mediterranean,” it became clear that very little exists in the way of a standardized set of characteristics. Federica Bicchi argues the European Union has “invented” the Mediterranean” (Bicchi 2007, 63). Although the region has served a literary, political, and economic function as the nexus of civilizations for millennia, Bicchi touches on a sentiment achieved quite recently: the attempt to categorize and institutionalize what can be made to count as the Mediterranean. It is this institutionalization and operational sense of “the Mediterranean” that brought me to the questions proposed in this project.

Even though the Mediterranean sits at a dubious position of being understood as both part of Europe and yet remaining separated from it, Edward Said’s analytical and methodological framework of orientalism is key in understanding the creation and recreation of difference. The formation of the notion of the exotic “Other” is demonstrated in Said’s Orientalism (1978) as the mystical Orient is (re)produced by epistemic communities and knowledge codification, which then transfers to popular culture. Orientalism is characterized by the acceptance of:

Basic distinctions between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, “mind,” destiny, and so on (Said 1979, 2).

I theorize in this dissertation that perhaps “the Mediterranean,” broadly conceived of as a geocultural-political entity and experience, is a locality for the investigation into the processes through which representations of continents and civilizations come into focus. I have suggested that “the Mediterranean” exists largely as a discursive formation that, as shown here, factors into the practice of European Union foreign policy with direct consequences. The Mediterranean is
the subject of particular narratives about otherness and belonging in Europe, Asia, and Africa, and in this way mine is a study that works within discursivities that work to produce sets of knowledge about the nature of the sovereign state system. I also suggest, influenced by the works of those like Stuart Hall and Michel Foucault, that discourses are never neutral, but are instead always reflective of particular interests, preconceptions, and power relations as they help to (re)produce political subjectivities (Foucault 1972; Hall 1996).

I have argued that “the Mediterranean” is a discursive formation that is best understood as representative of a liminal space and notion, one that is porous and exposes the inherent fluidity of notions like “Europe,” that too often are taken as self-evident. For example, in regard to the “problem” of irregular immigration in the Mediterranean, this project has positioned the migrant body as a site of saturation, upon which borders are inscribed and reified. In order to problematize conceptions of what it means to be “European,” the “outsider” must be similarly positioned as a discursively constructed subjectivity. As Richard Ashley suggests, discursivity helps to constitute identities not just of the foreigner, but also of the citizen, and in doing so directly reflects upon practices of statecraft and exercises of sovereignty, both of which are ultimately reflective of power relations (Ashley 1989).

This is not to suggest that I argue that borders do not exist or matter. Quite the opposite, I argue that borders matter more than we like to give them credit for. Indeed, “borders acquire their roles as barriers or bridges from the context in which they are erected and in which they function” (Popescu 2012, 21). They are complicated, complex projects that are in continual formation and are impossible to leave alone. Nor do I argue that the experiences of difference in “the Mediterranean” are not real. Indeed, it is precisely the assumption that the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean are representative of different “worlds” that allow for an
explanation or rationalization for the overwhelming discrepancy in economic and political possibilities across the shores of the Sea.

Scholarly pursuits of knowledge creation are intimately bound up in the power/knowledge relationship that both Foucault and Said find integral to an understanding of how power relations function in society (Foucault & Gordon, 1980; Said, 1978). Thus, we must problematize the ways in which difference is discursively constructed through a particular form of knowledge production, and the ways in which some narratives take on a greater salience than others. Moreover, with regards to the Mediterranean, most of these narratives have not yet been “uncovered.” That is to say, many of these discussions of the Mediterranean as an ambiguous space with certain assumed cultural characteristics are nuanced and discrete.

Thus, this project takes into focus three distinct, yet inextricably interrelated, processes of the “borderization” of the Mediterranean that work to maintain the space as a global axis of sorts, upon which academic and popular discussions and representations of the “East” versus the “West” or the “North” versus the “South” emerge. It is an underlying argument of this study that links the examples of the Barcelona Process, discussions of a “migration crisis,” and Turkey’s accession to the EU. While they are often analyzed as separate phenomenon, all indicative of these spatial and temporal borders represented by “the Mediterranean,” seen together they have the capability of highlighting the interconnectedness of the varying threads of “Mediterraneanism.” In other words, these three vignettes are all demonstrative of the same types of power relations that manifest in political projects designed to “govern” the Mediterranean, yet in doing so reiterate the necessity and importance of borders, thereby reasserting the nature of geo-political dualisms.
Thoughts on Further Research

Although this project focuses on the discursive construction of “the Mediterranean” as indicative of the processes of border making more broadly in the EU, there are both areas outside the scale of this project and consequences of this project that require analysis. The example of the Mediterranean is a beachhead of sorts, it is not definitive but rather opens up a space for further interrogation and questions. Liminality in the Mediterranean, in other words, pries open interstices in discussions of belonging and Otherness in Europe. This leaves a space to shed light onto the problem of the productivity of borders and “regioncraft” more broadly. The goal here, then, is not to find a “solution,” but rather to expose a plot, to draw attention to the need for an interrogation of how regions come to be injected with meaningful political subjectivities.

Further research in this area, then, would include an extension of this theorization of the making of regions to other areas, like the Caribbean, Europe’s eastern frontiers, or the Middle East, for example. Europe has many historical peripheral zones, as its boundaries have always been fuzzy and contested, at best. For example, Algeria was, until the middle of the 20th century, a liminal space that was integral in the elaboration of “Frenchness.” Similarly, the Iberian Peninsula elucidates a long tradition of historical anxiety about the “infiltration” of the African, Muslim Other into “Europe.” This dissertation opens up a space to theorize the significance of these historically sites of geopolitical contestation with respect to the contemporary articulation of a “European” subjectivity. While admittedly some key features do not factor into the structure of this dissertation, they are important to note as areas that should not be left outside the scope of such questions about belonging, difference, and borderization in the Mediterranean.

First, and perhaps most glaringly, is the lack of explicitly “non-Western” iterations of “the Mediterranean” in this project. For the sake of scale, this project takes into consideration
the institutionalization of representations of the Mediterranean in European Union foreign policy making. However, attention deserves to be brought to narratives emerging from the other shores of the Mediterranean. Specifically, I seek to extend this research to Turkish and Ottoman, as well as Middle Eastern, literary considerations of the role of the Mediterranean both historically and contemporarily. Without doubt, the experience of “the Mediterranean” will be contingent based on temporal and spatial factors, yet I suspect that there are similar narratives that emerge about the Sea as a space of fluidity.

Regardless, I acknowledge the primary focus of this study is on the EU not because of any blind spots or over Euro-centrism, but rather because it provides parameters to the project that allow for the inferences and consequences of this study to come to light for the purposes of making sense of the expansion of the European Union. In other words, I suggest that the Mediterranean is structurally important for processes of conditionality and accession of the European Union, but are by no means limited to European narratives of belonging. Certainly, an engagement of the questions proposed in this dissertation and their consequences for practices of statecraft can be understood in non-Western iterations of borders, states, and historically fluid spaces.

Second, there is an emerging body of literature concerned with “the Mediterranean” as a sort of geo-political condition (Abulafia 2005; Chambers 2008; Goody 2004). In other words, one can extrapolate the presumed features and functions of this uniquely bound yet diverse Sea to discuss other areas of vast space that operate as nexuses. This study takes the Mediterranean as a dividing space that is historically taken as separating (yet connecting) Europe, Asia, and Africa. However, these large, porous yet sticky categorizations are not the only ones that are negotiated upon a hybrid borderscape. For example, a similar analysis can be applied, perhaps,
to the Caribbean as a historic barrier separating North America from the southern hemisphere. For example, Abulafia notes that the “Mediterranean” is more of a condition and function rather than a particular locality, noting that “we talk of the Mediterranean and of the Mediterranean Sea, and we often assume we mean much the same thing” (Abulafia 2005, 64). This means, in other words, that one can perhaps speak of multiple Mediterraneans throughout the globe, indeed, multiple “centers” of various “worlds.” From this perspective, “the Mediterranean” is not an exception, but rather demonstrative of larger processes of political, cultural, and geographic interconnectivity.

While the dissertation at hand certainly makes the argument that “the Mediterranean” is illustrative of larger border making processes, the actual application of this framework to other examples warrants more attention.

Third, I suspect there is significant space for work to be done on individual experiences of “Mediterraneanism.” This dissertation takes issue largely with political processes that occur at the supra-national level, and thus leaves space for a critical reading of the embodiment of representations of “the Mediterranean” in individuals’ experiences. While the chapter concerned with immigration here discusses the valuable role of the body in discussions of the power processes of border making, there is certainly room in the literature for a more in depth ethnographic study of the real-life encounters of those that live on, along, or cross the Mediterranean. Part of this study would inevitably intersect with literary studies, as the Mediterranean has proven to be a fertile space of inspiration for authors from the cultures surrounding the Sea. This perspective might, as well, give greater attention to issues of gender and the Mediterranean, especially with respect to the experiences of the migrant or asylum seeker. There are, to be sure, individuals that spend their lives crossing the presumably
distinctive borders represented in the Mediterranean, just like the real life experiences of those who live along the Mexico-U.S. border often give a great degree of texture and depth to analyses of the violence and invasiveness of borders. Although the Mediterranean is often taken as a naturally occurring and thus “obvious” border, the rationalization of geographic determinism is undoubtedly influential on individuals’ lives.

Finally, and perhaps of the greatest concern to critical border studies, is the possibility of extending this project to discuss particular technologies of border iteration and reiteration. Of particular interest to the author is the emerging field of biometric border control, which uses advanced technology for border surveillance and control. These biometric practices, as well as the introduction of the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), in the Mediterranean provide a rich space for an analysis of some key experiences of biopolitics, border making, and post-modernity. Although Gregory Feldman introduces the study of biometrics in the Mediterranean in his book *The Migration Apparatus* (2012), there is still a large amount of work to be done in this emerging field.

Of particular concern here are questions of the production of “bare life,” and how “liberal ideology is now transforming into technologies of rule” (Feldman 2012, 12). These biometric technologies coalesce in a dispositif that works to produce and exercise relations of power through administrative, institutional, and surveillance techniques that work to produce a particular order and resulting subjectivities of the migrant and the citizen. The introduction of advanced technologies reduces the individual into a set of data, a body that must be “managed” to protect the sovereign space, thus creating a securitized subject (L. L. Martin 2010). The underlying assumption that borders are weak and must (and can be) securitized or “strengthened”
is directly tied to the particular rationale involved in the deployment of such technologies along the Mediterranean, and work to further alienate the shores of the Sea from one another.

What’s at Stake

The implications of this study open up a space for understanding what happens on the periphery, along the borders of “Europe,” not simply as processes of protecting “fortress Europe,” but rather as having a productive capacity. That is, European policies about exclusion and the erection of frontiers and barriers to entry are not just meant to stop flows. They actively produce and reinforce a European subjectivity. The “European” is unintelligible without the construction of the migrant, the African, or the Turk. These subjectivities are not simply unwanted Others, but are instead necessary and fundamental to any notion of what it means to be European. They then deserve to be theorized as such. Migration, for example, is not just a human rights issue in Europe. The African men attempting to cross the Mediterranean on a rickety boat are not simply nuisances for Europe—forcing it to confront the paradox of security and humanitarianism. Similarly, European cannot “solve” its migration problem. Despite the insistence Sarkozy gives to combatting the phenomenon, “Europe” cannot be intelligible without the migrant, the African, or the Turk. That is the real contribution of this study, to bring these spaces and subjectivities into the light, to paint them not as secondary concerns for Europe, but rather as conditions that the architects of political “Europe” have too much stake in reproducing to “resolve.” Drawing attention to these underrepresented spaces shifts the dialogue within IR towards a more nuanced characterization of the role of borders in the making of “sovereign” spaces. Moreover, this study is important in that it attempts to shift the attention in the study of the making of European identities away from the “core” and towards the “peripheral” spaces,
arguing that it is in the fuzzy spaces where one can really begin to untangle the complex processes of identity creation.

Ultimately, I make two arguments in this project. First, I theorize the Mediterranean as a fluid and porous space, that is the rule rather than an exception to how borders work. Secondly, and more importantly, I argue that the Mediterranean is a key site for an investigation into the (re)production of politically and culturally saturated discourses of belonging and otherness. These discourses, upon which so much scholarly and popular knowledge about the world is built, take for granted an assumed exclusivity between notions of North, South, East, and West. These terms too often go without saying, and although have been problematized in critical analyses countless times, come together at the “nodal point” represented by the “Mediterranean.” In this way, problematizing the Mediterranean is not simply concerned with an analysis of European politics, but speaks to ontological assumptions about where the “West” and “East” or “North and “South” are located.

In this way the applications and implications of this study are crucial for overcoming the traps laid by these geo-politically deterministic categorizations of the world. As Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney argue, “moving beyond the hegemony of the West requires the rediscovery and reimagination of the West” (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, 16). Breaking down the homogenized notion of “the West” requires shifting the analytic lens through which Europe is positioned against its various “outsides.”

Problematising the processes of border making in the Mediterranean carries with it consequences for studies of conditionality and accession, in particular. To understand the fact that borders are continual processes, that never fully come to fruition provides a new analysis for
the role of expansion of the European Union, and thus of “Europe.” In particular, I ask how the Mediterranean comes to be understood as border through particular discourses, and, more importantly, how these discourses play out in political narratives of belonging and otherness in Europe, Asia, and Africa. In other words, I am interested in what purposes these discourses serve, what they do when they are in circulation, whose interests are served, and how these representations of the Mediterranean are productive of particular hierarchies and subjectivities.

The Mediterranean as a borderscape gathers historical normativity that is (re)made and (re)produced in practices of institutional and discursive border making in the European Union. Yet, the purpose of this study is not to suggest that the Mediterranean is not a significant landscape, or that the obvious conclusion is to throw out notions of borders, states, and sovereignty all together. In response to the anticipated question of “What then?” that often accompanies critical discourse analyses, Nevzat Soguk recognizes, from Foucault, that:

Critique does not have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this is then what needs to be done. It should be an instrument for those who fight, who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in process of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It does not have to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed to what is, what counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary (Foucault 1991 in Soguk 1999, 257).

This dissertation is a consideration of the experiences of the Mediterranean as a seemingly evident border of “civilizations.” Borders are, in a very real way, sites of power where economic, political, and social factors coalesce. Yet, borders also work to conceal power, mainly by attempting to stop spaces of flows (Popescu 2012, 23). As Popescu succinctly puts it, “in order to unearth the power of boundaries, we need to ask whose interests are being served by the imposition and maintaining of various borders” (Popescu 2012, 23). I have argued that in the
case of the Mediterranean, there are various cultural and geopolitical narratives that demonstrate a shared interest in European Union foreign policy of reproducing and insisting upon the presumed evident nature of the EU’s southern and southeastern border. The persistence of the Mediterranean as a boundary allows for the discursive power of the binaries and categorizations of North/South, East/West to come into contact in the Mediterranean space, as a meeting point of sorts where Europe, Africa, and Asia maintain alleged mutual exclusivity. I have demonstrated that more than the Mediterranean as a border itself, attention should be drawn to the processes through which the Mediterranean is represented as a bordered space.

These representations provide political ammunition and a rationality that accounts for the otherwise impossible presumptions that one can quadrant off the globe, that “civilizations” exist in incongruous states. These representations of diametric categories of belonging provide a context through which “Europe” comes to have meaning, a space where “Europe,” “Asia,” and “Africa” are continually remade in relation to one another. “The Mediterranean,” like all borders, has a direct effect on social life. The exploration of the Mediterranean as a border scape in this dissertation brings to the forefront a critical orientation to all borders, one that allows for an awareness of the ways in which the historic “center of the world” is a space where identities are constructed and maintained, a potent political space that is representative of power relations, and where we can see in full effect the borderizing practices of statecraft.
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