The Road to Rio: Infrastructure, Image, and New Media and the 2014 FIFA World Cup

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ABSTRACT

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is currently in the midst of an extraordinary period of mega-event hosting. Central to the preparation and hosting of such mega-events are the issues of infrastructure and image. While a large number of articles have been keen to illustrate the transformative potential (and dilemmas) of utilizing mega-events to advance an urban agenda, less understood is the role that citizen journalists and traditional media journalists play in the construction of the “media geography” of mega-events. This research examines the dominant narratives in the international media coverage of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil before the 2014 FIFA World Cup, specifically the 12 months leading up to that event starting with the 2013 Confederations Cup Riots. Data was derived from a content analysis of five western, international media outlets, as well as interviews with international and new media journalists from the New York Times, BBC, Wall Street Journal, Associated Press, Midia NINJA, and several other media organizations. These journalists were questioned about the dominant media narratives, as well as the role of new media, not only in reporting news on the ground in Rio de Janeiro, but also in how their presence helped shape the media's representation of Rio’s and perhaps construct a new ‘point of reference’ for the city. The results of the quantitative and qualitative data suggest a couple of clear narratives. The first questioned whether or not the event's infrastructure projects would be ready in time for the start of the games. The second focused on reporting of the protests in Rio de Janeiro and elsewhere, attempting to give meaning to protests and the array of grievances that sparked those demonstrations. Additionally, this research examined how traditional and new media journalists leveraged social media to mobilize and facilitate the various contestations of Rio de Janeiro’s mega-events.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Randy and Eva, for their unwavering support of everything that I do. Rather than complain about my hectic schedule and a noticeable lack of grandchildren, they have offered nothing but abiding enthusiasm. Thank you both for being the best parents that anyone could ever have.
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and extend my deepest gratitude to my advisor and committee chair, Dr. Bob Oliver. Dr. Oliver is one of the most thoughtful, insightful, demanding, and brutally honest individuals I’ve encountered. He is undoubtedly the best mentor and teacher from whom I’ve been privileged to learn, and I am incredibly grateful for his guidance.

Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. Christopher Gaffney and Dr. Korine Kolivras for their support of this research and thesis. Dr. Gaffney’s experience in Brazil proved (expectedly) to be critical, and his expertise in the field was invaluable. Dr. Kolivras’ possesses a unique willingness to help with anything at any time. Hers was among the first classes I took as part of the graduate program, and it helped me immeasurably in succeeding.

This thesis would not have been possible without Dr. Bill Carstensen and Dr. Lisa Kennedy, who took a chance on me. When the workload seemed insurmountable and the time insufficient, I reminded myself that I’m forever indebted to them for giving me this opportunity.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge my colleague and friend, Ms. Camille Martineau, as she will never fully understand the impact she had on me during this process. Her love, kindness, and encouragement kept me going, and without her support I surely would have lost my way.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Thesis Structure and Attribution

This thesis is divided into four chapters. The current chapter summarizes the history of and social responses to the mega-event mode of urban planning. It also addresses the motivation for this research and the relevant application to the discipline of media geography. The second chapter reviews the relevant literature regarding the decade-long cycle mega-event planning and hosting in Rio de Janeiro. Additionally, Chapter 2 examines the evolution of new media and social activism with a particular focus on its evolution in the Internet age.

Chapter Three is a manuscript prepared for eventual publication in a relevant academic journal. As the lead author, I was responsible for the data collection and analysis processes, as well as co-authoring the manuscript along with Dr. Bob Oliver who aided in the theoretical framing and editing processes. Dr. Christopher Gaffney provided guidance in data collection and editing process, while also serving as a research participant in the interview portion, as Dr. Gaffney served as a social activist and journalist in Rio de Janeiro in addition to his role as an academic geographer. Dr. Korine Kolivras provided expertise in the methodological portion of the research and participated extensively in editing the manuscript and thesis.

Chapter Four is a post-script, providing space for relevant reflections on this research and the possibility for mega-event research that may relate to or expand upon this endeavor. The remaining space is devoted to a list of the academic and media references...
used by the authors, and Appendix A is a list of the interview questions used while conducting each of the semi-structured interviews.

1.2 Introduction

What is the role of mega-events in urban regeneration? Since David Harvey’s (1989) shrewd tracking of the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism in the 1970s and 1980s, this question has been central to the rethinking of how inter-urban competition influences economic development and social change.

Researchers associate the local politics of mega-events with a manifestation of “a neoliberal mode of planning, often referred to as strategic planning” (Sanchez et al 2013, p. 134). Strategic planning reduces the state’s influence in favor more of entrepreneurial, free market mechanisms to provide event infrastructure and basic public services (Essex, 2003; Hall, 2006; Harvey, 1989, 2003; Sanchez et al, 2013; and others). Private corporations secure government contracts to carry out the commodification of public space including projects related to transportation infrastructure, subsidizing hotel development, sporting facilities, security projects, housing projects, and other associated processes of gentrifying a host city or country (Essex, 2003; Gaffney, 2010, 2011; Hall, 2006; Horne, 2012; and others). Mega-event planning and preparations “provide an opportunity for massive infrastructure investments and real estate speculation that bypasses normal political processes” (Freeman, 2013, p. 97). Coalitions of upper-class elites – business interests, politicians, and mega-event organizing officials – leverage their unified influence to enact public policy that is favorable to its own agenda without
democratic oversight, thereby constructing a “‘city of exception,’ where exceptions made for power interests become the rule” (Vainer, 2011 cited in Freeman, 2013, p. 97). The emergence of these regimes has historically coincided with increased corruption, cronyism, extreme cost inflation, militarized public space, and debt accumulation (Essex, 2003; Gaffney, 2010, 2011, 2013a; Hall, 2006; Horne, 2012; and others).

Considering cultural nuances and social responses to local politics provides vital context to the study of global mega-events. The mega-event mode of neoliberalism as urban social policy has historically led to social tension manifested in the form of public demonstrations and varying degrees of violence, as seen in Mexico City (1968), Athens (2004), Beijing (2008), Vancouver (2009), South Africa (2010), London (2012), and Sochi (2014) to name a few. Despite a significant history of collective action as a response to mega-event planning, Tilly (1993) reminds us that collective social action “varies decisively by time and place” (p. 267). Protests in democratic London, authoritarian Russia, and developing South Africa emerged from often vastly different socio-political circumstances. Superficially, these protests are aimed directly at mega-events and the sporting bodies that operate them. However, the essential linkage between the protests and protesters exists not in a particular sporting event or policy decision, but rather a wider discontent with the accountability of government to its people and the unfulfilled promises of inclusion and progress that accompany mega-event planning.

This thesis is motivated by the conclusions drawn by both Gaffney (2013b) and Sanchez et al (2013) vis-à-vis the changing nature of Brazil’s social consciousness and a legacy of collective action that may have irreparably altered the mega-event mode of
entrepreneurial planning. Sanchez et al. (2013) argue that the efforts of the Comitê Popular da Copa e das Olimpíadas (People’s Committee for the Cup and the Olympics), an organization comprised of academics, new media organizations, citizen journalists, and other social actors, “played a significant part in raising public awareness to the public policy problems posed by mega-events” (p. 149). Additionally, Sanchez et al (2013) critically considered the media coverage of Brazil’s protests, claiming Rio de Janeiro’s residents displayed a clear comprehension of the way “mainstream media manipulates information to blame groups of hooded provocateurs, window smashers and other troublemakers, in contrast with the generally peaceful demonstrations experienced on the streets” (p. 149). Both articles claimed Brazil’s social uprising provided strong evidence that the “political landscape of mega-event planning” (Sanchez et al, 2013, p. 151) now faces an “existential crisis” after Brazilians very publicly “called into question the political economy of FIFA’s signature tournament” (Gaffney, 2013b, p. 15). An increase in public transportation fees and subsequently brutal governmental response, coinciding with the 2013 Confederations Cup, inspired more than a million discontented citizens to flood the streets of Brazilian cities to engage in collective action. Critical to this study is whether or not that critical mass of discontent also fostered a substantive and enduring global media discourse about the current model of mega-event planning?

The planning and construction of urban geographies, communities, and identities depends not only upon how cities combine the traditional economic elements of land, labor, and capital but also “how they manipulate symbolic languages of exclusion and entitlement” (Zukin, 1995, pg. 7). In this study, I examine the role of traditional and new
media journalists and activists in representing those symbolic languages, thereby altering the media geography of Rio de Janeiro, which has diverse and extensive influences on the city. Media are producers of geographic knowledge, and journalists require a fundamental grasp of geography in order to inform readers about current events and to explain what is taking place across the world (Zimmerman, 2007). Discourses in mass media construct space, and they create a sense of place, identity, culture and community, promoting specific ways in which the audience understands the world. (Howe, 2009; Martin, 2000; Zimmerman, 2007).

1.1 Research Objectives and Methodology

1.1.1 Research Objectives

This research explores the dominant narratives present in the international media coverage of the 12-month period leading into the 2014 Brazil World Cup and attempts to establish the role of traditional and new media in contesting and constructing the image Rio de Janeiro. This study aims to address the following research questions:

- RQ1: What are the dominant narratives present in the international media’s construction of Rio de Janeiro’s image?
- RQ2: How did/does new media play a role in constructing and/or contesting those dominant narratives?
• RQ3: How did international and new media mobilize social media technologies to contest and report to advance the anti-World Cup/Olympic movement?

The 2014 World Cup was spread across 12 Brazilian cities, all subject to the mega-event mode of planning and urban regeneration. Exploring the event’s impact on each of those specific locales, as well as the role of new media and press coverage across a series of larger urban centers such as São Paulo or Brasília would certainly be a worthwhile endeavor, however, it constitutes an effort that is simply beyond the scope of a single researcher with limited time and a restricted budget. Fortunately, Rio de Janeiro is central to a series of discussions concerning the representation, legacy and impacts of mega-event planning in Brazil and serves as a useful case-example to explore the intersection of mega-event planning and media geography.

1.1.2 Methodology

To discern the nature of Rio de Janeiro’s media geography, I applied both quantitative and qualitative research methods of content analysis and personal interviews toward analyzing the media coverage of Brazil’s World Cup. This approach allows for examining “what” and “how often” through the content analysis while also examining the “why” through interviewing the producers of that media content (Hay, 2000; Weber, 2002).

Employing a content analysis of newspaper articles and other textual data is a time-honored academic and journalistic practice, and a vast assortment of research exists
that leverages this quantitative method to uncover and examine the nature of narratives or messages. However, this research borrows from the works of Hammett (2011) and Swart et al (2013), each utilizing a content analysis to establish the dominant media narratives that surrounded the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. I conducted a content analysis of English-language news stories about Rio de Janeiro from the start of the Confederations Cup protests on June 17, 2013 through the day before the start of the World Cup, June 11, 2014.

The content analysis presented in this study offers a dual analysis of media literature pertaining to the 2014 Brazil World Cup. The first is a textual content analysis wherein search terms and the results of those searches are used to examine the use of words and/or phrases within a text to best consider how their use influences the reader. The second is a thematic analysis of media content (Weber, 2002). The content analysis was designed using the emergent coding process. Where \textit{a priori} design and coding is grounded in some pre-conceived theory and coding is established prior to the execution of the content analysis, emergent coding of search terms and themes is done after a preliminary examination of the data (Haney et al, 1998).

The textual content analysis involved creating a list of search terms from reading the media coverage of the selected media outlets in the 12-month period leading into the World Cup by selecting terms that were identified as relating to the academic literature on mega-events. Terms were identified as being frequent in the media coverage and then examined as part of the content analysis. Multiple iterations of the content analysis were performed to achieve optimal results. Search terms were added and removed based upon the search yield.

The thematic content analysis involved grouping and coding search terms into themes which constitute specific media narratives, and a search was executed on all
grouped terms simultaneously. This method is a bit more labor intensive but offers a more detailed examination of the content analysis. However, a weakness of the thematic analysis is that the researcher is charged with choosing themes that suit the research. This aspect of the method is potentially problematic because researchers often choose themes that best suit the research and the coding process can lead to questions of ambiguity or accuracy (Weber, 2002).

Millington and Darnell (2014) analyzed new media activist blogs as an “important repository” to understanding the “contestation of development politics related to Olympic sport” (p. 4) in Rio de Janeiro. Our research expands upon this work by adding a qualitative layer through the incorporation of twenty semi-structured interviews with journalists from several international media outlets, as well as journalists and activists from new media organizations in Rio de Janeiro. Similarly, we examine how influential new media organizations contested the politics of mega-event development. Though as Hay (2000) reminds us, “discourse analysis is a process of unraveling how the producer of a particular text is woven” into the larger message. We therefore found it equally important to situate new media in constructing hegemonic or dominant media narratives. See Table 2 for a complete roster of the journalists who were interviewed for this research.
Table 1. List of Individuals Interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Media Journalist</th>
<th>Organization(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simon Romero</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor Barnes</td>
<td>New York Times/USA Today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan Watts</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent Bevins</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loretta Chao</td>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Wade</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyre Davies</td>
<td>BBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerardo Lissardy</td>
<td>BBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Elizondo</td>
<td>Aljazeera Americas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariq Panja</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Jenkins</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Wahl</td>
<td>Sports Illustrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright Thompson</td>
<td>ESPN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Media Journalist</td>
<td>Organization(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruno Torturra</td>
<td>Midia Ninja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Christopher Gaffney</td>
<td>Geostadia/ “Hunting White Elephants”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julia Michaels</td>
<td>Rio Real Blog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kate Steiker-Ginzberg</td>
<td>Rio On Watch/Geostadia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leona Deckelbaum</td>
<td>Meu Rio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel Glickhouse</td>
<td>Rio Gringa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theresa Williamson</td>
<td>Catalytic Communities/ Rio On Watch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traditional journalists from the international media outlets that were designated for the content analysis were automatically selected as research participants. Michael Patton’s (1990, cited in Hay, 2000) work on the various types of “purposeful sampling” (p. 72) provided the framework for how the remaining research participants were selected. “Opportunistic Sampling” allowed us to flexibly follow new leads during fieldwork, while “Chain Sampling” adding participants during the course of research and identifying new journalists or activists based on networking and recommendations from current participants (p. 72).
Interview questions were designed to reflect on the representations of Rio de Janeiro during the lead up to the World Cup as well as the role of social media in shaping those representations. Semi-structured interviews best enabled us to understand “key informants” in such a “complex cultural situation” as Rio de Janeiro (Geertz, 1973; Herod 1993 cited in Hay, 2000, p. 72). Interviews were recorded and immediately transcribed then processed into “Dedoose,” an application which facilitates the coding and analysis of qualitative data. The interview data were coded by assigning responses to the original question, and if responses from interviewees similarly addressed other interview questions then that data were additionally coded under the associated question to provide greater depth or quality (Hay, 2000).

The quantitative and qualitative methods were not ordered nor were the results of one method dependent upon the other. That is to say, the results of the content analysis were not required to design interview questions. Likewise, responses to interview questions were not used to design the content analysis. The two methods were carried out independently for comparative analysis later on.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Mega-event planning in Rio de Janeiro

Sporting mega-events are recognized by their capacity to stimulate investment, to transform urban geographies through the development of modern infrastructure, and to promote an image of power and prestige (Cornelissen, 2010; Essex, 2003; Gaffney, 2010, 2011; Greene, 2003, Horne, 2012; Roche, 1994, 2003, 2006).

Rio de Janeiro’s embrace of mega-events as a means of positioning itself among great world cities dates back to the 1992 World Summit on the Environment (Freeman, 2013; Sanchez et al, 2013). At the time, officials considered urban mega-event planning as a viable option to compete in the new era of globalization with efforts to secure the 2004 and 2012 Olympic Games signaling the desire attract highly mobile financial capital through sport development (Gaffney, 2010, 2011, 2013a; Sanchez et al, 2013). While these two Olympic Games efforts failed, in 2002, Rio de Janeiro secured the right to host the 2007 Pan American Games. The Pan American Games would mark the beginning of a decade-long cycle of mega-events in Brazil (though concentrated in Rio de Janeiro) that included the 2010 World Urban Forum, 2011 Military Games, 2013 Confederations Cup, 2014 World Cup, and “the Holy Grail in the entrepreneurial city competition” (Freeman, 2013, p. 97), the 2016 Summer Olympics. The 2016 Olympic Games also represent a significant milestone in the history of the Olympics since they will represent the first staging of the Olympic Games in South America and according to Darnell (2010) will reflect the “long-term political emergence and development of Brazil itself” (p. 2). For
Gaffney (2010), Rio de Janeiro’s crowded sport calendar is indicative of the city’s adoption of a development logic guided by neo-liberal urban policy. More specifically, in a 2014 lecture Gaffney (2014) argued that state officials and organizing committees in Rio de Janeiro have been “clothing” the city in a narrative of progress, development, and sustainability to market the regeneration of Rio de Janeiro as a global city. Critically, Gaffney (2010) reminds us to question the appropriateness of allocating urban space in order to host a sporting event and to consider the ramifications for local residents whose lives are altered to accommodate a global sporting spectacle.

Dating back to the preparations for the 2007 Pan American Games, Rio de Janeiro’s shift toward entrepreneurial city staging focused on the city’s removing or concealing favelas, a process that has not only continued but also accelerated during preparations for the World Cup and Olympics. Efforts to forcefully (and often illegally) remove and relocate citizens, as well as the razing of communities to make way for mega-event infrastructure became increasingly commonplace, though met with varying levels of resistance. Drawing on Harvey’s (2003) notion of “accumulation by dispossession,” neoliberalism’s fundamental ideals of a reduced role for state government in urban planning directly contradict the mega-event mode of neoliberalism in which governments rely on militaristic force and state coercion to occupy public space and to ensure privatization (Freeman, 2013; Gaffney, 2010, 2011, 2013a; Harvey, 1989, 2003; Prouse, 2013; and others). For example, in the year following the Pan American Games, the city deployed police pacification units (UPPs) to secure and occupy favelas, ostensibly in an effort to combat crime and drug use (Freeman, 2013; Gaffney, 2010, 2011, 2013a;
Prouse, 2013; Saborio, 2013; Steinbrink, 2014). While the UPP policy states that its mission is centered on social inclusion, citizens are wary of replacing the criminals that formerly controlled these territories with a police force, which boasts a history of brutality and corruption. Prouse (2013) wrote that favela residents believe the UPP presence is more about facilitating favela participation in the neoliberal process and maintaining an image of safety for tourists and media (Freeman, 2013; Prouse, 2013; Saborio, 2013). UPP presence also facilitates the arrival of small businesses and increases property values since pacified favelas are more attractive to potential homebuyers (Steinbrink, 2014). The result is that favela residents are now often priced out of their communities and forced to relocate because of the very improvements implemented to make their residences safer and more secure. Here we find that a publicly sponsored program that? may render certain populations socially vulnerable.

Though Brazil publicly grappled with socio-political issues in the lead up to the games, the 2014 World Cup captivated global soccer fans who witnessed a collection of the world’s premier players delivering memorable goals and thrilling finishes (Brazil’s 7-1 defeat at the hands of eventual champion Germany notwithstanding). Though once the tournament ended and foreign soccer fans returned home, the issue of settling the $15 billion balance for hosting the World Cup remained. Wade (2015, January 23) of the Associated Press reported that Brazil spent approximately $3 billion on new or refurbished stadiums, and 90% was paid for with public money. Rio de Janeiro’s Maracanã, one of international soccer’s iconic stadiums, is a symbol of the city and the site of the 2014 World Cup Final between Argentina and Germany. The venue was
constructed in 1862 and publicly owned until June 2013 when the Rio de Janeiro state government awarded a management contract to a private consortium. According to various media reports, the state paid more than an estimated $1 billion in renovations before signing off on a contract that guaranteed privatization of the stadium for at least 35 years. Much of the public space organizers have seized and sold for private sector development will not return to the people of Rio de Janeiro, the same scenario faced by Brazilians after the 2007 Pan American games when none of the sporting venues that were built with state funds were open for community use (Sanchez et al 2013). Officials have already announced that 75 percent of Rio de Janeiro’s “Olympic Park” will be sold to private developers after the 2016 Olympics.

2.2 New Media and Social Activism

Prior to the advent of new media technologies, traditional media or “fourth estate” and its agents, primarily journalists, enjoyed total autonomy in the flow of news (Gasher, 2009; Hafez, 1999; Murphy, 2007). However, the emergence of new media organizations has created fierce competition in the global marketplace of news and information. Greer (2010) explains the rise of new media as “accompanied, and perhaps encouraged, by a decline in deference to authority and a deterioration of trust in official or elite institutions” (p. 21). New media has empowered communities of citizen journalists to challenge political policy, the right to public space, and to highlight inequalities in news coverage or cast doubt on the accuracy or agenda of news coverage, thus acting as a
“fifth estate” watchdog over traditional media. (Dutton, 2009; Greer, 2010; Maratea, 2008; Reese, 2007; Stassen, 2010).

Robert Gee became one of the earliest citizen journalists when he captured analog camcorder footage of the Centennial Park bomb explosion at the 1996 Olympics, and that footage appeared on the front page of CNN’s first web site. Nearly 20 years later, hundreds of millions of ordinary people walk the streets armed with smartphones, tablets, and laptops capable of capturing high-quality digital images, video, and audio at a moment’s notice (Greer, 2010). Using those same devices, images and sounds can be instantaneously uploaded to social media and web sites. Video can even be streamed live in real-time to viewers on the other side of the world. A process that once required expensive television equipment and a broadcasting license from the government can now be achieved with a mobile device and an Internet connection. Citizen journalists can provide “authenticity, immediacy, and realism to news stories through production of “dramatic and visually powerful ‘evidence’ of events ‘as they happen’” (Greer, 2010, p. 7).

Social movements and other forms of collective action have increasingly taken the form of and/or been enhanced by the proliferation of new media. Greer (2010) characterizes the contemporary news media environment as providing “new political opportunities for protest organizations, activists, and their supporters to communicate independently of mainstream news media” (p. 6). Blogs, independent news organizations, activism web sites, and social media (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) pages provide platforms
for activist organizations to produce media content, thus becoming new media organizations (Greer, 2010; Maratea, 2008; Reese, 2007).

Researchers have progressively demonstrated that the Internet can enhance the evolution and operation of activist groups (Wilson, 2007). Bloggers, social activists, and citizen journalists create and participate in online networks as a primary means to organize and interact with other members of social movements. However, new media is not without flaws. Maratea (2008), Wilson (2007), and Darnell (2012) explore the inherent problems with citizen journalism and new media activism; in the opinion of this researcher, chief among them is the overwhelming lack of editorial oversight, scrutiny, or objectivity relative to traditional media institutions. Blog posts are not beholden to the same level of oversight and can therefore be rife with inaccuracies, gossip, and conjecture (Darnell, 2012; Wilson, 2007).

With respect to social media, Morozov (2009a) argues academics and analysts have exaggerated its role in social activism, in particular the significance of Twitter in the Iranian Revolution. Morozov points out that the Iranian government had little difficulty shutting down Internet access (and therefore social media communication) and stifling mobile usage in order to control the protesters. Morozov (2009a, 2009b) also writes extensively about “slacktivism,” which refers to political activities that occur exclusively online and have no real-world impact on public policy. According to Morozov, slacktivists engage in political discourse online for the feel good factor much more often than they do in offline environments to enact tangible change. This accusation is primarily leveled at well-off citizens of developed countries (Christensen, 2011).
New media may have inherent flaws, but it is still a powerful mechanism for cultivating counter-narratives and facilitating demonstrations of widespread discontent. Darnell (2012) concluded that, despite its shortcomings, activism in new media offers “compelling, organized and accessible communication that clearly and forcefully counters official narratives” (p. 17). The deployment of social media and citizen journalism web sites has played a substantial role in the evolution and operation of social movements.

Chapter 3: Negotiating “New” Narratives: Rio de Janeiro and the “media geography” of the 2014 FIFA World Cup

Kyle E. Bailey, Robert D. Oliver, Christopher Gaffney, & Korine N. Kolivras

To be submitted to the Journal of Sport and Social Issues

3.1 Introduction: Brazil’s Mega-Event Mania

Building on Harvey’s (1989) notion of entrepreneurial governance, a number of researchers have illustrated the implications that arise from linking mega-event planning to urban development strategy (Ward 2003). Described as “large scale leisure and tourism events such as Olympic Games and World Fairs” and “short-term events with long-term consequences for the cities that stage them” (Roche 1994, 1) mega-events are often used to restructure or rebrand a city’s infrastructure and image and promoted as a means to halt economic decline and urban decay (Cochrane et al. 1996; Oliver 2011;
Prouse 2012; Sanchez and Broudehoux, 2013). As Steinbrink (2014) describes, sporting mega-events have become instruments for countries and cities “to position themselves on the global market” (p. 131). With the increasing interconnectivity of the marketplace cities feel that they have to play the mega-event regeneration game (Cochrane et al. 1996). Oliver (2011, 2014) argues that cities frequently bid for large-scale mega-events, not for the love of sport, but because the perceived neutrality of sport allows for large scale urban transformations to be negotiated or enforced. The urban ‘interventions’ being made by public-private partnerships under the cover of ‘leveraging’ the economic potential of mega-events have generated substantial scrutiny with the motivations for pursuing a large scale sporting mega-event, the legitimation process that influences bids, the impacts or legacies of these events, as well as resistance to these events (amongst other considerations) all under investigation (Cornelissen, 2010; Essex 2003; Gaffney 2013; Greene 2003; Grix, 2013; Hiller, 2000; Horne 2012; Roche 1994, 2003, 2006; Oliver 2014).

The tendency of mega-events to become vehicles for the alteration of socio-spatial arrangements requires that careful attention be paid to the long-term impacts of event-led urban transformation (Gaffney 2010, 2011). The coupling of the expectations of event rights holders (FIFA, IOC, etc.) to the objectives of state and local organizing committees has produced mixed results. For example, Gaffney (2010) has argued that mega-events frequently impose a neo-liberal shock doctrine upon host cities by suspending democratic processes and “installing temporary regimes of extra-legal governance that permanently transform socio-space” (p. 7). Similarly, in their investigation of Rio de Janeiro’s
adoption of mega-event planning Sánchez et al (2013) claim that “an event-led planning model fosters an exclusive vision of urban regeneration that can open the way for the state-assisted privatization and commodification of the urban realm, thus serving the needs of capital while exacerbating socio-spatial segregation, inequality, and social conflicts” (p. 133). For Prouse (2012) the current strength of mega-event research has been the thoughtful investigations that explore the implications of the “built material infrastructure” (p. 2) generated by hosting. But Prouse (2012) stresses that along with efforts to expose the consequences of accelerating infrastructure projects it is imperative to consider how “historically-situated socio-political processes are (re)entrenched or transformed due to the hosting of mega events” (p. 8).

Brazil’s success in securing mega-events—most notably the FIFA 2014 World Cup and the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Summer Olympic Games—provides an opportunity to explore the nuances and competing narratives that emerge from the ongoing urban restructuring of Rio de Janeiro. In particular, the role of Police Pacification Units (UPP) in the occupation of the favelas (Saborio 2013; Prouse 2012; Freeman 2012, 2014), evidence of wide spread securitization and suspension of civil liberties (Peet-Martel 2014), the repercussions of stadium construction (Gaffney 2010, 2013) and other revitalizations projects (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013), and the disconnect between state spatial restructuring and metropolitan governance (Klink 2013) all reveal the complexity of mega-event hosting in Brazil.

This paper adds to the debate by focusing on the “media geography” of the recent FIFA 2014 World Cup. Brazil was awarded the 2014 World Cup in 2007, and the
matches scheduled to be held in Rio de Janeiro added to the city’s impressive hosting calendar (including the 2007 Pan American Games, the 2010 World Urban Forum, 2011 Military Games, the 2010 UN Rio+20 Environmental Conference, the 2013 Jornada Mundial de Juventude (Pope’s visit), the 2013 Confederations Cup, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics). Rio de Janeiro’s pursuit of mega-events “as a means of positioning itself among great world cities” dates back to the 1992 World Summit on the Environment and adoption of “a neo-liberal mode of planning, often referred to as strategic planning” (Sanchez et al, 2013, p. 134). While many cities have embraced a mega-event development agenda, no other city will have undergone the type of rapid, expansive, and fiercely contested socio-spatial transformation as a result of mega-event hosting in such a compressed time period.

A full discussion of the multidimensionality of the term media is beyond the scope of this paper but we follow Couldry and McCarthy’s (2004) logic that it is “productive to think of media, as with all spatial processes, as complex co-ordinations of presences and absences” (p. 8) and subscribe to Howe’s (2009) notion that “media are producers of geographic knowledge” (p. 43). Recognizing that “media mediates public discourse, knowledge, and understanding of events and places” (Martin 2000, p. 382) we seek to investigate how several western, international newspapers represented Rio de Janeiro’s preparations for the 2014 World Cup.

We have two aims in this paper. First, we seek to illustrate the difficulty that foreign journalists faced in their attempts to represent the circumstances of “two Brazils” (Wahl, 2014 February 27). Second, we highlight the role new media played in shifting the
representative frame as Rio de Janeiro prepared for the tournament. As the stereotypical images of Brazilian “beaches and women and caiparinas” (G. Wahl, personal communication, October 3, 2014) and “happy football people” (T. Panja, personal communication, September 26, 2014) meshed with a “deep history” of “inequality and struggle” (T. Williamson, personal communication, August 29 2014) it became clear that “Brazil is not for beginners” (Elizondo, 2013 June 21). Equally telling, however, were the parallels that emerged between the criticism levied at the Brazilian government’s investment in mega-events and the accountability of FIFA.

3.2 Data Sources

3.2.1 International Newspapers

Media continually shapes and reshapes our relationship with the rest of the world (Gasher, 2009). More than simply disseminating facts and figures, media functions as a “chain of practices and processes by and through which geographical information is gathered, geographical facts are ordered and our imaginative geographies are constructed” (Craine, 2007, p. 149). This analysis produced a sample of 1273 news articles and provided one portion of the empirical data in this study. Content was retrieved from The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, and BBC. The Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism (Edmonds, 2013 May 7) has indicated the importance of these five media outlets in terms of geographic circulation, readership, and market size. The outlets were
examined using the popular media search databases, LexisNexis and Factiva, as well as the Los Angeles Times’ search archives.

For each media outlet, an initial search was conducted to establish a baseline number of articles including the phrase “rio de janeiro.” Each successive search consisted of the root term “rio de janeiro,” the Boolean operator “AND,” then a singular search term such as “world cup”, olympics, riot*, protest*, security, crime, and others. The use of the Boolean wildcard “*” was utilized to truncate and search for variations of the root word. For example, a search of protest* could yield articles mentioning protest, protests, protesters, and protesting. Search results were then filtered to avoid counting duplicate articles. The complete list of search terms and the total number of articles retrieved can be seen in Figure 1.

![Figure 1. Total number of articles by search term](image-url)
Table 2 shows the ten search terms yielding the largest number and percentage of news articles among the 1273 total articles produced by the five media outlets.

Table 2. Top 10 search terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“rio de janeiro” AND…</th>
<th># of articles</th>
<th>% of total articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“world cup”</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest*</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stadium*</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympics</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politic*</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violen*</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spend*</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, terms of a similar theme were grouped together in order to search for stories featuring a specific narrative. These searches included ‘rio de janeiro’ and a list of terms in parentheses, separated by the Boolean operator “OR,” which allowed for the presence of one or all search terms. For example, the search terms protest*, riot*, demonstrat*,
activis*, and “confederations cup” were grouped to identify news articles reporting on protests. Similarly, the terms police, militar*, pacification, security, and safety comprised the search for articles featuring narratives of police and security. Figure 2 shows each narrative as a percentage of the 1273 total stories searched.

![Figure 2. Narratives as a percentage of total stories](image)

3.2.2 Interviews

Interviews with twenty members of both the traditional, international media working in Brazil, as well as new media journalists, activists, and organizers provided the second source of empirical data. Interviews were conducted from July to December 2014, either in-person, in a one-on-one setting, using a digital audio recorder to capture the entirety of the interview or one-on-one interviews via Skype, utilizing third-party software to record.
the conversation. Each interview was transcribed and coded using the software package Dedoose. Interviewees were asked questions pertaining to the preparation and hosting of the World Cup in Brazil and the potential impact of the event on the infrastructure and image of Rio de Janeiro as well as the role of new media in influencing the representations of Rio de Janeiro. Many of the journalists interviewed were foreign correspondents covering Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo. Others were international journalists who were on assignment and traveled to Rio de Janeiro to report but were not living and working full-time in the city or elsewhere in Brazil. Table 2 below provides a comprehensive list of the traditional and new media journalists who were interviewed for this research.

3.3 Results and Discussion

3.3.1 (Re)presenting Rio de Janeiro

“The complicated soul of Brazil can only be seen when one reality is viewed through the window of another. Is it the paradise of soccer games and beaches or is the hellscap of political corruption and drug militia violence? Both realities on their own are lies, but seen together they approach something like truth” (Thompson, 2014 July 12).

Written the day before the end of the 2014 World Cup, the above sentences reveal the difficulty of crafting a post-games soliloquy for Brazil. Despite the difficulty of the task, it is critical to consider that journalists “build public stages, people them with actors, and frame the action in a certain way. They create a certain kind of public space and issue us
an invitation to it” (Rosen, 1997, 198-99 cited in Gasher, 2009). In essence, discourses in mass media construct, reinforce, and promote specific ways in which the audience understands people, cultures, cities, and countries (Howe, 2009; Martin, 2000; Zimmerman, 2007).

As is common practice, Brazil’s federal and state governments along with the organizing committees of both FIFA and the IOC promoted the positive legacies (sustainability, social progress, urban development, etc.) that would be the result of hosting a mega-event. However, as the events approached, a sense of mass discontent over the costs and processes of preparing and hosting emerged in reports by traditional and new media. In the 12 months leading up to the 2014 World Cup, two narratives were consistently presented to the reading public by major English language newspapers. The first narrative appeared in the form of a question: Will or can Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) be ready for the World Cup? The second narrative concerned the social and spatial violence and the protests against an “array of grievances” (Romero and Neuman, 2013 June 20) triggered by the urban restructuring necessitated in part by the mega-event.

3.3.2 Narrative 1: Will they be ready?

Beginning with the 2013 Confederations Cup protests that climaxed during the final between Brazil and Spain in the Maracanã stadium, the international media consistently questioned Brazil’s ability to host the World Cup. In particular the issues of stadium
construction and the provision of security generated significant interest. Deadly accidents during construction of stadiums in São Paulo, Brasília and Manaus led The New York Times columnist, Simon Romero, to highlight the “concerns over the country’s ability to finish an array of lavish arenas that have been plagued by delays and cost overruns” (Romero, 2014 April 12). The construction of the stadium in Manaus, a remote city in north-western Brazil posed the special challenge of constructing a facility in the Amazon where supplies could only be shipped via boat. Progress was reported as being “sluggish” and although the construction deadline was declared “theoretically feasible”, the logic of holding football matches in this isolated location was questioned (Borden, 2013 September 24). When half of the stadiums remained unfinished at the beginning of 2014, the dismay of FIFA president Sepp Blatter was widely disseminated: “No country has been so far behind in preparations since I have been at FIFA even though it is the only host nation which has had so much time, seven years, in which to prepare” (quoted in Priechenfried, 2014 January 6). Although Blatter was later quoted as being more optimistic about Brazil’s ability to get everything in order, his new found confidence coincided with a series of articles that continued to question Brazil’s commitment and ability to deliver a wide variety of infrastructure projects as well as the repeated public expressions of concern made by FIFA’s secretary general, Jérôme Valcke (Wade, 2014 January 8).

In Rio de Janeiro the concerns over preparations stretched from a conversation regarding the 2014 World Cup to the 2016 Olympic Games with Nawal El Moutawakel, head of the IOC’s coordination panel for Rio de Janeiro, noting that “constant supervision
and assistance will be required over the coming months” (Wilson, 2014 February 6). A few months after Blatter publicly ridiculed Brazil for its lack of progress, IOC Vice President John Coates delivered an identically dire report to the press claiming Rio de Janeiro’s preparations for the 2016 Olympics were the worst he had ever witnessed. Yahoo Sports columnist Dan Wetzel penned a scathing column, arguing that it is simply standard operating procedure for FIFA and the IOC to publicly chide host nations for preparation delays. “Now, Coates is likely telling the truth,” Wetzel (2014) wrote. “Rio probably is the worst in terms of preparation. But IOC officials say the same about almost every Olympics” (2014 April 30).

Wahl (2014) argues there is a simple logic behind such rhetoric, explaining that openly questioning the competence and the capacity of host governments to deliver is intentional: “The reason that there’s this proliferation of media stories,” Wahl (2014) said, “especially the ‘will they be ready’ [type], is that organizers – whether it’s the IOC or FIFA – it’s in their interest to try to create pressure on the local organizers to get things done” (personal communication, October 3 2014). Rachel Glickhouse (2014) of RioGringa.com recalled “a lot of coverage that was expected failure in terms of security, infrastructure, preparation, and transportation…The only thing I would say is that the coverage may have put pressure on people to get things finished” (personal communication, September 30 2014). While acknowledging that the “Will they be ready?” media narratives are a staple of mega-event preparation coverage, Guardian correspondent Jonathan Watts argues that journalists had to write the stories. “I’m not sure how else you’re supposed report things that should’ve been done and aren’t done,”
Watts (2014) said, “when even FIFA’s going ‘Oh my God! This is the biggest headache we’ve ever had at a world cup.’ This wasn’t coming from journalists; this was coming from the people that organize the world cup for 30-40 years” (personal communication, September 5 2014).

Theresa Williamson (2014), founder of the NGO Catalytic Communities and its citizen journalism initiative, Rio On Watch, remarked that the “Will they be ready?” narrative was unnecessary, predictable, and especially injurious to already disadvantaged communities:

“We have the U.N. Earth Summit. We’ve had the World Urban Forum; numerous international events. This city, more than most major cities of this size, is home to these kinds of scale events. So I had no doubt it was going to pull it off, and I thought that question was counterproductive because it gave fuel for [organizers] to say: “We have to pull it off! So what are we going to do? We have to remove this community.” What for? “We don’t have time to give you the plans.” (personal communication, August 29 2014)

Media coverage of World Cup preparations also highlighted Brazil’s heavy investment in security. Drawing attention to Rio de Janeiro’s high rates of violent crime (Kiernan, 2014 March 21), and ongoing struggle to eradicate gang activity, drug trafficking, prostitution and the trafficking of minors (Griffin, 2014 February 8; Sutton, 2013 December 5),
journalists routinely questioned visitor safety. Froio (2014 May 18) illustrated Brazil’s systemic inequality, writing that thousands are murdered in Rio de Janeiro every year and offered numerous examples of abuse and the denial of civil liberties. Although the coverage blurred the boundaries between villains and victims it was clear that Rio de Janeiro was a place of violent unrest. In particular, journalists examined whether the rampant ‘lawlessness’ of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas could be reduced through the deployment of thousands of police officers in a series of pacification exercises (Biller, 2014 May 3). Although the Police Units for Pacification (UPP) program had commenced in 2008, it intensified as Rio de Janeiro prepared for the World Cup tournament. Summarized as “militarized cleansing operations that have driven narco-traffickers, as well as corrupt police militias, out of some of Rio de Janeiro’s densely populated urban favelas” the pacification program employed Special-Operations Police Battalions (BOPE) or SWAT teams with mixed results” (Amar 2013, p. 305). Reporters documented the revenge killings, examples of torture and other human rights violations, the presence of tanks and corpses in the street, and acts of indiscriminate violence that complicates daily life for many residents. Guardian correspondent Simon Jenkins (2013) claimed that the government’s interventions in favelas were “testing Brazil’s civic conscience” (2013, April 20) as strategies for urban renewal oscillated between the politics of forced removal and those that recognized the valuable security of tenure that the favelas provide. Elsewhere, Amar (2013) has claimed that while the “UPPs have been welcomed and celebrated … by a large portion of Rio’s public, including by favela residents” there is the concern that the “success” of the pacification program rests on “the racial violence of
the state and the instrumentalization of blackness by the media to legitimize state violence” (p. 305). Using the work of João Vargas, Amar (2013) argues that media coverage of BOPE operations by the television network O Globo often “frames the radical otherness and explicitly labeled blackness of the favelas as spaces of utter terror and chaos” (p. 307). The situation is further complicated when the same “invasion” or “crackdown” tactics and “racial militarization” are “displaced” from the favelas and employed in the public spaces of Rio de Janeiro during protests and demonstrations (Amar, 2013). Although sympathetic to potential of the pacification program, Robert Muggah and Ilona Szabó De Carvalho (2014) writing in The New York Times cautioned that, “media outlets are unintentionally stigmatizing the favelas as havens of crime and drugs, reinforcing the government’s hard line” (2014, April 15). In their estimation, a “rhetoric of fear” had prevented other issues such as the expansion of public services from being discussed (Muggah and Szabó De Carvalho 2014, April 15).

Watts (2014) was careful to remind his readers that although the various depictions and descriptions of violence were likely to “alarm tourists and World Cup organizers” (2014, April 23) the greater issue was the underlying intentions of the pacification program. Watts’ concern was whether or not the increased efforts towards public security was simply designed to improve areas where World Cup and Olympic visitors would congregate while disregarding those areas of the city that are more distant from the main tourist and business districts. This was the conclusion reached by Guardian reporter Nicole Froio (2014) who noted:
“It's becoming increasingly clear that UPPs are a PR move, not a public security policy. They are designed to hide the violence and drive the drug gangs away from the places that will be popular during the major global events Rio is hosting. Sure, clearing the streets from drugs and guns is great, but the UPP project doesn't have any other aims, it doesn't seek to integrate marginalized people into society, it doesn't work towards long-term solutions. In most cases, the UPPs are simply an endless military occupation that fails to protect the people” (2014, May 18).

Similarly Williamson declared the UPP program an example of “state funding of gentrification” (Williamson quoted in Griffin 2014, January 17) but was encouraged by the reporting on favelas in the months leading up to the World Cup noting, “prior to 2010, it was very rare to have a favela perspective in an article in the mainstream media, and there was very little alternative or citizen media.” She felt that the efforts of Rio On Watch and the willingness of international media such as the BBC, NPR, Globe and Mail, the Guardian, New York Times and others to produce “articles that look at things with more nuance” helped to expose some of the dilemmas of favela pacification (personal communication, August 29 2014).

When asked about the media’s portrayal of Brazil’s need to deliver security infrastructure in time for the World Cup, our interviewees offered differing opinions on whether the level of violence and danger in Rio de Janeiro was properly represented.
Romero offered a perspective cultivated by many years of working and living in Rio de Janeiro, arguing that journalists were simply depicting the city’s reality:

“Are there are enclaves of safety, yes. … I lived here back in the 90’s when this was a truly crazy place and going into a favela, going into Rocinha or Vidigal was really intense. There have been achievements. No one can say that there haven’t been. But then again, in the past year or year and a half there has been an erosion of those accomplishments in an incredible way. Murders are up. Violent crime is up. Robberies, muggings, rapes are all up across the board in this city. To cover it up would not be really fair. Boosters of the city and authorities don’t like those stories to be told. But we’re not writing PR releases (personal communication, July 6 2014).

In contrast, Watts (2014) suggested that coverage of the violence in Rio de Janeiro was perhaps “over the top” with journalists “probably playing up to ‘isn’t the outside world a dangerous place?’ narrative and ‘aren’t we lucky to live in safe ole Britain’” (personal communication, September 5 2014). Gaffney (2014) also echoed the dilemma of a foreign media corps that brings “a colonialist perspective” to bear on reporting events in Brazil (personal communication, September 10 2014).
3.3.3 Narrative 2: An “array of grievances”

As FIFA and IOC officials and the international media repeatedly questioned Brazilians’ level of competence to deliver the promised infrastructure for the forthcoming mega-events, the corporatist refrains and rationale for hosting the World Cup and Olympics remained the same. Organizing officials continued to reiterate promises that the World Cup and 2016 Olympics would leave a legacy of sustainability, progress, and an enhanced quality of living for Brazilians across the economic spectrum. In June 2013, however, millions of protesters flooded into streets across the country to challenge the veracity of those promises articulating an array of grievances that challenged the logic of urban restructuring catering to mega-event planning and the demands of extra local authorities.

The protests were initially sparked by a social organization called the Free Pass Movement (MPL, Movimentio Passe Livre) which mobilized against a R$ .20 hike in bus fares in São Paulo. Tensions quickly escalated when the São Paulo military police used extreme force to repress the protesters on June 13, 2013 (Hilton 2013). The images of violence reminded many Brazilians of the military rule and state repression of previous decades and within days, more than a million protestors had taken to the streets in more than 100 cities across Brazil. “It was one of those black swan moments in Brazil,” Romero (2014) remarked. “Anyone who said they saw it coming is full of it. It was one of those phenomenal periods when there’s this trigger – the bus fares that were hiked – and that fed into this pool of resentment in the country that had really been festering for
some time and had been sort of masked or camouflaged during Brazil’s boom” (personal communication, July 6 2014). Al Jazeera correspondent Gabriel Elizondo (2013, July 15) was especially candid, with the title of one of his blog entries—“How I missed Brazil’s revolution”—illustrating the unexpected nature of the protests.

Wall Street Journal reporter Loretta Chao remembers a dramatic shift in the city’s mood and outlook. Chao (2014) claims, “When the World Cup was first awarded to Brazil, the country was in such a different place…Everyone was optimistic. People were working and investing. But the protests were a signal that everything had changed by the time the [Confederations] cup started” (personal communication, October 15 2014).

According to Carlo Pio (2013, June 20), the inaugurations of Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2003 and then Dilma Rousseff in 2011 introduced regulatory changes that deterred private investment in Brazil and when China’s economy slackened, Brazil’s commodity exports suffered. With the gap between poverty and privilege stark, the government’s generous financial support for development projects that included the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics became the substance and symbol of failed institutional policy, creating a crisis of legitimacy for the ruling Workers’ Party. Central to these frustrations was the “suspicion that the government was using diversions like sports and street parties to distract the public from endemic corruption and economic inequality” (Etim 2013, June 19). Brazil’s four largest construction companies, nicknamed the “Four Sisters,” were often referenced in reports of corruption, which a São Paulo State Government study said cost Brazil between 1.38 – 2.3 percent of its $2.253 trillion GDP (Antunes, 2013 November 28).
The sense of indignation was particularly acute in Rio de Janeiro where residents had already experienced the false promises and unmet expectations of the 2007 Pan American Games and had witnessed how mega-event rhetoric translated into a series of evictions and forced relocations in the favelas (Curi, 2011; Gaffney, 2010, 2011, 2014; Sanchez et al., 2013; Steinbrink, 2014). In his examination of the critical geography of sporting infrastructures in Brazil, Gaffney (2010, 2012) has illustrated how “disciplinary regimes associated with mega-events are imagined, legislated, constructed, and imposed in Rio de Janeiro.” Writing in the aftermath of the 2007 Pan American Games, Gaffney (2010, 25) warned, “As Rio de Janeiro moves forward with its plans to invest billions in mega-events, it will be critically important to have an open, democratic involvement in the process so that the most pressing needs of its citizens can be addressed.” The protests that emerged in 2013-2014 illustrate that a list of grievances remained unresolved and that there was a willingness to take to the streets to express discontent with protestors carrying signs denouncing FIFA and using social media such as Facebook to question who the World Cup served (Bevins, 2013 June 20).

What began as a concern over increasing public transportation fares, quickly became linked to the emerging tension between ‘bread and circuses’ development with diverse groups exposing and critiquing mega-event development as well as the regimes sponsoring and supporting the transformation of Rio de Janeiro and other cities in Brazil. Protestors carried banners and shouted “Nao vai ter copa!” — “There will be no World Cup!” — and “Copa para quem?!” — “World Cup for whom?!” — with regularity to
publicly question the logic of spending on stadiums while neglecting the glaring inadequacies of the transportation, health and education services.

When asked to characterize the fundamental cause of Brazilian discontent and the extraordinary scale of the protests, Watts (2014) reflected on his coverage in particular: “Whenever there are happiness indexes, generally Brazil does very well. So what happened? I guess I’ve spent the last year trying to answer that question more than any other” (personal communication, September 5 2014). Associated Press reporter Stephen Wade (2014) was even more candid:

“I was shocked by what an unequal society it is. The enormous breach between black people and white people, between people who have something and those who don’t. I began to look into the history of policing here which was brutal during the dictatorship. Police here are seriously tough. So almost all the stories I wrote were stories that need some tension. I tried to create that tension between what you think you know about Brazil and what you don’t know” (personal communication, September 24 2014).

When analyzing social protests, Charles Tilly (1993) reminds us to examine the identity of the protestors, the content of the claims and the manner that the claims are articulated. Tilley also warns us not to be quick to declare collective action a social movement. As journalists tracked the unfolding of street protests they were careful to highlight the diversity of complaints and to document “the stunning acts of violence”
(Thompson 2013, December 5) perpetrated by the government as well as protestors such as Black Bloc anarchists. As Chao (2014) recalled, it was difficult for journalists to analyze and portray the protests’ primary drivers. “We have to analyze this whole thing,” Chao (2014) said, “…all of those people have different grievances so what does it all mean? Brazil has this new middle class that everyone is talking about. People who are much better off, who are starting to get education and Internet access for the first time. What is driving these people to protest even though they’re protesting about a hundred different things” (personal communication, October 15 2014)? For Glickhouse (2014), the protests were “essentially a backlash against a declining quality of life amid an increasing cost of living and an increasing middle class” (personal communication, September 20 2014). Gaffney (2014) reaches a similar conclusion, opining:

“All of the protests were born out of a sense of frustration and a sense of exclusion… I think there’s a sense that things improved materially but not democratically over the last 15 years. People want to get things for themselves and I think that the protests were as much about the middle classes demanding what the upper classes have as anything else. So if you’re being called middle class yet you don’t have the ability to live as the middle class life then that’s extremely frustrating. And no one’s calling for equality for all. They’re saying “I want better schools so I don’t have to pay for private school.” A typical middle class reaction is that if you can, you avoid the public. You avoid public schools, public transportation,
health care, public water. You avoid public anything. And that’s what people wanted to continue. That’s what the promise of being middle class means and when that isn’t realized people get frustrated. Not across the board but the majority of the people that came out on the street but then stayed home later were the people demanding more for themselves and that’s very frustrating from a social justice perspective” (personal communication, September 10 2014).

3.3.4 Social media: from affect to effect

While journalists struggled to predict whether or not the frustration of the citizenry would affect the World Cup, more obvious was the powerful role that social media played in shaping coverage. According to Los Angeles Times correspondent Vincent Bevins (2014), what began as a small protest lacking media interest quickly shifted when the images and video clips of police brutality captured by citizen journalists were shared via social media. For Bevins (2014) the importance of social media could not be overstated: “it’s entirely possible that Brazil would never had any protest of any significance at all without social media” (personal communication, September 23 2014). In particular, the efforts of Midia NINJA—a collective of citizen journalists—attracted attention because of their ability to provide an alternative narrative through the live streaming of video and circulation of thousands of photographs emerging from the protests, thus
establishing an unprecedented and powerful position in the battle over the
democratization and commoditization of news (Greer et al, 2010; Sambrook, 2005).

Our interviewees described the efforts of Midia NINJA as having a transformative
effect by forcing mainstream media organizations to rethink content and sources of
information. As Watts (2013) highlighted, “NINJA is an acronym for ‘independent
narratives, journalism and action’ and the ninjas frequently occupied the frontline during
protests with many members blurring the line between activism and journalism (2013,
August 29). In examining the 2009 G9 Summit Protests in London, Greer and
McLaughlin (2010) argued the rise of the citizen journalist is “a key indicator of the
changing contexts within which ‘news’ is generated, disseminated and consumed” (p. 2).
Likewise, Midia NINJA placed the news production process into the hands of a legion of
young, independent operators who leveraged real-time multimedia production and social
media platforms like Facebook and Twitter.

The advantage of Midia NINJA held was their ability to cultivate a distinct position
that was independent of more prominent Brazilian newspapers such as Brazil’s media
monolith, O Globo, whose perceived intimate relationship with the Brazilian government
was the source of considerable tension and distrust. As Chao explains:

“Globo is dominated by a group of people who are traditionally from the
upper class… They’re elite. They have certain kinds of education, certain
exposure to the outside world, a very specific view of Brazil. They’re less
diverse and tend to be white. That fuels the distrust because Globo is
basically dictating news as it is seen from this group of elites, whereas people don’t have the same kind of preconceptions about international media” (personal communication, October 15 2014).

The belief that O Globo is deeply intertwined with the Brazilian government is one of root causes of the proliferation of new media in Rio de Janeiro and a source of inspiration for those citizen journalists seeking to offer a different reading of protests, police repression, pacification programs, and other controversial issues in Brazil. Upon arriving Rio de Janeiro, Tariq Panja (2014) of Bloomberg was struck by Midia NINJA’s ability “to get people right into the heart of the action as it was happening and to tell an unfiltered story. You just put the camera on and that’s what you’re seeing. There was no editing involved” (personal communication, September 26 2014). New media journalist and activist Kate Steiker-Ginzberg (2014) recalls the dueling narratives and images presented by Midia NINJA and O Globo:

“You would go home, you would turn on O Globo and then you would open your computer and go on social media … And you were looking at two completely different narratives about what the protests were in the sense that the O Globo guys on the ground got out of their as soon as the tear gas started. So all you have is a helicopter view showing vandalism, and it’s all very much ‘the police are defending the city from these anarchists who are breaking things’ kind of imagery. Then you go on
social media, and it is police using a lot of aggression and violence against peaceful protesters. And that was important to see because that was also the reality that you felt on the ground” (personal communication, September 26 2014).

For Bruno Torturra (2014), the founder of the Midia NINJA, both the protests and new media are means of catharsis:

“The importance of new media is not the audience but the narrative. What happened was we got an alternative version of the facts that we can dispute with the mainstream media. So the mainstream media can be embarrassed, as well. So they don’t have the monopoly of the narrative themselves any more. And the new media knows how to surf and how to use social media really well. So it’s not that millions of people are watching Midia NINJA, but Midia NINJA’s narrative can go viral through personal profiles. Everybody was impacted by some image, and Midia NINJA, I think, was the only one who really broke the ceiling when the mainstream media started to use our images. It got a massive amount of attention, but the whole environment of new media, especially here in Brazil, is mostly about setting a narrative that has to be included in any mainstream media coverage. So even if the outlet is conservative or has an opinion that “the cops are right” or “the World Cup should happen,”
they have to include the dissidents. That really changed, I think, and it’s growing” (personal communication, November 19 2014)

When O Globo began using Midia NINJA content in its own reporting, the impact of citizen journalism shifted from affect to effect. The international media rushed to utilize this loose collective of idealogues and activists armed with smartphones and go-pro cameras as both a source for reporting news but also a story of its own (Barshad, 2014 July 17). The Midia NINJA later signed a licensing agreement with ESPN, the World Cup’s broadcast media rights holder in the United States, to provide digital imagery of Brazil “off the pitch” for its soccer division, ESPN FC, as well as for broadcast across its network of television channels (ESPNFC Staff, 2014 July 4).

Arguably the most publicized story in Midia NINJA’s emergence is linked to its coverage of a street protest that coincided with Pope Francis’ visit to Rio de Janeiro in July 2013. When covering the protest, ninja reporters allegedly captured footage of an undercover police officer or agent provocateur lobbing a Molotov Cocktail in an effort to trigger an excuse for the use of force by police. The incident was covered by The New York Times, which linked a series of Youtube videos to their reporting, blending traditional and new media and visually introducing their audience to the unrest in Brazil. Midia NINJA became so influential that Rio de Janeiro’s mayor, Eduardo Paes, granted Midia NINJA a televised interview in July 2013. For Gabriel Elizondo (2014) the meeting represented “a very significant moment in the recent history of new media in Brazil because a very powerful and popular mayor of one of the biggest cities in Brazil”
granted an interview “to a bunch of young people with iPhones that had been out on the streets collecting real-time information.” In Elizondo’s (2014) estimation, the lengthy interview “was an admission by Paes and by extension the government in Rio de Janeiro that Midia NINJA had some real power and some real influence and they needed to be engaged” (personal communication, September 25 2014).

The labors of new media outlets and organizations such as Midia NINJA, Rio On Watch, Nova Democracia, Meu Rio, Rio Gringa, Geostadia.com, and Comitê Popular Rio Copa e Olimpíadas (People’s Committee of the World Cup and Olympics in Rio) helped to bring a number of previously unexamined questions to the attention of the international media. Brazilian new media helped to construct alternative narratives while simultaneously contesting the traditional media, highlighting inequalities in news coverage or casting doubt on the accuracy or agenda of news coverage.” (Greer et al, 2010; Reese, 2007; Dutton, 2009; Sambrook, 2005; Stassen, 2010). Whether it was Rio On Watch’s exposure of the new media- and citizen journalism-driven resistance to gentrification and forced relocations in Vila Taboinha or Meu Rio’s campaign to reveal the city’s sanitation crisis, various obstacles to urban development were exposed. Each vignette that became the focus of an international audience helped to expose the contradictions and conflicts of interest that always accompany mega-event development projects.
3.3.5 Moving Forward - Legacy

“‘From now on, FIFA will have no peace,’ Altenfelder promises ‘The thing will move. We activated the debate globally. It’s a legacy of Brazilian people during this World Cup. This is nice.’ But the distinction between anti-FIFA and anti-Cup sentiment is crucial. And the fervor engendered by brilliant soccer is strong enough to blast it all away.” (Barshad, 2014 July 17)

“Brazil lost 7-1, and it was a tragedy. And Brazilians didn’t even tear their country apart. So the image of Rio and Brazil after the World Cup was perhaps more positive after the World Cup. That’s really going to screw us over for the Olympics just because I mean they pulled it off. They’re so lucky, these bastards.” (L. Deckelbaum, personal communication, September 19 2014)

The above excerpts capture the dichotomous reality of Brazil’s 2014 World Cup. Felipe Altenfeder’s (Midia Ninja) bold proclamation that the legacy of the 2014 World Cup will be to upset the power vacuum that FIFA enjoys contrast nicely with Meu Rio activist Leona Deckelbaum’s sense that good football played in a football-loving country might be enough to overlook the negative impacts. The latter perspective was also the viewpoint reached by Altenfelder’s colleague and Midia NINJA founder, Bruno Torturra (2014):
“The problem is that it was a World Cup in Brazil. People fucking love soccer here. I said this to the [protesters]. I said, ‘It’s a bad idea to protest during the World Cup. It’s a very bad idea because everyone will hate you.’ The fact that the World Cup was a structural success helped FIFA a lot because it was such a good party in most of the country. People were so happy to have the foreigners here. Everyone had a good time, and people said, ‘Well, there might be some wrongdoing. It was expensive to make this, but the politicians rob anyway. It’s happened every time. At least we got a good World Cup.’ I think that’s the majority of people who think that. In a way, it feels that the World Cup never happened now for me. When I think about it, it felt just like this pause where everyone was thinking about it, wanting to understand, and to have an opinion. And then the 7-1 came [Brazil lost to Germany in the semi-finals], and everyone was just ‘what the fuck happened?’ And it became a joke” (personal communication, November 19 2014).

While some journalists and activists conceded that the Brazilian social uprising and accompanying media coverage could be a watershed moment in the history of international sport and politics, most expressed far less certainty than Altenfelder. Most were reluctant to claim any form of tangible, immediate victory for the protesters, though most were either hopeful or willing to consider that the magnitude of mega-event contestation witnessed in Brazil could lead to change both locally and globally.
Wahl (2014) believes there is hope, though his expectations are tempered. “I think it potentially could be a turning point,” Wahl (2014) said. “I don’t know if it will be for sure. I think the only way you’ll really know is when you see what happens. Will we see protests in Russia about World Cup 2018? I don’t know. Maybe the possibility is increased because of what we saw with Brazil 2014… The amount of money being spent on all of this stuff – the facilities and the stadiums and everything – it’s pretty out of hand. I think we’re going to run out of places that are willing to do that before too long” (personal communication, October 3 2014). For Watts, “the legacy is much more about the event than the build-up” and given the relative success of the World Cup he expressed doubt about the lasting impact of the coverage (personal communication, September 5 2014). Elizondo echoed this assessment, citing a lack of meaningful post-games media coverage: “I don’t think the media coverage had any impact on the legacy in Brazil … Most people came in, covered the World Cup, and they left. How many stories have you seen since the World Cup has ended on what’s happening with any of the stadiums in Brazil? I’ve seen zero including myself. I haven’t done any either” (personal communication, September 25 2014). Chao was more optimistic arguing that the international media coverage leading up to the event lead to “a lot a lot of western publications who have like no presence here whatsoever are paying attention to Brazil news and that’s all because of the coverage before the Cup” (personal communication, October 15 2014). Steiker-Ginzberg argues there was a significant legacy left despite the shift toward euphoric coverage once the World Cup began. “…there has been a legacy of activism that has been left behind, a legacy of critique. A legacy of challenging what this
event is. I do think Brazil will be remembered for” (personal communication, September 26 2014). When asked whether or not Brazilian dissidents left a World Cup legacy of affecting both the country’s sporting and political landscape and the future of mega-event hosting, Torturra (2014) shifted attention to the upcoming Rio 2016 Olympics as being more pivotal:

“The Olympics will be interesting. I don’t know what to expect because its way more local, it’s just in Rio. Brazil doesn’t care as much about the Olympics as we care for soccer. We will like it if it goes according to plan. I think logistically its way worse than the World Cup. The Olympics can be chaos, a huge failure. Rio is a mess, and Rio is really hard for you to go about the city because of the traffic. The city is just a construction site. Guanabara Bay is polluted. It’s absolutely illegal to make an Olympics in Rio, in a way. We know how to organize soccer. The masses go to the stadium; the masses leave the stadium. We’re good at it. But we’ve never organized very good volleyball tournaments or canoeing or skiing or… name it. We don’t actually care much for these sports in Brazil, so that’s another problem. Our cities are very bad at multi-tasking, and the Olympics is all about multi-tasking. I hope for the best. I’d just rather that we could have a critical conversation without the chaos…it could be a good opportunity for us to pay attention to other sports than soccer and to have more kids
engage in it. But we definitely won’t have much use for a Rugby stadium [after the games], that’s for sure” (personal communication, November 19 2014).

Jenkins (2014) agreed with Torturra’s sentiment but believes that Rio 2016 is a litmus test that those Brazilians seeking to effect socio-political change will ultimately fail: “To me the test in Rio is are they going to be able to affect the Olympics. And the answer is, I think, ‘No.’ The Olympics are going to be even more extravagant than the World Cup was, and Rio is going to be paying for this for decades” (Jenkins, personal communication, 2014).

For Romero, hosting the World Cup, produced a “domestic kind of soul-searching” regarding the “state of sport in Brazil” and “levels of corruption and incompetence and waste and mismanagement that are involved in professional soccer in Brazil.” On the event itself Romero acknowledges that there was “a type of amnesia that set in because you know you have hundreds of thousands of people that come to the country on vacation. There’re in a different mindset…. I think people were really willing to overlook the other aspects of the preparations and they just enjoyed it [the football].” Although Romero thought that the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro would be different, he believed the hosting of the World Cup had instilled “a confidence in the city and the country that Brazil can pull off the Olympics as well” (personal communication, July 6 2014).
3.4 Conclusion

The 2013 Confederations Cup protests became a flashpoint for social unrest across Brazil as protestors leveraged the spotlight of one mega-event to contest the preparations for two others. Over the course of twelve months both international and new media fashioned the geography of Brazil by producing narratives that explored the country’s internal strife. In the months that followed the June 2013 protests, the link between the Brazilian government’s failures to provide basic public services in cities such as Rio de Janeiro was connected to the narrative that excessive spending on sport (both the World Cup and the Olympics) was a misguided priority that only served to exacerbate existing inequalities and would do nothing to improve the lives of the people financing the party. By the time the first match kicked off, “Will Brazil be ready?” shifted toward questioning the political economy of FIFA’s World Cup and whether cities such as Rio de Janeiro should pursue event-led development.

While protesting the merits of a mega-event is not a new phenomenon, the evolution, sophistication, and ubiquity of Brazil’s new media’s influence was unique because it could not be easily ignored or dismissed. Instead, a variety of citizen journalists and activists across a range of platforms contributed to the dialogue about the role and implications of mega-event planning and hosting. Equally important was the communication of a series of alternate viewpoints to an international audience. The result as Wahl (2014) put it, was that for those who still held the notion of Brazil “as beaches and women and caiparинhas,” (personal communication, October 3 2014) the media
coverage of World Cup preparations revealed, as he wrote in Sports Illustrated, “there are two Brazils” (Wahl, 2014 February 27). Watts (2014) hopes the media coverage of “favelas, citizen journalism protests, the difficulties of even commuting as an ordinary person in Brazil, as well as the bigger headline stuff about the stadiums and the teams…expanded people’s understanding” (personal communication, September 5 2014).

Facilitated by citizen journalists and social activists leveraging the utility of new media, the Brazilian uprising seemingly paralleled a substantive discourse in the international media regarding the operations of Brazil’s government and those of FIFA. Calls for a complete recording of the direct and indirect subsidies provided for host cities as well as demands for transparency regarding the operations of bid corporations, organizing committees, sport federations, and state institutions that have previously been launched by individuals or small watchdog groups are now being recognized. Writing on the eve of the Confederations Cup in 2013, Gaffney (2013, 15) argued “There is every indication that the current model of mega-event hosting is facing an existential crisis and that this crisis was precipitated by the collective actions of Brazilian civil society actors in public space at a critical moment.” A couple months following the 2014 World Cup, Adam Chandler (2014, October 1) writing for the Atlantic asked: “What If Democracies Refuse to Pay for the Olympics Again?”

The critical mass of discontent in Brazil that sparked unprecedented collective action in June 2013 may be symbolic of a new ‘mediated’ relationship between sport and society, where a more critical assessment of organizations which oversee a “sporting monoculture” (Wamsley, 2002, p. 401) as well as those governing institutions who
submit to them. Yet, as Thompson (2013, December 5) explained, “a protest against the way things work” often fails to satisfy individuals seeking immediate change. Thompson (2013) critically indicates that the assessment of a year’s worth of street activism may ultimately rest on whether or not “a generation of involved citizens” was born, and if the activities “convinced a country that the status quo might be vulnerable” (2013, December 5). Equally important is whether or not the status quo for global sporting bodies is now vulnerable. Despite Brazil’s extraordinary social uprisings, its domestic socio-political challenges are in constant and contentious negotiation. However, the media coverage of Brazil’s World Cup preparations and associated protests centered on the “changing nature of local responses to global forces” (Wilson, 2007, p. 472). Though much research and analysis remains, Rio de Janeiro’s unprecedented cycle of hosting mega-events is undoubtedly leaving a legacy that critically questions the logic of how global mega-events function in the local context.
Chapter 4: Post-Script

4.1 The Future: Mega-events and Research

The conclusions drawn in this thesis align with the assertions made by Gaffney (2013b) and Sanchez et al (2013) that the June 2013 protests and subsequent collective action permanently altered the political and socio-spatial dynamics in Rio de Janeiro and other cities in Brazil. What remains to be seen is whether or not the historic social uprising spawns a new generation of involved and influential social actors who, most importantly, can “keep the fires of discontent alive in the public consciousness” (Gaffney, 2013b, p. 15). Equally significant is whether or not the critical mass of discontent that resulted from a decade of mega-event planning and hosting gave birth to a new political consciousness about the way international sporting bodies and national and local governments negotiate the operation of mega-events. It is critically important to establish the linkages between academic concerns and everyday politics, and this thesis is attempts to make a contribution toward that effort.

In suggesting the possibility of future research on repertoires of contention within particular forms of collective action, Tilly (1993) surmised that the history of certain forms of contention “in a locale constrains their subsequent use,” as well as calling for “comparisons of different times and places in which similar forms of claim-making could, in principle, have appeared” (p. 277). This perspective is essential to a greater understanding of the mega-event mode of entrepreneurial planning, resulting collective

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social action, and the impacts of mega-events – both globally and locally in Rio de Janeiro as the 2016 Olympics are fast approaching.

It would be very interesting to continue an examination of the domestic and foreign media coverage of Rio de Janeiro’s mega-event cycle in advance of the 2016 Rio Olympics. What will be the dominant narratives present in the coverage of that event now that so many of Rio de Janeiro’s issues have been revealed and discussed in the international press? Might the array of grievances gravitate toward a more specific sense of discontent? Furthermore, it would be fascinating to seek the opinions of traditional media journalists in Brazil and to comparatively explore the dominant narratives presented Portuguese-language outlets such as O Globo, which was often publicly condemned due to the nature of its relationship with the Brazilian government and elites. Understanding the media geography of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil as this process continues to unfold may prove invaluable to interpreting and presenting the “symbolic languages of exclusion and entitlement” (Zukin, 1995, p. 7) and constructing more useful discourses surrounding future mega-events.

A growing number of seemingly disinterested democratic countries has declined to even bid on sporting mega-events while a coalition of authoritarian governments have stepped up, aspiring to climb the geopolitical ladder by showcasing their own modern, global cities. Often touting fewer labor laws and a more obedient citizenry, autocratic nations offer political and economic conditions that are more amenable to the infrastructural and time demands of international sporting bodies. Russia and Qatar will host the 2018 and 2022 World Cup tournaments, respectively. The IOC will soon select
the host of its 2022 Winter Olympics, with only Beijing and Kazakhstan remaining after Oslo, Stockholm, Munich, and Krakow, Poland all pulled out due to plummeting public support. Though democratic nations are undoubtedly far less eager to host or even bid on sporting mega-events, notable is the United States Olympic Committee’s decision to nominate Boston as a candidate to host the 2024 Summer Games – an announcement met with skepticism by much of Boston’s mainstream media and the national press.

At an Olympic summit meeting in December 2014, IOC President Thomas Bach signed legislation that will contractually obligate host countries to establish protections against human rights, labor, and environmental violations. Critics like Minky Worden, director of global initiatives at Human Rights Watch are hesitant to praise the IOC’s sudden humanitarianism and question its will to enforce the new protocols, though Worden and others recognize that the new regulations “might be the only way to make human rights advances in some of the most abusive places” (Worden, 2015 January 18). Worden (2015) recalls recent violations by these countries in preparing for previous mega-events:

“These reforms are about to get a rigorous test in the global spotlight — whether the 2022 Games are in China, which welcomed journalists to Beijing in 2008 with a censored Internet, or Kazakhstan, which locks up critics and closes down newspapers. ... Beijing locked up critics of the Olympics. In Russia, an environmentalist drew a three-year prison sentence, and members of the feminist band Pussy Riot were beaten and
detained, for their protests of the Sochi Games. … As Qatar builds an estimated $200 billion of infrastructure for the 2022 World Cup, hundreds of South Asian migrant workers have died working on construction projects. … Given the abuses, is there any hope for change?”

A historically substantive, global conversation is taking place concerning the socio-spatial implications of mega-event planning and hosting in its current form. Due partly to the events of June 2013 and a focus on the urban transformation of Rio de Janeiro, the future of our academic discipline is full of uncertainty yet ripe with opportunity.
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Appendix A

1. What were the dominant narratives present in the international media coverage of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil in the 12-month period leading into the 2014 World Cup?

2. Do you believe the international media coverage in the 12-month period leading into the 2014 World Cup was fair and balanced? Were the events, issues, and individuals portrayed accurately?

3. How would you characterize the media geography of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil based on the press coverage leading into the 2014 World Cup?

4. How would you describe or summarize the reasons behind the June 2013 protests that accompanied the Confederations Cup? Is there a common, unified grievance among the many displayed in those protests or was it an issue of many competing interests?

5. What was the reasoning and motivation behind the creation of or your involvement in this particular new media organization (if new media)?

6. What was the role of new media – citizen journalists, blogs, social activists, and social media – in contesting and constructing the dominant narratives from both the international media and mega-event organizing committees?

7. If traditional media, how often did you collaborate with new media journalists or activists in reporting on a particular story? What was the nature of that collaboration and can you provide examples?

8. If new media, how often were you or your organization leveraged by traditional media journalists to report on stories? What was the nature of that collaboration and can you provide examples?
9. How would you characterize your use of social media in reporting news stories or finding useful information in reporting news stories? How important was the use of social media to your job?

10. How important was the use of social media in the protest movement? Can you provide any specific examples?

11. How would you characterize the role and importance of Midia NINJA in affecting the news coverage of the June 2013 protests? How did Midia NINJA affect the international media’s reporting on Rio de Janeiro and Brazil?

12. What do you think will be the legacy of the 2014 World Cup? Did the media coverage of the World Cup play a significant role in shaping and/or determining that legacy?

13. Do you believe the media coverage of the events and the social uprising in Rio de Janeiro and Brazil could be considered a turning point in the future of sporting mega-events and how they operate?