

CAMPFIRE and Payments for Environmental Services

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Outline

- **What is CAMPFIRE?**
 - **Origins**
 - **Functioning**
 - **Performance**
- **How does CAMPFIRE relate to PES?**
- **What lessons can be learned from CAMPFIRE that could apply to PES?**
- **Conclusions**



COMMUNAL AREAS MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME FOR INDIGENOUS RESOURCES

Key Concept

People living in or adjacent to wildlife habitat must be able to realize some value from that wildlife, or else they will replace it with other forms of land use. This value must be direct, material and substantial.


Zimbabwe The Problem

widespread loss of
natural land cover;

associated loss of
wildlife habitat;

reduced wildlife
numbers;

little corresponding
benefit in terms of
human development



A timeline of wildlife conservation and use in Zimbabwe

<p>Wildlife - <i>res nullius</i> - treated as State property</p> <p>Protectionist policies centred on creation of 'Game Reserves'</p> <p>Hunting for 'own use'</p>	<p>National parks and safari areas established</p> <p>Experiments with game ranching</p>	<p><u>1975</u> Parks and Wild Life Act - private landowners given the right to use wildlife commercially</p>	<p><u>1982</u> - PWL Act amended to extend same rights to residents of communal lands</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • mid 1980s Project WINDFALL • CAMPFIRE proposed (1986) 	<p><u>1989</u> CAMPFIRE initiated</p> <p><u>1991</u> Appropriate Authority extended to 12 districts</p> <p><u>1998</u> 25 districts have AA</p> <p>Safari hunting etc expanding country-wide</p>
Pre-1960	1960-1975	1975-1982	1982-1989	1989 to now

Zimbabwe's Communal Lands

- 42% of country
- 6 million people
- Marginal agricultural potential
- High frequency of drought
- Food insecure
- Poor
- Few livelihood options other than subsistence agriculture (cropping, livestock, harvesting woodland products)



PES-Methods and Design: ZEP
workshop, Titisee, Germany

Yet, some communal lands have pest problems

- adjacent to existing, unfenced, national parks and safari areas
- substantial wildlife populations
- wildlife poses real problems for people (crop raiding; threats to life and property)
- what options are there for reducing human conflict with wildlife?
 - remove wildlife?
 - pay compensation?
 - or realise larger monetary benefits from wildlife?



Main CAMPFIRE Objectives

- Initiate a programme for the long-term development, management and sustainable use of natural resources in the Communal Areas.
- Achieve management of resources by placing custody and responsibility with the resident communities.
- Allow communities to benefit directly from the exploitation of natural resources within the Communal Areas.
- Establish the administrative and institutional structures necessary for the programme to function.



Wildlife



Woodlands

CAMPFIRE:
focused initially on
four main
natural resources




Water




Grazing


Where is **CAMPFIRE** active?



Communities involved in CAMPFIRE are mostly situated on the borders of, or close to, National Parks and Safari Areas



Most CAMPFIRE initiatives occur in areas where rural population density is still relatively low (1992 census data)



Many CAMPFIRE communities are 'poor' in the sense of having low life expectancy, high illiteracy, malnourishment, limited access to clean water and healthcare, and overall low standard of living

How is *CAMPFIRE* organised?

Third-parties have been important in all of this, in many different ways: political, technical, institutional



The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management originally devolved its responsibilities for wildlife to communities and now provides those communities with technical advice on wildlife management.



The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development is responsible for the overall administration of the rural district councils, to whom the authority for wildlife has been devolved.



Zimbabwe Trust focuses on training, institution building, and the development of skills among community members and representatives.



The Africa Resources Trust monitors external policy and regulation that effects CAMPFIRE and provides information to decision-makers worldwide.




World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) provides ecological and economic research, monitoring, and advisory services to CAMPFIRE and also assists in training.



ACTION is best known for providing environmental education, training and materials to schools in CAMPFIRE districts.

What services under *CAMPFIRE* ?

Safari hunting is well established in southern Africa and a lucrative enterprise. Could payments for hunting concession areas and trophy fees provide incentives for people to maintain wildlife habitat and populations?




Only sport hunting has generated sufficient revenue in these communal areas to be considered an economically viable form of land use under present circumstances.


Between 1989 and 2001, CAMPFIRE revenues amounted to more than US\$ 20 million, ~90% from sport hunting.

Elephant alone account for ~60% of this value







Concession areas and hunting/ecotourism rights are normally auctioned or decided on the basis of tenders received. This has pushed prices upwards, close to a genuine market price for the service being provided



CAMPFIRE revenues have risen consistently in real terms since the programme's inception, though growth has slowed in recent years



The proportion of unallocated ('Not Detailed') CAMPFIRE revenues has increased over time, while payments to communities has declined in proportional terms



CAMPFIRE: is there payment for an environmental service?


Payment for environmental services:

- a voluntary transaction
- well-defined environmental service (ES) or land use likely to secure that service
- “bought” from a minimum of one service provider
- by a minimum of one service buyer
- if and only if the ES provider secures that ES (i.e. payment is conditional on production of the ES)

(Wunder, 2005)

CAMPFIRE is a PES !

Voluntary	RDCs apply for Appropriate Authority on behalf of communities
Well-defined ES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Access to viable hunting or ecotourism concession area (well maintained area)• Right to take trophy animals (a product)
Buyer(s)	Safari operators who then market hunting or ecotourism opportunities to clients. Competition for concessions and hunting rights
Seller(s)	14 and more hunting/ecotourism concessions on offer through tenders and auctions)
Conditionality	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Bids for concession areas reflect diversity and size of quota and length of lease• Receipts from trophy fees depend on hunting success (=f(animal numbers, skill))



Outstanding issues

- Management units remain ill-defined
- Organisation complexity complicates the search for simple solutions: there is no silver bullet (but nor is it all fool's gold)
- Revenue capture by non-poorest community members
- Property rights over the land and resources still not clearly defined; tenure remains weak
- Some recentralisation of authority RDCs are appropriating too much of the revenue - or greatly delaying disbursements


Some lessons for PES

- **Form should follow function** - avoid over-designing projects at the outset
- **Retain flexibility** - allow opportunities for adaptive solutions to emerge, partic. greater sense of local ownership and commitment
- **Encourage diversity** - allow natural selection to operate among alternatives
- **Recognise the complexity** of institutional landscapes - many stakeholders, many interests, many competing claims; management&transactions costs are high

More lessons


- **Complexity can be distracting** - don't be put off by the difficulty of showing precise links between payments and outcomes - too much concern on issues such as 'additionality', 'leakage' and demonstration of causality could become diverting.
- **Identify benefit 'metric'** - Intangible benefits far outweigh the direct benefits especially in poorer communities
- **Success and failure are relative** - there was no single CAMPFIRE but rather a series of experiments: some worked (so far); some failed (so what can we learn?)
- **Replication is flattery** - Namibia, Zambia, South Africa and Cambodia

Finally, agendas evolve...



Initially, natural resource conservation was the primary objective, with human development the means to that end

No doubt they will do so also within PES!



Subsequently, issues of human well-being and rural institutional and organisational development became ends in themselves, with natural resource conservation large subsumed to being the means