Analysis of the Appointment of the
First African American Ambassador to Apartheid-Era South Africa

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ABSTRACT

This study applies the metaphor of two-level games to generate explanations of how and why President Reagan chose to appoint Edward J. Perkins ambassador to South Africa. It explored the relationship between national and international factors that may have influenced Reagan’s decision, as well as his policy preferences, beliefs and values. International factors included U.S.-South Africa relations, alliances, international organizations, and transnational movements for human rights and racial equality. Among the domestic factors were the dynamics between the executive and legislative branches of government, interest groups, and activism. National and international politics and policies overlapped in four areas—strategic interests, race, morality, and national values. Analysis of the evidence suggests that while international events were an important part of the context of the decision, domestic politics and the President's own views had the most influence on the decision. The Perkins appointment exemplified how a personnel selection might reaffirm national reconciliation of opposing views on race, ethnicity, democratic values and national interests.
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DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this dissertation are the author’s own views. They do not represent those of the Department of State or the U.S. government.
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>A/S</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary</td>
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<td>CAAA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act</td>
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<td>CBC</td>
<td>Congressional Black Caucus</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>DCM</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission</td>
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<td>DNSA</td>
<td>Digital National Security Archives</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>FSAM</td>
<td>Free South Africa Movement</td>
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<td>FSO</td>
<td>Foreign Service Officer</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>International Political Committee</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Assistant</td>
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<td>NSDD</td>
<td>National Security Decision Directive</td>
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<td>NSSM</td>
<td>National Security Study Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>SAG</td>
<td>Government of South Africa</td>
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<td>OPP</td>
<td>Office of Presidential Personnel</td>
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<td>SFRC</td>
<td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee</td>
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<td>SCLC</td>
<td>Southern Christian Leadership Conference</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>Government of the United States</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>United Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>WOA</td>
<td>Washington Office on Africa</td>
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Introduction

This study examined President Reagan’s historic decision in 1986 to appoint Edward J. Perkins the first African American ambassador to South Africa. The decision was historic for a number of reasons including that it signaled an unprecedented willingness of a conservative Republican administration to engage with not only the minority white government of South Africa, but Black South Africans as well. Appointing an African American ambassador lent credibility to the notion that the U.S. government was willing to acknowledge and legitimate the views of a broader spectrum of the South African polity even if it created tensions between Washington and Pretoria. The Perkins appointment symbolically distanced the U.S. government from the system of apartheid and emphasized U.S. national values of fairness and equity in a multiracial and multicultural society. The Perkins appointment is significant as an example of one of the tools a president may use to manage and mediate competing interests at the national and international levels while implementing policy.

In addition, the Perkins appointment demonstrates that ambassadorial appointments can be a means of communication among advocacy groups, the Congress, the international community and the president. It indicates as well how important that communication can become when the interests of advocacy groups, members of Congress and the President diverge. The Perkins appointment suggests how a president may use a personnel selection not only to implement his or her policies, but also to confirm moral commitments and validate a collective system of beliefs and values. Ambassador Perkins’s willingness to accept the appointment and his subsequent contribution to U.S. policy towards South Africa exemplify the courage and devotion to duty of outstanding public administrators.

Research Questions

The central research question of this study is how and why President Reagan chose to appoint Edward Perkins as Ambassador to South Africa. There are many possible influences on this decision. These include the linkage between this particular appointment and overall broad Cold War national security interests and the Reagan administration's evolving policy of constructive engagement with the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Other possible influences include second-term presidential personnel appointment practices and pressures within and outside the Administration to appoint more African Americans to high-level positions. Similarly, policy disputes between the Congress and the White House as well as advocacy
groups and the rest of society may have influenced this appointment. This study sought to identify and explore factors that may indicate how and why the Perkins appointment came about. Factors that contributed to explanations of President Reagan’s decision include 1) the dynamic between the President’s national security assistant and the rest of the White House staff, 2) public opinion and activism, 3) legislative branch politics, 4) political party politics and electoral imperatives, and 5) international politics and policies.

The following additions to the central research question guided examination of these factors. First, did the President articulate to the American public the goals and objectives of U.S. policy towards South Africa; if so, did citizens understand and support those goals. Second, did the President consider public opinion when he decided to appoint Perkins and did the Perkins appointment signify a change or subtle variation in established policy? Third, did the interaction of domestic and foreign politics and policies have an impact on the Perkins decision, and did Reagan’s personal views guide his decision to appoint Perkins?

Overview

The global foreign policy of the Reagan administration is well documented in scholarship on the “Reagan Doctrine.” Its core principle was to confront actively and push back the influence of Communism everywhere. Accordingly, the Administration was willing to support and interact with all countries and groups deemed to be engaged in efforts to prevent Soviet dominance. The Reagan Doctrine also included a commitment to promote democracy and capitalism and to protect fundamental human rights. Consistent with these views, the Reagan administration considered South Africa an ally in the struggle with the Soviet Union for influence on the African continent. Further, the Administration sought to distance itself from the regime’s system of institutionalized racial segregation and marginalization of the majority of people in South Africa. In his first term the President was successful in pursuing dialogue with South Africa directed at reducing regional tensions without applying direct pressure on the South African government to eliminate apartheid and without “risks of losing domestic support and facing congressional and media opposition.” (Crocker, 1989, p. 147) The expectation was that stabilizing the region would create an environment in which the internal system of governance and organization of society in South Africa would evolve at its own pace.¹ (Crocker, 1989)

By his second term, Reagan faced waning domestic and international support for his policy of dialogue and interaction with the government of South Africa (SAG). It appeared that
non-state actors at both the domestic and international levels perceived that he placed less emphasis than they thought necessary to encourage peaceful change in South Africa’s social, economic and political system.

Domestically, states and localities adopted measures that were at odds with the Administration’s goal to encourage U.S. investment in South Africa. Sit-ins, protests, and arrests in front of the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. became commonplace as did protests on college campuses and calls for divestiture of investments by U.S. businesses in South Africa. Escalating violence in South Africa's townships received intensive coverage in the global media. U.S. network television coverage of the deteriorating conditions in South Africa, as well as stories in major print media, increased in time and space allotted, especially during the period 1984-86. A coalition of anti-apartheid advocacy groups like TransAfrica, the Free South Africa and Free Mandela movements took the position that dismantling the Apartheid system was necessary to secure equal rights for the Black majority in South Africa. These groups as well as human rights activists and members of Congress came to believe that economic and other forms of sanctions against the regime were the most effective means to influence the SAG to change its system of governance. It appeared that all of these groups questioned President Reagan’s leadership and commitment to pressure South Africa to eliminate apartheid.

Abroad, Great Britain, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, stood out as the principal ally of the Reagan administration’s policy toward South Africa, although the President also relied on the support of Germany, France, and Japan. As happened in the U.S dozens of anti-apartheid organizations and advocacy groups in Europe and elsewhere questioned U.S. policy towards South Africa as well as that of their governments.

By the middle of his second term, Reagan faced growing congressional and public criticism of the priorities he had set for engagement with South Africa. Criticism in the Congress was bipartisan, primarily due to a split in the Republican caucus between hardline conservatives and moderates in the Senate and a group of “Young Turks” in the House. (Finnegan, 1986) Members of Congress and other prominent figures as well as anti-apartheid activists questioned the President’s leadership and commitment to pressuring the South African government (SAG) to dismantle apartheid. Subsequently, members of the House and Senate introduced legislation that would impose economic sanctions on South Africa in 1985 and 1986. To forestall sanctions, the President negotiated with the Congress that he would issue an
executive order in 1985 imposing limited economic sanctions on South Africa in lieu of legislation. Along with the executive order, the President assured Congress that the SAG was committed to reform, and there would be tangible progress towards dismantling apartheid.

The President faced a similar scenario in 1986 but failed to persuade his party’s leadership to accept a second executive order as an alternative to legislation. Consequently, the Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA), which the President vetoed. To persuade the Congress to sustain his veto, the President proposed, among other things, the appointment of an African American ambassador to South Africa.

**Significance of the Research**

This study builds on three sets of complementary research traditions: foreign policy decision-making, the relationship between domestic and foreign influences on foreign policy and presidential appointments. The examination focuses on where these traditions intersect. This intersection includes gaps in the fields of routine foreign policy decision-making, the impact of high-level personnel selections on foreign relations between countries and presidential appointments of ambassadors.

For the most part, foreign policy case studies examine foreign policy decisions taken under crisis conditions. The goal of these studies is usually to determine the effect of such decisions on policy. Few studies examine cases of decision-making under routine non-crisis conditions and even less focus on personnel decisions. The research here will contribute to what we know about routine foreign policy decision-making as well as add to the small body of foreign policy decision-making case studies that focus on a single case under non-crisis conditions (Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010; Mintz, Geva, Redd, & Carnes, 1997). Examining this personnel decision in the context of routine rather than crisis foreign policy decision-making provides an opportunity to contribute to knowledge about the ways that high-level appointments are made and used as tools of policy implementation.

There are also gaps in the foreign policy decision-making literature on the impact of the selection of key personnel to carry out policies. The process of selecting such individuals also has been less explored. This study serves as well as a means to understand better how presidents use ambassadorial appointments as tools of foreign policy, for example, as signaling devices or symbolic gestures. It also gives insight into the process of selecting career officials as opposed to political appointees as ambassadors. Viewing Ambassador Perkins's appointment in this way
provides information on how personnel selections can contribute to policy implementation, signal subtle changes, disrupt opposition, or help achieve consensus.

Finally, this research seeks to contribute to the emerging literature about key public administrators, including ambassadors, as well as the role of African Americans in foreign policy. It also adds to what we know about this small subset of high-level presidential appointments as well as ambassadorial appointments drawn from the career Foreign Service.

**Organization of the Study**

This study is organized in five chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the body of scholarly literature that informs this study and introduces the conceptual framework. Chapter 2 presents the study’s hypotheses and describes the research design. Chapter 3 turns to an examination of the dynamic among events, processes, individual actions, and institutional structures that might have influenced the Perkins decision. It explores these factors at two levels of analysis; U.S. domestic and international politics and policies. Chapter 4 applies these ideas to the process of identifying and selecting Perkins. Chapter 5 compares the working hypotheses with rival explanations of the Perkins appointment that emerged during the study as well as those in the U.S. foreign policy and anti-apartheid literature. The chapter then discusses the implications of the study and possibilities for future research followed by the conclusion.
Chapter 1
Conceptual Framework and Existing Scholarship

Discussion begins by presenting the conceptual framework that guides the analysis of the Perkins decision. A synthesis of the scholarship that contributes to understanding how and why the decision came about follows.

Conceptual Framework

I argue that explanations for ambassadorial appointments can be found in the national and international policy-making environments. Further, the interactions between factors in these environments influence presidents’ choice of nominees for these positions. Relationships between these factors can be discovered through analysis of events and documentary evidence. Moreover, frameworks that structure the analysis of foreign and domestic policies and politics and how they may influence presidential decision-making can be applied to personnel selections. This study uses Robert Putnam’s classic metaphor of the “two-level” game to structure examination of factors in domestic and international policies and politics to discover if there are patterns that suggest explanations for the Perkins appointment.

Putnam’s framework has been applied to many case studies of crisis decision-making. Briefly stated, Putnam describes how national leaders contend simultaneously with the dynamics of politics at the domestic and international levels to negotiate international agreements. In Putnam’s “game” national leaders sit at the “table” opposite their counterparts and negotiate international agreements. Each leader’s advisors sit at the table; rows of domestic representatives of interest groups who seek to influence the outcome of the negotiation. The national leader must reconcile the views of numerous domestic constituencies that are seeking to influence him or her to adopt policies and make decisions consistent with their goals and beliefs. To resolve these competing demands national leaders build domestic coalitions that will empower them to negotiate effectively with international partners (Putnam, 1988). In essence Putnam posits that national leaders are obliged to “maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures” (Putnam, 1988, p. 434) so that they can avoid consequences at the domestic level that might jeopardize the leader’s goals and objectives at the international level.

Putnam also suggests that although there are situations when national or international factors most influence the actions of decision makers, in other instances the two overlap. He notes that it may be more productive to explore when and how each or both may apply in given
situations rather than try to “untangle” the relationship to identify which is determinative. To Putnam’s set of questions about “when” and “how” factors at the international and domestic levels may affect outcomes, I add “why” to frame possible explanations of the Perkins decision.

In addition, this study was influenced by subsequent research on whether the two-level concept could be applied to cases other than international negotiations, for example to seek explanations of foreign policies over time, such as U.S.-Cuba relations (LeoGrande, 1998; Werry, 2008). Other research investigates whether the leader can affect not only domestic constituencies, but also those of his or her counterparts as well as how much flexibility the leader has to pursue his or her preferences (P. B. Evans, Jacobson, & Putnam, 1993). Mo (1994) adds political power relationships to the two-level framework; even if the leader’s goals diverge from domestic constituencies, he or she may still achieve his or her objective depending on relative power. Stated differently, the leaders may have “veto” power over some constituencies, but it cannot be assumed that the leader’s power is preeminent. The two-level metaphor has been used as well to analyze the dynamics of transnational advocacy networks that can forge consensus and pursue agendas that are at odds with their governments (P. B. Evans et al., 1993; Morin, 2010).

Morin suggests placing greater emphasis on exploring the executive’s preferences rather than the “win sets” that will be acceptable to his or her constituents or international partners. The two-level concept also has been applied to gender-related job negotiations (Bowles & McGinn, 2008). Drawing on these lines of inquiry, this study uses Putnam’s construct of the two-level game to gain insights into Reagan’s South Africa policy; his ability to influence the Congress, the public and his foreign counterparts and how these factors may have affected the Perkins decision.

**Existing Scholarship**

Consistent with Putnam’s multidimensional framework for analysis of diplomacy and international bargaining, several bodies of literature inform this study, including those on foreign policy decision-making, presidential appointments, the influence of presidential advisors, the role of Congress in foreign policy, and the influence of the media, public opinion, and advocacy groups on foreign policy. This scholarship is significant in the analysis of the influences on presidential decision-making; however, a full discussion is beyond the scope of this study. With these literatures in mind, the study first draws upon a subset of the theories of foreign policy decision-making that focus on the actions that individuals or groups of individuals take on behalf
of the state as well as the many and varied influences on such actions. Second, it draws upon scholarship on presidential appointments as well as the small subset of this literature that relates to ambassadorial appointments.

**Foreign Policy Decision-Making**

The foundational research in foreign policy analysis shifted the focus from the nation-state level of analysis to a decision-making framework that stressed the people involved in the foreign policy process and their values, cognitive limits and organizational roles. Within this literature decision-making frameworks are based on the premise that foreign policy is best understood by studying the actions of leaders, groups, and coalitions (Dugis, 2007; Hagan, 2001; Hudson, 2005, 2007; Snyder et al., 2002). This research informs this study’s focus on the actions, policy preferences, and beliefs of President Reagan to analyze his selection of personnel.

This scholarship also suggests that each decision-maker responds to action-forcing events based on his or her idea of what is in the national interest. These ideas are not static and may or may not coincide with those of society as a whole. However, such notions likely derive from a shared set of beliefs about the nation’s role and responsibilities in the international system (Halperin & Clapp, 2006). In democracies like the United States these beliefs include a collective sense of identity, values and democratic norms of fairness and equality among peoples. Vanessa Beasley calls this the “shared beliefs” hypothesis. That is; the “people of the United States are uniquely united by certain constitutive ideals.” (V. Beasley, 2001, p. 49)

Among these are egalitarianism, equality under the law, popular sovereignty, individualism, and the value of hard work. Beasley proposes that presidents try to use rhetoric to shape beliefs and national identity. This narrative can also be thought of as “the set of priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world.” (Nye, 1999, p. 3) This literature suggests a way to discover and analyze policy preferences and belief systems that may reveal more about why Reagan chose Perkins.

This study also draws on work that emphasizes the process of decision-making rather than the outcomes of decisions (Hudson, 2007; Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010). It is informed as well by theories that go beyond the treatment of decisions as discrete occurrences. (Kuperman, 2006; Ozkececi-Taner, 2006). Such research proposes that foreign policy decisions are continually informed by evolving situations, new information, or changed circumstances. Consequently, this study examines how Reagan’s decision to appoint Perkins took shape within a
dynamic policy environment; it does not focus on what happened in U.S.-South Africa relations after the Perkins appointment.

Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (SBS) (1962, 2002) argued for analysis of decision-making that includes internal and external factors affecting those who act on behalf of the state. Subsequent scholarship in international relations and foreign policy analysis drew on SBS’s argument for the inclusion of internal and external factors to analyze foreign policy decisions. This research suggests that scholars readily agree that there is a relationship between domestic and foreign policy and politics, and they also agree that these factors affect decision makers. Moreover there appears to be consensus that research thus far does not definitively answer the question of how these factors interact and which of them is determinative of a particular decision or policy response (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012; Fearon, 1998; Hudson, 2007; Knecht & Weatherford, 2006; Milner, 1998; Putnam, 1988). Conceptually, this study draws upon this literature as well as ongoing research on and analysis of how context affects foreign policy decision makers to identify influences on President Reagan’s decision to appoint Perkins.

This literature also suggests that context matters when we attempt to explain how and why leaders decide on a course of action (R. K. Beasley, Kaarbo, & Lantis, 2012; Hudson, 2007; Rosati & Scott, 2011). It contends that explanations of the actions of decision makers or the result of decision-making should include variations in both the domestic and foreign policy environment. These variations are not mutually exclusive and often overlap; the boundaries between the foreign and domestic levels of analysis may be largely artificial (Starr, 2006). Moreover, (Hagan, 2001) suggests that identifying and interpreting possible influences on decision makers can contribute to developing explanations of how and why leaders respond to domestic and international dynamics. Variations in the policy making environment include crises that threaten the security of the homeland or the way of the life of the population and non-crisis environments when there is an established policy in place. Assuming that Reagan made the Perkins decision while implementing existing policy, the following section of the chapter explores the literature on presidential decision-making in a routine policy environment.

**Routine Policy Environment and Decision-Making**

In such an environment, action-forcing events or policy decision points are often the result of cumulative pressures or variations in an established bilateral relationship or international affairs over time. Such decision-making can be a deliberative process in which
precedent plays an important role and decisions are prospective and conditional in nature. The challenge is to reconcile the inability to predict the future with trying to channel events in one direction, or another. In a routine foreign policy environment, necessary decisions are continually informed by evolving situations, new information, or changed circumstances (Heikkila & Isett, 2004; Kuperman, 2006; Ozkececi-Taner, 2006). These variations in the decision-making environment may also elicit public interest in changing or influencing a given policy or decision (Knecht & Weatherford, 2006). However, there is no consensus in the field on what triggers public interest or on whether, when, why and how the public takes note of foreign policy issues. Further, there is no agreement on the degree to which public opinion influences foreign policy (Baum & Potter, 2008). Even so, ongoing research suggests associations between public interest in foreign policy issues and individual morality as well as standards for the treatment of others. Public interest in turn motivates congressional interest. For example, Hildebrandt (2013) found an association between domestic politics and humanitarian interventions. Similarly, Tomz & Weeks (2013) studied public opinion and the use of force against democratic versus autocratic regimes. They suggest that all things being equal, a sense of shared values mitigates against public support for the use of force against other democracies.

That said, under routine circumstances, presidents usually have greater latitude to infuse foreign policy with their own vision of the national interest without the constraint of enhanced public scrutiny; however, once public attention is drawn to an issue presidents have far less autonomy (Knecht & Weatherford, 2010). Public opinion, advocacy, and electoral imperatives can constrain the choices available when presidents make foreign policy decisions. Presidents “may be compelled to make ‘popular’ decisions to please an attentive public” (Knecht & Weatherford, 2006, p. 706). Recent research seeks to identify influences that may raise public awareness of foreign policy issues and those that may trigger public interest in foreign policy decisions (Furia, 2012). A growing body of scholarship examines possible influences that result in public interest and engagement in foreign policy issues, including the role of mass media. In addition, the literature includes investigation of the degree to which public opinion provokes presidential interest in and responsiveness to a particular issue and the public’s effect on presidential agenda-setting and decision-making (e.g., Baum & Potter, 2008; Burstein, 2003; Knecht & Weatherford, 2006; Sparrow, 2008). For example, Knecht (2010) suggests several
phases of presidential decision making: problem definition, options generation, policy decision, implementation, and policy review during crises and non-crisis situations. Using hours of television coverage as a proxy for issue salience, Knecht examined seventeen “non-crisis” cases (including apartheid) over their presumed duration. He found that the public paid more attention to non-crisis during the policy decision phase. This research suggests a way to assess the extent to which public interest may have affected the Perkins appointment. The following section builds on such work and uses some of these concepts to examine possible influences on ambassadorial appointments.

**Presidential Selection of Ambassadors**

Hollibaugh (2014; 2013) suggests that ambassadorial appointments are best understood through the lens of presidential appointments. That said, studies of ambassadorial appointments rarely appear in the vast literature on presidential appointments. This work is most likely to include research on the appointment of Supreme Court Justices and other federal judges, cabinet officers, and heads of agencies and members of commissions. Enumeration of these appointments is covered in the literature on presidents’ constitutional right to nominate candidates for particular positions and the Senate’s right to “advise and consent” as well as its responsibility to effect appointments through confirmation. Ambassadorial appointments are also rarely included in studies on the role of patronage in presidential appointments, although this aspect of ambassadorial appointments is vigorously debated in print and broadcast media. Fortuitously for this study, an emerging literature examines how patronage may influence ambassadorial appointments (Fedderke & Jett, 2012; Hollibaugh Jr., Horton, & Lewis, 2013; Gary E Hollibaugh Jr., 2013; Hollibaugh Jr., Horton, & Lewis, 2013; Torres-Spelliscy, 2012).

Although not singled out in work on the relationship between the president’s right to nominate and the Senate’s prerogative to assess the suitability of nominees, ambassadorial appointments are subject to close scrutiny for qualifications, professional background, ethics and impropriety. King and Riddlesperger (2013) suggest that these factors are more likely reasons why a nominee is or is not confirmed than ideological or policy differences between the president and the Senate. Initial research for this study suggested that the Perkins nomination was controversial because of a gap between the President’s views and those of the Senate. Observation of the dynamic between the presidency and the Congress provides some clarity about why Reagan decided to appoint Perkins.
Pre-selection of nominees and consultations between the White House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) can identify problem areas and differences of opinion that might jeopardize confirmation. Properly managed this process can save the president from a political defeat and the candidate from embarrassment. If the formal nomination process continues without resolution of disputes any single senator may place a “hold” on the nomination, the SFRC may also delay a nomination indefinitely, or the full Senate may reject the nomination. Considering these practices and formal procedures may provide insight into the politics of the Perkins appointment and its meaning and significance to the President.

Hollibaugh (2013) also suggests that ambassadorial appointments are distinct from other appointments based on the factors that influence them; these factors are embedded in the dynamics of domestic and international policies and politics. This way of looking at ambassadorial appointments is consistent with this study’s emphases; personnel decisions can be analyzed by examining elements of national and international policies and politics. Building on Hollibaugh, I argue that ambassadorial appointments may be better understood as a subset of foreign affairs appointments that require Senate confirmation. These appointments also include assistant secretaries and executives of foreign affairs departments and agencies. Little if any literature goes beyond referring to these positions in discussions of constitutional authorities over foreign policy. Consequently, reports on the SFRC’s oversight of foreign affairs appointments as well as transcripts of confirmation hearings may provide insight into the criteria for evaluating the suitability and qualifications of nominees as well as the views of the president and Congress on policy issues. Along with statutory and procedural criteria that the SFRC used to evaluate ambassadorial nominees during Reagan’s first term, the Committee considered a nominee’s “...(2) views on specific foreign policy issues; and (3) attitude and plans regarding cooperation with Congress reflected in the past” (Congressional Research Service, The Senate Role in Foreign Affairs Appointments, 1982, p. 30). This suggests another way to evaluate the Perkins appointment given the SFRC and the full Senate’s challenges to Reagan’s nomination of Earnest Lefever for Assistant Secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. The SFRC rejected the nomination because of ethical considerations as well as Lefever’s views on racial equality and human rights. In addition Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) was often at odds with the President over his foreign affairs appointments; Helms put a lengthy hold on the nomination of Chester Crocker as Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of...
African Affairs, and challenged a number of ambassadorial nominations on ideological grounds while supporting others, (e.g., the failed nomination of his protégé, James L. Malone, for Ambassador to Belize) for the same reason. (Gwertzman, 1986i; Omang, 1986b)

Apart from Senate and media reports, biographies, autobiographies (DeRoche, 2003; Gaddis, 2011; Stapleton & McCready, 2010) and some literature on the significance of diplomacy and the office of ambassador (Mak & Kennedy, 1992), there is scant scholarly mention of how the selection and appointment of ambassadors may be used in the conduct of foreign policy. Individual assessments of ambassadorial appointments and how they affect policy are also found in interviews with former or retired ambassadors (Mak & Kennedy, 1992). These accounts are subject to many interpretations of the degree to which ambassadors influence or are chosen to implement policies. However, those of individuals who were ambassadors and foreign affairs officials during the Reagan administration can provide insight when triangulated with interviews and other documentary evidence.

Lewis (2011, p. 56) also points out “appointments are an important political resource that presidents use in working with parties, interest groups and Congress.” Furthermore, (Wegner, 2002) suggests that interest groups influence the dialogue between the White House and the Congress on nominations; they communicate their preferences to Congress through consultations and testimony, in publications and through civic action. This aspect of nomination politics should help one to infer the degree to which domestic politics may have influenced Perkins’s nomination and appointment. Exploring this perspective on presidential personnel selections is one way to examine the hypothesis that Reagan used the Perkins appointment to counter advocacy groups’ criticism of his South Africa policy.

**Scholarship on Reagan South Africa Policy: Perkins Appointment**

The Perkins appointment neither appears often nor is examined in depth in the large body of literature on the Reagan administration's South Africa policy and apartheid. However, the scholarship does note the historical significance of sending an African American to be Ambassador to South Africa as well as what Perkins accomplished while he served in South Africa. A sample of this work suggests that the Perkins appointment coincided with the imperative to change the scope of Reagan's approach to South Africa and to enhance the credibility of his policies at home and abroad. Thomson (2008, p. 155) observes that the Perkins appointment added a “new dimension” to Reagan's policy. Lyman (2002, p. 42) suggests that
Perkins “did much to restore a sense of dignity and credibility to the U.S. position.” Moreover Chester Crocker (1992, p. 401) also praised Perkins for bringing “his ‘on the ground’ credibility to bear with other delegates [to sub-ministerial meetings].” George Shultz (1993, p. 1123) added that Perkins “went about the business of systematically opening doors to our message, pressing South Africans to listen to each other...” Thomson (2008) attributes substantive significance to Perkins’ appointment by pointing out Perkins’ role in the realization of the change in U.S. policy by expounding on his confrontations with the SAG suggesting that Perkins made the U.S. Embassy, an “agent for change.” Analysis grounded in the evolution of Reagan’s South Africa policy could provide information about how and why the President chose to appoint Perkins. In addition, the Perkins appointment occasionally appears in the research on exceptional public servants (Riccucci, 1995) and on the role of African Americans in foreign policy (Miller, 2000).

**Conclusion**

Existing scholarship anchors the study’s conceptual framework, which contends that explanations of the Perkins appointment can be found in the interplay between domestic and international politics. The scholarship is consistent with the many layers of complexity within each of these domains as well as the interplay between the two. The nature of these relationships suggested employing a multi-factor and multi-perspective analysis of the Perkins appointment. Consequently, I compiled and analyzed scholarship from several disciplines including international relations, foreign policy analysis, diplomatic theory and practice, as well as bureaucratic politics and historical institutionalism. Each provided different perspectives on how to interpret intentions, actions, and motivations of individuals and institutions that resulted in the appointment of Edward J. Perkins as the first African American ambassador to South Africa. The result was the discovery of linkages and synergies among disciplines, which enriched the analysis.
Chapter 2

Hypotheses and Research Design

This chapter introduces the hypotheses that were the starting point for the examination of the research questions. Discussion then moves to the research design for exploring those expectations.

Hypotheses

The study explored the hypotheses that the interaction between elements of domestic and international policies and politics influenced the Perkins appointment. Those factors include public dialogue about U.S.-South African relations as well as policy debates in the executive and legislative branches. It is also informed by the President’s vision of victory over communism and his interactions with his foreign counterparts.

My working hypotheses were that the Reagan administration’s overriding objective was to continue implementing constructive engagement with South Africa at a time when domestic political and policy concerns in the United States began to diverge from the President’s definition of the national interest. Rather than discard the policy, the Administration chose to adopt a series of incremental changes in the policy. The anticipated finding was that the Perkins appointment was among the more visible and striking measures the Administration adopted to accommodate the views of critics and to influence public opinion towards acceptance of the efficacy and advisability of continuing the broad outlines of constructive engagement with South Africa. I expected that the Perkins appointment was the “face of change” in a largely unchanged policy. The study also proposes that the President’s core values, his sensitivity to public opinion as well as the political imperatives of the Congress and his own party influenced his decision to appoint the first African American Ambassador to South Africa.

Research Design

To explore these expectations, the study relied on process tracing and within-case study. It examined the interplay among events, processes, individual actions, and institutional structures that may have influenced the Perkins decision. It also involved collecting and analyzing primary and secondary documentary evidence and conducting elite interviews. In addition, the research analyzed policy argumentation and public statements (Mitchell, 2005; Walcott & Hult, 2005).
Case Study

This study examines how and why Reagan chose to appoint the first African American Ambassador to South Africa, Edward J. Perkins in 1986. Using Stake’s (1995) terms, the case has features of both an “intrinsic” and an “instrumental” case study. This case is worth understanding in and of itself because it has distinctive qualities including symbolic and explicit commonalities and connections between the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and the civil rights movement in the United States. At the same time, the study has features of an instrumental case. It is an example of “routine” foreign policy decision-making. Such decisions are not driven by exigent imperatives for action or critical threats to core national values, goals, or objectives. Routine decisions are responses to factors internal or external to a nation-state that intervene in the implementation of existing policy. The study examines the Perkins appointment and the relationships among factors that may have contributed to that decision, aiming to develop an explanation or set of explanations about how and why the decision was made. These explanations may apply to similar decisions.

Period Examined

This study focuses on President Reagan’s second term, particularly the years 1984-1986, for several reasons. Pressure for the Administration to change its South Africa policy was most intense during this period because of the deteriorating situation in South Africa, growing international opprobrium, and increasing grassroots advocacy and protests in the U.S. It also was a time in which the SAG violently repressed opposition and made only cosmetic changes to the Apartheid system, leaving the President with few levers left to mitigate against calls for substantial change in South Africa policy.

Process Tracing

Process tracing is designed to provide insights into possible connections between details and sequences of events and to suggest possible answers to “how” questions. Analysis of the outcome—Perkins’s appointment—may also point to responses to the “why” questions.

Processing tracing (e.g., Collier, 2011; George & Bennett, 2005; Mintz & DeRouen Jr., 2010) involves reviewing historical accounts, examining primary and secondary written sources and analyzing interviews and other applicable data to discern the process that brought about a decision, the evident motivations of principal actors in the decision process, institutional factors that may have contributed to the decision, and any other factors that may be uncovered. The
questions are a starting point to uncover explanations of how and why the decision was made to appoint the first African American Ambassador to South Africa. Process tracing was used to link the data collected to hypotheses identified through preliminary research, and those that emerged as the research progressed. Through the process of examining sequences of information and events, evidence was found to support or disconfirm hypotheses about particular influences or patterns of influence.

**Data Sources and Collection**

1. **Documents**

   Research drew on primary documents from the “South Africa Making of U.S. Policy 1962-1989” collection of the Digital National Security Archive. This archive, available online and at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C., is a collection of declassified documents developed through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and made available to the public. This database includes in-depth information on conditions on the ground in South Africa that helped inform the context of this dissertation. I examined cables and reports sent to the Department of State and other agencies from U.S. missions in South Africa and elsewhere in the southern sub-region of Africa. I also investigated recently declassified documents that provided insight both into internal deliberations on U.S. Cold War policy and other external and internal influences that may have had an impact on Ambassador Perkins’s appointment and into exchanges between the two governments on *agrément* for the Perkins appointment. These included minutes of National Security Council meetings, briefing memoranda for the President, and materials from the White House national security staff, members of special working and planning groups, the International Policy Committee (IPC) and officials in the Department of State. Finally, I explored policy assessments prepared for the President, transcripts of speeches and congressional testimony and memoranda of telephone conversations and meetings.

   I examined as well the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, particularly the accounts of former Ambassadors to the Republic of South Africa, Assistant Secretaries of State for African Affairs during the period 1980-1986, the Secretary of State, members of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa policy, and officers assigned to U.S. missions in South Africa. These accounts reflected points of view on the extent to which race played a role in the Perkins appointment and linkages between that appointment and evolving policy towards South Africa. In addition, the accounts offered insight into institutional norms and practices that
may have influenced the selection and nomination of an African American Ambassador to South Africa.

The holdings of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library were key sources for the study. Research at the Library and on-line examined White House and National Security Council staff files along with Presidential speeches and public statements, entries from the President’s White House diary and such personnel records that have been declassified or made available for research. Illustrative records of interest included appointee files for Edward J. Perkins, the files of the Assistant to the President for National Security, the Chief of White House Personnel, and the records of J. Douglas Holladay, Personal Rank Ambassador who chaired the South African Working Group on Public Diplomacy, as well as the files of Patrick J. Buchanan, Assistant to the President for Communications. These records provided information on the policy environment, the personnel appointment process, and the linkages between domestic and foreign policy during President Reagan’s second term.

The Department of State’s Office of the Historian is responsible under law for the preparation and publication of the official documentary history of U.S. foreign policy in volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States. The series draws on a variety of declassified records from a number of agencies and tends to focus on policy formulation and the impact of its implementation. They provided another perspective on the relationship between Ambassador Perkins’s appointment and the evolution of U.S. policy towards South Africa.

I also examined memoirs such as those of Ambassador Perkins, early members of the Congressional Black Caucus and activists, other autobiographical information, and records of African American organizations, lobbyists and congressional testimony to probe their influence on the appointment process and policy implementation. To the extent available the archives of the NAACP, Trans-Africa, and the Urban League were mined since these organizations were instrumental in the Free South Africa Movement and advocates for diversity in U.S. government service. Similarly, the African Activist Archive online and the O’Malley Archive proved to be very rich sources of data on anti-apartheid advocacy.

2. Interviews

I conducted five personal interviews with past and present official of the executive branch of the U.S. federal government. These interviews provide a rich context for this study.
by incorporating the views and recollections of actual participants in and observers of events. Government officials' insights provided information about the decision process and factors considered in the appointment of Edward Perkins to be Ambassador to South Africa at the highest level of governments. The public statements of elites in think tanks, non-governmental organizations, public interest groups, and other stakeholders provided other perspectives that decision makers took into account.

These interviews are also a means to cross check, refute or support written accounts as well as establish an account of events from a perspective not found in other data (Tansey, 2007). Interviews provide other benefits such as eliciting details that may not be otherwise accessible through archival research. In addition, events can be reconstructed, and motivations of individual actors can be explored, and glimpses may be obtained of values, beliefs and other influences on the actors (Tansey, 2007). These interviews are also a means to triangulate the substance of written archival documents.

The subject pool consisted of government officials, leaders of nongovernmental and advocacy organizations, academics as well as other stakeholders familiar with U.S. foreign policy during the years of apartheid in South Africa particularly the period 1981-1986. The sample drawn from this group included those persons who were available to the researcher and who were willing to participate in discussions. Age, sex, and other demographic factors were not used to exclude a potential participant in this study. Selection criteria included the position an individual held or holds in an organization that was influential in the Perkins selection process, the extent to which an individual could have had an impact on that process, and peer assessment of individuals who had the most potential relevance to this study (Tansey, 2007). The initial list of interviewees was based on relevance to the study and prior knowledge. I expected that these participants would reference other actors who could be potential participants. Consequently, the sampling technique was a combination of both purposive and iterative techniques (Aberbach & Rockman, 2003; Goldstein, 2002; Tansey, 2007).

Prior knowledge and initial research helped to identify the individuals described above. Search engines, unclassified national security documents, records of congressional hearings and testimony, volumes of the Diplomatic History of the United States, presidential library collections, oral histories, and media reports provided a variety of means for identifying individuals likely to inform this study. My expectation was that initial contacts and initial
interviews would elicit suggestions of additional persons to be interviewed. In cases where this did not occur, interviewees were asked to suggest any other individuals who might participate or should be contacted. Each individual identified was contacted with a letter describing the research and requesting an interview. This first contact letter included the purpose of the research and the interview, and assured potential respondents confidentiality. I contacted nine potential interviewees. Five agreed to participate, three did not respond to the first contact letter, and one was deceased before the study was completed. The three who did not respond were officials of the legislative branch or the President’s White House staff.

I asked respondents about events and processes that are and were public policy processes, and they had the opportunity to speak frankly about these processes. I recorded the interviews electronically and by hand when necessary. No recording devices were used when interviewees were reluctant to speak candidly and without constraint if their views and opinions were recorded. Even though much time has passed since the events reviewed in this study, some individuals were concerned about even the slightest chance of attribution. Some interviewees participated in interviews on the condition that it would be best to discuss the subject of this research discretely off-site. Moreover, all interviewees expressed admiration for all that Ambassador Perkins had accomplished in South Africa. The dominate impression was that interviewees wanted to protect and preserve his legacy. I transcribed both the recorded and written notes and recorded the date and time of the interviews and the location of all interviews (including those conducted by telephone) on the written and electronic notes.6

The interview data were organized and analyzed using qualitative data analysis to code the data by key phrases, words, subjects, or themes and to determine the frequency of such data. Data mapping techniques were used to identify cross references and sequences. Interviewees’ names are not associated with the data in the written research products, and only I had access to the interview notes and contact information. References to respondents use a general title—such as “an official with a role in the appointment of Edward J. Perkins as Ambassador to South Africa” or “an official with knowledge of processes or events leading up to the appointment of Edward J. Perkins as Ambassador to South Africa.”

Data Analysis Techniques

To structure the analysis of the documents and interviews, I constructed timelines across policy levels with factors that may have influenced the decision to appoint Perkins. For
example, at the national level timelines included the President, NSC staff, other White House advisors for congressional relations and public liaison as well as descriptions of domestic policy and politics in the U.S. At the international level timelines tracked South African government policies and politics that affected the political and social environment in South Africa, South Africa’s standing in the international community, and global attitudes and reactions to conditions in South Africa. The timelines were analyzed separately and then compared to identify key events and how they might be related.

Several steps were used to analyze the timelines and other data. First, I reviewed the timelines to uncover patterns. Second, I searched for themes and patterns in the documents and interviews. The study’s working hypotheses informed the kinds of words, events, or other evidence used to search for themes and patterns. Further, common phrases and terms in the literature on apartheid, civil rights, civil society, ambassadorial appointments and Reagan-era foreign policy provided other keywords (e.g., social movements, human rights, appointments, ambassadors, inter-branch bargaining, and constructive engagement). The interviews and the documents also yielded more phrases that appeared in similar contexts. The keywords and phrases constituted a “code” that was used to move back and forth between the documents and interviews until there were no additional codes or patterns to discern. The objective of the cycles of coding was to reduce the data and compare the story lines that emerged from the analysis of the documents with those derived from the recollections of interviewees. Saldana (2009) suggests that doing so creates a “visual map” of the data. This technique was used to develop a narrative that ties together the findings from the analysis and triangulation of the interviews, documents, and timelines.

Validating or discounting inferences and rival explanations is complicated by the absence of explicit, systematic ways of testing them. Developing systematic ways to do so is a fairly new aspect of process tracing research that is still evolving (Bennett, 2010; Brady & Collier, 2010; Van Evera, 1997; Zaks, 2011). Nonetheless, there are heuristic tools that are useful starting points that can contribute to the development of logic to determine whether inferences support, weaken or eliminate a given hypotheses. The study uses a set of criteria identified during the data analysis to evaluate plausible explanations found in the working hypotheses for relevancy and consistency. For example, the criteria include events along the timeline of the Perkins appoint and how they may be related.
Limitations of the Study

In order to examine how and why an event happened, analysis depends heavily on detailing sequences of events that unfold over time and through many iterations. The focal event itself as well as every sequence of events from which it might have flowed must be described rigorously. This study may be limited by the extent to which it is possible to manage and manipulate a large amount of data, describe it adequately and determine when one has regressed enough from the event, in this case the Perkins appointment, to its presumed origins. There is no guarantee that the “right” set of sequences was identified or delved into sufficiently to make connections between any two or more of them. Therefore, the internal validity of this study may be constrained by how thick the analysis becomes and the strength of the techniques used to validate or discount inferences and evaluate rival explanations. The selection of hypotheses and judgments made on other explanations and how to categorize them can always be challenged.

This chapter set forth the expectations of the study, the scope of the research and the methods that were used to examine the data. It also noted the sources and significance of the data and pointed out the limitations of the study. The next chapter applies the techniques to probe the data for explanations of the Perkins appointment at the domestic and international levels of analysis.
Chapter 3
Levels of Analysis

This study explores the expectation that President Reagan’s decision to appoint the first African American ambassador to South Africa is embedded in a broader set of policy-making dynamics that include U.S.-South African relations, national and international policies and politics as well as ambassadorial appointments. Having suggested that this broader set of policy making dynamics form the context for the Perkins’s decision, I applied the logic of two-level games (P. B. Evans et al., 1993; Hudson, 2007; Putnam, 1988) to discern if there are patterns that may help clarify the relationship between international and domestic influences on Reagan’s decision to appoint an African American Ambassador to South Africa and his decision to nominate Perkins.

The chapter begins with an analysis of U.S.-South African relations from the Nixon through Reagan administrations up to the Perkins appointment in the fall of 1986. This analysis seeks to identify changes in policy and particular events in South Africa that may have influenced appointments of ambassadors and discern if there are patterns that have some bearing on the Perkins appointment. The chapter also discusses apartheid and internal politics in South Africa. These topics frame the context for the events in South Africa that affected the policy making environment in the United States and the Perkins appointment. However, a full discussion is outside the scope of this study.

Having hypothesized that Reagan’s beliefs and core values influenced the Perkins decision, the chapter discusses the beliefs, values, world view and moral commitments Reagan espoused and how he applied them to South Africa briefly. Next, the chapter will explore the relationship between Reagan’s beliefs and values and a collective set of beliefs about democratic freedoms, respect for human rights, freedom of association, and racial equality. That is to say that Americans share a core set of beliefs about their relationships with each other as well as a commitment that these beliefs and core values should be shared with the rest of the world. (V. Beasley, 2001; Ceaser, 2012; K. J. Holsti, 2011; O. R. Holsti, 1996; Kristol & Kagan, 1996; Lepgold & McKeown, 1995; Lockhart, 2012; Tomes, 2014; Walt, 2011) This part of the chapter frames the Administration’s dialogue with the American public on South Africa. Next the chapter explores the data on domestic politics and policies to discern factors that may have influenced the selection of ambassadorial nominees for Ambassador to South Africa. The
chapter also incorporates observations from international politics and policies that have affected governmental and public actions towards South Africa and on U.S.-South Africa relations.

**U.S.-South Africa Relations**

The broad themes of U.S.-South Africa relations were consistent from the Nixon\(^7\) to Reagan administrations with each administration adding emphasis or adjusting priorities (Fatton, 1984). These themes included economic, defense, scientific and strategic engagement with South Africa; wariness of becoming embroiled in racial politics in South Africa; and concern about the tendency of domestic and foreign entities to associate “racial problems” in the U.S. with those in regimes that discriminated against blacks.\(^8\) The Nixon administration refined and codified these themes and identified policy options for U.S.-South Africa relations in a comprehensive national security study of U.S. relations with Southern Africa. (Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa, December 9, 1969, Digital National Security Archive) (NSSM-39) The study took note of “growing congressional interest in Southern Africa,” particularly South Africa pointing out that while congressional interest in southern Africa was not pervasive it did produce resolutions and “insertions in the congressional record.”\(^9\) The study observes as well that these “resolutions...show a definite linkage with the civil rights problem in the U.S. Persons sensitive to the U.S. aspect are also likely to be concerned about southern Africa as part of the universal problem of human rights and dignity.” (NSSM-39 Study, Annex 6) Annex 6 also commented that “…an increasing number of members are concerned about our relations with the region. Of interested Senators and Members of Congress, the majority are critical of South Africa” (NSSM-39 Study, p. 57).\(^10\) The study reported that the activities of advocacy groups, such as the American Committee on Africa and the Episcopal Churchmen for Africa had the potential to generate even greater congressional interest through lobbying and protests. (NSSM-39 Study) These groups intensified their activities during the Reagan administration.

In addition, NSSM-39 captured Nixon’s and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s, concern that China and the USSR would exploit the race issue to the detriment of “Western nations” by providing material and rhetorical support to black liberation movements in southern Africa. Another of the underlying assumptions of the Nixon formula was that black liberation movements in southern Africa were incapable of achieving “victory” over white regimes like that of South Africa, and it was in the U.S. national interest to have a dialogue of “constructive
engagement” with those regimes (NSSM-39; Fatton, 1984). According to Harvey F. Nelson, Jr., Deputy Director of South African Affairs, during the first years of the Nixon administration:

We were pretty soft on South Africa. We viewed them as “God-fearing” folks. We were pretty easy on them. We did make it known that we opposed apartheid. We wanted that system terminated. But we didn’t for example vote for UN resolutions highly critical of South Africa. We didn’t support sanctions. It was a long time before we became very active on apartheid. The issue was not a very high priority for the Nixon Administration. There was no strategic interest that would have been served by our pressures...One of the advantages South Africa had was that it was staunchly anti-Communist. The government thought that most of the rabble rousing in the black population came from domestic communists. So the government was much on our side in the Cold War. (H. Nelson, Jr., personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

To carry out his policy in South Africa Nixon chose political appointee John G. Hurd (1970-1975) to replace career FSO William M. Rountree (1966-1970), a holdover from the Johnson administration. Hurd was a Texas oil man who had chaired Nixon’s 1968 election in Texas11 and had no diplomatic experience. While the Administration could say with a degree of certainty that the anti-apartheid movement had minimal influence on U.S. policy towards South Africa, the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) did mount a campaign against Hurd’s nomination. The Director of ACOA testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee alleging that Hurd was “pro-Afrikaner.” (“Mailing Support Rejection of Hurd Nomination American Committee on Africa,” 1970)

Before going to South Africa, Hurd met with Nixon and later with Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The President briefed Hurd on the elements of the policy review in NSSM-39 and cautioned him about the danger that “outbreaks of violence” in South Africa “could have severe domestic implications.” (Morgan, 2006, p. 477) At the President’s request, NSA Kissinger arranged for Hurd to meet with former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In setting up the meeting Kissinger made the following points, which suggest the President’s preference for political rather than career ambassadorial appointments:

We were talking this morning to our new ambassador to South Africa, his name is Hurd, and the President thought before he went off he should have the benefit of your thinking on South Africa...You can talk freely with Mr. Hurd; he is the President’s man. You can have full confidence in him. He is not a product of the Department. (Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Kissinger and Acheson, 1970)

Hurd’s tenure in South Africa was remarkable for his close association and social interaction with white South Africans as well as the assignment of the first African American
FSO. Hurd’s deputy chief of mission, Robert Smith, recalled that the Ambassador, while personable, came to South Africa:

...with a considerable bit of naiveté, both with respect to Africa and even, indeed, the civil rights movement here in the United States. But John Hurd was enormously popular with the [white] South Africans...I think he felt then, and perhaps he still feels now, that I pushed him awfully hard a lot of the time to do things that were “nasty” as far as the South African government was concerned. I had very strong views then and do now about this institutionalized racism that permeates the scene out there.

So those four years as DCM to John...was a real strain because I was always regarded by the South African government as the guy who the State Department sent out to keep John Hurd from being John Hurd and letting his normal instincts run; i.e., let the South Africans handle their own problem. ‘It's an internal problem and why should we be butting into their business. We wouldn't like it if they were butting into our business, et cetera, et cetera.’ And the whole human rights equation didn't loom that large in Ambassador Hurd's mind. (R. Smith, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader (n.p.)

As the discussion of U.S.-South Africa relations during the Reagan administration will reveal, the historical record suggests that domestic aspects of relations with South Africa that NSSM-39 described would become more significant in succeeding administrations as the social and political environment in South Africa evolved. It appears that each administration that followed Nixon’s faced greater pressure to become active on apartheid and communicate effectively with the public and members of Congress its policy toward South Africa. Moreover, each administration faced the challenge of maintaining domestic and foreign consensus on its relations with South Africa. The next part of the chapter compares U.S.-South Africa relations during the Carter and Reagan presidencies. The former’s policy towards South Africa differed from the latter’s in the scope of the dialogue and the degree of flexibility that each had to choose personnel (including ambassadors) to implement their foreign policies.

**Carter Administration**

The Carter administration continued Nixon’s engagement with South Africa on a variety of economic, military, and political matters. Unlike Nixon, however, Carter made South Africa one of his top five foreign policy priorities. His staff monitored major television network coverage of South Africa along with the percentage of public support for his priority to reshape foreign policy and human rights, and provided him periodic reports (Hamilton Jordan Confidential File, 1977). In another notable contrast to Nixon, Carter overtly applied to South

[He emphasized]...the strands that connect our actions overseas with our essential character as a nation. I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which we have, for humane purposes.

Unlike Nixon and later Reagan, Carter also placed, in NSC-30, less emphasis on Cold War politics and more on global movements for human rights and racial equality:

The world is still divided by ideological disputes, dominated by regional conflicts, and threatened by danger that we will not resolve the differences of race and wealth without violence or without drawing into combat the major military powers. We can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights.

Drawing upon these commitments, the Carter administration used strong language and public statements to condemn South Africa’s political and social segregation, economic disparity, and denial of individual rights, while maintaining economic and other ties with the ruling white regime. A former deputy chief of mission in Pretoria commented:

The policy of the Carter people...was public, adamant, clear opposition to apartheid. That did not mean backing that up with great resources to change things. It meant essentially a lot of rhetorical and other symbolic criticism. It meant a lot of proactive encouragement from Washington for the embassy to take proactive measures to demonstrate the American opposition to the policy of apartheid and to seek out and cultivate those who were opposed to it within South Africa. (H. Walker, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader, n.p.)

In keeping with this approach Carter appointed Andrew Young to be Ambassador to the United Nations. Young recounts (1996) that Carter asked him to be his Ambassador to the UN because of his close association with Martin Luther King, Jr., and the civil rights movement; Young would lend credibility to Carter’s human rights agenda as well as his outreach to African countries. (DeRoche, 2003; Young, 1996) Young became the first African American UN Ambassador and the principal spokesperson for the Administration’s criticism of South Africa.14 Along with criticism of apartheid Young expounded on the virtue of business activities in South Africa; both Carter and Young believed that business could aid in liberalizing economic, social, and political conditions for blacks in South Africa. The positive role of U.S. business in South
Africa became a pillar of Reagan’s policy toward South Africa. Ironically, it also became a rallying point for the student anti-apartheid movement.

Carter’s chose to criticize South Africa, a departure from the Nixon administration's approach and one that the Reagan administration would reverse publicly. Another hallmark of the Carter administration’s South Africa policy was its ongoing dialogue with black organizations in South Africa, another shift that Reagan would halt. To carry out his policy in South Africa Carter chose two career FSOs as ambassadors, first William Bowdler (1975-1978) and then William Edmonson (1978-1981). When he decided to apply pressure to South Africa, he would sometimes use diplomatic tools to send a message. For example, when South Africa attempted to thwart a U.S. cultural exchange program targeting diverse black and white groups, Carter signaled his displeasure by temporarily recalling Bowdler to Washington as Reagan would later do with Nickel when South Africa suspended civil liberties in 1985. Carter also sent a high-level delegation including his Ambassador to the funeral of Steve Biko, a South African anti-apartheid activist, who died while in the custody of South African security forces.

Despite public condemnation of apartheid and dialogue with black South Africans (Forsythe, 1990; Kouki, 2011; Lulat, 2008), the Carter policy towards South Africa was rhetorically different from previous administrations but substantively the same. Although he supported the concept of “one man [person], one vote,” which would have enfranchised 26 million blacks in South Africa, Carter opposed economic sanctions and disinvestment. Even so Thomson (2008) submits that the rhetoric and symbolic acts15 of the Carter administration achieved some credibility with anti-apartheid groups and “a wide belief that the executive was sincerely engaged in trying to bring about change: a recognition that had ...eluded previous administrations” (Thomson, 2008, p. 98). Kouki (2011) also contends that the Carter administration’s rhetoric created the “perception” of more distance between South Africa and the U.S. on a variety of issues, including race relations. This suggests that rhetoric, symbolism, credibility, and perception will be important factors in examining how Reagan’s approach to U.S.-South Africa relations evolved during the first six years of his presidency as well as the impact of these factors on the Perkins decision.

**Reagan Administration - First Term**

**1981-1983**
Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter (2006) suggest that when Reagan took office the shared images of the American public and its leaders were that the spread of Communism was the greatest threat to peace, stability, and prosperity. Fully embracing this paradigm and the idea of an East-West struggle for global influence and power, the top priority of the new Reagan administration was to prevent further expansion of Soviet influence and reverse it when possible. To prevent this expansion the Administration adopted a national security policy that included in part economic isolation of the Soviet Union, maintaining a strong military, encouraging the spread of democracy and capitalism as well as building alliances to fight Communism (NSDD 75, 1983). In some cases these alliances entailed engaging in dialogue and cooperation with authoritarian regimes in Europe, the southern hemisphere and Africa. (Fatton, 1984) Instructive in this respect is the President’s response to a student who asked why the U.S. government would support and ally itself with “dictatorships” like Argentina and South Africa. Consistent with his focus on the Cold War, Reagan responded that the U.S. should not abandon countries at risk of Soviet inspired totalitarianism, suggesting that it would be better to use quiet diplomacy to persuade and influence these countries behind the scenes; public confrontation risks polarization. (Reagan Remarks Providence-St. Mel High School, 1982)

Although there are many more aspects and nuances of the Cold War paradigm, as well as a vast literature on the Reagan Doctrine, I draw upon three aspects of the Doctrine to frame the discussion of U.S.-South Africa relations during the Reagan administration. First, the developing world is an important “battleground” in the struggle against Soviet domination as well as a source of resources critical to the world economy. As such South Africa was an important ally with the capability to counter communist insurgencies in the southern Africa region and a reliable source of “critical minerals.” South Africa’s then-Prime Minister, P. W. Botha, shared similar views alleging that the Soviets were seeking to control the trade in “critical minerals” (Giliomee, 2008). The Reagan administration often invoked this part of the strategic importance of South Africa in public statements on U.S.-South Africa relations. Botha and President Reagan also shared the view that the Soviet Union was the principal instigator of conflict in Southern Africa commensurate with its rivalry with the United States (Giliomee, 2008). The Administration believed that the Afrikaners were committed to reform the apartheid system gradually and establish a more representative government. (Sampson, 1981) and that the Afrikaners understood that they must move “towards an accommodation” (Botha-Nickel
Meeting, April 22, 1982) These shared themes about Communism, terrorism and evolutionary change away from apartheid recurred in Reagan’s speeches and public statements throughout his first term as well as during the first half of the second term. Although relatively harmless in the first term, this convergence of views became a liability in the second.

Second, Soviet influence impedes economic development, creates instability, and is the source of civil unrest (Halperin & Clapp, 2006; Kouki, 2011). For the Reagan administration, South Africa was the engine of economic progress in Southern Africa that would ultimately raise the standards of living of its black population as well as those of other states in the region. Unrest in South Africa and other countries in the region were due to Communist-inspired insurgencies or Soviet-inspired governments. Like Reagan Botha also believed that Communist agitation contributed to instability in South Africa (Giliomee, 2008).

Third, the Soviet system is repressive and at odds with democratic values such as “...individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy...” (NSDD 75, 1983, p.3). Despite the apparent similarities between the USSR and South Africa related to repression and democratic values, the Administration reserved judgment on South Africa pending settlement of the regional conflicts in Southern Africa. It theorized that once South Africa allayed its strategic concerns it would align itself with the pro-democracy ideology of the Administration and the shared beliefs of the American polity.16

To facilitate and implement Reagan’s vision of the world as it applied to South Africa, he and his national security team reoriented policy towards South Africa away from that of the Carter administration. The SAG welcomed this change, having been offended by Carter “pressurizing” South Africa. Although little suggests that the Reagan administration had a lesser commitment to respecting human rights than the Carter administration, it appears that it did not emphasize human rights at the expense of broader Cold War strategic interests with South Africa or any other country.17 Secretary of State George Shultz describes this as part of Reagan’s commitment to democracy; he was willing to “give the benefit of the doubt to anti-Communists” (Shultz, 1993, p.1115 ) Applying this view to South Africa, the Reagan administration set out not only to soften the anti-apartheid rhetoric of its predecessor and adopt a more conciliatory approach by minimizing contact with Black activists in South Africa,18 but also to provide positive incentives to influence South Africa’s behavior towards its black population as well as its neighbors.19 To that end it sought to prevent further isolation of the regime. Moreover, in
May 1981 the Administration announced a new policy of “quiet diplomacy,” otherwise known as “constructive engagement.” (Schwartz, 1986) Charles Daris, a former State Department labor attaché, in Pretoria commented:

The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Chet Crocker, was the architect of that and in the context of the world view of the Reagan administration, constructive engagement was as clever a way as we could have contrived to soothe a difficult relationship with a government we were trying to change. (C. Daris, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

The Administration first sought to ensure the stability of South Africa and its cooperation in the settlement of regional conflicts and to mitigate the influence of the Soviet Union in Southern Africa. As a former State official recalled:

...[in] the first Reagan term the issue on the agenda internationally, in the UN, with our allies and with the frontline states was Namibia. The key to Namibia was obviously South Africa so the number one issue on the U.S.-South Africa bilateral agenda as we defined it was achieving Namibian independence which was, by the way, the number one for the previous administration. (Interview C, personal communication)

In the process of implementing a new policy, Reagan officials relaxed diplomatic, and other restrictions imposed by previous administrations as well as the UN arms embargo that the U.S. had supported since the Kennedy administration. These steps gave rise to criticism from congressional Democrats in the House [e.g., Representatives Howard Wolpe (D-MI), William Gray (D-PA) and George Crockett, Jr., (D-MI)]. In the Senate, Republicans Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN) and Larry Pressler (R-SD) joined Democrats Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Paul Tsongas (D-MA) in sponsoring a resolution to deny licenses to export arms to South Africa. (Neigus, Root, & Sindab, 1982b) In addition, the President signaled that his administration would diverge from a broad consensus on South Africa by opposing or vetoing resolutions in the Security Council and abstaining or not voting with the majority in the UNGA. Reagan also supported International Monetary Fund lending to South Africa. At the same time, the Administration decided that it must continue its predecessors’ moral commitment to encourage the South African minority white government to dismantle apartheid. However, it would not publicly push the South African government towards internal reforms at the expense of a broader set of geostrategic goals.

Consistent with the policy of the Nixon and Carter administrations, the Reagan administration did not support adopting “punitive” sanctions as a tool to pressure the South
African government to reform. It cast them as counterproductive actions that would only serve to provoke the South African government to adopt even harsher measures to repress the Black population and damage its economy at the expense of Black workers. Sanctions would also compromise the Administration’s ability to influence the SAG.

Throughout Reagan’s first term, he and other Administration officials consistently framed U.S.-South Africa relations in the context of the East-West struggle. For example, in several interviews and press conferences President Reagan and his foreign policy advisors defended the Administration’s close relationship with South Africa by invoking the struggle against Communism. For example, in a 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite President Reagan responded to a question about the U.S.-South Africa relationship:

Mr. Cronkite. He [Lefever] says also that we should not be concerned with South Africa’s racial policies, but should make the country a full-fledged partner of the United States in the struggle against Communist expansion. Should we drop all of our concerns about human rights in South Africa?

The President. No, no, and I think, though, that there's been a failure, maybe for political reasons in this country, to recognize how many people, black and white, in South Africa are trying to remove apartheid and the steps that they’ve taken and the gains that they’ve made. As long as there's a sincere and honest effort being made, based on our own experience in our own land, it would seem to me that we should be trying to be helpful. And can we, again, take that other course? Can we abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war we've ever fought, a country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals we all must have and so forth? (R. Reagan, 1981)

To carry out his vision of U.S.-South Africa relations Reagan nominated Herman J. Nickel to be Ambassador to South Africa.23 His predecessor was career FSO William Edmonson, a Carter appointee, whose relationship with the SAG was problematic from the Reagan administration’s point of view:

The [relations between Edmonson and the SAG] were a bit strained, as almost any ambassador under the Carter administration would be. I think Bill was not always that warmly received by the South African government....They knew where he stood. He had to take some messages, as any ambassador would, of strong criticism in to the South African government as instructed by Washington and that did not set well with them. (H, Walker, personal communication, South Africa Reader)

Walker also provides some insight into how the Reagan administration managed ambassadorial appointments as he describes the departure of the “sitting ambassador,” William Edmonson.
[Edmonson]...left very quickly and under embarrassing—indeed I would even say rude—circumstances on the part of the Reagan administration. He had, as all ambassadors do with a change of administration, submitted his letter of resignation. It takes time for these things to be processed and even more time for a new ambassador to be identified, vetted, nominated, and go through all of the procedures and get out to the field. During that period, we had a very high level visit led by Judge Clark, who at that time was head of the NSC, I believe, and some other people on his team. They came out and had absolutely nothing to do with the American ambassador.

...in the meetings that we arranged at Judge Clark’s request…with the state president, P. W. Botha, Judge Clark did not take the American ambassador to that meeting. That was a very clear signal—and I’m sure quite an intentional signal—that the new administration intended a dramatic change in direction because Bill Edmondson was not only a loyal implementer of the Carter administration’s policy, he personally believed in it...But he was also a very professional Foreign Service officer and would have loyally carried out the instructions of his government while trying to influence them [the South African Government]. (H. Walker, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

After a nine-month vacancy resulting from Edmondson’s abrupt departure, the Administration nominated Nickel to replace Edmondson. Nickel was a journalist who wrote articles for Fortune magazine that were consistent with Administration policy, but objectionable to some advocacy groups, 23 many of whom doubted his commitment to work towards eliminating apartheid.

Nickel recalled:

The articles which I wrote in Fortune appeared in 1978 came to the attention of a number of people...[in] the incoming Reagan administration, notably Chet Crocker who would serve as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs throughout the Reagan years...we found that our policy approaches toward the South African issue were remarkably compatible...in mid-1981 he amazed me by asking me if he could put forward my name as his candidate for the ambassadorship. (H. Nickel, personal communication 2005, South Africa Country Reader)24

Nickel’s recollection of his relationship with Crocker and the path that ultimately led to his nomination provides insight into the rationale for choosing a specific nominee that appears to support Howard Walker’s view that the Administration used the appointment of a new ambassador to signal a new approach to U.S.-South Africa relations.

The White House had decided that they were going to have a political appointee to signal a different policy approach...[several prospective nominees were unacceptable for a variety of reasons] Bill Clark, who was the First Deputy Secretary of State in the Reagan administration and a long-time confidant of the President...called me in and finally said, “Well, this might be just the solution to pick someone who actually has South African experience and has written about it. And the fact that they expelled you 20 years ago
might actually help you on the Hill”…early in November 1981 the phone rang in my Washington home, and there was the President of the United States asking me if I were prepared to represent him as American ambassador in South Africa. (H. Nickel, personal communication, 2005)

President Reagan nominated Nickel on February 24, 1982. While preparing for his confirmation hearing, Nickel agreed to an interview with Reuters during which he acknowledged that the system of apartheid had to change; however, he proposed that there were limits to what the U.S. should or could do to influence the SAG. “The necessity for change is widely acknowledged. All we can do is to lend encouragement to moderate forces across the spectrum, black and white, to help this process along...I don't think we can do this by public lecturing or hectoring.” Many anti-apartheid activists objected to these comments. (Reuters, 1982)

Notwithstanding the controversy over these remarks as well as his writings, Nickel was voted out of Committee and confirmed unanimously on March 29 with little or no opposition (“The Senate Confirms Nickel As U.S. Envoy to South Africa,” 1982). According to Schraeder (1991) the Senate had rarely challenged the executive on Africa appointments, but later events suggest a change in this pattern as the Reagan administration’s South Africa policy evolved under greater scrutiny in his second term.

In the year following Nickel’s appointment, the SAG declared martial law, detained hundreds of people, banned others or placed then under house arrest, and prohibited others from traveling outside the country. Despite these actions and the criticism that followed, the Administration was able to continue its version of engagement with South Africa virtually unchallenged. It fended off criticism from activist groups, minimized the impact of hearings by the House Subcommittee on Africa on the results of an independent study of South Africa policy, and thwarted legislative efforts to obtain information on the efficacy of the Administration policy towards South Africa (Thomson, 2008).

Similar to the Nixon administration, the Reagan administration faced only modest congressional interest and activity on South Africa in his first term. Consequently, during his first term the President rarely mentioned South Africa or apartheid in public statements or press opportunities. However, as 1983 ended the Administration did include South Africa in Proclamation 5135, Bill of Rights Day and Human Rights Day and Week in the context of race: “in South Africa the apartheid system institutionalizes racial injustice.” Summing up the first
term, an Administration appointee said, “In the early years there was not a lot of domestic politics on South Africa.” A former State official opined:

...for the first term of the Reagan administration—essentially that [constructive engagement] meant having engagement [with South Africa] but with purpose and that those who were disadvantaged by apartheid policy would eventually benefit from a change in South Africa and the government—social change, economic change and political change. The policy was essentially don’t rock the boat, but work with the current government to bring about change and for the first four years the President got away with this. (Interview B, personal communication)

Similarly, Administration officials believed that after four years they had achieved a measure of success by establishing a dialogue with the SAG, making progress toward settling regional disputes, engaging with the SAG on “reform away from apartheid,” and taking measured steps to blunt human rights abuses inside South Africa. (Wettering, 1984) With little opposition from the Congress or advocacy groups, it appeared that the President if reelected would have relatively little or no opposition to his policy towards South Africa.

The Second Term

1984—Turning Point

Apartheid and human rights became a part of national electoral politics. Democrats discussed these topics during the Democratic primaries and caucuses, debates between the candidates and at the party convention. Candidate Jesse Jackson challenged his competitors to discuss apartheid as a moral and political issue; he accused his opponents, including the eventual Democratic nominee, Walter Mondale, of “evading” the issue (Inman, 2010). A stand against apartheid eventually became part of the Democratic Party platform. South Africa and human rights also made a brief appearance in electoral politics during the presidential debates in October. Mondale raised the issue of the Administration’s position on South Africa and human rights. He quoted Bishop Desmond Tutu’s condemnation of the Administration’s policy towards South Africa in the context of the Administration’s association with “dictatorial” regimes. Reagan defended his record on human rights, insisting that it could not be “assailed” and that his administration had promoted human rights “throughout the world.” (Debate between the President and Former Vice President Mondale, October, 21 1984) That said, Reagan did take the Soviet Union to task on human rights in campaign speeches. While the Republican party
platform denounced apartheid, there is little to suggest that Reagan’s record on human rights or South Africa were contentious during the campaign.

In the months leading up to and after Reagan’s landslide victory, parts of the Administration’s policy towards South Africa appeared to unravel as the SAG continued its pattern of escalating suppression of dissent while adopting minimal “reforms.” For example, shortly after Reagan was reelected the Botha government instituted a new constitution that permitted “colored” participation in Parliament, but excluded blacks, one of several reforms that Reagan would later point to as an evolution away from apartheid. Ambassador Nickel reported that Botha thought empowering coloreds and Asians should be the first step in a “new political dispensation” because they were “western” and including them in the political system would give whites more confidence “in dealing with the problems of the blacks” which were tribal. (Message from Herman Nickel to the Secretary of State DOS Cable, Cape Town to Washington 2273, p.4) This action along with rising SAG violence in response to the increased tempo of protests, labor strikes, and demonstrations seemed to increase congressional and public scrutiny of the Administration’s policy of “constructive engagement.” As a former official described it:

The trigger for the protests and the debates in Congress was the unrest in South Africa’s urban areas that got into high gear in ’84, ’85, ’86 so you had all the horrific scenes of urban township violence of necklacing and of security forces beating up on people and people getting shot and killed, you know. And for quite a while the South Africans encouraged the press to come in and photograph this stuff, which I think in hindsight they might have thought was not really a good idea.27 But they did it, which created fuel for the debates here (Interview C, personal communication).

It also appeared that the Administration would have difficulty continuing to focus on the same set of priorities—regional and geostrategic strategy—and convincingly argue for a sequential approach to apartheid. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker explained the weakening Administration policy:

It was a combination of the left going after Ronald Reagan after his great victory in the fall of 1984, going after him on South Africa and mobilizing a nationwide campaign to stop constructive engagement and impose sanctions on South Africa on the one hand and the retaliation, if you like, from the right, saying, “Well, that diplomacy is putting much too much pressure on our friends in South Africa…”

We faced very major attacks on our policy of regional negotiations, both because of the upheaval in South Africa and the American reaction to it and American reaction, as I’ve said, to Reagan’s victory and to the increasingly negative imagery coming out of the
township violence in South Africa. (C. Crocker, personal communication, South Africa Reader)

Nonetheless, early in the year the Administration continued to emphasize that creating a sequence of events that would resolve regional conflicts and territorial claims by South Africa would spur measures that would over time eliminate apartheid. Later in 1984 Bishop Desmond Tutu, a sharp critic of the Administration’s South Africa policy, received the Nobel Peace Prize. The President sent a letter congratulating Tutu in which he acknowledged the legitimate aspirations of blacks but made no commitment that his Administration would apply greater pressure on South Africa to change how it treated the majority of its citizens:

…the U.S. government had heard the appeal for justice from South Africans who suffer under Apartheid; and the U.S. continues to urge the SAG to engage in meaningful dialogue with all citizens aimed at peaceful transition away from apartheid. (Ronald Reagan Letter to Desmond Tutu, October 19, 1984)

Tutu came to the U.S. in December and testified before the House Sub-Committee on Africa on December 6 and called for a “face-to-face” meeting with Reagan. A reluctant Reagan met with him on December 7. (S. Evans, 1984) During their meeting, the President emphasized that:

1) The U.S. “abhors” apartheid but, has limited influence on the South African government's policies and the challenge is how and when to use it;
2) Confrontation wastes our influence; and
3) Genuine changes are occurring in South Africa, but is a long-term process and
4) the Black South Africans themselves are the primary force for change
(Memorandum from Robert C. McFarlane to the President December 6, 1984: Prepared for Meeting with Bishop on Tutu December 7, 1984)

Reflecting his confidence in the way he had chosen to interact with the SAG, his opposition to sanctions as well as his understanding of apartheid, Reagan described his meeting with Tutu:

Bishop Tutu of S. Africa came in. I’m sure he is sincere in his belief that we should turn our back on S.A. & take actions such as sanctions to bring about a change in race relations. He is naı́ve. We’ve made considerable progress with quiet diplomacy. There are S. Africans who want an end to Apartheid & I think they understand what we are doing. American owned firms in S.A. treat their employees as they would in Am. This has meant a tremendous improvement for thousands & thousands of SA Blacks. There have been other improvements but there is still a long way to go. The Bishop seems unaware, even though he himself is Black, that part of the problem is tribal not racial. If apartheid ended now there still would be civil strife between the Black tribes. (R. Reagan, White House Diary, December 7, 1984)
Although the President was not pleased with his meeting with Tutu, members of Congress and anti-apartheid activists considered Tutu’s visit a welcome impetus “that drew more and more Americans into the debate and conversation about South Africa.” (Howard Wolpe in Field, 2007)

For his part, the President would repeat his idea of a tribal rather than racial problem in South Africa even as his break with the Congress on South Africa policy intensified over the next two years. This was apparently a longstanding interpretation of the problem that South Africa represented. Ambassador Nickel noted that “when he [Reagan] was a radio commentator Reagan had also said—wrongly—that the South African problem was more inter-tribal than it was interracial.” (H. Nickel, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader, 2005) Another Reagan appointee attributed the President’s views to a lack of knowledge: “You know he—the President was not focused too much on the internal structure of South Africa. He was thinking of the South Africans he had met who tended to be white guys.” (Interview A, personal communication)

At a press conference following his meeting with Bishop Tutu, the President made several points that appeared to become his core message on South Africa.30 He said often that the Administration’s policy was working; the situation in South Africa was improving and significant progress had been made in persuading the SAG to make changes; he acknowledged violence in South Africa but attributed it to “both sides.” Further, he would add that divestment hurts the people we want to help; American companies were a source of employment, did not discriminate, and had spent more than $100 million dollars on education and training black workers; most black “tribal leaders” approved of their presence. To these points Reagan added that pressuring South Africa is counterproductive; “it would be counterproductive for one country to splash itself all over the headlines,” demanding that another country do something.” (Reagan Remarks Question-and-Answer Session, December 7, 1984)

On the same day, South Africa released eleven black political prisoners. Reagan and his deputy press secretary praised the release as evidence that the SAG was prepared to respond constructively to those within and outside the country who supported “meaningful dialogue” between the SAG and representatives of other racial groups. (Statement by Deputy Press Secretary, December 7, 1984). The President attributed the release of these prisoners to hard work on “quiet diplomacy” rather than the impact of demonstrations in the U.S., which he
asserted had no affect that outcome. (Reagan Exchange with Reporters, December 7, 1984). The next day the SAG rearrested six of the former prisoners on charges of treason, weakening Reagan’s argument that the SAG and his policy were making progress.

Just days after his exchange with reporters on the rearrests of prisoners, the President signed the International Human Rights Day Proclamation on December 10, 1984. The proclamation appeared to take South Africa to task for its treatment of its black population and white anti-apartheid activists. In the Proclamation Reagan conceded that there were times when diplomacy does not work and called upon the SAG to reach out to the Black majority; end forced removals from communities, detention without trial, and lengthy imprisonment of leaders; and make constructive changes to move toward a more just society. At the same time, he reiterated his commitment to “quiet diplomacy” and satisfaction with the progress the policy had yielded in Latin America and South Africa. On the other hand, he invoked a moral obligation to speak out about racism and violations of human rights in South Africa and called for dialogue towards more peaceful and just change.

A review of policy documents in 1984 implies that the President’s human rights statement was driven as much by public engagement on South Africa’s racial policy as the violations committed by the SAG. For instance, the State Department had sent a memo to National Security Assistant McFarlane, for inclusion in a briefing for the President; the memo acknowledged growing public engagement on South Africa “…the ongoing disturbances in South Africa (which have led to the sit-ins at the South African Embassy by members of Congress and other civil rights activists) have brought the region and South Africa, especially, to the center of public attention.” (Memorandum, Charles M. Hill to Robert C. “Bud” MacFarlane, November 29, 1984) In addition, a former official who served at State and on the NSC staff commented that:

Randall Robinson was chaining himself to the South African Embassy and if you were part of that crowd that was, have you been arrested yet—so it was a big thing…so a light bulb went into Reagan’s head—something must be happening here. (Interview C, personal communication)

Similarly, former Ambassador Nickel acknowledged the significance of the public’s attention to South Africa and the sanctions movement. “The sanctions campaign really picked up after the outbreak of the unrest in [South Africa] the second half of 1984 and the repression which followed in its wake. This built and built.” (H. Nickel, personal communication, 1994)
De St. Jorre (1986) notes, too, that “By late 1984, only a few months after the wave of black protest began in South Africa, anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States began to grow dramatically and crossed previously impenetrable political lines.” (p. 556). This increased public awareness of South Africa set the stage for the most intense clashes between the Administration and its detractors over relations with South Africa in 1985.

**1985—Policy and Perception**

For most of 1985 the Administration engaged in an apparent defensive battle with the Congress, interest groups, and activists over sanctions as the situation in South Africa worsened. Two former officials described the tension between the public perception of “constructive engagement” and the need to distinguish between that policy and the continuation of apartheid.

Accordingly, the President was being made more and more aware of this unrest and he was caught between two elements—one element wanted him to be very active in pushing for change. The other side and many of the kitchen cabinet probably in this category they wanted to hold the line, hold fast I think I could say (Interview B, personal communication).

...Ok Pat [Buchanan], it’s a bulwark against communism but you know we can’t be behind the U.S. population. So what do we do? So Reagan...wanted to demonstrate that he was anti-apartheid even though he was not about to do nasty things to the South African government...[Pat] said to Reagan look these guys are entrenched and you’re never going to get them out...the ANC and SWAPO with all their guerrilla tactics...are not going to get these guys out and these Afrikaners are not going to move. So it’s like kicking a dead horse if you want to end Apartheid. (Interview A, personal communication)

Although the Administration’s policy statements continued to focus on regional security and Soviet influence in Southern Africa, they gradually began to include what appeared to be a new approach to human rights. The President and his team attempted to narrow the gap between strategic goals and values in the U.S. and South Africa. The President praised every action that demonstrated, in the Administration’s view that the SAG was eschewing violent suppression of dissent and changing aspects of the apartheid regime to accommodate greater political participation by the Black majority. Reagan’s public statements seemed to draw a brighter line between the SAG and the U.S government on apartheid while apparently trying to create in the public mind a connection between the strategic goals and ending apartheid.

In South Africa, Ambassador Nickel spoke out against apartheid using print and broadcast media as well as speeches. He also emphasized that the motivation of U.S. policy
toward South Africa was not only one of strategic national interest, “but also deeply felt national values of our multicultural society.” (DOS cable Cape Town 01098, Section 5). Along with appealing to his audiences in South Africa, Nickel sent texts and transcripts to Washington to use to counter congressional critics. For example, U.S. diplomats (DOS Cable 01098) suggested that the material in the cable might be “useful in refuting Senator Kassebaum’s claim in a May Washington Post story that we have not been [speaking out forcefully] in South Africa.” (Cape Town 01098, Section 2)

On the other hand, Secretary Shultz took a slightly different approach to educating the public on the Administration’s South Africa policy. He acknowledged the lack of “an American consensus on southern Africa,” in a speech at the National Press Club on April 16 (Current Policy No. 685, p. 311) and made a case for how best to balance morality, values and strategic interests. He appealed for “public discourse” based on facts rather than emotion.

While the Administration tried to narrow the gap between its rhetoric and public discourse, South Africa continued its pattern of aggression towards neighboring countries; it suspended civil liberties and imposed martial law mainly in urban centers. In response, the Administration recalled Ambassador Nickel in May. Along with the Nickel recall, the Administration supported a UN Security Council resolution condemning the violence in South Africa, and in a break with precedent abstained on a UNSC resolution to impose sanctions. During his recall Nickel and Assistant Secretary Crocker met with National Security Assistant Robert McFarlane (Ringdahl memorandum to McFarlane, July 3, 1985). In recognition of the link between consensus at the national and international level the discussion was twofold: regional policies and “domestic political fallout to South Africa’s actions, and the appropriate U.S. visibility” (Ringdahl to MacFarlane, p. 2).

In mid-July, the New York Times reported that the Administration was not inclined to send Nickel back but would send a charge d’affaires to replace him (Clarity & Warren Weaver, 1985). Nickel, however, ultimately returned to South Africa. Before he left, the National Security Council met to discuss South Africa; Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead reported:

We had recalled our ambassador, a significant diplomatic rebuke. Despite these steps [recalling the ambassador and “severe” criticism of the SAG], we were being wrongly perceived by the public as being soft on apartheid, and cooperating with the SAG; calls were being made for a policy review. (NSC Meeting Minutes, July 26, 1985, p.3)
Mindful of the role of students in public campaigns against apartheid, McFarlane cautioned:

The S.A. issue is likely to be very hot when students return to campuses this fall, and we need a really effective public affairs program of what helps and what hinders the process of reform, as well as realistic concepts of what the U.S. is trying to achieve. (NSC Meeting Minutes, July 26, 1985, p.3)

The President agreed with his counselors that public relations was important and added his perspective on South Africa, which he would later retract. He differentiated South Africa’s whites from “other colonial peoples” of Africa in that the whites were native to certain parts of South Africa. In Reagan’s view, the problems in South Africa were “tribal” as much as they were between blacks and whites, and he seemed to liken the speed at which “our own problems in the American South” were resolved with the need for gradual change in South Africa. (NSC Meeting Minutes, July 26, 1985, pp. 4-5) After the meeting, the President commented in his diary:

Staff meetings here in W.H. & then an NSC meeting in the old treaty room. Subject S. Africa. We’ve quietly influenced the S.A. G. to a number of changes benefitting Blacks. Now our Congress yielding to demonstrations, etc. is debating legislation to impose sanctions on S.A. Govt. We’re opposed. It isn’t a solution to the problem of apartheid & it will hurt the very Blacks we’re trying to help. I think we’re all agreed on continuing & even stepping up our present program but resisting the other.

Subsequently, the President’s national security team prepared, and Reagan approved, National Security Decision Directive (NSSD-187) that in part committed to measures to build U.S. public support for the Administration’s policy. NSDD 187 restated U.S. policy objectives concerning South Africa. Among these objectives was using the combined resources of the executive branch including the Department of State to oppose or satisfactorily limit the imposition of new legislative sanctions against South Africa. NSDD 187 also stated that the State Department would lead a government-wide public affairs strategy to “seek public understanding and support of our policies and of why punitive sanctions are counterproductive.”

As a follow-up, the team established a public diplomacy working group for South Africa and the southern Africa region. An essential component of the public diplomacy campaign was reliance on the President’s ability to project a vision of South Africa that included a more vigorous articulation of opposition to apartheid.
In the midst of these plans the SAG declared yet another state of emergency, prompting numerous questions to the President following his public statements and during press opportunities. The media repeatedly questioned if the Administration would act more forcefully to curb violence by the South African Government; what Reagan thought about pending sanctions legislation in the Senate; and whether he would continue the policy of “constructive engagement.” Each time, Reagan invoked his core message. On sanctions, he made three points that were consistent throughout the first six years of his terms in office: sanctions would be counterproductive; they would hurt the economy of South Africa and other countries in the region; and they would harm Blacks whom “we are trying to help.” While he was consistent, Reagan was not immune to the significance of continuing his policy. Consequently, when Ambassador Nickel returned to South Africa in September he carried a letter to President Botha motivated by “troubles” in South Africa that acknowledged “troubles” at home:

Within our own country, the problems of South Africa have occupied the attention of the American public as never before, arousing deep emotions on issues that touch the most sensitive nerves in our body politic. (Ronald Reagan letter to P.W.Botha, September 6, 1985)

Yet, shortly after Nickel’s return to South Africa the President sent another signal to Botha; he accredited South Africa’s Ambassador to the U.S. after a five-month delay, initially designed to signal displeasure over deteriorating conditions in South Africa. (Thomson, 2008; “U.S. Ends Delay, Accepts South African Ambassador,” 1985)

At the same time, Reagan appeared to temper his rhetoric on sanctions. Publicly the President said that he shared the concerns of many in Congress, however, privately, he considered issuing an executive order followed by a veto should the Congress enact sanctions legislation, a strategy that was similar to what he would adopt in the summer of 1986. (Memo: Platt to McFarlane, September 6, 1985; Memo from McFarlane to SPG on behalf of the President, September 5, 1985) By September the pressures in Congress and among the public threatened to overwhelm the Administration’s stance on sanctions.

The detentions and deaths along with Botha's hardline speech in August seemed to leave the Reagan administration little choice but to announce limited economic sanctions against South Africa once it was clear that House and Senate conferees had agreed on a bill in August. It was only through Senator Richard Lugar’s management of the bill that the President avoided a legislative defeat on sanctions. On September 9, Reagan sent Congress a message imposing new
trade and financial sanctions on South Africa, accompanied by Executive Order 12532 along with the statutorily required declaration of emergency to legitimate the imposition of sanctions. E.O. 12532 included the President’s intent to form an advisory committee to review and make recommendations. The order also contained a section that suggested that the current policy would be reconsidered:

Sec. 7. The Secretary of State shall establish, pursuant to appropriate legal authority, an Advisory Committee on South Africa to provide recommendations on measures to encourage peaceful change in South Africa. The Advisory Committee shall provide its initial report within twelve months.

Perhaps responding to calls for divestment, the order instructed the Secretary of State to implement Sec.2(a)(b)(c), which encouraged U.S. firms to apply fair labor practices in South Africa. The Secretary would monitor the exports of U.S. firms subject to this directive and register their compliance. Significantly, this section of the order included principles very similar to those promulgated by Reverend Leon Sullivan, an African American cleric and anti-apartheid activist.

One former government official referred to the imposition of sanctions under E.O. 12532 as a “shot across South Africa’s bow,” signaling that the Administration would have difficulty in pursuing dialogue and coordination with South Africa if it continued to resort to violence to address civil unrest. Herman Nickel characterized the import of the sanctions differently:

In 1985, the President barely avoided the passage of congressional legislation by the device of, in a way, preempting action with an executive order in September, 1985 [codifying]...some of the restrictions which we have already practiced in economic dealings with South Africa; such things as computer sales and things of that sort. (Nickel, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader, August 25, 1989)

A former State official recalled that:

...I think there was a lot of focus on how to keep ahead of the curve on the sanctions debate so we put some additional sanctions in place...there were sanctions from the Carter years that we kept...there were additional sanctions that we added in ’84–’85 and then Congress began drafting additional sanctions and that led up to the drama of ’86 when Senator Lugar and others put forward sanctions. (Interview C, personal communication)

Following the release of the order, the International Political Committee (IPC) met on September 23. During the meeting, Assistant Secretary Crocker acknowledged the link between adverse events in South Africa and its consequences for the Administration’s South Africa policy:
...for the past 12 months our efforts and our initiatives as well as the SAF’s *sic.* limited reform moves have been swamped, even overwhelmed, by a cycle of setbacks as violence and repression inside South Africa have fed on each other. This has produced endless fuel for negative western media coverage that has triggered into both a partisan U.S. domestic campaign against the administration and a highly emotional but more genuine debate here. The U.S. debate and South African violence have played into each other as negative feedback in a downward spiral, thus damaging severely U.S. efforts in the region.

[He said of the public diplomacy effort] The President’s September 9 message [in conjunction with E.O. 12532] hopefully will help break the cycle and provide a more solid basis for advocacy in support of U.S. policies. The President’s remarks reiterated the context of our policy all along striking a balance between our abhorrence of an odious policy while not damaging the economic stability in the region. We are trying to get people involved in a constructive way and trying to come to grips with a perception gap. (Minutes of September 20, 1985 IPC Meeting)

Summing up the year, Secretary of State George Shultz highlighted three trends: increased media coverage of South Africa, public unease with what viewers saw on television, and mounting tensions between the executive and legislative branches as well as heightened division within the Administration on the direction U.S.-South Africa relations (Shultz, 1993). The trend would continue in 1986.

**1986**

In March, the Administration welcomed South Africa’s announcement that it would comply with UNSC Resolution 435, which would lead to its withdrawal from Namibia. In addition, the SAG announced its intention to lift its domestic declaration of a state of emergency and suspend or eliminate “many overt forms of racial discrimination.” (Ottoway, 1986) Assistant Secretary Crocker praised these developments in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, but also censured the SAG for at the same time banning more political activists; Crocker for the first time spoke of “majority rule” and referred to the ANC as “freedom fighters.” (Ottoway, 1986) Yet the SAG continued to ban political activists and conducted military attacks in three neighboring countries in May. Although he saw no justification for military strikes President Reagan remained “sympathetic” to the challenges that the SAG faced (R. Reagan, White House Diary, May 19, 1986) and did not mention majority rule or dialogue with the ANC.

In various fora, the President maintained that progress was being made in ending Apartheid and that the U.S. could be most helpful by “advocating quietly” for “helpful steps” in
that direction. At the same time, Reagan publicly acknowledged student demonstrations and divestment campaigns in the United States. He countered that U.S. companies were playing a helpful role by extending the same rights to workers in South Africa that applied to American workers. He added that such corporate behavior was in line with the Sullivan principles, noting that Sullivan was a black minister. (Ronald Reagan Remarks and Q&A with High School Students, May 21, 1986)

In June, the SAG imposed another state of emergency. As the anniversary of the Soweto uprising loomed, the Administration called on all parties to exercise restraint and deplored violence by those who enforced and who opposed apartheid. Reagan appealed publicly for Botha to reverse the government's ban on gatherings of dissidents and permit meetings as long as they were nonviolent. (Statement by Deputy Press Secretary Speakes, June 12, 1986, Ronald Reagan Library; Statement on the Tenth Anniversary of the Soweto Uprising, June 13, 1986, Ronald Reagan Library) Notwithstanding the President's plea, the SAG continued to adopt repressive laws and regulations, abridge the right to free speech, and deny access to courts, prompting increased scrutiny of the Administration's policy towards South Africa by Congress and advocacy groups on the basis of continued violations of human rights. Ambassador Nickel commented in a 1989 interview:

But by 1986, it was clear...the South Africa issue had become very much a mainstream issue in American politics and the politicians wanted a chance to send their own message[to South Africa]. By 1986, when you had Simon Legree-like scenes on television screens, night after night after night, something had to be done. (H. Nickel, personal communication, August 31, 1989)

Accordingly, the spring and summer of 1986 were significant for both the White House and the Congress. During legislative debate over how to effect change in the SAG's policy of apartheid, the Administration organized a campaign to forestall enactment of further sanctions against South Africa just as it had done under similar circumstances in the summer of 1985. In addition, the Administration tried to find ways to seize the initiative from Congress and forestall punitive sanctions while at the same time demonstrating awareness of the human rights issues underlying public interest in South Africa. Discussion within the Administration intensified over how to manage pressure to change its policy towards South Africa. A strategy followed to influence public perceptions of South Africa policy and forestall sanctions legislation by energizing conservative constituencies to counter “liberal” criticism of Administration policy on
South Africa. At the same time Secretary Shultz, while not in favor of sanctions, recommended that the Administration apply additional pressure on South Africa. The President agreed with many of his recommendations except for endorsing majority rule in South Africa (R. Reagan, White House Diary, July 2, 1986).

With sanctions legislation pending in June and July, as well as divestment campaigns, protests, and the imposition of state and local government sanctions against South Africa, Reagan and his team considered a number of options to offset these developments, including appointing a special envoy, scheduling a Shultz trip to the region, increasing various assistance programs, and extending greater outreach to the African National Congress (ANC). Hearing from corporations and informally from the Advisory Committee authorized in E.O. 12532, the State Department also advised that the President should demonstrate leadership by making a “forceful assertion of presidential vision to clarify U.S. goals...”(Crocker, 1992, p. 317).

Lawrence Eagleburger, a former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, was a member of the Advisory Committee. Crocker described Eagleburger as being in tune with the State Department on the importance of settling regional issues and recommending that the President’s vision for South Africa include unequivocal commitments to work towards the elimination of apartheid, an end to reliance on gradual change advocated by the SAG, and adoption of greater flexibility on sanctions. Richard C. Matheron, former Ambassador to Swaziland, expressed a similar view.

I subscribe to the position taken by Secretary [George] Shultz, or rather the commission he set up to study our relations at the time of sanctions. The point they made was that the United States’ President should show real interest in changing the situation in South Africa. It is in the interest of the United States to bring about rapid social change towards majority rule in South Africa. If, in fact, the President of the United States really showed that he cared about it, was personally interested, that would be a lot more effective than sanctions. (R. Matheron, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

But I can say now, quite frankly, that I believe that President Reagan paid only lip service to the anti-apartheid movement, but there was no indication that his heart and soul was in it. My perception is that he didn't care. The South Africans knew that. The South African whites knew it, the South African blacks knew it, that there was not a strong commitment on his part. (R. Matheron, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

When published, the Advisory Committee report recommended that U.S. policy take into account “a fundamental commitment to the promotion of justice and democratic values” (Advisory Committee Report, p.2) that would preclude standing aside if there was a “human
tragedy”[race war] in South Africa. It also pointed out what members described as the potential for “racially divisive political tensions among Americans” should such a war take place in South Africa. The report suggested as well the qualifications and mission of the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa if the U.S. were to implement a new policy.

...it will be important that U.S. officials, and most particularly the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, create new contacts and strengthen old contacts with the broadest possible range of responsible representative South African groups, black and white. The Ambassador's responsibility will be to serve as the U.S. representative in South Africa in relationships with the South African government and equally in relationships with black and white leaders across the political spectrum. (Advisory Committee Report, p.44)

Constantine Kontos, an FSO and executive director of the Advisory Committee, recalls that there was always a State Department official at Committee meetings. He added that the Department had little experience with such Committees but by creating it:

...In effect, the Department was saying that it would welcome new ideas and new approaches to this highly volatile and sensitive issue which was of particular concern to the 15% of black American citizens. (C. Kontos personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

[Part of]...the reason for the Committee36 was to diffuse a domestic political problem; in part it was to help shed some new light on ways and means of dealing with an intractable problem. There was the hope that the educational process that was required to bring the twelve Committee members up to speed might shed some new light and that the attendant publicity might be helpful in the education of that sector of the public that was interested in the issue. (C. Kontos, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

The ongoing communication between State and the Advisory Committee suggests that the Committee's deliberations contributed to the dialogue that would lead to a new direction in the existing policy. This also seems consistent with Shultz's description of its mission in a press conference shortly after E.O. 12532 was issued in 1985.

...I hope that it will be possible to have an Advisory Committee that cannot only make a report at some moment in time, but also be useful in counseling on events as they occur. And we all know there will be a pattern of events—we don't know what they are—but I hope the Advisory Committee will be useful in that regard. (Transcript Secretary Shultz Press Conference, September 9, 1985, p. 362)

That said, as early as the end of June after the full House passed a sanctions bill that called for divestment and a trade embargo against the SAG, the NSC, State and White House staffs were reviewing the Administration’s policy on South Africa, developing a strategy to
preempt enactment of new sanctions as well as brainstorming how to build support to sustain a veto if necessary (Memorandum from Scott Sullivan to Peter Rodman June 23, 86, Ronald Reagan Library). Sullivan, a senior NSC advisor, feared that a veto would anger most members of Congress and that signing a bill would cause a backlash from the SAG. Moreover, an unattributed document in Patrick Buchanan’s files entitled “Back Door To Sanctions,” alleged that the President had closed the “front door to sanctions” and warned that State would use the President’s upcoming speech to test the reaction to a more confrontational policy towards South Africa. If so, the unnamed author claimed such a speech would compromise the Reagan’s “credibility with the Botha government.” Moreover, “…the Botha Government will be forced to conclude that U.S. policy is now driven entirely by domestic political considerations, and is therefore irrelevant to them.” Further, the memo argued that such a speech would give the appearance that the Administration had “been forced finally to jettison its misbegotten policy and adopt the policy of its deadliest enemies.” (“Backdoor to Sanctions,” n.p.) The controversy over the speech exposed fundamental differences between State officials and the White House communication staff largely around policy preferences (Grunwald, 1984). As a former State official put it:

Ronald Reagan would have been better served if he’d had more people around him like George Schultz. But he had his old buddy Bill Casey and Pat Buchanan [and] others who kept telling him that basically this was a struggle between white allies and black terrorists—a very simplistic black and white kind of thing and the terrorists by the way, the ANC, they’re pro-Communist you know—and that would be what Reagan would hear. So if you read the speech that Reagan gave in July of ’86—that’s the key speech. (Interview C, personal communication)

The President delivered a speech before members of the Foreign Policy Association on July 22, the day before Shultz was to testify before an SFRC hearing on South Africa. The speech proved controversial for moderate Republicans, such as Senators Richard Lugar (IN), Nancy Kassebaum (KS), and Robert Dole (KS) who had met with Reagan the day before the speech. (Lugar, 2004) All three asked him to make clear his opposition to apartheid. Furthermore, Lugar asked Reagan not to talk about sanctions or constructive engagement, because neither would help to prevent the sanctions legislation passed by the House from becoming law and would provoke Democrats in the Senate to “force the issue.”(Lugar, 2004; Radcliffe, 1986) Republicans facing reelection in the fall and anti-apartheid activists alike criticized Reagan’s speech; it failed to communicate any flexibility on the direction of policy or a
convincing commitment to press the SAG to eliminate apartheid. For example, Roberts (1986f) reported that although conservative Republicans either praised the speech or expressed support for the President’s policy, there was bipartisan condemnation of the speech because it did not go far enough. Significantly, Lugar, a Reagan stalwart, said: “I think the President needs to do more...I had hoped the President would take the occasion for an extraordinary message to the world. He did not do so.” (Roberts, 1986f, para 4)

The State Department members of the Reagan’s national security team thought the President’s speech was “polarizing,” and that it appeared to align the Administration more closely with the Botha regime. Shultz and Crocker considered the speech and the President’s press conference the end of the fight against sanctions. They suggested that the President’s failure to express convincingly his opposition to apartheid had left the Senate’s moderate Republicans no choice but to vote for sanctions. (Crocker, 1992; Shultz, 1993) Ambassador Nickel echoed the sentiment that Reagan had failed to communicate his views on apartheid effectively.

...in resisting the political pressure, we got no help from P.W. Botha. But it must also be said that it hurt us that President Reagan, who was rightly known as the Great Communicator, somehow failed to communicate that he personally shared the outrage over racial injustice and repression in South Africa (H. Nickel, personal communication, June 3, 2005, South Africa Country Reader)...I also was acutely aware of the fact that what drives the issue in the United States is less the strategic importance of South Africa than our national concern with the issue of race. (H. Nickel, personal communication, August 31, 1989, South Africa Country Reader)

Perhaps reflecting some of the views of anti-apartheid activists in the U.S., TransAfrica President Randall Robinson called the speech “a shameful performance on the part of an American President.” (Roberts, 1986f, para 24) For his part South African Bishop Desmond Tutu was very critical, likening the speech to something that P.W. Botha could have written. On the other hand, the SAG praised Reagan’s speech for its acknowledgement of reforms and the futility of trying to impose solutions to the “complex problems” in South Africa. (Zucchino, 1986)

Differing from the views of anti-apartheid activists at home and abroad, the Counselor for International Affairs at the Heritage Foundation praised the President for communicating effectively his vision of a policy that was “against sanctions and apartheid.”

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By virtue of his personal involvement in the issue, the President has now aligned himself with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in defining and defending a common policy of promoting reform in South Africa and rejecting arbitrary punitive sanctions which have the sole virtue of vengeance for Pretoria's racist sins...(Gayner, 1986)

Meanwhile, some members of the White House staff blamed the media for the “negative response” to the speech. The subject line of a memo from Phil Nicholaides, Director of Special Presidential Messages to Patrick Buchanan was “Most Americans know little and care less about SA.” “Ronald Reagan is the most popular President of Modern times.” Nicholaides blamed part of the reaction to the speech on “people in the mega media who are relentlessly hostile to Mr. Reagan and his basically conservative views” (Memorandum from Phil Nicholaides to Pat Buchanan July 23, 1986, Ronald Reagan Library)

Although many Americans may have known little about South Africa, apartheid, and the President’s policy in 1985 (CBS Poll September 1985), by 1986 public support for putting more pressure on South Africa had grown close to 45 percent, and support for sanctions was nearly 46 percent (Gallup, 2008 in Morehouse and Avilés). Of course, some, such as Knecht (2010) and Morehouse and Avilés (n.d.), have suggested the increases were due to increased media coverage of South Africa and apartheid. Similar to the media coverage of the Vietnam conflict, television brought black protest and South African government reprisals into the living rooms of America. Network coverage of South Africa on several international (apartheid, racial unrest, state of emergency) and domestic issues (sanctions, Reagan policy, divestment, demonstrations and protest) peaked in 1985. Ambassador Nickel commented:

By 1986, when you had Simon Legree-like scenes on television screens, night after night after night, something had to be done to punish the villains. South Africa became a morality play. (H. Nickel, personal communication, August 31, 1989, South Africa Country Reader)

Knecht and Weatherford (2006) also contend that in non-crisis matters like South Africa and apartheid, public opinion is more focused when the public perceives that government must respond to an action-forcing event; in this case increased threats to human rights in South Africa and conflict between the presidency and Congress. That said, the President’s overall approval ratings held steady between 70 and 74% during 1986; however, it is unclear what effect his personal approval rating had on the specific questions about approval of the Administration’s South Africa policy compared to legislative opposition.
Two weeks after the speech the President seemed to fuel more domestic and international criticism. During a press conference, he emphasized that the U.S. wanted an end to Apartheid and added that Botha was committed to the same thing. He quoted a letter he had received from an “eloquent black leader” (Chief Gatsha Buthelezi) who was impatient with the slow progress, but did not disapprove of Botha. Reagan was particularly impressed with Buthelezi because he was “anti-Communist.” The President also appeared to align himself with some of the rhetoric of the Botha regime; for example, he referred to, “radical groups” in South Africa (i.e., the ANC) that had been infiltrated by the Communist party as well as the “tribal” aspects of the unrest in South Africa. He condemned all violence but noted that “a lot [of violence] being inflicted was black on black.” (News Conference, August, 1986)

When reporters challenged the President on the inconsistency of his approach to sanctions since the U.S. had imposed sanctions on Poland and Nicaragua, the President invoked Cold War rhetoric. He noted that although there were repugnant practices in South Africa, the SAG was not trying to impose its government on surrounding countries as was Poland. (News Conference, August 12, 1986) The year before Reagan had asserted that Nicaragua was a “moral challenge,” and South Africa was not. (Schmitz, 2006) Interestingly, these views diverged from an NSC staff memo that cautioned there was a:

...pressing need to reestablish “moral equivalence” between Apartheid in SA and repression in Eastern Europe (for example, Bulgaria's treatment of the Turks). If we fail to place the SAG and communist governments in the same category, so far as the treatment of their citizens is concerned, we run the risk of allowing the left in Congress to dominate the human rights agenda. This development would complicate our relations not only with South Africa, but with other authoritarian states (South Korea, Chile, Guatemala) friendly to the U.S. We can count on Solarz, Bonker, and Dellums to; take advantage by imposing sweeping new controls on trade, investment, and foreign aid to these countries. (Memorandum Scott Sullivan to Peter Rodman June 23, 2986, Defusing the South Africa Sanctions Issue, Buchanan Box 012958)

It appears also that the President’s “unscripted” remarks caused consternation among his national security team given what members of Congress had been hearing from their constituents and the President's failure, in the opinion of some moderate Republicans, to make a strong statement against apartheid. Herman Nickel recalled:

Practically every politician in the country felt that he had to address himself to that problem and show his indignation. So, under those circumstances, what do you do to show your indignation? You pass a law. We have to give some tangible signal. Well,
this was supposed to be a signal to P.W. Botha as if he had somehow misunderstood that
Americans didn't care about apartheid...It was also meant as a message to the American
constituencies that mattered to these politicians... (H. Nickel, personal communication,
August 31, 1989)

Similarly, Les de Villiers, a South African diplomat in the 1980s, commented on the opposing
perspectives of the White House and Congress:

If you are faced with an issue like apartheid, you can only go so far with the argument we
don't want to interfere with other people's internal affairs, or the countries sic important to
us economically, etc. Back home you have a constituency that consists of African
Americans, it consists of people who hate to see oppression in other countries, etc., and
you think of the next election. I mean South Africa isn't worth anybody's position in the
Congress or the Senate. (Field, 2007b)

Subsequently Senator Lugar took up the bill House-Senate conferees agreed upon.

According to Lugar,

From the time in 1985, when I supported President Reagan, we had not seen change.
President Botha over in South Africa, certainly had not indicated the changes that we had
anticipated. We were looking at a situation where there was very likely to be racial civil
war of a dimension that had been unheard of. Our strategic interests could have been hurt
if guerrilla warfare had brought about a different government in South Africa that was
Communist. And so I indicated I would lead the fight on the floor of the Senate.
(Field, 2007a)

The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act passed even though the President as he had in
1985, tried to enlist Lugar to help him avoid such sanctions legislation:

Then President Reagan asked me to visit with him. We sat together in the Oval Office.
He strongly encouraged us to adopt once again the same strategy as the year before.
Namely that President Reagan would once again issue an executive order incorporating
most of what we had passed, but I indicated to him that I would not accept that, that we
had been down that road before. And I told him how sorry I was that I could not support
him on this, but then I tried to argue constructively why he should support and sign in
essence the bill that we had. (Field, 2007a)

Before his meeting with the President, Administration documents indicate that Senators
Lugar and Dole met with Chief of Staff Donald Regan, who had asked if an executive order
would satisfy the Republican caucus. In addition, Regan suggested the outlines of a compromise
on the newly passed CAAA that included the appointment of a new ambassador, Edward J.
Perkins:
The debate in Congress over the sanctions issue and our growing dismay over the continuing violence and repression in South Africa...has convinced us that we must do more to head off the crisis in southern Africa. Specifically we propose, in conjunction with a veto of the enrolled bill, to announce, in a strong statement of our goals and initiatives, the following actions:

…the appointment of Ed Perkins as Ambassador to South Africa. Pretoria has agreed to accept him and I am convinced he will enhance our ability to reach out to all the parties in an effort to foster good-faith negotiations. (Alton Keel, Talking Points (TPs) for Meeting with Dole and Lugar September 15-16, 1986. p. 2)

As for the latter, the State Department had already prepared a report for the SFRC in August that included a certificate of demonstrated competence for the then-Ambassador to Liberia. The report noted Perkins’s distinguished career in the U.S. military and service in the Agency for International Development as well as milestones in his Department of State career. It also highlighted Perkins’s rapid promotion in the Foreign Service as well as his “calm demeanor, a penchant for sound decision-making and a great strength in interpersonal relations…” (Memorandum from Michael G. Kozak to Jay B. Stephens) The Regan talking points appear to acknowledge that Congress was more attuned to public concerns than the Administration. “The Congress has strongly expressed the concern of the American people that the United States must help to solve the South African problem and we are trying to respond.” (Talking Points, p.2) Lugar recommended that the President sign the bill, but Dole counseled that the President could sustain a veto, if he included parts of the bill in an executive order and took additional steps including naming a black Ambassador. Ultimately, the President opted to veto the bill.

Before the veto, the White House legislative and domestic policy aides tried to enlist governors and other groups to lobby against the CAAA and work to sustain his veto. For example, Alton Keel, Deputy National Security Assistant, met with White House staff and conservative leaders in September.38 The group outlined a plan that included outreach to Jewish leaders, mailings to contributors and the “religious right,” and editorials. Planning also included calls to the “new right”. Even at this point Paul Weyrich, 39 cofounder of the Heritage Foundation, argued that the Administration needed a “symbolic gesture” along with other aspects of its veto strategy. (Notes of White House Meeting Alton Keel File, Ronald Reagan Library) The President and his aides made a series of calls and visits to key senators; for example, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK) recalled that Shultz and the President had called him, and he also met with Reagan. Murkowski ultimately voted to override Reagan’s veto.
The debate over the veto in the Senate pitted moderate and conservative Republicans against each other. For example, leaders Lugar and Dole were on opposite sides on whether the Senate should sustain the President’s veto. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) broke ranks with Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) on the veto vote. Following his vote to override, McConnell said:

In the 1960s, when I was in college, civil rights issues were clear...After that, it became complicated with questions of quotas and other matters that split people of good will. When the apartheid issues came along, it made civil rights black and white again. It was not complicated. (Clift, 2013, para. 4)

In addition, fractures among Republicans were exacerbated by South African officials communicating to “farm state” Senators that the vote to override the President’s veto could jeopardize South Africa’s imports of grain from the United States.

Reagan’s effort to sustain his veto failed, and Congress voted to override on October 6 (Field, 2007a). From Herman Nickel’s point of view:

Once the township rebellion and the ensuing images of repression on American television screens crowded out the evidence of reform, that policy [constructive engagement] became a political liability. Even so, Ronald Reagan stuck with it until, in September 1986, the Congress overrode his veto of the sanctions legislation. It was a logical moment for me to leave and for someone else to take over. (H. Nickel, personal communication, June 3, 2005)

Nonetheless the White House announced that Nickel would return to South Africa on August 8, amid press reports that the Administration would replace him with a black ambassador to emphasize the U.S. commitment to racial equality as well as others that reported that he had asked to be replaced “as soon as possible.” (Clift, 1986a) Two weeks later, Nickel submitted his letter of resignation on August 19.

Less than a month later, the President nominated Perkins amid congressional concerns over whether and how the Administration would implement the CAAA. Perhaps echoing Grunwald’s observation that the challenge for Reagan was to achieve consensus on foreign policy in his second term, Senator Lugar described the break between the Administration and Congress that led to the override of the President’s veto as an instance “...when the Congress perceives the President to have no policy or one at odds with domestic and international political reality...” (Lugar, 2004, p. 222) However, a Reagan official countered that the Administration
did have a policy, and it did not change it. This in turn suggests that the Perkins appointment was another dimension of the same policy.

We needed to see bigger steps [from the SAG] and I think Ed doing those things and our supporting him in doing those things gave people a clearer sense of the vision we saw for the future of the country, but, here’s a big caveat we never changed our policy on regional diplomacy. What we did was we added to it. We didn’t change it. And the people who were so happy that they’d passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act may have thought they had changed American policy. (Interview C, personal communication)

Recalling the conceptual framework of the study the evidence presented in this section suggested that for the first half of his second term Reagan seemed to pursue only his preferences in U.S. policy towards South Africa despite mounting opposition from Congress and its constituents. He evidently believed that he could impose his will through the power of his office, and his ability to persuade. Moe (1994) suggests that a leader’s vision may prevail if the balance of political power is in his or her favor; however in this case, the power of the presidency was not preeminent. Unlike the leader in Putnam’s framework, Reagan appeared not to pursue “win-sets” to achieve domestic consensus until just before and after the initial passage of the CAAA. Moreover, the lack of consensus among his advisors was not helpful. Faced with competing narratives, he chose the one that was most consistent with his beliefs and conservative ideology. Throughout this period, he was unable to co-opt the issues or negate the influence of the domestic and transnational antiapartheid movements or influence positively the black majority in South Africa or the publics in the countries of his counterparts. During and after a costly and divisive political battle over South Africa policy, Reagan’s commitment to staying the course was remarkable. The next section of the chapter will delve more into the domestic and international forces that lead to Reagan’s legislative defeat and subsequent decision to appoint and African American ambassador.

Domestic Politics and Policies

Advocacy and Legislative Action

Jacobs and Page (2005, p. 107) suggest that there are “a variety of actors who appear to influence U.S. foreign policy,” some more than others; for example, business and labor typically are more influential than other organized interests. At the beginning of the Reagan administration, there were numerous anti-apartheid organizations intent upon dismantling
apartheid along with a small group of legislators in the House of Representatives and a few perennial supporters in the Senate. During Reagan’s first term, advocacy groups were not influential in shaping relations with South Africa or successful in broadening public dialogue. Congress was not particularly engaged on South Africa beyond a small group of Democrats in the House under the aegis of the House Subcommittee on Africa. However, in the second term opposition grew in these fora as well as internationally as global movements of human rights and racial equality gained momentum.

Similar to the range of organizations involved during the civil rights movement, groups opposed to apartheid included churches, student groups, state and local governments, universities, foundations, organized labor, business associations and independent corporations. (Culverson, 1986; Ferraro, 2012; Nagan, 2000) The American Committee on Africa (ACOA) was the oldest of the anti-apartheid organizations. ACOA’s constituencies included student groups, labor unions, civil rights organizations, the religious community, and community activists as well as elected officials. Through its Washington Office on Africa (WOA), ACOA joined with church and labor groups to form a permanent lobby in Washington. Even though these groups had little influence on policy toward the southern Africa region and South Africa itself during the Nixon administration, they did gain momentum when the Carter administration placed a higher priority on southern Africa; international interest in confronting apartheid grew; and congressional engagement increased. When Reagan came to office much of the anti-apartheid community anticipated a strong alliance between Washington and Pretoria because of the new Administration’s Cold War world view of the world; predicting a “tilt” toward the white regime in South Africa. (Neigus, Root, & Sindab, 1982a)

Indeed, the first years of the Reagan presidency were challenging for the anti-apartheid coalitions as the Administration shifted the emphasis in U.S.-South Africa relations to the East-West conflict. Nonetheless, Reverend Leon Sullivan, the first African American member of the board of directors of a major corporation, was able to raise the profile of South Africa and apartheid through promulgation of a corporate code of conduct, which committed U.S. companies to respect human rights and provide equal opportunity in South Africa. As early as 1981 State held a press briefing noting that the Administration was reviewing its South Africa policy and had not made a decision whether it would support legislation that would make mandatory compliance with the Sullivan principles. As the Administration grappled with its
critics in 1984, the Sullivan principles became more salient as more U.S. companies operating in South Africa agreed to abide by an expanded version of the principles and committed themselves to press for broad changes in South Africa society including repeal of Apartheid laws. The principles were evidence the Administration would soon point to as justification for the continued presence of U.S. business in South Africa.

That said, a year later the Washington Office on Africa and church groups rallied to oppose Reagan's nomination of Herman J. Nickel as Ambassador to South Africa. Jean Sindab, Executive Director of the WOA, noted in a press release:

...Nickel's close relationship with Lefever [Reagan’s failed nominee as State Assistant Secretary for Human Right and South Africa], whose pro-South Africa and anti-human rights are well-known, raises serious concerns among the church and anti-apartheid activists in this country. Nickel's comments and views suggest that he shares much of Lefever's thinking. He has sharply chastised critics of apartheid for “unleashing their moralistic rhetoric” against South Africa. (Washington Office on Africa, March 1982)

Wegner (2002) suggests that this type of advocacy and mobilization against a nomination is a way to convey voter preference to senators and make the nomination relevant to the electoral process. It would appear that the Nickel’s nomination had little or no political salience for the Administration or the Senate; he was voted out of committee and confirmed by the full Senate with little fanfare. (New York Times, March 30, 1982)

For their part church groups, predominately Protestant, were potent actors in the anti-apartheid movement; Roman Catholics would join later in condemning the SAG and lobbying for sanctions. The impact of the American churches extended beyond U.S. borders. For example, U.S. churches joined the international church community in denouncing the SAG and calling for it to resign; protesting alleged torture of some detainees; and censuring South African branches of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches because of their support of apartheid. In addition, they participated in the divestment movement and outreach to members of Congress (Washington Notes on Africa, Spring 1986). For example, the Catholic Bishops wrote to all members of the Senate in July 1986, urging them to pass a sanctions bill (Goldman, 1986).

Citing the influence of religious groups, a former Administration official noted:

He [Shultz] was getting all this mail from congressmen saying people in my district are getting all upset about this. And it's mainly church on Sunday. Every church whether it's Protestant or Jewish, they were all talking about this [apartheid] (Interview A, personal communication)
Such was the impact of the church that Shultz hosted a conference on South Africa for religious leaders on June 2, 1986 in the midst of congressional debate on sanctions legislation. His speech invoked the role of the church in the civil rights movement and argued against divestment and economic sanctions. He echoed the Administration’s view that the SAG had adopted reforms and that the presence of U.S. companies in South Africa was integral to sway the SAG and to promote “peaceful change.”(Shultz Address to American Religious Leaders, 1986).

In addition, student movements against apartheid gained momentum in the 1980s but were not particularly effective until the first two years of Reagan’s second term. Altbach and Cohen (1990) suggest that the immorality of apartheid was the impetus for the movement. “The unambiguous moral issue of apartheid was at the heart of the student protests. The activists focused most of their attention on pressuring the university and the nation to use their economic leverage against Pretoria’s racist regime.” (Altbach & Cohen, 1990, p. 41) Alton and Cohen also suggest that the upsurge of violence in South Africa in 1985-1986, protests organized by civil rights organizations and churches to call for sanctions against South Africa and heightened media coverage caused increased student activism. The goal of the student groups was to intensify economic pressure on the SAG to dismantle apartheid. To that end they urged U.S. pension funds, insurance companies, colleges and universities to divest themselves of their South African investments. They also pushed U.S. corporations to cease operations in South Africa.. (Soule, 1997) and moreover used protests, petition drives, boycotts, demonstrations, and sit-ins to draw attention to their demands. Fueled by student demonstrations, the divestment movement spread to state and local governments. By 1986, over 20 state governments agreed to divest pension funds of investments in companies operating in South Africa; over 140 state and local governments conditioned procurement and the award of contracts to entities having nothing to do with business with South Africa.(Kenneth A. Rodman, 1994).

Triggered by increasing violence and repression in South Africa, TransAfrica, a lobby founded by the CBC in 1977, unified diverse anti-apartheid groups to form the core of the Free South Africa Movement. (Tillery, 2006) The FSAM became a “potent political force” by exerting pressure on members of Congress to declare themselves on the issue of apartheid. In the fall of 1984 TransAfrica organized daily protests at the South African Embassy in Washington to protest against apartheid and contest Reagan’s policy of “constructive engagement.” Members of Congress, celebrities, and other prominent persons participated in
these protests and were among the demonstrators who were arrested. By December, these demonstrations spread to other U.S. cities where the SAG had consulates (O’Malley Archives, 1980s) A former State official commented:

...these Embassy protests were sort of—I guess you could say mediagenic. They were scheduled in prime time so that the cameras could cover them, and people got arrested for the news hour. And, given at the same time what was taking place in and this is the important point—The trigger for the protests and the debates in Congress was the unrest in South Africa’s urban areas (Interview C, personal communication)

Demonstrations at the South African Embassy continued every day for two years until Congress overrode the President’s veto of the CAAA. If one were to call the imposition of sanctions a victory for anti-apartheid activists, the movement did not consider the struggle with the Administration to be over. There was skepticism that the Administration would vigorously implement the law and questions about its motivation in appointing a black Ambassador. Perkins recalled that the President was aware that some African American leaders were skeptical of the decision to send him to South Africa and thought that they would not be pleased; he urged Perkins to consult with them: “…I can tell you that they won’t like it. If I send you, you need to get to know as many black leaders as you can and tell them what you’ll do if you go down there.” (Perkins, 2006, p. 257)

Unlike Nickel, skepticism about the Perkins appointment revolved largely around the Administration’s credibility and commitment rather than the nominee. Perkins noted that skeptics included members of the CBC, Randall Robinson, Director of TransAfrica, and Jesse Jackson. Some of these critics questioned whether he would have any impact on Administration policy or merely be a token, symbol or diversion. (Perkins, 2006) The latter criticism often appeared in the print media [for example (Moore, 1986b) and (Clift & Fritz, 1986b)]. Liberian expatriates and some congressional staff criticized how he had managed U.S. relations with the President of Liberia, a despot and long accused violator of human rights. Having met with various anti-apartheid and civil rights groups, the CBC and other legislators and apparently assuaging their concerns, Perkins did not face opposition that would have affected his confirmation.

**Labor**

Organized labor in the U.S. had traditionally participated in the public dialogue on foreign policy issues (on, e.g., Vietnam, repression in Soviet bloc countries, defense spending
During the Reagan administration, labor was among the activists against apartheid in solidarity with international trade unions and labor organizations. For example, U.S. labor joined in the consensus of the 1981 International Labor Organization General Conference in Geneva that condemned apartheid as degrading, criminal and inhuman. The following year the AFL-CIO began to provide funding for attorneys for South African workers subject to arrest and detention. The AFL-CIO also worked with the Administration to launch labor sector programs in South Africa in May of 1983. Although some of the programs were beneficial, black trade unions were skeptical of the juxtaposition of the AFL-CIO’s anti-apartheid activities with the Administration-backed training programs for black trade unions. The unions distrusted Reagan’s policy of “constructive engagement” as well as U.S. organized labor’s history of cooperation with various administrations to counter Communist influence in Latin America and the former Soviet Bloc (Cox, 2012).

However, early in 1985 Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO called for an International Labor Organization inquiry into “appalling” working conditions for workers in South Africa. The A. Phillip Randolph Institute and the African American Labor Institute also sponsored a conference in Washington on trade unions’ ability to produce change in South Africa. By August, the AFL-CIO executive council concluded that the Reagan administration’s policy towards South Africa had failed to produce visible changes and called for trade unions of the world to pledge full support for South African workers struggling for human rights. (Department of State Cable 258058) At home, the AFL-CIO advocated sanctions legislation. According to Kirkland, “the AFL-CIO was already strongly pushing sanctions; in fact, we lobbied the sanctions through the Congress against the resistance of the Administration and the State Department.” (L. Kirkland, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

Business

The goals of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) and the Reagan administration policy were reciprocal; corporations could continue to profit from business in South Africa, and the Administration could tout the benefits of business’s presence in South Africa to counter criticism of its policy of promoting gradual change. Jacobs and Page (2005) suggest that “business people (along with experts) are estimated to exert the strongest effects on policy makers overall and, especially, on administration officials.” (p. 115). Business interests likely had substantial influence on the Administration’s South Africa policy since business activity in
South Africa figured prominently among measures the Administration chose to implement its South Africa policy. In return, MNCs expected the Administration to negotiate a favorable investment climate and maintain their access to the South African market.

On the other hand, anti-apartheid activists equated corporate presence in South Africa with complicity if not approval of a discredited regime. Any company’s presence in South Africa became a moral issue. (Kumar, Lamb, & Wokutch, 2002) Under pressure from these activists and shareholders in particular, U.S. corporations adopted voluntary codes of conduct for corporate social responsibility, for example, the Sullivan Principles entailing health and welfare programs and education and training. By 1982, 146 companies pledged compliance with the original Sullivan Principles. (Thomson, 2008). Moreover, by 1984, 119 of 350 U.S. MNCs operating in South Africa had agreed to comply with expanded Sullivan principles and committed themselves to press for broad changes in South African society including repeal of apartheid laws. Apparently feeling the pressure from shareholders, nearly 200 U.S. MNCs operating in South Africa sent a telex to Botha urging him to reduce “tensions” in black school systems. These commitments and activities seemed to fuel the Administration’s rhetoric against divestment. Blacks were better off working for U.S. multinationals, and the absence of U.S. corporations would cause economic hardship even though U.S. multinationals employed just one percent of the South African workforce.

By 1985 pressure for U.S. companies to divest grew due to the proliferation of shareholder resolutions, boycotts of products, and state and local government and institutional investors’ decision to refuse business from enterprises that were present in South Africa. Consequently, the chairpersons of General Motors and Burroughs met with White House staff to discuss their intention to establish the U.S. Corporate Council on South Africa, buy ads (White, 1986) in major newspapers calling on the SAG to move away from apartheid and establish a more just system, as well as to meet with their South African counterparts. Nonetheless, by that time 39 U.S. companies had left South Africa compared to seven in 1984. (Mower, 1986). Later White House correspondence indicates that corporate leaders concluded that they had done all they could to persuade the Botha government to create an environment that would allow U.S. investors to stay. However, Botha seemed to have cut off communication; above all their companies were losing money. They urged the President to speak out “unequivocally” against apartheid and stressed, “the immediate future is our last shot.”
Societal pressures against apartheid at home and in South Africa, as well as financial setbacks, could account for corporate calls for the President to make a definitive statement demonstrating his commitment against apartheid. Reagan’s speech did not break new ground on apartheid or the role of corporations. While he acknowledged that the “marketplace had sent a message” because some Western businessmen [sic] have packed up and gone home,” he extolled the benefits of the presence of western businesses in South Africa and warned of the dangers if they were to leave. After the July speech and passage of the CAAA, a number of large American corporations announced they would withdraw from South Africa. For example, in the fall of 1986 General Motors announced that it would sell its investments in South Africa to local companies for political, as well as economic reasons. In an opinion piece in the *New York Times*, General Motors Chairman Roger Smith said that GM was leaving South Africa “to send a signal that we are disappointed in the slow pace of progress.”(Smith, 1986). Coca-Cola also announced it would sell its operations in South Africa. In a public statement Coca-Cola opposed apartheid but denied being influenced by an anticipated Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) boycott of its products. However, Rodman (1994) suggests that the departure of Coca-Cola and GM signaled a change in the attitudes of U.S. business and also signaled to the Administration that business could not ignore the risks of being in South Africa. Perhaps as Richard Knight, a spokesman for the American Committee on Africa opined, “These companies are concerned about their image because they're seen as allies of racism in South Africa...”(White, 1986, para. 5) In the fall Barclays joined the exodus of U.S. companies from South Africa mainly because of pressure from student groups.43

**Congress**

For the first six years of the Reagan administration, legislative interest and activity on South Africa and apartheid were mainly confined to the Democratic majority in the House along with a few longstanding supporters in the Senate.44 Reagan-era chairs of the Subcommittee on Africa followed a tradition of study missions to South Africa and hearings that dated from Charles Diggs’s tenure during the Nixon administration. (Culverson, 1986) For example, the Subcommittee held a hearing in 1981 to review the findings of a report by a study commission on U.S. policy toward South Africa.45 Besides the Subcommittee, the Congressional Black Caucus took a particular interest in the South African issue. Ambassador Nickel opined:
“There had always been segments of the Congress that had their own particular interest in the South African issue—I’m talking particularly about the black caucus, and about various liberal constituencies, like the churches.” (H. Nickel, personal communication)

To add perspective to the CBC’s interest in and influence on the South Africa issue, Representative Charles Diggs (D-MI) introduced the first sanctions bill in 1969; 17 years passed between the introduction of this bill and passage of the CAAA. Over time, the percentage of CBC members who introduced sanctions bills changed with events in South Africa. One must also consider that the CBC was quite small in absolute terms, numbering no more than 23 during the Reagan administration. Tillery (2006) suggests that variations in the number of measures introduced by members of the CBC can be accounted for by the variability of “constituency and institutional pressure”(Tillery, 2006, p. 90), the latter motivated by the need to attain institutional credibility and influence and the former to electoral imperatives. Along these lines Tillery suggests that part of the reason that the CBC focused on passing sanctions legislation was “the ability to claim a share of the credit bound to accrue to the group for winning passage of the CAAA.” (2006, p. 90) He adds that the CBC while ideologically opposed to apartheid, was playing a “two-tiered game.” It was using an international issue to achieve electoral success and improve its stature in Congress. In Reagan’s first term, some members of the CBC had achieved enough seniority to become chairs of other House committees that had purview over aspects of sanctions legislation.

Near the beginning of Reagan’s second term, congressional interest in South Africa grew. Rourke (1980, p. 189) has suggested that, “stimulation of domestic ethnic/racial groups will tend to motivate congressional activity.” This could account in part for increased activity in the House Subcommittee on Africa that coincided with anti-apartheid demonstrations at the South African embassy and elsewhere. The Subcommittee held a series of hearings on three proposed anti-apartheid resolutions46 as well as one on the “Current Crisis in South Africa” in December 1984, during which Bishop Desmond Tutu testified.

In the month before Tutu’s speech a number of members of Congress joined demonstrators in front of the South African Embassy in Washington and made a point of being arrested, including one Republican senator, Lowell Weicker, Jr. (R-CT). For their part 35, moderate House Republicans wrote to the South African Ambassador to warn him of the possibility of sanctions if the SAG did not take steps towards dismantling apartheid. In addition,
Senators Kassebaum (R-KS) and Lugar (R-IN) wrote to the President to urge him to review his South Africa policy. It is unclear whether Reagan or high ranking members of the White House staff saw the letter, and there is nothing to suggest that the White House responded to it (Lugar, 2004).

South African actions in May 1985, including the deaths of more blacks and military incursions into neighboring Angola and a press blackout in June, not only roused demonstrators but increased congressional support for sanctions. In June 1985 Representative William H. Gray (D-PA), chair of the Budget Committee and member of the CBC introduced H.R. 1460. Although Representative Gray’s bill was initially unsuccessful, the Senate passed its bill in August. House and Senate conferees then agreed (Engelberg, 1985) on a compromise bill that would impose sanctions similar to those called for in a French UNSC resolution, the implication being that the U.S. could do no less than the France. In 1985, the House voted 295 to 127 to impose new sanctions designed to pressure South Africa to end apartheid. Notably, 56 Republicans joined Democrats in favor of the bill.

In the summer of 1986 Representative George Crockett (D-MI) and members of the CBC tried unsuccessfully to pass a resolution to urge South Africa to free Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and to recognize the African National Congress as the legitimate representative of the country's black majority. Despite the setback, the Democratic minority in Congress rallied when a younger generation of Republicans joined by senior Republican leaders, sought to avoid a link between conservative principles and racism because of the perception that the Administration policy of constructive engagement supported apartheid. (de St. Jorre, 1986)

In July Senators Dole, Kassebaum, and Lugar met with President Reagan to discuss South Africa policy. The President remained adamant that he could not support “punitive sanctions.” Shortly thereafter the House approved and sent to the Senate legislation requiring divestment in 180 days as well as a trade embargo. Lugar, who consistently voted with the President during the first term, led the pro-sanction effort in the GOP-controlled Senate; the bill passed and the President vetoed it. Prior to the Senate vote to override his veto the President sent a message to Congress suggesting a new executive order, sent Shultz to the Hill to lobby to sustain the veto, and announced the Perkins nomination. Majority leader Dole observed that the Perkins appointment would not help the Administration either in South Africa or the Congress. (Roberts, 1986g) Other Congressional comments on of the impending Perkins nomination
echoed Dole. The Senate overrode Reagan veto of sanctions bill by vote of 78-21. Former Ambassador Nickel described the passage of sanctions legislation:

In the final analysis, the main thing which sanctions did achieve was to relieve the pressure which members of the Congress felt from their constituents, which is to say that sanctions were a way of dealing with an international issue that touched the most sensitive nerve in our domestic body politic, race. And it allowed politicians to do so at no political cost to themselves. (H. Nickel, personal communication, 2005, South Africa Country Reader)

Assistant Secretary of State Crocker added similarly:

The Congress wanted more cover, in terms of leadership, on the issue of apartheid than Ronald Reagan was capable or willing to provide. So the president’s effort to sustain his view of the situation was ultimately unsuccessful. (C. Crocker, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

Another Administration official opined after passage of the CAAA and the change of ambassadors that:

…supporting him [Perkins]...gave people a clearer sense of the vision we saw for the future of the country, but, here’s a big caveat we never changed our policy on regional diplomacy. What we did was we added to it. We didn’t change it. And, the people who were so happy that they’d passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act may have thought they had changed American policy. (Interview C, personal communication

The Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1986, p. 359) commented that the passage of the sanctions legislation was linked to Reagan’s misjudgment of the mood of the electorate and the Congress:

There was widespread agreement on Capitol Hill that South Africa represented a special case in which Reagan was so out of step with the American public that Congress had no choice but to intervene...The common theme binding all of Congress’s foreign policy battles with Reagan was public sentiment. Although an enormously popular president, Reagan had implemented a number of policies that appeared to have little backing among the voters.

International Politics and Policies

International Organizations

It is important to note that the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. was part of a longstanding global movement that included thousands of groups in over 100 countries. (Thörn, 2006) These groups created networks to educate followers, organize protests, and mobilize support for their agendas. While the organizations were not governmental, they did form
relationships with international governmental organizations; for example, TransAfrica was invited to meetings of the Organization for African Unity. Many non-governmental organizations also participated in or co-sponsored activities carried out by the U.N Committee Against Apartheid. Given years of interaction and coordination the groups that made up the movement eventually shared a common strategy and similar tactics, even though they focused their efforts on different aspects of the struggle against apartheid (e.g., raising awareness, mobilization, lobbying, legal assistance and fund raising). The common strategy was to direct activism toward international organizations that presumably could bring pressure to bear on national governments. (Seidman, 2000) Seidman (2000, p. 351) also suggests that loose coalitions of groups at the national level, some dating from the 1950s, transformed into an international movement with a “collective identity.”

Klotz (1999) situates the anti-apartheid movement in the agenda-setting literature. The movement gained leverage in the UN and other multi-lateral organizations by privileging human rights. Moreover, Klotz (p. 40) suggests, “the anti-apartheid movement is an example of ‘agenda setting’ by weak [e.g., African, and smaller less influential European] states and non-state actors…” He proposes as well that the movement raised the profile of international norms and legitimization of the actions of nation-states. Culverson (1996, pp. 127, 128) attributes some of the success of the anti-apartheid movement to “opportunities created by shifting power configurations in southern Africa and declining public confidence in the U.S. government…” Important to this study Culverson concluded that the anti-apartheid movement is an example of “how challenging groups gain entrance into the foreign policy-making process.”

Even in Reagan’s first term the UN paid increasing attention to South Africa and took action to denounce the Pretoria regime publicly. For instance, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) published a roster of 65 multinational companies allegedly in “criminal” collaboration with South Africa and a blacklist of 270 athletes who furthered sports contacts with South Africa. The OAU and the UN organized an International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa. On the other hand, the U.S. used its veto in the UNSC to block sanctions resolutions. Thomson (2008) notes four of these in 1981 alone. At other times, the U.S. stood alone as the sole dissenting vote in the UNGA.

Paralleling the intensity of events in the U.S. during Reagan’s second term, the pace of activities in the UN to isolate and apply pressure on the SAG quickened in 1984. The
Administration bowed to UN pressure as well as rising discontent in the U.S. by abstaining on a UNSC resolution that condemned South Africa’s apartheid regime and demanded cessation of violence and release of political prisoners and detainees. Late in the year, the UNSC reaffirmed its mandatory arms embargo and for the first time requested that all states refrain from importing arms, ammunition and military vehicles produced in South Africa.

A year later UNGA focused even more on South Africa, considering over 147 agenda items. The Assembly was expected to urge the UNSC to adopt mandatory sanctions against South Africa. (Sciolino, 1985) Reflecting the Administration’s national public statements, the U.S. voted against most of these resolutions including those on mandatory sanctions, concerted action to end apartheid and a world conference on sanctions against South Africa. (United Nations Information, 1989) The UN tightened the existing arms embargo in 1986 to include military and police vehicles and equipment. Following the State of Emergency declared in South Africa, the UN Security Council passed a non-binding resolution (no. 569) that commended states that had already adopted voluntary measures against the SAG and urged them to adopt new provisions, and invited those which had not yet done so to follow their example. As national policies shifted, member countries used the UN as a forum to announce actions taken to break commercial, cultural and other ties to South Africa.

**Intergovernmental Coordination**

To strengthen its influence with South Africa, the Administration built coalitions with international partners to develop a common approach to relations with the country. One aspect of Reagan’s approach was to oppose sanctions against the regime. Constantine Kontos, a member of the Secretary of State’s policy planning office recalled:

....we discussed the embargo issue with the British, the French, the Germans, the Dutch, the Italians. There was a western European working group with which we were in constant touch as well as the Canadians. We were able to reach a certain level of coordination on such actions. (C. Kontos, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

Most important for the Administration, Rodman (1998) suggests that most Western countries concurred with the Reagan policy of “constructive engagement.” Initially, the like-minded included Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Belgium; of these Great Britain was the most committed, primarily because Reagan, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were
close allies. Nesbitt (2004) observes that Thatcher and Reagan stood for election on similar platforms; they viewed the world through the lens of the East-West conflict; and they perceived the danger of the spread of Communism in southern Africa. Their personal correspondence and diplomatic exchanges on South Africa appear to reflect close cooperation and coordination on South Africa policy. For instance, Reagan’s letter to Thatcher confirmed their shared opposition to sanctions but acknowledged that both might have to take steps to indicate opposition to apartheid:

...the time available to us may be limited, both in our ability to put aside our respective pressures for punitive, destructive sanctions, and in turning around the deteriorating situation inside South Africa...you noted you may be forced to accept some modest steps within the European and Commonwealth contexts to signal your opposition to apartheid, and in all frankness, we may be faced with the same situation if the Congress, as expected, passes some sanctions bill later this summer or fall. (Reagan Letter to Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher, June 23, 1986)

Moreover, Morehouse and Avilés (n.d.) contend that Reagan adopted similar plans to “educate” the public and media on their policies toward South Africa.

In Reagan’s second term his international partners faced similar challenges in convincing their domestic constituencies that dialogue and trade with as well as investment in South Africa would yield meaningful progress towards peace in the region and concrete social and political change in South Africa. Reagan allies in Europe met pressure from not only their publics but also other states. Protesting the SAG’s imposition of a state of emergency France recalled its Ambassador to South Africa in 1985, which may have prompted the Nickel recall, and banned new investing and lending to South Africa. Echikson (1985) highlighted that this was the first significant fracture in Western solidarity on sanctions against South Africa and opined that France’s actions were motivated in part by racial dynamics at home and abroad. At risk for France were its relations with its former African colonies and large immigrant population; further defusing potential racial tension was consistent with the Socialists’ agenda.

Throughout 1985 a growing number of countries imposed bilateral economic, cultural and diplomatic sanctions on South Africa (for example, Sweden, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Canada, Ireland and the Netherlands). In the European Community, Portugal and Spain adopted measures against South Africa. Initially, Great Britain, with the support of West Germany, resisted European Community sanctions. Britain withheld approval of these sanctions pending an assessment of their efficacy and objected to the agreement by other states to recall
their military attachés from embassies in South Africa, but later agreed to adopt this measure. Along similar lines, the Commonwealth Heads of State adopted the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa in October over Great Britain’s objection. (Thatcher Press Conference, October 20, 1985) Great Britain’s stance against sanctions had put it at odds with the African members of the Commonwealth. Lulat (2008) suggests that African countries did not privilege Namibia’s independence over ending apartheid. Moreover, he opines that South Africa’s dominion over Namibia and the apartheid system were one and the same, the last vestige of colonialism in Africa. Further, Lulat observes that southern Africa’s “frontline states” were wary of western governments -- especially the U.S. -- that mediated differences between South Africa and states in the region. The mediation (for example, between Mozambique and South Africa) often occurred when countries were at risk from natural disasters, economic downturns, or the prospect of South African sanctions. Australia and New Zealand also parted ways with Great Britain as the South Africa problem threatened the balance between their strategic interests and national consensus on morals, values and race. (Hendrix, 2012)

A year later Britain acceded to the rotating presidency of the EC’s council of ministers where it presided over deliberations to determine Community sanctions against South Africa. Montgomery (1986, para. 8) suggested that the round of talks in the summer of 1986 would result in “yet another example of the politics of gesture.” At the same time an opinion piece in *The Economist* recounted that the leaders of Japan, West Germany, Britain and the U.S. still shared similar views; sanctions would not work; they would only make Botha more obdurate and life more difficult for poor people throughout Southern Africa; Black leaders who called for sanctions were influenced by western anti-apartheid lobbyists’ claim that sanctions would end apartheid and Afrikaner rule. However, it noted that Thatcher had already lost the sanctions battle in the EC and the Commonwealth as Reagan had in the House (“Stumbling into Sanctions,” 1986). Notwithstanding this conclusion, conservative members of the President’s staff such as Buchanan appropriated the parts of the article that endorsed Thatcher’s view that the public sentiment in favor of sanctions was not as strong as some would have it and sanctions would incite Botha to further excesses against Black South Africans. Further, black leaders in South Africa were greatly influenced by anti-apartheid forces in the West who assumed a direct relationship between sanctions and the elimination of apartheid. These arguments were used in
the President’s speech in July, and with Congress to buttress the Administration’s arguments against pending sanctions legislation.

Subsequently Thatcher, during the 1986 Mini Commonwealth meeting in London, agreed to voluntary bans on new investment and tourism in South Africa as presaged in Reagan’s letter. Nonetheless, the reality of Thatcher’s decision was an apparent blow to the Administration because it considered her its most reliable partner in its South Africa policy. Moreover, the Administration had advocated that Congress delay sanctions legislation until after the London meeting, suggesting that the U.S. should follow Great Britain’s lead on sanctions rather than act unilaterally. The Administration argued that given the history between Britain and South Africa, Great Britain would have the most influence on the SAG; a coordinated international effort with Britain taking the lead would be most effective. (Benesch, 1986)

Similar to congressional activities in the U.S., European and other parliaments introduced or recommended measures to impose sanctions on South Africa. For example, the foreign affairs committee of the Finnish parliament appealed to the Finnish government to end all economic relationships with South Africa. Some governments adopted boycotts and divestment measures. Denmark prohibited new Danish investment into South West Africa (Namibia) or South Africa, and the Australian Government announced that it would boycott any company with a majority South African ownership.

As we moved, because of Congressional pressure, toward a more coercive and tougher policy, a number of European countries followed us. [Conversely] The Scandinavians were way ahead of us. They had long ago agreed not to deal with the South African government... (C. Kontos, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

Nesbitt (2004) suggests that similar to Reagan, Thatcher and Helmut Kohl contended with discord within their political parties, the general public and interest groups. George (1986) reported that Thatcher lead a divided Conservative party, with the far right leaning heavily towards supporting South Africa and a growing moderate faction that favored sanctions out of a sense of “moral duty.” Fifty of her cohort formed a committee for “fundamental change in South Africa.” In addition, the British anti-apartheid movement was one of the oldest and strongest among the worldwide network of these activists as well as closely aligned with the Labor Party. For his part, Kohl faced a modest challenge to the country’s relations with South Africa from two small parties in his conservative coalition and the opposition parties. (Engel & Olsen, 2004; Landsberg, 2004) Like Reagan, he contended as well with anti-apartheid sentiments from trade
unions and churches. Assistant Secretary Crocker perhaps described best the unraveling of international consensus against sanctions driven by domestic incentives:

They [South African Government] felt let down. They couldn’t believe that Ronald Reagan, their great friend, would not be able to prevent this (sanctions), or Margaret Thatcher, who also had to deal with her sanctioneers at home and in the Commonwealth and Helmut Kohl in Germany, who had to deal with his church groups. (C. Crocker, personal communication)

Analysis

This final section of the chapter analyzes the evidence presented earlier employing the study’s conceptual framework and hypotheses. I first focus on the relationship between the executive, Ronald Reagan, and his advisors, who sat at the table with him. Second, I add the relationship between the executive and domestic constituencies who seek to achieve their goals, as well as his counterparts.

Relationships between the Executive, Advisors and Constituencies

Judging from internal Administration documents, it is apparent that Reagan’s relationships with his advisors affected the decisions he took in both the national and international policy environments. Reagan's foreign policy team was not united on all aspects of South Africa policy in his second term. There was neither consensus on where to rank U.S.-South Africa relations on the President’s agenda nor agreement on the significance of apartheid to U.S. citizens. Some White House staffers such as Patrick Buchanan ranked the country high on the Administration’s agenda for ideological reasons (the East-West war of ideas) and counseled the President to become personally involved in policy implementation once South Africa and apartheid gained salience with the public. For this group of conservative advisors, the anti-apartheid movement and the demand for sanctions became inimical to achieving the goals and objectives of the policy. For them, the President could and should discount Anti-Apartheid sentiment and congressional interest in South African policy. Therefore, the Administration should exert maximum effort and use political capital to block all efforts to impose sanctions against South Africa. More moderate members of the President's national security team, for instance, George Shultz, agreed that sanctions would not be helpful in influencing the SAG to adopt reforms. He supported compromise in order to foster a national consensus that would allow progress towards geostrategic goals; continuing to argue against sanctions would only divert resources and attention from core objectives.
Given these two perspectives and lack of consensus, Reagan elected to become more personally involved in South Africa policy for reasons of his own once he determined that opposition parties in South Africa were Communist-inspired. According to several interviewees, and his public statements, he did not know much about the history of South Africa or the system of apartheid. It appears that what he did know and espouse came from confidants or those who shared his philosophy. Reagan also seemed unaware of the impact of the tone and substance of his rhetoric on South Africa on the public and legislators. Although his correspondence with Botha and Thatcher in 1985 seems to argue otherwise; Reagan appeared not to take note of the import of the raced-based system in South Africa to citizens who had helped forge a national consensus on race. His failure to take this into consideration and apparent unwillingness to adapt to a dynamic policy environment eroded his political power and credibility. The legislative debate on sanctions became a referendum on his South Africa policy. Having missed opportunities to compromise with the Congress, and unable to co-opt the issue, or negate the power of anti-apartheid constituencies, Reagan lost control of South Africa policy. He failed to convince the public and the Congress that he was committed to promoting in South Africa the core beliefs and principles intrinsic to governance and society in the U.S., as well as his personal commitment to the ideals of fairness, equity, equality, and self-determination. In this context, the President and his team considered other options to build a national consensus, including appointing an African American Ambassador to South Africa. Whether the intention was to signal a change in policy, adjust priorities, create distance from the SAG, promote a renewed moral responsibility to “right a wrong,” or project an image that reflected U.S. society is unclear, although evidence of all objectives appear in internal documents, as well as the press.

Abroad, the dialogue and civic action on South Africa was similar to what took place in the U.S. A network of advocacy groups including those in the U.S. challenged their governments’ relations with South Africa. Taken together these activities along with public sentiment and legislative activity seemed to fracture the consensus among leaders at the international level. Reagan's correspondence with his counterparts indicates that he struggled to keep and forge consensus on his South Africa policy at both the national and international levels in his second term. It also seems that the President and his foreign counterparts faced similar internal barriers to their policies towards South Africa that resulted ultimately in a more visible
and vigorous opposition to apartheid. Consequently, neither Reagan nor his counterparts could achieve their international goals absent domestic consensus.

At the outset, I proposed that the Reagan administration set a South Africa policy that it wished to continue throughout his presidency, and only nominated an African American Ambassador to silence critics. The national security directives during the Reagan years indicate that the President established a South Africa policy that continued many aspects of those of his predecessors. Relations with South African were not high on the Administration's foreign policy agenda; there was no expectation of crises. Reagan led the formulation of policy, set priorities and signed the directives that established South Africa policy; from that point cabinet departments and interagency working groups routinely implemented policy. Nothing in the data implies that the President or White House staff implemented South Africa policy on a day-day basis during Reagan's first term or that the President had an interest in the historical or contemporary governance in South Africa.

According to other Reagan-era national security documents, national race relations were historically a subtext of U.S.-South Africa relations because of apartheid. It was difficult to balance the tension between racial segregation in South Africa with U.S. national values of respect for human rights and racial equality. Anti-apartheid activists saw neither the need to create a balance nor to compromise national values; however, they were unable to mobilize a mass movement, influence the Administration or energize the Congress in the first term.

Reagan followed the pattern of his predecessors when he chose a nominee for South African ambassador, selecting someone who was attuned to the Administration’s thinking on relations with South Africa. Inasmuch as the incumbent was a Carter appointee who was at odds with the SAG, one can conclude from the variations in relations with South Africa that coincided with the Nixon and Carter appointments that Reagan nominated a new ambassador in conjunction with a change in policy. The Nickel appointment appears to have sent a message to the SAG. Nickel's recollection that the President nominated him to indicate a change in policy coincides with the observations of the former Ambassador's Deputy Chief of Mission. The appointment, then, also was a symbol of a change in U.S.-South Africa relations. In addition, Nickel was a political appointee, and South African officials like those in other countries might have concluded that he enjoyed greater access to the President and more closely represented the
President's views. Consequently, his appointment may have signaled to the SAG that U.S.-South Africa relations were high on the Reagan’s agenda.

Hollibaugh (2013) argued that domestic factors may affect an ambassadorial appointment, including unified partisan control of the White House and both houses of Congress, ideological agreement between the president and his party, and the president's ability to influence electoral constituencies. In the first and part of the second Reagan terms, Democrats controlled the House, and Republicans held the majority in the Senate. One could argue that Reagan nominated Nickel in the first term confident that he would be confirmed because Republicans controlled the Senate and for the most part voted with his policy preferences. Apart from that, widespread public interest in South Africa was nascent or nonexistent.

In the second term, the President appeared to be at odds not only with Democrats but also with some members of his own party as well as with a broad-based constituency, including most African Americans, that opposed apartheid. By the second term relations with South Africa attracted negative public attention, and the Republican caucus was split between moderates and conservatives. Consequently, the President could not depend on the Republican caucus to support his preferences on policy or personnel.

The Perkins appointment was embedded in the Administration's efforts to reach a compromise with congressional leaders to ward off sanctions legislation. Sanctions became a proxy for the moral implications of apartheid as well as its priority in U.S. policy towards South Africa in both the Administration and the public domain. A vote to override the President's veto reflected a legislative assessment that Reagan was out of touch with popular sentiment and the symbolism of his opposition to sanctions. Indeed, some members of Congress considered votes on sanctions legislation a test of commitment to civil rights and to shared beliefs and ideals of fairness and protection of human rights. Thus, the Perkins appointment symbolized a revalidation of these beliefs and ideals.

Finally, this chapter examined the dynamics between domestic and international policies and politics to discern patterns that might explain the Perkins appointment. Although there were synergies and similarities between the two levels, it seems apparent that national consensus was the most significant factor that affected Reagan’s freedom of action on relations with South Africa. This constraint provoked the consideration of a range of options to reconcile domestic
and strategic interests. The next chapter explores this constraint as well as institutional interactions that may have contributed to the Perkins decision.
Chapter 4

Search for an African American Ambassador

Having established that domestic and international influences were critical in accounting for the appointment of Perkins as Ambassador to South Africa, I explore in this chapter the dynamics within and among the Administration, Congress, and other domestic actors that appear to have influenced the appointment.

This chapter will discuss the dynamics between the formal and informal procedures, norms and practices that the White House and Department of State employed to select a group of candidates to consider for ambassadorships and to identify one of the group to nominate. The discussion will focus on how these dynamics and the relationship between the White House and the Department resulted in the nomination of Perkins. The chapter also will briefly examine the criteria for career versus political appointments insofar as they affected the interaction between White House staff and the Department of State that resulted in the identification, nomination, and confirmation of a career ambassador to South Africa. Throughout, I will seek to explain how and why norms, practices and procedures in both the White House and the Department of State informed what we know about the Perkins appointment. I will take into account as well how domestic political imperatives and the content of public discourse influenced the appointment.

The chapter is organized in two parts. The first will discuss how and why the President and White House staff chose ambassadorial candidates and the events that led to the Perkins nomination from the White House perspective. It will examine the decision to select a political appointee initially and later a career candidate and, most important for this study, why the White House decided that the candidate should be an African American. The chapter then turns to an in-depth examination of how, once Reagan decided to nominate a career FSO, the Department of State developed a pool of career candidates and recommended Perkins.

Inside the White House

White House Procedures

Ambassadors are the personal representatives of the president to foreign countries. They are appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate and serve at the pleasure of the president. They may be political appointees or career Foreign Service Officers (FSOs). However, the Foreign Service Act of 1980 stipulates that ambassadors should "normally" be drawn from the Service. In conjunction with the Senate’s advice and consent role, the Act noted
that it was the sense of the Congress that individuals should have “demonstrated competence to perform ambassadorial duties, and appointments as Ambassador to a foreign country and should not be accorded primarily because of financial contributions to political campaigns” [22 USC 2688].

Presidents traditionally have awarded approximately 30% of ambassadorial appointments to non-career candidates drawn from a number of categories including campaign donors, political operatives and friends, some of whom are well qualified for these positions and others that are not. Some presidents, while exercising the broad leeway that they have to make ambassadorial appointments and with no particular commitment to appoint career rather than political ambassadors (Perkins, 2006); have sought to legitimate their choices by establishing consultative mechanisms. For example, President Carter in Executive Order 11970, created an advisory board on ambassadorial appointments, hoping to avoid some of the controversy previous presidencies had experienced when they appointed clearly unqualified political candidates (Lewis, 2008; Vaughn & Otenyo, 2007). The Board’s mission was to evaluate the qualifications of career and political candidates under consideration for nomination and to advise the President and the Secretary of State of its findings. The Order also stipulated that the Secretary of State would submit all names—career and political—to the Board for review of their qualifications. The Board had the power to, at the request of the President or Secretary of State, consider and make confidential recommendations on “which ambassadorial posts should be filled by career people and which should be filled by non-career people” (E.O. 11970).

The Reagan administration laid the foundation for its approach to selecting nominees for ambassadorial appointments in E.O. 12299. Issued in March 1981, the Order eliminated Carter’s advisory board, suggesting that the new administration was inclined to eliminate oversight and vetting by an independent body whose mandate might impinge even minimally upon the President’s absolute right to nominate ambassadors of his choosing. Issuance of the Order also indicated that a new system for the identification and selection of ambassadorial candidates was in the offing that might change the Secretary of State’s role in managing the nomination process. Nonetheless, there does not appear to have been an overt effort, at least in Reagan’s first term, to establish a new protocol for selection of potential ambassadorial candidates.
Even after the President signed E. O. 12299, the practice was for the White House Office of Presidential Personnel (OPP) to send lists of prospective ambassadors to the State Department before White House staff sent their recommendations to the President (R. Tuttle, personal communication, December 12, 2003). For its part, the Department bided its time until the White House specified the choices President Reagan had made. In the first term once State returned a list of possible nominees, Deputy Secretary of State William Clark (1982-1983), Chief of Staff James Baker (1981-1985), Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver (1981-1985), and OPP Associate Director Wendy Borchert (1981-1982) met to decide between career and political nominees (Mak & Kennedy 1992; R. Tuttle personal communication, December 12, 2003).

Considering this system one might have expected that by default, once the President made his preferences known, all other vacancies could be filled by career FSOs. With knowledge of all the vacancies and arguing for the rotation of political as well as career ambassadors, Secretary Shultz could use his position of trust and access to the President to maximize the number of career ambassadorial appointments to the degree he wished.49

Shultz, who held the post from 1982 until the end of the Reagan administration, was a moderate conservative who had served previously in the Nixon administration as the secretary of Labor and of the Treasury as well as the first director of the Office of Management and Budget. He also chaired President Reagan’s economic advisor group during the 1980 campaign and the Economic Advisory Board after the President’s inauguration. As Shultz described his relationship with Reagan: “I could talk to Ronald Reagan candidly, and he would listen. He had strong views, and I respected them.” (Shultz, p. 8)

Although Shultz always had a political appointee as deputy secretary of State, he relied on career members of the Foreign Service to help formulate and implement policy. His special assistant also was a Foreign Service Officer. By 1985, he was able to appoint all senior positions in the Department, 5051...emphasizing professional over political credentials” (Department of State Historian, 2013; Shultz, 1993). This was in stark contrast to the early years of the Administration when political appointments permeated the Department at the assistant and deputy assistant secretary levels down to special assistants and office directors. The earlier period, along with increasing numbers of political ambassadors, “politicized” the Department to a degree that may have exceeded that of the Nixon administration (Bird, 2011). Shultz’s52 propensity to contest appointments sometimes put him at odds with White House staff and
conservative think tanks and advocacy groups on the number and qualifications of political 
appointees inside the Department or as ambassadors. As Shultz recalls this also was part of 
broader institutional tensions between the White House and State over personnel issues and 
foreign policy before and during his tenure (Shultz, 1993).53

During the Reagan transition as well as throughout the first term and into the second, the 
directors of OPP perceived that State had an inordinate degree of control over selecting and 
identifying ambassadorial candidates. This was not in accord with the model of centralized 
control of presidential appointments that characterized an administration that aimed to make 
appointments based on loyalty and ideological commitment 54(Maranto, 1993; Newland, 1983). 
Loyalty in this case was “long-term Reagan support” (Newland, p. 3), and ideological 
commitment meant “political conservatism”(Maranto, 1993 p. 687; Weko, 1995). In addition, 
Maranto (1993) suggests that the Reagan administration’s political conservatism criterion for 
presidential appointments mirrored that of the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations. Even so, 
“the Reagan presidency more than any other epitomized the use of political appointments to 
effect political control” of the federal government bureaucracy (Wood & Waterman, 1991, p. 
804). From this perspective and from OPP’s point of view, State control of ambassadorial 
appointments was an anomaly that left open the possibility that ambassadorial appointments 
could be used as a means to circumvent the President’s preferences for loyal and ideologically 
committed appointees. Conversely, as Sorenson (1987) notes, ambassadorial appointments could 
be used to further the President’s agenda by using political appointees to circumvent the 
Secretary of State.

Perhaps hampered by lack of government experience, institutional knowledge and 
memory that often come to the fore during the transition from one administration to another, the 
Office of White House Personnel continued to send the names of ambassadorial nominees to 
State without knowing the number of vacancies or whether current political appointees would be 
extended in their positions. Secretary Shultz preferred that political appointee ambassadors 
rotate rather than remain in their positions indefinitely. Over time, White House aides decided 
that they were at a disadvantage in implementing their mandate to identify candidates who were 
loyal and committed to carrying out the President’s policies because the Department had the 
“right of first review” of all candidates. It thus became incumbent on White House staff to carve
out a more expansive role in the selection of ambassadorial candidates. As E. Pendleton James put it:

...it’s the job of the Personnel Office to do the same thing in Ambassadors that we try to do in the other appointments—to find people who were both committed to the President’s agenda and competent to serve in that country. (E. Pendleton James, personal communication)

Due to a lack of clarity over the identification and selection of ambassadorial candidates, at least from OPP’s point of view, tensions rose between the two organizations, often reaching the senior levels. To some degree these tensions were fueled by what some in the Administration (for instance, White House aides Michael Deaver and Patrick Buchanan) saw as a “political divide” between State and the White House. In the first term, Deaver was the key staff person on ambassadorial appointments, and he argued in favor of political appointees. (“Interview with E. Pendleton James Charlottesville, VA,” 2005) Buchanan often was at odds with policy and proposals originating from the Department as well as from Secretary Shultz. The sense of a “political divide” also emanated from partisan supporters of the President such as the Heritage Foundation and conservative Republicans such as Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Strom Thurman (R-SC).

This divide was part of the debate in the Administration over the prospective nomination of Robert Brown as Ambassador to South Africa rather than a career Foreign Service officer. A former official observed:

I am also sure that there was an effort in the domestic side of the White House to find a political appointee Black Republican who would be a Reagan person. If we’re going to do an African American Ambassador [he or she] should be one of ours kind of thing. (Interview C, personal communication).

Reflecting the ongoing bureaucratic tensions between OPP and State, Robert Tuttle, Director of White House Personnel (1985-1985), proposed formal guidelines to clarify the roles of the White House staff and the Department of State in ambassadorial appointments. As a follow-up to an earlier meeting with Chief of Staff Donald Regan and National Security Assistant Vice Admiral John Poindexter, Tuttle sent a memo to Poindexter that argued for the empowerment of OPP, which was considerably less influential in controlling and centralizing appointments in the second term (Brownstein, 1985; Kirschten, 1985; Weko, 1995). The memo proposed establishment of guidelines with State for selecting ambassadorial candidates and the ratio of political to career ambassadors:
We would strongly oppose any proposal which would deny President Reagan and Presidential Personnel the opportunity to present candidates for each ambassadorial position...the bottom-line is that the current process forces each side, the Department of State and Presidential Personnel, to present its best possible candidate for each post in order to secure that post in its column...If, as State suggests, certain posts were earmarked for non-career candidates and certain posts for career candidates, two problems would arise: (1) it would be nearly impossible to agree on which posts are reserved for career and which for non-career and (2) neither side would be under any meaningful pressure to produce their best for posts that are preordained in their column.

...it remains our position that any absolute limitations on the President's right to appoint personal representatives to Chief of Mission positions is “inappropriate,” we can live with the formula suggested by Don (Regan)-at the meeting-i.e, a compromise non-career target of 35%...plus/minus variation of a few percentage points...such limitations to apply only to the 133 bilateral posts.57 (Memorandum from Robert Tuttle to John Poindexter, March 1986)

Although Poindexter approved this new understanding between the White House and the Department of State, he included a cautionary note that seemed to place some value on career appointments. He thought of the Tuttle “model” as an interim measure and was concerned about the career management of FSOs, who “after all are important to the President and the U.S.” This would suggest that there was not a concerted “war” against the Foreign Service at least at senior staff levels of the White House as Bird (2011) and others have implied. Interestingly, although President Reagan generally followed the historic average of 65% career and 35% political appointee ambassadors, he did break precedent by appointing in absolute terms more Foreign Service Officers as Chiefs of Mission than his predecessors 58(Fedderke & Jett, 2012; Pacy & Henderson, 1992).

As a result of the understanding approved by Regan, White House staff became more assertive in the selection and identification of all ambassadorial candidates. From that point on, the White House gained an advantage through a procedural change: insisting that State send lists of all upcoming vacancies to OPP. Once received, Robert Tuttle would, in consultation with Chief of Staff Regan, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead (1985-1989), and national security assistants John Poindexter (1985-1986) and Frank Carlucci (1987-1989), identify non-career candidates for every upcoming ambassadorial vacancy (R. Tuttle personal communication, December 12, 2003).
After this step officials in the West Wing met and made the final selection for all vacancies except those in the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and South Africa; the President “controlled” these “plum” jobs (R. Tuttle personal communication, December 12, 2003; E.P. James personal communication, November 3, 2003). Historically, the White House had filled these positions with political appointees, partially as a way to reward key donors, partly due to the nominee’s ability to take on the financial burden of maintaining official ambassadorial residences and entertaining in some capitals (e.g., London, Rome), and at least symbolically to send a message to these countries that their governments would have greater access to the president.  

Many people assume that the ambassador can pick up the phone and talk to the president and get something done. And it’s one of the reasons, quite frankly, why in many places a political appointee is much preferred. Because they assume if this guy isn’t career, yet the president picked and sent him here, he must be a buddy. And if anything happens he can. “Hey, Prez,” and it’s done. That’s what a country is looking for. They’re looking for a channel of direct communication and a person of influence...the career people are at a slight disadvantage. (T. Todman personal communication, June 13, 1995)  

Candidates for Ambassadorships  
As in other administrations, the pool of political candidates for ambassadorships during the Reagan presidency included party officials, campaign contributors, academics, friends of the President, and candidates suggested by members of Congress, conservative groups and the national Republican Party. OPP also drew names from its database of donors, campaign staff and other office seekers, some of whom E. Pendleton James and Edwin Meese identified during the transition (Maranto, 1993; Newland, 1983). Others outside those categories also were considered, including some who were involved in state politics or elsewhere who “lobbied” for ambassadorial positions. For example, Langhorne Motley, who eventually became Ambassador to Brazil, “lobbied hard for it for six months” (Mak & Kennedy, 1992, p. 22) by first finding out who the decision makers were for ambassadorships in the State Department and the White House and then meeting with as many as he could to plead his case (Mak & Kennedy, 1992). He also enlisted the aid of a freshman senator to speak to then-Secretary Haig, courted the favor of both the regional assistant secretary of State, and people within the presidential appointments system who helped keep him abreast of who was in or out of the competition. He “worked the system” to achieve his goal (Mak & Kennedy, 1992).
The President clearly was involved in selecting nominees for ambassadorial appointments. For example, early on, he was so personally involved that he made telephone calls to nominees to offer ambassadorial appointments. As Maxwell Rabb recalled, the President called to offer him the ambassadorship to Italy (Mak & Kennedy, 1992). Reagan frequently met with his chiefs of staff, national security advisors, and directors of personnel to review and sign off personally on nominations (R. Reagan White House Diary Schedules). Not only did Reagan consider staff recommendations, he also received advice on personnel including ambassadors from members of his kitchen cabinet. The latter formed a personnel committee that met before and after the inauguration to make personnel recommendations (Bonafede, 1981; Newland, 1983). Whether for cabinet positions or ambassadorships, the group screened candidates according to their partisan *bona fides*.

According to Henry Salvatori, an oil producer and member of Reagan’s kitchen cabinet:

> “The three criteria we followed were, one, was he a Reagan man? Two, a Republican? And three, a conservative? Probably our most crucial concern was to ensure that conservative ideology was properly represented. That doesn’t mean someone else couldn’t get through.” (in Bonafede, 1981, para. 65)


In the first term, the Heritage Foundation also played a role in domestic and foreign appointments. The Director of OPP brought Betsy Norton Dunlop, a former Heritage Foundation employee, to the White House to assist with ideological screening of candidates (Weko, 1995). The Ronald Reagan Library staff review of Dunlop’s files notes that she was “continually interested in placing personnel with specific conservative principles and experience” when she was assigned to OPP and cabinet affairs (White House Staff and Office Files, 1981-1989). David Funderburk notes that not only “was [he] sponsored primarily by Senator Jesse Helms and other conservatives like Strom Thurman,” but Heritage “endorsed” his nomination as Ambassador to Romania ((Mak & Kennedy, 1992, p. 33, 34).

President Reagan also had his own candidates in mind, typically reflecting personal relationships. In his first term, for instance, he nominated his personal assistant and later Chief
of the OPP, Helene von Damm, as Ambassador to Austria (1983-1986); John Gavin, a friend and fellow actor, as Ambassador to Mexico (1981-1986); and Robert Nesen, an automobile salesman, as Ambassador to Australia and the Republic of Nauru (1981-1985). Others included business executives, housing developers, and insurance salespeople he had known as governor of California. Some of the President’s candidates had worked in international business, but lacked foreign policy or diplomatic experience, and others had neither.

The President also followed the advice and recommendations of friends and donors as well as his advisors. For example, Leonore Annenberg, friend, campaign donor and Chief of Protocol (1981-1982) with the rank of Ambassador, called Reagan to urge him to nominate a career FSO of her choosing as Ambassador to Morocco (Viets, personal communication, April 6, 1990). Mrs. Annenberg allegedly made the recommendation based on the advice of her deputy in the Protocol Office. The President famously intervened just as Viets' nomination was to be announced (Viets, personal communication, April 6, 1990). Walter Annenberg also was instrumental in the first-term appointment of John J. Louis, Jr., heir to Johnson Wax, as Ambassador to Great Britain (1981-1983) and Charles Price as British Ambassador (1983-end of Administration) (Holmes & Rofe, 2012; Radcliffe, 1989).

Nancy Reagan was quite influential as well in the appointment of Reagan friends such as Ronald Lauder as Ambassador to Austria (1986-1987) and John J. Louis as Ambassador to Great Britain (Radcliffe, 1989 & R. Tuttle, personal communication). She also influenced the termination of appointments, as with, for example, Helene von Damm, Ambassador to Austria, who left her post in 1986 (Barnes 1985; Radcliffe, 1989).

Early in the first term, Walter and Leonore Annenberg recommended to the President a friend for an ambassadorship who had not been a Reagan donor or supporter. The President acquiesced without knowing the background of the proposed candidate. As a consequence, Reagan’s staff believed they needed to protect him by intervening when the President was considering following through on commitments he had made to friends and supporters to spare him political embarrassment and prevent other missteps (R. Tuttle, personal communication; Regan, 1988). Both James and Tuttle suggested that this incident was a turning point for the President and led to setting procedures for ambassadorial selection, including political vetting.

By the second term, the President was more cautious with ambassadorial appointments. Perhaps also influenced by bipartisan participation in a private group’s effort to “screen” his
ambassadorial nominees, he consulted more with his staff and followed procedure closely. Even so he also gave informal instructions to his advisors on ambassadorial appointments (Regan, 1988), for example, instructing Donald Regan to extend the tenure of R. Douglas Stuart as Ambassador to Norway (1984-1989). Although Reagan continued to nominate political supporters and friends as ambassadors, he also adopted a different approach to such appointments. For example, he took advantage of what are pro forma resignations of ambassadors at the beginning of each presidential term in office. The President followed George Shultz’s advice and replaced three political and one career ambassador in Latin America to respond to criticism from the Congress and human rights activists. Legislative criticism primarily focused on the Administration’s assistance to regimes that violated human rights (Department of State Office of the Historian). The New York Times also suggested that Shultz recommended these changes to bolster the competence of envoys to those countries. Despite the predictions of the Heritage Foundation and other conservative groups that these personnel changes heralded a shift away from the Reagan Doctrine, the Times opined: “...faces were changing, not policies” (“The Shultz Reshuffle At State,” 1984, p. 22).

That said, as Jönsson & Hall (2005) suggest, ambassadorial appointments, diplomatic recognition, and other symbolic acts are tools of statecraft that can be used to signal fundamental changes, nuances, and subtleties in foreign policy, much as this study argues. Murray (2008) submits symbolism might be added to his taxonomy of modern diplomatic thought, suggesting greater interest in the import of symbolism.

Ambassadors to South Africa

If one considers the association between individuals who represent the President and controversial policies such as those in Latin America, it is possible to draw analogies between the personnel changes in Latin America because of human rights and those in South Africa due to apartheid, which also had a human rights component. In the latter case, Herman Nickel, Reagan’s first term ambassador, was a target for anti-apartheid groups and critics of the Administration’s South Africa policy when the President nominated him in 1981. A former deputy chief of mission in South Africa, referring to his own and the then-Assistant Secretary’s recollections, provides a glimpse into how and why the Administration decided to nominate Nickel:
Chet [Chester A. Crocker] is a Republican, but I would think a Republican of the Rockefeller ring. Chet had a hell of a time getting agreement in Washington on who would be an ambassador to South Africa. He had his preferences, but all kinds of people—and some quite weird—were attempted to be thrust on him, including the chief of police of Los Angeles, who had a terrible reputation as far as race relations and respect for democratic processes are concerned....what happened, I later learned from Chet, was that he heard thunder on the right in terms of nominating the new American ambassador and proposed his own man, who he thought would keep him from having to accept some of the very right wingers being pressed on him.

Chet’s choice was Herman Nickel, who fully accepting the policy position that Chet was taking of constructive engagement in South Africa, a position I have no doubt that a professional career Foreign Service Officer would have accepted and conducted as well for professional reasons. In any event, Herman Nickel was the choice of Chet not only because of Herman’s competence but because he was likely to be able to survive the White House vetting process. (H. Walker, personal communication, 2001)

This opposition later became a factor when the Administration considered whether Nickel should remain in his position during the second term and then again over his replacement when the White House decided that he could no longer stay in South Africa.

During the first term Nickel gave a number of speeches on how multinational companies could contribute to solutions to internal instability and end apartheid in South Africa by employing blacks, investing in training and education of their workforce and providing equal access to benefits and accommodations (for example, his 1983 speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa, “Constructive Engagement Mid-term”). In the second term, he clashed with Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) over Administration policy, when he and the Senator attended an event with South African and U.S. multinational business executives in January 1985. Nickel challenged those who were making a moral argument against apartheid without in his view understanding the complexity of the issue, while Kennedy warned the business executives about congressional and public impatience with the pace of reform in South Africa (“ABC Evening News for January 5, 1985, South Africa Kennedy Trip;” “S. African Blacks Again Greet Kennedy With Jeers,” 1985; Slambrouck, 1985). Although the Administration praised Nickel for how he handled “a very difficult situation,” the same message also noted that:

This administration remains committed to fostering constructive change in South Africa away from apartheid, but the President strongly believes that U.S disinvestment would have a very counterproductive effect in that process, especially for blacks as some
members of congress prepare to propose divestiture initiatives on the Hill. Your efforts there will play an important part in turning back these proposals. (White House Message to Herman Nickel, para. 2)

Nickel’s interaction with Kennedy would not appear to have been constructive as the White House shaped its campaign to convince lawmakers and others that the Administration would respond positively to their concerns about the deteriorating situation in South Africa without further legislative action. Nor was Nickel’s encounter with Kennedy, one of the leading proponents of divestment, helpful. After the incident, Nickel continued to speak about the efficacy of economic growth and worker education, along with the need for legal and social reform to end apartheid (Cable, Cape Town to Washington, D.C., May 22, 1985). Despite the latter and the President’s public statements and interviews, congressional debate continued, and members introduced bills that included divestiture, as well as trade and financial sanctions on South Africa.

In another speech to business executives on February 21, Nickel reassured them that the Administration would do all it could to defeat “punitive sanctions,” characterizing them as a “self-indulgence of elitists” (Roherty, 1992, p. 192). He added that it was not the U.S. role to “define change” but rather to support it, and he observed that South Africa did not need to please the world (Roherty, 1992, p. 192). Pressure from Congress and the public finally led a reluctant president to impose sanctions on South Africa by executive order in 1985. By the time Reagan recalled Nickel to Washington in May to signal disapproval of South Africa’s incursions into neighboring countries, there already were calls in the Senate for the Ambassador’s resignation (Rotberg & Foundation, 2002).

Nickel’s speeches again raised flags at an inopportune time in 1986 as the Administration contended with resurgence in congressional concern about conditions in South Africa that resulted in more calls for sanctions. Events leading up to sanctions legislation in 1985 and 1986 suggest that Nickel’s (1) perceived association with denouncing sanctions before he was confirmed, (2) belief in (Nickel, 1985) and emphasis on business and investment (Bates, 1983), (3) limited contact with black South Africans,65 and (4) vigorous espousal of constructive engagement led to the decision to replace him during the summer of 1986. Nickel’s deputy, Richard Barkley, opined:
He had become sort of a lightning rod for the anti-apartheid movements in the United States. He stayed longer than his normal three years. He was a political appointee and could stay longer. He stayed almost four. There was increasing anger over his behavior. Apparently it goes back to a visit by Teddy Kennedy in which Ambassador Nickel gave welcoming comments to him to which he took offense later on. So he was looked upon I think quite unfairly, nonetheless as one of the architects of the American policy against sanctions, therefore against the anti-apartheid movement. It was not at all true, but nonetheless, he began to get that reputation (R. Barkley, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader).

Media reports that the Administration would replace Nickel appeared in conjunction with background information on the proposed Robert Brown nomination in mid-July. The Chicago Tribune reported in part that Brown would improve communications with blacks in South Africa, and his appointment would send a message to the South African government that the Administration condemned South African racial policies and violent suppression of dissent (deLama, 1986a). Nickel resigned on July 29.

Facing the prospect of the enactment of new sanctions against South Africa and an embattled ambassador in Pretoria as well as the possibility of a foreign policy defeat if he vetoed pending sanctions legislation, the President took the advice of White House staff and the State Department to remove Nickel and to consider nominating an African American ambassador to South Africa. Nominating an African American ambassador was part of a strategy for the President to show leadership and regain control of the South Africa agenda from the Congress. Reagan agreed despite having misgivings. His misgivings evidently reflected the debate within the Administration, aired during a White House meeting on the possible nomination of Robert Brown as ambassador. As a former official put it:

One side said Mr. President if we appoint a Black Ambassador that might quiet people down and they might not be so vociferous as they are now. The other side said it’s nice to appoint a Black Ambassador but who will it be and what kind of a message will that person take to South Africa? And a suggested name put before the President and this person was a political person. (Interview B, personal communication)

After that meeting, the President was concerned that such a nomination would offend blacks in the U.S. and South Africa by evoking the “Uncle Tom syndrome.” Reagan also worried that the South African government would not be receptive to a black ambassador (Reagan White House Diary, July 9, 1986)
Even so, some of his staff, led by Director of Communications Patrick Buchanan, continued to push for naming a black ambassador as a means to forestall impending sanctions legislation, thus enabling the Administration to continue its policy without “distraction.” Buchanan was a member of “a smaller South Africa group” that pushed for the announcement of a new ambassador just before the President’s veto of the CAAA (Memo, Dennis Thomas to Donald T. Regan, September 23, 1986 box OA 91635, Alton Keel Files, Ronald Reagan Library). He also was a longtime advocate of the rights of the white regime in South Africa. Given the population differential of five million whites to 26 million blacks, Buchanan was concerned that the transition to majority rule in South Africa would result in the establishment of a Soviet-inspired socialist government that would exclude whites. The President shared this concern with George Shultz (Reagan White House Diary, July 2, 1986). Buchanan cast the U.S.-South Africa relationship in the framework of the Reagan Doctrine, which included supporting regimes that could be counted on to work in partnership with the U.S. to confront Communism, apartheid or other human rights violations notwithstanding. This approach to South African policy resonated with President Reagan. In a 2006 interview, former Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker said of Reagan:

He viewed the South African regime as people who had been our allies in World War One and World War Two and would talk that way, rather than talking about how we sympathize with and we support the aspirations of the majority for a rightful share of opportunity and power in their country. (C. Crocker personal communication, South Africa Reader)

According to several former officials, Buchanan’s official title, Special Assistant to the President for Communications and supervisor of the Office of Public Liaison, did not reflect the full extent of his control over the Administration’s “message” or his influence with the President. Chief of Staff Regan described Buchanan’s appointment as “philosophical” and noted that, “Buchanan’s philosophy in many ways parallels that of the President.” (Coffey and deLama, 1985) Specific to South Africa a former official noted:

Pat Buchanan he was a sort of an advisor—a principal political advisor and he said, they're (the South Africans)...our Bulwark against Cuban against Communism so we should not be hostile to them. We’ve got to be—you know—Constructive Engagement with them. (Interview A, personal communication; cf. (Hult & Walcott, 2004)
Along with his role in policy making, Buchanan also participated in the personnel process (Kirschten, 1985) as did other staff as part of the Administration’s procedures for selecting and identifying candidates as well as vetting potential appointees (Weko, 1995). Buchanan was involved in most decision-making meetings, partly because of his responsibility for press briefings and because Regan wanted White House spokespersons to be able to speak authoritatively on behalf of the Administration. Although this approach nominally was intended to address domestic policies, the press did not distinguish between the NSC press office and that of the White House; inevitably the White House spokespersons became involved in foreign policy issues as well (Regan, 1988).

Together with other senior staff, Buchanan chose the President’s speech on South Africa scheduled for July 22 as the vehicle to make an announcement “symbolizing” a change in policy as a counterweight to the push for new sanctions that might anger the South African government and set back the Administration’s regional objectives in Southern Africa (Walter Raymond note to Patrick Buchanan Staff File, Ronald Reagan Library). Staff at the State Department wrote the first draft of the speech, and a lengthy struggle ensued between the Department on the one hand and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the White House on the other hand over elements of the speech that indicated the direction of South Africa policy as well as over whether there could or should be an announcement of an African American ambassador to South Africa (Shultz 1993). As Crocker recalled:

...the time came in the summer of ’86 for President Reagan to give a major speech on South Africa in order to be able to sustain his veto of the most recent sanctions bill. We went through about probably eleven drafts of that speech and every time a draft went to the White House it came back rewritten and it was rewritten by three people: by Pat Buchanan in the Communications Office; by Bill Casey, the director of CIA; and by their friends in the South African government. (C. Crocker personal communication, Country Reader South Africa)

Both sides went public with the dispute and leaked to the press; for example, a Washington Times article described the “enormous gulf” between State and the White House over the tone and substance of the upcoming speech. (McWilliams, 1986) The article also referred to Nickel’s replacement. As Chester Crocker recalls, the NSC staff and the Vice President’s office chose to stay on the sidelines, and the dispute over the content of the President’s speech was between State and the Office of Communication:
We did have some friends in the NSC [staff]. We worked with Bud Macfarlane and we worked with, I think, Poindexter. And we worked of course with our Africa level staffers on the NSC. We also worked with the vice president’s office, but they didn’t assert themselves on this issue. This was a speech drafting tug of war between the White House and the State Department and the White House communications office won. (C. Crocker personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

*The New Republic* reported that Buchanan gained the upper hand by going directly to Reagan with his own draft, which the President approved (Barnes, 1986). After the end of the “war” over the speech, the combatants agreed that the President should demonstrate leadership on apartheid and U.S. policy, but differed on the direction and channels for the initiative:

...I’m told that, and I’ve heard nothing to contradict this that Pat Buchanan advised the President that if he would appoint a Black Ambassador then the pressure would ease because Congress would not wish to be opposing something where a Black Ambassador was involved. ...the President was advised, as I’m told, that if he appointed a Black Ambassador then the Black Caucus would ease up and to try to stop them from blocking the policy. (Interview D, personal communication)

As the White House team worked on the final draft of President’s speech, they discussed its purpose, message and primary components. For example, Walter Raymond of the NSC intelligence staff suggested:

...several items which I think would give “real power to the speech” for example: (I) Announcement of the new U.S. Ambassador. Gives appearance of movement and if it were Brown it would create a sensation. (Note from Walter Raymond to Buchanan July 7, 1986)

Finally, according to the *New York Times*, Reagan officials implied that the speech would announce a black ambassador, argue that sanctions were counterproductive, advocate using persuasion not confrontation with South Africa, and allow the Administration more time to work with allies. (Gwerzman, 1986d)

**Identifying a “Black” Nominee**

Although the origins of the recommendation and the various justifications for appointing an African American as South African ambassador are debatable, the President ultimately agreed to choose such a nominee. This section will examine more closely the evolution of the candidacies of Robert Brown, Terrence Todman and Edward Perkins.

**Robert Brown**
Given OPP’s strategy to propose a political candidate for every ambassadorial vacancy, the unit initially identified and proposed Robert Brown. Brown had been a special assistant in the Nixon administration, and he had consulted with the Reagan administration on how to create opportunities for black South Africans through education (Goshko & Hoffman). From the White House staff’s point of view, Brown was perfect—a moderate Republican who was Black and who would carry out the President’s policies (Note from Walter Raymond to Patrick Buchanan, July 7, 1986).

Ironically, the Brown nomination brought together two poles of the political spectrum—Andrew Young and Senator Jesse Helms, each of whom advocated a “tougher” policy towards South Africa, albeit in different directions. Greatly simplified, Young advocated greater engagement with South Africa’s black organizations, and Helms emphasized no interactions with Communist elements in South Africa as well as in the rest of southern Africa. Brown won over Young because of his prior record on civil rights and Helms with his conservative credentials (Clift, 1986; deLama, 1986a; Skidmore, 1986). Even so, many activists in both the U.S. and South Africa, questioned the Administration’s motive in nominating Brown because doing so would make little difference if not accompanied by a “change” in policy ("Wrong Ambassador," 1986). Nonetheless, Brown’s selection began to move through the vetting process, which included background checks by the FBI and Diplomatic Security, as well as verification of financial disclosures. In the interim, Brown visited the State Department in anticipation of consultation and briefings and granted an interview to ABC News about his potential appointment (ABC Evening News, July 16, 86). Yet the White House did not announce his nomination but did test its plausibility through leaks to the press.

The New York Times and Washington Post published a number of articles based on briefings by anonymous sources referred to as “administration officials.” These stories recounted the origins of the idea to nominate Brown as a consensus reached among Chief of Staff Donald Regan, the State Department, and the National Security Assistant as well as how the idea gained momentum within the Administration in a matter of days (Gwertzman, 1986d). All parties agreed that the Administration should expedite the Brown nomination (Oberdorfer & Hoffman, 1986a). The stories added that the Brown nomination went forward over the objections of Secretary of State George Shultz, who argued for a career nominee (Gwertzman, 1986d). A former State official commented on the alleged Shultz “objections”:
I think there would have been push back on the idea of a career officer more than is it a good idea to send an African American Ambassador because what Schultz would have said is look if you pick some car dealer from North Carolina or whoever you know he might be a great car dealer and he may have contributed to the Reagan campaign but he’s not going to have any credibility anywhere else. We needed a person who’s professional, who’s disciplined, who is proven as a foreign service officer. (Interview C, personal communication)

According to the *Times* account, Shultz agreed to the Brown nomination, with the proviso that the nominee must be able to have access to the White government of South Africa. Quoting a “State Department” source, the article continued: “it was decided that a Black American could do so.”(Gwertzman 1986d) Reports also surfaced that the Department did not consider it wise to appoint an inexperienced person to go to an important country that was “in crisis” (Oberdorfer & Hoffman, 1986).

White House staff correspondence suggests as well that there was tension and distrust between the White House and State over the Brown nomination, primarily due to a perceived State Department campaign to derail the Brown nomination because a political appointee might “actually” carry out the President’s policies.

Unsettled by word that the President may send a “political appointee” (a black moderate-to-conservative) over there as our next ambassador, State has gone into action. They know that political appointees are dangerously inclined to try to implement the President’s policy rather than the policy consensus of the career professionals. So they are busy leaking stories which cast doubt on the probity of Brown, and suggesting that a professional “career diplomat” would be better able to carry out the “new policy.” (Buchanan Staff File (unattributed document, n.d.) Ronald Reagan Library)

Nonetheless, the President concluded that Brown was well qualified to be a “middleman” in the South Africa situation. The next step was to probe Prime Minister Botha’s reaction (Reagan White House Diary, July 9, 1986). The consensus in the Administration was that Botha probably would accept an African American ambassador; yet he also might consider it a hostile act and could retaliate by refusing to interact meaningfully with a black ambassador (Goshko & Hoffman, 1986). In the meantime, the *Chicago Tribune* reported that an unnamed Administration official shared that there had been informal consultations with “lawmakers,” and the Administration expected Brown’s nomination to “sail” through the confirmation process. The same official added that Brown’s nomination grew out of an ongoing review of the
Administration’s South Africa policy and could herald a “shift of emphasis” in current policy. (deLama, 1986b)

The State Department then forwarded Brown’s nomination documents to the White House on July 16 (Letter, James H. Thessin to Jay B. Stephens July 16, 1986) along with his financial disclosure report. However, the prospective Brown nomination ran into trouble almost immediately. The White House counsel’s office raised concerns about possible wrongdoing related to a Nigerian money laundering scheme. The Washington Post and other media outlets reported that there was a “hitch” in the Brown nomination because of a grand jury hearing in South Carolina about a college implicated in laundering money from Nigeria (Goshko, 1986). Brown’s public relations firm represented Nigeria from 1980 to 1982. The press also reported that a State official implied that there were other Nigeria issues with Brown that could jeopardize good relations with Nigeria because of his close association with a political advisor to the former Nigerian president. The advisor was under investigation by the Nigerian government and charged with corruption. The State official also indicated that the country’s new military leader, Major General Babangida, was surprised that Brown would be considered for an ambassadorship given the pending case in Nigeria (Pear, 1986). Eventually, the contention over the Brown candidacy became so intense that the New York Times reported that White House officials put his nomination “on hold.” (Gwertzman, 1986c)

For his part, President Reagan was “upset” that he had to hold off on the Brown nomination (Reagan White House Diary, July 19, 1986). Although Reagan did not believe that Brown was involved in “anything,” it became clear that Brown would not be confirmed by the Senate because of these disqualifying incidents. As one official said:

…they heard from the Senate that he could not be confirmed because they saw a conflict of interest with some of the businesses he had before and so they could not go with him, but they decided anyway that it had to be a Black and I think that the Secretary of State then decided that if you got a Black career person that a Black career person could not refuse to go. (Interview D, personal communication)

The Brown nomination also drew fire from anti-apartheid activists and labor groups that accused him of arguing against union organizing when his firm represented textile manufacturers. Although this was a pro-business strategy that may have resonated with U.S. multinational firms doing business in South Africa, it also was problematic given the political activism of South African unions and the rhetorical support these unions received from the AFL-
CIO. In addition, there were charges that Brown had obtained a minority-based contract for a white-run business fraudulently. Federal investigations of his contract with Southern Rail alleged pilfering funds from the railroad (Clendinen, 1986; Gwerzman, 1986d).

Most important, however, senior White House staffers were uncomfortable with what the FBI had uncovered during Brown’s background investigation. White House Counsel Peter Wallison recalled:

In the FBI reports there were a number of things that raised problems for me and for Jay Stephens. This [Brown vetting] had gone along pretty far when Jay brought it to me. He said, “You know, I’m not sure this is such a good idea.” His [Brown’s] name had ...been in the press. He was going to be the nominee. It was considered really quite a good thing for the administration to nominate a black man to take this job.

Jay and I really had concerns. So we called him and we started asking him about some of these questions, and we didn’t like the answers we got back. I took that whole dossier, so to speak, to Regan. Regan agreed that this was not going to work. (P. Wallison, personal communication)75

It was after this that White House officials were quoted as saying that the President abandoned the Brown nomination (Oberdorfer & Hoffman, 1986a) despite Reagan’s refusal to “believe [Brown would] ever be involved in anything shady” (Reagan White House Diary, July 19, 1986). Finally, Brown withdrew his name from consideration in a letter to the President on July 20, 1986. The epitaph of the Brown nomination appears in a “note for the record” from Wallison and his deputy Jay Stephens to Chief of Staff Regan accompanied by press clippings that tracked the public debate on Brown’s qualifications and suitability (Robert Brown Appointee File, Ronald Reagan Library).

Reagan’s South Africa speech ultimately neither included nor was accompanied by an announcement of a new ambassador to South Africa. He delivered the speech to members of the World Affairs Council and Foreign Policy Association in the East Room of the White House on July 22, 1986. Afterwards, the President recognized that his speech did not have the desired effect.

Then at 2 P.M. [I] did my speech on S. Africa in the East Room before an audience of Diplomats, Congressmen & reps. of (sic) all kinds of groups involved in foreign relations. It was live on CNN T.V also. Of course when it was over & Cong. Grey [sic] at 4 P.M. broadcast the official Dem. reply (pure demagoguery) and the media sought out every
enemy they could and put them on T.V. I was a colossal failure. I don’t think I was. Dick Nixon called and thought it was masterful. (Reagan White House Diary, July 22, 1986)

The speech failed to increase the credibility of Reagan’s policy towards South Africa with Congress or Africa advocacy groups.76 “The speech triggered a bipartisan storm. It literally forced a split in [Reagan’s] party in the Senate—a mere three months before the mid-term election...” (Crocker 1992, p. 323).

After the speech, Congress moved closer to passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA). On August 15, 1986, the Senate voted 84-14 for a sanctions bill, and the House voted for the same bill on September 12 by a margin of 308-77. After the legislation passed, the Administration contemplated its response: the President could withhold signature and allow the bill to die without becoming law (a pocket veto), veto it and return the bill to the Congress with a message explaining the reasons for disapproval or let the legislation go into effect without his signature. The interagency and staff recommendation was to veto. The State Department joined the consensus to veto the legislation, with the caveat that the message to Congress both acknowledge the parts of the law with which the Administration agreed and include plans to nominate a black ambassador to South Africa, undertake a new initiative to provide assistance to black South Africans, and launch a Shultz mission to Southern Africa (Crocker, 1992). Subsequently, a small group of White House staff met to discuss a strategy that included the State initiative. In a memo to Donald Regan the group advised him:

As a follow-up to your meeting today a smaller South Africa Group met to implement the decisions reached and to consider further actions. All felt an announcement on a new Ambassador and trip to the region by Secretary Shultz be made at the earliest opportunity. (Dennis Thomas Memorandum to Donald Regan)

In addition, the group discussed the idea of appointing a new ambassador in anticipation of an upcoming meeting with Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) to gain his support to sustain a veto of the CAAA.

Dole plans to meet Wednesday with a group of Senators and Al Keel and Will [Ball] are to meet with him before this meeting. They will advise him [that] a veto with a message will be sent to the Hill on Friday and that we will announce new Ambassador and Shultz trip on Thursday. (White House Memo, Dennis Thomas to Donald Regan)
On September 26, 1986, the President notified the House of his veto, including in the message why he chose to veto the legislation; he did not however, announce the nomination of a new ambassador to South Africa. Conley and Kreppel (2001) describe three types of vetoes, the last being vetoes of legislation passed by at least 75% in both chambers. They suggest that in such cases the veto will be overridden, and the veto indicates “position taking” by the executive (Conley & Kreppel, 2001, p. 833); the president knows he will not prevail but uses the veto to make a statement of policy or principle to influence the public. The President’s policy message in this instance appeared in the document returning the bill to the House of Representatives, which conveyed the following:

1) South Africa is a strategic partner;
2) Sanctions would hurt blacks in South Africa as well as the economies of other countries in the region;
3) The Administrations agreed with parts of the CAAA; one issue should not define U.S.-South Africa relations. (Message to the House of Representative on Apartheid)

Reagan added: “I am also vetoing the bill because it contains provisions that infringe on the President's constitutional prerogative to articulate the foreign policy of the United States” (Message to the House of Representative on Apartheid, para. 12).

Congress overrode the CAAA veto: the House (313-83) on September 29 and the Senate (78-21) on October 3. For his part, the President was not surprised (e.g., Reagan White House Diary, September 29, 1986). He had met with Republican senators Robert Dole (R-KS), Kassebaum (R-KS), and Lugar (R-IN) before his South Africa speech (Reagan White House Diary, July 21, 1986) and was aware of their misgivings about his South Africa policy. Later, he made a number of unsuccessful calls to convince this group of senators and others to sustain his veto of the CAAA:

Spent a lot of the morning calling Sens. & seeing one John Stennis & couldn’t even get him to vote to uphold my veto...word came Sen. overrode my veto 78-21 (R. Reagan, White House Diary, October 2, 1986)

The override of Reagan’s veto was the first of a veto on a bill involving presidential management of foreign policy since the 1973 enactment of the War Powers Resolution (Crocker, 1992; Shultz, 1993; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 99th Congress, 1986); it also was one of only nine Conley/Kreppel Type III vetoes overridden during the first six years of the Reagan
presidency (Mckay, 1989). McKay describes the override of the President’s veto of the CAAA as a “fundamental challenge to the administration’s foreign policy that has no precedent in American history” (p. 459). Conley and Kreppel (2001, p. 845) remark that the sanctions override was “…perhaps the most symbolic and damaging” of the two foreign policy vetoes overridden during the Reagan administration through 1986.

Following the override, there was renewed speculation about the direction of the Administration’s policy on South Africa, including whether he would appoint a new ambassador and if that ambassador would be an African American. The Administration itself sent mixed signals. Responding to press inquiries about the failed Brown nomination and whether the next candidate would be black, President Reagan emphasized that being black was not the only qualification for a nominee and that he would name “the best man [sic] for the job without looking at what color he is” (deLama, 1986b, para. 10). Yet news reports in the Washington Post from July 19-21, 1986, and the New York Times on July 26 suggest otherwise, quoting Administration officials including Donald Regan that the search for an African American candidate would go on. A senior official said the Administration was determined to choose a black envoy to demonstrate its commitment to improving the plight of black South Africans.

Once the Brown nomination failed, and Congress overrode the President’s veto of the CAAA, it was unclear if the White House would nominate another political appointee to be Ambassador to South Africa. Hollibaugh’s (1993) research on career versus political ambassadorial appointments suggests that when there is a partisan dispute (e.g. the gap between moderate congressional Republicans and the President on economic sanctions on South Africa), the probability of a career ambassadorial appointment increases. In any case, according to press accounts, both senior State and White House officials said that the Administration was close to naming a black career diplomat as Ambassador to South Africa. In later reports, Administration officials said that the hunt for a Black career ambassador was frustrating because of the scarcity of qualified Black diplomats, perhaps also reflecting a lingering desire to identify a political appointee. The next steps evidently involved whom to choose among the limited pool of possible candidates, using what criteria. A former State official opined that the White House and the State Department were looking for someone who had the discipline to do what he or she was told regardless of the direction of U.S.-South Africa policy. (Interview D, personal communication)

Two candidates emerged: Terence Todman, who enjoyed support among moderate Republicans
such as Senator Richard Lugar, and Edward Perkins, who was a first-time Ambassador to Liberia. After a possible Todman appointment had been tested in the press and ten days after the Brown nomination failed, President Reagan met with Secretary Shultz, noting that, “We will probably name our present Ambas. (sic) to Liberia to go to South Africa. He is a remarkable man & self-made. He is also Black” (Reagan White House Diary, July 30, 1986).

In August, the print media reported that pending background checks and pre-nomination consultation with the Senate, the President would nominate Perkins (Gwertzman, 1986h). If confirmed, he would assume his duties in October. A formal announcement was expected to coincide with the President’s extension of Executive Order 12532, the 1985 order that prohibited trade with and imposed other sanctions on South Africa in hopes of preempting further legislation (Clift & Parks, 1986). Along with making public the Order’s possible renewal, the White House authorized leaks that Perkins would be the next Ambassador to South Africa (Crocker, 1992). Yet many in Congress were not appeased by the Perkins nomination or the prospect of the extension of E.O. 12532. Similar to the debate over the significance of ambassadorial changes in Latin America, the Administration and its critics differed over the import of the appointment of an African American ambassador to South Africa and specifically about Perkins. On the one hand, the Administration said that the Perkins appointment would send a strong message to South Africa that the violence toward and marginalization of the black populations was unacceptable; on the other, critics described the appointment as lacking substance, i.e., the messenger would change but not the policy. Representative William Gray (D-PA) commented that the Perkins nominations was “devoid of substance,” and Representative Howard Wolpe (D-MI) opined that the color of the Ambassador meant less than the policy (Moffett III, 1986). Senator Lowell Weicker (R -CT) had reacted similarly to the Brown candidacy; he preferred a new policy to a new ambassador. According to some press reports, Perkins himself was “aware that his appointment had been described by critics as a symbolic” (Williams, 1987) as well as a “diversionary gesture” (Barber, 1986). A former State official added:

...there were probably some people who wondered if that wasn’t some kind of hokey gesture. You know, is this substance or is this cosmetics. And that was clearly in Ed’s mind because he wanted to know what he was supposed to be doing—anything different from his predecessor—when he went down there and what was the message, you know. But, there were a lot of good answers to that and Shultz and others gave him good
answers to that. You will have the chance for a fresh start in outreach with the black community in South Africa. You’ll have the symbolic backing of all of us. You’ll be a statement of what America is as well as what it has been and what it can be, you know. So, it’s actually quite a powerful platform if you want to use it. So, I think Ed was persuaded that he should take it on. (Interview C, personal communication)

Despite the form over substance debate, there was consensus on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in the White House that Perkins, if nominated, would be confirmed (Barber, 1986). As noted earlier, the SFRC had already received a favorable report of Ambassador Perkins’s qualifications and background from the State Department. On the day of his confirmation hearing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Presiding Chair, Nancy Kassebaum, predicted early confirmation. During the hearing, she criticized former Ambassador Herman Nickel for not interacting with the black population in South Africa, a clear indication that Congress expected the new Ambassador to do otherwise. Perkins assured senators that he would uphold sanctions passed by Congress and that he would seek to meet with Nelson Mandela. When Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) questioned him about the Administration’s policy of “constructive engagement,” Perkins said, “constructive engagement means many things to many people, but I will not be using it” (Senate Hearing Transcript; Williams 1987). The SFRC unanimously voted Perkins’s nomination out of committee the same week as the hearing, and the Senate confirmed him by voice vote on October 16, 1986.

Inside the State Department

Discussion of the Administration’s strategic goals in U.S.-South Africa relations and how to implement them, perceptions of White House, NSC and State staff about how appointing an African American Ambassador would facilitate those goals, and the White House personnel process sets the stage for focusing on the dynamics within the State Department once the President decided that he would nominate a career FSO. With that decision, I suggest that the primary responsibility and freedom of action to select a pool of candidates and identify a nominee shifted from OPP and White House staff to the State Department because OPP had no authority over the Department’s personnel decisions. This section will examine how State selected a pool of candidates and identified one to recommend for nomination and how that process and its associated norms led the Department to recommend that the President nominate Perkins. Throughout this section I will use the terms selection, identification, vetting and nomination to refer to assembling a pool of potential ambassadorial candidates; choosing one to
nominate; and screening of the candidate to identify potential disqualifying factors such as conflicts of interest that cannot be mitigated, criminal behavior, personal misconduct and violations of ethics. This final phase of the process also includes consultation with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its staff to determine if the candidate is acceptable before the President announces the nomination.

**Process, Procedure and Norms in Identifying Ambassadorial Candidates**

Throughout its history, the State Department has been a complex and closed system of informal and formal organizations, and the “former drove the latter” (Perkins, 2006, p. 154). Maranto (1993) adds: “the State Department has been a very hierarchical bureaucracy with numerous internal checks for loyalty and policy soundness. Large management [units]…check and control the activities of employees to assure no actions embarrass the organization” (p. 36). As this discussion unfolds, one will see how loyalty and the discipline to carry out instructions and to avoid public disputes became pivotal in identifying and nominating Perkins as ambassador to South Africa.

Before the Kennedy administration, the norm was that career officers would work hard, do what they were asked to do, and in time progress to higher levels of responsibility including serving as ambassador.

Officers...expected that if they did well and didn't get out of line, their turn would come for the top positions, the few ambassadorships that we would get or the DCMships [Deputy Chief of Mission]. It would be their turn to be up there in these positions, and in the Kennedy Administration one felt more a plucking of people who were considered to be the brightest, the best, and the most able. And the practice of moving up through the ranks, whose turn it is, stopped. (Todman, personal communication, June 13, 1995)

At the time of Perkins’s appointment and just as it was during the Kennedy administration, few formal procedures were in place for the selection of career ambassadorial candidates; instead personal relationships, policy objectives and professional reputation were important selection criteria. It was not until 1989 that the Department developed and implemented a more formal selection and identification process for ambassadorial positions. The process included consultations between geographic and functional bureaus, vetting of qualifications, and a committee that decided which candidates should be recommended to the White House for nomination.
Prior to the Foreign Service Act of 1980, officers at the upper middle ranks of the Service could be selected and appointed ambassadors. The Act created the Senior Foreign Service; career FSOs had to reach the senior ranks of the Service before they could be considered for ambassadorships. To reach that level, a potential candidate had to demonstrate exceptional competence in policy leadership roles and the discipline to follow instructions and act according to established policy (Mak & Kennedy, 1992). These did not guarantee that one would ever reach the rank of ambassador. The only sure route to becoming an ambassador is to be identified and selected by the president. Absent that, as one officer put it in 1985, “‘You [also] have to have a rabbi on the seventh floor to get ahead in this building...a fixer, a rabbi’” (Bird, para 47), “who could mentor and advance your career to put you in position to rise in the ranks to Ambassador or other high ranking position” (Todman, personal communication, June 18, 1995).

In 1986, there were 248 black career officers (out of a total of approximately 4,029), and nine who had reached the Senior Foreign Service. Of those nine, five—Terence Todman (1983-1989), Edward Perkins (Liberia: 1985-1986), Ronald Palmer (1986-1989), Irvin Hicks (1985-1987), and George Moose (1983-1986)—were ambassadors (out of 150 ambassadorial positions). There also were two black political appointee ambassadors, Cynthia Perry (1986-1989) and Gerald Thomas (1983-1989). The career service statistics explain why Administration officials could justifiably argue that there were few African Americans to choose from (History of U.S. Diplomacy; Omang, 1986) after the White House decided to nominate a career officer.

For the most part, African American FSOs were newly minted. They moved very slowly up the ranks and were not readily placed in policy leadership roles that might have led to a promotion to the senior ranks. Consequently, in the 1980s, very few had reached the senior levels that would make them eligible for consideration for an ambassadorship. Indeed, there were so few black FSOs in the State Department that a number of the first cohort of black career Ambassadors were drawn from the ranks of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Agency for International Development (USAID) (History of U.S. Diplomacy). As Terence Todman put it: “...we had to go out and bring in senior people from USIA and AID because we didn't have anybody at senior levels in the State Department” (T. Todman personal communication, June 18, 1995).

Ambassador Perkins, for example, began his diplomatic career in USAID and moved laterally to the State Department. Examinations of the progression of his career and recollections
in his autobiography suggest that he had a “rabbi,” the only career Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger (Perkins, 2006; Williams, 1987). Eagleburger’s family was closely connected to the Wisconsin Republican party in Representative Melvin Laird’s district. When Laird became Secretary of Defense, Eagleburger’s career in the State Department blossomed as did Perkins’s, and it advanced further when Eagleburger worked with Henry Kissinger (Bird, 2011). Perkins and Eagleburger were colleagues during Kissinger’s stint as Secretary of State. Perkins also was a staff assistant to Eagleburger when the latter was undersecretary of State for Management. (Perkins, 2006) Throughout Perkins’s career, it appears that Eagleburger exercised influence to help Perkins advance in his career. After Perkins’s terms as Ambassador to South Africa and to the United Nations, Eagleburger and Warren Christopher argued for Perkins’s appointment as Ambassador to Australia, a position typically reserved for political appointees (Perkins, 2006).

In view of the few African American FSOs and the informal and formal systems in the State Department, it is not surprising that Secretary Shultz initially asked Richard N. Viets, the white career officer who would have gone to Morocco had it not been for Lenore Annenberg, to accept the assignment as Ambassador to South Africa. As the Chicago Tribune reported, “officials” said that Viets “had been promised the job” before the White House decided to choose an African American candidate (deLama, 1986a, para. 9). After Shultz offered him the job, Viets recalls that he spent ten months preparing for the assignment and speaking throughout the country on behalf of the Administration's South Africa policy, only to be told the day before his nomination was to go to the Senate that he would not go to South Africa. Viets had reached the Senior Foreign Service, held two previous ambassadorships (in Tanzania and Jordan), and was “well and favorably” known in the bureaucracy.79 Harkening back to the period before the Kennedy administration, one also can argue that Viets had earned the opportunity to be ambassador to South Africa because he was slighted in the Annenberg-Morocco matter and had followed organizational discipline by defending the Administration’s policy towards South Africa. Shultz was aware of the Morocco incident (Viets, personal communication, April 6, 1990); Viets recalled that the Secretary told him that at:

...a meeting in the White House on the sanctions bill (it was pending in the Senate and was to be voted on in the next several days and the administration looked as if it were going to lose), Don Regan, who was then the President's Chief of Staff, decided on the spur of the moment that one way to defang opposition in the Senate would be to send up the name of a black American to be our Ambassador to South Africa. He thought this
would take the wind out of the sails of the opposition. (R. Viets, personal communication)

Consistent with bargaining and informal practices and the values of loyalty, discipline in espousing established policy, and Shultz’s influence with the President, Viets was not to be disappointed again.

...at the same moment the Secretary told me that I had been such a good soldier (he was aware of the earlier Morocco fiasco), that he had talked to the President about sending me to Lisbon. The President apparently had a personal friend he intended to send to Portugal but the Secretary said the President agreed that because of what I had done for the Administration that I should get first crack at the job. (R. Viets, personal communication)

Notwithstanding the Viets candidacy, two former officials recall that it was Shultz who had argued that the next ambassador to South Africa should be an African American. These individuals made two arguments. The first suggests the tactical use of symbolism to alter perceptions of the Administration’s policy:

...we really want to demonstrate to the American people who are all up in arms we’re doing something to show that we’re on the right side of history. Wouldn’t it be great symbolism to send a Black Ambassador so Reagan said ok. (Interview A, personal communication)

The second proposes that the President succumbed to a moral argument to alter the policy.

...he was persuaded by then Secretary of State George Shultz that the U.S. because of who we are and who we think we are should make a stand in trying to bring about change in South Africa through our foreign policy vis a vis that country and that government. One of the main tools suggested by George Shultz was to appoint a Black American as Ambassador to South Africa. (Interview B, personal communication)

...this is the kind of thing that would have initiated at the top rather than at the working level by which I mean Schultz would have spoken to Reagan and a couple of other people in the White House. Would it be a good idea to assign an African American Ambassador to South Africa as a gesture of empathy, of concern, a statement, a powerful statement that would be made that this is the kind of country we are. It’s a statement of bearing witness you might put it that way. This is the way Schultz described it to President Reagan. (Interview C, personal communication)

Shultz writes in his account of his years as Secretary of State, as did Chester Crocker in his book on regional peace in southern Africa, that Shultz had recommended that Reagan appoint
a black career ambassador after the President’s July 1986 speech on South Africa. The Chicago Tribune reported in late July that Shultz also had discussed the recommendation with SFRC Chair Richard Lugar (R-IN). The *New York Times* added that Lugar’s spokesperson confirmed that the Senator had proposed Terence Todman as the next ambassador to South African (“Two Black Diplomats Considered for Post of Envoy to South Africa,” 1986). Subsequently, reminiscent of press coverage of Robert Brown’s candidacy, the print media began to refer to Todman as the “front runner” for Ambassador to South Africa. The accompanying background briefings and statements to the press by administration officials indicate that the Administration was testing the viability of a possible Todman nomination. A former Department official suggested that the strategy behind these briefings and statements was to get the name out [even] without any previous conversation [with the FSO] and...then it’s out publicly and people start commenting on it then you know the person would have to go. (Interview D, personal communication) Considering this interpretation of the Administration’s dialogue with the press, I examine the Todman and Perkins candidacies in greater detail.

**Terence Todman**

Terence Todman joined the Foreign Service in 1952; he was a five time ambassador and former assistant secretary of state under Jimmy Carter, who had amassed a record of successful confirmation hearings. He also had been a holdover from the Carter administration when he was Ambassador to Spain. In that capacity he worked closely with Secretary Shultz on NATO basing rights in Spain and had met with President Reagan (T. Todman, personal communication, June 18, 1995). This would suggest that both the White House and the State Department were well acquainted with his professional qualifications, ideological commitments, and temperament, judging by pass performance and cooperation and coordination with State and White House leadership. In any case speculation about a Todman nomination increased, especially when he returned to Washington to sit on a promotion panel and met with Secretary Shultz on another matter. As Todman recalls (Todman, personal communication, June 18, 1995):

I went to see Secretary Shultz on a totally different issue. And when I got ready to leave he said, “Oh, I thought you had come to see me about South Africa.” And I laughed. I said, “No, I wouldn't do that. That thing is too silly for words. I wouldn't waste your time on something like that.” He says, “Wait a minute...it's not silly at all, it's really serious. The President really would like to do this.” And I said, “Well, you're wrong, and
not for me.” And he says, “Well, what's wrong with it?” And I said, “Mr. Secretary, if you're serious, I would really like to tell you.” He said, “Yeah, why don't you write me a paper.”

I got a call back from him two days later to come talk about the paper I had written... And he said, “Well, your points make a lot of sense, but the President is not willing to open a discussion on the South Africa policy; he doesn't want to revisit the issue.” I said, “Then, Mr. Secretary, if he doesn't want to, then I'm not the person who you would want because I'm not at all interested. Painting it black doesn't mean that you would be changing anything.”

Many outside the Administration shared the view that appointing a black ambassador would be a cosmetic change, rather than a principled shift in the direction and import of the policy. These included prominent African Americans such as Randall Robinson of TransAfrica and Jesse Jackson as well as Representative Howard Wolpe (D-MI) and Senators Lugar (R-IN) and Kassebaum (R-KS).

Demonstrating the organizational norms of duty and loyalty, Ambassador Todman promised not to undermine the nomination of another black candidate. He made no such commitment concerning the policy, however:

So he [Secretary Shultz] asked me if I would come out in opposition to someone who might take it. I said, “I’m a career officer, I'm loyal to the career and the State Department. I would never think of opposing publicly if somebody else wanted to do it. In fact, I would certainly wish that person the very best.” And he says, “All right, thanks for your attitude.” (T. Todman, personal communication)

After Todman’s conversation with Shultz, media reports continued to tout his nomination, but these stories also mentioned problems that might affect negatively his nomination and confirmation. For example, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs criticized his record as Assistant Secretary for Hemispheric Affairs. Critics alleged that he preferred to work behind the scenes to improve human rights in the region rather than to confront publicly the worst offenders in Latin America. One of his more vocal detractors was Professor Stephen B. Cohen of the Council. Cohen assailed Todman’s human rights record not only as Assistant Secretary but also as Ambassador to Costa Rica. Although Department of State officials discounted criticism of Todman’s human rights record, they agreed with Cohen that Todman’s career as Assistant Secretary was over when he gave a speech on ten “don’ts for human rights diplomacy.” Rumors in the press also suggested that he often had been at odds with Department leadership including Secretary Christopher on human rights issues (Gwertzman, 1986f)
When Todman returned to Copenhagen, his colleagues greeted him as if he would be the next ambassador to South Africa. As he recalled in a 1995 interview:

I went back to Denmark and found an enormous number of farewell invitations and expressions of regrets that I was leaving, but that I was the best person to go to South Africa and get this thing going, and farewell, don't forget me. I had requests for interviews, from many people. So I said, “Look, if you want to come and you have any questions, I'll answer them.” So, they came and I told them I wasn't going. And, that came out as a press conference, and, of course, since it was impromptu, there was no prepared text. The Department was frantic trying to get a text of my press conference statement and the rest of that. (T. Todman personal communication)

As reported by the media, Todman in the Copenhagen press conference said he had no doubt that the U.S. opposed apartheid, but the Administration’s official statements had no credibility with black South Africans, the South African government, or elsewhere. After the press conference, the State Department spokesperson said that the press distorted Todman’s statements on South African policy, suggesting that what he actually said was that he was criticizing the perception of the policy rather than the policy itself (Schweid, 1986a). Other press reports, however, asserted that Todman said the Administration should adopt a policy for South Africa that commanded the respect of blacks and whites before seeking a new ambassador to South Africa. Several outlets reported these remarks as Todman’s “break” with Administration policy, opining that he had “turned down” or “ruled” out South Africa (Mohr, 1986; Oberdorfer & Hoffman, 1986b). On August 8 White House spokesperson Dan Howard summed up the Administration’s position: “Ambassador Todman speaks for himself. It is not a view that is shared by the administration. We have a credible policy.” (Schweid, 1986a) The New York Daily News notes that on the same day Howard said, “...Todman's statements were designed to remove himself from contention without any sign of disloyalty.”

According to Richard C. Barkley, Deputy Chief of Mission in South Africa (1985-1988), initially it was my understanding they wanted Terry Todman. Todman at that time was ambassador in Denmark. I remember he gave a press conference in which he said he would not even consider going to South Africa unless we changed our policy, which of course made it extremely difficult for the Administration to ask him. I don’t know if it was officially ever offered to him or not. Nonetheless I was called finally by Chet Crocker who said, “Ed Perkins will be coming out as ambassador,” (R. Barkley personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)
After Todman’s press conference, the State Department spokesperson added that Todman had not been officially offered the post of Ambassador to South Africa; nor had he cleared his remarks in Denmark with the Department, and he was expected to remove himself from consideration (Gwertzman, 1986g). Both the White House and the State Department worked to parse Todman’s statements and described Perkins as the current candidate; yet earlier a State Department “officer” had said that the chances were “very low” that Perkins would be transferred from his post in Liberia to South Africa (Gwertzman, 1986e). Here one can see a parallel with the prospective Brown nomination. Like Brown, Todman was not “officially” offered the job. The State Department publicized that Todman would withdraw his name from consideration just as the White House had done during the Brown matter. One difference is that no evidence suggests that Todman sought or was interested in the job while Brown seems to have wanted it until the press focused on his character and business ethics. Even in the midst of this turmoil, Brown told the press that he would accept the nomination if the President asked him to serve (Minehart, 1986).

**Edward Perkins**

After the Todman candidacy had faded, the Administration turned its attention to Perkins. In this subsection I will describe the Perkins appointment from the point that he was identified as the White House candidate through his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, confirmation by the full Senate, swearing-in, and departure to South Africa.

Perkins was in the first year of his assignment as Ambassador to Liberia. During that time, he and the Administrations faced criticism from Congress that they had not pushed the Samuel Doe regime hard enough to adopt economic and democratic reform in Liberia. Similar to some of the criticism of Todman on human rights, Congressional critics charged that Perkins and the Administration had failed to contest vigorously the many human rights abuses in Liberia (Omang, 1986a). No evidence suggests, however that human rights in Liberia became an issue during White House or legislative vetting of his nomination. Moreover, Perkins shared with Secretary Shultz a commitment to organizational discipline; both were former Marines.

...Ed Perkins was an ex-Marine Corps officer, and when his commander in chief asked him to serve, he was going to do it. (R. Barkley, personal communication, 2003)

Another former State official recalled:
We needed a person who’s professional, who’s disciplined, who is proven as a foreign service officer and you know Ed had a lot of qualities and I was able to speak to them because I knew him well...I could say with credibility to Schultz that this guy is, he’s rock solid. (Interview C, personal communication)

In contrast to the rumored Todman nomination and Todman’s recollection that he had not been asked before press reports touted his candidacy, Secretary Shultz called Perkins on July 19, 1986, to ask permission to submit his name for consideration as Ambassador to South Africa (Perkins, 2006). Perkins agreed, noting in Mr. Ambassador, Warrior for Peace that he took an oath to serve when asked and where needed. However, he too, heard first on CNN that he would be the nominee (Perkins, 2006).

The Secretary also asked Perkins to return to Washington, D.C. by August 10 (Perkins, 2006). In a rare instance for a career nominee, the White House invited Perkins to a series of meetings. First, he met with OPP Director Robert Tuttle and his deputy. The latter asked about Perkins’s party affiliation, which was Independent. Then Perkins met with the President, Chief of Staff Regan and Admiral Poindexter in order for Reagan to “determine my suitability for this sensitive appointment in terms of the administration’s political values.” (Perkins, 2006, p. 256) He recalled that as the discussion continued, and the President asked what he would do in South Africa if he chose to send him there, Perkins sensed “disapproval” from Poindexter and Regan when he indicated that he would “try to change the system using the power of your office” (Perkins 2006, p. 257). He added, “...I could feel disapproval emanating from Regan who was not happy with my response. I think he wanted a political appointment instead of a career officer.” (Perkins, 2006) Nonetheless on September 10, 1986, Shultz sent the customary memo to the President requesting approval of the Perkins nomination, noting an Agrément from South Africa.82

Following an avalanche of companies divesting from South Africa, “...the President made a statement of his own” by nominating Perkins in the wake of a legislative defeat; the appointment served notice of the Administration’s intent to reach out to all segments of the South African polity. By his presence Perkins was “the...embodiment of our own principles of equal opportunity” (Shultz 1993 p. 1123, cf. Crocker 1992). “The fact that he is black was intended to send a message” (Shultz in Perkins 2006, p. xvii).
On October 23, the Department submitted a formal request for the President to meet with Perkins. The White House staff concurred and recommended that the President schedule the meeting, noting that State believed a meeting and photo-op would confer “special status” on Perkins with the blacks and whites that he would meet shortly after his arrival in South Africa; staffers also argued that the session would make Perkins more effective when the black opposition tested his credibility and ties with Washington (Memo to the President Proposed with new Ambassador to South Africa). The President met with his new ambassador on November 12 and privately noted that he thought [that] “he’ll [Perkins] do great” (Reagan White House Diary).

Shultz swore in Perkins on November 3, 1986. During his remarks, the Secretary of State said, “The debate [over sanctions] is now over. A festering debate that has become a distraction from the real issues can now be set aside. For better or for ill, punitive sanctions are a fact. We can now proceed with our diplomacy.” (Gottlieb, 1986, para. 9) In a December 1986 address to the International Management and Development Institute, Secretary Shultz said that Perkins’s “principal mission” would be to broaden and deepen U.S. contacts with all South Africans.

He will be making clear to them that we [the United States] has no intention of...leaving them [South Africans] to face the future in isolation, and...we do not ask black South Africans [to] temper their passion for change. We share it [and] ask that it be channeled into constructive strategies for reconciliation” (Shultz, 1986, as prepared for delivery, p.10)

**Conclusion**

At the outset, I argued that factors in the national and international policy environments influence how and why presidents select ambassadorial nominees. In the succeeding chapters, I explored this idea and concluded that it is likely that President Reagan chose to nominate an African American ambassador to South Africa and Edward Perkins in particular based on domestic political influences. To close the chapter, I advance several tentative conclusions based on the dynamics within the Reagan administration, the Congress and the citizenry.

First, identifying and then nominating Perkins emerged from the debate among the Administration, Congress, and organized constituencies over the direction of U.S.-South Africa policy. That debate revolved around whether the existing policy of constructive engagement should be modified to place greater emphasis and higher priority on pressuring the South African government to eliminate apartheid and how the Administration should exert that pressure.
Second, based on the accounts of policy makers and implementers, George Shultz, Chester Crocker, White House advisors, and National Security Council staff, the Administration sought solutions to conflicts with the Congress as well as ways to increase public understanding of U.S. policy towards South Africa. It appears that the Reagan administration wished to maintain cooperation with the SAG on regional security and geostrategic issues, while demonstrating a commitment to “change” that would convince its detractors that ending apartheid was a higher priority for the Administration than it appeared.

These debates over both policy direction and strategies to shape the public and congressional discussions influenced whether a new ambassador to South Africa would be chosen. If so, then discussion turned to whether the ambassador would be African American and an FSO or a political appointee.

Two factions in the Administration argued over the priorities that should be preeminent in South Africa policy, led by Patrick Buchanan and William Casey (CIA) and Shultz and Regan. The factions argued over which tactics could or should be used to continue or redirect policy, and which would be the most effective at creating a national consensus on South Africa and apartheid. Appointment of an African American ambassador to South Africa was one tactical element in proposals both sides used to persuade the President to maintain the order of priorities of South Africa policy or to change or redirect them temporarily.

After Congress had overridden the President’s veto of the CAAA, momentum shifted from the Buchanan-Casey faction to the Regan-Shultz faction. The former’s advice to “stay the course” against sanctions; continue close political, military and economic cooperation with the SAG; avoid stronger public condemnation of apartheid; and do nothing more to pressure the regime to change its political or social system did not accomplish what the advocates sought. Sanctions became law against the President’s wishes; the Congress asserted itself by making ending apartheid a higher priority in U.S. relations with South Africa; and the legislative defeat on sanctions cost Reagan the support of moderates and some conservatives in his party. For its part, the Shultz-Regan faction argued for a plan to move beyond the sanctions debate and to return attention to policy implementation. The plan sought to address public perceptions of the Administration and its policies by more forcefully denouncing apartheid and appointing an African American as Ambassador to South Africa, providing assistance to mitigate inequities in
economic and political participation by all South Africans to forestall escalation of internal violence, and continuing efforts to end regional conflict in Southern Africa.

Both sides used the news media to gauge congressional and public reaction to the Administration’s policy debates and the proposal to nominate an African American to be ambassador to South Africa and whether he or she would be a career or political appointee. This became apparent in the public consideration and discussion of the possible nominations of Robert Brown, Terence Todman and Edward Perkins. Whether the candidate was career or a political appointee reflected some degree of ongoing tensions between White House staff and the State Department over loyalty, competence, professionalism, and commitment to the President and his policies. Perkins’s recollections of his pre-nomination meeting with the President suggest that Reagan and his advisors wanted to take his measure as a professional and evaluate whether he understood and would carry out the Administration’s policy. The Todman nomination faltered in part because he expressed publicly views that State and the White House considered inconsistent with established policy. The Perkins nomination evidently depended on whether the President was confident that Perkins would act and speak according to the Administration’s policy.

The role of presidential advisors cannot be overstated. One can argue that the Perkins nomination came about as a result of consultations between Secretary Shultz and Chief of Staff Regan. Regan controlled access to the President and had a significant influence in setting the President’s agenda. Shultz’s regularly scheduled meetings with the President were at Reagan’s request, and Regan concurred. Although meeting one-on-one with the President, it also seems likely that Shultz would have discussed the agenda of those meetings with Regan. It would appear that the Perkins appointment was one of the items on the agenda.

It appears that from Regan’s point of view, the President’s image had to be repaired after Congress overrode his veto and in effect eroded the wide leeway in foreign policy that other presidents had enjoyed, particularly in areas of ambiguity or those that are unstated in the Constitution. Shultz sought to regain from Buchanan and Casey a measure of control over the direction of South Africa policy to redirect public and congressional dialogue on South Africa. Meanwhile, Reagan’s staff sought a way to help him regain control of South Africa policy as well as the moral high ground Congress had obtained by its stance against apartheid.
There is contending evidence about the origins of the idea to appoint an African American ambassador to South Africa. It is unclear whether it originated in the White House or the NSC staffers; however, Shultz and Crocker recall that the White House staff exerted significant “control” over South Africa policy and was the vector for a number of initiatives to forestall sanctions. The appointment of a black ambassador was the subject of White House meetings and policy documents as well as “leaks” to the press on Administration policy. No definitive evidence attributes the origins of the Perkins nomination to White House or NSC staffers. Other evidence such as the recollections of a number of former officials suggests that George Shultz proposed the idea to Donald Regan, who agreed. Additional information indicates that the Secretary of State worked closely with the Chief of Staff and would have been able to propose initiatives to him that may have included appointing a “black ambassador.” Given the hierarchical organization of the White House under Donald Regan as well as his control of access to the President, it appears very likely that regardless of where the idea originated, Regan would have approved the recommendation before it was presented to Reagan. Evidence such as the President’s diary entries indicates that Reagan met with a group of (unnamed) advisors who discussed with him the merits of appointing a “black” ambassador as well as the candidacy of Robert Brown. In sum, available evidence strongly suggests that the President made the decision to appoint a “black” ambassador after considering arguments for and against the recommendation; the most important aspects in the chain of events and circumstance leading up to the Perkins appointment were Reagan’s decisions.

The external environment placed constraints on the preferences and possibilities that decision-makers confronted. Assuming an African American nominee, it appears that the White House used the same criteria it had applied when making other ambassadorial appointments. In those instances, the preferred appointee would be a conservative whose political and social views were in keeping with those of the President and who would have credibility with liberals and conservatives. Brown met these criteria, but the vetting process in the White House failed to identify soon enough ethical and other considerations that should have been flagged before Administration officials publicized his candidacy.

Once the President decided that the nominee should be a career FSO, a key aspect of the appointment process—selection and identification—shifted to the State Department. Secretary
Shultz followed through on his recommendation that the President nominate an African American FSO after Reagan vetoed the CAAA, although Shultz initially had asked a white career officer to take the job. The advantage of a career candidate was that an FSO would be expected to be cautious for the sake of his or her career and unlikely to challenge the Department’s hierarchy. An FSO committed to service “discipline” would not circumvent the Secretary of State and would carry out the policy set by the White House. This suggests that the Todman nomination would not have met the discipline criterion given his record on human rights debates within the Department and his remarks during the Copenhagen press conference. Identifying an African American FSO, who would carry out the policy regardless of his or her personal views was critical for the Administration. If the core challenge in U.S.-South African policy was navigating the relations between blacks and whites in South Africa with an administration that lacked credibility with the former, then arguably the policy could be legitimated by an African American who was willing to be a spokesperson for the policy on the ground in South Africa.

President Reagan discussed a possible Brown and ultimately a Perkins nomination with his advisors and heeded their advice in both cases. Initially OPP, the Office of Communication and Chief of Staff Regan selected a small group of candidates and chose Brown as the prospective nominee. When that no longer was viable, and Todman disqualified himself, Reagan accepted the advice of his Secretary of State and Chief of Staff to nominate Perkins. The President did so only after he had met with him and felt confident that Perkins understood Administration policy and was committed to implementing it.

Considering the evidence in Chapters 3 and 4, aspects of South Africa’s social and political environment became part of public discussion in the U.S. on the President’s management of U.S.-South Africa relations. The debate over the President’s management of relations with South Africa intensified as violence in South Africa increased. I have already suggested the existence of a gap between the public’s and the President’s perceptions of what should be the highest priority in South Africa; this gap precipitated numerous interagency policy reviews and recommendations to Reagan on methods he might use to communicate his vision of policy towards South Africa and his acknowledgement that he would accommodate the views of his critics. One of the recommendations he approved was to appoint a new Ambassador to South Africa to demonstrate his commitment to pay greater attention to eliminating apartheid and to
encouraging broad political and economic participation by all South Africans. The President’s advisors evidently convinced him that the new Ambassador should be an African American and that this option would improve his credibility with advocacy groups and the Congress. It appears as well that he used the same ideological criteria to select a career FSO as he did to identify a political candidate. Reagan chose Perkins because of his personal characteristics, professional expertise and discipline as well as his respect for the chain of command. Moreover, Reagan used a change in personnel to signal a shift in the direction of policy to build and maintain domestic consensus. The Perkins appointment was meant to redirect public dialogue to enable the Administration to pursue larger geo-strategic goals more easily.

In the next chapter, I compare the hypotheses I proposed in Chapter 2 with the conclusions I reached in Chapters 3 and 4. I will evaluate these conclusions and the underlying evidence to determine if they support, weaken, or eliminate the hypotheses of this study.
Chapter 5
Overall Conclusions and Implications

Building on previous chapters, this chapter first returns to the working hypotheses and compares them with other possible explanations for the Perkins appointment. Then, the chapter analyzes and compares these explanations. Finally, this chapter presents the conclusion of the study and its implications for future study and research.

Working Hypotheses

At the outset, this study hypothesized that the interaction among elements of national and international policies and politics influenced the Perkins appointment. These elements include the ongoing dialogue about U.S.-South African relations within the Administration, the executive and legislative branches as well as the broader polity. Furthermore, the primary objective in U.S.-South African relations of the “executive” in the proposed two-level analysis, Ronald Reagan, was to achieve geostrategic goals that he believed were in the national interest. Yet national political and societal views were not in accord with the President's policy towards South Africa and his interpretation of national security interests. In addition, this account suggested that the Administration chose to adopt a series of incremental changes in its policy toward South Africa, including the appointment of an African American Ambassador. The Perkins appointment was among the more visible and striking measures the Administration adopted to accommodate the views of critics and to influence public opinion towards acceptance of the efficacy and wisdom of continuing the Administration's South Africa policy; the Perkins appointment was the “face of change” in a largely unchanged policy. Finally, I proposed that the President's core values, his sensitivity to public opinion influenced his decision to appoint an African American Ambassador to South Africa and the political imperatives of the Congress, especially those of Republican members of Congress, influenced Reagan's decision to appoint Perkins.

Alternative Explanations

Other explanations also are possible. At least four alternatives can be drawn from scholarly perspectives on apartheid and national foreign policies as well as interpretations of apartheid and the Reagan administration's relations with South Africa. (Di Brigida, 2003; Klotz, 1995) In reconstructing these alternatives, I also draw on research on the Reagan Doctrine, his
world view, and themes found in analyses of his foreign policy: realism, idealism and pragmatism. (Anderson & Kernek, 1985; Becker, 2011; Hantz, 1996; Rucki, 2009)

The Administration Perspective

This perspective suggests that the explanation for the Perkins decision is nested in overall U.S. policy towards South Africa. Di Brigida (2003) interprets apartheid policy through the lens of realism, contending that the underpinnings of Reagan foreign policy included elements of realism, idealism and pragmatism.86 If realism shaped Reagan's policy towards South Africa, it would seem unlikely that he would set goals or make policy decisions based primarily on ethical considerations, morality, public opinion or activities in international organizations. Accordingly, non-state actors would have little or no effect on policy decisions inasmuch as the Administration’s goals were to counter the influence of the Soviet Union and to extend democracy and capitalism. In southern Africa, the Administration pursued these goals by leveraging its relations with the white minority government in South Africa to settle regional conflicts and counter Soviet interventions in intrastate warfare in the region. Anderson and Kernek (1985) suggest that the Administration's alignment with South Africa made the U.S. “vulnerable” to the Soviet use of race-based rhetoric. For its part, the Soviet Union supported insurgencies in the countries surrounding South Africa and accused the U.S. of racism because of its engagement with South Africa and marginalization of majority ruled countries in Africa.

Policy documents from the Reagan and previous administrations suggest that race was a sub-text of U.S. policy in southern Africa that other countries could exploit given race relations in the U.S. and South Africa's institutionalized segregation of the races and discrimination against most people in South Africa. Consequently, one might contend that the Perkins appointment could be viewed as mitigating a perceived Soviet advantage and improving U.S. standing among the majority-ruled countries in the region.

That said, Reagan's policy towards South Africa apparently was not devoid of moral conviction; it included the moral obligation to condemn apartheid but eschewed applying pressure on the SAG to eliminate apartheid or imposing solutions or deadlines for it to do so. This raises the question of how much the Administration was willing to press South Africa on apartheid, i.e., the degree to which it would compromise a moral commitment to achieving other national interests. A “characteristically realist point of view is that [there are circumstances
where there is a] need to compromise particular moral principles in the pursuit of major national interests” (Anderson & Kernek, 1985, p. 395). To this end Administration policy documents suggest a bifurcated policy: apartheid was an internal matter that should be left to the SAG to solve; confrontation on apartheid would jeopardize the more urgent goal of regional security. During his first term, the President appeared to be successful in setting aside the urgency of addressing apartheid as a moral issue while pursuing negotiations to resolve regional conflicts.

By the middle of his second term Reagan evidently realized that the line he had drawn between apartheid and strategic goals in southern Africa was tenuous. His detractors seemed to gain traction on two fronts: the Administration's tilt towards the SAG and the President’s apparent insensitivity on race-related matters and failure to communicate sufficiently the egregiousness of apartheid. However uninformed his policy team thought the public and the Congress were to oppose his South Africa policy, campaigns to change his policy priorities gained momentum. Reagan’s public statements about sanctions, boycotts, disinvestment, and other negative incentives failed to persuade the SAG to change its internal social and political structure, caused a backlash against the U.S. in the region, and did not resonate with black South Africans. Moreover, his first term comparison of the history of the civil rights movement in the U.S. with the evolution of race relations in South Africa and his characterization of Martin Luther King, Jr., as a Communist, along with his fight against the King federal holiday reverberated in the second term. His detractors used every misstep that Reagan made to link his attitudes on domestic race relations with apartheid.

Absent success in thwarting civic action and “punitive” sanctions legislation as well as the prospect of losing control of the policy, the White House staff tried to broker a compromise with Congress by offering a plan of action that included appointing Perkins Ambassador to South Africa. Although Reagan would have preferred a political appointee, he nominated Perkins on the advice of George Shultz, who believed that conservative ideology should not stand in the way of compromise. The Secretary of State contended that the President would be better served by having a professional diplomat in Pretoria; Perkins was an African American whose presence would enhance Reagan’s credibility in the U.S. and South Africa. By his presence in South Africa, Perkins symbolized the U.S. as a successful multiethnic society. His appointment would send a message to the SAG that apartheid jeopardized a broader economic and political agenda of cooperation and coordination on major issues and to black South Africans that the U.S. was
prepared to confront the SAG on apartheid and sought a peaceful solution to the internal struggle in South Africa. That accomplished; the Administration could follow realist dictates and return to its primary objectives in southern Africa unencumbered by a costly public debate on apartheid. Perkins would attend to internal problems while other officials would lead on regional negotiations.87

Moral Principles

A second explanation for the Perkins appointment that can be viewed as part of the first alternative emerged from interviews and memoirs. These suggested that the President cared deeply about opposing apartheid but did not have a credible South Africa policy because it did not include a way to confront the SAG on apartheid directly.88 Consequently, in this view Reagan decided in his second term that he must speak out on apartheid, and he wanted an ambassador who could help develop a credible policy within the confines of the President’s vision for South Africa. He nominated Perkins because he was a skilled and experienced FSO who could assist in crafting a credible policy that placed greater emphasis on eliminating apartheid. Moreover, Perkins had the desired appearance and demeanor to be effective in a hostile environment; he was an imposing figure and a calm person who could handle a hostile environment. His appointment would send a message to the SAG that the President of the United States was willing to engage with all parties to foster a peaceful end to apartheid. The U.S “could no longer sit on the sidelines of the disintegration of the apartheid system...President Reagan sent a black man to South Africa to make a statement.” Edward Perkins quoted in (Inman, 2010, para. 2) In addition, Perkins said in his swearing-in speech that not only would he be U.S. Ambassador to all of the people of South Africa; he would “carry with him” America’s “intolerance of racial apartness.” He added: “The American people have forcefully expressed their abhorrence of apartheid and their desire for a foreign policy that works to facilitate peaceful change in South Africa.” (Gottlieb, 1986b, para. 2)

Deflection

Another analysis of the Perkins appointment appeared most often among some leaders of advocacy groups, legislators, and public figures strongly opposed to the President's policies. This view suggests, first that Reagan nominated Perkins to deflect public criticism of the Administration's South Africa policy and to convince the Congress that it need not pass sanctions
legislation. Second, he nominated Perkins to assure the Congress that the CAAA would be implemented as it intended. Perkins’s assurances would have greater credibility with Congress than any that the Administration could give. Third, Reagan did not want “to confront the South African government in a substantive way, so he opted for a symbolic gesture.” (Jesse Jackson quoted in Gottlieb, 1986a, para. 6) In this view, the appointment sent a “contradictory message” to domestic critics as well as the SAG because the President had no intention of changing his policy towards South Africa. Perkins would represent the change, but would be a token, shut out of policy development and implementation; he was “doomed to fail.” (Julian Bond, quoted in Gottlieb, 1986a, para. 6, 7). Further, the Perkins appointment was only significant to the few African American FSOs because his was one of the most important assignments ever given to a “black man.” Moreover, Moore (1986, para. 10) opined that Perkins (1986a) was not the “right” choice because he would be passive, and the Administration nominated him because he would legitimate a policy that had been discredited and would not “rock the boat.”

**Revisionist**

Following Nelson Mandela’s death in 2013 controversy arose again over Reagan, apartheid and his motivation for appointing an African American Ambassador to South Africa. Newspaper articles and broadcast media recalled Reagan's beliefs, conservative ideology and commitment to oppose apartheid. Conservative and moderate Republicans, Reagan confidants, biographers and family members recalled that during his first term the President sent William Clark, Deputy Secretary of State (1981-1982) and later National Security Assistant (1982-1983), to South Africa to tell President Botha how much Reagan abhorred apartheid. A number of them also cite the Perkins appointment in his second term as proof of Reagan's strong opposition to apartheid (Chiles, 2013; Gingrich, 2013; M. Reagan, 2013; Steinberg, 2013).

These media exchanges included contextual influences; explanations of how South Africa fit in Cold War strategy; the inroads of Communism in southern Africa as well as assessments of the politics of liberation movements in southern Africa as a way of framing Reagan’s stance on apartheid. In these reflections, the Perkins appointment was cited by supporters and detractors. Supporters singled out the appointment as proof that the President unequivocally opposed apartheid. Detractors focused primarily on their belief that Reagan was not sufficiently confrontational or vocal in opposing apartheid, and the Perkins appointment was little more than a gesture.
In addition, interpretation of scenes from the film, *The Butler*, prompted further debate about Reagan’s commitment to oppose apartheid, his attitudes toward race and his motivations for sending an African American ambassador to South Africa. The movie included a scene in which Reagan met with Senator Kassebaum, who urged him to support sanctions because it was “the moral thing to do and Republican are [were] on board.” (Buchanan, 2013; Daniels, 2013) The President responds that he will veto sanctions. The screenwriter also included Patrick Buchanan in the background of the meeting. Some of Reagan’s biographers suggested that the film took Reagan’s veto out of context and noted the East-West struggle and Communist influence in Africa during the Administration. They also took issue with what they perceived as the film’s depiction of Reagan as a racist. The dialogue included Reagan reflecting that he fears that he might be on the “wrong side” on civil rights much as he did in an interview at the end of his term in office. (Buchanan, 2013; Rosenthal, 1989)

Analysis of Explanations

In this section, I compare the data with the working hypotheses and alternative accounts. A strong explanation of the Perkins appointment should account for why South Africa and apartheid moved up on the President’s foreign policy agenda; why Reagan decided to become personally involved in the implementation of his policy towards South Africa; and why he chose to replace the sitting ambassador. Such an explanation also should account for the criteria he used to select a replacement and why he chose to nominate a career FSO. A viable explanation should explain as well how an FSO is identified and recommended to the President and why Perkins emerged as the nominee. The first alternative, the Administration perspective, includes the origin and evolution of U.S.-South Africa policy. It discusses the President’s ideological and moral commitments and how those were incorporated into the implementation of his policy. It also discusses how and why two parts of the policy were prioritized, while the working hypotheses and the moral principle and deflection explanations appear not to make that distinction. The first alternative does not address why the President became so involved in the sanctions debate since avoiding sanctions was only one aspect of the implementation of his policy. This is significant given the timing of the Perkins appointment; it converges with the turning point in the sanctions debate and the prospect of a legislative defeat for the President.
Although not explicitly stated, the realist aspects of the Administration perspective provide insight into why Reagan chose to replace Herman Nickel and several reasons why he may have decided to nominate an African American FSO. It takes into account domestic race relations and media coverage of South Africa as well as the dynamic between the apartheid struggles in South Africa with the civil rights movement in the U.S. The Administration perspective also encompasses electoral imperatives and Administration policy debates, policy reviews and perceptions as well as the President’s ideological commitments, his rhetoric and beliefs and relationship with the public.

The working hypotheses and the moral principles and deflection explanations differ from the Administration perspective. The latter included a bifurcated policy that ranked regional negotiations above internal politics in South Africa. In contrast, the working hypotheses and the other alternative explanations do not take into account a bifurcated policy. In addition, the moral principles and deflection explanations appear grounded in public perceptions of apartheid and the President’s *bona fides* as being fully committed to eliminating apartheid.

Race, explicit as well as implicit, is a focal point in all the explanations. The revisionist explanation aligns with the geo-strategic aspects of the Administration perspective alternative. It implies a sense of urgency in confronting Soviet influence in the region and accords less urgency to responding to the injustices of apartheid.

The President’s personal views on apartheid and on race and the influence they may have had on the Perkins appointment feature prominently in all the explanations. They suggest that Reagan’s beliefs and moral commitments influenced the Perkins decision. The Administration and deflection alternatives provide more pragmatic accounts of the Perkins appointment, albeit from different perspectives. Both imply continuation of existing policy with adjustments to address criticism. The deflection explanation questions the President’s intent to comply with the will of the public as expressed through the CAAA. None of these possible explanations is clear about why Reagan became personally involved in implementing policy towards South Africa.

Rather clearly, the working hypotheses and alternative explanations of the Perkins appointment are not mutually exclusive. All appear grounded in interpretations of Reagan's South Africa policy and how it reflected and shaped the domestic policy environment and how that environment may have influenced the Perkins appointment. None is independent of the others, and none eliminates the others. All contribute to describing the context of the Perkins
decision as well as why the President chose to appoint an African American ambassador to South Africa, and how Perkins became his nominee.

**Implications of the Study and Future Research**

Although studied less than other presidential appointments, ambassadorial appointments demonstrate how presidents, the Congress and interests groups can communicate beliefs and values at home and abroad. These appointments can embody national interests that go beyond physical security. Moreover, they can indicate policy directions that reflect shifts in political power within the polity, as well as the executive and the legislature. They reflect the evolving relationship between presidents and Congress on devising and implementing foreign policy, an area frequently dominated by the executive. The Perkins appointment emphasizes the importance of creating mutual understanding between presidents and the polity, building relationships and support for foreign policies. It showed as well how emotions can define a problem and jeopardize national reconciliation and how ethnic and racial interests groups can have an impact on foreign policy decisions when they can leverage national values and beliefs to enlist broad-based support. Presidents cannot easily dismiss these interests when they cross the boundaries between groups and levels of government. The Perkins appointment was a response to opposition from these interests as well.

Future studies of foreign affairs appointments could provide greater insight into the international dimension of presidential appointments and their impact on domestic and international relationships. Such studies might also shed light on how these appointments may be used to implement policy.

**Conclusion**

Hudson (2007) and (Putnam, 1988) suggest that the distinctions between national and international influences on foreign policy decisions blur; however, nation-states ultimately make policy decisions based on factors at the domestic level. Transnational movements for human rights and racial equality, U.S. geostrategic interests, and credibility in the promotion of democratic principles contributed to the context of the Perkins appointment. The concerns of the citizenry and the Congress motivated the President to choose an Ambassador who would reflect not only Reagan’s views, but also those of the polity.
Other influences included the President’s national legislative agenda (focused around the budget) and the congressional willingness to authorize foreign assistance to insurgent groups. These may have been at risk because of the South Africa debate; South Africa and apartheid diverted attention from the President’s domestic agenda. Foreign aid to the SAG and for programs for the black majority were at stake. The President’s national security team included progress on South Africa on the President’s foreign policy agenda for the second term. (Regan, 1988) A credible ambassador could help convince the Congress to approve programs for South Africa. (T. Todman, personal communication).

The discord within the President’s national security team grew so intense and polarized that the President became personally involved in implementing South Africa policy when it seemed that his anti-Communism objective might be at stake. Reagan believed in democratic principles and fundamental rights for all people; these were part of his core values and beliefs. However, he was less sensitive to the impact of his rhetoric on race, apartheid, and the suspension of civil rights and human rights in South Africa. Reagan also appeared insensitive to perceptions that the Administration did not respond appropriately to internal conditions in South Africa. Public opinion, as well as the political imperatives of Congress, coalesced around sanctions; sanctions would impress upon South Africa that the U.S. could not maintain the status quo unless it adopted meaningful policies to dismantle apartheid. The President misjudged the strength of the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. and the movement's impact on members on the Republican party, which contributed to the override of his veto of sanctions legislation. He nominated Perkins the same week that the Congress overrode his veto, evidently hoping to forestall a foreign policy defeat and continue to implement a discredited policy. Leading up to the Perkins appointment Reagan showed that he was inflexible and unwilling to adjust to the evolving policy landscape. The President's actions revealed his vulnerability on race relations in the U.S., his inability to persuade and build a coalition as well as to manage conflicting demands. Reagan lost perspective on how to reconcile aspects of his foreign policy and discounted criticisms.

Although Ambassador Perkins’s appointment symbolized the values of a multicultural society, the appointment also signaled to the South African government that the U.S. had fundamentally altered the relationship. Ambassador Perkins himself reinforced the changed policy through dialogue with all the people of South Africa and by bearing witness at public
protests and during unlawful prosecutions. After serving in South Africa, Perkins went on to a
distinguished career as Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador to the Commonwealth of
Australia and Director General of the Foreign Service
**Appendix A**

**Perkins Appointment Timeline**

**1985**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 19</td>
<td>Reagan recalls Nickel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Media reports that Administration will replace Nickel with a Chargé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 8</td>
<td>Nickel returns to South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1986**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun 29</td>
<td>White House official says Administration has begun a review of South Africa policy (Hess, 1986) Miami Herald, p. 8A in Patrick J. Buchanan Files, Reagan Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 4</td>
<td>Memorandum from Walter Raymond to Patrick Buchanan—Announcement of a new Ambassador would add “real power to the speech” and give “appearance of movement,” and if it were Brown it would create a sensation (Patrick J. Buchanan Files, Reagan Library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 9</td>
<td>White House meeting on the nomination of Robert Brown as Ambassador to South Africa; President has doubts (White House Diary, Reagan Library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 11</td>
<td>President signs off on the nomination of Brown as Ambassador to South Africa (White House Diary, Reagan Library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 15</td>
<td>Nicolaides to Buchanan accuses DOS of leaking stories undermining Brown nomination and suggesting “career diplomat” better able to carry out “new policy”— DOS blocking “a black moderate-to-conservative”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 17</td>
<td>President considering nomination of Robert Brown (<em>Chicago Tribune</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 18</td>
<td>Washington Times Reports (McWilliams, 1986, p. A10) White House-State Department split over South Africa policy; President is expected to announce in speech that he will appoint Brown as new Ambassador to South Africa in (Patrick Buchanan Files, Reagan Library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 19</td>
<td>President “upset” because has to “hold off” on Brown nomination because of possible wrong-doing (White House Diary, Reagan Library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 19</td>
<td>Robert Brown withdraws name from consideration as Ambassador to South Africa (Appointment File)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jul 21  President told reporter he would name “the best man for the job without looking at color, he is (Chicago Tribune)

Jul 21  Lugar meets with President and recommends Todman (New York Times, Section 1, p.1)

Jul 26  Senior State and White House officials say Administration is close to naming career diplomat as Ambassador to South Africa—two candidates-Todman and Perkins (New Times, Section 1; p. 1)

Jul 27  Todman faces criticism on human rights record; State officer says chances are “very low” that Perkins would be transferred to South Africa

Jul 28  Administrations committed to the idea of Black Ambassador (Christian Science Monitor, p. 5)

Jul 30  President meets with Secretary Schultz—“we will probably name our present Ambassador to Liberia to South Africa” (White House Diary, Reagan Library)


Aug 7  Todman rules out Ambassadorship (Charles Mohr, New York Times, Section 1, p. 1)


Aug 8  White House spokesman, Peter Roussel, says search for a successor to Nickel Would go on; Todman is criticizing perception of policy, not policy itself (AP Archives)

Aug 8  Administration officials say hunt for black career candidate for Ambassador frustrating because of lack of scarcity of qualified black diplomats (Joanne Omang, Washington Post, A13)

Aug 8  White House announces Nickel’s return to South Africa (Eleanor Cliff, Los Angeles Times)

Aug 18  Principal Deputy Legal Advisor Kozak memorandum to Jay Stephens, Deputy Counsel to President transmits Perkins financial disclosure form
Aug 19  State transmits Nickel’s letter of resignation
Aug 29  Quotes Donald Regan, White House Chief of Staff, that Administration
        committed to naming black envoy to South Africa (Bernard Gwertzman, New
        York Times, p. 4)
Aug 30  SAG does not object to Perkins nomination; it has had Black ambassadors before,
        but not from U.S. (James Gerstenzang, Los Angeles Times)
Sep 3   Congressman says appointment of Perkins will mean little if no change in policy
        (George D. Moffett, III, Cristian Science Monitor)
Sep 10  Schultz memorandum to President requesting approval of the nomination
        of Perkins as next Ambassador to South Africa, noting agrément from SAG
Sep 11  Transmission of the nomination memo, draft press release, and report to
        Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Schultz to Wolcott through
        Robert Tuttle
Sep 26  President vetoes sanctions legislation
Sep 29  House votes to override veto
Sep 30  Senate votes on its own anti-apartheid bill
Sep 30  White House announcement of the nomination of Edward J. Perkins Ambassador
        to South Africa
Oct 1   Administration officials hope President’s offer to stiffen sanctions unilaterally
        plus historic appointment of first Black Ambassador to South Africa will persuade
        Senate to sustain President’s veto (Eleanor Clift, Los Angeles Times)
Oct 1   Perkins appointment will have no impact on Congress; Perkins expected to be
        easily confirmed (Eleanor Clift, Los Angeles Times)
Oct 1   President names Black ambassador to South Africa (Sun Sentinel)
Oct 2   Senate overrides Reagan veto of sanctions bill by vote of 78-21
Oct 6   Perkins hearing before Senate Foreign Relations Committee; assures
        Senate, he will uphold sanctions and seek to meet Nelson Mandela
Oct 9   Senate expected to confirm Perkins (Barber, 1986, p. 6)
Oct 23  Executive Secretary memorandum to Poindexter requesting meeting with
        President to confer “special status” on Perking (Ronald Reagan Library
Oct 24  Dutcher to Poindexter memo proposes President meeting with Perkins
Nov 3  Schultz swears in Perkins as Ambassador to South Africa
Nov 3  Perkins meeting with President approved
Nov 12 President “saw off” Ambassador Perkins (White House Diary, Reagan Library)
Dec 1  Assistant Secretary Crocker quotes Secretary Schultz remarks at “send-off” (swearing-in) for new Ambassador and says it is “time to move on.”
Dec 4  Secretary Schultz addresses International Management and Development Institute and shares Perkins mission as Ambassador
Appendix B

White House Staff and National Security Staff

Carl Anderson, 1985-1987
Special Assistant to the President and Acting Director
Office of Public Liaison (Domestic Policy, Catholics, Family Issues)

Linda L. Arey, 1985-1986
Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Director for Public Liaison; Women

William L. Ball, 1986-1988
Legislative Affairs, White House Office of

Patrick J. Buchanan, 1985-1987
Special Assistant to the President for Communications
Director, Office of Communications

David L. Chew, 1985-1988
Staff Secretary, Office of the Staff Secretary

Michael Deaver, 1981-1985
Deputy Chief of Staff

Fred Fielding, 1981-1986
Counsel to the President
Office of the White House Counsel

J. Douglas Holladay, 1984-1986
Office of Public Liaison, Religion and Education

E. Pendleton James, 1981-1982
Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel

Alton G. Keel, Jr. 1987-1987
Deputy Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security
Acting Principle Deputy to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Office of the Legal Advisor, NSC
Office of the Executive Secretariat, NSC

Mari Maseng, 1981-1987
Office of Speechwriting
Director, Office of Public Liaison
Robert C. “Bud” McFarlane,
Deputy Assistance to the President for National Security
Assistant to the President for National Security
Constantine C. Menges, 1983-1985
Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC
International Communications and Information Directorate, NSC
Philip Nicolaides, 1986-87
Office of White House Correspondence: Deputy Director, Special Presidential Messages,
John Poindexter, 1983-1986
National Security Affairs, Office of the Assistant to the President for
Walter Raymond, 1982-1987
International Communications and Information Directorate, NSC
Intelligence Directorate, NSC
Philip Ringdahl, 1986-1988
Director, African Affairs, NSC
Office of the Counsel to the President
Scott Sullivan, 1984 - 1986
Senior Advisor for International Economics at the Crisis Management Center of the National
Security Council,
Robert H. Tuttle, 1982-1988
Special Assistant to the President in the Office of Presidential Personnel
Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Presidential Personnel
Helene von Damm, 1981-1983
White House Staff Director of Presidential Personnel
White House Staff Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel
Fred Wettering, 1981-84
Political Affairs Directorate, NSC:
Director African Affairs Directorate, NSC
National Security Assistants to the President
Robert C. McFarlane (1983-1985)
Richard V. Allen (1981-1982),
William P. Clark (1982-1983),
John M. Poindexter (1985-1986)
Chiefs of Staffs
James Baker (1981-1985)
Donald Regan (1985-1987)
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Notes

1 See Digital National Security Archive, South Africa: the making of U.S. Policy, 1962-1989
2 The “Young Turks” included, for example, Newt Gingrich and Jack Kemp, who were concerned about the optics of a close alliance with South Africa, and wanted to improve Republicans’ standing with African Americans and youth. (Finnegan, 1986)
3 Numerous witnesses testified against Lefever’s nomination on ideological grounds including the NAACP and Helsinki Watch. Two of Lefever’s brothers also testified that Lefever subscribed to theories that some races are genetically inferior to others.
4 The Foreign Affairs Oral History collection is available on CD-ROM, in the Library of Congress database and on line through the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
5 Interviews took place after the Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board granted approval.
6 An electronic copy of the notes as well as the hand written notes are in the principle investigator’s dissertation files. The principal investigator recorded an identifying study code on both the hand written and electronic notes. A list of corresponding study codes and subject names were stored in a separate file so that the data could be linked back to the interview subject’s identity.
7 There is no specific discussion of U.S.-South African relations during the Ford administration because Henry Kissinger was still the principal foreign policy advisor and implementer of South Africa policy. No changes to the policy were adopted after the recommendations in NSSM-39 were approved during the Nixon and Ford administrations.
8 As noted in the Nixon administration (National Security Study Memorandum-39, p. 1) the concern was that: “Because of the multiracial character of our own society and own racial problems, other countries would tend to see our relationship with southern Africa as reflections of [our] domestic attitude on race. This situation is exacerbated by the extension of South African racial discrimination to black Americans who may be refused visas or who are subjected to segregated facilities in South Africa.”
9 Tillery (2006) notes that circa 1969 Congressional Black Caucus members were among those inserting statements in the Congressional Record as well as making them to the press.
10 NSSM-39 identified Representative Charles Diggs, Chairperson of the House Subcommittee on Africa as well as 13 Senators (including one Republican), and 23 members of the House opposed to extension of South Africa’s sugar quota as a means of beginning disengagement from South Africa.
11 Nixon had originally nominated Hurd to be Ambassador to Venezuela, but Hurd later withdrew his name from consideration because of a conflict of interest.
12 Quotes from The South Africa Country Reader can be found in a compilation of excerpts of individual interviews conducted over decades for the Foreign Service Oral History Project. The collection is organized chronologically and can be searched by name, and accessed online on the website of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
13 Although President Carter did not designate Hamilton Jordan, Chief of Staff until 1979, the Jimmy Carter Library collection includes the files of Hamilton Jordan as part of the Chief of Staff collection (1977-1981). Hamilton Jordan’s files (1977-1980) are cited as part of this collection.
14 Young often compared the civil rights movement in the U.S. to that of blacks in South Africa, a view that did not resonate with blacks in South Africa and other Africans who differentiated
between the liberation from minority rule and the struggle of a minority to achieve equitable treatment. This suggests that Young related his experience in the civil rights movement to the black liberation movements (McAdam & Rught 1993; Guigni, 198). He also credited U.S. businesses with helping to resolve “racial problems” in the U.S., and argued that U.S. business could play a meaningful role in resolving South Africa’s racial issues. The latter was later to become an element of the criticism of Reagan’s first Ambassador to South Africa. (Lulat, 2008)

Thomson (2008, p. 98) cites as “symbolic” high-level representation at the funeral of Steve Biko, the recall of Ambassador Bowdler as well the U.S. joining the rest of the UNSC in condemning apartheid and supporting its opponents.

I refer here to constitutional freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, as well as President Roosevelt’s articulation of freedom from want and freedom from fear in his Arsenal Democracy Speech (United States & Roosevelt, 1995). I infer from perennial articulation of values and interests in the National Security Strategy of the United States, and presidential rhetoric (e.g. Reagan’s 1983 Evil Empire Speech and Carter’s 1977 commencement address at Notre Dame as well as public discourse) a desire to extend and secure these freedoms for all people.

In early 1981 Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced in his first news conference that human rights would no longer be the central focus of U.S. foreign policy; rather, it would be international terrorism, “the ultimate of abuses of human rights.” Reagan’s nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Ernest Lefever, was widely quoted as saying that promoting human rights abroad should not be the responsibility of the United States. (Jacoby, 1986)

This approach continued that of the Nixon administration as outlined in National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 39).

When Reagan assumed office South Africa faced many challenges including a shrinking white population, stagnating economy, a widening split between right wing Afrikaner nationalists and progressives, ever more intense pressure from the black majority as well as neighboring countries, and growing pressure and isolation from the international community because of apartheid. These conditions represented opportunities for the Reagan administration to influence the SAG.

The SAG administered what was known as South West Africa from 1915 until 1990 when it became the independent nation of Namibia.

For example, early in 1981, the U.S. opposed language in a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) statement that called members of the ANC freedom fighters and “patriots” and reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people (Current Foreign Relations, 1981[6]). Similarly, U.S. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick protested the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) Credentials Committee’s refusal to seat South African delegates (Current Foreign Relations 1981[10]). In March the U.S. was among five Western states that abstained on UNGA resolutions calling on the UNSC to impose comprehensive sanctions against SA to compel its withdrawal from Namibia.

The Reagan administration referred to incentives it provided South Africa as “positive sanctions.”

The previous ambassador was career FSO William B. Edmonson, who left the post on July 22, 1981.

Herman Nickel granted two interviews for the Foreign Service Oral History Project, one in 1989, and the other in 2005.
This raises the question of what constituted change in the eyes of the Administration, Congress and advocacy groups. It is possible to infer that to activists, those opposed to administration policy, and the broader U.S. polity, change may have meant pressuring South Africa to dismantle apartheid immediately and share power, while the Administration’s idea of change was a gradual evolution from reforms to power sharing at the pace set by white South Africans.

The Democratic Presidential Debate, Dartmouth College January 15, 1984 and New York April 1, 1984 are examples.

The SAG banned television, radio, and photographic coverage of unrest in black townships in November 1985 (O’Malley Archives Chronology 1985, Nelson Mandela Foundation).

Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and Mark Hatfield (R-MI) had begun a letter writing campaign to urge Reagan to meet with Tutu.

The argument that tribal dynamics were integral to internal discord was part of Botha’s explanation of unrest in South Africa.

The underlying themes can be found in (National Security Decision Directive Number 187 United States Policy Towards South Africa, 1985) and public diplomacy documents. However, the quotes that follow are found though out Reagan’s remarks to and encounters with the press for example, following his meeting with Desmond Tutu, he added to these quotes that the U.S. could be seen to be “rolling over to demands from outsiders.”(Rigg, 2011)

Reagan, to his detriment, commented after Botha’s speech on August 15, 1985. It was then that he compared racial relations in the U.S. with those in South Africa; he advanced the idea that South Africa had eliminated segregation. He later recanted. (Lugar, 2004; “Reagan, Ronald. “Telephone Interview with Bob Mohan of WSB Radio in Atlanta, Georgia. Santa Barbara. 24 Aug 1985. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu”)

The working group was established under the authority of NSDD 77, which created a structure for management of foreign policy: the Special Planning Group (SPG) and the International Political Committee (IPC).

His policy was effective and there had been progress; maintaining the policy would increase the chances that the U.S. could might convince South Africa to find a peaceful solution to the strife between the black majority and the white minority, and the whites are committed to give up power gradually and form a government that respects the rights of all its people.

The West as well as the South African public had expected Botha to announce new reforms, but he ruled out significant political power sharing and blamed “communist agitators” for disturbances in South Africa (Giliomee, 2008). Reagan administration officials had briefed the Congress that Botha would announce new reforms.

An Administration spokesperson commented that this was particularly egregious given that an Eminent Persons Group was in the region to promote dialogue between blacks and whites in South Africa.

Members of the committee included Frank Carey, the recent CEO of IBM and William Coleman, former U.S. Secretary of Transportation and a distinguished black lawyer. The other members were Dr. Timothy Healy, President of Georgetown University; Owen Bieber, head of the UAW; Vernon Jordan, the well-known civil rights leader and former executive director of the Urban League; the Reverend Leon Sullivan, a Philadelphia pastor; Helene Kaplan, a distinguished lawyer and chairman of the board of the Carnegie Corporation; John Dellenback, a former Congressman from Oregon; Larry Eagleburger, then with Kissinger Associates; Franklin Thomas, an African American and head of the Ford Foundation; Roger Smith, the CEO of
General Motors; and Griffin Bell, Attorney General under President Carter. (C. Kontos, personal communication, South Africa Country Reader)

37 Reagan met with Chief Buthelezi on January 30, 1985; he was at the White House in 1982. (“Memorandum from Nicholas Platt to Robert C. McFarlane Briefing Memorandum for President Reagan's Meeting with South African Chief Gatsha Buthelezi,”)

38 Attendees included Howard Philips, formerly on Senator Helms’s political staff, and Henry Walther, U.S. Defense Committee. Both were “new right” colleagues who were involved in the founding of the Conservative Caucus.

39 Paul Weyrich was a conservative thinker and strategist who coined the phrase “moral majority.” He was a key figure in the “new right.”

40 The Administration believed that South Africa’s black unions were heavily influenced and financed by Soviet Bloc countries and Cuba.

41 Chavez October 10, 1985 memo to Phil Ringdahl, which indicates that they discussed the idea during a situation room meeting with Shultz (NSC African Affairs Directorate Box 91876, Ronald Reagan Library)

42 Excerpt from what appears to have been a paragraph cut from a classified document with the annotation “Ringdahl.” Philip Ringdahl was Director of the NSC African Affairs Directorate. The document is included (NSC African Affairs Directorate Box 91876, Reagan Library).

43 Its share of the student loan market fell from 28% in 1981 to 17% in 1986.

44 However, other committees became involved such as those on international trade, fiscal affairs, human rights and international organizations, supervision of financial institution regulation and insurance.

45 The Study recommended that the U.S. government demonstrate opposition to apartheid by applying economic sanctions to South Africa and supporting economic growth in southern Africa. The Study also recommended changes in existing policy by extending the arms embargo and restricting nuclear cooperation and investment in South Africa.

46 They included 1) freeing Mandela, 2) contesting the Administration’s approval of honorary consuls for South Africa, and 3) calling for the SAG to end relocation programs affecting blacks.

47 This was a bill jointly introduced in the House and Senate that prohibited lending and new investment in South Africa and enforced sanctions on imports and exports with the nation. The bill also introduced sanctions on United States business involvement in South Africa.

48 Career ambassadors generally serve three year terms; however, ideology can play a role in shortening the term of a career ambassador. For example, President Nixon wanted to demand the resignation of all career ambassadors immediately as he did not trust FSOs and thought they were liberals who opposed his policies (CBS evening news 2009). Today all ambassadors submit pro forma resignations when there is a change in administration, but those of career ambassadors are very rarely accepted unless they have completed their assignment.

49 Schultz had a standing meeting with the President twice a week and attended other meetings with Reagan (Daalder & Destler, 2009; Regan, 1988, Reagan White House Diary Schedules; Shultz, 1993). Destler and Daadler suggest these scheduled meeting were the result of infighting between Shultz and William Clark, National Security Assistant (1982-1983), and that Shultz met with the President alone. Moreover, Shultz worked well with Chief of Staff Don Regan (Regan 1988; Shultz 1993), strengthened the Secretary of State’s effect on policy decisions.

50 David E. Lewis notes that, “selection of the Deputy Secretary of State or United Nations Ambassador historically has been influenced by the need to make up for perceived shortcomings
in the president’s Secretary of State” (Lewis, 2008, p.57). In the first term, for example, Deputy Secretary William Clark was part of the informal group that met to decide on political versus career ambassadorial appointments. On the other hand Shultz recruited and selected both of his deputies, Kenneth W. van Dam and John C. Whitehead (“Short History of the Department of State-Secretary Shultz Takes Charge,”).

This was due in part to the diminished role of the OPP in the second term. Robert Tuttle was demoted to Deputy Assistant to the President, and the office did not benefit as much from the support of the Chief of Staff. Consequently, Cabinet officers had much greater latitude in making appointments and enjoyed the President’s support in doing so (Weko, 1995).

In this context and consistent with (Lewis, 2009) and (Moe, 1985), politicization refers to presidential appointments of like-minded and committed individuals to carry out his agenda. (Bird, 1984) is consistent with Lewis and Moe but places greater emphasis on assessing the appointments in the State Department in a negative way, arguing that the President displaced FSOs with less competent individuals, relegated human rights policy to the bottom of U.S. relations with Latin America, and elevated conservative ideology in the identification of FSOs to fill policy-related positions as well as the appointment of ambassadors.

Bonafede (1987, p. 53) in Mackenzie 1987) notes that Shultz’s “insistence upon hand-picking appointees who served under his jurisdiction” caused tensions not only with OPP but also with Senate conservatives. Shultz had jurisdiction over Ambassadors as well. Although Ambassadors nominally report to the president, presidents generally delegate the day-to-day supervision of Ambassadors to the Secretary of State.

This study does not include a broad discussion of the vast literature on the administrative presidency and the Office of Presidential Personnel, although it does provide context for ambassadorial appointments along with the identification and nomination of Perkins. For a fuller discussion of the administrative presidency, OPP, the politicization of the federal executive branch and the administrative presidency, see, e.g.,(Lewis, 2011; Moe, 1985; Weko, 1995) Heclo 1977 Nathan 1983)

In the first term Buchanan wrote articles critical of Shultz and others in the Administration that he judged to be not sufficiently conservative or attuned to Reagan’s beliefs and agenda (Cannon, 1991; Coffey, 1985). Once appointed, he encouraged the President to make speeches and offered policy recommendations whose tone and content challenged State’s recommendations. For example, he urged the President to go to Germany and make a speech at Bitburg cemetery where Nazis were buried and another on South Africa sanctions (Regan 1988; Shultz 1993; Stanley 2012). Buchanan wrote several controversial articles (e.g., June 17, 1997, “Yes, Watergate was a Coup D’Etat” that cited Richard’s Nixon just cause in pursuing the investigation of Alger Hiss, the State Department official accused of spying for the Soviet Union). He also clashed with State over policy in Latin America and the Soviet Union. According to Chester Crocker, Buchanan was the voice of “movement conservatism” and classified State as “enemy territory” (Crocker, 1992).

The Heritage Foundation wrote many position papers for the Administration on a variety of issues including aspects of foreign policy. Over the course of the Administration, Heritage provided a forum for Reagan-era political appointees to voice their concerns about implementation (or the lack thereof) of the President’s policies by certain departments and agencies. One such event (July 2, 1985), “The State Department versus Ronald Reagan,”
featured four political appointee ambassadors who argued that the Department was denying the President’s electoral mandate by undermining Reagan’s policies.

57 Presidents also may appoint ambassadors to international organizations or confer the rank of ambassador to envoys; in the case of envoys the president must confer with the Senate to justify such justifications (22 USC 3942)

58 Bird (2011) suggests that the Administration purged FSOs in policy positions and replaced them with political appointees or FSOs whom the Administration deemed ideologically compatible.

59 Modest funds are made available for official events that ambassadors host and for maintenance of official residences. The real cost of entertaining in these capitals is usually far beyond the means of a career officer. Wealthy political appointees supplement the funds for representation and maintenance of their residences. This is also one reason that there are fewer career appointments to these posts.

60 FSOs also may choose to “lobby” within State and seek endorsements for their candidacies from outside the Department. The latter channel may not be beneficial as State officials may perceive it as an attempt to preempt formal and informal norms.

61 According to (Bonafede, 1981, para. 65)...the group includes Holmes P. Tuttle, a Los Angeles automobile dealer; William A. Wilson, a California rancher and real estate developer; Hal Wallis, the motion picture producer; Alfred Bloomingdale, scion of the department store chain and former Chairman of the Diners Club; Walter H. Annenberg, publisher and former ambassador to Great Britain; Earle M. Jorgensen, president of the Jorgensen Steel Co.; Theodore E. Cummings, builder of a national supermarket operation; Charles Z. Wick, an investor, lawyer and businessman; Jack Wrather, a television producer; Henry Salvatori, an oil producer; Joseph Coors, the brewery company head; and Daniel J. Terra, founder and chief officer of an Illinois chemical firm.

62 Funded by the Ford Foundation, the American Academy of Diplomacy formed a committee similar to that of the American Bar Association that screens federal judicial nominees. In an announcement on Capitol Hill Senators Charles Mathias (R-MD), Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Alan Cranston (D-CA), Christopher Dodd (D-CT), Daniel Evans (R-MA) and Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) agreed to work with the group to “weed out unqualified nominees.” (Oberdorfer, 1985)

63 When there is a change in administration, all ambassadors, both career and political, submit resignations. Resignations of career ambassadors are usually pro forma; it is rare when career resignations are accepted unless the White House wished to change ambassadors. Some administrations see changing ambassadors as an opportunity to shift focus, reward people who did not receive office initially, and signal a shift in policies.

64 The Washington Office on Africa and the National Council of Churches criticized the Nickel nomination because it would send a signal of approval to the SAG while repression continued, and the articles he wrote emphasizing the positive role that corporations could play to support incremental change in South Africa. He also criticized moral arguments against apartheid as well as “lecturing or hectoring” the SAG to reform. (“Reagan Choice Urges Care on South Africa” February 26, 1982)

65 Staff at the embassy in Pretoria and its consulates in Johannesburg and Cape Town differed somewhat on the issue of Ambassador Nickel’s contact with black South Africans. Some of them recall some contact, but for the most part the consensus was that this contact was very limited and confined to a narrow range of people. All note that Ambassador Perkins was much
more active with the black community. (B. Brown, personal communication; R. Barkley, personal communication)

Chapters 3 and 4 include broader, but limited discussions of policy differences between Administration factions. However, a comprehensive discussion of U.S.-South Africa relations and all of its nuances falls outside the scope of this inquiry.

“Black” ambassadors from other countries were accredited to South Africa; however, there had never been one from the U.S. until the Perkins appointment. African Americans had served as Consuls General in Cape Town.

The small group included: Dennis Thomas, (Office of the Chief of Staff), William Ball (Office of Legislative Affairs), David Chew (Office of the Staff Secretary), Patrick Buchanan (Office of Communication), Mitchell Daniels, Jr. (Office of Intergovernmental Affairs), Alton G. Keel (National Security Council staff), and Mari Maseng (Office of Public Liaison).

Buchanan wrote numerous articles about South Africa and had ambitions to be ambassador to South Africa. During the Ford administration, Chief of Staff Alexander Haig approved, but the President refused to nominate Buchanan.

Ronald Reagan Library staff notes describe the content and scope of the Buchanan collection of subject files, noting Buchanan’s involvement in the South Africa sanctions debate and substantial “control over [the message].” Regan (1988) describes how the White House determined daily which issues were the most important for the Administration to channel press coverage in the desired direction and coordinate the “message” with cabinet press offices. Regan (1988) lists South Africa as one of these topics. Hertsgaard (1988) describes this technique at length.

Barnes (1986) alleges that the State and the NSC staff worked on three drafts of the President’s speech independent of the Office of Communication. He alleges that the NSC staff did not share the initial drafts with Buchanan; however once Buchanan received a “bootlegged copy” of the latest draft he took over, shutting out the NSC staff and State.

Early in the Administration, James Baker, Edward Meese and Michael Deaver put in place the practice of the “systematic” leak “to produce a specific effect…the leaks covered a wide range of issues both foreign and domestic and in general accurate as far as it went” (Regan 1988, p. 253-254). The leaks were usually done through attributed and non-attributed background briefings for reporters. As the Brown nomination gained momentum inside the White House, the Administration used authorized leaks to test how Congress, advocacy groups, churches and interests such as business and organized labor would react to a Brown nomination. Leaks were later to become a factor when the Brown nomination faltered and the public dialogue on other candidates began.

Nominating documents include separate questionnaires for the White House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). The White House uses its questionnaire as part of the vetting process, and the Senate uses its questionnaire to perform due diligence.

An ABC news telecast quoted the spokesperson of the Clothing and Textile Union who noted the “irony” of the Brown nomination: “Brown’s role as labor relations consultant with Sara Lee, owners of Hanes textiles” (Vanderbilt tvnews ABC evening broadcast July 16, 1986)

Wallison (personal communication) characterizes the Brown matter as “...an example of trying to keep the President’s skirts clean, so to speak, by using the vetting process, and the ethics issues that arise in that context, to prevent him from getting into political trouble.”
Bipartisan criticism followed the speech including comments, for example, by Senators Kennedy (D-MA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN). However, South Africa’s Ambassador to the U.S. Herman Beukes, praised the speech (Vanderbilt tvnews CBS evening broadcast July22, 1986). For its part some White House staff attributed the negative response to the speech to “sympathetic” coverage by the “megamedia” to detractors and to ineffective liaison by some members of the White House legislative operation because of “clientitis,” i.e. “accommodating the concerns of squishy senator sand reps(sic) [rather than] pushing the President’s policies.” (Nicholaides memo to Buchanan dated July 23, 86, Buchanan file OA 12958, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

There is a significant literature on foreign policy vetoes and overrides as well as on Congress’s role in foreign policy, including (Canes-Wrone, 2010; Lu & Vander Wielen, 2012; Mack, DeRouen, & Lanoue, 2013; Wildavsky, 1966). Explanations for the relatively small number of overrides of presidential vetoes of foreign policy related legislation include the considerable latitude and deference from the Congress that presidents have enjoyed that go beyond the executive’s constitutional (Article 2, Section 2) powers related to foreign relations. Increasingly, Congress has challenged the traditional role of the president in managing the nation’s relations with other countries.

Opening statements and statements for the record are reviewed and “cleared” by the Department of State. Any response to a question from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) would have been vetted previously through consultations with SFRC staff. Nominees also participate in “murder boards” where they role play to practice before their hearing. Given the tensions over Administration South Africa policy, it is likely that the response to this question was thought out and rehearsed before the hearing. It is common practice for nominees to make calls on Senators before their hearings, if the member wishes to receive them. It is possible that if there is an area of concern to the member, the senator may question the nominee before the confirmation hearing.

“Well and favorably known” is a term of art to describe an individual’s reputation that is meant to convey that the individual was well connected and had no blemishes on his or her record.

However, Perkins does recount that CNN reported that he would be the nominee for Ambassador to South Africa before the Secretary called him.

Shultz had not called Todman to discuss a possible nomination (Todman, personal communication, June 18, 1995).

The Los Angeles Times reported on July 15, 1985 that the SAG stated that it was unaware of the possibility of the appointment of a new ambassador, and far right white politicians of the Reformed Nationalist Party viewed the U.S. sending a black ambassador to South Africa as an affront to the South African government, a signal of support to blacks, and encouraging defiance of the SAG while compromising decades of cooperation and good relations. However, the head of the Johannesburg International Institute said that it would be difficult for the SAG to object to such an appointment based on other than diplomatic reasons.

A full discussion of the role of advisors and bureaucratic dynamics is important for considering how and why Perkins was appointed, but it is beyond the scope of this inquiry.

Among these documents are a Buchanan memo to Regan through Poindexter September 10, 1986 and Murdock memo to Poindexter September12, 1986). Clark A. Murdock was NSC Senior Director of African Affairs. The memos discuss strategy for the President to “regain
support for his leadership” on South Africa; elements of the strategy include announcement of a new Ambassador to South Africa. In his memo, Murdock analyzed Buchanan’s “Reagan Plan.”  
(Alton Keel File, Box 91635, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library)

85 Entries for 1986 (paraphrased) include: July-9—lengthy meeting to discuss appointment of Brown; July 1—signed off on Brown appointment and July 30—met with Shultz we will appoint our man in Liberia as Ambassador to South Africa.

86 These ideas are well documented in the literature on international relations and foreign policy, and, therefore will not be described in depth.

87 Considering an interview with Charles W. Freeman, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ricucci suggests that Reagan appointed Perkins to manage internal matters in South Africa rather than concern himself with the external policy in the region. Freeman's role in the foreign policy bureaucracy lends credence to the notion that his assessment of a two-tiered policy was part of the rationale for the Perkins appointment.

88 Even Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, whom Reagan admired as a moderate South African black leader and with whom he met in the White House, referred to Constructive Engagement as no policy or half a policy.  
(Raspberry, 1985; R. Reagan, 2009)