Brazil Comes to the Future: Living Time and Space in the International Order of Competition

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ABSTRACT

The rise of Brazil as an economic power in the last decade has been celebrated by politicians and analysts as an opportunity for the country to take advantage of its visibility and bargaining power in order to effectively advocate for and promote an institutional and normative reform of the international order toward a less asymmetric and exclusionary space for politics. This dissertation aims to examine the spatial and temporal assumptions in these recent discourses about Brazil’s emergence to the global stage and Brazil’s disposition towards the future. Departing from an understanding that there are scripts governing the realm of the possible and the visible in international politics, this dissertation proposes an analysis of what defines the conditions of possibility for Brazil’s emergence to the global stage. By looking at discourses about Brazil’s position and positioning in international politics, this study explores implicit and explicit rules defining the possibilities for one to be seen as a ‘legitimate presence in the future’ and what these spatiotemporal constructs reveal about what is allowed as repetition and as change in the world. Contrary to many optimistic accounts of Brazil’s emergence as a transformational leader from the developing world, I argue that it is only possible for Brazil to be discursively represented as an emerging global player and/or a ‘country of the future that may have finally arrived’ because of the same limiting spatial and temporal discursive representations in world politics that translate difference into hierarchy and that contain and define intelligible possibilities for an alternative political order.
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Brazil’s accelerated growth as an economic power in the last decade has been celebrated by many politicians and analysts as an opportunity for the country to start influencing reforms in international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations) that would favor the construction of a more democratic and less unequal international system. This dissertation aims to examine the assumptions about space and time in these recent discourses about Brazil’s emergence to the global stage and Brazil’s disposition towards the future. Departing from an understanding that there are scripts defining what is acceptable and imaginable in relation to international politics, this dissertation proposes an analysis of what enables Brazil’s emergence to the global stage. By looking at discourses about Brazil’s position and positioning in international politics, this study explores implicit and explicit rules defining the possibilities for one to be seen as a ‘legitimate presence in the future’ and what these spatiotemporal constructs reveal about what is allowed as repetition and as change in the world. Contrary to many optimistic accounts of Brazil’s emergence as a transformational leader from the developing world, I highlight the fact that it is only possible for Brazil to be accepted and represented in discourses and as an emerging global player and/or a ‘country of the future that may have finally arrived’ because of the same limiting conditions for visibility reproduced through world politics that translate difference into hierarchy and that contain and define intelligible possibilities for an alternative political order.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Benefício de Prestação Continuada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMI</td>
<td>Conselho Indigenista Missionário</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAS</td>
<td>Centro de Referência de Assistência Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNAG</td>
<td>Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUNAI</td>
<td>Fundação Nacional do Índio</td>
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<td>FUNASA</td>
<td>Fundação Nacional de Saúde</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGOs</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organizations</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Nongovernmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Internationa Paralympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPEA</td>
<td>Instituto de Pesquisa e Economia Aplicada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>Intertribal Committee – Indigenous Science and Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IYSPE</td>
<td>International Year of Sport and Physical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDS</td>
<td>Ministério de Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Mission des Nations Unies Pour la Stabilisation en Haïti</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF</td>
<td>Programa Bolsa Família</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETI</td>
<td>Programa de Erradicaçao do Trabalho Infantil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNAS</td>
<td>Programa Nacional de Assistência Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGPS</td>
<td>Registro Geral de Previdência Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RtoP</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RwP</td>
<td>Responsibility while Protecting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECOSM</td>
<td>Secretaria de Comunicação Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSDP</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFS</td>
<td>World Food Security</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Introduction

At the opening of the General Debate of the 59th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2004, former Brazilian president Lula (Luiz Inácio da Silva) asserted: “the path to lasting peace must encompass a new political and economic international order, one that extends to all countries real opportunities for economic and social development” (Da Silva, 2004, p.2). Lula expressed his anti-imperialistic position through his emphasis on inequality and his call for a more democratic world order. He reiterated his “life-long commitment to those silenced by inequality, hunger and hopelessness”, and he cited Franz Fanon on the legacy of the colonial past that determined the kind of freedom decolonization could offer to these people: “If you so desire, take it: the freedom to starve” (Da Silva, 2004, p.1; Burges, 2013, p.581). Addressing an audience of 191 nation-states, Lula reminded them that 125 countries, including Brazil, had been subjected in the past to the oppression of a few powers that represented less than 2% of the global territorial space. He acknowledged advancements towards a postcolonial democratic order, but he also expressed his view that the present configuration of international institutions still hinders a greater participation of the ‘Global South’ in the global economy and in global political debates.

The predominant strategy of Brazil's foreign policy that took shape during the first mandate of president Lula (2002-2006) was to emphasize South-South cooperation, the establishment of new relations with non-traditional partners, and the formation of coalitions with other developing states. The most common interpretation of this shift to the 'global South' is that Brazil's diversification of trade partners and alliances with developing countries were an attempt to reduce the asymmetries vis-à-vis the United States and the European Union while becoming part of an anti-hegemonic force (Sotero & Armijo, 2007; Vigevani &
As a result of Brazil's greater participation in the global economy, measured mainly by the solid performance of the Brazilian economy during the 2008 financial crisis and as a result of its strong and early recovery, a more prominent role for the country in the delineation of the global governance architecture was not only accepted, but also expected (Cervo, 2010; De Almeida, 2010; Carrasco & Williams, 2012; Burges, 2013). Since 2003, the country has emerged into a leadership position among the newly formed coalition of developing countries within the World Trade Organization (WTO), the commercial G20. Brazil has also been heard at the financial G20, an institution that since 2009 has become a major multilateral forum for debates on global financial governance. For the first time, a Brazilian became the leader of one of the key bodies of the Bretton Woods system, with Roberto Azevêdo appointed in 2013 as the director general of the WTO. At the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Brazil was able to pay in full its obligations amounting to US$15.46 billion in 2006 (IMF, 2006, p.9), and started to advocate a reform of the decision-making structure seen as obsolete because it is said to no longer reflect the distribution of economic power across the globe. And, finally, at the United Nations (UN), Brazil called for a reform of the United Nations’ Security Council (UNSC), claiming that the organ should reflect the new global geopolitical reality (Burges, 2013; Imber, 2006).

It was in this context of exacerbated optimism about the prospects of a different and less asymmetric global future that emerged during the last decade that Brazil became the subject of several studies and much media speculation on the prospects and conditions of its

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1 The decision-making structure in the International Monetary Fund is determined by a system of quotas that is equivalent to the size of the market of each country and its contribution to the fund. It means that a bigger quota is converted into a stronger voting power. See: International Monetary Fund, "IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors," accessed May 05, 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx#3.
newly acquired position in global politics. A different representation of Brazil as a ‘global player’ started to emerge while some countries in the so-called 'global South' were portrayed as the new drivers of the world economy (Zoellick, 2010). Brazil was discursively positioned in a new political space and was granted a new temporal dimension. It was climbing up both to the global stage and toward the future, a place and a time from which Lula could promise to challenge the current international institutional and normative frameworks in favor of a less asymmetric and more inclusive world order.

Besides Brazil’s economic indicators and increased bargaining power in the institutions mentioned above, the new position of Brazil as a global player was also corroborated by Brazil’s ‘successes’ in other fields. Brazil’s ability and willingness to start assuming, since 2004, a leadership role in United Nations missions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which qualifies those missions as military interventions that do not require the consent of the parties, has been seen as a major and necessary shift in Brazil’s foreign policy, one that could help the country shape its image as a global player (Kenkel, 2013; Amorim, 2005). In 2014, Brazil was said to have eradicated extreme poverty and did not feature on the UN World Hunger Map, for the first time since the annual reports started to be published (FAO, 2014). Given all these ‘achievements’, the selection of Rio de Janeiro to host the Olympic Games after a competitive bidding process with other ‘global cities’, such


3 In 2012, there are a number of publications in newspapers and economic reports revisiting the definition of Brazil as 'the country of the future'. See: Velascos, A, Brazil, Country of the Future No more? Project Syndicate; K.D., Will Brazil remain the country of the future? The Economist; Salek, S. Brazil: No longer 'country of the future', BBC News.
as Chicago, Madrid, and Tokyo, was described by Lula as a final recognition that Brazil had become a global ‘first-class citizen’ (Da Silva, 2009).

Although these events placing 'Brazil on a global stage' initially inspired me to pursue research on this topic, this dissertation is not concerned with the phenomenon of "Brazil's emergence" *per se*. It does not aim to add voice to the debate about the different conditions and prospects about Brazil’s rise and fall as a global player. Rather, this project aims to investigate what has been taken for granted by many analysts and politicians, namely, the discourses that enable the contemporary proliferation of narratives and representations about the new status of the country, and about Brazil’s potential to intervene against the asymmetries of the global order.

Most claims that Brazil's time has finally arrived go hand-in-hand with the recognition by politicians and analysts of Brazil's new differentiated geopolitical position. Both the claims about the new temporal dimension in which Brazil is being placed and the claims about Brazil’s greater influence in international politics derive their authority from data related to Brazil's economic performance. The easy association between power/authority, future and economic capability in these discourses is part of what I propose to problematize. My dissertation exposes the symbiosis between traditional discourses of power politics in international relations (primarily concerned with distribution of power and a state's geopolitical positioning in international politics) and discourses of modernization and development (primarily concerned with a state's capabilities and its position in relation to a

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4 Celso Lafer (2000) notes that Brazil has expressed its uneasiness with the asymmetries of international negotiations for over a century. How could Brazil emerge and be heard now? The answers provided to this question are relevant to my research to the extent they expose the common understanding about the conditions for being in the global stage, and in the future. These assumptions behind the claims about Brazil's emergence are the subject of my investigation. For example, the following conditions for Brazil's increased bargaining power are usually assumed: according to De Onis (2008), some key features for the fulfillment of a long-unrealized potential were expanded exports, oil discoveries, financial stability, low inflation, growing foreign and domestic investment, booming consumer demand, social assistance focused on the poor, and democratic political cohesion (p.110). Sotero (2010) highlights the fact that Brazilian exports almost tripled from 2003 ($66 billion) to 2010 ($169 billion), and Brazilian foreign debt shrank from 45% of the GDP in 2003 to 15% of the GDP in 2010, with Brazilian international reserves soaring from $37.6 billion in 2003 to $252.5 billion in 2010 (p.72).
universal or singular temporality) that enables an understanding of Brazil as an international actor that can be positioned along a temporal spectrum (past, present, or future), but also according to a spatial or territorial dialectic of visible versus invisible political space on an international scale.

The examination of Brazil's new temporal and spatial positionings or representations implied in the notion of Brazil’s emergence to the global stage cannot be detached from the broader processes and discourses within which this 'phenomenon' takes place. Future and power, concepts that are embedded in these narratives about the country's status, do not have an absolute or inherent meaning. They make sense when attached to particular representations of Brazil in relation to other types of representation. What I intend to highlight in relation to Brazil's so-called emergence is the fact that the notion of making it to the global stage implies leaving behind a condition of inferiority or backwardness. One of my arguments is that while the phenomenon of ‘emergence’ is celebrated as the conquest of more authority for Brazil on the global stage, especially as Brazil is presented as a representative of developing countries in multilateral institutions, the discourses about Brazil as a global player are also perpetuating a spatio-temporal structure that rewards some societies at the expense of many others. The claims about Brazil’s new privileged position mask assumptions about the underprivileged position of the less wealthy economies in relation to global time and space.

Inspired by Michel Foucault’s mode of inquiry, my research will be organized around the following questions: What is happening now? What is this present that is “ours”? How have we become what we are, and what are the possibilities of becoming ‘other’? (Tamboukou, 1999, p.215) The current state of affairs is one in which it is possible to speak of transformations in the world order that involve Brazil pushing forward with reforms of the international institutional and normative framework. The main problem guiding this dissertation concerns the discursive possibilities that Brazil's emergence is said to open up to
new forms of representation and inclusion in the international political world. The main question is: How are discourses about Brazil’s emergence as a global actor aiming to confront the asymmetries of the current world order reinforcing particular temporal and spatial formations that enable the perpetuation of international hierarchies?

In the next sections, I briefly review some aspects of the discourses about ‘Brazil’s emergence to the global stage’. I lay out my theoretical framework, and I start to analyze the contributions that this study can make to the field of International Relations (IR). First, I review existing representations of the world and world politics that inspire my analysis. Second, I analyze the importance of studying world politics as a matter of discourse, and of exploring ontological claims in traditional theoretical accounts of world politics that have been forgotten or ignored in the context of discourses of globalization and deterritorialization common to late twentieth century and early twenty-first century international politics. Finally, I discuss how particular representations of the world and world politics shape the way I define my topic.

**Brazil’s Emergence to the Global Stage**

Considering its continental size (as the world's fifth largest country), its population (the fifth largest population in the world\(^5\)), its Gross Domestic Product (the world's seventh richest economy, with a GDP of US$2.25 trillion\(^6\)), its biodiversity, and the stability with regards to its borders, Brazil is frequently presented as naturally endowed with the resources to assume a role as a 'big' country in the shaping of the international order (Lafer, 2000, 208; De Lima, 2005, 21).

\(^5\) According to the latest data from Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE, 2013). www.ibge.gov.br

Despite its historical memberships and its participation in global fora, the recent debate about the emergence of Brazil as a global player has been sustained by a representation of the country as one that can manage a strong domestic economy, even during a world economic crisis that affected most of the top economies in the world. One condition that seems to be taken for granted is that the path to the future, where the status of global player is there for Brazil to take, is necessarily paved with economic development measures. In this sense, the narrative about Brazil's future is fused with mantras about Brazil's development.

Brazil's own conceptualization of sovereignty and the understanding of its external vulnerabilities have always been associated with economic development (De Lima & Hirst, 2006, 22). This explains that development has always been a top priority in the economic, political, and diplomatic agendas of the country. Dependency theorists, mostly dissident voices speaking from exile in the 1960s and 1970s, already recognized the problems of the developmentalist 'raison d’état' in Brazil and other countries in South America. In the 70s, Cardoso and Faletto (1979) argued:

The basic ideology of the state is fundamentally 'developmentalism'. In view of the explicit ends of economic growth and national grandeur, the exploitation of workers, if not openly defended by the state, is justified by the argument that the tightening of belts is necessary ‘at the moment’ so that ‘in the future’ the results of this economy may be redistributed” (p.215).

Despite the critical interpretations of development that spread from Latin America to academic circles all over the world forty years ago or so, Brazil’s domestic agenda and foreign policy have remained dominated by the ideal of a future that has to be achieved.

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7 Even though Cardoso and Faletto (1979) did not elaborate thoroughly on an alternative to capitalist development, they believed that the progress of productive force through the import of technology, capital accumulation, penetration of local economies by foreign enterprises, increasing number of wage-earning groups, and intensification of social division of labor would not lead to autonomy and amelioration of the population's condition (xxiv). The arguments that will be developed in this dissertation deal with a different scope of analysis, which involve the perpetuation of dependency and subordination beyond economic relations and the struggle between a core and a periphery that can be easily identified and classified.
through development. Considering Brazil’s historical background of participation in international institutions, and other cycles of accelerated economic growth and stagnation the country has been through, what seems to have distinguished the ‘emergence’ during the last decade is a combination of economic growth, an anti-imperialistic positioning (at least discursively) of a center-left government, and the reduction of inequality within the country. By looking at some of the elements of Brazil’s emergence, and the articulation of discourses that have made the ‘truth’ about Brazil’s emergence possible, we may also be able to understand the kind of emergence that has not been made possible, or that has been made impossible, often through these same discourses. What makes the ‘global stage’ or the ‘future’ possible ‘locations’ or ‘temporalities’ that enable Brazil to have ‘emerged’ or to be ‘emerging’? In the next section, I offer an illustration of Brazil’s new role in global politics.

The New Geography of the World Economy and Anti-imperialism

Brazil’s increased bargaining power has been associated with its effort to diversify its economic partners by shifting its attention to the ‘global South’ and by advocating for a better integration of ‘developing’ countries in the world economy. Brazil is said to have adopted a 'southern' stance in international institutions (Veiga, 2005). Since Brazil assumed the leadership role in the coalition of developing states, the G20, in 2003 during the WTO negotiations in Cancun, the country has become increasingly active and assertive in multilateral fora, and it has served as a bridge between old and new powers (Burges, 2013), or between the developed and the developing world.

The slogan “a new geography for world trade” adopted by ‘southern’ countries does not advocate isolationism vis-à-vis the 'North', but rather calls for an alignment among developing countries that would allow them to present a united front against rich nations.

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8 The goal has always been development and progress, even though the strategies towards economic growth in Brazil varied between a more isolationist approach and the struggle for autonomy (which has included the notion of import substitution), and the integration with the international structures of production and trade.
instead of remaining conditioned by rich countries’ predominant views or demands (De Almeida, 2010, 172).

The need for alliances to balance the relations between 'North' and 'South' also translates into a need for global institutions that enable encounters and fair negotiations among nations with divergent interests. Cervo (2010) highlights the importance of multilateralism in Brazil's rise to the global stage, but also in the quest toward democratization in the global order. He argues that a multilateral order based on reciprocity in all areas - economy, trade, security, environment, health, and human rights – can ensure that international rules will benefit all (11). Multilateralism has long existed without reciprocity, with asymmetries that have favored the dominant countries. Brazil is said to push for a reciprocal form of multilateralism (Cervo, 2010, 11) whereby the international order is not structured to benefit the stronger nations.

In an interview to The Guardian, Celso Amorim (2005), the Brazilian Ambassador who was leading the negotiations at the WTO, affirmed that developed countries "could not afford to keep the inequalities [and] to widen the gap between developing countries and developed countries". When asked about the lack of compatibility between various interest groups, he answered:

The need to dismantle the absurd subsidies which distort world trade and which create hunger in the third world. We are talking about 60%-70% of mankind, something like 50% of agricultural production. Real reform is what will help countries like Burkina Faso, like Chad [and] Benin.

Later, Amorim (2006) argued that one could state, with no exaggeration, that the G20 had changed the geopolitics of international negotiations on matters of agriculture. According to him, the G20 was formed when the United States and the European Union were trying to impose an unfair agreement that did not touch upon issues that could benefit developing countries (quoted in Cervo, 2010, 11).
In Lula's statements in 2004 at the General Assembly and on several other occasions during his mandate, and from the perspective of Brazil as the leader of the G20 in World Trade Organization negotiations, the distribution of resources as one of the defining principles of power is clearly highlighted. According to the dominant logic that has recently informed Brazil’s participation in multilateral institutions and in coalitions of developing countries, like the G20, power needs to be redistributed. And, by redistribution of power, the representatives of Brazil have meant, among other things, the de-centralization of world trade and the de-concentration of global wealth.

But power also becomes relative in these contexts, in the sense that Brazil has led a coalition of developing countries in order to balance what many of these countries have defined as the 'developed world's' determination to maximize its own interests in the negotiations of the WTO to the detriment of the poorest countries. Efforts to balance power within the framework of multilateral institutions have meant that absolute gains (the liberal-institutionalist notion of a positive outcome that benefits all the ‘players’) are not desirable or achievable. Considering the disparity between developed and developing countries' positions, any negotiation would only be acceptable to the extent that it could reduce the gap. And the reduction of this power gap depends on relative gains in favor of 'developing countries'.

The notion of 'balance of power' is at the very core of the discourses about 'Brazil's emergence'. For example, the slogan 'a new geography for world trade' promoted by Brazilian former president Lula calls for an alignment among developing countries that can allow them to present a united front against rich countries (De Almeida, 2010, 172). Balancing against the asymmetries of power in multilateral institutions became a priority in Brazil's foreign policy during Lula's presidency, and we can discern in this discursive construction the reproduction of a world of competition that is being promoted by Brazilian politicians and through several interpretations about Brazil's status in international politics.
As Ashley (1987) points out, "critical analysis cannot regard political realism as something opposed, external to, and constraining or conditioning the world historical development of capitalist society and its modernist ideology" (p. 423). Capitalism has been largely a territorial phenomenon, and without disregarding contingencies and historical transformations, one may argue that capitalism remains ingrained in collective action as state actors institutionalize competition for economic growth and treat it as normal or routine, to the point that any problem that could prevent them from continuing to play the game should be dealt with on an international basis (Wendt, 1996, p.60).

While acknowledging the transformations in Brazil's self-representation, its position as an emerging power, and the external recognition of Brazil’s impact on the decision-making process in many institutional contexts, the debates about whether or not Brazil is now 'there' depart from a set of assumptions about the 'now' and the 'here' without ever problematizing these terms. In this context, where and when discourses about Brazil’s emergence proliferate, Brazil’s participation in international institutions and its leadership in campaigns in favor of a less asymmetric world order call for a deeper analysis about the conditions for politics and power that have been attached for so long to an idealization in discourses of international politics and development about an appropriate time and space for the realization of power, leadership, and supremacy.

When world politics is reconceptualized as a discursive practice, "by which intellectuals of statecraft 'spatialize' international politics in such a way as to represent it as a 'world' characterized by particular types of places, peoples, and dramas” (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, 192), Brazil’s empowerment or final emergence may be seen as taking place within a field of possibilities and reasoning that can actualize Brazil’s future in a particular way. As I explore in this dissertation, within the field of possibilities and reasoning about Brazil's emergence to the 'global future', power or empowerment are conceptualized in a way
that discursively inhibits any form of escape from the temporal and spatial confines of a world order marked by geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. In the next section, I explain what understanding world politics as a discourse or discursive practice means for my analysis. Following this explanation, I also clarify what I mean by a ‘world of competition’.

**World Politics as Discourse**

The post-positivist and linguistic turns in the field of International Relations are marked by the incorporation of discourse analysis into the study of international politics. Critics of mainstream international relations theory have been largely influenced by the works of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, utilizing “'deconstructive' and 'genealogical' tools deliberately designed to automatically 'target' assumptive theoretical headquarters” (Lapid, 1989, 242). The purpose of these approaches has been mainly to problematize answers, to make strange what has become familiar, and to reverse the process of construction (Ashley, 1988). Although the constructions these authors were destabilizing 20 years or so ago, such as the concept of sovereignty, are quite different from the constructions that have become familiar in the twenty-first century, as long as we have a world that we understand to be always in construction and ultimately a representation, this critical approach and its analytical tools are still valid and extremely relevant.

My research is designed as a contribution to the investigations and inquiries initiated by those who came to be categorized as poststructuralists in the field of International Relations. Poststructuralist scholars distinguish themselves from both mainstream and other critical scholars, such as constructivists, as they not only use language as a point of departure for a different understanding of social reality, but they also challenge claims to normativity (Debrix, 2003, p.12). They often share a nonfoundationalist stance, which rejects ‘progressive’ metanarratives and structural determinism. They recognize that “language is a
form of action. Speaking organizes activity. And listening, interpreting, and understanding are integral elements of all political events” (Luke, 2003, 103).

For poststructuralists, there is no world pre-existing interpretation, but rather an endless process of stabilization and destabilization of world representations. Language, as an essential element of this process, becomes an important object of analysis. More than simply mediating techniques, according to poststructuralists, “texts are what social reality is made of” (Debrix, 2003, 12). Any object or subject can only emerge as a performance of language. Judith Butler (1997), whose work on language and performativity was brought to the study of international politics by poststructuralists, adds that it is not only a matter of signification, but also one of enactment:

What would it mean for a thing to be ‘done by’ a word [...]? When and where, [...], would such a thing become disentangled from the word by which it is done or done in, and where and when would that conjunction between word and thing appear indissoluble? If a word in this sense might be said ‘to do’ a thing, then it appears that the word not only signifies the thing, but that this signification will also be an enactment of the thing. It seems here that the meaning of a performative act is to be found in this apparent coincidence of signifying and enacting (p.44).

It is not that a material world does not exist or does not impact social relations outside language, but rather that the materiality of the world can only mean something to social relations through language. Foucault, who largely influenced the poststructuralist perspective in IR, was emphatic about the absence of foundational or essential meaning in 'things'. He argued that "there are no constants, no fixed meanings, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no final structures or limits of history" (1977, p.150; quoted in Ashley, 1987, p.408). In this sense, "there is only interpretation, and interpretation itself is comprehended as a practice of domination occurring on the surface of history" (Foucault, 1977, p.150; quoted in Ashley, 1987, p.408).
For a critical analysis of discourse, statements are not judged on the basis of their truth-value in communication, but instead, as Michael Shapiro asserts, "on the basis of their capacity for value creation in human relations" (Shapiro, 1988, p.11). In contrast to traditional empiricism, which recognizes nondiscursive elements as referents to language, the emphasis on discourse as practice places nondiscursive elements as a field of other possible practices (Shapiro, 1988, p.11). Or, according to Foucault, it places nondiscursive elements as a field of violence, "the violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them" (Foucault, 1984, p.127). The fact that meanings are imposed on world politics and that the field of possible practices is narrowed by the imposition of meanings inspires my research on the discourses and the conditions for discourses about Brazil’s emergence and empowerment as a global player and about Brazil’s representation as the country of the future.

Seeing the world as a discursive representation means that we should not expect it to reveal itself to us. It is always a world that co-emerges with our descriptions, definitions, and analyses. Taking this into account, a poststructuralist discourse analysis may be centered on identity or subject positions, but it does not begin by presuming a stable self, whether that of an individual or of a state. Epstein (2011) explains that the starting point of discourse analysis "is both more empirically grounded and unencumbered by the host of assumptions that need to be made about the internal structure of these identities and what constitutes their essential properties" (p.341). State subjectivity, for instance, is constituted by practices of differentiation and representation, and there is no 'originary presence' that forms an essential basis for this subjectivity.

It would seem contradictory to adopt a poststructuralist perspective and to assume the pre-discursive existence of 'Brazil' or the world order within which a country can be placed in a particular spatial and temporal ranking. That is why it is important for me to be clear that I
am not looking at an event or at the transformations of Brazil at the beginning of the twenty-first century, but rather at an economy of meanings and values that make intelligible and visible some interpretations and representations about the 'reality' of the country and world politics in this particular period of time, often to the detriment of others, and how this making intelligible and visible can have concrete implications and applications. It is worth noting here that representations do not imitate reality, but "are the practices through which things take on meaning and value; to the extent that a representation is regarded as realistic, it is because it is so familiar it operates transparently" (Shapiro, 1988, p.xi).

There is nothing exceptionally novel about some of the themes that constitute the conceptual map that I draw in and with my research, such as power, the hierarchical structure of international politics, or the spatialization of time and inequality. As Ashley asserted in 1987, and I would say is especially relevant more than twenty years later, there is "no need to be reminded to look for the unabated play of power hiding in high-sounding claims as to the existence of universal scientific truths, transcendent moral principles, essential meanings, or immanent communities of humankind" (Ashley, 1987, 412). And yet, this unabated play of power is widely overlooked. One of my main arguments is that the representation of Brazil as a new global player that advocates for a less asymmetric world order is actually enabled by and enabling of the continuation of a culture of competition whereby states move along spatial and temporal spectrums according to their commitment to unabated rules. In other words, 'Brazil' emerges as a relevant actor and visible power in the system of states so that the system can remain the same.

Alexander Wendt (1996), who took up the challenge to find a via media between rationalism and reflectivism, argued that "if system structure is reduced to a distribution of material power, structural change can mean nothing more than shifts in polarity that will not end the dreary cycles of conflict and despair over the millennia" (p.62). Taking this argument
as a relevant hypothesis to be analyzed, my task is to investigate the different texts and pretexts that give meaning to the new geopolitical position of Brazil. My focus is on the circulation of meanings and representations that makes 'power' a value that can be distributed among nation-states whose existences in time and space depend on various 'reality-making scripts'.

**Intertextuality**

My approach assumes that there are no pre-discursive events or subjects. And there is no absolute and all-encompassing discourse that may signify events or subjects. In other words, there is no fundamental signified (a presence that can be expressed without any reference to a signifier), and there is no final signifier (an end of the chain of significations). Derrida (2002) notes that:

> In the extent to which what is called 'meaning' [...] is already, and thoroughly, constituted by a tissue of differences, in the extent to which there is already a text, a network of textual referrals to other texts, a textual transformation in which each allegedly 'simple term' is marked by the trace of another term, the presumed interiority of meaning is already worked upon by its own exteriority (p.33).

Julia Kristeva coined the term ‘intertextuality’ in the late 1960s in the context of her influential interpretations of the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (Fairclough, 1992, p.269). Bakhtin was concerned with the "ways in which texts and utterances are shaped by prior texts that they are 'responding' to and subsequent texts that they 'antecipate'" (Fairclough, 1992, p.269). In the field of IR, the term 'intertextuality' was introduced by James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro with the publication of *International/Intertextual Relations* in 1989. Shapiro (1989) argues that:

> Investigations of how the world is apprehended require inquiries into the various pretexts of apprehension, for the meaning and value imposed on the world is structured
not by one's immediate consciousness but by the various reality-making scripts one inherits or acquires from one's surrounding cultural/linguistic condition (p. 11).

Intertextuality is a condition for a discourse to emerge and circulate. For any particular text, there is a set of other texts that are potentially incorporated into it. Fairclough (2003) argues that critical discourse analysis should necessarily consider the relevance of the following questions: “which texts and voices are included, which are excluded, and what significant absences are there?” (p.47) In this dissertation, I too am driven by the question of which texts are incorporated in the initial text that motivated my research: ‘Brazil’s emergence to the global stage’.

The notion of ‘Brazil’s emergence to the global stage’ contains a lot of pre-texts that need to be problematized. In order for 'Brazil's emergence' to become a text that can be circulated and reproduced, a particular spatial and temporal representation of power and politics has to be assumed. What I intend to unveil with my research is that both the representations about Brazil and the representations of the world assumed, constructed, and represented by Brazilian politicians and analysts are reinforcing the political world as a world of competition. The concepts of development and multilateralism, instead of being texts that contradict realist discourses of power politics, actually rely on them and complement them, something that makes the notion of the quest for a less asymmetric global order through development a paradoxical notion. In the next section, I explain and justify my level of analysis by problematizing the relationship between the spatial particularity and the temporal universality that seems to be at the core of the discourses/texts that establish the idea of ‘Brazil’s emergence as a global player’ as a taken-for-granted notion.

**World Politics as Competition**
As I explained above, one of the purposes of critical discourse analysis is to make strange what has become too familiar. However, I need to highlight in this section that the discourses about Brazil’s emergence have assumed a number of ontological truths that are not necessarily popular in the study of international politics today. In contrast to the notion that has been present for more than 20 years that "exclusively political poles and fundamentally geopolitical polarities are slipping out of phase" (Luke, 1993, p.255), I argue that the discourses about the new spatial and temporal position of Brazil as a global player in the last decade have revitalized narratives about balance of power politics and geopolitical polarity that, in turn, reenact a representation of world politics as a fragmented political space of competition between sovereign actors. This revitalized representation of world politics as a domain of and for global competition also becomes the discursive condition for the emergence and circulation of ideas such as 'coalition of southern states', 'asymmetric world order', etc.

In this so-called 'postmodern era’ dominated by discourses about globalization, disintegration, decentralization, and detrerritorialization, the idea that the sovereign state is a historical and obsolete construction may sound more familiar. Many scholars are now focused on flows over and across territories, on networks over and across relations between states, and on speed and simultaneity over and across linear conceptions of time⁹. The problem with critical analyses that emphasize the global transformations that allegedly render the system of states obsolete is that they run the risk of replacing one totalizing ontology with another. While the 'global' and the 'transnational' may become dominant spatial categories that are said to correspond to the most recent and common conceptualizations of the political, economic, cultural, and social world, one may overlook the resilience of state-centric

⁹ Blake and Walters (1976) argued in the 1970s that “what were once international relations – understood as 'politics among nations’ – progressively and unavoidably has become global politics” (quoted in Dwivedi et al, 2007, p.33). Since the end of the World War II, many scholars have conceptualized ‘globalization’ as an unavoidable and irreversible process, highlighting the development of military and industrial technology, which ‘reduced the time and space limits of world politics’ (Dwivedi et al, 2007, p.33).
discourses and the interplay between universal and particular that constitutes the modern political world. By trying to destabilize and de-essentialize political realism, and showing how realist discourses of state-centric power politics do not correspond to current political realities, critics may be end up essentializing a deterritorialized world where there is no longer space for recognition or critique of the kind of hierarchization that still depends and relies on national boundaries.

I depart from the assumption that it is important to consider the conditions and effects of contemporary discourses that enable a representation of political fragmentation and competition at the level of nation-states. However, I am not concerned with the debate over whether 'political realism' or 'globalization' provides a better 'picture' of the political world in the twenty-first century. As Rob B. J Walker (2009) notes,

much depends on how it has become possible to draw the lines of discrimination marking boundaries, borders and limits, in time quite as much as in space, and on how we have been encouraged to think about boundaries, borders and limits as if they were indeed just simple lines distinguishing here from there, now from then, normal from exceptional, possible from impossible or intelligible from unintelligible (p.6).

Traditional theories of international relations then remain instructive as “they so persistently affirm assumptions about where, and therefore what, political life must be” (Walker, 2009, p.22). Keeping in mind the discursive character of world politics, and the way spatial and temporal boundaries are ‘naturalized’ through discourse, what matters for the purpose of this dissertation is the possibility for a discourse about ‘Brazil’ to emerge out of a (sometimes unexpected) combination of different texts. This dissertation is thus primarily concerned with the visibility, the rules of intelligibility, and the current value of particular discursive practices. But it is also concerned with the effects of these practices. One does not keep de-essentializing the world for the sake of preventing the stabilization of meanings, but
because of the violent and exclusionary effects of the circulation of some discourses and the stabilization of some meanings.

Ideology is not necessarily antithetical to the notion of discourse. For Purvis and Hunt (1993), some discourses "impose their own rationalities upon the discursive possibilities of participants. There is a marked absence of attention to tensions, let alone contradictions, within discourses that provide the raw material for the discourse of resistance" (p.489). Shapiro (1988) notes that

Ideological production will be characterized as a kind of writing and ideological thinking as a kind of reading, an enforced dyslexia wherein the reader is disenabled by being encouraged to adopt a politically insensitive view of the surrounding social formation and the objects, relationships, and events it contains" (p.6).

Every intelligible statement, such as 'Brazil emerges as a global player', or Brazilian politicians' proclamation that 'developing countries need to be better represented in multilateral institutions', or economic analysts' discussions about whether Brazil truly deserves the status of ‘country of the future’ or not, accommodates some degree of authority and institutionalized realities that derive legitimacy from depoliticized measurements, values, and goals of international politics. These statements could not make sense if they were not also anchored in normalized criteria for what is taken to constitute successful statehood, global politics, or the temporality of development and authority.

**Method**

For the purpose of this research on the emergence and constitution of discourses, such as those related to Brazil's emergence to the global stage, a genealogical approach to the problem seems to be the most appropriate. Shapiro describes the appropriate posture for a critical political perspective as "one that questions the privileged forms of representation whose dominance has led to the unproblematic acceptance of subjects, objects, acts, and
themes through which the political world is constructed" (Shapiro, 1989, 13). For Ashley (1987), drawing insights from Foucault, a genealogical attitude is “a form of history which accounts for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to refer to a subject, whether it be transcendental in relation to the field of events or whether it chase its empty identity throughout history” (Foucault, 1979, p.35; quoted in Ashley, 1987, p.408). Genealogy further reveals the mechanisms through which certain concepts are naturalized. It does not oppose itself to history but, according to Foucault (1984), "it rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for 'origins'" (p.77). The purpose of history is then to dissipate the roots of our identity, making visible the discontinuities, demarcations and supposed coherences (p.95).

Foucault adds that the critical movement is a movement "by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and questions power on its discourses of truth" (Foucault, 1997, 32). Criticism serves the purpose of showing “that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult” (Foucault, 1988, 155). I hope to show with this study that transforming (de-centralizing, or 'de-westernizing') the world order is not as simple as having an increased bargaining power in a few multilateral institutions. And texts regarding 'Brazil's emergence' or 'Brazil as the country of the future' carry more assumptions than one can challenge by simply looking at economic indicators.

**Structure of the Dissertation**

In order to analyze the articulation of texts that bring together the discourses about Brazil's status as a global player, I look at different aspects of Brazil’s emergence: Brazil's
position as an economic power and its commitment to narratives of progress (Chapter 2); Brazil's position as an actor willing to assume a greater role in international security and its commitment to sovereignty (Chapter 3); Brazil’s position as the host of mega-sports events and its commitment to the ordering of the domestic space (Chapter 4); and finally, Brazil’s position as a transformational leader in the fight against hunger and extreme poverty and its commitment to the synchronization of the multiplicity of temporalities within the country around the notion of Brazil as a ‘rich country without poverty’ (Chapter 5).

None of the chapters have been developed on the basis of isolated conceptual structures. Even though they can be read separately, each chapter emphasizes different aspects of the representation of ‘Brazil’ and of the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the country as a global player that are intrinsically connected with each other. The conceptualization of progress in the second chapter, for instance, lays out many pre-texts that are often been taken for granted in studies focused on the conceptualization of order and the organization of international space, which is my focus in the third chapter. Sovereignty, in turn, explored in the third chapter, underlines the conceptualization of domestic order (chapter 4) and social inclusion (chapter 5).

Once again, my analysis does not aim at finding a truth, but rather at exposing the ‘pre-texts’, or in other words, the articulations in discourses that make it possible to ‘locate’ and ‘rank’ societies and nations according to particular representations of time and space. By looking at what has been normalized or naturalized in the debate about the country’s political position in world politics, I wish to question the notion of transformation that follows the diagnosis about the emergence of the ‘developing world’. Thus, I am less interested in what is said or written about the event recorded as 'Brazil's rise to the global stage' than in what is mobilized in support of these statements, or in other words, in the ontological claims at work behind the recognition or affirmation of Brazil's global power at the beginning of the twenty-
first century. In this sense, this is not a quest to find ‘Brazil’. Rather than asking, “what is Brazil” or “who is Brazil”, a better question should be, as suggested by Rogers Brubaker (1996), “how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states?” (1996, p.16). This understanding is reiterated and developed further in the first Chapter of the dissertation, where I lay out the theoretical framework informing my analysis, and where I explain more specifically how time becomes a crucial element in the formation of international space that cannot be ignored in these kinds of analysis.

Analyzing the textual conditions of representation allows me to go beyond the superficial 'reading' of the geopolitical shifts across the globe in order to question the processes through which materiality and reality have been mobilized or constructed in the process of constituting intelligible discourses about an emerging ‘Self’. But most importantly, this kind of analysis allows us to find the ‘others’ who are displaced through the same process. The conditions for 'power' and competition are largely overlooked in analyses about Brazil's rise to what is represented as a ‘relevant’ global status. When the conditions for power are simply taken for granted, the debate is limited to accepting indicators, norms, and measurements. Instead, I look at the notion of 'emergence' in the context of established conditions necessary for the discursive constructions of a country's spatial and temporal positioning.

There is no inherent meaning to the concept of the 'future' or to the notion of a new political status aimed by Brazil, and there is no inherent truth to claims about what the world order, nation-states, or societies should be or become. Analyzing Brazil's representation as an emerging global player allows me to identify a number of statements that reveal assumptions about the conditionalities for Brazil's bargaining power (influence) and Brazil's future as a global player. At the same time, the discourses reproduced by Brazilian representatives about the transformations they aspire to achieve reveal an understanding of the normative
framework of international politics that legitimizes and forces ‘corrections’ within Brazilian society.

After further examination of the theoretical framework informing my analysis in this dissertation in Chapter 1, the next four Chapters are each an exploration of an aspect of the ‘emerging Brazil’ that has become part of a larger discourse about the future of the country. The unfolding of the dissertation can be seen as a movement that starts with analyses of narratives about ‘Brazil’ as an actor who is positioning itself and being positioned across a certain spatiotemporal construct reproduced by and through international politics, to analyses that are focused on ‘Brazil’ as a space where Brazilian citizens are the ones who are being positioned according to images, representations, and expectations that are reproduced about Brazil’s future.

As Foucault (2010) explains, discourse is not an ideal or timeless form. Rather, from beginning to end, it is historical. It is "a fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself, posing the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality rather than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities of time" (p.117). By 'thinking' these discourses and textually rendered spatial and temporal categories, I wish to be able "to create the conditions of possibility for imagining alternative worlds (and thus to be able to recognize the political commitments sequestered in every political imaginary)" (Shapiro, 2013, xv).

At another level, my dissertation questions the authority of ‘becoming’ over ‘being’, or of the ‘future’ over the ‘present’. I see my analysis as an initial step towards an exploration of alternative forms of thinking, doing, and being temporally and spatially that are not limited to the competition among states for geopolitical status in the international system. Inclusiveness limited to 'significant' participation in the international market does not seem to represent a challenge to current asymmetries and injustices in world politics. As long as we
keep reproducing discourses that sustain the illusion of spatial and temporal separation between peoples across the globe, we will prevent less hierarchical forms of coexistence from emerging.

This work is also a response to the recent optimism expressed in relation to the possibilities opened up by Brazil's increased bargaining power at the beginning of this century. My argument is that what is currently seen as an achievement can also be seen as the perpetuation of inequalities, particularly since the conditions for dialogue are clearly already established and reinforced by Brazil's achievements. And since the conditions determining the path from ‘here’ to ‘there’, or from ‘now’ to ‘then’, are not challenged, Brazil may also ‘fall’ again depending on how well it performs its pre-determined role as a newly relevant or emergent ‘global player’.

The combination of a desire for greatness on a global stage with the economic and political indicators of greatness that have been established is highly problematic. Status and political power are linked to economic achievements, and Brazil is pushed to develop *ad e ternum*. While Brazil waits for others to recognize its 'greatness' in this near future, bodies that are considered ‘useless’ in this kind of endeavor disappear within the country, the land area of forests shrinks, and the urban population of Brazil grows with an increased need for energy that is stimulated by unbridled consumption.

My concern is that, in this irrational pursuit of 'greatness' in the future and the maintenance of the presently acquired global recognition as an emergent power, what makes Brazil a great place to live (despite everything else), starting with its natural resources and its people, will be destroyed. When will Brazil finally be coming to the 'future' and realize its full potential? Let's us hope that it is not when we lose our last tree or when the last human being is brought to work in the service of development, often to the detriment of his/her wellbeing.
Chapter 1  
The Conditions for 'RE-Presentation' in IR

This dissertation is strongly influenced by the body of literature in International Relations that takes seriously the understanding that not only the separation between subjects and objects of knowledge is a dangerous and seductive illusion, but more specifically that the separation between words and worlds is as well. The 'language turn' in IR has separated those who still believe in the existence of a political reality independent from our understanding of it from those who claim that our political reality is constituted and sustained through language. I am joining this second group of scholars "who convert nouns into verbs" (George & Campbell, 1990, p.273), but especially those in this group who assume that "theory is already practice" (George & Campbell, 1990, p.280), and above all, who understand power as a force embedded in these practices.

In the first part of this chapter, I review the literature in International Relations theory that has attempted to expose the implications of our focus on spatial categories in discourses about 'change' in international relations. The historicization and contextualization of the 'international' as a means to denaturalize or de-essentialize the sovereign subject who occupies a privileged position in time and political space may be aspects of IR theory that help us not only to expose the multiplicity of political processes that are marginalized by hegemonic temporalities, or hegemonic discourses about a 'ahistorical' international political structure, but also to expose the impossibility of historicization and narrativity outside of a discourse of time that enables us to talk about continuous and/or discontinuous progressions.

In the next sections, I explore the ways in which IR theory has been emblematic of the problem of time vis-à-vis space, and how critical IR scholars have mobilized this issue. I also analyze the importance of moving away from the search for a new space for politics and towards an examination of the 'political' processes through which the conditions for the very
possibility for politics are established and reproduced. Following that, I discuss some complications that temporality may bring to IR theory and how these might shift our gaze on the 'contemporary world order'.

In the second part of this chapter, I explain how genealogy and discourse analysis may be complementary and compatible 'tools' for research when they are combined into the kind of poststructural agenda introduced above. Discourses are a crucial element of genealogical research, without which the different nondiscursive disciplinary and institutional practices would hardly take any specific form that enable us to read them as a set of 'normalizing' practices. It is within and across the limits of a discourse that these practices of inclusion and exclusion may be revealed. Thus, some form of discourse analysis is not simply expected but also a necessary step in a genealogical exploration, especially when we expand the notion of 'text' beyond the written and spoken word to include events and social practices as well. These texts, non-verbal statements or practices, are invariably related to different discourses and articulated in certain ways in order to become intelligible.

I start this exploration of the epistemological structure of my dissertation by explaining the distinctions, similarities, and complementarities between critical discourse analysis and genealogy. Next, I analyze the peculiarity of genealogy according to a Foucauldian tradition and how the emphasis on 'subjectivity' means the distancing of this approach from critical theory and traditional ideology critiques. Then, I offer some examples of studies that engage critical discourse analysis and genealogy in International Relations. I point out their strengths and weaknesses in their appropriation of these methodological and analytical tools and discuss the possible challenges I face in my own research. Following this elaboration, I offer a conceptualization of the 'chronotope'. This is the section where the problematic of time and the genealogical approach to discourse analysis come together.
Before the conclusion, I examine the resistance to 'not knowing' that prevents even some critical scholars to truly embrace temporal openness in their critical endeavors.

**The Problem of Time**

International Relations theory has been traditionally emblematic of the "problem" of time vis-à-vis space. John Agnew (1994) defined the "territorial trap" as a combination of three different geographical assumptions that are constitutive of the discipline: (1) territorial state as container of society; (2) the domestic/international polarity; and (3) reification of national spaces as units of secure sovereign space (p.92-101). He argues that, traditionally, "international relations theory [has been...] put beyond history by its geographical assumptions" (p.102).

Even though a number of studies in international relations still depart from these assumptions, in the 1980s, critical scholars in the field were already distancing themselves from these disciplinary certainties reproduced by mainstream IR theories that imposed on international studies the demarcation between inside and outside, progress and repetition, peace and violence, presence and absence, etc. Richard Ashley (1988), one of the 'dissident' scholars engaged in destabilizing the truths upon which IR mainstream theories stand, explains how sovereignty became the regulative ideal that enabled the assimilation of ambiguous and contingent events in space and time. He points out that sovereign presence was "itself considered the centre and origin of truth and meaning in such a narrative of progress" (p.238). According to Agnew (1994),

the critical theoretical issue has become the historical relation between specific forms that political organization can take, of which the territorial state is only one type, and the broader social and economic structures and geographical worlds [...] in which these forms of political organization must operate (p.106).

In this context, critical IR scholars, in particular those who came to be labeled
poststructuralists or postmodernists, were concerned, above all, with “the problem of the representation of the state and domestic society as a sovereign presence in global politics” (Ashley, 1988, p.252). They not only exposed the geographical assumptions produced by IR theories, but they were also committed to the historicization of the sovereign nation-state, revealing its contingency and challenging the notion of a transcendentally fixed unit that predominated in the field (Agnew 1994, p.106). Ashley (1988) remarked that, "in the absence of the ability to presuppose an absolute boundary, one would have to acknowledge that all claims regarding state interests and state means are intrinsically disputed" (p.249). Critical IR scholars were committed to the unsettling of the relationship between space and time that relied on the containment of 'progress', 'history', and the political inside the boundaries of sovereign spaces, in contrast to an insecure, ungoverned, and ahistorical anarchical structure outside.

As these critical studies highlight, "theories of international relations can thus be read as a primary expression of the limits of modern politics. They, especially, frame these limits spatially" (Walker, 1995, p.307). Rob Walker (1993) defines international relations theory as a reifying discourse that "both expresses and constantly affirms the presence and absence of political life inside and outside the modern state as the only ground on which structural necessities can be understood and new realms of freedom and history can be revealed" (p.ix). Walker and Bigo (2007) adds that

the discipline [of IR] works by affirming very clear boundaries as the condition under which the problem of the international might be engaged, even though it is the very capacity to affirm clear boundaries and the need to establish the conditions under which clear boundaries might be constructed that is quite obviously at stake in any attempt to identify what counts as a problem of the international (p.728).

Given this emphasis on borders (insides and outsides) and a predominantly spatial vocabulary, one could argue that both mainstream IR theories and critical IR theories are
predominantly concerned with the matter of spatiality, with the placing of borders and the proliferation of these spatial demarcations. However, as critical IR scholars discuss the insides and outsides reproduced by dominant understandings of international politics, they are not simply talking about space. They are also implicitly talking about the disciplining of spatiality and the distributions of identities within a narrative of time that pretends to be ahiistorical. Johannes Fabian (1983), in his analysis of the 'time of the other' in anthropology, highlights the fact that "labels that connote temporal distancing need not have explicitly temporal references" (p.30). One should not assume that the absence of a vocabulary that is explicitly related to 'temporality' means the absence of some kind of discursive mechanism of 'temporal distancing'. Any implicit references to conditions for 'being' and 'becoming', for 'present' and 'future', or for encounters and communication - which often presuppose intersubjective time and coevalness - may offer some clues.

It is the very possibility of implicitly affirming temporal and spatial boundaries that is at stake. In this dissertation, I am not interested in (re)ordering the events or discourses in order to rearticulate international spatialities and temporalities. Rather, I am interested in looking closely at the conditions for a historical and geographical 'order of things'. Walker (1995) observes that "the status of change and temporality in so many theories of international relations" is highly problematic (p.309). According to him, theories of international relations experience tremendous difficulty accounting for temporal transformations of any kind. They are essentially troubled [...] by claims about beginnings and endings. Claims about novel political practices, about new world orders, interdependencies, integrations, globalizations, and so on, quickly run up against the counterclaim that international relations is simply a realm of structural continuity and repetition. To the extent that claims about novelty are considered plausible, the concepts used to grasp their contours express a spatial imagery of extension in space far more readily than of possibilities in time. Thus as discourses of limits in space, theories of international relations can also be read as discourses of limits in time (Walker, 1995, p.309).
The delimitation of space in this context defines the relation between spatial and temporal categories. If we take maps as obvious examples of how spatial boundaries are drawn, we may see how they "serve as images of imagined futures" (Sullivan, 2011, p.102). For Sullivan (2011), "maps are blueprints of possibility", and "in such a conception, maps manifest a certain fictive quality as they depict visions of reality that may come to be, or not" (p.102). The opposite may also be true. Discourses about temporality usually translate into conditionalities and limits to the dynamics of social life in space, if we agree that the perception of time is not independent from movements, measurements, and transformations in space. Richard Ashley (1988) complicates the analysis by adding the element of multiplicity to the notions of political time and space:

In a world of difference, change, and the mobility of people, information, and social resources, how are contesting interpretations disciplined, practices orchestrated, and resistances tamed so as to differentiate a multiplicity of political times and spaces, each represented as a well-bounded domestic society, each understood as subordinate to the sovereign gaze of a state, and the several understood to comprise a continuous, self-evident, and necessary structure of world political life? (p.253)

In Turbulence in World Affairs: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Rosenau (1990) defined the term 'postinternationalism' as "an apparent trend in which more and more of the interactions that sustain world politics unfold without the direct involvement of nations and states" (p.6). He listed five main sources of transformation that, to him, signaled the end of the Westphalian experiment: (1) the globalization of certain technologies that accompanied the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial order; (2) the recognition of important transnational issues such as HIV/AIDS, pollution, and climate change; (3) the reduced capability of states to assert their authority; (4) the rise of governance subsystems; and (5) the rise of the importance of individuals following a skills revolution (Rosenau, 1990, p.12-13). In this new era of 'postinternational politics', he argued, old theories and paradigms of international relations were no longer adequate for the explanation of the course of events
Yet, the problem is that, while we may acknowledge the complexity of temporal and spatial boundaries in IR, we should also consider the fact that what starts with the deterritorialization of the 'political' in IR has often been followed by an attempt to reterritorialize or 're-anchor' politics elsewhere. Even though most recent studies would depart from, for instance, the notion that "realists and neorealists are [...] pernicious ransackers of history as they try to transform messy historical reality into a story of how sovereign states are virtually universal political communities" (Ferguson & Mansbach, 2004, p.59), some of those who diagnose the dissolution of states' borders almost as inevitably also assume that "it is critical to understand from where we have come before we can begin to discern where we are going" (Ferguson & Mansbach, 2004, p.106). The risk that we all take when we start searching for an answer to the question of the ' contesting interpretations and multiplicity of political times and spaces' is that we move from the sovereign state to other spaces that may end up being transformed into a different kind of trap (territorial, in particular), with beginnings and ends, and with their own mechanisms of inclusions and exclusions.

On the one hand, 'postinternationalists' such as Rosenau, or Ferguson and Mansbach criticize the uncomplicated conceptualization of the 'international'. But on the other hand, these theorists labeling themselves 'postinternationalists' understand the post-international necessarily in relation to the international, and very often as the alternative future in relation to a pre-international moment in history. In Remapping Global Politics, Ferguson & Mansbach (2004) compare the post-international world with the medieval system, which lacked a clear "distinction between 'a domestic' and 'foreign' realm, what would make the distinction between private and public, or war and crime impossible" (p.76). These analyses seek to find an easy way out of the inside/outside dichotomy by rearticulating the
geographical political boundaries or deterritorializing political authority. They do not seem to offer very helpful analytical tools for one to rethink the matter of temporality in international politics as they reinforce a notion of history as enclosed in itself whereby past, present and future come together in recognizable cycles or patterns. In this case, the interpretation of the future is either a constant of fragmentation or a return to the past.

Many scholars who accepted that the nation-state is not a transcendental, universal, and fixed unit are still insisting on remapping deterritorialized political spaces, searching for some kind of explanation in a pre-modern past and through new units of analysis. Ferguson and Mansbach (2004) argue that the future is uncertain, but they also determine that "if the state is losing pride of place in global politics, then we have to seek a new unit of analysis around which to focus research" (p.329). The postinternational theory, as they argue, "revolves around individuals and groups associating with one another" (Ferguson & Mansbach, 2004, p.329).

Other scholars would find relief to their anxieties about the new uncertainties brought by the blurriness of the boundaries of the sovereign state in the domestication of the international. If the 'international' is possibly not as much of an ahistorical and chaotic outside, then how can we bring time (or 'reason') into it? The easiest answer has been to rely on and introduce the notion of progress. Adler et al. (1991), in Progress in Postwar International Relations, are discussing the possibility of progress in international relations, with a view to contrasting realist and neorealist interpretations. They observe that "national policy agendas and the programs of international organizations are guided by an implicit belief in international progress" (p.1). Of course, this is not always explicitly stated. But they can make this affirmation once they take for granted the relation between progress and "references to the goals of development, equality, human survival, 'quality of life', and foreign policy programs that would bring about cooperation, stability, economic growth, and
social justice in relations among nations" (p.1). Adler et al. (1991) ask the following questions: "What is progress in international relations? What are the international conditions under which 'progressive' change takes place? [...]" They believe that, by raising the question of progress, they can "discover the dynamics and assess the direction of international change" (Adler et al., 1991, p.1). But is there a direction for change? Is temporality simply happening to us, waiting to be revealed? Scholars in IR have been worried about transformations in temporal and spatial relations as if the events that they expose as illustrative of change could exist outside of the discourse that enables and conditions the temporal organization of particular dynamics or movements happening in space.

By asking questions about progress in international relations, Crawford (1991) clarifies that the authors of the referenced edited volume are not asking "how human interests can come to replace national interests, rather how national interests can come to incorporate a respect for the needs of individuals across borders" (p.445). While Ferguson and Mansbach try to find in the past a descriptive explanation for the post-international world by embracing a rather circular kind of temporality, Adler, Crawford, and Donelly, among others, try to expand the linear temporality of progress to transnational or inter-national relations. Both kinds of analysis are engaged in a rearticulation of subjectivities (the postinternational subject and the human/national or transnational subject) into an allegedly 'new' or revised arrangement of spatial and temporal relations. About these discourses that promote the proliferation of identities and/or human rights, Walker (1995) warns us that the ease with which various forms of 'identity politics' lapse into elitisms of one kind or another [...] or even in more virulent forms of self-righteousness, is especially troubling in the context of theories of international relations, which can be read precisely as discourses that seek to place limits on the politics of self-righteousness that is intrinsic to modern states [...] a politics of self-righteousness identity is all too likely to reproduce the codes of inclusion and exclusion that have made theories of international relations what they have become (p.324).
Rethinking temporality and spatiality requires the courage to embrace uncertainty. Didier Bigo and Rob Walker (2007) note that "the idea that borders are either permanent or are about to disappear is so familiar that even if it is easily dismissed as ridiculously simplistic on many dimensions it finds expression in many seemingly sophisticated fields of scholarship" (p.731). The mapping and remapping of political relations and subjectivities "can itself essentialize relations, putting an emphasis on stasis and order rather than on flow and transformation. It may recreate and multiply boundaries as lines of exclusion, especially when it comes to the negation of these boundaries and attempts to ‘integrate’" (Bigo & Walker, 2007, p.733). In this sense, it seems that the attempt to critically analyze the boundaries of 'international politics' requires an investigation of the mechanisms and processes through which subjectivities have been arranged and rearranged in space and time, rather than a search for or an identification of the spatial and temporal boundaries themselves.

In the next section, I analyze the disengagement of critical IR theorists from international 'politics', and I try to explain how this is a relevant move if we wish to rethink spatiality and temporality in domestic/international politics.

The Political Space

One needs to consider the relevance of engaging the 'political' as the realm of the very possibility of politics. The boundaries, or mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, that need to be challenged are beyond those defining the national, the transnational, or the postinternational. Some of the dichotomies that have been examined, "turned, rethought and exposed as arbitrary cultural constructs by which, in modern culture, modes of subjectivity, objectivity, and conduct are imposed" are:

Identity/difference, man/history, present/past, present/future, inside/outside, domestic/international, sovereignty/anarchy, community/war, male/female, realism/idealism, speech/language, agent/structure, particular/universal,
For Walker (1995), "challenges to these limits, and to the spatial framing of inclusions and exclusions that have made them possible constitute the crucial condition under which we might be able to renegotiate our understanding of the political under contemporary conditions" (p.309). These inclusions and exclusions are invariably implicated in the construction and reproduction of not only spatialities, but also 'temporalities' as mechanisms of differentiation.

Didier Bigo and Rob Walker (2007) note that IR theory is founded upon not only the determination of drawing borders between the domestic and the international, but also between any other two entities, "call them states, or nations, or classes, or cosmopolitan and communitarian identities, or civilizations, and so on" (p.735). The tendency captured by Chris Brown and analyzed by Bigo and Walker (2007) is that "identity is always about difference, [and] borders are about maintaining difference" (p.735). By not simply maintaining difference, but also a certain hierarchy of difference, these borders end up becoming a way of controlling historical change too.

As I explained above, many researchers investigating the 'problems' of international politics are still in the realm of 'politics', a realm where the 'political' can be either violently or gently denied. Jenny Edkins (1999) explains that 'the challenge to international relations' comes not only from "a realignment and reexamination of subjectivity that leads to a rearticulation of fundamental political questions but also from a reassessment of 'the political' itself" (p.xi). She claims that, in western society, 'politics' became an area of activity that is both 'depoliticized' and 'technologized' (p.1), and international politics is a specific site where depoliticization and technologization occur (p.9).
Jenny Edkins (1999) embraces a definition of the 'political' that comprises "an interminable process of decisioning, of traversing the undecidable" (p.5). She adds that "it is through the political that new social practices are instituted" (p.5). But the 'political' moment is often concealed through the legitimation of certain practices or certain social orders, and of the production of the political as 'inevitable' and 'authoritative', "as if it has always been already existed or been prophesied" (p.8). In this sense, 'politics' could be seen as "one of the subsystems of all the systems that go to make up the social order, that enables us to escape or forget the lack of 'the political' and the absence of the possibility of any political action" (Edkins, 1999, p.9), as it is reduced to the calculable and the instrumental.

Drawing on the work of Michael Dillon, Jenny Edkins (1999) argues that international relations as a discipline "dissipates the concern with the political and substitutes, instead, a fascination with the manifold globalized and globalizing technologies of order that have emerged to administer human beings" (p.9). She observes that an understanding of the 'political' is not taught or researched, but rather replaced by what Dillon (1996) conceptualized as the "technology of calculative order". In this process, we become confined to activity within the boundaries set by existing social and international orders, and our criticism is restricted to the technical arrangements that make up the 'politics' within which we exist as 'subjects' [...]. The political subject and the international subject, too, are safely caged and their teeth pulled (Edkins, 1999, p.9)

In this study, I am dealing with a number of discourses about Brazil's position in international politics and Brazil's future that confine change, authority, and decision-making to certain spatial and temporal arrangements that are seen as already set and not open to contestation. In the following chapters, I examine the unfolding of some events or discourses in a way that allows me to identify moments of undecidability - political moments - that open up the possibility, even if for an instant, of different spatial and temporal arrangements to emerge. I am also concerned with the institutionalization of international 'politics' as the
realm of measurements and calculations that imposes specific meanings on social orders and human existence, rewarding some subjectivities and activities while punishing or ignoring others.

The 'cage' of international politics is tight and felt even (or especially) in narratives of autonomy. For example, in Developing Brazil, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira (2009) analyzes the historical subordination of Brazil to hegemonic economic policies promoted by core economies into the developing world. But Bresser Pereira fails, as most economic analysts do, to see that the understanding that "Brazil is lagging behind the massive international competition that characterizes today's global capitalism" (Bresser-Pereira, 2009, p.11) may possibly be a condition of possibility for global competition and inequality. He offers an explanation for the "chronic quasi stagnation of the Brazilian economy", which is followed by a number of analysts in Brazil and around the world who do not bother to question the implications of looking at the past and the future according to specific indicators whose usefulness or naturalness are simply taken for granted.

Discourses about Brazil's emergence, about the emergence of the developing world, or about the transformation of the world order are immersed in other discourses about the 'calculability' and 'measurability' of time and change. Is time speeding up? Did time collapse with the shrinking of space? Is global politics changing? How do we know the answer to these questions if not by arbitrarily assigning meanings to 'patterns' and desirable 'change'? What are the conditions of possibility for discourses of stagnation, movement, and change? As Edkins (1999) notes, "the unsettling of the subject (of theory as well as of politics) has taken place in parallel with a freeing of the colonized subject, albeit still within a postcolonial world, and a reexamination of boundaries of various kinds constructed to keep subjects in their place" (Edkins, 1999, p.xi). Neither a stagnant nor an emerging Brazilian society is free if we do not keep asking those questions about who 'we' are and what 'we' can be.
The kind of power or authority that measures, plans, calculates, and elevates some subjectivities to the realm of visibility and intelligibility is diffuse and does not present itself as an oppressive power that we would be able to fight against. Productive power is a kind of power that endorses the rules for visibility and authority of particular subjectivities to create the rules, and it is intrinsically related to regimes of truth. Productive power does not deny the autonomy of subjects (Foucault, 1995, p.194). On the contrary, it operates through subjectivation. Different from 'subjection', subjectivation is about mobilizing bodies whose conducts as bodies can become receptive but also productive of regimes of power/knowledge as liberal government or governmentality without the requirement of centralization, hegemony, sovereignty, state authority, but also without the requirement of repression or totalitarism (Debrix, 2013, p.53).

Foucault (1980) explains that "truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it" (133). According to Ashley and Walker (1990), these practices of power work to impose and fix ways of knowing and doing that shall be recognized as natural and necessary to autonomous being. They work to produce effects of presence, of identity, of a territorial ground and origin of meaning. And they work by discriminantly reading and representing ambiguous circumstances to impose differences between that which may be counted as the certainty of presence and that which must be regarded as the absence beyond its bounds (p.261).

The spatial dislocation of what is considered 'power' in global politics can only be seen and produced once one is fully committed to the kind of productive power that conditions a narrow understanding of political power. Edkins (1999) notes that "the existence of a power capable of obtaining generalized obedience and allegiance implies a certain type of social division and articulation, as well as certain type of representation... concerning the legitimacy of the social order" (p.3). Brazil's emergence as a global player, or the shortly lived narratives of Brazil's emergence as a country finally in the future, could only be
articulated in relation to spatial and temporal discursive arrangements that were accepted as legitimate, but these arrangements in turn are reinforced through the narratives that they enable.

Because 'power', beyond established political authorities, does not operate directly and explicitly by excluding subjects in/from political time and space, we are only able to investigate what sustains international politics and its inclusions and exclusions by looking at the margins, where the distinctions between the visible and invisible, the possible and impossible, and the now and the then operate. Foucault (1980) claimed that, "rather than worry about the problem of the central spirit [the sovereign], [...] we must attempt to study the myriad of bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects as a result of the effects of power" (p.98). By looking at the margins, we also find

those who would live and move in these paradoxical marginal spaces and times and who, in order to do so, must struggle to resist knowledgeable practices of power that would impose upon them a certain identity, a set of limitations on what can be done, an order of truth (Ashley & Walker, 1990, p.263).

Resistance against productive power may be possible through disengagement, and in this sense, it may not be recognized as resistance. The marginal sites "resist knowing in the sense celebrated in modern culture, where to 'know' is to construct a coherent representation that excludes contesting interpretations and controls meaning from the standpoint of a sovereign subject whose word is the origin of truth beyond doubt" (Ashley & Walker, 1990, p.261). Rethinking temporality requires an investigation of these contesting interpretations of possible 'becomings', but also of these mechanisms of control and organization of the 'political' dynamic into a coherent and closed representational frame. In the next section, I offer a conceptualization of time as an open discourse. Perhaps the absence of a coherent theorization of time developed by critical IR scholars is the result of their understanding that
The Discourse of Time

In his investigation of anthropological time, Alfred Gell (1992) affirms that there is a "distinction between time and the processes which happen in time" (p.315). He argues that "the aim is not to transcend the logic of the everyday, familiar world, but simply to be in a position to see what is there to be seen" (p.314). By separating time from the processes that happen in time, Gell seems to suggest that it is possible to be in a 'temporal apolitical zone' while looking at temporality. We have long questioned the positivist separation between the subjects who observe 'reality' from the observed reality itself. However, time is still a variable that many scholars isolate in order to make sense of the world.

Gell is probably right when he argues that the effectiveness of "an abstract category such as 'time' is precisely that it provides the means for the relative unification of otherwise diverse categories of processes. Time [...] allows for the co-ordination of diverse processes" (p.315). Time may indeed be a necessary category for the 'ordering of objects'. But to the degree the ordering of subjects and objects itself is what is being contested in my research, it is imperative to examine temporality as a function of power, as an inherently 'political' category. For West-Pavlov (2013), "the very naturalness of time reposes upon its power to elide, from the outset, its construction in discourse and via the mediation of technology" (p.5).

When we understand abstract time as a category that is independent of our cognition, we look at events related to the transformations and changes in the world order as if they were unfolding in time. Under these conditions, we can stand still in history and observe coherent patterns and disruptions. But what are we actually doing if we understand that "there
is no place outside of those streams of becoming from which, untouched by their dynamic, we could apprehend them?" (West-Pavlov, 2013, p.54)

By ordering meaning embedded in notions of change and disruption in a particular way, we are contributing to the perpetuation of a particular set of possibilities for 'becoming' and marginalizing other subjective positions and possibilities. In world history, for example, we see the ordering of events as taking "the form of a relief map, on the mnemonic hills and dales of which memorable and forgettable events from the past are respectively featured" (Zerubavel, 2003, p.27). The perceived density of some historical periods is enabled by the relegation of other periods, those "generally regarded as less memorable, [...] 'unmarked' stretches of history", to social oblivion. As a result, "we come to remember some historical periods much more intensely than others" (Zerubavel, 2003, p.26-27).

The arbitrary organization of historical developments is one of the conditions for the deepening of the boundaries of spatial arrangements (Shapiro, 1992, p.89). The different arenas whereby social life is organized, such as politics, economics, culture, etc., carry their own rules of spatial differentiation and temporal organization. One may find these rules by acknowledging the assumptions that need to be put in place before one is allowed to be positioned in a particular arena and speak from this position with authority. As Shapiro (1992) explains,

these arenas, the resultants of spatial practices, are not audible part of policy talk. They exist at a silent level, or, to turn to a lexic metaphor, they are a series of power inscriptions that do their effective work without being read. They belong, in effect to a political rhetoric that is implicit in a society’s spatial practices, as part of its ‘ground plan’, which situates the sets of eligible speaker/actors who can produce meaningful and effective policy utterances and actions (p.88).

Shapiro (1992) adds that “there are good reasons to resist this naturalizing of space” since “the meaning and value that statements confer are inseparable from the mapping of persons within which the statements are deposited” (p.88). He points out that, “those who
use a discourse – an institutionalized practice through which meaning and value is imposed, reaffirmed, and exchanged – generally fail to discern the historically developed, presupposed practices, spatial among others, that ventriloquate themselves through the discourse” (Shapiro, 1992, p.88).

Eligible to speak from the economic arena, Pereira (2009), the influential Brazilian economist who diagnosed the stagnation of the Brazilian economy at the beginning of this century and conceptualized 'neo-developmentalism', offers us an example of discursive practice that operates through naturalizing spatiotemporal categories that often serve as conditions of legitimate intervention. He boldly stresses that

the main criterion for success for the political rulers of every modern national state is high economic growth relative to that of other countries. Globalization is the stage of capitalism where, for the first time, nation-states span the entire globe and compete economically among themselves through their firms (Pereira, 2009, p.20).

As soon as Pereira assumes that high economic growth is the criterion for success, he moves on to an analysis of the 'failures' of the Brazilian economic system, of the political mistakes committed by Brazilian politicians, and finally provides his recommendations for a successful economy policy. One of the recommendations involves the rethinking of Brazilian history, "realizing that its objectives cannot be just democracy and the reduction of social inequality but economic development as well; otherwise it will never overcome its present quasi stagnation" (Pereira, 2009, p.26). Here, the criterion for success not only create the possibility of failure, but also the possibility for the reorganization of the past and the present towards the accomplishment of established goals.

What does it mean to rethink history as a means to create a different future? For Ashis Nandy (2008), the future cannot be projected from the past or the present, "for the future is always less tied to the past and the present than we, in our defensiveness and fear of the unknown, like to admit" (p.65). And yet, "we like to believe that the future can be
domesticated [...] we have been so thoroughly trained to look at the present through the prism of a historicized, objectified, and tamed past" (p.66).

Maybe there is just "no 'time' outside of the multiple ongoing processes of material becoming, the constant transformations, often invisible, that make up the life of apparent inert things" (West-Pavlov, 2013, p.3). West-Pavlov (2013) argues that "all these dynamic processes of change: to ideas, to materials, to words and ideas as materials, to the person affected by words, ideas and materials, do not merely happen in time. More radically, as change, as transformation, they are the dynamism of time itself" (p.9). We create time by trying to control or for the purpose of organizing the 'chaos' of constant transformations and life expressions in their infinite possibilities.

There seems to be nothing inherently colonizing in a notion of 'physical time' that includes space, bodies, and motion. However, this notion becomes colonizing from the moment that it is "transformed into a kind of political physics" (Fabian, 1983, p.29). Fabian (1983) explains that, in the course of colonial expansion, the western body politic and the autochthonous body came to literally occupy the same space at the same time. In order to deal with this violation of the rule that affirms that "two bodies cannot occupy the same space", time became the other variable to be manipulated "with the help of various devices of sequencing and distancing" (Fabian, 1983, p.29-30).

This use of time as a technique for sequencing and distancing peoples that are actually sharing the same space (or place) is possible once we understand time as a variable that can be manipulated. Albert Einstein's conceptualization of time is usually mentioned by individuals interested in the matter or effects of temporality. Some aspects of Einstein's analysis are remarkably relevant for international political studies, too. Einstein suggested that time is intrinsically related to the act of time-measurement and could perhaps be reduced to a consequence of this act (Kern, 1983, p.18). Time exists when measured, and relative
motions of both the measuring body and the body measured affect the measurements (Kern, 1983, p.18-19). If we bring this understanding to international politics, we could argue that there might indeed be centralized and decentralized struggles to measure and control time through this constant effort to order and limit the dynamics of history in a certain way. But the subjects of this disciplining mechanisms do not remain still in order to be measured. Fabian (1983) argued more than thirty years ago that

little more than technology and sheer economic exploitation seem to be left over for the purposes of 'explaining' western superiority. It has become foreseeable that even those prerogatives may either disappear or no longer be claimed. There remains 'only' the all-pervading denial of coevalness which ultimately is expressive of a cosmological myth of frightening magnitude and persistency. It takes imagination and courage to picture what would happen to the West [...] if its temporal fortress were suddenly invaded by the Time of its 'Other' (p.35).

For Walter Benjamin (2003), the invasion of the temporal fortress by the time of the oppressed would be characterized by the explosion of the continuum of history (p.365), the illusory continuum that has been sustained over discrimination, hierarchization, and the denial of coevalness. There is "no knowledge of the Other which is not also a temporal, historical, [and] political act" (Fabian, 1983, p.1). In this study, I argue more specifically that there is no knowledge of Brazil or of other subjects of international politics that is not a temporal, historical, and political act. Whether Brazil could be seen as the western 'Other' is an open question. But there are certainly many more 'Brazils' than a few discourses could reveal or allow. The initial explorations in this study depart from the hypothesis that 'Brazil', as a political entity in the international realm, has been actually actively participating in the perpetuation of whatever mechanisms and technologies that are still at work in the denial of 'coevalness' by putting itself in its place and accepting the conditions for its authority. It is interesting to see how Brazilian politicians, and even certain sectors of Brazilian society, would embrace notions of present and future that would automatically place them in a
position of powerlessness and inferiority in relation to other societies. But I am also interested in exploring events or representations that might be surprisingly disengaged from these narratives, and may actually reveal some different spatiotemporal platforms for Brazil.

It seems too simplistic or unsophisticated to develop a critique of a universal or linear notion of time. But how else is one able to understand the persistence of a "view of knowledge as separate from the political (or power), a subject that preexists politics, and a notion of the real as separable from thought about it"? (Edkins, 1999, p.14) Some form of linearity needs to be imposed so that "things become what they already were [...] retrospectively, through discourse and ideological processes..." (Edkins, 1999, p.14). Even the idea of accelerated time privileged in some postmodernist critiques could be seen as "confirm[ing] rather than undermin[ing] the special significance of the trajectory inherent in Western capitalist modernity" (Hutchings, 2007, p.82).

I argue for an understanding of time as an open and fundamentally political discourse, but I am also aware that I am ordering my own narrative in a legible and consistent way (thus linear), which means to subordinate myself to the rules I am trying to destabilize. When Hayden White (1990) asks "does the world really present itself to perception in the form of well-made stories, with central subjects, proper beginnings, middles, and ends, and a coherence that permits us to see 'the end' in every beginning?" (p.24), my answer is a resonant NO. But are we really able or allowed to leave it open as scholars? At least we need to recognize the political implications of our affirmations, understanding that

fact selection, their arrangement, and their meaning - the chief functions of theory - are dangerous tasks. All are conditioned by necessary and inevitable prejudices; to a substantial extent we perceive what we look for and we are often conditioned to ignore what is in front of our noses (Ferguson and Mansbach, 2004, p.330).

Rethinking temporality does not mean assigning new meanings to time. It is not a matter of finding, understanding, observing, or defining time in its form as circular, linear,
rectangular, hexagonal, or multiple, but rather to analyze how these different temporal forms are discursively created, conditioned by, and conditioning their specific content (subjects, places, dramas, events, etc.). 'International' or 'global' politics and all its temporal and spatial conditionings are realities imposed by specific historical narratives that subsequently erase the traces of other potential historical 'becomings'. According to White (1990), "the authority of the historical narrative is the authority of reality itself; the historical account endows this reality with form and thereby makes it desirable by the imposition upon its processes of the formal coherency that only stories possess" (White, 1990, p.20). Past, present, and future are stories we tell ourselves, and the events authorizing the progression of past to present and on to future "are real not because they occurred but because, first, they were remembered and, second, they are capable of finding a place in a chronologically ordered sequence" (White, 1990, p.20). In this sense, international relations, as history, is also a discourse of the real that is taken as reality.

Of course there is a variety of chronologies. But I do not think that the answer to my question about the 'problem' of time vis-à-vis space is to simply recognize the multiplicity of temporalities. Postcolonialists, such as Chakrabarty (2000), who suggests that the rewriting of history from the subaltern standpoint depends on the recognition of the "plurality of times existing together" (p.109), and others have done this and seem to have placed temporality into a larger box. I may try to "engage with diverse temporalities without reference to a higher level principle of historical organization" (Hutchings, 2007, 88), but it is possible that, by trying to 'perceive' diversity, I am already coming from some pre-conceptualization of sameness. In the next sections, I offer an explanation for the appropriateness of a genealogical approach to the analysis of temporal and spatial assumptions in discourses about Brazil's position in world politics. Genealogy allows me to explore the conditions for historical emergences without a commitment to essentialism or normative definitions of
reality. More specifically in the context of this study, it allows me to explore discursive and non-discursive practices through which Brazil came to be 'positioned' in certain spatial and temporal arrangements that limit and confine conditions of possibility for representations of what the country is and does.

**Genealogy and Discourse Analysis Beyond Structuralism**

The major divisions within critical discourse analysis involve approaches that include detailed analyses of texts and approaches that pay little attention to the linguistic features of the texts (Fairclough, 2003, p.2). Here I am focusing on the second kind of approach, which is greatly influenced by Michel Foucault. In this Foucauldian tradition of critical discourse analysis, one focuses on written or spoken texts and on the rhetorical and technical use of language, but especially "on questions of how social categories, knowledges, and relations are shaped by discourse" (Fairclough, 2003; Anaïs, 2013, p.123-124). In that sense, critical discourse analysis starts to distance itself from positivist approaches to texts, since texts or words are not seen as necessarily having a referent in the outside world, but as constitutive of social worlds. A 'critical' discourse analysis is characterized by skepticism, which means that words and meanings are not simply taken for granted. Foucault (2010) explains that, from the kind of analysis he has undertaken, "words are as deliberately absent as things themselves; any description of a vocabulary is as lacking as any reference to the living plenitude of experience" (p.48). Because there is no state anterior to or beyond discourse, "we shall remain, or try to remain, at the level of discourse itself" (p.48). Foucault's insistence on analyzing the systematic formation of the objects of which discourses speak (p.49) at the level of discourse is what distinguishes his archeological perspective from his genealogical approach.
Genealogy and discourse analysis can be understood as two distinct approaches to discursive practices if we understand the former as the rejection of the structuralism of the latter. As "ways of representing aspects of the world - the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the 'mental world' of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world" (Fairclough, 2003, p.214), discourse analysis allows one to look at a particular formation in its regularities and contradictions, but still as a system or field of rules "proper to discursive practice" (Foucault, 2010, p.49). Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) claim that, during Foucault's 'archeological moment', the subject was reduced to a function of discourse and discourses were treated as autonomous rule-governed systems (p.xxvi). This was so even though Foucault (2010) himself argued that his aim in the Archeology of Knowledge was "most decidedly not to use the categories of cultural totalities [...] in order to impose on history, despite itself, the forms of structural analysis" (p.15).

For Foucault (2010), "to analyze discourse is to hide and reveal contradictions; it is to show the play that they set up within it; it is to manifest how it can express them, embody them, or give them a temporary appearance" (p.151). He oriented the analysis of the discursive field in the following way: "we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it excludes" (p.28). According to him, the proper question for this kind of analysis is: "what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else?" (Foucault, 2010, p.28) We could say that Foucault was invested in "discerning the rules which 'govern' bodies of texts and utterances" (Fairclough, 2003, p.123) and immersed in the analysis of the domain of 'statements', something that further justifies his observation that his analysis was not "entirely foreign to what is called structural analysis" (Foucault, 2010, p.15), despite all his warnings about his non-structuralism.
Discourse analysis, to a great degree, is still about systems and rules. But the analysis of a discursive internal structure, or rules of organization, may as well expose its vulnerability and contradictions, or demystify notions of different epistemes as being established and presenting themselves as atemporal arrangements. Foucault did not go to the archives to reproduce and reinforce social structures of any kind, but rather to look at their formations. For Foucault (2010), "the archive defines a particular level: that of a practice that causes a multiplicity of statements to emerge as so many regular events, as so many things to be dealt with and manipulated . . . it reveals the rules of a practice that enables statements both to survive and to undergo regular modification" (p. 130). Archeology would then involve "historical investigations of particular arrangements that determine the limits and contours of what can and cannot be legitimately said, and who may legitimately say it" (Anaïs, 2013, p. 126). A critical discourse analysis, in these terms, requires an investigation of the possibility of discourses.

Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) argue that with Foucault's later "abandonment of archaeology as a theoretical project [...] he] not only distances himself from structuralism but situates the structuralist project historically within a context of the increased isolating, ordering, systematizing practices characteristic of what he calls disciplinary technology" (p.xxvi). However, they also note that Foucault would only abandon "the attempt to work out a theory of rule-governed systems of discursive practices" (p.xxv), and not the method itself. Genealogy could then be seen as a different step of investigation that does not cancel or negate archeology (Foucault's approach to discursive practices). Foucault would "preserve the structural technique of focusing on both discourse and the speaker as constructed objects, however, as a necessary step to free himself from taking the discourses and practices of this society as simply expressing the way things are" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p.xxvii).
Foucault (2010) explains that "critical and genealogical descriptions are to alternate, support and complete each other" (p.234).

As a technique, "archeology serves genealogy" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p.xxv). Archeology, "as a method of isolating discourse objects, [...] serves to distance and defamiliarize the serious discourse of the human sciences" (p.xxv). But Foucault (1998) acknowledges that when it comes to determining the systems of discourse on the basis of which we still live, as soon as we are obliged to question the words that still resonate in our ears, that are mingled with those we are trying to speak, then archeology, like Nietzschean philosophy, is forced to work with hammer blows (p.293).

Thus Foucault's recognition was that his "archeology owes more to Nietzschean genealogy than to structuralism properly so called" (Foucault, 1998, p.204). Foucault then embraces Nietzsche's approach to genealogical analysis, in which one is able to investigate the fabrication of the present, finding "at the historical beginning of things [...] not the inviolable identity of their origin; [but] the dissension of other things" (Foucault, 1998, p.372). Foucault's use of Nietzsche's approach to genealogy as a starting point for the development of different kinds of investigations allowed him to "thematize the relationship between truth, theory, and values and the social institutions and practices in which they emerge" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p.xxv).

Critical discourse analysis and genealogy, in the versions adopted here, share a critical post-positivist approach to the analysis of texts. Both approaches "use discourse to refer to speech and text as communicative events and to the boundaries of possibility that determine the limits of what can be said, by whom, and in what fashion" (Anaïs, 2013, p.128). And to the extent that critical discourse analysis, even when emphasizing discursive systems, sees language as a social practice and reveals the non-invitability of social or discursive structures (Anaïs, 2013, p.124), both approaches could also be categorized as
Genealogy and critical discourse analysis can be even more easily reconciled when we define genealogy not as a strict poststructuralist methodology, but as an "ethos of analysis", a "set of conceptual practices and habits of mind" (Anaïs, 2013, p.124). Some of the habits of mind that could be highlighted are patience and skepticism. Genealogy "requires patience and a knowledge of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material" (Foucault, 1998, p.370), but the goal is never the (re)constitution of the totality of any story. On the contrary, a genealogical approach never involves the generation of data according to a logic of beginning, middle, and end, it involves the collection of a wide range of source materials in order to discern socially and historically contingent patterns and events where existing practices are invested with new significations, or where they are co-opted and redeployed towards new ends (Anaïs, 2013, p. 129).

Even though neither a Foucauldian tradition of discourse analysis nor a Foucauldian genealogical approach could be labeled 'positivist', as I explained above, discourse analysis could still be seen as a method that entails some systematization of discourses whereas genealogy allows the researcher to break through the discourses of epistemes. Genealogy does not stay at the level of discursive phenomena, but it also "emphasizes the connection between the discourses of human sciences and their practices, and applications" (Anaïs, 2013, p.128). What genealogy does is emphasize the relation between texts and practices, and it takes discourses as ongoing processes (Anaïs, 2013, p.126). A genealogical approach to discourse:

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10 Some scholars like Ben Agger (1991) in social theory would draw a line between poststructuralism and postmodernism defining the former as a "theory of knowledge and language" and the latter as a "theory of society, culture, and history", and further allocating Foucault in the second group (p.112). I think this is a very problematic categorization because, in my view, knowledge and language are still crucial elements in postmodern - definitely in Foucauldian - analyses of society, culture and history, and most poststructuralists would probably not see their emphasis on knowledge and language as detached or isolated from the social, political, cultural, and historical 'contexts' that are necessarily embedded in and constituted through discursive practices. In IR, poststructuralists do not make the distinction between theory and practice exactly because they do not draw a line between words and social worlds (George and Campbell, 1990, p.280).
locates these discourses within the field of prior discourses and entails collection of historical series of texts and selection of key texts within these series, analysis of the constitution of these discourses through articulation of elements within the field of prior discourses, and specification of the relations of articulation between the diverse discourses which are drawn together within these nodal discourses (Fairclough, 2007, 54).

Discourse analysis is still extremely important for a genealogical project, but not as a means of interpretation of texts or an end in itself, because there is nothing to be interpreted. Since "there is no deeper level of meaning to be revealed, interpretations are Foucault’s data, not his mode of inquiry" (Shapiro, 1988, p.19). On this point, even as distinct 'methods', critical discourse analysis (CDA) and genealogical approaches share the same assumptions, "as [...] both approaches cause a problem for the very truth that an institutional text holds out before us, and uncovers the plays of power behind establishing the possibility of a discourse and its claims to truth" (Anaïs, 2013, p.132). As complementary tools for research, Foucault (2010) clarifies further that

the critical side of the analysis deals with the systems enveloping discourse; attempting to mark out and distinguish the principles of ordering, exclusion and rarity in discourse. We might, to play with words, say it practices a kind of studied casualness. The genealogical side of discourse, by way of contrast, deals with series of effective formation of discourse: it attempts to grasp it in its power of affirmation, by which I do not mean a power opposed to that of negation, but the power of constituting domains of objects, in relation to which one can affirm or deny true or false propositions (p.234).

Genealogy is intrinsically concerned with the nexus power-knowledge (Foucault, 1980, p.99). Foucault (1980) recommends "an ascending analysis of power, starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been [...] invested" (p. 99). This power, realized in everyday practice, "shapes our behaviors, knowledge, and the processes through which we relate to ourselves and others", and these
excavations of minor practices "involved in rendering behavior, knowledge, and social relations to thought, description, and intervention [...] are carried out in the form of situated analyses of text" (Anaïs, 2013, p.125). On the genealogical uses of texts and discourses, Bartelson (1995) adds that

genealogy cannot concern itself exclusively with the great texts of the great events of an age, since the greatness of a text or an event is a function of the significance given to them by a present which is problematic precisely because it has evolved out of this texts and events; instead, it must continuously question the relationship between interpretative centre and interpretative periphery, whether in singular texts or in entire discourses (p.76).

In this section, I emphasized the relationship between discourses and genealogy, explaining how the former become an element of the latter. I also explained how critical discourse analysis and genealogy, as two distinct post-positivist methodological (or anti-methodological) approaches, share some assumptions. In the next section, I focus on the peculiarities of the Foucauldian approach to genealogy. While Foucault was concerned with the history of epistemic discourses when he was engaged primarily with discursive practices, when he moves away from the regularities and contradictions within discourses and towards genealogy, he shifts his focus to the history, or histories, of modern subjectivity. According to Foucault (1990), "the archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms themselves [discursive practices that conformed to certain epistemic rules]; its genealogical dimension enabled me to analyze their formation out of the practices and the modifications undergone by the latter" (p.11-12). Disciplinary practices and discursive practices complement each other by defining the "conditions in which human beings 'problematize' what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live" (Foucault, 1990, p.10). This means, in part, that a genealogical project in the Foucauldian tradition departs from some specific assumptions about the kind of processes that are considered relevant,
setting up an agenda for the genealogist, and necessarily distancing itself from some other perspectives and inquiries. This is what I will try to further illuminate below.

The Peculiarities of Genealogical Explorations

According to Foucault (1984), a "historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying" (p.46) can be pursued as a criticism that is genealogical in its design but also archaeological in its method:

Archaeological - and not transcendental - in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think (p.46).

A critical aspect of genealogy, "that which sets it apart from other methodological approaches to the writing of history and the analysis of discourse, rests in its disruption of the notion that our present modes of being are timeless, essential, and could not have been otherwise" (Anaïs, 2013, p. 134). The question that interests genealogy would be primarily: “which possible self is being imposed on the basis of what attempt to naturalize and thereby maintain the order? [...] Every form of life creates its modes of subjectivity or kinds of human identity and its systems of meaning and value in a struggle with other possible forms of life” (Shapiro, 1992, p.3). Foucault (1983) defines three possible domains of genealogy:

First, an historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, an historical ontology of ourselves through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, an historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents (p. 237)
Foucault (1980) is not interested in the questions of "'why' certain people want to dominate, what they seek, what is their overall strategy" (p.97) because referring to certain 'people' is itself not an unproblematic move. He would invite us instead to look at

how things work at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviors etc. In other words, rather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects (Foucault, 1980, p.97).

Shapiro (1992) explains that what makes genealogy 'patient' is "the ontology within which it functions" (p.2). According to him, "rather than presuming an underlying system of order, a form of life in which the self can achieve authenticity or nonalienation, it assumes that Being is an arbitrary imposition or a violent practice. There is no natural limit summoning the process of inquiry” (Shapiro, 1992, p.2). Instead of seeking answers to the question of 'why', to which we would be able to find some 'becauses', "genealogy asks 'how' and through what relays of power" (Anaïs, 2013, p. 127).

Genealogy, functioning within this specific ontology, carries a more critical attitude towards what we understand as 'reality'. As a form of textual practice, the Foucauldian genealogy

is driven by a commitment to a process of disruptive inscription, where the process aspect is especially important. […] He outlined a mode of inquiry aimed at the continuous disruption of the structures of intelligibility that provide both individual and collective identities for persons and peoples and that construct the spaces as well as the more general assumptions of the order within which they are confined (Shapiro, 1992, p.1-2).

It is exactly in this nonfoundationalist posture in relation to the 'self' that we find the points of contention between genealogy and other critical methodologies. On the
irreconcilability of genealogy with other critical agendas of research, Shapiro (1992) argues that

Unlike, for example, most Marxian-inspired critical analyses, genealogy does not presume the validity of a particular construction of the self and the other, such as one in which the self masters ‘nature’ rather than succumbing to self-defeating ideologies of subjectivity (a version associated critical theory). Whereas the general tendency of critical theory is toward critique of ideology, based on the presumption of an authentic model of intelligibility, the genealogical imagination construes all systems of intelligibility as (in Nietzschean terms) false arrests, as the arbitrary fixings of the momentary results of struggles among contending forces, struggles that could have produced other possible systems of intelligibility and the orders they support (p.2).

Genealogy would not be appropriate for ideological critique in the most traditional sense, "inasmuch as [Foucault] is not criticizing something masking the truth but showing how the very production of knowledge and truth is linked to systems of power” (Shapiro, 1988, p.19). Shapiro (1992) adds that the Foucauldian textual practice

is a writing against a mode of interpretation that naturalizes prevailing human identities and operates within the pretense that all possibilities are exhausted. It is not the typical critical theory style of writing that is aimed at overcoming an estrangement between an adequate self and a mystified one, constructed within dominant discourses. Foucault, like Nietzsche, assumes that there is an indeterminant range of possible selves and that every institutionalized version of the self represents a political victory (p.16).

Conceptualizations of power and knowledge may justify or explain disagreements between these critical approaches. Power, in both the liberal and Marxist critiques of ideology, justifies the understanding of knowledge in these traditions as "a strategically important antidote to dominance and repression, and consequently a source of human emancipation, whether by gradual reform of total revolution. Truth becomes the antithesis of illegitimate power wrongly exercised” (Bartelson, 1995, p.79). For those writing from these theoretical perspectives, the source of domination is illegitimate, or ideological. Power becomes "a constant upon knowledge [...] and] operates by suspending knowledge in favor of
ideology, which serves to mask power’s ugly face and make its hegemony acceptable" (Bartelson, 1995, p.79). Genealogy, relying on a broader conceptualization of power as productive and decentralized, disqualifies ideological critique. The genealogist who "refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, [eventually] finds [...] not a timeless and essential secret [behind things] but the secret that they have no essence, or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms" (Foucault, 1998, p.371).

Genealogy can perhaps be criticized for being a form of 'perspectivism' that is self-refuting. One could argue, for instance, that “if there is no exteriority, and hence no spot uncontaminated by power from where to reflect and judge, all knowledge must be ideology" (Bartelson, 1995, p.81). Bartelson (1995) contends that a possible response to this kind of critique is for the genealogist "to turn his back on universal logic", explaining that "genealogy cannot raise any claims to universal truth for itself; its truth must remain local and particular, and it cannot validate its own standpoint with reference to a hypothetic future where all power relations are suspended, or a final truth acquired” (p.81).

Genealogy, critical discourse analysis, and ideological critique do not need to be opposites, however, if we consider a different conceptualization of ideology, and a different understanding of critique from the one offered by critical theorists. If genealogy is basically an analysis of what texts do to us, of how they are used, or, as Dreyfus and Rabinow explain, an investigation that allows one to "thematize the relationship between truth, theory, and values and the social institutions and practices in which they emerge" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p.xxv), we could argue that truths, theories, and values can be found to be embedded in discourses that are ideological in "their connection with systems of domination [...and] incorporated into lived experience where the basic mechanism of incorporation is one whereby sectional or specific interests are represented as universal interests” (Purvis & Hunt, 1993, p.497). However, recognizing as ideological a discourse or an institutional practice
through which particular representations or truths are represented as universal conditions and considerations does not mean that these discourses are covering deeper truths, theories, and values.

We could also say that, to the extent that genealogy is invested in investigating processes and mechanisms through which "boundaries of social identity function by rewarding/ punishing actions that are congruent/deviant with those identities as well as by enabling/constraining what is possible", there is an implication that “constitutive discourses are in some way causal" (Vucetic, 2011, p.1310). I would not refer to these relations as causal relations, however. But I would agree that to consider the different 'effects' of the mechanisms of power through which we come to constitute ourselves and define a space for politics does not contradict genealogy or critical discourse analysis. Purvis and Hunt (1993) note that Foucault "tended not to ask the 'result' or 'effect' questions: what were the consequences of asylums, prisons, etc.?" Rather, they argue that "there is nothing in his analysis of discourse that impedes either of these enquiries or inhibits the exploration of questions of both cause and effect" (Purvis & Hunt, 1993, p.491). If the focus of the genealogist is a deeper examination of the 'conditions of possibility' for X or Y, we consistently find at least reasons for X or Y. But, often, we would only be able to identify the operation of the mechanisms or practices we aim to investigate and their effects, whether ideological or not. In the next section, I explore some of these methods in relation to the field of IR, and I offer more details about their 'application' in analyses of development and geopolitics.

**Discourse, Power, and International Relations**

Genealogy is not an unfamiliar research tool for IR theorists. Srdjan Vucetic (2011) observes that, "since James Der Derian’s *On Diplomacy* appeared in 1987, hardly a year
passed in the discipline without at least one publication with the word genealogy in one of its titles" (p.1295). In all of these publications mobilizing the term genealogy, discourses are crucial 'object of analysis', and most of them analyze a number of texts in relation to institutional practices. Vucetic argues that "genealogy is typically employed [in IR] to analyze the ways in which agents and structures are constituted within historically and culturally specific sites, by drawing attention to contingency and, especially, the productive power of discourse" (Vucetic, 2011, p.1312). He does not see genealogy as an exclusive poststructuralist research tool, but rather believes that, "despite an occasional anti-methodological posturing by poststructuralists, a typical genealogy authored in IR tends to carefully interrogate the evidentiary base, operationalize its concepts, and delineate the scope and domain of its truth-claims, often against specific alternative explanations as well" (Vucetic, 2011, p.1312). Vucetic complicates the understanding of genealogy to include inferences about 'constitutive' and 'causal' relations. As explained above, a consideration of effects may be inevitable. But here it seems that Vucetic is making genealogy into a different methodological category.

Despite the fact that genealogy is no longer an unfamiliar research tool, 'genealogists' are not always clear about what they are doing. Vucetic (2011) points out that, "for the authors of IR genealogies [...], a tendency has been to provide no more than a couple of paragraphs on their research tool of choice" (p.1296). This may have further influenced a certain mystification of genealogy and led to inappropriate uses of the term. Even though genealogy may actually serve the analysis of a wide range of different puzzles, I believe that we should be careful with the 'everything goes' tendency, especially at a time when so many scholars claim to be able to talk about or develop research within the Foucauldian 'tradition'.

Some of the publications in which authors engage with a type of genealogical research considered seminal in the field, according to Vucetic (2011), include Jens
Bartelson's *Genealogy of Sovereignty*, David Campbell's *Writing Security*, Richard Price's *Chemical Weapons Taboo*, Lene Hansen's *Security as Practice*, and even Patrick Jackson's constructivist approach to genealogy in *Civilizing the Enemy*. This list is far from exhaustive or even coherent, but the reason I mention it here is because it is illustrative of what is considered by many to be genealogical study in international relations. Why are these specific books on the topics of 'state sovereignty', 'Western civilization', 'chemical weapons', and 'military interventions' the ones considered seminal in the field? Other questions for study suggested by Srdjan Vucetic (2011) are:

"Why does the 'Black Atlantic' matter for world politics? Who is a refugee, when and why? How did individual criminal accountability at the international level become possible and what effects does it have on interstate relations? What are transnational networks and how did they emerge in a realm hitherto defined by the modes of organization exclusively centered on states? How did the environment go global or Asia-Pacific regional?" (p.1312)

Vucetic's suggestions include a lot of 'why', 'what' and 'who' questions that I do not think are necessarily calling for a genealogical approach. How could the end goal of a genealogy be the search for a 'because', a 'thing', or a 'someone'? Vucetic seems to understand genealogy in a much broader sense than what I suggested above. He ends up defining genealogy as a "methodology that can be equipped to carry multiple narratives simultaneously – political, ontological, epistemological and ethical [and then] could come to be elevated as a research tool of first resort in IR" (Vucetic, 2011, p.1312) because it can enable "some form of historical and comparative evaluation" and can allow IR scholars to examine "the processes through which individuals and other non-state actors have gained and lost agency, authority and power in world politics" (Vucetic, 2011, p.1312).

My understanding of genealogy is different, as I intimated above, and more in line with an 'anti-methodological' perspective. Bartelson (1995), who engages a lot of historical texts and discourses on the topic of sovereignty, emphasizes that "genealogy is not a
historical method" (p.7). It is not a matter of drawing historical and comparative evaluations. Genealogy attempts to effect history, and by being effective, Bartelson (1995) explains that it can "not be a history of causal connections between opinions or precursive relationships between ideological positions, but a history of logical spaces and their succession in time [that leads us to an understanding of] how the present became logically possible" (p.7-8).

Bartelson (1995) also takes seriously the fact that genealogy must be episodical and exemplary, focusing "only in those episodes of the past which are crucial to our understanding of what was singled out as problematic in the present", and proceeding "by means of examples [that] grouped together constitute episodes" (p.8). Examples are "chosen on the basis of a hypothetical rule which governs the formation of examples within this field, and then used to support the hypothesis of such general rule" (p.8). One is not trying to tell a whole story or seeking continuity, and this is why there is an emphasis on unique and singular episodes in order to examine forces, power, and their reversals. In his genealogy of sovereignty, Bartelson (1995) insists that

[1] the history of sovereignty is more a matter of swift and partly covert epistemic discontinuity than of a ceaseless battle of overt opinions taking place within delimited and successive contexts. [...] 2] the history of sovereignty ought to be studied not in isolation or within a narrow temporal frame of inferential and rhetorical connections, but in terms of its multiple relations with other concepts within larger discursive wholes, these not being necessarily confined to political ones. Finally, [...] 3] these conceptual systems or discourses are open-ended and subject to constant modifications by means of rhetoric – a battle over truth which moves discourses forward in unexpected directions more by its unintended consequences than by its intended ones” (p.2)

This conceptualization of genealogy as a tool for an understanding of power relations that can only be partial, historical, and geographically located inhibits any research project that pretends to offer some sort of universal explanation or solution. But it probably should also be avoided by those who wish to find 'local' or 'better' subjectivities that could possibly replace dominant or hegemonic ones, as genealogy is not simply a rejection of universality,
but a disruption of the ontological status of any subject. In the next subsections, I share my evaluation of two different studies that seek to use genealogy and discourse analysis on questions of development and geopolitics, respectively.

*Discourse and Development*

Arturo Escobar, in "Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of his Work to the Third World", analyzes the way Western domination over the Third World is enacted by the extension to non-western societies of disciplinary and normalizing mechanisms in a variety of fields - encompassing political, economic, cultural and social domains - through discourses of development. Escobar (1984) argues that Foucault's insights on discourse, knowledge, and power enable us to conduct inquiry regarding the 'present' situation of the Third World, where development as a discourse and a productive apparatus have taken charge of the management of 'life'. Drawing on Foucault's notion of productive power as it relates to "practices by which 'men' govern themselves and others through the establishment of domains in which the distinction between true and false is made" (Escobar, 1984, p.378), Escobar scrutinizes the types of power and knowledge deployed in the Third World that “try to insure the conformity of its peoples to a certain type of economic and cultural behavior" (p.382). By exposing the strategies and specificities of the normalizing power embedded in development discourses and practices, he aims to re-politicize individuals, intellectuals, workers, and oppressed groups (p.381).

Escobar (1984) proposes to study the discourses of development archeologically - by identifying the different elements of which they are composed, and the system of relations by which these elements form wholes - and genealogically - by looking at the effective formation of discourse by nondiscursive practices, such as socioeconomic factors, institutions, administrative requirements. (p.379) After exploring the nuances of the
theoretical framework within which the article is situated, Escobar sets out to structure his argumentation. First, he explores the historical conditions under which new forms of exploitation, domination, and subjection arose and how they were embedded in discourses of development. Then, he examines the structure of this discourse. And finally, he analyzes the relations of power and knowledge that are made possible by the deployment of development (p.384). However, his analysis is not limited to an attempt to historicize and denaturalize relations of power by exposing the mechanisms through which North-South relations and the subjects of these representations have been normalized. Escobar goes one step further by looking at possible 'counterdiscourses', coming from grass-roots movements, and the 'nature' of their resistance. He is concerned with the materiality (basic conditions of life) upon which the dominant discourse is constructed, and with the possibility of looking at this materiality through new categories.

Escobar offers a compelling explanation to how Participatory Action Research (PAR) that grew out of experiences in grass-roots activism in Latin America, Asia and Africa may be seen as an efficient form of resistance against the 'normalizing' forces of the West. Even though the counterdiscourses operate within the same discursive space and within the same field of power as the dominant strategy (Escobar, 1984, p.390), they challenge traditional Western philosophy by rejecting the subject/object division and the abstract criteria for objective knowledge used to assess practices. The project emphasizes subject-subject relations and evaluates them in terms of the quality of the practices and actions (p.391-392). A drawback in Escobar's analysis lies in his effort to delineate the conditions for resistance. He ends up creating another divide between discourse and counterdiscourse, between an arbitrary idea of science and truth and 'local knowledges' - that he sees as more authentic and autonomous (p.393). While genealogy allows him to 'dismantle the discourse of development', and to open up a space for discussing alternative ways of thinking poverty in
the 'Third World', he does not question whether a Foucauldian perspective actually allows him to locate in the autonomous, non-centralized, and non-hierarchical character of the 'local' struggles an effective form of resistance against a form of domination that is placed somewhere else, in the 'outside'. As explained in previous sections, a Foucauldian perspective allows us to focus on the processes and mechanisms through which what is acceptable, desirable and legitimate is differentiated from what is unacceptable and illegitimate. From this standpoint, power is not identified and measured in relation to oppression. By legitimizing an alternative, Escobar is taking the risk of essentializing dominance and resistance while overlooking the way power operates through the distinction between these two spaces.

This example is particularly relevant to my study because I want to avoid romanticizing any alternative spatiality or temporality. Rather, I wish to explore the non-inevitability of and the conditions of possibility for our dominant spatialities and temporalities that constitute both the subjects and the problems that implicate the subjects. My acknowledgement of the exclusions produced by particular practices does not "arise out of a desire [...] to liberate those who were marginalized [...] or to diagnose their reasons for so being; rather, it is to understand the wider historical discourses that operate to maintain their position at the edges or on the margins of society" (Anaïs, 2013, p. 133).

Geopolitics and Discourse

In "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy", Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew propose a re-conceptualization of the conventional meaning of geopolitics. Geopolitics, conventionally understood as concerning the relationship between the physical environment (geography) and the conduct of foreign policy, is redefined by Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992) as "a discursive practice by which
intellectuals of statecraft 'spatialize' international politics in such a way as to represent it as a 'world' characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas" (p.192). In this sense, the study of geopolitics involves the study of statecraft as a set of social practices. The authors challenge the notion of geography as an objective materiality that can be taken for granted and observed. Instead, they are interested in understanding the production of geographical knowledge, something that requires the investigation of the ways places, people and dramas are described, represented, interpreted and appropriated. In this essay, Ó Tuathail and Agnew analyze more specifically the spatialization of international politics by intellectuals of statecraft in the United States during the Cold War.

Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992) organize their article in two parts, in which they explore the concepts of geopolitics as discourse and practical geopolitical reasoning, respectively. In the first part, they discuss the implications of conceptualizing geopolitics in discursive terms. They define discourse as "a set of capabilities whose existence we infer from their realizations in activities, texts and speeches" (p.193). Drawing inspiration from the writings of Foucault, they argue that "geography as discourse is a form of power/knowledge itself" (p.192). In the second part of the article, they explore the development of practical geopolitical reasoning in the United States. In contrast to formal or strategic reasoning, the practical type relies on assumptions about places and their particular identities (p.194). The authors investigate the constitution of an American discourse - and the lines this discourse draws between the space of the 'Self' and the 'Other' - in relation to processes of 'geopolitical world ordering' in the late 1940s. They look at two documents written by George Keenan, the 'Long Telegram' and the 'Mr X' text, to expose ways in which the enemy (Soviet Union) was created and represented in the American geographical imaginary. The practical geopolitical reasoning through which particular representations of the Soviet Union were discursively 'stabilized' in the United States closed the space for dialogue between the two super powers.
during the Cold War, as the USSR's character had already been determined historically and geographically by US intellectuals of statecraft, and thus rendered immutable.

Ó Tuathail and Agnew effectively demonstrate how the Cold War itself was a discourse. It depended on particular descriptions, representations, and interpretations of international space, and of the space for the 'Self' and the 'Other'. The relevance of their work lies in the fact that the "geopolitical reasoning works by being anti-geographical" (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, p.190). This means that the effectiveness of the geopolitical discourse lies in the stabilization of certain 'spatializations' of politics. The re-conceptualization of geopolitics as discourse also re-politicizes the international order because it discloses the political struggles behind the construction of political maps. Geopolitics as discourse brings to the fore the process of 'geo-graphing'. The authors elucidate that discourses enable a field of possibilities and reasoning. Through discourses, the conditions are created for recognizing and thinking international political space. In light of this claim, however, one question can be asked about this particular project: how might Ó Tuathail and Agnew themselves be able to prevent enclosing the space for thinking geopolitics as a result of their emphasis on the importance of intellectuals of statecraft and the disproportionate influence of 'core powers' over how the international political space is represented? On the one hand, they explain that the effectiveness of a geopolitical discourse can be measured by the degree to which it stabilizes certain spatializations of politics. By looking at statecraft, they are able to illustrate how political maps are continually in the making through discursive practices. On the other hand, their choice of statecraft as an illustrative example can be misleading to the extent it reinforces a normative assumption about the international political map that is designed predominantly from the political spaces inhabited by politicians of the ‘developed world’.

My own project seems to be related to the two kinds of inquiries described above. That is to say, it seems to be connected to the exploration of development as a discourse
embedded in practices that are closely related to the constitution of the 'third world', and to an understanding of geopolitics as a discursive practice that spatializes and encloses particular representations of 'self' and 'other' in international politics. Indeed, one of the challenges of this study will be to avoid doing what I have criticized above about these scholars’ works. One study (Escobar’s) took seriously Foucault's recommendation of an "ascending analysis power", looked at operations of power at a micro level, but ended up reifying an alternative perspective against dominant/global forces. The other study (Ó Tuathail & Agnew’s) adopted the recommendation to suspend all truth claims and to transcend the 'self'/other' dichotomy, but its level of analysis ended up reinforcing the notion of statecraft as an exclusive space for politics.

Shapiro (1992) reminds us that genealogy is involved in telling a story about the exercise of power. But it is not "a form of power analyzed by focusing on geopolitical space, but a power that functions through discursive strategies and tactics, through the identities produced in the forms of knowledge and interpretation that normalize human subjectivity in various historical periods" (p.4). In this dissertation, part of the reason why I choose to start with the 'geopolitical' or the international ‘level’ is because the 'problematicizations' motivating analyses about Brazil and geopolitical shifts in the twenty-first century are calling for a destabilization of the arrangements that make these analyses possible. Still, this does not mean that I am limiting my analysis to what is typically understood as the 'international' or 'geopolitical' scale.

**Problematization**

This dissertation is not guided by a 'problem'. Rather, it is driven by a curiosity about how some 'people', 'places', and 'histories' become problematized. There is no problem to be fixed, but mechanisms and practices of disciplinary power that "effect 'problematization'
through strategies of normalization" (Campbell, 1998, p.xi). Campbell (1998) notes that "these strategies work on people and places so as to compare, differentiate, hierarchize, and homogenize them in ways that map them as manageable problems amenable to solutions that more often than not involve distribution, enclosure, and surveillance" (p.xi). This research is, along these lines, a reaction to the ongoing discursive and non-discursive practices leading to the constitution, the temporal and spatial hierarchization, and the problematization of 'Brazil' and 'Brazilians' in relation to other subjectivities and other temporal and spatial 'positionings'.

I am concerned with the way these temporal and spatial 'positionings' are problematized. The fact that a notion of Brazil's position in time and space that can be found in such questions as "Did Brazil arrive to the future? Is Brazil a global player? Can Brazil become a global power?" has been predominant in so many studies and analyses recently means that what I am actually looking at are the processes through which Brazil has been 'problematized' and how this problematization has been poorly addressed or not even questioned at all. Genealogy is an appropriate analytical tool here, as it is not my priority to analyze behaviors, ideas, societies, or ideologies, but rather to examine “the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought - and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed" (Foucault, 1990, p.11).

I would love to be able to say that my research will unveil an image of Brazil associated with hope and beauty, one that could offer an alternative to the way 'peoples', 'places', and 'politics' are arranged. But that is unlikely to be the case, and it is not my goal as a researcher. What does prevent one to say that Brazil is a great power, or even better, that the future belongs to loving and unarmed societies who commune with nature? How is a statement like this automatically labeled utopian, or how are its supporters called ingenuous fools? Providing some possible answers to this 'how' question is closer to my objective in this study. Again, I am not trying to defend utopia, but to show how alternative categorizations
have been ruled out. The genealogical spatial strategy I propose "is not coming from an imagined transcendent or otherwise dematerialized place [...and] one needs to avoid the more familiar geographic metaphors - the now and the then, the now and the yet-to-be, the real and the ideal, the symbolic and the real" (Shapiro, 1992, p.12). The examination of 'where we are' is "not meant as a simple description of the current state of things", or an apology to go somewhere else. Rather, it is "an attempt to show that the 'now' is an unstable victory won at the expense of other possible nows" (Shapiro, 1992, p.12). I believe that it is especially relevant to engage in this kind of study now because, with the most recent cycle of 'emergence' of developing countries, one might be tempted to celebrate the end of the third world once again, to the detriment of subjectivities that become even more invisible and strange in this 'so-called' globalizing world.

Why do research if we do not seem to be contributing to the construction of a better world? I agree with those who argue that we can improve the way things are once we are no longer confined to a standardized ideal according to which peoples, places, and things can be measured and from which a perception of improvement can be deduced. Perhaps evil is not to be found in 'nonfoundationalist' positions that prevent one to say 'this is better', but in the cruelties that are enabled when the duality good/evil is naturalized and sustained. On the topic of Foucault's ethical sensibility, Connolly (1993) stresses, Foucault contends, along with Nietzsche, Arendt, and Todorov, that systemic cruelty flows regularly from the thoughtlessness of aggressive conventionality, the transcendentalization of contingent identities, and the treatment of good/evil as a duality wired into the intrinsic order of things. A modern problem of evil resides, paradoxically, within the good/evil duality and numerous dualities linked to it. Evil, again, not as gratuitous action by free agents operating in an innocent institutional matrix but as undeserved suffering imposed by practices protecting the reassurance (the goodness, purity, normality) of hegemonic identities (p. 366).

We do not need to offer an alternative to what we destabilize. That should not even be expected after we finally understand theory as practice. We do not need to do anything to
intervene in the world, because we are, 'in theory' (and not with theory), already 'doing' something. One of the elements of Foucauldian ethical sensibility that Connolly (1993) highlights is the genealogical analysis itself and its tendency to "disturb the sense of ontological necessity, historical inevitability, and purity of discrimination in established dualities of identity/difference, normality/abnormality, innocence/guilty, crime/accident, and responsible agency/delinquent offender" (p.367). By revealing the discontinuities in the present social formations, we may actually be able to trace "possible ways of thinking differently, instead of accepting and legitimating what are already the 'truths' of our world, [and] to provide a counter-memory that [...] help subjects recreate the historical and practical conditions of their present existence" (Tamboukou, 1999, p.203), even when we are not trying to define and/or impose these conditions on them.

The Chronotope

This dissertation may be seen as a collection of different stories about Brazil, stories developing within a "chronotope", and stories emerging as "interpretative agonistics" (Shapiro, 1992, p.3). The chronotope is defined by Bakhtin (1981) as "the place where the knots of narrative are tied and untied" (p.250). The chronotope functions "as the primary means for materializing time in space, [emerging] as a center for concretizing representation, as a force giving body to the entire novel" (Bakhtin, 1981, p.250). In his literary analysis, Bakhtin (1981) claims that the chronotope is where "time becomes, in effect, palpable and visible", providing "the ground essential for the showing forth, the representability of events" (p.250). Drawing on Bakhtin's notion of the chronotope as a platform and a condition for visibility and representation, I focus on temporal-spatial expressions that enable different discourses and representations, and I emphasize how these representations come into being within and through chronotopic constructions.
The chronotope ties many of the elements of my study together. The genealogical approach describes my gaze, and the chronotope grounds my strategy of discourse analysis. This study is ultimately about the conditions of possibility for the circulation of meanings and representations, and it starts from the assumption that "language, as a treasure-house of images, is fundamentally chronotopic" (Bakhtin, 1981, p.251). Bakhtin (1981) argues that

Whatever these meanings turn out to be, in order to enter our experience [...] they must take on the form of a sign that is audible and visible for us [...]. Without such temporal-spatial expression, even abstract thought is impossible. Consequently, every entry into the sphere of meaning is accomplished only through the gates of the chronotope (p.258).

Each chronotope demarcates a field of possible subjectivities and potential becomings. The two essential aspects of a chronotope emphasized by Agha (2007) are that "it links representations of time to those of locale and personhood. And it is experienced within a participation framework: The act of producing or construing a chronotopic representation itself has a chronotopic organization [...] which may be transformed by that act" (p.321). Given these two aspects, we can now see how "belonging to a public sphere requires performing a figure of 'public subjectivity' whose felicity conditions include fluency in a set of chronotopic conventions" (Agha, 2007, p.329). Time in turn can be defined as something that is "textuality diagrammed and ideologically grasped in relation to, and through activities of, locatable selves" (Agha, 2007, p.320).

Bakhtin's conceptualization of the chronotope is useful as a methodological strategy for searching the elements or motifs in a discourse as well as their constitutive and distributive roles in the different formations of temporal and spatial political 'reality'. According to Bakhtin (1981), "the motif of meeting is [...] closely related to other important motifs, especially the motif of recognition/nonrecognition" (p.98). He acknowledges that this "is one of the most universal motifs, not only in literature [...] but also in other areas of
culture and in various spheres of public and everyday life" (Bakhtin, 1981, p.98). On the chronotope operating in 'real-life', Bakhtin (1981) adds:

A real-life chronotope of meeting is constantly present in organizations of social and governmental life. Everyone is familiar with organized social meetings of all possible sorts, and how important they are. In the life of the state, meetings are also very important. Let us mention here only diplomatic encounters, always strictly regulated, where the time, place and makeup of these encounters are dependent upon the rank of people being met (p.99).

In my own investigation, my focus is reversed, as I look at the ‘rank of people being met’ as a variable that depends on the time, the place, and the makeup of these encounters. Even though I find the concept of the chronotope useful, I should clarify that my study challenges the idea that there is a distinction between the representation and the represented, or that I am dealing with a particular nonfictional genre. Challenging Bakhtin's understanding in his literary analysis that “out of the actual chronotopes of our world (which serves as the source of representation) emerge the reflected and created chronotopes of the world represented in the work (in the text)” (Bakhtin, 1981, p.253), I assume that there is no 'actual world' but a collection of novels all the way. Or, in other words, there is no real world or subject outside of representation; there is nobody standing in front of the mirror waiting to see his/her image reflected back. While Bakhtin (1981) adds that "we must never confuse [...] the represented world with the world outside the text [as] such confusions are methodologically impermissible" (p.253), this dissertation does not recognize the world outside the text because:

if words are metaphorical fictions themselves (e.g. the word 'table' is not the table), then no piece of writing is immune from a parasitic relationship with the fictional; in fact, if this is true, nonfiction is essentially dependent on fiction, as it has no other access to reality except by the metaphorical bridge of language, itself a system which is not the world but a representational assemblage of the same (Sullivan, 2011, p.15).
This means that, while Bakhtin (1981) understands that every image that enters the chronotope in the literary work is a created, and not a creating, thing" (p.256), I am arguing that the images themselves create. Given my focus on spatiotemporal categories, and going back to the problematic of time vis-à-vis space in international relations, we should keep in mind the way 'time' holds maps together, and also the way "maps in and of themselves create power" (Sullivan, 2011, p.101). For Pickles (2004),

the map is a conjured object that creates categories, boundaries and territories: the spaces of temperature, biota, populations, regions, spaces and objects attain the reality that is particular to them through the combined and multiplied acts of mapping, delimiting, bounding, categorizing (p.94)

Thus, I appropriate and twist Bakhtin's conceptualization and analysis of chronotopes, starting by dematerializing the kind of 'temporality' and 'spatiality' that have become the ground for the showing forth of so many ugly representations of reality and about the 'future' of the world. History can never be exhausted, and my stories reveal only a few aspects of the present that did not 'naturally' come to be. My contribution is an approach to genealogy and discourse that deals with the practices through which time is materialized not only in an abstract space, but also in bodies and places. In the next section, I explore some possible limitations and obstacles to this approach. One needs to show courage to move from 'politics' to the 'political', and not to run away back to politics at the first sign of crisis. Even though I may acknowledge the relevance of chronotopic boundaries to discourse participants and the possibility of alternative chronotopes, I must reiterate that it is not my goal to replace the current boundaries or to create new ones.

Dare Not to Know

International Relations as a field of study seems to be constantly in crisis. Its foundations are permanently shaky, but somehow it keeps reinventing new firm grounds. In
one of these moments in which IR scholars were debating the future of the discipline, Ken Booth (1995) turned on its head Kant's motto for the Enlightenment, deploying the phrase 'Dare not to know' as the title of his chapter in International Theory Today. He argued that "established knowledge in international relations has tended to become an oxymoron. Knowledge in the subject is no longer established: it is contested" (Booth, 1995, p.329). And the "implications of saying 'Dare not to know' in international relations are profound" (p.330), entailing a revolution in the ontology, epistemology, and overall agenda of the discipline. According to him,

Dare not to know means: re-examining basic concepts; opening up to what has been closed out; rehumanizing what has been dehumanized; de-gendering what has been gendered; celebrating confusion rather than certainty; dethroning the logic of anarchy with the logics of anarchy; denaturalizing established common sense; populating the frontier zones between the academic disciplines; ideologizing the supposedly objective; re-imagining the humanly constituted; contextualizing the tradition; making normativity a norm; and listening carefully to the subject's 'screaming silences' (Booth, 1995, p.330).

Of course, there are limitations to what we can afford not to know, according to Ken Booth. He understood that the program he proposed came with "the risk of academic international relations being sucked into the black hole of philosophy" (Booth, 1995, p.330). He might have a point about the tendency of some 'dissident theorists' in the discipline to isolate themselves in the exercise of 'thinking about thinking'. But it seems to me that Booth does not fully embrace the challenge of leaving the future open as he suggests. He argues that "anchorages are needed so that we can argue that 'this way is better than that' in the endless global debate about the manner in which we live - or fight - together" (Booth, 1995, p.347).

While I have my own ideas about what is better for the world, I believe that there are enough people claiming to know what is better for the 'Other', and I would object that this kind of anchorage is desirable. Maybe we should be more concerned with lifting the current anchorages that are keeping the 'Other' at the bottom.
As an alternative to the notion of an appropriate critical attitude that requires an anchorage, Foucault (1980) offers a "radical but unaggressive skepticism" (p.49). This skepticism makes it a principle not to regard the point in time where we are now standing as the outcome of a teleological progression which it would be one's business to reconstruct historically: that skepticism regarding ourselves and what we are, our here and now, which prevents one from assuming that what we have is better than - or more than - in the past (Foucault, 1980, p.49).

By the same token, this skepticism can prevent us from 'seeing' the present only in relation to an inevitable unfolding into a predictable and better future. As Mário de Andrade put it in one of his poems, we may have advanced a little bit, because progress is also an accident (fatality). Hutchings (2007) reminds us that "the task of the critical theorists is to keep this promise open by always acknowledging that even actions inspired by aspirations towards justice will inevitably fail to do justice to the indeterminacy of the future" (p.81). This promise is always upsetting to many because "where there is no beginning or end then there is also no orientation relative to the present, no measure, no organization, only the ongoing differential production of past and future" (Hutchings, 2007, p.87). The invisibility of this kind of project, or the number of questions that would be thrown at anyone trying to rethink temporality in an unsettling way, might be symptomatic of a craving for control and certainty. "What is the alternative? Where do we go from here?" Ashley (1988) argues that "there will no doubt be those who say that such a way of looking at international theory and practice is altogether too unsettling, too open, too ready to entertain the undecidable play of ambiguity and chance in history (p.254). But, as Walker (1995) remarks, "surely we have had enough of a politics of little boxes" (p.324).

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Time and The Country of the Future

The idea attributed to Albert Einstein that we cannot solve problems at the same level as that where the problem was created is now taken as a big cliché, but it remains a remarkably valid statement for international relations. If we want to discuss the problems of the 'international', it is probably neither in the 'national' nor in the 'international' that we will be able to find the solutions. As critical IR scholars have shown, the problem might be exactly in the constitution of exclusionary sovereign subjects, spaces, and temporalities as unproblematic. Unfortunately, critical IR scholars' attempt to shed light on the fundamental inclination of the discipline to draw and reproduce borders has been followed by a simplistic translation of this critique into a critique of the sovereign state, as if the diminishing of this unit of analysis in international studies would automatically free the 'subjects' from all kinds of borders they have been subordinated to. The problem is not the 'state' itself, or the 'international', but the way the manipulation of these and other categories defines the limits of what we are and what we can become.

'Time' has been a powerful variable in the process, because it is through the acceptance of certain discourses of time, and the embracing of specific temporalities, that we are able to write world history. We arbitrarily rank and order events, peoples, stories, and all sorts of dramas in a particular way, shaping what was and what will 'naturally' be through exclusion of what can be forgotten and what cannot be seen as a future possibility. If we understand that "injustice, inequality, and indignity [have been] the ordering principles of global social life" (Inayatullah, 1996, p.77), there must be something wrong with the way we are ranking and reproducing certain ideas about past, present, and future to the detriment of others.

We cannot really step outside temporality to study the 'problem' of time, but we can start trying to not take for granted the coherence and reliability of some stories over others.
because of the way they seem to contain the right characters or seem to unfold in a predictable and consistent way. This is a possible task to the degree that we are not committed to any established borders and hierarchizing differentiations, but instead are devoted to the relentless suspension of them. Discourse analysis continues to be a crucial element in my genealogical approach. I would say that it actually enables us to look at the normalizing aspect of disciplinary practices within different chronotopes. Even though genealogy also elevates non-discursive practices to the position of important pieces in the puzzle of relations of power, the 'constitution of selves', and subjective 'positionings', these pieces could only be put (or forced) together if there is some structure to this puzzle enabled by and though discursive practices arranged according to certain spatiotemporal frameworks. In other words, there must be a number of non-discursive and institutional mechanisms involved in the hierarchization of 'peoples' and 'places', but these mechanisms do not stand by themselves. They are given form, legitimacy, meaning, and authority through language, even if language alone cannot account for all that is involved in the constitution of a 'country of the future'.
Chapter 2
The End of Times: Developing Between the ‘Space of Experience’ and the ‘Horizon of Expectation’

Tupi or not tupi, that's the question!\textsuperscript{12}
- Oswald de Andrade, Manifesto Antropofago

On a cover of a printed Latin American issue of The Economist in September 2013, Christ the Redeemer (the symbol of the city of Rio de Janeiro) is upside down flying straight down to Earth. No explanation of this image was deemed necessary by the editors, except that it was a reference to a cover from 2009 in which the statue was taking off like a rocket. The headlines accompanying these illustrations were "Brazil takes off" (2009) and "Has Brazil blown it? Brazil's Future" (2013). Both issues included a special report on Brazil that supposedly justified the respective representations of the ascension and the fall of the country. Given the number of assumptions being made on the current spatiotemporal position of Brazil, this chapter investigates on the conditions for representation in the international political and economic arena that have been established and reproduced through these narratives about the future.

From speculations about the 'country of the future' having finally arrived at its own time to analyses about the current 'uncertain future' of Brazil, the last decade marked another moment in the history of the country in which its position in time and space was contested, analyzed, explained, justified, measured, and/or anticipated. Questions like: Is Brazil finally coming to the future? Is Brazil still the country of the future? Or even, Brazil's future: Has it blown it? have been some of the headlines in newspapers and magazines since the mid-2000s. A closer look at these questions, the diagnoses, and the prognoses that have been

\textsuperscript{12}Oswald de Andrade wrote the anthropophagic manifest in 1928. As part of an artist manifest, it ironizes the submission of the Brazilian elite to 'developed' societies and to the universalities and metaphysical speculations introduced by Europeans. Andrade and other followers of this movement proposed instead the devouring and transfiguration of imported philosophies, customs, and techniques. Tupi (pronounced tu-pee) languages were one of the most widespread groups of South American indigenous languages. 'Tupi or not tupi' could then be understood as an invitation to eat the 'other', disorganizing the logic of assimilation and the hierarchy among different temporalities.
offered, allows us to consider a different interrogation: How do we recognize the 'future' when we see it? For Bakhtin (1986),

the ability to see time, to read time, in the spatial whole of the world and, on the other hand, to perceive the filling of space not as an immobile background, a given that is completed once and for all, but as an emerging whole, an event - this is the ability to read in everything signs that show time in its course (p. 25).

In this explanation, time is a measure of movement in space, the perception of spatial transformation itself. The elusive pervasiveness of the temporal element in social and political analysis would be precisely the fact that "while space is associated with visible matter and sense data, time is the invisible 'other', that which works outside and beyond the reach of our senses" (Adam, 1998, p.10). The problem in trying to see and read time then becomes one of deciding which signs are worth noting and where we can find more like them, given the fact that seeing signs everywhere may end up meaning seeing signs nowhere. As Einstein explained about the measurement of the motion of a material point in space, coordinates are necessary, in which case "we give the values of its coordinates as functions of the time" (Einstein, 1905). But what we should also take into account is that "this coordination has the disadvantage that it is not independent of the standpoint of the observer with the watch or clock, as we know from experience" (Einstein, 1905). As obvious as this disadvantage may seem, the ‘international’ is one of the spaces in which time is still often discussed in terms of a ‘here’ and a ‘there’, without a problematization of the definition of the coordinates or of the naming and positioning of the observers who are authorized to measure the movement from one platform of experience to the other.

In Timescapes of Modernity, Barbara Adam focused on the implications of this process of abstraction of time from context embedded in the notion of clock time as the "ultimate expression of the Newtonian understanding of time", and through which time becomes "invariable, standardized and universally applicable" (Adam, 1998, p.41). For Adam
it makes a significant difference [...] whether or not de-contextualized, abstract atemporality is aspired to, whether or not reversibility is a basic assumption, and whether or not the control of time and the transformation from transience to permanence are considered possible in principle and desirable in practice (p.41).

Even though this chapter accommodates some of these questions, my analysis is not focused on the implications of the abstraction or standardization of time mentioned above, but on the mechanisms of materialization of time in space. In other words, I look at practices of contextualization of time, or temporal positionings, through which time becomes tangible. This exploration is guided by a discussion of the relationship between two topologies of time, the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of expectation’, as conditions of possibility for the current distribution of representations and positions in international relations. In order to illustrate spatiotemporal arrangements enabling and enabled by international political and economic discourses, I focus on ongoing discourses about Brazil’s process of coming to the future and becoming a global player, or a country of the present. Given that representations of Brazil have often been designed and shaped by an anxiety to analyze how the course of events expressed by various statistics is leading Brazil to the fulfillment of the prophecy of a great future, one may look at the interplay between experience and expectation in order to explore the possibilities that different polities hold as characters in international politics.

My analysis includes the revisiting of the notion of the 'future' and the prophetic nature of progress in Brazil’s historical narrative, as well as the exploration of the role of international institutions in reproducing the temporal disjunction between those who claim to hold the vision of the future and those who are expected to unfold into a future that has been foreseen and announced. In the first section, I examine the concept of progress and the secularization of the perception of the future. Following this explanation of the unfolding of the new understanding of the future in western modern societies, I discuss the prophetic
nature of the idea of the future for Brazil, what has been reproduced by narratives about 'Brazil's emergence' since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The subsequent sections explore further the ways in which Brazil is represented and positioned according to particular categorizations through which time is distributed and organized on the international stage. The conditions for the future that are imposed by these practices limit the realm of experience and render invisible any practices or events that are not recognized by the current measuring sticks of time.

**Progress and the Space of Experience**

Koselleck's investigation of the concept of historical time is guided by the question: "how, in a given present, are the temporal dimensions of past and future related?" (2004, p.3) He argues that "historical time is bound up with social and political actions, with concretely acting and suffering human beings and their institutions and organizations" (Koselleck, 2004, p.2). To answer this question, Koselleck explores the articulation of the temporal dimensions of past and future in socio-political experience from early Christianity to modernity to illustrate the process of temporalization of history and the acceleration of time that characterizes modernity (Koselleck, 2004, p.11).

Until the sixteenth century, past and present were a function of the future. The End of the World defined the image of the future, and from that certainty, the history of Christianity has been marked by constant anticipation, deferment, and expectation (Koselleck, 2004, p.11-12). In this context, the study of the past has been driven by an anxiety to analyze how the course of events is leading to the fulfillment of the final prophecy. The past helps one to situate the present in relation to the future, while the future is known, revealed by God, and interpreted by the prophets. The faith in the future yet to come was also supported by a strong faith in the clarity and certainty of the revelation, as expressed in a well-known prophets'
prayer: "when the years approach you will be known, when the time has come you will be shown" (Augustine, 2003 [1467], p.800). In museums all over the western world, hundreds of paintings of the final judgment depicted this teleological concept of world history, "with an origin (creation) and an end (the final judgment). [...]. But time here did not imply 'progress' from beginning to end" (Mignolo, 2011, p.155). The future was an expectation of a final destination that could not be manipulated or negotiated. Returning to the New Testament and the eschatological dimension of the present, Pascal (1900) stated that

the present is never our aim, and while it and the past are our means, the future alone is our end. Thus we never live, but are always hoping to live, and, constantly preparing ourselves to be happy, it is beyond doubt that we never shall be happy (p.17).

Koselleck contends that the emergence of absolutist States and other changes in the sociopolitical environment gradually transformed the experience of time. He highlights Spinoza's critique of prophecy in 1670 as the "victim of primitive powers of self-delusion" (Koselleck, 2004, p.17). The persecution of prophets and the opening of the future to different interpretations in these societies birthing into 'modernity' were initial movements towards secularization. Modern historical time eliminates the notion of the future as taken for granted. The future becomes "the domain of finite possibilities, arranged according to their greater or lesser probability" (Koselleck, 2004, p.18). Prognosis replaces prophecy while it also introduces the past into the future. This new understanding of time still limits the future to what one can predict based on the observation of the regularities of the past. The future, in this sense, is "trapped within a temporal structure" (Koselleck, 2004, p.22) that ties beginnings with the means and the ends, even though the end loses its prophetic nature.

Up to this point, in the western world, Mignolo argues that "space was the principle of classification, vertically and horizontally" (Mignolo, 2011, p.155). The Christian T-in-O
map\textsuperscript{13} dividing the planet into three continents (Asia, Africa, and Europe) represented the \textit{cosmo-graphy} of that time, a horizontal and spatial model of classification complemented by a vertical classification implied in the notion of the 'chain of beings', a natural order of things under which all living beings subsumed (Mignolo, 2011, 155). By the eighteenth century, time had become "one of the central categories to distinguish culture from nature" (Mignolo, 2011, p.151). With the reconfiguration of the world map, and time becoming a defining category, barbarians were no longer simply situated in a particular territory, but translated into primitives. According to Mignolo, the two main features of the new model were: "First, primitives were closer to nature and civilized people were at the peak of culture. Second, primitives were traditional, and civilized Europeans were modern" (Mignolo, 2011, p.155-156). The illusory detachment of 'modern man' from a natural order of things enabled the attachment of time to mundane movements, and to human designed histories and paths. In this context, the 'chain of beings' could be desacralized. As explained by Shapiro (1989),

The 'heavens' have since been increasingly populated by both strategic and commercial vehicles. In a sense, the horizontal axis has been pivoted, and the old vertical dimension of the Middle Ages has become a geopolitical extension of the horizontal territoriality that has subjugated it. If the spatialization of the world is still the shape of the cross, that cross has been largely desacralized, for the powers that control the readings of the world's text identify themselves with mundane, nationalistic world histories rather than sacred mythologies" (p.13).

The perception of the acceleration of time mainly since the nineteenth century enabled by, among other things, the introduction of new technologies and scientific discoveries creates the conditions for the emergence of the notion of progress, which opens up the future and is characterized by: "first, the increasing speed with which it approaches us, and second, its unknown quality" (Koselleck, 2004, p.22). The past and present become future possibilities for an unknown and increasingly 'immediate' future.

\textsuperscript{13}The T-in-O map consisted of a circle with a 'T' inside. The horizontal line of the 'T' divides the circle in two. Asia is placed at the top of the horizontal line, while Europe and Africa are placed below, to the left and to the right of the vertical line of the 'T', respectively.
Koselleck acknowledges that, to a greater or lesser extent, future reality can be predicted. Historical experience, some degree of regularity, and probability are not completely left aside with progress. Experience would still function as a site of "possibilities that individually or collectively indicate various chances for their realization. Accordingly, there must be an art of prognosis that contains at least minimal rules for its success" (Koselleck, 2002, p.134). What must be clear regarding the 'future' in modern temporality is that, even though it might be to some extent predicted, once one is able to plan and establish causal relationships between means and ends, the future is much "less of a retrospective notion because it has arisen from the present, which is opening out toward the future. The future of modern time is thought to be open, without boundaries, [and] totally different from all that has passed before" (Koselleck, 2002, p.120).

In this particular account of the modern conception of the 'future', it seems that the future and the present almost 'touch' each other, and quickly become past. The acceleration that results from scientific inventions shrinks time and becomes the new indicator of change in historical time, replacing the notion of improvement towards an ideal state of being (Koselleck, 2002, p.269-270). Acceleration is identified in everyday experience, in the perception of novelty and the immediacy of the future, rather than in the expectation of better historical conditions yet to come. In other words, progress as a concept and a perception of time as acceleration and fast transformation in space "reduced the temporal difference between experience and expectation to a single concept" (Koselleck, 2004, p.268). And what becomes a rule is that "all previous experience might not count against the possible otherness of the future. The future would be different from the past, and better, to boot" (Koselleck, 2004, p.267).

Prophecy and the Horizon of Expectation
Mignolo (2011) reminds us that "time [...] is a category of reckoning, not a category of experiencing; it is a category belonging to culture, not to nature" (p.151). By reproducing a story about time and about the conceptualization of progress, I am not aiming at reinforcing this dominant perspective on temporality or at claiming that it is generalizable. Rather I wish to emphasize its drawbacks while exposing it to the light of a different understanding of temporal experience and progress. While a few 'modern' societies saw the secularization of the future, or an understanding of the future that brings expectations to a more immediate experience, the idea of the future for Brazil that is present in dominant representations and narratives about the country seems to still be informed by the stigma of the great future as a prophecy (See Dines, 2004). Since the publication in 1941 of Brasil: um país do futuro (Brazil, the country of the future), written by Stefan Zweig, an Austrian who immigrated to Brazil to escape Nazism, the title has become a key slogan about Brazilian political identity, and it has been used and recycled by sociologists, anthropologists, as well as by politicians and economists. Initially meant to express Zweig's astonishment at Brazil's natural and social resources and intended to be a positive expectation about Brazil's future, it was later linked to the (self)deprecating proverb: "Brazil is the country of the future, and always will be." This proverb expresses both the recognition of Brazil's potential and the frustration about its non-realization.

The slogan was created in the mid-twentieth century, but not long after Brazil's independence, representatives of the Brazilian government already defined Brazil as a big country that was entitled to a preeminent position in international politics. In 1908, Brazilian ambassador Joaquim Nabuco delivered a speech before the Spanish club of Yale University.

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14 Alberto Dines, Brazilian writer and journalist, acknowledges the stigma of the 'country of the future' that we inherited from Stefan Zweig, and states that what has been "conceived as prospect, became prospection" (Dines, 2004, p.368). He is the author of Death in the Paradise. But the pessimistic accounts of the promise of a great future, for many, are as old as the national anthem, where we find a description of the country as "an intrepid colossus, beautiful and strong", but "eternally recumbent in a splendid cradle" (translated by Rohter, 2010, p.7).
entitled *The Spirit of Nationality in the History of Brazil*. In this speech, Nabuco asserted that "Brazil has always been conscious of its size and has been governed by a prophetic sentiment with regard to its future" (Nabuco, 1908).

As the world's fifth largest country, a population of 206.1 million people and a GDP of $2.346 trillion (World Bank, 2014), with stable borders, and with great biodiversity, Brazil is frequently defined as a country naturally endowed with the resources to assume its role as a 'big' country that can shape the international order (Lafer, 2000, p.208; De Lima, 2005, p.21). More recently, it had been referred to as a sleeping giant that might be awakening to "finally fulfill its long-unrealized potential as a global player" (De Onis, 2008, p.110).

Lafer (2000) and De Lima (2005) point out that Brazil has been historically integrated into the international system as an active member of international institutions since the nineteenth century. Brazil was a belligerent country in the two world wars; it was present at the Paris Conference in 1919; it was a member of the League of Nations from 1919 to 1926; it was one of the founding members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); and it participated in the meetings that resulted in the creation of the multilateral order after 1945. However, the country has rarely been in a position where it could actually draw the rules that inform the relations between states, where it could challenge the normative framework constituted and enforced by the so-called great powers, or where it might effectively affect the dominant intellectual script and the distribution of positions and roles on a global stage.

Despite Brazil's historical membership and participation in global fora, the debate about the emergence of Brazil as an economic power whose geopolitical relevance has been significantly recognized in multilateral organizations is mostly a concern of the last decade\(^\text{15}\).

\(^\text{15}\)Speculations and predictions about Brazil's potential as a global player are not recent though. In the introduction of his book *Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power*, published in 1976, Ronald Schneider states: "Brazil is nearing the ill-defined but generally recognized point at which it can claim to be a ranking power - the first Southern Hemisphere star in the world galaxy and the first new major
As Roett (2010) emphasizes, “Brazil’s emergence as a player in international affairs is of recent vintage” (p.149). Being historically an active member of international institutions and claiming for itself a particular position based on a sense of self-representation or expectation, according to these interpretations, is different from becoming a global player actually recognized by others as such and able to influence international interactions and experiences.

In his visit to Brazil in 2011, Barack Obama told a cheering audience in Rio de Janeiro:

For so long, Brazil was a nation brimming with potential but held back by politics, both at home and abroad. For so long, you were called a country of the future, told to wait for a better day that was always just around the corner. / Meus amigos, that day has finally come. And this is a country of the future no more. The people of Brazil should know that the future has arrived. It is here now. And it’s time to seize it. / Now, our countries have not always agreed on everything. And just like many nations, we’re going to have our differences of opinion going forward. But I’m here to tell you that the American people don’t just recognize Brazil’s success — we root for Brazil’s success. As you confront the many challenges you still face at home as well as abroad, let us stand together — not as senior and junior partners, but as equal partners, joined in a spirit of mutual interest and mutual respect, committed to the progress that I know that we can make together. I’m confident we can do it (Obama, 2011).

What did it mean to hear from Barack Obama that the future of Brazil had arrived and that the American people now recognized Brazil's success? The fact that these statements about the ‘future’, or the authority of some to recognize Brazil’s temporal stance, are rarely questioned or commonly followed by analyses about its accuracy is rather intriguing. In 2012, there were a number of publications and economic reports that precisely sought to revisit the definition of Brazil as 'the country of the future'.

Andrés Velasco, former finance minister of Chile and visiting professor at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, wrote an article in 2012 to project-syndicate.org entitled 'Brazil, Country of the Future No More?' in which he analyzed power to emerge on the international stage since the rise of China after World War II" (Schneider, 1976, p.xlii).
Obama's declaration. Velasco argued that there were some facts to support the notion of Brazil's realization of the future. Looking back at past events, he identified the democratic government, Brazil's participation in much-publicized BRICS summits, the fast recovery of the Brazilian economy during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the attractiveness of Brazil to global capital, and a stable macroeconomic situation. On the other hand, he also claimed that there were still questions up in the air regarding how much, how fast, and for how long the Brazilian economy could grow.

Velasco contended that there are still reforms to be made, such as freeing up resources for public investment, and other areas where 'progress' had been slow. He argued that Brazil must build new roads, ports, and airports, create new exports, and develop higher-paying jobs. In his concluding remarks, he affirmed that "Brazil will be the country of the present and the future" (Velasco, 2012) if it successfully implements these reforms towards further modernization.

Later that same year, an article was published on the website of The Economist titled "Will Brazil remain the country of the future?" (D.W., 2012). In this article, Brazilian and Mexican economies were compared. The future was again defined by way of productive capacity, and the answer to the question in the title of the article was: it depends on whether Brazil can grow economically. In this particular analysis, economic growth was split into three categories, human capital, physical capital, and total factor productivity, thus suggesting that a condition for further progress would necessarily involve the transformation of Brazilian society into a productive mass.

BBC News also featured an article along these lines that was titled "Brazil: No longer 'country of the future'," and was written by Silvia Salek. Salek highlighted the fact that Brazil had overtaken the UK in 2012 as the sixth-largest economy in the world. Brazil's resilience in the face of the financial crisis was interpreted as Brazilian 'good fortune'. She asserted that,
despite its 'lower-than-expected' economic growth since 2011, the old tag of "country of the future - and always will be" had "start[ed] to sound less of a joke and more like a promise to be fulfilled" (Salek, 2012).

According to Salek, some signs that Brazil was closer to the fulfillment of the promise were: Brazil's consolidation as an agricultural superpower; the payment of its debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the discovery of massive oil reserves in the Atlantic in Brazil's waters; and Brazil's more assertive diplomacy. With Brazilian confidence reconstructed through economic development, Brazil "start[ed] to break through the stereotypical image when it was often seen by others as only being the land of football and samba" (Salek, 2012).

There are a lot of assumptions in all these articles that can only be identified through a destabilization and de-naturalization of meanings ascribed to the concepts that are mobilized in these analyses. In this context, economists seem to play the role of prophets or theologians. They seem to have privileged access to information about the future. They are able to see how the approaching of the future looks like. And they can tell if these emerging economies are in fact closer or farther away from the 'ascension' process by looking at specific signs that have been given to them. In contrast to the concept of progress brought by modernity to some societies, and in which the future comes to the present while allowing the present to unfold into the unknown, the discourses about the emergence of Brazil are strongly marked by a theological conceptualization of time, as described in the section above, in which the future is known, prophesied, and constantly informs and even defines the experience of the present.

In addition to publications in popular media such as those cited above, many scholars have also been engaged in this movement of leading Brazil to the 'global stage' or toward the 'future'. De Onis (2008), for instance, defined some of the key features for the fulfillment of a long-unrealized potential as being: expanded exports, oil discoveries, financial stability, low
inflation, growing foreign and domestic investment, booming consumer demand, social assistance focused on the poor, and democratic political cohesion (p.110). For Sotero (2010), important signs of 'emergence' were the fact that Brazilian exports almost tripled from 2003 ($66 billion) to 2010 ($169 billion), and that Brazil's foreign debt shrank from 45% of the GDP in 2003 to 15% of the GDP in 2010, with Brazilian international reserves soaring from $37.6 billion in 2003 to $252.5 billion in 2010 (p.72).

Analysts also emphasized that the discovery of oil and gas deposits transformed the country into an exporter of energy and made it self-sufficient in oil and gas (De Onis, 2008, p.111). For the first time, the country was said to be not only a net international creditor and a liquid credit exporter, but also self-sufficient in energy and, in fact, the world leader in biofuels (Ubiraci & Narciso, 2009, p.17-18). About these economic achievements, De Onis (2008) further argued that “the secret of Brazil’s [...] success [lay] in the continuity of its sound economic and political management” (p.110), and not in "tropical alchemy or voodoo economics" (p.113).

Although still classified as a developing country by Brazilian politicians, national and international analysts, and in a number of rankings provided by intergovernmental institutions, the indicators above and the strong competitiveness of Brazil’s agricultural exports is said to put the country in a privileged position at the negotiating table of multilateral institutions (De Lima & Hirst, 2006, p.27). Some other signs of Brazil's intention to expand its role in multilateral institutions, but also in regional politics and through Third World agendas, were said to be the creation of a South America Community, activist policies and positions in trade negotiations, the formation of South-South coalitions (G20 and the Dialogue Forum IBSA - India, Brazil and South Africa), the promotion of its own candidates to head the World Trade Organization and the Inter-Development Bank, and, finally, the campaign for a reform of the United Nations Security Council through which Brazil could be
elevated to the position of permanent member (De Lima, 2005, p.22). To this list, we could also add the formalization of the grouping BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa since 2010) that held its seventh summit in the Russian city of Ufa, in Bashkortostan, in July of 2015, as another sign that is now mentioned as one that can further justify the perception of Brazil's elevation to a new international position, or even its creation of a new identity and political role.

Perhaps the first 'southern' coalition that emerged under this 'new' diplomatic paradigm, informed by an expectation about a new position/identity for Brazil, and expressed in a declared determination to change the representation and direction of conversations about the experiences of the 'south', was the G20, formed during the 5th Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization, and held in Cancun in 2003. Back in the early to mid-2000s, some scholars interpreted the coalition as a renewal of Cold War 'third worldism', but united now by the agricultural interests of developing countries (De Lima, 2005, p.20). Others already emphasized Brazil's position as a leader in this coalition and an important bridge between "old and new powers" (De Almeida, 2010, Roett, 2010, Burges, 2013). De Almeida (2010) stresses that the commercial G20 created at the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003 was a "strong expression of Brazilian leadership in trade negotiations, and an alternative to old negotiating schemes" (p.172). The commercial G20 was constituted by countries from 3 different continents, namely, South Africa, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ecuador, Philippines, Guatemala, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Paraguay, Thailand, Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. According to data from the MRE (Brazilian External Relations Ministry), the group represented in the early 2000s 60% of the world's rural population, 21% of the world's agricultural production, 26% of world's exportations, and 18% of world's importations. These countries, led by Brazil, advocated an ambitious realization of the three pillars of the Doha Round's agricultural mandate: access to
markets (tariffs reduction); elimination of subsidies to exports; and the reduction of domestic subsidies to production.

Burges (2013) notes that Brazil became a key bridge to the South for the US and EU at that time too, "organizing and restraining dissenting voices in the South and using an extended process of consultations and policy discussions to discipline dissenting voices that could have created a [...] rupture" (p.585). De Lima (2005) argues that the G20 exposed the "hypocrisy of the negotiating position of developed countries" (p.20), while Cervo (2010) reiterates that the pursuit of actual interdependence, instead of dependence on the willingness of developed states to play a fair game (p.11).

According to Celso Amorim, the Brazilian Ambassador that was leading the negotiations, the G20 was formed when the US and EU were trying to impose an unfair agreement that did not touch upon the issues that mattered to developing countries and were demanding disproportionate concessions (quoted in Cervo, 2010, p.11). Later, in 2012, the expectations about Brazil and its role on the global stage were still very upbeat. An article published in *Foreign Policy* discussed the role of Antonio Patriota, Brazil's Foreign Minister during the first presidential mandate of Dilma Rousseff, in the negotiations. David Rothkopf, analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argued that Patriota was moving beyond the era in Brazil's foreign policy when it was groundbreaking to have the country look outside its region and play an active role in global affairs to a period, not too many years from now, when Brazil, as a country with one of the world's five largest economies and populations, as a world leader in agribusiness and energy, is unhesitatingly assumed to deserve its place at the table (Rothkopf, 2012).

The most common interpretation of the G20 coalition accepts that the group has represented a successful challenge to the United States and the European Union, especially after what has been considered the successful outcome of the Bali Conference at the end of 2013 (Ranjan, 2014). According to this interpretation, Brazil, who led the constitution of the
group, was able to elevate the 'developing world' to a level in which communication and negotiation with the 'developed world' could become possible. This understanding normalizes the idea that there are different temporal dimensions of existence, and communication between the developed world and the developing world is only possible when they meet at the same temporal dimension, or when they find a gateway to the 'other'. Different people sharing the same space would not be able to see or hear the 'other' unless they also come closer to each other temporally (See Fabian, 1983 on the 'denial of coevalness').

Brazil also stood out in the financial G20 summits (Roett, 2010, p.141). Following the initiative to lead the Financial G20 Summit in 2008, in which Guido Mantega, former Brazil's Minister of Finance, was the chairperson and represented the developing countries, Brazil and other emerging economies were invited to participate in the meetings of the rich countries, the G8. According to Cervo (2010), more than a courtesy, the invitations were prompted by the recognition of these countries' new weight in the global economy and the "need for addressing the issues and solving problems on a global scale" (p.13).

Over the last decade, Brazil was also granted a leading role in one of the key bodies of the Bretton Woods system. Brazilian Roberto Azevêdo was not England's nor the United States’ preferred candidate, but he was appointed in 2013 as Director General of the WTO after convincing a majority of 159 member states to vote for him. At the IMF, Brazil is listed as one of the four EMDCs (Emerging Markets and Developing Countries in IMF's jargon) to be among the 10 largest shareholders in the Fund, according to the 14th General Review of Quotas approved in 2010. Once more, what all this information tells us is how conditions for the invitation to participate in the G8 meetings and Brazil’s more preeminent role as a

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16 The decision-making structure in the International Monetary Fund is determined by a system of quotas that is equivalent to the size of the market of each country and its contribution to the fund. It means that a bigger quota is converted into a stronger voting power. In September of 2015, the share (%) of the total number of votes for Brazil is 1.72, with a quota of 1.78% of the total value of the quotas. See: IMF, "IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors," https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx. Fact Sheet, "IMF Quotas," http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm
global player (as an active and influential member of different arrangements and multilateral institutions) reproduce very specific rules through which actors are allowed to cross the different dimensions of time and space established by and through international politics.

The purpose of the previous exploration is not to add voice to the debate about Brazil's position in contemporary global politics, but rather to expose some of the signs that are taken to be the markers of a movement forward in both global time and global space. The image of a country's 'emergence' is only allowed into our imaginary through preconceived ideas about the 'logical' disposition of each abstract representation in the grand scheme of global politics. If we define the global stage as one of the platforms where representability is possible, the conditions for this materialization of time in space - the perception of progression through its association to specific signs of spatial transformation - are established and constantly being reproduced in the process through which the roles to be played out are distributed and enabled within specific realms of possibility. And movement is oriented and re-oriented according to a desirable script. For example, the notion that Brazil could function as a bridge between North and South, or the idea that there are conditions to be met that would allow Brazil to be ever more 'present' as a main player in these international institutions and in various negotiations on global issues, illustrates the inseparability of time and space mentioned in the introduction above. It also reveals the different spatiotemporal platforms for existence and interaction that have been set out. As Bakhtin (1981) shows in his analysis of Greek romance,

in any meeting the temporal marker ('at one and the same time') is inseparable from the spatial marker ('in one and the same place'). In the negative motif 'they did not meet [...]') the chronotopicity is retained but one or another member of the chronotope bears a negative sign: they did not meet because they did not arrive at the given place at the same time, or at the same time they were in different places (p.97).
"Brazil comes to the future" and "Brazil becomes a global player" are phrases used interchangeably in most of these recent analyses. In these scenarios, these phrases reveal the inseparability of time and space. The 'global space' of interaction appears in discourses on the emergence of Brazil as the 'promised land', a place where Brazil would finally come to its self-realization and find the freedom to experience and write its own history. The emergence, in this case, becomes the pre-condition for the 'meeting' in this space, a space where expectation meets experience. The journey has revolved around working through this gap, while the chronotopicity, to use Bakhtin's language, is retained and the temporal and spatial markers between 'here' and 'there' are held in place through discourses and practices of classification. In the institutional and discursive domain of 'inter-national' politics, one gets there when the right time comes. Otherwise, the only way for an event or an actor to be included without disturbing history is for it to be called a miracle, an experience that is 'out of this world', as seen in narratives about 'Brazil's economic miracle' in the 1970s, a phenomenon that has been dislocated from its own time and has impressed analysts trying to justify it (See Fishlow, 1973).

In this particular chronotope, the simultaneity of experiences is replaced by a temporalization and compartmentalization of different stories. If, at one time, the monsters and the unknown were located in the space in-between the different continents on the map (Mignolo, 2011, p.155), what we see now are monsters and 'unknowns' that are located temporally, dangerously floating in-between those spaces where one event connects with the other in a coherent story. The problem here, as we have seen, is possibly not the universalization or standardization of time alone, but the particular classification and hierarchization of the different temporalities or experiences expressed in space. In this case, the acknowledgement of multiple times, as some postcolonialists propose, may not be sufficient to destabilize the spatiotemporal hierarchies through which experiences are
classified, especially if the notion of multiple temporalities requires an understanding of what each one of these temporalities is and what it is not.

In the next section, I explore the gap between 'here' and 'there', and between the 'prophecy' and its fulfillment. While progress brought some to a position in which the present does not need to be defined by an expectation about the future, this notion of a space of experience in the present that is always opening up to an immediate future can only be enabled and legitimated by its anticipation, or its non-realization somewhere else. This movement into the future can only be recognized through the definition of specific coordinates that allow one to identify and measure the difference between what has been and what is. This calculation requires the constant fragmentation and separation of different stages that are then associated with the journey towards what shall be.

**The Space Between Prophecy and Progress**

Koselleck's notion of conceptual history (*Begriffigeschichte*) suggests that history can only be understood within a conceptual framework that enables the practice of historicizing. He shows that in order to make sense of the past and the future, one cannot escape explaining time according to the available structure of language and according to a sociopolitical experience that is both contextually and temporally specific. In that sense, the past and the future are written and rewritten by the present.

The theory of history and historiography developed by Koselleck calls for the investigation of the ruptures and continuities in the systems of meanings through which we understand the 'world' and the relation among past, present, and future. This endeavor also demands a denaturalization of the positivistic recording of concepts, meanings, and events (Koselleck, 2002, p.6). Koselleck's notion of conceptual history sheds light on the intertextuality inherent in historical concepts and the intrinsic connection of historical
narratives with the sets of meanings available at a given time and in a given space (Koselleck, 2002, p.9). There is no objective account of history, but rather historical narratives that were enabled and informed by the set of meanings (or the language) that was available to the ones narrating it. The present chapter adds to many other analyses engaged with the denaturalization of temporal concepts and the implications of transforming time into a collective space whereby humanity must pass towards a future that has already been established. It also looks at some of the ways through which these spatiotemporal constructs have been reproduced and imposed as conditions for one’s visibility and recognition in time and space. This kind of transformation of time into space analyzed in this chapter locks some actors and their stories into a certain horizon of expectation, thus often preventing them to write or experience their own history.

On the one hand, the practice of temporalization, or historicization, is greatly defined by the present. Koselleck shows that progress not always referred to an entire social process. He argues that progress gradually became "a word that neatly and deftly brought the manifold of scientific, technological, and industrial meanings of progress, and finally also those meanings involving social morality and even the totality of history, under a common concept" (Koselleck, 2002, p.229). Then, progress became a collective singular. From a position of referential subject, 'humanity' becomes the object in the course of the universalization of progress. Koselleck argues that "the subjective genitive turns into the objective genitive: in the expression 'the progress of time' or 'the progress of history', progress assumes the leading role. Progress itself becomes the historical agent" (Koselleck, 2002, p.230). In this sense, historical time becomes independent from human beings' actions, institutions, and organizations.

On the other hand, to cosmopolitan beings, contingences are said to no longer define the direction of the historical movement. Instead, one is bounded to a future-oriented
perspective. As the future is unknown, one must "plan for the empirical inexperience" (Koselleck, 2002, p.133), and that is the paradox of modern times. Koselleck's thesis is that only the modern time has "genuinely a historical meaning, distinct from mythical, theological, or natural chronological origins" (Koselleck, 2002, p.119). He adds that, as part of the Enlightenment program, "people begin to organize history according to generalized aspects of politics, and later of economics, or of a history of societies relating to the churches or peoples" (Koselleck, 2002, p.119). As noted by Horkheimer and Adorno (2002), "matter was finally to be controlled without the illusion of immanent powers or hidden properties" and "anything which [did] not conform to the standard of calculability and utility [was] viewed with suspicion" (p.3).

It should also be noted that, for the developed or modern countries, future and present are much closer than for societies whose experiences and transformations are not recognized within the scope of historical cognition as current. The singularity of progress for modern and developed societies emerges out of difference and alterity. As Derrida (1994) puts it, "no difference without alterity, no alterity without singularity, no singularity without here-now" (p.37), and no here-now without a there-then. Timothy Luke describes that, throughout history, a number of different categories and scales have been used to classify societies. Systems have been categorized as hunting and gathering, agrarian, manufacturing, and industrial, among others. Societies have also been categorized along "racial, cultural, geographical, and religious, political, economic, or evolutionary scales of comparison" (Luke, 1990, p.220). But it was only "after 1945 that the chronological classifications of the modernizationists gained wide acceptance. Using this metaphorical language, based on time, societies are seen as premodern, or nonmodern" (Luke, 1990, p.220).

In this new, post-1945, chronological classification, the developed nation is seen as having "attained a certain perfection of improvement in its social structures and cultural
processes, whereas a developing nation [...] displays a positive commitment for applying its potential in adopting the existing "developed" forms and states of being" (Luke, 1990, p.221).

The premodern is automatically defined as wanting modernization or as being willing to be forced into modernity as it evolved in the 'modernized' regions, since "to be premodern, in this discourse, is to participate in another less complex social totality" (Luke, 1990, p.220).

Modernization will involve the diffusion of what one might call 'world culture', "based on advanced technology and the spirit of science, on a rational view of life, a secular approach to social relations, a feeling for justice in public affairs and, above else, on the acceptance in the political realm of belief that the prime unit of polity should be the nation-state" (Pye, 1966, p.8).

In this discursive framework, modernity means "gaining rational control of the physical and social environment, building a liberal democratic state, participating in world culture, and joining the scientific revolution" (Luke, 1990, p.212). In contrast to the notion of 'Westernization', the entire conceptual program of modernization and development doctrines since 1945 presents itself as culturally unbiased, even though it embodies primarily the cultural assumptions, political premises, and economic values of the United States (Luke, 1990, p.213). The metaphor of modernity "collapses technological, economic, and political measures into a single indicator without raising the problems of race, region, religion, or culture, as did the 'Westernization' model" (Luke, 1990, p.210). In this process,

what has been labeled 'development' in the Third and Fourth Worlds since 1945 has meant the 'corification' or the 'metropolization' of certain classes, industries, and institutions there in order to integrate certain key sectors of their economies into the larger transnational economic system constructed by major transnational banks and corporations and the OECD states, under American leadership (Luke, 1990, p.214).

The allegedly neutral doctrine of modernization that "plainly places upon the rational control of the environment, the technological view of life, and the secular approach to social
relations engendered by the scientific revolution reveals a substrata of assumptions, beliefs, and intentions deeply rooted in everyday American life" (Luke, 1990, p.217). The fragmentation, compartmentalization, and marginalization of societies to the realm of expectation and necessary improvement are an ongoing process reproduced discursively, through every interaction, and through the establishment of the rules of visibility in the 'international' system, "as the periphery bureaucratizes, industrializes, mechanizes, mobilizes, rationalizes, secularizes, and urbanizes, it also disorganizes, deagriculturalizes, dehumanizes, desolidarizes, deanimates, desacralizes, and deruralizes" (Luke, 1990, p.229).

A few invent the future while writing their own present. The dichotomies tradition/modernity, developed/developing, or even global/local define contemporary and modern states of being. But the second category in the dichotomies is always rendered "in inferior contemporaneousness that is shared by 'men of the past', whereas 'modernity' represents the superior contemporaneousness that is collectively advanced by 'men of the present' who are truly 'of their time', not merely 'in their time', like the 'men of the past'" (Luke, 1990, p.233).

Ashis Nandy observes that "nothing succeeds like success. It is more difficult to admit that all criteria, except the ones handed down to us by dominant global conscience, are being either pre-empted or rendered obsolete" (Nandy, 2007, p.175). Any state of being that has not reached what is considered to be its full capacity is defined as incomplete. There is no full existence or hope for success, if not through adherence to the accelerated time of modernity and globalization. But "modernity has a meaning only when connected to the concrete contemporary practices of the core" (Luke, 1990, p.230).

The problem is that "the historiography of the modernized becomes the futurology of the modernizing" (Luke, 1990, p.221), and even through adherence to the dominant rules for the materialization of time in space, and through a willingness to follow the coordinates
Towards the future, the future is constantly escaping the modernizing or developing states. Development and modernization become elements of a "speech that defers, deferring not what it affirms but deferring just so as to affirm, to affirm justly, so as to have the power (a power without power) to affirm the coming of the event, its future-to-come itself" (Derrida, 1994, p.19). It is unachievable to the extent that the present is never stabilized by the 'men' of their time, who are writing past and future in the present. It is not to say that those holding the authority to dictate which movements can be temporalized have reached the ultimate end either. But this infinite continuum towards an indefinite future is dictated by the man, or the cultures, of the present (Luke, 1990, p.231), while those trying to catch up are left with the feeling that "'time is out of joint': something in the present is not going well [for them], it is not going as it ought to go" (Derrida, 1994, p.27).

The 'men of the present' not only define the future, but they also create the past, and thus the backward and the 'local', in contrast to the contemporary modern and global state of being. Nandy points out that one of the consequences of the logic of the increasingly global culture of the metropolitan city, and its spirited denial of what slums and ghettos stand for is that it "force[s] many Southern cities to attempt a surgical bypass even when the major coronary arteries - those connecting the city to the village through slums and ghettos - are open and functioning. It is thus that these cities push the contemporary and the immediate into the past and into history" (Nandy, 2007, p.160). He contends that,

Some societies have got rid of parts of their past and present, and rewritten the rest from the point of view of their borrowed futures. Their journey from the past to the present now reads remarkably like similar journeys undertaken by other - usually West European - societies during the last three hundred years. They are success stories within global civilization today; they can be called the new historical societies (Nandy, 2007, p.174).

As a consequence, "domination today is rarely justified through oracles, ritual superiority, or claims to birthright; domination is now more frequently justified in terms of
better acquaintance with universal knowledge or better access to universal modes of acquiring knowledge" (Nandy, 2007, p.183). The progressive interpretation of the future opened up the space for questions about cultural achievements as the criterion for a historically immanent structure (Koselleck, 2002, p.119). Koselleck affirms that, since then, "past and future differentiate themselves qualitatively from one another and, to this extent, a genuinely historical time is discovered that is finally encapsulated in the term progress" (Koselleck, 2002, p.225). By combining experiences and expectations, progress is endowed with a temporal coefficient of change, and

as part of a group, a country, or finally, a class, one was conscious of being advanced in comparison with the others; or one sought to catch up with or overtake the others. One might be superior technically and look down on previous states of development enjoyed by other peoples, whose guidance was thus a justifiable task for their civilized superiors (Koselleck, 2004, p. 266).

While history remains "the linguistic organization of temporal experience" (Koselleck, 2004, p.4), any total history is always the product of a necessary perspective (Koselleck, 2004, p.117; White, 1990, p.41). For Hayden White, "one can produce an imaginary discourse about real events that may not be less 'true' for being imaginary. It all depends upon how one construes the function of the faculty of imagination in human nature" (p.57). When it comes to history and the organization of human experience, one should entertain the question: "How else can any past, which by definition comprises events, processes, structures, and so forth, considered to be no longer perceivable, be represented in either consciousness or discourse except in an 'imaginary' way? (White, 1990, p.57) Progress, as the new prophecy of the modern 'world history', is experienced and perceived differently geographically (Koselleck, 2004, p.234). The understanding that the art of organizing and narrating sequences of events in a coherent way becomes possible through practices of temporalization is not a new or surprising statement. Even the fact that it has never been
about time, in particular, should come as a surprise. But how material points have been discursively organized in a way that gives form to time is key here. The contemporaneity of these processes is undeniable when we look at the amount of publications, evaluations, and other practices that build upon this kind of temporal compartmentalization and marginalization from actual experience. Recent analyses about Brazil are illustrations of how the vocabulary used to express change and improvement is limited by and limiting of the modes of existence and representability we have.

The Denial of the Final Redemption

As explored in the sections above, geography and history are two inseparable elements in the 'prophecies' about Brazil's future and the diagnoses about Brazil's current position in space and time. Being in the future is associated with standing out as a global power. Power is in the future, shared by people in the future. Temporal and spatial categories are often used interchangeably in the old and new analyses about what/where the country is in relation to what/where it should be. The anticipation of a 'rise' or 'emergence' to Brazil's 'future' or to its position as a 'global player' is informed by a conventional chronotopic understanding of geopolitics, one that reduces the possibilities of politics and history to particular representations of space and to certain transformations in space. Even though the temporal fragmentation still allows for physical presence in the same experiential space, not all experiences are considered exemplars of current, visible, or 'present' reality. Some perspectives are "interrupted according to political generation and social standpoint. Since then there has existed and does exist the consciousness of living in a transitional period that graduates the difference between experience and expectation in distinct temporal phases" (Koselleck, 2004. p. 269).
The literature on the emergence of Brazil as a global actor focuses on the domestic and international conditions for Brazil to occupy a more assertive position in global affairs. The studies vary in their optimism in relation to the country's capabilities or willingness to challenge the status quo. However, economic stability and growth are invariably set as key conditions through which the country has to approach the time and space in which it may have a chance to speak about a new world order, and where and when its own experiences would become the standpoint from which new domestic and global expectations could be designed and shared. The promise of the event becomes more important than a discussion about the event itself. What kind of future are we actually coming to? As Derrida observes,

> the event is now the realization, now the heralding of the realization. Even as we take seriously the idea that a heralding sign or a promise constitutes an irreducible event, we must nevertheless guard against confusing these two types of event. A thinking of the event is no doubt what is most lacking from such a discourse (Derrida, 1994, p.78).

Even though the concept of progress has been part of the imaginary throughout Brazil's history, as we have seen, past and present are defined in relation to the certainty of a great future yet to come. The country then lives according to this 'horizon', to "that line behind which a new space of experience will open, but which cannot yet be seen" (Koselleck, 2004, p.260-261). Koselleck (2004) explains that "the legibility of the future, despite possible prognoses, confronts an absolute limit, for it cannot be experienced" (p.260-261). It could only be experienced through the repetition of the choices of those who have crossed the line before. The progressive interpretation of world history, or any other story, is only possible when experiences can be accumulated, and they can be accumulated to the extent that they can be repeated. In this scenario,

> there must then exist long-term formal structures in history which allow the repeated accumulation of experience. But for this, the difference between experience and expectation has to be bridged to such an extent that history might once again be
regarded as exemplary. History is only able to recognize what continually changes, and what is new, if it has access to the conventions within which lasting structures are concealed (Koselleck, 2004, p. 275).

In the discourses about Brazil's future, this future is not necessarily the unknown. The optimism or pessimism about 'the time of Brazil' comes from specific identifications or measurements of the signs of arrival. Where is the tomorrow if it is not in the unfolding of the present? Brazil's future can be associated with the constant chasing of a ghost, or, perhaps, as the breadcrumbs or shadows of those who have passed before. Then, an interesting question emerges: "what if this came down to being followed by it. Always. Persecuted perhaps by the very chase we are leading? Here again what seems to be out front, the future, comes back in advance: from the past, from the back" (Derrida, 1994, p.10).

In 1840, Januário da Cunha Barbosa argued that history, in making present the experience of past centuries, "illuminates the course to be taken, the shoals to be avoided, and the secure port into which a wise maneuver can felicitously guide the ship of State" (Barbosa, 1858, p.103). He acknowledged that politics and civilization demanded that we apply ourselves to saving from the veracity of the centuries those facts that have conducted us to our present state and that will, in future times, serve as a point of comparison for our progress after our establishment as an independent nation. He describes history as:

Witness of the times, light of truth, she abounds with elements necessary to our civilization and the prosperity of the State; as instructress of life, she offers examples of heroic deeds for those who prize the honor of serving the fatherland (Barbosa, 1858, p.573).

In 1838, Brazilian Empire founded the Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute (IHGB) aiming at the creation of a Brazilian nation. Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagem, who wrote História Geral do Brasil, was finally recognized by this institute by the end of his life. Looking back at the efforts of Brazilian historiographers to create a Brazilian history, we find
that the 'official' identity of the country has 'progressively' but mainly been informed by an acute observation about the past with the purpose of the creation of the present while dreaming about the future ahead. About the study of the Nation's History, Varnhagem writes:

Your Imperial Majesty, my Lord, had recognized the importance and sanctioned the study of the Nation's History, as much to contribute to her greater splendor among foreigners as to provide facts useful in the administration of the State; and also to strengthen the ties of national unity, enliven and exalt patriotism, ennoble public spirit, and augment faith in our future (Varnhagem, 1877, p.i-ii).

In his book, Varnhagem invents the Brazilian nation through the creation of its history (Alves Filho, 2009, p.4), and through faith in its future. He creates a sequence of historical events that justifies and explains the pacific transition from the colony to the Empire. Soares (1991) notes that

in this vision of a 'history' that teleologically focused all past events as though they were inherent in the process of forming the 'nation,' forming 'Brazil,' the dominant slaveholding class projected onto the pasts of the various areas of the country all that it desired and needed in order to consolidate its power over the recently created state (p.103-104).

Doubtless relevant to unite people through a common myth of origin17, it was the economy, not necessarily the invented past, that finally integrated the populations of Brazil towards a common fate. Luís Carlos Soares explains that:

With the beginning of the current century [nineteenth century], the accelerated reproduction of capital was already taking place, integrating all of these areas into a single worldwide productive and mercantile circuit. From this profound "revolution", caused by capitalism's expansion, there at last emerged, in truth, a worldwide social and economic formation in which the areas corresponding to the old defunct precapitalist formations were transformed into mere parts or regions of a larger whole (Soares, 1991, p.105).

17The myth of origin relates to the invention of tradition that enables the justification of the present state of affairs. Soares (1991) notes that even marxist historians, critics of the official history of Brazil, such as Caio Prado Júnior, Ciro Cardoso, and Gorender, were "unable to escape from the specter of the 'nation' in their rewritings (p.104) For an understanding of the role of tradition in the constitution of the international system, see (Walker, 1993).
Toward the middle of the twentieth century, Soares observes, "the inhabitants of the most different and far-flung parts of the country had come to think of themselves as, and therefore actually to be, 'Brazilians'. Thus, due to the development of imperialistic capitalism, 'national integration' was finally brought about" (Soares, 1991, p.106). But the economic integration did not mean the realization of the 'future' for Brazil. At this point, it meant to be on the road, moved by the faith in the 'future'. As the prophecy about the future is reinvented, so is the past and the present.

Brazil's experience of progress can hardly be explained as the opening out toward the future. The study of the past situates the present in relation to the future. And it has often been driven by an anxiety to analyze how the course of events is leading Brazil to the realization of its potential, even in those moments in which representatives of Brazil or groups of Brazilian scholars have tried to dissociate the experience of Brazil from the expectations imposed upon the country. In the discourses analyzed here, it is possible to say that Brazil is "turned toward the future, going toward it, [but] it also comes from it, it proceeds from [...] the future" (Derrida, 1994, p.xix), probably similar to other developing country who might be defined by and through this path towards what will be and has come before. When experiences are superseded by the expectation of a future yet to come, one "must therefore exceed any presence as presence to [one]self. At least [one] has to make this presence possible only on the basis of the movement of some disjointing, disjunction, or disproportion: in the inadequation to self" (Derrida, 1994, p.xix).

Perhaps the inadequacy of the country, which may come to be expressed in terms such as corruption, inequality, poverty, or instability, is the sole result of the chase for the ideal, a chase created by its required positioning at the disjuncture of time. The inadequacy itself is rarely proof of an invalid or less than ideal ontological presence. The path into world history takes a big toll on the transients, and the latest diagnoses and prospects about the
possibilities for Brazil's future show how the country, or what it represents, is always discursively called to exceed its presence as presence to itself.

Interrupting the euphoria about Brazil's emergence in the first decade of the twenty-first century and the heightened hopes for a final redemption into the adequacy of the space of experience, the signs are proving Brazil's distanciation from salvation. In September 2013, and again in January 2016, Brazil was featured on the cover of The Economist. The first article was titled "Has Brazil blown it? Brazil's future" (2013), and the second, "Brazil's Fall" (2016). Following the optimistic analysis published in 2009 in the same magazine under the headline “Brazil takes off” (The Economist, 2009), now the diagnosis sounds apocalyptic in the subtitle "Disaster looms for Latin America's biggest economy" (2016), followed by the following prognoses: "Dilma Rousseff must change course" (The Economist, 2013, p.12) and "Brazil's crisis managers do not have the luxury of waiting for better times to begin reform" (The Economist, 2016, p.7). The statue of Christ the Redeemer, which was going upwards in the 2009 cover, was now literally coming back down to earth in the image at the cover of the 2013 edition. These images alone are strong symbols of the chronotopic character of our 'international' system. Contrary to conventional understandings of international politics as a horizontal space, the distancing of the 'other' has been enabled by an ordering of things that is fundamentally vertical. The sacred cross has not been put down or completely desacralized by secularization for the entire world, otherwise we would not need to make sense of expressions such as 'rise' or 'emergence' to the future.

By the end of 2014, Brazil was even said to have missed its opportunity for redemption. Given the conditions and indicators that defined its 'big moment', Brazil's current economic and political situation has been evaluated as stagnant, instable, or as uncertain as its own future. 'Stagnant' is another recurrent expression in these prophetic narratives, as if any movement or event that is caught between the coordinates that enable the measurement of
time between 'here' and 'there' did not actually exist temporally. As a deviation, it is often regarded as something that needs to be brought back in line so that transformation can be made visible, as the following debate illustrates. In a press briefing of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Western Hemisphere Department in October 2014, Krishna Srinivasan stated that "Brazil is in a tough place". He explains that "growth is coming down quite sharply; inflation is high [and] if you look at the base indicators, there is not much slack there. So, our emphasis is on improving the credibility of frameworks and on structural reforms" (IMF, 2014).

This evaluation not only reifies the position of Brazil as an incompetent economic actor that needs structural reforms, but it also embodies the set of rules that are deemed to be required for the conquest of history. Mantega, former Brazilian Minister of Finance, spoke at the IMF against these recent evaluations of Brazil's economy. He argued that "the global economic recovery continues to create a sense of disillusionment", and he accused the IMF of contributing to this sentiment:

The IMF has probably contributed to that sentiment by what seems to be an entrenched propensity to overstate prospects for advanced economies (AEs), with projections repeatedly contradicted by reality. At the same time, contradictory assessments by the IMF about emerging market economies within a short period also add uncertainty at a time when the world is trying to pull out of the most serious crisis of recent history and initiate a new growth cycle. We urge the IMF to be more realistic in its assessments henceforth (Mantega, 2014, p.1).

Mantega (2014) also pointed out a contradiction in recent IMF assessments on Brazil. Some Fund documents attribute the slowdown in economic growth to internal factors, in line with the opinion expressed in the press briefing of the Western Hemisphere Department in October of 2014. However, some papers published by the IMF, including one presented in the World Economic Outlook at the beginning of 2014, concluded that "external factors have been responsible for 60 percent of the growth slowdown in Brazil" (p.1). Mantega (2014)
then suggested that "perhaps the IMF needs to consider more carefully its assessments of national economies before publishing them" (p.1).

Again, "the manner in which these concepts are formed testifies to a conscious separation of space of experience and horizon of expectation, and it becomes the task of political action to bridge this difference" (Koselleck, 2004, p. 272). Institutions such as the IMF, WTO, or the World Bank formalize the mechanisms through which the temporal and spatial gaps are managed. Their practices of monitoring and evaluating normalize expressions like 'deviation', or 'course correction' in the process of measuring, predicting, and limiting possibilities. This mechanism of fragmenting, temporalizing, measuring, and excluding experiences from the realm of possibility enables expressions such as "the future of Brazil is uncertain", or "Brazil must change its course", to be acceptable or even meaningful. Instead of a space for experience, Brazil is left with a horizon, once again. Its redemption is 'right there', but salvation will only come for those who follow the 'right path'.

**How do We Know the Future When We See It?**

In contrast to what some have implied about the emergence of Brazil and other economies from the 'global South', namely, that the true North, as the direction towards the future, has perhaps shifted towards the South, we do not seem to have reached a point yet in which the 'global South' is seen as a space full of history and movement unless it is geared 'upwards', towards a path that is recognizable, and has previously been traced by the 'North'. The geographical disposition of North and South on our world map undoubtedly reinforces the discourses about the 'ups' and the 'downs' that are repeated through world history. For analysts of the current 'emergence' of Brazil, as well as of Brazil's economic 'miracle' in the 70s, the ‘True South’ is defined as an area where there are no visible stars:
The Southern Cross, one of the loveliest constellations to the Southern Hemisphere, is becoming a symbol for Brazil in its emulation of Japan and its Rising Sun. Perhaps Brazil will be a new Japan and its Rising Sun. Perhaps Brazil will be a new Japan emerging from the jungle. Unlike Polaris in this hemisphere, which for the last few thousand years has varied only infinitesimally from true North, the Southern Cross is not indicative of true South. True South lies in the "Coal Pit," an area where there are no visible stars at all. Those who navigate by the Southern Cross alone will find themselves way off course and occasionally in serious danger. [...] For us, the 'Southern Cross" could well become the Southern Curse (Devoe J., 1974, p.87).

As long as representations and definitions of Brazil in the global political and economic arena are defined by expectations or, in other words, by alien futures past, the experience or performance of Brazil will be limited to the horizon, the yet-to-come that moves away as we approach it. But moving away from it is seen as falling into the dark, the unknown, with no stars guiding the navigation. The global stage is reproduced as the space where the future is drawn from the perspective of those living in the present moment, or the space of experience. The emergence to this global stage is the emergence to a space where experience and expectation will meet. There is no expectation without experience, and no experience without expectation. But, as Koselleck (2004) points out, "the lesser the experiential substance, the greater the expectations joined to it. The lesser the experience, the greater the expectation" (p. 274).

We do not know the future unless we categorize particular experiences as the future. And how else would we see it if not by separating it from those other experiences that are not the future? Different representations then emerge within this cognitive space created by language. For that reason, to cognitively open up time to different transformations could be a major task for the critical analyst, either through the refusal of any boundaries to experience, or through the deconstruction of the ones we have created. Any attempt to define a better future would ultimately become another limiting construction of a horizon. And for those worried that by giving up the ideal of a 'better future' or all the 'course corrections' one would have to face chaos and darkness, a quick look at the events around the world can show us that
no amount of classification, idealization, fragmentation, or temporalization has been able to bring humanity to the ideal that many of these practices allegedly have been aiming at. As Hartog (2015) reminds us, "Criticizing progress does not automatically imply advocating the present, but it does cast doubt on the supposedly positive character of striding toward the future" (Hartog, 2015, p.109-111).

In the next chapter, I explore some of the conditions for progress, or for the distribution of the spaces of experience and the horizons of expectation, that are revealed when Brazil decides to pursue a more active role as a relevant actor in the safeguarding of ‘international peace and security’.
Chapter 3
Order and Progress: Brazil, International Security, and the (Re)production of the Space for the Future

Haiti is here / Haiti is not here.
(Caetano Veloso, Haiti)

Ronald M. Schneider, following and followed by many others in an attempt to provide a "global" interpretation of Brazil in his book Order and Progress, points out that "only gross political malperformance can prevent the dreams of past generations and the aspirations of the present one from becoming reality during the lifetime of the generation to come" (Schneider, 1991, p.xii). For Schneider, "the road to demonstrate clearly the true character of Brazil passes through the reconstruction of the country’s history. Both past and present must be explained if readers are to understand where the country is headed” (Schneider, 1991, p. xii). According to him, “the essence of the problem of analyzing Brazil is the simultaneous need to explain what the country has been, what it now is, and what it is becoming” (Schneider, 1991, p.1). For many analysts of Brazil, the historical tension between order and progress would be one of the major reasons why the country has not yet been able to realize its greater potential. Most critics of the pace of Brazil’s development towards greatness are quick to blame the lack of a particular order for the slow progress of the country in reaching a position in world politics that matches the promise of the 'country of the future'.

In the previous chapter, I argued that in traditional narratives about the 'country of the future' and contemporary representations of Brazil, the concept of progress, embedded in many analyses of the emergence of the country to the global stage, has subordinated the present to a promised future, something that further transformed the experience of those embodying these representations into an expectation of a time that has been constantly postponed. The prophetic and theological nature of the discourses of the ascension and fall of Brazil at the beginning of the 21st century reveals a vertical spatiotemporal structure whereby
particular images, roles, and expectations have been recognized and arranged in international politics. In this particular structure, “different 'places' were interpreted as different stages in a single temporal development. All the stories of unilinear progress, modernization, development, the sequence of modes of production ... perform this operation” (Massey, 2005, p.60).

In this dissertation, I have emphasized the relevance of looking at time and space as articulated in the formation of stages that make possible representations and encounters. Thus, an analysis of the historicism of that version of the story of progress and the future also requires a closer look at its spatiality. As Massey (2005) argued,

> the lack of openness of the future for those 'behind' in the queue is a function of the singularity of the trajectory. Ironically, not only is this temporal convening of the geography of modernity a repression of the spatial, it is also the repression of the possibility of other temporalities. The long-hegemonic temporal convening of the geography of modernity entails the repression of the possibility of other trajectories (p.70).

While “the temporal order is concretized in the making of history” through the spatialization of time, Soja (1990) also emphasizes that “the spatial order of human existence arises from the (social) production of space, the construction of human geographies that both reflect and configure being in the world” (p.25). But to the degree that the future becomes a prophecy, and is not open to contingencies, the social production of space is confined to the possible trajectories that were already established.

This chapter focuses on the role of an emerging Brazil in practices of production of the international space, and on the trajectories that have been enabled and reproduced within the discourses about the 'repositioning' of the country as a global player. In the first section, I revisit a conceptualization of sovereignty as a technique for the articulation of time and space geared towards the production of an international order of competition. I reiterate one of my main arguments, which is that discourses about Brazil’s new status and about an expectation
of institutional transformation associated with the emergence of the ‘developing world’ in the twenty-first century create claims that are founded upon and reinforce limiting temporal and spatial constructs that, in turn, foreclose the possibility of a less exclusionary world order. In the second section, I explore how the efforts of Brazil in the United Nations Mission of stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH), tells us a story about peace operations as ways of disciplining spaces into particular temporal trajectories and about an encounter that simultaneously challenges and reproduces the hierarchical positions of different actors in international politics. The third section analyzes another element of Brazil's effort to be integrated into the club of powerful actors that make decisions about the international order, which was the proposal for a conceptual revision of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). By standing up against the current paradigm informing decision-making processes at the United Nations Security Council through which missions of ‘stabilization’ and ‘restoration of peace’ in ‘sovereign’ states are authorized and sustained, Brazilian officials introduce a different understanding of responsibility with the concept of ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RwP). The RwP retains paternalistic qualities and assumptions, even though it presents itself as a provision against the more ‘irresponsible’ approach to international intervention and the flexibilization of the principle of sovereignty. By focusing on the temporal sequencing of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, this particular proposal of the ‘RwP’ illustrates the pervasiveness of the spatiotemporal constructs upon which an ‘international order’ is constantly being reproduced. What the cases examined in sections two and three of this chapter illustrate is that, even though Brazil’s foreign policy has been informed by a traditional and strict conceptualization of sovereignty and by the pursuit of a more influential position for Brazil, the way Brazil is situated and situates itself as incomplete gets translated into encounters and policies that represent a disruption of the strict separation between domestic and international spaces. Finally, in the last section, I reflect on the implications of
accepting the conditions for visibility and influence in international politics, and of acquiescing to discourses regarding the limitations and inadequacies of Brazil vis-à-vis its aspirations uncritically.

The International Order of Competition

In this section, I aim to highlight the way contemporary discourses about Brazil’s emergence still rely on realist ontological assumptions that turn competition into the only intelligible way through which societies around the world can move forward and be organized. Ashley (1987) defines ‘realism’ from a genealogical standpoint as “a discourse of power and rule in modern global life” (p.422). He emphasizes two elements that make up the realist representation of the world: a commitment to Western rationalist understandings of community, and a commitment to history understood as “a zone beyond and limiting the ambit of modern domestic order” (Ashley, 1987, p.422). History and geography have to be combined and administered in a particular way in a process through which the space and conditions for politics are delineated and can give birth to what we call the modern world. Luke (1993) further defines realist states as:

essentially fictive constructs, which spring almost wholly from origins at which there is "in the beginning" only the sweep of authoritative gazing, strike of coercive blows, or the sign of normalizing discipline, modern states enveloped and enforced their powerful designs through force by warping time and fabricating space (p.233).

The long realist tradition of international relations theorizing assumes that the "ahistorical, acultural, and individualistic deductive assumptions of the state of nature allow us to problematize contact between cultures and peoples in terms of competitive losses and gains" (Inayatullah & Blaney, 1996, p.67). Waltz (2000) explains that two key propositions derived from realist theory are that: "international politics reflects the distribution of national capabilities, a proposition daily borne out; [and] the balancing of power by some states
against others recurs" (p. 27). For realists, "a permissive structure of 'anarchy' compels the actions of autonomous states to be consistent with seeking their advantage relative to other states" (Inayatullah & Blaney, 1996, p.67).

The definition of the outside (the anarchical structure) as a ahistorical realm of recurrence or repetition is part of what enables spatial and temporal differentiations to be made on the basis of qualities that are associated with the inside, the 'domestic' realm. Indeed, the "domestic order of modern liberal society is the sphere wherein the singularity, constancy, and continuity of community are most fully formed. Within the sovereign span of the state, the modernist narrative is thought to be historically effective" (Ashley, 1987, 414).

Through this 'inside/outside' dichotomy (Walker, 1993) and the incorporation of a modernist narrative, the individualization of space and history inside the state confronts the transcendence of history outside sovereign territory, and conditions for hierarchization emerge as a result.

For realists, competition among states is not only expected and rational, but it is also natural. Structural realists, like Waltz, are concerned with the distribution of capabilities (military or economic) in the system, and power is always a function of an unequal distribution. Power is relative, which means that the resources of the one are measured against the resources of the others, and not against an abstract value. Because relative position matters, balance of power is a crucial term for theorists of this school of thought. Waltz (2000) avers that "unbalanced power leaves weaker states feeling uneasy and gives them reason to strengthen their positions" (p. 27). If we look back at the narratives about Brazil’s emergence and its assertive positioning in the world order discussed in the previous chapter, we can observe that the willingness to balance power against the ‘developed world’ is taken for granted, as if the realist supposedly ‘rational’ prediction that ‘balances that were disrupted always get restored’ stemmed from an unquestionable natural rule. But also, the
concept of ‘emerging powers’ does not make sense if not in relation to the gap between what is perceived to be the current level of ‘established powers’ and the other levels. How would anyone be able to analyze and discuss the movement characterized as ‘emergence’ in international politics if the distance between ‘here’ and ‘there’ was not at least implicitly stated?

Power, usually associated with military capability by traditional scholars of international relations, could also be understood as a more complex measure of influence in international politics. Waltz (2000) explicitly associates economic growth with status in world affairs. He argues that "the growth of a country's economic capability to the great power level places it at the center of regional and global affairs. It widens the range of a state's interests and increases their importance. The high volume of a country's external business thrusts it ever more deeply into world affairs" (p. 33). Waltz explains that, even reluctantly, countries with powerful economies have always become great powers because eventually international status rises in step with material resources (p.33-34). It is worth noting that this relation between economic capability and status is so rooted in the political imaginary that it becomes a textual certainty or convention that does not need to be stated. Instead, it can be seen as a pre-text for a number of other discourses and representations.

Competition thus becomes an ontological norm to the extent that it is considered a structural anomaly for a country to choose not to maximize its capabilities, not to balance against others, and not to wish to pursue the status of great power (Waltz, 2000, p.33). These assumptions are particularly manifest in the discourses about the emergence of Brazil, where the link between Brazil's economic performance and the entitlement to a greater role in international security and global governance has been largely assumed.

On the question of competition in Waltz's work, Inayatullah and Blaney (1996) argue that "competition can be seen as a response to (or characterization of) a theoretical and
historical problem - the tension created by the appearance of the idea of equality where the idea of hierarchy is still prevalent" (p.70). The idea of equality embedded in an understanding of states as like-units is contrasted with the qualitative differentiation and ranking of societies in the 'modern world'. In such a situation,

equality comes to mean arriving at a ranking (an expression of hierarchy), but through competitively 'fair' individual effort (where equality is conceived as 'equality of opportunity'). If, in spontaneous and informal ways, individuals are socialized to think and act in terms of this understanding of competition, then we have a structure created through competition that (1) is ordered but without an orderer, yet, importantly (2) is a structure of meaning and purpose (Inayatullah and Blaney, 1996, p.70).

Considering the meaning and purpose of the state beyond and through competition, Luke (1993) argues that the basic qualities of the state, such as sovereignty and autonomy, are "linked in a past, present, and future that can be disclosed, delineated, and described in the same uniform fungible units of time" (p.234). It is particularly significant for my analysis to understand that states can only survive "through invariant measures of homogeneous time that accumulate like territory or population" (p.234) and through which they can "manipulate ordinary codes of temporal duration into their own peculiarly textualized chronotext in new historicized origins, on-goings, and outcomes to temporalize their historiography" (p.233). Economic capabilities, or development, can only be measured if one adopts a representation of the world as a system of fragmented spatiality with each different fragments of territory - that came to be known as states - containing a specific amount of accumulated 'history'. These fragmented and individualized social realities are reconnected structurally to the degree that states are differentiated, positioned, and ranked in relation to one another. Luke (1993) observes that

realist notions of time and space provide the sites of struggle for the diverse in-stated sovereignties in the world of nation-states, where each tries to write over more
territory or speak through greater expanses of time by finding a more central niche in
the balance of power (p.236).

Sovereignty, "established through the naturalization of the prior boundaries that [...] contain our disagreements" (Shaw, 2004, p.10), becomes the precondition for politics, and it is rendered natural and necessary rather than contingent. This containment of the spatial, according to Massey (2005), "was bound up with the establishment of foundational universals (and vice versa), the repression of the possibility of multiple trajectories, and the denial of the real difference of others" (p.70). This, in turn, entails "the establishment of a geography of power/knowledge [and] the suppression of the real challenges of space" (Massey, 2005, p.70). Within this dominant understanding, “the assumption is precisely that there is no room for surprises” (Massey, 2005, p.111). Massey explains that “just as when space is understood as (closed/stable) representation […], so in this representation of space you never lose your way, are never surprised by an encounter with something unexpected, never face the unknown” (Massey, 2005, p.111).

According to Shapiro (1989), this spatial construct leads “much of political thinking [to be] exhausted by concern with the distribution of things thought to be meaningful and valuable” (p.12). But, as he articulates it, our attention could go to another aspect of political processes “in which boundaries for constituting meaning and value are constructed” (Shapiro, 1989, p.12). He defines political processes as “among other things, contests over the alternative understandings (often implicit) immanent in the representational practices that implicate the actions and objects one recognizes and the various spaces” (Shapiro, 1989, p.12). The ‘political’, in this sense, is the process of managing the boundaries within which politics occurs, or in other words, the process of writing the spaces for representation (see, for example, Ó Tuathail, 1996). Shapiro argues that “the separation of the world into kinds of space is perhaps the most significant kind of practice for establishing the systems of
intelligibility within which understandings of global politics are forged" (Shapiro, 1989, p.12).

This story about the constitution of world politics, or the establishment of systems of intelligibility where world politics is said to occur, helps us to understand the discursive pre-conditions for the representation of spaces as containers of different temporalities that are measured in relation to each other and in relation to a transcendental future. However, as with the concept of progress, the concept of sovereignty is never singular, or complete. There is no singular, universal, and cohesive story about the formation of sovereign spaces. A closer look at some recent stories involving Brazil, sovereignty, and the field of international security reveals the incongruences and disputes between some of the Brazilian narratives and practices of production of space and the dominant narratives and practices that compose the choreography played by change and continuity in world politics.

**From Nonintervention to Non-indifference**

The transformation of Brazil's discourses of foreign policy in the twenty first century, to a great extent, reflects the traditional expectation that economic powers will eventually become more involved in matters of international security. But while economic development has been assumed to be the obvious step towards a relevant and influential decision-making position in international financial institutions and other relevant multilateral fora, the path of Brazil towards playing a major role in the United Nations Security Council, which is given primary responsibility for the *maintenance of international peace and security by the United Nations Charter*, has been more ambiguous and contested.

Brazil has been elected by the General Assembly for 10 mandates as non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since the foundation of the organization. In addition to the most recent mandate in 2010-2011, Brazil previously joined
the UNSC as non-permanent member in 1946-47, 1951-52, 1954-55, 1963-64, 1967-68, 1988-89, 1993-94, 1998-99 and 2004-05. This can be seen as a great number of opportunities to be involved in global decision-making processes. However, extending Brazil’s participation at the UNSC became an important issue in Brazil’s former president Lula's foreign policy agenda (Amorim, 2005). During Brazil's most recent mandate as a nonpermanent member, in February 2011, Brazil, India, Germany and Japan issued a joint statement on the UNSC reform. These four countries constitute the G4, a group whose main goal is to support each other's bids for a permanent seat. In the margins of the 67th session of the UN General Assembly, they held a ministerial meeting in which they reiterated their goal:

Recalling also their previous joint statements, the Ministers reiterated their common vision of a reformed Security Council, taking into consideration the contributions made by countries to the maintenance of international peace and security and other purposes of the organization, as well as the need for increased representation of developing countries in both categories, in order to better reflect today’s geopolitical realities. The G4 countries reiterated their commitments as aspiring new permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as their support for each other’s candidatures (G4, 2012).

The campaign for a reform of the UNSC has been mainly directed towards the legitimacy of this political body on the grounds that it still reflects a political configuration that dates back to almost 70 years ago. The supporters of the reform understand that the power structure of the UNSC is a frozen structure that reflects the one that was in place at the end of World War II. Since 1945, the number of member states of the United Nations has increased from 51 to 193, but the only change in the configuration of the UNSC was an increase in the number of non-permanent members from 6 to 10 in 1965 (Weiss, 2003, p.147).

This was not the first time Brazil has requested to be considered for a permanent seat at the UNSC. Brazil has participated in the organization of the United Nations from the
Moura (2013) notes that there was a Brazilian delegate at conferences that preceded the creation of the institution, and the country assumed the responsibilities of a full member in both meetings, at the Conference on Food and Agriculture and at the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation (UNRRA) in 1943. A representative of Brazil "was also involved with the activities of the Executive Committee, the Security Council in London in 1945, the Preparatory Committee and the General Assemblies from 1946 onwards" (Moura, 2013, p.244). But, as we know, Brazil did not succeed in obtaining a permanent seat at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Nevertheless, the United States supported Brazil's nomination to a non-permanent position in 1946 for a two-year mandate. Some telegrams exchanged between Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations (MRE) and the delegations at the Preparatory Committee and at the General Assembly in London, dated December 1, 1945 and January 14, 1946, respectively, show that, for the Chief of the Brazilian delegation, the nomination meant that his country was counted as “one of the six Powers of the World” (quoted in Moura, 2013, p.244). Itamaraty, or MRE, considered the nomination and subsequent result as a “significant triumph". And after receiving other invitations to participate in several committees of the General Assembly (in addition to the position as a non-permanent member of the UNSC), another telegram dated December 12, 1946 showed that Brazilian policy-makers were celebrating the “brilliant conquests achieved by Brazilian foreign policy” (quoted in Moura, 2013, p.245).

The orientation of Brazilian policy at that time was "to follow the US vote", even when not agreeing with it, something that made Brazil "part of a bloc of Latin American states, representing 40% of the voting strength of the UN, under US leadership" (Moura, 2013, p.247). As a non-permanent member, Brazil would openly declare that it was unable to

\[^{18}\] The history of Brazilian campaigns to become part of the club of major powers through prominent participation in international institutions can be traced back to the country's engagement in the League of Nations during 1920 and 1928. Brazil launched a campaign to occupy a permanent seat on the Executive Council of the League after World War I. For an interpretation of Brazil’s ‘overconfidence’ and access to some of the political statements regarding this campaign, see (Garcia, 2005).
support the causes of ‘smaller’ states on the grounds that "if the Great Powers are opposed, we cannot grant our support" (quoted in Moura, 2013, p.247). Brazil’s particular position at the United Nations at that time suggests that Brazil's presence in the UNSC as a permanent member would probably not have made a difference in the predominant balance of power and in the way world politics was being analyzed and conducted by the organ.

The Brazilian position during the more recent campaign for a permanent seat at the UNSC has involved a different narrative and the rejection by Brazil of American and European models for the monitoring and management of “global” space. As Cervo (2010) observes, Brazil openly "berates the United States’ unilateral preemptive action, and the doctrine of European intervention and terrorism" (p.17). At the General Debate of the 69th session of the UN General Assembly, Brazil’s president Dilma Rousseff (2014) reiterated Brazil's position against military intervention:

The use of force is incapable of eliminating the underlying causes of conflict. This is made clear by the persistence of the Question of Palestine; the systematic massacre of the Syrian people; the tragic national destructuring of Iraq; the serious insecurity in Libya; the conflicts in the Sahel; and the clashes in Ukraine. / Each military intervention leads not to peace, but to the deterioration of these conflicts (p.4).

Rousseff (2014) recalls the need for a "genuine reform" of the UNSC in order to overcome paralysis and to remove the obstacles in the way of peaceful solutions. She insists that "this process has been dragging on for too long" (p.5). The 70th anniversary of the United Nations in 2015 was seen as an "auspicious occasion for achieving the progress required", and again, legitimacy and representativeness were brought together to justify the need for a reform towards a more "effective council" (p.5). However, some analysts have

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19 When Brazil abstained from voting the United Nations General Assembly Resolution n. 68/262, on the ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine’, against the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014, many analysts started to discredit Brazil’s ‘noninterventionism’. In this occasion, BRICS countries remained silent about Russian's unilateralism and invasion of the Ukrainian territory. The voting record on Draft Resolution A/68/L.39 Territorial Integrity of Ukraine is available at: https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/2498292/voting-record.pdf
emphasized the fact that there is little agreement "as to which countries should accede to the UNSC or even by what formula aspirants should be judged" (McDonald and Patrick, 2010, p.vi).

In this special report about the UNSC enlargement and the United States' interests, McDonald and Patrick (2010) argue that the "Charter prescribes that regional parity should be, at most, a secondary issue; the ability to advocate and defend international peace and security should, it says, be the primary concerns" (p.vi). This particular argument invalidates Brazil's quest for a permanent seat on the grounds of regional representativeness in the organ. McDonald and Patrick (2010) interpret the UN Charter against the claims based on legitimacy and democratic representation, and they affirm that the candidacies of emerging powers such as Brazil or India should be "weighed not on their role as regional leaders, but on their ability to help safeguard international peace" (p.7). However, there is nothing in Chapter V, Article 23 of the UN Charter, about the election of members, that clearly mentions that "equitable geographic distribution is a secondary consideration" (McDonald & Patrick, 2010, p.7):

> the General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution (UN Charter).

McDonald and Patrick (2010) argue that the "primary consideration for permanent membership should be power - the ability and willingness to deploy it in the service of global security" (p.9). But they do not understand power in strict military terms. They note that, given the changing nature of threats to international peace, qualification involves "not only military but also diplomatic, economic, and technological capabilities" in order to deal with 'disruptions' "ranging from terrorism to nuclear proliferation to climate change" (McDonald
The enlargement of the UNSC is then justified not by the need for more representation and legitimation through democratic decision-making, but "by the need to harness the power of emerging and established states as pillars of an open, rule-bound global system" (p.9).

Given the understanding that the representatives of Brazil cannot cogently and legally convince the other permanent members of the necessity to expand the Security Council on the basis of geographic representation or of the influential position of Brazil in the international economy, many analysts have concluded that the only way Brazil could climb its way up to the Security Council would be to prove to the world that the country is ready to embody a more assertive role in and contribute more directly to the safeguarding of international peace. Departing from this understanding about the conditions for joining the powerful group who decides on what constitutes international peace and order, the contradiction between the Brazilian campaign for a permanent seat and Brazil’s unwillingness to accept a more flexible conceptualization of sovereignty has often been emphasized. And, in this context, the transformations in Brazil’s discourses of foreign policy and Brazil's recent distinguished role in peacekeeping/peacebuilding operations have been associated with a desire to prove Brazil's maturity in the field and its capability of assuming a greater responsibility as a global player (Esteves, 2010, p.615; Cavalcante, 2010, p.143; Almeida, 2014, p.61; Wrobel & Herz, 2002).

Even though Brazil has been a consistent contributor to peace operations throughout the history of the United Nations, it has never been a major player. From 1957 to 1999, Brazil deployed over 11,000 troops and more than 300 policemen on UN missions. But as Kenkel (2010a) notes, “Brazil’s contribution consisted of a steady trickle of small teams of military observers, staff officers and liaison officers, with three major exceptions until the advent of MINUSTAH in 2004” (p.655). Prior to its prominent participation in the UN mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH) in 2004, Brazil persistently rejected taking part in missions authorized under Chapter VII20. The exceptions were a “battalion-sized contingents sent to the Sinai (UN Emergency Force - UNEF, 1956-1967) and Angola (UN Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM, 1995-1997), as well as a large police contingent to UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 1999-2002” (Kenkel, 2013, p.279).

Some scholars argue that Brazil’s participation in peace operations has been part of a strategy of integration into the international system since the 1980’s (Wrobel & Herz, 2002, p.256). Other studies highlight the fact that the ability of South American countries, and particularly Brazil, to participate in military operations authorized by the United Nations is seen as "a way to assert themselves as ‘normal states’ and a reflexive means to strengthen the process of transformation of their own societies in order to be integrated into a new global cartography" (Esteves, 2010, p. 615). In this regard, Esteves (2010) notes that

when South American countries take part in PKOs’ therapeutic techniques, they are affected in two ways. First, from a transformative perspective, the participation in PKOs became a reflexive way to reshape domestic institutions and practices, especially those related to public security. Second, from the integrative side, to participate in PKOs was a way to ensure that South America would have a place in the new global cartography (p. 624).

In the pursuit of recognition and visibility for the country as a global player, Brazilian politicians find themselves subordinated to "a doctrine of legitimacy according to which subjects of international system are constituted [...] that articulates and reproduces political communities in space and time" (Esteves, 2010, p. 616). Even though "Brazilian positions and attitudes on UN peacekeeping issues" could still be defined as unclear

20 Article 42 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizes the UN Security Council to take action by air, sea, or land forces in order to maintain or restore international peace and security, when measures provided for in Article 41, such as economic sanctions, prove to be inadequate. Chapter VII basically means the authorization to use force, and the suspension, to some degree, of the traditional principles of peace operations (consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate). Chapter VII of the UN Charter is available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/
Brazilian state policies and actions concerning international security under Luis Inácio Lula da Silva's term of office changed to incorporate efforts to play a more active role in international security. Those are reflected in the three objectives that guided Lula's foreign policy, according to Celso Amorim, which were: 1) obtaining a permanent seat on the UNSC; 2) strengthening and enlargement of Mercosur; and 3) concluding trade negotiations started in 2001 within the World Trade Organization (Amorim, 2005, p.14). The 2005 National Defense Policy includes in its guidelines the stipulation that Brazil must "have a capability to project its power in order to participate in peace operations established or authorized by the UN Security Council" (Ministry of Defense, Brazil, 2005, 7.1 - XXIII). The document also states that one of the goals of national defense is “the projection of Brazil in the concert of nations and its greater integration into the international decision-making process” (Ministry of Defense, Brazil, 2005, para.3.3.f). In the same document, participating in international peacekeeping operations appeared within the general strategic guidelines (Ministry of Defense, 2005, para.4.e)

Due to the historical hesitancy against military interventions, Brazil’s decision to take over the United Nations Mission of stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004 and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2013 have been interpreted as exceptional cases in Brazilian foreign policy (Hirst & Nasser, 2014; Kenkel, 2010b; Moreno et al., 2012). More recently, the Brazilian Navy has also assumed command of the Maritime Task Force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which suggests that Brazil is still committed not only to participation in the command of operations, but perhaps also to an expansion of this kind of responsibility outside the Americas (Azevov, 2013, p.167). According to Azevov (2013), this participation in UNIFIL "is also in line with the Brazilian perception that maritime security operations will further gain in prominence in international conflict management in the future"
For Kenkel, these changes reflect a period of transition from a regional to a global horizon: “the former fostered by its status as a regional hegemon, the latter by its astonishing economic growth over the last decade and half – [which] is echoed in a further change that affects the country's engagement with both peace operations and other regions of the world” (Kenkel, 2013, p.278). This transition is interpreted by Kenkel as “a transition from a regional security culture that interprets non-intervention strictly to a global posture that increasingly confronts it with the need to project responsibility in international security, including through robust peace operations" (Kenkel, 2013, p.273). He reiterates that recent changes in Brazil's foreign conduct bear all the jarring hallmarks prescribed by academic treatments of emerging (middle) powers. Participation in peace operations, as well as relations with the Global South as a whole […] , play a crucial role in the international positioning of these states. Indeed, for Brazil the key objective has become the rapid realization of its long-held dream of a permanent, veto-endowed seat on a reformed United Nations (UN) Security Council (Kenkel, 2013, p.275).

Even though the perception that Brazilian policy-makers were accommodating to a new role and new position for the country in international politics during the first decade of this century was widely accepted, the classification of Brazil as a middle power has been a contentious issue. According to Burges (2013), “a central precept of Brazilian foreign policy beyond being a major power or major power-to-be is that the country is not part of the dominant North-Atlantic bloc set up and managed by the United States” (p.287). Instead, Burges argues that Brazil “is seeking to reform international institutions with a view to substantially realigning the relative power configuration in the international system and

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21 In the literature about 'middle powers', we find a variety of methodologies, qualitative and quantitative, employed for the measurement or analysis of a country's predisposition and role with regards to international affairs. See (Kenkel, 2010b). Australia and Canada have been traditionally classified as 'middle powers'. For Sean Burges (2005), middle powers differs from rising powers or great powers, as they align and “adopt[] a strategy of supporting and advancing the Western liberal project launched by the United States, albeit in a manner that frequently pushes the United States on issues it finds uncomfortable and inconvenient (for example, Cuba, landmines, human rights,...)” (p.287).
retarding the sort of active, interventionist international institutions sought by the North Atlantic countries” (p.288).

While scholars disagree on how to classify Brazil, the obvious assumption in these studies and analyses is still that a particular position in global politics inevitably leads to specific agendas and behaviors that are predictable and expected. The emergence to the global stage as a significant player implies taking the responsibility of “a global stakeholder prepared to uphold universal principles beyond state borders” (Kenkel, 2013, p.279). In this scenario, a particular trajectory is emphasized as the single possible trajectory to prominence in global politics. Analysts and politicians often take for granted the notion that Brazil’s historical position in relation to sovereignty and intervention “clouds the country's ability to project and readiness to take on increased international responsibility” (Kenkel, 2013, p.283). The acceptance of these rules and conditions of representation is expressed in former president Lula's statement about the country’s willingness to take on more responsibility:

This is how we responded, Brazil and other Latin American countries, to the call from the UN to contribute to the stabilization of Haiti. Whoever defends new paradigms in international relations cannot be absent from a concrete situation (quoted in Kenkel, 2013, p.283).

Historically, the principles of national sovereignty, non-intervention, and peaceful settlement of disputes have been deeply embedded in Brazil's political and juridical cultures (Serbin & Rodrigues, 2011). Even though the vague language and expressions in some documents may indicate that these concepts could hardly be used as operational guidelines, it is stipulated in the 1996 Brazilian National Defense Policy, under the principle of nonintervention, that "Brazil's actions in the international community must respect the constitutional principles of self-determination, non-intervention, and equality among states” (Almeida, 2014, p. 31). Consistent with Brazil's commitment to these principles, the response of Brazil to the crisis in Haiti in the 1990s was completely different from the response in the
2000s, when the country finally assumed an active role in an intervention authorized by the United Nations under chapter VII. In 1994, Celso Amorim declared: "my country will not fail to support the democratic reconstruction of Haiti, with complete respect for its sovereignty and in accordance with the principles of non-intervention and self-determination" (Amorim, 1994, pp.17-18).

The risk of isolation from the international community combined with a renewed desire to participate in international affairs as a powerful player have been pointed to as one of the major triggers that led Brazil to reevaluate its commitment to the principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention. As Hurrell (2006) notes,

"membership of the club of great powers is a social category that depends on recognition by others: by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy. One of the difficulties facing potential aspirants to the great power club is that the criteria for membership may militate against them (p.4)."

Almeida (2014) states that "in order for the country to play a greater role in decision-making process in the international arena, the principle of non-intervention has recently been reinterpreted by Brazilian diplomats" (p.32). Peace operations gave Brazil the stage and the spotlight to demonstrate its aspirations and rising ambitions during Lula's presidency, in particular Brazil’s desire to become a more powerful and influential player (Almeida, 2014, p. 32). However, the discussion about the principle of non-intervention itself was avoided. Instead, Brazil's discourse about its more assertive position was characterized by a focus on tackling 'poverty', 'social injustice', and the promotion of 'equitable development' (Da Silva, 2004, p.3). Brazil's involvement in Haiti was not based solely on security concerns, and the legitimacy of the operation was also drawn from its "commitment to peace and development of a brother country" (quoted in Cavalcante, 2010, p.154).

Brazilian diplomacy thus opened up from a commitment to nonintervention and to the
avoidance of the 'responsibility to protect' to an engagement with the concept of 'non-indifference', which became the diplomatic slogan enabling a more active participation with respect to situations judged as threats to international peace and security (Almeida, 2014, p. 32). On May 25, 2004, after the adoption of Resolution n.1542, Lula defined Brazil's new position in a speech at the University of Beijing where he explained that

the increasing [political] proximity and consolidation of Brazil's relation to its region require[d] that the situations of instability in countries of the continent [we]re carefully watched by the Brazilian government, oriented by the principle of non-intervention, but also by an attitude of 'non-indifference' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil, 2007, p.19).

In September 2004, in his speech during the 59th session of the General Assembly, Lula reiterated that his country does not support interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, but that this would not mean it would seek refuge in omission and indifference in the face of the instability that affects Brazil's neighbors (Da Silva, 2004, p.3).

The notion of 'non-indifference' was created out of a concern about the development of a security culture in Africa and was first adopted by the African Union (Hermann, 2011, p.20; Almeida, 2014, p. 33). According to Kenkel, "the concept's pillars, though never overly detailed or operationalized, centered on solidarity between (Southern) states, non-military conflict resolution and the idea that foreign policy at times must act beyond national interests to help those in need" (Kenkel, 2013, p.97). 'Non-indifference’ was meant to be deployed "whenever the country's action is requested and whenever it can play a positive role" (Almeida, 2014, p.39). What seems to distinguish ‘non-indifference’ from the concept of ‘intervention’ that Brazilian policy-makers have historically resisted is the rhetoric of southern solidarity and a somewhat horizontal positioning (at least discursively) in relation to the ‘other’ who needs to be rescued. The new concept was first included as an element of state policy in the context of Brazil's participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission.
in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was interpreted as an opportunity for the country to demonstrate its new intentions and the kind of responsibilities it was finally willing to assume (Almeida, 2014, p. 34). In the next section, I explore the participation of Brazil in this mission, and I analyze the ways in which the different issues (including shortcomings) of the mission were both produced and challenged by the dominant practices of production of international space and its temporal trajectories.

**MINUSTAH: Spaces, Places, and Coevalness**

There is a common misconception that MINUSTAH was a Brazilian-led mission. The mission in Haiti was led from the beginning by a United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), and none of the several representatives who held this position were from Brazil. However, Brazil participated actively at the highest level in MINUSTAH’s decision-making process. According to Braga, MINUSTAH force commander from 2004 to 2005, "the successive appointment of Brazilian generals as force commanders – a clear break with standard practice – resulted in participation and direct influence in every sphere of decision-making" (Braga, 2010, p.718).

There are a few reasons why MINUSTAH is said to be unique and challenging to Brazil. This was a mission in which Brazil, for the first time, had a primary role, with Brazil’s President and Defense Minister granted an influential presence at the highest level of the decision-making process. Brazilian Generals in Haiti were also responsible for the command of troops from a dozen of countries, most of them from South America (Almeida, 2014, p.37). The mandate for MINUSTAH was established under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which represented a rupture with the tradition of Brazil's participation in peace operations under chapter VI in which the consent of the parties is required. Operations under chapter VII may demand the use of force, and that is why those operations are also
known as 'peace-enforcement operations' or ‘missions of stabilization’. MINUSTAH was designed as a model of contemporary multidimensional and integrated operation, which reflects "the very nature of the root causes of Haiti’s complex problems" (Braga, 2010, p.711). Finally, the contingent of Brazilian troops deployed to this mission has been the largest that the country has ever deployed to United Nations peacekeeping operations (Almeida, 2014, p.37).

As MINUSTAH forces began to deploy, the Multinational Interim Force Haiti (MIF-H), which was composed of troops from the United States, France, Canada, and Chile, withdrew (Braga, 2010, p.714). The security challenges in Haiti were far from fitting the conventional approaches to or doctrines of international peace operations, and the UN missions deployed in the country since 1993 had failed to properly respond to "an armed conflict between organized opposing forces" (Braga, 2010, p.712). Even though the tactics used by the troops from the previous missions had proven to be ineffective in the stabilization of the crisis in Haiti, when the new mission took over, some countries, and especially the United States, France, and Canada, disagreed with the approach chosen by the new mission’s force commanders. According to Braga, an intense pressure for a more proactive use of force was exerted through diplomatic démarches, frequent visits, and diplomatic conversations, among other initiatives, which the MINUSTAH troops resisted (Braga, 2010, p.714). The use of force was necessary for the fulfillment of the mandate in Haiti, but there was great hesitance and even objection to it on the part of South American troops and decision-makers (Azevov, 2013, p.167).

The reluctance on the part of Brazilian troops to use force might have been the cause for a major conflict between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Transitional Government of Haiti (TGoH). On various occasions, demonstrators were protected against the will and authorization of the TGoH, and the soldiers (peacekeepers) had
to confront the Haitian National Police (HNP). Braga (2010) explains that in one of these occasions, in February 2005, a demonstration escorted by MINUSTAH troops was attacked by the HNP and a demonstrator was shot and killed, which caused some increased tension between the government and the parties involved in the mission. Braga argues that this situation reflects the culture of Brazilian peacekeepers as conciliators [...] searching for alternative solutions and negotiations and only resorting to force when it is deemed absolutely unavoidable. Such an approach contributed to a better appreciation of the military force among the population (Braga, 2010, p.718).

The unfolding of the mission proved that Brazil was not ready to assume this kind of responsibility in a traditional way, due to a lack of material resources, or to an understanding of the situation from a different perspective. Some elements of Brazil's participation included a focus on integrated development and peacebuilding over peace enforcement, and an engagement based on cultural affinity and close contact with the host country population (Kenkel, 2010a, p.656). The Brazilian Ministry of Defense tried to craft a 'Brazilian way' to be tested in Haiti and, since 2013, in the Congo, after the appointment of Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz as Force Commander of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (Hirst & Nasser, 2014, p.2). The discourse guiding Brazil's participation in multidimensional peace operations put considerable emphasis on the tripod 'security, reconciliation, and development' (Moreno et al., 2012, p.386). When negotiating the authorization of the mandate of MINUSTAH at the UN

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22 When compared to America troops, Canadians and British serving the United Nations have also been mentioned as relatively more capable of coming into a closer contact with the 'local population'. The 'Brazilian way' is probably not unique, and I am not concerned about whether this is true or not in the ground. What I aim to highlight in this chapter is the emphasis in the literature and official statements on this particular self-representation of Brazil as capable of a more horizontal kind of interaction. The passion for football (soccer), the African roots, and the historical and geographical connections between Brazil and Haiti have all been discursively used as way to legitimize and justify the presence of Brazilian soldiers in Haiti and elsewhere as brothers who were there extending a hand, instead of a disciplining father.
Security Council, Brazilian representatives “were not only able to emphasize the tripod mentioned above, but also to add ‘combating poverty’ as one of the mission’s efforts” (Moreno et al., 2012, p.386). However, Moreno et al. (2012) argue that “due to their special interest in the mission, the United States, Canada, and France, managed to have some influence on [the mission’s] configuration and mode of action” (p.385). The pillars of the MINUSTAH mandate ended up reflecting a more traditional approach to intra-state conflict favored by the countries mentioned above. They were: (1) Secure and Stable Environment, (2) Political Process, and (3) Human Rights (UNSC, 2004). Development was mentioned only vaguely under the third pillar, which:

emphasizes the need for Member States, United Nations organs, bodies and agencies and other international organizations, in particular OAS and CARICOM, other regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations to continue to contribute to the promotion of the social and economic development of Haiti, in particular for the long-term, in order to achieve and sustain stability and combat poverty (UNSC, 2004).

Given the gap between a predefined peace operation model and what was seen as the local reality, the alternative was to work through the limitations of the mandate, by establishing a "new set of interactions and arrangements out of the institutional limits of MINUSTAH" (Moreno et al., 2012, p.387). Some of the most important challenges to MINUSTAH were directly related to development. Braga notes that this aspect of the mandate was dropped between the UN Secretary-General's initial recommendation for the mission and the adoption of resolution 1452. According to the Security Council, "primary development tasks were not to be undertaken by MINUSTAH but rather by donor countries and other international organizations, based on their own interests and capacities" (Braga, 2010, p.716). The mission then became dependent on the "goodwill of other external agents" for its progress (Braga, 2010, p.716).

Moreno et al. (2012) note that “by identifying the lack of developmental initiatives as
one of the main weaknesses of MINUSTAH’s mandate, countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Argentina established different programmes and partnerships with third party actors" (p.386). Braga argues that perhaps the most important reason for MINUSTAH's successes have been the "high level of involvement of Brazilian organizations from outside the military ambit" (Braga, 2010, p.719), including non-governmental initiatives, such as projects developed by the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio. Moreover, different Brazilian governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation were coordinating efforts in Haiti with Brazil’s foreign and defense ministries (Braga, 2010, p.719-720). So, while Herz suggests that it "is fundamental for the reproduction of the idea of a peaceful and stable region" that the concept of security reinforces this division between a "domestic realm [...] marked by intra-state war and transnational criminality" and a "peaceful [region] as an international space" (Herz, 2010, p.603), one may claim that the basic tenets of the Westphalian system, that is to say, the stress on the division between the domestic and the international, is challenged by the blurriness of the line that separated Brazil's foreign and domestic agenda, especially as the Brazilian military became involved in the 'pacification' of domestic conflicts in Brazil using the training and experience acquired in the policing tasks it assumed in Haiti. Brazil’s leadership of MINUSTAH has been noticeable for delivering policies that merged the fight against poverty and violence in Haiti with the management of similar problems in its domestic environment. In many instances, Brazil’s participation in the stabilization of Haiti became the laboratory where different strategies towards the stabilization of the country were later applied by the Brazilian military in 'conflict zones’ in Brazil. At a strategic level, Brazilian forces were able to establish a permanent presence in the most violent neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince. Moreno et al. (2012) explain that

with limited use of force, troops were able to enter areas such as Belair and Cité Soleil and establish a permanent military presence in the form of so-called ‘strong points’. Unknown to most of the members of the mission bureaucracy, this technique, adapted
by Brazilian troops, allowed a substantial increase in security levels in those areas, while over the long term resorting to minimum force (Moreno et al., 2012, p.385).

Hirst and Nasser (2014) note that "the learning process undergone by the Brazilian Armed Forces in the pacification of Haiti has replicated in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. [...] Troops do not fight and then leave, but attack and occupy the strong points in a particular area" (Hirst & Nasser, 2014, p.4). For Paul Amar (2013), the "Global South [might be] not merely a source of resistance forms of localisms; it is also a factory for globalizing forms of moralization, militarization, and control" (p.244). In this case, the 'pacification' of favelas within Brazil can be understood in the context of a larger discourse in which Brazil promotes itself as a "'human-security superpower' on the world stage, in ways that would not threaten the value agendas of its Middle Eastern geopolitical partners or the US administration" (p.34). However, the dominant perception is still that the current practices and spatiotemporal conditions through which a 'security superpower' is recognized might prevent Brazil to experience a big moment as part of the club of those who decide on 'breaches' to international peace and security, especially when coupled with the country's conservative stance towards norms such as the RtoP (Responsibility to Protect), given Brazil’s emphasis on a horizontal conceptualization of sovereignty that favors nonintervention (Kenkel, 2010a, p. 657).

Kenkel (2010a) points out that "Brazil's internal military missions are considered an indicator of incomplete civilian control" (p.651). How would Brazil be included in the club of powerful states in which the topic of 'terrorism', for example, evokes the image of a morally and materially superior hero that Brazil is not prepared and perhaps not willing to play? To what extent does MINUSTAH challenge what Paulo Esteves calls the 'therapeutic logic' of peacekeeping operations? According to Esteves, the therapeutic logic consists in the understanding that "peacekeepers are presented as privileged interpreters of the population's will and aspirations, [and] when international will and local aspirations do not match, locals
should be persuaded to follow the liberal democratic path" (Esteves, 2010, p. 625). Given the representation of MINUSTAH as a mission in which the country with the position of leadership in ‘stabilization’ and the host population claim to share a similar stigma of incompleteness and an aspiration for a future yet to come, how has this particular representation helped or harmed Brazil in its aspiration to join the club of powerful and influential global powers? Some scholars concerned with the way Brazil has positioned itself in relation to its aspiration to a permanent seat at the UNSC argue that the emphasis on the ‘Brazilian way’ contains both advantages and disadvantages for Brazil's insertion into the arena of 'global peace and security'. Indeed,

the advantage of these projects is clear: their adaptation to the host country heightens both their effectiveness and their acceptability to the local population. They represent a further unique positive point in that Brazilian authorities have included in their bilateral efforts very close cooperation with Brazilian NGOs, of which the Rio de Janeiro-based Viva Rio is the most felicitous example. Their disadvantage is also clear, though mitigated by a close link to the selection criteria for deployment of Brazilian troops mentioned above: precisely because they are attuned to the specific [...] context[s] due to socioeconomic similarities, there are limits to their exportability to other peacebuilding contexts (Kenkel, 2010a, p.656-657).

Following these interpretations, the conclusion is that the 'Brazilian way' might contribute to the positioning of Brazil in the future as a good leader for dealing with these kind of conflicts in which Brazil could possibly claim the existence of cultural affinity and common historical roots. But it might also distance Brazil from the future envisaged by current UN permanent members who strongly resist the adoption of a different repertoire and of practices that, under the current paradigm that still privileges a realist ontology, may be translated as vulnerability. These 'missions' are undertaken under the perception that 'space' is "orienting the mind to quantity (versus quality), measurement (versus meaning). Space is thus seen as pulverizing the fluid flow of duration into meaningless pieces and collapsing time into its own physical dimensionalities" (Soja, 1990, p.123). This is seen in the chronological
orientation and specific sequences of the different mandates authorized by the United Nations. The temporality of the mission, in this case, is attached to desired rearrangements and rearticulations of the trajectories already in place. The fact that Brazil, by representing itself as temporally close to Haitians yet incomplete in its path towards the future, recognizes in Haiti a reflection of its own problems, challenges not only the dominant narrative about the boundaries between the sovereign spaces that compose the international order, but also Brazil's own quest for a position that seems to require a certain amount of accumulated history before a country can be granted the authority to be ‘responsible’ for others whose containers (defined by sovereignty) of time are considered to be empty.

Some cultural attributes of Brazilian soldiers are highlighted both as a strength and a cause of relative success in Haiti and as a weakness in relation to claims that the 'Brazilian way' could be universalized. According to Braga, "cultural attributes of Brazilian soldiers and marines were crucial in improving interaction with the local population as well as with Haitian and international authorities" (Braga, 2010, p.712). Braga (2010) explains that

> the cultural similarity between Haiti and Brazil is far-reaching, ranging from a passion for soccer and carnaval to shared religious syncretism. From a Haitian perspective, this identification is very deep. To give a curious example, several Haitian fellows claimed that when reading books by Brazilian author Jorge Amado they understood the stories to be set in Haiti (p.719).

This image of the Brazilian military contingent as uniquely close to the Haitian population, able to connect with the Haitian people, and likely to perceive their needs differently from any other contingents coming from developed countries has been largely accepted and reproduced by different actors involved in the mission as well as by scholars studying Brazil's participation in peacekeeping operations²³. One of the latest MINUSTAH

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²³ Since the 'Football for Peace' match, a match between a team from Brazil and the Haitian soccer team, organized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and FIFA in 2004, months after the deployment of MINUSTAH, the way president Lula and specially Brazilian soccer players were received in the country and cheered by the crowd holding Brazilian flags in the streets of Port-au-Prince have been
SRSG, Hédi Annabi, who fell victim to the 2010 earthquake, delivered a speech in April 2009 in which he claimed that:

the Brazilian Contingent – infantry, Marines, mechanized company, supply and engineers – and the exceptional Force Commanders seconded by Brazil, have made an invaluable contribution to the stabilization process, based on a combination of different qualities: professionalism, firmness and courage in the face of opposition; imagination, sensitivity and a readiness to reach out, whether by playing soccer with a child, providing emergency care, or helping victims of disaster or violence. And, above all, a genuine desire to help the Haitian people, a people with a proud history that has contributed much to the continent, but which now needs the assistance of its friends in the region and of the international community. The performance of Brazil’s contingent has won the admiration and gratitude of their comrades and colleagues, and of the Haitian leadership and people. It corresponds to the ideal of UN peacekeeping, according to which peace cannot ultimately be imposed through force, but must be consolidated by winning hearts (quoted in Braga, 2010, p.719).

Despite the acknowledgement of increasing resistance in Haiti against the ‘international occupation’ and the limitations of MINUSTAH’s mandate (see Lemay-Hébert, 2014), the perception disseminated through different studies and reports is that Brazilian troops were praised by UN officials and Haitian citizens for displaying particular traits that are not necessarily rewarded in mainstream discourses of international security. In the Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Dziedzic and Perito emphasise the remarkable acceptance by the Haitian citizens of the mission, stating that there was "an overwhelmingly positive attitude of Haitian citizens toward the UN operation and its results" (Dziedzic & Perito, 2008, p.1). They also note that after the gangs were successfully driven out of Cité Soleil, there was a gap that needed to be filled before government services could be restored. Quick-impact projects needed to fill this vacuum were provided by the Brazilian

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remembered as evidence of the lack of resistance of the Haitian population against the presence of Brazilian soldiers in the country. For a short report from 2004 reflecting this optimism, see this post from the Red Cross available at http://www.ifrc.org/ar/news-and-media/news-stories/americas/haiti/haitian-red-cross-participates-in-football-for-peace-match/ However, since 2004, and specially after the earthquake in 2010, a number of incidents and scandals involving sexual exploitation and a cholera outbreak in the country (linked to the MINUSTAH troops, but not necessarily linked to the Brazilian contingent), have resulted in increasing resistance and hostility against the 'international' occupation. For an analysis of the resistance in Haiti and the limits of the MINUSTAH, see (Lemay-Hébert, 2014).
military. And according to the report, "the impact was magnified by the Brazilian military's emphasis on community involvement, turning projects into street parties complete with music and refreshments" (Dziedzic & Perito, 2008, p.10).

Brazilian leadership of MINUSTAH illustrates how Brazil reverses the logic that predominates in operations led by advanced states. The latter is usually marked by an interaction with the local population and a representation of the 'local' within a narrative of 'failed state' that assumes a more hierarchical quality between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', overlooks the socio-cultural idiosyncrasies of the country, and perpetuates a condition in which 'c'est le blanc qui decide' (Moreno et al., 2012, p.386). A new paradigm in which the country providing security and development may be at the same time dealing with its own internal problems seems to be threatening as it may destabilize the boundaries between the 'self' and the 'other', or between the subject of the future teaching the lessons and the subject of the past learning the lessons (Moreno et al., 2012, p.379). This new paradigm also subverts the language of victory, largely assumed by the United Nations and dominant practices of 'ordering' spaces, in which "the victory is of course one of 'representation' over 'reality', of stabilization over life, where space is equated with representation and stabilization (and therefore time, one is forced to presume, with reality and life)" (Massey, 2005, p.29). In the next section, I discuss Brazil's proposal of a Responsibility while Protecting (Rwp), a global project that can also be interpreted as Brazil’s failure to conform to the current political and legal mechanisms through which the separation between international and domestic spaces are preserved.

**Responsibility while Protecting (Rwp)**

Brazil's increase in international engagement has been somewhat consistent with its commitment to the principle of nonintervention, a commitment "marked by its advance of the
'Responsibility While Protecting' principle, an attempt to facilitate a peaceful solution to the tension around Iran's nuclear programme, and significant financial and operational leadership in MINUSTAH" (Azevov, 2013, p.166). A major change in Brazilian diplomacy after the adoption of the principle of non-indifference was Brazil's proposal of the concept 'Responsibility while Protecting', or what was interpreted by some scholars as another indicator of the country's intention to participate actively in the United Nations (Almeida, 2014, p. 29). As a manifestation of Brazilian officials' uneasiness with regards to the intervention by NATO in Libya, the UN was approached with a suggestion for a new doctrine. The idea behind ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ is that military action taken in the name of the responsibility to protect must also be carried out in a responsible manner (Österdahl, 2013, p.460). The new concept does not invalidate the ‘RtoP’, but it is an invitation for the international community to shift the discussion from when an intervention is necessary and legitimate to how could the international community help in the development of local capacities necessary for the prevention of violations against human rights and the restoration of sovereignty.

In a letter dated November 2011 and addressed to the Secretary-General entitled “Responsibility while protecting: elements for the development and promotion of a concept", Brazil’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (in office from July 25, 2007 to January 16, 2013), discussed Brazil's official understanding and suggestions regarding international interventions and, especially, Brazil's safeguards in relation to the concept of the responsibility to protect, which were structured along three pillars:

The first pillar identifies the State as the primary bearer of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The second pillar stresses the role of the international community in providing cooperation and assistance to allow States to develop local capacities that will enable them to discharge that responsibility. The third pillar, which applies to exceptional
circumstances and when measures provided for in the first and second pillars have manifestly failed, allows for the international community to resort to collective action, in accordance with the norms and procedures established in the Charter (Viotti, 2011).

It is often assumed that the relevance or significance of Brazil's suggestions comes from its position as “an emerging big power in today's world” (Österdahl, 2013, p.466). Österdahl argues that "this gives the content of the letter a significance that it would not otherwise have and it also constitutes a reason to take the content seriously" (Österdahl, 2013, p.466-467). He also adds that the fact that it is Brazil who puts forward the suggestions might imply that many states belonging to the Global South would agree with the Brazilian views. Obviously, Russia and China agree, at least with the implied criticism of the actions of NATO in Libya contained in Brazil’s letter (Österdahl, 2013, p.466-467).

The focus in Brazilian politico-military and diplomatic discourses has traditionally been on the second pillar, 'international assistance and capacity building', and Brazilian politicians have avoided conversations about the third pillar that deals with "the responsibility of the international community to take timely and decisive action" (Almeida, 2014, p. 42). In this concept paper that circulated for discussion at the Security Council, Brazil emphasized the strict chronological order of the three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect. The paper states that "the three pillars must follow a strict line of political subordination and chronological sequencing. In this sequencing, it is essential to distinguish between collective responsibility, which can be fully exercised through non-coercive measures, and collective security" (Viotti, 2011). The paper also goes on reiterating "the importance of preventive measures and actions taken under the auspices of the second pillar" (Almeida, 2014, p. 45). The letter also highlights that,

(d) The authorization for the use of force must be limited in its legal, operational and temporal elements and the scope of military action must abide by the letter and the spirit of the mandate conferred by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and
be carried out in strict conformity with international law, in particular international humanitarian law and the international law of armed conflict (Viotti, 2011).

While this letter might be interpreted as an illustration of Brazil's intention to confront the established decision-making structures of the United Nations Security Council, from a legal point of view, Österdahl (2013) suggests that "most of what Brazil seems to strive for by its letter to the UN could be achieved through the careful implementation of the existing law" (p. 485). He argues that what Brazil alluded to as 'Responsibility while Protecting' in its letter to the UN is presumably the duty to protect already present in International Humanitarian Law (IHL). But he also notes that, to some extent, Brazil's proposal for a review of the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect' with an emphasis on the role and the responsibility of the parties involved to protect during the process of intervention fundamentally challenges the normative framework by distinguishing the legitimacy of an intervention and the legislation regulating the behavior of actors after the intervention. According to Österdahl, "Brazil advertently or inadvertently mixes aspects of the jus ad bellum relating to the justifications of military intervention with aspects of the jus in bello relating to the way the intervention is carried out" (Österdahl, 2013, p.460). One of the problems with the "erosion of the separation principle" could be the discouragement of "desirable wars" and the encouragement of "undesirable wars", as "the jus in bello steers the jus ad bellum" (Österdahl, 2013, p. 473).

The United States and some European countries have not been very welcoming about the RwP, justifying their dismissive response on the basis that the Brazilian initiative was "an attempt to delay or block interventions that were necessary to prevent mass atrocities" (Almeida, 2014, p. 61). Brazil and other BRICS (Russia, India, China, South Africa) countries have been accused of using their global influence in a disruptive way, instead of using it to stop the bloodshed in Syria, for example, and by joining the great powers in their
decisions with regards to the reestablishment of stability and maintenance of international peace and security. Susan Rice, the United States ambassador to the United Nations, declared that her country was 'not encouraged' by the performance of the IBSA group (India, Brazil, and South Africa) during their temporary tenure on the Security Council, and she threatened to block their acquisition of a permanent seat on the Security Council (Gaouette, 2011). Brazil, India, and South Africa insisted on diplomatic measures in dealing with oppressive regimes while serving two-year temporary terms on the Security Council. For Susan Rice, this position "might not have [been] anticipated, given that each of them come out of strong and proud democratic traditions" (Gaouette, 2011).

Asked about the elusiveness and controversies around the idea of RwP, Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in August 2012 that Brazilian diplomats had no intention to improve the concept or to clarify it for the international community. To do so would feel as if Brazil was seeking "to impose a solution [instead of garnering] the opinions of other countries with respect to its proposal, and to rebuild consensus around situations involving RtoP” (Almeida, 2014, p.63). Azevov (2013) suggests that "Brazil is likely to opt for less open advocacy for RwP so that the concept can be embraced as a global rather than a Brazilian concept" (p.165).

The proposal contains a number of elements that deserve attention. First, the space for speaking of a new doctrine was enabled by the recognition that Brazil had reached an international position from which it now could and should be heard. Second, the proposal was not well received because, among other things, it disarticulated the norms according to which the different spaces constituting the inter-national are managed. And finally, this case also illustrates the obstructions faced by those who aim to instigate a ‘global’ discussion from a locus of enunciation that is still perceived as ‘local’. The ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ is invariably seen as a Brazilian initiative, while many other perceptions and concepts dealing
with the organization, the design, and the monitoring of the ‘international space’ are expressed from abstract ‘globalized’ positions.

In this section, the point was not to discuss the usefulness or potentiality of the new doctrine proposed by Brazilian diplomats, but rather to explore another instance of ‘Brazil’s big moment’ that exposes common assumptions regarding the incompleteness and inadequacy of the country when facing the conditions for existing as a global leader. Going back to the examination of the realist ontology at the beginning of this chapter, one could argue that, under these circumstances, before Brazil is accepted and recognized as an actor that is ready to be a member of the club of great powers and to take responsibility for the safeguarding of the international order, it needs first to fill its own sovereign space (the temporal container) with history and progress before it (as a representation and a possibility) can spill over to other international spaces. In this case, the logic of Brazil’s national motto is inverted to ‘progress and order’. The problem is that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, ‘progress’ is likely to become a prophecy, and one that is constantly postponed, as great powers never cease to accumulate history and to shift the point at which the future may be reached.

**Challenging and Reproducing the Spaces for the Future**

This chapter has analyzed the participation of Brazil in practices of production of the international space. It was not meant to discuss Brazil’s ‘worthiness’ with regards to obtaining a greater position in international security. Instead, it has explored the temporal trajectories and spatial structures that have been confronted and reproduced through Brazil’s quest for more power and visibility. By aspiring to a greater position, Brazilian policy-makers have expressed their willingness to conform to a number of criteria that have defined the path to the ‘global stage’, while also attempting to bring Brazil’s unique self-representation and
principles to the negotiating table. For example, Brazil adopted the notion of non-indifference and led the mission of stabilization in Haiti, but it also tried to avoid the unpopularity that comes with intervening in sovereign countries by representing itself as a neighbor who was offering solidarity. By insisting in south-south cooperation and solidarity, and resisting a more hierarchical top-down approach to sovereignty, Brazil is nonetheless seen with suspicion by those who judge its capability to assume greater responsibility as a global player.

The price that a 'good candidate' would have to pay to be accepted into the UNSC may thus be the abandonment of spatial and temporal politics associated with 'third worldism' and the acceptance of the principle of political hierarchy as a given. For example, McDonald and Patrick (2010) recommend that "developing countries elevated to positions of authority [...] seriously weigh their responsibilities for global security, abandoning the aspects of G77 and NAM diplomacy that often turn the UNGA into a circus" (p.19). As expressed in McDonald and Patrick’s words, claims for a rearticulation of the international ‘order’ coming from these groups of developing countries are often depicted as signs of immaturity and illegitimacy. In his inaugural address to the UNGA in September 2009, President Obama stated that:

the traditional division between nations of the South and the North makes no sense in an interconnected world; nor do alignments rooted in the cleavages of a long-gone Cold War. The time has come to realize that the old habits, the old arguments, are irrelevant to the challenges faced by our people (Obama, 2009).

The denial of this division between 'South' and 'North' could become an argument against the self-image as a leader from the Global South that Brazil has reinforced in the international arena. The country has used its 'southern' identity to form coalitions and strengthen its relations with other developing countries, sometimes against the perceived
position of those in the north. Even though the divisions between the global North and the
global South are increasingly blurred, Lula started a campaign since he was elected in 2002
that involved 'southern' pride and self-confidence, something which I explored more
extensively in the chapter 2.

Brazil is defining new terms for its participation in the restoration and/or maintenance
of global peace and security, showing the problems and obstacles that the UNSC faces
because of its frozen structure, and offering new approaches to peace operations. However,
Brazil is regarded as not suitable for participating in the decision-making processes as a
permanent member with veto power when it depicts itself as a country of the 'global South'
with a unique discourse. Brazil's "ability to broker and deliver global solutions to
transnational threats" (p.9) is contested, as illustrated by the reaction of the great powers
against the RwP, or by the silence regarding Brazil’s successes in the leadership of
MINUSTAH. But while Brazil confronts this resistance against its projection onto the global
stage, the fact that Brazil and others continue to perceive the permanent seat at the United
Nations Security Council as a marker of status, authority, and prestige reinforces the
perception of the UNSC as a relevant and legitimate organ. McDonald and Patrick (2010)
highlight the fact that

every October, the UNGA is filled to capacity when delegations elect the new rotating
UNSC members amid an orgy of vote-buying. Even countries that make a profession
of attacking the UNSC’s credibility nonetheless spend millions trying to gain a seat—
suggesting that, at a minimum, it retains prestige" (p.8).

Whether Brazil is a good candidate or not for a permanent seat at the United Nations
Security Council is not my concern in this chapter. Rather, I have been concerned with the
combination of this desire to be a 'global player' and the practices, institutionalized or not,
that define the path from 'here' to 'there', or from 'mediocrity' to 'grandiosity'. It is a path that
might seem so obviously colonizing and yet so naturally reproduced. It is path that requires
the acceptance that a global player needs to become a great container of progress and history in order to expand its agenda and to get involved in the designing of other societies' 'right' trajectories in time and space so that they too can become full containers of the right kind of history.

The ontology reproduced by these practices geared towards the maintenance of the international 'order' reinforces the necessity of sovereignty "enabled through a set of distinctions, a production of identity and difference" (Shaw, 2004, p.10). It is easy to see how the expectation of a certain trajectory is naturalized when we look at the justifications for international intervention, and the interpretation of ‘failed states’ as ‘empty shells’ (Lemay-Hébert, 2012), as if any movements, interactions, or structures deviating from the 'right’ order and or the right temporal trajectory did not count as history. For Shaw (2004), these distinctions function to exclude a range of different cosmologies, peoples, behaviors, and so on. More crucially, the ontology of sovereignty effectively naturalizes these exclusions, producing all of "us" as essentially the same, with "differences" located either spatially (in another sovereign community) or temporally (as savages, children, animals) (p.10).

Even in its 'incompleteness' exposed by the encounter with the Haitian people, Brazil, in its official discourses and representations, has adopted what has also become a common ontology among specialists and policymakers in South America since the 1970s. In this context, questioning the centrality of the state as the referent ‘object’ of security and the major ‘actor’ of international security is not permitted (Herz, 2010, p.602). In these configurations, the distribution of power between states is a crucial and nonnegotiable element. By buying into these discourses and practices for securing the boundaries and limiting the expression of different trajectories, the quest for a position as a global player favors the dehistoricization of the men and women whose choices are not aligned with
dominant spatiotemporal doctrines. While the individual who is ‘integrated’ into world history "realizes that he not only ‘has history’ all around him, but is himself, in his own historicity, that by means of which a history of human life, a history of economics, and a history of languages are given their form" (Foucault, 2002, p.403), not all men and women become themselves historical. This is so because

since time comes to him from somewhere other than himself, he constitutes himself as a subject of history only by the superimposition of the history of living beings, the history of things, and the history of words. He is subjected to the pure events those histories contain (Foucault, 2002, p.403).

History here is a matter of position, of which place one occupies. While the historical man finds himself operating in an abstract global space, other histories are developed in relation to their capability to transform their own spatial trajectories accordingly. Massey (2005) argues that

space conquers time by being set up as the representation of history/life/the real world. On this reading space is an order imposed upon the inherent life of the real. (Spatial) order obliterates (temporal) dislocation. Spatial immobility quietens temporal becoming. It is, though, the most dismal of pyrrhic victories. For in the very moment of its conquering triumph 'space' is reduced to stasis. The very life, and certainly the politics, are taken out of it (p.30)

This 'fixing of temporality' within spatial categories, according to Walker (1993), "has been [...] crucial in the construction of the most influential traditions of Western philosophy and socio-political thought" (p.4), particularly to the degree that "modern accounts of history and temporality have been guided by attempts to capture the passing moment within a spatial order" (p. 4-5). What this means, Massey argues (2005), is that "if time is to be open to a future of the new then space cannot be equated with the closures and horizontalities of representation" (59). She explains that "if time is to be open then space must be open too. Conceptualising space as open, multiple and relational, unfinished and always becoming, is a
prerequisite for history to be open and thus a prerequisite, too, for the possibility of politics (Massey, 2005, p.59).

In the context of 'global peace and security', Brazil seems to not qualify for being cast in a major role, particularly when it presents itself as vulnerable, solidary, or anything ‘other’ than a self-assured strong power who is ready to intervene and restore order. Even though Brazil is recognized for its active engagement in United Nations' activities, from peace operations to a greater participation in UN agencies, in the hyper-masculinized domain of 'global peace and security', there is no space for a player like Brazil who could, at the most, offer a hand to a neighbor as a brother, but not as a disciplining and protective father. Brazil’s perceived ‘incompleteness’ seems to place the country in a middle ground position between the masculine archetype of giver and the feminine archetype of receiver. While Brazil positioned itself as an actor who was able to take over the leadership in an international mission, its self-representation as a leader of the third world whose own struggles inform its perspective on issues related to the production of the international space seems to disqualify the country as a strong candidate to have a voice in the club of great powers. This also shows us how ‘receiving’ in global politics is still stigmatized as a sign of vulnerability.

Developed countries are seen as established sovereign states, representing containers filled with accumulated history, which further allows them to transcend their own spatial boundaries. An international division of labor between givers and receivers (of knowledge, discipline, material resources, etc.) is strongly implied. This understanding is not only conditioned by a realist ontology, but it also becomes the condition of possibility for

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24 For some feminists, the inclusion of women in peace operations and the operationalization of international security do not change the fact that the structure itself is gendered. Sjoberg and Gentry (2007, p.174) argue that we need to challenge, not the mainstream, but the malestream, the dysfunctional masculine ways of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, including the ways in which givers and receivers are classified and hierarchized.

25 Even when attempting to criticize the dominant catechism, many scholars fail to question the relationship between vulnerable people and vulnerable states, concluding that the solution is to 'strengthen the state'. See, for instance, (Brooley & Anderson, 2012).
progress. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, the measurement of progress or development is only possible when a particular order is established within which individualized units are positioned in relation to each other and compared to a certain point of the progressive trajectory. As Vivienne Jabri (2013) notes,

the construction of the [...] state in both perspectives [liberal and realist] is based on conceptual schema that do not derive from local understandings and local interpretations of what it means to engage in international politics, in the constitution of international order, or the form that such order should take (p.108).

Given the implications of fitting spaces into pre-established categories and trajectories, Shaw (2004) reminds us that

critical scholarship cannot afford either to take a specific account of what sovereignty must be as an unquestioned assumption or to assume that we can simply ignore the mutually constitutive relationship between what counts as authority in relation to the state and what counts as authority in relation to knowledge about the state or relations among states (Shaw, 2004, p.17).

But more important than questioning whether the repositioning of Brazil is justified or not, or whether it has the capability of assuming a different role, is to recognize that these investigations have departed from a congealed (his)tory about order, not necessarily as the basis for progress, but an order that is legitimized as being the result of accumulated ‘history’. Any destabilization of this current order, whereby states compete with each other to decide who will be able to forcefully write more history over space, would require the emptying of these containers to such an extent that these spaces would be open to their own vulnerability again. As Beattie and Schick (2013) argue,

vulnerability is an important pedagogical tool to the extend that it can contribute to making an opening in which the white-Western subject might begin to feel 'all the radiation' emanating from the 'spaces of the world' beyond its narcissism (Beattie & Schick, 2013, p.141)
After the examination of the conditions for Brazil’s emergence to the global stage and to the future in relation to the concepts of Progress and Order in the last two chapters, the next chapter explores a different aspect of ‘sovereignty’ revealed by the rearticulation of boundaries within the state as Brazil celebrated the selection of the country and of Rio de Janeiro as the hosts of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympics.
Chapter 4
Brazil Hosts the World Cup and the Olympics: Sports Mega-events as Trampolines to the Future?

*I hear the storm. They talk to me about progress, about "achievements," diseases cured, improved standards of living. I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out.*

(Césaire, 1972, p.6)

Brazil hosted the World Cup for the second time in 2014, and it will be the host of the Summer Olympic and Paralympic games in August 2016. These events are not only seen as opportunities for Brazil to promote a representation of the country as a global player, but also as a challenge, since hosting these events put Brazil on the spotlight, what can potentially reveal some contradictions between a representation of Brazil as a country arriving at the future and assuming a greater role in global politics, and a multiplicity of different temporal trajectories and spatial realities within the country that do not fit into that particular spatiotemporal direction. In this chapter, I analyze how sports mega events have become, discursively, a major spring board for a space and a time where and when recognition and visibility will be realized. But, most importantly, I explore the ways in which the election of host countries and host cities in the ‘developing’ world for sports mega events allow us to discuss the boundaries between ‘here’ and ‘there’ that are inscribed onto bodies that subsequently need to be properly placed and disciplined. This is primarily a chapter about temporal and spatial boundaries between the international and its ‘other’, boundaries between those who are made visible and placed under the spotlight of these highly regarded international events, and those who are not. A closer look at these discourses and practices invites us to “pay greater attention both to contemporary patterns of inclusion and exclusion and to a wide range of historical and structural tendencies now forcing us to rethink our fundamental assumptions about universality and difference” (Walker, 1999, p.151). In this
analysis, I depart from the assumption that we need “a lot more analysis of what boundaries and limits do, and a lot more analysis of what happens at those sites in space and in time where the modern political imagination has come to believe that hardly anything happens at all” (Walker, 2006, p.57). As Walker (2006) points out,

> Clichés of presence and absence only detract from our capacity to make sense of the increasing complexity, the spatiotemporal disarticulation and rearticulation, of borders, limits, practices of inclusion and exclusion and declaration of exceptions. We need to pay greater attention to the transformation of borders, and to be more sensitive to the relatively limited vocabulary and conceptual resources through which we try to make sense of our contemporary limitations (Walker, 2006, p.57).

In the first section of the chapter, I examine the process through which Brazil became the host country for the World Cup and Rio de Janeiro became the host city for the 2016 Summer Olympic and Paralympic games, and I look at the predominant interpretations that have been given of such ‘unique and historical’ opportunities. In the second section, I analyze at the role that sports have progressively played in programs, projects, and initiatives involving Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs), national governments, and other political actors, particularly projects geared towards conflict resolution, the promotion of human rights, and development in general. The third section is an exploration of the ‘legacy’ of the sports mega events in Brazil and of the role of these events in the legitimation of disciplinary practices. Here, I also explore the transformations and uses of the notion of ‘political space’. In contrast to the analysis in chapter 3, in which I focused on the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion articulated by a boundary between inside and outside shaped by the concept of sovereignty, this chapter looks more carefully at the way in which the idea of ‘international citizenship’ and Lula’s claim that Brazil has entered the category of first-class citizen imply a distribution of the good, the bad, and the ugly that is no longer a matter of an inside/outside dynamic as we ‘zoom in’ on the rearticulation of spaces and time within the state itself. Lastly, before
reaching a conclusion in this chapter, I examine the possibilities for debating disciplining practices towards the reformation of bodies around the notion of a ‘good international citizen’ in relation to rearrangements of space and time that they impose, and I discuss the effects of the dominant requirements for existence in the international space that are revealed when certain bodies fail to subject themselves to the state security apparatus and to mechanisms of subjectification.

Mega Events as Trampolines to the Global Stage

In 2008, one year after the Pan American Games in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil initiated, for the third time, a formal bidding process to host the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The International Olympic Committee received seven bids for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, from Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Tokyo (Japan), Chicago (USA), Madrid (Spain), Prague (Czech Republic), Baku (Azerbaijan), and Doha (Qatar). For the first time, Brazil went into the second round (IOC, 2008). In the 121st IOC session in Copenhagen, IOC president Jacques Rogge announced Rio de Janeiro as the host of the 2016 Olympics after beating in three rounds of voting Chicago, Tokyo, and Madrid, in this order (De Almeida et al., 2014, p. 277).

In 2009, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s president at the time, was in tears celebrating in Copenhagen the selection of Rio de Janeiro as the host city. When asked by reporters what that moment represented, given the fact that Brazil won the right to host the event with 66 votes against only 32 for Madrid, Lula said:

They could see in our eyes that we were the only ones that really wanted to do this. We put our hearts and souls in it. For them it would just be another one. Today is a day for celebration, because Brazil has left behind the level of second-class countries and entered the ranks of first-class countries. Respect is good, and we like to be respected. Today we earned respect. Reason, passion, and truth prevailed. Brazil deserved to host the Olympic games. The world finally recognized that this is the time
for Brazil. […] Brazil conquered its ‘absolute’ citizenship. The world no longer doubts the grandiosity of the country (Lula, 2009).

The election brought the Olympic games to South America for the first time, the second time to Latin America, and the third time to the southern hemisphere. It was also the first time the same country would organize the Olympic games and the football World Cup concurrently (De Pieri & Del Río, 2009, p.21). Lula’s statement and the reaction of other politicians and thousands of Brazilian citizens anxiously awaiting the results at Copacabana beach suggest that the final selection of Rio de Janeiro as the host of the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic games in 2016 meant more than simply the right to organize a mega event. The ‘victory’ of Brazil was considered by many “a victory for Brazilian self-esteem, as defeating other global powers in the bid process had a symbolic meaning” (De Almeida et al., 2014, p.277). In the press conference after the selection of Rio, President Lula added: “I’m sorry for being happy and you [President Obama, President Zapatero, and Prime Minister Hatoyama] sad, but you were happy and we were sad many times. We are allowed to be happy today and you added value to our dispute” (quoted in De Almeida et al., 2014, p.277).

Defined as “large-scale cultural […] events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance” (Roche, 2000, p.1), sports mega events, such as Olympic and Paralympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, are often recognized as important instruments of foreign policy, trampolines for a future of visibility and recognition on the global stage. According to this view, these events offer Brazil the possibility “to reinforce and establish new multilateral relations, to reflect economic and political conquests in both the domestic and global level through these international platforms, to promote peace through sport and to present Brazil as a leading representative of South America” (De Almeida et al., 2014, p.280). In addition to “institutional discourses and profits”, mega events are also seen by the host cities and countries as opportunities to improve their image (Black
& van der Westhuizen, 2004; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006, Zirin, 2014), and they enable “these countries to symbolically challenge the traditional global order and identify themselves as representatives of wider emerging territories or cultures” (De Almeida et al., 2014, p.272; Cornelissen, 2004; Desai & Vahed, 2010; Hiller, 2000). The host countries are granted the space, due to the large-scale nature of these events, to represent themselves on the global stage as “part of the solution”, as was expressed by Lula on another occasion:

Overcoming difficulties is the mark of the recent history of Brazil and the trajectory of millions of Brazilians. I have just participated at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh, where it was drawn by consensus a new economic global map. This map recognizes the importance of rising powers as Brazil in the global scenario and, moreover, in overcoming the financial crisis. I am proud, as Brazilian, to be engaged in this process and to see Brazil as part of the solution (Silva, 2009, quoted in De Almeida et al., 2014, p.279).

As expressed by Gareth Evans in his famous address on Foreign Policy and Good International Citizenship in 1990, there are both ‘obligations and benefits’ associated with one’s position of ‘good international citizen’, with the most basic obligation being “to ensure that [one’s] own house is in order before [one] raise issues on the international scene. Credibility is, simply, the most important asset a country can have in the pursuit of good international citizenship” (Evans, 1990). Similar to what was seen in Chapter 3 in relation to Brazil’s participation as an actor of international security, the assumption here is that one’s projection onto the international stage requires credibility, and credibility comes with the proper ‘ordering’ of one’s house.

In the first pages of the application dossier, the bidding committee for Rio de Janeiro expresses its commitment “to building a games legacy with the IOC [International Olympic Committee] and IPC [International Paralympic Committee] which transcends Brazil and will extend across the globe” (Candidature Committee, 2009, p.12). The document adds that “the opportunity presented by an inaugural Olympic and Paralympic Games in South America is
truly historic and unique” (Candidature Committee, 2009, p.12). For Brazil, “with a robust economy even in the current global economic climate, the Games will bring worldwide recognition as well as a tangible sporting legacy that is already being developed” (Candidature Committee, 2009, p.19). However, it is not only an opportunity, but also a challenge for mega events hosts to deal with “past image or how to present culture, values and politics accepted by an international audience“ (De Almeida et al., 2014, p.274). This mix of pride and hope is well articulated in the way the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro were named by the bidding committee the ‘Games of Celebration and Transformation’. The transformation is planned according to five key strategies: engagement of young people; social transformation through sport; regional outreach; global promotion; and successful delivery (Comitê de Candidatura, 2009, p.21).

For commentators around the world, “Brazil is at a critical juncture”, and it should take advantage of this unique opportunity to “renew its approach to urban development” (He, 2012, p.10). He argues that “the political momentum created by the 2016 Olympics has truly created a much needed ‘Olympic Opportunity’ for the development and implementation of proactive, vigorous urban development policies” that can bring “sustainable and inclusive development for all of its metropolitan areas“ (He, 2012, p.10).

The selection of Brazil to host the FIFA World Cup was not the outcome of a competitive bidding process as it was the case with the selection of Rio to host the Olympics, but this did not mean the World Cup was taken for granted by Brazilian officials. The selection of Brazil to host the World Cup was also seen as a great opportunity and equally celebrated. Brazil was the only one bidding to host the 2014 tournament, after Colombia’s withdrawal, and because of FIFA’s rotation system that established 2014 as the year of South America. However, FIFA former president Joseph S. Blatter argued that the same requirements and conditions were rigorously applied in the process even with one candidate
(FIFA, 2007). According to him, after announcing Brazil as the host, “there was an extraordinary presentation by the [Brazilian] delegation and they [the committee evaluating the bid] witnessed that this world cup will have such a big social and cultural impact in Brazil” (FIFA, 2007). De Onis notes about the World Cup that “the event was political from the onset, its significance potentially going well beyond the results on the playing fields where Brazil has won the world championship a record five times, a source of great national pride” (De Onis, 2014, p.51).

This was the second time Brazil hosted the World Cup. When the country was selected for the first time as the host of the World Cup in 1948, it was also the only candidate. Germany was prohibited from participating, and FIFA had just decided to resume the competition after the end of World War II (Fraga, 2000, p.150). Even though the literature that situates the analysis at the intersection between sports and foreign policy is relatively new, the translation of mega events into platforms for greater visibility has always been an issue. Brazil had only two years to prepare for the 1950 tournament, and during this time, it constructed the largest stadium that existed at that moment in history, the Maracanã in Rio (Vinton, 2011, p.7). According to Fraga (2000), the messages circulating in 1950 amongst the different spheres involved in the organization and evaluation of the mega event suggested the predominant understanding that the presence of reporters from different nationalities in Brazil had the potential to “materialize the construction of such an image of modernity and civility of the nation” (p.151). In this context, victory would be only one amongst many other goals. Some expected results from the World Cup in 1950 were to be “civility, organization, urbanization – modernity” (Fraga, 2000, p.151). To host any world cup game was seen as “to enter the map, being in the spotlight inside and outside the boundaries of the state”, and for this reason, many cities disputed the right to host one of the games and gain national popularity and recognition (Fraga, 2000, p.151).
More than sixty years later, in an era when images circulate at a different speed and through other media that were not available in 1950, analysts, politicians, and bidding committees (World Cup and Olympics) are still emphasizing very similar reasons for why Brazil should celebrate being in the spotlight again. But they are also aware that the chances are high that internal contradictions between representation and social realities could not remain hidden from international audiences. Even though the opportunity to host both mega events was interpreted “as a means to promote Brazil’s rising status as an emerging power” (Sampaio, 2014, p.107), what became obvious, especially since the protests in 2013, was that the preparation for those events was intensifying the gap between an official narrative about transformations of a rising state and what the discursive transformations inspired by the way Brazil positioned itself in space and time were doing to Brazilian society. According to Simões,

On the one hand, events such as the World Cup and the pope’s triumphant visit in 2013 have put Brazil at the center of the world stage and allowed the country to showcase its economic growth and modern technological achievements, clearly bolstering its image internationally as the emerging power it has always known itself to be. […] It was hoped that Brazil’s hosting the World Cup and the Olympic Games would further cement its international status. On the other hand, the preparation for the World Cup games has also exposed to the world some of the country’s most pressing though long-standing problems—its intense poverty, violence, income disparities, lack of education, racial tensions, political clientelism, and corruption (Simões, 2014, p.3).

The management of these contradictions (between a representation of Brazil as a country entering the category of ‘first-class country’ and the presence of images and bodies that did not correspond to this classification) was part of the agenda since the beginning. For

26 During the first weeks of June 2013, crowds of protesters went to the streets of several capitals of Brazil. Initially organized against the increase in bus fares in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, it quickly developed into one the largest protests since re-democratization. Issues such as corruption and overspending of the state with the mega events to the detriment of education and health inspired slogans in the streets of Brazil. Demonstrations also pressurred the government for more accountability in relation to the removal of low-income houses for the construction of football stadiums for the FIFA World Cup. See: Brancoli, F. L., & Rodrigues, T. (2013). A Brazilian Spring? No, not really. Ideas – International Affairs – London School of Economics, v.1. Retrieved from http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2013/07/a-brazilian-spring-no-not-really/
Resende (2000), the decision to compete for the right to host these sports mega events required an effort on the part of Itamaraty, Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to influence the process through which the image of Brazil promoted by these events and the actions to be taken in order for that image to reverberate internationally would be defined (p.40). The main intention was to represent Brazil as an established democracy with a sustainable economic growth (De Almeida et al., 2014, p.279). In the next section, I situate the analysis of sports mega events within a larger context, explored by an emerging literature, of the relationship between sports and politics, and more specifically, of the deployment of sports as tools of global disciplinary mechanisms and practices.

**Sports, Performance, and Discipline**

The 2008 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games seem to have inaugurated an era in which the mega sports events are increasingly hosted by cities and countries that are located not only in different geographical territories from what has traditionally been the case, but also in regions often categorized as being part of a ‘developing’ or ‘emerging’ world, such as South Africa (FIFA, 2010), Brazil (FIFA, 2014; Summer Olympic/Paralympics, 2016), Russia (FIFA, 2018; Winter Olympics/Paralympics, 2014), and Qatar (FIFA, 2022). Why are these mega events going to these allegedly new regions? The official discourse suggests that the sports organizing bodies are looking for “diversification, democracy, and equality” (De Almeida et. al, 2014, p.272). The idea is to offer the host cities and countries, as suggested above, the opportunity to “get into the map” and to gain a higher status in international politics. However, scholars are increasingly interested in sports “becoming central to the issue of determining the outcome of international power struggles, of who gets what, when and how” (Jarvie, 2006, p.66). Those engaged in this kind of analysis may be divided into

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27 Since 1896, out of 27 editions of the Summer Olympics, 22 were held in Europe or North America. But the point analysts have emphasized about this tendency is that hosting sports mega events have been recently seen and discussed more explicitly as a ticket to the global stage.
two broad schools of thought that focus on:

(i) politics in sport which direct our attention to the use made by governments of sport and the process by which public policy is made and implemented and (ii) politics in sport which lead to a consideration of issues concerned with the way in which sports organisations use power to pursue their own sectional interests at the expense of other social groups (Jarvie, 2006, p.66).

But there are also those who associate these changes with a broader inclusion of sports in the international political agenda as an instrument of transformation and development. Zanotti et al. (2015) argue, for instance, that “the growing interest in sport as a peacebuilding strategy through ‘bottom–up’ transformation of conflict societies can be understood as part of an intensification of the biopolitical and disciplinary trajectories of the liberal peace” (Zanotti et al., 2015, p.187).

Development and sport are now appearing together in a number of documents produced by international organizations. In October 1993, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/48/10, which recognized that “the goal of the Olympic Movement is to build a peaceful and better world by educating the youth of the world through sport and culture” (UNGA, 1993, p.1). In this same resolution, 1994 was proclaimed International Year of Sport and the Olympic Ideal (UNGA, 1993, p.2). A number of resolutions were adopted from 1997 to 2003, all titled “Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic Ideal”, and urging the member states to observe the Olympic truce throughout the duration of the games. Since 2003, another series of resolutions have been adopted with the title of “Sport as a means to promote education, health, development and peace” (UNOSDP, 2015). Following this movement, 2005 was proclaimed, through Resolution A/RES/58/5 adopted in 2003, the International Year of Sport and Physical Education (IYSPE 2005). In this resolution, the General Assembly declared that “sport and physical education in many countries face increasing marginalization within education
systems even though they are a major tool not only for health and physical development but also for acquiring values necessary for social cohesion and intercultural dialogue” (UNGA, 2003, p.2). For that reason, it includes “sport and physical education as a tool to contribute towards achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration and the broader aims of development and peace” (UNGA, 2003, p.2).

The emphasis on the potential role of sport in civil society, which includes partnerships, social development, social cohesion, coordination, sharing of knowledge and expertise, according to Coalter (2010), “reflects a broader shift in the ‘aid paradigm’” (p.1376). This new aid paradigm is illustrated not only by the United Nations’ inclusion of sport in its agenda for conflict resolution, but also “in the World Bank’s increased emphasis on the potential of social capital, community and social relations to contribute to various types of social development and economic growth” (Coalter, 2010, p.1376). For Zanotti at al. (2015), the emphasis on sport is part of a gradual shift in the notion of security from its attachment to territory to its attachment to ‘people’ as the “primary target of protection as well as a potential source of threat and instability” (p.187). As a result, Zanotti and her colleagues note that national populations emerged as the central focus of international initiatives. In this framework United Nations and European Union officials now saw changing the way people lived together and seeking ways and means to provide opportunities for them to shift their behaviors as indispensable for realizing peace and as a necessary complement to reforming institutions (Zanotti et al., 2015, p.187).

The position of Special Advisor on Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) to the United Nations Secretary-General was created in 2001, formalizing and legitimizing the newfound status of sport “as an accepted intervention” (Zanotti et al., 2015, p.188). Following the creation of the position of Special Advisor, the UN formed an Inter-Agency
Task Force on SDP in 2002 and established the SDP International Working Group in 2004 (Zanotti et al., 2015, p.188; Beutler, 2008). Various other organizations, including International non-governmental organizations (INGOs), national governments, and major corporations, have since joined the cause. Among these organizations are the Right to Play, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and International Paralympic Committee (IPC). Zanotti et al. (2015) also note that the "sportanddev.org, the International Platform on Sport and Development, serves an on-line networking function connecting various individuals and organizations from across the world with an interest in the topic” (p.188).

In the latest resolution (A/Res/70/4) archived at the UNOSDP website, and adopted in October 2015, the General Assembly discusses the upcoming 2016 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games, and it acknowledges:

the joint endeavors of the International Olympic Committee, the International Paralympic Committee, the United Nations Office on Sport for Development and Peace and relevant United Nations entities in such fields as the promotion of human rights, human development, poverty alleviation, humanitarian assistance, health promotion, HIV and AIDS prevention, child and youth education, gender equality, peacebuilding and sustainable development (UNGA, 2015, p.2).

To date, the impact of sport on all these spheres of social life has not been clearly assessed (Zanotti et al., 2015, p.189). For some scholars, the inclusion of sports in agendas of foreign policy and developmental programs justifies the imposition of “a neo-liberal paradigm on countries and/or populations that do not fit the definition of ‘developed’” (Zanotti et al., 2015, p.189). In relation to how impact, or ‘legacy’, is measured, some studies have suggested that “sport for development and peace is part of a ‘hegemonic discourse’ that calls for evidence, firmly entrenched in a positivist scientific paradigm, which dismisses alternate forms of knowledge” (Zanotti et al., 2015, p.189; Darnell, 2010, p.71).
It is worth remembering that Brazil’s participation in the United Nations stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) started with the promotion and the realization of the ‘match for peace’ in Port-au-Prince, a friendly football match between an acclaimed Brazilian soccer team and Haitian soccer team, which took place on August 18, 2004. A cheery crowd of Brazilian football fans in Haiti received Lula, Ronaldinho, and other Brazilian players, who appeared publicly in armored vehicles of the UN in what was perceived as a day in which Brazil brought Haiti a ‘joyful respite’ from the domestic turmoil (Sullivan, 2004). Lula told the reporters in Brazil after the game that “[Brazil] want[ed] to show the world that not everything demands cannons, machine guns and weapons of mass destruction. Sometimes affectionate gestures are worth more than certain wars” (quoted in Sullivan, 2004).

With regard to the body of work engaged in debates over “the social and political meanings articulated through sport”, Jarvie argues that “the major contribution […] was due the recognition of and priority given to the sport, power and culture problematic, and that the politics of sport could not be simply limited to analysis of government and policy intervention into sport” (Jarvie, 2006, p.69). In this context, it is interesting to observe that sports mega events are being hosted in countries and cities in which the narratives and debates over the capacity to organize and deliver the event are marked by assumptions and reasoning mechanisms that resemble a sort of “environmental determinism”, defined by Coalter (2013) as the “assumption that deprived societies inevitably produce deficient people” (p.3). The impact of sports mega events on the so-called ‘developing’ societies varies over space, time, and between groups. Jarvie (2006) notes that

even within many international sporting cities or places where mega sporting events are held, certain neighborhoods within these cities or places where poverty or disadvantage prevail will, at one level, remain peripheral to the event itself and, at another level, to the working of the international sporting economy (p.95).

Jarvie (2006) makes an interesting observation that “global forces and many
international sports bypass many people and places” (p.95). On the other hand, it is also a pervasive force that runs through many sectors of society, and this is especially the case in those societies hosting sports mega events, where there is often a concern with the ‘reforms’ that are required for the sake of pleasing a demanding international audience, or, perhaps, for the sake of earning a ticket to the global stage and to become a relevant player with a special place in the ‘map’ and in ‘history’. These reforms are not reforms exclusively addressing territory or physical space, but also reforms at the level of bodies. According to the definition of discipline provided by Zanotti et al. (2015), these are “techniques by which individuals are brought to behave according to desired norms” (p.194). For Shapiro (1989b), reminding us that “most sporting events had their origin in military engagement or at least military-training activities” (p.80),

it is the case that the present structure of sports discourse is an authority-reinforcing practice that, in its effect in constituting identities — sports virtuosos, spectators, amateurs, professionals — as well as activities thought of as sporting versus non-sporting, participates in the discursive economies that create and orient us to modern social and political reality (p.79-80).

In this scenario, “international competition in the Olympic Games and World Cup Soccer Championships evoke deeply rooted aspects of international competition” (Shapiro, 1989b, p.84). However, as Foucault noted, it is no longer a matter of “bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor” (Foucault, 1978, p.144). In the next section, I examine how the sports mega events become a strategy for the establishment of emerging economies as global players through the disciplining of space and the control over temporal trajectories in these host societies.
Sovereignty, Bodies, Spaces

Walker (1999) defines sovereignty as “a claim to particularity that can be meaningful only in relation to something more general. This something more general, of course, is open to various practices of naming: […], the society of states, modernity, and the United Nations Charter …” (p.154-155). Brazil, in its quest to show the world that it ‘deserves’ respect, necessarily defines itself in relation to an idea of the international, or the ‘global stage’. Aiming to have a place on this stage, the objectives of Brazilian Foreign Policy in relation to the World Cup and, mostly, in relation to the Olympic and Paralympic Games too are always designed in relation to the ‘other’ against which ‘Brazil’ would define itself as inadequate. As an illustration of the relational character of Brazil’s self-definition, the bidding committee for Rio de Janeiro defined its objectives in relation to (i) the consolidation of Rio de Janeiro as an international pole of attraction, with the “aim to boost its economic and cultural development according to the molds of the so-called global cities”; (ii) the intention to put forth the urban transformations delineated by the adopted model of urban planning, “inspired by the example of Barcelona” (Toledo et al., 2015, p.26).

The preparation for these events has implied substantial interventions in the physical spaces of the city, altering not only “its uses for the diverse segments and social classes”, but also the flow of people, commodities, services, and capital (Magalhães, 2013, p.98). The security preparations have been informed by the “spatial propinquity between the rich and the poor” (McMichael, 2013, p.330). State Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame has acknowledged that the goal of the pacification programme (a comprehensive program launched in 2008 to “pacify” Rio de Janeiro’s violent favelas by establishing and maintaining

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28 The pacification programme was launched in 2008 and since the occupation of the first favela, Santa Marta, the authorities have occupied another 37 favelas in Rio de Janeiro between 2008 and 2014. The occupation involves the high command of the civil and military police, and in most cases, Brazil’s army and navy. They have used military helicopters and tanks to ‘invade’ and occupy these spaces. Brazilian state sustains its presence in these communities by establishing Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) in the favelas after the occupation. See http://www.upprj.com/index.php/o_que_e_upp for information about the UPPs in Rio de Janeiro.
a sustained police and state presence in the area) is to “protect the most economically productive areas of Rio de Janeiro” (Gaffney, 2012, p.80), thus reinforcing the idea that, in relation to sports mega events, “security is more about appearance and protecting sites of value than about leaving a sustainable public safety legacy” (McMichael, 2013, p.331).

Fernando Gabeira, a politician and onetime guerrilla fighter against the military regime in Brazil, also expressed concern about how violence could affect the image of Brazil: “We have for years cultivated the image of Brazil as a land of cordiality and peace. That is at risk if we don’t bring violence under control during the World Cup” (quoted in De Onis, 2014, p.53).

Security is not only an instrument of or a means for prestige, but in many cases, it has become the end in itself, and even the symbol of state modernity. A ‘world class’ security regime makes use of technology and police measures that are “far greater than that provoked by concerns for human safety or protection of property” (Bernhard & Martin, 20, p.60). José Ricardo Botelho, the Secretary for the Security of Large-Scale Events in Brazil’s Ministry of Justice, declared that technology and integration were extremely important for preemption against terrorists, ‘troublemakers’, and hooligans:

We want to work proactively rather than defensively; hence the importance of technology. We are linking everything so that when a person fitting this profile applies for a visa, for example, we will already have the first barrier in place. But in the case of a country for which an entry visa is not required, when the person gets to our borders he or she will not be allowed into Brazil. But what if he or she does? We are working with state-of-the-art equipment to identify these people. We do not want them among us (quoted in Gusmão, 2011).

Both Brazil and South Africa (who hosted the World Cup in 2010) have used the language of science fiction to describe their deployment of futuristic technology. For example, Military Police officials in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have showcased glasses, with cameras attached to them, that can capture 400 facial images per second and send them
to a central computer database storing up to 13 million faces (Yapp, 2011). The idea is to cross-check these images against a database of criminals. A red signal appears in the device when there is a match. In 2014, during the World Cup, the police uniforms came with gas masks that were actually inspired by Darth Vader, and could protect “against gas, withstands higher temperatures than even the RoboCop suits (up to 1800 degrees Fahrenheit), and has an internal hydration tube and air cleaner, which can be hooked up to an external oxygen source” (Schoon, 2014). As such, “security becomes an issue of aesthetics and a portmanteau term that covers everything from air restrictions and counter-terrorism measures to open-ended projects, enforcing social control and preventing ‘embarrassing’ protests” (McMichael, 2013, p.332). There is a drastic contrast between the official discourse of social cohesion through sport and the highly controlled and disciplined spaces created by and through these mega events.

Comparing the cases of South Africa and Brazil, McMichael (2013) argues that, in both contexts, “security has been used as a statement of intent: the respective states have instrumentalized mega-events as an international platform to signal their ability to secure urban environments” (p.313). McMichael shows that the reality and fear of crime have justified the militarization of public space, ‘zero tolerance’ policing, and the emergence of heavily armed private security industry (McMichael, 2013, p.317). He adds that

in both South Africa and Brazil, the security preparations adopted seem as applicable to urban warfare as the policing of an entertainment event. For instance, the policing of Rio’s narcotics trade is an especially urgent task now that the city will host the Olympics in 2016. Security is a task performed by armed civilian and military police and SWAT [special weapons and tactics] teams, carried by armoured vehicles and high mobility AS.350B2 light helicopters' (McMichael, 2013, p.315).

In this scenario, “sporting bodies and governments converge on governance models that aim at enforcing spatial and social order during tournaments” (McMichael, 2013, p.329). What a closer look at the recent transformations in Brazil’s security apparatus and practices
tells us is that these operations are not exclusively motivated by a preoccupation with the safety of tourists. As McMichael compellingly shows (2013), “security measures in both South Africa and Brazil were undergirded by a diversity of political and economic motivations, especially the goal of signaling the 'global competitiveness' of the host countries as safe environments for business and capital accumulation” (McMichael, 2013, p.316).

In order to create and foster a safe environment for business and capital accumulation in the country during these mega events, Brazil has not hesitated to compromise its legal-institutional structures. Following the demands of sporting bodies like FIFA and IOC, the Brazilian government included in its candidacy dossier that it was willing to change its legislation at the national and municipal levels in order to align its laws with the requirements of the sporting bodies. Some of the laws that were put in place as conditions imposed by FIFA and IOC to host the World Cup and the Olympic and Paralympic games in Brazil were (i) Law 12.035, October 2009; (ii) Law 12.663, June 2012 and (iii) Law 12.462, August 2011 (Toledo et al., 2015, p.29). The General Law of the World Cup (Lei Geral da Copa) allowed the registration of brands and symbols of FIFA events in Brazil, while it criminalized the reproduction, imitation, and falsification, as well as the importation, exportation, sale, and distribution, of any symbols associated with FIFA events. It also became a crime to associate products and services with the 2013 Confederations Cup (a precursor football tournament to the World Cup) or the 2014 World Cup in advertisements without FIFA’s authorization (Toledo et al., 2015, p.30). Even though FIFA had total control over any images and symbols associated with the events hosted in Brazil, the government still had the responsibility and obligation to control, monitor, and punish any violations of FIFA’s rights to intellectual and industrial property (Toledo et al., 2015, p.29).

In 2009, Rio’s City Hall approved through the City Council a law prohibiting unauthorized vendors to work within a 2 km radius from the stadiums, venues of related
events, and accommodations for athletes. Later, Decree 38,367/2014 regulating the World Cup General Law established the “Commercial Restriction Area of Rio de Janeiro” to delineate a 1 km radius surrounding the Maracanã Stadium. In these spaces, only FIFA or people and businesses authorized by the organization could engage in commerce, thus reinforcing the repression of information trading (Popular Committee, 2015, p.57). In relation to the Olympics, a special section of the candidacy dossier in volume 1 confirmed that the Brazilian government intended “to enact and enforce legislation to reduce and sanction ambush marketing and to control indoor/outdoor advertising space and airspace at/near venues, on public transport systems and at airports” (Candidature Committee, 2009, p.53), among other necessary measures that would guarantee that rights to intellectual property would be respected during the games.

The kind of displacement and dispossession that results from these policies implemented by the Brazilian government in the name of the future are not enabled by a form of power that can be “localized in a particular type of institution or state apparatus. For they have recourse to it; they use, select or impose certain of its methods. But, in its mechanisms and its effects, it is situated at a quite different level” (Foucault, 1995, p.26). The field of validity of this micro-physics of power imposed by international sports apparatuses and institutions but enforced by local governments is itself situated “between these great functionings and the bodies themselves with their materiality and their forces” (Foucault, 1995, p.26). In this sense, power is “exercised rather than possessed; it is not the 'privilege', acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions” (Foucault, 1995, p.26).

It is not very helpful, in this context, to base one’s analysis on a “who is doing what to whom” kind of question. FIFA and IOC do not see themselves as politically responsible for what happens in the name of the World Cup and the Olympics. FIFA refused to cooperate
with the UN to ensure that the government would not have recourse to forced evictions in order to host the World Cup, stating that “the Association has nothing to do with the politics of host countries” (McMichael, 2013, p.332). When handed in a letter showing the stories and images of evictions in Rio, co-signed by Amnesty International, the WITNESS (an international nonprofit organization that trains and supports people using videos in their fight for human rights), the World Cup and Olympics Popular Committee, the Popular Council of Rio de Janeiro, and the National Movement for the Right to Habitation, the president of the World Union of Olympic Cities Daniel Brélaz refused to accept it and stated: “this is of no interest to me” (Néri, 2011). It seems easy for the representatives of these organizations, such as FIFA and the IOC, to say that they hold no responsibility, as they represent a ‘sporting body’, and not a ‘political body’. The ‘political body’, in turn, while enforcing the rules, is responding to the requirements imposed by sporting bodies and to the demands from a diffuse and decentralized type of power that goes from controlling urban spaces and enforcing proper behavior to controlling the circulation of images.

The Double Outside

The report compiled by social movements in several of Brazil’s World Cup host cities details some of the ‘legacies’ of the preparations, which included the exploitation of stadium construction workers, the reported death of at least eight workers, and a dramatic increase in evictions. The Brazilian state has been accused of employing strategies of war and persecution in many marginalized neighborhoods and areas of the country by entering homes without judicial authority, misappropriating and destroying personal property, using verbal violence against residents, threatening integrity and family rights, cutting public services, and demolishing and abandoning the ruins of one in every three houses so that neighboring homes overlook scenes of terror (McMichael, 2013, p.329-330).
In the midst of all the narratives that have pointed to the need to modernize, urbanize, monitor, control, discipline, pre-empt, transform, pacify, and improve, we also find in the language that supports notions of urban revitalization, the disappearance of the bodies that are not easily modernized, urbanized, monitored, controlled, disciplined, transformed, pacified, or improved. As Foucault (1995) observed: “the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body” (p.26). Foucault argues that,

this subjection is not only obtained by the instruments of violence or ideology; it can also be direct, physical, pitting force against force, bearing on material elements, and yet without involving violence it may be calculated, organized, technically thought out; it may be subtle, make use neither of weapons nor of terror and yet remain of a physical order. That is to say, there may be a 'knowledge' of the body that is not exactly the science of its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is more than the ability to conquer them: this knowledge and this mastery constitute what might be called the political technology of the body (Foucault, 1995, p.26).

To the extent that some bodies remain invisible, they become legitimizing objects of subjection, while circulating around the limits imposed by mechanisms and practices of subjectification that often characterize the birth of modern democracy. These bodies risk to be buried under the call to move toward the ‘future’ and to go along with the flow of ‘progress’, as the bodies of underpaid workers have been literally buried underneath the wreckage of stadiums when cranes collapsed (Watts, 2013). While it is expected from a docile body that it is going to conform to the norm and will be submitted to whatever practices are regarded as appropriate for bodies occupying the space that is controlled according to an ideal of inclusion and adequacy, there are also bodies that are beyond docility and are deemed disposable for the sake of order and coherence between representation and reality. These bodies represent what Agamben called ‘sacred life’, life “set outside human jurisdiction without being brought into the realm of divine law” (p.82). Under these conditions, sacred life is life that “can not be sacrificed and yet may be killed” (p.82).

In an interview to BBC Brazil, engineer Carlos Carvalho, who owns a great portion of
the land in Barra da Tijuca, embodies the discourses that have enabled the exclusions that have taken place in the name of the World Cup, the Olympics, or the call to a better future for the country. When asked about the legacies of the Olympics to Rio de Janeiro, Carvalho said that “the preparation for the Olympics is integrating Rio de Janeiro. This privileged space [Barra da Tijuca] is receiving an infrastructure that will allow an ordered urban development. This solution represents a relief of 100% of the suffering associated with the exercise of using the city” (quoted in Puff, 2015). He adds that the Olympic Park is a place where kids will play and have fun. But the surrounding areas will be sold to developers by Rio City Hall for about R$ 1 billion, and will be used for the construction of buildings and investments in real estate beginning in 2018. According to Carvalho’s map, Vila Autódromo, a community of about 800 people who still inhabit the area between the Olympic Park and Carvalho’s plan for a luxury apartment complex, is shown as a green and empty space.

In Carvalho’s map, upon which he is projecting a particular representation of the future, children are the only subjects whose appearance is allowed. Their innocent presence seems to offer the map a sense of neutrality, purity, and sterility that Carvalho needs in order to define his project as a promise of an ‘ordered urban development’ in that area of the city of Rio. Many studies have pointed to the “connections between subjectivity, image, and the creation of economic value” as a way of highlighting the “centrality of development actors to the active making of space” (Guy & Henneberry, 2008, p.301), in contrast to any claims that developers’ role in shaping spaces in the cities is ‘objective’, ‘professional, or ‘technical’. For Henri Lefebvre (1991), “abstract space […] has nothing of a 'subject' about it, yet it acts like a subject in that it transports and maintains specific social relations, dissolves others and stands opposed to yet others” (p.50). The complex spatial heterogeneity and messy productiveness of a social space such as Vila Autódromo is replaced by “images and memories whose content, whether sensory, sensual or sexual, is so far displaced that it barely
achieves symbolic force. Perhaps young children can live in a space of this kind, with its indifference to age and sex (and even to time itself)” (Lefebvre, 1991, p.50).

The process of removing families and demolishing houses has started, but there are many families who still resist the forced evictions. Carvalho affirms that this is not his problem. According to him, “it is a political problem, that ‘they’ [the authorities] know how to solve” (quoted in Puff, 2015). Carvalho guarantees that he is working with the mayor and that they think the “provisions are adequate”. But he insists that his own perspective on these ‘provisions’ is merely technical, and that he does not express a ‘political’ opinion. According to Carvalho, with regards to the location of the buildings that he plans to construct and their proximity to Vila Autódromo, it

all depends on how you organize the space… but you can not organize with *favela*, because you cannot think of moving a *favelado* from where he lives, from his habitat, for him to come and pay rent and townhouse fees. If he is not prepared and do not have the appropriate support in order to learn about his new habitat, the plan cannot actually work (quoted in Puff, 2015)

Carvalho argues that “you cannot live in an apartment and have a native [*indio*] right next to you. We have nothing against the *indio*, but there are things that just do not work. You stink. What am I going to do? Am I going to stay next to you? I will find somewhere else to stay” (quoted in Puff, 2015).

Discriminatory discourses such as the one expressed in this interview are embedded in practices of sanitization, based on the rationality of “‘cleaning’ the city, removing from the view of the rest of the population the “ugly”, “dirty”, “ignorant”, “junkie” sector of society, among other stereotypes” (Popular Committee, 2015, p.63). Even though the Decree N.7.053 signed by president Lula in 2009 was supposed to foster the creation of policies in favor of the homeless populations, a number of studies have expressed concern about the radicalization of ‘sanitization’ practices before and during the sports mega events (Dossiê –
Jogos da Exclusão, p.63). Often, these practices and the discourses that support them stand side by side with narratives of modernization and arguments about the emergence of Brazil as a global actor, or of Rio de Janeiro as a major global city. In this Dossier titled ‘The Exclusion Games’ prepared by the popular committee, we are reminded of what happened in the 1960s, “when hundreds of men and women living in the streets were exterminated… their bodies thrown into the rivers Guarda and Guandú” (Popular Committee, 2015, p.63). The Dossier also notes how the 2011 feature film “Topografia de um Desnudo” [Topography of a Naked Person] “superbly portrays how these men and women are turned invisible, destitute of dignity and deprived of the public policies which they are entitled to have” (Popular Committee, 2015, p.63). These events illustrate how, to use Agamben’s terms, “the very body [...] is, in its capacity to be killed but not sacrificed, a living pledge to his subjection to a power of death” (1998, p.99). The worthless life, however, “has an eminently political character and exhibits an essential link with the terrain on which sovereign power is founded” (Agamben, 1998, p.100), as it becomes the principal category of human waste laid out in the course of the modern production of orderly (law abiding, rule governed) sovereign realms (Bauman, 2004, p.32).

In September 2009, Rio’s City Hall launched the Operação Choque de Ordem [Order Shock Operation], which promised to end urban disorder, and was defined as the “great catalyst of public feelings of insecurity and a generator of ideal conditions for criminal practices” (Rio de Janeiro City Hall, 2009). At the time, Rodrigo Bethlem, the head officer of the Municipal Office of Public Order (SEOP), stated that the “measures had the aim of giving back to citizens all illegally occupied public spaces” (Rio de Janeiro City Hall, 2009). To achieve this, “they saw as priority measures to remove from the streets abandoned children and the homeless, as well as repressing the informal and irregular trade and urban occupations” (Popular Committee, 2015 p.56).
The language of illegality is a building block in the legitimation of the people’s eviction from the *favelas* and other spaces where the *future* is supposed to be constructed. The future is enacted through the mobilization, among other things, of the word ‘legacy’, a vocable that started to be used in justifications for a number of ‘urban interventions’ leading to the realization of the sports mega events (Magalhães, 2013, p.98). Removals or eradications are techniques used against those resisting or considered incapable of being transformed into docile subjects that are ready to inhabit the spaces that are worthy of first-class world citizens, a phrase used by Lula when he celebrated the selection of Rio de Janeiro as a host city. The popular Committee estimates that, in 2006, “1,030 people were killed by the police under the allegation that they were resisting arrest. In the following year, when the city hosted the Pan-American games, there were 1,330 deaths. The phenomenon repeats itself in 2013… and 2014” (Popular Committee, 2015, p.101), illustrating Agamben’s definition of the relationship between law and life: “the originary relation of law to life is not application by Abandonment” (1998, p.29). These individuals were both inside the juridical order as citizens and outside the juridical order as they are banned from the application of the law. As Agamben (1998) explains, “he who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable” (p.28).

Interestingly, all these policies have also been somewhat legitimatized by the idea that there is always sacrifice to any victory. As Brimmer (2014) points out, some responsibilities come with a greater dose of unpopularity:

> Is Brazil willing to be unpopular? The exercise of soft power is important and attracts partners. Robust leadership also requires making hard choices and occasionally angering friends. Brazil will have to decide if it wants international leadership enough to be unpopular (Brimmer, 2014, p.150).
Who is Brazil becoming unpopular to? And to whom should Brazil become unpopular for the sake of international acceptance and popularity? Where are these transformations leading Brazil, and who is celebrating the ‘Games of Celebration and Transformation’? The respect and dignity that, according to president Lula, ‘Brazil’ earned when Rio de Janeiro was announced as the host city for the 2016 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games called for the ordering of the domestic space, and in the process of conforming to an expectation of ‘good’ or first-class international citizen, many have already bodies disappeared, what calls into question when in time and where in space this particular ‘Brazil’ who earned the respect from the international community is.

Viveiros de Castro (2014) notes that “there is no pre-prepared world to be seen; no world before vision, or better, no world prior to the division between the visible and the invisible” (p.188). In world politics, as in a football match, our vision can be extremely partial and constrained by our expectations in relation to the circumstances. This does not mean that perfect vision should be the goal, but perhaps we should consider the ways in which we might be deceived by the anticipation of outcomes or by buying into preconceived notions about the natural course of events. A football match does not happen only where the ball is rolling in the field. Whenever we abide to this narrow perception, we take the risk of continuing to neglect all sorts of violations that may happen around, similar to the way the Brazilian cameras did not captured the penalty committed by Brazilian player Junior Baiano on the Norwegian player Tore Flo during the World Cup of 1998 because it was following the players’ moves in the field with the ball.

Is it Time for Brazil?

Most positive and negative analyses about Brazil and its position in the world, an issue that became even more dominant with the selection of the country as the host of two
sports mega events in the same decade, are marked by a similar kind of interrogation: ‘is it time for Brazil? (Vinton, 2011, p.8). However, what is implied in the analysis performed in this chapter is that we need to rethink the standards of realization and fulfillment against which we have been measuring adequacy, fulfillment, and realization. And, especially, we need to rethink the understanding of the future that enables one to judge how close to it or away from it one allegedly is. Looking at the discourses and practices around the mega events has enabled us to recognize how political actors are used to play a game of circular rhetoric in which the solutions for the established problems (such as violence and inequality) are usually found, discursively, in the same analytical domains where we already know that the so-called problems came from. Thus, on the name of modernization, one dehumanizes. In the name of human rights, one oppresses. In the name of development, one excludes; in the name of the future, one demolishes the present and any forms of existence resembling the past. And in the name of occupying a space worthy of the international arena, one displaces and relegates the ‘inadequate places and people’ to disappearance and oblivion.

It seems that, at the global stage, when we consider the dominant discourses about what it takes for one to become a global player, there is no space for multiple performances, and not many are qualified to play a major role, or any role at all, except for the recognition that the excluded must become the foundation for any understanding of inclusion, or for any construction of a coherent inside. As Walker (2006) points out, the world of modern subjectivity and objectivity, or interiority and exteriority, already assumes its own distinction from some world outside of itself. There is consequently always an assumed outside to the production of modern subjectivities capable of objectivity, an outside that must be excluded so as to permit the modern self to know itself in relation to its own understanding of what objectivity, indeed the world as such, must be (Walker, 2006, p.58).

Some diagnoses of the situation in Brazil emphasize the gap between “Brazil’s political imagination” and the “means” Brazil has and uses to realize its big dreams (De Onis,
What I have tried to show in this chapter with the different stories about the mega events and their legacies to Brazilian society is that, perhaps, what is going on in Brazil is a symptom of a much larger dysfunction. And, to some extent, the ‘official’ dream of being recognized as part of the club of powerful states is exactly what gets in the way of a different approach to self-realization, one that presupposes the destabilization of the dominant spatiotemporal constructs that became the conditions for representability in the global stage.

Even though there are many possible ways to look at the practices of exclusion, discrimination, criminalization, eviction, and oppression of all kinds, in this chapter, I have sought to reconsider the politics of place in relation to the politics of abstract space(s). Where does the urgency for the transformation of place (or of the local) come from? How can one focus on places without paying attention to the pervasiveness of these abstract spaces against which these places have been compared? What are these places being emptied and ‘sanitized’ for? It is often in relation to a global or international space that policies about the transformation of the local are being enacted. In the next Chapter, I analyze the representation of ‘Brazil’ as an exporter of a model of antipoverty policy. Along with what was analyzed in this chapter, Chapter 5 looks at the rearticulation of time and space around an idea of the ‘Brazilian nation’ that puts into question the productivity and usefulness of some bodies.
Chapter 5
Antipoverty Policies in Brazil: When the Global Meets the Local Temporal Disjunctions

Hear the white world
horribly weary from its immense efforts
its stiff joints crack under the hard stars
its blue steel rigidities pierce the mystic flesh
bear its deceptive victories tout its defeats
hear the grandiose alibis of its pitiful stumbling

Pity for our omniscient and naive conquerors!

Eia for those who never invented anything
for those who never explored anything
for those who never conquered anything

Eia for joy
Eia for love

Eia for grief and its udders of reincarnated tears.

(Aimé Césaire, Notebook of a Return to the Native Land)

In 2011, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was chosen to receive the 2011 World Food Prize for his “personal commitment and visionary leadership” while serving as Brazil’s president (The World Food Prize, 2011). On the World Food Prize Laureates page, Lula is described as an example of how “transformational leadership truly can effect positive change and greatly improve people’s lives” (The World Food Prize, 2011). Three years later, in the 2014 edition of the report State of Food Insecurity in the World published annually by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Brazil was removed from the United Nations World Hunger Map and was recognized for having achieved both “the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of halving the proportion of its people who suffer from hunger and the more stringent World Food Security (WFS) target of reducing by half the absolute number of hungry people”\(^{29}\) (FAO, 2014, p.23). Brazil’s progress in achieving

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\(^{29}\) Some of the results highlighted by FAO in relation to Brazil are: “poverty fell from 24.3 percent to 8.4 percent of the population between 2001 and 2012, while extreme poverty dropped from 14.0 percent to 3.5 percent. From 2001 to 2012, the income of the poorest 20 percent of the population grew by three times as much as that of the wealthiest 20 percent. The proportion of undernourished people fell from 10.7 percent of the population in 2000–02 to less than 5 percent in 2004–06” (FAO, 2014, p.23).
“internationally established targets” is said to have been “accelerated when ending hunger was put at the centre of Brazil’s political agenda” (FAO, 2014, p.23).

In his official pronouncement as Brazil’s president in 2003, Lula stated that, if by the end of his mandate, every Brazilian citizen could have at least three meals every day, he would have accomplished his life’s mission (FUNAG, 2008, p.9). Since his election, fighting hunger and eradicating extreme poverty in Brazil have become not only Lula’s declared political and personal goals, but also the central themes of political campaigns and policies implemented by his successor Dilma Rousseff. What should be noted, however, is that these goals have also often been presented as means to larger political objectives. In an address at the opening of the 30th Regional Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008, Lula established an explicit connection between the integration of the poor in the economy through policies of direct transfer of income and the emergence of Brazil to the global stage. According to Lula,

in Brazil, many people are afraid because consumption in the Northeast is higher than consumption in the southern region of the country. But for one reason: for a long time those people had no access to the minimum ration of food. But today those same people are entering supermarkets and taking food home. Because, besides being able to work, those people are beginning, through the policy of transfer of income, to receive a modicum of dignity. If they had received that dignity throughout the last century, Brazil would already be a great power and not an emerging country (Da Silva, 2008, p.7).

At the opening session of the 39th FAO conference in 2015, Lula, who was invited as the 29th McDougall Memorial Lecturer, reiterated the importance of social inclusion for Brazil by stating that Brazil’s success in the ‘fight’ against poverty and hunger was the result of a “set of policies focusing on proving that the poor are not part of the problem” (Da Silva, 2015, p.7). Lula stated that

30 According to the description of the McDougall Memorial Lecture on the FAO website, the lecturer should be a “person of world standing”, and “have considerable latitude in the choice of subject”. For an explanation about the criteria for the selection of lecturers, see: http://www.fao.org/about/meetings/conference/mcdougall/en/
when looked at properly, the poor are part of the solution for our countries. If you lend one million to a rich person, that money will go into a bank account. If you lend 10 dollars to a poor person, it will help to feed mouths, the money will circulate and everybody will be able to participate (Da Silva, 2015, p.7).

Social inclusion has shaped the representation of Brazil promoted by the Workers Party (PT) government, something that has also been reflected by the different official slogans adopted by Lula and Rousseff since 2003. In 2003, advertiser Duda Mendonça was hired by the Secretariat of Social Communication SECOM\textsuperscript{31} to create a new slogan for the country under Lula’s presidency. The slogan was Brasil, um país de todos [Brazil, a country for everyone]. In 2011, Dilma Roussef took over the presidency and changed the slogan to Brasil, país rico é um país sem pobreza [Brazil, a rich country is a country without poverty], which was created by advertiser Marcelo Kertész\textsuperscript{32} and allegedly expressed better what President Rousseff had emphasized during her campaign. Both slogans imply the unification of the country through social inclusion, with the latter explicitly defining unification around the notion of ‘rich country’, a notion that further requires the eradication of ‘poverty’. In her first official pronouncement on national television as Brazil’s President, Rousseff emphasized education as the way to unite society in the hope of eradicating poverty and realizing the goal of Brazil as a rich country. Rousseff stated that

No area can better unite society than education. No tool is more conclusive than education in order to overcome poverty and misery. No space can realize better the present and project the future with more hope than a well-equipped classroom where teachers can teach well and students can learn better each day. It is in this path that we have to advance … (Rousseff, 2011).

\textsuperscript{31} In Brazil, the Secretariat of Social Communication (SECOM) is responsible for the creation and promotion of campaigns, events, and general advertisement of the federal government’s policies and projects.

\textsuperscript{32} Marcelo Kertész has been involved in the promotion of the campaign Fim da Miséria [End of Misery] adopted by Dilma Rousseff’s government. On his website, we can find the latest images capturing the idea of the emerging ‘new time’ without misery: http://www.marcelokertesz.com/fimd amiseria
In the ideal of inclusion and with the idea of the future as expressed by Rousseff, education is playing, at least discursively, a crucial role. According to Rousseff (2011), “no country can develop itself without educating well its youth and fully capacitate them to the job market and the new necessities created by the knowledge society” (Rousseff, 2011). In these statements, a clear connection is made between education as the path towards advancement and the idea that poverty and misery can be solved through the “capacitation” and inclusion of the poor in the economy. In this context, it seems that education means preparing Brazilian citizens to find jobs and meet the demands of what Rousseff calls “the knowledge society”.

Given Brazil’s new position as a leader in the ‘fight’ against hunger and poverty, this chapter explores the way poverty has been articulated with a representation of Brazil as an example of success. In this chapter, my analysis of the notions and slogans that “a rich country is a country without poverty” or that “the poor are part of the solution” is informed by the assumption that, first, “any ‘reality’ is mediated by a mode of representation and, second, that representations are not descriptions of a world of facticity, but are ways of making facticity” (Shapiro, 1989, p.14). As explained in Chapter 1, I am not concerned with the coherence between representation and social reality, but rather with how ‘reality’ is already confined within “economies of possible representations” (Shapiro, 1989, p.14). In this sense, what are the practices and subjectivities that the representation of Brazil as “a rich country without poverty” enables? And what are the effects of the enactment and circulation of this particular representation onto the people who make up Brazil’s social structures?

To be clear, my goal in this chapter is not to deny the merits of a political and social project that reached over 50 million individuals (13 million families) in need around Brazil,

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33 Education actually became part of the slogan Dilma Rousseff adopted during her second mandate, which is now Brasil, pátria educadora [Brazil, the educator homeland – or the nation that educates]. The presentation of the most recent slogan to the public can be found at http://www.brasil.gov.br/governo/2015/01/dilma-toma-posse-e-anuncia-lema-do-novo-governo-201cbrasil-patria-educadora201d
but rather to look at some of the effects of the continuing mediation of subjectivities through the notions of social inclusion, citizenship, and rights, especially as these notions are articulated in relation to a particular temporal trajectory for Brazil. What I argue in this chapter is that the eradication of poverty as a national project, the way it has been framed and employed, has the potential to increase (or reveal) in Brazil the discrimination against the poor. The poor are represented as the ‘other’ that obstructs the realization of the future, or “the distracting presence of another temporality that disturbs the contemporaneity of the national present” (Bhabha, 1990, p.295). Thus, some of the questions inspiring this exploration include:

How does one encounter the past as an anteriority that continually introduces an otherness or alterity within the present? How does one then narrate the present as a form of contemporaneity that is always belated? In what historical time do such configurations of cultural difference assume forms of cultural and political authority? (Bhabha, 1990, p.308).

This chapter looks at the role of a narrative of citizenship promoted by the Workers Party (PT) government (since Lula assumed power in 2003) in an effort to stabilize different histories into one single narrative that could support the representation of Brazil as a ‘global actor’. In particular, it explores the way in which the antipoverty policies launched during Lula’s mandate ignited a process of increasing fragmentation and revealed the “ways in which citizen-subjects are temporally disjunctive” (Shapiro, 2000, p.79). Social policies that have targeted inequality and, in some cases, have successfully reduced extreme poverty in the country have also exposed more dramatically the temporal disjunctions and the mechanisms through which one nation constitutes itself as an inter-national subject.

The last three chapters have departed from the notion of Brazil as an emerging actor in international politics. This chapter focuses on the processes of reformation, internalization, and cooptation that result from an effort to stabilize a dominant self-representation or image
of ‘Brazil’. The ‘country of the future’, when looked at closely, reveals itself to be a country with many histories, some of which have been blamed for Brazil’s non-realization as a powerful and stable political and economic entity. The official discourse about the emergence of Brazil to the global stage is challenged by the incoherence expressed by the co-existence of and interaction between different stories about the ‘past’ within one country and different understandings with regards to the future.

In the first section of this chapter, I briefly revisit some studies that have been invested in investigating ‘the question of Brazil’, or the peculiarities of the ‘Brazilian nation’. Following the brief account of historical and contemporary interpretations of Brazil, I explore the implementation of conditional cash transfers as part of Brazilian government’s goal of eradicating extreme poverty. In this section, I look at some understandings about these social programs in Brazil geared towards direct distribution of income, and what makes them acceptable tools of antipoverty policies. In the third section, I compare different stories about the impact of the Programa Bolsa Família [Family Stipend Program] (one of the most ambitious programs of direct cash transfers within this framework) on Brazilian people’s lives. Following the narration of these stories, I seek to tie them together within a discussion about citizenship and about the notion of eradication of poverty developed as an effort to organize the history of Brazil and to coherently represent its past, present, and future. In the last section, I explore how the notion of brasilidade that emerges in this context as the accommodation of differences into a single category and through a single trajectory (from past to future) may be supplemented by an urgency to erase from the present the different temporal traces that allegedly prevent its realization. Finally, I discuss the possibility of the ‘return’ to the future of groups of people who have been displaced from their territories as well as from history. In the conclusion, I highlight the importance of challenging the myth of origin if we wish to open our imagination to different images and ways of being in the future.
The Question of ‘Brazil’

The question of what is ‘Brazil’ is intrinsically related to the question of who is a ‘Brazilian’, or what ‘Brazilianity’ entails. This question has intrigued a number of anthropologists, economists, historians, political and social scientists throughout history, and even though most of them would agree with Tom Jobin’s famous and widely reproduced statement that “Brazil is not for beginners”, we are still faced with different projects focused on an analysis and elaboration of what has been called the Brazilian ‘archetype’ or ‘character’. The point here is that the ‘national question’ or the question about ‘Brazil’s formation’ has been a constant (Ianni, 1992, p.8; Tavolaro, 2014, p.639) even though the diversity of this ‘intellectual tradition’ has been expressed in a variety of projects involved in some form of stabilization of ‘Brazil’. Some of the names of intellectuals who have been involved in these projects include: the journalist and politician Tavares Bastos (1839 – 1875), the abolitionist André Rebouças (1838 – 1898), the diplomat and historian Joaquim Nabuco (1849 – 1910), the journalist, sociologist and politician Silvio Romero (1851 – 1914), the historian and sociologist Oliveira Vianna (1883 – 1951), the writer Paulo Prado (1869 – 1943), the writer Mário de Andrade (1893 – 1945), the sociologist and anthropologist Gilberto Freyre (1900 - 1987), the journalist and historian Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1902 – 1982), the historian, geographer, and writer Caio Prado Jr. (1907 - 1990), the economist Celso Furtado (1920 - 2004), the sociologist, historian, and political scientist Raymundo Faoro (1925 – 2003), among others (Brandão, 2007; Botelho and Schwarcz, 2009, apud Tavolaro, 2014, p.641).

What most of these intellectual expressions of ‘Brazilianity’ have in common is the acceptance of Brazil as a relational category, to the extent that Brazil has often been defined and classified in relation to what it is not, or in relation to what it has yet to become. For
many of these intellectuals, or for studies departing from their interpretations, Brazil’s singularity or the singularity of Brazil’s ‘modernity’ is a reflection of the imposition or adoption by the elites of categories imported from Europe and transposed to an inhospitable space, thus resulting in a reality that Roberto Schwarz (2009) has referred to as one in which ‘ideas are out of place’, and where there is an incredible “disarrangement between representation and context” (Schwarz, 2009, p.76). In *Raízes do Brazil* [Brazilian Roots], Sérgio Buarque de Holanda states that, “by bringing from distant lands our ways of living (*convívio*), our institutions, our ideas, and trying to keep this all together in an environment often times unfavorable and hostile, we are still outcasts in our own homeland (*nossa própria terra*)” (Holanda, 1994, p.3). Peculiarities such as slavery and the intrusion of the private into the public sphere (through the mediation of political contracts and bureaucratic administration by privileges and personal discretion) embedded in the notion of ‘favor’ in Brazilian society would justify and illustrate what Franco (1976, p.61) understood as the “premise of an essential difference” between ‘colonizer societies’ and ‘colonized societies’.

In *The Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian State*, Fernando Uricoechea (1980) states that

> the colonial world, […] with its subjective and particularized social relations, was too fraught with – and enmeshed in – the immediacy of privatized patriarchal experience to be able conceive of impersonal forms alive enough to permit the objective and institutionalized ordering of that very experience” (p.15).

With this notion of essential difference, the ‘difference’ in ‘colonized societies’ is not necessarily seen as fundamentally separate from the ‘sameness’ associated with ‘colonizer societies’. On the contrary, anthropologists have emphasized both the distortions and the possibilities that are often seen as a result of the “sin of miscegenation” (Freyre, 2003, p.62). The construction of the stereotype of ‘Brazilian’ around the notion of ‘hybridity’ has been seen both as an obstacle to ‘civilization’ and as a solution and strategy towards ‘civilization’.
On the one hand, the presence of indigenous and slaves in Brazil has been described throughout history as an obstacle to the construction of a strong Brazilian nation. On the other hand, “the encouragement of integration through mixed-race settlement and marriage had been official, legislated policy since colonial times” (Holston, 2008, p.69).

In 1823, José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, consecrated as the “patriarch of independence” for his role as a Minister of the Brazilian Empire, submitted a project to the constitutional assembly in which he explained how “wild Indians” should be transformed into subjects that could be integrated into the Brazilian Empire. In this project, Bonifácio (2002) starts with the recognition of the “desire to domesticate and make them [the wild Indians] happy” (p.183). But then he lists some of the traits that explain why this is difficult, traits such as laziness, lack of needs, and the disregard for civil and religious norms and rules (p.183-184). In this project, the solution proposed by Bonifácio implies a careful study of this ‘race’ and the introduction of white people and mulatos34 in villages inhabited by the ‘wild Indians’ in order to start a process of miscegenation that could result in the “connection of reciprocal interests” between them and the colonizers, or what would lead to the formation of “a stronger, well educated, and entrepreneurial single body of the nation” (p.198).

Miscegenation, even though often acclaimed as a source of pride and the basis for the self-representation of Brazil as inherently inclusive, has also been linked throughout history to ‘whitening’ strategies and assumptions about the kinds of transformations that are required for the formation of a stronger Brazil (Holston, 2008, p.69-70).

Of course, the notion of ‘ideas out of place’ discussed by interpreters of Brazil’s identity should not imply that those ideas or ideals of and about modernity are perfect fits in other societies elsewhere, or that modernity is a coherent project. But, I would argue that simply embracing the notion that there is a “multiplicity of modernities and cultural projects”

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34 This is a term used to designate descendants from Europeans and Africans.
(Eisenstadt, 2000) should not prevent us from engaging more overtly the asymmetries and hierarchies that emerge as a result of certain expectations and narratives about what a modern and civilized society should be. The recognition that modernity is not exactly a coherent and cohesive totality should not mean that the effects of certain expectations and narratives associated with it are not pervasive and should not be taken into account. What we are dealing with here is ‘modernity’ as a rhetoric, an image, and a set of practices and expectations that ‘do things to people’. Or to use Tavolaro’s (2014) definition, it is a “discursive perspective that, anchored in hegemonic loci of enunciation, perpetuates asymmetric relations of economic, political, cultural, epistemic, symbolic, and political power” (p.665). As Chakrabarty (2000) explains:

> Concepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual, distinctions between public and private, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality, and so on all bear the burden of European thought and history. One simply cannot think of political modernity without these and other related concepts that found a climactic form in the course of the European Enlightenment and the nineteenth century (p.4).

> Even though these could be seen as old or outdated debates in an era of globalization in which polarizations and dualisms (such as developed/underdeveloped, modern/non modern, etc.) are increasingly seen as oversimplifications of a much more complex reality, the transformations and discourses that saturate Brazilian society and governmental practices with a desire or need for ‘transformation’ and ‘change’ illustrate the contemporaneity of exclusionary and discriminatory ‘modernizing discourses’ that emerge from a perception of the national space as one in which ideas are ‘out of place’. As I will show in this chapter, and along with what was already seen in Chapter 4, the perception of ideas being out of place has legitimized practices that have required the displacement and rearrangement of people in certain ways, supposedly enabling representation and social context to come closer together
as a single spatiotemporal platform whereby prestige and status in international politics become possible. Instead of working at the level of the ideas that are causing people the sense of ‘homelessness’ and inadequacy, authorities, in the saga toward the constitution of a strong nation and a better future, often target people as the ‘things’ that are ‘out of place’.

In the next section, I explore the way social programs of redistribution of income geared towards the eradication of hunger and poverty in Brazil deployed by the Workers Party (PT) government are closely associated with a range of implicit and explicit expectations in relation to the unfolding of Brazilian citizens’ temporal trajectories. Criteria for a ‘better future’ are reproduced and ‘naturalized’ through narratives of success that became part of governmental campaigns for the ‘end of misery’ and the constitution of a future without poverty for Brazil.

The Eradication of Poverty

The number of Brazilian citizens in classes D and E\(^{35}\) has decreased by nearly 25% between 2003 and 2009, with class C becoming the new category for almost 30 million people (Carrillo, 2014, p.64). According to the latest data provided by the Brazilian Research Institute of Applied Economics (IPEA), income inequality in Brazil has steadily decreased from 2003 to 2014. Brazil’s Gini index, which measures the deviation of the distribution of income within an economy from a perfectly equal distribution (represented by 0), dropped from 0.583 in 2003 to 0.518 in 2014 (IPEA, 2014). The old story about ‘growing the cake before dividing it’ [crescer o bolo antes de dividê-lo] defended by Brazilian Minister of Finance Antônio Delfim Neto during ‘Brazil’s economy miracle’ in the 1970\(^{36}\), was replaced

\(^{35}\) According to the Center for Political Sciences at Fundação Getúlio Vargas (CPS/IBRE/FGV), class E is the category for families with a monthly income below R$768. Between R$768 and R$1,064, families are classified as belonging to class D. Class C is composed by families who have a monthly income between R$1,064 and R$4,591. For an article about the ascension to the Middle Class, see (Neri, 2010).

\(^{36}\) From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, during the first decade of the military regime in Brazil, the Brazilian economy was growing at impressive rates. The period is now referred to as the decade of “Brazil’s economy
by active policies aiming at the reduction of poverty that resulted in a historical decrease in the gap between the rich and poor (Neri, 2010, p.10-11).

According to Carrillo (2014, p.59-60), one of major results of the recent ‘pro-poor growth’, which included cash transfers and minimum-wage increases, has been the emergence of people to the formal workforce and the market. As a multiplier effect, these policies aligned with a ‘pro-poor growth’ stimulated domestic consumption. A report prepared by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 2011 about the strategy for income transfer in Brazil argues that “the multipliers on output of the three streams of social transfers [General Regime of Social Security (RGPS), Continued Benefit Provision (BPC) – a social assistance programme for elderly and disabled poor – and Bolsa Família (PBF)] are estimated to have led to an injection of US$30 billion into the economy […] and potentially created (or saved) 1.3 million jobs” (ILO, 2011, p.95). But this shift from an old paradigm, according to which income distribution is seen as an obstacle to economic growth, to a new one whereby it is understood that income distribution may actually fuel economic growth did not change the way economic growth continues to be seen as a critical condition for the reduction of inequality. Carrillo (2014) states that

conditions must be present [for inclusive growth]: (1) There must be a strong market and state. (2) Only a strengthening of these two institutions and the implementation of adequate macroeconomic policies will sustain high rates of growth. (3) A strong state and a strong market can only be constructed through a project for national development that is sustained by social equity. (4) It is impossible to achieve a reduction in social inequality without sustaining high rates of growth (p.64).

As suggested above, economists in Brazil and abroad continue to emphasize the importance of sustaining global competitiveness, or a healthy insertion into the international market, as conditions for the successful management of inclusive domestic growth (Schutte, miracle”. Inequality was understood as a problem that would be naturally fixed as a result of the economy growth. What we saw instead was an increase of the GINI index from 0.5367 in 1960 to 0.5828 in 1970, as the outcome of an accelerated growth that also furthered income concentration (Neri, 2010, p.11).
The way economic analysts strongly resist the idea that economic competitiveness could be sacrificed in the name of the reduction of inequalities within an economy is illustrated by the reaction to the term ‘eradication of poverty’ that Lula started using during the presidential election campaign in the early 2000s and how it scared investors around the world. Goldman Sachs started to publish the ‘Lulameter’ on June 6, 2002, quantifying “the probability of a Lula victory that is currently being priced in by currency markets” (Tenengauzer, 2002), and warning investors about the risk of BRL (Brazilian Real) exposure. As a result, foreign banks started to cut off credit, and “the main stock index fell by 30 percent. Investors started dumping their Brazilian holdings, yanking more than $12 billion in capital out of the country within a few months. And the value of the real… fell by 40 percent against the dollar” (Tepperman, 2016, p.35).

For these investors, the good news was that the rhetoric of change was more radical than the policies that were actually implemented to target poverty and hunger in Brazil. As Ansell (2014) observes, the rhetoric of social inclusion adopted by Lula “meant the right kind of participation in the institutions of representative democracy” (p.7) accommodated into what Ansell (2014) calls “left-wing neoliberalism” (p.15). Tepperman (2016) argues that the impact of the social programs implemented in Brazil “ha[ve] shown that there’s a far better, less provocative, and more market-friendly way to fight inequality” (Tepperman, 2016, p.34). The statistics showing the reduction of poverty, the reduction of inequality, and the positive impact these programs could have on the market through an increase in consumption appeased tensions that were initially triggered among the elites and investors by the slogan ‘eradication of poverty’. While criticisms around the idea of handing out money to the poor persisted, in the scenario of accelerated economic growth combined with pro-market programs of alleviation of poverty that would not impact Brazil’s GDP too much, the *Bolsa Família Program* (BFP), explained in the following sub-section, started to be treated like a
“magic bullet” by many analysts (The Economist, 2010), and the program was exported to a number of other countries (Rosenberg, 2011). The government claims to have exported the ‘model’ to 52 countries (Portal Brasil, 2016).

**Conditional Cash Transfer in Brazil**

Conditional cash transfers were not created during Lula’s mandate, but rather they were consolidated and expanded after he assumed the presidency in 2003. *Fome Zero*[^37] [Zero Hunger] started as an umbrella project worth of about 40 different programs and run by almost 20 different government ministries. Among these programs, *Bolsa Familia* [Family Stipend] stood out for its ‘size, ambition, and design’ (Tepperman, 2016, p.36). Instead of giving the poor goods and services, such as food and other forms of direct assistance, *Bolsa Família* was a strategy through which families were given money and could then decide what to do with it.

The *Bolsa Família* Program (PBF) was created by Law n. 10,836 in January 9, 2004, and regulated by Decree n. 5,209, established on December 17, 2004[^38]. It is a program of direct transfer of income designed to help families to overcome extreme poverty in Brazil. The program aims at securing for citizens the right to food, to education, and to health. The need to help these families is justified on the basis of the vulnerability and insecurity that extreme poverty represents (Caixa Econômica Federal, 2015). More than 13,9 million families are still currently assisted by the government through this program, according to the agency responsible for the distribution of benefits (Caixa Econômica Federal, 2015).

[^37]: Fome Zero takes a variety of forms, from direct cash transfers (with Bolsa Familia cards), to the creation of low-cost restaurants, programs designed to educate people about healthy eating habits, the creation of water cisterns in semi-arid areas, and subsistence of family farming, among other projects.

Families with an income of up to R$77 per person are eligible. For families with incomes between R$77.01 and R$154, there are different ways through which they can still qualify for the program, based for example on the number of pregnant women in a family, or on the number of children and teens between 0 and 16 years of age. Some of the conditions for remaining in the program are an updated vaccination card for all children between 0 and 7 years old, the monitoring of the health of women between 14 and 44 years old, and a minimum of 85% in school attendance for children and teenagers between 6 and 15 years old and 75% for 16 and 17-year-old teenagers (Caixa Econômica, 2015).

The growth of the middle class in Brazil in the last decade has been attributed, among other things, to the readjustments in the minimum wage (Neri, 2010). However, programs of direct transfer of income for the poorest of individuals and families have also become a key element in the national project of integration of the most disadvantaged sectors of society in the productive economy and in the system of consumption by inspiring and financially supporting a commitment to a ‘better life’. Two World Bank economists have affirmed that conditionality is a key element of programs of direct transfer of income, such as Bolsa Família. The notion of handing out money to the poor without asking them for something in return is not a widely accepted policy. According to Firszbein and Schady (2009), to appeal to the idea of a ‘social contract’ is an alternative way to deal with the antagonisms, because once the ones opposing these policies are convinced that the benefit “requires recipients to take a number of concrete steps to improve their lives or those of their children” (p.10), they usually reassess their views about what distribution of income means. A telling example of this understanding of governmental social programs as an exchange or a contract between the government and the beneficiaries is the potentially humiliating oath promoted by Piauí’s Governor Dias in Passarinho. The state Governor “told the townspeople gathered to raise their right hands and swear an oath: ‘I will assume the commitment to get myself out of
poverty’’ (Ansell, 2004, p.166). Ansell notes that “the oath would perhaps persuade the urban middle class that Zero Hunger was not assistencialismo, that it did not promote laziness and endless state expenditure on the poor, or deepen the poor’s subordination to elites” (Ansell, 2014, p.166)

If we accept the claims that “Bolsa Família”’s architects have presented the program as a temporary investment in human capital, as an aid to consumption, as an unstable gift, and [a] benefit that has been distinguished from the wage, the paradigmatic money of the man” (Morton, 2014, p.931), it is possible to assume that the beneficiaries are rewarded for conforming to an ideal of ‘becoming’ that further reifies the private domain of the household as an initial place or stage of maturity where the individual receives the necessary incentive to start to project herself/himself in the public sphere. Morton argues (2014) that

The program’s symbolism comes to hide an alternative vision: Bolsa Família could be understood as a wage for housework. As a wage for housework, Bolsa Família would help valorize a mode of work at once neglected and essential. The program would turn into an obligation of the state, a form of remuneration that the recipient earns and can, in justice, demand. A true source of human wealth would then be recognized (p.931).

Furthermore, the debates and concerns around what the poor will do with the money and the way analysts claim to be quite surprised that “most spent the money quite rationally” (Tepperman, 2016, p.37-38) are signs of the kind of representations and reifications that are part of an ‘economy of meanings’ and an ‘economy of otherness’ that prevail in Brazilian society. In the above statement about Bolsa Família, the understanding that rationality is easily measured by a pattern of consumption combined with the assumption that ‘poor’ people do not know what is better for them is revealing.

Morton’s experience with Bolsa Família’s beneficiaries in the state of Bahia is marked by rumors that the government was suspending the program. On May 18, 2003, in 13 states, Morton reports that “900,000 people rushed to the ATMs, banks, and lottery
disbursement centers [...because] Caixa Econômica Federal, which administers the program, [...]
had skipped over the normal staggered payment schedule, releasing the monthly payment for all
beneficiaries on the same day” (Morton, 2014, p.927). Many interviewees, in this context, expressed
to Morton their uncertainty about continuing to receive the benefits in the future (Morton, 2014, p.927-928).
There is no consensus, however, about how the program is seen in terms of ‘rights’. Ansell’s
experiences in Piauí with the Zero Hunger Coordenadoria, Zero Hunger’s beneficiaries, and community
leaders informed a different understanding of the Zero Hunger project, a larger project that included
a version of what later became Bolsa Família, as a right to which the poor were entitled (Ansell, 2014, p.183).
However, the language of rights was not necessarily coming from the beneficiaries. In Ansell’s
account, state officials were the ones who reproduced the idea that “the exchange relationship between
citizens and their leaders was one in which leaders were in perpetual debt to their citizens”, and that the
citizens did not owe anything because they had already paid the government through their taxes (Ansell, 2014, p.149).

Even though this argument associating social programs to the citizen’s right to expect a return
from his/her contributions may seem to be ‘common sense’, there are a couple of problems with this
argument. The first and most obvious one weakens the argument by using its own premises, namely, the
fact that the amount collected in taxes from the most destitute portion of society in need of help could
not logically justify a sense of entitlement. But it is also complicated to understand social benefits in
terms of rights if it is the case that “symbolically and juridically, the money never belongs totally to the
beneficiary, who has no right to it and cannot take legal action if denied it” (p.931). Thus, “the much-touted
spirit of ‘citizenship’ that the program generates is hence a spirit that remains incomplete” (Morton, 2014, p.931).
Shapiro (2000) locates citizenship both “in a legal, territorial entity, which is associated with the privileges of sovereignty and the rights of individuals, and in a cultural community where it is associated with a history of shared ethnic and social characteristics” (p.81). In this definition, “individual citizens, in their universality and lack of specific qualities” (Domingues, 2013, p.24), are entitled as such to rights (what Domingues calls “real abstractions”). However, the tension between citizenship and membership articulated in terms of rights should not be confused with real or strict equality. As Balibar (1995), points out, “nation-states adopt various means […] to make peace among religions, regional background or ethnic memberships” (p.59), and usually,

they are permeated with relations of force, but they are successful inasmuch as they allow the particular communities and networks, not only to become integrated in the “total community” (national citizenship), but, much more, to work as its own mediations. Recognized differences, or otherness-within-the-limits-of-citizenship, become the essential mediation of national membership (Balibar, 1995, p.60).

In contrast to the idea that rights are real abstractions and are embedded in discourses of citizens’ equality, some studies “highlight the focused and particularistic character” of the *Bolsa Família* and other social programs as capable of creating a “‘collective subjectivity’ that is sharply bounded seriality – the very large and passive bounded seriality of the very poor” (Domingues, 2013, p. 24).

In Brazil, the notion of citizenship deserves some scrutiny. Holston (2008) notes that, “from the beginning [at the inception of nationhood as expressed in the 1824 Constitution that lasted through the nineteenth century until the adoption of the Old Republic Constitution in 1891], inclusion mattered less than the kind and quality of included citizen” (p.63). Holston observes that even though

all free native-born residents may have been Brazilian national citizens, […] not all citizens had legally equal and uniform rights. Rather, the principles of equality that drove Americans and French to fight each other and to try to restrict citizenship –
principles of uniform, indivisible, individual, all-or-nothing distribution of rights – never became either the core or leading edge of Brazilian citizenship […] Indeed, the word equality does not appear in the 1824 Constitution (Holston, 2008, p.65).

Considering the historical records of discrimination and inequality in Brazil that were formalized through the initial notion of nationhood, a governmental initiative that finally turns its attention to individuals in extreme poverty, and legitimizes its actions by using the language of citizenship, deserves attention. The potentially oppressive component of programs of eradication of poverty result from the circulation of representations and expectations enabled through these new spaces of negotiation and encounter with the ‘poor’, particularly to the extent that ‘a better life’ often implies the reformation of one’s character as a condition for the construction of a ‘rich country’ or a ‘country for everyone’, as stated in the government’s campaigns.

In the next section, I expand on the argument that antipoverty policies are underlined and legitimized by normative claims about human life, and thus become another means through which the government deals with “centrifugal forms of otherness within the modern ‘nation-state’” (Shapiro, 2000, p.81). In order to illustrate this claim, I look at the story of a beneficiary of the Bolsa Família that is narrated on one of the Brazilian government websites as an example of how the program is empowered to change people’s lives. I then contrast this story with other accounts of beneficiaries who, for a variety of reasons, have not followed a similar path.

**Heroes and Anti-heroes**

*The Hero*

On one of the Brazilian government websites, there is a section where we can find stories of success about Brazilian citizens who have overcome extreme poverty and past struggles by benefiting from some of the different antipoverty social programs created or
fostered during the last decade. The individual stories in this particular platform are each related to a specific program and how the benefits of those programs have changed their lives. Dorival Filho’s story is about the benefits of the *Bolsa Família* Program. Dorival is a man who once survived by foraging in the dumping ground and now is getting his PhD in linguistics. Brazilian writer and journalist José Rezende Jr. narrates Dorival’s journey from extreme poverty to a master’s degree and now a doctorate at the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC) on the website. Dorival himself emphasizes how the small R$100 amount received from the government every month by his two sisters, combined with what he could find in the dumping ground, allowed them to start eating better and directing their energies towards the realization of their dreams. According to Dorival, hunger was not even the worst they had to face:

> We were invisible. Nobody saw us. Society did not want to see us. Not even the garbage truck driver, who was not much better off than us. It was as if we were in an inferior scale of humanity (quoted in Rezende Jr., 2015)

Dorival argues that there was no distinction between people, dogs, and vultures in the dumping ground. They were all there fighting for survival. Rezende Jr. (2015) passionately highlights the fact that Dorival’s story illustrates how “the program of direct transfer of income created a fertile ground of opportunities, upon which talent and perseverance flourishes”. In 2003, “Brazil was no longer a country governed for a few”, claims Rezende Jr. He also adds more specifically that the “*future has arrived* in the form of *Bolsa Família*, which helped to introduce in the political and social dictionary of Brazil a magical word: opportunity” (Rezende Jr., 2015). The notions of struggle, persistence, hope, and, finally, victory saturate this narration. Dorival is depicted as a hero who never gave up on school despite all the deprivations that marked his childhood. Thanks to *Bolsa Família*, he regained the strength and the hope to pursue his goals and to leave behind his scavenging of other
people’s leftovers. Dorival claims that admission at the university was his turning point, and that his next big goal is to spend part of his doctorate studying in Lyon, France (Rezende Jr., 2015).

During the 2014 electoral campaign, Dorival posted on social media: “I worked at the dumping ground, and now I am a doctoral student in linguistics at a public university because of the Bolsa Família”. His profile on Facebook was quickly the object of many reactions. Dorival claims to have received a number of offensive messages, such as “go back to the dumping ground, you dirty pig”. Dorival reacts to these comments by stating that people should earn their incomes based on merit and rejects the idea that Bolsa Família is charity or the generator of laziness by saying that “there is no meritocracy when you start the day fighting your breakfast with vultures, and other people don’t” (quoted in Rezende Jr., 2015).

Even though we are accustomed to reading stories like this that are meant to be symbols of hope and success, I am inviting the reader here to also find in this story other symbols, particularly symbols for what is not possible to achieve. The point is not to be against policies that alleviate hunger but rather to ask how this understanding of possibility and futurity could be a potentially homogenizing and oppressive move as well. How could efforts to eradicate poverty lead to a stigmatization that often prevents the poor from being seen as bearers of rights and dignity? Or, what about other individuals who do not end up with a doctoral degree or any other story of success?

On another website maintained by the Brazilian Government, in a section titled ‘Citizenship and Justice’, another series of stories about Brazilian citizens is organized under the title Brasilidade. In this section, we are invited to “know the stories of Brazilian winners”. This section is followed by descriptions of awards, inventions, creations, degrees, etc. By narrating success in this way, the government has been trying to (re)define
brasilidade (brazilianity),\(^{39}\) while also forcing into the history of the country the ‘logical’ and linear path that is expressed in and through these stories in the form of a movement from poverty to financial stability, from invisibility to recognition and awards. In this context, the Brazilian ‘people’ become the necessary embodiment of a desirable temporal trajectory for and about ‘Brazil’. And they are placed in what Bhabha (1990) calls ‘double-time’ whereby:

the people are the historical 'objects' of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pregiven or constituted historical origin or event; the people are also the 'subjects' of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principle of the people as that continual process by which the national life is redeemed and signified as a repeating and reproductive process (p.297).

What these stories reveal is that a particular positioning of Brazil in time and space requires the proper positioning of Brazilian citizens in time and space too. The Brazilian population then becomes both a legitimizing tool and a target of policies that aim at ascribing people to a particular spatiotemporal construct. Reiterating what I stated at the beginning of this chapter, the perception of Brazil as a site where “ideas are out of place”, when combined with discourses that implicitly or explicitly blame certain groups of people for any distortions in the path to success, gives birth to a different perception about Brazil as a nation where “people are out of place”, since some of them come to be seen as the embodiment of the wrong and limiting kind of ideas about the country or society.

The Anti-Hero

In 2004, with the creation of the Social Development Ministry (MDS) and the deployment of the National Program of Social Assistance (PNAS), policies aimed at targeting extreme poverty were extended to indigenous and other ethnic communities\(^{40}\). Programs such

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\(^{39}\) These stories are available at http://www.brasil.gov.br/cidadania-e-justica/brasilidade

\(^{40}\) This expansion and new agenda emerged from discussions at the V National Conference of Social Assistance. Thematic workshop 01 during the Conference dealt with ‘The Organization of the Basic Social Protection in
as *Bolsa Família* (PBF), the Program for the Eradication of Child Labor (PETI), the distribution of *cestas básicas*\(^{41}\), and the Continued Benefit Provision (BPC) were all combined in an effort to reach villages and quilombola communities\(^{42}\), communities inhabited by people classified as extremely vulnerable and in need of protection for a variety of social reasons (Quermes & De Carvalho, 2013). The MDS also started the process of establishing Social Assistance Reference Centres (CRAS) in indigenous communities to facilitate access to benefits for these communities’ members. However, Quermes and De Carvalho (2013, p.774) observe that there has been a lot of confusion about what kind of service has been offered through the CRAS. Many cases that should have been addressed in these centres have been brought to the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) or to the National Health Foundation (FUNASA), organs that are also working closely with indigenous communities, but that usually do not have the ability to provide answers to questions and issues related to the social assistance programs offered to these groups.

According to Quermes and De Carvalho’s study in Guarani communities, individuals from Guarani-Kaiowá ethnicity are extremely dependent on government assistance, as nearly 90% of the families are beneficiaries of *Bolsa Família* and have this kind of assistance as their single source of income (Quermes & De Carvalho, 2013, p. 787). Analyses such as the one developed by Quermes and De Carvalho illustrate the shortcomings of these efforts to ‘include’ indigenous groups into national policies and programs. One of Quermes and De Carvalho’s initial claims is that these programs have been unable to change the vulnerable

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\(^{41}\) In Brazil, food is usually distributed directly to families and individuals in programs that provide them with what is called a *cesta básica*, which could be translated as a basic basket of food items that are considered essential for health.

\(^{42}\) The definition provided by INCRA (National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform), the organ responsible for the designation of quilombola communities is the following: Quilombola communities are ethnic groups, predominantly constituted by rural or urban population of afro-descendants, whose self-denominated are based on specific relations to the land, territory, traditions, unique cultural practices, and ancestry. In Brazil today, INCRA estimates that there are about three thousand quilombola communities. For more information, see: http://www.incra.gov.br/quilombola. Quilombos were historically the name of villages composed by escaped slaves in Brazil.
conditions of indigenous communities because they are not designed for these social groups (Quermes & De Carvalho, 2013, p.770). Differences in the way indigenous groups are organized become a challenge for those who need assistance. Even though assistance projects recognize that expanding social benefits in the form of cash transfers to indigenous communities requires special considerations in order not to compromise local ethical and cultural values (Quermes & De Carvalho, 2013, p. 775), many inconsistencies can be found. One example is the difference between the way indigenous groups understand and organize themselves around the idea of the family. Several indigenous groups are usually not organized around nuclear families. Each ‘family’, or what they call ‘parentelas’, is composed of many members sharing the living space but who are not necessarily related to each other by blood (Quermes & De Carvalho, 2013, p. 787). According to FUNAI (2015), the distribution of benefits to indigenous groups follows the same criteria, conditions, and rules for distribution as those in place for other Brazilian citizens. Differentiated treatment was granted to them as beneficiaries is mainly related to how they can access assistance. FUNAI is supposed to follow through and organize the process from the registration stage to cash disbursements in the cities. However, beneficiaries from indigenous communities still have to fulfill all the regular requirements for remaining in the program. Requirements include having children and teenagers enrolled in school and regularly attending classes, having an updated vaccination card and monitoring the development of children up to eight years old, and having pregnant women see a doctor and go through prenatal testing (FUNAI, 2015).

_Bolsa Família_ was proposed as part of a number of other measures and programs for the immediate relief of extreme poverty and hunger. But _Bolsa Família_ was also supposed to

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43 Indigenous groups have been recognized as bearers of rights with the Federal Constitution of 1988. Among other conditions for the integration, Art. 210 prescribes a fixed minimum content in the curriculum for elementary school in order to assure a common basic education and the respect for national and regional cultural and artistic values. Par. 2 declares that all classes be taught in the Portuguese language, even though they would be granted the right to use their own languages and communication processes. All the articles related to Indigenous rights in the 1988 Constitution are available at: http://portal.mec.gov.br/secad/arquivos/pdf/cf.pdf
be a temporary program. As Dorival’s success story described above indicates, the goal was to offer families the opportunity to overcome conditions of deprivation and dependency. The problem with indigenous communities is that overcoming their current conditions of poverty through education and through job market competitiveness necessarily means that they have to be integrated into a mode of social organization that does not necessarily respect their local histories and indigenous cultural and social forms of expression. Quermes and De Carvalho (2013) note that the restriction to work, for instance, appears in many forms: “in the cultural form, it is mostly related to communication, once they may have their own languages and ways of communicating amongst them. And in the social form, it is related to the adaptation to the job market outside the social environment in the village” (p.772), something which can be straining and difficult to achieve. The expansion of assistance to these groups then masks the fact that many indigenous communities find themselves in a condition of extreme poverty and deprivation not because of a lack of opportunity, but because they are already constructed in the national imaginary as a problem (a past or obsolete social condition) that needs to be overcome. As the slogan in all the campaigns of the Brazilian government from 2011 to 2014 put it, “a rich country is a country without poverty”. The problem is that with eradication of poverty, often times the eradication of the ‘poor’ is implied as well. To repeat, I am not arguing that hunger or deprivation is part of a lifestyle that needs to be preserved, but rather that the reproduction of the idea that everyone needs to have the opportunity to be educated and to work in order to be validated as good citizens of a strong nation normalizes the conditions for human recognition and human dignity within a very limiting frame of possibilities. To use Balibar’s (1995) definition of ‘normalization’:

normality is not the simple fact of adopting customs and obeying rules or laws: it means internalizing representations of the “human type” or the “human subject” (not exactly an essence, but a norm and a standard behavior) in order to be recognized as a person in its full right, to become presentable (fit to be seen) in order to be represented. To become responsible (fit to be answered) in order to be respected
As a result, we sustain exclusions and discriminations against representations of the ‘human type’ that do not conform to the expectations of a ‘better life’ expressed in the sections above. In 2011, the Missionary Indigeneity Council (CIMI) published a report on violence against the indigenous people of Brazil. In this report, CIMI listed about twenty specific cases of humiliation, discrimination, assassination, and other forms of rights violations during that year. Many groups continue to be threatened by an economy of meanings and representations that locks them into a position from which they necessarily have to evolve if they desire to become presentable (fit to be seen) and responsible (fit to be answered), to use Balibar’s terms. To name a few cases, in Roraima and Amazonas, the Yanomamis have denounced the construction of small illegal airports, as well as the illicit activities of miners who are polluting the rivers and the land, causing diseases and making them even more vulnerable, given the pathologies that come with pollution of water and land (CIMI, 2011, p.12). The Xingu people of Mato Grosso are also constantly endangered by studies about the implementation of hydroelectric plants, new waterways, or highways in a region where there are already problems related to water scarcity and to the pollution of the Xingu and Culuene rivers (CIMI, 2011, p.12).

Some of the major problems indigenous communities face are related to racism. Miscegenation, for instance, is presented as a problem, particularly when, as a result, some groups are not seen as authentic indigenous groups. The division between “pure indians” and “impure indians” becomes an excuse to treat “impure” indigenous groups as a lower race. They are often accused of fraud when they demand rights as members of an indigenous culture (CIMI, 2011, p.14). In its report, CIMI found that this argument has been used to refuse “impure” groups access to health, education, and other basic services (CIMI, 2011, p.14). Some cases of discrimination against indigenous groups illustrate the presence of a
discrimination that runs much deeper than the kinds of exclusions that are tied to federal assistance programs.

In Manaus, indigenous people from the Saterê-Mawe groups were discriminated against when they moved to a more urbanized area. Their neighbors would tell them ‘to go back to the forest’. In the schools, indigenous children from this group were reported to be constant targets of bullying and not allowed to express their indigenous culture (CIMI, 2011, p.89). In Campo Grande, Mato Grosso, three students from the Guarani Kaiowá people were prohibited by a school superintendent from speaking Guarani while at school, and they were asked to sign a letter promising that they would not speak Guarani again (CIMI, 2011, p.90).

As Bhabha points out, “it is from this incommensurability in the midst of the everyday that the nation speaks its disjunctive narrative” (Bhabha, 1990, p.311). From the “margins of modernity, at the insurmountable extremes of storytelling, we encounter the question of cultural difference as the perplexity of living, and writing, the nation” (Bhabha, 1990, p.311). While some may describe these cases as isolated incidents caused by a few malicious people, even a brief mention of these situations suggests that stigmatization is systematic and, more crucially, that citizenship is never complete when conditions for belonging become the foundation for a form of national hierarchization. Even though Bolsa Familia might have successfully alleviated hunger, undernourishment, and extreme poverty in some cases, it has failed to open up radically different ways of thinking about difference and belonging in Brazil. In the next section, I explore the struggle between the desire to become a nation and the impossibility for the nation to exist as a unified and homogenous spatiotemporal construct. I also develop the argument that destabilization of a homogenizing and hierarchizing spatiotemporal way of thinking requires one to rethink the turn to the future.
Temporal Disjunctions

Dorival’s story and the stories of the various experiences of indigenous people with assistance programs in Brazil illustrate the “critical relationship between the spaces of temporal presence and the politics of citizenship” (Shapiro, 2000, p.83). There are many ways in which the state “attempts at monopolizing the staging of citizenship”, and these practices usually require “as part of its pedagogy of national unity, […] the fram[ing] of its encounter with the prior inhabitants of its territory in a way that keeps them (indigenes) off the national stage (Shapiro, 2000, p.85). As we can see through the different stories presented above, no integration is ever complete when eradicating ‘otherness’ also requires the eradication of the other. Racism is ingrained in social and political imaginaries, particularly “if we look at race as an interrelated set of material, ideological, and epistemological practices” (Persaud & Walker, 2001, p.374). Not even Dorival, after receiving a master’s degree and embodying the ideal promoted by the national propaganda, could avoid being seen, in a pejorative way, as a man who needed assistance in order to get out of his dumping ground. If we were to acknowledge disjointed forms of presence, as Shapiro (2000) suggests, “a politics of citizenship w[ould] require a continuous renegotiation of the aggregation of difference, an appreciation of an uneasy coexistence of subjects who live in overlapping but different temporal traces” (p.85). Nancy (1991) notes that “the communication that takes place on this limit, and that, in truth, constitutes it, demands that way of destining ourselves in common that we call a politics, that way of opening community to itself, rather than to a destiny or to a future” (Nancy, 1991, p.80).

Instead of accepting uncritically slogans, policies, programs, agendas, and discourses about the ‘togetherness’ of Brazil, “we may begin by questioning that progressive metaphor of modern social cohesion — the many as one — shared by organic theories of the holism of culture and community, and by theorists who treat gender, class, or race as radically
'expressive' social totalities” (Bhabha, 1990, p.294). The production of ‘racial sameness’, with the expectation, for instance, that everyone should be integrated into a particular way of being and should be part of one productive body “has long been, an integral aspect of a general strategy of inscribing the principles of national solidarity and the broader cultural framework of citizenship” (Persaud & Walker, 2001, p. 375). But the idea of ‘sameness’ is also constantly slipping away. If we were to look at issues of intersectionality between race and class in Brazil, we would notice that the emergence of a middle class in Brazil reveals how integrating difference is a constantly postponed endeavor. There are quantitative and qualitative studies now that seek to classify the ‘new middle class’ according to criteria that try to distinguish it from a traditional middle class classification, such as occupational traits or labor market insertion (Kerstenetzky et al., 2015, p.25). What this means is that, even if marginalized groups in the country assume the risk of becoming the embodiment of Brazil’s future, the markers of prestige and position keep on changing. For instance, if once the markers of social status and social positioning were directly related to monetary compensation in the form of a salary, we have now entered an era in which “the salary is not measured like a wage in terms of work done” (Isin, 1997, p.129) but rather according to the status and position assigned to different professional occupations. As I argued about the question and discourse of prophecy about the future in and for Brazil in Chapter 2, the same can be said to apply to Brazilian society: one cannot win a race that has no finish line. Competing itself may not be the problem. But it does become a problem when competition inspires the reformation of character that leads to self-destruction. As Fanon (2008) argued, “There is no white world, there is no white ethic, any more than there is a white intelligence” (Fanon, 2008, p.179), and one should not seek in ‘history’ the meaning of one’s destiny.

Back to the Future
In October 2015, Palmas, a city located in the state of Tocantins in Brazil, hosted the I World Indigenous Games. The slogan for the event was *Agora todos somos indígenas* [Now we are all indigenous]. Some of the countries that confirmed participation in the indigenous games were Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, United States, Ethiopia, Philippines, Finland, Guatemala, French Guiana, Mexico, Mongolian, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Russia, and Uruguay. In Brazil alone, participation included a multiplicity of ethnicities, such as Assuriní, Bororo Boe, Guarani Kaiowá, Javaé Itya Mahâdu, Kamayura, Karajá, Kayapó Mebêngökre, Kyikatêjê, Parakatêjê, Matis, Paresi, Pataxò, Tapirapê, Terena, Wai Wai, Xavante, Xerente, Kaingang, Manoki, Kura Bakairi, Kanela, Kuikuro, Erikibaktsa, and Mamaindê.

In contrast to the sports mega-events discussed in Chapter 4, the silence and lack of visibility that accompanied these World Indigenous Games (an event that gathered indigenous groups from at least 20 different countries and dozens of different ethnicities or nationalities) was remarkable. While the selection of Rio de Janeiro to host the Olympic and Paralympic games inspired Lula to claim that this recognition was the sign that Brazil had left the category of second-class citizen and finally become a first-class citizen, what did it mean for Brazil to host the first World Indigenous Games? On the official website of the I World Indigenous Games⁴⁴, we can find the claim that ‘in Tocantins, modernity coexists with tradition’.⁴⁵ However, the few references one is able to find about tradition seem to emphasize the display of tradition on this occasion as a way to attract tourism and investment to modernize the region. Besides the brief acknowledgement of the participation of the Intertribal Committee – Indigenous Science and Memory (ITC) in the organization of the

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⁴⁴ Information about the I World Indigenous Games is available at http://www.i-games2015.com
⁴⁵ Even though Tocantins has an indigenous population of about 10,000, according to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), a search at the website of the government of Tocantins (tocantins.mg.gov.br) for the words “*indígenas*” [indigenous] or “*índios*” [Indians] only returns one result about the history of the struggle between Portuguese and indigenous people in Brazil in the region, reifying the image of indigenous struggles as an element of the past.
event, the emphasis is on the legacy to the city in terms of the infrastructure created as a result of preparing and hosting the games. Lieutenant Cleyton Alen, President of the Fundesportes (Municipal Foundation of Sports and Leisure), states that “with no doubt, the greatest benefits of the realization of the games in Palmas went to sport”. He highlighted the fact that the planning committee for the event could count on the support of renowned national athletes, and the opportunity opened up a space for increased expertise and valorization of local professionals. It is interesting to observe that the infrastructure was not necessarily related to the indigenous games. On the website, it is also explained that the funding received from the Federal Government was connected to the construction of two units of the Center of Sports Initiation (CIEs), a Center of Excellence in Soccer, a Supercross track, and an Olympic pool.

The notion that “we are all indigenous” deployed in the games’ slogan was confronted by protests organized by indigenous people from Brazil who interrupted the games to demand respect for their rights to the land and to a space that would allow them to fully and freely express themselves. They claimed to be concerned about how the event could distract audiences from the realities faced by the indigenous people of Brazil. Natanel Karajá expressed his frustration: “why are they making such a big event such as this one and do nothing in relation to the demarcation of our lands, to ensure our legal rights, our culture, and our religion”? (Carneiro, 2015) Even though protests and similar questions have surrounded the organization of the mega-sports events as well, the I World Indigenous Games were marked by an astonishing inability on the part of the authorities to address the issue of difference. In her opening speech at the event, Rousseff (2015) referred to indigenous people as “important to our civilization”, and she saluted manioc as an indigenous contribution to Brazilian history. Within four minutes into her speech, Rousseff used the words ‘civilization’

46 During the Indigenous games, an amendment, PEC 215, was approved, passing the responsibility to determine indigenous lands from the executive to the legislative, which some suggest are highly influenced by agriculture companies.
and ‘evolution’ three times, and mentioned indigenous groups in Brazil mainly in relation to their legacy and almost as if they were no longer ‘there’.

Very often, critics of development and progress are accused of romanticizing tradition or even a pre-modern era. In this chapter, my aim has not been to value the past over the future, or the local over the global. Instead, this chapter can be read as a protest against the continuing displacement of certain groups of people from the future. I have called for a destabilization of narratives and images that lock humanity into a self-destructive and exclusionary mode of ‘becoming’ often disguised as the most natural and pure form of salvation. In this sub-section, I wish to further explore and contrast the notions of ‘return’ and ‘salvation’ that often appear in narratives surrounding the Zero Hunger and Bolsa Família programs, but are also found in the reclaiming of space and history expressed by people who have been silenced and excluded from the process of constitution of ‘our’ world and ‘our’ history.

In Chapter 2, I argued that the dominant images surrounding the organization of past, present, and future in Brazil, combined with a particular understanding of Brazil’s position in the world, have been saturated by theological symbols and concepts embedded in the prophetic nature of the concept of the future and the idea of Brazil’s self-realization. In the twenty-first century, the language of salvation seems to be deployed to reconcile a desire for greatness about Brazil with efforts by the government to unify Brazilian society behind a particular ‘progressive’ trajectory that involves bringing the poor to the future.

For Aaron Ansell (2014), the “messianic aura” of the Zero Hunger Program is manifested by the propaganda campaign launched by President Lula right after assuming power in January 2003. With many of the newly appointed federal ministers, Lula went on a Misery Tour. According to Ansell (2014),
part of Zero Hunger’s propaganda campaign, this camera-friendly tour featured Lula’s well-dressed, light-completed statesmen hiking through the brown-skinned reality of Brazil’s destitute Northeast: the Vila Irmã Dulce in Teresina, the shantytown Brasília Teimosa in Recife, the Vale do Jequitinhonha in the north of Minas Gerais, and Zero Hunger’s other pilot town in Piauí (p.92).

Lula is presented not only as the Misery Tour guide, but also as the embodiment of future possibilities that were finally being given to Brazilian people. Lula was “the poor caipira from the backlands of Pernambuco who left his town to seek his fortune in the city” (Ansell, 2014, p.92). It is worthy looking at a more detailed description of Lula’s story provided by the Lula Institute website. The following portion of Lula’s story, labeled “The Source”, states the following:

A “sertanejo” — a man of the land — above all is a man of strength. Coined by famous writer Euclides da Cunha, the word seemed to adjust to Lula’s personality since the day he was born. A man of the Northeast, poor, the seventh son of illiterate farm workers, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was born in 1945 in a two-room shack with an earthen floor in the semiarid zone of Pernambuco. With no electricity, running water, inside bathroom or shoes, the boy was seven years old when he climbed up on a “pau-de-arara” (“parrots perch” — a flatbed truck with boards set up for seating, a poor man's bus), and following the same star as thousands of other Brazilians, headed off to the marvelous land to the south with his mother and brothers to find his father who had left a few weeks before Lula was born in search for a better life far from drought and poverty (Instituto Lula, 2016).

Lula’s family journey in search of a better life in the city and his personal journey towards ‘power’ later became the main source of legitimacy for this campaign by insisting on his ‘return’ to (his) ‘origins’. Such a return to origins would carry a message of hope for all those who were ‘left behind’. While Ansell (2014) associates the “messianic aura” of the “pilgrimage” with “a redemptive return of privileged Brazilians to the locus of tradition and humble simplicity” or with “the return of the prodigal son to his honest humble origins” (as Lula walked through Garanhuns, Pernambuco, where he was born) (Ansell, 2014, p.93), I believe that the “messianic aura” is clearly connected to the symbolic image of the savior. The prodigal son burns the bridge behind him when he comes back, full of shame, to his
origins, whereas Lula ‘comes back’ with a different purpose, which seems to be more clearly related to helping the poor to cross the bridge he had himself crossed before from a past of misery to a future full of achievements and success.

A particular emphasis on ‘rescuing’ the poor appears in many of Ansell’s narrated experiences with agents involved in the implementation of the Zero Hunger development project and with beneficiaries of the programs in the Northeast region of Brazil. In one of his experiences in Passarinho, Ansell follows the representatives from the state Bureau of Planning, the Rural Extension and Technical Assistance Company, the Brazilian Agricultural Support Company, and the Zero Hunger Coordination Team in a meeting with a village woman, who had “volunteered her cornfield for an experiment in sustainable development” (Ansell, 2014, p.98). Ansell (2014) observes the tension that emerges when Emília, the village woman “praises the Food Card policy instead of picking up on the CDR representative’s suggestion that she (and other beneficiaries) value Zero Hunger’s more ‘structural projects’ in addition to its cash grant” (Ansell, 2014, p.99). Against the critique, often directed towards what is pejoratively referred to as “assistencialismo”, based on the expectation that “the (lazy) poor would choose to remain dependent on the state’s handouts, the state agents […] tried to solicit an opposing discourse from Emília only to hear her affirm only the cash grant” (Ansell, 2014, p.99).

Lula’s Misery Tour and the different stories of success that are meant to display the transcendence of the past became important symbols for the potential of programs geared towards the eradication of poverty in Brazil. The ‘return’ in this context then resembles a movement in which one returns to the past from a future of possibilities and opportunities, only to invite the ones still stuck in the ‘past’ to follow the new lead and leaders. Within this temporal frame, the ‘other’ is left with two options: either it jumps on board the boat of
progress as the national territory (as the temporal container) is filled with the ‘right’ history, or it drowns to the bottom of the ocean.

As a consequence of the continuing reproduction of these limiting conditions of existence in world history and across the world map driven by a quest to future presence, some groups have been eradicated. Other groups, realizing that being overwritten by history is perhaps a better option, look for a different kind of return. In September 2012, after a judicial decision was issued demanding the eviction of Guarani-Kaiowá communities from a land (Pyelito Kue/Mbarakay) that had been demarcated for them more than 100 years ago, a group of 50 men, 50 women, and 70 children from these communities signed a petition sent to the Brazilian government in which they evaluated their situation, gave up the Brazilian Justice system, and asked that the government perpetrate their collective death, eradicate them, and bury them all together in their land (Pyelito Kue/Mbarakay). Pyelito Kue/Mbarakay is the land where their ancestors had lived and where they had been buried. For this reason, it is a sacred place for Guarani-Kaiowá communities, and they are reclaiming their right to be buried there, even if that means their eradication (CIMI, 2012).

A return to the future requires working through the holes of the spatial and temporal container, “strip[ping] away the layers of white mythology” (Nielsen, 2013, p.345) that have denied the future to certain groups and their forms of life expression. I use life expression instead of culture as a way to avoid reifying the term ‘culture’. My goal with this analysis is not the preservation or their (re)location to a space previously designated as theirs. What I am proposing here instead is a revision of the current spatiotemporal construct that could open space and time to different representations of, about, and in the future and that would allow for the return of those who have been deemed not ‘presentable’ or ‘responsible’. The return of the ‘past’ (or of the presences and images that have been relegated as representations of the past) to the future does not imply stopping time or the flow of progress. But it calls for the
possibility that different coordinates can start to indicate what moving forward means.

**The Myth of Origin**

How do we resist the identity-fixing effect and the homogenization of the temporal stories of citizen-subjects? Shapiro (2000) suggests that “claims of the political must involve a continuous recognition of persons whose ways of being-in-time are diverse” (Shapiro, 2000, p.94). The problem with this solution is that we would need to be clearer about what it means to ‘recognize’. Rhetorically, the recognition of difference can be found everywhere, from official documents to all sorts of pro-diversity campaigns. As has been already suggested in Chapter 2, ‘modernity’ or ‘progress’ needs the ‘other’ “in order to assert its sovereignty as the universal ideal […] if it could actualize itself in the real world as the truly universal, it would destroy itself” (Chatterjee, 1986, *apud* Bhabha, 1990, p.293). Perhaps we should consider the fact that the ‘international’ has been traditionally built upon the concept of a ‘state of nature’ that, some scholars affirm, has been developed from the European encounter with Amerindian communities (Jahn, 1999). The return of the past to the future in this case would possibly also mean the dissolution of the “basis for an implicit construction of the international realm” (Jahn, 1999, p.421). As Jahn (1999) explains

*By introducing the state of nature as a universal condition from which humankind started its historical development the European authors introduced one linear time scale into the history of humanity. And, furthermore, the explanations which the European authors developed for the movement of humanity from one to the other stage of development, justified and naturalized the particular European path of development, state-building, private property, money (Jahn, 1999, p.423).*

In this chapter, my emphasis on indigenous groups as anti-heroes in their inability to conform to the expectations of antipoverty policies and to the new representation of the Brazilian nation as a ‘rich country’ does not mean that other groups, and other differences, are less relevant for a critique. However, given the classification of peoples in history in
relation to their proximity to or distance from what came to be understood as the starting point of development or progress, namely, the state of nature (Jahn, 1999, p.430), discussing the distribution of different life expressions across a spatiotemporal scale calls for a revisiting of the ‘myth’ of origin from where time is said to have emerged.

When the other is the condition for the reproduction of privileged positions, recognition of the ‘other’ as the ‘other’ is not the solution. As Eduardo Viveiro de Castro (2014) notes,

Overestimating one's own humanity to the detriment of the contemptible other's reveals one's deep resemblance with it. Since the other of the Same (of the European) shows itself to be the same as the Other's other (of the indigenous), the Same ends up unwittingly showing itself to be the same as the Other (p.51).

If this is so, instead of trying to ‘rescue’ the other in a constant effort to bring it ‘up’ or ‘forward’, we should pay more attention to the reproduction of privileged positions and temporalities and perhaps to the possibility of (or resistance to) the surrender or annihilation of the privileged ‘self’ that has been sustained by and through an international order of competition.
Conclusion

The main question guiding this dissertation has been: How are discourses about Brazil’s emergence as a global actor aiming to confront the asymmetries of the current world order reinforcing particular temporal and spatial formations that enable the perpetuation of international hierarchies? This question was initially inspired by the disseminated perception, explored throughout the dissertation, that Brazil was emerging as a leader of and for the ‘third world’, one that would be able to transform the hierarchical structures of the international system from within. This perception was reinforced by economic indicators, widely accepted (or assumed) as evidence of the strengthening of Brazil’s position by the end of last decade, combined with Lula’s anti-imperialistic rhetoric and his assertive position in multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations (UN), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Departing from an understanding that there are scripts governing the realm of the possible and the visible in international politics, this dissertation proposed an analysis of what defined the conditions of possibility for Brazil’s emergence to the global stage as a preeminent global player. By looking at discourses about Brazil’s position and positioning in international politics, this dissertation has explored implicit and explicit rules that define the possibilities for one to be seen as a ‘legitimate presence in the future’ and what these spatiotemporal constructs mean about what is allowed as repetition and as change in the world. What has been said about how ‘Brazil’ (as a representation, an image, and a polity) is or should be accepted and recognized on the global stage, or about how it is deemed insufficiently qualified to be featured amongst the great powers, reveals ways in which “we are now able, or unable, to conceive of other possibilities, other forms of political identity and community, other histories, other futures” (Walker, 1993, p.14).

This is not to say that different histories, different political identities and
communities, and different images about the future are not possible or do not exist beyond the dominant spatiotemporal constructs reproduced through practices and discourses underlying the notion of successfully reaching a relevant position on the global stage and a space in the political imagery of the future. However, as I have been arguing throughout this dissertation, focusing on the marginalized stories, actors, and images without also looking at the pervasiveness of hegemonic discourses, normative claims, and representations of success does not necessarily lead to the destabilization of the hierarchies between the established positions of political actors in time and space. It also does not necessarily open the discursive space to a reframing and a rearticulation of the current distributions of the good, the bad, and the ugly in world politics. Against the expectation accepted by some scholars that a ‘politics of place’ could represent an alternative to the constant reproduction of the notion of places as nodes in a global competitive system (Escobar, 2008, p.64-67), I have tried to illustrate how easily places and bodies do disappear as a result of transformations that are deemed necessary in the name of the future, of prestige, of a higher status on the global stage, or even in the name of a better life. Perhaps we should not ignore the ways in which ‘place’ is already marked by spatiotemporal resolutions in modern thought and the practices that are deeply embedded in the way boundaries have been established between tradition (past) and modernity (future), local and global, difference and identity, and so on. Thus, the question we should probably ask is how our perception of our ‘journey to somewhere else’ is playing out through assumptions about these boundaries. As Shaw argues (2004),

the disciplining of thought almost perfectly reproduces the divisions of time and space expressed by sovereignty: the discipline of politics focuses on what happens inside states under state sovereignty; international relations is concerned with what happens outside states and state sovereignty; anthropology with what happens before state sovereignty; sociology with what happens "under" the structures of governance; the divide between "micro" and "macro" economics echoes the same architecture, and so on (Shaw, 2004, p.13).
What the disciplinary boundaries Shaw refers to suggest is that ‘localization’ and ‘universalization’ are possibly paradigmatic of modern ways of thinking time and space. For this reason, this dissertation has not focused too much on the problematization of ‘levels’. But it has focused on the question of the adoption, reproduction, and dissemination of particular coordinates through which certain movements, appearances, and transformations in space are materialized in time, and thus become exemplars of the movement of time itself. While focusing on the exploration of the coordinates across which images of ‘here’ and ‘there’ are distributed, and on how ‘emergence’ reflects a set of rules for visibility and for becoming a presence in time and of time, this analysis, as a whole, has not been particularly concerned with being contained within any one of the disciplinary traditions mentioned above.

**Intertextuality and Interdisciplinarity**

Interdisciplinarity and intertextuality have been key elements of this dissertation, and the organization of the different chapters has aimed to illustrate how some concepts, expectations, and ontologies are simply assumed in the reproduction of other narratives. In this sense, we cannot only look at what is said, but we also have to examine what allegedly does not need to be said, since the connections between concepts, meanings, and images have already been established before what is said has been enabled within the realm of intelligibility. What I have tried to show about the different narratives that are weaved together with the narrative about Brazil’s emergence is that we should not take any of these stories (about progress, order, sovereignty, international citizenship, or social inclusion) for granted as a totality, since any story necessarily emerges out of and with other stories that are always already present as pre-texts and conditions of possibility for its emergence.

This dissertation has engaged different literatures that are often confined within
different fields of study. This does not mean that disciplinary boundaries are stable, and it also does not imply that I have posited a referent object as a stabled ‘thing’ that I have intended to analyze from different perspectives or disciplines. In contrast to an understanding of the object of study (in this case, Brazil) as a whole whose parts are to be analyzed from different angles by theorists and analysts from different fields, I have suggested that the so-called object of study was never really ‘there’ waiting to be analyzed. It was and is always moving as it is reinvented by analysts and practices of representation that aim to stabilize its meaning. What we understand as the reality of 'Brazil' is intrinsically connected with what one is able to see and conceptualize as ‘Brazil’ or in relation to ‘Brazil’. This does not imply that we should ignore the physicality of the world, but rather that we need to consider the ways in which the physical world is itself shaped by practices that are more often than not enacted through conceptualizations. For instance, in each one of the chapters, Brazil has been represented and positioned according to a different concept, such as progress, sovereignty, international security, international citizenship, and social inclusion. And each one of these concepts has enacted different boundaries, images, expectations, and possibilities that have shaped experience of ‘Brazil’ in fundamental ways. Consequently, by taking conceptualizations for granted, scholars often end up being responsible for the reification of particular 'Brazils' because their effort is to discern, compare, and hierarchize, in order to try to make sense of ‘reality’.

A Story of Many Tales

Similar to the way the "novelistic representational practices are governed to a larger extent by the evolving rules of representation characteristic of the novelistic genre" (Shapiro, 1989, p.11), when we look at the world as a text, we find that representational practices are governed in the different spheres of social life according to their own evolving rules of
representation. Michael Shapiro suggests that, “to regard the world of 'international relations' as a text, therefore, is to inquire into the style of its scripting, to reveal the way it has been mediated by historically specific scripts governing the interpretations through which it has emerged” (Shapiro, 1989, p.11). By doing so, we may be able to associate the stories around the emergence of Brazil that have been told in each chapter of this dissertation with a particular type of plot, a particular conception of the world, and a particular composition of the script of international politics.

As the unfolding of the different chapters has suggested, ‘Brazil’ acquires different meanings depending on the kinds of narratives one is engaging. Chapter 2 explored narratives that present Brazil as a political and economic actor who desires to be and expects to emerge as a global player ‘in the future’, with a stronger voice in international decision-making processes. In this context, economic indicators, such as GDP annual growth, or inflation rates, among others, have defined Brazil’s position in time and space. In Chapter 3, Brazil was presented as an actor whose spatio-temporal positioning as a member of the club of great powers depends on the transformation of Brazil’s self-representation as a leader of the developing world (discussed in Chapter 2), since ‘third-worldism’ prevents the country from being recognized as responsible and mature enough to be involved in matters of international security (as a powerful decision-maker would). Chapters 4 and 5 examined discourses about ‘Brazil’ in which Brazil is no longer predominantly an actor, but a government, a society, a space of struggle, and a space of a multiplicity for different ‘Brazils’. In this context, there is not one ‘Brazil’ as an actor who is emerging to the future and to the global stage, but rather a number of stories, bodies, desires, and life expressions that are often shaped, affected, displaced, and oppressed by notions of ‘Brazil’ as an actor or as a homogenous entity who is ‘playing’ the political game allegedly required in and by the international field.
Even though my main goal has been to destabilize some meanings that have served as ‘stabilizers’ for stories about an ‘emerging Brazil’, I also have to acknowledge that there is probably no way to totally destabilize the historicization of the present. Even though I have tried to show how the predominant discourses and practices that sustain each institutionalized platform of political performance (the international economic stage in chapter 2, the international security stage in chapter 3, the international stage of first-class citizenship in chapter 4, and the stage of national politics in chapter 5) have allowed or prevented ‘Brazil’ to feature as an important player in the primary plot of world politics, I recognize that my analysis of these representations and their effects for something called ‘Brazil’ remains at times an oversimplification of more complex interactions. While writing this dissertation, I had to accept that I would inevitably have to deal with the fact that my analysis would, to some degree, either stabilize ‘Brazil’ as an unintended consequence of exposing the narratives and discussing different practices coherently, or risk being as messy and unstructured as the story about Brazil’s big moment. The result is that I may have presented some transformations and movements as outcomes of an oversimplified desire to ‘move forward’, to be in the future, and to reach the global stage.

Nevertheless, the fact that not all transformations can be attributed to a totalizing desire for greatness or to the ruthless winds of progress does not make an exploration of the assumptions behind questions such as “is it time for Brazil?” or “is Brazil the country of future no more?” less relevant, especially when these questions are followed by studies that often are based on collections of circumstances and indicators that scholars representationally force together to justify or explain a specific account of the present in relation to a future that, they assume, to be not only acceptable, desirable and intelligible, but also excludes other futures from the realm of possibility, of visibility, and intelligibility.
The Price of the Future

In international and domestic politics, sovereign states are a form of presence (embodied by politicians, citizens, and other representatives and agents) whose circulation is defined by the dominant language about who gets what, when, and how. As argued from the beginning of this analysis, states have been defined through a kind of language that reproduces an order of competition, in which past, present, and future become spaces for the distribution of winners and losers. Visibility and recognition, in this context, require a commitment to the rules of the game. But as one commits to the game, one is automatically locked into a position of ‘inadequacy’ or ‘incompleteness’ while victory remains on the horizon of expectation. While the representation and the expectation do not always match, what can be understood as a reality in which ‘ideas are out of place’ starts to be defined as a distortion that justifies policies that blame particular bodies for this distortion and transform these bodies into the ‘things’ that are out of place and in need of correction or improvement.

The path towards the future seems to be correlated with not only profound transformations in the legal, economic, and social structures of the country, but also with an increasing investment in practices “directed toward the performances of the body”, operated by a kind of power “whose highest function [is…] to invest life through and through” (Foucault, 1978, p.139). Within this frame of possibilities, the management of movement from ‘here’ to ‘there’ and from ‘now’ to ‘then’ often becomes deeply entrenched in and dependent on the management of the movement of different bodies (as was more directly explored in chapters 4 and 5). This need to control the freedom and the contingency of bodies and to confine these bodies within certain boundaries that define what is acceptable (many times expressed in terms of legality and illegality) or desirable is often justified by a declared need for the continuous management of uncertainty (See Dillon, 2007). The lack of control or the failure to ‘virtuously’ manage uncertainty is then characterized as the cause of ‘economic
stagnation’, social unrest, or all sorts of ‘crises’ that are presented as obstacles to a natural desire to move forward and to follow the course of progress.

**Chronotopic and Aesthetic Conditions of Representation**

This dissertation is ultimately about the conditions of possibility for the circulation of meanings, and representations. This is why it started with the assumption that "language, as a treasure-house of images, is fundamentally chronotopic" (Bakhtin, 1981, p.251). The conditions for Brazil's representability in the economic, political, military, social, or cultural arenas are created, reproduced, and performed according to different practices of 'materialization of time in space', to once again use Bakhtin’s definition of chronotopic conditions of representations. It is through language that one creates the conditions for the appearance of particular images and representations in time and space, because it is through language that we organize cognitively the positions and meanings of each ‘presence’ (or image) and define how it is able to move.

The distribution of positions, meanings, and images in international and national politics is intrinsically related to the distribution of the desirable and the disgusting, or the good and the bad, across the spectrum of the visible and the invisible, as seen in Chapters 4 and 5. Most narratives about the future explored in this dissertation not only encourage the exaltation of that which is seen as beautiful, virtuous, and honorable, but they also define and reproduce aesthetic boundaries. These boundaries, in turn, end up legitimizing policies aiming to clean and sanitize spaces through the eradication of the ‘dirty’, the ‘bad’, and the ‘ugly’.

As Opondo and Shapiro (2012) note, "by treating [International Relations] as a form of aesthetic practice, we get an insight into how international conflicts and relations are reproduced through representation/mimetic practices" (p.9). The genre of international
politics itself can be presented "as a representative regime of the redistribution of the sensible in so far as sovereignty and subjectivity attempt to secure the same traumatic lack, gap or anarchy that such formulations themselves require in order to remain relevant and viable” (Opondo and Shapiro, 2012, p.9). This approach to international politics as a form of aesthetic practice, as sensory experience and a mode of subjectivity enable us to explore questions "about what is seen, and what can be said about it, about who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, about the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Rancière, 2004, p.12).

Given the aesthetic character informing the distribution of the different positions in time and space, the contemporary literature on the 'emergence' of Brazil to the international stage can be read in relation to the type of hero that is being enabled and excluded within and through these stories about successes and failures as one engage in the international competition for relevance and significance. As Bakhtin notes in his investigation of historical topologies of the novel, the particular type of plot, the specific conception of the world, and the way the different stories are composed all define the image of the hero. Thus, each category of novel can be classified “according to how the image of the main hero is constructed” (Bakhtin, 1986, p.10). In relation to the novel of human emergence, in which a major theme is “the image of man in the process of becoming in the novel” (Bakhtin, 1986, p.19), we find, for instance, following possible scenarios: the hero whose change and emergence does not become the plot; the hero whose change acquires plot significance, thus forcing the entire plot to be reinterpreted and reconstructed; and the hero who emerges with the world, reflecting the historical emergence of the world itself (Bakhtin, 1986, p.21-23). With regards to the image of the hero that is enabled in international politics, the story about Brazil’s emergence might be revealing. While Lula presented ‘Brazil’ at the beginning of his mandate as the anti-imperial hero who would force all the plot of international politics to be
reinterpreted and reconstructed, the subsequent efforts to conform to the plot and the failure to sustain the ‘emergence’ seem to point to a structure in which the hero is often constructed and restrained by the plot itself. Within Brazil, while the emergence of heroes such as Dorival becomes the condition for the establishment and legitimation of the ‘time of the nation’ informed by the notion of ‘Brasilidade’, the destiny of the hero is shaped for him, and the hero’s emergence and recognition actually requires the reformation of his character along the journey.

Even though I did not frame my analysis of the 'emerging subject' explicitly as an aesthetic subject, in this dissertation, I have been engaged in an examination of the narratives about the 'emergence' of Brazil as a relevant actor on the international political stage that reveals "regimes for the 'distribution of bodies into function' [that] determine what bodies are recognizable and what they can and cannot do within the spaces and times they occupy” (Rancière, 1998, p.101, *apud* Opondo and Shapiro, 2012, p.2). By moving away from traditional analyses of diplomacy and foreign policy that focus on the behavior of actors as a reflection of given interests, necessities, and desires, and towards an investigation that is akin to the distribution of the sensible, the movement of Brazil in time and space is less significant in terms of what is revealed about Brazil “than what [the movement] tell us about the world to which [it] belong” (Shapiro, 2013, p.11).

My contribution with this dissertation has been to offer an approach that deals with the practices through which time is materialized not only in an abstract space, but also in actual bodies and places. An intervention in politics that challenges the disciplinary limitations imposed by a rationality that focuses on a narrow idea of the 'real world' tainted by the supremacy of stability and predictability is crucial if one wants to "imagine the future not as simple unfolding of the logic of the present, but as a process of rediscovery and reimagination" (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004, p.217). But in order to challenge what has
been perceived as logical, rational, obvious, and intelligible processes of rediscovery and reimagination, and as I stated in Chapter 1, one needs to dare not to know.
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