Social Capital and Government Performance in American Urban Counties

John Robert Tennert

Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

Public Administration and Public Affairs

Larkin S. Dudley, Chair
Karen M. Hult
Anne M. Khademian
Nicholas P. Lovrich

June 15, 2016
Blacksburg, Virginia

Keywords: public administration, social capital, government performance,
trust, civic engagement, U.S. counties

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ABSTRACT

Civil society and social capital have become staples of political science and public administration since the publication of Robert Putnam's landmark book *Making Democracy Work* in 1993 and his bestseller *Bowling Alone* in 2000. The research presented here explores the role of social capital and trust in enhancing institutional performance. Specifically, this dissertation analyzes the dynamics of social capital and government performance in metropolitan county governments. The dissertation also explores alternative theoretical approaches that have recently or historically been proposed as predictors or determinants of government performance in public administration and political science scholarship.

The results reported here indicate that many of the dimensions of social capital are significantly correlated with government performance. The results suggest that counties with citizens that are more open to taking risks, that are more open-minded and less averse to change, that have faith in major political and economic institutions, that are more optimistic and that are more trusting of people they perceive to be like themselves, tend to have higher performing governments. The results also indicate that the relationship between the various dimensions of social capital and government performance is more nuanced than portrayed by a simple bi-variate correlation analysis, suggesting that the relationship between government performance and social capital is strongest at the margins – that is, among both the highest and lowest performing county governments.

Dedication

For Joseph and Mathias

Author's Acknowledgments

I always imagined that the acknowledgements section would be the most eloquently written part of my dissertation – a testament to all of the people who helped make it possible. I imagined that it would be at once poetic and humorous and would be loved by all. Now as I sit to actually write to these many people, the words seem inadequate to the gratitude I feel. I have no wit or prose to offer – only thanks.

Donald Davidson's seminal collection of essays entitled *Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation* is dedicated to the memory of W.V.O. Quine with the words "without whom not." The same sentiment applies to Professors Larkin S. Dudley and Nicholas P. Lovrich. I am eternally grateful for their guidance, patience and support in this long journey. Without these two individuals, I would never have finished this work. I am also indebted to Professors Brent Steel and John Pierce, who along with Dr. Lovrich, introduced me to the world of academic thought and writing and encouraged me in ways that were far beyond the call of duty. I also want to thank Professors Karen Hult and Anne Khademian for participating on my committee and for their important guidance in developing and improving an early draft of this dissertation.

To my parents, Werner, Shirley and Marjorie, I give thanks for the unconditional love and support you have given me. I also thank Cindy Casson for traveling across the country with me and supporting me through the years we were together.

An acknowledgements section would not be complete without recognition of the many graduate students and professors that were part of my journey, including Bill Cannell, Bryce Hoflund, Susan Pandy, Rick Morse, Lloyd Collins, Kathryn Godfrey, Melony Price-Rhodes, Gail Ledford and many others.

Special thanks also go to Professors Charles Goodsell, John Rohr, Gary Wamsley, James Wolf, Orion White, William Weaver, Elizabeth Fredericksen and Kathleen Staudt for their commitment to all of their students – including me.

Finally, I want to thank Patty Kaczmarek for supporting and encouraging the completion of this process.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Why do some democratic governments succeed while others fail?

Robert Putnam

Civil society and social capital have become staples of political science and public .administration since the publication of Robert Putnam's landmark book *Making Democracy Work* in 1993 and his bestseller *Bowling Alone* in 2000. Since the publication of these important books, social capital and civil society have become central to discussions that attempt to explain government performance and democratic efficacy (Halpern, 2005). Putnam and many other scholars of his persuasion posit that much of what accounts for success and failure in political communities is the result of extended interpersonal relationships, associational development and interpersonal trust – namely, social capital. The research presented here will attempt to add to this growing and important literature by exploring the role of social capital and trust in enhancing institutional performance. Specifically, this dissertation will analyze the dynamics of social capital and government performance in metropolitan county governments.

While social capital as an analytical concept has only recently come into prominence in political science and public administration, its origins extend back to Alexis de Tocqueville. As Robert Putnam (2000) acknowledges, "social capital is to some extent merely new language for a very old debate in American intellectual circles" (24). Writing in *Democracy in America*, de Tocqueville observed early the importance of civic engagement and trust to the newly developing American democracy:

> [I]f the object be to have the local affairs of a district conducted by men who reside there, the same persons are always in contact, and they are, in a manner,

> forced to be acquainted and to adapt themselves to one another…Men attend to the interests of the public, first by necessity, afterwards by choice; what was intentional becomes an instinct, and by dint of working for the good of one's fellow citizens, the habit and the taste for serving them are at length acquired (1945 [1840]: 153).

Essential to this transformation from mere necessity to choice is widespread civic engagement in myriad interpersonal relationships and exchanges that develop over time into a form of social capital which facilitates collective action.

Statement of the Problem

Social capital theorists seek to explain why "some democratic governments succeed and others fail" (Putnam, 1993: 3). Portes and Vickstrom (2011) note that "the concept of social capital is arguably the most successful export from sociology into the public domain in recent years" (762). The importance of this export from sociology into economics, political science and public administration has been significant and has resulted in uncounted proposals to modify or create institutions and programs to try to build social capital. Putnam himself attributes myriad positive social outcomes to presence or absence of social capital – be they student academic performance, economic inequality, child welfare or single parenthood to name only a few (Putnam, 2000). However, the nature of the causal effects of social capital remain widely disputed, as are conscious efforts to procure social capital. "For if social capital is the outcome of historical forces buried deep in the nation's past, there is little point in promoting it as a cure for social ills and exhorting citizens to become more participatory" (Portes and Vickstrom, 2011: 468).

Why has social capital become such a significant area of study? As Lovrich and Pierce (2017) note, it is because of what social capital can inform about the nature of collective action in the face of so-called rational actors:

> [I]n the context of democratic societies and in cultural settings where individualistic perspectives predominate over collectivistic values, the need is imperative to understand why some social units (ranging from neighborhoods, to small towns, to large cities, to entire nations) are able to act in concert to accomplish shared benefits and other comparable social units are unable to overcome inevitable differences in perspectives to achieve collective goals…Since the self-interest of individuals would call for them to "free ride" and enjoy the benefit of others reaching out to the distressed families, conserving water, restricting their own movements, and adopting energy-saving practices, WHY is it that some social units achieve effective collection action when it is called for while others do not? (3).

Lovrich and Pierce maintain that social capital theory as formulated by James Coleman and Robert Putnam helps provide answers to this question.

Since the publication of the Putnam's work, research in social capital has virtually exploded. With this explosion, calls have come for numerous programs and interventions designed to address and alleviate myriad collective action problems. Kawachi and Berkman (2000) note that the "benefits" of social capital have been identified in eight different fields of inquiry: family and youth behavior, schooling and education, community life, workplace and organizational democracy and governance, economic development, criminal justice and public health (177). Lovrich and Pierce similarly note that social scientists have applied social capital theory to a broad array of applied social science fields, including urban planning, criminal

justice, public health, development and organizational change. Elinor Ostrom (2000) argues that "national and regional governmental institutions strongly affect the level and type of social capital available to individuals to pursue long-term development efforts" (182). Given widespread efforts to apply social capital, it is important to better understand the nature of the relationship between institutions of local government and social capital in a U.S. context.

This dissertation research attempts to add to the now rather voluminous research literature on social capital by exploring the relationships between social capital and government performance in American urbanized county governments.[1] Following Putnam, the findings reported here attempt to explain why some county governments have the capacity to perform well while others do not. The dissertation explores how key concepts such as social capital, social trust and civic engagement relate to capacity to perform.

Theoretical Foundations

The standard treatment of social capital starts with contemporary scholars – primarily Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam. However, this dissertation begins with the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville penned in an effort to describe the emerging American democracy. De Tocqueville's writing on both the French and American revolutionary experiences can be read to reflect to a remarkable degree our modern understanding of social capital. De Tocqueville wrote extensively on the connection and relationship between the character of administration and the temperament of the citizenry, particularly as they relate to questions of collective action on behalf of common interests.

[1] While this dissertation focuses on the conceptual development and measurement of social capital, it does not address the more normative implications of social capital that have become important discussions in the application of social capital theory to real world problems and that outline some of the negative implications of social capital. By normative, I am referring to disagreement among the scholarly community as to whether social capital is a positive or negative aspect of communities and whether communities should in fact pursue greater social capital. While important for both theoretical and policy purposes, it is beyond the scope of this study.

Social capital has been defined in numerous ways by different scholars. For sociologist James Coleman social capital "comes about through changes in the relations among persons that facilitate action." But this is not a "tangible resource" as is the case with physical capital or human capital because it "exists in the relations among persons" (100). For Coleman, social capital can be understood as a resource that is used to achieve certain ends. Relatedly, Paxton (1999) observes that social capital is "the idea that individuals and groups can gain resources from their connections to one another" and that such social relationship "resources can be used to produce certain goods" (89). Boix and Posner define social capital as "a set of institutionalized expectations that other social actors will reciprocate co-operative overtures. This expectation generates co-operation by making otherwise uncooperative actors willing to undertake those overtures in the first place" (686).

Putnam (1993) defines social capital as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action" (167). Portes and Vickstrom (2011) argue that Robert Putnam *extended* Coleman's definition and application of social capital to larger groups than those articulated by Coleman, making social capital a public resource – a "macro" level phenomena of social life. "When Putnam telescoped the concept into much larger social units, the empirical focus changed from the immediate circle of relationships surrounding individuals and families to aggregate characteristics of the population" (462).

Essential to all discussions of social capital in modern contexts are the role that civic or voluntary associations play in facilitating the building of interpersonal trust. As Stolle (1998) argues, the "claim of a connection between membership in voluntary associations and democracy is based on the assumption that membership in voluntary associations facilitates mobilization and socialization effects, as well as democratic learning processes with these associations…it is

based on the assumption that membership in voluntary associations produces trust and facilitates the learning of cooperative attitudes among members" (498). De Tocqueville emphasized the importance of voluntary associations active during the early years of the American democratic experience:

> Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds – religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive, or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found establishments for education, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; and in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools (p. 114).

From this perspective voluntary associations are the incubators of trust and norms of reciprocity. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, not all voluntary associations can be considered equal, and certain kinds are expected to facilitate different kinds of trust and social capital than others. Rupasingha et al. make a clear distinction between "Putnam" organizations and "Olson" organizations. Referring to the more civically oriented associations lauded by Robert Putnam, Putnam organizations are those organizations that are believed to generate "bridging" social capital – that is, a bond among persons of a wide variety of racial, class and economic standing. Olson organizations are so-named in reference to the seminal work of Mancur Olson and his focus on organizations which are characterized more by rent-seeking. The distinction is important because rent-seeking associations are hypothesized to reflect a primarily in a financial/private interest incentive to join, whereas groups that are not rent-seeking are thought to reflect primarily a public interest motivation and seek societal benefits, and in their activities

they are likely to build trust and cooperative behavior among their members (Knack and Keefer, 1997, cited in Rupasingha et al., 2006: 89).

The link between social capital and collective action is directly connected in turn to government performance. For purposes of this dissertation, the concept of government performance is conceived of as the *capacity to perform* as opposed to the documentation of outcomes. Government performance is measured across five dimensions or functional areas: *financial management, human resource management, capital/infrastructure management, information systems and managing-for-results*. As Ingraham et al. (2003) correctly note, government performance provides a platform for performance that may or may not result in improved outcomes. *Co-production* is a concept that is related to both government performance and social capital. Co-production can best be thought of as the joint delivery of services by both policy makers and users (Boivard, 2007). Ostrom (1996) defines coproduction as "the process through which inputs used to provide a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not in the same organization" (1073). It is related to government performance in that it results in service-delivery efficiencies and it is related to social capital in that it speaks to the problem of collective action and norms of reciprocity.

Understanding the link between social capital and government performance is important because, as Boix and Posner argue (1998), "although the accumulated evidence strongly suggests that the two are correlated, we lack an understanding of the microlinkages that connect one with the other" (686). Boix and Posner offer five potential linkages or "models" whereby social capital serves to enhance government performance: 1) rational voters, 2) rule compliance, 3) civic virtue, 4) bureaucratic efficiency and 5) elite accommodation. The *rational voter model* argues that participation in various associations makes citizens more "sophisticated consumers of politics" and that knowing this, political elites are more responsive to the needs of an engaged

citizenry. The *rule compliance model* argues that social capital helps to reduce transaction costs associated with the implementation of governmental programs by reducing the need to implement more inefficient and costly bureaucracy. The *civic virtue model* asserts that social capital results in what De Tocqueville referred to as "self-interest rightly understood," and government effectiveness is more easily achieved among citizens who are promoting broader public goods over more narrow individualistic goals. *Bureaucratic efficiency models* hypothesize that social capital helps increase government performance by creating incentives to improve decision-making by policy and bureaucratic elites. This is done by facilitating greater cooperation between policy-makers and bureaucrats as well as increasing the efficiency by which goods and services can be delivered more efficiently by reducing shirking and other pathologies presumed to be inherent in the principal-agent relationship. Finally, the *elite accommodation model* is applicable to situations where there is entrenched between-group conflict (political, racial/ethnic, etc). In these situations, while moderate levels of social capital are thought to reinforce perceived between-group differences, eventually social capital can increase to levels that allow groups to overcome these differences.

The common thread through all of these postulated models is the key role of trust. Trust is the lubricant of social capital. In arguing that social capital is a good or a resource used to facilitate collective action among individuals, Coleman made trust a key feature of social capital, arguing that "a group within which there is extensive trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more than a comparable group without that trustworthiness and trust" (101). Based on "norms of reciprocity"– trust that one's good turn will be reciprocated – social capital facilitates collective action in cases where it is necessary to feel that others will do their fair share if one makes a sacrifice of self-interest for the sake of societal benefits. Trust in this context can take two forms: 1) particularized trust and 2) generalized trust. Particularized trust is

focused on the level of trust among people with some common background or shared characteristic. Putnam calls this trust *bonding social capital* because it speaks to the bonds that tie like-minded individuals together. Generalized trust, or *bridging social capital*, extends the concept of trust to others not like oneself in society as a whole. Generalized trust is conceived of by Putnam as bridging because it helps connect otherwise unconnected individuals that may not have anything in common but share a common fate of gain or loss depending on whether or not some form of collective action is taken.

Hypotheses

Following the discussion above, the following are the key hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation:

Hypothesis 1: Dimensions of social capital measuring civic engagement will be positively correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital).

Hypothesis 2: Government performance will be positively correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital).

Hypothesis 3: Government performance will be positively correlated with higher levels of civic engagement.

Hypothesis 4: Government performance will be correlated with structural aspects of county government.

Hypothesis 5: Government performance will be correlated with political culture.

Hypothesis 6: Social capital will be more strongly correlated with government performance than alternatives related to structural or political culture theories.

Theoretical Model

Brehm and Rahn (1997) propose a "structural model of social capital, causes and consequences" that posits a reciprocal relationship among civic engagement, interpersonal trust and confidence in government (1002). Figure 1-1 displays a theoretical model that builds on the Brehm and Rahn model, one which describes the reciprocal nature of the predicted relationships among the variables used in this study. Following social capital theory, the dependent variable is government performance situated at the center of the model. Based on the hypotheses set forth above, counties with higher performing governments are expected to have citizens with higher levels of social capital. Social capital is measured using both behavioral and value-based attitudinal measures. The model also assumes that county government performance is influenced by other variables, including structural variables such as form of government, and revenues and expenditures which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. These variables are assumed to both influence – and be influenced by – social capital. Finally, the model includes elements of political culture to be analyzed in Chapter 6 as well. Again, political culture is assumed to influence and be influenced by social capital and government performance. The reciprocal

nature of these relationships is important because they can mean the difference between a "virtuous" and a "vicious" cycle between trust and civic engagement (Brehm and Rahn, 1997: 1018).

Figure 1-1. Theoretical Model



Why County Government?

The use of counties as the unit of analysis for this study is important for a number of reasons. In *Making Democracy Work*, Robert Putnam (1993) based his analysis on the regional governments of Italy. In order to most effectively replicate this study in the American context, large urban area counties represent the best parallel to these regional governments. Indeed, as Menzel et al. (1992) note, "the arrival of regional problems such as water usage and rapid urbanization has lifted counties into the spotlight" (173). Rupasingha et al. (2006) maintain that "the underlying premise of social capital is that it facilitates collective action, and collective action is more often found at the sub-national level of organization than at the national level"

(85). While there has been research evaluating the linkage between social capital and government performance at the state-level and the city-level (see Knack, 2002; Pierce et al., 2000), a similar analysis has not been conducted at the urban county-level.

The exploration of counties is important for another reason – counties are increasingly becoming the principal service delivery agents for local and regional communities (Benton, 2002). During the past 50 years, the political roles and governmental responsibilities associated with county governments have increased dramatically. County government expenditures, as a proportion of overall expenditures – when compared with municipal governments, special districts and townships – have increased from 31.5 percent in 1952 to 39.1 percent in 1997. Municipal government expenditures, which continue to make up the largest proportion of overall expenditures, have decreased over the same period, from 51.2 percent in 1952 to 44.9 percent in 1997 (Benton, 2002: 5). These figures indicate that as the proportion of expenditures made by municipalities has decreased, the proportion of expenditures made by counties has increased. The proportion of employment accounted for by county governments reflects a similar pattern. While employment in county governments has increased from 25.7 percent in 1951 to 39.9 percent in 1997, employment in municipal governments has decreased from 64.3 percent to 44 percent of total local government employment during the same period. The remaining 15.7 percent is accounted for by special districts and townships (Benton, 2002: 6). Counties are becoming an increasingly important actor in local and regional government service delivery throughout the county.

These trends have important implications for the analysis of government performance at the local level. Over the past century, county governments have evolved politically and the functions they have been required to perform have changed as well. County governments were initially established as administrative arms of state governments, and the services they provided

were the result of direct mandates emanating from state governments. Indeed, *Dillon's Rule* – a cardinal pillar of American constitutional law – emerged from a case involving a county government in Iowa in 1868 (Grumm and Murphy, 1974). Since that time, however, tremendous change has occurred in the nature of what county governments across the country are required to do. In addition to traditional county government functions such as the maintenance of roads and the operation of jails, counties serve many local government and regional government functions that were not traditionally associated with county government (Benton, 2002). Many counties are now required to provide a variety of services once associated with municipal governments, such as water, sewer, fire protection and parks and recreation. They have also become increasingly responsible for addressing regional problems associated with mass urbanization and suburbanization. These activities typically include addressing regional transportation issues, air and environmental quality monitoring, land-use planning, natural resource and wildlife habitat protection, and public health and safety education (Benton, 2002: 30-35).

Despite these broadly-noted significant trends, however, counties in general, and metropolitan counties in particular, remain the "still forgotten governments" in academic research (Schneider and Park, 1989). As metropolitan communities continue grow, counties are increasingly becoming the "weather vanes" of urban communities (Menzel et al., 1992). These trends indicate that counties are poised to become the preeminent service provider and principal governmental actor in large metropolitan communities as the 21st century progresses. And if, as Brehm and Rahn assert, the connection between social capital and confidence in government is tightly linked, performance and capacity to perform will become increasingly important for county governments to consider.

Scope and Organization of the Dissertation

This study examines the relationship between social capital and government performance in 34 county governments. Using both attitudinal and behavioral data, the analysis demonstrates that social capital is indeed strongly correlated with government performance. The analysis will explore how different forms of social capital are correlated with government performance in different ways. Chapter 2 provides a more detailed review of the scholarly literature on the relationship between social capital and government performance. Beginning with the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, Chapter 2 will explore the research in social capital by exploring the different ways that social capital has been defined and operationalized, as well as summarize the key literature that has explicitly examined the relationship between social capital and government performance. Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the hypotheses, research methodology and data used to carry out the study. The research methodology will use a nested analysis to combine both large-n and small-n data sources to test the relationship between social capital and government performance. Chapter 4 describes the results of the bi-variate analysis of the correlation between social capital and government performance as described in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 builds on the work presented in Chapter 4 to develop a more nuanced framework for conceptualizing social capital and government performance, highlighting the types of contexts in which government performance and social capital do not always correlate in the predicted directions. Chapter 6 is a comparative analysis testing other rival theories against social capital as correlates of government performance. More specifically, the analysis evaluates the explanatory power of various structural and political culture theories as predictors of government performance compared to the various measures of social capital used in this study. Chapter 7 provides a summary of the major findings associated with the study, and then identifies areas for future fruitful study.

Chapter 2

Social Capital and Government Performance:

A Review

The belief that the greatness and power of a nation are a product of its administrative machinery is, to say the least, shortsighted; however perfect that machinery, the driving force behind it is what counts.

Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*

This chapter discusses some of the voluminous literature surrounding the concept of social capital with a focus on the dimensions of social capital and the controversy surrounding its potential relationship to governance. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the foundational work involving social capital and to introduce some of the conceptual and methodological issues associated with its development.[2] The chapter will begin with the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, arguing that elements of social capital can be traced to his prescient writings. The chapter will then turn to modern conceptions of social capital as formulated by James Coleman and Robert Putnam and explore some of the criticisms of this approach.

The influence of de Tocqueville on contemporary discussions of social capital and civil society cannot be overstated. To be sure, myriad scholars, thinkers, political actors and the like, of all political stripes and analytical perspectives, regularly invoke de Tocqueville as evidence for their unique perspectives. Given the singular importance of his work, this chapter will begin by exploring de Tocqueville's thought and writings in order to better understand how de Tocqueville understood the interface of civil society and the state in the American democratic context as a preface for the analysis that follows.

[2] For more detailed discussion of the social capital literature and its applications see Halperin (2005).

Tocqueville and the Old Regime

It is reasonable to insist that, in discussing de Tocqueville and his importance to understanding American democracy and public administration, one should begin with a discussion of his treatise *Democracy in America*. However, de Tocqueville's insights developed in *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (*The Old Regime*) were directly informed by his experience and writing about American democracy. As a result, *The Old Regime* presents, in many ways, some of de Tocqueville's clearest insights into the relationship between civil society and the state.

De Tocqueville's contribution and thinking surrounding what we now call social capital is significant for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the attention he pays to the link between public administration and the concomitant social fabric of the historical French regime is of particular significance. De Tocqueville writes extensively of public administration of the French feudal period, describing how the nobility were not only intermediaries between the King and his subjects, but they were the public administrators of their era. During this time the nobility enjoyed great, and at particular times, oppressive powers and great privileges, including complete exemption from taxation in some cases. But as de Tocqueville observes, "in return…they kept order, administered justice, saw to the execution of laws, came to the rescue of the oppressed, and watched over the interests of all" (30).

Over time, however, de Tocqueville observed that a certain "lethargy" came to permeate the French nobility; they became increasingly absent from their traditional affairs, interested more in privilege and the trappings of the Court than in fulfilling their broader administrative duties. At the same time, King Louis XV worked to centralize his power and build a substantial professional army, loyal only to the King and independent of the nobility. De Tocqueville writes

how for more than four decades preceding the revolution of 1789 "the whole social system" in France "was the prey of a curious lethargy":

> The government did little more than keep to the beaten track of the old routine without ever striking out in new directions; municipal authorities did hardly anything to make the living conditions in the towns healthier or more agreeable; even private enterprise was in the doldrums (De Tocqueville, 1856: 171).

But even as the nobility ceased to be a part of the administrative apparatus of the country during this time of "national malaise," many of them retained their exemption from taxation. Not surprisingly, this resulted in an unprecedented level of social discontent among the French citizenry.

Around this time de Tocqueville observed a shift in the administration of the nation. He writes in this regard that "the government was infected by this spirit, to all appearances the administrative system had remained as it had always been but within there was a change of heart. The laws were not altered but differently enforced" (171, emphasis added). This spirit that he observed arose from the belief that "every Frenchman was dissatisfied with his lot and quite decided to better it" and was driven in part by a "spirit of progress" (see note 66, p. 282). De Tocqueville believed that it was this nebulous spirit that largely determined the effectiveness of public administration, and indeed, could overcome it. For de Tocqueville, the effective carrying out of public administration was not necessarily a pre-requisite for the development of civil society. Indeed, he maintained that "the belief that the greatness and power of a nation are products of its administrative machinery is, to say the least, shortsighted; however perfect that machinery, the driving force behind it is what counts" (175). The driving force de Tocqueville observed was the "spirit of progress and enterprise" that had infected all of France. As we shall

see, the spirit of which de Tocqueville wrote is in many ways equivalent to what modern day scholars and historians refer to as social capital.

At the same time, however, de Tocqueville recognized that French civil society could be greatly undermined by an uninspired and ineffectual administration of the machinery of governance. At the time the nobility was plagued by malaise the French monarchy and his immediate royal nobility were rapidly implementing reforms that were improving the overall social condition of the people. However, along with their progressive actions they continued to mismanage the finances of the state, placing a great deal of private investment, and with it material comfort, at risk. De Tocqueville noted in this regard: "The mismanagement of the State finances, which formerly had affected only the administration, now brought ruins to many homes" (179). In the end, it was the administration of France that at once brought prosperity to its citizens and simultaneously brought about its own demise. "On the one hand was a nation in which the love of wealth and luxury was daily spreading; on the other a government that while constantly fomenting this new passion, at the same time frustrated it – and by this fatal inconsistency was sealing its own doom" (179).

In this respect, public administration in France during this period fundamentally altered not just how the government interacted with the citizenry, but also affected relations among the citizens themselves. It was what de Tocqueville called the "first revolution" that first altered relations among the different classes in France and the administration of secondary, or routine, laws (as opposed to fundamental constitutional changes) that ultimately led to the second, and more violent, revolution of 1789. The administrative upheavals that took place in the last days of the regime sowed the seeds of the political revolution that would follow. De Tocqueville described this situation in the following words:

> When the Revolution broke out, that part of the government which, though subordinate, keeps every citizen constantly aware of its existence and affects his daily life at every turn, had just been thrown into confusion; the public administration made a clean sweep of all its former representatives and embarked on a quite new program. Radical as they were these reforms did not seem to have jeopardized the State itself, but every Frenchman was affected by them, if only in a minor way (203).

What is significant about de Tocqueville's remarks in this regard is his contention that the historic revolution of 1789 was driven as much by the subtle changes in the ways in which the country was administered as it was by a fundamental shift in ideology or political thought at the time. The dissolution of the caste system that once held the French social fabric together resulted in a gradual decline of communitarian sentiment and the concomitant rapid rise of materialism and individualism. "[I]n a community in which the ties of family, of caste, of class, and craft fraternities no longer exist people are far too much disposed to think exclusively of their own interests in hierarchy, but not in unbridled self-interest" (xii). For de Tocqueville, associations became necessary to bind citizens together in common purpose where "[O]nly freedom can deliver the members of a community from that isolation which is the lot of the individual left to his own devices and, compelling them to get in touch with each other, promote an active sense of fellowship" (xii).

By the end of the 18th century, not only had the French lost the ability to govern themselves but they had become unable to envision the public good.

> In no other country had the private citizen become so completely out of touch with public affairs and so unused to studying the course of events, so much so that not only had the average Frenchman no experience of 'popular movements' but

> he hardly understood what 'the people' meant…the old order had long since deprived Frenchmen of the possibility, and even the desire, of coming to each other's aid (205).

The experience of the French during this period makes it clear that public administration, and the effectiveness and manner in which it is conducted, was of fundamental import to the conduct and outcomes of government and civil society alike.

Democracy in America

> *Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a free government, but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.*
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*

More than two decades before his dissertation on the French Revolution, de Tocqueville began his study of the urge to democracy evident in the New World. Writing in *Democracy in America*, de Tocqueville states that his principal aim in studying the experiment with democracy underway in America was principally to draw lessons that could be applied to the emerging French democratic temperament. Speaking to his French audience, he wrote that "it is not…merely to satisfy a curiosity, however legitimate, that I have examined America; my wish has been to find there instruction by which we ourselves may profit" (1835: 14). It is not surprising that many of the themes discussed above regarding public administration in 18th century France were derived in part from his earlier observations of the American democratic experience.

Principal among these differences is the importance of the administration of local government, and the connection of that administration to the local community. Where the French experience discussed above emphasized a strong national authority that imposed its will on the local administration, in the American setting, the "Form of the federal government of the United States was the last to be adopted" (59). De Tocqueville observed early on the clear importance that local government and administration played in the establishment of the political and social structure, and his observations shaped much of his writing on the subject.

> [Townships] did not receive their powers from a central authority, but, on the contrary, they gave up a portion of their independence to the state. This is an important distinction and one that the reader must constantly recollect… [Whereas] the French government lends its agents to the commune; in America the township lends its agents to the government. This fact alone shows how widely the two nations differ (65-66).

This emphasis on local administration and the importance of structuring a democracy based in part on the imperatives of the daily lives of the citizen is key to understanding not only de Tocqueville's depiction of American democracy, but also to making sense of current debates surrounding social capital and institutional performance. Indeed, while most treatises on American democracy focus on the constitutional structure of the nation, de Tocqueville pays almost no attention to the federal government, instead focusing on the political and social fabric of local communities.

In the administration of local government, de Tocqueville observed what is in our time popularly referred to as "civil society." He notes that in the townships of New England "governance emanates from the governed," whereby the citizen played a direct role in the administration of the township because he held a direct stake in its success – "his co-operation in

its affairs ensures his attachment to its interests" (68). Thus, effective governance was directly linked to participation of the governed. In this manner, administration in local townships was highly decentralized. Where de Tocqueville saw a single magistrate being responsible for the administration of similar townships in France, in America he counted nineteen. In America, the citizen was also administrator and a bond is formed among the citizenry such that "the hand that directs the social machine is invisible" (70). From de Tocqueville's perspective, it is invisible because it is embedded in the social fabric of the community. "The American attaches himself to his little community for the same reason that the mountaineer clings to his hills, because the characteristic features of his country are there more distinctly marked; it has a more striking physiognomy" (68).

While a great deal of de Tocqueville's discussion of civil society emanates from his observations of the New England townships in operation, he also describes the role of county governments of New England in the administration of local governance. Likening the role of counties to the French *arrondisements* (administrative districts), de Tocqueville notes that the fundamental purpose of county governments was to "facilitate the administration" of local governance, particularly the administration of the courts of justice. Because townships were too small and states too large and remote for the effective administration of justice, counties were established to perform this function. To be sure, county government at this time was limited; while townships possessed an "indestructible principle of life", county governments performed only basic functions designed to fill gaps in the administration of local communities between those of the state and township.

In contrast to New England, county government in other states was much more active. In states such as New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania, for example, "the importance of the town is gradually transferred to the county, which becomes the center of administration and the

intermediate power between the government and the citizen" (80). To what does de Tocqueville attribute this variation, and what are its impacts on local administration? While he observed that the principles of administration in the United States were "differently applied" from that in France, "the same spirit animates them…namely, that everyone is the best judge of what concerns himself alone, and the most proper person to supply his own wants. The township and the county are therefore bound to take care of their special interests; the state governs, but does not execute the laws" (81). The administration of government is at once local and contextual. This growth trend is important and will be developed further in later chapters. As we will see, county government since the time of de Tocqueville has expanded in both scope and size. But this expansion has been based on the same ubiquitous necessities identified above. County governments have expanded out of a continued need to address gaps in service delivery between those of local municipalities and state governments (not to mention federal mandates), and their evolution has been heavily influenced by the local preferences of the community in which they operate.

Another prominent feature of public administration in America that occupied much of de Tocqueville's thought was "its excessive decentralization" (82). The relationship between the degree of centralization of administration and performance has been a prominent feature in public administration scholarship, particularly since the early 20th century. For de Tocqueville, centralization often has the opposite effect from that intended:

> Decentralization imparts without difficulty an admirable regularity to the routine of business; provides skillfully for the details of the social police; represses small disorders and petty misdemeanors; maintains society in a status quo alike secure from improvement and decline; and perpetuates a drowsy regularity in the conduct of affairs which the heads of the administration are wont to call good

> order and public tranquility; in short, it excels in prevention, but not in action (90).

Following Wilson's distinction between politics and administration, much of early American public administration theory followed the premise that effective administration required greater centralization of duties and functions. De Tocqueville asserts, however, that such centralization undermined the capacity for effective administration by undermining the "public spiritedness" of the community. Good governance in 19th century America did not require effective or centralized governance. Rather, it required close connection between the apparatus of government and the governed.

While public administration practice in the United States was far "less regular, less enlightened and less skillful" than was the case in its European counterparts, the operation of American local governments resulted in far better results: "I know of no people who have established schools so numerous and efficacious, places of public worship better suited to the wants of the inhabitants, or roads kept in better repair" (91). What accounts for such effective administration despite inferior structural inputs? For de Tocqueville, it was the spirit of the citizenry – "In no country in the world do the citizens make such exertions for the common weal…what we find is the presence of a power which, if it is somewhat wild, is at least robust, and an existence checkered with accidents, indeed, but full of animation and effort" (91). And it is this commitment to the "common weal," balanced with personal interest and political liberty, that creates a proper balance between centralization and decentralization in the administration of government. He speculated that the more centralized the administration of government, the more likely it is to become removed from the governed and over time unresponsive to the needs of public life.

While de Tocqueville's observations are generally applicable to communities throughout the young nation, he observed early on in his studies that the contextual nature of the relationship between administration and "public spiritedness." In contrast to the vigorous and active civil society de Tocqueville observed in the New England and northeastern states, de Tocqueville also observed that "the farther we go towards the South, the less active does the business of the township or parish become...[As] the power of the elected magistrate is augmented and that of the voter diminished…the public spirit of the local communities is less excited and less influential" (79). Not unlike numerous scholars after him (see for example V.O. Key and Elazar), de Tocqueville observed an increase in the centralization of administration and a decline in public spirit as he moved further south.

Modern Conceptions of Social Capital

The first contemporary analytical use of social capital as a concept is largely credited to the American sociologist James Coleman (1988) and the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (Portes, 1998: 3). According to Portes (1998), Bourdieu's conceptualization of the social capital construct is "arguably the most theoretically refined" of the era. Bourdieu defined social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition" (Bourdieu, 1985, cited in Portes, 1998). Similarly, James Coleman's (1988) essay in the *American Journal of Sociology*, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," was one of the first robust conceptualizations of social capital to appear in the social sciences. Envisioned as a means of uniting sociological and economic research and analysis related to the description of social action, for Coleman the construct of social capital "accepts the principle of rational or purposive action and attempts to show how that principle, in conjunction with particular social

contexts, can account not only for the actions of individuals in particular contexts, but also for the development of social organization" (1988: 96). For Coleman, social capital is simply the extension of the concept of capital as it relates to physical and human capital; it is viewed as a resource for action. According to Coleman, social capital

> is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible (1988: 98).

Unlike many other forms of capital, social capital is not tangible – it "exists in the relations among persons" (Coleman, 1988: 100-101). That is, social capital is useful and effective only to the extent that an individual has incorporated relations in others and that those others are "motivated" to extend those benefits to the individual (Portes, 1998).

What motivates individuals to extend these intangible resources to others arises from what Portes classifies as either consummatory or instrumental motivations. Consummatory motivations are rooted in internalized norms of behavior that provide for the exchange of various resources essential for social capital to be accumulated and utilized. Instrumental motivations are more formal exchanges based on "the norm of reciprocity." This norm is based on the premise that the exchange of resources will eventually be reciprocated in some way or other. Consummatory motivations do not incorporate this expectation (Portes, 1998: 7). Where consummatory motivations incorporate aspects of "value introjection" and "bounded solidarity," instrumental motivations involve aspects related more to exchange and the expectation of reciprocity and "enforceable trust." These distinctions are important because they can have

major implications for how social capital develops, how it is used, and how its presence and absence affect social institutions.

Social capital has tremendous promise in contributing to what Elinor Ostrom (1998) refers to as "the central subject of political science" – namely, a theory of collective action. Specifically, theory and research in social capital has the potential to help build a more comprehensive theory of collective action "based on models of the individual consistent with empirical evidence about how individuals make decisions in social-dilemma situations" (1). Social capital is promising in this regard because it has the potential to fill important gaps between theories of rational choice regarding human behavior and empirical results testing these theories. Ostrom argues that a substantial amount of theory in rational choice has failed to bear significant fruit when subjected to empirical findings. Discussing what she refers to as a "lack of a general fit," Ostrom discusses in detail "a strong rejection of predictions derived from a complete model of rationality" in predicting actual human behavior in social dilemma situations, in both field and laboratory investigations. Based on these findings, Ostrom urges a "second-generation" model of bounded rationality whereby norms of trust and reciprocity are used to guide decision-making in social dilemmas where pure rationality falters. As Ostrom notes,

> In the context of a social dilemma, trust affects whether an individual is willing to initiate cooperation in the expectation that it will be reciprocated. Boundedly rational individuals enter situations with an initial probability of using reciprocity based on their own prior training and experience (Ostrom, 1998:12).

The mutually reinforcing cycle between reputation, trust and reciprocity is heavily influenced by structural variables. That is, the extent to which there are rules and sanctions in place to enforce compliance and "reward" trust influences both how much individuals are willing to invest in the resolution of social dilemmas and thereby enhance their overall outcomes. Social

capital, then, has the potential to provide insights into how structural variables and differing institutional arrangements affect trust and the resolution of common social dilemmas.

Social Capital and Government Performance

More than a century after de Tocqueville published his work on the American experience, an American would publish a book that would launch a renewed interest in de Tocqueville's work. Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone* has become not only essential reading for scholars researching social capital and civil society, but it has also become required reading for many in the arenas of community and economic development, urban planning and even criminal justice. Scholars and practitioners alike have taken the concepts elucidated by Putnam, admired or reviled, and have applied them to myriad social and political ends. For purposes of this research however, it is one of Putnam's earlier books that will form the theoretical starting point.

The introduction of social capital theory into political science came with the publication of Robert Putnam's book *Making Democracy Work* (1993). In this work, the American political scientist Putnam describes social capital as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action" (167). Mirroring de Tocqueville's examination of America, Robert Putnam spent the better part of 25 years studying the relationship between civil society and the institutions of regional local government in Italy. *Making Democracy Work* established the framework for what would eventually lead to the publication of *Bowling Alone*. *Bowling Alone* is an application of the findings first presented in *Making Democracy Work* to the American setting. Putnam begins *Making Democracy Work* with a simple question: "Why do some democratic governments succeed and others fail?" (3). Like de Tocqueville, Putnam explored the dynamics of this question in Italy with the hope that it would provide insight into "understanding what makes

governments work well" and to "contribute to our understanding of the *performance* of democratic institutions" (3; emphasis added). This is precisely the aim of the research in this dissertation.

This study will follow Putnam's (1993) definition of social capital as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action" (167). In *Making Democracy Work,* Putnam charts the course of the creation of 15 regional governments throughout the nation of Italy. While these regional governments were structurally and institutionally identical, as Putnam notes, the "social, economic, political, and cultural contexts into which the new institutions were implanted differed dramatically" (6). For Putnam, context shapes institutions. Putnam finds that the most important contextual factors correlating with institutional performance of the Italian regional governments are various measures of "civicness" present:

> Some regions of Italy have many choral societies and soccer teams and bird-watching clubs and Rotary clubs. Most citizens in those regions read eagerly about community affairs in the daily press. They are engaged by public issues, but not by paternalistic patron-client politics. Inhabitants trust one another to act fairly and to obey the law…At the other pole are the "uncivic" regions…Public life in these regions is organized hierarchically, rather than horizontally. The very concept of "citizen" here is stunted. From the point of view of the individual inhabitant, public affairs is the business of somebody else…Corruption is widely regarded as the norm, even by politicians themselves, and they are cynical about democratic principles (115).

Various dimensions of social capital – participation in civic associations, perceptions of honesty, trust, and overall civic engagement – are discovered to be the most important predictor of performance of the Italian regional governments.

Following de Tocqueville's model, Putnam traces the roots of civic traditions in Italy back more than 700 years. The patterns that emerged in his study of Italian regional governments between 1970 and 1990 could be seen as far back as the 1300s (125). Describing the different historical trajectories taken by the Northern versus Southern regions, Putnam observes that "in the communal republics of northern medieval Italy, vast improvements in economic life, as well as in government performance, were made possible by the norms and networks of civic engagement" (129).

Boix and Posner (1998) describe social capital as "a set of institutionalized expectations that other social actors will reciprocate co-operative overtures" (686). Essential to the continual development and maintenance of social capital is the concept of trust, or generalized reciprocity:

> A society that relies on generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter. Honesty and trust lubricate the inevitable frictions of social life (Putnam, 2000: 135).

Putnam notes, however, that trust in other people is not the same as trust in government – "trust in government may be a cause or consequence of social trust, but it is not the same thing as social trust" (Putnam, 2000: 137). As a result, it is important to distinguish between different modes of trust and different forms or dimensions of social capital.

In addition to advances in operationalizing and measuring social capital, the concept has been used as an explanatory variable to account for a variety of social and political outcomes (see Putnam, 2000). One of the most promising settings where social capital has created significant speculation as an explanatory variable has been the realm of government performance

(Putnam, 1993; Knack, 2002; Pierce, Lovrich and Moon, 2002; Rice, 2001). In his work in the Italian context, Putnam found a strong association between government performance and social capital. Similarly, Boix and Posner note that social capital has "energized" policy-making communities, and the "creation of social capital has been embraced as a solution for social problems as diverse as urban poverty and crime, economic underdevelopment and inefficient government" (2001: 686).

Social capital has become conceptually and operationally well-defined as a result of this renewed interest in the implications and variations of the concept. In *Making Democracy Work* and *Bowling Alone*, Putnam operationalized social capital in terms of the affinity of various communities to form and sustain civic and political associations such as church groups, Lions Clubs and adult bowling leagues. Other studies have focused on participation in the political arena as yet another factor influencing overall levels of social capital (Brehm and Rahn, 1998). Voting rates and level of participation in political parties, levels of crime and fear of crime, and the level of social and institutional trust have also been used as indicators of the various facets of social capital over the past decade.

For as much progress as has been made in social capital research in the social sciences, however, significant disagreement and deep controversy remain. The overwhelming popularity of the concept, both in the academic community and among public administrators and many community development advocates, potentially causes people to ignore the "pathological tendencies" some scholars note to be associated with social capital (Knack, 2002; Portes, 2002; Fiorina, 1999). The foundational assumption underlying most research on social capital is that the presence of social capital does have a positive impact on government performance. However, this broadly held assumption may not be valid – it may be more appropriate for some societal problems than for others, or may be both beneficial and produce some undesirable

consequences at the same time. Nonetheless, the case for social capital remains to be made. In *Democracy in America*, de Tocqueville made what has been interpreted as an anti-statist argument with respect to early civil society in 19th century America:

> The citizen of the United States is taught from infancy to rely upon his own exertions in order to resist the evils and the difficulties of life; he looks upon the social authority with an eye of mistrust and anxiety, and he claims its assistance only when he is unable to do without it (1848, 1990).

For de Tocqueville, government performance, or what he termed "centralization," was a threat to the formation of social capital and the promotion of civic engagement rather than an asset. Viewed from this perspective, government's growth in service provision and regulation inhibits the formation of social capital, leading citizens to become overly reliant upon on government rather than building networks of reciprocity among one another.

Contrary to this anti-statist line of argument, Skocpol (2003) maintains that government performance was essential to facilitating the growth and expansion of civic associations during the same period of American history that de Tocqueville observed the development of profound mistrust in governing institutions. In her analysis of early American associational life, Skocpol argues that most civic groups structured themselves as a reflection of the model of the federal government. Skocpol argues further that the efficacy of the Postal Service during this period was essential to nurturing and maintaining coherence and connection between the various chapters in these federalized national associations. To her way of thinking, the ongoing thickening of American governmental institutions promoted rather than retarded the development of social capital in American society.

Progress has also been made with respect to developing more sophisticated analyses of various rival measures of social capital. While much of the research on social capital has tended

to collapse variables measuring levels of social and institutional trust with measures of associational and civic engagement, Knack (2002) distinguishes between generalized reciprocity (social trust) and civic engagement (participation in civic associations) as separate factors related to government performance. Knack argues that these concepts have different and distinct implications for evaluating social capital and government performance at the state level, and that they must be assessed independently. Indeed, Knack finds clear evidence for the relationship between measures of volunteering, census response and social trust and state government performance (as reported by the Government Performance Project or *GPP*[3]). However, his analysis failed to find any measurable connection between government performance and civic engagement as measured by an index of informal socialization, as well as measures of the percentage of the community that participates in various social groups and civic clubs. The findings reported by Knack mirror those reported by Rice (2001) in his analysis of social capital and government performance among small communities in Iowa.

In their analysis of the relationship between social capital, civic engagement and confidence in government, Brehm and Rahn (1997) find that the "phenomenon of social capital manifests itself in individuals as a tight reciprocal relationship between the levels of civic engagement and interpersonal trust…the more that citizens participate in their communities, the more that they learn to trust others; the greater trust that citizens hold for others, the more likely they are to participate" (1001-1002). Central to this line of argument is the existence of an interconnection between civic engagement, interpersonal trust and government/institutional performance. Brehm and Rahn (1997) contend that governments that perform better are more likely to engender confidence within the community than those that do not. While the effect of

[3] The Government Performance Project (GPP) was undertaken by researchers from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, in collaboration with Governing Magazine and with generous financial support from The Pew Charitable Trusts, to assess the state of government performance in local, state and federal levels of government. The GPP is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

confidence in government on civic engagement is determined to be *de minimus*, the impact of confidence in government is argued to be substantial:

> This finding suggests that it is possible for governments to counter the vicious circle and stave off unabated declines in social capital. This finding also implies that poor performance by government can initiate downward spirals in social capital by first undermining trust, and then feeding into the reciprocal cycle (Brehm and Rahn, 1997: 1014-1015).

Hence, for Brehm and Rahn, as for Putnam, trust is a central ingredient for both social capital and government performance.

In another analysis, Pierce, Moon and Lovrich (2000) evaluate the connection between government performance and social capital in a group of American cities. Again, by applying the results of the GPP report on 35 of many of the largest cities in the United States, Pierce et al. examine the relationship between government performance and social capital for 20 of the 35 cities examined in the GPP data. Similar to Knack (2002) and Rice (2001), this study disaggregates social capital into the elements of civic engagement and social trust. Pierce et al. also find substantial evidence for a relationship between social trust and government performance. However, contrary to the findings reported by Knack and Rice, Pierce et al. find evidence for the connection between civic engagement and government performance. In their analysis, Pierce et al. use three different measures of civic engagement to test the relationship between social capital and government performance – membership in fraternal organizations, the number of associations in existence, and the number of membership organizations present in each community. While the relationship between per capita associations, membership organizations and government performance was not significant, the relationship between membership in fraternal organizations was significantly related to government performance.

Pierce et al. speculate that this finding may be due to the fact that fraternal organizations, by their strong bonding practices and traditions, will engender higher levels of interpersonal trust than other kinds of associations and social organizations. This speculation is consistent with the findings reported by Theda Skocpol who found that despite an increase in overall membership in various organizations and associations, the elements of social trust are not nearly as prevalent as they once were, and the reasons for joining are much more individualistic and parochial than were the case in previous generations. It may be the case that the nature of civic engagement and participation is just as important as the amount of participation taking place. Put somewhat differently, participation may not matter if it does not infuse its participants with the appropriate affective motivations and values.

Social Capital and Trust

A key factor with respect to social capital is the concept of trust. As noted above, social capital is properly conceptualized as a multi-dimensional concept, entailing the core elements of participation in public affairs, civic association, and interpersonal and generalized trust. However, David Halpern (2005) suggests that, based on Putnam's social capital index, "items tapping social trust, averaged at the community, regional or national level, appear to be simple, reliable and valid indicators of social capital at the aggregate level" (35). Similar to Stephen Knack's differentiation between civic engagement and generalized reciprocity, Eric Uslaner (2004) finds evidence for the relationship between generalized trust and policy outcomes. Generalized trust "is a moral value that we learn early in life and is largely independent of adult experiences, including membership in voluntary associations…it is trust in strangers, not trust in people we already know…It is trust in people who are likely to be different from ourselves,

rather than trust in people like ourselves" (2004). For Uslaner, trust is not just a dimension of social capital, it is the engine, and increased civic engagement is the outcome.

Another point of contention and disagreement among scholars involves whether social capital is a function of relations between and among individuals and small groups, or whether it can be extended to include relations among communities, cities or nations. While Portes (1998) contends that sociological analyses of social capital have "been grounded in relationships between actors or between an individual and a group" (18), Brehm and Rahn (1997) contend that while "normally conceived as a property of communities, the reciprocal relationship between community involvement and trust in others is a demonstration of social capital in individual behavior and attitudes" (999). It remains unclear, then, what the best analytical focus of the concept should in fact be for carrying out effective scholarship.

Partially because of the lack of clarity on analytical focus on the concept of social capital, the conceptual link between social capital and government performance is proving to be far more complex than originally thought. In some cases, social capital is conceived of as a strong predictor of government performance, as evidenced in Putnam's work on Italy and later on American states. However, a central and unresolved issue is the extent to which social capital is a dependent or independent variable related to government performance. That is, do governing institutions influence social capital, or does the level of social capital present within a political community determine government performance? Referencing an "interesting conceptual twist" in the social capital research by political scientists, Portes discusses Putnam's work in some detail and questions the utility of applying social capital as a construct to larger communities and nations. Citing critiques that question Putnam's claim to declining social capital in America, and decrying the latent elitism that may portend from his conclusions, Portes does one better by claiming that these criticisms do not address a more basic problem with Putnam's work and the

concept in general as applied to broader communities. The problem in question is its "logical circularity" – that is, "as a property of communities and nations rather than individuals, social capital is simultaneously a cause and effect. It leads to positive outcomes, such as economic development and less crime, and its existence is inferred from the same outcomes. Cities that are governed well and moving ahead economically, do so because they have high social capital; poorer cities lack in this virtue" (Portes, 1998: 19).

For Portes, there are two dangers that emerge from this approach to social capital. First, Portes describes the tendency towards "post-factum" descriptions of events, whereby the analyst works backwards from differences to develop causal explanations of the differences. The second problem, and more "insidious" from Portes' perspective, is the "search for full explanation of all observed differences…this happens as the elimination of exceptions reduces the logical space between alleged cause and effect so that the final predictive statement is either a truism or circular" (Portes, 1998: 20). This analytic concern highlights the importance of context as a significant variable in the exploration of the connection between social capital and government performance.

Conclusion

Despite the ubiquity of social capital throughout the social sciences, there is little if any agreement about its theoretical and empirical significance and the potential role it plays in facilitating democratic governance and administration. In the American experience, social capital is often used a surrogate for elements of trust, interpersonal engagement, political engagement, socio-psychological dimensions, as well as participation in various social and political groups and activities. Thus what counts as social capital is itself widely debated but has come to be understood as reflecting two fundamental dimensions: attitudinal and behavior. That

is to say, social capital appears to consist of both what people believe and how they act. But how are these concepts related? Do behaviors influence attitudes, or the reverse? Does participation in civic groups increase trust, or is it that people who are more trusting are more likely to participate in civic and social groups?

In addition to debates about what constitutes social capital are debates regarding the importance of social capital to democratic governance, and whether social capital increases effective governance or whether good governance and effective administration create the framework necessary to build social capital. While many have drawn favorable conclusions regarding the conceptual fit between exceptional government performance and social capital, the empirical evidence to verify this hypothesized connection has been mixed (Portes and Vickstrom cite). This situation is particularly troubling, and the findings from appropriate research in these areas could have profound implications for both the teaching of and the active practice of public policy. Without more comprehensive research, community efforts and scarce governmental resources that are currently being channeled into programs intended to build new and strengthen existing stores of social capital in an effort to improve government performance and enhance community participation may prove to be ineffective, or perhaps even produce pernicious effects on local communities.

These debates lead to two fundamental questions that will be explored in the following chapters:

1. How are the behavioral and attitudinal dimensions of social capital related?
2. What is the relationship between different dimensions of social capital and government performance?

Chapter Three will define how the core concepts of social capital and government performance will be measured, outline key hypotheses to be examined in the dissertation, describe data

sources used to measure the core concepts and test the hypotheses, and describe the jurisdictions and data sample featured in the analysis.

Chapter 3

Data, Hypotheses and Research Methodology

This research addresses some of the unresolved questions regarding the relationship between social capital and government performance identified in the previous chapter. The issue of how to properly conceptualize and measure social capital is a particularly controversial and vexing dilemma (Rupasingha et al., 2002: 88). The analysis begins from the assumption that social capital is a *multi-dimensional concept* consisting of socio-cultural variables reflecting social trust, participation in groups and associations, civic engagement and socio-political outlook. Following Coleman, social capital "is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors…Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible" (Coleman, 1988: 98). With this conception in mind, social capital will be viewed both as a measure of what people *think* as well as a measure of what people *do* (Coofe and Geys, 2006).

Social capital has been defined in numerous ways by different scholars. For sociologist James Coleman social capital "comes about through changes in the relations among persons that facilitate action." But this is not a "tangible resource" as is the case with physical capital or human capital because it "exists in the relations among persons" (100). For Coleman, social capital can be understood as a resource that is used to achieve certain ends. Relatedly, Paxton (1999) observes that social capital is "the idea that individuals and groups can gain resources from their connections to one another" and that such social relationship "resources can be used to produce certain goods" (89). Boix and Posner define social capital as "a set of institutionalized expectations that other social actors will reciprocate co-operative overtures. This expectation

generates co-operation by making otherwise uncooperative actors willing to undertake those overtures in the first place" (686).

Putnam (1993) defines social capital as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action" (167). This study followed Putnam's definition of social capital and assumes that the different dimensions of social capital can be aggregated to develop or create a stock of social capital. The more positive dimensions that are present, the more social capital exists within a given community.

Focusing on county government in the United States, this study first evaluated a series of hypotheses regarding the bi-variate relationship between what will be referred to as the behavioral and attitudinal dimensions of social capital. The bi-variate analysis will then turned to an examination of the relationship between the different dimensions of social capital and government performance. Building on the work reported in Pierce, Moon and Lovrich (2000), this study reports a detailed analysis of the relationship between performance capacity in county government documented in the Pew Charitable Trust-funded studies conducted by researchers at Syracuse University and social capital, social trust and institutional trust. In later chapters, the analysis will explore the effects on county government performance of other variables such as political culture and institutional and structural characteristics.

Hypotheses

Based on the extensive conceptual and empirical research discussed in previous chapters, the research tests the hypothesized relationships between county government performance and various aspects of social capital. It is important to note that while these hypotheses specify correlations, considerable uncertainty remains regarding causality in the relationship between

social capital and government performance. From both theoretical and empirical perspectives, there is little agreement within the scholarly literature as to whether higher social capital causes higher government performance, whether higher government performance results in higher social capital, or whether some other intervening variables are critical to realizing hypothesized outcomes. As a result, this analysis will focus on identifying the richness of the connections and discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of these connections.

H1: Dimensions of social capital measuring civic engagement will be positively correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital). As described above, Putnam theorizes that social capital and social trust arises from the "density and extent" of social networks (Lovrich and Pierce, 2016). Accordingly, we would expect communities with a higher density of associations to have citizens that are more likely to be trusting of others.

H2: Government performance will be positively correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital). Trust is viewed as the grease that moves democracy forward (Uslaner, 2002). As Rosenberg notes, a general lack of "faith in human nature," or misanthropy, can have important negative consequences for political institutions and for the development and maintenance of public support for various policies and programs. Significantly, from a social capital perspective, a lack of faith in others generally conceived can result in a reduced capacity for citizens to engage in the kinds of interpersonal relationships that are necessary to build social capital (Rosenberg, 1956). Trust is an essential variable helping to reduce transaction costs in interpersonal interactions. In the case of local government performance, higher levels of generalized trust are expected to be associated with

less bureaucratic, more streamlined and responsive governments. In contrast, communities with low levels of trust are expected to feature more bureaucratic and less efficient governments. Public employees residing in trusting communities are more likely to be willing to experiment and take risks in policy development and implementation if they can trust that well-intentioned failures will not result in unduly harsh backlash from the broader public. Communities in which trust abounds tend to encourage greater degrees of innovation because they are less likely to believe that policy and administrative setbacks are a result of untrustworthy caretakers (Putnam, 1993: 101-105; Uslaner, 2002: 48)

H3: Government performance will be positively correlated with higher levels of civic engagement. Following the work of Putnam (1993, 2000) and Brehm and Rahn (1997), citizens that are more fully engaged in their communities are more likely to be politically informed and more likely to demand effective governance. Similarly, public institutions are more likely to be responsive to citizens in communities that are more highly engaged (Putnam, 1993; Portes, 1998; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Uslaner, 2002). As a result, counties with higher levels of participation in a variety of civic associations are hypothesized to portray higher levels of government performance.

While this chapter is focused on data methods for testing hypothesized relationships between social capital and government performance, two additional hypotheses will be considered in Chapter 6 and are mentioned briefly below.

H4: Government performance will be correlated with structural aspects of county government. The following variables will be used to measure structural aspects of county government:

- Form of government
- System of representation
- Number of governments
- Fiscal environment

H5: Government performance will be correlated with political culture. Based on the work of Joel Lieske (1993) and Daniel Elazar (1972), different political cultures within counties are expected to have important effects on the performance of county governments. For example, counties with more traditionalistic political cultures would be expected to have higher performing governments based on the preference for centralized governance and inclination to defer to (rather than closely monitor persons in authority; see Chapter 6).

As described in Chapter 1, Figure 1-1 displays a theoretical model of the predicted relationships among the variables used in this study. Following social capital theory, the dependent variable is government performance located at the center of the model. Based on the hypotheses listed above, counties with higher performing governments are expected to have citizens with higher levels of social capital. Social capital is measured using both behavioral and value-based attitudinal measures. The model also assumes that county government performance is influenced by other variables, including structural variables such as form of government, and revenues and expenditures which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. These variables are assumed to both influence – and be influenced by – social capital. Finally, the model includes elements of political culture to be analyzed in Chapter 6 as well. Again, political culture is assumed to both influence and be influenced by social capital and government performance.

Figure 1-1. Theoretical Model



Data – Government Performance

Beginning in 1997, researchers from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, in collaboration with *Governing Magazine* and with generous financial support from *The Pew Charitable Trusts*, embarked on what has become the most comprehensive effort undertaken to date to assess the state of government performance in local, state and federal levels of government. The *Government Performance Project* (GPP) assessed the extent to which "effective management is basic to the overall effectiveness of government" at all levels (Ingraham et al., 2003: 2). In their book *Government Performance: Why Management Matters*, Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue (2003) detail the rationale behind the GPP, set forth its principal findings, and describe the implications for public administration and public management which they believe flow from this important pioneering work.

All else being equal, if public organizations have good managers and good management systems, we assume they are more likely to be effective performers.

> But it is important not to construe the development of such management capacity as demonstrated performance. Capacity is, rather, a *platform* for performance – a measure of positive or negative potential to obtain desired program results and policy outcomes. Similarly, it is a mistake to consider performance and measurement of performance in a context that does not also include analysis of capacity to perform (Ingraham et al., 2003: 2)

The emphasis on *platform* is critical. The studies described above that use the GPP assume that the measure is a reflection of actual performance – that is, performance as outcomes. However, the GPP measures *capacity* to perform, not performance *per se*. The presence of effective management systems – the capacity to perform – does not necessarily translate into performance as measured by outcomes. As a result, context may play an important role in determining both the relative capacity for performance and the overall level of performance as measured in outcomes.

The GPP results were compiled and published in a series of special issues of *Governing Magazine*. The evaluations for county government to be used here appeared in the February 2002 issue. The county-level analysis carried out by research teams at the Maxwell School evaluated 40 counties across four geographic regions of the United States. As with the studies conducted for the city, state and federal agencies, the county-level analysis assessed performance capacity across five functional areas: *financial management, human resource management, capital/infrastructure management, information systems and managing-for-results*. The data used to develop the final scores in the analysis of the counties were compiled through a combination of: 1) quantitative data collected via an extremely comprehensive management survey sent to each government agency; 2) a series of follow-up on-site interviews; and, 3) systematic archival document reviews and analysis. A final A through F letter grade was

assigned to each county across each area of study which was arrived at through a *facilitated collaborative discursive process* conducted among university-based researchers and journalists from *Governing Magazine* (Ingraham et al., 2003).

Data – Social Capital

Measures of social capital exhibit considerable variation across studies. Paxton (1999) argues that one of the problems with scholarship on social capital is that some studies use a single variable to measure social capital. But as she notes, "social capital is a general concept, and we should not expect that it can be captured with just one variable" (90). As displayed in Figure 3-1, this analysis will assume that social capital is a multi-dimensional concept, including civic engagement and participation, social trust, and faith in others. Data measuring social trust and institutional trust were culled from a combination of two data sets. The first dataset is an extensive collection of household survey data collected by Leigh Stowell and Company, a Seattle-based market research firm. Over a ten-year period ranging from 1992 through 2002, this market research company (whose clients include major newspapers and ABC, NBC and CBS network television affiliates) conducted extensive surveys in more than 60 major media markets in the United States and Canada. Because the survey data collected were based on multi-county urban media markets, the analysis of individual county-level phenomena is possible for most of the counties included in the GPP report.

Figure 3-1. Dimensions of Social Capital



The Stowell data include measures of individual media consumption patterns, such as television and newspaper readership, consumer behavior, and brand preference/loyalty, as well as important demographic information. The surveys also include an extensive battery of social and political *psychographic* measures derived from early social science-based measures evaluating social and institutional trust, self-esteem, political liberalism/conservatism, open-minded/close-minded thinking and sophistication of tastes. These attitudinal measures have important implications for social capital theory and are hypothesized to be significant correlates of government performance.

When measuring and evaluating social capital as a research concept, in addition to measures of what people think it is important to also consider what people do. A central element in the analysis of social capital has been the important role that various types of community associations play in the functioning of healthy civil society. Indeed, it is hypothesized by Putnam and others that it is participation in associations – participation in bowling leagues rather than bowling alone – that allows for or leads to the creation of trust and social bonding that is believed central to community and political life. As Putnam has found, this is where individuals make use of the resources that social capital has to offer.

In order to measure associational density within the counties that are the focus of this analysis, the second dataset used to measure social capital was developed by Rupasingha et al. (2002). In their article "The production of social capital in US counties," Rupasingha et al. collected data on associational densities from all counties in the United States. Using secondary data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau, Rupasingha et al. created separate measures of associationalism across two theoretical dimensions: "Putnam" organizations (P-organizations) and "Olson" organizations (O-organizations). Participation in P-organizations is thought to be more closely aligned with the branch of social capital literature proffered by Robert Putnam, which contends that participation in civic and social associations builds trust and cooperation among its members, and that this will lead to a vibrant civil society. O-organizations are referred to as "rent-seeking" organizations. Following Knack and Keefer (1997), Rupasingha et al. maintain that participation in O-organizations is driven by a "financial incentive" that assumes that participation in certain types of associations is a "mechanism for transferring income or wealth from other parts of society to members" (Rupasingha et al., 2006: 89). As a result, participation in O-organizations potentially represents a more calculated inference that is thought to lead to more economic gains for the group and the individuals participating.

It is important to note that while this study disaggregated the different dimensions of social capital for analytical purposes, it is acknowledged that in reality there is tremendous overlap among the various dimensions of social capital. In addition, not all measures relate to overall social capital equally. This study attempted identify how the various dimensions of social capital are related to and affect social capital overall. The different dimensions should be thought of as additive with respect to social capital – that is, they are dimensions *of* social capital; taken together, the dimensions comprise what is a community's stock of social capital.

Bridging and Bonding Social Capital

As noted above, measures of trust have been determined to be "simple, reliable and valid indicators of social capital" (Halpern, 2005: 35). In his study of regional governments in Italy, Robert Putnam used measures of associational life, newspaper readership, electoral turnout and voting patterns as measures of social capital (1995). Key among these measures was the degree of associational life (Fields, 2003: 33). Later, in *Bowling Alone*, Putnam would further refine the concept to include the important distinction between "bridging" and "bonding" types of social capital. A key component of measuring bridging and bonding is the extent to which individuals trust certain others – in bonding social capital, those others are those that fall within one's network of influence, principally from work, church, social clubs and personal friends. In contrast, bridging social capital is based in individual trust in those others that are outside of one's immediate network or typical ongoing sphere of influence. This trust plays a central role in overall conceptions of social capital. In the case of bridging and bonding social capital, trust is the essential element that makes these various networks and associations possible. As a result, generalized trust, or reciprocity of assumed good intentions among people, is required for bridging social capital and particularized trust is required for bonding social capital. As a result, measures of both the generalized and the several particularized types of inter-personal trust are included in this study.

Generalized Trust

In this study, generalized trust was measured using the following survey items[4]:

- The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. [Trust in the capacity of others to hear unpleasant or contradictory points of view]

[4] Items with "*" denote reverse scoring.

- Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.* [Trust in public officials to treat all citizens equally; misanthropy]
- Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.* [Measure of generalized trust; mistrust motives of disadvantaged people; misanthropy]
- Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society. [Measure of generalized trust; mistrust motives of other people; misanthropy]
- A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.* [Trust in societal institutions; misanthropy]
- Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.* [Global Trust; Misanthropy]

Particularized Trust

In this study, particularized trust was measured using the following survey items:

- My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires. [Financial security results in more freedom to participate in civic affairs and increases support for income redistribution]
- Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me. [Measure of particularized trust-people that are socially active have higher levels of trust]
- I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home.* [Measure of particularized trust-people that are socially active have higher levels of trust]
- I like to visit art galleries and go to classical music concerts. [Measure of particularized trust-people that are socially active have higher levels of trust]

Civic and associational engagement

As noted in the previous section, one of the most important components of social capital is that of associationalism. Putnam's work in both the Italian and American contexts used measures of

civic associationalism as key indicators of social capital. Putnam finds that overall, higher levels of community and civic engagement are strongly related to more efficient regional governments in Italy, and he argues that similar connections can be documented in the American context as well. On the other hand, other studies have found that associationalism is not a significant factor in predicting government performance (see Knack and Peirce et al.). The following measures of civic engagement and associationalism was employed to test their influence on government performance.

- I have personally worked in a political campaign. [Measure of political participation]
- I get most of my entertainment from watching television.* [Less likely to participate in community/civic affairs]
- Census response rates.
- Electoral turnout.
- Average charitable contribution.
- Average charitable contribution as a percentage of discretionary income.
- Number of charitable organizations per 1,000 residents.

As noted above, in addition to the psychographic dimensions available from the Stowell data, this analysis will also use the various measures of association density made available by Rupasingha et al. (2006). The following measures are included in the analysis; the religious organizations (R) and the Putnam (P) and Olson (O) organizations are all expressed as number of associations per 10,000 residents:

- P-Organizations: include civic organizations, bowling centers, golf clubs, fitness centers and sports organizations
- R-organizations: include religious organizations (churches and church-related organizations)

- O-organizations: include political organizations, labor organizations, business organizations and professional organizations

The analysis also used a composite measure of social capital created by Rupasingha et al., a measure that considers all three types of organizations as well as the measures of citizen co-production of public goods listed above, including voting rates and census survey response rates.

Risk

Another dimension of social capital is the concept of propensity to take risks. As society and social interactions become more uncertain and more complex – more risky – the role of trust in facilitating these interactions has become increasingly important as well (Fukuyama, 2001). Individuals who do not trust others, particularly those that they do not know or those with whom they cannot interact, are less likely to take some of the well-considered risks that are required for adaptation to change in contemporary society. The concept of risk is also important given the role of institutions in modern society. In many cases, institutions exist to help fill the void between risk and trust. If institutions, such as county governments, function efficiently this can help offset the effects of a lack of trust. The capacity for risk-taking is also important to government performance. Communities that have a higher capacity for risk-taking are more likely to support novel governance approaches and experimentation with service delivery. Reversely, communities with a lower tolerance for risk may be less likely to support the kind of experimentation that results in improvements to government functions, making administrators less likely to take risks in pursuit of better performance.

The following survey-based measures of individual willingness to take risks were included in this analysis.

- As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.* [Willingness to take risks]
- I believe everything is changing too fast today.* [Affinity for certainty/risk avoidance]

- It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.* [Affinity for uncertainty/risk]
- I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.* [Affinity for certainty/risk avoidance]

Life satisfaction

One dimension of social capital that has received relatively little attention is the role that individual self-esteem/self-actualization plays in facilitating social cooperation and engagement, and how, if at all, institutions can help offset the negative impacts of low self-esteem (measured in the aggregate). Brehm and Rahn found in their research that "general *life satisfaction* is strongly related to interpersonal trust" (1015, emphasis added). It is possible that low levels of life satisfaction will have important effects on social capital overall. Individuals who have low life satisfaction would be expected to have fewer social relationships and be less likely to trust others. For example, dissatisfaction with one's lot in life may reduce overall levels of participation in civic and community affairs. That is, the lower an individual's sense of self-efficacy, the less likely that individual is to believe that their own participation in community affairs will make a substantive difference. The following measures were used to assess the import of overall life satisfaction to social capital.

- I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.* [Trust in others to listen and take seriously one's point of view]
- If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.* [Satisfaction with one's lot in life increases opportunity for social/civic engagement]
- Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.* [Systemic trust/faith in a level playing field]

Political liberalism

Historically throughout the social sciences, particularly in public administration and political science, political liberalism has been used as an important predictor of policy outcomes in the study of all levels of government. The following measures of political liberalism/conservatism were used to test whether these survey-based indicators are additional dimensions of social capital or government performance at the county level.

- I believe the world was created in six days just like the bible says. [High = conservative]
- I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention. [High = conservative]
- I feel that women have not been active enough in politics. [High = liberal]
- Too much money is being spent on military defense. [High = liberal]
- The roles of men and women are too much alike. [High = conservative]

Counties

The Stowell survey data archives include surveys from 34 of the 40 counties evaluated in the GPP county evaluations. Survey data, census and Rupasingha et al. data for these counties form the basis of this study:

Alameda, California
Allegheny, Pennsylvania
Anne Arundel, Maryland
Baltimore, Maryland
Broward, Florida
Clark, Nevada
Contra Costa, California
Cook, Illinois
Cuyahoga, Ohio
Dallas, Texas
Fairfax, Virginia
Franklin, Ohio
Fulton, Georgia
Hamilton, Ohio
Harris, Texas
Hennepin, Minnesota
Hillsborough, Florida
King, Washington
Los Angeles, California
Maricopa, Arizona
Mecklenburg, N. Carolina
Miami-Dade, Florida
Monroe, New York
Montgomery, Maryland

Orange, California

Oakland, Michigan

Palm Beach, Florida

Prince George's,

Maryland

Riverside, California

Sacramento, California

San Bernardino, California

San Diego, California

Santa Clara, California

Wayne, Michigan

Research Methodology

Following recent calls for increased use of so-called "mixed-methods" design, this analysis utilized what Lieberman (2005) refers to as a "nested analysis." The nested analysis approach utilizes both elements of large-n analysis (quantitative/statistical) along with elements of small-n analysis (qualitative/case study) to identify both generalized patterns across a large number of cases, as well as more particularized findings from a smaller set of cases investigated in depth (Lieberman, 2005: 436). Lieberman sketches out an approach to mixed-methods research whereby the researcher begins by conducting a large-n analysis. For purposes of this research, the large-n analysis will involve the statistical analysis of the attitudinal and other quantitative survey data measures to test the bi-variate hypotheses about social capital and government performance (that is, to what extent are the social capital measures correlated with measures of government performance, and how do these correlations compare to other correlates of government performance such as racial/ethnic diversity and economic inequality).

Based on the findings of the large-n analysis, a decision must be made as to the extent to which the key assumptions of the model were found to be consistent with data collected across the 34 counties. In this case, the first question will be whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that social capital is correlated with government performance. The findings from the large-n analysis should be used to guide/inform the small-n analysis. If the large-n analysis provides evidence confirming the predicted model, the small-n analysis should be designed to provide greater richness to the study. That is, in this circumstance, "the main goal of the in-depth component of the nested research design is to further test the robustness of those findings" (Leiberman, 2005: 442). Lieberman refers to this approach as "Model-testing Small-n analysis" (Mt-SNA). On the other hand, if the findings of the large-n analysis do not confirm or provide

sufficient evidence for the predicted model, then the small-n analysis is designed to provide new insights or revisions to the original model. In the case of "Model-building Small-n Analysis" (Mb-SNA) the researcher "does not proceed with the notion that a fully specified model is available and must develop explanations for the puzzle of varied outcomes" (Lieberman, 2005: 443). In this case, the small-n analysis is used to provide insights into how the predicted model should be modified to account for "weak or varied outcomes" from the large-n analysis.

The nested analysis approach used small-n analysis to complement the large-n analysis and to inform the selection of cases. In the event the large-n analysis results in a Mt-SNA approach the selection of cases will be determined by consistency with the predicted model. As Lieberman notes, in using Mt-SNA, "scholars should select cases for further investigation that are well-predicted by the best fitting statistical model" (444). Conversely, if the large-n analysis results in Mb-SNA, then a different case selection approach must be used. In this instance, cases should be selected that are not well explained by the predicted model. As a result, case selection for this analysis will be based on conformance with the predicted hypotheses regarding correlates of government performance and social capital measures.

County Profiles

This section will describe briefly some of the demographic profiles of the counties under investigation. It will also report the results each of the counties received from the evaluation teams associated with the *Government Performance Project* (GPP). Table 3-1 presents some of the economic, residential and ethnic composition demographic data for each of the counties listed above. In addition, the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for each demographic measure are also listed. The information set forth in Table 1 demonstrates that this

set of counties represents a wide spectrum of characteristics thought to be important to social capital and civic engagement. For example, in terms of population, the set of counties range from a high of nearly ten million (9,519,338) in Los Angeles County to a low of less than one half million (489,656) in Anne Arundel County, Maryland (Baltimore area). The mean population of the counties is 1,800,160, with a median of 1,194,156 (Oakland, California). There is also tremendous variation in the amount of growth the counties have experienced between the 1990 and 2000 census counts. Between 1990 and 2000, counties such as Clark, Nevada (Las Vegas) and Maricopa, Arizona (Phoenix) experienced tremendous sustained growth (46.1 and 30.9 percent, respectively). In contrast, some urban counties such as Allegheny, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh) and Hamilton, Ohio (Cincinnati) have experienced noteworthy ongoing declines in population.

The size of the service base and the rate of growth in a given county are critical factors of consideration in cross-county comparisons of any kind. Government performance capacity can be influenced a great deal by both resident population size and rate of population growth or decline. Larger counties will naturally have larger and more diverse service needs than smaller counties.

Table 3-1. Government Performance Scores and Comparative Demographic Data

MSA	County	GPP County Score (numeric)	Percent change population	Percent born in state of residence	Population over 5 years & lived in different state in 1995	Itemized Returns	Average discretionary income	Average charitable donation	Discretionary income to charitable donation	Charities per 1,000 people	White	African American	Asian	Hispanic
San Francisco	Alameda	7	11.40	67.0	11.0	154,366	$34,259	$2,643	7.70%	3.1	0.56	0.10	0.19	0.12
Pittsburgh	Allegheny	3	-4.27	85.5	6.4	111,711	$58,507	$3,647	6.20%	2.9	0.91	0.06	0.02	0.01
Baltimore	Anne Arundel	6	12.75	55.4	13.5	70,608	$40,644	$2,586	6.40%	2.2	0.86	0.10	0.02	0.02
Baltimore	Baltimore	10	8.24	73.9	8.0	87,104	$53,559	$4,043	7.50%	2.5	0.78	0.18	0.03	0.01
Miami	Broward	8	22.64	37.4	16.7	114,274	$57,595	$3,599	6.20%	1.5	0.71	0.12	0.02	0.13
Las Vegas	Clark	7	46.11	23.3	32.1	89,752	$59,403	$3,524	5.90%	1.1	0.75	0.06	0.05	0.12
San Jose	Contra Costa	8	15.29	67.4	8.3	130,998	$41,006	$2,894	7.10%	2.3	0.71	0.07	0.10	0.10
Chicago	Cook	7	5.05	76.8	9.5	420,593	$57,200	$3,995	7.00%	2.5	0.66	0.17	0.05	0.11
Cleveland	Cuyahoga	6	-1.30	77.2	6.3	117,218	$55,191	$4,266	7.70%	3.3	0.80	0.15	0.02	0.02
Dallas/Ft. Worth	Dallas	9	16.50	69.8	13.6	144,329	$71,950	$5,950	8.30%	2.5	0.68	0.13	0.04	0.13
Washington, D.C.	Fairfax	11	15.59	31.3	22.6	164,836	$51,888	$3,284	6.30%	2.4	0.77	0.07	0.09	0.06
Columbus	Franklin	9	10.06	72.4	10.8	95,989	$42,778	$2,905	6.80%	3.5	0.84	0.11	0.03	0.01
Atlanta	Fulton	6	20.47	52.5	21.8	87,261	$91,345	$7,087	7.80%	4.2	0.69	0.24	0.03	0.03
Cincinnati	Hamilton	9	-2.48	74.2	8.0	80,784	$58,438	$4,420	7.60%	3.5	0.85	0.12	0.02	0.01
Houston	Harris	7	17.13	70.4	11.6	201,494	$66,156	$5,429	8.20%	2.1	0.66	0.12	0.05	0.15
Minneapolis	Hennepin	9	7.50	66.6	13.9	148,262	$52,473	$4,370	8.30%	3.8	0.90	0.04	0.03	0.02
Tampa Bay	Hillsborough	6	16.51	45	16.5	61,495	$61,884	$3,847	6.20%	1.8	0.78	0.08	0.02	0.11
Seattle	King	6	13.22	50.8	16.4	195,090	$51,688	$4,094	7.90%	3.6	0.83	0.03	0.08	0.03
Los Angeles	Los Angeles	6	6.89	70.9	8.6	682,292	$56,603	$4,111	7.30%	2.3	0.53	0.08	0.13	0.23
Phoenix	Maricopa	11	30.92	37.6	22.0	249,394	$50,833	$3,256	6.40%	1.6	0.82	0.03	0.02	0.11
Charlotte	Mecklenburg	9	26.46	51.2	23.7	81,497	$55,673	$4,063	7.30%	2.2	0.78	0.16	0.03	0.03
Miami	Miami-Dade	7	14.04	60.3	14.7	100,336	$71,171	$4,284	6.00%	0	0.34	0.13	0.02	0.51
Rochester	Monroe	6	2.91	80.6	6.7	86,080	$45,405	$2,898	6.40%	2.5	0.89	0.06	0.02	0.02
Washington, D.C.	Montgomery	9	13.32	30.6	19.7	147,247	$57,210	$3,820	6.70%	3.8	0.72	0.11	0.09	0.06
Detroit	Oakland	9	9.26	77.3	8.7	190,331	$59,465	$3,668	6.20%	2.4	0.85	0.08	0.04	0.02
Los Angeles	Orange	9	15.31	66.3	9.0	278,312	$49,046	$3,444	7.00%	2	0.70	0.02	0.12	0.15
West Palm Beach	Palm Beach	7	23.66	31.2	17.3	97,429	$118,056	$8,501	7.20%	2.5	0.86	0.06	0.01	0.06
Washington, D.C.	Prince George's	8	9.01	26.8	17.7	88,166	$20,615	$3,443	16.70%	2.1	0.31	0.61	0.03	0.04
Palm Springs	Riverside	7	24.26	66.4	7.5	106,074	$31,989	$2,782	8.70%	1.6	0.69	0.05	0.04	0.20
Sacramento	Sacramento	7	14.90	68.3	8.0	99,677	$34,167	$2,452	7.20%	2.3	0.71	0.07	0.09	0.10
San Bernardino	San Bernardino										0.44	0.09	0.05	0.39
San Diego	San Diego	10	11.22	56	13.3	234,930	$45,205	$3,082	6.80%	2.1	0.73	0.04	0.08	0.12
San Jose	Santa Clara	7	11.00	66.4	13.2	228,665	$52,268	$3,387	6.50%	2.2	0.58	0.02	0.24	0.13
Detroit	Wayne	8	-2.45	77.6	5.8	168,631	$37,874	$2,744	7.20%	2	0.66	0.28	0.02	0.03
	Mean	7.7	13.21	60	13	161,067	$54,289	$3,894	7.35%	2.44	71.5%	11.2%	5.5%	9.9%
	Standard Deviation	1.70	10.09	17.61	6.21	119,770	$17,483.92	$1,278.11	1.84%	0.9	14.8%	10.6%	5.2%	10.8%
	Minimum	3	-4.27	23.30	5.80	61,495	$20,615.00	$2,452.00	5.90%	0.0	30.5%	1.5%	1.3%	0.6%
	Maximum	11	46.11	85.50	32.10	682,292	$118,056.00	$8,501.00	16.70%	4.2	91.3%	61.3%	24.1%	51.3%

Source: U.S. Census, 2000

Smaller counties will have fewer citizens to serve, but will also have a smaller tax base from which to draw resources. Counties that are dependent on local tax revenue as opposed to receiving state aid (as many counties are) will be greatly affected by variations in population.

Similarly, patterns of growth will also have a major impact on capacity to perform. Rapidly growing counties such as Clark and Maricopa will have an ever-increasing tax base from which to draw resources, but they will experience significant strain placed on existing resources and infrastructure and will be under constant pressure to keep up with growth. For example, during the 2002-2003 school year, the Clark County School District in Nevada opened 14 new schools. These kinds of fiscal and institutional pressures can have a dramatic effect on the ability of county governments to develop the capacity for performance.

Not surprisingly, those counties experiencing higher rates of growth also have higher percentages of people born in a different state and who have lived in at least one other state since 1995. The mean percentage of persons born in their current state of residence is 60 percent, and the median is 66.4 percent. The mean for the percentage of the population who lived in a different state in 1995 is 13, and the median is 13.2. The range of the percentage of the population that was born in the state in which they reside goes from a low of 23.3 percent in Clark County, Nevada to a high of 85.5 percent in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. These figures are likely to be quite important from a social capital perspective. From one perspective, rapidly growing communities might be expected to have lower levels of social capital and lower levels of interpersonal trust because most residents have not been embedded in the community long enough to develop strong social ties. In contrast, more stable communities might be expected to have higher levels of social capital because these communities should have well-

established civic organizations and provide greater opportunity for effective interpersonal interaction.

Population size and patterns of growth are not the only important factors related to government performance and social capital. Income and ethnicity can also be expected to have an important impact on social capital and government performance. All things being equal, more homogenous communities would be expected to have higher levels of social capital and higher government performance because ethnic diversity may undermine trust and different ethnic groups would be expected to compete for scarce resources, diminishing the capacity of local governments to address the distinct needs of all the different subgroups of citizens. The set of counties examined here ranges from communities that have high percentages of residents who identify themselves as white (Allegheny County, Pennsylvania and Hennepin County, Minnesota at 91.3 and 90.4, respectively), to communities such as Prince George's County, Maryland (Washington, D.C.), Shelby County, Tennessee (Memphis) and Wayne County, Michigan (Detroit) which have high percentages of African-American but low percentages of other minority groups (61.3, 27.6 and 27.9 percent, respectively). Other communities, such as Dade County, Florida, have high percentages of Hispanics (51.3 percent), while others have high percentages of persons of Asian descent, such as Santa Clara County, California with 24.1 percent. Other counties, such as Alameda County, California and Los Angeles County, California have relatively diverse ethnic communities featuring multiple ethnic groups.

Income levels can also have important implications for government performance and social capital. Annual discretionary household income varies considerably across these counties, ranging from a high of $118,056 in Palm Beach County to a low of $20,615 in Prince George's County. The mean annual discretionary income for these counties is $54,646, and the median is

$53,559. Discretionary income (as opposed to gross income) is important because it can affect the level of charitable giving in a given community, and charitable giving is another factor considered to be an important facet of social capital, trust and government performance alike (Putnam, 2000). Average charitable donations as a percentage of discretionary income ranges from a low of 5.9 percent in Clark County, Nevada to a high of 16.7 percent in Prince George's County, Maryland (Washington, D.C.).

Chapter 4

Social Capital and Government Performance: A Bi-variate Analysis

This chapter examines the relationship between social capital and government performance in 34 U.S. counties evaluated in the *Government Performance Project* (GPP) assessment of county government performance. This chapter will present the results of a detailed bi-variate analysis[5] of the relationship between government performance and the various social capital data described in Chapter 3 to test the following principal hypotheses:

- H1: Dimensions of social capital measuring civic engagement will be correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital).

- H2: Government performance will be positively correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital).

- H3: Government performance will be positively correlated with higher levels of civic engagement.

The GPP research team originally assessed each county using letter grades. To allow for quantitative analysis, these letter scores have been converted into numeric scores ranging from 1

[5] The analysis that follows should be viewed as foundational in the sense that it represents the first step in what is a multi-phase research project. The analysis focuses on the bi-variate correlations in an effort to identify the most important variables present in the volume of data that is utilized for the study. The absence of control variables is noted, but they will be applied in future phases of analysis and will be essential to further elaborating the results presented below.

to 12, where one corresponds to a grade of F and 12 corresponds to a grade of A. Table 4-1 displays the letter and numeric scores for the overall performance score as well as each letter and corresponding numeric score for each of the six functional areas evaluated (Financial Management, Human Resource Management, Information Technology, Capital Management and Managing-for-Results).

Overall scores ranged from a low of D (3) for Allegheny County, Pennsylvania to a high of A- (11) for Fairfax County, Virginia and for Maricopa County, Arizona (Phoenix). The mean overall score was C+ to B- (7.7), and the median score was C+ (7). The evaluations for each of the functional areas examined display similar noteworthy variation. Overall, financial management and human resource management reflect slightly higher scores than do the functional areas of capital management, information technology and managing-for-results. This pattern of scores across areas of assessment is consistent with the findings discussed by Ingraham et al. (2003) on the other governmental entities (cities and states) included in the GPP study (county government findings were not included in this book).

Table 4-1. Government Performance Project County Grades

County	MSA	Overall Letter	Overall Numeric	FM Letter	FM Numeric	HRM Letter	HRM Numeric	IT Letter	IT Numeric	CM Letter	CM Numeric	MFR Letter	MFR Numeric
Fairfax	Washington, D.C.	A-	11	A-	11	A-	11	A-	11	A-	11	A	12
Maricopa	Phoenix	A-	11	A-	11	B+	10	B+	10	A-	11	A	12
Baltimore	Baltimore	B+	10	A-	11	A-	11	B-	8	B	9	A-	11
San Diego	San Diego	B+	10	A-	11	A-	11	B-	8	A-	11	B+	10
Oakland	Detroit	B	9	B	9	B-	8	B	9	C	6	A-	11
Orange	Los Angeles	B	9	B	9	B	9	B-	8	C+	7	A-	11
Hennepin	Minneapolis	B	9	B+	10	B+	10	B-	8	B	9	B+	10
Mecklenburg	Charlotte	B	9	B-	8	C+	7	B	9	B+	10	B	9
Dallas	Dallas/Ft. Worth	B	9	B+	10	B-	8	B+	10	B	9	B-	8
Montgomery	Washington, D.C.	B	9	B+	10	C	6	B+	10	B+	10	B-	8
Franklin	Columbus	B	9	B	9	B+	10	B-	8	B	9	C+	7
Hamilton	Cincinnati	B	9	B	9	B+	10	B	9	B+	10	C+	7
Prince George's	Washington, D.C.	B-	8	B+	10	C	6	B-	8	C+	7	B+	10
Contra Costa	San Jose	B-	8	B-	8	B-	8	B-	8	C-	5	B-	8
Wayne	Detroit	B-	8	B-	8	B-	8	B-	8	C+	7	B-	8
Broward	Miami	B-	8	B+	10	C+	7	B+	9	B	9	C+	7
Alameda	San Francisco	C+	7	C+	7	B-	8	D+	4	C	6	B	9
Cook	Chicago	C+	7	B-	8	C+	7	D	3	B-	8	B-	8
Harris	Houston	C+	7	B-	8	B-	8	C+	7	C+	7	C+	7
Sacramento	Sacramento	C+	7	B-	8	C-	5	C	6	B-	8	C+	7
Riverside	Palm Springs	C+	7	B-	8	C-	5	B	9	C	6	C	6
Clark	Las Vegas	C+	7	B+	10	C+	7	C-	5	B	9	C	6
Palm Beach	West Palm Beach	C+	7	B	9	B	9	C	6	B-	8	C-	5
Santa Clara	San Jose	C+	7	B	9	B-	8	C+	7	C-	5	D+	4
Miami-Dade	Miami	C+	7	B-	8	C	6	B-	8	B-	8	D+	4
Anne Arundel	Baltimore	C	6	C+	7	C-	5	C	6	D+	4	B	9
Fulton	Atlanta	C	6	B-	8	C	6	C	6	C	6	C-	6
Hillsborough	Tampa Bay	C	6	B	9	C	6	D	3	C+	7	C-	5
King	Seattle	C	6	B-	8	B	9	D+	4	C	6	C-	5
Los Angeles	Los Angeles	C	6	B-	8	D+	4	B-	8	C+	7	C-	5
Cuyahoga	Cleveland	C	6	B	9	C-	5	C-	5	B-	8	D+	4
Monroe	Rochester	C	6	C	6	B	9	C-	5	C	6	D	3
San Bernardino	San Bernardino	C-	6	C	6	C-	5	D+	4	C-	6	D	3
Allegheny	Pittsburgh	D	3	C-	6	D+	4	D-	2	D	3	D	3
Minimum			**3**		**6**		**4**		**2**		**3**		**3**
Maximum			**11**		**11**		**11**		**11**		**11**		**12**
Mean			**7.65**		**8.71**		**7.53**		**7.03**		**7.59**		**7.29**
Standard Deviation			**1.70**		**1.40**		**2.06**		**2.29**		**2.00**		**2.66**

Table 4-2 displays a correlation matrix of all the scores arrayed across functional areas, as well as the overall grade given to each county. These correlations indicate that there is considerable variation among the various factors, suggesting that these different functional areas are measuring rather distinct areas of public management. Correlations between the overall grade and the score for each functional area also indicate that each individual functional score is an important component of the overall score.[6]

[6] It is important to recognize the distinction between *substantive* significance and *statistical* significance for purposes of interpreting correlation results. Following Cohen's (1988) formulation, effect size represents the strength of correlation relative to its significance level. For Cohen, a correlation's effect size is considered small if the Pearson r is .10; a correlation of 0.30 is considered moderate; and a correlation of 0.50 or greater is considered to be large.

Table 4-2. GPP Inter-Item Correlations		County Score	Financial Management	Human Resource Management	Information Technology	Capital Management	Managing-for-Results
County Score	Pearson Correlation	1					
	Sig. (1-tailed)						
Financial Management	Pearson Correlation	0.7787**	1				
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000					
Human Resource Management	Pearson Correlation	0.7272**	0.5470**	1			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0004				
Information Technology	Pearson Correlation	0.8030**	0.6155**	0.3879**	1		
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0001	0.0117			
Capital Management	Pearson Correlation	0.7736**	0.7534**	0.5239**	0.5713**	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0007	0.0002		
Managing-for-Results	Pearson Correlation	0.8134**	0.6167**	0.5344**	0.5862**	0.4677**	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0001	0.0006	0.0001	0.0026	
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)							
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)							

As discussed in the previous chapter, this study uses two primary datasets to construct measures of county-level social capital. These datasets provide a glimpse into social capital from both a social-psychological perspective and a civic engagement/networking perspective. The measures of civic engagement/networking are derived from county-level measures created by economist Anil Rupasingha and his colleagues at the University of Wisconsin (2006). The social-psychological measures, or psychographic measures, are derived from the Stowell datasets. While these two dimensions of attitudinal predisposition and social connectivity of social capital have been found to be significant and distinct elements of social capital, there nonetheless has been a considerable amount of debate regarding how or whether these factors lead to, or are a manifestation of, social capital.

Associational Density and Related Measures

To begin, we will examine the measures of civic engagement as constructed by Rupasingha and his associates. The researchers constructed their measures based on the number of the following types of establishments in each county as identified in work conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau:

- civic organizations
- bowling centers
- golf clubs

- fitness centers
- sports organizations
- religious organizations
- political organizations
- labor organizations
- business organizations
- professional organizations

The per capita ratios for each of these types of social entities were calculated for measures of civic engagement. In addition, Rupasingha et al. also incorporated other behavior-based measures of civic engagement in their analysis; these are the percentage of voters who voted in presidential elections and the county-level response rate to the Census Bureau's decennial census. Finally, the number of tax-exempt, non-profit organizations per capita were also included in the analysis.

Displayed in Table 4-3 are the correlation statistics for all of the measures of civic engagement/networking created by Rupasingha et al. for the 34 counties included in this study. Looking only at the individual association measures for a moment, the measures appear to display both structural integrity (reliability) as well as conceptual variation (validity). The measures assess a broad spectrum of associations, ranging from bowling centers to labor involvement, and confirm the presumption that they serve as a reliable set of indicators of networking as a function of social capital. Looking only at the measures of association-based networking, the statistically significant correlations (Pearson's r) reported in Table 4-3 range from a low of 0.4455 (public golf courses and political organizations) to a high of 0.9468 (business and professional organizations) and 0.9465 (civic/social associations and religious

organizations). All of the inter-item correlations of both the Putnam associational subgroup and the Olson “rent-seeking” subgroup of organizations were positive in direction and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Table 4-3. Associational Density Inter-Item Correlations (n=34)		Bowling Centers	Civic and Social Associations	Physical Fitness Facilities	Public Golf Courses	Religious Organizations	Sports Clubs	Membership Sports and Recreation Clubs	Political Organizations	Professional Organizations
Bowling Centers	Pearson Correlation	1								
	Sig. (1-tailed)									
Civic and Social Associations	Pearson Correlation	**0.7984*** **	1							
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000								
Physical Fitness Facilities	Pearson Correlation	**0.6875*** **	**0.9204*** **	1						
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000							
Public Golf Courses	Pearson Correlation	**0.5919*** **	**0.6738*** **	**0.7101*** **	1					
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0001	0.0000	0.0000						
Religious Organizations	Pearson Correlation	**0.8087*** **	**0.9465*** **	**0.9168*** **	**0.6984*** **	1				
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000					
Sports Clubs	Pearson Correlation	**0.5823*** **	**0.8174*** **	**0.8886*** **	**0.7620*** **	**0.8367*** **	1			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0002	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000				
Membership Sports and Recreation Clubs	Pearson Correlation	**0.6279*** **	**0.8029*** **	**0.8594*** **	**0.7700*** **	**0.7888*** **	**0.7513*** **	1		
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000			
Political Organizations	Pearson Correlation	**0.6273*** **	**0.7291*** **	**0.7331*** **	**0.4455*** **	**0.7215*** **	**0.6327*** **	**0.5443*** **	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0041	0.0000	0.0000	0.0004		
Professional Organizations	Pearson Correlation	**0.7385*** **	**0.7523*** **	**0.7563*** **	**0.4941*** **	**0.7789*** **	**0.6567*** **	**0.6139*** **	**0.8302*** **	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0015	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000	
Business Organizations	Pearson Correlation	**0.7744*** **	**0.8572*** **	**0.8637*** **	**0.5901*** **	**0.8843*** **	**0.7568*** **	**0.7004*** **	**0.8379*** **	**0.9468*** **
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Labor Organizations	Pearson Correlation	**0.9212*** **	**0.8816*** **	**0.7621*** **	**0.5038*** **	**0.8585*** **	**0.6347*** **	**0.6066*** **	**0.7305*** **	**0.7428*** **
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0012	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000	0.0000
Other Membership Organizations	Pearson Correlation	**0.7646*** **	**0.9303*** **	**0.9332*** **	**0.6920*** **	**0.9321*** **	**0.8316*** **	**0.8137*** **	**0.7716*** **	**0.7667*** **
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Aggregate of All Associations	Pearson Correlation	**0.8371*** **	**0.9681*** **	**0.9387*** **	**0.7056*** **	**0.9902*** **	**0.8450*** **	**0.8123*** **	**0.7709*** **	**0.8266*** **
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Census 2000 Response Rate	Pearson Correlation	0.0062	-0.2039	-0.1485	-0.1462	-0.1828	**-0.3181** **	0.0731	-0.1747	-0.1340
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4862	0.1237	0.2010	0.2047	0.1504	0.0333	0.3405	0.1615	0.2250
Percent Vote in 96 Election	Pearson Correlation	0.0378	**-0.2700** *	**-0.2857** *	-0.2451	**-0.2587** *	**-0.3562** **	-0.0648	-0.0380	-0.0814
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4160	0.0613	0.0507	0.0812	0.0697	0.0193	0.3579	0.4155	0.3237
Number of Non-Profit Organizations in 1997	Pearson Correlation	**0.7988*** **	**0.9244*** **	**0.9311*** **	**0.6347*** **	**0.9482*** **	**0.8258*** **	**0.7907*** **	**0.7657*** **	**0.8029*** **
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Social Capital Index (principal components model)	Pearson Correlation	0.0354	-0.2104	-0.2321	**-0.2912** **	-0.1832	-0.2820*	-0.0495	0.0250	-0.0133
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4213	0.1162	0.0933	0.0473	0.1498	0.0531	0.3905	0.4442	0.4703
Social Capital Index (standardized model)	Pearson Correlation	0.0362	-0.2148	**-0.2275** *	**-0.2851** *	-0.1874	**-0.2937** **	-0.0350	0.0077	-0.0233
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4195	0.1113	0.0978	0.0511	0.1443	0.0459	0.4222	0.4828	0.4479

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

Table 4-3 cont'd. Associational Density Inter-Item Correlations (n=34)		Business Organizations	Labor Organizations	Other Membership Organizations	Aggregate of All Associations	Census 2000 Response Rate	Percent Vote in 96 Election	Number of Non-Profit Organizations in 1997	Social Capital Index (principal components
Business Organizations	Pearson Correlation	1							
	Sig. (1-tailed)								
Labor Organizations	Pearson Correlation	**0.8203*** **	1						
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000							
Other Membership Organizations	Pearson Correlation	**0.8891*** **	**0.8563*** **	1					
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000						
Aggregate of All Associations	Pearson Correlation	**0.9208*** **	**0.8900*** **	**0.9550*** **	1				
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000					
Census 2000 Response Rate	Pearson Correlation	-0.1316	-0.0793	-0.0995	-0.1657	1			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2291	0.3279	0.2879	0.1744				
Percent Vote in 96 Election	Pearson Correlation	-0.1416	-0.0511	-0.1633	-0.2252	**0.6189*** **	1		
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2122	0.3870	0.1781	0.1002	0.0000			
Number of Non-Profit Organizations in 1997	Pearson Correlation	**0.9104*** **	**0.8885*** **	**0.9742*** **	**0.9666*** **	-0.0758	-0.1669	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.3350	0.1727		
Social Capital Index (principal components model)	Pearson Correlation	-0.0652	0.0023	-0.0783	-0.1568	**0.6071*** **	**0.9360*** **	-0.0641	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3570	0.4949	0.3300	0.1879	0.0001	0.0000	0.3593	
Social Capital Index (standardized model)	Pearson Correlation	-0.0704	-0.0021	-0.0783	-0.1603	**0.6722*** **	**0.9372*** **	-0.0622	**0.9962*** **
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3461	0.4953	0.3299	0.1826	0.0000	0.0000	0.3633	0.0000

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

In addition to the measures of civic engagement or networking, Rupasingha et al. also created aggregate measures of all of the associations included in their study, including a principal components model estimation, a standardized model and a simple aggregation of all of the associations present. These measures have been included in this analysis as well. Of major significance for our purposes is the finding that for the 34 counties evaluated in this study, the principal components social capital index is not significantly correlated with any of the individual measures of association except the number of public golf courses. Similarly, the standardized index of social capital created by Rupasingha et al. is significantly correlated with only the number of public golf courses, sports clubs and physical fitness centers. These indexes are more strongly correlated with the behavior report measures of census response rates and voter turnout. The aggregated measure of associations is strongly correlated with all of the measures of association, including the number of non-profit associations. However, the aggregated index is not significantly correlated with either the census response rates or voter turnout rates, and is not significantly correlated with the previous social capital indexes created by Rupasingha et al.

These findings indicate that census response rates and voter turnout as a function of social capital appear to be independent of the presence or absence of associations, and may be better used as separate and independent measures of social capital (often referred to as *measures of co-production*). This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that voter turnout was *negatively* correlated with 12 of the 13 measures of civic engagement, five of which were statistically significant. Following social capital theory, we would expect the measures of co-production to be positively correlated with the measures of civic engagement.

Social Psychological Measures

As noted above, a good deal of empirical research conducted on social capital has found that the social-psychological dimensions are just as important aspects of social capital as are the associational measures, particularly those which are related to trust. To measure these important pre-dispositional dimensions of social capital, this study relies on a variety of psychographic measures featured in the Stowell datasets described in Chapter 3. The surveys were conducted using a standard Likert-type scale for documenting attitudes and beliefs. To develop county-level measures from individual level data, a mean score for each county across each item was calculated and then converted to z-scores. The z-scores for each item for each county were combined into a second dataset.

The inter-item correlations for the Stowell items included in this analysis are displayed in Table 4-4. As noted above, there is some variation among counties as to which individual items were included in the samples, which range from a low of 27 to a high of 34 counties being included. Most items of interest were included in at least 30 of the 34 counties covered in this analysis. Overall, the correlations displayed in Table 4-4 feature much more variation than was present among the Rupasingha et al. civic engagement measures, with as many correlations reporting significance as not. There are a few interesting findings that warrant additional discussion which become important in later analyses.

Among the Rupasingha et al. measures, participation in religious organizations was strongly correlated with participation in civic and social associations (0.95, sig. > 0.01). By itself, this finding is rather unremarkable in that it fits with the overall literature on social capital which holds that individuals who participate in religious organizations also tend to participate more in other kinds of organizations as well (Uslaner, 2002: 87; Putnam, 2001: 66). This

pattern of association is broadly viewed as evidence that widespread citizen participation in associations leads to high levels of social capital within a community (Putnam, 1993, 2001). It should be noted that there is a very clear distinction to be made between aggregate levels of religious organizations within a community and individual level religious beliefs.[7] At the individual level, counties with many persons who believe "that the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says" are more likely to believe that "most public officials today are only interested in people with money" (0.79, sig. > 0.01), "most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power" (0.61, sig. > 0.01), and that "few major corporations in this country have all the real power" (0.55, sig. > 0.01). That is, people expressing a literal belief in the bible tend to be more distrusting of others (both generalized and particularized trust), tend to be more averse to change and risk, and tend to be more pessimistic in their overall outlook.

The role de Tocqueville has played in the development and evolution of the concept of social capital and government performance was discussed in some detail in Chapter 2. Table 4-4 provides evidence that reinforces some of de Tocqueville's prescient observations, particularly with respect to materialism and "self-interest rightly understood." For example, individuals residing in these 34 counties who indicated that their "family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires" were less likely to believe that "Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society" (-0.38, sig. > 0.05), were less likely to believe that "a few major corporations in this country have all the real power" (-0.65, sig. > 0.01), and were less likely to believe that "life has not been fair" to them (-0.87, sig. > 0.01). On the other hand, these same individuals were more likely to indicate that "going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me" (0.64, sig. > 0.01). This finding suggests that from the perspective of

[7] Sample n ranges from 70,159 to 100,003, depending on the item.

psychological state of relative standing, material well-being and comfort are positively correlated with a variety of measures of trust and social capital.

Another finding that further demonstrates the complexity of social capital viewed as a socio-psychological phenomenon is the relationship between self-esteem and trust. Counties featuring higher percentages of citizens reporting that "people generally view me as a leader" were more likely to score high on the political campaign involvement item (0.88, sig. > 0.01) and less likely to score high on the items measuring risk, tolerance, openness to change, and dependence on television as a source of entertainment; these items read "I don't believe in taking risks" (-0.91, sig. > 0.01), "It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new" (-0.94, sig. > 0.01), and "I get most of their entertainment from watching television" (-0.96, sig. > 0.01). However, at the aggregate level none of the items measuring either generalized or particularized trust were correlated with this self-esteem item in these 34 counties. It would appear that self-esteem is clearly essential to one's willingness to question convention and try new things and use broad range of sources of entertainment, but it does not incline one to place trust in others.

Reversely, counties featuring many individuals indicating that they "often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously" were more likely to have citizens who also believe that "it is always better to stay with something familiar" (0.91, sig. > 0.01) and that they get most of their entertainment from watching television (0.92, sig. > 0.01). However, similar to the measure of self-perceptions of leadership status, this self-esteem measure was not significantly correlated with either the measure of generalized trust or the measure of particularized trust. Overall, these findings strongly suggest that self-esteem is not an important factor in assessing community-level trust.

Particularized and Generalized Trust

Turning to particularized trust, counties featuring high proportions of respondents indicating that "going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me" were less likely to be cynical and believe that "most public officials today are only interested in people with money" (-0.72, sig. > 0.01), that "a few major corporations in this country have all the real power" (-0.72, sig. > 0.01), or that life has not been fair (-0.62, sig. > 0.01). And while these counties were more likely to have citizens that believe that "most people who don't get ahead don't have enough will power" (0.56, sig.>0.01), they were less likely to have citizens that believe that too many people are getting a free ride (-0.49, sig. > 0.01). Another measure of particularized trust – I like to visit art museums and go to classic music concerts – follows a similar pattern as noted above, with the exception that these individuals are less likely to believe that "most people who don't get ahead don't have enough will power." This correlation is positive, but not statistically significant.

When we turn to measures of generalized trust – trust in people in general – some interesting and noteworthy patterns again emerge. Perhaps the best measure of generalized trust included in the Stowell datasets is a free-rider item (Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society). This measure is important because theories surrounding free-riders in democratic societies have been central to discussions of social capital and democratic theory for a very long time. Indeed, the fable of the *tragedy of the commons* is based in good measure on solving the free-rider dilemma (Putnam, 1993). As predicted, people that believe "too many people are getting a free ride in today's society" are more pessimistic, more risk-averse and less trusting of others. The free-rider item is positively correlated with "human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict" (0.32, sig. > 0.1), with "generally, I feel that life has

not been fair to me" (0.42, sig. > 0.05) and with the belief "everything is changing too fast" (0.55, sig. > 0.01). These individuals are also more likely to believe that "most public officials today are only interested in people with money" (0.66, sig. > 0.01), that "a few major corporations in this country have all the real power" (0.52, sig. > 0.01) and that "most people who don't get ahead don't have enough will power" (0.56, sig. > 0.01).

Applicability of the Stowell Data

The applicability of the Stowell datasets as measures of social capital has been confirmed through a separate analysis conducted by researchers with the Division of Governmental Studies and Services at Washington State University (Lovrich, 2008). In particular, *two of the Stowell items discussed above are significantly correlated with two of Robert Putnam's trust-based items, as well as his overall social capital index*. The analysis conducted by Lovrich examined data collected from 58 counties in all major regions of the U.S. (n=<50,000), including the 34 counties that comprise the sample for this study. Of this sample, 25 of the Stowell counties include data across five years or more, 12 of which are included in this study. While the social capital items compared below are not identical, as the statistical results indicate, they do tap into similar dimensions and enhance the validity of their use as measures different dimensions of social capital.

Generalized trust

Stowell item: *Most politicians today are only interested in people with money*.

Putnam item: *Can trust others vs. need to be careful*.

Pearson Correlation = -0.57 (p<0.001); -0.25 (p<0.056) (Putnam Social Capital Scale)

Individual/Particularized Trust

Stowell item: *Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society*.

Putnam item: *How much can you trust people in your neighborhood?*

How much can you trust people at your church or place of worship?

How much can you trust the police in your local community?

Pearson Correlation = -0.44 ($p<0.002$) (neighborhood)

-0.38 ($p<0.008$) (church)

-0.47 ($p<0.001$) (police)

-0.47 ($p<0.021$) (Putnam Social Capital Scale)

Table 4-4. Stowell Psychographic Inter-Item Correlations

		My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires.	I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.	My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.	I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	People generally view me as a leader.	I believe everything is changing too fast today.	If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.	Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.	Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.
My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires.	Pearson Correlation	1										
	Sig. (1-tailed)											
	N	99338										
I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.	Pearson Correlation	**-.053****	1									
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0										
	N	95259	95924									
My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.	Pearson Correlation	.044**	**.026****	1								
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0	0									
	N	73996	74661	75048								
I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	Pearson Correlation	.054**	-.120**	.136**	1							
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0	0	0								
	N	93759	93759	72496	93759							
People generally view me as a leader.	Pearson Correlation	.119**	**-.027****	**.340****	.146**	1						
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0	0	0.0000	0							
	N	80418	81083	71048	78918	81470						
I believe everything is changing too fast today.	Pearson Correlation	**-.105****	**.227****	-.011**	**-.109****	-.134**	1					
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0	0.001	0	0						
	N	99338	95924	74661	93759	81083	100003					
If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.	Pearson Correlation	**-.245****	**.045****	**0**	-.012**	-.067**	**.160****	1				
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0	0.468	0	0.0000	0.0000					
	N	99338	95924	74661	93759	81083	100003	100003				
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson Correlation	**0**	**.185****	**.015****	**-.131****	**.013****	**.196****	**.046****	1			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.445	0	0	0	0	0	0				
	N	91751	90916	73276	88751	79698	92416	92416	92416			
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.	Pearson Correlation	**-.037****	.029**	-.081**	-.080**	-.139**	**.167****	.134**	.070**	1		
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0	0	0	0.0000	0	0	0	0			
	N	84575	85240	70661	83075	78022	85240	85240	83855	85991		
Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	Pearson Correlation	**.009****	.054**	-.017**	-.041**	-.026**	**.105****	**.051****	**.103****	**.129****	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.003	0	0	0	0	0.0000	0	0	0.0000		
	N	90453	88863	70661	86698	78022	91118	91118	83855	85240	91118	
A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.	Pearson Correlation	**-.098****	**.102****	.031**	**-.021****	-.018**	**.220****	**.135****	**.118****	**.111****	**.073****	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0	0	0	
	N	93874	94539	73276	92374	79698	94539	94539	90916	83855	87478	94539
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	Pearson Correlation	**-.120****	**.104****	**-.094****	-.086**	**-.184****	**.221****	**.194****	**.133****	.170**	**.059****	**.167****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	92120	88706	74661	86541	81083	92785	92785	85198	78022	83900	87321
Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.	Pearson Correlation	**-.205****	**.068****	-.035**	-.071**	-.093**	**.196****	**.308****	**.057****	**.195****	**.065****	**.141****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	91259	91924	71048	89759	81470	91924	91924	86916	85991	88863	90539
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	Pearson Correlation	**-.018****	**.144****	**-.105****	-.100**	**-.193****	**.228****	**.047****	**.091****	**.159****	**.069****	**.107****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	90296	88706	74661	86541	81083	90961	90961	83698	78022	83900	87321

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

Table 4-4 cont'd. Stowell Psychographic Inter-Item Correlations

		My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires.	I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.	My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.	I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	People generally view me as a leader.	I believe everything is changing too fast today.	If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.	Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.	Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	Pearson Correlation	.083**	-.094**	.095**	.154**	.096**	-.079**	-.009**	-.037**	.031**	0.004	-.015**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.004	0	0	0.139	0
	N	86696	84441	63565	82941	69987	86696	86696	79433	73757	79635	83056
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	Pearson Correlation	**.028****	**.104****	.029**	**-.099****	.034**	**.132****	**.053****	**.270****	.162**	**.121****	**.074****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	89453	86039	69276	83874	75198	90118	90118	83916	82416	88294	86039
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	.066**	**-.072****	**.081****	**.172****	.143**	**-.082****	-.038**	**-.084****	**-.034****	**-0.003**	**-.037****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1830	0.0000
	N	71672	72337	69276	70172	72337	72337	72337	72337	69276	69276	72337
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	-.108**	.115**	.028**	-.095**	-.015**	.212**	.152**	**.198****	.105**	.079**	**.320****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	97838	95924	74661	93759	81083	98503	98503	90916	85240	91118	94539
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	Pearson Correlation	**-.040****	**.144****	**-.083****	**-.165****	**-.153****	**.277****	**.099****	**.108****	.262**	**.112****	**.119****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	80980	81645	71048	79480	78409	81645	81645	76637	78022	81645	80260
I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	Pearson Correlation	**-.089****	**.159****	-.025**	-.119**	**-.106****	**.210****	**.141****	**.100****	**.137****	**.063****	**.127****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	83880	84222	69044	82380	77004	84222	84222	82837	83623	83623	82837
I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.004**	**.096****	**-.017****	**-.096****	-.047**	**.153****	**.022****	**.081****	.038**	**.043****	**.075****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1380	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	95259	95924	75048	93759	81470	95924	95924	90916	85240	88863	94539
Too much money is being spent on military defense.	Pearson Correlation	**-.076****	**-.089****	.044**	.061**	-.026**	**.093****	**.109****	**-.094****	.060**	**-.071****	**.142****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	97953	94539	73276	92374	79698	98618	98618	92416	83855	89733	94539
I feel there is too much sex on television today.	Pearson Correlation	**.007***	.261**	.009**	0	-.047**	**.272****	-.007*	**.137****	**-0.001**	**.044****	**.085****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0220	0.0000	0.0080	0.4390	0.0000	0.0000	0.0180	0.0000	0.3530	0.0000	0.0000
	N	88041	88706	74661	86541	81083	88706	88706	83698	78022	81645	87321
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	-.080**	.129**	**-.088****	-.167**	**-.128****	.165**	.129**	.093**	.169**	.065**	.130**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	92120	88706	74661	86541	81083	92785	92785	85198	78022	83900	87321
I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.	Pearson Correlation	**.022****	**.174****	-.030**	**-.133****	**-.037****	**.167****	**.013****	**.231****	.083**	**.133****	**.023****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	85236	85236	69996	83736	78018	85236	85236	83851	82175	82175	83851
The roles of men and women today are too much alike.	Pearson Correlation	**-.033****	**.178****	-.031**	**-.113****	-.076**	**.266****	.094**	**.168****	.170**	**.146****	**.108****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	88131	87296	69656	85131	80078	88796	88796	87411	84235	84235	85911
In general, would you say you feel better off or more financially secure now than you were two years ago?	Pearson Correlation	**-.088****	**.007***	-.095**	**-.014****	-.102**	**.049****	**.018****	**-0.006**	.038**	**.030****	**.028****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0270	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0610	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	69836	67358	50475	67035	55497	70159	70159	67215	59654	62274	67358
How about two years from now; do you think you will be better off, worse off or no different than you are now?	Pearson Correlation	.030**	**.011****	-.131**	-.032**	-.153**	.074**	-.029**	0.006	.076**	.045**	.025**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0030	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0590	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	69836	67358	50475	67035	55497	70159	70159	67215	59654	62274	67358

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

Table 4-4 cont'd. Stowell Psychographic Inter-Item Correlations

		I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.	As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.	Too much money is being spent on military defense.
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	Pearson Correlation	1										
	Sig. (1-tailed)											
	N	92785										
Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.	Pearson Correlation	**.247****	1									
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000										
	N	84706	93062									
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	Pearson Correlation	**.193****	**.111****	1								
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000									
	N	90961	84706	90961								
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	Pearson Correlation	**-.042****	**-0.003**	**-.090****	1							
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.1690	0.0000								
	N	79478	80828	79478	87084							
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	Pearson Correlation	**.081****	**.067****	.066**	**.012****	1						
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000							
	N	82900	86039	81076	76811	90118						
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	-.050**	-.032**	**-.049****	.072**	**-.054****	1					
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000						
	N	72337	72337	72337	60854	69276	72337					
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	**.189****	**.154****	**.071****	**-.045****	.125**	**-.096****	1				
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000					
	N	91285	91924	90961	86696	88618	72337	98503				
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	Pearson Correlation	**.190****	**.194****	**.291****	**-.047****	**.171****	-.077**	**.124****	1			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000				
	N	81645	82032	81645	70549	78821	69276	81645	82032			
I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	Pearson Correlation	**.140****	**.156****	**.174****	**-.048****	**.107****	-.111**	**.126****	**.243****	1		
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000			
	N	77004	84222	77004	73062	80799	68258	84222	76405	84222		
I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.	Pearson Correlation	.083**	**.029****	**.149****	**-.314****	**.062****	-.034**	**.079****	**.156****	**.107****	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000		
	N	88706	92311	88706	84829	86039	72337	95924	82032	84222	96312	
Too much money is being spent on military defense.	Pearson Correlation	.067**	**.120****	**.019****	.026**	-.030**	-.024**	.116**	**.053****	**.055****	**0.003**	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1960	
	N	91400	90539	89576	85311	90118	72337	97118	80260	82837	94539	98618
I feel there is too much sex on television today.	Pearson Correlation	**.095****	0	**.187****	-.132**	.034**	-0.002	.060**	**.104****	.073**	**.155****	-0.003
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.4460	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.3350	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.1820
	N	88706	84706	88706	77223	78821	72337	88706	81645	77004	88706	87321
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	**.174****	**.165****	**.206****	**-.047****	.082**	-.070**	**.103****	**.230****	**.154****	**.130****	**.022****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	92785	84706	90961	79478	82900	72337	91285	81645	77004	88706	91400
I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.	Pearson Correlation	**.090****	**.055****	**.106****	**-.031****	**.151****	**-.030****	**.077****	**.127****	**.065****	**.074****	-.115**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	78018	85236	78018	74418	79351	71672	85236	74957	81480	85236	83851
The roles of men and women today are too much alike.	Pearson Correlation	**.135****	**.132****	**.147****	**-.050****	**.173****	-.038**	**.130****	**.223****	**.147****	**.105****	**-0.002**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.3100
	N	81578	87296	80078	75813	82911	71332	87296	77017	83217	87296	87411
Would you say you feel better off or more financially secure now than you were two years ago?	Pearson Correlation	.073**	.043**	.124**	**-.028****	**-.041****	.026**	0.001	.056**	-.022**	.027**	-.031**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.3930	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	N	62941	64358	61117	59824	62659	50536	68659	54079	59269	67358	70159
How about two years from now?	Pearson Correlation	.097**	.022**	.179**	**-.035****	**-.032****	.034**	-.014**	.102**	**-.011****	**.049****	-.046**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0050	0.0000	0.0000
	N	62941	64358	61117	59824	62659	50536	68659	54079	59269	67358	70159

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

Table 4-4 cont'd. Stowell Psychographic Inter-Item Correlations

		I feel there is too much sex on television today.	I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.	The roles of men and women today are too much alike.	Would you say you feel better off or more financially secure now than you were two years ago?	How about two years from now?
I feel there is too much sex on television today.	Pearson Correlation	1					
	Sig. (1-tailed)						
	N	88706					
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	**.046****	1				
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000					
	N	88706	92785				
I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.	Pearson Correlation	.122**	**.062****	1			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000				
	N	78018	78018	85236			
The roles of men and women today are too much alike.	Pearson Correlation	.148**	**.123****	**.300****	1		
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000			
	N	80078	81578	84231	88796		
Would you say you feel better off or more financially secure now than you were two years ago?	Pearson Correlation	.082**	.051**	.039**	.047**	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000		
	N	60140	62941	62392	63210	70159	
How about two years from now?	Pearson Correlation	.109**	.080**	.062**	.063**	**.287****	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
	N	60140	62941	62392	63210	70159	70159

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

Relationship Among Measures of Civic Engagement and Psychographic Dimensions

An important question that has emerged in the literature on social capital has been the relationship between trust and participation in civic and social associations. Following Putnam and others, trust emerges from participation in various civic associations. Thus, we would expect that counties with more vibrant associational life would have citizens that are more engaged and more trusting of others. Table 4-5 displays the correlations between the civic engagement measures reported in Rupasingha et al. and the Stowell data items discussed earlier. Looking first at the *aggregate measure of associations, this item is significantly correlated with 13 of the 28 Stowell items* – many of which are direct measures of generalized, particularized and political trust – and all correlations are in the predicted direction, which anticipates that higher civic engagement/participation in associations will be positively correlated with measures of trust. Similarly, the *social capital indexes created by Rupasingha et al. are also significantly correlated with virtually all of the Stowell items*. The Stowell items are also significantly correlated with the *citizen co-production measures* (census response rate and voter turnout items).

One interesting finding is that while the aggregate measure of associations was not significantly correlated with the Stowell item measuring television consumption ("I get most of my entertainment from watching television"), it was significantly positively correlated with the item measuring an individual's belief that there is too much sex on television. However, the number of civic and social organizations present in a given county was *positively* correlated with both of the Stowell television items. This finding is in some ways inconsistent with Putnam's earlier findings that social capital is generally negatively correlated with television viewing. From a macro perspective, Putnam finds that the decline in social capital in the U.S. closely

follows the advent of the technology and the growth of television viewing, dating back to the 1950s (Putnam, 1995: 680). Putnam argued that social capital declines as a result of an increase in television viewing for two reasons: 1) the more time a person spends watching television, the less time they have to spend participating in community and civic affairs; and 2) television viewing is generally an asocial activity. Does this finding contradict Putnam's assertion that television is one of the principal causes of the decline in social capital (Putnam, 1995)? In some ways yes; it may be the case that overall people are motivated to participate in civic and social organizations because of what they see on television.

The Rupasingha measures that appear to be most significantly correlated with the Stowell items are physical fitness and sports and recreation clubs (significantly correlated with 18 and 14 of the 28 Stowell items, respectively), political and professional organizations (significantly correlated with 17 and 15 of the Stowell items), and civic, social and religious organizations (each significantly correlated with 10 of the Stowell items, respectively). The prevalence of bowling centers is only significantly correlated with 5 of the 28 Stowell items. The findings noted followed the predicted direction, with one most noteworthy exception. The Stowell item that asks respondents if they have participated in a political campaign was *negatively* correlated, both with the number of civic and social organizations (-0.26, sig. > 0.1) and the number of political organizations present in a particular county (-0.42, sig. > 0.05). The item was not significantly correlated with any of the other items.

Looking at the correlations of the individual Stowell items with the associational and co-production measures, Table 4-5 provides evidence in support of Putnam's claim that *participation in a variety of social groups and associations is significantly correlated with measures of generalized and particularized trust, political trust, self-esteem and optimism*.

Overall, the aggregate county-level measures of particularized and generalized trust were significantly correlated with roughly two-thirds of the Rupsingha county-level social capital items, including the co-production items and the overall social capital indexes of associations. Similarly, the political trust items indicate overall a strong relationship with the measures of the three types of associations.

The results reported in Table 4-5 indicate that for these 34 counties, *civic engagement as measured by the prevalence of associations appears to be an important correlate of the several psychographic measures of social capital featured in the Stowell datasets*. This is somewhat contrary to the findings reported by Knack (2002) for state-level analyses, and to the findings reported by Pierce, Moon and Lovrich (2000) for city-level analyses. Knack and the Pierce et al. research teams both found that measures of civic engagement and measures related to trust and other social psychological dimensions were not closely associated at the aggregate level. These findings also suggest that the connection between trust and associationalism is strong at the level of major urban counties. It is important to keep in mind that this finding pertains to the aggregate, county-level comparisons within these 34 counties; these findings do not speak to individual-level dynamics.

Table 4-5. Rupasingha et al (2006) Social Capital Scores and Stowell Dataset Correlations		Putnam Organizations						
		Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	Number of Public Golf Courses per 10,000	Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	Number of Sports Clubs, Managers and Promoters per 10,000	Number of Membership Sports and Recreation Clubs per 10,000
My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires.	Pearson Correlation	0.0143	-0.0267	**0.3684****	**0.3713****	0.0381	0.1822	**0.4763*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4680	0.4405	0.0160	0.0153	0.4153	0.1511	0.0022
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.	Pearson Correlation	0.1699	0.1224	**-0.3977****	-0.0889	**0.2768***	0.1340	**-0.3620****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1804	0.2559	0.0133	0.3173	0.0658	0.2362	0.0227
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.	Pearson Correlation	0.0158	**-0.3769****	**-0.2945***	-0.0227	-0.1609	-0.0108	-0.1036
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4676	0.0219	0.0605	0.4535	0.2022	0.4778	0.2964
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	Pearson Correlation	0.2345	-0.0535	**0.3687****	-0.0228	**0.3440****	0.2138	**0.4570*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1061	0.3895	0.0225	0.4523	0.0313	0.1283	0.0056
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
People generally view me as a leader.	Pearson Correlation	0.0203	**-0.2590***	-0.2269	-0.0364	-0.1777	0.0152	-0.0599
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4576	0.0834	0.1139	0.4242	0.1738	0.4681	0.3767
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
I believe everything is changing too fast today.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0431	-0.1002	**-0.4442*****	-0.1174	-0.1151	-0.1544	**-0.3245****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4044	0.2864	0.0042	0.2542	0.2584	0.1916	0.0305
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2076	**-0.2674***	**-0.3989*****	**-0.3306****	**-0.2767***	-0.1114	**-0.5146*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1194	0.0631	0.0097	0.0281	0.0565	0.2653	0.0009
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson Correlation	0.0244	-0.0565	**-0.4453*****	-0.0685	**-0.2436***	**-0.2410****	-0.1380
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4473	0.3794	0.0053	0.3548	0.0895	0.0920	0.2256
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0398	-0.1986	-0.2142	0.0410	**-0.3685****	-0.1487	-0.0771
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4174	0.1464	0.1278	0.4148	0.0225	0.2165	0.3427
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2741***	-0.1462	**-0.2428***	-0.1342	-0.1811	-0.0445	-0.1728
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0678	0.2163	0.0940	0.2358	0.1648	0.4060	0.1763
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0906	-0.0437	**-0.5219*****	-0.1171	**-0.2971****	-0.0885	**-0.4854*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3109	0.4062	0.0011	0.2617	0.0493	0.3150	0.0024
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	Pearson Correlation	0.0891	**0.3084****	0.1631	-0.0452	0.1142	-0.0137	0.0351
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3081	0.0379	0.1784	0.3998	0.2600	0.4694	0.4218
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0648	-0.0971	**-0.4028****	**-0.3533****	-0.0327	-0.1510	**-0.3406****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3646	0.3017	0.0123	0.0256	0.4308	0.2087	0.0304
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	Pearson Correlation	0.0616	**0.3149****	0.0986	0.0291	0.1759	0.0635	-0.0026
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3667	0.0371	0.2925	0.4361	0.1637	0.3628	0.4942
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33	33
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	Pearson Correlation	**0.4110****	0.1760	**0.4858*****	**0.3508****	0.2143	0.0348	**0.6162*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0120	0.1761	0.0032	0.0287	0.1277	0.4276	0.0001
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	Pearson Correlation	-0.1721	-0.1222	-0.1903	**0.3707****	**0.3167****	**0.3712****	0.0095
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1773	0.2563	0.1526	0.0200	0.0413	0.0199	0.4798
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	0.0107	**-0.2622***	-0.2171	-0.0461	-0.1585	0.0368	-0.0370
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4789	0.0932	0.1384	0.4096	0.2149	0.4278	0.4274
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0731	-0.0547	**-0.5367*****	**-0.2356***	**-0.2479***	-0.1065	**-0.5464*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3431	0.3812	0.0006	0.0934	0.0821	0.2777	0.0005
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33	33
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0313	0.2339	0.1085	-0.0415	0.1900	0.0370	-0.0399
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4349	0.1067	0.2841	0.4138	0.1573	0.4230	0.4171
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0986	-0.1533	**-0.4936*****	-0.1969	-0.0470	-0.1043	**-0.4568*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3022	0.2093	0.0028	0.1486	0.4025	0.2917	0.0056
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2105	-0.0916	**-0.2406***	**-0.2537***	0.0327	-0.0121	**-0.2871***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1237	0.3090	0.0923	0.0806	0.4296	0.4738	0.0555
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
Too much money is being spent on military defense.	Pearson Correlation	0.2058	0.1594	-0.0337	**-0.2379***	**0.3262****	-0.0741	-0.0071
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1214	0.1839	0.4250	0.0877	0.0299	0.3386	0.4841
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
I feel there is too much sex on television today.	Pearson Correlation	0.2144	**0.3091****	0.1339	0.0349	**0.3465****	-0.0456	0.1410
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1193	0.0426	0.2326	0.4249	0.0260	0.4021	0.2207
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	0.0267	**0.2693***	0.1822	-0.0886	0.0893	-0.0459	-0.0267
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4404	0.0617	0.1512	0.3092	0.3078	0.3983	0.4403
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.	Pearson Correlation	0.0250	0.1087	**-0.4619*****	-0.0362	-0.0945	**-0.3447****	-0.1755
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4478	0.2837	0.0051	0.4247	0.3096	0.0310	0.1768
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
The roles of men and women today are too much alike.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2591***	-0.1418	**-0.5357*****	**-0.2558***	-0.2120	-0.2090	**-0.3693****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0834	0.2273	0.0011	0.0862	0.1304	0.1338	0.0223
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
In general, would you say you feel better off or more financially secure now than you were two years ago? Do you feel worse off or no different than you were before?	Pearson Correlation	**0.2578***	**0.3093****	**0.2651***	0.1227	-0.1582	**-0.2661***	**0.2444***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0807	0.0452	0.0747	0.2554	0.1976	0.0739	0.0925
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
How about two years from now; do you think you will be better off, worse off or no different than you are now?	Pearson Correlation	**0.5367*****	**0.4877*****	**0.2864***	**0.3099****	0.0519	**-0.2537***	**0.4972*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0009	0.0027	0.0591	0.0448	0.3908	0.0842	0.0022
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
		5	10	18	10	10	5	14

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

Table 4-5. Rupasingha et al (2006) Social Capital Scores and Stowell Dataset Correlations		Olson Organizations				Other		
		Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	Number of Business Associations per 10,000	Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	Number of Membership Organizations Not Elsewhere Classified per 10,000	Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	Number of Not-for-Profit Organizations per 10,000
My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires.	Pearson Correlation	0.1716	**0.2729***	**0.2602***	-0.1936	0.0937	0.1461	-0.0039
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1660	0.0591	0.0686	0.1364	0.2990	0.2048	0.4912
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.	Pearson Correlation	-0.1907	**-0.2527***	**-0.2695***	0.1901	-0.1397	0.0670	-0.1896
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1521	0.0851	0.0713	0.1529	0.2267	0.3601	0.1534
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.5020*****	-0.1149	-0.1863	-0.1895	-0.2258	-0.2396	-0.2121
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0028	0.2764	0.1666	0.1624	0.1195	0.1053	0.1346
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	Pearson Correlation	0.0881	**0.4244*****	0.2267	-0.0319	**0.2834***	**0.3315****	**0.3023***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3217	0.0097	0.1142	0.4336	0.0645	0.0367	0.0522
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
People generally view me as a leader.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.4511*****	-0.0651	-0.1347	-0.1791	-0.1855	-0.2203	-0.1937
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0062	0.3662	0.2390	0.1719	0.1632	0.1211	0.1526
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
I believe everything is changing too fast today.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3162****	**-0.4730*****	**-0.4394*****	0.0653	**-0.2446***	**-0.2572***	-0.1686
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0342	0.0024	0.0047	0.3568	0.0816	0.0710	0.1703
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2360***	**-0.2593***	**-0.3233****	-0.1188	**-0.2494***	**-0.3918****	-0.1878
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0895	0.0693	0.0311	0.2517	0.0774	0.0109	0.1438
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3237****	**-0.4877*****	**-0.4243*****	-0.1448	**-0.2807***	**-0.3175****	**-0.4213*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0353	0.0023	0.0077	0.2146	0.0598	0.0383	0.0082
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2684***	**-0.3390****	**-0.3251****	-0.0524	-0.1937	**-0.3402****	-0.1983
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0757	0.0334	0.0398	0.3916	0.1526	0.0329	0.1467
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2707***	-0.2117	**-0.2585***	**-0.2901***	**-0.3748****	**-0.2843***	**-0.2721***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0703	0.1265	0.0801	0.0567	0.0189	0.0605	0.0693
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3472****	**-0.5724*****	**-0.5512*****	0.0600	**-0.3485****	**-0.3943****	**-0.4081****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0258	0.0003	0.0005	0.3722	0.0253	0.0128	0.0102
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	Pearson Correlation	**0.3262**	0.0050	0.0350	**0.2787***	0.2194	0.1869	0.1715
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0298	0.4888	0.4222	0.0552	0.1063	0.1449	0.1661
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2715***	**-0.3023****	**-0.3017****	0.0773	-0.2244	-0.1879	-0.0133
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0698	0.0491	0.0495	0.3396	0.1125	0.1557	0.4717
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	Pearson Correlation	0.1532	-0.1329	-0.1102	0.1979	0.0798	0.1688	0.0708
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1973	0.2304	0.2707	0.1348	0.3294	0.1738	0.3476
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33	33
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0347	**0.2631***	**0.2864***	0.1838	**0.3360****	**0.3555****	**0.3729****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4278	0.0800	0.0624	0.1654	0.0347	0.0269	0.0212
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2580***	**-0.2930***	-0.1955	**-0.3440****	**-0.3685****	0.0638	**-0.2531***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0805	0.0548	0.1459	0.0290	0.0207	0.3665	0.0847
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.4247****	-0.0490	-0.1069	-0.1498	-0.1985	-0.1893	-0.0890
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0136	0.4041	0.2979	0.2280	0.1605	0.1721	0.3295
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3114****	**-0.5139*****	**-0.5152*****	0.0348	**-0.3982****	**-0.3808****	**-0.4444*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0389	0.0011	0.0011	0.4238	0.0108	0.0144	0.0048
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33	33
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	Pearson Correlation	0.2341	-0.1059	-0.0720	0.1832	0.0941	0.1526	0.1266
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1065	0.2888	0.3527	0.1662	0.3104	0.2104	0.2525
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3045***	**-0.3932****	**-0.4231*****	0.1021	-0.2321	-0.2321	-0.1455
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0509	0.0158	0.0099	0.2957	0.1085	0.1085	0.2216
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.	Pearson Correlation	0.2088	-0.0455	-0.0496	0.0325	0.0598	-0.0568	0.0117
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1258	0.4024	0.3938	0.4298	0.3725	0.3787	0.4748
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
Too much money is being spent on military defense.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0786	-0.0048	0.0562	**0.4248*****	0.1984	**0.2720***	**0.4567*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3294	0.4893	0.3761	0.0061	0.1303	0.0598	0.0033
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
I feel there is too much sex on television today.	Pearson Correlation	**0.4212*****	0.0615	0.1009	**0.3341****	**0.3155****	**0.3488****	0.2264
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0082	0.3691	0.2913	0.0308	0.0393	0.0252	0.1064
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	**0.3708****	0.0035	0.0400	**0.2279***	0.1397	0.1494	0.1061
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0154	0.4921	0.4111	0.0974	0.2154	0.1996	0.2751
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2295	**-0.3604****	-0.2198	-0.0023	-0.2183	-0.1640	**-0.2502***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1112	0.0252	0.1216	0.4952	0.1232	0.1932	0.0912
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
The roles of men and women today are too much alike.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3395****	**-0.4111****	**-0.3962****	-0.0599	**-0.3425****	**-0.3476****	-0.1678
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0332	0.0120	0.0151	0.3765	0.0319	0.0299	0.1877
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
In general, would you say you feel better off or more financially secure now than you were two years ago? Do you feel worse off or no different than you were before?	Pearson Correlation	-0.0524	0.0315	-0.0754	0.2302	0.2039	0.0343	0.0676
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3898	0.4331	0.3434	0.1064	0.1356	0.4274	0.3590
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
How about two years from now; do you think you will be better off, worse off or no different than you are now?	Pearson Correlation	-0.1798	-0.0639	-0.1001	**0.4104****	**0.3184****	**0.2367***	0.1714
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1665	0.3663	0.2961	0.0109	0.0404	0.0999	0.1782
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
		17	15	13	7	12	13	9

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

Table 4-5. Rupasingha et al (2006) Social Capital Scores and Stowell Dataset Correlations		**Co-Production**		**Index**	
		Census Mail Response Rate 1990	Percent Voter Turnout 1996	Social Capital Index Principal Components Analysis	Social Capital Index-Standardized
My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires.	Pearson Correlation	**0.3415****	0.2202	0.1991	0.2185
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0240	0.1054	0.1295	0.1072
	N	34	34	34	34
I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.5162*****	**-0.3568****	**-0.3186****	**-0.3580****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0015	0.0244	0.0403	0.0240
	N	31	31	31	31
My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0464	**-0.2957***	**-0.2599***	**-0.2474***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4055	0.0596	0.0866	0.0978
	N	29	29	29	29
I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	Pearson Correlation	**0.3061****	**0.4739*****	**0.4473*****	**0.4506*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0500	0.0041	0.0066	0.0062
	N	30	30	30	30
People generally view me as a leader.	Pearson Correlation	0.0260	**-0.2500***	-0.2155	-0.1982
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4458	0.0913	0.1264	0.1469
	N	30	30	30	30
I believe everything is changing too fast today.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3517****	**-0.3471****	**-0.3391****	**-0.3514****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0207	0.0221	0.0249	0.0208
	N	34	34	34	34
If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.4136*****	**-0.4519*****	**-0.4343*****	**-0.4443*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0075	0.0036	0.0051	0.0042
	N	34	34	34	34
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson Correlation	-0.1804	**-0.3830****	**-0.4136*****	**-0.4066****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1615	0.0152	0.0093	0.0104
	N	32	32	32	32
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0841	-0.0525	-0.1791	-0.1719
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3292	0.3915	0.1718	0.1818
	N	30	30	30	30
Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2327	**-0.3236****	**-0.3430****	**-0.3443****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1039	0.0379	0.0294	0.0289
	N	31	31	31	31
A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.6173*****	**-0.5182*****	**-0.5793*****	**-0.6055*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0001	0.0012	0.0003	0.0001
	N	32	32	32	32
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0799	0.1949	0.1672	0.1476
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3267	0.1346	0.1723	0.2024
	N	34	34	34	34
Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3179****	**-0.3122****	**-0.2478***	**-0.2612***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0406	0.0436	0.0895	0.0779
	N	31	31	31	31
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2222	0.1149	0.0649	0.0355
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1070	0.2622	0.3599	0.4222
	N	33	33	33	33
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	Pearson Correlation	**0.6681*****	**0.6474*****	**0.6235*****	**0.6515*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001	0.0000
	N	30	30	30	30
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3146****	**-0.2753***	**-0.2576***	**-0.2802***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0424	0.0669	0.0809	0.0634
	N	31	31	31	31
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	0.0034	-0.2167	-0.1619	-0.1492
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4933	0.1388	0.2099	0.2288
	N	27	27	27	27
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.5446*****	**-0.5880*****	**-0.6073*****	**-0.6255*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0005	0.0002	0.0001	0.0000
	N	33	33	33	33
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	Pearson Correlation	-0.1774	0.1280	0.0932	0.0685
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1741	0.2501	0.3121	0.3596
	N	30	30	30	30
I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.4438*****	**-0.3825****	**-0.3581****	**-0.3785****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0070	0.0185	0.0260	0.0196
	N	30	30	30	30
I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3973****	**-0.2627***	-0.2072	**-0.2340***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0122	0.0732	0.1276	0.0986
	N	32	32	32	32
Too much money is being spent on military defense.	Pearson Correlation	0.1050	**0.2551***	**0.3471****	**0.3381****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2773	0.0726	0.0221	0.0252
	N	34	34	34	34
I feel there is too much sex on television today.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0184	**0.3053****	**0.2808***	**0.2579***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4601	0.0446	0.0598	0.0770
	N	32	32	32	32
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	-0.1140	0.1559	0.1127	0.0927
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2605	0.1893	0.2628	0.3010
	N	34	34	34	34
I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0418	**-0.2612***	**-0.2418***	-0.2320
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4132	0.0816	0.0990	0.1087
	N	30	30	30	30
The roles of men and women today are too much alike.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2239	**-0.4732*****	**-0.3836****	**-0.3776****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1171	0.0041	0.0182	0.0198
	N	30	30	30	30
In general, would you say you feel better off or more financially secure now than you were two years ago? Do you feel worse off or no different than you were before?	Pearson Correlation	**0.2722***	**0.3361****	0.2362	**0.2518***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0692	0.0322	0.1004	0.0859
	N	31	31	31	31
How about two years from now; do you think you will be better off, worse off or no different than you are now?	Pearson Correlation	**0.4248*****	**0.5627*****	**0.4503*****	**0.4667*****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0086	0.0005	0.0055	0.0041
	N	31	31	31	31
		14	21	18	19

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

Social Capital and Government Performance

This section will now turn to a bi-variate analysis of the relationship between the social capital items discussed above and the government performance data reported in the GPP for the 34 counties included in this study. Starting with the measures of association and co-production, Table 4-6 displays the results of the correlation analysis between the Rupasingha measures and the county GPP scores. First, in regard to the Rupasingha measures of associations, data provide some surprising results. Looking first at the correlation with the overall GPP scores for each county, *only two of the association types were significantly correlated with government performance – number of civic and social organizations and number of labor organizations* (-0.35 and -0.34, respectively). However, both of these measures were **negatively correlated** with government performance. The number of labor organizations was also significantly correlated with the financial management, information technology and capital management sub-dimensions of government performance, and all were in the negative direction. Similarly, the number of civic and social organizations was also significantly correlated with information technology and managing-for-results dimensions of government performance, but also in the negative direction.

Census response rate was significantly and positively correlated with four of the government performance dimensions (human resource management, information technology and managing-for-results), and with the overall county performance score. *That single measure of citizen co-production is by far the most important feature of the Rupasingha et al. suite of measures*. However, voter turnout rates were significantly correlated only with the human resource management dimension (0.36), and in the predicted direction. Overall, despite some significant correlations mentioned above, the aggregated association item was not significantly correlated with any of the government performance measures, and the composite social capital

indexes developed by Rupasingha et al. were significantly correlated with only the human resource management item.

Table 4-6. Rupasingha et al (2006) Social Capital Index and GPP Correlations		County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.0829	-0.1525	0.0801	-0.1106	-0.2156	0.0684
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3205	0.1947	0.3263	0.2667	0.1104	0.3503
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3544****	-0.1687	-0.0841	**-0.3088****	-0.1890	**-0.2322***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	**0.0198**	0.1701	0.3181	**0.0378**	0.1422	**0.0931**
Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.0129	0.0528	0.1209	0.0123	0.0274	-0.0165
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4712	0.3833	0.2479	0.4725	0.4388	0.4631
Number of Public Golf Courses per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.1472	-0.0538	0.1493	**0.2458***	0.0225	0.0930
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2030	0.3813	0.1997	**0.0805**	0.4498	0.3005
Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.0946	-0.0988	0.1597	0.1507	0.1417	0.0554
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2972	0.2892	0.1836	0.1974	0.2120	0.3777
Number of Sports Clubs, Managers and Promoters per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.1226	**0.2277***	0.1016	0.1470	**0.3282****	0.0389
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2448	**0.0976**	0.2838	0.2034	**0.0290**	0.4136
Number of Membership Sports and Recreation Clubs per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.1764	0.0326	**0.3365****	0.2020	0.0002	0.1640
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1591	0.4274	**0.0258**	0.1259	0.4994	0.1769
Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.1428	-0.0129	-0.0712	-0.1685	-0.0028	-0.0144
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2102	0.4711	0.3445	0.1704	0.4937	0.4678
Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.2127	0.2025	0.1064	0.1530	**0.2716***	**0.2362***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1136	0.1253	0.2746	0.1939	**0.0601**	**0.0893**
Number of Business Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.1409	0.0822	0.1420	0.0469	0.1642	0.1868
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2133	0.3220	0.2115	0.3961	0.1767	0.1451
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3433****	**-0.2686***	-0.0617	**-0.4177*****	**-0.2715***	-0.2137
	Sig. (1-tailed)	**0.0234**	**0.0622**	0.3645	**0.0070**	**0.0601**	0.1125
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.1652	-0.1454	0.0751	-0.1516	-0.1272	-0.1283
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1752	0.2060	0.3364	0.1960	0.2367	0.2349
Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.0040	-0.0877	0.1496	0.0239	0.0623	0.0300
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4909	0.3109	0.1992	0.4466	0.3631	0.4332
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	Pearson Correlation	**0.30287****	0.0775	**0.3421****	**0.2598***	-0.0577	**0.3476****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	**0.0408**	0.3316	**0.0238**	**0.0689**	0.3729	**0.0220**
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	Pearson Correlation	0.1280	-0.0622	**0.3617****	0.0743	-0.0001	0.1190
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2352	0.3633	**0.0178**	0.3381	0.4998	0.2513
Number of Not-for-Profit Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.0845	-0.1329	0.1260	-0.1137	-0.0248	-0.0833
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3173	0.2268	0.2388	0.2610	0.4445	0.3197
Population 1997	Pearson Correlation	-0.1125	-0.0384	-0.1906	-0.0560	0.0183	-0.0604
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2633	0.4147	0.1401	0.3766	0.4591	0.3671
Social Capital Index Principal Components Analysis	Pearson Correlation	0.0921	-0.0749	**0.3051****	0.0543	-0.0066	0.1038
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3023	0.3368	**0.0396**	0.3802	0.4852	0.2796
Social Capital Index-Standardized	Pearson Correlation	0.1160	-0.0627	**0.3205****	0.0750	-0.0141	0.1309
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2567	0.3624	**0.0323**	0.3366	0.4685	0.2302

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed).

While some of the individual measures of civic engagement and associationalism show some significant results, these results are somewhat scattered and inconsistent and thus do not appear to be important correlates of government performance. While this finding is inconsistent with those reported by Robert Putnam in his study of the Italian context, they are consistent with the findings of research conducted in the U.S. context, most notably those of Knack (2002) and Pierce, Moon and Lovrich (2000).

Social-psychological Dimensions and Government Performance

Turning to an analysis of the relationship between the social-psychological dimensions of social capital and county government performance, Table 4-7 displays the correlations between the Stowell psychographic items and the scores reported in the GPP. At first glance, it is evident that these measures are in general more often significantly correlated with the government performance measures than were the civic engagement measures developed by Rupasingha et al. In addition, the correlations tend to be stronger than those reported for the Rupasingha measures. Of the 26 psychographic items culled from the Stowell datasets, 14 were significantly correlated with the overall government performance scores. Similarly, the individual dimensions of government performance are also more frequently significantly correlated with the Stowell items. Of particular importance is the fact that the managing-for-results dimension of government performance is significantly correlated with 15 of the 26 Stowell items, compared to 10 with the financial management dimension, 13 with the human resource dimension, six with the capital management dimension, and three with the information technology dimension. Clearly *the managing-for-results dimension is the most significant dimension of government performance in terms of correlates with social capital and trust.*

The overall county performance score is significantly correlated with many of the items already discussed above. Surprisingly, the strongest correlation is with the "visit art galleries and go to concerts" item. Counties with respondents that are more likely to report that they like to visit art galleries and museums and go to classical music concerts are more likely to be among the county governments that score high on the government performance measures (0.52, sig. > 0.01) and was also significantly correlated with all five performance dimensions. It is possible that this bivariate relationship is in part a reflection of an intervening variable relating to income, level of formal education, or social class.

Counties with governments scoring higher on the overall county government performance score were also more likely to have residents that believe their incomes are high enough (0.27, sig. > 0.1), that believe that going out with friends is important (0.31, sig. > 0.01), and that generally feel they are better off than they were two years prior (-0.33, sig. > 0.1). These same counties were less likely to have residents that report that that they don't believe in taking risks (-0.35, sig. > 0.05), that it is always better to stay with what is familiar (-0.41, sig. > 0.05), and that they get most of their entertainment from television (-0.39, sig. > 0.05). Residents of higher performing counties were also less likely to believe that a few major corporations have all the power (-0.41, sig. > 0.05), that most public officials are only interested in people with money (-0.33, sig. > 0.05), that their opinions are not taken seriously (-0.37, sig. > 0.05), and that the best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear (-0.31, sig. > 0.05). Neither the free-rider item nor the item measuring perceptions of others will power to get ahead, both of which are important measures of generalized trust, were significantly correlated with the overall county government performance scores.

Another dimension of social capital measured in the Stowell datasets is a reflection of individuals' level of comfort with change and/or capacity for taking a reasonable risk. Uslaner (2002) finds substantial evidence for a close relationship between risk and trust. People who are more likely to trust others, particularly those who are perceived to be different from themselves, are more likely to accept and take risks because they are more likely to believe that risks often enough are worth taking (Uslaner, 2002: 33). Reversely, people who feel they don't have sufficient control over their own lives, that their "destinies" are controlled by forces outside themselves, are less willing to take risks, are more likely to require structure in their lives, and are less willing to trust others. *The items measuring a person's willingness to accept risk are important correlates of government performance.* The item asking whether a person agrees that "It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than try something new," was the most strongly correlated item (negatively) with overall government performance and was likewise the strongest correlate with the managing-for-results dimension as well (r = -0.41 and –0.51, respectively, sig. > .01). Similarly, counties whose citizens are inclined to indicate that they "don't believe in taking risks" are more likely to have governments with a lower overall government performance and Managing-for-Results score (r = -0.35 and –0.40, respectively, sig. > .01). The item asking whether people "believe everything is changing too fast today" was only moderately correlated with Financial Management and Managing-for-Results dimension (r = -0.25 and –0.35, respectively, sig. > .1 and .05).

Another dimension of social capital that is predicted to be associated with government performance is that of self-esteem. People with a lower sense of self-worth are less likely to be engaged because they are less likely to believe that they have a contribution to make. Reversely, people who believe that their own views are important, and believe they can have an impact on

the way others act and think, are more likely to become involved in public life and are more likely to believe that others will take them seriously. *The correlates of self-esteem and government performance are mixed, but tend to support the predicted relationship.* Counties containing many citizens who indicate that they "often feel their opinions are not taken seriously" are more likely to be lower performing governments (r = -0.3607, sig. > .05).

The item measuring a person's self-assessment of their level of political engagement does not appear to be an important correlate of government performance. This item was significantly correlated with neither the overall county score nor the Managing-for-Results dimension of government performance, but was moderately correlated with the Financial Management dimension (r=0.34, sig. > .1). However, because this item is significantly skewed towards disagree (an overwhelming percentage of respondents from all counties indicated low levels of personal involvement in political campaigns), this item may not have sufficient variance to gauge its importance to government performance effectively.

Table 4-7. Stowell Psychographic Items and GPP Correlations		County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR
My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires.	Pearson Correlation	0.2703	0.2208	0.2704	0.1754	0.0372	**0.3184***
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.1221	0.2095	0.122	0.3211	0.8346	0.0665
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.	Pearson Correlation	-0.1244	-0.0543	-0.2113	0.0536	0.0146	-0.1397
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.5048	0.7715	0.2538	0.7744	0.9377	0.4535
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31
My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.	Pearson Correlation	0.1309	0.0468	-0.2233	0.2444	0.0791	0.0926
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.4986	0.8094	0.2442	0.2013	0.6833	0.6327
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29
I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	Pearson Correlation	**.5184*****	**.3759****	**.5192*****	**.3725****	**.4570****	**.4393****
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.0033	0.0406	0.0033	0.0426	0.0111	0.0151
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30
People generally view me as a leader.	Pearson Correlation	0.2298	0.1717	-0.0932	0.2242	0.1681	0.2338
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.2219	0.3642	0.6244	0.2336	0.3747	0.2137
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30
I believe everything is changing too fast today.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2545	**-0.2905***	-0.2717	-0.1022	-0.1538	**-.3537****
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.1463	0.0956	0.1201	0.5652	0.3853	0.0402
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0054	0.0481	-0.1374	0.0886	0.0446	-0.0267
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.9756	0.787	0.4384	0.6181	0.8023	0.8809
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0166	-0.0245	-0.0405	0.0026	0.0519	-0.0699
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.928	0.894	0.8257	0.9886	0.778	0.7038
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3121***	**-0.3109***	-0.2587	-0.1994	-0.2402	-0.2774
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.0932	0.0945	0.1674	0.2908	0.2011	0.1378
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30
Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0103	-0.0639	-0.1772	0.2348	0.049	-0.1383
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.956	0.7325	0.3401	0.2036	0.7935	0.4581
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31
A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.	Pearson Correlation	**-.4070****	-0.2052	**-.4518*****	-0.2917	-0.1518	**-.3986****
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.0208	0.26	0.0094	0.1052	0.407	0.0238
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	Pearson Correlation	**-.3607****	-0.1997	-0.1466	-0.2233	**-0.339***	**-.3646****
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.0392	0.2653	0.4155	0.2116	0.0536	0.0369
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33
Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2254	-0.2775	-0.2694	-0.0399	-0.1597	-0.2292
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.2228	0.1306	0.1427	0.8311	0.3907	0.2148
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	Pearson Correlation	**-.3565****	-0.2663	-0.2776	-0.072	-0.1883	**-.4656*****
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.0452	0.1406	0.124	0.6956	0.302	0.0072
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	Pearson Correlation	**0.3099***	0.1826	**.4360****	0.1517	0.0857	**0.336***
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.0956	0.3341	0.016	0.4236	0.6527	0.0694
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	Pearson Correlation	0.179	-0.0522	-0.1205	0.2372	0.3266	0.0755
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.3353	0.7804	0.5183	0.1988	0.0729	0.6863
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	0.1608	**0.3404***	0.2182	0.0849	0.0631	0.136
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.4327	0.0889	0.2842	0.6802	0.7593	0.5078
	N	26	26	26	26	26	26
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3295***	-0.2163	**-.4018****	-0.1879	-0.1697	**-0.3137***
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.0611	0.2267	0.0205	0.2951	0.3452	0.0754
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	Pearson Correlation	**-.4134****	**-.4068****	-0.3212	-0.1349	-0.2291	**-.5101*****
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.0258	0.0285	0.0893	0.4854	0.232	0.0047
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29
I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2765	**-0.3185***	**-0.3515***	-0.0744	-0.1023	**-.3718****
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.139	0.0863	0.0568	0.6959	0.5908	0.0431
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30
I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.	Pearson Correlation	-0.1893	-0.1322	-0.1658	-0.0693	0.0618	**-0.3178***
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.2994	0.4708	0.3646	0.7064	0.7368	0.0763
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32
Too much money is being spent on military defense.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2893***	**-0.3292***	-0.2017	-0.1827	-0.2854	-0.2099
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.097	0.0573	0.2527	0.3009	0.1018	0.2335
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
I feel there is too much sex on television today.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2211	-0.219	0.073	-0.226	-0.2128	-0.2016
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.2239	0.2285	0.6913	0.2135	0.2424	0.2686
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	**-.3882****	-0.1964	-0.2675	-0.175	-0.2532	**-.4508*****
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.0256	0.2734	0.1324	0.3301	0.1552	0.0085
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33
I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2244	**-0.3246***	-0.1806	-0.0977	-0.212	-0.2559
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.2331	0.0801	0.3396	0.6076	0.2606	0.1722
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30
The roles of men and women today are too much alike.	Pearson Correlation	-0.2038	-0.1542	**-.3765****	0.0085	-0.1888	-0.1709
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.2801	0.4159	0.0403	0.9645	0.3176	0.3666
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30
Would you say you feel better off or more financially secure now than you were two years ago?	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3273***	-0.2704	-0.2584	-0.2611	-0.2986	-0.2632
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.0723	0.1412	0.1604	0.156	0.1027	0.1526
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31
How about two years from now?	Pearson Correlation	-0.2145	-0.1655	0.0305	-0.1571	-0.2725	-0.1945
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.2465	0.3736	0.8705	0.3987	0.138	0.2944
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

Conclusion

This chapter reported the results of a simple bi-variate analysis of the relationship between social capital, civic engagement and government performance in American counties. That analysis was undertaken to test three hypotheses first discussed in Chapter 3:

- H1: Dimensions of social capital measuring civic engagement will be correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital).
- H2: Government performance will be positively correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital).
- H3: Government performance will be positively correlated with higher levels of civic engagement.

Overall, the results confirm previous research conducted by Putnam (1995, 2001), Knack and Keefer (1997) and Pierce, Lovrich and Moon (2000) and provide some degree of support for both H1 and H2, but rejected H3 (see Table 4-8). The measures of government performance developed as part of the GPP are significantly correlated with many of the measures of social capital included in the Stowell datasets. These Stowell survey items measure the psychographic/social psychological dimensions of social capital, such as particularized and generalized trust, self-esteem and personal efficacy, and general open-mindedness. However, the measures of associationalism as developed by Rupasingha et al. do not appear to be significant correlates of government performance, and they are only minimally correlated with the social capital measures included in the Stowell datasets.

Table 4-8. Hypotheses		Confirmed/Rejected
H1	Dimensions of social capital measuring civic engagement will be correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital).	Confirmed
H2	Government performance will be positively correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital).	Partially confirmed
H3	Government performance will be positively correlated with higher levels of civic engagement.	Partially confirmed

The findings partially confirm earlier results reported by Knack and Keefer (1997) and Pierce, Lovrich and Moon (2000), and tend to undermine a great deal of the social capital literature which has focused on the importance of participation and associationalism as essential dimensions of social capital and the achievement of collective action (Beem, 1999; Halpern, 2005; Putnam, 1995, 2001; Skocpol, 2003). This summary should not lead one to conclude that associationalism is an unimportant dimension of civic and public life; I only note here that it does not seem to be a necessary pre-requisite for good government. On the other hand, good government does seem to emerge in communities whose citizens tend to be more trusting of others, tend to be more open-minded and tend to have greater self-efficacy. Combined with the Rupasingha et al. factors measuring the level of civic engagement and participation at the county-level, these factors provide a suitable tool in assessing the relationship between social capital and government performance in the following chapters.

Chapter 5

Towards a Social Capital-Government Performance Framework

Thus far, this analysis has provided a broad overview of the relationship between government performance and social capital. The findings reported indicate that county government performance is correlated with some dimensions of social capital, but not others. In particular, *the dimensions of social capital more closely associated with particularized and institutional trust (i.e., trust in institutions) appear to be the strongest correlates of government performance.* Other dimensions of social capital associated more with associationalism and civic engagement appear to be less important as correlates or predictors of county government performance.

In this section I will narrow down this broad array of possible measures to develop a more robust index of social capital for use in later chapters. This section discusses briefly the justification for using a smaller number of measures moving forward in order to more clearly explore the dynamics between social capital and alternative correlates of government performance. Turning first to the social capital measures reported in Rupasingha et al., given the strong internal consistency of the measure of aggregated associations this analysis will use this as a measure of associationalism moving forward. Given the strong correlation between the Rupasingha social capital indexes and the census response rates and voter turnout rates, the following sections will use these as surrogate measures of citizen co-production of public goods.

Narrowing the psychographic items pulled from the Stowell dataset items presents more of a challenge. In order to avoid selection bias from simply selecting items that are significantly correlated with government performance, I have narrowed the number of items based on research

conducting by other scholars using the Stowell datasets. Analysis conducted by Budd, Lovrich and Pierce (2007) and Brody (2007) identified 11 principal measures that cover the range of psychographic dimensions discussed thus far in this analysis. Specifically, these items measure aspects of institutional, particularized and generalized trust, the propensity for risk taking, acceptance/embrace of change, and self-esteem. These items are displayed in Table 4-8 along with their respective correlations with the government performance measures. Table 4-8 also includes two additional psychographic items not included in either the Brody (2007) or Budd, Lovrich and Pierce (2007) analyses. The item assessing respondents' activity in partisan politics is included in order to include an explicitly political dimension of associationalism not included in the other psychographic items, and as an alternative to the measure of political associations created by Rupasingha et al. which is embedded in the aggregated measure of associationalism used in that study. The second additional item measures respondents' self-reporting of the amount of entertainment they get from television. This item is included as a measure of the influence of television on social capital and government performance based on Putnam's 1995 essay in *PS* which attributes the decades-long decline in social capital in the U.S. primarily to the corresponding increase in the influence of television in contemporary society (Putnam, 1995).

For comparative purposes, the correlations of these measures with the GPP scores for each county are presented in Table 5-1. Comparing the various measures of social capital presented in Table 4-8 (see Chapter 4), in general, the several Stowell psychographic measures of social capital are more strongly correlated with government performance than are the measures of associational density and co-production, an observation which is consistent with the overall findings presented earlier. Unlike the other Stowell items included in Table 4-8, *both measures of generalized trust (the "free-rider" and "will power" items) appear to be unrelated*

to government performance at the county level. This is a significant and noteworthy departure from the literature, which in general places a strong emphasis on the importance of generalized trust as a pre-requisite for effective governance. Of the eight individual measures of associational density included, only civic and social, and labor organizational density are significantly correlated with government performance at the county level.

Table 5-1. Social Capital and GPP Correlations			County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR
Risk Aversion	As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3494****	-0.2279	-0.0598	-0.2276	-0.2226	**-0.3995****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0231	0.1011	0.3706	0.1013	0.1065	0.0106
		n	33	33	33	33	33	33
Acceptance of Change	It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3530****	**-0.2777***	-0.0358	**-0.2635****	-0.2277	**-0.3869****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0278	0.0686	0.4255	0.0797	0.1131	0.0173
		n	30	30	30	30	30	30
	I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2765***	**-0.3184****	**-0.3515****	-0.0744	-0.1023	**-0.3718****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0695	0.0432	0.0284	0.3480	0.2954	0.0215
		n	30	30	30	30	30	30
	I believe everything is changing too fast today.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2545***	**-0.2905****	**-0.2716***	-0.1022	-0.1538	**-0.3536****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0732	0.0478	0.0601	0.2826	0.1926	0.0201
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
Self-Esteem	I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2963****	-0.1596	0.0589	**-0.3001****	**-0.2604***	**-0.2814***
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0444	0.1836	0.3703	0.0423	0.0684	0.0534
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
Particularized Trust/ Socially Active	Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	Pearson Correlation	**0.3099****	0.1826	**0.4360*****	0.1517	0.0857	**0.3360****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0478	0.1670	0.0080	0.2118	0.3263	0.0347
		n	30	30	30	30	30	30
	I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	Pearson Correlation	**0.5183*****	**0.3759****	**0.5192****	**0.3725****	**0.4570*****	**0.4393*****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0017	0.0203	0.0016	0.0213	0.0056	0.0076
		n	30	30	30	30	30	30
Institutional Trust	A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.4070****	-0.2052	**-0.4518*****	**-0.2917***	-0.1518	**-0.3986****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0104	0.1300	0.0047	0.0526	0.2035	0.0119
		n	32	32	32	32	32	32
	Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3295****	-0.2163	**-0.4017****	-0.1879	-0.1697	**-0.3137****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0306	0.1134	0.0102	0.1475	0.1726	0.0377
		n	33	33	33	33	33	33
Generalized Trust	Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson Correlation	-0.0166	-0.0245	-0.0405	0.0026	0.0519	-0.0699
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4640	0.4470	0.4128	0.4943	0.3890	0.3519
		n	32	32	32	32	32	32
	Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	Pearson Correlation	0.1790	-0.0522	-0.1205	**0.2372***	**0.3266***	0.0755
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1676	0.3902	0.2592	0.0994	0.0365	0.3432
		n	31	31	31	31	31	31
Active in Partisan Politics	I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	**0.2669***	**0.2608***	-0.0354	**0.2921***	0.1939	0.1999
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0892	0.0944	0.4303	0.0696	0.1662	0.1588
		n	27	27	27	27	27	27
Entertainment from Television	I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3042****	-0.1569	0.0148	**-0.2811***	**-0.2254***	**-0.3114****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0401	0.1877	0.4668	0.0536	0.0999	0.0365
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
Associationalism P-Organizations	Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3544****	-0.1687	-0.0841	**-0.3088****	-0.1890	**-0.2322***
		Sig. (1-tailed)	**0.0198**	0.1701	0.3181	**0.0378**	0.1422	**0.0931**
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.0829	-0.1525	0.0801	-0.1106	-0.2156	0.0684
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3205	0.1947	0.3263	0.2667	0.1104	0.3503
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.0946	-0.0988	0.1597	0.1507	0.1417	0.0554
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2972	0.2892	0.1836	0.1974	0.2120	0.3777
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.0129	0.0528	0.1209	0.0123	0.0274	-0.0165
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4712	0.3833	0.2479	0.4725	0.4388	0.4631
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
Associationalism O-Organizations	Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.1428	-0.0129	-0.0712	-0.1685	-0.0028	-0.0144
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2102	0.4711	0.3445	0.1704	0.4937	0.4678
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.2127	0.2025	0.1064	0.1530	**0.2716***	**0.2362***
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1136	0.1253	0.2746	0.1939	**0.0601**	**0.0893**
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Number of Business Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.1409	0.0822	0.1420	0.0469	0.1642	0.1868
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2133	0.3220	0.2115	0.3961	0.1767	0.1451
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3433****	**-0.2686***	-0.0617	**-0.4177*****	**-0.2715***	-0.2137
		Sig. (1-tailed)	**0.0234**	**0.0622**	0.3645	**0.0070**	**0.0601**	0.1125
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
Associationalism Indexes	Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.0040	-0.0877	0.1496	0.0239	0.0623	0.0300
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4909	0.3109	0.1992	0.4466	0.3631	0.4332
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Social Capital Index-Standardized	Pearson Correlation	0.1160	-0.0627	**0.3205****	0.0750	-0.0141	0.1309
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2567	0.3624	**0.0323**	0.3366	0.4685	0.2302
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
Co-Production	Census 2000 Response Rate	Pearson Correlation	**0.3028****	0.0775	**0.3421****	**0.2598***	-0.0577	**0.3476****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	**0.0408**	0.3316	**0.0238**	**0.0689**	0.3729	**0.0220**
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Percent Vote in 96 Election	Pearson Correlation	0.1280	-0.0622	**0.3617****	0.0743	-0.0001	0.1190
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2352	0.3633	**0.0178**	0.3381	0.4998	0.2513
		n	34	34	34	34	34	34

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

To provide a different assessment of the relative importance of the various measures of social capital, Tables 5-2 and 5-3 display the results of a bi-variate regression analysis using the county GPP scores and Managing-for-Results (MFR) scores as dependent variables. It is important to note that these results must be interpreted with caution based on the small *n* used to calculate them. Still, the results of Tables 5-2 and 5-3 provide valuable information as to the *relative* importance of the various measures as predictors of government performance, and in many ways provide additional confirmation of the results of the correlation analysis discussed above. As the findings reported in the tables illustrate, the Stowell items appear to be superior predictors of county government performance. Only the density of labor organizations is a significant predictor of overall government performance; none of the associational density measures were significant with respect to MFR. Consistent with the correlation analysis discussed above, the measures of generalized trust are not significant predictors of either MFR or overall county government performance. With the exception of one item,[8] the Stowell items are stronger predictors of the MFR scores than they are of the overall government performance scores. This is an important finding because MFR captures the essence of government performance in a more focused manner than does the overall county performance score.

[8] "I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts."

Table 5-2. Social Capital and GPP Bivariate OLS Regression	R	R Square	F	Sig.	N	Regression Coefficient
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	0.3565	0.1271	**4.3683****	0.0451	33	-0.3565
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	0.4134	0.1709	**5.5641****	0.0258	29	-0.4134
I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	0.2765	0.0765	2.3188	0.1390	30	-0.2765
I believe everything is changing too fast today.	0.2545	0.0648	2.2168	0.1463	34	-0.2545
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	0.3607	0.1301	**4.6356****	0.0392	33	-0.3607
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	0.3099	0.0960	**2.9740***	0.0956	30	0.3099
I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	0.5184	0.2687	**10.2896*****	0.0033	30	0.5184
A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.	0.4070	0.1657	**5.9564****	0.0207	32	-0.4070
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	0.3295	0.1086	**3.7759***	0.0611	33	-0.3295
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	0.0166	0.0003	0.0083	0.9280	32	-0.0166
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	0.0433	0.0019	0.0545	0.8171	31	0.0433
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	0.1608	0.0258	0.6367	0.4327	26	0.1608
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	0.3882	0.1507	**5.5022****	0.0255	33	-0.3882
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	0.3545	0.1257	**4.5988****	0.0396	34	-0.3545
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	0.0829	0.0069	0.2215	0.6411	34	-0.0829
Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	0.0946	0.0090	0.2893	0.5944	34	0.0946
Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	0.0129	0.0002	0.0053	0.9424	34	-0.0129
Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	0.0204	-0.0102	0.6665	0.4203	34	-0.1428
Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	0.2127	0.0452	1.5165	0.2271	34	0.2127
Number of Business Associations per 10,000	0.1409	0.0199	0.6486	0.4266	34	0.1409
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	0.3434	0.1179	**4.2776****	0.0467	34	-0.3434
Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	0.0040	0.0000	0.0005	0.9819	34	0.0040
Social Capital Index-Standardized	0.1160	0.0135	0.4367	0.5135	34	0.1160
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	0.3029	0.0917	**3.2320***	0.0816	34	0.3029
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	0.1280	0.0164	0.5334	0.4705	34	0.1280

*** Significant at the 0.01 level

** Significant at the 0.05 level

* Significant at the 0.1 level

Table 5-3. Social Capital and MFR Bivariate OLS Regression	R	R Square	F	Sig.	N	Regression Coefficient
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	0.3996	0.1597	**5.8896****	0.0212	33	-0.3996
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	0.5101	0.2602	**9.4980*****	0.0047	29	-0.5101
I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	0.3718	0.1383	**4.4920****	0.0431	30	-0.3718
I believe everything is changing too fast today.	0.3537	0.1251	**4.5745****	0.0402	34	-0.3537
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	0.3646	0.1330	**4.7538****	0.0369	33	-0.3646
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	0.3360	0.1129	**3.5644***	0.0694	30	0.3360
I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	0.4393	0.1930	**6.6958****	0.0151	30	0.4393
A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.	0.3986	0.1589	**5.6674****	0.0238	32	-0.3986
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	0.3137	0.0984	**3.3845***	0.0754	33	-0.3137
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	0.0699	0.0049	0.1473	0.7038	32	-0.0699
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	0.0656	0.0043	0.1255	0.7257	31	-0.0656
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	0.1360	0.0185	0.4521	0.5078	26	0.1360
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	0.4508	0.2032	**7.9076***	0.0085	33	-0.4508
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	0.2322	0.0539	1.8241	0.1863	34	-0.2322
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	0.0684	0.0047	0.1506	0.7005	34	0.0684
Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	0.0554	0.0031	0.0987	0.7555	34	0.0554
Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	0.0165	0.0003	0.0087	0.9261	34	-0.0165
Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	0.0144	0.0002	0.0066	0.9355	34	-0.0144
Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	0.2362	0.0558	1.8911	0.1786	34	0.2362
Number of Business Associations per 10,000	0.1868	0.0349	1.1567	0.2902	34	0.1868
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	0.2137	0.0457	1.5309	0.2250	34	-0.2137
Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	0.0300	0.0009	0.0288	0.8664	34	0.0300
Social Capital Index-Standardized	0.1309	0.0171	0.5581	0.4605	34	0.1309
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	0.3476	0.1209	**4.3988****	0.0440	34	0.3476
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	0.3476	0.1209	**4.3988****	0.0440	34	0.3476

*** Significant at the 0.01 level

** Significant at the 0.05 level

* Significant at the 0.1 level

To provide a visual depiction of the relationship between social capital and government performance, Figures 5-1a through 5-1y display scatterplots of the correlations presented in Table 4-8 based on z-scores calculated for each variable. Figures 5-2a through 5-2y present similar scatterplots for the correlations between the managing-for-results scores and the social capital items. The scatterplots include reference lines for each axis at the 0.00 point, showing which counties fall above and below the mean on each dimension. Based on these figures, we can begin to construct a classification scheme for each county based on their social capital and government performance scores. The reference lines in the scatterplots divide the counties into four quadrants, classifying each county into one of four categories – namely, high social capital/high government performance; low social capital/low government performance; high social capital/low government performance; and low social capital/high government performance.

The scatterplots demonstrate that most of the counties fall consistently in the same quadrant. For example, Fairfax County falls in the high social capital/high government performance quadrant in all but three of the 25 scatterplots displaying social capital and the county GPP scores. Similarly, Los Angeles County falls in the low social capital/low government performance quadrant in all but two of the 22 scatterplots for which it has scores. Other counties demonstrate different patterns of distribution. For example, Allegheny County falls consistently in the low social capital/low government performance quadrants on the psychographic dimensions (Stowell) of social capital. However, because Allegheny County has a much higher number of various associations per capita than most other counties, in particular civic and social organizations, it tends to fall in the high social capital/low government performance quadrant on many of the associationalism measures, despite consistently scoring on

the lower end of the psychographic items. And while Fairfax County generally falls close to or below the mean on the P-organizations included in the associational density and co-production measures, it falls high above the mean on three of the four measures of the O-organizations (rent seeking), particularly the professional associations and business associations. This is likely the result of Fairfax County's proximity to Washington, D.C., where many professional associations and their associated lobbying organizations have headquarters for policy advocacy, public relations activities and other purposes.

Figures 5-1a through 5-1y

Figure 5-1a



Figure 5-1b



Figure 5-1c



Figure 5-1d



Figure 5-1e



Figure 5-1f



Figure 5-1g



Figure 5-1h



Figure 5-1i



Figure 5-1j



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

Figure 5-1l



Figure 5-1m



Figure 5-1n



Figure 5-1o



Figure 5-1p



Figure 5-1q



Figure 5-1r



Figure 5-1s



Figure 5-1t



Figure 5-1u



Figure 5-1v



Figure 5-1w



Figure 5-1x



Figure 5-1y


Percent Voter Turnout 1996
County Score
R² Linear = 0.016
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
-1.00
-2.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
Hennepin
Hamilton
Oakland
Kings
Monroe
Contra Costa
Allegheny
Cuyahoga
Montgomery
Fairfax
Franklin
Palm Beach
Anne Arundel
Sacramento
Baltimore
Wayne
Mecklenburg
Miami-Dade
Alameda
Cook
San Diego
Broward
Orange
Fulton
Santa Clara
Prince George
Maricopa
Riverside
San Bernardino
Dallas
Los Angeles
Harris
Hillsborough
Clark

Figures 5-2a through 5-2y

Figure 5-2a



Figure 5-2b



Figure 5-2c



Figure 5-2d



Figure 5-2e



Figure 5-2f



Figure 5-2g

Figure 5-2h



Figure 5-2i



Figure 5-2j



Figure 5-2k



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

Figure 5-2m



Figure 5-2n



Figure 5-2o



Figure 5-2p



Figure 5-2q

Figure 5-2r



Figure 5-2s



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

Figure 5-2u



Figure 5-2v



Figure 5-2w



Figure 5-2x





Figure 5-2y


Percent Voter Turnout 1996
MFR
R² Linear = 0.014
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
-1.00
-2.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
Hennepin
Monroe
King
Hamilton
Oakland
Allegheny
Cuyahoga
Franklin
Montgomery
Contra Costa
Fairfax
Palm Beach
Sacramento
Wayne
Anne Arundel
Baltimore
Mecklenburg
Miami-Dade
Cook
San Diego
Fulton
Broward
Alameda
Orange
Santa Clara
Prince George
Maricopa
Riverside
San Bernardino
Harris
Dallas
Los Angeles
Hillsborough
Clark

To develop a more systematic and reliable assessment of where each county falls on the various dimensions with respect to social capital and government performance, each county was sorted individually on each of the 25 dimensions based on their respective z-scores. Following this sort, each dimension was *roughly* divided into thirds and rated as "High," "Medium" or "Low."[9] A similar division was conducted for the GPP county scores. Once each of the counties was classified as high, medium or low on each item, a social capital index score was calculated for each county based on the following formula:

$$\textbf{Social Capital Score} = \frac{\Sigma(3H_i, 2M_i, L_i)}{\Sigma(H_i, M_i, L_i)}$$

where H is High, M is Medium, L is Low, and *i* is the number of occurrences of each rank for each county.

Figures 5-3a through 5-3e present a series of matrices based on the social capital scores described above. Figure 5-3a displays a matrix based on a composite score that includes all three social capital measures (Stowell, P-organizations and O-organizations) with the overall county GPP scores; Figure 5-3b displays the overall composite social capital scores with the MFR scores for each county. Figure 5-3c displays the matrix for the Stowell psychographic measures and the overall county GPP score; Figures 5-3d and 5-3e display similar information based on the county scores for the P-organizations and O-organizations, respectively.

The matrices thusly constructed provide some interesting and important insights with respect to the relationship between social capital and government performance. First, the figures demonstrate that the counties are, for the most part, evenly distributed among the various cells.

[9] After each category was divided into thirds, a more subjective determination was made as to whether the numeric division was applicable. In some cases the dividing line between high and medium, or between medium and low, was moved up or down based on what seemed to be the "natural" dividing point for the range of z-scores.

This provides further evidence that the relationship between social capital and government performance is not uniform across counties. While this is to be expected, in part because of the way in which each county was "forced" into one of three categories across each measured dimension, the number of counties that are present in the null hypothesis cells[10] suggests that the *interaction between government performance and social capital is complex*. Based on the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3, we would expect most of the counties to fall in either the "HH", "MM" or "LL" cells. In this case however, **only about one-third to one-half of the counties in the sample score in the predicted pattern**.

A second observation to be noted is the amount of *variation present among the three core measures of social capital* used in Figures 5-3c-e. Only 10 of the 34 counties fall in the same cell in each of the three matrices (Stowell, P-organizations and O-organizations). For example, while Allegheny County scored Low on the Stowell measures, it scored High on both measures of associational density. This finding itself is unique in that the literature on social capital maintains that communities with higher levels of social and political trust should have a more vibrant and active associational environment. Similarly, while Mecklenburg County scored High on the Stowell measure, it scored "Medium" on the measure of P-organizations and "Low" on the measure of O-organizations. It may be that Putnam's distinction between bridging and bonding social capital is critical to understanding how government performance is (or is not) related to social capital. These figures reinforce the value of using multiple measures of social capital and demonstrate the extent to which social capital is a multi-dimensional concept.

[10] The null hypothesis cells are: HM, HL, MH, ML, LH and LM.

Figure 5-3a. Overall Social Capital-GPP

		County GPP		
		H	**M**	**L**
Social Capital	**H**	Baltimore **Fairfax** Franklin Hennepin Montgomery Oakland	Sacramento	Anne Arundel Fulton **King** Monroe
	M	Hamilton Mecklenburg Orange San Diego	Alameda Contra Costa **Cook** Palm Beach Santa Clara Wayne	Allegheny Cuyahoga Hillsborough
	L	Dallas **Maricopa**	Broward **Clark** Harris Miami-Dade Prince George's Riverside	**Los Angeles** San Bernardino

Figure 3b. Overall Social Capital-MFR

		County Managing-for-Results		
		H	**M**	**L**
Social Capital	**H**	Anne Arundel Baltimore **Fairfax** Hennepin Oakland	Franklin Fulton Montgomery Sacramento	**King** Monroe
	M	Alameda Mecklenburg Orange San Diego	**Cook** Contra Costa Hamilton Wayne	Allegheny Cuyahoga Hillsborough Palm Beach Santa Clara
	L	**Maricopa** Prince George's	Broward **Clark** Dallas Harris Riverside	**Los Angeles** Miami-Dade San Bernardino

Figure 3c. Stowell-GPP

		County GPP		
		H	**M**	**L**
Social Capital	**H**	**Fairfax** **Hennepin** Mecklenburg **Montgomery** Oakland	Santa Clara	**Fulton** Hillsborough **King** Monroe
	M	Baltimore Franklin Orange San Diego	**Alameda** Contra Costa Cook Palm Beach Sacramento Wayne	Anne Arundel Hamilton
	L	Dallas Maricopa	Broward Clark **Harris** Miami-Dade Prince George's **Riverside**	Allegheny Cuyahoga **Los Angeles** **San Bernardino**

Figure 3d. P-organization-GPP

		County GPP		
		H	**M**	**L**
	H	Baltimore **Fairfax** Franklin Hamilton **Hennepin** **Montgomery** Oakland	Contra Costa	Allegheny Anne Arundel Cuyahoga **Fulton** **King** Monroe
Social Capital	**M**	Dallas Mecklenburg San Diego	**Alameda** Broward Cook Miami-Dade Palm Beach Sacramento	
	L	Maricopa Orange	Clark **Harris** Prince George's **Riverside** Santa Clara Wayne	Hillsborough **Los Angeles** **San Bernardino**

Figure 3e. O-organizations-GPP

		County GPP		
		H	**M**	**L**
Social Capital	**H**	Baltimore **Fairfax** Franklin **Hennepin** **Montgomery**	Cook Sacramento	Allegheny Anne Arundel **Fulton** **King**
	M	Dallas Hamilton Maricopa Oakland	**Alameda** Clark Miami-Dade Prince George's	Cuyahoga Monroe
	L	Mecklenburg Orange San Diego	Broward Contra Costa **Harris** Palm Beach **Riverside** Santa Clara Wayne	Hillsborough **Los Angeles** **San Bernardino**

	Rank	Range
Social Capital	H	2.880 to 2.227
	M	2.167 to 1.800
	L	1.583 to 1.160
GPP	H	1.968 to 0.794
	M	0.207 to -0.380
	L	0.967 to -2.728
MFR	H	1.771 to 0.642
	M	0.266 to 1.487
	L	-0.863 to -1.616

One possible explanation for the amount of variation among the counties and the substantial correlations among the various measures would be the presence of extreme value counties within the sample. To determine the extent to which the variance in the sample is influenced by the presence of extreme value cases that magnify the correlations, a separate analysis was conducted that excluded three counties that were thought to be potential outliers based on the GPP scores (Fairfax and Maricopa counties, which scored highest on the overall GPP measure, and Allegheny County, which scored lowest on the overall GPP measure). Table 5-4a presents the results of the correlation analysis that compares the 34 county dataset with a smaller 31 county dataset that excluded the three outlier counties. The results confirm that the correlations present in the 34 county analyses are significantly influenced by these outliers. Removing the three outlier counties reduces the number of significant correlations by nearly 50 percent (see the column labeled "Change" in Table 5-4). Similarly, in most cases, the strength of the correlations decreased. The difference in the two samples was uniform across the Stowell, associational density and co-production measures alike.

The results presented in Table 5-4 provide a significant and nuanced finding relative to the social capital-government performance literature and research. **This finding suggests that the relationship between government performance and social capital is strongest at the margins – that is, among both the highest- and lowest-performing county governments.** While there were a similar number of counties falling in the HL cell as in the HH cell in Figure 5-3a, the counties in the HH cell in general scored higher on the social capital items than did the counties in the HL cells. For example, while both Fairfax and King counties scored high on social capital, the scores for Fairfax County were higher than those for King County (social

capital index scores were 2.74 and 2.68, respectively). Similarly, while both San Bernardino and Dallas counties scored low on the social capital items, San Bernardino County scored lower overall on the social capital index than did Dallas County (social capital index scores were 1.13 and 1.62, respectively). The research to date exploring social capital and government performance has assumed that the relationship is uniform across all contexts and institutions. The evidence presented here suggests this not the case with respect to urban area county governments.

Table 5-4a. Correlation Analysis with Outliers Removed		34 County Correlations						31 County Correlations w/out Outliers						
		County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR	County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR	Change
My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires.	Pearson	**0.2703***	0.2208	**0.2704***	0.1754	0.0372	**0.3184****	0.0704	0.0632	0.1312	-0.0138	-0.2031	0.1930	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0611	0.1048	0.0610	0.1605	0.4173	0.0333	0.3533	0.3678	0.2408	0.4707	0.1366	0.1491	**-3**
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	31	31	31	31	31	31	
I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.	Pearson	-0.1244	-0.0543	-0.2113	0.0536	0.0146	-0.1397	0.0766	0.1029	-0.0998	**0.2464***	0.2075	-0.0083	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2524	0.3858	0.1269	0.3872	0.4689	0.2268	0.3464	0.2976	0.3033	0.0987	0.1400	0.4830	**1**
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	29	29	29	29	29	29	
My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.	Pearson	0.1309	0.0468	-0.2233	0.2444	0.0791	0.0926	0.1317	0.0393	-0.2456	**0.2512***	0.0734	0.0879	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2493	0.4047	0.1221	0.1007	0.3417	0.3163	0.2521	0.4212	0.1039	0.0986	0.3552	0.3282	**1**
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29	28	28	28	28	28	28	
I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	Pearson	**0.5184*****	**0.3759****	**0.5192*****	**0.3725****	**0.4570*****	**0.4393*****	**0.3423****	0.2128	**0.4073****	0.1883	**0.2885***	**0.3031***	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0017	0.0203	0.0016	0.0213	0.0056	0.0076	0.0373	0.1385	0.0157	0.1687	0.0682	0.0584	**-2**
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	28	28	28	28	28	28	
People generally view me as a leader.	Pearson	0.2298	0.1717	-0.0932	0.2242	0.1681	0.2338	0.2271	0.1462	-0.1537	0.2078	0.1420	0.2158	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1109	0.1821	0.3122	0.1168	0.1873	0.1068	0.1225	0.2289	0.2174	0.1443	0.2355	0.1351	**0**
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	28	28	28	28	28	28	
I believe everything is changing too fast today.	Pearson	**-0.2545***	**-0.2905****	**-0.2717***	-0.1022	-0.1538	**-0.3537****	-0.1576	-0.2230	-0.1872	0.0362	-0.0375	**-0.3045****	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0732	0.0478	0.0601	0.2826	0.1926	0.0201	0.1986	0.1139	0.1567	0.4234	0.4206	0.0479	**-3**
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	31	31	31	31	31	31	
If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.	Pearson	-0.0054	0.0481	-0.1374	0.0886	0.0446	-0.0267	-0.1743	-0.0530	**-0.2433***	0.0403	-0.0667	-0.1610	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4878	0.3935	0.2192	0.3090	0.4012	0.4404	0.1741	0.3886	0.0935	0.4147	0.3608	0.1934	**1**
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	31	31	31	31	31	31	
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson	-0.0166	-0.0245	-0.0405	0.0026	0.0519	-0.0699	0.1092	0.0517	0.0346	0.1056	0.1673	-0.0185	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4640	0.4470	0.4128	0.4943	0.3890	0.3519	0.2864	0.3950	0.4293	0.2929	0.1929	0.4621	**0**
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	29	29	29	29	29	29	
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.	Pearson	**-0.3121****	**-0.3109****	**-0.2587***	-0.1994	-0.2402	**-0.2774***	**-0.3393****	**-0.3061***	-0.2430	-0.1797	-0.2306	**-0.2612***	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0466	0.0472	0.0837	0.1454	0.1006	0.0689	0.0387	0.0566	0.1064	0.1800	0.1189	0.0897	**-1**
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	28	28	28	28	28	28	
Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	Pearson	-0.0103	-0.0639	-0.1772	0.2348	0.049	-0.1383	-0.0404	-0.0922	-0.2162	**0.2551***	0.0380	-0.1731	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4780	0.3663	0.1701	0.1018	0.3967	0.2291	0.4177	0.3171	0.1300	0.0908	0.4224	0.1846	**1**
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	29	29	29	29	29	29	
A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.	Pearson	**-0.4070****	-0.2052	**-0.4518*****	**-0.2917***	-0.1518	**-0.3986****	-0.2253	-0.0162	**-0.3353****	-0.1094	0.0890	**-0.2527***	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0104	0.1300	0.0047	0.0526	0.2035	0.0119	0.1157	0.4661	0.0350	0.2825	0.3199	0.0889	**-2**
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	30	30	30	30	30	30	
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	Pearson	**-0.2963****	-0.1596	0.0589	**-0.3002****	**-0.2604***	**-0.2815***	**-0.3234****	-0.1352	0.1168	**-0.2971***	**-0.2582***	**-0.2821***	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0444	0.1836	0.3703	0.0423	0.0684	0.0534	0.0379	0.2343	0.2657	0.0522	0.0804	0.0620	**0**
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	31	31	31	31	31	31	
Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.	Pearson	-0.2254	**-0.2775***	**-0.2694***	-0.0399	-0.1597	-0.2292	-0.0940	-0.1878	-0.1818	0.0994	-0.0284	-0.1326	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1114	0.0653	0.0714	0.4156	0.1954	0.1074	0.3138	0.1646	0.1727	0.3039	0.4419	0.2465	**-2**
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	29	29	29	29	29	29	

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

Table 5-4a. Correlation Analysis with Outliers Removed		34 County Correlations						31 County Correlations w/out Outliers						
		County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR	County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR	Change
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	Pearson	**-0.3494****	-0.2279	-0.0598	-0.2276	-0.2226	**-0.3996****	**-0.3032****	-0.1614	0.0248	-0.1569	-0.1491	**-0.3576****	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0231	0.1011	0.3706	0.1013	0.1065	0.0106	0.0486	0.1929	0.4474	0.1996	0.2118	0.0241	**0**
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33	31	31	31	31	31	31	
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	Pearson	**0.3099****	0.1826	**0.4360*****	0.1517	0.0857	**0.3360****	**0.3306****	0.1479	**0.4344****	0.1177	0.0366	**0.3104***	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0478	0.1670	0.0080	0.2118	0.3263	0.0347	0.0428	0.2263	0.0104	0.2754	0.4266	0.0539	**0**
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	28	28	28	28	28	28	
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	Pearson	0.1790	-0.0522	-0.1205	**0.2372***	**0.3266****	0.0755	0.1147	-0.1523	-0.1908	0.2224	**0.3055***	0.0022	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1676	0.3902	0.2592	0.0994	0.0365	0.3432	0.2768	0.2151	0.1608	0.1231	0.0535	0.4956	**-1**
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	29	29	29	29	29	29	
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson	**0.2669***	**0.2608***	-0.0354	**0.2921***	0.1939	0.1999	0.2475	0.2403	-0.0778	**0.2738***	0.1659	0.1736	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0892	0.0944	0.4303	0.0696	0.1662	0.1588	0.1114	0.1185	0.3528	0.0879	0.2089	0.1982	**-2**
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27	26	26	26	26	26	26	
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson	**-0.3295****	-0.2163	**-0.4018****	-0.1879	-0.1697	**-0.3137****	-0.1331	-0.0477	**-0.2821***	0.0035	0.0346	-0.1681	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0306	0.1134	0.0102	0.1475	0.1726	0.0377	0.2376	0.3993	0.0620	0.4926	0.4268	0.1829	**-2**
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33	31	31	31	31	31	31	
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	Pearson	**-0.3530****	**-0.2778***	-0.0358	**-0.2635***	-0.2277	**-0.3869****	**-0.3332****	-0.2282	0.0464	-0.2112	-0.1653	**-0.3518****	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0278	0.0686	0.4255	0.0797	0.1131	0.0173	0.0416	0.1214	0.4072	0.1403	0.2003	0.0331	**-2**
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	28	28	28	28	28	28	
I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.	Pearson	-0.1893	-0.1322	-0.1658	-0.0693	0.0618	**-.3178(*)**	-0.1529	-0.2272	**-0.2648***	0.0728	0.0623	**-0.2812***	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1497	0.2354	0.1823	0.3532	0.3684	0.0382	0.2187	0.1224	0.0866	0.3564	0.3763	0.0736	**1**
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	28	28	28	28	28	28	
Too much money is being spent on military defense.	Pearson	**-0.2893****	**-0.3292****	-0.2017	-0.1827	**-0.2854***	-0.2099	-0.2226	-0.1320	-0.1649	-0.0620	0.0925	**-0.3323****	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0485	0.0287	0.1263	0.1505	0.0509	0.1168	0.1186	0.2434	0.1920	0.3725	0.3135	0.0364	**-2**
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	30	30	30	30	30	30	
I feel there is too much sex on television today.	Pearson	-0.2211	-0.2190	0.0730	-0.2260	-0.2128	-0.2016	0.0462	-0.1063	0.0135	0.0751	-0.0185	0.0766	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1119	0.1142	0.3457	0.1067	0.1212	0.1343	0.4025	0.2847	0.4713	0.3439	0.4606	0.3411	**0**
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	31	31	31	31	31	31	
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson	**-0.3042****	-0.1569	0.0148	**-0.2811***	**-0.2254***	**-.3114****	-0.2028	-0.1933	0.1328	-0.2021	-0.1874	-0.1713	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0401	0.1877	0.4668	0.0536	0.0999	0.0365	0.1412	0.1531	0.2421	0.1421	0.1607	0.1828	**-4**
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	30	30	30	30	30	30	
I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.	Pearson	-0.2244	**-0.3246****	-0.1806	-0.0977	-0.2120	**-0.2559***	**-0.2465***	-0.0619	0.1198	-0.2289	-0.1444	**-0.2410***	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1166	0.0400	0.1698	0.3038	0.1303	0.0861	0.0906	0.3703	0.2604	0.1078	0.2192	0.0957	**0**
	N	30	30	30	30	30	30	31	31	31	31	31	31	
(Recoded) In general, would you say you feel better off, worse off or no different than you were two years ago?	Pearson	**0.3201****	**0.3309****	0.2286	**0.2800***	**0.3372****	**0.2555***	0.0134	-0.2004	-0.0379	0.1030	-0.0203	-0.1475	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0396	0.0345	0.1081	0.0636	0.0318	0.0826	0.4730	0.1533	0.4241	0.3010	0.4593	0.2269	**-5**
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	28	28	28	28	28	28	
(Recoded) How about two years from now, do you think you will be better off, worse off or no different than you are now?	Pearson	0.1821	0.1724	-0.1369	0.1984	**0.2546***	0.1440	-0.1061	-0.0634	**-0.3380****	0.1451	-0.1007	-0.1039	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1634	0.1769	0.2313	0.1423	0.0834	0.2198	0.2992	0.3766	0.0423	0.2351	0.3087	0.3030	**0**
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	27	27	27	27	27	27	
Change	**60**	14	9	8	8	7	14	**-7**	**-8**	**-1**	**-3**	**-4**	**-3**	**-26**

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

Table 5-4a. Correlation Analysis with Outliers Removed		34 County Correlations						31 County Correlations w/out Outliers						
		County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR	County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR	Change
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Pearson Correl	-0.0829	-0.1525	0.0801	-0.1106	-0.2156	0.0684	0.1848	0.0026	0.2656	0.0747	-0.0498	0.2611	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3205	0.1947	0.3263	0.2667	0.1104	0.3503	0.3195	0.9888	0.1488	0.6896	0.7902	0.1559	
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correl	**-0.3544****	-0.1687	-0.0841	**-0.3088****	-0.1890	**-0.2322***	0.0491	0.1791	0.2549	-0.0176	0.2387	-0.0013	**-3**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0198	0.1701	0.3181	0.0378	0.1422	0.0931	0.7933	0.3351	0.1663	0.9253	0.1960	0.9945	
Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	Pearson Correl	-0.0129	0.0528	0.1209	0.0123	0.0274	-0.0165	0.0325	0.1015	0.1658	0.0426	0.0738	0.0264	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4712	0.3833	0.2479	0.4725	0.4388	0.4631	0.8624	0.5868	0.3728	0.8199	0.6933	0.8878	
Number of Public Golf Courses per 10,000	Pearson Correl	0.1472	-0.0538	0.1493	**0.2458***	0.0225	0.0930	0.1808	-0.0878	0.1762	**0.3030***	0.0065	0.0870	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2030	0.3813	0.1997	0.0805	0.4498	0.3005	0.3303	0.6387	0.3431	0.0975	0.9725	0.6416	
Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correl	0.0946	-0.0988	0.1597	0.1507	0.1417	0.0554	0.2956	-0.0126	0.2694	0.2908	**0.3029***	0.1646	**1**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2972	0.2892	0.1836	0.1974	0.2120	0.3777	0.1064	0.9465	0.1427	0.1125	0.0976	0.3762	
Number of Sports Clubs, Managers and Promoters per 10,000	Pearson Correl	0.1226	**0.2277***	0.1016	0.1470	**0.3282****	0.0389	0.0365	0.1848	0.0488	0.0912	**0.3069***	-0.0360	**-1**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2448	0.0976	0.2838	0.2034	0.0290	0.4136	0.8453	0.3197	0.7942	0.6254	0.0931	0.8474	
Number of Membership Sports and Recreation Clubs per 10,000	Pearson Correl	0.1764	0.0326	**0.3365****	0.2020	0.0002	0.1640	0.2898	0.0626	**0.3984****	0.2671	0.0333	0.2097	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1591	0.4274	0.0258	0.1259	0.4994	0.1769	0.1138	0.7380	0.0264	0.1464	0.8588	0.2576	
Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correl	-0.1428	-0.0129	-0.0712	-0.1685	-0.0028	-0.0144	-0.2442	-0.0500	-0.1236	-0.2453	-0.0394	-0.0574	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2102	0.4711	0.3445	0.1704	0.4937	0.4678	0.1856	0.7893	0.5076	0.1834	0.8333	0.7590	
Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correl	0.2127	0.2025	0.1064	0.1530	**0.2716***	**0.2362***	0.1250	0.1222	-0.0109	0.0467	0.2160	0.1524	**-2**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1136	0.1253	0.2746	0.1939	0.0601	0.0893	0.5028	0.5125	0.9537	0.8028	0.2432	0.4131	
Number of Business Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correl	0.1409	0.0822	0.1420	0.0469	0.1642	0.1868	0.0767	0.0092	0.0706	-0.0469	0.1150	0.1303	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2133	0.3220	0.2115	0.3961	0.1767	0.1451	0.6816	0.9608	0.7057	0.8021	0.5379	0.4848	
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correl	**-0.3433****	**-0.2686***	-0.0617	**-0.4177*****	**-0.2715***	-0.2137	-0.0096	-0.0215	0.2163	-0.2078	0.0215	0.0313	**-4**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0234	0.0622	0.3645	0.0070	0.0601	0.1125	0.9593	0.9087	0.2425	0.2621	0.9084	0.8673	
Number of Membership Organizations Not Elsewhere Classified per 10,000	Pearson Correl	-0.1652	-0.1454	0.0751	-0.1516	-0.1272	-0.1283	0.0109	-0.0176	0.2268	-0.0156	0.0253	-0.0048	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1752	0.2060	0.3364	0.1960	0.2367	0.2349	0.9537	0.9252	0.2198	0.9334	0.8926	0.9794	
Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correl	0.0040	-0.0877	0.1496	0.0239	0.0623	0.0300	0.2396	0.0361	0.2938	0.1840	0.2585	0.1635	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4909	0.3109	0.1992	0.4466	0.3631	0.4332	0.1943	0.8472	0.1086	0.3216	0.1602	0.3795	
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	Pearson Correl	**0.30287****	0.0775	**0.3421****	**0.2598***	-0.0577	**0.3476****	**0.3869****	0.0495	**0.3528***	0.2716	-0.1249	**0.3798****	**-1**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0408	0.3316	0.0238	0.0689	0.3729	0.0220	0.0315	0.7914	0.0515	0.1394	0.5033	0.0351	
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	Pearson Correl	0.1280	-0.0622	**0.3617****	0.0743	-0.0001	0.1190	0.2574	-0.0275	**0.4475****	0.1335	0.0592	0.1821	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2352	0.3633	0.0178	0.3381	0.4998	0.2513	0.1621	0.8831	0.0116	0.4741	0.7518	0.3269	
Number of Not-for-Profit Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correl	-0.0845	-0.1329	0.1260	-0.1137	-0.0248	-0.0833	0.0812	-0.0287	0.2540	-0.0053	0.1217	0.0261	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3173	0.2268	0.2388	0.2610	0.4445	0.3197	0.6641	0.8780	0.1680	0.9776	0.5143	0.8893	
Social Capital Index Principal Components Analysis	Pearson Correl	0.0921	-0.0749	**0.3051****	0.0543	-0.0066	0.1038	0.2723	-0.0040	**0.4201****	0.1526	0.0991	0.2022	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3023	0.3368	0.0396	0.3802	0.4852	0.2796	0.1383	0.9830	0.0186	0.4124	0.5959	0.2754	
Social Capital Index-Standardized	Pearson Correl	0.1160	-0.0627	**0.3205****	0.0750	-0.0141	0.1309	0.2905	-0.0004	**0.4284****	0.1660	0.0769	0.2244	**0**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2567	0.3624	0.0323	0.3366	0.4685	0.2302	0.1129	0.9985	0.0162	0.3721	0.6808	0.2248	
Change	**20**	3	2	5	4	3	3	**-2**	**-2**	**0**	**-3**	**-1**	**-2**	**-10**

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed).

The analysis presented above has focused on aggregate measures of social capital and government performance for each county. While this is appropriate (and necessary) for the government performance measures, there are potentially important insights to be gained from a detailed analysis of the individual level data in the Stowell datasets. While the analysis thus far tells us some interesting things about how social capital and government performance vary from place to place, it tells us little about *why* it varies. The analysis to follow will seek to provide additional information to help understand more fully why the counties organize the way they do.

The Nested Analysis Approach

Figures 5-3a-e provide another useful classification of the 34 counties across the social capital and government performance measures which permits a more detailed analysis of the dynamics of social capital effects in county governments. As discussed in Chapter 3, the nested analysis approach allows unique insights into the analysis of the data used in this study. By combining large-n and small-n analyses to guide the research, overall reliability and validity of the research methodology is enhanced. This stage of the analysis will be based on what Lieberman calls "Model-building Small-n Analysis" (Lieberman, 2005: 445). Based on the results of the large-n analysis conducted thus far, a smaller subset of counties was selected for more detailed combined small-n and large-n analysis. Using the trichotomized social capital and performance matrix classifications presented in Figures 5-3a-e, a subset of seven counties was chosen from the overall 34 county sample based on the following selection criteria:

- The selection of counties should come from all four of the corner cells (HH, HL, LH and LL)

- The selection of counties should include the middle (MM) cell
- The selection of counties within each cell should be consistent across all three index measures of social capital
- All things being equal, selected counties should have larger n sizes and number of sample years
- As much as possible, the selection of counties should be geographically diverse
- Each row and column from Figure 4-3a should include 2 counties[11]

Based on the results and criteria discussed above, the following seven counties were selected for more detailed analysis:

County	Region	Cell Location
Clark	**W**	LM
Cook	**MW**	MM
Dallas	**S**	LH
Fairfax	**NE**	HH
King	**NW**	HL
Los Angeles	**W**	LL
Palm Beach	**S**	MM

These counties will be used to explore broader contextual and individual-level attributes in the following chapters that may provide additional insight into why there is such variation among counties with respect to the effects of various measures and variables associated with social capital upon county government performance.

[11] Clark County was selected as an anomaly county for comparative purposes.

Before turning to additional detailed analysis of possible alternative explanatory theories, there remains a methodological issue that must be explored and evaluated. Recall from Table 4-4 (Chapter 4) that overall, there is a great deal of inter-item correlation among the Stowell items included in this study. While this provides strong evidence that these items can be conceptually thought of as measuring a common underlying construct of social capital, as we have seen there are also many underlying dimensions of social capital that need to be more fully explored in the data. Chapter 3 presented a discussion of the hypothesized dimensions of social capital that each of the measures was thought to reflect; the results reported above have served to validate many of these initial hypotheses. However, in order to further assess the evidence of the presence of these relationships, we must explore in more detail the pattern of relationships among the Stowell items in an effort to reduce spuriousness and selection bias while obtaining greater parsimony in the variables included in our analytical framework.

Factor Analysis

Table 5-5 displays the results of a principal components factor analysis of the 28 Stowell items used in this study, calculated using the individual-level responses to each of the items in each of 34 counties being studied here (n=70,159 to 100,003). The results of the factor analysis reveal eight underlying factors or dimensions present in the 28-variable dataset. Further review of the factor table reduced the number of valid factors to seven robust independent dimensions, and also resulted in the elimination 10 of the 28 individual items. Individual items were removed principally based on a subjective assessment of face validity – that is, an assessment of how well the items "fit" conceptually with each other. In other cases, items were dropped when there was no definitive factor under which the item fit.

Table 5-5. Rotated Component Matrix*

Stowell Item	Component 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	**0.630**	0.089	0.032	0.157	0.046	-0.093	0.045	-0.085
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.	**0.617**	0.114	0.075	-0.168	0.083	-0.043	-0.026	0.079
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.	**0.466**	-0.049	-0.099	0.336	0.033	-0.148	-0.214	-0.097
I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.	**0.393**	-0.017	0.182	0.241	0.048	-0.122	0.283	-0.051
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	**0.384**	0.086	0.148	0.022	0.094	-0.183	-0.033	-0.147
I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.	0.088	**0.589**	0.003	0.253	-0.073	-0.024	-0.107	0.051
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	-0.063	**0.569**	-0.049	0.171	0.310	-0.101	0.030	0.015
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.	0.258	**0.501**	-0.052	-0.103	0.187	0.051	0.210	-0.017
Too much money is being spent on military defense.	0.216	**-0.462**	0.076	-0.017	0.397	0.111	0.130	0.044
Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	0.293	**0.402**	0.021	-0.159	0.002	0.146	-0.156	-0.072
The roles of men and women today are too much alike.	0.347	**0.394**	0.106	0.267	0.010	0.053	-0.027	0.000
My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires.	0.118	0.044	**-0.719**	-0.034	-0.030	0.138	0.057	0.094
If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.	0.173	-0.003	**0.682**	-0.001	0.103	0.050	0.036	0.021
Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.	0.337	-0.004	**0.558**	0.008	0.126	0.015	-0.004	0.082
I feel there is too much sex on television today.	0.036	0.000	-0.102	**0.704**	0.054	0.088	-0.150	-0.140
I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.	-0.018	0.226	0.101	**0.647**	0.006	-0.069	0.133	-0.043
I believe everything is changing too fast today.	0.330	0.091	0.136	**0.482**	0.288	-0.023	-0.008	-0.034
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	0.030	0.153	0.115	0.011	**0.736**	-0.064	0.015	-0.056
A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.	0.111	-0.008	0.071	0.094	**0.702**	0.053	-0.071	-0.043
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.	0.257	0.016	0.244	0.176	**0.298**	-0.205	-0.156	0.088
People generally view me as a leader.	-0.268	0.154	-0.066	-0.090	0.052	**0.616**	0.207	-0.040
My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.	-0.157	0.055	0.042	0.085	0.126	**0.612**	0.246	0.016
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	0.068	-0.074	-0.050	-0.064	-0.184	**0.555**	-0.285	0.006
I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.	-0.095	-0.304	-0.051	0.058	-0.041	**0.491**	-0.153	0.258
How about two years from now; do you think you will be better off, worse off or no different than you are now?	-0.107	-0.034	0.119	-0.049	-0.052	0.081	**0.720**	-0.008
In general, would you say you feel better off, worse off or no different than you were two years ago?	0.099	-0.070	-0.354	-0.024	-0.035	0.002	**0.638**	0.070
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	0.053	0.012	-0.058	-0.093	0.006	0.154	0.025	**0.782**
I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.	0.196	0.013	-0.055	0.103	0.073	0.078	-0.019	**-0.759**

*Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

Table 5-6 presents the results of a reliability analysis of each of the seven factors that were identified in the principal components factor analysis. The reliability analysis demonstrates that most of the factors hold together well, and measure the distinct dimensions of social capital that have been discussed above. The alpha's for the scales range from -0.012 (indicating that the items do not scale particularly strongly together) to a high of -0.907 (indicating that the items scale tightly together), with four of the seven factors displaying alpha's between 0.387 and 0.499.

Table 5-6 Factor and Reliability Analysis for Stowell Social Capital Items

Factor	Items	Cronbach's Alpha	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Trust/Risk	It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.	**0.480**	4.96	4.837	0.363	0.274
	The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.		5.28	5.11	0.259	0.449
	As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.		4.77	4.873	0.28	0.415
Trust in human nature/free rider	Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	**0.364**	6.16	5.046	0.241	0.22
	Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.		6.81	4.59	0.253	0.189
	Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.		6.93	5.008	0.146	0.411
Traditionalist/ aversion to change	I feel there is too much sex on television today.	**0.499**	6.61	5.639	0.34	0.366
	I believe everything is changing too fast today.		7.33	5.327	0.31	0.409
	I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.		7.1	5	0.303	0.426
Political trust	Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	**0.484**	3.42	1.965	0.32	n/a
	A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.		3.68	1.705	0.32	n/a
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	People generally view me as a leader.	**-0.012**	6.76	2.787	0.061	-0.216
	My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.		6.24	2.949	0.171	-0.447
	I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.		7.5	3.689	-0.178	0.5
Optimism	Would you say you feel better off or more financially secure now than you were two years ago?	**0.387**	2.59	0.39	0.245	n/a
	How about two years from now?		2.4	0.582	0.245	n/a
Particularized trust	Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	**-0.907**	3.72	1.696	-0.314	n/a
	I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.		2.91	2.165	-0.314	n/a

In order to assess the extent to which the factor and scale analysis described above are consistent with the results of the correlation analysis presented earlier in the chapter, Tables 5-7a and 5-8b display the correlation matrices for each of the factors displayed above. Table 5-7a displays the correlation matrix for the seven factors calculated at the individual level based on

the factor scores that were calculated for each individual respondent. Despite the variation among the alphas displayed in Table 5-6, all of the seven factors are significantly correlated with each other at the individual level (Table 5-7a).

Table 5-7a. Factor Correlations-Individual Level		Generalized trust/risk	Generalized trust/human nature/free ride	Traditionalist/ aversion to change	Political trust	Personal efficacy/self-esteem	Optimism	Particularized trust
Trust/risk	Pearson Correlation	1						
	Sig. (1-tailed)							
	N	78022						
Generalized rust/human nature/free rider	Pearson Correlation	**.233****	1					
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000						
	N	75198	82416					
Traditionalist/aversion to change	Pearson Correlation	**.293****	**.232****	1				
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000					
	N	78022	75198	88706				
Political trust	Pearson Correlation	**.190****	**.213****	**.229****	1			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000				
	N	76637	82416	87321	94539			
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	Pearson Correlation	**-.285****	**-.029****	**-.122****	**-.072****	1		
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000			
	N	70661	69276	70661	69276	70661		
Optimism	Pearson Correlation	**-.126****	**.011****	**-.081****	**-.045****	**.163****	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0060	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000		
	N	48519	53982	55682	62443	43942	65056	
Particularized trust	Pearson Correlation	**.139****	**.065****	**.207****	**.080****	**-.110****	**-.049****	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	
	N	66539	70933	77223	83056	59178	54644	84829
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)								
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)								

In order to construct a correlation matrix for the county-level factors displayed in Table 4-15b, the individual-level means for each factor were calculated for each individual county. A correlation matrix was then calculated based on the factor means at the county level. Not surprisingly, the results of the correlation analysis at the county-level were not as strongly correlated as they were at the individual level – the result of a much smaller n and resulting smaller degrees of freedom. One interesting departure was seen in the results of the factor measuring optimism. While the individual level optimism scale was strongly correlated with all of the other factors, the optimism scale was significantly correlated only with the generalized trust/risk factor at the county level.

Table 5-7b. Factor Correlations-County Level		Generalized trust/risk	Generalized trust/human nature/free ride	Traditionalist/ aversion to change	Political trust	Personal efficacy/self-esteem	Optimism	Particularized trust
Generalized trust/risk	Pearson Correlation	1						
	Sig. (1-tailed)							
	N	28						
Generalized trust/human nature/free ride	Pearson Correlation	**.777****	1					
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000						
	N	27	28					
Traditionalist/aversion to change	Pearson Correlation	**.782****	**.771****	1				
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000					
	N	27	27	31				
Political trust	Pearson Correlation	**.671****	**.738****	**.839****	1			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000				
	N	28	28	31	32			
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	Pearson Correlation	**-.740****	**-.542****	**-.597****	**-.427***	1		
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0020	0.0010	0.0130			
	N	27	27	26	27	27		
Optimism	Pearson Correlation	**-.348***	0.052	0.167	0.027	0.185	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0440	0.4020	0.1980	0.4440	0.1940		
	N	25	25	28	29	24	31	
Particularized trust	Pearson Correlation	**-.621****	**-.626****	**-.622****	**-.664****	**.433***	**-.369***	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0170	0.0320	
	N	25	25	28	29	24	26	29
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)								
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)								

The final step in validating the factor analysis and assessing the utility of these factors in the following chapters will be to replicate the correlation analysis at the county level with the measures of government performance described above. Table 5-8 displays the results of a correlation analysis of the seven Stowell data factors with the GPP scores. The results displayed in 5-8 are consistent with the results displayed in Table 4-7 (GPP correlations with the individual Stowell items). In both tables, the overall county score and the Managing-for-Results dimensions of government performance appear to be the most significant correlates with the factors derived from the Stowell data. As Table 4-16 shows, *five of the seven factors are correlated with the overall GPP scores and six of the seven factors are correlated with the Managing-for-Results dimension of the GPP government performance data*. Only the factor measuring personal efficacy/self-esteem was not significantly correlated with any of the GPP scores.

Table 5-8 Factor Stowell Factor-GPP Correlations		County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR
Trust/risk	Pearson Correlation	**-.329***	-0.2440	-0.0470	**-0.2610**	-0.1900	**-.374***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0410	0.1010	0.4040	0.0850	0.1620	0.0230
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29
Generalized trust/human nature/free rider	Pearson Correlation	-0.1390	-0.0300	-0.2050	0.1630	-0.0550	**-0.2780**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2400	0.4390	0.1480	0.2030	0.3900	0.0760
	N	28	28	28	28	28	28
Traditionalist/aversion to change	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2950**	-0.1770	0.0260	-0.2250	**-0.2420**	**-.316***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0500	0.1660	0.4440	0.1080	0.0910	0.0390
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32
Political trust	Pearson Correlation	**-.377***	-0.1510	**-.398***	-0.1880	**-0.2440**	**-.385***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0170	0.2050	0.0120	0.1510	0.0890	0.0150
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	Pearson Correlation	0.2380	0.1950	-0.1320	0.3050	0.1820	0.1920
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1110	0.1610	0.2520	0.0570	0.1770	0.1640
	N	28	28	28	28	28	28
Optimism	Pearson Correlation	**.385***	**.417****	0.1560	**.344***	**.437****	**.348***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0160	0.0100	0.2000	0.0290	0.0070	0.0270
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31
Social/particularized trust	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3010**	-0.1280	**-.316***	-0.1000	-0.1110	**-.373***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0560	0.2540	0.0480	0.3030	0.2830	0.0230
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

Conclusion

This Chapter has reported the results of efforts to systematically narrow the number of items used to measure social capital, and then to use these measures to develop a framework for classifying counties along both social capital and government performance dimensions. As reported in Chapter 4, county government performance is correlated with some dimensions of social capital, but not others. More specifically, Chapter 4 reported that the dimensions of social capital more closely associated with particularized trust appear to be the strongest correlates of government performance. This finding was further highlighted by the more in-depth and nuanced analysis conducted in this chapter. Counties with citizens that are more willing to take risks, that are more open to change, that are more likely to trust political institutions, and that express a general predisposition to trust others are indeed more likely to have higher performing governments. Surprisingly however, the measures of generalized trust (the “free-rider” and “will

power” items) appear to be unrelated to government performance at the county level, contrary to expectations.

Another important feature of the relationship between social capital and government performance is the extent to which it appears that the relationship is contextual and complex. As displayed in Figures 5-3a through e, only about one-third to one-half of the counties in the sample score in the predicted pattern. This indicates that the interaction between government performance and social capital is indeed complex. The results presented in this chapter also suggest that the relationship between government performance and social capital is strongest at the margins – that is, among both the highest and lowest performing county governments. These findings, taken in concert, are unique in their contributions to the literature on social capital.

Chapter 6

Alternatives to Social Capital as a Predictor of Government Performance

This chapter will explore in more detail alternative theoretical approaches that have recently or historically been proposed as predictors or determinants of government performance in public administration and political science scholarship. The purpose of this analysis will be to not only assess which competing theories are significantly correlated with the government performance analysis conducted by the GPP, but also to comparatively assess these theories against the results reported in Chapters 4 and 5. This chapter will compare both cultural and structural aspects of the 34 counties included in this analysis to evaluate whether any of these other variables are important correlates of county government performance. Specifically, the analysis will evaluate and compare theories of political culture – specifically the work of Daniel Elazar and Joel Lieske; Richard Florida's theory of the "creative class"; and conventional structural variables, such as county government form of government and level of annual budget expenditures (Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001).

Structuralism

Thus far, the analysis presented has focused on the social-psychological dynamics of citizens in the counties and how these dynamics influence government performance. One element missing from these approaches is the extent to which structural variables of a given county government can influence the ability of that jurisdiction to develop and implement strategies designed to enhance government performance (Benton, 2003: 79). Indeed, Clingermayer and Feiock (2001) argue that the "constraints and incentives derived from

institutions influence the choices and *performance* of local governments" (5, emphasis added). Clingermayer and Feiock argue that the structure of municipal governments often shape the policy outcomes that are ultimately pursued, sometimes influencing these outcomes decades later (10). Following this logic, it may be that the structure of county governments is central to understanding the ability of county governments to develop and implement actions designed to enhance the county's capacity for long-term performance.

Form of government, system of representation. Two key structural variables that have been found to be powerful explanations of various policy outcomes focus on the localities' form of government and system of representation. Lubell et al. (2005) maintain that the structure of local elections has important implications for policy choices made by local elected officials depending upon whether or not they are elected by geographic district or at-large. Examining the propensity for county governments to adopt conservation amendments to their long-term land-use plans, Lubell et al. (1995) maintain that "at-large elections force local legislators to respond to a much broader set of political interests than are typically found in a single district. At-large representatives serve a citywide constituency, and hence, they are more likely to think in terms of aggregate welfare" (714; see also Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001: 10).

Based on this theory, one would expect that counties with legislators that are selected at-large would have better performing governments. Legislators with broader constituencies are more likely to pursue policies and programs viewed as benefitting the common good. District-based elected officials are expected to be less likely to be associated with high performing governments because it is more difficult to take credit and assign benefits to a smaller sector of a given community, and as a result legislators sometimes have the incentive to reward their local constituencies at the expense of overall government performance.

Related to how legislators are elected is the substantive issue of the number of legislators serving on an elected board. Clingermayer and Feiock (2001) have found that larger city-councils are more inclined to borrowing on the part of city governments than are smaller councils. One potential explanation may be the extent to which the political consequences of increasing municipal debt are more diffused for large councils than for small councils. From a government performance perspective, it is predicted here that larger governing board size would be negatively correlated with government performance capacity. Aside from the traditional warning against "decision by committee," larger elected governing bodies will likely have similar effects on local government performance as method of election. That is, the larger the elected body, the more diffuse the consequences for poor decision-making on the part of the board, the more incentive there is to reward individual constituencies and the less likely it is that the benefits of performance management are for elected officials to communicate to constituents.

A third element of local government structure that is predicted to influence a county government's capacity for performance is the structure of the executive branch. Lubell et al. (1995) describe two dominant theories in the areas of urban affairs research, both of which appear to be firmly rooted in the traditional politics-administration dichotomy. The first is the *insulation hypothesis*, which posits that appointed county managers are "insulated" from the political pressures that predominate in a given community. The second hypothesis is the *planning hypothesis*, which stipulates that given the predominant number of executives with urban planning and public administration backgrounds, and the propensity for interests to give deference to this expertise, appointed managers are more likely to support conservation amendments given that they tend to be predisposed to support the principles of sustainable growth and development.

Both the insulation and the planning hypothesis assume that appointed county officials are more likely to be less influenced by parochial political interests and more likely to promote and support policies that are consistent with the technical, non-political dynamics of local government administration. From this perspective, appointed county managers simply implement the will of the board. Conversely, elected executives are predicted to be more beholden to special interests because they are directly dependent upon those interests for their current position. As a result, elected county executives are expected to focus more on rewarding political allies and less on managing the burdens of good governance and administration.

Following this logic, both the insulation hypothesis and the planning hypothesis would predict that appointed county executives would be more likely to promote and support policies and procedures within county governments that develop and enhance the capacity of their organizations to perform. Appointed county executives would be expected to be more insulated from parochial political pressures that affect those seeking elected offices and would be more likely to be steeped in the professional training that places a premium on professional and dispassionate administration.

Fiscal opportunities/ constraints. A key element in understanding government performance may be the available financial resources and financial integrity of a given county. Benton (2003a, 2003b) has provided substantial evidence indicating that county expenditures increase when counties reform their government (that is, shift to a council-manager form of government), largely as a result of greater autonomy and flexibility in how county governments can raise revenues and the increasing demands placed on county governments to provide regional services. Given the increased demand for services placed on counties, counties with lower available

revenues and counties with lower per capita expenditures would be expected to have a correspondingly lower government performance rating.

The demand for services, increasingly competitive environment for services, and the hypothesis that elected and appointed officials will maximize the amount of resources dedicated to services for county residents, leads to the expectation that counties with smaller budgets are less willing to dedicate resources necessary to build a robust government structure that emphasizes quality service delivery and performance. Alternatively, it may be that counties with smaller fiscal budgets may have a greater incentive to innovate and develop performance structures that assist in maximizing limited resources. Counties with larger budgets may have less incentive to implement rigorous performance-based governing measures because there is less pressure placed from a fiscal perspective on county service delivery.

Number of governments. While form of government and fiscal environment are both internal structural variables that have the potential to affect county government performance, the number of governments within a given region represents external structural constraints that can also affect county government performance. A community with a large number of disparate and distinct local governmental units may be more likely to have fragmented and uncoordinated service delivery patterns and will likely compete with each of those local governments for limited taxpayer/ratepayer funds. On the other hand, regions with numerous government entities may have more effective service delivery mechanisms, where each entity focuses on a relatively small number of core tasks rather than being spread too thinly. Olberding (2002) finds evidence indicating that in terms of economic development, local governments are just as likely, if not more so, to cooperate than they are to compete because cooperation can often result in more effective service delivery.

Park and Feiock (2005) found similar results to those reported by Olberding, but most importantly also found that the presence of social capital – measured in their study as crime rate, homeownership and norms of cooperation among local governments – are positively related to increased cooperation in economic development arenas; they remark in this regard:

> The results…highlight the importance of the endogenous role for social capital in theories of institutional cooperation by accounting for social capital resulting from institutional interactions. The influence of institutional level, cognitive forms of social capital is reinforced by the finding that interlocal agreements had a greater impact on collective action to form economic development partnerships than did civic associations (Park and Feiock, 2005: 19).

The next section presents findings related to the importance of the structural variables described above for county government performance. The analysis presented below uses the following as independent variables:

<u>Form of government</u>

Chief Executive Type (elected or appointed)

Number on Governing Board

How board is elected (at-large or district)

<u>Number of governments</u>

Per capita no. governments

Per capita no. special districts

Per capita no. school districts

Fiscal environment

Per Capita-Revenues

Per Capita-Expenditures

Per Capita Expenditures-Education

Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries

Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services

Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety

Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing

Per Capita Expenditures-Administration

Per Capita Debt

Overall, there is substantial diversity among the sample of 34 counties included in this study. Of the 34 counties, 21 have reformed forms of government with an appointed administrative executive, and 13 counties have elected county administrators. The overwhelming majority of counties have legislators that are elected by district, with only 3 having all legislators elected at-large and 5 more counties having a combination of at-large and district elected legislators. Wide variety likewise exists with respect to the size of the governing boards/commissions, ranging from 3 to 29, with a median of seven. There is also tremendous variation among the counties when it comes to the number of governments present in a given region (defined as Metropolitan Statistical Area), ranging from 3 to 539, with a median of 27; the number of special districts ranges from 2 to 434, with a median of 29. Because number of governments can also be a function of population, the analysis was based on *per capita* residents in a given county to control for the effects of county population size. Data for the number of

governments and county government expenditure and revenue data was derived from U.S. Census Bureau publication *2002 Census of Governments: Finances of County Governments*.

Table 6-1 displays summary statistics for revenue and expenditure data collected for all of the counties. While the total revenues, expenditures and debt figures display substantial variation, some categories of spending have considerably more variation than others. Data on county government revenues and expenditures were derived from the U.S. Census Bureau publication of *Government Finances, 1999-2000* and were calculated on a per capita basis to control for the effects of differing county population size.

Table 6-1. County Per capita expenditure statistics

	Per Capita Revenues	Per Capita Expenditures	Per Capita Expenditures-Education*	Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries*	Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	Per Capita Debt
N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Mean	$1.57	$1.49	$0.42	$0.02	$0.37	$0.18	$0.15	$0.15	$1.43
Median	$1.24	$1.26	$0.09	$0.01	$0.30	$0.18	$0.09	$0.13	$1.25
Std. Deviation	$0.87	$0.81	$0.61	$0.01	$0.26	$0.09	$0.13	$0.14	$0.95
Minimum	$0.53	$0.47	$0.00	$0.00	$0.03	$0.06	$0.01	$0.05	$0.23
Maximum	$4.22	$3.84	$1.64	$0.04	$0.92	$0.38	$0.50	$0.89	$3.76

* Not all counties in the sample have jurisdiction over libraries or schools.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Government Finances, 1999-2000

Table 6-2 displays the inter-item correlations among the 15 structural variables described above. Among this sample of counties, those counties with appointed county executives (coded as "0") are more likely to have smaller governing boards (0.589, sig. > 0.01), smaller per capita number of special districts (0.368, sig. > 0.05), lower per capita expenditures on education (0.297, sig. > 0.1) and higher per capita expenditures on social services (-0.371, sig. > 0.05) and county government administration (-0.274, sig. > 0.1).

Interestingly, the positive correlation with special districts is not replicated for total number of governments. The 2002 Census of County Governments defines special districts as follows: "independent, special purpose governmental units (other than school district governments) that exist as separate entities with substantial administrative and fiscal

independence from general purpose local governments…[and exist] as an organized entity, governmental character, and substantial autonomy" (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002: vii). This finding is consistent with both the insulation and planning hypotheses presented above, given that very often these many special districts are regional in scope (such as water flood control, etc.) and may often be spin-offs from county governments. It may also be that county executives who are appointed are more likely to support fragmenting and specializing service delivery of certain specialized functions, whereas elected executives may be incentivized to retain these core government functions as contributors to a locus of political power.

Table 6-2. Institutional/Structural Variable Inter-Item Correlations

		Chief Executive Type[1]	Number on Governing Board	How board is elected[2]	Per capita no. govts	Per capita no. special districts	Per capita no. school districts	Per Capita-Revenues	Per Capita-Expenditures	Per Capita Expenditures-Education	Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	Per Capita Expenditures-Administration
Chief Executive Type	Pearson Correlation	1													
	Sig. (1-tailed)														
	N	33													
Number on Governing Board	Pearson Correlation	**0.595****	1												
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0002													
	N	34	34												
How board is elected	Pearson Correlation	-0.0806	-0.0437	1											
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.325	0.4029												
	N	34	34	34											
Per capita total governments	Pearson Correlation	0.1944	-0.0657	-0.067	1										
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1352	0.3558	0.3532											
	N	34	34	34	34										
Per capita special districts	Pearson Correlation	**0.3746***	0.071	-0.0054	**0.7322****	1									
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0145	0.3287	0.4877	0.0000										
	N	34	34	34	34	34									
Per capita school districts	Pearson Correlation	-0.0496	-0.0322	0.0166	**0.3756***	**0.4124****	1								
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3902	0.4284	0.4629	0.0143	0.0077									
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34								
Per Capita-Revenues	Pearson Correlation	0.1183	-0.0417	0.1491	**0.5003****	**0.5365****	**0.4035****	1							
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2526	0.4072	0.1999	0.0013	0.0005	0.009								
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34							
Per Capita-Expenditures	Pearson Correlation	0.1261	-0.0221	0.1727	**0.4971****	**0.5745****	**0.4291****	**0.9873****	1						
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2384	0.4506	0.1643	0.0014	0.0002	0.0057	0.0000							
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34						
Per Capita Expenditures-Education	Pearson Correlation	**0.3153**	-0.0658	0.2095	**0.6346****	**0.8206****	**0.7605****	**0.8861****	**0.9092****	1					
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0713	0.3827	0.1686	0.0006	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000						
	N	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23					
Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	Pearson Correlation	0.0508	-0.0653	**0.5030****	**0.4907****	**0.4565****	**0.2156**	**0.6546****	**0.6618****	**0.8996****	1				
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3968	0.3706	0.0032	0.0034	0.0064	0.1307	0.0001	0.0000	0.0000					
	N	29	28	28	29	29	29	29	29	20	29				
Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3581***	-0.1009	-0.0584	**-0.2892***	-0.225	**-0.3069***	-0.0115	-0.0167	**-0.3864***	**-0.2756**	1			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0188	0.2849	0.3714	0.0486	0.1004	0.0388	0.4742	0.4627	0.0343	0.0739				
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	23	29	34			
Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	Pearson Correlation	-0.0525	-0.1392	-0.1444	**0.3756***	**0.3336***	**0.6731****	**0.7195****	**0.7004****	**0.6153****	**0.2827**	-0.0673	1		
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3841	0.2162	0.2075	0.0143	0.0269	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0009	0.0686	0.3527			
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	23	29	34	34		
Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	Pearson Correlation	**0.2397***	0.0432	0.1477	**0.3357***	**0.5344****	**0.5063****	**0.6936****	**0.7296****	**0.6363****	**0.4766****	**-0.3208***	**0.5465****	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0861	0.4042	0.2022	0.0261	0.0006	0.0011	0.0000	0.0000	0.0005	0.0045	0.0322	0.0004		
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	
Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2599**	-0.2124	-0.1263	0.0151	-0.1123	**0.4956****	0.0908	0.1034	-0.2116	**-0.2463**	0.0692	**0.4594****	0.1222	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0688	0.1139	0.2383	0.4663	0.2635	0.0014	0.3048	0.2804	0.1662	0.0988	0.3487	0.0031	0.2455	
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Debt	Pearson Correlation	0.2086	0.0569	**0.2322***	**0.2919***	**0.4317****	**0.6828****	**0.6972****	**0.7330****	**0.7121****	**0.4051***	-0.1997	**0.6725****	**0.7788****	**0.2881***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1182	0.3747	0.0932	0.047	0.0054	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0146	0.1288	0.0000	0.0000	0.0492
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

1 . Elected=1, Appointed=0

2. District=1, Al-large=2, Combinaiton=3

Among other structural variables, the number of elected representatives on a county governing board is positively correlated only with type of executive (appointed or elected) as noted above. None of the expenditure or structural variables were significantly correlated with this item. Similarly, type of election was only correlated significantly with the variable per capita expenditures on libraries. However, this is not surprising given the overwhelming number of counties that elect their local legislators by district as opposed to at-large. This measure may not accurately capture this dimension of local government structural variables, considering that there are more than 3,000 county governments in the United States and most are rather small in population and feature limited structural complexity.

Total county government revenues and expenditures were not significantly correlated with any of the structural variables associated with reform counties, particularly with council-manager forms with appointed professional executives. While inconsistent with previous findings presented by Benton (2003a; 2003b), it may be that the constraints on revenues and expenditures in the largest counties have already been maximized. Alternatively, it may be that appointed elected executives in large urban counties are somewhat insulated from the political dynamics that incentivize rewarding local constituencies, and instead emphasize the professionalism of county management and the requisite fiscal restraint that comes with effective management.

While total revenues and expenditures were not significantly correlated with the structural variables associated with county governments in this sample, individual categories of expenditures as calculated per capita were significantly correlated with the structural variables external to individual county governments, as measured by the total number of governments, total number of special districts and total number of school districts. The number of

governments in a given Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), including special districts and school districts, was significantly and positively correlated with all of the revenue and expenditure categories, with just a few notable exceptions. First, per capita county government expenditures on administration were significantly correlated with per capita number of school districts (0.496, sig. > 0.01) and per capita expenditures on public safety (0.459, sig. > 0.01), and in the positive direction. However, per capita expenditures on county administration were **negatively** correlated with per capita expenditures on libraries (-0.246, sig. > 0.1). It is clear that the external environment of county government appears to be significantly correlated with overall government expenditures, and it is likewise clear that whether a chief executive is elected or appointed also seems to highlight a significant element in understanding not only the revenues and expenditures of county governments, but also the broader institutional environment within which counties function.

Social Capital and Structuralism

How does the presence or absence of network social capital within a community relate to the structural variables described above? Table 6-3 displays the correlations between the network social capital measures developed by Rupasingha et al. and the structural variables described above. *The most striking finding in Table 6-3 is the absence of any correlation between the total number of governments in a given MSA and the number of various other types of organizations that are hypothesized to help foster social capital through the extension of social networks and interpersonal interactions*. This is **not the case for total number of special districts or total number of school districts**. The total number of special districts is positively correlated with the number of bowling centers, the number of religious organizations and the

aggregate index of all organizations. However, the total number of school districts is **negatively** correlated with the Rupasingha social capital index (-0.330, sig. > 0.1), the 1990 Census mail response rate (-0.243, sig. > 0.1) and the percent voter turnout in 1996 (-0.272, sig. > 0.1), as well as negatively correlated with the total number of labor organizations (-0.315, sig. > 0.1) and the total number of bowling centers (-0.332, sig. > 0.1).

Table 6-3. Rupasingha and Institutional Variable Correlations

		Chief Executive Type	Number on Governing Board	How board is elected	Per capita total governments	Per capita special districts	Per capita school districts
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**0.250***	0.145	**0.452*****	0.017	-0.003	-0.019
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.077	0.206	0.004	0.4620	0.4940	0.4580
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**0.432*****	**0.440*****	0.034	0.197	**.295****	**-.332****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.005	0.005	0.424	0.132	0.045	0.028
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**0.241***	0.199	**0.472*****	0.108	**.311***	-0.162
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.084	0.13	0.002	0.271	0.037	0.18
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.106	0.218	**.387****	0.033	-0.025	0.06
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.276	0.108	0.012	0.426	0.444	0.369
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.128	0.023	0.157	0.131	0.016	0.1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.235	0.448	0.188	0.23	0.465	0.287
	N	33	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.112	0.04	**.308****	0.109	0.168	0.118
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.264	0.411	0.038	0.269	0.171	0.254
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Business Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.114	-0.081	**0.261***	0.009	-0.001	-0.062
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.259	0.324	0.068	0.479	0.498	0.363
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**0.278***	**0.266***	**0.227***	-0.022	0.123	**-.315****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.056	0.065	0.098	0.45	0.244	0.035
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.241	0.232	**.508****	0.105	**0.229**	-0.138
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.085	0.094	0.001	0.277	0.096	0.219
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Social Capital Index-Standardized	Pearson Correlation	0.142	**.314****	**0.248***	0.015	0.091	**-.330****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.211	0.035	0.079	0.467	0.304	0.028
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	Pearson Correlation	0.124	**.303****	-0.096	0.204	0.185	**-0.243***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.243	0.041	0.294	0.124	0.148	0.083
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	Pearson Correlation	0.163	**.394****	0.075	-0.046	0.061	**-0.272***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.178	0.011	0.337	0.397	0.365	0.06
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

Table 6-3 cont'd. Rupasingha and Institutional Variable Correlations

		Per Capita-Revenues	Per Capita-Expenditures	Per Capita Expenditures-Education	Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	Per Capita Debt
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.088	-0.089	0.06	**.336****	-0.154	-0.224	0.027	-0.186	0.036
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3110	0.3080	0.3930	0.0370	0.1930	0.1020	0.4390	0.1460	0.4200
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.049	-0.039	0.111	0.225	0.023	**-.323****	-0.004	**-0.283***	-0.06
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.392	0.413	0.307	0.121	0.448	0.031	0.491	0.053	0.368
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.02	0.097	**0.345**	**.517*****	0.012	**-.383****	0.136	**-.431*****	0.035
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.455	0.292	0.054	0.002	0.473	0.013	0.222	0.005	0.423
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.163	0.144	0.231	**.451*****	-0.205	0.054	0.158	-0.175	0.185
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.178	0.208	0.145	0.007	0.123	0.381	0.187	0.161	0.148
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**0.253***	**0.232***	0.218	**0.25***	-0.067	0.142	0.191	0.166	0.223
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.074	0.094	0.158	0.096	0.354	0.212	0.14	0.175	0.102
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**.423*****	**.393****	**.477****	**.431*****	-0.119	0.096	**.382***	-0.074	**0.253***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.006	0.011	0.011	0.01	0.252	0.294	0.013	0.34	0.074
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Business Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.137	0.112	0.273	**.365****	0.107	-0.131	-0.029	-0.13	-0.036
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.219	0.264	0.104	0.026	0.274	0.23	0.435	0.232	0.419
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.149	-0.131	-0.188	0.076	**0.251***	**-.364****	0.01	-0.061	-0.072
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2	0.23	0.195	0.347	0.076	0.017	0.477	0.366	0.343
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.068	0.113	**0.329***	**.572*****	-0.022	**-.317****	0.158	**-.343****	0.068
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.352	0.263	0.063	0.001	0.45	0.034	0.186	0.024	0.352
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Social Capital Index-Standardized	Pearson Correlation	0.132	0.148	0.177	.417*	0.244	**-.308****	0.111	-0.276	-0.03
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.228	0.201	0.209	0.012	0.082	0.038	0.265	0.057	0.434
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	Pearson Correlation	**.351****	**.334****	**0.299***	0.196	**0.247***	-0.055	0.123	-0.131	0.027
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.021	0.027	0.083	0.155	0.08	0.379	0.243	0.23	0.441
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	Pearson Correlation	0.056	0.084	0.092	**.314****	0.175	**-0.258***	0.144	**-0.282***	0.016
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.377	0.317	0.339	0.049	0.161	0.07	0.208	0.053	0.464
	N	34	34	23	29	34	34	34	34	34

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

The one variable associated with internal county structure that seems to be most strongly correlated with the Rupasingha network social capital variables was the one variable that was not correlated with the other structural variables as reported in Table 6-2 – namely how a county's governing board is elected. Counties with elected officials that are chosen by districts tend to have fewer organizations overall than counties with either at-large or a combination of district and at-large.

A second important finding is that when comparing the P-organizations with O-organizations, in general the P-organizations appear to be correlated with more of the structural variables, and in general those correlations are stronger. For example, the number of bowling centers is significantly correlated with counties with elected county executives, with larger governing boards and more total special districts (0.429, 0.438 and 0.295, respectively) and negatively correlated with total number of school districts. The total number of labor organizations is significantly correlated with counties with elected chief executives and larger governing boards as well, but the correlations are not as strong as those for the bowling centers (0.261 and 0.253, respectively). It may be that less politicized environments, as reflected by fewer elected officials with broader constituencies, results in fewer overall organizations that may mobilize in part from some political purpose. An alternative explanation may be that more politicized counties are more civically engaged overall—that is, political life intersects in with broader civic interaction.

How does county government finance and expenditure correlate with network social capital? Table 6-3 also displays the correlations among the Rupasingha and the financial revenue and expenditure data for each of the 34 counties included in the study. Once more, the correlations are somewhat different than expected.

The per capita revenues and expenditures by counties are positively correlated with the number of political organizations (0.253 and 0.232, respectively), number of professional organizations (0.423 and 0.393, respectively) and the 1990 Census mail response rate (0.351 and 0.334, respectively). Interestingly, the county expenditure category with the most significant correlations is per capita expenditures on libraries, and these correlations tend to be the strongest. Another interesting result is that counties with a greater presence of network social capital tend to be significantly correlated with per capita expenditures on public safety, but in the negative direction. What accounts for these results? Counties with greater levels of network social capital may have less need for public safety, suggesting that this kind of social capital has the effect of enhancing public safety. Similarly, the number of significant and positive correlations among per capita expenditures on education and libraries may also reflect a greater sense of civic commitment.

As described in Chapter 4, there are significant differences between so-called network social capital and the attitudinal measures of social capital constructed using the Stowell data. Table 6-4 displays the correlations among the structural variables and the Stowell social capital factors. Table 6-4 also includes the individual Stowell social capital items that were reported in Chapters 4 and 5 to be significantly correlated with the social capital index developed by Putnam (2000). As with the Rupasingha measures of network social capital, six of eleven of the Stowell measures of social capital are significantly correlated with both how a county's governing board is elected and the number of elected officials serving on the county governing board. Only one of the Stowell items was significantly correlated with the type of chief executive (watching television). However, unlike the Rupasingha measures, the total number of governments was not significantly correlated with any of the Stowell items, and only optimism was significantly

correlated with number of special districts and school districts. The results displayed indicate that counties with smaller governing boards that are elected by district tend to have higher levels of social capital as measured by the Stowell data.

Table 6-4. Stowell Factors and Institutional Variable Correlations		Chief Executive Type	Number on Governing Board	How board is elected	Per capita total governments	Per capita special districts	Per capita school districts
Generalized trust/risk	Pearson Correlation	0.050	-0.068	**-0.253***	-0.133	0.056	0.116
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.400	0.365	0.097	0.250	0.389	0.278
	N	28	28	28	28	28	28
Generalized trust/human nature/free ride	Pearson Correlation	-0.191	**-.344****	**-.371****	0.122	0.125	**0.291***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.165	0.036	0.026	0.268	0.263	0.067
	N	28	28	28	28	28	28
Traditionalist/aversion to change	Pearson Correlation	0.117	-0.164	-0.088	0.018	0.229	0.075
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.265	0.189	0.319	0.463	0.107	0.343
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31
Political trust	Pearson Correlation	-0.035	**-0.242***	-0.154	-0.071	0.042	0.107
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.425	0.091	0.200	0.349	0.410	0.280
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	Pearson Correlation	0.012	0.173	**0.408****	-0.026	-0.014	0.035
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.475	0.194	0.017	0.448	0.472	0.430
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27
Optimism	Pearson Correlation	-0.077	**-0.264***	0.084	0.155	**0.299***	**0.368****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.339	0.076	0.326	0.202	0.051	0.021
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31
Particularized trust	Pearson Correlation	-0.019	**0.369****	**0.254***	-0.07	-0.141	-0.19
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.462	0.024	0.092	0.360	0.233	0.162
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	**0.283***	-0.055	-0.209	0.123	0.192	0.193
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.055	0.381	0.122	0.247	0.142	0.141
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	0.031	-0.015	0.119	0.103	-0.022	-0.043
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.441	0.471	0.281	0.309	0.457	0.418
	N	26	26	26	26	26	26
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	0.013	**-0.244***	-0.149	-0.076	0.025	0.052
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.471	0.085	0.204	0.338	0.445	0.388
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson Correlation	-0.164	**-0.383****	**-0.257***	0.151	-0.063	-0.037
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.185	0.015	0.078	0.205	0.366	0.420
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

Table 6-4 cont'd. Stowell Factors and Institutional Variable Correlations

		Per Capita-Revenues	Per Capita-Expenditures	Per Capita Expenditures-Education	Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	Per Capita Debt
Generalized trust/risk	Pearson Correlation	-0.141	-0.122	**-0.404**	**-0.275***	**0.258***	0.138	-0.061	-0.066	0.025
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.237	0.267	0.048	0.097	0.092	0.243	0.378	0.37	0.450
	N	28	28	18	24	28	28	28	28	28
Generalized trust/human nature/free ride	Pearson Correlation	-0.02	-0.025	-0.037	**-0.308***	0.131	**0.347****	-0.078	0.163	0.104
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.459	0.450	0.442	0.077	0.254	0.035	0.347	0.203	0.300
	N	28	28	18	23	28	28	28	28	28
Traditionalist/aversion to change	Pearson Correlation	-0.237	-0.212	-0.129	**-0.356****	0.106	-0.048	-0.141	-0.011	-0.087
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.100	0.126	0.293	0.037	0.285	0.398	0.225	0.477	0.321
	N	31	31	20	26	31	31	31	31	31
Political trust	Pearson Correlation	-0.222	-0.222	-0.261	**-0.342****	0.081	0.110	-0.143	0.149	-0.067
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.111	0.111	0.127	0.040	0.329	0.275	0.218	0.208	0.357
	N	32	32	21	27	32	32	32	32	32
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	Pearson Correlation	0.128	0.098	0.301	0.270	**-0.365****	-0.044	0.073	-0.023	-0.005
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.263	0.314	0.12	0.107	0.031	0.415	0.358	0.454	0.491
	N	27	27	17	23	27	27	27	27	27
Optimism	Pearson Correlation	0.073	0.135	**0.448****	0.074	-0.157	0.030	0.120	**0.318****	0.216
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.348	0.235	0.018	0.360	0.199	0.437	0.261	0.041	0.122
	N	31	31	22	26	31	31	31	31	31
Particularized trust	Pearson Correlation	-0.092	-0.115	-0.034	0.215	-0.185	**-0.308***	0.013	**-0.277***	-0.095
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.317	0.276	0.446	0.151	0.169	0.052	0.473	0.073	0.312
	N	29	29	18	25	29	29	29	29	29
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	-0.124	-0.127	-0.112	-0.160	-0.046	0.128	0.061	0.040	0.054
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.245	0.241	0.310	0.203	0.399	0.238	0.369	0.412	0.383
	N	33	33	22	29	33	33	33	33	33
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	-0.171	-0.146	0.074	0.006	-0.222	-0.243	-0.135	0.142	**-0.279***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.202	0.238	0.397	0.489	0.138	0.116	0.256	0.244	0.084
	N	26	26	15	22	26	26	26	26	26
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.259***	**-0.277***	**-0.288***	**-0.445*****	0.090	0.040	-0.176	0.088	-0.118
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.073	0.059	0.097	0.009	0.309	0.413	0.164	0.314	0.256
	N	33	33	22	28	33	33	33	33	33
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson Correlation	-0.097	-0.110	-0.015	-0.218	0.095	0.059	**-0.239***	0.141	-0.098
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.299	0.275	0.474	0.137	0.302	0.374	0.094	0.221	0.296
	N	32	32	21	27	32	32	32	32	32

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

The results of the correlation analysis among the revenue and expenditures of county governments and the Stowell data as displayed in Table 6-4 illustrate some important elements of social capital theory that were discussed in previous chapters. In terms of overall revenues and expenditures, only the individual item measuring political trust was significantly correlated with revenues and expenditures, and in the negative direction. This suggests that counties with low levels of political trust (as measured by trust in elected officials) raise and spend less money per capita than those counties with higher levels of political trust. Adding to the importance of this finding is the fact that the free-rider item was not significantly correlated with any of the revenue or expenditure items with the exception of environment/housing expenditures. This suggests that trust in elected officials is a definitive factor in understanding county government financing, and not necessarily perceptions of whether the "right" people are being assisted.

An additional finding of interest from a social capital theory perspective are the results related to generalized trust. First, *generalized trust related to capacity for risk taking was significantly correlated with per capita expenditures on education (-0.404, sig. > 0.01), libraries (-0.275, sig. > 0.1) and social services (0.258, sig. > 0.1).* The direction may be important as well; communities with a high capacity for risk taking are more likely to devote resources to education and libraries; reversely, communities with individuals with a lower preference for risk taking are more likely to devote resources to enhancing the social safety net. This pattern is replicated to a certain extent with the human nature/free rider dimension of generalized trust. *Counties with residents that have a more positive view of human nature tend to spend more resources on libraries (-0.308, sig. > 0.1). Counties with residents who have a more negative view of human nature tend to spend more money on public safety (0.347, sig. > 0.01).*

Structural Dimensions of Government Performance

The capacity for government performance is very often thought to be highly dependent upon the various structural variables described earlier in this chapter. For example, conventional wisdom dictates that the ability of local governments to deliver services is in large measure contingent upon the amount of revenue those governments can access in the delivery of those services. Similarly, local governments with appointed professional executives are thought to be more likely to be trained in and committed to the principles of managing-for-results than are elected executives that are likely more inclined to be subject to the day-to-day political influence of key constituencies. The next series of tables will explore the correlates of government performance associated with the various structural variables described above.

Table 6-5 displays the results of a correlation analysis among the structural variables and the various government performance measures described in Chapters 3 and 4. Overall, the results indicate broad support for the theory that structural dynamics are important correlates of government performance among these 34 counties. Of particular note is the finding that neither type of chief executive nor the number of elected officials on a particular governing board are significantly correlated with either the overall government performance measures or the managing-for-results measure. Reversely, the per capita total governments and per capita special districts measures are both significantly correlated with almost every dimension of the GPP measures with only one notable exception – namely, the per capita special districts measure is not significantly correlated with the human resource management dimension of the GPP measures. Overall county GPP and MFR are significantly correlated with per capita special districts and per capita total governments at the .05 level.

Table 6-5. Institutional-GPP Correlations		County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR
Chief Executive Type	Pearson Correlation	-0.1591	-0.1827	-0.0858	-0.0908	**-0.2654***	0.0041
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1844	0.1505	0.3147	0.3049	0.0647	0.4909
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number on Governing Board	Pearson Correlation	-0.1824	**-0.3258****	0.0064	-0.1832	**-0.265***	-0.0979
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1509	0.0301	0.4857	0.1499	0.065	0.2909
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
How board is elected	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2265***	-0.1219	**-0.2957****	-0.168	0.0072	**-0.2287***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0988	0.246	0.0447	0.1711	0.4838	0.0967
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per capita total governments	Pearson Correlation	**.353***	**.386***	**0.2820**	**0.2310**	**0.2580**	**.362***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0200	0.0120	0.0530	0.0940	0.0700	0.0180
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per capita special districts	Pearson Correlation	**.353***	**.366***	0.1060	**.374***	**0.2810**	**.302***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0200	0.0170	0.2760	0.0150	0.0540	0.0420
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per capita school districts	Pearson Correlation	0.0910	**.335***	-0.0220	0.1300	**.318***	-0.0100
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3040	0.0260	0.4510	0.2320	0.0330	0.4770
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita-Revenues	Pearson Correlation	0.1300	0.1100	-0.1640	0.2120	0.1130	0.1590
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2320	0.2670	0.1770	0.1150	0.2620	0.1840
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita-Expenditures	Pearson Correlation	0.1450	0.1120	-0.1380	**0.2360**	0.1390	0.1380
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2070	0.2640	0.2180	0.0890	0.2170	0.2180
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Education	Pearson Correlation	**.366***	**.361***	0.0510	**.440***	**0.3190**	**.411***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0430	0.0450	0.4090	0.0180	0.0690	0.0260
	N	23	23	23	23	23	23
Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	Pearson Correlation	0.1070	0.1680	0.0180	0.0990	0.1460	0.1870
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2900	0.1920	0.4630	0.3050	0.2250	0.1650
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29
Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	Pearson Correlation	-0.2030	**-.386***	-0.1380	-0.1680	-0.1480	**-.356***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1240	0.0120	0.2190	0.1710	0.2010	0.0190
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	Pearson Correlation	-0.0740	0.0720	**-0.2850**	0.0280	0.0050	-0.0900
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3380	0.3430	0.0510	0.4380	0.4890	0.3060
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	Pearson Correlation	0.2010	**0.2690**	0.0180	**0.2720**	**0.2850**	0.1110
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1270	0.0620	0.4590	0.0600	0.0510	0.2660
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	Pearson Correlation	-0.1040	0.1410	-0.0760	-0.1790	0.0710	-0.1330
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2790	0.2130	0.3340	0.1550	0.3450	0.2270
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Debt	Pearson Correlation	-0.0720	0.0410	-0.2020	0.0130	0.1470	-0.1090
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3440	0.4080	0.1260	0.4700	0.2030	0.2690
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

There are a number of possible explanations for this finding. First, Feiock, Clingermayer and others have found substantial evidence for the hypothesis that competition among and between local governments can increase overall performance and accountability (see Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001; Park and Feiock, 2005; Olberding, 2002). It is possible that these findings indicate that the larger number of local governments in a given county help increase overall performance by encouraging competition among governments. Second, the finding that higher per capita special districts are significantly correlated with GPP could be an indication that as specialization of function occurs, the overall mission of a given county may be narrowed, allowing for greater focus on a smaller range of services. For example, as special districts for water, transportation, sewer, etc. are created and moved out of county functions, it may be that these counties are relieved of these specialized services (or they were never burdened with them to begin with) and subsequently have greater capacity to increase overall performance and service delivery capacity.

Another unexpected finding is the lack of correlation between overall revenues and expenditures and government performance. None of the GPP scores were significantly correlated with per capita county government revenues, and only the information technology dimension of GPP was significantly correlated with overall county government per capita expenditures. Exploring per capita expenditures by category reveals a number of important nuances. First, the category of expenditure that appears to be most significantly correlated with GPP is expenditures on education. *Per capita expenditures on education are significantly correlated with all of the dimensions of GPP except HRM, and education is the only category of expenditure that is significantly correlated with the overall county GPP score (0.366, sig. > 0.05).* In addition to expenditures on education (0.411, sig. > 0.05), the Managing-for-Results

dimension of GPP is also significantly correlated with per capita expenditures on social services, but in the negative direction (-0.356, sig. > 0.05). Another interesting result is the finding that per capita expenditures on administration and per capita county debt were not significantly correlated with any of the GPP measures, particularly given the public perception that larger administrative costs and public debt lead to greater overall government inefficiency.

In order to understand the importance of these findings relative to the findings presented in Chapter 4, Tables 6-6a and 6-6b display the results of a series of bi-variate regression analyses conducted using the GPP overall and MFR measures as the dependent variable and the structural variables described above as independent variables. Tables 6-6a and 6-6b also replicate the some of the findings discussed in Chapter 5 in order to compare the relative statistical significance of the various social capital measures in predicting government performance. The tables include only those items reported by Rupasingha et al. that were significant predictors of GPP or MFR, the Stowell social capital factors developed in Chapter 5 and the individual Stowell items reported to be significantly correlated with the social capital index developed by Putnam (2000).

Displayed in this fashion, **we can readily see that the various social capital measures appear to be more important predictors or correlates of government performance than are most of the structural variables that were hypothesized to be important in terms of understanding government performance**. As noted above, only per capita total governments and per capita special districts are significant predictors of government performance. By contrast, the various social capital measures that were found to be significant predictors of government performance appear to be at least as important, if not more important, than the

structural variables as predictors of government performance, as evidenced by comparing F statistics for each measure.

Table 6-6a. Structural/Institutional and GPP Bivariate OLS Regression	R	R Square	F	Sig.	N	Regression Coefficient
Chief Executive Type	0.120	0.014	0.453	0.506	34	-0.120
Number on Governing Board	0.158	0.025	0.792	0.380	34	-0.158
How board is elected	0.209	0.043	1.410	0.244	34	-0.209
Per capita total governments	0.353	0.125	**4.554****	0.041	33	0.353
Per capita special districts	0.353	0.124	**4.542****	0.041	34	0.353
Per capita school districts	0.091	0.008	0.270	0.607	34	0.091
Per Capita-Revenues	0.13	0.017	0.550	0.464	34	0.13
Per Capita-Expenditures	0.145	0.021	0.684	0.414	34	0.145
Per Capita Expenditures-Education	0.366	0.134	3.240	0.086	23	0.366
Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	0.107	0.011	0.313	0.581	29	0.107
Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	0.203	0.041	1.379	0.249	34	-0.203
Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	0.074	0.006	0.177	0.676	34	-0.074
Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	0.201	0.040	1.346	0.255	34	0.201
Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	0.104	0.011	0.352	0.557	34	-0.104
Per Capita Debt	0.072	0.005	0.165	0.687	34	-0.072
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	0.3545	0.1257	**4.5988****	0.0396	34	-0.3545
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	0.3434	0.1179	**4.2776****	0.0467	34	-0.3434
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	0.3029	0.0917	**3.2320***	0.0816	34	0.3029
Generalized trust/risk	0.407	0.166	**5.169****	0.031	28	-0.407
Generalized trust/human nature/free ride	0.163	0.027	0.712	0.407	28	-0.163
Traditionalist/ aversion to change	0.198	0.039	1.187	0.285	31	-0.198
Political trust	0.378	0.143	**4.994****	0.033	32	-0.378
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	0.204	0.042	1.086	0.307	27	0.204
Optimism	0.290	0.084	2.672	0.113	31	0.290
Particularized trust	0.294	0.087	2.563	0.121	29	0.294
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	0.0166	0.0003	0.0083	0.9280	32	-0.0166
Most politicians today are only interested in people with money.	0.3300	0.1090	**3.776***	0.0610	32	-0.3300
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	0.1608	0.0258	0.6367	0.4327	26	0.1608
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	0.3882	0.1507	**5.5022****	0.0255	33	-0.3882

*** Significant at the 0.01 level

** Significant at the 0.05 level

* Significant at the 0.1 level

Table 6-6b. Structural/Institutional and MFR Bivariate OLS Regression	R	R Square	F	Sig.	N	Regression Coefficient
Chief Executive Type	0.05	0.002	0.077	0.783	34	0.05
Number on Governing Board	0.07	0.005	0.153	0.698	34	-0.07
How board is elected	0.212	0.045	1.452	0.237	34	-0.212
Per capita total governments	0.362	0.131	**4.814****	0.036	34	0.362
Per capita special districts	0.302	0.091	**3.200***	0.083	34	0.302
Per capita school districts	0.010	0.000	0.003	0.953	34	-0.01
Per Capita-Revenues	0.159	0.025	0.835	0.368	34	0.159
Per Capita-Expenditures	0.138	0.019	0.623	0.436	34	0.138
Per Capita Expenditures-Education	0.411	0.169	**4.265***	0.051	23	0.411
Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	0.187	0.035	0.982	0.330	29	0.187
Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	0.356	0.127	**4.647****	0.039	34	-0.356
Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	0.090	0.008	0.262	0.612	34	-0.09
Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	0.111	0.012	0.399	0.532	34	0.111
Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	0.133	0.018	0.575	0.454	34	-0.133
Per Capita Debt	0.109	0.012	0.387	0.539	34	-0.109
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	0.3476	0.1209	**4.3988****	0.0440	34	0.3476
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	0.3476	0.1209	**4.3988****	0.0440	34	0.3476
Generalized trust/risk	0.503	0.253	**8.805*****	0.006	28	-0.503
Generalized trust/human nature/free ride	0.267	0.071	2.000	0.169	28	-0.267
Traditionalist/ aversion to change	0.259	0.067	2.093	0.159	31	-0.259
Political trust	0.366	0.134	**4.654****	0.039	32	-0.366
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	0.296	0.088	2.403	0.134	27	0.296
Optimism	0.231	0.053	1.635	0.211	31	0.231
Particularized trust	0.353	0.124	**3.839***	0.060	29	0.353
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	0.0699	0.0049	0.1473	0.7038	32	-0.0699
Most politicians today are only interested in people with money.	0.3140	0.0980	**3.385***	0.0750	32	-0.3140
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	0.1360	0.0185	0.4521	0.5078	26	0.1360
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	0.4508	0.2032	**7.9076*****	0.0085	33	-0.4508
*** Significant at the 0.01 level						
** Significant at the 0.05 level						
* Significant at the 0.1 level						

Another way of looking at the data presented in Tables 6-4 through 6-6 is to develop a "truth" table that is designed to display each county relative to each other based on their relative score on the GPP, MFR and social capital score using the high (H), medium (M) and low (L) ranks developed in Chapter 5. Each county is ranked from low to high based on per capita revenues (Table 6-7a) and per capita expenditures (Table 6-7b). While this method does not allow for the calculation of statistical measures of correlation or causation, it allows for a more qualitative assessment of the relationship among the various variables and their relationship to singular factor for local governments: revenue and expenditure. Tables 6-7a and 6-7b highlight the seven counties selected as contextual counties in Chapter 4.

Table 6-7a. Social Capital, GPP and Per Capita Revenues					
City	**County**	**Social Capital Index Score**	**MFR Score**	**GPP Score**	**Per capita Revenues**
Dallas/Ft. Worth	**Dallas**	**L**	**M**	**H**	**$0.53**
Chicago	**Cook**	**M**	**M**	**M**	**$0.55**
Phoenix	Maricopa	L	H	H	$0.62
Houston	Harris	L	M	M	$0.62
Detroit	Oakland	H	H	H	$0.73
Columbus	Franklin	H	M	H	$0.83
Miami	Broward	L	M	M	$1.00
Detroit	Wayne	M	M	M	$1.02
Los Angeles	Orange	M	H	H	$1.05
Seattle	**King**	**H**	**L**	**L**	**$1.05**
West Palm Beach	**Palm Beach**	**M**	**L**	**M**	**$1.07**
Cleveland	Cuyahoga	M	L	L	$1.08
Pittsburgh	Allegheny	M	L	L	$1.09
Cincinnati	Hamilton	M	M	H	$1.11
San Diego	San Diego	M	H	H	$1.11
Palm Springs	Riverside	L	M	M	$1.17
Minneapolis	Hennepin	H	H	H	$1.19
Tampa Bay	Hillsborough	M	L	L	$1.29
San Jose	Santa Clara	M	L	M	$1.42
Atlanta	Fulton	H	M	L	$1.50
Rochester	Monroe	H	L	L	$1.56
San Jose	Contra Costa	M	M	M	$1.65
San Francisco	Alameda	M	H	M	$1.66
Las Vegas	**Clark**	**L**	**M**	**M**	**$1.79**
Los Angeles	**Los Angeles**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**$1.87**
Sacramento	Sacramento	H	M	M	$2.02
Miami	Miami-Dade	L	L	M	$2.12
San Bernardino	San Bernardino	L	L	L	$2.15
Charlotte	Mecklenburg	M	H	H	$2.16
Baltimore	Anne Arundel	H	H	L	$2.77
Baltimore	Baltimore	H	H	H	$2.78
Washington, D.C.	Prince George	L	H	M	$3.01
Washington, D.C.	**Fairfax**	**H**	**H**	**H**	**$3.50**
Washington, D.C.	Montgomery	H	M	H	$4.22
				Mean	*$1.57*
				Median	*$1.24*
				Mode	*$0.62*

Table 6-7b. Social Capital, GPP and Per Capita Expenditures					
City	**County**	**Social Capital Index Score**	**MFR Score**	**GPP Score**	**Per capita Expenditures**
Chicago	**Cook**	**M**	**M**	**M**	**$0.47**
Dallas/Ft. Worth	**Dallas**	**L**	**M**	**H**	**$0.50**
Phoenix	Maricopa	L	H	H	$0.57
Detroit	Oakland	H	H	H	$0.63
Houston	Harris	L	M	M	$0.66
Columbus	Franklin	H	M	H	$0.80
Miami	Broward	L	M	M	$0.87
Los Angeles	Orange	M	H	H	$0.90
San Diego	San Diego	M	H	H	$0.94
Pittsburgh	Allegheny	M	L	L	$0.99
West Palm Beach	**Palm Beach**	**M**	**L**	**M**	**$0.99**
Detroit	Wayne	M	M	M	$1.05
Cleveland	Cuyahoga	M	L	L	$1.11
Seattle	**King**	**H**	**L**	**L**	**$1.11**
Minneapolis	Hennepin	H	H	H	$1.17
Tampa Bay	Hillsborough	M	L	L	$1.18
Palm Springs	Riverside	L	M	M	$1.24
Cincinnati	Hamilton	M	M	H	$1.27
Atlanta	Fulton	H	M	L	$1.34
San Francisco	Alameda	M	H	M	$1.41
San Jose	Santa Clara	M	L	M	$1.45
Los Angeles	**Los Angeles**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**$1.51**
San Jose	Contra Costa	M	M	M	$1.59
Rochester	Monroe	H	L	L	$1.61
Las Vegas	**Clark**	**L**	**M**	**M**	**$1.81**
Sacramento	Sacramento	H	M	M	$1.81
San Bernardino	San Bernardino	L	L	L	$1.87
Miami	Miami-Dade	L	L	M	$2.17
Charlotte	Mecklenburg	M	H	H	$2.42
Baltimore	Anne Arundel	H	H	L	$2.43
Baltimore	Baltimore	H	H	H	$2.56
Washington, D.C.	Prince George	L	H	M	$2.95
Washington, D.C.	**Fairfax**	**H**	**H**	**H**	**$3.27**
Washington, D.C.	Montgomery	H	M	H	$3.84
				Mean	*$1.49*
				Median	*$1.26*
				Mode	*$0.99*

Looking first at the counties with the highest per capita revenues and expenditures, the five highest counties in general scored high on the GPP, MFR and social capital measures, as evidenced by Fairfax County which represented the HH quadrant of Table 5-3 (see Chapter 5). Of the five counties with the highest per capita revenues and expenditures, 4 were ranked as High on both the social capital measure and the MFR, and three ranked High on the overall GPP

score. When we shift to those counties with the lowest per capita revenues and expenditures, the results are surprising. None of the bottom five counties in terms of per capita revenues and expenditures ranked Low on either GPP or MFR. However, consistent with the hypothesized relationship, counties with Low social capital rank tended to be counties with low per capita revenues and expenditures, relatively speaking. However, not all low scoring counties had low per capita revenues and expenditures. For example, Los Angeles County, which ranked Low on each of the social capital, MFR and GPP measures, has higher per capita revenues and greater expenditures than the other counties in the sample.

Based on the findings and analysis presented above, there are little if any clear patterns emerging, at least with respect to the relationship between measures of government performance capacity, social capital and various structural aspects of county government. The relationship among the various structural variables and the measures of social capital and government performance are somewhat mixed. However, *it is clear from a comparison between the findings presented in Chapter 4 and those presented thus far, that the social capital measures are on the whole better predictors of government performance than are structural variables used in the analysis above.*

Political Culture, Social Capital and Government Performance

In many ways, the current focus on social capital can be thought of as a variation on earlier studies of political culture, particularly to the extent that social capital theory emphasizes shared values and trust as essential to public life. Like social capital, the concept of political culture is "regarded as an enduring set of publicly shared and socially communicated beliefs, values, and traditions about politics which constitutes a general framework of plans, recipes, rules, and instructions for the conduct of political life, especially who gets what, when and how" (Kincaid, 1980: 91). In the 1970s, Daniel Elazar (1972) pioneered one of the most influential and enduring studies of American political culture research ever conducted by a social scientist. Some thirty years after publishing his groundbreaking work, Elazar's approach to political culture has been replicated by numerous scholars and found to be among the most important explanatory theories of a variety of social phenomena associated with political culture and civil society (Lieske, 1993; Pierce et al., 2000).

In his landmark publication *American Federalism: A View from the States* (1972) Elazar describes how American political culture can be seen to consist of three major sub-cultures reflecting the migration patterns that populated the various regions of the country during its westward expansion. As a result, Elazar's typology is deeply rooted in history and the contextual dimensions of political life of local communities. As Lieske points out (1993), Elazar argued that political (sub)cultures influence "(1) what state and local governments do, (2) how they are organized, (3) what political rules they observe, and (4) who participates in the political process" (888). It is from this perspective that it would seem that political culture would be an important correlate of government performance

By examining the historical migration patterns of different ethnic and religious groups across the United States, Elazar identified three "core" political culture types: *individualistic*, *moralistic* and *traditionalistic*. The individualistic political culture is based on "the conception of the democratic order as marketplace" and "emphasizes the centrality of private concerns" (Elazar, 1980: 275). The role of government in individualistic cultures is limited to ensuring the proper functioning of the market and to encourage private initiative, limiting broader intrusion into the private affairs of individuals. Individualistic cultures place a premium on limiting bureaucracy and pursuing highly centralized and efficient local governments with limited spheres of influence (Johnson, 1976: 500).

In contrast to the individualistic political culture, the moralistic political culture emphasizes the pursuit of "the common good" as the goal of government, "measured by the degree to which it promotes the public good…in terms of the honesty, selflessness and commitment to the public welfare of those who govern" (Elazar, 1980: 276). The moralistic culture values professional administrative professionals and supports intervention into the private affairs of individuals in society for the good of the commonwealth (Sharkansky, 1969: 69). Because the moralistic culture emphasizes the common good over a concern for efficiency, moralistic cultures are hypothesized to have more decentralized governments that pursue a broad range of political and social goals" (Johnson, 1976: 500).

The traditionalistic political culture is based on "an ambivalent attitude toward the marketplace coupled with a paternalistic and elitist conception of the commonwealth' (Elazar, 1980: 276). The role of government is first and foremost to secure and maintain the *status quo*, particularly of the elite; as a result, government in traditionalistic communities would be expected to be highly centralized. Unlike moralistic cultures, which view public participation in

political affairs as a duty of all citizens, traditionalistic cultures eschew broad public participation in political affairs and view the public and non-elites as threats to their power (Sharkansky, 1969; Johnson, 1976).

Elazar's typology of political culture has been subjected to a variety of investigations testing its ability to predict and explain numerous public policy outcomes (Sharkansky, 1969; Johnson, 1976; Kincaid, 1980; Miller, 1991; Lovrich et al., 1980). These studies include assessing the relationship between Elazar's political culture typology and various measures of government activity, government decentralization and innovation, popular participation in elections and emphasis on local administration of government. The results of a number of studies indicate that political culture as measured by Elazar is related to various aspects of political and government characteristics (Johnson, 1976: 507).

Notwithstanding these findings, significant theoretical and methodological shortcomings have been raised with respect to Elazar's research, ranging from the extent to which the typology has not been updated since its original publication roughly 40 years ago. Elazar's typology has been characterized as "crude" and Lieske notes that "it is well-known that Elazar's derivation of the three political subcultures is not based on any rigorous statistical procedures" (889). In part, the crudeness of Elazar's measures is the result of the difficulty of defining regional subcultures and deciding how to define these boundaries. Like natural ecosystems, subcultures rarely follow state or local jurisdictional boundaries, and the interpretation and definition of these subcultures tends to be highly subjective (Lieske, 889).

In an effort to address these shortcomings, Lieske published his refined model of American regional subcultures in 1993. According to Lieske, regional subcultures are "the product of historical interactions between the cultural preferences of different ethno-religious

settler groups and the nationally centripetal and regionally centrifugal demands of their environments. Therefore, they represent the historical extensions of earlier settlement patterns and the continuing advantages of the first effective settler groups…over later arrivals…who are placed in the culturally subordinate position of challenging social conventions and tradition" (Lieske, 1993: 891). The Lieske model of regional subcultures is based on indicators measuring racial, ethnic and religious affiliation, as well as so-called "structural" variables associated with elements of urbanization, industrialization, agrarianism, inequality and family structure. Statistical analysis of these indicators across all 3,165 counties in the United States resulted in 10 different regional subcultures identified as: 1) germanic, 2) ethnic, 3) heartland, 4) hispanic, 5) nordic, 6) mormon, 7) border, 8) blackbelt, 9) rurban, and 10) anglo-french. Of these 10 new subcultures, 6 are reflected in the 34-county sample used for this study: rurban (16), ethnic (13), blackbelt (2), germanic (1), and heartland (1) (see Table 5-8). As reflected in the sample used for this study, the rurban and ethnic subcultures are the largest subcultures in Lieske's study and represent 29 of the 34 counties in the sample. The rurban and ethnic subcultures are generally characterized as large, inclusive, pluralistic and spatially dispersed subcultures. Where the ethnic subcultures tends to locate primarily in the Northeast and Midwest, the rurban subcultures are more evenly dispersed throughout all regions of the United States where large metropolitan communities occur.

Displayed in Table 6-8 are the Elazar and Lieske classifications for each of the 34 counties analyzed in this study. For the Elazar classifications, each of the subcultures can be further distinguished as having a dominant presence, major presence, secondary presence, or no presence. Counties classified as dominant are characteristic of only a single political culture. Counties without a dominant political subculture have a major and a secondary classification.

As described above, many of the counties classified as either rurban or ethnic subculture by Lieske generally have a dominant or major presence of individualistic political culture as defined by the Elazar typology (11 of the 34 counties); six of the counties with a secondary presence of the individualistic typology are classified as ethnic using Lieske's methodology, and three of the counties with a secondary presence of the individualistic classification are rurban. Overall, the counties are more diverse across Elazar's typology than they are using Lieske's classification.

Table 6-8. Elazar and Lieske County Profiles

	Elazar			Lieske					
County	Moralistic	Individualistic	Traditionalistic	Rurban	Ethnic	Blackbelt	Germanic	Hispanic	Heartland
Alameda	**Secondary**	**Major**		X					
Allegheny		**Dominant**			X				
Anne Arundel		**Dominant**		X					
Baltimore		**Dominant**			X				
Broward		**Secondary**	**Major**		X				
Clark		**Dominant**		X					
Contra Costa	**Secondary**	**Major**		X					
Cook	**Secondary**	**Major**			X				
Cuyahoga	**Major**	**Secondary**			X				
Dallas		**Major**	**Secondary**	X					
Fairfax	**Secondary**		**Major**		X				
Franklin		**Dominant**		X					
Fulton		**Secondary**	**Major**			X			
Hamilton	**Secondary**	**Major**			X				
Harris		**Secondary**	**Major**	X					
Hennepin	**Dominant**						X		
Hillsborough		**Secondary**	**Major**	X					
King	**Major**	**Secondary**		X					
Los Angeles	**Major**	**Secondary**			X				
Maricopa	**Major**		**Secondary**					X	
Mecklenburg	**Secondary**		**Major**			X			
Miami-Dade	**Dominant**				X				
Monroe	**Major**	**Secondary**							X
Montgomery		**Dominant**			X				
Oakland	**Major**		**Secondary**		X				
Orange	**Major**		**Secondary**	X					
Palm Beach		**Secondary**	**Major**		X				
Prince George's		**Dominant**		X					
Riverside	**Major**		**Secondary**	X					
Sacramento		**Dominant**		X					
San Bernardino	**Major**		**Secondary**	X					
San Diego	**Major**		**Secondary**	X					
Santa Clara	**Dominant**			X					
Wayne	**Major**	**Secondary**			X				

Table 6-9 displays the results of inter-item correlations between the Elazar and Lieske typologies for the 34 counties used in this study. Overall, there is a significantly larger amount of intra-item correlations among the Elazar classifications than among the Lieske typology. This is likely the result of the fact that counties can be classified using more than a single subculture in Elazar's scheme whereas using Lieske's each county is classified using only a single category. Turning to the inter-item correlations, only two of Lieske's subcultures are significantly correlated with Elazar's political cultures – namely, the Germanic subculture is positively correlated with the moralistic subculture, and the blackbelt subculture is positively correlated with the moralistic political culture.

Table 6-9. Elazar and Lieske Inter-Item Correlations

			Elazar			Lieske					
			Moralistic	**Individualistic**	**Traditionalistic**	**Rurban**	**Ethnic**	**Blackbelt**	**Germanic**	**Hispanic**	**Heartland**
Elazar	**Moralistic**	Pearson Correlation	1								
		Sig. (1-tailed)									
		N	34								
	Individualistic	Pearson Correlation	**-.734*** **	1							
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0000								
		N	34	34							
	Traditionalistic	Pearson Correlation	**-0.240** **	**-.482*** **	1						
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0850	0.0020							
		N	34	34	34						
Lieske	**Rurban**	Pearson Correlation	-0.137	0.169	-0.065	1					
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2203	0.1702	0.3583						
		N	34	34	34	34					
	Ethnic	Pearson Correlation	-0.009	0.062	-0.077	**-0.742*** **	1				
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4808	0.3641	0.3317	0.0000					
		N	34	34	34	34	34				
	Blackbelt	Pearson Correlation	-0.141	-0.172	**0.429*** **	**-0.235* **	-0.197	1			
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2124	0.1647	0.0056	0.0898	0.1324				
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34			
	Germanic	Pearson Correlation	**0.320** **	-0.196	-0.134	-0.164	-0.137	-0.044	1		
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0324	0.1337	0.2257	0.1768	0.2199	0.4035			
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34		
	Hispanic	Pearson Correlation	0.153	-0.196	0.083	-0.164	-0.137	-0.044	-0.030	1	
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1943	0.1337	0.3210	0.1768	0.2199	0.4035	0.4325		
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	
	Heartland	Pearson Correlation	0.153	-0.044	-0.134	-0.164	-0.137	-0.044	-0.030	-0.030	1
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1943	0.4014	0.2257	0.1768	0.2199	0.4035	0.4325	0.4325	
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

In his analysis, Lieske compared the effectiveness of his methodology at predicting specific social and political outcomes with Elazar's, including voter registration and turnout, poverty and income inequality, teenage pregnancy and crime. Lieske found that on many of these measures his typology was either equal to or better at predicting various policy outcomes than were Elazar's (908). A similar analysis is presented in Table 6-10 comparing the extent to which the structural "outcomes" described earlier in this chapter are correlated with the Elazar and Lieske subculture definitions. Overall, the Elazar typology of political culture appears to better predict the structural outcomes used above than do the Lieske classifications. The moralistic political culture type is significantly correlated with 5 of the 12 structural variables; the individualistic culture is significantly correlated with 7 of the 12 measures, and the traditionalistic culture is significantly correlated with only 2 of the 12 measures. By comparison, the rurban subculture is significantly correlated with only four of the structural variables and the ethnic and blackbelt subcultures are significantly correlated with only three of the structural variables. The results of the correlations for the Lieske subculture types should be viewed with caution, given that only 2 of Lieske's 10 subcultures are represented in more than two counties in the sample used for this study.

Table 6-10. Elazar/Lieske and Institutional Variable Correlations		Elazar			Lieske					
		Moralistic	**Individualistic**	**Traditionalistic**	**Rurban**	**Ethnic**	**Blackbelt**	**Germanic**	**Hispanic**	**Heartland**
Chief Executive Type	Pearson Correlation	-0.125	**.325****	**-.303****	-0.136	**0.253**	-0.197	-0.137	-0.137	0.221
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.241	0.03	0.041	0.2224	0.0746*	0.1324	0.2199	0.2199	0.1043
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number on Governing Board	Pearson Correlation	0.201	-0.101	-0.116	**-.428*****	**0.285***	-0.018	-0.042	-0.101	**.611****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.127	0.286	0.257	0.0058	0.0510	0.4608	0.4070	0.2844	0.0001
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
How board is elected	Pearson Correlation	**-.355****	0.182	0.199	**-0.252***	0.086	**.555*****	-0.091	-0.091	-0.091
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.02	0.152	0.129	0.0750	0.3152	0.0003	0.3036	0.3036	0.3036
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita-Revenues	Pearson Correlation	-0.21	**.287****	-0.14	-0.066	0.125	0.077	-0.077	-0.192	-0.001
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.117	0.050	0.215	0.3557	0.2413	0.3333	0.3333	0.1378	0.4967
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita-Expenditures	Pearson Correlation	-0.179	**0.260***	-0.141	-0.082	0.108	0.124	-0.069	-0.199	0.027
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.155	0.068	0.214	0.3226	0.2716	0.2430	0.3498	0.1290	0.4392
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Education	Pearson Correlation	**-.512*****	**0.310***	0.122	-0.224	0.201	**0.313***		-0.148	-0.087
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.006	0.075	0.289	0.1524	0.1790	0.0723		0.2505	0.3459
	N	23	23	23	23	23	23		23	23
Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	Pearson Correlation	**-0.297***	0.194	0.109	**-.356****	0.194	**.407****	0.210	-0.225	-0.080
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.059	0.157	0.286	0.0289	0.1566	0.0142	0.1369	0.1201	0.3398
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	Pearson Correlation	**.459*****	-0.144	**-.387****	0.029	-0.147	-0.027	0.222	-0.067	0.222
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.003	0.208	0.012	0.4364	0.2028	0.4397	0.1033	0.3532	0.1033
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	Pearson Correlation	-0.2	0.219	-0.055	0.131	0.023	-0.076	-0.083	-0.201	-0.063
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.128	0.107	0.379	0.2300	0.4493	0.3339	0.3211	0.1277	0.3617
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	Pearson Correlation	-0.225	**.289****	-0.123	-0.174	**.350****	-0.098	-0.128	-0.154	-0.075
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1	0.049	0.245	0.1631	0.0213	0.2903	0.2357	0.1919	0.3367
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	Pearson Correlation	-0.103	**0.239***	-0.209	**0.255***	-0.158	-0.069	-0.016	-0.080	-0.105
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.281	0.087	0.118	0.0727	0.1856	0.3486	0.4632	0.3264	0.2765
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Per Capita Debt	Pearson Correlation	**-0.285***	**.305****	-0.068	-0.092	0.183	-0.036	-0.137	-0.176	0.108
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.051	0.040	0.352	0.3017	0.1495	0.4207	0.2198	0.1597	0.2720
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

Understanding the variations among the different conceptualizations of social and political cultures – whether they are defined by regional ethnic-religious orientations, political traditions or social trust – can be difficult to disaggregate. Indeed, the very definitions of regional subcultures, political culture and social capital begin to run together very quickly. To what extent are the various elements of these theories related? Table 6-11 displays the results of inter-item correlations among the Elazar and Lieske typologies with the Rupasingha social capital measures described in Chapter 4. The results are telling, and demonstrate the value of using a plurality of measures to understand complex social phenomena. Unlike Table 6-10, the Lieske measures display a substantial number of significant relationships with independent variables (Rupasingha social capital items). The Elazar political culture types likewise are significantly correlated with nearly half of the Rupasingha items.

More interesting is the fact that the individualistic subcultures are significantly correlated with a number of the same measures as the traditionalistic and moralistic cultures – but in all cases *in the opposite direction*. For example, the individualistic culture is significantly correlated with number of labor organizations in the positive direction (0.388, sig. > 0.05), whereas the traditionalistic subculture is significantly correlated with the number of labor organizations, but in the negative direction (-0.571, sig. > 0.01). A similar pattern exists when comparing the individualistic cultures with moralistic, where the individualistic culture is positively correlated with the number of political organizations (0.367, sig. > 0.05) but the moralistic culture is negatively correlated the same measure (-0.289, sig. > 0.05). Overall the individualistic culture is positively correlated with the Rupasingha measures and the traditionalistic and the moralistic cultures are negatively correlated with the Rupasingha measures (with the exception of census response rate item). Furthermore, with the exception of

the census response rate item, there is no overlap among the traditionalistic and moralistic cultures that are significantly correlated with the Rupasingha items.

Table 6-11. Elazar/Lieske and Rupasingha Social Capital Variable Correlations		Elazar			Lieske					
		Moralistic	Individualistic	Traditionalistic	Rurban	Ethnic	Blackbelt	Germanic	Hispanic	Heartland
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-.303**	.302**	-0.040	-.330**	.340**	0.080	0.135	-0.122	-0.128
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.041	0.041	0.410	0.0283	0.0244	0.3271	0.2232	0.2464	0.2351
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.059	0.261*	-.449***	-.418***	.365**	-0.134	0.195	-0.049	0.223
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.370	0.068	0.004	0.0070	0.0168	0.2256	0.1340	0.3914	0.1024
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.057	0.050	0.002	-.431***	0.100	.528***	0.249*	-0.114	0.116
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.374	0.389	0.496	0.0055	0.2866	0.0007	0.0782	0.2600	0.2574
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-.292**	0.160	0.148	-0.2491*	0.096	.295**	-0.001	-0.132	0.182
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.047	0.183	0.202	0.0777	0.2948	0.0450	0.4974	0.2286	0.1515
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-.289**	.367**	-0.152	0.009	-0.100	0.207	0.052	-0.063	-0.016
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.049	0.016	0.196	0.4801	0.2867	0.1202	0.3848	0.3626	0.4636
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-.349**	.346**	-0.044	-0.154	0.115	0.126	0.082	-0.046	-0.086
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.022	0.023	0.402	0.1920	0.2592	0.2386	0.3218	0.3979	0.3139
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Business Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.187	0.192	-0.032	-0.037	-0.089	0.189	.313**	-0.076	-0.134
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.144	0.139	0.428	0.4169	0.3086	0.1424	0.0356	0.3341	0.2250
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.012	.388**	-.572***	-0.2712*	0.275*	-0.080	0.186	-0.170	0.104
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.472	0.012	0.000	0.0604	0.0572	0.3255	0.1456	0.1681	0.2798
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.178	0.22	-0.085	-.445***	0.181	.409***	0.268*	-0.130	0.086
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.157	0.105	0.316	0.0042	0.1529	0.0081	0.0628	0.2316	0.3148
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Social Capital Index-Standardized	Pearson Correlation	0.164	0.092	-.343**	-.382**	0.196	0.090	.390**	-0.166	0.217
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.177	0.303	0.024	0.0128	0.1339	0.3064	0.0112	0.1747	0.1086
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	Pearson Correlation	.337**	-0.062	-.346**	-0.137	0.160	-0.247*	0.213	-0.137	0.213
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.026	0.363	0.022	0.2193	0.1830	0.0796	0.1131	0.2200	0.1131
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	Pearson Correlation	0.214	0.033	-.324**	-.396**	0.251*	-0.048	.400***	-0.131	0.247*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.112	0.426	0.031	0.0102	0.0764	0.3948	0.0096	0.2296	0.0795
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

The results presented in Table 6-12 similarly display the inter-item correlations between the Elazar and Lieske political culture measures and the Stowell measures of social capital. Unlike the Rupasingha measures, the Stowell measures of social capital do not correlate as broadly with the Elazar and Lieske measures. Only two of the Stowell social capital factors were significantly correlated with the Elazar typologies. The moralistic subculture was significantly correlated with the Stowell measure of generalized trust in the positive direction (0.279, sig. > 0.10); the traditionalistic subculture was significantly correlated with the personal efficacy in the positive direction (0.424, sig. > 0.014).

Table 6-12. Elazar/Lieske and Stowell Social Capital Variable Correlations		Elazar			Lieske					
		Moralistic	Individualistic	Traditionalistic	Rurban	Ethnic	Blackbelt	Germanic	Hispanic	Heartland
Generalized trust/risk	Pearson Correlation	**0.279***	-0.137	-0.172	-0.102	0.220	-0.112	-0.211	.a	0.005
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.075	0.243	0.191	0.3020	0.1310	0.2850	0.1410		0.4890
	N	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
Generalized trust/human nature/free ride	Pearson Correlation	0.021	-0.085	0.087	0.063	0.120	-0.101	**-0.285***	.a	-0.103
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.458	0.333	0.331	0.3750	0.2720	0.3050	0.0710		0.3020
	N	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
Traditionalist/aversion to change	Pearson Correlation	-0.101	0.162	-0.095	-0.054	0.114	0.063	-0.219	.a	-0.008
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.295	0.192	0.305	0.3860	0.2710	0.3680	0.1180		0.4830
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
Political trust	Pearson Correlation	-0.144	0.194	-0.088	0.125	0.053	-0.075	**-0.283***	.a	-0.151
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.216	0.143	0.317	0.2470	0.3870	0.3410	0.0580		0.2050
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	Pearson Correlation	-0.216	-0.109	**.424****	-0.014	-0.098	**.339****	0.064	.a	-0.108
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.14	0.295	0.014	0.4720	0.3130	0.0420	0.3750		0.2960
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
Optimism	Pearson Correlation	-0.14	0.043	0.118	0.148	**-.359****	**.400****	0.016	0.095	-0.114
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.226	0.41	0.264	0.2140	0.0240	0.0130	0.4650	0.3050	0.2710
	N	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
Particularized trust	Pearson Correlation	0.081	-0.223	0.197	**-.332****	**0.292***	-0.130	0.207	.a	0.056
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.338	0.123	0.153	0.0390	0.0620	0.2510	0.1410		0.3870
	N	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	-0.133	0.227	-0.156	0.107	**.323****	**-0.266***	**-0.239***	**-.547*****	-0.073
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.231	0.102	0.193	0.2770	0.0340	0.0680	0.0900	0.0000	0.3420
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	-0.006	-0.084	0.123	-0.200	0.194	**0.266***	-0.010	.a	-0.246
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.488	0.341	0.275	0.1640	0.1710	0.0950	0.4800		0.1130
	N	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	-0.168	0.175	-0.031	0.153	0.066	-0.091	**-.346****	.a	-0.162
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.175	0.164	0.431	0.1970	0.3570	0.3070	0.0240		0.1830
	N	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson Correlation	-0.159	0.136	0.019	0.226	-0.127	-0.214	-0.178	0.097	0.002
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.192	0.229	0.459	0.1060	0.2450	0.1200	0.1650	0.2990	0.4950
	N	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

a. Cannot be computed because at least one variable is constant.

Of the six Lieske subcultures, all but the Heartland subculture was significantly correlated with at least one of the Stowell social capital items. Unlike the results in Table 6-11, the Rurban subculture was significantly correlated with only one of the Stowell social capital items in the negative direction (particularized trust; -0.332, sig. > 0.039). The Stowell item with the most significant correlations with the Lieske subcultures was the item measuring respondent's assessment of the amount of entertainment they get from watching television, which was significantly correlated with four of the six Lieske subcultures (Ethnic, Blackbelt, Germanic, Hispanic). While the correlation of this item with the Ethnic subculture was positive, the remainder of the correlations were in the negative direction.

Turning to an evaluation of how well the Elazar and Lieske regional subculture measures correlate with the measures of government performance, we would expect the Elazar measures to be more strongly correlated with the measures of government performance because of the explicit manner in which Elazar's typology is linked to specific policy perspectives and outcomes. For example, one might expect that counties with a more traditionalistic subculture to have higher performing county governments given the emphasis on deference to centralized governance and ambivalence to market-based strategies. Similarly, counties with a moralistic political subculture might also be expected to have higher performing governments given the emphasis on the common good. Conversely, counties with individualistic subcultures would be expected to have lower performing governments given that this sub-type generally eschews the role of government in favor of free-market individualism.

Surprisingly, however, none of the Elazar subculture types are significantly correlated with the overall measure of government performance or managing-for-results measures used in this study (see Table 6-13). Only two of the five individual measures of government

performance were significantly correlated with the Elazar subtypes. *Similarly, with the exception of the Hispanic subculture types, the Lieske subcultures do not appear to be significantly correlated with the measures of government performance.* Despite the number of significant correlations between the Hispanic subculture type and the government performance measures, we cannot necessarily conclude that this subculture type is a significant factor explaining government performance. Only one of the 34 counties included in this study was classified by Lieske as Hispanic (Maricopa County, Arizona). Given that this is also one of the highest performing governments in the sample as measured by the GPP, it is not surprising that this factor is significantly correlated with the GPP. If the Lieske typology were truly predictive of government performance, we would expect to find significant correlations across more of the subtypes than just a single one.

Table 6-13. Elazar/Lieske and GPP Correlations

			County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR
Elazar	Moralistic	Pearson Correlation	0.085	-0.084	0.145	0.112	-0.04	-0.074
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.316	0.318	0.207	0.265	0.412	0.338
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Individualistic	Pearson Correlation	-0.205	-0.056	-0.205	**-0.241***	-0.128	-0.029
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.122	0.375	0.123	0.085	0.235	0.436
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Traditionalistic	Pearson Correlation	0.183	0.19	0.106	0.201	**0.234***	0.137
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.150	0.141	0.276	0.128	0.091	0.220
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34
Lieske	Rurban	Pearson Correlation	-0.118	-0.098	-0.072	-0.195	**-0.281***	-0.038
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2536	0.2912	0.3436	0.1343	0.0536	0.4147
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Ethnic	Pearson Correlation	0.021	0.124	-0.056	0.124	0.164	-0.042
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4526	0.2432	0.3764	0.2425	0.1766	0.4064
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Blackbelt	Pearson Correlation	-0.022	-0.128	-0.127	0.052	0.052	0.020
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4511	0.2361	0.2378	0.3848	0.3847	0.4561
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Germanic	Pearson Correlation	0.140	0.163	0.212	0.075	0.125	0.180
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2143	0.1787	0.1148	0.3369	0.2413	0.1543
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Hispanic	Pearson Correlation	**.348****	**.289****	0.212	**0.229***	**.301****	**.313****
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0219	0.0489	0.1148	0.0961	0.0417	0.0358
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34
	Heartland	Pearson Correlation	-0.171	**-.341****	0.126	-0.157	-0.140	**-0.286***
		Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1670	0.0244	0.2389	0.1882	0.2145	0.0508
		N	34	34	34	34	34	34

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

Exploring the Creative Class

A final alternative to social capital as a predictor of government performance is the "Creative Class" theory postulated by Richard Florida (2002) – sort of. The caveat is used because, as will become more evident below, it is not readily apparent what, if any, relationship is predicted to exist between government performance and the Creative Class. Florida provides hints in various places, and possible hypotheses can be deduced from other parts of his work, but little if any discussion is devoted to the issue of government performance. However, Florida does devote an entire chapter to comparing the creative class with the work on social capital developed by Robert Putnam. This section will first describe Florida's conception of the Creative Class, and will then describe how he differentiates the Creative Class from social capital as social theory. Finally, this section will describe the correlations between Creative Class, social capital and government performance.

Richard Florida argues that during the last century a new class of citizens has emerged, which he characterizes as the Creative Class. He writes:

> [T]he defining basis for this new class is economic…the Creative Class derives its identity from its members roles as purveyors of creativity. Because creativity is the defining force of economic growth, in terms of influence the Creative Class has become the dominant class in society (p. xxvii).

The growing dominance of the Creative Class comes from the increasing importance of creativity in modern society – it is becoming increasingly valued and important in our economic and social lives. "Creativity is multidimensional and comes in many reinforcing forms…technological and economic creativity are nurtured by and interact with artistic and cultural creativity" to create a new social class with different social values, norms and

preferences (p. 7). The Creative Class includes people in "science and engineering, architecture and design, education, arts, music and entertainment" who function to "create new ideas, new technology and/or new creative content." The Creative Class also includes what Florida labels as creative professionals – people that engage in complex problem solving that involves a great deal of independent judgement and requires high levels of education or human capital" (p. 8).

The Creative Class has emerged alongside the traditional working class – people who have traditionally been involved in manufacturing, transportation, construction and similar occupations. Florida also contends that the concomitant growth of the service class – low-wage service industries including food service, clerical and office workers and the like – has been in large part a response to the growth of the Creative Class. "The growth of this Service Class is in large part a response to the demands of the Creative Economy. Members of the Creative Class, because they are well compensated and work long, unpredictable hours, require a growing pool of low-end service workers to take care of them and do their chores. This class has thus been created out of necessity because of the way the Creative Economy operates" (p. 71).

Above all else, the Creative Class values individuality – "the members of the Creative Class exhibit a strong preference for individuality and self-statement. They do not want to conform to organizational or institutional directives and resist *traditional* group–oriented norms" (p. 78, emphasis added). The Creative Class also values meritocracy, diversity and openness. While the Creative Class emphasizes ambition and achievement, Florida notes that they do not define themselves by the amount of money they make. Similarly, the emphasis on diversity and openness is broader than the more politically charged conception often associated with being "politically correct." As Florida notes, the Creative Economy has come to value diversity because it is more economically beneficial (p. 79). As such, the emphasis on diversity is more

related to social norms or personal behavioral traits than it is a matter of conventional ethnic, racial, religious or gender classifications. Florida argues that "Many highly creative people, regardless of ethnic background or sexual orientation, grew up feeling like outsiders, different in some way from most of their schoolmates" (p. 79).

This emphasis on openness and diversity reflects the third of three "T's" that Florida argues are essential characteristics of the Creative Economy – Technology, Talent and Tolerance (p. 249). Indeed, for Florida tolerance is the core value underlying the Creative Class, this emphasis on tolerance and is reflected in the measures Florida uses to describe and quantify the Creative Class. Florida's "Creativity Index" is the principal measure he uses to classify more than 80 percent of metropolitan communities in the United States. This index is a composite of four separate indexes (see Appendix A):

1. *Creative Class Index*. This index is an historical occupational index based on data compiled from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It is the primary measure used to define the Super-Creative Core, Creative Professionals, Working Class and Service Class sectors of the economy.
2. *Innovation Index*. This is an index of patented innovations per capita for each MSA.
3. *High-Tech Index*. This index was developed by the Milken Institute and measures metropolitan *high-tech* industrial output as percentage of total national high-tech industrial output, and a measure of a metropolitan communities' high-tech industrial output as a percentage of its total economy.
4. *Gay Index*. This index measures the extent to which coupled gay people are over- or under-represented in metropolitan communities.

Florida also uses a series of other indexes throughout his analysis (including a Bohemian Index, Talent Index and Melting Pot Index), but these measures do not factor into the Florida's Creativity Index. Table 6-14 displays the Creativity Rank and Creativity Index for each of counties used in this study, sorted by rank. Note that the index and ranks are calculated by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA); as such, some of the counties have the same rank/index score because they share the same MSA.

Table 6-14. Creativity Index and Creativity Rank by County			
MSA	**County**	**Creativity Rank**	**Creativity Index**
San Francisco	Alameda	2	0.958
San Jose	Contra Costa	2	0.958
San Jose	Santa Clara	2	0.958
Seattle	King	3	0.955
Minneapolis	Hennepin	10	0.9
Baltimore	Anne Arundel	11	0.897
Baltimore	Baltimore	11	0.897
Washington, D.C.	Fairfax	11	0.897
Washington, D.C.	Montgomery	11	0.897
Washington, D.C.	Prince George's	11	0.897
Sacramento	Sacramento	13	0.895
Atlanta	Fulton	15	0.873
San Diego	San Diego	19	0.865
Dallas/Ft. Worth	Dallas	21	0.847
Phoenix	Maricopa	28	0.809
Rochester	Monroe	29	0.803
Los Angeles	Los Angeles	31	0.792
Los Angeles	Orange	31	0.792
Palm Springs	Riverside	31	0.792
San Bernardino	San Bernardino	31	0.792
Houston	Harris	37	0.772
Columbus	Franklin	38	0.764
Chicago	Cook	39	0.754
West Palm Beach	Palm Beach	43	0.74
Tampa Bay	Hillsborough	51	0.704
Charlotte	Mecklenburg	60	0.67
Cincinnati	Hamilton	68	0.65
Miami	Broward	72	0.636
Miami	Miami-Dade	72	0.636
Pittsburgh	Allegheny	90	0.601
Las Vegas	Clark	95	0.595
Detroit	Oakland	113	0.557
Detroit	Wayne	113	0.557
Cleveland	Cuyahoga	118	0.55

A principal claim made by Florida in describing the import of the Creative Class is its effect on economic prosperity. Given Florida's assertion that higher creativity results in higher economic prosperity, what is the impact of higher creativity on other structural variables analyzed in this chapter? Table 6-15 displays the results of inter-item correlations between the Creativity Index scores for each of the counties (MSA) and the several explanatory structural

variables described above. The results indicate some support for Florida's hypothesis. While only five of the 15 structural variables investigated were significantly correlated with the Creativity Index, three of the five are important to Florida's overall thesis and are correlated in the predicted direction. Both per-capita revenues and per-capita expenditures were positively correlated with the Creativity Index (0.358, sig. > 0.019, and 0.314, sig. > 0.019, respectively). Counties that are more economically prosperous would be expected to generate more revenues and expend more on community priorities that counties that struggle financially. Moreover, expenditures on per capita expenditures on libraries were positively correlated with the Creativity Index (0.278, sig. > 0.072). This suggests that communities with a more dominant creative class are more likely to devote resources to activities that enhance creativity.

Table 6-15. Creative Class and Structural/Institutional Inter-Item Correlations		Creativity Index
Chief Executive Type	Pearson Correlation	-0.059
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.370
	N	34
Number on Governing Board	Pearson Correlation	**-0.267***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.063
	N	34
How board is elected	Pearson Correlation	**-0.237***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.089
	N	34
Per capita total governments	Pearson Correlation	0.158
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.186
	N	34
Per capita special districts	Pearson Correlation	-0.081
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.325
	N	34
Per capita school districts	Pearson Correlation	-0.213
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.113
	N	34
Per Capita-Revenues	Pearson Correlation	**.358****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.019
	N	34
Per Capita-Expenditures	Pearson Correlation	**.314****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.035
	N	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Education	Pearson Correlation	0.255
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.120
	N	23
Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	Pearson Correlation	**0.278***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.072
	N	29
Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	Pearson Correlation	0.096
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.295
	N	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	Pearson Correlation	0.208
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.119
	N	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	Pearson Correlation	0.027
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.440
	N	34
Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	Pearson Correlation	-0.108
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.271
	N	34
Per Capita Debt	Pearson Correlation	-0.105
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.277
	N	34

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

There are also parallels between Elazar's theory of political culture and Florida's Creative Class. The emphasis on individualism and non-conformity in Elazar's individualistic typology is similar to the core values held by members of the Creative Class. Similarly, the emphasis on adhering to community values and mores is in striking contrast to the values of the Creative Class. As such, we would expect that the individualistic typology would be positively correlated with the Creativity Index, and that the moralistic and traditionalistic typologies would be negatively correlated with the Creativity Index. The results of the correlation did not find any of the Elazar typologies to be significantly correlated with Florida's Creativity Index. This is not entirely surprising, however. As discussed above, the economic dimension of the Creative Class is of primary import to Florida's work. While he devotes significant work comparing his theory to social capital, this is perhaps the weakest part of his analysis and Florida devotes little of his book to discussing the overtly political implications of his theory.

Social Capital and the Creative Class

While Florida is largely silent on how the Creative Class interacts with local government or how higher levels of creativity can influence government performance, he is explicit about his predictions for how the Creative Class is related to other aspects of social and economic life – particularly the social capital theory most commonly associated with Robert Putnam and the focus of this research. A brief review of this section of Florida's book will permit us to better predict how the Creative Class measure is related to government performance.

Florida's critique of Putnam is largely derivative, citing other critics that have identified potential flaws or inconsistencies in Putnam's analysis and conclusions – ranging from disputes as to whether social capital is in fact declining, why it is declining, and what the outlook for communities will be if it is, in fact, declining. Like many others, Florida is at once dismissive of

the evidence suggesting that social capital is declining while simultaneously disputing the import of the decline if it is in fact occurring. In a revealing passage, Florida writes:

"The people in my focus groups and interviews rarely wished for the kinds of community-connectedness Putnam talks about. If anything, they were trying to get away from those kinds of environments. Sure, they wanted community, but not to the extent that they were inhibited from living their own life and being themselves. They did not want friends and neighbors peering over the fence into their lives." Florida continues: "This leads me to a more basic observation. The kinds of communities that we desire and that generate economic prosperity are very different from those of the past. *Social structures that were important in earlier years now work against prosperity*" (p. 269, emphasis added). The utility of social capital theory as a predictor of economic prosperity notwithstanding, the quote above makes it clear that the Creative Class, as conceptualized by Florida, is unrelated and possibly anathema to social capital. As such, we would expect a strong negative correlation between communities with high social capital and the Creativity Index.

Tables 6-16 displays the correlations between the Creativity Index and the Rupasingha measures of social capital. *The Creativity Index is significantly correlated with five of the Rupsingha measures of social capital – bowling centers, labor, business, professional and political*. Of these, four are so-called Olson organizations, emphasizing what Rupasingha refers to as rent-seeking groups. This is not surprising, given the Creative Class theory's emphasis on individualism and career ambition. More interesting is that while the number of business, professional and political organizations in a given community is positively correlated with the Creativity Index (0.326, sig. > 0.030, 0.336, sig. > 0.026, and 0.312, sig. > 0.036, respectively), the number of bridging social capital associations such as bowling centers and labor

organizations is negatively correlated (-0.248, sig. > 0.079, and -0.245, sig. > 0.081, respectively).

Table 6-16. Creative Class and Rupasingha Social Capital Correlations		Creativity Index
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.197
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.132
	N	34
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**-0.248***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.079
	N	34
Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.091
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.305
	N	34
Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.222
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.103
	N	34
Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**.312****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.036
	N	34
Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**.336****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.026
	N	34
Number of Business Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**.326****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.030
	N	34
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**-0.245***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.081
	N	34
Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.020
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.455
	N	34
Social Capital Index-Standardized	Pearson Correlation	0.167
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.173
	N	34
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	Pearson Correlation	0.213
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.113
	N	34
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	Pearson Correlation	0.074
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.339
	N	34
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)		
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)		
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)		

According to Florida, highly creative people favor what Granovetter (1973, 1974) referred to as “weak ties” over strong ties; that is, community and government are held at arms length in favor of more individualistic values. Florida provides confirmation of this in his final chapter where he describes the coming obligations of the Creative Class.

> Members of the Creative Class have been widely criticized as uninvolved and me-oriented…They naively assume that if they take care of their own business, the rest of the world will take care of itself and continue to provide the environment they need to prosper. Time and again, I find such people complaining that traditional forms of organized politics or organized anything "aren't for us." This is understandable. The old forms are relics of the past age; they often leave much to be desired. Unless we design new forms of civic involvement appropriate to our times, we will be left with a substantial void in our society and our politics (pp. 315-316).

While it is unclear what "void" Florida is referring to, it is clear that his conception of the Creative Class is largely absent from and apathetic to political life.

The correlations between the Creativity Index and the Stowell measures of social capital provide a very different picture of the Creative Class and the role of social capital than that described by Florida. *Contrary to the predicted relationship described above, the Creativity Index was positively correlated with five of the Stowell measures of social capital*. And of these five measures,four were directly related to measures of generalized trust or reciprocity (see Table 6-17). Based on the reported correlations, communities that scored higher on the Creativity Index are less likely to believe that too many people are getting a free-ride, are less likely to have a negative view of human nature, and are less cynical and more optimistic about the state of contemporary politics. In addition, these communities are also less likely to report that they get most of their entertainment from watching television.

Table 6-17. Creative Class and Stowell Factor Correlations		Creativity Index
Generalized trust/risk	Pearson Correlation	-0.191
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.165
	N	28
Generalized trust/human nature/free ride	Pearson Correlation	**-0.298**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.062
	N	28
Traditionalist/aversion to change	Pearson Correlation	**-.377***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.018
	N	31
Political trust	Pearson Correlation	**-.404***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.011
	N	32
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	Pearson Correlation	-0.022
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.458
	N	27
Optimism	Pearson Correlation	-0.015
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.468
	N	31
Particularized trust	Pearson Correlation	-0.128
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.254
	N	29
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.	Pearson Correlation	**-0.28**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.057
	N	33
I have personally worked in a political campaign.	Pearson Correlation	0.039
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.426
	N	26
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.	Pearson Correlation	**-.404****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.01
	N	33
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.	Pearson Correlation	-0.128
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.243
	N	32

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)

Government Performance in Creative Communities

Based on the description of the Creative Class, one would predict that communities with high-government performance would score low on Florida's Creativity Index. Table 6-18a displays the GPP scores, Creativity Rank and Creativity index scores for each of the 34 counties

included in this study. One of the limitations of using MSA-based measures for an assessment of counties is that the MSA measures are calculated across entire metropolitan areas, whereas the county-level measures are more geographically distinct. A cursory inspection of Table 6-18a shows a tremendous amount of variation between the Creativity Index scores and the GPP scores. Note that the highest (Alameda County, Contra Costa and Santa Clara counties in the San Francisco MSA) and lowest ranking counties (Cuyahoga County) on the Creativity Index have similar GPP scores. The counties with the highest (Maricopa and Fairfax counties) and lowest (Allegheny County) have been highlighted to illustrate a similar finding to the results described in previous chapters with respect to government performance. *While there appears to be a tremendous amount of variation among the middle counties – the highest and lowest scoring counties tend to follow the predicted pattern.* That is, Fairfax County and to a lesser extent, Maricopa County, both score relatively high on both the Creativity Index and the GPP index. Reversely, Allegheny County scores relatively low on both the Creativity Index and the GPP index.

Table 6-18a. Creativity Index, Creativity Rank and GPP by County				
MSA	**County**	**Creativity Rank**	**Creativity Index**	**GPP Grade**
San Francisco	Alameda	2	0.958	C+
San Jose	Contra Costa	2	0.958	B-
San Jose	Santa Clara	2	0.958	C+
Seattle	King	3	0.955	C
Minneapolis	Hennepin	10	0.9	B
Baltimore	Anne Arundel	11	0.897	C
Baltimore	Baltimore	11	0.897	B+
Washington, D.C.	***Fairfax***	***11***	***0.897***	***A-***
Washington, D.C.	Montgomery	11	0.897	B
Washington, D.C.	Prince George's	11	0.897	B-
Sacramento	Sacramento	13	0.895	C+
Atlanta	Fulton	15	0.873	C
San Diego	San Diego	19	0.865	B+
Dallas/Ft. Worth	Dallas	21	0.847	B
Phoenix	***Maricopa***	***28***	***0.809***	***A-***
Rochester	Monroe	29	0.803	C
Los Angeles	Los Angeles	31	0.792	C
Los Angeles	Orange	31	0.792	B
Palm Springs	Riverside	31	0.792	C+
San Bernardino	San Bernardino	31	0.792	C-
Houston	Harris	37	0.772	C+
Columbus	Franklin	38	0.764	B
Chicago	Cook	39	0.754	C+
West Palm Beach	Palm Beach	43	0.74	C+
Tampa Bay	Hillsborough	51	0.704	C
Charlotte	Mecklenburg	60	0.67	B
Cincinnati	Hamilton	68	0.65	B
Miami	Broward	72	0.636	B-
Miami	Miami-Dade	72	0.636	C+
Pittsburgh	***Allegheny***	***90***	***0.601***	***D***
Las Vegas	Clark	95	0.595	C+
Detroit	Oakland	113	0.557	B
Detroit	Wayne	113	0.557	B-
Cleveland	Cuyahoga	118	0.55	C

Table 6-18b displays the results of the correlation analysis between the Creativity Index and the GPP scores. The Creativity Index was not significantly correlated with the overall GPP scores, but was significantly correlated with the Human Resource and Managing-for-Results dimensions of the GPP index. While this suggests that there may be some relationship between creative communities and government performance, the relationship is relatively weak when compared to the various measures of social capital.

Table 6-18b. Creative Class and GPP Correlations		County Score	FM	HRM	IT	CM	MFR
Creativity Index	Pearson Correlation	0.179	0.101	**0.234***	0.091	-0.065	**0.255***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.155	0.286	0.091	0.305	0.357	0.073
	N	34	34	34	34	34	34
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)							
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)							
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (1-tailed)							

Conclusion

This chapter has explored alternatives to social capital as predictors or correlates of government performance. The purpose of this analysis was to compare and contrast the explanatory power of social capital theory against other theories that would be expected to have important impacts on the capacity for performance among county governments. The chapter explored the importance of various structural variables on government performance, such as form and number of governments, system of representation, and overall fiscal environment. This chapter also tested three approaches to political culture as rival explanatory theories to social capital – those of Daniel Elazar, Joel Lieske, as well as that of Richard Florida's "Creative Class".

The capacity for local governments to perform is often thought to be at least in part dependent upon the environment in which local governments operate. The ability of local governments to deliver services is largely influenced the revenue available to those governments. Overall, the results of the correlation analysis indicate that county government performance is correlated with various structural variables. In particular, per capita special districts and total governments are important correlates of government performance, suggesting that "competition" among different local governments can indeed increase performance and accountability. Surprisingly however, there does not appear to be a connection between government performance and per capita revenues and expenditures.

This chapter also explored the utility of various political culture theories to explain both elements of social capital and government performance. As noted above, the similarities between social capital theory and different conceptions of political culture can be difficult to disaggregate. We would expect there to be strong correlations among the variables measuring civic and associational engagement, social psychological elements of social capital and political culture. The results indicate however, that while the measures of participation in various associations was broadly correlated with many of the political culture measures, the Stowell social psychographic measures, for the most part, were not.

More importantly for purposes of this dissertation is the finding that on the whole, the social capital measures are superior correlates of government performance than the structural variables tested. Social capital is also superior to the various political culture measures reported by Elazar, Lieske and Florida. This confirms Hypothesis 5 which predicted that social capital would be more strongly correlated with government performance than alternative theories. As described above, while we would expect the Elazar measures to be significantly correlated with government performance given the explicit manned in which Elazar's typology is linked to policy outcomes. However, none of the Elazar subculture types were found to be significantly correlated with government performance.

The final alternative theory examined in this chapter was Richard Florida's Creative Class. While it is difficult to predict whether the creative class will be correlated with government performance, we would expect Florida's index to be negatively correlated with both the associational and social psychological measures of social capital. The overtly economic and individualistic orientation of the Creative Class suggests that trust and norms of reciprocity will be negatively correlated. However, the Creative Class index was significantly correlated with

the more individualistic elements of the Rupasingha measures (business and political groups), and surprisingly the Creative Class index was positively correlated with five of the Stowell social capital measures. Finally, while the Creativity Index was significantly correlated with the Managing for Results dimension, viewed overall, social capital appears to be a superior correlate of government performance in comparison to the rival theories investigated in this chapter.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between social capital and government performance in American counties. The study also explored other correlates of government performance, including a variety of structural variables, political culture and creative class theories and compared them all to social capital with respect to their validity in explaining county government capacity for performance. This chapter will briefly summarize the results associated with each hypothesis, summarize what these findings mean for both theory and practice, discuss the limitations of the study, and suggest directions for future research.

Key Findings

This section provides a summary of the major findings and the results of the hypotheses tested in previous chapters. Note that a hypothesis is determined to be confirmed if it is significantly correlated at the 0.05 level for both the MFR and GPP scores. A hypothesis is considered partially confirmed if it is significantly correlated at the 0.05 level with only one of either the MFR or GPP scores.

H1: Dimensions of social capital measuring civic engagement will be positively correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital). This hypothesis was largely confirmed based on the correlation analysis presented in Chapter 4. Table 7-1 displays a summary of the correlation results among the Stowell social psychological measures and the Rupasingha associational density measures as reported in Chapter 4. Note that

the shaded cells indicate correlations that were statistically significant. While not all of the item correlated, it is clear that a large number of the items were significantly correlated. More importantly, the social psychological items were significantly correlated with more than two-thirds of the two social capital associational density indexes created by Rupasingha et al. Most of the Stowell items were also significantly correlated with the percent voter turnout item, and half of the Stowell items were correlated with the census mail response rate item. Table 7-1 provides evidence confirming that associational density is indeed connected with the social psychological dimensions of social capital.

Table 7-1. Rupasingha et al (2006) Social Capital Scores and Stowell Dataset Correlations	Putnam Organizations							Olson Organizations				Other			Co-Production		Index	
	Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	Number of Public Golf Courses per 10,000	Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	Number of Sports Clubs, Managers and Promoters per 10,000	Number of Membership Sports and Recreation Clubs per 10,000	Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	Number of Business Associations per 10,000	Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	Number of Membership Organizations Not Elsewhere Classified per 10,000	Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	Number of Not-for-Profit Organizations per 10,000	Census Mail Response Rate 1990	Percent Voter Turnout 1996	Social Capital Index Principal Components Analysis	Social Capital Index-Standardized
My family income is high enough to satisfy nearly all our important desires.			■	■			■		■	■					■			
I believe the world was created in six days, just like the Bible says.			■		■		■		■	■					■	■	■	■
My friends often come to me for advice or good ideas.		■	■					■								■	■	■
I like to visit art galleries and go to concerts.			■		■		■		■			■	■	■	■	■	■	■
People generally view me as a leader.		■						■								■		
I believe everything is changing too fast today.			■				■	■	■	■		■	■		■	■	■	■
If I could, I would change my present life and do something entirely different.		■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■		■	■		■	■	■	■
Too many people are getting a free ride in today's society.			■		■	■		■	■	■		■	■	■		■	■	■
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.					■			■	■	■			■					
Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.	■		■					■		■	■	■	■	■		■	■	■
A few major corporations in this country have all the real power.			■		■		■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■
I often feel that my opinions are not taken seriously.		■						■			■							
Generally, I feel that life has not been fair to me.			■	■			■	■	■	■					■	■	■	■
As a rule, I don't believe in taking risks.		■																
Going to parties and being out with friends is very important to me.	■		■	■			■		■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.				■	■	■		■	■		■	■		■	■	■	■	■
I have personally worked in a political campaign.		■						■										
Most public officials today are only interested in people with money.			■	■	■		■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■	■
It is always better to stay with something familiar, rather than something new.																		
I prefer working to a set schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.			■				■	■	■	■					■	■	■	■
I would much rather spend a quiet evening at home than go out somewhere.			■	■			■								■	■		■
Too much money is being spent on military defense.				■	■						■		■	■		■	■	■
I feel there is too much sex on television today.		■			■			■			■	■	■			■	■	■
I get most of my entertainment from watching television.		■						■			■							
I believe the women's rights issue has received too much attention.			■			■			■					■		■	■	
The roles of men and women today are too much alike.	■		■	■			■	■	■	■		■	■			■	■	■
In general, would you say you feel better off or more financially secure now than you were two years ago? Do you feel worse off or no	■	■	■			■	■								■	■		■
How about two years from now; do you think you will be better off, worse off or no different than you are now?	■	■	■	■		■	■				■	■	■		■	■	■	■

H2: Government performance will be positively correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital). For hypotheses H2 through H6, the hypothesis is deemed confirmed if both the overall GPP score and the MFR score are significantly correlated with the independent variable at the 0.05 level. If the independent variable is correlated with only one of the two performance scores, the hypothesis is viewed as being partially confirmed. Hypothesis 2 was partially confirmed; some measures of generalized and particularized trust as measured by the Stowell psychographic items were positively correlated with government performance as measured by the Overall GPP score and/or the Managing-for-Results score; however, other measures were not. As reported in Chapter 4, of the 26 items from the Stowell datasets, 14 were significantly correlated with the overall government performance scores. The managing-for-results sub-dimension of government performance was significantly and positively correlated with 15 of the Stowell items, and was the most important sub-dimension in terms of correlates with social capital and trust. However, the two most important measures of generalized trust (*Most public officials today are only interested in people with money* and *Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power*) were not correlated with either overall government performance or with the managing for results sub-dimension. Table 7-2 displays a summary of the correlations between the overall GPP and Managing-for-Results dimensions of government performance with other independent variables reported in previous chapters and used to test the remaining hypotheses.

Table 7-2. GPP and MFR Correlations		County Score	MFR
Trust/risk	Pearson Correlation	**-.329***	**-.374***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0410	0.0230
Generalized trust/human nature/free rider	Pearson Correlation	-0.1390	**-0.278***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2400	0.0760
Traditionalist/aversion to change	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2950**	**-.316***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0500	0.0390
Political trust	Pearson Correlation	**-.377***	**-.385***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0170	0.0150
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	Pearson Correlation	0.2380	0.1920
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1110	0.1640
Optimism	Pearson Correlation	**.385***	**.348***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0160	0.0270
Social/particularized trust	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3010**	**-.373***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0560	0.0230
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.0829	0.0684
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3205	0.3503
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3544****	**-0.2322***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0198	0.0931
Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.0129	-0.0165
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4712	0.4631
Number of Public Golf Courses per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.1472	0.0930
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2030	0.3005
Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.0946	0.0554
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2972	0.3777
Number of Sports Clubs, Managers and Promoters per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.1226	0.0389
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2448	0.4136
Number of Membership Sports and Recreation Clubs per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.1764	0.1640
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1591	0.1769
Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.1428	-0.0144
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2102	0.4678
Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.2127	**0.2362***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1136	0.0893
Number of Business Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.1409	0.1868
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2133	0.1451
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	**-0.3433****	-0.2137
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0234	0.1125
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	-0.1652	-0.1283
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1752	0.2349
Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	Pearson Correlation	0.0040	0.0300
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4909	0.4332
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	Pearson Correlation	**0.30287****	**0.3476****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0408	0.0220
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	Pearson Correlation	0.1280	0.1190
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2352	0.2513
Social Capital Index Principal Components Analysis	Pearson Correlation	0.0921	0.1038
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3023	0.2796
Social Capital Index-Standardized	Pearson Correlation	0.1160	0.1309
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2567	0.2302

Table 7-2 cont'd. GPP and MFR Correlations		County Score	MFR
Chief Executive Type	Pearson Correlation	-0.1591	0.0041
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1844	0.4909
Number on Governing Board	Pearson Correlation	-0.1824	-0.0979
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1509	0.2909
How board is elected	Pearson Correlation	**-0.2265***	**-0.2287***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0988	0.0967
Per capita total governments	Pearson Correlation	**.353***	**.362***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0200	0.0180
Per capita special districts	Pearson Correlation	**.353***	**.302***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0200	0.0420
Per capita school districts	Pearson Correlation	0.0910	-0.0100
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3040	0.4770
Per Capita-Revenues	Pearson Correlation	0.1300	0.1590
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2320	0.1840
Per Capita-Expenditures	Pearson Correlation	0.1450	0.1380
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2070	0.2180
Per Capita Expenditures-Education	Pearson Correlation	**.366***	**.411***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0430	0.0260
Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	Pearson Correlation	0.1070	0.1870
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2900	0.1650
Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	Pearson Correlation	-0.2030	**-.356***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1240	0.0190
Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	Pearson Correlation	-0.0740	-0.0900
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3380	0.3060
Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	Pearson Correlation	0.2010	0.1110
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1270	0.2660
Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	Pearson Correlation	-0.1040	-0.1330
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2790	0.2270
Per Capita Debt	Pearson Correlation	-0.0720	-0.1090
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.3440	0.2690
Moralistic	Pearson Correlation	0.085	-0.074
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.316	0.338
Individualistic	Pearson Correlation	-0.205	-0.029
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.122	0.436
Traditionalistic	Pearson Correlation	0.183	0.137
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.150	0.220
Rurban	Pearson Correlation	-0.118	-0.038
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2536	0.4147
Ethnic	Pearson Correlation	0.021	-0.042
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4526	0.4064
Blackbelt	Pearson Correlation	-0.022	0.020
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.4511	0.4561
Germanic	Pearson Correlation	0.140	0.180
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.2143	0.1543
Hispanic	Pearson Correlation	**.348****	**.313****
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.0219	0.0358
Heartland	Pearson Correlation	-0.171	**-0.286***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.1670	0.0508
Creativity Index	Pearson Correlation	0.179	**0.255***
	Sig. (1-tailed)	0.155	0.073

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

H3: Government performance will be positively correlated with higher levels of civic engagement. This hypothesis was only partially confirmed; overall, it does not appear that civic engagement in associations, as measured by Rupasingha et al. is a significant correlate of government performance. Only two of the Rupasingha measures of association were significantly correlated with overall government performance, and these were correlated but not in the predicted direction. The number of civic and social organizations, as well as the number of labor organizations were significantly but **negatively** correlated with government performance. The only measure of civic engagement that was significantly correlated with government performance in the predicted direction was the **census response rate**. Neither the composite nor aggregate measures of associations created by Rupasingha and his colleagues were significantly correlated with overall government performance. While inconsistent with the work of Robert Putnam (1993; 2000), the finding that associational density is not correlated with government performance is consistent with the results reported by Knack (2002) and Pierce, Moon and Lovrich (2000).

H4: Government performance will be correlated with structural aspects of county government. This hypothesis was only partially confirmed as well. Of the structural variables tested, only the items measuring how a governing board is elected, per capita total governments, per capita special districts, and expenditures on education were significantly correlated with the overall GPP score. The remaining items were not significantly correlated with government performance. These findings may suggest that government performance is enhanced in an environment where there is competition among different local governments. Somewhat

surprising is the finding that per capita revenues and expenditures do not appear to be significant correlates of government performance.

H5: Government performance will be correlated with political culture. This hypothesis can be rejected. None of the Elazar political culture typologies were significantly correlated with government performance. While the Hispanic subculture typology from Lieske's political culture classification was significantly correlated, the result is unreliable because it is based on only a single county (Maricopa County in Arizona).

H6: Social capital will be more strongly correlated with government performance than alternatives related to structural or political culture theories. This hypothesis was substantially confirmed. In general, more of the social capital items were correlated with government performance at higher levels than were the most of the other variables tested. However, the structural variables measuring per capita total governments, per capita special districts and per capita expenditures on education were significantly correlated with government performance on par with the social capital factors created using the Stowell social psychographic measures.

Table 7-3 provides a summary of the major hypotheses tested in this dissertation, and indicates whether they were rejected, partially rejected or confirmed. Note that 5 of 6 hypotheses laid out prior to testing were either confirmed or partially confirmed.

Table 7-3. Hypotheses		Confirmed/Rejected
H1	Dimensions of social capital measuring civic engagement will be correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital).	Confirmed
H2	Government performance will be positively correlated with both generalized trust (bridging social capital) and particularized trust (bonding social capital).	Partially confirmed
H3	Government performance will be positively correlated with higher levels of civic engagement.	Partially confirmed
H4	Government performance will be correlated with institutional and structural aspects of county government.	Partially confirmed
H5	Government performance will be correlated with political culture.	Rejected
H6	Social capital will be more strongly correlated with government performance than alternatives related to institutional, structural or political culture theories.	Partially confirmed

Table 7-4 provides a summary of the results of each variable tested against both the overall GPP score as well as the MFR dimension of government performance. As noted above, variables had to be significantly correlated with **both** the overall GPP score as well as the MFR to be confirmed. As Table 7-4 demonstrates, government performance was correlated or partially correlated with 17 of the 44 variables tested. Importantly, of these 17 variables, more than half were measures of social capital. Of the measures of associational density, only the measures of civic and social organizations, professional organizations and labor organizations were significantly correlated with government performance. However, the number of civic and social associations and number of labor associations were negatively correlated with government performance.

Thus, despite evidence for a relationship between the Stowell social-psychographic measures of social capital and associational density, the relationship does not extend to government performance. Other key findings include:

- The dimensions of social capital more closely associated with particularized and institutional trust (i.e., trust in institutions) appear to be the strongest correlates of government performance.

- The items measuring a person's willingness to accept risk are important correlates of government performance.
- The correlates of self-esteem and government performance are mixed, but tend to support the predicted relationship.
- Measures of generalized trust ("Too many people are getting a free-ride" and "Most people don't have enough will power") appear to be unrelated to government performance at the county level.

Table 7-4. GPP/MFR Summary of Findings	Predicted Direction	Confirmed/Rejected
Generalized trust/risk	+	Confirmed
Generalized trust/human nature/free ride	+	Partially confirmed
Traditionalist/ aversion to change	-	Confirmed
Political trust	+	Confirmed
Personal efficacy/self-esteem	+	Rejected
Optimism	+	Confirmed
Particularized trust	+	Confirmed
Number of Civic and Social Organizations per 10,000	+	Confirmed
Number of Bowling Centers per 10,000	+	Rejected
Number of Religious Organizations per 10,000	+	Rejected
Number of Physical Fitness Facilities per 10,000	+	Rejected
Number of Political Organizations per 10,000	+	Rejected
Number of Professional Organizations per 10,000	+	Rejected
Number of Business Associations per 10,000	+	Rejected
Number of Labor Organizations per 10,000	+	Rejected
Aggregate of All Associations per 10,000	+	Rejected
Social Capital Index-Standardized	+	Rejected
Census Mail Response Rate 1990	+	Confirmed
Percent Voter Turnout 1996	+	Rejected
Chief Executive Type	+	Rejected
Number on Governing Board	+	Rejected
How board is elected	+	Confirmed
Per capita total governments	+	Confirmed
Per capita special districts	+	Confirmed
Per capita school districts	+	Rejected
Per Capita-Revenues	+	Rejected
Per Capita-Expenditures	+	Rejected
Per Capita Expenditures-Education	+	Confirmed
Per Capita Expenditures-Libraries	+	Rejected
Per Capita Expenditures-Social Services	+	Partially confirmed
Per Capita Expenditures-Public Safety	+	Rejected
Per Capita Expenditures-Environment/Housing	+	Rejected
Per Capita Expenditures-Administration	+	Rejected
Per Capita Debt	+	Rejected
Moralistic	+	Rejected
Individualistic	+	Rejected
Traditionalistic	+	Rejected
Rurban	+	Rejected
Ethnic	+	Rejected
Blackbelt	+	Rejected
Germanic	+	Rejected
Hispanic	+	Confirmed
Heartland	+	Rejected
Creativity Index	-	Partially confirmed

The results summarized above confirm previous research that finds that many of the dimensions of social capital are significantly correlated with government performance. In particular, the results reported above suggest that counties with citizens that are more open to taking risks, that are more open-minded and less averse to change, that have faith in major political and economic institutions, that are more optimistic and that are more trusting of people they perceive to be like themselves, tend to have higher performing governments. In addition, counties that have a higher percentage of citizens that responded to U.S. Census mail survey also have higher performing governments.

While important, these results do not paint a complete picture of the relationship between social capital and government performance in American counties. The analysis undertaken in Chapter 5 reported in part that the relationship between the various dimensions of social capital and government performance is more nuanced than portrayed by a simple bi-variate correlation analysis. By trichotomizing the two variables across government performance and social capital, the analysis demonstrated that the relationship is far more complex than is typically reported in the literature. There are indeed some counties like Fairfax, Virginia that have high social capital and high government performance, and there are some counties like Allegheny County in Pennsylvania that have low social capital and low government performance to be sure. However, there are also counties that have high social capital and low government performance such as King County, Washington, or low social capital and high government performance like Maricopa County, Arizona. The findings reported in Chapter 5 suggest that the relationship between government performance and social capital is strongest at the margins – that is, among both the highest and lowest performing county governments. As Figures 5-3a and 5-3b illustrate, there are more counties that do not fit the hypothesized relationship than those that do.

Figure 5-3a. Overall Social Capital-GPP

		County GPP		
		H	**M**	**L**
Social Capital	**H**	Baltimore **Fairfax** Franklin Hennepin Montgomery Oakland	Sacramento	Anne Arundel Fulton **King** Monroe
	M	Hamilton Mecklenburg Orange San Diego	Alameda Contra Costa **Cook** Palm Beach Santa Clara Wayne	Allegheny Cuyahoga Hillsborough
	L	Dallas **Maricopa**	Broward **Clark** Harris Miami-Dade Prince George's Riverside	**Los Angeles** San Bernardino

Figure 5-3b. Overall Social Capital-MFR

Social Capital	County Managing-for-Results: H	M	L
H	Anne Arundel Baltimore **Fairfax** Hennepin Oakland	Franklin Fulton Montgomery Sacramento	**King** Monroe
M	Alameda Mecklenburg Orange San Diego	**Cook** Contra Costa Hamilton Wayne	Allegheny Cuyahoga Hillsborough Palm Beach Santa Clara
L	**Maricopa** Prince George's	Broward **Clark** Dallas Harris Riverside	**Los Angeles** Miami-Dade San Bernardino

These results have important implications for the social capital-government performance model (Figure 1-1) discussed in Chapters 1 and 3. First and foremost is the lack of a statistically significant relationship between generalized trust and government performance in American counties. The relationship between government performance and generalized trust has become a mainstay of the social capital literature and has been found to be an important predictor of government performance in a number of different studies (Pierce, Lovrich and Moon, 2000; Rice, 2001; Knack, 2002). Indeed, Putnam's studies of Italy and America are both based on the notion that generalized trust is essential to effective governance. Another important implication for the model is one of complexity. The social capital-government performance model implies a linear relationship between values and behavior, social capital and government performance.

The results reported here indicate that the model oversimplifies the complex dynamics among the various factors that influence government performance.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Directions for future research can best be framed in terms of shortcomings or weaknesses associated with the results reported in this dissertation and those associated with social capital theory in general. Portes and Vickstrom (2011) argue that social capital theory suffers from weaknesses associated with both endogeneity and spuriousness. Endogeneity addresses the issue of causal order (Portes and Vickstrom, 2014: 464). While the results above indicate strong evidence for the claim that social capital is indeed a powerful correlate of government performance, the results do not provide evidence as to **why** or **how** this is the case. Social capital theory postulated by Putnam asserts that greater participation in civic associations *causes* greater levels of trust and norms of reciprocity. This in turn results in predictable positive outcomes for communities, including higher school performance, lower levels of crime and higher government performance among others (see Lovrich and Pierce, 2015). The results reported in this dissertation do not speak to causality in this manner and only address the issue of correlation. Further research is required to determine whether social capital indeed facilitates government performance as hypothesized, or is actually a by-product of high performing governments.

The second shortcoming of this study is related to the issue of spuriousness. Spuriousness is defined as a situation when two variables appear to be statistically related, but the "alleged causal relationship is due to common antecedent factors" (Portes and Vickstrom, 2014: 466). Social capital theory hypothesizes a direct positive relationship between high social capital and high government performance. However, it may be that other common variables

contribute to the appearance of a positive relationship between these variables. This study has found that while the various measures of social capital are in large part statistically correlated with government performance, it also reported that just as many counties do not fit the model as do (see Figures 5-3a-e). This suggests that while there is evidence that social capital is positively correlated with government performance, there is also evidence that in many cases, it is not. The question becomes: what other variables not tested in this study may be contributing to higher government performance?

Another limitation of this study is the *effect size* of the correlations reported in the various correlation matrices. For example, while more of the social capital measures were *statistically* significant, based on Cohen's (1988) framework for interpreting correlations, we can only conclude that these correlation are small to moderate. Indeed, converting the Pearson r to r^2 reveals that the strongest correlation – that between per capita expenditures on education and MFR – explains only 16 percent of the shared variance. Further analysis is necessary in order to conclude that that there is a meaningful relationship between government performance and social capital. This poses important questions for social capital theorists and highlights the importance of additional contextual case study for purposes of further unraveling the nuanced nature of the causal forces at play when exploring the social capital – government performance nexus.

Two important variables not tested here that would be expected to influence both a community's stock of social capital as well as government performance are income inequality and racial/ethnic diversity. The relationship between racial/ethnic diversity and social capital has become a much researched and debated topic. However, little has been done to explore the extent to which these dynamics influence government performance. Similarly, while economic inequality has been widely researched in a variety of ways with respect to social capital theory,

little has been done to examine how economic inequality influences the dynamics between social capital and government performance.

Another area needing additional attention with respect to social capital and government performance in county government is whether the results reported here hold in more rural counties. The results reported in this dissertation focus on a limited sample of highly urbanized counties. However, the vast majority of the more than 3,000 counties in the United States are small, rural jurisdictions. What, if any, role does social capital play in influencing government performance in smaller micropolitan rural counties? Do the same patterns as reported above hold true? Future scholarship should be directed toward answering these important questions. Similar to the issue of urban verses rural county contexts is the different contextual influences that the states have on how county government perform. The foundational nature of this study neglected the influence of the state and the ways in which state governments have a tremendous influence on how county governments operate. Finally, the study is limited by the extent it neglects that all of the counties under analysis are situated within a larger metropolitan area.

Future research should also explore why the relationship between government performance and social capital is contrary to what would be predicted in so many cases. If government performance is indeed significantly correlated with social capital, why do counties such as King County, Washington have low government performance even though its citizens possess a relatively high level of social capital? Why do counties such as Maricopa, Arizona, have high government performance despite having low levels of social capital? These are questions that will provide important insights into the contextual nature of social capital and government performance.

Future research with respect to this analysis would benefit from an approach that utilizes qualitative comparative analysis or QCA. The QCA approach combines both qualitative and quantitative data analysis to explore the dynamics of cases under analysis and was first developed by Charles Ragin in 1987 (Rihoux, 2006). The QCA approach allows analysis of multiple cases from both a quantitative and qualitative approach using Boolean algebra "which require that each case be reduced to a series of variables (conditions and an outcome)" Rihoux, 2006: 682). Ragin defines QCA thusly:

> Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a new analytic technique that uses Boolean algebra to implement principles of comparison used by scholars engaged in the qualitative study of macro social phenomena. Typically, qualitatively oriented scholars examine only a few cases at a time, but their analyses are both intensive -- addressing many aspects of cases -- and integrative -- examining how the different parts of a case fit together, both contextually and historically. By formalizing the logic of qualitative analysis, QCA makes it possible to bring the logic and empirical intensity of qualitative approaches to studies that embrace more than a handful of cases -- research situations that normally call for the use of variable-oriented, quantitative methods (Ragin, 2016).

QCA will allow a more detailed and complex analysis of the 34 counties analyzed in this research.

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