Seizing the Initiative: Rhetorical Implications of US Army Doctrine

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a pilot study that takes a mixed-methods approach to researching US Army doctrine. Two capstone doctrine publications published by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) emphasize the Army as a profession and the Army professional, as well as the Army’s mission (seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative in operations). TRADOC doctrinal publications also explain the Army’s philosophy of command, known as mission command, which defines the relationship between commanders and subordinates and emphasizes the relationship between a commander’s intent and disciplined initiative among subordinates. The doctrinal documents selected for analysis present the Army professional’s demeanor and awareness in terms of an ability to recognize and capitalize on fleeting opportunities.

A close reading of the capstone doctrine publications and the mission command doctrine publications reveal an emphasis on professionalism and disciplined initiative as it relates to autonomous decision making in the absence of direct orders. A coding scheme was developed based on these concepts in order to segment the language used to discuss these particular concepts. The resulting databank of excerpts was then used to guide a rhetorical analysis of the corpus.

Rhetorical analysis of the presentation of professionalism in the corpus shows that the Army’s philosophy of command is communicated in terms of \textit{kairos} and offers insight into how the Army professional is taught to recognize and act on opportunity. In rhetorical studies, \textit{kairos} is understood as an independent force that the rhetor must
accommodate and also an ability with which the rhetor creates an opening, or a *kairos*; both models are rooted in reasoned action. Recent work on bodily rhetorics makes room for an immanent, embodied, and nonrational model of *kairos* as a kind of instinctual awareness. Army doctrine provides an example of how all three models function in the education of the Army professional.
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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

Army doctrine imbues the organization and its personnel with characteristics of professionalism. Texts analyzed for this dissertation present the Army professional’s demeanor and awareness in terms of an ability to recognize and capitalize on fleeting opportunities. These doctrinal texts show that the Army professional embodies the rhetorical concept of kairos. In rhetoric studies, Kairos is understood to be an independent force that a rhetor must accommodate and also as an ability whereby a rhetor creates an opening for action; both models are rooted in reasoned action. Recent work on bodily rhetorics makes room for an immanent, embodied, and nonrational model of kairos as a kind of instinctual awareness. An analysis of how the notion of professionalism is conveyed in the selected corpus shows that the Army’s philosophy of command is communicated in terms of kairos, and offers insight into how the Army professional is taught to recognize and act on opportunity. Army doctrine provides an example of how all three models of kairos function in the education of the Army professional.
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INTRODUCTION

United States Army Doctrine represents the fundamental principles that drive the conduct of operations for the Army. These publicly published documents provide a common frame of reference and cultural perspective intended to guide the conduct and comportment of all Army personnel. The characteristics of the Army professional are articulated in doctrine and inculcated through training and education that have a foundation in the collection of doctrinal texts. Army doctrine publications make up the body of professional knowledge that constitutes a philosophical framework for one of the oldest American institutions.

The United States Army Publications Directorate has recently been reengineering Army doctrine by instituting a more compartmentalized, hierarchical publications system. For the past fifty years, all Army doctrine was contained in a collection of field manuals, and the initiative to reorganize, known as Doctrine 2015, states that the new publications scheme is an effort to organize and prioritize different information. The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC, has argued that the purpose of Doctrine 2015 is to give order and structure to the entire body of professional knowledge and beliefs that shape the art and science of the Army profession. ADP 1-01 is the designator of the primer published under this initiative and explains the purpose and role of doctrine in the US Army, and this document occupies the highest level of the new publications hierarchy that is designated for overarching principles. The introduction to the primer explains the rationale for Doctrine 2015 as follows: “Over time, doctrine grew to over 500 field manuals. Although they provided tactics and procedures, these publications lacked a clear hierarchy that served to both categorize and prioritize
information… In 2011, the Army instituted Doctrine 2015 to bring clarity to doctrine. Doctrine 2015 restructures and reformats information. It identifies and distills overarching doctrine into Army doctrine publications (known as ADPs) and Army doctrine reference publications (known as ADRPs)” (ADP 1-01, v). The overarching principles that shape the Army profession and inform the system of command are the subject of this dissertation.

The new hierarchical publications scheme segments doctrine into different types of information that places these broad, overarching principles at the top, and continues down to more prescriptive tactics and procedures. This new organization provides the researcher with an opportunity to focus on how the Army articulates the principles that shape its own image. In this dissertation, I analyze the Army’s capstone doctrine publications and command doctrine publications in order to determine the rhetorical strategies used to construct the figure of the Army professional. The successful branding of the Army as a profession supports a philosophy of command that influences the Army’s entire operations process, and this system of command offers a context in which to study how decisions are made and actions are taken up and down the chain of command. The results of mapping a theory of decision making that is present in command doctrine reveal an ability of Army professionals to recognize, create, and instinctively act on opportunity that has implications for theories of *kairos* in rhetoric studies.

The Army is a hugely important institution in American culture, but rhetoric scholarship has had difficulty engaging with this institution. The American military heritage ranges from the idea of the citizen-soldier, or Minuteman, during the American
Revolution to the current era of mainly all-professional armed forces. The Army is the senior service of the United States’ Armed Forces and predates the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. As such, the Army has been one of the shaping forces of American history and culture, from exploring the Louisiana Purchase to building the Panama Canal to the two world wars all the way to the current war on terror. The Army is a symbol of the United States, just as the White House or Washington Monument. Materially, the Army is the most capable and powerful force in the world, projecting American power around the globe. For the most part, however, scholars might study and analyze instances of the military in the news, and how political and public figures respond to breaking news about US military engagements. Scholars study the rhetoric that politicians use about the military and the surrounding public opinion about the purpose and implications of operations. We study veterans’ issues and how the armed forces function as a part of American society and culture. But we rarely get a chance to study the inner workings of these military institutions. We don’t always have the opportunity to study how the military understands itself, rather than how the public or political theater frames the military in discourse. Doctrine is a way to read and analyze the language that the Army uses to define and describe its own identity by rhetorical means.

Army doctrine provides an accessible account of a self-reflexive Army that is engaged in a first-person narrative in an effort to communicate its essence to the force. Doctrine is a primary source that documents how the Army “thinks.” That is, the corpus of texts that make up Army doctrine explain to the reader, from the perspective of the Army, why the Army exists, and how Army professionals are supposed to think and act.
Doctrine 2015 is a rhetorical project that distills overarching principles in Army doctrine into easily accessible and discrete categories that are frameworks for conceptualizing the Army’s image and thought process. This presents the researcher with a self-consciously rhetorical corpus that articulates a philosophy of the Army by providing a conceptual image and thought process that informs physical and material decisions and actions among members of the institution. While this philosophy might have been accessible and intelligible to Army professionals before Doctrine 2015 because of their participation in the profession, it might not have been easily ascertained by civilians except in the context of discourse outside of the Army. Today less than one-half of one percent of Americans serves in the military, and only about half of them are soldiers. Doctrine has the potential to invite the civilian reader into the internal conversation going on in the Army and the opportunity to analyze how this institution rhetorically constructs itself.

I show how these newly published doctrine publications are successful at providing a coherent Army philosophy by analyzing how the capstone publications frame an image of professionalism, and I uncover consequences reaching command doctrine resulting from this rhetorical endeavor. There is a connection between the Army’s articulation of core principles and rhetorical theory, in particular theories of kairos. Army capstone doctrine clearly imbues the organization and personnel with characteristics of professionalism. Furthermore, command doctrine presents the Army professional’s demeanor and awareness in terms of an ability to recognize and capitalize on fleeting opportunities. These texts exemplify that the Army professional embodies the rhetorical concept of kairos. An analysis of how the notion of professionalism is conveyed in the corpus shows that the Army’s philosophy of command is communicated in terms of
\textit{kairos}, and offers insight into how the Army professional is taught to recognize and act on opportunity.

\textit{Kairos} has been studied within rhetoric as an independent force that the rhetor must accommodate and also as an ability whereby the rhetor creates an opening, or a \textit{kairos}; both models are rooted in reasoned action. Additionally, Debra Hawhee’s work on bodily rhetorics makes room for an immanent, embodied, and nonrational model of \textit{kairos} as a kind of instinctual awareness. Army doctrine provides an example of how all three models function in the training and education of the Army professional.

By making the connection between Army doctrine and \textit{kairos} explicit, I am attempting to put rhetoric studies in conversation with Army doctrine. In the 40-year history of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Army has changed or updated its doctrine several times, and the outcome of the latest Doctrine 2015 Initiative is the latest iteration of the Army’s understanding and articulation of the theories and philosophy that underlie its existence. To date, the existing discussions, histories, and analyses of Army doctrine come from the Army’s own efforts at reflection and revision. My dissertation focuses a rhetorical lens on Army discourse in an effort to demonstrate how rhetorical research might profitably engage military language, publications, and philosophy, as well as how implicit military articulations of \textit{kairos} might fruitfully influence rhetorical theory.

**TRADOC: The Author of Army Doctrine**

In order to present a brief history and description of TRADOC, I rely on the Army’s own published accounts of this organization, \textit{Victory Starts Here: A short 40-year history of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command}, prepared by the Combat
Studies Institute Press at Fort Leavenworth. TRADOC also has a website that offers general information about the command, www.tradoc.army.mil. Using TRADOC’S own source presents benefits and limitations, as these sources are not externally verified documents or analyses. It’s important to recognize that these sources represent what information the organization itself deems relevant and integral to describing what TRADOC does and has done over the years. All sources share similar language in describing the organization as the designer, builder and architect of the future Army.

TRADOC is the United States Army agency with executive responsibility for developing and promulgating tactical doctrine and for teaching the Army how to fight using that doctrine. TRADOC was first established in July 1973 in the wake of Vietnam to solve the cumbersome command and control issues of the old US Continental Army Command (CONARC) (Victory Starts Here iv). The command also oversees Army schools and training, and functions as the Army’s “architect of the future” in planning future force structure (Victory Starts Here iv). Victory Starts Here provides the definition of TRADOC as “an organization to train and educate Soldiers, to formulate and promulgate doctrine, to devise and determine weapons and organizations, and to puzzle out tomorrow’s Army” (Victory Starts Here iv). On July 1 1973, TRADOC assumed control of training centers, Army schools, and doctrine development. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will focus on TRADOC’s role of writing official doctrine publications.

Since its inception, TRADOC’s efforts to develop and revise doctrine have been marked by considerable debate, both inside and outside the Army. But ideas for change come from the acting generals of TRADOC. The acting commanders of TRADOC initiate new doctrine development in the face of new world orders. For example, to a
great extent, the AirLand Battle concept that became official doctrine when published in 1981 as the Army’s capstone Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, came from the views of then acting General Donn A. Starry, who began his career at TRADOC in 1977. AirLand Battle doctrine placed new emphasis on combined arms tactics, joining the different branches in strategies for wargaming. AirLand Battle was in large part a response and reaction to the political context of the previous decade. Political currents affect decisions on Army developments and preparedness while doctrinal transformations across the history of TRADOC all bear the personal stamps of the acting commanders. However, authorship remains at the level of the organization, rather than the level of the individual commander.

TRADOC’s first commander in 1977, General William E. Depuy, noticed problems and challenges in all levels of the Army, “from corps to company,” and believed that a program to reorient and restructure the whole body of Army doctrine was needed (*Victory Starts Here*). Over time the subsequent commanding generals of TRADOC have established the role of the command as ensuring the understanding of what the Army must be to win on the future battlefield. That understanding would provide vision and direction for the Army (*Victory Starts Here* 9). TRADOC and the doctrine it produces attempts to do two things. First, doctrine is the accumulated knowledge of military engagements. Second, doctrine is responsible for articulating a vision of the Army in the future. General Vuono, who assumed command of TRADOC in 1986, endorsed the TRADOC Long Range Plan, designed to support TRADOC’s mission as the “architect of the future Army.”
If it’s hard to change institutional thinking, then it’s no surprise that the structure of doctrine has been slow to change, but it is well to note the changes and the situation that preceded these changes. The emphasis in past decades on joint operations called for a substantial revision of US Army doctrine in the form of FM 100-5, *Operations*. In a clear break with the past, the Army manual numbering system was dropped and the joint numbering system was adopted in 2001 when the manual became FM 3-0. The new manual recognized the changes in the nation’s geostrategic position since the end of the Cold War and FM 3-0 was further revised in 2008 and placed even greater emphasis on joint interdependence. Army FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, published in 2006 was also Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*. The joint publications to which TRADOC contributed in 2007 included topics as varied as joint terminology, joint intelligence, joint operations, joint amphibious operations, and space operations and logistics. What we see in the historical developments of TRADOC and their role in producing doctrine is the Army’s official argument for its existence and how it functions in a larger joint military structure. Army Doctrine, developed by TRADOC, is an expression of not just the logistical requirements of recruiting and equipping an Army, but also an expression of the Army’s own sense of identity and position and posture within a larger military structure.

The official histories of TRADOC present a level of detail that is necessarily confusing to the average reader. Instead of offering a general history of the purpose and role of doctrine in Army affairs, the histories present a step-by-step account of the major and minor changes that have occurred over 40 years. The Doctrine 2015 Initiative presents an opportunity to analyze the information, or doctrinal knowledge, that the Army
itself has segmented into the category of overarching principles. Among the overarching principles that provide a coherent and commonly understood vision of the Army are the Army’s professional ethos and the mission command philosophy of command. Capstone doctrine publications, particular Army Doctrine Publication 1, *The Army*, spend a lot of time defining the Army as a profession, and this is a foundational principle of the philosophy of command. TRADOC, through reflection and revision, has identified the theories and philosophy that are intended to guide all other doctrine, and this latest evolution of Army doctrine is the opportunity presented for rhetorical analysis.

The history of TRADOC presents a massive, 40-year organization that has been the author of the official definition and position of the Army. Doctrine publications are primary discursive sources that allow insight into this enormously important institution. Rhetorical analysis demonstrates the mechanisms by which the Army’s principles reveal the importance of *kairos* as crucial to military professionalism. A rhetorical analysis demonstrates the military’s careful rendition of its own principles and how these reflect the values and capabilities that are embedded in the concept of *kairos*.

**Doctrine 2015 as a Topic and Corpus**

The military community has engaged in discourse about doctrine in publications such as *Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly*, and *Military Review*. In light of the decision to reengineer Army Doctrine, authors J.W. Kipp and L.W. Grau published “Military Theory, Strategy, and Praxis,” in *Military Review* in 2011. The authors examine the theory and history of US military policy and discuss the balance between military theory, strategy and praxis as it is presented in US military doctrine. The new publications
hierarchy clearly delineates different doctrine publications into these categories, providing a clearly distilled look at Army theory. J.P. Clark’s article “The Missed Opportunity,” published in *Military Review* in 2012, focuses on the critique of the US Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, which was introduced in October 2011 to replace FM 3-0, *Operations*. The author argues that ADP 3-0 doesn’t provide the necessary details regarding the use of land power in future military conflicts, and that its guidance is too general to be of use to commanders and staff officers. This misses the point of providing guiding principles and a common mental construct for decision making in the Army. The new ADP 1-0: *Doctrine Primer*, clearly states that the ADP level of publications is intended to provide guiding principles rather than detailed prescriptions for how to apply landpower. The ADP level of publications represents the philosophy that guides the detailed day to day operations. ADPs include the Army’s philosophy of command that emphasizes critical thinking among commanders and subordinates alike and expects the Army professional to be able to act in the absence of detailed orders. The decision to streamline ADPs into short documents providing general principles of Army operations that will guide the lower-level publications is certainly accomplished with the established hierarchy implemented by Doctrine 2015. Other authors have understood that Doctrine 2015 provides new guiding concepts for Army professionals. S.T. Brackin’s “Reframing Army Doctrine,” published in *Military Review* in 2012, argues specifically for the role of critical thinking and decision making in the redesign of US Army Doctrine. The author analyzes field manuals to argue that new doctrine should include critical thinking as a significant aspect of military planning. The conversation in his article concerns how to best organize and prioritize the information in
Army doctrine in order to articulate this common understanding to aid in the Army professional’s ability to think critically while conducting operations.

Military leaders and other researchers have published articles that take up the broader question of how US Army Doctrine has evolved and how it fits within a larger national security narrative. Colonel Bill Benson’s “The Evolution of Army Doctrine for Success in the 21st Century,” published in 2012 in *Military Review* reiterates the exigence for doctrine reengineering. Benson cites “operations other than war,” that began in the 1990s in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as precipitating the ascension of stability operations to equal importance with offensive and defensive operations, and he argues that this runs counter to the appropriate role of the Army: to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Benson argues that the new ADPs being developed under the Doctrine 2015 Initiative return this central idea to Army doctrine. Placing these concepts in the ADP level of the hierarchy imbues them with an essential quality that makes them integral to the ethos of the Army. In my own analysis of Army doctrine I extend the conversation to confront questions about the rhetorical mechanisms at work in the written documents and potential consequences for understanding the Army.

The current Doctrine 2015 Initiative is a valuable opportunity for studying theories of *kairos* as they appear in Army doctrine. The reengineering of the structure of the doctrine publications is supposed to assist the Army in understanding the entire body of professional knowledge and beliefs that shape the art and science of their profession (ADP 1-01, iii). The new Army Doctrine Publications, at the top of the hierarchy, include a Doctrine Primer, ADP 1-01, which addresses what doctrine is, why it is important, and which major ideas underlie it. This publication also discusses the most important
taxonomies and terms used in the conduct of operations and the way they fit together as a single coherent whole. This assumes a previous lack of understanding in the Army of how different kinds of information relate to each other and a general understanding of this knowledge. The Doctrine Primer is the text that is meant to be a guide for Army professionals about the language of the profession (ADP 1-01, v). The Primer uses sweeping statements to describe Army doctrine like “the entire body of professional knowledge and beliefs that shape the art and science of the profession,” and “the language of the profession,” that lead the reader to believe that Army doctrine is more than protocol for specific operations; it is also the theory of the Army.

The Doctrine Primer explains that the purpose of the text is to answer the why of Army doctrine, and assist soldiers and leaders in understanding what Army doctrine is, what its purpose is, how it is organized, and why the information in doctrine is important (ADP 1-01, v). This Doctrine Primer, ADP 1-01, is the first of its kind, and is the standard for evaluating future doctrine by establishing terms and categorizing the operational knowledge articulated in doctrine. The Primer fills an intellectual gap in doctrine through rhetorical means. Questions such as what doctrine is and why it is important, what is the structure, what are the types and relationships of doctrinal knowledge, what are the foundations of doctrine, and how the terms and taxonomies of current doctrine work together, are all questions that have heretofore been unanswered. The Doctrine Primer and the Doctrine 2015 Initiative are designed to fill these gaps in institutional knowledge.

In the introduction, the publication describes doctrine as “the entire body of professional knowledge and beliefs,” and then in Chapter 1 the text describes how
doctrine fits into a larger body of Army knowledge. Army regulations and pamphlets address the administration of the Army, doctrine addresses the conduct of operations, training publications address specific training tasks and procedures, and technical manuals address specific equipment-related topics. Focusing in on doctrine, the Primer offers the Army’s official definition of doctrine: “Army Doctrine is the fundamental principles, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols, used for the conduct of operations and which the operating force, and elements of the institutional Army that directly support operations, and guide their actions in support of national objectives” (ADP 1-01, 1-2). Army doctrine is the articulation of organizational learning and is meant to provide a coherent body of knowledge that remains relevant and easily understood. The Primer states that this knowledge provides a philosophical framework for thinking about and conducting operations, and this framework is grounded in “enduring principles” (ADP 1-01, 1-2). It is the segmenting of these enduring principles into a separate category of publications that presents the opportunity for analysis.

Chapter 2 of the Primer is titled “Doctrine in Context,” and provides a description of the structure of doctrine and the types of information contained in that doctrine. The structure of doctrine is divided into three taxonomies: types of information, types of doctrine, and types of Army doctrine and their hierarchy (ADP 1-01, 2-1). The first taxonomy, types of information, include five basic types of information that are included in Army doctrine and arranged hierarchically: principles, tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols. The second taxonomy, types of doctrine, include four general types of doctrine in hierarchical order as well: joint, multinational, multi-service, and
service doctrine. This leads to the description of types of Army Doctrine and their hierarchy, which is the result of Doctrine 2015 and the reengineering of all previous publications by the new structure that places all Army doctrine into four types of publications, each with different purposes. Arranged in hierarchical order, the four new types of publications are: Army Doctrine Publications, Army Doctrine Reference Publications, Field Manuals, and Army Techniques Publications.

There are five basic types of information included in Army Doctrine, but only four categories of publications. At the top of the publications hierarchy, Army Doctrine Publications, known as ADPs, contain the fundamental principles that provide the intellectual underpinnings of how the Army operates. ADPs are at the top of the hierarchy and correspond with the hierarchy of types of information. Principles are at the top of the information-type hierarchy. Next in the publications hierarchy are Army Doctrine Reference Publications, or ADRPs. These publications provide a more detailed explanation of the principles contained in the related Army Doctrine Publications.

Field Manuals are third in the hierarchy of publications, but contain principles, tactics, and procedures. This means that FMs contain at least three of the five basic types of information included in Army Doctrine. Finally, at the bottom of the publications hierarchy, Army Techniques Publications, or ATPs, describe techniques. Terms and symbols, at the bottom of the information hierarchy, are found throughout all publications.

| Type of Publication: ADP, ADRP, FM, ATP | Type of Information: Principles, Tactics, Techniques, Procedures, Terms and |
By separating out the four major categories of doctrine and the information contained in them, the reengineering provides a true hierarchy, in that those manuals at the top drive the content of those below them. If there is a conflict, the higher level manual is considered authoritative. The manuals go from general (ADP) down to specific (ATP), with each level including more and more detail. The rationale that TRADOC provides for this reengineering is that this new structure will facilitate more rapid updating of information. The lower level manuals are the ones that tend to change more often, and by breaking them out into separate manuals the Army can update these more rapidly without having to change the whole body of information on a specific subject. The ADPs and their related ADRPs function together to ensure a common understanding of the fundamental principles across the force. The ADRPs are more fully developed discussions of the fundamental principles introduced by the ADPs, and the lower level publications like FMs and ATPs are updated according to the guiding principles articulated in the ADPs.

The biggest change to the publications scheme is in techniques, which have been separated out as their own category in the publications hierarchy because they are the most dynamic and changeable and contain the least prescriptive type of information.
Breaking out techniques into their own publications highlights the fact that they are adaptable to rapidly changing environments. Each Army Techniques Publication will have a TRADOC approved version of the publication posted on the official Army Doctrine site run by the Army Publishing Directorate. For each of these approved ATPs, TRADOC is establishing a mirror image version on a MilWiki site that will be open to input by any soldier. Every ATP will have a proponent responsible for reviewing suggested changes and deciding whether or not to implement them into the approved version of the ATP on the official Army Doctrine site.

Army doctrine publications, (known as ADPs) contain the fundamental principles by which operating forces and elements of the generating force that directly support operations and guide their actions in support of national objectives. An Army doctrine publication provides the intellectual underpinnings of how the Army operates as a force (ADP 1-01; 2.19). The fundamental principles that ADPs contain guide how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations. In the Doctrine 2015 Initiative, the goal of separating out these fundamental principles into their own, brief publications is to provide an articulated, accessible, commonly understood, and universally applicable document. ADPs are generally limited to about 10 pages and there are two capstone publications: ADP 1, *The Army*, and ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. These publications are at the top of the new hierarchy and represent the overarching doctrine and fundamental principles with which all other doctrine in the hierarchy must comply. TRADOC describes these ADPs as providing the intellectual underpinnings of how the Army operates as a force. Indeed, ADP 1, *The Army*, states what the Army is, what the Army does, how the Army does it, and where the Army is going. This publication
delineates the Army’s mission, purpose, and roles. ADP 1 also tries to articulate an understandable Army Ethic.

The Army Ethic White Paper, published 11 July 2014, identifies an omission in doctrine—the absence of an articulated, accessible, and understandable expression of the Army ethic. This paper is meant to glean the fundamental nature of the Army ethic, and explains that this ethic should guide the production of doctrine. Indeed, ADP 1 tries to articulate an understandable Army ethic. According to this document, this ethic should sustain the moral-ethical ethos within Army culture. Doctrine 2015 is a response to omissions in doctrine, and suggests that these fundamental principles and this Army ethic were not previously articulated in doctrine but were implied. As a result, ADP 1 has been written to ensure a common understanding of this ethic, and what the Army Profession is, in order to foster a common identity among the force with these principles and this ethic. ADP 1 informs the identity of Army Professionals. Getting everyone on the same page with enduring principles and the ethic that drives doctrine are rhetorical moves that are meant to inspire and strengthen the Army’s shared identity. TRADOC determined that these things were not properly articulated until now, and their stated reason for providing them is to fill gaps in the rhetoric.

The other capstone doctrine publication, ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, provides the Army’s common operational concept, which establishes the idea that Army units seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in land operations as the unifying principle of the Army’s operations. This publication also adds the principles of flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization as founding principles of the Army’s operating concept. A closer look at the taxonomies will be needed here, as “concepts” are
explained in the Doctrine Primer as different from doctrine. According to the Primer, concepts are ideas for a significant change based on proposed new approaches to the conduct of operations, and usually propose how the Army might do something 5 to 15 years in the future. Doctrine is the validated principles, tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols that the force can apply currently. However, in ADP 3-0, the “common operational concept,” is not discussed as a proposed change that might take place in the future, but as a common construct for organizing military operations right now. Seizing the initiative is the central idea driving the Army’s conduct of operations and the system of command, and this concept echoes theories of *kairos* that focus on acting on opportunity.

Mission command is the Army’s name for the philosophy of command, and it is mentioned in capstone doctrine and is given its own doctrine publication, ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, with a companion reference publication. In the preface to ADP 6-0, TRADOC explains that “to understand and apply mission command doctrine, readers must understand how unified land operations (ADP 3-0) contributes to unified action. In addition, readers must be familiar with the fundamentals of the operations process, established in ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*,” (ADP 6-0 preface). The prefaces to ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, and ADP 5-0 all refer to the other publications and argue that each one cannot be understood alone. To comprehend the operations process in ADP 5-0, readers must understand the Army’s operating concept outlined in ADP 3-0 and the principles of mission command outlined in ADP 6-0. In the preface to ADRP 6-0, TRADOC bundles these doctrine publications together and states that, “taken as a whole, the doctrine in ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, and ADP 5-0 forms the foundation for the tactics,
techniques, and procedures for the exercise of mission command” (ADRP 6-0 preface). The relationship between these three doctrine publications is explicitly constitutive, and provides a rationale for including these texts in the corpus. The result of my approach to Doctrine 2015 as a topic for this dissertation is a corpus of texts that include the articulation of the Army’s image as a profession in capstone doctrine and also an articulation of the Army’s philosophy of command in mission command doctrine. This dissertation is textually focused on the Army doctrine publications and uses these texts to explore and frame a theoretical inquiry into notions of *kairos*.

**Chapter Outline**

*Literature Review:* This chapter provides the background necessary to frame how rhetoric studies have interacted with the military. Additionally, a literature review of theories of *kairos* in rhetoric studies is provided to frame the analysis of how Army doctrine can advance current models and lead to pedagogical developments.

*Methods:* This chapter provides the rationale for including the strategy of coding. Using coding strategies, I am able to identify themes and code for these themes in order to focus in on the specific language the Army uses to advance certain ideas, such as professionalism. This approach also provides an opportunity to identify what other concepts this idea of professionalism is tied to, such as the Army’s philosophy of command.

*Results and Analysis:* The results of the methods I use provide the foundation for a rhetorical analysis that focuses on the connection between my corpus and theories of *kairos*. Coding for the theme of professionalism in capstone doctrine leads to coding mission command doctrine for the themes of autonomy and disciplined initiative. These
themes were co-coded with the themes of effective leadership and the relationship of the commander to the subordinate, and I analyze how these rhetorical mechanisms work to articulate an implicit theory of *kairos* in Army command doctrine.

**Conclusion:** In the conclusion I look ahead to further opportunities for studying *kairos* as an immanent, embodied and instinctual response to perceived opportunity, and how this view of *kairos* can be cultivated and inculcated among large groups.
Literature Review of Rhetoric and the Military

A review of the literature reveals a multitude of research questions regarding the military articulated by rhetorical scholars. The phrase “military rhetoric” does not yield many results as a keyword search in rhetoric journals like *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* and *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* and *Philosophy and Rhetoric*. Broadening my search to include military journals and keyword searches on Google Scholar yielded more results that show scholars employing rhetorical theory as a framework for analyzing military issues. Reviewing the literature in rhetoric studies reveals a dalliance with military issues, and not much of a sustained conversation, or relationship. The military as a topic presents a seemingly conveniently bounded system a rhetoric scholar can analyze in any number of ways, from many different perspectives, but that can be deceptive.

For example, in 2003 a retired United States Air Force Major, Gary H. Mills, published a *Fairchild Paper* titled “The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis: A Soldier’s Guide to Rhetorical Theory.” The *Fairchild Papers* are published by the Air University Press out of Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The papers are substantive essays considered too short for publication as monographs but too lengthy to be journal articles. The Air University is a component of the Air Education and Training Command and is the Air Force’s center for professional military education. In Major Mills’s paper, he expresses his purpose as wanting to share rhetorical understanding with young officers attending initial intelligence training. Throughout the paper he infuses key elements from the rhetorical discourse community into the discourse communities that deal with training in military intelligence. The audience for this paper is
the military intelligence community, and Mills’s hope is that rhetorical theory will add to
the daily application of intelligence analysis. Mills uses Foucault as his theoretical
backdrop while explaining that Foucault’s assessment of the flow of power through
organizational hierarchies can assist a military intelligence analyst in looking at an
organization as a power being with a rhetorical circulatory structure supporting its
existence. Mills’s proposal to include rhetorical training for military intelligence analysts
was met with some criticism years later in a response written by Hamilton Bean from the
University of Colorado Denver’s Communications Department. While Bean is not a
military veteran like many of the scholars in this review, since 2005 he has been affiliated
with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START)—a US Department of Homeland Security-funded Center of Excellence based
at the University of Maryland.

Bean’s article was published in 2010 in *Poroi: An Interdisciplinary Journal of
Rhetorical Analysis and Invention*. The issue Bean’s article was published in was a
special topics issue with the title of *Issues in the Rhetoric of Science and Technology*.
Bean takes up the question that Mills tried to tackle in 2003: How can communication
theory inform current intelligence and national security debates? Bean recognizes that
Mills’s paper is significant in that “it is possibly the only publicly available document
produced by the US military that discusses the role of rhetorical theory, ancient, modern,
or postmodern, within intelligence analysis. The essay thus provides a window into the
secreotive world of intelligence analysis and suggests how rhetorical theory might be
appropriated within that domain” (Bean 19). Bean continues to argue that Mills’s
appropriation of Foucault’s theories of power and discontinuity to intelligence processes
is flawed and his essay is more an artifact of the US military’s “enduring pursuit of absolute control of the battlefield” (Bean 22). Bean cites an example with a military doctrine publication, Joint Publication 2-01.3, released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2009, titled “Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment” that promises “superior” knowledge and military dominance.

Bean uses Foucault’s theories of power to ask questions about the sanctioning and authority of military intelligence discourse. He argues that Mills’s gaze should have been pointed internally, critically examining the role that intelligence analysts themselves play within the discursive system of national security. These analysts perpetuate an institutional discourse within US intelligence and US military structures. A sophisticated and hierarchical system of analyst education, training, vetting, promotion, and evaluation ensures that the “consensus” of the intelligence community carries authority and is understood. Bean argues, “the perception of intelligence analysis as an elite, insular, and objective activity must be cultivated in order to bolster both the legitimacy of intelligence and the exercise of presidential power” (Bean 17). In his view, Mills overlooks the fact that the military intelligence discourse community constitutes a fully-developed system of discursive acts that result in truth and knowledge of a particular kind. Bean argues that the military intelligence community is a discourse community that can be analyzed rhetorically, in contrast to Mills’ approach of trying to inject some forms of rhetorical analysis into the practice of this discourse community. This conclusion is exciting when considering how it applies to Army Doctrine. If the emergence of “new” doctrine in the form of the Doctrine 2015 initiative is not a set of new practices resulting from changes in ideas or technologies, what is it? Can it be seen as the establishment of relations
between a number of distinct elements like status, institutional sites, a subject’s position, etc?

Other rhetorical scholarship that takes up military issues has been incongruous and most seem like one-off projects that scholars write and publish in a kairotic moment. For example, Marouf Hasian, a communications professor at the University of Utah, published “US Military Perceptions of Victories in Iraq, the “Long War” Against Terrorism, and the Enduring Rhetorical Power of the 2006 Counterinsurgency Manual,” in the *Western Journal of Communication* in 2010. Hasian provides a rhetorical analysis of the counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual and argues that the 2006 manual was a significant departure from conventional warfighting doctrines. Hasian argues that a change in doctrine, such as the 2006 COIN manual, constitutes a change in military culture. His analysis argues that COIN authors used two key rhetorical strategies: They worked on familiarizing readers with some of the lexicons that were used by historical and contemporary figures who were supposed to be experts on counterinsurgency, and they used what they called “vignettes” to help explain some of the various principles and guidelines that could be used to diffuse confrontations (Hasian 576). Hasian sees the COIN manual as an ideological critique of the conventional war paradigms. While this essay is a thorough rhetorical analysis of the COIN manual, the conclusions are not astonishing: the shift to the COIN doctrine as a capstone doctrine of American warfighting “will influence the way we think about decade-long irregular wars.” This conclusion, that the way we fight wars (regular standing armies; insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; revolutions; etc.) will affect how these wars are perceived, seems rather obvious. What is exciting for my project is Hasian’s observation that these written
documents, as examples of Army doctrine, are manipulated rhetorically and reveal the thought process of a military trying to represent itself and its actions to a wider audience.

*Kairos*, a journal of rhetoric, technology, and pedagogy, published a special issue in the Summer of 2010 titled “Rhetoric, Technology, and the Military.” The special issue investigates the intersections among technology, rhetoric, and the military, as well as the connections between the military and literacy instruction. In the issue, Chris Anson and Shawn Neely explore the concept of authorship in the academy, where individual authorship is king, and in the military, which has a more public conception of authorship. In the same issue, Geoffrey Carter and Bill Williamson write about the paradox of “soldier videos,” which both undercut authority and honor effective leaders. Another article in the issue by Paige Paquette and Mike Warren discuss methods for soldiers to share their war stories. This issue is a great example of the open territory available to rhetoric scholars. The authors in this special issue explore a variety of issues and reveal how rhetoric can advance into the realm of military discourse. Yet none of these articles speak to the issues at stake in the revision of Army doctrine I am examining.

In 2010 authors Dury, Overby, Ang and Li wrote an article in response to the growing “Support Our Troops” rhetoric: “’Pretty Prudent’ or Rhetorically Responsive? The American Public’s Support for Military Action,” published in *Political Research Quarterly*. The authors discuss the rhetorical force of Support Our Troops rhetoric in soliciting a pro-war response from the public rather than sustained deliberation. Again, this article establishes a place for rhetorical analysis of military rhetoric in the public sphere, but is not pertinent to my study.
Another one-off attempt at subsuming military issues into the discipline of rhetoric includes Gerald Voorhees’s article “Play and Possibility in the Rhetoric of the War on Terror: The Structure of Agency in Halo 2.” This essay looks at the popular military-themed first person shooter video game *Halo 2*, and contends that the video game is a post-9/11 rhetoric that helps position players attitudinally in relation to the War on Terror. This essay uses Foucault’s theory of agency to discuss responses to the video game and argues that these responses “variously affirm and contest the Bush administration’s narrative of the War on Terror, foreground both the rhetorical efficacy of digital games and the player’s agency to determine their rhetorical effect” (Voorhees, par. 1). This paper offers a unique interpretation of how a military-themed video game can influence perceptions of actual war, but is floating further away from military discourse and closer to public discourse and deliberations about the War on Terror.

Other studies come from disciplines outside of rhetoric, but nonetheless use rhetorical theory and rhetorical analysis to frame military issues. For example, from the *Journal of Leadership Studies* we find Philip J. Hutchison’s article “Leadership as an Ideograph: A Rhetorical Analysis of Military Leadership Training Material.” Published in 2013, this article uses McGee’s theory of ideographs to identify how cultural politics influence efforts to portray “leadership” in a military setting. The author claims this approach, which examines US Air Force leadership training material, documents the manner in which ideographic portrayals of leadership were pervasive in each training program, and it considers practical implications of such a situation.

The *Journal of Leadership Studies* is an interdisciplinary journal that promotes bridging the gap between scholarship and practice, and this is well to note because many
of the studies discussed so far are attempting to use rhetorical and communication theories pragmatically, such as Major Mills’s Fairchild paper. Similarly in the special issue of *Kairos*, the idea is to have scholars cross the aisle, so to speak, and use theory to better understand and interpret current issues involving the military. It is apparent that the military reaches into political and social discourses while remaining fairly insulated as its own discourse community. At times military discourse acts as a closed system, with a strict hierarchy that determines what is sayable and who has authority to speak.

This military discourse reaches out into other registers and other discourses in society. From the *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, in the Summer of 2002, Tomis Kapitan, a philosopher, responded to the dangers of bellicose rhetoric in his article, “The Rhetoric of ‘Terrorism’ and Its Consequences.” He concludes with a call to severely curtail the rhetoric of “terrorism.” Further searches for studies on terrorism in the field of rhetoric yielded few results. But when discourse about political issues such as foreign policy intersect with the topic of terrorism, rhetoric scholars have noticed and have studied the rhetoric of terrorism in political discourse. The web of relations between public, political and military discourses presents sites of exploration while controlling what is sayable in those situations. Discourse on the War on Terror necessarily happens across the political, public and military registers, with each speaker retaining authority in his or her register, but possibly not in others. For example, both public and military discourses take the War on Terror as a topic of discussion and debate, but arguments in the public discourse might not resonate at all in the military discourse, and vice versa.

The journal *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* seems like the right place to find rhetorical scholarship on military issues as they pertain to public affairs and public
discourse. Indeed there was a special issue in the winter of 2005 that took up the 2004 presidential election campaign, which had the War on Terrorism as a main point of debate. The issue includes an article by Christian Spielvogel about the moral framing of the War on Terrorism and the Iraq War in the 2004 presidential campaign. Furthermore, in this special issue Marouf Hasian and James Hedges write an article about the “administrative amnesias” suffered by presidential candidates when discussing military decision making during their campaigns. Again, these articles demonstrate the promise of rhetorical approaches to military issues while also demonstrating my previous point, that debates concerning the military and the War on Terrorism take place outside military discourse and comment on things peripheral to the military but include the military nonetheless, such as how presidential candidates frame the current war that the military is fighting.

I did find a few book-length studies in rhetoric that include consideration of military issues or focus entirely on military issues. The first continues the trend of exploring the intersection of scholarly and military discourse by discovering a kairotic moment. Elizabeth M. Weiser’s 2008 book, *Burke, War, Words: Rhetoricizing Dramatism*, really explores the limited attention scholars have given to Burke’s wartime context while he was writing *A Grammar of Motives*. Weiser argues that *A Grammar of Motives* was Burke’s major wartime response, but subsequent scholarship on it has relegated the issue to footnotes of those parts of GM that discuss war. In response to this lack of treatment of Burke’s discussion of war, Weiser is “rhetoricizing” Burke’s theory, by placing it into conversation with the ideological, material, and social conditions of its development, i.e. war. Wesier argues that “the same theory used to shed light on a
rhetorical situation—and dramatism has been used in the past decade to analyze everything from the plague narrative in Exodus to fetal protection policies to music—itself can undergo a rhetorical analysis that emphasizes its development within a particular time and place. Rhetoricizing theory involves practicing rhetoric by using history to do theory” (Wesier Introduction). Her main claim is that Burke’s theory grew from the geopolitical situation Burke faced at that time. Weiser is answering how a theory can better, more fully guide responses to contemporary situations by exploring how the responses of other theorists to geopolitical events play out in their theories. She does this by analyzing conversations between Burke and other contemporaries in academia and the implications of their theories as conversationally constructed entities.

Weiser’s theoretical approach does highlight the versatility of rhetoric and its ability to analyze not only the message of Burke’s GM in context; but also the context that is constitutive of the message. Rhetorical criticism seeks to understand the message in context, rhetorical history seeks to understand the context through messages that reflect and construct that context. Weiser’s analysis of Burke’s GM as a wartime response indicates that the military situation happening at the time informed Burke’s theory, and therefore his rhetorical theory can be considered a part of military discourse. The complex web of relations between discourses is a main point to be gleaned from Weiser’s work.

Another book-length study in rhetoric that takes up a military topic is Keith Yellin’s Battle Exhortation: The Rhetoric of Combat Leadership. Yellin is a former Marine Corps Captain with a PhD in communication from the University of Iowa. Published in 2008 by the University of South Carolina Press, this study contends that
“students of speech communication, for instance, tend to avoid military discourse today. A progenitor of the current tradition, I.A. Richards, deliberately avoids the ‘combative impulse,’ preferring the study of rhetoric to focus on ‘misunderstanding and its remedies.’ But in avoiding martial venues, speech scholars overlook a significant body of communicative practice. Millions of persons are serving under arms. What are they saying? What are they hearing?” (Yellin 2). This is a welcome intervention in the literature. Yellin is questioning the assumption, which many military leaders have, that sound doctrine, selection, training, and equipment necessarily produce effective combat communicators. He argues, based on the premise that force of will trumps force of arms, that the right word at the right time, or battle exhortation by military leaders to their subordinates, crucially influences this force of will. Yellin contends that “rhetoricians’ study of war discourse is limited to examinations of civilian texts (such as presidential addresses) or material chronicled long ago…the gap between combat and rhetorical studies has not always been this dramatic…And yet my review of the literature confirms Keegan’s impression that study on how commanders should address their troops has always been limited” (Yellin 4). (Here, Yellin is referring to John Keegan, a British historian, and his book from 1987, The Mask of Command, which looks at military leaders throughout history, beginning with Alexander the Great.) Yellin’s intervention attempts to cross the plane between civilian and military discourse by understanding battle exhortation, an intellectual goal, but also by offering insight to improve it, a practical military goal. But Yellin’s authority to offer insight for improving battle exhortation, a part of military discourse, comes in part from his participation in the military as a Marine. He can offer both an insider and outsider perspective on military
discourse, a positioning not afforded to all scholars attempting to undertake analysis of military issues.

Robert H. Carpenter was similarly positioned when he published *Rhetoric in Martial Deliberations and Decision Making: Cases and Consequences* in 2004. Carpenter joined the Air Force shortly after the Korean War ended. While Carpenter admits that he merely “flew a desk,” during his time in the Air Force, his rank of second lieutenant, Ret., already endows him with the emic, or insider perspective of the military. His study “uses apt examples from recent military history to demonstrate the powerful influence of rhetoric, or persuasive speaking and writing, on key instances of military decision making” (Carpenter intro). Happily, Carpenter includes consideration of how doctrine, understood as the written documentation of standard military operating processes formed over time, influences the formation of martial rhetoric. As the author notes, doctrine dies hard, and procedures that worked in one war are often assumed to work in the next. This raises one of many complex questions the book addresses: to what extent is it wise to advocate following doctrine and use its possible role in past successes to rhetorically influence decisions in a current war? This is done all the time in debates over the role and function and identity of the military. Carpenter elaborates:

During martial deliberations several factors can combine, in varying degrees, to constrain if not thwart decisions attaining Aristotelian *agathon*. Important among these is doctrine. Armed forces over the span of time formulate standard operating procedures, which are products of long-term cultivation by training that hones practiced implementation corroborated by successes in the past. By relying on SOP, armed forces are assured of reasonably quick and efficient operation and
thereby likely victory. The world changes, however; war often takes on different characteristics; and established doctrines of yesterday are irrelevant for martial deeds of tomorrow. But doctrine dies hard. (Carpenter 7)

Carpenter shares Weiser’s theoretical approach of rhetorical history, rather than criticism, although Carpenter explains that the line between history and criticism is not always as dichotomous as some scholars would argue. He argues that rhetorical processes constitute historical processes, and rhetorical historians and critics can share scholarly roles. In his view, rhetorical history is not necessarily devoid of critical commentary.

Carpenter’s focus is interesting because he’s exploring the why, when, where and how to achieve certain military goals deliberated by military leaders. The Aristotelian agothon, the greatest good, in each of Carpenter’s case studies is not in question: the decision to undertake an amphibious assault in the Korean War was never questioned, but where the assault was to take place was the subject of martial deliberations; for the threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba, deliberations did not determine if they should be removed but how; for Japanese planners of the Pearl Harbor raid and Midway Island assault, the decision was not if the attack should be made but why; and finally, for the task of wresting lands from their Japanese occupiers in WWII, the decision to be made were not about if to do so but how. The why, when, where and how questions that Carpenter is exploring were deliberated by military leaders in the historical context of military doctrine. The answers to these questions rely on the current doctrine for supporting evidence, and the outcome of these martial deliberations have bearing on future revisions of doctrine. The martial deliberations about when to attack, how in terms of tactics and strategy, with what weaponry, and from where and against which targets are discussions
that take place in the context of established military doctrine. It is my sense after reading Carpenter that doctrine includes the language available for persuasive arguments that military leaders can use to persuade their peers to courses of action.

This dissertation attempts to continue the work of people like Yellin and Carpenter, which asks questions about the role and function of doctrine. I analyze how Army doctrine describes the effective combat communicator and how doctrine explains the ideal relationship between commanders and subordinates. Army capstone doctrine and doctrine on the Army’s philosophy of command are analyzed to provide a discussion about the principles that underlie the Army’s conceptualization of an effective leader. By connecting Army capstone doctrine and the Army’s philosophy of command with theories of *kairos* in rhetoric studies, I am attempting to build on the conversation between the Army and rhetoric studies. What I have discovered through a review of the literature is that rhetorical scholarship lacks a sustained relationship with military rhetoric used within the military by military personnel. This dissertation puts theories of *kairos* in conversation with the Army’s philosophy of command.

**Literature Review of Kairos**

*Kairos* is a concept from classical rhetoric that, according to Carolyn Miller’s foreword to an edited collection of essays on the topic, is central to at least some versions of the rhetorical tradition and arguably necessary to all. The essays in the collection, *Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis*, edited by Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin, Foreword by Carolyn Miller, cover the role of *kairos* in ancient thinkers’ conceptions of rhetoric from Plato and Aristotle to Isocrates and Gorgias.
concept of *Kairos* can also be found in Hippocratic medicine, Pythagorean philosophy, the New Testament and even modern psychoanalysis and psychological ethics. And now, Army doctrine. The essays in the collection articulate two different and not entirely compatible understandings of *kairos*. In one view, *kairos* refers to propriety. Knowing the *kairos* means understanding an order that guides rhetorical action. This view aligns with what later thinkers like Vico, Blair, and Campbell might call common sense or tastefulness, a common mental construct that informs action and is used to assess the appropriateness of actions. James Kinneavy, in his essay “*Kairos* in Classical and Modern Rhetorical Theory,” defines *kairos* as the right or opportune time to do something, or right measure in doing something. Kinneavy continues to argue that logos thinking puts emphasis on timelessness, on form, on law, on stasis, and on method, while *kairic* thinking puts emphasis on time, on change, on creation, on conflict, on fate, and on individuality. John Poulakos, in his essay “*Kairos* in Gorgias’ Rhetorical Compositions,” offers the idea that *kairos* has two locations outside the production of the actual oration: if it precedes the speech, the orator is said to become aware of an opportune moment and speak spontaneously in response to that awareness; if it succeeds, the audience is said to listen to an oration and immediately realize its timeliness. This idea presents the rhetor with the challenge of knowing the *kairos* before, during, and after the rhetorical action. Poulakos continues to argue that *kairos* can be observed not only intuitively, which does not require instruction, but also technically, which does, positioning *kairos* as both a precept and a tool in rhetoric. Put differently, Poulakos argues that “responding orally (by means of an oration) to the awareness of an opportune moment is one thing; creating and managing self-consciously opportunities within rhetorical composition is quite another”
(Rhetoric and Kairos 90). In the first instance, the orator seeks to match words with his perception of timeliness; in the second, to create an impression of timeliness in the audience. Based on this definition, kairos can achieve at least two ends: it can respond to discursive surprises as well as create them. This is an important concept when analyzing how closely the Army’s philosophy of command mirrors the concept of kairos, in that both are attempting to describe an ability to recognize opportunity for action and also the ability to create or manage the conditions for these opportunities.

Catherine Eskin’s essay “Hippocrates, Kairos, and Writing in the Sciences,” helps the reader with a more practical understanding of kairos by including a linguistic analysis of the word kairos in the words of Hippocrates. She provides an etymology and accepted translations of the word. In the works of Hippocrates, kairos is translated as “opportunity,” “the right moment,” “whenever it seems opportune,” “recognizing the right time,” etc. Another translation from the works of Hippocrates of kairo is “on such occasions…” “the hour (kairon) of recovery…” “if the disease be acute (kairon)…” “offering no opportunity (kairoi)…” “And if there be an opportunity (kairos)…” “In medicine the correct measure (kairos)…” “the opportune moment (kairos)…” and “inopportunity (akairin)…” Eskin argues that Hippocrates’ statements, though often specifically related to health issues, might as easily be applied to discourse and rhetoric. As I will discuss in the analysis chapter, we can extend that notion and apply the concept of kairos to action, to war, and to the Army’s operating concept, unified land operations. That is, kairos is a concept that can be applied to rhetorical performance in general, rather than restricted to written and oral discourse. As Eskin notes, what is key is “the ability of the speaker to recognize the ‘right’ moment, and, knowing that right moment, to take
decisive action” (Rhetoric and *kairos* 107). This notion of recognizing the right moment
to act and taking decisive action corresponds to the principle in the Army’s philosophy of
command that encourages the subordinate to exercise disciplined initiative within a
commander’s intent. General understandings of *kairos* in rhetoric studies correspond to
the discussion of appropriate action that is present in Army doctrine.

Further readings of *kairos* in rhetoric studies lean more towards a concept of
taking action in general. Phillip Sipiora, in his essay “*Kairos*: The Rhetoric of Time and
Timing in the New Testament,” gives a short description of the concept of *kairos*—very
generally defined as timing, opportunity, or due measure, before he quotes John E. Smith,
who gives a more agonistic view of the concept of *kairos*. Smith defines *kairos* as
follows:

> It means, first the “right time” for something to happen…Second, *kairos* means a
time of tension or conflict, a time of “crisis” implying that the course of events
poses a problem which calls for a decision at that time. Third, *kairos* means a time
when an opportunity for accomplishing some purpose has opened up as a result of
the problem that led to the crisis. (Rhetoric and *Kairos* 119)

This expanded definition introduces the idea that *kairos* is defined by a tension or conflict
and supports my argument that a theory of *kairos* can help us understand the Army’s
mission command philosophy of command. Indeed, the Army professional is expected to
make decisions at times of extreme tension and conflict, sometimes in the absence of
orders.

I want to turn my attention now to Hunter W. Stephenson and his book,
*Forecasting Opportunity: Kairos, production, and writing*, in which he traces the history
of the concept of *kairos* to when it was first defined by spatial as well as temporal considerations. More importantly, he raises the question of whether the principles of timing and proportion govern human performance generally. This is relevant to my study because the mission command philosophy of command doesn’t necessarily focus on recognizing opportunity for written or oral communication, but on opportunity for action in general. The appropriate action of a soldier that is described by mission command is based on the communication of the commander’s intent, which is both oral and written communication, but the recognition and responses to opportunity can call for physical action rather than a written or rhetorical response, and it has been established that, at times, the Army professional is expected to exercise disciplined initiative and act autonomously in the absence of orders or when existing orders no longer apply.

With this in mind, I turn to the question that Stephenson asks: “Do ‘kairotic moments,’ occur in non-rhetorical or non-linguistic areas of human performance?” (Stephenson 3). The roots that Stephenson recognizes for concepts of *kairos* are relevant to a military understanding of the concept and provide support for the argument that the Army’s mission command philosophy of command can be viewed as a contemporary version of a theory of *kairos* and as a pedagogy for educating the Army professional to recognize and respond appropriately to kairotic moments. Specifically, Stephenson refers to a 1951 discussion by Onians, an author who initially suggests that the two meanings most commonly associated with *kairos*, right-timing and due measure, are derived from physical actions rather than discourse. Onians traces the primary root back to archery, where *kairos* denotes the moment in which an arrow may be fired with sufficient force to penetrate the target. There is a secondary root that Onians also notes, which comes from
the craft of weaving where *kairos* denotes the moment in which the shuttle could be passed through the threads on the loom. These two definitions are strikingly similar and suggest, as Onians notes, that the two roots for *kairos* ultimately arose from a single source. This leads Stephenson to agree with White’s (1987) conclusion that “‘putting the two meanings together, one might understand *kairos* to refer to a passing instant when an opening appears which must be driven through with force if success is to be achieved’” (Stephenson 4). This definition of *kairos* that describes physical action closely aligns with the language used in Army doctrine to define the mission command philosophy of command. The Army professional’s ability to recognize opportunity and seize the initiative is critical if mission success is to be achieved.

Continuing his discussion of the concept of *kairos* being born out of physical action, Stephenson also notes that Onians observed that Homer used the term to describe “a place in the body where a weapon could easily penetrate to the life within” (Stephenson 5). Homer does not use the term to describe what it later came to be associated with, “right timing,” and “due measure.” So *kairos* began as more than abstraction, and it shifts with the early Greek philosophers from a literal concept to a metaphorical concept. Later on, when Pythagoras used the term, *kairos* referred to a balance. *Kairos*, encapsulating the notions of right timing and due measure, referred to balance and harmony. “It was only after such a resolution, only after harmony or balance was achieved, that knowledge, belief and opinion could be realized or understood. As the time of and for conflict resolution, *kairos* helped to situate human affairs, allowing people to make judgments or decisions in a relativistic world” (Stephenson 5). As the history of the concept progresses from the Pythagorean era, the spatial aspect of *kairos*
receives less attention in as much as it referred to a concrete location, and emphasis shifts to right-timing and due measure in the context of discourse and rhetoric. But Stephenson argues that this idea of *kairos* as it pertains to judgment still has bearing on human action in general:

> Perhaps even more so than *kairos*, the Latin *decorum*, most often translated as propriety, stresses the importance of the audience. The constituency of the audience plays a key role in determining the appropriateness of the discourse. This explicit link of *kairos/decorum* to the presence of the audience provides an implicit link between *kairos/decorum* and the material world. This line of reasoning suggests that *kairos* is important to not only rhetorical performance but human performance more generally. That is, *kairos* may figure into human performance in the material world. (Stephenson 8).

Furthering the discussion of *kairos* and materiality, Stephenson writes about *kairos* as a productive tool. He invokes a Dutch writer from the 1960s, De Vogel, when he argues:

> De Vogel’s analysis…lead(s) him to conclude that *kairos*, for Pythagoras, was synonymous with *circumstances* or “the modern term *situationism*, however with this restriction that for Pythagoras the ‘situation’ was morally and rationally determined.” This “determination” was done by the individual or the group who judged the appropriateness of an act by evaluating the context in which the act was committed. Thus, as De Vogel points out, “even robbing temples and murdering one’s next-of-kin could, under the right circumstances, be ‘fitting.’” On such a view, an understanding of *kairos* becomes a tool for production, wherein production is looking forward to the proposed act. (Stephenson 18)
This understanding also allows for *kairos* to be used as a tool for evaluation, a way to judge the appropriateness of an act already committed. In both cases, *kairos* is used as a tool for human cognitive planning. It can be used as a tool for production or as a tool for evaluation.

Stephenson continues to argue that *kairos* was understood as a tool and a force in classical Greek rhetoric. He argues that *kairos*, translated into rhetorical terms, becomes both a capacity and a precept. As a capacity, it means the ability to improvise and adapt speeches to a particular time, place and audience. It becomes the ability to adapt speech to the situation. He argues that based on interpretations of the use of *kairos* from Pythagoras to Gorgias, the rhetor can use his understanding of *kairos* as he might use his knowledge of the issue or his prodigious vocabulary to produce a better text. Stephenson acknowledges a contradiction to this notion when he argues that *kairos* cannot be considered a tool, even analogously, to be used by the rhetor. As a tool, *kairos* exists independently of the rhetor but lacks independent volition. In other words, the rhetor must understand or “read” the *kairos* in order for it to be useful during the production of texts. Stephenson gives an example of the two uses of *kairos* in the writings of Gorgias. In *The Defense of Palamedes*, we get the first understanding of *kairos* as adapting speech to “fit” the situation, and this contrasts significantly with the second use of *kairos* where Palamedes states that he was “forced” by *kairos*, by the “present time,” to include his lengthy self-praise. In the latter example, *kairos* is independent of the rhetor and seemingly forces the rhetor to produce certain kinds of texts. That is, *kairos* exercises its own volition. This is the difficulty that arises when a single term is used to explain both capability and precept. Stephenson concludes: “*Kairos* is, for Gorgias, a tool for
production: the rhetor’s understanding of the circumstances, the place, the time, help the rhetor produce an appropriate text. An understanding of kairos is also a tool used for evaluation, at least by the rhetor if not the audience” (Stephenson 20). It seems that in ancient Greek thought, kairos was a part of the rhetorical act before, during and after the performance. As Stephenson notes, in several places within Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Aristotle suggests that he has written enough on a particular subject given the situation at hand. These passages from Aristotle also suggest that an understanding of kairos helps determine when speech should end as well as begin. Put another way, kairos functions as a tool for production from the beginning through the end of the rhetorical performance. This leads to the argument that knowledge of kairos not only guides the rhetor in determining whether or not to speak, it also guides the rhetor in determining what, how, and for how long to speak. Stephenson concludes that kairos has a dual role of production and evaluation.

Moving on to a discussion of adapting understandings of kairos to contemporary contexts, Stephenson identifies a gap in one of Kinneavy’s essays in which Kinneavy outlines a writing program based on kairos. The problem is that it’s unclear how students are to recognize, or how they could be taught to recognize, the appropriate moment or measure of rhetorical performance. How does one teach the ability to recognize right timing and the appropriate response in a given situation? Transferring this notion to the context of Army doctrine, does the mission command philosophy of command actually delineate how soldiers are supposed to recognize, or be taught to recognize, the appropriate or opportune moment to act? Is it an innate ability? Does the Army’s certification of expert knowledge assume an ability to recognize, understand, and use the
kairos? Studying *kairos* as only connected to print and linguistic settings is difficult or problematic because it removes the rhetor from the immediacy of time and place. The historical concept of *kairos*, in contrast, is rooted in a context where a speaker had to immediately recognize and judge an audience and produce a speech that fit at that moment, but writing removes the rhetor from the immediacy of a context, and therefore they must project a context. For the soldier, that immediacy returns, and the Army’s philosophy of command places a responsibility on the soldier to recognize opportunity and act immediately in the interest of a commander’s intent.

A concept of *kairos* in the context of the Army profession can advance the understanding of *kairos* as a tool and force, and eventually instinct, in contemporary rhetorical studies. Stephenson talks about how modern scholars employ the *kairos* construct as an analytical tool. He argues that contemporary students of writing and rhetoric generally focus on the role of *kairos* in the evaluation of discourse, ignoring its role in the production of discourse. They have “under theorized their application of *kairos*, a term rooted primarily in an oral tradition, to the analyses of printlinguistic texts” (Stephenson 25). In other words, more can be done to theorize how *kairos* functions in general human action, or performance, and the Army’s philosophy of command offers a place to study how this military organization can help us understand the role of *kairos* in determining and evaluating human action.

Returning to Stephenson’s objections to Kinneavy’s idea to base a college composition program around the concept of *kairos*, Stephenson says that what’s missing is “any discussion of how students qua writers are to recognize the ‘right or opportune moment’ for addressing such relevant issues or, indeed, how they are to recognize the
‘proper measure’ within their own texts” (Stephenson 26). In the context of the mission command philosophy of command, if one were to understand this philosophy of command as it relates to the concept of *kairos*, then the subordinate is able to recognize the right or opportune moment because the subordinate is a certified professional who understands the commander’s intent and to take action in the absence of direct orders. The commander helps to shape and create the conditions of opportunity by writing and articulating a clear intent, and also by fostering a command climate that encourages autonomous action. That is, commanders exercise a level of control of the *kairos* through the commander’s intent and they help their subordinates recognize and understand the *kairos*. These soldiers can recognize the proper measure in their own actions because the Army has certified them as expert professionals, with expert knowledge of their profession, and also because soldiers take an oath to uphold the Army ethic. While Stephenson laments that “Kinneavy does not delineate, at a practical level, how students are to recognize, or how they are to be taught to recognize, either the moment or the measure,” the Army capstone doctrine and the mission command philosophy of command can help us understand how the subordinate, or the rhetor, is supposed to recognize the moment and the measure of appropriate action. Mission command advances theories of *kairos* by explaining a context in which commanders and subordinates collaborate not only to recognize and understand the *kairos*, but also to define and shape the *kairos*, which leads to a sort of collective, instinctual kairotic ability among Army professionals.

Stephenson emphasizes that contemporary rhetoric scholarship focuses more on *kairos* as an evaluative tool rather than a productive tool, and he says that this is wrong
because in classical Greek rhetoric, such evaluation was always linked to production. Stephenson also references the DNA publication example, where the scientist Avery submitted his article in 1944, and it took three months before it was published, while Watson and Crick’s article was submitted in 1953 and only took three weeks to publish. What Stephenson questions about this example is, can a kairotic moment be durable? Can a given text remain as “appropriate” at its publication as at its conception? This suggests that an original kairotic moment might span a great deal of time. This leads me to think of the commander’s intent. The commander’s intent communicates what is appropriate, it communicates certain boundaries of taste and appropriateness by defining overall goals, and the subordinate acts “appropriately,” with disciplined initiative, within this intent. The commander’s intent is used to make decisions in that it defines the overall objectives of a campaign that are used to assess the appropriateness of actions. It is used by subordinates to make decisions about the appropriate moment and measure for action. If an action aids in accomplishing the goals of a commander’s intent, then it is judged as right, or appropriate. If the commander’s intent can change, or endure, perhaps it’s also possible that the kairos inherent in a commander’s intent can span the length of an entire war. A commander’s intent, as it relates to kairos as an evaluative tool, can be used to evaluate a multitude of actions spanning an extended length of time. This is an affect of the influence that a commander has in defining the kairos through a commander’s intent.

The image of the Army as expressed by the Army itself, the image of the Army as a profession, and the Army’s philosophy of command, or their theory of command, all mirror theories of kairos and actually fill in some gaps that contemporary rhetoric scholars have overlooked and can further our understandings of kairos as instinct, and
push even further to suggest that a sort of collective kairotic ability or vision exists among Army professionals. Stephenson explicitly talks about the relationship between *kairos* and expertise, and this speaks to the idea that the mission command philosophy of command has a foundation in the image that the Army is a profession that employs expert professionals. He states, “it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the ability to forecast such opportunities (i.e., the ability to recognize kairotic moments) requires certain levels of expertise and/or domain-specific knowledge as well as the application of various problem-solving skills.” (Stephenson 29). This points to the practice of the Army to certify their professionals in domain-specific knowledge. Mission command also bridges the gap between understandings of *kairos* as a tool and *kairos* as a force.

Stephenson talks about the differences between the Platonic *kairos*, (kairotic moments are independent of the rhetor) and the Gorgian *kairos* (where the rhetors create their own kairotic moments). Gorgias understands *kairos* as a tool for production. In Gorgian rhetoric, the rhetor uses their knowledge of *kairos* to understand the conditions that influence rhetorical action, and the rhetor produces an appropriate text based on that understanding. This notion seems to describe *kairos* as a literacy. Contrasting that, Plato’s view, according to Stephenson, describes *kairos* as more of an external force being imposed on the rhetor. Stephenson says that Sipiora makes a compelling claim that Plato, speaking through Socrates, defines *kairos* as the measurement of the discourse to the souls of the auditors, and that rhetoric is the practical application of particular types of speech to particular people to achieve particular effects. According to Plato, however, “it is only when the speaker has learned this practical application as well as a knowledge of the times appropriate for speaking that the speaker has become a rhetorician”
(Stephenson 21). So for Plato, even if a rhetorician may “measure” the discourse against the interlocutor and find that the discourse is appropriate, the moment, or *kairos*, might still be inopportune. The ability of the rhetor to understand *kairos* might still be limited by inopportune timing, and therefore *kairos* might still be an outside force that acts on the rhetor, or actor, instead of an ability or tool that the actor can employ to make decisions that shape and create further opportunity, or further kairotic moments.

However, Stephenson still argues that within Plato’s system *kairos* functions as a rule to be learned and applied by the rhetor. Stephenson says that Plato suggests that a knowledge of *kairos*, like knowledge of the types of souls and the kinds of speeches, can be acquired through instruction. Such a view of *kairos*, as an entity outside the rhetor with an almost physical presence (so much so that it can be “grasped”), accords well with Plato’s epistemology. Less clear, however, is whether Plato considered *kairos* a capability or an ability to improvise and adapt speeches to the particularities of the time, place, and audience. Plato says that *kairos* helps the rhetor decide whether to speak or keep silent, but that it doesn’t play a role in determining the *logos* of the speech. The *logos* is determined by the conditions or context of the speech and is static. *Kairos* doesn’t help to determine the content of the speech in this understanding.

In this dissertation these contemporary theories of *kairos* will be applied to understandings of Army command doctrine and how the professional soldier is expected to embody *kairos* at three levels: *kairos* as a force acting on the rhetor; *kairos* as ability to read a situation and respond appropriately; and *kairos* as instinctual, immanent and bodily response.
METHODS

Introduction

As rhetoric and writing scholars we recognize, or sometimes create, bounded systems of groups of people and their writing practices for the purposes of research. In this dissertation I have created a bounded system of texts that include the doctrine publications that the Army positions as its capstone publications, and the doctrine publications that treat the Army’s philosophy of command. These doctrine publications make up the corpus for analysis. Capstone doctrine includes the Army’s effort to brand itself as a profession in ADP 1, The Army, and introduces the Army’s “mission command philosophy of command.” Mission command has its own ADP, and further defines a command climate that takes advantage of the Army’s professional status. My analysis focuses on the Army’s professional branding through doctrine as well as the Army’s philosophy as disseminated through the mission command philosophy of command. My goal is to understand these texts as the result of deliberate and planned rhetorical actions taken by TRADOC in order to persuade the force and any civilian readers of the Army’s image, and to communicate the proper system of command.

My methods began with a close reading and summary of the most prominent rhetorical features of the corpus. I am restricted as an outsider, a civilian, but I can still observe, describe, and analyze the Army’s rhetorical construction of itself as a profession in the corpus of texts. My analysis shows that the Army describes its professionals as being able to recognize and respond appropriately to opportunity, making its understanding of the mission command philosophy similar to the classical rhetorical concept of kairos. In order to use Army doctrine to frame a theory of kairos (and vice-
versa) I needed to put rhetoric studies in conversation with my corpus. This was done by coding, line by line, the Army doctrine in my corpus for those rhetorical features that echo theories of *kairos*. For example, I coded mission command doctrine for language that described a successful commander to uncover how the Army rhetorically constructs the image of the professional leader. The coding methods I use are borrowed from qualitative discourse analysis.

The goal of building a coding scheme to apply to my corpus is to extract the language the Army uses as rhetorical strategies for constructing an epistemology that concerns the image and command climate of the Army. Once this language is distilled into databanks of excerpts that exemplify these rhetorical strategies, a rhetorical analysis can follow that attempts to push current theories of *kairos* further by examining the concept in the context of the Army. The strategy of coding identifies and amplifies the connection that Army doctrine demonstrates between understandings of *kairos* and the construction of the Army professional. My study involves mixed methods that are calibrated to take advantage of newly available coding and text mining software to provide a data set that supports observations grounded in close reading. That is, some of the data from text mining is used to support and advance a more qualitative rhetorical analysis. The quantitative methods are used to provide an entry point and rationale for a rhetorical analysis. Augmenting my own description and history of TRADOC and further close reading of the corpus with these computer-aided methods demonstrates consistencies across the broad swath of texts that become the topics of further rhetorical analysis. This kind of methodological approach results in a pilot study that might lead to further generalizations about Army doctrine and the Doctrine 2015 Initiative. The
methodology can also be used to create points of entry, or access, into traditionally closed
discourse communities through their doctrinal texts.

Computer software programs offer different ways of visualizing textual
documents. I use the online software available at the Voyant Tools website to create a
quick hierarchical taxonomy of most frequently used words in my corpus to get an
overall sense of the language being used, and as supporting evidence for the themes that I
discovered during an initial close reading of the texts. I use these themes to create a
coding scheme for qualitative discourse analysis. I use Johnny Saldana’s book The
Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers to guide and explain my methods of coding
the corpus, and to physically code the corpus I rely on computer-aided discourse analysis
software from Dedoose. While the coding software from Dedoose provides myriad
analytical tools, I use it mainly as an organizational tool to keep track of excerpts that are
coded for certain themes, to observe the prevalence of certain themes throughout the
corpus, and to identify those excerpts that are co-coded for more than one theme. Taking
this approach I discovered a connection between the Army’s philosophy of command and
classical theories of *kairos* while I was in the middle of the coding process. I took this as
an opportunity to continue with a rhetorical analysis of both the Army’s philosophy of
command and the concept of *kairos*. The code-co occurrences reveal a more complex
understanding of the rhetorical mechanisms that advance the professional branding of the
Army and the rhetoric that creates the shared mental construct for decision making in
mission command.
Text Mining With Voyant Tools

I first use straightforward text mining strategies to afford myself multiple perspectives of the corpus. The online software available at the Voyant Tools website offers researchers a web-based text reading and analysis environment. Voyant Tools is an open source, web-based “suite of analysis and exploration tools for digital texts,” as noted on its website. The site allows users to upload their own corpus of texts to be analyzed. The site was developed by Stefan Sinclair, Associate Professor of Digital Humanities at McGill University, and Geoffrey Rockwell, Professor of Philosophy and Humanities Computing at the University of Alberta, Canada. One of the most useful tools offered on the Voyant website is the ability to upload a text and immediately track the relative frequencies of key terms under examination. This same tool offers a global look at any text by producing a hierarchical taxonomy of most frequently used words in the corpus. The site also has the ability to edit for “stop” words, such as common articles that naturally appear in a text more frequently than the key words and terms that the researcher is examining.

The Voyant Tools website cites examples of research that has been aided by the software, and the most recent example listed comes from the British Library’s Digital Scholarship Blog, titled “On metadata and cartoons,” written by James Baker. Baker describes a project in which he analyzed metadata from British cartoons in the 1960s and 70s using the tools from Voyant. Baker acknowledges the limitations of this online software when he states that he mostly “discovered what [he] expected to discover” from the data. While the tools for analysis might be limited, Voyant provides extremely helpful visual representations of word usage. The visual constructions that Voyant uses to track
word frequencies across a corpus present the researcher with another point of access into the texts and a holistic perspective of the economy of words; sort of a bird’s eye view the language at work in the documents. These features enable easy and intuitive visualization of the most frequently occurring words in a corpus and can help identify the most important or prominent terms for topic modeling and building a coding scheme for qualitative discourse analysis. Visualizing the corpus with these tools can help the researcher identify useful directions for further investigation or contradict a hypothesis about the texts under consideration. The basic text mining functions of Voyant make it possible to quickly extract characteristics from a corpus and discover themes.

This type of text mining is very straightforward, and offers further evidence to support the initial observations of rhetorical themes and language use that were discovered during a close reading of the text. The data produced by this text mining software supports the assumptions a researcher might already have about a corpus, and help them discover what they expect to discover. Alternatively, the text mining can point out word frequencies and emphases that the researcher might miss through close reading. In this case, the characteristics that define my corpus of texts resist interpretation from an outsider perspective, and text mining offers an alternative perspective. These texts are written by the Army and for the Army professional and represent the knowledge shared by members of the profession, and a close reading by an outsider will naturally focus on the rhetorical and linguistic features that speak to the positionality of the researcher. The results of a quantitative text mining analysis helps the researcher avoid tunnel vision and provide a foothold for further investigation and analysis of the text. For example, the results of text mining mission command doctrine revealed that “commander,” and
“subordinate,” appeared frequently and suggested a discussion of those two roles in a command structure. This evidence supported the decision to code for the relationship between commander and subordinate as it appears in command doctrine.

The decision to use a mixed-methods approach that includes close reading, text mining, coding and rhetorical analysis stems from the need to triangulate my data in order to make claims about the purpose and impact of these texts as a civilian with no military experience. I began pursuing my research interests in the military by looking at public discourse about the military. There are certainly issues about the military that are the subjects of public debate. Lifting the ban on women serving in combat roles in the military is still being discussed among military professionals and government officials and civilians because it has implications for all of the people involved. Women in combat brings up discussions of rights of citizenship and equality in general and these discussions take place in the public sphere. Military suicide is also discussed both in and outside of the military because it is a medical issue and the medical community has bearing on the discussion and can influence any initiatives taken to understand and solve the problem. Military suicide is also the subject of government debate as elected officials grapple with how to best serve returning veterans who are at risk of suicide. The discourse on these issues takes place in the public sphere, in newspapers and scholarly journals, and is open to rhetoric studies because the discourse offers sites of access that are not restricted to military professionals and that do not resist analysis and critique from someone outside of the military.

My corpus, however, does indeed resist analysis and critique from outsiders. At least, a researcher with no military experience and no exposure to Army doctrine is not in
a position to make claims about how these texts function at a practical level among Army personnel and in Army training and education. The Army doctrine that I am studying is the profession’s intellectual underpinnings, it is the expression of the Army’s image, and it is written for the Army professional, published under the authority of the Army. This doctrine is not the subject of debate outside of the Army, or even necessarily inside the Army. TRADOC is the proponent for these new publications and for the reorganization of doctrine. Furthermore, the new hierarchical publications scheme that results from Doctrine 2015 bestows characteristics of ultimate authority on these capstone and other top-tier doctrine publications. It is clearly stated that these ADPs that make up my corpus are authoritative over lower-level doctrine. In order to position myself to make claims about how these texts function I gathered initial data about the kind of language being used in these documents. Mining the text for purely quantitative data provides a first step into the text. The results of quantitative text mining provide a sort of bird’s eye view of the content of these documents. The end game is for the researcher to maneuver into a position that allows for a rhetorical analysis of the text by an outsider. When I first read closely the capstone doctrine, it was clear that the language was primarily devoted to describing the Army as a profession, and a list of the most frequently used words generated by the text mining software supported this conclusion. Nevertheless, this confirmation allowed me to see how significant kairos is with respect to how the Army professional is thought to act as a professional.
Qualitative Discourse Analysis; or Coding

What Is It?

I use qualitative coding methods to analyze my corpus because it is a logical extension of the quantitative text mining analysis and provides another perspective that supports further rhetorical analysis. A qualitative coding analysis provides additional evidence of the different themes and relationships in the documents. That is, coding allows the researcher to see which themes function together to create an overall message. This type of methodological approach segments the text into categories that represent certain rhetorical strategies. For example, in one category I place the excerpts coded for the rhetorical strategy of defining disciplined initiative among subordinates in the Army. Using the computer-aided software I can then comb through all of the excerpts that fall under this rhetorical strategy and analyze how this conforms to theories of kairos and develops the idea that spontaneous initiative can be synchronized and coordinated among a larger force. The rhetorical analysis is supported and driven by the data that results from the coding process.

The prevalent themes that I chose to code for were initially observed during a close reading of the texts. These themes include language that is shown by the quantitative analysis to appear with more relative frequency in the corpus, supporting the claim that passages that express or represent these themes should be the focus of further rhetorical analysis. By building a coding scheme that corresponds to the language and themes that appear most frequently, and that appear to be the most important in the text, I end up with an extensive bank of excerpts that can be observed for consistencies or aberrations. The data set that is the result of coding my corpus provides the content for
rhetorical analysis and for claims that my corpus has implications for the theoretical model of *kairos*. Furthermore, the coding software provides a tool that tracks the occurrence of passages that are coded for more than one theme. These code co-occurrences represent how different themes work together to constitute a rhetorical mechanism and lend insight into the persuasive consequences of the rhetorical strategies found in doctrine.

Johnny Saldana’s coding manual provides the framework to my approach to coding my corpus. Johnny Saldana’s *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers* (2nd ed.) focuses exclusively on codes and coding and how these methods can assist in qualitative data analysis. In short, the “things” that I decided were the most important about the corpus during the initial close reading were adapted into a coding scheme intended to identify and “tag” passages that represent what I discovered as the most important themes in the text.

A code is meant to capture and represent a datum’s primary content and essence. Saldana summarily defines a code as most often “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldana 3). A code can summarize, distill, or condense data. My coding scheme reflects what I, as a reader, determined were the most important things about the text. Coding represents the search for patterns in data and for ideas that help explain why those patterns are there in the first place. Descriptive codes are those that summarize the primary topic of the excerpt and are used to represent a breadth of opinions. For example, a passage in the text that discusses the role of the Army as a profession that civilians rely upon is coded, or “tagged” with, professionalism.
Further, a passage that explains that this status as a profession endows the Army with a certain degree of self-regulation is tagged with professionalism and autonomy.

Saldana identifies multiple cycles of coding, and in a subsequent Second Cycle coding process “the portions coded can be the exact same units, longer passages of text, analytic memos about the data, and even a reconfiguration of the codes themselves developed thus far” (Saldana 3). My own second pass through my data included adding the mission command and operations process doctrine publications while eliminating superfluous or redundant codes and an attempt to recognize which codes revealed excerpts that could lead to a productive rhetorical analysis. The second pass was focused on interpreting passages of text with the intention of discovering some link to an existing rhetorical theory. Saldana mentions, and I agree, that most qualitative researchers will code their data both during and after collection, and that coding is an analytic tactic. The process of coding is analysis, and the researcher develops a coding scheme based on perceptions and interpretations of the data. As a cyclical act, the process of coding allows the researcher to discover new meanings about the data that can lead to more rigorous analysis. As the researcher codes and recodes, the categories may merit more refinement into subcategories, or some codes might be subsumed by others or dropped altogether from the scheme.

My approach to the data can best be described as what Saldana presents as Eclectic Coding. This is an exploratory method that meets criteria for multiple coding methods and both First and Second Cycle coding. This method combines select and compatible coding methods that are refined during multiple coding passes. This approach allows any of the researcher’s first-impression responses to serve as codes. As I
summarized the documents and mined the text for a taxonomy of most frequently used words, I developed first-impression codes that fit the descriptions and definitions of other coding methods treated in Saldana’s book.

Saldana’s descriptions of different coding methods are rather simple and direct, and developing a coding scheme is largely based on the researcher’s approach to the study. The methods I adopted from Saldana’s book include In Vivo, Process, and Initial coding. In Vivo codes refer “to a word or short phrase from the actual language found in the qualitative data record” (Saldana 91). This method is appropriate for all qualitative studies and is particularly helpful for the beginner who’s just learning to code. My use of In Vivo coding reflects the results of my description and summary of the documents as well as the results of the quantitative text mining analysis. Professionalism is an example of an In Vivo code because all excerpts coded for this theme used some form of the word “profession.” Process Coding, according to Saldana, is also appropriate for virtually all qualitative studies, and is used to mark action in the data. I use process coding to identify the active relationship between commander and subordinate in my data, and to mark the prescriptive actions and attitudes of commanders and subordinates. Initial Coding is the method I use most in my first cycle of coding because it is defined by Saldana as an open-ended approach that offers the researcher a starting point intended to lead to further exploration and analysis. Saldana notes that a lot of these methods overlap and are part of the iterative, cyclical process of coding data.

The coding methods I use are intended to fracture or split the data into individually coded segments, and include what Saldana defines as Descriptive and Structural coding methods. Descriptive Coding assigns basic labels to data to provide an
inventory of their topics, and this seems to overlap with Structural coding. Structural Coding is a labeling and indexing device, while Descriptive Coding identifies the topic of a certain passage, for example trust, autonomy, decision-making, chain of command, authority, service, etc. My initial coding scheme uses codes that could be labeled as both Structural and Descriptive, and these codes are attempts at uncovering and foregrounding broad topics of inquiry that were revealed through the close reading of the documents.

Attribute Coding is concerned with identifying things about the participants in a qualitative study, and presents certain issues for my particular project. Attribute Coding, according to Saldana, logs essential information about the data and demographic characteristics of the participants for future management and reference. My data set does not include research participants or interview subjects, just the corpus that represents the thought process of the Army. My corpus is what the Army is saying about itself to the members of the profession. The research participant in this study is the Army, and the corpus answers questions about the character, purpose, and function of the Army and the Army professional. The earlier discussion of the history of TRADOC and the description of the Doctrine 2015 Initiative provides the essential and descriptive information about the research subject. Further attributes include the descriptive information of ADP vs. ADRP, also explained in the primer as a difference in type of information, though in this case all of the documents define, describe, and discuss the role and character of the Army. The corpus also includes the attribute of being the intellectual foundation of all Army doctrine.

I developed my coding scheme according to the aforementioned ideas, and my first pass using the software from Dedoose took a considerable amount of time as I was
still learning a new skill and new software. I scrolled through the documents and when I noticed passages that could be categorized as one of the themes in my coding scheme I highlighted it and clicked on the corresponding code. This automatically creates data that can be exported as a Microsoft Word file that lists the individual excerpts that are highlighted and coded. I quickly got the hang of it and before long it started to become evident which codes were producing the most excerpts. In the case of coding for autonomy and mission command it also became clear that I would need to include ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, in future cycles, and upon reading the mission command doctrine, it was also clear that the operations process doctrine would also need to be coded in conjunction with mission command doctrine.

At this point the coding became a much more recursive and iterative process, and this process began to point towards an analysis of how the Army’s philosophy of command, insomuch as it emphasizes disciplined initiative and autonomous action, has a foundation in the Army’s image as a profession that employs and certifies expert professionals. I focused on the data that were coded for these themes and began to see similarities between how the Army’s philosophy of command describes the way an Army professional is expected to be able to recognize and respond appropriately to opportunity and theories of *kairos* in rhetoric studies.

Based on an initial summary of the four capstone documents I determined that the text emphasizes the Army as a profession that employs expert professionals. As an organization of competent, expert professionals the Army builds trust with the American people, who trust the Army to act autonomously in the interest of the US and in accordance with the will of the American people, Congress, and the President. This
theme trickles down to the description of the competent professional soldier taking individual initiative and acting autonomously in accordance with a commander’s intent. Related to this idea is an emphasis on the joint environment, which increasingly has Army forces cooperating with other branches of the military, partner nations, and other government and nongovernment agencies. Professionalism, the joint environment and mission command all became codes in my scheme.

The summaries and initial close reading of the corpus accomplish what Saldana defines as *decoding the documents in order to decipher core meanings*. These first impressions of the core meanings are confirmed by the quantitative text mining as well. My codes are based on the patterns I recognized through this process of decoding. My immediate impression was that the data was emphasizing professionalism, the joint environment, and the concept mission command, which is based on individual initiative taken in the interest of the commander’s intent. Codes identifying passages that mention the human element were harder to identify because they ranged from explicitly using the words “the human element” to those passages that mention protecting the population. The code for partner and host nations was also a grey area that often overlapped with codes for the joint environment. The code for service appeared less frequently throughout the documents but revealed an interesting interplay between the Army’s subordination and service to civil authorities, while maintaining autonomy as a professional organization.

In subsequent rounds of coding those that overlapped and were redundant were dismissed, but instances of code co-occurrence also led to the discovery that some codes were not redundant, but constitutive. That is, some codes revealed a link between themes that supported a more complex rhetorical mechanism at work in the text. For example,
excerpts that describe an effective leader often did so by describing the relationship between a commander and a subordinate, signaling a connection between these two strategies that results in a better understanding of the persuasive elements in the documents.

*My Coding Scheme*

I’ve coded for the themes of professionalism, the joint environment, and mission command in capstone doctrine because they were presented in the corpus as the foundation for discussing the Army. The Army is moving towards a professionalization of the force and seeks to present the Army as a profession that employs professionals with expert knowledge. This idea of the professional informs the concept of mission command, which is the Army’s philosophy of command and is based on the individual initiative of subordinates, and the ability of a commander to adequately articulate his or her intent to those subordinates. The joint environment also became an initial code because the discussion of any action or function of the Army was usually identified as an action or function within the broader context of joint operations, or cooperation with a host nation. Mission Command might be the best example of structural coding, because the concept of mission command, what it stands for, doesn’t quite match up with the exact language, “mission command.” Mission command is an iteration of a thought process that emphasizes critical thinking, and the ability for an Army professional to act autonomously in the interest of the commander’s intent. Mission command assumes a commander’s successful articulation of his or her intent, and is a warning against micromanagement. It is connected with the push towards the professionalization of the Army. Professionals are allowed and expected to act autonomously in their fields because
they have expert knowledge and capabilities. Because mission command appeared as an integral concept in describing the Army as a profession, the ADP and ADRP that covers mission command were added to the corpus. I use the same approach to developing a coding scheme for these documents as I did with the capstone doctrine.

The capstone publications contain over 56,000 words. I assigned 7 parent codes to these documents. After a first pass I am able to provide a description of my codes and examples of each:

- **Professionalism:** Professionalism comes up primarily as an In Vivo code, and passages that include the words “professional,” “professionalism,” or “profession,” are coded.
  - **Example from ADP 1:** “A key component of the way ahead is remaining focused on the professionalism of our force.” – Foreword
  - **Example from ADRP 1:** “Like other professions, the Army provides for the American people what they cannot provide for themselves: security and defense through the conduct of unified land operations with the other Services. The Army Profession provides the United States with the landpower to prevent, shape, and win in the land domain.” – Foreword

- **The Joint Environment:** This is also primarily an In Vivo code, and those passages that include the word “joint,” are usually talking about joint operations and the role of the Army within a larger, whole-military approach to campaigns. But, this code also can include passages that mention cooperation or coordination with
other agencies, branches or partner and host nations, even if the word “joint,” is absent from the passage.

- Example from ADP 3-0: “Army forces do not operate independently but as a part of a larger joint, interagency, and frequently multinational effort.”
- Example from ADP 1: “combined with the Nation’s air, sea, and space-based power, it becomes preeminent.”

- **Mission Command**: This is an important code, because it describes the mode of thought that is supposed to be informing all decisions in the Army, from top to bottom. Mission command, in my view, and based on the summaries written of these capstone documents, is describing critical thinking. Mission Command puts pressure on top commanders to articulate their vision and mission clearly, so that subordinates can be creative and autonomous in carrying out the mission in concert with the commander’s intent. Words in these passages include “intent,” “autonomous,” “flexibility,” etc.
  - Example from ADRP 1: “The trust we have earned and continuously reinforce is essential for the autonomy granted by our society and our government, permitting us to exercise discretion in fulfilling our role within the defense community. The ethical, effective, and efficient accomplishment of our mission depends on the freedom to exercise disciplined initiative under mission command.”
  - From ADP 3-0: “Allowing subordinate and adjacent units to use their common understanding of the operational environment and commander’s intent, in conjunction with their own initiative, to synchronize actions
with those of other units without direct control from the higher headquarters.”

- The Human Element: During my first readings of these documents, there was enough emphasis put on “the human element” that I wrote it down. This includes reference to protecting the civilian population, at home or abroad. It also includes words like “noncombatants.” I also use “The Human Element” to code for mentions of humanitarian aid. After the first coding pass it became evident that this theme was less important, and it was dropped in favor of focusing primarily on professionalism and mission command.
  
  o Example from ADP 3-0: “They follow up with a series of actions that destroy enemy capabilities, seize decisive terrain, protect populations and critical infrastructure, and degrade the coherence of the enemy force.”
  
  o Example from ADP 1: “Any mission can rapidly become a combination of combat, governance, and civil security. Most of our missions require combinations of lethal and nonlethal actions. This is inherent in the nature of land operations, usually conducted in the midst of noncombatants. When called upon, Soldiers accomplish nonlethal missions such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance quickly and effectively.”

- Service: During the initial reading of the documents, there was enough mention of subordination to civil authorities to warrant this code. There is emphasis on the fact that the Army is ultimately controlled, or in service of, the civilian population.
and Congress. This theme also ultimately was dropped and attention was focused primarily on professionalism and mission command.

- **Example from ADP 1:** “In practical terms, our public accounting as a profession occurs when the Nation calls us to accomplish the Army mission: to fight and win our Nation’s wars. Stewardship therefore involves a subordination of all Army leaders, civilian and military, to the larger responsibilities of the profession: being the stewards of the trust between the Army and American people.”

- **Example from ADP 1:** “We derive our mission from the intent of Congress and through the laws governing the Armed Forces. The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the authority to determine the size and organization of the Army, and gives the President overall command of the Armed Forces.”

- **Partner/Host nations:** This code became a nested code under the Joint Environment, in that for the most part when I coded passages that mention the joint environment I also coded them for “Partner/Host nation,” as the theme was generally understood to include both. It includes passages that emphasize cooperation and coordination with host nations, and protection of host nation civil authorities.

  - **Example from ADP 1:** “Geographic combatant commanders shape their regions through many cooperative actions with partner nations.”
- **Example from ADP 1:** “The equipment, training, and financial assistance the United States provides to partner nations improve their abilities to secure themselves.”

- **Reference to other doctrine publications:** This code revealed itself to be ineffective at this level of the publications hierarchy. The lower-level publications might reference other, top-tier doctrine more than the top-tier reference lower-level publications. There have been mentions of other publications, however, and the references are usually to JPs, or Joint Publications. So reference to other doctrine can also usually be coded as a mention of the joint environment as well.

  - **Example from ADP 1:** Army doctrine supports and is consistent with joint doctrine. This publication connects Army doctrine to joint doctrine as expressed in the relevant joint publications, especially Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations. ADP 1 also links the National Security, National Defense, and National Military Strategies with the Army’s operational doctrine in ADP 3-0.”

I applied these codes to the corpus as researcher-generated codes that came out of my summaries and preparatory investigation. I focused on professionalism and mission command and the joint environment, primarily. These codes range from a single sentence to an entire page of text. My codes are also influenced by the Doctrine Primer and what Doctrine 2015 laid out as the goals for the initiative. That’s why I coded for references to other doctrine publications, because one of the main benefits of Doctrine 2015 is that
information would be easier to find. But you necessarily wouldn’t find these references in the capstone publications; you would find references from lower to higher, not references from higher to lower. This is why this code was dropped during subsequent coding cycles. The Joint Environment and Partner/Host Nations were codes that necessarily overlapped and Partner/Host Nations was subsumed under the Joint Environment code in subsequent passes. Service and the Human Element were codes that simply did not produce any further insight into the text and neither pointed to any significant theory that could be applied to the data.

One exciting outcome of the first pass of the capstone publications was the identification of mission command as a concept that is the basis for the relationship between commander and subordinate, and the basis for defining the characteristics of a successful commander and the appropriate conduct of a subordinate. The concept of mission command that is presented in these capstone publications has its own ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*. Mission command is the Army’s philosophy of command, and explains how autonomy, initiative, and discretion form the basis of the Army’s decision making process. In the preface to ADP 6-0, TRADOC explains that “to understand and apply mission command doctrine, readers must understand how unified land operations (ADP 3-0) contributes to unified action. In addition, readers must be familiar with the fundamentals of the operations process, established in ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process,*” (ADP 6-0 preface). The prefaces to ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, and ADP 5-0 all refer to the other publications and argue that each one cannot be understood alone. To comprehend the operations process in ADP 5-0, readers must understand the Army’s operating concept outlined in ADP 3-0 and the principles of mission command outlined
in ADP 6-0. In the preface to ADRP 6-0, TRADOC bundles these doctrine publications together and states that, “taken as a whole, the doctrine in ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, and ADP 5-0 forms the foundation for the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the exercise of mission command” (ADRP 6-0 preface). The relationship between these three doctrine publications is explicitly constitutive, and provides a rationale for including these three doctrine publications in my corpus.

I use the same coding methods I applied to the capstone doctrine publications to the publications treating mission command. After reading and summarizing the three ADPs that form the foundation of the mission command philosophy of command, I decided to code for six themes in these texts:

- **Effective Leadership**: Excerpts that describe or define characteristics of an effective leader.
  
  - Example from ADRP 6-0: “Effectively employing control measures requires commanders and staffs to understand their purposes and ramifications including the permissions or limitations imposed on subordinates’ freedom of action and initiative.”

- **Initiative and Intent**: Excerpts that describe subordinates exercising disciplined initiative within a commander’s intent.

  - Example from ADP 6-0: “Effective commanders impose enough control to maximize total combat power while allowing subordinates freedom of action.”

- **Judgment and Decisionmaking**: Excerpts that describe how the mission command philosophy informs decisionmaking.
Example from ADP 5-0: “Effective execution requires leaders trained and educated in independent decisionmaking, aggressiveness, and risk taking in an environment of mission command.”

- **Kind of Thinking**: Excerpts that describe the restrictions/constraints of thinking; excerpts that describe or prescribe critical/creative/conceptual/detailed thought processes.
  - Example from ADRP 6-0: “The traditional view of communication within military organizations is that subordinates send commanders information, and commanders provide subordinates with decisions and instructions. This linear form of communication is inadequate for mission command.”

- **Principle/Fundamental**: Excerpts that define or describe a fundamental tenet of mission command.
  - Example from ADRP 6-0: “A key aspect of mission command is determining the appropriate degree of control to impose on subordinates.”

- **Relation of commander to subordinate**: Excerpts that define or describe the relationship between commander and subordinate.
  - Example from ADRP 6-0: “The degree of trust and confidence a commander has in subordinate commanders, as well as confidence in one’s own abilities, weighs heavily in deciding delegation of authority.”

It’s clear that most excerpts can be coded for multiple codes, and indeed they were. For example, characteristics of effective leadership are often embedded in a discussion of the relationship of a commander to a subordinate, and this relationship is
supposed to foster initiative in the subordinate. In subsequent passes it became clear that all of the codes were describing the appropriate actions and thought processes of Army professionals. After coding these documents and refining the schemes to focus on the themes that really form the basis for the Army’s image of itself and for the Army’s philosophy of command, the results pointed toward a rhetorical analysis of the connection between the Army’s image as a profession and the mission command philosophy of command. Furthermore, the articulation of the Army’s philosophy of command shares characteristics with the classical rhetorical concept of *kairos*.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Results

Text Mining:

The results of the text mining analysis using the software from Voyant Tools provides a semantic analysis of the capstone doctrine publications and their respective reference publications. Mining the text in this way provides a quantitative description of the text at the aggregate level of the four documents. Before entering the text into the website to produce these results the .pdf files were cleaned up, so to speak, to include only the text from the introduction to the conclusion, omitting images, tables of contents, and appendixes. The Voyant Tools site also allows for removal of “stop words,” such as “and, it, the,” etc., when compiling the taxonomy of most frequently used words. The results of the four documents that are the Army’s capstone doctrine are what were generally expected. The four documents total 56,892 words. The documents ordered by number of words are: ADRP 3-0 (24,797), ADRP 1-0 (13,137), ADP 1-0 (12,950), ADP 3-0 (6,008). The most frequently used words across all four documents are: army (1,047), operations (623), forces (428), mission (289), operational (284). These results were to be expected, and do not necessarily represent data that lends insight into the rhetorical choice of the Army to describe its own image as a profession. However, a look at the hierarchical taxonomies of most frequently used words in each individual publication does show that there appears to be an effort emphasize and foreground the Army as a profession.

Distinctive words within each doctrine publication are:
For an aggregate list of the most frequently used words across all four documents, see the appendix. What is notable for the purposes of developing and justifying a coding scheme for these documents are the appearances of “joint,” “profession/professionals,” “ethic,” and “trust.” All of these words appear most frequently in the doctrine publications that define the image of the Army. ADRP 1-0, The Army, in particular, defines and defends what it means that the Army is recognized as a profession that employs expert professionals. The capstone publications that treat the Army’s operating concept, unified land operations, does not similarly use these words. What is notable for my analysis is the appearance of “leaders” and “commanders” in the operating concept publications, because these words point to a definition of an effective leader, and to the doctrine publications on mission command, which were subsequently folded into my corpus. The word “initiative” appears 20 times in ADP 3-0, and 61 times in ADRP 3-0, as shown in the individual taxonomies of those publications. The use of the word “initiative” is used to describe the concept of mission command and is included in the coding scheme for the mission command doctrine publications.

I apply the same text mining analysis to the doctrine publications treating mission command and the operations process. There are 3 documents that the reader is instructed
to read as constitutive: ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, and ADP 5-0. These three documents
together total 28,112 words. Ordered by number of words the results are: ADRP 6-0
(16,283), ADP 5-0 (5,995), and ADP 6-0 (5,834). The most frequently used words across
all three documents are: commanders (572), command (424), mission (347), operations
(307), information (247), subordinates (166). It’s clear from this hierarchical taxonomy of
most frequently used words that these doctrine publications describe and define what an
effective commander is and does, along with a discussion of the role of subordinates.

Distinctive words within each publication:

1. ADP 6-0: command (127), commanders (111), mission (96), information (55),
   operations (55), subordinates (45).

2. ADRP 6-0: commanders (352), command (282), mission (216), information
   (170), operations (167), subordinates (99).

3. ADP 5-0: commanders (109), operations (85), planning (71), operational (46),
   understanding (44), plan (43).

From the results of this text mining analysis it’s clear that within these documents is a
discussion of the interactions between commanders and subordinates. I took this to mean
that within the Army’s philosophy of command is an articulation of the relationship
between commanders and subordinates. It makes sense that doctrine concerning how to
“command” other Army professionals and resources includes what a subordinate can
expect from a superior and vice versa. This relationship helps describe the way that Army
professionals are taught to recognize and act on opportunities based on a common understanding between commanders and subordinates.

Coding:

The following image is a table depicting the allocation of each code within each doctrine publication. The individual cells show the number of times that code appears in that doctrine publication, and represents the number of excerpts that were highlighted and tagged with that specific code. The dispersions of codes across each capstone doctrine publication reveal professionalism to be the most prominent theme overall. The topic of professionalism appears 161 times in a single document, ADRP 1, *The Army*, by far the most heavily weighted topic in Army capstone doctrine. This means that 161 times, a passage in ADRP 1 was highlighted and tagged with the professionalism code, resulting in 161 excerpts that discuss the topic of professionalism in the Army. All 161 individual excerpts can then be exported into Microsoft Word, offering a linear and concerted look at how professionalism appears in Army capstone doctrine.
It’s clear that “professionalism” was the most prominent code, and appeared most in the reference publication, ADRP 1-0, *The Army*, while it appeared 201 times overall across the four capstone publications. “Autonomy/mission command,” appeared most in the reference publication ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, and appeared 101 times overall in the doctrine publications. While “The Joint Environment” appears significantly throughout the publications, appearing 149 times, it was still determined that this aspect of Army capstone doctrine does not lend any further insight into the subsequent rhetorical
analysis. The other codes also appeared consistently in all capstone doctrine publications, but do not yield further insight into a rhetorical analysis. For that reason, further passes through the documents focused only on excerpts about mission command and professionalism. These codes were chosen to produce the banks of excerpts that are used for rhetorical analysis. Professionalism is the most important concept in the capstone publications that is analyzed for its use as a rhetorical device that defines the Army as a profession that employs expert professionals in order to provide justification for the autonomy and individual discretion that is granted to the subordinate in the mission command philosophy of command.

The following image is of code co-occurrences in these four capstone doctrine publications. This shows the instances of when two codes are attached to the same passage across all capstone doctrine. The ten excerpts that are coded for both professionalism and mission command provide information about how these two concepts are connected in the presentation of the Army’s image in these capstone publications. These excerpts provide the foundation for a rhetorical analysis of how both concepts are constitutive in justifying the autonomous action and decision making of a subordinate in the Army’s philosophy of command.
The results that are productive for rhetorical analysis are those excerpts that are co-coded for both professionalism and mission command because they demonstrate that arguments for the use of discretionary judgment within the mission command philosophy of command are based on the image of the Army as a profession that employs expert professionals. In the following section these banks of excerpts, specifically the 161 excerpts coded for professionalism in capstone doctrine, will be analyzed more closely.
The decision to also code the doctrine publications that treat the mission command philosophy of command arose from the prevalence of the term and concept in the capstone publications. In the preface to ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, is listed as required reading in order for the reader to understand mission command. With that in mind, all three doctrine publications were uploaded into the Dedoose website and a coding scheme was created that included: Effective leadership; Initiative and intent; Judgment and decisionmaking; Kind of thinking; Principle/fundamental of mission command; Relation of commander to subordinate. After an initial coding pass, 365 excerpts were coded. The following image depicts the allocation of codes across these doctrine publications.
While “kind of thinking,” is prevalent in these publications, during a second coding pass it was determined that this code was too broad and was always accompanied by another code, and so was dropped. The results of the initial pass that are productive for a rhetorical analysis are those excerpts that were determined to be discussing or defining effective leadership, those excerpts discussing the role of initiative and intent, and those discussing the relationship of the commander to the subordinate. These are the excerpts that provide the principles and foundations that support and explain the Army’s...
conception of the effective commander and subordinate, and the relationship that defines the image of these Army professionals. The following image shows further how these codes relate to each other.

Excerpts discussing the relationship of the commander to the subordinate are co-coded for effective leadership 82 times. Effective leadership is also closely related to the concept of initiative and intent, appearing as co-codes 61 times. From this it is evident
that the codes that are most prominent and productive for rhetorical analysis are the relationship of the commander to the subordinate, effective leadership and initiative and intent. Further coding passes eliminated the redundant and superfluous and unproductive codes to focus the scheme and to create a bank of excerpts that provide a distilled look at how the relationship of the commander to subordinate, effective leadership and initiative and intent function together in the articulation of the Army’s philosophy of command. These excerpts provide the language that defines the Army’s thought process of how to recognize opportunity and act on that opportunity with appropriate measure, keeping within the boundaries of a commander’s intent. This thought process reflects theories of *kairos*, or “right timing,” in rhetoric studies. In the following section, these banks of codes will be analyzed in depth.

Coding the corpus is a way to take a closer look at these documents, and to extract data from the corpus for the purposes of analysis. The process of coding is like dissection, trying to segment different parts of the corpus for further examination. The segments of the corpus that make up the Army’s image and the Army’s philosophy of command are related, and have similarities with theories of *kairos* in rhetoric studies. Analyzing the mission command philosophy of command as it reflects theories of *kairos* provides insight into both of these concepts.

**Analysis**

**Introduction**

The Army’s mission command philosophy of command describes how commanders and their staffs make decisions, and this doctrine echoes theories of *kairos*.
Mission command is a concept in Army doctrine that encompasses the unique relationship between commanders and their subordinates that is intentionally designed to empower all members of the Army profession with the ability and authority to make decisions. Army doctrine defines the core function of the Army as the ability to win the nation’s wars by seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative, and command doctrine rhetorically constructs a relationship between successful commanders and subordinates that hinges on the ability to recognize moments of opportunity and to act with disciplined initiative to respond appropriately to these opportunities. This unique relationship is buttressed by the arguments in capstone doctrine that the Army professional is an expert who is granted a certain degree of autonomy. Mission command doctrine characterizes all Army professionals with the ability to create conditions favorable to maintaining the initiative and to create the opportunities, or kairotic moments, to achieve decisive results. ADP 6 and ADRP 6 describe a command climate in which Army personnel are expected to know how and when to act in order to achieve mission success without being micromanaged by immediate superiors, and sometimes in the absence of direct orders.

The ability to take action in the interest of accomplishing the overarching goals of a military campaign, but in the absence of direct orders, is cultivated by the rhetorical strategy of writing doctrine that is intended to provide a common mental construct for decision making. In other words, mission command provides a framework for how the Army professional thinks by describing how commanders and subordinates function together in this philosophy of command. The development of this relationship and command structure is made possible by the rhetorical strategy in capstone doctrine of defining the Army as a profession.
Professionalism in Capstone Doctrine

Capstone doctrine defines the Army and its personnel against the backdrop of other widely known and accepted professions such as medicine and law. The capstone doctrine publications foreground the expectation that these professions will provide their services honorably and behave a certain way. Similar to other professions, the Army is shaped by many things that determine or prescribe a certain behavior. Commanders and subordinates alike share a professional development that includes things like the rules of engagement and the Army ethic to define the boundaries of decorum. For example, the Army self-regulates by relying on rules like proportionality. While there might be a kairos, or an opportunity, to end a war using nuclear or chemical weapons, the rule of proportionality prevents the military from using a nuclear bomb again. These limits of decorum help characterize the Army with professional status.

Capstone doctrine is the rhetorical project that imbues the Army with a professional ethos on which subsequent doctrine relies for justification, including mission command doctrine. Returning to the results of coding capstone doctrine, Professionalism was coded 201 times, more than any other code, and this is no surprise given that the stated goal of ADP 1 and ADRP 1 is to describe the Army as a unique profession. Autonomy was coded 101 times in capstone doctrine, suggesting a link between the ethos of professionalism that dominates capstone doctrine and the ability and expectation for Army soldiers to know when and how to act without direct supervision. Taken together, these two codes represent a rhetorical strategy in capstone doctrine intended to move the reader to accept that the Army can be its own steward; this organization and its
members can be trusted to act in the best interest of the nation. Part of this strategy includes linking professions to the expert knowledge professionals are certified to have: “Like other professions, we are a repository of a unique body of knowledge” (ADP 1; 2-8). “Also like other professions, we apply our knowledge using expertise developed through extensive education and training. Like other professions, we certify individual and organizational competence” (ADP 1: 2-8). “We develop and maintain professional knowledge…” (ADP 1: 2-9). The insistence on identifying the Army as a profession relies in part on the assurance that the Army can train and educate professionals in accordance with official doctrine. This assurance extends to how decisions are made within the organization, and as a profession the Army has its own system for making decisions that is the mission command philosophy of command.

Mission command is introduced in ADP 1 as “the conduct of military operations that allows subordinate leaders maximum initiative” (ADP 1; 2-11). The language used to describe mission command relies heavily on the idea that all Army professionals, commanders and subordinates alike, must operate autonomously within the boundaries of a higher commander’s intent. Mission command “encourages Army leaders to exercise discretionary judgments without close supervision” (ADP 1; 2-12). The chain of command in a professional organization like the Army ensures that there will always be a second in command to take up the mantle of a fallen or absent leader, and mission command takes this further and identifies all Army professionals as leaders in some context who are expected to act in the absence of orders to develop a situation that advances the goals set out in a commander’s intent.

The professional ethos built up in capstone doctrine underlies the effort to
describe a command climate that resembles theories of *kairos* in the sense that mission command requires professionals who exercise a level of discretion, or due measure. War and the risks posed to soldiers “make the discriminate application of combat power one of our greatest challenges. It emphasizes our unique ability to use our weapons discretely and precisely in populated areas. Meeting this challenge requires highly professional leaders, unmatched individual expertise, and unshakeable teamwork” (ADP 1; 4-11). The ability of Army personnel to exercise disciplined initiative and make discretionary judgments in the absence of direct oversight is predicated on the availability of “highly professional leaders.” The professional ethos constructed in capstone doctrine has the rhetorical effect of endowing Army leaders with kairotic ability at three levels; *kairos* as ability and initiative, where the actor has agency to affect the opportunities of any given *kairos*; *kairos* as outside force, where the actor has a developed and learned literacy of kairotic moments; and *kairos* as innate ability, as instinct, and perhaps a shared collective instinct. These abilities are developed in mission command doctrine through the rhetorical construction of the relationship between commander and subordinate.

The rhetoric of professionalism in capstone doctrine extends to both commander and subordinate sharing this professional ethos, and as stated earlier professionalism is linked to autonomy: “A profession is a trusted, disciplined, and relatively autonomous vocation” (ADRP 1;1-2 ). In the same passage in ADRP 1 the language shifts from stating that a profession is “relatively autonomous” to stating that professionals “are granted *significant autonomy* and discretion in the practice of their profession,” (ADRP 1; 1-2 emphasis added) to finally stating that “professions *self-regulate* and guide the actions of their members.” (ADRP 1; 1-6 emphasis added). In the span of a page,
professions, and by extension the Army profession, are relatively autonomous organizations whose professionals are granted significant autonomy in a profession that ultimately self-regulates. This theme of autonomy reaches in to mission command doctrine to describe the soldier’s ability to recognize opportunity and act in the absence of direct orders, and this begins to shape the relationship between commanders and subordinates.

Code Co-Occurrences in Mission Command Doctrine

Coding mission command doctrine resulted in the discovery of two notable code co-occurences that represent the rhetorical mechanisms that create this philosophy of command. First, Effective Leadership was co-coded with Relationship of Commander to Subordinate 82 times. For example, “successful commanders minimize risk and unify the effort by monitoring how well subordinates are using their authority and resources and exercising initiative” (ADRP 6-0; 2-52). Furthermore, Relationship of Commander to Subordinate was co-coded with Initiative and Intent 64 times. That is, mission command doctrine urges that the desired relationship between commanders and subordinates will ensure that subordinates are exercising disciplined initiative. For example, “successful commanders allow subordinates to learn through their mistakes and develop experience. With such acceptance in the command climate, subordinates gain the experience required to operate on their own” (ADRP 6-0; 2-53). Mission command doctrine defines effective leadership and the desired command climate by rhetorically constructing a relationship between commanders and subordinates that enables the subordinate to identify and act on opportunity without direct oversight and in the absence
of direct orders.

Mission command doctrine represents an effort to teach the soldier a notion of *kairos* as it is understood as this relationship between commander and subordinate that is marked by disciplined initiative and seizing the opportunity. Three rhetorical mechanisms—(1) characterizing **effective leadership** by the relationship between commander and subordinate; (2) identifying how this relationship is marked by **disciplined initiative**; and (3) demonstrating how effective leaders use this concept of initiative—provide a framework for a command structure that is actually based on an understanding of *kairos* as a relationship that enables disciplined initiative.

*Mission Command and The Effective Leader’s Relationship to Subordinate*

The written documents that make up mission command doctrine explain the style of command by introducing the figures of commander and subordinate, and assigning certain characteristics to these figures. Freedom of action and maximum latitude are themes that characterize a rhetorical relationship between commanders and subordinates. While effective commanders must provide a clear intent that guides subordinates’ actions, the commander’s intent must also enable the subordinate to “adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities. They are given the latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in a manner that best fits the situation” (ADRP 6-0; 1-12). By allowing maximum latitude, commanders encourage subordinates to “create opportunity and to seize the initiative” (ADRP 6-0; 1-12). The way that this relationship is rhetorically constructed through the explanation of what commanders can expect from their subordinates and vice versa empowers the subordinate to exercise disciplined
As noted earlier, this level of freedom of action that subordinates enjoy in mission command has a foundation in the rhetorical effectiveness of branding the Army soldier as a professional, and it also has a foundation in a shared understanding between the commander and subordinate. ADRP 6-0 includes a lengthier excerpt that was co-coded for Effective Leadership and the Relationship of the Commander to Subordinate that provides an example of the rhetorical strategy of building this enabling relationship:

Commanders collaborate and dialogue with subordinates to ensure they understand the commander’s intent. Subordinates aware of the commander’s intent are far more likely to exercise initiative in unexpected situations. Under mission command, subordinates are required to use their initiative to make decisions that further their higher commander’s intent. Subordinates use the commander’s intent, together with the mission statement and concept of the operation, to accomplish the mission. Empowered with trust, authority, and a shared understanding, they can develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively under fluid, dynamic conditions. ADRP 6-0; 2-15

This excerpt describes the relationship between a commander and subordinate as a reciprocal, shared, mutual partnership. Collaboration and dialogue with subordinates ensures a shared understanding that allows the subordinate to almost know what the commander thinks, and to take action based on the idea that he or she knows what the commander would want them to do in the absence of orders. The description of an effective leader employs the strategy of rhetorically constructing the ideal relationship to subordinates in that the documents treat the commander and subordinate as two discrete
actors with complementary roles. The two actors of commander and subordinate are developed as characters in these texts that results in a general rhetorical relationship that is a distinguishing characteristic of both commander and subordinate.

Further describing the rhetorical effort to construct the relationship between the commander and subordinate, ADP 6-0 reminds the reader that “successful commanders act decisively, within the higher commander’s intent, and in the best interest of the organization” (ADP 6-0; 2-64). This excerpt was coded for Effective Leadership and Relationship of Commander to Subordinate because of the reference to a higher commander’s intent. That is, the commander being constructed in Army doctrine is also a subordinate in some way, because he or she also has a higher commander, and this relationship is also characterized by an expectation to take initiative within the boundaries of a shared understanding of the operation or campaign.

The Relationship Enables Disciplined Initiative

The reciprocal and empowering relationship underwriting mission command is a rhetorical mechanism that advances the argument that this relationship ensures disciplined initiative. The code co-occurrence in mission command doctrine of Relationship of Commander to Subordinate and Initiative and Intent further distinguishes the relationship between commander and subordinate by the characteristic of disciplined initiative. One such excerpt co-coded for the relationship and initiative reads: “They (commanders) encourage subordinates to bring creative and innovative ideas to the forefront. They also seek feedback from subordinates. The result is a command climate that encourages initiative and supports operational adaptability”
(ADRP 6-0; 2-75). In fact, this command climate shapes the Army’s entire operations process. ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, states that this operations process, the way of doing things in the Army, “requires a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to accept prudent risk and exercise disciplined initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent” (ADP 5-0; 4). The rhetorical construction of this relationship informs the way the Army “thinks” through an operation and is heavily marked by the rhetoric of disciplined initiative.

The rhetorical mechanisms that create the relationship between commander and subordinate in mission command doctrine and characterize this relationship with disciplined initiative move us closer to how the Army’s philosophy of command is articulated through an implied concept of *kairos*. Disciplined initiative means the professional soldier’s ability to recognize and act on fleeting opportunities within a commander’s intent. The level of control that is present in this relationship is actually intended to minimize direct control. That is, “successful commanders minimize risk and unify the effort by monitoring how well subordinates are using their authority and resources and exercising initiative” (ADRP 6-0; 2-52). One of the commander’s responsibilities is to ensure that his or her subordinates can act on their own, without orders or direct control. Of course, the commander’s intent defines the limits within which subordinates may exercise initiative, and this imposes a level of control on subordinates’ actions, but this enabling relationship hinges on support from the commander for disciplined initiative: “(subordinates) learn to trust their commander to give them authority to act, knowing the commander will back their decisions” (ADRP 6-0; 2-53). It is a commander’s role to support and promote disciplined initiative in their
relationship to subordinates.

In mission command, the Army professional is a figure characterized with the ability to make the correct choice at the correct time in concert with the larger effort. *Kairos* can help map the thought process of the Army professional that is based on a shared relationship and shared understanding throughout the force. To do this it’s necessary to analyze how disciplined initiative, as it is understood in Army doctrine, is used as a rhetorical mechanism to endow the Army professional with the ability to recognize and act on *kairos*.

**Kairos and Mission Command**

ADRP 1 increasingly uses language that imbues the Army professional with an expectation that these soldiers have the ability to act appropriately, with due measure, at the right time. More than responding to the dangers of combat with courageous and steady resolve, Army doctrine rhetorically constructs the soldier as a competent professional by way of comparison:

The professional must routinely make discretionary judgments and take *appropriate* action. Think of a surgeon performing surgery in an operating room, a military leader conducting security operations in a combat zone, or a civilian scientist doing research in an Army laboratory. All have trained for years, all are surrounded by technology, and all, as individual professionals, are granted autonomy to make right decisions and take right actions to contribute to their service, honorably. (ADRP 1; 1-8 emphasis added)

The ability to act autonomously and to be trusted to make the right decision in a given
circumstance is linked to professionalism. At this point ADP 1 and ADRP 1 have given the reader the idea that Army personnel are certified professionals, just like a doctor or a lawyer, and professionals necessarily know what appropriate decisions to make and actions to take, and when, on their own.

This doctrine can be understood as a theory of *kairos* that views the concept as an ability to “read” the kairotic moment and know when and how to respond, appropriately. This sort of kairotic literacy, in Army doctrine at least, is a function of the relationship between commander and subordinate and is acquired through certification as professionals and through a shared understanding of a commander’s intent. *Kairos as literacy* resembles the rhetoric in Army doctrine of a common understanding, or common mental construct, throughout the force. For example, in ADP 3, the operations doctrine, synchronization is described as “Allowing subordinate and adjacent units to use their common understanding of the operational environment and commander’s intent, in conjunction with their own initiative, to synchronize actions with those of other units without direct control from the higher headquarters” (ADP 3; 32). This is a way of articulating the idea of a collective literacy based in *kairos*.

The rhetorical effort in doctrine to describe a shared understanding is in part based on the fact that the US military is moving increasingly towards a joint environment, with all branches collaborating and working together to win the nation’s wars. It is well to note that the theme of the joint environment was coded in capstone doctrine 149 times. It is possible that one reason for the latest articulation of the competent Army professional who acts autonomously in seizing opportunities is that this doctrine is responding to the fact that these Army professionals are increasingly working
with other branches that may not share the same professional knowledge, but are nonetheless professionals themselves. The major themes that dominate Army capstone doctrine are professionalism and the ability to function autonomously but also in collaboration with other branches and agencies. These results suggest that it’s more important than ever for the Army professional to recognize their professional status in order to adapt and collaborate in a joint environment. It’s not just important for the Army professional to understand and be able to act autonomously within their own Army commander’s intent, but also to understand overall goals of joint campaigns and to think critically about how to collaborate and coordinate initiatives within the larger framework of the joint environment. The rhetorical effort of constructing an Army professional who acts autonomously is accompanied by the rhetorical effort to describe a shared understanding that leads to a synchronization of actions.

There is a lot of emphasis throughout capstone doctrine to avoid “direct control from higher headquarters,” and for the Army professional to be able to act in the absence of direct orders. A common understanding among Army professionals of Army doctrine and the Army ethic, along with a central commander’s intent that influences all actions, potentially indoctrinates all Army professionals, or at least those Army professionals operating under the same commander’s intent, with the same kairotic literacy. Doctrine is the rhetorical project that provides a common mental construct for recognizing and acting on opportunity. This suggests that similarly trained and certified Army professionals will necessarily react in the same manner to a kairotic moment, or opportunity. At the same time, the rhetoric of synchronization and unity of effort suggests that somehow this kairotic literacy among Army professionals will necessarily support unity of effort across
a theater of operations. This begins to point to Hawhee’s theory of *kairos* as athletic
instinct, but on a much larger scale than, say, a wrestling match or a foot race. As stated
in ADRP 1, “Every Soldier and Army Civilian has the opportunity to simultaneously be a
leader, follower and steward of the Army Profession” (ADRP 1; 2-23). Army doctrine
seems to be describing a collective understanding of right-timing and due measure.

Through the rhetorical efforts to define the ways in which to take action, doctrine
reflects theories of *kairos* that attempt to explain how a rhetor recognizes and seizes an
opportunity to speak. Army professionals, commanders and subordinates alike, are
expected to seize the initiative. The mission command philosophy of command develops
and extends the characteristic of disciplined initiative to explain conditions of decision
making that emphasize right-timing, or the ability to recognize the appropriate moment
and measure for action. TRADOC’s mission to write and publish doctrine that is
specifically meant to articulate the intellectual underpinnings of the profession is a
rhetorical attempt to provide Army personnel with a common perspective from which to
make and assess decisions up and down the chain of command. Theories of *kairos* in
rhetoric studies are similar attempts to describe the ways and means with which a rhetor
makes the appropriate decision at the right time in order to accomplish pre-established
goals.

ADP 6-0, *Mission Command* defines mission command as follows:

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander
using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s
intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land
operations. ADP 6-0; 2
This excerpt suggests that every Army professional is expected to have the same ability to recognize and act appropriately in response to kairotic moments. Mission command doctrine presupposes that “some decisions must be made quickly at the point of action,” (ADP 6-0; 5) and each Army professional must be able to instinctively respond and take action. Furthermore Army professionals are expected to coordinate their actions with the rest of the force to provide what Army doctrine calls “unity of effort.” Within a commander’s intent, which concentrates on the objectives of an operation rather than how to achieve it, Army professionals, including subordinates working towards the goals in the commander’s intent, “exercise disciplined initiative to respond to unanticipated problems” (ADP 6-0; 5). Through the rhetoric of professionalism and disciplined initiative, capstone and mission command doctrine construct a common way of thinking in the Army that presupposes that “every Soldier must be prepared to assume responsibility, maintain unity of effort, take prudent action, and act resourcefully within the commander’s intent” (ADP 6-0; 5). Mission command doctrine assumes an awareness among all Army professionals that constitutes a “shared understanding throughout the force” (ADP 6-0; 6). It is this shared understanding that accompanies the Army professional’s ability to act autonomously that points to a theory of collective kairotic literacy, and a shared *kairos*.

**Kairos as Shared Instinct**

Mission command doctrine easily translates to existing theories of *kairos*. For example, mission command doctrine states that “Subordinates, by understanding the commander’s intent and the overall common objective, are then able to adapt to rapidly
changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities” (ADP 6-0; 6). Exploiting fleeting opportunities is a touchstone of current theories of *kairos*. Mission command as a framework for decision making includes the characteristic of “due measure,” along with right timing, and encompasses the theory of *kairos* as ability: “When given sufficient latitude, they (subordinates) can accomplish assigned tasks in a manner that fits the situation” (ADP 6-0; 6). “Fits the situation” is the language that aligns with “due measure.” So mission command describes an ability to recognize moments of opportunity to take action, just as the rhetor has the ability to recognize moments of opportunity to speak.

Mission command doctrine extends this ability a bit further, and includes the idea that “The commander’s intent defines the limits within which subordinates may exercise initiative” (ADP 6-0; 17). This can be understood as the commander’s intent influencing what counts as “right timing” and “due measure,” and suggests the commander’s ability to purposefully establish the boundaries of kairotic moments for the force. Army professionals rely on a shared understanding of the commander’s intent for “the confidence to apply their judgment in ambiguous and urgent situations because they know the mission’s purpose, key task, and desired end state” (ADP 6-0; 17). If theories of *kairos* focus on recognizing moments of opportunity and responding appropriately, and mission command doctrine states that “commanders focus on creating opportunities,” then this doctrine is a rhetorical effort to articulate a philosophy of command that actually aligns with theories of *kairos* that allow for some manipulation and creation of kairotic moments.

What the rhetoric of Army doctrine does to push these theories further is to
include an understanding of *kairos* as an instinct in the Army professional, and even further that Army professionals, at least those operating under the same commander’s intent, can perceive kairotic moments similarly and synchronize their actions and synchronize their appropriate responses to ensure unity of effort towards the same goals.

One such excerpt that came from coding mission command doctrine hints at the idea that there is something instinctual and shared among Army professionals:

“Commanders use the philosophy of mission command to exploit and enhance uniquely human skills. Commanders implement mission command through the balancing of the art of command with the science of control” (ADP 6-0; 22). This excerpt was coded for Effective Leadership, and I take this to be a rhetorical strategy that frames the intangible, but nonetheless felt, unity of effort and shared understanding throughout the Army as a uniquely human instinct.

Without the rhetoric of shared understanding this command style might be dangerous and unpredictable. Mission command is not new, and has been the Army’s preferred command style since the 1980s, and is simplified in the expectation of commanders that subordinates act appropriately when opportunity arises. The rhetorical mechanisms that lead to a relationship that enables disciplined initiative and empowering subordinates to act in response to situations as they personally see fit must be accompanied by the rhetoric of shared understanding; otherwise unity of effort would not be possible.

Furthermore, the way that Army doctrine describes disciplined initiative as a unique human ability points to an instinctive collective understanding between commander and subordinate:
This philosophy of command helps commanders capitalize on the human ability to take action to develop the situation and integrate military operations to achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state. Mission command emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative. This precept guides leaders toward mission accomplishment (ADRP 6-0; 1-5).

There is a lot to unpack in this quotation from the reference publication for mission command doctrine.

This excerpt, coded for Initiative and Intent, seems to describe kairos, as it is understood as taking the initiative, as a human instinct. The rhetoric of integration points to a collective human instinct. The synchronization that a shared understanding of both the commander’s intent and the operational environment enables can be applied to theories of kairos in order to extend the soldier’s kairotic understanding, or a sort of kairotic literacy and ability, from an individual to an entire group. This places great importance on understanding the centralized intent that guides soldiers’ perception of and responses to kairotic moments, guides the actions they choose to take to “develop the situation” to create their own kairotic opportunities, and influences their natural instinct or “human ability” to take action in response to opportunity.

Acting on Instinct in the Absence of Orders

Mission command doctrine can be understood simply to align with theories of kairos as internal ability and outside force, but it takes a little more digging to understand how it aligns with a theory of kairos as instinct and to then conceive of a collective kairotic instinct. Kairos as instinctive ability appears in mission command when there are
lapses in knowledge and understanding of a situation:

Adaptive leaders realize that concrete answers or perfect solutions to operational problems are rarely apparent. They understand that there may be periods of reduced uncertainty as the situation evolves. Agile and adaptive leaders use initiative to set and dictate the terms of action. They accept they will often have to act despite significant gaps in their understanding. (ADRP 6-0; 1-6).

Even though unity of effort is based largely on a shared understanding of the operational environment and commander’s intent, appropriate action is still possible on an instinctual level, when soldiers lack a clear understanding of the situation.

In the absence of information or understanding of the situation, synchronized and coordinated disciplined initiative becomes an innate ability of the Army professional to read the kairos of a situation appropriately:

Leaders and subordinates who exercise disciplined initiative create opportunity by taking action to develop the situation. Disciplined initiative is action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. (ADRP 6-0; 2-16)

It is in this realm of less information that mission command doctrine can have implications for theories of kairos as instinct. In Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece, Debra Hawhee traces the two existing models of kairos in contemporary rhetoric studies. As she notes, Kinneavy laid the groundwork for the “accommodation” model of kairos, whereby kairos directs the rhetor to consider and adapt to the tones and moods of the situation at hand. This model includes the concepts of due measure and propriety. Beyond that there is the “creation” model of kairos where the rhetor creates the
opening for a rhetorical response. Both of these ideas, of reasoned accommodation and persuasive creation, have placed *kairos* outside of the rhetor. Debra Hawhee argues that there is room for an immanent, embodied, mobile, and nonrational version of rhetorical *kairos* as an “immanent awareness.”

To begin understanding how *kairos* can be understood as embodied by the rhetor, Hawhee discusses rhetoric as an art of *hexis*, or bodily comportment. *Hexis* can be cultivated by *arête*, which means virtuosity, and is inseparable from bodily actions. This means that rhetoric is a bodily art just like athletics. Athletics in ancient Greece took place in the *agon*, which simply means the struggle or contest, and also includes the place where wars take place and are won and lost. As Hawhee notes, in the spirit of the *agon*, or struggle, bodies became bodies, bodies capable of action and identity formation. In this sense, connecting *kairos* to the *agon* means that *kairos* only emerges when a “player,” or soldier, is engaged in the contingencies of a particular situation and occurs within that situation. Based on this understanding complete creative control or sheer accommodation are impossible when *kairos* is connected to the *agon*, because the *kairos* doesn’t exist outside of the contest or play. In this sense rhetoric is an immanent art, one in which shifting conditions or countermoves can’t be known in advance. This begins to develop a theory of *kairos* as an instinct.

Hawhee continues her analysis by invoking the earliest understandings of *kairos*, before it was taken up in rhetoric. “The kairotic arts of medicine and navigation thus help foreground the way *kairos* entails the twin abilities to notice and respond with both mind and body. In other words, the capacity for discerning *kairos*—especially in the context of the struggling *agon*, depends on a ready, perceptive body” (Hawhee 71). Here Hawhee
starts to disarticulate the idea of “discerning kairos” from cognitive recognition, getting rid of the “discerning” part to where a kairotic response becomes an instinct and a part of a nonrational register. It becomes a kairos of inspiration. Here in her analysis Hawhee has brought up the idea of kairos as aperture, or opening, but not necessarily a force somewhere “out there” acting on the rhetor. Instead, the rhetor “opens him or herself up to the immediate situation, allowing for more of an exchange than the creation or accommodation models of kairos” (Hawhee 71). It is this understanding of kairos as an instinctual or bodily capacity for instantaneous response that aligns with mission command, and the context of the Army gives us the even more complicated idea of a synchronized and coordinated sense of kairos. Hawhee uses the words “immanent, rhythmic, and embodied” to describe her theory of kairos, and the word “rhythmic” invokes concepts of synchronized action; actions in rhythm with other actions.

Trying to think kairos not only through the body, but through multiple, synchronized bodies is difficult because the idea of immanent, embodied kairos resists any kind of rational design. Hawhee explains this best when she states that “While these versions (accommodation/creation) of kairos require the ‘rhetor’—a discrete, rational being—to decode a ‘rhetorical situation’ from outside (step one), and then consciously select or create ‘appropriate’ arguments (step two), kairos provides a point of departure from reasoned, linear steps—even from consciousness” (Hawhee 78). The idea that there is no overarching principle or rational design in this model is based on the fact that the fleeting nature of kairos necessitates a move away from a privileging of “design” or preformulated principles. That is, these so-called principles of right-timing and due measure could be so habituated and embodied that they do not require “thinking” per se.
This is the part of Hawhee’s analysis that moves rhetoric beyond reason and leads her back to Isocrates, whose view was that “kairois thus flees epistemology, eluding the systematic definition desired by Dionysius of Halicarnassus” (Hawhee 84). This begs the question that if kairos cannot be known, then how can it be taught? Can it even be theorized or codified like the philosophy of mission command? Hawhee, invoking Isocrates, suggests that we might “foster a kind of synthetic, embodied training that relies on the repeated production of encounters” (Hawhee 84). Perhaps the physical nature of Army training that concerns pedagogies of both rhetoric and athletics, that is, training of the mind and body, is a context in which kairos as an instinctual, bodily capacity for instantaneous response can be uncovered. Furthermore, the chaotic nature of the operational environment in which Army professionals function provides a context to study the idea that this bodily capacity can be synchronized and coordinated throughout a large group, forming a collective instinct. This introduces the idea of a shared kairos and a shared kairotic literacy.

The next step is to try to uncover how something like kairos as collective human instinct can be taught. Hawhee suggests that the concept of kairos as it applies to ancient rhetorical practices might be instructed in the form of exemplary display, a training that emphasizes the teaching body and the learning body. At the heart of this training concept is the notion of bodily transformation, or “the capacity to respond and transform in different situations” (Hawhee 86). Citing Protagoras, Hawhee describes this bodily transformation as it relates to sophistic techne, and uncovers that sophistic arts like poetry, music and athletics “hold the promise of self-improvement (beltious esomenous, ‘becoming better’) attained through students’ ‘linking to’ (suneinai) those sophists who
practice them” (Hawhee 87). The relationship between sophist and student mirrors the relationship in mission command between commander and subordinate.

The relationship between commander and subordinate has been established as one of empowerment, whereby “commanders allocate resources and provide a clear intent that guides subordinates’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative” (ADP 6-0; 6). This excerpt was coded for the relationship between commander and subordinate and initiative and intent. There is a sort of “linking to” the commander’s intent and the overall objectives of an operation apparent in mission command doctrine. The concept of “acting resourcefully within the commander’s intent” describes a connection between commander and subordinate made possible by Army training that is based on doctrine and results in what Hawhee describes as a “cunning sensibility (metis) as well as a kind of kairotic deployment” that characterized training in the sophistic arts in ancient Greece (Hawhee 87). The Army provides an example where the training and education that result in this kairotic linkage between commander and subordinate takes place on a grand scale.

Mission command doctrine thus seems to be a rhetorical project of developing a philosophy of command that conceives of kairos as a shared human instinct that can actually be cultivated among large groups. It is possible that we might use Army doctrine as a model for advancing pedagogies of rhetoric as embodied action to rhetoric as a shared embodied reaction. The Army’s philosophy of command reaches past a system of command and control and articulates a chain of command that is founded on nurturing the soldier’s confidence and ability to act autonomously. More than that, the soldier’s innate ability, or natural human capacity to exercise disciplined initiative provide the context and the rhetoric with which scholars can theorize the body’s role in spontaneous
and instinctual rhetorical performance in general.
The Doctrine 2015 Initiative itself represents a kairotic moment, for both the Army and for rhetoric studies. Over the 40-year history of TRADOC, Army doctrine has evolved as it collects more and newer information, reorients its focus to reflect the latest vision of Army commanders and in response to the latest threats the Army is expected to confront. After a decade of being engaged in multiple conflicts, TRADOC has recognized this moment in history as the opportunity to be seized for updating their body of professional knowledge. The latest effort to hierarchicalize and synthesize this body of knowledge is also an opportunity for scholars to analyze doctrinal text as it is situated in a value-laden framework created by the Army. The new framework, or hierarchy, identifies for the researcher, and for Army personnel, the information that contains the fundamental principles that underlie the existence of this American institution. For the civilian with no military experience, this is a great opportunity to analyze and make credible claims about the concept of the Army profession as understood by the Army itself. Doctrine 2015 distills the information pertinent to understanding a thought process and an ethos of the Army into relatively short publications designed to communicate an essence of what the Army is. Doctrine provides an entrance, or invitation, into a conversation with the Army. Capstone doctrine and mission command doctrine in particular function as self-reflective statements about the Army, and offer the researcher a chance to engage conversationally with these texts, starting a collaborative relationship that has the potential to advance both written Army doctrine and rhetoric studies.

In order to enter the conversation, however, it was still necessary to develop a system for understanding these uniquely military texts from a rhetorical perspective. The
method of coding was used to engage this corpus ended up being quite fruitful. As a pilot study, this dissertation demonstrates how computer-aided coding software produces multiple perspectives from which to view the text. It is a method that functions as a sort of rhetorical dissection of a corpus, capable of identifying and segmenting specific rhetorical features in order to take a closer look. Furthermore, this dissection has the potential to reveal how systems of persuasion work in a document. That is, the appearance of code co-occurrences reveals the interplay between two or more rhetorical features in a corpus that have a cumulative persuasive effect. The constitutive nature of some rhetorical strategies points to larger, overall systems of persuasion that can be further analyzed for unexpected consequences. The code co-occurrences that were noticed in the data demonstrated interactions between rhetorical themes. The relationships that characterize the co-occurrences that appeared offered depth to the rhetorical analysis. The banks of excerpts produced by these co-occurrences provide the different parts, or mechanisms, that drive the whole system of persuasion in the documents and provide a unique perspective of Army doctrine. Together the rhetorical mechanisms in the corpus constitute a remarkably complete theory of *kairos* that is founded in the embodied disciplined initiative of the Army professional.

*Implications for Theories of Kairos*

Observing the ways in which Army doctrine reflects theories of *kairos* provides a context for studying how the notion of right-timing is understood within a particular profession, and can be compared and contrasted with other professional institutions. Army doctrine articulates an understanding of the notions contained in theories of *kairos*
such as recognizing opportunity and responding with the appropriate measures at the right time, or seizing the initiative. Furthermore, Army doctrine answers questions of pedagogical importance concerning the ability to teach *kairos*, and whether or not *kairos* is an internal ability that the actor has to recognize and shape opportunity, or an external force that is exerted on the actor. The ability to teach and learn *kairos* in the context of the Army is based on professionalism and a particular relationship between commanders and subordinates that might not define other professional settings. The Army certifies Army professionals with expert knowledge, and this cultivation of the Army as a profession is used to justify autonomous action and self-regulation among the members of the profession. The Army provides indoctrination into the profession with an established ethic and an ethos that can be learned, and this knowledge becomes the principles that guide a soldier’s actions. This education informs how the soldier recognizes and responds to kairotic moments. The soldier learns the boundaries of good taste, so to speak, and learns how to develop an understanding of right-timing based on overarching principles like the Army ethic, and also how to tailor actions to respond appropriately to changing orders or in the absence of orders based on a commander’s intent.

Communication of the commander’s intent and an empowering command climate provide a look at how mutual and shared understanding between commander and subordinate, cultivated in part through Army doctrine, characterize a method of training that emphasizes a linkage between commander and subordinate that results in a kairotic deployment of disciplined initiative among all Army professionals. The soldier learns that seizing the initiative is an ability that each Army professional can rely upon when making
decisions in the face of fleeting opportunities. By being certified with expert professional knowledge, the Army professional learns how to recognize fleeting moments of opportunity and learns how to think critically through an appropriate response that will also ensure unity of effort among the larger force.

The “linking to” a commander, or in the context of ancient Greece, a sophist, is a compelling notion to explore further in the Army’s philosophy of command. This suggests a mentoring relationship between commander and subordinate that might not resonate with common conceptions of an Army climate defined in part by following orders and not questioning superiors. Instead what is described in mission command is closer to a professional partnership that is intended to empower those soldiers lower in the chain of command. This provides insight into how we might study the rhetorical strategies in Army doctrine that work to construct the citizen-soldier, a competent and active member of society. As in ancient Greece, the relationship between commander and subordinate, or teacher and student, is meant to produce a well-rounded and ethical citizen. It is possible to extract a pedagogy from the Army’s articulation of an effective leadership role and the role of a competent student, or subordinate.

For example, a writing course built around a sophistic, bodily pedagogy might borrow strategies from military education. Hawhee describes athletic training and training in rhetoric as requiring intense repetition in order to make habitual the component skills of either discipline, to then be used with improvisation in “real world” settings. We have a perfect example of this pedagogy at work right here at Virginia Tech and the Corps of Cadets. In the three weeks prior to the start of the Fall semester, cadets are trained by a cadre in bodily comportment, such as how to march properly together as
a unit. This physical literacy is displayed in a pass-in-review before the first week of class. This bodily comportment reaches into the cadets’ non-military education and results in the training of both mind and body that Isocrates argued was an effort to shape the entire self. The idea of an embodied *kairos* leads to the inability to separate the body from education.

Furthermore, *kairos* can be studied as it relates to the genre of commander’s intent. It is possible to textually analyze a written commander’s intent, and then observe the actions taken within a commander’s intent in the absence of direct orders. It is possible to study and theorize about how a written commander’s intent affects subordinates’ understanding of the boundaries of disciplined initiative within that intent. We can essentially study how, and how much, rhetoric in the form of the commander’s intent affects the *kairos* in different contexts and at different levels of Army operations. The context of the Army allows theories of *kairos* to be used in analyzing physical responses to opportunities as well as rhetorical responses, allowing theories of *kairos* to reflect its original meaning. This approach has the potential to serve both military and academic contexts.

*Implications for Mission Command*

Understanding the mission command philosophy of command within the framework of theories of *kairos* in contemporary rhetoric studies provides a bridge between the two communities that can aid in understanding the Army’s thought process. The doctrine primer goes so far as to describe doctrine, and in particular the high level ADPs, as *how the Army thinks*. Rhetoric scholars can use theories of *kairos* to better
understand mission command and the thought process that guides military action, and
this can lead to a more collaborative relationship between scholars and the military. This
framework can help the Army explain to the public why certain actions are taken, and to
communicate more effectively to civilian audiences why certain actions are appropriate
in furthering a commander’s intent. It identifies the thought process for actions taken by
individual commanders and subordinates, and this can aid in how the Army might
respond rhetorically to inquiries about specific operations or campaigns.

The connection of mission command to *kairos* also has the potential for a
collaborative project that takes a closer look at the genre of commander’s intent. The
communicative act of writing a commander’s intent contributes to defining the
boundaries of what is an acceptable and appropriate response to kairotic moments in the
context of the Army. The relationship between a commander and subordinate that is
foundational to defining appropriate action can be studied and analyzed in the context of
these high-level publications in a way not possible before TRADOC engaged in this self-
reflective project of hierarchicalizing doctrinal knowledge.

This study also offers the observation that the philosophy of mission command
relies heavily on the ethos of professionalism established in capstone doctrine. The ethos
of professionalism covered in ADP 1 influences the *kairos* in all Army situations, up and
down the chain of command. Arguably, professionalism defines the boundaries of
appropriate action, or disciplined initiative, for all Army professionals all the time. As its
status as ADP 1, capstone doctrine publication, *The Army*, this document has bearing on
all Army conduct, and transfers a culture of professionalism throughout the Army. In
essence, the question any Army professional has about how to act, or how to respond
appropriately to a perceived opportunity, is answered or influenced by what is professional conduct. This will have implications for the future development of the force and the Army’s place in American society.

Limitations of This Study

The Army, even though it is now self-identified as a profession alongside other professions such as law or medicine, retains unique characteristics that make it difficult to understand this organization in the same ways a civilian understands the profession of doctor or lawyer. The average citizen interacts with doctors and lawyers, and enters and participates in the domains of these professions. We interact with and participate in the medical profession as early as birth. We get regular checkups, we collaborate with medical professionals on treatments, and we give our own input when facing the choices affecting our own health. We might hire a lawyer for legal troubles or to purchase a house, seek advice when constructing a will, or use legal services to sue for damages. We might even hire a lawyer for something as simple as a traffic ticket. We meet lawyers in their offices and sit next to them in court. We interact with police officers and accountants and teachers.

While we certainly recognize Army professionals out and about in the world wearing uniforms, we don’t necessarily have occasion, or permission, to visit an Army base, or board a Navy ship, or fly on an Air Force transport. We do elect officials based in part on their stances on the military, and we hold rallies to support our troops or stage protests against decisions to engage in military conflict. But we don’t necessarily have the occasion to enter the domain of the Army profession the way that we would enter the
professional domain of a doctor or a lawyer. The methodological approach used in this study and the decision to analyze a corpus of texts that represents the knowledge and thought process of the Army can bridge that gap and allow the civilian researcher to enter the domain of the Army professional.

Applying coding methods to these texts is a first step, but still lacks research into how this Army doctrine actually manifests in real day to day actions that are being taken by Army professionals. The dissertation thus lacks a perspective of how mission command doctrine that articulates and emphasizes the importance of disciplined initiative among Army professionals is actually captured in the education and training that goes on in the Army. What is missing is a look at doctrine in action and an assessment of how well the principles contained in capstone and mission command doctrine are understood throughout different levels of leadership within the Army.

This dissertation is textually focused on the Army doctrine publications available and that was a conscious decision to limit the scope of this study. As a result there is future motivation to expand the study to include human research subjects in order to collect input and perspectives from Army professionals themselves. This kind of expansion could envelope research questions about how Army professionals are exposed to doctrine, how doctrine manifests in training and education, and how doctrine functions at different levels of command and in different contexts and situations.

Suggestions for Further Research

As a pilot study, the methods used in this dissertation can be applied to any profession or organization that writes and publishes doctrine. These experimental
methods can be used to research groups, organizations, or professions that are hard to reach, either physically or experientially. These approaches can open up new and exciting sites of research that might feel closed or inaccessible to outsiders.

For this particular study of Army doctrine, as stated above, interaction with any Army professionals as human research subjects would be valuable. In particular, getting access to Army professionals stationed in TRADOC as research subjects would open up an exciting new avenue to explore exactly how doctrine is drafted and published. A look at the physical writing process could have potential implications for topics in professional and technical communications such as collaborative writing projects and information and knowledge management.

Interviewing human research subjects that are Army professionals can lead to more productive findings concerning pedagogy that can be beneficial in rhetoric and composition studies. Mission command doctrine defines a successful relationship between commander and subordinate, and closer cooperation between researchers and Army professionals can uncover how this doctrine can be used to advance theories of kairos in a classroom setting. This approach has the potential to build a productive relationship between scholars and Army professionals.

In addition to reaching out to Army professionals as research participants, further research should consider new strategies for physically entering the domain of Army and other military professionals. Becoming a participant observer at any level of the Army profession would allow for a closer look at how doctrine manifests in the relationships and actions that shape the culture of the Army. This could also provide insight into how
doctrine might be taught experientially, in the form of sanctioned and unsanctioned behavior in a military setting.

Something else to consider is to study the physical, written commander’s intents alongside the operations and actions that are the result of these intents, and which are expected to comply with these intents. This approach has the potential to raise and answer questions about the boundaries created by these rhetorical artifacts and how an intent is interpreted at different levels of Army command. This context is a step removed from training and inculcation and is actually situated in a field of operations, on a battlefield, where the fog of war and Murphy’s law could lend insight into how soldier’s act in changing conditions, in the absence of orders, or when orders no longer apply.

Finally, professional military education should be studied. Professional Military Education (PME) refers to the professional training, development, and schooling of military personnel. It encompasses many schools, universities, and training programs designed to foster leadership in military service members. Researching how doctrine, understood as the professional body of knowledge of the military, influences and is encapsulated in professional military education can lead to more insight and implications for theories of *kairos* and how it might be taught. This type of focus would be especially fruitful for research looking to expand notions of pedagogy in the university. The Army context offers a model to compare and contrast with our own department and program doctrine and pedagogies.
Works Cited


Drury, A. Cooper, L. Marvin Overby, A. Ang, and Yitan Li. "'Pretty Prudent' or Rhetorically Responsive?: The American Public's Support for Military Action."

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Appendix A: Summaries

CAPSTONE DOCTRINE

Google search “TRADOC,” and click on the first link, www.tradoc.army.mil. The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command website opens with an Army fatigue color scheme and links to featured news and a .pdf of the US Army Operating Concept. The words “Win in a Complex World,” appear twice on the home page, once on the top right, and once as the first tab on the left-hand side, above the other tabs that offer an index of the role of TRADOC. The first tab under “Win in a Complex World,” is “What is TRADOC for?” Beneath that are tabs that answer that question: “Design, Build, Develop, Innovate, Centers of Excellence,” all of which offer a brief description based on the title word, such as “TRADOC designs the future Army.” The descriptions under the tabs “Design, Build, Develop, Innovate, Centers of Excellence,” all point to the individual centers that serve the purposes of TRADOC, like the Army Capabilities Integration Center, or ARCIC, that, according to the website, “is responsible for developing concepts and capabilities, evaluating proposed modernization solutions, and integrating these capabilities across doctrine and materiel development, organizational design, training, leader development and education, personnel management, and facility domains.” Under the “Build” tab, the website lists the US Army’s Recruiting Command, Center for Initial Military Training, and Cadet Command. Through these institutions, the website states, “TRADOC serves as the foundation for the ‘Start Strong’ phase of every Soldier’s career.” Under the develop tab, the website lists the Combined Arms Center as the leader of TRADOC. “Led by the Combined Arms Center, a three-star command
located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, TRADOC manages the Army schools and centers that develop innovative and agile leaders and Trusted Professionals ready to lead formations and defeat the nation’s enemies.” In the second paragraph in the “Develop” tab, the website states: “TRADOC also develops and maintains the Army’s doctrine—the body of thought on how Army forces operate as an integral part of a joint force. Developing leaders is the foundation for success for the Army’s future. TRADOC’s goal is to create an institutional learning environment that is challenging, dynamic, free flowing and exciting.” Across the top of the page is another set of tabs, “Home, About, Leaders, Organizations, Army U (training), Doctrine, Connect, and Publications & Resources.” Clicking on the “Doctrine” tab navigates the user away from TRADOC’s homepage, and redirects to the United States Army Combined Arms Center, or CAC, homepage.

The CAC homepage includes 5 main links in the body of the page, “Current Doctrine, Comprehensive Doctrine Guide, Joint Electronic Library, Multimedia Resources, and Historical Doctrine.” There is a clearance required to access the Joint Electronic Library and the Historical Doctrine links. Clicking on the “Current Doctrine” link, the user is directed to armypubs.army.mil, a page that offers links to .pdfs of official Department of the Army publications and forms. The page is titled at the top, “Official Department of the Army Publications and Forms.” The product map that follows begins with Administrative publications such as Army Directives and Army Regulations publications, and also includes a link to Department of the Army Letterhead and Instructions. Below the Administrative level is the Technical and Equipment level that
includes links to Technical Manuals and Technical Bulletins. Below that is the Doctrine and Training publications.

Clicking on the link, “ADP-Army Doctrine Publications,” the user is directed to a long list of publications and links to the corresponding .pdfs. There is a link at the top of the page that directs the user to the Army Techniques Publications Wiki, which requires authorization.
Clicking on the other links to ADRPs, ATPs, ATTPs, FMs and so on, the user is directed to similar repositories of .pdf documents. Clicking on the PDF link to ADP 1, *The Army*, a .pdf document is opened on the user’s computer.
The title page of ADP 1, *The Army*, includes three images of men and women in uniform. The first is a line of men and women in Army uniform with their right hands raised, as if taking an oath. The second image is of a soldier in full battle kit sitting down his rifle, presumably aiming at something, with a desert landscape in the background. The third image is of a similarly equipped soldier extending his hand to a small child. The child has its back to the camera, while the soldier is seen smiling at the child.

The first two pages after the cover are The Soldier’s Creed and Warrior Ethos, and The Army Civilian Creed, respectively. The two creeds are printed over images. The Soldier’s Creed and Warrior Ethos is printed over what appears to be a helicopter door gunner, and The Army Civilian Creed is printed over the image of a woman working on some sort of electronic device in what appears to be the back seat of a helicopter, the pilot visible in the background. The woman is not in uniform, but wearing an overcoat that looks business-casual.

Immediately following those creeds and the images, there is a Foreword written by Raymond T. Odierno, General, United States Army Chief of Staff, and bears Odierno’s signature. In the Foreword, General Odierno states that this ADP, ADP 1 *The Army*, is a capstone publication that frames how “we, as the Soldiers and Civilians of the United States Army, think about the strategic environment, develop and refine doctrine, and chart a course into the future.” In the Foreword, Odierno stresses the importance of highlighting the professionalism of the Army force, which is connected to the trust between the Army and the American people. Odierno points out that over 237 years, the US Army has not only won wars in decisive action, but has also conducted humanitarian assistance operations, operations in support of allies and support to civil authorities. With
this in mind, Odierno describes a period of transition for the Army that is revealing an increasingly complex strategic environment in which technological advances have changed the nature of communication and interaction. Reflecting on the past decade of war, Odierno stresses the centrality of human beings in all aspects of military operations. While technology has the potential to simplify military operations, Odierno argues that warfare remains a fundamentally human endeavor, and a core strength of the Army is being able to interact with populations. Following this he concludes with some remarks on how the Army functions as part of the joint force, with warfighting as their primary mission, and the fundamental principle in which everything the Army does should be grounded.

The table of contents page includes an asterisk at the top right, and the text:

“*ADP 1 (FM 1)” as this publication is the latest iteration of FM 1. This is unknown unless the reader has read the doctrine primer, ADP 1-01, which explains the transition from a publications scheme that has all information types under one heading, the Field Manual, to the new publications hierarchy, or unless the reader is in the service and has a general knowledge of the capstone doctrine publications. At the bottom of the page is another asterisk: “*This publication supersedes FM 1, 14 June 2005.” This publication, ADP 1, is Army Doctrine Publication no. 1, and was issued on 9/17/2012. The document is 76 pages long, and includes four chapters after a preface and introduction: Our Service; Our Profession; The Army and the Joint Force; and Our Continuing Duty. It also includes two appendices, a glossary, and references.

The preface gives more description of the document itself, stating that ADP 1 is prepared under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army, that it is his vision for the
Army, and that this publication “states what the Army is, what the Army does, how the
Army does it, and where the Army is going. It establishes the Army’s contribution to
America’s landpower. ADP 1 delineates the Army’s mission, purpose, and roles, deriving
them from the Constitution; the Congress, in Title 10, United States Code; and the
Department of Defense, in Department of Defense Directive 5100.01.” The preface states
that Army doctrine is supportive and consistent with joint doctrine, and that ADP 1
connects Army doctrine to joint doctrine, and that ADP 1 also links the National Security,
National Defense, and National Military Strategies with the Army’s operational doctrine,
which is outlined in ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*.

The preface states the principle audience for ADP 1, including combatant
commanders, other services, all serving soldiers, and all Army civilians. It also states that
the United States Army Combined Arms Center is the proponent for this publication. The
preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army
Combined Arms Center. There is an address given if the reader wishes to send written
comments and recommendations.

The introduction begins with the history of the Army, dating back to the first year
of the American Revolution, on 14 June 1775, when the Second Continental Congress
established the American Continental Army, making the United States Army the senior
service of the Armed Forces. The Army is one of the oldest American institutions,
predating the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Furthermore, the
introduction mentions that the Army flag has over 180 campaign and battle streamers.
The introduction states: “Because of the Army, the United States is independent and one
undivided nation. The Army explored the Louisiana Purchase, ended slavery on the
battlefields of the Civil War, helped build the Panama Canal, played a major part in winning two world wars, stood watch throughout the Cold War, deposed Saddam Hussein, and took the fight to Al Qaeda.” The introductory figure accompanying the introduction is subtitled “Soldiers—the strength of the nation,” and depicts a group of soldiers in the foreground with two helicopters overhead in the background. After the figure, the introduction poses and answers the question “What does the uniform of the Army represent?” The answer is that the uniform represents for the soldier that they have become part of something bigger than themselves and have a chance to serve their country and change the world. It means danger, fatigue and stress; for Army families it means both pride and anxiety; for veterans it represents one of the most important periods of their lives; for the American citizen, the uniform represents patriotism and selfless service.

The Army soldier represents a lot according to the introduction, as it continues to state that people around the world recognize the American soldier as a symbol of the United States just as they do the White House or Washington Monument. The introduction recognizes Army soldiers as sons, daughters, relatives, neighbors, allies and a signal of American commitment during a crisis. To enemies, the soldier represents America’s means to win wars. The introduction makes special mention of the young Americans who volunteer and reenlist everyday, then includes the oath in italics, followed by an explanation that through the oath, soldiers effectively affirm subordination to the Nation’s elected civilian leadership and abstain from public political involvement. The soldier’s sacrifice is a foundation of the profession, as warfighting as the primary mission of the Army is a fundamental principle of the Army in which
everything they do should be grounded. The introduction ends with a paragraph recognizing the soldiers’ reliance on the support of the Army Civilian Corps, and a paragraph of concluding remarks on the heritage of resolve of the US Army.

Before the chapters begin, there is an entire page with one image: a silhouette of a soldier, head looking down, weapon relaxed and pointed down, and underneath the silhouette the words: “The United States Army—The Strength of the Nation.” There is one final page of authorization before page one of chapter one, that lists and dates the ADP at the top right, and then states “By Order of the Secretary of the Army;” followed by General Odierno’s title, but no signature, and then Joyce Morrow’s title as Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, with her signature.

Chapter 1 then begins, “Our Service,” with a quote from the 2012 Army Posture Statement. The annual Army Posture Statement is an unclassified summary of Army roles, missions, accomplishments, plans, and programs, available at www.army.mil. The quote used from the 2012 statement lists characteristics of the Army as agile, adaptable and capable, while asserting that the Army reflects the diversity and values that built the nation such as hard work, duty, selflessness, determination, honor and compassion. After the quote but before the document begins a numbered paragraph scheme with chapter 1, paragraph 1, there is a brief paragraph explaining the land domain, the purview of the Army. The land domain is listed as the most complex of the domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace) because it addresses cultures, ethnicities, religions, and politics. Landpower is identified as usually the arbiter of victory. With this brief description of the land domain, chapter 1, paragraph 1 begins, “The Land Domain.”
The first paragraph emphasizes the distinguishing characteristic of the land domain: the presence of humans in large numbers. This characteristic; humans; affects almost every aspect of land operations as soldiers operate among populations. This paragraph emphasizes the fact that because of this human characteristic, winning battles and engagements must be augmented by the Army’s ability to manage populations and civilian authorities in order to produce lasting change in the conditions that spawned the conflict. The next paragraph introduces the idea of “shaping,” as an important role of Army soldiers. Shaping is defined as altering conditions that, if left unchanged, can precipitate international crisis or war. Shaping is accomplished by cooperation with partner nations designed to improve their own security while often allowing the US more access in key regions.

The next section that begins with paragraph 1-4 is titled “Land Operations,” and describes land combat against an armed adversary as an intense, lethal human activity. Land combat includes complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty. Paragraph 1-4 is a dizzying account of the complexity of modern warfare, where soldiers will have to deal with a battlefield teeming with noncombatants and crowded with infrastructure; a battlefield that includes regular, irregular, and paramilitary enemy forces that possess advanced weapons; enemy forces that employ terror, criminal activity, and technologically advanced communication networks. Paragraph 1-5 admits that any Army mission can rapidly become a combination of combat, governance, and civil security, and that most missions require combinations of lethal and nonlethal actions conducted in the midst of noncombatants.
Paragraph 1-6 introduces the Army’s basic operational doctrine, ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. This operational doctrine emphasizes the necessity of synchronizing the Army’s capabilities with the other services, government agencies, and international partners. The basic premise of this doctrine is defined as the combination of “offensive tasks, defensive tasks, stability tasks, and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), in concert with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners.” To illustrate, the description of unified land operations is followed by figure 1-1, “The environment of land operations,” which is of a soldier addressing a crowd of middle-easterners. This section titled “Land Operations,” paragraphs 1-4 through 1-7, ends with a recognition of the civilian agencies of the US Government that provide expertise and resources needed to reconstruct facilities within war-torn regions.

The next section is titled “Landpower for the Nation,” and begins with a definition that is cited from ADRP 3-0, the reference publication attached to the capstone document ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. “Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people (ADRP 3-0).” This is followed by a list of the abilities included in landpower:

- Impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if necessary.
- Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in any operational environment.
- Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development.
- Address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural and man-made—to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services.
Secure and support bases from which joint forces can influence and dominate the air, land, and maritime domains of an operational environment.

The final paragraph of the section titled “Landpower for the Nation,” begins by declaring that no major conflict has ever been won without boots on the ground. Rather, swift and victorious campaigns have been the exception in history, and this paragraph explains that conflicts may last months or years and require steady pressure from the US military forces working closely with partner nations and civilian agencies. It is stated that soldiers can remain in the region of conflict until they secure the nation’s long-term strategic objectives, and that inserting ground troops is the most tangible measure of America’s commitment to defend America’s interests. This section is concluded with a figure of a female soldier possibly administering medical aid to a middle-eastern child with presumably the mother of the child also in the shot, covered in a burka, and the caption, “Landpower makes permanent the temporary effects of battle.”

The next section outlines the Army’s roles, with the title of “Our Roles: Prevent, Shape, and Win.” There is another italicized quote, this time from The Army Vision, a recently published document written by General Odierno and the Secretary of the Army, John McHugh. This document is not labeled as an Army Doctrine Publication, and does not bear the title of a preparing agency, such as the Combined Arms Center, like the other doctrine publications. The quote is general, and defines the Army as “globally engaged and regionally responsive,” and reiterates the emphasis on partner capabilities in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national environment. The italicized quote is explained in the following paragraph 1-10: “The Army Vision captures the three strategic roles of the Army: prevent, shape, and win.” Each role is taken up individually.
Prevention refers to the Army’s role of preventing conflict, which requires a credible force, and the document defines credibility as equating to capability of combat-ready forces that can be tailored and deployed rapidly. The argument presented is that credible Army forces convince potential opponents that the US Army is unbeatable. This is identified as what makes the Army’s landpower more than credible, it becomes preeminent.

Shaping is defined based on an international environment in which the Army enables our partners and contains our enemies. Shaping is done by working with international partners in military-to-military contacts that are designed to help the partners build the capacity to defend themselves. This is described as shaping the strategic security environment, and is intended to diminish regional tensions. Designing programs to shape and improve regional stability is the responsibility of each geographic combatant commander. Shaping is described as something that “nudges global regions away from military confrontation and increases the effect of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power” (ADP 1; 1-13). Finally soldiers are singled out as particularly important to the shaping efforts of the Army because both special operations and conventional units frequently train with foreign counterparts. There is an accompanying figure that is an image of a group of soldiers surrounding another soldier apparently giving instruction to the group, with the caption “American Soldiers training with Croatian forces.”

The final role, “win,” is defined as the Army’s ability to attack and defend successfully against enemy ground forces. This requires Army units that can destroy an enemy with all types of combat power. The fact that land combat remains chaotic, lethal
and intensely human is reiterated. Beyond defeating the enemy from a distance, Army soldiers must be prepared to “close with and destroy the enemy—room to room, face to face…If Army units cannot find, fix, close with, and destroy armed opponents in any terrain; exploit success; shatter opponents’ coherence; and break the enemy’s will to continue the fight, then neither we, nor the joint force, will be decisive” (ADP 1; 1-15). Immediately following this statement is the acknowledgement that lethality by itself is not sufficient and that Army forces must address the requirements of noncombatants before, during, and after battle to avoid strategic failure and world condemnation. Prevent, shape, and win summarizes the Army’s roles as part of the joint force.

The final section of chapter 1 is titled “The Army Mission,” and begins by explaining that the Army’s mission is derived from the intent of Congress and through the laws governing the Armed Forces. This section gives excerpts of Title 10, United States Code, that regulates the Armed Forces and specifies Congress’ intent and requirements for the Army. The intent is for Congress to provide an Army that can preserve peace and security, provide for the defense of the US, support national policies and implement national objectives, and overcome any adversary. Next the chapter discusses how the Army refines the mission outlined by Congress based on Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, a directive that assigns specific responsibilities to the Armed Forces.

Chapter 2 is titled “Our Profession,” and begins with an italicized quote from the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Marching Orders: “We will foster continued commitment to the Army Profession, a noble and selfless calling founded on the bedrock of trust.” The chapter begins by outlining the dual nature of the Army as both a military department and a military profession. The Army is defined as “a unique military profession, built upon an
ethos of trust, which buttresses four other essential characteristics of our profession:
military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship” (ADP 1; 2-1). The
figure that accompanies this first paragraph of chapter two is captioned “Thumbs up!—a
profession built on trust,” and shows a group of soldiers carrying another soldier on a
stretcher, with the injured soldier lifting a “thumbs up.”

The chapter then moves to a section titled “A Profession Built on Trust,” with
subsections “Trust Between Soldiers; Trust Between Soldiers and Leaders; Trust Among
Soldiers, Their Families, and the Army; and Trust Between the Army and the American
People.” Each subsection describes the importance of trust in each situation. Trust
between soldiers is what allows them to overcome paralyzing fear because they will not
let their comrades down. The diversity of the Army is noted and developing common
values is emphasized, and the reader is directed to a further discussion on the Army
Values contained in ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership. Trust between soldiers and leaders is
listed as the second critical aspect of trust and it’s noted that doctrine emphasizes
building trust up and down the chain of command. This is described as the trust
commanders have in their subordinates to empower them to accomplish missions, and the
trust subordinates have for superiors to give them the freedom to execute the
commander’s intent. Trust among soldiers, their families, and the Army is listed as the
Army’s commitment to provide a strong, supportive environment for soldiers and their
families. Trust between the Army and the American people is listed as underwriting the
Army’s relationship to the Nation, a relationship that relies on the confidence of the
citizens.
The next section discusses the characteristic of military expertise as the Army’s role as a repository of a unique body of knowledge, in this case the employment of landpower. The Army is likened to other professions in that the Army applies knowledge using expertise developed through extensive education and training. Like other professions, the Army certifies individual and organizational competence. The remainder of the section titled “Military Expertise” is a description of the “Fields of Professional Knowledge.” The four broad fields of professional knowledge listed are “military-technical; moral-ethical; political-cultural; and leader development.” Each field corresponds to relating doctrine, which is used to educate and train at the individual and unit level. “Doctrine expresses a common body of knowledge that Soldiers and Army Civilians use to educate and train” (ADP 1; 2-10). Individual initiative is stressed as a characteristic of mission command, “the conduct of military operations that allows subordinate leaders maximum initiative. It acknowledges that operations in the land domain are complex and often chaotic, and micro-management does not work” (ADP 1; 2-11). Based on this definition of mission command, training is described as more than developing technical expertise; training should foster and encourage discretionary judgments without close supervision.

There are three paragraphs devoted to discussing how the Army certifies the expertise of individuals and units. Certification occurs at different stages for different individuals, and that while some Army professionals earn certification in a broader profession such as doctor or lawyer before coming to the Army, military expertise is defined as highly specialized and validated wholly within the Army. There are three broad criteria listed that apply to certification of Army professionals: competence; character; and
commitment. The section titled “Military Expertise” ends with a paragraph delineating the two communities of the Army profession: the profession of arms and the Army Civilian Corps. Both can be called a member of the Army profession, but an individual is not a professional until certified.

The section on the characteristic of “Honorable Service” is brief, and contains subsections on “Our Constitutional Oaths,” and “Our Ethics,” respectively. This section describes the Army’s collective ethos as “the moral principles that define our profession,” based on constitutional oaths and Army Values and Ethics. This section describes the gravity of the commitment a soldier gives to support the Constitution, and notices that this commitment is legally binding and makes the soldier subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and therefore different from the Civilian Corps and all other employees of the Federal Government.

The next section of chapter 2 is “Esprit de Corps,” defined as a respect for the history of the Army tradition as committed to standards of excellence. Discipline and pride are listed as hallmarks of units with high esprit de corps. “Stewardship,” is the final section in chapter 2, and is defined as the Army professional’s responsibilities to the Army and to the nation. In line with this, a steward of the Army profession is defined as not just someone holding a job, but someone holding an office upon swearing the oath.

Chapter 3 is titled “The Army and the Joint Force,” and begins with an italicized quote from Joint Publication 1 (JP 1). The introductory paragraph to this chapter introduces the complementary roles of landpower, air, maritime, and space-based power. “Joint interdependence is the evolution of combined arms; the use of a specific military capability to multiply the effectiveness and redress the shortcomings of another.” It is
noted that combined arms is not a new idea, but joint interdependence is the evolution of combined arms achieved at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Chapter 3 has three main sections: “Joint Missions; Core and Enabling Competencies; and Joint Interdependence.” The section “Joint Missions” lists the eleven missions in which landpower is decisive, ranging from counterterrorism and irregular warfare to conducting humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations. This section refers to the Army Strategic Planning Guidance for 2012, and quotes this document as it reiterates the concept of joint interdependence. “Joint interdependence is the deliberate reliance of one armed service on the capabilities of another armed service” (ADP 1; 3-2). This section discusses those capabilities of the Army that fall under “Army support to other Services.” The text states that joint interdependence allows for more tailorable and scalable force packages for various contingencies. The section “Joint Missions” ends with reiteration of “mission command,” the concept that offers combatant commanders sufficient leeway and discretion in preparing tailorable and scalable force packages.

The core competencies of the Army are combined arms maneuver and wide area security. The enabling competencies are fundamental to the Army’s ability to maneuver and secure land areas, and include support security cooperation; tailor forces for the combatant commander; conduct entry operations; provide flexible mission command; support joint and Army Forces; support domestic civil authorities; and mobilize and integrate the Reserve Components. Combined arms maneuver is defined as the skills needed to synchronize joint firepower and land maneuver. Wide area security is defined as the ability of landpower to secure and control populations, resources, and terrain within a joint operational area. Stability operations fall under this core competency, the
tactical tasks that the Army conducts to improve conditions for noncombatants. “Support security cooperation” is an enabling competency defined as shaping the security environment in order to diminish regional tensions. The text reiterates that each geographic combatant commander develops programs to shape their region. “Tailor forces for the combatant commander” is an enabling competency that this text defines by referring to ADRP 3-0, the reference publication attached to ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. “ADRP 3-0 defines force tailoring as the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander” (ADP 1; 3-15). “Provide flexible mission command” is an enabling competency defined as the art of command and the science of control. This competency defines command as having authority and using it effectively as an art. This leads to the reiteration of giving as much authority and support to the leader on the scene, or the concept of mission command.

The second paragraph of the section “Provide flexible mission command,” begins: “ADP 6-0 (*Mission Command*) stresses that mission command is based on mutual trust, shared understanding, and purpose” (ADP 1; 3-19). Mission command emphasizes the objective, or end state, and not the details of how to accomplish the mission, and as a result communication and understanding of the purpose of the operation and the intent of the mission is essential. “Support joint and Army forces” is a competency defined as the Army’s ability to be the best supplied, best equipped and healthiest troops in history, ready to sustain not just Army units, but also other service forces and multinational forces.
The fourth and final chapter of ADP 1, *The Army*, is titled “Our Continuing Duty,” and begins with a quote from President George Washington, at the First Annual Address to both Houses of Congress, 8 January 1790: “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” There is a brief paragraph explaining the significance of the quote, recognizing the challenge to prepare for future operations while concentrating on current operations. There are two sections in this chapter, “Win the Current Fight,” and “Develop the Future Army.” The first section, “Win the Current Fight,” states the immediate focus remains on accomplishing current missions. “Develop the Future Army” is a lengthier section, describing the unpredictable security environment that is requiring the Army to develop the land force of the future as part of a joint force. This unpredictable environment requires the Army to be able to expand rapidly, and this ability depends on four structural factors: a strong cadre of noncommissioned and mid-grade officers to build the core of new formations when needed; special operations forces capable of providing the President with more options; ready and accessible reserve forces; and the research and development being done in the nation’s industrial base. Operational adaptability is based on pairs of characteristics: depth and versatility; adaptive and innovative; flexibility and agility; and integrated and synchronized. The chapter, and this ADP 1, *The Army*, ends with a brief discussion of each pair of characteristics that ensure operational adaptability.

The aspects of this document that stand out are the themes of mission command and cooperation. Throughout this ADP and the other capstone ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, the overall messages are that the Army is a profession that trains expert professionals who are capable of operating autonomously within a commander’s intent.
This autonomy is the result of a trust built on the professionalism projected by the Army to the American people. The challenge beyond establishing the Army as a profession and enabling individual initiative among all echelons is enabling coordination and cooperation among Army forces and between Army forces and other joint partners.

SUMMARY: ADRP 1 THE ARMY PROFESSION.

ADRP 1 is the Army Doctrine Reference Publication that expands on the discussion of the Army profession in ADP 1, The Army. The ADRP is 72 pages long and contains 6 chapters that correspond to the characteristics of the Army profession that are outlined in chapter 2 of ADP 1, “Our Profession.” The chapters in the corresponding ADRP align with the subsections of that chapter in ADP 1 and are titled, consecutively, “The United States Army Profession; Trust—the Bedrock of Our Profession; Military Expertise—Our Application of Landpower; Honorable Service—Our Noble Calling to Serve the Nation; Esprit de Corps—the Winning Spirit; Stewardship of the Army Profession.” The Foreword for this ADRP is not written by the chief of staff, General Odierno, but rather by commanding Lieutenant General David G. Perkins. His remarks foreground the role of the Army to provide the US with the landpower to prevent, shape, and win conflicts, and that this ability is predicated on the trust of the American people, and to earn this trust the Army must serve the people as professionals. Perkins states that the doctrine contained in ADRP 1 answers two questions asked in 2010 by the Army’s senior military and civilian leaders: What does it mean now for the Army to be a military profession after more than a decade of war? What does it mean now for Soldiers and Army Civilians to be Army professionals?
The preface states that this ADRP, in answering the two questions raised by the leadership, defines and describes the Army profession and the Army ethic, expands the discussion on the Army profession’s dual character as a military department of the US government and a military profession, identifies the two communities of the profession of arms and the Army Civilian Corps, and establishes the five essential characteristics that legitimize the Army as a profession and on which the chapters of this ADRP are based: trust, military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship of the profession. Notably, the preface states that this ADRP describes Army culture, describes the Army ethic, and lays the groundwork for developing the moral identity of the Army.
profession and its professionals.
Our Army Profession

Army Profession - A unique vocation of experts certified in the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower, serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.

Profession of Arms - A community within the Army Profession composed of Soldiers of the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve.

Army Civilian Corps - A community within the Army Profession composed of civilians serving in the Department of the Army.

Army Professional - A Soldier or Army Civilian who meets the Army Profession's certification criteria in character, competence, and commitment.

Essential Characteristics of the Army Profession

Military Expertise
Honorable Service
Trust
Esprit de Corps
Stewardship of the Profession

Our Ethical Application of Landpower
Our Noble Calling to Service and Sacrifice
The Bedrock of our Profession
Our Winning Spirit
Our Long Term Responsibility

Trust between Soldiers.
Trust between Soldiers and Leaders.
Trust among Soldiers, their Families, and the Army.
Trust between the Army and the American People.

Ethical Foundation: Legal and Moral

Loyalty • Duty • Respect • Selfless Service • Honor • Integrity • Personal Courage

Professional Certification Process

Member of Army Profession
Initial certification
Progressive certifications
End of official service

Voluntary entry
Oath of service
Aspiring professional
Serving professional
Training, education, evaluations, promotions, and assignments
Army retirees and Army veterans of honorable service

Army Ethic - The evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs, embedded within the Army culture of trust that motivates and guides the conduct of Army professionals bound together in common moral purpose.
Chapter 1, “The United States Army Profession,” begins by defining the Army as a noble calling and a trusted profession. The Army professional is defined as a member of the Army who meets the certification criteria of competence, character, and commitment. The words “profession,” and “professional,” are stressed and defined in detail. Emphasis is placed on a profession as a self-policing and relatively autonomous vocation. A profession is defined as application of expert knowledge to offer an essential service to society. By rendering an essential service and offering expert knowledge, a profession earns the trust of society and is subsequently granted the authority and autonomy to self-regulate. The service that the military profession provides in particular is singled out as something society cannot provide for itself but without which the society cannot survive. By providing this service ethically and effectively, the military is granted autonomy, and the military professional’s actual work is defined in paragraph 1-9 as “the continuous exercise of discretionary judgments.” This section answers what it means to be a profession and a professional in advance of the section titled “The US Army as a Military Profession.”

Chapter 1 continues by applying the aspects of what it means to be a profession to the context of the Army, and gives a bolded definition of the Army profession as “a unique vocation of experts certified in the design, generation, support, and ethical application of landpower, serving under civilian authority and entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.” The unique aspect of the Army profession among American professions is the lethality of military operations. It is reiterated here that the Army professional accepts unlimited personal liability in their preparation to accomplish missions with the application of lethal force. This section
repeats the fact that the Army provides what society cannot, and that civilian authorities grant the Army profession autonomy to use lethal force on society’s behalf. The self-policing and regulation of behavior and effectiveness of Army professionals is guided by the Army ethic, which is defined in bold letters as the set of laws, values, and beliefs embedded in Army culture and used to motivate and guide appropriate conduct within the profession.

The Army ethic is defined as the evolving moral dimension that helps the Army professional understand why a prescribed behavior is right and good. The ethic is listed as providing the inspiration and motivating spirit of Army professionals, as it attempts to describe those intangible motivations that include both legal and moral components. The treatment of the Army ethic at this point in the doctrine publications is limited, but it’s stressed that the Army ethic is embedded in all aspects of the Army profession.

The next section of chapter 1 is a discussion of the dual character of the Army as a profession and a department. The exigence for developing doctrine that establishes the Army as a profession is briefly mentioned as simply the fact that the Army has not always been widely acknowledged as a military profession. This section argues that the Army began as a department of the federal government, a hierarchical bureaucratic institution that was slowly transformed into the modern professional entity it is today. The Army had to go through processes of professionalization that began with the officer corps, and the text states that in the aftermath of Vietnam, professional status was extended through professional development to warrant officers, NCOs and Army civilians.
The dual nature of the Army that this section highlights are its roles as both a governmental occupation within a military department organized as a hierarchical bureaucracy and, more recently, recognized collectively as a military profession. These two aspects of the institution—bureaucracy and profession—are somewhat at odds, but the text acknowledges that both aspects are necessary within the variety of organizations and functions within the Army while stressing that the overall challenge is to keep the predominant culture and climate of the Army as that of a military profession.

The final section of chapter 1 restates the 5 characteristics of the Army profession—trust; military expertise; honorable service; esprit de corps; and stewardship of the profession—and gives a brief paragraph description of each. These characteristics will be taken up individually in the following chapters. The next 5 chapters of this ARDP are dedicated to expanding the discussion on the five essential characteristics that legitimize the Army as a military profession.

Chapter 2 is devoted to the topic of trust, defined as the bedrock of the Army profession. Notably, it is mentioned that even the actions of one member of the profession can positively or negatively impact the Army’s relationship with the American public. While the trust between the Army and the American people is strong, and the Army is praised as being successful in protecting this relationship of trust, it is stated that this relationship is nonetheless fragile and easily damaged if the Army professional falls short of performing his or her duty according to the Army ethic.

Trust is further explained in this chapter as the Army’s internal organizing principle. Trust is essential for building coherence among teams and units, and this principle of trust enables the culture of autonomy, lessening the need for detailed
guidance and close supervision. The text ties in the institutional culture and climate of trust with the characteristics of mission command, which requires trust “up and down the chain of command and left and right between units. Superiors trust subordinates and empower them to accomplish missions to meet the commander’s intent. Subordinates trust superiors to give them freedom to execute the commander’s intent” (ADRP 1; 2-6). Empowerment and freedom to think critically and accomplish tasks autonomously is constitutive with the fostering of a culture and climate of professionalism that is one of the goals of Doctrine 2015.

The discussion of trust shifts here to how relationships of trust within the Army, and between the Army and the American people, is predicated on the Army professional’s adherence to the Army ethic. There is a table offered that depicts the framework of the Army ethic and its sources.
The discussion continues to state that this Army ethic provides the moral basis for the Army’s actions and informs why and how the Army fights, leaving no doubt to the value of the Army professional’s service to a noble and just cause. Adhering to the Army ethic provides justification for the ethical application of lethal force. The text states that Army leaders apply both legal and ethical principles contained in the Army ethic to determine how their units use lethal force. The chapter on trust concludes with comments about how Army professionals are expected to adopt the values and ethical principles contained in the Army ethic in all that they do.

Chapter 3 is devoted to the professional characteristic of military expertise, or the Army’s use of landpower. Military expertise is defined as the application of the US’s landpower in the design, generation, support, and ethical application of lethal force in
unified land operations. In keeping with the ethos of professionalism and mission command, following the definition of military expertise, the text states that Army professionals should see in the definition the role their unit plays and where their contribution fits into the larger mission, and the Army professional is responsible for self-assessing their competence and improving upon their own shortfalls. This fits into the following discussion of the three tasks put to every Army professional in order to maintain military expertise: develop the knowledge and expertise; apply this expertise; certify the expertise of Army professionals and units.

Developing expert knowledge and expertise is divided into four distinct fields: military-technical; moral-ethical; political-cultural; and the leader/human development field. Each field is rather self-explanatory and each only warrants a sentence of explanation in the text. The second task, applying this Army expertise, is similarly brief and stresses characteristics of mission command. The text states that applying military expertise is based on the autonomy that’s granted by the American people to the Army and relies on Army professionals to exercise discretionary judgments and to assume responsibility and liability in the application of lethal force. The third task of certifying the expertise of Army professionals and units simply means the verification and validation of the Army professional’s competence, character, and commitment to fulfill whatever responsibilities and duties are being certified. This certification is important to maintain trust and the autonomy of the Army to develop its own doctrine by ensuring the expertise of its individual professionals and their units. This chapter on military expertise ends with a distinction between the two broad categories of Army professionals—the profession of arms and the Army civilian corps.
Chapter 4 discusses the characteristic of honorable service, and begins by stating that the Army ethic reflects unique American values and norms. Two of the five essential characteristics of the Army profession, honorable service and esprit de corps, particularly encompass the moral principles of the Army ethic. This section talks about how honor can be understood as integrating all Army values in the development of the Army professional’s character, and the Army values are listed in Appendix B of ADRP 1. They include loyalty, duty, respect, honor, and personal courage. This chapter wraps up by stating that adhering to the Army ethic and Army values engenders the trust necessary to maintain autonomy as an honorable service to the American people. Finally it mentions that members of the Profession of Arms are bound to an unlimited liability—accepting risk of serious personal harm or even death, and that this is a vital aspect of the Army ethic of honorable service: a true ethos of service before self.

Chapter 5 treats esprit de corps, “the winning spirit.” Esprit de corps is a traditional military term that denotes the common spirit pervading the members of the profession. This concept is meant to foster cohesive and confident units with strong bonds of loyalty and pride and a never-quit resolve. This concept is proffered as the intangible trait that even the most well-trained and well-equipped unit can rely on when the challenges of warfare wear on even the most experienced Army professional. The Army’s culture of esprit de corps is rooted in its battle history and built on a foundation of discipline and pride that are the result of a never-quit attitude.

Chapter 6 takes up the professional characteristic of stewardship of the Army profession. This wraps up the five essential characteristics of the Army profession—trust, military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship. Stewardship is
defined as the responsibility of Army professionals to ensure the profession maintains its five essential characteristics now and into the future. This characteristic reiterates the concept of self-policing and self-regulation that is embedded in mission command. Stewardship is cited as important for maintaining the professional status that the Army has only recently matured into since the early twentieth century. This professional status must be maintained by developing trust, military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship.

**MISSION COMMAND**

**SUMMARY: ADP 6-0, MISSION COMMAND**

Mission command is given it’s own doctrine publication, ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, with a companion reference publication. In the preface to ADP 6-0, TRADOC explains that “to understand and apply mission command doctrine, readers must understand how unified land operations (ADP 3-0) contributes to unified action. In addition, readers must be familiar with the fundamentals of the operations process, established in ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process,*” (ADP 6-0 preface). The prefaces to ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, and ADP 5-0 all refer to the other publications and argue that each one cannot be understood alone. To comprehend the operations process in ADP 5-0, readers must understand the Army’s operating concept outlined in ADP 3-0 and the principles of mission command outlined in ADP 6-0. In the preface to ADRP 6-0, TRADOC bundles these doctrine publications together and states that, “taken as a whole,
the doctrine in ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, and ADP 5-0 forms the foundation for the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the exercise of mission command” (ADRP 6-0 preface). The relationship between these three doctrine publications is explicitly constitutive and provides a rationale for analyzing them together.

ADP 6-0, Mission Command, is brief, and contains 5 sections: Unified Land Operations and Mission Command; The Army’s Approach to Mission Command; The Mission Command Philosophy of Command; The Mission Command Warfighting Function; and a Conclusion.

Mission command is the doctrine that guides the Army on command and control. The concept combines the art of command and the science of control to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and accomplish missions. The Preface warns that to understand and apply mission command doctrine, the reader must also be familiar with ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, and the Army’s operational concept, or ADP 3-0. Mission Command has a reference publication and the Preface clearly states that taken as a whole, the doctrine in ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, and ADP 5-0 forms the foundation for the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the exercise of mission command. These three documents encompass the Army’s thought process and procedures for exercising command and control.

ADP 6-0 begins with a flow chart of how the mission command philosophy is a foundation of unified land operations and is a way to account for the ever-changing nature of war. The mission command warfighting function is labeled as something different from the philosophy. The philosophy is given the definition of “exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined
initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the
conduct of unified land operations” (ADP 6-0; 1). The warfighting function is defined as
the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a
commander to balance the art of command and the science of control. Taken together, the
philosophy and warfighting function of mission command guide Army forces in the
conduct of operations. The concept of mission command, as both a philosophy and as a
function of different tasks and systems, articulates the art of command and the science of
control that translates into unified land operations. It’s a philosophy of command that is
turned practically into a warfighting function.

The concept and central idea of unified land operations is reiterated at the start of
this publication in order to discuss how mission command is foundational in operations.
The central idea of the Army’s operating concept is that Army units seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative. Already the word “initiative,” connects to the mission command
characteristics of enabling disciplined initiative in subordinates. The operational concept
of seizing the initiative and retaining advantage is accomplished through “decisive
action,” or simply offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The mission command
philosophy is defined as one of the foundations of unified land operations. The
philosophy is concerned with how commanders exercise authority and direction by using
mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower
agile and adaptive leaders in operations. The text states that the mission command
philosophy effectively accounts for the nature of military operations, namely, that
operations require responsibility and decisionmaking at constantly changing points of
action. The mission command philosophy stresses the commander’s intent, and
articulation and understanding of a common goal, so that commanders can initiate and 
integrate all military functions and actions toward this common goal.

It is stressed that military operations as a whole defy orderly, efficient, and 
precise control. Mission command doctrine is the Army’s strategy for overcoming the 
complexity of unified land operations. The doctrine breaks up mission command doctrine 
into three ideas: the exercise of mission command, the mission command philosophy, and 
the mission command warfighting function. The exercise of mission command is simply 
an overarching idea that unifies the mission command philosophy and warfighting 
function.

The 6 principles of mission command are:

- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
- Create shared understanding
- Provide a clear commander’s intent
- Exercise disciplined initiative
- Use mission orders
- Accept prudent risk

The exercise of mission command is based on mutual trust, shared understanding, and 
purpose. Mission command focuses on the objectives of an operation, not how to achieve 
it. That is left up to the subordinates. Commanders provide subordinates with their intent, 
the purpose of the operation, the key tasks, the desired end state, and resources. 
Subordinates then exercise disciplined initiative to respond to unanticipated problems. 
Every soldier assumes responsibility within the commander’s intent. By establishing 
mutual trust and shared understanding, a commander can allocate resources and provide a
clear intent that guides subordinates but also promotes freedom of action and initiative.

It’s a way to exploit fleeting opportunities. Subordinates are given latitude, and they are expected to synchronize and coordinate their actions with the rest of the force. Commanders influence the situation, rather than dictating a situation, by providing direction, guidance, and resources. Subordinates are encouraged to take bold action and accept prudent risks to create opportunity and seize initiative.

Trust in this context is built through shared experiences and living day to day by the Army values, rather than grand gestures. Mission command doctrine relies on trust between commanders and subordinates. Creating a shared understanding is a defining challenge for commanders. Shared understanding and purpose form the basis for unity of effort and trust. Shared understanding is accomplished through maintaining collaboration and dialogue throughout the operations process. Collaboration establishes human connection, builds trust and creates shared understanding and purpose. Providing a clear commander’s intent seems similar, but a commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). A well-crafted commander’s intent conveys a clear image of the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and the desired outcome. It expresses the broader purpose of the operation and helps subordinate commanders and soldiers to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and most important why the mission is being undertaken. ADRP 5-0 offers the format of the commander’s intent. A commander’s intent describes the boundaries within
which subordinates may exercise disciplined initiative. Doctrine states that subordinates who are aware of the commander’s intent are far more likely to exercise initiative in unexpected situations. This exercise of initiative is something that mission command demands of subordinates and effective leaders alike.

Exercising disciplined initiative is a basic principle of mission command. Disciplined initiative is action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. Disciplined initiative can be used to create opportunities when subordinates take action to develop the situation to maintain initiative. This initiative is exercised within the limits defined by the commander’s intent. Mission command doctrine warns against straying beyond legal boundaries when exercising disciplined initiative.

Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. Commanders use them to provide direction and guidance. Mission orders provide subordinates the maximum freedom of action in determining how best to accomplish missions. They are intended to maximize individual initiative.

Prudent risk is a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost. This is fundamental to mission command because it is a way to create and exploit opportunities.

Mission command doctrine stresses that the philosophy of mission command is implemented through the balancing of the art of command with the science of control. Joint doctrine defines command as the authority that a commander lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank. Command includes the authority and responsibility
for resources and forces. It includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of forces. The *art of command* is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through timely decisionmaking and leadership. It’s an art of judgment and also an art of leadership; the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation.

Authority is defined in this doctrine as the delegated power to judge, act, or command. The discussion then goes back to the art of command, which relies on a commander’s ability to discriminate between mistakes to underwrite as teaching points from those mistakes that are unacceptable in a military leader. Decisionmaking relies on understanding. Leadership is based on mutual trust, shared understanding, and cohesive teams.

Control is defined in this doctrine as the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. *The science of control* consists of systems and procedures used to improve the commander’s understanding and support accomplishing missions. It’s based on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis. This science supports the art of command. Mission command doctrine also states that the science of control is concerned with things like physical- and time-based concerns, such as the number of troops, fuel consumption, time it takes to get places and move and maneuver, etc. This requires information and communication so commanders can exercise immediate control over resources. Organizational structure also helps commanders exercise control, like the chain of command.
The mission command warfighting function is defined in this doctrine as the related tasks and systems that enable a commander to exercise command and control and integrate other warfighting functions. This warfighting function is the tasks and systems that support the exercise of authority by a commander. The mission command warfighting function tasks integrate all military functions and actions that drive the operations process. The staff supports with staff tasks such as conduct the operations process; conduct knowledge management; synchronize information-related capabilities; conduct cyber electromagnetic activities. Other tasks included in the mission command warfighting function are conduct military deception; conduct civil affairs operations; install a network; conduct airspace control; conduct information protection.

A mission command system encompasses a philosophy of command and the related practical activities and tasks that support this philosophy.
Appendix B: Excerpts

CAPSTONE DOCTRINE EXCERPTS

The following excerpts are the excerpts that were co-coded for the themes of **Professionalism and Autonomy/Mission Command**. These excerpts demonstrate that mission command is based in part on the image of the Army as a profession that employs expert professionals. These excerpts were the catalyst for including mission command doctrine in the corpus.

Title: adrp1.pdf
Codes Applied: Professionalism Autonomy/mission command

Army leaders, at all levels, are responsible for reinforcing the Army culture of trust and establishing a professional organization and command climate essential for mission command.

Title: adrp1.pdf
Codes Applied: Professionalism Autonomy/mission command

The Army Ethic is inherent within the Army culture of trust. It is manifest as the Army demonstrates its essential characteristics. It motivates and guides Army professionals within mission command, in the conduct of every operation, in performance of duty, and in all aspects of life. The Army Ethic is the heart of the Army.

Title: adp1.pdf
Codes Applied: The Joint Environment Autonomy/mission command Professionalism

The equipment, training, and financial assistance the United States provides to partner nations improve their abilities to secure themselves. This assistance often improves access to key regions. Security cooperation also communicates our position to potential adversaries in that region.

Title: adrp1.pdf
Codes Applied: Professionalism Autonomy/mission command

Willingly live by and uphold the Army Ethic, without the need for external regulation, to enhance the profession’s autonomy.

Title: adp3_0.pdf
Codes Applied: Autonomy/mission command Professionalism

Information networks greatly enhance the potential for synchronization by—

Allowing commanders to more quickly understand their operational environments and communicate their intents.
Allowing subordinate and adjacent units to use their common understanding of the operational environment and commander’s intent, in conjunction with their own initiative, to synchronize actions with those of other units without direct control from the higher headquarters.

Title: adrp1.pdf
Codes Applied: Autonomy/mission command Professionalism

Thus, the Army cannot simply declare itself to be a profession; the American people determine whether the Army is serving them as a trusted military profession. They will continue to regard the Army as a profession based on our ethical, effective, and efficient application of landpower. As long as the American people trust Army professionals to provide for their common defense, they will grant us the autonomy we need to accomplish our mission in the right way.

Title: adrp1.pdf
Codes Applied: Autonomy/mission command Professionalism

When applying military expertise, Army professionals repetitively make discretionary judgments, often with high moral implications and consequences.

Title: adrp1.pdf
Codes Applied: Professionalism Autonomy/mission command

Based on trust between the profession and the society it serves, professionals are granted autonomy (a high degree of discretion). The professional must routinely make discretionary judgments and take appropriate action. Think of a surgeon performing surgery in an operating room, a military leader conducting security operations in a combat zone, or a civilian scientist doing research in an Army laboratory. All have trained for years, all are surrounded by technology, and all, as individual professionals, are granted autonomy to make right decisions and take right actions to contribute their service, honorably.

Title: adrp1.pdf
Codes Applied: Autonomy/mission command Professionalism

It encourages Army leaders to exercise discretionary judgments without close supervision. Given the nature of modern land operations, this ability is critically important because of the lethality of what we do. The failure of individual Army professionals to make the right decision can be devastating, particularly in an omnipresent information environment. The Army Values shape and bind Soldiers’ and Army Civilians’ discretionary judgments. We strive to ingrain a strong professional
ethos, one of trust, honorable service, and high esprit de corps, in parallel with our technical expertise.

Title: adrp1.pdf
Codes Applied: Professionalism Autonomy/mission command

We lead by example and demonstrate courage by doing what is right despite risk, uncertainty, and fear; we candidly express our professional judgment to subordinates, peers, and superiors.

MISSION COMMAND DOCTRINE EXCERPTS

The following excerpts are the excerpts that were co-coded for the themes of Initiative and Intent and Effective Leadership, demonstrating the relationship between a commander’s effective leadership and the extent to which a commander fosters disciplined initiative among subordinates. These excerpts also demonstrate how a commander’s intent is tied to fostering disciplined initiative among subordinates.

Title: adrp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Kind of thinking Initiative and Intent Relation of commander to subordinate Effective leadership

Successful commanders understand they cannot provide guidance or direction for all contingencies. Commanders formulate and communicate their commander’s intent to describe the boundaries within which subordinates may exercise disciplined initiative while maintaining unity of effort.

Title: adp5_0 OPERATIONS PROCESS.pdf
Codes Applied: Effective leadership Initiative and Intent Judgment and Decisionmaking Relation of commander to subordinate

Commanders are the most important participants in effective planning. They focus the planning effort by providing their commander’s intent, issuing planning guidance, and making decisions throughout the planning process.

Title: adrp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Effective leadership

Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and make decisions that accomplish missions.

Title: adp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Relation of commander to subordinate Effective leadership
It gives subordinates the confidence to apply their judgment in ambiguous and urgent situations because they know the mission’s purpose, key task, and desired end state.

Title: adrp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Relation of commander to subordinate Initiative and Intent Judgment and Decisionmaking Effective leadership

Commanders collaborate and dialogue with subordinates to ensure they understand the commander’s intent. Subordinates aware of the commander’s intent are far more likely to exercise initiative in unexpected situations. Under mission command, subordinates are required to use their initiative to make decisions that further their higher commander’s intent. Subordinates use the commander’s intent, together with the mission statement and concept of the operation, to accomplish the mission. Empowered with trust, authority, and a shared understanding, they can develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively under fluid, dynamic conditions.

Title: adp5_0 OPERATIONS PROCESS.pdf
Codes Applied: Initiative and Intent Effective leadership

Generally, the more involved commanders are in planning, the faster staffs can plan. Through personal involvement, commanders ensure the plan reflects their commander’s intent.

Title: adp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Relation of commander to subordinate Effective leadership Initiative and Intent Kind of thinking

Commanders exercise control to account for changing circumstances and direct the changes necessary to address the new situation. Commanders impose enough control to mass the effect of combat power at the decisive point in time while allowing subordinates the maximum freedom of action to accomplish assigned tasks. They provide subordinates as much leeway for initiative as possible while keeping operations synchronized.

Title: adp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Initiative and Intent Relation of commander to subordinate Effective leadership

The commander’s intent defines the limits within which subordinates may exercise initiative.
Successful commanders understand that swift action may be necessary to capitalize on fleeting opportunities.

Successful commanders are mindful of this when they configure their mission command system. Commanders determine information requirements and set information priorities. They avoid requesting too much information, which decreases the staff’s chances of obtaining the right information. The quest for information is time-consuming; commanders who demand complete information place unreasonable burdens upon subordinates. Subordinates pressured to worry over every detail rarely have the desire to exercise initiative. At worst, excessive information demands corrupt the trust required for mission command.

Effective commanders impose enough control to maximize total combat power while allowing subordinates freedom of action.

During execution, leaders must be able and willing to solve problems within the commander’s intent without constantly referring to higher headquarters. Subordinates need not wait for top-down synchronization to act.

Subordinate commanders need maximum latitude to take advantage of situations and meet the higher commander’s intent when the original order no longer applies.

The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the
operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0)

Title: adp5_0 OPERATIONS PROCESS.pdf
Codes Applied: Relation of commander to subordinate Effective leadership Initiative and Intent

It requires a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to accept prudent risk and exercise disciplined initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent.

Title: adrp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Kind of thinking Initiative and Intent Effective leadership Relation of commander to subordinate

Subordinates are more willing to exercise initiative when they believe their commander trusts them. They will also be more willing to exercise initiative if they believe their higher commander will accept and support the outcome of their decisions. Likewise, commanders delegate greater authority to subordinates whose judgment they trust.

Title: adp5_0 OPERATIONS PROCESS.pdf
Codes Applied: Effective leadership Initiative and Intent Judgment and Decisionmaking

Commanders create conditions for seizing the initiative by acting.

Title: adp5_0 OPERATIONS PROCESS.pdf
Codes Applied: Initiative and Intent Effective leadership Relation of commander to subordinate

During planning, the initial commander's intent drives course of action development. In execution, the commander’s intent guides disciplined initiative as subordinates make decisions when facing unforeseen opportunities or countering threats.

Title: adp5_0 OPERATIONS PROCESS.pdf
Codes Applied: Effective leadership Initiative and Intent Kind of thinking

Army design methodology entails framing the operational environment, framing the problem, and developing an operational approach to solve the problem. Army design methodology results in an improved understanding of the operational environment, a problem statement, an initial commander’s intent, and an operational approach that serves as the link between conceptual and detailed planning. Based on their understanding and learning gained during Army design methodology, commanders issue
planning guidance, to include an operational approach, to guide more detailed planning using the MDMP.

Title: adp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Kind of thinking Initiative and Intent Effective leadership
Relation of commander to subordinate

Commanders strive to provide subordinates the resources and the freedom to take action to develop the situation. Commanders and subordinates understand what risks the higher commander will accept and what risks will remain with the subordinate commander. The appropriate degree of control affords subordinates sufficient latitude to exploit opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Title: adrp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Relation of commander to subordinate Effective leadership Initiative and Intent Kind of thinking

Commanders rely on subordinates to act. A subordinate’s disciplined initiative may be the starting point for seizing the tactical initiative. This willingness to act helps develop and maintain operational initiative used by forces to set or dictate the terms of action throughout an operation.

Title: adp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Principle/Fundamental Kind of thinking

Making reasonable estimates and intentionally accepting prudent risk are fundamental to mission command.

Title: adrp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Effective leadership Initiative and Intent Relation of commander to subordinate

Effectively employing control measures requires commanders and staffs to understand their purposes and ramifications, including the permissions or limitations imposed on subordinates’ freedom of action and initiative.

Title: adp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Initiative and Intent Kind of thinking Judgment and Decisionmaking Principle/Fundamental

Leaders and subordinates who exercise disciplined initiative create opportunity by taking action to develop the situation. Disciplined initiative is action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise.

Title: adp5_0_OPERATIONS PROCESS.pdf
In addition to issuing their commander’s intent, commanders provide planning guidance that conveys the essence of their visualization. Effective planning guidance broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent. Planning guidance includes an operational approach—a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 5-0).

Establishing command presence makes the commander’s knowledge and experience available to subordinates. It does not require giving subordinates detailed instructions, nor does it include second-guessing subordinates’ performance. Skilled commanders communicate tactical and technical knowledge that goes beyond plans and procedures. Command presence establishes a background for all plans and procedures so that subordinates can understand how and when to adapt them to achieve the commander’s intent.

Commanders focus on creating opportunities rather than simply preventing defeat—even when preventing defeat appears safer.

Delegation allows subordinates to decide and act for the commander in specified areas. Once they delegate authority, commanders supervise just enough to assure subordinates’ success. While commanders can delegate authority, they cannot delegate their responsibility for the actions or omissions of their subordinates.

Commanders provide subordinates with their intent, the purpose of the operation, the key tasks, the desired end state, and resources. Subordinates then exercise disciplined initiative to respond to unanticipated problems. Mission command is based on mutual trust and shared understanding and purpose. It demands every Soldier be
prepared to assume responsibility, maintain unity of effort, take prudent action, and act resourcefully within the commander’s intent.

Title: adp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Kind of thinking Initiative and Intent Effective leadership
Principle/Fundamental Relation of commander to subordinate

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

Title: adp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Kind of thinking Initiative and Intent Effective leadership
Relation of commander to subordinate

Skilled commanders communicate tactical and technical knowledge that goes beyond plans and procedures. Command presence establishes a background for all plans and procedures so that subordinates can understand how and when to adapt them to achieve the commander’s intent. In many instances, a leader’s physical presence is necessary to lead effectively.

Title: adrp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Effective leadership Principle/Fundamental Initiative and Intent Kind of thinking Relation of commander to subordinate

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0).

Title: adp5_0 OPERATIONS PROCESS.pdf
Codes Applied: Relation of commander to subordinate Initiative and Intent Kind of thinking Effective leadership Judgment and Decisionmaking

Mission orders clearly convey the unit’s mission and the commander’s intent. Mission orders focus subordinates on what to do and the purpose of doing it, without prescribing exactly how to do it. Commanders establish control measures to aid cooperation among forces without imposing needless restriction on freedom of action.

Title: adp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Initiative and Intent

The mission command philosophy effectively accounts for the nature of military operations. Throughout operations, unexpected opportunities and threats rapidly present themselves.

Title: adp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Commanders position themselves where they can command effectively without losing the ability to respond to changing situations. They seek to establish a positive command climate that facilitates team building, encourages initiative, and fosters collaboration, dialogue and mutual trust and understanding.

Commanders provide subordinates with their intent, the purpose of the operation, the key tasks, the desired end state, and resources. Subordinates then exercise disciplined initiative to respond to unanticipated problems. Every Soldier must be prepared to assume responsibility, maintain unity of effort, take prudent action, and act resourcefully within the commander’s intent.

Commanders understand that subordinates and staffs require resources and a clear intent to guide their actions. They allow them the freedom of action to exercise disciplined initiative to adapt to changing situations. Because mission command decentralizes decisionmaking authority and grants subordinates’ significant freedom of action, it demands more of commanders at all levels and requires rigorous training and education.

Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as many hazards as possible, and then take prudent risks to exploit opportunities.

Commanders direct all aspects of operations by establishing their commander’s intent, setting achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units.
The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0).

This philosophy of command helps commanders capitalize on the human ability to take action to develop the situation and integrate military operations to achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state. Mission command emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative. This precept guides leaders toward mission accomplishment.

Commanders articulate the overall reason for the operation so forces understand why it is being conducted. They use the commander’s intent to explain the broader purpose of the operation beyond that of the mission statement. Doing this allows subordinate commanders and Soldiers to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and most importantly, why the mission is being conducted.

Commanders articulate the overall reason for the operation so forces understand why it is being conducted. A well-crafted commander’s intent conveys a clear image of the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and the desired outcome. It expresses the broader purpose of the operation—beyond that of the mission statement.

Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk are not gambling. Gambling, in contrast to prudent risk taking, is staking the success of an entire action on a single event without considering the hazard to the force should the event not unfold as envisioned. Therefore, commanders avoid taking gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as many hazards as possible, and then take prudent risks to exploit opportunities.
Commanders accept prudent risk when making decisions because uncertainty exists in all military operations. Prudent risk is a deliberate exposure to potential injury or loss when the commander judges the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment as worth the cost (ADP 6-0). Opportunities come with risks. The willingness to accept prudent risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses.

Encouraging disciplined initiative frees commanders to focus on higher-level tasks and decisions.

Successful commanders minimize risk and unify the effort by monitoring how well subordinates are using their authority and resources and exercising initiative.

Commanders realize that subordinates may not accomplish all tasks initially and that errors may occur. Successful commanders allow subordinates to learn through their mistakes and develop experience. With such acceptance in the command climate, subordinates gain the experience required to operate on their own. However, commanders do not continually underwrite subordinates’ mistakes resulting from a critical lack of judgment. Nor do they tolerate repeated errors of omission, when subordinates fail to exercise initiative. The art of command lies in discriminating between mistakes to underwrite as teaching points and those that are unacceptable in a military leader.

Leaders and subordinates who exercise initiative, within the commander’s intent, create opportunity by taking action to develop the situation.
Commanders allocate resources and provide a clear intent that guides subordinates’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative. Subordinates, by understanding the commander’s intent and the overall common objective, are then able to adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities. When given sufficient latitude, they can accomplish assigned tasks in a manner that fits the situation. Subordinates understand that they have an obligation to act and synchronize their actions with the rest of the force. Likewise, commanders influence the situation and provide direction, guidance, and resources while synchronizing operations. They encourage subordinates to take bold action, and they accept prudent risks to create opportunity and to seize the initiative.

All commanders have a responsibility to act within their higher commander’s intent to achieve the desired end state. However, humans sometimes make mistakes.

Commanders avoid inadequate planning and preparation. Successful commanders use risk assessment and risk management to help determine what level of risk exists and how to mitigate it. Additionally, they collaborate and dialogue with subordinates when deciding how much risk to accept and how to minimize the effects of that risk.

Commanders concentrate and synchronize multiple units to mass effects, and they centralize or decentralize control of operations as needed to ensure units can adapt to changing situations. The appropriate degree of control varies with each situation and is not easy to determine.

The commander’s intent becomes the basis on which staffs and subordinate leaders develop plans and orders that transform thought into action. A well-crafted commander’s intent conveys a clear image of the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and the desired
outcome. The commander’s intent provides a focus for subordinates to coordinate their separate efforts. Commanders personally prepare their commander’s intent. When possible, they deliver it in person. Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual understanding of what the commander wants by allowing immediate clarification of specific points. Individuals can then exercise disciplined initiative within the overarching guidance provided in the commander’s intent. The shorter the commander’s intent, the better it serves these purposes. Typically, the commander’s intent consists of three to five sentences. A clear commander’s intent that lower-level leaders can understand is key to maintaining unity of effort. Soldiers two echelons down must easily remember and clearly understand the commander’s intent.

Commanders provide a clear intent to their forces that guides subordinates’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative. Subordinates, by understanding the commander’s intent and the overall common objective, are then able to adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities. They are given the latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in a manner that best fits the situation. Subordinates understand that they have an obligation to act and synchronize their actions with the rest of the force. Likewise, commanders influence the situation and provide direction and guidance while synchronizing their own operations. They encourage subordinates to take action, and they accept prudent risks to create opportunity and to seize the initiative.

Historically, military commanders have employed variations of two basic concepts of command: mission command and detailed command. While some have favored detailed command, the nature of operations and the patterns of military history point to the advantages of mission command. Mission command has been the Army’s preferred style for exercising command since the 1980s. The concept traces its roots back to the German concept of Auftragstaktik, which translates roughly to mission-type tactics. Auftragstaktik held all German commissioned and noncommissioned officers dutybound to do whatever the situation required, as they personally saw it. Understanding and achieving the broader purpose of a task was the central idea behind this style of command. Commanders expected subordinates to act when opportunities arose.
Successful mission command relies on leaders who act decisively, within the intent and purpose of superior leaders, and in the best interest of the organization.

Title: adp5_0 OPERATIONS PROCESS.pdf
Codes Applied: Relation of commander to subordinate Effective leadership

After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate shared understanding and purpose. During planning, commanders ensure subordinates understand their visualization well enough to begin course of action development. During execution, commanders describe modifications to their visualization resulting in fragmentary orders that adjust the original order. Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it as circumstances require.

Title: adrp6_0 MISSION COMMAND.pdf
Codes Applied: Kind of thinking Initiative and Intent Effective leadership

Commanders also avoid delaying action while waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization. Experienced commanders balance audacity and imagination with risk and uncertainty. They strike at a time and place and in a manner wholly unexpected by the enemy. They seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to achieve decisive results while accepting prudent risk.
### Appendix C: Acronyms, Abbreviations, Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army doctrine reference publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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**Area of operations**

An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)

**Army doctrine**

Fundamental principles, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols, used for the conduct of operations and which the operating force, and elements of the institutional Army that directly support operations, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (ADP 1-01)

**Army Ethic**

The evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs, deeply embedded within the core of the Army culture and practiced by all members of the Army Profession to motivate and guide the appropriate conduct of individual members bound together in common moral purpose. (ADRP 1)

**doctrine**

Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

**mission command**

(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

**operation**

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0)

**operational environment**

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)
operations process

The major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. (ADP 5-0)