

*Recommending Political Warfare—The Role of Eisenhower’s Presidential Committee on
International Information Activities in the United States’ Approach to the Cold War*

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Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In

Planning, Governance, and Globalization

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September 22, 2016

Alexandria, Virginia

Key Words: Cold War, Jackson Committee, Strategy, Political Warfare,
Psychological Warfare, Social Constructivist Discourse Analysis

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ABSTRACT

In 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower charged an ad hoc advisory group with assessing the current U.S. Cold War effort and offering recommendations for an “unified and dynamic” way forward. This work investigates the case of Eisenhower’s Presidential Committee on International Information Activities and its role in the United States’ approach to the Cold War. Problematizing that which is often taken for granted, this empirical, interpretive study uncovers the discursive conditions of possibility for and the discursive activities taking place within Jackson Committee decision making processes.

Employing a constructivist discursive framework, this project builds on an understanding of policy making as a process of argumentation in which actors intersubjectively define problems and delimit policy and strategy options. Revealing discursive conditions of possibility enables a deeper understanding of the substance, tensions and discursive maneuvers informing subsequent U.S. strategy and policy choices during the Cold War and may offer insights into understanding and addressing geopolitical challenges in the 21st century.

The thick analytic narrative illuminates the “witcraft” involved in conceptualizing the unique threat posed by the Soviet Union whose practices challenged existing categories, and in extending wartime discourses to the post-war geopolitical environment. It examines discursive practices informing the nascent concepts of national strategy, psychological warfare, and political warfare, including arguments for constituent elements and relationships between them. In so doing, this dissertation conceptualizes national strategy as practices underpinning a prioritized drive for competitive advantage over adversaries. Additionally, political warfare represents practices intended to create and present alternatives to foreign actors that are in the U.S. interest through the integration and coordination of diplomatic, economic, military, and informational activities.

Based on its conceptualization of a long-term adversarial competition with the Soviet Union, the committee recommended solutions for a sustainable national strategy of political warfare prioritizing the free world and liberal world order. Its recommendations sought to recast strategic panic into strategic patience.

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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

Within geopolitics, threats sometimes emerge that policymakers consider unique because of their goals and/or methods for challenging the status quo, including communicating directly with foreign populations to confuse or gain support. These can be periods of strategic panic and conceptual confusion as policymakers, the press, and even academics work to classify these new threats and develop appropriate responses. The reasoning process usually begins by using familiar categories which individuals extend through storytelling and debates as a means to develop a shared understanding and language to describe the new geopolitical situation and possible policy options.

Today the Cold War seems like a familiar and well-understood competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, in the early post-World War II years, policymakers wrestled with understanding and addressing Soviet actions, including Communist propaganda activities throughout the world. In 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower asked an ad hoc advisory group to assess the Cold War situation and offer new “unified and dynamic” ways for securing the United States and advancing U.S. interests.

This research examines the advisory Jackson Committee’s rhetorical activities informing its recommendations for a national strategy of political warfare that would create and offer alternatives to foreign populations that were in the U.S. interest. The Committee recommended prioritizing the development of a liberal world order as a way to gain a competitive advantage over the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. It offered solutions for directing and mobilizing integrated and coordinated national activities across diplomacy, economics, information, and the military. Additionally, the Committee envisioned the possibility of inspiring and guiding quotidian societal activities to reinforce the foundations of the aspirational world order.

This study stems from the premise that understanding how recommendations come about are as important as the recommendations themselves. Illuminating meanings and practices considered during the policy making process can provide insights into subsequent substance and tensions within national security strategies and policies. To do so, this study re-creates a narrative of the storytelling and debates involved in defining workable problems, addressing conceptual confusion, and developing solutions deemed sustainable over the “long-haul.”

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation culminates a nearly six year journey. As I assert in this work, the story of “how” is as important as the “what.” My story begins with my family who inspires me every day. When I began, my daughters Annabelle and Sophia were ten and seven years old, respectively. Evening dinners were scenes of storytelling about things learned or tried that day. My husband BJ and I had so much fun hearing about what inspired or intrigued them, and watching them channel their energies into a host of activities. However, we had a rule. If you started something, you had to finish it. Each chosen experience had to have its due credit; only then could you decide to move on. This was the rule all three repeated back to me over the course of the last six years, even as I skipped practices, meets, tournaments, regattas, and concerts. BJ shouldered primary chauffeur, cheering, and videography responsibilities. Annabelle crafted beautiful wall-art encouraging me to “Keep Calm and Get a PhD.” (Sophia’s rendition was “Keep Calm and Love the Dog.”) My family’s support was the foundation for this marathon endeavor that concludes in time to partner with BJ in enjoying the rest of our girls’ teenage years and I can’t wait. I love them all dearly.

I thank my primary advisor, Professor Gerard Toal for his patience and steady guidance. I learned immensely from him and Professors Joel Peters and Giselle Datz who also dedicated time over the years to honing my analytical skills and shaping this academic inquiry from a nebulous and unwieldy set of somewhat-related thoughts. Professor Jay M. Parker straddles my academic and professional thank yous. His 1997 phone call inviting me to teach in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point set me on my path through graduate education and toward teaching as a profession. His mentorship, wise counsel, and joyful approach in helping others discover their interests has inspired my own professional and academic practices. Finally, I want to acknowledge my colleagues, peers, and superiors serving across various colleges at the National Defense University and within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy who served as cheerleaders and informal advisors over the course of this journey. Along with my friends and neighbors, their encouragement sustained my belief that I could balance professional, personal, and academic responsibilities and one day complete what I started in 2011. With these inadequate acknowledgements, let me say something about my positionality.

I began my graduate studies at Virginia Tech a few months after returning home from a deployment to Iraq where I served as a strategic advisor to the U.S. commander responsible for coalition efforts. In Iraq, U.S. and coalition forces faced a range of loosely affiliated adversaries adept in the art of propaganda and psychological warfare designed to gain supporters and converts and thus extend their interpretation of a desired world order. A battle for the “strategic narrative” played out alongside active hostilities. Before deploying to Iraq, I also had served as a speechwriter for the Army Chief of Staff in Washington D.C. and spent four years as a strategic advisor and speechwriter for the U.S. commander responsible for U.S. and UN forces on the Korean peninsula facing North Korea with a long history of psychological warfare activities. Across these assignments, I played a role in strategic planning and strategic communication efforts focused on gaining support from a variety of audiences at home and abroad for U.S. causes and positions. My strategist/speechwriter roles honed my appreciation for the power of deeds, words and argumentation.

As I began my Virginia Tech coursework, I was assigned to the National Defense University where I taught national and defense strategy, and public diplomacy courses to war college students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, now renamed The Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy. To a certain degree, our curriculum at the time juxtaposed the U.S. Cold War strategy addressing a single, known threat to the complexity of challenges facing the U.S., allies, and partners in the 21st century. In seminars, we debated the need for creative thinking and new languages and practices enabling the U.S. to address unique threat networks and resurgent state actors whose activities could not be neatly categorized within war and peace. But I remained curious about the contingency within the early Cold War era when U.S. policy makers wrestled with understanding the Soviet Union and conceptualizing the “battle for hearts and minds.”

The 1953 Jackson Committee began its activities by focusing on psychological warfare; however, as I delved into the archival documentation, I saw committee argumentation honing in on the concepts of national strategy, political warfare, and strategic planning. I was taken with the fact that while I began this intellectual endeavor from the perspective of a speechwriter interested in psychological warfare and public diplomacy, I concluded this research from the perspective of a strategist teaching her own graduate students about the necessity of realistic

integrated strategic analysis and planning. After a 26 year career in the U.S. Army, I can honestly say that I wish I had gained the insights from this endeavor much earlier in my career.

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Prelude: Looking to History to Inform 21st Century Strategy and Policy

*“The battle for the minds of men may decide the struggle for the world”
-- Hoover Commission Report, January 1949*

“The central question of our global age: whether we will solve our problems together, in a spirit of mutual interests and mutual respect, or whether we descend into destructive rivalries of the past.” -- President Barak Obama, September 24, 2014, the United Nations Headquarters

In 1989 as the Cold War was thawing, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world was witnessing “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (Fukuyama 1989). In the intervening quarter-century, American pundits, policymakers, and academics have re-energized discussions regarding the U.S.’s role and responsibility for protecting and promoting universal human rights, Western values and way of life against competing ideologies fueled by an array of propaganda and destabilizing activities promoted by aggressive authoritarian regimes.¹ Somewhat reminiscent of the Cold War, U.S. military leaders have taken to describing the twenty-first century as an era of persistent conflict characterized by adversarial competition, with former policy practitioners arguing there have been “real and significant changes in the geopolitical landscape...[that] makes it virtually impossible to draw neat lines between war and peace, foreign and domestic, emergency and normality” (Brooks 2015).

Brooks’ identification of the contemporary complexity involving established categories would sound familiar to early-Cold War figures who also tackled characterizing and categorizing the emerging geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union. Indeed, in many ways today’s geopolitical situation is analogous to the early Cold War era. As two prominent scholars offered in 1951:

... underlying the diplomatic-economic-military aspects of the global cold war is the ideological struggle--the conflict for men’s loyalties and beliefs which uses human emotions, hopes and fears and aspirations as prime political ammunition... [leaving] the borderline between peace and war more vague and undefined than at other periods of history (Padover and Lasswell 1951, 3-5).

¹ I use the term ideology to describe a system of beliefs, values, and commitments. Associate Professor of Speech and Dramatic Arts Michael Calvin McGee addresses the relationship between ideology and mass consciousness and writes “[i]n practice... ideology is a political language composed of slogan-like terms signifying collective commitment” (McGee 1980, 15). Deborah Larson defines ideology as a belief system that explains and justifies a preferred order for society, and offers a strategy for its attainment (1985, 21). Ideology reflects, and can be used to affect, social organizations.

In the early Cold War, U.S. policymakers constructed a Soviet threat that they perceived as unique in history. Soviet non-military measures taken to advance its influence and control challenged traditional U.S. conceptions and categorizations of international relations. In particular, U.S. policymakers wrestled with understanding and addressing Soviet propaganda. Compounded by conceptual confusion, this moment of strategic panic revealed a fear of retreat from the heretofore assumed progressive march of history if the Soviet Union attracted “men’s loyalties and beliefs.” Theorists, practitioners, and policymakers cast about for new symbolic means to represent and address this new threat.

In the twenty-first century, U.S. leaders face an array of geostrategic challenges involving state and non-state actors. Following the attacks on 11 September 2001, U.S. policymakers and academics developed new discourses and practices, including preventative war, to address the unique threat posed by al-Qaeda and associated “threat networks.” Since 2001, the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism has sought to dismantle al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other extremist organizations, deny terrorist safe havens, and combat anti-Americanism and extremist Islamic ideology. One month after the U.S. initiated Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to capture Osama bin Laden and expel al-Qaeda, journalist Tony Koran proclaimed, “Bin Laden's war, of course, is all about propaganda” employing its adept media wing As-Sahab (The Cloud) (2001). The following year a senior Bush administration official intoned, “A lot of the world does not like America, and it's going to take years to change their hearts and minds” (Becker and Dao, 2002). Rising from al-Qaeda in Iraq, The Islamic State also has proven successful with “its agile and robust propaganda machine that has helped to inspire as many as 31,000 people from across the globe to leave their homes and join the cause” (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2016). According to the Institute for the Study of War, the Islamic State “is executing a sophisticated global strategy that involves simultaneous efforts in Iraq and Syria, the Middle East and North Africa, and the wider world” (Gambhir 2015).

Russia also is reasserting its geopolitical position and challenging the liberal international order with propaganda, overt and covert activities that test any neat conceptual divisions between “war and peace, foreign and domestic, emergency and normality.” Scholars, pundits, and policymakers use a variety of terms to conceptualize Russia’s strategic use of primarily non-military means to achieve its geopolitical objectives: information warfare; hybrid warfare;

unrestricted warfare; non-linear warfare; and political warfare. Many offer parallels to Soviet times (Price 2015, 134; Maigre 2015; Hughes 2016; Hoffman 2007/2014; Haines 2016).²

Under President Putin, Russia has expanded its use of propaganda with the notable advent of its flagship *Rossiya Segodnya*, translated as *Russia Today*, in 2005. It is the parent company to RT and Sputnik News which debuted in 2014 offering self-described alternative perspectives to Western media. Western news outlets have offered a chorus of commentary regarding Russian propaganda efforts including assessments that such “efforts have been increased since the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014” with RT “emotive news coverage... widely believed to have influenced public opinion ahead of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine” (Ennis 2015). Interpreted by some as having called the breakup of the Soviet Union the “greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century,” Putin has actively sought to stoke Russian nationalism with strategic messaging targeting Russian-speaking populations inside and outside of current Russian borders, including the ethnic Russians who comprise roughly one quarter of the populations (and Russian outlet audiences) in Estonia and Latvia, both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).³ *The Economist* assessed Putin’s “overarching aim is to divide and neuter that [Western] alliance, fracture its collective approach to security, and resist and roll back its advances... The EU and NATO are Mr. Putin’s ultimate targets. To him, Western institutions and values are more threatening than armies” (14 Feb 15). According to a November 2015 report from the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a U.S. think tank focusing on Central and Eastern European issues:

The overall aim of these propaganda efforts is to undermine a rules-based multilateral security order in Europe that Russia regards as unfair and unsustainable. Russia believes it is entitled to

² The works cited are illustrative of the plethora of scholarly articles, policy articles, and opinion pieces that illustrate the continuing conceptual struggle to categorize a competitor’s strategic activities in times other than conventional war (the use of force to achieve political goals). Within defense analyses, hybrid warfare has become the more common term. Nonetheless, robust debate continues. A scholar/practitioner, Frank Hoffman was one of the first to argue the need for new categorization and conceptualization of hybrid wars in order to inform future U.S. strategic defense planning. “Instead of separate challengers with fundamentally different approaches (conventional, irregular or terrorist), we can expect to face competitors who will employ all forms of war and tactics, perhaps simultaneously. Criminal activity may also be considered part of this problem as well...” (Hoffman 2007, 7). Hoffman did not specifically address psychological/informational activities.

³ Jill Dougherty and Riina Kaljurand offer a qualitative study of the Russian-speaking population in the northeastern region of Estonia to inform the threat perception of these populations. While Russian-speaking populations generally reside within different information spheres than their country of residence, their nationalistic affiliation is more cultural than political (2015). In April 2016, I also visited Estonia spending time with Estonian national political and military leaders in Tallinn, as well as students, businessmen, and academics living in Narva, a city whose population is over 90% Russian speaking. My anecdotal experiences reflected those described by Dougherty and Kaljurand.

a “grey zone” along its borders in which other nations’ sovereignty is constrained and in which it enjoys privileged economic and political status. It regards the post-1989 settlement as both deplorable and temporary. It sees democracies and open societies as a threat: they may infect Russia. It regards Western talk of human rights and the rule of law as either cynical propaganda or naive and delusional (Lucas and Nimmo 2015).

One of the “intellectual contributors” to the CEPA report, Peter Pomerantsev argues that while

disinformation and psychological operations are as old as the Trojan Horse...what distinguished the Kremlin’s approach from that of its western rivals was this new stress on the “psychosphere” as the theatre of conflict. The information operation was no longer auxiliary to some physical struggle or military invasion: now it had become an end in itself (Pomerantsev, 9 Apr 2015).

Many contemporary analyses of Russian psychological activities reflect British military theorist and historian J. F. C. Fuller’s musings on the evolving character of war. For military theorists, war has an enduring nature, but a changing character based on who wages war, why, and importantly how. In 1920, Fuller imagined an “evolutionary ladder of war” based on technological advances in mechanical and electrical “wireless” engineering. He envisioned a day in which the

method of imposing the will of one man on another may in turn be replaced by a purely psychological warfare, wherein weapons are not used or battlefields sought or loss of life or limb aimed at; but, in place, the corruption of the human reason, the dimming of the human intellect, and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual life of one nation by the influence of the will of another is accomplished (Fuller 1920, 377).⁴

U.S. policymakers continue to debate the meaning of and how to compete and win in twenty-first century propaganda wars (Miller and Higham 2015). On 8 January 2016, the U.S. Department of State announced the creation of a new Global Engagement Center led by Dr. Michael D. Lumpkin, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/ Low-Intensity Conflict. The goal is to “more effectively coordinate, integrate and synchronize

⁴ Professor William E. Daugherty attributes the first use of the phrase “psychological warfare” to J. F. C. Fuller, although this employment was not widely known within the U.S. (1958).

messaging to foreign audiences that undermines the disinformation espoused by violent extremist groups, including ISIL and al-Qaeda, and that offers positive alternatives” (Department of State 2016). U.S. lawmakers also are responding to Russian propaganda activities. In early 2016, a bipartisan bill was introduced to improve the United States’ ability to counter “propaganda and disinformation” spread by Russia and other actors. The Countering Information Warfare Act of 2016 includes a proposal to establish a Center for Information Analysis and Response to analyze "foreign government information-warfare efforts."

Given propaganda’s relationship with other instruments of power, there have been calls for a renewed emphasis on conceptualizing competitors’ strategic activities-- hybrid/information/unrestricted/non-linear/political warfare-- in times outside of conventional hostilities in order to address twenty-first century threats. Acknowledging the blurred line between peace and war, John Haines argues the importance of conceptualizing hybrid warfare not as a form of war per se, but of strategy (Haines 2016). Derived from the Greek “strategos” meaning military general, the concept of strategy has spawned innumerable scholarship across a host of disciplines. Implicit within most discussions of strategy is an underlying meaning of striving for competitive advantage in achieving goals through an array of ways and means. Chinese philosopher, military strategist, and general Sun Tzu first advanced the conceptual link between competitive advantage, strategy and warfare in 500BC. In the context of Chinese warring states, Sun Tzu understood warfare as a continual competition. He argued the acumen of strategy and the essence of warfare was to “win” without actively employing military forces (Sun Tzu 1971).⁵ In 1954, British military historian and theorist Basil H. Liddell Hart revived the notion that “indirect methods... are the essence of strategy” (1967, xix). Liddell Hart contended the atomic age necessitated a “reversion” to “indirect” strategies employing ways and means other than military force (1967, xix). His prescription reflected discursive efforts to categorize state pursuits of national goals in times with blurred lines between peace and war.

Contemporary scholars are again investigating the concept now commonly called grand strategy that often spans the divide between peace and war. Focusing on grand strategy in

⁵ This concept again came to the fore with the 1999 publication of *Unrestricted Warfare*, also translated from the Chinese *Chao Xian Zhan* as “War beyond Rules.” The two Chinese People’s Liberation Army colonels authoring this work argue “the arena of war has expanded, encompassing the political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and psychological spheres, in addition to the land, sea, air, space, and electronics spheres... War will be conducted in nonwar [i.e. non-military] spheres...” (Qiao and Wang 1999, 6).

peacetime, Tony Corn explains “in Grand Strategy, the military dimension proper only plays a supporting role in what will later become known as the DIME spectrum (diplomacy, military, information, economy)” (2010, 10). Also focusing on peacetime, Colin Dueck calls grand strategy “a conceptual roadmap... [that] addresses the crucial question of how to rank interests, assess threats, and adapt resources” (2006, 11). Charles Kupchan stresses the importance of balancing external commitments with available national resources (1994, 3). Barry Posen describes the concept as a state’s theory about how it can best “cause” security for itself (1985, 13). Similarly Hal Brands defines a state’s grand strategy as “the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy.” More explicitly, grand strategy

is a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should go about doing so. Grand strategy requires a clear understanding of... the international environment, a country’s highest goals and interests...the primary threats to those goals and interests, and the ways that finite resources can be used (Brands 2014, 3).⁶

Strategic analysis therefore implicitly involves assessing external and internal dimensions/obstacles (Howard 1979; Rumelt 2011).

In 1953, President Eisenhower established a Presidential Committee on International Information Activities (PCIIA), known informally as the Jackson Committee. Numerous scholars cite the PCIIA’s far-reaching impact on the U.S. approach to the Cold War, while others question the committee’s contribution. In an era also characterized as lacking “clear lines between war and peace, foreign and domestic, emergency and normality,” the Jackson Committee assessed the overall U.S. Cold War effort offering recommendations as to what the U.S. sought to accomplish and how it should go about securing itself. An examination of Jackson Committee conceptual argumentative games reveal an intertwinement between the emerging concepts of psychological warfare, political warfare, and grand strategy in advancing U.S. interests within the blurred space between peace and war. This intertwinement reflected a discursive effort to appropriately define U.S. aspirational and practical goals and align these with available resources. As the Jackson Committee formed, member C. D. Jackson acknowledged to

⁶ British historian Sir Michael Howard writes of the operational, logistical, social, and technological “forgotten” dimensions of strategy. Professor of Business and Society Richard Rumelt asserts that good strategy involves diagnosis, guiding policy, and coherent action. These conceptualizations highlight the necessity of assessing internal resources and capabilities (strengths/weaknesses/obstacles).

Eisenhower's Chief of Staff Sherman Adams that "political warfare is a strange, unknown thing to a lot of people" (C. D. Jackson Records, Box 7, 24 Jan 53).⁷ Near the end of its tenure, PCIIA Executive Secretary Abbott Washburn posed the question: "Is political warfare everything, or just a very special thing? [The answer is:] the broad aspect: waging Cold War; the narrow aspect: waging propaganda" (Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, PCIIA Records, Box 1, undated). The committee advanced the broader categorization as the core of U.S. national strategy. However, to appreciate the committee's role, scholars must understand temporal discursive meanings.

Public Affairs professor Kenneth A. Osgood charges "[a]lthough Eisenhower's commitment to psychological warfare has not gone unnoticed by historians, the subject has received little in-depth attention... surprisingly, there exists no systematic study of the relationship of political warfare to Eisenhower's foreign policy" (Osgood 2000, 406). This study contributes to answering this call through an in-depth, theoretically-informed historical, empirical, and interpretive analysis of the PCIIA and its role in the U.S. approach to the Cold War during the Eisenhower administration. It offers that such an endeavor will further our understanding of how actors confronted conceptual confusion within an emerging geopolitical condition and subsequently contributed to a discourse involving new language and national security practices. In uncovering discursive conditions of possibility, scholars may gain a deeper appreciation for the tensions and discursive maneuverings informing subsequent strategic policy choices.

⁷ All archival documents cited throughout this dissertation are located at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEPL). Further annotations will identify source collection, box number, and date.

Introduction: Pitfalls and Promises of Psychological Warfare in the Cold War

“Today this world dwells in a twilight zone between peace and war--a zone we call “cold war”... Let us talk about the wisdom and skill which we need to prosecute this “cold war” that infects nations around the globe... If we are to prevail in this “cold war” struggle for the minds and wills of humanity, we must do better.” -- Dwight D. Eisenhower, October 8, 1952, San Francisco

By 1952, Americans had developed a Cold War discourse and consensus centering on “a Manichean world of light and darkness” between Western Civilization and an aggressive and nuclear-capable totalitarian Soviet Union (Medhurst 2000, 466). Notwithstanding such consensus, policy debates regarding the United States’ Cold War efforts continued. In Asia, the U.S. had been leading United Nations forces against communist North Korean and Chinese forces for over two years. Presidential candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower soon would pledge that he would “go to Korea” to resolve the crisis. In Western Europe, countries continued to rebuild with assistance from the European Recovery Program as the nascent, American-led Allied Command Europe planned for the military defense of Western Europe against the Soviet Union. And, around the world, decolonization was seen as presenting the possibility for Soviet expansionism, especially given the influential reach and seemingly effective propaganda of the global Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). Additionally, at home, Senator Joseph McCarthy’s two year crusade to root out communists and communist influence across the government and civil society continued unabated.

Challenging Common Understanding: Eisenhower’s Campaign Speech

In this geopolitical environment, Dwight D. Eisenhower gave the most comprehensive foreign policy speech of his presidential campaign to a San Francisco audience on 8 October 1952 at the Cow Palace, an arena built in 1941 with a concrete and steel roof that covered nearly six acres. Promising “leadership of wisdom and courage,” Eisenhower outlined his sweeping vision for winning the global Cold War--an international effort in psychological warfare intended to influence public attitudes and activities at home and abroad (Stephen Benedict Papers, Box 4). To accomplish his vision for winning the Cold War, President-elect Eisenhower later delegated authority to an ad hoc advisory committee charged with surveying America’s Cold War efforts and providing recommendations.

Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones (1989), Bowie and Immerman (1998) and Saki Dockrill (1996) each describe an Eisenhower who grasped the necessity for winning hearts and minds given his wartime experiences and understanding of the importance of morale in wartime. As Eisenhower told the crowd on 8 October, “psychological warfare is the struggle for the minds and wills of men [and] if we are to prevail in this “cold war” struggle for the minds and wills of humanity, we must do better” (Stephen Benedict Papers, Box 4, 8 Oct 52) According to Kenneth Osgood, Eisenhower’s speech reflected a “remarkable moment: here was a presidential candidate, making *psychological warfare* an issue in a political campaign... Eisenhower promised a coherent national security strategy that accorded paramount significance to psychological considerations” (Osgood 2006, 46-47).⁸ Illustrating the conceptual ambiguity of “psychological warfare,” Eisenhower’s bold proclamation that day was his opening act in recasting the meaning of psychological warfare (beyond propaganda) by linking it directly to the discourse of the Cold War which “[b]y 1952...was familiar, widely practiced, and rarely challenged” (Medhurst 2000, 466). Eisenhower caveated that

many people think “psychological warfare” means just the use of propaganda, like the controversial “Voice of America”... But propaganda is not the most important part in this struggle. The present administration has never yet been able to grasp the full importance of a psychological effort put forth on a national scale (Stephen Benedict Papers, Box 4, 8 Oct 52).

Eisenhower’s pronouncement was remarkable. Despite the indispensability of propaganda and psychological warfare to the United States’ own revolutionary beginnings (Davidson 1941; Berger 1976; Hart 2013, 46) and America’s employment of propaganda and psychological activities across her wartime experiences (Milton 1942; Linebarger 1947; Daugherty 1958), Americans in general have “accorded the word a sinister meaning” (Finch 2000, 368). Exemplifying the negativity associated with psychological warfare, a Washington Post editorial on Valentine’s Day 1953--just weeks after the Jackson Committee first convened--declared “[p]sychological warfare, in addition to being contrary to the American way of doing things, is also antithetical to the American way of life.” Totalitarian regimes, real and imagined, practiced psychological warfare to secure total control over populations. Democracies did not.

⁸ Conversely, historian Walter L. Hixson claims that the subject of psychological warfare and information programs played a marginal role in Eisenhower’s 1952 campaign, despite any underlying intent to elevate psychological warfare to the center of an eventual Cold War strategy (Hixson 1997, 21).

Published nearly four years earlier, George Orwell's popular dystopian novel *1984* warned readers of the insidiousness of any activities resembling Thought Police patrolling against "thoughtcrimes" inherent in individualism (1948).

For the average citizens gathered in San Francisco, and those who later read excerpts of Eisenhower's speech in newspapers, early twentieth century wartime practices shaped their common understanding of psychological warfare. During the Great War, the Committee for Public Information, known informally as the Creel Committee, had approached its task of supporting America's military effort with a centralized heavy-handedness (Hart 2013, 7). The Creel Committee emphasized activities that "promoted jingoism, intolerance, and vigilantism, an assessment that quickly became the reigning interpretation of both Creel's legacy and, at war's end, of the powers of propaganda" (Kennedy 1980, 62). The backlash was such that when the Creel Committee disbanded after the war, U.S. policymakers and practitioners, including the War Department, retained virtually no residual knowledge or capability in psychological warfare (Hart 2013, 76; Paddock 2002, 6).

During World War II, Americans had considered propaganda at best a wartime tool to destroy the enemy's will, while also encouraging allies. It was a supplemental tool employed by theater commanders charged with winning overseas battles and the war. Even the name given to the organization responsible for limited domestic information activities, the Office of War Information, designated the specific context and implied boundaries of appropriate information activities at home. In other words, the U.S. accepted and employed psychological warfare only within the specific context of wartime exigencies. As Johns Hopkins University Professor Paul M. A. Linebarger later reasoned "[i]n the American use of the term, psychological warfare was the supplementing of normal military operations by the use of mass communications" (Linebarger 1947, 40). According to Thomas C. Sorensen, "[p]rior to the mid-1940s," no one "ever seriously considered an organized, government-sponsored effort to influence peoples *in peacetime*" (Parry-Giles 1992, 265, emphasis added; Osgood 2006, 33). During the Truman administration, government efforts to enhance U.S. peacetime psychological influence abroad, including the passage of the 1948 Information and Educational Exchange (Smith-Mundt) Act, often involved contentious legislative and public battles (Hart 2013, 122; Parry-Giles 1992).⁹

⁹ Chapter 2 provides additional contextual background on the American understanding of psychological warfare through a genealogy or history of the present.

Fusing Psychological Warfare with Daily Life and the U.S. “Cold War” Effort

Scholars at the time promoted Eisenhower’s symbolic role in solidifying a revolutionary foreign policy. In a *Foreign Affairs* article published just weeks before the 1952 election, George McBundy described the “extraordinary degree to which in his [Eisenhower’s] one person there were symbolized all three of these basic propositions of modern American policy” (McBundy 1952, 3). With the assumption that a revolution only succeeds when the mantle is accepted by subsequent generations, McBundy argued Eisenhower stood for the “revolutionary” imperatives that “the United States must act with friends and against enemies, for freedom and peace” (McBundy 1952, 3).

In resolutely affirming sustained American psychological warfare during his campaign speech, Eisenhower illustrated how language can be persuasive, interpretive, and constitutive of reality. According to Martin Medhurst, Eisenhower successfully drew on and intertwined familiar discourses and understandings of the Cold War, American foreign policy, and himself as a leader whose “very name evoked images of victory... His sincerity and humility lead to trust” (Medhurst 2000, 469). In combining these discourses with psychological warfare, Eisenhower sought to persuade the American public that the Cold War was in fact a psychological struggle that could be won through quotidian activities contributing to a comprehensive psychological effort. In this regard, he understood that language does not simply reflect reality, but has the power to evolve and create new realities. Eisenhower argued he offered “leadership of wisdom and courage” capable of governing a psychological effort that incorporated the entire nation. The “we” in “we wage a “cold war” encompassed individuals across society, not just the State. Appealing to the spiritual strength, compassion, self-dedication, and courage of each individual, he asked Americans to recognize that “everything we say, everything we do, and everything we fail to say or to do, will have its impact in other lands. It will affect the minds and wills of men and women there.”

Eisenhower’s rhetoric attempted to expand the geographic scope of the majority of Americans who had never traveled beyond U.S. borders. Americans had mobilized to achieve victory in World War II. Eisenhower now called on Americans to mobilize through daily activities affecting “minds and wills” abroad to save humanity in the struggle against

Communism. He emotively appealed to Americans' sense of selves by describing the United States' ultimate aim as "trying to get the world by peaceful means, to believe the truth...that Americans want a world at peace, a world in which all peoples shall have the opportunity for maximum individual development." Individual daily activities home and abroad would contribute to a "common need for common defense" against Communism, but importantly, these activities could also represent offensive, dynamic means to fight the war without actually fighting. Combined with the symbolism of Eisenhower the victorious World War II leader, "psychological warfare revived the sense of a wartime fight to the finish, a struggle that would conclude, like the last war, with the "unconditional surrender" of the enemies of the "free world"" (Hixson 1997, 27).

Purposefully attempting to fuse the meaning of psychological warfare with the future U.S. Cold War effort under his leadership, Eisenhower reminded his San Francisco audience: "Modern war is not a conceivable choice... Remember this: we wage a "cold war" in order to escape the horror of its opposite-- war itself." Through psychological warfare, America would be able "to gain a victory without casualties, to win a contest that can quite literally save peace." He reassured the audience that they should not "be afraid of that term [psychological warfare] just because it's a five-dollar, five-syllable word" (Stephen Benedict Papers, Box 4, 8 Oct 52).

The Truman Administration and Challenges in Waging the "Cold War"

Contemporary scholars Gregory Mitrovich, Justin Hart, and Chris Tudda contend Truman and key members of his administration became committed over time to all methods short of war including psychological warfare and propaganda (Mitrovich 2000; Hart 2013; Tudda 2006). Historian Walter Hixson also characterizes the Truman administration as having a successful and "aggressive program of psychological warfare that aimed to undermine communist movements worldwide" (Hixson 1997, 21). Nonetheless, candidate-Eisenhower juxtaposed his leadership and vision with the mistakes and meekness of the Truman administration over the previous eight years. This section provides general context for Eisenhower's claims and decision to establish the Jackson Committee.

Assuming a post-war position as a leading world power, the Truman administration wrestled with not only defining the emerging geopolitical situation, but developing ways to advance its liberal agenda. Prior to World War II, the U.S. had relied primarily upon a "laissez-

faire approach” to foreign policy and “the primacy of private initiative” (Ninkovich 1981, 14; Hart 2013). However, as Europe struggled to rebuild and reconstruct its way of life, visiting U.S. lawmakers in 1946 and 1947 saw that Europeans were being offered alternatives to the American way. Private industry also took note. In 1946, Philip Reed, Chairman of General Electric, addressed a conference of industrialists, urging a persuasive advertising and information effort to secure American free enterprise.

We have failed to recognize that we must advertise and sell the American economic system as well as the products of that system. It is our job to explain and sell the rightness of private competitive enterprise both at home and abroad. If we don't, we shall be in very real danger of losing it (in Lucas 1999, 25)

During fact-finding trips in 1946 and 1947, U.S. legislators “came smack up against the gross misrepresentation abroad of the United States, its actions, and its policies” (Needell 1993, 401; Parry-Giles 1992, 3). Reviving a bill first introduced in December 1945, Congress again debated proposals for an official U.S. international information program. Information programs that continued after World War II were quite modest. Psychological warfare advocates were challenged by recalcitrance and accusations of embarking on a “radical departure in the method of our foreign relations” (in Hart 2013, 112-113; Krugler 2000, 70; Parry-Giles 1992). Underpinning much of the debate were differing views on the centrality of government and the primacy of the private sphere (Ninkovich 1981, 125). International information programs also potentially blurred the lines between foreign and domestic politics. Some Republican lawmakers associated psychological warfare programs with the New Deal and feared that overseas propaganda would “further the policies of whatever administration happened to be in power” rather than promoting a general understanding of the American way of life (Parry-Giles 1992, 4). Although Justin Hart contends that by 1945, “foreign policy had already been redefined to such an extent that excluding [propaganda] was unthinkable,” heated public debates illustrate the inherent contingency during these early post-war years (2013, 70). Additionally, while numerous top secret NSC documents in the late 1940s and early 1950s stressed the necessity of a coordinated U.S. response to Soviet activities, the Truman administration itself debated *how* to respond. With fragile political and economic situations abroad, the arrival of mass communication technologies capable of reaching mass societies many of which were reestablishing (or establishing) democratic systems, and a desire to avoid conventional conflict

with the Soviet Union, propaganda activities assumed a center stage within policy debates (Osgood 2006, 33).¹⁰

Many scholars cite 1947 as pivotal to congressional and administration psychological warfare choices (Karalekas in Leary 1984, 39-40). The year prior a general suspicion of Soviet intentions and actions began moving to the mainstream fueled by revelations of Soviet atomic espionage and Winston Churchill's publicized Iron Curtain speech in March (Craig and Logevall 2012, 66-72). A year later President Truman hyped the Communist threat to gain domestic support for the Truman Doctrine and economic aid packages (Freeland 1972; Krugler 2000, 54). Six months after Truman's declaration to Congress, the Soviet Union created the Communist Information Bureau, Cominform, to direct and coordinate Communist parties worldwide. This official practice accentuated fears of Soviet-centralized control and raised the specter of Soviet ideological warfare. Public rhetoric regarding Soviet activities contributed to an emerging strategic panic in which U.S. policymakers considered activities heretofore deemed unacceptable in peacetime. According to some scholars, the creation of Cominform spurred subsequent U.S. psychological warfare decisions (Jeffrey-Jones 1989, 50). Gregory Mitrovich contends that the U.S. expanded psychological operations because the "growing Soviet propaganda offensive demonstrated as early as 1947 that the United States had either to respond *in kind* to this challenge or lose Europe without firing a shot" (Mitrovich 2000, 16, emphasis added). In chronicling the often politically contentious legislative and executive historiography of the United States Information Agency (USIA), Nicholas Cull also argues that by late 1947 "[n]o one doubted that the United States was now engaged in a propaganda war; it merely lacked the apparatus to do the job" (Cull 2008, 39; Freeland 1972, 207-208).

In January 1948 President Truman signed into law the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act (Smith-Mundt Act) officially authorizing U.S. international information activities while also mandating maximum use of private media. Administration officials now began to connect Voice of America programming to promoting anti-communism abroad and containing the Soviets, in addition to promoting the American way (Krugler 2000, 57-58). Weeks before

¹⁰ Justin Hart attributes sociological changes as the foundation for U.S. policy steps institutionalizing information activities.

The dilemma that U.S. policymakers confronted, and their decision to seek a solution in the realm of ideology, stemmed from what is typically described as the "dispersal of power" from the state to civil society throughout the 20th century--a concept most closely associated with the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (Hart 2013, 205).

signing the Smith-Mundt Act Truman also signed the confidential NSC 4 “Coordination of Foreign Information Measures” that concluded:

The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the U.S. and is employing coordinated psychological, political, and economic measures designed to undermine all non-Communist elements in all countries. The ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine the prestige of the U.S. and the effectiveness of its national policy but to weaken and divide the world opinion to a point where effective opposition to Soviet designs is no longer attainable by political, economic, or military means.

David Krugler contends “the importance of this [NSC 4] declaration is not easily underestimated” as it set the stage for more aggressive psychological warfare (2000, 78). NSC 4 assigned the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs the responsibility to strengthen and coordinate U.S. government foreign information measures countering anti-U.S. propaganda. The corresponding Top Secret NSC 4A assigned the recently created Central Intelligence Agency responsibility for psychological warfare and peacetime covert action.¹¹ These decisions effectively contributed to an evolving disjointed ensemble of propaganda activities.

By 1950, the Soviets were jamming an estimated 80-85% of U.S. radio transmissions to the Soviet sphere. U.S. policymakers interpreted this jamming as an activity aiding Soviet expansionism and consolidation (Krugler 2000, 103). Until 1950, U.S. international information efforts had emphasized “winning friends.” Truman’s “Campaign of Truth” marked a turning point in which the Truman administration justified more combative propaganda by portraying the geopolitical situation as a global crisis given the north Korean invasion, the loss of China, and Soviet atomic power (Parry-Giles 1992). In a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors given six days after receiving NSC 68, Truman argued the urgent need to “spread the truth about freedom and democracy” (20 Apr 50). Writing at the time, Dr. Edward P. Lilly described Truman’s Campaign of Truth as the administration’s first attempt at long-range planning rather than ad hoc activities (Edward P. Lilly Papers, 1928-1992, Box 48, 90).

To support a more aggressive Campaign of Truth, the U.S. State Department initiated Project TROY, a U.S. government-academia collaborative project led by researchers at the

¹¹ Hixson stresses the National Security Act of 1947 established the “bureaucratic structure required to launch “peacetime” psychological warfare that aimed to undermine the Soviet and Eastern European regimes” (Hixson 1997, 12).

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Beginning in October 1950, Project TROY brought together twenty-one scientists, social scientists, and historians for nearly three months to focus on providing the technical, as well as intellectual, framework for “getting the truth behind the Iron Curtain” (Needell 1993, 400). “Everyone involved in the [TROY] project was convinced of the central importance of political warfare and believed it could have an enormous impact on the world’s economic and social systems” (Needell 1993, 400). Submitted to the State Department in early 1951, the final report centered around the concept of political warfare as “strategic power of the several elements when combined as a well rounded and coordinated whole” (Needell 1993, 409). Centrally coordinated, political warfare would entail “special weapons, strategy, tactics, logistics, and training” (Needell 1993, 399). Nonetheless, Congress refused to appropriate funds to complete Project TROY’s recommended Ring Plan in both 1951 and 1952. In January 1953, the Administrator of the United States International Information Administration Wilson Compton again noted “the hesitation of Congressional leaders of both parties to commit themselves to the approval of reasonable reallocations of radio construction funds already appropriated and already available to the Department of State” (PCIIA Records, Box 14, 26 Jan 53).¹²

Over the course of the Truman administration, Congressional legislation and National Security Council directives broadened the scope and organizational responsibilities for American psychological warfare activities. To address “urgent requirements” stemming from the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the State Department established an ad hoc inter-departmental group

¹² Tepidly-adjudicated organizational responses to Truman’s 1950 Campaign for Truth illustrate the lack of national policy direction for governmental departments with different, perhaps even competing missions. The DoS-sponsored Project TROY consulting team led by Dr. Jerome Wiesner of MIT (a participant in the 1952 Princeton conference on psychological warfare highlighted in chapter three) recommended a Ring Plan of 14 high-powered radio transmitters surrounding the Iron Curtain to overcoming Soviet jamming of VOA. Ultimately the plan worked with the VOA strengthening its signals to the Iron Curtain; yet, both the CIA and JCS initially opposed the plan complicating implementation (in addition to domestic politics involving transmitter locations). From the CIA’s perspective, sustained Soviet jamming actually benefited the U.S. The Soviets were hurting themselves given the resources required and the fact that people behind the Iron Curtain knew the regime was fighting to keep some sort of information from them (regardless of what the information was). Subsequently, the CIA was reluctant to provide DoS with the detailed technical reports on Soviet jamming capabilities that were needed to complete the Ring Plan (Krugler 2000, 109). Additionally, the JCS opposed the Ring Plan because the military was concerned the Soviets would perfect their jamming methods and thus could “jam U.S. military transmissions during an emergency” (Krugler 2000, 180).

During the PCIIA’s first meeting on 30 Jan 53 (three years after Project TROY), the members discussed the issue of continuing DoD intransigence on VOA expansion within the NSC and PSB (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7). At an informal dinner a week later with four committee members, William H. Jackson informed the others that the NSC “wants to throw the issue in their [the Jackson Committee’s] lap” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 6 Feb 53). This incident highlights the continued lack of direction/dysfunction that the Jackson Committee was charged to remedy.

focusing on psychological operations. The 17 October 1950 “Second Progress Report on NSC 59/1 “The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning”” claimed that “instead of serving simply as policy consultants,” representatives from State, Defense, and the CIA, in addition to others, met weekly to provide “concrete advice on both policy and operating problems in current situations where joint political and military action is required in the psychological warfare field” (Webb 17 Oct 50). In the spring of 1951, NSC 59/1 authorized the establishment of a Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POCC) to focus on strengthening and coordinating foreign information activities in peace and psychological warfare in wartime. In particular, the POCC was charged to ensure continuity between peace and wartime plans and programs.

In July 1951, Under Secretary of Defense John Magruder nonetheless lamented, “[o]ur psychological operating agencies are like bodies of troops without a commander and staff. Not having been told what to do or where to go, but too dynamic to stand still, the troops have marched in all directions” (in Hixson 1997, 19). Osgood describes the resulting “organizational chaos” of Truman’s “sprawling apparatus for influencing foreign attitudes” (Osgood 2006, 43). In her examination of early Cold War covert operations, Sarah-Jane Corke also identifies the “bureaucratic fiasco” during the Truman administration arguing there was a

persistent inability of the administration as a whole to reconcile policy and operations successfully and to agree on a consistent course of action for waging the Cold War. ... The United States simply did not have a coherent foreign policy during these years. Nor did it develop and maintain an integrated strategy on which covert operations could be based (Corke 2008, 4).

Contributing to the incoherency were internal contradictions between the policy of Containment and activities promoting liberation of Eastern Europe, also known as rollback. Dr. Edward Lilly assessed “with the negativism implicit in Containment, an aggressive [information] program was really the last thing the State wanted to undertake” (Edward P. Lilly Papers, 1928-1992, Box 58, 1961). Yet the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination covertly supported resistance movements and the recently established CIA-funded National Committee for a Free Europe broadcast covert information to Soviet satellites encouraging steps toward “liberation.” C. D. Jackson, the driving force behind the Jackson Committee, soon would specifically charge the Truman administration with potentially dangerously unleashing psychological activities without

any coherent policy direction. After the Korean War began, Senator Robert Taft also advanced the concept of liberation and rollback in his 1951 *A Foreign Policy for Americans*. Representing Old Guard Republicans as he campaigned for the Republican nomination, Taft argued that the United States could justify the use of Soviet [psychological] methods in this *emergency*, a classification that reveals the continuing strategic panic now aggravated by Soviet material advances in both atomic weapons and presumed resources given its treaty with Communist China. Taft nonetheless maintained such activities were not part of American tradition and should not become part of America's permanent foreign policy (Taft 1951, 116-120, emphasis added). The Jackson Committee would later debate the classification of "emergency" and its implications for sustained U.S. actions as it considered the nature of the "cold war."

In an attempt to overcome bureaucratic struggles involving psychological activities, Truman established a Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) on 4 April 1951.¹³ The Presidential Directive specified the PSB "to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations." Composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence (or their designated representatives), the PSB reported to the NSC. Journalist and Professor of International Politics Scott Lucas asks whether the PSB's role was simply to "devise "information" for the operations of other agencies? Or was the PSB's role to equate psychological strategy with Cold War strategy, coordinating diplomatic, economic, and military planning?" (Lucas 1999, 131). Truman's directive was unclear. While some within the PSB sought to coordinate a Cold War strategy with specific emphasis on psychological aspects, the bureaucratic resistance of the State Department in particular was so persistent that gridlock ensued. By the end of 1952, "the PSB had become a largely nominal body" (Dockrill 1996, 44). Corke offers that the PSB simply reflected "the complete lack of unanimity that existed within the [Truman] administration over the meaning and interpretation of American Cold War policy" (Corke 2008, 134). Political communications scholars Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. assess that "[i]n attempting to stand by universal principles but at the same time recognizing Soviet "special" interests in eastern Europe, he [Truman] created a peacetime

¹³ Allan Needell's investigation of Project TROY uncovered draft directives for a "Psychological Strategy Board" within TROY papers submitted to the State Department (1993, 415).

rhetoric that had little direction for practical policies in dealing with the Soviet Union” (Hinds and Windt Jr 1991, 83). In his correspondence with president-elect Eisenhower regarding the proposed advisory committee, C.D. Jackson referenced the bureaucratic chaos and lack of leadership. On 17 December 1952, he wrote:

These organizations are highly competitive-- in fact to the point of sabotage. The real reason for this fratricidal warfare is not so much mutual dislike or empire-building ambitions as it is the realization that the Government of the U.S. has neither policy nor plan for conducting the cold war. Therefore, each organization is desperately casting about to stake out some kind of claim (Ann Whitman File, Box 21).

Justin Hart and Nicholas Cull assess that as Truman left office in January 1953, the “international information program was built on inherently unstable foundations” (Cull 2008, 80).

Making Good on his Promise: The Jackson Committee

Eisenhower’s speech declaring his vision for psychological warfare was not an empty gesture. Prompted by Charles Douglas (C.D.) Jackson, one of his campaign speechwriters and a veteran of his Psychological Warfare Division at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) during World War II, Eisenhower agreed in the fall of 1952 to establish an ad hoc advisory committee to make an “Appraisal Survey of our Cold War effort” (Brands 1988). In particular, the committee would assess what the U.S. had done to date in psychological warfare and recommend what the program should be in the future (Central Files, General File 1955, Box 1185, 26 Nov 52). Four days after his 20 January 1953 inauguration, in one of his first acts as President, Eisenhower officially established the Presidential Committee on International Information Activities (PCIIA) known informally as the Jackson Committee. In a 24 January 1953 letter to James S. Lay, Jr, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC), President Eisenhower informed the NSC of the Jackson Committee’s directive:

to make a survey and evaluation of the international information policies and activities of the Executive Branch of the Government and of policies and activities related thereto with particular reference to the international relations and national security of this country. It shall make recommendations to me for such legislative, administrative, or other action, respecting the said policies and activities as in its opinion may be desirable.

The letter, as well as the subsequent press release on 26 January 1953, quoted Eisenhower highlighting the significance of the committee's task. "It has long been my conviction that a unified and dynamic effort in this field is essential to the security of the United States and of the other peoples in the community of free nations" (PCIIA Records, Box 1). Eisenhower's directive implied that the Truman administration's "cold war" effort over the previous eight years had been neither unified nor dynamic. The Jackson Committee would assess the disjointed ensemble of ongoing psychological policies and activities over its five month tenure.

Scholarly Assessments of the Jackson Committee's Scope and Effect

Scholars analyzing the final Jackson Report offer various interpretations as to the scope and effect of committee problem representation processes. Bowie and Immerman characterize the committee as having a limited charter to "review and assess the Psychological Strategy Board's operations and responsibilities" (Bowie and Immerman 1998, 94). However, given the PSB's unclear directive, this characterization does not illuminate the committee's actual scope or effects. H.W. Brands describes the committee as dealing with a limited scope of "institutional reorganization" (Brands 1988, 120). Other scholars contend that the Jackson Committee carried out a "thorough-going review and analysis of the nation's foreign information *programs*" (Daugherty 1958, 14, emphasis added) as well as Truman administration information *policies* (Daugherty 1958; Wiesen Cook 1981; Parry-Giles 1992; Mitrovich 2000; Osgood 2006; Cull 2008; Guth 2002, 2008). David Guth, in his comparison of the 1953 and 2001 U.S. propaganda policy debates suggests that the Jackson Committee's focus came down to two questions involving both strategy and organization: "a) should the nation use propaganda to advance its foreign policy goals, and b) where in the government should overseas information programs reside?" (Guth 2008, 316). Hixson and Osgood frame the Committee's scope by citing C. D. Jackson's explanation that Eisenhower directed "it to investigate all aspects of the Cold War effort" (in Osgood 2006, 55; Hixson 1999, 24). In fact, the Jackson Committee took a broader look at America's overall Cold War approach as will be described in chapters four through seven. Additionally, the analytic narrative will highlight the committee's concern with institutional abilities to inspire, coordinate, and integrate words and activities over the long-term, rather than a concern for locations of specific programs.

Writing a year after the committee presented its recommendations to President Eisenhower, Roland I. Perusse describes how the committee's recommendations inspired a general rethinking, reappraisal, and re-evaluation of the technologies of influencing people abroad. He assesses the recommendations as "startling" with findings having "far-reaching effects on the reorganization of U.S. "psychological" strategy" (in Daugherty 1958, 31-32). Michael Hogan also concludes that "Eisenhower and his propaganda advisors [the Jackson Committee] brought a whole new attitude toward propaganda to the White House. Moreover, they changed the information program in ways that shaped the character and direction of the Cold War for years to come" (in Medhurst 2000, 135). Lucas is less effusive about the Committee's novelty claiming that the Jackson Committee simply represented the prevailing sentiment as reported by the press. As evidence, Lucas cites a 24 May 1953 Washington Post article: "True psychological warfare, properly defined, is so bound up with the conduct and demeanor of the whole American Government, that you cannot establish a separate department of psychological warriors" (Lucas 1999, 177). Krugler also writes of the Jackson Committee's preemption by other decisions saying "the recommendations it did provide were still strikingly repetitive or contradictory" yet "the repetitive import of the Jackson committee's recommendations did not negate their relevance" (Krugler 2000, 207). Additionally, Mitrovich claims the committee's final report did *not* necessarily advance America's psychological warfare. Despite including psychological warfare advocates as committee members, Mitrovich says the report critiqued the excessive zeal of the Truman administration and in fact did not challenge what Eisenhower and others considered a retrenchment in psychological warfare activities in the early 1950s (Mitrovich 2000). O'Gorman offers a more nuanced interpretation writing that the Committee's attempt to "balance between "peaceful" appearances and aggressive actions" resulted in a "strong emphasis on state-private networks in fighting the most provocative battles of political warfare" (O'Gorman 2009, 401-402).

According to Parry-Giles, rather than simply bringing a new attitude, the Jackson Committee institutionally affected the role of overt and covert propaganda in American foreign policy (Parry-Giles 1992, 15-17). Nicholas Cull emphasizes the implications of the committee's organizational recommendations for an "Operations Coordinating Board [OCB] to integrate the psychological aspects of U.S. foreign and defense policy [with] a higher-powered membership, including the Under Secretary of State as chair, the director of the CIA, deputy directors from

Defense and agencies, and a representative of the President” (Cull 2008, 94). He also notes the committee’s exhortation for a clear demarcation between factual and other sorts of information-related activities (Cull 2008, 95). Lucas also stresses the “valuable reorganization” stemming from the Jackson Committee recommendations including the OCB and the newly-formed U.S. Information Agency affording propaganda a “higher profile” which was the “most far-reaching result” according to Hixson (Lucas 1999, 199; Hixson 1999, 25). Hixson goes on to write:

Creation of the USIA, together with the report of the Jackson committee, marked a turning point in the postwar era...the essential bureaucratic framework finally had been established by 1953. [However,] [c]ontrary to the Jackson committee’s wishes, psychological considerations would not assume a position as the vital “fourth area” along with economic, political, and military affairs in the nation’s overall foreign policy” (Hixson 1999, 27).

Blanche Wiesen Cook further underlines the committee’s influence on executive branch institutional change. “On the recommendation of the Jackson Committee, the entire structure of the NSC was overhauled” (Wiesen Cook 1981, 364), enabling the NSC “to administer political, economic, and psychological warfare” (Wiesen Cook 1981, 175). Shawn Parry-Giles takes Wiesen Cook’s argument a step further, specifically connecting the Jackson Committee to expanding executive power and the emergence of an American national security state. In particular, she argues how “the Jackson Committee’s philosophy furthered the militarization of the [encompassing psychological] program by connecting it to the presidency rather than to the diplomatic arms of the U.S. government” (Parry-Giles 2001, 136). She also describes the effects of “a militarized structure...resulting in the greater coordination of propaganda strategy, [and] the development of long-range propaganda campaigns more reflective of military philosophy” (Parry-Giles 2001, 152).

Finally, Wiesen Cook contends Eisenhower created the PCIIA to develop a unified and coherent Cold War strategy and that ultimately the Jackson Committee’s “recommendations would influence United States foreign policy for decades” (Wiesen Cook 1981, 176). Twenty-five years later Kenneth Osgood reiterates such conclusions asserting that the Jackson Committee’s “recommendations played a pivotal role in providing a new look for the information program and shaping U.S. propaganda strategy for the rest of the decade and beyond” (Osgood 2006, 79).

The Role of Ad hoc Presidential Advisory Commissions in Recasting Policy Agendas

Amy Zegart's "Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes" large-N study of ad hoc advisory commissions assesses that presidents use the ideal-type "information commission" for foreign policy issues because these "are precisely the kinds of problems that information commissions are created to solve" (Zegart 2004, 380). Information commissions focus on providing government leaders new ways of thinking about foreign policy problems that transcend bureaucratic boundaries. Zegart thus concludes "the political benefit more often comes at the end of the process, when presidents and their officials assess, digest, and if warranted, act on the information they receive" (Zegart 2004, 379). Although advisory committees themselves are not legally capable of taking any authoritative action, making decisions, or implementing recommendations (Wolanin 1975, 7), Thomas Cronin argues advisory systems are "one of the most important segments of the Presidency since it is at this level...that the major portion of the policy agenda is acted upon and *recast*" (Cronin 1969, xviii, emphasis added). Having specifically analyzed advisory committees during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Alan L. Dean concluded in 1957, "*Ad hoc* commissions have attained a position of considerable importance in the arsenal of devices and techniques for policy formulation in the Federal Government (in Cronin 1969, 115). Focusing specifically on President Eisenhower's penchant for debate to inform presidential decision making, Meena Bose asserts "Eisenhower's advisory arrangements served to ensure active debate and discussions about major policy issues, at least in the area of national security, and the president himself played the central role in this process" (Bose 1998, 11). Bowie and Immerman also relay that "[f]or Eisenhower, a systematic process was imperative for analyzing alternatives and making sound policy decisions" (Bowie and Immerman 1998, 4).

The aforementioned scholarship attributes various Eisenhower administration organizational, philosophical, and strategic choices to Jackson Committee recommendations. None has addressed the conditions of possibility for, and how, the Jackson Committee contributed to reducing strategic conceptual confusion and recasting policy discourse, agendas, and options. Wolanin admits

the study of why the analyses and preferences of some persons rather than others on questions of public policy are accepted as authoritative is not nearly as well developed. We seem to lack an important baseline for the understanding of public policy

formation...The difficulty appears when one asks why one interpretation of and prescription for dealing with a novel, complex, and uncertain policy problem is accepted rather than another (Wolanin 1975, 37).

Noting the various scholarly conclusions regarding the Jackson Committee, this study problematizes the committee itself to interpret the role of the Jackson Committee in the U.S. approach to the Cold War.¹⁴ Delving inside the “black box,” the study illuminates conditions of possibility and the “how” of the committee’s discursive decision making practices that informed subsequent policy decisions. As British political scientist Harold Laski points out in his interpretive study of the American presidency, “the processes of government are very like an iceberg: what appears on the surface may be but a small part of the reality beneath” (Laski 1940, 2).

¹⁴ Scholars investigating advisory commissions have shown that ad hoc commissions may serve a variety of purposes: policy analysis and innovation; education; window dressing and rubber stamping; issue avoidance, and even preemption of Congressional action (Wolanin 1975; Smith 1977; Tutchings 1979; Kitts 1996; Campbell 1998; Zegart 2004; Hastedt 2007). The analysis reveals the Jackson Committee’s dedication to policy analysis and innovation. As the committee completed its tenure, the Committee Chair and Executive Secretary drafted a press release. They described their considerations as: no breach of security; nothing to embarrass the President or Secretary of State; enough to satisfy the press; and “*enough to show the committee has done real work*” (PCIIA Records, Box 14, 26 Jun 53; emphasis added).

Chapter One: A Constructivist Discursive Approach

“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”
-- William Isaac Thomas, 1928

Research Objective

The Jackson Committee’s final report was a specific tangible output of five months filled with testimonies and testimonials, committee interactions, interpretations and argumentation. Current literature focuses on the committee output and its implications. While the report may have been *what* appeared on the surface, the *conditions of possibility for* and *how* the committee fulfilled its mandate is part of the argumentative policy making reality beneath the surface not yet explored. Thus, the focus of this research effort is not on the resulting after-effects, but rather an archival-based, theoretically-informed historical and interpretive examination of Cold War conceptualization, problem definition, and solution specification. In this general moment of strategic panic compounded by conceptual confusion, actors cast about new discourses of language and practices to address a uniquely constructed threat. I propose that investigating discursive activities contributing to the creation and conduct of the Jackson Committee will enable a deeper understanding of the committee’s role in the U.S. approach to the Cold War. Rather than developing and testing hypotheses or falsifying a particular theory, this project embarks from a philosophical ontological position that equates truth with explanatory utility (Jackson 2011, 141).

Underlying this endeavor is a fundamental assumption that the “how” of policy processes are as important to understand as the resulting “what.” I offer a plausible and reasonable interpretive explanation satisfying Weberian “adequate causality” (Jackson 2006, 43), rather than necessary and sufficient (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 75-82). My conclusions do not seek to be generalizable, but heavily contextual and contingent, contributing to the body of Cold War history literature as well as literature on American political warfare, strategy, and public diplomacy. I propose that the theoretical and methodological approach employed may serve as an example for new research avenues in the fields of foreign policy decision making, American politics, and public policy, including advisory commissions which have become a recurring feature within American public policy making.

Theoretical Approach, Organization of Research, and Method of Inquiry

Given the *advisory* nature of this ad hoc commission, I argue that an interdisciplinary, constructivist discursive approach is appropriate for analytical inquiry into the role of the Presidential Committee on International Information Activities. The committee's activities in surveying, evaluating, and providing recommendations for a unified and dynamic Cold War effort were inherently discursive. Inspired by European social theorists including Juergen Habermas and Michel Foucault, as well as the social constructivist movement, Frank Fischer provides a public policy analysis explanation of what this means. "Policy making is a discursive struggle over the definition of problems, boundaries of categories used to describe them, criteria for classification/assessment, and meaning of ideals used to guide actions" (Fischer 2003, 60). The Jackson Committee, during its five month tenure, identified categories and developed criteria to classify the volumes of information before them from over 700 individuals (PCIIA Records, Box 2, Correspondence-Record). And underlying committee activities were implicit American values that operated "below the surface to structure basic policy definitions and understandings" (Fischer 2003, 14).

This constructivist discursive approach draws on the insights of the argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning (Fischer and Forester, eds, 1993; Fischer 2003), informed by social and political psychology (Sylvan and Voss 1998). Underpinning this approach is a theoretical claim that language itself has productive power. Jennifer Milliken explains that discourse productivity refers to how

discourses make intelligible some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world, and of operationalizing a particular 'regime of truth' while excluding other possible modes of identity and action. More specifically, discourses define *subjects authorized to speak and to act...* [and] also define *knowledgeable practices...* Finally, of significance for the legitimacy of international practices is that discourses produce as subjects *publics (audiences) for authorized actors*, and their *common sense* of the existence and qualities of different phenomena and of how public officials should act for them and in their name (Milliken 1999, 229).

Whereas traditional approaches often emphasize bargaining between actors with established preferences and positions, this approach offers the possibility for actors' interests and beliefs to be intersubjectively constituted through discourse over the course of the policy making process. Within the field of political psychology, research into intra-group dynamics has

“consistently demonstrated that decision making in a group context does not result in an aggregation of individual group members’ preferences... [or] that seldom have the decisions exactly reflected a *single* individual’s preferences” (Sylvan and Haddad in Sylvan and Voss 1998, 187). Rather, their experiments show policy outcomes are constructed through social interaction and discursive practices.¹⁵ Therefore, the analysis focuses on the discursive space in which policy discursive/communicative interaction occurs. In this case involving the creation and conduct of the Jackson Committee, the available concepts representing the geopolitical situation and practices were themselves in flux and did not fit neatly into existing categories or directly translate to established institutional responsibilities. Individuals thus endeavored to frame and represent policy problems including the geopolitical threat, international information and the overall U.S. Cold War effort. Committee argumentation focused in part on shaping behaviors and encouraging specific self-practices; therefore, a governmentality framework is layered within the constructivist discursive approach.

Operationalizing this analytic framework, the empirical and interpretive inquiry first examines discursive conditions of possibility for the Jackson Committee in the following two chapters. Scholarship within social constructivist paradigms contends that actors draw on existing cultural and linguistic knowledge in the course of their activities, thus the importance of situating actors within specific times and places (Weldes 1996). As policy analysts, the Jackson Committee members and staff were grounded in basic social and cultural meanings that operated as discursive antecedent resources. Chapter two interprets a relevant early-1950s American geopolitical discursive landscape. It includes a brief genealogy of psychological warfare in order to establish how the concept evolved and became available for deployment by General Eisenhower during the presidential campaign and subsequent investigation by the Jackson Committee. Having established the macro/meso-level discursive landscape in which the Jackson Committee members were situated in chapter two, chapter three focuses its analytic narrative on discursive activities in 1952 directly contributing to the creation of Eisenhower’s directive to the Jackson Committee.

¹⁵ Alternatively, responding to the prevalent rational actor model of decision making, Graham Allison’s classic bureaucratic politics approach argues that policy outcomes can be the result of bargaining (Allison and Zelikow 1999).

Chapters four through seven provide an analytic narrative of committee practices, including the argumentative games involved in interpreting its mandate and representing the problem. Employing an ideal-type of decision making process found within the literature on advisory commissions (Simon 1957; Tutchings 1979; Cronin and Greenberg 1969; Wolanin 1975), the analytic narrative “moves back and forth between interpretation and case materials” (Bates et al 1998, 16). Within the scholarship on ad hoc advisory commissions, ideal-type decision making processes generally affirm Herbert Simon’s classic observations and theory of decision making behavior. Terrence Tutchings describes inputs of personnel, information and research reports into commissions whose outputs are recommendations. Thomas Wolanin adds fidelity by describing sub-activities within task definition, specifically breaking the general problem into specific manageable subordinate problems before gathering information, research, and data. Committees then write a report and offer recommendations that usually reflect a majority consensus due to small group dynamics and esprit de corps which develops among commission members. Wolanin also notes an underlying pragmatism within committee deliberations rather than any commitment to formal scientific inquiry (Wolanin 1975, 96-101). This study begins with such ideal-types and add layers of insights from the fields of public policy and social/political psychology for a more in-depth understanding of the conceptual political process involved in addressing a unique geopolitical threat.

During the committee’s five month tenure, members and staff conducted over 217 interview sessions and received over 270 pieces of correspondence from over 700 individuals representing differing discursive communities. These chapters therefore also identify various discursive communities and discourses available to the committee. Chapter eight offers conclusions on the role of the Jackson Committee. Each of these analytic components merits elaboration.

A Constructivist Discursive Paradigm

Over forty years ago sociologists Berger and Luckmann described how intersubjective human activity generates *social* facts that we treat “...as if they were something other than human products--such as facts of nature” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 106). Underpinning this constructivist scholarship is the ontological position that the social world, built upon social facts, is *intersubjectively* meaningful. Knowledge and understanding are created through social

interaction, therefore this discursive approach recognizes the critical role of language and practices as social mechanisms. Conventionally, language is often thought of as a mirror reflecting an already existing reality or a transportation tool expressing cognitive ideas and existing material items. However, Martha Finnemore offers even “[m]aterial facts acquire meaning only through human cognition and social interaction” (Finnemore 1996, 6). K.J. Holsti notes that rhetorical devices often “express deeply held ideological convictions, mental frameworks, and social constructions that have a profound effect on perceptual processes, on how issues ... are defined, how friends and enemies become categorized..., and how policy choices are articulated” (Holsti 2010, 382-383).¹⁶ Recognizing the *intersubjective* power of language, Roxanne Doty explains the “productive nature of language does not depend on nor necessarily coincide with the motivations, perceptions, intentions, or understandings of social actors” (Doty 1993, 302). This approach highlights the intersubjective discursive construction of reality by interpreting what discursive practices *do* rather than what individuals *think*.¹⁷ This approach also highlights the role of discourse in positioning actors in social relationships.

Defined broadly, discourse is language and practices, or linguistic and non-linguistic sign systems, that produce meaning and both limit and advance what is perceived possible in a given context. Maarten Hajer provides additional specificity in defining discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995, 44). Based on historical references and even myths, ideas/concepts/categorizations may be normative or analytical (Hajer in Fischer and Forester 1993, 45). While John Ruggie argues that social facts are those “that are produced by virtue of all the relevant actors agreeing that they exist” (Ruggie 1998, 12), a discursive approach also

¹⁶ Within international relations, Wendt advanced this macro-level conceptual framework with his 1995 proposal that the fundamental structures of international relations are social: shared knowledge, material resources, and practices; therefore, “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1995). While Wendt did not address the meso-level social processes involved in developing shared knowledge, subsequent scholarship has argued that actors draw on existing cultural and linguistic knowledge in the course of their activities (Weldes 1996).

¹⁷ Interestingly, in *The Truth is Our Weapon: The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles*, Chris Tudda argues that Eisenhower and Dulles’ public rhetoric boxed them in and thwarted their intentions to establish peaceful accommodation with the Soviet Union. This also can be understood in terms of discursive productivity in that the discourses on the surface created a reality despite any personal intentions otherwise. K.J. Holsti quotes Widmaier’s 2007 study that concludes Truman became a victim of his rhetoric as well (Holsti 2010, 383).

appreciates the power of language in shaping what individuals believe is possible in the first place (Milliken 1999, 229). Operating at the broad, cultural level, discourse regularizes ways of thinking and contributes to culturally and temporally-bounded common sense (Fischer 2003, 75). Discourse also operates within everyday communicative interactions (Fischer 2003, 78).

Given that individuals are grounded in, and thus not autonomous from, relatively stable social structures including discursive landscapes, agency is understood not simply as individuals having the ability to exercise choice, but rather as a broader possibility “that things could have been different, save for the impact and implications of certain actions” (Jackson 2006, 33).

Jackson further explains

Neither individuals nor social forces stand in complete autonomy from one another. This may be a fairly obvious point, but it is profound in its implications; inasmuch as we consider social life to be at all distinct from the natural world, social structures and institutions must be “instantiated only in the process” (Wendt 1999, 185) (Jackson 2006, 34).

Discursive Conditions of Possibility: Discursive Landscapes

As an ad hoc advisory committee representing private and public sectors, the Jackson Committee members and staff interpreted the world through available cultural and linguistic resources. Constructivist scholarship recognizes contextual settings as specific socio-political constructs that in turn influence the production of temporal common sense and knowledge. Many Cold War scholars contend that the emotional forces and patterns of belief comprising a Cold War consensus were fully developed by the late 1940s (Freeland 1972; Leffler 1994; Craig and Logevall 2009; Mitrovich 2000; Thompson 2010). Additionally, from the field of rhetoric and communication studies, Martin Medhurst asserts that by 1952, as Eisenhower campaigned for the presidency, Cold War discourse “was familiar, widely practiced, and rarely challenged” (Medhurst 2000, 466). Cold War discourse was structured in terms of binary oppositions such as democracy/freedom versus communism/slavery (Milliken 1999, 229).

Chapter two inductively establishes an early 1950s American geopolitical discursive landscape that represents basic discursive antecedents, or already-in-circulation linguistic building blocks. These antecedents underpinned discursive activities contributing to Eisenhower’s directive, as well as Jackson Committee engagements and deliberations on U.S. Cold War efforts. Reflecting a Weberian ideal-type model of relatively stable structures of

meanings, the discursive landscape is comprised of a minimal spanning set of vague, multifaceted, and often metaphorical rhetorical commonplaces (Jackson 2006, 50). As an attribute, vagueness provides a unifying possibility in which actors holding differing understandings find a discursive common ground for further policy discussions (Rein and Schoen in Fischer and Forester 1993, 161). Jackson explains that participants in policy debates

have some relation to this underlying topography, which is shared by all participants as the very condition of their participating in a discussion in the first place--opposing positions with nothing whatsoever in common cannot engage one another in any sort of a dialogue (Jackson 2006, 46).

While providing a discursive basis for policy discussions, rhetorical commonplaces are pliable enough that actors also may draw on and relationally combine them to produce a variety of meanings. Configured together, “constellations” of rhetorical commonplaces provide the discursive rationale for why particular policy positions may be seen as acceptable and others not (Jackson 2006, 56). In his campaign speech on psychological warfare, Eisenhower created an explicit constellation using the rhetorical power of “cold war” and himself as a national leader with the emerging rhetorical commonplace of “psychological warfare” to make the case for why and how a comprehensive psychological effort could win the Cold War. His efforts highlight the ways that discourses can interact with and draw on other discourses with possibilities for new knowledge and new ways of categorizing the world (Milliken 1999).

Developing this “interpretive aid” involves a bit of creativity and obvious oversimplification. Chapter two does not claim to represent an exhaustive account of the entire discursive landscape in the early 1950s. Rather, it identifies basic commonplaces informing the Cold War consensus. The narration weaves diachronic meanings and synchronic relationships between the rhetorical commonplaces as it describes the vague and multifaceted meanings available to those involved in Jackson Committee activities (McGee 1980). It sets the discursive stage for understanding how such rhetorical commonplaces were employed and may have influenced policy deliberations and recommendations. The analysis is grounded in empirical data drawn primarily from secondary literature that identifies rhetorical commonplaces as well as their practical, formal, and popular sites of production and primary literature that provides

concrete examples (‘O Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 5).¹⁸ The analysis reveals that key rhetorical commonplaces within early Cold War discourse provided reinforcing symbolic foundations linking daily individual activities to the security of the nation-state and altered the geographic scope for what Americans considered their unique purpose in world history.

To understand the emergence of psychological warfare as a rhetorical commonplace available to Eisenhower invites a brief genealogical study of the concept. A Foucauldian-inspired genealogy is essentially a storytelling of emergence or a history of the present (Foucault 1980; Ninkovich 1994; Milliken 1999; Jackson 2006). The intent is not to recount each incremental activity associated with the naturalization and institutionalization of psychological warfare within the American experience in the twentieth century. Rather, chapter two identifies key actors, locations/institutional settings, ideas/concepts, categories, and practices “through which understanding is articulated and maintained in specific cultural contexts and translated and extended into new contexts” (Farish 2010, xviii). The genealogy illustrates how the meaning is “practiced, operationalized and supported institutionally, professionally, socially, legally, and economically” (Carabine in Wetherell et al 2001, 276). The research revealed the necessity of beginning the brief genealogy with America’s World War I and interwar propaganda activities. Fueled by an underlying progressive belief that solutions could be “sought in the realm of mind and rational control,” this period involved scientific advances that created imperatives to harness minds, and communications technologies that provided the means to do so (Ninkovich 1994, 56). Concepts and practices developed within academia and private enterprise prior to World War II proved essential to later psychological warfare embodiments. Additionally, many of the key actors identified later engaged with Jackson Committee members. Therefore, the brief genealogy provides conceptual context for many of the inputs regarding established categories and practices that informed Jackson Committee discursive practices. Propaganda, public relations, psychological warfare, political warfare, and “international information activities” were terms used interchangeably, often in describing a variety of ideas/concepts/categories and practices, and will be discussed in more detail in chapter two.

¹⁸ Henrik Larsen also compellingly argues that sources of foreign policy discourse encompass more than elites (Larsen 1997).

Discursive Practices

Chapter three analyzes the discursive practices during a 1952 Psychological Warfare Conference in Princeton, New Jersey that informed the Jackson Committee directive. Chapters four through seven interpret committee discursive practices, including contributing discursive communities and informal discourse coalitions. The approach employed problematizes that which is often taken for granted by focusing on the conditions of possibility and *how* the Jackson Committee approached and conducted its policy analysis activities. Representing practical processes of argumentation, committee social interactions are “conceptualized as an exchange of arguments, of competing, sometimes contradictory, suggestions of how one is to make sense of reality” (Fischer 2003, 83). While argument refers to the analytic content, it also describes the productive performance of language, recognizing that the discursive structure of arguments impact deliberative policy processes. Argumentation inherently implies the existence of counter-arguments, including that which is purposely discounted as well as that left unsaid. Fischer explains the implications for researchers “exploring discourse practices through which social actors seek to persuade others to see a particular situation or event. In this dialectical or perspectival view of knowledge it is important to know the counter arguments and positions of the others involved” (Fischer 2003, 83). Thus, the analytic narrative of discursive practices weaves interpretation of possible differing points of view with analysis of the substantive content of the archival case materials. The analysis also addresses the implications of the arguments for subsequent institutional practices (Fischer 2003, 84).

The existing scholarship on ad hoc advisory commissions highlights group independence due to the fact that temporary organizations are not weighed down by institutional and historical “baggage” (Wolanin 1975, 32). However, this belies the reality that the Jackson Committee’s discursive practices took place within broader socio-political and institutional constructs. As Rein and Schoen contend, “[i]nterpersonal discourse must also have an institutional locus within some larger social system” (in Fischer and Forester 1993, 156). In analyzing Jackson Committee discursive practices, the analysis accounts for the socio-political context of the Eisenhower administration, the first Republican administration after twenty years of Democratic chief executives. Additionally, the Jackson Committee established internal organizational processes and standard operating procedures to guide committee activities. The analysis accounts for this institutional context influencing the mutually-understood committee practices, including roles,

channels, routines, and norms, guiding the mechanics of the Jackson Committee's discursive activities.

Representing the Problem

President Eisenhower's directive specified addressing U.S. "international information activities" with "particular reference to international relations." Ideal-type decision making processes begin with gathering information and identifying the problem (Simon 1957). As Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin persuasively reasoned, researchers must establish *how those involved* understood and defined the problem because actions flow "from this definition of the situation" (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002, 6).¹⁹ More recent insights from social and political psychology reinforce the perspective that problem representation significantly affects subsequent group reasoning processes and therefore the range of solutions deemed possible for addressing problems (Sylvan and Voss 1998). From the field of public policy, Fischer and Forester also agree that "problem solution depends on the prior work of problem construction and reconstruction, [adding,] and this work is deeply rhetorical and interpretive, if little understood" (Fischer and Forester 1993, 6).²⁰

Like most foreign policy problems, the situation confronting the Jackson Committee in January 1953 was ill-structured in that the initial state of affairs including the geopolitical environment, policy goals, constraints, and means to reach the goals were not well-defined (Reitman 1965). As stated above, "policy making is a discursive struggle over the definition of problems" (Fischer 2003, 60). Requiring specification, "problem" is a perceived discrepancy or gap between a preferred state of affairs and perceived reality. Problem *representation* is both a process and a product (Sylvan and Voss 1998). Billings and Hermann explain that the process begins with detecting and categorizing the gap(s) representing tangible or intangible valuables

¹⁹ Arguing for an interdisciplinary investigation into decision making, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin include within their broad theoretical framework: information on individuals in decision making roles; the organizational context in which decisions are made; the communication-network structures, process, and content; cultural and ideational setting; sequences of decision making and modifications; and the dynamic co-construction among them all. This classic theoretical enterprise would sound familiar to those working within a discourse analysis approach. However, a discursive approach emphasizes the productive, intersubjective power of language rather than the individual per se.

²⁰ Starting from a similar ontological position as this constructivist discursive approach, political psychologists Sylvan and Haddad address the issue of interpretation and the possibility of misperception. Calling misperception "irrelevant," they argue for an "ontologically based understanding of representation [that] denies the universal separation between an object and its representations by rejecting the notion that objects can be viewed apart from structures of representation and interpretation" (Sylvan and Voss 1998, 189).

such as allied relationships and state credibility, and diagnosing causal connections (Billings and Hermann in Sylvan and Voss 1998, 55). As O' Tuathail explains "[s]ocial scientists have long recognized that categorization is fundamental to understanding how people make sense of their world (O' Tuathail 2002, 608).

Problem representation thus begins with efforts to frame the situation. Framing describes the "way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting. A frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on" (Rein and Schoen in Fischer and Forester 1993, 146). In 1952, discursive activities including a weekend gathering of key individuals in Princeton, New Jersey contributed to the development of Eisenhower's mandate. This conference, like the Jackson Committee later, began with actors contributing individual problem representations that served as argumentative starting points. The complex Cold War problem involving international information activities was comprised of many facets-- including strategic-military, political, geographic, moral, scientific, engineering, organizational, and legal--offering differing, even competing, ways to frame the problem. In identifying foundational frames for committee discursive processes, the analysis illuminates underlying assumptions associated with the various frames, uncovers complexity involved in problem representation, and sets the stage for exploring the relationship between problem representation and committee solutions/recommendations (Fischer and Forester 1993, 12).

According to social constructivists and social psychologists, representations are informed by culturally-grounded common sense knowledge and experiences, beliefs and values (Sylvan and Haddad in Sylvan and Voss 1998, 189). While public policy and social psychology scholars emphasize the role of values, political scientist Hans Morgenthau highlights the role of political philosophy in informing problem definition and solution. In an article published just prior to the Jackson Committee's inaugural meeting, Morgenthau addressed the political implications of the two competing philosophical positions that he termed idealists and realists. Writing that while idealists and realists may propose similar policies, the "overall character, substance, emphasis, and likely consequence" would be different based on the underlying philosophy of man, society, and international relations (Morgenthau 1952, 982). Such assertions reinforce the importance of unpacking problem representation in policy making.

Storytelling, Categorizing, and the Game of “Witcraft”

As described above, the process of problem representation involves recognizing and categorizing gaps, as well as diagnosing causes and consequences. In experiments on group foreign policy decision making, Sylvan and Haddad found that actors most often use stories to frame and represent problems (in Sylvan and Voss 1998, 205). Political psychology experimentation reveals that stories are an integral and inherent element of the cognitive reasoning process, rather than after-effects or subsequent justifications. They act as categories, while also revealing participants’ understandings of subject positioning and causal connections (Sylvan and Haddad in Sylvan and Voss 1998, 191). While some cognitive models assume that individuals’ “cognitive structures accommodate new information as it becomes available,” research has shown “that new information is made to accommodate cognitive structures” such as stories (Sylvan and Haddad 1998, 190). Stories can therefore serve as guides for decision making and play causal roles.

As simplified narratives, stories are often analogies or metaphors that enable an actor to try and “match what he is experiencing to a preconceived schema describing analogous situations in the past” (Larson 1985, 55). According to Larson, schema is “a generic concept stored in memory, referring to objects, situations, or people. It is a collection of knowledge related to a concept, not a dictionary definition; a schema describes what is usually the case, not necessarily true...” (Larson 1985, 51).²¹ In their pioneering research, Lakoff and Johnson found that metaphors also “can have the power to define reality. They do this through a coherent network of entailments that highlight some features of reality and hide others” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 157). In the geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union, metaphors became an essential part of how people understood reality. Hinds and Windt Jr. highlight the images and emotions evoked by the metaphors of Iron Curtain, Cold War, and communism as a disease. These predisposed Americans’ orientations to reality in ways different from other possibilities (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 12). In crafting stories, actors implicitly interpret what information is relevant and how the information should be categorized and understood by weaving together facts and expectations that often also reveal underlying values. As Fischer and Forester aptly

²¹ Applying cognitive and social psychological theories involving how people process information, Deborah Larson’s research offers a psychological explanation for the origins of the Cold War belief system.

point out, policy decisions are rarely based solely on data and facts (Fischer and Forester 1993, 10).

Metaphors also serve an interactive role. By drawing on shared understandings, metaphors can create common discursive ground and group cohesion. Sylvan and Voss note this storytelling power after observing group social interactions focused on problem representation and solution recommendations (in Sylvan and Voss 1998, 205). Acting as heuristics, stories allow group members “to economize on the mental effort required to reach a decision as a group. A “story” is a composite of a group’s common social and substantive meanings that helps to delimit the group’s problem space” (in Sylvan and Voss 1998, 188). Hajer also contends that individuals “do not draw on comprehensive discursive systems for their cognition, rather these are evoked through storylines” (Hajer 1995, 56). For Hajer, storylines are more condensed versions of stories capable of providing common ground between various discourses. Although cognitive and social psychology provide insights into practical reasoning processes, this social discursive approach does not center around individual beliefs per se, but looks to the argumentative exchanges which constitute policy positions.

Hajer employs the phrase “witcraft” to describe the argumentative game taking place within policy deliberative processes. In analyzing discursive practices, particular attention is paid to how the deliberations began and the implications of any formal or informal rules established regarding individual contributions. Hajer explains that the “disciplinary force of discursive practices often consists in the implicit assumption that subsequent speakers will answer within the same discursive frame. Even if they do try to challenge the dominant storyline, people are expected to position their contribution in terms of known categories” (Hajer 1995, 57). Therefore, finding the appropriate story/storyline was an important form of agency within the Princeton group and Jackson Committee deliberations. According to Hajer, credibility, acceptability, and trust are integral to the argumentative game. Individuals establish credibility when they are able to persuade other actors to believe in the subject positioning within their story. Acceptability refers to whether the position appears attractive or necessary. Trust is revealed when inherent uncertainties are ignored and doubt suppressed.

Discursive communities and discourse coalitions

The analytic narrative in chapters four through seven highlights the Jackson Committee's argumentative games leading to the final report. Ideal-type decision making processes begin with defining the problem; next steps involve gathering information, research, and data to inform policy analysis discursive activities. Jackson Committee practices involved in gathering and analyzing inputs, including developing criteria and identifying categories to classify the volumes of information received from individual and group interviews and written commentary from over 700 organizations, individual American citizens, refugees/emigres, and foreigners living abroad (PCIIA Records, Box 2, Correspondence-Record). Many individuals engaging with the Jackson Committee were members of various discursive communities, each having unique linguistic and social practices or meaning systems.

According to Hajer, differing discursive communities may coalesce around storylines creating discourse coalitions. While forming an informal discourse coalition, individual discursive communities may nonetheless retain differing understandings of what a particular storyline means.²² Identifying the various communities and possible discourse coalitions enables a deeper appreciation for inputs informing the committee's deliberations, including how various representations may have constrained committee discursive interactions in addition to the textual space of the committee's final report and recommendations. In other words, the analysis is attune to whether inputs delimited the discursive grounds upon which the committee developed its recommendations and thus concluded its policy analysis activities (Rubino-Hallman in Sylvan and Voss 1998, 275).

Governing and Shaping Conduct

Milliken suggests that Foucault's concept of governmentality provides scholars "with a means to theorize the production of foreign policy and international practices (Foucault 1977, 1980, 1991)" (Milliken 1999, 241). In Eisenhower's campaign speech, he appealed directly to every individual American to think about how his or her daily activities impacted the security of

²² Hajer offers the example of 'rainforest' as a storyline within environmental politics. He cites that for activist Sting, rainforest symbolizes the preservation of indigenous cultures whereas the organization World Wildlife Fund focuses on the moral issue of forest destruction and ecologists highlight the role of rainforests within the world biosphere (Hajer 1995, 13).

the nation and America's ability to save the hard-fought peace. Claiming that "everything we say, everything we do, and everything we fail to say or to do, will have its impact on other lands," Eisenhower worked to persuade average Americans to think of themselves as political agents advancing the hope and reality of the American dream to others abroad. Eight months later, the Jackson Committee reiterated decentralized power relations, asserting within their final report that the United States is judged "by the actions and attitudes of the Government in international affairs and the actions and attitudes of its citizens and officials, abroad and at home" (Jackson Report 1953, 1836).²³ Extending the concept of the political beyond the state, the analytic perspective of governmentality conceives of government as an *activity*, rather than an institution, involving the exercise of authority over oneself and others within modern, liberal societies (Barry et al 1996, 20). Government, as an activity, constitutes individuals as political beings contributing to larger goals through specific mentalities and practices. Just as Eisenhower implied, to govern is to strive toward certain standards, norms, or ideals through daily practices advancing what some scholars describe as a "will to improve" (Dean 1999, 12; Ingram 2011; Brown et al 2012). Again, the Jackson Committee concluded the "primary purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are also consistent with the national objectives of the United States" (Jackson Report 1953, 1838).

Within liberal societies and certainly across national borders, a state does not exercise coercive power over society to achieve ideals such as the American dream and international peace. Rather, states may strategically organize decentralized and productive power relations by encouraging certain self-practices and mobilizing the masses toward achieving particular national objectives through commonplace means (Broeckling et al 2011, 2; Barry et al 1996, 43). In describing a U.S. state-private network built during the Cold War, Scott Lucas reasons that "the nature of American ideology... meant the U.S. Government, unlike its evil Soviet counterpart, did not direct... it was all the product of individuals freely making their own decisions and pursuing their own objectives" (Lucas 1999, 3). A governmentality approach provides a framework for thinking about the linkages between the state, society, and individuals,

²³ The Jackson Report can be found in the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections of the Foreign Relations of the United States. <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=div&did=FRUS.FRUS195254v02p2.i0011&isize=M>

while not overvaluing the role of the state (Saar in Broeckling et al 2011, 39). Scholars describe this perspective as “the conduct of conduct,” a construct linking the state (the conduct(or)) with the quotidian self-practices of individuals (who conduct themselves accordingly) (Barry et al 1996; Lemke 2011).

Governmentality examines the art of government by identifying the productive power of discourse in opening new avenues for intervention and emphasizing the technological aspects of government involved in creating “responsible citizens” by legitimizing certain images of self while excluding others (Broeckling et al 2011, 13). To promote and manage decentralized, productive power relations across society requires systems of knowledge and expertise that render life understandable and calculable, able of being shaped and transformed (Broeckling et al 2011, 177). The brief genealogy of psychological warfare in chapter two identifies the impact of emerging expertise within the fields of psychology and mass communications that created new avenues for governmental activities related to improving and harnessing the minds of men. Conceptualized broadly as a technology of government, psychological warfare promoted a ‘will to improve’ and involved an array of strategies, techniques, apparatuses, programs, instruments, and procedures intended to mobilize individuals and populations abroad by establishing norms of acceptable behavior enticed by self-regulation (Saar in Broeckling 2011 et al, 39). As described earlier, Eisenhower’s campaign speech was a psychological move--a use of the technology of psychological warfare--in enlisting the American public as political actors as they lived daily lives. Osgood and Freeland both highlight the intended domestic effects of psychological warfare (Osgood 2006; Freeland 1972). Nikolas Rose explains, governmentality

... is not a matter of the implementation of idealized schema in the real by an act of will, but of the complex assemblage of diverse forces..., techniques..., devices... that promise to regulate decisions and actions of individuals, groups, and organizations in relation to authoritative criteria (cf. Rose & Miller 1992: 183)(Rose in Barry et al 1996, 42).

A governmentality perspective provides an analytic framework for understanding the committee’s role in organizing strategic decentralized power relations to fulfill Eisenhower’s “conviction in a unified and dynamic effort” to win the Cold War. The analytic narrative interprets discursive practices informing Jackson Committee recommendations that encompassed “practices, mentalities and techniques of government” guiding individuals within the U.S.

government and across societies to lead and behave within a field of possibilities in order to win the Cold War (Dean 1999, 5; Lemke 2011, 18; Broeckling et al 2011). As Eisenhower envisioned in San Francisco, the United States government could win the Cold War without fighting by mobilizing the power of individuals and the masses to conduct psychological warfare on a global scale through common means including American cultural and free enterprise activities that could serve to attract and persuade rather than coerce support. Informed and guided by particular rationalities and technologies, citizens, societies, and states within the free world see “their self-interest in decisions which the United States wishes them to make” (Jackson Report 1953, 1811). Rose explains that from a governmentality perspective, the “power of the State is a resultant, not a cause, an outcome of the composition and assembling of actors, flows, buildings, relations of authority into relatively durable association mobilized, to a greater or lesser extent, towards the achievement of particular objectives by common means” (Rose in Barry 1996, 43). In examining the broad art of government, a governmentality perspective highlights the possibility of what Joseph S. Nye, Jr. has termed “soft power.” According to Nye, “soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies” (Nye 2008, 94).

Method of Approach, Sources of Data, and Production

This study draws predominantly from archival documents located at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEPL) in Abilene, Kansas where I conducted research in August 2014. This endeavor does not attempt to recreate the totality of the situation in 1952-1953. As Valerie Hudson reasons “[t]he desire to “see” everything at once is a natural one, but it represents another siren song for it is based on the assumption that the social world can or must be reconstituted to the last detail which is neither possible, necessary, nor desirable” (Snyder, Bruck, Sapin 2002, 10). In order to construct a thick narrative account of the committee’s discursive activities, I ground the analysis in documentation and materials available to the Jackson Committee. Documentation includes memoranda outlining organizational practices, inter-committee correspondence, hand and type written notes summarizing testimonies and committee argumentation. The data also includes media reports on the Jackson Committee.

There is no single method for discursive analyses. This research employs a number of methodological strategies for inductively interpreting the case materials at hand. Focusing on verbs, adverbs, and adjectives attached to nouns within Jackson Committee documents, predicate analysis enables an empirical interpretation of ideas/concepts/categorizations involved in producing particular meanings. Additionally, metaphorical analysis is employed (Milliken 1999). To avoid imposing my own contemporary categories, I rely on committee members' own categorizations of the materials available to them, including memoranda and notes regarding positions and materials discounted by committee members and staff. Where necessary, any categorizations are made a posteriori, not a priori, after cataloging data that emerged from the discursive analysis. I chronologically organized and reviewed archival documents in order to avoid either discounting or overemphasizing specific committee discursive activities in light of final committee recommendations. I analyzed the Jackson Committee Report as the final document. Together, these methods support the analytical task of tracing argumentative games and identifying discursive communities and informal discourse coalitions influencing Jackson Committee deliberations.

Chapter Two: The Cold War Discursive Landscape

“Language is politics, politics assigns power, power governs how people talk and how they are understood.” -- Robin Tolmach Lakoff, 1990

Drawing on scholarship that addresses various aspects of why, how, and what type of Cold War consensus developed in America, this chapter inductively extrapolates a discursive landscape comprised of relevant rhetorical commonplaces. The intent is to establish a temporally-relevant discursive foundation that informed Jackson Committee Cold War conceptualization, problem representation and solution specification (Jackson 2006, 42). The identified discursive landscape consisted of vague and multifaceted rhetorical commonplaces that often overlapped in terms of meanings and practices.

By the early 1950s, most Americans, including policymakers, had little direct Cold War experiences involving the Soviet Union or even domestic communists given that by 1951, the American communist party membership was down from a high of 80,000 in 1945 to 32,000 in a population of over 150 million people (Whitfield 1996, 9). Instead, people relied on various social exchange mechanisms, including mass communication sources of newspapers, radio, and the emerging popular new media of television, to develop intersubjective, symbolic understandings of the world around them. Public discourse contributed to a general strategic panic in which policymakers wrestled with defining this unique threat posed by an opposing atomic power perceived as threatening the American way of life through daily, subversive activities.

Years earlier, one of the era’s most influential newspaper columnists, Walter Lippmann, identified the reliance on symbols asserting, “[t]he world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind” (Lippmann 1922, 18). Describing the symbolic and practical effects of rhetorical commonplaces, Lippmann wrote that common words such as Americanism act “like a strategic railroad center where many roads converge regardless of their ultimate origin or their ultimate destination. But he who captures the symbols by which public feeding is for the moment contained, controls by that much the approaches of public policy” (Lippmann 1922, 132-133). As for Lippmann’s influence in particular, his *Today and Tomorrow* column was published three times a week in nearly 300 domestic newspapers beginning in the

1930s. Frank Costigliola describes how, “millions of Americans did not know what they thought about a foreign policy issue until they had read Lippmann’s column in the morning paper” (in Medhurst 2000, 48). A prolific writer, Lippmann also published a number of books on U.S. foreign policy, including a 1943 book of the month club selection *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* that sold nearly half a million copies.

Between 1950 and 1952, the elite blue-ribbon group Committee on the Present Danger also contributed to public discourse. Its founding members included the president of the J. Walter Thomas Advertising Agency which provided public relations expertise to distribute Committee messaging. The president of Harvard University, James Conant, served as the Committee’s first chair and declared during an inaugural 12 December 1950 press conference at the Willard Hotel in Washington D.C., the “aggressive designs of the Soviet Union are unmistakably plain” (Wells 1979, 142). Twenty years after Lippmann published his insights into public opinion, British political scientist Harold Laski aptly observed the impact of popular sites of production on public discourse and public policy explaining they “... shape the climate of American opinion...They build a stereotype of ideas which slowly, but incisively, makes its impact upon those who shape decisions in Washington” (Laski 1941, 11).

Rhetorical Commonplaces informing the Cold War Consensus

Communism and Anti-Communism

In the United States, Communism and anti-Communism emerged as rhetorical commonplaces after World War One (Jackson 2006, 56). Notwithstanding the Russian revolution and universality of Communism as an ideology, American political leaders first understood Communism not in terms of geopolitics, but within a domestic context as an economic ideology rooted in poverty (Leffler 1994, 19; Ninkovich 1994, 84-85). Communist supporters were positioned as economic underdogs whose lots could be improved through modern technological and economic means. The 1918 Senate Judiciary Overman sub-committee investigation into Soviet activities in the U.S., including propaganda campaigns, contributed to a broadening categorization of “Communists.” Categorical boundaries included groups such as strikers and socialists who were characterized as advocating the disruption of American enterprise (Sproule 1997, 123). In positioning themselves as anti-Communist, Anti-New Dealers in the 1930s, including Hearst newspapers, insinuated (and often directly charged) President

Roosevelt's federal economic policies and programs as Communist (Leffler 1994, 59). Broadly, to be anti-Communist was to affirm federalism and uphold individual rights while rejecting "liberalism" which was understood in terms of federal government "interference" in the marketplace.

With the advent of Soviet military power and political influence after World War II, Communism became a *foreign threat to the United States*, with a conscious blurring of foreign and domestic Communism (Whitfield 1996, 3-4; Craig and Logevall 2009, 122). In testimony to the House Committee on Un-American Activities regarding efforts to define Communism and make its acts treasonable (McDonough bill HR 4581), former Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador Adolph A. Berle expressed his disagreement saying:

The word "Communist" has been applied as an epithet to any reformer for half a century... In my own thinking, I define a Communist as a member of the Communist Party or as an individual intellectually or emotionally so under control that he will at all times follow the in the Communist Party line as laid down by Moscow (Berle 1973, 581).

Diplomat and Soviet specialist Chip Bohlen also offered a warning regarding the blurring of categorical boundaries in a 1948 speech on the aims of American foreign policy.

I think it is worthwhile to digress briefly to point out that when we use the term Communism, we need to know just what we mean... Any loose definition of Communism which would embrace progressive or even radical thought of native origin is not only misleading but actually dangerous to the foundations of democratic society. Confusion on this issue and suspicion which can be sown between Americans of different political views but of equally sincere patriotism would be of great advantage to the Communist purpose (Freeland 1972, 358).

Similarly, American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr called for focusing on specific Soviet totalitarian practices rather than employing Communists/anti-Communists as categories within domestic, parochial politics (Whitfield 1996, 100). Regardless of such dissenting voices, the common understanding of Communists expanded to include domestic progressive voices. Those reading *Reader's Digest* saw a dramatic shift from the 1930s to the 1940s with articles initially noting socialism as an alternative economic system to capitalism to depictions of Communism as threatening American social, political and economic way of life (Sharp 1996, 566). The U.S.

Chamber of Commerce officially advocated the removal of communists and socialists from any opinion-forming agencies including schools, libraries, and news outlets (Whitfield 1996, 15).

Key public rhetorical events including Kennan's "X" article, Churchill's Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan contributed to an anti-Communist ideology by the late 1940s and set the basic tone for Americans' conceptualization of what it meant to be anti-Communist within the global context (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 202). According to Ninkovich, by 1950 "liberal and anti-communist principles had become functional equivalents, an identity symbolized by an adoption of a vocabulary that embraced both without offending either" (Ninkovich 1981, 148). To be anti-Communist meant upholding "the free institutions of the Western world" and containing the totalitarian Soviet Union. Dominating public discourse, anti-Communism "resonated with the American people. It provided a framework for understanding a complicated world with which few Americans had much experience" (Leffler 1994, 121). To be anti-Communist was, in a sense, to be patriotic, to purify and reaffirm American morality and market-based way of life (Whitfield 1996, 34).

In 1947-1948, the U.S. Commissioner for Education promoted "Zeal for Democracy" within school curricula to psychologically bolster American youth against Communist ideology (*Education Digest* 1947, 56). Popular figures and publications, including Ayn Rand in Hollywood and *Time*, *Life*, *Look*, and *Newsweek*, regularly argued the necessity of active anti-Communist mindsets to protect against aggressive Soviet expansionism which could affect individual thoughts and deeds (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 194-5; Leffler 1994; Whitfield 1996, 129; Sharp 1996). In 1947, Attorney General Clark told an audience in Boston "our best defense against subversive elements is to make the ideal of democracy a living fact, a way of life such as to enlist the loyalty of the individual in thought, in feeling, and in behavior" (Freeland 1972, 227). Loyalty oaths across Federal, state and local governments, academia, and even popular outlets became common and fed the understanding of Communism as secretive, subversive, manipulative, and universally-directed by the totalitarian Soviet Union (Freeland 1972; Leffler 1994; Whitfield 1996; Schiffrin 1997; Sproule 1997, 248). Anti-Communism practices focused on separating and excluding domestic Communists, rather than influencing them. The post-war permanent House Un-American Activities Committee assigned itself the broad task of identifying Communist influence across American life with Joseph McCarthy later using his bully pulpit to publicly fan the flames of anti-Communism (Freeland 1972, 117-118). In the early

1950s, anti-Communism became associated with the idea of dismantling Communism abroad (Jackson 2006, 164-167).

Americanism, American exceptionalism

“Americanism” and “American exceptionalism” are rhetorical commonplaces with roots tracing back to the Puritans and how they “regarded themselves as a unique social and religious experiment” (Holsti 2010, 397; Johnson 1997, 28; Jackson 2006). British historian Paul Johnson describes how the settlers and their progeny constituted two principle elements of Americanism. The first is a creative pragmatism manifest through the “conviction that no problem is without a solution” (Johnson 1997, 300). With propensity for “common sense” solutions to problems, this commonplace also encompassed a predisposition for rational, scientific approaches to advance society. Lippmann captured this essence explaining that science “*treat[s] life not as something given but as something to be shaped...* Science... is the unfrightened, masterful, and humble approach to reality--the needs of our natures and the possibilities of the world (Lippmann 1961, 151, emphasis added).

The second element is a moral, ideological, and religious self-righteousness (Johnson 1997, 28; Whitfield 1996, 87). American exceptionalism affirmed the revolutionary and superior nature of American principles and social and economic way of life compared to those left behind in Europe. Americanism became an ideology encompassing American principles and unique purpose in world history (Niebuhr 1952; Lucas 1999; Holsti 2010). In 1845, John L. O’Sullivan coined the phrase “Manifest Destiny.” While contested at the time, this phrase subsequently represented the progressive mission of Americanism to expand freedom, democracy, individual liberty, and free enterprise. In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis assumed “that history was inherently progressive, that is, civilizations moved forward through time from an inchoate state to a well-developed, stable condition” (Krugler 2000, 17). Subsequent policy documents including Wilson’s Fourteen Points reflected these underlying assumptions.

Americanism also meant an affirmation and dedication to industry, progress, and success which assumed a more poignant meaning with the threat of Communism. President Hoover noted, “the dominating fact of this last century has been economic development. And it continues today as the force which dominates the whole spiritual, social and political life of our country

and the world” (Ninkovich 1994, 79).²⁴ Ahead of his bid for the Republican nomination in 1952, Robert Taft explicitly argued that American liberty has produced the highest standard of living and happiness, both in terms of free enterprise and ideas (Taft 1951, 115-117).

By 1950, when again invoked by President Truman, American exceptionalism had become connected *with* Western political tradition in *opposition* to Bolshevism and Communism (Jackson 2006, 56; Whitfield 1996, 34; Chilton 1996, 194).²⁵ Highlighting domestic programs, Truman touted America’s commitment to advancing political, social, and economic rights and prescribed others to follow America’s lead (Whitfield 1996, 53, 87; Leffler 1994, 14-15; Holsti 2010, 399).

Our national history began with a revolutionary idea--the idea of human freedom and political equality... And this idea -- this endlessly revolutionary idea of human freedom and political equality-- is what we held out to all nations as the answer to the tyranny of international communism... We know that it means progress for all men (Truman, 17 Oct 50, San Francisco).

While Truman’s usage reflected a “city upon the hill” perspective of American exceptionalism, Henry Luce’s 1941 “The American Century” advocated activist exceptionalism. As the creator, publisher, and editor-in-chief of *Time*, *Fortune*, and *Life*, Luce was “the most powerful influence on... American public opinion” in this era (Whitfield 1996, 160). His essay “became the beacon by which America was to be guided to alter its vision of itself, its national goals, its sense of power in the world. Throughout the country and across the political spectrum it was hailed and reviled, but nowhere ignored” (Wiesen Cook 1981, xv). Arguing that which is “*especially* American-- a love of freedom, a feeling for the equality of opportunity, a tradition of self-reliance and independence and also of co-operation,” Luce challenged Americans to accept their unique duty and responsibility to all mankind, essentially expanding the geographic scope of America’s mission (Luce 1941, 170, emphasis added). According to Luce, the U.S. must

²⁴ Historian William R. Leach chronicles the turn of the 20th century transformation of the American consumer society, characterized by “acquisition and consumption as the means of achieving happiness” (1993, 3). Leach argues consumerism denied the American people “access to insight into other ways of organizing and conceiving life” (1993, xv). However, historian T.H. Breen traces American consumerism to colonial times. He contends that consumption politics combined with American idealism to establish the conditions for the American Revolutionary War (2004).

²⁵ Ernest May extends this argument offering that some rhetorical commonplaces, including Western Civilization and Freedom, served as policy axioms--self-evident truths drawn from America’s historical and cultural experiences but molded to the particular geopolitical environment of the Cold War (May 1962, 667).

accept its role as a world power and actively shape the American Century for a world that was “fundamentally indivisible” (Luce 1941, 167).

Having demanded (to the chagrin of allies) and achieved unconditional surrender of Axis powers in World War II, the zeal of Americanism continued (Morgenthau 1948, 269). The U.S. led the institutionalization of a new liberal economic order promoting open markets and such activities collectively reinforced Americans’ understanding of American exceptionalism, the power of the American Dream, and the feeling “that what was best for the United States was best for the world as a whole” (McMahon in Medhurst 2000, 234). Yet, along the way, a few voices offered caveats. After chiding Americans for promoting the myth of America’s unique and unilateral power (Lippmann 1943, 22), Lippmann affirmed the historic hope of “the American idea,” but cautioned that the “persistent evangel[ism] of Americanism in the outer world must reflect something more than meddlesome self-righteousness” (Lippman 1944, 208, 40). In speeches later compiled into a book, Niebuhr warned that the American myth, axiom, and pride had become a persistent sin of American exceptionalism (Niebuhr 1952).

*National Security*²⁶

In *The Federalist #41*, James Madison essentialized security against foreign danger, acknowledging how America’s geography provided “happy security” for the new nation (1788/1961, 254). His argument centered on the state power, and prudence, required to defend America’s border against hostile forces while preserving the Union. Within the American tradition, times of mobilization and defense were considered distinct from times of normality. However, in 1914, Wall Street lawyer Solomon Stanwood Menken established the National Security League (NSL). This private organization urged policymakers to categorize normal civilian peacetime activities as elements of national preparedness contributing to America’s defense (Shulman 2000). At an annual meeting, honorary NSL Vice President Theodore Roosevelt argued:

We need, more than anything else in the country, thoroughgoing Americanism... and thoroughgoing preparedness in time of peace against war... The work of preparedness -- *spiritual and material, civil, industrial, and military* -- and the work of Americanization are simply the two paramount phases or elements of the work of

²⁶ Ernest May provides an overview of American notions of national security from the 1780s through the 1990s (in Allison and Treverton, eds 1992).

constructive patriotism which your Congress has gathered to foster... (Shulman 2000, 312).

Although unsuccessful at the time, the NSL represented a discursive practice contributing to subsequent national security discourse and institutions created with the advent of the atomic age and the emerging geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union (Shulman 2000; Harlow and Maerz 1991, 173; May, in Allison and Treverton 1992, 94-114; Chilton 1996, 131; Craig and Logevall 2009, 135-138). Whereas the established commonplace of 'national defense' conjured images of military forces mobilized to fight opposing forces in specific times of war, national security challenged the traditional normalcy-defense-normalcy understanding. Securing implied consistency compared to defending which was a reaction to specific offensive activities.

In a series of lectures given at the U.S. War College in 1946 and 1947, George Kennan described the emerging political, economic, and military competition with the Soviet Union, arguing that Russian political power threatened American national security, which included (but was not limited to) Russian military power as a threat to America's defense (Harlow and Maerz 1991). Conceptually, national security mobilized America's economic and social life, linking these realms to the security of the nation, implying "not only boundaries and the machinery of the state, but also a people and a shared set of values" (Shulman 2000, 291). As Navy Secretary James Forrestal testified to a Senate committee in 1945:

Our national security can only be assured on a very broad and comprehensive front... I am using the word 'security' here consistently and continuously, rather than 'defense.'...The question of national security is not merely a question of the Army and the Navy. We have to take into account our whole potential for war, our mines, industry, manpower, research and all the activities that go into normal civilian life (in Shulman 2000, 327).

In 1947, the National Security Act declared congressional intent "to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States." Reorganizing the foreign policy and military establishment, the Act created a unified Department of Defense, a Central Intelligence Agency, and a National Security Council "to advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security." The NSC articulated its own working definition of national security as "to preserve the United States as a

free nation with our fundamental institutions and values intact” (Peterson and Sebenius in Allison and Treverton 1992, 57).

Kennan, George Marshall and other early Cold War strategists and theorists, including Morgenthau, extended the conceptualization in asserting America’s national security was linked to the economic and social security, as well as defense, of specific geographic areas. In particular, American leaders advanced Western Civilization as the United States and Western Europe connected by shared values (Jackson 2006). May explains a further expansion, writing “Truman in 1948 applied to the whole world words similar to those previously applied to the Western Hemisphere: “The loss of independence by any nation adds directly to the insecurity of the United States and all free nations”” (May in Allison and Treverton 1992, 99). The Truman Doctrine reflected earlier arguments made by President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Henry Stimson. As recalled by Stephanson, Stimson had “projected onto the whole world Lincoln’s famous dictum that no nation can survive half slave and half free: from now on it was the world itself that had to be either free or slave” (Stephanson 1996, 15). According to Craig and Logevall, the Truman doctrine offered an ideological doctrine of “Us versus Them,” expanding the grounding of national security from geographic sovereignty to ideology (Craig and Logevall 2009, 137; Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 130). Replacing the European Recovery Program, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, by its very name, reinforced the rhetorical commonplace’s extension of securing Western Civilization, geographically and ideologically.

*Cold War*²⁷

In a 1945 British *Tribune* article, George Orwell presciently introduced the phrase “Cold War.” Believing that the introduction of atomic weapons had permanently altered international relations, Orwell argued a state with atomic weapons was militarily unconquerable and therefore would be in a “permanent state of ‘cold war’ with its neighbors.” Orwell asserted that atomic weapons would result in an enduring balance of power between self-contained empires, but questioned “the kind of world-view, the kind of beliefs, and the social structure” that could

²⁷ See Anders Stephanson (1996) for a genealogical investigation into the logical and ontological character of the Cold War. Stephanson contends that the “intense legalism that had marked the 1920s-- not a return to just war doctrines of the medieval type but the institutionalization of legal procedure as international norm-- had the paradoxical effect in the following decade of actually increasing the space for war as non-war” with the 1930s experiencing a proliferation of “‘intermediate’ states of war” (15).

develop within unconquerable atomic states and subsequently affect their relations with others including those within the self-contained empires (Orwell 1945). Churchill's Iron Curtain speech provided a powerful metaphor for these self-contained empires separated by the Curtain. Behind the curtain, the totalitarian Soviet regime was in total control of writing and directing the script, including those who emerged from behind the Curtain.

Two years later, the phrase Cold War became popularized and normalized in the U.S. as the description of the geopolitical situation between the United States and the Soviet Union in no small way because of Walter Lippmann. In a series of 14 newspaper columns collated in a short book called *The Cold War*, Lippmann critiqued Kennan's X article in *Foreign Affairs*, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," and Truman's Containment policy which seemed to preclude normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Lippmann critiqued what he saw as an increasing emphasis on ideological competition. Yet one of Lippmann's concerns was reminiscent of Orwell. Lippmann admonished the administration for assuming the United States, as the nuclear leader, could dictate policy to her allies rather than consult, and thus treat Western European and American neighbors as "dependencies" (Lippmann 1947, 54). For Lippmann, the geopolitical competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union was akin to previous great power rivalries. Lippmann's prescription was to focus on the Soviet Union's military posture that enabled Russian expansion over European territory and not overemphasize ideology. Doing so would effectively turn the Cold War into "crusades bent on universalizing democratic ideals" (Wasniewski 2004, 107).

Despite exhortations from the Committee on the Present Danger, Lippmann, and others to concentrate on the Soviet military and atomic threat, for average Americans the Cold War centered on threats to the American social and economic way of life. As described above, domestic practices such as loyalty oaths and censoring reinforced the common understanding of an ideological competition with Communist Russia. The *New York Times* even concluded Americans "had become used to living with the idea that Russia has A-bombs as one of the unpleasant facts of international life" following Russia's second atomic test (*New York Times*, "Russia's Bomb," 7 Oct 51, 155). The hesitancy of U.S. public officials to discuss atomic matters nonetheless contributed to strategic panic with certain scientific practitioners including Robert Oppenheimer advocating more transparency.

During Eisenhower's campaign speech he offered "we wage a 'cold war' in order to escape the horror of its opposite--war itself." This rhetoric placed Americans' traditional peacetime and normal daily activities within a new context. Quotidian economic and social activities could serve a national purpose in helping the United States to avoid a military war and promote peace.²⁸ In describing the Cold War as a "twilight zone between peace and war," Eisenhower projected a hopefulness that Americans would serve as the prevailing light for freedom against the darkness of communism. As Anders Stephanson later assessed the Cold War was "an ideological, political and economic claim to universality, taking place not in the two-dimensional space of traditional battles but mediated through other realms" (Stephanson 1996, 20). Writing at the time, Hans Morgenthau charged that both the United States and the Soviet Union were guilty of being "imbued with the crusading spirit of the new moral force of nationalistic universalism" (Morgenthau 1948, 430). He described a

fundamental change which separates our age from the preceding one... For the nationalistic universalism of the mid-twentieth century, the nation is but the starting point of a universal mission whose ultimate goal reaches to the confines of the political world. ... the nationalistic universalism of our age claims for one nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standards of actions upon all the other nations (Morgenthau 1948, 268-269).

Wiesen Cook notes the care American public officials took to avoid characterizing the Cold War as capitalism versus communism, instead emphasizing a Manichean world of freedom versus slavery, light versus darkness. In General Eisenhower's first speech to a Western European audience as the NATO commander, he stressed Free Enterprise, The Free World, and Free Peoples (Wiesen Cook 1981, 117). According to Morgenthau, a state's moral valuations were determined by public opinion, thus making public opinion across the globe a focus of foreign and public policy (Morgenthau 1948, 351).²⁹

²⁸ Encouraging Americans to be mindful that their daily lives were connected to and supportive of a greater purpose --that of peace-- was itself a psychological move.

²⁹ Morgenthau nonetheless disputes the idea of a world opinion but offers the fallacy persists because of the mistaken belief that people have common psychological traits and elemental aspirations. He acknowledges that all men may want to live, be free, have opportunities for self-expression and even seek power, but that all of these concepts are products of specific conditions and therefore the idea of a universal understanding is foolhardy. He critiques the conflation of technological means of communication with content (Morgenthau 1948, 198-200).

Genealogy: Storytelling the Emergence of Psychological Warfare in the American Experience

“Prior to World War One, the word propaganda was little-used in English, except by certain social activists, and close observers of the Vatican” (Bernays 2005 (1928), 9).³⁰ More specifically, “[b]efore the war, propaganda, if it had any meaning for an ordinary American, signified chiefly the spreading of self-interested opinions through publicity” (Sproule 1997, 9).³¹ A rarity in nineteenth century manuals of international law, propaganda was first employed on a broad, global scale as a “regular means of exerting power” during the First World War (Lasswell in Lerner, 1951, 264; Daugherty 1958, 27; quote from Whitton and Larson 1964, 31). Enabled by advances in mass communications technologies, the U.S., UK, and many continental powers established formal organizations to coordinate, produce and distribute propaganda designed to enlist and maintain popular domestic support, as well as foreign support (Davison in Annals 1971, 11). Osgood explains, “the concept of total war provided a legitimating rationale for the systematic use of propaganda as an instrument of statecraft” (Osgood 2006, 22). Although the United States disbanded its propaganda apparatuses after the war, European colonial powers continued propaganda practices now enabled by shortwave communications to enhance bonds across empires (Whitton and Larson 1964, 35).

³⁰ In 1622, Pope Gregory XV founded a Congregatio de propaganda fide to propagate the faith and fight Protestantism. The congregation of cardinals instituted their own propaganda college, the Collegium Urbanum, with courses, archives, museums, a library, and printing presses. Utilizing modern technologies, the church promoted propaganda as words and practices recognized by modern-day scholars as the “first appearance of organized propaganda as a political instrument” (Farago 1972, 158).

³¹ Military theory has recognized the concept of propaganda as an element of statecraft. Writing in 500 BC, Chinese strategist and theorist Sun Tzu stressed the role of information and deception in war. Classic ‘Western’ theorist Carl von Clausewitz also implicitly included the feelings, beliefs and activities of populations in his theory of war as a trinity. However, the U.S. military did not adopt Clausewitz’s now-classic *On War* until the post-Vietnam era. In *On War* Clausewitz proposes:

As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical [“remarkable” is a more apt translation] trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy... The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people... (Clausewitz 1989, 89).

Propaganda During the Great War

In 1915, American newspapers sensationalized German propagandizing leading to propaganda's "sinister connotations of manipulations and half truths secretly sowed by society's avowed enemies" (Sproule 1997, 9; Finch 2000, 368).³² Two weeks after the U.S. entered the war, President Wilson established the purposefully-named Committee for Public Information (CPI). As a result of the Industrial Revolution and the emerging culture of consumption, information and "knowledge" became akin to commodities. Americans developed a growing belief in the necessity of staying informed (Sharp 1996, 562). The prevalent industrial attitude altered the "academic curriculum [which changed] from argumentative oratory to information composition" (Sproule 1997, 27). Rather than citizen-orators, Americans were taught the importance of conveying "factual" information to advance society.

The CPI name drew upon this industrial perspective of neutral information. However, according to George Creel, his "whole business" was "mobilizing the mind" (Creel 1920, xiv). To develop and maintain support for the war effort, Creel enlisted advertisers, music publishers, the movie industry and theaters, teachers, and preachers to collectively promote a desire to fight for the ideals of justice, freedom and the liberty of mankind (Creel 1920, xv). In employing "all available media of communications for the purposes of persuasion," Creel's practices reflected the essence of what would be known as modern psychological warfare after World War II (Padover and Lasswell 1951, 5).

By Creel's own admission, his comprehensive approach to influence and *control* public opinion for a *specific* national purpose "rocked the boat" (Creel 1920, xiv). His visionary ideas for centralized wartime patriotic discourse, institutionally supported and operationalized via interpersonal communications across the entire American ecological environment, aroused suspicion and hostility as the war ended, particularly within Congress (Carabine in Wetherell 2001, 276). The American public now associated propaganda with political authorities using media outlets to influence and control mass audiences for a specific public purpose. This meaning evoked the possibility of those in power infringing on liberty, individual rights, and American democracy. The Creel Committee disbanded and U.S. public figures reaffirmed a

³² Having cut the sea cable to Germany, Great Britain essentially controlled and censored much of the war news provided to the U.S. Britain also established an extensive propaganda program in the United States that was effectively camouflaged until after the war (Sproule 1997, 7-9).

traditional belief that an organization telling America's story at home or abroad was needless (Hart 2013, 7). Conventional military leaders also dissolved propaganda apparatuses and expunged relevant expertise after the war. Despite any Army concerns with the power of propaganda given the nature of World War I, leaders in the War Department remained skeptical of the new specialized propaganda warfare (Padover and Lasswell 1951, 9; Paddock 2002, 6). Over the next twenty years, the war college curriculum shunned propaganda with only two war college papers investigating the topic in the early 1920s (Linebarger 1947, 77).

Propaganda as Threat to -or Tool for- the American Way of Life in the Interwar Period

The lingering popular legacy of propaganda as a “covert and institutionally promoted threat” to democracy was reinforced in the 1920s and 1930s. Popular writings within a broad category of “progressive propaganda analysis” focused on propaganda's effect on the democratic ideal of an informed citizenry (Sproule 1997, 21). The Lippmann-Dewey debates presaged future discussions and scholarly research into public opinion, the categories and boundaries of education versus propaganda in modern life, and their relationship to democracy (Lippmann 1922; Dewey 1922). Upton Sinclair directly tackled the subject in his 1924 *The Goslings: A Study of the American Schools* whose cover reads: *Who owns schools and why? Are your children getting an education or propaganda? And whose propaganda? ... no more important questions than these three*” (Sproule 1997, 46).

In 1937 Edward Filene, a progressive businessman and liberal philanthropist from Boston, provided a grant underwriting The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA). He was concerned that Americans were becoming victims of propaganda, unable to make sense of the litany of claims and counterclaims in mass media (Sproule 1997, 130). Contributing to a crystallization of propaganda's negative meaning, the IPA focused its attention on special-interest groups working to influence public opinion toward predetermined positions. In so doing, IPA attempted to differentiate between the propaganda of special interest groups and the necessity of influencing people as part of modern life (Sproule 1997, 156).³³ Run by former

³³ French philosopher and sociologist, Jacques Ellul sees propaganda as an inherent component of modern life developing from the contemporary sociological situation. In order to unify disparate citizens and organize a mass-market economy, Americans had to be educated and socialized into the American identity shaped by the American mythology. Ellul argues that American propaganda is founded in great measure on Dewey's theory of teaching (Ellul 1965, 5).

journalist Clyde Miller, the IPA initially focused on uncovering special interests in business. The IPA's pithy bulletins advising ways to recognize and resist propaganda were mailed to nearly 6,000 subscribers and almost 20,000 members of consumer organizations, academic and religious institutions, and news outlets and opinion leaders in the late 1930s (Sproule 1997, 132). In December 1938, it published a case study detailing A&P's use of a Public Relations firm to derail a proposed federal tax on sales (Sproule 1997, 141). As war broke out in Europe, the organization began focusing on the propaganda of hate and fear revealing a popular radio orator, Father Charles Coughlin, as using fascist material (Sproule 1997, 144).

During the interwar years, other social scientists studying the human mind, communication, and the public sphere also saw themselves as reformers and progressives. They were committed to developing scientific ways to manage positive social change in American democratic society given the trends of industrialization and urbanization (Simpson 1994, 95; Ninkovich 1994, 56). Their scholarship and commercial and industrial applications provided foundations for much of the practical "common sense" regarding psychological warfare during World War II and thereafter (Simpson 1994, 16-17). Emphasizing the modern necessity for social control through symbols rather than force, there was a general "sense of excitement building in the 1920s about the possibility of using psychological measurement to build a new science of politics" (Sproule 1997, 66). Sproule asserts the "result was a notion of propaganda for democracy in which leaders took firm reign and in which intellectuals were given license to propagandize for the preservation of government "for" (if not "of" and "by") the people" (Sproule 1997, 207).³⁴ With claims of "boosting the efficiency of democracy," George Gallup applied his scientific methods for measuring and managing the public in numerous polls conducted for industry and government officials, including President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Scientific advances effectively created imperatives--because it was possible to measure the public, public officials should do so. According to Michael Sproule,

the psychological view of the public gained great credence in academic social science from the successes of social psychologists in creating attitude-scale questionnaires, which, when marked by respondents, allowed a mathematical tally of how opinions differed on various social, economic, and political questions...Such data

³⁴ Niebuhr relayed the following anecdote that reflected a dissenting point of view. "In his address at the Convocation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 30, 1949, Mr. Winston Churchill declared: "The Dean of the Humanities spoke with awe 'of an approaching scientific ability to control men's thoughts with precision.'--I shall be very content to be dead before that happens"" (Niebuhr 1952, 82).

permitted the unwieldy notion of a whole discursive public to be replaced with a more manageable construct presenting a “public” as the sum of individual responses reported on questionnaires (Sproule 1997, 62-63).

Political theorist Harold Lasswell’s 1927 *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* “opened a new field of research” for scholars across disciplines (Lerner 1951, viii; Daugherty 1958; Simpson 1994; Sproule 1997).³⁵ Propaganda emerged as a theoretical subject supported by academic specialization notably in the fields of psychology, sociology, and the newly emerging mass communication studies (Linebarger 1947, 1; Davison in *Annals*, 1971; Sproule 1997; Osgood 2006, 17). Following World War II, Dr. Paul Linebarger explained, “[m]odern psychological warfare has become self-conscious in using modern scientific psychology as a tool” (Linebarger 1947, 25). Padover and Lasswell also acknowledged that psychological warfare “tends to place some confidence in the teachings of modern sciences of man, notably psychology and cultural anthropology” (Padover and Lasswell 1951, 6).

A nascent topic amongst a limited field of scholars, some academics carefully categorized their related research as either propaganda or education. Still debated today, the boundaries of such categorizations generally revolved around whether the forms of communications were *planned* and *by whom*, and whether the *purpose was specific* (propaganda) rather than a broader element of advancing modern society. At Yale, Leonard Doob, with a background in both psychology and sociology, focused on the cognitive and social dimensions of propaganda and persuasion, as distinct from education (Doob, 1935; Sproule 1997, 49). Albert Hadley Cantril founded the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton, also the home of *Public Opinion Quarterly* which, after World War II, became an academic site unabashedly advocating for American propaganda and psychological warfare in the geopolitical competition with Communist Russia (Simpson 1994, 49). In Denver, Professor Ben Cherrington developed pioneering work in the theory and practice of privately-sponsored intellectual exchanges and education, as distinct from propaganda, in forming international attitudes (Hart 2013, 24), leading to his appointment as Director of the Division of Cultural Relations at the Department of State in 1938. While his research laid the foundation for future overt psychological warfare

³⁵ According to Osgood, Lasswell’s groundbreaking book also “crystallized the argument that propaganda was essential to modern war” (Osgood 2006, 27).

practices, Cherrington himself “was convinced of “the futility, even the absurdity, of the export of culture by any government,” for propaganda carried with it the “implication of penetration, imposition, and unilateralism” (Ninkovich 1981, 31).

The paradigm shift away from the humanities towards quantitative scientific approaches contributed to a neutral-to-positive understanding of propaganda within academia and industry. Buttressing this shift toward scientific, quantitative research on propaganda and social processes was generous funding from foundations, notably the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation (Simpson 1994, 82; Sproule 1997, 82). Additionally, the Social Science Research Council, established in 1923 by members of the American Political Science Association, institutionally promoted applied, quantitative research, including research on business practices and industry relations. This had the practical effect of making industry a junior partner in many academic propaganda studies.

Edward Bernays served as propaganda’s staunchest advocate within industry. He developed information concepts and practices for private enterprise that were later extended into wartime and Cold War geopolitical contexts. The nephew of Sigmund Freud, Bernays saw himself as an applied social scientist who tirelessly and unashamedly advanced Creel’s comprehensive, yet decentralized approach within private enterprise (Bernays 1928; Osgood 2006, 19). Bernays described modern propaganda as “a consistent, enduring effort to *create or shape* events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group... in its sum total it is *regimenting* the public mind every bit as much as an army regiments the bodies of its soldiers” (Bernays 1928, 52, emphasis added). He also renamed propagandists as public relations counselors whose expertise would advance a productive, modern American way of life benefitting individuals, society, and the state (Bernays 1928, 168).³⁶ The concluding sentence of his 1928 *Propaganda* declared, “[i]ntelligent men must realize that propaganda is the modern instrument by which they can fight for productive ends and help bring order out of chaos” (Bernays 1928, 168). General Motors’ 1936 “Who Serves Progress Serves America” public relations campaign illustrated Bernays’ vision and social engineering approach linking American production and consumption to social progress (Ellul 1965, 68). Bernays explained:

The public relations counsel, then, is the agent who, working with modern media of communications and the group formations of

³⁶ The theoretical propositions laid out in chapter one’s governing and shaping conduct section provide a framework for understanding Bernay’s own conceptualization of the linkages between the state and the private sector.

society, brings an idea to the consciousness of the public. But he is a great deal more than that. He is concerned with courses of action, doctrines, systems and opinions, and the securing of public support for them (Bernays 1928, 64).

Bernays introduced the concept of materiality to propaganda with the understanding of propaganda as both words and actions. Together these offered the potential to shape the understanding of social conditions and the public's behavior. Lasswell later explicitly identified an underlying assumption of "economy" implicit within Bernay's understanding of propaganda (Lasswell in Lerner 1951, 263). In influencing attitudes, emotions, and actions, propaganda/psychological warfare could contribute to more efficiently promoting progress, modernity, and the American dream.

Notwithstanding the propaganda expertise developed and honed within academia and private industry during the interwar years, few books during this time period devoted any space to propaganda, psychological warfare, or international communications. This reveals its minority status as a rhetorical commonplace. Americans had rejected propaganda activities within the political sphere, whether conducted by centralized authorities or special interest groups. However, with America industry employing persuasive propaganda techniques, such activities had become normalized by American industry within the private sphere. Under the rubric of public relations and advertising, industry employed numerous persuasive propaganda techniques (Daugherty and Janowitz 1958, 4).³⁷

Psychological Warfare and Information Activities During World War II

As the U.S. inched toward joining the allied effort in World War II, propaganda practitioners began to rebrand the unpopular "propaganda" as "information activities" and "psychological warfare," with the terms often used interchangeably despite describing different concepts, categories, and practices. American scholars "eager to demonstrate that their skills could be used for the national defense in time of war" were among the first to highlight the dangers posed by Nazi psychological warfare, as well as the potential for American

³⁷ A 1976 Department of the Army Pamphlet also recognized this tendency within the American experience decrying how Americans were accustomed to commercial advertising and the like, but consistently resisted the notion of such activities being considered elements of statecraft. See Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 525-7-1, *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application*, Vol 1 (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1976), 2.

psychological activities to achieve immediate and longer-term national goals (Lasswell in Lerner 1951, 264). Concurrently, Yale Professor Ralph Turner asserted that American long-term national interests were linked to the domestic way of life of foreign populations. His 1941 “The Great Cultural Tradition: the Foundations of Civilization” contended that cultural reorientations occurred with fundamental changes in the way of life of the masses. The following year he produced a study for the State Department arguing that, given modernization, the United States should use its power to shape the direction of modernization toward democratization and the liberal creed. “By creating the world situation required by their national interest, the American people promote the liberation of all common men” and fulfill the United States’s unique mission (in Ninkovich 1981, 67-68).³⁸

In 1941, the specific phrase “psychological warfare” gained wider popular recognition. The Committee for National Morale published *German Psychological Warfare*, an extensive survey and translation of over 561 German publications and documents. Assorted academics organized this private non-profit group the year prior, convinced that morale represented a decisive force in human affairs (Daugherty 1958, 12; Farago 1941, 297). Originally produced for “insiders” and technicians, editor Ladislas Farago relayed an urgent need for the American public to better understand the war being waged by Nazi Germany. Explaining German psychological theory, science, and Nazi propaganda and terror practices, *German Psychological Warfare* revealed the collaboration between academics and practitioners in developing and applying psychology to enhance the conduct of war (the art of violent persuasion) and achieve national ends. These activities constituted “psychological warfare” (Linebarger 1947, 25). According to Farago, Nazi psychological warfare had begun over a decade prior to cultivate a German personality that did not allow “for living in a peaceful world of ordinary competition and co-operation” (Farago 1941, xviii).³⁹ The picture he painted for the public was of a totalitarian Germany executing an all-encompassing psychological strategy designed to support total war and world control. Linebarger later explained, “in the Nazi sense of the term, it was the calculation and execution of both political and military strategy on studied psychological grounds... it involved a transformation of the process of war itself” (Linebarger 1947, 40-41).

³⁸ While not affecting policy at the time, later policy discussions reflected Turner’s assumptions and reasoning.

³⁹ With this assertion regarding ideology’s role in cultivating a particular mindset/personality, Farago presaged a strain of American beliefs regarding the power of Communist propaganda and an impossibility of “normal” geopolitical competition.

In the spring and summer of 1941, with the potentiality of another world war, the U.S. Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act to assist British and Allied Forces and the U.S. continued enforcing a complete oil embargo against the Japanese Empire. That summer, President Roosevelt also established and appointed Wall Street Republican lawyer and Medal of Honor recipient William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan to the vague position of “Coordinator of Information” (COI) by executive order. Having been impressed by the British war model linking strategic intelligence to wartime operations and tactics, Donovan had personally campaigned FDR for an organization that would stress the psychological element in modern warfare (Troy 1981, 32-40; Paddock 2002, 4). Donovan proved to be an essential entrepreneur for American psychological warfare and, organizationally, the COI “can be considered a common point of origin for unconventional and psychological warfare in the modern American experience” (Paddock 2002, 36).⁴⁰ Given the dearth of retained propaganda expertise within the U.S. government and military, psychological warfare practitioners essentially recreated the wheel during World War II. Ad hoc organizations and dynamic practices reflected the entrepreneurial spirit of influential individuals operating within the mindsets of unconditional surrender and total victory (Simpson 1994, 16; Hart 2013, 76; Paddock 2002, 6; Department of the Army 1976, 6).

Donovan envisioned America’s information organization as combining intelligence, propaganda, and special activities (such as sabotage and subversion) in order to shape an environment for subsequent conventional military operations. Accordingly, he sought to have his civilian-led organization under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to supplement, not transform, how America conducted conventional warfare (Paddock 2002, 4). With two divisions, a Research and Analysis Branch and the Foreign Information Service, COI conducted two primary functions: 1) overseas intelligence by collecting, analyzing, correlating, and providing administration officials information bearing upon the nation’s security and 2) supplementary services (soon to be known as special services) including overt and covert propaganda.

⁴⁰ Paddock’s history of U.S. Special Forces employs the contemporary categories of unconventional warfare as distinguished from psychological warfare (2002). During World War II and the early years of the Cold War, such categories were not as distinct with practices including intelligence, sabotage and subversion often being considered under the concept of information activities/psychological warfare. Subsequent scholarship has criticized the terminology of the time. Simpson writes that psychological warfare--with its connotations of media and persuasion--was used as a euphemism for covert, physical activities more appropriately associated with coercive war (Simpson 1994, 40).

Within a year, amidst bureaucratic infighting predicated in part on differing interpretations of appropriate American propaganda (Paddock 2002, 5), FDR issued another vaguely worded executive order reorganizing America's information efforts into an Office of War Information (OWI) and an Office of Strategic Services (OSS). These organizations persisted for the duration of World War II, although as one participant observed at the time, "the frontier between our two operations does not seem to be designated with complete precision" (Troy 1981, 160). The vaguely worded executive order is notable. It enabled an entrepreneurial, improvisational spirit on the part of the civilians charged to lead the OWI, responsible for "information" and "war information," as well as the OSS, responsible for "strategic information" and "special services." Created by presidential executive order and led by civilians, these organization influenced a "prevailing American philosophy ... that propaganda, if not all psychological warfare, is first and foremost a civilian and not primarily a military responsibility" (Daugherty 1958, 129). The Office of Strategic Services, under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was led by FDR's trusted civilian, William J. Donovan. Donovan continued to position psychological warfare as a supporting element of traditional combat (Paddock 2002, 4).

Skeptical or at best indifferent to psychological warfare, the conventionally-minded War and Navy Departments tended to reinforce the "civilian" philosophy. Regardless of prodding by the Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, War Department uniformed leaders and staff organizations offered lukewarm endorsements of psychological activities and resisted accepting responsibility for this unorthodox warfare (Paddock 2002). The War Department delegated the responsibility to relatively-autonomous theater commanders to coordinate directly with OWI and OSS as they saw fit (Paddock 2002, 8). As Daugherty explains:

Notwithstanding the employment of psychological warfare on both the strategic and tactical levels in World War I, Americans began similar types of operations in World War II with little if any reference to the lessons learned in the earlier struggle. In addition, top-echelon leaders from the President down were, first, deeply engrossed in problems of general military and political strategy, and second, they were either ignorant or indifferent to the potentialities and limitations of the use of psychological warfare in the worldwide struggle against the Nazis and the Japanese (Daugherty 1958, 127).

By executive order theater commanders had the authority and responsibility to approve all plans and projects within their areas; therefore, "the character of the psychological warfare

organizations [and activities] that developed during the war in the overseas commands” reflected theater commanders’ differing acceptance” (Daugherty 1958, 130). However, as William H. Jackson later wrote, “psychological warriors played little, if any, role in the determination of military objectives or in the general conduct of war. Psychological implications were... not consciously made part and parcel of war plans” (Ann Whitman Files, Box 21, 31 Dec 56). Himself a psychological warfare practitioner during World War II, Dr. Paul Linebarger cautioned, “[t]here is not much from the formal records and the formal charts which conveys the actual tone of governmental operations in terms of propaganda ... The formal outlines mean nothing; they are positively deceptive unless the actual controls and operations are known” (Linebarger 1958, 178). In summarizing the decentralized nature of psychological activities, Linebarger wrote “at the height of the psychological warfare campaigning, there were at least nine unrelated agencies in Washington, all directly connected with psychological warfare, and none actually subject to the control of any others” (Linebarger 1947, 91-93).

Specifically defining propaganda/psychological warfare/information operations proved elusive throughout the war (Paddock 2002, 8). Broadly speaking, practitioners considered psychological warfare as the influencing of attitudes, emotions, and actions through the symbolization of events, enabled by mass communications, in support of U.S. war efforts and aims. In reality, two competing understandings of the vague and multifaceted concept solidified with differing concepts, categories and practices within OWI and OSS.

Truth-telling and the Office of War Information

Cognizant of Americans’ distrust of propaganda and revulsion to the manipulative psychological deception of Nazi Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels, President Roosevelt did not authorize the same broad authorities for psychological operations at home as the earlier Creel Committee. FDR’s Executive Order 9312 charged the Office of War Information to “plan, develop, and execute all phases of the federal program of radio, press, publication and related propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information.” Elmer Davis, a newsman and radio commentator from the Columbia Broadcasting System, led and shaped the psychological warfare practices of OWI. Believing that truthful information (propaganda) was the constituent element of psychological warfare, Davis asserted OWI’s primacy as an auxiliary to the armed forces (Davis in Lerner 1951, 274; Troy 1981, 172; Hart 2013, 82). Davis interpreted his role as

truthfully informing mass audiences, foreign and domestic, about U.S. wartime activities and postwar goals. This was conceptually in opposition to totalitarian regimes' centralized, deceptive, and manipulative psychological warfare. Reminiscent of Professor Cherrington, Davis categorically distinguished OWI's educational information practices from propaganda. Testifying to Congress in 1943 Davis explained, "'propaganda' is a word in bad odor in this country... there is no public hostility to the idea of education... We regard [public information] as education" (Hart 2013, 83).

While American scholars and practitioners emphasized the categorical distinctions between propaganda and education, it is useful to note such categories were not crisply defined by British allies as they conceptualized and put into practice British political warfare. In a 1952 speech on psychological warfare, R. H. S. Crossman asserted that the "only person who can do successful propaganda or psychological warfare is the person who cares about education; for the art of education surprisingly is the same as the art of propaganda, especially when dealing with totalitarian countries" (Crossmann 1952, 326).⁴¹ Contending that the purpose of propaganda is to make individuals question and think, Crossman offered that individual thinking is itself is a form of resistance in totalitarian regimes.

Despite Davis' assertions that his organization differed from the previous Creel Committee, OWI was not popular with Congress or the American public who remained skeptical of any centralized control over domestic information even in wartime situations (Padover and Lasswell 1951, 11). OWI domestic practices generally remained limited to systematic advertising and calculated political publicity (Linebarger 1958, 62). Nonetheless, centralized control ala the Creel Committee proved unnecessary. Within the geopolitical context of another world war, America's

commercial press, radio, magazine and book publishing facilities of the country for the most part expressed a national point of view without being prodded... even after the government entered the field, private American news and publishing continued to engage in operations which had the effect if not the intention of propaganda (Linebarger 1958, 89-90).

⁴¹ R. H. S. Crossman was a part of Britain's embryonic development of political warfare--the preferred British terminology. In the early 1940s, he established contact with the FDR administration. He became the head of the German section of Britain's Political Warfare Executive and later top British propaganda advisor to General Robert McClure in the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Force. He then served under Eisenhower in Northern Africa and Europe conducting political warfare.

Operating abroad via government owned and leased shortwave radios and the newly-established Voice of America (VOA), “OWI “undertook to spread the gospel of democracy... and to explain the objectives of the U.S. throughout the world, except Latin America” (Daugherty 1958, 127). Since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, the “Americas” had represented a special category which influenced the types of acceptable psychological practices even in the face of increasing Italian and German propaganda in the Americas. The Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), established by executive order in 1941, emphasized cultural exchanges and education, vice propaganda, as a means to “combat the Nazi lie” (Osgood 2006, 29; Troy 1981; Hart 2013). Elsewhere, OWI propaganda reflected an underlying confidence in the destiny of America and democracy to prevail and a commitment to total victory (Roholl 2012). To the chagrin of scholars within its ranks, the OWI relied nearly exclusively on the expertise from advertisers, public relations counselors and executives, and journalists who had *practical* experiences in actively influencing American society through mass media (Doob in Lerner 1951, 303). This was not unique. An underlying anti-intellectualism and tendency to promote and rely on practical, “common sense” experiences characterized much of America’s psychological warfare organizations in World War II (Padover and Lasswell 1951, 46).

Deception and Action in the Office of Strategic Services

Under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Wild Bill” Donovan led the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), responsible for the military program of psychological warfare (Daugherty 1958, 128). Donovan created an organization built on his belief that psychological warfare encompassed strategic intelligence, propaganda, and secret, unorthodox operations including sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare, “responsibilities in a field previously ignored and scorned by any diplomats and military professionals” (Troy 1981, 173; quote in Paddock 2002, 26). Donovan’s inclusion of actions with words emphasized the materiality of propaganda much more than the truth-telling of the OWI although the OWI also had material programs such as libraries. Setting the tone for OSS operations, Donovan promoted covert propaganda as an effective weapon of deception capable of weakening enemy morale and thus contributing directly to successful military operations and tactical engagements.

Organizationally, the OSS included a Research and Analysis Operations Branch charged with compiling political, psychological, sociological, and economic information useful for military operations. Led by Archibald MacLeish, former editor of *Fortune* and Librarian of Congress, the Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch sought to employ all techniques of public opinion research developed in foundations, business, and industry. Because of his embrace of modern, innovative techniques, Archibald MacLeish has been described as the “George Kennan of U.S. information policy in that his thinking would continue to pervade virtually every aspect of the emerging propaganda programs long after his relatively short tenure in government ended” (Hart 2013, 74). In addition to techniques, many prominent advertising agencies, including the New York-based industry leader J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency, supplied executives and resources to the OSS (Smith 1972, 15). Supplementing practitioners, Donovan also “assembled the best academic and analytical brains that he could beg, borrow, or steal from the universities, laboratories, and museums” (Smith 1972, 13).

The OSS Psychological Warfare Operations Branch included a Morale Operations Division responsible for creating and disseminating “gray” and “black” propaganda. Deemed necessary because of the wartime exigency, the OSS produced and disseminated both gray, unidentified propaganda to sow confusion and unattributable, black propaganda designed to undermine and disrupt the enemy. Operationally, these supported other OSS cloak-and-dagger operations intended to set the stage for conventional forces. Encouraging creativity, Donovan created a free-wheeling, almost helter skelter operational environment for those within the OSS. “Standing operating procedures were almost taboo in the OSS. Effective action was the sole objective” (Smith 1972, 5). An aide to Donovan noted he possessed a “basically democratic faith in the unexploited capabilities of the common man... [who could] improve the world through common effort” (Smith 1972, 30). In many cases, while supporting conventional military operations, the OSS operated independently on the battlefield which was unsettling to many hierarchically-inclined, conventionally-minded uniformed leaders.

Tactical and Operational Toolkits within the Psychological Warfare Division

General Robert Alexis McClure also proved to be a psychological warfare entrepreneur whose personal engagement contributed to psychological warfare developing an identity, even if tenuous, within the Army by the close of World War II (Paddock 2002). A career Army officer

with a background in intelligence, McClure was hand-picked by Eisenhower in 1942 to create an organization dealing with public relations, censorship, and psychological warfare in the North African, and later European, theater. According to McClure, the War Department or Army had never before contemplated such an organization. With the explicit backing of the European theater commander, McClure created the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF). PWD's civilian-military organizational structure included OWI, OSS, the British Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, and the British Ministry of Information, in addition to five Army mobile radio broadcasting companies equipped with loudspeakers, radio capabilities, and the ability to print leaflets to be distributed via airplanes. Like Donovan, McClure encouraged personnel to experiment in creating favorable psychological atmospheres for military operations. He defined psychological warfare as the "dissemination of propaganda designed to undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize his forces, and sustain the morale of our supporters" (Paddock 2002, 12). Akin to Bernay's "economy," PWD activities aimed to reduce the resources required for physical battle and ease the enemy toward surrender and eventual transition to the family of democratic nations (Crossman in Lerner 1951). McClure deemed civilian-military teamwork essential, as did those working for him, an attitude that tended to arouse suspicion within the regular Army.

Overall, the total number of individuals engaged in, and activities associated with, American psychological warfare during World War II were insignificant compared to the overall scope of U.S. mobilization of resources and wartime operations. Daugherty provides an "informed guess" of 1000 civilians plus local natives as involved psychological warfare in the European theater, Southwest Pacific, Burma and China, and the Central Pacific. His guess does not include those employed by OWI (Daugherty 1958, 134-135). Al Paddock concurs, estimating that "Army personnel employed in psychological warfare in all theaters probably never totaled more than two thousand at any one time, a miniscule number compared to other activities" (Paddock 2002, 20).

In the context of wartime exigency with little centralized oversight, military and civilian psychological warfare practitioners enjoyed the freedom to experiment. In his portrayal of C.D. Jackson, H.W. Brands described psychological warfare as an "immature art and one that afforded great opportunities for ... [those] with ingenuity and drive. More important, the psychological

warriors enjoyed a great deal of freedom practicing their tricks” (Brands 1988, 118). Although operational psychological warfare practices were generally decentralized, ad hoc, and uniquely tailored to particular situations, Linebarger assessed an underlying continuity amongst practitioners writing the “common denominator [for all psychological warfare personnel] was American civilization itself” (Linebarger 1958, 178).

Shaping a New Nation with Information Control

Ladislav Farago presaged America’s commitment to unconditional surrender and role as victors who would settle “ideological accounts” with defeated civilian populations after “total war” (Farago 1941, 128). The PWD transitioned to the Information Control Division (ICD), operating independently in Germany for nearly a year before coming under the authority of the Office of the Military Government of the United States (OMGUS) in February 1946. Within the broader context of occupying Germany not “for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation,”⁴² ICD’s directive was to

provide the Germans with information, which will influence [changed on April 16, 1947 to “enable”] them to understand and accept the United States program of occupation, and to establish for themselves a stable, peace, and acceptable government. Such information will impress upon the Germans the totality of their military defeat, the impossibility of rearmament, the responsibility of the individual German for the war and atrocities, the disastrous effects of the structure and system of National Socialism on Germany and the world, and the possibility that through work and cooperation Germany may again be accepted into the family of nations (Shandley 2010, 11).

Under General McClure, the ICD first closed all German media outlets including newspapers, journals, radio stations, and theaters in order to sanitize and remove all Nazi, militaristic and overly nationalistic information. Exercising complete control over information, ICD personnel (many of whom spoke German and understood German culture) defined acceptable content categories across political and cultural activities within Germany. As part of the reconstruction process, ICD slowly licensed newspapers and radio stations. ICD selected editors including Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and a small number of Communists in

⁴² JCS Directive 1067 informed OMGUS policy from 1945-1947, stating Germany “will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation.”

order to institute a diversity of views reflective of a democratic society (Goldstein 2008). Finally, ICD also approved content, first pre-publication and later post-publication, with the possibility of license revocation as punishment.

Information and Truth as Weapons in a Cold War of Words

As the U.S. demobilized after the war and returned to normalcy, Truman dissolved the OSS and OWI as wartime organizations with a small remnant of OWI folding into the Department of State. In 1946, Representative Sol Bloom (D-IL) publicly introduced a bill, at the urging of the Department of State, seeking to institutionalize State's existing information and exchange programs, including the Voice of America, as official peacetime instruments of foreign policy. Despite a lack of explicit authorities or directed funding, the Department of State had continued limited exchange and information programs since the end of World War II. Taking advantage of the categorical divide between propaganda and education, Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR) secured funding and a mandate for some previously existing *exchange* programs within a 1946 amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944. However, efforts for officially-institutionalized *information* programs were defeated in no small part because of concerns of the possibility of the U.S. government propagandizing the American public. These were similar to concerns regarding OWI's domestic mission and the perceived overreach of Creel's CPI. Additionally, commercial press, radio, and film representatives actively opposed government competition within the private information sphere (Perusse in Daugherty 1948, 25-27).

Institutionally, the locus for psychological warfare shifted to Washington D.C. Policymakers recognized the lack of wartime exigency, yet saw emerging unclear boundaries between peace and war creating possible imperatives for psychological activities intending to persuade rather than coerce allies and partners. President Truman promised the U.S.'s open-ended commitment "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure" in what became known as the Truman Doctrine. Truman's pronouncement was followed shortly by Secretary of State Marshall's offer of aid to support European recovery and reconstruction. In 1947, Representatives Karl Mundt (R-SD) and Alexander Smith (R-NJ) again introduced the Information and Educational Exchange bill after "reports from Americans traveling abroad indicated that grave misunderstandings of American

foreign policy existed in many parts of the world” (Parry-Giles 1992, 3). Nonetheless, Congressional public debates over the Smith-Mundt bill were extremely contentious. General Eisenhower summarized his congressional testimony in a diary entry:

Just as in the economic and defense arenas, America was squandering its ideological capital. As a consequence, the Russians are getting closer to the masses than we are... We have been amateurs in the field and we have not been experts like some of our opponents have been. The minds of men are what we are trying to win (in Bowie and Immerman 1998, 52).

Other testimonies highlighted Soviet prowess at “poisoning and deluding ‘the minds of men’” and others, such as Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins argued for better “weapons” in this battle of ideas” (Parry-Giles 1992, 85-86). Despite Collins’ public support, the institutional Army continued to categorize psychological warfare as an unusual activity not required by traditional conventional forces. After the War Department demobilized its psychological warfare personnel in the post-war drawdown, the Army re-activated *one* operational Tactical Information Detachment comprised of *twenty men* equipped with loudspeakers and leaflets in 1947 (Paddock 2002).

Conceptually, supporters of the bill defined U.S. information activities in opposition to the totalitarian Soviet Union, implicitly and explicitly relating Soviet psychological warfare to that of Nazi Germany. Linebarger described the successful role of German and Soviet propaganda in giving meaning to every activity in life through combined persuasion and coercion (Linebarger 1947, 79). U.S. policymakers talked of the 1,400,000 full-time, paid Communist propagandists who wielded complete control over the Soviet Union’s domestic population in addition to an important fraction dedicated to foreign audiences (Padover and Lasswell 1951, 26). Contrasting such centralized control, the Smith-Mundt Act focused on truth-telling and allowing the U.S. to showcase its commitment to liberty, individual rights, and democracy. As Congress recommended the bill, it declared “truth can be a powerful weapon.”

Concurrently within academia, the referent of American psychological activities was shifting from those being propagandized to those leading “communication” efforts. This indicated another shift to a neutral-to-positive understanding of propaganda reminiscent of the inter-war period.

[The] years 1948-1949 marked the pivotal point at which the aggregate number of citations in Psychological Abstracts to

“persuasion,” “communication” and “information” regularly exceeded those relating to “propaganda.” The shift resulted chiefly from the striking emergence of “communication” as the main marker for symbolic inducement; where this term registered but one citation in 1942, and four in 1946, a full 48 could be found in 1950 (Sproule 1997, 217).

In 1950 President Truman called for a “Campaign of Truth” to combat enemy lies. A few weeks later, North Korean forces invaded the South providing further justification for more aggressive propaganda. The “Voice of America now sought to convince its listeners as well as inform them” by mixing factual truth with persuasive propaganda (Edward P. Lilly Papers, 1928-1992, Box 58, 4 Feb 52). It was during this time period that “the term psychological warfare came gradually to be used in public discussions, in congressional hearings, and in newspapers to describe those activities conducted in peacetime by civilian agencies of the government that previously had been characterized by such terms as “overseas information” and the like” (Daugherty 1958, 13). Edward Barrett, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1950-1952, offered a practical rationale for the nomenclature change saying “American congressmen, like Americans in general, were suspicious of anything that could be labeled as propaganda” but “if you dressed it up as warfare, money was very easy to come by” (in Hixson 1997, 15). Some, including diplomat Charles Bohlen, decried the propensity of civilian advocates to appropriate the military term psychological warfare in arguing for a “rigorous peacetime information program” (Perusse in Daugherty 1958, 26). The categorical boundaries of psychological warfare expanded to include civilian activities in peacetime. The military also expanded its doctrinal definition between 1948 and 1953. With the deletion of the phrase “in time of war or declared emergency” in official doctrine, military psychological warfare practices could be employed in peacetime (Daugherty 1958, 14).

Covert Psychological Operations supporting the War of Words

In late 1947, NSC 4A authorized the recently established CIA to conduct covert psychological operations outside the United States in which the originating role of the U.S. government would be concealed. Within a year, the CIA established the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) led by former OSS officer Frank Wisner. Originally named the Office of Special Projects, the name change reflected an understanding that psychological operations by

their nature crossed all activities and thus required coordination. With four functional staffs focused on political warfare, psychological warfare, paramilitary operations, and economic warfare, the OPC coordinated with Defense and State in Washington D.C. and executed operations through field offices abroad (Karalekas in Leary 1984, 45-47). Although only officially sanctioned in late 1947, the CIA had inherited and maintained seven secret field stations in North Africa and the Near East since 1945 with personnel and “equipment, codes, techniques, and communications facilities [that] were intact and ready to be activated” (Karalekas in Leary 1984, 126). Originally sites for OSS secret intelligence and counter-espionage branch programs, the field stations were transferred to the War Department after the war before being assigned to the Central Intelligence Group in 1946. Operating within the OSS understanding of psychological warfare, the field stations melded intelligence and propaganda with the potential for secret physical operations such as sabotage. According to Anne Karalekas in her history of the CIA for the Church Committee in 1975, these field stations enabled covert psychological operations in 1947 in Central and Eastern Europe with techniques including unattributable publications and radio broadcasts. By 1948, the organization had acquired a radio transmitter to broadcast behind the Iron Curtain and established a secret printing plant in Germany, and even began assembling a fleet of balloons to drop pamphlets in the East (Karalekas in Leary 1984, 38-41). In 1948, U.S. policymakers feared that Italian communists would secure a majority or near majority in the upcoming general elections, paving the way for a coup. As Kennan testified to the 1975 Church Committee:

We were alarmed at the inroads of the Russian influence in Western Europe beyond the point where the Russian troops had reached. And we were alarmed particularly over the situation in France and Italy. We felt that the Communists were using the very extensive funds that they then had in hand to gain control of key elements of life in France and Italy, particularly the publishing companies, the press, the labor unions, student organizations, women’s organizations, and all sort of organizations of that sort, to gain control of them and use them as front organizations...

Daugherty characterizes Italy in 1947 as a principal psychological battleground in the Cold War with a notable democratic victory achieved through both Department of State overt information efforts and covert CIA activities. In addition to radio, leaflets, and civilian letter writing campaigns, U.S. psychological practitioner activities included working with film

distributors to ensure wide distribution of films such as MGM's 1939 *Ninotchka* starring Greta Garbo and Melvyn Douglas that satirized life in Russia (Daugherty 1958, 320-330). The following year, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 exempted the CIA from disclosing information related to CIA operations and allowed the CIA director to spend money without government oversight. While the name OPC implied coordination, institutional practices encouraged compartmentalization and further decentralization (Karalekas in Leary 1984, 45-47).

Covert psychological operations included not only information, but broader cultural activities. Kennan later explained “[t]his country has no ministry of culture, and the CIA was obliged to do what it could to fill the gap” (in Lucas 1999, 69). CIA practices filling the gap included establishing the Congress for Cultural Freedom in 1950. Historian Frances Stonor Saunders highlights the decentralized power relations within the Congress for Cultural Freedom. “Whether they liked it or not, whether they knew it or not, there were few writers, poets, artists, historians, scientists, or critics in postwar Europe whose names were not in some way linked to this covert enterprise” (Saunders 2000, 2). The 1975 Church Committee also found “from a sample of 700 grants of more than \$10,000 from 164 foundations outside the “big three” (Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie), that 108 were “partial or complete CIA funding” (Lucas 1999, 109). Through funding streams, the CIA could encourage certain self-practices that supported U.S. Cold War efforts.

As the Policy Planning Staff Director at the Department of State, George Kennan also urged an “ostensibly private corporation to assist refugees while mobilizing them into the anti-communist movement” (Hixson 1997, 59). Kennan called on former Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew and former diplomat DeWitt C. Poole to develop the idea. Supported by CIA funding, they, along with Henry Luce of *Time-Life*, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Adolph A. Berle, businessman Frank Altschul and former OSS officer Robert Lang established the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) in June 1949. The Dulles brothers’ law office of Sullivan and Cromwell filed the papers of incorporation with Allen Dulles as the organization’s first president. NCFE looked to broadcasting covert “independent” information to Soviet satellites under the banner of Radio Free Europe (RFE).

The following year, NCFE launched a Crusade for Freedom to raise public awareness, and symbolic funding from individuals and corporations. Fundraising took place in the U.S. and abroad. A highlight included a “Freedom Bell, modeled on the Liberty Bell of the American

Revolution [with] the words of Abraham Lincoln “That this world under God shall have a new birth of freedom” (Krugler 2000, 155). Symbolically linking Americans’ fight for freedom to the contemporary situation, the Crusade for Freedom discursively worked to expand the American people’s geographic understanding and commitment. “By December 1952, RFE was airing 218 hours of programming each day, produced in and aired from 22 studios situated in its Munich headquarters” (Krugler 2000, 156). A November 1952 NCFE fact sheet highlighted the \$3.5 million raised, a small but again symbolic amount, in addition to 25 million signatures collected on “Freedom Scrolls” pledging support to the fight against Communism (Lucas 1999, 101-102). Having been asked to contribute, General Motors’ Business Research Staff studied RFE’s “value” and concluded that “beyond question, Radio Free Europe is the outstanding weapon we have in our psychological warfare against the Communist regimes of the satellite countries... its effectiveness must be ascribed to its private character. The organization aims at flexibility and efficiency...” (PCIIA Records, Box 9, 15 Dec 52). Other CIA-RFE operations included the Free Europe University in Strasbourg, France to educate refugees and prepare for eventual democratization within the Soviet sphere. Likewise in Asia, the CIA sponsored Radio Free Asia with broadcasting facilities in Manila, Philippines.

Privately-Sponsored Initiatives spreading the American Way of Life

In the post-war environment, a host of privately-sponsored psychological initiatives revived to influence social, economic, and political behavior. In 1947, the American Bible Society promised to donate “1,000,000 Russian Gospels, 500,000 Russian New Testaments with Psalms and 300,000 Russian Bibles” to the Metropolitan Gregory of Leningrad and Novgorod (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 13 Jan 53). Around the country, Rotary, Kiwanis and Lions Clubs sponsored educational citizen exchanges. With financial support from the Mutual Security Agency and Italian industry, American schools of business and management and the National Management Council established an Advanced Management Training Center in Turin, Italy (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 16 Apr 53). A number of activities were specifically initiated to influence Cold War politics. Ahead of the 1948 Italian general election columnist Drew Pearson “spearheaded a campaign to swarm Italy with American letters” with support from the “National Catholic Welfare Council [that] informally circulated to Italian-American parishes the suggestion

that this letter-writing be recommended from the pulpits on Sundays” (White House Office, NSC Staff: papers, 1948-1961, OCB Secretariat Series, Box 6, 21 Dec 51).

Given the Cold War context, privately sponsored activities such as these became the concern for the small State Department Office of Private Cooperation responsible for “Cooperation with Private Enterprise.” With three offices in the east, mid-west, and west-coast, this staff conducted outreach to local civic, academic, and business/industrial organizations to encourage privately sponsored activities that were now categorized as “psychological.” The staff then catalogued ongoing projects. A 31 December 50 “Cooperation with Private Enterprise” summary highlighted thirty major projects from industrial projects to traveling art exhibits and various educational exchanges (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 31 Dec 50).

Chapter Three: Creating An Imperative for Political Warfare

“We have been handicapped however by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war... by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations--the perpetual rhythm of.” -- George Kennan, 1948

Discursive activities include language and practices contributing to the production of meaning that both limit and advance what is perceived possible in a given context (Milliken 1999). This chapter provides an analytic narrative of discursive activities in 1952 underpinning the imperative for Eisenhower’s directive. A number of contemporary scholars cite Eisenhower’s 8 October 1952 campaign speech as the genesis of Eisenhower’s Cold War approach (Osgood 2006, Bowie and Immerman 1998). This chapter traces the discursive origins of Eisenhower campaign speeches emphasizing national security and foreign policy, as well as the imperative for the Jackson Committee, to a 11-12 May 1952 conference on “psychological warfare” held in Princeton, New Jersey. The conference was a discursive practice essential to the conceptual and practical foundations of the Jackson Committee mandate. “Indeed, the [Jackson] committee was itself in part the product of a pre-election secret conference on psychological warfare at Princeton that had been organized by [C. D.] Jackson,” writes Ned O’Gorman (O’Gorman 2009, 399).

The analytic narrative in this chapter highlights processes of problem representation before and during Princeton. Delving beneath the surface into the black-boxes of informal decision making processes, the narrative weaves primary, archival case materials with interpretation. Source documentation from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEPL) includes written correspondence, handwritten and typed summary meeting notes, and full conference transcripts which were later provided to the Jackson Committee. The narration examines discursive activities of problem framing using military terminology, establishing categorical boundaries, and diagnosing causes and consequences of perceived gaps. Far from unique, military framing dominated much post-war discourse. However, the analytic narrative illuminates how the participants worked within this frame, revealing underlying assumptions and implications including how military framing necessitated an animating national purpose. It also interprets underlying assumptions and values and constellations of rhetorical commonplaces providing the discursive rationale for acceptable positions. It pays particular attention to how

argumentative games began and subsequently directed the deliberative discursive processes to issues of national policy and strategy. It reveals the strategic panic compounded by conceptual confusion as the participants sought solutions they deemed urgent enough to share with leaders within the current administration as well as C. D. Jackson's primary intended recipient, General Eisenhower.

Additional discursive practices included the crafting of the formal directive in the fall and the selection of those charged with interpreting and fulfilling the directive. Four key Jackson Committee figures participated in the Princeton conference. As Wolanin contends in describing the selection of advisory commission members, each is selected to "favor the direction of presidential policy in the area or is at least open minded" (Wolanin 1975, 75). As the analytic narrative will show over the next two chapters, the composition and settings of the advisory groups, as well as the fluidity of concepts, contributed to the individuals intersubjectively constituting ideas more than bargaining from established preferences and positions within problem representation processes.

Reinvigorating a Political Warfare Imperative: The Princeton Gathering⁴³

The story of the Jackson Committee mandate began in the initial days of 1952 when General Eisenhower indicated his willingness to run for the presidency. Confident of the prospect of a successful Eisenhower candidacy, C. D. Jackson and Abbott Washburn projected that Eisenhower would want to offer a new, dynamic approach to the global situation.⁴⁴ Proposing the need to develop an "overall blueprint for cold war future without regard to

⁴³ I use "reinvigorating" because, as the Princeton dialogue shows, as well as details provided in the previous chapters, C. D. Jackson's drive focused on addressing the Truman administration's disjointed ensemble of psychological warfare activities. In 1948 George Kennan first argued for U.S. political warfare in a Policy Planning Staff paper, critiquing American policymakers' continuing predilection for thinking in terms of a war-peace binary opposition (30 Apr 48). Document within the Wilson Center Digital Archive of declassified Cold War documents: http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/assets/media_files/000/001/718/1718.pdf. All footnotes within the analytic narrative of the Princeton gathering are drawn from the full transcript, unless otherwise noted (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 83, 11-12 May 52).

⁴⁴ In the spring of 1952, C. D. Jackson was on a one year leave of absence from Fortune, serving as the president of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc (NCFE). Abbott Washburn was the National Director of Organization for Citizens for Eisenhower. Jackson and Washburn certainly intended to develop discursive themes to propel Eisenhower's candidacy and distinguish a "dynamic" way forward from Truman's defensive policy of Containment. Nonetheless, the gathering also included individuals serving within the Truman administration. Of these attendees, not all were disenchanted per se with the current policies and bureaucracies, but all revealed an interest in thinking through possibilities to enhance the U.S. effort. Additionally, the final product was freely shared across both political parties.

jurisdictional scrapping,” Jackson and Washburn developed the idea for an informal gathering to discuss psychological warfare in the spring.⁴⁵ Jackson was frustrated by a perceived lack of policy guidance from the Truman administration that affected Radio Free Europe (RFE) activities in Central and Eastern Europe. In office calls and meetings throughout the spring, Jackson’s storytelling described RFE’s motivating, dynamic energy. He also notably caveated RFE’s potential to cause harm in encouraging resistance behind the Iron Curtain without any guiding U.S. policies regarding the extent of possible U.S. material support for anti-Communist uprisings. As he would later say to the group in Princeton, RFE had the luxury of ample funding, no questions asked, and the ability to promote “no holds barred” programming; however, this was proving to be dangerous because RFE operators, and the U.S. government, had not prepared for creating, or responding to, contingencies in satellite countries. Jackson’s stories of “salients created” emphasized an operational necessity for policy boundaries while reinforcing an RFE institutional view of the positive potential of its activities.

In his opening remarks to the Princeton gathering on 11 May, C.D. Jackson again told a story of RFE having created “salients into the hearts and minds of our friends behind the Iron Curtain; into the fears and mistrust of Communist officials behind the Curtain; and possibly created a frown on Uncle Joe’s brow.” He then described his hope for the gathering to be a “long-term think session” as to whether the United States could develop the will to conduct political warfare. The concept itself was contemplated over the weekend as the participants wrestled with applying and transforming traditional military concepts and redefining categories in order to better describe and understand the geopolitical situation, represent problems, and develop initial ideas for an improved way forward.

Institutional Setting at Princeton & the Promotion of Credibility, Trust, and Acceptability

As the official host, NCFE sponsored this unofficial meeting-of-the-minds of hand-selected individuals whom Jackson openly complimented as having “talent, prestige, and leverage.” Consisting of “top men in this field,” the group included 28 individuals with technical, academic, and operational psychological warfare backgrounds from the Department of State, the CIA, NCFE, RFE, Radio Free Asia (RFA), Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), industry, and

⁴⁵ The quote is from Jackson’s hand-written marginalia on an initial guest list for the Princeton gathering (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 83, 4 Feb 52).

academic institutions.⁴⁶ Former Ambassador to Japan and recently appointed NCFE president, Joseph Grew reinforced the elite nature of the gathering in remarking on the first day that he had “never sat down with a group like this before—representing a great many different organizations and different interests.” Yet, importantly, Jackson explained to the group that he purposefully selected Princeton because “all of us are off our home fields” and therefore should not feel bound to institutional or organizational responsibilities or loyalties. With collaborative sessions, cocktails, and cohabitation, the informal setting encouraged attendees to freely engage as individual citizens, not official representatives. Over the course of the weekend, participants verbally restated their roles as unofficial, professional men of good will trying to further an important cause. Each was also an “amateur” with an open mind, an attribute that influenced the tenor of the group’s discursive activities.⁴⁷

Confronted with a geopolitical situation that the participants felt was unlike anything in the United States’ previous 150-year experience, the attendees revealed a willingness to frankly contribute. Throughout the weekend, many offered different problem representations, diagnoses of causes and consequences of gaps, and ideas for advancing U.S. interests. Given the novelty of the geopolitical situation, the amateurs wrestled with developing contemporary, contextual, conceptual meanings within their selected frames to more effectively understand the competition with the Soviet Union and possible dynamic ways forward.

As noted earlier, a number of policymakers, practitioners, professors, and pundits were debating and advancing the concept of psychological warfare during this time period. Most of

⁴⁶ This is Washburn’s characterization in a summary provided to Eisenhower (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 22 Aug 52). Participants are listed here in terms of assigned roommates: Dr. J. B. Wiesner (Harvard) and Dr. Walter Rostow (MIT); Mr. Allen Dulles (Deputy Director, CIA) and Mr. John C. Hughes (NCFE Board of Directors); Mr. Abbott Washburn and Mr. C.D. Jackson; Mr. Lewis Galantiere (RFE) and Mr. Robert E. Lang (Director, RFE); Admiral H.B. Miller (NCFE) and Honorable Joseph C. Grew (NCFE); Honorable Adolf A. Berle (former diplomat; NCFE) and Commander Dixon; Mr. Frank Altschul (investment banker; NCFE) and Mr. Fred Dolbeare (CIA); Mr. John Leich (DoS) and Mr. William E. Griffith (Political Advisor, RFE); Mr. Thomas W. Braden (CIA) and Dr. Levering Tyson (President, Muhlenberg College); Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner (President, Associated Universities, Inc.); and Mr. Howard M. Chapin (Director of Advertising, General Foods Corporation; NCFE); Mr. John Devine (DoS); Mr. Charles Bohlen (DoS) and Mr. Robert Joyce (DoS); Mr. George Morgan (PSB) and Mr. Alan Valentine (RFA); Professor Cyril Black (Princeton University); Mr. DeWitt Poole (former diplomat; NCFE); and Mr. William H. Jackson (investment banker, former CIA). Ann Whitman (Secretary, NCFE’s Crusade for Freedom who would become Eisenhower’s personal secretary for the eight years he was president), Wanda Allender, Marie McCrum, and Joseph La Chapelle assisted as secretaries.

⁴⁷ Alan Valentine, Director of Radio Free Asia, characterized himself as an amateur during one of the group sessions when describing the enormity of his organization’s geographical scope encompassing over two billion individuals. It was his comment that cued my interpretation of amateurism as an underlying characteristic supporting the trust and acceptability within the group of individuals with established professional credibility.

those attending the Princeton gathering approached their weekend activities with an unbridled enthusiasm. Joseph Grew had categorized the participants as “fundamentally objective-minded.” Over the weekend, they exhibited a confidence that they were uniquely positioned to advance the practical possibility of political warfare as a substitute for, not prelude to, conventional war with the Soviet Union. DeWitt Poole offered an initial conceptual intertwinement between political warfare and strategy in asserting “[i]t seems to me that the formulation of our [national] strategy need not be at all an official task. It would benefit from coming unofficially and then being allowed to influence official policy.” Similarly, C. D. Jackson heralded “[w]e are going to have something fresh and new and in this jungle in which we are operating to have any kind of foot-path is going to be of tremendous value.” The group generated a spirit of positive momentum. A majority believed the United States’ approach could and would be different going forward.

Simultaneously, they assiduously attempted to work within boundaries of being “fundamentally objective-minded.” The transcript reveals the participants reminding themselves of the necessity of being realistic and acknowledging international and domestic constraints. Constraints discussed included those posed by the Soviet Union (jamming, physical control over areas), those posed by the U.S. political and bureaucratic systems, and those posed by the perceived responsibilities of global leadership in a world distinguished by regional complexities.

As the gathering came to an end, Grew projected, “this gathering today, I think, is going to be really historic... [having developed ideas giving] permanent advantage to our country.” Representing various discursive communities, the Princeton attendees formed an informal discourse coalition coalescing around the storyline of political warfare within the Cold War. Jackson and others assumed this session would inform Eisenhower, both in terms of presidential campaign themes, but also his governance once victorious. Additionally, the attendees agreed to share their work, namely a draft policy statement, with the current administration in the hopes of spurring foreign policy momentum (even by the current Democratic administration) ahead of the domestic political campaign season kicking off in July with the Democratic and Republican party conventions. As the chapter will highlight, individuals retained differing understandings of what the particular storyline of political warfare meant, from ensuring internal governmental coordination to creating national policy and strategy to devising alternative futures that appeal to others.

Underlying Assumptions within the Selected Military Frame

To open the weekend session on 11 May, Jackson read aloud a letter from General Eisenhower hand-delivered from France by General Lucius Clay. Writing on 8 May 1952, Eisenhower offered the group words of encouragement.

Dear Mr. Jackson, As you and your associates gather to discuss ways and means to improve our penetration of the Iron Curtain, I give full endorsement to your efforts. I learned the importance of truth as a weapon in the midst of battle. I am sure that to win the peace, we must have a dynamic program of penetration designed to accomplish our objectives to bring freedom to those who want it, and lasting peace to a troubled world. Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7).

Eisenhower's imagery of penetrating the Iron Curtain complemented Jackson's reference to "salients" in minds. Yet, in evoking images of soldiers with exposed flanks in danger of being isolated from the main effort, Jackson also skillfully illustrated his preoccupation with purpose as opposed to simply the "ways and means" of psychological warfare.⁴⁸ Two weeks earlier, C. D. met with Frank Altschul in his NYC office to finalize the general sequence of events for the Princeton meeting. An investment banker, Frank Altschul led the NCFE Radio Committee that established RFE in 1950. Jackson lamented that RFE had been told to "do something" and had gone further and faster than anyone dreamed. However, there was an "absolute paucity of policy in Washington. Complete vacuum. There is essentially nothing on: What do we want? Where are we going? What is our plan?" Eisenhower's vague call to win the peace and bring freedom and peace represented the discursive difficulties confronting the Princeton group concerned with practical policy making. Eisenhower's letter illustrated the assumption that U.S. goals and objectives were self-evident, a topic debated at Princeton.

Much of the weekend's discursive activities involved efforts to transform traditional, conventional military concepts to better describe the unique contemporary geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union. Aptly identifying much of the discursive difficulties

⁴⁸ In combining "salient" with "hearts and minds of our friends," Jackson also summoned a possible image of the potential for destruction at the individual level. Given the political and material constraints imposed by Soviet supported regimes, creating too large a salient into hearts and minds could result in individuals taking physical steps to challenge their current conditions, a move not supported by U.S. policy. It could also build too much hope for immediate action leading to bitterness and resignation, as RFE Director Lang described during the weekend.

encountered by the participants during the weekend, diplomat and Soviet specialist Chip Bohlen cautioned about the inadequacy of military terminology.

Whenever the word “warfare” gets into this discussion, it gets immediately translated into military terms, and you find the use of words such as “offensive,” “defensive,” “military,” “tactical,” etc. I am not sure that they are not inaccurate descriptions. In the military art you have two things. When you are at war, you already have taken the commitment [toward a preferred end-state]. Also in war you are dealing with known factors... You have fixed points in your thinking when you draw plans. The essence of political warfare is the extraordinary absence of just such fixed points. So when you go to work out the overall objective, you usually find yourself fanning out into generalities—but they are not really comparable to a military overall strategic plan.

The weekend-long contemplations rested upon three key assumptions within the military framing: the Soviet Union was waging a war, albeit with a character unlike traditional conventional war; war required positive political aims; and victory necessitated both defense and offense.⁴⁹ First, the United States was in a long-term, global war based on the Soviet Union’s pronouncements of eventual world domination. War itself was a violent *and* political phenomenon. In this war, the Soviets were using all available practices and institutions to conduct an aggressive, coordinated, worldwide campaign toward their political end. However, in relegating conventional and atomic forces to a supporting role, Soviet activities did not fall into the traditional category of war. The traditional meaning of war elevated violent practices over political; however, in the current context, political outweighed physical violence. With this understanding, the Princeton participants agreed with Jackson that “[i]t [political warfare] is a fact of contemporary existence.” Yet, Walt Rostow also spoke of Stalin and Lenin’s position

⁴⁹ Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of war in *On War* provides an intellectual framework for understanding and distinguishing the nature and character of war. According to Clausewitz, war as a violent and political phenomenon—akin to a duel—is unchanging. However, the character of war—how war manifests itself in the real world, reflects specific politics and societies. In other words, the character of war changes depending upon who wages violence, how, where, and why. See book one, chapter one. Reflecting upon his experiences in the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz assumes that violence is the result of physical force; however, one can, as the Princeton participants did, attempt to categorize violence differently. While the Soviet declared political goal of world domination was similar to previous antagonists such as Hitler, Soviet violence was perpetrated primarily by instruments other than military forces. This challenged the contemporary legal and institutional understandings of war as something declared and subsequently fought by mobilized armed forces. However, in book eight, chapter two, Clausewitz applies his pure concept of war to reality, declaring the form of war depends on specific temporal conditions. Importantly, he cautions that “[n]o one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it” (von Clausewitz 1989, 579).

“that the end ultimately has to be [conventional] war. This is not our view at all.” Dr. Lloyd Berkner also reminded the group of the increasing power and terror of nuclear weapons suggesting “[t]ime is not indefinite... a settlement of some kind must be reached in the foreseeable future.”

Drawing on American wartime experiences, attendees revealed a second assumption regarding the necessity of positive policy purposes. From the American revolutionary and civil wars to the latest world war in which the U.S. successfully demanded unconditional surrender of Axis powers, American war efforts were guided, inspired, and sustained by positive aims. However, as James Burnham, a champion of rollback, would soon enunciate, outside of wartime “there has ordinarily been no foreign policy at all” (Burnham 1952, 3). Traditional foreign policy supported a general peace and stability rather than advancing any particular agenda (Hart 2013, 61-63). Periods of normality had not compelled national policy imperatives; however, the Soviet strategic goal of world domination challenged the traditional notion of normality. Bob Joyce of the Policy Planning Staff pointed out the perceived gap within the policy of Containment. Missing within the host of classified papers and NSC directives that comprised Containment was a “courage of action” represented by a positive policy. Joyce explained that for those currently inside government, “we don’t believe you can have one at this time.” DeWitt Poole argued otherwise. “We must step in today as the champion of an attitude of life just as Russia is the champion of another attitude. Russia on one hand is reactionary. Over against this reactionary character of Russia you have the progressive and revolutionary character of the U.S.”

And, third, the discussions revealed the assumption that to win a war, a state must realize that offense is an integral element of defense.⁵⁰ The US must be *at war*, not simply *in war*. In their conceptualization of political war as the global condition, the concept of the status quo was obsolete. The discussions reflected an anxiety and even lack of confidence in the ability to resist Soviet active and aggressive campaigning primarily because populations were unaware of the unique threat. This in turn extended the range of political actors to include the public.

⁵⁰ Princeton debates led me to Clausewitz’s classic articulation (1976, 370). The Princeton group’s assessment of U.S. emphasis on defense was not necessarily unique. In his examination of the 1950 Project TROY, Allan Needell reports that the while the research group praised U.S. government efforts to date including the marquis Marshall Plan and the Point Four program, they described these measures as “essentially defensive” (Needell 1993, 409). Needell attributes this perspective to the prevailing rhetoric within the American political establishment in the wake of the north Korean invasion of the south and subsequent acceptance of NSC 68. Of course, the issue is how one categorizes defensive versus offensive when employing primarily non-military measures.

Nonetheless, based on the temporal assumption regarding the long-term nature of the Cold War, the group implicitly rejected the categorization of the current situation as an emergency. This contrasted a sentiment prevalent within the Truman administration, as well as some prominent Republican leaders.

The U.S. was in a new kind of war. Consequently, the U.S. must identify positive goals and conduct offensive activities to “win.” However, how could one translate “commitment,” “fixed points,” and “victory”? What did it mean in terms of actual aims and practices to offensively champion an attitude of life and “bring freedom to those who want it” as suggested by Eisenhower in his letter? To be offensive without triggering actual conventional hostilities required a moderated conceptualization and categorization of “offensive effects.” This would be at the heart of continuing debates over possible solutions for Eisenhower’s specific call for a “dynamic program.”

Collectively, these underlying assumptions informed how the participants represented gaps between reality and a preferred state of affairs, as well as how they diagnosed causes and consequences. In framing the geopolitical situation as a state of political war, which also described the Soviet Union’s approach, the participants spent the weekend deliberating what “political warfare” meant and required in terms of developing an American approach. The participants worked to constitute American political warfare as a long-term substitute for, not prelude to, conventional war.

Necessity of Purpose for Popular Inspiration and Action

For the majority at the Princeton gathering, a positive policy was necessary to guide official and unofficial actions abroad, otherwise these were mere tactics rather than a campaign toward a preferred end. Positive policy also would galvanize domestic public support and attract and sustain international allies and partners. This was critical because in a global war for a way of life, the United States government could not win alone. Broadening the aperture beyond immediate operational necessities, a number of participants framed the need for a positive policy in political/moral terms, calling for a *raison d’etre*. The ensuing discourse reflected the binary oppositions within established Cold War discourse with constellations of “American exceptionalism” and “Cold War/political war” providing the discursive rationale for prescribed solutions. Dr. Walt Rostow of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute

of Technology (CENIS, MIT) evoked the familiar analogy of Lincoln and the United States' fight to eliminate slavery during the Civil War, a story also raised by Frank Altschul in his meeting with Jackson and Washburn two weeks earlier. "As a people we would seem to have lost our capacity for moral indignation, our essential American hallmark of being crusaders for human liberty" Altschul declared. Without a *raison d'être*, Altschul claimed Americans

are only, or seem to be, interested in protecting our living standard, our unspeakably high living standard. [The consequences?] We don't give a damn for the rest of the world. And the rest of the world knows it....[We need] to be able to say, truthfully, America has now recaptured her past traditions. A new day has dawned.

To champion an American "way of life" required capturing what Robert Lang described as "that Baptist fervor" and, as Poole termed it, the spiritual forces of American exceptionalism. To succeed in this long-term fight implicitly required a mobilized public, emotionally inspired and sustained by policies evoking a modern version of the United States' stance against slavery. Alan Valentine agreed that a positive statement of policy would serve the operational needs of not only official and unofficial organizations conducting psychological warfare activities, but also "the average well-meaning and intelligent American citizen who wants guidance." It would also reinforce "the conviction and inspiration of other people." Unlike its "evil Soviet counterpart," the American attitude of life centered around "individuals freely making their own decisions and pursuing their own objectives" (Lucas 1999, 3). Whereas the Communists gained control over organizations and used them as "fronts," U.S. policymakers would encourage individuals to be political agents advancing the hope and reality of the American dream to others abroad. Therefore, policymakers had to conceptually envision how to guide and harness government as an activity to achieve national goals (Dean 1999, 2; Barry et al, 1996, 20).

Altschul cautioned the group that the American public might not be ready to support a dynamic program to bring freedom to others, as Eisenhower's letter suggested. Worth quoting in whole, Joyce eloquently described a gap resulting from their framing of the geopolitical competition as a long-term war of ways of life, and its consequences in terms of governing and shaping conduct to enhance the security of the United States:

What we say is just as good as what we do. There is a tragic dilemma between acts and deeds... If political warfare is going to have value in this country, it has to be backed by specific actions. The best we can do, given our system of government and power

coming from the people and elected representatives controlling purse strings, is to approach the problem a la long [term] and to explain to and educate the American people in the position of the United States in the world today as to what we face regarding the nature of Russian imperialism and international communism, so we can understand what we are up against. If we have not got that, our foreign policy is only as good as our domestic health. Our political warfare is only as good as our foreign policy. I would think that the main things we have to face in political warfare are domestic—they are so intertwined that you can't separate them.

The weekend participants held up “Liberation” as a potential *raison d’etre*. Yet, Professor Walt Rostow noted the American penchant for platitudes, identifying a “schizophrenia” and conceptual “gap” between American long-run policy preambles and short run actions that had negatively affected U.S. relations with others. “Abstractions have meaning to us in our traditions which they don’t have in other parts of the world.” So, while Americans identified with vague rhetorical commonplaces such as Containment or Liberation, Europeans did not have the same traditions or experiences given their history as a “plaything of major foreign powers.” For Rostow, the consequences of platitudes were the rising apathy and neutralism in Europe as foreign populations identified the U.S. as a status quo power. The current Director of RFE, Robert Lang reinforced this understanding. “We give our listeners a mixture of generalities about freedom, justice, and free enterprise, seasoned with hazy promises...[it] may be conducive to a feeling of bitterness and resignation. It may also induce a fatalistic indifference, or—at best—the belief that “Western imperialism” is the lesser of two evils.”⁵¹

The experienced threat of persistent Soviet political warfare and an assessment of a Soviet belief in the conflictual nature of international relations eliminated any possibility of status quo. Therefore, the logic turned to the necessity of the U.S. government enticing and persuading other states and populations to join in its vision. Lang offered the idea of developing “a positive creed, something worth striving for—a synthesis of all that Western Civilization stands for. We should offer a positive vision of a better future.”⁵² The participants argued that the

⁵¹ Contrasting this interpretation of causes of neutralism, Robert LeBaron argued two years earlier of increasing neutrality amongst European states if the U.S. lost relative military strength and its “atomic monopoly” (Wells 1979, 127). LeBaron was the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on atomic energy affairs. At the time LeBaron was advocating for the military build up being recommended within the draft NSC 68.

⁵² In the official transcript provided to Jackson Committee staff members, the quote about a guiding creed ala Wilson’s and FDR’s was annotated and checked.

U.S. policy of Containment positioned the U.S. as a status-quo power. This positioning challenged the self-image within American exceptionalism and the underlying progressive mission to expand freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. Raising analogies of Wilson's Fourteen Points and Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter, participants questioned many times throughout the weekend whether they themselves could verbalize U.S. aims without "fanning out into generalities" as warned by Bohlen. After hours of free-flowing discussion, Harvard Professor Jerry Wiesner succinctly summarized "[a]ren't there really two problems: 1) We are not doing a good job of political warfare for our aims; 2) We don't know what our aims really are."

A number asserted U.S. interests and aims were self-evident, linking the concepts to the United States' 150 year history of domestic liberal reforms. However, most conceded they could not readily and easily identify U.S. interests and aims, especially within the context of a global war played out within regional contexts. Rostow challenged the group to position the U.S. to act as a "living historical objective, a picture of America which would include aims vis-a-vis Russia, which would constitute a realistic alternative, to which the minds of men might become attached over a period of time. To do this, you must go very much beyond the themes we now project."⁵³ Policy goals should link America's revolutionary history of advancing liberty and freedom for its own citizens to the contemporary global challenges. Arguing the importance of marrying up ideological, emotional, and security concepts, Rostow proposed "a unified Europe with a unified Germany." He suggested such a statement would provide tangible, intermediate policy goals within the overarching rhetorical commonplace and long-term objective of liberation. A few weeks later candidate Eisenhower alluded to the difficulty of identifying specific goals, "...we must state our purposes in positive rather than in terms of negative Containment...Only through positive pronouncement of our intentions in the international field can we ourselves be sure of our nation's aims."⁵⁴

The character of this political war posed challenges to the traditional concept of war aims. In simple terms, U.S. goals during recent conventional wars had been the physical defeat of the enemy and restoration of territorially-based sovereignty. Intermediate goals often involved

⁵³ After the weekend conference, George Morgan of the PSB sent a memo to the PSB Director, Dr. Allen, in which he said Walt Rostow had served as a realistic advocate against those representing a more aggressive group (Edward P. Lilly Papers, Box 57, 12 May 52).

⁵⁴ "Text of Eisenhower Broadcast" from Denver, Colorado reprinted in the Herald Tribune, 24 June 1952 (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 50).

physically reaching fixed geographic points. However, as Bohlen perceived, “the essence of political warfare is the extraordinary absence of just such fixed points.” In a global war involving competing ways of life played out across various regional contexts, how could U.S. policymakers specify long-term objectives, and medium- and short-term goals? Howard Chapin, Director of Advertising of General Foods Corporation and former OSS officer in Czechoslovakia, asserted that U.S. goals must represent a common ground incorporating the desires of foreign populations. This assertion logically flowed from the values underpinning the American attitude of life in which individuals freely made decisions and pursued their own objectives (Lucas 1999, 3).

Chip Bohlen again tempered the discussions with words of caution regarding how and where the U.S. would draw geographical lines between populations. The group coalesced around the proposition that Western Europe represented a geographically-based Western Civilization population. Characterizing Great Britain as the only dependable ally, the participants concluded the U.S. must find ways to shore up support while “doing no harm.” The debates regarding Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Russia, were more amorphous. The group was unable to identify specific short-term interests and goals supporting long-term liberation. Left undiscussed were the actual activities required to ascertain political-social-economic interests of those abroad, especially given the real limitations imposed by Communist regimes. The participants had even less background dealing with Asia. Alan Valentine described the enormity of the region in terms of two billion people representing a myriad of situations, interests, and goals. Nonetheless, he informed the participants that “Asians” as a whole were generally “sitting on the fence,” not convinced the U.S. was better than the Soviet Union. In so doing he tacitly revealed an imperial vision of “Asians” as a collective group incapable of rational assessments and decisions (Said 1978).

Policy, Strategy, and Political Warfare

The vast majority of weekend argumentative games focused on the imperative for positive policy to guide the currently disjointed ensemble of psychological warfare machinery governing and shaping publics. Representing those on the “frontlines” in Europe and Asia, many weekend participants deemed Containment inadequate. It did not provide the guiding light necessary for on-going official and informal psychological warfare activities. Yet as Sunday’s

final session began, William H. Jackson categorized the problem as strategy, not simply policy. Jackson identified a gap in the U.S. government's ability to develop a national strategy accounting for and directing the disjointed ensemble of psychological warfare machinery. Jackson offered, "I think the trouble that has been voiced on both sides of the table is that there is the absence of a strategic plan [for political warfare] or absence of knowledge of it." Poole agreed saying "our problem and our present lack is strategy. If our strategy is formulated the tactics will follow of themselves."

Military framing shaped participant beliefs in the possibility of transforming and extending the concept of military strategy into the context of foreign affairs. Military strategy centered around a military commander responsible for planning, coordinating, and conducting activities within a specific temporal and geographic scope. Extrapolated to a national context, national strategy practices would begin with the President (and Secretary of State) specifying national objectives and goals, and coordinating and employing a full range of capabilities and activities across a longer temporal and wider geographic context.

The group considered "ways and means" as well as prioritization and synchronization of activities inherent in strategic planning. As attendees arrived, they had received an initial working description of political warfare drafted by Lewis Galantieri, Head of RFE's Propaganda Policy:

It [political warfare] is the sum of the activities in which a government engages for the attainment of its objectives without unleashing armed warfare. But it is a description which applies to none of those activities when each of them is carried on independently of the others. In that case they become "mere" diplomacy, intelligence, propaganda, economic negotiation, armament production, and so on. The essence of political warfare is that it is planned and the means employed to carry it on are coordinated.

According to Galantieri and others, current activities were disjointed, conducted "in water-tight departments--propaganda, negotiations, rearmament, etc--without regard to the rest, with the sum total of it being less than the sum of the parts instead of more..." This perspective focused problem representation on the gap involved in coordinating existing institutional activities. The weekend discourse also had expanded categories of government beyond

institutional activities to include individual activities for governing and shaping individual freedom of choice that underpinned the American way of life.

Playing the “devil’s advocate,” Walt Rostow stressed the relational nature of strategy, offering:

political warfare is a lot more serious than your definition would imply. What you do essentially in political warfare is to hold out to a man a realistic alternative to a situation in which he finds himself, and that alternative is in your interest...Until you face up to the fact that we must make all that another country has done come out in our interest, this is a game which has no meaning.

Rostow extended the conceptual complexity of political warfare. On one hand, military strategy evoked images of forces driving over resistance to reach fixed objectives. Conventional war was a relatively direct and linear game.⁵⁵ Conceptually, political warfare lacked “fixed points” and implied a process of multifaceted and continuous interaction. Winning the game was not about overcoming resistance through force. Winning involved bringing others into the fold through free choice. This required more than integrated and coordinated activities; it necessitated daily engagements. To realize the game’s “meaning,” policymakers also must first understand those to whom the U.S. would offer alternatives. Despite Rostow’s exhortation, the event transcript reveals a glaring omission of substantive debates over the concerns of any foreign populations. However, the insights regarding free choice and continuous interaction later informed Jackson Committee recommendations.

The group returned to Rostow’s observation that Soviet leaders had publicly stated “the end ultimately has to be war [but] this is not our view at all.” The participants implicitly diagnosed that the Truman policy of Containment, with its defensive approach, contributed to a popular understanding of political warfare as a prelude to, not substitute for, armed conflict. They rejected this popular meaning, instead projecting American political warfare as a substitute for armed conflict. Eisenhower would relay this sentiment months later on the campaign trail as he attempted to fuse the meaning of psychological warfare with the Cold War. “Remember this: we wage a “cold war” in order to escape the horror of its opposite--war itself,” he declared to the San Francisco audience.

⁵⁵ I grant I oversimplified the interactive nature of tactical and operational battles. My conceptual point is the fundamental difference in the types of interactions. Militaries “engage” to defeat opposing forces. In political warfare, a host of actors engage with populations to attract and persuade.

The gathering posited that political warfare could and should be both defensive and offensive. Bohlen again caveated the limitation of military framing. “When you ask, “Shall we go on the offensive,” I see a vast field of illusion. All political warfare is by its nature both offensive *and* defensive, and you were in the Kremlin tonight, they would consider that political warfare is being waged against them.” Bohlen also offered that while the U.S. could carry the fight behind the Iron Curtain, “we have one hell of a lot to do on our side, and in Western Europe that is free.” In this context, Bohlen categorized “offense” in positive terms. Rather than directing energies against an enemy, offensive activities could be understood as those directed toward one’s own side to reinforce one’s own way of life. This conceptualization resonated amongst the future Jackson Committee members.

Reflecting a traditional category of offense, Dr. Berkner argued offense meant that “one must consider acts directed at the enemy himself. This is dangerous to do, unless one has broad strategic bases for his acts.” However, he took the concept further in agreeing with Rostow in that “I think that the offensive activity must require that we try to create a situation to which they [the Soviets] can truly aspire -- an alternative to their present situation.” In this regard, the participants implicitly categorized the Cold War as a type of limited war. Unlike the conventional world wars earlier in the century, the U.S. did not seek the physical overthrow of the Soviet Union; yet, conversely, it was also a total war in that the participants envisioned only one system ultimately surviving. In this spirit, Berkner returned to the difficulty of identifying political aims for political war. He couched his comments with “[h]ow far are you willing to go? If you are willing to go far, the methods to be employed are quite different from those used if you are not willing to go far.”⁵⁶

Weekend discourse exposed fundamental conceptual dilemmas facing U.S. policymakers. The participants understood the geopolitical condition as a type of limited war within a broader temporal geopolitical conflict of total war given assumptions that only one type of system could survive.⁵⁷ What did this mean in terms of developing national aims and corresponding ways and

⁵⁶ H.W. Brands posed a similar question in 1988 in his examination of Eisenhower and the people to whom he delegated authority. Brands included C. D. Jackson, classifying him as a policy agitator who was “continually seeking support for the psychological warfare activities that fascinated him” (Brands 1998, xi). “The basic issue was how far psychological warfare could go before it became real warfare. During World War II, when [C. D.] Jackson had won his spurs, the problem did not exist. Total war meant that nothing was off limits. But the cold war, to the extent it was a war at all, was a limited war” (Brands 1998, 124).

⁵⁷ Soviet pronouncements and Marxist economic theory clashed with the liberal progressive path for mankind.

means? The rhetorical commonplace “liberation” represented a historically-grounded progressive U.S. purpose now being transmuted to the geopolitical stage. Many implicitly considered “liberation” as the long-term objective informing the current Containment policy. Additionally, across the political spectrum, others advocated near-term policies and activities advancing a “rollback” of Communist control in Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union to achieve “liberation.” However such moves risked escalating the current limited, political war to a general war with the Soviet Union. As Berkner asked, “how far are you willing to go?” The group’s underlying assumptions led them to ponder the meaning and practices of “offensive” political warfare, while assuming its necessity for a dynamic program. The two days of argumentative games revealed difficulties in extending traditional concepts of offense and defense, salients and exploitation, and victory in the current geopolitical context. However, it is worth noting how the group’s “amateur” status seemed to propel free-flowing intersubjective conceptual discussions.

Policy Proposals

At the suggestion of Allen Dulles, the weekend output was a draft national policy statement to inform future efforts. Acknowledging the complexity of specifying universal aims given regional complexities, the draft policy statement focused on Europe and identified three overarching U.S. foreign policy goals: “the defense of the United States, the creation and maintenance of a structure of world peace in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the development of conditions in which peoples may freely establish the governments and institutions under which they live.” In identifying a “common interest” the statement read “[w]e share with those people the common interest that no single power shall again dominate Europe, destroying their national existence and threatening our own.” Serving as a primary devil’s advocate during the weekend, Chip Bohlen questioned the need for a clear definition of U.S. objectives, describing the potential consequences of issuing a policy statement given the complexity of a global war played out regionally. Nonetheless, Bohlen concluded that the final document was a “reaffirmation of a number of things that have been said [by the current administration]” and that the paragraph on Russia was “extremely well handled.” Rostow observed that from such a general statement, more concrete versions for specific regions/countries were necessary so that the “technicians” could deal with particular cases, addressing C. D. Jackson’s initial concerns on behalf of RFE.

Addressing the Imperative

Adopted during the July Republican national convention, the 1952 Republican platform charged the Truman administration as having, “in reality, no foreign policy. They swing erratically from timid appeasement to reckless bluster.” In contrast to the “negative, futile and immoral policy of ‘containment’,” Republicans promised to espouse policies reviving “the contagious, liberating influences which are inherent in freedom. They will inevitably set up strains and stresses within the captive world which will make the rulers impotent to continue in their monstrous ways and mark the beginning of their end.”⁵⁸ Overall, the party pledged a “compact and efficient” administration that would “reflect a dynamic initiative.”

On 22 August, just over a month after the Republican national convention, Abbott Washburn, now correspondence secretary for Eisenhower, provided the candidate with a summary of the Princeton conference along with a full transcript. Washburn highlighted the group’s “majority (although not unanimous) agreement” on the potential of political warfare. If the U.S. government could integrate functions within a national strategy, the U.S. could conduct political warfare and win World War III without fighting. Washburn explained:

...political warfare embraces diplomacy, intelligence, propaganda, economic negotiations, armament production, etc., and to be effective requires the integration of these functions according to an overall plan.... and that this integration has never been achieved by our government, although it is readily apparent in the Kremlin’s extremely effective use of political warfare (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 22 Aug 52).

Washburn also cited majority agreement that the policy of containment had “outlived its usefulness and should be replaced with a more dynamic and positive policy of ultimate liberation of the enslaved nations, in line with our fundamental American concept of man’s God-given right to individual freedoms” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 22 Aug 52). Notable was Washburn’s use of the modifier “ultimate.” This reflected the argument for identifying a *raison d’être* while not committing to near-term calls for “rollback.” Eisenhower accepted Washburn’s recommendations that he ask C. D. Jackson to develop a plan for integrating American political warfare. The general also approved using conference materials to develop upcoming campaign

⁵⁸ The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara catalogued Democratic and Republican Party platforms over time. The 1952 Republican Party platform: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25837>

speeches addressing national security and foreign policy. In an August letter written while staying at the Brown Palace Hotel in Denver, Colorado, Eisenhower extolled the Princeton group's conceptual efforts and asked C. D. Jackson to extend his activities into actual policy planning.

Dear C. D.: Since returning from the Convention, I have had an opportunity to review the extremely interesting material you forwarded on the Psychological Warfare Conference at Princeton. This seems to me to be of the utmost significance, and I hope to have the opportunity of discussing the subject personally with you before long. ... D.D.E.
P.S. Can I count on it that you people are now going to go ahead and develop an actual plan? (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 22 Aug 52)

In a September 5, 1952 letter to General Eisenhower, Jackson confirmed:

We are indeed counting on going ahead and developing an actual plan, our chief concern at the moment being a matter of timing and composition of the planning group, since I fear that the original Princeton group is far too large for getting down to real cases... you can be assured that the urge that brought about the original conference will not be allowed to die (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7).

As the election neared, Washburn, C. D. Jackson, NCFE's John Hughes, and Eisenhower's executive assistant Arthur Vandenberg (son of the late Michigan senator) met and agreed on putting together a small task force-like group to begin thinking of a plan. Eisenhower "expressed himself as favoring the development of an overall plan for United States political warfare, but cautioned... no publicity or an unrestricted discussion of this prior to November 4, as this would jeopardize the campaign and embarrass General Eisenhower" (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 9 Oct 52). Days after becoming president-elect Eisenhower again relayed his hope for "some outline of suggested procedure before December 1st" to explore psychological warfare in a completely informal and preliminary way (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7).

Political, Psychological, Informational: In Crafting the Mandate, what's in a Name?

Future Jackson Committee staff member Robert Tufts characterized the competition with the Soviet Union as "essentially a political and psychological one, aimed at the transformation of one system or the other" (in Lucas 1999, 88). This reflected a prevalent understanding of the

Cold War. Despite Jackson's declared preference for the term political warfare, when communicating with Eisenhower he used "psychological warfare." Likewise, Eisenhower employed psychological warfare both in private and public forums. During his 8 October campaign speech, Eisenhower promised to lead the nation to victory, proposing "[i]n the cold war we do not use an arsenal or arms and armaments. Rather, we use all means short of war to lead men to believe in the values that will preserve peace and freedom. The means we shall use to spread this truth are often called 'psychological'" (Stephen Benedict Papers, Box 4). Why employ "psychological warfare" within both classified and external communications? Why use "international information" in naming the committee? The context of domestic politics informs an interpretive answer, despite the continued fluidity of the overall concept and interchangeability of nomenclature.

While on the campaign trail, Eisenhower drew on the discourse of himself as a victorious leader and offered that under his continued leadership, all men would one day believe in values with which Americans identified (Medhurst 2000). As he attempted to rally and enlist the crowd that October day, he insisted the effort involved more than just official information such as the Voice of America. Eisenhower proposed a unified, comprehensive effort to "lead men to believe." As suggested in the introduction, Eisenhower purposefully attempted to fuse the meaning of psychological warfare with the Cold War. Had he employed "political warfare" instead of "psychological warfare," this could have evoked images of, and analogies to, domestic political "battles." As the Republican candidate focusing on foreign policy, Eisenhower not only faced Democratic opposition, but the prospect of overcoming internal Republican differences over foreign policy after a successful election. Although it had been over four years since the congressional debates over the Smith-Mundt Act, many prominent Republican lawmakers still voiced concerns over the potential for the political party in power to use international information activities to support particular *political* agendas, with some still not convinced of the need for a U.S. governmental role rather than relying strictly on the private sector.

Jackson answered Eisenhower's call with a November 26 memorandum entitled "Appraisal Survey of our Cold War Effort" in which he proposed putting together a committee to "make a comprehensive survey of: (a) What we have done in Psychological Warfare to date. (b) What we have been able to find out about Soviet Russia's cold war effort. (c) What our program

should be for the future” (Central Files, General File, Box 1185).⁵⁹ In a follow-on memorandum to Eisenhower, C.D. Jackson had refined the committee objectives to:

1. An analysis of all Psychological Warfare presently conducted by this country.
2. An appraisal of Russia’s cold war efforts.
3. Conclusions and recommendations as to how we should prosecute the cold war, assuming that Psychological Warfare is not a freak of one or more Departments of the entire Government, but a considered policy of the entire Government to win World War III without having to fight it (Ann Whitman File, Box 21, 17 Dec 52).

Emphasizing the need to analyze and appraise the situation in order to inform recommendations for America’s Cold War approach, the committee’s scope would broadly encompass “this country.” Two weeks later in correspondence with Walt Rostow, Jackson added fidelity to sub-categories, writing the committee would conduct a “real survey of what is being done now in political warfare and information by this country, in Government, in private organizations, and in para-Government or para-private organizations” (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 91, 31 Dec 52).

Likewise, the series of draft executive orders establishing the Jackson Committee reveal a similar focus on analyzing the totality of efforts beyond the U.S. government. The committee title evolved from “President’s Committee on Information *Services* of the *Federal Government*” to “President’s Committee on Information *Activities* of the *Federal Government*” to “Presidential Committee on *International Information Activities*” (PCIIA Records, Box 1). The final title broadened the scope in terms of actors, while limiting the scope to the types of activities to assuage domestic political concerns. As White House Press Secretary James Hagerty highlighted in press briefings, the Jackson Committee would not investigate domestic news distribution by the government, but instead would focus on *international* information activities. On 24 January 1953, President Eisenhower officially issued the directive guiding the President’s Committee on International Information Activities.⁶⁰ The committee was:

⁵⁹ According to Adolph A. Berle, C. D. Jackson was a bit brash in his own desires for a dynamic plan. Having had lunch with Jackson on 13 November 1952, Berle recorded in his diary that Jackson intended to “produce a “dynamic plan,” promised by General Eisenhower during his campaign designed to push the Russians back rather nearer to their original quarters” (Berle 1973, 613).

⁶⁰ Eisenhower’s advisors recommended the PCIIA be established by Executive Order rather than a “Presidential Letter [which] might attract either attention or investigation.” The PCIIA was Eisenhower’s first committee and first use of the President’s Emergency Fund; therefore, an Executive Order, for which there were models, was “the neater

to make a survey and evaluation of the international information policies and activities of the Executive Branch of the Government and of policies and activities related thereto with particular reference to the international relations and the national security of this country. It shall make recommendations to me for such legislative, administrative, or other action, respecting the said policies and activities as in its opinion may be desirable. ... It has long been my conviction that a unified and dynamic effort in this field is essential to the security of the United States and of the other peoples in the community of free nations.

The incoming administration did not wait for the official announcement to shape public perception of the Jackson Committee and its mandate. Weeks prior to the inauguration and official designation of the Jackson Committee, Washburn expressed to Eisenhower's executive assistant Governor Adams:

the successful administrations have been administrations which very early adopted constructive, forward-looking programs, then vigorously presented and interpreted those programs to the public. The program of the Eisenhower administration will unquestionably be constructive and progressive. The manner in which it is presented and interpreted to the public will be a tremendous factor in its ultimate success or failure (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 17 Dec 52).

On 12 and 13 January 1953, Eisenhower held his first pre-inaugural conference with all Cabinet designees and other key appointees at the Republican Campaign headquarters in New York City's Commodore Hotel. The agenda included a review of domestic and foreign problems and programs. The day prior, numerous newspapers received a phone call alerting them of Eisenhower's intent to name a "commission to review [Cold War] strategy and recommend methods for its improvement and coordination" (PCIIA Records, Box 14, 12 Jan 53, *Richmond (Va.) Times*). After the official announcement, 27 January 1953 headlines from New York to Chicago, Minneapolis to Denver highlighted the Jackson Committee's mandate to "Overhaul U.S. Strategy" (*Baltimore Sun*), "Unify Psychological Warfare" (*New York Times*), "Map Cold War Strategy" (*Washington Times-Herald*), and "Organize Cold War Strategy" (*Denver Post*) (PCIIA Records, Box 14). The U.S. public was informed the Eisenhower administration was

way" according to Robert D. H. Harvey, Special Assistant to the Deputy Director (Administration) of the CIA, in his 13 January 1953 Memorandum for the Record on "Special Presidential Committee to Investigate the Information Practices of the Federal government," (PCIIA Records, Box 1).

committed to a constructive, forward-looking approach to the Cold War with the assistance of an ad hoc advisory commission.

Selecting Jackson Committee Members, and Staff

In his proposal for an “Appraisal Survey of our Cold War Effort,” C. D. Jackson suggested the Committee be comprised of “informed, critical civilians,” including designees of the incoming Secretaries of State and Defense and the Mutual Security Administrator. To lead the effort he recommended William H. Jackson, a 51 year old managing partner of the New York investment firm J. H. Whitney and Company. W. H. Jackson was also the current CIA director and soon-to-be Under Secretary of State, General Walter Bedell Smith’s first choice (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 63). W. H. Jackson had wartime and postwar intelligence experience having served as the deputy chief of intelligence for General Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group in 1944 when he first met General Eisenhower. In 1949, he had been a member of the 1949 Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee that evaluated the CIA’s operational effectiveness, particularly intelligence coordination and the production of national intelligence estimates. He then served as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the year thereafter guiding implementation of that committee’s recommendations.

The 26 January 1953 White House press release for the President’s Committee on International Information Activities also identified Robert Cutler (58 years old), C. D. Jackson (50 years), Sigurd Larmon (62 years), Gordon Gray (44 years), Barklie “Buz” McKee Henry (50 years), and John C. Hughes (62 years) as committee members, with Abbott Washburn (38 years) acting as the Executive Secretary. Overall, the committee featured members predominantly from New York and New Jersey representing business, the publishing and advertising industries, and academia.⁶¹ All members but one had previous military experience in either intelligence or psychological warfare. Most had experience dealing with the media.

The driving force behind the Jackson Committee’s inception was C. D. Jackson who had advised Eisenhower throughout the campaign and served as “ringmaster of the speech writers at

⁶¹ Interestingly, W. H. Jackson recommended leaving domiciles off of the press release after realizing there were so many New Yorkers on the list (22 January 1953 Memo for Mr. Thomas E. Stephens from Robert Cutler discussing the announcement for Jim Hagerty, White House spokesman (White House Central files, Official File 1953-1961, Box 570)). Despite his concern, the press release included all hometowns which did invite some constituent suggestions for additional committee members to adequately represent the south. These suggestions went unheeded.

the Commodore Hotel” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 64, 11 Jul 66). Jackson had been with Time, Inc. since 1931 and was the current publisher of *Fortune* magazine. During World War II, C. D. served as General Robert McClure’s OWI Deputy within the Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF. Gordon Gray, president of the University of North Carolina, also had publishing credentials as the president of a company that operated a radio station and published both the *Winston-Salem Journal* and the *Twin Cities Sentinel*. Gray had also served in the U.S. government: first as an Assistant Secretary, and then Secretary, of the Army; as Special Assistant to President Truman; and, most recently, as the first director of President Truman’s Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) in 1951. As the PSB Director, Gray had favored a broader conceptualization of psychological operations as “a cover name to describe those activities of the U.S. in peace and war through which all elements of national power are systematically brought to bear on other nations for the attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives” (Lucas 1999, 132). As Gordon’s PSB Deputy, Robert Cutler also had advocated the PSB to be “more that of a command post than an information center,” an idea deemed unacceptable to the established U.S. governmental departments accustomed to operating relatively autonomously (Lucas 1999, 132). Cutler was currently President Eisenhower’s administrative assistant and soon-to-be named as the first National Security Advisor. He had also served as special assistant to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson during World War II. In the immediate post-war years, Cutler was president and director of the Old Colony Trust Company in Boston.

Three committee members had previous experience with the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. (NCFE, Inc.), the organization operating Radio Free Europe with covert Central Intelligence Agency funding. As mentioned earlier, C.D. Jackson had taken a year leave of absence from Time, Inc. in 1951 to serve as NCFE, Inc. president. The Jackson Committee’s executive secretary, Abbott Washburn, had been NCFE’s Director of Public Relations, while New York businessman John C. Hughes was on the NCFE, Inc. Board of Directors. All three participated in the psychological warfare conference in Princeton, as did W. H. Jackson. During World War II, both Hughes and Washburn had served in the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with Hughes serving as the OSS chief for the New York Branch. New Jersey businessman and author Barklie McKee Henry had ties to the CIA as a civilian consultant. The PCIIA press release listed Henry as a director or trustee of over six organizations including the New York Hospital and the Carnegie Institution of Washington,

in addition to being a member of the Advisory Council of the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs.⁶²

The only committee member without military experience, advertising executive Sigurd Larmon, had been with New York City-based Young and Rubican since 1929 and its president since 1942. Following the passage of the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act, Larmon had informally assisted the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, a commission mandated by Congress to independently review and appraise all programs and activities carried out under the authority of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act (Krugler 2000, 198). Larmon was also associated with the Rumford Press located in Concord, New Hampshire. The Director of the Mutual Security Agency, Harold Stassen (who just over a year earlier had served as chairman of NCFE's Crusade for Freedom), nominated Larson for a position on the Jackson Committee. In his confidential letter to General Eisenhower, Stassen wrote:

I presume that the other members of the committee will include men with direct experience in the CIA and OSS type of activity, and I have therefore selected an individual with unusual competence and experience in the analysis of the various emotions which move large masses of people to action and in the preparation of successful programs using multiple media for this purpose (C. D. Jackson Files, Box 63, 5 Dec 52).

General Motors executive Roger Kyes joined the committee in February 1953 after being named deputy secretary of defense and in this capacity was the only committee member directly responsible for any U.S. government operational activities. Spending just over a year in Washington D.C., Kyes gained a reputation for critiquing and curtailing the defense establishment's "unrealistic requirements, poor planning and inefficient execution" (Time 1971).

The committee was enabled by "five or six good staff men throughout its investigations" drawn from the CIA, State, Defense, and Mutual Security Agency (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 63). As the following chapters will elaborate, committee members met formally in Washington D. C. once a month. In between committee meetings, staff members worked full time collecting, cataloging, analyzing, and presenting information; interviewing and summarizing witnesses; and drafting the final report. Requested from the MSA where he served as a part-time consultant,

⁶² Cornell University later established the Barklie McKee Henry Professor and Chair of Psychiatry at its Weill Medical College which is affiliated with The New York Hospital.

Robert Blum was responsible for coordinating and supervising staff work, including the committee report. Having taught international relations at Yale University prior to the war, Blum joined the OSS during the war and then served as an assistant to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. Blum later led the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) Marshall Plan efforts in Indochina before becoming the Assistant Deputy for Economic Affairs, Office of the Special Representative in Europe at Paris in late 1951.

The Department of Defense provided A. Atley Peterson and Townsend Hoopes whom Secretary Charles Brown personally recommended. Hoopes had previous experience as Assistant to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and then assistant to three previous Secretaries of Defense from 1948-1953. Mentioned previously was Robert Tufts who served in the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff and had been instrumental and "present at the creation" of the Marshall Plan (Kindleberger 1987, 199). Tufts also participated in the drafting of NSC 68. Working with Tufts in the early days of the Marshall Plan was Franklin Lindsay. Lindsay joined the Jackson Committee staff from the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination with career highlights that included developing the CIA's emigre program in 1948 as well as putting together the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, the ostensibly private foundation that laid the groundwork for Radio Liberty which would begin broadcasting to the Soviet Union in the spring of 1953.

Wayne Jackson was also on loan from the CIA where he was special assistant to the Deputy for Central Intelligence (DCI) having been brought into the CIA by William H. Jackson in 1951. A graduate of Yale Law School, Wayne had shared an office with Bill Jackson while working for the Offices of Carter, Ledyard & Millburn. During the war, he served in the War Production Board and the Department of State (Montague 1971). Henry Loomis arrived from the staff of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), having previously served as a special assistant to the Director of the Research and Development Boards of the Secretary of Defense. A physicist by training, he also had practical and academic credentials having established and taught for the U.S. Pacific Fleet's RADAR operations and maintenance school during WWII. He then spent four years as assistant to the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the late 1940s. Additional staff members included: Francis Stevens (State Department), Ellis Phillips (no affiliation), Lewis C. Mattison (Office of Defense Mobilization), and Robert L. Lounsbury (CIA). The committee also hired a number of temporary civilian consultants. Editor and

publisher of the *Winston-Salem Journal and Sentinel*, Wallace Carroll spent over a month with the committee. During World War II, Carroll was the Deputy Director, Office of War Information Overseas Branch for Europe. Describing psychological warfare in the European theater during World War II, his 1948 *Persuade or Perish* argued Russian expansionism necessitated continuing U.S. psychological warfare. Other consultants included: MIT economist and political theorist Walt W. Rostow; Leon Volkov, a Soviet Russian colonel who defected soon after World War II; and, on loan from the Ford Foundation, former Harvard Law lecturer and Economic Recovery Administration volunteer, Milton Katz (PCIIA Records, Box 1).

As the committee prepared to convene, Walt Rostow asserted the Jackson Committee's unique potential to advance U.S. Cold War efforts. Writing to C. D. Jackson on 12 January 1953, Rostow urged a weighty sense of responsibility for the task ahead:

I sense that this is one of those times when a converging set of circumstances may make possible a real step forward... It would be naive [for the Jackson Committee] not to appreciate that rare, if not unique, possibilities exist, and it would be wicked not to do whatever was possible to make the most of them (PCIIA Records, Box 2).

While Rostow did not identify the specific converging set of circumstances to which he referred, these would have been elements within the broader socio-political context and conditions of possibility addressed throughout this work. The brief historiography highlighted the disjointed ensemble of psychological warfare activities during the Truman administration. The existence of a disjointed ensemble indicates a baseline of support within the U.S. government for such activities, notwithstanding any lack of guiding leadership. Symbolizing effective leadership, action and victory, Eisenhower worked to recast and elevate psychological warfare on the campaign trail (McBundy 1952; Medhurst 2000, 469). His 8 October speech was an extension of the Princeton group's discursive activities that created an informal discourse coalition around the storyline of political warfare and its importance to national security within the context of the Cold War. Eisenhower won the election with 55% of the popular vote. The converging set of circumstances therefore included new political leadership and conceptual momentum.

And so the Jackson Committee began with its first meeting on 30 January 1953. The next chapter examines its discursive activities and the argumentative games played as the members

and staff came together to interpret Eisenhower's mandate and ascertain whether it was possible to fulfill C. D. Jackson's parting guidance to the Princeton group seven months ago:

...we are trying to win World War III without having to fight it. It is going to be the neatest trick of the week if we can pull it off. I hope that you will agree that in pulling it off, political warfare, or whatever you want to call it--which deals with the minds of men everywhere (the only thing we can get at in many places)--may be the way in which we can pull off the neatest trick of the century.

Jackson's appealing goal perhaps sounded fanciful. However, as the following narration reveals, the Jackson Committee developed a nuanced definition of victory focusing primarily on the free world. The U.S. could consider itself as winning if its activities contributed to its long-term progressive vision of history, while avoiding general war with the Soviet Union.

Chapter Four: Interpreting the Presidential Mandate

“As politicians know only too well but social scientists too often forget, public policy is made of language. Whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process.” -- Giandomenico Majone, 1989

The President’s directive provided the Jackson Committee wide latitude in determining how to interpret its mandate and where to focus its efforts. As explained in chapter one, problem solutions depend on the discursive and interpretive practices of problem representation (Fischer and Forester 1993, 6; Sylvan and Voss 1998). During the committee’s 30 January 1953 opening session, Bill Jackson framed their mandate in terms of providing a “new look at the cold war effort” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7). This chapter’s analytic narrative focuses on committee discursive activities involved in interpreting its mandate, specifically framing the problem, establishing initial categorical boundaries for subordinate problems, and prioritizing sub-problems.⁶³ Boundaries and priorities guided committee practices of detecting and categorizing gaps between the conceptualized Cold War situation and preferred state of affairs.

Representing the ill-structured problem and specifying solutions proved to be a circuitous process. Nearly mid-way through the committee’s tenure, C. D. Jackson scolded, “I am afraid that we have all fallen in love with the sound of our own voices (including myself) to such an extent that we have forgotten why we are here in the first place” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 31 Mar 53). C. D. reminded Bill Jackson their mandate was based upon President Eisenhower’s assumption that the current Cold War effort was “poor, disorganized, diffuse, ineffective, and not what he wanted.” The committee was not “assembled to tell him that he was wrong ... [or] right.” Rather, Eisenhower had charged the committee with recommending a new way of engaging in the Cold War-- “how it should be done” (emphasis in original). He continued:

I fully appreciate that your judicial mind will prompt you to reply that what I am suggesting comes under the heading of carrying out orders rather than conducting an impartial investigation and coming up with independent, objective recommendations. If that is your reply, my rebuttal then has got to be, “What are we producing this report for--the archives? Or the President of the United States,

⁶³ All quotations from the first committee meeting are drawn from executive secretary Abbott Washburn’s handwritten notes (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 30 Jan 53).

in whose service we are presumably working? (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 31 Mar 53).

This exchange reveals the complexities and contingency within problem representation processes even within an independent ad hoc advisory committee comprised of members “likely to favor the direction of presidential policy” (Wolanin 1975, 75). Two months into their discursive endeavors, committee members and staff continued to wrestle with what “a new way of engaging in the “cold war” could and should entail.

Socio-Political and Institutional Contexts

Committee discursive practices took place within broader socio-political and specific institutional contexts and practices including committee roles, routines, and norms that guided Jackson Committee mechanics. In a draft history of American psychological warfare Edward Lilly assessed:

The establishment of the Presidential Committee on International Information Activities should be viewed in the context of Eisenhower’s, the Republican Party’s, and the average American’s feeling during late 1952: that national policy was inadequately developed and, more particularly, that its implementation was being efficiently and bureaucratically mis-executed to America’s disadvantage (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 64, 11 Jul 66).⁶⁴

Having campaigned on an overall platform highlighting Korea, Communism, and corruption, Eisenhower won decisively with 55% of the popular vote and 442 electoral college votes to Adlai Stevenson’s 89, becoming the first Republican administration in twenty years. “We have grown in power and responsibility,” Eisenhower declared during his inauguration speech. He promised to lead with “confidence and conviction” to “produce unity” and “defend freedom” and peace for all of mankind.

On 24 January 1953 President Eisenhower also established the Presidential Advisory Committee on Government Organization chaired by Nelson A. Rockefeller. The Rockefeller Committee was charged with strengthening executive authority and clarifying and simplifying

⁶⁴ Dr. Edward Lilly began his draft history while working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the mid-to-late 1940s. His professional experiences placed him within the various institutions practicing psychological warfare during World War II and the Cold War, including Truman’s Psychological Strategy Board (PSB). In July 1966, Lilly asked Abbott Washburn to review his draft chapter on the Jackson Committee.

Executive Branch organization in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Its mandate supported the Republican Party platform pledge of constructing a “compact and efficient” government. The Rockefeller Committee also examined structures supporting U.S. information programs and in late April 1953 recommended the creation of a separate agency for information while retaining cultural and exchange programs within the Department of State.

The 83rd Congress convened in January 1953 with slim Republican majorities in both the House and the Senate. With a three seat advantage in the House and a one seat advantage in the Senate, Republicans controlled the Executive and Legislative branches for the first time since 1930. The Republican Party enjoyed party consensus on balancing the budget and reducing governmental interference in domestic social and economic life (exemplified by New Deal programs). In a letter to Bill Jackson on 5 February 1953, Senator Charles Kersten (R-Wis) encouraged productive cooperation and collaboration between the branches.

Past experience has indicated that such parallel action by Executive and Legislative branches saves much time and reduces unnecessary conflict and debate. Failure to act in such parallel fashion in time past has resulted in the loss of much needed legislation recommended by the Executive department. The urgency of the international situation would seem to call for the full scale collaboration of both departments... in the framing of a new and dynamic policy (PCIIA Records, Box 6).⁶⁵

However, Eisenhower faced the need to mute, circumvent, or gain the support of the “reactionaries” and “isolationists” within his own party in order to consolidate what George McBundy called a “revolution” in American foreign policy begun twelve years ago (McBundy 1952).

The Jackson Committee indeed reached out to key congressional leaders of both chambers and parties, including the moderate and conservative wings of the Republican party. In

⁶⁵ Kersten had introduced Concurrent Resolution 21 to establish a joint committee on Extraordinary Methods of Protecting the National Security. Focusing primarily on psychological methods, propaganda, escapees, and resistance, this committee would have overlapped with the Jackson Committee’s scope. On 24 January, Robert Cutler, Bill Jackson, C. D. Jackson, and Abbott Washburn invited Senator Kersten to lunch. In a 27 January memorandum to the President, Cutler described the meeting as “a very friendly and helpful talk.” Kersten indicated his willingness to defer his resolution and allow the Jackson Committee to do its work before any Congressional intervention (PCIIA Records, Box 1). A staunch supporter for liberation efforts, Senator Kersten also had sponsored the 1951 Kersten Amendment directing Congress to appropriate \$100 million annually to “support resistance behind the Iron Curtain.” During the Princeton Conference and Jackson Committee deliberations, the Kersten Amendment itself was debated as to its role in furthering national objectives within the established Containment policy.

particular, the committee met with the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs, informally known in 1953 as the Hickenlooper Committee, whose tenure overlapped with the Jackson Committee. Extended by the Senate, the Hickenlooper Committee continued its examination of all aspects of U.S. overseas information programs after having issued a report on 31 January 1953 criticizing the “centrally-directed world-wide [information] program” as “cumbersome” (CQ Almanac 1954). The Subcommittee assisted the Jackson Committee by sharing testimony from over 45 witnesses, internal staff studies, and its final May 1953 recommendations.⁶⁶ The Jackson and Hickenlooper Committees positioned each other as an informal ally, especially given the charged atmosphere and political theater of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis) and the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee. C. D. Jackson described Hickenlooper as belonging “to that all too rare school that says the information activities of the U.S. Government have not been really any good since the end of the war... However, the solution is not to kill information activities, but to set up some good ones” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 19 Feb 53). In mid-April, Abbott Washburn relayed the Hickenlooper Committee’s anxiousness “for a meeting of the minds between the Hickenlooper Committee [and] the Jackson Committee...[because] If we all recommend different things, the McCarthy elements on the Hill will move in a destructive way with some half-baked programs” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 16 Apr 53).

Political opposition was not limited to the McCarthy elements. Abbott Washburn assessed that even the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Representative John Taber (R-NY) “and a substantial number of other characters hereabouts are secretly convinced that we would get along just about as well or better without any information program or P-Factor effort” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 29 May 53). The International Information Administration administrator, Robert Livingston Johnson, also expressed his conviction of a “wider conspiracy within the Republican Party to sabotage the information program” (in Cull 2008, 86). The conservative wing of the Republican Party enjoyed popular support from the McCormick papers,

⁶⁶ The Hickenlooper Committee Resolution recommended the Administrator of the Information and Educational Programs be elevated and given greater authority and responsibility. Contrasting the Rockefeller Committee recommendation, it did not recommend separating the information program from State, but acknowledged that if that was the President’s decision, then the educational exchange programs should remain in Department of State. Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR) chaired the subcommittee in 1952 with Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA) as a member. Both had been members of the 1947 congressional delegation to Europe that upon return was instrumental in the passage of the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act. Hickenlooper became subcommittee chair in 1953.

including the *Chicago Tribune* and *New York Daily Mirror*. A conservative Republican himself, Robert R. McCormick used his news outlets to campaign against any perceived increases in federal power. In the 1930s and 1940s, he attacked the New Deal and promoted anti-communism. In the early 1950s, he attacked U.S. information activities. Abbott Washburn forwarded a 5 February 1953 *N.Y. Daily Mirror* editorial entitled “Who needs Propaganda?” to all committee members. Washburn urged “part of McCormick papers’ deliberate policy to kill VOA. Will fall on many ignorant willing ears, and must be fought” (PCIIA Records, Box 13).

With the approval of the Bureau of Budget, the Jackson Committee leased a 3 ½ story converted townhouse located at 901 16th Street NW on the corner of 16th and I Streets, just two blocks north of the White House across Lafayette Park.⁶⁷ The building provided space for a first floor guard post and reception area. Individual office spaces and a conference room were on the floors above. Given the classified nature of the committee’s work, a CIA-supervised guard was posted 24 hours a day at the entrance (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 10 Apr 53).⁶⁸ Before monthly full committee conferences, the second floor conference room also was “given a special electronic security check by a qualified technician” to ensure no listening devices were recording or transmitting committee deliberations. A designated security officer also watched over the document security of available Restricted, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret documents. Committee members and staff were reminded to exercise extreme caution in physically handling and storing classified information as well as verbally discussing any classified materials. In a memorandum to the staff, the Top Secret control officer, Frank Cook, even cautioned that “[s]ome of the committee members you may work for might have a rather vague idea of security. Might be well to keep an eye on what they are doing with papers and scraps” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, undated). Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, voiced concerns about the Jackson Committee’s security procedures given “a number of your employees did not receive a security check or security training” (PCIIA Records,

⁶⁷ The building was leased from the Charles H. Tompkins Company, a construction firm that built the U.S. Courthouse, the West and East wings of the White House, the Lincoln Memorial reflecting pool, and later remodeled President Eisenhower’s farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The original building no longer stands.

⁶⁸ A Security Indoctrination Program established on 28 January 1953 specified initial standard operating procedures for both physical and personnel security. After briefings on appropriate security practices and regulations, all members and staff received badges to present to the on-duty guard when entering and departing the building. Guards also directed visitors to the immediate reception area where secretaries logged in their information. Visitors were required to be escorted by badged personnel at all times. All security-related details are derived from PCIIA Records, Box 1, 10 Apr 53, PCIIA Security Status Report.

Box 2, 17 Mar 53). Also hailing from Minnesota and having known Humphrey before the war, Abbott Washburn met personally with Humphrey to reassure him. Afterwards Washburn told Bill Jackson to consider Humphrey an ally because he had “a broad concept of political warfare as a lot more than information and propaganda” (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 7 Apr 53).

The committee agreed to meet formally in Washington D. C. the final five consecutive working days of each month. Committee conferences included interviews with key witnesses, staff presentations, and time for committee deliberations. In between conferences, staff and committee members conducted individual or small-group interviews at various locations in Washington D.C. and New York, and read correspondence. The pre-inaugural Cabinet meeting press leak highlighting the Jackson Committee had solicited public input of ideas, proposals and concerns, representing a practice that supported Eisenhower’s call for an engaged public and the creation of “responsible citizens” (Broeckling et al 2011, 13). Overall, the committee received over 270 letters, reports, and proposals by mail. By far, unaffiliated individuals (U.S. citizens and individuals living abroad) submitted the most suggestions. The committee also received advice and offers for assistance from academics, the publishing industry, Public Relations experts and advertisers, press and news industry personnel, motion picture and television executives, and numerous religious, civic, and expatriate groups. Committee members and staff also held over 217 interview sessions with over 250 individuals and groups (PCIIA Records, Box 11).

Nearly all of the almost 500 submissions and engagements involving over 700 individuals were recorded on formal summary sheets. A secretary compiled weekly, providing to all members and staff to “help all of us keep straight on who has seen whom and what has been proposed” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 17 Feb 53). Washburn reiterated this guidance again in April, asking personnel to submit a synopsis even “if there is nothing special to report” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 10 Apr 53). After the first month, Bill Jackson verbalized a need to reduce the number of witnesses while maintaining a “minimum sampling [across topics and regions] for our own protection” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53). Roger Kyes also asked the staff to act as “digesting task forces” to lighten the reading requirements of committee members and allow them time to think (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 25 Feb 53). Kyes’ request reveals the staff’s integral role in collecting, analyzing, and presenting information drawn from outside sources and U.S. governmental departments and agencies. Executive Secretary Washburn

specified the norm that staff would act as “presenters”, not “defendants” of information and analyses (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53).

A Pragmatic Approach toward a “new, unified, and dynamic” Effort

During the first committee conference, Bill Jackson cautioned the group of the need to “walk slowly through the factual case first.” He emphasized analytic precision between acquiring facts regarding the current state of affairs before diagnosing causes and consequences of gaps to inform committee critiques and recommendations. He stressed that the committee “must hear people,” many of whom have had “no place to spill their guts.” The committee would “provide the machinery to listen. [It’s] good for our own public relations [and there] will be a nugget or two somewhere” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 30 Jan 53). Jackson also solicited ideas for interviews across a range of categories, a request he also posed to the staff the next day.⁶⁹

Bill Jackson discursively endeavored to position the committee as a pragmatic body. This influenced the committee’s overall approach. During their first meeting Jackson described the committee’s work in terms of what it was not. The committee was “not an operating, intelligence, or study committee.” He wanted the committee to provide practical and realistic strategic recommendations drawing on available intelligence, information, and insights into current U.S. and Soviet policies and activities. The emphasis on practicality and realism also shaped the witness list. Academics and professional organizations across a host of fields urged the committee to take advantage of their expertise. In February, Henry Loomis advised the committee against becoming involved in research organizations and instead hire individual consultants as necessary (PCIIA Records, Box 3, 11 Feb 53). During his 25 February testimony, Hans Speier (Director, Social Science Division, RAND) even warned the committee “not to trust the social scientists so much” even though “we know so little about the business of reaching the hearts and minds of men” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7). According to Barklie Henry, “our problem of “contacting intellectuals and academic people” could be solved by heeding Carnegie

⁶⁹ A “Tentative List of Witnesses and/or Interviewees” identified the following categories: Former Directors/Leaders of Organizations related to Psychological Warfare; Current U.S. Government departments/agencies including DoS, DoD, PSB, CIA, MSA; Economic Warfare experts within government and MIT (CENIS); Technical Problems of Broadcasting; Press and Radio/Television; Public Opinion including polling experts; Senate and Congress; Committee for Free Asia; NCFE and RFE; Industry and Advertising; and others including religious and labor leaders (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated). A later list included the categories of Russian experts, Women, and Important Names (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 7 May 53).

Corporation advice. On 13 April 1953, James Perkins and Pendleton Herring of the Carnegie Corporation of New York recommended the committee seek academic assistance only after the NSC approval of basic guidance (committee recommendations). Their rationale was that academics generally conduct *constructive* research only with a specified purpose (PCIIA Records, Box 8).

Committee members confirmed their practical intentions to address specific elements of the problem while avoiding “any exaggeration of withholding or revealing.” This intent carried through to the committee’s final recommendations. C. D. Jackson also reinforced the pragmatic necessity of offering tangible and practical solutions to specific pressing Cold War problems as a way to gain and maintain bureaucratic support for political warfare. In a 6 March 1953 letter to the President, Abbott Washburn relayed his confidence that “the end product will be useful” (White House Central Files, Official File 1953-1961, Box 570). Eisenhower encouraged this pragmatism telling Bill Jackson he wanted a secret report, not an essay (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 8 Apr 53).⁷⁰ Eisenhower also wrote to C. D. Jackson: “I need to enunciate an overall program that will comprehend the various and detailed activities that we undertake in the foreign field--and the same for the domestic field” (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 50, 20 Mar 53).

The modifiers “new, unified, and dynamic” productively influenced the committee’s interpretative activities. To develop recommendations for a “new” effort, the committee worked to understand the current state of affairs, specifically international relations and the relationship to U.S. national security, as specified in the President’s directive. The committee prioritized conceptualizing the Cold War by examining Soviet goals and objectives, capabilities, policies, and activities (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 6 May 53). The assumption that a totalitarian Soviet Union bore responsibility for the Cold War geopolitical situation informed committee argumentation over an imperative for a long-term U.S. approach. Discursive activities also initially focused on international information activities and those “related thereto” with debates over the categorical boundaries of the “policies and activities... related thereto.” Committee members initially emphasized ways and means, including a new mental paradigm. However, the

⁷⁰ In February as the committee debated the format of their recommendations, Robert Cutler declared “anything over 100 pages is too long... a great big long thing won’t formulate policy” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53). The final report was 106 pages.

staff argued the necessity of identifying “new” realistic U.S. expectations and policy objectives predicated on an understanding of the current state of international relations.

The committee interpreted planning, coordination, and organization as the cornerstones for an “unified” effort. With a particular, the committee sought to improve Washington D.C.-based interagency planning and coordination of ways using available means. The committee also debated the relationship of the “psychological” element to traditional instruments of diplomacy, economics, and the military. Finally, the committee interpreted “dynamic” as necessitating an ability to productively execute plans and make and measure progress toward stated Cold War objectives. As the analytical narrative over the next four chapters will illuminate, a self-imposed restraint to remain within Cold War boundaries reinforced the prioritization of “psychological” ends involving “the minds and wills of humanity” both at home and abroad (Stephen Benedict Papers, Box 4, 8 Oct 52).

Framing the Problem: Continuing Name Games

Problem framing is meaningful because it guides the selection, organization, and interpretation of material. Bill Jackson initially framed the problem in terms of “a new look at the cold war effort.” Through this framing and subsequent problem representation prioritization, Jackson reinforced a focus on institutional structures and organizational arrangements capable of enabling a “new, unified, and dynamic” way forward. President Eisenhower had directed to the committee to survey and evaluate “international information policies and activities... with particular reference to the international relations and national security of this country.” “International information policies and activities” specifically called out those U.S. activities popularly understood as psychological warfare. “International relations and national security” directed a focus to the implications of international interactions on the sanctity of the American way of life, given the emerging understanding of national security as incorporating physical defense with a concern for social, economic, and political well-being. Conceptualizing the Cold War itself became a necessary, supporting discursive venture.

Committee argumentative games reveal discursive challenges throughout the spring as staff worked to clarify the meaning of Bill Jackson’s framing. Although Bill Jackson framed the problem in terms of a “a new [U.S.] cold war effort” during the first committee conference, he and other committee members continued to use the rhetorical commonplaces of “Cold War,”

“psychological warfare” and “political warfare” interchangeably. This broader usage traced to the May 1952 Princeton conference argumentative games. At the 1952 conference, participants attempted to recast the concept of psychological warfare as political warfare as well as the Cold War, thus explicitly broadening the meaning to all “activities in which a government engages for the attainment of its objectives without unleashing armed warfare” as stated by Lewis Galantieri, head of RFE’s Propaganda Policy (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 83, 10 May 52). Eisenhower’s October 8th campaign speech was a rhetorical output of these discursive efforts:

Many people think “psychological warfare” means *just* the use of propaganda... but propaganda is not the most important part in this struggle... What would such a peace-time or “cold war” national strategy mean? ... It means that, in carrying out a national policy, every department and every agency of government that can make a useful contribution will bring its full strength to bear under a coordinated program (Stephen Benedict Papers, Box 4, emphasis added).⁷¹

In December 1952, author James Burnham also publicly advanced political warfare as “methods of struggle other than those of formal military warfare, insofar as these methods are guided by a strategic objective” (Burnham December 1952, 10).

In an interview for the 28 February 1953 edition of *Tide*, a trade magazine for advertising and public relations executives, William Jackson publicly confirmed his intent for the broader Cold War framing. He described how the Jackson Committee’s “outsized job is to study every possible aspect of the cold war. This means going far beyond the process of opinion molding” (PCIIA Records, Box 14, 28 Feb 52). Weeks later, he publicly reiterated that the “title of the Committee does not really describe its work which is to survey our conduct of the cold war in all its aspects” (PCIIA Records, Box 7, 11 Mar 53). Notwithstanding Eisenhower and Jackson’s public pronouncements, staff members wrestled with the meaning and boundaries of rhetorical commonplaces as frames for the committee’s problem. Committee member simultaneous use of the terms “psychological warfare” and “political warfare” to describe specific categories of activities contributed to the conceptual confusion. As noted in the genealogy, current U.S.

⁷¹ In exchanges with Eisenhower leading to the creation of the Jackson Committee, C. D. Jackson continued this discursive effort to recast psychological warfare. He told Eisenhower that he assumed “that Psychological Warfare is not a freak of one or more Departments of the entire Government, but a considered policy of the entire Government to win World War III without having to fight it” (Ann Whitman File, Box 21, 17 Dec 52).

psychological warfare practices commonly were categorized as encompassing specific DoS/Voice of America and MSA overt, and CIA-covert, international information activities.

In late February Townsend Hoopes cautioned that the “committee would be merely shadow-boxing if it were to address itself only to “psychological operations” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 27 Feb 53). Akin to Clausewitz’s analogy of war as a duel, Hoopes’ boxing metaphor conjured specific images and emotions. Boxing was a popular, hyper-masculine combat sport characterized by violent power punches and knockouts. To enter the ring half-heartedly risks defeat in the interactive hand-to-hand fight. To win, the boxer must be aware, and take advantage, of the entire ring. And, he must enter the ring with a strategy, having studied his opponent’s strengths, weaknesses, and range of potential moves. He must not waste time and energy against an illusory opponent. Every physical punch and move must be coordinated to contribute to a victory that visually symbolizes physical “destruction” of the opponent. A winning strategy productively draws on all of a boxer’s available resources. The boxing metaphor thus reinforced the implied imperative of framing the problem from a wider perspective. Robert Cutler reinforced Townsend’s boxing metaphor the next day as a means for visualizing the cause-and-effect of integrated activities that together carried a much bigger punch.

The United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in an active global competition involving more than information activities; therefore, the committee should frame the problem in terms of Cold War activities. Framing the problem as such would expand categorical boundaries, broaden the scope of inquiry, and possibly expand the range of possible solutions. Hoopes’ memorandum illustrates the “witcraft” involved in positioning the committee to address the broader “cold war effort” involving diplomacy, economics, and the military. Given Jackson’s understanding of the frame, Hoopes was “preaching to the choir.” However, the discourse reveals the continuing conceptual confusion affecting problem representation processes throughout the spring. Illustrating a lack of conceptual consensus even as the staff began drafting the final report, A. Atley Peterson revealed his continuing categorization of psychological warfare as specific information activities. In summarizing and assessing correspondence, Peterson told Abbott Washburn of a “prevalent concept that the war between the East and the West can be won essentially by psychological warfare. I believe that that is not enough; that our total pressures are important” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 9 Apr 53).

A week earlier staff member Ellis Phillips, Jr. lamented a lack of “real progress” due to “the failure of all in the field of semantics (the science of meanings). We were dealing with words we did not collectively understand, and as this lack of common understanding dawned on each of us, we... backed away from the problem in full retreat” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 30 Mar 53). In particular, Phillips cited the rhetorical commonplaces of “psychological warfare, cold war, national security, and strategy” as problematic. While Cold War rhetorical commonplaces provided common ground for discussions with various stakeholders, their vague and multifaceted nature complicated staff analytical efforts to establish specific guideposts for collecting and analyzing information. Even into the late spring Executive Secretary Abbott Washburn continued to pose the question, “is political warfare everything, or just a very special thing?” According to personnel assigned to the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), the answer was two-fold: “broad aspect: waging Cold War; narrow aspect: waging propaganda [aka psychological warfare]” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, undated). Yet even the line dividing the narrow from the broad aspects remained uncertain. Committee discursive frustrations were not unique. Dr. Edward Lilly of the PSB, who engaged with the committee on a number of occasions, was in the midst of drafting a history of “Psychological Operations, 1945-1951.” His draft history began by noting a

major stumbling block has been the lack of an accepted definition for these activities. “Propaganda” was the word employed during World War I. ... “psychological warfare” during World War II. ... Now in 1951, “Psychological operations” has been coined to embrace this field ... Psychological operations, since they involve political, military and economic aspects, invite inter-agency disagreement. Semantic arguments have tended to replace national planning (Edward P. Lilly Papers, 1928-1992, Box 58, 4 Feb 52).

While committee leaders framed the problem in terms of improving Cold War efforts, Bill Jackson acknowledged in the same February *Tide* interview that the “committee is fully aware of its octopus-like nature and broad scope” (PCIIA Records, Box 14, 28 Feb 53). In fact, Jackson cautioned the PCIIA staff to “not take on too much scope,” but to set practical limitations on what they could investigate. Committee problem representation processes not only set limits but also established priorities regarding “what areas of the total problem it can usefully attack, and what areas it would be prudent to leave alone” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 27 Feb 53).

Committee Discursive Practices: Establishing and Prioritizing Categorical Boundaries

The committee began its problem representation process on 30 January by breaking down the overall Cold War problem into manageable parts. They also worked to determine and prioritize the categorical boundaries of the subordinate parts. C. D. Jackson's November 1952 memorandum on the "U.S. Cold War effort" suggested that the Jackson Committee would break the problem into surveying and evaluating U.S. and Soviet Cold War activities and offering recommendations for a future U.S. program. During the committee's opening session on 30 January 1953, Bill Jackson delineated their "new look at the cold war effort" in terms of: "1) Enemy; 2) What U.S. has been doing (from the "innocent voice broadcasts to [the] meanest covert acts"); 3) Criticisms; 4) Reorganization; and 5) Recommendations."

Committee discourse subsequently focused on developing initial understandings of the categorical boundaries for these sub-problems. They also discussed how the committee would approach its analytical endeavors. Addressing the subordinate problem of U.S. efforts, Gordon Gray asked about the geographical boundaries of their inquiry. "How global are we?" because "we need a global footprint." C. D. Jackson argued the inclusion of domestic activities because "what happens here goes out." In addition to activities, Bill Jackson specified the need to examine U.S. capabilities including the "arsenal of unused cold war weapons" as well as allied capabilities and activities. While still rather vague, these boundaries nonetheless reflected a broader framing of the problem incorporating diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power rather than a constricted focus on international information activities alone.

Addressing the subordinate problem of "criticisms," Gray noted the necessity to assess the negative perceptions of Voice of America (VOA) effectiveness and address the gap involving U.S. credibility. C. D. levied accusations that "everybody has been operating against a non-existent backdrop of no U.S. policy." Additionally, he charged that since the Truman administration had never coordinated a "broad front" of government, the United States' approach had been piecemeal. Therefore, C. D. argued the committee's focus on political warfare should address and make recommendations for the "entire posture of the entire government at all times."

Thus, during their first meeting committee members established initial categorical boundaries to describe the prioritized problem of the U.S. effort: integration and coordination of planning and execution; current U.S. and allied activities; and active and latent capabilities of the U.S. at home and abroad. This guided information gathering and analysis. However, given the

“octopus-like nature” of the problem, the committee members continued to refine boundaries throughout the spring.

Fischer explains “group discursive practices can be conceptualized as practical processes of argumentation...[with] competing, sometimes contradictory, suggestions for how to make sense of reality” (Fischer 2003, 83). As the committee conceptualized the geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union, the members indirectly addressed the relationship between Cold War policy and strategy and U.S. foreign policy. Were these equivalent or hierarchical concepts and practices? Appropriated from military contingencies, the concept of “strategy” and its associated practices were relatively new within public policy making. The Jackson Committee also wrestled with the categories and conceptual relationships between national, foreign, and Cold War objectives throughout their tenure.⁷²

Bill and C.D. Jackson offered competing views of the relationship between U.S. Cold War strategy and foreign policy during the first committee conference. The slightly differing interpretations reflected the uncertain blurred line between peace and war in this new Cold War. In arguing for political warfare recommendations addressing the “entire posture of the entire government at all times” toward all countries, C. D. essentially subsumed U.S. foreign policy within Cold War strategy. As C. D. publicly repeated throughout the spring, the:

broad panorama of the struggle therefore included diplomatic and political maneuver, economic pressures, military pressures, moral and spiritual forces, industrial and defense production, atomic development information and propaganda programs, the work of the CIA, civilian defense, and a good deal more besides... (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, undated).

While agreeing with the broad panorama of the struggle, Bill Jackson told the committee that Cold War policy and psychological strategy must be tailored to, and go along with, foreign policy. He reiterated this with the staff in mid-March. Their problem involved “more than information, but less than the whole national security complex. We are NOT making foreign policy” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 18 Mar 53). Jackson’s categorization offered the possibility for the U.S. to conduct some international relations outside of Cold War boundaries. Professor and former Ambassador Adolph Berle later contributed to a counter-argument. He

⁷² Abbott Washburn and Townsend Hoopes discussed these relationships as they considered organizational recommendations. The categorical boundaries would affect recommendations regarding organizational relationships, authorities, and responsibilities (PCIIA Records, Box 1, undated (March 1953)).

testified to the committee, “[t]here is a close relationship between political warfare and foreign political formulations... Cold war strategy involves the combination of foreign policy, military policy, economic policy, and information policy” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 26 Feb 53). In essence, Berle equated political warfare with Cold War strategy which guided foreign policies.

Meeting with the committee in March, Walter Lippmann argued “political warfare is the same as diplomacy.” He told the committee a story highlighting the Brits’ brilliant conduct of “top political warfare” during Yugoslav President Tito’s 19 March 53 visit to London. In Lippmann’s re-telling, newsreels of Tito bonding with the Queen were tempting to Czech officials and therefore the diplomatic engagement tied in with the Czech-Turkey-Yugoslav alliance. Lippmann specifically pointed out that British officials never specifically mentioned “political warfare” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53). Through his storytelling Lippmann insinuated that the U.S. preoccupation with political warfare was sophomoric compared to the Brit’s real-world expertise. Lippmann’s argument belied the complexity of U.S. international “diplomatic” relations and undercut the complexity involved in fulfilling Eisenhower’s mandate for a “unified” effort. As Bill Jackson later pointed out to President Eisenhower, the structure of U.S. diplomatic representation abroad had evolved and expanded.

Times have changed since the days when almost every single employee serving overseas was in the State Department, except chiefs of mission appointed by the President. Today we have about 220,000 civilian employees of various government agencies serving overseas, in addition to about 800,000 serving in military capacities (Ann Whitman File, Box 21, 31 Dec 56).

Nonetheless, Lippmann’s critique flowed from his understanding of foreign policy, a concept in transition with popular figures including James Burnham and George McBundy publicly advocating for a “modern” understanding. These public arguments contributed to the broader socio-political construct in which the Jackson Committee was situated. In a *Foreign Affairs* article published weeks before the 1952 election, McBundy affirmed both presidential candidates’ ability to solidify the United States’ “revolutionary” foreign policy (McBundy 1952, 6). He positioned those who agreed with the imperatives underpinning this “revolution” as being

“wise and well-informed” about the current geopolitical situation compared to those uninformed individuals who remained mired in traditional practices.⁷³

This begs the question of how post-war foreign policy differed from historical practices. According to McBundy, U.S. foreign policy presently was guided by imperatives that “the United States must *act with friends and against enemies, for freedom and peace*” (McBundy 1952, 3, emphasis added). In historian Justin Hart’s words, the U.S. was now advancing a particular agenda (Hart 2013, 61-63). With the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. government had created institutional structures that bureaucratically enabled and physically supported the conduct of such a “revolutionary” foreign policy. Additionally, the U.S. now sought the common defense through mutual defense alliances and active leadership in international organizations.

Chiding the United States’ historical lack of purposeful international engagement, James Burnham implied the traditional mindset continued. “There has ordinarily been *no* foreign policy at all,” he claimed (Burnham 1952, 13, emphasis added). Scholars later described a traditional American “laissez-faire” approach to foreign policy with goals of general peace and stability with little reference to security (Ninkovich 1981; Hart 2013). In an essay provided to the committee entitled “Psychological Operations in the Conduct of Foreign Policy,” Walter Radius of the State Department provided a more measured assessment of the American historical foreign policy experience. “Before World War II, foreign affairs were a minor responsibility of government. There were two principal lines of activity: maintain friendly relations, and promote international trade--the latter primarily directed at the development of markets abroad for United States exports.” Providing for the “common defense” had centered on avoiding “entangling alliances,” and rejecting a large standing military force with overseas stationing (Dwight D. Eisenhower POTUS Records, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 61, 1952). Foreign policy practices had extended from popular understandings of American exceptionalism.

Lippmann offered a different critique, deploring the dearth of *adequate* foreign policy since the Monroe Doctrine. He argued that historic circumstance had buttressed the myth of

⁷³ McBundy highlighted the expertise within the pages of *Foreign Affairs* as contributing to the development of “modern” foreign policy. Its journal articles had chronicled this revolution “punctuated by issues in which, to put it very bluntly, the wise and well-informed have been mostly on one side, and the historic tradition of American on the other” (McBundy 1952, 11).

American exceptionalism. As a storyline, American exceptionalism positioned the U.S. such that Americans believed domestic power and resources alone secured the United States. The storyline obscured the informal alliance with Great Britain that earlier American leaders (Jefferson, Madison, Monroe) had cultivated to serve as a backbone of the Monroe Doctrine. Never learning of this informal alliance, Americans “were taught to believe that the immense obligation to protect the Western Hemisphere, and consequently almost any other obligation we chose to assume, could in the nature of things be validated by American forces alone” (Lippmann 1943, 22). The result was a perpetuating national failure to uphold the “self-evident common principle” of balancing ends with means (Lippmann 1943, 6). For Lippmann, the U.S. had gone beyond maintaining friendly relations and had in fact overextended its commitments. The Truman Doctrine was another manifestation in declaring it was the “policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”⁷⁴

Staff Discursive Practices: Refining and Prioritizing Categorical Boundaries

During the initial staff meeting on 31 January, staff members asked “what’s the purpose of this exercise? What is the focus of our interest?”⁷⁵ Harkening back to C. D. Jackson’s refrain, Bill Jackson answered “the defeat of the Soviets without a shooting war. The great disintegration” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7). He told the staff that the committee members had agreed on the need for clearer leadership and better coordination of Cold War efforts; therefore, the committee had a practical job of improving the current machinery of the disjointed ensemble. PCIIA staff were responsible for most of the information gathering, research, and analysis informing the recommendations for a new, unified and dynamic effort. Staff members thus began their argumentative games with calls to refine and prioritize categorical boundaries of problem definitions in order to identify gaps. A number of staff members outlined arguments for

⁷⁴ Hal Brands offers a critical analysis of what pundits have called the “golden age” of the Truman administration. Acknowledging Truman’s low approval ratings and how the “golden age...did not appear so golden at the time,” Brands nonetheless gives credit to the Truman administration for its initial efforts at crafting a grand strategy. “Yet it also bears remembering that Truman-era grand strategy was often a messy affair, and in some ways a deeply problematic one... The president and his advisors continually struggled to reconcile America’s expanding commitments with its finite capabilities...[and] sometimes found it difficult to maintain a sense of proportion...” (Brands 2014, 57).

⁷⁵ The first staff meeting on 31 January included A. Atley Peterson and Townsend Hoopes (DoD), Henry Loomis (PSB), Wayne Jackson (CIA), Robert Tufts (DoS), Francis Stevens, Franklin Lindsay (CIA), W. H. Jackson, and Abbott Washburn.

including and prioritizing an understanding of U.S. policy. Despite C. D. Jackson's accusations that the U.S. lacked policy, committee members initially did not address his argument or explicitly include policy within their problem boundaries. Staff members argued from a practical standpoint. In order to identify and evaluate the relevant current U.S. efforts, the committee should first *understand* what the United States was trying to accomplish. Staff members also argued a need to examine underlying assumptions and values, determine acceptable risk, and *reassess* Cold War policies.

Following Bill Jackson's call to "walk slowly through the factual case first," Townsend Hoopes provided a "straightforward gathering" of the "salient portions of NSC 20/1, 20/4, 68, 135/3 (which is the current reappraisal of 68), and 141 (which is a re-examination of the adequacy of programs within the framework of policy as set down in NSC 135/3)" (PCIIA Records, Box 6). In a 4 February memorandum, Hoopes summarized U.S. aims from the aforementioned policy documents in terms of two categories: general, long-term objectives and immediate policy purposes. Over the long-term the U.S. had two goals: to reduce the power and influence of the Soviet regime so it would no longer constitute a threat to peace and stability; and, to bring about a change in the current Soviet theory and practice of international relations. Supporting these long-term objectives, the U.S. sought to: develop positive appeals superior to communism; block Soviet expansion even at the risk of general war; and without the risk of general war, induce a retraction of Soviet control and foster seeds of destruction within the Soviet system so it at least modified its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards. This short-to-medium term goal involved promoting change ("the great disintegration") within geographic locations behind the Iron Curtain considered as part of the Soviet Union's vital interests. According to Townsend, this introduced the category of risk which should be included specifically in committee considerations.

On 6 February, Robert Tufts told fellow staffers that he assumed the committee would decide to address three overarching problems of U.S. organization, activities, and a governing psychological strategy (PCIIA Records, Box 11). As a member of the Policy Planning Staff, Tufts had played a key role in initial efforts to conceptualize "psychological strategy" (Lucas 1999, 88). In a draft PPS document dated 13 October 1950, Tufts wrote:

The conflict between the US and the USSR will continue until one or the other is defeated. Defeat may be brought about by the exploitation of a military victory or by peaceful means, but what is

on trial is the survival power of two systems. It follows that, although the conflict may be waged with the entire armory of weapons—political, psychological, economy, and military—at the disposition of the adversaries, the process is essentially a political and psychological one, aimed at the transformation of one system or the other.

Despite staff member Phillips' lament over a lack of accepted meaning for strategy, Tufts' conceptualization identified subordinate components of time, interests, threats to interests, goals, and resources. Tufts highlighted the temporal aspect of the situation including the identification and differentiation of ultimate objectives from interim goals geared toward the "transformation" of the other system. His use of "on trial" implies the necessity of defining and defending one's interests/way of life. Additionally, this metaphor conjures images of convincing the jury of public opinion of one's version of the truth. One must convince the jury to expend effort in ensuring "the survival power" of its own system. Tufts also specified the "armory of weapons" as encompassing all available measures. Three years later the committee deliberated each of these subordinate components.

Tufts conceded that the Jackson Committee could decide to restrict its efforts to the problems of organization and activities (the machinery enabling the use of "weapons"), as these were relatively straightforward. Envisioning how the problem of strategy presented "serious difficulties," Tufts nonetheless also advocated inclusion of strategy and policy within the problem boundaries. "I wonder if it [the President's directive] does not establish certain minimum requirements. One of these, it seems to me, is "to make ... (an) evaluation of the international information policies ... and of policies... related thereto... It shall make recommendations... for such... action respecting the said policies... as in its opinion may be desirable." Acknowledging the staff's job would be much simpler if the committee focused only on issues of organization, ways and means, Tufts voiced "I hope, nevertheless, that our job will not be simplified, for I believe that the committee can make an important contribution in the policy field--without intruding in any way on the proper jurisdiction of the NSC." He thus attempted to position the committee as an appropriate ad hoc forum to inform the new administration's policy making apparatus. Staff member Robert Lounsbury later reinforced Tufts' argument.

There seems to be a large measure of agreement that we lack an adequate national grand strategy and that something other than the

present policy is needed... merely tying together and unifying present activity under new policy direction with a restatement of goals will not meet the basic issue. The fundamental strategy of our approach must be analyzed and recast (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 18 Mar 53).

In a 4 February 1953 Top Secret document entitled “First Thoughts on the Problem,” Townsend Hoopes expanded his argument to include policy considerations. Not only should the committee understand U.S. policies, but “it seems clear that the committee must examine and come to judgments concerning ends if these recommendations are to be intelligent” (PCIIA Records, Box 11). Rendering judgment should involve considering the boundaries of legitimate expectation regarding policy aims for the Soviet Union and its satellites in the “cold” or “partial” war.” The staff continued to emphasize the need for a “determination of and agreement on national objectives” over the course of the committee’s tenure. In late March, Ellis Phillips Jr. argued in order for the committee to make recommendations regarding “propaganda” and “national psychological operations intended to affect morale abroad,” the committee required a collective understanding of national objectives (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 30 Mar 53). A number of correspondents also advocated the committee to identify long- and short-term goals. The president of the Foreign Policy Association, Brooks Emeny, closed his letter by noting that “one of our past weaknesses has been our emergency approach,” and that “we must realize that America will be in the thick of the fight for a long time to come” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 4 May 53). This line of argumentation reinforced staff discursive efforts to classify the Cold War as a *long-term* competition and thus differentiate temporal policy aims.

Hoopes argued that the committee must re-examine the broader state of activities affecting international relations which, he believed, had changed since many of the guiding policy documents were written. In particular, Hoopes cited a potentially false assumption of Western spiritual and material power superiority that underpinned NSC 68. NSC 68 asserted that from a position of strength, the U.S. could and would assume more risk in aggressively seeking policy goals against a Soviet Union positioned on the defensive. As Samuel Wells Jr. would later assess, based on such assumptions NSC 68 introduced a “new goal of changing the nature of the Soviet system through political pressure, backed by economic, psychological, propaganda and covert activities” (1979, 138-9). Leaving aside the difficulty in measuring spiritual power, Hoopes noted the committee should reassess the balance of material power. Both the U.S. and

the Soviet Union had advanced their atomic capabilities since 1950. This placed in question the notion of an U.S. offensive advantage upon which NSC 68 was predicated. In April and May discussions with committee members, J. Robert Oppenheimer confirmed Hoopes' conjecture declaring that each state was within five years of being able to destroy the other. While predicting the Soviets would wave the atomic bomb in the direction of Western Europe quite soon, Oppenheimer also noted the Soviet Union's limited, one-way capability for strikes against the United States. Oppenheimer linked these scientific presumptions to the committee's inquiry into psychological warfare. He reasoned that such revelations "would help to dispel the false European illusion that only they are exposed" and thus secure European support (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 2 May 53). However, Oppenheimer also stressed the necessity for differentiating "gross" from "net" capabilities in the Cold War competition. "Without a net capability estimate, you're planning in a complete fool's paradise" (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 8 Apr 53).⁷⁶ The committee members had committed themselves to avoiding "any exaggeration of withholding or revealing" in their own argumentation. Oppenheimer's exhortation also emphasized accurate assessments of relative capabilities as prerequisites for planning. Factual data may be "grim," but necessary to reduce panic associated with uncertainty (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 2 May 53). In the final report, the committee plainly stated "we recommend that the necessary measures be taken to provide net estimates of of political, economic and military capabilities" (Jackson Report 1953, 1799-1800).

Hoopes argued the committee must seriously consider whether Soviet atomic capabilities imposed inhibitions on U.S. efforts behind the Iron Curtain and judge whether a Soviet geographic retraction would in fact significantly reduce the threat posed to the free world. Given a mandate for a new, unified and dynamic effort to achieve policy goals, Hoopes called for the committee to "make its own determination at a fairly early stage in its inquiry as to what may be legitimately expected from an intensified and well-coordinated effort, and what lies beyond the bounds of either possibility or acceptable risk" (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 4 Feb 53). He argued

⁷⁶ Oppenheimer's discussion highlights some of the early analyses that would inform the future concept of "net assessment." Rather than simply identifying the Soviet Union's "gross" capabilities, Oppenheimer argued the Jackson Committee must compare these capabilities to the United States' for a net assessment of the competitive situation. However, Oppenheimer also stressed the importance of identifying specific parts of each whole in assessing the nuclear competition. While the Soviets may have had warheads, they did not have aircraft capable of reaching the U.S. "Net assessment [today] emphasizes that strategic interactions are shaped by the complex sprawling organizations that break big problems into manageable smaller ones... Departmentalization also created a need for integration... [and] those with a grasp of net assessment understood that nothing is automatic in big organizations" (Bracken 2006, 92). Oppenheimer's description of "net" capabilities informed Jackson Committee debates over institutional practices supporting coordination and integration of U.S. practices.

that describing acceptable risk might be “the major determinant” for committee recommendations regarding efforts within the Soviet orbit. The committee discussed the subject of risk during deliberations on the boundaries of the Cold War, a topic addressed below. Committee members also considered the atomic equation and the relationship of capabilities to risk (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53).

Tufts and Townsend were spurred by Wayne Jackson’s proposal that the committee’s discursive activities also address underlying assumptions and values informing policy objectives. Three days before the committee members first met, Wayne suggested that the committee address a number of questions that may “seem somewhat theoretical,” but “the answers to which give direction and form to our activities” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 27 Jan 53). He argued the committee should consider questions regarding the cohesive forces holding together societies and political-economic-social preconditions for Western political democracy; the United States’ stance on nationalism and colonialism; and the possibility of tolerable dictatorships. He contended the committee’s answers would reveal underlying sociological, political, and normative assumptions guiding policy goals and subsequent recommendations. Positioning the committee as a bridge capable of connecting expert studies to practical strategic advice, Wayne Jackson indirectly shaped the committee’s engagement with experts across government, civil society, and academia to inform its own ad hoc practices. Wayne Jackson wrote, “I doubt whether this type of problem is being adequately handled in the Government and it may well be that the basic thinking needed to make decisions cannot, as a practical matter, be done in Government.”

As the staff began laying out the framework for the final report, Hoopes again made a plea for the committee to exercise “independent judgement on a number of issues including... prospects for success... practical limits on expectations... risks... and stamina required” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 31 Mar 53). He and Robert Blum argued for Bill Jackson to consider the value to the President if “the considered opinion of well-informed private citizens whose views had been enlarged by temporary exposure to a number of official secrets” recognized a “gap between the official and popular assessments of the general situation.”

Chapter Five: Conceptualizing Them, Us, and the Meanings of “Cold War”

“The conflict between the US and the USSR will continue until one or the other is defeated...by the exploitation of a military victory or by peaceful means, but what is on trial is the survival power of two systems... the process is essentially a political and psychological one, aimed at the transformation of one system or the other.” --Robert Tufts, Department of State, 13 October 1950

Bill Jackson informed the staff of his intent to begin the final report with an overview of the nature of the Cold War (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 18 Mar 53). Robert Blum further delineated to the staff that the report would include “the Committee’s conclusions on the nature of the cold war, the approximate time period for which we must plan, the approximate intensity of the effort that is required, and the risks involved” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 1 Apr 53). Conceptualizing the Cold War proved to be an argumentative struggle for hegemony of a particular understanding of reality regarding both the Soviet threat and the United States. In May 1953, as Jackson Committee staff member Robert Tufts began drafting the report, he identified the committee’s deliberate choice of identifying conflicting objectives, capabilities, and policies of the Soviet system and the United States to assess the nature of the Cold War (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 6 May 53). To grasp the Cold War dynamic, committee discursive activities focused on understanding the Soviet Union and the ways the Soviets were competing against the U.S. in the free world. The committee also debated the “soul of the U.S.” and its relevance for U.S. actions during this geopolitical moment of “cold war” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53). Many witnesses and contributors instigated argumentative games regarding the very name “Cold War,” its boundaries, and its positioning effect on the United States.

It is again worth noting the conceptual confusion characterizing committee deliberations, often perpetuated by the members themselves, as individuals cast about for languages and practices appropriate for this experienced threat. The conceptual uncertainty began with the Soviet threat itself. Jackson Committee discursive activities centered on understanding Soviet goals, capabilities, and activities around the globe, including the role and appeal of Marxist ideology. Asking whether the Soviet goal of world domination should be understood in terms of “world communism or old-fashioned power domination,” the committee groped towards its own assessment (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, undated). Five years after U.S. policymakers

classified the Soviet Union as *the* threat to the U.S. and the world, experts offered a plethora of characterizations, each with differing implications for recommended U.S. approaches.

Bill Jackson's March guidance to the staff also contributed to conceptual confusion regarding the "cold war." Jackson specified a focus on "cold war" and explicitly rejected a focus on "information" or "political warfare." However, as an emerging multifaceted rhetorical commonplace, Jackson and others often employed political warfare to describe Soviet strategy driving the "cold war." A year earlier the Princeton gathering had characterized the Soviet approach of coordinated and integrated activities as "political warfare." Was this not part of the equation? The analytic narrative illustrates how the concepts of political warfare and strategy intertwined as the committee ultimately offered its assessment of the nature of the Cold War.

Soviet Russia: "Post-Renaissance" or Post-Westphalian Totalitarian State?

While the Cold War was mediated primarily through realms outside of traditional warfare, the U.S. continued to lead United Nations forces in the conventional fight against communist forces on the Korean peninsula (Stephanson 1996). In his 24 October "I will go to Korea" campaign speech, Eisenhower charged the U.S. was only involved in Korea because we "failed to read and outwit the totalitarian mind." In a letter to the committee, historian Peter Viereck chronicled American policymakers' historical failure at reading the "totalitarian mind." Viereck argued that this failure in the early and mid-1940s resulted in "the Soviet record as of 1952: 13 territories annexed and satellites controlled, 151,700 square miles, with a total population of 574,843,000 all conquered since 1939 by Communist imperialism" (Viereck 1953, 4). Emphasizing Soviet *control* over nearly ten percent of the earth's land mass and twenty percent of the world's population, Viereck and other contributors revealed the strategic panic experienced during this moment. Cartographic propaganda reinforced the panic often through colored representations of the vast geographic spaces, rather than the population densities, under Communist control. A year earlier political cartographer R. M. Chapin created a popular map entitled "Europe from Moscow" featured in the 10 March 1952 edition of *Time*. The title and non-traditional imagery powerfully highlighted a bright orange Soviet Union and Eastern Europe flowing into Western Europe, evoking fear over the sheer size, scope, and assumed power of the enemy (Mazzer 2014). As the committee reassessed stated U.S. policy objectives of reducing the power and influence of the Soviet regime and bringing about a change in its theory and practice

of international relations, the CIA presentation to the Jackson Committee reinforced the image of complete control

Soviet regime is securely entrenched in power, and there is no apparent prospect of its control being threatened or shaken... Soviet control over the Satellites is virtually complete... we estimate that no issue will develop into more than a nuisance or minor impediment to the Communist program unless breakdown of the Kremlin's controls occurred in a general war (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 18 Mar 53).

From Kennan's "X" article to Eisenhower's campaign speeches, the modifier "totalitarian" had become a powerful rhetorical commonplace within American Cold War discourse.⁷⁷ During a 5 June 1953 Cabinet meeting, Eisenhower "characterized the basic struggle as one between the totalitarian state which can force its subjects to provide security, as against the free state which must successfully convince its subjects in order to maintain that very freedom." "It is," he said, "the struggle of men to rule themselves" (White House Office, Office of Staff Secretary: Records, Cabinet Minute Series, Box 1). Deliberating within the discursive atmosphere of binary oppositions, the committee considered categorical boundaries for the Soviet totalitarian state. James Burnham critiqued the American proclivity for believing the Soviet Union was simply a "post-Renaissance" state characterized as "powerful, expansionist, dangerous, but nevertheless not differing in kind from the many other powerful national states of the past several centuries" (Burnham 1952, 44). Post-Renaissance and post-Westphalian characterizations served as conceptual boundaries within which the committee developed its interpretation of the geopolitical situation and subsequent recommendations.

⁷⁷ According to Hinds and Windt Jr., the concept of totalitarianism is central to understanding Cold War rhetoric. Popular sources including Walter Lippmann's 1936 *The Good Society* connected fascism and communism as the two faces of totalitarianism both categorized as dictatorial governments with similar goals of world domination although such regimes may employ different strategies and tactics (Hinds and Windt Jr. 1991, 51). The analogy to Hitler and the Nazi state limited political choices in the late 1940s as key political spectacles including Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, Kennan's "X" article, the Marshall Plan, and the Truman Doctrine emphasized the ideological threat from the totalitarian Soviet Union. According to the authors, those who "sought more conciliatory policies to reach practical arrangements with the Soviet Union ran into a brick wall of preconceptions and linguistic obstacles..." (1991, 51). If this logic that precluded conciliatory policies with the totalitarian Soviet Union also extended to other dictatorships, this could explain why PCIIA staffer Wayne Jackson asked the committee to consider the theoretical possibility of any tolerable dictatorships. In other words, could the free world also include dictatorships? Or were the categories of dictatorships and totalitarian states collapsing such that all dictatorships were part of the geopolitical problem?

One of the committee's first witnesses, Charles "Chip" Bohlen positioned himself as one of the few Russian specialists, adding that his perspective was "held by most people who had specialized in Russian work." In framing the Soviet Union as a totalitarian state with "rulers [who] would never feel safe so long as there is a great power in the world which is outside their *control*," Bohlen argued:

To explain their motivation in terms of world revolution... is to over-simplify their problem. The Soviet rulers are preoccupied with the maintenance of their power in Russia... The key to an understanding of Soviet policy does not lie in doctrinaire writings but in the harsh requirements for the maintenance of totalitarian power (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 24 Feb 53).

Bohlen began his 24 February testimony reaffirming his stature by contending that "the Committee was undoubtedly familiar with the origins of the Communist system in Russia and with the Role of the Bolshevik Party." He retold the Soviet story of November 1917 through the nearly four decades to the present day. As a totalitarian state, Soviet Russia required an external enemy to justify its domestic power distribution. Anything beyond the regime's control posed a threat. Therefore, Russia would be aggressive and expansionist when it saw an opportunity. From Bohlen's perspective, Soviet policy in action revealed power grabs, not ideological motivation. For over thirty years the Soviets had followed the same pattern; therefore, the committee should think of the current geopolitical situation as "the natural habitat of the Soviet Union," rather than a crisis. Korea was a Soviet miscalculation and the Soviets would not risk general war by placing their own troops on the peninsula (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 24 Feb 53). Robert Cutler commented that Bohlen had "outlined a rather comfortable philosophy... preservation of the home base takes priority over the desire to expand... the Soviet Union will protect the satellites. However, there is not a greater master plan to destroy the United States and achieve world domination" (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 24 Feb 53). The committee revisited the assumption of Soviet leaders prioritizing protection of their home base over destroying the United States many times, including after Stalin's death in March 1953.

In his testimony to the Jackson Committee, Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan also returned to history. Evoking "October 1939" as an apt analogy for the present day, he described how in 1939 the United States stood on the sidelines while the Soviet Union acted as an opportunistic "vulture" as Western Europe tore itself apart. Kennan argued that the Soviet

Union sought the “restoration of October 1939” through the exploitation of French fears of a united Germany (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 24 Feb 53). The expansionist Soviet regime coveted Germany and Japan for their industrial and military power potentials, yet was cautious and calculated. The Soviet Union sought specific strategic centers that would provide materials to enhance its own power. Like Bohlen, Kennan emphasized Soviet motivation to preserve its base of power. In also arguing the Soviet Union to be a totalitarian state focused on solidifying internal power and control, Kennan implicitly stressed that the committee consider Soviet intentions, not simply capabilities. Soviet material capabilities primarily enabled domination within the Soviet system. While the Soviet regime would risk war to stop rollbacks in its satellites, Soviet leaders only reluctantly would risk general war with the U.S.

Bohlen and Kennan argued Marxist ideology was a “fig leaf,” a rationalization, for the totalitarian-dictatorial distribution of power. Isaac Don Levine, editor of *Plain Talk*, also repeatedly argued “Lenin invented nothing... he did not change the inner character of the state... His spiritual weapons were not new. They were as ancient as human society, namely violence, benevolent despotism” (Methvin 1995).⁷⁸ The committee met with Levine in late April to discuss his 23 March 1953 *Life* article entitled “How to Make Soviet Troops Desert.”

Nonetheless, none of the witnesses discounted the allure of this “false” ideology to those downtrodden. Marxist “ideology is the honey which catches flies abroad” declared Bohlen (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 24 Feb 53). Like honey, Marxist ideology lured individuals with promises of something sweeter. And this was evident across Europe with George Gallup describing the “absolutely solid propaganda” within the more than 100 Communist newspapers having circulations of over thirty million (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 1 Feb 53). General Donovan concurred that continuous Russian propaganda efforts were destroying the will to resist Soviet interpretations and thus retarding the West (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Feb 53). Soviet propaganda also had manipulated European labor unions into tools for establishing strong communist parties. Although committee discussions centered on explaining the Soviet Union, the Russian experts prescribed improving economic, social, and political conditions in Europe

⁷⁸ After emigrating to the U.S. at the age of 19, Levine became a journalist who famously interviewed Lenin for a 1923 biography of the Soviet leader. A strident anti-communist, Levine helped form the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia whose stated objective was the overthrow of the Soviet regime. *Plain Talk* was dedicated to exposing worldwide Stalinist terrorists operations.

and the free world to reduce the appeal of this false ideology, while maintaining a baseline of military strength to affect Soviet calculations.

Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, Paul Nitze contrasted Kennan and Bohlen's assertions of Soviet prudence regarding external adventurism. Nitze underlined Soviet material capabilities in his discussions with the Jackson Committee, arguing the Soviets would assume much more risk if they thought they could win, even if it jeopardized their own regime (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 26 Feb 53). Professor of European History Peter Viereck of Mount Holyoke College was also among the voices who reached out to the committee stressing the Soviet military threat. Viereck submitted his article "The Trojan Dove" that declared "[o]ur main enemy is not the Communist ideology nor their "socialist" economics, but the Red army, the Red air force, the Red spies and saboteurs" (Viereck 1953, 10). This assessment set up a very different prescription for U.S. priorities, specifically a concerted focus on maintaining overwhelming U.S. military capabilities to defend territories.⁷⁹

Frank Altschul also emphasized Soviet material capabilities underpinning an aggressive imperialistic state. The Soviet Union was not simply totalitarian, but imperial. He insinuated disagreement that the Soviets prioritized "home base... over the desire to expand," instead stressing a classic imperial goal of extending domination over others.

The real enemy is NOT Communism, but an encroaching Soviet imperialism which uses Communism as an ideological weapon. Were it not for Soviet imperialism and the Red Army we would not care a tinker's damn about Communism. We would be completely satisfied that as a form of social, political, and economic organization it offered no threat whatsoever as a system competing with our own for the allegiance of men (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 25 Feb 53).

According to Altschul, Marxist ideology was not "honey" or a "fig leaf." Ideology was a weapon, a means to imperial ends. However, testifying to the Hickenlooper Committee on the "forces of imperialistic communism," Lewis Gough, president of the American Legion, took this metaphor a step further. The American Legion, an organization of almost three million veterans

⁷⁹ Adolph Berle also met several times with committee members. While the archival documents do not include full transcripts of each engagement, Berle's post-war diary entries revealed his concerns which he may have expressed during discussions. As early as 1944 Berle forecast an expansionist Russia and urged American policymakers to formulate counter-policies. On 7 September 1948 he wrote in his diary, "and how--oh, how--to explain that opposition to Russian expansion is opposition to expansion and not to Russia" (Berle 1973, 587).

of the two World Wars and Korea and another one million auxiliary members, had declared in 1952 “[w]e cannot hope to win the global propaganda war until we face the reality that it is a war” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 16 Mar 53). Gough again accentuated the threat of Marxist “ideological weapons acting as the heavy artillery in the arsenal of attack” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 16 Mar 53). Heavy artillery was lethal, capable of neutralizing an enemy. However, artillery was also an indirect weapon. Victims could be unaware of impending destruction. Gough’s characterization reinforced an atmosphere of strategic panic that the U.S. and free world were under active attack by a “deadly” weapon. Dr. Mark A. May, Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, also stridently argued in the Commission’s February 1953 report to Congress that “[i]nternational communist propaganda is more dangerous to the peace of the world and the security of the United States than is the Red Army” (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 50, 20 Jun 53).⁸⁰ The implication of these threat interpretations would be a prioritization of non-military measures to defend minds of men, in addition to military capabilities to defend territory.

Experts thus presented the committee differing assessments of the threat highlighting totalitarian desire for control and classic imperialistic expansionism and domination, whether by force or through propaganda and political warfare. However, the committee also considered testimony from those who conceptualized Soviet Russia as a post-Westphalian state motivated to impose a world Communist system.⁸¹ It is worth noting that Truman’s Psychological Strategy Board sidetracked the question of categorizing the Soviet Union as post-Renaissance or post-Westphalian. During a Panel on Doctrinal Warfare held in November 1952, PSB personnel assessed there was no answer as to whether the situation was a struggle of ideology or “a modern version of old style power politics.” In fact, it was “probably a bit of both” given many behind

⁸⁰ The U.S. Advisory Commission was created as part of the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act. Its role was to provide outside appraisals of U.S. effectiveness and recommendations to the Secretary of State. The Commission’s threat assessment rested upon the assumption that the Soviet Union would pursue their objectives without resorting to conventional warfare if at all possible.

⁸¹ Within the archival files, there is no direct evidence that political scientist Hans Morgenthau interacted with or influenced the Jackson Committee. Nonetheless, his influential 1948 *Politics Among Nations* also described ideologies as both justifications and weapons (63). In particular, the Communist International “aims not at the conquest of territory or at the control of economic life, but at the conquest and control of the minds of men as an instrument for changing the power relations between two nations” (40). However, the stakes of this new power politics were no longer “relative positions within a political and moral system accepted by all, but the ability to impose upon the other contestants a new universal political and moral system recreated in the image of the victorious nation’s political and moral convictions” (193).

the Iron Curtain were “unconsciously conditioned” and “ideologically passive” (WH Office, NSC Staff: papers, 1948-1961, OCB Secretariat Series, Box 2, 17 Feb 53).

James Burnham directly challenged the “post-Renaissance” categorization of the Soviet Union, ridiculing American policymakers’ inability to develop and agree on new categories. Burnham charged that American pragmatism saddled the ability to appreciate the political role of ideology and supporting practices designed to inculcate Marxist ideology. He explicitly disagreed with Bohlen’s assertion that a certain standard of living would insulate individuals from communism (Burnham 1952, 160).⁸² In resorting to the existing category of a Westphalian-based totalitarian state, policymakers discounted the Soviet *political* apparatus underpinning the communist world revolutionary enterprise (Burnham 1952).⁸³ Testifying the same day as Bohlen and Kennan, Mr. Harvey of the State Department rejected the notion that the Soviet Union was a “merely imperialistic power.” World domination meant the establishment of a world Communist system controlled by the Soviets (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 24 Feb 53). Harvey reinforced his

⁸² In a way, the Russianists seemed to discount the possibility of indoctrination and acceptance over generations within the Soviet Union. Resting on the premise that Marxism was a false ideology, their position asserted its temporary nature in the face of “the truth” advanced by the U.S. Hinds and Windt Jr. offer a potential explanation for the Russianist perspective. The political communication theorists chronicle the American myths over time that built an image of the Russian people as friends and active supporters of American democracy. The myths contributed to an overriding belief that the Russian people were betrayed by their leaders during the 1917 revolution. “Americans greeted the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty in 1917 as a triumph of democracy. But, before the year was over, Americans went to the other extreme of seeing the Bolshevik Revolution as a betrayal of the Russian people” (1991, 31). Such logic argued that once communism was defeated, the Russian people would again triumph democracy, free enterprise, and Christianity. On that topic, Isaiah Berlin, Britain’s top Russia expert and intimate of both Bohlen and Kennan, criticized Kennan’s “unduly simple view” that with the fall of communism, Christianity would return to its “rightful place.” Berlin urged American policymakers not to discount the generation of change and increasing skepticism among Russian peasants (Robert Hooker correspondence, PCIIA Records, Box 6, 4 Feb 53). Anders Stephanson describes the “pervasive distaste for the tedious particulars of communist theory and practice that so characterized the Foreign Service, including its Russianists. The result was sheer ignorance of areas such as the Communist International and a certain lack of depth in understanding Soviet strategy and tactics, linked as the latter were to a distinct political tradition of fronts and alliances” (Stephanson 1989, 15). For Stephanson, the implication of this lack of understanding was an erroneous assessment of a Soviet belief in conflictual international relations that led U.S. officials to focus on developing a counter-offensive strategy.

⁸³ Burnham was invited to testify in April at the request of John Hughes. Hughes noted it was “obviously impossible to cover the waterfront” of individuals who considered themselves as authorities on Russia and the Russian mentality; however, he recommended the committee meet with Burnham to discuss his recently published *Containment or Liberation* (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 1 Apr 53). While a philosophy professor at NYU in the 1930s, Burnham had participated in the American radical movement, including helping to organize the American Workers Party in 1933. By 1940 he had disassociated himself from Marxism and its theory of inevitable socialism. In 1941, he published the influential *The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening in the World*, in which he offered an alternative explanation for future economic systems. Rather than being immutable, Burnham argued capitalism was transforming into a managerial revolution. And, unlike Marxist theory emphasis on the *ownership* of the means of production, the managerial revolution was characterized by elite *control* over the means of production. Elite control occurred across various political forms from fascism to communism to the New Deal (Burnham 1941).

perspective by noting the British agreed with this interpretation of the geopolitical competition, as did the Secretary of State. In a May meeting with the President, John Foster Dulles declared that the “existing threat posed by the Soviets to the Western World is the most terrible and fundamental in the latter’s 1000 years of domination. This threat differs in quality from the threat of a Napoleon or Hitler. It is like the invasion by Islam in the 10th century. Now the clear issue is: can western civilization survive?” (White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-1961, Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 15, 8 May 53).⁸⁴

According to Harvey, the current phase of the Soviet campaign for “mastery of the world” focused on isolating the United States from Europe and Asia. Evoking the storyline of Argentina’s Juan Perón, Harvey raised the specter of nationalism, neutrality, and economic independence (Perón’s “Third Way”) as the Soviets’ strategy for Europe (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 24 Feb 53). E. S. Glenn of the State Department offered a logic for the success of Soviet propaganda. “The main strength of communist propaganda lies, I believe, in the complete, or almost complete, dissociation of the idea of Communism from the idea of Russia... thus communism may be accepted without any abdication of national or nationalistic feelings” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 27 Jan 53). In colonial areas, Soviet propaganda also emphasized “national independence” stressing the unreliability of current governments. Soviet goals were to “move the masses away from present allegiances” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 24 Feb 53).

Within Cold War discourse structured in terms of binary oppositions, Soviet propaganda activities counter-positioned the United States as “imperialist” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 24, Feb 53). According to Marxist ideology, imperialism was an inherent manifestation of the capitalist system. Working within a liberal economic frame, committee members understood imperialism as a maladjustment of capitalism and therefore rejected this interpretation (Hobson 1902). Nonetheless, they discussed U.S. activities posing the potential to contribute to an “imperialist” label. In particular, the committee considered ongoing U.S. efforts to overthrow Jacobo Árbenz and reverse socio-economic reforms in Guatemala. In mid-March staff secretary Wanda Allender cautioned Washburn about committee recommendations for “the [“really serious”] Commie situation in Guatemala... if we just step in and try to tell them how to run the Government, we will play into the Commie propaganda line and will be “Yankee Imperialists”... the Latins don’t like the Commies, but they also don’t like us more” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 16

⁸⁴ See Stephanson 1996.

Mar 53). Two weeks later, the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, reinforced the importance of patient, long-term, indirect political warfare “to infuse into local leaders of public opinion the ideas which the Embassy desired... [noting] all peoples resist foreign ideas and that the Guatemalans are no exception” (PCIIA Records, Box 13, 1 Apr 53).⁸⁵

In a letter to Milton Eisenhower, Luther H. Evans the Librarian of Congress reinforced the underlying role of ideology. In Europe, a “whole generation of intellectuals have been brought up in an essentially Marxist tradition...[but stressed] in Asia and the Middle East universities pathetically impoverished but vital in enthusiasm are serving as centers of the renaissance” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 29 Jan 53). A paper John Hughes forwarded the group entitled “Winning the Cold Peace: Soviet Communism and U.S. Psychological Warfare” also amalgamated the categorizations of Soviet Russia by highlighting ideological “what ifs.” With the U.S. and U.S.S.R. geographically positioned “face to face” with no “buffer states” or “no man’s land” to absorb any shock (with the exception of the “wavering Arab-Asian bloc of territories”), the U.S. should understand the conflict as a battle for strategic position (political/military supremacy), raw materials, *and* minds.

In this momentous conflict, the battle for the human soul, the human mind and the human heart is as vitally important as the struggle for raw materials, the jockeying for strategic positions, and the seizure of political, and, if necessary, military supremacy. For the victory of the Western Democracies would be a Pyrrhic victory, were it to be discovered upon the morrow that what remained of the people whom the Free World had fought to liberate from red rule, were yearning silently for the return of the Communist regime. Besides it is high probably that however powerful the material resources of the Free World, victory would be well high impossible unless these now oppressed peoples, both within and without the Iron Curtain, were in their hearts on our sides (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 10 Apr 53).

The committee received numerous letters from Russian expatriates and U.S. citizens with ties to Russians retelling tales of the generation of Marxist political propaganda and

⁸⁵ In August 1953, President Eisenhower authorized PBSUCCESS, a CIA-led operation involving a force of 480 men backed by psychological warfare activities intended to depose Árbenz. Interestingly, Edward Bernays led the United Fruit Company’s public relations (misinformation) campaign that provided much of the rationale for U.S. intervention (Schlesinger and Kinzer 2005). When interviewed by the Jackson Committee, Bernays did not discuss Guatemala specifically. He stressed “engineering of consent” through advanced planning by experts who can combine the practical with the theoretical (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 18 Apr 53). Note, Wanda Allender later married Abbott Washburn. They were together for 40 years until his death in 2004.

indoctrination. Some told stories emphasizing the power of political indoctrination over the generations. Others emphasized the continuing strength of traditional democratic and religious institutions within the Soviet sphere. However, correspondents cautioned that foreign foes of the Soviet regime were not automatically friends of the Russian people (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 10 Apr 53). The multitude of received anecdotes and analysis underlined the complexity of the body politic behind the Iron Curtain. “Winning the Cold Peace” specifically cautioned

the experience of history shows that it is extremely hazardous to stimulate gratuitously the disintegration of such vast and complex body-politic as the Russian nation... Following World War II, national pride and awareness have been still further played up in the Soviet Union and patriotism in its most chauvinistic form has been erected into an article of faith which even the severest critics of the regime recognize to be generally accepted... Hence, at this stage of the struggle...all “separatist” activities are to be viewed as strengthening the hand of the Kremlin... (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 10 Apr 53).⁸⁶

In conceptualizing the Soviet threat, the committee considered internal factors, judged Soviet strengths and weaknesses, and assessed external activities. A 6 May draft chapter of the committee’s final report acknowledged the dominance of Soviet internal control and stated “it seems clear to the Committee that the United States cannot reasonably count on the collapse or drastic alteration of the Soviet system from either internal or external causes” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 6 May 53). Acknowledging various theories of Soviet motivation, the final report repeated this basic assessment. This appraisal importantly narrowed the range of possibility for, and prioritization of, U.S. strategic options. Arguments led the committee to assess the feasibility of changing the nature of the Soviet system given its internal control. The final report also highlighted Stalin’s “great importance to the economic disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union, regarding it as a factor of perhaps decisive importance.” The committee concluded the “new regime probably shares this view and clearly intends to maintain the rate of

⁸⁶ Staff member L.C. Mattison characterized the paper as “presenting a viewpoint not commonly held. I found it fresh and extremely interesting.” This proved to be a persuasive argument for the committee. The final report acknowledged “the delicate political question of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union” and the possible practical effect of U.S. minority language broadcasts. Although having similar content, “the mere existence of programs in these languages emanating from an official United States station is frequently interpreted by Soviet propaganda and by Russians in the Soviet Union to mean that this Government favors a policy of dismemberment” (Jackson Report 1953, 1825). Committee recommendations argued for VOA to eliminate “provocative propaganda” and seriously consider reducing minority language broadcasts (1953, 1826).

economic growth” (Jackson Report 1953, 1809). Soviet economic growth would underpin the regime’s increasing atomic capabilities, including better long-range bombers (Jackson Report 1953, 1804). However, the committee reasoned that the “major significance” of economic growth would be “the strengthening of Soviet political warfare capabilities” (Jackson Report 1953, 1803). This is worth noting. The Jackson Committee directly acknowledged inevitable increase in conventional and atomic forces. However, the final report tacitly concluded that the Soviet threat was predominantly political backed by military forces. As the analytic narrative will reveal, this assessment was intertwined with the committee’s evolving understanding of the relational nature of strategy.

The U.S. and the West: Political Philosophy, Ideology, and “Great Words”

During February’s concluding Saturday morning session, the committee reiterated their mandate of “trying to devise a new way of fighting this war.” The discussion centered around assessing the Soviet Union and its activities, as well as U.S. activities. Staffer Robert Blum attempted to pivot committee deliberations by asking “what does the U.S. stand for abroad?” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53). The Top Secret NSC 68 had defined U.S. interests in terms of the Soviet threat. The U.S. was to frustrate the Kremlin design (Gaddis and Nitze 1980, 168). However, this side-stepped any specific positive pronouncements. Over the previous weeks the Jackson Committee staff had reviewed correspondence that Robert Tufts suggested categorizing as “Overt Information Program: Themes.” These themes included free enterprise and democracy (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 6 Feb 53). Blum was perhaps prompted by Adolph Berle’s testimony two days earlier. Berle had declared, “as contrasted to war-time, political philosophy becomes a primary rather than secondary element of policy formation” because

during war the objectives of propaganda and political warfare activities are well defined and are in direct support of military objectives. Today the requirement is for political operations which will contain the Soviet orbit and which will detach important elements from the bloc in a way in which war will not be risked (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 26 Feb 53).

Blum argued the committee should develop a “proper statement of what this means in the world and in each country... make ‘em feel we need them, just as they need us” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53). In the day-to-day realm of foreign affairs, the U.S. sought

to attract and persuade, not coerce unity. John Fistere of Fortune Magazine took this argument a step further insisting that “it is more permanently effective to educate our people to love the rest of the world than it is to spend all our time and money educating the rest of the world to love us” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 19 Jan 53, emphasis in original). Subsequent witnesses reinforced Blum’s argument for a debate on grand and country-specific policy themes to reinforce international relationships.

Blum contended the committee report must include “substance,” not simply “machinery.” What was required was to “pull up socks” and present the “soul of the U.S.--the Great Words.” Robert Cutler and C. D. Jackson immediately agreed, calling for a chapter on this “posture” in the final report. Based on “Great Words” the committee could develop “a blueprint for the world--a strategic plan,” declared C. D (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53). Two days prior, Gordon Grey had specifically asked Adolph Berle if the U.S. “should have a global blueprint or should attempt to “play by ear”.” Berle supported the idea of developing a basic strategic plan (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 26 Feb 53). Robert Tufts added that the chapter should address the headstart of Soviet propaganda and “acknowledge” that a the “reversal was on the way” and why “we” would win (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53).

The committee discourse illustrates a fundamental confidence in the ideology of American exceptionalism. As a vague and multifaceted rhetorical commonplace, American exceptionalism enabled the committee to coalesce around the idea of “Great Words.” Interestingly, the committee did not attempt to identify specific “Great Words” or describe their meaning during the February committee conference. Assumptions of their relevance and inspirational power fueled the committee’s discursive agreement.

A few weeks after the February conference Bill Jackson again met with the staff and posed the question: “what does the U.S. stand for in the world?” He mused “We stand for peace... this is not how other nations think of us. We think we are progressive... others think us reactionary. The Soviet Union is smearing us” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 18 Mar 53). The U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Cabot Lodge, confirmed Jackson’s sentiment during his 27 March interview. Sigurd Larmon summarized Lodge’s concerns that the “basic line of what we’re selling hasn’t been worked out. We’ve got to have themes” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53). Lodge urged the committee to focus on the importance of “positive themes, lines, phrases, gags, and anticipation -- like Bob Hope.” Bob Hope attracted audiences

and energized them with his performances. As the leader on center stage within the free world, the U.S. must also attract and persuade its audience and supporters. Similarly, an October 1952 Bureau of Social Science Research report based on 71 ambassadorial evaluations of U.S. information programs argued for accentuating positive values and themes rather than strident, and seemingly reactionary, anti-communism (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 1 Oct 52). Committee consultant Wallace Carroll assessed that, in hindsight, American acts over the years were presented “in such a breathless fashion that they actually contributed in some degree to a world climate of uneasiness and fear” (Dwight D. Eisenhower, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 50, 1 May 53). Mr. Brooks Emeny, President of the Foreign Policy Association, also assessed that “one of our past weaknesses has been our emergency approach” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 4 May 53). Rather than continuously improvising and offering “semi-hysterical responses” to communist initiatives, Carroll argued the United States should be guided by an overarching theme such as “freedom moves forward.” Symbolically, such a theme could revitalize the progressive, revolutionary ideas for which the United States stood.

Whereas Burnham critiqued an American pragmatism that discounted ideology, Hans Morgenthau exposed the implicit American ideology driving the conduct of international relations. Morgenthau described how the “universalism” of democracy, ushered in by Woodrow Wilson’s war “to make the world safe for democracy,” underpinned subsequent U.S. foreign policy (Morgenthau 1948, 194). Representing a “fundamental change which separates our age from the preceding one... the nationalistic universalism of our age claims for one nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standards of action upon all the other nations” (Morgenthau 1948, 268-9).⁸⁷ In a 1952 paper given to the Jackson Committee, Walter Radius aptly offered similar conclusions. Radius wrote the U.S. had

no initial concept of converting the rest of the world to our way of life, or of inducing them to act in ways that we might think they ought to act. Nevertheless, we are almost unconsciously going on the assumption that those objectives which we consider fundamental would be best for the rest of the world, and if the rest of the world only saw things as we did, then the identity of objectives would lead to harmonious relations (Dwight D.

⁸⁷ According to Morgenthau, nationalistic universalism was altering the goals and ways of historical power politics. “These rival claims to universal dominion on the part of different nations have dealt the final, fatal blow to that social system of international intercourse within which for almost three centuries nations were living together in constant rivalry, yet under the common roof of shared values and universal standards of action” (1948, 269).

Eisenhower POTUS Records, White House Central Files
(Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 61, 1952).

Throughout the spring, numerous witnesses and correspondents reinforced an imperative that the U.S. promote deeper values and broad positive themes to inspire hope and provide direction for those conducting Cold War activities (Dwight D. Eisenhower, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 50, 16 Jun 53). The archival data revealed two discursive communities within the informal discourse coalition advocating the U.S. advance broad guiding themes, aka “Great Words” and reduce the emphasis on material goods/technology/gadgets. Many contributors noted American materialism did not have the same appeal abroad. An emigrant from Vienna, Dr. Karl Ettinger of the School of Social Science Research argued the current “material approach” would fail to garner support abroad (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 16 Feb 53). Described as “probably our most distinguished American historian of military strategy, authority on contemporary France, and General Eisenhower’s part-time political advisor at SHAEF,” Professor Edwin Earle asserted American “talk of largess did not earn us thanks, but mistrust” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 30 Mar 53). The “absence of an adequate ideological appeal is one of the greatest weaknesses in the U.S. effort” ventured *New York Times* correspondent Tillman Durdin who had spent extensive time in Asia (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 27 Mar 53).⁸⁸ Highlighting the implicit consumerism within American society, many witnesses told the congressional Hickenlooper Committee that the U.S. placed “too much emphasis on selling America, [and] technology” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 10 Apr 53).⁸⁹ One of those witnesses, propaganda-expert Edward Bernays critiqued U.S. “amateurish” methods of mass messaging that emphasized American superiority (Central Files, General File, Box 1185, 13 Apr 53). Senator Ralph Flanders (R-VT) wrote to Robert Cutler advocating the U.S. “cease trying to sell ourselves... and start in trying to help them” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 17 Feb 53).

A “spiritual” community specifically advocated the unifying power of spirituality, religion, and morality. In the early 1950s, tele-evangelist Billy Graham’s syndicated columns in 125 newspapers and pulpit sermons preaching to more than 55% of Americans emphasized the

⁸⁸ These quotes illustrate the predominant perspectives shared with the committee by practitioners, scholars, and individual citizens. Conversely, the committee also received correspondence arguing for a propaganda emphasis on American technical and technological prowess.

⁸⁹ Provided to the Jackson Committee, the Hickenlooper Committee Staff Memorandum No. 8 “Criticisms and Suggestion on the Overseas Information Programs” summarized testimony highlights. The Jackson Committee also received direct statements lamenting the fallacies underpinning current U.S. international information activities.

value of Christian America versus atheist Russia (Whitfield 1996, 79-87). In addition to numerous interviewees, the committee received nearly 20 letters specifically focusing on Christianity and spirituality with many others incorporating the theme into their narrations. Letters highlighted discursive practices including local congregational activities and their ties abroad. The Christianity-centered discourse confidently advocated government-sanctioned evangelism without much regard for the actual spiritual beliefs of those abroad. The self-evident superiority of American exceptionalism manifested in suggestions that frankly disregarded the realities in non-Christian areas of the world, potentially undercutting the appeal of any U.S. propaganda activities. Individuals also wrote to inform the committee about the international Moral Rearmament movement (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 26 Mar 53). The committee received a copy of the Congressional Record covering the 23 February 1953 national meeting for Moral Rearmament that took place at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington D.C. with Representative Alexander Wiley (R-WI) giving the keynote speech (PCIIA Records, Box 10, 23 Feb 53).

Another discursive community centered around Western principles and ideology. Political philosopher George Catlin represented this community that called for a “projection of ideas” illuminating “the principles for which the free world stands” based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points and Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter (PCIIA Records, Box 3, 6 Jan 53). In addition to interview commentaries, the committee received over ten letters specifically addressing the importance of democracy, freedom, and equal rights. A host of others also touched upon the subject. Many of the letters highlighted the potential role of the U.S. Bill of Rights, FDR’s Four Freedoms, and the Atlantic Charter in the current geopolitical struggle. Numerous correspondents and witnesses supported identifying and promoting a “free world doctrine,” and reflected the propensity to speak in generalities (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 19 Mar 53). In a letter to C. D. Jackson, MIT professor Walt Rostow also suggested the Jackson Committee address “an area almost totally missing in this field in the past... the formulation of some clear strategic concepts somewhat more specific than the Declaration of Independence” (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 12 Jan 53). On 21 May, the committee asked Frank Altschul “what do we seek to project? How do we make it concrete? Are we clear ourselves as to what it is?” Altschul suggested reviewing the preamble of the United Nations Charter and reminded the committee of his 3 February correspondence urging the committee to consider that the U.S. cause is not democracy or free enterprise, but human freedom (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 21 May 53).

Edward Bernays asserted an imperative of presenting positive concepts of U.S. democratic principles tailored to “the hopes, frustrations and needs, customs and ideas of each area” (Central Files, General File, Box 1185, 13 Apr 53). Tailoring required an ability to imagine the social and material perspectives of populations abroad. Ford Foundation president Paul Hoffman reinforced the argument for tailoring grand policy themes through imaginative ideas to specific areas (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 19 Mar 53). The committee heard similar refrains from Hollywood motion picture producers representing nascent U.S. soft power who were eager to incorporate U.S. foreign policy themes. Hollywood executives described how film promotions were already based on their industry’s ability to analyze specific audiences and markets. Over 40% of their revenue was earned from audiences abroad. However, Darryl Zanuck and Tony Morton of the Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation told the committee, “we try to guess on our foreign policy to put under-the-table lines in our pictures,” because all “we are given [is] a list of taboos... the negative: avoid this, don’t offend this group or that group” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 10 Apr 53). Abbott Washburn mused in marginalia, “Where do taboos come from?”

Discussions about audiences and markets propelled C. D. Jackson to reaffirm his stated desire for the Jackson Report to include positive ideas pinpointed to specific areas. While Blum articulated a need to define the meaning of American “Great Words” for specific countries as a means to enlist indigenous support, Walt Rostow focused on empowering the U.S. machinery. For both Rostow and Walter Lippmann, the “essence of political warfare” was developing a “strategy of third choice” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53). The translation of broad concepts to more specific goals was the linchpin for the machinery to take practical steps in creating “a realistic alternative to a situation in which he [a foreigner] finds himself, and that alternative is in your interest” (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 83, 11-12 May 52). Rostow urged the committee to consider providing “an indication of the meaning of those concepts for the next steps in Presidential action, diplomacy, broadcasting, domestic discussions, etc” (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 12 Jan 53). During the May 1952 conference, Rostow had noted the unique American penchant for generalities and Radio Free Europe Director Robert Lang cautioned against using “generalities about freedom, justice, and free enterprise (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box

83).⁹⁰ Having recently compared “VOA, RFE, Public Information Division of HICOG [U.S. High Commissioner for Germany], RIAS [Radio in the American Sector (Berlin)] and the overseas broadcasting programs of BBC,” Albert Somit of New York University assessed the U.S. had failed to “formulate a clear-cut statement of the objectives toward which our informational activities should strive and develop a consistent, coordinated and effective program aimed at achieving these objectives” (PCIIA Records, Box 9, 19 Feb 53). At C. D. Jackson’s request, Abbott Washburn translated grand themes into “Nine Points for Peace” (C. D. Jackson Records, Box 7, 6 Apr 53). Washburn suggested the Nine Points could serve as the basis for “our more positive foreign policy. It is the true peace program of the U.S., the U.N. and the Free World...” Washburn’s points can be interpreted as a discursive practice to support Walt Rostow’s urging for “an indication of the meaning of those concepts for the next steps in ... action” (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 12 Jan 53). Washburn’s suggestions included: ending the Korean War; reducing armaments and allowing UN inspections and control; returning illegally held free world citizens; completing the Austrian Treaty; withdrawing troops from Germany and holding free elections; and ending Communist aggression in Indo-China.

Despite a discursive momentum and internal committee consensus for identifying a guiding U.S. political philosophy and “Great Words,” as committee discursive activities transitioned to engagements with practitioners, the committee’s focus narrowed to the “machinery” of the disjointed ensemble of Cold War activities. Awash in data, analysis, and suggestions for practical improvements for the machinery, the initial draft report omitted any reference to “Great Words.” On 16 June after reviewing the draft report that was due to the President in two weeks, Abbott Washburn wrote he was “struck by the fact that we say nothing about themes and substantive content of U.S. propaganda” (Dwight D. Eisenhower, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 50). Reviewing Eisenhower’s speeches as well as Wilson’s Fourteen Points, Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter, and the United Nations charter, the committee debated how to emphasize a Magna Carta of Freedom during its final weeks (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 64, 11 Jul 66).

⁹⁰ In *The Cold War as Rhetoric*, authors Hinds and Windt Jr. quote Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation about the American predilection for abstraction. “Democratic writers are perpetually coining abstract words... in which they sublimate into further abstractions the abstract terms of the language. Moreover, to render their mode of speech more succinct, they personify the object of these abstract terms and make it act like a real person” (1991, 147; quotation from *Democracy in America*, Volume 2, 1945, 73).

The exclusion of “Great Words” reflected Bill Jackson’s admission in May that his original framing “has disappeared a little bit... but that something more important has taken its place, i.e. a better organization of government itself, a better coordination of policies, plans, and operations” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 18 May 53).⁹¹ Yet, the staff and many other committee members discursively worked to incorporate all elements of strategy within the final report in order to support a “new, unified, and dynamic” Cold War effort. As Walt Rostow had advocated in January, “[i]t may be that the fruitfulness of the Committee may depend on its defining and holding to a terrain of analysis and recommendations which defines a strategy and links it in a meaningful way to the tactical arm of our policy” (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 12 Jan 53).

Cold War Positioning of the United States

On the campaign trail, Eisenhower juxtaposed the concept of Cold War with conventional world war, reasoning that the U.S. only waged “a “cold war” in order to escape the horror of its opposite--war itself.” Within Cold War discourse structured in terms of binary oppositions, this productively positioned U.S. Cold War efforts with sustaining peace. Eisenhower was not alone in his discursive efforts to contrast Cold War/psychological warfare with conventional war. Chief of Psychological Warfare for the Department of the Army, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure provided the headline “Psychological Strategy as a Preventative of Large War” for the 2 January 1953 *U.S. News and World Report* (PCIIA Records, Box 7, 2 Jan 53). James Burnham was more dramatic. He concluded his December 1952 *The American Mercury* article with, “[o]f one conclusion we may be certain: political warfare, dynamically carried out and vast in scale, is the only alternative to unlimited nuclear war” (Burnham December 1952, 24). Dr. Elizabeth Pilant, Executive Secretary of the National Conference of American Folklore for Youth based in Muncie, Indiana represented a host of correspondence praising Eisenhower’s emphasis “on winning the war of ideas and ideals as an alternative rather than just a preliminary to atomic warfare” (PCIIA Records, Box 8, 2 Mar 53).

⁹¹ This analytic narrative focused on interpreting discussions about guiding content. Committee discursive activities pertaining to national direction, organization, coordination and operations are interpreted in the following chapter.

In appropriating the specific concept of *Cold War*, U.S. activities were simultaneously linked with the traditional concept of war.⁹² General “Wild Bill” Donovan’s testimony represented an informal discourse coalition that rejected the positioning imposed on the United States by the concept *Cold War*. Echoing an assumption developed during the Princeton gathering, Donovan asserted the U.S. was in a war; however, the “Russians do all these things in the name of peace” giving them a narrative advantage (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Feb 53). Displeased with the extension of military terms into the context of foreign affairs, Bohlen also expressed his difficulty with the term *Cold War* during his testimony. The American Legion president Lewis Gough reiterated the point that the *Cold War* was a misnomer. In his testimony to the the Hickenlooper Committee, he described how the enemy talks of peace while the United States talks of war (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 16 Mar 53). Abbott Washburn and C. D. Jackson later discussed the susceptibility of populations, including the U.S., to Soviet deceptive narratives that masked Soviet expansionism. They assessed an overriding desire for peace defined as stability lulled people into complacency (C. D. Jackson Records, Box 7, 6 Apr 53). Because Soviet political warfare rendered the concept of status quo obsolete, uncritical contentment was classified as a negative attribute. Washburn and Jackson contended the geopolitical competition necessitated a consistent striving toward the fundamental, aspirational objective of a peaceful and free world order conducive for Western principles.

The committee received numerous correspondence pointing out the “fallacy” of describing the geopolitical situation in terms of war. Many took umbrage with equating current U.S. activities with wartime activities. Alternative suggestions included “coordinated diplomacy,” “winning a Cold Peace,” engaging in “peace-ware,” “psychological-diplomacy,” and “waging peace.” For some, a “Cold Peace” reflected American ways and means in stark contrast to totalitarian states with histories of employing deceptive measures against civilian populations. A number of contributors from European countries stressed the necessity of avoiding another war. The terminology of “peace” symbolically prescribed boundaries for acceptable activities. War did not, even with the modifier “cold” (assorted correspondence, PCIIA Records, Boxes 2, 3, 4, 6, 7). Interviewed numerous times by the committee, Paul

⁹² This is an apt illustration of Doty’s theoretical explanation of how the “productive nature of language does not depend on nor necessarily coincide with the motivations, perceptions, intentions, or understandings of social actors” (Doty 1993, 302).

Hoffman the former director of the Economic Cooperation Administration had argued the U.S. was *waging peace* effectively in his 1951 *Peace Can be Won*. The committee heard many overlapping arguments that the United States should position itself and its actions in terms of positive goals of peace and stability. The informal discourse coalition centering on Cold Peace included informal discursive communities who advanced the concept from various perspectives, many linked to American self-identity. “The U.S. fights armies--not people” wrote a citizen from California (PCIIA Records, Box 7, 26 Mar 53). “We don’t start wars” declared Charles Bohlen (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 24 Feb 53). Bohlen explained that wars begin and end, usually with the defeat of the enemy. However, the U.S. did not seek to destroy the Soviet Union in terms of a military defeat (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 24 Feb 53). Therefore “war” inappropriately symbolized U.S. goals.

Retracting Soviet power while avoiding war were two of the three policy priorities identified by Paul Nitze during his 25 February testimony to the committee (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7). However, that did not preclude discrete U.S. governmental elements from planning for possible transition to and the conduct of war with the Soviet Union. “X-day” became the name for the initiation of hostilities. Within the military services, U.S. military planners were drafting conventional war plans for a confrontation in the European theater. The inter-departmental Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POCC) created an “X-Day Working Group” to develop specific recommendations for the delineation of psychological warfare responsibilities during the transition from peacetime foreign information activities to wartime psychological warfare under military authorities (Dwight D. Eisenhower POTUS Records, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 61, undated OSD document). The X-Day Working Group’s deliberations were ongoing as the Jackson Committee commenced its discursive activities.

With a primary focus on day-to-day activities, Abbott Washburn and Gordon Gray asserted that U.S. policymakers ought to “get war out of everything we can” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, undated notes). Washburn and C. D. Jackson agreed that the U.S. was advancing “the Free World’s program for peace. This is the program for permanent and peaceful co-existence which the United States and the United Nations have clearly laid down in the years since the end of World War II” (C. D. Jackson Records, Box 7, 6 Apr 53). Conflict was the operative word

within the final report. In the committee's 30 June 1953 letter of transmittal to President Eisenhower, the members stated their unanimous agreement.

We do not believe that the terms "cold war" ... which are so frequently used, contribute to a clear understanding of the world struggle. The phrase "cold war" is an inaccurate description of the present conflict. Moreover, when used by officials of the United States Government it is helpful to Soviet propaganda (PCIIA Report 1953, 1796).

The 8 July 1953 official press release also stated

Cold war"... [is an] unfortunate term. They do not describe the efforts of our nation and our allies to build a world of peace and freedom. They should be discarded in favor of others which describe our true goals. New terms are needed to express the solidarity of freedom-loving men and women everywhere (PCIIA Records, Box 15, 8 Jul 53).

Cold War Conceptual Boundaries

In January, Bill Jackson told the Jackson Committee staff that the *ultimate* goal was the defeat and disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, having positioned the U.S. as a proponent of peace, the committee returned to a theme raised at Princeton by Dr. Lloyd Berkner who asked "how far are you willing to go?" The question now was framed in terms of risk and the boundaries of the Cold War. How "dynamic" could U.S. political warfare be within Cold War boundaries? Given that U.S. Cold War aims did not call for destroying the Soviet state in the conventional sense, how should the committee categorize Cold War activities in order to avoid triggering a conventional or atomic war? Eisenhower himself implicitly acknowledged the discursive dilemma. In a campaign speech, Eisenhower declared:

Nothing we may do in pursuing a positive policy for peace and freedom could provoke them into war except as the last desperate gasp of a dying dictatorship. ... The second thing of which I am absolutely certain is that the Russians are determined to pursue their political war plans without ever resorting to real warfare if it can possibly be avoided because their religion tells them that they will certainly win by political war whereas they might lose a real war (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 50, 20 June 52).

In Eisenhower's formulation Cold War boundaries were broad, providing ample space for dynamic competition. However, any activities directly threatening the Soviet regime potentially

risked war. The committee heard many metaphorical arguments of the Soviet Union as the source of an infection, as “venom,” and “Communist bacteria” (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 10 Apr 53 and assorted others). How close could the U.S. get to treating the source without risking a dramatic flare up from a “dying dictatorship”? Would “winning” solutions instead prioritize “inoculation” activities?

Jackson asked the staff to consider whether “[we] can afford to begin winning the Cold War?” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 18 Mar 53). While focusing on identifying the pliability of Cold War boundaries, his inquiry also raised questions of “how” and “with what”? In testimony to the Hickenlooper Committee, former International Information Administration (IIA) Administrator Wilson Compton declared the U.S. had not yet tried to win the Cold War. This again implied potential space for additional U.S. political warfare activities within Cold War boundaries. However, in Compton’s view, the U.S. had prioritized developing and acquiring military capabilities for future contingencies rather than focusing on capabilities to address the current “war of words” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 13 Mar 53). Did the “arsenal of unused cold war weapons” (as Bill Jackson described during the first committee conference) include yet-to-be-developed capabilities? If so, what type, and how should the U.S. conceptualize their employment? Dr. Claude Robinson of the Opinion Research Corporation assessed the difficulty involved in answering the question. “You could have peace through military hardware or through ideas. We [Americans] are a hardware people... [but we must be] concerned with emphasizing the importance of ideas” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 13 May 53). In fact, the committee heard numerous testimonies and correspondence addressing the trade-offs between Cold War and “hot war” requirements. In a paper on “The Role of the Soviet Emigration,” Admiral L.C. Stevens asserted:

We must play it both ways and wage the cold war on a long-term basis while ensuring that we are adequately prepared for a hot war at any time, and continually take care that our cold war activities do not unnecessarily precipitate a hot war. At the same time our hot war preparations should not necessarily infringe on our cold war capabilities (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 12 Feb 53).

During the February and March committee conferences, Bill Jackson challenged members and staff to think through types of U.S. and allied capabilities and ways to employ without provoking war (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53, 28 Mar 53). Essentially,

Jackson's guidance pointed the committee to think in terms of a Cold War strategy utilizing all instruments of power. The arguments involved in conceptualizing the Cold War informed committee deliberations and recommendations regarding the goals of, and ways to, reducing Soviet power and influence and bringing about a change in Soviet theory and practice of international relations.

The Nature of the Cold War: a long-term Conflictual Competition

In identifying conflicting objectives, capabilities, and policies of the Soviet system and the United States, the committee concluded the protracted global conflict was based in the two competing visions for the global geopolitical structure (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 6 May 53). The committee agreed with expert assertions regarding Soviet beliefs in the conflictual nature of international relations that fueled a drive for "world domination." In advancing a "just and peaceful world order," the U.S. served as the greatest obstacle to the Soviet objective. However, the members rejected categorizing the current situation as an "emergency" and worked to reduce the conceptual confusion contributing to the strategic panic of the moment in part by rejecting the term Cold War.⁹³ As the narration will highlight, Jackson Committee recommendations for U.S. political warfare integrating all measures of power short of war reinforced the discursive rejection of "war."

The committee conceptualized the geopolitical condition in terms of a long-term conflictual competition. Informing this characterization was the U.S./Western European desire to avoid general war and an assessment that "the Soviet rulers will be most reluctant to run deliberately a grave risk of general war" because of the current "power relationship between the Soviet system and the free nations" (Jackson Report 1953, 1800). The committee agreed with the premise that U.S. atomic and conventional weapons restrained overt, aggressive Soviet activities outside of the Soviet bloc and the report underscored the indispensability of maintaining a "strong military position" as a deterrent for general war (1953, 1800). In an "age, not an instant, of peril," the geopolitical situation remained "serious" and "dangerous" not the least because of probable Soviet brinkmanship throughout the long-term competition. In declaring this

⁹³ Some witnesses and policymakers categorized the situation as an emergency, justifying policy decisions to employ Soviet-like tactics. The committee considered these arguments, but debates over "Great Words" and the psychological effects of gaps between U.S. words and U.S. actions led them to reject such proposals. Robert Blum assessed any effort to build a Cold War strategy with Soviet-like "beliefs and practices... would be doomed to failure" (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 2 Apr 53).

probability, the committee tacitly called for a disciplined political wisdom within U.S. policy making, both in developing policies and plans, and in responding to Soviet-instigated crises. This was critical for two reasons involving both adversaries and allies. The committee asserted the “execution of American policies demands a constant awareness of one easily ignored fact: the actions of the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes are partially determined by what the U.S. does” (Jackson Report 1953, 1823). The U.S. should not be seen as initiating acts that could lead to general war or a “world climate of uneasiness and fear” (Dwight D. Eisenhower, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 50, 1 May 53). To do so could undermine its credibility with allies and standing as the standard bearer for peace. Policy decisions should be somewhere between the hawk and the dove, harassing but not crossing Cold War boundaries.⁹⁴

In drafting the report the committee became convinced that power is “more than military strength; it relates also to political wisdom, economic health, tenacity of will, and the respect or disrespect in which one’s purposes are held by others” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 6 May 53). A year earlier Walt Rostow imparted a relational nature of strategy in his description of political warfare as holding “out to a man a realistic alternative to a situation in which he finds himself, and that alternative is in your interests” (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 83, 11-12 May 52). The committee wove this concept into its understanding of national power, political warfare and strategy. Abbott Washburn argued the most significant sentence in the report stated, “[t]he committee believes the primary and overriding purpose of the information program should be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interests to take actions which are consistent with the national objectives of the United States” (1953, 1838).

To do so, the committee prescribed the necessity of determining the wants and needs of others, recognizing shared values, and relating these in ways that would inspire others to work toward similar goals in the course of their own lives. After initially neglecting the emotive aspects of “Great Words,” the final report highlighted the “deeper spiritual values uniting this

⁹⁴ I borrowed the literary device from Nicholas Thompson’s *The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan and the History of the Cold War* which contrasts two approaches towards peace. As the dove, Kennan advocated acting peacefully. As the hawk, Nitze argued the U.S. must prepare for war to achieve peace (2010). The Jackson Report indirectly addressed calls for any military-style rollback citing “liberation” in the context of “reiterating our faith in their [Eastern Europeans] *eventual* liberation” (1953, 1827, emphasis added).

nation with the rest of the world” (1953, 1840). Specifically, the committee noted the advantages of

sharing fundamental beliefs and basic values with millions of the men and women the United States is attempting to win to its side: belief in God, beliefs in individual and national freedom and the right to ownership of property, belief in a peaceful world and in the common humanity of men and nations compromising their differences and cooperating in the United Nations. Sharing such beliefs, the United States has partners and allies abroad, not subservient satellites held by force” (Jackson Report 1953, 1840).

Abbott Washburn argued to Bill Jackson that in projecting “these values as basically American,” the U.S. could overcome the present stereotype “of the vulgar Babbitt without culture or any deep feeling” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 16 Jun 53). The committee concluded the U.S. must emotively connect with foreign populations in addition to materially improving conditions to negate Soviet goals.

How did the committee assess Soviet goals? The committee identified a critical distinction between the Soviet *aspirational* objective of world domination and *preliminary* goals, including isolating the United States (Jackson Report 1953, 1798). This distinction was essential for rejecting the categorization of “emergency” and normalizing an “age... of peril.” The atomic Soviet Union preferred “the process of encroachment to the risks of total war” in extending its influence and power beyond its current geographical boundaries toward its objective of world domination (1953, 1798). The committee assessed “the greatest danger of Soviet expansion lies in political warfare and local communist armed action” *in the free world* (1953, 1800). Given its successes, the Soviet regime would likely intensify political warfare efforts including

political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities, the action of communist parties and communist-party-controlled trade unions outside the Bloc, sabotage, exploitation of subversive and revolutionary movements and of civil wars, and psychological warfare (1953, 1800).

The committee’s clear prescription was that wise political leaders would focus on denying Soviet preliminary goals. Focusing on the ultimate Soviet objective of world domination would overly magnify the existing threat and practically ill-inform the prioritization of near- and mid-term U.S. policy choices directed toward improving the overall strength of the free world.

The committee's judgment regarding the temporal horizon of the long-term conflict shaped its prescriptions for a realistic U.S. approach capable of adjusting to evolving conditions. The report importantly urged policymakers to "continually and carefully" match Soviet objectives, goals, and capabilities against those of the United States and its allies for realistic appraisals of the situation (1953, 1799). "Net estimates" were deemed essential to the development and refinement of any U.S. national strategy which policymakers would necessarily adjust due to the "long-pull nature of the conflict" (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 64, 11 Jul 66).

Chapter Six: The Problems of National Planning

“For military warfare the President has his statutory advisors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a large planning establishment. For political warfare he does not...Perhaps this explains some of our failures in the struggle with international Communism... failures of the mind and the will--a lack of ideas and method and an absence of driving force” --Wallace Carroll, 27 March 1953

In December 1952, political warfare advocate James Burnham publicly asked “Can Washington Conduct Political Warfare?” (PCIIA Records, Box 13, Dec 52). His article in *American Mercury* asserted the United States required new institutional structures *and* people capable of rising above a “bureaucratic” mindset to defeat the Soviet threat (Burnham Dec 52, 19). Informed and shaped by argumentative games, the committee came to similar conclusions but with differing substance and emphasis. The analytic narrative in this chapter and the next interprets committee discursive activities focusing on the U.S. “cold war” effort. In addition to arguments on the nature of the “cold war,” committee problem representation processes considered the disjointed ensemble of the U.S. machinery. While the language of “cold war” was becoming familiar, many organizations remained unsure of what the concept meant in terms of actual, required and appropriate practices. Jackson Committee staff and members surveyed a broad range of institutional and organizational responsibilities and relationships, in addition to ongoing governmental, semi-private, and private activities. Surveying and assessing the complex machinery was a monumental task given that psychological warfare/political warfare/Cold War activities did not fit neatly into traditional governmental categories or directly translate to historical organizational responsibilities. Given the “octopus-like nature and broad scope” of the committee’s mandate, problem representation processes necessitated judging “what areas of the total problem it can usefully attack, and what areas it would be prudent to leave alone” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 27 Feb 53).

Rather than focusing committee deliberations on “bottom up” details, Consultant Wallace Carroll suggested the “legitimate starting point for our final effort... [is] to consider what the President actually needs to discharge his duties as a leader in the political conflict” (White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 50, 27 Mar 53). The President’s call for “new, unified, and dynamic” way forward guided committee discursive activities, as did Bill Jackson’s initial guidance to avoid becoming an “operating” committee. Also informing

committee argumentation was a commonly held assumption of the strategic advantages held by the totalitarian Soviet Union in centralized planning, decision making, and resource extraction. The Jackson Committee's quest for a "unified and dynamic" approach directly tackled ways to enhance U.S. presidential decision making by enabling centralized, long-term planning. Committee deliberations also considered the criticality of resourcing and enabling decentralized execution of activities.

Aaron Friedberg argues that during the Cold War, an anti-statism ideology underpinned Cold War institutions and practices. He suggests that U.S. leaders were unable to mobilize, direct, and control the resources, primarily military, thought necessary to deal with the Soviet threat, but concludes this weakness was in fact the strength of the state as the U.S. avoided becoming a garrison state. He attributes Eisenhower as contributing to "strategic synthesis" of balancing military strength and economic growth (2000). This analysis provides additional context for the conditions of possibility for Eisenhower's "strategic synthesis" in terms of strategy development. Having categorized the Cold War as a long-term conflictual competition, the Jackson Committee sought sustainable solutions for a unified national effort that simultaneously affirmed American principles. The modifiers "unified" and "national" led the committee to consider centralized policy planning and guidance under the president for integration and coordination of the disjointed ensemble of governmental departments and agencies. The same modifiers also affected debates for clear policy guidance to inspire decentralized execution and private, voluntary participation which would be decidedly distinct from Soviet "repugnant control" (PCIIA Records, Box 12, undated).

Conceptualizing the Disjointed Ensemble of Cold War Activities

On 6 February 1953, Robert Cutler, Bill and C. D. Jackson, and Abbott Washburn met over dinner to brainstorm initial ideas for making the U.S. Cold War effort more unified and dynamic. The focus of the discussion reflected C. D. Jackson's desire a year prior to develop an "overall blueprint for cold war future without regard to jurisdictional scrapping" (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 83, 4 Feb 52). The dinner party participants had a common conceptualization of psychological warfare as the "sum of" planned activities undertaken by various actors for specific goals. This opened categorical boundaries to include all official, semi-official, and even informal organizations, departments, and agencies involved in Cold War efforts (Abbott

Washburn Papers, Box 7, 10 May 53). As Bill Jackson offered during the committee's inaugural meeting, the committee should consider the full "arsenal of unused cold war weapons" (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 30 Jan 53).

The dinner debate centered on executive-level organizational responsibilities and structural relationships involved in "arranging an action" (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 6 Feb 53). The men decried the Truman administration's ad hoc approach to Cold War programs. Any time more than one department had a role in an operation or activities, the NSC selected a department to serve as the ad hoc coordinator. In a way, this practice evolved from, and contributed to, the prevailing reactionary, even "emergency" mindset of the previous administration. The dinner party members implied a systemic lack of consideration of the broader context as each Cold War case was treated as a distinct event. Developing a story about a potential Albanian Defector Program, the four men talked through expected executive branch steps involved in the planning and execution of a particular action and program. "Telling the story" required coordinated and integrated words and deeds conducted by multiple departments. The dinner story highlighted the IIA as responsible for overt international information, the CIA as responsible for gray information and other activities, and White House leadership and responsibility for informing the U.S. public.

The evening's discussions provided a discursive foundation for conceptualizing the strategic processes involved in "psychological strategy." A few weeks later Robert Cutler elaborated his understanding of psychological strategy, noting he based his argument on President Eisenhower's 8 October campaign speech. Chapter three revealed that the Princeton argumentative games served as the source for the speech.

Psychological strategy is the marshalling and integration of the powers of our national government so that when our national government takes a significant action, all these powers can be brought to bear at once and a single coordinated massive blow or series of blows can be delivered on target, rather than an unplanned, unrelated, scattered delivery of blows (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 28 Feb 53).

Employing the boxing metaphor, Cutler juxtaposed the images of delivering blows with men's minds. Powerful blows represented deliberate, integrated words and actions that would shape the target's understanding of his social conditions and ultimately change his behavior. Cutler's description directly inferred the machinery must be capable of planning, integrating, and

coordinating specific effects on “targets.” The boxing metaphor worked to overcome any conceptual difficulties in visualizing the minds of men as targets. The image of a boxing match evoked visual cause-and-effects of productive punches and decisive, violent blows physically wearing down a opponent. Extrapolating the metaphor, Cutler reinforced confidence in the ability to achieve and measure dynamic, psychological effects. Director of the Institute of Public Opinion at Princeton George Gallup, “a neighbor and a good friend” of both Barklie Henry and C. D. Jackson, had assured them “there were reliable opinion survey firms, with similar standards to his own, in practically every country in Western Europe... [and a reasonable investigation could ask] To what extent did the programs on the Voice [of America] influence their opinions, and how?” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 1 Feb 53). Two weeks later doctors M.D. Graham and Leonard Cottrell, Jr. of the Research and Development Board caveated that despite the improvements in poll-taking techniques, “any given poll is a static expression of the mood of the people” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 16 Feb 53). Nonetheless, given the skepticism on Capitol Hill and certain news outlets of the efficacy of international information and related programs, the boxing metaphor helped the committee conceptualize success.

However, to be victorious often requires numerous rounds in the ring. The punches within each round are only steps toward an ultimate victory. Three months later, consultant Wallace Carroll extolled what he called the “Cutlerian revelation” enunciated by “a prophet [Robert Cutler, who] may be without honor in his own committee.” After months of information gathering and analysis, storytelling and “witcraft” over coordinating specific “actions,” Carroll reminded the committee that their recommendations should provide an institutional framework to enable an “unified and dynamic” *long-term* approach for winning the Cold War.

No action or project is an end in itself. We are not interested merely in planting so many factories, so many rifles, so many tractors in given positions around the world. All this outpouring of materials and money is intended to create something much bigger than the sum of the parts. What we want to bring about is *a world climate of confidence and hope* in which freedom will flourish and Communism wither... Naturally, the creation of a world climate of this kind would not be a mere “propaganda” operation. It would require the conscious cooperation of the President and other high officials, of our diplomacy and of responsible Congressional leaders” (POTUS, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 50, “Telling the Story,” 1 May 53, emphasis added).

What is remarkable to observe is the incongruence in the language used to describe U.S. objectives-- “a world climate of confidence and hope”--and the violent boxing metaphors employed to reflect the way and means. It is an indication of how individuals continued to cast about for language that represented not only the geopolitical condition and the threat, but also the desired U.S. approach.

A Mountain Metaphor for Cold War Strategic Processes

At the 6 February dinner Bill Jackson introduced a mountain metaphor to visualize the planning, decision making, coordination, and execution of any Cold War action. Representing both reality and an ideal, the metaphor served as a foundation for committee deliberations on the machinery. Carried throughout the committee’s tenure, the mountain metaphor provided a compact visualization for various organizational responsibilities, structural relationships, and ongoing U.S. governmental activities within a Cold War strategy. It enabled discursive efforts to identify subordinate problems within the U.S. Cold War effort, select and refine categorical boundaries for subordinate problems, and judge which the committee could “usefully attack.”

The upward slope of the mountain represented government planning efforts. A myriad of discrete planning efforts took place within individual departments and agencies at the broad base on the left-hand side of the mountain. Robert Cutler characterized the bureaucratic landscape as a “dense jungle” (POTUS Records, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 61, 15 Feb 53) and quipped that there were more planners in D.C. than capable coordinators (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 28 Feb 53). The metaphorical entailment of the physical effort required to climb out of the “dense jungle” and reach the summit extended to represent the slow-paced, deliberate and even distinct policy planning within the hierarchical bureaucracy within the Executive Branch. With the NSC at the crest, the apex represented the locale where departmental policy planning efforts narrowed and converged, and presidential decision making took place. The converging of paths metaphorically entailed the ideal of policy planning integration. Again, Cutler specified, “[w]e must all keep clear that policy is not made in water-tight compartments and that the properly organized national government constantly seeks to integrate foreign, domestic, military, economic policy. The purpose of NSC and of PSB is to bring about such integration” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 28 Feb 53).

At the summit, national-level decision making determined the fate of policy proposals-- either recede back to the left or advance down the right side to enact the plans and policies. The

metaphor also implied that in a “properly organized national government,” all major policy planning proposals must pass through the Executive for decision. One must crest the mountain in order to go down the other side. Situated on the right side’s crest was the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) ideally providing “fruitful details” for “timing,” “coordinating,” and “integrating” operational guidance when more than one department or agency within the “dense jungle” was involved in a psychological warfare program (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 6 Feb 53). The mountain’s downward slope metaphorically entailed the speed and hazards involved in traversing down a mountain. Executing plans in the real world required the agility to adapt to changing situations and react to unexpected threats and opportunities.

While the mountain metaphor served as a conceptual structure for the machinery, Wallace Carroll provided a metaphorical framework for thinking through specific activities arrayed along the mountain. Given the assumption that the existing machinery did not meet the President’s needs, Carroll proposed the committee specifically address deficiencies of “mind and the will.” The “mind” represented “ideas and method,” specifically the organizational arrangements for developing strategy and plans for presidential consideration. The “will” represented the organizational arrangements involved in the execution of integrated and coordinated plans (White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 50, 27 Mar 53).⁹⁵ Committee interviews and correspondence reinforced Carroll’s call for the committee to address subordinate problems of planning *and* execution. Representing the many contributing voices, Edward Bernays wrote a series of letters and met with numerous committee members and staff to reiterate that “instrumentalities carrying on the cold war demand a great deal of reorientation, both in their approaches to the problem and in the implementation of action” (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 15 Jan 53).

Lakoff and Johnson explain that “the coherent network of [metaphorical] entailments... highlight some features of reality and hide others” (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 157). The visual representation of a mountain with various organizations conducting activities both up and down

⁹⁵ In a 1956 *Foreign Affairs* article, Robert Cutler described Eisenhower’s NSC as “policy hill” (448). Crediting Cutler, Cramer and Mullins later claim the “real innovation of Eisenhower’s [national security] reforms came from... the conceptualization of the NSC policy hill as a sequence of interrelated processes contributing to coherent national security policy... the idea of the NSC as a policy system or a machine that could streamline the intellectual and organizational elements of this process required considerable imagination and foresight on the part of Eisenhower and Cutler” (18). According to Cramer and Mullins, the image of a “policy hill” enabled those within the system to imagine how their individual efforts fit into the larger policy making picture.

the two slopes emphasized those activities leading to operations abroad. Actual Cold War operations abroad only took place at the base of the right-hand side of the mountain. In this regard, the metaphor did not hide the reality, but it had the effect of prioritizing discursive efforts on internal governmental processes occurring predominantly within Washington D.C. In early February having reviewed the scheduled list of interviewees, staff member Robert Blum commented the committee was “weak on the side of persons with recent foreign experience... we should have adequate numbers of persons who have been able to observe the effects of our policies and information program abroad, even though they themselves may not have been directly concerned with our information program” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 12 Feb 53). Blum had the responsibility for coordinating and supervising staff work as well as drafting the final report. Later that spring after reviewing the array of classified materials presented to the committee by various agencies, consultant Milton Katz on loan from the Ford Motor Company again noted “I am struck by the apparent preoccupation with the situation in Washington. The situation in the field-- the actual theatre of operation-- tends to be ignored” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated “Notes on Reports”). Outside voices such as Katz’s provided the committee with valuable checks on the direction of committee discursive activities.

Psychological or National Strategy? Name Games Continue

During the 6 February dinner, Cutler implied C. D. had responsibility for integrating a diffuse array of activities, while lacking authority over the organizations themselves in his role as Special Assistant for Cold War Activities (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 6 Feb). The diners agreed *all* NSC decisions included a psychological warfare component spurring debate on the practical scope of authorities and responsibilities for the Cold War Special Assistant.

As noted, C. D. Jackson publicly and privately worked to reinforce President Eisenhower’s October message of recasting psychological warfare. In an undated public speech on the Jackson Committee’s ongoing efforts, C. D. proclaimed:

The new approach... is very clear. Psychological warfare is not a little pet monster of any one department... with an aura of mystery and cloak and dagger... it is nothing more or less than the total posture of the entire Government, in the present struggle, toward all countries at all times... broad panorama of the struggle, therefore, including diplomatic and political maneuver, economic pressures, military pressures, moral and spiritual forces, industrial and defense production, atomic development, information and

propaganda programs, the work of the CIA, civilian defense, and a good deal more besides (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, undated).

C. D. was buoyed by an informal discourse coalition coalescing around a storyline of political warfare. As during the Princeton Conference, the storyline symbolized the inter-related activities of Cold War policy and strategy, internal coordination and integration, and realistic alternatives for foreign populations that aligned with U.S. interests. Referent emphasis differentiated various discursive communities. Funded by the CIA and Ford Foundation, the Center for International Studies (CENIS) at MIT had “devoted part of its energies over the past two years to research and analysis of political warfare problems on behalf of the Government” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 27 Feb 53). CENIS Director Max F. Millikan, who recently returned after a leave of absence to serve as an assistant director within the CIA, explained to the Jackson Committee that “the original idea of the Center was that political warfare problems cut across departmental lines...” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 27 Feb 53). A CENIS proposal for government organization focused on creating attitudinal and behavioral effects abroad through coordinated and integrated actions. Proposed solutions addressing internal governmental obstacles supported the goal of producing external psychological effects.

Political warfare is not a kind of activity separable from other activities of the government in the foreign field, but is rather an aspect of the totality of action we call foreign policy... The essence... is a concern for the impact of our actions... on the attitudes and behavior of foreigners vis-a-vis the East-West conflict. There are no distinctive elements of political warfare apart from the traditional and the newer instruments of foreign policy (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 27 Feb 53).

Walter Lippmann similarly argued that the essence of political warfare was developing a “strategy of third choice” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53). A strategy of third choice focused on targeting potentially receptive sectors within Russian society to convince key Russian individuals that current Soviet policies were tools justifying domestic control. U.S. political warfare activities would illuminate the potential for Russians to develop an alternative Soviet strategy that would also address “traditional Russian security concerns that no single power would dominate the European continent and that no hostile states should border Russia” (Mitrovich 2000, 118). As noted earlier, sensing committee preoccupation over organizational

constructs, Wallace Carroll again reminded the committee not to lose sight of the fundamental aspiration of changing attitudes and behaviors. He argued creating “*a world climate of confidence and hope*” reflected a broad, realistic alternative aligning with U.S. interests (POTUS, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 50, 1 May 53).

Jackson also was energized by similar storylines emanating from inside the government. At the Department of State a year prior, Walter Radius’ assessed that psychological “cuts across established agencies, with their traditional ways of doing things...” and “important consideration is that the existence of this area be fully recognized by those responsible for the conduct of foreign policy.” C. D. annotated “Read Must” on Radius’ paper that argued “of primary importance is a recognition that there are no clear-cut lines of demarcation between categories of instruments, and that the most effective use of the various instruments is achieved when they are used in combinations” (Dwight D. Eisenhower POTUS Records, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 61, 1952).

The committee also heard many arguments that “psychological strategy” was a misnomer. As noted in the previous chapter, the vague, multifaceted, and in-flux “semantics” of key rhetorical commonplaces complicated committee analytical efforts and argumentative games (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 30 Mar 53). Committee members used the modifier “psychological” to represent specific international information activities as well as comprehensive Cold War-related activities. This frustrated and even confused some staff members who aimed for analytical precision for categorical guideposts. Despite conceptual confusion, staff and committee members all discursively fought for solution specifications addressing an overall U.S. Cold War strategy rather than simply international information policies and activities.

Princeton economist Oskar Morgenstern reasoned a “national strategy” could not be “psychological” because the actual forces were military, political, and economic (PCIIA Records, Box 7, 8 Apr 53). A month earlier, Barklie Henry sat down with Sir Frederick S. Bartlett, “the most important and respected psychologist in England,” who urged the committee to conceptually employ “grand strategy.” According to Bartlett, “psychological strategy” gave the impression of being a “magic formula” that could solve a complex and dangerous problem (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 9 Mar 53). After meeting with Bartlett, Barklie Henry advocated the committee play a role in developing an “overall national strategy” as a “powerful weapon never before formally constructed in this country, and yet unique adapted to our government and to our

political and moral beliefs.” Henry conceptualized “national strategy... [as] an overall strategy in which the five chief agents of national power-- State, Defense, Foreign Aid, Foreign Information, and Central Intelligence-- are functionalized on an equal level, and not a “psychological strategy” in which the fourth component is elevated above the others” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 16 Mar 53).⁹⁶

The archival documents reveal many variations of the magic metaphor. General Robert McClure told the committee, “This is not just a sideshow. VOA [Voice of America] and the dirty tricks department [CIA] are played up too much” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Feb 53). Even committee members and staff employed magical metaphors. During the February committee conference, Townsend Hoopes and A. Atley Peterson described psychological warfare as “mental hokus pokus” through the “application of every type of pressure and persuasion” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 25 Feb 53). C. D. Jackson spoke of dispelling the “aura of mystery and cloak and dagger” surrounding psychological warfare (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, undated).

Bartlett’s comments highlighted two practical effects of such discourse on machinery practices and relationships. First, a “magical” strategy was simply exceptional. It negated any necessity for integration and coordination. George Morgan of the PSB conceded an unintended consequence of employing the term “psychological warfare” within the non-fighting sphere of the Cold War. It “conveys to many minds the idea that there is an easy road to victory which in fact does not exist” (PCIIA Records, Box 7, 21 May 53). Secondly, only specialists who understood the “magic” of psychological warfare were capable of developing and conducting such a strategy. This relieved traditional practitioners across the government from assuming new mentalities and practices. As an Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) document argued, “the types of background, education, training and experience required for persons engaged in psychological warfare are inherently different from those necessary for the successful conduct of [other] operations” (Dwight D. Eisenhower POTUS Records, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 61, undated). Bartlett essentially implied that in using

⁹⁶ Illustrating the relationship between problem representation and solutions, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information had an explicit focus on U.S. international information services. In its Seventh Semi-Annual Report to Congress in January 1953, the Commission recommended a Cabinet level agency with “vested authority to formulate psychological strategy” implying a distinct strategy emphasizing international information activities. Townsend Hoopes summarized the report and underlined the particular phrase (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 17 Mar 53). Contrast this perspective with the Jackson Committee’s comprehensive assessment of the Cold War effort.

the term “psychological,” the committee would perpetuate many of the subordinate problems it was seeking to address.

Rejecting Psychological Warfare in the Context of this Conflict

Recognizing the discursive problem, Gordon Gray wrote to Bill Jackson, “I think that we are all agreed that it would be useful to discontinue any such phrases as psychological strategy or psychological warfare, especially as designations of agencies or entities of government, or indeed as descriptions of government activities” (PCIIA Records, Box 13, 10 Mar 53). In the end, the final committee report and press release acknowledged a

particular confusion in regard to “psychological warfare” and “psychological activities.” We have found that psychological activity is not a field of endeavor separable from the main body of diplomatic, economic, and military measures by which the United States seeks to achieve its national objectives. It is an ingredient of such measures (1953, 1796).

The classified report and unclassified press release recommended policymakers and pundits discard the rhetorical commonplaces of psychological warfare and Cold War, concepts initially informing the committee’s mandate. Argumentative games persuaded the committee that these concepts inappropriately symbolized U.S. objectives, day-to-day activities, and required expertise. The modifiers “Cold” and “psychological” respectively trivialized the complexity of this novel conflict and promoted fanciful expectations for its aims, conduct, and conclusion. As Charles Bohlen pointed out, wars begin and end usually with one side’s defeat.

Conceptualizing and specifying national aims within the uncertain space between peace and war challenged the Eisenhower administration throughout the spring. Drawing on familiar “war” discourse, individuals continued to wrestle with extending military concepts to the current geopolitical context. In addition to Jackson Committee deliberations, various administration debates in the spring of 1953 were reminiscent of the dialogue in Princeton a year earlier. In early May, President Eisenhower met with his Secretaries of State and Treasury to brainstorm “Project Solarium” which would become a summer exercise to think through specific options for U.S. strategy and foreign policy. During the meeting, Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey raised the point that historically wars had been fought for conquest, unlike the contemporary “cold war.” He urged the administration to consider alternative national objectives appropriate

for the “cold war.” “We should look ahead to see what we would do with any victory we might win... Don’t go into an action unless you know where you’re coming out” (White House Office: NSC Staff Papers 1948-1961, Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, Box 15, 8 May 53).⁹⁷ Humphrey’s admonishment reflected military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s maxim that “no one starts a war -- or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so -- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it” (1976, 579). For Clausewitz, war was the application of violence to achieve goals. Humphrey’s dialogue reveals the confusion during this broader moment as policymakers sought discursive solutions transmuting the concepts of wartime goals achieved by violence to the geopolitical conflict involving primarily non-military measures. Wars were inherently violent *and* political, yet in the current context, political competition outweighed physical violence.

Two months after submitting the Jackson Report, C. D. Jackson gave a speech to the American Legion in St. Louis, Missouri. He expounded on the Jackson Committee’s discursive investigation into the nature and activities of psychological warfare and the rationale for rejecting this rhetorical commonplace as descriptive of U.S. efforts.

Because of a phoney aura of mystery which has attached itself to the concept... [people] have come to believe that when certain international problems arise, all you have to do is turn them over to the psychological warfare experts and they, through some kind of black magic and the liberal use of mirrors, will solve them (White House Central Files, Official File, 1953-1961, Box 570, 28 Aug 53).

Jackson argued that psychological warfare was neither warfare, nor “‘psychological’ because the men and women we seek to persuade are going to be persuaded mainly by what the United States does, what the United States is and stands for -- not by what we say or by any cute tricks of psychology or salesmanship.” Jackson’s discursive act reinforced the inclusion and positioning of individuals as political agents imbued with a responsibility for achieving U.S. objectives.

⁹⁷ The Jackson Committee received dictated notes from the 8 May meeting.

Organization and Reorganization for an Unified and Dynamic Effort

As the committee chairman, Bill Jackson subsequently prioritized discursive efforts toward the subordinate problem of institutional and organizational responsibilities and relationships by calling for an interim report on organization by the end of March (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53). The February and March committee conferences featured staff overview presentations and sessions with governmental and semi-official organizations. The formal conference briefings provided a window into the “dense” and “devious” jungle of organizations planning, coordinating, and conducting specific informational and broader Cold War activities (C. D. Jackson Records, Box 7, 24 Jan 53). Staff and committee members also engaged with numerous individual witnesses who offered perspectives on organizational gaps, causal connections, and possible solutions.

Townsend Hoopes had the responsibility of drafting the “organization” section of the committee’s final report. He framed the overarching question as “what is needed at the inter-departmental level to make our effort more coherent, better controlled, capable of swifter response to crisis and opportunity, and capable of better long-range planning?” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 27 Feb 53) In a memorandum to Robert Blum, Hoopes sought to refine problem boundaries and priorities. He argued the committee should focus on “the NSC and PSB levels primarily... and either avoid or to treat lightly the intra-departmental problems of organization... Concentration ought to be upon the inter-departmental agencies where less tradition is involved and the need for changes a good deal more apparent” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 27 Feb 53). Hoopes judged that were the committee to include intra-departmental issues, any analysis would “be clumsy and superficial at best.” The committee did not have enough time “to acquire enough knowledge...to come to wise judgment” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 27 Feb 53). Townsend’s initial proposals prioritized long-range planning (conceptually on the left-hand side of the mountain). However, Assistant Secretary of Defense W. H. Godel reinforced Hoopes’ inclusion of “crisis and opportunity” within the committee’s categorical boundaries. Godel wrote that this was

an oversight about what I feel most strongly. You have not addressed... the need for a “crash committee” in the national strategy board to consider government actions against targets of opportunity. I believe this to be one of the most important concepts which the committee could develop (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 17 Mar 53).

At a 18 March staff meeting, Bill Jackson reiterated his perspective of the causal connections between inter-departmental coordination and dynamic U.S. Cold War efforts. “All overture. No opera,” Jackson declared. “Inter-departmental friction must go” for the U.S. to have a unified and dynamic approach to the Cold War (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 18 Mar 53).

During the final day of the March committee conference, Robert Tufts circulated a memorandum on “Planning and Operations in the Cold War.” The memorandum began with two theses:

The first is that it is necessary to distinguish between and to make organizational arrangements for: “policy planning”, “operational planning” and “operations”. The second is that the U.S. Government is better able to deal with the problem of “policy planning” than it is to deal with the problem of “operational planning” and the problem of carrying out “combined operations” (that is, operations involving more than one agency) (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 28 Mar 53).

Tufts’ conceptualization and prioritization of the “mind and the will” sub-problems provided the foundation for subsequent argumentative exchanges contributing to solution specifications (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 6 Feb 53). The mountain metaphor combined with Tufts’ proposal to distinguish policy planning from operational planning and operations assisted committee categorization of information. In an undated submission, the Naval War College president Vice Admiral Richard L. Connolly described how the current tendency to conflate the three activities stymied strategic planning. “Attempts to formulate strategic plans are often impossible. Other government agencies [vice PSB] have the primary operating responsibility for total policy. They frequently postpone decisions on psychological plans on grounds that the situation is too “fluid” for planning” (PCIIA Records, Box 3, undated). Working within the mountain metaphor, committee members separated the environments associated with deliberate planning versus operational activities taking place in fluid environments.

Centralized Cold War Policy Planning

“Before World War II, foreign affairs were a minor responsibility of government” wrote Walter Radius who succinctly identified perceived gaps involving jurisdiction and authority within the post-World War II policy making process. With increasing U.S. involvement in world affairs came an increase in the number of departments and agencies competing in the policy

planning process. In 1949, the Hoover Commission reported at least thirty inter-departmental committees relating to foreign affairs alone (Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 1949, 21). Nelson Rockefeller described “ten years of strife between agencies” during a 9 April 53 meeting with the president (White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-61, Cabinet Series, Box 1, 9 Apr 53). Vice Admiral Connolly of the Naval War College asserted the “top men in the primary operating agencies such as State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs, etc, have made no real commitment to the principle of coordinated strategic planning and execution...” and therefore, neither have their respective staffs (PCIIA Records, Box 3, undated). U.S. Representative to the United Nations Cabot Lodge offered an illustrative example describing how the UN desk within State provided him guidance and “said who the hell are you to the PSB” which had attempted to weigh in on an issue. Cabot argued “this thing [the Cold War] is broader than the State Department” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53).

Given “the machinery now operating in psychological warfare [is] on a world-wide basis” and “not confined to areas of military operations,” an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) report argued for “centralized authority” with “direct access to the President” and the ability to deal with “elements in the domestic field whose implications are often widespread abroad, and which could not logically be coordinated under either State or the JCS” (Dwight D. Eisenhower POTUS Records, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 61, undated). OSD argued it was “essential” for a “single, central and responsible point for issuing directives... Its importance is perhaps greater in times of peace than in war for its success in peace could conceivably eliminate the necessity for war.” A Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff questionnaire submitted to the Jackson Committee also complained of a “lack of clear guidance as to the cold war role of the military” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, undated, 6). Despite these OSD recommendations, the institutional commitment to peacetime/Cold War activities and “centralized authority” was murkier. With exclusive responsibility for the application of force during hostilities, the military services focused on war planning and preparations, not *Cold War* planning and activities. Murray Dyer of the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University (a civilian military research center founded by the U.S. Army) wrote to the committee lamenting the fact that Army leaders *rejected* any notion of participating in national planning and coordination efforts. Dyer urged the committee to

recommend top down direction with specific caveats regarding Cold War military integration (Dwight D. Eisenhower POTUS Records, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 61, 15 Jul 53). Uniformed leaders also assumed that during hostilities, theater commanders would have explicit responsibility for all activities within specific theaters of operations as had been the case during World War II. Nonetheless, referencing the “known sentiments of the President-elect,” the OSD report also recommended to the Jackson Committee that in considering “where National responsibility should be placed for the production, coordinating and supervision of psychological warfare operations on X-Day and the period thereafter,” a Presidentially-appointed “Director of Psychological Warfare” was the most desirable solution.

Walter Radius of the State Department assessed “the President himself represents the only point in the government that has the jurisdiction and authority to insure the coordinated and effective use of all of these instruments for the achievement of national objectives” (Dwight D. Eisenhower POTUS Records, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 61, 1952). Anticipating bureaucratic resistance, C. D. Jackson argued to President-elect Eisenhower

it is essential... that during and after the study, some person deputized by you, with the necessary authority in this particular area, should be charged with the responsibility of setting up and at least initiating the operation recommended by the committee and approved by you. You will be the first to appreciate that this person will be operating in a never-never world... he will suffer the difficulties of coordinating without official authority (Ann Whitman Files, Box 21, 17 Dec 52).

As the committee debated the gap involving authorities, Bill Jackson agreed that presidential authority was the key to “bring the whole thing together” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53).

The committee heard repeated solicited and unsolicited arguments from former and current practitioners employing a storyline of centralized Cold War policy planning.⁹⁸ To

⁹⁸ It is interesting to note that practitioner George Creel did not directly contribute to Jackson Committee discursive activities despite being on initial lists of possible interviewees. On 12 January 1953, Creel wrote to President-elect Eisenhower offering to contribute “to the development of your “psychological warfare” plan, as outlined in your San Francisco speech of October 8th” (PCIIA Records, Box 2). Weeks later, feeling snubbed because the entire Jackson Committee was unable to see him right away, Creel wrote a letter to Robert Taft disparaging the Jackson Committee. Taft in turn forwarded the letter to journalist Malcolm Johnson who wrote an article entitled “Creel

improve the current “feeble, inefficient” planning efforts, Edward Bernays emphasized the need for a “centralized body” under the president which would be “free from politics and bureaucracy” (Central Files, General File 1955, Box 1185, 13 Apr 53). Addressing organizational insularity, Frank Barnett, executive secretary of the American Friends of Russian Freedom, argued a “powerful, centralized agency is the only answer” (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 18 Feb 53). Former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Barrett suggested “a coordinator at the President’s elbow” imbued with the authority to overcome bureaucratic resistance (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 25 Mar 53). Special Assistant to the Secretary of War in World War I Douglas Allen’s argument focused on the burden of departmental administrative responsibilities. Allen judged that daily tasks limited NSC and PSB members’ ability to devote to strategy planning. He urged John Foster Dulles to support a “Central Strategy Board” to devise a master plan for winning the political war (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 1 Dec 52). Wallace Carroll’s call for a “Strategy Group” was based on a similar argument (White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 50, 27 Mar 53). Harkening back to Princeton deliberations, current practitioners including Paul Hoffmann stressed an operational need for centralized doctrine and policy objectives (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 19 Mar 53). As the Chief of the International Information Administration for Greece, Turkey, and Iran, Katherine Bracken reminded the committee “that our propaganda or information is completely the handmaiden of policy” (PCIIA Records, Box 3, 13 Mar 53). Her implication was clear. Successful operations began with clearly coordinated and integrated national policy and strategy.

Equating “policy planning” with “strategy” in “the art of war” in his 28 March memorandum, Tufts argued the NSC would soon be well poised to conduct policy planning. Eleven days earlier, President Eisenhower had approved significant changes in the composition and functions of the NSC staff which was originally created to advise the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs became the “principal NSC executive officer” and Chairman of “the Planning Board” (formerly the Senior Staff) with “powers of coordination, review, inspection and supervision.” Townsend Hoopes assessed that “these new arrangements could produce a far more centralized and tightly controlled direction of the national effort in the

rejects new Voice role.” Citing Creel’s letter, the article decried the Jackson Committee’s lack of authority and expertise. Creel argued the committee was poised to fail and thus waste more time and resources required for the Cold War (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 11 Mar 53).

cold war” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 20 Mar 53). Tufts suggested that Planning Board practices should include identifying the general course of action approved by the president, how each agency fits into the picture, and the costs and risk limits within which each agency could then develop detailed operational planning (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 28 Mar 53). Tufts’ proposal echoed Assistant Secretary of Defense W. H. Godel. After reviewing Townsend Hoopes’ initial organizational proposal, Godel wrote:

I think that the national strategy board would have a rather more important planning function than you have suggested. I think that scope, pace, and magnitude of operations should be planned... that subordinate objectives should be established... [for the] myriad of contributory actions” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 17 Mar 53).

This was akin to Rostow, Lang, and others’ calls for the machinery to translate broad concepts and goals into specific objectives in order to empower the rest of the machinery to take practical steps. Given the approved changes, Tufts assessed “the areas in which improvement is most badly needed” are “operational planning” and “a more effective conduct of combined operations” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 28 Mar 53).

Centralized Cold War Operational Planning

Returning to Bill Jackson’s mountain metaphor, Cold War strategic processes on the downward slope dealt with the “timing,” “coordinating,” and “integrating” of operational planning. President Truman had created the Psychological Strategy Board to overcome bureaucratic hurdles in planning and coordinating. The PSB represented an “evolutionary stride” in organizational arrangements in that it brought together key officials on a weekly basis to discuss psychological warfare activities. However, even Gordon Gray, the PSB’s first director, conceded it had serious shortcomings (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53). Persistent organizational resistance to inter-departmental coordination, unclear directives and lack of authority within the institutional Executive Branch bureaucracy contributed to departmental “fratricidal warfare” described by C. D. Jackson a few months earlier (Ann Whitman File, Box 22, 17 Dec 52).

Jackson Committee “witcraft” initially centered on improving NSC, particularly PSB, performance (PCIIA Records, Box 13, 12 Feb 53). During the 6 February dinner, Cutler, the two Jacksons and Washburn discussed putting “teeth into the PSB to give it the authority it needs”

(PCIIA Records, Box 1, 6 Feb 53). Gordon Gray and Abbott Washburn independently recommended changing the name to “Security Strategy Board” (PCIIA Records, Box 13, 10 Mar 53). Washburn explained that this discursive solution specification would reflect a more specific directive to “encompass cold war operations in the broad sense: propaganda, diplomatic maneuvers, economic pressures, covert operations, intelligence, armament production, etc” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 12 Mar 53).

A myriad of interviews and correspondence reinforced this direction of argumentation. Indicating his preference for a “broad” view, Assistant Secretary of Defense Godel argued “it is imperative that we make a choice between the “broad” or the “narrow” or “dim” view. This, I think, is the principal contribution the Jackson Committee may make” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 17 Mar 53). “Narrow” implied that departments would continue to operate independently within respective lanes with psychological activities understood as a novel, distinct category. The Secretary of State would serve as the principal lead for all foreign policy-related activities with ad hoc assignments to coordinate specific Cold War programs. The argument for a “broad” view underpinned deliberations on what Hoopes termed a “supra-departmental body” as the appropriate location of executive authority and responsibility (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 20 Mar 53). General Robert McClure also spoke of the need for “broadening” the PSB’s scope and arming the organization “with authority to carry out decisions” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Feb 53). Dr. Edward Lilly of the PSB “talked discursively for half an hour on the continuing lack, in his view, of any organizational pattern, in PSB and between PSB and the executive departments, which permits the pinning down of responsibility and the carrying out of plans” (PCIIA Records, Box 7, 7 Apr 53). Acting PSB Director George Morgan agreed the gap between planning and effective implementation abroad “is one whose solution requires new authority and new organizational arrangements. Surely this is the crucial point, the keystone of the whole structure of psychological strategy without which the rest is useless” (WH Office, NSC Staff: Papers 1953-1961, PSB Central Files Series, Box 22, 5 Mar 53). Conversely, Walter Lippmann reminded the committee of the resident expertise within executive departments, cautioning against encouraging the PSB/NSC to draft policies and plans itself (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53).

General “Wild Bill” Donovan reminded the committee of the ongoing, sustained competition against Soviet influences taking place abroad. Compared to the Soviet machinery

capable of skillfully integrating and coordinating Communist activities to great effect, U.S. support from the top was “terribly inept” placing the U.S. at a disadvantage. Donovan advocated organizational provisions enabling integrated operational planning “just under the NSC” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Feb 53). The U.S. must be able “to make a fist, not just stick fingers with these four forces” of popular voice, economic, military, and political instruments. There is an inherent contradiction within this repeated boxing metaphor. Evoking images of power and force compelling others, the metaphor countered the conceptual foundation of U.S. political warfare as attracting and persuading through the exercise of free choice.

During the March committee conference as Robert Cutler announced the pending NSC Planning Board designation, he also relayed that the NSC anticipated establishing a “Security Strategy Board” to replace the Psychological Strategy Board.⁹⁹ “A great many questions developed” among the committee and staff (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 24 Mar 53). The committee had developed a consensus that presidential *authority* was required to overcome organizational intransigence and inculcate the perspective of *national* Cold War efforts. The committee questioned whether a Security Strategy Board would integrate and phase interdepartmental activities “to deliver the most massive blow” and also “follow up the development of and coordinating the programs of different departments and agencies to carry out a national policy.” Would the Board act as an “Executive Committee of the policy maker?” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 24 Mar 53). Robert Tufts developed a proposal in response to these committee inquiries.

On 28 March Tufts proposed establishing an Operations Board, comparable to the new Planning Board so that “all inter-departmental problems of national security policy--in planning or execution--are brought under the NSC in an orderly way” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 28 Mar 53). As Abbott Washburn described the concept to C. D. Jackson, the Operations Board was located “on the downward side of the mountain under the NSC” to “ride herd on the execution of all NSC decisions” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 7 Apr 53). Tufts noted to the committee that this solution specification would settle the question of jurisdiction. It discursively represented the “broad view” that “all actions in the cold war have an impact on the wills and attitudes of other governments and peoples (and in this sense have a psychological effect)” (PCIIA Records, Box

⁹⁹ According to Robert Cutler, President Eisenhower asked Cutler to examine NSC organization and operation and make recommendations on “how to make the N.S.C. mechanism more capable of carrying out effectively its statutory charter” (Cutler 1956, 456; Bose 1998, 12).

11, 28 Mar 53). The naming solution also discursively highlighted national operations as the practices directly contributing to dynamic effects. George Morgan, E. L. Taylor and H.S. Craig of the PSB later agreed having an OCB at the NSC level would “settle jurisdictional problems, so the government can act as a whole.” However, they advocated the inclusion of specific “psy-people” because “the fight we are in against communism in this field requires insight into a new world, a new dimension with which we have been unfamiliar” (PCIIA Records, Box 7, 21 May 53).

Organizational Arrangements for “National Strategy,” not “Psychological Warfare”

After hearing Tufts’ proposal, John Hughes drafted an informal note summarizing committee deliberations on Tufts’ proposal. The summary reveals a subtle and, for some within the committee, unintentional discursive shift since the psychological warfare conference in Princeton nearly a year earlier which Hughes also attended. At Princeton, the attendees discussed political warfare and agreed on a need to integrate and coordinate functions and activities. Yet, “psychological impacts” were the referent of their psychological warfare discussions. Coordination and integration were ways to achieve desired “psychological” ends. The distinction is one of emphasis. Working within the boundaries of the Cold War, Princeton participants’ argumentation worked backwards from identifying incremental “psychological” goals of reaching “hearts and minds” that supported long-term U.S. policy objectives of reducing the power and influence of the Soviet regime and bringing about a change in the current Soviet theory and practice of international relations.

Since the Princeton Conference, advocates had worked to disabuse the notion that psychological warfare was a “freak of one or more departments” and the discourse adjusted slightly from psychological to political warfare (Ann Whitman Files, Box 21, 17 Dec 52). The referent, perhaps unintentionally, became internal action rather than external effects. Building on arguments that psychological content “cannot be separated out and handled by cold war specialists,” the Jackson Committee coalesced around the “thesis” that “every act and policy of the government has psychological implications” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 11 Jun 53). However, as the next chapter will reveal, a new mindset was required across the executive branch in order to operationalize this thesis. Having prioritized the subordinate problem of

organization, the discursive emphasis shifted toward solution specifications for coordinating and integrating functions with no explicit reference to what Hughes termed the “p” factor:

Trend towards creating an Operations Board, made up as is present PSB. Basic idea is that just as Planning Board on one side of NSC helps draft policy papers so the Operations Board on the other side of NSC would help coordinate development of programs to carry out such policy papers... the Operations Board would be used, not because of the existence of a “p” factor in a policy, but whenever there was a major policy involving several departments (WH Office, NSC Staff: Papers, PSB Central File Series, Box 22, 28 Mar 53).

To mitigate any potential loss of the “p” factor, Millikan and Rostow argued “[t]here should be present on the NSC itself a member whose explicit mission is to see to it that political warfare considerations are given due weight in the deliberations of that body on virtually all issues” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 25 Mar 53). Two months later, PSB personnel echoed the argument. Tufts recommended that the President’s Special Assistant for Cold War Activities serve on the Operations Board “to cover the function of telling the story and the function of seeing that the sequence of actions to be taken would be most telling in influencing men’s minds and wills” (White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, PSB Central File Series, Box 22, 28 Mar 53). The solution in effect required a “Cold War specialist” to be the lynchpin for determining and realizing psychological impacts.

On 8 April Bill Jackson briefed the Operations Board concept to President Eisenhower. The President informally concurred with proposed recommendations for centralized policy and operational planning at the NSC level to “unify” programs involving two or more departments or agencies. Meeting with the staff members afterwards, Jackson relayed Eisenhower’s approval of an “Operations *Coordinating* Board [OCB] with a joint staff serving both planning and operations.” The amended name reflected the emphasis on coordination and integration of instruments employed in operations overseas. Bill Jackson then relayed that Eisenhower “didn’t want PSB or PW [psychological warfare]...[telling me] You have national strategy, not psychological warfare” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 8 Apr 53).

That same day, Abbott Washburn wrote to C. D. Jackson:

Bill says you agree with the organizational concept and I am a churl for implying it shortchanges the cold war component. I’m prepared to yield gracefully but here are some questions. Will this

make the cold war effort “MORE UNIFIED AND MORE DYNAMIC?” Under this plan, there is no psychological strategy per se, only national policy and national strategy (C. D. Jackson Records, Box 7, 8 Apr 53).

Robert Blum also expressed concerns to Townsend Hoopes. “Now that we seem to be accomplishing our objective of putting psychological warfare in the full perspective of Government policy and not allowing the tail to wag the dog, I think we should make sure that we are not overdoing this” (PCIIA Records, Box 13, 10 Apr 53). In particular Blum argued “in the structure that we recommend there must be a proper place for the development and coordination of information and “psychological” activities” (PCIIA Records, Box 13, 10 Apr 53). Complimenting Bill Jackson that his “organizational plan is unquestionably the best proposal to date,” Abbott Washburn nonetheless “still [had] the feeling... that it doesn’t completely cover the cold war base” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 11 Apr 53). Washburn told C. D. Jackson that the committee must incorporate a solution that enabled “certain projects [to be] dreamed up and executed solely for cold war purposes--things that wouldn’t normally fall into the categories of day-to-day official action or policy making” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 11 Apr 53). The same day the PSB Assistant Director of Plans and Policy Edmund Taylor expressed his hope that the “psychological factor... would receive equal treatment with other considerations, e.g., military, economic, and political” (PCIIA Records, Box 10, 11 Apr 53). Taylor’s understanding of a psychological factor aligned with Washburn’s in that “it pays primary attention to the influencing of opinions of the masses and of key individuals and groups *which might otherwise be neglected*” (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the argumentative games played over the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), its broad scope, and a continuing concern for the “p” factor, Abbott Washburn later noted that the initial draft report said “nothing about P-Factor planning” in its recommendations (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 29 May 53).

Herein revealed a practical consequence of problem framing and committee discourse involving the rhetorical commonplace “psychological warfare.” In February, Bill Jackson reinforced categorical boundaries involving inter-departmental organizational arrangements by emphasizing the overall coordination of the Cold War effort (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53). This focus and corresponding discourse that associated all NSC decisions with psychological warfare had the unintended consequence of de-emphasizing specific “psychological” activities. In particular, committee argumentative games moved away from

explicit references to the “psychological” impact of U.S. actions.¹⁰⁰ The committee contended the psychological element was inherent in all governmental actions and could not be isolated. This emphasis overshadowed a focus on deliberate psychological “telling of the story” through specific words and actions (White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, PSB Central Files Series, Box 22, 28 Mar 53).

Despite Eisenhower’s specific guidance to Bill Jackson regarding a national strategy solution specification, he too, later voiced concern about potential neglect of the “p” factor. During the 2 July 1953 NSC meeting, the Jackson Committee report was a specific topic of discussion. President Eisenhower asked:

how could we make sure that the psychological factor in important Government actions was not overlooked, since the OCB would have as its primary responsibility the coordinated execution of national security policies? ... he wanted to be assured that someone was going to keep track of the psychological side as of major importance (DDE POTUS Papers, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4, 2 Jul 53).

The NSC minutes relay that “Mr. Cutler attempted to point out that the burden of the whole Jackson Committee report indicated that there was no such separate entity as a psychological factor, but that all actions of the Government had psychological repercussions which could not be separated.” C. D. Jackson reassured the president that a small “think staff” within the Operations Coordinating Board would focus on the “psychological impact of significant government action.” Eisenhower “expressed himself as satisfied as long as the matter were not overlooked” (DDE POTUS Papers, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 4, 2 Jul 53).

This interpretation does not imply that the Jackson Committee neglected international information activities as a specific category within its problem framing of “a new look at the cold war effort” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 30 Jan 53). Robert Cutler drafted an informal note following the February committee conference in which he argued that elevating and giving stature to all foreign information services and cultural and educational exchange programs was necessary for “attack[ing] the cold war problem in a new, vital way.” In fact, given the physical

¹⁰⁰ This realization may have been part of the prompt for consultant Wallace Carroll’s reminder of “Telling the Story.” Carroll’s memorandum reminded the committee not to lose sight of the big picture. The fundamental, aspirational objective sought was a “world climate of confidence and hope in which freedom will flourish and communism wither” (POTUS, White House Central Files (Confidential File), Subject Series, Box 50, 1 May 53).

limitations for operations behind the Iron Curtain, the final report specifically emphasized the critical role of overt, factual VOA reporting and covert RFE, Radio Liberty, and to a lesser extent Radio Free Asia, in political warfare within the Communist sphere (Jackson Report 1953, 1824-1834). Nonetheless, in the same February memorandum Cutler caveated “[t]o me, the more vital aspect of “psychological strategy” is the fitting-together of the elements of government in what is being done day-by-day” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 28 Feb 53). In the “free world,” information activities would be an effective “auxiliary” to material activities (Jackson Report 1953, 1836).

The Jackson Committee heard many testimonials suggesting cabinet-level rank for the International Information Administrator. The congressional Hickenlooper Committee and presidential Rockefeller Committee also recommended increasing the authority and responsibility of the International Information Administration (IIA), whether it remained within the State Department or became a new executive agency. As a previous chapter noted, as Bill Jackson briefed the president on the Operations Board, the Rockefeller Committee was poised to publish its recommendation for the creation of a separate information agency. Bill Jackson, John Hughes, Milton Eisenhower and Arthur Fleming all had argued for the agency to remain within State. John Foster Dulles and Nelson Rockefeller argued for its independence (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 12 Mar 53 and Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 6 Feb 53).¹⁰¹ Notwithstanding Bill Jackson’s personal preference to keep IIA in the State Department, he considered organization from the perspective of promoting an “unified” effort both in terms of planning and coordinating action. As Jackson explained to Sig Larmon, “having the service in or out of the State Department is just not that important” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 18 Mar 53). In a 1 May 53 letter to William Benton, President Eisenhower also expressed his preference for the VOA to remain within the State Department. Nonetheless, “I have never been one of those who maintains that in some particular detail of organization lies the secret of success or failure. Consequently, I am moved to agree with your [Benton’s] statement that this is an important, but not a vital, question” (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 50, 1 May 53). The Jackson Report instead provided discursive

¹⁰¹ Arthur Fleming served in the FDR and Truman administrations, including the Hoover Commission charged with studying the organization of the federal government. He later served as the U.S. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under President Eisenhower.

rationale informing the philosophy behind the role and integration of information within national strategy.

Effective Coordination, Unified Effort, National Planning

The keystone of the Jackson Report was enabling “a national effort” by reaffirming the institution of the presidency and its authority for foreign affairs (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 64, 11 Jul 66). Replacing the Psychological Strategy Board within the National Security Council, the Operations Coordinating Board would coordinate the development of detailed operational plans, assure timely and coordinated execution, initiate proposals for arising geopolitical opportunities, and assure execution of programs contributed to the desired “climate of opinion” (Jackson Report 1953, 1854). The White House press release described the OCB as part of the “reconstitution and revitalization of the National Security Council.” Notwithstanding internal argumentation regarding the necessity of “centralization,” “unified” and “national” represented the operative words for the U.S. approach. The U.S. sought a similar, presumed strategic advantage in centralized planning, but discursively distinguished U.S. practices from Soviet centralized control. Reaffirming presidential *authority* for national planning, Robert Cutler later clarified the OCB’s role as

a coordinator and an expediter and a follower-up and a progress reporter... [but noted] I have seen it erroneously called the Operations *Control* Board... The O.C.B. can assist, follow up, report; but it cannot initiate or change policy. And the language of the Executive Order is scrupulously exact to this effect (1956, 449).

Chapter Seven: An Orchestra Playing from the Same Score

“In a free society we can’t order the instruments in our orchestra. But we can at least see that everybody’s playing from the same score.” -- C. D. Jackson, 1953

The Operations Coordinating Board solution specification addressed gaps involving operational planning and coordination. Although the committee prioritized the subordinate problem of operational planning, the members also addressed implementation within their problem representation processes. Committee attention was perhaps spurred by consultant Milton Katz. After assessing all classified material available to the committee, Katz contended “[i]t is necessary also to approach the problem in terms of the actual situation in the theatre of operations. For example, what course of policy and action is needed in France; what sort of organization does this require in France, in Western Europe? What supporting organization in D.C.?” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated) Tufts reinforced Katz’ argument in his 28 March proposal that concluded, “operations are the pay-off. We may have excellent policy planning, a wise policy decision, and a sound program, but unless the operations are skillfully coordinated and executed, we will not gain the objective. In short, campaigns are won or lost on the battlefields” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 28 Mar 53). The committee geographically categorized the “battlefields” as the Soviet bloc [the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe], third areas [the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa], the U.S., and the rest of the free world [Western Europe, Latin America, and the Far East] (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 18 Mar 53). Heeding Bill Jackson’s initial guidance to avoid becoming “an operating committee,” committee argumentative games centered around determining gaps and causal connections affecting successful operations and the achievement of policy objectives. Information gathering focused on categories of available and untapped Cold War means, ways means were employed, and “battlefield” operational control. The committee’s iterative discursive processes reexamined whether current U.S. policies and objectives were “realistic” given the array of possible means and “whether current operations... contribute[d] to the realization of such objectives” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated).

In a May meeting with his advisors, President Eisenhower identified “three broad classifications” of psychological/Cold War activities. Although the notes were provided to the

committee, his classifications reflected categories already debated amongst the Jackson Committee. The first two categories were primarily psychological in that they involved forms of information intended to shape public perceptions of social and material conditions. The first was providing “truthful, accurate statements” of policy and American positions through official broadcasting by the VOA. The second was “presenting the American story” in ways where the “hand of government must be carefully concealed, and, in some cases I [Eisenhower] should say, wholly eliminated.” The third category involved U.S. economic, defense, and political “deeds” having “a direct impact” on material reality (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 5, 1 May 53).

Representing many testimonials, Paul Hoffman declared to the committee “what we do is critical” (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 19 Mar 53). Because of the direct relationship between material and social realities, Eisenhower stressed actions “must be carefully coordinated with all other efforts to present America accurately to the eyes and ears and hearts of the world” (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 5, 1 May 53).

Skillful coordination of local actions and words was complicated by the evolving practices of foreign policy in the post-war era. As Cabot Lodge told the committee “this thing is broader than the State Department” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53). As relayed earlier, U.S. diplomatic missions abroad had evolved to include about “220,000 civilian employees of various government agencies serving overseas, in addition to about 800,000 serving in military capacities” (Ann Whitman File, Box 21, 31 Dec 56, emphasis added).

Empowering Decentralized Operations

The committee became a focal point for individual citizens’ ideas for Cold War activities with the majority of received correspondence offering insights and specific suggestions.¹⁰² Leading an organization of almost three million war veterans and another one million auxiliary members, the American Legion president Lewis K. Gough told the Jackson Committee that he had “been speaking constantly in general terms on psychological warfare and [found] a great interest and ready acceptance in the field” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 12 Feb 53). The committee categorized much correspondence in terms of specific discursive communities, including public relations/advertising, news media, social scientists, and current practitioners stationed abroad.

¹⁰² The committee responded to each letter received. Many responses thanked individuals for their creativity and attention to the problem, but also noted that the Jackson Committee itself would not deal directly with operations. In some cases, the committee forwarded ideas to the CIA or other operational departments for consideration.

The committee held numerous sessions focusing on organizations responsible for conducting Cold War activities, including specific white, gray, and black international information activities. The committee also interviewed departmental representatives located in Washington D.C., current and former ambassadors and personnel assigned to country teams around the globe, as well as informed citizens living overseas.

Presidentially-Appointed Ambassadors and Country Teams

A confidential 1952 Bureau of Social Science Research (BSSR) report summarizing seventy-one ambassadors' evaluations of U.S. information programs also informed committee deliberations. The BSSR questionnaire reflected the prevailing practice of distinguishing psychological goals from foreign policy goals. Chiefs of Mission and consulates were asked to identify "information" goals and ongoing activities and messaging supporting those goals. Respondents also provided assessments of effectiveness, suggestions for improvements, and comparisons of U.S. efforts with other countries including, but not limited to, the Soviet Union (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 1 Oct 52). The majority of ambassadors highlighted the magnitude of "effective" covert Soviet propaganda and psychological warfare activities advancing Soviet political objectives. They also expressed "optimism" for achieving U.S. objectives. Chiefs of Mission specifically identified the following "information" objectives: strengthening allies, allied relationships, and foreign support for U.S. policies; combating enemy ideologies (primarily communism); and combating forces "hostile" to the U.S., including neutralism. In contrast to the inter-departmental challenges in D.C., U.S. ambassadors "virtually unanimously" assessed information programs were "completely accepted by other United States personnel and in most cases completely integrated into the mission's other activities" (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 1 Oct 52, 66).

Discussions highlighted a primary gap of U.S. credibility. The committee considered causal connections impacting U.S. credibility and effectiveness including propaganda content and dissemination methods. Before the committee officially convened, John Fistere of *Fortune* wrote to C. D. Jackson that, "the source, and the manner of dissemination are just as important in effective political warfare as the ideas that are to be communicated" (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 19 Jan 53, emphasis in original). Reflecting an American tendency to distinguish between educating and propagandizing, testimonies attributed reduced U.S. credibility to blurry delineations

between information and propaganda (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 9 Mar 53). Walter Lippmann argued the “VOA should echo what the AP is saying to the American people. BBC talks to the British; that’s why foreigners believe it” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53). Austrian refugee and OSS alum George Hoffmann characterized the VOA as “pretty good.” In the midst of a multi-month assessment of U.S. information programs in Europe, Hoffmann told the committee that to improve U.S. credibility, the VOA should report facts and reduce interpretations. The VOA “tries to tell the Europeans what and how to interpret instead of giving them the background and the reasons for the decisions-pro and con” he wrote (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 13 May 53). Hoffman stressed the importance of allowing Europeans to draw their own conclusions. A month earlier Columbia Broadcasting System commentators, including Edward R. Murrow, offered the same recommendations adding the U.S. should concentrate more on our friends than our enemies (PCIIA Records, Box 13, 14 Apr 53). Eisenhower himself insisted on precise boundaries between white information and gray and black information activities in demanding the separation of “official Voice of America information.” He demanded “never a lie or an exaggeration. Do the “funny stuff” some other way. That’s the only thing I insist on” (WH Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-61, Cabinet Series, Box 1, 9 Apr 53). Eisenhower’s secretary noted in the marginalia “this is the most determined presentation DDE has ever made.”

A previous chapter interpreted committee witcraft regarding “Great Words,” including arguments for translating grand themes into messages and objectives tailored to specific audiences. In representing that for which the U.S. stood, “Great Words” also provided practical boundaries for practitioners conducting local psychological operations. Having recently completed a tour as a military propagandist in Germany, industrial designer Everett Hoffman contended

in the realm of PsyWar planning and in direct dealing with the German people... there was... a sad tendency to do absolutely nothing. In my talks with State Department personnel, with PsyWar Officers and with the German civilians, the same feeling of confusion resulted. We, of these United States, did not know what we stood for (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 11 Jan 53).

Repeated witnesses cited ineffective centralized information, departmental unresponsiveness to U.S. missions abroad, and lack of policy direction for public, semi-public,

and private programs and initiatives as negatively affecting U.S. Cold War efforts. Witnesses representing State's International Information Administration (IIA), DoD, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) offered anecdotal stories illustrating the necessity of decentralized operational control in order to engage effectively with foreign audiences (PCIIA Records, Box 2, assorted dates). Having recently visited United States Information Services in France, Germany, and Italy, Ruth Adams of IIA lamented the "lip service paid to directives to tailor programs to countries and areas" (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 11 Mar 53). Writing from Baghdad, Public Affairs Officer David Newsom reminded the committee that "words mean different things to different men." Centralized messages of "our democracy as a way of life" and "capitalism" are counterproductive without understanding the specific local practices that provide meaning in different areas of the world (PCIIA Records, Box 8, 16 Apr 53). Richard Pough of the American Museum of Natural History was among those who independently reinforced Newsom's argument (PCIIA Records, Box 8, 18 May 53). Meeting with Barklie Henry, publisher Robert Crowell presented "very vivid evidence" of Washington D.C.'s lack of responsiveness to the field. Henry assessed that Crowell's case study involving libraries highlighted "a criticism which seems to cut across all areas of our foreign information activities... At every turn, it seems to me, we find that there is too much control from Washington, too little control by the Ambassador" (PCIIA Records, Box 3, 4 Apr 53).

Solution suggestions almost uniformly pointed to decentralized operational control to U.S. ambassadors appointed by the President. President Eisenhower himself contributed to the "witcraft" for decentralizing operations. On 9 April, when discussing the pending Rockefeller Committee recommendations, he asked "is there any place in this thing that says an Ambassador is boss is his own area?"¹⁰³ He then relayed "an old helpful cliché" that "centralization is the refuge of fear" (White House Office, Office of Staff Secretary: Records, Cabinet Series, Box 1, 9 Apr 53).

Former IIA Administrator Dr. Wilson Compton publicly advocated for ambassadorial authority to supervise programs within their respective countries in a 22 March interview for *Newsweek*. However, writing from Paris, Public Relations executive James Jones warned the

¹⁰³ His secretary also captured Eisenhower as saying, "I must admit in my time I've ignored a few of them myself, but I must say it was for cause!" (WH Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-61, Cabinet Series, Box 1, 9 Apr 53).

committee of the “great temptation for the Ambassador to “cater” to the country to which he is accredited... in endeavoring to please, he would sugar-coat or gloss over the realities of American foreign policy” (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 7 Mar 53). Interestingly, in the 1952 ambassador survey only a “small number” suggested increasing local autonomy. U.S. Special Representative in Europe Ambassador William H. Draper Jr. reinforced the argument for localized control through his selection of the word “primacy” in testimony. He assessed country teams “were working fairly well” and he “did not seem to think that any important changes were necessary in order to insure the primacy of the Ambassador” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 9 Apr 53). According to Draper, country teams were well positioned to develop relationships and build trust with key local nationals (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 8 Apr 53). Local nationals had the societal connections and indigenous knowledge required for U.S. embassies to tailor words and actions to address and link local conditions and concerns to U.S. interests.

Consultant Milton Katz pointed out to the committee that Draper’s own position was a “post of action,” whereas the “traditional foreign service concept [developed during the laissez faire approach to foreign policy]... tends to conceive of the Ambassador’s role as one primarily of observation and communication” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated). Implicitly working within the “modern” understanding of foreign policy, Katz suggested the committee specifically consider the nature of diplomatic representation and its relationship to dynamic Cold War efforts. The committee did so, explicitly advocating all ambassadors regard their posts “as one of action, rather than merely of observation” (Jackson Report 1953, 1859). Katherine Bracken, IIA Chief for Greece, Turkey and Iran, reinforced calls for modern, active diplomatic posts conducting combined operations at the local level. She told the committee she was “strongly in favor of the country plan and the decentralization of the information program [which is] completely the handmaiden of policy” (PCIIA Records, Box 3, 13 Mar 53). Bracken was not alone in emphasizing the relationship between information activities and policy. At its 1952 National Convention, the American Legion adopted a “vigorous declaration of policy... Effective propaganda is inseparable from effective national policy” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 16 Mar 53). However, staff editorial comments noting Miss Bracken’s “interesting ideas” indicated the novelty of ambassadorial-led country teams and plans. A staff member wrote “Miss Bracken had some very definite and interesting ideas concerning the purpose of an information program in these countries [and] the organization of a staff to implement such a program” (PCIIA Records,

Box 3, 13 Mar 53). When later asked “what is the central objective of international information” during a roundtable discussion with public relations executives, Bill Jackson’s response was “the job is to persuade peoples that our policies are good for them. In each country the Ambassador is the key” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 13 May 53).

Ford Foundation president and former ECA director, Paul Hoffman argued an impossibility to “mastermind from D.C.” because of the lack of local knowledge and understanding. The ECA decentralized its operations to personnel in each country and its indigenous national groups (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 19 Mar 53). In testimony to the Hickenlooper Committee, Chairman of the Board and General Counsel of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters Justin Miller offered an analogy of successful political campaigns. To be successful a candidate must “understand the backgrounds of our people and gauge the tides of emotions which run constantly...” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 18 Mar 53). One could not develop this type of understanding while sitting in Washington D. C. based offices. Various emigres supported decentralization within VOA in order to improve broadcasts (PCIIA Records, Box 3, 4 Apr 53). A private individual offered that effective public relations programs must “be constantly aware of foreign conditions” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 28 Jan 53). M.D. Graham and Leonard Cottrell, Jr. of the Research and Development Board pitched academic expertise adding that “to understand the dynamics of... people requires a much broader understanding of the social forces behind those people” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 16 Feb 53).

Paul Hoffman’s testimony reinforced the argument that decentralized, indigenous propaganda was more effective than centralized messages from Washington, although he affirmed the advantages of NSC orchestration for major programs (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 19 Mar 53). A number of testimonies, including the 1952 ambassador survey, also advocated for institutional solutions enabling greater regional coordination to address Cold War problems that spanned state geographic borders. Some correspondents, including Bulgarian legal specialist Dr. Constantine Dimitroff Kojouharoff, supported broadening categorical boundaries of “regional” activities to specifically include “international” (allied) activities (PCIIA Records, Box 6, Feb 53). Madame Thome Patenotre, a member of the French Assembly who was a personal friend of U.S. Representative to the UN Cabot Lodge, also urged the committee to consider recommending the creation of a Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) specifically for psychological warfare (PCIIA Records, Box 14, 13 Mar 53).

The Jackson Report recommended recognizing U.S. ambassadors as the “principal field authority” (1953, 1858). Arguments convinced committee members that the most effective programs were those in which the Chief of Mission actively provided advice and guidance for integrated country teams (1953, 1828). The unclassified press release for the final classified report correlated improved direction, integration and coordination within the executive branch with a need for “similar strengthening of coordination in United States missions abroad under the direction of the respective Chiefs of Mission” (PCIIA Records, Box 15, 8 Jul 53). Decentralized execution should be managed through “effective centralized control... in each country” (1953, 1842-3). The report advanced the emerging concept of “country teams” which symbolized an ideal of U.S. missions working together to accomplish *national* goals. The country team concept reaffirmed Chiefs of Mission as the president’s representatives, encouraged active ambassadorial leadership, and emphasized intra-mission relationships over organizational ties to respective departments and agencies in Washington D. C. The committee concluded country teams were uniquely positioned to conduct effective political warfare given that U.S. missions were geographically situated to best understand local conditions and desires, determine and engage with local leaders and publics, and tailor U.S. deeds and words to create climates and alternatives in the U.S. interest.

People-to-People Activities

The committee received numerous letters outlining an assemblage of diverse, ongoing private and semi-private activities contributing to U.S. Cold War efforts, as well as proposals for future operations. Although many private and semi-private Cold War activities began during the Truman administration, the committee assessed “it is doubtful that the American people have a clear idea... [of] how they can participate in the common effort” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated draft chapter 8). President Eisenhower’s fall campaign speech and January announcement of the Presidential Committee on International Information Activities symbolically raised the stature of these citizen activities by linking them to Eisenhower’s vision for winning the Cold War. Among many who wrote to President Eisenhower and the committee, A.R. Doumaux of Wellsboro, Pennsylvania declared “[c]ommon citizens like ourselves are thinking deeply on this subject of the aggressions of the Soviets and the possibility of curbing them without warfare. It is only in this spirit of utilizing powerful psychological forces on a

national scale that we have presumed to address you” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 7 Feb 53). The Common Council for American Unity wrote of the “considered judgment of the Council” that the “United States can no longer afford to overlook the unique and powerful asset that our newer citizens offer in conjunction with psychological warfare” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 29 Apr 53). This assertion assumed an ability to harness decentralized activities toward national, even international, goals. Other correspondents offered a plethora of ideas for “genuine people-to-people” approaches that would satisfy the American public’s “pent up energy to do something in the cold war” (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 17 Mar 53).¹⁰⁴

In April, the staff drafted an initial three-page chapter on “The Participation of the American People and Private Organizations” for the committee report. The subordinate problem was framed as such:

In the cold war, the assets of our democratic institutions may go largely unused and even risk becoming a liability. Consideration of this problem is of paramount importance because the total investment and overseas activities of American private institutions of all types dwarf Government activities (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated draft chapter 8).

The chapter specified that to inspire and harness private sector activities required public understanding of the “responsibilities and burdens which must be borne for generations.” “Great Words” and democratic ideals would guide this understanding. As early as spring 1941, C. D. Jackson intoned “American democracy must assume increasing responsibility throughout the world during the coming post-war readjustment. It is not enough for democracy itself to be a dynamic and explosive idea with a universal appeal. It must be manned by intelligent leaders imbued with a fervor for democracy” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 1941).

¹⁰⁴ The correspondent suggesting a “genuine people-to-people” approach concluded his letter with the “operation would need a name, of course, and should be chosen carefully and with due regard to the symbolism inherent in the idea” (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 17 Mar 53). President Eisenhower established the People-to-People Program on 11 September 1956 to enhance international understanding through cultural, educational, and humanitarian activities. According to the Eisenhower Archives, “The idea for People-to-People was President Eisenhower’s but he envisioned the execution and implementation of this program coming from the country’s citizens, not their government; however, the program did have initial links to the U.S. government through the United States Information Agency (USIA). The People-to-People Program was comprised of forty committees chaired by prominent leaders, businessmen and citizens from all walks of American life” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/people_to_people.html My teenage daughter participated in three People-to-People Student Ambassador Programs in Australia, Europe, and South Africa from 2012-2014.

The potential in harnessing private sector expertise was not limited to overseas engagements. Professor of Economics at Princeton and author of *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* Oskar Morgenstern described the “tremendous gap between the work of the government and the academic disciplines which could usefully contribute to it” (PCIIA Records, Box 7, 8 Apr 53). The culprit was governmental security requirements that effectively prohibited even informal collaboration. Edward K. Moss, Public Information Officer for the National Production Authority and the Defense Production Administration, also implored a “revision of handling of security information practices” inhibiting the government from sharing information with the public (PCIIA Records, Box 7, 21 May 53). Abbott Washburn responded that the committee had indeed addressed that point in the Jackson Report (PCIIA Records, Box 7, 18 Jun 53).

Shifting Mentalities and Practices

Having framed the problem as a “new look at the cold war effort,” the Jackson Committee’s discursive activities addressed a series of interlocking subordinate problems within its problem representation processes. The committee conceptualized the Cold War as a long-term competition with the Soviet Union characterized by quotidian struggles in “nonwar” spheres that threatened American national security. In rejecting the current geopolitical situation as an “emergency” but considering the possibility of “X-day,” committee discourse projected a new normality within international relations. As the Princeton participants concluded, the concept of status quo was obsolete. Soviet political warfare characterized the global condition. Within this context, the committee specifically considered overarching U.S. policy goals and objectives, institutional and organizational structures to coordinate and integrate resources, and decentralized operations. In projecting a new normality of international relations and prescribing centralized guidance for decentralized national Cold War efforts, the committee implicitly asserted the U.S. was in a period of transition. This required the mobilization of the American mind.

As experts within the fields of publishing, industrial propaganda, and academia respectively, Walter Lippmann, Edward Bernays, and Milton Eisenhower represented voices of an informal discourse coalition arguing that organizational solutions alone would not satisfy President Eisenhower’s directive. The discourse coalition advanced the notion that promoting

and sustaining a “new, unified, and dynamic” Cold War effort required a shift in individual mentalities and practices. As George McBundy asserted “no revolution is ever safely complete until its work is carried on by men not in the immediate circle of those who made it; and the longer it is led by a small or limited group, the greater its fragility” (McBundy 1952, 6). The committee expanded McBundy’s categorical boundaries to include the American public. Committee argumentative games considered gaps, causal connections, and solutions for decentralizing power relations and mobilizing the power of individuals within government and across society.

An Enlightened and Engaged Bureaucracy

As the committee began focusing its argumentative games on organizational solutions, Walter Lippmann cautioned “the thing itself is not organization. Six men in a Coca Cola plant make syrup [like] national policy” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53). The industrial analogy evoked images of an automated plant in which workers exercised little independent thought in producing a consistent product. According to Lippmann, the “psychological component” of American foreign policy required individuals to understand the relevance of, and creatively apply, their activities to the “free world versus Soviet struggle.” In his testimony to the Hickenlooper Committee, Edward Bernays also expanded the problem beyond the machinery to the mind. “The existing machinery is not altogether at fault for our losing battle for man’s mind.” The real fault is “our own blindness to the relative importance of psychological warfare to our total effort” (Central Files, General File 1955, Box 1185, 13 Apr 53). Milton Eisenhower agreed, declaring plainly that “there hasn’t been enough recognition by Government officials of the relevance of their actions to the overriding struggle of the Free World versus the Soviet World” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Mar 53).

Lippmann described patterns of behavior in which “State did not see Cold War opportunity [but] a diplomatic headache.” He offered a litany of illustrative examples, echoed by Milton Eisenhower, including the “Soviet atomic explosion, the Rosenbergs, Stalin’s death, a Czech plane coming out, and a Brazilian loan deal.”¹⁰⁵ U.S. officials could have considered these

¹⁰⁵ In 1950, three Czech State Airline planes were hijacked, landing near Munich rather than Prague. Two-thirds of the passengers asked to return, providing Czech authorities with a positive propaganda story. In Brazil, leaders had reintroduced political and economic liberalism after World War II. Import licensing prioritized essential inputs rather than consumer goods in order to spur domestic production. However, this exacerbated balance of payments.

unique situations from the perspective of influencing foreign perspectives and behaviors through a deliberate “telling of the story” in words and deeds. However, only in some cases was the “normal course reversed after somebody had persuaded a high State official.” Lippmann charged “big organizations are never creative”(Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53).

“Normal” meant routine, bureaucratic, automatic, unimaginative, and even uninformed. Akin to the Coca-Cola plant, the U.S. government was a system of organizational structures that generated internal requirements and managed through established bureaucratic routines that omitted explicit references to the broader geopolitical context. The Coca-Cola workers had no need or inclination to understand the external marketplace. Even as the committee debated the proposed Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), staff member Robert Blum warned Bill Jackson of “the danger that the Board would become routine and unimaginative” due to other “pre-occupations” (PCIIA Records, Box 13, 13 Apr 53). To hedge against bureaucratic pre-occupations, Abbott Washburn proposed the OCB include “a small staff of 6 or 7 cold war specialists (of the Rostow, Carroll, Tufts caliber) [who] would constantly be feeding ideas in, be always available for brainstorm sessions on events as they break” (C. D. Jackson Records, Box 7, 8 Apr 53).

Having agreed to “avoid or treat lightly the intra-departmental problems of organization,” the Jackson Committee did not address bureaucratic burdens within its problem representation processes. Argumentative games centered on solutions for shifting individual mentalities and practices. Milton Eisenhower and psychological warfare practitioners Generals “Wild Bill” Donovan and Robert McClure respectively stressed the need to develop “eagerness at all levels” as well as “indoctrinate the top people” because the Cold War was “not just a sideshow” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Feb 53). Staff member Robert Lounsbury offered specific categories for the committee to consider: “education and dedication,” “standards,” and “training.” How could the U.S. government shape and guide beliefs and behaviors? “How can we maximize the individual impact of American personnel, especially abroad, through their belief in our program?” Lounsbury contextualized his categories and questions by also asking how “to meet our needs five and ten years hence” (PCIIA Records, Box 13, 9 Mar 53). Lippmann also argued “indoctrination” and “education” were the necessary “new ingredients” to empower the free world in its struggle against the Soviets (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53). C. D. Jackson responded that such eagerness was evident only in the CIA and certain

“private” organizations, such as RFE. The newly created CIA had discursive origins unlike the traditionally-minded, and Washington D.C.-centric, State and Defense Departments. Many current CIA personnel had served in the OSS under General Donovan during World War II. Donovan’s ad hoc, creative, can-do climate had a discursive legacy on the current attitudes and activities within the operational arm of the new peacetime intelligence organization.

Similar to the CIA, the U.S. Point Four Program was established within the context of the post-war environment and thus did not have the historical, bureaucratic baggage of other Executive departments and programs. In his 1949 inaugural address, President Truman had announced a “bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped nations” (20 Jan 49). U.S. technical assistance programs were a specific activity within a U.S. foreign policy aiming to stem Soviet expansion in developing countries. During the February committee conference, Roger Kyes and Gordon Gray asked Point Four Program personnel whether and how they placed “day-to-day operating problems” within the context of U.S. psychological warfare and the Cold War. Kyes asked specifically whether any of the 1500 people conducting technical training programs in the field “get any training on political warfare?” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 25 Feb 53). The committee learned that people conducting Point Four training focused exclusively on developing specific technical skills. They received no explicit training on broader foreign policy goals and did not approach individual programs and engagements from the perspective of the geopolitical context or national policy objectives. Kyes identified the opportunity to tie in Future Farmers of America as a “reservoir of personnel for this [political warfare] work” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 25 Feb 53).

Staff members A. Atley Peterson and Townsend Hoopes’ overview of the Department of Defense informed arguments for educating Americans stationed abroad as to how their daily activities could contribute to U.S. national goals. Peterson described

a wide-spread feeling... that the U.S. can and should get more results from the billions it is spending for defense... I am sure that the Committee should examine the field of military participation in the cold war objectively... I am sure they will find that the efforts of the military can be stepped up (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 13 Feb 53).

Hoopes reiterated that “DoD has not been assigned ---and hence does not fully accept-- explicit responsibilities in the “cold war”.” Reverting to a traditional understanding of the Armed Forces’ role in defense, the institution considered other “national security”-related roles as distractions. Hoopes recommended the committee explore the inherent potential of the 1,500,000 service members stationed abroad “for purposes quite novel to our national tradition and experience” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 25 Feb 53). Barklie Henry quipped “it’s silly to say an Army is not a persuasive force” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 25 Feb 53). Peterson agreed offering that to “appreciate the impact that the man in uniform and his equipment has on foreign people, one only has to read the papers” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 17 Mar 53). The final Jackson Report denounced the “inadequate understanding on the part of military authorities that they and their commands are full participants in the political aspects of the present struggle” (1953, 1860). The committee recommended U.S. policymakers develop a more precise definition of the military role to encourage an institutional shift, including a willingness to use “military resources with political imagination” (1953, 1860). The recommendations also highlighted military representation within country teams in locations with stationed U.S. forces.¹⁰⁶

Although the ambassadors surveyed expressed their content with the quality of personnel assigned to country teams, the committee also heard testimonies bemoaning the difficulties in attracting and retaining quality personnel who understood how to conduct psychological warfare. Eileen Boyle, former colleague of C. D. Jackson’s at *Time*, took “a pretty dim view of the effectiveness of the International Press Service effort... [and the ability of] the overseas stations [to] do the final job. She believes that this has not worked...” (PCIIA Records, Box 3, 12 Feb 53). Members and staff also received input on the suggested types of skillsets and mindsets required to be successful. Cecil B. DeMille of Paramount Pictures talked of the “necessity” of “persuading a \$100,000 man [like himself] to take a \$12,000 job” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 23

¹⁰⁶ Jackson Committee arguments for mobilizing individual service members for the U.S. Cold War effort were not novel. Five years earlier, on 18 December 1947, George Kennan had told the predominantly military audience at the National War College that

political warfare is foreign to our tradition. We have never done it before. We are not skilled in this. Many of our people don’t understand it... [But] political and military are inextricably intertwined... It is you in the armed services who have to help us in many respects in the present phase of political resistance, political containment, even though your forces do not come into play directly in a military sense or constitute the main component in our effort (in Harlow and Maerz 1991, 302-308).

Apr 53). Reinforcing the notion of special communication expertise, Public Relations (PR) representatives positioned their prowess as capable of invigorating traditional bureaucratic mindsets. Armed with knowledge of modern techniques, creativity, initiative, and drive to seek opportunities, PR/advertising expertise could help “sell” America’s story. Advertising executive Lee Ringer of Ringer and Associates explained to the President that advertisers “have the brains to create and disseminate propaganda that will win the cold war and prevent the hot war. These people have a proven record of performance in *selling* to an apathetic public” (Central Files, General File, 1955, Box 1185, 13 Jan 53). PR executive Edward Flynn of Los Angeles specifically contrasted PR expertise with that of the news industry. Although “newspaper men” can write, “he is the worst candidate for the [propaganda] job” because he will not have trained his mind “to create and develop ideas” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 2 Apr 53). The president himself later specified “*presenting* the American story” rather than selling although he implicitly included creativity by acknowledging the gray and black propaganda activities employed by departments other than the Voice of America (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 5, 1 May 53, emphasis added).

Representing nascent U.S. soft power, representatives from the U.S. film industry decried U.S. governmental guidance to “make a picture to glorify us” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 10 Apr 53). From the field of public relations, one executive offered an “analogy between Government information programs and American businesses 30 years ago. Business used to engage in “publicity” and gradually grew into public relations... U.S. information abroad is at present doing what American business did 30 years ago--indulging itself in “publicity” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 27 Jan 53). New York City-based Earl Newsom of Earl Newsom & Company also offered contrasting advice during a 13 May Public Relations roundtable event with Bill and C. D. Jackson. Newsom “pointed out that Congressional committees often use the word “sell” as the basis on which to change our information program... that is a false standard... the problem was one of policy, its coordinated implementation and the creation of an understanding of what we are doing and why” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 13 May 53). This PR assessment reinforced staff perspectives on the importance of policy. Drafted in late spring, an initial chapter of the final report emphasized policy as the starting point. “The first step... is a foreign policy that will arouse the enthusiasm of the American people and a steady informational effort about this policy”

to make clear what is expected of them” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated, emphasis in original).

Columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop also directly condemned the notion that the skillsets of entertainers or communicators were the panacea for winning the Cold War. In effect, the Alsops’ arguments overlapped with Sir Frederick S. Bartlett who warned of solutions implying any sort “magic formula” (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 9 Mar 53). Representing an alternative perspective presented to the committee, the Alsops’ 12 January 53 *Washington Post* column insisted “democracy cannot be peddled like soap flakes.” The columnists critiqued the notion that Cold War policy issues could “be answered by the techniques prevalent in advertising agencies. These are not difficulties that can be overcome by “reaching the mass mind”... It is naive, amazingly naive, to make such suppositions” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 12 Jan 53). As Walt Rostow hard argued at Princeton, political warfare was about “hold[ing] out to a man a realistic alternative to a situation in which he finds himself, and that alternative is in your interest” (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 83, 10-11 May 52). Asserting the backing of IIA Administrator Robert Johnson and the Hickenlooper Committee, Arthur Goodfriend argued that winning hearts and minds of “alien [Asian] people” required “an approach entirely different from advertising techniques developed for the American domestic market” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 6 May 53). And, although the committee discounted Dr. C. D. Kojouharoff’s proposal for a “utopian one-world psychological warfare organization” as “a very intellectual approach,” the committee agreed with his assessment that a

cold-war campaign based on publicity techniques and conventional advertising tricks, no matter how psychologically wise, is incapable of dealing effectively with communism... [without] knowledge of the communist doctrine and various levels of its interpretation ... a drive of this sort simply does not touch the decisive points responsible for the mass appeal of communism (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 1 Feb 53).

Offering yet another argument for reducing U.S. “advertisement methods,” psychologist A.D. Jonas contended “the principle of fear is greater than the realization of the truth” (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 12 Jan 53).

It is worth noting that the PR roundtable of seven “of the top men and women” in the “public relations profession” was part of the committee’s effort “to make a proper bow” to the profession (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 5 May 53). When the committee began its tenure, there was

a mild skepticism as to whether “PR men” could offer anything new. Secretary Wanda Allender summarized one PR executive’s submission as representing the community of “PR men who are interested in propaganda [but have] no really new ideas” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 27 Jan 53). Nonetheless, the May meeting satisfied Bill Jackson’s initial guidance to provide “the machinery to listen [because it is] good for our own public relations [and there] will be a nugget or two somewhere” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 30 Jan 53). The committee also gave “time and treatment” to Darryl Zannuck of the Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation. Although in a memo to Bill Jackson, Washburn asked if Bill had “any suggestions? Will try to think of something, though it will be difficult since he knows nothing of our problems” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 1 Apr 53).

By late March or early April as the staff began drafting the committee report, Townsend Hoopes and Abbott Washburn concluded

the “broad view” concept of cold war (which is the application of every type of one’s resources--military pressures, diplomatic maneuver, economic forces, information and propaganda, to the defeat on an enemy by means short of general war) is very new to us. Top officials do not yet think automatically in terms of cold war relevance of their actions and policies (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, undated transcript).

Hoopes and Washburn proposed that C. D. Jackson, as the Presidential Assistant for the Cold War, would address the immediate gap of determining and realizing psychological impacts of unique opportunities such as those raised by Lippmann and Milton Eisenhower. The Cold War Special Assistant also would have a specific responsibility to “constantly educate the top men throughout the Government to think in terms of political warfare, in terms of the cold war relevance of all their actions” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 11 Apr 53). With this education, executive leadership could inculcate a national security mentality within their own organizations. This mindset was crucial because of the myriad of foreign affairs-related activities conducted on a daily basis across the U.S. government. It was within the bureaucracy that daily decisions were made and actions initiated.

Walter Lippmann suggested a specific “war college for psychological warfare” as an educational solution (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53). Sig Larmon suggested “training for psychological warfare” within college curriculums. To answer “the demand,” the Chairman of the Education and Psychology Division at Long Beach State College alerted C. D.

Jackson of his institution's "psychological strategy" course that addressed national security problems through psychology fundamentals (White House Central Files, Official File, 1953-1961, Box 570, 7 Jul 53). Both C. D. Jackson and Walter Lippmann asserted the importance of reinvigorating theoretical and historical studies of democracy, democratic governance, and democratic ideals. Such studies would underpin public understanding of American "responsibilities and burdens" (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated). According to Lippmann, "classics" would inspire a creative "strategy of third choices [that were the] essence of political warfare" (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Mar 53). Jackson cited the importance of understanding the history of labor and social reform, religion and its political aspects, money and international finance, imperialism and other political/economic systems. This education would inform individuals' understanding of the current geopolitical environment as well as the values and ideals underpinning national objectives. To spur creativity regarding the technologies of psychological warfare, Jackson also recommended the theory and techniques of propaganda including journalism, public relations/advertising, and human relations informed by applied psychology (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 1941). C. D. Jackson suggested the Woodrow Wilson School and the School of Advanced International Studies of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation as places to engage, in addition to enlisting "the cooperation of private enterprise" for "practical field training." American Legion president Lewis Gough also offered to sponsor Legion scholarships for individuals interested in "this kind of work" (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 1 Jun 53).

Although committee members never explicitly defined a national security mentality, the meaning can be interpreted through committee deliberations on the multifaceted rhetorical commonplaces of Cold War, psychological warfare, and political warfare. Individuals would be educated about the long-term nature of the day-to-day conflict with the Soviet Union based on competing political and economic philosophies. Armed with this understanding of the geopolitical situation, they would actively and creatively seek ways to advance national goals and objectives by considering the potential psychological and behavioral effects of U.S. deeds and words. However, words and deeds must reflect the principles upon which the U.S. was created which would require reinvigorated civic understanding. Day-to-day activities now required "creative," "imaginative" individuals who would seek "opportunities" and thus actively supplement normal bureaucratic decision making processes. Routine activities had the potential

to be more meaningful from the perspective of U.S. global responsibilities and ultimate objectives.

Approaching the Cold War as a puzzle, individuals would envision themselves and their organizations as interlocking pieces that when integrated and coordinated, contributed to the puzzle's completion. This also required a "disciplined" mind. The initial committee draft asserted, "[b]etter discipline in the executive agencies should be attainable so that at least all persons responsible to the President speak with one voice and do not work at cross purposes" (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated draft chapter 8). For effective U.S. leadership of the free world in the long-term psychological Cold War, an American mindset had to be improved and harnessed.

Domestic Health and National Security

Despite White House Press Secretary James Hagerty's January public assurances that the committee's scope included only "international information activities," the committee also considered "domestic health" within its problem representation activities. As Robert Joyce assessed during the Princeton Conference, "our foreign policy is only as good as our domestic health" (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 82, 10-11 May 52). On the campaign trail General Eisenhower's discursive constellation of himself and cold *War* elicited recent images of national mobilization, unity, and victory. However, conventional war involved the mobilization of specialized military skillsets. A "psychological war" was a war for minds fought through "everything we say, everything we do, and everything we fail to say or to do" (Stephen Benedict Papers, Box 4, 8 Oct 52). In introducing the modifier "psychological," Eisenhower opened the door for individual quotidian activities to advance the U.S. towards victory. Although never explicitly defined, victory encompassed a preservation of the peace and the American way of life, or as some correspondents termed it "triumph of Democracy" (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 8 Apr 53). A letter, later circulated amongst the entire committee, specifically noted that "in giving the American people a chance to take part in the cold war, we would be carrying out a rather unique activity, of value in itself" (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 17 Mar 53). Eisenhower's use of the rhetorical commonplace explicitly rejected specific linkage to specialized, magical skillsets. In encouraging self-practices and mobilizing individuals, the U.S. would decentralize power to achieve long-term aims in the psychological Cold War.

According to the British political philosopher George Catlin, Eisenhower had long recognized the relationship between “domestic health” and national security. Catlin forwarded to the committee a speech he gave to the Sigma Kappa Alpha Society at the University of California on 6 January 1953 entitled “Stalin versus Eisenhower: The Projection of Ideas and the American Press.” In the speech, Catlin told the story of “seeing the General in 1948, four days after he became President of Columbia.” During their two hour meeting, Eisenhower said he was “fanatically interested” in the idea that security starts at home. Eisenhower discussed the possibility of distributing the Atlantic Charter to schools across the country so that every American child would know for what the United States stood. After Eisenhower accepted the Republican nomination in July 1953, Catlin again met with him and discussed such ideas during a “talk in his room at the [Denver] Brown Palace Hotel” (PCIIA Records, Box 3, 6 Jan 53).¹⁰⁷

Having debated “Great Words” within the context of international relations, the committee also considered its domestic implications. Over ten individuals wrote to the committee exclusively arguing the “vital” necessity of initiating a domestic education program. The majority of correspondents stressed re-educating Americans on “American ideology” and associated “morals and ethics.” The letters implicitly reintroduced Frank Altschul, Robert Lang, and DeWitt Poole’s call to reignite the political, social, and spiritual forces of American exceptionalism and strengthen the United States from within (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 83, 11-12 May 52). Although these individual citizens were not privy to NSC documents, their arguments for national guidance to reinvigorate “American” discursive practices reinforced the NSC’s working definition of national security: “to preserve the United States as a free nation with our fundamental institutions and values in tact” (Peterson and Sebenius in Allison and Treverton 1992, 57).

Reinvigorating U.S. “domestic health” would also provide the foundation for the U.S. government and citizen engagement with others around the world. As General Robert McClure contended, any American traveling overseas, including tourists, could represent a mobilized force for the U.S. if they were properly prepared (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 27 Feb 53). Hadley Cantril, Director of the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton University, expressed “hope” for a “new and so far untried effort to improve our spiritual and intellectual

¹⁰⁷ During Eisenhower’s stay in Denver, he also asked C. D. Jackson to develop a plan based on the initial conceptual work conducted during the Princeton psychological warfare conference.

standards at home and in our relations with nations abroad” to “show the world abroad that our country does have an ideology and a philosophy that is better than communism” (PCIIA Records, Box 6, 27 Feb 53). Cantril caveated that “these may be trite and obvious statements, but we have grave doubts that sufficient concentrated effort has so far been given to this.” Brooks Emeny, President of the Foreign Policy Association, submitted a 15-page letter expressing “hope that the Committee report will have both short-term and long-term significance” (PCIIA Records, Box 4, 4 May 53). Emeny’s theme was “that the U.S., not the Soviets, represents the true revolution in the world today.” However, with a specific reference to the “rise of anti-intellectualism or McCarthyism,” Emeny asserted the U.S. must maintain “domestic sanity at home.” Highlighted by Jackson Committee personnel, two of Emeny’s long-term prescriptions were educating “American public opinion in the realities of our new world position” and “better train[ing] and select[ing] personnel to represent us abroad, both official and private.”

Public Relations executive W. Howard Chase identified causal connections between an educated public and domestic support for specific U.S. international information programs. “Congress and citizens distrust official use of information... The President in using propaganda or information as a weapon of war is by no means immune from the general principle that people will support the means only if they understand the ends” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 21 May 53). Chase also invoked “Great Words,” urging the committee to identify policy objectives supporting “the dignity and freedom of the individual human being.” Others contributing to this argument included the American Legion President Lewis Gough and Dr. Claude Robinson of the Opinion Research Corporation in Princeton, New Jersey. Gough testified to the Hickenlooper Committee that “public understanding and evaluation ... is ... essential for the [psychological] program’s success” (PCIIA Records, Box 5, 16 Mar 53).¹⁰⁸ Robinson stressed the importance of “making the American people feel that the United States needs an information program” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 13 May 53).

The committee’s draft chapter dealing with the American people and private organizations drew on many of the arguments presented. The chapter began with a “strong foreign policy begins at home and must rest on public support and understanding” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, undated). Acknowledging “America speaks with many voices,” the draft argued

¹⁰⁸ This sentence was underlined in the Jackson Committee’s copy of the transcript.

it is most important that, in the long era of the struggle for power with communism, the many voices of America speak in a mutually supporting way, insofar as compatible with democratic practices and ideals. Only an adequately informed public... can be mentally and morally equipped to judge the soundness of national policies and support them...” (emphasis in original).

In early April Barklie Henry and Robert Oppenheimer had a chance meeting while waiting on the station platform at Princeton Junction. Oppenheimer had volunteered that public awareness was one of the Jackson Committee’s “chief problems” to address (PCIIA Records, Box 8, 8 Apr 53). It is interesting to note that many arguments before the committee regarding informed publics centered around a presumed general ignorance of the material threat that accompanied the ideological competition. Chapter two quoted a 1951 *New York Times* article that concluded Americans perceived Soviet atomic power as one of the “unpleasant facts of international life” (7 Oct 51). During a formal interview with the committee in May, Robert Oppenheimer “urged the enlightenment and understanding of the American people and the allies through a proper public discussion of the hard atomic facts of international life” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 2 May 53). Given the increasing destructiveness and portability of nuclear weapons, the United States and Soviet Union would soon have the “ability to obliterate the other.” While such revelations would be “grim,” Oppenheimer was convinced that “better judgment can be made on the basis of knowledge.”

However, returning to the committee’s problem framing, the issue was not simply one of communicating and educating the public. The problem of the “cold war effort” began with strategy and the relationships between objectives, policies, and capabilities. A draft chapter two of the final report contended “[u]nless the Administration is prepared to face this fact, no magic of public relations will succeed in arousing the American people” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 6 May 53).

Guiding Actions and Attitudes Across Government and Society

A “unified and dynamic” effort required indirect as well as direct public support. In a discursive move that reinforced the possibility for expanding decentralized power relations to include common activities, the final report recommended recasting the U.S. policy agenda from Containment of the Soviet Union to strengthening a free world coalition committed to building a

peaceful world order.¹⁰⁹ The committee caveated “it is not enough just to be anti-communist” (1953, 1866). Seemingly innocuous, this judgment reflected debates over the prior year concluding the imperative of positive policy pronouncements to inspire sustainable self-practices capable of contributing over time to national objectives. The committee did not dismiss the Soviet threat, but instead advised transparency in informing the public of trends in the Soviet economy and military capabilities including atomic weaponry “to spur increased productivity both here and in Western Europe” (1953, 1866). In a certain respect, the committee presented the Soviet threat as part of the conflictual context, but not the singular rationale for strengthening a free world coalition. The report specifically acknowledged that “[n]ot all of the free world is prepared to view its problems in the context of a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union” (1953, 1941). Therefore, Americans must understand that “the United States must appeal to foreign nations in terms of their own self-interest” (1953, 1866). Returning to Walt Rostow’s relational understanding of strategy, the U.S. could only be successful if it brought others willingly into its long-term program. The report stressed that to attain “goals in Western Europe, the United States must... encourage a sense of shared responsibility and equal participation in decisions and actions...” (1953, 1820).

The first substantive paragraph of the 8 July press release specified that “the United States, in cooperation with other free nations, is striving to build a world order conforming to the ideals of the Charter of the United Nations” (PCIIA Records, Box 15, 8 Jul 53). “World order” and “United Nations” were also emerging rhetorical commonplaces, but ones that symbolized positive objectives. Average citizens may have questioned their abilities to “fight” a psychological Cold War against the Soviet Union; however, they certainly engaged in trade and commerce, traveled as tourists, missionaries and academics, and developed personal and professional relationships with people abroad. The press release reminded the public of the values shared across the globe providing the foundation “for the kind of world order which the United States and other free nations seek to achieve” (1953, 1836).

The report specifically identified the function of “propaganda” as informing foreign publics about the nature of U.S. objectives and “arous[ing] in them an understanding and sympathy for the kind of world order which the United States and other free nations seek to

¹⁰⁹ Many of the programs and activities would be similar, but the substance, emphasis, and likely consequence would differ because of the changing referent.

achieve” (1953, 1836). The committee classified traditional state instruments of diplomacy, economics, and the military as persuasive tools. The report also advanced information activities as legitimate instruments of day-to-day statecraft, although best employed as an “auxiliary to create a climate of opinion in which national policy objectives can be most readily accomplished” (1953, 1837). The report affirmed President Eisenhower’s demand for a clear demarcation between official U.S. government “dependable” and “truthful” information sources, specifically the Voice of America, and unofficial sources such as CIA-sponsored Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation.

Notably, the classification of propaganda opened the door for semi-public and private activities within its categorical boundaries. The report called for a “maximum decentralization of information activities” and an increased percentage of unattributed information activities that would “arouse... an understanding and sympathy for the kind of world order” sought by the U.S. (1953, 1842 and 1836). The committee urged that a “far greater effort should be made to utilize private American organizations for the advancement of United States objectives... The gain in dissemination and credibility... more than offset the loss... of some control over content” (1953, 1852). Untapped unattributable capabilities included common activities within academia and foundations, industry and business, media and motion pictures, and missionaries. Although deleted from the final version, an initial draft explicitly distinguished the government’s role in providing “guidance” for the private sector from Soviet “repugnant control” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, undated).

One of the conceptual centerpieces of the Jackson Report was its conclusion “that psychological activity is not a field of endeavor separable from the main body of diplomatic, economic, and military measures by which the United States seeks to achieve its national objectives. It is an ingredient of such measures” (1953, 1796). The report argued the “United States is judged less by what it says through official information outlets than by the actions and attitudes of the Government in international affairs and the actions and attitudes of its citizens and officials, abroad and at home” (1953, 1836). The enduring conflict necessitated an evolving national security mentality in which policymakers and citizens alike expanded their geographical scope and considered the psychological and behavioral effects of policies, actions, and words. The report specifically charged that to “meet the communist threat...[Americans must understand] it is not enough just to be anti-communist, that the United States must appeal to

foreign nations in terms of their own self-interest, that alliances with other nations of the free world are critical to the survival of the United States” (1953, 1866). The institutional government had a role in guiding productive relationships and day-to-day activities contributing to the constant striving toward national goals and objectives. Publics must understand the nature of the conflict to inform appropriate choices.

***Chapter Eight: U.S. National Strategy as an Offensive Weapon
Enabling the Neatest Trick of the Century***

“Our changed role has developed so rapidly that our institutions of government and public attitudes have been slow to adjust to the new circumstances.”
-- Walter Rauschenbush, Department of State, 1952

In the early 1950s, Americans faced “a manichean world of light and darkness” perpetuated by a uniquely constructed threat posed by the Soviet Union. In this broad moment of strategic panic, the Eisenhower administration signalled its intent to embark on “a unified and dynamic effort” that would ensure “the security of the United States and of the other peoples in the community of free nations” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 26 Jan 53). An early January 1953 phone call alerted the press to a pending commission that would “review strategy and recommend methods for its improvement and coordination” (PCIIA Records, Box 14, 12 Jan 53). Notwithstanding this initial interpretation of the Jackson Committee’s mandate, the analytic narrative revealed the contingency within committee debates over defining the problem and establishing categorical boundaries for the committee’s inquiry into “international information policies and activities of the Executive Branch of the Government and of policies and activities related thereto with particular reference to the international relations and national security of this country.” The Jackson Committee engaged in often circuitous argumentative games over ill-structured problems involving the geopolitical condition and the threat, U.S. purposes and policies, executive branch strategic processes and organization, and state and private activities abroad. Its output offered recommendations intended to reduce conceptual uncertainty surrounding this experienced threat and shape an evolving national security discourse of language and practices.

This chapter offers a brief analysis of the overarching Jackson Report as the product of argumentative games over ill-structured problems and its recommended “realistic” solutions for a national strategy based on political warfare as a “new, unified, and dynamic” U.S. approach to the Cold War.¹¹⁰ It summarizes the research aims and approach before offering conclusions, reflects on implications at both the practical and more formal, theoretical levels, and suggests opportunities for further research.

¹¹⁰ Previous chapters illustrated specific aspects of the committee’s conclusions. This chapter does not reiterate those points.

The Jackson Report

On 30 June 1953 the Jackson Committee submitted its final Top Secret report to President Eisenhower. The report consisted of two parts. The first described the nature of the conflict including a juxtaposed overview of the “USSR drive for world domination” and the “U.S. program for World Order.” The second section concentrated on U.S. activities and specific programmatic, institutional, and organizational recommendations. The Top Secret report, as well as the unclassified yet substantive press release, described an enduring geopolitical conflict with a totalitarian Soviet Union. The committee characterized the conflict in terms of sustained Soviet political warfare *in the free world*-- a myriad of daily ways and means outside of general war. However, a persistent possibility of general war shadowed the day-to-day competition. These prospects shaped committee argumentation and recommendations.

The Jackson Committee sought to distinguish the Eisenhower administration from the policies and activities of the Truman era which it considered disjointed and even dangerous because of its seeming inability to prioritize or balance commitments with resources. The committee began its deliberations by considering the nature of the Soviet Union and character of the Cold War, as described in chapter five. In the final report the committee asserted its “view [of the conflict] is widely held,” but acknowledged “there are important differences of opinion as to the policies by which United States objectives can best be pursued” (1953, 1798).

Jackson Committee member Barklie Henry voiced what became the committee’s overarching solution of developing and enabling “national strategy” as a “weapon” to advance the long-term competitive advantage of the United States (PCIIA Records, Box 12, undated). A “combination of constructive policies and political warfare” were at the heart of the recommended U.S. strategic approach (1953, 1807). The modifier “constructive” hinted to the committee’s judgment regarding recasting the U.S. policy agenda. The committee proposed explicitly prioritizing allied and partner relationships and foundations to construct a “coalition” of free states. This coalition would serve as a “secure base” for building and extending a free “world order” over time (1953, 1823). As Edward Bernays described over twenty years earlier, and again while meeting with the committee, U.S. political warfare involved the “engineering of consent” (PCIIA Records, Box 1, 18 Apr 53). Based on the principle of free choice, U.S. political warfare would create and present alternatives to “both allies and enemies, in such a way

that the one favorable to United States interests seems desirable in terms of the self-interest of those who have the power of decision” (1953, 1812). This recommended strategic approach tacitly urged strategic patience which was within the realm of the possible because of the committee’s framing of the Soviet threat and the “long-haul” nature of the conflict.

This interpretation does not ignore the Jackson Committee’s affirmation of “necessary” overt and covert political warfare activities against the Soviet Union and Communist affiliates. The operative word is “prioritization.” In mid-December 1952, Abbott Washburn characterized successful administrations as those which “very early adopted constructive, forward-looking programs... the Eisenhower administration will unquestionably be constructive and progressive” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 17 Dec 52). Prioritizing the objective of a peaceful and free world order logically advanced the presumed U.S. progressive mission. It also productively broadened the possibility for national efforts, both public and private, as well as international support. In contrast, a strategy that would have prioritized activities against the Soviet bloc would have delimited the range of actors with applicable capabilities.

How to Build a Realistic Strategy: Objectives, Capabilities, Policies

In a major contribution for future strategic analysis processes, the committee normatively prescribed the appropriate “relationship between objectives, capabilities and policies” in the report’s opening chapter (1953, 1798). This constellation of objectives-capabilities-policies established a conceptual foundation for the committee’s strategic assessment and recommendations addressing the “serious gap between the formulation of general objectives and the detailed actions required to give effect to them” (1953, 1853). Directed to the emerging discursive community of policymakers and strategic planners, the proposed constellation of meso-level rhetorical commonplaces was intended to provide a discursive foundation for future unified efforts. The report positioned those leaders ascribing to the described “principles” as politically wise. Importantly, following these principles would advance coherent strategies by delimiting the range of possible solutions to those aligning commitments with capabilities. Despite various witness disclaimers regarding the “obvious” nature of these concepts and relationships, the committee’s inclusion indicated the very opposite. The constellation discursively represented the intersection of committee debates over U.S. policies and “Great

Words,” risk and Cold War boundaries, temporal horizons, and the creation of psychological effects.

As the analytic narrative highlighted, conceptual confusion surrounded efforts to identify U.S. interests and objectives within the context of current international relations. Policymakers wrestled with extending historical domestic interests as well as traditional concepts of “war” aims and victory to the current geopolitical competition. The committee sought to produce clarity by differentiating between aspirational objectives and achievable goals. If NSC 68 gave rise to a “utopian notion” of total security based on a position of strength (Cox 1992, 83), the Jackson Report stands out for its notable caveat that U.S. objectives, while unchanging, “can be defined only in general terms, and can never be wholly attained, once and for all. They can only be approached” (1953, 1799). Classifying objectives as aspirational, the committee transformed the meaning of wartime objectives and extended Charles Bohlen’s argument at Princeton that the “essence” of day-to-day political warfare was “the extraordinary absence of any fixed points” (C. D. Jackson Papers, Box 83, 11-12 May 52). The proposed definition of objectives productively worked to normalize the competitive geopolitical environment. It necessitated a constant striving toward a just and peaceful world order and a sustained will to improve the foundations of U.S. national security. However, the classification also symbolized “realistic” limits for what the U.S. could accomplish given competing Soviet aspirations. The question remained, how could policymakers devise programs for activities and measure progress toward objectives that “can never be wholly attained”?

The committee asserted that the translation of broad purposes/objectives/concepts to “subsidiary, specific goals” was the linchpin for the formal and informal machinery to take practical steps in operational planning and execution (1953, 1798). As Walt Rostow advocated in January, “[i]t may be that the fruitfulness of the Committee may depend on its defining and holding to a terrain of analysis and recommendations which defines a strategy and links it in a meaningful way to the tactical arm of our policy” (PCIIA Records, Box 2, 12 Jan 53). The committee contended it was possible to enable and measure progress by establishing “subsidiary, specific goals... [which] should be defined in as precise political, diplomatic, economic, military or psychological terms as possible” (1953, 1798-1799). The report charged that in the post-war era, the

Government has often failed to define its specific goals clearly and precisely and this failure has been an important obstacle to progress... The distinction should be clearly made between policies and objectives with respect to which the United States commits itself to act and those ends to which we, as a nation, aspire but regarding which the Government is not committed to take action (1953, 1799).

A second critical caveat for policymakers and planners involved the relationship of objectives-goals-policies to capabilities. The report prescribed the alignment of general objectives and specific goals with policies, described as courses of action. However, realistic policy and operational planning necessitated linking aims and ways with available capabilities. As John Lewis Gaddis later argues, strategic vision involves relating “short-term to long-term considerations, to coordinate actions with interests... [and] perception of means may be as important as perceptions of threats in ultimately determining the nature of United States actions in the world” (Gaddis 1980, 168-169). The Jackson Report exemplifies this understanding of strategic vision. The 11 May draft plainly charged that “a goal which is beyond one’s capabilities is not really a goal at all” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 11 May 53). The final report gently stated that “[t]he policies by which the United States pursues its goals should be harmonious not only with its general objectives but also with its capabilities. In practice, failure to understand this principle is a source of controversy and misunderstanding” (1953, 1799). Stories highlighting declining U.S. credibility abroad, as well as domestic political squabbles, informed the discursive rationale for this prescriptive constellation. Clearly differentiating between long-term aspirational objectives and near-to-mid-term achievable goals *and* aligning objectives-goals-policies with capabilities would reduce the potential for “say-do” gaps and public misunderstanding of the United States. Improving U.S. credibility was crucial within the committee’s understanding of the relational nature of a U.S. Cold War strategy. The U.S. could succeed only if it had support from allies and partners, as detailed below. U.S. policymakers should not promise or plan for that which they were incapable of delivering. The constellation also aimed to reduce “controversy” which was a thinly-veiled reference to congressional and public hyperbole. By insisting on identifying specific incremental goals commensurate with available capabilities, the report implied the necessity of self-discipline and the possibility to make and measure progress and thus satisfy domestic political demands.

The 8 July 1953 White House press release on the Jackson Report specifically warned of the “danger in formulating policies beyond capabilities” (PCIIA Records, Box 15, 8 Jul 53). In noting this was a “prevalent error in the past,” the press release positioned the Eisenhower administration in opposition to the Truman administration. Eisenhower’s approach would be “new, unified, and dynamic” but also feasible. In warning of the “danger,” the press release attempted to hedge against calls for unwise goals and policies that could either diminish U.S. standing among the free world or threaten Cold War boundaries. As the debates over the previous year revealed, advocates positioned political warfare as a substitute for, rather than prelude to, general war with the Soviet Union. However, what practices would the committee offer to actualize a *realistic* “new, unified, and dynamic” effort toward aspirational objectives?

Applying its Strategic Logic

The committee assessed that U.S. aspirational objectives included physical and national security and “a just and peaceful world order” (1953, 1798). The report also classified “a substantial relative reduction in Soviet capabilities or a basic change in Soviet objectives” as long-term aspirational objectives (1953, 1799). As noted, the committee conceptualized avoiding general war with the Soviet Union as an informal goal. The committee agreed with testimony regarding the degree of Soviet internal control and subsequently prioritized subordinate goals geared toward a “relative reduction in Soviet capabilities” over “basic change in Soviet objectives.” The 6 May draft report declared:

In short, it seems clear to the Committee that the United States cannot *reasonably* count on the collapse or drastic alteration of the Soviet system from either internal or external causes. The result should be sought by all *appropriate* means, but it cannot be *prudently* assumed that it can be produced by the best efforts of the free nations in *any short period*. It follows, in our judgement, that the United States must place its reliance on what can be done to strengthen the free world, trusting that if the free world gains and maintains preponderant power, Soviet power will *in time* decline and the Soviet system change” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 6 May 53, emphasis added).

The committee rewrote this passage to clearly identify its policy prioritization, as well as counter a common inclination “to view the present conflict as a temporary irritation, an abnormal interruption of our peaceful development” and (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 6 May 53). In including

“safely,” the committee attempted to refute calls for militarily-based provocations or solutions that could move the U.S. toward general war with the Soviet Union. The final report specified that U.S. policies

should be planned to maximize the chance of [Soviet] collapse, but it cannot be *safely* assumed that this result can be produced *for many years* even by the best efforts of the free nations. The United States must place its *chief reliance* on strengthening the free world, while maintaining pressures on the Soviet System (1953, 1812, emphasis added).¹¹¹

The committee faced a conundrum in developing a dynamic, even “offensive” approach that would not threaten Cold War boundaries. Along with its assessment of current Soviet capabilities and a *collective* consideration of U.S. aspirational goals for U.S. national security, a just and peaceful world order, and relative reduction in Soviet capabilities, the committee advanced a policy prescription of strengthening the free world, with a prioritization on Western Europe. Facing a Soviet goal of isolating the U.S., “strengthening” the free world meant both international relations between, and the domestic health within, free states. The committee declared that a

basic feature of the conflict--one that underlies and largely determines the conduct of the struggle--is that it is a conflict between coalitions... It is of transcendent importance that the American people understand this and also the corollary fact that the security of the United States cannot be achieved in isolation (1953, 1801).

This conceptualization also reinforced the relational aspect of a U.S. national strategy that depended on other states aligning their interests with the U.S. The report stressed that to attain “goals in Western Europe, the United States must... encourage a sense of shared responsibility

¹¹¹ The introduction recognized Mitrovich’s charge that the Jackson Committee instigated a retrenchment in U.S. psychological warfare (2000). My interpretation differs. This investigation into how the committee approached the overarching “cold war” problem concludes a fundamental issue involved prioritization. The committee prioritized strengthening the free world, however, overt and covert programs and activities against the Soviet Union and its external actors certainly continued, as noted in various footnotes. The committee rejected the rhetorical commonplace, but not the underlying meaning involving affecting attitudes and behaviors. This is a cautionary tale of the importance of understanding how actors at the time employed terminology. As Irish political theorist Edmund Burke declared in 1757:

A definition may be very exact, and yet go but a very little way towards informing us of the nature of the thing defined; but let the virtue of a definition be what it will, in the order of things, it seems rather to follow than to precede our enquiry, of which it ought to be considered the result (Burke 2014).

and equal participation in decisions and actions” (1953, 1820). Herein lies an implicit acknowledgement of Orwell and Lippmann’s warning regarding the relationships between nuclear and non-nuclear states within Cold War self-contained empires. As staff member Robert Blum urged in February, the U.S. must “make ‘em feel we need them, just as they need us” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 7, 28 Feb 53).

The report urged policymakers to identify specific goals to improve domestic “health” across the free world, specifically addressing military power, political unity and moral power, and economic weakness (1953, 1818).¹¹² Within this prescription, the report specifically cautioned that military programs, while providing fundamental deterrence, are “by themselves, inadequate. It has become increasingly clear that the vulnerability of a country to direct or indirect aggression and its ability to resist them are closely related to its underlying political, social, and economic health” (1953, 1818). This reflected the committee’s understanding of the current conditions and competition involving all measures short of war. Policy goals should be directed toward building a “base,” enhancing the free world’s relative standing over the Soviet bloc, and importantly contributing directly to the fundamental, aspirational world order.

While draft versions included qualifiers such as “sufficient” and “steady improvement” in strengthening Western Europe (PCIIA Records, Box 12, undated), the final report indulged in its own hyperbolic imprecision in identifying goals for European countries to reach their “full potentialities” and “maximum military and economic strength” (1953, 1819). Although assessing that “free nations, because they are free, are necessarily more open to communist penetration and subversion” (1953, 1817), the final report also retained an impossible goal outlined in an earlier draft to make “the free world *invulnerable* to the political warfare efforts of the Kremlin” (PCIIA Records, Box 12, 6 May 53, emphasis added).

Whereas Containment focused on the Soviet Union, this nuanced policy prioritized goals and activities directly contributing to the fundamental, long-term progressive march of history of which the U.S. was the primary champion. Tackling the space between peace and general war, the Jackson Report affirmed George Kennan’s 1948 recognition of the “perpetual rhythm[ic]” realities of international relations. The categorization of continual conflictual relations challenged the possibility of a traditional victory as associated with conventional wars. Instead, it

¹¹² Although the Soviet Union continued to improve its power base, the committee assessed “the American system of free enterprise” could not be matched by a totally planned economy.

led to an understanding of victory as achieving a level of competitive advantage over the Soviet Union over the long-run, while forestalling the possibility for war. The advantage would exist in solidifying the American/Western way of life within a free world order, while also creating conditions for possible evolutionary change within the Soviet system. As Basil H. Liddell Hart urged the following year, a U.S. national strategy would be “indirect” (1967, xix). The committee judged its recommendations represented “realistic” possibilities for sustained U.S. and allied efforts over the “long-pull nature of the conflict” (Abbott Washburn Papers, Box 64, 11 Jul 66).

Recapping Research Aims and the Approach

Spurred by Neustadt and May’s classic *Thinking in Time*, this project has its genesis in contemporary national security and public policy challenges in addressing actors whose strategic activities blur the lines between peace and war, particularly within the information realm. Since 2001, U.S. policymakers have grappled with stemming Al-Qaeda and, more recently, Islamic State propaganda recruitment efforts. Additionally, U.S. policymakers are once again considering ways to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation efforts. In 2016 U.S. policymakers established a Global Engagement Center within the State Department and proposed legislation for another Center for Information Analysis and Response to analyze “foreign government information-warfare efforts.” “Propaganda wars” again are coming to the forefront of policy discussions. Although non-state and state challenges to the established liberal international order may rely heavily on propaganda efforts, these activities are elements of broader strategies conceptualized as hybrid/information/unrestricted/non-linear and political warfare. Strategic planners and decision makers again are wrestling with conceptualizing the psychological sphere and its relationship to national strategy and foreign policy goals. Policymakers during the early Cold War faced analogous challenges in envisioning the geopolitical environment and engaging in problem representation processes to devise solutions. In particular, the Jackson Committee served as a focal point through which public servants and private citizens alike contributed ideas and concepts that informed recommended “realistic” national security strategy practices.

My aims for this project were essentially two-fold. Foremost, I sought to understand the role of the Jackson Committee in the U.S. approach to the Cold War. In a moment of strategic

panic compounded by conceptual uncertainty, the Jackson Committee tackled an ill-structured problem and offered solutions to transform strategic panic to strategic patience by recasting the U.S. policy agenda and reorganizing for an integrated, coordinated national strategy of political warfare.¹¹³ I also sought to expand my understanding of rhetorical and interpretative decision making processes acting upon and potentially recasting policy. This required an in-depth examination of problem representation processes taking place within the “black box” of the Jackson Committee. This empirical case illuminated intersubjective discursive activities involved in creating a shared understanding of an emerging unique geopolitical situation and the relationship of that understanding to perceived possible strategic approaches. These contingent moments present the possibility “that things could have been different, save for the impact and implications of certain actions” (Jackson 2006, 33). A constructivist discursive approach illuminates the discursive space in which policy communicative interaction occurs, enabling the researcher to gain a deeper appreciation for the conceptual “messiness” and contingency within argumentative policy analysis. Cases involving the advent of unique threats may be more likely to present opportunities for understandings to be intersubjectively developed rather than “bargained” because unique threats do not fit into traditional categories or translate to existing institutional and organizational responsibilities.

I applied a middle-range theoretical and methodological approach to empirical, archival data to understand the discursive activities leading to the Jackson Committee’s understanding of the Soviet threat and recommendations for a national strategy of U.S. political warfare. Illuminating how actors at the time defined political warfare, both its internal and external practices, can provide a foundation for future scholarship investigating the relationship of political warfare to Eisenhower’s foreign policy. I also sought to extrapolate lessons learned for practical contemporary strategic analysis and public policy making. Insights drawn from these early Cold War discursive activities could inform twenty-first century policy planning for an era

¹¹³ A 24 May 1953 Washington Post article argued that psychological warfare was “bound up with the conduct and demeanor of the whole American Government” (Lucas 1999, 177). Political scientist Scott Lucas claims the Jackson Committee’s conceptual centerpiece that psychological activity was inseparable from traditional instruments simply reflected a prevailing sentiment. The archival revealed a number of individuals advocating this broad view, C. D. Jackson being one of the most vociferous and persistent. However, the repeated argumentation on behalf of this broad view led me to conclude that this was anything but a prevailing sentiment either within or outside of the U.S. government. The Jackson Committee and other advocates engaged with press outlets to shape such narratives. The committee also specified how the Cold War Special Assistant (C. D. Jackson) would educate top leaders to this way of thinking and governing.

of “persistent conflict” and “adversarial competition” also lacking “neat lines between war and peace, foreign and domestic, emergency and normality” (Brooks 2015).

To analyze Jackson Committee decision making processes, I crafted a constructivist discursive analytic framework informed by the argumentative turn in policy planning and analysis and social and political philosophy that view policy outcomes as products of social interaction and argumentation. Applying this analytic framework to an ideal-type of decision making processes, I constructed an analytic narrative that illuminated the productivity of language and intersubjective construction of reality underpinning the final product of Jackson Report. I examined discursive foundations and conditions of possibility, argumentative games within decision making processes, and underlying values informing the Jackson Committee’s “new look at the cold war effort.” In particular, an underlying value of “realism” and “pragmatism,” a form of self-discipline, guided Jackson Committee judgments regarding sustainable solutions to advance U.S. interests over the long-term. Underlying liberal values and pragmatism animated committee debates over the ways and means employed to achieve U.S. objectives and goals. A national strategy of political warfare would utilize both the powers of the state and the arsenal of unused weapons within U.S. and foreign societies mobilized and guided by clear, positive goals and objectives. Upholding the principle of free choice and recognizing others’ self-interests was a key point in the committee’s reasoning. They asserted the only way to affect lasting change was to craft conditions in which others also saw their self-interests. Layered within the framework, a governmentality perspective provided a means to understand efforts to govern and shape conduct through decentralized, productive power relations.

The first half of the empirical inquiry investigated discursive conditions of possibility for Jackson Committee activities including micro-level social argumentation between individuals participating in a 1952 Psychological Warfare Conference in Princeton, New Jersey. The micro-discursive activities were situated within a macro/meso-level Cold War discourse. To illustrate the symbolic foundations of the early Cold War “common sense,” I inductively interpreted a Cold War discursive landscape by weaving diachronic meanings and synchronic relationships of key rhetorical commonplaces. The research revealed the importance of illuminating the meanings of, and relationships between, existing discursive antecedents in order to interpret underlying assumptions, arguments and counterarguments. The landscape provided a foundation

for understanding argumentation that built upon, reacted to, and in some cases attempted to transform existing discursive antecedents.

The second half examined Jackson Committee problem representation processes. I identified discursive communities and key individuals contributing to information gathering and informal discourse coalitions influencing committee problem representation processes. I illuminated the “witcraft” of discursive activities involved in conceptualizing the Cold War. “Psychological warfare” served as the discursive starting point for Jackson Committee activities. While Cold War rhetorical commonplaces provided a discursive basis for initiating policy discussions, vague and multifaceted meanings complicated specific policy analysis. Informed by the Princeton Conference deliberations, candidate Eisenhower had worked to assuage Americans’ “fear” over the “five-dollar, five-syllable word” “psychological” in enlisting them to “save the peace” (Stephen Benedict papers, Box 4, 8 Oct 52). In its broadest sense, psychological warfare encompassed all persuasive activities supporting U.S. interests. This conceptualization expanded the possibility for decentralized power relations and the positioning of individual citizens as political actors within the geopolitical competition. However, the concept’s diachronic multifaceted meanings simultaneously threatened this possibility as many individuals associated the concept with specialized, even “magical” skillsets and activities rather than quotidian actions guided by clear policy objectives and goals. Conceptual confusion and discursive “baggage” spurred the committee to prescribe specific semantics within its final report to guide future “realistic” strategic policy planning. Contemporary scholarship has overlooked this valuable contribution perhaps because its importance is revealed through the committee’s often messy process of argumentation.¹¹⁴

Jackson Committee Cold War conceptualization and problem representation built upon argumentative games during the 1952 Princeton Conference on Psychological Warfare. I demonstrated how military framing productively shaped deliberations toward issues of policy and strategy to direct the disjointed ensemble of psychological warfare machinery, a discursive move that even surprised some of the participants and highlighted the contingency within the debates. A resulting storyline of political warfare emerged that encompassed internal dimensions of government coordination and integration as well as external dimensions of presenting

¹¹⁴ Also, the committee’s semantic guidance is embedded within the narration of the opening chapter rather than within the enumerated recommendations at the end.

persuasive alternative futures to attract and bolster partners committed to the principles outlined in Wilson's Fourteen Points and FDR's Atlantic Charter. The Jackson Committee's subsequent focus on internal dimensions of coordinating and integrating policy and operational planning corresponded with a discursive shift toward employing the emerging rhetorical commonplace of political warfare and rejecting the laden concept of psychological warfare. I interpreted the argumentative games that shaped recommendations for a long-term national strategy prioritizing political warfare activities within the free world. Arguing from a broad understanding of "power," the committee asserted that strengthening the free world would enhance relative power vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc while simultaneously contributing to the aspirational objective of a desired liberal world order. "Political warfare" symbolically reinforced the centrality of national *political* goals, rejecting the concept of national *psychological* goals. The final report declared "[a]lthough there may be distinct psychological plans and specific psychological activities directed toward national objectives, there are no "national psychological objectives" separate and distinct from national objectives" (1953, 1854). This assertion may give pause to contemporary categorizations of "propaganda wars" that may improperly decouple information activities from other instruments, effectively delimiting the range of possible solutions available to achieve national objectives.

Speaking of national objectives, the committee was persuaded to reject the concept "Cold War" by an informal discourse coalition countering the hegemonic discourse of "Cold War." It is worth noting that the committee never formally initiated this semantic issue within its problem representation deliberations. The constructivist discursive approach employed enabled me to trace these informal discourses and their effects on the argumentative space. The final recommendation emerged as a result of repeated witness arguments that the concept erroneously represented U.S. objectives and activities, and storytelling about unintended negative consequences of equating the U.S. with war. The final report specifically noted the "governments and peoples of Western Europe... dislike the cold war" (1953, 1820). Framing the conflict and U.S. activities in terms of a "Cold War" placed the U.S. in a negative position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union who conducted its political warfare activities in the name of "peace." The counterargument productively shaped committee discussions such that the members specifically considered U.S. interests, objectives, and goals, impressing upon the committee the necessity of framing the geopolitical competition as a continuing conflict rather than a war. While the

commonplace of Cold War obviously remained a centerpiece of post-war discourse, the core concept that the U.S. could prevail without resorting to general warfare continued to inform subsequent policy discussions.

Conclusions, Implications, and Opportunities

Presidential scholars assert Eisenhower's integral use of advisory arrangements in the area of national security. During a broad moment of strategic panic, the Jackson Committee was publically positioned to provide recommendations for a "new, unified, and dynamic" U.S. approach to the Cold War. This study fills a gap in knowledge about early Cold War advisory decision making through an in-depth, theoretically-informed analytic narrative of Jackson Committee discursive activities. Theoretically, this study proposes that in cases involving unique threats, researchers must be attuned to conceptual complexities within decision making processes. The constructivist discursive approach in particular addresses neglected dimensions by illuminating conceptual struggles within problem representation processes. In particular, it highlights actors' questioning of assumptions and "witcraft" within argumentative games that contribute to intersubjective understandings of emerging situations and possible solutions. It is worth noting that as discursive control is diffused across the governing enterprise, the discursive foundations established by advisory commissions, even if not dominant, may nonetheless continue to inform discursive debates over strategy and policy choices.

This study argues the Jackson Committee played an important conceptual role in advancing the emerging concept of, and supporting institutional and organizational constructs for, *U.S. national strategy* employing *all instruments of power to achieve a competitive advantage* over the Soviet Union. Psychological warfare and information activities served as the impetus for the committee's mandate. However, committee discursive practices congealed around the concept of national strategy that would be realized through "constructive policies" and "political warfare" based on the principle of free choice. The keystone of the Jackson Report was enabling a sustained "national effort" under Presidential leadership.

There is a certain elegance to the committee's coherency of Cold War conceptualization, policy objectives and goals, and ways and means to achieve them. Rejecting "emergency," the committee worked to instill strategic patience within U.S. policy making by normalizing the geopolitical situation as a long-term conflictual competition with the atomic Soviet Union.

“Winning” was defined as achieving a competitive advantage over the Soviet Union. Given the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the committee advanced political warfare, as described earlier, as a sustainable way to compete *within* Cold War boundaries and achieve specific, realistic national goals supporting long-term, aspirational objectives while affirming fundamental U.S. values. Overall, the Jackson Report urged the Eisenhower administration to take the long-view, develop a sustainable national strategy of political warfare prioritizing the free world as the U.S. approach, and exercise political wisdom in resisting overreactions to Soviet provocations.

The Jackson Committee advanced a nuanced, multifaceted meaning of political warfare that sounds very much like contemporary descriptions of national strategy. Although the elements of strategy may sound obvious to today’s readers, in the early 1950s, conceptualizing and operationalizing specific elements of a steady-state national strategy were novel endeavors. As George McBundy intoned just months before the Jackson Committee began its tenure, U.S. policy makers were still solidifying a “revolutionary” foreign policy that would advance a specific agenda of freedom and peace (1952, 6). The Jackson Committee tackled the “octopus-like” problem of national strategy recommending what the U.S. sought to accomplish and how it should go about doing so. Committee recommendations included key discursive steps in inculcating methods and mindsets for realistic strategic analysis and policy planning. In particular, the committee specifically linked the imperative of realistic strategies to U.S. credibility, deemed crucial because of the relational nature of national strategies that required support from allies and partners.

While many contemporary scholars single out information/psychological activities as the core of Jackson Committee recommendations, this archival-based interpretation places the committee’s proffering of information within the context of advancing an integrated national strategy. Specifically tasked with assessing “international information activities,” the Jackson Committee debated how to use information as an element of statecraft, not whether to do so. The Jackson Report ultimately provided the discursive rationale underpinning the institutionalization of overt (and covert) U.S. information activities that would become known as public diplomacy by the 1960s.¹¹⁵ In June 1953 President Eisenhower submitted Reorganization Plan No. 8 of

¹¹⁵ As explained earlier, the Rockefeller Committee focused on organization. While David Guth contends the committee’s focus came down to whether the U.S. should use propaganda and if so where should such activities reside, my research leads me to conclude that the committee quickly moved away from such questions and instead conceptually addressed how and why to incorporate the psychological dimension within national strategic planning.

1953 to the Congress calling for establishing the United States Information Agency (USIA). Rowland R. Hughes, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, testified to the House Committee on Government Operations that the USIA was responsible for U.S. foreign information activities “bearing an exclusive label which presents the official position of the United States Government” (22 Jun 53). He continued that USIA would disseminate “clearly and unequivocally to officials, leaders, and the peoples abroad what the United States Government stands for.” Hughes also testified that “the President in his letter makes it very clear that he expects all the different parts to operate together as a team and not as individual fighters among themselves, and that certainly has been the spirit and will continue to be the spirit of this reorganization.”

To support the integration and coordination amongst the “team,” President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10483 on 2 September 1953 establishing the Operations Coordinating Board. By Bill Jackson’s admission the OCB “was considerably weaker and looser than recommended by the President’s Committee” (Ann Whitman Files, Box 21, 31 Dec 56). Inter-departmental bargaining over Jackson Committee recommendations resulted in the OCB as an interdepartmental committee technically outside of the NSC structure. A year later, Eisenhower requested a reexamination of the Jackson Report and again conceptually approved the OCB within the NSC structure as an “executive committee of the policy maker” (PCIIA Records, Box 11, 24 Mar 53). However, it was not until 1956 that the OCB staff relocated to the Executive Office Building to be adjacent with the NSC staff and a year later Eisenhower finally signed Executive Order 10700 formally designating the OCB within the NSC structure.

As alluded to in chapter six, as the Jackson Committee began drafting its final recommendations, the top secret Project Solarium commenced. Held from 10 June through 15 July 1953, the Solarium exercise explored three possible national security approaches. During a 1988 oral history project, George Kennan, Andrew J. Goodpaster, and Robert Bowie offered that the conclusions and value of Solarium could be summarized as: the Soviet Union as a long-term nuclear and conventional military threat to the United States; a necessity for avoiding public

Former U.S. diplomat and then Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University Edmund Gullion is credited as having coined the phrase “public diplomacy” with the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at Tufts in the 1960s. The concept encompasses US government efforts to understand, inform and influence foreign populations. See <http://publicdiplomacy.org/pages/index.php?page=about-public-diplomacy>.

alarm, and complacency; the importance of allies in pursuing U.S. national security; and the most useful strategy being political and educational (Pickett 2004, 9). These discursive threads run through the Jackson Report formally presented to President Eisenhower two weeks before Solarium's conclusion as well.

Three months later President Eisenhower approved the Top Secret NSC 162/2 "Basic National Security Policy," later known as the New Look policy. Drawing on Jackson Report language (Osgood 2000, 424), NSC 162/2 identified the Soviet threat as a combination of Soviet hostility to the U.S., Soviet military power, and Soviet political warfare designed "to weaken the free world alliances and will to resist the Soviet power" (30 Oct 53, 5). The policy also stressed that increasing Soviet atomic capability would "enhance" Soviet capacity for political warfare in the free world. Describing Soviet control over its satellites as reinforced by military forces, the policy assessed an unlikely prospect of detaching any areas. While the Soviet Union would not launch a general war, the policy repeated a warning of any provocative Western moves "which they [the Soviet leadership] view as a serious threat to their security" (30 Oct 1953, 4).

The Jackson Committee had sought a sustainable strategy, workable within the boundaries of Cold War, and American understanding of governance and society. NSC 162/2 identified the basic U.S. problem as meeting the Soviet threat without "seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermining our fundamental values and institutions" (30 Oct 53, 1). While many contemporary analyses highlight the U.S. "New Look" nuclear policy as linked to budgetary concerns, NSC 162/2 also importantly reasserted the necessity of allies and the role of constructive policies "not related solely to anti-communism" in retaining and extending cooperation. As the Jackson Report noted, "[n]ot all of the free world is prepared to view its problems in the context of a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union" (1953, 1841). Reminiscent of Wallace Carroll's revelation of the U.S.'s fundamental, aspirational objective, the Basic National Security Policy concluded that the "broad aim... must always seek to create and sustain the hope and confidence of the free world in the ability of its basic ideas and institutions not merely to oppose the communist threat, but to provide a way of life superior to Communism" (30 Oct 53, 25). Implicitly this identified "basic ideas," the "Great Words," as a source of U.S. competitive advantage over the long-haul. Covert activities played a part in harassing Soviet control, but the overall approach was more evolutionary rather than revolutionary in the conventional sense.

As President Eisenhower bid farewell to the nation on 17 January 1961, we continue to see echoes of Jackson Committee discourse within his farewell address as he stressed a balanced approach toward ultimate objectives, famously warning against the “military-industrial complex.”

Unhappily, the danger it [the Soviet Union] poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle--with liberty at stake!!! Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our chartered course toward permanent peace and human betterment...

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done! (17 Jan 61, handwritten exclamations included).

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