Training Bodies: Performances of Ethos in 21st Century Sportswomen

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ABSTRACT

This study reveals the ways in which previous cultural narratives about race, class, and gender may influence how one performs ethos and how that performance of ethos is received by an audience. Through a rhetorical analysis of the performances of ethos by elite female athletes such as Brandi Chastain, Serena Williams, and Michelle Wie, this study demonstrates the dynamic interplay between these facets of identity, suggesting not only the inter-relatedness of these elements and ethos, but also that a contemporary account of ethos must acknowledge identities as fluid, and must account for race, class, gender, and embodiment as parts of an interlocking system of representation. A consideration of how ethos is performed in women’s sports is particularly important because elite female athletes represent a bit of a tension in feminist scholarship: by caring for and developing their bodies through athletic training, they are able to assert their presence in a traditionally male-dominated sphere, while on the other hand, the very structures of sport—one of the few social institutions where an ontological difference based on sex is not only reinforced but actually upheld as a moral of “fair play”—are situated in discourses that reinforce women’s difference from and subordination to men.

This study argues that female athletes’ ability to shape and invent their physical bodies through athletic training also influences their ability to shape and invent their ethos. However, repeated bodily actions do not just signify one’s ethos, but actually work to constitute the individual. In this way, practices such as the care of the self and dedicated athletic training are not so much about the social impositions placed on the subject but on the work that these practices do in shaping the individual. Therefore, in order to understand ethos and the performance of ethos as an embodied practice, rhetorical scholars need an entire conceptualization of the role the body plays in the making of the self, and in particular, a conceptualization in which outward bodily actions are understood as both the potential for transforming and developing the self and the means through which such transformation may take place.
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When I began my graduate studies my advisor, Richard Leo Enos, often told me that writing the dissertation was a marathon, not a sprint. As a former collegiate track and field athlete with a strong aversion to any distance over 400 meters, the metaphor was not only apt, but particularly daunting. Behind every successful athletic performance is a team of individuals whose support, guidance, partnership, sacrifice, and yes, discipline, while not always immediately obvious, create the conditions and practices that foster such success. This is true here as well, and I wish to thank the various coaches, training partners, and support staff—in all their iterations—that have helped me along the way.

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Chapter 1: Sport as Disciplinary Practice and the Moving, Trained Body as the Means of Transformation

Since the passage of Title IX in 1972, women’s participation in athletics in the United States has soared. Women are participating in elite athletic performance in ever-increasing numbers and yet these opportunities have done little to subvert socially constructed gender norms which influence perceptions of women’s status in society. For example, the 2012 Olympics was proudly touted as the “Women’s Olympics,” with, for the first time ever, female athletes representing each of the countries participating that year, and yet this was also the first year that women were allowed to compete in more modest uniforms for international beach volleyball competitions, such as sleeved shirts or shorts of any type. Previously, women were required to compete in bikini-like uniforms, while men wore sleeveless shirts and shorts.

Elite female athletes are particularly interesting as a site for feminist research because they represent a tension in feminist scholarship and also a tension in theories of the subject and subjectivity. Elite female athletes represent a tension in feminist scholarship because on the one hand, they subvert gendered expectations by participating in a typically male-dominated sphere. On the other hand, because sport is one of the only social institutions that not only insists on an ontological difference based on sex but actually posits this difference as a moral of fair play, women’s very participation in sport also reinforces their difference from men. In addition, the increase in women’s sporting opportunities often only privileges white women, because the women’s sports programs most often added to meet Title IX compliance are “country club”

\footnote{That is, while more women are participating in sport than ever before, there are still more professional sporting opportunities for male athletes than for female athletes, and men often earn more than women within the same sport. At the collegiate level, there are still more male coaches (including male coaches of women’s programs), athletic directors, administrators, and sports media personnel than women. For more information on the continued discrepancies within sport, see the Women’s Sports Foundation’s, “Title IX at Forty: A White Paper.”}
sports, or sports such as tennis, golf, lacrosse, field hockey, equestrian, and swimming and diving, which are typically dominated by white upper and middle class women (Fields 141).

Elite female athletes also represent a tension within theories of subjectivity more generally because the very disciplining practices and behaviors they pursue (such as strict diets and regulated weight training) also become the means through which they might exercise agency. While this is true to a certain extent for anyone who participates in disciplinary practices that involve learning and acquiring knowledge (for example students of any subject), what is different about elite female athletes is the direct tie to the body. In this understanding the body is not just the medium of signification, but the tool through which the embodied subject is formed.

Although sport has provided women with opportunities to build and transform their physical bodies, thus providing women with a way to challenge gendered expectations about women’s appearance, body shape, and size, the very structure of sport simultaneously reinforces gendered expectations for women’s behavior and their adherence to a normative aesthetic ideal. In this way, some female athletes’ bodies present a problem in that their characteristic sexuality is seen as at odds with or more important than their athleticism. This is a problem because these gendered expectations and the cultural values that dictate the dominant aesthetic ideal influence how women are perceived by the public and how they may perform ethos. Ethos is a rhetorical concept that refers to one’s personal character and the use of one’s character as a persuasive force. The performance of ethos, then, consists of a sort of stylization of the self, or the deliberate construction of a certain persona by the individual, in order to produce a particular conception of him or herself by others, whether that conception is actually held by others or not. Importantly, though, ethos is co-constructed, or negotiated, between the audience and the speaker or performer. One cannot simply “claim” or “earn” ethos, rather, ethos must be granted by an
audience. In this way, ethos is both external to and internal to the speaker or performer: one’s ethos may be deliberately styled by the individual for a particular audience and situation, but previous conceptions of that individual’s ethos by the audience may also influence how the audience perceives of subsequent performances of ethos.

These performances might consist of bodily movements, actions, and behaviors, and outward adornment in addition to more traditional understandings that attend to ethos as part of public, linguistically-based discourse. Because elite female athletes, much like female politicians and celebrities, hold a privileged place in society and help establish how women are perceived in the public sphere, their performances of ethos can therefore be seen as a form of epideictic rhetoric, which has important implications for cultural and societal values. Epideictic rhetoric consists of discourse that builds on previous actions, speaks to the present moment, and has the potential for future action. Traditionally, epideictic rhetoric works to either praise or blame, and previous cultural narratives, stereotypes, and social norms are all related to epideictic rhetoric in the sense that epideictic rhetoric helps establish these discourses as part of cultural memory, and they come to signify the cultural values of a particular community or group of people. Because epideictic works to help recognize and reify what a community values, it has a close association with ethos. For example, the audience is more likely to grant ethos to a speaker or performer who they think embodies their own cultural values, so a speaker or performer may deliberately try to display themselves and their actions as characteristic of those values. In doing so, however, the speaker or performer further emphasizes the epideictic rhetoric that establishes and reinforces those cultural values.

Ethos is also related to what I term the development of the self or the care of the self and also to subjectivity. The care of the self is a particular philosophy commonly associated with
Michel Foucault, though it has had various iterations throughout history. Foucault discusses the care of the self as a practice or way of life in ancient Greece that valued one’s ability to care for and train the physical body. For the ancient Greeks, the trained, cared for body was seen as a sign of one’s readiness to participate in civic life. That is, the physical body was symbolic of one’s subjectivity; it signaled one’s ability to act or take action in a particular context. In this way, the self and subjectivity are also closely tied to ethos, because ethos amounts to one’s personal credibility and character, and thus represents one’s conception of the self or status as a subject to others.

Importantly, though, in this understanding, subjectivity is also tied to the body. For Foucault, power operates on the body through disciplinary mechanisms such as ranking and individualization, which work to normalize individuals, and an individual’s pursuit of such disciplinary practices in turn reinforces the circulation of power. However, the relationship between athletic training and the body also presents a problem because of the materiality of the body. Elite athletic training posits that one can change the body, that the tissues and physiological structures of the body can be developed and trained, leading the elite athlete to believe that she can shape her body, and thus shape her subjectivity. Yet the same understanding of the malleability of the body poses a problem because there are certain aspects of the material body that one simply cannot change, such as one’s race or height, or the types of tissue that can be built or grafted onto the body. This presents the elite athlete with the illusion that she is the self-author of her body and the way her body is perceived in society, but really her understanding of herself and the way that others perceive her are culturally constructed and situated in discourses that are shaped by previous cultural narratives, which may limit how she performs ethos and how that ethos is perceived.
One of the reasons why elite athletes present such a problem for feminist scholarship is because they occupy a contradictory position. That is, elite athletes pursue disciplinary practices such as regimented athletic training programs and specific diets, but these disciplinary practices are also the key component for their success as athletes and for their agency as individuals. More specifically, the very practices that render them docile also enable their ability to use such practices and behaviors as what I term modalities of action. This is a phrase I borrow from feminist anthropologist Saba Mahmood, and it refers to the potential for one to re-purpose or re-deploy disciplinary practices and bodily movements for one’s own purposes and agenda. These modalities of action may take several different forms, and in this interpretation, the process of athletic training and the care of the self—processes often thought of as disciplinary mechanisms that produce a subordinate subject—may actually function as processes of invention that offer the possibility of agency. In this way, agency exists not only in actions that resist social norms but also in the ways in which one inhabits norms. That is, I want to suggest that one’s desire to submit to an established authority (such as a coach) is not necessarily in opposition to feminist politics, nor do certain practices necessarily only reinscribe traditional gender roles or expectations. Rather, I want to focus instead on the ways in which disciplinary practices and one’s subordination might produce different capacities in the subject. This understanding of power and subject formation means that agency is not just the same as resistance to social norms, but is a capacity for action that is made possible specifically through one’s subordination.

Literature Review

In order to address the problems described above, this project considers two general areas of scholarship from several disciplinary and theoretical perspectives: scholarship that discusses the relationship between the body and subjectivity, and scholarship that focuses specifically on
the care of the self as a bodily practice that is related to one’s subjectivity. First, I discuss the relationship between the body and subjectivity, incorporating scholarship from the fields of feminist studies and sports studies in order to explain the ways in which the body is socially constructed and is tied to one’s identity. I then incorporate this research with scholarship from rhetorical studies on ethos as bodily and situated in order to illustrate how the body and the cultural narratives that influence perceptions of the body help determine one’s personal character or status in society. After establishing the body’s connection to the development of the self and subjectivity more generally, I then move on to focus on scholarship that discusses the care of the self specifically. Attending to scholarship that examines the care of the self in particular is important for my study because of the emphasis on the care of the self as a bodily practice that is related to one’s subjectivity. In this section of the literature review, I examine the care of the self from a variety of perspectives: feminist studies, rhetorical studies, and sports studies, focusing especially on the care of the self as a disciplinary practice that operates on the body and functions through repeated bodily movements and behaviors. This focus allows me to examine the ways in which bodily habits and behaviors, such as those produced through dedicated athletic training—which I argue is an extension of the care of the self— influences one’s subjectivity.

The Relationship Between the Body and Subjectivity

Feminist scholars in several fields (for example, Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz, Susan Bordo, Shari Dworkin and Faye Linda Wachs, Debra Gimlin, and Pirkko Markula and Eileen Kennedy, among many others) have interrogated the social construction of the body, drawing attention to the way the body often functions as an assumed “natural” signifier of sexual, gendered, and racial difference. In this way, the physical body comes to signify women’s identity
and social positions, with material consequences for women’s lived experiences. For example, in the 1990s, feminist scholars noted the cultural construction of the thin, feminine body as an aesthetic ideal is often conflated with understandings of what is “healthy” for women. According to Debra Gimlin, understanding social constructions of the body is especially critical for women, because women’s appearances become “symbolic of their characters,” to the extent that “the body is the primary indicator of self to the outside world” (4). Bordo adds that body shape and size also have symbolic functions, serving to designate social position and to mark class status or gender roles (88). In this understanding, one’s physical body is often seen as an indication of social mobility (or lack thereof), with those who are able to “manage” their bodies seen as also capable of managing their lives and businesses (95). And certainly, medical and other technologies that allowed one to shape and define the body in new ways only proliferated understandings of the body as plastic, as capable of being remade into what society considered a more “desirable” image, and thus the ability to remake the body according to an aesthetic ideal only made that aesthetic ideal more narrow and difficult to attain.

More recent feminist scholarship argues the body and its relationship to the aesthetic ideal are conflated with ideas about health and one’s social status. Pirkko Markula and Eileen Kennedy note the singularity of the female body reproduced by the media and discourses surrounding the body. The ideal feminine aesthetic represented by health and fitness industries promotes thin, toned, young, and mostly white bodies as the ideal aesthetic (2). Importantly, Markula and Kennedy note that women’s health is “culturally expressed in aesthetic terms as a thin, healthy looking body,” suggesting that for women, it is the particular aesthetic ideal that signifies the properly cared for body, the “healthy” body, rather than other measures of health.

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2 However, Judith Butler’s important work on gender questioned ideas of a “pure body” that exists prior to discourse. Butler’s work will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
such as the absence of illness (4). As Markula and Kennedy point out, in many popular media texts, “looking good (the ideal body) and feeling good (health) become closely intertwined” to the extent that women’s health is “culturally expressed in aesthetic terms as a thin, healthy looking body” (3-4). Markula and Kennedy claim the popular discourse surrounding women’s bodies is primarily aesthetic and that these discourses turn exercise into a discipline that women diligently subscribe to in their “never-ending quest for beauty and health” (12-13). Likewise, sports studies scholars Shari L. Dworkin and Faye Linda Wachs contend “the appearance of the fit body, rather than the reality of fitness, has become a critical determinant of social status and a factor that is self-policing by individuals as they negotiate social positions” (12). The conflation of bodies and one’s social status presents a problem for individuals whose bodies do not conform to these established ideals. As I argued above, these cultural constructions of the body influence how women are perceived by the public and how they may perform ethos.

However, while feminist scholars’ interest in the body and its relationship to subjectivity is relatively recent, these problems are not at all new. Rhetoric has a very long relationship with the body, dating back to rhetoric’s beginnings in ancient Greece, and rhetorical history also helps explain why the body is such an important factor in cultural understandings of identity. Historically, the body and ethos were connected in Greek society, with physical fitness and beauty as physical signs of virtue and honor, signs that demonstrated who could participate in the public sphere. The body was thus the outward indication of one who could be trusted to speak on another’s behalf, of someone who was responsible enough for participation in government service, of, in short, the ethical subject. In particular, the ancient Greek philosophy of caring for the self (also referred to as the art of living or the aesthetics of existence) illustrated the importance for Greeks of caring for the mind and the body. The care of the self was seen as a
sort of prerequisite for participation in civic discourse, and the body that was cared for was the outward sign of one’s readiness to take on the responsibilities of the polis.

However, this philosophy of caring for the self assumed a particular type of body. The art of living was directed to men only, and more specifically, to those who were free citizens and thus able to care for others through their participation in the public sphere. Many Aristotelian understandings of bodily ethos (for example, Hawhee, Hyde, and Smith, discussed in more detail in chapter two) therefore assumes that certain factors, such as one’s social status and ability to care for the self, are thus within the realm of the speaker or performer’s control. Thus while classical rhetoric provides a strong tradition of understanding the body as part of ethos, contemporary scholars must work to repurpose these theories in ways that are inclusive of women’s bodily experiences. For example, rhetoric scholars such as Jacqueline Jones Royster and Coretta Pittman call for revisions to classical models of ethos because certain marginalized individuals may already face a disadvantage in their ability to construct ethos, though Western society still assumes that one’s credibility is completely self-created, without accounting for individual lived experiences (Pittman 44). By discussing ethos in the context of epideictic rhetoric and focusing on the ways in which the lived, material body influences perceptions of ethos, I aim to provide one such alternative model of ethos that might extend understandings of ethos to include how socio-cultural factors outside of the speaker’s realm of control might influence one’s performances of ethos.

More recently, scholarship in rhetorical studies situates ethos as constructed through a variety of forces: the individual, the specific context of the discourse, and the community or audience that one speaks to (Crowley and Hawhee, Hyde, Jarratt and Reynolds, Royster, Pittman), and other contemporary understandings of ethos have considered it as a bodily or
performative concept (Hawhee, Holiday). This important scholarship considers ethos as both internal to the individual and the result of external factors, extending classical understandings of ethos that tend to situate ethos completely within the speaker’s realm of control to include ethos as negotiated between audience and rhetor. However, such scholarship tends to focus more on a general body instead of the particularities of a specific (gendered and racial) body performing ethos in a specific context. Elite female athletes thus offer an especially interesting site for rhetoric scholars to study contemporary performances of ethos because of the emphasis in athletics on both the body and performance. In addition, a consideration of how ethos is performed in women’s sports is particularly attractive because of the negotiation between normative discourses of femininity and the ability of athletes to shape the self as deviant, as compliant, or as some combination thereof, and sometimes both all at once, which extends current rhetorical scholarship that is interested in how the audience and the cultural values of a particular community might influence how one’s ethos is performed.

In addition, rhetoric attends to the ways in which language and discourse influences social reality, including the ways in which previous cultural narratives affect how current discourse is shaped by a speaker and received by an audience. For example, feminist scholars in rhetoric (for example, Patricia Bizzell, Cheryl Glenn, Kimberly Harrison, Susan Jarratt, Andrea Lunsford, and Nedra Reynolds, among others) have worked to question the gender dichotomy that situates rhetoric as specifically patriarchal, noting the ways in which discourse situates women differently from men, and working to include women’s particular communicative practices—such as Glenn’s work on silence, Harrison’s work on personal writing, or Jarratt’s work on the habits and customs of social behavior—within the rhetorical tradition. However,

3 I provide a more detailed discussion of ethos in chapter two.
such scholarship, while foundational for feminist rhetorics, focuses more on recovery efforts that examine women’s use of rhetoric historically—and thus justifies their inclusion in the history of rhetoric—and less on the complicated relationship of gender, sex, the body, and language and what such complications mean for women’s identity. I aim to extend this important scholarship to include the material realities of particular women’s lived experiences, such as the repeated training practices that build and shape the physical body. Other feminist rhetoric scholars, such as Royster and Pittman, argue that race and cultural understandings of race must be considered when scholars examine issues related to ethos and a speaker’s relationship with the audience. My analysis addresses this issue that Royster and Pittman respectively raise, and I approach my analysis of race and ethos by combining an embodied understanding of ethos (based on rhetorical theory) and cultural studies approaches to race as socially constructed. I argue that though race is socially constructed, understandings of race remain connected to their manifestation in the body, and the materiality of the body—that is, the visible markings of difference that individuals carry with them—nevertheless have real, lived consequences for these individuals.4

Finally, recent scholarship in rhetoric and writing (Cheville, Fishman and Lunsford, Hawhee, Pollack, and Skinner-Linnenberg) increasingly focuses on performance, suggesting a revived interest in understanding rhetoric as performative, which is helpful for explaining how language might lead to action. Performative understandings of rhetoric draw from the work of J.L. Austin, who explains that a given communicative event is performative if by saying something, one also does something, the classic example being when one says “I do” during a wedding ceremony. Performative actions are dependent on context: if one says “I do” in a context other than the wedding ceremony it is not performative. Speech and gestures are also

4 I provide a much more detailed discussion of these intersecting theoretical frameworks in chapter two.
considered performative when used to construct identity, as Judith Butler notes in her understanding of performativity. For Butler, however, performance does not reflect an individual’s interior identity, but is an activity that actually forms identity through repetition, thus demonstrating the power of discourse to create the self. Rhetoric scholars have applied both Austin and Butler’s respective understandings of performance to consider how semiotic expression, such as that portrayed by and through the body, might be considered rhetorical. For example, Debra Hawhee and Julie Cheville draw attention to the relationship between bodily performance and learning, and Della Pollock, Virginia Skinner-Linnenberg, and Jenna Fishman and Andrea Lunsford note the importance of performance for illustrating issues of audience and delivery, but they work primarily in the context of the writing classroom and apply performance theory to written texts rather than bodily movements or practices. Rhetoric’s understanding of the care of the self as an implicit part of classical rhetoric, along with a recent interest in performance, situates rhetoric as a system of study capable of understanding the various complexities of the body’s role in performing ethos.

However, rhetorical scholars’ recent focus on the body and performance still tends to emphasize language as the medium of performativity, instead of attending to the materiality of the physical body. In this way, rhetorical scholars’ incorporation of Butler (along with Foucault, Grosz, and Bordo, among others) tends to situate non-verbal performances within the register of language, rather than including affective or experiential registers of meaning. Consequently, there is a tendency in body theory toward assuming that meaning resides only in verbal

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5 Performance and performativity, along with embodied subjectivity, are discussed in much more detail in chapter two.

6 Notable exceptions include the work of Celeste Condit and Jack Selzer and Sharon Crowley’s Rhetorical Bodies. However, in the case of Selzer and Crowley’s edited collection, there is a tendency to move too quickly past the body and on to materiality, without fully interrogating the materiality of the body.
signification, and bodies are thus analyzed for their symbolic meaning. Focusing on the body as a productive force that moves and invents the self helps account for the body’s capacity to move and change over time. For these reasons, I focus my analysis not only on how discourse and the epideictic rhetoric that helps circulate such discourses shape an athlete’s performance of ethos, but also on the ways in which the performance of repeated bodily practices and behaviors come to constitute a sense of self for that individual.

*Understandings of the Care of the Self as a Disciplinary Practice*

In the previous section, I discussed the relationship between the body and subjectivity from the perspectives of feminist studies, sports studies, and rhetorical studies, bringing these different disciplinary perspectives together in order to explain the way that the body is socially constructed and is tied to one’s identity. In particular, by including research in rhetorical studies on ethos as bodily and situated, I demonstrate how the body and the cultural narratives that influence perceptions of the body help determine one’s personal character or status in society, which extends scholarship in sports studies and feminist studies to include the importance of the body in considerations of one’s public credibility. I now turn to the care of the self to examine the specific ways in which disciplinary practices such as athletic training influence one’s subjectivity. Focusing on the care of the self as a process of transformation importantly attends to the materiality of the body and its capacity to move and change. It also accounts for the ways in which repeated bodily movements and behaviors come to constitute the subject. As I mentioned previously, the care of the self is an ancient Greek tradition which incorporated the body, aesthetics, and rhetoric. In this system of thinking, the Greeks believed that one could transform the self through specific training and attention to the body. Notably, the care of the self was also associated with one’s involvement and preparation for civic discourse and with the development
of ethics. For the Greeks, one had to be able to care for the self before one was able to care for others through participation in government, and one of the signs of caring for the self was the outward physical appearance evident in the body (*Hermeneutics* 36-39). The body thus communicated one’s readiness and capability for civic responsibility.

Likewise, the ability to care for and transform the self was linked with one’s ability to access the truth and to proceed as an ethical subject in society. In his later works, Foucault turned his attention to the care of the self or the “arts of existence,” providing a more active understanding of the subject in comparison to the passive subject many feminists critiqued in works such as *Discipline and Punish*. According to Foucault, the ancient Greeks believed the body’s adaptability—through training and caring for the self—communicated one’s virtue. Foucault cites Musonius Rufus, who claims “the body must not be neglected in the exercises, even when it is a matter of practicing philosophy ... it is an instrument that the virtues really have to make use of for the actions of life. Virtue must go through the body in order to become active. Therefore, one must take care of one’s body” (426-427). The care of the self and the art of living also necessitated a subject, one capable of the freedom of choice involved in “making one’s life the object of a techne, making one’s life a work—a beautiful and good work (as everything produced by a good and reasonable techne should be),” which suggests the association of the body, or of a particular body (the results of a beautiful and good work), with the free subject (424). In other words, in order to be able to shape the body in this way, one had to be able to control one’s own body, so the trained body in part at least signified the free body, the body ready to participate in civic discourse and contribute to society.

However, the self that Foucault discusses when describing the care of the self is of course male, and feminists have objected to his lack of consideration of gender difference. Importantly
though, the attention to the body in Foucault’s later works reveals the subject as capable of transforming the self, and discipline is emphasized as both an enabling and constraining force (McLaren 5). This understanding of the care of the self is particularly well-suited for discussions of female athletes, since athletic training, as a disciplining activity, both requires that the athlete undergo specific surveillance practices that regulate the body—such as submitting to rigorous training schedules and modified diets—but then offers the body greater freedoms in the development of new abilities, such as increased speed and strength. In the context of the female athlete, the body is more disciplined, but this discipline also allows women to do things they previously could not, such as quite literally being able to move heavy items without requiring help, leading to greater independence.

Several feminist scholars have applied Foucault’s understanding of the care of the self to studies on the female body. For example, Honi Fern Haber provides an excellent illustration of discipline as both enabling and constraining in her “Body Politics and the Muscled Woman,” which offers the female body builder as an example of Foucauldian resistance applied to gender norms. As Haber points out, discipline requires the regulation of the body, seen in weightlifting as the precise training of certain movements in the right sequence and for a particular duration, and through dietary restrictions, but also allows one to acquire new skills, strength, confidence, and a different understanding of one’s body. For Haber, muscle is one way for feminists to “take control of embodied signification” because “power operates and is reproduced—both passively and actively—through aesthetic strategies” (139). According to Haber, power reinscribes aesthetic ideologies “in gender and social relations, in language, … in bodies themselves—especially, and most literally, in the bodies of women” (140). Notably though, Haber situates only women bodybuilders, but not other female athletes, as subversive, because they present “an
alternative” “inscribed on the surface of the body” which Haber claims problematizes seeing and the aesthetic ideologies that power reinscribes, explaining the body of the muscled woman demonstrates a “form of resistance that does not need to step outside of power; rather, she recombines already given images [the masculine muscles and the physiological female body] and resignifies them in the process” (153).

While Haber’s work suggests the possibility of rereading Foucault’s understanding of the subject—that is, the individual who though capable of self-creation is nevertheless still a vehicle of power—for feminist goals through the idea of the trained female athlete, there is clearly more to be done in determining why and how the female body may become subversive and may challenge prevailing conceptions of the aesthetic ideal. In fact, Haber worried (in 1996) that the muscled woman will no longer be a subversive image, because the image will be seen as too masculine or the notion of femininity will be “expanded to include the image of the muscled woman,” and I would agree that this has become the case (152). If anything, the muscled woman is becoming the new aesthetic ideal, simply replacing the ultra-thin model of femininity in the 90s with a new social norm. In this way, Haber’s emphasis on women’s exercise practices as specifically subversive, and therefore useful for feminist politics, assumes that it is only through the resistance to social norms that women can achieve agency. Instead, as will become clear later in the dissertation, the process of bodily transformation that is available to women through athletic training opens up new and different possibilities of agency. Instead of the traditional feminist model of agency, which often positions agency within the binary of resistance/subordination, I argue that outward bodily actions—such as the weight lifting Haber discusses—can be understood as both the potential for transforming and developing the self and the means through which such transformation may take place. In this way, certain performative behaviors
and bodily practices can be read as more than just particular prescriptive behaviors, but as modalities of action that allow the individual to recode or redirect these resources for one’s own interests and agendas, situating such movements and behaviors as processes that might lead to agency. That is, the process of athletic training and the care of the self—processes often thought of as disciplinary mechanisms that produce a subordinate subject—may actually function as processes of invention that offer the possibility of agency. In this way, agency exists not only in actions that resist social norms but also in the ways in which one inhabits norms. In this way, one’s deliberate submission to disciplinary practices might produce different capacities in the subject, situating agency as not just a synonym for the resistance to social norms, but as a capacity for action that is made possible specifically through one’s subordination.

Other feminist scholars, such as Margaret A. McLaren, point out that in the traditional understanding of the care of the self which was such a prominent part of Foucault’s later works, one becomes a subject through the bodily practices of regimen, or training (67). In the traditional understanding, regimen helps one to moderate and control of the self, which then leads to self-mastery through training and discipline. The care of the self, even as an aesthetic notion, involves a social dimension that according to McLaren, situates it in the political and social realm. For example, the care of the self requires ethical work, “enables one to occupy one’s proper social role,” and involves a guide or counselor, which implies an active role in the polis and concerns one’s relationships with others (71).

In particular, feminist scholars within the fields of sports studies and exercise studies have incorporated Foucault’s understanding of the care of the self as a way to address aspects of this problem of elite female athletes’ subjectivity, such as how women’s use of exercise and athletics might be considered a way of shaping the self, or shaping one’s identity. However, such
research tends to focus on women’s exercise practices as either the compulsion to achieve a singular aesthetic ideal—and thus oppressive to women—or to situate women’s exercise practices as resistant, or as an opportunity to subvert the dominant aesthetic ideal (Markula and Kennedy 11). For example, Gwen Chapman studied weight management practices of a women’s rowing team and David Johns and Jennifer Johns similarly researched diet and weight management practices of female gymnasts. However, in both studies, it is not clear how the athletes used diet and weight management as a technology of the self. These studies do not apply the technology of the self to one’s construction of ethos or the process of becoming an ethical subject, and rather, as Markula suggests, focus more on the technologies of the self as a coping mechanism that athletes use to almost counteract the disciplining process of participating in athletics (“Technologies” 91). Importantly though, Markula argues that it is not so much the practice of weight management itself—as an established disciplining technique—that is the problem. According to Markula an ethical care of the self does not require new practices (in contrast to the commonly accepted practice of weight management), but a “folding of the existing, every day practices to create a self” in an active fashion (99). Markula looks back to ancient Greek practices of caring for the self, which included such “everyday practices” as writing, self-examination (melete), and exercise which worked to “analyze and develop one’s self, not necessarily to transform one’s body shape” (99). To counter, Markula explains that these very same practices can become disciplinary techniques if constant self-surveillance occurs. As the studies by Chapman, Johns and Johns, and Markula suggest, the technologies of the self do not always serve as a technique of transformation, but can also become a process of creating docile bodies.
Other studies, such as Jennifer Wesely’s research on women bodybuilders, situates the care of the self as a more complicated system of negotiation. For example, Wesely argues that the women bodybuilder’s ability to build and shape the body allowed them to “negotiate gender identity,” but that the resulting size of their bodies led some women to focus on types of competitions that required a more typically “feminine” body shape rather than the larger body often seen in bodybuilding competitions (167-168). According to Wesely, bodybuilding has “the potential to be both technologies of femininity and technologies of the self, reinforcing, challenging, and creating a new sense of identity all at once (176). While Wesely’s study importantly notes the complex power relations involved in women’s exercise practices and the persistent aesthetic emphasis for women, it does not address how women are able to construct identities and perform ethos through this relationship with their bodies, since the women in Wesely’s study did little to disrupt the dominant discourses about the female body: they transformed the shape of their bodies, but did not transform the self. This scholarship assumes that efforts to construct the self either fall into a desire to be seen as socially acceptable or a desire to subvert expectations entirely, when women’s exercise practices might be both at the same time. Indeed, critical feminist researchers note that women’s exercise experiences are often contradictory: women might recognize the particular aesthetic ideal expressed by the media as oppressive, and yet they continue to strive for that ideal through their relentless exercise practices.

According to Pirkko Markula and Eileen Kennedy, such research assumes a binary between “oppressive media images and resistant exercise experience,” with the result that “embodied fitness experiences are endorsed as more authentic representations of femininity than media representations” (11). The problem of course is that these researchers are not considering
how such “embodied fitness experiences” might reinforce or perpetuate media representations and cultural narratives already circulating in public opinion. It assumes that a true self exists and can be found outside of ideology and also that there is no agency for women who are pursuing an aesthetic ideal, or even that there are other motivations for shaping the body, such as excelling in athletic events, or a desire to control an aspect of the self. Such assumptions also do not fully consider the complicated relationship between agency and subjectivity that elite female athletes represent. For example, while disciplinary practices associated with athletic training, such as dieting or regimented weight training, may render an athlete subordinate to a coach (or more generally, subordinate to public expectations about women’s bodies), these same practices also allow the athlete to potentially gain agency, whether by shaping one’s body or through constructing a specific persona for a public that is readily available. That is, rather than focusing on how these women attempt to gain agency by resisting or subverting social norms, as much important feminist scholarship has already demonstrated⁷, I seek instead to analyze the varieties of ways in which women use their bodies in order to build and construct ethos, and the various bodily movements, behaviors, and practices that might constitute women’s agency and the ways in which these bodily movements and behaviors allow one to inhabit or embody certain social norms.

In an earlier publication, Markula argues for the importance of considering the care of the self as a deliberate practice that might shape an individual’s sense of self. In her “‘Tuning into One’s Self:’ Foucault’s Technologies of the Self and Mindful Fitness” Markula points out that for Foucault, the care of the self included the idea of re-creating the self over and over again, to the extent that the self was seen as a work of art or a process of invention. According to Markula, 

⁷ See for example Chapman, Johns and Johns, Markula and Kennedy, and Wesely, discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
this required a “complex and difficult process of stylization” such that one’s relationship to oneself is a “creative activity, a constant process of invention” (307). As Markula suggests, much of the research in sports studies that incorporates the care of the self does not adequately address the care of the self as a recurrent, creative process or as a multifaceted dynamic, but rather situates the care of the self based on only a particular aspect of the self. In addition, in another article, Markula stresses that many of the studies that analyzed women’s sport as a way of caring for the self do not account for how individual athletes used power, but rather tend to focus on athlete’s reactions to the use of power (“Technologies” 100). According to Markula, in order to understand how change happens in women’s sport, and I would add, in order to understand how individual athletes construct themselves as ethical subjects, it might be “as important to study the management of power as it is to analyze individual athletes’ reactions to it” (100). By analyzing the ways in which repeated bodily habits and behaviors help to develop one’s ethos, I incorporate rhetorical studies perspectives on the body, ethos, and invention in order to extend this scholarship in sports studies to include discussions of the care of the self as a creative, transformative process.

Another aspect of the care of the self and its relationship with women’s sports that tends to be overlooked by sports studies scholars is the importance of experience as part of identity formation. In their book *Foucault, Sport, and Exercise: Power, Knowledge, and Transforming the Self*, Markula and co-author Richard Pringle explain that in a Foucauldian understanding of the care of the self, “identity can be understood as constructed via experiences that are linked to the workings of discourse, power relations, disciplinary techniques and processes of active self-negotiation,” though “the focus on ‘experiences’ as constituting subjectivities has been largely overlooked within sporting research” (98-99). In addition, as Markula and Kennedy suggest,
sports studies scholars have difficulty addressing the socio-cultural factors that influence
dwomen’s exercise experiences (1). Rhetoric, as a field that studies the use of discourse and
cconsiders the importance of contingent, situational experiences is especially well-suited to
addressthow female athletes construct ethos and how those constructions are influenced by
socio-cultural factors. Furthermore, a performative understanding of ethos better accounts for the
variation, possible contradictions, and partial representations of the self evident in bodily
performances of ethos.

A rhetorical perspective on the care of the self and the performance of ethos would enrich
sports studies understandings to include the importance of ethos in creating an ethical subject. In
particular, a rhetorical approach highlights ethos and the care of the self as performative actions,
rather than as an articulation of a “true” self, and acknowledges the ways in which epideictic
rhetoric and previous cultural narratives influence the way that an audience perceives the subject.
At the same time, this study is important for rhetorical studies because it offers a
conceptualization of ethos that accounts for the performance of ethos as an embodied practice
and that examines gender, race, class, and the body as interlocking facets that influence ethos.
Because much of the current scholarship in rhetoric either assumes that ethos is completely
within the realm of the speaker or tends to focus more on a general body and less on the
particular, lived experience of a specific racialized and gendered body, it is difficult for scholars
to address the ways in which normative discourses and stereotypes are used to determine a
person’s character.

Therefore, in order to fully account for the ways in which factors such as gender, race,
class, the body, and previous cultural discourses influence one’s performance of ethos and how
that performance is received by an audience, and to provide alternatives that might disrupt some
of these established cultural narratives, scholars in rhetoric, sports studies, and feminist studies must consider the following questions:

- What are the mechanisms by which elite female athletes’ ethos is limited by factors such as gender, race, class, and the body?
- How does athletic training, as a means of caring for the self, allow women to subvert gendered and racial expectations?
- How do constructions or performances of ethos inform notions of embodied ethos and what are the implications of this understanding for feminist rhetorics?

**Description of the Chapters**

After discussing the relevant literature on ethos and the body and women’s exercise experiences from several disciplines in the first chapter, I discuss my research methodology and theoretical framework in chapter two. Chapter two examines the ways in which ethos and epideictic rhetoric often work together to reinforce the cultural values of a community, and discusses the relationship between the care of the self and embodied subjectivity. In particular, I build on previous scholarship to forward an understanding of ethos as contingent on the body, because the body both influences how one participates in and performs certain practices and behaviors and also reflects one’s conception of the self. The body may also be read as a marker of particular values and expectations, influencing how one’s ethos is perceived no matter how these practices and behaviors are performed. In this way, the cultural values and beliefs associated with one’s body, and the epideictic rhetoric that perpetuates these values and beliefs, also influence how one performs ethos and how that ethos is perceived by an audience. I also demonstrate the care of the self as a disciplinary practice that involves that deliberate bodily movements and behaviors, which have an effect on one’s character and one’s sense of self, such
that an individual can be *trained* through specific bodily practices to become an ethical subject. In this way, then, the care of the self can therefore be understood as part of the process through which bodily practices and behaviors come to form habits, which then influence an individual’s sense of self and ethos.

Chapters three, four, and five examine the ways in which individual athletes build and construct ethos, focusing on specific moments in each woman’s athletic career. Chapter three analyzes soccer player Brandi Chastain’s performance of ethos, highlighting her sports-bra revealing goal celebration at the 1999 Women’s World Cup. I argue that Chastain’s ability to build and shape her body through athletic training, along with her identity as a white, conventionally attractive, middle class woman allowed her to capitalize on previous discourses that established an aesthetic ideal—one Chastain happened to reflect—in order to build ethos. Chastain’s performances of ethos specifically illustrate the malleability of the body and the ways in which athletic training and repeated bodily behaviors allow the individual to transform and reinvent the self. In addition, Chastain also nicely illustrates the ways in which individuals may inhabit or embody social norms, redeploying these systems of power as a means to gain agency. Applying Chastain’s performance of ethos to feminist understandings of agency therefore extends scholarship that focuses on agency as the resistance to social norms to also include inhabiting social norms as a form of feminist agency.

Chapter four discusses tennis player Serena Williams’ performances of ethos, focusing especially on her 2004 U.S. Open match against Jennifer Capriati. In this chapter, I explain the ways in which cultural narratives about black athletes and black bodies influence how Williams performs ethos and how those performances are received by a mostly white, upper class tennis community. More specifically, I argue that Williams works to assert a specifically black ethos
that figures her as both more spectacular than and also deviant from her white peers. Williams’ performances of ethos also demonstrates the ways in which repeated bodily habits and behaviors come to constitute the individual, and how the materiality of the body might challenge social norms related to masculinity, femininity, race, and class. In this way, I argue that Williams’ bodily movements and behaviors can be read as both subversive to established social norms and as embodying certain social norms, expanding understandings of what might constitute women’s agency.

Chapter five addresses golfer Michelle Wie’s performances of ethos, noting especially her performance in the 2004 (men’s) PGA Sony Open, and her efforts to play in other men’s tournaments. In discussing Wie, I address cultural narratives that situate her as exotic or disingenuous, and I note especially the way her ethos changes over the course of her career in order to demonstrate ethos as dynamic and situational. More specifically, I argue that Wie situates her athletic performance as entertainment in order to redeploy narratives that situate her behavior as resistant to the social norms of golf and justify her participation in traditionally male-only tournaments. At the same time, however, Wie also relies on her ability to inhabit social norms that situate her as non-threatening to these social norms in order to gain more playing opportunities. Together, Chastain, Williams, and Wie’s respective performances of ethos demonstrate the importance of considering repeated bodily movements and behaviors and the work these practices do in constituting the individual. Examining the ways in which elite female athletes utilize disciplinary practices such as the care of the self and dedicated athletic training reveals the ways in which the materiality of the body influences the development of the self and one’s ethos and illustrates how one might deploy disciplinary practices as a process that might
lead to one’s agency. In this way, these athletes reveal the ways in which one’s ability to resist and inhabit social norms might both be read as aspects of feminist agency.

The final chapter demonstrates how these case studies enhance rhetoric scholars’ understanding of performances of ethos through the body, and thus furthers knowledge of the care of the self, which in turn complicates, challenges, and extends what scholars in feminist studies, sports studies, and rhetorical studies already know about the body, ethos, and the construction of the ethical subject. In addition, this chapter also situates ethos and epideictic rhetoric as interrelated concepts, and explains how previous cultural narratives about gender, race, class, and the body influence who may perform ethos and how they perform ethos.
Chapter 2: The Embodied Subject: Ethos, Epideictic Rhetoric, and the Care of the Self as Mechanisms of Subjectivity and Transformation

In the previous chapter I discussed how sport perpetuates gender norms and a normative aesthetic ideal, which then influences how women build and construct ethos. I argue that female athletes and women who pursue a particular bodily ideal through exercise occupy an uncomfortable position in feminist scholarship because on the one hand, they pursue practices and goals that reinforce a dominant aesthetic ideal, and because sport is one of the only modern social spaces that continues to encourage separation of the sexes, their participation in athletics reinforces normative gender expectations. On the other hand, women’s ability to construct and shape their bodies through athletic training also allows them to challenge some of these gendered expectations, and their social status as professional athletes grants them a platform and an audience to enact social change. More specifically, it is precisely because elite female athletes occupy a somewhat contradictory position that they pose a bit of a dilemma for feminist analysis because on the one hand, these women are able to assert their presence in a traditionally male-dominated sphere, while on the other hand, the very structures of sport and the morals of “fair play” are situated in discourses that reinforce women’s difference from and subordination to men.

However, instead of focusing on how these women attempt to gain agency by resisting or subverting social norms, as much important feminist scholarship has already demonstrated, I seek instead to analyze the varieties of ways in which women use their bodies in order to build and construct ethos, and the various bodily movements, behaviors, and practices that might constitute women’s agency and the ways in which these bodily movements and behaviors allow one to inhabit or embody certain social norms. Instead of attempting to provide a theory of
women’s agency, I am interested instead in analyzing the various modalities of action that might lead to one’s agency. What I am calling “modalities of action,” which is a term I borrow from feminist anthropologist Saba Mahmood, refers to the potential for one to re-purpose or re-deploy disciplinary practices and bodily movements for one’s own purposes and agenda. In this way, the very practices that might render one docile also have the potential to lead to agency. What is important about considering these behaviors and practices as modalities of action, and what is different about my understanding of these practices than those of, for example, a more traditional feminist objectification critique, is that individuals might employ a variety of behaviors and practices—even those that seem to only reinforce gendered or racial norms and stereotypes—for their own purposes and agendas. In some cases, it is the very inhabiting of social norms that allows individuals to take action. It also considers the context in which these behaviors and practices occur. In this understanding, what constitutes agency or critique cannot be fixed in advance, but must come from an understanding of how particular behaviors and practices enable different modes of being.

My analysis also responds to a problem within rhetorical studies and contemporary theory more generally about the relationship between bodies and language and the tendency to rely on a body-mind polarity. Body theorists in the humanities and social sciences, especially important scholars such as Judith Butler, Susan Bordo, and Elizabeth Grosz (often working with the strong influence of Michel Foucault), have tended to emphasize language even while they discuss the body, positioning the body as secondary to language and knowledge of the body as always-already dependent on language. While such scholarship is useful for rhetorical scholars

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8 For example, though Butler claims to include non-verbal performances of gender, such as performing in drag, as a signification in which a biologically sexed male might signify as female, she still treats such non-verbal performances as if they were verbal utterances. That is, because
because it accounts for how discourse shapes knowledge of the body, much of body theory tends to “fix” the body, and consequently, bodies come to stand in for subject positions. As rhetoric scholar Debra Hawhee explains, contemporary theory “has a tendency to freeze bodies, to analyze them for their symbolic properties, thereby evacuating and ignoring their capacity to sense and to move through time” (*Moving* 7). The tendency to fix the body not only ignores the body’s capacity to move and change, but also presents a problem for feminists when the body serves as a signifier for sexual difference. As Annette Kuhn suggests, if performance assumes the possibility of a mutable self, but the body connotes a fixed self (200), how then do scholars account for activities such as sport that actively produce a particular body? Instead, I want to suggest that it is the adaptability and malleability of the body—the very thing that allows athletes to train and develop the body—which influences subject positions, so that subjectivity is always in flux. In doing so, however, I want to acknowledge that language and previous discourses also influence subjectivity. Instead of taking a strictly constructivist approach to the body, I utilize what cultural theorist Brian Massumi calls a “productivist” approach which emphasizes interactivity. That is, I see bodies and language as operating together, not one before the other.

In addition, my project speaks to a trend within rhetorical studies toward materiality. For example, Celeste M. Condit, Hawhee, and Jack Selzer and Sharon Crowley have all noted rhetoric’s association with materiality, including physical bodies, bodies of knowledge, and physical spaces, among other topics. In particular, Selzer and Crowley note that although rhetoric has historically been concerned with situatedness, most rhetorical scholars overlook material and

Butler considers gender to be a “speech act” whose code can be disrupted through parodies that repeat that code, she still locates such non-verbal performances within the register of language, and consequently assumes meaning resides only in verbal signification, though non-verbal modes of communication might include different registers of meaning, such as affective and experiential registers of meaning. See Julia Walker’s “Why Performance? Why Now?” for a more extended critique of Butler.
bodily actions. Instead, rhetorical scholars are typically, and with due reason, focused on oral and written discourses that are studied as texts, rather than for their performative aspects. According to Selzer and Crowley, “the relationship of rhetorical events to the material world that sustains and produces them has not often enough been fully elaborated or clearly articulated” (9). However, Selzer and Crowley’s *Rhetorical Bodies*, despite its title, focuses more on materiality than the body per se, dropping bodies as a site of investigation without fully interrogating the important relationship between bodies—and their capacity to move and change—and subject positions. In this way, my project returns to the body, but in a way that accounts for the transformative potential of bodies that *move*. Using this perspective, I aim in turn to “move” theoretical orientations that tend to fix the body.

My project also holds particular significance for rhetorical scholars because elite female athletes, much like female politicians and celebrities, hold a privileged place in society and help establish how women are perceived in the public sphere, and their performances of ethos can therefore be seen as a form of epideictic rhetoric, which has important implications for cultural and societal values. For the purposes of this study, epideictic rhetoric is defined as discourse which draws from past actions in order to speak to the present moment, creating the possibility of future action without necessarily directing the audience toward a specific course of action⁹. In this way, epideictic rhetoric is tied to the cultural values of a community and prompts attention to the situation and context in which specific communicative exchanges take place. The connection, then, between ethos and epideictic lies in the way that rhetors are able to represent or fail to represent the cultural values of the community and to what extent those previous actions and

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⁹ My definition of epideictic rhetoric is shaped by the work of rhetoric scholars such as Walter Beale, Cynthia Sheard, Dale Sullivan, and Jeffrey Walker, whose discussions of epideictic rhetoric are included later in the chapter.
discourses influence the current communicative exchange. My analysis also contributes to understandings of ethos, epideictic rhetoric, and invention in rhetorical studies. While existing scholarship associates ethos with the body, this scholarship often discusses a general body, and not necessarily the specific relationship of a particular body in a particular context. Instead, I argue that conceptualizations of ethos and performances of ethos need to be grounded in the specific context of the communicative exchange and need to consider the ways that the body, materiality, and space influence both the performance of ethos and how that ethos is received by an audience.

The construction and performance of ethos has very interesting connections to elite athletes because of athletes’ ability to care for and shape the physical self through athletic training. This ability to care for the self (and I purposely draw on the term *the care of the self* as forwarded by Foucault, and discuss this term in more detail below)—the literal making and shaping of the body—also has very real implications for one’s social status. The connection between caring for the self and one’s ability to construct oneself as an ethical subject has important political and social consequences, seen in how individuals are able to construct and perform ethos and their ability to engage in epideictic rhetoric. In the remainder of the chapter, I outline a reconceptualization of the rhetorical concepts of ethos and epideictic rhetoric in order to explain their relationship to embodied subjectivity. This theoretical framework allows me to analyze the ways in which epideictic rhetoric has material consequences for women’s development and performance of ethos, and allows me to offer possible alternatives that will disrupt some of these established cultural narratives.

My investigation focuses on bodily movements and embodied practices as the site upon which the performance of a subject is enacted, and I analyze the performance of the self through
the different forms that these bodily practices take, allowing me to attend to such factors as the body, race, class, and gender, and how they influence the way the subject is developed. *The self* and *subjectivity,* along with *the subject* are important and related concepts in philosophy and critical theory. While not often discussed using the same terms, classical rhetoric’s emphasis on creating educated citizens also often carries with it an implicit desire to create ethical subjects that can participate in civic life. In addition, Kenneth Burke’s emphasis on an agent who acts within the communicative exchange also is related to critical theory’s understanding of the subject as one who has the capability of acting. More recently, rhetoric and writing scholars such as James Berlin, Thomas Rickert, and Victor Vitanza (among others) often draw from these theories of the self, the subject, and subjectivity to emphasize the social context and politicization of writing. Put simply, *the self* refers to one’s recognition of oneself as existing separate from another individual. Importantly, though, one’s ability to have a sense of self is not innate, but depends on other individuals. Jacques Lacan’s “mirror stage,” which refers to the moment in which a child recognizes him or herself as separate from his or her mother, is commonly used to discuss conceptions of the self. The recognition of oneself in the mirror results in the turning of oneself into an object that can be recognized by the child from outside himself or herself. Other understandings of the self refer more specifically to the idea of developing or caring for a unique consciousness or status as an individual as a means of becoming an ethical subject. This particular understanding is influenced by Foucault’s later work, in which he examines the care of the self as a process of self-transformation that enables one to participate in civic life. It also implies a view of the self that is not necessarily fixed: it suggests an understanding of the self as one currently perceives of oneself, but also includes a projection of what the self might become. For example, Foucault argues that in the philosophy of
the care of the self, “the self appears both as the object one cares for, the thing one should be concerned about, and also, crucially, as the end one has in view when one cares for the self” (Hermeneutics 83). In this understanding, then, the self refers both to the current state of the individual and also the self one hopes to be in the future. It also implies the need to “know oneself,” or to fashion oneself as an object of knowledge, as something capable of being known. When I discuss the self, I refer to the understanding of the self discussed in connection with Foucault and with the process of creating subjects through the care of the self because this understanding emphasizes a view of the self that is not fixed, but is in a constant state of self transformation. In addition, because the care of the self involves the body, the physical transformation of the body through athletic training also influences understandings of the self, because such training gives the individual a different ability to “know oneself.”

In philosophy and critical theory, the subject refers to one who may act or observe, in contrast to an object, which is passive and is observed by others. In addition, in much the same way that knowledge of the self requires other individuals, the subject is called into being by external forces: for Louis Althusser, ideology hails individuals as subjects; for Foucault the subject is the product of power and simultaneously participates in the operation of power. Importantly though, for Foucault power (through the form of discipline) operates on the body, and the disciplined, productive body is directly related to the idea of the subject. Several feminist scholars, most notably Butler, also incorporate Foucault’s understanding of the subject as coming into being through power, and Butler more specifically argues that there is no subject prior to discourse. However, Foucault’s more recent work on the subject provides a slightly different understanding: prior to about 1980, Foucault conceived of the subject as merely the “passive product of techniques of domination,” but his more recent work argues that the individual-
subject emerges “at the intersection of a technique of domination and a technique of the self” *(Hermeneutics* 525-526). This conception of the subject suggests that while power still operates on the individual and the individual is the effect or product of the circulation of power, the subject is still capable of sound action; that is, there is still some agency in how the subject fashions himself or herself, but this self-fashioning still includes at least to some extent, a physical, bodily self-fashioning. My understanding of the subject stems from Foucault’s more recent articulation of the subject as one who is influenced by power, but also capable of self-transformation, and includes his emphasis on the relationship between the body and the subject.

Finally, *subjectivity* refers to the process through which the subject or individual is produced. Subjectivity, according to Foucault, requires a subject that may act or that possesses agency *(Discipline* 137-138, 170). My use of the term subjectivity considers both one’s ability to act or take action in a particular context and also one’s capacity for self-transformation. I also forward an understanding of embodied subjectivity, which considers the relationship between one’s ability to change and develop the physical body through processes such as athletic training and one’s ability to act or possess agency.

The self and subjectivity are also closely tied to ethos, because ethos amounts to one’s personal credibility and character, and thus represents one’s conception of the self or status as a subject to others. As an artistic proof, ethos is related to the rhetorical canon of invention, and is a component that is capable of being changed and created by the rhetor for a specific rhetorical situation. Therefore, in traditional Aristotelian understandings of rhetoric, ethos is not fixed, but varies based on the particular context, which means, put very simply, that an individual may invent or reinvent his or her ethos for a particular audience or situation. Classical rhetoric is specifically concerned with defining a subject, with one’s sense of self or identity as an
individual, but it is important to remember that one’s sense of self and what constitutes the self is historically and culturally constructed. Therefore, while Aristotelian understandings of rhetoric often aim to define a subject, they also simultaneously frustrate a clear distinction between subject and object.

In addition, when ethos is considered as bodily and performative, certain problems arise in terms of how one may develop ethos. For example, while ethos is capable of being changed and developed, it is still developed communally, in relationship with the audience and the previous cultural narratives that may influence that audience. It may also be affected by material and physical conditions, such as the specific site in which discourse takes place, or the gender or race of the speaker. What this means is that ethos has very important implications for understanding subjectivity and the self, and that scholars must attend to the ways in which material and physical conditions may influence how one may invent the self and who may invent the self.

It is also important to note that gender, race, class, and the body are culturally constructed concepts with no fixed, unified meaning, and whose constructed meaning(s) often intersect and influence each other. For example, feminist scholars (most notably Butler and Grosz among many others) have long been concerned with the sex/gender distinction, in which sex refers to the biological difference between individuals and gender commonly refers to the social expectations and behaviors associated with one’s sex and a person’s self-representation of those social expectations and behaviors. Judith Butler’s important work on gender questioned

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10 Feminist scholars in rhetoric have also questioned the gender dichotomy that situates rhetoric as specifically patriarchal. For example, scholars such as Patricia Bizzell, Cheryl Glenn, Susan Jarratt, Andrea Lunsford, and Nedra Reynolds (among others) have argued for women’s inclusion in the history of rhetoric and for the ways in which discourse situates women differently than men. Other scholars, such as Celeste Condit, offer an understanding of gender as
ideas of a “pure body” that exists prior to discourse. That is, Butler argues that both sex and
gender are culturally constructed and that discourse itself produces the materialities to which it
refers. For Butler, repeated bodily acts produce the appearance of gender as a stable interior
quality, when there is actually no identity behind those expressions of gender. Instead, gender
identity is “performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results”
(*Gender* 34). Within those repetitions, however, there is the possibility of variation, and it is in
this variation that Butler locates a sense of agency. Therefore, while Butler argues that one’s
performance of gender does not signify any interior quality, such performances and the
discourses that situate them are related to the construction of subjectivity.

However, the intersections of gender, sex, and the body also need to be considered
historically. Gender, as a concept, is a relatively recent term that originates in 1955 with
psychologist John Money. Money developed the term *gender* to refer to an individual’s social
behaviors, which were used to help determine the sex that intersexed individuals should be
assigned. As Bernice Hausman argues, historically the body was actually *not* seen as the signifier
of gender, but rather certain behaviors signified the body and what sex should be assigned to that
body, because the body did not always indicate a distinct male or female identity (187). In this
way, gender came to almost replace sex as a more “natural” sign of identity, and came to signify
the appropriate sex and body of the individual. The body, in turn, became something that could
be shaped and transformed to properly represent one’s gender\(^{11}\). What I am suggesting then, is

\(^{11}\) For a more complete discussion of the intersections of sex, gender, and the body from an
historical perspective, see Hausman’s *Changing Sex*, especially pages 183-190.
that gender, as a cultural construct, both influences one’s behaviors and also the ways in which one chooses to shape the body, and is therefore necessarily related to how one develops oneself as an ethical subject and how one experiences one’s body. However, gender only appears to represent a fixed identity, and thus requires repeated performances in order to maintain the illusion of a stable self that enacts established social norms.

Relatedly, the body often functions as an assumed “natural” signifier of sexual, gendered, and racial difference (Kuhn). However, in the context of athletics, the illusion of a fixed identity, and the need to embody “male” or “female” have real material consequences. That is, the repeated performances of gender needed to maintain the illusion of a stable self can be seen as acts of training that change not only the individual’s physical body, but also one’s character. For example, elite female gymnasts participate in a sport that not only idealizes the image of a pre-pubescent, thin, and small body as decidedly female, but in which one’s possession of such a body makes it easier to participate and excel in the demands of that sport, because a smaller, leaner body means one can spin and twist faster and tighter, giving the appearance of more spectacular aerial movements. At the same time however, the physical demands of intense gymnastic training, along with one’s attempts to perform gender within the context of gymnastics can result in stunted growth and delayed menstruation, permanently altering the body, and ironically, possibly influencing the ways one performs gender in contexts outside of gymnastics. Therefore, while many feminist scholars (for example, Butler and Grosz) have argued that gender does not exist or that gender represents only an empty category, such understandings do not account for the material consequences on the physical body.

Likewise, the body often signifies racial difference, serving as a marker of phenotypical and physiological difference. Though cultural theorists have long argued that race is socially
constructed and not biologically determined\textsuperscript{12}, understandings of race remain connected to their manifestation in the body. It is also important to note, however, that the body only marks racial difference if one already accepts those social constructions or stereotypes about racial difference. Therefore, while race is socially constructed, one cannot escape the materiality of the body. As Ann duCille argues, one cannot treat race and gender differences as “biological stigmata that can be fixed in plastic and mass-produced” because such conceptions do not account for the individual bodies that have visible markings and carry the material consequences of such difference (57-58). Instead of claiming that gender does not exist or that race is an empty category, duCille argues that scholars must theorize race and gender as “sites of difference, filled with constructed meanings that are in need of constant decoding and interrogation” in order to account for the “material facts and fictions of the body—with the different ifs, ands, and butts of different bodies” (58). Thus, while I agree with duCille that race and gender must be interrogated precisely because of their material effects on the body, I also want to acknowledge that any attempt to theorize difference necessarily assumes that there is a certain standard or ideal from which to measure difference from. In this way, efforts to draw attention to discourses that exoticize or marginalize certain individuals may in turn simply reproduce those individuals as exotic or exceptional. Despite this risk, I concur with duCille that race and gender must be acknowledged as sites of difference that should be interrogated, even if that interrogation can never completely disrupt an established center.

Race, class, gender, and the body also intersect and influence interpretations of each other. That is, it is impossible to delineate each of these constructs from each other, because they often operate in connection to each other. For example, Patricia Hill Collins argues that for

\textsuperscript{12} See for example Kimberlé Crenshaw, Richard Delgado, and Stuart Hall, among others.
African Americans, “the relationship between gender and race is intensified, producing a Black gender ideology that shapes ideas about Black masculinity and Black femininity” (6). Using Collins’ interpretation, it is impossible to separate a black feminine experience into a simply black experience, because cultural constructions of blackness are also inextricably tied to one’s performance of gender. Collins explains the complicated relationship among frameworks such as race, class, and gender as intersecting, rather than competing frameworks (discussed in more detail below). Like Collins, I suggest that these frameworks interact with and influence each other, and therefore, when I discuss these concepts, though I may focus my analysis on one specific aspect for a given situation, I see these constructions as operating together.

In the remainder of the chapter, I will discuss the theoretical orientations that inform this project. Because I forward an interdisciplinary approach and draw my research methodology (discussed in more detail later in the chapter) from a variety of different disciplines, there are a number of theoretical orientations that influence my project, and it is important to note that these disciplinary boundaries are not mutually exclusive. In many cases, key terms, values, or theories are important to several disciplines, and I draw from multiple theoretical frameworks that all discuss questions of what constitutes the subject, the self, agency, and identity. Because I draw from several theoretical orientations, it is important to remember the potential for rhetoric to move as well as to persuade. That is, my particular perspective on rhetoric acknowledges its physical and material abilities as well as its ability to change and adapt over time and given the particular, kairotic situation of discourse. As such, I argue that rhetoric moves across and between disciplines and theoretical orientations, so while I incorporate an interdisciplinary approach, I emphasize rhetorical analysis and use terms that stem from the field of rhetorical studies. In addition, while I discuss the individual theoretical orientations that inform my project
in depth later in the chapter, I see these frameworks as overlapping, rather than distinct. Below, I provide a brief overview of my understanding of ethos, invention, and the care of the self and how they merge together to influence my project. I will discuss each theoretical framework in more detail later in the chapter.

In particular, I first argue for a reconceptualization of ethos as performative[^13], embodied, and situated in order to explain how ethos influences subjectivity and the development of the self. My theory of ethos as performative first highlights the idea that ethos is trained, and is in part the result of repeated bodily practices and behaviors. These repeated practices come to constitute the individual because a sense of self is developed specifically through these particular bodily movements and these bodily movements come to constitute necessary attributes of the self, as the athlete both associates certain qualities with these behaviors and is known by others for her performance of these practices. For example, Serena Williams’ grunting during tennis matches (discussed in more detail in chapter four) allows her to cultivate and embody the ethos of a competitive, intimidating opponent, so much so that she becomes intimidating in the eyes of her opponents. In addition, Williams is known specifically for her grunting, and this behavior has come to represent an attribute of the self. Ethos is also situated. That is, ethos is influenced by the specific context of the communicative exchange and by the cultural values of the community to which one speaks or performs. In this understanding, ethos is contingent on the body, because the body both influences how one participates in and performs certain practices and behaviors and also reflects one’s conception of the self. The body may also be read as a marker of

[^13]: As mentioned in chapter one, performative understandings of rhetoric draw from the work of J.L. Austin, who explains that a given communicative event is performative if by saying something, one also does something, the classic example being when one says “I do” during a wedding ceremony. However, performative actions are dependent on context: if one says “I do” in a context other than the wedding ceremony it is not performative.
particular values and expectations, influencing how one’s ethos is perceived no matter how these practices and behaviors are performed. In this way, the cultural values and beliefs associated with one’s body, and the epideictic rhetoric that perpetuates these values and beliefs, also influence how one performs ethos and how that ethos is perceived by an audience. That is, one’s ethos depends in part on the body and bodily movements, but one’s body is always read and constructed in the context of the particular community to which one speaks. In considering embodied ethos, then, I argue that scholars must not only account for the particular, material realities of an individual’s body, but also the ways in which public discourse shapes how those bodies are perceived.

Kenneth Burke’s understanding of the psychology of form is helpful in explaining how the body functions rhetorically and how the process of shaping the physical body might be seen as a process of invention. Burke’s psychology of form suggests that there is a sort of ligature between a text and the audience that occurs when the audience recognizes the form of the text. In this way, there are multiple moments of invention: the moment of the author creating form in the text, and the moment where the audience recognizes that form and creates meaning from it. If, in relation to athletics, we consider the human body as “the text,” then the creation of the self by the athlete—the literal shaping of the body through athletic training\textsuperscript{14}—also functions rhetorically in the minds of the audience: they recognize the athletic form, or the athletic body, as a creative act.

\textsuperscript{14} As I argued in chapter one, repeated bodily practices and behaviors such as those perpetuated through athletic training influence the development of the self because these practices come to constitute attributes of the self for the individual and also because the individual becomes associated with these particular behaviors. That is, in much the same way that the body is often seen as the signifier of the self, certain practices and behaviors such as working on the body become associated with a particular self, such as that of the “healthy” or properly managed self. The transformative capacity of the body and bodily movements (often utilized through disciplinary practices such as dedicated athletic training), however, can change the self, such that these bodily habits and behaviors have consequences for conceptions of the self and one’s subjectivity.
In this way, the physical, material bodies of athletes work epideictically, and such an understanding implies that the act of training the body and caring for the self necessarily leads to an epideictic, rhetorical effect in the minds of the audience.

In addition, Burke’s understanding of form suggests that it also acts to identify the rhetor with the audience, because the audience recognizes something in the “work” of the rhetor, in the very body of the rhetor. If ethos consists of the bodily practices and behaviors that form habits and influence one’s sense of self, then these acts and practices—the very athletic training itself—are processes of invention, and the athlete’s body is both a creative act and the manifestation or representation of the athlete’s ethos. In this way, invention, like ethos, is also co-constructed and fluid: one is inventing and being invented simultaneously. The simultaneous nature of inventing and being invented also suggests that invention may not always be conscious or deliberately planned, but may occur in the kairotic moment, in the material-bodily-temporal encounter. In this way, the process of invention or the process of caring for and developing the self can be seen as acts of agency. When invention is considered the “middle,” rather than the beginning of circulating discourses, then it presents an opportunity of intervention, even when that intervention is not planned ahead of time. This opens up understandings of agency to include actions and movements that may not necessarily be considered deliberate acts of resistance to normative gender ideals, but behaviors that may interrupt circulating discourses, such as Chastain’s goal celebration (discussed in chapter three).

Because the body plays such a significant role in how one develops ethos, and because the bodily practices that one performs directly influence one’s conception of the self, it is also necessary to consider how the care of the self factors into the development of the subject. As I mentioned in chapter one, the care of the self is an ancient Greek philosophy that was believed to
develop and prepare individuals for participation in civic life. The care of the self is the belief that one can transform the self through specific training and attention to the body, or put differently, that deliberate bodily practices and movements have an effect on one’s character and one’s sense of self, and that an individual can be trained through specific bodily practices to become an ethical subject. In this way, then, the care of the self was seen as a process of developing individuals who were capable of participating in civic discourse, who were capable of speaking on behalf of their communities, and who were thus capable of being granted ethos. The care of the self can therefore be understood as part of the process through which bodily practices and behaviors come to form habits, which then influence an individual’s sense of self and ethos. In order to properly attend to how individuals perform ethos then, it is necessary to operate with an understanding of the care of the self and the development of one’s ethos as coordinate processes of invention.

**Ethos as Performative and Embodied**

A key piece in understanding how female athletes build and construct their public credibility is an understanding of ethos as performative and embodied. This understanding is shaped by classical understandings of ethos as a concept related to the body and one’s bodily actions, in addition to more recent discussions of ethos as communally created and related to one’s subjectivity. I hope to demonstrate ethos as a rhetorical concept that is specifically embodied and performative. That is, I argue that ethos necessarily involves the body and that it has implications beyond the particular communicative exchange. By incorporating Foucault’s work on the care of the self and feminist understandings of the subject and subjectivity, along with the rhetorical concepts of ethos and invention, I explain how understanding ethos as performative allows scholars to consider how ethos relates to subjectivity and the development
of the self, which has political and social implications for who may perform ethos and how they may develop that ethos. While existing scholarship associates ethos with the body, this scholarship often discusses a general body, and not necessarily the specific relationship of a particular body in a particular context. Instead, I argue that conceptualizations of ethos and performances of ethos need to be grounded in the specific context of the communicative exchange and need to consider the ways that the body, materiality, and space influence both the performance of ethos and how that ethos is received by an audience.

Traditional (Bodily) Understandings of Ethos

As a rhetorical concept, ethos typically refers to one’s display of personal character. It is one of Aristotle’s three artistic proofs (along with pathos and logos) that a speaker may use as part of the available means of persuasion. While the artistic proofs work together and overlap somewhat, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of ethos, calling ethos “the most authoritative form of persuasion” (On Rhetoric 1.2.4). Aristotle’s taxonomy includes three components that factor into how one builds ethos: practical wisdom (phronesis), virtue (arete), and goodwill (euonia), and according to rhetoric scholars Craig R. Smith and Debra Hawhee, respectively, each of these rhetorical concepts can be linked to the body in some way. Hawhee links ethos to the body by tracing the importance of athletics to Greek culture, though she does not discuss the care of the self as a bodily process that helps develop citizens. According to Hawhee, the athletic body was not only an aesthetic ideal, but signified a citizen who possessed a certain type of character and a particular type of training. For example, Hawhee explains that the concept arete, which she translates as “virtuosity,” was “associated with bodily appearance, action, and performance as much as it was conceived of as an abstracted ‘guide’ for such actions” (Bodily 17). As discussed in chapter one, arete thus seems very closely connected to ethos because of its
connection to bodily habits. As Hawhee explains, in ancient Greece one could not just be virtuous, but one became virtuous by performing certain actions that then produced particular habits (18). In addition, Cynthia Sheard relates arete with a civic ethic necessary for “responsible critical judgment and action in the world” (789). The ancient concept of ethos can mean both habit and disposition or character, and arete was the result of particular habits, which was then seen as a marker of a virtuous character. Arete’s connection to the body and to habit suggests that repeated bodily movements, such as those performed by an elite athlete in the course of athletic training influence both one’s own conception of the self and also how others perceive the self. The bodily actions performed in athletic training thus are seen as indications of one’s ethos, which suggests that ethos can be developed and trained over time, and that these repeated bodily movements influence how one’s ethos is perceived by others. Building on Hawhee’s discussion of bodily ethos, I argue that the repeated bodily movements often performed through athletic training also play a significant role in how the subject is developed, to the extent that these particular movements and behaviors not only reflect one’s ethos to others, but come to constitute necessary attributes of the self.

Practical wisdom, or phronesis has a bodily element when seen in relation to the rhetorical concept metis, which I argue is made possible through deliberate, habitual practice (98). According to Hawhee, metis generally refers to “intelligent ability,” which emphasizes “practicality, success, or resourcefulness in a particular sphere” and “distinguishes action that would otherwise be predictable,” such as the ability to successfully shift one’s body at just the right time to avoid a wrestler’s pin and instead use the opponents’ weight to one’s own advantage (46-47). A more modern example would be the craftiness of a soccer player forcing a defender’s misstep, and then cutting the ball around the defender to take an open shot on goal.
Metis combines cunning intelligence, situational awareness, and bodily instinct, and is often gained through repeated practice in a particular context. I argue that it is precisely this repeated practice that helps one to develop practical wisdom, and these repeated bodily movements not only prepare one to capitalize on an opportune moment in athletic competition, but can also train one to recognize and respond to a particular moment in the rhetorical exchange. In this way, repeated practice prepares the speaker or performer to recognize key moments of intervention, allowing a greater number of opportunities for the speaker or performer to build ethos.

Within classical rhetoric, the body is also seen as an indication of one’s goodwill through the concept of caring for the self. For example, Michel Foucault explains the care of the self as a sort of prerequisite to civic life for the ancient Greeks, and the body that was cared for was an indication of one’s ability to also care for others. That is, a properly maintained body demonstrated one’s goodwill toward others and toward the city-state. As Foucault explains, “For by teaching citizens to take care of themselves (rather than their goods) one also teaches them to take care of the city-state itself (rather than its material affairs),” which suggests that one’s physical body also represents one’s civic presence (Hermeneutics 492). A properly maintained body was also the symbol of an ethics of care that ties the body to ethical behavior or civic ethics. Of the three components of ethos Smith lists, he notes that goodwill is the least understood and is not actually defined by Aristotle. While goodwill is difficult to examine, it is important to note how the body factors into understandings of ethos. The body is involved in each of the components of ethos outlined by Smith, and this connection suggests the need for a more bodily understanding of ethos and prompts more attention to the body in the construction of the self and identity. Each component of ethos listed by Aristotle contains a bodily element and also emphasizes the relationship between repeated practice of bodily movements or
behaviors by the individual and outward perceptions of the individual by others. Therefore, classical understandings of ethos not only suggest that ethos is related to the body, but also that ethos is to some extent trained through certain bodily behaviors and movements that then come to constitute how the individual is perceived by others. In this way, both the individual efforts of the speaker or performer and the ways that these efforts are read by others make up one’s ethos.

However, while existing scholarship relates ethos with the body, such scholarship often assumes a general body, and does not attend to particular bodies in particular contexts. For example, while Hawhee’s work is important for understanding the relationship between specific bodily movements and habits with the way one may develop ethos, it assumes that all bodies have the same opportunities for cultivating these movements and habits that then influence one’s ethos. Likewise, Aristotelian understandings of ethos assume that one acts from deliberate choice and that one has the means to engage in chosen practices and behaviors that might lead to habit formation. For example, Smith asserts that Aristotle’s discussion of virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics* “reinforces the position that character is derived from deliberate choice” (9). But this ignores factors that influence ethos and habit formation of which an individual has no choice in: for example, one’s race and the stereotypes that may influence certain audience’s expectations for that individual, or one’s gender and the gendered expectations associated with it, or with the material conditions of women’s labor and life responsibilities. That is, the repeated practices certain individuals perform (such as feeding children and changing diapers or caring for sick family members) may not necessarily be practices that they choose to perform, but rather actions they are compelled to perform. In relation to athletics, while one certainly has some agency in the decision to pursue professional athletic training, specific movements and practices, such as regimented diets or maximum timed mile runs, are dictated by coaches and other authority
figures, such that certain habits are developed not through the deliberate choice of the individual, but because of one’s subjection to another authority, and these disciplinary practices, whether chosen by the individual or not, contribute to one’s ethos. In this way, discussions of bodily ethos that rely on Aristotelian understandings of ethos cannot account for the ways in which an individual’s ethos might be influenced by factors outside of his or her realm of control. Instead, rhetoric scholars need to attend to the specific material conditions of individuals and to how the bodily practices and habits one performs—whether deliberately or out of necessity—contribute to conceptions of the self.

*The Social Nature of Ethos*

A bodily understanding of ethos of course raises questions about what types of bodies are granted ethos, questions that classical understandings of rhetoric often ignore, because of assumptions about the ancient Greek speaker as a free man. In an effort to address some of these questions, more recent discussions of ethos (Hyde, Royster, Pittman, among others) consider the relationship between bodily and material aspects of ethos and discourse, emphasizing the material effects that language has on the individual, as well as the interplay between the audience and the speaker, demonstrating a more social understanding of ethos. For example, recent understandings of ethos focus on ethos as co-constructed, developed through an exchange between audience and speaker. In particular, Michael Hyde combines an Aristotelian understanding of ethos with Heidegger’s emphasis on the communal nature of ethos. For Heidegger, one’s ethos is contingent on one’s ability to move an audience, with *move* meaning both one’s ability to influence the audience to consider something (moving the passions, or taking something to heart), but also to place or “move” the audience into a relationship with the speaker, and into a “dwelling place” where audience and rhetor may deliberate together (xiii).
According to Hyde, ethos “is a matter, at the very least, of character, ethics, Being, space and time, emotion, truth, rhetorical competence, and everyday situations that are contextualized within the dwelling place of human being—a place known to encourage metaphysical wonder” (xxi). In other words, in contrast to Aristotelian understandings of ethos that emphasize the speaker, Hyde considers the importance of the audience and the audience’s beliefs. That is, instead of Aristotelian understandings of ethos that emphasize the speaker and tend to “fix” ethos as predetermined, Hyde considers the ways that human being, that is, the way in which one exists in the world, influences ethos. This understanding suggests that ethos, like the human body, is not fixed in advance, but is capable of being shaped and trained, and also that it reveals some sort of fundamental aspect of the self. By utilizing Hawhee’s emphasis on ethos as embodied and trained over time through habits and deliberate practice, along with Hyde’s understanding of ethos as fluid and constantly in flux, I want to suggest that ethos is not only embodied and trained, but that it creates possibilities of being in the world, or of existing as an ethical subject capable of action.

In this interpretation, ethos is both internal to the individual—that is, ethos is considered an outward indication of one’s interior self—and also external to the individual—it reflects the values of the particular culture one communicates with. That is, while classical understandings of ethos tend to situate ethos as completely within the speaker’s realm of control—the speaker is the original source of ethos and controls how it is received by others—Hyde (and others) situate ethos as negotiated between audience and rhetor: there must be some consensus between speaker and audience on what is valued, and when the audience sees their own values revealed in the character of the speaker, they grant that person ethos. However, Hyde’s communal understanding of ethos focuses more on the ways in which a speaker should create spaces for the
audience to dwell, and less on how a particular audience might limit the space available for a speaker to dwell. Therefore, as I suggest, it is necessary to consider not only the speaker’s attempts at appealing to a particular audience, but also how the cultural beliefs of an audience, and the epideictic rhetoric that shapes those beliefs, might also influence how one performs ethos.

Other scholars, such as Susan Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds also discuss ethos as communal, and specifically emphasize the positionality and situational nature of ethos, but do not account for the ways in which the physical and material body might influence one’s social position. Jarratt and Reynolds note the importance for the speaker to recognize “that one always speaks from a particular place in a social structure” (47). In addition, Jarratt and Reynolds also introduce the idea of ethos as split or multiplicitous, building on Donna Haraway’s “Situated Knowledges” to suggest that ethos changes given the situation, and also that it is created for a particular context (56). In this understanding, ethos is influenced by social values but also developed by the individual. However, as Jarratt and Reynolds are careful to point out, these created selves are not disingenuous; they are not distortions or deceptions, but rather “recognitions of the ways one is positioned multiply differently” (56). Thus, while ethos is heavily influenced by the audience, it is also something that can be performed: an individual can shape—to a certain extent—his or her actions for a particular audience, and can intentionally appeal to the social values and expectations he or she believes will be important to that audience. This performance can also, of course, change, given the situation and context. This understanding is important because it emphasizes the ways in which an individual may perform ethos differently for a different audience or situation. However, by incorporating Butler’s understanding of performativity, though one might choose how to perform, these performances
are still situated in discourses that regulate one’s behavior. For Butler, one’s identity or sense of self (which is related to the rhetorical concept of ethos as a representation of one’s personal character) is constituted through those performances which are said to be the results of an established identity, though Butler does not believe there is any “true” identity behind those performances. In other words, applying Butler’s notion of performativity to how individuals perform ethos suggests that it is these repeated performances, along with the discourses that situate these performances, that helps constitute how the individual is perceived by the audience, even though these performances may not reflect any interior identity and are deliberately shaped by the individual for a given audience and situation. Jarratt and Reynolds also importantly emphasize one’s particular social position as a factor that may influence ethos, but their discussion does not explain how factors such as race, class, and gender (among others) may influence one’s social position. That is, though Jarratt and Reynolds do importantly consider how elements outside of a speaker’s influence, like one’s social position, may influence ethos, they still assume that individuals start from the same general position of opportunity when it comes to developing ethos. However, as I will demonstrate below, certain individuals already face a disadvantage when it comes to their ability to build ethos.

Likewise, Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee have attempted to resolve some of the confusion about Aristotelian understandings of ethos as something the speaker controls and other conceptualizations of ethos that position ethos as a negotiation between audience and rhetor by separating ethos into two distinct categories, invented ethos and situated ethos. Invented ethos refers to the speaker’s ability to construct or invent public credibility through the use of linguistic devices, and situated ethos refers to the credibility afforded the speaker prior to discourse, such as the speaker’s reputation or the authority of the speaker’s social position (108). In this
understanding, one’s social position and the power relationships that help establish that social position directly influence how one’s ethos is received: if one’s social status is perceived favorably, it can enhance the speaker’s ability in the eyes of the audience, but conversely, one’s less favorable social status can also compromise one’s communicative ability. While Crowley and Hawhee’s distinction between invented and situated ethos is helpful for understanding the different ways in which ethos is constructed, the separation between invented and situated ethos assumes that these processes are distinct and fails to account for the ways in which invented and situated ethos may influence each other. For example, Crowley and Hawhee do not explain how one’s social position might limit the ways in which the individual might use certain linguistic devices, and does not account for how one’s situated ethos might be always-already compromised by factors outside of the speaker’s realm of control, such as one’s race or gender.

In addition, Crowley and Hawhee’s invented ethos focuses more on the speaker’s ability to invent the self through linguistic devices, and less on how the body—including the ways in which the body often reveals or is assumed to reveal one’s social position—might factor into how one performs ethos. Therefore, my analysis focuses on the body and bodily practices, in addition to the epideictic rhetoric that situates and constructs the body, considering how a specifically embodied understanding of invented ethos and situated ethos work together in order to extend current scholarship that either tends to focus primarily on situated ethos or does not consider the body as part of invented ethos.

For example, Jacqueline Jones Royster argues that for African American women, “any acts by which they claim agency and authority are necessarily defined as going against the grain, that is, against the dominant values and expectations of the general culture” (64). In this way, African American women and other marginalized individuals already face a disadvantage in their
ability to construct ethos, and while Crowley and Hawhee’s understanding of a situated ethos reminds rhetoric scholars that certain individuals always-already face a disadvantage when it comes to how they may develop ethos, and are consequently faced with different challenges in how they define themselves to others, especially when they seek to build ethos with a community that is not their own, this understanding does not account for the wide array of strategies that certain individuals must consequently use to perform ethos. Despite attempts by numerous rhetoric scholars to revise or extend Aristotelian understandings of ethos, according to Coretta Pittman, “Western culture has appropriated a classical model of ethos to judge the behavior of all of its citizens” (44). That is, Western society still assumes that one’s credibility is completely self-created, without accounting for individual lived experiences. However, as I have argued above, certain individuals face issues of racism, classism, or sexism that mark them as undesirable or outside of an established norm. I want to emphasize, though, that the problem with ethos is not necessarily the deviation from an established norm but that current conceptions of ethos do not discuss ethos relative to the lived, embodied experience of particular individuals. For example, Royster suggests that African American women must construct multiple identities and incorporate bodily experience in order to construct an ethos that “does not operate in the absence of rhetorical actions but in tandem with them and also with the way that these writers envision the context” (66-68). Likewise, Pittman contends that scholars in rhetorical theory need to establish “a different set of guidelines for a good ethos relative to their [black women’s] lived realities and experiences” (68). What I am trying to do then, is to bring together conceptions of situated and invented ethos, along with understandings of bodily ethos, to demonstrate how the bodily practices and behaviors that one engages in influence ethos. My particular theory of ethos brings together existing scholarship on ethos, along with feminist scholarship that complicates
the distinction between subordination and agency in order to account for the variety of ways in which women attempt to construct the self and the various factors that may influence their ability to develop the self and the type of self they may develop. In this way, I am more interested in how individuals inhabit and embody social norms than in how social norms are subverted, and I argue that certain disciplinary practices and the bodily movements and behaviors they enable, even those that only seem to reinforce gendered or racial norms and stereotypes, might be considered modalities of action that may lead to one’s agency.

Epideictic Rhetoric and Ethos

As mentioned above, scholars such as Royster and Pittman argue that certain individuals already face a disadvantage when it comes to their ability to develop ethos because their bodies do not reflect the cultural values of the community to which they speak. In working to offer a more bodily and performative understanding of ethos that accounts for the lived experiences of individuals, I argue that epideictic rhetoric influences one’s situated ethos, and thus, rhetoric scholars must also consider the ways in which epideictic rhetoric comes to bear on these cultural values, which consequently help shape one’s situated ethos. While traditional, Aristotelian understandings of epideictic as merely “praise or blame” still persist, recent scholarship has taken another look at epideictic, with scholars attending to the relationship between epideictic and ethos (Hauser, Sullivan), performative and aesthetic aspects of epideictic (Beale), and the educational and civic functions of epideictic (Agnew, Sheard, Walker). I incorporate this scholarship into my definition of epideictic rhetoric as discourse and bodily movements which draw from the past, speak to the present, and help create future action. Epideictic rhetoric is important in understanding ethos because it helps explain why and how situated ethos is established. Though rhetoric scholars such as Royster and Pittman rightly argue that certain
individuals’ efforts at establishing ethos are limited by cultural values or social norms, it is important to also consider how these cultural values and social norms come into being and why they hold such an influence. In bringing together epideictic rhetoric and ethos, then, I hope to offer an explanation of how discourse constructs certain aspects of identity, such as race, gender, and class, and how these constructions then hold material consequences for certain individuals.

Epideictic rhetoric is related to one’s situated ethos because epideictic helps determine the social values of a society by dictating public memory. In this way, epideictic also helps to create citizens or to situate individuals as members of a community. Epideictic’s ability to influence cultural values is also tied strongly to ethos, and in many ways the two reinforce each other: the epideictic speaker gains ethos by communicating the values of the culture, and then because the epideictic speaker has gained ethos, he or she helps shape the values of the culture.

Dale Sullivan explains that the epideictic speaker’s ethos consists of “the audience’s recognition that the rhetor, as one who represents the culture, ‘sees’ reality as the culture sees it” (“Ethos” 122). According to Sullivan, ethos is not associated only with the speaker or only with the audience, but is “the common dwelling place of both, the timeless, consubstantial space that enfolds participants in epideictic exchange” (“Ethos” 127), and therefore, in this interpretation of ethos as a consubstantial space, audience and rhetor share a common mental or metaphysical substance. In this way, ethos and epideictic affect not only the values of the community, but also the ontological makeup of the community, the very stuff (matter, materiality) of human interaction. This is important for understanding women’s social situation and their ability to build and construct ethos because epideictic reinforces the status quo, valuing and granting ethos to those who perpetuate and recognize the particular culture of a community. In this way, it can be very difficult to challenge already established discourses, and individuals whose bodies do not
represent the values or ideals of the dominant discourse may be limited in how they can build and construct ethos.

In addition, as Cynthia Sheard notes, Sullivan’s portrayal of epideictic ethos suggests that ethos is created through the discourse itself, and consequently, “questions of character lying outside the epideictic context become irrelevant to the success of the discourse” (788). However, such a characterization of ethos and epideictic assumes the “epideictic context” consists only of the discourse used, and limits the construction of ethos to the discourse itself, ignoring other factors that contribute to how one constructs ethos. Instead, I suggest that if the “epideictic context” is conceived more broadly than simply the discourse used, then we expand understandings of ethos to move beyond mere discourse and to bodily and performative understandings of ethos. The current, limited understanding of epideictic and ethos presents a problem for individuals who do not represent the dominant cultural values of a community, individuals whose bodies do not conform to social norms or whose bodily movements and behaviors fall outside of gendered expectations, because it does not consider how facets of identity such as one’s race, class, and gender influence how individuals may build ethos and how previous cultural narratives in turn affect how an audience perceives that performance of ethos.

Incorporating an understanding of epideictic rhetoric and ethos as interrelated concepts also helps explain the ways in which the audience and the audience’s values can influence how ethos is performed. While scholars have disagreed about the role of the audience in epideictic rhetoric, I concur with Beale that epideictic’s performative function draws the audience to

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15 For example, Hauser differentiates between epideictic and deliberative or forensic because the audience does not “sit in judgment,” but serves as witnesses of the honorable deeds performed before them (15). However, Sheard and Beale both conclude that rather than a passive observer, epideictic actually asks the audience to participate in the decision making, engaging them in a sort of critical judgment.
participate in the rhetorical exchange. For example, Beale suggests epideictic rhetoric frames discourse in “the performance of or participation in an action” because epideictic rhetoric is an action that “participates in the reality to which it refers” (225-226). In this way, the epideictic speaker is often seen as the manifestation of the idea that he or she speaks about, situating epideictic discourse as performative and embodied. Because epideictic is performative and embodied, Christine Oravec suggests that the audience “‘learns’ or ‘understands’ the connection between the principle and the manifestation of the principle” (166), and applying this interpretation, the speaker’s physical body and bodily actions can be said to symbolize the speaker’s message. In addition, the audience’s ability to understand the principles presented by the speaker seem contingent on the connection between the principle and the speaker’s ability to manifest that principle in his or her performance. Put differently, the speaker’s ability to embody the concept that he or she discusses also influences the audience’s perceptions of the speaker’s ethos.

Finally, because of its kairotic and communal nature, epideictic rhetoric helps create situations for future action. According to Sheard, epideictic can be linked to “a vision that inspires, even compels an audience to act,” relating epideictic to the traditionally more action-focused deliberative and forensic forms of rhetoric (787). In addition, Jeffrey Walker defines epideictic as “argument directed toward the establishment, reconfirmation, or revision of general values and beliefs,” and then argues that when defined in this way, “epideictic speaks to the recurring, or experientially ‘permanent’ or chronic issues in a society’s pattern of existence” (7-8). Walker’s characterization of epideictic thus situates epideictic as particularly able to recognize and respond to the kairotic exigence of a situation, especially to recurring problems or situations within a society. In this way, epideictic not only responds to situations, but can
potentially create situations, “preceding, even precipitating, deliberative or forensic rhetoric,” as Sheard argues, in part by “instilling a sense of responsibility for and possibility of change for the better” (786). Sheard also suggests epideictic not only “participates in reality at critical moments in time but that it interprets and represents one reality for the purpose of positing and inspiring a new one,” effectively situating epideictic as reciprocal, because “such discourse both responds to and creates ‘opportune’ and ‘critical’ moments in time (kairos) that warrant critical attention and corrective action” (790). In addition, this reciprocal understanding of epideictic is even more apparent when scholars consider performative and bodily aspects of epideictic, because if epideictic is particularly tied to kairos, as both Walker and Sheard imply, and the body helps illustrate aspects of kairos, as Hawhee argues, then a bodily and performative understanding of epideictic helps illustrate the importance of kairos to epideictic.

Bodily and Material Aspects of Ethos

In addition to incorporating bodily and social understandings of ethos, I also argue that one must consider material aspects of ethos, such as the particular spaces in which performances of ethos occur. This is particularly important in the context of athletics, where the physical construction of the athletic venue automatically positions the performer as an object on display, and directs the audience’s attention to the performer. Recently, scholarship in rhetoric has taken considerable interest in rhetoric’s materiality. For example, Hyde’s understanding of ethos as a dwelling place also suggests ethos has a structural function; it “directs one’s attention to the ‘architectural’ function of the art [rhetoric]” (xiii). Because ethos is a communal enterprise, it is often performed or constructed in the public eye. The symposia and gymnasia of ancient times were spaces of public deliberation and public performance, and the physical structures were built in such a way as to allow people to gather and to watch. Hawhee notes the importance of the
agon in rhetorical history as a “gathering place” where virtue may be produced, explaining that rather than emphasizing the contest, as some feminist critiques of agonistic rhetoric focus on, the agon was more so about the gathering itself (11). In this way, the gathering force of agon is similar to the dwelling place of ethos. Athletic and rhetorical performance served as a gathering force, bringing people together into a space in which they can dwell and deliberate together. The contemporary architecture of sporting arenas and stadiums also allows for the gathering of individuals. Filled to capacity football stadiums are equivalent to large cities, situating sporting events as discursive opportunities with audiences equivalent to or larger than state representative districts. For example when Penn State’s Beaver Stadium reaches its capacity of 110,000 people, State College becomes the third-largest “city” in Pennsylvania, after only Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, while a Pennsylvania House Representative serves around 60,000 people, on average.

In addition to drawing an audience, Hawhee suggests that the gathering force of agon was related to the production of virtue, or arete, a concept scholars also associate with ethos (Hawhee 11, Smith 6). As Hawhee explains, agon emphasizes “movement through struggle, a productive training practice wherein subject production takes place through the encounter itself” (16). When discussed in this way, ethos builds and supports. It is the foundation on which identity and character are created, as much as it creates the opportunities for these encounters through the architectural structure of the gathering itself. In addition, the encounter between athlete or rhetor and audience itself helps determine one’s subjectivity. In this understanding, the training practices and bodily movements one performs, and the fact that an audience or training partner bears witness to these practices comes to constitute one’s subjectivity. Athletes and rhetors are granted ethos through the very structure of the spaces in which they perform, because these spaces draw people together, but the same public nature of their performances also shapes and
determines how they construct ethos. Rhetorical theory needs to consider the architecture and the space of discourse itself as a factor in producing ethos, including materiality as well as temporality into the discussion of ethos, because these factors have the potential to create advantages or disadvantages for certain speakers in ways similar to Crowley and Hawhee’s discussion of situated ethos. That is, like the way that one’s situated ethos is often already decided before the communicative exchange occurs, the material and structural conditions of a performance of ethos might also be outside of the speaker’s realm of control. In the context of athletic performance, the structure of sporting arenas may provide the athlete an advantage in that their audience is already tuned in to their performance because of the way in which stadium seating steers attention toward the athlete, automatically situating the performance as important and valuable. However, this same structure also positions the athlete as an object to be consumed, which may automatically undercut the athlete’s attempts to position herself as a subject capable of action. Therefore, such discussions would enrich understandings of the context and situation in which discourse takes place, as well as considering the ways in which the physical space dictates how ethos may be constructed.

I also argue that performance studies and theatre studies approaches to ethos further consider the situation and context of a performance by attending to the role of the audience and the physical surroundings as part of the performance of ethos, which would enrich rhetorical scholar’s understanding of ethos to consider other, non-verbal factors that might influence the communicative exchange. For example, Robert L. King argues in *The Ethos of Drama* that theatre is rhetorical not only in the text of the play but also in the performance of the action and everything on the stage. King incorporates Antonin Artaud’s theory of performance as a “unique language half-way between gesture and thought” (89) and a “genuine physical language with
signs, not words, as its root” (124) to explain the rhetorical effects of the entire drama, not just the spoken text. According to Artaud, this “physical language” differentiates itself from speech and consists of “everything that occupies the stage, everything that can be manifested and expressed materially on a stage that is addressed first of all to the senses instead of being addressed primarily to the mind as is the language of words” (Artaud 37-38, King 7). Artaud and King’s respective understandings of performance situates performance as more physical and more material than just the words, which in turn implies that ethos is physical and material, not just linguistic and not just influenced by the performer, but by the entire situation (the performance itself) including all the in-the-moment intangibles. When applied to an athletic context, then, the entire performance of the sporting event is part of the construction of ethos. This includes the sporting event, the officials, the media and their presentation of the event, the audience, the coaches, the other athletes, the individual athlete in question, their appearance and uniform, their play (which might be considered the performance itself), their interviews or actions before and after the game, etc., widening the range and scope of ethos beyond simply the speaker/performer or even the speaker/performer and the audience to include multiple factors.

**Ethos and the Development of the Self**

Another key component in my understanding of ethos is the way that it relates to the development of the self and subjectivity. As I demonstrated previously, ethos is trained and is partly the result of repeated bodily habits and behaviors. These bodily practices are then related to the development of the subject because a sense of self is developed specifically through these bodily movements and these movements come to constitute necessary attributes of the self. In the section that follows, I outline the relationship between ethos and rhetorical understandings of invention, and then discuss how the body influences invention by using the care of the self.
Finally, I discuss the relationship between the care of the self and the development of the subject and ethos, arguing that the disciplinary mechanisms that may result in one’s subjectivity also provide the conditions which may produce agency. In this way, certain bodily practices and behaviors may provide individuals with the capacity to subvert dominant cultural norms, and these bodily practices and behaviors might produce modalities of action that lead to social change.

**Ethos and Invention**

As mentioned previously in the chapter, sport perpetuates gender norms and a normative aesthetic ideal—most typically, the white, conventionally attractive, slim, young woman, though this ideal may be slightly different depending on the particular cultural values of the community in question—which then influences how women build and construct ethos. These gender norms and aesthetic ideals are reinforced through dominant cultural narratives (epideictic rhetoric, discussed in more detail below), which in turn influence how ethos is developed and by whom. In this way, the connection between ethics and aesthetics is also at stake in discussing ethos and invention. According to rhetoric scholar Margaret Zulick, rhetoric is at heart an integration of ethics and aesthetics, and this convergence is most evident in what she calls the ethos of invention. Ethics and aesthetics are related to an understanding of embodied ethos through the ancient Greek association between the physical body and one’s sense of virtue and goodwill (arete and euonia, discussed previously as components of ethos). Zulick argues, “the customary line between ethics and aesthetics disappears when we begin with their convergence in the ethos of invention. From this standpoint, ethics and aesthetics appear not as mutually opposed categories but as coordinate acts of imagination that spring from the same inventive source in the social mind” (21). Using Kenneth Burke’s work on the psychology of form, Zulick notes that
when Burke claims form is the “psychology of the audience,” “he works into his definition of form the idea that it operates as a kind of ligature between the work and its audience; thus the creation of form in the work, and the recognition of form in the mind of the audience, is the same creative act” (24, emphasis in original).

As I mentioned previously, if we consider the human body as “the work,” then the body and the process of developing and shaping that body through athletic training functions rhetorically in the minds of the audience: they recognize the athletic form, or the athletic body, as a creative act. In this way, the physical, material bodies of athletes work epideictically, and such an understanding implies that the act of training the body and caring for the self necessarily leads to an epideictic, rhetorical effect in the minds of the audience. In addition, Burke’s understanding of form suggests that it also acts to identify the rhetor with the audience, because the audience recognizes something in the “work” of the rhetor, in the very body of the rhetor. Through identification, Burke bridges the gap between ethics and aesthetics, and draws attention to the ways in which the care of the self (discussed in more detail below) operates in contemporary times as a process of invention. In this way, if invention is the making of the self (or the care of or the technology of the self), identification and invention bring the aesthetic and the ethical together in the human body. However, as I have argued already, because one’s body is always read and constructed in the context of the particular community to which one speaks, it is also necessary to consider the ways in which public discourse shapes how those bodies are perceived and how the particular material realities of an individual’s daily life may influence how one invents the self.

Invention and ethos are not just tied to aesthetics and epideictic rhetoric, but to the practice of rhetoric as a whole. For example, rhetoric scholar Judy Holiday claims ethos is not
simply a component of rhetoric, but “intrinsic to it,” and therefore, “the study and teaching of rhetorical invention (that is, what we know and value, a search for available arguments) theoretically should be indissociable from the study of *ethos* or ethics (and, by extension, politics)” (390). If ethos is an effect of what a particular community knows and values, and rhetorical invention is in part shaped by what a community knows and values, then ethos, to at least a certain extent, dictates what arguments may be constructed for a given context. In this way, Holiday argues rhetoric “both *invents* and *is invented* by humans,” and this understanding of invention—that knowledge is “always incomplete, situated, and contingent” and that “situated knowledge generates group partisanship and politics” (390)—figures invention as both constructed by the individual and the community and suggests an ethical component to invention, not unlike that of epideictic rhetoric.

Holiday works with Janice Lauer’s and Debra Hawhee’s respective works on invention to argue for a more postmodern understanding of invention and the ethical subject, which considers the speaker as an element of the discourse that is influenced by the rhetorical situation, instead of the origin of that discourse, and thus somehow outside of the text (389). Lauer notes invention is the only canon that “directly addresses the content of communication as well as the process of creation,” situating invention as both product and process (2). According to Holiday, this “two-fold aspect of invention” demands a definition of invention that “embraces postmodern notions of intertextuality (and thus indeterminacy) of inventional processes and products,” and Holiday offers Hawhee’s understanding of *invention-in-the-middle* as a possibility (393-394). As Hawhee explains, “‘Invention-in-the-middle’ assumes that rhetoric is a performance, a discursive–material–bodily–temporal encounter, a force among forces” (24). Hawhee draws from Richard Young and Yaming Liu’s two perspectives on rhetorical invention, invention as a process of
discovery and invention as a creative act to propose an alternative, what she calls “invention in the middle.” Instead of a discovery model that situates invention as outside of the rhetor (something to be discovered objectively) or a creation model that situates invention as something already within the rhetor (something that emanates from the subject), Hawhee suggests a middle between active and passive, subject and object (16-17). According to Hawhee, the discovery and creation models are active constructions that both assume a subject “that is better described as the outcome of the rhetorical situation,” while invention in the middle proposes a rhetor who simultaneously invents and is invented by oneself and by others (17). The simultaneous nature of inventing and being invented, or the “middleness” of invention, also suggests that invention may not always be conscious or deliberately planned, but may occur in the kairotic moment, in the material-bodily-temporal encounter. In this way, the process of invention or the process of caring for and developing the self can be seen as acts of agency. When invention is considered the “middle,” rather than the beginning of circulating discourses, then it presents an opportunity of intervention, even when that intervention is not planned ahead of time. This opens up understandings of agency to include actions and movements that may not necessarily be considered deliberate acts of resistance to dominant gender ideals, but behaviors that interrupt circulating discourses.

According to Holiday, this understanding of invention as the “middle” of discourse incorporates an important understanding of the individual as dynamic, fluid, and not always operating rationally or consciously (393-394). As Holiday suggests, such an understanding of ethos is important because discussions of ethos often “assume a uniform self whose virtues traverse all fields,” instead of considering the individual as a work in progress, shaped and influenced by external circumstances while at the same time creating and inventing
understandings of the self (402). Holiday explains that “because humans are constituted in language and in ways unconscious (naturalized) to them, a postmodern definition of invention must incorporate a postmodern notion of the subject and portray invention as a ubiquitous process that both continues the process and is productive” (393-394). For example, Holiday argues for an understanding of the self as “an ethical project,” incorporating Foucault’s work on the care of the self. For Holiday, the most important aspect of Foucault’s care of the self is the recognition that one can shape the self, and in turn, the “ethical social fabric” that determines one’s value to society (400). The self can be invented by the individual, but is also shaped by society, and in order to change society one must change the ways in which the self can be invented. Invention is in some ways contingent on social values and context, but at the same time, invention has the capacity to change social values and context, and I argue that rhetoric scholars need to acknowledge both the ways in which invention might be constrained and also the ethical implications of the invention process.

*The Care of the Self*

Because my analysis hinges on an understanding of ethos as embodied and performative, it is necessary to discuss the ways in which the physical development and care for the body influences such things as ethos, invention, and subjectivity. As Holiday mentions, Foucault’s understanding of the care of the self provides important insights into how the self is created or invented and how such creative acts consequently influence one’s status as an ethical subject in society. In particular, the construction and performance of ethos has interesting connections to elite athletes because of athletes’ ability to care for and shape the self through athletic training. This ability to shape the self has important implications for how athletes are able to construct and perform ethos and for their ability to engage in epideictic rhetoric. In the remainder of this
section, I will first discuss the care of the self as a system of thinking, and then explain the relationship between the care of the self and ethos.

While contemporary scholars in several fields associate the concept of the care of the self with Foucault (for example, Chapman, Haber, Holiday, Johns and Johns, Markula and Pringle, McLaren, and Wesley), this tradition has existed historically in several different forms, one of which is the ancient Greek concept of caring for the self. In this system of thinking, the Greeks believed that one could transform the self through specific training and attention to the body. Notably, the care of the self was also associated with one’s involvement and preparation for civic discourse and with the development of ethics. For the Greeks, one had to be able to care for the self before one was able to care for others through participation in government, and one of the signs of caring for the self was the outward physical appearance evident in the body (Hermeneutics 36-39). Historically, rhetoric, aesthetics, and the body were all connected in Greek society, with a nascent understanding of the care of the self as a sign that demonstrated who could participate in the public sphere. For the ancient Greeks, the importance of the body is linked to Greek culture and the reverence due to the athletic body as the aesthetic ideal.

Timothy O’Leary relates the ethos of Aristotle’s Nicomachian Ethics—ethos meaning custom or habits in this usage—with the care of the self, suggesting that “moral character is a product of the cultivation of the right habits,” and argues that Foucault makes the same connection regarding ethos when he relates the “ethics of the intellectual and a certain set of attitudes or habits” (O’Leary 160). According to Foucault, the Greeks had two terms for different exercises that helped one care for or develop the self, melete and gymnasia. Melete means meditation, and according to Foucault, it is a term “borrowed” from rhetoric, and helps one to anticipate the real situation (“Technologies” 36). Training in the gymnasia, as Hawhee has
discussed, is training in the real situation, and is tied to kairos and training of and for kairos. For example, Hawhee explains kairos as “‘the opportune moment and the instinct to seize it in a contest,’” and claims that this recognition is learned through repeated practice (Hawhee 75 quoting Leslie Kurke 293). Foucault’s understanding of the care of the self or the technologies of the self, therefore, situate this practice as an act of self-transformation, but also as a trained, deliberate effort that can also be shaped by others. According to Foucault, the technologies of the self “permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (“Technologies” 18). This definition offers both promise—that individuals can shape and construct themselves—and problems for feminists, because it assumes a standard end goal that all individuals seek and it ignores the different circumstances individuals may face in seeking that transformation. For example, in contemporary American culture, women are often constrained by the expectation to care for others—children or older family members—that the ability to care for themselves is limited. In addition, this definition also does not account for socioeconomic factors that may influence one’s ability to seek such transformation. It also assumes that transformation is needed and wanted, let alone possible.

Despite these considerations, it is important to note that Foucault explains the care of the self as related to the principle of knowing oneself, which became part of modern philosophy. In discussing Foucault’s care of the self and ethos, I operate based on what Claire Colebrook calls a “positive conception of ethics” in which ethics are not so much a set of norms that dictate behavior but a set of activities that shape a particular way of life (50). According to Foucault, part of the practice of caring for oneself includes preparation, or “a set of practices by which one
can acquire, assimilate, and transform truth into a permanent principle of action,” a “progressive consideration of self, or mastery over oneself,” which then produces or becomes ethos (“Technologies” 35). Markula explains Foucault’s process this way: “an engagement in self care to facilitate an ethical use of one’s power through everyday practices in everyday relationships” (“Sport” 99). In this way, Foucault’s understanding of the care of the self includes bodily practices and training efforts (shaping of the body) that consequently grants one a sense of ethos that can be used in everyday situations, not just those that relate to and engage the body. In this interpretation, ethical self-care can consist of a variety of practices and is not limited to a certain “set” of specific practices (“Sport” 99). In other words, the care of the self is not a set of universal ethics but is always particular and dependent on the individual and the specific historical, social, and political context.

The Care of the Self in Relation to Ethos

Athletes’ ability to shape the physical body through athletic training helps them develop the care of the self, and this ability to create the self also relates to the construction of ethos because dedicated athletic training establishes habits that inform one’s sense of self. Kath Woodward argues that athletes’ bodies are produced and reproduced through their training practices, through the “routine, iterative embodied practice of a dedicated training regime” (161), and Markula and Pringle note the importance of experience as part of identity formation (98-99). Together, Woodward and Markula and Pringle demonstrate how the bodily experiences of athlete’s training practices—the repetitive efforts to care for and construct the self—factor into the construction of the athlete as an ethical subject. For example, part of an athlete’s training practice involves constant self-reflection and self-examination—was a particular exercise easy or difficult, and was it easier to complete the exercise last week or this week—or in team sports,
how a particular movement relates to the movements of teammates. This constant self-reflection and self-awareness (including how one’s actions affect others’ actions) allows the athlete to consider and potentially change aspects of their identity and ethos. As Markula explains, “only critical self-reflection can result in a change of one’s condition,” and such critical thought is “the core of the ethical self-care” Foucault advocates (“Sport” 101-102). According to Foucault, the potential for transgression actually depends on a sort of artistic understanding of the self and identity—the understanding that the individual can create and construct the self, but also that this process of invention is a sort of art form (Hermeneutics 51, “Enlightenment” 41-42). Building on Foucault’s understanding of the care of the self as an “art of living” (Hermeneutics 86), Markula explains that “if we think of our lives as works of art, we regain the ability to think creatively and challenge the limitations of the ‘natural’ identities formed through the games of truth. Aesthetic stylization of the self denotes a self that is open to change and the constant recreation of changing conditions in society” (“Sport” 102). It is precisely this “stylization of the self” that I call the performance of ethos—it is the deliberate construction of the self, of a certain persona, by the individual, in order to produce a particular conception of him or herself by others, whether that conception is actually held by others or not.

While Moya Lloyd argues that the technologies of the self are only useful for feminist politics if they include a process of self-fashioning “allied with critique,” I contend that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine when and if individuals proceed with a sense of this critical awareness that Lloyd requires, because one’s actions, while purposeful, may not always be the result of such deliberate preparation (250). Rather, like the process of invention, which may occur “in the middle” of discourse or in the kairotic moment of a sporting event, certain actions and behaviors can be read as interventions, even if they are not planned ahead of time.
through critical awareness. Furthermore, such a conceptualization of agency ignores the specific context in which change occurs, as well as what exactly constitutes “critique” or “critical awareness.” Rather, as feminist anthropologist Saba Mahmood argues, “if the ability to effect change in the world and oneself is historically and culturally specific (both in terms of what constitutes ‘change’ and the means by which is it effected), then the meaning and sense of agency cannot be fixed in advance, but must emerge through an analysis of the particular concepts that enable specific modes of being, responsibility, and effectivity” (14-15). In this interpretation, feminist understandings of what constitutes agency are expanded to include how bodily practices and behaviors—whether they conform to social norms or resist them—might be recoded or repurposed for one’s own interests and agendas. These bodily practices and behaviors can thus be considered modalities of action that may lead to further agency and political action. Such an understanding is particularly important in the context of athletics, where the very disciplinary practices that might render one docile also have the potential to lead to agency. In contrast to a more traditional feminist objectification critique, this type of analysis considers how individuals inhabit and embody social norms, rather than categorizing behaviors only as subversive or locating agency only in efforts at resistance.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, elite female athletes represent a point of tension in feminist scholarship because of their position on both sides of the agency/subordination binary, and it is precisely this point of tension that Lloyd and Mahmood respectively bring up, and exactly this point of tension that I address in this project. For example, when soccer player Brandi Chastain ripped off her jersey and flexed her biceps in celebration of the winning 1999 World Cup goal, can we read those actions as a critique of accepted female behavior, even if Chastain’s celebration was not planned ahead of time? Or would Chastain have to “purposefully”
perform such a celebration in order for it to be considered critique? I argue (in much more detail in the following chapter) that Chastain’s celebration—while perhaps performed without the “critical awareness” Lloyd purports—can nevertheless be useful for feminist politics and can constitute a critique of gender expectations. In fact, the very situatedness of Chastain’s response—that it happened in the moment, in “the middle” of discourses about women in sports and Chastain’s sexuality in particular—may have made it more of an “intervention” and more useful for feminist understandings of agency.

The tensions in feminist theory between agency and subordination become particularly complicated in regards to elite female athletes because of the ways in which their bodies become intensely disciplined but also serve as the means of their athletic accomplishment. Mahmood’s discussion of Foucault’s work on power and subjectivity and the care of the self are especially useful for examining the complicated relationship of agency and subordination that elite female athletes represent. Foucault’s formulation of power actually hinges on what he calls the paradox of subjectivity, in which the very mechanisms and conditions of a subject’s subordination are also the very means by which the subject can become a self-conscious agent. As Mahmood argues, this understanding of power and subjectivity “encourages us to conceptualize agency not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create and enable” (17). In the context of elite athletes, then, this understanding of power means that while disciplinary practices such as regimented weight lifting and calorie consumption render the athlete as subordinate (usually to a coach, but also more broadly speaking, to a public the expects certain levels of athletic performance), these same mechanisms also enable the athlete to reflect on such training practices and potentially use them to gain agency, whether by shaping one’s body or by constructing a specific persona for a public
that is readily available. In analyzing these elite athletes, however, I am not interested in providing a theory of agency, but in analyzing the different modalities that might lead to agency or political action.

In addition, Lloyd acknowledges that the technologies of the self and the related opportunity of shaping and inventing the self are pivotal for one’s ability to critique dominant discourses, and I further argue that women’s ability to shape and create their own bodies, and subsequently, their identities and subject positions, creates the potential for women to transcend these discourses, whether or not they directly critique them. Finally, I argue that because the technologies of the self are so closely intertwined with ethos, and because ethos is negotiated between audience and speaker, women must be granted ethos by their audiences before their critique will be heard. Therefore, we need to broaden our understanding of ethos to include more bodily and performative conceptions of ethos, and we must broaden our understanding of critique to include performative and not just linguistic understandings, which would better account for the variety of practices and behaviors that might become modalities of action for women’s agency.

**Embodied Subjectivity**

The previous sections focused on emphasizing ethos and epideictic as bodily and performative and argued that ethos and epideictic work together to mutually reinforce each other. In addition to the body’s role in developing ethos and participating in epideictic rhetoric, the body also has an important role in determining ethical subjects. In the section that follows, I bring together theories of the body from fields such as feminist studies and sports studies to explain the importance of the body in developing subjectivity and the role of sports in particular in determining a woman’s subjectivity and sense of self.
The Body and Subjectivity

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Foucault’s work in *Discipline and Punish* as well as his later ethical works (*The History of Sexuality* series and the *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, based on his later lecture notes) demonstrate the body as the primary site of power, the mechanism through which power operates. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault explains the body is “directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs” (25). In his examination of the prison system, Foucault explains the methods of controlling and regulating the body—when bodies moved, what time bodies ate, slept, or worked—had the duel function of making bodies both more obedient and thus more useful, calling these methods disciplines (137). Notably, discipline operated on the body, and functioned almost insidiously to increase power and aptitude in the body at the same time that it also increased domination:

Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an “aptitude,” a “capacity,” which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection. (138)

Here, Foucault focuses on discipline as a modality for the exercise of power, which was the start of his identification of *biopower*, or the use of power to control populations. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault primarily associates discipline with the regulations and methods of surveillance placed on prisoners, but also lists other contexts in which disciplinary practices exist, such as the
hospital and health care system, or the modern school system. The effects of biopower and an increased emphasis on the body as a means of regulating individuals can be seen today in the proliferation of discourses and mandates surrounding “health” and “wellness.” This increased attention on the body suggests the need for re-examining how the body relates to subjectivity, and necessitates the need for analyzing the body as a potential means through which women may subvert or transform some of these disciplinary practices. It also reinforces the need for rhetoric scholars to reconceptualize ethos and epideictic as bodily, in order to better account for the ways that the body influences subjectivity and the development of the self.

The body, much like in the times of ancient Greece, is still the focus of government and citizenship. Bodies were signifiers of “good citizens” in ancient Greece, and to a certain extent, bodies are still the symbols of model citizenship, and governments often target bodies in efforts to create ideal citizens, as evidenced in government-sponsored health mandates. For example, the recent passing of the Affordable Care Act mandates that American citizens purchase health insurance, making it illegal, in effect, for individuals to not care for themselves. Another example would be employer-sponsored incentives related to physical exercise: if an employee walks a certain number of steps per day, that individual receives a discount on health insurance costs. Notably, this type of incentivization requires the individual to monitor his or her physical actions and report them, perhaps the model of bodies as symbols of citizenship. As Kath Woodward points out, “boundaries are blurred between the fit, disciplined body and the active citizen,” with the body the measurement of one’s ability to participate in society (4). Likewise, Jennifer Smith Maguire explains that those who participate in fitness are not only involved in certain practices (such as working out or reading fitness magazines), but are also “implicated in the production and reproduction of the social legitimacy of fitness as a mode of self-investment,
and the social value conferred on the fit body and lifestyle,” and in the employer-benefit model discussed above, fitness has a very real investment value for the individual (5).

However, as I have argued previously, certain bodies are measured and valued differently, figuring some bodies as signifiers of model citizenship, while other bodies signify anxiety. For example, cultural studies scholar Carla L. Peterson notes that the black body has historically been a laboring body. Though it would appear that the laboring black body is certainly a disciplined body, similar to the understanding of the disciplined body as the model of ethical citizenship that Smith Maguire and Woodward discuss, there is an important difference: the black body was historically compelled toward discipline, while the ethical citizen is assumed to specifically choose (self) discipline, though this “choice” is itself an effect of disciplinary practices. In addition, because black women historically performed both physical labor and sex work, their labor resulted in a simultaneous blurring of masculinity and femininity (Peterson xi), leading to a grotesqueness associated with the disciplined black body, as opposed to a sense of normalization in the disciplined white body. That is, while the disciplined white body led to a more stable understanding of the individual, the disciplined black body actually created more instability. According to Peterson, the black body is still a “highly contested site of meaning both within and without the black community” and African American women still “struggle with its representation, vacillating between the poles of sentimental normalization and the flaunting of eccentricity” (xv). In this way, while certain individuals may attempt to work on the body, that work may already be undermined by previous discourses and histories that construct their bodies in different ways.

As a signifier of one’s role in society, working on the body has also become associated with working on one’s identity. According to Smith Maguire, while the rationale for working on
the body has continued to change, “what has not changed is the underlying assumptions regarding the instrumental value of exercise, and the dynamic interplay of body and self—that is, to work on the body is to transform the self,” an idea that stretches back to ancient Greek understandings of the body and the care of the self. As Smith Maguire explains, while working on the body is still “an important avenue of self-transformation,” the current consumer culture has “intensified the instrumentalization of the body, draining body-development and the care of the self of their once deeper associations with ethical existence and moral communities,” and consequently, the process of inventing the self has become “a lifelong project of self-production and self-management; in short, identity becomes work” (60, 113). Therefore, while cultural understandings of the body have undoubtedly changed since the practices of ancient Greeks, in many ways, the imperative to care for the self is more daunting now, with identity construction now just one of many other forms of work.

The body also plays an important role in developing subject positions. Woodward explains that because the body is perceived as part of lived experience and is “a way of being present in the world,” the body can be considered a situation, and as such it “encompasses both the subjective and objective aspects of experience” (106). As a situation, Woodward argues that embodiment, and embodied selves, rather than “the body” or “bodies,” more accurately describes the corporeality of the postmodern self because “embodiment always involves a self who is embodied and a self which cannot be disentangled from its corporeality” (1). As such, embodiment “challenges the division between subject and object” and emphasizes the blending of being, doing, and thinking (1). Woodward’s embodied subject can thus be thought of as an assemblage of sex, race, class, ethnicity, culture, and ability, and individuals can transcend these variables or be constrained by them (154). Likewise, Woodward’s embodied subject nicely
captures the understanding of the interplay between the body and the care of the self and the ways in which the care of the self influences subject positions and is influenced by outside factors. This construction of the subject both demonstrates how bodies are influenced by outside factors and how they can create the situations that they inhabit. In addition, Woodward’s understanding of the relationship between bodies and situations is related to the blurring of the audience and the rhetor within understandings of ethos. That is, embodied subjectivity captures the subtleties between ethos and subjectivity and allows scholars to focus on ethos as specifically embodied and consisting of a negotiation between the individual and identity factors unique to that individual (such as race, class, and gender) and factors external to the individual, such as the context or situation of discourse and the audience to which one speaks or performs.

Understanding ethos and subjectivity as embodied offers scholars a way to account for the individual lived realities that influence the communicative exchange, factors that are not typically emphasized in current discussions of ethos.

Sport specifically highlights the body, and in particular, the sexual differences that are manifest in the body. Organized sport is one of the last strongholds of sexual difference, and it reifies inequality between men and women at the same time that it provides women with the means and an opportunity to transcend those inequalities. Woodward notes that the emphasis on the body aligns sport with other systems of governmentality and Cheryl Cole argues that because sport is centered on the body, it remains a “particularly powerful ideological mechanism” (15). Woodward links Foucauldian analyses of governmentality and sports because Foucault recognizes the body as a “key target for the operation of mechanisms of power” and “many aspects of marginalization in sport center on the body” (85-86, 180). For example, the regulation of the body in sports through disciplinary practices of training and diet and the continued rigid
distinction between the sexes leads to increased surveillance on women and increased societal pressure for women to care for themselves and ascribe to a particular aesthetic ideal, typically that of the thin, young, white woman. In this way, rather than providing more opportunities for women, it can be argued that sport in some ways further constrains women and the ways in which they can build and construct ethos. Cole explains that the “seemingly free display of bodies in motion contributes to an illusion that sport and its bodies are transparent, set apart from politics, culture, and the economy,” when really the ways that bodies are perceived and discussed within sports has important consequences for public discourses about bodies and subjectivity (15).

However, at the same time sport provides an opportunity to transcend some of these aesthetic ideals and gendered expectations. For example, as Woodward points out, sport highlights the “beautiful body,” which includes “physical fitness, muscle, skill, and good looks,” at the same time that it also reveals “the damaged body with all its points of frailty” (161). Competitive boxing or mixed martial arts, football, and wrestling are sports in which athletes often face physical harm and aesthetic “deformities” such as broken noses or cauliflower ears. In some cases, more prominent injuries occur, leaving athletes physically or mentally disabled, hardly the “ideal,” physical specimen sport propagates. Elite female athletes may have diet restrictions and consequently, minimal body fat, losing the curves that signal their bodies as feminine. Whether by personal choice or in order to excel at their sport, female athletes may even surgically reduce their breast size,¹⁶ and their muscular bodies often challenge conceptions of what the female body may look like, sometimes with unfortunate consequences, such as the

¹⁶ According to Amanda Hess’s article, “You Can Only Hope to Contain Them,” featured in ESPN the Magazine’s 2013 Body Issue, elite female athletes have turned to surgery and even special coaching techniques to work around their breast size (113).
gender testing of Caster Semenya\textsuperscript{17}. And while some female athletes seem to embrace an appearance that may challenge gender norms, there are also female athletes that seem to embrace certain gender expectations and particular sports that seem especially to promote gender norms. For example, track star Florence Griffith Joyner, or Flo-Jo, was known for her long, painted fingernails and bright red lipstick, and female bodybuilders often surgically enhance their breast size, perhaps in an effort to feminize their “masculine” muscular bodies. Such behaviors might be read as attempts to conform to a normative aesthetic ideal, or they might be considered parodies of the feminine stereotype. Other sports, such as gymnastics and figure skating, promote the pre-pubescent woman as the aesthetic ideal. Additionally, as much as sport produces the beautiful, ideal, athletic body, it also produces broken bodies: Muhammad Ali’s Parkinson disease is widely thought to be a direct result of his boxing career, and soccer player Brianna Scurry’s undiagnosed concussions effectively ended her career and sent her into depression\textsuperscript{18}.

In addition to sport’s influence on individual identity, sport’s epideictic nature has the potential to transform community identity, and as Woodward notes, governments are beginning to recognize sport as a catalyst for collective identity and integration, seen most notably with

\textsuperscript{17} Semenya is a South African track and field athlete whose crop cut hair and muscular build, along with her fast times, raised suspicions with rules officials, and she was forced to take a gender test in 2009 or be banned from international competition. Shortly after the test, Semenya participated in a makeover with \textit{YOU}, a South African magazine, and has since notably appeared in competition with longer, relaxed hair worn in a ponytail, and shorter spandex shorts and more revealing competition tops, bringing her appearance more in line with the socially constructed aesthetic ideal for women.

\textsuperscript{18} While the highly publicized deaths of former professional football players Junior Seau, Dave Duerson, and Ray Easterling—all of which have been linked with chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), which is thought to be caused by repetitive head injuries—have prompted attention to the risks involved with impact sports, such discussions are usually linked with male-dominated sports like football and hockey. However, according to \textit{The Washington Post}’s Caitlin Dewey, “female athletes suffer relatively more concussions than their male counterparts, and they struggle with more dramatic symptoms when they do” (Dewey).
Nelson Mandela’s involvement in the 1995 Rugby World Cup. According to Woodward, “meanings about body practices and embodied selves are recreated very powerfully through the public arena of representation and the media as well as routine practices of training in the gym,” and celebrities—both athletes and other public figures—“play a key role in the media sport nexus and are a key component in the production of powerfully expressed and often deeply felt meanings about embodied sporting identities.” In this way, sport often helps dictate culture, and athletes’ privileged positions in society, along with the regulatory influence of sport, create systems of power and inequality. As Ann M. Hall explains, because sport is an intensely visible aspect of culture, “sport, like other cultural forms and practices that become institutionalized, is profoundly affected by (and in turn affects) existing structures of power and inequality in those societies.” And the ability to transform the body through athletics also provides an opportunity to challenge some of those institutionalized practices, as illustrated, for example, by the social change in South Africa following the 1995 Rugby World Cup.

The process of changing and shaping the physical bodies of athletes results in more than just a physical transformation, but influences one’s position as an ethical subject, because of the way that ethos is related to the body. In developing one’s body, one also influences one’s ethos. Consequently, the ability to care for and shape the self has political and social consequences. As I will explain in the chapters that follow, Chastain, Williams, and Wie’s ability to physically

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19 Shortly after the end of apartheid, Mandela made the brave move to fully support South Africa’s Springboks, the national rugby team that symbolized white Afrikaaners and black oppression, in the 1995 Rugby World Cup, which was held in South Africa. Mandela famously struck up a friendship with the team captain and wore a jersey to the final. In a speech several years after the World Cup, Mandela said, “Sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire, it has the power to unite people in a way that little else does,” perhaps the ultimate statement of the epideictic nature of sport and the need for more attention to inequalities within sport.
transform and train their bodies also had direct implications for the ways in which they were able to position themselves in the eyes of coaches, the media, and the public.

*Sport and Women’s Subjectivity*

In addition to sports’ influence on the wider social and political world and on issues of identity and subjectivity, sports and fitness have a very particular influence on women. Despite the ability to shape and transform the body, female athletes are still subject to rigid societal norms, and in some cases, the very means to transcend those norms—their bodies—are the same material evidence of those societal norms. As Markula explains, women’s sports are a prime example of the systems of regulatory power because “while the athletes possess certain freedom to choose practices to create themselves, their bodies are defined strictly within the limits of the dominant discourse of femininity” (“Sport” 98). Complicating matters, elite female athletes are often caught somewhere in between masculine and feminine societal expectations: Cole argues that the female athletic body “remains suspicious because of both its apparent masculinization and its position as a border case that challenges the normalized feminine and masculine body” (20), and Woodward contends that “even Olympic women athletes are expected to conform to heterosexualized criteria of glamour off the field,” noting, for example, the “challenge” of “killer heels” that several British Beijing Olympians faced after winning their gold medals. According to Woodward, in donning heels these women “embody success and the incredibly demanding training regimen required to achieve so highly” while also embodying “a woman who inevitably wants to look sexy and wear stiletto heels” (165). Despite elite female athletes’ primary task of performing in their sport, there is often the additional societal expectation that they conform to

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20 Woodward explains, for example, the way that swimmer Rebecca Adlington was praised by the British media for her Olympic performance as well as her sex appeal (165).
heterosexual aesthetic standards, even when those standards—such as wearing “killer heels”—could compromise their athletic performance.

However, the materiality of the body and its various stages of development—or deterioration—through athletics also challenges some of these discourses. For example, Woodward argues that because an athlete’s body includes multiple materialities it challenges the idea that the body can be “read.” According to Woodward, “the exchange in sport often takes place within the context of the relationship between the beautiful body that incorporates not only physical fitness, muscle, skill, and good looks, but also a whole set of physical experiences that constitute the energies of the sporting self and the damaged body with all its points of frailty” (161). Although sport allows for—and often creates—such “broken bodies,” the beautiful athletic body is still the expected cultural aesthetic, and as Woodward acknowledges, “broken bodies are nonetheless constructed through the prism of beautiful bodies in sport” and “women athlete’s bodies are still more likely to be sexualized when represented outside the sporting arena,” which perhaps explains the lack of media attention to women’s athletic-related injuries in comparison to those of male athletes (162-163). Jennifer Smith Maguire explains this tension by describing fitness as “a field of negotiations” that provides opportunities for individuals to “navigate, resist and comply with demands that the body be a focus of both work and leisure, and the body’s function and form—its health and appearance—be maintained and improved, that the body be disciplined as well as enjoyed” (3). Maguire argues that through this navigation, individuals “produce the body’s status: as a status object per se, a site of investment, and an instrument of self-production” (3). The materiality of the athletic body both challenges the expected aesthetic ideal and serves to reinforce it, and an individual’s ability to shape the body,
to “produce” its status, as Maguire claims, means that through athletic training, individuals also have an opportunity to develop themselves as ethical subjects and to perform ethos.

*Athletic Performance, Performing Subjectivity*

A key aspect of an athlete’s performance of ethos that differs from another individual’s is the performative nature of sports as a whole. An athlete has a specific moment in which he or she is required to “perform”—the athletic competition or sporting event—and the athlete typically does so in front of an audience, even if that audience only consists of coaches or teammates and sporting officials. Certain sporting events also generate huge audiences, both live at the event and televised audiences, and such audiences tune in to see athletes perform athletically in their respective sports and to view athletes’ performances of ethos. For example, audiences might watch Williams’ tennis matches both to see her powerful serve and to see her latest on-court fashion statement, or college football audiences might gravitate towards a game as much to see the athletes score touchdowns and block punts as they do to see the players enact values associated with the particular school. The athletes thus perform in an athletic regard—they physically perform certain actions at a particular moment as their sport calls for—and also perform a certain identity. Likewise, the NFL’s use of helmet microphones spotlights not only the athlete’s actions in a game, but their comments to teammates or opposing team members, including what is spoken in huddles or while the player is sitting on the bench. This constant focus on the athlete serves as a method of surveillance in addition to situating the entire sporting event—including times when the athlete is not actively competing—as part of the performance. Thus an elite athlete is almost always involved in constructing his or her ethos.

The emphasis on performance in sport also lends itself to the spectacular, not unlike the showy discourse often associated with epideictic rhetoric. Rhetoric scholars often focus on
epideictic’s aesthetic effects over its civic effects, and in much the same way, sport is often seen as mere spectacle rather than a symbolic event with the potential to shape cultural values. Woodward incorporates Deleuze’s concept of sensation as the event itself to explain how sport combines the symbolic and the corporeal. For Woodward, the body affects and is affected, and this understanding of sensation transcends the “separation between the flesh and the symbolic,” and consequently, “there is not a simple causal link between the show that is staged and the performance of sporting super stars in the arena and the audience of fans who react as spectators” (181-182). Rather, as I will demonstrate in the following three chapters, the sporting situation provides the context and the audience for a performance of ethos, which for athletes often involves a bodily performance of ethos and at the same time, the context of the sporting event and the audience often influence that performance of ethos.

**Research Methodology**

As I have demonstrated above, ethos, invention, and the care of the self are interrelated concepts that inform my discussion of embodied subjectivity and embodied ethos. Though I have discussed these theoretical frameworks separately, I see these frameworks as overlapping, rather than distinct, and their merging forms the basis of my research methodology. For these reasons, I draw on methodological and theoretical approaches from several different disciplines, developing an approach I term *performative textual analysis of embodiment*. My research methodology draws from the fields of rhetoric studies, sports studies, and feminist studies, although I rely primarily on my training in rhetoric. Rhetoric, as a field that studies the use of discourse and considers the importance of contingent, situational experiences, can contribute to existing discussions of female athletes and their efforts to construct the self by extending its traditional focus on textual analysis to include the domain of the body. Therefore, this project
takes a rhetorical approach to the performance of ethos, which provides a way of studying language use, whether linguistic or semiotic, that attends to how certain configurations of language function in particular contexts. Many of the key concepts I discuss as part of the rhetorical tradition are relevant across several disciplines (such as feminist studies and sports studies), in part because questions about what constitutes the subject, the self, agency, and identity have become important to a wide range of scholarly traditions. It makes sense, then, to draw from several disciplines to formulate my research methodology, and this project is therefore also relevant to a number of scholarly fields.

My methodological approach, performative textual analysis of embodiment, consists of a combination of textual analysis, feminist rhetorical analysis, intersectionality, performance theory, and critical sport analysis. Textual analysis consists of close examination of public discourse in order to gain insight into how language functions in specific contexts. Traditional approaches to textual analysis focus on literary texts or public oratory, such as analyses of presidential speeches, but more recent applications of textual analysis, influenced by the field of cultural studies and the linguistic turn in rhetoric, often attend to particular events, artifacts, images, or even individuals as “texts” that can be “read” and analyzed\(^\text{21}\). This assumes a broad understanding of language as a symbol system that includes verbal and nonverbal communication and a broad understanding of what might be considered a text. More specifically, for the purposes of my study, I include bodily movement and comportment, in addition to more traditional written and spoken forms of communication, as texts that can reveal insights into how language functions in a given context.

\(^{21}\) For example, Jay Dolmage analyzes representations of the Greek gods Metis and Hephaestus, Heywood and Dworkin examine the female athlete as a cultural icon, and Carol Mattingly discusses nineteenth-century women’s dress.
Feminist rhetorical analysis, very broadly speaking, is concerned with the analysis of gender in a rhetorical artifact or performance. However, in providing this very general understanding of feminist rhetorical analysis, I want to emphasize that I see this approach as dynamic, open, and fluid. As Gesa E. Kirsch and Jacqueline J. Royster argue, when we consider rhetorical practices and our methods of studying those practices, “we should actually expect there to be, to some extent, resonances, complementarities, intersections, and a range of variations, triggered, for example, by such factors as rhetor, text, context, and conditions” (644). My particular application of feminist rhetorical analysis includes theories of performativity and textual analysis, and combines approaches from several disciplines in an effort to account for variations in context and situation and to open up conversation across disciplines, as Kirsch and Royster suggest. My methodological approach assumes an epistemological understanding of rhetoric as *techne*, or as a productive art. According to Janet Atwill, understanding rhetoric as *techne* means that rhetoric is concerned with *making*, and consequently, that rhetoric is “characterized by both epistemological and ethical indeterminacy” (*Rhetoric* 195). Atwill thus concludes that rhetoric as *techne* cannot be held in a theory/practice binary, because this binary forces rhetoric into a “discipline of representation” that is more likely to “reproduce the given” rather than an understanding of rhetoric as an “art of intervention” capable of inventing new possibilities (*Rhetoric* 207). The importance of understanding rhetoric as *techne* is that it focuses on invention and intervention, and thus opens up alternative models of knowledge and value, which are important for feminist aims of inclusion and advocacy.

Intersectionality, while not a specifically feminist analytical tool, is often employed by feminist researchers because of its sensitivity to various facets of identity that influence or are
influenced by different systems of power. As Patricia Hill Collins explains, intersectionality\textsuperscript{22} treats race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, age, and other identity characteristics as intersecting, rather than competing frameworks, and as aspects of “mutually constructing systems of power” (10-11). An intersectional approach allows me to discuss various factors that may influence one’s performance of ethos, and to consider these factors as interconnected and fluid. Intersectionality is an especially important aspect of my research methodology because much previous scholarship on ethos from rhetorical studies ignores some of these identity categories, and also because previous sports studies scholarship tends to focus on a particular aspect of identity (most commonly gender or race), rather than considering how these facets of identity interact with and influence each other and one’s ethos as a whole. Performance theory lends my study a way to discuss embodiment and the way that the body functions rhetorically. In addition, performance theory also attends to the material and physical aspects of athletic training and competition and also the site and space in which such performances take place. My application of performance theory incorporates the work of J.L. Austin and Judith Butler, respectively, to explain how language \textit{does something}. However, Austin’s framework typically only includes speech acts, while Butler expands Austin’s framework to include bodily actions as well as speech acts, though as I argued previously, Butler treats non-verbal actions as if they were verbal utterances, ignoring affective and experiential registers of meaning. Instead, I take a broader approach to conceptualizations of performance, including bodily \textit{and} linguistic actions in

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{22} Collins’ intersectionality approach is based on critical race theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw’s work. Crenshaw developed the term \textit{intersectionality} as a means of conceptualizing problems within the legal system that occurred when individuals faced both racial and gender discrimination. Because the law had no means of accounting for multiple forms of discrimination at that time, legal counsel did not know how to address multiple forms of exclusion. Collins applies Crenshaw’s term to forward a theoretical framework that accounts for race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and age, among others, as compounding systems of power (11).
\end{footnote}
my analysis. However, like Austin, I am also concerned with the specific context in which these actions occur, and in particular, on the material and physical contexts of performance, attending, for example, to an athlete’s specific training practices, to the kairotic moment of the sporting event in question, and to the architectural and environmental influences that gather an audience to these particular athletes and these specific moments. Such an approach accounts for the adaptability and malleability of the body, which I believe is missing from Butler’s theory of performativity, while also acknowledging the ways in which previous cultural narratives influence how the body is read. Considering the body and the development of the body as a rhetorical process of invention speaks to a problem within sports studies scholarship\textsuperscript{23} that tends to situate exercise practices as only reinforcing or subverting an aesthetic ideal, instead of considering various factors that lead to one’s status as an ethical subject.

Finally, reading sport critically refers to a particular methodology from the field of sports studies. According to Mary G. McDonald and Susan Birrell, reading sport critically “focuses analytical attention on specific sporting incidents and personalities and uses them to reveal a nexus of power that helps produce their meanings” (283-284). Therefore, my methodology focuses on a \textit{nexus} of power, and in particular, on the intersections of identity positions and power relationships such as gender, race, and class, noting especially how the body and performance factor into these power relationships. However, while my research is primarily discursive—that is, I focus on the way that language is used and how this language use affects representation—I am also interested in the material realities that discourse produces. Put more simply, I am interested in how particular performances of ethos come to mean what they do and what the cultural significance of these performances are, and for whom.

\textsuperscript{23} See for example Chapman, Johns and Johns, Markula and Kennedy, Markula and Pringle, and Wesley.
My aim in offering performative textual analysis of embodiment as a research methodology, then, is threefold: first, I seek a means to articulate and conduct feminist research in rhetoric that accounts for bodily and performative aspects of the rhetorical exchange. Second, I reveal the ways that dominant cultural narratives may influence one’s performance of ethos and how that performance is received by an audience. Finally, I seek to provide counter-narratives to these dominant cultural narratives, counter-narratives that draw attention to historical, physical, and material contexts of these performances of ethos. As McDonald and Birrell argue, “narratives matter because they do ideological work which has material consequences. And counter-narratives matter because they offer resistant visions while creating spaces for mobilization of political action” (295). Therefore, this dissertation aims to expose the material consequences of these normative cultural narratives and to offer possible alternatives that disrupt established discourses and provide women with the capacity to use disciplinary practices as a tool in becoming self-conscious agents.

**Archive and Materials Used in Analysis**

In order to understand how ethos is performed, received, and developed over time, and how factors such as gender, race, class, and the body influence how ethos is produced, negotiated, and reproduced in discourse, I examine several different sites of public discourse, including: the athletes’ respective sporting performances (that is, their athletic performance, bodily comportment, and interaction with coaches, other players, fans, and the media during athletic competition); the athletes’ autobiographies and/or biographies written about the athletes; newspaper, magazine, and television commentary about the athletes, focusing primarily on discourse from defining moments in the athletes’ respective careers; and when applicable,
newspaper, magazine, and television productions (including commemorative documentaries) that celebrate moments in the athletes’ career.

My archive consists primarily of material from spectacular moments of each athlete’s career that have captured the public’s attention (for example, newspaper and magazine articles leading up to and following Chastain’s 1999 World Cup celebration or television commentary and newspaper articles following Williams’ 2004 U.S. Open match against Jennifer Capriati), but also follows the athlete’s career and performance of ethos over time, utilizing more recent public discourse, such as discussions of Williams’ historic 18th Grand Slam victory in the 2014 U.S. Open or a Tenth Anniversary commemoration of the 1999 Women’s World Cup team produced by ESPN. Tracing public discourse in this way allows me to analyze both how an athlete’s ethos was performed and received during particular moments in their respective careers—allowing an analysis that is sensitive to the specific rhetorical situation and context of defining performances of ethos—but also to attend to how ethos is performed and developed over a period of time, allowing me to discuss the fluidity of ethos and identity and to account for changes in how ethos is developed and performed.

Chastain, Williams, and Wie were chosen because of their respective ability to represent challenges to a particular element of the dominant public discourse surrounding sport. For example, discourse surrounding Chastain’s goal celebration framed her as both a poster child for the success of Title IX and a representation of the then-current status of feminism, while also situating her as a sex symbol and an example of the new aesthetic ideal for women. Likewise, Serena Williams, along with her sister Venus, have disrupted tennis’ overwhelmingly white, wealthy, and privileged culture, and Wie’s youth, racial background, and insistence on playing against men upset golf’s predominantly older, white, male population.
Chastain, Williams, and Wie also provide a diverse cross section of sports, racial backgrounds, and socioeconomic status that allows me to analyze the ways in which race and class, in addition to gender, influence how ethos is performed and received. In addition, Chastain, Williams, and Wie’s respective careers span a time period from the mid-90s—the heyday of feminist scholars’ focus on the body—to the current time, with their athletic careers overlapping somewhat. For example, Chastain’s professional career lasted roughly from 1991-2004, Williams’ from roughly 1995-the present, and Wie’s from 2005-the present. In this way, although these athletes represent very different racial and socioeconomic backgrounds, the historical contexts of their respective performances of ethos is similar, and I can trace the development of ethos as it occurs across a particular time period.

While Chastain, Williams, and Wie lend my study a nice focus on the ways that race and class, along with gender and the body, influence ethos, they do not necessarily provide the same sort of diversity in regards to sexuality, another facet of identity that would be especially interesting to feminist scholars. The media’s representations of Chastain, Williams, and Wie frame them as heterosexual (Chastain is married and has children, while Williams and Wie’s respective sexual orientations are unspecified at present, though the media assumes both are heterosexual), and their normative sexual orientation undoubtedly factors into their performance of ethos and the reception of that ethos. While sexual orientation was not a dominant concern in my study, it would be interesting to analyze the performances of ethos of avowedly lesbian female athletes, such as WNBA star Brittney Griner, as a point of comparison.

The in-depth focus on individual athletes made possible by the case study approach allows me to account for the ways in which ethos may be developed and performed differently at different times and in different contexts, even by the same individual. Narrowing my focus to
just three individual athletes also provides the opportunity for close examination of bodily movements and comportment as they occur in the context of sport, an examination that would be difficult if I were to broaden my scope to include entire athletic teams or a larger sample of athletes.

While a case study approach allows me to examine several individuals in depth, there are limitations to such a methodological approach. For example, it would be inappropriate to make generalizations about how all female athletes perform ethos based on the performances of just three individuals, or to argue that Williams’ performances of ethos can be read as representative of all black women’s performances of ethos. Nevertheless, the case study approach does allow me insight into how elite female athletes in particular build and perform ethos, and these conclusions can be related to the ways in which everyday women are able to perform ethos.

My study is also limited in some ways by my focus on textual analysis. More specifically, I am limited by the texts included in my archive, whereas other research methods, such as a more ethnographic approach would also incorporate personal interviews and participant observation. Interviews with the athletes themselves or with fans and/or media analysts may have provided different insights into how these athletes performed ethos and how ethos was perceived by the public, revealing how audiences engaged with these mediated “texts,” which is not possible with textual analysis. However, because I am more interested in the dominant discourses surrounding these athletes and how they potentially pose problems for women’s embodiment and construction of ethos rather than in individuals’ understanding of or perceptions of these athletes, a textual analysis grounded in feminist rhetorical theory with an emphasis on performance and embodiment seemed most appropriate for this study.
In the next three chapters, I analyze the performances of ethos of Chastain, Williams, and Wie, focusing especially on the intersections between gender, race, class, and the body as I examine a particular moment in each woman’s athletic career. In doing so, I reveal the ways that dominant cultural narratives may influence one’s performance of ethos and how that performance is received by an audience.
Chapter 3: Exposing Training (Bras): Reading Brandi Chastain’s Penalty Kick Celebration as a Performance of Ethos

*Over time, I’ve come to understand that the player you are on the field mirrors who you are off it ... the things we do in the course of competition often transcend the moment and reflect who we are. – Brandi Chastain*  

It has been called the most iconic image of women’s sports, the symbolic manifestation of Title IX, and even, according to some, the picture of contemporary feminism itself. It was an image that left women both outraged and jubilant. And I remember the moment, as it played out, with distinct clarity.

The 1999 U.S. women’s soccer team had played 90 minutes and two overtime periods in a scoreless World Cup Championship game against China. I was watching the game with my teammates—we had rushed back to the hotel from our own soccer tournament—and the excitement and anxiety of the game left this room full of 13 year-old girls strangely quiet. Penalty kicks. The first converted PK by Carla Overbeck, the amazing save by Brianna Scurry, and then Brandi Chastain, who took her PK with her opposite, left foot—a detail nearly lost in the celebration when the ball hit the back of the net. I remember that she ripped off her jersey and slid or fell to her knees, seemingly in one part relief, one part celebration. I remember she

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25 For example, sports studies scholars Leslie Heywood and Shari Dworkin claim “the astonishing *Newsweek* cover that featured Chastain in all of her muscular glory, on her knees in joy, fists raised in victory, biceps and shoulders as chiseled as her face, full of exhaustion and triumph and amazed relief, seemed to give license to all women’s sports fans: this was it, this was serious, this was sport in all of its emotion and soaring. Women’s sports were now iconic” (34). Journalists Ann Gearhart and Jere Longman (among others) also noted the importance of the image for popular understandings of feminism (discussed below).
was wearing a black sports bra, but I don’t remember thinking the bra, or the celebration itself was remarkable. What was remarkable, at least for me at the time, was that the U.S. had won the World Cup, it had won it in penalty kicks, and the winning goal was scored by a defender who took the shot with her opposite foot. That was remarkable.

I did not know at the time that the image of Brandi Chastain’s celebration—shirt removed, biceps flexed triumphantly, abdominals visible, look of sheer joy and triumph on her face—was unprecedented, that it would become, as reporter and author Jere Longman has put it, “a cultural Rorschach test” for the status of feminism in the public sphere (279), or as Ann Gearhart suggested, “the symbol of Title IX’s success” (“Cashing In”). I do not recall being surprised by Chastain’s celebration or appalled that she had removed her jersey. In fact, I’m sure at least one of my teammates was sitting and watching the game in her sports bra and soccer shorts.

But according to Longman, in interviews after the game, “women on the network morning shows had seemed troubled by her celebration” (304). Some called it a publicity stunt designed for Nike, who sponsored the team and worked with Chastain and other players to design the sports bra Chastain was wearing. Others brought attention to Chastain’s recent photo shoot in the men’s magazine Gear, in which Chastain appeared nude, save for some strategically placed soccer balls. Together with what some called her “strip tease” celebration, Chastain was figured as a flamboyant, exhibitionist sex symbol. Yet at the same time, she was championed as the face of Title IX, her flexed biceps a symbol of contemporary feminism in the public sphere. Chastain’s goal celebration came at a time (1999) where some of the first generations of post-Title IX female athletes—that is, women who had always experienced the benefits of Title IX and had access to sporting opportunities from a young age—were earning college athletic
scholarships and had established themselves as professional athletes. In contrast to earlier generations of female athletes, Chastain and her teammates therefore had a slightly different understanding of how women’s bodies were understood in the public sphere. In addition, the more recent body commodification culture of the 80s and 90s resulted in less social stigma for women who displayed their bodies. Coupled with women’s increased participation in sports, the female body was now not immediately or only objectified. That is, because Chastain had always had the opportunity to invent and shape her physical body, she saw herself as the author of her own self-image and her physical appearance as a marketing asset that was not necessarily gender-specific. For these reasons, I argue that Chastain’s goal celebration marks a shift in feminist understandings about the body, and in particular, that it highlights a tension within feminist scholarship about the body and women’s subordination versus women’s agency.

Chastain’s performance of ethos during her goal celebration also represents an important moment for women’s sports, and thus it makes sense to begin my analysis in this critical historical moment within public discourse about women’s athletics.

In this chapter I argue that Chastain’s performances of ethos illustrate the variety of ways in which bodily practices and behaviors might be used as modalities of action that offer the possibility for women’s agency. For example, her goal celebration can be read as a type of resistance to social norms that dictated appropriate behavior for women, and a reappropriation of a typically male celebration that provides an interruption to established discourses about women’s achievement. In this way, Chastain’s goal celebration is a form of embodied epideictic rhetoric that invites a critical response and enacts an alternative reality for women, even though this action was not planned in advance. In addition, Chastain’s ability to build and shape her

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26 See Heywood and Dworkin, along with Holly Brubach.
body through athletic training also provided her with a type of malleability that allowed her to shape and develop her ethos for particular audiences and purposes. For example, because Chastain’s white, thin, conventionally attractive body reflected middle class values and ideals, she is able to capitalize on these gendered and stereotyped discourses, redeploying them for her own purposes. Chastain’s performances of ethos suggest that ethos is trained, and is the result of repeated bodily practices and behaviors, which influence an individual’s sense of self. This is an important consideration for rhetorical scholars interested in body theory, materiality, or ethos (such as Sharon Crowley, Debra Hawhee, Michael Hyde, Susan Jarratt, and Coretta Pittman, among others) because such practices and behaviors are not always chosen by the individual, but may be imposed on the individual. In addition, these performances of ethos demonstrate ethos as situated, or as influenced by the specific context of the communicative exchange, the cultural values of the community to which one speaks or performs, and the particular body that performs ethos.

Finally, Chastain’s performances of ethos serve as an example of how the process of athletic training and the care of the self—processes often thought of as disciplinary mechanisms that produce a subordinate subject—may actually function as processes of invention that offer the possibility of agency. In this way, agency exists not only in actions that resist social norms but also in the ways in which one inhabits norms. That is, I want to suggest that one’s desire to submit to an established authority (such as a coach) is not necessarily in opposition to feminist politics, nor do certain practices necessarily only reinscribe traditional gender roles or expectations. Rather, I want to focus instead on the ways in which disciplinary practices and one’s subordination might produce different capacities in the subject. This understanding of
power and subject formation means that agency is not just the same as resistance to social norms, but is a capacity for action that is made possible specifically through one’s subordination.

Training Ethos in the Post-Title IX Female Athlete

In exposing her (trained) body, Chastain follows a long history of ethos associated with the body that is cared for. While Chastain’s body does challenge conventional understandings of women’s behavior, it is in part because she displayed a trained body that Chastain is able to build ethos. In the iconic image that captures Chastain’s goal celebration, Chastain appears on her knees, but leaning back slightly at the waist, head lifted up and back, with her arms raised out in front of her, forming 90 degree angles, and with clenched fists, her right hand gripping her jersey. This position, though not necessarily what one would consider an athletic stance, actually remarkably highlights Chastain’s muscularity in almost every part of her body. For example, though Chastain’s legs are not weight bearing, there is still visible muscle definition in her quads. The fact that she happens to be leaning back slightly at the waist also means that her abdominals are fully engaged. Her arm position, with elbows bent, fists clenched, and arms lifted in front of her, manages to highlight her biceps and deltoids, in addition to the muscles in her forearms and back. Even her head position accentuates muscles in her neck and upper back. Despite the fact that Chastain is shown on her knees—not typically a position associated with strength and power—it is evident that Chastain is in full control of her body and situation.

Chastain in particular has an interesting relationship to training and disciplinary practices. Her ability to change and shape her own body through athletic training provided her with an opportunity to also shape and reform her ethos. Chastain had been a member of the 1991 World Cup team and was a top college player, although she admits that in her early career, “few would have described me as a disciplined player” (31). Or, as Longman put it, “she had a passion for
soccer but no dedication to being in shape” (220). Chastain was left off the 1995 World Cup squad, in part because she lacked the physicality and fitness coaches sought. Spurred by the snub, Chastain came back for the 1996 Olympic training camp with a new regime of weight training and fitness drills and won her spot back. However, it was a slightly different spot. In her college days and for the 1991 World Cup, Chastain had played forward, where her main responsibility was to score goals and assist other players in scoring goals. When she tried out for the national team again in 1996, Chastain was told the only position available was defender, a position she struggled with. In reshaping and training her body, Chastain also reshaped her identity and ethos, becoming the hallmark of strength and fitness where she once struggled to complete a fitness drill, and moving from forward to defender, a complete shift in playing style and mentality. In her transformation from undisciplined forward to fit defender, Chastain not only reshaped her body and her role on the team, but she crafted a different public image.

Debra Hawhee’s work on *metis*, or cunning intelligence, and its relationship to the body is helpful in understanding why and how Chastain’s malleability—brought about through disciplinary training—actually allows her to reinvent the self. Hawhee explains that *metis* is “the mode of negotiating agonistic forces, the ability to cunningly and effectively maneuver a cutting instrument, a ship, a chariot, a body, on the spot, in the heat of the moment” (47). Importantly, however, *metis* is developed in part through repeated practice, and though one cannot train for every possible situation, repeated practice allows one to develop a ready, perceptive body, that is capable of particular maneuvers at key moments. But *metis* also implies an adaptability, a rhetorical flexibility that allows one to respond to the situation at hand. Hawhee relates the rhetorical concept of *metis* with the Greek goddess Metis, who was known for her ability to morph into different forms, arguing that *metis* is “a kind of bodily becoming, insofar as it is
transmitted through a blurring of boundaries between bodies” and that *metis* “possesses the capacity for bodily disguise” (49-50). While Hawhee uses the Greek myth of Zeus ingesting Metis as an example of the blurring of bodies, I argue that rhetorical scholars can also consider the concept of *metis* as a blurring of different identities by the same individual, such as the way that Chastain was able to blur her roles as defender and goal-scorer. This malleability grants the rhetor a rhetorical flexibility that allows her to adapt to particular situations, shifting shape (and in the example of the athlete, one might shift shape both literally, by developing and training the body, and more figuratively, through performative actions such as Chastain’s goal celebration mentioned above) in order to better respond to a particular situation. This understanding of the body as specifically malleable and capable of change extends scholarship that tends to “fix” the body in particular subject positions, and furthers understandings of rhetorical invention (such as Judy Holiday’s) as occurring in the middle of discourse.

In addition, shortly after making the national team for the second time, Chastain signed several advertising deals. Anson Dorrance, the U.S. National team coach from 1986-1994—when Chastain made, and then was released from the national team—had “stressed that players must ‘sell the game,’ in the assertive way they played, in marketing it to a public that did not yet know or care that they existed” (qtd. in Longman 64). Perhaps in an effort to further remake her ethos, Chastain took Dorrance’s charge to sell the game to a whole new level. Chastain appeared, along with other teammates, in several advertisements and commercials leading up to the World Cup, including an ad for a Nike sports bra in which her bare back was visible. Then there were the *Gear* photos, in which Chastain appeared nude except for her cleats and a strategically placed soccer ball. David Letterman had Chastain on his show—a replacement for the unwilling Mia Hamm—just prior to the 1999 World Cup, and then featured the team nightly leading up to the
championship game and in the celebration after. And when asked by USA Today’s Christine Brennan if the team’s popularity was due to their physical appearance, Chastain calmly answered, “There are those people who come purely for the soccer. There are those people who come purely for the event. And there are those people who come because they like us, to look at us. Those are three great reasons to come” (Longman 37-38).27

But it was not just Chastain who attracted as much attention for her playing as for her looks: Hamm made the list of People’s 50 most beautiful people, and Julie Foudy appeared with her husband in a Sports Illustrated swimsuit issue. Add to that figure skater Katarina Witt and several track and field athletes, and you have what Longman calls “a generation of female athletes who believed that their exposed bodies would be as appreciated for strength and power as for sex appeal, certain that nothing would be denied them or taken away, neither their reputations, their careers, nor their financial opportunities” (37). However, feminist scholar Mariah Burton Nelson notes that because elite female athletes often “buck the traditional female role” by playing sports, the compromise is often that they “go along with” normative expectations for how women should behave, namely as the lady or the tramp (qtd. in Longman 39). Burton Nelson even argues that the Gear photo shoot was a mistake because of the way the images can be used. According to Burton Nelson, female athletes may claim they are trying to “show off power” or “redefine beauty,” but “there is still a struggle about who’s going to define female beauty, who’s going to define what women should wear and how they should behave. Women’s sports will not have arrived until we are writing those rules for ourselves” (qtd. in

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27 Chastain would later amend this statement in her book (2004), explaining, “I want the reason people come to watch to be because they appreciate hardworking athletes and they enjoy soccer—not because of how we look. To do otherwise would not be fair to the thirty million women worldwide who play this game, and just not the right message to the players and parents reading this book” (174). Chastain’s book is, while partly autobiographical, mostly about sportsmanship in youth sports, and targets youth players and their parents.
Chastain’s celebration has certainly been read as an important moment for women’s sports, but some have suggested it is also a sexualized image, no doubt because Chastain reflected the dominant aesthetic ideal and because she had built some of her ethos on her physical appearance.

However, the body that Chastain displays and the context of that particular moment complicate the analysis Burton Nelson offers. For example, Chastain’s body is very obviously a trained one. Though she does happen to be imaged at a precise moment in which much of her musculature is engaged, that musculature would not be as apparent if Chastain had not trained and developed her body. The body that she displays, though marked as feminine by her sports bra and ponytailed hair, also lacks the obvious curves and breasts that typically symbolize a women’s sex appeal. And in contrast to her Gear magazine photos, in which Chastain appears bent over and looking at the viewer, holding the viewer’s gaze, in the image of Chastain’s goal celebration, her attention is directed away from the viewer. Film studies scholars Jill Dolan and Laura Mulvey have both noted the differences in the roles of men and women within cinema, and I believe their critique is helpful here as well. According to Mulvey, when a woman is displayed as a sexual object and erotic spectacle “she holds the look, and plays to and signifies male desire” by returning the viewer’s gaze (19). In Chastain’s goal celebration, however, her gaze is directed upward, away from the viewer. She refuses to return to the viewer’s gaze. Therefore, while she is pictured in only her bra, the fact that it is a black sports bra, that her body position highlights her strength and power and ignores the viewer, and that the body she displays is somewhat androgynous, it is difficult to read this image of Chastain as a traditionally sexualized image of an objectified body. One must also consider the context of the image, which further complicates an objectification critique. Incorporating Kath Woodward’s understanding of
the body as a situation (discussed in the previous chapter), Chastain occupies both a subjective and objective position: because she refuses to acknowledge the viewer’s gaze, the image figures her as an embodied subject that must be understood through her corporeality, but at the same time, Chastain’s status as an elite athlete and the context of the sporting event in particular position her as an object to be consumed by a captive audience. In this way, Chastain’s goal celebration extends discussions of women’s subjectivity and embodiment and draws attention to the body’s materiality.

In addition, Chastain’s jersey removal happened so quickly in response to her winning penalty kick that there are almost no images of her actually removing the jersey. Immediately after scoring, Chastain removes her jersey, whips around in a circle with the jersey raised over her head, and then collapses onto her knees. But she is only actually kneeling for about one second before jumping up triumphantly and embracing her teammates. That is, though the image of Chastain’s celebration makes it appear as if she is savoring the moment, it was actually a very brief reaction. Television cameras did not have time to jump to another camera angle, and viewers would hardly have noticed that Chastain was ever on her knees to begin with. There was no time—for viewers or the media—to focus on Chastain’s body in that moment, and television commentators did not mention Chastain’s jersey removal or comment on her goal celebration. Thus, while the media focused intensely on Chastain’s body and the fact that she had displayed her body in this way in the days following the World Cup, it seemed to make little impression on the television commentators, who actually mentioned very little about Chastain individually. For example, as she prepared to take her penalty kick, announcers pointed out that the last time the U.S. and China had met in penalty kicks (a year before the World Cup final), Chastain’s shot had been blocked and the U.S. had lost. They are silent as Chastain takes her shot, then simply
exclaim “It’s a goal!” and that the U.S. had won. There is no discussion of Chastain’s celebration, and the replay of Chastain’s winning kick does not include her celebration.

In contrast to Burton Nelson’s critique, Leslie Heywood and Shari Dworkin suggest that post-Title IX female athletes—those that have grown up after Title IX’s passing in 1972 and have thus always experienced its benefits—have a different understanding of how women’s bodies are represented in the public sphere. Heywood and Dworkin claim that athletes like Chastain and volleyball player Gabrielle Reese “tend to see physical appearance as a marketing asset that is not necessarily gender-specific, pointing to the ways the male body has itself become sexualized and commodified in recent media culture, and the ways male athletes are increasingly valued for aesthetic reasons as well as for their athletic successes” (39). Indeed, in recent years, several male athletes have appeared in revealing advertisements, most notably soccer player David Beckham, who was featured in print and television commercials for an underwear line by H&M.

According to Heywood and Dworkin, post-Title IX female athletes have come to redeem the erasure of individual women that the old Playboy model of sexualization performed, rewriting the symbology of the female body from empty signifiers of ready heterosexual access, blank canvases, or holes on which to write one’s heteronormative desires, to the active, self-present sexuality of a body that signifies achievement and power and is in that sense “masculinized” or “queered” if you follow the traditional equation of masculinity with power and heteronormativity. (82-83)

As they explain, when the body is specifically coded as athletic, it can “redeem female sexuality and make it visible as an assertion of female presence, and make that presence amenable to a range of sexualities” (82-83). In this interpretation, the iconic image of Chastain’s celebration,
while it exposes her body, is a definitive statement of female presence, and is clearly an athletic image. As such, her celebration and performance of ethos allows a questioning and queering of traditional understandings of femininity and masculinity. Thus, while the image does reinforce a normative aesthetic ideal for women, Chastain is able to repurpose this image, redeploying gendered discourses for her own purposes and agendas, such as bringing attention to the wage disparity in men’s and women’s soccer.

**Training Ethos and Disciplining Subjectivity**

I also want to emphasize the importance of Chastain’s training and bodily development and its effects on her goal celebration. First, the act of taking a penalty kick (or defending one) is highly dependent on repeated practice. Penalty kicks are taken from a set point and only occur in distinct moments within the game, in contrast to the unpredictability of shots coming from any direction, distance, time, or situation in soccer’s typically constantly-running time. What this means is that both penalty kick shooters and goalkeepers can practice these skills in reliable conditions that closely replicate what they would experience during the game, while other skills, such as trying to score a goal while being pursued by a defender, can vary tremendously given the particular situation in the game. It also means that one’s ability to score goals in typical game situations may not always correspond to one’s ability to score penalty kicks. Some leading goal scorers are not necessarily skilled at taking penalty kicks, and other players may “specialize” in taking or defending penalty kicks. In addition, penalty kicks are typically a high-stakes opportunity for goal scoring because soccer, as a sport, tends to produce very few goals. Even when penalty kicks are not the last, deciding factor in a game (which occurs only when the game is still tied after regulation and overtime periods), they can still influence the outcome because they represent an important and advantageous goal-scoring opportunity in that the shooter is
allowed to shoot from close range, uninhibited by defenders. Because of the relative predictability of penalty kicks within a highly unpredictable sport, and because they can decisively impact the outcome of the game, most players and coaches dedicate specific training and practice time solely to penalty kicks. For example, coaches and goalkeepers will often keep track of a player’s penalty kick attempts, both in practice and in games, including the number of shots that were successful or unsuccessful, where those shots were placed (for example, to the right side of the goal or the left, or low to the ground versus in an upper corner), what foot a player used to take the shot, and the part of the foot that was used to take the shot (for example, the laces, the instep, or the outside of the foot), both of which can sometimes influence the direction of the shot.

In addition, penalty kick shooters are chosen by coaches, and when a game advances to penalty kicks following overtime, a coach must submit an ordered list of shooters prior to the start of the penalty kick attempts. The preparation for taking and defending penalty kicks is thus highly regulated and documented, situating this training as what Foucault would refer to as a type of disciplinary power. The process of measuring and ordering penalty kick shooters in particular emphasizes one’s individuality and how one compares to a whole, in this case, the rest of the team. It also depends on systems of surveillance in which individuals are watched, measured, and recorded, and perpetuates systems of self-surveillance. That is, because disciplinary power is concerned with processes of normalization, or how one compares to another, it also encourages individuals to monitor themselves. This is particularly apparent with penalty kick practice, in which several team members, including Chastain, would stay on after practice to perform additional penalty kicks (Longman 2). Such disciplinary self-surveillance not only positions the individual as the instrument of her own subjectivation, but it also positions
individuals as mechanisms of power: by perpetuating their own self-surveillance, team members establish additional practice above and beyond what is required as the new “normal.”

It is also important to note that Chastain took the winning penalty kick with her left, non-dominant foot. While elite soccer players are expected to be skilled at using both feet, most players have a foot that they prefer, and it is unusual for a player to feel equally confident shooting a penalty kick with either foot, especially a penalty kick that might result in a World Cup title. For example, according to Longman, U.S. coach Tony DiCicco “could not think of many men or women who would be comfortable switching feet in the final of a World Cup,” and said of the shot, “the ability to play with both feet, someone who normally takes the kick right footed and feels totally confident switching to her left foot, that’s unique in my mind. Amazing confidence” (qtd. in Longman 264-265). Chastain’s willingness to take the penalty kick with her opposite foot, along with the fact that the shot was successful, suggest that she had spent a considerable amount of time practicing this skill, and that she had specifically trained with equal attention to both feet, suggesting an even more intense focus on normalization. That is, not only did Chastain likely concern herself with how her penalty kick ability compared to other teammate’s penalty kick skills, but she also measured how one foot performed in comparison to the other. In this way, Chastain’s body and her bodily performance was not just the object of examination, but specific parts of her body were also treated as objects of examination.

In this way, Chastain’s celebration can also be read as a statement affirming her role on the team. As mentioned above, Chastain had to reshape herself—both her physical body and her playing position—in order to get back on the national team just prior to the 1996 Olympics. In fact, Chastain was only invited back to the Olympic team training camp (a selection period of sorts, where players are invited to compete for a spot on the Olympic squad) because several top
players, including Hamm, Foudy and Kristine Lilly went on strike. And while she played well in the 1996 Olympic tournament, three years later Chastain was having a difficult World Cup until the final. In the opening minutes of their match against Nigeria, Chastain collided with fellow defender Carla Overbeck, and Nigeria scored, putting the Americans immediately down 0-1, though they recovered to an eventual 7-1 victory. In the quarterfinals against Germany, Chastain scored an own goal when she attempted a no-look pass back to Scurry, who was not anticipating the ball. The own goal put Germany ahead 1-0. Amazingly, Chastain kept her composure and managed to score late in the game to tie it at 2-2, and the team scored one more goal, ultimately beating Germany 3-2 to advance to the semifinals. Up until the final, Chastain’s athletic performance had been lackluster, hardly reflective of the standout player that she seemed after the World Cup. In fact, Chastain was not even originally going to take a penalty kick in the final, but in the last moment before turning in the shooting order, DiCicco moved Chastain from the number six kicker to number five, but only on the condition that she take the shot with her left foot, instead of her more dominant right foot. When Chastain stepped up to take her penalty kick, she certainly had something to prove.

While I do not believe Chastain’s celebration was planned in the slightest, I do think there was a reason that she responded the way that she did. All of Chastain’s performances of

28 An own goal is recorded when a player hits the ball into his or her own goal, recording a goal for the other team, even if the ball is deflected off of the player and into the net. In Chastain’s case, she had meant to pass the ball back to the goalkeeper, but because Scurry was not prepared for the pass, it rolled into the goal, giving Germany a 1-0 lead.

29 There were some, such as William Saletan of Slate and Davie Browder of the (Indianapolis) Post-Tribune that suggested the celebration was a contrived publicity stunt for Nike. Chastain insists the moment was not planned, pointing out that it was impossible for her to predict that the game would go to penalty kicks, or that she would even have a chance to take a PK. Moreover, Chastain scored a goal against Germany earlier in the tournament, and if she did have a deal with Nike, why not pull the stunt then? There was no way to know that Chastain would score a goal later in the tournament, much less in the final, with soccer being such a miserly sport and
ethos leading up to the World Cup—her interviews, ad campaigns, *Gear* photo-shoot, and of course, her playing—shaped and influenced her response in that moment. Chastain had built her ethos around her ability to shape and transform her body, and had capitalized on the media’s obsession with an aesthetic ideal that privileged her young, white, fit body. But that moment also called for a specific response. Chastain’s celebration was kairotic: it fit the situation and context Chastain found herself in and it met audience expectations of Chastain’s performance and the performance of the team as a whole. The celebration, with its display of her body, also suggested that Chastain’s ethos consisted of her status as both an elite soccer player—with the fit, athletic body that one might expect from a professional athlete—and also her status as a white, heterosexual woman who represented the normative aesthetic ideal.

**The Girl Next Door: Situated Ethos**

In the previous chapter, I explained the ways in which bodily training and behaviors, whether chosen by the individual or behaviors the individual is compelled to perform, work together with cultural values and expectations to influence how one develops ethos and how that ethos is received by an audience. Therefore, when analyzing Chastain’s performance of ethos in and leading up to her goal celebration, it is important to remember that ethos is situated and depends in part on the cultural values of the community one addresses and the cultural narratives that influence how one is perceived prior to the communicative exchange. For example, as rhetoric scholars Jacqueline Jones Royster and Coretta Pittman argue, certain individuals may already face a disadvantage in their ability to construct ethos because their bodies do not reflect the normative values of the community to which they speak, and thus any attempts to establish agency are automatically viewed as deviant. However, Chastain’s white, blonde body reflected Chastain not usually having many goal-scoring opportunities in her role as a defender. The conspiracy stories have little evidence to corroborate them.
the cultural values of the middle class and a normative, white, heterosexual sexuality. In this way, and without any deliberate choice on her part, Chastain inhabited and embodied the social norms of her community. At the same time, however, Chastain’s celebration also challenged expectations of acceptable female behavior. Media coverage of the team consistently portrayed the players as wholesome, “safe” role models that appealed to suburban (read white, middle class) America, and newspaper articles and books published about the team often referred to them as “girls,” rather than women. Take for example Longman’s *The Girls of Summer* (2000), Marla Miller’s *All-American Girls*, the authorized biography of the players (1999), and Rick Reilly’s *Sports Illustrated* article “The Goal-Goal Girls” (July 5, 1999). The women’s team was referred to as someone’s sister, daughter, or “the girls next door” by promoters, organizers, sponsors, the media, and by team members themselves. Donna Lopiano, then the executive director of the Women’s Sports Foundation, called the women’s national team “a socially acceptable team” with “great appeal to middle America, to corporate America, because this was pretty much an all-white, little-girl-down-the-street, not-too-tough group” (qtd. in Longman 43). In the 2005 documentary *Dare to Dream*, which was produced by HBO to commemorate the World Cup team, Sally Jenkins, a journalist who covered the World Cup for *The Washington Times*,

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30 Though I will acknowledge that this was the 90s, and the phrase “You go, girl” was very popular at the time. While the ubiquity of the phrase could explain the frequent references to the team as girls rather than women, I argue that by referring to the players as girls and not women, the media situated the players as “safe,” asexual, and non-threatening to the male-dominated sports world.

31 Longman argues, “if the American team represented an ideal, it was primarily a white suburban ideal” (42). Of the 20 players on the World Cup roster, none were Hispanic, and only two—both goalkeepers—were black. The lack of racial diversity was especially glaring on the U.S. women’s team because, as Longman points out, “in most places around the world, soccer was a game of the urban poor. But, in the United States it was a suburban sport, played mostly by middle class and upper middle class whites …. the U.S. women reflected, like no other team, the values of mainstream, middle class, middle of the road America” (42-43). However, Longman and others’ assertions that the team reflected “mainstream” America is itself rift with the bias of the white, mostly middle-class media.
Post, noted “one of the problems with mainstream sports today is they’ve gotten so far from the people who watch them. This team came back to the audience. They were approachable, they were connective, and they looked like somebody who lived down the street from you” (15:36). ABC sportscaster Robin Roberts added, “You had the perfect cast. They were the girls next door. There was a freshness to them. There was a wholesomeness to them. They were the right kind of mix of sexuality, with athleticism, and you know what? They were good” (19:55 in Dare to Dream, italics used to capture original, spoken emphasis). These media narratives thus provided Chastain with public credibility even prior to her goal celebration, but they also worked in combination with Chastain’s bodily training to influence the ways in which Chastain embodied and inhabited these social norms in her performance of ethos.

For example, the players themselves embraced this “girl next door” characterization, and through their marketing strategies, participated in and embodied these narratives. Goalkeeper Saskia Webber explaining the team’s appeal in this way: “Here comes a female team that could be your daughter, literally your daughter, that played rec soccer, that played in the backyard, that went to high school and college. [All of the players on the 1999 World Cup team had either earned college degrees or were working toward degrees (Longman 19).] You’re not going to pick up the paper tomorrow and see one of us in it for money laundering or cocaine use or soliciting,” like the sports headlines running at the time (qtd. in Longman 25-26). While these “girl next door” conceptualizations of the team obviously worked to attract fans of all ages (evident by the attendance records at the World Cup games) such conceptualizations minimized the player’s accomplishments and dedication to the sport, figured them as heterosexual only (and thus safe), ignored their sexuality while also hypersexualizing them, and situated them as non-threatening to a male-dominated sports world.
“The girl next door” trope also, of course figures the women’s team as girls, rather than women. As “girls,” the women’s team presented a “safe,” wholesome image that appealed to suburbia. According to Longman, the “unthreatening symbol” of the ponytail—a ubiquitous symbol of girlhood—was even incorporated into the official Women’s World Cup logo for the 1999 tournament, perhaps a deliberate attempt to soften the image of female athletes, or at the very least, to reinforce their heterosexuality (41). As Joan Ryan explains, the child-like image of gymnasts and figure skaters, whose careers often end with puberty, present more “acceptable” role models than imposing and explosive athletes such as Martina Navratilova and Jackie Joyner-Kersee. Ryan argues, “in a modern sports world grappling with the changing roles of women, from the front offices to the playing fields, gymnasts are beacons of feminine simplicity and innocence” (Ryan 68). The continual reiteration of the U.S. women’s team as girls rather than women can be read as an attempt to diminish fears about the team as powerful, successful athletes, and to instead situate the women’s team as safe, acceptable role models.

Inhabiting Social Norms: “Safe-Sexy” (White, Heterosexual, Middle-Class) Femininity

Framing the U.S. women’s team as “the girls next door” also positions them as objects of desire pursued by a male gaze. The girl next door is always available for sexual advances, but she is the girl that a man wants to marry, not the whore he dismisses. The girl next door is close enough for a man to lust over, but hidden in the seeming innocence of the home, she is still virginal, still desirable (see for example Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, and Laura Mulvey). Situated in this way, the U.S. women’s team “presented a safe-sexy picture of bouncy femininity,” that appealed to fans, corporate sponsors, and the media (Longman 41). In this framework, the team was encouraged to promote only a certain amount of sexuality, and definitely a certain type of sexuality. However, though the media used these discourses, the team
seemed to embrace this framing as well, willingly inhabiting these social norms as a means to publicize women’s soccer. Importantly, however, while Chastain and the women’s soccer team already benefitted from a situated ethos that granted them authority because their white, heterosexual, and middle-class bodies happened to reflect certain social norms, their willingness to perpetuate these cultural constructs through commercials and advertising also reinforced these social norms. For example, in a 1997 commercial for Pert Plus, Mia Hamm is shown briefly in her soccer gear with her hair in a ponytail, and then is transformed (via Pert Plus) to a casual business suit with full makeup, earrings, heels, and of course, shiny, full, hair that she repeatedly tosses over her shoulder. In another ad, Hamm endorses a soccer Barbie doll, perhaps the very symbol of feminine, heterosexual girlhood, with a group of adoring, predominantly white girls who play with the white Barbie doll32. In yet another example, one of Nike’s “We Will Take on the World as a Team” commercials depicts Chastain, Mia Hamm, Scurry, Tisha Venturini and Tiffeny Milbrett on a date33. The commercial opens with a man, carrying flowers, knocking on a door and announcing, “I’m here for Tisha [Venturini].” The second man, who answers the door, calls upstairs, “Girls, your date’s here!” The players—all wearing their soccer uniforms—file downstairs and are then shown piling into one car, together at the movies, etc., while their date goes along, perplexed. The commercial ends with the date promising to call, and the players collectively shrugging their shoulders while Nike’s tag line, “We will take on the world as a team,” appears over the image. While the end of the commercial does seem to suggest that the players are unconcerned with having a man’s attention, the commercial strongly situates the

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32 There is a very brief shot of one African American girl, but all the other girls in the commercial are white, and all of the girls with speaking roles are white. Kira, a black Barbie doll, is also shown and mentioned very briefly, but the main focus is on the blonde Barbie.

33 If you like, you can view the commercial here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFuPTnJ9ABc
players as heterosexual and as perpetuating normative gender roles. And yet again, the players are referred to as girls, rather than women, and their actions are always shown in response to a male figure.

The commercial effectively situates the team as minors in need of parental permission to date, which is especially ridiculous given that Venturini, the youngest player featured in the commercial, was 26 at the time, and Chastain was married. In addition, both men in the commercial are white, and their dress and surroundings mark them and the commercial as middle class. For example, both men wear collared shirts, the outside of the players’ “home” is well landscaped, and they climb into a red sports car. It seems that safe, sexy, and feminine are really just code words for heterosexual, white, and middle-class, linking whiteness and middle-class values with women’s ability to gain an audience. Whiteness and middle-class markers such as an expensive car or well-maintained home are circulated (via commercials or other media) into social discourses and become entrenched into cultural memory as indications of “successful” womanhood.

In contrast, the mostly African American 1996 women’s Olympic basketball team, although they were just as successful as the women’s soccer team and garnered the same sold-out stadium support from fans, were not as endearing to the predominantly white media, and were not figured as the “girls next door” (Longman 43). For example, a Nike commercial which aired prior to the 1996 Olympics featured just Lisa Leslie—no other players on the team—and simply depicts her dribbling and shooting the basketball while a voiceover says, “You don’t win silver, you lose gold.” The commercial focuses on Leslie’s skills as a basketball player, and she is depicted wearing loose-fitting basketball clothing, no jewelry or makeup, and with her hair pulled back tightly into a neat, inconspicuous bun. In contrast to the way the women’s soccer
team was represented, Leslie’s sex appeal and heterosexuality does not seem to be a main focus of the ad, and there are no obvious markers of her femininity. In fact, the commercial opens with and returns several times to a close up shot of Leslie’s face, which cuts out her hair and neck, actually removing markers of her gender and instead presenting a very ambiguous image. At first glance, it is unclear if the viewer is looking at a man or a woman until the camera pans out and Leslie turns, revealing her hair. Unlike the bouncy ponytails and girlish eagerness of the women’s soccer team, Leslie appears serious, focused, and professional, and she is depicted as a skilled athlete, not a potential date.

Other coverage of the 1996 Olympic women’s basketball team focused on team member’s socioeconomic backgrounds. For example, a mini-documentary also produced by Nike featured the women’s basketball team members discussing each other’s contributions to the team and mentioned a few players’ family backgrounds: for example, that Leslie’s mother is a single parent and drives a semi-truck, and that Ruthie Bolton grew up playing on a grass basketball court with her 11 sisters and 8 brothers. Likewise, Sport’s Illustrated’s Alexander Wolff described point guard Dawn Staley as “a Philly street kid with a heart of sisterly love” (Wolff). In contrast, the women’s soccer team is noted (in the same publication) for their “bright-red toenails,” shopping habits, and diaper bags (Reilly).

Because the women’s basketball team did not possess the same markers deemed desirable and acceptable by the media—that is, because they were not white and were not associated with the markers of the middle class—they received substantially less attention than the women’s soccer team at the time, and subsequently, less opportunity to build and perform ethos. The media’s depiction of the women’s basketball team, with their working-class, “street kid” backgrounds and their ambiguous bodies, situated these women as very different from the safety
of the white, middle-class, feminine women’s soccer team. These narratives about the women’s basketball team and women’s soccer team in turn influenced public opinion about the two teams, determining who may build ethos and how they may do so.

The Body and Situated Ethos

Chastain’s performance of ethos in her goal celebration also highlights the importance of understanding situated ethos and how the body often serves as a visible marker of one’s situated ethos. In this way, the body and one’s bodily habits and behaviors not only influence one’s invented ethos, but also influence the way one’s situated ethos is perceived. My analysis of Chastain therefore extends current discussions of situated ethos to include the ways in which the body and bodily habits influence ethos, which is important for rhetorical scholarship because in many cases, these are factors that the speaker or performer cannot always utilize in the communicative exchange. That is, while a speaker might temper her argument to appeal to a skeptical audience or an athlete might choose to gain muscle (changing body shape) to intimidate an opponent, the body’s materiality poses limits on what can be realistically altered by the speaker. What this means is that not everyone has the same “available means” of persuasion from which to draw from, and this disparity often results in certain individuals being granted ethos, while others are ignored. It is also necessary to consider how cultural constructs such as race, gender, and class often operate together to influence one’s situated ethos, and how these constructs are in turn shaped by the discourses that perpetuate and continue to circulate them. In this way, when I discuss race, class, or gender, it is with the understanding that these constructions intersect and are informed by the specific context in which they occur.

For example, I argue that the attention Chastain garnered was at least in part because she reflected normative femininity, and her white body with its heterosexual markers in many ways
helped her to build ethos. In the iconic image of her goal celebration, there is the ponytail, what some called the hallmark of heterosexuality, which of course fit with the official World Cup logo. If you look closely you can also make out the faint glimmer of Chastain’s wedding ring, a further mark of her normative sexual orientation. It is an interesting thought experiment to consider what would have happened if goalkeeper Briana Scurry, who made an incredible save in the penalty kicks just a few moments earlier, had been the featured photo. Scurry’s black body, larger frame, ambiguous hair cut, and intimidating antics—she was known to glare at opponents and yell at herself—would have been perceived much differently. The photo of Scurry’s save—with her body parallel to the ground, arms completely outstretched—was featured in many newspaper and magazine articles, and there was some debate in several papers about which photo to include, the one of Scurry or the photo of Chastain. Some, including Scurry’s mother and Harry Edwards, a professor of sociology at UC Berkeley, called it a racial question, and Edwards claimed that whether intentional or not, the slight was because Scurry “‘did not fit the wholesome all-American image they were trying to project’” (Edwards qtd. in Longman 285). In other words, the All-American image—the ideal reinforced and perpetuated through epideictic rhetoric (that is, the commemorative rhetoric of the game as articulated in sports magazines, newspapers, and television spots)—was not black. That is, because Scurry’s black and more sexually ambiguous body was located in discourses that esteemed a very different type of body, Scurry’s situated ethos was already compromised.

Consider also, that two other women’s players, Linda Medalen of Norway and Sissi of Brazil had both removed their jerseys in the same tournament, albeit in less important moments, with considerably less attention. Was it simply because they were not American, and did not do it in the same type of moment that Chastain did? Or was it partly because their bodies did not
display such normative femininity and thus their sexual orientation was more questionable? Sissi sported a shaved head—which she claims is in honor of the famous men’s soccer player Ronaldo—hardly in keeping with the World Cup ponytail. Medalen had come out as a lesbian in a Norwegian magazine shortly before the World Cup, and though it is unclear what the American team and media knew about her sexual orientation, when discussing Medalen’s goal celebration, then U.S. coach Tony DiCicco called her a “hard-looking woman” and noted she had something flapping under her sports bra that looked like a nicotine patch, suggesting his disapproval of the celebration (qtd. in Longman 225). Media coverage of Medalen’s celebration was decidedly different than that of Chastain’s. A *Sports Illustrated* writer detailed it in this way:

> It wasn’t exactly what soccer fans had in mind when they talked about more exposure for women: After Linda Medalen scored a goal in Norway’s 7-1 rout of Canada, she lifted her shirt over her head. ‘That’s because the men do it,’ said Medalen, whose goal moved her into a tie for top career scorer in Women’s World Cup play. ‘I was joking to the team that only men do it. Of course, I’m crazy enough I had to do it.’ Fortunately for television censors, Medalen was wearing a sports bra. But her celebration was the highlight of Wednesday’s lopsided game which the defending champions controlled from the kickoff with a precision attack against an inferior opponent to become the first team to qualify for the Women’s World Cup quarterfinals. (“What a Rout!”)

Because Chastain’s celebration was for the deciding goal of the World Cup, it unquestionably garnered more attention than Medalen and Sissi’s respective goal celebrations. Nevertheless, it would be remiss to ignore the elements of race, class, sexual orientation, and aesthetic appeal that Chastain possessed. Chastain’s identity as a white, middle-class, heterosexual woman gave
her a significant advantage in terms of her ability to construct ethos. Many of the cultural values that her physical body represented and that her bodily actions reinforced were already rewarded by society and perpetuated through dominant cultural narratives, allowing Chastain’s performance of ethos to work epideictically. That is, Chastain’s racial, class, and gendered identity markers already mirror the dominant culture’s values, making Chastain’s performances of ethos more appealing to the public, and Chastain’s reinforcement of these values only further inscribes them in cultural memory.

A Fitting Response for a Final

When analyzing Chastain’s performance of ethos in her goal celebration, it is also necessary to account for the specific situation and the material conditions that influenced her performance of ethos. Rhetoric scholar Gerald Hyde describes ethos as a dwelling place where the audience is moved into a relationship with the speaker, but this ability to “move” the audience is located within the speaker’s sphere of influence (xiii). That is, Hyde suggests that it is up to the speaker to create the conditions of discourse, or a particular environment, that will allow the audience to participate in the communicative exchange. However, this understanding does not account for the ways in which the physical and material conditions in which ethos is performed might also influence the audience or the speaker. For example, the structure of many sporting arenas already works to gather and move an audience into a particular location, and focuses their attention on a specific individual or group of individuals. In certain sports, therefore, the athlete may have to do very little in order to move the audience: they are already gathered into a position and an environment in which they can participate in the communicative exchange.
On the other hand, though, the structure of modern sporting arenas, with their scaffolded seating and central focus automatically position the athlete as the object of attention, constantly under surveillance. For example, the most privileged seats in many stadiums—that is, the seats that are most expensive or that are reserved for esteemed individuals—are either the seats closest to the athletes, or those from which one can most easily scrutinize their every movement, or the seats that are furthest from the athletes and other audience members. Up in the private boxes, these audience members have the ultimate position of surveillance: they can see everyone and everything, but almost no one can see them. New technological advances, such as enormous television screens, multiple camera angles, and on-field microphones, allow viewers (whether in person or via television) increased access and increased surveillance over elements of the game that were once capable of being concealed. For example, an athlete’s frustrated utterance, once unheard to most, if not all, of the audience, can now be picked up by large microphones and broadcast. Thus while modern sporting arenas effectively work to create a ready audience for the athlete or performer, their structure also automatically positions the athlete as an object, creating a rhetorical situation in which the athlete must demonstrate her agency and authority.

In this way, the structure of the sporting arena and the system of surveillance that this structure fosters may condition the athlete to respond in a particular way. That is, the constant attention on the athlete and the athlete’s body (by the athlete herself, coaches and training staff, and audience viewers) emphasizes a sense of individuality and creates the desire to be seen. Chastain scored the winning penalty kick in a tension-packed World Cup final played in front of a record-setting audience of almost 94,000 people, the largest crowd to ever watch a women’s sporting event. It was the most important moment of her career thus far, and her successful penalty kick not only ensured the win, it ensured Chastain some security in her place on the
team. Because it was such a pivotal moment in the game, the audience expected something spectacular, their collective attention riveted, after 120 minutes, on a single player and a split second. And Chastain’s penalty shot was, in fact, spectacular—a hard driven shot with very little spin that was tucked into the very right corner of the goal—a shot that would have been almost impossible to stop even if the Chinese goalkeeper knew where Chastain was going to shoot. And it was taken with her opposite (left) foot, a display of skill and confidence rarely seen in even the world’s best soccer players. This performance of ethos—that is, the display of soccer skill that Chastain demonstrated through her successful penalty shot—demanded an equally spectacular response, so it makes sense that Chastain’s celebration—like her winning shot—was unprecedented.

It also makes sense that since Chastain had developed her ethos in part through the display of her body, she once again chooses to display her body in her next performance of ethos, her jersey-removing goal celebration. The difference though, is that by exposing her body in that particular way, Chastain reappropriates a typically male celebration, effectively suggesting that her athletic performance, and the performance of the team as a whole, were on par with any performance of a men’s soccer team. Her celebration also situates her as a professional and immediately recognizable player, one who is just as dynamic and audience-engaging as a male player.

In this way, Chastain’s celebration can be seen as a form of embodied epideictic rhetoric. Cynthia Sheard argues epideictic “moves its audience toward a process of critical reflection that goes beyond evaluation toward envisioning and actualizing alternative realities” (787), and because Chastain’s celebration was so unprecedented it both prompted critical reflection on the status of women’s sports and the perception of feminism in the public sphere while it also
enacted an alternative reality, one in which a woman could be seen as strong, athletic, and just as skilled as her male counterparts and where a woman’s sporting event could draw just as many, if not more, fans. In addition, Sheard explains that epideictic not only “participates in reality at critical moments in time but that it interprets and represents one reality for the purpose of positing and inspiring a new one,” effectively situating epideictic as reciprocal, because “such discourse both responds to and creates ‘opportune’ and ‘critical’ moments in time (kairos) that warrant critical attention and corrective action” (790). In this way, Chastain’s celebration can be read as a particular modality of action that may lead to political action: Chastain’s resistance of the social norms that dictated a woman’s response to her own athletic success allows her to later question other social norms that emphasize women’s difference from men (discussed in more detail later in the chapter).

Chastain’s celebration also aptly illustrates the reciprocal nature of epideictic: her celebration responds to a critical moment, the culmination of the World Cup; it interprets and represents reality, the changing status of women’s bodies and women’s sports in the public sphere; and it creates a moment for critical reflection, what would the girls in the stands, faces painted red, white, and blue, think about their opportunities to play sports professionally? Would the soccer federation now see women’s soccer as worthy of funding? Would Nike, McDonalds, and Coca-Cola see female athletes as spokespeople for their brand? Would men be able to look at the (partially) exposed body of a female athlete and see an athlete, or would they still see only a sexualized female body?

In fact, Chastain and the women’s national team as a whole deliberately attempted to shape the public perception of the team. They promoted the World Cup tournament themselves, appearing at youth soccer games, camps, and clinics, and at sporting goods stores and schools,
where they signed autographs and passed out bumper stickers (Longman 29-31). By making public appearances at small, grassroots events and signing autographs for hours on end, the team effectively “displayed honorable deeds,” as Gerald Hauser says about epideictic rhetoric, “ask[ing] [their] audience to witness what appears before it” (15). This utilization of epideictic rhetoric and ethos—the players relied on their own credibility and character along with their display of good deeds—suggests at least an implicit understanding of the relationship between the players’ ethos and the public reception of the team. As was mentioned above, Dorrance, who served as the national team coach for the team’s first World Cup, and who coached many of the players collegiately at the University of North Carolina, had stressed that the team promote themselves. But it was not just self-promotion, or promotion of the tournament that players were after. Julie Foudy, for example, claims that the team understood the magnitude of the event for all women and girls in sport. In discussing the way that opportunities in sports have allowed girls to go from dreaming about playing in the Olympics and World Championships to asserting that they would play, Foudy asserts, “for girls today, this dream has become a reality because those before them have done it. That cultural shift was not lost on our World Cup team; we understood that this World Cup was about more than soccer” (qtd. in Heywood and Dworkin viii).

For example, Burton Nelson suggests the World Cup team took deliberate—though perhaps nontraditional—political action. As Burton Nelson explains about the team, “they call it [being] role models. It’s really radical what they are doing, changing opinions of women. I think female athletes are in the forefront of the feminist movement, although almost none of them use the word” (qtd. in Longman 21). According to Foudy, even the somewhat risqué constructions of the team, such as their ongoing tirade with David Letterman, were meant as critique. Foudy argues that for the post-Title IX generation of female athletes, images of femininity, such as the
one of the team posed “Rockette-style” in *Late Night* shirts and soccer cleats and nothing else, “can be used ironically, as parody and camp” and that it was this very “irreverence to traditional feminine poses” that attracted fans (qtd. in Heywood and Dworkin ix). For the women’s World Cup team, behaviors not typically associated with women’s agency, such as these ironically sexualized poses or grassroots publicity efforts and participation in youth clinics serve as modalities of action that had a specific political effect—providing more opportunities for women and girls to participate in athletics and drawing more attention to women’s athletics and the variety of ways in which women may experience their bodies.

In addition to the team’s efforts to build ethos prior to the World Cup, Chastain also seems cognizant of the kairotic nature of her celebration and its potential to play a pivotal role in how female athletes were perceived by the general public. When reporters asked about her jersey removal, Chastain called it “‘a moment of temporary insanity. I just thought, “My God, that’s the greatest moment of my life in soccer. I just lost control, I guess’” (qtd. in Longman 279). Upon further reflection she would add, “‘We had been carrying the weight of World Cup on our shoulders, and this was a release of that weight,’” and no doubt also an unburdening of her own lackluster performance in earlier World Cup matches (qtd. in Longman 279). Chastain’s characterization of the celebration as “temporary insanity” is a bit curious, however, especially given her earlier outspokenness about the team’s combination of athletic and aesthetic appeal. By calling the celebration a moment of “temporary insanity,” Chastain suggests that she lost control of her mental faculty or that her actions were foolish and inappropriate. In effect, Chastain implies both that her actions were not planned—they were simply the result of a momentary lapse in judgment—and also that they may have left the wrong impression with her audience. In this way, Chastain’s recollection of the celebration might be read as an *apologia*, or a
deliberative attempt to acknowledge wrongdoing in order to reconcile oneself with the audience. If read as apologia, Chastain’s explanation illustrates a sophisticated performance of ethos. She anticipated the possible criticism of her celebration and was able to deflect that criticism by situating her celebratory moment as somehow out of her control. Chastain’s response demonstrates both her rhetorical suaveness and her efforts to build ethos, even when those efforts seem to denounce earlier attempts at building ethos.

**A Woman, Celebrating Like a Man**

Chastain’s goal celebration also illustrates the ways in which deliberate training and the care of the self can lead to different ways of inventing the self and developing the subject. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how an athlete’s ability to physically shape the body can be seen as a process of invention that has a rhetorical effect in the minds of the audience. In this understanding, the audience recognizes the form of the human body and comes to draw meaning from it, creating multiple moments of invention: that of the athlete inventing the body, and that of the audience inventing meaning from that body. What is key in this understanding, however, is that it is precisely the athlete’s deliberate training—the process of subjecting oneself to disciplinary practices—that then allows this transformation and invention to take place. Thus, I want to suggest that Chastain’s goal celebration, though unplanned, was a trained response. In addition, it is important to note that though Chastain’s goal celebration was unprecedented for a woman\(^\text{34}\), countless men had, and still do, remove jerseys in goal celebrations\(^\text{35}\). In performing a

\(^{34}\) Although Medalen and Sissi had both raised their jerseys and revealed sports bras in goal celebrations in the same tournament, neither had completely removed her jersey.

\(^{35}\) Following a 2004 rule change, referees are now directed to award a player a yellow card if a player removes a jersey as part of a goal celebration, even if the jersey is simply lifted over the head and not completely removed. It is still considered a violation if the player has an undershirt on, even if the undershirt is a replica of the official jersey. Despite the rule change, notable men’s soccer players Mario Balotelli of Italy (vs. Germany in Euro Cup 2012), Andres Iniesta of Spain
goal celebration typically only done by men, Chastain reappropriates male behavior, but importantly, this reappropriation can be read as a trained response cultivated through years of playing with and against men.

As a kid, Chastain played on a boy’s flag football team through the sixth grade and played on a boy’s soccer team in junior high school (no girl’s team existed). The U.S. national team also routinely scrimmages with the men’s Under-19 and Under-17 national teams, and Chastain also practiced with her stepson’s high school and club teams when not working out with the national team. Chastain even advocates for the benefit—in terms of both soccer development and social effects—of girls playing with boys: In her book, which is directed at youth soccer players and their parents, Chastain argues that mixing boys and girls on the same team, within limits, can be a positive experience for both girls and boys. While she cautions that after around age 13 differences in physical strength and size might make the experience “risky,” according to Chastain, girls “can gain great skills as players, and there is some social status to be ranked alongside the boys” and “it is a great learning opportunity for boys to share the field with girls, especially in a social context—that is, interaction with teammates, team-first concepts, and communication skills” (167-168). In this explanation, Chastain assumes that it is simply playing with boys that will allow girls to gain “great skills,” with no mention of the need for correct coaching, while the boys gain only social benefits, not physical or soccer-related skills, from playing with girls. Although Chastain incorporates teammate Cindy Parlow’s assertion that “to the extent that guys are faster and stronger, you’ve got to play a little smarter, find ways to make

(vs. Holland in the 2010 World Cup final), and Diego Forlan of Uruguay all removed jerseys in goal celebrations. Prior to the rule change, Forlan infamously celebrated a goal by removing his jersey and then could not get the jersey back on, playing several minutes shirtless before finally getting things sorted out. Forlan is so well known for his jersey removing goal celebrations that the cover of his biography, *Uruguayo*, features Forlan shirtless, jersey in hand.
quicker and cleaner touches,” as an example of how playing with boys might improve a girl’s soccer skills, she offers no specific example of the benefits boys might get from playing with girls (167). However, also in this explanation, Chastain notes the differences in social status between boys and girls and the potential for improving one’s public credibility by playing with boys (or men). In this way, her goal celebration might be read as a performance of ethos specifically meant to gain social status because of its alignment with men’s sports and men’s behavior. Chastain’s celebration—the act of removing one’s jersey after scoring a goal—was already a recognizable and even acclaimed response in men’s soccer (discussed in more detail later in the chapter), and by performing this typically male celebration, Chastain relies on the previous (male) celebrations and the response they received from the public. In this way, Chastain draws from cultural memory that valued such a celebration and associated that bodily action with values like passion, strength, and athletic dominance in order to suggest that she also possessed such virtues and that her athleticism should be just as admired as those of other (male) players.

Chastain’s reappropriation of a typically male goal celebration can be read as a direct challenge to the characterization of the women’s team as girls. The conceptualization of the team as girls rather than women minimizes the professionalism of the team and their commitment to the sport. By performing a typically male celebration, Chastain implies that her level of play and her dedication to the sport is on par with that of male players. In effect, by performing this typically male celebration, Chastain suggests that her goal—and that particular moment in World Cup play—is no less spectacular, no less monumental, and no less skilled than that of any man’s. The specific bodily movements and behaviors involved in Chastain’s goal celebration thus are important not just for the meaning it signifies to Chastain herself, but also for the effect that such
bodily movements and behaviors have in developing the subject, in this case, of situating Chastain as capable of resisting social norms that validate men’s athletic performance over women’s. In this way, bodily movements and behaviors can be read as modalities of political action, even when the meaning of such movements or behaviors is not fixed in advance.

In addition, Chastain’s goal celebration also challenges the framing of the team as girls because her expression and body position (at least in the iconic image of her celebration) suggest strength and athleticism, and hers is clearly a woman’s—not a girl’s—body. Her obvious and defined musculature, plus the presence of the black sports bra signal a more mature body than those of the seemingly pre-pubescent gymnasts and figure skaters. With her prominent biceps and abdominals, it is obvious that Chastain has deliberately shaped and cared for her body: through athletic training, she has mastered it, and she has utilized it effectively. Her stance and body position suggest Chastain is in control not only of her body, but of this moment in history, of her role on the team (which was in flux), of her status as an elite player, and of the public perception of female athletes. Unlike the girl next door who is called home once the sun goes down, Chastain’s bodily movements suggest she will not be beckoned anywhere.

**Inventing the Self: Inhabiting and Subverting Social Norms**

Chastain’s goal celebration can be seen as a process of inventing the self and creating alternative realities both in the kairotic moment of her celebration, and also for the opportunities it provided her following the World Cup. That is, while her initial goal celebration might be read as a distinct performance of ethos that was influenced by the context and situation of that particular moment, it also would become part of Chastain’s situated ethos in subsequent performances of ethos. In this way, one’s situated ethos is constantly in development, meaning that previous attempts at building ethos come to bear on subsequent performances of ethos.
After the World Cup, Chastain used the iconic moment of her celebration as a platform to launch her book, humorously titled, *It’s Not About the Bra: How to Play Hard, Play Fair, and Put the Fun Back into Competitive Sports*. Despite its title, the book’s cover image is of Chastain’s celebration, and she opens the book by describing the penalty kick and her celebration. Though Chastain’s focus in the book is on sportsmanship and equal opportunity for girls and women in sports, she employs the penalty kick celebration as a demonstration of her ethos and her expertise on the subject. From there Chastain is able to address youth players and their parents about balancing competitive playing with teamwork and the importance of women’s sports for youth.

Chastain’s book serves as an example of the ways in which agency might be developed through both inhabiting and subverting social norms, which may occur simultaneously. In contrast to much of the current feminist sports studies scholarship that focuses on how women might use the care of the self and dedicated athletic training to subvert social norms (for example, Gwen Chapman, David Johns and Jennifer Johns, and Jennifer Wesley, among others), I want to put this scholarship in conversation with discussions within feminist theory and rhetorical scholarship to suggest that instead of reading certain actions and behaviors as efforts to resist dominant systems of power, these actions must also be understood as reinscribing alternative forms of power. That is, efforts to “subvert” social norms are still located within systems of power, and resistance to these norms does not allow an individual to escape power.

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36 *Sportsmanship* refers to the expectation that one will adhere to the rules of competition and participates in competition with respect to one’s competitors (for example, refraining from gloating over a win or ridiculing an opponent). It also esteems certain mannerisms and behaviors, such as shaking an opponent’s hand before or after competition, and respecting the authority of officials or umpires. Such expectations assume that the sporting event will be conducted fairly and that sport will be enjoyed for its own sake, ignoring the possibility that, for example, a referee may be biased against an individual, or that a participant may depend on a successful outcome in order to make a living.
relations, it just means that the individual participates in a slightly different form of power. Instead, I want to focus on the ways in which individuals embody social norms, and how these practices might make possible certain modes of being. In this way, agency does not just exist in one’s resistance to or subversion of social norms, but might also arise from the ways in which one inhabits those norms.

For example, Chastain’s book in some ways emphasizes the ways in which Chastain embodies an acceptable social position for women, but in other moments, it serves as an effort to subtly shift what might constitute that acceptable social position. She alludes to the moment that made her most recognizable through the book’s title and cover image, which as I mentioned earlier in the chapter, demonstrate her normative heterosexuality, but she then moves away from talking about herself and her special moment in order to talk about other concerns. Chastain could easily have written this book as an autobiography, which would have contributed to her ethos in different ways, but instead she redirects her ethos, emphasizing teamwork and sportsmanship instead of her own experience. In addition, while Chastain opens the book with the penalty kick moment, she avoids talking about the public display of her body (both in the goal celebration and in the Gear photo shoot and Nike ads) until much later in the book. In fact, she seems to attempt to distance herself from that moment throughout the book, as if she is trying to reframe and remodel that moment. For example, after describing the penalty kick and celebration Chastain says, “it was just a moment, a celebration …. it was obviously a wonderful moment, but I do wish more attention could be paid to the many other things my team and I have done …. Even before the World Cup, this team, and this game, deserved more attention, especially in the United States, where too often women and soccer both are treated as second class” (xiv-xv). In some ways the book can be seen as an effort to reshape her public image and
refocus her ethos on her playing ability and her status as a spokesperson for women’s athletics instead of the previous focus on the display of her body and her identity as a sex symbol. She capitalizes on the celebratory moment because it has likely granted her the most ethos, the most recognition in the public eye, but at the same time she tries to move away from the focus on the celebration and to reshape it as a moment in women’s sports that has changed society for the better.

Indeed, there is a definite tension in Chastain’s book and her performances of ethos more generally between acknowledging and approving of her own use of normative femininity and sexuality to develop ethos and her claims that women’s sports and athletics should not just be about aesthetic appeal. That is, Chastain seems to rely on the fact that her white, heterosexual body inhabits certain social norms, while at the same time she also attempts to resist those social norms. In her book, Chastain claims she was “irritated” when FIFA president Sepp Blatter recommended in January 2004 that women soccer players play in “more feminine clothes like they do in volleyball. They could, for example, have tighter shorts … to create a more female aesthetic” (Christenson and Kelso). Chastain claims she was upset because Blatter’s comments implied “that it’s necessary to add sex to sell our game, and to promote interest, as opposed to selling the game based on the fact that we’re good at it” (172). However, leading up to the World Cup in 1999, Chastain and her teammates did add sex to sell the game, capitalizing on the media’s attention to their fit, attractive, and mostly-white bodies. In this way, Chastain and her teammates represent the paradoxical subject-object described by Heywood and Dworkin: they are both subjects that purposely market their image and ethos, and yet they are commodified as objects whose image is consumed by the public.
In addition, Chastain admits that when Blatter’s comments were made public, her name was tied to them because of her goal celebration, Nike ad, and Gear photo shoot. She defends her own attempts to make soccer sexy by explaining that the Gear photo shoot was “pitched to me as a pre-World Cup promotion, so I was caught off guard when I realized that they intended for me to pose nude with a soccer ball,” and that the photo shoot “turned out to be a great experience. Nothing critical was revealed, and the photo was tame enough that it was shown on the Today show … from that photo shoot, I came to understand that this is who I am, and this is what I’m working with, as the expression goes, and I’m comfortable with myself” (173-174). Yet Chastain’s statements about the Gear photos seem to stand at odds with her “irritation” over Blatter’s comments. It appears as though Chastain wants to be able to construct her ethos by displaying her body, but does not want others to be forced to do so, or does not want others to expect her to construct her ethos only by displaying her body. This tension actually reflects a tension within feminist studies between the objectification model and a woman’s ability to capitalize on her own sexuality. On the one hand, Chastain opposes wearing the tighter, shorter uniform shorts Blatter suggests because such a choice would objectify her body and reinforce gendered stereotypes that see women’s sexuality as at odds with their athleticism. At the same time, however, Chastain’s defense of her Gear magazine shoot also reflects her understanding of her own body as a tool that can be used to gain publicity for her sport. It also illustrates Chastain’s assumptions that she is the agent of her own image. That is, Chastain suggests that her ethos and her performance of ethos can and should be changeable, and that Chastain can control it. Like her ability to train and change her body, Chastain expects to be able to change and shape her ethos, but because ethos is negotiated between audience and rhetor, Chastain’s ethos is partly shaped by the cultural narratives and epideictic rhetoric that reinforces an aesthetic ideal based
on the model of the young, attractive, thin, white woman, which Chastain happens to reflect. Therefore, while Chastain may not experience herself as objectified in images like those of her *Gear* magazine spread, their proliferation in public discourse continues to reify gender norms that highlights women’s sexuality instead of their athleticism, further entrenching sport’s insistence on an ontological distinction based on sex.

In addition, the book also functions as a form of epideictic rhetoric with a specific social and political message, which might be read as an effort to resist social norms that position female athletes in a subordinate position to their male counterparts. At the same time, its celebratory nod to the World Cup championship softens the directives Chastain outlines for women’s athletics. For example, Chastain frankly states:

> It’s important that both boys and girls see women play soccer. Most walk away from that experience understanding that there are great women athletes, and that knowledge translates to other aspects of life. My objective is to break down some of the social barriers that kept my mother and her generation from the full experience of athletics and, to a degree, even limited me. I want girls to have all the physical, emotional, and social benefits that I see boys enjoying, and to take that into the rest of their lives. (171)

This direct statement of her objective illustrates Chastain’s attempts to transform culture through her book. It also illustrates the ways in which Chastain is able to use her own ethos as a now famous women’s soccer player to advocate for greater opportunities for female athletes, using the specific bodily practices of her athletic training and her goal celebration in particular as modalities of action that allow her to then attempt to influence political change.
Elsewhere in the book, Chastain even outlines her deliberate attempts to “correct” social expectations for women and girls. In discussing her coaching methods, Chastain admits that she treats boys and girls differently:

It should be equal. But it’s not. When I coach, I feel the need for a “necessary corrective,” because society has lowered the bar for girls when it comes to sports. I think I’m harder on the girls than on the boys; I feel that if I’m not, they may not get the fullest possible sports experience. The expectations for them may be lower, and in turn, they may expect less from themselves. (170)

In this example, Chastain speaks to a specific problem in society, using epideictic to argue for the “establishment, reconfirmation, or revision of general values and beliefs,” to use Jeffrey Walker’s definition of epideictic, such as the limited expectations about girls’ athletic ability.

Chastain’s book can also be seen as an example of epideictic rhetoric because of its attention to kairos, a characteristic of epideictic emphasized by both Sheard and Walker. The book capitalizes on a specific moment—Chastain’s goal celebration—in order to address other issues, such as problems with poor sportsmanship at all levels of soccer and sports in general, and the limited opportunities for women in sports. Walker explains that epideictic is able to recognize and respond to the kairotic exigence of a situation, such as Chastain’s celebration, in order to address recurring problems in society (7-8). Sheard argues that epideictic not only responds to situations, but also can potentially create situations, in part by “instilling a sense of responsibility for and possibility of change for the better” (786). In this way, the goal celebration can be seen as a kairotic exigence, a specific rhetorical situation that then allows Chastain to create a new situation and exigence, the need to correct the differences in how boys and girls are coached, which then has consequences for women and girls’ social and political lives.
Chastain’s performances of ethos before, during, and after the 1999 World Cup demonstrate that ethos is developed over time and can be shaped by the individual as well as the situation. Chastain’s ability to transform and develop her body through dedicated athletic training and repeated bodily habits also illustrates the importance of the malleability of the body and how one’s agency in shaping and re-inventing the physical body and bodily movements and behaviors also affects one’s ability to develop the self and shape one’s subjectivity. Importantly though, the malleability of the body and the ability to change and develop one’s physical body do not merely symbolize a particular interior self, but rather its potential. Repeated bodily actions do not just signify one’s ethos, but actually work to constitute the individual. In this way, bodily habits such as the repeated movements of an athlete in training actually have the capacity to change a person’s character. What this means is that disciplinary practices such as the care of the self and dedicated athletic training are not so much about the social impositions placed on the subject but on the work that these practices do in shaping the individual. That is, I argue that in contrast to much feminist sports studies scholarship (such as the work of Chapman, Johns and Johns, and Wesely, among others) that emphasizes the care of the self as either enabling resistance to or reinforcing social norms, scholars must consider how these practices enable an embodied subjectivity.

Chastain’s performances of ethos also illustrate the ways in which race, class, gender, and the body are involved in developing ethos and the connections between a female athlete’s ability to shape and transform her body and her ability to shape and transform her ethos. Attention to the intersections between race, class, gender, and the body and how they influenced Chastain’s situated ethos extends current rhetorical scholarship on the body to include a consideration of the role the body plays in the making of the self, and in particular, a conceptualization in which
outward bodily actions are understood as both the potential for transforming and developing the self and the means through which such transformation may take place. A consideration of the ways in which race, class, gender, and the body influenced Chastain’s situated ethos also addresses a need identified by rhetorical scholars such as Jacqueline Jones Royster and Coretta Pittman to consider the particular lived experiences of individuals when developing ethos and the cultural narratives that might already influence how that ethos is perceived.

This analysis also complicates a tension within feminist scholarship between a traditional feminist objectification model and current body commodification culture. While the objectification critique is concerned with the display of the female body as overly sexualized and as confirming heteronormativity, contemporary female athletes who have always experienced the benefits of Title IX often do not experience their bodies as manipulated or powerless, but believe they are the authors of their own bodies and images. One’s physical appearance is something that male and female athletes may utilize for their own agendas, evident in the way that Chastain and the 1999 U.S. women’s World Cup team also used their physical appearance as a marketing asset. However, because ethos is always co-created, no one is completely self-created, and the contemporary female athlete demonstrates the complicated blurring of subject and object that occurs through elite athletic training. On the one hand, the elite athlete, through intense athletic training, learns to develop and shape the body, inventing and reinventing his or her subjectivity. On the other hand, that same athlete markets herself as an object to be consumed, an entertainer whose body and bodily performance is sold as a product. This is the paradox of the elite athlete, but in many ways, this is also the paradox of the contemporary subject. Our current American commodification culture complicates the distinction between subject and object, and an understanding of how ethos is performed and embodied through the care of the self helps
illustrate this problem, and in turn, helps feminist scholars address body commodification culture more adequately.

Finally, Chastain’s performance of ethos highlights the bodily and kairotic nature of ethos and the importance of ethos and epideictic in creating situations for future action. For example, Chastain deploys narratives that draw attention to her adherence to a dominant, white, aesthetic ideal in order to eventually question some of the assumptions about gender difference in sport. Through her book, which uses her famous goal celebration as a launching point, Chastain argues for girls and boys to play soccer together, rather than on different teams, and forwards the idea of using sport to change gendered expectations about women and girls’ athletic ability. In this understanding, certain bodily movements or behaviors, such as Chastain’s goal celebration, can be read as modalities of action that might provide the potential for individuals to gain agency or take political action.

Importantly, however, Chastain’s ability to build and perform ethos was bolstered by the dominant cultural narratives that already esteemed her identity as a white, middle-class woman, and her performances of ethos in turn continued to perpetuate those values. In the next two chapters, I examine the performances of ethos of Serena Williams and Michelle Wie, respectively, two women whose racial backgrounds and class status differ from Chastain’s, in order to more fully discuss how gender, race, class, and the body intersect and influence one’s situated ethos. Such an analysis responds to the problems Royster and Pittman respectively note about scholars’ current understanding of ethos, furthering the discussion I have started in this chapter. As will become clear in the next two chapters, the dominant cultural narratives in circulation through epideictic rhetoric influenced the ways in which Williams and Wie were able
to build and perform ethos, extending current discussions of situated ethos to consider how ethos works epideictically and how epideictic rhetoric influences one’s ability to construct ethos.
Chapter 4: Training “Killer Instincts”: Serena Williams’ Deviant Black Ethos

*I understand that I’m in the entertainment business. I compete at the highest levels of my sport. I know the only reason there’s all that prize money and endorsement money is because people buy tickets to watch. I get that. But I also get that I do what I do for me.—Serena Williams* \(^{37}\)

At the 2004 U.S. Open Serena Williams took the court for her highly anticipated quarterfinal match against Jennifer Capriati in unusual tennis apparel: a studded, cropped black tank top, a denim skirt, and black sneakers that combined with removable gaiters to give the appearance of knee-high boots. The cropped tank top revealed her sculpted abs and a glittering navel piercing along with well-defined shoulders and biceps, and the short denim skirt highlighted her strong, muscular legs. The match, and Williams’ penchant for the dramatic, lived up to the hype. In the first game of the third set, with the match tied at one set each, and the game at deuce (meaning that in tennis’ win-by-two rules, the score was tied and whoever won the ensuing point would then serve for the game), Williams hit a backhand down the line, which the lines official correctly called in. The head official, however, overruled the decision, giving the point to Capriati. Williams, thinking the ball was in, as the lines judge had ruled, was already on her way back to serve. Stunned, Williams asked the head official, Mariana Alves of Portugal, “What happened? That’s my point. That ball was in. It’s my advantage” (Fendrich, “Capriati”). According to *USA Today*’s Howard Fendrich, when the call was not changed, Williams then approached Alves, saying, “No, no, no, no, no. That was my point! What are you talking about? What’s going on? Excuse me? That ball was so in. What the heck is this?” (“Capriati”). Williams continued to protest—a move frowned upon in tennis etiquette—while pointing to the place on

\(^{37}\) From her autobiography, *On the Line*, page 76.
the court where the ball had landed, exclaiming, “The ball landed here. That ball was not out. Are you kidding me? I’m trying to tell you: The ball was not out. Do I need to speak another language?” (“Capriati”). Alves simply implored Williams to “calm down,” and the match continued, with Capriati serving for the game. There were other questionable calls in the match, all in Capriati’s favor, and she went on to win the match.

While most of the media sympathized with Williams after the match, especially since television replays showed that the umpire’s over-ruling had been a mistake, this outburst would eventually be linked to several others, with one reporter claiming Williams’ most recent 2011 U.S. Open tirade was “seven years in the making” (Abad-Santos). In the predominantly white tennis world, Williams’ unexpected behavior, along with her attention-attracting physique, certainly stand out. Tennis analysts love to point out Williams’ “imposing height” even though Capriati, at 6’2” is much taller than Williams, who is listed at 5’9”, and have not shied away from discussing Williams’ body. For example, during a 2007 Wimbledon match, John McEnroe commented on “how much less of her there is,” referring to the weight Williams had gained while recovering from an injury and recently lost, and when Williams needed medical attention for a calf cramp in the game, he speculated that the injury was related to her lack of fitness (Dominus). And after her disappointing finish at the 2006 Australian Open, The Telegraph’s Matthew Norman opined, “Generally, I’m all for chunky sports stars …. But tennis requires a mobility Serena cannot hope to achieve while lugging around breasts that are registered to vote in a different U.S. state from the rest of her” (Norman). This commentary not only portrays Williams as hypersexualized, but also suggests a kind of freakish, subhuman—or superhuman—body. Serena Williams, despite being one of the best tennis players in the history of the sport, and the highest earning female athlete in any sport, is just as well known for the shape and size
of her body. Williams may well be the twenty-first century version of the Venus Hottentot\textsuperscript{38}, and athletics provides her with one of the most prominent stages. Like the Venus Hottentot, Williams’ body is often on display, both through her athletic exploits, which sometimes receive even more attention due to her unconventional choices in tennis uniforms, and through media representations. However, while Williams has spoken out about the disproportionate attention to her body—she claims tennis critics focus more on her physical strength and speed rather than the strategy or mental aspect of her game—it appears that Williams also capitalizes on her curvaceous figure (\textit{The Blacklist}). Williams’ tennis outfits and accessories often draw additional attention to her body, and their atypical-for-tennis design, along with Williams’ bodily movements and behaviors all contribute to the ways in which Williams builds and constructs ethos. It is clear that while Williams wants to be known for more than her body, she uses her body in very strategic ways to construct her ethos. Like the Venus Hottentot, whose role in her own performances researchers have questioned\textsuperscript{39}, the ways that Williams and other female athletes perform ethos is more complicated than scholars acknowledge in current understandings of ethos.

\textsuperscript{38} Janell Hobson also offers this pairing in her essay “The ‘Batty’ Politic: Toward an Aesthetic of the Black Female Body,” noting in particular that the attention to Serena Williams’ buttocks is similar to the fascination over those of the Venus Hottentot. Saartje Baartman, the Venus Hottentot, was a Khoisan South African woman brought to London in 1810 to put on public performances, in which she often simply stood nude, awaiting examination by an incredulous public. According to Hobson, while much of the specifics of Baartman’s life are largely unclear to historians, her colonized body, namely, her buttocks and genitalia, “served as an important symbol of racial difference in her exhibition in London and in French sideshows, and in her later dissection by French anatomists” (90).

\textsuperscript{39} For example, Anne Fausto-Sterling notes that scholars know very little about Baartman, and that what is known is often contradictory: some claim Baartman was a form of indentured servant, while other research suggests she performed of her own will (28-29). In addition, as an exotic “savage” Baartman escaped some of the cultural constraints placed on women: she drank spirits and chewed tobacco, habits that were taboo for European women at the time (32).
The example of Williams’ 2004 match against Capriati demonstrates the ways in which gender, race, class, and the body influence performances of ethos. As a black woman in a predominantly white sport, Williams’ performances of ethos were shaped by her physical body and her bodily movements, along with dominant cultural narratives about race and black athletic achievement. Williams’ blackness means her behaviors and actions are always-already read as deviant, even when such behaviors did not differ from those of other (white) players. As will become clear in the rest of this chapter, these existing discourses influenced Williams’ performances of ethos in ways that were very different from the ways that cultural narratives perpetuated and reinforced soccer player Brandi Chastain’s construction of ethos. However, Williams utilizes these gendered and racialized narratives for her own purposes, using them as a modality of action that allows her to build intimidation in the eyes of her opponents. In addition, her resistance to the social norms of tennis—seen in her unconventional tennis attire and her unorthodox behavior during matches—demonstrates the variety of ways in which women may develop agency. For example, the repeated bodily movements and behaviors that Williams employs through her athletic training, like those of Brandi Chastain, are trained habits that then influence her sense of self and subjectivity. In particular, Williams’ bodily training allows her to utilize the rhetorical concept of metis, or cunning intelligence, in which she employs a type of blurring between typically masculine behaviors and typically feminine behaviors, which she selects for a particular audience and context. That is, Williams’ bodily movements and habits influence her subjectivity in that she is prepared and trained to inhabit certain social norms in some contexts and to defy them in others, depending on how Williams chooses to perform ethos. In this way, Williams redeploy social norms and expectations for her own purposes, using them
as modalities of action, which suggests the possibility of agency even when such movements and behaviors are not planned in advance.

Like Chastain, Williams’ performances of ethos suggest that the process of athletic training and the care of the self may also function as processes of invention that offer the possibility of agency. By shifting the focus from how certain practices reinscribe traditional gender roles or expectations to how those practices might produce different capacities in the subject, I argue that it is precisely Williams’ subordination to the disciplinary practices of her athletic training that enables her capacity for action. However, as I will demonstrate below, Williams’ identity as a black tennis player in a predominantly white tennis community has material consequences in the movements and bodily behaviors that Williams employs and in the way these behaviors are read by her audience. In this way, my analysis speaks to scholars interested in body theory and materiality (such as Hawhee and Selzer and Crowley) and those interested in racial and gendered components of ethos (such as Royster and Pittman). In the sections that follow, I first discuss the racialized narratives circulating in popular discourses about Williams, demonstrating how both previous cultural narratives and the materiality of the body affects one’s situated ethos, and how Williams’ specifically black body is read in the context of the predominantly white tennis community. I next illustrate how Williams inhabits some of these social norms, capitalizing on racialized and gendered expectations about acceptable behavior in order to raise awareness about issues of systematic racism. Finally, I examine the ways in which Williams’ bodily training practices lead to particular habits and behaviors that then influence her sense of the self and subjectivity.

Serena and her older sister Venus Williams are two of the most well known tennis players currently competing on the professional tour. As of early 2015, Serena has won a total of
19 Grand Slam titles in singles, 13 titles in women’s doubles, and two titles in mixed doubles, the most combined titles of any player—male or female—currently competing. And with her current world number one ranking, Serena is the oldest player, at 33, to retain a number one ranking in Women’s Tennis Association history. Serena has been playing on the professional tour since 1995, and is the only women’s player to earn over $50 million in prize money. While her overwhelming and enduring success on the court is certainly enough to talk about, Serena also receives a lot of attention for her body and the ways that she chooses to display her body. In fact, tennis commentators and the media obsess over Williams’ body, often situating Williams as deviant and perhaps also defiant to the largely white, upper class, conservative tennis culture and the slender, blonde, aesthetic it often represents. For example, according to Delia Douglas, “the institutional and cultural practices of tennis have historically promoted images of a racialized femininity constitutive of a middle-class standard of white heterosexual womanhood embodied in the likes of Chris Evert, Anna Kournikova, and most recently, Maria Sharapova” (275).

When the Williams sisters started their professional careers in the mid 90s, there were very few black players on the tour, male or female, but they were not the first black tennis players on the tour or even the first black tennis players to win a major tournament. Althea Gibson won the French Open in 1956, Wimbledon in 1957 and 1958, the U.S. Open in 1957 and 1958, and was the first black player to be ranked number one in the world, and Arthur Ashe won the U.S. Open in 1968, the Australian Open in 1970, and Wimbledon in 1975. Zina Garrison and Lori McNeil held top-ten rankings in the 70s, yet the Williams sisters were treated as somewhat of an oddity in the tennis world. Venus and Serena’s notable style of play—a power-oriented game that relied on stinging serves and crushing backhands rather than clever drop shots or long rallies—and their imposing stature and physicality—Venus is 6’1” and Serena is listed
anywhere from 5’9” to 5’11” depending on the source—are not new either. Gibson utilized a similar style of play, which in the 1950s was more in keeping with the men’s game than the women’s, and stood 5’10” (Harris 48, 57). In other words, there was a precedent for powerful, successful, black female tennis players long before the Williams sisters started playing professionally, yet tennis critics seemed captivated by Venus and Serena’s bodies. In the section that follows, I discuss the ways in which previous discourses about black athleticism influenced how Williams was perceived by the tennis community, and how she subsequently capitalized on those expectations in order to construct a specifically black female athletic ethos.

**Black Superhuman (or Subhuman) Athleticism: Situated Ethos**

As I mentioned in chapter two, rhetoric scholars such as Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee, Jacqueline Jones Royster, and Coretta Pittman have argued that understandings of ethos must account for one’s situated ethos, or for how one’s social position influences one’s ethos. However, as I have already argued, because Western society still assumes that one’s personal credibility is completely self-created, without accounting for individual lived experiences, certain individuals face issues of racism, classism, or sexism that mark them as undesirable or outside of an established norm, which has consequences for how their ethos is perceived by an audience. As I will demonstrate below, the fascination with black athletes’ bodies reflected in media discourses that focus on Williams’ height and muscularity has specific material consequences manifest in Williams’ bodily behaviors and movements, which subsequently influence her subjectivity. For example, according to sport sociology scholar Nancy E. Spencer, “the most visible traces of scientific racism remain in the obsession with Black athletic bodies,” and black athletes are assumed to have an almost innate, “natural” physicality (“Sister Act” 120). Such assumptions of innate athleticism undermine individual athletes’ years of athletic training, their
learned skill in a particular sport, and their mental strategy. In addition, characterizing black athletes as “naturally” athletic or possessing “innate” physicality often leads to easy associations with animals, denying these athletes of their humanity and individuality. For example, Spencer points out Venus Williams has been referred to as “an impala” and Serena Williams has been called “feline” (“Sister Act”120-121), and Jaime Schultz notes the history of referring to black athletes as animals, listing boxer Joe Louis, who was called “a creature from the jungle,” and track standout Wilma Rudolph, who was nicknamed “the black gazelle” as examples of other athletes who were similarly framed (345). Finally, this type of scientific racism also situates black athletes as more primitive: their athletic skills are supposedly due to raw talent and not highly skilled training, and they overpower opponents rather than out-strategizing them with a more sophisticated game plan.

The Williams sisters’ bodies are also the focus of attention because of their racial background, which actually works to overemphasize their athleticism. According to Spencer, the construction of the black athlete as somehow naturally physically superior to other athletes results in a “cultural fascination” with black athletic bodies, most apparent in the popularity of Michael Jordan as “Air Jordan” in the 90s. Spencer argues that like Jordan, the Williams sisters “have been characterized in terms of their physicality since their arrival within the popular imaginary” (“Sister Act” 120). “Origin” stories about the Williams sisters emphasize their obvious athleticism, such as the famous story of tennis coach Rick Macci’s first visit to check out the sisters, in which Venus reportedly walked off the court on her hands and then did a handspring back to her feet (“Sister Act” 121, Todd 15). Discussions of the sisters’ physical prominence persist today: tennis commentators at the 2014 Wimbledon tournament emphasized
Serena’s height and power in her match against Chanelle Scheepers, even though Scheepers, listed at 5'9”, is the same height as Serena.

Their black bodies also further mark the Williams sisters as deviant and outside of the typical tennis mold. When the Williams sisters started their professional careers in 1994 (Venus) and 1995 (Serena), tennis commentators remarked not only about their atypical playing style—powerful serves and crushing backhands rather than the more common baseline rally game—but also on their atypical and somewhat signature beaded hairstyles. For example, tennis analyst Mary Carillo suggested the hair beads were “noisy and disruptive” (“Sister Act” 122), and Lindsay Davenport claimed the beads were “annoying” (qtd. in Clarey). According to Spencer, such commentary “dismisses their unique cultural hairstyles [and] serves to mark the Williams sisters as ‘Others,’ just as descriptors that focus on their physicality often obscure the intelligence and hard work needed to obtain such results” (“Sister Act”122). The insistent focus on the Williams sisters’ black bodies, and in particular, on Serena Williams’ body, work to position them as others— as both deviant and exotic, superhuman and subhuman.

Blacks studies scholars also note the importance of black women’s hair as social signifiers that evoke certain attitudes and cultural values. According to Michelle L. Filling, an Afro, a straightened and relaxed bob, or organized braids or cornrows are “markers that signify differently and range from embracing an unprocessed style synonymous with the Black Power movement, to assimilating a white standard of hair styling, to creating a style that evokes an African aesthetic” (99). Likewise, Tracey Owens Patton explains that beauty routines and hair are performative, and that for African American women in particular, hairstyling becomes part of a performance of hegemonically defined beauty as well as “a way for the marginalized to attempt to become centered in a world of beauty that tends not to value African American forms of
beauty” (123). Like the discussion of the ways in which bodily movements and material bodies themselves may come to stand for different cultural values, hair itself, and especially for black women, becomes “part of a complex sign system that … communicates competing values about blackness and beauty culture to both African American and white communities” (Filling 99). In this way, the Williams sisters’ hairstyles not only represents their Otherness from the dominant white tennis community, but also symbolizes a specifically black aesthetic, effectively emphasizing and politicizing their black bodies, and situating their blackness as an important part of their performances of ethos.

In the predominantly white tennis world, the Williams sisters stand out, to be sure. Their black skin—even by their own acknowledgement—sets them apart from other players on the tour. And although they burst on to the tennis scene in an era after African American athletes had become ubiquitous in other sports, there was not such an easy acceptance into the tennis community. Kim Sands, the former head women’s tennis coach at the University of Miami, explains that unlike the NBA or NFL, “there is no African American culture in tennis …. In tennis the color line is what separates us. Players can be from Sweden, Russia, Belgium, wherever, but they’re all white and they all gravitate toward one another …. Their color is the common denominator” (qtd. in Harris 18-19).

The color difference was especially stark at the 1997 U.S. Open, the same year that the stadium was renamed in honor of Arthur Ashe, when a match between Venus Williams and Romanian Irina Spirlea prompted a whole other discussion of racism. During a changeover—a moment in a set when the players switch sides, usually by crossing in front of the umpire—

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40 Following her stunning 1997 U.S. Open run, in which she lost in the finals to Martina Hingis, then 17-year old Venus famously said, “I’m tall. I’m black. Everything’s different about me. Just face the facts” (Price).
Williams and Spirlea collided, evidently because neither player was willing to momentarily step aside to let the other player pass. Spirlea later admitted the run-in was intentional; she did it because “she thinks she’s the fucking Venus Williams” (qtd. in Price “Venus Envy”). Richard Williams, Venus and Serena’s father, insisted the bumping incident was racially motivated, though some other players on the tour suggested it was a sentiment specific to Venus: Davenport and Monica Seles both complained that Venus did not return their friendly greetings, and Davenport asserted, “I don’t feel it’s a problem of race. I feel like she’s separated herself from us for whatever reason. … The players in the locker room love Chanda Rubin, and Zina Garrison is a good friend. Some people have tried [to be friendly towards Venus], but you can only try so much” (qtd. in Price “Venus Envy”). The Williams sisters were known for making bold predictions about their goals and future success in the sport, earning them reputations of “cockiness” or arrogance, but other players on the tour, such as Martina Hingis, also made frank statements about their ability. As Sports Illustrated writer S.L. Price has noted, “Hingis can make cocky statements at the drop of a ballpoint, yet no one minds because she does it with a grin. Women’s tennis loves to make nice” (Price “Venus Envy”). However, Hingis also has the benefit of fitting into the normative tennis mold—white, slim, attractive—women’s tennis’ very definition of “nice.”

Like Chastain and the U.S. women’s soccer team (discussed in the previous chapter), Hingis is able to capitalize on the dominant cultural narratives that associate her with the safety and comfort of the girl-next-door trope, marking her behavior as within the realm of middle class ideals of sportsmanship, and allowing Hingis’ ethos—cockiness with a grin—to be accepted by the tennis community. On the other hand, and much like the mostly black 1996 women’s Olympic basketball team, the Williams sisters face cultural narratives that position their behavior
and appearance as already outside of the dominant culture. The fact that the Williams sisters are black in a overwhelmingly white tennis world marks their behavior, as well as their appearance, as deviant, even when it does not differ from that of other players.

Black studies scholar Delia Douglas argues that because of their racial background, tennis media portrays Venus and Serena Williams quite differently than other popular players. According to Douglas, the media is unusually preoccupied with the Williams sisters’ “on-court” play and “off-court” activities, and this preoccupation “functions as a form of racialized gender marking that constitutes a form of surveillance that is used by Whites to observe, identify, and ultimately, control the range of available representations of the sisters” (“Inconspicuous” 130). In this interpretation, the criticism that Venus and Serena received from tennis commentators for having interests outside of tennis (such as fashion, interior design, and charity work) reveals an effort made by white tennis critics to influence and regulate the sisters’ behavior (“Inconspicuous” 131).

In addition, tennis analysts love to bring up the sisters’ childhood in Compton, sometimes embellishing their origin story to almost mythical proportions: some accounts suggest that the Williams family was often forced to dodge bullets during practice when gunshots were fired by gang members or had to sweep broken glass and drug paraphernalia off the courts before playing (Spencer “Sister Act” 125, Todd 15). The Williams sisters’ time in Compton is continually emphasized although the Williams family moved to Florida when Serena was nine and Venus was 10 in order for them to further their tennis careers. In addition, prior to moving to Compton, the Williams family lived in Long Beach, a significantly more affluent area (at the time) than Compton, though this is often left out of their story. The continued reference to the sisters’ childhood in Compton—an area commonly described as dangerous, poor, and gang-riddled—
rather than, for example, their time in Florida, effectively calls attention to the sisters’ blackness and ghetto-izes them, further reinforcing their status as outside of the normative tennis community. This emphasis on the sisters’ time in Compton also continues to perpetuate myths of the violent black athlete, and relies on an “overcoming the odds” trope that sensationalizes black achievement, further emphasizing spectacular natural talent rather than attributing such success to hard work and dedicated training.

**Inhabiting Social Norms: Ghetto Cinderellas and Political Action**

Though these cultural narratives worked to emphasize Williams’ difference from other tennis players, consequently influencing her situated ethos, Williams also inhabits these social norms, redeploying these discourses as modalities of action that allow her to bring attention to these differences. For example, while Douglas rightly notes the media’s focus on Williams’ Compton roots, the Williams family themselves often employs this narrative and emphasizes their difference from other players on the tour. According to Anne Todd, Richard Williams often refers to Venus and Serena as “ghetto Cinderellas,” and in a documentary produced about the sisters, *Raising Tennis Aces*[^41], Richard Williams talks at length about their life in Compton, even claiming that he would fight with gang members to gain access to the tennis courts so the family could practice (*Todd 27, Tennis Aces*). Richard Williams also claims that he raised Venus and

[^41]: Curiously, the documentary seems to be more about Richard Williams than it is about Venus and Serena. The film goes into detail about Richard’s upbringing in racially tense Louisiana, including a return to the obviously dilapidated house in which he grew up. There is no mention of tennis in this segment of the film, and Venus and Serena do not appear at all. The film actually seems to serve as a defense of Richard Williams’ training techniques and coaching choices, such as not allowing Venus or Serena to play on the junior circuit, which was met with heavy criticism from the tennis community. In addition, several “authorities,” including the Williams family’s lawyer and a civil rights activist, serve to refute claims that Richard Williams was too controlling of his daughters’ careers or too sensitive about the racial issues they faced. We do not hear Venus or Serena’s opinions of the racial differences they face, and we only hear their opinions of their father as he is sitting right next to them.
Serena as if they were growing up in the segregated South of the 40s and 50s, and that consequently, they would not be affected by racist booing from white tennis fans.\footnote{Richard Williams is likely referring to an incident at the Indian Wells tournament in 2001, in which Serena faced a hostile crowd (discussed in more detail below).}

In fact, Richard Williams appears to have deliberatively emphasized Venus and Serena’s blackness as something that would situate them as outsiders in the predominantly white tennis culture. He claims the decision to move the family to Compton from Long Beach was part of a deliberate plan, because “the greatest champions came out of the ghetto …. It would make them tough, give them a fighter’s mentality” (190). Specifically, he asserts that the filth of the Compton tennis courts, which were often littered with broken glass, human waste, needles, condoms, and “anything else you could think of that was filthy or contaminated,” were “exactly what I needed” in order to shape the girls’ mentality (196). Richard Williams reportedly bribed neighborhood children to yell racial taunts while Venus and Serena practiced “to prepare them for the kind of prejudice they might face in the mostly white tennis world,” and he had the brilliant foresight to prepare the sisters for the media by videotaping them playing tennis and answering questions about their playing technique and future goals (Todd 15, *Black and White* 229). In effect, Richard Williams trained Venus and Serena to expect that they would be treated differently than their white tennis-playing peers. In emphasizing their blackness and the possibility of racist remarks, Richard Williams helped influence the development of Serena’s ethos as specifically black, and the shaping of her identity as different from her audience of white tennis fans and players.

However, the Williams family has experienced some racially tense situations while playing tennis, most notably the hostile audience at the final of the 2001 Master’s tournament at Indian Wells. At the tournament, Venus and Serena had both advanced and were scheduled to
play each other in a much-anticipated semifinal match. However, Venus had to withdraw from the tournament the day of the match with knee problems, leaving Serena with a free pass into the finals, and, for reasons still unknown, tournament officials did not announce Venus’s withdrawal until moments before the match was scheduled to start. Disappointed and upset over the cancellation, fans and tennis media claimed the match had been fixed ahead of time, and in the final, they booed Serena and the Williams family when they walked to the player’s box. According to Serena, not only did they boo, but they also yelled “nigger” and “go back to Compton” (71). Richard Williams claims the audience’s behavior was atypical for tennis, and the fact that “no one questioned the unruly behavior of the fans” was “a message from the past, one America tries to put behind it but can never forget. It was a snapshot from the days when the open humiliation of the black race was accepted without question” (252). In addition, Douglas argues that the match-fixing allegations demonstrate a prevalent suspicion of black people, and would not have been so prevalent if the Williams sisters were not black and automatically “Other” (Douglas “Race” 261-262). Thus, while the Williams family themselves emphasize their blackness and difference from others in the tennis community, the tennis community in turn reinforces this difference.

In addition, when Williams recently announced she would return to play at Indian Wells (now renamed the BNP Paribas Open) in 2015, her decision was framed by tennis media as a move toward forgiveness and signaling Serena’s new maturity over the incident, especially when discussed in contrast to Venus’ “stubborn” position to continue to skip the event (Jones). For example, EPSN’s Peter Bodo claims that the Williams family chose to “punish” the tournament.

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43 Allegations of match fixing by the Williams family were not uncommon even before the Indian Wells tournament. Tennis media and even other players claimed that when the sisters played each other Richard Williams determined who would win (Douglas, “Race” 261).
with the boycott, and that Serena reacted to the crowd’s response at the 2001 event “as if the sky had fallen in, because to her 19-year-old mind and heart it really had” (Bodo). According to Bodo, during the interim in which she was not competing at Indian Wells, Williams was more interested in her celebrity, but “once she embraced her identity [as a serious tennis athlete rather than a part-time actress], a new, more thoughtful and secure Serena began to emerge. She earned a platform from which she could say whatever she wanted, whenever she wanted, with the guarantee that she would not only be heard but also that many would take her words for gospel truth” (Bodo). Presumably in contrast with her previous stance of boycotting the tournament, Bodo says of Williams’ new outlook on the tournament and her decision to return to play there, “Serena is making a statement, but it isn’t aggressive, vindictive or self-regarding” (Bodo).

Bodo’s characterization of Williams reveals several insights relevant to my discussion of ethos and race. First, Bodo’s assertion that it is only in her decision to return to Indian Wells that Williams demonstrates maturity implies that Williams’ earlier stance of boycotting the event was immature and that her stance on the issue was overly vindictive. However, rather than throwing a tantrum, Williams quietly—there has never been a public announcement that the Williams sisters were boycotting the tournament—chose to boycott the event, relying on a type of protest traditionally associated with the African American civil rights movement. The decision to boycott the event was thus actually an incredibly appropriate means through which to communicate her ethos.

In addition, Bodo’s focus on Williams as now older and wiser effectively focuses the incident on Williams’ response to it, discounting the way that tournament officials handled the incident (the Williams family has still not received a formal apology from the tournament) and exempting tennis media from addressing issues of race. This type of framing puts the onus on
Williams for reaching a resolution to the issue, allowing tennis media and officials to escape any sort of accountability for the boycott. Unfortunately, this construction is consistent with racialized narratives that place the responsibility for reconciliation on the one who experiences racism. As journalist Howard Bryant points out, African Americans who have been subjected to racism often only get one choice from the American public: “forgive, be the bigger person, focus not on what occurred and its accompanying trauma but on all of the good, supportive people. The unforgiving suffer even worse labeling for the crime of not recognizing that things are better than they were, and for not getting over it—that is, until they come around and make America feel good about itself” (Bryant). And indeed, Williams framed her return to Indian Wells as an act of forgiveness (“I’m Going Back”), and by several accounts, it was Williams who initiated discussions of returning to Indian Wells (Bodo, Bryant, Jones).

However, as in other circumstances, Williams’ willingness to embrace racialized expectations—such as seeking reconciliation—actually allows her to use such moments of subordination for her own purposes. As Bodo suggests, Williams’ athletic success means that she has earned a public platform, and Williams leverages this platform to bring attention to issues of racial injustice. When she announced her return to Indian Wells, Williams also highlighted the social injustice still faced by African Americans by inviting fans to donate to the Equal Justice Initiative, a criminal justice group that addresses the mass incarceration of African Americans and provides legal aid to those who have been denied fair and just treatment in the legal system. One lucky donor would be selected to attend Williams’ first match at the tournament from her players’ box. In this way, Williams is able to utilize racialized expectations, redeploying the discourses that continue to reinscribe her as subordinate to the dominant white tennis community as modalities of action that then allow her to take political action. Importantly though, I want to
emphasize that it is specifically Williams’ complicity in inhabiting these social norms about appropriately reconciliatory black behavior that then allows her to bring attention to these systemic issues of racism.

Training (Black) Habits and Behaviors

As I mentioned above, Williams at times seems to embrace media discourses that situate her as outside of the norm for women’s tennis. More specifically, I argue below that Williams seems to employ her blackness as an element of her ethos that works especially to intimidate her opponents, and the particular bodily training habits and behaviors that she practices in the course of her athletic training also influence her sense of self and her subjectivity. For example, Williams keeps a “matchbook” (a small notebook that she takes with her to tennis matches and looks through at breaks) of “whatever I can think might inspire me during my next match,” things like inspirational quotes, or reminders of an opponent’s playing style and weaknesses or corrections of her own weaknesses (7). This type of strategizing is not unusual for elite athletes, who often review game film or rely on visualization or other motivational techniques to prepare for competition. One of her matchbook entries (included in her autobiography) reads: “Be strong. Be black…. They want to see you angry. Be angry, but don’t let them see it. Play angry, but let them see confidence. Play angry, but let them see patience. Play angry, but let them see certainty. Play angry, but let them see determination” (42). Here Williams equates her blackness with a source of personal strength and confidence, and she seems to suggest that it is a quality she can use to her advantage. In addition, the directive to “Be black” also suggests that blackness is an important part of Williams’ ethos, and is a quality she actively works to construct and embody through her athletic performance. According to John Hoberman, this type of assumed athletic superiority based on one’s blackness is common because of a social process that “imposes an
athleticized identity on blacks” (5). Hoberman argues that “countless blacks believe in their own athletic superiority,” often because they “grow up assuming that they were simply born with athletic ability, and some coaches encourage them in this belief” (5). Serena also seems to conflate blackness with anger, or at least suggests that her audience may conflate blackness with anger, and that this composed, concealed anger is a quality that will help her succeed.

Likewise, according to Spencer, Richard Williams “seems to purposely deploy narratives of threat in attempts to evoke fear/ intimidation in his daughters’ opponents,” and has suggested that because of their racial background, Venus and Serena are not intimidated by opponents (“Child’s Play”’ 87). Both Serena and her father rely on narratives about black athletic superiority and prowess in order to construct a certain type of ethos in the eyes of possible opponents. Hoberman explains that stereotypes about black athletic superiority can be considered “the most recent version of a racial folklore,” and often perpetuate “a corresponding belief in white athletic inferiority” that works to influence popular thinking about racial difference (xiv).

The Williams’ efforts to reinforce their racial difference from other tennis players can thus be seen as a type of epideictic rhetoric that works to reinforce the social values of a community. The predominantly white tennis community already sees the Williams sisters as different from, and outside of the cultural values already in place, and by emphasizing their difference, the Williams family only further reinforces those cultural values.

In addition, while the persistent focus on Serena Williams as a black athlete leads to associations with a primitive animality that some scholars criticize (Douglas, Hoberman, McKay and Johnson, Spencer), Serena at times embraces this type of framing and seems to capitalize on or emphasize this expectation. For example, Williams is well known for her vocalized exhalations, or grunts, during matches, which often serve to accentuate her powerful serves. She
describes a particular moment in the 2007 Australian Open when one of those well-known grunts allowed her to put her game together after facing impending elimination in a third-round match:

“There was this one point when I let out this unbelievable grunt. It was almost primal. You could hear it outside the stadium, someone told me later” (208). In describing her grunt as “primal” and as the catalyst for her success, Serena seems to invoke the very trope of black athletes as animals that scholars find so troubling. In fact, she argues that in order to be a professional athlete, “you need a wild streak … You need a kind of irrational killer instinct. You need to put it out there that you’re reckless and unpredictable—not just so your opponents take note, but so that you notice, too” (40). While it is impossible to determine whether or not Williams intentionally invokes this typically negative stereotype of black athletes, Williams does seem to specifically practice certain behaviors and bodily movements as an attempt to cultivate this “killer instinct.”

In addition, by calling the grunt “primal,” Williams invokes epideictic narratives about black athletes, whether this association is deliberate or not. Similar to Chastain’s goal celebration, while Williams’ grunt may not have been planned per se, it seems to have been a trained response to a specific kairotic moment.

First, this assertion, along with her encouragement to herself to “be black” implies that Williams is aware of audience expectations about her behavior, and has anticipated that her audience will expect the type of behavior consistent with black athletic stereotypes of reckless, animal-like physicality. Her directive that competitive athletes require an “irrational killer instinct” suggests both that Williams thinks such a response is innate, or natural, and cannot be taught—much like the “natural” assumptions of black athletic superiority—and also that such behavior is “irrational,” in contrast to a carefully calculated strategy—which is also in keeping with stereotypes about black athletes as unable to control their emotions and behavior.
(Hoberman xvii). However, the very fact that this assertion was recorded in Williams’
matchbook suggests that developing an “instinct” was very much a part of her strategy. This
assertion suggests that while Williams deliberately sought to develop a particular ethos, she also
wanted this performance to seem natural, instinctual.

In addition, Hoberman argues that black athletes are assumed to be more violent, and that
the popular media have merged “the athlete, the gangster rapper, and the criminal into a single
black male persona” (xviii). According to Hoberman, “the thoughtful black athlete recognizes
the commercial value of violence and understands that he [sic] has been cast in two grotesquely
incongruous roles, impersonating the traditional sportsman, who honors fair play, while being
paid to behave like a predator, a role to which the black athlete brings a special resonance” (xx).
Though I take issue with Hoberman’s assumption that the athlete who honors fair play and the
athlete who competes “like a predator” are “incongruous roles,” Williams’ insistence on a “killer
instinct” reflects Hoberman’s assertion that the black athlete is expected to compete violently,
like a predator. In addition, while Hoberman’s discussion is focused specifically on black male
athletes, this claim can also be applied to black female athletes. For example, according to
Schultz, Williams is often framed as masculine (discussed in more detail below), and Douglas
suggests that the tennis media assumes Williams is “devoid of feeling,” not unlike the
characterization of black male athletes that Hoberman offers (Schultz 347-348, Douglas 138).

Secondly, Williams’ rationale that one must notice their own “wild streak” reflects
Aristotle’s notion of habits/ habitus and a deliberate effort to develop ethos. According to
Aristotle, there is a close relationship between ethos, habits, and nature, to the extent that one’s
habits might become so instinctual that they become “natural.” In the *Nicomachian Ethics*,

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Aristotle explains, “The virtues⁴⁴ [i.e. ethos, or goodness of character], therefore, emerge in us neither beside nature nor before nature, but rather nature produces in us the capacity to exhibit them, perfecting them by means of habit” (NE 2.1.3). In other words, when Williams mentions the importance of both other competitors recognizing her “killer instinct” and her own recognition of that instinct, she unwittingly acknowledges Aristotle’s discussion of cultivating habits as a way of changing one’s nature, or one’s ethos. As Williams practices and recognizes this “killer instinct” in herself, she forms habits that then become instinctual, so instinctual that she embodies them in the kairotic moments of her tennis matches, and her opponents take note of this ethos. Or, as rhetoric scholar Debra Hawhee helpfully explains, “through habit, therefore, a ‘second nature’ emerges” (95).

Importantly, this type of habit formation and embodied ethos can only be developed through performance, or through deliberate training. Hawhee contends, “no system of knowledge can teach kairotic response; rather such response emerges out of repeated encounters with difference—different opponents in different positions at different times and places” (148). In fact, Aristotle suggests that through such training, one can change his or her nature:

Those who have become unrestrained through habit are more easily cured than those who are unrestrained by nature, since habit is easier to change than nature; for even habit is hard to change, precisely because it is a sort of nature, as Evenus says: “Mark me, my friend, [habit] is long-lasting, and training in the end becomes men’s nature.” (NE 7.10.4-5).

Likewise, in his discussion of this passage, Jeffrey Walker also links melete (or deliberate practice, training) with cultivating ethos (Hawhee 146, Walker 148), which suggests that the

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⁴⁴ The Greek word translated here as “virtues” is arete, discussed in chapter 2.
deliberate training athletes undertake, including the mental training that Williams alludes to in her directive to recognize her own “killer instinct” thus allows the athlete to change and develop her ethos. At the same time, this cultivation of ethos then allows the athlete to respond instinctually in the kairotic moment. In Williams’ case, her efforts to recognize a killer instinct and to practice that instinct until it becomes habit allows her to then put that instinct into practice at the propitious moment of her tennis matches, embodying and therefore solidifying this ethos both in herself and in the eyes of her opponents. The possibility of changing one’s nature or ethos through habit also has important implications for understanding rhetorical invention. Williams’ ability to cultivate ethos through trained habits suggests that inventing the self happens continually and in the kairotic moment. Invention then, occurs not just prior to discourse, but at multiple points throughout the communicative exchange. In addition, invention is influenced by kairos, by the situation, and by the audience. Williams’ emphasis on recognizing and practicing certain qualities, such as her killer instinct, together with evidence of the training by her father, suggests a connection between bodily movements, embodied habits, previous cultural discourses, and the development of the subject. However, those previous cultural narratives influence one’s present performance of ethos, as seen by the tennis community’s resistance to Williams’ specifically black ethos, even while they embrace the same behavior performed by other (white) individuals.

**The Body and Situated Ethos: Deviant (Black) Sexuality**

In addition to emphasizing her racial difference through her bodily movements and habits, Williams seems to reinforce the idea that she is different from other tennis players through her choices of tennis apparel, which have come to reinforce her ethos as specifically black. Likewise, her unconventional (at least for the tennis world) competition clothing often
serves to emphasize her physical difference from other players, and together with cultural narratives about black women’s fashion and sexuality, influences the way her ethos is received by audiences. While Serena and Venus’s beaded hair first brought attention to their racial and cultural difference from other players in ways that were “distracting” to their opponents, their attire in recent years has sometimes brought more attention from fans, commentators, and yes, other competitors, than their playing. Both sisters are known to wear bright, neon colors that stand out in the typically white or pastel color palette worn by most players, and Serena embellishes her tennis outfits with large earrings and necklaces. Both sisters wear fake nails, sometimes with crystals attached to their fingernails, and Venus wore glue-on body crystals at the 2005 U.S. Open. Serena’s clothing choices and hair styles—that is, her choices in representing herself—can be read as practices that are resistant to the social norms of tennis.

Indeed, while Williams’ ethos is influenced by racialized and gendered stereotypes and the epideictic rhetoric that perpetuates these discourses, her tennis apparel seems specifically designed to draw additional attention to her difference from other, more traditional players who wear more conservative tennis gear. For example, Williams designs many of her tennis outfits, including the infamous catsuit she wore at the 2002 U.S. Open and the crop top, denim skirt, and black boot combination Williams wore for the 2004 U.S. Open. In fact, when Williams signed her sponsorship deal with Puma in 1998, the company did not have a dedicated tennis line, and so she worked with them in designing all of her clothing (On the Line 130). Williams even acknowledges that she has always been concerned about her appearance, admitting, for example,

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45 For example, Venus’ cut out designs at 2001 Australian Open, her black and red lace lingerie-like dress and skin-colored tights at 2010 U.S. Open, and her purple floral dress and matching purple hair at 2013 U.S. Open, and Serena’s black studded crop top and denim skirt, plus black warm up boots in 2004 U.S. Open are examples where the sisters’ tennis apparel outdid their athletic performance. The New York Daily News even has a dedicated gallery to photographs of the sisters’ “outrageous” tennis outfits.
that when she looks back at her professional debut, what bothers her the most is not her inexperienced playing, but the way she looked: “For some reason, the thing I remember best about that first tournament was that I was so ugly! Forget how miserably I played, what’s stayed with me is how I looked” (114). In reflecting on her debut, Williams proclaims, “I have to think my self-image had something to do with my disappointing debut. I mean, it only follows that if you want to be at your best you have to look your best, right?” (114-115). She now explains, “I’ve come to spend a lot of time on my appearance. I want to look good while I’m out there, sweating and grunting” (114-115). Williams’ comments about her appearance and her efforts to construct her self-image suggest a careful consideration of the way she presents herself to her audience, and also demonstrate Williams’ embrace of a particular aesthetic ideal, although that ideal may be different than the one forwarded by the predominantly white tennis media.

Her comments also suggest an effort to construct her ethos as specifically feminine, perhaps in an effort to counteract discourses that consistently paint her athletic performance and body type as masculine. It is also interesting to note Williams’ appearance is actually part of her competition strategy. That is, her rationale that “if you want to be at your best you have to look your best” suggests a link between the ability to care for her body and construct a particular aesthetic and her ability to perform successfully. Williams’ concern over her appearance in addition to her athletic performance (and in the example of her professional debut, over her athletic performance) reinforces traditional gender stereotypes about women, and perhaps also reinforces stereotypes about black women’s fashion more generally. Her proclivity to wearing

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46 Black studies scholars note, for example, the prevalence of bright, neon colors, excessive jewelry, and animal prints in contemporary black fashion (see for example Bailey, Craig, and Summers). Eric J. Bailey claims such attention-grabbing styles can be linked to the black fashion parades of the 20s and 30s, events that were similar to slavery-era Sunday promenades to and from church. According to Bailey, both events were “spectacles in which participants expressed
jewelry, rhinestone-embellished tennis dresses and body jewels, and manicured fingernails while playing all serve as a type of hyper-feminization, emphasizing Williams’ racialized femininity in the face of her bullet of a serve. Williams’ fashion embellishments can be compared to track star Florence Griffith-Joyner’s “flaunting of hyper-sexuality and fashion,” which Vertinsky and Captain claim can be read as “one attempt to dismantle and disrupt the dominant society’s deployment of race” (553). In addition, Williams’ habit of spinning in place to address the crowd following a win—which usually causes her tennis skirt to flutter around her as she twirls—can also be read as an effort to evoke femininity and innocence, recalling a behavior more typical of young girls, or of royalty waving to her subjects. In fact, Williams seems to embrace discourses and behaviors that emphasize her masculinity while simultaneously employing behaviors and practices more commonly associated with a normative femininity, such as her manicured fingers and delicate twirling. These different behaviors, and Williams’ specific deployment of them, suggest a malleability and rhetorical flexibility, or metis (discussed previously), which allows Williams to actively craft a particular ethos—masculine or feminine—for a particular audience or situation.

However, as Vertinsky and Captain are quick to point out, “it’s just a slip from one dominant stereotype to another, erasing notions of masculinity by recasting another traditional image of powerful sexuality …. Thus, conceptualizations of the black female’s physicality can fall into the creative trap or paradox of finding one way out of traditional stereotypes by simply themselves and desired their peers and ‘inferiors’ to notice them” and were “didactic rituals deliberately and clearly establishing social differences” (52). Thus, the black fashion parades were linked to African American cultural history and combined “ostentation and piety, consumption and religion (church groups and charities were the usual organizers and beneficiaries) in a way that sanctioned the cultural authority not only of the fashion show institution but of the black middle class itself” (52). Williams’ choice of tennis attire can also be seen as a type of spectacle, but I argue that like the fashion parades, it serves to draw attention to the social and cultural differences between Williams and other (white) tennis players.
reinvigorating another stereotype” (553). Like Vertinsky and Captain’s analysis of Griffith-Joyner, Williams is just as often refigured from masculine muscle-woman to eroticized sex symbol, her efforts at constructing a strong, but feminine ethos still influenced by racial and gendered stereotypes perpetuated by epideictic rhetoric.

The effects of these dominant cultural narratives are especially evident in discussions of two of Williams’ most well known outfits, the “catsuit,” a sleeveless, one-piece black lycra bodysuit she wore at the 2002 U.S. Open, and a black knee-high boots and denim skirt ensemble she wore at the 2004 U.S. Open. The catsuit in particular received a tremendous amount of attention from tennis media, who described the catsuit as “super-tight, ultra-risqué” and “requir[ing] more bravery than fabric” (Everson, Preston, see also Harris). According to sports studies scholar Jaime Schultz, media response to Serena’s catsuit focused on not only on the way that the garment highlighted her muscular physique, but also suggested “a deviant sexuality, thereby contrasting her with a compliant sexuality emphasized in journalistic and promotional representations” (338-339). These previous discourses depicted other tennis players, such as Anna Kournikova and Maria Sharapova as sexually available, while Williams’ sexuality was framed as defiant and threatening to white male audiences (Schultz 339). However, though Serena’s catsuit was unconventional, it was not an entirely novel fashion choice, even in the traditional confines of women’s tennis: in 1985, Anne White wore a long-sleeved, one-piece white lycra bodysuit at Wimbledon. Schultz claims that although White’s body suit and Williams’ catsuit were similar in design,

there is a striking discrepancy in the ways in which she [Williams] and Anne White were framed and discussed by the popular media …. White was admired because of her conventionally feminine attractiveness. Williams was praised for
pushing the boundaries of what constituted that conventionally feminine attractiveness. White was scolded for accentuating her feminine assets; Williams was admonished for exhibiting her masculine muscul arity. In other words, the white bodysuit on a white body was read differently than the black catsuit on the black body. (344).

As Schultz convincingly points out, even the term *catsuit* has different connotations than White’s *bodysuit*. On the one hand, Williams’ catsuit was sleeveless and included shorter legs, while White’s bodysuit was long sleeved and included full-length legs, essentially covering her entire body. However, Schultz notes that *catsuit* often refers to a type of lingerie, which immediately groups Williams with “the legions of other female athletes sexualized by the popular media” (344). The catsuit is also sometimes considered a fetishized form of lingerie, associated with deviant forms of sexuality and sexual expression. In addition, the term *catsuit* might also suggest the racist stereotype of relating black athletes with animals. Though it is important to note that the outfit was designed by Williams in connection with her sponsor, Puma—whose logo itself is a leaping cat—and that Williams herself refers to the outfit as “a catsuit” (discussed in more detail below), responses to Williams’ tennis apparel, and the catsuit in particular, emphasize the ways her physical body is outside of the normative white, slender, feminine aesthetic typical in tennis.

Likewise, feminist scholar Janell Hobson explains that the criticism of Williams’ catsuit can be related to a long history of “enslavement, colonial conquest, and ethnographic exhibition” which often framed the black female body as “grotesque,” “strange,” “unfeminine,” “lascivious,” and “obscene” (87). Sociologists James McKay and Helen Johnson add that “the categorization of black women’s bodies as hyper-muscular and their targeting for lascivious comment mirrors
the public and pseudo-scientific response to nineteenth century exhibits of Saartije Baartman,” or the Hottentot Venus, and such assumed racial difference only serves to reinforce historical and cultural associations with “grotesque and deviant sexuality” (493). For example, in addition to the criticism Williams received after wearing the catsuit, *Washington Post* fashion writer Robert Givhan described her dress at a publicity event as “an orange crochet hussy dress modeled after something that Wilma Flintstone might choose,” and suggested the dress was “more appropriate for a working girl of a different sort” (Givhan). Likewise, New Zealand reporter Michael Brown claimed the hype leading up to the 2006 Australian Open was not focused on the “$40,000 diamond earrings she wears on court or her outrageously garish outfits but this week it’s Serena Williams’ rump which is the talk around Melbourne town” (Brown). This commentary not only portrays Williams as hypersexualized, but also suggests a kind of freakish, subhuman, body.

In addition, such commentary also draws attention to particular parts of Williams’ body, namely, her buttocks and breasts, which reduces her to just those body parts, similar to the obsession with Saartije Baartman’s genetalia and buttocks. One satirical sports website even went so far as to personify Williams’ butt:

> Tennis star Serena Williams cruised to a victory in the finals of Australian Open women’s singles on Saturday and then dispatched her buttocks on Sunday to secure the doubles title …. The feat is the first-known occurrence of a body part winning a professional athletic contest. “I was very happy with my butt’s performance,” Serena said. “This is an opportunity for me to rest most of my body for singles, while still being able to lay claim to doubles wins.” Serena sat several rows up in the stands and cheered her butt to victory during the one hour, eight
minute match. “I was nervous for it, but it performed extremely well,” she said.

(Sportspickle.com, qtd. in McKay and Johnson 498).

In this example, not only is Williams effectively disembodied, her buttocks seen as a separate entity on their own and able to stand in for her entire existence, but she is also situated as superhuman, able to exist in two places at once. Her butt is discussed as a sort of stand-in double, and Williams is able to “rest most of her body” because of her butt’s spectacular tennis skill all by itself. Such discussions suggest that Williams’ ethos not only cannot be separated from her body, but that in some ways, her buttocks come to stand in for her subjectivity. In addition, the implication that her buttocks are so prominent they could compete even without the rest of Williams’ body situates her as a freak of nature, almost subhuman.

While these discourses focus on Williams’ body as hypersexualized, and therefore deviant, other discourses focus on Williams’ body as deviant in another way: her well-defined muscularity is framed as unnaturally masculine or superhuman, denying Williams’ femininity. Both Williams sisters have been described by the tennis media as “Amazons” (“Sister Act” 121), and Serena’s catsuit also inspired comparisons to comic book superheroes (Price, “Grand” Schultz 347-348). For example, *Sports Illustrated* writer S.L. Price described the catsuit as “flaunting curves and muscles that could be dreamed up only by the brains at Marvel Comics,” and noted that when she was a kid at Rick Macci’s tennis academy in Florida, Williams had beaten Andy Roddick and other current players on the men’s tour (Price, “Grand”), and *The New York Daily News’* Wayne Coffey described her body type as a “defensive-back physique” (qtd. in Schultz 347). The persistent focus on Williams’ musculature and physical stature, along with the suggestion that she looks more like a male football player than a women’s tennis player not only masculinize her body, but also figure her as unnatural or superhuman.
Sport historians Patricia Vertinsky and Gwendolyn Captain explain that discourses equating Williams’ musculature with masculinity can be traced back to several persistent historical myths about black womanhood, namely, “the linking of African American women’s work history as slaves, their supposedly ‘natural’ brute strength and endurance inherited from their African origins, and the notion that vigorous or competitive sport masculinized women physically and sexually” (541). According to Vertinsky and Captain, the association between “stereotyped depictions of black womanhood and ‘manly’ athletic and physically gifted females” are related to “slave womanhood stereotypes involving the colonization of the black female body by the white master” (541). The obsessive focus on Williams’ body, and specifically, on her buttocks, by the predominantly white tennis world can be read as an attempt toward colonization, or at the very least, as Douglas notes, suggests an attempt at surveillance over Williams’ deviant, black, muscular body (“Inconspicuous” 130). While this surveillance is common in sports in general and in relation to women’s bodies as a whole, I argue that Williams’ racial difference further marked her, resulting in increased attention from the predominantly white tennis community.

In addition, these discourses illustrate the ways in which social constructions of black women’s bodies have material consequences for how certain individuals may develop the self. Critical race theorist Carla Peterson explains that because black women historically performed both physical labor and sex work, their labor resulted in a simultaneous blurring of masculinity and femininity (Peterson x-xi), leading to a grotesqueness associated with the disciplined black body, as opposed to a sense of normalization in the disciplined white body. In this way, while the disciplined white body might lead to a more stable understanding of the individual, the disciplined black body actually creates more instability, such that while certain individuals may
attempt to work on the body, that work may already be undermined by previous discourses and histories that construct their bodies in different ways. In this interpretation, although Williams employs disciplinary practices such as dedicated athletic training, these practices are still influenced by social constructions of her black body. That is, while Williams might utilize the very same disciplinary practices that other (white) female athletes employ, rather than normalizing her body, these practices only serve to reinforce her difference.

The tendency to portray Williams as masculine and superhuman also stands in tension with discourses about Williams’ “natural” athleticism, and sensationalizes her performances of ethos. As Schultz explains, “Strength, corporeally symbolized by well-defined, sizable muscularity, is culturally understood as a masculine trait and hence positioned outside what is considered natural for women. To consider Serena Williams outside the natural seems at odds with the stereotype of African Americans as natural athletes” (348). Indeed, Williams is depicted as both the naturally gifted black athlete and unnaturally strong female athlete, and consequently, she is seen as both super and subhuman. For example, Hobson argues that the tennis media’s response to Williams’ catsuit demonstrates “a racialized sense of aesthetics that position blackness in terms of grotesquerie while whiteness serves as an emblem of beauty” (88), and Schultz points out that the obsession with Williams’ backside “sexualizes her in a way that is inconsistent with discussions of the white women on the professional tennis circuit, constructing and highlighting a racialized corporeal difference between females” (350). Consequently, Williams’ performances of ethos seem spectacular and sensational rather than authentic, and they are influenced by cultural narratives that raise suspicion about Williams’ commitment to tennis. Furthermore, the epideictic rhetoric that circulates such narratives also influences how other black women construct ethos. McKay and Johnson argue that as a result of such perceived racial
difference, “African American women struggle to articulate a positive and sustaining discourse of black female beauty that enhances their agency and subjectivity, and works conterminously to challenge dominant discourses of black women’s bodies as ‘sexually grotesque’” (493). And according to Schultz, in the context of tennis, “where traditional femininity is publicly valued above strength in female athletes,” there is “little natural about female athleticism and muscul arity,” and as a result, Williams must negotiate overlapping racialized and gendered stereotypes (348).

The tensions between Williams’ embrace and refusal of racial and gendered stereotypes are particularly present in her discussion of the two outfits she is most famous for, the catsuit and the denim skirt. As mentioned above, the use of the term catsuit in itself suggests a kind of deviant sexuality, although similarly designed athletic apparel is common in certain sports, such as skiing or swimming. However, Williams herself uses this term to describe the outfit. According to USA Today’s Greg Boeck, when some reporters called the outfit a wetsuit, “Williams corrected: ‘It’s more of a cat suit. This is an innovative outfit. It’s really sexy. I love it’” (Boeck). As Schultz argues, Williams’ agency over the design and reception of the catsuit reminds audiences that “she is producer and product of these representations” (345). In addition, Williams readily acknowledges her role as an entertainer, expressing a desire to play “thrilling, high-level tennis [that gives] the fans something to cheer about,” instead of the routine point-trading that sometimes happens at the beginning of matches (6). She also claims the hostile audience she faced at Indian Wells is because “they were denied their entertainment the day before” due to Venus’s withdrawal. Williams asserts, “I understand that I’m in the entertainment business. I compete at the highest levels of my sport. I know the only reason there’s all that prize money and endorsement money is because people buy tickets to watch. I get that” (76). Indeed,
Williams’ obviously conscious constructions of her ethos suggests both that Williams actively produces her ethos, and that she considers herself a product, an entertainer that audiences pay to see.

The athlete-as-entertainer is a particularly interesting concept in relationship to women’s athletics. Sports studies scholars Leslie Heywood and Shari Dworkin note that in today’s body commodification culture, male and female athletes tend to be seen as “both active subjects who perform their sport and market their image, and commodified objects who are passive” (86). In this understanding, by situating herself as an entertainer and professional athletics as part of the entertainment business, Williams both suggests that she is the author of her own self-image and ethos—an active subject who specifically performs for an audience—and also an object to be consumed and sold as a product. However, because ethos is always co-constructed, no one is completely self-created, and this presents a problem in particular for feminist scholars, because of the ways in which the female body has traditionally been objectified. That is, the traditional feminist objectification critique suggests that Williams’ body and athletic performances are always-already under surveillance through the very structure of sport and the sporting context, and therefore, through her very participation in the social institution of athletics and its related commodification culture Williams’ body is objectified. Yet Williams’ (and other female athletes’) ability to occupy this blurred position of both subject and object, in combination with her strategic use of both inhabiting and resisting social norms (such as by highlighting her deviant black body through atypical tennis apparel) complicates the objectification critique. Williams’ agency in creating certain outfits, highlighting certain aspects of her body, and performing certain movements and behaviors thus situates her as an embodied subject that must
be understood through her corporeality, which in turn extends discussions of women’s subjectivity and embodiment within sports.

Another example of Williams’ agency and efforts to shape a particular public image can be seen through her clothing choices. Williams seems acutely aware of the attention she receives for her tennis outfits, and implies that her apparel is used to intimidate opponents or gain audience attention. For example, in describing her design partnership with Puma, Williams says, “They had me wearing all kinds of outrageous outfits. It got to where people started to wonder what I’d wear at the start of each tournament. I became known for my outfits as much as for my aggressive, relentless style of play” (130). And in her discussion of an infamous match against Jennifer Capriati in which several incorrect calls were made against her (described earlier in the chapter), prompting multiple outbursts from Williams, and eventually, rule changes that allowed for reviews of close line calls, she simply describes the match as a “maddening and famous match in tennis circles” and then describes her outfit before the match itself. Despite the fact that the match is well known as the catalyst for the player-driven challenge system and the first of Williams’ well-publicized explosions, Williams claims it was her outfit that people remember: “I had a great outfit that year, so people remember it because of these killer shiny-black warm-up boots I wore over my sneakers, the short denim skirt, the studded black sport tank that gave the outfit an in-your-face, hip-hop feel” (167). In these examples, Williams not only attributes audience attention to her clothing choices, but also implies that her tennis apparel has a specific affect on her opponents (i.e. “an in-your-face, hip-hop feel”) suggesting that she actively constructs a particular ethos when she steps on the court. Williams’ “in-your-face, hip-hop feel” draws on associations of black hip hop culture with violence, intimidation, deviant behavior, and masculinity (Arthur 113), associations that Williams perhaps employs to put additional pressure
on her opponents. In addition, by donning clothing that already represents a certain set of cultural values and behaviors, Williams almost conditions herself to behave in ways that are consistent with these clothing choices. In other words, her very choice of attire, and her efforts to cultivate an “in-your-face, hip-hop feel” may have also influenced her bodily movements and behavior as she got “in the face” of the head umpire to question the incorrect call.

**Outbursts of Blackness**

In fact, certain on-court behaviors also illustrate the ways in which deliberate training and the care of the self can lead to different ways of inventing the self and developing the subject. In chapter two, I argued that an athlete’s ability to physically shape the body can be seen as a process of invention that has a rhetorical effect in the minds of the audience. In this understanding, the audience recognizes the form of the human body and comes to draw meaning from it, creating multiple moments of invention: that of the athlete inventing the body, and that of the audience inventing meaning from that body. What is key in this understanding, however, is that it is precisely the athlete’s deliberate training—the process of subjecting oneself to particular disciplinary practices—that then allows this transformation and invention to take place. Thus, I want to suggest that Williams’ on-court behavior, though unplanned, was a trained response that might be read as a deliberate effort to cultivate a particular ethos.

For example, in addition to the controversy over Williams’ 2004 match against Capriati, she had another run-in with an official at the 2009 U.S. Open. Down 5-6 in the second set of the semifinal, Williams faulted on her first serve, and then was called for a foot-fault on her second serve—an error rarely seen by Williams or many other professional players—resulting in a point for her opponent, Kim Clijsters, who was then only one point away from taking the match. Outraged at the call, which television replays later revealed was inconclusive, Williams
approached the lines judge and exploded: “I swear to God I’ll fucking take the ball and shove it down your fucking throat” (Donegan). The outburst included pointing and gesturing at the lines judge with her tennis racquet. When the line judge was called over by the head official, Williams followed, unrepentedly explaining, “Sorry, but there are a lot of people who’ve said way worse” (“Clijsters”). After an exchange between the line judge and the head official (which is difficult to make out over the loud booing of the crowd), Williams continued to defend herself, claiming, “I didn’t say I would kill you. Are you serious? I didn’t say that” (“Clijsters”). Because Williams had been warned earlier in the match when she threw her racquet in frustration after losing the first set, tournament rules stipulated that her opponent would receive a penalty point, giving Clijsters the set and the match.

In addition to losing the match, Williams was also fined $82,500 and placed on probation for two years, meaning that any other outburst at a major tournament would result in suspension (Clarey). Williams received sharp criticism from the tennis media following the outburst, with even John McEnroe, who had been fined and penalized himself, suggesting that Williams should be suspended (Donegan). It is important to note that other notable players who have been fined and penalized for unsportsmanlike behavior include McEnroe, Jimmy Connors, and Ilie Nastase, all men. Williams’ behavior and resulting fine further associates her with masculine attributes and situates her as outside of the normative feminine aesthetic in tennis, which can be read as a type of resistance to the social norms of tennis. At the time of her infraction, Williams’s fine was the largest sum ever levied against a player for a single violation (Clarey).

In addition, Williams at first refused to apologize for the incident, claiming, “An apology from me? How many people yell at linespeople? I see it happening all the time. I don’t know how many times I have seen that happen. I am a professional. I’m not the beggar, like, “Please,
please, please, let me have another chance,’ because it was the rules and I play by the rules” (Donegan). In this statement, Williams first claims that it is typical for other tennis players to yell at lines judges, and then curiously suggests that her outburst was more “professional” than pleading with officials to reverse a call. In asserting that she “plays by the rules” Williams also implies that the foot-fault call was incorrect because as a professional, Williams would not try to cheat by stepping over the line on her serve. On the other hand, part of the rules also stipulate penalties for unsportsmanlike behavior, and her comment neglects to take this into account, somewhat nullifying her attempts to build ethos as “a professional.” In this way, Williams seems to associate professionalism with competitiveness more so than adherence to the rules or displaying conventional tennis etiquette, perhaps aligning herself more with male players such as McEnroe and Connors—professionals despite their unsportsmanlike behavior—rather than with other women tennis players who adhere to expectations regarding on-court demeanor.

However, her initial denial of responsibility and her assertion of “professionalism” do contribute to a particular aspect of her ethos, her identity as a black athlete. Her outbursts add to her efforts to construct herself as “irrational” or as having “a wild streak,” and her threats to the lines judge only perpetuate the idea of a “killer instinct” that Williams tries to cultivate. Such behavior also reinforces stereotypes of the violent black athlete, and her unexpected outbursts and unapologetic behavior can perhaps be read as an attempt to instill fear in opponents and officials that she would later face. Likewise, while most of the tennis media seemed appalled at Williams’s outburst, at least one reporter suggested that the tennis community’s tendency to shun the Williams family might have contributed to Serena’s tirade, citing underlying issues of racism. For example, the Williams family have been outsiders in the predominantly white, wealthy tennis community, not only because of their race and working class background, but also
because of the unconventional approach the Williams sisters have taken in their careers, skipping the elite tennis academies and junior circuit, playing a limited number of tournaments, and pursuing outside interests such as fashion design. In addition, Irina Spirlea’s infamous intentional bump of Venus in the 1997 U.S. Open, the hostile crowd Serena faced at Indian Wells (where she coincidently also played Clijsters), and the questionable calls in Serena’s 2004 U.S. Open match all suggest at least the possibility of racist undertones. Add to that the fact that the 2009 U.S. Open crowd, according to Sam Damre, “cheer[ed] for the Belgian Clijsters over one of the greatest female players ever and an American in Serena,” and perhaps Williams’ tirade was simply an effort to let the tennis world know she would not be taken advantage of (Damre).

Damre also notes that the American crowd cheered for Clijsters over Venus in the fourth round and that there was “at least one sports talk show host in the Baltimore-Washington D.C. area who said that Melanie Oudin was the only American left in the U.S. Open when in fact Serena was still playing,” leading Damre to ask, “Is this because Serena and Venus do not embody the All-American girl stereotype of being blond and white?” (Damre).

In addition, because such uproars are typically only caused by male tennis players, Williams challenges the expected behavior and social norms for female tennis players. Instead of the ladylike behavior assumed by most women on the professional tour, Williams’ tirades actually add a dimension of radical competitiveness and spectacle more typically associated with the men’s game. Like Brandi Chastain’s penalty kick celebration, Williams reappropriates male behavior to suggest that women’s tennis is just as serious and the players just as intense as their male counterparts.

Williams’s most recent uproar might also be read as an attempt to emulate typically male behavior. After losing the first set of the 2011 U.S. Open finale to Australian Samantha Stosur,
Williams hit a beautiful forehand that she evidently believed to be “a winner,” or a shot that her opponent could not return, winning her the point. Indeed, Stosur was sent reeling, and did not look like she would be able to return the ball. However, after hitting the shot but before the play was over, Williams called out “Come on!” a response she sometimes lets out in the midst of matches, and head umpire Eva Asderaki ruled Williams’s challenge an intentional hindrance. Under tennis regulations, “If a player is hindered in playing the point by a deliberate act of the opponent(s), the player shall win the point,” and citing this rule, Asderaki awarded the point to Stosur (Fendrich “Upset”). However, if the player is hindered from playing the ball by an unintentional act of her opponent, such as the grunting often heard by some players, or by something outside the player’s control, such as when a player’s hat falls off in the middle of a rally, then the point is replayed. Williams appealed that the point should be replayed—in other words, that her shout had been involuntary—but Asderaki stood firm, explaining, “This is not a replay. This is hindrance and it is her point. Because when you shouted, she ran to the ball and she touched the ball” (qtd. in Abad-Santos). Williams responded accusingly, “Are you the one who screwed me over last time?” then continued her tirade during changeovers, where the players change sides in front of the head official, practically threatening Asderaki: “You ever see me walking down the hall, look the other way. Because you’re out of control—totally out of control…. You give a code violation because I expressed who I am? We’re in America last I checked” (qtd. in Abad-Santos).

Williams’s defense of her mid-play shout as an expression of who she is can be read as emphasizing her difference from other female players or as an attempt to associate herself with...
other aggressive and typically male athletes. For example, it is fairly common for football or baseball players to trash talk with their opponents at the line of scrimmage or while on base. While players in these other sports are also penalized for unsportsmanlike conduct, a certain amount of trash talking or challenging opponents is generally considered acceptable for male athletes, though perhaps not male tennis players (there is at least one example of hindrance being called for a similar shout by Mardy Fish in the 2012 Indian Wells tournament). Tennis’ expectations of genteel behavior, especially for women, masks the focus on Williams’ body and bodily deviance, seemingly justifying the unfair treatment of Williams and the increased scrutiny of her body and behavior. In this way, Williams’ behavior and defense of her behavior can be read as an attempt to resist the social norms of tennis. In addition, Williams’ bodily actions and her description of those actions—her grunting and shouts, and her insistence that such actions were involuntary—draws attention to the ways in which repeated bodily actions produce a certain type of subject. Williams’ repeated training and efforts to cultivate habits until they become instinctual (mentioned previously) can be seen as a process of inventing the self, producing a subjectivity that challenges the social norms of tennis.

In addition, Williams’s claim that the shout was unintentional is akin to the non-calls for the grunting often seen in men’s and women’s tennis. At the time, such grunting was deemed unintentional, leading Alexander Abad-Santos to reason, “What exactly is the difference between a grunt and Williams’ shout? Audible words? Making Williams an example looks silly if you’re not going to regulate the grunting that punctuates women’s tennis at the moment” (Abad-Santos). The grunting in women’s tennis has recently been criticized by some players, including Martina Navratilova and Caroline Wozniacki, who call it distracting, and in some ways, cheating,
because opponents can’t hear the way the ball is coming off of the racquet and because some grunts are still heard after the player has already hit the ball.

Curiously, it is only the women’s game that has come under fire for the grunting, although men’s players (most notably Jimmy Connors, Rafael Nadal, Novak Djokovic, and David Ferrer) can also be noisy. And while Williams is known for her grunting, Maria Sharapova, Victoria Azarenko, and Michelle Larcher de Brito—all white women—are often referred to as “shriekers” and their grunts have been recorded by a decibel reader (Collins). Perhaps it is simply the higher pitch of these women’s shouts, but it is interesting that they seem to face more criticism than either Williams or male players, as if the tennis world has different expectations for the behavior of white female players than for Williams or male players. It is also worth noting that in other sports, grunting or vocalized exhaling is often common, and sometimes actively pursued. For example, in competitive weight lifting, athletes are taught to grunt because it is believed to help relax the body and minimize tension that might impede the athlete from performing at his or her best. In track and field, athletes are encouraged to grunt at “explosive” moments—pushing out of the starting blocks, releasing a shot put throw, or launching off a long jump board—to minimize tension and as a sort of mental cue to finish the movement with complete intensity and maximum pushing power.

Williams’ other on-court antics are also quite different from those of other female players, and can be read as a type of resistance to the social norms of tennis. For example, Williams is known for changing sides “as far away from my opponent as possible,” instead of changing sides by passing in front of the head official (4). This might simply be an attempt to avoid a collision like the one between Venus and Spirlea, or this bit of gamesmanship could be read as an effort to throw her opponents off guard or a deliberate refusal to follow tennis’
conventions. In addition, Williams says she usually meets an opponent’s eyes with a “mean, steely look” if they happen to make eye contact, and she will often glare at opponents following a winning shot, sometimes accompanied by a fist-pump or a shout of “Come on!” (4). Williams also tries to finish a service game with an ace, which she claims is “always one of my favorite psyche-out moves on the court … because then you get to start walking toward the umpire’s chair while your opponent is still lunging for your serve” (215). These bodily actions—while not uncommon in some sports—don’t align with tennis’s supposedly genteel demeanor, leading some to call Williams arrogant or unfriendly (Price “Venus Envy”). Yet this very arrogance or unfriendliness seems to be exactly what Williams is after: she has constructed her ethos around being different from, and thus feared by, other opponents. In addition, by focusing on and criticizing Williams’ body, the tennis world deflects attention on the inequities of the tennis community and the social norms that it fosters. In this way, her bodily movements and behaviors might be read as a form of political action meant to draw attention to these inequities.

Williams actively resists the normative white aesthetic imperative and social norms of the traditional tennis culture, highlighting the difference between herself and her mostly white, conservative upper class audience. By emphasizing her racial difference and refusing to conform to audience expectations, Williams disrupts their narratives about sport, race, and class, and draws attention to those false racist narratives. However, in doing so, she simultaneously reinforces racist assumptions about black athletes as violent, naturally physically superior, and unable to control their emotions, effectively inhabiting these racialized expectations, and continuing to perpetuate these discourses. As Schultz puts it, “in many ways, Serena Williams contests the ideological center of women’s sport, challenging the dominant cultural perceptions of gender,” and I would add, of the normative white aesthetic. However, the rhetorical strategies
she employs to set herself apart as different from other players “continue to stigmatize and marginalize Williams’s femininity in ways that clarify the boundaries and reassert the dominance of that center” (Schultz 349).

Williams builds her ethos by drawing attention to her physical difference from other players and capitalizes on the obsession over her body, but in doing so, she still meets the expectations of the mostly white tennis community as both subhuman and superhuman Other. In this way, Williams gains ethos because she continues to both defy the white aesthetic imperative but also to confirm those expectations that she is outside of the normative aesthetic. Williams also readily acknowledges her role as an entertainer, suggesting a sophisticated understanding of just how to carefully craft her ethos in order to both intimidate opponents and attract a curious fascination with her Other-worldly tennis ability.

Williams’ performances of ethos draw attention to the ways in which previous cultural narratives and the epideictic rhetoric that perpetuates such discourses, along with the materiality of the body, affects one’s situated ethos. Such an analysis responds to the problems Royster and Pittman respectively note about scholars’ current understanding of ethos and builds on the discussion I started in chapter three about the intersections of race, class, gender, and the body that influence one’s ethos. More specifically, while Brandi Chastain benefitted from the dominant cultural narratives that already esteemed her identity as a white, middle-class woman, Williams faced gendered and racialized discourses that positioned her as an outsider, even when her behaviors or actions did not differ from that of other (white) players. These considerations are important for rhetorical scholars because there are material consequences of these discourses in how individuals choose to perform ethos and how that ethos is received by an audience. That is, the bodily practices and behaviors that come to establish one’s sense of self and subjectivity
have real material consequences in the bodies of individuals that perform these movements. In this way, attention to the intersections between race, class, gender, and the body and how they influenced Williams’ situated ethos extends current rhetorical scholarship on the body to include a consideration of the role the body plays in the making of the self, and in particular, a conceptualization in which outward bodily actions are understood as both the potential for transforming the self and the means through which such transformation may take place.

Williams’ performances of ethos also demonstrate the ways in which one might inhabit social norms, in addition to resisting them, expanding the actions and behaviors that might constitute one’s agency. For example, though Williams faces gendered and racialized discourses that draw attention to her difference from other tennis players, she is able to utilize such discourses to intimidate her opponents or to draw attention to issues of systemic racism. However, Williams’ ability to either inhabit or subvert social norms depends on her ability to develop and shape the body through dedicated athletic training, revealing the ways in which repeated bodily habits and behaviors provides the individual with a malleability or a rhetorical flexibility that allows one to develop and shape one’s subjectivity. In this way, repeated bodily actions do not just signify one’s ethos, but actually work to constitute the individual. Therefore, in contrast to feminist sports studies scholarship (such as the work of Chapman, Johns and Johns, and Wesely, among others) that emphasizes the care of the self as either enabling resistance to or reinforcing social norms, Williams’ performances of ethos suggest that disciplinary practices such as the care of the self and dedicated athletic training are not so much about the social impositions placed on the subject but on the work that these practices do in shaping the individual.
In the next chapter, I continue to examine the interrelationships between the body, gender, race, and class by analyzing the performances of ethos of Michelle Wie, a Korean American golfer. Like Williams, Wie is often positioned as an outsider in a typically white sport. However, her Asian American racial background means that her situated ethos is often framed in very different ways than those of Williams. As I will illustrate in the next chapter, while Williams was often framed as deviant or defiant, Wie was more likely to be described as naïve or non-threatening, constructions that I argue she specifically capitalized on to gain a competitive advantage over her opponents. Much like Williams, though, Wie’s ability to both inhabit and subvert gendered and racialized expectations about her behavior afforded her with opportunities to deploy these narratives for her own purposes.
Chapter 5: Training Celebrity: Michelle Wie’s Entertainment-Driven Ethos

“‘I guess I play golf, because I want to be a living testimony. Most barriers to women are self-imposed …. Limitations are pretty artificial. I can be a statement for that.’”—Michelle Wie

Michelle Wie had started off the sixteenth hole of the 2004 Sony Open with a 311-yard drive, then used a pitching wedge to chip her golf ball about 15 feet from the hole. After a careful, accurate putt, she birdied the par-4 hole, reaching it in one stroke under par. What was most impressive about her play on that hole, though, was that she was a 13 year-old girl playing in a professional men’s event, and with two holes left to play, she had a shot at making the cut and advancing to the next round of the tournament.

At just 13 years old, Michelle Wie became the youngest player to make the cut at a Ladies’ Professional Golf Association (LPGA) event, when she advanced in the 2003 Kraft Nabisco Championship. Later that year, she became the youngest player—male or female—to win a United States Golf Association (USGA) adult event when she won the Women’s Amateur Public Links Tournament. She went on to qualify for and then make the cut at the U.S. Women’s Open, once again, the youngest player ever to do so. Just seven months later, at the 2004 Sony Open, Wie became just the fourth woman—and the youngest ever—to play in a Professional Golf Association (PGA) event. Though she missed the cut by one stroke, her second round score of 68 was the lowest ever scored by a woman at a PGA event. Despite never having won an LPGA tournament, when Wie signed her professional contract in October of 2005, at not quite 16, she was the highest paid women’s golfer in the world, and her professional debut also made

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her the third-highest paid female athlete in the world, behind tennis players Serena Williams and Maria Sharapova (Mario 109, 118).

Wie was young, attractive, charismatic, and had the size and swing to make people stare. At 6’1” she stood taller than nearly all of her competitors, and she routinely out-drove the competition, even in men’s events. Her aggressive playing style—Wie often chose more difficult shots or gambled with reaching the greens a stroke early—was balanced with a softly feminine aesthetic: her golf attire usually included large chandelier earrings and her responses to the media typically were accompanied with a slight giggle, together producing a youthful, charming ethos that the media and golf fans seemed to adore. For example, according to Eric Adelson, in an ESPN.com poll conducted just after the 2004 Sony Open (where Wie just barely missed the cut, shooting a 68), “nearly three-quarters of respondents wanted other PGA Tour sponsors to offer Wie an exemption. Even more stunning, more than 68 percent of those polled said Wie should go ahead and play more against the men. Seventy-two percent believed Wie would do for women’s golf what Tiger Woods was doing for men’s golf” (52). At tournaments where Wie played, attendance and revenue both increased over the numbers from the previous year, and tournaments raised more money for charity when Wie played than they had previously (Mario vii, 99).

Yet in the midst of all this spotlight, several professionals wondered if Wie had earned all of this attention (Mario ix, discussed in more detail below). Though Wie had placed in the top five at the 2005 British Women’s Open and LPGA Championships, she had not yet won a professional tournament, and had not played in the nationally recognized junior golf circuit. Like Serena Williams, Wie had skipped the junior tournaments entirely, and many felt she had not paid her dues. While the typical route to professional status included finishing at the top of the
junior tour and then qualifying for LPGA membership by successfully completing Q-School, an extensive tournament where the top finishers are granted membership, Wie instead went straight from local junior tournaments to USGA amateur events and sought sponsor’s exemptions\textsuperscript{49} to play in LPGA-sponsored events. Then there was Wie’s insistence on playing in men’s events, a move frowned upon by golf analysts and players alike (Adelson 117, Mario 100), including Hall of Famers Nancy Lopez and Annika Sorenstam and British pro Laura Davies, who all seemed insulted and perplexed that Wie did not consider the LPGA tournaments competitive enough, despite the fact she had yet to win one (Mario 64, 72, 117). In addition, her use of sponsor’s exemptions had made golf analysts such as Rob Sirak suspicious of preferential treatment, and critics pointed out that Wie’s exemptions meant other, perhaps more deserving, players were left out of the competition simply for the sake of Wie’s star power (Mario 78-79).

Wie was relatively unproven as a serious golfer when she signed her professional contract, yet had managed to garner the most lucrative deal ever signed by a female player, in part through a sophisticated performance of ethos, capitalizing on a careful balance of a traditionally feminine aesthetic matched with her relentless pursuit of competing against men. Yet while she enjoyed some initial success in her professional career, an injury and some questionable playing and training decisions soon slid her from the leaderboard into the hot seat. By the start of the 2009 season, Wie had still not won a professional tournament, and ESPN reporter Eric Adelson, who has covered Wie’s career since she was a child, published \textit{The Sure Thing: The Making and Unmaking of Golf Phenom Michelle Wie}, as if Wie’s golf career and public credibility had already been “unmade.” However, Wie was not willing to settle into the

\textsuperscript{49} The tournament sponsor may grant exemptions to individuals, which allows them to participate in the tournament without being LPGA (or PGA) members. It also often means that the player may skip the early qualifying rounds of the tournament, allowing them to rest before the typical three 18-hole rounds that comprise the main portion of the tournament.
role of one-time teenage phenom that the media seemed to write for her, and won her first professional tournament in November of 2009, and her first major, the U.S. Women’s Open, in 2014, 11 years after she first qualified for and played in that event.

In this chapter I argue that Wie’s performances of ethos demonstrate the ways in which gender, race, class, and the body influence how one’s situated ethos is received by an audience. Like I discussed in the previous chapter on Serena Williams, Wie’s performances of ethos were shaped by her physical body and her bodily movements, along with dominant cultural narratives about her race and gender. These existing discourses, along with Wie’s identity as an Asian American woman in the predominantly white, male golfing community, influenced Wie’s bodily movements and behaviors and the way these behaviors are read by her audience. However, as I will demonstrate below, rather than resisting these discourses, Wie instead inhabits certain social norms and expectations in order to redeploy racist and gendered narratives to gain access to tournaments that she would otherwise not be eligible to participate in. That is, Wie complies with certain regulatory practices in order to gain advantage of the subjective positions they represent or make possible. In this way, my analysis continues to speak especially to scholars interested in racial and gendered components of ethos (such as Royster and Pittman), or to feminist approaches to agency and subjectivity (such as Heywood and Dworkin and Markula and Kennedy), in addition to those interested in body theory and materiality (such as Hawhee and Selzer and Crowley).

At the same time, however, Wie resists the social norms of golf by situating her athletic performance as entertainment and positioning herself as a (unmarked) professional golfer, rather than a (specifically) woman’s professional golfer. Wie’s simultaneous embrace of social norms that highlight her celebrity and exceptionalism, along with her resistance to social norms that
dictate who she competes with complicate understandings of the sexualized, commodified image of the female athlete and extend conversations about the paradox of the subject/object within athletic training, such as those forwarded by Heywood and Dworkin and Markula and Kennedy.

In addition, I argue that like Chastain and Williams, Wie’s performances of ethos suggest that the process of athletic training and the care of the self may also function as processes of invention that offer the possibility of agency. As I have argued in previous chapters, shifting the focus from how certain practices reinscribe traditional gender roles or expectations to how those practices might produce different capacities in the subject, allows scholars to explain how subordination to the disciplinary practices of athletic training actually enables certain capacities for action. More specifically, the malleability of the body—brought about through dedicated athletic training—influences one’s subjectivity and suggests the possibility of agency.

In the sections that follow, I first discuss the racialized and gendered narratives circulating in popular discourses about Wie, demonstrating how both previous cultural narratives and the materiality of the body affects one’s situated ethos. I next illustrate how Wie inhabits some of these social norms, utilizing racialized and gendered discourses that situated her as exceptional, but also non-threatening, in order to gain access to tournaments that she would otherwise be ineligible to participate in. Finally, I examine the ways in which Wie’s early and repeated training playing against older golfers and male golfers and her resistance to social norms that dictated who she should compete against and when she should do so created modalities of action that allowed her to recode—with varying degrees of success—the overwhelming media and fan attention to her resistance for her own purposes, using such discourses to gain access to more playing opportunities.
Situated Ethos: The Drive Swing of a Man, With Feminine Grace

As I mentioned above, Michelle Wie tempered her resistance to certain gender norms with her adherence to other norms, and the media in turn was also keen on emphasizing Wie as non-threatening to the traditionally male golf community, even as they seemed to marvel over her curious physical abilities. Like the media attention that Serena Williams received from the tennis community, these discourses focused on Wie as spectacular, which situated her as different from other women’s golfers, and consequently, outside of the social norms of golf. In previous chapters, I explained the importance of understanding one’s situated ethos, or how one’s social position might influence one’s ethos, building on the work of rhetoric scholars such as Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee, Jacqueline Jones Royster, and Coretta Pittman. In the discussion that follows, I will demonstrate how these media discourses, which highlighted Wie’s “exceptional” body, influenced Wie’s situated ethos.

For example, when Wie burst onto the national golf scene in 2003, she was just 13 years old, but according to the media, she sure didn’t look it. Wie had always been tall for her age, and stood just under 6’. By the age of 16, Wie was 6’1”, considered tall for any golfer, especially a female golfer. The golf media raved about the power in her swing, and she was already hitting the ball farther than most women and many men, too. Wie’s height and long arms meant she could generate more speed and force in her golf swing, and though Wie was in the midst of puberty she never seemed uncoordinated. Adelson claims, “there wasn’t a trace of gawkiness or awkwardness in her gait” and during her golf swing, “her torso twisted and turned as if on a swivel, and her shoulders rotated around her spine like a propeller. Her long arms effortlessly carried her hands to the top of her backswing, then through the ball and all the way over her left shoulder in a fluid pendulum motion” (6). Wie’s seemingly effortless swing was even likened to
that of Ernie Els, whose nickname, “The Big Easy,” refers to his powerful, yet smooth golf swing. Wie would eventually become known as “The Big Wiesy,” a play on Els’ nickname. Golf analysts also marveled at her grip strength, or the amount of force that Wie could apply to the golf club and then maintain throughout her golf swing. According to Adelson, a normal adult man’s grip strength is about 80 pounds, but can diminish to less than 45 pounds at the apex of the golf swing. In contrast, Wie’s grip strength was 120 pounds, or “double that of a normal grown woman and equivalent to that of a full-time male carpenter” (Adelson 6).

In this way, golf media also discussed Wie’s body and playing style in ways that were more consistent with male golfers. Longtime golf analyst John Andrisani, who has written books about Tiger Woods, Jack Nicholas, and Sergio Garcia’s respective golf swings, claims that Wie’s driver swing is “technically better than the one Woods employed,” and Johnny Miller, a former Masters and U.S. Open champion and current golf analyst has called Wie’s swing “one of the best top-five swings of all time” (Andrisani 3-4). According to Andrisani, “Wie promotes length [in her drives] through a wide arc of swing, exceptionally good balance, a high degree of hand-arm speed, and a well-timed body-club release in the hitting area” (11-12), and claims Wie’s swing also has “incredible rhythm” and is “powerfully poetic” (14). As Andrisani explains, the ability to drive the ball a long distance offers players “a huge psychological advantage over an opponent onto every tee,” and “long drives, more than any other shot played during a round of golf, keeps golfers coming back to the course,” which contributes to Wie’s success in her golf game and in building and maintaining an audience for that game (10).

Andrisani also points out that Wie’s height is key to her driving ability, and that “Wie’s height advantage over almost all her other female competitors is following a trend on the men’s PGA Tour,” where some of the best male golfers—Tiger Woods, Phil Mickelson, Vijay Singh, Retief
Goosen, and Ernie Els, are all over six feet tall. In addition, Andrisani points out that the men’s
golf game has also taken on more attention to physical training and fitness, and women golfers
are also “getting bigger and stronger” (18-19).

Wie also receives different attention from golf commentators than her female peers. For
example, Andrew C. Billings, James Angelini, and Susan Eastman analyzed television
commentary of Wie’s 2004 televised appearances in both LPGA and PGA events, and compared
this commentary to previous studies of commentary for other PGA and LPGA players, including
Tiger Woods and Annika Sorenstam. Billings, Angelini, and Eastman found that some comments
about Wie were more similar to comments made about male golfers than they were to those
made about female golfers. For example, comments about Wie’s finesse, or shot making ability,
was more similar to comments about male player’s finesse (75), but “depictions of Wie’s
composure and consonance (i.e., good luck or ‘having it together’) were more like those of
other female golfers, whereas comments about Wie’s experience were more like those about
male golfers, at least regarding her successes” (76). Another interesting result were the
comments that referred to a golfer’s emotionality or emotional state. According to Billings,
Angelini, and Eastman, “although not one comment about male golfers referred to their
emotions, 7.9% of comments related to female golfers’ emotional states, and a lesser amount
(3%) to Wie’s presumed emotional state, placing Wie about halfway between the two gender
groups” (77). In this understanding, discussions of Wie by both golf analysts and sports writers
tend to position her as a bit of an oddity in golf, with some narratives framing Wie as more
masculine than other women’s golfers, or at least positioning Wie as somewhere between
normative descriptions of male and female golfers. Therefore, comments about Wie often
situated her as different from other women players, in much the same way that media attention
focused on Williams as outside of the social norms for women’s tennis. Like Williams, Wie would eventually utilize this blurring of masculine and feminine qualities, or this “exceptional” framing, for her own purposes, such as gaining entry into men’s tournaments (discussed later in the chapter).

At the same time, however, and despite Wie’s obvious strength and her imposing size, she was also often described as graceful, delicate, and feminine. Adelson claims Wie’s hands, though “strong enough to whip a club around her body like a light saber,” were also “soft and feminine,” and though her body, with its long legs and arms “screamed power,” “everything about her soft and delicate face whispered fragility” (6-7). In fact, the media’s portrayal of Wie early in her career often reflected typical stereotypes about Asian and Asian American women as feminine, delicate, innocent, and exotic. Asian American scholars Kent A. Ono and Vincent N. Pham identify two primary stereotypes often applied to Asian American women: the Lotus Blossom, Madame Butterfly, or China Doll on one hand, which are similar to the virgin stereotype applied to white women and the Dragon Lady, Geisha or “hypersexualized Manga babe,” which correspond to the whore narrative (66). According to Ono and Pham, depictions that rely on the Lotus Blossom framework situate Asian American women as “sexually attractive and alluring and demure, passive, obedient, physically non-imposing, self-sacrificial, and supplicant (especially to white male suitors),” noting importantly that Asian American women are thus constructed “both as sexual objects and as lacking power; indeed, the lack of power is intrinsic to the representation of sexual desirability” (66).

Adjectives such as soft, delicate, feminine, and fragile—which have been used by Adelson and other golf media to discuss Wie—seem incongruent with Wie’s atypical height and physicality, especially when such characteristics are not exactly common in other women
golfers. For example, at the close of the 2014 LPGA season only one other golfer in the top twenty-five of the money earnings was listed at 6’ or above, and the average height of players in the top twenty-five was 5’6”. Despite other qualities that made Wie stand out from her golfing peers, qualities such as her height, the average distance she drove the ball, or even her age sometimes took a backseat to discussions of Wie’s “soft” features or feminine style. Like the gendered and racialized narratives that situated Williams as outside of the social norms for women’s tennis players, these discourses also positioned Wie as different from other women’s golfers. However, whereas media discourses emphasized Williams’ masculinity, discussions of Wie often hyperfeminized her and in some ways infantilized her, undermining her seriousness as a competitor in much the same way that media representations of the U.S. women’s soccer team as girls rather than women made these women “safe” and non-threatening to established gender norms. Together with discourses that focused on Wie’s exceptionality, these racialized and gendered narratives actually worked to situate Wie as more acceptable to the male golfing community. That is, because she was different from other women’s golfers, male golfers did not have to fear that other women would try to play in their tournaments, and because Wie was suitably feminine, or because she inhabited racialized and gendered expectations for Asian women’s behavior, she was seen as non-threatening to the established social norms of golf.

But though the media focused on Wie’s delicate, feminine qualities, Wie herself seemed to emphasize them as well. In fact, Wie seems to have deliberately sought a traditionally feminine ethos, even as she sought to play head to head with the men. For example, Wie was conscious of her height and at 15, already had a longtime beautician who styled her hair (Adelson 74). During a 2004 interview for 60 Minutes, when Wie was 14, “she called herself ‘freakishly tall’ and said she didn’t want to grow any more,” seemingly embarrassed at her
physical prowess. According to Adelson, Wie “hid the power [in her swing] as well as she hid her emotions. And yet, even at 16, she exuded femininity almost without knowing she had it” (6-7). Adelson insinuates here that Wie deliberately hid her power and strength, as if it, like her emotions, was something she may not be able to control, or was a liability that could be used against her. Why would Wie attempt to hide her strength, the part of her game that was the most spectacular, that helped her stand out from other players? Perhaps Wie wanted to present herself as traditionally feminine, despite her clear physicality. Or perhaps it was an attempt to balance the more physically imposing aspects of her identity and ethos with a more normative feminine ethos, one that was more expected of an Asian American women. According to Sheridan Prasso, who has written about Asia for over 15 years, “often, Asian women are aware of these Western perceptions of Asian Mystique and know how to play them to advantage” (394). The “Asian Mystique” refers to the antiquated and contorted Western perception of Asia as sensual, exotic, and decadent, and Sheridan argues that years of Western stereotypes, fantasies, fears and mythologies about Asia create the culture of the Asian Mystique, but that Americans perpetuate such narratives, “literally buying it as well as buying into it” (395). In this way, Western consumer culture often creates the expectation that Asian and Asians American women will display typically feminine qualities, but knowing this expectation, Asian and Asian American women may also capitalize on this stereotype, using it to gain trust and build ethos with their audience.

This emphasis on Wie’s appearance, innocence, and femininity reveals a clear stereotype about Asian women, and positions Wie in stark contrast to female athletes of other racial backgrounds, such as Williams. While Williams was often described as masculine and her physical strength was emphasized, Wie is more often described as feminine and delicate, despite
her relatively unusual height (Wie is very tall for a golfer, whereas there are many tennis players that are taller than Williams, though Williams’ height is emphasized and Wie’s often is not) and her impressive driving range. Gender studies scholars Karen D. Pyke and Denise L. Johnson argue that “while Black women are masculinized as aggressive and overpowering, Asian women are rendered hyperfeminine: passive, weak, quiet, excessively submissive, slavishly dutiful, sexually exotic, and available for white men” (36). In addition, Pyke and Johnson’s study of second-generation Korean and Vietnamese American women reveals that for these women, race, more than any other factor (such as culture or individual personalities), determined variations in femininity. According to Pyke and Johnson, “despite their own situational variation in doing gender, they [respondents] treat gender as a racialized feature of bodies rather than a sociocultural product. Specific gender displays, such as a submissive demeanor, are required to confirm an Asian identity” (49-50). Therefore, while the media works to emphasize Wie’s femininity, Wie herself may also be reinforcing such typically feminine stereotypes, simply by trying to negotiate her identity as a Korean American. In addition, Pyke and Johnson argue that discourses that cast black women as “not feminine enough and Asian women as too feminine” serve to reinforce white forms of gender as “normal and superior,” subsequently awarding white women more racial privilege (36). In predominantly white, country club sports like golf and tennis, black women and Asian women are racially othered, and white, heterosexual femininity is heralded over other variations of femininity.

**Exotic Appeal: Inhabiting Social Norms**

In the previous section, I explained how Wie’s situated ethos was influenced by racialized and gendered discourses that emphasized Wie as exceptional and exotic. Such

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50 Michelle Wie, who was born in Hawaii but whose parents both emigrated from Korea, would fall into this category, and is precisely of the demographic that Pyke and Johnson studied.
discourses tend to emphasize Wie’s femininity and sexuality, positioning her as an object or product to be consumed by a captive audience. However, I argue that Wie’s ability to inhabit these social norms actually allowed her to gain entry into tournaments that would otherwise be unavailable to her, complicating this analysis of Wie as only and always objectified. In this way, Wie’s performances of ethos demonstrates the ways in which agency might be developed through both inhabiting and subverting social norms, which may occur simultaneously. This understanding extends feminist sports studies scholarship that focuses on how women might use the care of the self and dedicated athletic training to subvert social norms (for example, Gwen Chapman, David Johns and Jennifer Johns, and Jennifer Wesley, among others) to suggest that instead of reading certain actions and behaviors as efforts to resist dominant systems of power, these actions must also be understood as reinscribing alternative forms of power. That is, efforts to “subvert” social norms are still located within systems of power, and resistance to these norms does not allow an individual to escape power relations, it just means that the individual participates in a slightly different form of power. Instead, I want to focus on the ways in which individuals embody social norms, and how these practices might make possible certain modes of being. In this way, agency does not just exist in one’s resistance to or subversion of social norms, but might also arise from the ways in which one inhabits those norms.

For example, Wie’s sex appeal was utilized as a selling point by both Wie herself and also by the LPGA. Her golfing ability and her composure did not match her age, and combined with her height and physical build, Wie was often mistaken for being much older, a mature woman rather than a young teenager. Ty Votaw, the LPGA commissioner from 1999-2005, first saw Wie in 2002, when she was 13, and assumed Wie was about 25 (Adelson 28). Likewise, Christina Kim, an LPGA veteran and a friend of Wie’s said of Wie at 16, “Physically, she’s got
the body of a rockin’ 25-year old. She’s a hot chick” (qtd. in Adelson 7). This fact was not lost on golf fans, who nearly always made Wie’s galleries—the group of fans that follows a player around the golf course—the largest of the competition, no matter who Wie was playing against, and often the loudest, too, with shouts of “Hot body!” heard in the midst of the otherwise typically quiet golf crowds (Adelson 7). According to Adelson, this type of attention was important for women’s golf, which did not attract the same viewership as men’s golf, or even as other women’s sports, like the Women’s World Cup team had done. Adelson explains that the LPGA “has rarely been seen as ‘feminine,’ flashy, or sexy,” and is often viewed by male sports fans as “a haven for lesbians,” evident by the nickname “Lesbians Playing Golf Association” (128). Unlike other women’s sports, the LPGA “had no must-see players back then who could appeal to young women or 18-to-35-year-old men,” no female athletes like Mia Hamm, Brandi Chastain, Kerri Walsh, Marion Jones, or Serena Williams, whose dominant performances and striking appearances immediately grabbed an audience’s attention (Adelson 128). But then Wie burst onto the scene, and she was young and conventionally attractive, and her Asian American racial background stood out amidst the predominantly white golf community.

Wie and the LPGA both aimed at drawing attention to Wie’s ability to attract an audience, situating golfing as entertainment, not necessarily athleticism. For example, once she became a professional golfer, she hired an “image consultant,” David Lipman, who helps her “define her physical persona, both on and off the golf course” (Lipman in Fortune magazine, qtd. in Mario 115). “Physical persona,” which Lipman seems to use to describe Wie’s appearance and public demeanor, as well as her athletic performance, might be another way of saying _bodily ethos_, a term that rhetoric scholar Debra Hawhee uses to explain the way that repeated bodily
performance, through such things as athletic practice, leads one to internalize such movements, becoming what one practices (146).

Likewise, in 2002, the same year he saw Wie play in her first LPGA event, LPGA commissioner Votaw created the “Five Points of Celebrity” program, designed to create a more modern look for the LPGA. According to Votaw, “The LPGA is competing not just in the golf industry but also in the sports entertainment industry. Our success and our members’ success will be determined by how well the LPGA meets consumers’ entertainment wishes” (qtd. in Adelson 130-131). Votaw’s Five Points—Performance, Approachability, Passion, Appearance, and Relevance—suggested specific attention to a golfer’s public image or ethos and her physical appearance, and reflected, as Adelson points out, “Michelle Wie come to life” (131).

Importantly, Votaw’s program focused on how the golfers functioned as entertainers\textsuperscript{51}, an important distinction from their role as simply golfers. To shift the focus from one’s golfing to one’s entertainment ability meant that skilled golfing was not “enough,” but rather, the women golfers should also be concerned with how they appeared to fans and with fans’ reactions. And, to a certain extent, it meant that momentary lapses in great play might be overcome by other factors, such as passion for the game. Note that Votaw’s program aimed at “celebrity,” not necessarily winning championships. In this way, Wie fit in perfectly with the new image of the LPGA that Votaw aimed to create. Though she was relatively unproven on the golf course—she had yet to win a professional tournament, though her performance consistently left her in the top 25, including four top-ten finishes while Votaw was commissioner—Wie had great rapport with fans and the media, and attracted a bigger audience than other players. As Laura Neal, director of

\textsuperscript{51} Like Williams and Chastain, Wie’s ability to entertain an audience was a significant factor in her ability to build ethos, and served as a modality of action that allowed her greater opportunities as an athlete. The entertainment factor as it relates to ethos (and athletics more generally) will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
public relations for the LPGA explains, “Whenever Michelle Wie tees it up, more media follow her, more people tune in to our telecast, and more people get on the website and check out the scores” (qtd. in Mario 167). Wie’s ability to entertain an audience and capture their attention would eventually be used as a modality of action that allowed her to participate in more golf tournaments, and to challenge social norms that separated men’s and women’s athletic competition.

In this way, Wie’s willingness to inhabit certain racial and gender norms complicates the traditional feminist objectification critique because it is specifically Wie’s submission to these ideals that allows her to then participate in men’s tournaments and eventually challenge some of these gender norms. As I discussed in previous chapters, the post-Title IX female athlete often has a different understanding of how women’s bodies are represented in the public sphere. For example, feminist sports studies scholars Leslie Heywood and Shari Dworkin suggest that post-Title IX female athletes—those that have grown up after Title IX’s passing in 1972 and have thus always experienced its benefits—“tend to see physical appearance as a marketing asset that is not necessarily gender-specific, pointing to the ways the male body has itself become sexualized and commodified in recent media culture, and the ways male athletes are increasingly valued for aesthetic reasons as well as for their athletic successes” (39). In this interpretation, though Wie’s bodily behaviors and practices reinforced a particular social norm for women, she is able to repurpose this image, redeploying gendered and racialized discourses for her own purposes and agendas, such as gaining entry into men’s golf tournaments.

Votaw’s program also highlights the importance of developing and performing ethos. Aside from the emphasis on golfing results, Votaw’s Five Points of Celebrity all relate to how one presents herself to a golfing audience and how one is perceived by that audience. For
example, approachability and relevance in part depend on the interchange between audience and athlete/rhetor. They are negotiated between the two parties and they require an audience to grant “approachability” or “relevance”. In addition, appearance and passion are things that are mostly performed: they are publicly displayed actions that have symbolic meaning. Wie’s embellished earrings, dramatic eyeliner, and perfectly styled hair signal aspects of normative femininity. Her triumphant fist pumps after sinking a putt and her progressive crouch as her ball travels closer and closer to the hole suggest a sense of focus and intensity that audiences gravitate toward.

Because ethos is co-constructed between rhetor/performer and audience, Wie needed a captive audience to bear witness to and negotiate her performances of ethos. In addition, the cultural values and narratives deemed important to that audience—for example, the normative femininity that Wie displayed, combined with youth and expressive putting—also influence who is granted ethos and how that ethos is developed.

In addition, Wie also perhaps reflected the model minority myth, which positioned her more favorably in the eyes of her audience. According to Frank H. Wu, the dominant image of Asians in the United States is based on the model minority myth, in which Asians are assumed to be intelligent, hard working, family-oriented, law-abiding, and successful. Wu compares the model minority myth to the Horatio Alger tale, just “updated for the new millennium with an ‘Oriental’ face and imbued with Asian values” (40-41). Ono and Pham even suggest that Tiger Woods, who is of mixed black, Caucasian, American Indian, and Asian ancestry, is often framed to represent “mixed-race Asian Americans as the wave of the future, harbingers of the end of racism,” but that his connection to Nike also markets him as a “‘Horatio Alger figure’ that has been commodified through the media” (Ono and Pham 180). Curiously, while Wie and Woods are often compared, the media often focuses on her youth, driving ability, and celebrity status in
their comparison (Mario 64), and does not mention that Wie and Woods are both Asian American. Instead, Woods’ black racial identity is often highlighted, and Wie is framed as “Hawaiian” as well as Asian American. In addition to her playing ability, part of Wie’s appeal is that she fulfills the model minority myth. According to Wu, “in the view of other Americans, Asian Americans vindicate the American Dream” (44), and in this interpretation, Wie lives up to the expectation that Asian Americans are hard-working and successful, and that the American Dream is obtainable, ignoring the power structures of race and class that often make it impossible for minorities to get ahead. In this way, while Wie resists certain social norms—for example, those that dictate she play only against women—she also seems to reinforce other social norms, such as this model minority myth.

An additional factor in the excitement surrounding Wie might also have been the relative absence of Asian Americans in popular culture. According to Adelson, in 1989, the year Wie was born, while there were Asian American leaders in business, the sciences and academia, there were few in the media, entertainment, and politics, and “Asian Americans were even rarer in sports” (102). As Adelson points out, “when ESPN compiled its list of greatest athletes of the 20th century, the number of Asian Americans who made the top one hundred was zero. That’s three fewer Asian Americans than horses” (Adelson 102). The lack of recognition for Asian American athletes also meant that there were few cultural narratives about Asian American

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52 For example, commentators often mention that Wie is from Hawaii or use comments referring to Wie as “Hawaiian” or as a “Hawaii native,” comments that emphasize her exoticism and her difference from other American players, whose hometowns are not often mentioned. These comments are more likely to occur in nationally televised broadcasts, and are especially troubling because in Hawaii, one is only referred to as Hawaiian if they are descendants of Native Hawaiians, not simply because they reside in Hawaii, unlike the way one may describe a California resident as a Californian.

53 Some notable exceptions are U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye from Hawaii, who was first elected in 1962 and became the most senior-ranking Senator in 2010 through his death in 2012, and Connie Chung, a national news anchor and reporter in the 80s.
athleticism in the popular media, making Wie’s athletic achievement seem even more extraordinary. In addition, not only was Wie exoticized for her Asian American ancestry, but she also appeared doubly exotic because of the relatively small number of successful Asian and Asian American athletes. Because there were such limited discourses about Asian and Asian American athletes, Wie’s performance seemed even more spectacular and attracted even more attention. It also meant that her narratives became the dominant narratives for other Asian and Asian American athletes. In this way, Wie’s performances of ethos and embodied subjectivity also shaped expectations about the Asian and Asian American subject.

**Training a Bodily Ethos to Resist Social Norms**

While the previous section discussed the ways in which Wie inhabited established social norms, it is also important to note, that Wie also expressed an explicit desire to break down barriers and challenge the status quo from a young age, a desire that I think was trained in part by her father and in part due to the limited playing opportunities available to Wie in Hawaii. That is, I argue that repeated exposure to training and competing with and against men from a young age conditioned Wie that such practices were not only acceptable, but specifically beneficial for improving her athletic performance. In this way, the repeated behaviors and habits that Wie cultivated by competing against men and boys become aspects of her subjectivity, which later allow her to articulate a different social reality for women golfers.

When Wie was 10, she wrote a letter that was published in *ESPN the Magazine’s* November 27, 2000 issue, which mentioned that when she watched golf on TV she watched “the PGA tour, not the LPGA,” because “I like the golfers on the PGA Tour better. I want to play on the PGA Tour. My favorite golfer is Tiger Woods. I think I can beat him in the near future. Like when I’m 15.” (qtd. in Adelson xii). And in the 2004 segment for *60 Minutes*, when Wie was 14,
she said “playing women’s tournaments over and over again might make her bored with golf,” and that growing up playing golf with her dad taught her that “men’s egos can be easily brought down” (qtd. in Adelson 125). At this point, Wie already had lots of experience playing against men and boys, in part simply because Hawaii has a relatively small golf community and there just weren’t enough women’s tournaments for her to play in. Casey Nakama, Wie’s first golf coach, explains that there were only two or three women’s tournaments a year in Hawaii, and so in order to play in more tournaments and compete more often, Wie entered typically male-only events starting when she was just 11 years old (Adelson 25). These repeated practices of playing against male golfers (and much older golfers) allows Wie to normalize such behaviors, rather than seeing these practices as necessarily resistant.

While Wie’s age at the time that she made these statements must be taken into consideration, they can be read as a sophisticated understanding of the complicated interrelationship between gender and athletics. For example, Wie’s insistence on watching and eventually playing on the PGA rather than the LPGA tour suggests that Wie has internalized ideas of male athletic superiority or has recognized that men’s golf is of a different status professionally and athletically than women’s golf. Importantly, however, she seems undaunted by normative gender expectations that dictate that women play in the Ladies’ PGA, and men play in the (unmarked) PGA. In fact, following the 2004 U.S. Amateur Public Links championship, in which the winner got an invitation to the PGA’s highly esteemed Masters event and Wie had advanced to the quarterfinals, playing against men, Wie responded to critics of her goal to play in men’s events by pointing out, “It’s the PGA Tour. Not the MPGA” (qtd. in Adelson 72-73). Wie’s statements about the PGA and her desire to play in it suggest that Wie considers the PGA of a different caliber than the LPGA, perhaps with better players, more exposure, and possibly
more money from sponsors. It also shows that Wie is aware of normative gender expectations and constructions and specifically wants to challenge them. She points out that the men’s tour is not marked or named for the sex of its participants, but that it only specifies it is a professional tour. The women’s tour, on the other hand, has the modifier Ladies’, and is marked in reference to the men’s tour, which not only suggest that it is of a lesser quality than the men’s tour, but also specifies a certain type of woman: one who is generally well-behaved and virtuous, and who typically belongs to a certain socio-economic class. Wie’s comment also draws attention to the fact that the PGA tournament technically does not exclude on the basis of sex, and therefore, Wie should be allowed to participate in PGA events, and women golfers should not be insulted, because Wie has simply chosen to play in an event sponsored by a different professional organization. Wie’s attempts to play PGA tournaments are actions that not only resist the social norms of golf, but that also articulate the possibility of an alternative reality for women golfers: in emphasizing the PGA not MPGA, Wie suggests the possibility of men and women playing together on one tour, rather than on separate tours distinguished by sex.

However, Wie’s assertion that playing women’s tournaments repeatedly might make her “bored with golf” also suggests a belief that men’s golf is somehow inherently better and more exciting, and that if Wie really wants to excel at golf, she should aim to play against men, because women will never fully challenge her. In this way, Wie’s statements can also be read as demonstrating a lack of understanding about the impact of emphasizing men’s sports as more exciting than women’s sports. This is a complicated set of statements, because on the one hand it suggests that Wie’s goal of playing with men is to challenge herself and to challenge the expectations for women and women’s athletic performance, but it also subtly reinforces stereotypical understandings of men’s athletic dominance and supports assumptions about men’s
athletics as inherently more exciting, more competitive, and of a higher quality than women’s athletics. Wie’s desire to play against men detracts from the women’s golf tour as a whole, and emphasizes Wie as extraordinary, rather than representative of women’s golf. Rather than proving that women’s golf is just as exciting or just as competitive as men’s golf, and the players just as skilled, Wie’s statements actually suggest that she is unusual in women’s golf, which is of a lessor caliber than the men’s game, and therefore, Wie, but not necessarily other women golfers, should play with men. In addition, by suggesting that the men’s game is more exciting, Wie perpetuates discourses that affirm men’s sports over and above women’s sports, further entrenching these stereotypes in the dominant discourse about sport.

These statements also work in an interesting way to build Wie’s ethos. On the one hand, her reinforcement of men’s athletics as superior likely frustrated other women golfers, and it works to separate Wie from her female golfing peers. In fact, several top women players seemed offended by Wie’s ambition to play against men, especially since Wie had not even won an LPGA event yet. For example, Hall of Famer Nancy Lopez called Wie’s goal “a little insulting. She should play out here [on the LPGA tour] and try to beat Annika [Sorenstam] first” (qtd. in Mario 64). Laura Davies, a British pro, also said that while Wie was a great player, “if I was her I’d be more concerned about trying to beat Annika, about trying to be the best women’s golfer, before worrying about all that other stuff” [playing on the PGA tour] (qtd. in Mario 72). In this way, Wie’s explicit statements about wanting to play with men shaped her ethos as that of an outsider, or as someone who does not feel compelled to follow the social norms of the golf community. This was a bit of a risk because of how closely ethos is tied to epideictic rhetoric. In chapter two, I explained the way that epideictic rhetoric is related to the social values of a community, and thus how epideictic rhetoric and ethos often reinforce each other: the epideictic
speaker gains ethos by communicating the values of the culture, and then because the epideictic speaker has gained ethos, he or she helps shape the values of the culture. Wie’s statements, however, do not reflect the values of the community, but challenge them. On the other hand, Wie’s statements separate her from the rest of the women’s golf community and work to situate her as a golfer, no modifier needed. Thus, while she separates herself from women golfers, she also effectively works to build her ethos as a golfer (unmarked) first and foremost. In this way, Wie seems to direct her audience to grant her ethos based solely on her golfing ability as a whole, not just on her golfing ability as it compares to other women golfers. In this way, she challenges sport’s insistence on an ontological distinction based on sex, as well as the epideictic rhetoric that continues to reinforce this insistence.

Wie’s assertion that men’s egos “can be easily brought down” also suggests recognition of both gendered expectations regarding athletic performance and of the renegotiation required when one challenges those gender expectations. That is, she demonstrates a balance between resisting social norms and negotiating those norms. Wie’s statement also implies that men’s egos not only can be “brought down,” but that they should be. Her acknowledgement of men’s egos and the implication that they are built and formed through athletic performance suggests a knowledge of at least one way in which men perform public credibility, through athletic competence. In asserting that their egos can be “brought down,” Wie implies that her own athletic performance also helps her to build public credibility, or ethos, and that her ability to do so may, in comparison, challenge the ethos of male peers. The contention that this can be done “easily” also seems to suggest that men rely primarily on their athletic performance in order to build ethos, and that out-performing men can be something relatively achievable for women.
Likewise, during a press conference prior to the 2006 U.S. Women’s Open, Wie was asked if she thought her example would get more young girls interested in golf. Wie responded, “I think that girls are starting to realize that we can throw out our Barbies and start playing sports. People might think golf’s a pansy sport. You’re walking five miles every day if you’re playing eighteen holes. I think that’s a great way of being fit” (qtd. in Adelson 173). Wie also seems to have considered herself a role model not just for women’s and young girls’ participation in golf, but in their pursuit of overcoming other socially imposed limitations. In a conversation with sports psychologist Jim Loehr, Loehr asked Wie why golf meant so much to her. “I guess I play golf,” Wie said, ‘because I want to be a living testimony. Most barriers to women are self-imposed.’” When pressed, Wie explained, “All I’ve done is break records. I started out on a boys’ baseball team. I was the best hitter. Limitations are pretty artificial. I can be a statement for that” (qtd. in Adelson 59). Wie’s explanation suggests not only a mature understanding of the role of professional athletes in the public sphere, namely, that they hold a privileged position in society and are often granted a ready audience to potentially influence, but also that her athletic performance itself might function as a type of epideictic rhetoric with the potential to influence social change. Using Cynthia Sheard’s understanding of epideictic rhetoric as “a vision that inspires, even compels an audience to act” (787), Wie’s statements both raise attention to the fact that women are still limited by gender expectations, while simultaneously leading the audience to view Wie’s golfing performances as efforts to establish change. In this way, Wie implies that her own resistance to social norms—her success playing with and against boys as a child—have created certain modalities of action that allow her to “testify” that women’s limitations may not be as limiting as they seem.
In addition, while Wie’s suggestion that women’s limitations are “self-imposed” might be quite troubling for feminists and for other female athletes, her statement also might be read as a critique of the power of epideictic rhetoric: the same discourses and vision that might compel an audience to act can also function to reinforce a particular understanding or cultural value, entrenching stereotypes or discourses that an individual herself might embrace, such as the example of Williams’ seeming acceptance of narratives about the dominant black athlete. At the same time, such statements reveal a sense of self-authorship that Heywood and Dworkin associate with the post-Title IX female athlete who thinks of herself and her self image as capable of being shaped and constructed, and as the agent of such constructions. However, because ethos is negotiated between audience and the rhetor or performer, the cultural narratives and epideictic rhetoric surrounding sport continue to perpetuate gendered expectations for female athletes, even as they give the appearance of self-authorship.

Reframing Resistance

Wie’s efforts to situate her athletic performance as entertainment and her attempts to resist gendered social norms associated with golf also illustrates the ways in which deliberate training and the care of the self can lead to different ways of inventing the self and developing the subject. In chapter two, I explained that an athlete’s training practices—that is, the very the process of subjecting oneself to disciplinary practices—that then allows this transformation and invention to take place. Thus, I want to suggest that Wie’s efforts to play on the PGA tour can be read as a trained response cultivated through years of playing with and against men. In addition, Wie’s efforts to situate her athletic performance as entertainment and her attempts to resist gendered social norms associated with golf can be read as modalities of action that allowed her
to reframe her resistance in ways that were more appealing to the predominantly male golfing community.

This rhetorical strategy might be especially useful for speakers whose situated ethos positions them as outside of the dominant community. For example, it is important to consider the long history of gender exclusion in the golf world, and the underlying masculinity reinforced by the country club setting of most golf courses. *The New York Times’* Charles McGrath notes that while golf’s handicap systems allows men and women to compete more equally, “when it comes to women, golf has proved only slightly more tolerant than most organized religions have been about admitting female clergy” (McGrath). For example, Augusta National, the most premier golf course in the world and the site of the PGA’s Masters Tournament, did not admit women as members until 2012, and numerous golf clubs still treat women members as second-class, limiting their access to certain times or days, and even excluding them from particular areas of the facility (McGrath). Jessica Holden Sherwood adds that “country club members’ expectations of their women are influenced by norms about femininity,” such as compliance, nurturance, and empathy. In the country club setting, Sherwood explains, “gender segregation is more culturally accepted than explicit racial segregation. Some club members speak approvingly of separating the sexes, in a way that they would not, today, of separating ‘the races’” (127-128).

These exclusionary practices that reinforce a normative masculinity are not unique to golf’s country clubs either, but are also perpetuated by golf analysts and even the LPGA itself. In the late 80s, former LPGA commissioner Ray Volpe, known for trying to make the LPGA tour “more sexy” told *Sports Illustrated*, “Something that was holding the women back financially was the butch image, so we tried to deal with it,” (qtd. in Diaz). The apparent solution? The next commissioner, Charles Mechem “encouraged players to appear in fashion layouts, declaring,
‘I’m not at all against marketing our attractiveness’” (qtd. in Cross). Or, as Todd Crossett put it, “the tour’s promotion of itself is very similar to that of the annual Miss America contest—a simultaneous promotion of wholesomeness and sexuality, of Puritan sensibilities and the legitimation of men’s entitlement to use women’s bodies for their sexual gratification” (Crossett 129). Even as late as 1995, golf commentator Ben Wright claimed “women are handicapped by their boobs,” because they made it more difficult for female players to keep their arms straight while hitting the ball, and that “lesbians in the sport hurt women’s golf” (qtd. in Festle 265).

It should come as no surprise then, that Wie’s desire to play against male golfers brought criticism from both golf analysts and her fellow golfers of both genders. *Sports Illustrated*’s Frank Deford suggested Wie should “play against her own kind,” and suggested that Wie’s insistence on playing against men would actually be detrimental to women’s golf: “You may beat most men on the golf course, but every time you try that, you’re beating women’s sports more than you’re beating men golfers” and that playing against men would “detract from women’s golf and, really, all of women’s sport” (qtd. in Mario 100). These comments are interesting given the emphasis placed on playing against men in other sports, such as Brandi Chastain’s suggestion that highly skilled girl soccer players play on boys’ teams or her discussion of practicing with men, or Serena William’s longtime male hitting partner or her claim that more young female tennis players should practice with boys because they are stronger and faster. While Chastain and Williams focus mainly on the training benefits of playing with and against men in practice situations and not necessarily in competitive events, this sort of practice seems more frowned upon in golf than in other sports. For example, it is also rather common for women’s college basketball teams to utilize a practice squad of men to scrimmage against or for women’s college and professional volleyball teams to practice hitting and blocking
against men, who sometimes jump higher and hit at a different trajectory than most women. Therefore, it seems that not only is it common for women to utilize playing with and against men as a training tool, but that efforts to build one’s ethos based on athletic performance often means a positioning of the female athlete and of professional sports as entertainers in an entertainment-related industry. In this way, the measurement of comparison between male and female athletes is not necessarily how fast one runs or how far one can hit the ball, but how well one can captivate an audience, how well one can solicit and cultivate that audience, or in other words, how well one can use her ethos to influence an audience. Shifting the focus from a physical comparison to one based on entertainment ability provides female athletes with a modality of action that allows them to work within established social norms, providing other avenues of agency besides the mere resistance of social norms.

In comparing the reception Wie received from other players at PGA events versus LPGA events, her coach at the time Gary Gilchrist, directly emphasized Wie’s entertainment value, her ability to attract an audience. According to Gilchrist, Wie seemed better received at the PGA events than at the LPGA matches she played. He claims, “I would think that a lot of the LPGA would’ve seen what happened with Tiger Woods and say, ‘Here’s somebody that’s coming on our Tour, who’s not taking any of our [prize] money and marketing our Tour for free.’” (qtd. in Mario 64). Gilchrist’s statement focuses not on Wie’s playing ability, but on the fact that she is able to market the tour and women’s golf as a sport, and that because she was still an amateur at the time, she was doing this marketing and ethos-building without ever taking a share of the prize money.

In addition, while Wie received a lot of media attention for playing against the men on the PGA tour, she was not the only woman to have done so. Babe Didrikson Zaharias was the
first woman to play in a PGA event in 1938, and she became the first (and so far, only) woman to make the tournament cut at a regular PGA tour event at the 1945 Los Angeles Open. Annika Sorenstam also played in a PGA event, the 2003 Bank of America Colonial tournament, where she led through the first round in driving accuracy, but missed the cut. Although Sorenstam called her own experience playing in a PGA event “a turning point in my career and as a person,” she criticized Wie’s persistence in playing in PGA events, claiming, “I really don’t know why Michelle continues to do this” (qtd. in “Sorenstam”). In particular, Sorenstam questioned Wie’s choice to skip an LPGA event (in this case, the 2008 Women’s British Open) in favor of the PGA event: “We have a major this week, and if you can’t qualify for a major, I don’t see any reason why you should play with the men” (qtd. in “Sorenstam”). This criticism is interesting given Sorenstam’s own positive experience playing in a men’s event, and the improvement in her playing ability that Sorenstam claims was a result of playing in the PGA event. Indeed, Mario notes that before the Colonial, Sorenstam won 22 percent of the LPGA events that she entered, but in the three years immediately following the Colonial her winning percentage improved to 46 percent (142). Importantly though, Sorenstam’s criticism is not of women golfers playing against men, but of a certain caliber of women golfers who attempt to play against men. Although Sorenstam credits her PGA experience as improving her play on the LPGA tour and seems to frame the one-time appearance as a learning event, when it comes to Wie’s playing against the men, Sorenstam suggests Wie must first “prove” she is good enough. These comments only reinforce cultural narratives that situate men’s sports as inherently more competitive or of a higher quality than women’s sports. In addition, Sorenstam’s assertion that Wie could not qualify for a major is somewhat misleading. While Wie had not made the cut at a major in 2008, she qualified for the LPGA Championship in 2007 and finished tied for third at
the same Women’s British Open event in 2005. However, Sorenstam’s point that Wie should not miss an LPGA major tournament to play a PGA event suggests that Wie’s ethos was (at the time) not yet established among her peers.

Another underlying factor in the animosity Wie received from other LPGA players might be due to differences in her bodily behaviors and practices on the golf course. For example, though Wie did have several well-publicized etiquette blunders early in her career, other women’s golfers seemed unnecessarily critical of Wie and other Asian golfers who participated on the tour. For example Prasso notes that in October of 2003 (when Wie was new to the national golf scene), LPGA star Jan Stephenson told Golf Magazine that the recent success of Korean players Se Ri Pak and Grace Park was bad news for the LPGA: “They’ve taken it over. This is probably going to get me into trouble, but the Asians are killing our tour, absolutely killing it—their lack of emotion, their refusal to speak English when they can speak English. They rarely speak” (qtd. in Prasso 133-134).

While Stephenson mentions the foreign-born Pak and Park and not the American-born Wie, her statements suggest a fear and overt racism toward these Asian players, and situates them as outsiders that threaten to take over the LPGA Tour, which is not, by the way specifically American. Annika Sorenstam, one of the most successful and revered LPGA golfers of all time, is Swedish, though Stephenson did not seem concerned about her participation on the Tour, and Stephenson herself is Australian. Stephenson’s comments express disdain not necessarily toward international players, but toward the behaviors of certain players—their mannerisms and lack of chatter. In addition, Stephenson’s emphasis on language use seems focused more on the players’ lack of attention to convention rather on the specific language that is spoken. Her comments do not mention any misunderstanding or problem in translation between different languages, for
example, but rather focus on adherence to social norms on the golf course. Such comments single out a particular group of people based on race and bodily behavior, not on nationality. In addition, while Stephenson’s comments met harsh criticism from then LPGA commissioner Votaw, American players “privately applauded” (Markus).

Wie’s bodily behaviors and practices while playing in tournaments have been criticized by fellow golfers Danielle Ammaccapane, Brittany Lincicome, Alena Sharp, and Annika Sorenstam, among others in the golf media. Ammaccapane publicly complained about Michelle and her father’s lack of professionalism on the golf course during the 2003 Women’s U.S. Open (B.J. Wie was serving as Michelle’s caddie at the time), Lincicome noted after the 2006 HSBC Women’s World Match Play Championships that Wie did not talk much and didn’t concede certain short putts, as was customary in match play, and Sharp and Sorenstam both questioned the severity of Wie’s wrist injury when she withdrew from one tournament but then played in the 2007 LPGA Championships the following weekend.

These criticisms, while perhaps warranted, also happen to reflect the association of Asian American women with the Dragon Lady stereotype, or the belief that Asian and Asian American women are “untrustworthy, deceitful, conniving, and plotting,” and “may use sex or sexuality to get what she wants” (Ono and Pham 66). Such depictions of Asian and Asian American women suggest they are mysterious (Espiritu 10) and raise suspicion about their behavior, such as the

54 In match play, golfers are paired and compete elimination-style through 18 holes, with each hole being “won” by the player that shoots the lowest score for that hole. If players shoot the same score for a hole, no one wins the hole, and the player with the most holes won wins the round and advances to play against another player. Because of the format, match play can be conceded early, without playing a full 18 holes or without completing every shot for a hole. For example, if one player is already down two strokes on a given hole and her partner only needs to sink a short putt, it is common to concede the hole. Likewise, if one player has already won the first 10 holes, the round is over, because her partner cannot win enough of the remaining holes to gain the lead.

55 For more on these incidents in question, see Adelson and Mario.
seemingly “odd” way her parents approached Michelle’s golf career. For example, Michelle’s father B.J. often served as her caddy rather than hiring a professional caddy, and when Michelle became a professional, they hired a talent agency more commonly associated with actors and entertainers than with athletes to handle her affairs. Such unconventional decisions about Wie’s career, plus her relative silence about her wrist injuries, and her lack of expression on the golf course all led to suspicions about Wie’s integrity and personal character, which influenced her situated ethos.

These discourses therefore highlight the importance of understanding situated ethos and how the body often serves as a visible marker of one’s situated ethos. In this way, the body and one’s bodily habits and behaviors not only influence one’s invented ethos, but also influence the way one’s situated ethos is perceived. My analysis of Wie therefore extends current discussions of situated ethos to include the ways in which the body and bodily habits influence ethos, which is important for rhetorical scholarship because in many cases, these are factors that the speaker or performer cannot always utilize in the communicative exchange. That is, while a speaker might temper her argument to appeal to a skeptical audience or an athlete might choose to gain muscle (changing body shape) to intimidate an opponent, the body’s materiality poses limits on what can be realistically altered by the speaker. What this means is that not everyone has the same “available means” of persuasion from which to draw from, and this disparity often results in certain individuals being granted ethos, while others are ignored. It is also necessary to consider how cultural constructs such as race, gender, and class often operate together to influence one’s situated ethos, and how these constructs are in turn shaped by the discourses that perpetuate and continue to circulate them.
Inhabiting Social Norms, Training Celebrity

As I mentioned earlier in the chapter, Wie’s situated ethos was shaped in part by racialized and gendered narratives that situated her as outside of the social norms for women’s golf. While these narratives relied on racial stereotypes and exceptional discourses, Wie was actually able to utilize such discourses for her own purposes. That is, Wie specifically employs narratives that situate her as somehow different from other women’s golfers to suggest that she— as an entertainer who can attract a large audience—should have access to professional tournaments. In this way, Wie’s efforts to situate her athletic performance as entertainment and her attempts to resist gendered social norms associated with golf actually appear less threatening to the golfing community because Wie’s presence at these tournaments can be read as an anomaly, and not the new norm for women’s golf. More specifically, Wie manipulated her celebrity status and the intrigue associated with Asian American stereotypes for her own advantage, capitalizing on her ability to attract an audience and entertain that audience in order to gain access to men’s and women’s tournaments she would otherwise not be allowed to enter.

For example, although Wie turned professional in 2005, she did not become an LPGA member until the end of 2008. The LPGA requires that its members be at least 18 years of age, and because Wie was not even 16 years old when she became a professional, she was not eligible to join. Though other young players such as Morgan Pressel and Aree Song petitioned for early LPGA membership at age 17, Wie chose not to pursue early membership. Therefore, because Wie was not a member of the LPGA, she was only allowed to participate in LPGA events where she had been given a sponsor’s exemption to participate. Normally, amateurs and non-LPGA members who wanted to play in an LPGA event had to first qualify for the tournament by advancing through two rounds of 18-holes. These qualifying rounds are typically held the two
days prior to the start of the tournament, and then women who qualified for the main event—usually the top two finishers in the qualifying rounds—would play another four days and four rounds of golf (assuming they make the cut after the second day), for a possible total of 108 holes over six days. However, if given a sponsor’s exemption, a player was automatically included in the main tournament field and could skip the qualifying rounds altogether. Therefore, when Wie was granted a sponsor’s exemption, not only was she allowed to play in the event without being a member of the organization, but she was also able to bypass the qualifying rounds. In addition, because there are a limited number of sponsor’s exemptions granted per tournament, if Wie received an exemption, another possibly more deserving player either was left out of the tournament or had to go through qualifying rounds. In this way, though Wie did not compete with other LPGA members for prize money, she did compete for a playing spot in their tournaments.

For these reasons, Wie faced suspicion from the golf community because of her sponsor’s exemptions, which allowed her to compete in LPGA events without actually being a member of the LPGA. For example, several LPGA players and golf analysts believed Wie should have to “earn” her way into the LPGA tournaments by either becoming a member—which required completing “Q-School,” or Qualifying School, which is a series of multiple-round qualifying tournaments, after which the top finishers are rewarded with LPGA membership, and required Wie to be at least 18 years of age—or through advancing into the tournament via the qualifying rounds that her sponsor’s exemptions allowed her to bypass. But because of the media and fan attention Wie brought to tournaments, event sponsors wanted her to play in their tournaments (Adelson 65). In other words, because of the ethos that Wie had built, because of the audience that she had gained both in the media specifically and in the public sphere more generally, event

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sponsors wanted to capitalize on Wie’s ethos, using it as a marketing tool, and by and large, this strategy worked.

In 2004, Wie received a sponsor’s exemption to play in the PGA Tour’s Sony Open in Hawaii. She had tried to qualify for this event twice before, but had failed to make it each time. This year, however, Wie had an unlikely ally, then Hawaii governor Linda Lingle, who requested that Sony allow Wie in without having to go through the qualifying rounds. Sony agreed, and reaped the benefits: according to The Honolulu Advertiser, attendance at the event increased 76 percent from the previous year (“Wie Watched”). Sony would later become one of Wie’s first sponsors when she turned professional in 2005. These sponsor’s exemptions, and Wie’s opportunistic use of them, also suggest a complicated commodification culture surrounding athletics. On the one hand, Sony effectively capitalized on Wie’s physical presence at their tournament, selling her image and identity as a female athlete among male athletes. At the same time, however, Wie also commodified herself, taking advantage of the media and fan attention to gain access to tournaments she would otherwise be unable to attend. In this way, Wie recoded the attention to her young, female body in order to use such attention for her own purposes—playing in more golf tournaments—using media and fan attention as a modality of action that furthered her own interests and agendas.

In July of the same year, Wie received another unexpected invitation, this one to the U.S. Women’s Open. When she had played in the same event in 2003, she had done it by making it through the qualifying rounds, but this time, her invitation was based on her theoretical position on the LPGA’s money list. The top thirty-five players on the money list automatically receive an invitation to the U.S. Open, and had Wie accepted any of her winnings (she was still an amateur at the time), her play the previous year was good enough to finish twenty-eighth on the money
list. It was the first time an amateur had been given an automatic invitation to the U.S. Open, and
golf analysts were suspicious about preferential treatment of Wie. For example, Rob Sirak of
*Golf World* magazine asserted, “Here’s why Wie got a special exemption: It will help TV
ratings, give a boost to ticket sales … and it will guarantee Wie’s presence in other USGA
events. Simply put, now she owes them one” (qtd. in Mario 78-79). According to Mario, Wie
also faced resentment from LPGA players over the sponsor’s exemptions because she “appeared
to be an upstart, stealing media attention and fanfare for nothing more than extra publicity” (63).
But in the PGA’s Sony Open Wie missed the cut by a mere one stroke, and shot a second-round
score of 68, which was the lowest score ever recorded by a woman in a PGA event, and in the
2004 U.S. Women’s Open she tied for 13th, results that should have silenced critics of her play
on both the PGA and the LPGA tours.

In addition, tour organizers and event sponsors often had a different opinion on Wie’s
participation in these events, and specifically sought to capitalize on the audience and attention
Wie brought to tour events. For example, then PGA Tour vice president Ric Clarson explained
Wie’s 2004 Sony Open exemption in this way: “We’re in the entertainment business; it’s more
than just a golf tournament. So when a player like Michelle Wie plays in the Sony Open, it
creates national and international attention on, ‘Can she do it?’” (qtd. in Mario 75). Importantly,
while Clarson emphasizes Wie’s athletic ability, or whether or not she is able to compete
successfully against male golfers, his discussion of golf and the PGA Tour as entertainment
suggests that attracting an audience and maintaining that audience’s attention, or put differently,
the ability to build and develop one’s ethos, is of more importance than one’s physical abilities.
By situating golf, and professional sports more generally, as entertainment events, women
athletes draw attention to their ability to attract and capture an audience—using various tactics,
not just their athletic skill, and use this to argue that they are worth paying attention to, instead of focusing on old comparisons of how men and women compare physically and how far they can throw, kick, hit, or how fast they can run. They are on par with male athletes in their ability to capture an audience’s attention, and if sports equates to entertainment, then they are just as exciting and entertaining as men’s sports.

In 2005 LPGA Championships, event sponsor McDonald’s threatened to pull its sponsorship if Wie was not allowed to enter. Although no amateur had received a sponsor’s exemption to play in the LPGA Championships before—it was, after all, the championship tournament for LPGA members—Wie got one in order to appease McDonald’s. She proved she deserved it, finishing second and just three strokes behind winner Annika Sorenstam. Wie’s ability to attract an audience and to draw attention to women’s golf ultimately meant that she got more opportunities to play in events that other amateurs were not allowed to play in, bringing her even more opportunities to further build her ethos. At the same time, she was able to leverage her ethos and the audience that that ethos attracted in order to convince the LPGA to allow her to play in more tournaments without being a member. The LPGA, meanwhile, “embraced Wie when convenient and shooed her away when expedient,” allowing her to participate in events when it seemed good for gaining sponsor, media, or fan attention (Adelson 126). Wie’s marketability and capacity to attract a large audience, both in terms of spectators at the tournaments she played in and increased television viewership, also meant the PGA tour was more receptive to including her in their events as well. For example, according to Mario, in the PGA’s 2005 John Deere Classic, “the tournament’s gross revenue went up 40 percent and TV ratings were up 54 percent over last year (to more than two million viewers) with Michelle in the field” (vii). In addition, the tournament raised $1 million more for charity than it had the
previous year (Mario 99). Likewise, television coverage of the 2006 HSBC Women’s World Match Play Championship increased 68 percent over the previous year, but was up only 12 percent after Wie was eliminated from the tournament. And according to Adelson, the following year, when Wie was not entered in the tournament, it “seemed completely deserted” of fan and media attention (185).

**Reshaping the Body, Reshaping Ethos**

While Wie enjoyed athletic success early in her career, after a slew of wrist problems, her performance began to suffer. Like soccer player Brandi Chastain, Wie had an interesting relationship to athletic training and the disciplinary practices associated with such training. For example, Jennifer Mario calls Wie “notoriously anti-exercise,” and says that though Wie also played baseball (not softball) and basketball as a child, she chose golf over the other sports because “she hated running” (43). Casey Nakama, who coached Wie from ages 9-12, claims Wie refused to run, even with a partner, and Gary Gilchrist, Wie’s next coach, says that at first Wie was “very closed-minded when it came to training” (qtd. in Mario 43). However, according to Gilchrist, “with golfers today, it’s all about stability, lower-body stability. With women golfers, you have to work on their arm strength, shoulders, and midsection,” emphasizing the need for additional athletic training outside of simply playing golf (qtd. in Mario 44). Eventually, Gilchrist convinced Wie to work out regularly outside of golfing, and Wie rode a stationary bike, ran, and incorporated strength training that focused especially on her core—the muscles of the lower back, abdominals, and hips—which improved her golf swing and endurance, as well as building an impressive physique (Mario 44). Following Wie’s wrist injuries, however, David Leadbetter (Wie’s coach at the time) admitted that Wie had lost strength in her hands and upper body, and suggested the imbalance in these areas had affected her swing and exasperated the
problem (Adelson 233-234). Wie’s grip strength, once heralded, was now simply average. Since her 2007 injury Wie’s performance in tournaments was inconsistent at best, and she failed to make the cut at the 2007 Women’s British Open, the first time she had missed the cut in an LPGA event since she was 13, and she did not qualify for the 2008 U.S. Women’s Open. As Adelson puts it, “Wie found herself with nowhere to play. Men’s events had enough of her unsightly scores and quick exits. Women’s events wouldn’t keep inviting her while everyone else had to qualify” (239). Fortunately, Wie turned 18 in 2008, meaning she was finally eligible to go through the LPGA’s qualifying school to become a member, which would allow her to compete in LPGA events without needing an invitation.

Wie finished tied for 12th at qualifying school, a good enough finish to grant her fully exempt status on the 2009 LPGA Tour. After earning her tour card, Wie explained, “I’ve learned to respect my body,” and opened up about her previous injury (qtd. in Adelson 243). In a 2009 interview with Adelson, Wie finally admitted, “Everything hurt. I took a lot of Motrin. I was taking four or five pills a day, and then I had to take stomach pills because of all the painkillers. I even got food allergies, probably due to the stress. I got allergic to cherries, pineapple, dairy. I got sick all the time. I was not healthy” (“Wie Opens Up”). Interestingly, Wie situates her comeback as a matter of properly caring for her body, and does not mention other factors that may have influenced her poor play, such as immaturity, the pressure of travel, or scheduling too many tournaments. By situating her successful return as a matter of the body, Wie also attempts to re-focus media attention on her body, returning to the factor that helped her build ethos earlier in her career. In addition, by focusing on her body, Wie is able to emphasize the qualities that make her extraordinary to the golf world—her unusual height and grip strength—rather than framing her new success as the result of ordinary practices such as playing fewer tournaments or
relocating closer to where tournaments were played. In other words, Wie situates her subjectivity as a result of bodily practices that influenced her success as a golfer, emphasizing the importance of one’s malleability and willingness to submit to disciplinary practices as the very conditions that then enable self-transformation.

Importantly, Wie’s ability to change and shape her own body through athletic training provided her with an opportunity to also shape and reform her ethos, allowing her to craft a different public image. Rhetoric scholar Debra Hawhee’s work on *metis*, or cunning intelligence, and its relationship to the body is helpful in understanding why and how Wie’s malleability—brought about through disciplinary training—actually allows her to reinvent the self. As I mentioned in chapter three, *metis* implies an adaptability or a rhetorical flexibility that allows one to respond to the situation at hand, and this malleability grants the rhetor a rhetorical flexibility that allows her to adapt to particular situations, shifting (body) shape in order to better respond to a particular situation. For example, in addition to Wie’s changed approach to her body, she also appears to have re-thought the way she is perceived by other golfers, seeking a balance between resisting and negotiating existing social norms. Wie has not played in a men’s tournament since 2008, and although she told Adelson in 2009 that her dream was still to play against men, she specifies that “for now, I just want to try to be the number one woman golfer in the world” (244). With rest, new efforts to improve her physical strength and swing, and a new “tabletop” putting technique [where Wie is more bent over in her putting stance compared to other players], Wie finally won her first professional tournament, the 2009 Lorena Ochoa Invitational. She followed that with tournament wins in 2010 and 2014, and won her first major, the U.S. Women’s Open in June of 2014.

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56 By this time, Wie was attending Stanford University and living in California, making travel to tournaments much easier than when she was living in Hawaii.
Following her U.S. Open win, Wie told *Golf Digest* that a big factor in her new playing style was increased attention on her physical strength. Wie explains, “I used to think I had strong legs … but my lack of lower-body strength made me inconsistent. So I really got focused on making my legs, glutes and hips stronger, and now my swing is more stable. That means I can consistently hit the ball hard. I don’t have to force myself to get into good positions. Now it comes naturally” (qtd. in Kaspriske). *The New York Times*’ Karen Crouse also highlighted Wie’s resolve and maturity in the win, and then top-ranked Stacy Lewis (who finished second to Wie) said that though some criticized Wie’s new tabletop putting stance, “She didn’t care what anybody was saying or writing. She went out there and was trying to get better” (qtd. in Crouse).

Other golf analysts, such as Larry Bohannan, argued that Wie’s win was much needed for the LPGA, crediting her comeback with “the continuing surge of the women’s game” (Bohannan). According to Bohannan, “Wie’s return gives fans a little more to pay attention to on the women’s tour. She has already shown she can attract television viewers, with her win at the Women’s Open posting double-digit gains in ratings for NBC” (Bohannan).

In addition, Wie appeared on the cover of the October 2014 issue of *Golf Digest*, a publication infamous for ignoring women golfers. For example, since 1964, LPGA golfers have appeared on the cover only 11 times, with the most recent being Lorena Ochoa in 2008 (Clayton). Most recently, *Golf Digest* faced criticism for featuring Paulina Gretzky, model and fiancé of PGA star Dustin Johnson, on its May 2014 cover. Jerry Tarde, *Golf Digest*’s editor in chief defended the decision, claiming, “Sports figures, celebrities and models have appeared on *Golf Digest* covers since the magazine’s beginning. Paulina ranks at the high end of the golf celebrity scene today, and she has a compelling story to tell” (qtd. in Clayton). Though Wie appears in a baseball hat and cropped tank top—hardly her typical golfing attire—her appearance
on the cover suggests that Wie was able to rebuild her ethos in the eyes of the golf community, and more importantly, it suggests a renewed attention to women’s golf. This understanding of the body as specifically malleable and capable of change extends scholarship that tends to “fix” the body in particular subject positions, and furthers understandings of rhetorical invention (such as Judy Holiday’s) as occurring in the middle of discourse.

Like those of Chastain and Williams, Wie’s performances of ethos draw attention to the ways in which previous cultural narratives and the epideictic rhetoric that perpetuates such discourses, along with the materiality of the body, affects one’s situated ethos. As I argued previously, such an analysis extends scholarship on ethos to include the intersections of race, class, gender, and the body that may influence one’s situated ethos. This analysis thus provides a consideration of the role the body plays in the making of the self, and in particular, a conceptualization in which outward bodily actions are understood as both the potential for transforming the self and the means through which such transformation may take place.

In addition, Wie’s performances of ethos also demonstrate the ways in which one might inhabit and resist social norms, expanding the actions and behaviors that might constitute one’s agency. For example, though media discourses about Wie often infantilized her through the use of gendered and racial stereotypes about her Asian American identity, Wie inhabits some of these social norms, utilizing racialized and gendered discourses that situated her as exceptional, but also non-threatening, in order to gain access to tournaments that she would not otherwise be able to participate in, providing her with more playing opportunities and with a competitive advantage over her opponents.

In other instances, Wie specifically attempts to resist social norms by situating her athletic performance as entertainment, using this rhetorical strategy to justify her efforts to play
against men or to play in tournaments held by professional organizations of which she is not a member. Importantly though, Wie’s ability to either inhabit or subvert social norms can be read as a direct result of her early and repeated training playing against older golfers and male golfers. In this way, Wie’s performances of ethos reveal the ways in which repeated bodily habits and behaviors provides the individual with a malleability or a rhetorical flexibility that allows one to develop and shape one’s subjectivity. Like the performances of Chastain and Williams, Wie’s training practices and her ability to utilize disciplinary practices such as the care of the self and dedicated athletic training challenges current feminist sports studies scholarship (such as the work of Chapman, Johns and Johns, and Wesely, among others) that emphasizes the care of the self as either enabling resistance to or reinforcing social norms. Instead, these repeated bodily actions do not just signify one’s ethos, but actually work to constitute the individual.

Taken together with the performances of ethos of female athletes such as Brandi Chastain and Serena Williams, ethos can be seen as a complicated interrelationship between gender, race, class, and the body. In this way, when rhetoric scholars seek to examine media representations, they must account for the dynamic way that gender, race, class, and the body influence issues of identity, recognizing that identity and ethos are fluid and situational. Wie’s performances of ethos in particular also complicates current feminist understandings of the commodification of the body, suggesting that while sport still perpetuates gendered expectations for women’s bodies and women’s behaviors, women may capitalize on this commodification, using it as a modality of action to pursue their own interests and agendas, as Wie did when taking advantage of her status as a young, exotic, woman to gain sponsor’s exemptions to tournaments. As will become clear in the following chapter, these women’s respective performances of ethos offer different understandings of agency, and situate ethos as integral to the development of the subject.
Chapter 6: Training an Embodied Feminist Ethos

In the 2014 National Football League Championship game, the Seattle Seahawks led the San Francisco 49ers 23-17 with just seconds on the clock, but San Francisco was threatening, and quarterback Colin Kaepernick threw a pass toward the end zone and star wide receiver Michael Crabtree. The Seahawks’ Richard Sherman, however, deflected the pass from Crabtree’s waiting hands, and his teammate, Malcolm Smith, was there to intercept it. Sherman’s spectacular deflection, which sent his team to the Super Bowl, was somewhat overshadowed by his behavior immediately after the game. As the referees signaled the game’s conclusion, Sherman approached Crabtree and said something to him—Sherman claims he merely meant to offer Crabtree the usual “good game” greeting—but whatever he said prompted Crabtree to shove Sherman out of the way, nearly knocking Sherman’s helmet off.

Moments later, Sherman was interviewed by Erin Andrews. Andrews asked Sherman to take viewers through the last moment of the game, where he was able to make the game-winning play. Sherman responded by shouting angrily at the camera, “Well I’m the best corner in the game. When you try me with a sorry receiver like Crabtree, that’s the result you’re gonna get! Don’t you ever talk about me!” When Andrews pressed Sherman to clarify who was talking about him, he responded, “Crabtree. Don’t you open your mouth about the best, or I’m gonna shut it for you real quick!” The interview quickly went viral, and many people criticized Sherman’s outburst. Sherman, a young African American man who, at the time of the interview, had a beard and wore his hair in long dreadlocks, was quickly labeled a thug, and Andrews, a conventionally attractive blonde woman, was said to look terrified. As Greg Howard put it, “to a lot of people there was something viscerally ugly about Sherman standing over a pretty blonde woman, yelling into our living rooms with an emotional mixture of joy, relief, and excitement,
arrogance, and anger” (Howard). For example, according to Deadspin’s Barry Petchesky, the day following the Seahawks’ win and Sherman’s interview, the word thug was mentioned on American television 625 times, “more than any single day in the last three years” (Petchesky). Countless Twitter users called Sherman “an ignorant ape” or “a cocky nigger” in addition to the ubiquitous thug. Fellow Fox Sports reporter Kayla Knapp tweeted, “Erin Andrews looked petrified. I don’t blame her” (Knapp). Andrews would later explain that her momentary look of surprise at Sherman’s response (which some read as fear), was simply her realization that she needed to have a different follow-up question ready, and that it had better be a good one, because, as she says, “this is big because no athletes do this [provide an emotional response in the interview]” (qtd. in Buxton). Despite Andrews’ attempt to dispel such responses, the juxtaposition of the angry black man and the terrified white woman was a cultural narrative difficult for the public to look past.

However, others noted both the raw emotion and adrenaline that likely influenced Sherman’s behavior just moments after the biggest play in his career, somewhat excusing his unconventional interview, or the importance of understanding the fierce rivalry between Sherman and Crabtree, who were known for exchanging insults, and Crabtree’s animosity toward Sherman, including an incident at a charity event where Crabtree reportedly tried to start a fight with Sherman (Brewer). Some even pointed out the intersections between Sherman’s race and class and his treatment by the public. For example, Howard notes Sherman’s upbringing in Compton but his college education at Stanford—seemingly incongruous experiences—and the differences between the way that Sherman was perceived and the way that other—white—football players were perceived after making similarly outspoken comments. Howard explains,
When you’re a public figure, there are rules. Here’s one: A public personality can be black, talented, or arrogant, but he can’t be any more than two of these traits at a time. It’s why antics and sound bites from guys like Brett Favre, Johnny Football [Manziel] and Bryce Harper seem almost hyper-American, capable of capturing the country’s imagination, but black superstars like Sherman, Floyd Mayweather, and Cam Newton are seen as polarizing, as selfish, as glory boys, as distasteful and perhaps *offensive*. (Howard)

Still other sportswriters brought up the idea that perhaps Sherman’s response was not the spontaneous reaction of a charged up athlete, but a planned performance. For example, Forbes’ Roger Groves noted the salary disparity between Sherman, who made a mere $555,000 at the time and other players, such as Crabtree, whose salary was 2.745 million (Groves). Groves also notes that the interview brought more publicity to Sherman, whose position at cornerback typically receives less media and sponsor attention than higher-profile positions such as quarterback, running back, or wide receiver (Groves). Finally, several writers noted Sherman’s fascination with Muhammad Ali, notorious for his own bold claims, and suggested that Sherman perhaps modeled himself after Ali (Jenkins, Shipigel, Zirin). For example, prior to his infamous interview, Sherman told *Sports Illustrated*’s Lee Jenkins, “[Ali] understood how to manipulate the world. When he said, ‘The champ is here,’ he probably wasn’t that cocky. He created a persona. He was a leader, an entertainer, and he knew how to break people down in the ring. I didn’t really care about boxing, but I wanted to be like Ali” (qtd. in Jenkins).

While several writers pointed to this earlier interview when discussing Sherman’s impassioned response to Andrews’ question, few were willing to take a stab at what Sherman’s reference to Ali might mean. When Sherman suggests that Ali “understood how to manipulate
the world” and that he “created a persona” Sherman points specifically to Ali’s performance of ethos, to the way that he was able to embody and perform a particular persona, one of a tough, confident, and intimidating fighter. Ali captured audiences with his provocative statements, and when Sherman explains this ability to attract an audience as Ali “understanding how to manipulate the world” Sherman alludes to the way Ali used rhetoric and his platform as a professional athlete to gain an audience and influence that audience. Read in this light, it would seem that Sherman’s response—while of course influenced by the kairotic moment—was deliberate. It was meant to shape Sherman’s ethos in a particular way, to help him create a persona that would both cause audiences to pay attention to an often-ignored position, that would give him a platform for discussing other social issues that concerned him—such as emphasizing the importance of a college education to high school athletes (Shipigel) or destroying the dumb jock stereotype (Jenkins)—and that would incite fear and intimidation in his opponents.

I provide this discussion of Sherman in the context of a study on contemporary female athletes because his interview and the public’s response to that interview provide a specific example of why such a study is needed and why a reconsideration of ethos as performative and as influenced by factors such as race, class, gender, and the body is important. The public response to Sherman’s interview reveal the ways in which previous cultural narratives about race, class, and gender may influence how one performs ethos and how that performance of ethos is received by an audience. More specifically, public reactions to Sherman demonstrate that ethos is influenced by the specific context of the communicative exchange and by the cultural values of the community to which one speaks or performs. In this understanding, ethos is contingent on the body, because the body both influences how one participates in and performs certain practices and behaviors and also reflects one’s conception of the self. The body may also
be read as a marker of particular values and expectations, influencing how one’s ethos is perceived no matter how these practices and behaviors are performed. In this way, the cultural values and beliefs associated with one’s body, and the epideictic rhetoric that perpetuates these values and beliefs, also influence how one performs ethos and how that ethos is perceived by an audience. That is, one’s ethos depends in part on the body and bodily movements, but one’s body is always read and constructed in the context of the particular community to which one speaks. As this study demonstrates, the performances of ethos by athletes such as Brandi Chastain, Serena Williams, and Michelle Wie (to name just a few), reflect the dynamic interplay between these facets of identity, suggesting not only the inter-relatedness of these elements and ethos, but also that a contemporary account of ethos must acknowledge identities as fluid, and must account for race, class, gender, and embodiment as parts of an interlocking system of representation. My analysis focuses on the body and bodily practices, in addition to the epideictic rhetoric that situates and constructs the body, considering how a specifically embodied understanding of invented ethos and situated ethos work together in order to extend current scholarship that either tends to focus primarily on situated ethos or does not consider the body as part of invented ethos.

The responses to Sherman’s interview also suggest that while my study focuses primarily on the performances of ethos by female athletes, the conclusions can be applied to other individuals. It also suggests that race, class, and the body, in addition to gender, affect how an audience perceives one’s ethos. For example, as Howard argues, public perceptions of Sherman likely would have been different if Sherman were a white football player from a middle-class family in Indiana, rather than a dreadlock-sporting black man from a working-class family in Compton. It is also interesting to speculate if Sherman’s interview would have produced as much
ridicule if he had been interviewed by another African American, or if he had been interviewed by a male reporter, rather than by a white, conventionally attractive woman. Responses to Sherman’s interview also reveal that ethos is dependent on the situation and the audience. For example, Sherman’s unusual response was partly excused by the understanding that he had just made a spectacular play in the most important game of his career at that point. He was interviewed just moments after the play, in front of the loudest audience in the NFL. It was a moment and an audience, like Chastain’s dramatic goal celebration, that demanded a spectacular response. Like Chastain’s winning penalty kick, Sherman’s fantastic defensive effort won the game for his team, sending the Seahawks to the Super Bowl. And like Chastain’s, his audience expected a spectacular response to a spectacular athletic performance, and Sherman’s interview responds to that specific moment and context.

Responses to Sherman’s interview also suggest the powerful connection between epideictic rhetoric and situated ethos and the pervasiveness of cultural memory and social narratives in influencing how ethos is built or fails to be built. Those that were appalled at Sherman’s interview and that labeled him a thug (or worse) immediately placed Sherman into the violent black male athlete archetype that John Hoberman claims is the “predominant image of black masculinity in the United States and around the world” (xviii). According to Hoberman, while sports have supposedly led to more racial integration, such assumed progress is “counterbalanced by the merger of the athlete, the gangster rapper, and the criminal into a single

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57 The crowd at Seattle’s Century Link Stadium actually holds a Guinness World Record for loudest crowd roar, measured at 137.6 decibels. As a point of comparison, a jet engine typically measures around 140 decibels. The record-setting crowd actually caused a minor earthquake in the area, with the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network detecting vibrations that measured between a magnitude 1 and 2 earthquake during the game (Lynch). Because of the noise produced in the stadium, it is likely that Sherman actually had to yell in order to be heard during his interview with Andrews.
black male persona” (xviii). Indeed, as The Huffington Post’s Isaac Saul noted, much of the public neglected the fact that in contrast to the 31 NFL players who were arrested in the 2013 offseason for “everything from gun charges and driving under the influence to murder,” not to mention the slew of domestic violence cases more recently, Sherman is a “Stanford graduate from Compton who has never been arrested, never cursed in a post-game interview, never been accused of being a dirty player, started his own charitable non-profit, and won an appeal in the only thing close to a smudge on his record” (Saul). In this interpretation, the response to Sherman’s interview actually reflects the dominance of certain cultural narratives, which are reinforced and perpetuated through epideictic rhetoric. For example, according to Saul, Sherman’s interview and the public’s response to the interview “taught us that we’re still a country that isn’t ready for lower-class Americans from neighborhoods like Compton to succeed. We’re still a country that can’t decipher a person’s character” (Saul).

That is, as rhetoric scholars such as Jacqueline Jones Royster and Coretta Pittman have argued, because Western society still assumes that one’s credibility is completely self-created, without accounting for individual lived experiences, certain individuals face issues of racism, classism, or sexism that mark them as undesirable or outside of an established norm. I want to emphasize, though, that the problem with ethos is not necessarily the deviation from an established norm but that current conceptions of ethos do not discuss ethos relative to the lived, embodied experience of particular individuals. The current, limited understanding of epideictic and ethos presents a problem for individuals who do not represent the dominant cultural values of a community, individuals whose bodies do not conform to social norms or whose bodily

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58 In 2013 Sherman tested positive for Adderall, the ADHD medication, but was able to prove that his test sample had not been properly processed, so the positive result was cast out and Sherman was not suspended (Saul).
movements and behaviors fall outside of gendered expectations, because it does not consider how facets of identity such as one’s race, class, and gender influence how individuals may build ethos and how previous cultural narratives in turn affect how an audience perceives that performance of ethos. In bringing together epideictic rhetoric and ethos, then, I offer an explanation of how discourse constructs certain aspects of identity, such as race, gender, and class, and how these constructions then hold material consequences for certain individuals.

The public’s insistence on using dominant cultural narratives such as the myth of the violent black male athlete is especially interesting given the fact that Sherman works actively to challenge the stereotypes surrounding black male athletes, stereotypes that are perpetuated through epideictic rhetoric and our cultural narratives, even as he himself seems to fall into those narratives. For example, in an article published prior to his interview with Andrews, Sherman told Jenkins that in high school he was considered strange because “I went to class, did the work, read the books and was still pretty good at sports. If you’re like me, people think you’re weird …. I know the jock stereotype—cool guy, walking around with your friends, not caring about school, not caring about anything. I hate that stereotype. I want to destroy it. I want to kill it” (qtd. in Jenkins). In this example, while Sherman seeks to actively challenge stereotypes about athletes, and specifically, about black male athletes, he uses violent imagery to describe his attempts to disrupt those narratives, simultaneously reinforcing narratives of the violent black male even as he works to directly counter those narratives.

Likewise, the NFL produced a short feature on Sherman as part of their “Turning Point” series called, “Richard Sherman: Student of the Game.” In the feature, Sherman discusses his preparation for games, focusing primarily on his extensive study of opposing teams’ game films. According to Sherman, his success as an athlete is dependent not so much on his athletic ability
but on this research and mental strategy: “I feel like I’m a decent athlete, but my tape study and
my meticulous attention to detail are what makes me a good ball player …. Some people can
play with pure athleticism. I’m not one of those guys” (“Student”). In these two examples,
Sherman specifically emphasizes his mental edge, his commitment to studying different aspects
of the game, rather than his innate natural talent, which directly challenges the myth of the
natural black athlete and the assumption that black athletes rely on athleticism rather than mental
preparation and strategy (Hoberman).

Yet despite Sherman’s efforts to build his ethos as specifically different from the
discourses that we have accepted as part of the dominant social narrative, discourses such as the
myth of the naturally gifted black athlete which are perpetuated through epideictic rhetoric, much
of the American public still relied on this cultural memory when evaluating Sherman’s ethos.
This is important for rhetorical studies because scholars still tend to focus on how the rhetor or
speaker builds ethos, and when the audience does come into consideration, most discussions of
ethos emphasize the relationship between audience and speaker in the rhetorical exchange as the
main factor in how ethos is established, failing to account for how one’s situated ethos might be
always-already compromised by factors outside of the speaker’s realm of control, such as one’s
race or gender. While this previous scholarship is certainly important, as this study demonstrates,
athletes like Brandi Chastain, Serena Williams, Michelle Wie, and Richard Sherman (to name
just a few) also bring attention to the ways that epideictic rhetoric and our cultural narratives
influence ethos, extending discussions of ethos in rhetorical scholarship to include the specific
material conditions certain individuals face and how the bodily practices and habits one
performs—whether deliberately or out of necessity—contribute to conceptions of the self.
Implications for Women’s Ethos

In addition to examining the role of epideictic rhetoric on ethos, this study also attends to the dynamic interplay of race, class, gender, the body, and one’s performance of ethos. While Sherman’s interview and the public’s response to that interview suggest that the conclusions of this study can be applied to male athletes as well as to female athletes, an analysis of the performances of ethos by Chastain, Williams, and Wie also reveal several defining characteristics about how elite female athletes build and perform ethos and thus suggest possible rhetorical strategies for women seeking to build ethos in other typically gendered spaces.

Entertainment Value, Equal Value

In athletics, the body is valued as a performance tool and physical factors such as speed and strength make a difference in one’s success. These physical and biological differences have been used to encourage the separation of men and women and to emphasize the categorization of individuals into either “man” or “woman,” and this separation is not only encouraged but actually deemed essential for maintaining a standard of “fair play” in athletic competition. In other words, unlike almost every other modern social institution, “equality” in athletics depends on firmly distinguishing between men and women, and individuals must fall into the category of either man or woman, and the physical difference between men and women is emphasized as the reason for different treatment. Elite female athletes such as Chastain, Williams, and Wie, however, situate their athletic performance as entertainment, emphasizing their ability to attract and capture an audience’s attention, rather than their physical abilities. In situating themselves as entertainers, these women use their entertainment ability—whether that ability is attributed to their athletic performance or to other factors such as their physical appearance—to argue for equal attention for women’s sports and monetary compensation that is comparable to that of their
male peers. By emphasizing their entertainment ability, these women are able to recode their physical difference from male athletes as a modality of action that allows them to utilize media and fan attention for their own purposes and agendas.

For example, though Chastain implied that the team’s physical appearance was a motivating factor in getting fans in the stands to watch games (see chapter 3), in reappropriating a typically male goal celebration Chastain suggests that her athletic performance is on par with any male player and situates her as a player who is just as dynamic and audience engaging as a any male soccer player. In addition, Serena Williams directly frames herself as “in the entertainment business” and claims, “the only reason there’s all that prize money and endorsement money is because people buy tickets to watch” (On the Line 76, see also chapter 4). In women’s tennis, though, another reason there’s all that prize money is because the Williams sisters used their star-power to successfully argue that Grand Slam events like Wimbledon should offer equal purses for women and men. Venus Williams spoke in front of the Grand Slam Committee just prior to the 2005 Wimbledon final, and she wrote an op-ed piece arguing for equal prize money at all levels of Grand Slam events, which was published in London’s Times. Ava DuVernay, who directed the documentary “Venus Vs.” for ESPN’s “Nine for IX” series, which commemorated the fortieth anniversary of Title IX, explains that “Venus had the on-court prowess, the commercial viability, and the activist spirit and thoughtful personality” to make the appeal work (qtd. in Ford). According to DuVernay, then, it was not just Venus Williams’ eloquent words and athletic success that helped her argument, but also her “commercial viability,” her ability to attract an audience and entertain that audience, an audience that tuned in to watch her and her sister play just as often—if not more so—than male players who were earning more money for winning. In fact, Mary Carillo, a former player who now does tennis
and other sports commentary for NBC and CBS, said, “the single highest ratings getter for us is Serena. More than Roger Federer, more than Andy Roddick, more than Rafael Nadal” (qtd. in Crouse). In this way, the recoding of resources such as the Williams’ sisters commercial viability—despite the fact that such media attention often relies on racist and sexist fascination with their black bodies—might be used as a means of political action.

Likewise, Michelle Wie’s insistence on playing in the Professional Golf Association, noting that it was not the Men’s Professional Golf Association, can be read as a type of resistance to social norms that might lead to political action. In addition, Wie, like Williams, continues to attract more television viewers and tournament attenders than even some of the most esteemed male golfers, and her golf swing has been called “one of the top five in the world,” male or female, and more technically sound than that of even Tiger Woods, one of the PGA’s most notable players (Andrisani 17). By emphasizing their ability to attract and entertain an audience rather than their physical athletic performance, Chastain, Williams, and Wie are able to avoid and directly challenge the rationale that physical difference from their male peers also means different treatment of and attention to women’s athletics.

Furthermore, by framing their athletic performance as entertainment and by emphasizing the audience of their sporting events, these women also suggest the rhetorical and performative nature of the body, and in particular, the importance of the body in understanding ethos. While rhetoric is of course not merely entertainment, but rather works to direct an audience toward a particular end result, whether or not that end result is actually achieved, rhetoric is traditionally associated with public performance. Epideictic rhetoric’s association with entertainment and athletics’ association with entertainment both share an emphasis on the audience and in how the audience perceives embodied performance and bodily acts. Understanding athletic performance
as a form of epideictic rhetoric also provides a particular focus on the place and context in which epideictic rhetoric takes place. The very structure of athletic arenas and stadiums gather an audience and focus their attention on the athletes themselves. The dynamics of sport, the intensity of the kairotic moment in athletic events, and the presence of a captive audience all contribute to the performances of ethos that elite athletes display in an athletic context. The rhetorical situation of elite sporting events often demands a particular response, one that is shaped by the materiality and physicality of the audience and the space in which that performance takes place. Coupling athletics with epideictic rhetoric thus illustrates the contingent, situational nature of rhetoric and prompts attention to the material and physical context in which discourse takes place.

However, in situating their athletic performance as entertainment, these athletes also rely on the commodification of the body and demonstrate the ways in which capitalism has continued to reinforce the objectification of the body and has continued to highlight the sexual difference of male and female bodies. By emphasizing their ability to entertain an audience, elite female athletes situate their bodies and their bodily performances as products to be consumed. While relying on their entertainment value reinforces the objectification of the body, consequently situating even one’s process of caring for the self as a capitalistic venture, these efforts to shape and transform the self also challenge the traditional feminist critique of capitalism, because at least in the context of sports, one’s ability to transform the self also translates to an ability to challenge gendered expectations. As Toby Miller points out, while sports spectatorship and participation reinforces sexist ideas about body image, there is also a certain amount of pleasure that comes both from the ability to shape and transform the self and also from watching an individual pursue and undergo such transformation (133). In this way, while sports still
perpetuate gendered power, the increasing commodification of sport and the need to appeal to new and broader markets have the potential for transforming cultural understandings of sex and gender. The recent objectification of the male body, along with the at least partial acceptance of female masculinity in the elite athlete, both driven by capitalism, suggest a contradictory understanding of gender politics within sports. Once again, the traditional feminist critique is at least partially inadequate when applied to the ability of elite athletes to transform the self, and consequently, to challenge gendered expectations.

Playing with Men, Celebrating like Men

Another strategy used by the women in my study is the use of play with and against men and the use of bodily movements and behaviors typically associated with male athletes to build their ethos. For example, Chastain, Williams, and Wie all argue for the usefulness of practicing with and playing against men at all levels of their respective sports. In her book addressed to young soccer players and their parents, Chastain directly advocates for both the social and athletic development-related benefits of girls playing with boys. According to Chastain, girls “can gain great skills as players, and there is some social status to be ranked alongside the boys” (167-168). Though Chastain assumes that it is simply playing with boys that will help advance one’s soccer development, in this example, not only is there the benefit of improving one’s athletic skills, but Chastain notes the importance of playing with boys in order to increase one’s social status and gain credibility as a player.

Likewise, Williams employs a longtime male hitting partner to practice with, and claims that she has been playing against men since her early development as a player, even though the practice was not common. Williams explains that since the family’s move to Florida, “I was almost always hitting with boys, because Daddy believed that in order for me and Venus to
develop as players we needed to learn to play faster, harder, stronger … even though at the time this was looked on as a fairly radical approach” (100). According to Williams, while it is relatively common for professional women’s tennis players to hit with male partners, as Williams herself does, it is still unusual for junior players to take this approach. Williams suggests more girls should play against boys, and claims, “I don’t get the controversy, because it always seemed so logical to me. I still can’t understand why nobody really approached girls’ training in just this way” (100).

Finally, Wie has been arguably the strongest proponent of women playing against men, directly challenging them on the PGA Tour. Despite the criticism she received from both male and female golfers and the media, Wie explained “The more PGA Tour events I play, the better my chance of making the cut and eventually becoming the first female member of the PGA Tour. When I go out and play in a PGA Tour event, I don’t go there to win now, but to learn from the best” (qtd. in Mario 97). While Wie, like Chastain, situates playing against males as inherently “better” or more competitive, it is the fact that she played against men regularly that initially made her so well known. As Jennifer Mario suggests, Wie’s insistence on playing against men is “thinking outside the box, and the sports world is at once both fascinated and uncomfortable with the idea” (141). Whether it is simply by resisting social norms or by framing their athletic performance as on par with that of their male counterparts, these athletes all respectively directly compare their performance with that of male athletes, and in some cases, such as Chastain’s goal celebration or Williams’ grunts and fist-pumps, incorporate bodily behavior typically associated with male athletes to challenge gendered expectations about women’s athletic performance.
Ethos as Contextual and Situational

This study also emphasizes the importance of understanding ethos as contextual and situational, which has implications for understanding subjectivity. While traditional rhetorical approaches to ethos attend to the relationship between audience and rhetor, which I agree is pivotal to understanding how ethos is created and produced, more attention is needed on the kairotic moment and the physical space in which such moments occur. Spatial and material rhetorics offer promising potential for understanding the physical and material context of the rhetorical exchange, but such analysis must be coupled with attention to the cultural memory of the audience and the role of previous established discourses—the epideictic rhetoric in circulation within a given community—to fully account for the context and situation, the historical, physical, and material setting in which ethos develops and is performed. Such an understanding prompts attention to the ways in which other individuals, previous discourses, bodily movements and behaviors, and the kairotic moment influence subjectivity.

Is the Post-Title IX Athlete Feminist?

This project also raises several questions about the state of feminism today. When Chastain ripped off her jersey in celebration of the biggest moment in her career, when she performed a goal celebration typical of male soccer players, but that few women had ever done before, when she revealed not only a black sports bra but chiseled abs and flexed biceps and a look of sheer triumph, the moment was celebrated as representing the success of Title IX and the state of feminism at the turn of the century. Fifteen years later, how do feminist scholars read this image? What is the current state of feminism as reflected by these female athletes?

In some ways, Chastain, Williams, and Wie’s respective performances of ethos reflect a tension within feminism itself, and a shift toward understandings of the body and aesthetics that
symbolizes achievement and power, and not always exploitation. As Leslie Heywood and Shari L. Dworkin note, there is a rift between feminists every time the issue of body image or aesthetic ideals are raised: one side situates the media and consumer culture as “the product of evil capitalist patriarchy, and its representation of women is the worst,” because certain actions, such as female athlete nudity, “confirms the ‘normalcy’ of heterosexuality,” while the other side sees the possibility of manipulating the media for one’s own purposes (78), such as the way that Chastain used the publicity gained through photo shoots, advertisements, and her goal celebration to advocate for more funding for the women’s national soccer team and better pay for its players. Heywood and Dworkin argue that the biggest difference between the two camps may very well be demographics, because a post-Title IX demographic of female athletes has experienced more structural equality and more “commodification of bodies,” both male and female, and is accustomed to that normalization in ways that pre-Title IX women are not (12).

For example, they point out that some female athletes “tend to see physical appearance as a marketing asset that is not necessarily gender-specific, pointing to the ways the male body has itself become sexualized and commodified in recent media culture, and the ways male athletes are increasingly valued for aesthetic reasons as well as for their athletic successes” (Heywood and Dworkin 39). Thus, while Chastain, Williams, and Wie all rely on their physical appearance in order to build ethos, reifying gendered stereotypes that associate a woman’s public presence with her sex appeal, in the process they also capitalize on that media attention to emphasize their athletic achievement. Therefore, it is no longer accurate to frame performances of ethos that emphasize one’s appearance—actions such as choosing to pose nude or wearing curve-hugging tennis skirts—as only objectifying the female body. Contemporary female athletes who have always experienced the benefits of Title IX and the athletic training that comes with being an
elite athlete experience their bodies, and thus their selves, as capable of being shaped and constructed, and believe they are the agent of such constructions. However, while these athletes may not experience themselves as manipulated and powerless, because ethos is always co-constructed, no one is completely self-created, and because sport still works to reify gender norms and an ontological distinction based on sex, the cultural narratives and epideictic rhetoric surrounding sport continue to perpetuate gendered expectations for female athletes, and continue to reinforce an aesthetic ideal based on the model of the young, attractive, thin, white woman.

As this study demonstrates, contemporary female athletes face a more complicated cultural production of the body than women athletes of the 70s and 80s. While women continue to experience objectification and differences in gender expectations simply by participating in the structure of sport—much like women did in previous generations—the commodification of the body more generally, regardless of sex, has led to a different relationship between women, their bodies, and subjectivity. As Miller suggests, contemporary capitalism, when applied to athletics and the sport-media complex, occurs on the level of the body (10). However, while Miller argues “objectification is a fact of sexual practice within capitalism,” he is quick to point out that though the objectification of women’s bodies, with heterosexual men as the implied viewer, has long been part of capitalism, “the process of body commodification through niched targeting has identified men’s bodies as objects of desire and gay men and straight women as consumers” (11). Because both male and female bodies are commodified, the second wave feminist objectification critique no longer adequately depicts the current problem with how women and women’s bodies are perceived in the public sphere. As Heywood and Dworkin argue, “it is no longer simply the case of naïve women who buy into a false sense of power when they pose for the camera and we need to educate them about their mistake” (85). Instead, as
Heywood and Dworkin suggest, female athletes *know* what they are doing and “both because they do not experience themselves as manipulated and powerless, and because … they see rightly visibility in the media as the only ‘real’ outlet for the achievement of selfhood this culture offers,” they capitalize on a body commodification culture to advance their careers (85).

Another difference in the way contemporary female athletes shape and perform their subjectivity and their ethos from female athletes in pre-Title IX generations is that because the body is so commodified there is not as much social stigma associated with displaying the body, including the nude body. In fact, for much of the post-Title IX generation, displaying a shaped, trained, cared for body is generally valued, not shunned, though the young, white body is still valued differently than older bodies or racially diverse bodies. What is more important is the context of the body being displayed—the rhetorical situation to which the athlete responds—not whether or not that athlete is naked. The recent commodification of men’s bodies—while they still appear much less frequently than that of women’s bodies—has “destabilized the hegemonic masculinity thesis” (Miller 52), such that Heywood and Dworkin argue there is a “definite trend in the ideal image repertoire that emphasizes male femininity and female masculinity” (82).

According to Heywood and Dworkin, this shifting context of “male objectification alongside the idealization of female masculinity” demonstrates the traditional feminist objectification model as at least partially inadequate. On the one hand, Heywood and Dworkin explain that

Female athletes in the generations after Title IX have come to redeem the erasure of individual women that the old *Playboy* model of sexualization performed, rewriting the symbology of the female body from empty signifiers of ready heterosexual access, blank canvases, or holes on which to write one’s heteronormative desires, to the active, self-present sexuality of a body that
signifies achievement and power and is in that sense ‘masculinized’ or ‘queered’ if you follow the traditional equation of masculinity with power and heteronormativity. The athletic body, when coded as athletic, can redeem female sexuality and make it visible as an assertion of female presence, and make that presence amenable to a range of sexualities. (82-83, emphasis mine)

However, in many cases, the female athletic body is not coded as specifically athletic, such as in Chastain’s Gear magazine photos, in which she appears crouched over, vulnerable, and coy, nothing like the image of strength and triumph captured in her famous goal celebration. In this way, the objectification critique is still needed and necessary, because the structure and nature of sport itself still emphasizes the physical difference between men and women, and our contemporary culture still tends to emphasize women’s heterosexuality as her primary identity.

In addition, the objectification model is still needed, though perhaps in a revised form, because of the blurring of subject and object (whether male or female) that occurs with elite athletic training. On the one hand, the elite athlete, through intense athletic training, learns to develop and shape the body, inventing and reinventing his or her subjectivity. On the other hand, that same athlete markets herself as an object to be consumed, an entertainer whose body and bodily performance is sold as a product. In some ways, elite athletic training encourages a disassociation of the body, situating the body as a separate entity which must be mastered, taught to perform on demand, forced to submit, at the same time that it is viewed as the tool through which self-accomplishment is achieved. As Heywood and Dworkin helpfully explain, “serious athletic training paradoxically produces a profound (and only partially mistaken) sense of self-authorship of one’s body. This sense is one of the benefits of sport—you get beyond a culturally mediated sense of your body and tend to forget the cultural fetishization of female breasts and
nudity because that isn’t how you experience yourself” (86-87). However, while the ability to shape and invent the self through athletic training gives one the idea that you can somehow get past a culturally-mediated understanding of your own body, to a certain extent, you cannot, because your ethos is partly shaped by others. This is, as Heywood and Dworkin suggest, the paradox of the elite athlete, but in many ways, this is also the paradox of the contemporary subject. Our current American commodification culture complicates the distinction between subject and object, and an understanding of how ethos is performed and embodied through the care of the self helps illustrate this problem, and in turn, helps feminist scholars address body commodification culture more adequately.

Training the Subject, Transforming Agency

As mentioned earlier, elite female athletes pose a bit of a dilemma for feminist analysis because on the one hand, they are able to assert their presence in a typically male-dominated sphere and their ability to develop and transform their bodies through athletic training challenges certain gendered expectations about the aesthetic ideal for women. However, because the very structures of sport and the morals of “fair play” demand attention to women’s difference from and subordination to men, their very participation in athletics appears to simultaneously reinforce women’s subjugation to men, even as that participation allows them to call such practices into question. To a certain extent, this is the double bind of athletic training, or any type of disciplinary practice that requires one to become teachable or trainable. In order to acquire the agency and mastery of one’s body and athletic performance, the elite athlete must become docile, and must subjugate herself to specific training practices, whether those practices consist of regimented exercises or a strict diet. In much the same way, other types of training that require one to learn a particular skill or knowledge require the same type of willing submission. The
student of higher education must devote considerable time and attention to his field of study, or
the concert violinist must spend hours practicing her craft and maintaining the integrity of her
violin. In all of these examples, the compliance and subjugation of the individual—one’s
willingness to submit oneself to the training practices that will bring self-improvement and
greater knowledge—is necessary to learn a particular skill or acquire knowledge, and this ability
and willingness to submit oneself to disciplinary practices actually allows the individual to
become malleable, to be able to shift, change, and reinvent the self. At the same time, however,
this malleability, which is contingent on being docile, actually allows the subject/athlete the
agency to change and transform oneself, rendering the subject/athlete as anything but docile.

For example, the rhetorical concept metis, or cunning intelligence, refers to one’s ability
to shift or blur identities to gain an advantage in a specific situation, such as the way that Serena
Williams may embrace the media’s masculine framing with her grunts while also emphasizing
her femininity with her manicured nails and delicate twirling after matches. This malleability
grants the rhetor a rhetorical flexibility that allows her to adapt to particular situations, shifting
shape (and in the example of the athlete, one might shift shape both literally, by developing and
training the body, and more figuratively, through performative actions such as Williams’
mentioned above) in order to better respond to a particular situation.

Importantly though, the malleability of the body and the ability to change and develop
one’s physical body do not merely symbolize a particular interior self, but rather its potential.
Repeated bodily actions do not just signify one’s ethos, but actually work to constitute the
individual. Through dedicated training and repeated performance, one develops habitus, which in
turn influences one’s character and sense of self. Aristotle’s notion of habitus, or acquired
excellence in a particular sphere, is closely related to habit, in the sense that habitus is learned or
acquired through repeated practice—through habit—which then influences one’s character. In this way, bodily habits such as the repeated movements of an athlete in training actually have the capacity to *change* a person’s character.

Likewise, then, as feminist anthropologist Saba Mahmood argues, “the body is not a medium of signification but the substance and the necessary tool through which the embodied subject is formed” (29). In this way, practices such as the care of the self and dedicated athletic training are not so much about the social impositions placed on the subject but on the work that these practices do in shaping the individual. For example, outward bodily gestures and acts, such as Williams’ twirls and grunts or Chastain’s goal celebration, constitute important aspects of ethos because for these athletes, a sense of self is developed specifically through these particular bodily movements *and* these bodily movements come to constitute necessary attributes of the self—Williams is known specifically for her twirling and grunting. These are bodily movements and actions that have become associated with her sense of self and ethos. In this way, elite female athletes’ performances of ethos serve as an example of how the process of athletic training and the care of the self—processes often thought of as disciplinary mechanisms that produce a subordinate subject—may actually function as processes of invention that offer the possibility of agency. In this way, agency exists not only in actions that resist social norms but also in the ways in which one *inhabits* norms. That is, one’s desire to submit to an established authority (such as a coach) is not necessarily in opposition to feminist politics, nor do certain practices necessarily only reinscribe traditional gender roles or expectations. Rather, these disciplinary practices and one’s subordination might produce different capacities in the subject.

This understanding of power and subject formation means that agency is not just the same as
resistance to social norms, but is a capacity for action that is made possible specifically through one’s subordination.

When such a conceptualization is applied, the women in my study offer a different understanding of agency than the traditional feminist model of agency, which often positions agency within the binary of resistance/subordination. While much of the feminist sports studies scholarship situates elite female athletes and women who pursue a particular bodily ideal through dedicated exercise practices as either resisting social norms and gender expectations or as reinforcing those norms and expectations through such disciplinary practices, I argue that if feminist scholarship were to consider agency as more than just the resistance to social norms, and were to consider bodily movements and behaviors as “modalities of action” (to borrow Mahmood’s phrase), then scholars must continue to question and interrogate the relationships between subjects and social norms and between performative bodily behavior and conceptions of the self. More specifically, refiguring agency and feminist critique as modalities of action rather than as particular prescriptive behaviors opens up understandings of agency and critique to include other methods of pursuing and achieving feminist ideals.

When applied to how elite female athletes perform ethos, this conception of agency and critique also leads scholars to question whether agency or other acts of resistance depend on one’s ability to make the body perform in a certain way. In this way, resisting gendered expectations may not simply be about raising critical awareness or critiquing the subject but may also include changing or training bodily actions, sensibilities, and affect, “those registers of corporeality” that Mahmood argues “often escape the logic of representation and symbolic articulation” (188). As this study demonstrates, feminist studies does not currently have a way to account for certain bodily actions, those things that “escape the logic of representation,” as acts
of resistance. However, as I argue in this study, understanding the body as rhetorical and as the means through which the embodied subject is formed offers feminist scholars a way to talk about some of these bodily actions and states of being as methods or modes of change that can lead to political action. For example, Chastain’s goal celebration can be read as an act of resistance that prompted media and fan attention (to her body as well as to her athleticism), which Chastain then recodes in order to take political action against sexist practices from FIFA and the U.S. soccer federation. Likewise, Wie and Williams recode the racist and sexist attention to their non-white bodies and use this fascination for their own purposes and agendas, whether arguing for equal prize money for women’s tennis players or gaining access to more playing opportunities. As I have shown throughout this study, the self-transformation made possible through athletic training, when understood as a process of invention made possible specifically through one’s willingness to submit to disciplinary practices, can offer the subject alternative ways of building and performing ethos. When these bodily movements and behaviors are seen as practices that enable the refiguring of subjectivity, such movements and behaviors can be seen as new modes of political action.

Importantly, though, such a reimagining of political action is only possible when ethos is understood as embodied, and when scholars attend to the ways in which race, class, gender, the body, and a community’s cultural narratives influence the performance and production of ethos. While this study demonstrates the potential for reimagining the feminist subject, such an understanding is only possible with a new conceptualization of ethos in rhetorical studies, and with attention to the ways in which epideictic rhetoric works to perpetuate and influence who is granted ethos and how the individual builds and performs that ethos. Understanding ethos as embodied and as part of an interlocking system that includes gender, race, class, and the body
not only provides rhetoric scholars with a more performative, situationally, and contextually-sensitive understanding of ethos, but it also offers rhetoric scholars with an account of subjectivity that includes embodiment and that considers the ways in which bodily movements and actions influence subjectivity and the process of becoming a subject, an account of subjectivity that might be of specific interest to feminist scholars. In this way, my study demonstrates the need for rhetorical studies and feminist studies to work together to address issues of subjectivity and political action, with the potential for a richer account of the ways in which women may continue to challenge normative gender expectations.
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