Neoliberalism, Academic Capitalism and Higher Education in Developing Countries: The Case of Iraqi Kurdistan

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ABSTRACT

This study was undertaken to begin to understand better the emergence of academic capitalism in public higher education in less developed countries. How and why income-generating practices have appeared in public universities in less developed countries has not been well examined (Maldonado-Maldonado 2014, 201). I chose the Iraqi Kurdistan region as the locus for this study in part for convenience, but also because it is unique in having emerged after the Second Gulf War from an oppressive National Socialist ruling government overtly hostile to market-based economic activities (Republic of Iraq 1970, Article 28).

I found several instances of academic capitalist/income generating activities at Kurdish public universities. Consulting and language centers were in place well before the study began. Evening programs and parallel education emerged over the course of the inquiry as the economy in the region declined. I also elaborate on the specific relationship between the Kurdish Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research and the region’s universities in developing and fostering different types of academic capitalism. Such cooperation is previously undescribed in the literature.

I used an academic capitalism theoretical framework to guide my inquiry. This model provides four observable characteristics of neoliberal educational reform on higher education: new circuits of knowledge, interstitial organizational emergence, intermediating organizations, and expanded managerial capacity (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 26).
I collected data through semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Following on similar approaches by Hackett (1990, 249) and Kleinman and Vallas (2007, 290), this study incorporated selective sampling of institutions which were likely to be engaged in academic capitalism, and included Ministry of Higher Education officials, as well as public university administrators and faculty members who were likely to have knowledge of these academic capitalism activities.
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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

I undertook this study to understand better how and why public universities in developing 
countries have undertaken income generation activities. Such practices have not been well 
examined in the developing nation context (Maldonado-Maldonado 2014, 201). I chose to 
conduct the study in the Iraqi Kurdistan region in part for convenience, but also because it is 
unique in having emerged after the Second Gulf War from an oppressive National Socialist 
ruling government overtly hostile to market-based economic activities (Republic of Iraq 1970, 
Article 28).

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declined. I also elaborate on the specific relationship between the Kurdish Ministry of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research and the region’s universities in developing and fostering 
different types of academic capitalism. Such cooperation is previously undescribed in the 
literature.

I used Slaughter and Rhoades’ theory of academic capitalism as the conceptual 
framework for this study. Their model allows the analyst to chart the influence of several 
characteristics of neoliberal educational initiatives on higher education (Slaughter and Rhoades 
2004, 26). I collected data by interviewing key informants and analyzing official documents. 
Those individuals I interviewed were chosen based on the likelihood of their having knowledge
of income generating activities. They included Kurdish Ministry of Higher Education officials, as well as public university administrators and faculty members Hackett (1990, 249 and Kleinman and Vallas 2007, 290).
Dedication

To my mother Betty,

my wife Venecia

and

my daughter, Camille.

They were there with me every step of the way.
Acknowledgements

I am honored to have had the opportunity to conduct a study on public higher education in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. I cannot say enough about the kindness and generosity of those I had the opportunity to meet over the course of my time there these past two years, starting with the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Affairs. Through the generosity of Minister Yousif Samad Lutfulla, better known as Dr. Yousif Goran, I was given free access to the ministry and its charges, the universities in the region. Director of relations Maqsood Mohammed was invaluable, introducing me to many officials who would help me on my way. Those I interacted with thereafter at the universities were equally supportive and gracious. Any apparent criticism of the ministry or Kurdish universities should be taken in the context of the great respect and admiration I have for these institutions.

I owe a great debt to IREX (the International Research and Exchanges Board) for their support and encouragement throughout this study. The higher education team in Iraq led by Dr. Lori Mason is a credit to this organization. The work that this NGO has done and continues to do to advance the quality and effectiveness of higher education in the Kurdistan region is without equal.

I would also like to thank my colleagues at Virginia Tech in Outreach and International Affairs and the Language and Culture Institute, which I currently direct, for giving me the space that I needed to complete my research. My Vice President, Guru Ghosh, and my immediate supervisor, Susan Short, backed me a hundred percent, as did my co-workers at the institute.

I save my greatest appreciation for those on my committee, who guided me through the process of developing and completing the dissertation. Dr. Timothy Luke advised me through
the first two years of my doctoral program and taught my favorite course, which rekindled my interest in development. Dr. Joan Hirt helped me refine my initial observations of Kurdish higher education into the construct of a study. Dr. Laura Zanotti’s course on Haiti introduced me to the idea that researchers in developing contexts have an obligation to give back—which I have tried to do. I wrote with each in mind, attempting to channel their critiques and predilections.

My chair, Dr. Max Stephenson, taught me in the most profound sense what it means to be a mentor. He listened to my ideas and helped to shape my direction without imposing his own views. He prompted me from time to time on my progress, gently prodding me forward. He gently, but firmly, critiqued my drafts. He raised me up in moments of crisis. In the end, he gave prodigiously of his time to help me give birth to my final draft. All in a day’s work, according to Max.

I would be remiss not to acknowledge Dr. Craig Brians, now deceased, with whom I had my first graduate class. Craig gave me confidence that I could do it. He is greatly missed.
Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ ii
General Audience Abstract ........................................................................................................ iv
Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... vi
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... vii
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................ ix
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... xii
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... xiii

Chapter One: Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1

   Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................................... 2
   Macro Trends Shaping Higher Education in the Middle East .................................................... 6
   Applicability of the Academic Capitalism Framework in MENA Nations ............................ 9
   Iraqi Kurdistan Demographic Trends and Higher Education ................................................. 11
   Statement of the Problem ......................................................................................................... 21
   Purpose Statement .................................................................................................................. 22
   Research Questions ................................................................................................................ 22
   Significance of the Study ......................................................................................................... 23
   Delimitations .......................................................................................................................... 24
   Organization of the Study ....................................................................................................... 25

Chapter Two: Neoliberalism ....................................................................................................... 26

   A Brief History of Neoliberal Ideology in Higher Education ................................................... 42
   Neoliberal Changes in Higher Education .............................................................................. 47
   Neoliberalism and the Knowledge Economy ......................................................................... 53
   Neoliberalism as the Prevailing Ideology in Higher Education ............................................ 56
   Exportation of Neoliberalism ............................................................................................... 58
   Neoliberalism, Higher Education and the World Bank ........................................................ 60
   Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 66

Chapter Three: Academic Capitalism ......................................................................................... 69

   Academic Capitalism Defined ............................................................................................... 69
   Evolution of the Theory of Academic Capitalism ................................................................. 71
   Manifestations of Academic Capitalism ................................................................................ 74
   Mechanisms of Academic Capitalism .................................................................................... 77
Roots of the Academic Capitalist/Learning Regime ............................................................. 81
The Student as a Customer? .................................................................................................. 82
The Research Turn ............................................................................................................... 88
Changes in Higher Education .............................................................................................. 94
Academic Capitalism Comes of Age ................................................................................... 100
Academic Capitalism in Developing Countries ................................................................. 111
Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 119
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 123

Chapter Four: Academic Capitalism in Developing Contexts ........................................ 125

Jordan: 1989-2007 ............................................................................................................. 133
Comparing the Cases ......................................................................................................... 148
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 154

Chapter Five: Research Design and Methodology ......................................................... 157

Section 1: Interviews ......................................................................................................... 157
Interview Method ............................................................................................................... 157
Sample Selection .............................................................................................................. 157
Instrumentation ............................................................................................................... 162
Data Collection ............................................................................................................... 164
Data Analysis .................................................................................................................. 167
Triangulation and Internal Validation ............................................................................. 170

Section 2: Documents Review .......................................................................................... 171
The Document Analysis Method .................................................................................... 171

Section 3: Broader Methodological Considerations ......................................................... 172
Positionality ..................................................................................................................... 172
Reflexivity ......................................................................................................................... 173
Ethics ............................................................................................................................... 177

Section 4: Implementation .................................................................................................. 178
Implementation of Interviews ......................................................................................... 178
Participant Profiles .......................................................................................................... 178

Chapter Six: Findings ........................................................................................................ 181

Introduction to Findings .................................................................................................... 181
Classification System ....................................................................................................... 181
Markers of Academic Capitalism ..................................................................................... 182
Terminology ..................................................................................................................... 185
Observed Instances of Academic Capitalism .................................................................... 186
Parallel Programs ............................................................................................................. 187
Evening Programs ............................................................................................................ 195
Basic Education ............................................................................................................... 198
Evening Program Finances .............................................................................................. 200
List of Figures

Figure 1: Iraq: population in millions by age group ................................................................. 12
Figure 2: Iraq: total population by major age groups .............................................................. 12
Figure 3: Map of Iraq ............................................................................................................. 14
Figure 4: IKR four-year public university enrollment ........................................................... 17
Figure 5: U.S. college enrollment of all undergraduate students 14 - 34 years old .............. 86
Figure 6: U.S. research university patents as a percentage of all domestic assignee U.S. patents, 1963-1999 .......................................................................................................................... 92
Figure 7: Map of Kurdistan governorates ............................................................................. 159
List of Tables

Table 1: Enrollments in Jordanian universities and community colleges................................. 136
Table 2: Per credit hour tuition and other fees at public Jordanian universities for the 2008-2009 academic year (in U.S. dollars) ................................................................................................... 140
Table 3: Cumulative recurrent deficits for all public universities ............................................. 146
Table 4: Planned interviews....................................................................................................... 160
Table 5: Axial coding model elements ...................................................................................... 168
Table 6: Axial coding examples ................................................................................................ 169
Table 7: Summary table of interviewees ................................................................................... 179
Table 8: Summary of Observed Academic Capitalism Activities............................................. 184
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Neoliberalism is a political philosophy that reifies the ‘free market’—dissociating government from control of the economy by ceding it to the private sector (Olssen and Peters 2005, 314). Harvey has described neoliberalism as a doctrine that, since its origins in the 1970s, has become “The central guiding principle of economic thought and management...” and has argued:

Neoliberalism in the first instance is a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices (Harvey 2005, 2).

The state’s role in this view is to serve as maintainer of a superstructure within which markets can flourish. Its proponents have also used neoliberal ideology vigorously to justify privatization of public institutions. Some of the noteworthy impacts on government of policies based on neoliberal ideology include: reduced funding, deregulation, de-unionization of labor, increased private (for-profit sector) influence on public decision-making, efficiency centered performance-based assessment and privatization of services (Harvey 2005, 2).

While the United States (U.S.), the United Kingdom (U.K.) and other Western countries have widely adopted neoliberal policies on their own volition, they have largely been demanded of developing nations, directly and indirectly, by those same states. An example of this phenomenon is the World Bank’s (WB) forced marketization of higher education (Levidow 2002, 2). Beginning in the 1980s, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) adopted a broad neoliberal agenda that dictated self-financing of higher education in exchange
for development loans. This turn had its roots in Africa, where the two intergovernmental international organizations had already required market-oriented structural adjustment programs for loan seekers (Levidow 2002, 6). Harvey has argued that, unlike the situation in Africa and many other locations, coalition forces directly imposed neoliberal policies in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 (Harvey 2005, 6).

This study investigates public higher education in the Kurdish region of Iraq for evidence of neoliberal influence, an orientation that some scholars have labeled academic capitalism. It was not intended to be a comprehensive examination of that region’s higher education institutions, but specifically to identify instances of academic capitalism at several leading universities and, if and where found, to examine how and why they occurred. This introductory chapter outlines the framework I used for my inquiry, explains the rationale for using it in light of the macro trends shaping the Middle East as well as the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and briefly addresses this study’s sample, research questions and methodology. I conclude the chapter with an outline of the dissertation.

Conceptual Framework

Researchers have employed various analytical frameworks to understand market-centered activities in universities better, e.g., the entrepreneurial university (Etzkowitz 1983), resource dependency (Rhoades and Slaughter 1997) and new institutional theory (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004). One such conceptualization that has not been applied to examine public higher education in the Middle Eastern context as yet is academic capitalism. This model is useful for understanding universities’ entrepreneurial activities and the structures that support them: organizations emerging from higher education institutions that facilitate marketization, external
organizations that promote closer university-industry relations and enhanced professional capacity to manage market-oriented initiatives (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004).

Academic capitalism, one manifestation of the influence of neoliberal ideology in higher education institutions, is defined as “… institutional and professorial or marketlike behaviors to secure extra moneys” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 8). The word ‘capitalism’ is used here in the sense of “an economic system in which allocation decisions are driven by market forces” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 9). In this conception, colleges and universities and their faculties are exhibiting ‘marketlike behavior’ when they compete for money in the form of “external grants and contracts, endowment funds, university-industry partnerships, institutional investment in professors’ spinoff companies, or student tuition and fees” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 11).

As neoliberal ideology has resulted in declining state support for higher education in developed and developing nations alike during the past five decades, public academic institutions have restructured substantially so as to remain economically viable, increasingly seeking resources from sources other than the state (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 11). Academic capitalism provides a lens through which to examine the institutional manifestations of this neoliberalism-inspired privatization movement in higher education.

Academic capitalism describes how neoliberal ideology has established itself in higher education, transforming the ways that public universities operate and, more broadly, their missions (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 20). Slaughter and Rhoades have contended that in the new (i.e. neoliberal) economy, advanced knowledge has become a commodity that is increasingly packaged, marketed and sold (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 22). Pusser and Doane have cited a number of examples of academic capitalism in U.S. universities:
The growth of auxiliary enterprises, industry-university research partnerships, for-profit subsidiaries of nonprofit institutions, and entrepreneurial continuing-education programs are just a few examples of an increasingly commercial orientation of nonprofits, and a conversion of nonprofit and for-profit institutional forms and behaviors (Pusser and Doane 2001, 22).

Slaughter and Rhoades have conceptualized colleges and universities as shifting “from a public good knowledge/learning regime to an academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime” (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 28). That is, universities have moved from an organizing principle of knowledge acquisition as an aspiration and public good to a perspective that the pursuit of learning must produce commodities and provide potential sources of revenue (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 30).

This new learning regime is characterized by broad acceptance of academic capitalism’s assumptions (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 28). Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) have offered an analytic framework that suggests that universities that are part of this approach exhibit one or more of the following four characteristics:

- New circuits of knowledge: more broadly defined pathways to learning that occur outside the traditional professional and scholarly networks that once dominated higher education
- Interstitial organizations: administrative structures and processes that have arisen from the need among colleges and universities to manage revenues from profit-making activities
- Intermediating networks: alliances across public, business and civil society sectors that coalesce around concrete issues to enable each party to take better advantage of opportunities in the new neoliberal economy
- Extended managerial capacity: additional managerial capacity to market opportunities more effectively (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 26).

According to these analysts these four markers of academic capitalism enable universities to attach “a price to things that were once free” or charge “more for items and services that were
once subsidized or provided at cost” (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 26). These characteristics of academic capitalism are further explored in Chapter Three.

As suggested above, academic capitalism is informed by several organizational theories: resource dependency (Slaughter and Leslie 1997), new institutionalism (Rhoades and Slaughter) and networks (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004). The resource dependency perspective posits that organizations compete for resources within their environment, striving for autonomy. When resources are strained, organizations, as a managerial response, resort to alternative strategies to obtain more revenue (Oliver 1990, 244). New institutional theory seeks to explain why organizations that perform similar functions across the globe, such as universities, are so similar not only in what they do but in structure: a homogenizing phenomenon called ‘isomorphism.’ DiMaggio and Powell have defined isomorphism as “a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 149). Network theory explains organizational behavior in terms of social relationships between and among organizations. Powell has described networks as distinct “reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions relying on “reputation, trust, tacit collusion, and a relative absence of calculative quid pro quo behavior” (Powell 1987, 82). In a network, organizations do not exist in and by themselves, but in relationship to other institutions (Powell 1987, 82). The degree to which a university is inclined to adopt or practice academic capitalism, by extension of these theories, should be determined by the financial stress it confronts, the rules that constrain it (e.g., legal or regulatory) and its network (e.g., board, faculty or university linkages) (Guo and Acar 2005, 346).

In sum, academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004) is a useful framework for examining higher education privatization because it arose from an
analysis of neoliberal influences on universities from the early 1980s forward. Further, it provides a classification scheme for observable practices that has been extensively applied across higher education institutions, albeit primarily in developed countries.

Macro Trends Shaping Higher Education in the Middle East

A 2011 World Bank report on higher education in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region pointed to three primary issues facing governments in that area: preparing young adults for the job market, increasing access to higher education and financing university studies (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, v). Underlying these issues in these nations is a systemic problem of rapid population growth, particularly among youth. A 2009 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on security issues confronting Arab states described this challenge succinctly:

The most evident and challenging aspect of the region’s demographic profile is its ‘youth bulge.’ Young people are the fastest growing segment of Arab countries’ populations. Some 60 per cent of the population is under 25 years old, making this one of the most youthful regions in the world, with a median age of 22 years compared to a global average of 28 (United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Arab States 2009, 3).

This growth in the youth population is not expected to peak across all MENA countries until 2045 (Galal 2008, 55).

That demographic expansion is currently working its way through universities in the region. A 2009 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) report estimated the number of students in higher education across Arab states had increased 256 percent between 1998 and 2008, from 2.967 to 7.607 million (Lamine 2010, 11). UNESCO listed two principal factors contributing to this increase in relatively equal measure: rising population
and growing social demand for higher education. During roughly the same period, the number of universities in the MENA region increased from 178 to 398. The variety of higher education institutions has also grown to include more open and virtual and private for-profit and not-for-profit institutions and international branch campuses (Lamine 2010, 19, Jaramillo 2011, 13). In addition to building new universities, MENA governments have added many other alternatives, such as community and teacher training colleges and technical training programs to the higher education mix (Lamine 2010, 19). While the region’s states have made progress in providing broad access to post-secondary school opportunities, the numbers of students entering universities continues to grow at a phenomenal pace (Jaramillo 2011, v).

The rapidly growing populations in MENA countries have created staggering pressures on higher education. While college and university enrollments doubled for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states between 1995 and 2009, they tripled for MENA nations. During the eight-year period from 2000-2008, for example, average enrollments at Middle Eastern and North African universities increased an average 20 to 30 percent. World Bank Senior Education Specialist Adrianna Jaramillo has predicted an additional increase in MENA higher education enrollments of as high as 50 percent by 2023 (World Bank 2013a). She has called for colleges and universities to find alternative sources of funding to support this growth, given that “tax increases are highly unlikely” (World Bank 2013a). Enrollment pressure from the youth bulge has stressed facilities, caused teacher shortages and stretched financial resources throughout the region (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, v).

State higher education in the MENA nations is challenged by a dearth of financial resources, underprepared students entering the system and difficult employment situations for graduates (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, 17). As historic numbers of youths make their way into
higher education, universities throughout the Middle East and North Africa are facing the task of educating more people with fewer resources. On the surface, higher education spending as a portion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in many MENA states appears on par with country expenditures for the purpose in the European Union (averaging 1.4 percent of GDP) and OECD (averaging 1.2 percent of GDP). Some nations in the region, such as Algeria (2.6 percent of GDP) and Libya (3 percent of GDP), for example, approach or exceed spending by the U.S. (about 2.7 percent of GDP) (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, 17). However, when the populations of MENA countries are factored into their spending for higher education, i.e., higher education spending per enrollment as a portion of GDP per capita, the financial stress these nations now confront becomes clear. As the number of students matriculating at universities increases at a greater rate than the general population, which is the case with the current youth population among the MENA countries, spending per student decreases. Indeed, while average spending per student among the region’s states increased from U.S.$ 1,288 to U.S.$ 2,082 between 1995 and 2009, higher education spending per student as a proportion of GDP per capita decreased by an average 45 percent during the same period (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, 17).

A 2010 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) report criticized school systems in MENA countries at all levels as of “uneven quality and relevance” and inconsistently preparing students for careers (UNICEF MENA Regional Office 2010, 84). UNICEF argued that students in these nations demonstrate little interest in the science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) fields, evidence high dropout rates and relatively low average educational attainment compared to other world regions (UNICEF MENA Regional Office 2010, 64). The UN Children’s Fund analysis cited a “lack of feedback loops between the education system and the needs of the labor market,” and advised:
The global marketplace calls for new competencies that the current education system is not fully prepared to teach. And to adjust to the realities of globalization, schools must be prepared to transform their curricula even while they diversify their funding sources (UNICEF MENA Regional Office 2010, 64).

The 2013 World Bank report cited above echoed this assessment, noting that large numbers of MENA graduates in the humanities and social sciences are ill-suited, “to meet the demands of the recent private sector expansion in the manufacturing and service sectors” (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, 5).

Compounding the severity of the situation confronting the higher education sectors in MENA countries is a lack of jobs for university graduates. The International Labour Organization (2014) reported that in many countries unemployment increases with educational attainment:

For instance, over 29 percent of those with tertiary education are unemployed in Tunisia; over 26 percent in the Palestinian Authority; 22 percent in United Arab Emirates; and over 18 percent in Morocco, 15 percent in Algeria; and around 14 per cent in Egypt (International Labour Office 2014, 64).

Both the UNICEF and World Bank reports cited concluded that higher education in MENA countries should provide the skills and capacities that graduates need to become productive members of the workforce in their states and region, i.e., that a market-oriented strategy should be central to higher education planning and curricula in the region (UNICEF MENA Regional Office 2010, 64, Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, 6).

Applicability of the Academic Capitalism Framework in MENA Nations

One weakness of the academic capitalist/learning regime model may be its presupposition that universities have adopted neoliberal thought and practices. This may not be
the case in developing nation contexts. In particular, while some Middle Eastern countries, especially the Gulf States, are relatively well integrated into the global economy, most others are not—whether due to pervasive poverty, political isolation or conditions of constant conflict. Nonetheless, Jaramillo and Melonio have identified a number of examples of higher education privatization in MENA states, including:

- **Performance-related agreements:** In 2009, the Tunisian and Moroccan governments established programs to fund institutional projects proposed by public universities. The proposal process was competitive, with funding contingent upon achieving negotiated outcome-oriented goals enshrined in performance contracts (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, 31).

- **Training vouchers:** In 2008, the Tunisian government established a system of training vouchers to fund training for government officials. Users obtained vouchers through an application system and redeemed them at private accredited training providers (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, 34).

- **Government scholarships:** In 2006, Kuwait established a system to fund 80 percent of the cost of attending private higher education institutions, with the balance of tuition covered by the receiving institution. Students obtained scholarships through an application process (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, 35).

- **Student loans:** In 2001, the Palestine government established a revolving student loan program to increase access to public higher education. Students could establish eligibility both on achievement and financial need (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, 40).

These examples suggest that at least some aspects of the academic capitalism frame may be applicable in these emergent nations’ situations, a setting in which it has not heretofore been widely adopted.

Working with universities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) for some time, and specifically with new universities in the region (see ‘Positionality’ in Chapter Five), I became interested in the increasingly observable capitalistic practices of higher education institutions in this area of Iraq. After further research, I elected to examine the phenomenon I was observing...
more intensively and selected Iraqi Kurdistan as the target for this study. Iraq is an appropriate region in which to explore emergent neoliberal influences on higher education because of its relative isolation from the West from 1968 through 2003 under Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime. My choice of Iraq, and particularly the IKR, for study arose in part too as a matter of convenience since I was working there as a professional in any case. It is also an appropriate region for this analysis because of its comparative security, recent history, relative autonomy from the rest of the country and its government’s emphasis on higher education.

Iraqi Kurdistan Demographic Trends and Higher Education

The overarching demographic trends in Iraq are similar to those in other parts of the MENA region and they present particular challenges for higher education. As of 2015, the population of Iraq, including the IKR, was approximately 36.5 million. Of these individuals, more than 60 percent are under 25 (United Nations Development Programme in Iraq 2015, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division 2015). As of 2015, those of working-age in the country (aged 15 to 64) made up 56 percent of the total population. The demographic profiles in Figure 1, below, include the IKR population and illustrate the projected development of the Iraqi youth bulge: Figure 2, below, shows the expected growth in the Iraqi youth to adult population (i.e. working adults) aged 15 to 64 relative to other age groups. This rising population, combined with high rates of unemployment, is a major source of stress in both the IKR and greater Iraq.
Figure 1: Iraq: population in millions by age group


Figure 2: Iraq: total population by major age groups

As of 2014, a UNDP demographic profile of Iraq pegged unemployment among youths aged 15 to 24 in Iraq at 18 percent versus a national average jobless rate of 11 percent. Unemployment among members of this cohort with higher education was higher than those without university degrees (United Nations Development Programme in Iraq 2015). According to the Iraqi Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs the nation’s unemployment rate had surpassed 25 percent as of March of 2015 (Lee 2015b). By comparison, the Sulaimani Directorate of Statistics recently reported average unemployment in the IKR at 7 percent in 2013 increasing to 10 percent in 2014 (eKurd Net Staff 2015). The situation in the region is dynamic, however, and government statistics are disputed by non-government sources. The Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s Syndicate of Investors, a business association, recently asserted that actual unemployment in the IKR, with the economic disruption and displaced populations created by the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) conflict, was closer to 20 to 25 percent (Lee 2015a).

Iraq has continued to experience a great deal of popular unrest since the end of the Second Gulf War in 2003. The recent emergence of the Islamic State has only added to the ongoing social turmoil in the nation. The IKR, in contrast to the remainder of the country, has remained relatively stable for the past two decades – since the end of a four-year internal civil war in 1997 (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2015, 26, Katzman 2015, 10). Universities in Iraqi Kurdistan emerged from the Second Gulf War relatively unscathed (UNESCO 2004, 92). Currently, while ISIS activities on its western and southern borders have caused a refugee crisis in the IKR, the region’s colleges and universities have so far been relatively unaffected by that conflict.
As Figure 3 depicts the IKR is located in the northern part of the country and is roughly bordered by the Tigris River to the south, Iran to the east, Turkey to the north and Syria to the west. Three of 18 Iraqi governorates, or provinces, comprise the region: Erbil, in which the regional capital of the same name is located, Duhok and Sulaimania. The IKR is predominantly populated by Kurds, an ethnically distinct group also found as minorities in adjacent countries, including, especially, Turkey (McDowall 2004, 2).

Figure 3: Map of Iraq


The Kurds have looked to the U.S. as a patron and protector for more than 25 years (McDowall 2004, 369). The IKR gained a measure of autonomy from the Iraqi government as a result of the Gulf War (also called the First Gulf War or Persian Gulf War) in the early 1990s.
That conflict resulted from Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. United States-led coalition forces responded to the incursion by invading Iraq to liberate Kuwait. The war ended in early 1991 with Iraqi defeat and the U.S. withdrew from the region. Soon thereafter, Saddam turned a share of his forces on Kurdish separatists in the north in retaliation for helping the American-led alliance. The ensuing conflict created a humanitarian crisis, forcing hundreds of thousands of Kurds to flee their homes (McDowall 2004, 372). To end a growing refugee emergency, the American led coalition established a No Fly Zone in the Kurdish region. This protection enabled the region’s population to recapture territory lost to Saddam’s forces and to begin to build its own governance institutions within the Iraqi state (Stansfield 2003, 2, McDowall 2004, 397). It also increased exposure to the West, as international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) entered the area to assist displaced residents (Stansfield 2003, 52). After an internal civil war from 1993 to 1997, the Kurdistan Regional Government, also known as the KRG, began to develop its own structures and capacities to govern the area (Stansfield 2003, 132).

While the 2005 Iraqi Constitution calls for cooperation between federal and regional authorities in developing educational and instructional policy, public education in the IKR is administered independently from the remainder of the nation. Planning, resources and data, for example, are separately maintained by the respective ministries of education in Iraq and the IKR (UNESCO Iraq Office 2011, 23). Three ministries are engaged with education in the region: the Ministry of Education (KMOE) supervises primary and secondary education, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (KMOLSA) oversees vocational education and training and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (KMHESR) is responsible for post-secondary technical and higher education (Vernez and Culbertson 2014, 3). The IKR employs a
parliamentary system of government and the ruling party or coalition therefore selects the leaders of these various ministries. The KRG receives its budget from the Iraqi government and its officials control the allocation of those funds, including those earmarked for higher education.

Higher education in the IKR has grown substantially since the Saddam era. As of 2003, only three public universities existed in the region, one in each of the three governorates in the IKR. The KMHESR now lists 14 public universities—11 four-year degree-granting institutions and three polytechnics. The oldest university in the region, Salahaddin University, was established in 1968. The University of Duhok and the University of Sulaimani followed in 1992. Eight additional universities were established in the immediate aftermath of the Second Gulf War, between 2003 and 2010. Six were created, respectively, in the district centers of Koya, Raparin, Zakho, Halabja, Garmian and Soran, and two in Erbil (Vernez and Culbertson 2014, 4). The newest four-year degree-granting institution, Charmo University, was founded in 2014. The University of Kurdistan (UKH), interestingly, is listed not as a public or private university, but in the classification “Other Universities” (KMHESR 2015m).

Entrepreneurs and other interested parties began to establish private universities in the IKR in 2004. The KMHESR recognized 14 such private entities as of 2015 (KMHESR 2015m). Seven of these institutions, several with multiple campuses, opened between 2006 and 2009. Two others began operations in 2015. Many have been founded by foreigners, including American, British, Lebanese and Turkish investors and universities (KMHESR 2014c).6

There is evidence that higher education institutions in the Kurdish region are experiencing matriculation pressures. Between the 2006 and 2013 school years, enrollment at public universities in the Iraqi Kurdistan region grew from 47,000 to 78,000 students (KMHESR 2014a).7
The KRG opened seven public four-year universities in the region during this period, while investors created eight private universities.

Al-Hadithi et al., writing on the youth bulge in Iraqi Kurdistan, has warned of “…serious challenges in terms of accommodating the growing generation in schools and universities” (Al-Hadithi et al. 2010, 1101). Palander (2013), in arguing for the need for greater quality control in Kurdish universities, has described the KRG’s acquiescence in 2005 to student protests demanding access to public higher education. Following those demonstrations, the government...
dropped admission requirements to permit marginal students entry into universities, resulting in increased (doubled) class sizes and greatly reduced quality of instruction (Palander 2013, 106).

Following the transition to an Iraqi-controlled government in 2004, various international actors have highlighted national and IKR higher education needs. Neoliberal assumptions have suffused and defined their analyses and recommendations. A 2004 UNESCO study, for example, (like that organization’s later 2010 analysis cited above) asserted that Iraqi universities should educate students in accordance with the needs of the market and the emerging knowledge society, and promoted greater interaction with international universities (UNESCO 2004, 92). UNESCO incorporated these aims in its National Development Plan for Iraq for 2010-2014 (UNESCO Iraq Office 2011, 53). A 2008 U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored report highlighted similar needs for higher education in the IKR:

Firstly, the infrastructure of universities must be such as to allow universal Internet access to staff and students. Secondly, the universities must be able to become a part of the worldwide academic network. Thirdly, courses of study must be instituted that will train students in fields appropriate to employment in local industry and lead to academic research that is relevant to local industry. Syllabi must be kept relevant and current through research and communication with other centers of learning excellence around the world (RTI International 2008, 66).

Deference to the market, the desirability of joining the international knowledge economy and the inevitability of joining the global economic regime permeate these recommendations.

The penetration of neoliberal thought into Iraqi Kurdish higher education is apparent, too, in the rhetoric of government and university leaders. In a speech in 2007, for example, Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani called for integrating Kurdish higher education into, “the world educational community, i.e., the network of governmental and non-governmental resources, to improve the educational system, including online courses, training programs and
seminars” (UNESCO Iraq Office 2011, 53). In those same remarks he also sought more intense interaction between the private for-profit sector and higher education to provide assistance to improve the quality of education. The final recommendations of a 2007 major conference of Iraqi educators and international organizations also reflected neoliberal thought. One proposal that arose from that meeting, for example, was to increase university connections with industry by involving business leaders on advisory boards, providing consulting services and soliciting research funding (Iraq Higher Education Organising Committee 2007, 8). Another was to license use of intellectual property arising from university research to help raise funds for those institutions (Iraq Higher Education Organising Committee 2007, 8). While governmental and university leaders have embraced neoliberal views, it is not clear to what extent this acceptance has influenced and become institutionalized in Kurdish higher education policies and practices. The IKR’s universities provide a laboratory for examining this question.

Public universities in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the exception of the University of Kurdistan-Hawler, have little autonomy and are tightly controlled by the KMHESR. Policy and curricula, for example, originate solely from the Ministry, which also employs teachers (the universities do not employ their own faculties). The KMHESR also determines placement in tertiary institutions by assigning students to universities hierarchically according to scores attained on examinations it administers at the secondary school level (Vernez and Culbertson 2014, 4).

This circumstance suggests that Kurdish universities seemingly possess neither the authority to privatize functions nor the motivation to do so. This said, some higher education institutions nonetheless appear to evidence characteristics or features typical of academic capitalism. The Koya University, for example, presents its research program as extending to “collaborations with national and international institutions, partnerships with industry as well as
knowledge transfer activities.” Koya also entered into an agreement with the private firm Kaplan International Universities in 2014 to provide English language training on its campus (Kaplan International Staff 2013). Soran University boasts an official Pearson Test Center. The Pearson Test of English, or PTE, is a standardized examination designed for admission to universities in the U.S. and the U.K. Arrangements to become a test center generally involve an income-sharing arrangement with the vendor. The Soran University website states that the Center opened to facilitate visas for students wishing to study abroad on KRG sponsored scholarships. While these are relatively minor instances of what might be termed academic capitalism, they may be indicative of broader trends emerging in the region’s public higher education sector as a whole.

The University of Kurdistan-Hawler (UKH), which receives its budget directly from the Kurdistan Regional Government, is the only independent public university in the region. Officials at the institution describe it this way: “UKH is an English-speaking public University dedicated to being the region's leading centre of excellence in research and teaching and in the dissemination and application of knowledge to further the industrial, economic, cultural, environmental and social development of Kurdistan” (University of Kurdistan - Hawler 2014b). UKH has plans to establish a ‘Regional Research Center’ that will focus on and engage in “promoting and supporting sustainable development and responding to market needs in the region and beyond” (University of Kurdistan - Hawler 2014a). The university has specifically identified continuing education, lifelong learning and enterprise activities as integral to its mission (University of Kurdistan - Hawler 2014b). These emergent institutional activities in the IKR’s public universities are consistent with the neoliberal rhetoric introduced above.
From its origins in the U.S. and the United Kingdom (Harvey 2005, introduction), neoliberal ideology has gradually grown in prominence to the point where it now shapes globalization by defining the ways in which nations, and particularly Western countries, relate to one another (Olssen and Peters 2005, 314). Nonetheless, the extent to which neoliberal policies are shaping higher education in other parts of the world has not been broadly studied. While the advancement of neoliberalism has been well documented in Western countries, in parts of Africa, as well as in China, analysts have thus far not examined its influence in the Middle East. This study begins to address this gap in the relevant literature by examining the privatization of public higher education in the IKR in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War in Iraq.

Statement of the Problem

This study sought to understand better the institutional manifestations of public higher education privatization in one nation in the Middle East. Higher education funding concerns countries around the globe (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, v). In less developed nations, for example, and particularly in Africa, universities are consistently under-resourced (Levidow 2002, 6). In the U.S since the early 1980s, state subsidy of public higher education has steadily declined on a per student basis. U.S. public higher education, as a result, has been increasingly supported by those attending it and by the federal government and private industry through research funding (Pusser and Doane 2001, 22). Perhaps nowhere is this sort of budgetary challenge more acute than in the MENA region, which is facing explosive population growth during the coming two decades (Jaramillo and Melonio 2011, v).
Purpose Statement

I aimed to determine whether academic capitalism markers were present in sample universities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. My premise was that if academic capitalism were at work, evidence of one or more of the following shifts predicted in the academic capitalism framework\textsuperscript{17} should be observable: new circuits of knowledge, interstitial organizations, intermediating organizations or networks, and/or extended managerial capacity (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 26).

In the case of developing countries, Western mimicry might be an alternative explanation for any instances of academic capitalism observed at universities. University administrators and professors who studied in Western universities could, conceivably, have brought these practices back with them, or could have picked them up through other exposure to outside practices—perhaps through conferences or training programs.

In addition to identifying practices of academic capitalism, I undertook as well to describe the circumstances that brought them about.

Research Questions

The central research questions that guided this inquiry, derived directly from Slaughter and Rhoades’ (2004) academic capitalism framework, follow:

1. If present, how and why have new circuits of knowledge emerged in the public universities examined in the IKR?
2. If present, how and why have interstitial organizations emerged within Kurdish public universities?
3. If present, how and why have intermediating organizations and/or networks emerged in universities in the IKR?
4. If present, how and why have new circuits of knowledge, interstitial organizations and intermediating organizations and/or networks resulted in extended managerial capacity within Kurdish region universities?

Significance of the Study

After the downfall of the Baathist regime in 2003, universities in the Iraqi Kurdistan region entered a golden period as higher education blossomed. The KRG opened more public universities and implemented an extensive international scholarship program to help train their professoriate (Palander 2013, 55). Access to public higher education in the region at the time this study began was at an all-time high, and students received full government support to attend: free tuition and books, free accommodation and meals and monthly living allowances (Al-Hadithi et al. 2010, 1101).

Some of the broader issues affecting the Middle East generally, however, have now (March 2016) begun to take a toll on Kurdistan’s higher education system. As outlined above, ever increasing student numbers are straining university capacity and the quality of higher education (Al-Hadithi et al. 2010, 1101). Graduates are now facing a new market-driven economy offering few job opportunities and finding they possess limited capacities to compete effectively for such jobs as may be available (Al-Hadithi et al. 2010, 1101).

This study focused on Kurdish universities’ attempts to cope with increasing financial pressures, enrollment growth and relatively high unemployment levels and also sought to identify the strategies the region’s higher education institutions are employing to mitigate this strain. The theory of academic capitalism suggests that universities under financial pressures will seek ways to augment their budgets (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 8).
This study’s results should be of interest to researchers and policymakers interested in knowing more about the phenomenon of privatization of public higher education as it is being expressed in the Middle East.

Delimitations

I collected data by means of semi-structured interviews with selected individuals from three specific groups: a sample of university administrators and faculty, KMHESR officials and outside experts from U.S. and U.K. foreign missions who are familiar with Iraqi higher education. I sought to obtain a depth of understanding concerning the situations at Kurdish universities and a breadth of awareness of the perspectives of their overseers and interested outside observers of higher education in Kurdistan. To gain perspective on how KRG universities were adapting to increasing financial pressure, I selected three representative higher education institutions at which to conduct interviews: two from a group of the earliest established universities in the region (1968-1992)—both under the direct control of the KMHESR and funded by the Ministry of Finance—and one more recently established autonomous KRG funded institution.

I also investigated the impetus for academic capitalism’s adoption in IKR public universities via document analysis. I limited my focus to IKR produced documents concerning Kurdish higher education, as described in the document analysis section of Chapter Five concerning my study design and methodology. I did not examine documents produced at the national government level—e.g., laws or policies directed at Iraq as a whole.
Organization of the Study

This study is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter One has offered a brief introduction and overview of salient framing issues as well as a statement of the study’s purpose and significance. Chapters Two and Three review the literature on neoliberalism in higher education and academic capitalism, respectively. Chapter Four examines the emergence of academic capitalism in the context of privatization in several developing countries. This chapter relates several cases in which developing countries have gone through significant economic declines that led to privatization of their higher education systems—to varying degrees. Chapter Five outlines the research design and methodology I employed. Chapter Six provides an analysis and overview of major findings. Chapter Seven discusses the implications of the study’s findings for university leaders and policymakers and outlines areas for possible further research.
CHAPTER TWO

NEOLIBERALISM

I reviewed literature concerning neoliberalism, academic capitalism and privatization of public higher education in developing countries for this study. This chapter is divided into three main sections to address those concerns. In the first, I provide a short history of neoliberalism and describe how it gained prominence in American life in the 1980s. In the second, I sketch the evolution of neoliberalism in higher education, discuss its effects as articulated by various researchers and offer an analysis of its impacts. In the first two sections I focus on the neoliberal turn in the U.S., concentrating specifically on the period between 1970 and 1990. In the third section I follow neoliberalism as it evolved from the 1980s and was exported to the developing world by Western governments and international institutions. As an example, I address the means by which the World Bank has contributed to the adoption of neoliberal higher education policies in developing countries. I employ Harvey’s detailed account, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (2005), to provide historical context for this chapter.

Defining Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is, “a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade” (Harvey 2005, 2). The role of the state in such a system, according to Harvey, is to provide something of an open-source framework, in the form of market-oriented policies and security (e.g. for business and trade), within which the market can function effectively (Harvey 2005, 2). Hay has developed the following list of key characteristics of neoliberalism:
1. A confidence in the market as an efficient mechanism for allocation of scarce resources.
2. A belief in the desirability of a global regime of free trade and free capital mobility.
3. A belief in the desirability, all things being equal, of a limited and non-interventionist role for the state.
4. A conception of the state as a facilitator and custodian rather than a substitute for market mechanisms.
5. A defense of individual liberty.
6. A commitment to the removal of those welfare benefits which might be seen to act as disincentives to market participation.
7. A defense of labour-market flexibility and the promotion and nurturing of cost competitiveness.
8. A confidence in the use of private finance in public projects and, more generally, in the allocative efficiency of market and quasi-market mechanisms in the provision of public goods (Hay 2007, 54).

Neoliberalism is premised on a notion of the self-regulating or disembedded market, largely freed from government oversight (Polanyi 1967, 60). This form of social organization, otherwise known as the ‘free market,’ is based on the notion that individuals, acting in relatively unrestricted ways and in their own self-interest, will eventually order themselves to form a complex system of economic activity. The market, then, is comprised of that network of transactions and the ways that actors monetarily interrelate within it. This view assumes that left to itself (i.e., in a ‘natural’ state), the market will take on a life of its own–become self-sustaining and act, through competition, to promote economic development (Hayek 1976, 68).

Along with market liberalization, deregulation and privatization make up the other primary pillars of neoliberalism. Proponents contend that public regulation is anathema to a free market because it interferes with the incentive structures that drive it (Hayek 1976, 73). Neoliberals therefore argue for the elimination of regulations that they perceive as inhibiting trade and commerce. They purport that the state has no place in the free market: “any attempt to control prices or quantities of particular commodities deprives competition of its power of
bringing about an effective coordination of individual efforts” (Hayek 1976, 85). The state is relegated, in this thinking, to the role of preserver of competition. Because each individual is responsible for his or her own productivity and success in the free market, proponents of neoliberalism deem state welfare services such as health, education and pensions as largely superfluous. This is not to say that state provision of social services is entirely incompatible with free market thinking. Rather, in this view, governments should not provide services that could otherwise be profitably undertaken by for-profit firms (Hayek 1976, 87).

Friedrich von Hayek, a notable proponent of this view, attributed the rise of Western civilization from the Renaissance through the industrial age to the ‘invention’ of the free market, made possible through a gradual political awakening (Hayek 1976, 68). In his defining work on the subject, *The Road to Serfdom*, originally published in 1944, Hayek observed:

The gradual transformation of a rigidly organized hierarchic system into one where men could at least attempt to shape their own life, where man gained the opportunity of knowing and choosing between different forms of life, is closely associated with the growth of commerce (Hayek 1976, 68).

Hayek argued that the freedom to pursue ‘individual energies’ that evolved with increasing political freedom in the post-Renaissance era cultivated progress and the advancement of knowledge in the West. This turn led to rapid development in the 19th century as class consciousness and aspirations of individual freedom peaked:

What in the future will probably appear the most significant and far-reaching effect of this success is the new sense of power over their own fate, the belief in the unbounded possibilities of improving their own lot which the success already achieved created among men (Hayek 1976, 70).

For Hayek, economic freedom, which he regarded as the latitude to pursue economic security, formed the basis of a free Western society (Hayek 1976, 70).
Karl Polanyi, a Hayek contemporary and strong critic of free market ideology, attributed the decline of nineteenth century civilization to that imaginary (Polanyi 1967, 247). In *The Great Transformation*, originally published in 1944, he refuted Hayek’s contention that the free market was a ‘natural phenomenon’ (Polanyi 1967, 247). In sharp contrast to Hayek, he argued that accepting this premise would ultimately undermine democratic society. As evidence, Polanyi pointed to the rise of economic liberalism under laissez faire (non-interventionist) government rule in Western Europe in the early 1800s. Industrialization during that period brought with it a self-interested economic imaginary that justified, or simply ignored, extraordinary excesses of greed and exploitation (Polanyi 1967, 257). With ‘improvement’ in society came gross abuses of civil rights: child labor, slave labor (in the then colonies), wages and terrible working conditions (Polanyi 1967, 153). The resulting popular backlash in the latter part of the century ushered in child welfare laws, workers compensation and insurance and workers’ union protections (Polanyi 1967, 155). Polanyi argued that such reforms were essential to avoid social destruction “by the action of the self-regulating market” (Polanyi 1967, 155).

Polanyi further asserted that the self-regulating market was not socially architectonic, and that the notion that it could be was fantasy. He pointed out that “even capitalist business itself had to be sheltered from the unrestricted working of the market economy” (Polanyi 1967, 201). He cited as an example the constant intervention of nations’ central banks in markets in any number of ways to mitigate broad fluctuations in currency values (Polanyi 1967, 204). He argued that political resolve subordinated markets, as demonstrated in Britain’s decision to leave the gold standard in 1931, followed by the United States in 1933 (Polanyi 1967, 209). Polanyi asserted that the supposed free market was not a natural phenomenon. Indeed, the state imposed, manipulated and terminated the market at will:
Economic history reveals that the emergence of national markets was in no way the result of gradual and spontaneous emancipation of the economic sphere from government control. On the contrary, the market has been the outcome of a conscious and often violent intervention on the part of government which imposed the market organization on society for noneconomic ends (Polanyi 1967, 248).

Polanyi concluded from his analysis of nineteenth century economics that the economy must be embedded in the political sphere to ensure its regulation for the public good (Polanyi 1967, 268). Neoliberalism is the present-day manifestation of Polanyi’s worst fears (Harvey 2005, 70). This public philosophy has motivated businesses consistently to challenge state regulation as an attack on their (and individual) freedom (Polanyi 1967, 263). Polanyi denounced businesses’ complaints of government “planning and control,” arguing that public oversight was necessary to protect “justice and security” on behalf of the greater populace (Polanyi 1967, 263). Harvey has asserted that, in the neoliberal era, business assumed control of the modern economy: “corporate interests and class elites” embraced a “neo-liberal market-based populist culture of differentiated consumerism and individual libertarianism” in the 1980s. This blending of ideas successfully turned the general public against state regulation (Harvey 2005, 42). Business and conservative political leaders accomplished this feat by expanding and eventually displacing the traditional notion of political freedom to include “lifestyles, modes of expression, and a wide range of cultural practices” (Harvey 2005, 42).

Neoliberalism arose as a philosophy of governance in the U.S. and Great Britain in the late 1970s and early 1980s, principally with the support of then President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 72, Harvey 2005, 1, Galbraith 2008, 9). The opening to markets in China under Deng Xiaoping and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union under Mikhail Gorbachev have also popularly been attributed to neoliberalism (Harvey 2005, 3, Roy, Denzau, and Willett 2007, 3).

The Neoliberal Transformation in the U.S.

Neoliberalism became the predominant political and economic mindset in the United States in the 1980s and continues to serve in that role today. Accounts that describe and seek to explain its ascendency (Bird 2007, Galbraith 2008, Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, Harvey 2005) are mostly complementary. In the U.S., neoliberal ideology emerged in relationship to turbulent economic conditions, specifically the recessions of the 1970s.

Prior to the Second World War and through the 1960s, political leaders managed the U.S. economy on Keynesian principles. Respected economists of the period marginalized free market advocates such as Hayek, not only in the U.S., but also in Europe. Nonetheless, during the post-World War II era, a small group of academics preserved and developed neoliberal thought (Harvey 2005, 21). In the early 1970s, U.S. businesses, which considered themselves somewhat suppressed under the Keynesian system, began to assert themselves politically--complaining of excessive taxation and over-regulation (Harvey 2005, 42). ‘Stagflation’ recessions at the start and end of the 1970s shook confidence among the American public in management of the economy (Harvey 2005, 23). Conservatives, including Reagan and other emerging leaders in the Republican Party, used this opportunity to promote Hayekian/neoliberal economic thought. The media picked up and amplified these ideas—particularly the business press (Harvey 2005, 40). Conservative think tanks supporting neoliberal principles began to appear. The decade culminated with conservative religious and political interests combining to elect Reagan on a
neoliberal economic platform (Harvey 2005, 25). This electoral turn positioned neoliberalism to become “hegemonic as a mode of discourse” (Harvey 2005, 3, 2007, 31).

As previously noted, neoliberalism as we know it today had its beginnings with economists Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises of Austria, and Milton Friedman of the United States (Harvey 2005, 20). To critique the Western welfare, as well as communist-ruled and fascist states that dominated post-war Europe, and to celebrate the supposed virtues of an unfettered market, Hayek helped to found the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947 (Harvey 2005, 19). The group, comprised of intellectuals from around the world who shared a free market ideology, aimed to reverse an alleged citizen “dependence” on government:

Over large stretches of the earth's surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared. In others they are under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy. The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power (Higgs 2011).

The society provided a forum for conservative economists from England, Austria, Germany, France and elsewhere in Europe, as well as the United States to share their views (Harvey 2005, 22).

Milton Friedman would later become an influential proponent of neoliberalism in the U.S., but he first led a movement pressing for the adoption of policies predicated on the ideology’s principles in Chile. Chile enacted neoliberal policies in the early 1970s, a number of years before the United States (Harvey 2005, 7). General Augusto Pinochet came to power in a 1973 coup d’état of the popularly elected Salvador Allende government with the support of the U.S., including the CIA, Secretary of State Kissinger and several major American corporations (Harvey 2005, 7). Soon thereafter, the Chilean military leader named several economists, part of
a group called the ‘Chicago Boys’ that included Friedman, to key government positions in an attempt to “reconstruct the Chilean economy” along neoliberal lines (Harvey 2005, 8).

The Chicago Boys influenced Chilean economic policy throughout Pinochet’s rule from 1975, when they entered government, through 1990 (Harvey 2005, 8). This group of economists was educated at the University of Chicago and they undertook their work in Chile as part of a project initiated by USAID and later continued by the Ford Foundation. The initiative had been “prompted by growing U.S. concern about increasing public support in Chile for left wing parties and the desire to promote belief in free enterprise and discourage communism” (Teichman 2001, 69). Friedman, a well-known advocate of free market principles and minimal government intervention in economies, served on the faculty at the University of Chicago during this time (Harvey 2005, 8). Soon after Pinochet came to power, Friedman was engaged as a consultant to the Chilean government to assist with designing economic reform initiatives. His suggestions included reducing the nation’s money supply, cutting state expenditures, removing price controls, eliminating regulatory obstacles to market growth and liberalizing trade (Friedman and Friedman 1998, Appendix A). Friedman’s experiment in Chile would later influence policymakers who supported neoliberal reforms in the U.S. (Harvey 2005, 8).

According to Harvey (2005), the opening for the neoliberal movement to gain broader popular acceptance in the U.S. came with the unprecedented difficulties encountered in the Keynesian economic system in the early 1970s (Harvey 2005, 12). In the Keynesian economic view, government sought to harness the energy and creativity of the market as a tool for national development to promote employment, growth and public welfare:

Fiscal and monetary policies usually dubbed ‘Keynesian’ were widely deployed to dampen business cycles and to ensure reasonably full employment. … States actively intervened in industrial policy and moved to set standards for social
wages by constructing a variety of health systems (health care, education and the like) (Harvey 2005, 10).

Keynesian principles began to fall out of favor with economists and the public during a period of prolonged recession and ‘stagflation,’ or slow economic growth accompanied by relatively high interest and unemployment rates (Harvey 2005, 23).

Gilpin and Gilpin have asserted that the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange system precipitated the eclipse of Keynesian economic policies (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 237). The Bretton Woods agreement, which established a monetary order based upon the value in gold of the U.S. dollar, ensured international trade stability from 1944 through 1974. For exchange purposes, the agreement tied other currencies to the dollar. Many countries held the dollar as a reserve currency because it could be redeemed for gold at a congressionally-set fixed rate (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 237).

In the 1960s, the U.S. struggled to support both the Vietnam War and Johnson’s Great Society initiative. President Johnson did not want to raise taxes during this period to avoid drawing domestic attention to the cost of the war. Private investors and foreign governments, which had vast U.S. dollar holdings, lost confidence in the value of the dollar due to the widening gap between U.S. government expenditures and revenues (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 237). Anticipating a decline in the valuation of the dollar, speculators began selling them, in turn placing pressure on U.S. gold reserves. In 1971, the Nixon administration, responding to a worsening trade situation as a result of the ‘run’ on the U.S. dollar, suspended fixed dollar to gold convertibility (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 238). The value of the dollar fell immediately against other world currencies. Deterioration of the gold standard, according to Harvey, set off a
global fiscal crisis which deepened in 1973 with the first of two oil price shocks to affect the U.S. that decade (Harvey 2005, 12).

Due to the de facto devaluation of the dollar in the early 1970s, many governments had to borrow to cover large, sudden deficits in their budgets. Monetarists, who shared a neoliberal mindset, used this opportunity to criticize Keynesian fiscal policies and offered a tripartite explanation for the worldwide recession of the 1970s (Bird 2007, 105). They claimed that expansionary (Keynesian) monetary policies during the 1960s, i.e. pumping money into the economy to spur growth, had led to high inflation. The contraction necessary to counteract inflation, they averred, led to recession (Bird 2007, 106). Monetarists further argued that, as a result of recession, governments had to borrow money to balance their budgets. More borrowing led to less confidence on the part of lenders, who responded by increasing interest rates. Higher interest rates, they said, stifled private sector growth (Bird 2007, 106). Finally, monetarists held that releasing more money into the economy stimulated employment. They reasoned that real wages declined as a result of inflation. Lower-wage jobs increased as a result of cheaper labor rates (Bird 2007, 106). Monetarists censured government for having deepened the recession by intervening actively using Keynesian policies and contended that it would have self-corrected more quickly without public intervention. No evidence backed this stance, according to Bird, but nonetheless this view gained broad political and popular prominence (Bird 2007, 107).

As noted above, the business sector also began to assert itself politically in the early 1970s (Harvey 2005, 15). The Chamber of Commerce, with a mandate from Nixon to promote U.S. business interests within the country, began a massive expansion in 1972. That same year, an organization of CEOs called the Business Roundtable formed, “committed to the aggressive pursuit of political power for the corporation” (Harvey 2005, 43).
Recession struck in 1973 as a result of the first of two oil shocks that occurred in that decade. Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), unhappy with those nations that supported Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, including the U.S., drastically reduced production and stopped exporting oil to them. The U.S. economy, already struggling, was shaken by historically high fuel costs and propelled into recession (Ross 2013). Ironically, New York financial institutions, which managed much of the oil wealth generated by OPEC states as a result of the embargo, prospered in its immediate aftermath (Harvey 2005, 27). Their relative power later enabled banks to refuse to refinance debt for a nearly bankrupt New York City in 1975, resulting in deterioration of city services and infrastructure (Harvey 2005, 45). The showdown became a symbol of growing business influence (Harvey 2005, 44).

Indeed, conservative political groups began to prosper in the 1970s (Harvey 2005, 44). The Heritage Foundation, one of the most prominent bastions of conservatism and neoliberal thought today, was founded in 1973. The libertarian Cato Institute, created as the Charles Koch Foundation, followed in 1974 (Harvey 2005, 44). In 1974, when campaign finance reform limited campaign contributions, political action committees (PACs) increased in number and became far more influential in American politics (Harvey 2005, 49). Business interests supporting PACs tended to favor conservatives (Harvey 2005, 49).

The American media became captivated by the idea that U.S. free enterprise was over-regulated during the 1973 recession. Think tank staff, business press authors and university business school faculty members began to discuss neoliberal principles. Robert Nozick’s 1974 book, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, praising the “rights of the individual” and the virtues of a “minimal state” elevated him to national stardom. The volume won the National Book Award
that year and the *Times Literary Supplement* recognized it as one of "The Hundred Most Influential Books Since the War." Meanwhile, one of the original architects of neoliberal free market thinking, Friedrich von Hayek, won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1974. The Nobel Committee also awarded its Economics prize to monetarist Milton Friedman in 1976, lending further legitimacy to neoliberal claims (Harvey 2005, 22). Friedman’s books espousing neoliberal ideology, *Free to Choose* and *Tyranny of the Status Quo*, published in 1980 and 1984, respectively, formed the basis of two PBS television series.

A new fringe group of neoliberal economists, the supply-siders, also emerged in the 1970s, gaining prominence during the Reagan Administration. Monetarists believed that the economy would self-correct in downturns if banks had enough liquidity (i.e. a sufficient supply of money) to continue lending (Harvey 2005, 73). Supply-siders, in contrast, believed that high levels of taxation discouraged spending, and therefore reducing taxes and providing incentives for business investment during economic downturns would stimulate growth (Cannon 2000, 198). Economist Arthur Laffer introduced supply-side thinking into the Ford administration in the mid-1970s (Laffer Center 2014). Jude Wanninski’s *The Way the World Works* and George Gilder’s *Wealth and Poverty*, published in 1978 and 1981, respectively, popularized this thinking (Cannon 2000, 198). In 1977, Republican Jack Kemp and Democrat William Roth, Senators from New York and Delaware, respectively, introduced a bill calling for significant tax cuts and deregulation—the first supply-side remedy proposed to stimulate the economy (Cannon 2000, 200). ‘Reaganomics,’ the term by which by which Reagan’s first economic plan in 1981 became known, included both monetarist and supply-side elements (Cannon 2000, 198). Reagan’s plan called for four primary changes: sharply reducing federal spending, lowering personal income tax rates while accelerating business asset depreciation, decreasing regulations to “...eliminate
government interference in the marketplace” and enlarging the money supply (The White House 1981, 2, Cannon 2000, 199).

A coalition of corporate interests, the Republican Party and Christian Evangelicals formed a nationalist-religious movement with strong roots in the South called the Moral Majority in 1979 (Harvey 2007, 31). Allied with conservative Republicans and capitalist interests represented by the business media particularly, the Moral Majority helped sweep Reagan to power in the 1980 election. During Reagan’s tenure, bolstered by a supportive administration, an expanding economy and an enamored media, neoliberalism assumed mainstream status (Harvey 2005, 54).

Connolly (2008) and Galbraith (2008) have offered complementary explanations for the transcendence of neoliberalism during the Reagan and Bush eras. Connolly has attributed the rise of neoliberalism to an ‘evangelical-capitalist resonance machine,’ which had its beginnings in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Connolly 2008, 30). During this period, Connelly explained, evangelical Christianity, ‘cowboy’ capitalism, the electronic news media and the Republican Party discovered certain shared values and ideas that joined them—among these was neoliberal ideology. Together, the groups acted as a kind of political machine that amplified their common views as one voice (Connolly 2008, 40).

The American public found the notion of “individual economic freedom,” rooted in pioneer mythology, attractive (Galbraith 2008, 4). Conservative politicians Reagan and George H. W. Bush used this notion of self-sufficiency, with the shared mantras of “cut taxes, end inflation, and free the market,” as the basis for their economic plans (Galbraith 2008, 4). A share of leading economists of the time supported their plans, particularly Milton Friedman (Galbraith 2008, 4). Nonetheless, Galbraith has contended that once neoliberal policies gained a foothold
with the public, corporations took advantage of the resulting deregulation to supplant democratic political governance (Galbraith 2008, 148).

Galbraith argued that a notion he called the ‘freedom to shop’ supplanted traditional political views of freedom within the public in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s (Galbraith 2008, 24). The freedom to shop is a somewhat cynical take on Hayek’s (1976) view of economic freedom. Hayek suggested that every individual should have the right to create his or her own financial security. Freedom, in this sense, is the right to compete for resources (Hayek 1976, 70). Friedman played off of this notion in his ten-part television series *Free to Choose*, which aired on public television in 1980. In its opening scenes, the series’ voice-over narrative described the American immigrant experience:

> For the immigrants welcomed by this statue, America was truly a land of opportunity... There were many rewards for hard work, enterprise and ability. Life was hard, but opportunity was real. There were few government programs to turn to and nobody expected them. But also, there were few rules and regulations. On the other hand, there were no licenses, no permits, no red tape to restrict them. They found, in fact, a free market, and most of them thrived on it (Friedman 1980).

The ‘American dream,’ as Friedman introduced it here, is well known. Galbraith has pointed out how deeply this imaginary has penetrated American life (Galbraith 2008, 17). In U.S. society, independence and hard work are equated with success in the form of financial reward, just as dependency and sloth are associated with societal burden. Success leads to the ability to buy nice things and live in comfort (Friedman 1980). This notion of competition extended to what Americans expect of goods and services—that they be made available at the lowest feasible cost (Friedman 1980, Galbraith 2008, 17).

Undergirding this conception of an individual’s economic ‘rights’ is the premise of a free and uninhibited ‘market’ (Galbraith 2008, 19). In the neoliberal representation of the market, it
is the perfect system: it both monitors and establishes fair value, it results in efficiency in production and it makes goods and services available at the lowest possible cost (Galbraith 2008, 20). However appealing these arguments, Galbraith observed that the market was so far from perfect—as evidenced in the many problems in its operation (e.g. monopolies, financial scandals, recessions, price collapses and the like)—that it was questionable such an entity truly existed (Galbraith 2008, 21). He asserted that far from creating an even playing field, neoliberal policies had made the government vulnerable to corporate corruption (Galbraith 2008, 15).

Galbraith traced the roots of corporate infiltration of government back to the Reagan administration and the former actor’s philosophy of ‘economic freedom’ (Galbraith 2008, 15). He argued that the conception of economic freedom popularized from the 1970s forward does not, in fact, benefit the individual. Rather, it advantages corporations, which exist not to protect personal freedoms, but to remove them:

Everywhere you look, the public decision is made by the agent of a private party for the purpose of delivering private gain. This is not an accident, it is a system (Galbraith 2008, 147).

In Galbraith’s view, businesses profited from deregulation because it allowed them to operate as they might wish with less concern for the social consequences of their actions. Also, and more significantly, deregulation created opportunities that permitted firms to prey upon public resources under the guise of outsourcing (Galbraith 2008, 23).

Galbraith offered several examples of this ‘predator’ phenomenon in the education policy domain. The No Child Left Behind Act, enacted in 2001, provided increased funding for public schools while, at the same time, imposing strict testing regimens on students as a requirement to receive those funds. The program created a vast and quite profitable private-sector testing
enterprise (Galbraith 2008, 135). In another example, Congress passed a school voucher system in 2004. Vouchers channel public funds to the business sector by subsidizing privately provided education for low-to-middle-class youth (Galbraith 2008, 134). In 2004, too, Congress voted to privatize the Student Loan Marketing Association, SMLA or Sallie Mae for short. Created in 1973 under the Higher Education Authorization Act of 1965, the SMLA was a quasi-private government entity charged with administering the nation’s higher education loan program. While still under federal auspices, but preparing for privatization between 1995 and 2005, Sallie Mae spent nine million dollars lobbying Congress to ensure that student loans remained non-dischargeable in bankruptcy (Piazza and Nava 2013, 3). Sallie Mae’s conversion in 2004 transferred billions of dollars in loan obligations to the private sector (Galbraith 2008, 134). As these examples reveal, those benefitting from neoliberal policies of privatization and deregulation are not a broad swath of businesses in the private sector, but relatively select groups that position themselves to take advantage of opportunities (Galbraith 2008, 127).

The neoliberal idea that individuals were responsible for their own financial success and had the inherent right to pursue this aim was not new to conservative Republicans of the 1980s. Ronald Reagan had drawn on this conviction during his gubernatorial campaign in the late 1960s (Reagan 1966). He again utilized this stance as the foundation for an effort to rally conservative business owners, media and Protestants, with whom these ideas also resonated, to win the presidency in 1980 (Harvey 2005, 84). As Galbraith has pointed out, deregulation and privatization eliminated walls between government and business, leading to a ‘looting,’ to his thinking, of federal institutions (Galbraith 2008, 126). Reagan’s backing of neoliberal ideology would lead to an unprecedented marketization of public social welfare services, including higher education (Galbraith 2008, 131).
In his Godkin Lectures at Harvard in 1963 Clark Kerr (2001), then chancellor of the University of California (UC) system of higher education, reflected on some of the changes he had seen as a university president and chancellor in that state. He identified the World War era leading up to and into the Cold War as one of the most significant for U.S. public higher education, and particularly for research-intensive universities (Kerr 2001, 36). During this period, the federal government began heavily to fund university research, a practice that began to shift traditional relationships among faculty members in those institutions. For instance, the government provided $1 billion to universities for inquiry in 1960, accounting for 75 percent of their total research expenditures. Most of that support was allocated to the physical and biomedical sciences and engineering (Kerr 2001, 40).

In his 1963 essay, Kerr (2001) highlighted trends including widening disparities in faculty salaries and rates of promotion between the sciences and humanities, diverting faculty from undergraduate education toward research, and legitimizing consulting as an accepted practice among professors. In addition, he noted, the increased institutional focus on research had resulted in the emergence of a new class of non-teaching research faculty. Kerr (2001) based his observations on ‘Research I’ universities, a Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching classification reserved for a select group of (then) about 20 research-intensive higher education institutions (Kerr 2001, 41).

Looking ahead to the future of public research universities, Kerr (2001) presciently predicted a growing emphasis on privatization activities, including increasing tuition and seeking more income from sales of services and patents. He also rightly foresaw closer ties to industry, as universities sought increased research and development funding from the for-profit sector.
Finally, he believed universities would give still more attention to offering training in advanced skills in response to a challenging job market (Kerr 2001, 189). Many of the changes that Kerr (2001) predicted align with those that Levidow (2002) has also theorized and have since transpired.

Ironically, Kerr was himself an early victim of the neoliberal movement in higher education. As noted, in 1967, Kerr was serving as chancellor of the University of California (UC) system. He had held his position for 10 years following a 7-year tenure as president of the University of California at Berkeley (Cannon 2003, 273). Kerr was responsible to the California Board of Regents, an oversight body consisting of 24 members, 16 of whom were political appointees from various administrations (the term of a board member was 16 years) and the balance ex-officio. The governor served on the board in an ex-officio capacity (Cannon 2003, 273).

Ronald Reagan, a staunch conservative, began his tenure as governor of California in January 1967 (Cannon 2003, 273). In his campaign, Reagan had railed against big (i.e. bloated, inefficient) government and high income and property taxes. Reagan based his economic policy on individual freedom and the free market: “I believe in and put my faith in the private sector of the economy and a belief in the people's right and ability to run their own affairs” (Reagan 1966). Reagan took office during a budget crisis—anticipating a $463 million dollar shortfall by the end of his first year as governor (Reagan 1967a).

Soon after entering office, Reagan called for budget cuts at universities and an end to ‘free tuition’ for residents, which up to then had been a tradition at California’s public universities (Cannon 2003, 273). Many higher education administrators and students, who defended free tuition as a right, found Reagan’s proposal abhorrent. The Board of Regents
initially supported their view (Cannon 2003, 276). Kerr responded to Reagan’s pronouncement, without notifying the board, by freezing registrations at California universities due to ‘budget uncertainty’ (Cannon 2003, 276). Reagan took issue with Kerr’s action, which he represented to the public as unwarranted (Reagan 1967c). In a speech given January 17, 1967, just two weeks after being sworn into office, Reagan criticized Kerr’s step while also seeking to justify cutbacks in higher education:

> Every segment of government must share in the economies first, as every citizen must share in the increased taxes. Education and welfare total 80 percent or more of the general fund spending. There is no way we could exempt them from the belt tightening that is necessary. If we did, we'd have to eliminate all other government services to arrive at any meaningful reduction (Reagan 1967c).

Part of Reagan’s solution to the state’s budget crisis, which he expressed in the same address, was to generate new revenues. He denied that imposing tuition would reduce access to higher education, claiming that loans and scholarships would be made available to ‘deserving’ students (Reagan 1967c). This speech constituted the opening salvo of a political battle between the new governor and the Regents. Cowed by pressure from Reagan, the Board fired Kerr on January 19, 1967. After an ensuing eight month standoff with the Governor, the Board of Regents accepted the imposition of a “a charge for the privilege of attending the university” (Cannon 2003, 283).

Many U.S. universities underwent a period of extensive retrenchment in the 1970s. As noted above, as the decade opened, stagflation plagued the economy and the first Arab oil crisis of 1973-74 worsened the situation (Brubacher and Rudy 1997, 383). State support for higher education dropped as tax revenue declined. Universities lost students as the post-World War II enrollment boom waned and increasing numbers of young people became disillusioned with the
prospects for a job after university graduation. Tuition, which rose quickly at many institutions as a result of high inflation, was another factor that kept students away (Brubacher and Rudy 1997, 383). University administrations cut back faculties and froze salary increases. The University of Wisconsin and Southern Illinois University laid off more than 100 tenured faculty between them in the early 1970s (Brubacher and Rudy 1997, 384). The City University of New York (CUNY), which had just begun offering classes free of tuition to all students in 1970, was forced to reinstitute charges in 1976 (CUNY 2011).

Between 1980 and 1993 Congress passed several laws designed to increase the competitiveness of America’s technology sector. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was the first, permitting universities, non-profits and small businesses to retain ownership of intellectual property developed with the assistance of federal research funding (Powell and Owen-Smith 1998, 255). The Stevenson-Wydler Act of 1980, the Cooperative Research Act of 1986, and the National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989 further facilitated commercialization of research at universities (Powell and Owen-Smith 1998, 256). Bayh-Dole and these other statutes permitted higher education institutions to profit from research, opened cooperative channels between them and the federal government and corporations, incentivized research on drugs to treat rare diseases and protected industry collaborations from anti-trust actions. These policies increased the money available to universities for applied scientific inquiry while support for pure scientific research and the social sciences and humanities declined markedly (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 48).

At the same time Congress sought to address U.S. technological competitiveness at the global level, the Reagan administration began to press for popular support for neoliberal notions of minimal taxes and smaller government (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 21, Harvey 2005, 26).
As governor of California and later as U.S. president, Reagan sought consistently to limit government involvement in social welfare services provision for citizens (Harvey 2005, 3). With respect to higher education, he targeted entitlements. In his first year as governor, as outlined above, he imposed tuition on students who previously had attended California universities free of charge (Cannon 2003, 279). As president from January 1981 until January 1989, he cut national grant programs, particularly those favoring the middle class (Reagan 1983, Verstegen 1990, 369). Both as governor and as president, he favored support for student loan programs in lieu of direct student subsidies, except for the most needy (Reagan 1967c, b, Verstegen 1990, 368).26 His presidential administration, for example, presided over inflation-adjusted cuts in Perkins Loans of 53 percent, College Work Study of 23 percent and Supplemental Opportunity Grants of 18 percent (Verstegen 1990, 369). As part of a political strategy to foist responsibility for higher education funding increases onto Congress, the Reagan administration’s appropriation requests for higher education dropped 18 percent during his two terms in office (Verstegen 1990, 368).

Slaughter and Leslie have suggested that fiscal pressures during the Reagan administration also encouraged state legislatures to reduce funding for higher education (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 55). Beginning in 1988 and continuing through 1998, the average share of state appropriations dedicated to higher education dropped 21 percent (Tandberg 2010, 418). Tandberg (2010) has argued that one of the reasons for this political choice may be the relative ease with which universities can offset reductions in higher education appropriations. He has offered several fiscal reasons for this, made possible through innovations of the neoliberal regime:

1. Reductions in higher education spending at state institutions can be offset by tuition increases. Such hikes are not felt immediately by many students who take student loans.
2. Institutions can also make up shortfalls. State universities can increase entrepreneurial activities, seek donations, and apply for research grants, generating funds to offset budget cuts (Tandberg 2010, 418).

Hackett aptly dubbed the latter shift by “universities as they coped with their changed fiscal and policy environments,” academic capitalism (Hackett 1990, 273).

The opening for popularization of neoliberal ideas and their subsequent acceptance arose during challenging economic circumstances (Harvey 2005, 12). The changes wrought as a result of popular acceptance of the neoliberal imaginary survived Reagan and that orientation has continued in every subsequent political administration, Republican and Democratic (Harvey 2005, 50). One example of this phenomenon was continued reductions in state support for higher education well after President Reagan’s term in office (Tandberg 2010, 418). The increasingly accepted neoliberal imaginary has had many implications for government support of social welfare services, including higher education. Perhaps the most significant has been the steady erosion of the general public’s perception of higher education as a public good (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 28). Interestingly, Ronald Reagan had announced just this aim in his initial call for reduced California public support of that state’s higher education system as he began his tenure as governor.

Neoliberal Changes in Higher Education

Levidow (2002) has outlined a conceptual framework for evaluating neoliberal influence in higher education. Universities in the neoliberal economy, he has argued, are transformed into business-like entities:

- All constituencies are treated through business relationships;
- Educational efficiency, accountability and quality are redefined in accountancy terms;
Courses are recast as instructional commodities;
Student-teacher relations are mediated by the consumption and production of things, e.g. software products, performance criteria, etc. (Levidow 2002, 2)

Levidow (2002) suggested that these claims represented increasing pressures on universities to provide enhanced education to more and more learners at lower cost. Rather than guiding change in the ‘knowledge economy,’ he observed, “… they [universities] are becoming subordinate to corporate-style managerialism and income-maximization” (Levidow 2002, 2).

Writing on trends in U.S. higher education from 1975 to 2000, Gumport (2000) observed several converging forces that she posited had shaped change during that period. The most troubling of these was reorganization “along a utilitarian trajectory,” which changed “the dominant legitimating idea of public higher education … from higher education as a social institution to higher education as an industry” (Gumport 2000, 68). She attributed this fundamental shift to three primary causes:

1) Ascendancy of business-style management in higher education institutions, a by-product of the discourse and research of the day concerning managing organizations;
2) ‘Academic consumerism,’ an extension of the wide and deep cultural consumerism arising after World War II, and;
3) A ‘re-stratification’ within higher education, the result of a re-valuation of various kinds of knowledge within society (Gumport 2000, 69).

Higher education, she argued, was continually expected to increase access while economizing on costs and increasing quality (Gumport 2000, 68). State legislatures and political leaders complicated this tenuous balance by demanding accountability to the public at every opportunity (Gumport 2000, 69).

Gumport (2000) asserted that how we conceive higher education is critical in that it defines the discourse around the subject and thereby contributes to how we construct reality
(Gumport 2000, 74). She described a broadening in the way that higher education has been conceived since the end of the Second World War:

Thus, when one uses the lens of ‘social institution’ to examine the institutional imperatives for public higher educations, one sees educational organizations devoted to a wide array of social functions that have been expanded over time: the development of individual learning and human capital, the socialization and cultivation of citizens and political loyalties, the preservation of knowledge, and the fostering of other legitimate pursuits for the nation-state. It is commonly acknowledged that the decades following World War II entailed not only an expansion of higher education, but also a dramatic diversification of the activities regarded as the legitimate province of public higher education. These include educating the masses, advancing knowledge through research, contributing to economic development by employing and producing workers, and developing industrial applications (Gumport 2000, 74).

This evolution, she suggested, had been accompanied by a change in the rhetoric describing higher education. Increasingly, she noted, analysts and legislators refer to universities are referred as ‘organizations’ and not ‘institutions.’ Significant in its reductionism--the term ‘organization’ invokes comparison with corporations and business, while ‘institution’ links universities, “with other social institutions--not only with other levels of education, but also with the family, government, industry, religion, and popular culture” (Gumport 2000, 74). Gumport concluded that this linguistic association has profoundly reshaped how we think about higher education; less in its context of history, social import and morality, more in a role of “human capital, workforce development, and economic development” (Gumport 2000, 75).

Critics who today charge that universities are now viewing themselves increasingly in market-like terms point to the importance they now collectively place on rankings as additional evidence for their concerns. Galbraith (2008) has observed that with the appearance of such metrics, prestige replaced quality in the consumer’s mind when choosing a university.
Beginning under the sway of neoliberal thought in 1983, rankings created, “a system of ‘positional goods’ – [wherein] the value of an education depends not on the learning acquired, but on the relative stature of the institution attended” (Galbraith 2008, 107). Universities responded to a new breed of more thoroughly consumerist students by becoming more brand-conscious and using rankings as a competitive benchmark in their recruitment efforts (Galbraith 2008, 107).

Studies of the impact of the *U.S. News and World Report* College Rankings—aimed at helping universities increase their standing in them and thereby applications—appear to bolster these criticisms. Tsakalis and Palais (2004) and Gnolek et al. (2012), for example, focused attention on identifying critical sub-factors in ratings that had the greatest influence on total scores. These two studies intentionally targeted university presidents, deans, marketers and admissions officers with the aim of assisting them in improving schools’ standing (Tsakalis and Palais 2004, Gnolek, Falciano, and Kuncl 2014).

Pusser and Marginson (2013) have suggested that, by normalizing a competition which favors older, more selective, more established, wealthier institutions, the rankings, “give comfort and legitimation to those who benefit most from the growing economic inequalities that have marked the neoliberal era” (Pusser and Marginson 2013, 563).

Supporting this contention, a study by Dichev (2001) that examined changes in the *U.S. News* College Rankings noted little movement in the top 25 national universities and national liberal arts colleges over time. Universities whose rankings had changed one year, he observed, tended to revert back to their former rank within two annual cycles (Dichev 2001, 239). Delving deeper into the correlation between changes in rank and changes in application numbers, Luca
and Smith (2013), found that the highest ranked (and most featured) national universities show
the strongest relationship between rankings and applications (Luca and Smith 2013).

Gumport marked the 1970s as the period in which a popular shift in the perception of
higher education institutions occurred. Citizens began to view universities in more business-like
terms as they struggled to manage costs more efficiently, to compete with their peers for
enrollment and resources and to prepare students better for the changing job market (Gumport
2000, 72). With implementation of the guaranteed student loan program in the late 1960s,
students became more mobile—with access to more money, greater numbers of students were
able to go to college and a broader swath of universities became financially accessible to them.
Universities responded by becoming more competitive with one another for these students
(Leslie and Johnson 1974, 17, Gumport 2000, 80, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 45). Dichev has
suggested that demand from consumers for more information concerning universities gave rise to
the emergence of college rankings during the early 1980s (Dichev 2001, 241). The import many
universities gave (and still give) to these such external performance measures, is one
manifestation of their competitive behavior (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 290).

The professional sanctum that was the privilege of academicians, according to Gumport
(2000), eroded during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. In a manifestation of external pressures to
conform, universities began to exhibit private sector behaviors previously unknown to the
academy (Gumport 2000, 71). University administrators began to demand business-like
behavior of faculty, such as assistance in the effort to garner more resources (Gumport 2000, 81).
Authorities increasingly expected professors to teach evenings and weekends, or on-line as well
(Gumport 2000, 81). They also began to value certain departments more than others based on
their potential for revenue-generation and appeal to student-consumers (Gumport 2000, 83).
Policymakers increasingly tied funding for public universities to their attainment of specific (often economic) performance measures (Gumport 2000, 77).

To understand these changes, often broadly termed the commodification of higher education, Naidoo has argued that it is essential to appreciate knowledge as a form of capital (Naidoo 2008, 87). Naidoo has contended that under the neoliberal regime economic forces infringed on the higher education field (to employ Bourdieu’s terminology) and effectively warped its reward structure:

Academic success shifts from being measured according to academic principles to being measured according to narrow criteria relating to income generation such as the number of student-customers captured, the number of courses sold, extent of involvement with commercial interests and degree of financial surplus created (Naidoo 2008, 88).

Pierre Bourdieu (1991) conceptualized power as exerted in different planes, or social fields. Each field had a high degree of autonomy by virtue of exhibiting its own culture. Authorities within these fields compete for legitimacy (power and resources) by way of a struggle of ideas (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991, 57). If we consider higher education as one such field, we could say that inherent value is vested in knowledge as a resource, i.e., knowledge is a form of capital in this social field. By accumulating knowledge as ‘academic capital,’ one enters and advances in this field. Power structures (rules, protocols, etc.) evolve in higher education around this imaginary (Naidoo 2008, 88).

Naidoo (2008) has pointed to a transformation in the reward system that drives higher education in the public service knowledge/learning regime. In the neoliberal imaginary, higher education is reconceived as an enterprise. Universities become more attentive to their place in the market—to their branding and rankings (Galbraith 2008, 107). Students become customers, choosing their university based upon perceptions of quality, price and outcomes (Gumport 2000,
In contrast, institutions and their faculties largely gauged prestige in terms of service to mankind prior to the 1970s (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 14). Thereafter, universities, public and private alike, have no longer educated citizens regardless of their ability to pay, but instead have increasingly sold their knowledge to those with the greatest ability and willingness to purchase it (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 22). As Naidoo has asserted, the noble principles upon which higher education rested prior to the neoliberal regime have been subverted. The state university has become a publicly-managed business that must compete in the market for survival (Naidoo 2008, 88).

Neoliberalism and the Knowledge Economy

In their theory of academic capitalism, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) asserted that as sources of emergent knowledge, universities had become the equivalent of mines for a new technological age: “The new economy treats advanced knowledge as raw material that can be claimed through legal devices, owned and marketed as products or services” (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 15). Knowledge in the new economy is a commodity that can be packaged and repackaged, bought and sold: “Corporations in the new economy treat advanced knowledge as raw material that can be claimed through legal devices, owned and marketed as products or services” (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 17). These scholars contended that knowledge is now secreted and protected using instruments such as copyright, patenting and trademarks to be later bought, sold and leased (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 17).

Roberts has observed that knowledge must be standardized before it can be traded in a competitive academic or global market (Roberts 2007, 354). He critically analyzed New Zealand’s Performance Based Research Fund (PBRF), a government scheme to support inquiry
conducted at tertiary institutions and research organizations in that country. By standardized, Roberts meant to suggest that research must be output-oriented and measurable:

Knowledge that cannot be standardized in this manner has no use value in a system driven by performativity and commercial imperatives, and is rendered irrelevant for funding purposes. Standardization allows clearer, cleaner distinctions to be drawn – and defended – between those who are performing and those who are not. It encourages all to play by the same language game and makes it easier to bring in new players (Roberts 2007, 358).

Roberts has also explained that in this process of becoming more oriented to achieving end products (i.e., focusing on applied research), the essential character of inquiry becomes lost and efforts trivialized. He concluded that the market-oriented, neoliberal framework of New Zealand’s PBRD was antithetical to basic research, favoring production above all else (Roberts 2007, 359).

More generally, the neoliberal state has replaced social welfare with production and therefore values foremost preparing citizens to function effectively in a competitive economy. Placing a higher value on STEM fields and business than the liberal arts, according to Slaughter and Rhoades exemplifies this sort of functionalist market influence in higher education (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 21). The neoliberal state has relentlessly promoted “privatization, commercialization, deregulation, and reregulation” in the United States and in other countries where the ideology has taken hold. The U.S., for example, dropped policies that inhibited trade and replaced them with trade provisions aimed at securing trade. The United States began signing free trade agreements in 1985, beginning with Israel and has signed 14 more such accords with 20 nations during the ensuing 30 years (U.S. Department of State 2015).

This turn was hardly accidental. The neoliberal state has had a large role in instituting practices aimed at promoting trade and protection of intellectual property. Slaughter and
Rhoades have contended that re-tooling universities during the past three decades to be more competitive for research grants, enabled and encouraged by the Bayh-Dole act, constitutes an example of knowledge commodification (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 21). The neoliberal state has also actively discouraged unionization, creating more temporary workers earning lower wages in the economy. This trend has been reflected in higher education through the increased use of adjuncts and other temporary workers—employees typically not eligible for health or other full-time benefits. Slaughter and Rhoades have observed that adjuncts increasingly have replaced full-time professors in teacher-fronted classrooms and also often teach distance education courses (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 22).

Several research studies have demonstrated that the neoliberal imaginary is a powerful guiding force in educational policy. Kleinman, Feinstein, and Downey (2013) conducted a study of two significant independent events at the University of Wisconsin-Madison: the establishment of a new research center and efforts to gain increased operating autonomy for the university from the state legislature. Despite the dissimilar characteristics of the projects and the fact that they took place in different administrations (Kleinman, Feinstein, and Downey 2013, 2389), the two cases shared important similarities: the university officials had several strategies open to them in each case, and in each they chose the neoliberal path. The university employed neoliberal rhetoric to frame both cases to the public. As a consequence, the episodes generated labor issues, as current university workers feared losing their jobs to the private sector (Kleinman, Feinstein, and Downey 2013, 2393). More deeply, the fact that university leaders turned to such rhetoric suggests how significantly neoliberal assumptions had permeated their expectations and behavior.
Samuels has critiqued The University of California’s (UC) higher education system in an examination of its recent fiscal activity (Samuels 2011, 84). The UC system lost $23 billion in its pension and endowment funds between 2008 and 2010. In the hope of generating additional resources to help it cope with declining state support and rising student demand and costs, system leaders had taken a share of its investment portfolio out of secure bonds and treasury notes to invest in equities. Samuels has highlighted other market-like behaviors as well in the California system, including investment in high-risk projects, exorbitant salaries for “high-performing” professors and diversification into activities well outside the university’s academic mission (along with a corresponding ballooning in the number of administrators hired to manage them) (Samuels 2011, 85).

These cases, elaborated by Kleinman, Feinstein, and Downey (2013) and Samuels (2011), on top of the many examples contributed by Slaughter and Rhoades (2004), suggest that neoliberal ideology has become a tolerated, if not everywhere accepted, way of life in Western higher education. Kleinman et al. summed up this state of affairs: “the essential notions underlying neoliberal ideology—that markets, competitiveness, and state down-sizing are virtuous—have become social common sense” (Kleinman, Feinstein, and Downey 2013, 2398).

Neoliberalism as the Prevailing Ideology in Higher Education

Commenting on higher education in an increasingly neoliberal world, Giroux (2014) has echoed many of the same arguments first offered by Gumport (2000). Giroux (2014) has contended that the public no longer perceives universities as a right, but a privilege and bemoaned the fact that the Jeffersonian notion of liberal higher education has given way to a highly marketized curriculum that packages and markets courses like products in a store. As a
public funding priority, meanwhile, policymakers have relegated higher education to second-hand status behind the military and an out-of-control prison system. Students routinely incur enormous financial obligations to attend university, entering into an “indentured form of citizenship predicated on consuming and going into debt” (Giroux 2014). Meanwhile, faculty members have become more like part-time laborers than possessors and purveyors of culturally relevant knowledge. According to Giroux, faculties have increasingly ceded power to a university managerial class, which has grown during the past 20 years to account for the majority of university administrative costs (Giroux 2014).

Giroux refers to assaults by the current neoliberal state on academic freedom as a new brutalism (Giroux 2014). Olssen and Peters (2005), citing Burchell (1996), have described the ‘governmentality’ of neoliberalism as a discipline based on competitive economic conduct, regulated by such means as “auditing, accounting and management” (Olssen and Peters 2005, 315). Levidow (2002) has similarly asserted that under neoliberalism, relationships between constituencies in higher education are governed by business calculations, and that “educational efficiency, accountability and quality are redefined in accountancy terms” (Levidow 2002, 2). University administrators achieve greater control over academics by invoking new methods of management, installing new relations of competition and more fundamentally, reconceiving knowledge as capital (Olssen and Peters 2005, 324).

Olssen and Peters have contended that in higher education, a ‘contractualist’ governmentality has replaced ‘the public service ethic’ (Olssen and Peters 2005, 324). This neoliberal management approach emphasizes flexibility (i.e., work for delimited periods), specific objectives (clearly-defined terms) and clean results (measurable achievements). The academic, under this system, has lost a significant share of her autonomy—a fundamental norm
under the prior public good regime. Other aspects of the ‘de-professionalization’ of faculty included institution of more hierarchical management (replacing collegial and democratic governance), rising job demands and increasingly market-oriented responsibilities (Olssen and Peters 2005, 325). The notion of scholars as professionals has been eroded by this diminishing autonomy.

Another aspect of governmentality under the neoliberal regime is forms of competition that increase “productivity, accountability and control” in the belief that such will secure greater responsibility to students, government and the public (Olssen and Peters 2005, 326). Responding to external drivers that incentivize applied research, Olssen and Peters have asserted, universities have worked to develop internal capacity to manage the research undertaken under their aegis—compromising as they did so a measure of the academic freedom of the faculty members responsible for that inquiry. In addition, as public colleges and universities have sought to respond to social and political demands to admit more students, they have become more responsive to the interests of their prospects; that is, to market demands. That orientation is reflected in their course offerings, marketing and branding (Olssen and Peters 2005, 327).

Exportation of Neoliberalism

Some authors credit the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s with institutionalizing neoliberalism around the globe (Harvey 2005, 9, Galbraith 2008). That financial situation began taking shape in the early 1970s in concert with the reconfiguration of the exchange system (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 312). In 1973, a sudden and substantial increase in oil prices by OPEC countries resulted in large balance of trade deficits for many countries. U.S. commercial banks stepped in to help Latin American countries finance their accumulating debt. Subsequently, in
1979, a rise in U.S. interest rates due to monetary tightening required huge interest payments from South American debtor countries (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 314). Overall, Latin American debt ballooned from US$ 29 billion in 1970 to US$ 159 billion in 1978, reaching US$ 327 billion by 1982 (Sims and Romero 2013). By the early 1980s, many South American nations could not service their loans due to insolvency (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 314).

James Baker, U.S. Treasury Secretary under Ronald Reagan, responded to the crisis in accord with the President’s free market ideology (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 314). His policy of “structural adjustment” required prospective borrowers from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to adopt “such structural reforms as export-led growth, reductions in the role of the state in the economy, and public sector (read decreases in its size and reach) reforms” (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 314).

The IMF and the World Bank had incorporated conditionalities into their loan and credit agreements for some time prior to 1985, but they were relatively ineffective. Subsequent to Baker’s 1985 policy pronouncement, however, the IMF and the World Bank adopted new conditionalities that attempted to reconcile structural adjustment with economic growth. A few years later, John Williamson wrote the Washington Consensus a series of neoliberal policies developed at the Institute for International Economics in Washington (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001, 314, Williamson 2009). The Consensus summarized the thinking of economists in Washington (chiefly experts from the U.S. government and international financial institutions) as of the late 1980s. Intended as a guide for less developed countries concerning how to achieve growth, the reforms recommended under the consensus included:

1. Fiscal Discipline
2. Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities
3. Tax Reform
4. Liberalizing Interest Rates
5. A Competitive Exchange Rate
6. Trade Liberalization
7. Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment
8. Privatization
9. Deregulation

If Latin American leaders adopted such reforms, Williamson asserted, they would restore confidence in the financial security of their region, which in turn would help to repatriate capital that had fled during the early 1980s (Williamson 1993, 1330). Williamson later contended that these recommendations had been “long advocated” by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and many Latin nations already had them in place (Williamson 2009, 8).

When the IMF and World Bank began to impose neoliberal strictures within their loan and credit programs in the early 1980s, their agendas did not initially include higher education (Mamdani 2009, 11). During this period, resource deprivation affected higher education in developing counties in ways similar to U.S. institutions in the 1970s (Levidow 2002, 6). In the mid-1980s and into the 1990s, the IMF and World Bank began to target higher education for ‘structural adjustment’ in highly invasive and coercive ways (Mamdani 2009, 11).

Neoliberalism, Higher Education and the World Bank

Neoliberalism has both directly and indirectly influenced higher education in developing regions, through the actions of Western donor nations. Shivji and Wallace et al. have claimed that the current Western notion of development, which is the promotion of economic growth, is underpinned by neoliberalism. Inherent in the desired ‘ideal’ outcome of a liberal democratic
model of governance is an open, unprotected economy (Shivji 2006, 39, Wallace, Bornstein, and Chapman 2006, 19). Privatization of government institutions and services is implicit in the Western ideal of a liberal economy. Stephenson and Zanotti have observed that “Neoliberal policies promote and facilitate the deregulation of markets, privatization of public services, and withdrawal of the state from social welfare provision” (Stephenson and Zanotti 2012, 6).

Neoliberalism is characterized by ideals of free (‘liberalized’) trade, open markets, deregulation and privatization. Shivji (2006) has characterized aid as an instrument of the developed world. As such, development activities reflect these principles:

...The neoliberal model of development is based on private property and accumulation, the market as the motor of society, commodification of resources, services and basic needs is taken as ‘common sense.’ Society under neoliberalism becomes subservient to a self-regulating market (Shivji 2006, 39).

Put differently, developing countries suffer a modern version of uneven and combined development insofar as they are locked into the social conditions of their own particular conditions, yet subject to the strategies and assumptions of the advanced liberal countries that dominate the major development organizations and other global governance institutions (Joseph 2012, 51).

Olssen and Peters (2005) have argued that International Monetary Fund and World Bank adoption of neoliberal principles for policy development and implementation facilitated the spread of neoliberal ideology worldwide (Olssen and Peters 2005, 330). These institutions’ actions forced the transfer of higher education expenditures from governments to private households, as had already occurred in the United States (Levidow 2002, 6). This policy turn was accompanied and its effects exacerbated by a World Bank and IMF decision not to invest in higher education. Indeed, a 1994 World Bank report on higher education acknowledged that the
Bank had dramatically reduced lending for higher education in favor of primary and secondary education in previous years. The report cited evidence that:

… higher education investments have lower social rates of return than investments in primary and secondary education and that investments in basic education can also have more direct impact on poverty reduction, because they tend to improve income equality (World Bank 1994, 12).

In contrast to primary and secondary education, the Bank took a dim view of higher education: “Since higher education systems are financed by the entire population but available only to a small minority, they have a regressive fiscal impact” (World Bank 1994, 23). In many developing countries, only the elite enjoyed access to public higher education. Aware of this fact but unwilling to move to redress it, the Bank encouraged the implementation of cost-sharing and grant and loan programs to make university study available to the poor (World Bank 1994, 36). The 1994 report went on to criticize the funding of higher education as an entitlement in many countries as unsustainable, particularly where tied with guaranteed government jobs upon graduation (World Bank 1994, 21). The analysis stated that efforts in nations to achieve such aims might be provided support (World Bank 1994, 86). The Bank stood by these contentions. Bloom et al. found that the World Bank reduced lending for higher education from 17 percent of its worldwide education portfolio between 1985 and 1989 to just 7 percent between 1995 and 1999 (Bloom, Canning, and Chan 2006, 4).

Mamdani developed a case analysis of the interplay between loan conditionalities, the Bank’s higher education development goals and resulting reforms at Makerere University in Uganda (Mamdani 2009). As a legacy of the former Amin regime, the new Ugandan government found itself in financial crisis when it came to power in 1981. During the ensuing decade, it sought assistance from the IMF and the World Bank. By 1990, the World Bank
enjoyed considerable influence on education policy in the country (Mamdani 2009, 9). Two corresponding events occurred moving into the early 1990s: a fresh state budget crisis and a drastic drop in higher education funding. At the same time, state support for primary education and to a lesser extent secondary education, substantially increased (Mamdani 2009, 8). Mamdani (2009) attributed this turn to the World Bank’s policy favoring the financial efficacy of educating primary students in lieu of individuals enrolled at university (Mamdani 2009, 11).

Starting in 1986, the World Bank issued a series of recommended reforms for universities. The Bank suggested that higher education institutions should attain increased financial autonomy, which could be achieved by both cost-sharing (i.e. introducing tuition) and privatizing functions capable of income generation (Mamdani 2009, 11). It further advised that those university units capable of income generation be incentivized to earn more, including being permitted to keep part of the funds generated for themselves (Mamdani 2009, 11).

Three separate commissions charged by the Ugandan government with recommending higher education reform between 1987 and 1991 concurred with the Bank’s recommendations. A summary 1992 Education White Paper issued by the that nation’s government, for example, called for, “admission of ‘privately sponsored students’ to ‘publicly-funded tertiary institutions’ to ‘democratize higher education’” (Mamdani 2009, 11). Makerere University’s attempt to impose tuition in the 1990/91 school year failed as a result of student and staff strikes (Mamdani 2009, 11). Shortly after release of the government’s White Paper, Makerere adopted and began to implement several alternative strategies to increase revenues: 1) admission of privately-funded students; 2) curricular changes to enable the university to attract more private students, and 3) ‘commercialization’ activities to create more income from previously state-funded services—such as student housing (Mamdani 2009, 11).
In the 1990s, critics leveled two main arguments at the Bank’s higher education policies: 1) higher education (particularly STEM education) was necessary to compete in the knowledge economy, and; 2) higher education permitted individuals to pursue not only employment, but also helped them to be more productive contributors to civil society and thereby to democracy or democratization (Oketch, McCowan, and Schendel 2014, 14). A task force on higher education policy convened by the World Bank and UNESCO in 2006 encouraged the Bank to reconsider its lending policies based upon the need for improved human capital in the new knowledge economy. Their report argued that the Internet provided a sustainable resource to benefit human development in the hands of an educated populace (World Bank 2000, 17). Relevance in the modern economy was predicated upon increasing attention to higher education in the developing world (World Bank 2000, 20).

Based on this re-evaluation of its policies toward higher education, Bank officials began to advance a new position; that materially poorer countries might be lifted from poverty by engaging in the so called ‘knowledge economy’ (Naidoo 2008, 84). The Bank’s logic behind this shift was clear and concise:

1) The information society functions through a rapid transmission of knowledge.
2) Developing countries, to be productive in the modern world, had to have the capacity to participate in this new economy.
3) The ability to generate knowledge products and services, therefore, was prerequisite.
4) Higher education, as a generator of knowledge, is therefore a critical component of development (Naidoo 2008, 84).

If developing countries did not keep up with modern technology, according to this logic, they would inevitably fail to continue to develop: “Higher education in developing countries is therefore expected to impart to students the academic, technical, social and managerial skills to take their place in the knowledge economy and contribute to the government’s ‘high skills’
strategies” (Naidoo 2008, 85). According to Naidoo, this mindset assumed that developing countries could succeed by emulating the progress of the developed world (Naidoo 2008, 85).

The Bank’s new thinking manifested in a repositioning of funding to support, “higher education in developing countries as a crucial site for social development and for the production, dissemination, and transfer of economically productive knowledge and innovation” (Naidoo 2008, 84).

Olssen and Peters concluded that the neoliberal ideology or public philosophy, by virtue of being imposed in structural adjustment programs, had replaced other globalization narratives:

[The neoliberal account] universalizes policies and obscures country and regional differences. … [It] denies the capacity of local institutions and cultural values to mediate, negotiate, reinterpret and transmute the dominant model of globalization and the emergent form of knowledge capitalism on which it is based (Olssen and Peters 2005, 330).

Supporting this view, Naidoo has asserted that the World Bank and the IMF “have exerted tremendous pressure to roll back state control, deregulate domestic markets and open up to international trade and competition” (Naidoo 2008, 86). Their practices, as illustrated in the examples above, affected governments and individual educational institutions alike. Consistent with neoliberal aims to dismantle state social support programs, the World Bank was openly unsympathetic to the view that higher education should be an entitlement. Equally consistent with neoliberal notions of free trade and the movement of goods and ideas, the Bank supported efforts by universities to be more competitive in the knowledge economy. The result of this orientation as Levidow (2002) suggested, are universities taking steps strongly encouraged, if not demanded, by their financiers. The higher education policies of the governments of developing
states have similarly been shaped by their OCED funders: “U.S. capital serves as both a prime
driving force and as a model for its imitators or partners elsewhere” (Levidow 2002, 5).

Conclusion

This review of the literature concerning neoliberalism has chronicled its ascendency and
revealed its pervasive influence on many levels and in many forms. Harvey has argued that
neoliberal thought is derived from and consistent with free market ideals (Harvey 2005, 2). He
has suggested that political leaders, policymakers and economists, as well as higher education
leaders, accepted neoliberal premises as doctrine in the 1980s (Harvey 2005, 1). Galbraith has
argued, from a political and economic perspective, that neoliberalism had been proven, indeed
had proven itself, a bankrupt ideology by the end of the George W. Bush administration
(Galbraith 2008, 5). The neoliberal imaginary has nonetheless persisted in U.S. higher education
and in the educational systems of many developing nations, including Iraq (Slaughter and

A period of high inflation and unemployment during the 1970s first motivated U.S.
public universities to adopt marketing strategies to attract students (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004,
42). Throughout this period, tuition rose while state support dwindled (Brubacher and Rudy
1997, 383). The 1980s began with a recession, but Bayh-Dole and related legislation passed
between 1980 and 1984 helped universities by opening avenues for them to garner resources
through funded research (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 53).

Overall, higher education began assuming a very different character in the 1970s and
1980s (Gumport 2000, 68). Business-like management began to take hold at the institutional
level to control costs and raise money (Gumport 2000, 68). Ties to business and industry
became more desirable as potential sources of funds. A stratification among departments emerged based on such connections and perceived capacity to secure research support (Gumport 2000, 83). A new class of contracted workers, professional researchers, arose to augment the research work of professors (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 65). In a reaction to poor economic conditions, businesses and students began to demand more effective preparation for jobs. To remain competitive from an admissions perspective, university administrators conceded to this pressure and began to promote market-oriented curricular changes within their institutions (Gumport 2000, 84).

The IMF and the World Bank exported this same view of higher education in the 1980s and 1990s (Harvey 2005, 29). In an effort to ‘cure’ debtor countries of the economic problems that had brought about their need to borrow, these organizations adopted neoliberal loan and credit conditionalities during the early 1980s (Harvey 2005, 29). The Latin American debt crisis, precipitated by the failure of Bretton Woods and a quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC in 1979, forced many countries to adopt these conditionalities. The financial crisis was not limited to Latin American countries, but affected many others around the world (Levidow 2002, 6). The Bank did not target higher education in its earlier reform efforts, but higher education became a focus in some countries in later loan agreements (Mamdani 2009, 11). For many years, the IMF and World Bank viewed higher education as a welfare entity enjoyed by a small measure of the populace that tended to command disproportionately high funding relative to other national priorities (World Bank 1994, 12). The Bank’s prescription for higher education was privatization (Mamdani 2009, 11).

Neoliberal ideology incorporated Hayekian notions of personal liberty and economic freedom—inherent in which is the ideal of the free market (Harvey 2005, 1). This is part of the
allure of the imaginary. In Friedman’s words, as he framed the concern for his popular PBS series,

That is why the operation of the free market is so essential, not only to promote productive efficiency, but even more to foster harmony and peace among the peoples of the world. ... Human and political freedom has never existed and cannot exist without a large measure of economic freedom (Friedman 1980).

The conflation of these two notions, argued Polanyi is not only fallacious, but also dangerous (Polanyi 1967, 257). The market, he contended, is a human creation subject to human control and intervention (Polanyi 1967, 201). Galbraith (2008) echoed Polanyi’s sentiments, pointing out that in the neoliberal conception of the market takes on almost god-like qualities (Galbraith 2008). In fact, there are many examples of failure, intervention and purposeful manipulation of the ‘free market’ (Galbraith 2008). And yet the neoliberal imaginary prospered in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and beyond (Harvey 2005). Academic capitalism, the subject of the next chapter, is its legacy in higher education (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004).
CHAPTER THREE

ACADEMIC CAPITALISM

Researchers theorize that academic capitalism is a mechanism by which higher education has been transformed from a public good knowledge/learning regime to a new imaginary that views universities as offering private goods. This view is characterized by a near obsession with marketization and competition, garnering external resources and protecting and selling knowledge (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). This chapter reviews the literature on academic capitalism, which scholars have developed during roughly the last two-and-a-half decades. I begin by tracing the evolution of the term. Thereafter, I examine the various manifestations of academic capitalism in American higher education, as well as the mechanisms behind them. To do so, I focus on two critical junctures at which national legislation first created the higher education marketplace and later fostered entrepreneurialism through research. Thereafter, I compare and contrast major studies in this field of inquiry, explore the global reach of the idea and identify weaknesses and omissions in the literature. I conclude this chapter with an analysis of the relationship between neoliberalism and academic capitalism.

Academic Capitalism Defined

As noted above, Hackett coined the term ‘academic capitalism’ in 1990 to refer to an observed cultural shift in the study of the sciences in public higher education institutions (Hackett 1990, 242). As evidence for this change, he pointed to deans expecting professors to raise money, professors considering graduate students (particularly those working on research) as employees and university officials treating schools and departments as ‘cost centers’ for
accounting purposes. Hackett tied these changes to declining public resources that, in turn, led to closer corporate-university ties and, thus, adoption of more firm-like behavior by educational organizations (Hackett 1990, 242). This cultural transformation resulted in an increasing focus on results-oriented (i.e., applied) research that could be turned around quickly (Hackett 1990, 257).

Slaughter and Leslie studied changes in “the nature of academic labor” at public universities in the United States, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom between 1970 and 1995. While adopting Hackett’s term, they more precisely defined academic capitalism as: “…institutional and professorial or marketlike behaviors to secure extra moneys” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 8). By way of explication they noted,

Marketlike behavior refers to institutional and faculty competition for monies, whether these are from external grants and contracts, endowment funds, university–industry partnerships, institutional investment in professors’ spin-off companies or student tuition and fees (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 11).

Slaughter and Leslie first observed and commented on academic capitalism in the sciences and research, but also began to see it at work in other university endeavors: selling university-logoed paraphernalia, revenue-sharing with food-service providers, charging for services once provided as part of tuition and financing of campus growth through student fees (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 11, Slaughter and Rhoades 2000, 74).

Slaughter and Leslie identified competition as the fundamental driver of academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 12). Like Hackett, Slaughter and Leslie attributed the need for public universities to obtain funds from external sources to defray public resource deprivation. This revenue helped to compensate for declining government support of universities (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 11). Just as it necessitated academic capitalism, public
policy could also determine the form(s) academic capitalism might take. The U.S. and Australian governments’ drives toward enhancing global competitiveness, for example, incentivized universities to engage in research that could be taken to the market (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 13). The degree to which these researchers found consistencies across their samples suggested that faculty engagement in market-like behaviors could ultimately compromise the core public service role of the university (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 5).

Evolution of the Theory of Academic Capitalism

The focus of the academic capitalism literature shifted to U.S. public higher education in 2000. In that year and soon after, Slaughter and Rhoades and Slaughter and Leslie began to tie marketization in U.S. higher education to neoliberalism (Slaughter and Rhoades 2000, 73, Slaughter and Leslie 2001, 155). These researchers pointed to several emergent themes at U.S. universities:

- Administrators were giving global competitiveness increasing attention at a policy level (Slaughter and Leslie 2001, 155)
- Academic managers were giving techno-science, as the perceived center of innovation, greater emphasis in curricular offerings (Slaughter and Rhoades 2000, 75).
- Support professionals were increasingly interacting with external markets for fundraising and technology transfer (Slaughter and Rhoades 2000, 78).
- Professors were gearing research more toward invention, particularly commercializable technological advances (Slaughter and Rhoades 2000, 74).
- Academic managers were stressing preparation for jobs in the information society in both community college and undergraduate education (Slaughter and Rhoades 2000, 73).

Change was apparent in public university curricula modes of instruction, research, funding, management strategies and organizational structures:
We still identified reduced state resources as the trigger for academic capitalism; however, we began to think about the enactment or adaptation of academic capitalism by concrete actors and organizational units in terms of external and internal mechanisms; organizational restructuring or interstitial emergence of new organizations; products, processes and services and their markets, public and private; managerial rewards and incentives, penalties and disincentives; and of course ideology (Slaughter and Leslie 2001, 156).

For their part, Slaughter and Rhoades highlighted a change in how universities—financial aid and admissions personnel—perceived their students (Slaughter and Rhoades 2000, 157). They argued that the Higher Education Act of 1972, by initiating a system of grants and loans, had created a voucher system that gave students (in increasing numbers) a much wider range of schools from which to choose, thereby stimulating fresh competition among universities (Slaughter and Rhoades 2000, 157).

In a second seminal work on academic capitalism Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) posited that a fundamental transition had occurred in American higher education beginning in the mid-1970s. Prior to that period, the system could be characterized accurately as a public good knowledge/learning regime:

...Valuing knowledge as a public good to which the citizenry has claims. [Robert K.] Mertonian norms—such as communalism, universality, the free flow of knowledge, and organized skepticism—were associated with the public good model (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 28).

The public good regime valued basic science, which required long, deliberate research trajectories before yielding results (if any). Professors published freely; the regime “honored professors’ rights to follow research where it led and gave professors rights to dispose of discoveries as they saw fit” and faculty treated graduate students as learners (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 29). Slaughter and Rhoades acknowledged that this was a somewhat idealized
view of the past, as at universities receiving defense funding during the Cold War, for example, secrecy had often prevailed. The McCarthy era, too, while embedded in the public good knowledge/learning regime period, nonetheless had a broader, if uneven, stifling effect on academic freedom (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 29).

Nevertheless, with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, still the dominant sociopolitical imaginary today, Slaughter and Leslie contended that the public good knowledge/learning regime had given way, in U.S. higher education, to an academic capitalist knowledge/learning orientation (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 28). Within this imaginary, the profit aims of faculty members and corporations linked to their universities take precedence over public interests. This orientation is typified by a measure of rationalization. For example, bringing a protected invention to the market might be justified as serving the public good, even if it served only those who could afford it (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 29, 111). In this way of thinking, too, basic science is displaced by applied science, whose results are, relatively speaking, more immediate and transferable (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 29). Knowledge is similarly valued for its profit-creating potential. Business and industry, for example, typically direct the aims of research that they support toward profit, rather than the public good (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 29). In this regime too, professors treat their graduate students as employees in training. According to patent law, for example, faculty members and universities own discoveries made in their laboratories, not graduate students who may have done the work (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 110). The theory of academic capitalism developed by Slaughter and Rhoades recognized academic capitalism as both an expression of the new economy of higher education and as a product of increasing ties through networks of relationships among universities, government agencies and corporations (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 15).
While Slaughter and Rhoades asserted that these changes were taking place in higher education, they also acknowledged that the public good knowledge/learning regime has continued to coexist to varying degrees with academic capitalism within universities (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 110). They defended the doctoral experience at research institutions, for example, as exemplary of a public good mission. They classified professional master’s degrees, on the other hand, as market-oriented and therefore associated directly with the academic capitalism regime (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 110).

Manifestations of Academic Capitalism

Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) argued that colleges and universities had shifted over the prior two decades “from a public good knowledge learning regime to an academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime” (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 1). That is, universities had moved from an organizing principle of knowledge acquisition as an aspiration and public good to a perspective that the pursuit of learning must produce commodities and provide potential sources of revenue (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 1). This new conceptualization of higher education’s social role was characterized by broad acceptance of academic capitalism’s assumptions (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 1). Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) developed an analytical framework suggesting that universities that are part of this regime exhibit one or more of the following four characteristics: new circuits of knowledge, interstitial organizations, intermediating networks and extended managerial capacity (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 15).
New Circuits of Knowledge

As these analysts saw them, new circuits of knowledge are broadly defined pathways to learning that occur outside the traditional professional and scholarly networks that once dominated higher education (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 22). On-line course management systems and webcasting are examples in this formulation of how new circuits of knowledge have redefined the teacher-student classroom relationship. University and professor rating systems are another new circuit, replacing quality measures once the province of university decision-makers and faculties alone. Appointing professionals to the editorial boards of peer-reviewed journals, positions formerly reserved solely for members of the academy, is yet another example of a new circuit of knowledge (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 23). Other instances in the university context include the employment of external advisory boards by academic units, dissemination of research findings through industry reports and university ‘branding’ initiatives.

Universities and faculty pursue new circuits of knowledge to generate income. Slaughter and Cantwell classified continuing education, distance education and differential tuition\textsuperscript{30} as new circuits (Slaughter and Cantwell 2012, 596). These authors also characterized “increased publishing, patenting, licensing, start ups [sic] and other entrepreneurial activities, such as university funding of research parks and incubators” as new research-related knowledge circuits (Slaughter and Cantwell 2012, 596).

Interstitial Organizations

Interstitial organizations are administrative structures and processes that arise from the need among colleges and universities to manage revenues from profit-making activities (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 23). Technology licensing and economic development entities and
their accompanying roles are examples of such entities. Technology licensing staffs search for ways to commercialize or otherwise apply professors’ inventions. Economic development offices seek to leverage faculty members’ research to increase the vitality of targeted communities (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 24). Slaughter and Rhodes also contended that offices supporting continuing and professional education and distance education constituted examples of interstitial organizations; these units incorporate faculty expertise, generally part-time, to extend the university’s reach outside its physical infrastructure. Interstitial organizations generate resources. That is, in principle, such offices and activities are self-sustaining and raise capital to benefit the university (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 24).

Intermediating Networks and Organizations

Intermediating networks bridge the gaps between the public, business and civil society sectors; these are alliances that coalesce around concrete issues to enable each participating actor to take better advantage of opportunities in the neoliberal economy (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 24). Professional associations that lobby governments on behalf of university and corporate interests are examples of these institutions. In the 1980s, the Business Higher Education Forum (BHEF), a group composed of corporate and higher education executives, devised individual education accounts that would permit contributors to fund, tax free, retraining at a community college or university should the contributors lose their jobs (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 24). Anticipating the need for workers to change careers multiple times in the new, market-driven economy, colleges and university leaders strongly supported this strategy in the belief that their institutions would benefit by providing such curricula (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 24).
Extended Managerial Capacity

With the demands created by the appearance of new circuits of knowledge, interstitial organizations and intermediating networks, universities required additional managerial capacity to market and oversee these new opportunities more effectively (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 25). Management of profit-generating enterprises, such as trademark licensing, distance education, economic development, technology transfer and continuing education requires knowledgeable, well-trained professionals. Administrators who manage intellectual property, who must handle licensing income, disseminate equity interest for investors and maintain trade secrets represented a new management class altogether for higher education (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 25).

According to Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) these four markers of academic capitalism—new circuits of knowledge, interstitial organizations, intermediating networks and extended managerial capacity as well as other minor market-like behaviors—attached “a price to things that were once free” or charged “more for items and services that were once subsidized or provided at cost” (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 25).

Mechanisms of Academic Capitalism

Kaidesoja and Kauppinen have criticized the academic capitalism literature on the basis that much of it focuses on “identifying and characterizing the trends and changes in universities and in their relations to other social systems” as opposed to attempting to identify the root causes of the phenomena being observed (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 168). Their analysis suggested that academic capitalism assumes different forms depending upon the rationale for its creation. Not enough emphasis has been given, they have contended, to the social mechanism,
i.e., the causal social processes—the ‘why’ and ‘how’ that animate academic capitalist steps in the first instance. Moreover, according to these authors, the framework does not provide “methodologically conscious causal explanations for the emergence of academic capitalist knowledge/learning regimes” (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 168). For Kaidesoja and Kauppinen ‘social mechanism’ referred to an elemental component (individual or collective or both) of a broader dynamic social system which, when articulated, changed that frame in some fundamental, observable way. In this view, no such single process was likely to elicit social change by itself, but various processes interacting together could increase its likelihood (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 172).

Kaidesoja and Kauppinen proposed four possible causative social mechanisms for the emergence of academic capitalism and the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime based on their review of the relevant literature: 31 global economic competition, coalition formation, organization design and legislation (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 173). Intensified global economic competition, these researchers asserted, came about as a result of rapid globalization brought about by the neoliberal regime. Competition in this view, simply stated, is a struggle undertaken by two or more actors concerning a resource that results in one or the other obtaining the greater portion of it— i.e., a winner and a loser. These analysts contend that the current U.S. context of public higher education is an example of intensified global competition. Driven by budget reductions, the need to compete on broader geographic scales, massive enrollment increases and the political expectation to do more with less, U.S. universities (and the actors comprising them) have been forced to seek and compete for new revenue sources on many different levels:
… Competition between universities for wealthy and bright students as well as for external funding and rankings, competition between departments for budget funds and external funding. Competition between research teams and individual researchers for prestige and external funding (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 175).

According to Kaidesoja and Kauppinen (2014) coalition formation is an alliance bounded by time, formed between individuals or collectives to achieve some common end. Coalitions are constructed through negotiation and compromise. They require that members possess the expertise to identify, elaborate, frame and communicate a unifying issue (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 175). Slaughter and Rhoades have highlighted the Business Higher Education Forum (BHEF) as convener of a coalition supporting individual education accounts in the 1980s as an example (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 25). They identified other similar organizations as including, “the University-Industry-Government Research Council, Internet2, Educause and the League for Innovation” (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 25).

Organization design, another causative social mechanism proposed by Kaidesoja and Kauppinen, explains the observed phenomena of interstitial and intermediating organizations (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 178). Whether internal or external to a university, organizations supporting academic capitalism arose for a purpose: “to secure and increase external resources for their universities in competition with other universities” (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 178). Where such organizations existed, their effectiveness could be measured against the aim(s) for which they were created. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have suggested that organizational structures within institutions arise from three main processes—coercion, mimesis or professionalization. Organizations may be forced to adopt certain structures through regulation or competition, they may copy one or more observed at another institution in hopes of
replicating their perceived success, standing or utility, or professionals of similar training working at different institutions may impose similar structures by adopting standards or best practices in their new locations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 179). These scholars argued that while organizational structures tend toward isomorphism, or convergence, over time, they can diverge—they are not static, but fluid in the sense that they can be redesigned by social actors to adapt to changing circumstances, such as shifts in their regulatory environment or competitive pressures (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 179).

Legislation, as a social mechanism, involves coalition formation and ultimately influences, or can determine, organization design. In the democratic West, at the national level, legislators or the executive propose changes to law, debate those proposals and, finally, enact them into law via Congress or Parliament. The interests of many groups, including political parties, the business community, state-run institutions, advocacy organizations and the public at-large are represented in the process of making and passing legislation (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 177). Significantly, federal legislation has facilitated the rise of academic capitalism during the past five decades in the U.S. Slaughter and Rhoades have contended, for instance, that the Higher Education Act of 1965, most notably the 1972 reauthorization of that statute, began the trend toward marketization in higher education (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 42). As outlined above and detailed below, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and a series of laws following it through 1995 made it easier for universities to market their discoveries through patenting and licensing (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 50, Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 178).

Kaidesoja and Kauppinen (2014) helped to frame research concerning academic capitalism by drawing attention to the possible causes of the phenomenon. Their insights are particularly relevant to my inquiry, which seeks to identify and, if present, to explain emergent
academic capitalism in a little explored developing nation context. If I observe academic
capitalist processes or characteristics in Kurdish higher education, Kaidesoja and Kauppinen’s
(2014) causal social mechanisms framework should help to guide inquiry into why and how they
came to exist.

As Kaidesoja and Kauppinen have observed, different combinations of social
mechanisms could be at play in different national contexts (i.e., social systems)—leading to
different, although similar, manifestations of academic capitalism:

Thus, it is a fundamentally empirical question whether the globalization of
academic capitalism is about the relative convergence of national higher
education systems or the transnationalization of those elements that characterize
academic capitalism (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 183).

A researcher, therefore, should not assume that academic capitalism observed outside a given
context (e.g. the U.S. or Europe) is the same as academic capitalism in his or her own context, or
results from the same mechanisms. While a phenomenon could have been imposed from another
source (e.g. through coercion or direct competition), it could also have been imitated or have
evolved independently as a result of similar selective pressures. Alternatively, other unidentified
social mechanisms could be at play (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 180).

Roots of the Academic Capitalist/Learning Regime

In the early 1980s Congress sought to address American technological competitiveness at
the global level. At the same time, the Reagan administration began to address the nation’s
economic issues on the basis of neoliberal notions of minimal taxes and smaller government.
The Reagan administration adopted supply-side economics and budget reductions (i.e., an
extensive smaller federal government campaign). The resulting fiscal pressure on states, and
therefore public universities, drove state funding for higher education institutions down (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 55). Universities responded to this turn over time by allocating more resources to fields ‘close to the market,’ such as sciences, engineering and business, to the detriment of other areas of inquiry or domains of knowledge (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 55). The confluence of legislation enabling universities to profit from research and economic policies that otherwise strangled higher education created the condition that Hackett (1990) would soon describe as ‘academic capitalism.’

The Student as a Customer?

Slaughter and Rhoades have claimed that reauthorizations of the Higher Education Act (HEA) in the 1970s 32 ever more thoroughly marketized higher education by treating students as consumers (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 45). The student aid provided under HEA represented a shift in the funding model for higher education (Slaughter and Leslie 2001, 157). The grant and loan programs established under the act gave students more choice in the institutions they could attend; by doing so, these new instruments created a national higher education market and introduced more competition (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 45).

The first major financing initiative for higher education since the Second World War, the HEA of 1965, was part of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society agenda (Leslie and Johnson 1974, 7, Cervantes et al. 2005, 17). Intended to increase access to higher education, it provided programs for students, including an Equal Opportunity Grants (EOG) program, a Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program, work-study funding and a National Defense Student Loan Program (Cervantes et al. 2005, 27). Prior to the HEA, the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (also known as the GI Bill) of 1944 and the National Defense Education Act of 1958 had provided
student aid. However, the EOGs and GSLs, in their infancy in 1965, would later dwarf the other initiatives in both their scale and their effects on American higher education (Leslie and Johnson 1974, 7, Cervantes et al. 2005, 11).

The 1972 HEA reauthorization featured opportunity grants that lower-income students could use at a university of their choosing (Slaughter and Leslie 2001, 157, Cervantes et al. 2005, 35). The grants were of two types: the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (BEOG), now known as the Pell Grant, and the Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (SEOG). The BEOG was a new award of up to $1400 per year, depending on family need. The SEOG, a successor to the EOG, could be added to the BEOG to a maximum value of $1500 per year (Cervantes et al. 2005, 34). Policymakers intended these grants to act like vouchers, to increase the number of students attending universities and give them more choice in the institutions they could consider (Slaughter and Leslie 2001, 157, Cervantes et al. 2005, 34). The layering of state grants on top of BEOGs and SEOGs compounded their impact in many states; federal matching dollars provided for by Congress under the 1972 HEA reauthorization incentivized such additional support (Cervantes et al. 2005, 33).

While grants targeted lower-income aspirants, HEA policymakers increased access for middle class students through the GSL program (Cervantes et al. 2005, 24). Although part of the original 1965 legislation, the loan program received little attention from lawmakers in early iterations of the HEA (Cervantes et al. 2005, 24). While the 1972 reauthorization did not target loans, it did increase GSL limits to $2500 per year and an aggregate of $10,000. More significantly, the 1976 reauthorization raised the family income maximum for obtaining a GSL without having to show need from $15,000 to $25,000. It further permitted medical and professional school students to borrow up to $5,000 per year (Cervantes et al. 2005, 35).
The Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA) of 1978 eliminated the family income test entirely, opening up GSLs to all students regardless of family income (Cervantes et al. 2005, 36). In the ensuing four years the number of GSLs issued tripled to more than 3.1 million (Cervantes et al. 2005, 36). This rapid acceleration in loans combined with a weakening economy prompted Congress to reinstate the family income test in 1981 (Cervantes et al. 2005, 37). Loans constituted 17 percent of all student aid in 1976, growing to 55 percent in 1994-1995 (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 42). Like grants, GSLs were voucher-like in their effect; placing school choice in the hands of students. Overall, these programs introduced market-like qualities into the university selection process (Slaughter and Leslie 2001, 157).

As referenced in Chapter Four (p. 48), higher education was mired in a sector-wide recession throughout much of the 1970s (Brubacher and Rudy 1997, 383). Researchers at the time attributed the financial crisis to several causes: overbuilding in the 1960s, tuition hikes, declines in federal institutional grants and recessionary cutbacks in state funding (Carovano 1966, 125, Adams 1977, 88, Leslie 1995, 7). In the early to mid-1970s, the Vietnam War and the OPEC oil embargo reduced federal government spending. Post-Sputnik federal institutional grants first instituted in the early 1960s waned. In one extreme example of the times, the City University of New York (CUNY) let thousands of full-time employees go and began charging tuition for the first time in its history in 1976. At the time, CUNY was tied budgetarily to the City of New York, which nearly went bankrupt in the mid-1970s (Slaughter 1990, 39, 2003, 3). While policymakers deemed higher education important, the political mood during this period was one of retrenchment (Slaughter 1990, 38).

Leslie has chronicled the debate within the higher education community concerning how to resolve the funding crisis during this period (Leslie 1995, 7). The Carnegie Commission on
Higher Education (CCHE) and the Committee for Economic Development (CED) offered independent recommendations aimed at reforming higher education financing in 1973 that exemplified the differing positions taken by principal groups at the time. The CCHE was a higher education research institute, while the CED was a business-led public policy group (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 1973, Committee for Economic Development 1973). The organizations differed in their views concerning institutional grants, with the CCHE recommending that they be a federal responsibility (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 1973, 105) and the CED suggesting that states and localities assume responsibility for them (Committee for Economic Development 1973, 25). The CCHE called for broad taxpayer support for higher education (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education 1973, 104) while the CED believed voluntary tax incentives a more appropriate strategy (Committee for Economic Development 1973, 26). Despite their ideological differences, both institutions expressed support for continuing the market-based student aid alternatives initiated in the HEA (Leslie 1995, 7).

The HEA facilitated decades of growth in American higher education (see Figure 5, below), but it has done so mostly by assisting middle class students and their families. Slaughter and Rhoades have argued that federal loans and subsequent tax benefit programs underwrote elite higher education particularly (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 42). Under the new loan programs, middle-to upper-middle class students could afford to go to previously unattainable prestigious and expensive private universities (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 42).

Tax incentives added on top of loans acted as an additional subsidy by helping families offset college costs (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 43). The Tax Relief Act of 1997 exempted funds withdrawn from Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) from gross income for tax
purposes, when these were used for college expenses. Further, contributions to college savings funds of up to $500 per year per child could be sheltered in a similar way. Available for families earning up to $150,000 to $160,000 per year (approximately $222,000 to $237,000 in 2015 dollars), these tax relief benefits extended well into the middle class (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 43). Median household income in 1997 was $37,005 in 1997 dollars ($55,000 in 2015 dollars) (U.S. Census Bureau 1998).

Figure 5: U.S. college enrollment of all undergraduate students 14 - 34 years old (in thousands, non-institutionalized population)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

The new grant and loan programs under the HEA acted as a subsidy to private universities particularly (Geiger and Heller 2011, 8). Jellema has conducted studies on the financial state of U.S. private colleges and universities from 1969-1971 and has reported alarming increases in debt levels at these institutions during that relatively short period (Jellema 1970,
Changes in the structure of student aid in the mid-1970s, however, permitted private universities to raise tuition and charge students according to the larger amounts they could now afford, factoring in anticipated grants and loans, “They [private universities] were thus free to raise tuition for those who could afford it while providing an appropriate tuition discount for those who could not” (Geiger and Heller 2011, 8).

In addition to subsidizing higher education, the HEA and associated legislation placed the student in the position of consumer, thereby contributing to an increasingly segmented and marketized higher education system (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 42). Prospective students, with more buying power, enjoyed a broader choice of schools and could seek the best institution for which they could gain admission and that they could afford. Universities, in their continual pursuit of greater prestige, contended for the most academically qualified and financially fit students (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 43). These individuals tended to be from more advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds, i.e., the middle- and upper-middle classes. The combination created, particularly among elite nonprofit private institutions, but also among public universities as well, a kind of selective vicious cycle (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 44). Universities sought to admit increasingly qualified students, enhancing their reputations and their value in the market and enabling them to attract increasingly better candidate pools. Thereafter, their graduates, from well selected ‘stock,’ tended to be more successful, further enhancing their institutional reputations (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 44). This cycle differentiated and grouped institutions by selectivity and cost of attendance; comparable institutions competed amongst themselves while the most elite institutions retained their superior status (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 44).
Ironically, the legislation conceived to assist marginalized students on the lower end of the socioeconomic scale did not have broad positive impacts for that group (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 44). Lower-income students tended to be less academically qualified, to score lower on standardized tests and to be financially stressed. They had difficulty meeting both university admission requirements and the costs of more prestigious schools. Further, banks considered them financial risks (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 45). As a result, the system developed to help these students effectively channeled them into community colleges, less expensive public universities and for-profit institutions when they went on to higher education (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 45). Slaughter and Rhoades concluded from this evidence that neoliberalism had, consciously or not, redefined higher education to favor those of means—the middle-and upper-middle class (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 45). Other researchers who have examined socioeconomic factors influencing the admission of college freshmen have supported their conclusion. Oseguera and Astin, for example, cited increased academic competitiveness and stratification of universities over time as the two factors most responsible for declining access to them by members of underrepresented groups and low-income families (Oseguera and Astin 2004, 337).

The Research Turn

The attention given to research and development (R&D) today at U.S. universities evolved during a considerable period influenced during different periods by military, health, national security and economic competitiveness interests. The growing emphasis on research at American universities is at the root of many changes now associated with academic capitalism. These shifts, including increasing pressure to attract external funding, inter-institutional
competitiveness, and professionalization, accelerated as the influence of neoliberalism grew in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.

Prior to the Second World War, most faculty at American universities engaged in teaching with little incentive or time to devote effort to research (Graham and Diamond 1997, 20). In the period between the First and Second World Wars, foundations and private individuals comprised the primary sources of funds for inquiry at U.S. research universities. The organization providing funding during this period often strongly influenced, or even dictated, the study to be performed (Kleinman and Vallas 2001, 458). In order to receive funding from the Rockefeller Foundation during the 1930s, for example, university researchers were required to use approaches that were determined by “science managers with their own agendas” (Kleinman and Vallas 2001, 458). During World War II, the federal government began to fund defense research at American universities, probably due to the ready capacity available for this activity (Etzkowitz 1983, 214).

After the war, defense spending naturally declined. However, the government continued to be the primary source of research dollars for universities. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), tracing its origins to the late 1700s, became the nation’s primary supporter of medical research in 1945. The U.S. Congress created the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950 and designated it the primary funding source for basic research in physical sciences and engineering (Graham and Diamond 1997, 31). Nevertheless, the research budgets of other government agencies, such as the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) dwarfed those of the NIH and NSF in the 1950s. Agencies other than NSF funded basic inquiry at universities within the scope of their missions, but allocated most of their research budgets to applied or programmatic concerns (Graham and Diamond 1997, 32). As of
1954, federal agencies together accounted for 69 percent of university research budgets, followed by private foundations at 11 percent and industry at 9 percent (Graham and Diamond 1997, 31). However, the overall fiscal importance of research funding to most universities during this period, relative to other sources of revenue, was quite limited.

The Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957 spurred a re-evaluation of policy toward basic research. Graham and Diamond have contended that the five years from 1958 through 1963 constituted a turning point during which:

First, the federal government assumed primary responsibility for supporting basic research in the United States. Second, the research enterprise was to be carried out primarily by the nation’s universities as an integral component of graduate education (Graham and Diamond 1997, 33).

The President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), a new task force appointed by President Eisenhower, facilitated this policy shift by working in concert with a lobbying coalition comprised of the American Association of Universities (AAU), the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Research policy advocacy drove research funding from $255 million in 1953 to $1.1 billion in 1963. Further, Congress expanded federal support to include not only inquiry, but also, “the entire infrastructure of academic science—scientific buildings and equipment, teaching and research laboratories, and graduate fellowships and training programs” (Graham and Diamond 1997, 33). Between 1963 and 1968, the years immediately following the Cuban Missile Crisis, research budgets at the National Institutes of Health and NSF doubled (Graham and Diamond 1997, 43). By 1968, these two institutions had emerged as the main sources of money for basic research at universities (Graham and Diamond 1997, 46).
Federal research funding contracted between 1968 and 1978 due to the costs of the Vietnam War and of maintaining social welfare programs (Graham and Diamond 1997, 85, National Science Foundation 2013, 10). Meanwhile, as noted, problems in the broader U.S. economy brought about a period of structural adjustment at universities (Graham and Diamond 1997, 84). The enrollment boom of the 1960s ended and while matriculation at American universities continued to rise overall, that increase did not occur at the pace expected. Moreover, the benefits of that growth were not distributed evenly; many higher education institutions experienced enrollment declines during these years. This trend was created in part by the end of selective military service in 1970 and, with it, service deferment (Graham and Diamond 1997, 84). A number of other factors contributed to financial woes at some colleges and universities: accumulated debt from overbuilding during the prior decade, smaller tax bases in supporting states as a result of demographic changes, record inflation from recessionary economic conditions in the early 1970s and high oil costs brought about by the Iranian oil crisis (Graham and Diamond 1997, 85). Universities also confronted increased costs to insure compliance with new federal mandates in several areas including, student aid, affirmative action and health and safety (Graham and Diamond 1997, 85).

Support for research accelerated again during the Reagan era (Graham and Diamond 1997, 117). That administration emphasized military-related inquiry, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Meanwhile, Congress, as noted above, while continuing to support defense related spending, also began to provide aid for investigation into ways and means to increase the nation’s global technological competitiveness (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 47). The reasons for this thrust included:
... increased competition in global markets, a drop in U.S. productivity, a disagreement among U.S. industrial leaders over the nature of R&D funding, the restructuring of defense industries, the rise of an information economy, and the end of the Cold War (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 48).

While Reagan-era research policies did not directly target them, as discussed above, universities nevertheless benefitted greatly from strengthened intellectual property protection and the ability to transfer inventions more readily that were enacted during this period (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 48). Spurred by Bayh-Dole and subsequent related legislation, university-originated patents increased fourfold between 1974 and 1989 (see Figure 6), and doubled again by 1997. The share of the total number of patents granted to universities or their researchers rose from 1 percent in 1976 to 2.5 percent in 1990 (Mowery et al. 2001, 104).

Figure 6: U.S. research university patents as a percentage of all domestic assignee U.S. patents, 1963-1999

This growth in patents accruing to university researchers notwithstanding, the degree to which Bayh-Dole actually increased income generation activities at higher education institutions
is contested in the literature. Universities had already benefitted from patenting and licensing for some time prior to Bayh-Dole. Mowery et al. (2001), for example, have demonstrated that the University of California, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the University of Wisconsin had installed provisions to protect and transfer inventions prior to World War II. Other universities employed the services of the Research Corporation to facilitate patenting and licensing (Mowery et al. 2001, 102). Accordingly, these scholars have suggested that it was not Bayh-Dole per se that spurred the increase in patenting and licensing activities at universities in the 1980s (Mowery et al. 2001). Rather, it was the growth of the biotechnology field in the 1960s and 1970s, in concert with judicial decisions upholding the right to patent inventions in this new field (e.g. enabling the patenting of organisms, molecules and emergent techniques) that prompted the well-documented growth in this activity among higher education institutions (Mowery et al. 2001, 102).

Shane has examined the university share of patents issued across 117 lines of business between 1969 and 1996, comparing those focused on acquiring transferable, or readily licensed, technical knowledge with those that were not (Shane 2004, 133). He found a strong positive correlation between passage of Bayh-Dole and the shares of patents issued to universities for those lines of business that the Act promoted, that is, those commercially oriented (Shane 2004, 147). Shane’s investigation did not disprove Mowery et al.’s (2001) argument that many universities were already well positioned to benefit from Bayh-Dole prior to the act going into effect. He did, however, show that the law led many institutions to “shift their patenting at the margin towards technologies in which licensing was more effective” (Shane 2004, 148).

Bayh-Dole marked a change in how universities viewed research—from a government subsidy to a way to generate capital (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 51). Historically, public
R&D dollars had been a significant source of support for U.S. universities. Research funding offsets professor salaries by buying out portions of their time otherwise paid by the institution. Overhead expenses recovered from grants help to sustain university infrastructure and to purchase new equipment. Bayh-Dole, according to Slaughter and Rhoades “directly signaled the inclusion of universities in profit-taking” in these terms (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 51). Financial incentives created by Bayh-Dole sparked the creation of patent and licensing offices, discovery incubators, corporate research parks and spin-off companies; most universities only marginally participated in such activities, if at all, prior to 1980 (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 50, Grimaldi et al. 2011). An upsurge in venture capital, an increase in the number of researchers and engineers, faster computer processing and a rise in biotechnology and nanotechnology accompanied the growth of these enterprises (Rothaermel, Agung, and Jiang 2007, 691).

Changes in Higher Education

In a study assessing the institutional effects of research funding, Hackett (1990) interviewed active researchers with different roles (scientists, department heads, administrators and agency officials) and at different academic ranks at doctoral degree-granting research universities. He discovered that universities had initiated a number of changes to accommodate increases in research funding during the decade that preceded his research, including the following:

1) Growth of research centers and institutes
2) Appearance of discretionary accounts to disseminate income from research activities, as well as faculty committees to determine use of these funds
3) Creation of new administrative positions to foster and manage research activities, as well as transfer (i.e., commercialize) research products
4) Streamlining of research positions to highly focused activities
5) Marginalization of research positions within the university’s academic community (i.e., as faculty used for specific purpose and thereafter discarded)
6) Change in expectations of faculty from teachers to “small businesspeople” responsible for attracting funding to support themselves, their departments and their students
7) Tying of faculty evaluations (and stature in their departments) to success as “entrepreneurs”
8) Treatment of the graduate student more as an employee than as one being mentored
9) Decline in basic research in favor of less risky, more short-term results-oriented, more commercially viable alternatives
10) Increased competition among faculty for limited resources (Hackett 1990, 269).

Overall, Hackett concluded that increasing interdependencies between universities, corporations and government, for example in defense and commerce, had fundamentally altered the relationship between faculty and students (Hackett 1990, 248). Hearkening to Max Weber, who referred to “large institutes of state capitalism or natural science” as “‘state capitalist’ enterprises,” Hackett (1990) observed:

My research supports this view of academic capitalism and suggests that alienation, the classic malady of capitalist work organization, has indeed resulted in some instances. The relationship between principal investigators and their staffs has taken on some of the characteristics of the relationship between capitalists and workers (Hackett 1990, 273).

In a later article, Hackett (2014) clarified what he views as a detrimental relationship between academe and capital:

Capital constructs and equips laboratories, supports research and researchers (sometimes directly with personal or corporate funds), bestows “gifts” that smuggle donors’ demands and desires into programs of education and research, and enriches university endowments. More subtly, capital shapes research agendas by raising alarm about gathering storms of offshore competitors and by concentrating research on topics that enhance economic performance and national
security, while steering funds away from those that deepen fundamental knowledge or enhance human capabilities and well-being (Hackett 2014, 636).

Gumport has echoed Hackett’s concerns, charging that in their search for popular legitimacy as economic drivers, universities are abandoning the “educational legacies and democratic interests that have long characterized American public higher education” (Gumport 2000, 67).

Hackett (1990) was not the first to study the growing ties between universities and firms and their effects. Etzkowitz (1983) began documenting the relationships between university scientists and industry in the early 1980s and expressed concern that, “two classes were being created within the academic profession: those who produce knowledge which can be made the basis of business enterprises, and those who do not” (Etzkowitz 1983, 200). Etzkowitz cited emerging examples of increasing university acceptance of industry inter-relationships in the emerging bio-tech sector, including tolerance for joint university-industry appointments of professors, institutional partnerships with industry, provision of venture capital for firms formed by university scientists, and the like (Etzkowitz 1983, 203). He saw such developments and their effects on the university as potentially damaging, creating important administrative challenges:

With the division of income resulting from research, with restricting the self-enrichment of their staff from research done within the university, the protection of the traditional standards of the university, and the restraint of intellectual conflicts within the university over these developments (Etzkowitz 1983, 232).

Etzkowitz labeled the institution whose president or other administrators sought to acquire income, “by the performance of research and sale of the results to private enterprises through commercial agents,” the ‘entrepreneurial university’ (Etzkowitz 1983, 198).

While studies by Hackett and Etzkowitz mentioned some of the external factors contributing to the transformation they saw occurring in colleges and universities, they did not
address the links between higher education and those influences (Etzkowitz 1983, Hackett 1990). Slaughter examined policy statements issued by the Business-Higher Education Forum between 1983 and 1986 (Slaughter 1990, 20). Formed in 1978, BHEF was (and still is) a higher education lobbying group that describes itself as, “the nation’s oldest organization of senior business and higher education executives dedicated to advancing solutions to U.S. education and workforce challenges.” Members join the Forum by invitation-only; they include Fortune 200 CEOs and the presidents of elite universities. Slaughter selected BHEF for study because it was among the first of a number of higher education lobbying groups formed to promote university-industry relations. The group advocated for “legislation facilitating technology transfer and supportive of university ownership of intellectual property” (Slaughter 1990, 20). BHEF also developed policy statements in response to a 1982 challenge by President Reagan to produce recommendations to make the U.S. more competitive in the global marketplace (Slaughter 1990, 174).

In her analysis of discourse in BHEF reports, Slaughter challenged that entity’s leaders’ self-characterization that they were not personally members of the upper class, arguing instead, that these individuals should more accurately be viewed as elite actors in their institutional roles, irrespective of their personal incomes (Slaughter 1990, 218). BHEF members bridge the divide between the business and higher education sectors in their leadership capacities. Together, they form a network of individuals with interlocking interests, shared acquaintances and common investments. Many also serve together on various governing boards. BHEF leaders comprise a ‘class’ (in Marxian terms) of tightly interrelated actors with common political aims, effectively “empowering [their collective] as policy actors” (Slaughter 1990, 220). As Slaughter remarked,
“The social institutions which they headed were at one in the same time a power base and resources which they strive to control” (Slaughter 1990, 220).

Combining Slaughter’s observations with Hackett and Etzkowitz’s findings, the four elements of the academic capitalist knowledge-learning regime emerge clearly (Hackett 1990, Slaughter 1990, Etzkowitz 1983). Hackett (1990) described one example of a ‘new knowledge circuit,’ as a shift in priorities away from fundamental research toward inquiry viewed as directly contributing to the economy. He charted the appearance of new administrative structures, i.e. ‘interstitial organizations,’ to manage activities such as patenting and technology transfer (Hackett 1990). Hackett and Etzkowitz both remarked on changes in management and performance expectations, and the growth of ‘managerial capacity,’ which took place to support these new directions (Etzkowitz 1983, Hackett 1990). In her study on BHEF, Slaughter contributed to this developing framework by suggesting how ‘intermediating organizations or networks’ brought about change (Slaughter 1990). Together, these forms, new knowledge circuits, emergent interstitial organizations, intermediating organizations or networks and adaptations in managerial capacity formed the basis for Slaughter and Rhoades’ theory of academic capitalism (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004).

The argument that enhanced university-government-industry relations and the desire to accrue capital wealth has harmed universities (Hackett 1990) has been contested in the literature. Etzkowitz (1983), for example, has asserted that business-industry partnerships could be effectively and responsibly managed by university scientists and administrators (Etzkowitz 1983, 233). Powell and Owen-Smith (1998) have shared this view. Focusing on the life sciences, Powell and Owen-Smith (1998) examined the impact of legislation promoting technology transfer on the relationships between businesses and universities. They found that the United
States Patent and Trademark Office issued five times the number of patents to universities in 1992 than it had in 1965. The income that universities derived from licensing such patents reached $255 million by 1994 (Powell and Owen-Smith 1998, 260). Powell and Owen-Smith (1998) concluded that by the late 1990s universities had become repositories for intellectual property and, through exploitation of that proprietary knowledge, drivers for regional economic growth. Examples of university-affiliated technology hubs included the Silicon Valley in California and the Research Triangle in North Carolina. These authors also argued that universities began investing in promising startups in the 1980s as an alternative to licensing technology (Powell and Owen-Smith 1998, 258).

Scholars addressing academic capitalism in the 2000s have focused on the nature of the changes that this organizational way of operating imposes on universities, both within higher education institutions and externally in their relationships with other entities, notably governments and firms. While Etzkowitz (1983) emphasized the roles of various actors and their incentives in establishing academic capitalism—corporate sponsors, university scientists and university administrators—later works (Hackett 1990, Kleinman and Vallas 2001, Owen-Smith and Powell 2004, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, Powell et al. 2005, Etzkowitz 2008, Vallas and Kleinman 2008) have examined the structural effects of this regime.

As researchers documented the growth of the science and technology fields in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of increased resources, they also began to note discrepancies in the way institutional leaders treated those parts of universities that produced commercially-attractive inquiry and those that did not (Etzkowitz 1983, 200, Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 11). Outside of sciences and engineering (for example, in the humanities), Slaughter and Leslie (1997) found that faculty earned far lower wages, that departments employed more part-time instructors and
that part-time faculty members confronted a higher chance of layoff than their scientific counterparts. Resource discrepancies became increasingly apparent as NSF-funded research centers began appearing at more universities. Slaughter and Leslie (1997) have described these state-subsidized centers as incubators for fostering relationships, academic entrepreneurs and large corporations (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 11, Rhoades and Slaughter 1997). These analysts suggested that administrators treated science and engineering faculty members preferentially versus those of other disciplines. This favoritism was manifest in higher pay, as well as other financial support and resources (Kleinman and Vallas 2001, 469).

Academic Capitalism Comes of Age

Higher education shifts of the Bayh-Dole ilk arose in Australia in 1988, when the Labor government in power at the time adopted policies aimed at promoting research and technological development to help the nation secure increased economic competitiveness. In their defining work, *Academic Capitalism*, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) explored changes in the attitudes of faculty and administrators toward entrepreneurialism following these, “Dawkins,” reforms (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 3). John Dawkins, as Australia’s Minister of Employment, Education and Training from 1987 to 1991, instituted a series of neoliberal policy shifts that revolutionized that country’s higher education system. Changes effected under the reforms included cutting government subsidies for universities, reinstituting university fees (which had been discontinued in 1974) and focusing government funding priorities toward research perceived to be in the national interest (Smyth 1994, 40). Slaughter and Leslie (1997) conducted several inquiries into dimensions of these changes:
1. An examination of how faculty entrepreneurs described the rewards and drawbacks of their work (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 113)
2. A comparison of administrators’ and academics’ responses to the problem of resource dependence (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 139)
3. An investigation into changes in the attitudes of professors toward research after the Dawkins reforms (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 178).

These analyses laid the foundation for further research during the following three decades.

In their first study, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) found that most revenues earned by departments in the university tended to be retained by those units. Self-funded organizations generally retained all of the revenue they earned. The successful entrepreneurs interviewed named some of the monetary advantages of their efforts as: “greater number of people employed (by grants), financial relief for affected departments, and increased travel allowances” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 121). Slaughter and Leslie (1997) found that non-monetary gains, however, outweighed the monetary benefits of academic capitalism. Respondents cited improved relations with outside companies, prestige, spillovers to basic research and teaching, future consulting opportunities and employment of graduates (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 124). They noted the primary disadvantages of entrepreneurial activities as: loss of time for basic research, the great amount of time devoted to projects by central, or chief, administrators and the substitution of previously subsidized budgets with money earned through entrepreneurship (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 130). Slaughter and Leslie (1997) did not report the non-monetary disadvantages raised by respondents to any great extent, saying only that their results conformed substantially with an earlier, similar study by Philpott, who had identified performance worries and stress as among the main concerns raised by entrepreneurial faculty (Philpott 1994, 124).

In their second study, also conducted in Australia, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) examined the effects of resource dependency on those individuals involved in technology transfer: the
central (i.e., chief) university administrators, the research center heads (i.e., institute administrators) and the academician (including lecturers and graduate students) levels. These researchers were particularly interested in technology transfer, the “movement of products and processes from the university to the market,” as a reaction to resource dependency (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 139). They conducted forty-seven key informant interviews at three institutions as the foundation of their inquiry.

In their first subject group, university administrators, Slaughter and Leslie found that the idea of moving “their faculty closer to the marketplace” was generally supported on the belief that this was necessary to promote economic development (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 144). While differing in their approaches, these leaders supported faculty involvement in revenue-generating activities. All of the Australian universities studied established resource-generating strategies and structures in response to the Dawkins changes. While central administrators wanted and needed to generate more money for their institutions none of the universities examined explicitly created strategies and structures designed to maximize profit (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 151).

Slaughter and Leslie (1997) contended that subjects in their research center head group had begun to view themselves more as business leaders than academicians. One indication of this shift was changes in their hiring practices. As research centers proliferated and began to mature after the reforms, the heads of those organizations gravitated from hiring faculty and graduate students to hiring professional research staff. Center heads and professors established strategies and structures that raised capital, but also developed opportunities in ways that sought to enhance their prestige and status within their universities and professions (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 164).
Among faculty in their last group, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) began to see a gulf opening between tenured professors, as a group, and non-tenured lecturers and postdoctoral fellows. Characteristic of the tenure-track group was a perception that the employment landscape had changed: they found themselves unqualified for positions opening around them; temporary positions increasingly replaced full-time positions; competition for any position was more fierce and the path to success was less clearly defined (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 170). Females on the tenure track (assistant professors, untenured lecturers and doctoral students) found themselves increasingly marginalized in a field (the sciences) that was already male dominated. Unlike members of the other groups in this study (central administrators, center heads and full professors), most lecturers and post-doctoral students interviewed did not have clear strategies for dealing with the marketization of their professions (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 173).

In their third and final study in *Academic Capitalism*, Slaughter and Leslie examined how attitudes toward basic and applied research changed among faculty members in Australia following implementation of Dawkins policies (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 178). They hypothesized that concepts of altruism and public service would diminish as faculty became more involved with corporate partners and in entrepreneurial activities. They found that as funding for basic research dried up and professors began to seek money for applied research in the marketplace, “they began to define themselves as inventors and entrepreneurs and sought to negotiate contracts for themselves … they knew that if they did not sit at the table with industry and government they would not be players” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 179). Consistent with this supposition, researchers discovered that prestige among faculty became synonymous with their knowledge and ability to transfer technology to the marketplace (Slaughter and Leslie 1997,
In the minds of faculty members reacting to market incentives and the demands of their central administrators and professional officers, the concepts of public service and market orientation became one and the same. For Slaughter and Leslie this signaled a turn in these professors’ epistemology (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 184).

Bayh-Dole critics have argued that the commercialization of research changed the balance between applied and basic research in favor of the former (Thursby and Thursby 2011, 1077, Schacht 2012, 20). Nonetheless, Thursby and Thursby (2002, 2011) have sought to refute the claim that faculty propensity to conduct basic research has been negatively affected by Bayh-Dole. They examined the increase in university licensing activity at U.S. research universities in two studies for sources of that growth (Thursby and Thursby 2011, 2002). The first inquiry encompassed the period between 1994 and 1998 and used Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) annual survey data for 64 institutions, augmented with information from businesses that in-sourced university research and development (Thursby and Thursby 2002, 91). The second analysis covered the years 1983 through 1999 and followed the research of faculty scientists and engineers at eight major universities (Thursby and Thursby 2011, 1079). In both studies, the researchers determined that the proportion of basic investigation being conducted had not significantly changed relative to applied research during the study period (Thursby and Thursby 2002, 101, 2011, 1083). Indeed, their 2011 study suggested that Bayh-Dole might have contributed to an increase in both basic and applied research (Thursby and Thursby 2011, 1083).

Studies on the internal or organizational effects of academic capitalism have also focused on some of the ethical concerns raised by closer university-industry cooperation (Hackett 1990, Campbell and Slaughter 1999, Mendoza 2007, Mendoza and Berger 2008). Exploring the effects of such collaborations, Hackett (1990) interviewed 40 active scientific researchers in different
roles (scientists, department heads, administrators and agency officials) and at all academic ranks at doctoral degree-granting research universities. The primary internal concerns raised by his interviewees follow: the treatment of graduate students as employees rather than apprentices; the linking of raises, promotion, and tenure to success in securing sponsored research; a shift in emphasis from quality of research to quantity of publications and citations for promotion purposes; the foregoing of basic research in favor of less risky, more short-term results-oriented, more commercially viable alternatives (Hackett 1990, 265).

Some researchers have expanded on Hackett’s early work concerning the treatment of graduate students. Hutchinson (2005), for example, examined the role of graduate students in a university-based research institute. She found that the interests of sponsors funding the center drove the organization’s work in lieu of the academic interests of the entity’s student researchers. Nevertheless, all parties benefited: the students from training and job experience, the sponsor from the work being done and the institute from relatively cheap student labor (Hutchinson 2005, 181). In an apparent capitulation to the prevailing imaginary, Hutchinson concluded: “... given the current difficult budgetary times for higher education as a whole, it may be that the more institutions can build partnerships outside their walls, and particularly with local communities, the more likely other support might be forthcoming” (Hutchinson 2005, 197).

Later researchers, such as Mendoza (2007) and Mendoza and Berger (2008), confirmed Hutchinson’s findings. In an embedded case study analyzing the effects of academic capitalism on graduate students, Mendoza (2007) found these individuals generally cognizant of their department’s industry relations, satisfied with their freedom to pursue different avenues of research and largely convinced that direct market-connections helped future job prospects.
Mendoza (2007) did not find evidence of delays in graduation or exploitation of student labor (Mendoza 2007, 91).

Cantwell (2011) explored yet another potentially exploitable academic labor class, the visiting professor. He studied the engagement of international faculty at universities in the U.S. and the U.K. He found that international postdocs made up an increasing proportion of faculty at these universities and, further, that they primarily engaged in research production (Cantwell 2011, 111). Through interviews and document analysis, he discovered that these postdocs worked under a different framework than other researchers at the institutions be studied. Like contracted lecturers, their employment was contingent—in this case on continued grant funding; also, international postdocs tended to be employed in research enterprises rather than academic departments. Other researchers, in contrast, had the opportunity to advance and could be eligible for tenure. Cantwell pointed out that university employers could exploit these labor conditions, because most of these individuals held temporary visas (Cantwell 2011, 111).

Beyond the potential exploitation of graduate students and international postdocs, some researchers have expressed concern about possible corruption of faculty values. In a subsequent case study of faculty in a materials science department, Mendoza and Berger found that professors believed that industrial partnerships did not detract from their pursuit of basic science and improved the quality of education (Mendoza and Berger 2008, 13). Shinn and Lamy (2006) examined the effects of entrepreneurship on faculty expectations such as research and publications and offered more equivocal conclusions. Conducting their research in France, they followed 41 professors who established research spin-off companies between 1990 and 2003 and concluded that faculty tended to maintain their academic responsibilities better when work at their firms was closely tied to (i.e., overlapped with) their university responsibilities (Shinn and
Lamy 2006, 1466). Professors were able to accomplish this synergy most readily when they enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. When they enjoyed less independence in their academic roles, commercial interests took precedence over scholarship (Shinn and Lamy 2006, 1475).

Offering a somewhat different perspective on ethics, Campbell and Slaughter (1999) conducted a study on perceptions of conflict of interest between administrators and faculty. They discovered that with increasing acceptance of university-industry relationships over time, faculty and administrator attitudes toward what might constitute a conflict of interest had softened. Faculty came to appreciate the autonomy (i.e., financial independence), prestige and professional recognition that commercial activities offered. Administrators, too, became more tolerant of industry interaction. Closer business interaction has complicated the relationship between the university and its researchers, however; administrators overseeing research increasingly struggle with faculty concerning control of income and intellectual property (Campbell and Slaughter 1999, 344). Those faculty members interviewed by Campbell and Slaughter who were not involved in university-industry relationships did not support market-driven salaries. Further, while supportive of industry relationships for some purposes, such as service to the community, unengaged professors showed the least receptivity toward university involvement in entrepreneurial activities of any group (including university administrators and faculty involved in university-industry relationships) (Campbell and Slaughter 1999, 344).

A number of studies have concentrated on institutional changes resulting from closer contact between universities and business firms (Hackett 1990, Kleinman and Vallas 2001, Owen-Smith and Powell 2004, Powell et al. 2005, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, Vallas and Kleinman 2008). Hackett (1990) first noted that university-industry relationships seemed to have isomorphic influences on universities. He argued that due to their competitive environment
and closer relationships with firms, universities seemed to be changing structurally to behave in some ways, primarily administratively, more like businesses. Hackett further observed that some university leaders self-consciously copied the market-like management practices of other competing institutions they perceived as successful (Hackett 1990, 247).

Further to this analysis, Kleinman and Vallas (2001) reviewed the literature on university-industry relations to try to identify any adaptive changes that might be taking place on both sides of the relationship. They found that university leaders increasingly viewed their organization’s departments as ‘profit centers,’ departments’ use of contingent labor was on the rise and central offices provided more assistance to faculty for patent applications than in the past (Kleinman and Vallas 2001, 469). They also discovered that firms had adapted as well: changing their organizational cultures to facilitate the hiring of top-flight scientists, beginning to expect their scientists to publish, urging more collaborative practices among scientists and encouraging a learning culture among their researchers. Kleinman and Vallas speculated that these industry adaptations, which they termed ‘collegialization,’ projected legitimacy to university partners and allowed institutions to remain competitive among their business peers (Kleinman and Vallas 2001, 472). However, they found the processes of coadaptation or ‘asymmetrical convergence’ that they observed to be uneven and contradictory in character.

In a similar later study, Vallas and Kleinman (2008) conducted interviews with 95 scientific staff members in two important biotech hubs on the East and West Coasts. Their results confirmed their earlier conclusions, but to an unexpected extent: they observed that universities had adapted corporate practices to a far greater degree than corporations had reciprocated by adopting higher education practices or processes. They attributed this
asymmetry to a pervasive marketized culture in the biotech industry that had become an unchallenged norm in university laboratories (Vallas and Kleinman 2008, 305).

Lam (2007) examined an example of how that culture had developed. She identified co-adaptive, overlapping ‘internal labor markets’ (ILMs) in relationships between corporations and universities when the two partnered to conduct R&D (Lam 2007, 994). These ILMs consisted of exchanges of human resources whereby university faculty and graduate students would move in and out of the corporate environment as they progressed in their careers (Lam 2007, 1011). In these symbiotic relationships, Lam contended, corporate hosts benefitted by being able to “shape the knowledge and competencies they needed” while scientists gained “suitable career framework[s]” for personal and professional advancement (Lam 2007, 996). Lam’s work interestingly presumes value in the university-industry relationship, a marked change in perspective from earlier researchers such as Hackett (1990), Kleinman and Vallas (2001) and Slaughter and Rhoades (2004).

Following an examination of the evolution of a sample of biotech firms from 1988 to 1999, Powell et al. (2005) concluded that research universities had a prominent role in the initial development phases of that industry. Universities and firms operating within networks worked together in a sort of co-evolutionary manner, reinforcing each other through a cycle of innovation and commercialization. This system of loosely linked actors functioned with the consistent and significant input of financial support from government and venture capitalists (Powell et al. 2005, 1190).

Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) similarly connected corporate-university relations to academic capitalism in a study of boards of trustees of major public and private research universities. They chose a sample of 20 leading institutions, ten private and ten public, based on
their level of research expenditures (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 235). Hypothesizing that corporate linkages act to infuse a market-oriented/competitive logic into universities, the researchers examined the phenomenon of rising presidential salaries in the 1980s and 1990s (i.e., during the growing ascendency of the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime). These analysts found that many university governing boards they examined contained members from the same corporations. Further, board members often held CEO positions in their firms. The researchers surmised, based on prior studies of board behavior, that this overlap of trustees facilitated communication across members of these boards (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 248). Researchers linked the rapid increase in salaries and market-driven performance to mimicry of corporate trends and behavior during this same period (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 250). Presidential salaries rose faster and higher at private universities than at publics during the period under study. Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) attributed this difference to several factors: a greater connectedness to Fortune 500 executives on the boards of private universities; a lack of resources at public institutions to compete with rising presidential salaries at private universities, as well as political barriers, to rapidly or significantly increasing salaries at public institutions (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 250).

Slaughter and Rhoades departed from structural analyses to focus on agency in a study on faculty copyrighting trends (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). They examined the profit motives of faculty members and their institutions with respect to copyrighted materials, specifically those used in provision of distance education courses. The researchers drew on a variety of sources, including data developed by prior investigators, state sources and collective bargaining agreements from a national database (the Higher Education Contract Analysis System, or HECAS), as well as primary and secondary materials from a number of associations serving
Faculty (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 158). Their comparison of past HECAS data with more current years demonstrated that faculty increasingly pursued ownership claims in copyright agreements when their institutions rewarded them generously with shared income agreements for doing so (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 159). These analysts also found that the contracts they examined contained wording seeking to protect the quality of works, such as curriculum or distance education courses and they concluded that faculty members still also sought to protect the public good—despite their individual profit motive in generating marketable goods (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 160).

Academic Capitalism in Developing Countries

This section reviews a number of studies of academic capitalism in developing countries, including Kenya, Turkey, Panama and China. I found relatively few such inquiries, indicative of the need for more research on this topic. I reviewed Mamdani’s (2007) case study of the emergence of academic capitalism at Makerere University in Uganda in Chapter Two. All of the studies that I found cited a period of resource deprivation as a turning point linked to the introduction of academic capitalism. All of this research was qualitative in character, generally involving interviewing, focus groups and document analysis methodologies. In nearly all of these studies, investigators sampled one or two universities and examined the experiences of faculty members experiencing the effects of academic capitalism.

Two studies, one by Wangenge-Ouma (2008) and the other by Johnson and Hirt (2011), were situated in public universities in Kenya during a similar timeframe. Wangenge-Ouma associated his observations of academic capitalism with a continuous decline in public funding of higher education in Kenya from 1996 through 2005 (Wangenge-Ouma 2008).39 Johnson and
Hirt similarly pointed to a severe budget tightening in Kenyan universities during roughly the same period. According to both studies, the fount of broad government austerity measures, including those affecting higher education, was the 1993 IMF and World Bank intervention in Kenya (Johnson and Hirt 2011, 488).

Wangenge-Ouma (2008) examined the effects of parallel education on faculty and students at an unnamed Kenyan university. He interviewed 25 faculty members and administrators, and spoke with between 50 and 70 students in focus groups of 7 to 10 participants each. He analyzed university planning documents and reports, audits, and reports to overseers (Wangenge-Ouma 2008, 459). Wangenge-Ouma assessed the quality of education at the target institution using models developed by Cheng and Tam (1997) and Cheng (2003). He found that parallel education was exacerbating, not alleviating, already deteriorating conditions at the university. Among his findings were overwhelming teaching workloads, problems in staffing traditional programs and a decline in teaching quality (Wangenge-Ouma 2008, 462). Lecturers preferred to teach in the parallel courses versus traditional programs because they made more money in the former. Existing lecturers in traditional programs moonlighted in parallel courses to the extent that they suffered burnout or failed to teach their traditional program courses altogether (Wangenge-Ouma 2008, 462).

Along these same lines, Johnson and Hirt (2011) examined manifestations of academic capitalism at two unidentified public universities in Kenya. These researchers were interested in exploring the intersection of academic capitalism and development. Much like Wangenge-Ouma’s (2008) study, they employed several modes of data collection, including semi-structured interviews, document analysis and observation—using the snowball technique to identify interviewees at the two institutions. Employing a semi-structured protocol, they interviewed 15
knowledgeable administrators, and faculty and staff members at the two institutions (Johnson and Hirt 2011, 489). They identified several forms of academic capitalism, including parallel programs, which arose as a direct result of cutbacks in government funding (Johnson and Hirt 2011, 491).

Johnson and Hirt’s (2011) findings, however, contrasted with those of Wangenge-Ouma (2008) as they related to the pay incentives introduced by parallel programs. While Wangenge-Ouma emphasized the negative impacts of differential pay on traditional programs, Johnson and Hirt pointed out its benefits (Wangenge-Ouma 2008, 462). Faculty members and administrators in their study were positive about these changes, offering that “revenue generation was a positive thing for the university as it would improve the university’s facilities, its teaching staff, enable the university to reach more students, and aid in retention of qualified staff” (Johnson and Hirt 2011, 492). Further, Johnson and Hirt discovered that parallel programs, because they tended to be more applied, were more geared toward real market needs. This quality fostered greater interaction with and accountability to the university’s surrounding community (Johnson and Hirt 2011, 494). Johnson and Hirt (2011) suggested that a balance was possible between the public good and academic capitalism knowledge/learning regimes (Johnson and Hirt 2011, 496).

These Wangenge-Ouma (2008) and Johnson and Hirt (2011) studies offer contrasting perspectives on the same phenomenon in public higher education during the same period and in the same country. The former focused on the effects of academic capitalism on the quality of higher education, and the latter the phenomenon as a contributor (and detractor) to development. While Wangenge-Ouma’s respondents identified the additional pay associated with parallel programs as a key contributor to the decline in quality of offerings (e.g., contributing to burnout), Johnson and Hirt’s interviewees, also faculty members and administrators, saw such additional
opportunities for remuneration as a plus. One might speculate that to a faculty member, increased pay through moonlighting improves their livelihoods and, perhaps, the viability of being a university lecturer as a profession. To an administrator, the prospect of being able to offer greater pay may help to attract more qualified individuals to teaching roles.

In an interesting analysis, Kurul Tural questioned how academic capitalism had become the predominant knowledge/learning regime at Ankara University, her place of employment (Tural 2007, 62). The transformation from a public good regime to academic capitalism had occurred at her institution during the 1980s, when Turkey underwent a period of severe austerity (Tural 2007, 66). To understand better the change from different points of view, she conducted eighteen semi-structured interviews of research assistants, assistant professors and professors across several disciplines (medicine, applied sciences and social sciences). The work experience of individuals included in her sample ranged from 3 to 7 years for researchers, 9 to 23 years for assistant professors and 18-43 years for full professors (Tural 2007, 70).

The most interesting of Kurul Tural’s findings was the split among interviewees, across employment classes, with respect to their perspectives concerning desirability of the change. One group saw it positively, as a political awakening to the outside world (Tural 2007, 70). These individuals tended to be from the professions and applied sciences, and they viewed the university as increasingly democratic and concerned about educational and research standards (Tural 2007, 71). The other group, primarily from the social sciences, tended to associate the change with privatization and commercialization. The social scientists expressed concerns about a reduction of academic freedom, a loss of professional autonomy and the development of a culture less tolerant of alternative perspectives (Tural 2007, 72). On other questions, the respondents split in different ways. For example, the majority of those interviewed were
concerned about the university’s increasing utilization of part-time and contracted employees. Full-time employees saw this as a threat to their security and contract workers saw it as a source of personal stress (Tural 2007, 76).

There are several obvious flaws in Kurul Tural’s (2007) study. One concerns the time period in which it was conducted, which she described as one of severe financial hardship. Universities had recently cut their budgets and faculty salaries (Tural 2007, 67). Faculty members were increasingly teaching more hours and/or teaching in distance and continuing education courses to make ends meet (Tural 2007, 67). Some respondents may have conflated the immediate situation with the more distant past. Furthermore, younger interviewees, particularly research assistants but also some assistant professors, would have had no experience with the prior (pre-1980) knowledge/learning regime as a point of comparison (Tural 2007, 70).

Montoto (2013) conducted a study on academic capitalism expressed in three locally-based U.S. higher education enterprises in Panama: a branch campus, a university franchise operation and acquired/merged universities (Montoto 2013, 6). Florida State University (FSU) owned and operated the branch campus on a private, not-for-profit basis (Montoto 2013, 134). The franchise operation, for-profit Quality Leadership University (QLU), offered a shell of facilities and management for U.S. universities that were seeking to offer degree programs in Panama (Montoto 2013, 157). Acquired universities had been purchased by corporations such as Laureate Education, which retained the name and structure of the school but enforced rigorous for-profit operating requirements (Montoto 2013, 205). Montoto sampled faculty members, administrators and students in each environ to allow each to share their perceptions of access, quality and educational outcomes. Her primary means of collecting data was semi-structured interviews, supplemented by focus groups and classroom observation (Montoto 2013, 97).
Montoto’s (2013) results on examining the first two models were most relevant to my study. Montoto found that the FSU model, because of the relative expense of U.S. higher education, tended to appeal primarily to the Panamanian “elite or upper middle class” (Montoto 2013, 135). Some students were eligible for government scholarships and loans to attend, however (Montoto 2013, 135). Montoto assessed the quality and outcomes of the FSU model as superior to other approaches in Panama. FSU’s Panama operation is accredited by the same association as the main campus in Tallahassee. Doctoral-qualified faculty teach classes. Florida State’s reputation in Panama assured its location there competitive standing against Panamanian universities for employment purposes (Montoto 2013, 143). Study at QLU was comparable in price to FSU—far more expensive than public and local private universities (Montoto 2013, 170). The quality of education in programs taught by American university professors was perceived by students as very good, although students reported a lower opinion of QLU management. Students also perceived the outcomes of study at QLU, at least as measured by job placement rates, as quite good (Montoto 2013, 198).

Montoto (2013) argued that the FSU branch serves the public good more effectively than the other two models she examined. Florida State, an American public university, is not profiting from its Panamanian campus. According to Montoto, the university is redirecting proceeds toward sustaining its operation there. The branch, however, has already long outlived its original purpose, which was to serve the children of American Panama Canal workers during the period of U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone (Montoto 2013, 125). Now, this campus essentially operates as a school for the elite, somewhat contrary to the role its parent serves in the U.S. The QLU operation, in contrast, is designed to raise money for participating U.S. universities, which split collected tuition fees 50:50 with the host (Montoto 2013, 160). Montoto
did not poll U.S. universities to learn their reasons for participating in QLU, although one University of Louisville administrator shared that surplus generated from that institution’s participation was used in part to fund other international opportunities (Montoto 2013, 160). Montoto argues that ventures such as the FSU branch campus and QLU offer access to U.S. higher education at lower cost, but she misses the point that these programs do not serve the interests of the Panamanian people, but those of the engaged U.S. public universities (Montoto 2013, 173).

Lai and Lo (2007) examined changes in the work lives of academics in a regional Chinese university during recent reforms. According to these researchers, the Chinese government instituted changes in public higher education that increased undergraduate enrollment at universities by 165 percent between 1999 and 2002. The rapid increase in the student population gave rise to a number of problems, including a lack of resources, a reduction in quality and declines in the employment of university graduates. The scarcity of state funds, according to Lai and Lo, forced academic units to come up with ways to support themselves.

Lai and Lo (2007) used semi-structured interviews to collect data from a total of eight informants from an unnamed regional university in southeast China (Lai and Lo 2007, 151). The respondents were academic staff of undefined rank from two faculties: Computer Science and Technology and Political and Public Administration. Both of these academic units had been involved in income generation activities. The authors selected faculty members on the basis of the subjects individuals taught and the work activities in which they were involved. They asked each about how they were coping with the resource constraints related to higher education reforms, how they were maintaining quality under current conditions and how they were
preserving their academic status given the pressures under which they were working (Lai and Lo 2007, 151).

In order to help raise the funds needed to support their respective units, Lai and Lo found that many academics had adopted income generation activities such as working with companies on applied research projects or teaching in continuing education programs (Lai and Lo 2007, 152). Both of these sorts of efforts limited their opportunities for professional advancement. Offsetting these downsides, according to respondents in this study, was an improved standard of living (Lai and Lo 2007, 152). Those interviewed who engaged in consulting practices enjoyed higher incomes than their peers engaged simply in research (Lai and Lo 2007, 153). Teaching in adult programs also brought faculty members into closer contact with a more diverse array of community members. The revenue generated by faculty members engaged in continuing education was significant, making up an average 50 percent of their teaching salaries (Lai and Lo 2007, 154). Lai and Lo also discovered that faculty members engaged in academic capitalist efforts were able to mitigate damage to their careers by engaging in guanxi, a traditional method of advancement achieved by building political capital among peers (Lai and Lo 2007, 161).

Lai and Lo’s findings (2007) are consistent with Johnson and Hirt’s conclusions (2011). The latter have argued that academic capitalism has some redeeming characteristics for those involved, including higher remuneration and the potential for closer relationships with members of the immediate community. One could argue that academic capitalism promotes better informed practice, keeping society’s intelligentsia closer to the people they serve. This rationalization, however, is the equivalent of attempting to make wine from vinegar. In each study reviewed here, academic capitalism has resulted from a lack of support for higher education by the state. Arguably, U.S. public universities established themselves in Panama to
make money. This raises the key question of the raison d’être of the university. Is the purpose of the university simply to perpetuate itself and not to provide an education of some quality? Do faculty members and administrators, charged with protecting the public good—but embedded within the ‘system’—not see the contradiction in sacrificing quality for personal gain? And does the government bear more responsibility for ensuring the quality of higher education, and its viability, in the interest of the future of the nation?

Discussion

Slaughter and Leslie associated academic capitalism with resource dependency (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 11). Research has since demonstrated that, in keeping with the tenets of this theory, universities that have developed closer relationships with industry have adopted several characteristics of their partners and benefactors (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). Inquiry conducted at universities, for example, has moved away from basic and toward applied inquiry (Hackett 1990, 257, Gumport 2000, 82, Roberts 2007, 353). Departments engaging more frequently with firms have tended to imitate business behaviors and have adopted more business-like processes and cultures (Hackett 1990, 242). Meanwhile, graduate students in these departments are treated less like mentees and more like employees. As a result, students’ perspectives concerning the purpose(s) of graduate study have shifted accordingly (Hackett 1990). Higher administration in the neoliberal, academic capitalism imaginary is increasingly preoccupied with fundraising, and as such, is more ‘corporate’ in its demeanor for that very practical reason. In addition, university leaders’ expected connections and networking with individuals at the upper echelons of business have been used to argue that such justifies compensation similar to that of corporate leaders (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 248).
Overall, the literature on academic capitalism in the U.S. points to two transformative privatization events that resulted in its development and widespread adoption. The HEA introduced needs-based student grants and loans into higher education, creating individual choice through a voucher-like cost-sharing system where substantially less individual discretion had existed before (Slaughter and Leslie 2001, 157, Cervantes et al. 2005, 34). Most students prior to the HEA, if they could afford it, attended schools in their regions (Leslie and Johnson 1974, 13). After grants and, particularly, loans became widely available as a result of that law however, students had much more buying power and mobility, sparking increased competition for their tuitions (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 43, Geiger and Heller 2011, 8). The year that Congress introduced GSLs marked the beginning of a quarter century of sustained growth in college enrollment.

Congress adopted Bayh-Dole at a time when economic competitiveness was of great concern among the nation’s lawmakers (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 48). By incentivizing the commercialization of research this legislation transformed the role of inquiry in major universities. It led to the creation of university-run technology transfer offices, research institutes and centers, as well as research parks and innovation hubs, all justified on the basis of economic development and competitiveness (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 50, Grimaldi et al. 2011). Entirely new professions addressing the commercialization of research arose at universities (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 50, Grimaldi et al. 2011). After Bayh-Dole, the number of patents issued to higher education institutions, analogously to enrollments in the HEA case, grew significantly (Mowery et al. 2001, 104, Mowery and Sampat 2005, 120). Universities faced a difficult, declining budget situation when Congress passed both the HEA and Bayh-Dole laws (Carovano 1966, 125, Adams 1977, 88, Leslie 1995, 7, Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 55).
Both statutes significantly altered the incentive systems for individuals (students and faculty, respectively) and higher education institutions alike (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 43, Geiger and Heller 2011, 8). In both cases, privatization led to academic capitalism. Once in place, academic capitalism thrived—reshaping the landscapes of university admissions and research (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 44, Mowery et al. 2001, 104).

This shift since the 1980s has polarized the academy and engendered competing views of its efficacy and legitimacy (Johnson and Hirt 2011, 484). Some argue that, in these times of persistent state budget reductions, public universities must find alternative means, wherever available, to balance their budgets. Glenna et al., for example, found that, for this reason, university administrators tend to think about university-industry relations in very pragmatic financial terms (Glenna et al. 2007, 141, 156). They described these higher education leaders as key intermediaries between legislators and industry:

Federal legislation and funding agencies provide the vocabulary and incentives for adopting market fundamentalism. And administrators’ interactions with the state governments provide additional incentives. Through this process, university administrators serve as key mediators between state and federal economic policies and instigators of organizational and infrastructural change as their universities move toward academic capitalism (Glenna et al. 2007, 159).

Glenna et al. found that administrators equate commercialization of discoveries with the public good, thereby adopting a kind of ‘corporate speak’ (Glenna et al. 2007, 141, 156).

On the other hand, many in the professoriate believe that public higher education should be entirely funded by the state and find any association with commerce anathema (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 29). These critics of the ‘entrepreneurial university’ harken back to the days when a university education was intended to teach students to think, write and communicate effectively and to develop their worldviews—not simply to prepare for their first role in the
workplace. These analysts also have contended that professors focused more on research of
greater benefit to humankind under the prior learning regime than under the present neoliberal
dominated view (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 29).

Slaughter and Rhoades have argued that by imposing the incentive systems that it did
first through the HEA and later Bayh-Dole, the U.S. government effectively altered the
predominant higher education imaginary from a public good knowledge/learning regime to a
private good in the academic capitalist knowledge/learning orientation (Slaughter and Rhoades
2004). Knowledge, formerly generated for the purpose of societal good, is now generated for the
primary benefit, first and foremost, of individuals or the market. Those who have embraced this
view now equate immediate market utility with social value (Gumport 2000, 67, Slaughter and
Rhoades 2004). This is not to say that professors did not work on commercially relevant projects
before. They did, but many studies have demonstrated that applied, market-viable research has
become far more important and widespread than it once was in the academy. Setting aside
research, per se, as the object of government intervention in the Bayh-Dole case, and recalling
the impact of the HEA, one can see that privatization measures, enabled by legislation, have
proven to be a powerful instrument to advance academic capitalism (Slaughter and Rhoades
2004, Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 177). This has been true elsewhere in the West as well.
As noted above, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) have demonstrated that the Dawkins plan in
Australia had similar enduring effects to those of the HEA and Bayh-Dole in this nation
(Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 51).

The research on academic capitalism has a number of weaknesses, including a focus on
research-oriented entrepreneurialism and, often, a lack of inquiry into the underlying causes of
the phenomena it highlights. Moreover, much of the inquiry into academic capitalism has
focused on research-intensive universities, which are an unrepresentative case. In the U.S., for example, research universities made up only 297 of 4,634 colleges and universities in the nation as of 2009. These institutions tend to be relatively well resourced compared to those without such an orientation. Moreover, geographically, the research has a decidedly Western bias. Much of the early pivotal investigation occurred in Australia (Slaughter and Leslie 1997), with more recent studies situated in the U.S. (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004) and Europe (Kauppinen 2012).

Conclusion

Neoliberalism is often cited as the primary driver behind academic capitalism in the U.S. (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). Considerable evidence backs this claim. Two of the precepts of neoliberalism highlighted by Hay and espoused in the Washington Consensus are defunding of social programs and privatization of government enterprises (Hay 2007, 54). Congress reauthorized the Higher Education Act in 1972 and 1976, periods of economic recession and financial crisis for colleges and universities. These statutes included cost-sharing privatization measures that increased access to student loans (Carovano 1966, 125, Adams 1977, 88, Leslie 1995, 7). Bayh-Dole was similarly born out of an economic recession in the late 1970s and the Reagan budget cuts in the early 1980s (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 55). As noted above, concerns about national competitiveness also played a role in each policy decision. In the first, policymakers wished to help fund higher education, but also desired more competition between and among universities (Leslie 1995, 7). In the case of Bayh-Dole, lawmakers wished to promote economic competitiveness on the national level to boost the economy and enhance national security (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 48).
The subject of this research was academic capitalism in the developing world context. This review of the literature raises questions worthy of further exploration. Where academic capitalism does exist, has it arisen, as in the Western context, as a reaction to conditions of resource deprivation? Has privatization played a part in bringing it about, as it has in the U.S. and other developed countries? Per Kaidesoja and Kauppinen (2014), has legislation increased institutional competition and has organizational design played a role in its rise? Supranational organizations such as the World Bank and IMF have had both a direct and an indirect role in privatizing public higher education in developing countries (Harik and Sullivan 1992, Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1995, Mwiria et al. 2007, Oanda and Chege 2008). Accordingly, the next chapter explores the relationship between neoliberalism, privatization and academic capitalism in several well-documented cases in which international organizations have sought to reshape the character of higher education in developing nations: Ethiopia from 1991 to 2003; Jordan from 1989 to 2007 and Kenya from 1980 to 1999.
CHAPTER FOUR

ACADEMIC CAPITALISM IN DEVELOPING NATION CONTEXTS

As argued in the last chapter, the literature on academic capitalism tends to focus on higher education in Western countries. Much of this scholarship concerns entrepreneurial practices. Little attention has been given to study of this phenomenon in developing nations, in which resource deprivation is a much starker reality for universities. Maldonado-Maldonado has commented that works on academic capitalism in the developing world are both sparse and, as a group, unfocused (Maldonado-Maldonado 2014, 201). She and other authors largely ignore an entire body of literature on privatization that directly or indirectly ties resource scarcity with universities’ efforts to sustain themselves; this relationship may be especially obvious when institutions are confronting exigent circumstances. This chapter focuses on several cases to shed light on how and why academic capitalist strategies and practices might arise in universities coping with sustained financial stress. As such, what follows is not a comprehensive review of academic capitalism across nations, but of certain developing countries during specific periods.

The academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime presupposes that universities practicing this approach have accepted, to greater or lesser extent, neoliberal thought and practices (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 28). While researchers have established an association between the neoliberal state and academic capitalism in the U.S., Canada, the U.K. and Australia (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 20), that relationship has not been firmly established in the so-called ‘peripheral’ economies. Maldonado-Maldonado (2014), for example, has pointed out that those economic development policy drivers that stimulate academic capitalism in higher education in the West do not exist, or are present to a diminished extent in developing countries—where the private sector is far less established and advanced (Maldonado-Maldonado 2014, 197).
It is necessary to clarify two terms, ‘liberalization’ and ‘privatization,’ specifically, as they relate to academic capitalism and the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime. By ‘liberalization,’ I mean the embrace of market-oriented practices at the national level, whether imposed by another entity or voluntarily adopted. I use the term ‘privatization’ to describe the specific strategies a government entity may employ to liberalize a share of its structure and/or operations:

Privatization is a policy process whereby a government reduces its role as an owner and manager of business enterprises in the interest of other actors such as individuals or corporations (Harik 1992, 1).

Privatization trends in higher education have tended to take the following forms across nations: 1) a shift in responsibility for funding from the state to the individual (i.e., decreased state subsidy), exemplified by the introduction of tuition where it was not previously collected or a requirement that institutions increase tuition to replace previous state support; and, 2) a greater emphasis on technology and knowledge transfer in the name of economic development (Marginson and Rhoades 2002, 286).

New incentive structures in higher education that arise from privatization policies often lead to an increase in academic capitalism—that is, “institutional and professorial or marketlike behaviors to secure extra moneys” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 8). Competition among public universities for unsubsidized students could also be termed ‘academic capitalism.’ Public universities seek to enroll such individuals as a way to increase their income (Hemsley-Brown and Oplatka 2006, 331, Doucouliagos and Abbott 2009, 32). Abbott and Doucouliagos (2009), for example, have documented increased efforts to attract international students among public universities in Australia between 1995 and 2002, as a result of decreased government subsidies as well as increased competition from private higher education institutions. International
students in Australia pay the full (i.e., unsubsidized) cost of attendance and thus contribute more per enrollment to university budgets than do residents (Doucouliagos and Abbott 2009, 35).

While national governments are key policy actors in stimulating academic capitalism in developed countries, supra-national actors also may exert influence in developing nation contexts (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004). The World Bank (which I also refer to as the ‘Bank’ below), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, often influence developing nation policies (Head 2005, 4). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is also a significant supra-national actor in higher education, as are large donor organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and some international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (UNESCO Iraq Office 2011, Pierre-Louis 2011). In the African context, as in Latin America and the Caribbean, transnational corporations, or TNCs, can be so large as to influence a nation’s economic policy too (Subotsky 1999, 513, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2014, 27).


Financial resources and, through them, the coercive power to influence policy made the World Bank and the IMF significant supranational actors for the neoliberal cause. Their efforts influenced the trajectory of higher education both directly and indirectly in the countries in which they worked. In Kenya and Turkey, for example, World Bank privatization dictates in the 1980s affected higher education indirectly by prompting those governments to starve the sector of funds (Mwiria et al. 2007, 66, Tural 2007, 64). In several recent examples initiated in 2007, including Argentina, Nepal and Vietnam, the World Bank directly imposed privatization policies on higher education institutions through their national governments—encouraging greater institutional autonomy, more responsiveness to market needs (i.e., knowledge and skills) and more “business-like” performance-based management (World Bank 2013b). Marginson and Rhoades (2002) have termed this a ‘glonacal’ phenomenon, wherein supra-national agents trump both national and local government choice-making (Marginson and Rhoades 2002, 296).

The following brief case studies from Ethiopia, Jordan and Kenya illustrate the emergence of academic capitalism in the higher education systems of those nations. I selected these situations not because the World Bank and the IMF were involved, per se, but because these organizations are engaged only under dire economic circumstances and such interventions tend to be well documented. Each case is related to a structural adjustment intervention and each occurred between 1980 and 2010. World Bank and IMF involvement in economic change—
particularly during this timeframe—was clearly neoliberal in character, thereby highlighting and accentuating the connections between neoliberal ideology, privatization and academic capitalism.


The IMF and the World Bank worked with the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) to restructure its debt and rebuild after a 17-year civil war ended Marxist rule of that nation in 1991. A humanitarian crisis loomed as the country began its financial restructuring:

The TGE was faced with a massive social crisis with hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, refugees, demobilized soldiers, homeless, maimed and unemployed people needing assistance and rehabilitation (World Bank 1998, 1).

As of the end of 1992, Ethiopia was hundreds of millions of dollars in arrears on a debt amounting to billions of U.S. dollars (African Development Fund 1997, 2). An African Development Fund report characterized the challenge confronting the country as arising from “extensive state ownership and control, wide scale regulation of economic activities and restrictive economic policies” (African Development Fund 1997, viii). An Emergency Recovery and Reconstruction Plan (ERRP) sponsored by the World Bank and IMF in 1991 focused on rebuilding the nation’s infrastructure. It laid the groundwork for further financing from those two entities and other creditors (World Bank 1997, 1). The TGE later negotiated support from the World Bank (a Structural Adjustment Credit, or SAC) and IMF (a Structural Adjustment Facility, or SAF), for market reforms in the nation’s financial system and trade policies and practices. Ultimately, the TGE aimed, “to reduce poverty through rapid labor-intensive
growth...achieved through a fundamental transformation from central planning to a market-based economy” (World Bank 1997, 1).

The Ethiopian government undertook significant financial reforms for higher education in its first Education and Training Policy (ETP) in 1994 (Government of Ethiopia 1994). Under these new guidelines higher education ceased to be available to citizens free of charge. The Ethiopian government had offered its citizens free university education since 1950, inclusive of housing, meals and health care. The government had also long provided enrolled students an allowance for incidentals and textbooks (Ayalew 2013, 110). Under the 1994 ETP, however, a portion of tuition costs became the responsibility of students, although that sum could be paid following graduation or through service (Government of Ethiopia 1994, 3.9.1, 3.9.2). The policy further provided for scholarships and other assistance to deserving students and individuals from marginalized populations, including women (Government of Ethiopia 1994, 3.9.3-3.9.5). Finally, the ETP opened education to private investment and created the expectation that universities would now raise income on their own and “use it to strengthen the educational process” (Government of Ethiopia 1994, 3.9.6, 3.9.7). Despite its announcement of such policy intentions in 1994, the government did not introduce deferred cost sharing until 2004, and as of 2013, direct charges had not been implemented (Ayalew 2013, 111).

Reporting on progress toward market reforms under the IMF-SAF and the World Bank-SAC in 1996, the Ethiopian government stated:

The financing of education—especially at higher levels—and health will be improved through the introduction of user fees and/or other forms of cost recovery. The private sector will also be encouraged to participate in the provision of educational services at all levels and in the supply of instructional materials and textbooks (Government of Ethiopia 1996, 11).
Political activity in the mid-1990s concerning higher education reform ended with the Eritrean War for Independence in 1998 and the political will for such efforts did not reappear until the early 2000s (Yizengaw 2007, 173).

As of 2003, Ethiopia’s expenditure on higher education, at 2.8 percent of GDP, was low compared to the average of 3.9 percent expended by other sub-Saharan Africa nations (Yizengaw 2007, 173). At this time, Ethiopia also had one of the lowest higher education participation rates in Africa, at less than one half of one percent of its eligible population (Merisotis 2003, 1). The annual budget allocation to the education sector that year stood at 14 percent of GDP, an improvement relative to 9 percent in 1997. Of this total, the government allocated an average of 15 to 20 percent, or about US$ 60 million for higher education in the 2003-2004 budget year (Yizengaw 2007, 173).

The Ethiopian government sought the World Bank’s assistance in 2003 to expand public higher education. Six public universities existed in the nation at the time, four of them just three years old (Merisotis 2003, 1, World Bank 2003, 2). System-wide tertiary enrollment (including technical and teacher training colleges) during the 2002-03 academic year was 101,729 students, up 157 percent from 39,576 in 1996-97 (World Bank 2004, 3). Public university enrollment as of 2002 was 36,042 residential students, with the largest university, Addis Ababa, enrolling 12,467. The government planned to open two additional universities by 2006, by which time it anticipated an average university population of 10,000 residential degree-seeking students at each institution (World Bank 2003, 10, 85).

Private universities in Ethiopia grew in both number and enrollment during this period, too. According to the World Bank (2003), 37-private higher education institutions existed in the nation in 2003, all founded after 1995 (Merisotis 2003, 69). Yizengaw has reported a total of 20

While public universities did not charge fees to residential students during this period, they did hold non-residential and summer students accountable for tuition, room and board (Yizengaw 2007, 175). As of 2001-2002, fee-paying students made up about half of the student body at public universities, but those payments made up only five percent of university budgets, on average (World Bank 2003, 20).

Higher education expansion took a significant financial toll. As the then Vice-Minister of Education Teshome Yizengaw has related, “... the budget allocation is limited and the financial burden of the expanding system on the government is increasingly becoming unbearable (author’s emphasis)” (Yizengaw, 2003, 13). The government’s higher education reform agenda aimed at “diversifying financial resources and improving efficiency” (Yizengaw 2003, 12).

The national parliament’s Higher Education Proclamation Number 351 of 2003 cleared the way for subsequent World Bank-proposed reforms (Ethiopian Parliament 2003). Among its many provisions, the Proclamation:

1) Granted financial autonomy to Ethiopian universities
2) Defined and enabled university income generating enterprises
3) Imposed a ‘graduation tax’ on university graduates
4) Established the ‘block grant’ as the mechanism for government support
5) Enabled universities to use income generated (from research, consultancies continuing education, etc.) for their own benefit (Ethiopian Parliament 2003).

The World Bank had suggested the block grant subsidies and a graduation tax (i.e. a levy on all graduates of higher education) in its January 2003 higher education sector study, Higher
Education Development for Ethiopia: Pursuing the Vision, which anticipated ratification of the Proclamation in June (World Bank 2003, viii).

As noted, in addition to implementing a graduation tax scheme and block grants, the 2003 reforms enabled universities to retain earnings from income generating activities (Yizengaw 2003, 12). One of the hindrances to such initiatives in the past had been the government’s practice of reducing budget allocations to universities by the amount of self-generated income (World Bank 2003, 22). In a paper describing the changes, Yizengaw argued that universities would be expected to, “generate income covering not less than 20 percent of their total recurrent expenditure in the coming few years” (Yizengaw 2003, 11). He listed such activities as “short courses, contract research, consultancy services, farm activities and production services” as potential sources of revenue (Yizengaw 2003, 11). To incentivize income generation, the government granted universities autonomy in using the funds so generated (Yizengaw 2003, 11).


The Jordanian government began liberalizing in the early 1980s in the wake of declining oil prices brought about by the Iran-Iraq war (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 167). During this period, the Kingdom was not the direct recipient of a large portion of its GNP (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 169). Unlike the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf region, Jordan relied (as indeed, it does now) on external sources of income (i.e., rent) to support its economy. At this time, much of the nation’s income was derived from remittances, transit fees (largely for oil) and military aid (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 168). Approximately 40 percent of the Jordanian workforce worked abroad, mostly in the Gulf nations, at the time of the oil crisis. When the war broke out, many Jordanians working abroad lost their jobs and returned home to a market that could not support
them (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 169). The foreign contribution to the Jordanian budget also declined during the 1980s from a peak of US$ 1.2 billion per annum in 1981 and 1982 to 420 million in 1989 (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 167). As a result of declining revenues, the government was forced to implement austerity measures (e.g., cutting back on services and distributions) and to increase taxes (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 169).

The Jordanian government turned to the IMF and the World Bank for assistance in 1989, negotiating three Structural Adjustment Program loans during the course of the next 10 years. The first, SAP I, introduced controls on government spending, increased revenues from domestic taxation and restructured foreign debt (Knowles 2005, 93). The agreement reduced subsidies on various fuels, alcohol and cigarettes (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 180). Coming on top of a year of rampant inflation and a devaluation of the dinar in 1988, the IMF agreement sparked demonstrations in Ma’an and other parts of Jordan (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 180).

The Bank implemented Jordan’s second and third SAPs in 1992 and 1996, respectively. SAP II focused on balancing the Kingdom’s trade deficit, carrying 1989 reforms forward and achieving a balance of debt payments by 1998 (Knowles 2005, 95). SAP III targeted improving economic performance, reducing inflation, lowering the government’s debt load and building financial reserves. Designed to promote private sector growth, the third SAP imposed comprehensive changes in taxation, trade, regulations, finance and government expenditures. Privatization of public institutions was a key policy strategy for achieving some of these aims (Knowles 2005, 98).

The Jordanian public higher education system is relatively young by Western standards. The government founded the University of Jordan and Yarmouk University, the nation’s oldest and second oldest universities, respectively, in 1962 and 1976. It established three more higher
education institutions during the next three decades, Multa University (1981), Hashemite (1995) and Al Alibyt Universities (1995), as well as two derivative institutions, the Jordan University of Science and Technology (1986) and the Al-Balqa’ Applied University (1997) (Burke and Al-Waked 1997, 2). Higher education comprised 2.5 percent of the national budget as of 1994, up from 2.0 percent in 1990. The government spent an average of 0.8 percent of GDP on higher education between 1990 and 1995, as compared to a mean of 1.2 percent among OECD states (World Bank 1996, 3).


The nation’s continuing weak economy contributed to the growth in higher education enrollment at Jordanian universities during the 1980s and 1990s. One such factor was high unemployment. During this period, young people found it more difficult to obtain a job without a university degree (Reiter 2002, 143). The government stipulated in 1988, for example, that a Bachelor of Arts degree was required to teach at any level (‘teacher’ being a desirable government position) (World Bank 1996, 2). Another factor contributing to increased enrollment was diminished resources (private and public) for studying abroad (Reiter 2002, 141). Prior to the crisis, in the 1970s, most of the country’s college-aged youth attended university in other Arab countries, the U.S. and the U.K. 46

Reiter has attributed much of the growth in private universities during the financial crisis to returning expatriates, many of whom were Palestinians. An estimated 300,000 Jordanians repatriated from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Emirates as a result of sharply declining oil prices.
in the early 1980s (Reiter 2002, 141). Reiter has argued that Jordanian public universities did not accept most returning Palestinians who applied; these students instead went to Palestinian-owned private universities (Reiter 2002, 143).

Table 1: Enrollments in Jordanian universities and community colleges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Public Universities Undergraduate</th>
<th>Public Universities Graduate</th>
<th>Private Universities</th>
<th>Community Colleges</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>28,098</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37,632</td>
<td>69,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>31,517</td>
<td>4,292</td>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>40,774</td>
<td>77,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>35,915</td>
<td>4,949</td>
<td>4,072</td>
<td>38,185</td>
<td>83,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>44,511</td>
<td>4,812</td>
<td>11,319</td>
<td>25,292</td>
<td>85,934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1995, the Jordanian government sought assistance from the World Bank to assess a deteriorating higher education system (World Bank 1996, i). The Bank’s report, a *Jordan Higher Education Development Study*, found several shortcomings: higher education was not meeting the needs of the labor market; quality of instruction was diminishing as enrollment outpaced physical capacity and research was declining as increased emphasis was necessarily placed on instruction (World Bank 1996, i). The World Bank based its 1998 intervention in Jordan, the Higher Education Development Program, on this study’s findings and reform elements recommended in its 1994 policy paper *Higher Education: The Lessons of Experience*. Derived by the Bank from analysis of policy changes in other parts of the world, including Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, ‘Best practices’ cited in *The Lessons of Experience* included:

... university autonomy; accountability; quality assurance and accreditation; transparent financing, usually under a finance council; competition for research
and investment funding, usually under a research council; differentiated missions among colleges (short-cycle labor market) and universities (long cycle and research programs); diversified finance, including some public subsidy; cost recovery via tuition and loans; equity safeguards via student loans and scholarships; and overall system coordination and oversight via some sort of higher education council or ministry (World Bank 2011, 4).

By the time the Jordanian government began implementing SAP III reforms in 1996, the nation’s public higher education system had already begun to privatize. As of 1996, universities derived approximately 20 percent of their budgets, including capital expenditures, from tuition (World Bank 1996, 1). By 2009, they obtained 65.6 percent of their income from student payments (Kanaan, Al-Salamat, and Hanania 2009). Additional international and ‘parallel program’ student fees provided the growth in self-generated revenue that the 2009 figure represented (Kanaan, Al-Salamat, and Hanania 2009).

The parallel track, originating at the Jordanian University of Science and Technology (JUST) in the 1996-1997 academic year, became widespread at Jordanian public universities in 1997-1998 (Istaiteyeh 2011, 132). Admission to Jordanian universities at that time (as now) was based on scores attained on a national test called the tawjihi. The Jordanian government subsidized university studies for students who met the required scores, a practice that continues today. The parallel program permitted students (Jordanians and non-Jordanians) not normally qualified for admission, i.e. with national test scores below, but close to, those generally required for university admission, to pay a higher tuition for the privilege of attending a public higher education institution (Istaiteyeh 2011, 132). Universities admitted students into parallel programs independently from the government unified admission process, which selects students on the basis of national examination results alone (Kanaan, Al-Salamat, and Hanania 2011, 25).
Parallel programs quickly gained popularity following their creation. According to Buckner, the University of Jordan admitted nearly as many students into parallel programs in the 2012-2013 academic year as through the “regular” process (Buckner 2013). In 2015, the Jordanian-based National Campaign for Defending Students’ Rights complained that students in parallel status made up 70 percent of those admitted to the University of Jordan that year (Goussous 2015). Table 2, below, illustrates the range of tuition and fees amounts paid by different classes of students.

A 2007 report on completion of the Word Bank’s 1998 HEDP noted that public support of Jordanian university operations had declined from 50 percent to 20 percent of their total revenues between 2000 and 2005 (World Bank 2007, 19). The Bank attributed this reduction to “parallel fee-paying programs,” as well as a subsidized student loan program. The ‘Student Aid Fund’ referenced in the report was not introduced until 2004, however (El-Araby 2011, 16).

Even as public support for higher education declined, enrollment rose and the system expanded. During this same five-year period, enrollment at public universities increased 95 percent to 152,400, and the number of state universities increased from 7 to 10 (World Bank 2007, 35). Despite Jordan’s reduction in public expenditures for higher education, the Bank criticized these outcomes:

With the compression of expenditures and despite the increase in self-generated resources, universities have accumulated arrears and increased student teacher ratios from [1:]23 in 2000 to [1:]38 in 2005. No-teaching to teaching ratios [i.e. the ratio of administrators and staff to faculty] did not improve, going from 2.7:1 in 2000 to 2.8:1 over the same period. Universities and colleges were not able to establish budget policies and allocate resources to improve content, classroom delivery, and associated learning resource material (World Bank 2007, 20).
During the period from 2001 to 2005, universities began to accumulate deficits—as of 2005 totaling more than US$ 100 million. World Bank staff attributed these shortfalls to a decline in government subsidies from 36 percent to 22 percent of operating costs during those years (World Bank 2007, 37). The 2007 HEDP Bank report concluded that “Universities’ ability to finance quality was adversely affected by increased enrollments and reduced funding from the Government” (World Bank 2007, 37).
Table 2: Per credit hour tuition and other fees at public Jordanian universities for the 2008-2009 academic year (in U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enrollee Nationalities/Program Type</th>
<th>Jordanian/ Regular</th>
<th>Jordanian/ Parallel</th>
<th>Non-Jordanian/ Parallel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undergraduate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit-hour fee</td>
<td>14-85</td>
<td>35-85</td>
<td>56-130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - normal course</td>
<td>146-401</td>
<td>318-401</td>
<td>303-537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - summer course</td>
<td>132-401</td>
<td>190-401</td>
<td>303-537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scientific</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit-hour fee</td>
<td>17-113</td>
<td>42-211</td>
<td>85-296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - normal course</td>
<td>154-401</td>
<td>190-401</td>
<td>303-580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - summer course</td>
<td>139-401</td>
<td>368-401</td>
<td>303=555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Graduate-Master’s Degree</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit-hour fee</td>
<td>113-141</td>
<td>113-141</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - normal course</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - summer course</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scientific</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit-hour fee</td>
<td>113-211</td>
<td>113-211</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - normal course</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1,725-4.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - summer course</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1,725-4.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Graduate-Doctoral Degree</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>113-211</td>
<td>113-211</td>
<td>375-450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit-hour fee</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - normal course</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - summer course</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scientific</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit-hour fee</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - normal course</td>
<td>486-2.458</td>
<td>486-2.458</td>
<td>2,175-4.925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fees - summer course</td>
<td>486-2.458</td>
<td>486-2.458</td>
<td>2,175-4.925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reproduced from Istaiteyeh 2011, p. 135\(^{50}\)

The Kenyan government entered into a five-year SAC agreement with the World Bank and IMF to restructure its debt in 1980. With its economy still struggling after the 1973 oil crisis, a dramatic increase in oil prices accompanied by a poor coffee harvest triggered a national financial crisis in Kenya in 1979. Heavy commercial borrowing to compensate for the 1977 collapse of the East African Community, a trade cooperative between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, added to the country’s debt burden (World Bank 1980, 7). The government negotiated a SAC with the promise of increasing taxes, reviewing exchange rate policy, revising public investments, promoting exports, improving agricultural production and reducing the size of the service sector (World Bank 1980, 51). As of the end of the loan period, however, the Kenyan government had made virtually no progress on the structural reforms that the Bank and the IMF had outlined when they provided funds (Were, Ngugi, and Makau 2006, 38). World Bank leaders attributed the failure of the agreement to overly broad objectives (Were, Ngugi, and Makau 2006, 43).

The Kenyan government’s next SAC agreement with the World Bank and IMF took effect in 1985. Unlike the 1980 agreement, this plan targeted specific sectors—agriculture, industry, finance, export and education—on the argument that the government had demonstrated minimal implementation capability (Were, Ngugi, and Makau 2006, 44). For the education sector, this SAC required “a reduction of government subsidies to university education,” as well as:

... a redirection of public expenditures towards fields offering high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution such as primary health care, primary education and infrastructure (Oanda and Chege 2008, 24).
Oanda and Chege have commented that these changes were so fundamental as to shake the very foundations of the institutions governing these sectors (Oanda and Chege 2008, 25).

The Bank intended that the Kenyan government reduce its public higher education subsidy as part of the 1985 agreement. Instead, the nation’s political leadership expanded public higher education considerably from two to six universities between 1985 and 1990. The government accomplished this growth by transforming diploma-level schools to universities and devoting nearly all development funds for the education sector to higher education (World Bank 1991, 8). Enrollment increased nearly ten-fold during this time of expansion, as detailed below (Oanda and Chege 2008, 25). The government initiated this rapid growth for political purposes, which ultimately reduced the citizenry’s confidence in public higher education and increased demand for private education (Oanda and Chege 2008, 26). To address the crisis that its leaders had initiated, the Kenyan government was then forced to seek an additional emergency loan from the World Bank (Oanda and Chege 2008, 26).

The World Bank and IMF agreed with the Kenyan national government on a fresh adjustment program targeting public universities in 1991 (World Bank 1991, 1). Complementing a 1991 Education Sector Adjustment Credit (EDSAC) issued the same year, the University Investment Project (UIP) focused on:

(a) Rationalizing and strengthening the institutional framework for higher education, in both the public and the private sectors; (b) limiting the growth of government budgetary resources devoted to the public universities by promoting cost sharing and improved investment planning; and (c) improving the quality of the teaching and research delivered at the public universities (World Bank 1991, 1).

Privatization strategies suggested under the plan included reducing university enrollments and increasing cost-sharing, both direct and deferred (World Bank 1991, 1). As proposed, the cost-
sharing scheme first increased that portion of public university tuition paid by students in order to reduce subsidies. Secondly, it sought to improve an existing, but poorly functioning, student loan program to enhance returns through higher charges and enhanced collection efforts (World Bank 1991, 9). By reducing university enrollment, the government anticipated a future need for non-degree training alternatives for secondary graduates (i.e., vocational and technical training) (World Bank 1991, 7). The Ministry of Education budget for universities, considering the growth in the student population, had grown from 11 percent of its annual recurring budget in the 1985/86 school year to over 20 percent by 1990/91 (World Bank 1991, 56). The UIP ultimately aimed to keep Ministry of Education (MOE) support for universities to 20 percent of its annual recurring budget by the project’s end (World Bank 1991, i).

At the time of the World Bank’s intervention in 1991, Kenya had four public universities, The University of Nairobi, Moi University, Kenyatta University and Egerton University, each financially autonomous. Two constituent colleges also existed: Jomo Kenyatta University College of Agriculture and Technology (JKUCAT) and Maseno University College. JKUCAT and Maseno, while financially independent, ‘belonged to’ Kenyatta University and Moi University, respectively. These six public universities had, between them, eight additional branch campuses spread about the country, for a total of 14 higher education sites overall (World Bank 1991, 4). Public higher education was in an expansion mode when the UIP was implemented in 1991, with nearly 48,000 students having been admitted for the academic years 1986-87 to 1990-91 (inclusive) (World Bank 1991, 53).

While only the University of Nairobi existed between 1978-79 and 1985-86, university admissions in Kenya were relatively stable at about 2,500 students per year. As new public universities (Moi, Egerton, Kenyatta, JKUCAT and Maseno) opened between 1985-86 and 1990-
91, admissions increased to more than 7,000 per year. The government allowed an enrollment rise in 1987-88 in an effort to clear a backlog of applicants created by a 1982 coup attempt. Higher admittance rates continued through 1990-91, when the number of new matriculates nearly tripled to more than 21,000 (World Bank 1991, 53) to absorb a surplus of students created by a change in the secondary school system (Oanda and Chege 2008, 26). Between 1991-92 and 1994-95 new admissions declined to 9,000-to-10,000 students per year, by agreement with the World Bank, as a condition under EDSAC (World Bank 1991, 7). This cap stabilized total enrollment at public universities at about 31,500 per academic year from 1990-91 through 1995-96 (Mwiria et al. 2007, 25).

Private higher education has a relatively long history in Kenya. Eleven private universities existed in Kenya as of 1990, the earliest of which was established in 1970. Religious denominations founded all but one; these universities were ‘not for profit’ (Oanda and Chege 2008, 29). During the period from 1991-1999, religious entities created two more ‘not for profit’ schools while a non-religious organization created a ‘for profit’ university (Oanda and Chege 2008, 27). The UIP aimed to improve oversight of these entities (Kenya’s private higher education institutions) by strengthening the Commission for Higher Education (CHE) as an accrediting body (World Bank 1991, 7).

The World Bank described the state of Kenyan public higher education at the start of the UIP as poorly managed, overextended and underfunded. The Ministry of Education (MOE) and the CHE, charged with overseeing the university system, had little authority. CHE, charged with planning and cooperation between universities, was ineffective in executing its charge. Universities had enormous class sizes (up to 200-300 students per class) as a result of five years of admitting extraordinary numbers of individuals. In addition, higher education accounted for
nearly all of the MOE’s recurring expenditures. The infrastructure to teach science courses (i.e., laboratories, materials, equipment) was also seriously deficient at most public universities (World Bank 1991, 8).

Pursuant to the conditions in the EDSAC agreement of 1991, the Kenyan government revamped its existing student loan program and instituted a direct charge (World Bank 1995, ii). The cost sharing scheme that was replaced had been managed by the Ministry of Education in cooperation with the National Bank of Kenya and dated back to 1974 (Wadinga 1997, 47). Few students paid back their loans under this program, in part due to poor administration of the loan recovery unit. Established by and part of the Ministry of Education, the recovery unit was underfunded, lacked accounting expertise and suffered from insufficient oversight (Wadinga 1997, 48). Of 5.8 billion KSh (Kenyan Shillings) paid out during two decades, the government recovered only 3.5 percent (Wadinga 1997, 39). Under the revised 1991 program, students could optionally receive an annual loan of up to 21,500 KSh to be used toward tuition (5,000 KSh), university-provided room and board (8,000 KSh) and books (3,500 KSh).

The direct charge replaced part of the government’s subsidy to universities (particularly, the cost to feed and house students). Each student paid this cost as an offset to tuition. The Ministry of Education set price for the 1991-92 academic year at 6,000 KSh per student (Wadinga 1997, 39). The Ministry set aside part of the proceeds from direct charges in the form of a bursary to help subsidize poorer students. In light of the expense of maintaining scholarships, the government created a Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) to oversee the loan program in 1995. Collections subsequently improved (although 62 percent of former students who should have been repaying loans were not doing so) (World Bank 1999, 8). Private
university students became eligible for loans with the inauguration of HELB, (Oanda and Chege 2008, 36).

Despite these attempted UIP reforms, the privatization of Kenyan higher education between 1991 and 1999 largely failed. Government subsidies during the course of the initiative failed to keep up with the rising costs of education, particularly in the sciences, as well as of services (Mwiria et al. 2007, 67). Inflation in Kenya was an important factor in the demise of privatization efforts, averaging 22 percent annually between 1991 and 1996, and peaking at 46 percent in 1993.52 The World Bank indicated in its final report that the financial solvency of universities turned out to be a major issue during the project. The following chart, reproduced from Mwiria (2007), indicates the extent of the accumulated debt of Kenya’s universities during the 1991-1996 period.

Table 3: Cumulative recurrent deficits for all public universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deficit in KShs.</th>
<th>Deficits in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>22,705,554</td>
<td>315,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>310,858,544</td>
<td>4,317,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>216,326,145</td>
<td>3,004,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>147,715,640</td>
<td>2,051,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>135,313,271</td>
<td>1,877,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>503,280,783</td>
<td>6,990,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,336,199,937</td>
<td>18,556,925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mwiria (2007, 67)53

As of 1990-91 the MOE expended 26 percent of its budget on higher education (Wadinga 1997, 33). This share had declined to 12 percent by the end of the UIP in 1999, even as enrollment in public universities was growing at an unprecedented rate (World Bank 1999, ii, Oanda and Chege 2008, 25).
As a result of severe budget reductions and resulting deficits, universities in Kenya began to implement income-generating activities (IGAs) in the early 1990s to raise funds to pay for needed programs (Mwiria et al. 2007, 68). These new activities included both academic (e.g., consultancy services and study abroad) and non-academic initiatives (facilities rental, farm management, guesthouses, child care, bookshops, restaurants, etc.) (Mwiria et al. 2007, 68). Some universities went so far as to establish enterprise units and holding companies to manage non-academic activities. Kenyan universities adopted such income-generating academic programs as self-sponsored parallel degree programs, bridge programs,54 evening and weekend classes, continuing education and accreditation of affiliated schools (Mwiria et al. 2007, 69). By the end of the UIP, Kenyan universities generated, on average, approximately 20 percent of their annual budgets (World Bank 1999, Appendix C, page 7).

The University of Nairobi, Moi University and Kenyatta University began offering parallel degree (also termed self-sponsored or dual degree) programs, in the 1998-99 academic year (Mwiria et al. 2007, 28). These efforts targeted several groups: 1) students who did not meet minimum scores for national university entry, 2) professionals returning to university for postgraduate study to update their knowledge and 3) students attending extended campuses of established universities (Mwiria et al. 2007, 28). Mwiria (2007) has reported that at the University of Nairobi parallel programs accounted for 224 million KSh ($3.1 million USD) in 1998-99 and 240 million KSh ($3.3 million USD) in the following academic year.

In its final UIP implementation report in 1999, the World Bank conceded failure in achieving the goal of limiting university support to 20 percent of Kenya’s Ministry of Education’s (MOE) budget (World Bank 1999, ii). Bank staff attributed the rise of parallel programs not to the UIP, but to chronic higher education budget shortfalls:
... during a decade in which the real value of both Recurrent grants from the Government and tuition paid by students were eroded by inflation, the policies announced in 1995 have been insufficient to enable the universities generally to balance their budgets, with the more science-oriented institutions experiencing the greatest financial difficulties. Recently the universities have calculated the unit costs of various degree programs, and have begun to place more emphasis on raising their own revenues, including by enrolling "parallel" students who are not sponsored by the Government. Despite the accomplishments in establishing cost-sharing, an adequate system for financing education at the public universities is NOT (emphasis in original) now in place (World Bank 1999, ii).

Comparing the Cases

Governments in Ethiopia, Jordan and Kenya called on supranational lenders, chief among them the World Bank and the IMF to help them bridge periods of economic crisis. These two organizations required these governments to meet structural adjustment conditions to receive funds (Bayliss and Fine 2008, 57). The terms for these loans were decidedly neoliberal in character; lenders were required to adopt such measures as privatizing public services, opening their markets to trade, adopting flexible exchange rates that adjusted currency values to world markets, divesting government-owned enterprises, increasing taxation and dropping regulations “impeding” development of a market economy (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1995, 44, Head 2005, 35). The Bank dispensed loans at intervals during the course of a project (typically on a reimbursement basis), withholding payments if borrowers did not meet loan objectives during any given period (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1995, 45, Head 2005, 35).

Having been introduced by the World Bank in the early 1980s, structural adjustment conditions were a relatively new policy tool at the time of the interventions in Ethiopia, Kenya and Jordan analyzed here (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1995, 39). The neoliberal mindset behind SAPs was foreign to recipient governments, demanding changes which threatened their legitimacy and authority in the eyes of their publics (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 13). Emergent
democracies, which had to balance reforms required by the World Bank and the IMF with efforts to ensure their continuing political popularity, found SAPs particularly challenging (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 13). Jordan, for example, experienced an extensive period of public unrest when its government implemented structural adjustment (Brand 1992, 180).

The World Bank imposed higher education privatization measures in Jordan and Kenya. In Kenya in 1991, the Bank restructuring effort included the creation of a direct charge on university students to offset a portion of tuition; the cost of higher education in the country had previously been completely publicly underwritten (Wadinga 1997, 110, Mwiria et al. 2007, 66). Jordan already had a direct charge system in place (World Bank 1996, 3). Deferred cost sharing was also a part of Bank loan conditions in Jordan and Kenya. The Jordanian government introduced a student loan program and the Kenyan government revamped an existing loan assistance effort (Mwiria et al. 2007, 66, El-Araby 2011, 16). These programs allowed students to pay the costs of their tuition share, housing, board and other related expenses after graduation (Mwiria et al. 2007, 66, El-Araby 2011, 16). Rather than student loans, the government of Ethiopia chose to adopt an Australian-style post-graduation tax recommended by the Bank (Yizengaw 2007, 177).

The Ethiopian case was somewhat unique among these three countries in that the World Bank did not directly impose higher education restructuring there. Rather, the Ethiopian government invited the WB to work on such reforms in an expert capacity. A Bank consultant to the Ethiopian government had previously recommended, (in 1999) a graduate tax, based on an Australian cost-sharing model (Chapman 1999). Another Bank consultant designed a performance-based block grant system for the government in August 2003 (Merisotis 2003). Subsequently, in 2004, the World Bank awarded a US$ 40 million credit to Ethiopia for the
purpose of capacity building in post-secondary education (World Bank 2004). In a recent analysis of the Bank’s power in developing nations, Molla (2013) contended that it, “uses knowledge as an instrument of regulation when it exercises its power of agenda setting through what it misleadingly calls ‘knowledge sharing’ and ‘analytical and advisory activities’” (Molla 2013, 175). The Bank’s “expert authority and extensive experience” allow it to present its policy prescriptions as objective (Molla 2013, 175).

World Bank analysts have judged higher education privatization measures with which their institution was engaged in in Jordan and Kenya to be failures (World Bank 1999, ii, 2007, 35). The Bank’s officials had hoped that direct and deferred tuition schemes would decrease subsidies for higher education. Because of exigent economic circumstances, however, governments in both cases decreased higher education subsidies to the extent that the WB became concerned that the cuts adversely affected educational quality (World Bank 1999, ii, 2007, 35).

In each case examined here, universities adopted income generation measures along with World Bank and IMF interventions, even though such activities were not an explicit requirement of structural adjustment conditions (Mwiria et al. 2007, 8, Yizengaw 2007, 177, Istaiteyeh 2011, 117). Such activities, as “institutional and professorial market or marketlike behaviors to secure external moneys,” fit the definition of academic capitalism (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 8). In each of the cases, income generation appeared in association with severe financial deprivation--exacerbated by extraordinary enrollment increases in Jordan and rampant inflation in Kenya (World Bank 1999, ii, 2007, 35).

In Ethiopia, the Ministry of Education imposed the expectation that universities should conduct income generation activities. In the other cases, higher education institutions appeared
to adopt income generation initiatives themselves (Government of Ethiopia 1994, 3.9.1, 3.9.2, Mwiria et al. 2007, 66, Istaiteyeh 2011, 117). The literature is not clear on how much involvement the ministries overseeing universities in Jordan and Kenya had in those entities’ decisions to adopt academic capitalism. I surmise, however, that the ministries were aware that the institutions intended to adopt parallel programs to raise badly needed funds.

Kaidesoja and Kauppinen have proposed four possible causative social mechanisms to explain the emergence of academic capitalism and the academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime (see the discussion in Chapter 4 concerning this topic) (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, 173). All four factors—coalition building, legislation, competition and organization design—stand out as provoking or incubating academic capitalism in the cases presented. In the Ethiopian scenario, the Ministry of Education facilitated coalition-building to develop the Education and Training Policy (ETP) of 1994 (Ethiopian Ministry of Education 2002, 4). The process of developing the ETP involved “professionals from various universities, colleges, ministries, and public figures as well as regional education officers,” engaged in activities including a study, discussion forums and committees (Ethiopian Ministry of Education 2002, 4). According to the Ministry of Education:

The process of formulation of the policy to some extent was transparent, participatory and democratic. As a result, twenty-two government institutions and sixty-two experts from Addis Ababa University served in various committees and contributed to the drafting of the policy (Ethiopian Ministry of Education 2002, 4).

While the ETP elucidated many new policy stances, some provisions not already provided for in the law could not take effect until Parliament passed the Higher Education Proclamation of 2003.
That legislation enshrined academic capitalism in the nation’s higher education policy (Ethiopian Parliament 2003).

Competition in higher education, according to Kaidesoja and Kauppinen (2014), may take various forms, including direct contention for student enrollments among universities. In legitimizing private universities through accreditation in Kenya, that nation’s government created a competitive field for public higher education institutions (Mwiria et al. 2007, 80). Oanda and Chege have suggested that parallel education has placed public and private universities in direct competition (Oanda and Chege 2008, 29). Mwiria’s examination of parallel enrollments at Kenyan universities bears out their claim, demonstrating that the most popular such offerings by field were education, business management, engineering, medicine, pharmacy, arts, law, marketing and technology—applied fields commonly offered at private universities (Mwiria et al. 2007, 28). Mwiria has also pointed out that degrees at public universities in Kenya must now demonstrate market potential before they can gain state approval (Mwiria et al. 2007, 56).

Several researchers have commented on the role that competition has played in higher education in Jordan in the past and looks set to have in the future as well. Kanaan (2011), for example, has argued that it became necessary for public universities in the Kingdom to offer parallel programs for competitive reasons. Private universities began to offer salaries that attracted top faculty, thereby helping them recruit the best students (Kanaan, Al-Salamat, and Hanania 2011, 42). Istaiteyeh (2011) has expressed concern that Jordan is losing international students to other universities in the Middle East, particularly those from Egypt, Lebanon and the Gulf States. She recommended stepping up parallel programs to obtain the premium tuition these students are willing to pay (Istaiteyeh 2011, 138). El-Sheikh (2012) found that Jordan
retained only about half of its students who wished to pursue higher education. The remainder studied abroad. El-Sheikh concluded that not only were Jordanian institutions in competition for these students with foreign universities, but that their tuition also left the country in the form of hard currency. He pointed to the strategic importance of parallel programs and private universities in efforts to retain this capital (El-Sheikh et al. 2012, 76).

The same market principles that apply to parallel programs also apply to other income generating activities. In order to be a viable income-generating activity, consulting must help address problems critical to the success of business and government. Bridge programs, which transition students from secondary school to university, must successfully provide a foundation for students to obtain university admission and, thereafter, to succeed in their chosen course of study. Short courses must appeal to people who can afford them and be offered at convenient times and places. Competition, however, may have negative consequences for public institutions. Because ‘private’ courses must be offered at the most competitive rates possible, they are frequently staffed with moonlighting faculty and contracted instructors (Owuor 2012, 130).

It is unlikely that Jordanian and Kenyan universities created income-generating activities, such as parallel degree programs, bridge programs, short courses and consultancies, out of whole cloth. While the literature on these cases is not definitive, it appears that faculty at these institutions had experience in peddling their expertise and may have been exposed to continuing education models through study in the West or via information gleaned from conferences or journal articles. Other parallel degree systems pre-date those created in Jordan and Kenya. Johnson and Hirt (2011), for example, identified Makerere University in Uganda, which began offering such programs in 1992, as one well-known model (Wangenge-Ouma 2008, 460,
Johnson and Hirt 2011, 47). The Makerere experience with parallel degrees in law and business was featured at a colloquium, *The University in Africa in the 1990s and Beyond*, in Maseru, Lesotho, in 1995. That week-long event featured financing alternatives for African universities and was co-sponsored by the African Association of Universities (AAU) and the Donors to African Education Working Group on Higher Education (DAE-WGHE) (Morna 1995).

Kaidesoja and Kauppinen (2014) did not find that severe resource deprivation was a causative factor in the emergence of academic capitalism, but these cases suggest that it should be added to their framework as a key factor. In each of the three examples presented here, academic capitalism, reflecting a need for universities to raise money on their own, became necessary as a result of declining government support for higher education (Mwiria et al. 2007, 8, Yizengaw 2007, 177, Istaiteyeh 2011, 117). During the periods examined, Ethiopia, Jordan and Kenya reduced expenditures due to economic crises, recovery from which required an extensive period of austerity. These governments targeted the service sectors, especially education, as they worked to address the budgetary deficits they confronted (Harik and Sullivan 1992, 16).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the factors that appear to accompany the emergence of academic capitalism, but it has not investigated the effects of adoption of those strategies. While academic capitalism was at one time, at least in the cases of Jordan and Kenya, thought to be the solution to the problem of financing higher education, cracks are now beginning to show in what policymakers once viewed as the answer to reduced public funding (Owuor 2012, Buckner 2013,
Critics are increasingly vocal about the negative consequences of income generation activities, and especially of parallel education.

The uneven and often weak instruction available in parallel programs has been raised as an issue in Kenyan public universities, for example. Owuor (2012) conducted a study of those institutions in Kenya, including charting teaching and learning conditions evident in each. He found that universities traditionally conducted parallel programs outside regular class hours in the evenings and on weekends, although sometimes they did combine parallel students with ‘day’ students. Faculty members teaching parallel courses, he discovered, tended to be day or part-time contracted instructors. These teachers were often overworked, leading to a very poor quality of instruction (Owuor 2012, 130).

Another concern that critics have advanced is that a focus on earning revenue has reduced residents’ access to higher education. In Jordan, critics have argued that parallel admissions programs are de facto limited to students who can afford higher fees (Buckner 2013, Goussous 2015). Indeed, there is an apparent unfairness in such a system to students who have not demonstrated the scores needed to enter a selective public university, but can afford to pay to gain entry (Buckner 2013). This fact is important as parallel students graduate with the same credential as regularly admitted students (Istaiteyeh 2011, 133).

On the other hand, El Sheikh has argued that parallel programs help universities close budget deficits created by gaps in state funding (El-Sheikh et al. 2012). He has suggested that students enrolling in Jordanian parallel programs paid about the same amount as they would have had they been admitted to a private university57 (El-Sheikh et al. 2012). Revenues derived from these programs have been significant. Istaiteyeh has determined that international students alone contributed more than US$540 million to university budgets in Jordan between the 1996-1997
and 2002-2003 academic years (inclusive) (Istaityeh 2011, 143). Countering Buckner (2013), El Sheikh and his colleagues have contended that between 2000 and 2012, public universities in Jordan increased tuition three times to generate income—these actions too, he said, limited access to higher education (El-Sheikh et al. 2012).

It is not a foregone conclusion that the World Bank and IMF ultimately should bear responsibility for the rise of academic capitalism in each of the scenarios I examined. However, the literature supports the contention that universities in the nations analyzed had not adopted income generation practices as accepted practice before these supranational actors became involved in their educational systems. Further, it is clear that these activities continued following the international governmental organizations’ interventions. Academic capitalism proved controversial in these nations when it was introduced and remains so from many perspectives. The arguments presented here suggest that the academic capitalism knowledge/learning regime became an accepted reality in Ethiopia, Jordan and Kenya during the timeframes examined. While universities adopted academic capitalism as a matter of expedience in each instance, the evidence is clear in so doing that they also compromised the public good thereby, perhaps to a degree that academic capitalism became a more serious problem than the issues it was adopted to address.
CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter first addresses the interview method I employed. Thereafter, I outline how I undertook documents analysis. Finally, I address a range of additional relevant considerations, including positionality, reflexivity and ethics.

Section 1: Interviews

Interview Method

Johnson and Rowlands have argued that interviews are the preferred method of inquiry when “deep” knowledge is sought concerning a subject (Johnson and Rowlands 2012, 100). The interviewer’s goal is to achieve the same level of understanding of a social setting as those who operate within it. Interviews help investigators uncover ‘knowledge’ and develop ‘understanding’ (Schostak 2006, 5, Johnson and Rowlands 2012, 100). As Kvale has suggested, “interviews are particularly well-suited for studying people’s understanding of the meanings in their lived world, describing their experiences and self-understanding, and clarifying and elaborating their own perspective on their lived world” (Kvale 2008, 46).

Sample Selection

Building on similar approaches previously employed by Hackett (1990) and Vallas and Kleinman (2008), this study examined a selective sample of Kurdish universities positioned to be engaged in academic capitalism activities and officials likely to have knowledge of those efforts, should they be occurring (Hackett 1990, 249, Vallas and Kleinman 2008, 290). I interviewed an array of individuals, including university officials and faculty members, KMHESR officials and
a U.S. foreign mission representative to ensure I attained sufficient background on higher education in the region during the past decade, to gather a broad set of views concerning the privatization of higher education in Kurdistan and to garner an understanding of the role of each institution studied in any privatization activities discovered.

I had planned to compare the experiences of three public Kurdish higher education institutions: Salahaddin University, The University of Sulaimani and the University of Kurdistan-Hawler. I selected these universities for study for several reasons. First, I chose them as a matter of convenience. Salahaddin University and the University of Kurdistan-Hawler are both located in the capital of Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. The University of Sulaimani is located in the city of Sulaimani, a three-hour drive from Erbil. The proximity of the cities facilitated my conduct of in-person interviews during the short three-to-four-week window for interviews I had in the country in February 2015. Second, being among the more established universities in the region, these institutions appeared more likely to exhibit instances of academic capitalism, should such have emerged. Finally, their relative independence from KMHESR oversight was different, which I hypothesized might be a factor in any academic capitalism behaviors I might discover. That is, I was interested in investigating the effects of the relative independence of each selected institution from central oversight as a part of this project.

Salahaddin University and the University of Sulaimani are the oldest universities in the region. Both of these institutions are under KMHESR control and are funded by the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. The University of Kurdistan-Hawler was founded more recently, in 2006. UKH, as it is known, is unique among public universities in the region as it is not controlled by the KMHESR, but is autonomous, and is funded directly by the KRG. Examining different
institutional types was important to help me gauge the independent effects of KMHESR oversight, if any, on academic capitalism activities.

In addition to public universities, I chose representatives from two other institutional types for my sample of interviewees: KMHESR and the American and British foreign ministries. My view was that the effects of KMHESR oversight were likely to be best described by university officials working under the ministry’s supervision and by the responsible administrators themselves. I chose individual officials working in the foreign missions of the U.S. and the U.K. for interviews to gain their perspectives as informed independent observers of public higher education issues in the region. Both nations have been active to some degree in development activities in this sector in Iraqi Kurdistan during the period in which I was interested, 2006 through 2014.

Figure 7: Map of Kurdistan governorates

The map at left shows the three governorates that make up Iraqi Kurdistan. Those universities selected for inclusion in the sample are Salahaddin University in the city of Erbil (Arbil on this map), the University of Sulaimani in Sulaimani (Sulaimaniyya on this map) and the University of Kurdistan-Hawler in Erbil.

Source: Wikimedia Commons

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58 Source: Wikimedia Commons
I reviewed several studies to determine an appropriate number of interviewees for my sample (Dooley 1998, Natali 2007, Johnson 2009, Silverman and Thomas 2012). According to the literature, the number of interviews undertaken for a study depends on the question being addressed. The prevailing norm is to sample to theoretical saturation, however the definition of ‘theoretical saturation’ is vague (Beitin 2012, 244). Kvale has argued that 5 to 25 respondents is sufficient for “common interview studies” (Kvale 2008, 43). I resolved to conduct up to 18 interviews with individuals in three constituent groups: university officials and faculty members; Kurdistan Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research staff members and experts on higher education in the region from the U.S. and U.K. foreign missions. The planned target interviews are summarized in Table 4, below. The actual interviews conducted appear in Table 7 in chapter 6.

Table 4: Planned interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Targeted Interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Public Universities | - Salahaddin University  
- University of Sulaimani  
- University of Kurdistan-Hawler | Current or recently-serving officials in the following capacities:  
- President  
- Chief Financial Officer  
- Chief Academic Officer  
- Director, International Relations |
| Kurdistan Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research | | Current or recently serving officials familiar with public higher education |
| U.S. Department of State or British Foreign Service or British Council | | Current or recently-serving cultural affairs officers familiar with higher education in the IKR |
My research plan called for interviewing persons at the three universities who currently or had recently held the ranks of president, chief financial officer, chief academic officer and director of university relations (or their equivalents). I selected these positions based on the high probability that individuals holding them would possess knowledge of entrepreneurial activities at their institutions (Beitin 2012, 244). To qualify for interview, respondents had to have served during the past eight years, served or have currently been in office for at least one year, and possess sufficient facility with English to comprehend and comprehensibly respond to questions in that language.

In situations where individuals did not meet these criteria or refused interviews, I selected the next most senior officials who did meet them based on referrals from those originally approached. In the process of interviews, I asked participants to refer me to other faculty or staff they knew who were involved in or possessed deeper knowledge of activities of interest to me. This snowballing was somewhat limited due to the time available for study, but it did assist me in ensuring that I was interviewing individuals appropriate to my analytic purposes.

The KMHESR officials I sought to interview were knowledgeable about the organization of universities in the region, higher education trends, higher education financing and curricula offered at each institution. To qualify for interview, these individuals had to have been current or former ministers or high-ranking officials who had served during the past eight years (the Ministry was established in 2006), had served or were currently in office for at least one year and had sufficient English ability to comprehend and comprehensibly respond to questions in that language. I intended to conduct four such interviews.

I planned to interview two current or former foreign mission representatives knowledgeable about Iraqi, and specifically Kurdish, higher education: one U.S. Department of
State official and one British Council or British Foreign Service official. To qualify for interview, they should have served in one of these organizations in the past eight years and served or currently were serving in office for at least one year.

**Instrumentation**

Because interviews draw directly on the lived experience of those responding, I used personal interviews to address the research questions in this study. I employed Kvale’s *Doing Interviews* as a resource concerning how such inquiry should be conducted (Kvale 2008, 1). I used a semi-structured interview protocol so that I could flexibly explore key research questions while gaining as much insight as feasible from each respondent.

I developed three sets of interview questions for data collection, one for each category of interviewees (university, ministry or foreign experts). These appear as Appendix A. Each interview was designed to last between 30 and 60 minutes. The question list for public universities contained nine items, that for KMHESR had nine and that for foreign mission representatives addressed eight concerns. Each instrument began with compound questions intended to relax the interviewees and garner details about their backgrounds: where they were from, where they studied, how they became involved in higher education, how long they had been employed in their current roles and their current position responsibilities. I followed those queries with a question about the challenges confronting higher education in Kurdistan.

I designed the protocol for university officials and faculty members to solicit specific details relevant to academic capitalism. Question 4 concerned financial and enrollment stresses encountered. Questions 5 through 7 probed changes in curriculum, organization and management and interaction with private firms. Such changes could conceivably, depending
upon their nature, be classified respectively as: new circuits of knowledge; interstitial
ingurations or extended management or intermediate organizations or networks. Question 8
tested a possible alternative explanation for any changes that might otherwise be described as
academic capitalism: the activities of NGOs or aid agencies or Western influence. Finally, in
question 9, I asked participants if they had observed certain activities at their universities that the
literature has associated with academic capitalism. These included the development of applied
programs of study, growth in applied research capabilities, bridge programs, continuing or
lifelong education, consultancy services, internationalization initiatives, income generating
activities and performance-related reward systems.

The protocol for KMHESR officials was similar to that for university leaders. Questions
5 through 8, for example, were directed toward financial and enrollment stresses, curriculum
changes, organizational and management shifts and interaction with for-profit firms. Question 9
concerned the influence of NGOs and aid agencies on higher education. Question 4 departed
from the university protocol and addressed the proliferation of private universities in the region
and how that change had affected public higher education. I included that question to solicit
detail on the interaction between public and private higher education institutions.

Unlike the protocols for universities and KMHESR, the questions I devised for U.S. and
U.K. foreign mission staffers were designed to establish the nature of the influence of these
entities on Kurdish public higher education. Question 4 solicited their perceptions of private
higher education. Question 5 asked interviewees to describe some of the changes they had
observed in Kurdish higher education over time. Questions 6 and 7 sought staffers’ views
concerning how the U.S. or U.K. foreign missions have influenced public higher education in the
region and whether they can/should continue to do so in the future. Question 8 queried these
foreign experts about the impacts of NGO and aid agencies on public universities in the region. Overall, the questions sought to determine whether neoliberal influences were present in the Kurdish university context and if so, to identify and describe them.

Data Collection

I employed semi-structured questions to help direct the line of questioning to the study topic. In this interview approach, questions are organized in stems planned in advance. According to Morse, this method is appropriate when the researcher, “knows the limits of the topic and what is and what is not pertinent to the research question … but does not know and cannot anticipate all of the answers” (Morse 2012, 197). This procedure was suited to this study as its objective was well defined: to identify and describe possible indicators of academic capitalism in Kurdish public higher education.

Prior to conducting any interviews, I obtained approval from the Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (IRB) and also from the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in the Kurdistan region to do so. A copy of relevant IRB materials appears as Appendix B.

It is customary in the Kurdistan region to obtain permission from the KMHESR prior to conducting any studies at the area’s public higher education institutions. I contacted the KMHESR Director of Relations, responsible for issuing such permissions, to invite his cooperation and to request assistance in identifying and contacting senior officials at the universities I had selected for study. I also asked the Director of Relations to introduce me to officials with whom I wished to speak. A copy of my letter to the Director appears as Appendix C.
I first contacted possible study participants with an e-mail introducing the study, explaining the IRB process and requesting their consent to participate. I informed prospective interviewees that sessions would be recorded in that initial message and also explained that English proficiency would be required for them to participate. Finally, I also requested contact details and asked potential interviewees to verify that they met study criteria in that same note. Individuals agreed to participate in the study by returning the e-mail with an affirmative response. A sample of the message I employed appears as Appendix D. I gave each prospective interviewee one week to respond. If I had not received a response within seven days I sent a reminder. If I received no response to that second note within an additional week, I presumed the prospect was not interested in participating in the study. Four prospects that I initially contacted did not respond to my invitation.

I verified that potential interviewees indeed met the criteria for participation when I first heard back from each and I also requested an interview date and time. I scheduled interviews with due consideration to working hours and the comfort of my study participants. I sent prospects who self-identified as not meeting interview criteria a follow-up e-mail requesting referral to a comparable senior official with similar responsibilities who did meet the study’s requirements. I persisted with referral contacts until I had filled all interview slots for each target institution.

I sought to ensure that I received a signed consent form for each study participant prior to conducting each interview (see Appendix E). If not, and in person, I asked the interviewee to review and complete the form before beginning any questioning. If the meeting was to occur by telephone I re-sent the form and asked interviewees to return it affirming their consent before I conducted the interview.
The interview phase of this research began in February of 2015. Each conversation lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. Most interviews occurred in person in the offices of interviewees during normal business hours. Where that was not possible, I conducted interviews by telephone. A table of who was interviewed and by what means (in person, by telephone, by Skype) appears in Table 7 in chapter 6.

I began each interview by ensuring that individuals were clear about the study’s purposes and that I had addressed any questions they might have concerning it or their role within it. I recorded all interviews with the permission of my interviewees, explaining beforehand that they could choose not to answer any questions with which they were uncomfortable, could request that answers to any question not be recorded and could terminate the interview at any time for any reason. Two respondents requested that I not record their interview, but take notes instead. While interviewing, I took note of relevant comments (e.g., potentially related to neoliberal influences or instances of academic capitalism). As soon as I could after interviews I recorded observations on the interview dynamics and their settings in a field journal.

I transcribed most interviews personally. While I had intended to complete transcriptions within three weeks of each interview, this step took four to six weeks in reality. I arranged to have four of the interviews I conducted in the last months of my project professionally transcribed. To ensure that transcriptions were accurate, I sent them to interviewees for review, requesting that they correct any factual inaccuracies. If interviewees did not respond to this request, I assumed that the transcripts were correct. Only three interviewees offered editorial changes.
Data Analysis

I used QSR NVivo to organize, code and analyze the data collected for the study. After I transcribed the interviews and interviewees had reviewed them, I uploaded the transcripts into the software. I similarly scanned and entered documents and field memos. Prior to coding, as recommended by Saldaña (2013, 101), I reviewed the data corpus in detail to discern readily apparent themes related to my research questions.

I conducted two passes of the data for coding purposes. I employed ‘initial coding’ (Saldaña 2013, 100) or ‘open coding’ (Charmaz and Liska Belgrave 2012, 357) in the first iteration. I first coded each transcript to the appropriate interviewee, assigning a pseudonym and recording characteristics including institution, job classification (e.g. university official, ministry official, faculty, etc.), education level, where educated, gender, interview type (in-person, telephone, Skype), gender, date of interview and so on. Where I found a passage of interest in a transcript, I coded it to both the kind of activity (consulting, evening classes, parallel programs, etc.) and one or more broad framework categories, including new knowledge circuits, interstitial organizations, intermediating networks or extended management.

Example 1: Initial Coding

*For example, if I have 98 percent in my high school leaving exam score and the score required for medicine is 99 percent, I would not be accepted. So parallel education would allow me to come to medicine with a 98 percent [high school leaving exam score], but I have to pay.*

This statement was in an interview with a KMHESR official to whom I had given the name ‘Arhat.’ This was the first mention of parallel education in the interview transcripts, so I created the code ‘parallel education’ and assigned the statement to it. I further classified the statement in the pre-created category ‘new knowledge circuits.’
Once I had completed the first coding pass through all of the interviews, I stripped encoded data from the transcripts. Working with information in the categories I had created, I began a second iteration of coding. I re-coded and re-fit data assigned in the first stage by dominant themes and emergent structural relationships (Saldaña 2013, 221). Saldaña has labeled this second cycle process ‘axial coding’ (Saldaña 2013, 100). The following example illustrates how this process worked:

Example 2: Axial Coding

1) *But the amount of money [charged for evening classes] was ridiculous. I would say it was $300 USD a year. But these $300 a year [i.e. from each student] were enabling me to run a college.*
2) *...We were able to cover a good amount of money and it was a very sustainable thing.*

Two different individuals at the same institution offered these two statements, which I linked as related phenomena, i.e., money from evening classes. I recoded each under the created theme ‘evening class money’ with the relationship ‘consequences’ (see Table 5, below).

I continued this process of re-categorizing until all potential relationships within the data were exhausted, i.e., until ‘saturation’ was reached. Table 5 describes the attributes by which I re-classified my data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Causal conditions</td>
<td>What influences the central phenomenon, events, incidences, happenings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomenon</td>
<td>The central idea, event, happening, incident about which a set of actions or interactions are directed at managing or handling or to which the set of actions is related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>For addressing the phenomenon: purposeful, goal-related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Location of events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervening conditions</td>
<td>Conditions that shape, facilitate or constrain the strategies that take place within a specific context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action/interaction</td>
<td>Strategies devised to manage, handle, carry out, respond to a phenomenon under a set of perceived conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Outcomes or results of action or interaction that result from the strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reproduced from Gibbs (2007, 87)

Following is an example of axial coding for evening classes relative to one of my research questions:

Example 3: Axial coding example using hypothetical observations

Research Question 1: *If present, how and why have new circuits of knowledge emerged in the public universities examined in the IKR?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: Axial coding examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial Code</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Knowledge Circuits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

When using this method, the researcher documents the emergent coding hierarchy (Gibbs 2007, 75). I recorded field notes to document the reasons for my decisions during the axial coding process.

I followed these same steps with a re-parsing of data into categories for memo writing—wherein data are thematically reassembled, noting apparent relationships and potential reasons for those connections. I mapped those memos, or primitive typologies and models (Gibbs 2007,
73), into a logical framework, from which I formulated the final draft of the study’s results (Charmaz and Liska Belgrave 2012, 360).

**Triangulation and Internal Validation**

Kvale has argued that “the stronger the falsification attempts a knowledge proposition has survived, the stronger and more valid is the knowledge” (Kvale 2008, 123). It therefore behooves the researcher to build in checks on the “credibility, plausibility, and trustworthiness of the findings” (Kvale 2008, 123).

I sought to increase the validity of my study through member checking and the corroboration of different sources. As I have suggested, I transcribed each interview within four to six weeks of its occurrence, after which I sent the transcript to the interviewee to check it for any factual errors. Later, during the course of re-reading and coding transcripts, I double-checked facts and interpretations with several key interviewees by writing to them. This procedure was part of the protocol I shared with study participants.

I further ensured the accuracy of my interpretations of data through a process of triangulation (Yin 2009, chapter 4). I compared KMHESR officials’ statements, for example, to those of university officials and external experts, as well as to information gleaned from document analysis. I similarly compared the statements of university officials and external experts. Because I have personally visited the university campuses I studied and have had the opportunity to meet those directly involved in privatization activities at each, I was comfortable in validating statements by direct observation as well.
Section 2: Documents Review

The Document Analysis Method

Yin (2009) specified a second level of questions to be addressed in his framework for conducting case studies. These queries allow the researcher to understand the workings of the organization under study better and to construct a context for the analysis of information collected. Yin suggested that analysis include a review of organizational records (Yin 2009, chapter 4).

I employed document analysis to chart policy or organizational changes potentially linked to the emergence or existence of academic capitalism. In designing the study, I intended to review government documents created between 2006 and 2014, including:

1) Documents pertaining to the higher education development strategy for the Kurdish region
2) Kurdish parliamentary legislation (i.e. laws and policies) concerning higher education in the region
3) Publications developed by the KMHESR and higher education institutions in the region.

At the university level, I planned to examine organization charts and websites of the three public institutions I had identified.

At the Ministry-level, I secured documents through several sources, including the KRG Parliament library and the KMHESR website, as well as KMHESR and university officials participating in the study. I was successful in obtaining strategic planning documents, higher education laws, Kurdish Education Ministry documents and various reports concerning higher education. Documents pertinent to my study that I arranged to have translated included the University Act, regulations concerning language schools and public university enrollment data.

At the institutional level, I examined the websites I had planned. I had intended to examine
organizational charts at this level as well, but none of my interviewees were able to provide them.

Section 3: Broader Methodological Considerations

Positionality

I, the author of this study, Donald Back, am an international education professional employed by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, also known as Virginia Tech. I have worked in the field of international education for 30 years, approximately 20 years of which as an administrator in private post-secondary education. I have been at Virginia Tech for nine years in a leadership role in international programs, which has included language preparation efforts for students from other nations intending to attend the university.

My travel to Iraq was paid for as part of a Virginia Tech-managed faculty development project with universities in the Kurdish region, funded by the U.S. Embassy of Iraq in Erbil. Administered by the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), this project was two years in duration and began in early 2014. In 2014, in the course of my work at Virginia Tech, I spent four weeks in Kurdistan. During that time, I visited various universities to meet with senior administrators at each, attended a recruitment fair and conducted leadership training for faculty members at several Kurdish higher education institutions. I also led a semester-long online course in higher education leadership for faculty members at several Kurdish universities between March and August of 2014. I returned to the IKR in September 2014 for a workshop to close the first year of the project.

In February of 2015, I conducted interviews in the region in conjunction with leading a four-day workshop for university faculty and offering a two-day workshop to university
administrators on internationalization. I conducted interviews and university visits during a
three-week period around these obligations. I returned in September of 2015 and again in
November of that year to participate in faculty workshops and complete an accreditation project
for IREX. I continued to make university contacts relevant to this research during each of these
visits to Kurdistan.

Throughout the course of my work, I developed contacts in the KMHESR and
universities, mostly public, throughout the region. As much as was possible, I attempted to find
counterparts working in similar areas at my target universities. While I was successful in doing
so for the most part at Salahaddin University and at the University of Sulaimani, I did not have
adequate time to complete interviews at the University of Kurdistan.

As previously mentioned, my travel to Kurdistan was made possible through various
capacity-building projects funded by the U.S. Embassy and administered by the International
Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). IREX is an international nongovernmental organization
that has been active in the IKR for a number of years. Neither the U.S. Embassy nor IREX
directly funded my inquiry, although individuals connected with both organizations were aware
of my project and assisted me in making relevant contacts.

Reflexivity

I chose to approach this investigation from a social constructionist ontological
perspective. There is no “real world” in this view; meaning and knowledge are socially and
discursively constructed—“shaped by conventions of language and other social processes”
(Schwandt 1998, 240). To the social constructivist, ‘truth,’ the aim of a research project, is
therefore relative to the time, space and social context in which it exists. The researcher, to a
social constructionist, is an acknowledged imperfect observer and interpreter. More radical proponents of this philosophy might argue that knowledge claims are incomprehensible outside the social context in which they are made (Schwandt 1998, 241).

The epistemological implication of a social constructionist approach is a qualitative methodology, i.e., a means of penetrating the social milieu in which the phenomena of interest are located. In this case, I chose interviews and document analysis as my central methods. I reasoned that interviewing those with knowledge of activities that could be termed academic capitalism would lead to a better understanding of the trend as manifest in IKR public universities. According to Kvale, “the semi-structured interview attempts to understand themes of the lived daily world from the subject’s own perspective” (Kvale 2008, 10). I was determined to conduct as many interviews as possible in situ, i.e. in person at universities, so as to have a better grasp of the social circumstances in which academic capitalism was manifest. Further, I spent as much time as I could in the IKR and/or working with Kurds employed in the region’s universities. I chose document review as a complimentary method to interviews to help contextualize academic capitalism as it emerged or otherwise took place both in time and in relationship to other events (Rapley 2007, 119).

As interview data are interactively constituted between the interviewer and the respondent, it is necessary to consider how the questioning technique may affect research outcomes (Wooffitt 2005, 209). Several authors have identified the perceived power relationship between the researcher and the interviewee as one such concern (Wood-Sherif 1987, 47, Wooffitt 2005, 210). Differences in class, gender and ethnicity between interviewer and interviewee may introduce such power biases (Wood-Sherif 1987, 48). Wood-Sherif (1987) has outlined other potential issues that may come into play in interviews, including: predispositions
introduced by the researcher in expectation of a pre-conceived result (researcher bias) and potential point-of-reference misinterpretations arising from cultural differences between the interviewer and interviewee (Wood-Sherif 1987, 49).

Wood-Sherif (1987) has addressed how class and ethnic differences between researcher and subject may present themselves in international studies. One could readily see the potential for misunderstandings introduced by language and cultural differences in this inquiry, for example, due to the fact that some interviewees may be less proficient in English than others. Nonetheless, in practice, conducting interviews in English proved not to pose too much of an issue—only one prospect, for example, declined to be interviewed on grounds of insufficient language proficiency. I did not have significant issues understanding study participants or making myself understood. I did adapt to certain cultural protocols for meetings, including obtaining prior permission from higher officials to proceed with some interviews and respecting late afternoons and weekends as family time.

According to Gibbs, researchers, “should be explicit about their preconceptions, power relations in the field, the nature of the researcher/respondent interaction, how their interpretations and understandings may have changed, and more generally about their underlying epistemology” (Gibbs 2007, 92, citing Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). Gibbs has suggested that researchers follow good reflexive practices by critically assessing their roles in any inquiry they undertake (Gibbs 2007, 93). Relevant information for such an effort includes the investigator’s background and experience in the research setting, the period during which data were collected, how, where and from whom it was obtained and strengths and weaknesses discovered concerning the analytic and collection methods employed. Gibbs has further recommended clarifying the generalizability of the research, lines of inquiry not pursued, theoretical assumptions underlying
the work, how data were classified for analysis and alternative ways to categorize and interpret the information gathered (Gibbs 2007, 93). He has suggested that discussion of analytical rigor should include problems encountered in conducting the research, contradictory accounts from interviewees and instances that proved both supportive and unsupportive of theoretical conclusions (Gibbs 2007, 93).

I had anticipated that power relationships could play a part in participant responses. However, this did not prove to be a significant hindrance, at least as evidenced by the candor of most interviewees. This factor was likely balanced by the fact that many senior administrators in both the KMHESR and the region’s public universities often travel outside Kurdistan and many received at least some of their education in the West. Further, the Kurds are quite familiar with Westerners, as many work in universities and industries in the region.

Gender differences did not seem to impede effective communication in cases where I interviewed Kurdish females, again as judged by the candor of those interviewees. Females were underrepresented in the sample, however, because males tend to dominate administrative positions in the region.

I took precautions to ensure the confidentiality of interviewee responses. While meeting with Americans may be stigmatic and potentially dangerous in other parts of Iraq, this was not my experience in the IKR. The information I sought was not of a controversial nature, although some interviewee remarks could be construed as critical of the government or of university leaders. To protect the confidentiality of respondents, I assigned pseudonyms to their identities in interview transcripts and was also mindful of references to places in my analysis so as not inadvertently to reveal any interviewee’s identity (Creswell 2009, 91).
Ethics

This study adhered to the principalist approach described by Wiles (2013), modified slightly to incorporate several additions advocated by Schostak (2006). In this view, participants have the right to consent to being interviewed, the right to anonymity (where feasible) and the right to confidentiality. Because of the small sample sizes and some anticipated referrals, some respondents knew each other. Therefore, I could not promise anonymity in this study. Interviewees were able to opt out of participation at any time and for any reason, however.

Schostak has suggested that ethical protocols should emphasize the importance of researcher independence in recording and publishing results, as well as representing participants’ views “in ways that do not privilege one or more over others” (Schostak 2006, 54). This study was not funded by any outside party, nor did I have a vested interest in its outcome. Nonetheless, I kept in mind the importance of ensuring a fair hearing of all views expressed by key informants.

I have employed ethical practices in all aspects of this study. I sought to give all intended interviewees the choice to participate or not, as they wished. I also ensured that respondents provided an informed consent authorization (see approved Institutional Review Board consent form in Appendix F) (Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board 2014) before proceeding with their interview.
Section 4: Implementation

Implementation of Interviews

I have taken several precautions in reporting interviewee statements. Most importantly, I have assigned Kurdish pseudonyms randomly to each interviewee drawn from a list of names published by the Foundation-Kurdish Institute of Paris.

To disguise the posts occupied by those interviewed, I refer to broad classes of positions for each individual. For example, I refer to individuals in authoritative positions at universities, such as presidents, vice presidents, deans and department chairs, as administrators or university officials. I refer to faculty members as such. I refer similarly to comments by KMHESR officials. Where interviewees have made public statements, I attribute those comments to those responsible for them. Because I interviewed only one official from the Department of State and was ultimately unable to interview a U.K. British Council representative, I refer to the U.S. diplomat with whom I spoke simply as a foreign service official.

Participant Profiles

I interviewed seven senior officials, academic administrators and faculty members at Salahaddin University and seven at Sulaimani University. I define a senior official as a president, vice president or professional administrator and an academic administrator as a college dean, department head or program chair. I conducted ten of the university interviews in person, two by telephone and two via Skype. All of those with whom I spoke held doctoral degrees; four had earned their doctorates from universities in greater Iraq (i.e., outside of Kurdistan), six from the Kurdish region, one from the U.K. and three from other institutions in Europe. I was unable
to obtain the location where one of the interviewees studied. All of the university interviewees were currently employed at the time of the interviews.

Table 7: Summary table of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Where Educated</th>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Interview Type</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haydar, Salahaddin</td>
<td>University Official</td>
<td>Iraq Proper</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arîman, Sulaimani</td>
<td>Faculty</td>
<td>Kurdish Region</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çekan, Sulaimani</td>
<td>University Official</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behoş, Sulaimani</td>
<td>University Official</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rojen, Sulamania</td>
<td>Academic Admin</td>
<td>Kurdish Region</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parêz, KMHESR</td>
<td>Ministry Official</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Formerly in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baho, KMHESR</td>
<td>Ministry Official</td>
<td>Kurdish Region</td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arhat, KMHESR</td>
<td>Ministry Official</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardelan, Sulahaddinn</td>
<td>Faculty</td>
<td>Iraq Proper</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Formerly in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkar, Salahaddin</td>
<td>Academic Admin</td>
<td>Iraq Proper</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbilind, Salahaddin</td>
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<td>Europe</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceger, Sulaimani</td>
<td>Academic Admin</td>
<td>Kurdish Region</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Zerdeşt, Salahaddinn</td>
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<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazîn, KMHESR</td>
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<td>Kurdish Region</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
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<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rojdar, UKH</td>
<td>University Official</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyako, UKH</td>
<td>University Official</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nari, Sulaimani</td>
<td>Faculty</td>
<td>Kurdistan Region</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bêkes, Salahaddinn</td>
<td>Faculty</td>
<td>Kurdish Region</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bêdad, Salahaddinn</td>
<td>University Official</td>
<td>Kurdistan Region</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erdem, Sulaimani</td>
<td>University Official</td>
<td>Kurdistan Region</td>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Currently in posn</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cindy, Foreign Service</td>
<td>Foreign Service</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Master</td>
<td>In Person</td>
<td>Formerly in posn</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I undertook several interviews at the University of Kurdistan Hawler (UKH).

Unfortunately, I did not have sufficient time in the allotted period for the study to conduct the desired number of interviews there. I therefore elected not to use the interviews I did conduct. I do not believe that not completing all of the interviews I had intended affected my findings. I hope that the discussion below will make that apparent.

All but one of my interviewees at the KMHESR and my target universities were male.

The male bias was unavoidable, as an overwhelming majority of individuals in positions of authority in IKR universities are men. Without exception, those to whom I was referred at each university were male. The same was true at the KMHESR.
I interviewed four officials from the Ministry. I conducted three of these interviews in person and one occurred by telephone. Three of those I interviewed were currently serving; one was not, but had served within the time frame I had established in my methodology. Three of the four officials held doctorates while one possessed a master’s degree. Two of those interviewed earned their highest degrees in the IKR and two received their highest academic education in the U.K. All were male.

I interviewed one individual who was a “current or former cultural affairs officer” with the U.S. government. In the interest of preserving confidentiality I refrain here from providing further identifying characteristics.
CHAPTER SIX

FINDINGS

Introduction to Findings

This chapter discusses this study’s findings. I begin by reviewing the profiles of those interviewed and providing some additional detail on the universities visited. Next, I discuss how I identified a program or activity as an instance of academic capitalism and present those undertakings by institution.

I draw on the data obtained in interviews to address each of the three university cases in the context of my four research questions. I did not seek to establish the breadth of all activities that could be considered academic capitalism at each institution (for example, by examining consulting practices in all departments). Rather, I sought to identify consequential examples of academic capitalism and to explore how and why they originated.

To address the ‘how’ and ‘why’ behind any highlighted instances, I refer to the accounts provided by interviewees as well as KMHESR documents, including public statements of officials, news stories, plans, instructions (i.e., regulations) and similar authoritative records.

Classification System

I relied on the many types of academic capitalism described in my literature review to help me recognize instances of this phenomenon as I encountered them. Over the course of my fieldwork, I noted that while activities very similar to those observed by other authors were taking place in the IKR, they evidenced different characteristics in this milieu. I address those situations in my conclusions.
Many observers in more developed, Western contexts have documented major shifts in the type of research being conducted at universities or the way inquiry is being conducted and reported as evidence of academic capitalism. Public university faculty members in the IKR focus primarily on teaching (Etzkowitz 1983, 198, Hackett 1990, 269, Powell and Owen-Smith 1998, 260, Roberts 2007, 359). Through my initial inquiries and observations, it became apparent that the volume of inquiry conducted at public universities in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Iraq as a whole, is well behind that occurring in other countries. Citing ‘official statistics,’ Minister Yousif Samad Lutfulla (referenced hereinafter as Minister Yousif Goran, his ‘public’ nom de guerre), the current Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, recently noted that during the decade beginning in 2003, research production in neighboring countries was 20 to 75 times that of Iraq as a whole (KMHESR 2015e). This reality prompted me to focus on exploring possible instances of academic capitalism related to academic programs.

Markers of Academic Capitalism

In order to qualify here as academic capitalism, an observed phenomenon first had to satisfy the essential requirement that it raised revenue for the university. Recalling Slaughter and Leslie, academic capitalism is defined as, “… institutional and professorial or market-like behaviors to secure extra moneys” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 8). I classified activities meeting this standard into one or more categories according to the typology formulated by Slaughter and Rhoades typology (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 26). Following were my criteria for making such determinations:
R1: If present, how and why have new circuits of knowledge emerged in the public universities examined in the IKR?

Academic managers and faculty members create new circuits of knowledge to connect to wider, non-traditional realms through technology, partnerships, popular media and other new channels (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 23). To satisfy this requirement, I looked for:

1) Programs outside the university’s traditional undergraduate and graduate curricula.
2) Activities that connected knowledge housed within the university with the broader marketplace.

R2: If present, how and why have interstitial organizations emerged within Kurdish public universities?

Universities create interstitial organizations, or internal units, to generate and manage revenues and/or reach out to external constituencies, such as industry and government (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 23). To determine whether such changes had occurred, I asked interviewees questions about changes they had made in their organizational structures to accommodate programs and activities that generated income.

R3: If present, how and why have intermediating organizations and/or networks emerged in universities in the IKR?

Universities engage intermediating organizations and networks to connect with government and industry through an array of stakeholders—agents or organizations that have an interest in these relationships (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 24). To ascertain the presence of such go-betweens or middle-men, I questioned interviewees about their
interactions with government and businesses. To qualify as academic capitalism, an intermediating relationship had to link the university with a source of revenue.

**R4:** *If present, how and why have new circuits of knowledge, interstitial organizations and intermediating organizations and/or networks resulted in extended managerial capacity within Kurdish region universities?*

Universities create extended management capacity (new positions and ways of managing) to optimize academic capitalism activities (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 25). Where such undertakings appeared to be present, I questioned interviewees about changes in management that had occurred to accommodate them.

During the course of my study I identified four phenomena in the universities I investigated that fit the definition of academic capitalism: parallel degree programs, evening programs, university-run language centers and consultancies. The following table indicates where I observed these examples and how I categorized them:

Table 8: Summary of Observed Academic Capitalism Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New knowledge circuits</strong></td>
<td>Salahaddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultancy activity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interstitial organizations</strong></td>
<td>Language center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultancy activity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediating networks</strong></td>
<td>Not observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extended management capacity</strong></td>
<td>Language center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Terminology

Parallel Degree Programs

Parallel degree programs are a privatized alternative to free programs of study (Istaiteyeh 2011, 132). In Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, government fully subsidizes study in public universities (i.e., it is ‘free’) for students meeting admission requirements. Parallel programs were in operation at both Salahaddin University and the University of Sulaimani during the course of my study.

Parallel degree programs may be open to undergraduates or graduates and may assume several different forms. In one model, students who are not eligible for regular admission (e.g., due to lower than qualifying entrance examination scores or due to their older than usual age), but who possess the financial means pay for the privilege of attendance. These ‘parallel’ students may attend classes in the evenings or on weekends, or they may participate in the same sessions as regularly admitted students. They generally attain the same degree as students who met regular admission standards (Istaiteyeh 2011, 132). In another version of parallel programs, the university offers special ‘private’ courses of study outside its normal undergraduate or graduate programs. Such degree tracks (typically market-driven alternatives) are only available to students with the ability to pay for them (Mwiria et al. 2007, 28).

Evening Programs

Evening programs are geared primarily toward the employed, permitting them to complete degrees after typical work hours or on weekends. Universities charge students for participating in these curricula. I observed evening programs at both Salahaddin University and the University of Sulaimani.

Language Centers
Language centers are relatively independent auxiliary units geared toward helping students achieve a desired level of English language proficiency. The KMHESR encouraged universities to establish self-funded English language centers in 2011 to assist the large numbers of students it intended to fund for graduate study overseas. While I visited language centers at the University of Sulaimani and Salahaddin University, I was only able to conduct a related interview at Sulaimani. The KMHESR regulates language center revenues.

Consultancy Activities and Units

Consulting services permit professors, departments, schools or colleges and universities to earn money by making their knowledge and resources available to private firms. Consulting activities were ongoing during my visits at both of the universities targeted in this study. Until recently, these services brought in considerable revenues for a period of time both Salahaddin University and the University of Sulaimani. The KMHESR regulates consultancy revenues.

Observed Instances of Academic Capitalism

This examination of academic capitalism in the IKR was conducted at two levels of analysis, the KMHESR and the university. I used two methods to uncover instances at these levels, interviewing and document analysis. Parallel programs were potentially most significant of the four instances observed. This activity surfaced at both levels of analysis and using both methodologies. Therefore, I will address parallel programs and a related activity, evening programs, in considerable detail. The latter two instances, language centers and consultancies, are interesting in their own rights and are well established in those universities I examined, though not as well documented. Nevertheless, they, too, contribute to a more nuanced understanding of academic capitalism upon closer scrutiny. In the Analysis section that follows I
will address each instance of academic capitalism observed in the context of the research questions.

Parallel Programs

Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research in the sixth KRG cabinet from 2009 through 2012, first piloted parallel degree programs in public universities in 2010 (KMHESR 2011b, 56). While in office, Minister Ala’Aldeen also promoted private education. In a 2010 speech given at a trade and investment conference, for example, he addressed higher education reform in the Kurdistan region and, within that context, opportunities for foreign investment and commented: “they do say that in the U.K., the second biggest income generator is higher education, so if you think that higher education is just to educate professionals for business, actually it is a business in its own right” (Kurdistan Regional Government 2010).

Ala’Aldeen described his plans for a full-blown ‘parallel education system’ in a 2011 progress report on his administration’s initiatives.60 Following the pilot, which he deemed successful, Ala’Aldeen intended to roll out the model developed during the trial to all public universities at bachelor’s and master’s levels during the 2011-12 academic year (KMHESR 2011b, 57). Ala’Aldeen envisioned that a ‘parallel education system’ would accommodate students who did not qualify for public university admission, but preferred study at those institutions to private education. He argued that the parallel system would help fund quality enhancements at public universities in the short term and, in the longer pull, would become an economic driver (KMHESR 2011b, 57) and that:
This system was designed to allow privately funded students to select their chosen course. This will provide universities and educational institutes with an additional income stream to invest in quality. The programme was successfully applied last year to admissions for departments of media in several universities. This year [i.e., 2011] the programme was rolled out to all departments and universities in the Region. The parallel admissions system is believed to act as a source for attracting higher education investment in the Region and to incorporate universities as part of the Region’s economic system (KMHESR 2011b, 15).

Ala’Aldeen attributed the need for the parallel system to a rapidly growing population of high school graduates and an underfunded higher education sector—a product of very poor economic conditions during the past two decades:

As is well known, the limited financial resources of the universities and technical institutes has impacted the numbers of students these establishments were able to receive. It has also affected the ability of academics and scientists to preserve academic standards and quality scaling of grades. Along with their academic, quality and technology needs, even the basic needs of universities and technical institutes are not being properly met. Despite the best efforts of all the Government Cabinets of the Kurdistan Region in allocating a sufficient budget for higher education, the government is simply unable to cover all the needs of the sector (KMHESR 2011b, 56).

Permitting universities to enroll up to 10 percent of their student capacity as privately funded students, asserted Ala’Aldeen, would “generate additional income that can be reinvested in capacity building and ensuring quality” (KMHESR 2011b, 57).

Under Minister Ala’Aldeen’s plan, students not qualifying for regular university admission competed for seats offered under the parallel degree program. As with regular admission, university qualifying test scores governed entry into parallel programs. The Ministry required students enrolling in the most competitive programs to achieve a mark within a relatively narrow range of the minimum score normally expected, while students enrolling in less competitive programs were held to a lesser standard:

For example, for the department of medicine, the graduation grade may be 15 marks lower than the normal admission grade. All the protocols applied to the
normal admissions process will also be applied to the parallel one. For other specialties the graduation grade might be 20 points lower than the grade needed by students accepted in the normal admissions process (KMHESR 2011b, 57).

To qualify for parallel program admission, a student had to have completed his/her high school diploma not more than three years prior to entering university and had to be younger than 30, if male, and 35, if female (KMHESR 2011b, 57).

As incentive for parallel students to perform to expectations, Minister Ala’Aldeen’s plan provided for a reduction of fees: “discounts,” for so-called “bright students” (Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research 2010c, 58):

Each year the student with the highest results in the parallel system will be rewarded by receiving a 75 percent discount on his or her tuition fees for the coming year (i.e. they will only pay 25 percent). The student with the second highest results will receive a 50 percent discount, and the student with the third highest will receive a 25 percent discount on tuition fees (KMHESR 2011b, 58).

At no point did the plan bring a student admitted into the parallel program back into the fold of regularly admitted students, who attended university without charge. In other words, a parallel student could never qualify for study free of charge, even with superior academic performance.

The financial structure of the parallel education system, as Ala’Aldeen conceived it, provided for a split in the proceeds that it garnered while allowing universities to set their own fees, within limits. The plan allocated revenue generated from tuition three ways:

- University departments would receive seventy percent for their “needs.”
- Universities administrations would receive twenty percent for supplies and activities related to quality assurance.
- The Ministry of Higher Education would retain ten percent to help further reform efforts, particularly quality assurance (KMHESR 2011b, 59).

Universities would be permitted to set their own fees, not to exceed 20 percent of the operating expenses incurred from implementing parallel programs (e.g., “education expenses, academic’s
[sic] salaries, examination expenses, quality assurance expenses, administrative and logistics
expenses, etc.”) (KMHESR 2011b, 58).

In his 2011 progress report on his administration’s reforms, the Education Minister
defended parallel programs with the argument that no laws forbade student tuition payments and
several precedents supported fees collection. He cited as existing practices charges for evening
programs at public universities, which had been in place since 1992, and the collection of tuition
at private universities (KMHESR 2011b, 59). Ala’Aldeen further warranted that parallel
programs would not interfere with the normal admissions process at universities or decrease
seats allocated for “free education … as it [i.e., parallel education] is outside the admissions plan
for free attendance” (KMHESR 2011b, 59).

The Minister claimed that the parallel scheme would “not [be] implemented at the
expense of the place allocated for state-funded ‘free-education’” (KMHESR 2011b, 57).
However, the Ministry reduced the available publicly funded classrooms by 10 percent under his
plan.

Rules were published for Ala’Aldeen’s parallel system in November of 2010 and the
Ministry implemented it on a limited basis during the 2010-2011 academic year for students at
the master’s and bachelor’s degree levels. The cost of the course was 5 million dinars (about
$4,200 USD) per year for the sciences and 2 million dinars ($1,700 USD) for the humanities.
The program was open to students of all ages (KMHESR 2010b). In March 2011, the KMHESR
issued a policy clarification that required students in parallel master’s programs to pay only 25
percent of required tuition fees, while ministry employees (KMHESR or other) would pay only
basic expenses (i.e., no tuition). The advisory further stated that parallel students should expect
to pay full tuition the following academic year (KMHESR 2011a).
According to Arhat, a senior KMHESR official who I interviewed in February 2015, although implemented to a limited extent, Minister Ala’Aldeen’s parallel system ultimately failed. The Ministry of Finance, badly in need of funds to support other sectors of government, assumed control of the funds generated, removing the incentive for universities to participate (Arhat, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHESR). Another issue with the parallel system, Arhat explained, was that students objected to paying. Some individuals complained that they had the requisite score to join parallel courses, but had no money to participate in them (Arhat, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHESR).

Arhat remarked that “parallel education … would be a source of finance for the university” (Arhat, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHESR). He detailed how the parallel system proposed under Minister Ala’Aldeen was to have worked:

… if you are a high school graduate you will apply for the central admission system. Based on your choices and your [score] from high school you will be admitted to one of the universities’ departments. Sometimes you will not get your first preference, or second preference or third preference—this is based on your [score]. Sometimes for people their [score] is very close to that required for their interest. For example, if I have 98 percent in my high school [score] and the [score] required for medicine is 99 percent, I would not be accepted. So parallel education would allow me to come to medicine with 98 percent but I [would] have to pay (Arhat, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHESR).

The benefits Arhat related were that the student could follow his or her interests (despite not having met minimum requirements) and the government (i.e. the KMHESR) and the university would generate money. University funds could be used for expansion—for increasing capacity for students, which was needed but not otherwise possible (Arhat, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHESR).

Behoş, a University of Sulaimani official, shared with me during his interview that his institution would be opening parallel Master of Science (MSc) degree programs:
One thing about all public universities is that we just spend money—there is no income or there is little. For example, one of the things that we decided to establish and earn some money, it hasn’t been announced yet, but we are opening a parallel Master of Science which is a master’s degree, but students have to pay. It is the first time, because usually when the university does these master’s courses it is usually for free in the public universities. But the university decided to charge the students. It is not as much as the international universities, but there will be some fee. It is to raise some income for the university. It is the modern way in any university when they provide courses the students have to pay for them. Because nowadays there is so much competition to do your postgraduate studies, so students are willing to pay to get into these courses. And we believe that this will also increase the quality of all courses, because once you have income from that course you can provide more resources for all. We do get a little income from, like, training, language courses or things, but generally speaking there is no major income for our University (Behoş, personal interview, February 12, 2015, Sulaimani).

An academic administrator at the University of Sulaimani, Ceger, provided the following rationale for the parallel Master of Science (MSc) degrees offered at that institution:

Most of our people now they’re going to Turkish universities, they are going to the Egyptian universities, why they are going? Because it is too difficult to get a seat from Sulaimani University, from Erbil universities. Why? Because the instructions [i.e. KMHESR regulations] are very hard. The age of the student must not exceed 40. The student must have a [score] more than 65. There is an examination for admission. It is very, very difficult. It is very, very strong. About 10 percent only will pass this examination. So there is no chance for them

So the alternative is directly going to a Turkish university. It is also cheaper from the University of Sulaimani. They pay about $3,000 USD to $5,000 USD for completing an MSc in, for example, geology. In Egypt, I talked with the consul, who is in Erbil, he said to me the number of Kurdish students in Egypt now exceeds the number of students from all Arab countries. You have a lot of students [from the IKR] in Egypt, in Turkey, in Iran (Ceger, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani).

Ceger further stated that students would bear the cost of the degree (Ceger, personal communication, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani). At the University of Sulaimani, the cost of completing a two-year Master of Science degree would be the equivalent of about $10,000 USD.
The faculty of science intended to make 25 seats available for this program (Ceger, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani).

Bêdad, an official at Salahaddin University described the parallel system as it was being implemented in his institution in this way:

The mission of the parallel system is creating money, but since the number of seats is limited and the financial regulations of the Ministry of Finance are not clear and very restrictive, we did not get a good benefit from the system yet. For example, last year, the total amount at the university level was about $50,000 USD. But currently the Ministry of Higher Education is working with the Finance Ministry to set new regulations for the system. I am sure after this, maybe for the next academic year, this money will do something for the university (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin).

This year, Bêdad related, the KRG asked that universities generate the funds needed to operate themselves. The Ministry Council, consisting of the Minister of Higher Education, representatives from each university and several advisors to the Minister, then met to discuss how such could occur. They decided that universities would operate parallel programs and/or evening programs to generate the funds needed (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin).

Bêdad explained that, like Minister Ala’Aldeen’s version of the system, students with lower scores than those generally required for admission into certain undergraduate degree programs could be admitted “in parallel”:

In this [parallel system] 10 percent or 20 percent of students sit in regular classes. These students have scored less, maybe 5 percent less, on their national exam score. They go to the same program as regular students. The curriculum is the same. They sit beside regular students. Everything is the same but they pay. These students pay $2,000 USD to $3,000 USD in tuition fee per year (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin).

Last year, according to Bêdad, Salahaddin University operated parallel programs in three departments: finance, journalism and physical education, with approximately 20 paying students
enrolled in each. Next year, Bêdad expects 86 programs to participate (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin).

In parallel programs, Bêdad explained, students are combined so there is no additional cost: “We moved the responsibility, even financially, to the heads of the departments” (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin).

Departments will be responsible for collecting the money. Ten percent of the funds will go to the Ministry [of Higher Education and Scientific Research], 30 percent to the KRG and the remainder would remain within the university (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin).

While he thought it might help, parallel programs, Bêdad said, would not be adequate to address the salary crisis currently being experienced by public employees:

The parallel system and other decisions by the minister are not for solving the salary problem, since all actions by the minister will not cover 5 percent of the total salaries. We have about 24,000 students whom do not pay anything, we will expect around 1,000 only with parallel system and a small amount tuition fees. These fees help the public universities to handle running everyday issues like stationary, repairing and maintenance of equipment, cleaning, small lab and classroom equipment only (Bêdad, follow-up communication, March 11, 2016, Salahaddin).

As (and if) it becomes widely implemented, parallel education may require new management structures and organizational units. As it is currently planned, at least at Salahaddn University, colleges and departments will absorb the administrative load linked to this program’s implementation (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin).
Evening Programs

According to administrators at both the University of Sulaimani and Salahaddin University, evening programs have been offered on their campuses for many years. In his progress report on reforms, *On Route to Quality*, Minister Ala’Aldeen commented that evening programs began as early as 1992 (KMHESR 2011b, 59). At that time, only three universities existed in Kurdistan: Salahaddin, Sulaimani and Duhok.

Bêkes, an academic administrator at Salahaddin University, recalled evening program classes beginning in about 2000 and closing, on the decision of the university president, in 2012 (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin). According to this interviewee, courses taught in the evening at Salahaddin were basically the same as those held during the day, with fewer breaks between classes. The curricula of the two programs were largely the same (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin).

Evening programs played an important role in the history of the region, Bêkes related, because many individuals had been denied a university education under the Saddam Hussein regime (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin):

Even myself, 10 years … So they [i.e. the Kurdish people] wanted to study in any way, to in any way possible to go back to the university. That’s a number of them, and the other number of them were only, let’s say, they like to study. … English was one of the reasons.

Some other [younger, high school] students were not able to get high marks; here, they must get high marks in 12th grade. So when they were not able to do that, they must study—let’s say at a lower level—for example, at an institute. But they were not content with that so they prefer to pay some money to study, for example, English. You see, that is what you had in 2005 or 2004 (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin).

According to Bêkes, education has great value to a long-oppressed Kurdish people. Bêkes recalled that the evening program gave departments a good deal of financial latitude and:
That is a very good amount of money [i.e., the tuition collected from students]. We were able to buy everything from that and so many times we exempt students from paying at all. They [didn’t] pay because we have a large number, a good amount of money.

In fact, we had some authority. Let’s say whatever we thought we needed, we present[ed] them [i.e., a purchasing committee] with a list, and they [paid]. There was a committee of three members and they bought things. But we didn’t buy them ourselves. But we [informed] them basically what we need[ed]. … It was a very good amount of money and it was sufficient for everything (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin).

Not all evening program administrators at Salahaddin University experienced the same generosity that Bêkes recounted, however. Berkar, an academic administrator in a different college, claimed that the university administration used ‘his’ funds for other purposes:

For our college, and for other colleges, we used to have evening sessions. The evening sessions, we were charging them money. But the amount of money, it was ridiculous. I would say it was $300 USD a year. But that $300 a year was enabling me to run the university, the college. $300 a year, it was nothing. But I was able to. … According to the law, I am the authorized person to sign on such expenditures. But it was the presidency; they were having this authority to themselves. And they did not let me use it, because they used it for constructing other buildings in other places (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

Because these two programs were in place for some time, it seems likely that the university’s leaders could have viewed them differently at different times.

Asked why Salahaddin evening class offerings had ended, interviewees offered a variety of views. Bêkes, for example, suggested several possibilities. One of these was that the decision was political (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin). University leaders are often affiliated with one party or another, he said, leading to purely partisan decisions at times when a university administration is at odds with the political affiliation of KMHESR officials.
(Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin). Bêkes also cited ignorance as a possibility:

… we were able to cover a good amount of money and it was a very sustainable thing. … How do you say that the decisions of the government, of the university, sometimes they don’t know why do they do that, and why they decide to close something (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin).

Ultimately, Bêkes said, the university president justified the cancellation of evening classes on the basis that the morning students were better than the evening students (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin). He contested this view, saying that:

… evening students were, let’s say, somehow different in matters of age—they were older—but I think they were more serious. And they were paying. The payment was not so much, but it was a symbolic payment that it was very good (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin).

Berkar shared that students participating in evening programs complained that being required to pay violated their rights under the Iraqi Constitution:

Why the evening sessions were canceled? Because some of the students said that according to the Iraqi Constitution the university has no right to charge us money. So either free of charge or we will never come (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

Indeed, the Iraqi Constitution guarantees free education in all its stages. As a result of these complaints, according to Berkar, “we were forced the last three years to charge them no money” (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

In a January 2016 interview, Bêdad shared that evening programs, discontinued in 2012 at Salahaddin at the behest of the university’s president, were set to come back in a major way:

This year we asked that these departments [i.e., participating in evening programs in 2015-16] admit 50 persons each. We had about 20 students enrolled. The reason that more students did not enroll was that they were already enrolled at private universities and already paid tuition fees. Next year, we plan 30 evening programs with 3,000 students paying $1,500 USD each. If the departments do not agree to give the same degree [as regularly-admitted students would receive], we
Bêdad indicated his determination here that evening program participants be considered on the same basis as regularly admitted, or ‘morning’ students, which theretofore had not been the case.

Basic Education

Basic education programs, an offshoot of evening programs, began in 2012 (Haydar, personal interview, February 8, 2015, Salahaddin). Described by Haydar, an official at Salahaddin University as an ‘evening college,’ the basic education program was:

… especially designed for teachers of primary schools. They are holding high school certificates and they are teachers in the primary school. They would like to come back to university to continue to a BA degree or BSc degree certificate involving four-year study. In the evening these teachers come back and they register, and we will accept them in the evening attendance in the college of basic education primary school teachers program. They finish they will get a BA degree or BSc degree certificate and they will go back to the same primary school. The title of their post changes and their salary changes. Because the salary when you get a job if you hold a high school degree is different than if you hold a BA or BSC degree (Haydar, personal interview, February 8, 2015, Salahaddin).

Haydar explained that the president of Salahaddin University, concerned with the poor state of primary education in the region, developed the idea for a College of Basic Education to help to address that condition (Haydar, personal interview, February 8, 2015, Salahaddin). The administrator further suggested, “there are three or four colleges like that one—one in Duhok, one in Erbil, in Sulaimani, and one in Halabja” (Haydar, personal interview, February 8, 2015, Salahaddin).

Morning basic education classes are made up of regularly admitted students in training to teach in primary and secondary education. Evening basic education classes, in contrast, are
made up of teachers already employed in the schools who do not have a bachelor’s degree and now are required to obtain one (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani).

Rojen, an academic administrator at the University of Sulaimani, described the program’s evening participants as having been teaching for 10 to 15 years and being as old as “25 to even 50 or 55, and we have sometimes two or three students who are 60 years old” (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani).

The evening and morning classes, Rojen related, are the same except for the time that they are taught:

Evening courses are exactly the same as morning courses, because in the morning courses we have a set curriculum, we have a syllabus for all the departments. The same exact syllabus or curriculum is followed for the evening classes, and the same lecturers give lectures in the evening classes. So, evening classes are exactly the same as morning classes—teachers, syllabus, curriculum, everything is the same. Units are exactly the same (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani).

Unlike morning students, however, evening basic education students pay tuition. When asked why one group had to pay tuition and the other did not, Rojen could not provide a clear rationale (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani). Not only do evening students pay tuition, Rojen shared, they do not have the benefit of a stipend that students attending in the morning receive (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani).

According to Rojen, evening basic education students paid the equivalent of 600,000 Iraqi dinars (about $500 USD) in tuition per year (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani). KMHESR officials determined this charge after consulting with basic education administrators at the region’s universities (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani) and the Ministry of Finance approved it. Rojen said that normal annual tuition at a
private university, by comparison, was 2 to 3 million dinars ($1,700 to $2,500 USD) (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani). Unlike morning students, who receive a stipend of approximately 40,000-100,000 Iraqi dinars per month ($35 to $85 USD), depending on where they are living (on or off campus), evening students receive no stipend: “In the morning, they will be paid, let us say (laugh). In the evening though, they will have to pay, but it is not too much” (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani).

Evening Program Finances

To pay their tuition, evening students deposit funds directly to a specified Ministry of Finance bank account (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani). The university requires that students show this receipt for payment as part of their registration (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani). The Ministry of Finance redistributes collected funds to departments. The money that students paid was, in turn, used to fund evening program lecturers or teachers (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani). Bêkes, an academic administrator at Salahaddin University confirmed this same tuition and payment arrangement was in place for that institution’s evening basic education degree program (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin).

At Salahaddin University, as at the University of Sulaimani, evening teachers who also taught in the mornings received ‘overload’ pay for night classes, while the programs hired temporary lecturers as well:

But the extra lecturers were paid from that money, and it was of course more than the mornings. Something like double. We have some lecturers outside of the university. They were not appointed from inside the government, they were also paid more (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin).
Interviewees did not offer views on the quality of teaching in the evenings, but they did note that overworked or adjunct instructors staffed the courses.

According to Rojen a series of council meetings, beginning at the college-level (College Council), progressing through the university presidency and then to a council of college deans (University Council), determines the number and mix of evening basic education courses at Sulaimani (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani). Once the number of seats available for a program is approved, prospective students compete for acceptance through an application process:

In a council meeting all department heads have a meeting with the dean of the college taking the decision how many students to have for this year as a plan. … So after meeting, the dean will issue a letter and attach the meeting council decisions or suggestions [recommendations of the College Council] and send it to the president. He will decide, or he will send it to the University Council … for each department they decide [to reduce] numbers suggested … this is just because of lack of rooms, study rooms, because of the traffic in the university.

After declaring the names, announcing the names, after giving names to people and sending them to the president through his office, the names will be sent to the Ministry of Higher Education. The Minister of Higher Education has a committee for verification for marks, for documents, for forms. Then, after putting an end to the verification, they will send back the names to us and give okay to the names (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani).

The process whereby the council determines enrollment in evening basic education at Sulaimani is relatively involved and does not appear to be driven by a specific revenue goal. It is curious, however, that the president, whose office has a financial interest in the number of students accepted, has veto power over the College Council’s recommendations.

In recent years, according to Bêkes, the College of Basic Education at Salahaddin University has begun accepting students who do not otherwise qualify for day classes in something of a parallel status:
In fact, in the recent years the number of students has increased in a very strange way. So people, let’s say, students went back to studying in reality. So one of the numbers was very large and they said the morning classes were not able to admit them all. But they allowed them to attend in the evenings with a symbolic payment (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin).

Some Salahaddin students who would ordinarily qualify only for evening classes have been accepted into overcrowded day classes—subject to paying a tuition charge.

Economic Conditions and Parallel/Evening Programs

The reasons why public universities in the IKR have adopted parallel education and evening education as academic capitalist mechanisms appear to be linked to a deepening financial crisis in the region during 2015. I have come to this conclusion based on the interviews I conducted for this study, as well as supporting reports and news articles. The KMHESR publishes notices and news items on its website in chronological order. Many of these are in English. The section that follows provides a timetable of an evolving financial crisis derived from Education Ministry news and notices published between January 2015 and February 2016.

News briefs between January and February announced scholarships and other opportunities for students. In March, Minister Goran’s administration in the KMHESR set out several primary goals for public universities. A March 15, 2015 Ministry news brief, for example, announced Minister Goran’s intention to implement a regional ranking system, start job opportunity centers at each university, improve the quality and quantity of research output and enhance English language teaching in the region (KMHESR 2015b). During the course of the following months, rankings, participation in the European Union’s Bologna process and creating job centers would become the focal point of the Ministry’s activity.
Between March and August 2015, Ministry news reports described the import of the growing financial crisis as follows:

- A March 1, 2015 report alluded to the Ministry experiencing some difficulty funding its Human Capacity Development Program (HCDP), an international scholarship aimed at building the region’s professoriate. In that news item, Goran was cited as having stated that the Ministry had done all it could to mitigate financial issues for affected students (KMHESR 2015b).
- In a May 25, 2015 notice, Minister Goran thanked teachers and professors for their efforts during the financial crisis (KMHESR 2015d).
- A June 17, 2015 advisory related that HCDP funding had had been approved and the Ministry would be able to pay all outstanding grants up to May, 2015 (KMHESR 2015a).
- An August 28, 2015 article reported that Minister Goran had asked the region’s private universities not to increase “their education and tuition fees and costs, and that they take the current financial condition of the region into consideration” (KMHESR 2015h).

The Ministry’s budget shortfall and issues with teacher salaries arose as a result of an ongoing combination of macroeconomic factors including: 1) increased military spending (affecting the regional budget as a whole) as a result of the ISIS conflict; 2) an overall decline in government revenues due to an ongoing budget dispute with the Iraqi central government, and; 3) falling oil prices (IBN Staff 2016).

As of the beginning of October 2015, the KRG was three months in arrears in paying government employee salaries, including those for teachers. That fact, as well as opposition and public discontent concerning KRG President Barzani’s failure to step down after his term in office, precipitated riots in the city of Sulaimani. Striking workers, including hospital employees and teachers, insisted the government pay its past-due salaries (Reuters Staff 2015).

Following are several KMHESR statements reported in the English ministry news. Minister Goran, in early October 2015, appealed to patriotism, comparing university educators with the Kurdish military—also known as the Peshmerga:
As we all know that the Kurdistan Region is passing through a special political, economic, and security situation. At one side our region has been facing a compelled financial crisis, and on the other hand it is facing the ISIL terrorist organization, and the Kurdistan Region Peshmerga Forces are defending the sacred soil of Kurdistan Region in front lines across more than 1200 kilometers. Taking this special condition of Kurdistan region into consideration, you professors and students should go towards the academic centers like Peshmergas more than ever, and develop the science and development, because while the Peshmerga forces are defending our society from the black hands of the terrorists, similarly we in the academic centers should defend the development of our society through the weapon of science (KMHESR 2015c).

Later that same month, university presidents in the Kurdish region appealed to employees to return to work following protests over unpaid salaries. Like Minister Goran, they appealed to national pride:

Therefore, we in the Presidency of the Kurdistan Region Universities, ask professors and employees to return to the education centers and start with your normal office hours, because the future of students and the future of our homeland are in your hands. Thus, the preparation of this generation in a way that not became behind in the education process is a national duty of you. Moreover, we are insisting on making follow ups for your legitimate rights, including financial and administrative rights (KMHESR 2015l).

In a November 2015 interview, as the government faced a mounting ISIS threat, Goran described the state of public higher education in the region as follows:

The financial crisis is a general crisis; we cannot have an absolute solution for this crisis in which we are all living. The Ministry of Higher Education is not excluded from the current crisis, we are continuously in contact with the Ministry of Finance and the Kurdistan Regional Government, sometimes they can solve our problems but sometimes they are unable, because in spite of the financial crisis, we must not forget that we are at war. The priority is for war expenses (KMHESR 2015i).

As January of 2016, public workers began to strike to protest not having been paid for four months. Following are several news accounts of building unrest:
• January 27, 2016: Government-paid teachers strike in Sulaimani and Halabja provinces, as well as the Raparin administrative district. The KRG Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs promises to release half of September 2015 salaries (NRT Staff 2016c).

• January 30, 2016: Public school teachers in Sulaimani strike over having not been paid for five months. Twenty-five schools close. Fifty thousand (50,000) teachers take part (eKurd Net Staff 2016b).

• February 8, 2016: Doctors, educators and traffic officers protest salary cuts as deep as 70 percent after five months without compensation. Demonstrations take place in cities across the Iraqi Kurdistan region, including Erbil, Sulaimani, Chamchamal, Halabja, Koya, Qaladze and Raniya (NRT Staff 2016a).

• February 10, 2016: After university employees reached five months without pay, the University of Sulaimani announced closure for a full week. Striking university faculty join public school teachers in Sulaimani, Garmian and Raparin, who began striking in January 2016 (NRT Staff 2016b).

These incidents coincided with the KMHESR’s increasing attention to the financial crisis. In a January 2016 meeting of the Ministry Council, comprised of university presidents and ministerial advisors, Minister Goran asked for support to raise more revenues:

Kurdistan Region as the entire country, which counts on oil revenue has faced this financial crisis; however, ISIS fighting has made this problem doubled. So, we have to together strive to increase revenue and decrease expenses in which universities can continue their study and be a source of revenue for the KRG (KMHESR 2016d).

In that same gathering, the Ministry Council adopted a proposal to implement a parallel education system and an evening program at public universities to be implemented in the 2015-2016 academic year (KMHESR 2016d). The number of parallel program admissions was left to the discretion of university leaders and faculties—up to a 10 percent cap over their previously accepted plans. Maximum enrollment in evening programs was similarly left up to participating university departments, with the expectation that quality be maintained and human resources not
overly stretched. Fees charged for evening programs were not to exceed charges for like programs by private universities (KMHESR 2016d).

Doctoral programs had been suspended at most universities in the Kurdistan region for four years, beginning in 2011 (KMHESR 2015i). During this period, the region had been investing in its HCDP scholarship program, which sent students abroad for Ph.D. study to the U.K., the U.S. and other countries (KMHESR 2010a). In August of 2015, the KMHESR reopened doctoral programs at regional universities (KMHESR 2015k). University faculty would be eligible to enroll in Ph.D. programs for 2015-2016 at the discretion of their universities (KMHESR 2016d). The Ministry planned to open the program up more broadly, as specified below, in September 2016 (KMHESR 2015j).

The Ministry’s instructions concerning financing these new Ph.D. programs indicate the intent that they be sustained by tuition (KMHESR 2015j).

Applicants who work in the private sector or who are not employed [by government or by their universities] and hold an MA or MSc degree can apply for a Ph.D. in any of the governmental institutions according to the parallel program (KMHESR 2015j).

The ‘roll out’ of the parallel system has proceeded rapidly since November 2015. In a KMHESR news release on February 18, 2016, Minister Goran announced that master’s and doctoral programs at Kurdish public universities would be opened under the new parallel initiative. A staff writer reported the Minister’s comments as follows:

[Minister Goran said that] For the sake of facilitating education seekers and students on the way of their studies, we have decided to open master’s and Ph.D. at public universities for the year 2016-2017. He [Goran] explained that the study is performed in the base of parallel system. At the same time, the system will be for the MHESR’s employees and the other ministries (KMHESR 2016c).
Making opportunities available in the region for students who would otherwise leave the country, he emphasized, would reduce capital flight. Further, he stated that international students, heretofore not permitted to study at IKR public universities, would now be welcomed: “we want to make the foreign students to study at our universities and this leads to restore Kurdistan’s infrastructure” (KMHESR 2016c). According to Goran these changes would go into effect in 2016-2017 (KMHESR 2016c).

Language Centers

I visited language centers at Salahaddin University and the University of Sulaimani as part of this study. Language centers units are considered auxiliaries authorized under the University Act of 2008 (KMHESR 2014b).

The KMHESR encouraged universities to develop language centers from 2011 forward primarily to support likely HCDP graduate students (Ariman, personal communication, February 11, 2015, Sulaimani). A knowledgeable faculty member at the University of Sulaimani described the development of the centers as follows:

In 2011, because the Minister of Higher Education was Dr. Aladdin, he was so interested in these [English language] programs and how to improve them. There were these programs previously [i.e., language programs existed pre-2011] but still the [university] staff was not able to communicate in English. So, in a step to make communication in English possible, they decided to open centers for the universities. They [the KMHESR] were hoping that the centers would have continuous courses--besides certifying those who need prerequisites [HCDP candidates], would have reinforcement courses for teaching staff. So, the centers are open from 2011 (Ariman, personal interview, February 11, 2015, Sulaimani).

Before the KMHESR began a movement to formalize English training in university institutes, some universities taught English through academic departments. At the University of Sulaimani, for example, the English Department in the College of Languages provided English language
instruction prior to 2011 on a fee for service basis (Arîman, personal interview, February 11, 2015, Sulaimani).

Language centers have a structure different from departments in Kurdistan, although they are part of their host universities (KMHESR 2014b). The language center at the University of Sulaimani exemplifies these differences. Unlike academic departments, which report to chairs and ultimately to deans, this center reports to the university administration, specifically the office of the Vice President for Scientific Affairs and Postgraduate Studies. A faculty member appointed from the ranks of the English Department manages the language center at Sulaimani. It employs adjunct instructors (rare on the for-credit side) on contracts and permanent employees on an ‘overtime’ basis (Arîman, personal interview, February 11, 2015, Sulaimani).

According to KMHESR regulations governing their management, issued in 2014, language centers are expected to garner sufficient funding to support their operation. They may charge tuition fees within authorized limits, and are expected to manage their financial obligations out of those proceeds. They may not run deficits (KMHESR 2014b). Center administrators may hire their own faculty members, receive rewards, or bonuses, at the discretion of the president and contract adjuncts as needed (KMHESR 2014b). Language centers are authorized to enter into international agreements which may include provisions that help to supplement their income (KMHESR 2014b).

An administrator at the University of Sulaimani described the practicalities of this financial arrangement as follows:

… [T]he tuition fees and all the fees cover instruction and include all the staff who are working in the center. Part of the money is saved to develop the center itself, for infrastructure or the staff development. So we’re expecting a lot from the little funds that we have right now. The language center is part of the university but we do not receive money directly from the university. Part of the
staff of the center is also part of the staff of the university, which means that the
government is paying for them. For now, the only employees of the center are the
administrative staff, the usual employees who do every day work. The teachers
are all paid by the center itself out of the tuition for the center. But we are also
trying to have our own staff, which are paid by the government so that we save
more money to develop the center (Arîman, personal interview, February 11,
2015, Sulaimani).

By regulation, fee revenues are divided 80:20, with the language centers retaining the larger
share. Of the latter 20 percent distribution, 30 percent (6 percent of the whole) is disseminated to
university presidencies, 30 percent (another 6 percent) to the KMHESR and 40 percent (8
percent of the whole) to the language center for development purposes (KMHESR 2014b).

Unlike Salahaddin University or the University of Sulaimani, Koya University, another
public institution, chose in 2013 to engage Kaplan International Colleges, a for-profit
multinational corporation, to manage its English language center (Kaplan International Staff
2013).

Consultancy Units

As I began interviews in February of 2015, universities were beginning to feel especially
difficult budget pressures. This was reflected, as will be apparent below, in a conflict that arose
between the Ministry of Finance and the KMHESR, which aligned politically in the dispute with
the universities. Just prior to my arrival, The Ministry of Finance had issued a letter to
universities explaining that any revenues generated from consultancy activities from that point
forward would be collected and retained by that Ministry (Ceger, personal interview, February
17, 2015, Sulaimani). Several interviewees reacted to this news in their comments to me (Ceger,
personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani; Berkar, personal interview, February 17,
2015, Salahaddin).
Baho, a KMHSER official, spoke highly of consulting activities, stating that these efforts provided valuable community services in domains when the government might not otherwise have the capacity to provide them. Further, Baho believed that consulting was a legitimate source of revenue for universities—within reasonable bounds:

So this is pure business. And the amount of money, the university has the right to utilize a certain percentage of that amount of money for promoting their department or the university. [They may control a share of those funds] within [the purview of government] regulation and [retaining] a certain percentage of the amount of money, not all of it (Baho, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHSER).

While those engaged in consulting spoke highly of the opportunities it presented, others were skeptical. A former faculty member at Salahaddin University, Ardelan, for example, was critical of the lack of transparency in how revenues were used:

… [T]here is in the center for engineering in the College of Engineering, they have a center for this. I’m not sure who is utilizing it. For consulting, or for example if a contractor for a project is coming to them, maybe they do something for them. No one knows what their activity is and what is their revenue (Ardelan, personal interview, February 16, 2015, Salahaddin).

Salahaddin University

According to Zerdeşt, an academic administrator at Salahaddin University, the Civil Engineering department was the first to establish a consultancy bureau there, opening in 1979 (Zerdeşt, personal interview, February 18, 2015, Salahaddin). Initially, this unit tested building blocks, soil and the suitability of the soil on which construction was slated to occur. More recently, the bureau incorporated electrical and mechanical systems testing into its repertoire. Zerdeşt pointed to testing pipes for chemical and mechanical properties and purposed suitability as one example. Further, the unit now does design work for hospitals, hotels and other large construction projects:
[For] any work is coming to us, [the college consulting unit] takes 20 percent from the consulting. 80 percent goes to the person who is working the consulting—the teacher, the engineer, the technician who is working to do tests or taking samples (Zerdeşt, personal interview, February 18, 2015, Salahaddin).

Prior to the financial crisis, consulting for the College of Engineering had been quite profitable. According to Zerdeşt, demand for such services grew from 2006 to 2012—so much so that the college was outsourcing some of the requests for work it received:

In 2012, in one year, about $1 million USD was going to those who were working this, with $200,000 USD to the college. … Also we have contract[s] with other companies. Sometimes we are not doing these tests—we take the work, the contract, [and] we do a subcontract with a different company outside the college. We pay 50 percent for that company to do the test(s) for us. We write the report in the study for this work and they do it for us (Zerdeşt, personal interview, February 18, 2015, Salahaddin).

Since this 2012 peak, however, consulting has declined substantially with deteriorating economic conditions: “Our budget was very good two years ago, but now it’s very, very little. Business is very bad” (Zerdeşt, personal interview, February 18, 2015, Salahaddin).

According to Zerdest, 80 percent of revenues from consulting is returned to participating faculty and the balance is split among the KMHESR (a 2 percent share), the university presidency (a 6 percent share) and the college (a 12 percent share). Asked if the money from the consulting in better times was useful to the college, Zerdeşt replied:

… [The college’s share] is important for the college to do anything in the college we need. After we take the service for the consulting, we need something for the consulting. We have members for the consulting. [The dean] heads the Consulting Bureau. Also we have three or four teachers who are members from the different fields, from mechanical from the other [engineering] fields that are represented in the college. Also, they take money monthly (Zerdeşt, personal interview, February 18, 2015, Salahaddin).

Berkar, a Salahaddin academic administrator whose college hosted a consultancy unit, confirmed the revenue split Zerdeşt described (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015,
Salahaddin). He added that the 80 percent split with faculty members soliciting this work had only been in place a year or a year-and-a-half (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin). Prior to the advent of that policy, Berkar observed, faculty had earned 60 percent (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

Berkar agreed that the economy had reduced consultancy opportunities. Even so, he envied engineering’s success versus that of his own consulting unit:

The College of Engineering is doing much more better than us because they are having a lot of labs for the construction tests, for mechanical tests, and they were making a fortune. They were able to build a building—to construct a building! (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

Berkar was not so much concerned about the state of the region’s economy as the position that the Ministry of Finance had adopted concerning consultancy income:

And there is another obstacle that now is going to face us. … According to the new regulations of the Ministry of Finance, they said that ‘no, whatever you do is going directly to the Ministry of and you have nothing to be paid for.’ So this will stop the consultancy centers. It will make the professors making deals and contracting outside the university stop, which is something not good for the university. It [the university] is not pushing forward. Sometimes you need some companies, some private companies and industries. We develop things for them. This is good for research. This will stop. Like you are blocking the higher education. They [i.e., the Ministry of Finance] do not realize this, they think that money is everything – they don’t realize that it reflects on research, which is too bad (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

University professors, Berkar said, were telling him:

… Now we will not use the consultancy center to work contracts. We will not use the body of the university to work. We will go directly to make contracts without the university—which is very bad (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

The reaction among professors who performed consultancies, Berkar explained, was to be expected. By sweeping money earned from consultancies out of the university, the Ministry of Finance removed a key incentive for consulting:
When the Ministry of Finance realized that there was good work, especially in the College of Engineering, they said, ‘No, this amount of money should be for us.’ There is an article in finance--we call it graveyard--this is the nickname for band. This is the amount of money that goes to the Ministry of Finance. … So they want to take everything to the graveyard. They don’t want any revenue to be the ownership of the college. It is only for the graveyard (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

Not only was consulting affected by this change, but other contracts were as well: “The other contracts again goes directly to them [Finance]. So like, they have tightened us not to let us have a resource for income generation like they are doing it on purpose” (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

University of Sulaimani

Similar to Salahaddin University, the College of Engineering at the University of Sulaimani was the first to open a consultancy unit and it did so in 1995. It did so, according to Ceger, an academic administrator there, with “very little instruction, with very little knowledge or experience” (Ceger, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani). Given the lack of regulations, among the challenges facing this group in its early years of operation was determining how the money would be spent. Another issue was dislodging staff members who had earned a significant amount of money during the entity’s first five to 10 years of operation and were reserving consulting opportunities for themselves (Ceger, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani). Accordingly, Ceger said, the college introduced better instructions for use of the revenues earned, enforced a two-year rotation on those working in the unit and set guidelines for agreements with external “customers” (Ceger, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani).

As was the case with officials at Salahaddin University, Ceger objected to the Ministry of Finance interceding in consultancy practices:
Unfortunately, there’s a lot of people in the Ministry of Finance they do not understand how [valuable consulting is] for the university. … They destroyed a lot of good centers—for example, our center is very good, it has a good reputation. But now if any person, any customers come to us, we say, please, we have stopped the consultancy for a certain amount of time. … So, the [Finance] staff says we are not working (Ceger, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani).

As of January 2015, the Ministry of Finance required that all university consulting revenues be returned to it, Ceger argued, “this will not solve the problem of salary, of money, in the Iraqi Kurdistan region” (Ceger, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani).

In addition to engineering, interviewees identified the Faculty of Science and the College of Medicine as involved in consulting at Sulaimani. Çekan, a university official and faculty member in the sciences, said that his college’s consultation bureau conducted quality control assessments for certain products. Participating faculty earned money, he said (Çekan, personal interview, February 12, 2015, Sulaimani). Geology, offered another department administrator, cooperated with the oil industry:

Again with the geology department, because as you are probably aware, the oil industry is the major thing in this area. Sometimes they will ask the professors in the department—environment, yes. Nowadays, for example if a company wants to establish something in the field, there is an environment committee with some university professors who need to assess the area for if it is at risk for any wildlife or polluting the environment or anything, so they are using consultation from the university (Behoş, personal interview, February 12, 2015, Sulaimani).

Analysis

I chose the IKR as the locus for this study in part for convenience, but also because it was unique in having emerged after the Second Gulf War from an oppressive national socialist ruling government that was overtly hostile to capitalism. As I address the research questions below it is
important to keep in mind the context within which the KMHESR and universities advanced these changes.

**R1:** *If present, how and why have new circuits of knowledge emerged in the public universities examined in the IKR?*

Parallel education, evening programs, language centers and consulting all qualify as new circuits of knowledge, as each raised money and connected the universities using them to non-traditional communities.

Parallel education was made possible by a redefinition of the public student. Bachelor’s degree-level individuals previously inadmissible because they were older than an acceptable age or took too long to graduate, so-called “freeze students,” became private (KMHESR 2016b). Foreign students, previously inadmissible at Kurdish public universities, became admissible and are now similarly classified as private for the self-consciously adopted purpose of raising income (KMHESR 2016c). Students seeking master’s or doctoral degrees became private students when Ministry and university officials reinterpreted the Constitution (see below) as no longer encompassing graduate education (KMHESR 2016c).

Evening programs reach students who may not have gone to university because they did not qualify or were too old, or perhaps are in need of a more advanced qualification for their employment. Despite the Iraqi Constitutional guarantee that education for all of the nation’s citizens be free at all levels, evening students now enjoy neither this benefit nor the stipend that day students receive (Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani).

Language centers and consulting also reach out to communities in ways other than traditional education. Language centers address the need some have for improving their
English—whether it be to access government scholarships or to qualify for a better job (Arîman, personal interview, February 11, 2015, Sulaimani). Consulting extends faculty expertise and university resources (e.g. laboratories) to government and businesses (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

Unlike parallel and evening programs, language centers and consultancies are not designed to create significant resources, but rather to address needs without drawing upon state funds. The services are privatized in the sense that they generate revenue, but are self-sustaining. After expenses for faculty and staff salaries or reimbursement for use of university materials, and then satisfying the revenue split with the KMHESR and the presidency, the balance is theoretically zero. This having been said, regulations governing language centers specify that 8 percent of revenues be reinvested in the units themselves (Zerdeşt, personal interview, February 18, 2015, Salahaddin). Twelve percent of revenues from consulting practices are apportioned back to the colleges, but it is up to the dean whether any of those sums are reinvested in the consulting unit that garnered them (KMHESR 2014b).

Unlike language centers and consulting, parallel and evening programs can be tied directly to attempts to address significant budgetary shortfalls. Minister Ala’Aldeen attempted to implement the parallel education system to help universities fund his agenda to improve quality in higher education (KMHESR 2011b, 57). Minister Goran is implementing parallel programs at public universities to help universities survive a collapse in state funding (KMHESR 2016d).

R2: If present, how and why have interstitial organizations emerged within Kurdish public universities?
Language centers and consulting activities are, perhaps, the best examples of interstitial organizations that I observed in the Kurdish context. As mentioned above, a faculty appointee from the university’s English Department directs the language center at the University of Sulaimani. A similar arrangement is in place at Salahaddin University. Language centers at both universities are relatively independent auxiliary units. The center at Sulaimani, for example, is not overseen by academic departments or colleges, but by the university’s central administration (KMHESR 2014b). College deans oversaw consulting directly at both universities, unlike the language centers (Zerdeşt, personal interview, February 18, 2015, Sulaimani; Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin). Despite the difference in approaches to administering these two activities both initiatives emerged from the universities in response to their changing fiscal environment.

Nonetheless, it could be argued that the KMHESR imposed language centers upon universities while consultancies arose somewhat organically. A language program, certainly less formal, but also revenue-generating, pre-dated the language center at the University of Sulaimani. The English Department managed that effort and, like its successor, operated it on a revenue-sharing system (Arîman, personal interview, February 11, 2015, Sulaimani). Whether the KMHESR pushed universities to establish language centers (a debatable question), Salahaddin and Sulaimani certainly aggressively developed them (Arîman, personal interview, February 11, 2015, Sulaimani).

The consultancies that I observed at both target universities were fostered by colleges and enabled by the expertise of faculty members. They can be classified as interstitial activities because they arose from the ‘fabric’ of each university. As one interviewee quoted above observed, one such consultancy sponsored by the College of Engineering at Salahaddin
University had been so successful that the college raised enough funds to construct the building in which it was housed (Zerdeşt, personal interview, February 18, 2015, Sulaimani).

R3:  If present, how and why have intermediating organizations and/or networks emerged in universities in the IKR?

I did not observe intermediating organizations or networks that specifically connected the universities I investigated with financial resources outside those institutions.

R4:  If present, how and why have new circuits of knowledge, interstitial organizations and intermediating organizations and/or networks resulted in extended managerial capacity within Kurdish region universities?

Language centers represented the best example of extended managerial capacity that I observed. As Arîman, a knowledgeable administrator working at the University of Sulaimani, observed in an interview with me:

The language center is a fixed center, it has its own administration, and its own employees and things like that, but these centers [i.e., consulting units] they are annually changing so they don’t have an administrative construction. That is why they don’t have any money for empowering the center itself (Arîman, personal interview, February 11, 2015, Sulaimani).

As described in the section on language centers, above, these organizations are relatively independent. They manage their own finances, including the collection of tuition and accounts payable. They contract instructors as needed, or employ full-time faculty members on a part-time basis. They have the ability, as Arîman noted, to reinvest revenues into their own organization (KMHESR 2014b, Arîman, personal interview, February 11, 2015, Sulaimani).
It could be argued that consultancy activities are similar to language institutes in their relationship to management. A consultancy practice within a college, for example, can employ its own staff. However, consultancies are not divorced from control by academic units, as are language centers. Consultants are responsible directly to their college deans (Zerdeş, personal interview, February 18, 2015, Salahaddin).

The colleges and departments manage parallel and evening programs. These are relatively new enterprises and are not yet formally regulated by the KMHESR (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin).

Contextualizing Academic Capitalism in Kurdistan

The long-lived Baathist regime in Iraq had conceived education as a tool to confront capitalism and to promote Pan-Arabism. According to the 1970 constitution, for example:

Education has the objective of raising and developing the general educational level, promoting scientific thinking, animating the research spirit, responding to exigencies of economic and social evolution and development programs, creating a national, liberal and progressive generation, strong physically and morally, proud of his people, his homeland and heritage, aware of all his national rights, and who struggles against the capitalistic ideology, exploitation, reaction, zionism, and imperialism for the purpose of realizing the Arab unity, liberty, and socialism (Republic of Iraq 1970, Article 28).

The Baathist regime in Iraq fell in 2003. Four months after assuming leadership of the nation as civilian head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Paul Bremer issued a set of decrees introducing free market reforms aimed at undoing the anti-capitalist premises of the country’s previous constitution (Coalition Provisional Authority 2003, Sections 7(1)(a), (1)(b), (2)(b), Harvey 2005, 6).
This political and economic restructuring was carried over into higher education in the 2005 Iraq Constitution (Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 25). The new constitution provided for private education (Republic of Iraq, 2005@Article 34, Sec. 4, Article 31, Sec. 2) unmentioned in the 1970 constitution (Republic of Iraq 1970). With the ratification of Iraq’s Constitution, this new allowance for the development of private higher education became enshrined in the nation’s governance. Private institutions have played a role since in the development of academic capitalism in Kurdish public higher education.

In his 1990 study of the effects of increased research funding, Hackett noted a number of trends with parallels in the IKR context. Among these, Hackett (1990) cited a growth in centers and institutes, the appearance of discretionary accounts, the creation of new administrative positions to generate and manage new income and the marginalization of temporary faculty (Hackett 1990, 269). In the case of Salahaddin University and the University of Sulaimani, income-raising activities have grown from consulting and evening classes to include parallel programs and language centers. Salahaddin University departments manage parallel education programs directly (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin). University administrators at these two universities have created positions to oversee intensive English training in language centers. Managers of evening programs and language centers are employing adjunct instructors, easily hired and terminated, to teach (Bêkes, personal interview, January 10, 2016, Salahaddin; Rojen, personal interview, February 15, 2015, Sulaimani).

Parallel education is a good example of the surreptitious nature of academic capitalism. The 2005 constitution provides that “free education in all its stages is a right for all Iraqis” (Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 34). Private education is also recognized and protected under the constitution: “private and public education shall be guaranteed, and this shall be regulated by
law” (Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 34). In the U.S., a student is classified as public or private by the type of institution that he or she attends. In Iraq, meanwhile, parallel education is made possible by a redefinition of the ‘private’ student as someone who either does do not qualify outright for public education or has completed a bachelor’s degree. By classifying certain students in this manner, Minister Ala’Aldeen and, later, Minister Goran, created a rationale on which the public system could charge them for their education. Despite the potentially deleterious effects it may have on public higher education, universities in the IKR are now implementing parallel education and doing so without benefit of regulatory guidance from the government (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin).

By virtue of attracting funds to the university, academic capitalism practices can raise concerns about corruption, real or imagined. Two of those I interviewed for this study associated such issues with consulting practices. One interviewee, an outside observer, called into question the financial reporting and use of funds of a consultancy unit at Salahaddin University—this due to a lack of transparency (Ardelan, personal interview, February 16, 2015, Salahaddin). An administrator at the University of Sulaimani referenced hoarding of consultancy opportunities by certain vested faculty in his college as a problem with which he was confronted (Ceger, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani).

The theory of academic capitalism assumes considerable autonomy on the part of the university. Public universities in the United States, the United Kingdom, Western Europe and Australia, where much of the research concerning this phenomenon has been conducted to date, are quite independent compared to universities in the Kurdistan region. In the IKR, the KMHESR tightly controls public higher education. While the University Act of 2008 claims that the KRG has the ultimate goal of granting full autonomy to universities, this has not happened to
any significant degree. Perhaps paradoxically, the KMHESR’s otherwise strong grip on public higher education has not impeded universities from developing from academic capitalist programs. On the contrary, the Ministry has cooperated in and itself benefitted from academic capitalism at Kurdish public universities.

Universities in the Kurdistan region operate under the broad auspices of the Iraqi Constitution, higher education law, instructions handed down by the KMHESR and dictates of the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, which are generally informed by his advisors and council of university presidents (termed the Ministry Council). The KMHESR takes its direction from the KRG Council of Ministers, or cabinet, and the KRG Council of Education and Higher Education. The Council of Ministers is headed by the region’s prime minister and attended by all government ministers. The KRG Council of Education and Higher Education is chaired by the prime minister and deputy prime minister, and attended by education, higher education, planning, and economy and finance ministers.

The KMHESR regulates income-generating activities (i.e. academic capitalism) at public universities in the IKR, and receives a portion of the earnings for those activities that it permits (Baho, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHESR, Zerdeşt, personal communication, February 18, 2015, Sulaimani). According to financial instructions for language schools issued by the KMHESR in 2014, income distribution is permitted by, “the first item of subject 16 from Universities Act No. 23 of the year 2008 and the Ministry of Higher Education’s Act no. 10 of the year 2008” (KMHESR 2014b). Ministry officials have been motivated by these laws to find ways to help universities raise money. The KMHESR is, however, checked in its ability to do so by the Ministry of Finance. The finance ministry, for example, issued a letter in early 2015 claiming proceeds of all income-generating activities for the regional government. Several
interviewees commented that this letter would end such activities at universities by eliminating the incentive to pursue them (Ceger, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani; Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

Organizational theories informing academic capitalism, as earlier noted, include resource dependency, new institutionalism and networks (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004, Rhoades and Slaughter 1997, Slaughter and Leslie 1997). Resource dependency posits that when resources are scarce, institutions seek alternative means to increase revenue (Oliver 1990, 244). KMHESR Minister Goran is working to help universities raise more money through parallel education and evening programs (KMHESR 2016d). Ironically, consulting at Salahaddin and Sulaimani declined with the drop in the region’s economy and may end altogether as a result of the Finance Ministry’s stance (Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin; Ceger, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Sulaimani).

New institutional theory attempts to explain ‘isomorphism,’ a phenomenon whereby institutions of similar types, but in different locations, tend to have similar characteristics. Mimicry has been offered by researchers as one possible explanation for isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 149). While I found no definitive evidence that universities were copying practices of other institutions, I did find a circumstantial relationship that is worth noting. The KMHESR news of November 1, 2010 mentioned that the Ministry had sent a small delegation to visit its Jordanian counterpart. Among the subjects discussed during their meetings concerning ways to enhance public higher education was parallel programs. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Jordan introduced parallel programs at the Jordanian University of Science and Technology in 1996 (Istaiteyeh 2011, 132).
Network theory describes organizational behavior in terms of social relationships between and among organizations. Powell has described networks as distinct “reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions relying on “reputation, trust, tacit collusion, and a relative absence of calculative quid pro quo behavior guide” (Powell 1987, 82). In a network, organizations do not exist in and by themselves, but in relationship to other institutions (Powell 1987, 82). This theory received attention among higher education researchers in the U.S. and other developed countries as a result of heightened research cooperation between universities, government and industry following the Bayh-Dole Act. Researchers hypothesized that universities (particularly those departments closest to industry) would adopt more business-like behaviors, while businesses (particularly, industry laboratories) would adopt more university-like norms and mores. There is neither a significant amount of research conducted, nor contact between businesses and public universities in the IKR—making the theory inapplicable to the region.

Kaidesoja and Kauppinen (2014) have identified four social mechanisms that they have argued explain the adoption of academic capitalism, specifically how and why universities might adopt these practices. Two of the four, which they called intensified global competition and coalition formation, apply in the Kurdish public higher education context. Global economic competition, these researchers have asserted, results in a need for universities to compete on broader geographic scales, massive enrollment increases and, because driven in part by neoliberal claims, the political expectation to do more with less (Kauppinen and Kaidesoja 2014, 175). As a result, higher education institutions now find themselves with reduced budgets even as they seek to cope with rising demand. Some evidence of the KMHESR’s desire for recognition on a more global scale can be found in its imposition of a global ranking system on
public universities in the region (KMHESR 2015e). Kurdish universities are now on notice that
they will be treated “according to their rankings” (KMHESR 2015f).

KMHESR officials view rankings as more a means by which to evaluate quality than a
way to recruit more students (the recent decision to admit foreign students via parallel education
notwithstanding). The Ministry’s leaders look abroad to the Bologna process as a model for
achieving greater quality, aspiring to a standard that for now, at any rate, lies far beyond its
resources (KMHESR 2015g).

Public universities are coping with rapidly increasing student populations, sharply
constrained resources and looming restructuring (KMHESR 2016a). One administrator at
Salahaddin described the situation at the college level as follows:

I’ll give you an example of 2012. In 2012 I planned for 475 new students and I
received 1310, triple the number. When I claimed after budget [i.e., more money]
to support this big number, they [the university presidency] said use your own. At
that time, it was September, the budget was not approved yet. I didn’t have
[funds]. They told me, use what you have. I said I need extra classes. They said
no we don’t have the amount of money. I needed extra equipment, extra
everything. They said no, use your own. Using my own, I was forced to make
students stop [coming to class] because I didn’t have enough seats for them
(Berkar, personal interview, February 17, 2015, Salahaddin).

Pushed by the KMHESR to do so, universities continue to admit more students at an average
annual rate of rise of 7.5 percent since 2007-08 and 13 percent for the 2013-14 academic year.
The resulting population stress, combined with drastic budget reductions over the past several
years, has forced the KMHESR and universities to seek alternative funding mechanisms.

Ironically, as a result of admitting students that they ordinarily would not—through such
means as parallel education and evening programs—universities are both exacerbating the
enrollment problem and lowering their standards. The HCDP scholarship was introduced in
2010 to build the professoriate and increase the quality of teaching. The regional government
undertook that enormous investment in part because universities were not producing sufficient Ph.Ds. to staff Kurdistan’s growing universities (KMHESR 2009, 2).

Increasing the number of students entering the university has further stressed an already overburdened system (Arhat, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHESR). A KMHESR official explained the situation as follows:

For example, we have 50,000 students graduating [secondary school] this year. Our capacity [i.e., for new tertiary students, in total] is around 20,000. Actual capacity. What can we do with the rest of the 30,000? The young people are not having jobs and are not going to university, what are they going to do? They will be a source of social instability in the country. You know that. So, we increase the capacity for universities. Some of the universities are getting very higher than their actual capacity. We don’t have other choices at the moment because everyone wants to go to university.

…

We have a lot of problems in this country, the Iraqi system, the employment system in Iraq, every good salary, every good employee status is linked to the bachelor’s degree. For example, you can never ever think about being a general director without a bachelor’s degree. You can never think about some status without a bachelor’s degree. If you don’t have a bachelor’s degree your basic salary is minimal. It is not affordable for life. Everything is linked to the bachelor’s degree. Regardless of what kind of experience or what kind of expertise that you have—it’s all related to a bachelor’s degree—that’s why everyone wants to get a bachelor’s degree (Arhat, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHESR).

Adding to the challenge this interviewee outlined, parallel programs are enrolling still more students who would not have otherwise been admitted to the mix. It is easy to predict that this continued influx, with no new resources to help to address it, will result in a continued decline in educational quality at the region’s universities (KMHESR 2016d).

Coalition formation may also be at work in the Kurdish case (Kauppinen and Kaidesoja 2014, 175). Coalitions can be seen in the KMHESR’s response, in coordination with university presidents (via the Ministry Council), to the ongoing budget crisis in the region. Seeking to find ways to soften the effects of budget inadequacies the KMHESR Minister and the Ministry
Council together have resolved to rely more on parallel higher education programs (KMHESR 2016d). Similar resolve may be seen in the group’s continuing support for evening programs (KMHESR 2016d). While this solidarity may help the Ministry compete for scarce and insufficient resources, it appears to be having the unintended consequence of exacerbating deteriorating conditions of learning at the region’s public universities.

Concluding Thoughts

This examination of academic capitalism as it has evolved in the Kurdish context has given rise to a number of questions. For example, is it correct to term an activity that is self-sustaining academic capitalism? Arguably, some university-sponsored activities generate income, but are not intended to make a profit, per se. University language institutes contribute to efforts to address a public strategic priority, i.e., building the professoriate, but are self-sustaining by design. The basic education certificate is another example, wherein participants are required to pay to participate in a Bachelor’s degree program. In both cases, the payment received from students goes to sustaining the curricular offering. Government funding may not otherwise be available for this purpose and universities are contributing in-kind by hosting these activities and providing classrooms, teachers and oversight. Is this approach truly academic capitalism, or is academic capitalism an alternative means to a desired end? It is useful to recall that in the public good imaginary, achieving the end of highly trained teachers and professoriate through enterprise or commercial outsourcing is anathema.

Is academic capitalism at its root opportunistic, or does it instead represent a pragmatic response to exogenous conditions that universities did not create and cannot alone control? Does it arise from entrepreneurship or by necessity? One can find evidence of both of these
possibilities in the Kurdish context. Consulting, for example, has been incentivized (at least until recent Finance action) by generous financial terms for participating faculty. Language centers, evening programs and evening basic education provide opportunities for permanent faculty to earn additional compensation by moonlighting. Faculty teaching in university-based language centers may earn additional income by helping to develop curricula and by preparing tests and other contributions. Parallel education has surfaced out of financial necessity.

Without badly needed funds to support their operations, Kurdish universities are increasingly hard-pressed to continue providing courses. This having been said, government sets funding priorities even in times of financial crisis—failing to provide adequate funding to sustain higher education (and other social services) is a choice relative to other fiscal needs. The results of this study suggest that in the Kurdish case, the KMHESR and universities have employed different types of academic capitalism by necessity, opportunity and mandate.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Part of the reason I chose the Iraqi Kurdistan region as the location for this study was the fact that it had emerged from a strictly-controlled National Socialist government under Saddam Hussein. For a 10-year period following the downfall of this regime, the region thrived, higher education expanded and a market economy began to emerge. This change was both readily observable and well-documented. With an economic slump setting in at the close of 2014, I thought I might find academic capitalism activities emerging in the public universities. As the ISIS conflict not only persisted, but grew, the economy deteriorated much more rapidly than I or perhaps anyone else may have imagined. While I had identified several existing manifestations of academic capitalism at Salahaddin University and the University of Sulaimani early on in the inquiry, the economic crisis created the opportunity to view a new form, parallel programs, as it emerged at the peripheries of existing policy. Another unique aspect of this study was the close cooperation I observed between the KMHESR and public universities in developing and supporting different types of academic capitalism.

The economic situation in Iraqi Kurdistan declined dramatically during the course of this study--from the beginning of 2015 through the beginning of 2016. The Iraqi central government chose during this time not to provide budgetary support to the KRG as a result of a dispute between the regional and national government officials concerning ownership of oil rights in the region. This conflict has made the KRG dependent on its own petroleum exports for support of its efforts. This stream of revenue, however, has been unreliable due to the ownership controversy and falling oil prices. This difficult situation has been exacerbated by KRG obligations to support public workers and an extraordinary number of people displaced to the
IKR by conflict to the south and west. The KRG has made defense spending its highest priority as a result of the ongoing war with ISIS (IBN Staff 2016). These issues date to 2014, when ISIS invaded Mosul, the KRG entered into an oil-supply agreement with Baghdad and petroleum prices began a sharp descent from $105 USD per barrel, to $37 USD per barrel as this is written (IBN Staff 2014, Krauss 2016).

Prior to 2014-2015, Kurdistan’s universities were growing and the region’s government placed considerable emphasis on enhancing their quality. Through no fault of its own, as a result of the series of unfortunate and interlocking macro events outlined just above, public higher education funding support increasingly began to suffer during 2015. The KRG failed to pay salaries to its workers, including university faculty members and staff, for many months, a situation that eventually resulted in strikes (eKurd Net Staff 2016b). The University of Sulaimani broke a strike on March 23, 2016 that had begun that February (eKurd Net Staff 2016a). The KMHESR and university presidents met in February of 2016 to weigh restructuring options to reduce costs across the region’s universities (KMHESR 2016a).

The budget crisis has created an incentive for universities to introduce income-generating activities. Minister Goran of the KMHESR and the Ministry Council have introduced tuition charges for graduate students, marginal undergraduate students and international students (KMHESR 2016d, c). His administration has expanded evening courses as a way of raising money, as well. Minister Ala’Aldeen’s administration had previously undertaken similar measures but those initiatives had been abandoned after his departure from office (Arhat, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHESR).

Slaughter and Rhoades have argued that public universities engaged in the academic capitalism knowledge/learning regime exhibit five characteristics:
1. The university and thus the general public continue to subsidize academic capitalism activities to a great extent, despite claims that these efforts raise revenues.
2. As the university invests in promising academic capitalist activities, public space such as classrooms, laboratories and equipment, is made available for such purposes.
3. The academic capitalism activities undertaken by the university are frequently ineffective at generating surplus, and lead to “unexpected and undesirable practices and outcomes.”
4. The university refocuses efforts on raising income as opposed to its primary purpose of providing a quality education to its students.
5. The university begins looking to spread its influence outward beyond its local community. One way of doing so is to take steps to become more internationally competitive (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 329).

Judging by the number and intensity of academic capitalism activities I observed at Salahaddin University and the University of Sulaimani, it would be difficult to make the case that they were the product of a well-entrenched knowledge/learning regime. I did identify several mechanisms clearly intended to generate income, however, and signs that these universities may be moving to institutionalize just such an orientation. I identified consulting, language centers, evening programs and parallel education efforts that met the criteria to be defined as academic capitalist in character and intent (Slaughter and Rhoades (2004, 27).

I was not able to identify how and why consulting had originated as it came into being more than 20 years ago in the universities I investigated. This said, I was able to articulate the role consulting currently plays at these universities—primarily income generation, with some utility to paying industries. Notably, Kurdish higher education institutions also offered consulting services to government entities. A portion of the revenue generated from consulting is remitted to the relevant university presidency and to the KMHESR. Participating faculty members split the balance of the proceeds, less any materials costs owed the university. Consulting was the most ingrained of the academic capitalism activities I observed. Clearly, such initiatives utilize publicly-funded resources such as laboratories and equipment to generate
revenue. One unintended consequence of consulting, however, included a perception among some observers of potential corruption.

Both Salahaddin University and the University of Sulaimani had initiated language centers to prepare HCDP scholarship participants for overseas study. These centers were income generating enterprises in the sense that they typically raise modest revenue for the university presidency and the KMHESR. They are otherwise self-sustaining, with the balance of proceeds supporting faculty and staff salaries and maintaining/developing the enterprise. At the University of Sulaimani, this activity used space that had previously housed academic departments. The language center at Salahaddin University occupied a facility built for the purpose by the university.

Both universities offered evening programs at the undergraduate level. Such programs primarily serve the working public. These were recently reintroduced at Salahaddin University, and it is not yet clear that those graduating from such curricula will receive departmentally approved degrees. The individual universities handle admission for these programs as opposed to the KMHESR. Admission requirements are not as restrictive or competitive as regular admission offerings. While Ministry regulations have not yet been developed for evening programs, the government has developed some guidelines for revenue sharing between the involved parties. Enrolled students pay tuition. Participating departments pay instructors from these fees. Net proceeds are divided between the KMHESR, the university presidency and sponsoring departments.

Evening programs at both Salahaddin University and the University of Sulaimani utilize classrooms previously designated solely for instruction of regularly admitted students. These universities allowed this use of these spaces to raise funds for participating departments.
Parallel programs were in progress on a pilot basis at Salahaddin University. Parallel education provides an opportunity to attend university to students who would not normally qualify for admission. This option is available to individuals who have exceeded the normal allotment of time to complete a program, students in master’s and doctoral programs and students who are from other countries. The universities manage admission to these programs themselves. Academic departments design and designate available programs and seats. Participating parallel program students join regularly admitted students in the same classes and earn the same degrees. They pay tuition, which is apportioned between the KMHESR, the university presidency and sponsoring departments.

Parallel education and evening courses, according to one knowledgeable official I interviewed, currently do little to defray university costs, at best helping to fund purchase of some much-needed educational supplies (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin). This raises the question of their real utility—if parallel education is of little fiscal benefit, why has Minister Goran’s administration placed such great emphasis on its development? Of all of those academic capitalism activities I identified, parallel programs have the greatest potential to institutionalize an academic capitalist knowledge/learning regime in Kurdish public universities.

Parallel education represents a change in imaginary—a redefinition of the public good knowledge/learning regime. With parallel education, the public higher education space is reimagined to include private education. Individuals who were previously unqualified or blocked from accessing university studies are now embraced as private students. Though considered ‘private’ they remain publicly subsidized, paying only a fraction of the government’s cost to support their matriculation. Both the university and the KMHESR benefit from these
individuals, and because they constitute a relatively small portion of the student population they are of little political risk.

Examined more closely, however, parallel education may have unanticipated consequences for public higher education in the region. As I mention in my findings, above, one official at Salahaddin University, informed me that academic departments would benefit directly from managing their own parallel and evening enrollments (Bêdad, personal interview, January 24, 2016, Salahaddin). A similar approach at Makerere University in Uganda, according to Mamdani, ultimately resulted in the decentralization of that institution’s budget and intra-university competition among its various colleges for paying students (Mamdani 2009, 215). Arguably, Makerere privatized quickly in the mid-1990s, with colleges being immediately encouraged to recruit up to 90 percent of their student population as private students. What was once one institution evolved into two: a traditional university and a parallel counterpart. Quality did not increase, but rather classes became ever larger and education for the parallel students deteriorated to a “low-level vocational education in an expensive campus setting” (Mamdani 2009, 215).

Students at the University of Jordan (UJ) entered the fifteenth day of a strike on March 13, 2016 (Goussous 2016). According to a news article covering the event, they were protesting an increase in tuition fees for parallel and graduate programs. According to the news account, the UJ administration blamed the tuition increase on a continuing lack of support for higher education by the Jordanian Parliament (Goussous 2016). A Member of Parliament, on the other hand, contended that the fee increase was warranted because not enough students were paying tuition: “The ‘large’ number of scholarships and grants given to a wide array of students who do
not pay any of the educational fees ‘burdens’ the budgets of universities,” he said (University of Jordan News Staff 2016).

Parallel education has come to dominate public higher education in Jordan since it was initiated at the Jordanian University of Science and Technology in the early 1990s. Seven of every ten students in the institution were enrolled in parallel programs in 2015 (Goussous 2015). The lawmaker cited above conceded that three quarters of Jordanian families could not afford to pay for university education for more than one of their children (University of Jordan News Staff 2016). A low tuition alternative for regularly admitted students is reserved for relatively few. The University of Jordan president confirmed the access gap between the qualified and the wealthy, stating: “the group targeted through the parallel programme was the ‘more privileged’ class, whose members can afford the more expensive credit hours” (Goussous 2016).

Parallel education was introduced at Makerere in Uganda and at Jordanian universities to weather deep cuts in higher education budgets. While initially seen as a sustainable mechanism to support higher education, it remains controversial more than two decades later. Neither in my conversations about parallel education with Kurdish university administrators, nor in the official documents I examined was it clear that the potential consequences of adopting this academic capitalism mechanism had been discussed in any great detail among KMHESR officials, university leaders and faculty. The Ministry had not yet released regulations for implementing parallel education as of this writing.

During the course of this study, interviewees offered compelling claims justifying the need for parallel students. For example, one KMHESR leader pointed out that they (i.e., parallel students) take up little space, and therefore do not impinge on the resources the universities owe deserving, qualified students. While they are of lower qualification, they work to prove
themselves—and they bring in much needed revenue the institutions would not otherwise have (Baho, personal interview, February 16, 2015, KMHESR). Interestingly, interviewees did not relate counter-claims in the public interest, for example concerning the preservation of public access to universities and the quality of higher education. Perhaps such comments would have surfaced in a broader sample.

Recommendations

This inquiry aimed first to establish whether academic capitalism was occurring in public universities in the Kurdish region. Had I found it, I intended to provide university policymakers in the Iraqi Kurdistan region with a better understanding of the potential changes within their institutions (positive and negative) that may arise from policies and practices that promote academic capitalism. I intended to help government officials make more informed policy by increasing their awareness of the potential consequences of academic capitalism (Mendoza and Berger 2008, 19).

The measures now being put in place by the KMHESR and the Ministry Council to raise money, while they demonstrate some empathy for the immediate resource starvation facing faculty members and students in the university, have very broad implications. Unlike consulting, language centers and evening programs, parallel education has profound implications for the higher education system as a whole. Thus far, policymakers have focused their efforts on implementing such measures at the peripheries of the higher education system. One must question, however, why they are being implemented if not with the intent of later expansion.

Kurdish higher education policymakers would be well advised to heed some of the lessons learned by those who have implemented parallel education previously. The experience
of institutions such as Makerere University in Uganda and the University of Jordan are indicative of the massive internal and external rending that may lie ahead. In Jordan and elsewhere, promises of using funds raised through such efforts to enhance quality and improve access have proven to be fantasies.

Such has also been the experience in the U.S., where universities have endured a cycle of state funding cuts during the past 30 years. According to the American Council on Education, all but two states reduced funding for higher education between 1980 and 2011. Tandberg has argued that American lawmakers increasingly perceive public universities as able to raise their own revenues. Accordingly, those leaders believe they can reduce higher education budgets, and have done so repeatedly (Tandberg 2010, 418). Ironically, some now warn that public universities that are not best competing for student tuition, research resources or raising money by other means soon will be selected out of the higher education marketplace.

Epistemologically, I chose to approach the study through a constructivist and pragmatic perspective. A principal disadvantage of doing a qualitative study of this kind is the fact that it does not lead to statistically generalizable conclusions, although it can surely lead to analytical generalizations. I attempted to offset this concern through a thorough literature review, including an examination of the effects of privatization on higher education during pivotal time periods in three other countries: Kenya, Jordan and Ethiopia. This having been said, the IKR milieu is decidedly complex, perhaps now more than at any other time in modern history. Over the past 12 years, since 2003, Iraqi Kurdistan has sought to develop a higher education system capable of serving its entire population. But that still nascent structure is now beset by a financial and enrollment crisis. The struggle to maintain quality and continue to build the professoriate is challenged by macro trends beyond the control of the KMHESR and universities
in the region. The other cases of academic capitalism presented in the literature review, however, were also catalyzed by extreme stress.

Critics of this inquiry may argue that the scale of academic capitalism observed in this study was small, that these activities generate minimal revenues, and that some practices discussed in the findings have been suspended or are simply being discussed and have not yet been implemented. While this may be true, such criticisms miss the point. I undertook this study not to determine the degree of academic capitalism, but instead to determine whether it existed, and if so, to examine how and why those practices came to be. Particularly given the socialist heritage of the region, how and why any government or university adopted these practices are fascinating questions.

Limitations

Person-dependency, bias and subjectivity are common criticisms of the interview method (Kvale 2008, 84). Three potential limitations anticipated in this study were the selective sample, my lack of Kurdish language ability and document sourcing. I address each of these concerns next, in turn.

Person-dependency could also be a criticism of this study. I was very specific in the selection of interviewees on the assumption that leaders would know and understand their institutions, whether it be KMHESR officials having knowledge of universities in their charge or senior university officials being aware of activities at the department and college. I selected interviewees, to the extent possible, with an eye to the likelihood that each would have knowledge of finances and entrepreneurial activities at their university. Where this was not the case, interviewees were able to refer me to individuals with greater knowledge. I made every
effort to ensure comparability of interview questions and foci so as to permit later analysis and triangulation.

My lack of Kurdish language ability and relatively limited experience in Kurdistan did not prove to be a weakness in my analysis, as the individuals to whom I spoke possessed a good to excellent command of English. I reviewed a number of documents as part of this study and used a variety of sources to obtain them. Some documents were in Kurdish. Where necessary, I had these translated by English language faculty members at a leading university in Kurdistan.

I dropped one university I had planned to examine from my study, the University of Kurdistan Hawler, due to a lack of sufficient time to complete all necessary interviews. I used the interviews I had already conducted at that institution, before making the decision not to retain them in my study, solely for background information.

I acknowledge that in doing international research of this kind, there are real barriers to grasping the nature of the phenomenon under study. While language did not prove to be a significant barrier, I was separated from those I interviewed by day-to-day reality, which I view from my own perspective and life-story; and culture, including both home and work life. These facets of Kurdish existence were subject, despite my best efforts, to interpretation.

While the time I spent in the region was relatively short, I would point out that in addition to conducting interviews and document analysis, I actively sought out opportunities to visit the cities, villages and homes of colleagues, to visit a number of universities outside those identified in my study, to get to know people through long conversations about politics and life, and to teach—by which I sought to learn. Still, like the ever-evolving ISIS conflict and the Kurds’ struggle with political authorities in greater Iraq, the phenomenon I sought to study was dynamic and literally unfolded before my eyes. Having conducted the study in the manner that I did, it
was clear to me that a more positivist approach, devoid of an attempt to understand the culture and way of life, would have been entirely unsuccessful.

Future Studies

This study analyzed the privatization of public higher education in Iraqi Kurdistan using qualitative methods and interviews with a sample of public officials, university leaders and faculty, and interested observers. A future study might expand the sample I employed to include other institutions in Iraq or analyze this phenomenon using similar methods in another Middle Eastern country. Another variation, rather than or in addition to incorporating interviews, might be to conduct a survey of administrators at all Kurdish universities. Still another approach might be to examine the financials of different universities over time with particular attention to income from centers and institutes, grants and contracts, private donations and other educational services (Slaughter and Leslie 1997, 78). Adding another level of analysis, it would be very interesting to study the impacts of parallel education, using techniques such as classroom observation, surveys, focus groups and or interviews, on students in Iraqi Kurdistan and nearby Jordan.
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### Questions for Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION (PRESENT EMPLOYEES)</th>
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<th>RATIONALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Please tell me about yourself. Where are you from? Where have you studied? How did you come to be involved in higher education?</td>
<td>Please tell me about yourself. Where are you from? Where have you studied? How did you come to be involved in higher education?</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) How long have you been employed at the Ministry? Please tell me about your position and responsibilities.</td>
<td>When and for how long were you employed at the Ministry? Please tell me about your former position and responsibilities.</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) What are the primary challenges that face public universities in the Kurdistan region today?</td>
<td>What were the primary challenges that faced public universities in the Kurdistan region during your tenure?</td>
<td>Solicits general overview/perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) How has the proliferation of private universities in the region impacted public higher education?</td>
<td>How did the proliferation of private universities in the region impact public higher education during your tenure?</td>
<td>While ‘external’ to public higher education, the development of private higher education could influence activities in universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) What financial and enrollment stresses have public universities faced during your tenure?</td>
<td>What financial and enrollment stresses did public universities face during your tenure?</td>
<td>Looks for precursors to academic capitalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) How has the curriculum at public universities changed during your tenure?</td>
<td>How did the curriculum at public universities change during your tenure?</td>
<td>Seeks to identify academic capitalism behavior that could be classified as new circuits of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) How have the organization, management structure and management practices of public universities changed during your tenure?</td>
<td>How did the organization, management structure and management practices of public universities change during your tenure?</td>
<td>Seeks to identify academic capitalism behavior that could be classified as interstitial organizations or extended management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) During your tenure, would you say that public university interaction with the private sector (business/industry) has trended up, down or remained the same? If it has trended up, why?</td>
<td>During your tenure, would you say that public university interaction with the private sector (business/industry) has trended up, down or remained the same? If it trended up, why?</td>
<td>Seeks to identify academic capitalism behavior that could be classified as new intermediate organizations or networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) How do you think outside influences, such as the activities of NGOs or aid agencies, impact higher education?</td>
<td>How do you think outside influences, such as the activities of NGOs or aid agencies, influenced Kurdish higher education during your tenure?</td>
<td>Explores alternative hypothesis of Westernization being a cause for academic-capitalism-like behavior</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2) How long have you been employed at the university? Please tell me about your former position and responsibilities.</td>
<td>When and for how long were you employed at the university? Please tell me about your former position and responsibilities.</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<td>3) What are the primary challenges that your university faces today?</td>
<td>What were the primary challenges that your university faced during your tenure?</td>
<td>Solicits general overview/perspective</td>
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<td>8) How do you think outside influences, such as the activities of NGOs or aid agencies, influence your university?</td>
<td>How do you think outside influences, such as the activities of NGOs or aid agencies, influence your university during your tenure?</td>
<td>Identifies possible alternative hypothesis of Westernization being a cause for academic-capitalism-like behavior</td>
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<tr>
<td>9) Have you observed or are you aware of any of the following activities at your university? - Development of ‘applied’ programs, like teacher education or specialized programs</td>
<td>During your tenure, did you observe or were you aware of any of the following activities at your university? - Development of ‘applied’ programs, like teacher education or specialized programs</td>
<td>Solicits knowledge of academic capitalism activities by example</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bridge programs or language schools for students who do not meet university admission requirements</td>
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<td>- Development of applied research capabilities</td>
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<td>- Continuing or lifelong education</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Consultancy services</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Internationalization activities</td>
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<td>- Income generation activities, or activities designed to raise money</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Changes in reward systems for faculty members</td>
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</table>

If so, can you tell me about these activities, how they have arisen and who is responsible for them?

| - Bridge programs or language schools for students who do not meet university admission requirements |
| - Development of applied research capabilities |
| - Continuing or lifelong education |
| - Consultancy services |
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| - Income generation activities, or activities designed to raise money |
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If so, can you tell me about these activities, how they arose and who was responsible for them?
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<td>Please tell me about yourself. Where are you from? Where have you studied? How did you come to be involved in foreign service?</td>
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<td>2) How long have you been employed at the Department of State/British Council/British Foreign Service? Please tell me about your position and responsibilities.</td>
<td>When and for how long were you employed at the Department of State/British Council/British Foreign Service? Please tell me about your position and responsibilities.</td>
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<td>3) In your view, what are the primary challenges that face public higher education in Iraqi Kurdistan today?</td>
<td>What were the primary challenges that faced public higher education in Iraqi Kurdistan during your tenure?</td>
<td>Solicits general overview/perspective</td>
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<td>4) Are private universities a good thing or a bad thing in terms of their impacts on public higher education in the IKR?</td>
<td>Are private universities a good thing or a bad thing in terms of their impact on public higher education in the IKR?</td>
<td>While ‘external’ to public higher education, the development of private higher education could influence activities in universities</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) What changes have you observed in universities in the Kurdish region over time?</td>
<td>During your tenure, what changes did you observe in universities in the Kurdish region over time?</td>
<td>Seeks evidence of neoliberal perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) In what ways has the U.S./U.K. influenced or contributed to the development of Kurdish higher education?</td>
<td>During your tenure, in what ways did the U.S./U.K. influence or contribute to the development of Kurdish higher education?</td>
<td>Seeks evidence of neoliberal perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Going forward, in what ways should the U.S./U.K. continue to be involved in Kurdish higher education?</td>
<td>Going forward, in what ways should the U.S./U.K. continue to be involved in Kurdish higher education?</td>
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<td>8) How do you think outside influences, such as the activities of NGOs or aid agencies, influence universities in the region?</td>
<td>How do you think outside influences, such as the activities of NGOs or aid agencies, have shaped universities in the region during your tenure?</td>
<td>Investigates possible alternative hypothesis of Westernization being a cause for academic-capitalism-like behavior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

Institutional Review Board Approval Letter
MEMORANDUM

DATE: February 6, 2015
TO: Max O Stephenson Jr, Donald Ray Back
FROM: Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (FWA00000572, expires April 25, 2018)
PROTOCOL TITLE: Interviewing Officials and Experts in Kurdish Higher Education
IRB NUMBER: 14-1235

Effective February 6, 2015, the Virginia Tech Institution Review Board (IRB) Chair, David M Moore, approved the New Application request for the above-mentioned research protocol.

This approval provides permission to begin the human subject activities outlined in the IRB-approved protocol and supporting documents.

Plans to deviate from the approved protocol and/or supporting documents must be submitted to the IRB as an amendment request and approved by the IRB prior to the implementation of any changes, regardless of how minor, except where necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. Report within 5 business days to the IRB any injuries or other unanticipated or adverse events involving risks or harms to human research subjects or others.

All investigators (listed above) are required to comply with the researcher requirements outlined at:

http://www.irb.vt.edu/pages/responsibilities.htm

(Please review responsibilities before the commencement of your research.)

PROTOCOL INFORMATION:

Approved As: Expedited, under 45 CFR 46.110 category(ies) 5,6,7
Protocol Approval Date: February 6, 2015
Protocol Expiration Date: February 5, 2016
Continuing Review Due Date*: January 22, 2016

*Date a Continuing Review application is due to the IRB office if human subject activities covered under this protocol, including data analysis, are to continue beyond the Protocol Expiration Date.

FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS:

Per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.103(f), the IRB is required to compare all federally funded grant proposals/work statements to the IRB protocol(s) which cover the human research activities included in the proposal / work statement before funds are released. Note that this requirement does not apply to Exempt and Interim IRB protocols, or grants for which VT is not the primary awardee.

The table on the following page indicates whether grant proposals are related to this IRB protocol, and which of the listed proposals, if any, have been compared to this IRB protocol, if required.
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* Date this proposal number was compared, assessed as not requiring comparison, or comparison information was revised.

If this IRB protocol is to cover any other grant proposals, please contact the IRB office (irbadmin@vt.edu) immediately.
Maqsood S. Mohammed, M.B.A.
Director of Relations
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
Kurdistan Regional Government
Erbil, Iraq

Dear Kak Maqsood,
My name is Donald Back. I am a doctoral student in Planning, Governance and Globalization at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, also known as Virginia Tech. I write to request your permission and support to conduct a study on Kurdish higher education. Professor Max O. Stephenson Jr. will be supervising this inquiry.

It has been suggested by such influential institutions as the World Bank that privatization is a potential solution to financing the higher education sector. With respect to this assertion, this study will examine policy and practice related to the funding of higher education in the region. Iraqi Kurdistan’s relative isolation from the international community prior to 2003, followed by rapid development of higher education since this time, makes the region an attractive location for this research. The study aim to will address a gap in the scholarly literature and help to inform policy relating to privatization in public higher education.

My procedure will entail interviews with officials in the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, senior university officials and outside experts. I will interview five to ten university administrators, including the president, chief financial officer and international relations officer, at two universities: The University of Kurdistan-Hawler and Salahaddin University. Each interview is expected to take 60 to 90 minutes. Cooperation of the Ministry is requested to assist in introducing this study and in recruiting these subjects. Also, the Ministry’s help would be appreciated in providing some background data on the Kurdish Higher Education system not otherwise publicly available.

I would further be appreciative of the opportunity to interview you for an hour about current policy. I will be in the region during the first two weeks of February, or could also arrange a Skype session or telephone call outside this timeframe. Your participation would be on a voluntary basis, of course.

If you have an interest in participating I will e-mail a consent form which provides details on the kinds of questions I will ask, how the information will be used, and confidentiality will be preserved. If you agree to an interview, please return the consent form and retain a copy for your records.

Thank you for your kind consideration,

Donald Back
SUBJECT: Invitation to participate in the study: Privatization of Public Higher Education in Iraqi Kurdistan

Dear XXX,

My name is Donald Back. I am a doctoral student in Planning, Governance and Globalization at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, also known as Virginia Tech (http://www.vt.edu). I write to invite you to participate in a study on Kurdish higher education.

Such influential institutions as the World Bank have argued that privatization is a potential solution to the current challenge of financing the higher education sector. With respect to this assertion, this study will examine policy and practice related to the funding of higher education in Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan’s relative isolation from the international community prior to 2003, followed by rapid development of higher education in the region since that date, makes the area an attractive location for this research. The proposed study aims to address a gap in the scholarly literature and help to inform policy relating to privatization in public higher education in developing areas and nations.

Professor Max O. Stephenson Jr. is supervising this inquiry. The study has been approved by the Kurdistan Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. Ministry approval may be verified through Maqsood Mohammed, Director of relations, at maqsood.mohammed@mhe-krg.org.

My procedure entails conducting interviews with certain university officials, faculty and staff at select universities in the Kurdistan region. You are receiving this invitation because you are in a targeted position at your institution or are believed to have information relevant to the study. The interview will take 60-90 minutes and will be recorded. Responses to any questions would be kept confidential, as explained in the attached informed consent form.

To qualify for interview, you will need to meet the following three criteria: 1) you have served in the role of president, chief financial officer, chief academic officer or international officer during the past 8 years; 2) you have served or have currently been in office for at least one year, and; 3) you have sufficient English ability to comprehend and comprehensibly respond to questions. If you have been referred to this study as a ‘knowledgeable staff or faculty member,’ you will need to have sufficient English ability to comprehend and comprehensibly respond to questions.

I will be in the Erbil in February and would be happy to arrange a personal interview, or could also arrange a Skype session or telephone call outside this timeframe.

If you have an interest in participating and meet the above criteria, please return the attached consent form to me at your earliest convenience and retain a copy for your records. Note that you do not have to complete the form, but may simply respond to this e-mail as follows: “I agree to the attached terms for participation in the study: ‘Privatization of Public Higher Education in Iraqi Kurdistan.”

Thank you for your kind consideration,

Donald Back
Appendix E

Consent to Participate Reminder
SUBJECT: Reminder regarding participation in the study: Privatization of Public Higher Education in Iraqi Kurdistan

Dear XXX,
I am writing to follow-up on my prior e-mail requesting participation in the study: Privatization of Public Higher Education in Iraqi Kurdistan. This will be your only reminder.

I refer you to my prior e-mail of February XX, 2015 for details on the study, the interview process and criteria for participation.

If you have an interest in participating and meet the English language criteria, please return the attached consent form to me at your earliest convenience and retain a copy for your records. Note that you do not have to complete the form, but may simply respond to this e-mail as follows: “I agree to the attached terms for participation in the study: ‘Privatization of Public Higher Education in Iraqi Kurdistan.”

Thank you for your kind consideration,

Donald Back
Appendix F

Informed Consent Authorization Form
INFORMED CONSENT AUTHORIZATION FORM

Researcher: Donald Back Study: Privatization of Public Higher Education in Iraqi Kurdistan

Interviewee: ______________________  Date Issued: ______________________

Terms of Participation:

1) Your participation will consist of a 60- to 90-minute audio-recorded interview to take place in person, by Skype or by telephone.
2) There are no anticipated risks to participating in the study, certainly none higher than those you would encounter in the course of your normal daily activities.
3) No compensation will be provided for your participation.
4) Your participation in the study will be confidential; your name will not be mentioned during the recorded portion of the interview, nor will it be recorded in the study manuscript except by pseudonym.
5) The interview tape and transcripts will be numerically encoded and stored in a locked file cabinet in a separate location from identifiable information so as not to directly associate you with its contents.
6) Only myself and my research supervisor, Professor Max Stephenson, will have access to these digital recordings. Digital files will be password protected on the my laptop and back-ups will be stored in a locked cabinet.
7) Interview tapes and transcripts will be retained for a period of two years, and then destroyed.
8) The contents of your interview will be confidential to the extent that any remarks made cannot be personally attributable to you by a knowledgeable reader.
9) At no time will I release identifiable results of the study to anyone other the research supervisor without your written consent.
10) The Virginia Tech (VT) Institutional Review Board (IRB) may view the study’s data for auditing purposes. The IRB is responsible for the oversight of the protection of human subjects involved in research.
11) It is important for you to know that you are free to withdraw from this study at any time without penalty. You are free not to respond to any questions that you choose or respond to what is being asked of you without penalty.

I consent to be interviewed under the terms listed above:

Signature: ______________________  Date: ______________________

You may alternatively consent to this study by returning this form to dback@vt.edu via your personal e-mail account with the statement “I agree to the attached terms for participation in the study: ‘Privatization of Public Higher Education in Iraqi Kurdistan’”
Notes

1 The World Bank classifies Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen as developing nations (http://data.worldbank.org/region/MNA).


4 Founding dates for these universities were obtained from university websites, listed at http://www.mhe-krg.org/node/23. The Charmo University website is at http://www.charmouniversity.org/, accessed March 22, 2016.

5 These university websites are also listed at http://www.mhe-krg.org/node/23.

6 Established through a review of private university websites from a listing of these institutions on the KMHESR website (http://www.mhe-krg.org/node/1737). Lebanese, Ishik by Turks and Iraqis founded SABIS Universities, Americans and Kurds established American and British and Kurds created Stratford.

7 Provided by the KMHESR, received 1/12/2015.

8 The Baath regime fell on April 9, 2003. The U.S.-led occupation was in place from April 2003 to June 2004. The U.S.-backed Iraqi Governing Council named an Iraqi interim government on June 1, 2004 and it assumed power on June 28, 2004 (Otterman 2004).


10 Conversations with faculty members from various universities, August 2014.

11 The ‘brightest’ students are assigned to medical and engineering schools, for example.

12 Established in a review conducted of public higher education websites, confirmed in informal conversation with IKR higher education officials and university faculty members.

13 University of Koya website http://www.koyauniversity.org/, accessed December 13, 2014


17 These shifts are further elaborated in Chapter Three


19, Sweden’s central bank established the Nobel Prize for Economics Sciences. It was first awarded in 1969 (Sveriges Riksbank) in memory of Alfred Nobel (see http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/index.html).

20 Free to Choose and Tyranny of the Status Quo, were published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich in 1980 and 1984, respectively. See Friedman’s bio at http://www.edchoice.org/The-Friedmans/Milton-Friedman-s-Bio.aspx.
21 The Reagan Administration’s first economic development plan was entitled America’s New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery (Cannon 2000, 199).
22 Galbraith (2008) noted these as political freedom, particularly the freedom to participate in the democratic process, and the right to certain basic human needs (Galbraith 2008, 24).
23 Research funding at U.S. universities jumped almost fivefold from 1953 to 1963, from $515 million dollars to $2.5 billion (Kerr 2001, 142).
24 The ‘Research I’ classification was last used in 1994. Research intensive universities are now classified ‘RU/VH: Research Universities (very high research activity)’
25 Kerr was ostensibly fired in a no confidence vote by the California Board of Regents, not by Reagan personally (Cannon 2003, 277).
26 Funding for Pell Grants increased by 27 percent (after adjustment for inflation) during the Reagan administration (Verstegen 1990, 369).
28 A term coined by Michel Foucault, ‘governmentality’ is an amalgam of ‘governing’ and ‘mentality.’ It is used to describe the techniques of governing.
30 For example, differential tuition for fields perceived as close to the market, such as engineering and applied sciences, or for international students (Slaughter and Cantwell 2012, 596).
31 Social mechanisms defined as “a constellation of entities and activities that were organized such that they bring about a particular type of outcome” (Kaidesoja and Kauppinen 2014, citing Hedström, 2005).
32 The Higher Education Act was originally enacted in 1965 (P.L. 89-329, 11/8/1965). The law is reauthorized every four to six years. During the late 1960s and early 1970s there were three such reauthorizations: 1968 (P.L. 90-575, 10/16/1968), 1972 (P.L. 92-318, 6/23/1972) and 1976 (P.L. 94-482, 10/12/1976).
33 According to the 1997 U.S. Census report Money Income in the United States: 1997, the threshold of the top 5 percent tier of household income was $126,550 (p. xi).
34 http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
36 For a relatively complete list of legislation affecting U.S. competitiveness, see Slaughter and Rhoades (2004), p. 57. Of these, the Stevenson-Wydler Act of 1980, the Cooperative Research Act of 1986, and the National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989 had the greatest effects on university-government-industry relations. These laws respectively shaped the framework for cooperative agreements with government and industry, protected such relationships from anti-trust suits and safeguarded innovations developed through these partnerships from disclosure (Powell and Owen-Smith 1998, 256, Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 56).


The motivations for U.S. universities (as in the Panamanian case) to engage in academic capitalism are discussed elsewhere in Chapter Three.

Universities classified as very high research activity institutions and doctoral research universities according to the 2010 Carnegie Classification; National Center for Educations Statistics, IPEDS Fall Enrollment (2009),

http://carnegieclassifications.iu.edu/summary/basic.php.

This provision of the ETP was later implemented as a “graduate tax,” which extracted a portion of the income earned by graduates to pay their contribution to their university studies (Yizengaw 2003, 11). Chapman (1999) has discussed the rationale for and derivation of the tax (Chapman 1999).

I use the term ‘derivative university’ to describe an offshoot of a parent university which later becomes independent.

Today, Jordan has a total of ten public universities, with Al-Hussein Bin Talal University, Tafila Technical University and German Jordanian University founded in 1999, 2005 and 2005, respectively.

Burke and Al-Waked (1997) claim that the Jordanian government used study abroad from the 1950s forward as a safety valve to educate citizens in fields in which it lacked training capacity, even after universities were established (Burke and Al-Waked 1997, 2). Even as late as 1996, the World Bank estimated that as many as 30,000 Jordanians per year studied abroad (World Bank 1996, 2). Reiter (2002) cites capital flight as one of the main reasons the government established universities in Jordan (Reiter 2002, 142).

Enrollment in higher education had increased 33 percent between 1989-90 and 1994-95 (World Bank 1996, 2).

The national secondary exam in Jordan is the General Secondary Certificate Examination, or Tawjihi (Goussous 2015).

According to Buckner 2013, the University of Jordan admitted 3,511 students through the government’s unified admissions process and 3,407 students into the parallel program in 2012-2013 (Buckner 2013).

Istaiteyeh (2011) compiled this data from various official sources including the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Istaiteyeh 2011, 135).

KSh = Kenyan Shilling

Calculated by the author from historical interest rates at Index Mundi (http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/kenya/inflation, accessed August 28, 2015)


Bridge programs are designed to help prepare students who do not meet minimum cut-off scores on national entrance examinations to achieve university admission. This pre-university
training targets weaknesses carried over from secondary education and is therefore typically composed of math, science and language courses (Mwiria et al. 2007, 30).


56 In the case of Ethiopia, however, the World Bank did promise funds to support capacity-building for income generation (World Bank 2004, 16).

57 Private universities do not have parallel programs, but charge the same tuition for each student (Istaiteyeh 2011, 134).


60 A brief KMHESR statement on November 21, 2010 entitled the “Parallel system of education in Kurdistan Region,” announced the release of regulations to govern the parallel programs.

61 Minister Ala’Aldeen’s parallel education system lapsed with the electoral ouster of his Prime Minister and key supporter, Barham Salih. Minister Ala’Aldeen subsequently resigned in 2012.