Egyptian Attitudes toward Democracy: What the Afrobarometer Reveals about the Influence of Individuals’ Social Characteristics

Sofia Rukhin

Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science
In Sociology

Dale Wimberley, Chair
Nicholas Copeland
Paulo Polanah

May 4, 2015
Blacksburg, VA

Key words: Egypt, the Egyptian revolution 2011, democracy, Afrobarometer, individuals’ social characteristics

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ABSTRACT

This study intends to investigate the influence of age, education, gender, degree of religiosity, income, type of residence, interest in public affairs, social and political trust, and employment status on attitudes toward and interpretations of democracy among 1200 Egyptians living in urban and rural areas who participated in the Afrobarometer survey in 2013. The author uses principle component and regression analyses to test hypotheses about current state of political culture in Egypt after the Arab Spring of 2011 and before the military coup. The variables age, gender, employment status, residence type, and social trust have not been found significant in any of the observed models. Higher income individuals, compared to those with lower incomes valued democratic principles less – instead preferring unlimited control by one party or President – and were more likely to assess the term democracy negatively. More educated citizens tend to positively evaluate occupational gender equality and rejection of one party-one man rule, while less educated prefer material rights over free and fair elections and freedom of speech. Religious citizens tend to show more support for lawful actions imposed by executive governmental bodies on ordinary citizens than less religious people. Higher levels of political trust is positively associated with attitudes toward the term democracy and one party-one man rule. Finally, people interested in public affairs vs. those who are not interested tend to possess negative attitudes toward the term democracy.
# Table of Contents

ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................................... ii

Chapter 1: Research Problem .............................................................................................................. 1

Chapter 2: Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 3

  The State of Egypt in Years Preceding the Revolution: 1981 to 2011 ........................................ 4

  How Does This Study Fit the Global Political Picture? ............................................................... 7

  Why Egypt? ..................................................................................................................................... 10

Chapter 3: Literature Review .............................................................................................................. 13

  What Does Democracy Encompass? Conceptualization of the Dependent Variable “Interpretation of Democratic Principles” ......................................................................................... 13

  Democracy, Capitalism, and Economic Inequality ........................................................................ 19

  Conceptualization of the Dependent Variable “Attitudes toward Democratic Principles” ....... 23

  Modernization Theory of Democratization and Religiosity .......................................................... 27

          The Influence of Other Social Characteristics on Interpretations of Democracy and Attitudes toward it .................................................................................................................. 32

Chapter 4: Model ............................................................................................................................... 44

  Key Points from the Literature Review ......................................................................................... 44

  Conceptual Framework .................................................................................................................. 45

  Restatement of the Research Problem ........................................................................................... 47

Chapter 5: Methods ............................................................................................................................. 50

  Data: Sample Design and Survey Methods ..................................................................................... 55

Chapter 6: Measurement ...................................................................................................................... 58

  Dependent Variables: Principle Component Analysis and Indices ............................................... 58
Data Analysis Strategy 59

Chapter 7: Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 60

Independent Variables 60

Individual Economic Index 60

Political Trust Index 66

Other Independent Variables 69

Dependent Variables 71

Hypotheses Testing 78

Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 92

Appendix .................................................................................................................................................. 105

References ............................................................................................................................................. 113

**List of Figures**

Figure 1: Assumptions Check for Model 1 .............................................................................................. 109

Figure 2: Assumptions Check for Model 2 .............................................................................................. 110

Figure 3: Assumptions Check for Model 3 .............................................................................................. 111

Figure 4: Assumptions Check for Model 5 .............................................................................................. 112

**List of Tables**

Table 1: Dependent Variables: “Democratic Orientation/Attitudes” ......................................................... 51

Table 2: Independent Variables ............................................................................................................ 53

Table 3: Cronbach’s Alpha for Items Used to Create an Individual Economic Index, N=1773 .. 63

Table 4: Total Variance Explained for Three Observed Variables Measuring Economic Conditions, N=1173 ............................................................................................................................................. 64
Table 5: Component Matrix for Three Observed Variables Measuring Economic Conditions, N=1173

Table 6: Cronbach’s Alpha for Items Used to Create an Index of Political Trust

Table 7: Cronbach’s Alpha for Items Used to Create an Index of Political Trust

Table 8: Dependent Variables’ Measurement and Source

Table 9: Pattern Matrix with Factor Loadings, N=1156

Table 10: Component Matrix, N=930

Table 11: Component Matrix, N=1053

Table 12: Component Matrix, N=1127

Table 13: Description of Models

Table 14: Model 1. OLS Regression: Support for Occupational Gender Equality

Table 15: Model 2. OLS Regression: Attitude to General Performance of Democracy

Table 16: Model 3. OLS Regression: Support for One Party/One Man Rule

Table 17: Model 4.1. Multinominal Logistic Regression: Essential Characteristics of Democracy

Table 18: Model 4.2. Multinominal Logistic Regression: Essential Characteristics of Democracy

Table 19: Model 5. OLS Regression: Support for Procedural Aspects of Legitimate Coercion

Table 20: Frequency Distribution of Age

Table 21: Frequency Distribution of Gender

Table 22: Frequency Distribution of Education

Table 23: Frequency Distribution of the Importance of Religion

Table 24: Frequency Distribution of the Interest in Public Affairs

Table 25: Frequency Distribution of Residence Type
Table 26: Frequency Distribution of Essential Characteristics of Democracy .................. 106
Table 27: Descriptive Statistics of Gender Equality .......................................................... 106
Table 28: KMO and Bartlett's Test of Occupational Gender Equality .......................... 107
Table 29: Total Variance Explained of Occupational Gender Equality ....................... 107
Table 30: Descriptive Statistics of General Performance of Democracy ....................... 107
Table 31: KMO and Bartlett's Test of the General Performance of Democracy ............ 107
Table 32: Total Variance Explained of the General Performance of Democracy ......... 107
Table 33: Descriptive Statistics of One Party/One Man Rule ......................................... 108
Table 34: KMO and Bartlett's Test of One Party/One Man Rule .................................. 108
Table 35: Total Variance Explained of One Party/One Man Rule ............................... 108
Table 36: Descriptive Statistics of Procedural Aspects of Legitimate Coercion ............. 108
Table 37: KMO and Bartlett's Test of Procedural Aspects of Legitimate Coercion ......... 108
Table 38: Total Variance Explained of Procedural Aspects of Legitimate Coercion ...... 109
Table 39: Coefficients for Model 1 .................................................................................. 109
Table 40: Coefficients for Model 2 .................................................................................. 110
Table 41: Coefficient for Model 3 .................................................................................... 111
Table 42: Coefficients for Model 5 ................................................................................... 112
Chapter 1: Research Problem

The purpose of this research is to analyze whether individuals’ social characteristics of the Egyptian citizens such as age, education, gender, income, employment status, degree of religiosity, level of political and social trust, interest in public affairs, and residence type (urban vs. rural) influence their attitudes toward democratic values and their interpretations of democracy. If there is an impact, its effect should also be analyzed. Generally, democratic principles encompass a wide array of aspects including but not limited to gender equality, freedom of speech, free and fair election process, the supremacy of law over individual or collective unlawful decisions. The knowledge about the influence of social determinants on democratic views is especially important because views often stimulate real political actions of citizens, which is definitely true in case of the Egyptian chain of pro-democratic revolutions. Using the data from the Afrobarometer survey conducted in Egypt in 2013, the author investigates the relationship between selected social determinants and attitudes toward democratic principles as well as interpretations held by respondents and measured in the survey. The author quantitatively analyzes the data and draws meaningful conclusions concerning the relationship between views on democracy in the political context and respondents’ social features.

An essential part of the study consists in formulating its conceptual framework that relates theoretical democratic constructs with empirical survey variables. It is also important to find theoretical justification from previous studies about the potential influence of certain social characteristics on supporting or opposing democratic values. The research is seen to reveal results beneficial to predicting (at least partially) the political climate in the country and,
possibly, provides an analytical basis for similar works devoted to democratization issues and public opinion.
Chapter 2: Introduction

The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 is part of the revolutionary trend in the Arab world which first started in Tunisia. The main clashes in Egypt took place at Tahrir Square in Cairo on January 25th 2011, continuing until February 11th 2011. As a result, Hosni Mubarak resigned. A democratic framework united protesters around the issues of unemployment, lack of economic stability and opportunities to provide for families, political repressions and tensions between various religious groups. According to the journalist Alaa Al Aswany, “In Tahrir Square I saw Egypt fully represented: Egyptians of all ages and backgrounds, Copts and Muslims, young and old, children, women in hijab and women without, rich and poor” (Aswany 2011:ix). However, most people who participated in clashes were primarily from middle-class background and possessed university education (Tschirgi, Kazziha and McMahon 2013).

Democratic transition has never been an easy and smooth process in any country, especially in such a state as Egypt where millions of people historically suffer from political oppression, harsh socio-economic conditions, and a lack of fundamental freedoms. However, the meaning of ‘democracy’ varies across states, let alone individuals. Individuals’ perceptions of democracy shape views on how a democratic political system should work as well as how it should be achieved. In turn, these perceptions may lead people to organize not only peaceful protests in an attempt to defend democracy, but also to engage in violent clashes to overthrow an allegedly non-democratic regime (e.g. the Egyptian revolution), or in violent defenses of democratic principles and democratic the rule of law. Moreover, many studies demonstrate that people who participate in protests often not only share certain values, but also have a few important social characteristics in common (e.g. same age group, same class, approximately equal income level). For instance, the analysis of the social portrait of the protesters who
participated in the “March of Millions,” which took place in 2012 in Moscow in response to alleged fraudulent actions during the presidential elections, indicated that these protestors shared a few traits. The most active participants were men (64-71%) and respondents with higher education as well as those who possessed incomplete higher education. It also has been reported that an average protester was quite young: 65% of active oppositionists were under 34 years old (VCIOM 2012). It is also known that the most active participants of the Tahrir Square protests were mostly young, university-educated middle-class individuals (Tschirgi, Kazziha and McMahon 2013). Therefore, I find it important to test if there is an association between the individual social characteristics of a respondent and their attitudes toward democracy as well as their interpretations of what democracy is. Knowing which respondents’ characteristics are conducive to certain values may enable us to predict their relationships with government/political organizations, as well as and their patterns of their political activity. Egypt serves as an excellent case example with its latest democratic transitions.

*The State of Egypt in Years Preceding the Revolution: 1981 to 2011*

After the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Hosni Mubarak stepped into the presidency bringing significant changes to the domestic policy. These changes, seemingly democratic in nature, were thriving under the control of the authoritarian regime. The first main achievement of Mubarak’s regime is improvement in years of education among citizens. For instance, the World Bank Development Indicators demonstrate that from 1994 to 2011 percent of children enrolled in secondary school increased by 15% (from 65% to 80%) (WB 1994-2011). However, in comparison with other Arab countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan, Egypt’s spending on education were very modest (Hill 2000). This positive contribution
gradually contributed to the development of politically active youth willing to influence politics, and, thus, exert pressure on authoritarian structures of the state (Tschirgi, Kazziha and McMahon 2013). Another major improvement that occurred during Mubarak’s terms and which eventually contributed to overthrowing the regime was the relative freedom of association and assemblies. Another factor promoting relative democracy was seen in compromises achieved in 1999 between radical Islamist groups and the government (Zuhur 2007). Mubarak also allowed private satellite television channels to transmit news partially criticizing the government’s policies. This news shed light on failures of the government to provide basic services to citizens including drinking water, electricity, and others (Tschirgi, Kazziha and McMahon 2013). Although the government later limited the freedom of television channels by sentencing their owners to prison, these reversals could not erase the fact that the hypocrisy of the regime had been revealed to the public. The third area of improvement that backfired for the regime was Internet penetration, which became available not only for urban citizens, but also for those who resided in the countryside. Relatively cheap, Internet communication quickly became an innovative platform for political activists, creating great opportunities for them to mobilize their supporters and share information concerning planned anti-government demonstrations (Tschirgi, Kazziha and McMahon 2013). Internet helped maintain strong and weak network ties in Egypt and worked more effectively than other media including TV, radios and newspapers (Zhuo, Wellman and Yu 2011). The fourth area of state “success” that had unintended consequences was the autonomy of the armed forces. Their commanders were appointed in accordance with their professional achievement, and not on the basis of family ties. During the unrest, the army’s independence allowed them to decide whether to support the government or the opposition. Their decision turned out fatal to the Mubarak’s regime (Tschirgi, Kazziha and McMahon 2013). These internal
tendencies did not absolutely determine the coup d’État, but definitely made conditions ripe for the regime to collapse. The overall authoritarian direction of Mubarak’s Egypt was partially diluted with democratic changes, and instead of fostering citizens’ loyalty to the regime as “semi-democratic” and producing less pro-democratic demands, these transformations inspired the citizenry to persistently pursue their agenda.

Conflicts born during Mubarak’s presidency encompassed political, economic and social spheres of the Egyptian life. From the political point of view, the risk of potential succession of Mubarak’s son, Gamal, and fraud in political elections in 2011 which prevented the Muslim Brotherhood from occupying Parliament seats, soured attitudes toward the regime among the public. From the economic point of view, the society had been exhausted by poverty, unemployment and low wages. By 2000 public expenditures had remained very modest and had significantly declined for some government activities, which seemed a sign of neglecting the state’s social responsibilities (Hill 2000). Prior to the revolution, half of the Egyptian population had lived on less than 2 dollars a day. The public health care system did not function effectively either, failing to provide citizens with even minimal services (Aswany 2011). Again, during 1981-1995 government’s spending on health care on average accounted for 2.5% of all government expenditures, which was a low indicator compared to Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan. Trade union movements, including a string of strikes starting from 2004, and overall economic grievances were perceived by the administration as temporary phenomena which would evaporate as soon as the benefits of the economic growth touched the masses. Economic protests were generally smoothed out by negotiation with protesters; however, this principle was never applied to political protests. The government was generally more concerned about the public’s dissatisfaction with the economic situation of the state, rather than with political protests. The
assumption was that their society cared far less about political rights and freedoms than about economic stability. As such, Mubarak could never anticipate that citizens worrying about the poor economy, on the one hand, and those who demanded political rights (in addition to the segment lobbying changes in all important areas), would ever form an alliance as a strong opposition to the regime (Tschirgi, Kazziha and McMahon 2013).

The paradox of Mubarak’s regime could be described as a confrontation between the social forces he released and the authoritarian regime he nurtured. The rise of entrepreneurial groups willing to combine material wealth and political power could not be controlled within Mubarak’s political milieu. Economic liberalization promised a decent life for every citizen, but in reality widened the gap between the rich and the poor, ultimately worsening economic conditions for all, including high school and university graduates suffering from high unemployment rates. The degree of dissatisfaction with the economic performance reached a critical point months before the revolution. Mubarak could proceed in two directions: either allow further democratic reforms or control opponents to the fullest. Choosing the former, the Egyptian leader did not expect that the regime would lack “the capacity to suppress the massive outpouring of protest throughout the country” (Tschirgi, Kazziha and McMahon 2013:26).

*How Does This Study Fit the Global Political Picture?*

Every social or political conflict should be analyzed and understood within “the larger structural setting in which it occurs” (Buechler 2000:64). One of the central structural elements in several major social and political conflicts since the 1990s, and before, was public discontent observed in national, regional and transnational protests challenging neoliberal policies flourishing around the world. Neoliberal reforms had exacerbated national and global economic
disparities, and were often implemented by thin democracies and sometimes by overtly authoritarian regimes. Initially, neoliberal policies were presented as focused on keeping inflation under control, elevating poverty, creating jobs and accumulating capital. Despite its success in keeping inflation down, neoliberalism has not provided better well-being for all. Some states advance at the expense of others; however, periods of economic success quite often alternate with devastating economic crises. The same is true for individuals of different class positions within the same society as the wealthy get richer due to “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2005:170). Thus, economic conditions for the poor worsen. Overall, rooting of neoliberalism entailed such serious repercussions as overall commodification and privatization (2005). For instance, Reagan and Thatcher implemented policies for privatization of state-owned production, reducing expenditures on welfare and lowering taxes for corporations (Ayres 2004). Promises of “wellbeing for everyone” were not realized as social welfare, education, health system and other crucial components of state’s support were cut off. Structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and the World Bank for borrowing countries led to privatizing state-owned production, harsh austerity programs and exacerbating problems of developing economies rather than bailing them out as it happened, for example, after the 1997 Asian crisis in Indonesia and Thailand (Stiglitz 2002). As pointed out by J. E. Stiglitz, despite a promise of a better life and poverty reduction, poverty actually increased by 100 million (2002). The poorest region in the world – Sub-Saharan Africa – experienced an income decline of 2% as a result of trade agreements. No less devastating consequences of the Washington consensus were observed in the majority of Latin American states. One of the crucial controversies cited by opponents was the hypocrisy of these policies aimed at dismantling trade barriers in the developed countries, but keeping markets closed for certain products in the developed world
(Stiglitz 2002). As neoliberal policies became dominant, the failures of the free market sparked anti-neoliberal movements and/or revolutions all over the world at different times – in Latin America (most countries there rejected the Washington Consensus and elected anti-neoliberal leftist governments in the 2000s); North America, in several European countries, in the Arab World and other locations.

Consequently, the Arab spring has not been the only manifestation of public dissatisfaction with neoliberal governance and a low quality of life. Inspired by the Arab Spring, Westerners not only supported the riots, but also responded expressing essentially synonymous discontent towards failures of governance and economic inequalities in their own countries. Following the Middle Eastern riots, by May 2011 Southern European crisis had led to a series of youth uprisings in Spain designated as indignados. Similarly to North Africans, indignados expressed their rejection of the corrupt banking system, police brutality, and austerity measures undertaken by the government (Akbaba 2013). Another set of alarming issues addressed by indignados replicated the Egyptian experience: incredibly high unemployment rates at 21.3% (the highest in Europe) and even higher for young adults aged 16-25 – 43.5% (Dhaliwal 2012). A few months later Occupy Wall Street held their first official campaign at Zuccotti Park in New York. On September 17, 2011, “occupiers” formulated their basic collective views of failures of the American democracy – devastating economic inequalities caused by “corporate greed” and “the loss of democratic representation by elected officials who are beholden to special interests” (Skinner 2011:4). The message resonated with citizens of other states who joined the international Occupy Movement. Global engagement against the major “by product” of capitalism – inequality – was found in apparent contradiction with the governments’ response trying to prevent the public from engaging in protests. In regards to Egypt, despite overall public
support of the revolution, governments found themselves hesitating “until the last moment between supporting the revolution and backing Mubarak, their dictatorial ally” (Aswany 2011:x). Active political position of protesters can be seen as a sign of the crisis of State authority and overall “crisis of hegemony” in social, political, and economic spheres of life (Gramsci 1999).

*Why Egypt?*

The Egyptian revolution is an important case which, along with others, constitutes one in a series of anti-neoliberal revolutions. However, it is significant in its own right, and the causes of the Egyptian conflict cannot be reduced solely to a fight against capitalism, and should also be understood in light of longstanding struggles for democracy in that country. For decades Egypt was known as one of the most authoritarian states in the world (Akbaba 2013), and, despite a few preceding protests, Egyptians managed to overthrow the president ruling the country for 30 years only in 2011. During Mubarak’s terms Egypt has seen the most outrageous treatment of its citizens – unfair military trials, torture in police cells, prosecution of gay men, aggravated measures against innocent people suspected as terrorists, administrative detention without any reasonable explanation, and forced evictions as well as discrimination of religious minorities (Amnesty-International 2010). Such a long-awaited historic breakthrough in stagnant political life after the Revolution of 2011 should have sharpened the attitudes or significantly transformed the attitudes toward democracy and its definitions. It is equally fair to claim that it was demonstrated during the 18-day protest that the alternative to authoritarian hegemony is not an unachievable reality. It is clear that the Egyptian society as well as the world community witnessed a remarkable moment in the history of Egypt, where, despite the threat of political repressions and unveiled violence against countrymen, rebels did not obey. Representatives of
various political tendencies came together to end the hated regime of injustices represented in the face of Hosni Mubarak. It is no less remarkable to note that in spite of the strong foreign support for Mubarak from the U.S., Israel and a few Arab countries, the resistance of the people as well as support of the army made it possible for an initially successful revolution to happen.

As many of observers and analysts claimed, Egypt was not going to be the same anymore after 2011 uprisings, as a new democratic future was ahead (Aswany 2011). The Muslim Brotherhood party leader Mohamed Morsi was chosen in the first democratic elections. After Morsi was sworn into presidency in June 2012, his controversial draft constitution, as well as an apparent attempt to build an Islamist state, were perceived by the significant portion of the society as non-democratic measures, distorting the legacy of the bloody revolution. Morsi’s government’s underperformance was one of the additional reasons for public resentment (Masoud 2015). Egyptians responded in a 3-day protest which ended, again, with a coup d'état on July 3rd, 2013. Morsi was arrested, all members of the Muslim Brotherhood were condemned as terrorists and their bank accounts were frozen. Unlike events in 2011, anti-Morsi protests did not unite the country in a unison chant against the by-then-leader of the country. Egypt was found torn apart between various groups of protesters – supporters of Morsi, supporters of the army and opponents of both. It is hard to claim whether the defeat of Morsi’s government was a revolution won by people or coup d'état initiated by the Army. Events of late June to the beginning of July 2013 also have set a warning precedent in the country, where the first democratically chosen leader was deposed by the military, and the defense minister took over a few months later. A month after Morsi’s ouster, one thousand Muslim brotherhood supporters were killed by the army forces (Masoud 2015). Current President el-Sisi’s policies haven’t yet met the public’s expectations and, moreover, have shown that political repression and violence
against peaceful assemblies are el-Sisi’s preferred method of communication with the society. As has been seen, de jure revolutions occurred in the name of democracy, but the de facto outcomes were not as expected. One reasonable explanation of Egypt’s case as well as other uprisings in the Arab World is an apparent clash of modernity (democratically-oriented citizenry) with rigid tradition in the face of authoritative aggressive regimes.

To summarize, Egyptian massive non-violent protests of 2011 demanding better social and economic conditions developed into a more global and complex confrontation, which led to the ouster of the President and a “protracted struggle to democracy” (Basok 2014:3). We conclude that ousting the dictator did not result in an immediate and permanent democratic transition for Egypt or in economic improvements, making it obvious for millions of Egyptians that if there is a path to democracy, it is not a short and smooth one. There is no need to elaborate further why Egypt with its latest political transition back to authoritarianism serves as an excellent and unique example for this study, especially due to the fact that similar studies have not utilized the data collected in months preceding the military coup of 2013. The data available from Afrobarometer were collected in 2013 between March 8 and March 19, a few months before the downfall of Morsi’s regime. These survey responses might reflect the public’s perceptions of the Egyptian political reality months before the Revolution of 2013.
Chapter 3: Literature Review

What Does Democracy Encompass? Conceptualization of the Dependent Variable
“Interpretation of Democratic Principles”

As long as democracy is one of the central concepts used in this work, it is especially important to review how scholars have defined this term. The ambiguity associated with it is hard to overcome as there is a great number of definitions proposed by social scientists from various professional positions across the spectrum. Democracy theorist and political sociologist Adam Przeworski (1991) argues in *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, that a “democratic political regime” is a “competition” organized by “rules” in a system, with “multiple political forces” constantly vying for power; no one can predict the outcome of any election for sure, therefore, “uncertainty is institutionalized”. Another important feature of democracy derived from that definition is “devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules” (Przeworski 1991:14). Apparently, scholarly opinion may not coincide with the public view on what constitutes a democratic political regime. Notwithstanding, public expectation is not homogenous; we may find great variance in expectation even among members of the same social strata within a society.

*Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government* by Przeworski (2010) offers another definition of democracy, stating that every member of a democratic society should possess an equal chance to take part in the political process; people’s voice should have an equal weight. It is tempting to say that that “equality on a political landscape would lead to socio-economic equality” (Rukhin 2014:4), thus, democracy and socioeconomic equality may sound relatively synonymous. Nevertheless, Przeworski states that this view does not hold up in reality (Przeworski 2010). His standpoint is that every individual in society is apriori unequal due to the
fact that every member possesses different abilities and comes from different backgrounds, and this fact leads to different achievements. Even in a situation of complete equality, any society will produce and reproduce an unequal distribution of privileges and merits. The same sentiment is often articulated by opponents of Marxism who criticize its idealistic faith that a society of equals will emerge after a long-awaited proletarian revolution. According to Przeworski, even though capitalist societies are more conducive to democracies compared to other economic systems, successful functioning of the market generates wealth for business owners, thus, putting workers in a disadvantageous position when the only source of income for them is selling their labor. Consequently, absolute socioeconomic equality even within a democratic system should be seen as a utopian ideal.

In other words, Przeworski believes that democracy is a political rather than a socioeconomic revolution, ideally bringing equality of political rights among unequal and anonymous citizens. Implementation of their equal political rights, according to him, goes hand in hand with anonymity: “All individual qualities are left at the doorstep of democratic politics; they are irrelevant for the status of citizens. But this means only that anonymity is a veil over the inequality that exists in society” (Przeworski 2010:67). Thus, even effective exercising of political rights does not free any society from the inequalities of social and economic realms. Status differences in democratic political regimes are dismissed, not because they are nonexistent, but rather because ideally they should be kept hidden when it comes to political participation. However, Przeworski admits that quite often the rich find ways to use their privileged economic status to influence political affairs. In that case, he claims, “the condition of political equality is violated” (Przeworski 2010:68), thus, democratic regime is threatened. This theorist makes several underlying assumptions in his analysis of democratic development that
should be pointed out: first, democracy develops only within market economies; second, material inequalities are always inevitable; third, equality of political rights is the essence of democracy, and material rights is not a necessary part; and fourth, democracy can function effectively, despite economic disparities in the society.

Needless to say, Przeworski’s theory is just one of many. Heterogeneity in terminology should prompt us to consider the existence of various levels of definitions, or “basic” and “advanced” understandings of democracy. The authors of “What Democracy Means to Citizens – and Why It Matters” make a distinction between “minimal” and “maximal” conceptualizations of democracy: “The former focus on the importance of ‘means’, that is, procedures such as fair elections, respect for human rights, and universal suffrage. In contrast, maximal definitions include not only democratic procedures but also ‘ends’, or outputs (such as economic equality and social services)” (Baviskar and Malone 2004:4). It seems reasonable to claim that Przeworski’s variant of the definition can be categorized as a “minimum” conceptualization of the term while arguments concerning economically equal individuals who take part in the political process relate to the maximal definition of democracy. This differentiation between minimum and maximal definitions may help us draw important conclusions about the relationship between respondents’ attitudes toward them or respondents’ interpretations and what attributes of their social status are connected/not connected to their perceptions.

Przeworski’s definitions of democracy should be labeled not only as “minimal”, but “procedural” as well, because they reduce the term “democracy” solely to the political regime. Procedural definitions are often preferred by democracy theorists for the purposes of measurement, but others criticize this narrow understanding because it leaves aside many complex interactions between the regime, the State and the citizenry (Cullell 2012). Cullell states
that democracy should be analyzed on three different levels: First, it is regime, which characterizes “democracy as only legitimate means of selecting government” accompanied with “free, fair, competitive, decisive and periodic elections”, “political freedoms and rights”, and “universal citizen enfranchisement” (Cullell 2012:11). Second, a democratized State is also a component of democracy because it is supposed to enforce rights, “subordination of authorities to the law”, “horizontal accountability”, and “opportunities for direct citizen participation in policy making” (2012:11). Third, democracy exists within societal level supported by democratized society that support “rights and liberties”, “societal accountability”, “societal (private) institutions and groups subject to the law and to the exercise of political rights” (2012:11). The author claims, though, that even the most democratized states can’t be functioning fully on the basis of democratic governance due to the fact that every State employs coercive instruments in their monetary, fiscal, and industrial policies (2012:11). However, this limitation may not be accepted and understood by the public; as a result, respondents’ interpretations of democracy are not necessarily expected to coincide with a scholarly stance. Moreover, they might reflect contradiction with the theoretical analysis.

Contrary to levels of democratization, Robert Dahl described seven institutions emphasizing institutional and procedural aspects of democracy that in addition to the aforementioned categories include “the right to run for office”, “freedom of expression” (as relating “rights and liberties”), “alternative information” (Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1997:163). In general, understanding of democracy through the framework of institutions and procedures of democratic governance is quite common among scholars. Governments and international NGOs treat democracy in the same vein, which is why it is expected that ordinary citizens may tend to define democracy in the same rhetoric of free and fair elections, majority rule, and similar terms.
Respondents may also define democracy as vague outcomes such as “freedom and liberty” (Dalton, Sin and Jou 2007). A survey of 49 nations analyzing meanings respondents attach to democracy in a series of open-ended questions, revealed 5 major clusters of meanings: 1) “freedom, civil liberties, and citizen rights”; 2) “democratic institutions or democratic political process”; 3) “social benefits”, implying social and economic development, stability, justice and equality; 4) miscellaneous responses that could not be included in any consistent group; 5) no substantial definitions (respondents could not define the term). The authors emphasize the fact that the way respondents define democracy has an independent effect on attitudes toward it (Dalton, Sin and Jou 2007:145). Even though liberties and democratic political process are common sentiments to which respondents relate, there are societies where citizens claim that the notion of economic redistribution is central. For instance, a study conducted in South Africa in 1995 showed that 91.3% of respondents see the essence of democracy in “equal access to houses, jobs and a decent income” (Bratton and Mattes 2001). Thus, it is also likely that equality may be seen as the central concept associated with democracy, leaving other aspects ignored.

Using data obtained in 1992 and 1995 through surveys conducted in Russia and Ukraine, Miller, Hesli and Reisinger analyzed how people in the newly “democratized” countries defined democracy. The analysis of open-ended questions revealed that ordinary citizens were more likely to emphasize “freedoms” – “freedom of speech”, “individual choice”, and “freedom of beliefs”. Very few of them articulated a connection between democracy and the economic system (“equal opportunities”) (Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1997:170). The authors conclude by saying that Russians and Ukrainians were more concerned about freedoms rather than about the rule of law, majority rule or equality as potential characteristics of democracy. It is also reported that freedom to express one’s opinion without the fear of repression was “clearly the model
feature in the ordinary citizens’ understanding of democracy” (Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1997:175). The results of this particular study are very endemic to these countries and also reflect then-recent political, social and economic transitions”. Results yielded from the Egyptian’s survey of 2013 might well reflect different specifics.

A similar study was conducted in several Arab countries – Jordan, Palestine, Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait – where respondents were asked to define democracy. Even though 86% of respondents believed that “democracy is the best form of government” and 90% confirmed that democracy “would be a good or very good system of governance for the country in which they live”, in an open-ended question many of them described democracy in economic terms rather than in terms of political rights and freedoms (Jamal and Tessler 2008:98). Half the respondents in Algeria, Jordan and Palestine claimed that the most valuable element of democracy is to “to change the government through elections” and “freedom to criticize government”, while the rest of participants claimed that democracy implies “providing basic necessities like food, clothing, and shelter for everyone” or “decreasing the income gap between rich and poor” (Jamal and Tessler 2008:99). The authors believe that for most Arab countries economic concerns are the most urgent problem, which is why respondents might see democracy as a “useful” form of government for solving social problems. They might associate the concentration of political power with the maintenance of economic inequality. This view is also supported by other findings which suggest that these countries’ citizens are more critical of their governments in relation to economic hardship they face, than to the lack of political freedoms. It is noted by the authors “Understanding Democracy – Data from Unlikely Places” that in addition to the political dimension of democracy, people (especially in developing countries) normally articulate the social sentiment of the meaning – “social rights as social services, providing for
those in need, and ensuring the general welfare of others” (Dalton, Sin and Jou 2007:44). In measuring support for specific features of democracy, the authors identified the following democratic essentials emphasizing principles of diversity of opinions, social tolerance and gender equality: “it is important to have political leaders who are open to different political opinions”, “[I] do not mind having neighbors of a different race”, “men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages” (Jamal and Tessler 2008). As opposed to some other prominent democracy theorists, Jamal and Tessler imply that values of individualism inherited in the society are not the necessary element of democracy.

*Democracy, Capitalism, and Economic Inequality*

Many sociologists disagree with Przeworski’s thesis about the inescapability of economic inequality in democracy, and emphasize the fact that democracy (which in Przeworski’s view is characterized by the presence of political rights) cannot exist without relative economic equality. Availability of political rights cannot be assured if sharp economic inequality is present. This stance makes more sense when we take into account examples of contemporary “capitalist democracies” that are more accurately described by the term “neoliberal democracies”. These regimes work for the benefit of the wealthy as long as “a relative handful of private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of social life in order to maximize their personal profit” (McChesney 1999). As noted by McChesney, celebration of free markets, unrestricted personal choice, competition and individual liberty perpetuated by the public after the Cold War have been used as a rationale for policies (lower taxes, spending cuts on education and welfare programs) that facilitate the accumulation of financial resources among the wealthy. Every attempt to undermine the existing order, in the center of which is the corporate world, is seen as
an attack on the market, which in turn is understood as the only “fair, and democratic allocator of goods and services” (McChesney 1999). The problem with this “allocator” is its mythical fairness which in reality always leads to reinforcement of the gap between the rich and the poor by redistributing resources in favor of the few wealthy (Giroux 2014). In other words, promoters of corporate interests describe contemporary capitalist societies known for highly unequal distribution of material privileges as fair and democratic. The consequences of policies favoring the rich are inevitable – progressively developing inequality, unstable political and economic situations across the globe, deterioration of the quality of life and its unavoidable impact on public health and other determinants of social well-being. But the effect of neoliberal policies is not limited to widening the gap between the lower and high income individuals. Another problem is that government policies aimed at alleviating inequalities and helping citizens in need, are declining in magnitude, hence, the government is losing its function as a welfare provider. Neoliberals would call it an essential training for people to “make the most of their lives” while not relying on “safety-net” (Giroux 2014). However, people have to rely on the government’s assistance as long as they can’t confront the system apriori working against them.

Neoliberals’ positive descriptions of contemporary capitalist economy do not mean that they and other people living in this era fail to see obvious disadvantages encompassed in this regime. Proponents of neoliberal policies claim that capitalism is the only effectively functioning economic mechanism, and all other systems such as “communist societies, social democracies, and even modest social welfare states” have already failed (McChesney 1999). It is claimed that they have failed not only economically in terms of providing wealth and economic opportunities for the masses, but they have also proved unreliable in terms of developing democracies around the world. In turn, advocates argue, neoliberalism has opened doors for democratic dialog. But in
reality this dialog does not allow the civil society to challenge businesses, and have a say over decisions affecting peoples' lives. Therefore, in spite of claimed democratic development, the world has seen the growth of weak and formal democracies favoring “trivial debate over minor issues by parties that basically pursue the same pro-business policies regardless of formal differences and campaign debate” (McChesney 1999).

In other words, “trivial debates” are necessary for corporate interests because they create an illusion of flourishing democratic states without interfering with profit-making, thus assuring that people are satisfied with their quasi-democratic participation and will not attempt to critically question the existing order. According to Noam Chomsky, it does not matter where and when capitalism is developing, as long as it will never try to create or support the creation of real participatory democracy. This statement is in stark contrast with Przeworski, who is sure that democracies are almost always developed in free market economies. Furthermore, as opposed to Milton Freedman, who equated democracy with profit-making, Chomsky believes that democracy can never co-exist with capitalism. This does not necessarily mean that genuine democracy may definitely develop in any other economic and political system, but over the years failures of the free market economy proved that it is an unlikely event in a capitalist state. Chomsky also debunked the myth of free markets, which never actually provide an arena for competition among multiple economic actors because “most of the economy is dominated by massive corporations with tremendous control over their markets” (McChesney 1999).

Without the regulation of financial capital, weak democracies often develop into capitalist authoritarianism, which already led to two World Wars in the twentieth century (Weeks 2014). Authoritarian regimes quite often are skillfully concealed under a variety of masks. For instance, the Italian fascist regime did not promote anti-Semitism until late in its history, and,
known as one of the cruelest dictators, Joseph Stalin employed very progressive educational, cultural, and health care policies partially reminding us of democratic political measures (Wolin 2008). During Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency a lot of effort was put into supporting education, the poor, creating jobs for millions of unemployed Americans, and regulating businesses. In reality, in spite of the FDR administration’s seeming attempt to build a liberal social democracy and control capitalist production, in reality, all aforementioned actions were instrumental in saving capitalism “by promoting employment, decent wages, education, and a cushion against the cyclical swings endemic to capitalism” (Wolin 2008:22).

Going back to Przeworski’s definition of democracy as a competitive reality with multiple political actors and institutionalized uncertainty, we should come to the conclusion that this does fit well major capitalist systems we have known to this day. Russia, for instance, has not observed real political struggles between various parties. For that matter, we have not seen much uncertainty in political outcomes of the superficial competition in Egyptian politics. In my view, it is highly unlikely that political uncertainty will exist if politics remains immensely influenced by a few gigantic economic players. Another aforementioned aspect of Przeworski’s definition is that in democracy everyone should have an equal chance to participate in politics and have their voices equally weighted also casts doubt on comparability of democracy and capitalism, as we have discussed above. The gate to participate in politics and influence it is open to the wealthy members of a capitalist society. If you come from a less prosperous background, your voice will probably contribute to “trivial debates” only. These trivial debates, however, never address discussions concerning e.g. economic policies and economic redistribution.

Even though A. Przeworski claims that inequality is inevitable in any political system, including capitalism, he nonetheless believes that capitalism is more conducive to democracy
than the alternatives. His major argument is concerned about the essence of a democratic political regime. Democracy, in his view, encompasses political rights only, and its definition should not be extended to include equal material rights, which is an unreachable utopian ideal. But even political rights are ignored when it comes to, for instance, state violence against peaceful protesters demonstrating disagreement with policies (Giroux 2014), especially economic policies. In addition, Przworski’s argument does not account for degrees of inequality, ranging from the minimal to extreme divisions of wealth. With this in mind, Baviskar and Malone’s point about differentiating between minimal and maximal conceptualizations of democracy would indicate that the minimal (political and human rights) in reality cannot survive without the maximal (economic rights), or equal political rights cannot be guaranteed when mass poverty and extreme wealth go together in one society. Without some basis of economic rights, political rights will be gutted, or rendered meaningless. On this ground, I think it is extremely important to include socio-economic equality as a core democratic principle and measure respondents’ attitudes toward it.

**Conceptualization of the Dependent Variable “Attitudes toward Democratic Principles”**

The complexity of the term “democracy” is only partly due to the existence of multiple definitions. Another problem, especially for sociologists, involves finding the main components of the concept so that series of indicator questions can be made to measure it, for instance, attitudes toward this or that particular underlying concept. In the article “Modernization, Islam, or Social Capital: What Explains Attitudes toward Democracy in the Muslim World” a professor of political science at Kansas State University, Sabri Ciftci, uses the fourth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) to analyze what social determinants, if any, influence perceptions of democracy in ten Muslim countries, including Egypt. Even though I will discuss the independent
variables he employed later in this work, I would like to point out how he measured the outcome variable: attitudes toward democracy. Applying factor analysis, the author divided all his evaluation statements relating to democracy into two main groups – diffuse and specific support for democracy. Diffuse support related to general, overall support. A lack of diffuse support can be seen in affirmative responses to questions such as “Do you agree that democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling?” (Ciftci 2010:1449). Specific support, or lack thereof, would be demonstrated by reactions to questions about particular features of democracy; for example: “Do you agree that in democracy, the economic system runs poorly?” (Ciftci 2010:1449).

Another example of how the overall concept of democracy has been operationalized is illustrated by Amaney A. Jamal, professor of political science at Princeton. She measured attitudes toward democracy and democratic systems by using two questions from the WVS: “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government (Strongly agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree)” and “I am going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing your country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing your country (Very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way)” (Jamal 2006:61). It is not clear based on the description of the last question if it actually contained any specific descriptions of democratic systems or not. Using these questions the author constructed an index measuring attitudes toward democracy in general and employed it as an outcome variable. In my view, using these two questions for measuring relative support for democracy is not reliable; more questions could generate a more defined and specific index, achieving a broader range of surveyed information. Another issue with this study is that Jamal explores attitudes toward
democratic regimes, but there is a lack of questions actually investigating what respondents mean by democracy, e.g. what features they attribute to it. I assume that the author’s objective was not to explore a wide array of understandings respondents hold concerning democracy, but to measure their support or lack of thereof in connection with “objective” democracy’s criteria based on commonly accepted definitions found in the literature review.

Another scholar of Islam, professor of political science at Michigan State University, Mark Tessler, investigated the influence of a number of social indicators on attitudes toward democracy in four Muslim countries. To do so, Tessler used individual level public opinion data from Palestine (West Bank and Gaza, 1995), Morocco (1995-96), Algeria (1995-96) and Egypt (1988 and 1992). The importance of democratic values in the Egyptian (1988) survey was measured using agreement or disagreement with the four following statements:

1. “Parliamentary government is the preferred political system.”
2. Whether a respondent “prefers liberal democracy to Arab nationalism, socialism, and Islamic government.”
3. Whether a “respondent prefers a competitive political system along the U.S. or European model.”
4. If s/he “disagrees that western values are leading to the moral erosion of our society.”

(Tessler 2002:351)

It should be mentioned that the author implies that liberal democracy and capitalism always go together; thus, the assumption is that Arab nationalism and socialism are undemocratic in nature. The level of commitment to democratic principles in cases of other countries was measured by asking questions that emphasized freedom of speech, accountability of the
government, fair elections, political pluralism and development of the democratic institutions considered as central principles of democracy in the political landscape.

In turn, professors Michael Hoffman and Amaney Jamal explored how participation in protest activity amongst Tunisians and Egyptians was correlated with Islamic religiosity. They used the second wave of Arab Barometer for Tunisia and Egypt, and this dataset is very similar to the Afrobarometer survey. The outcome variable really measured not attitudes toward democratic government but gauged actual involvement/noninvolvement in pro-democratic protests. It uses the following question: “Did you participate in the protests against [president’s name] between [dates of protests] former President?” A simple dichotomous variable and the authors’ choice of it are justified by the purpose of their research (Hoffman and Jamal 2014). Similar questions from the Afrobarometer dataset may be relevant for my study as well.

Ephraim Yuchtman-Ya’ar and Yasmin Alkalay offer a more detailed operationalization of the dependent variable. Using the same WVS dataset, the authors intended to measure the influence of a few traditional factors such as education, income, gender, etc. on seven dimensions of democratic orientation: “attitudes toward democratic government” (e.g. “Having a democratic political system is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing your country”), “Evaluation of democracy’s performance (e.g. “Democracies are not good at maintaining order”), “Support of elected political leaders” (e.g. “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections is a very good/fairly good/fairly bad/very bad way of running this country”), “Approval of secular political leaders” (e.g. “It would be better for this country if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office”), “Priority of democratic values” (“First and second choice of the most important thing from the following list: “maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in important government
decisions, fighting rising prices, protecting freedom of speech”), “Attitudes toward civil political action”, “Attitudes toward gender and equality in public life” (Yuchtman-Ya’ar and Alkalay 2010:125).

**Modernization Theory of Democratization and Religiosity**

The question of which social status characteristics, if any, determine the Egyptians’ (Middle Eastern) attitudes toward democracy has already been explored in social sciences; however, there are few available empirical studies devoted to this topic, due to the lack of data. There are a few notable works that employ publicly available datasets to approach this issue, such as the previously mentioned World Values Survey (WVS), Arab Barometer and others. The study by Sabri Ciftci, briefly discussed in the previous section, uses the fourth wave of the WVS to answer this research question. Ciftci’s hypotheses concerning factors that influence individual attitudes toward democracy in the Muslim world are derived from three theories – modernization theory, social capital theory and the religious values approach (Ciftci 2010).

According to modernization theory, a path towards democracy starts with socioeconomic modernization that, eventually, brings political modernization. This quite broad term “modernization” can be broken down into its main constituents such as urbanization, increasing levels of education, social equality, wealth, and the spread of media. Therefore, “citizens who hold and appreciate these values emerge as a by-product of this process” (Ciftci 2010:1445). In addition to these aforementioned indicators, working and middle classes are also seen as strong supporters of democratic principles. All in all, modernization is expected not only to urbanize and educate, but to secularize values held by citizens. In turn, secularization “softens” conservatism and fosters democratic awareness.
However, modernization should not be seen as a monolithic process directly leading to changes in the socioeconomic environment with parallel changes in individual attitudes. As noted by Ciftci, modernization is a complex process, taking place in different institutionalized environments, and may result in various cultural values and socioeconomic conditions even within one particular state. For example, to the contrary of the ideal modernization theory, middle and working classes might be dependent on the government’s support and subsidies; therefore, socioeconomic modernization may not nourish individual support for democratic values. Middle and working classes are able to influence authoritarian and totalitarian practices only if they are quite independent from the state. Otherwise, extensive provision of various free services by the state along with subsidies nourish citizens’ loyalty to the government and decrease chances to ever challenge it (Ciftci 2010).

Taking into account the specific context of Middle Eastern countries where there is an established “mutually beneficial” relationship between states and certain social groups (such as owners of state enterprises and organized labor), it seems that the creation of an independent private sector may lead to the disempowering of authoritarian Middle Eastern States (Ciftci 2010). However, this is a doubtful conclusion in terms of such wealthy countries as Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and a number of others as oil trade (as a wealth generating activity) implies little dependence on citizenry. Egypt is not on this list.

Another challenge posed by modernization theory, Ciftci points out, is its relationship with religiosity. It is not clear if democratically-oriented cultural values are a result of positive consequences of democracy or, on the contrary, these values foster democracy. Solving this dilemma, the author provides an argument by political sociologist S.M. Lipset, who claims that cultural attitudes embedded in Islam counteract democratic principles. On the other hand, it is no
less reasonable to suggest, as said R.F. Inglehart, that progressive change in the economic environment is a stimulus for cultural/religious changes and leads to acceptance of democratic governance. Thus, in accordance with the cultural interpretation of the modernization theory, Ciftci suggests that people who are supportive of gender equality and who demonstrate tolerance in their attitudes are more likely to positively appraise principles of democratic governance.

Amaney A. Jamal argues that while modernization brings dramatic changes in the educational level of citizens – which, in turn, results in more secular values and, therefore, more positive attitudes toward democracy – support for Islamism “is more a function of poor socioeconomic conditions than of other prevailing explanations, namely politicocultural accounts” (Jamal 2006:52-53). The author explains that religion and political Islam became the core values of those people who pursued careers in government during the Egyptian economic boom in the 1980s, but who did not benefit from it. According to Jamal, for them, religion and political Islam were emotional bailouts in a desperate life situation where they had to supplement their embarrassingly low salaries from government jobs by moonlighting as taxi drivers or janitors (Jamal 2006).

Another paradigm Jamal offers states that Islam is incompatible with democracy because in any form it does not allow its adherents to demand democratic changes – Muslims are more likely to accept authoritarian power; the vast majority do not accept gender equality, there is no division between the church and state, and Islam does not promote education or competition for higher incomes (again, capitalism and democracy are assumed to be synonymous). Despite a significant number of scholarly works that support this point of view, recent opinion polls in a few Arab countries and some of scholars of Islam indicate that Islam and a positive outlook on democracy can be compatible (Jamal 2006). Professor of political science, Mark Tessler,
suggests this disagreement between scholars may only indicate the fact that there are certain components of Islam and overall Muslim tradition which are conducive to democracy as well as there are those which are not (Tessler 2002). This view is more nuanced than the others that assume a homogenous conception of Islam.

In Tessler’s study of four Muslim countries and their attitudes toward democracy, mentioned previously, he discovered that, in spite of the fact that for Morocco and Algeria there was no significant relationship found between religiosity and attitudes toward democratic norms, Palestine and Egypt showed that personal piety and appraisal of democratic norms are inversely associated: the more religious the person is, the more likely that they will be more skeptical or negative about democracy. However, based on the empirical research, the author concludes that Islam does not seem to be such a great obstacle to the development of democratic values as might have been suggested. In case of Egypt, democratic orientation was measured based on the preferred model of government (“parliamentary systems and liberal democracy” vs. “socialism, Arab nationalism and Islamic government”), and in the 1992 survey it was evaluated depending upon the importance of open and competitive elections to the respondent. In a later study conducted in Egypt in 2000, Tessler analyzed data from 2756 interviews concluding that the majority of Egyptians express support for democracy (no information is provided concerning operationalization of the democratic support) and that their religious orientations are not significantly related to it. Moreover, strong Islamic attachment was not found to be negatively related to support for gender equality (Tessler 2003).

The study “Religion in the Arab Spring: Between Two Competing Narratives” proves to be quite supportive of Tessler’s conclusion concerning Islam not being an obstacle to accepting the democratic values (Hoffman and Jamal 2014). Involvement in protests was chosen as a
dependent variable; the results of the analysis demonstrated that citizens who reported reading the Qur’an were much more likely to participate in protests than those who did not, even though communal prayer seems to correlate inversely with participation in protests, (though it was not statistically significant in Tunisia or Egypt). Therefore, Qur’an reading seems to play a more crucial role in determining involvement in protests, or, in other words, developing pro-democratic attitudes. The authors suggest that those Muslims who read it deeply internalized the notion of equality and that is why they actively opposed extreme social inequalities, corruption and other indicators of a “predatory” nondemocratic regime. Participation in the protest itself does not tell us much about what specific ideas of democracy protesters hold, but it is reasonable to suggest, taking into account a variety of economic problems around which the protest’s narrative developed, that the protesters’ views on democracy included notions of economic redistribution.

As seen, I probably should not expect the investigation of the relationship between commitment to Islam and attitudes toward democracy in this research to show an unambiguous negative or positive association, as the outcome will depend a lot on the choice of dependent variable in the dataset. Analysis of the relationship “religiosity – democratic values” is especially interesting because the Afrobarometer survey in Egypt was conducted in 2013, at least 6-7 years after the public opinion polls to which Amaney A. Jamal refers and more than 20 years after the other public opinion polls Tessler uses (and about a year later than the Arab Barometer survey used in the study by Hoffman and Jamal). One more chronological advantage of my study is that the Egypt Afrobarometer survey took place almost two years after revolutionary changes in the country. Therefore, I suggest that its results might capture significant changes or at least “sharpening” of attitudes among Egyptians.
Even though the primary focus of this study is to understand the impact of social characteristics on attitudes toward democracy, I should not ignore the fact that the definition itself, as discussed before, is quite complex and “overloaded”. Thus, it is also important to pay attention to respondents’ interpretations of democratic principles and what features they attribute to them. As long as I use the secondary dataset, I have to rely on items already included in the questionnaire. For example, there are a series of questions that directly ask respondents which of the named features describe a democratic political regime. Therefore, my hypotheses discussed further in this work will highlight not only the attitudinal side of the dependent variable, but also the definitional side of it in the view of respondents.

*The Influence of Other Social Characteristics on Interpretations of Democracy and Attitudes toward it*

Another approach to explaining the attitudes toward democratic principles lies in social capital theory. Relying on past studies, Ciftci claims that social trust (general trust in people) as well as trust in political institutions (political trust) are often associated with increasing support for democracy (Ciftci 2010). Despite its reasonable rationale, it also might be argued that this theory does not really work in Arab societies where social and political trust would imply support for already existing authoritarian regimes; in such contexts, lower levels of trust seem more conducive to democratic principles. Alternately, higher levels of generalized social and political trust foster support for democracy in states where democracy already exists to some degree. Social trust is often more generally referred to as social capital, the notion that “social relations can facilitate the production of economic and non-economic goods” (Paxton 2002:256). One of the forms which social capital takes is social trust; however, it may acquire other forms
such as obligations, sanctions, traditions and others. The relationship between social capital and democracy is conventionally, as mentioned above, viewed as direct: the higher the level of social capital in the society, the more likely it is to acquire a democratic political regime (Paxton 2002). Nevertheless, Paxton’s study of the relationship between social capital and democracy reveal that this relationship should be seen as reciprocal as well as negative in certain contexts. For example, membership in associations where members have multiple ties with other organizations tend to promote democracy in contrast to associations with fewer ties. In his study Ciftci also suggests that the relationship between social/political trust and attitudes toward democratic values can be negative for some states, as well as positive for others. Hence, the author tests the influence of the following independent variables: education, income, “the effect of the perceived membership of class” (Ciftci 2010:1450), “perceptions of gender equality”, social tolerance, religiosity (“frequency of attending religious services” and “the importance of piety in public officials as perceived by individuals (political Islam)”) and “the desire for the government involvement”, social and political trust) on attitudes toward democratic principles of governance. The author uses the following control variables: age, gender, satisfaction with finances, and the country for which the data are available. In Tessler’s study of commitment to Islam and its relationship with democratic values, he employed age, gender, income, and education, interest in politics and unemployment status as controls, and he measured Islamic religiosity using two variables (reading of Qur’an and mosque attendance) as independent variables. Notably in Ciftci’s study, income and education were included as independent determinants while controls included age, gender and satisfaction with finances.

Ciftci’s study demonstrates that the cultural interpretation of modernization theory proves to be quite relevant in explaining democratic attitudes in ten chosen Muslim countries, including
Egypt. Economic interpretations seem to be relevant to a lesser extent as well. As suggested by the author, OLS regressions show that social tolerance and positive opinion on gender equality are positively correlated with positive views on democracy. Education and income prove to be significant predictors of diffuse and specific support for democracy. Moreover, education seems to be a better predictor of diffuse support for democracy while higher income predicts more efficiently specific support. Tessler has also found that economic considerations (both personal and considerations of the country’s economic performance) have a much greater influence on democratic orientation than religious attachment (Tessler 2003). Neither perceived class membership nor the view on the government’s involvement are found to be statistically significant. Going back to the social capital theory, it is concluded that political trust is associated with positive attitude toward democratic values while social trust is significant only for the specific support model. In a study of Russian and Ukrainian citizens’ perceptions of democracy, people who expressed a lower degree of social trust were also more likely to emphasize the importance of the rule of law, compared to those who trusted others (41 and 28 percent respectively). It is suggested that the rule of law seems crucial in democracy because it provides protection from the social environment these people do not trust (Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1997). On the other hand, citizens who express trust toward others associate democracy with the “majority rule”.

Religiosity does not seem to be a significant determinant of attitudes toward democracy. This conclusion is supported in a study by Jamal and Tessler analyzing the interplay of Muslim religiosity and individual support for democracy in Jordan, Algeria, Palestine, Morocco, and Kuwait. The study reveals insubstantial support for arguments made by Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama, both of whom claimed that Islam and support for democracy are paths in two
opposite directions. Jamal and Tessler identified an apparent exception: they predominantly (54% on average) supported Islamic democracy (“Men of Religion Should Influence Government Decisions”), while 46% disagreed with this statement saying that leaders should be secular (Jamal and Tessler 2008:46). Despite this fact, respondents with varying degrees of religiosity did not demonstrate many significant differences in their perception of fundamental democratic values. Analysis of voting practices in several African countries confirmed a different hypothesis, namely that religiosity (not necessarily Islam) might influence whether a person votes in political elections. Kuenzi and Lambright found out that respondents who described themselves in ethnic and religious terms are more likely to participate in elections compared to those who prefer not to describe themselves in the aforementioned categories (Kuenzi and Lambright 2010). Views on democracy and privatization turned out to be quite different between religious citizens and educated men in several Arab countries: both groups support democratic governance. However, religious people tend to oppose privatization as a feature of democracy while the other group associates democracy with private property (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif and Meyer 2007). It should be mentioned that Egypt was among the countries where religious people were against privatization. The authors suggested that in Egypt and other states that are not oil-rich, respondents fear that too much privatization will exacerbate hard economic conditions for the working-class people that constitute the majority.

An additional argument in favor of considering income (or perception of class membership) as an independent factor influencing attitudes about democracy can be found in Przeworski’s “Self-enforcing Democracy” (2005). Przeworski’s argument is supported by public opinion surveys conducted in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the 1990s. It is said that 59% of respondents in Chile “expected that democracy would attenuate social inequalities”; in Eastern
Europe these numbers ranged from 61% in Czechoslovakia to 88% in Bulgaria (Przeworski 2005). The beginning of 1990s turned out to be the time of serious economic hardships when the vast majority of citizens in these countries suffered from apparent lack of financial resources. I suggest that in this desperate life situation, low-income citizens would advocate for socio-economic equality as a vital aspect of a democratic regime. It is no less logical to assume that high-income individuals who are much more satisfied with their economic conditions would oppose the principle of socioeconomic equality as an essential characteristic of democracy and, most likely, will express negative attitudes toward it. In addition to that, as Przeworski posits, “If they are self-interested, people who have little chance to earn a high income under capitalism prefer socialism; people whose earning potential is restrained under socialism prefer capitalism. Hence, preferences about economic systems have class bases” (Przeworski 1991:104). The influence of employment vs. unemployment status on democratic support (which can be used as a proxy for class if the dataset includes no indicator for income) was analyzed for Sub-Saharan African countries. No statistical difference was discovered; however, those who were inactive in their job search demonstrated less support for democracy (García-Peñalosa and Konte 2014). Research analyzing voting patterns for a sample of African countries revealed that lower income individuals were more likely to participate in elections than their wealthier fellow citizens. The authors explain this fact by saying that the poor might hope to change their condition, which is why they prefer to use their right to vote. On the other hand, their economic problems also make them more susceptible to the political promises of competing parties. In countries where the question concerning income was omitted from the Afrobarometer questionnaire, the authors used a proxy “How often does your family go hungry?” to evaluate the impact of the individual economic circumstances on voting practices (Kuenzi and Lambright 2010). The effect of gross
family income was also analyzed in other countries, for instance, in China. Family income was found statistically significant and positively related to support for democracy among females with higher education relating to the middle-class Chinese and lower-income citizens. Support for democracy was measured in three categories – “right consciousness”, “valuation of political liberty”, and “popular participation” (Chen and Lu 2011:707). However, overall support for democracy from the majority of the middle-class Chinese was labeled as negative. Chen and Lu explain it by the middle-class’s close and dependent relationship with the party-state and overall satisfaction with the economic conditions under the regime (Chen and Lu 2011).

A study conducted by an American political scientist Alan I. Abramowitz demonstrated different results. His findings based on data from the 2012 American National Election Study reveal that differences in income did not have significant impact on political behavior of respondents such as voting in Presidential elections 2012, nor did it appear to affect their (respondents’) opinion on political decisions. Abramowitz states that “race, partisanship and religion had much stronger effects on Americans’ political attitudes and behavior in 2012” than income, and “family income was only weakly related to presidential voting decisions” (Abramowitz 2014). “When race was used as a control variable, the data suggested that there was no connection found between political preferences and family incomes for African Americans and whites, but there were some significant difference for Hispanic families” (Rukhin 2014:5). Abramowitz suggests that American citizens value their partisanship more than economic self-interest — a statement that is in stark contrast with Przeworski’s claim. Republicans, no matter of their level of income, supported spending cuts while Democrats favored increased spending (Rukhin 2014). In the present study we are not going to investigate the influence of race on acceptance of democratic principles in the Egyptian society because the
dataset does not contain this information. In addition, the analogous survey by WVS that I reviewed demonstrated that Egyptian samples tend to be racially homogeneous.

In addition to the independent factors discussed above, there are authors who employ the respondent’s type of residence – urban vs. rural – as this factor may explain differences in interpretations of democracy. The authors of “Conceptions of Democracy among Mass and Elite in Post-Soviet Societies” found that urban citizens of Russia and Ukraine were more likely to choose the rule of law as the primary feature of democracy while people living in rural environments tended to emphasize freedoms. The authors suggest that urban areas seem more threatening and require special attention, so that explains the prevalence of this answer among urban residents. Rural citizens, as well as more educated respondents and those who are more involved in politics felt that freedoms are the foundation of democracy. Less-well educated citizens as well as those with low levels of political involvement tended to identify the rule of law as the central concept defining democracy. The latter subgroups mostly negatively assessed democracy (Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1997). In the analysis of support for democracy in Sub-Saharan countries based on Afrobarometer datasets, urban residents were more supportive of democracy than rural, however, controlling for access to the news decreases the level of significance on urban residence to 10% compared to 1% (Kuenzi and Lambright 2010).

Gender is no less an important factor, and should be taken into consideration in our analysis. Even in democratic regimes, women initially did not possess many political privileges, including the right to vote: “The right to vote in various elections, now regarded as absolutely fundamental to democracy, not only excluded women, but was linked to the ownership of property or subject to other limitations” (Rush 1992:79). In this respect women in Western states seem to occupy a more privileged position than females in Muslim and predominantly Muslim
countries. Egyptian women, despite, for instance, achieving suffrage in 1956 (Chase and Hamzawy 2013:96), are still subject to a variety of formal restrictions not known to Western women, and are subject to informal prejudice which unfortunately is common in Muslim and non-Muslim states alike. Therefore, I anticipate that the influence of gender on attitudes about democracy may be significant. Even though we cannot be absolutely sure of what kind of impact gender has on attitudes toward democratic governance in the case of Egypt, studies discussed above and some others provide evidence that females tend to be more skeptical about democracy. For example, the Pew Research Center reports that attitudes toward democracy are not drastically different between men and women in the predominantly Muslim countries (some Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries) however, “there are few gender differences, with the exception of Pakistan where a higher percentage of men than women feel democracy can work (63% vs. 51%)” (Pew-Research-Center 2005). In an analysis of Afrobarometer surveys in sub-Saharan countries, males tended to be more supportive than women for democratic regimes. Support for democracy in that study was measured with a binary variable derived from the following question: “Which of these three statements is closest to your opinion?”:

(1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government;

(2) In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable;

(3) For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have;

(4) I don’t know

(García-Peñalosa and Konte 2014:10)

Analysis of the interaction term between gender and interest in political affairs reveals that once women become interested in politics, they indicate support for democracy. On the other hand, comparison of Arab and non-Arab societies suggests that female sex is also negatively related to
democratic support. At the same time, studies conducted in Ghana, Zambia, and South Africa revealed that there was no difference in support for democracy among men and women (Bratton and Mattes 2001). As is the case with any social research, a crucial point is conceptualization and measurement of a dependent variable and specific features of samples due to their influence on final results as well as statistical operations.

Previous studies touching on similar topics usually include education as a conventional factor in shaping citizens’ perceptions. Many of the authors reviewed in this chapter suppose that an individual’s support for democracy is a function of formal education, and that individuals’ support for democratic values leads to establishing democratic regimes. Thus, it is believed that there is direct association between democratic political regimes and an educational level of citizens: more educated societies are more likely to occur under democratic regimes than in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Compared to people with less education, educated citizens are much more interested to participate in the political process and establishment of effectively functioning institutions. This can be explained by the fact that individuals with higher levels of education come from more educated and politically involved/interested families (Kuenzi and Lambright 2010). I believe that from this point of view, interest in public affairs and education may play similar roles as independent factors influencing attitudes and/or interpretations. Using cross-country data, economists also usually assert that higher levels of education and income of citizens are more conducive to democratic regimes (García-Peñalosa and Konte 2014). The study by Castelló-Climent concludes that “if formal education provides political attitudes conducive to democracy, the likelihood of a country establishing and maintaining a democratic regime will be higher, the larger the educated population in the society” (Castelló-Climent 2007:189). Based on the study, the author supports the aforementioned conclusion that more educated citizens value
their active participation in political process more than less educated citizens. This may be explained by the fact that the group of more educated citizens are also often richer than the rest, and their desire to articulate their political voice is largely motivated by pragmatic interest for preserving socio-economic privilege. This would imply that their interpretation of democracy might not be bound up with economic redistribution, or they are quite likely to view socio-economic equality negatively. Comparison of Arab and non-Arab societies in terms of the influence of socio-economic factors on attitudes toward democracy showed that in Arab societies university education was positively significantly related to democratic values; however, the same relationship did not prove significant for a sample of non-Arab societies (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif and Meyer 2007). As indicated by David H. Kamens (1988), the formula “the more, the better” does not always work. He acknowledges that there are studies supporting the conclusion “the more educated, the more democratic”, but there are also empirical data casting doubt on this argument. For instance, a survey in Austria revealed no significant correlation between level of education and rejection of anti-Semitic attitudes. A similar study conducted in the U.S. showed that higher levels of education are strongly and negatively correlated with anti-Semitic orientation (Kamens 1988). The author states that the role of education in the development of democracy and democratic attitudes depends upon the context. Studies by Evans and Rose as well as by Mattes and Mughogho indicate that primary years of schooling has crucial impact on the endorsement of democracy and rejection of authoritarian regimes, while higher levels of education are limited in their influence (García-Peñalosa and Konte 2014). The effect of formal education on the interpretation of and support for democracy has been estimated using Round 3 Afrobarometer databases, which include 18 sub-Saharan African countries. According to the finding, education is positively associated with overall support for democracy. More specifically, education has a
strong effect on willingness to desire to “confront bureaucratic intransigence and demand accountability”. Across the rest of democratic values offered for evaluation, however, the impact of education is almost non-existent (Mattes and Mughogho 2009:12). In regards to African countries, Bratton and Mattes state that the ability to formulate a general definition of democracy was a direct function of respondent’s years of schooling (Bratton and Mattes 2001).

The effect of age on attitudes toward and interpretations of democracy should also be taken into account. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press reports that its public opinion poll conducted in several Muslim countries (Egypt was not included) showed that attitudes towards democracy are changing across age groups as well. For example, “‘Indonesia is the only predominantly Muslim country in which there is a significant age difference in these opinions, with more respondents under age 40 than older people expressing the view that democracy can work there (44% vs. 34% of those age 40 and older)’” (Pew Research Center 2005; Rukhin 2014:7). It may seem that younger generations hold a more positive opinion on what democracy is capable of. In the Zogby poll of Egypt it was found that younger Egyptians (under 25 and 25-34 years old) hold a more positive attitude toward the U.S. democracy than older citizens (Tessler 2003). General questions concerning support for democracy and gender equality drawn from World Values Survey (1999-2003) in several Arab (including Egypt) and non-Arab states concluded that in Arab societies older people tend to be more positive about democracy as a form of governance than younger people, although older people also tend to disregard gender equality. In another research project conducted by M. Kuenzi and G. Lambright, the authors use Afrobarometer datasets acquired from surveys in 10 countries to analyze the influence of demographic, socio-political and contextual variables on voting practices. Even though voting does not necessarily indicate support for democracy or defining
democracy in any particular way, age was found to significantly predict voting vs. non-voting in political elections. Older people tend to be more politically involved than their younger counterparts (Kuenzi and Lambright 2010). However, similar research in such countries of the African continent as Ghana, Zambia, and South Africa has not revealed any significant statistical differences in democratic attitudes between people of different age groups (Bratton and Mattes 2001). Similar results were drawn from a probability-sample survey of middle-class Chinese and their support for democracy. Using age as a control variable, the authors conclude that age did not seem to influence support for democracy among respondents (Chen and Lu 2011). It is important to note that there is no unified effect of demographic factors as well as any other socioeconomic and contextual variables, as their impact largely depends upon the operationalization of the concept, methodology, sample design, and social context.
Chapter 4: Model

Key Points from the Literature Review

The review of the broad literature relevant to the present study can be summarized in a few key points: the core theoretical democratically oriented values include socioeconomic equality; positive attitudes toward free and fair elections; attitudes toward the fact that the voice of each member of society should be equally heard and weighted; the presence of multiple political forces; limited power of the government; gender equality; respect for human rights, and universal suffrage. General, or diffuse definitions may emphasize effectiveness/non-effectiveness of democracy compared to other political systems in general, while more specific definitions highlight such features as the ability to sustain order in a country, provide stable economic conditions for its citizens, accountability of the government, political pluralism and development of the democratic institutions, political competition and parliamentary government, and involvement/un-involvement in pro-democratic protests.

However, theoretical definitions of democratic values might differ from those offered to respondents for evaluation in actual surveys. For example, in theory these values may encompass a wide array of “minimal” definitions, while in surveys respondents might be asked about both “maximal” and “minimal” understandings (Baviskar and Malone 2004). More specifically, as discussed earlier, material rights are not always considered the main democratic principle by theorists (Przeworski 2010), but respondents usually find it the most prominent feature of democracies.

According to previous research, attitudes toward democratic governance to some degree are influenced by certain social determinants which include age, gender, education, income (or
perceived class membership), satisfaction with financial situation, race, general social and political trust, religiosity, partisanship, interest in politics and unemployment status, and whether a respondent resides in urban or rural environment. Different authors include some of these variables in their lists of independent factors while others often employ standard indicators as gender, age and education merely as control variables.

While operationalization of most independent variables of interest is quite conventional and does not represent a complex question, religiosity can be defined in various ways, as we saw in similar studies by Tessler and Ciftci, and those different definitions may lead to different results. Religiosity for Muslim countries participating in public opinion polls was explained in terms of reading Qur’an, mosque attendance, accepting political Islam, and perceiving the “laws of God” as the most influential life guides.

*Conceptual Framework*

My first hypothesis comes from studies that investigated similar research questions, but used different datasets with data collected in earlier time periods:

*H1: Gender equality. The higher an individuals’ income and education, and the lower her or his religiosity, the more likely she or he is to express positive attitudes concerning gender equality.*

The second hypothesis is:

*H2: General performance of democracy. The higher respondent’s interest in public affairs, the lower political trust index, the higher level of education, and income, the more likely they are to demonstrate positive attitudes toward general performance of democracy.*
The third hypothesis is:

**H3: One party-one man rule.** Females compared to males, respondents residing in rural areas compared to those in nonrural areas, less educated respondents compared to more educated respondents, respondents with low level of political trust compared to those with higher political trust, and low income citizens compared to high income citizens, are more likely to support usurpation of power by one party and/or President.

The fourth hypothesis is broken down into 2 sub-hypotheses:

**H4: The most essential characteristics of democracy**\(^1\).

**H4.1:** Older people, as well as respondents with lower level of education and unemployed are more likely to name socioeconomic equality as the most essential characteristic of democracy on the contrary to freedom of speech, compared to younger, more educated, and employed people respectively.

**H4.2:** Individuals possessing less income, those with lower levels of education, and respondents who are not very interested in public affairs, are less likely to choose free and fair elections over equal material rights as the most crucial characteristic of democracy, compared to individuals with higher income, more education, and more interest in public affairs.

The fifth hypothesis is articulated as follows:

**H5: Legitimate coercion.** Older respondents; females; religious respondent; and, citizens with a higher level of political trust, lower level of social trust, higher income and more education, are more likely to support the state’s procedures of legitimate coercion than younger

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\(^1\) Most of my hypotheses include multiple independent variables, but the reader should interpret these hypotheses as additive and not as interactions.
respondents; males; non-religious respondents; and those with a lower level of political trust, higher level of social trust, and lower income.

My unit of analysis is the individual. Concerning the study’s scope, the population is limited to individual Egyptian citizens older than 18. This population excludes those who live in institutionalized units such as dormitories, mental hospitals, prisons and other types of institutionalized facilities (Afrobarometer 2011a). For detailed information about sampling techniques and sample construction of the Afrobarometer survey, please, refer to the subsection Data: Sample Design and Survey Methods.

Restatement of the Research Problem

Going back to the research problem formulated in the beginning of this work, I am able to elaborate on it. The purpose of this study is to understand whether and how such independent factors as age, gender, education, employment status, income, interest in public affairs, degree of religiosity, urban/rural environment, degree of social and political trust influence Egyptians’ attitudes toward principles of democratic governance and interpretations of democracy. Some aspects of these attitudes toward democracy include attitudes toward gender equality; freedom of speech/press/joining organizations; presence of multiple political forces; devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules; economic redistribution; and general perceptions of democracy.

This quantitative study of political culture is especially important because it may yield useful findings about changes in the political culture of ordinary Egyptians citizens who have undergone the difficult process of democratic transition. According to R. Inglehart, the latter seems to be impossible without a society ready for this transformation: “…democracy is not
attained by simply making institutionalized changes or through elite level maneuvering. Its survival depends upon the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens” (as cited by Tessler 2002:338).

It is no less important that the results of this study will not only be of academic interest, but also can be applicable in policymaking.

The particular advantage of this study is the secondary source of data. The Afrobarometer dataset is an international research project collecting public opinion data from African countries concerning the quality of governance and democracy (Afrobarometer, 2014). This study will use the most recent data that has not been yet widely used in such research, and these data should capture positive changes in democratic attitudes among Egyptians after the revolution of 2011. In addition, I will employ new variables such as type of residence and employment status to see how those impacted pro-democratic orientation. However, it is also possible that I will find more conservatism and skepticism about democracy than in previous similar studies because according to some accounts, citizens have not seen much change: “Mubarak is gone, but some of the pillars of his political system remain” (e.g. SCAF, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces acts the same way as it acted during Mubarak’s presidency). For example, there is “increased pressure on radical movements, and the media have been subjected to the oppressive measures of the past”; furthermore, “government bureaucracy is still stifling the poor, and corruption has not receded” (Tschirgi 2013:4).

I have conducted an extensive search for potential studies using the same dataset for my same research problem and found none. My search for similar studies was conducted through the Web of Science database, JSTOR, Sage, and a few political science journals. The key words that I used for the search were Afrobarometer; Egypt and survey; Egyptian and democracy; and Egyptians, opinion, democracy. I found several studies where Afrobarometer datasets were
employed, but the survey itself was conducted in some other countries of the African content including Nigeria, Tanzania, South Africa, and Uganda. I suggest that the reason that the dataset from Egypt particularly has not been widely used is because the data were released only in 2013 while aforementioned African countries participated in earlier rounds of the survey in the beginning of 2000s.
Chapter 5: Methods

The cases for my research are the individuals who participated in the Afrobarometer survey in Egypt in 2013. I will employ already existing variables and create new ones from the old. Generally my dependent variables are 1) individual attitudes toward democracy (positive, neutral or negative) and 2) interpretations of the concept “democracy.” The nominal definition of the first dependent variable is a subjective degree of agreement/disagreement with statements describing the importance/non-importance of certain features of democratic governance such as freedom of speech; presence of multiple political forces; respect for human rights; gender equity, and socioeconomic equality. The nominal definition of the second dependent variable is subjective choice of the feature most accurately describing what democracy is. More specifically, I will have several dependent variables relating to different dimensions of the first dependent variable (table 1). The symbol “*” in the table is used to identify additional useful dependent variables, which may be used further in the analysis, but were not initially considered to be included.
Table 1: Dependent Variables: “Democratic Orientation/Attitudes”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of democratic attitudes</th>
<th>Example of a corresponding question (statement) from the questionnaire (Afrobarometer 2013b)</th>
<th>Scale used in the question</th>
<th>Question number in the questionnaire and similar questions’ numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Gender equality”</td>
<td>Statement 1: “If funds for schooling are limited, a boy should always receive an education in school before a girl” Statement 2: “If funds for schooling are limited, a family should send the child with greatest abilities to learn”</td>
<td>Agree Very Strongly With Statement 2) Agree With Statement 3) Agree With Neither 4) Don’t know</td>
<td>Q24 (statement 1) (other relevant questions: Q18, Q22, Q23, Q24(2), Q73(ARB))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Freedom of speech/press/joining organizations”</td>
<td>“The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control”</td>
<td>Agree Very Strongly With Statement 2) Agree With Statement 3) Agree With Neither 4) Don’t know</td>
<td>Q20 (statement 1) (other relevant questions: Q19, Q20(2), Q24 (2), Q38, Q44(4)), Q45(2), Q45(3))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Government as an employee vs. parent”</td>
<td>Statement 1: “The government is like a parent. It should decide what is good for us” Statement 2: “The government is like our employee. We are the bosses and we should tell the government what to do”</td>
<td>Agree Very Strongly With Statement 2) Agree With Statement 3) Agree With Neither 4) Don’t know</td>
<td>Q21 (statement 1) (other relevant questions: Q19, Q20(2), Q24 (2), Q33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Active political involvement”*</td>
<td>“Attended a community meeting” “Got together with others to raise an issue” “Refused to pay tax or fee to government”</td>
<td>Yes (Often, several times, once or twice) No (Would if had chance or would never do this) 3) Don’t know</td>
<td>Q26 (other relevant questions: Q29, Q30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Presence of multiple political forces”</td>
<td>“Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office”</td>
<td>1) Strongly disapprove 2) Disapprove 3) Neither approve nor disapprove 4) Approve 5) Strongly approve 6) Don’t know</td>
<td>Q31(A) (other relevant questions: Q31 (C), Q31(D), Q35, Q37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Free and fair elections”</td>
<td>“We should choose our leaders in Egypt through regular, open and honest elections”</td>
<td>Agree Very Strongly With Statement 2) Agree With Statement 3) Agree With Neither 4) Don’t know</td>
<td>Q34, (other relevant questions: Q44(2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Accountability of the”</td>
<td>“Parliament should ensure”</td>
<td>Agree Very Strongly With</td>
<td>Q36 (statement 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 The symbol “*” in the table is used to identify additional useful dependent variables, which may be used further in the analysis, but were not initially considered to be included.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of democratic attitudes</th>
<th>Example of a corresponding question (statement) from the questionnaire (Afrobarometer 2013b)</th>
<th>Scale used in the question</th>
<th>Question number in the questionnaire and similar questions’ numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>government”</td>
<td>“that the President explains to it on a regular basis how his government spends taxpayers’ money”</td>
<td>Statement 2) Agree With Statement 3) Agree With Neither 4) Don’t know</td>
<td>(other relevant questions: Q36 (statement 2), Q38, Q39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules (laws)”</td>
<td>“Since the President was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong”</td>
<td>Agree Very Strongly With Statement 2) Agree With Statement 3) Agree With Neither 4) Don’t know</td>
<td>Q40 (statement 1) (other relevant questions: Q39, Q40 (statement 2), Q41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“General perceptions of democracy”</td>
<td>“Democratic regimes are indecisive”</td>
<td>1) Strongly agree 2) Agree Neither agree nor disagree 4) Disagree 5) Strongly disagree 6) Don’t know</td>
<td>Q43ARB(B) (other relevant questions: Q43ARB (A, C, E), Q44 (1), Q44(2), Q44(3), Q44(4)), Q45(1), Q57, Q58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Subjective perception of contemporary democratic issues in Egypt”*</td>
<td>“Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Egypt?”</td>
<td>1) Very satisfied 2) Fairly satisfied 3) Not very satisfied 4) Not at all satisfied</td>
<td>Q43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My independent variables include: age, gender, education, income, interest in public affairs, employment status, and degree of religiosity, whether a respondent lives in urban or rural environment, social trust and political trust. The nominal definition for the independent variable income is the following: an amount of money a person is paid for a specific time period (e.g. annual salary) but not limited to income from one’s job only (pensions and various social benefits are included as well). The dataset I am going to use does not contain a question which specifically asks about income; however, there are a few questions which give us an understanding of a respondent’s financial situation (table 2).
### Table 2: Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of an independent/control variable</th>
<th>Example of a corresponding question (statement) from the questionnaire (Afrobarometer Questionnaire, 2013)</th>
<th>Scale used in the question</th>
<th>Question number in the questionnaire and similar questions’ numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Income                                 | "Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family Gone without enough food to eat? Gone without enough clean water for home use? Gone without medicines or medical treatment? Gone without enough fuel to cook your food? Gone without a cash income?" | 1) Never 
2) Just once or twice 
3) Several times 
4) Many times 
5) Always 
6) Don’t know | Q8 
(other relevant questions: Q3b, Q4b, Q5b, Q6b, Q90, Q92, Q94, Q96, Q96-ARB, Q105) |
| Interest in public affairs             | "How interested would you say you are in public affairs?" | 1) Very interested 
2) Somewhat interested 
3) Not very interested 
4) Not at all interested | Q14 
(other relevant questions: Q13, Q15, Q16) |
| Employment status                      | "Do you have a job that pays a cash income?" [If yes, ask:] Is it full-time or part-time? [If no, ask:] Are you presently looking for a job?" | 1) No (not looking) 
2) No, (looking) 
3) Yes, part time 
4) Yes, full time | Q96 
(other relevant questions: Q96(ARB)) |
| Degree of religiosity                  | "How important is religion in your life?" | 1) Not at all important 
2) Not very important 
3) Somewhat important 
4) Very important | Q98B 
(other relevant questions: 31D(ARB), Q41(ARB)) |
| Urban/rural                            | Urban or rural primary sampling unit | 1) Rural 
2) Urban | Interviewer’s notes |
| Social trust                           | "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?" | Most people can be trusted 
2) Must be very careful | Q87 
(other relevant questions: Q88) |
| Political trust                        | "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?" | 1) Not at all 
2) Just a little 
3) Somewhat 
4) A lot | Q59 |
|                                        | 1) The President 
2) Parliament 
3) The Electoral Commission 
4) The Tax Department 
5) Your Local Government Council 
6) The Ruling Party 
7) Opposition Political Parties 
8) The Police 
9) The Army 
10) Courts of law | | |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of an independent/control variable</th>
<th>Example of a corresponding question (statement) from the questionnaire (Afrobarometer Questionnaire, 2013)</th>
<th>Scale used in the question</th>
<th>Question number in the questionnaire and similar questions’ numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11) Constitution Drafting Committee</td>
<td>“Respondent's gender”</td>
<td>1) Male</td>
<td>Q101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>“What is the highest level of education you have completed?”</td>
<td>2) Female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>“What is the highest level of education you have completed?”</td>
<td>1) No formal schooling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling)</td>
<td>2) Some primary schooling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Some primary schooling</td>
<td>3) Primary school completed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Some secondary school / high school</td>
<td>4) Secondary school / high</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college</td>
<td>school completed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Some university</td>
<td>6) Some university</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7) University completed</td>
<td>7) University completed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8) Post-graduate</td>
<td>8) Post-graduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interest in public affairs can be *nominally* defined as a subjective degree of interest in political life of a country. Another variable, employment status, is defined as whether a person has a regular full-time paid job; part-time job; does not have a job, but is seeking employment; or does not have a job and is not seeking employment. In order to use this variable in OLS regression analysis, it will be recoded into as a dichotomous variable coded as 0 vs.1 (0 – Unemployed; 1 – Employed). Degree of religiosity, most simply put, is a subjective assessment of one’s commitment to a religion. Whether a person lives in an urban or rural environment is defined by living conditions of his/her residence (whether a respondent lives in the countryside or in a more urban, industrialized environment with highly developed infrastructure and manufacturing). In turn, social trust can be described as a degree of generalized trust in people around them while political trust is a degree of trust in government and political institutions. The control variable age in its simplest definition is the number of years a person has lived since s/he
was born. Education can be defined as the highest level of education completed by a respondent. Lastly, gender is whether the respondent is categorized as male or female.

Data: Sample Design and Survey Methods

For the purpose of this paper, the Afrobarometer dataset will be employed. Egypt participated in round 5 (the year 2013) of this survey. Afrobarometer employs national probability samples to collect data. These samples meet three important criteria. First, they are collected in a way that would tend to generate a representative cross-section of all citizens older than 18 (the age when most citizens are eligible to vote). Second, every eligible citizen is given an equal chance to be selected in the sample. In order to achieve this goal, random selection methods are employed “at every stage of sampling” (Afrobarometer 2011b). Third, the data collected through probability proportionate to population size sampling (PPPS). An obvious advantage of this method is that it equalizes chances of different geographical regions presenting different numbers of population to have an equal non-zero chance to be selected in the sample. The sampling frame, as reported by organizers, is derived from the most recent census data while the margin of sampling error in case of Egypt where 1200 respondents were interviewed, is “no more than +/-2.8% with a confidence level of 95 percent” for frequency distributions (2011:1).

Overall, the sample represents a “clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample” (Afrobarometer 2011b:27). Firstly, the geographic component is taken into account in the sampling process. The stratification process starts with clustering of governmental units, such as states, regions, cities, districts and others. This step decreases the chance that some population segments are not selected. However, this survey sometimes oversampled certain social groups which seem to have an important political weight in the country so as to make sure
sub-samples of these groups are large enough to be analyzed. In my statistical analyses, I reweight cases so that these oversampled groups correspond to their proportions in the population. The proportion of the sample allocated to each stratum is the same as its proportion in the national population as indicated by the updated census figures (2011). Since neither Egypt’s nor any other country’s census data participating in the Afrobarometer provide a full list of individuals, clustering starts with such units as households or certain geographical areas. Concerning the quality of the collected data, I should take into account the fact that while stratification increases the precision of estimates by making the confidence interval narrower, clustering, on the contrary, increases the sampling error.

As reported by survey organizers, all samples are “drawn in either four or five stages” (2011). In rural areas the first stage is to select Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs). The next stage includes the random selection of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs). Generally the PSU is the smallest geographical unit about which some reliable information concerning the population is available. In the case of Egypt and other countries participating in Afrobarometer, the PSU will be Census Enumeration Areas (or EAs). One of the principles of the survey is to organize eight interviews within one EA. The total size of the Egyptian sample is 1200. Therefore, the number of EAs by which the country is divided equals 150, and “to complete the process of sample design, we allocate the 150 PSU/EA’s across the strata based on the proportion of the sample allocated to each” (2011).

Afterwards, Sampling Start-Points are chosen from each EA/PSU, so that fieldworkers will know where to start to interview within each PSU (2011a). Then interviewers randomly select Households to be surveyed. After choosing a household, an interviewer, again, randomly chooses a person to interview. His/her choice guarantees the gender balance: from household to
household, the interviewer chooses a man while balancing his/her choice with a woman in another household. The data set includes a weighting factor for Primary Sampling Units “to account for individual selection probability” (2011:92), and it is strongly recommended to apply this variable when calculating any national statistics. The distribution of urban and rural population participated in the Afrobarometer survey in Egypt is 43% and 57% respectively (Afrobarometer 2014).

The mode of data collection used in this survey is face-to-face survey interviews conducted at the household’s home setting. The interview is conducted in Arabic and the questionnaire was translated into English afterwards. The total number of participants from Egypt in 2013 equaled 1200 including 596 males and 604 females.
Chapter 6: Measurement

Dependent Variables: Principle Component Analysis and Indices

One of the dependent variables, attitudes toward democratic principles, is complex and, obviously, has different dimensions. Therefore, in order to increase validity and reliability of measurement, I have to cluster questions which, in my view, are the most consistent in describing certain aspects of this variable. In order to do so, I use principle component analysis (PCA). In social science principle component analysis and factor analysis (FA) are used as synonyms and many treat them as identical statistical procedures. However, PCA and FA have somewhat different assumptions. PCA is used to reduce the number of observed variables while FA is helpful in exploring latent structures of variables. I am not interested in exploring latent structures, but I want to decrease observed categories and calculate components. However, later in this work I will be using terms “factors” and “components” interchangeably. I will examine components after varimax rotation, then apply direct oblimin rotation. I will elaborate further on this step later in this study. Upon running the analysis, I will extract distinctive factors which pertain to different questions I initially chose. Extracted factors will not be necessarily limited only to those with Eigenvalues more than 1, but I will also consider to choose the number of factors based on total variance. If variables put in the analysis are measured in different scales, I will have to standardize them. PCA can also be used to validate items used for computing aggregate variables. This might be helpful in constructing an economic index due to the fact that the data do not include an income variable.

After calculating components, I can create regression equations to see if our hypotheses about potential relationship are supported for this dataset.
Data Analysis Strategy

After calculating components, next step is to investigate the relationship between variables employed in hypotheses formulated earlier. For this purpose OLS and multinomial logistic regression analyses will be used.
Chapter 7: Analysis

Independent Variables

It is important to screen the data to detect univariate outliers and missing data, and if many data values are missing due to nonresponse, usually missing values should be imputed with statistically identified values. For this study I have not applied imputation, but used listwise deletion instead. Generally, percentage of missing data for most variables in this dataset is quite low (specifics will be discussed further). Most likely it is due to the fact that interviews were obtained through face-to-face interviewing. In case of outliers, their values were excluded from analysis. Categories such as “Don’t know” and “Refused to answer” were added to the missing.

All discussion of data from this point on is based on having weighted all cases by the variable “within country weight” to reweight oversampled groups to correspond to their proportions in the population, as determined by Afrobarometer.

Individual Economic Index

The independent variable for income poses a particular challenge due to the lack of direct information concerning income in the dataset. The following survey items were used to create an index of economic conditions, or were initially considered for this purpose.

- Q8a. “How often gone without food”
  1) Never
  2) Just once or twice
  3) Several times
  4) Many times
  5) Always
This item was used in similar studies as a proxy for income, for instance, at *Who votes in Africa? An examination of electoral participation in 10 African countries* (Kuenzi and Lambright 2010). In the Egyptian Afrobarometer categories “many times” and “always” in response to this question were not full enough compared to “never”. It seemed more logical to combine “just once or twice”, “several times”, “many times” and “always” as one category, and “never” as the other one, thus, creating a dichotomous variable “Have you ever gone without food”. This variable is coded as 0, meaning “a person has gone without food once or more,” and 1, indicating that “a person has not ever gone without food”.

- Q90. “Which of these things do you personally own?”
  1) Q90a. “Own radio”
  2) Q90b. “Own television”
  3) Q90c. “Own motor vehicle, car or motorcycle”

These three items, initially, seemed important to include because they provide more nuanced information concerning economic status of a respondent. Question 8a about potential food shortages characterizes only the lowest level of economic “well-being”, while question 90 indicates ownership of some relatively expensive items. However, I noticed that sub-variables “own television” and “own motor vehicle, car or motorcycle” do not represent much variability in responses: 95.2% of respondents own television while 82.4% of them do not own a vehicle. In order to create an index correctly reflecting economic differences between responses, items with more variability should be used. The only variable that actually shows a great deal of variability is the ownership of a radio (49.2% do not own, while 50.8% own). The fact that 95.2% of the respondents own a television most likely means that those, who do not own radio have no necessity/desire for one, as long as they have access to television, and a TV seems a much more expensive purchase than radio. Thus, I doubt that ownership of the radio tells us much about the economic status of the person. Questions about income and ownership of property are apparent
weaknesses of this dataset, and this limitation of the Afrobarometer will be addressed in the conclusion.

- Q3b. “In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?”
  1) Very bad
  2) Fairly bad
  3) Neither good nor bad
  4) Fairly good
  5) Very good

- Q4. “In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other Egyptians”
  1) Much worse
  2) Worse
  3) Same
  4) Better
  5) Much better

- Q5b. “Looking back, how do you rate the following compare to 12 months ago”
  1) Much worse
  2) Worse
  3) Same
  4) Better
  5) Much better

Due to the lack of better information on respondents’ economic conditions, questions Q3b, Q4, and Q5b seem important to include in the individual economic index. Similar studies employing the Afrobarometer datasets also used these questions as proxies for measuring income. These questions are measured in ordinal scale, however; therefore, technically, no arithmetic procedures should be applied to them. However, these are Likert type data measured in a 5-point scale, and it means that in its cumulative form, a composite variable created from these four items, is more of a continuous nature, rather than ordinal. Hence, the composite variable I create from Q3b, Q4, and Q5b may be treated as a continuous independent variable and is subject to arithmetic procedures.
The analysis of correlation between variables Q3b, Q4, Q5b, and Q8a reveals that variables exploring living conditions are highly and significantly correlated at the 0.01 level, while the question concerning whether respondents ever experienced lack of food (Q8a) is not highly correlated with two other items. Therefore, I include questions Q3b, Q4, and Q5b in the individual economic index and omit question Q8a.

The next step is to analyze internal consistency of these three items measuring the individual economic index. For this purpose we may use Cronbach’s Alpha, inter-item correlations or corrected item-total correlations. Cronbach’s Alpha equals .683 (table 3). As a rule of thumb in social science, Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.7 or more shows good internal consistency. The value .683 approximates this lower boundary. It means that if I calculate a composite score by combing those 3 items, 68.3% of the variance in that score would be considered true score variance, or internally consistent reliable variance. Therefore, the items used for the index seem appropriate and relevant.

Table 3: Cronbach’s Alpha for Items Used to Create an Individual Economic Index, N=17733

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized Items</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present living conditions</td>
<td>.683</td>
<td>.683</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living conditions compared to others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living conditions compared to past (12 months ago)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Items 1-3, used in the analysis above, include the following categories: present living conditions; living conditions compared to others, and living conditions compared to past (12 months ago).

3 Due to weighting, the actual sample size equals 1172.58, which has been rounded to 1173.
It should be mentioned that Cronbach’s Alpha does not show whether concepts measure the same latent construct; in other words, Alpha does not show whether, collectively, they are unidimensional. To check whether they are unidimensional, principle component analysis is conducted.

Table 4: Total Variance Explained for Three Observed Variables Measuring Economic Conditions (PCA), N=1173

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Initial Eigenvalues</th>
<th>Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of Variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present living conditions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.924</td>
<td>64.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living conditions compared to others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.622</td>
<td>20.741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living conditions compared to past</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.453</td>
<td>15.112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Items 1-3, used in the analysis above, include the following categories: present living conditions; living conditions compared to others, and living conditions to past (12 months ago).

Here and further in this paper, for the first step in the analysis I will use an orthogonal rotation method, namely varimax rotation, to get interpretable results, but in the second step I plan to use an oblique type of rotation, specifically, direct oblimin. The reason is that varimax produces uncorrelated factors and attempts to load smaller variables for each factor, leading to easily interpretable results, compared, for example, to another orthogonal rotation method, quartimax. In reality, especially, in social science research, it is very unlikely that extracted factors are uncorrelated. This is why it is important to rely more on oblique rotation solutions as they treat factors as possibly correlated (Field 2009). It should be noted that both direct oblimin and varimax rotations produced the same results in case of the individual economic index. It is also important to note that in all PCAs conducted I check the assumption of sampling adequacy.
(KMO measure of sampling adequacy), indicating whether my data is suitable for extracting factors. Unless KMO is less than .5, I am not going to mention it in the description of results. KMO equaling .5 is the bare minimum for PCA (Field 2009). It also relates to Bartlett’s test of sphericity showing whether variables included in the analysis are correlated enough and not independent. Unless it is insignificant, I am not going to describe it in the results. The opposite problem with multicollinearity is not an issue in PCA (Field 2009). As seen in table 4, eigenvalues are decreasing starting from the first component, which indicates that most likely, three variables measure only one component; thus, these three measure one underlying latent variable. If we take a look at the Communalities table (Appendix), we will see that our observed variables highly correlated with only one component (table 5).

Table 5: Component Matrix for Three Observed Variables Measuring Economic Conditions (PCA), N=1173

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component Matrix</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Living conditions compared to others</td>
<td>.749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living conditions compared to past (12 months ago)</td>
<td>.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present economic conditions</td>
<td>.834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

When I ordered to include a second component, 3 observed variables still were highly correlated with the first component, and the two factor model with two components did not seem to fit the data at all. Consequently, economic index is created by adding individual scores for 3 questions, where the minimum score for a question equals 1 and stands for poor economic conditions, and the maximum score for a question equals 5, indicating better conditions. Therefore, the economic index ranges from 3 points to 15 points.
Individual Economic Index:
- Mean: 6.86
- Median: 6.00
- Standard deviation: 2.503
- Range: 61
- Minimum: 3
- Maximum: 15
- Valid values: 97.7%
- Missing: 2.3%

Political Trust Index

Next, the following six items were initially considered to create an index measuring political trust.

- Q59. “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t heard enough about them to say (0 - not at all; 1 - just a little; 2 - somewhat; 3 - a lot)?”

Additional offered categories are omitted.
1) The President
2) Parliament
3) The Ruling Party
4) The Police
5) The Army
6) The Courts of Law

All of these items present enough response variability to use them for an index of political trust. Unlike the previous case with calculating an individual economic index, where all of the Likert-type items were measured in a 5-point ordinal scale, these items were measured in a 4-point scale, which, in my view, makes it a little bit more risky to use them for creating an index as they should be seen more as ordinal variables. It also creates a problem for principle component analysis, which usually requires at least a 5-point scale for ordinal variables. The solution is to recode these variables, making them dichotomous by combining the categories “not at all” and “just a little” and coding them as 0, and combining the categories “somewhat” and “a lot” and coding them as 1. This way every item can be treated as interval-level. Hence, I may
create an index of political trust using them, and also may put them in the PCA to help determine whether a set of chosen categories measures one concept rather than several different concepts.

Analysis of reliability of these items taken collectively shows that a set of variables has good internal consistency, with Cronbach’s Alpha equaling .703 (see table 6). Examination of the table of item-total statistics shows that exclusion of the variable “Trust in Army” will increase Cronbach’s Alpha to .705. Further examination of the inter-item correlation matrix demonstrates that “Trust in Army” is the least well-correlated item among all included in the analysis. Therefore, I do not include it in the index.

Table 6: Cronbach’s Alpha for Items Used to Create an Index of Political Trust (all items of interest are included), N=1088

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha</th>
<th>Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the President</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Ruling Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Courts of Law</td>
<td>.703</td>
<td>.704</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Items 1-6, used in the analysis above, include the following categories: subjective level of trust in the President; Parliament; the Ruling Party; the Police; the Army; the Courts of Law.

The next step is to conduct PCA to examine whether the items relate to one concept. Using, first, varimax rotation, I reveal the structure of the components. I notice that there are two variables with Eigenvalues of more than 1, which tends to indicate that I have two different components. The same argument can be made based on the scree plot, which clearly indicates two components. Since the analysis revealed more than 1 component, it provided us with rotated matrix component matrix, where variables “Trust in President”, “Trust in Parliament” and “Trust

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4 Due to weighting, the actual sample size equals 1087.94, which has been rounded to 1088.
in Ruling Party” are highly correlated with the first component, while “Trust in Police” and “Trust in Courts” are correlated with the other one. The first component might be interpreted as “trust in executive/legislative branch of the government” and the second “trust in judicial branch and law enforcement”. Direct oblimin rotation, overall, gives us the same pattern with just slightly different correlation values. Thus, I suggest that this particular set of variables measures two different dimensions of political trust. I am much more interested in respondents’ attitudes toward executive/legislative branch; therefore, I prefer to exclude “Trust in Police” and “Trust in Courts” and not use them for the index. Going back to reliability analysis of the three remaining items – “Trust in President”; “Trust in Parliament”; “Trust in the Ruling Party” – I see that Cronbach’s Alpha increased from .703 to .820 (see table 7).

Table 7: Cronbach’s Alpha for Items Used to Create an Index of Political Trust
(3 items of interest are included), N=1088

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized Items</th>
<th>N of Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the President</td>
<td>.820</td>
<td>.823</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Ruling Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Items 1-3, used in the analysis above, include the following categories: subjective level of trust in the President; Parliament, and the Ruling Party.

Cronbach’s Alpha is biased in terms of the number of items included in the analysis. It tends to increase if a larger number of items are analyzed. However, here, reducing the items increased its value, which implies that a composite variable constructed from three chosen items will function as a more reliable indicator of political trust in the executive/legislative branch of the Egyptian government. The resulting three-item index of political trust ranges from 0 to 3, where 0 indicates the lowest level of political trust, and 3 indicates the highest level.
• **Political Trust Index:**
  - Mean: 0.68
  - Median: 0
  - Standard deviation: 1.073
  - Range: 3
  - Minimum: 0
  - Maximum: 3
  - Valid values: 92%
  - Missing: 8%

**Other Independent Variables**

The following independent variables are simply items already present in the survey dataset. They did not require construction of indexes, unlike income and political trust, above.

• **Type of residence:**
  - Urban: 42.9%
  - Rural: 57.1%
  - Valid values: 100%
  - Missing: 0

• **Employment status:**
  - Unemployed: 58.9%
  - Employed: 41.1%
  - Valid values: 99.7%
  - Missing: .3%

• **Degree of religiosity:**
  - Mode: Very important
  - Median: Very important
  - Valid values: 98.6%
  - Missing: 1.4%

• **General/Social trust:**
  - Must be very careful: 78.8%
  - Most people can be trusted: 20.0%
  - Valid values: 98.8%
  - Missing: 1.2%

• **Interest in public affairs:**
  - Mode: Somewhat interested
  - Median: Somewhat interested
  - Valid values: 99.5%
  - Missing: .5%

• **Age:**
- Mean: 38.82
- Median: 36
- Standard deviation: 14.210
- Range: 61
- Minimum: 18
- Maximum: 79
- Valid values: 99.8%
- Missing: .2%

• **Gender:**
- Male: 49.6%
- Female: 50.4%
- Valid values: 100%
- Missing: 0

• **Education:**
- Mode: No formal schooling
- Median: Secondary school completed/high school
- Valid values: 1200
- Missing: 0
Dependent Variables

Four of six dependent variables identified in my hypotheses are multi-item indexes to be developed with principal component analysis. The other two are nominal variables already included in the dataset. Therefore, first I need to extract components. Original Afrobarometer variables, the basis for PCA, are measured in a 5-point ordinal scale. Strictly speaking PCA should be conducted on at least 7-point scale; however, in social sciences it is quite common among researchers to employ 5-point scale instead. These 5-point scales are usually used for measuring degree of agreement with Likert-type statements following the pattern: “Strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree”. Therefore, there are two polar ends of agreement/disagreement that are balanced with “neither agree nor disagree”. The problem with the Afrobarometer dataset is that some of the response categories follow this pattern: “Agree very strongly with statement 1”; “agree with statement 1”; “agree with statement 2”; “strongly agree with statement 2”; “agree with neither”; “don’t know”. Statement 1 and statement 2 represent two opposite attitudes toward an underlying concept. However, in this scale we do not observe any middle category between the two polar ends. But we do see a third dimension: “agree with neither”. Excluding “agree with neither” and using “don’t know” as a middle category will lead to losing a significant percentage of cases, which, in turn, will result in necessity to use an imputation method for categorical data, or a multiple imputation method for quantitative data, in case our variables are not strongly skewed, and, consequently, could be treated as continuous. If I transform my items into dichotomous variables coded as 0 vs. 1 to employ them as interval-level, I am also going to lose measurement detail by counting “don’t know” and “agree with neither” as missing. One solution that seems logically acceptable is to use
“don’t know’’ as a balanced point between two ends of the continuum, but also to treat “agree with neither” the same as “don’t know. That way I will have a 6-point scale, measuring different dimensions of an attitude; however, I have not found similar scales used in previous research. My solution is to use only variables that are classic Likert-type, instead of employing scales which are not common in social sciences. Table 8 briefly summarizes the measurement of dependent variables and indicates their originating source.

Table 8: Dependent Variables’ Measurement and Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1: Gender equality</td>
<td>4 observed variables: Q73ARB 5-point scale (Likert-type)</td>
<td>Result of PCA based on the items in the column “Measurement” originally from Table 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2: General Performance of Democracy</td>
<td>5 observed variables: Q43ARB</td>
<td>Result of PCA based on the items in the column “Measurement” originally from Table 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3: One party-one man rule</td>
<td>4 observed variables: Q31 5 point scale (Likert-type)</td>
<td>Result of PCA based on the items in the column “Measurement” originally from Table 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4.1: The choice of socio-economic equality vs. freedom of speech</td>
<td>Nominal variables: Q44</td>
<td>Included in the dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4.2: The choice of free and fair elections vs. socioeconomic equality</td>
<td>Nominal variables: Q44</td>
<td>Included in the dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5: Procedural aspects of legitimate coercion</td>
<td>3 observed variables: Q48 5-point scale (Likert-type)</td>
<td>Result of PCA based on the items in the column “Measurement” originally from Table 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of survey items (or observed variables) for calculating the components (and thus the multiple-item indexes) “Gender equality”, “General Performance of Democracy”, “One party-one man rule”, and “Procedural aspects of legitimate coercion” is, obviously, quite small. It is always better for a multiple-item index to consist of a larger set of survey items; however, even having only two observed variables should fit the idea of PCA – reducing observed items to
smaller number of components. Some researchers claim that the required minimum is 3 survey items per factor significantly correlated with it. However, cases with two observed variables per factor significantly correlated with it are also acceptable (Raubenheimer 2004). One of the examples is the Duke University Religion Index (DUREL), which is a 5-item measure of three dimensions of religiosity – organizational activity, non-organizational activity and subjective religiosity. This index shows high reliability, internal consistency and “high convergent validity with other religiosity measures” (Koenig and Büssing 2010:78). Obviously, the authors use only one item for one of the subscales. I am not going to follow this exceptional example, but will maximize the validity and reliability of my factors/components by measuring each with at least 2 observed variables. PCA analyses for “gender equality”, “general performance of democracy”, “one party-one man rule”, and “procedural aspects of legitimate coercion” show that I can appropriately do so with these data, i.e., each of the extracted components is highly correlated with at least two observed variables. Below is the description of PCAs conducted to extract needed components.

**Dependent variable:**

**Gender equality**

Q73-ARB: Please, tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements

1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – disagree; 3 – neither agree nor disagree; 4 – agree; 5 – strongly agree

A) Women and men should have equal work opportunities
B) A woman can become the prime minister or President of a Muslim State
C) Women’s share of inheritance should be equal that of a man
D) Women and men should have equal rights in making a decision to divorce

PCA with orthogonal rotation (varimax) was conducted on items A, B, C, D in question 73-ARB, resulting in two components with Eigenvalues greater than 1. These two components explain 77.5% of total variance. Scree plot examination also supported the conclusion that there are two distinctive components that need to be retained. According to factor loadings after
varimax rotation, component 1 may be interpreted as “gender equality in family affairs”, while component 2 may be designated as “occupational gender equality”. The second step in the analysis as to use oblique rotation to extract correlated factor solutions. With oblique rotation I observe a similar pattern revealed with orthogonal rotation: two components with Eigenvalues greater than 1 explaining 77.5% of total variance. Scree plot examination shows basically the same picture with two distinctive factors. Factor loadings also imply that there are two factors highly correlated (correlation > .40) with two components (see table 9).

Table 9: Pattern Matrix with Factor Loadings, N=1156

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern Matrix</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal work opportunities</td>
<td>-.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A woman can become the prime minister or the president</td>
<td>.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's share of inheritance should be equal</td>
<td>.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women and men should have equal rights in decision to divorce</td>
<td>.846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

Based on three main criteria – Eigenvalues, total variance explained, and scree plot examination – I retain the following factor solution and scores for each respondent. Even though both of components are important, I will only use the component “occupational gender equality” as a dependent variable in hypothesis tests later in this chapter. I use a regression method for factor extraction because it allows factor scores to be correlated (Field 2009). The result of this extraction will be index values calculated for each respondent that will indicate how prone they (respondents) are to certain values represented in the items included in PCA.
Dependent variable:
General performance of democracy

Q43-ARB. Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – disagree; 3 – neither agree nor disagree; 4 – agree; 5 – strongly agree
A) Under a democratic system, the country’s economic performance is weak
B) Democratic regimes are indecisive
C) Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability
D) Egyptians are not prepared for a democratic system
E) Democracy negatively affects social and ethical values

Initial PCA was conducted on items A, B, C, D, E from question 43-ARB with varimax rotation. PCA offered a one component model, where all observed variables are highly correlated with the component, with an Eigenvalue of more than 1 and total variance explained of 69.3%. The scree plot suggests the same one-component scenario. Also I examined the table communalities showing proportions of shared variance after extraction and I see that variable Q43-ARB-D has a communality of .387, which is much lower than .7. Thus, it seems that item D shares a small proportion of shared variance with other variables. The correlation matrix indicates that all other variables are better correlated with each other than with this variable (however, correlations between item Q43-ARB-D and others are still quite high). I decided to check the internal consistency of this set of items with and without Q43-ARB-D. It turns out that without this item, other variables show excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha of .910 compared to .882). I decided to exclude this variable from further PCA. Rerunning PCA with varimax rotation resulted, again, in a one factor solution with total variance explained of 78.9%, which is higher than in previous analysis. After direct oblimin rotation, the pattern remained the same: all four observed variables relate to one component. As with “gender equality”, I generated individual scores for this factor (i.e., values for a multiple-item index), which I label as “general performance of democracy”.
Table 10: Component Matrix, N=930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component Matrix</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q43A_ARB_ economic performance</td>
<td>.912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q43B_ARB_indecisive economic regimes</td>
<td>.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q43C_ARB_order in democracy</td>
<td>.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q43E_ARB_democracy and values</td>
<td>.805</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dependent variable:**
**One party-one man rule**

Q31. There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?

1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – disagree; 3 – neither agree nor disagree; 4 – agree; 5 – strongly agree

A) Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office
B) The army comes in to govern the country
C) Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything
D) A system governed by Islamic law without elections or political parties

It should be noted that item B, “The army comes in to govern the country,” was excluded from the analysis as it forms a component by itself, but a component described by one variable is not a reliable one. Plus, this variable is not well correlated with others. PCA with varimax rotation and without item B forms a one-factor solution, with total explained variance of 66.6%. The scree plot also clearly indicates one component. Oblique rotation also results in one factor (table 11). Therefore, extracting only one factor seems reasonable. I label it as “ways of political governance”.
Table 11: Component Matrix, N=1053

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component Matrix</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q31A_attitude to one party rule</td>
<td>.834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q31C_attitude to one man-rule</td>
<td>.842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q31D_attitude to Islamic law</td>
<td>.770</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dependent variable:**

**Procedural aspects of legitimate coercion**

Q48. “For each of the following statements, please, tell me whether you disagree or agree?”
1 – Strongly disagree; 2 - disagree; 3 – neither agree nor disagree; 4 – agree; 5 – strongly agree

A) The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by
B) The police always have the right to make people obey the law
C) The tax authorities always have the right to make people pay taxes

As in case with previous analyses PCA, initial analysis with varimax offered one component with an Eigenvalue greater than 1; total variance explained by this factor is 73.0%.

The scree test also indicates one distinctive factor. Oblique rotation still results in one component highly correlated with all of three observed variables (table 12). I call this factor “procedural aspects of legitimate coercion”.

Table 12: Component Matrix, N=1127

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component Matrix</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q48A_attitudes to courts decisions</td>
<td>.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q48B_attitudes to the rule of law</td>
<td>.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q48C_attitude to paying taxes</td>
<td>.864</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dependent variable:
The most essential characteristics of democracy

Q44. Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. If you have to choose only one of the things that I am going to read, which one would you choose as the most essential characteristic of democracy?

1) Government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor
2) People choose government leaders in free and fair elections
3) Government does not waste any public money
4) People are free to express their political views openly

This variable is nominal and it is not included in the PCA, but will be used in the multinomial logistic regression.

Hypotheses Testing

All six models will be constructed using either ordinary least squares regression or multinomial logistic regression analysis. The choice of these methods is determined by the research questions as well as measurement levels of independent and dependent variables. Table 13 describes in detail variables used in the models. The order and enumeration of the models corresponds to those of the hypotheses.

Table 13: Description of Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Regression type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>“Occupational gender equality”</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>“General performance of democracy”</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>OLS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When conducting OLS regression analysis, it is important to check the procedure’s assumptions:
1) The relationship between outcomes and each increment of the independent variable(s) are linear

2) Homoscedasticity

3) Independence of errors

4) Normally distributed errors

5) No perfect multicollinearity

Even though the sample is a probability one, in case some of the aforementioned assumptions are violated, I may not be able to generalize our results to the entire Egyptian population, which is why for every model these assumptions are checked. Particularly, violation of homoscedasticity assumption leads to distortion of parameter estimates, but does not lead to biased estimators. Outliers and influential cases are also investigated. As mentioned earlier, all cases have been weighted using Afrobarometer’s within-country weights adjusting for individual probabilities of choosing a particular respondent. Hence, with the statistical software used here (SPSS), I was not able to estimate Durbin-Watson statistics for accessing the assumption of independence of errors due to fractional within-country weights. The problem of dependence of errors mostly occurs when time/order is an independent variable, which is not the case in our study. Therefore, I suggest that the assumption is met for all OLS models.

Results for Model 1, which tests Hypothesis 1, are summarized in table 14. For this model only Muslims (branch not specified) and Sunni Muslims were selected for analysis. Other denominations account for 7.7% of the sample.
Table 14: Model 1. OLS Regression: Support for Occupational Gender Equality Regressed upon Individual Economic Index, Education, and Religiosity, N=1042

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.195</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>-.045</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-Squared = .010.  
Adjusted R-Squared = .008    
*p<.05

Economic Index: range from 3 points to 15 points (3 – worst economic conditions; 15 - best conditions).  
Education: 0 - No formal schooling; 1- Informal schooling only; 2 - Some primary schooling; 3 - Primary school completed; 4 - Some secondary school/high school; 5 - Secondary school completed/high school; 6 - Post-secondary qualifications, not university; 7 - Some university; 8 - University completed; 9 - Post-graduate.  
Religiosity: 0 - Not very important; Very important  
Support for Occupational Gender Equality: lower values stand for lower support

Missing cases were excluded listwise. Assumptions of linear relationship, as well as homoscedasticity, and normally distributed errors appear to be met (Appendix). Perfect multicollinearity has not been identified as tolerance is higher than 0.1 and variance inflation factor is less than 10 (Appendix). Examination of standardized z-values has not revealed outliers in the dependent variable: only 49 cases had absolute standard values greater than 2. Five percent of the cases are allowed to have standardized values of 2 and greater (but no greater than 3.29) (Field 2009:102). Therefore, .05*1200 = 52 cases > 49 cases. To search for influential cases I analyzed Cook’s distance, Leverage and Mahalanobis’s distance. Cook’s distance is in an acceptable range: it is less than 1 (maximum value is .012). Maximal acceptable Leverage for this sample size and number of predictors is 3(k+1)/N = 3 (3+1)/1042=0.01, where k = number of predictors and N = sample size (Field 2009:245). There are 69 cases which have Leverage values of more than 0.01. Omitting them from analysis results in a sample with respondents who show no variability in their measured degree of religiosity: their answers were grouped into the category “very important”. So, I decide not to exclude those cases as long as Mahalanobis’s distance is less than 25 (maximum actual value in the sample = 22.047) and the sample contains
more than 500 cases, then I find it acceptable (Field 2009). According to table 14, I see that the only significant predictor of support for occupational gender equality is education of a respondent. It is positively correlated with this support, as hypothesized; however, one unit change in education (which ranges from 0 to 9) results only in .032 increase in support for occupational gender equality. Support for gender equality ranges from -2.20016 to 1.44628, where the former represents the lowest level of support and the latter represents the highest. Thus, education does not seem a very influential predictor, and the same conclusion could be drawn from the analysis of Pearson correlation (these two variables are correlated at $r=.084$, a very low correlation). Prediction power of the model is also extremely small: it is only 1%. Neither the individual economic index nor degree of religiosity, according to this model, predict the outcome.

Let’s examine Model 2 (table 15), which tests Hypothesis 2. It is important to mention that the dependent composite variable, attitude to general performance of democracy, is missing 23% of cases in the sample after listwise deletion was applied. Main regression assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity, normality and absence of perfect multicollinearity were met (see Appendix).
Table 15: Model 2. OLS Regression: Attitude to General Performance of Democracy Regressed upon Individual Economic Index, Education, Interest in Public Affairs, and Political Trust Index

N=875

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.417</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>-.150</td>
<td>.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Public Affairs</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.031*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust Index</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>-.076</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-Squared = .066
Adjusted R-Squared = .062
*p<.05
**p<.001

Economic Index: range from 3 points to 15 points (3 – worst economic conditions; 15 - best conditions).
Education: 0 - No formal schooling; 1- Informal schooling only; 2 - Some primary schooling; 3 - Primary school completed; 4 - Some secondary school/high school; 5 - Secondary school completed/high school; 6 - Post-secondary qualifications, not university; 7 - Some university; 8 - University completed; 9 - Post-graduate.
Interest in Public Affairs: 0 – Not very interested; 1 – Very interested
Political Trust Index: ranges from 0 to 3; 0 indicates the lowest level of political trust; 3 indicates the highest level.
Attitude to General Performance of Democracy: higher values indicate negative attitudes, while lower values stand for more positive attitudes.

Tolerance values are higher than 0.1 and VIFs are above 10. There are no obvious outliers in the dependent variable: there are only 26 cases with standardized z-scores more than 2. The acceptable number of such cases for a sample size of N=875 equals .05*875= 44 cases >26 cases. Analysis of Cook’s distance, Leverage and Mahalanobis’s distance has not revealed any influential cases either. In this model there are three independent variables that are significantly influencing attitudes toward democratic performance: the economic index (positive coefficient), interest in public affairs (positive), and the political trust index (negative). A one unit change in the individual economic index, i.e., step toward better subjective individual economic conditions, results in a 0.095 increase in the outcome variable. The outcome ranges from -1.35 to 2.08, where lower scores indicate positive attitudes toward democracy, while higher scores indicate negative attitudes. In other words, the better a person characterizes their economic conditions, the more negative general perceptions of democracy they hold, at least as
“democracy” is measured here. Interest in public affairs is another variable significantly affecting the outcome, even though its influence also does not seem too strong. An increase in interest in public affairs decreases support for democracy. In turn, political trust index is positively related to pro-democratic attitudes (an increase in the political trust index leads to a decrease in the general performance of democracy variable, i.e., it leads to a more pro-democratic attitude. Comparison of standard betas leads us to conclude that economic index is a stronger predictor of the outcome than other independent variables included in this regression equation. Despite this fact, only 6.6% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the model.

Let’s now examine model 3 (table 16), which tests Hypothesis 3 with the dependent variable being support for one party, one man rule.

Table 16: Model 3. OLS Regression: Support for One Party/One Man Rule Regressed upon Individual Economic Index, Education, Political Trust Index, Gender, and Residence Type, N=975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.181</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.048*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.052</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-.152</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust Index</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence Type</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-Squared = .082
Adjusted R-Squared = .077
*p<.05
**p<.001

Economic Index: range from 3 points to 15 points (3 – worst economic conditions; 15 - best conditions).
Education: 0 - No formal schooling; 1- Informal schooling only; 2 - Some primary schooling; 3 - Primary school completed; 4 - Some secondary school/high school; 5 - Secondary school completed/high school; 6 - Post-secondary qualifications, not university; 7 - Some university; 8 - University completed; 9 - Post-graduate.
Political Trust Index: ranges from 0 to 3; 0 indicates the lowest level of political trust; 3 indicates the highest level.
Gender: 0- Female; 1 – Male
Residence Type: 0 – Urban; 1 – Rural
Support for One Party/One Man Rule: lower values indicate low support
Initial analysis identified 6 outliers with z-scores of more than 3.29, so I decided to exclude them from analysis and run regression once again. Assumptions of OLS regression were met including multicollinearity (tolerance > 0.1 and VIFs < 10). No influential cases were discovered either, as Cook’s distance, Leverage and Mahalanobis distance are within an acceptable range. In this model, 3 three independent variables seem to exert some significant effect on the outcome variable: economic index, education, and political trust index. Economic index is positively associated with the outcome variable: a one unit increase in the economic index leads to .025 increase in support for one party governing of the country. Support for one party/one man rule in the sample ranges from -1.009 to 3.99, with higher values corresponding to greater support for such rule. In other words, the higher the economic index, the more one tends to prefer one-party/one man rule. In turn, education is negatively associated with the outcome. More educated respondents tend to hold positive attitudes of one party control (a one unit increase in education results in reducing support by .052). But the political trust index has the most influence over the outcome compared to education and the individual economic index (see standardized betas, table 16). A one unit increase in the index leads to .189 increase in support for one party rule. It sounds quite reasonable that a person who indicates higher levels of political trust for the President, Parliament, and Party are also more likely to support their control. This model explains only 8.2% of variance of the dependent variable.

Next, let’s examine model 4.1 (table 17), which tests Hypothesis 4.1, regarding the dependent variable “essential characteristics of democracy,” specifically attitudes favoring freedom of speech over socioeconomic equality.
Table 17: Model 4.1. Multinomial Logistic Regression: Essential Characteristics of Democracy Regressed upon Employment Status, Age, and Education, N=1107

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom of speech vs. Socio-economic equality</th>
<th>B(SE)</th>
<th>Lower Bound</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Upper Bound</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.594 (.344)</td>
<td>.569</td>
<td>.906</td>
<td>1.441</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status</td>
<td>-.099 (.237)</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>1.106</td>
<td>2.056</td>
<td>.749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (18-29)</td>
<td>.249 (.323)</td>
<td>.681</td>
<td>1.283</td>
<td>2.418</td>
<td>.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (30-49)</td>
<td>.101 (.316)</td>
<td>.703</td>
<td>1.187</td>
<td>2.003</td>
<td>.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (50-79)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education_1</td>
<td>-.854 (.304)</td>
<td>.234</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>.773</td>
<td>.005*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education_2</td>
<td>.171 (.267)</td>
<td>.703</td>
<td>1.187</td>
<td>2.003</td>
<td>.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education_3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R-Squared (Nagelkerke) = .037

* p < .05

Employment: 0 – Unemployed; 1 – Employed
Age: 18-29 years; 30-49 years; 50-79 years. Category 50-79 years is reference, and set to zero because it is redundant.

Education_1: No formal schooling; informal schooling only; some primary schooling; primary school completed
Education_2: Some secondary school/high school; secondary school completed/high school
Education_3: Post-secondary qualifications, not university; some university; university completed; post-graduate. This reference category is set to zero because it is redundant.

For multinomial logistic regressions, there are three main assumptions that I need to check: 1) linearity between the logit of the outcome variable and any continuous predictors, 2) independence of errors, and 3) multicollinearity, even though the last of these is not an assumption, but an important condition of conducting this analysis. Multinomial regression may not work if I have incomplete data from predictors (some combinations of categories (“cells”) are empty). Another crucial consideration is expected frequencies in crosstabs: in each cell of the table they should be greater than 1 and no more than 20% are allowed to be less than 5 (Field 2009).

After initially running the analysis, it turned out that there are many empty cells, so it was decided to cluster categories of age and education together to reduce the number of empty cells. Age has been clustered in following groups: 1) 18-29; 2) 30-49; 3) 50-79. Education has been clustered in the following categories: 1) No formal schooling; informal schooling only; some
primary schooling; primary school completed; 2) Some secondary school/high school; secondary school completed/high school; 3) Post-secondary qualifications, not university; some university; university completed; post-graduate. I computed a variable natural logarithm of the dependent variable and constructed plots with independent variables to see if the relationship between them are linear, and this assumption seems to be satisfied. Multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem either, as predictors are not highly correlated: the maximum correlation (Kendall’s tau_b rank correlation) between age and education is -.222, and as in case with OLS regressions I assume that the independence of errors assumption has been met as well.

Model fitting information shows that our model only slightly decreases the amount of unexplained variance in the dependent variables. The chi-square test indicates that variance in this case has not decreased significantly, as it declined from 282.051 to 246.845 only. Goodness of fit demonstrates, however, that predicted values and values observed in the model are not statistically different, according to the Pearson value (sig. .017), which means that the model is a good fit. At the same Deviance’s significance level (sig. .003) indicates that they are actually statistically different. Ideally, these two indicators are supposed to show the same results. Differences in them may come from numerous empty cells, but I clustered the data to avoid empty cells. It means that the problem may be due to overdispersion – statistical variance, which is greater than the one predicted by the model. The value of the Nagelkerke pseudo-R squared measure is .037, which indicates that only 3.7% of variance in the dependent variable is explained by the predictors. Based on likelihood ratio tests, I may conclude that only education has a significant effect on the outcome. More specifically, the parameter estimates table shows that the only significant predictor is education group 1, which includes individuals with no formal schooling, informal schooling only, some primary schooling, or primary school
completed (B=-.854; Wald Statistics = 7.877; sig.=.005). In other words, relative log odds of choosing a category “people are free to express their views openly” compared to “government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor” decrease by .854 if I move from respondents in the education group 3 (most educated) to individuals in the education group 1 (least educated). If I talk about the odds ratio for this case, respondents with lowest level of education are about .406 times as likely to choose freedom of speech compared to socioeconomic equality (less likely). Other independent predictors do not prove to be significant.

Now let’s take a look at the model 4.2 (table 18) for Hypothesis 4.2, regarding the dependent variable on essential characteristics of democracy, specifically attitudes favoring free and fair elections over socioeconomic equality:

Table 18: Model 4.2. Multinomial Logistic Regression: Essential Characteristics of Democracy Regressed upon Education, Interest in Public Affairs, and Individual Economic Index, N=1013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free and fair elections vs. Socioeconomic equality</th>
<th>B(SE)</th>
<th>Lower Bound</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Upper Bound</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.447 (.271)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education_1</td>
<td>-.570 (.189)</td>
<td>.390</td>
<td>.565</td>
<td>.819</td>
<td>.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education_2</td>
<td>-.098 (.197)</td>
<td>.616</td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>1.334</td>
<td>.620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education_3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Public Affairs_0</td>
<td>-.008 (.167)</td>
<td>.715</td>
<td>.992</td>
<td>1.375</td>
<td>.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Public Affairs_1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index_1</td>
<td>-.360 (.278)</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>.698</td>
<td>1.204</td>
<td>.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index_2</td>
<td>.409 (.276)</td>
<td>.877</td>
<td>1.506</td>
<td>2.584</td>
<td>.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index_3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo R-Squared (Nagelkerke) = .056
*p<.05

Education_1: No formal schooling; informal schooling only; some primary schooling; primary school completed
Education_2: Some secondary school/high school; secondary school completed/high school
Education_3: Post-secondary qualifications, not university; some university; university completed; post-graduate. This category is set to zero because it is redundant.
Interest in Public Affairs_0: Not very interested
Interest in Public Affairs_1: Very interested. This category is set to zero because it is redundant.
Economic Index_1: Low income respondents
Economic Index_2: Middle income respondents
Economic Index_3: High income respondents. This category is set to zero because it is redundant.
The assumption of linearity between log value of the outcome variable and independent variables has been met, as well as absence of perfect multicollinearity (maximal rank correlation is the correlation between education and interest in public affairs, equaling .270). Model fitting information demonstrates that unexplained variance in the outcome has not declined much after adding our predictors in the model. Initially, without adding predictors, chi-square equaled 288.829; after including predictors in the model chi-square was 236.074. Obviously, the decrease in the unexplained variance does not seem substantial. Goodness of fit shows that our predicted values and observed values are statistically different. Thus, our model is not a good fit. The value of the Nagelkerke pseudo-R squared measure is .056, which indicates that only 5.6% of variance in the dependent variable is explained by the predictors. Parameter estimates clearly show that the only significant independent variable is education_1, which combines respondents with no formal schooling, informal schooling only, some primary schooling and primary school completed (b= -0.570; Wald Statistics = 9.901; sig.=.003). Hence, relative log odds of choosing free and fair elections vs. socioeconomic equality will decrease by .570 if I compare the group of respondents with the highest level of education to those with the lowest. In terms of the odds ratio for this case, respondents with lower education are about .565 times as likely to prefer free and fair elections to socioeconomic equality as the most essential characteristic of democracy (i.e., they are less likely to prefer free and fair elections). The remaining predictors are not statistically significant.

Finally I consider model 5 (table 19), an OLS regression model testing Hypothesis 5, with support for procedural aspects of legitimate coercion as the dependent variable.
Table 19: Model 5. OLS Regression: Support for Procedural Aspects of Legitimate Coercion Regressed upon
Age, Gender, Education, Ind. Economic Index, Religiosity, Political Trust Index,
N=942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.120</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>.532</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index</td>
<td>-.070</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.176</td>
<td>.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust Index</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.451</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Trust</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.808</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-Squared = .043
Adjusted R-Squared = .035
*p<.05
**p<.001

Economic Index: range from 3 points to 15 points (3 – worst economic conditions; 15 - best conditions).
Education: 0 - No formal schooling; 1- Informal schooling only; 2 - Some primary schooling; 3 - Primary school completed; 4 - Some secondary school/high school; 5 - Secondary school completed/high school; 6 - Post-secondary qualifications, not university; 7 - Some university; 8 - University completed; 9 - Post-graduate.
Political Trust Index: ranges from 0 to 3; 0 indicates the lowest level of political trust; 3 indicates the highest level.
Gender: 0- Female; 1 – Male
Religiosity: 0 - Not very important; 1 - Very important
Social Trust (Most can be trusted): 0 - Must be very careful; 1 - Most people can be trusted
Support for Procedural Aspects of Legitimate Coercion: higher values indicate higher support

Assumptions for OLS regression appeared to be met. I excluded outliers with standardized residuals larger than 3.29 and ran the regression once again. There is no perfect multicollinearity (tolerance > 0.1 and VIFs<10). No influential cases were identified. In this model there are two variables – individual economic index and religiosity – which significantly influence the outcome variable, larger values of which indicate greater support for legitimate coercion. The economic index is negatively related to support for legitimate coercion: a one unit increase in the individual economic index leads to -.070 decrease in support for procedural aspects of legitimate coercion. In other words, people who tend to evaluate their economic conditions higher, are less likely to support police decisions, court decisions and paying taxes. In turn, a one unit increase in religiosity leads to .451 increase in the outcome, which ranges from
-3.26 to 1.22, so it seems quite a strong predictor. At the same time the Pearson correlation between religiosity and the dependent variable, $r=0.116$, is not very high. Compared to other predictors, however, the economic index has the strongest apparent effect (refer to standardized betas).
Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion

In this study I attempted to analyze the influence of certain social characteristics on attitudes toward and interpretation of democratic values among respondents in the Egyptian round of Afrobarometer survey (Afrobarometer 2013a). In order to measure such a multidimensional concept as democracy – which is further complicated because this is a quantitative study employing secondary data – it was necessary to choose criteria allowing us to differentiate between democratic and not democratic values, as respondents may (and in fact they do) have different perceptions of what democracy is. As “objective” criteria for labeling principles as democratic vs. undemocratic I used theories and concepts found in literature. An undoubted limitation of this approach is judging on the basis of standards widely known as features of Western democracies and not taking into account specific, culturally different meanings people attach to the term democracy in different parts of the world. As fairly noted by Julia Paley, democracy is a constitutive term, rather than strictly confined, and those who tend to advocate for rigid definitions are the “groups with strong interests in particular definitions” (Paley 2002:471). Quite often these meanings describe democracy as a political regime with free and fair elections, the rule of law, freedom of speech, and gender and race equality. I do not argue that these definitions are incorrect, but certainly they are severely limited and neglect other important aspects of democracy as a phenomenon. Fundamental rights are often denied in regimes nominally designated as democracies (Paley 2002), including material rights, and some theorists argue that this is how it should be because democracy is a political concept, and not socioeconomic. They also go on to say that it thrives only in free market economies that perpetuate inequalities rather than leveling them out. Thus, socioeconomic equality sometimes may not seem a part of the formal discourse on democracy. As seen in the reviewed literature,
economic rights is the one (if not the most) contested issue in this respect because there is an opposite of camp of scholars arguing that democracy can only exist if material rights are ensured. The recent wave of anti-neoliberal revolutions and protests in Europe, North and Latin America, as well as Africa, challenge de facto democracies that nominally provide political rights, but take away another fundamental right. That is the reason I analyzed a variable “the most essential characteristics of democracy” that implied a choice between options describing democracy in political terms (e.g. free and fair elections) versus terms of economic equality (“the government narrows the gap between the rich and the poor”) (Afrobarometer 2013b:13). The second cluster of dependent variables included composite variables, which summarize each respondent’s attitude toward several aspects of democratic political regimes (occupational gender equality, general performance of democracy, rejection of one party/one man rule, and support for state coercion in terms of de jure lawful actions by court, police and fiscal authorities), though the last principle is not endemic to democracies only. Predictors of interest included age, gender, education, economic and employment status, level of religiosity, political trust, residence type, interest in public affairs and social trust.

The first hypothesis stated that the higher a respondent’s individual’s income and education, and the lower their degree of religiosity, the more likely they are to express positive attitudes concerning gender equality. Particularly, I investigated these variables’ relationship to occupational gender equality, implying that women are as capable as men of occupying a high-level position and both sexes should enjoy equal work opportunities. The only variable that proved to be statistically significant in this equation is education. One unit increase in education (education ranges from 0 to 9, where 0 stands for “no formal schooling” and 9 – “post-graduate”) leads to .032 increase in support for occupational gender equality. In our sample, support for
occupational gender equality (among non-specified Muslims and Sunni Muslims) ranged from -2.20 (least support) to 1.44 (highest support). Then, full range equals 3.65, and interquartile range is 1.097. Interquartile range shows that for a difference between third and first quartiles .032 increase in support does not seem very noteworthy ((.032/1.097)*100%=2.9%). For demonstration purpose let’s consider the following. Using as an example a person whose support for occupational gender equality equals 25th percentile (-.555), one unit increase in their education would lead to almost 5.8% increase in the score. For someone whose support equals to median, 50th percentile (.1018), one unit increase in education leads to 31.4% increase in support, which seems a substantial increase. For a person whose support equals 75th percentile (.542), one unit increase in education leads to 5.9% increase in support. If we compare a change in education (gaining additional level of education) with the change in the dependent variable, the effect is not that strong. It is a common sentiment in democracy studies to claim that the higher educational level of respondents, the higher they evaluate democratic values. The question becomes more complex when we remind ourselves that there is no single definition of democracy, hence, we should always consider the context. In the context of this study, though statistically significant, education does not seem to greatly impact attitudes toward gender equality in the workspace.

The second hypothesis concerned the impact of interest in public affairs, political trust, education, and individual economic conditions on attitudes toward general performance of democracy. It goes without saying that everyone may have their own interpretations of democracy, which is why this model analyzed only the influence of several status characteristics on attitudes toward the term “democracy” itself, rather than the interpretation of the phenomenon per se. Analysis showed that aforementioned factors, except for education, had statistically
significant effects. The *economic index* is negatively associated with attitudes concerning democratic performance: the higher the index, the lower a respondent’s attitude. However, its impact is quite marginal; a one unit increase in the economic index (it ranges from 3 to 15, where 3 stands for the worse economic conditions, and 15 – for the best) results in a .095 decrease in support for democratic regimes (controlling for all other variables). In the sample distribution, support for democratic regimes ranges from -1.35 (highest support) to 2.09 (lowest support). Thus, full range equals 3.44. Interquartile range is .124. Comparison of this interquartile range and effect of the economic index demonstrates that the effect is quite substantial (.095/.124)*100%=77%. The *political trust index* is positively related to support: a one unit increase in political trust (it ranges from 0 to 3, where 0 indicates the lowest degree of trust, and 3 is the highest) results in a .072 increase in support. Ratio of the unit increase effect to interquartile range indicates that effect might be essential (.072/.124)*100%=58%. *Interest in public affairs* is negatively related to general perceptions of the term democracy, and citizens who are very interested in public affairs are going to score .057 lower on the dependent variable, compared to those who are not interested. Ratio of the unit increase effect to interquartile range indicates that effect is quite substantial (.057/.124)*100%=50%. Among significant predictors, the economic index is the strongest one followed by political trust and then interest in public affairs, based on a comparison of standardized beta coefficients.

The third hypothesis states *females* compared to males, *respondents* residing in *rural areas* compared to those in *nonrural areas*, *less educated* respondents compared to *more educated* respondents, respondents with *low level of political trust* compared to those with higher political trust, and *low income* citizens compared to high income citizens, are more likely to support usurpation of power by one party and/or President. The study showed that, again,
education, level of political trust and individual economic index are statistically significant predictors. The most influential predictor of all, the political trust index, results in a .189 increase in support for one man/one party rule, if increased by one unit. This influence does not seem that strong if we consider a full range of the outcome variable in the sample (from -1.00 (lowest) to 3.99 (highest)) and interquartile range which equals 1.579. The ratio of the unit increase effect to the interquartile range is (0.189/1.579)*100%=12%. This effect should not be considered as overly substantial. Generally, the model shows that citizens demonstrating higher levels of political trust are more likely to support total control by a single person or political group. This conclusion confirms a hypothesis formulated by Sabri Ciftci who claimed that higher levels of political trust are more conducive to high appraisal of democratic values only in states where democracy already exists to some degree. On the contrary, he asserts, in Arab states higher degree of political trust supports previously established authoritarian regimes, therefore, lower levels of political trust are more associated with democracy values (Ciftci 2010). Political trust refers to the political system in one’s country, and not to some generic attitude of political trust. Less strong, but still with a significant effect, a one unit increase in education accounts for a .052 decrease in support. Thus, more educated people are less likely to show support for this principle. Note that in this hypothesis education was coded as 10-point scale ranging from 0 – “no formal schooling” to 9 –“post-graduate”. Similar to the example above, the ratio of the effect of one unit increase in education to the interquartile range ((.052/1.579)*100%=3.3%), shows only a marginal effect. The least strong, although still significant, factor is the individual economic index. A one unit increase in it would result in a .025 increase in support for total control of one party or governor. Hence, people who rank themselves higher on a subjective
economic scale, are more likely to prefer total usurpation of power by a President or/and party. The ratio also indicates only a marginal effect \(((.025/1.579)\times100\% = 1.6\%)\).

Assumption 4.1 supposes that older people, as well as respondents who are unemployed and respondents with lower level of education, are more likely to name socioeconomic equality as the most essential characteristic of democracy instead of freedom of speech. In this model, only one educational sub-group was determined statistically significant from the reference group (including respondents with either post-secondary qualifications, not university; some university; university completed; post-graduate): respondents with no formal schooling, with informal schooling only, with some primary schooling or with completed primary school. The Egyptian citizens in this group are more likely to prefer equal material rights rather than freedom of speech. Particularly, these respondents are 2.35 times more likely (vis-à-vis the comparison group) to prefer socioeconomic equality rather than freedom of speech. That is quite an expected conclusion, as I assumed that people with lower levels of education (and, therefore, with much less income) would prefer equality in economic and social realms rather than a right for free and unconstrained expression of their opinions. However, it is surprising to find that the individual economic index did not appear significant.

Hypothesis 4.2 states that individuals possessing less income, those with a lower level of education, and respondents who are not very interested in public affairs are less likely to choose free and fair elections as the most crucial characteristic of democracy compared to equal material rights. This hypothesis has been partly supported, as the group of individuals with the lowest level of education are less likely to choose free and fair elections over socioeconomic equality. Another way to describe this relationship is to say that the group of respondents with the lowest level of education is 1.77 times more likely (vis-à-vis the comparison group) to prefer equality of
material rights, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, rather than free and fair elections.

The fifth hypothesis predicts that older respondents, females, religious respondents, citizens with higher level of political trust, lower level of social trust, higher income and more education, are more likely to support the state’s procedures of legitimate coercion than younger respondents, males, not religious respondents, and those with lower level of political trust, higher level of social trust and lower income. Legitimate coercion refers to de jure lawful actions and decisions of executive bodies of the government such as courts, police and fiscal authorities imposed on ordinary citizens. Based on reviewed literature, it has been suggested that respondents with higher socioeconomic position in society are more supportive of actions of these entities, which should be aimed at sustaining stability of social life, thus, stability of their achieved socioeconomic status. The present study showed that neither age, gender, political trust, social trust nor education are statistically significant, while degree of religiosity and individual economic condition appear significant. The most powerful predictor out of all included in the equation is the economic index. But unlike the assumption made above, the model demonstrates a negative association between economic wellbeing and support for legitimate coercion: people who subjectively rank themselves higher on economic conditions, are less likely to support procedural aspects of lawful coercion. Particularly, they are less supportive of implicitly paying taxes, obeying courts’ and police’s actions without questioning them. A one unit increase in the economic index leads to decrease in support for this principle by .070. The dependent variable in this sample ranges from -4.14 (lowest support) to 1.22 (highest support). Full range equals 5.36, while interquartile range is 1.264. Hence, (.070/1.264)*100%=5.54%. The effect of one unit increase in the economic index seems marginal.
In turn, degree of religiosity is positively correlated with the outcome. Respondents for whom religion is very important/somewhat important compared to those for whom it is not very important/not important, score higher on support for legitimate coercion by .451. Again, the ratio of the effect of one unit increase to interquartile range equals (.451/1.264)*100%=36%, which seems quite substantial. Note, however, that it is not correct to compare the effect of the economic conditions with religiosity on support for legitimate coercion based on these ratios.

Overall, the regression models explain very little variance in the dependent variables. This is not surprising, and it can be explained from several points of view. First of all, the Afrobarometer dataset provides a very limited insight into the economic status of respondents, which is a crucial weakness of this data source. There is no direct information about respondents’ income, or at least range of incomes to which they may relate. Variables which could be used as proxies for income, for instance, “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without enough food to eat?”, do not seem useful in accessing economic status, as they ask only about very basic level of economic wellbeing, and only few respondents in the sample indicated that they have gone without food in past year. We observe the same issue with questions concerning ownership – there is very little variability in the responses about ownership of radio, television, motor vehicle, car or motorcycle, which prevents us from effectively clustering respondents into economic status groups. In addition, it became clear that ownership of a television decreases the need to own a radio. Thus, using these items in order to construct an aggregate variable measuring economic status is not effective. Several questions asking about cell phone ownership also fail to capture economic conditions, as they ask about the number of cells phones per family, but information about number of family members is not available. The dataset, however, encompasses a series of items which measure a respondent’s subjective view
of their economic situation compared to the one they experienced in the past 12 months, in the present and compared to other Egyptians. This set of variables has been used to construct an individual economic index; however, it does not capture much of the information we are interested in, compared to a direct measure of income. A second reason for the models’ limited ability to explain behavior of the dependent variables – attitudes and interpretations – is similar to that for many other quantitative analyses in social sciences. In the social world, as opposed to, for example, the biological world, we may find a great variety of independent factors which potentially impact the outcome. It is a daunting if not impossible task to account for them all. Due to this undeniable complexity, a correlation of .3 is considered moderately high as opposed to criteria applied in hard sciences. This complexity is exacerbated due to the multidimensional nature of the concept of democracy. Third, this study does not investigate the effects of interactions on the dependent variables. However, any future research that does examine such interactions may reveal a more complex relationship between social status characteristics and this study’s outcome variables. In terms of statistical approach, I would recommend building hierarchical regression by adding blocks of related independent variables one set at a time before combining them all rather than incorporating all variables in the model at once. This method unlike enter method will help observe how much variance is explained by every single predictor. Checking for curvilinear relationships would also be helpful in future studies. It is plausible that age, income, education, level of political trust, or religiosity (in case measured as ordinal or interval-level variable) may have curvilinear relationships with this study’s dependent variables.

The variables age, gender, employment status, residence type, and social trust have not been found significant in any of the observed models, despite implications of similar prior
research that they would. The individual economic index was found to be statistically significant in 3 out of the 5 models where it has been included:

- It is negatively related to attitudes toward the term democracy
- It is negatively related to support for lawful actions imposed by executive governmental bodies on ordinary citizens
- It is positively correlated with preference of one party-one man rule

Education was statistically significant in 4 models out of 6:

- It is positively related to support for occupational gender equality
- It is negatively related to support for one party-one man rule
- The group of respondents with the lowest level of education, compared to the group with the highest level of education prefers material rights over free and fair elections and freedom of speech

Degree of religiosity was significant in 1 model of 2:

- It is positively correlated with support for lawful actions imposed by executive governmental bodies on ordinary citizens

Political trust index was significant in 2 models of 3:

- It is positively associated with attitude toward the term democracy
- It is positively related to one party rule

Interest in public affairs reached statistical significance in 1 model out of 2:

- It is negatively associated with attitude toward the term democracy

Based on this brief summary of the relationships, we may observe several general patterns in the data: higher income individuals (again, the proxy for income is the individual economic index) seem to value less democratic principles – instead preferring unlimited control by one
party or President – and they tend to assess the term democracy negatively. On the contrary, individuals with higher levels of education show respect for democratic principles; however, the group of individuals with the lowest level of education are more likely to value the core democratic principle of material rights. Indeed, 49.1% of all respondents considered material rights a more important characteristic of democracy than either free and fair elections (24.2%), accountability of the government (11.6%), or freedom of speech (8.7%).

These findings on the relationship between education and views of democracy clearly support the point made earlier in this work that a more educated citizenry does not necessarily mean a more democratically oriented one. Controversial pattern is observed in political trust index: on the one hand, respondents with a higher level of political trust are prone to positive perceptions of the term democracy. On the other hand, they also tend to favor one party rule. Might this indicate that more politically trusting respondents believe that actions of the government are democratic in nature even if the President and/or the party exerts unlimited control over political decisions? Julia Paley contends that seemingly undemocratic principles may be revealed as quite democratic in nature if closely scrutinized. For example, she claims that in Botswana preference for one party rule among respondents meant their desire for accountability of the government and “deliberation over policy matters” as well as rejection of procedural democracy, and not a dismissal of democracy per se (Paley 2002:474). Although Paley’s argument may sound reasonable, political crisis caused by the uncontrolled authority of Hosni Mubarak should have convinced citizens that it might not work well.

Another noteworthy finding of this study significant and moderate-sized correlation between the economic and political trust indexes. They are correlated at .335 in the overall sample and at .327 when the sample was limited to Muslims (not specified brunch) and Sunni
Muslims. Hence, higher levels of political trust are associated with higher subjective rank of personal economic conditions.

Interestingly enough, age and education are negatively and significantly correlated at - .317, which indicates that older people tend to be less educated than the younger generation. This conclusion supports arguments made in *Egypt’s Tahrir Revolution* concerning a growing population of relatively more educated citizens in the last several years of Mubarak’s presidency, who are considered a key factor that made the revolution possible (Tschirgi, Kazziha and McMahon 2013). Another important though expected relationship observed in the present study is the correlation between gender and education. Women tend to show lower levels of education than men; however, the correlation coefficient equals .199, which means that it is still a quite weak.

Another point that I would like to emphasize is the interplay between variables measuring level of support for total control by one party or control solely by the President. In addition to asking about respondent’s relationship to one party-one man rule and Islamic law, the survey item inquiring about respondents’ attitudes toward the army ruling the country – initially considered to be used in the index construction – was poorly correlated with other items. If we examine frequency tables for each of these survey items, it becomes clear that unlike other items, where responses had low variability (e.g., a majority either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the principle of one party rule), respondents’ responses concerning the rule of the army are highly variable, with 50.1% supporting it, 19.8% opposing and 12.4% neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Taking into account the period the interviews were conducted – March 2013, a few months before the July 2013 military coup and overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leader Morsi – I may conclude that despite seemingly high public support of army rule months before
the coup, citizens were not so sure that military rule was the best option for their country. Mass execution and prosecution of protesters in July and August 2013 (Human-Rights-Watch 2014) tells us a much about political moods in the country and their apparent heterogeneity compared to those at the time of 2011 the Tahrir revolution, which united protesters on Cairo’s streets against Mubarak.
## Appendix

Frequency Tables:

### Table 20: Frequency Distribution of Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-29 years</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49 years</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-79 years</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1198</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 21: Frequency Distribution of Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 22: Frequency Distribution of Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No formal schooling</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal schooling only</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some primary schooling</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school completed</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some secondary school/high school</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school completed/high school</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary qualifications, not university</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some university</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University completed</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 23: Frequency Distribution of the Importance of Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all important</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1184</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Missing System: 16, Total 1200
Table 24: Frequency Distribution of the Interest in Public Affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not very interested</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very interested</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 25: Frequency Distribution of Residence Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 26: Frequency Distribution of Essential Characteristics of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government narrows the gap between the</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rich and the poor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People choose government leaders in free</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and fair elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government does not waste any public</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>money</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are free to express their political</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>views openly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1124</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Principle Component Analysis:

a) “Occupational Gender Equality” (final solution, rotation direct oblimin):

Table 27: Descriptive Statistics of Gender Equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Analysis N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal work opportunities</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>1.197</td>
<td>1156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A women can become the prime minister or the president</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>1.425</td>
<td>1156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's share of inheritance should be equal</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.186</td>
<td>1156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women and men should have equal rights in decision to divorce</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1.437</td>
<td>1156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 28: KMO and Bartlett's Test of Occupational Gender Equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy</th>
<th>.632</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bartlett's Test of Sphericity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. Chi-Square</td>
<td>991.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 29: Total Variance Explained of Occupational Gender Equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Initial Eigenvalues</th>
<th>Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings</th>
<th>Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total % of Variance</td>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
<td>Total % of Variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.101</td>
<td>52.520</td>
<td>2.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>25.015</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.472</td>
<td>11.799</td>
<td>.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>10.666</td>
<td>.427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.

b) “General Performance of Democracy” (final solution, rotation direct oblimin):

### Table 30: Descriptive Statistics of General Performance of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q43A_ARB_weak economic performance</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Analysis N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q43B_ARB_indecisive economic regimes</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>1.340</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q43C_ARB_order in democracy</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.342</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q43E_ARB_democracy and values</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.271</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 31: KMO and Bartlett's Test of the General Performance of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy</th>
<th>.843</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bartlett's Test of Sphericity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. Chi-Square</td>
<td>2676.662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 32: Total Variance Explained of the General Performance of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Initial Eigenvalues</th>
<th>Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total % of Variance</td>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.157</td>
<td>78.913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.443</td>
<td>11.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.216</td>
<td>5.392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>4.611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
c) “One Party/One Man Rule” (final solution, rotation direct oblimin)

Table 33: Descriptive Statistics of One Party/One Man Rule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Analysis N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q31A_attitude to one party rule</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>.917</td>
<td>1053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q31C_attitude to one man-rule</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>.911</td>
<td>1053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q31D_attitude_Islamic_Law</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.165</td>
<td>1053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 34: KMO and Bartlett's Test of One Party/One Man Rule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy</th>
<th>Bartlett's Test of Sphericity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.677</td>
<td>751.053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 35: Total Variance Explained of One Party/One Man Rule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Initial Eigenvalues</th>
<th>Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total % of Variance</td>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.998</td>
<td>66.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.580</td>
<td>19.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>14.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

d) “Procedural Aspects of Legitimate Coercion” (final solution, rotation direct oblimin)

Table 36: Descriptive Statistics of Procedural Aspects of Legitimate Coercion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Analysis N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q48A_attitudes to courts_decisions</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>.884</td>
<td>1127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q48_attitudes to the rule of law</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>.871</td>
<td>1127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q48C_attitude to paying taxes</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>.865</td>
<td>1127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 37: KMO and Bartlett's Test of Procedural Aspects of Legitimate Coercion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy</th>
<th>Bartlett's Test of Sphericity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. Chi-Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.698</td>
<td>1207.163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 38: Total Variance Explained of Procedural Aspects of Legitimate Coercion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Initial Eigenvalues</th>
<th>Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total % of Variance</td>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.191</td>
<td>73.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.492</td>
<td>16.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.317</td>
<td>10.571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

OLS Regressions: Models 1, 2, 3, and 5

a) Model 1. Assumptions check.

- Normally distributed residuals: histogram and normal PP
- Homoscedasticity and linearity: scatterplot

Figure 1: Assumptions Check for Model 1

Table 39: Coefficients for Model 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-.195</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>1.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Index</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>-.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.165</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95.0% Confidence Interval for B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>- .513</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- .043</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- .034</td>
<td>- .045</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correlations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Part</td>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>VIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- .045</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.984</td>
<td>1.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>1.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>1.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: component: occupational gender equality
b) Model 2. Assumptions check.
- Normally distributed residuals: histogram and normal PP
- Homoscedasticity and linearity: scatterplot

Figure 2: Assumptions Check for Model 2

Table 40: Coefficients for Model 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>95.0% Confidence Interval for B</th>
<th>Correlations</th>
<th>Collinearity Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td>Zero-Order Partial Partial Tolerance VIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-.417</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>3.871</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.628</td>
<td>-.206</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>-.150</td>
<td>4.467</td>
<td>-.077</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>-.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in public affairs</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.829</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust Index</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>-.076</td>
<td>2.156</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>-.138</td>
<td>-.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: component: general democratic performance

c) Model 3. Assumptions check.
- Normally distributed residuals: histogram and normal PP
- Homoscedasticity and linearity: scatterplot
Figure 3: Assumptions Check for Model 3

Table 41: Coefficient for Model 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>95.0% Confidence Interval for B</th>
<th>Correlations</th>
<th>Collinearity Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
<td>Zero-order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-.181</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.1737</td>
<td>-.385</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>1.977</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education recorded</td>
<td>-.052</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-.152</td>
<td>4.813</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.073</td>
<td>-.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust Index</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>6.241</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q101. Gender</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.939</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>-.062</td>
<td>.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence type</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.806</td>
<td>.420</td>
<td>-.070</td>
<td>.168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Dependent Variable: component: one man / one party rule

d) Model 5. Assumptions check.
- Normally distributed residuals: histogram and normal PP
- Homoscedasticity and linearity: scatterplot
Figure 4: Assumptions Check for Model 5

Table 42: Coefficients for Model 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>95.0% Confidence Interval for B</th>
<th>Collinearity Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
<td>Upper Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-.120</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>- .626</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>-.495</td>
<td>.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Index</td>
<td>-.070</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.176</td>
<td>-5.143</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education recorded</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>1.596</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Trust Index</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>1.317</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>-.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q101. Gender</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.276</td>
<td>.783</td>
<td>-.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.815</td>
<td>.415</td>
<td>-.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q98_importance of religion</td>
<td>.451</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>3.375</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people can be trusted</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>-.243</td>
<td>.808</td>
<td>-.174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Dependent Variable: component: procedural aspects of legitimate coercion
References


