EVOLUTION OF U.S. STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA AFTER THE COLD WAR

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ABSTRACT

In the years after the Cold War it appears that the U.S. distanced itself from Latin America. The region has begun to integrate itself in the world political economy without exclusively depending on the U.S. The integration has included engagement with extra-hemispheric states, such as China and Russia, and the creation of regional institutions. Some of these advancements may oppose U.S. interests in the region. The research aims to identify how the U.S. strategy for addressing key national interests in Latin America evolved since the end of the Cold War and how it should approach the region in the future.

The research provides an overview of U.S. policies towards Latin America from the Spanish-American War through the collapse of the Soviet Union; and from the post Cold War era through Barack Obama’s presidency. The focus is on the U.S.-Latin American policies during and after the Cold War. There is a review of China and Russia’s engagement of the region both during and after the Cold War. Finally there is a case study on the change of the U.S-Cuba policy and possible consequences.
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GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

In the years after the Cold War it appears that the U.S. distanced itself from Latin America. The region began to integrate itself economically and politically with the rest of the world without exclusively depending on the U.S. This integration has included engagement with China and Russia and the creation of regional organizations. Some of these advancements may oppose U.S. objectives in the region. The research aims to identify how the U.S. strategy for addressing key national interests in Latin America has evolved since the end of the Cold War and how it should approach the region in the future.

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7. CONCLUSION

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Chapter One:

Introduction

The United States’ entanglement in Latin American affairs can be traced back to the early years of the union in furtherance of U.S. political and economic interests. The decades before the Cold War witnessed the rise of the U.S. as a world power and in turn established dominance over Latin America, its “backyard” under the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. The Spanish-American war at the very end of the 19th century was a transition of power and influence over the region. From that point on, including throughout the Cold War, the U.S. functioned as a hemispheric hegemon and dictated the political outcomes of Latin American countries. Cold War conflicts in Latin America were seen through the lens of the East-West struggle (Gerrard-Burnett et al. 2013, 3). The dominant analysis of the Cold War in Latin America viewed the U.S. as “an all-powerful and [almost always] repressive hegemon that wielded practically unchallengeable political, economic, military, and cultural power in the hemisphere” (Gerrard-Burnett et al. 2013, 4).

In recent years, U.S. influence over Latin America has waned with the rise of left leaning governments. The U.S. track record of intervention in Latin America, which includes violent coups against democratically elected governments, has arguably created a cloud of skepticism in the region (Chatterjee 2015). For example, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America [ALBA], a regional organization whose eight Latin American members include Cuba and Venezuela, has an anti-U.S. discourse that is clearly counter to U.S. interests. ALBA attempts to build a new “economic, political, and military model” that is counter to Western democratic values and looks to Cuba for guidance (Farah 2015, 92). Such anti-U.S. discourse also propagated the formation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States [CELAC], “which was specifically founded in 2010 to exclude the United States” (Farah 2015,
Until President Obama’s December 2014 announcement to normalize relations with Cuba, many Latin American countries called for a change of the U.S. policy (LeoGrande 2015, 481). It can be argued that it has been the U.S. that has isolated itself from the region due to a combination of U.S. policy and its lack of outreach to the region (Chatterjee 2015).

According to a 2014 House of Representatives subcommittee hearing on “U.S. Disengagement from Latin America: Compromised Security and Economic Interests,” the antagonism in Latin America towards the U.S. and its interest has allowed “strategic adversaries,” such as Russia and China, to fill the space left by the U.S. in the region (U.S. Congress 2014d, 1-2). Additionally the “War on Terror” following the events of 9/11, has drawn U.S. foreign policy focus away from Latin America (U.S. Congress 2014d, 4). The region was looking for a relationship with the U.S. that was not “master-servant” but one where the region was recognized for its advancements and not only to be used by the U.S. when it was believed to advance strategic interest (U.S. Congress 2014d, 6).

Such a regional shift in attitude towards the U.S. and engagement with extra-hemispheric competitors, such as China and Russia, may have a significant impact on U.S. interests. Why have the atmospherics changed in Latin America and how could the U.S. improve its status moving forward? The research question pursued in this thesis is:

How has the U.S. strategy for addressing key national interests in Latin America evolved since the end of the Cold War?

During the Cold War the dominant theoretical paradigm was that of realism that lasted till the late 1980’s (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 2). In realist theory, individual states are the main actors in the anarchic international system, engaging in a constant struggle for power and existence (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 2001, 63). Hans Morgenthau explains that the state’s interest is the “essence of politics,” where interest is defined as power (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993,
10). In realism, states do not cooperate in pursuit of “international interest” or out of “altruism” (Keohane 1984a, X). As such, it fails to “incorporate international institutions as important entities” (Keohane 2002b, 6).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. was left as the lone superpower. Even as an unchallenged superpower however, it would be unable to achieve its goals through “the bilateral exercise of influence: the costs of such massive ‘arm-twisting’ would be too great” (Keohane 2002b, 27). With the strengthening of the world economy and the rise of globalization, the “state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances,” a new approach has to be considered (Keohane 2002b, 193). According to Robert O. Keohane, liberalism is the modern school of thought that attempts to advocate international cooperation, which may include institutions (Keohane 2002b, 10).

The rise of the global economy and interdependence has led to multiple Latin American regional organizations and an expansion of partnerships outside of the Western Hemisphere. In November 2013, Secretary of State Kerry announced that the “era of the Monroe Doctrine is over,” to the Organization of American States (Kerry 2013). However, the rise of Russia and China, two states that have shown to have contradicting interests with those of the U.S., acting in the United States’ own “backyard” is a logical security concern. Although the European Union [EU] has engaged the region since its inception in the early 1990’s, it can be considered an ally to the U.S. in pursuing mutual interests and generally ideologically aligned. Thus, this thesis does not examine the EU’s engagement of the region.

In recent years China and Russia have demonstrated their respective capabilities on the world stage. Chinese-Latin American trade skyrocketed from US$10 billion in 2000 to US$183 billion in 2011 (Hearn 2012, 156). The U.S. has shown concerns about the “economic
sustainability of Chinese operations in Latin America and anxiety about foreign interference in a region traditionally subsumed by U.S. hegemony” (Hearn 2012, 158). As U.S. influence in the region diminishes that of Russia increases through trade, diplomacy and investment (Sanchez 2010, 362). Russia’s view on Latin America has been described not as a “cornerstone” of Russian foreign policy but definitely “one of its pillars” (Sanchez 2010, 362).

Based on research, the following hypothesis is presented:

The decrease of U.S. influence in Latin America after the Cold War, has led U.S. foreign strategy to shift towards cooperation/liberalism instead of hegemony/realism.

Chapter two provides a succinct overview of U.S. policies towards Latin America between the declaration of the Spanish-American War and World War II. As we’ll see during the Cold War, realism and regional intervention dominated the era. Chapter three discusses how Latin America was viewed through a U.S.-Soviet lens. Although there were some U.S. efforts to address the regional needs, overall U.S. policy followed the realist paradigm. Chapter four illustrates how U.S. leadership acknowledged a need for regional cooperation after the Cold War, but failed to reach implied policy objectives. The Obama presidency however has made large strides in engaging the region. Chapter five presents how China and Russia are U.S. competitors on the global stage, and how their advancements in Latin America can clash with U.S. interests. Chapter six is a case study of U.S. policy shift to a liberal approach and how it may be affecting China and Russia. Finally, the conclusion provides suggestions to U.S. policy makers on how to break with the historical approach with Latin America.

Method of Research

The research has a regional framework focus on Latin America and its interactions with external states. Latin America refers geographically to all the countries in the Caribbean, Central
America, and South America. The term also refers to the regional identity when discussing attitudes/interactions towards the U.S. or other extra-hemispheric states. The primary external states to be reviewed will be the U.S., China, and Russia. In order to present a reasonable argument of the U.S. strategy shift towards Latin America to address national interests, I have done the following:

- Survey academic research and arguments, including:
  - Theories of international relations
  - Foreign policy analysis
- Survey government (foreign and domestic) bulletins, reports, speeches, etc.
  - Primary sources were mainly U.S. documents.
  - Secondary sources were the main focus due to language translations and availability.

In chapter seven, the conclusion, the information obtained is categorized and a result is presented with enough evidence to provide a research-based account of how U.S. policy towards the region has changed.

**Literature Review**

*Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, by Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, aimed to understand the forces that drive political relations between states and how these forces act upon each other (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 17). The book illustrated a realist approach to international politics in terms of power and interest. Unlike the moralistic perspective on international politics that assumed the “essential goodness and infinite malleability” of human nature, realism viewed the world as imperfect due to the “forces
inherent in human nature” of opposing interests and conflict (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 3). International politics was a struggle of power, and power is always the underlying aim regardless of policy goals (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 29). Political power was defined as “the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large” (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 30). For example, the political power of the U.S. over Central America was measured by the “conformity of the actions of Central American governments with the wishes of the government of the United States” (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 33).

The foundation of the theory was to address issues in an objective manner versus moralistic, and the concept of interest was defined in terms of power (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 4-13). Due to conflicting interests among states the only path to permanent peace in the world was through a world state, which is not probable (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 389). As a result the best “instrument” for peace was that of diplomacy which should aim to promote a state’s national interest by peaceful means (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 361).

The book was originally written in the early years of the Cold War. The realist principles were dominant throughout the duration of the conflict. For example, the threat posed from the armed strength of a state was an important factor in building its political power (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 31). The authors provided the example of the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 31). Another related topic was that of the status quo and balance of power. As states attempt to increase their power and change the status quo, the concept of “balance of power” is a mechanism to preserve it (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 183). During the Cold War era, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the “main weights, placed on opposite scales” (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 216). The attempt to
maintain the status quo can be observed in the U.S. policies of containment and concerns of Soviet intrusion in Latin America during the Cold War. There are plenty of historical examples, ranging from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the declaration of the “Reagan Doctrine.”

Robert O. Keohane’s book, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, attempted to demonstrate that cooperation between states was attainable in the world political economy when common interests exist, even without the leadership of a hegemon present. Political economy was defined as the interactions in international relations of “the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power” (Keohane 1984a, 18). Keohane wrote that as economic interdependence increases between states, a “synthesis” of realism and liberal institutionalism was necessary (Keohane 1984a, 135). The writer did not assume the complete liberal position that cooperation is achieved through harmony between states, but rather acknowledged the realist concept that discord between states would exist, and mutual interest would be an incentive for cooperation (Keohane 1984a, 63 & 215).

Derived from the theory of hegemonic stability, hegemonic leadership has historically emerged after great world conflicts, and has spearheaded cooperation between states (Keohane 1984a, 31-32). However, during peacetime “weaker countries have tended to gain on the hegemon” (Keohane 1984a, 9). Keohane explained that even with the decline or a lack of a hegemon, states would still have incentives to cooperate and form international institutions and regimes due to the interdependence of the world political economy (Keohane 1984a, 243-244). International regimes were defined by the writer as a set of principles, norms, and rules that “affect calculations of self-interest” by reducing the degree of uncertainty that member states faced when evaluating each other’s policies (Keohane 1984a, xi).
Christopher Sabatini’s article, “Will Latin America Miss U.S. Hegemony?” in the Journal of International Affairs, focused on the consequences of the decline of U.S. influence and hegemony in Latin America. Since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the U.S. stood as the “primary hegemonic power—the ‘colossus of the north’” that allowed it to intervene overtly or covertly to impose its national interests (Sabatini 2013, 2). U.S. hegemony over the region provided a security umbrella, reduced intra-regional conflict, and access to one of the top markets in the world (Sabatini 2013, 13). Sabatini wrote that since 2000, regional and multilateral organizations have developed to assert diplomatic power in the region and to reduce the U.S. role, for example the formation of ALBA and the global rise of the Southern Common Market [MERCOSUR].

At the end of the Cold War, the extra-hemispheric threat to the U.S. had all but disappeared, and the Western Hemisphere countries could thereby begin to aim for a common goal of “consensus and convergence.” The absence of such an external threat led to a reduction in U.S. political and economic intervention, and greater autonomy for governments and thereby reduced the region’s “historic concerns over national sovereignty” (Sabatini 2013, 2-5).

In 1991, the member states of the Organization of American States [OAS] passed a resolution that committed the region to defend democracy by granting the OAS authority to convene its members when it was perceived that there had been an “interruption of the constitutional process,” such as a coup, and discuss further action (Sabatini 2013, 6). In 1994, the U.S. convened the first Summit of the Americas [SOA] that led to the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas [FTAA] (Sabatini 2013, 5). However, this democratic tone developed new relevance with the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998, and other left leaning governments in Latin America in the early 2000’s (Sabatini 2013, 6). U.S. economic and political power in the region
has waned but not vanished. One reason for the decline was the expanding presence of China in Latin America that has become a commercial and political “counterweight” (Sabatini 2013, 10).

In the article titled “Empire’s Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” by Greg Grandin, the author writes on U.S. policy in Latin America and the gap between policy and reality. According to the article U.S. policy should be based on “twenty-first century multilateralism” that was capable of addressing transnational problems that concern both liberals and conservatives while respecting the sovereignty of Latin American states (Grandin 2010, 17). The aim of the U.S. would be not to “advance a set of altruistic ideals” but to defend U.S. interests, which Grandin defines as stable politics and economies in the region that would be amenable to U.S. capital and commodities (Grandin 2010, 15). Another U.S. objective would be to achieve soft power, defined as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion” (Grandin 2010, 15).

U.S.-Latin American relations have been defined by two particular eras, that of U.S. economic and territorial expansion of the early nineteenth century and the Cold War (Grandin 2010, 22). Grandin believed we may be entering a new era as U.S. influence in the region is declining (Grandin 2010, 22). Latin America could be a model for Barack Obama’s vision, which he declared in a September 2009 address to the United Nations, of “a new era of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect” (Grandin 2010, 17). Grandin proposes the following policy changes that could address mutual interest and respect: reducing tariffs and subsidies on Brazil; yield on issues that have delayed the FTAA; decrease military operations in Colombia; remove the Cuban embargo; and commit to a multilateral foreign policy (Grandin 2010, 15-16).
The Advance of Radical Populist Doctrine in Latin America, by Douglas Farah, discussed the decline of U.S. influence in Latin America that was exemplified by the rise of ALBA and CELAC. ALBA comprised of eight member states, countered U.S. regional interests by attempting to build a political, economic and military model in Latin America that contradicted Western democratic values (Farah 2015, 92). The 2010 founding of CELAC with the purposeful exclusion of the U.S. reinforced the trend of waning U.S. influence (Farah 2015, 99).

Historically, Latin American was usually a region of unchallenged U.S. influence. Recently the region has gained the attention of Russia and China. Within ten days in July 2014, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping visited Cuba (Farah 2015, 91). During his trip, Putin forgave a Cuban debt of more than US$ 30 billion from the Cold War (Farah 2015, 91). During Xi’s visit to the region he distributed approximately US$ 70 billion in loans, lines of credit and direct aid to Latin America (Farah 2015, 91). The development was a strong contrast to the shrinking U.S. aid to the region and President Obama’s visiting only six Latin American countries in eight years (Farah 2015, 91). Table 1.1 indicated a decrease in U.S. assistance to the region between fiscal years [FY] 2011 and 2014. U.S. aid decreased approximately 20 percent between FY2011 and FY2014 (Meyer 2016, 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>FY2011</th>
<th>FY2012</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,856,199</td>
<td>1,823,526</td>
<td>1,684,470</td>
<td>1,477,611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: U.S. Department of State, (Meyer 2016, 5)
Gonzalo Baeza and Mark Langevin’s article, “The Convergence We Need? President Obama and U.S. Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean,” for American Diplomacy, analyzed President Obama’s strategy for Latin America titled “A new Partnership for the Americas.” It focused on key topics that have been discussed in recent think tanks’ policy proposals. Latin American countries have diversified their economic and political relations around the world, meanwhile the U.S. sought to “reverse its irrelevancy” in the region in terms of “trade, development, and collective security” (Baeza and Langevin 2009). Political observers agreed that U.S. policy towards the region had “fallen behind the pace of change and that relations are strained at worst, distant at best” (Baeza and Langevin 2009). During the first months of the first Obama Administration, policy study organizations issued proposals and policy framework advocating a shift toward a more “relevant, engaging posture” regarding the people and governments of Latin America (Baeza and Langevin 2009).

The Obama administration aimed to develop cooperation with Latin America by addressing “converging” national interests based on the assumption that most states in the region shared the same national interests. The Brookings Institute proposed a “hemispheric partnership,” claiming that without such cooperation the region would face missed opportunities and increased risks when addressing challenges, such as organized crime and climate change (Baeza and Langevin 2009; Brookings Institution 2008, 3). The Council of Foreign Relations suggested U.S. policy engage the region on its own terms and not those imposed by the U.S. Similarly, the Washington Office on Latin America advised that U.S. policy should aim to enable a “hemispheric community” by building relations to solve common problems (Baeza and Langevin 2009). The Council of the Americas identified economic development as the most important national interest of the Latin American states, and recommended a reevaluation of U.S.
trade policy in “light of the diminishing returns accrued under former President Bush’s strategy of ‘competitive liberalization’” (Baeza and Langevin 2009; Council of the Americas 2009, 3). Baeza and Langevin wrote that the primary issues for the region primarily included “economic development, growth with equity, and the need to target development strategies on behalf of the region’s vast population of urban and rural poor.” Other regional topics up for discussion included energy and climate control, immigration reform, drug trade and crime, and democracy and human rights.
Chapter Two:
Before the Cold War

Realism as it is known today was not developed until the twentieth century, however its fundamentals could be traced back for centuries (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 63-69). Political philosophers have addressed realist concepts for centuries, such as Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli’s views on power and human behavior, or Georg Hegel and the conception of the state (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 69-70). Political realists argue that a state’s interest or objective is that of national security and power (Gilpin 1981, 19). Since the inception of the U.S., its existence has been threatened by European powers. Looking at U.S. foreign policy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through classical realist lens, the defense of the “continental homeland” was the fundamental national interest (Keohane 2002b, 274). The promotion of American political and economic interests can be seen contributing to intervention in Latin America through the Monroe Doctrine, the Spanish-American War, the Panama Canal and the group of small conflicts known as the Banana Wars. In order to demonstrate the validity of the argument in the thesis, a background of U.S. and Latin America before the Cold War is provided.

With the acquisition of Florida the U.S. began to focus on national security concerns in Latin America. The U.S. was not only concerned that other powers may inject themselves in Latin America, but also the Russian interest in the “northwest coast of the American continent” (Gott 2004, 58). President James Monroe warned the European powers that the U.S. would consider “any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety” (Gott 2004, 59). The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 proclaimed U.S resistance to any change in the prevailing distribution of power by foreign entities in the Western Hemisphere and was the cornerstone of U.S. national security policy (Morgenthau and
Thompson 1993, 53-54; Keohane 2002b, 274). This policy was a sign of the young U.S. declaring political independence from Europe and the development of “world-wide balance-of-power system” (Morgenthau and Thompson 1993, 206). The doctrine established U.S. hegemony over Latin America. As stated before, the Monroe Doctrine remained in place until Secretary of State John Kerry’s announcement in November 2013 to the Organization of American States that the Monroe Doctrine was over (Kerry 2013). Ironically, today the U.S. is facing similar concerns of extra-hemispheric encroachment encountered by President Monroe. As it will be discussed in chapter five, within the last two decades China and Russia have been threatening U.S. interests by making inroads into Latin America.

At the end of the 19th century the U.S. entered the Spanish-American war with objectives that included securing Cuba and Puerto Rico (Gott 2004, 99). For many Americans the destruction of American property in Cuba, to include the USS Maine, was a stimulus for concern and advocacy (Berner 2014, 18). The war allowed the U.S. to affirm itself as a “great-power status” in world politics by implementing foreign policies and emerging from the conflict with colonies that spanned the globe (McCartney 2013).

The Spanish-American war’s aftermath led to the Platt Amendment which permitted U.S. over watch of Cuba, allowed intervention on the island, and required the U.S. approval for any Cuban treaties with foreign countries. The U.S. would in fact intervene in Cuban affairs in 1906 and 1909, in 1912, and from 1917 to 1923 (Gott 2004, 111; U.S. Congress 2009b). The Platt Amendment remained in place until 1934 (Gilderhus 2000, 78).

Another landmark of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America was the building of the Panama Canal, between 1904 and 1914 (Carse 2014, 7). The American idea of a canal through the isthmus can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century (Hogan 1986, 19). In the 1890’s the
President Grover Cleveland administration, along with congressmen and the business community concluded, “foreign markets were necessary for the prosperity and tranquility of the United States” (Hogan 1986, 20). Thus, a canal would be essential for expansion to the South American and Oriental markets (Hogan 1986, 20). Additionally, an interoceanic canal would improve the U.S. strategic posture by enhancing U.S. naval power (Hogan 1986, 19). Before the construction on the canal began, the sought after stretch of Panamanian land was actually under Colombian rule. The Colombian congress rejected the treaty for the U.S. canal to be built. After failed negotiations in 1903, the U.S. flexed its naval power on both coasts of the isthmus in support of Panamanian independence, which was declared on November 3, 1903 (U.S. Dept. of State 2016c).

In that same year the Panama Canal treaty between Panama and the U.S. was signed, providing the U.S. with the land in exchange of a payment and the U.S. guarantee of Panamanian independence (U.S. Dept. of State 2016c). The act of intervention in Panama set the tone for President Theodore Roosevelt’s policy towards Latin America, which would later be called the Roosevelt Corollary. In a message to Congress in December 1904, Roosevelt enhanced the Monroe Doctrine by not only acknowledging to “stand against European intervention” in the Western Hemisphere, but to also take “corrective” action in Latin America (Gilderhus 2000, 29). Theodore Roosevelt believed in “preventive intervention by which the United States would step in and set things right” (Gilderhus 2000, 29).

From 1904 till 1979 the U.S. administered the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone, a five hundred square mile strip bisecting the country (Carse 2014, 16). In 1979 the U.S. began the Canal transfer process with Panama, and finally completed the transition in 1999 (Carse 2014, 16).
By 1914, approximately 87 percent of U.S. overseas investments were focused on Mexico, Chile, Cuba, and Peru, totaling approximately US$1.6 billion (Gilderhus 2000, 39). European investments were also on the rise, approximately US$7 billion by 1914, this new rise in foreign interest in the region arguably created a foreign economic dependency by Latin America, and was seen by some scholars as debilitating and as a form of exploitation (Gilderhus 2000, 39-40). At the same time there was a domestic controversy over the U.S. unilateral intervention in Latin America as a police power and the mis-execution of the Monroe Doctrine (Gilderhus 2000, 42). Regardless, revolts in the region would require U.S. military intervention that lasted until the years leading up to World War II.

Between 1916 and 1917, political instability in Haiti and the Dominican Republic led to U.S. military forces to be deployed to both countries (Gilderhus 2000, 49). Haiti and the Dominican Republic were in debt to various nations and internal turmoil was brewing (Clark 2014, 53). Haiti had as many presidents as years of existence, all of which had been killed in bloody revolutions (Clark 2014, 54). As early as 1914, the fear that the Haitian government was going to seize the Haitian gold reserves incited the National City Bank of New York to ask the U.S. Government to take action (Clark 2014, 54). As such the U.S. would maintain a military presence in Haiti until 1934, approximately twenty years (Clark 2014, 99).

Similarly to Haiti, the U.S. continued to execute the policy of intervention in the region. The Dominican Republic was in a state of collapse by early 1916 due to an insurrection launched by a Dominican general against the government (Clark 2014, 145). The U.S. navy was deployed to the area ostensibly for the protection of U.S. citizens (Clark 2014, 145). By the end of 1916 negotiations between the U.S. and the Dominicans failed to bring peace to the country, consequently the U.S. maintained a military occupation and government in Santo Domingo until
1924 (Clark 2014, 148). The U.S. maintained a military presence in Nicaragua between 1911 and 1932, when the Nicaraguan civil war was coming to an end (Gilderhus 2000, 62-63).

In the years leading up to the Second World War we see a shift in the U.S. approach towards Latin America. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt [FDR] took office his administration wanted to focus more on domestic issues, and it was implied that he had a personal preference for friendly relations with other countries (Gilderhus 2000, 75). During President FDR’s inaugural address in 1933, he stated that in foreign affairs he would “dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor – the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors” (Gilderhus 2000, 75). For Latin America, this “Good Neighbor Policy” signified an end to direct U.S. intervention in regional affairs, but also consisted of initiatives that promoted collaboration and economic expansion (Gilderhus 2000, 71-72).

Between 1933 and 1945, the U.S. signed 15 reciprocity agreements with Latin American countries, which aided in gathering support for U.S. policies at a “critical time” (Gilderhus 2000, 83). When the U.S. entered World War II, most Latin American states aligned themselves with the U.S. and severed relations with the Axis powers (Leffler and Painter 2005, 302). The exception was Chile and Argentina at the beginning of the conflict but would later align with the Allies. World War II strengthened existing political, economic, and ideological ties between Latin America and the U.S. (Leffler and Painter 2005, 302).

Long before the onset of U.S. covert and overt operations in Latin America during the Cold War, the U.S. had established a history of intervention. Although FDR attempted to shift the course of regional relations with the Good Neighbor Policy, it was Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary that best illustrates the U.S.-Latin American policies before 1945. The U.S. policies of
the first half of the 20th century towards the region laid the foundation for the labeling of the U.S. as “imperialist” and the “colossus of the north.”
Chapter Three:
The Cold War and Latin America

After World War II, realism was the dominant international relations paradigm (Kegley 1995, 151). The war’s aftermath brought a change in the international system through a shift in the distribution of power, ending European dominance (Leffler and Painter 2005, 3). The U.S. emerged as the strongest state followed by the Soviet Union (Leffler and Painter 2005, 3). The importance of national security for both superpowers and their ideological differences would lead to friction. The Cold War not only shaped the foreign policies of both states during the era but also influenced the foreign and domestic politics of other nations around the globe (Leffler and Painter 2005, 1). Moscow sought security through “territorial acquisitions and spheres of influence,” while the U.S. sought a “preservation of a favorable balance of power in Eurasia” and a “strategic sphere of influence in Latin America” (Gaddis 2000, 3; Leffler and Painter 2005, 17).

Latin America was of special concern to the U.S. because of its proximity, and history of vulnerability and instability (Pastor 2009, 20). It was the U.S. policies during the Cold War that would perpetuate the image of the “North American colonialism.” As a hegemon, the U.S. would build a reputation of intervention in the region, leading Latin America to perceive itself as pawns of U.S. interests. In general, the consistent U.S. interests in Latin America are those of national security, human rights, democracy, and economic development (Pastor 2009, 37). However, as we will see in this chapter, some administrations such as Eisenhower’s engaged in economic and social development in the region, while the Reagan administration would focus more on national security. The U.S. varied in the manner it addressed the Soviet threat in Latin America, from
attempting to improve social conditions in the region in order to “reduce the political appeal to the left” to direct conflict with the Soviets in Cuba (Edwards 2009, 2).

In the early years of the Cold War Latin America went through economic and industrial developments that led to social conflicts in some countries and consequently an open path for Marxist ideologies. According to a paper written by Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow, titled “Latin American Economic Development: 1950-1980,” the region’s economy grew substantially in the early part of the Cold War before declining towards the end of the conflict (Cardoso and Fishlow 1989, 2). While the Brazilian economy was most prominent, other smaller countries in the region did not have the same success (Cardoso and Fishlow 1989, 2). By 1988, most of the region’s per capita GDP had fallen below their 1980 level due to a combination of bad policies, inflation, and income distribution (Cardoso and Fishlow 1989, 4-39). According to the writers, Venezuela, Nicaragua and El Salvador demonstrated levels below those recorded in 1960 (Cardoso and Fishlow 1989, 4).

The end of the Cold War brought a different target into the cross hairs of U.S. policy makers towards Latin America, which was drug trafficking. The “war on drugs” replaced the threat of communism. The new policies would become an area of contention with some Latin American leaders.

Early Years of the Cold War

In 1947, the Inter-American Conference for the maintenance of Continental Peace and Security convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and adopted the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Also known as the Rio treaty, it was a regional security pact against attacks from foreign powers outside the region. The U.S. signed the treaty even though at the time the U.S.
perspective was that Latin America was fairly safe from the Soviets (Leffler and Painter 2005, 310). The treaty created the framework for the adoption of the Charter of the Organization of American States [OAS] in 1948, which complimented the Rio Treaty by addressing internal regional cooperation and solidarity (Organization of American States 2016).

The U.S. perceived Eurasia was under Soviet threat, which led to the Truman Doctrine that is otherwise recognized as the “doctrine of containment” (Leffler and Painter 2005, 310). Conversely, the U.S. believed the Soviet risk was minimal in Latin America (Leffler and Painter 2005, 310). President Harry S. Truman sought assistance for Greece against a communist insurgency due to the fear that Turkey would be next to fall, initiating to the domino effect (Brown 1994, 26). Truman’s policy set the tone for a U.S. led effort to maintain a balance of power with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and to further prevent any extension of Soviet control (Brown 1994, 28). Latin America was not a central issue for U.S. policy makers in the early years of the Cold War, but later we will see that it would be a “mistake to underestimate its importance” (Leffler and Painter 2005, 309).

Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough write in their essay “The Impact of the Cold War on Latin America,” on the events that led to the Latin American communist movement in the early years of the Cold War (Leffler and Painter 2005, 299). By the end of World War II almost all the countries in Latin America moved in the direction of political liberalization and partial democratization (Leffler and Painter 2005, 302). Although every country had its own history, Latin America in general had a certain trend in the early years after the War. The Latin American urban working class was growing due to migration and industrial development, which led to a widespread increase in union membership (Leffler and Painter 2005, 305). While a labor movement was underway, many Latin American states had declared communist parties illegal
(Leffler and Painter 2005, 307). The labor movement soon shifted to a socioeconomic conflict. Although “domestic class conflicts” were different in each county, they were “undoubtedly influenced by the Cold War” (Leffler and Painter 2005, 308). “Popular political mobilization” and strike activity became Marxist inspired and potentially revolutionary (Leffler and Painter 2005, 309).

During the years of the Cold War, conflicts in Latin America were seen through the lens of the East-West struggle (Gerrard-Burnett et al. 2013, 3). The dominant analysis of the effects of the Cold War in Latin America views the U.S. as “an all-powerful and [almost always] repressive hegemon that wielded practically unchallengeable political, economic, military, and cultural power in the hemisphere” (Gerrard-Burnett et al. 2013, 4). As per the examples below, the East-West struggle was the force behind U.S. policy and intervention in Latin America. U.S. policy would morph from simply “anti-communist” in the early years of the Cold War, to a more sophisticated set of assumptions by recognizing a connection between “socioeconomic underdevelopment and Marxist inroads in the Western Hemisphere” (Brown 1994, 460).

The Eisenhower administration appeared to use the full range of foreign policy options towards Latin America, from intervention to cooperation. In Eisenhower’s 1952 presidential campaign, he stated that the U.S. had “frantically wooed Latin America” during World War II but then preceded to forget the region, allowing a “terrible disillusionment” to set in (Gilderhus 2000, 139). Eisenhower asserted that communist agents were prepared to exploit the distress and unrest in the region (Gilderhus 2000, 139).

In 1954, a U.S. covert operation toppled the elected government of Guatemala because it was perceived as “communist-dominated” administration (Gilderhus 2000, 139). This
intervention “destroyed” whatever remained of President FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy (Gilderhus 2000, 144).

In 1959, Fidel Castro spearheaded the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista’s government in Cuba, a U.S. “man of trust” since the 1930’s (Arboleya 2000, 26). Initially, the U.S. had little concern over Castro’s victory due to the known pattern of anarchy and political fighting after a revolution (Gott 2004, 164). However, Castro laid the foundation for his anti-American rhetoric on his January 2, 1959 victory speech where he announced: “This time it will not be like 1898, when the North Americans came and made themselves masters of our country” (Gott 2004, 165). Castro would continue to align himself with Marxist-Leninist philosophy and institute a land reform policy (Gott 2004, 180). By mid-1959, the U.S. concluded that Castro’s government was not favorable to U.S. interests and objectives (Gott 2004, 180). In March 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the plans to overthrow the Cuban Revolution (Arboleya 2000, 75). In August 1960, Castro nationalized all the major American properties in Cuba (Gott 2004, 184-185). The U.S. would cut diplomatic ties in 1961 and institute an economic embargo that is still in place today (Gott 2004, 184-185). Meanwhile, the Soviets would reinstate diplomatic ties with Cuba in 1960 and assist Cuba by increasing its Cuban sugar purchases (Gott, 2004, p.181-184).

Towards the end of his second term, President Eisenhower described the situation in Latin America as a choice between “social evolution” and “revolution” (Brown 1994, 460). Some “evolutionary measures” recommended by President Eisenhower included “the strengthening of institutions for promoting economic growth, and greater respect for human rights and the will of the people as expressed in democratic elections” (Brown 1994, 460). A product of Eisenhower’s new approach to Latin America was the Act of Bogota of 1960, which
immediately offered a loan of $500 million to initiate a new social development program in the region (Brown 1994, 460).

The John F. Kennedy presidency saw the failed attempt of the Bay of Pigs and the near catastrophe of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In short, the Bay of Pigs in 1961 was a failed invasion of Cuba by U.S. trained Cuban exiles (Gott 2004, 190). This was a continued clandestine attempt by the U.S. to remove Castro from power. The incident demonstrated to many Latin Americans that the U.S. “could never be trusted” and that it was not as “all-powerful as it had once seemed” (Gott 2004, 191). The Cuban perceived threat from the U.S. after the Bay of Pigs incident led Cuba to seek protection from the Soviet Union (Kennedy 1999, 9). The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was a conflict between the U.S. and Soviets over U.S. nuclear missiles in Turkey and Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba (Kennedy 1999, 12). After thirteen days of the world being on the brink of nuclear war, the conflict was peacefully resolved. The agreement consisted of the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey and an assurance to not invade Cuba, while the Soviets removed their missiles from the island (Gott 2004, 207).

President Kennedy continued Eisenhower’s idea of Latin American outreach with the Alliance for Progress [La Alianza para el Progreso]. The initiative was an attempt to drive a wedge between suspected “Soviet clients and other leftist movements in the hemisphere” (Brown 1994, 460). It consisted of an effort “unparalleled in magnitude” in order to “satisfy the basic needs of the Latin American people for homes, work and land, health and schools” (Gilderhus 2000, 172).

Between the Kennedy and Ronald Reagan presidencies, the containment policy would drive U.S. intervention in Latin America. During the years of the Vietnam War, one can infer the policy focus was on the conflict and not on the development of an effective Latin American
strategy. President Lyndon B. Johnson prioritized political stability and economic growth over
democracy and reform in order to defend against “communist subversion” in the region
(Gilderhus 2000, 185-187). Under President Johnson the U.S. would intervene covertly in Brazil
in 1964 and overtly in the Dominican Republic in 1965 (Gilderhus 2000, 190-192). The Richard
Nixon administration would be implicated in covertly supporting opponents to the Marxist
government of Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile in 1973 (Brown 1994, 285). Henry Kissinger,
Secretary of State under the Nixon Administration, would state that if Chile had “followed the
Cuban pattern” it would have been “supported by Soviet forces and Soviet arms in the southern
core of the South American continent” (Brown 1994, 285).

During Jimmy Carter’s presidency, the U.S. renegotiated the terms of the Panama Canal
in a treaty ratified in 1978 in order to relieve growing tensions between the U.S. and Panama
(Gilderhus 2000, 205). The Panama Canal and the Canal Zone had caused friction over a number
control of the canal to the Panamanians on December 31, 1999, but also outlined U.S. rights to
defend the canal after the transfer (Gilderhus 2000, 205). The treaty was a counter argument to
the rhetoric of the “North American colonialism” spreading in the region (Carter 1982, 184). The
Venezuelan President at the time, Andres Perez, referred to the treaty as “the most significant
advance in political affairs in the Western Hemisphere in this century (Carter 1982, 184).

The Reagan Years

President Reagan led the West against the Soviets in the final years of the Cold War.
Reagan’s realism “checked and balanced” his belief that it was imperative for the U.S. to commit
resources worldwide in the struggle against the spread of communism, to include Latin America
Reagan viewed the U.S. as a global leader in the “forces of good against the forces of evil,” meaning capitalism versus socialism (Brown 1994, 402). It was the duty of the U.S. to strengthen pro democratic capitalist governments worldwide while weakening Marxist-Leninist governments (Brown 1994, 402). His philosophy was labeled as the Reagan Doctrine.

The Reagan Administration’s aggressive anti-Marxist policies in Latin America, when compared to the social development strategies of Eisenhower and Kennedy, represented “a great leap backward from the evolving realism in U.S. Latin American policy” (Brown 1994, 460). While U.S.-Latin American policy mainly focused on the spread of Marxism, it also began to shift focus towards the issue of narcotics trafficking.

The concerns over the rise of Marxism in Latin America were not unfounded. In 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig outlined what he believed to be the four objectives of Soviet operations in Central America before the Foreign Affairs Committee, which were Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala (Brown 1991, 462). In 1979, a Marxist-led coalition named the Sandinistas, after a Nicaraguan revolutionary hero, overthrew the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua (Cannon 1991, 343). Simultaneously, a civil war had developed in El Salvador. By early 1981, the leftist insurrection launched their “final offensive” against a U.S. backed government in El Salvador that appeared to be supported by the Sandinistas, Cuba and other Soviet bloc countries (Cannon 1991, 343; Brown, 1994, p.460). The bloody conflict in El Salvador was seen by the Reagan administration as a “flashpoint of the intensifying East-West struggle” (Brown 1994, 460). The U.S. responded to the Salvadorean crisis with military advisers and financial aid in an attempt to defeat the insurrection (Cannon 1994, 345; Brown 1994, 461). The Salvadorean rebels suffered major loses but remained a disruptive force till a peace accord in 1992.
From the execution of Reagan’s anti-Marxist policy in Latin America came the Iran-Contra Affair. In the governmental debate on how to approach the situation in Nicaragua, congress passed a restrictive amendment in 1982 that prohibited U.S. intelligence from using funds “for the purposes of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua” (Brown 1994, 472). The opposing force to the Marxist coalition was known as Contras, meaning counter or against. In order to covertly finance the Contras in Nicaragua, the U.S. turned to a fund-raising campaign in Saudi Arabia and other foreign countries, to include the illegal arms sales to Iran (Cannon 1991, 349; Pastor 2009, 75). The U.S. covert efforts in Nicaragua between 1984 and 1986 included financial aid and supplies to the Contras (Brown 1994, 476-477).


Aside from preventing the spread of leftist governments in Latin America, the issue of the region’s cocaine export to the U.S. would come to rise under the Reagan Administration. The Drug Enforcement Administration estimated that between 1981 and 1987, the amount of cocaine imported into the U.S. increased nearly twentyfold (Martz 1995, 14). An increase of crime in the U.S. was partly attributed to the Latin American cocaine export. By the end of the Cold War,
U.S. policy shifted from focusing on the Soviet threat in Latin America to the war on drugs. U.S. drug policies caused tension between the U.S. and Latin America, as the U.S. faulted the Latin American suppliers while Latin Americans would blame the U.S. demand (Martz 1995, 14).

Towards the end of the Reagan Presidency the Miguel Antonio Noriega controversy would arise. As head of the Panamanian Army, Noriega assisted the U.S. in the mid 1980’s by supporting the Contras’ fight against the Sandinistas (Pastor 2009, 76). However, in 1988 Noriega was indicted for drug trafficking charges in Miami, Florida. In December 1989, after the killing of a U.S. service member by the Panamanian Defense Force [PDF], President George H.W. Bush authorized U.S. forces to apprehend and arrest Noriega and other Panamanians who were also indicted in the U.S. on drug related offenses (Brown 1994, 531-532). The reaction of Latin America was severe and in countries with a history of U.S. intervention such as Cuba, Nicaragua and Mexico it was one of outrage (Pastor 2009, 97).

It can be argued that the war on drugs functioned as a new rationale for U.S. intervention in the Latin America and allowed the continuance of U.S. hegemony over the region. The H.W. Bush administration increased the initiative’s expenditures from US$6.4 billion in 1988 to US$11 billion in 1992 (Pastor 2009, 102). Additionally, the U.S. increased its military involvement in South America in furtherance of the strategy against drugs (Pastor 2009, 102).

H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War

Throughout President George H.W. Bush’s term, he would make an effort for regional economic outreach. By spring 1990, Mexico and most Latin American governments had executed economic reforms, and aimed to expand their economies by establishing “subregional trading pacts” (Pastor 2009, 99). Mexican President Carlos Salinas proposed a free trade
agreement with the U.S. (Pastor 2009, 98). This was a significant outreach by Mexico because it was the Latin American country that had the deepest scars of U.S. intervention and “where nationalism was the most defensive” (Pastor 2009, 88). In May 1991, Congress authorized the administration to conduct negotiations that would last approximately 14 months (Brown 1994, 572; Pastor 2009, 99).

The U.S. responded to the regional need by extending the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and in June 1990 launched the “Enterprise for the Americas” (Pastor 2009, 99). The initiative was a broad program to promote economic development in Central America and the Caribbean, and included reduction on tariffs and U.S. owned official debt, and free trade with Latin America (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 2000, 1; Pastor 2009, 99). At the time the initiative was well received, Argentinian President Carlos Menem stated “We are passing through the most brilliant moment in our relations with the United States” (Pastor 2009, 99). As President H.W. Bush left for a trip to South America in December 1990, he stated that as that in order to fulfill the “New World’s destiny,” “all of the Americas and Caribbean must embark on a venture for the coming century: to create the first fully democratic hemisphere in the history of mankind” (Pastor 2009, 100). By the end of 1991, the U.S. had enacted 15 trade framework agreements with 30 Latin American countries and substantially reduced the official debt of at least 15 regional countries (Pastor 2009, 99).

In June 1991, the member states of the OAS passed a resolution that committed the region to defend democracy by granting the OAS authority to convene its members when it was perceived that there had been an “interruption of the constitutional process,” such as a coup, and discuss further action (Pastor 2009, 100; Sabatini 2013, 6). By the end of the year the Soviet Union would dissolve and Mikhail Gorbachev would resign as president of the “expired Soviet
Union” on December 25, 1991 (Brown 1994, 524). President H.W. Bush would announce to the American people that same night that the “confrontation is now over” (Brown 1994, 524).

In August 1992, months before the end of his term, President H.W. Bush announced the initiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] between the U.S., Mexico and Canada (Brown 1994, 572). H.W. Bush associated the agreement with the new world order, claiming that the “Cold War is over” and that “the principal challenge now facing the United States is to compete in a rapidly changing, expanding global market” (Brown 1994, 572). NAFTA would not be implemented until 1994 under President Bill Clinton.

China and Latin America During the Cold War

Although China has interacted with Latin America through trade for over 250 years, it was not until the early 2000’s that the China’s engagement began to deepen both economically and politically (Ferchen 2011, 66; Koleski 2011, 3). During the beginning of the Cold War, the People’s Republic of China was just formed as a result of the 1949 revolution led by Mao Zedong (Huisk 2010, 31). The period of 1950-1970 has been labeled by China as “the period of humiliation,” when it was weak politically, militarily and economically (Huisk 2010, 3). China was not in a position to exert much influence over Latin America during the Cold War. China was focused on domestic and regional issues, such as: the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the Korean War and the Vietnam War (Huisk 2010, 31-45).

However, it is worth noting that in 1960 after Fidel Castro’s revolution, President Eisenhower signed an act to reduce the U.S. sugar purchasing quota form Cuba, leaving Cuba with a surplus of 700,000 tons of sugar (Gott 2004, 183-184). Along with the Soviets who
stepped in to purchase the U.S. induced 700,000 tons sugar surplus, China bought 500,000 tons of sugar each year for the next five years (Gott 2004, 184).

Conclusions

During the Cold War, realism was dominant in the U.S. approach to conserve a balance of power in Eurasia while maintaining its own sphere of influence in Latin America. Realist U.S. policies towards Latin America, driven by the Truman and Reagan doctrines, led to overt and covert interventions against the spread of Marxist ideologies. The U.S. hegemonic reputation developed during the Cold War is still referenced by Latin American left-wing leaders who continue to denounce the U.S. “imperialism.”

The presidencies of Eisenhower and Kennedy attempted to address the needs of Latin America, mainly social and economic development. Although, it was a strategy to create a wedge between the region and the Soviets, nevertheless it was a shift from other presidencies. At the end of the Cold War, President H.W. Bush would make an effort for regional economic outreach that would give Latin American leaders hope for the new century, a “new world destiny.”

Towards the end of the Cold War, it appears that the rationale for U.S. intervention in Latin America changed from combating the spread of Marxist ideologies, to the war on drugs. Between the Reagan and H.W. Bush presidencies, the U.S. intervened in Panama and arrested Noriega. As we will see in the next chapter, the continuing fight against drugs in Latin America included the deployment of U.S. military forces to the region and became a point of contention among Latin American leaders.
Chapter Four:
Latin America After the Cold War

By the end of the Cold War, democratic momentum had grown in Latin America. Between 1978 and 1991, 15 Latin American countries “turned or returned” to electoral democracies, abandoning the authoritarian regimes that dominated the region during the Cold War (Palmer 2006, 1). Many of these countries replaced state-led economic systems with market-oriented economies based on the principles of free trade and private investment (Palmer 2006, 1). The previous chapter demonstrated that the drive behind U.S. engagement in Latin America during the Cold War was the fear of Soviet intrusion. Many observers predicted at the end of the conflict that the U.S. would neglect the region (Pastor 2009, 101). Instead the H.W. Bush administration engaged the region with an increase in “telephone summits” and meetings with Latin American leaders, and a major trip to South America in the middle of the Persian Gulf crisis (Pastor 2009, 101).

The post-Cold War era witnessed the evolution of the world economy, globalization, and the importance for a state to integrate itself into the world system. Globalization can be defined as the “state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances” (Keohane, 2002b, 193). Globalization has contributed to the regional economic integration in Latin America, that is the establishment of institutions and agreements such as: the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], Southern Common Market [MERCOSUR], the Andean Community, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America [ALBA], the Union of South American Nations [UNASUR], and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States [CELAC] (Gonzalez Molina 2012, 125). It is worth noting that of the aforementioned
organizations, the U.S. is only involved in NAFTA, and some of the organizations are comprised of states with anti-U.S. views (Farah 2015, 99).

In the post-Cold War era, Latin America continued to face the issues of drug trafficking, poverty and inequality, social violence, and “political ineptitude” that are not only a threat to democracy in Latin America, but also to U.S. national interests (LeoGrande 2005, 25). Regional institutions not only aim to better position Latin America in the world market, but can also generate regional cooperation in addressing complex issues (Gonzalez Molina 2012, 126). Just as social and economic issues in Latin America were seen through the Cold War lens prior to 1991, after 9/11 the issues were seen through the lens of the Global War on Terrorism (LeoGrande 2005, 25).

The Clinton Years

The Clinton presidency was the first to entirely execute post Cold War politics in the region. As the new administration took office, there were “ample grounds for optimism in inter-American relations” (Palmer 2006, 1). During President Clinton’s two terms in office, some argue that his Latin American policies were not effective. President Clinton did not travel to the region until his second term in office, interpreted as having little concern for the region and being preoccupied with other international issues (Palmer 2006, 42). The immediate challenges facing the new administration in Latin America was the ratification of NAFTA and the Haitian crisis. Although President H.W. Bush negotiated the terms of NAFTA, it was up to President Clinton to seek congressional approval. In November 1993, both the House and Senate passed NAFTA and it was implemented in January 1994 (Pastor 2009, 114).
According to David Scott Palmer’s book, *U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years: Opportunities Lost Or Opportunities Squandered?*, during the 1990’s most assessments agreed that the “overall quality of democracy had declined” in Latin America (Palmer 2006, 3). Additionally, even though the region’s shift towards market-oriented economies during the Clinton era increased net economic growth, it also increased inequality, poverty, and unemployment levels (Palmer 2006, 3).

An October 1991 military coup in Haiti against its elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, had forced tens of thousands of refugees to sail in improvised boats and rafts to the U.S. (Brown 1994, 600). During his presidential campaign, Clinton had pledged to address the refugee crisis and the conflict in Haiti (Brown 1994, 600). Upon taking office, the Clinton administration began planning for the restoration of democracy on the island and economic development (Brown 1994, 600). In July 1994, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling member states to use force in order to restore Aristide’s presidency (Pastor 2009, 112). By September 1994, under the threat of U.S. military invasion an agreement was reached peacefully, the U.S. military did deploy to Haiti but in a peacekeeping capacity (Pastor 2009, 113).

In December 1993, Vice-President Al Gore invited “the democratically elected presidents and heads of government of the Americas to a summit meeting to discuss ways of deepening hemispheric cooperation through economic integration and shared commitment to democratic institutions” (Palmer 2006, 55-56). The first Summit of the Americas [SOA] was held in December 1994, in Miami. At the SOA, the Clinton administration articulated their goals for Latin America: “(1) deepening democratic practice, (2) achieving economic growth and
improved income redistribution with market economies, (3) eliminating poverty and discrimination, and (4) securing environmentally sustainable development” (Palmer 2006, 2-3).

At the SOA, the participants agreed to a “Declaration of Principles” and on a “Plan of Action,” towards democracy, economic integration, free trade, and development (Pastor 2009, 117). The Plan of Action listed numerous collaborative steps to be taken by states in order to meet their objectives (Palmer 2009, 57). A successful product of the SOA was the agreement by the leaders to negotiate on a Free Trade Area of the Americas [FTAA] by 2005 (Pastor 2009, 117). The members also agreed to have regular meetings with the Western Hemisphere’s elected heads of states, with the next SOA scheduled for Chile in 1998 (Palmer 2009, 57). The SOA was a “high point” in the U.S.-Latin American relations during the Clinton administration (Palmer 2006, 56). However, the Clinton administration was unable to make “significant progress” on most of its objectives announced at the SOA (Palmer 2006, 2).

The Clinton Administration continued the pattern of previous administrations to pursue the counter-drug policies implemented on the region, arguably focusing on drug related issues over other priorities (Palmer 2006, 65-70). The 1994 SOA Plan of Action included a component specifically for drug production and trafficking reduction within the strengthening of democracy objective (Palmer 2006, 80). A June 1997 session on Central American issues by the U.S. Congressional Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, highlighted the concern of corruption, weak rule of law institutions and the “growing more pervasive” threat of drugs in the region (U.S. Congress 1997a, 1). During Clinton’s second term, the U.S. committed new resources to the counter-drug campaign (Palmer 2006, 80). Between 1996 and 2000, military and police assistance increased fivefold, and economic and social aid grew by 74 percent (Palmer 2006, 80).
The largest share of the new funds went to the major illegal drug producing and trafficking nations of Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru (Palmer 2006, 81).

The W. Bush Years

President George W. Bush took office in January 2001, just months before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Part of W. Bush’s presidential campaign was to acknowledge the needed change to U.S. policy towards Latin America, which “often remains an afterthought of American foreign policy” (The Economist 2002a). W. Bush declared that as President he would “look south, not as an afterthought but as a fundamental commitment of my presidency” (Vanderbush 2009, 338). The challenge for the W. Bush presidency was to develop a relationship with Latin America that was “responsive to the region’s emerging demand for social and economic change” (LeoGrande 2007, 356). However, the W. Bush administration would find Latin America “surprisingly resistant to the assertion of U.S. hegemony” due to the reduction of U.S. bilateral assistance since the Cold War with aid about the same in 1985 as in 2005, and a focus of aid to countries involved in the drug war (LeoGrande 2007, 357).

Before 9/11, President Bush had advocated for the FTAA at the 2001 SOA in Quebec City, and had his first state dinner with Mexico’s President Vicente Fox (The Economist 2002a; Vanderbush 2009, 338). In 2002, President Bush was allowed by Congress to begin trade negotiations with five Central American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (Hicks and Milner 2014, 107). By 2004, the Dominican Republic had also joined the conversation (Hicks and Milner 2014, 107). In August 2004, the Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement [CAFTA-DR] was signed but not without debate in the participating countries, particularly Costa Rica (Hicks and Milner 2014, 106).
4.1 indicates the U.S. bilateral trade total values with the six CAFTA-DR partners between 2005 and 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). Trade increased by 37% from 2005 to 2010, amounting from approximately US$35 billion to US$48 billion (U.S. Office of Trade Representative 2011a). The intra-regional trade among the CAFTA-DR countries also increased by 50% between 2005 and 2010, that was from approximately US$4.2 billion to US$6.3 billion (U.S. Office of Trade Representative 2011a).

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<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Export</strong></td>
<td>16,886</td>
<td>19,585</td>
<td>22,394</td>
<td>25,295</td>
<td>19,944</td>
<td>24,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Import</strong></td>
<td>18,075</td>
<td>18,579</td>
<td>18,742</td>
<td>19,351</td>
<td>18,842</td>
<td>24,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>34,961</td>
<td>38,164</td>
<td>41,136</td>
<td>44,646</td>
<td>38,786</td>
<td>48,294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.1 U.S. Trade in Goods with CAFTA-DR: 2005 – 2010**
Figures are in millions of U.S. dollars

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2016

The events on 9/11 changed the U.S. foreign policy objectives and focus towards combating terrorism. The “Global War on Terror” was based on W. Bush’s doctrine, where states that harbor terrorists groups would be held accountable, and a preemptive strategy of attacking terrorists overseas before they are able to execute another attack on the U.S. (Bush 2010, 137; Jervis 2016, 285-311). At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the insurgent groups Shining Path [El Sendero Luminoso] and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] were included on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations List (U.S. Dept. of State 2015b, 2016d). However, the priority of the U.S. efforts against terrorism was concentrated in South-Central Asia and the Middle East.
It is “conventional wisdom” among analysts and scholars that during the era the U.S. neglected its relations with the region (Vanderbush 2009, 337). The U.S. focus on combating Islamic fundamentalism terrorism and a lack of such threat in Latin America, the region “slid to the bottom of Washington’s foreign policy agenda” (LeoGrande 2005, 25). The Economist wrote that after 9/11, “Latin America became the invisible continent again” (The Economist 2002a). Although a shift in policy focus away from Latin America may be rationalized due to the extraordinary U.S. national security threats on the other side of the globe, it has followed a trend of U.S. policy towards the region being “easily distracted” (The Economist 2002a).

Over ten years after 9/11 the perception of U.S. disengagement was still present. In 2014 a U.S. Congressional Western Hemisphere Subcommittee hearing on “U.S. Disengagement from Latin America: Compromised Security and Economic Interests,” Representative Albio Sires of New Jersey acknowledged that since 9/11 U.S. foreign policies had been directed towards extra-hemispheric crises, while the Latin American policies had become narrow in scope and reactive rather than proactive (U.S. Congress 2014d, 3-4).

W. Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address did not make a single reference to Latin America or its issues, even though the speech included bullet points aside from terrorism and Iraq, such as health initiatives in Africa (Encarnacion 2008, 99). A Colombian newspaper commented on the State of the Union speech, “apparently, to the Bush administration, the struggle against AIDS in Africa is more important than the poverty and resultant destabilization currently affecting its neighbors and natural partners” (Encarnacion 2008, 99).

President W. Bush’s image, and consequently that of the U.S., had declined since taking office. W. Bush’s attendance to the 4th Summit of the Americas in Argentina in 2005 was met with tens of thousands of protestors that “denounced U.S. imperialism and the stalled FTAA”
According to William LeoGrande of American University, polls in 2005 found 53% of South Americans and 87% of Latin opinion leaders had a negative opinion of President Bush, making him the most unpopular U.S. president ever (LeoGrande 2005, 25). Moreover, from 2000 to 2005, negative opinion of the U.S. in Latin America rose from 14% to 31% (LeoGrande 2005, 25).

The region’s shift towards market-oriented economies during the Clinton era increased net economic growth, but it also increased inequality, poverty, and unemployment levels (Palmer 2006, 3). According to William LeoGrande, from 1996 to 2004, Latin America’s GDP rose at an average annual rate of just 2.6%, with the urban unemployment rate rising from 9.4% to 10% (LeoGrande 2005, 32). Since 1990, the total number of “poor and extremely poor” Latin Americans had risen by 10% (LeoGrande 2005, 32 An alternative might have appealed to the poor whose lives might not have been improved by democracy, due to a lack of prosperity in the region compounded by the issues of political failures (LeoGrande 2005, 32).

During the W. Bush presidency, there was a rise in “populist or socialist” Latin American presidencies: Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva in Brazil; Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, Tabare Vazquez in Uruguay, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua; Rafael Correa in Ecuador; Fernando Lugo in Paraguay; and Michelle Bachelet in Chile (Emerson 2010, 33; LeoGrande, 2005, 32). The region’s “resistance to U.S. arrogance” led to a decline in U.S. dominance of the OAS and other inter-American organizations (Latin American Perspectives 2011, 17). Not only did the region have governments whose ideologies clashed with the U.S., it was also no longer solely economically dependent on the hegemon. Latin America expanded economic relations to with Europe, China, South Asia, and Africa (Latin American Perspectives 2011, 17).
The Rise of Institutions in Latin America

The issues of economic development and prosperity for Latin America have always been a priority. The need to improve their situation guided the region towards cooperation. After the Cold War there was a development of regional institutions and trade organizations. These regional institutions were the results of the need to better position themselves in the world market (Gonzalez Molina 2012, 126).

MERCOSUR was first established in 1991 with the goal of promoting democratic principles and economic development in Latin America (MERCOSUR 2016a). By 1995 the European Union and MERCOSUR countries had signed an inter-regional framework cooperation agreement that included trade matters (European Commission 2016). In 2014, the member states approved the “MERCOSUR International Cooperation Policy” that specifically included a “general principle” that any international cooperation should “respect” the member states’ sovereignty and prohibited the foreign interjection in domestic affairs (MERCOSUR 2016b). One can infer that this general principle was derived from the region’s interactions with the “colossus of the north” over the last 100 plus years. As of July 2016, the European Union and MERCOSUR were negotiating a trade agreement as part of a bioregional association agreement, which also included a “political and a cooperation pillar” (European Commission 2016).

Another notable institution developed in the post-Cold War era was that of the South American Community of Nations in 2004, which was later renamed as UNASUR (UNASUR 2016). The institution was created with the goal of “integrating regional processes” developed by MERCOSUR and the Andean Community (UNASUR 2016). The Andean Community was a cooperation dating back to 1969 for the purpose of economic integration, originally between Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru (Comunidad Andina 2016). The British
Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] reported the establishment of UNASUR to be the “most important political and economic bloc in Latin America” (Souviron 2004).

The pattern of regional integration and cooperation for economic development continued in the 2000’s with the establishment of new institutions. Some institutions had philosophies not aligned with U.S. interests in the region. For example, Fidel Castro of Cuba, and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela established ALBA in 2004. ALBA aimed to achieve the “integration and union of Latin America and the Caribbean based upon a model of independent development with emphasis on the regional complementarity that permits it to promote the development of all and strengthen the cooperation through mutual respect and solidarity” (ALBA-TCP 2016). ALBA’s eight Latin American members had an anti-U.S. discourse that contradicted U.S. interests (Farah 2015, 92).

Similarly, CELAC was founded with the purposeful exclusion of the U.S. (Farah 2015, 99). Moreover, it has been suggested that regional disappointment with the Obama administration was a major factor in the establishment of CELAC (Latin American Perspectives 2011, 19). CELAC was founded in 2011, a successor of the Rio Group, and aims to promote regional integration, sustainable development and political cooperation (CELAC 2016). According to the European Union’s External Action website, the EU pursues sub-regional relations the Andean Community and MERCOSUR (European Union 2016). CELAC and the EU had a continuing relationship demonstrated through biennial summits. The EU considered CELAC as its counterpart for the bi-regional process (European Union 2016).
The Obama Years

The election of Barack Obama not only brought new “hope” to a country fatigued by years of war, but to also to Latin America. When President Obama took office, political observers agreed that U.S. policy towards the region had “fallen behind the pace of change” and that relations were “strained at worst, distant at best” (Baeza and Langevin 2009). President Obama’s attempt to change the course set by the W. Bush years, began at the 5th Summit of the Americas in 2009 where he declared, “every one of our nations has a right to follow its own path” and pledged to “engage the rest of the hemisphere on the basis of ‘mutual respect and equality’” (Latin American Perspectives 2011, p.14).

In conjunction with President Obama’s election, independent think tanks also proposed a new U.S. approach to Latin America. The Brookings Institute proposed a “hemispheric partnership,” claiming that without such cooperation the region will face missed opportunities and increased risks when addressing challenges, such as organized crime and climate change (Baeza and Langevin 2009; Brookings Institute 2008, p.3). The Council of Foreign Relations suggested U.S. policy engage the region on its terms and not those imposed by the U.S. (Barshefsky et al. 2008, 6). Similarly, the Washington Office on Latin America advised that U.S. policy should aim to enable a “hemispheric community” by building relations to solve common problems (Baeza and Langevin, 2009). The Council of the Americas identified economic development as the most important national interest of the Latin American states, and recommended a reevaluation of U.S. trade policy in “light of the diminishing returns accrued under former President Bush’s strategy of ‘competitive liberalization’” (Council of the Americas 2009, 3-6).
In March 2010, the U.S. Congressional Western Hemisphere Subcommittee held a hearing on *U.S. Policy Toward the Americas in 2010 and Beyond*. At the hearing, Arturo Valenzuela of the U.S. Department Of State Bureau Office of Western Hemisphere Affairs, stated that the administration’s approach to Latin America was to avoid a “hegemonic presumption” and to make the U.S. an “indispensable partner” (U.S. Congress 2010c, 16). U.S. partnership was to be demonstrated by engaging the region based on “shared interests driven by mutual respect, and based on common values” (U.S. Congress 2010c, 16). Riordan Roett of John Hopkins University, argued at the hearing that the major regional issues of climate control, trade and financial architecture, are multilateral in nature and require U.S. assistance but “in cooperation with our neighbors in Latin America” (U.S. Congress 2010c, 58).

An indicator of a possible change to the U.S. regional strategy was observed at the 2009 SOA, when Obama declared “the United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba” (Latin American Perspectives 2011, 14). However, Obama did not announce the attempt to normalize U.S.-Cuban relations until December 2014, well into his second term. The Obama presidency has been criticized to have had a slow start with “little to distinguish Obama from his predecessor,” and with no plans for “fundamentally altering U.S. policy toward Latin America” (Latin American Perspectives 2011, 14; LeoGrande 2015, 481).

Although the Cold War ended a quarter of a century ago, the U.S. was still the primary suspect whenever a coup occurred in Latin America (Chatterjee 2015). Under the Obama administration, the U.S. had been less inclined to directly intervene in Latin American affairs. A Honduran coup in 2009 that removed the democratically elected president, Jose Manuel Zelaya, received a “tepid” response from the U.S. (Chatterjee 2015; Latin American Perspectives 2011, 14). In contrast, an undivided response from Latin America condemned the coup, this included
UNASUR, ALBA, and the OAS (Latin American Perspectives 2011, 15). While the European Union recalled all their ambassadors from Honduras, the U.S. ambassador was one of the few to remain in country (Chatterjee 2015). This was an opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate its change in attitude and commitment to the region.

In 2012, a “parliamentary coup” in Paraguay impeached Fernando Lugo and drew criticism from regional leaders similar to the Honduran coup, which included Latin American governments that normally aligned with U.S. policy in the region (Chatterjee 2015). The issue was severe enough that UNASUR and MERCOSUR suspended Paraguay’s membership (Chatterjee 2015). Again the U.S. remained one of the few countries to denounce the events in Paraguay (Chatterjee 2015).

Although, the “war on drugs” was not a slogan used by the Obama administration, drug trafficking was still a security issue. In a 2013 trip to Latin America, President Obama recognized that “many Central American countries are ‘struggling with both economic issues and security issues, but are important partners for us- because I think the vision here is that we want to make sure that our hemisphere is more effectively integrated to improve the economy and security of all people’” (Goldfarb and Miroff 2013). According to the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID] and the United Nations 2016 World Drug Report, drug trafficking in the region not only impacted the U.S. domestically, but also impacted social and economic development in Latin America (U.S. Agency for International Development 2016; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2016, 63-78). Organized criminal enterprises, such as El Salvador’s gang the Mara Salvatrucha, are associated with drug trafficking. A May 2016 issue of The Economist reports that gang violence in Central America may cost the region approximately 16% of the gross domestic product [GDP] due households spending extra on
security and the lost of income from people deterred from working (The Economist 2016b, 29-32).

### Table 4.2 U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2011 – FY2016 Request

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>FY2011</th>
<th>FY2012</th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2014</th>
<th>FY2015 (Estimate)</th>
<th>FY2016 (Request)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>361,463</td>
<td>333,785</td>
<td>305,945</td>
<td>214,399</td>
<td>214,113</td>
<td>615,041</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHP (USAID)</td>
<td>130,977</td>
<td>104,509</td>
<td>78,948</td>
<td>63,063</td>
<td>66,541</td>
<td>65,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHP (State)</td>
<td>203,323</td>
<td>182,236</td>
<td>173,496</td>
<td>157,368</td>
<td>148,244</td>
<td>148,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.L. 480</td>
<td>94,951</td>
<td>38,173</td>
<td>40,526</td>
<td>29,067</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>435,130</td>
<td>465,541</td>
<td>447,503</td>
<td>459,280</td>
<td>583,106</td>
<td>597,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>506,220</td>
<td>593,270</td>
<td>550,942</td>
<td>467,131</td>
<td>483,195</td>
<td>464,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADR</td>
<td>25,200</td>
<td>20,530</td>
<td>14,992</td>
<td>14,485</td>
<td>12,563</td>
<td>9,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>14,458</td>
<td>14,597</td>
<td>12,892</td>
<td>13,503</td>
<td>14,065</td>
<td>12,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>84,477</td>
<td>70,885</td>
<td>59,226</td>
<td>59,315</td>
<td>49,100</td>
<td>64,665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** U.S. Department of State, (Meyer 2016, 5)

**Notes:** DA=Development Assistance; GHP=Global Health Programs; P.L 489=Food For Peace; ESF=Economic Support Fund; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Nonproliferation Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs; IMET=International Military Education and Training; and FMF=Foreign Military Financing.

In addressing drug trafficking, most U.S. aid to Latin America was directed towards counter-narcotics efforts (Farah 2015, 91). Table 4.2 demonstrates that between FY2011 and FY2014, the majority of U.S. aid in the region was directed towards international narcotics control and law enforcement (Meyer 2016, 5). Only recently in FY2015 and FY2016 was it estimated that the narcotics initiative was second to economic and development efforts.
As part of the counter narcotics strategy, the U.S. had also increased its military presence in the region drawing criticism from some Latin American leaders (Latin American Perspectives 2011, 18-19). A prominent Bolivarian website stated, "Every U.S. military base in Our America is not only a terrible threat, but an attack on the dignity of the people and an intolerable humiliation" (Farah 2015, 95).

In March 2014, the U.S. Congressional Western Hemisphere Subcommittee held a hearing on “U.S. Disengagement from Latin America: Compromised Security and Economic Interests.” Representative Gregory Meeks stated that the region was looking for a relationship with the U.S. that was not “master-servant” but one where the region was recognized for its advancements and not only to be used by the U.S. when it believed to advance strategic interest (U.S. Congress 2014d, 6). Regarding U.S. policies towards Latin America, Meeks stated the U.S. was “looking through the prism of when we were in the Cold War, that we had not changed many of our policies toward them, that we had not moved forward and we were not engaged with them and that we needed to focus on our neighbors to the south because they are our neighbors” (U.S. Congress 2014d, 6). The hearing discussed the issue of extra-hemispheric encroachment that will be discussed in chapter seven. Meeks stated, “We share this hemisphere. They are very important, and if we didn't do it then others would come and they would try to invest and influence and be involved in their matters because we are leaving a vacuum…” (U.S. Congress 2014d, 6).

President Obama decided upgrade the NAFTA agreement by proposing the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP] pact between Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru (U.S. Office of Trade Representative 2016b). The pact aimed to promote trade and boost growth (News, BBC, 2016). By including the Latin American
states it addressed the regional issues of growth and development. The TTP preamble declared that the agreement was to promote economic integration to liberalize trade and investment, bring economic growth and social benefits, contribute to raising living standards, reduce poverty and promote sustainable growth (U.S. Office of Trade Representative 2016b). The TPP aimed to strengthen the “bonds of friendship and cooperation between them and their peoples” (U.S. Office of Trade Representative 2016b). The TPP excluded China, perhaps a counterweight to China’s trade expansion in Latin America and in Asia. The TPP needed to be ratified by each participating country’s legislative body, with an all-member ratification goal of February 2018 (BBC News 2016b).

The greatest indicator of a potential shift of U.S. policy from the right to more of cooperation came from the President Obama’s announcement of the normalization of relations with Cuba. In his December 17, 2014 address from the White House, President Obama announced the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, where shared interests such as “health, migration, counterterrorism, drug trafficking, and disaster response” can be advanced (Obama 2015, 53-54). In July 2015, the Cuban embassy officially opened in Washington, D.C, and in August 2015 the U.S. embassy opened in Havana (Schwartz 2015a, 2015b). This historical change will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter.

Opportunities for American leadership in Latin America have always presented themselves. For example, the current economic and political crisis in Venezuela that appeared to have worsened in 2016. The Miami Herald reported on September 22, 2016, that Peruvian President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski had asked U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to help organize a “group of countries to support Venezuela amid a political and economic crisis that many fear
will end up in bloodshed” (Flor 2016). Kuczynski also made reference to the Venezuelan crisis when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly on September 20, 2016 (Flor 2016).

The crisis in socialist Venezuela is known to U.S. competitors, and appears that the region may be seeking extra-regional leadership. If the U.S. declines to lead a cooperative effort on Venezuela, would another world power step-in?

Conclusions

Every president after the Cold War upon taking office has acknowledged the lack of U.S. engagement in Latin America, and declared new efforts to interact with the region. A commonality in the presidential declarations to the region was a pledge to shift the U.S. approach from hegemon to partner. From the Clinton initiating the Summit of the Americas, to Obama’s pledge to engage the region on the basis of respect and equality. Unfortunately, another commonality among the presidencies was the lack to follow-through with these proposals.

As we moved in to the second decade of the new millennium, the general consensuses among think thanks, scholars, and politicians, seemed to be that the U.S. needed to engage more with Latin America. However, there was a pattern of the U.S. being easily distracted with other international matters. Yet, a new hope has risen for Latin America with President Obama’s reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Latin America’s regional issues consisted of inequality, poverty, lack of economic growth and sustainable development. The U.S. as a superpower was in a position to address those needs and build relations with the region that can also positively address U.S. interests. However, the U.S. mostly assisted the region with counter-narcotics operations and funding. As the region addressed their needs and integrated into the world political economy, it has entered
agreements with extra-hemispheric entities and created their own regional institutions. Overall the region has been seeking a cooperative foreign policy that the U.S. has not fully addressed. Meanwhile, institutions that counter U.S. interests have formed, such as ALBA and CELAC. The next chapter will show that Russia and China are creating inroads in Latin America, possibly addressing the region’s needs.
Chapter Five:

China and Russia in Latin America

Since James Monroe’s presidency, U.S. policy has aimed to prevent major powers from attaining strategic positions that could pose a threat to U.S. security (LeoGrande 2007, 355-356). The end of the Cold War brought an end to the traditional military threats in Latin America and the U.S. remained unchallenged (LeoGrande 2005, 26). The post Cold War era can be described as dominated by development and competition of the global economy. As Latin America attempts to better place itself in the world political economy, the region’s relations with extra-hemispheric states have morphed into expanded state-to-state relations (LeoGrande 2005, 26). Since the 1990’s, as China and Russia attempt to rise in global status, they both have included Latin America in their strategies.

In November 2013, Secretary of State Kerry announced that the “era of the Monroe Doctrine is over,” to the Organization of American States (Kerry 2013). Representative Jeff Duncan of South Carolina, during a 2015 joint hearing between the Asia and the Pacific and the Western Hemisphere Subcommittees, viewed Secretary Kerry’s announcement as “effectively putting other countries, such as China, on notice that the United States would no longer contend their actions in our neighborhood, the Western Hemisphere” (U.S. Congress 2015e, 1).

According to the World Bank, China and Russia are predicted to be major contributors to global economic growth by 2025 (World Bank 2011, xi). As Russia and China strive share the world stage with the U.S., they have entered in a power rivalry to challenge the global order. A trait of a world power is the ability to project influence globally in the advancement of its interest, in this case Latin America. China’s approach has been mainly economic in the sense of
investments and trade agreements, while Russia has engaged more in military agreements and arm sales.

The encroachment of Russia and China in Latin America has not gone unnoticed by U.S. leadership. Although views in the U.S. are contradicting, some see it as a concern while others welcome the foreign investments to aid regional development. China and Russia are engaged with Latin American countries that have anti-U.S. sentiments. The establishment of China and Russia in the region should be closely observed by the U.S. in order to prevent long-term strategic disadvantages in pursuing U.S. interests in the region.

China and Russia as a U.S. Competitor

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. was the only superpower and world leader. The new Russian state had its internal struggles in re-establishing its role on the world stage. During the Cold War China was in the shadows of the two superpowers. The period between 1950-1970 has been labeled by China as “the period of humiliation,” when it was weak politically, militarily and economically (Huiskens 2010, 3). Today’s China is far from weak, as it has become a global economic power and arguably a regional hegemon as China expands its control of the South China Sea and challenges the U.S. presence. Since the new millennium, Russia has taken a more significant role in world politics, especially in the last five years. The Russian intention to undermine U.S. power projection in various world regions, including Latin America, has become “increasingly visible” (Farah and Reyes 2015, 101).

The analysis of China’s rise and future as a global competitor and security threat can be traced back to the early 1990’s, when the period saw a growing Chinese economy and significant military spending (Christensen 2001, 5-6). At the time some argued that with the fall of the
Soviet Union, China’s military would substitute the “Soviet military of the pre-Gorbachev years and the Japanese economy of the 1970’s as the next big purported threat to American global leadership,” while others viewed the China threat as over hyped (Christensen 2001, 6). In recent years, U.S.-China relations have been portrayed as conflictive and even antagonistic (Paz 2012, 22).

Russia considers U.S. hegemonic power in decline and advocates for the end of the unipolar world (Sanchez Ramirez 2010, 230). Russian President Vladimir Putin has aimed in recent years to “lead Russia back to superpower status, where Russian global leadership is a feasible alternative to the U.S. (Farah and Reyes 2015, 101). Former Ambassador Thomas R. Picker, a former ambassador to Russia, described Putin as obsessed with making the world bipolar by having Russia “running the world” along with the U.S. (Pickering 2014, 216). A greater indicator of Russia’s rise as a global player was the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the current military operations in Syria. The Ukraine campaign has increased tensions in Europe (Pawlyk 2016).

A 2011 World Bank Report titled *Multipolarity: The New Global Economy*, predicts that by the year 2025 China will account for a third of global growth more than any other country, while Russia is to be among the growing economies to be major contributors to global growth (World Bank 2011, xi & 46). Between 2004 and 2008, the U.S., the European area and China served as the world’s main “growth poles,” meaning their domestic economy drove the economic growth in other countries (World Bank 2011, 14-16). The trend is to continue as the report found it “most probable” that the global currency would be centered on the Dollar, Euro, and the Renminbi (World Bank 2011, xii).
In more recent years the predictions of China’s rise continued. Analysts saw China as an emerging superpower that could replace the U.S. as the “preponderant power of the world” in the next 20 years (Draghici 2011, 6). Through the first decade of the 21st century, China successfully improved its regional relationships through a “combination of economic cooperation, diplomatic outreach, and military restraint” (Saunders 2014, 26). However, within the last six years China has set a more aggressive posture on a range of issues including an attempt to “advance Chinese maritime sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea,” which is contrary to the idea of the China’s peaceful rise as a global power (Saunders 2014, 26). An indicator of China’s self-perception as a rising power, was its warning to the U.S. not to take actions that may be considered provocative as China attempts to expand its sphere of influence in the South China Sea (Lendon and Sciutto 2015).

As China and U.S. economies compete for “global pre-eminence,” both countries will naturally pursue policies that are primarily in their own interests and inevitably lead to tension (Yueh and Portes 2015, 34-35). The trend for the future is to focus economic development on the high-tech industries. Economic competition for the world’s leading advanced technology is behind sensitive issues such as cyber-security and industrial espionage that currently trouble the China-US relationship (Yueh and Portes 2015, 35).

Chinese military capabilities combined with the political geography of East Asia can pose significant challenges for the American security strategy in the region (Christensen 2001, 7). China’s expanding global interests and rising power has led President Barrack Obama to seek cooperation on regional and global issues, such as North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions and how to mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis (Saunders 2014, 24).
Early in President Obama’s first term, his administration proclaimed a U.S. return to Asia that included an increase in U.S. participation in regional multilateral meetings and regional treaties and more frequent travel to the region by senior officials (Saunders 2014, 20). According to Phillip C. Saunders, the director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the U.S. National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, Obama administration officials believed the U.S. focus on terrorism and military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan produced an “imbalanced global footprint” that diverted focus from the Asia-Pacific region (Saunders 2014, 20). The goal of the Obama administration was to have a stronger military presence in Asia that would be “geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable” in order to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to protecting the security of U.S. allies and partners (Saunders 2014, 33-34). U.S. officials have noted that uncertainty of Chinese military capabilities and strategic intentions and behaviors have heightened U.S. concerns; however, the strategy of Asian “rebalance” was not “intended to contain China, or seeking to build an anti-China coalition” (Saunders 2014, 38).

In 2015, the media reported on indicators of a rise in tensions between the U.S. and China. In May 2015 CNN reported the deployment of a littoral combat ship [LCS], one of the newest vessels in the U.S. fleet to the region (Lendon and Sciutto 2015). A U.S. Navy Captain was quoted as saying “as part of our strategic rebalance to bring our newest and most capable Navy platforms to the Indo-Asia-Pacific, [the LCSs have] a regular presence in Southeast Asia” (Lendon and Sciutto 2015). The Chinese state-run Xinhua news service had reported a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman cautioning the U.S. on how it uses the right of free navigation in the South China Sea (Lendon and Sciutto 2015). In 2015, Chinese Admiral Wang Yi promised a
“’head-on blow’ to any military ‘violating’ China’s supposed sovereignty” (Wall Street Journal 2015).

An October 2015 Wall Street Journal article reported on President Obama’s order for a guided missile destroyer to sail within 12 nautical miles of the PRC’s two artificial islands constructed in the South China Sea (Wall Street Journal 2015). Chinese naval vessels shadowed the U.S. destroyer during the pass-by of the islands, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry called the U.S. actions illegal (Wall Street Journal 2015).

From Cold War history, Russia’s role as a competitor was less of a surprise than China’s relatively quick rise. However the Russian threat to U.S. interest is serious. Russia’s growing global assertiveness, including Crimea and other hostile activities in the Ukraine, has led the U.S. national security community to single out Russia as the primary military and strategic threat to the U.S. (Farah and Reyes 2015, 101). Since 2014, Russian aircraft have intercepted the aircraft of U.S. allies in Europe, civilian passenger planes, and even conducted a provocative fly-by of a U.S. destroyer in international waters of the Baltic Sea (Pawlyk 2016).

The current conflict between the U.S. and Russia is over military operations in Syria. Diplomacy has failed to address the Russian bombing in Syria, which has been counterproductive to the U.S. strategy in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS] (DeYoung 2016). For example, Russia reportedly bombed a New Syrian Army base where U.S.-trained fighters were battling ISIS militants (Pawlyk 2016). While China’s threat may be economic and political, current events show a very militarily aggressive Russia towards the U.S.
China’s Political and Economic Involvement

Although China has interacted with Latin America through trade for over 250 years, it was not until the early 2000’s that China’s engagement began to escalate both economically and politically (Ferchen 2011, 66; Koleski 2011, 3). In a 2008 visit to the region, China’s President Hu Jintao said “in the present climate, China considers it necessary to develop strategic partnership with the Latin American countries” (Pashentsev 2013, 212). In a May 2009 town hall meeting at the State Department, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized Chinese advances in Latin America. Secretary Clinton stated, “…in fact, if you look at the gains, particularly in Latin America, that Iran is making and China is making, it’s quite disturbing. I mean, they are building very strong economic and political connections with a lot of these [leftist Latin American] leaders. I don’t think that’s in our interest” (Keyes 2009).

Since the end of the Cold War, China has demonstrated a consistent expansion of its economical, military, cultural and information presence in Latin America, more than the U.S. and Russia (Pashentsev 2013, 212). It was not until days before Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington, D.C. in April 2006, that the U.S.-Chinese dialogue began on Latin America under the W. Bush administration (Paz 2012, 23). Following the Chinese slogan of “peaceful rise,” China introduced its system to Latin America, as well as Africa, as a model for the struggle against poverty (Pashentsev 2013, 212). The slogan would later be replaced with “peaceful development” and with Hu Jintao’s term “harmonious world,” perhaps a more politically correct term for integrating in a competitor’s “backyard” (Paz 2012, 23).

The Latin America conversation with China initiated under President W. Bush continued into the Obama Presidency. The dialogue was not intended to contain or stop Chinese initiatives in the region but to shape them by clarifying interests and policy and to “increase transparency
and avoid miscalculations” (Paz 2012, 23-32). Such dialogue was a must for the U.S., due to the rise of leftist governments in the region and steady expansion of China. With Latin American countries looking to overcome the hegemony of the U.S., regional anti-American sentiment provided a “beachhead for the challengers,” such as the PRC (Paz 2012, 33).

Some scholars argue that the Chinese insertion in Latin America is not a threat to the U.S. For example, an article by Jose León-Manríquez and Luis F. Alvarez, titled “Mao's Steps in Monroe's Backyard: Towards a United States-China Hegemonic Struggle in Latin America?” published in the Brazilian Journal of International Politics [Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional], states China’s presence in Latin America was purely economical and necessary for the continuity of China’s development. For the moment the authors do not believe that China was seeking to create a “regional counter-hegemony to the U.S. in Latin America” (Leon-Manriquez and Alvarez 2014, 24). However, the authors did conclude that the U.S. lacked the tools to cope with the China’s growing presence in the region, and needed to develop a comprehensive strategy to “regain presence and prestige in Latin America” (Leon-Manriquez and Alvarez 2014, 24). The authors also were able to conclude that U.S.-Chinese relations are becoming increasingly tense and will continue to grow in the incoming years, perhaps making Latin America a “theatre of global disputes” (Leon-Manriquez and Alvarez 2014, 24).

A March 2010 hearing on “U.S. Policy Toward the Americas in 2010 and Beyond,” was held by the U.S. Congressional Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. At the hearing Arturo Valenzuela, the Assistant Secretary, Bureau Of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department Of State, stated it was in the U.S. interest for Latin American countries to grow economically even if it’s done through China, “so long as it doesn’t affect our own fundamental security interests, and at this particular point that is not an issue” (U.S. Congress 2010c, 38). Valenzuela
further stated, “if China invests, if China develops partnerships, and if Colombians at universities study Mandarin and so on and so forth and succeed in having Colombian exports export more effectively to China, more power to Colombia, and more power to the countries in Latin America” (U.S. Congress 2010c, 38).

In a town hall meeting in November 2010 at George Washington University, Valenzuela again had a positive spin on China’s involvement in Latin America. Valenzuela saw the Chinese economic involvement not as a “threat” but as an opportunity for Latin American countries to get more “investment, to send exports” (U.S. Dept. of State 2010a). In a question regarding China’s involvement in Latin America, Valenzuela stated,

“We certainly welcome the effort on the part of countries in Latin America to export more to other countries, including China; that we welcome investment opportunities that countries might seek as well. The United States remains the single largest exporter towards Latin America. Forty-three percent of all our exports worldwide go towards Latin America. And 37 percent of all direct investment in Latin America comes from the United States. The United States still plays a very, very significant role. But a country like Brazil and a country like Chile, for example, have really significantly benefited by very important exports to China. What does this do? If there’s greater commerce, if there’s greater exports, if there’s greater investments, this helps to improve living standards throughout the Americas, and that is good for all of us” (“Town Hall at George Washington University”, 2010).

Valenzuela’s 2010 comments appear to diverge from Secretary Clinton’s 2009 comments on foreign encroachment on the Western Hemisphere. However, the escalation of tension in the South China Sea and the issues of cyber espionage since 2010 might change the lens in which Valenzuela views the Chinese involvement in Latin America.

In early January 2015, just weeks after the U.S. announcement to normalize relations with Cuba, Beijing hosted a summit with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States [CELAC] (Berman 2015). CELAC initiated by Hugo Chavez, consists of 33 countries and was founded in 2010 with the purposeful exclusion of the U.S. (Farah 2015, 99). At the summit
President Xi pledged to double China’s trade with CELAC countries over the next ten years, and to invest US$250 billion across Latin America (Berman 2015). The leftist governments of Bolivia and Venezuela left the summit each with US$7 billion in Chinese aid and credit, and a pledge of investment from China state run banks (Berman 2015). China’s surging interest in the region was described by Ilan Berman, vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council, as a potential “significant shift in the Western Hemisphere’s balance of power” (Berman 2015).

A September 2015 hearing on “China’s Advance in Latin America and the Caribbean” held jointly by the Asia and the Pacific, and the Western Hemisphere Subcommittees, viewed China’s involvement in Latin America from a more malignant perspective. Representative Jeff Duncan of South Carolina viewed the U.S. as having shifted to a “benign neglect” of Latin America, and that China has noticed and “stepped up into this vacuum of leadership” (U.S. Congress 2015e, 1). Duncan explained that the Chinese presence could not be ignored as China has weaved an intricate “web of alliances in the Western Hemisphere through a vast array of diplomatic, economic, and military ties with multiple countries in the region” (U.S. Congress 2015e, 1-3). He recommended the U.S. “engage more deeply in a sustained way” with Latin American countries (U.S. Congress 2015e, 3).

The joint subcommittee hearing discussed the 2015 CELAC summit in Beijing and that three-quarters of the China’s loans to Latin America since 2005 has gone to Argentina and the regimes of ALBA, over US$119 billion (U.S. Congress 2015e, 2-6). China was the region’s second-largest trading partner, with free-trade agreements with Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica (U.S. Congress 2015e, 2). According to the joint hearing, China had announced US$35 Billion in loans to the region in the coming years, and US$250 Billion in investments over the next 10 years (U.S. Congress 2015e, 2). China funded projects of significance, such as the proposed Chinese
controlled Nicaragua Canal that would rival the Panama Canal and “provide greater access for Chinese ships and potentially submarines to the waters near U.S. shores” (U.S. Congress 2015e, 2). A second major Chinese project was the Twin Ocean railroad between Peru and Brazil, which would “also project greater Chinese influence and presence in Latin America” (U.S. Congress 2015e, 2).

Table 5.1 China-Latin America Financing Through CDB and Ex-Im Bank: 2005 – 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Loans</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inter-American Dialogue, (Gallagher and Margaret 2014)

Notes: CDB= China Development Bank; Ex-Im Bank= China Export-Import Bank

According to the Inter-American Dialogue, since 2010 Chinese banks have reached new heights in lending to foreign companies overseas. As table 5.1 demonstrates, Chinese lending to Latin America, specifically the China Development Bank [CDB] and the China Export-Import
Bank [Ex-Im Bank], reached a yearly high of US$35 billion in 2010 (Gallagher and Myers 2014). In 2015, China’s policy bank finance to Latin America exceeded the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank lending (Gallagher and Myers 2014).

Evan Ellis, a research professor of Latin American Studies at the Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, stated that the sharp increase in the presence of Chinese companies in the region over the last five years, “particularly in mining and petroleum, construction, manufacturing, telecommunications, logistics, and banking,” has given China “a greater stake” in the internal affairs of where the Chinese companies operate (U.S. Congress 2015e, 6). Ellis raised concerns that Chinese involvement with the region may indirectly undermine the “democracy and good governance in the region, as loans to populist regimes weaken the accountability of their leaders to citizens and institutions and facilitate corruption” (U.S. Congress 2015e, 6).

China’s Military Engagement

As China establishes itself as a global power and tensions rise in the South China Sea, it is worth reviewing any military issues arising from the China’s engagement with Latin America. As stated earlier, the proposed Nicaragua Canal by the Chinese government, through corporate intermediaries, could propose a strategic national security risk by allowing passage to Chinese military elements (Berman 2015; U.S. Congress 2015e, 2). The 2015 joint hearing on “China’s Advance in Latin America and the Caribbean” identified additional potential issues.

Representative Duncan of South Carolina discussed how Brazil had provided China with access to Brazilian satellite tracking facilities, “which could allow China to gain a more comprehensive picture of the flight paths of U.S. satellites” (U.S. Congress 2015e, 2). Additionally, China maintains a military presence in Soviet era monitoring facilities in Cuba.
According to Duncan, Chinese economic activity has strayed to arms sales to Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina, and reportedly also to non-state actors, such as the FARC and drug trafficking organizations (U.S. Congress 2015e, 2).

Evan Ellis, a research professor of Latin American Studies at the Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, also discussed Chinese military activities in the Western Hemisphere. He explained that in addition to the aforementioned arms sales, in August 2015 China sold Peru 27 Chinese artillery vehicles, while Argentina planned to purchase Chinese ocean patrol vessels and armored personnel carriers, among other items (U.S. Congress 2015e, 6). Other military activity included: Chinese soldiers attending military courses in Colombia and Brazil; regional medical exercises in 2010 and 2011; and in October 2013, for the first time, Chinese warships conducted combat exercises with Chile, Argentina, and Brazil (U.S. Congress 2015e, 6-7).

In order to face China’s military expansion, Ellis recommended the U.S. expand “theater security cooperation to bolster the U.S. position as partner of choice in the region” (U.S. Congress 2015e, 7). Additionally, Ellis recommended, “prioritizing a functional inter-American system,” specifically the OAS and not CELAC or UNASUR, to engage China and regional security issues (U.S. Congress 2015e, 7). The final note was for the U.S. to project a clear vision of what the “U.S. stands for in the hemisphere” and why it is the better approach to advance the region (U.S. Congress 2015e, 7). Ellis’ concluding statement was not only applicable in military terms but to the overall strategy in the region.

Russia’s Political and Economic Involvement

The fear of the spread of Marxism in Latin America may be over, but Russia still seeks strategic partnerships in the region. Although Latin America was not seen as a priority for
Russian foreign policy, as U.S.-Russian tensions rise, the region has become a focus in advancing Russian goals and diminishing U.S. power (Blank and Kim 2015, 159). Most countries in the region have openly supported Russia and identified mutual interests, such as: Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Paraguay, Cuba, and Venezuela (Sanchez Ramirez 2010, 232).

In Douglas Farah and Liana Eustacia Reyes’ article titled, “Russia in Latin America: A Strategic Analysis,” they note that Russia’s presence in the region, an area of vital interest to the U.S. that has also become an area of Russian state interest and activity, was not normally analyzed (Farah and Reyes 2015, 101-102). Russian activity in the region has been attributed to Russian leaders as retaliatory for the “U.S. meddling close to Russian borders, particularly in Ukraine” (Farah and Reyes 2015, 107).

Russia has engaged the member states of ALBA and CELAC, as allies against the narrative of an imminent and unavoidable U.S. invasion, based on the U.S. “pillaging the region’s natural resources, toppling the revolutionary regimes leading the march to Latin American independence, and subjugating its citizens” (Farah and Reyes 2015, 104-106). ALBA was the dominant organization aligned with Russia, ensuring the bloc allies had a “powerful friend” on the United Nations Security Council to veto any attempts to hold them accountable for human rights violations or electoral fraud (Farah and Reyes 2015, 103-104). Russia has also been successful in joining Latin American organizations: a Russia-CELAC political dialogue mechanism and cooperation was reached in May 2013 (Farah and Reyes 2015, 106; TASS Russian News Agency 2014). Russia attended the January 2014 CELAC summit in Havana (Farah and Reyes, 2015, p.106; TASS Russian News Agency 2014). A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman speaking on the summit said, “Russia considered CELAC formation process as a
promising step promoting the harmonization of integration development of Latin America and looked upon this organization as a promising partner” (TASS Russian News Agency 2014). In March 2015, Russia requested to become an observer of the Central American Integration System; according to Russia, the request was welcomed unanimously, which would give Russia extra-regional observer status (Farah and Reyes 2015, 106).

An article titled, "Russia and Latin America: The New Frontier for Geopolitics, Arms Sales and Energy," by Stephen Blank and Younkyoo Kim, states that Russia’s advances in Latin America are in pursuit of leveraging itself on the global stage, portraying itself as a global power and seeking status equality with the U.S. (Blank and Kim 2015, 159). In a late 2008 tour of Latin America, then Russian President Dimitri Medvedev stated that Russia would begin to engage in “comprehensive and multidimensional” relations with Latin America that had become a growing presence in world affairs (Blank and Kim 2015, 159). In 2008, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that “Latin America is becoming a noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar world that is forming—we will pay more and more attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy” (Blank and Kim 2015, 161). Russia’s geopolitical interests, particularly in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, aim to counter U.S. influence in Latin America (Blank and Kim 2015, 162). For example, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega claimed to turn Russia because “Washington offered nothing to Nicaragua despite requests for military and other aid” (Blank and Kim 2015, 166). Additionally, Russia seeks Latin American support for its foreign policy goals; Russia welcomed Chile’s “understanding” of its stance regarding Ukraine in 2014 (Blank and Kim 2015, 162-163).

Blank and Kim concluded that in the future Moscow may successfully achieve the undermining of U.S. concepts for multilateral organizations, while strengthening “counter blocs”
such as ALBA. Russia may influence key regional actors from cooperating with the U.S. on a variety of issues and also place pressure on U.S. allies. Finally, Russia may arm and bolster anti-U.S. regimes in the region, such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and potentially Argentina (Blank and Kim 2015, 169).

Russia’s engagement with Latin America has been mostly political. In terms of economic engagement, most concerning are the sales of military equipment. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, bilateral trade between Russia and the region remained low, reaching US$16.2 billion in 2012, which although triple the value in 2000, was only 5% of what the region trades with China (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2014). Brazil was the biggest trade partner with Russia, consisting of 40% of Russia’s regional trade (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2014).

The sale of weapons continues to be the strongest link between Russia and Latin America (Sanchez Ramirez 2010, 240). The region was Russia’s third-largest weapons commercial partner (Sanchez Ramirez 2010, 240). Weapon sales include more than the traditional sale of Russian AK-47 riffles, which have proliferated around the world. Between 2008 and 2011, Russia sold more than 3000 surface-to-air missiles to Latin America (Farah and Reyes 2015, 104). Russia’s main customer has been Venezuela with arms transfer agreements totaling US$13.1 billion in 2011 (Farah and Reyes 2015, 105). Other countries in the region have acquired ships and aircraft, and some have consider switching from the U.S. to Russia for arms deals (Farah and Reyes 2015, 105).

Russia’s Military Engagement

As Russia attempts to rise as a world leader, it will need to globally project its military power in order to protect its interest. As tensions rise between Russia and the U.S. in other
regions, Russia attempts to respond with a military presence in Latin America. In November 2014, the Russian Defense Minister declared “given the situation that has developed, we have been forced to provide a military presence in the western part of the Atlantic Ocean, in the eastern part of the Pacific Ocean, and in the waters of the Caribbean Basin and the Gulf of Mexico” (Blank and Kim 2015, 159). U.S. Southern Command General John Kelly, in his 2015 Posture Statement noted that:

   “Periodically since 2008, Russia has pursued an increased presence in Latin America through propaganda, military arms and equipment sales, counterdrug agreements, and trade. Under President Putin, however, we have seen a clear return to Cold War tactics. As part of its global strategy, Russia is using power projection in an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and challenge U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere. . .While these actions do not pose an immediate threat, Russia’s activities in the hemisphere are concerning and underscore the importance of remaining engaged with our partners” (Farah and Reyes 2015, 102).

   In the new technological era, Russia has planned to build up military and military-technical cooperation in the region along with logistical stations (Blank and Kim 2015, 159). For example, Russia planned to establish a station in Cuba to support its global navigation satellite system, a rival to the U.S. Global Positioning System [GPS] (O'Grady 2015). According to Hans de Salas-del Valle of the University of Miami, "the installation of a signals facility in Cuba is part of a broader strategy to integrate Cuba into Russia's space program," possibly establishing a satellite launch site in Cuba (O'Grady 2015). In April 2014, Russian legislators approved a draft proposal to set up a satellite navigation monitoring system (Blank and Kim 2015, 164). Russia may be seeking naval bases in Cuba, Argentina, and Nicaragua for maintenance stations, but also as refueling stations for its long-range bombers (Blank and Kim 2015, 163).

   A U.S. concern that has not materialized is the construction of the Nicaragua canal. In 2013 Nicaragua announced the construction of a trans-oceanic canal that would be financed by Chinese money with canal security possibly provided by Russia (Blank and Kim 2015, 159).
During a February 2015 visit to Nicaragua by the Russian Defense Minister, Russian media harped on the importance of the trip and quoted a Russian military analyst that when the Nicaragua Canal is complete it would allow the Russian fleet to enter the Gulf of Mexico (Farah and Reyes 2015, 107). The Russian military analyst, close to the Kremlin, further noted:

“This is highly important, because in this case, Russia will be able to ensure so-called nuclear deterrence, because the Russian navy has long-range cruise missiles. If such Russian vessels are deployed somewhere near the territory of Cuba, they will be able to attack the United States. This is our response to the deployment of U.S. military objects near the Russian border. The United States is quite vulnerable … One may eventually have to create missile defense from the side of Florida, rather than Alaska. All these issues arise and require huge financial resources. I think it will convince the United States of the short-sightedness of this kind of policy” (Farah and Reyes, 2015, p.107).

Conclusions

As China and Russia strive to cement their status as major global powers, they have taken aggressive postures towards U.S. encroachment on their sphere’s of influence. Whether the Sino-Russo outreach in Latin America can be seen as reciprocity for U.S. activity in their respective sphere of influences or not, the engagement cannot be ignored. As the atmospherics in the region towards the U.S. wax and wane, Chinese and Russian influence could undermine U.S. relations with both individual countries and regional institutions.

Chinese and Russian economic, political and military engagements offer an alternative to the U.S. Although the threats faced today in Latin America are different from those that triggered the Monroe Doctrine, they are analogous. In today’s world of global entanglement the security risks China and Russia pose are just as serious.
Chapter Six:

Cuba and a Shift to the Left

Arguably the most significant change in U.S.-Latin America policy since the Cold War was the announcement of the normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations in December 2014. Until President Obama’s announcement, the U.S. viewed Cuba through the realist lens of the Cold War. After the fall of Soviet Union, U.S.-Cuba relations only worsened with hostile actions taken by the Cuban government and countered by stiffer U.S. policy. The conservative Cuban exile community, primarily in Miami, had been able to influence U.S.-Cuba policy through the use of the U.S. electoral system (Wilkinson 2008, 55). However, younger generations of Cuban-Americans appeared to be open for a change in the U.S. strategy towards the island. Many Latin American countries also called for a change of U.S.-Cuba policy (LeoGrande 2015c, 481).

While the U.S. attempted to isolate Cuba in the post Cold War era, China and Russia continued to maintain relations with Cuba and provided support in an effort to undermine U.S. policy. The Chinese and Russian governments are in an interesting position now that their Cold War ally has begun to engage with the U.S. The Sino-Russo response to the new era of U.S.-Cuba relations could be an indicator of the effectiveness of U.S. strategy. Will China and Russia escalate engagement with Cuba and the rest of Latin America in order to counter U.S. influence? The final results of the U.S.-Cuba normalization attempt are yet to be seen. Yet engagement with Cuba can function as a case study on the effectiveness of a U.S.-Latin America policy shift towards cooperation, and the consequences for U.S. competitors in the Western Hemisphere.
A Memory of the Cold War

The Cuban-American exile community, through representation in Congress and interest groups, such as the Cuban American National Foundation [CANF], influenced U.S.-Cuba policies in the post-Soviet decade (Gott 2004, 301). Towards the end of H.W. Bush’s presidency, he signed the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, also known as the Torricelli Act. The act aimed to impede Cuban trade as a mechanism to bring an end to the Castro government (Gott 2004, 300-303). Representative Robert Torricelli of New Jersey, a state with a large Cuban-American population, sponsored the bill (Gott 2004, 300; Palmer 2006, 20). H.W. Bush signed the bill even though he initially opposed it; while at the time presidential candidate Bill Clinton endorsed it (Palmer 2006, 62). Although the act stated it was appropriate for “European and other allies” to cooperate with the U.S. policy, the act received little support from the rest of the world (Gott 2004, 303-304; U.S. Dept. of Treasury 2016b).

The legislation prohibited subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad from trading with Cuba and a six-month waiting period for ships that made Cuban port calls before arriving at the U.S. (Palmer 2006, 20). Additionally, the legislation allowed the U.S. President to lift the sanctions only if “free, fair, and internationally supervised elections were to take place,” civil liberties and human rights were upheld, and the country moved towards a market economy (Gott 2004, 303).

In the early years of the post-Cold War era under the Clinton Administration, the situation deteriorated in Cuba, which possibly marred the administration’s accomplishments from the first Summit of the Americas. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba entered what Fidel Castro referred to a “special period in time of peace,” which included an austerity program that included limiting access to gas, water and electricity, in order to compensate for the loss of
the Soviet Union’s economic support (Gott 2004, 289). The country also had to reconfigure its network of international relations.

In August 1994, the Castro government faced signs of unrest and allowed more than 30,000 people to leave the island on makeshift rafts (Pastor 2009, 118). The massive flow of Cuban refugees in addition to the Haitian flow of migrants compounded the 1994 immigration crisis for the U.S. In September 1994, Cuba and the U.S. struck an agreement in which the U.S. would provide 20,000 visas a year for Cubans seeking legal immigration to the U.S., while the Cuban government would attempt to restrict the illegal emigration attempts of U.S.-bound Cubans (Gott 2004, 300). In May 1995, the “wet foot, dry foot” policy was established: Cuban refugees, referred to as “rafters” [balseros] in Miami, detained by the U.S. at sea would be returned to Cuba unless able to prove fear of political persecution (Gott 2004, 300; Pastor 2009, 119).

The second key legislation towards the island in the post-Cold War era was that of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, also known as the Helms-Burton Act due to its sponsors Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton (Gott 2004, 303). The Clinton administration initially opposed the bill. However, the administration’s position changed in February 1996, when the Cuban air force shot-down two civilian Cessna airplanes from the Miami-based organization Brothers to the Rescue [Hermanos al Rescate] that killed four (Gott 2004, 305; Palmer 2006, 63). The bill was signed by President Clinton on March 12, 1996 and specifically referenced the shoot-down, “The response chosen by Fidel Castro, the use of lethal force, was completely inappropriate to the situation presented to the Cuban Government, making such actions a blatant and barbaric violation of international law and tantamount to cold blooded murder” (U.S. Dept. of Treasury 1996a).
The act was aimed at the foreign investment flow into Cuba that had contributed to the successful recovery of the island after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the concern that U.S. businesses would lag behind European, Canadian and Japanese investors (Gott 2004, 303). The Helms-Burton Act cemented the embargo into law by transferring control from the executive branch to the legislative branch (Palmer 2006, 63). The act also condemned Castro’s confiscation of property belonging to U.S. nationals when he first took power (U.S. Dept. of Treasury 1996a). The Helms-Burton Act allowed U.S. citizens the right to seek a “judicial remedy in the courts of the United States” against foreign companies that had taken over their former properties confiscated by the Castro government (U.S. Dept. of Treasury 1996a; Palmer 2006, 63).

The global response to the Helms-Burton Act was similar to that of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. The Helms-Burton Act caused immediate concerns to companies based in the European Union [EU], who were the primary investors in Cuba (Gott, 2004, 304). The EU attempted to oppose the act, describing it as a “clear violation of international law and impediment to trade” (Gott 2004, 305). The EU filed a formal complaint in May 1996 against the Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. with the World Trade Organization [WTO]. The EU claimed the terms of the act were “inconsistent with the U.S. obligations under the WTO Agreement” (World Trade Organization 1996).

By the time President W. Bush was in office, the U.S. had come to the conclusion that the preferred time for a Cuban government transition would be in a post-Fidel era, where it would be easier to interpret the intentions of the new leadership (Lopez 2004, 6). The W. Bush administration essentially followed the policies enacted by the Clinton administration (Lopez 2004, 6). In 2004, the administration implemented travel restrictions and a limit on the amount of money Cuban-Americans could send back to Cuba (Wilkinson 2008, 56). In 2006, Fidel
Castro stepped down from power due to illness and was replaced by his brother, Raul Castro (Brenner et al. 2015, 83). When Raul took power, he laid out guidance to the Cuban people for national unity around the country’s communist party and policies. Raul noted that the original members of the 1959 revolution were passing away and Cuba needed to ensure that their ideology continued for future generations by adjusting to the changing economy and society (Brenner et al. 2015, 83).

While the U.S. continued its strategy of isolation, China and Russia had been making inroads into Cuba, undermining U.S. policy. China advocated for years for an end to the U.S. embargo of Cuba, saying it was “cruel to the Cuban people” (Hernandez 2016). Former Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Cuba in 2004 and 2008, where trade deals were signed but never materialized (BBC News 2008a). However, progress has been made in Sino-Cuba relations since 2008. In 2014, Cuba started its first “Chinese-style special development zone” and passed attractive foreign investment legislation targeting friendly nations such as Russia, China, and Brazil (Frank 2014). In July 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Cuba and paid tribute to the barracks where Fidel Castro initiated the 1953 revolution (Hernandez 2016). As of July 2014, China provided trade credits to Cuba, making China the island’s largest creditor and second biggest trade partner after Venezuela (Frank 2014).

Similar to China, Russia has also engaged its old Cold War ally. In July 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Cuba and forgave a debt of more than US$30 billion from the Cold War (Farah 2015, 91). Additionally, Moscow converted the remaining US$3.5 billion debt into a line of credit for energy and industrial projects on the island (O’Grady 2015). The aid was distributed with the objective of assisting Cuba with the U.S. embargo (Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire 2014). Putin stated, "We'll be helping our Cuban friends in overcoming the
unlawful blockade," (Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire 2014). In return, Russia would use Cuba to establish a station supporting Russia's global navigation satellite system (O’Grady 2015).

Normalization of Relations

In the last ten years Cuba has become increasingly active in Latin American affairs (Hakim 2015). Socialist governments in the region have viewed Cuba as somewhat of a role model for their movement (Luciak 2007, 37). A parade of regional presidents and senior officials have visited Cuba, including: Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff of Brazil, Jose Mujica of Uruguay, Michelle Bachelet of Chile, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, Salvador Sanchez Ceren of El Salvador, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Rafael Correa of Ecuador (Hakim 2015). In 2012, Cuba demonstrated regional leadership when it hosted peace negotiations between the government of Colombia and the FARC guerrilla movement (FARC-EP International 2016). As Cuba’s political influence in the region rises, the U.S. cannot strategically afford to isolate itself from the island, while China and Russia are actively engaged.

As Latin America countries cooperate through regional institutions, they have called for an end to the U.S. isolation of Cuba. Peter Hakim in his article, “Cuba & the U.S. Rejoin the Hemisphere,” wrote that the member states of the Organization of American States [OAS] and the Summit of the Americas [SOA] nearly unanimously supported the reintegration of Cuba into their respective organizations. In 2009, Cuba’s exclusion from the OAS, considered as the Western Hemisphere’s “flagship institution,” was seriously debated for the first time. Although the U.S. strongly opposed it, every member supported the reinstatement of Cuba. At the 2012 SOA, most Latin American leaders declared they would not participate in future summits unless
Cuba was fully integrated. The U.S. and Canada resisted by claiming that the SOA was defined as a meeting of the Western Hemisphere’s democratically elected governments. In the 2014 SOA in Panama, Raul Castro was invited and attended the summit. U.S. engagement with Cuba could build rapport and increase credibility with Latin America, not just with select allies in the region, and further U.S. interests.

When President Obama took office he aimed to reexamine U.S.-Cuba policy, and in turn reversed some of W. Bush’s policies, such as easing travel restrictions (Kerrigan 2015, 3; Obama 2015, 53). However, by late 2009 the optimistic view was marred by the arrest of USAID employee Alan Gross in Cuba (Kerrigan 2015, 3). In President Obama’s December 2014 speech announcing normalization of relations, he referred to the arrest of Mr. Gross as a “major obstacle” (Obama 2015, 53). U.S.-Cuban negotiations were encouraged by Pope Francis and held secretly between 2013 and 2014 in Canada (Kerrigan 2015, 3; Obama 2015, 53). The negotiations focused on the release by Cuba of Mr. Gross; an imprisoned U.S. intelligence agent; and a number of political prisoners, in exchange for the release of three Cuban agents imprisoned in the U.S. (Obama 2015, 53-54).

In his December 17, 2014 address from the White House, President Obama announced the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, where shared interests such as “health, migration, counterterrorism, drug trafficking, and disaster response” could be advanced (Obama 2015, 53-54). Obama’s focus on shared interests is fundamental to the idea of cooperation between nations. In the address, Obama directed the following: the opening of an embassy in Havana, a visit by high ranking U.S. officials, a review of Cuba’s designation as a sponsor of terrorism, and the increase of travel, commerce and information into the island (Obama 2015, 53-54). The
proposed reconciliation was “universally applauded in Latin America and the Caribbean, and cheered around the world” (Hakim 2015).

In July 2015, the Cuban embassy officially opened in Washington, D.C, and in August 2015 the U.S. embassy opened in Havana (Schwartz 2015a, 2015b). In April 2015, after an assessment on Cuba and terrorism, Secretary of State John Kerry officially recommended to the White House the withdrawal of Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (U.S. Dept. of State 2015b). The SOA members welcomed Secretary Kerry’s announcement (Hakim 2015). Due to the removal of the sponsor of terrorism designation, Cuba would be able to conduct international banking transactions, including with the World Bank and other multilateral institutions, and likely attract new foreign investments (Hakim 2015). In exchange, Cuba has opened a new phase of engagement by cooperating with the U.S. on law enforcement matters (Hakim 2015).

The Cuban embargo is “codified in legislation,” specifically the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, but Obama stated in his address that he looked “forward to engaging Congress in an honest and serious debate about lifting the embargo” (Obama 2015, 54; Palmer 2006, 63). However, the Obama administration has struggled when working with Republican-controlled Congress. Republican lawmakers have disagreed with President Obama’s decision (Wilkinson 2015, 4). The disagreement is not just on lifting the embargo but in engaging with Cuba; Republican Senator Lindsey Graham said, “I will do all in my power to block the use of funds to open an embassy in Cuba,” (Wilkinson 2015, 4).

Interestingly, a 2014 Florida International University study on “How Cuban Americans in Miami View U.S. Policies Toward Cuba”, presented progressive results that diverged from the long-standing U.S. strategy towards Cuba (Grenier and Gladwin 2014, 7). The study was
conducted on a random sample of 1000 Cuban-Americans between February and May 2014, months before the White House announcement (Grenier and Gladwin 2014, 7). In summary, 71% of respondents believed the embargo had not worked at all or not very well versus 29% believed it worked very well or well (Grenier and Gladwin 2014, 8). Regarding the continuation of the embargo, 52% of respondents opposed the continuation and 48% favored the continuation (Grenier and Gladwin 2014, 9). Finally, regarding establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, 68% of respondents were in favor and 32% opposed it (Grenier and Gladwin 2014, 11).

Just as Raul Castro referenced that the original members of the 1959 revolution were dying off, the same can be said for the original members of the anti-Castro movement in the U.S-Cuban exile community. In Cuba, the generation that built the revolution remains loyal to the current system (Luciak 2007, 62). The original generations of Cuban-Americans that witnessed the 1959 revolution or experienced the Cold War in Cuba are more likely to have a conservative approach to U.S.-Cuba policy. The new generations of Cuban exiles appear to be more open to exchanges with the island and a change in U.S. policy. The “millennial” generation of Cuban-Americans appears to be less guided by anti-Marxist ideology. The new attitude has shifted to be more open-minded.

In March 2016, President Obama visited Cuba for a three-day trip, the first U.S. President to arrive on the island in nearly 90 years (Eilperin et al. 2016; Scholastic News/Weekly Reader 2016, p.2). Raul Castro received Obama upon his arrival (Eilperin et al. 2016). During the trip Obama participated in a meeting between American business leaders and Cuban entrepreneurs, and addressed the Cuban people (Eilperin et al. 2016). However, the visit did not affect the status of the embargo in Congress. Several measures have been introduced to “dilute the embargo and
restore free travel to Cuba,” but 2016 is an election year and the Cuban “thaw” has been a crucial topic (Demirjian 2016).

Although there are still areas of contention between the two states, progress slowly continues to develop. In May 2016, the Cuban government announced that it would “legalize small and medium sized private businesses,” a change that could significantly expand private enterprise in the communist country (Inter-American Dialogue 2016). Richard E. Feinberg, senior non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institute, wrote “by offering this new legal standing to private firms, the PCC [Communist Party of Cuba] has crossed an ideological Rubicon” (Inter-American Dialogue 2016). In early September 2016, direct flights between the U.S. and Cuba took place for the first time in 55 years (Cleave and Ruffini, 2016).

Chinese and Russian Reactions

Cuba is the only communist country in the Western Hemisphere. As seen in previous chapters, Cuba’s ties with China and Russia date back to the early days of the Cold War. Before the reconciliation with the U.S., Cuba may have been considered an ally to China and Russia against the U.S. policies. Now, with a new era of U.S.-Cuba relations, there is the potential that their Western Hemisphere foothold may be lost.

While the U.S. was uneasy with China’s relationship with Venezuela, China was concerned with the U.S. interference of Cuba’s political transition between the Castro brothers (Paz 2012, 23). However, Chinese scholars and officials appeared to publicly dismiss concerns over better U.S.-Cuba relations affecting China (Hernandez 2016). A professor at the China Foreign Affairs University said, “Cuba’s economy will develop, and that’s also beneficial to China” (Hernandez 2016).
However, after Obama’s announcement to normalize relations, China appeared to be mirroring the U.S. through outreach to the island. In early January 2015, just weeks after the U.S. announcement, Beijing hosted a summit with the Latin American organization of CELAC (Berman 2015). China used the March 2016 historical visit by President Obama to Cuba to emphasize its position on U.S. policy towards Cuba; a spokeswoman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said "It is hoped that the two sides would build on this good momentum” (Hernandez 2016). In September 2016, a month after the opening of the U.S. embassy in Cuba, the Chinese Prime Minister visited Havana. Reuters reported that Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang met with Cuban President Rural Castro, signing approximately 30 agreements on economic cooperation in a variety of sectors (Acosta and Marsh 2016). Prime Minister Li stated that the purpose of his trip was to deepen the relationship between China and Cuba, create new areas of economic cooperation and strengthen the political trust between the two countries (Acosta and Marsh 2016).

Obama’s December 2014 announcement also captured Russia’s attention. In response to the opening of the Cuban embassy in Washington, Vladimir Putin’s press secretary released a statement in July 2015, approving of the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Cuba (“Putin Approves of Normalization Process between U.S. and Cuba”, 2015). The press secretary was asked about Russian concerns “for its interests and Russian-Cuban relations” with the U.S. policy change, to which the press secretary gave a vague answer, only saying "The president [Putin] has already commented on it and has given quite a positive assessment of the process of normalizing relations between the U.S. and Cuba,” (Interfax: Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin 2015).
Although the Kremlin’s stance appears to be neutral and political as expected, the Kremlin may be preparing to protect its interests in Latin America, specifically Cuba. Reuters reported that in October 2016, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov announced that Russia was reconsidering restoring military bases in Vietnam and Cuba. A Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated, "The global situation is not static, it is in flux, and the last two years have made significant changes to international affairs and security" (Reuters 2016). Peskov continued, "Therefore, it's quite natural that all countries assess these changes in line with their national interests and take certain steps in the way they consider appropriate" (Reuters 2016).

While Russia attempts to maintain a positive position on the end of U.S. isolation of Cuba, President Obama’s announcement will only reduce Cuba’s dependence on Russia for economic aid, investment, and trade over time, as well as the attraction of Russia as an alternative to the United States (Blank and Kim 2015, 159). Now Russia’s old friend in the Caribbean, only 90 miles away from its greatest competitor, may potentially begin to shift alliances. It will be interesting to see what policy actions Russia takes towards Cuba in order to maintain Cuba’s preference for Russian over the U.S.

Conclusions

U.S. engagement with Cuba is the most significant change to U.S.-Latin American policy since the Cold War. The engagement deviates from Cold War realism and aligns itself with cooperation and liberalism. The opening of embassies, the initiation of direct flights, and the potential end to the embargo could improve political relations and move U.S. interests forward not only in Cuba but also in the region. The old policies of isolation not only engendered anti-U.S. sentiment in Cuba and Latin America, but also pushed the island towards U.S. competitors.
The engagement could minimize the island’s dependency on China and Russia, as Cuba engages politically and economically with the U.S. Contrary to the Cold War’s realist strategy of power politics, engagement and cooperation with Cuba can still address U.S. interests while shifting Cuba’s focus towards the U.S. and away from U.S. competitors. The proactive reactions of China and Russia could be interpreted as Sino-Russo perception of possible negative impact to their respective agendas in the region. As explained in Chapter Five, China, Russia and the U.S. are competitive world powers. In the struggle over influence of the Western Hemisphere, the normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations may represent the loss of a hemispheric foothold for China and Russia, and an increase in U.S. regional credibility. If that is the case, from a U.S. perspective, the strategy of cooperation has already begun to further U.S. interests in Latin America. This interpretation is an example of Keohane’s theory in which cooperation may be used to pursue the realist concept of furthering national interests.
Chapter Seven:

Conclusion

The hypothesis stated, *the decrease of U.S. influence in Latin America after the Cold War, has led U.S. foreign policy to shift towards cooperation/liberalism instead of hegemony/realism*. The research in pursuit of this hypothesis indicated that after the Cold War U.S. leadership recognized that political and economic engagement with the region was necessary in addition to continuous counter-narcotics funding and operations. The U.S. aimed to engage with Latin America through trade pacts and participation in regional institutions. However, until December 2014, U.S. efforts had fallen short of their goals. Meanwhile, China and Russia made inroads in Latin America and consequently pushed out an already waning U.S. influence in the region. Under President Obama, the U.S. has undertaken a convincing approach to engaging Latin America by reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba after over 50 years. Additionally through the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP], which excludes China, the administration aimed to integrate Latin America with Asia-Pacific and address the region’s own issues: the need for sustainable development and global integration. This great leap forward in U.S.-Latin America relations could be interpreted as a response to the Sino-Russo advancements in the region.

The shift from hegemonic realism to cooperation can help remove the uncertainty factor in international relations and help build trust within Latin America. As per Robert O. Keohane, in the modern world political economy the U.S. can engage its southern neighbors and still achieve its foreign policy goals while pursuing common interests. In other words, with today’s economic interdependence, liberal institutionalism is necessary, but it is also possible to maintain a “synthesis” of realism (Keohane 1984a, 135). Without cooperating with Latin America, the
research shows that the “uncertainty” factor has increased greatly for the U.S. due to the encroachment of China and Russia, the formation of a bloc of radical populist governments, and other regional institutions. Although we presume that China and Russia are rational state actors, there is no way of truly knowing their intentions in the region.

The U.S.-Latin America policy during the Cold War was guided by realism. The focus of the U.S. agenda was the Soviet Union, which spilled over to preventing the penetration of Latin America by Marxism. The era was a constant struggle for power and existence that led to an arms race with the Soviet Union and intervention in Latin America. Some U.S. presidencies attempted to engage the region early in the era, for example the 1960 Act of Bogota and the Alliance for Progress. However, Latin America’s reference to the U.S. as “imperialist” and the “colossus of the north,” comes from a history of military and political intervention that projected a perception of overall inconsideration for the region’s interests.

At the end of the Cold War, H.W. Bush declared a “new world destiny” which brought hope to Latin America. The new era presented a potential for the region’s needs of inequality, poverty, economic growth and sustainable development to be addressed through economic and political engagement. This new approach appeared to be a shift to the left, where there was potential to address mutual interest through cooperation and institutes such as NAFTA and the Summit of the Americas. Moreover, every U.S. president in the post Cold War period has acknowledged the need to further engage Latin America. The new era appeared to bring in a new U.S. strategy towards the region that did not solely focus on U.S. interests but was rather an attempt to counterbalance the negative hegemonic image developed during the Cold War.

Unfortunately, most of the presidential pledges for further Latin American engagement between 1991 and 2014 were not completely fulfilled. Perhaps U.S. neglect can be attributed to
other critical international matters, such as wars and international terrorism. The only consistency in U.S. policy was a continued focus on the narcotics threat, which has caused some controversy in the region. Meanwhile, the region has attempted to integrate itself in the world political economy through extra-hemispheric agreements and the creation of regional institutions such as MERCOSUR, UNASUR, ALBA, and CELAC. The region was in need of a “world power leadership” in order to attain its goals of prosperity, which the U.S. appeared to be neglecting.

Secretary Kerry’s 2013 announcement that the “era of the Monroe Doctrine is over” should have been an indicator that a shift in U.S. policy was necessary (Kerry 2013). Latin America was engaging the world under its own momentum. Latin America is far more independent from the U.S. now than ever before (Hakim 2015). The region has become confident and assertive, and has expanded and diversified its links across the world (Hakim 2015). The “world power” void in the “backyard” of the U.S. appeared to be filling with entities unfavorable to U.S. interests. Regionally, the institutions of ALBA and CELAC were created under the influence of anti-U.S. rhetoric. Even more concerning was the presence of China and Russia, two states that strive to establish equality with the U.S. on the world stage.

As Russia attempts to undermine U.S. influence around the world, and China rises as a superpower, the U.S. cannot afford to loose its grip on Latin America. Although the near term affects of an anti-U.S. interest shift in the region may not be of concern to some, the potential for a long-term strategic disadvantage is possible. Sino-Russo footholds in Latin America could undermine U.S. relations with both individual countries and regional institutions, and potentially pose a security threat.
President Obama’s last term in office showcased a prominent left shift of U.S. policy towards the region. A major indicator was Obama’s December 17, 2014 announcement of normalized relations with Cuba in order to advance shared interests. Another advancement is the U.S.-led TPP. The pact aims to integrate Mexico, Chile and Peru into a global partnership to promote sustainable growth, social benefits, and institute cooperation between nations. With China excluded from the pact, there is an opportunity for the U.S. to advance relations in both Latin America and the Asia-Pacific regions.

The Cuba policy change is an example of how U.S. engagement could counter decreased influence and extra-hemispheric presence in the region. Before Obama’s announcement Cuba was seen through a Cold War lens, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. U.S.-Cuba policy has been a point of contention for most Latin American countries, which wanted to see Cuba be regionally integrated. Meanwhile, Russia and China have engaged the island, condemning U.S. isolationist policies and undermining the embargo.

Cuba has grown to be a regional leader and has engaged Latin American countries individually. By U.S. normalizing relations and engaging Cuba, the U.S. may gain regional credibility and future cooperation that could consequently improve U.S. interests. The new U.S.-Cuba policy was a “chess move” by the U.S. that drew reactions from both China and Russia. Although the lifting of the embargo has yet to occur, the new U.S. approach could provide Cuba with an alternative to China and Russia. Strategically, it could lead to the U.S. re-gaining influence over the region.

Latin Americans have doubts as to whether the U.S. will actually implement all of Obama’s proposals and maintain them through the future (Hakim 2015). President-elect Donald Trump has campaigned on reversing Obama’s Cuba policies. The November 2016 death of Fidel
Castro may change the new administration’s approach. There are currently many political variables in the Western Hemisphere that justify continued research on this topic.

If the policy course is reversed, then the potential consequences of extra-hemispheric encroachment can materialize, in addition to another hit on U.S. credibility in the region. Early in the Cold War, President Eisenhower explained the choice facing the U.S. in Latin America as whether to support “social evolution” or to face “revolution” (Brown 1994, 460). The current Sino-Russo competition poses a threat to U.S. national interests analogous to the Cold War. At a 2010 U.S. Congressional Western Hemisphere Subcommittee hearing, Representative Eliot Engel stated that if the U.S. did not engage Latin America, other states such as China and Russia would step in the void (U.S. Congress 2010c, 30-31).

Latin America is a matter of the U.S. having a proactive strategy versus a reactive strategy when atmospherics have changed and endanger U.S. interests. That is, the proactive U.S. strategy needs to be a win-win relationship with the region through cooperation and institutions, and not the reactive strategy of “military interventions, coups, and destabilization programs” to protect national interests (Latin American Perspectives 2011, 24). Today Latin Americans are calling for a more equal situation. The U.S. should continue to address the region through cooperation in which Latin American issues can be addressed; simultaneously, the U.S. can re-gain influence and credibility in its “backyard” and advance U.S. interests. A cooperation strategy can better U.S. positions in future regional negotiations and provide Latin America with an alternative to China and Russia.
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