


THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES ON THE
SUCCESS OF NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS:
A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS


by


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(ABSTRACT)

The effects of organizational linkages on the success of neighborhood organizations are explored. The focus is on linkages between neighborhood organizations and local governments. A contextual framework developed from existing literature on neighborhood organizations is presented, and is used to evaluate the case study material.

The case studies indicate that the effects of linkages on the success of neighborhood organizations are varied. The effects of organizational linkages are reported and analyzed, and information is provided useful to the practicing local government planner and to neighborhood organizations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost I would like to acknowledge and thank . thanks for your patience, your understanding, your valued friendship, and your never-ending constructive criticism. "It's" a part of my graduate training I'll always remember. Planners need much more than technical capabilities, and your efforts have provided me skills I shall always need and use.

As Chairman of the Blacksburg Planning Commission, Mike Chandler is a good friend and colleague. Mike, your interest in neighborhood planning is refreshing. Time will tell whether such planning has a place in Blacksburg. I look forward to our working together during the next year.

I would also like to thank Bob Stuart for his friendship during the past four years. Bob, your energy, enthusiasm, and involvement within this community is an inspiration to both and me.

Finally, thank-you for your understanding and patience since September of 1979. Now it's my turn.

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I. Introduction and Purpose

Neighborhood organizations (Norgs), based and operating within a community, are likely to develop at some point during their organizational lives, formal ties or linkages with other organizations.¹ These linkages vary as to purpose and form.² Of concern in this case are organizational ties established by a neighborhood organization and the governing body of the locality in which the organization is based.

The development and existence of organizational ties is well reported in current literature devoted to neighborhood organizations and neighborhood related issues. O'Brien (1976), Perlman (1978), and Boyte (1980), in particular, address the existence of organizational ties and pursue various arguments including why linkages are developed and the impact they can have on the success of neighborhood organizations. Yet there is divergence among these authors regarding the effects of organizational ties on the success of neighborhood groups. This is particularly evident when the focus of the authors' arguments is on organizational linkages between neighborhood organizations and local governments.

As an example, Boyte argues that formal ties between a given neighborhood organization and local government will be detrimental to the ability of that neighborhood

organization to achieve its goals and objectives. The basis for his argument is that organizational success is dependent upon political power, which is shaped by all the constituent elements of an organization, including a group's continuing capability for autonomous organizing and political independence.³ In contrast, O'Brien argues that the development of organizational ties with a local government (or any other organization) can both help and hinder organizational success in that these ties can provide the resources and legitimacy needed for organizational success, while at the same time increasing the possibility for goal diffusion and cooptation.⁴ Finally, Perlman, who reports on the status of linkage relationships between Norgs and the public sector, asserts it is too early to conclude whether organizational linkages will "enable or disable" a neighborhood organization.⁵

Local government planners with responsibilities for working with neighborhood organizations in such areas as land use planning or neighborhood planning could benefit from knowledge of the effects of organizational linkages. These planners may be called upon to develop plans and programs aimed at addressing neighborhood issues; to provide information and resources to neighborhood organizations; or to assist neighborhood organizations in

implementing plans and programs developed by neighborhood residents.⁶

Neighborhood organizations could also benefit from a knowledge and understanding of the effects of organizational linkages with local governments. Accomplishing organizational objectives may at times require the adaptation of the Norg's structure or strategies to conditions present in the Norg's operating environment. One such adaptation is the establishment of a linkage with a local government. In choosing structures and/or strategies to adapt to environmental conditions, Norgs could benefit from information pertaining to the effects of organizational linkages.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the question: what are the effects of organizational ties on the success of neighborhood organizations?⁷ My focus for this inquiry will be upon the organizational linkages between neighborhood organizations and local governments. My intent is to provide information useful to the public sector, particularly to the practicing local government planner, and to neighborhood organizations.

Before proceeding with a discussion of the theoretical context for the central question of this paper, I have provided definitions of the major elements in this study, namely, neighborhoods, neighborhood

organizations, and organizational ties or linkages (the latter terms are used interchangeably in this paper).

Defining a Neighborhood

Neighborhoods have been the focus of considerable study by researchers in such areas as political science, sociology, public administration, and planning; and the literature which is a product of this research offers varying conceptual definitions of "neighborhood". Naparstek and Haskell (1978) state that there have been many studies using the terms neighborhood and community interchangeably, yet it is still possible to raise fundamental questions of definition. They conclude:

The literature on neighborhoods and communities contains a multiplicity of definitions, none of which appear to have universal acceptance. The concepts are defined from a host of different perspectives and ideological frames of reference, with the result that the definitions are often useful in a theoretical context, but difficult to operationalize in administrative or policy terms.

Early attempts to define neighborhoods emphasized the neighborhood as a physical entity identifiable by distinct geographical boundaries. The neighborhood was seen as the "building block" of a larger community, and was defined largely in terms of physical characteristics.⁹ Streets, railroads, and other definable physical barriers were viewed as natural neighborhood boundaries, separating one neighborhood from another. In contrast to this early

view, Kotler(1969) defines a neighborhood primarily in terms of its residents, and their perceptions of neighborhood boundaries. He writes:

The most sensible way to locate a neighborhood is to ask people where it is, for people spend much time fixing its boundaries. Gangs mark their turf. Old people watch for new faces. Children figure out safe routes between home and school. People walk their dogs¹⁰ through their neighborhood, but rarely beyond it.

The most common definitions of neighborhood incorporate both social and physical or spatial elements. Suzanne Keller is one author who adopts this perspective. She writes:

Essentially, it (neighborhood) refers to the distinctive areas into which larger spatial units may be subdivided . . . the distinctiveness of the areas stems from different sources whose independent contributions are difficult to assess; geographic boundaries, ethnic or cultural characteristics of the inhabitants, psychological unity among people who feel they belong together, or concentrated use of an area's facilities for shopping leisure and learning.¹¹

Keller goes on to say that neighborhoods combining all four elements are very rare and very often "the geographic and personal boundaries (of neighborhoods) do not always coincide."¹²

Naparstek's and Haskell's statement that definitions of neighborhood are a product of different perspectives and ideological frames of reference would seem to be valid. Early definitions which emphasized the

neighborhood solely in physical terms were developed and grasped by planners concerned with planning land uses and identifying spatial relationships. Keller writes from the sociological perspective, and her definition of neighborhood, while containing geographic references, focuses primarily on the ethnic, cultural and psychological components which compose a neighborhood. Kotler's perspective is one of emphasizing the potential for neighborhood power, self determination, and government through concerted citizen action, and his definition of neighborhood focuses on the central role neighborhood residents play in defining their neighborhood.

In this paper a neighborhood will be viewed as having both geographic and social dimensions. Neighborhoods occupy land, and thus have physical and spatial characteristics. They are also the habitat of people, and thus an arena within which a gamut of cultural, ethnic, psychological, and social characteristics may be displayed. The two dimensions of neighborhood are crucially intertwined in that the social characteristics, the roles which people play, occur within or outside the physical "boundaries" of a neighborhood.

Traditionally when neighborhoods were described in geographic terms, fixed physical barriers were used to delineate the area's boundaries. Neighborhoods will be considered herein as loosely defined geographic areas,

within which persons have "interests in common".¹³ Further, the physical boundaries of neighborhoods will not be viewed as fixed points or lines, rather neighborhoods will be seen as dynamic places whose boundaries change as "interests in common" expand or decline.

Neighborhood Organizations

Neighborhood organizations are ongoing, territorially based, voluntary associations that are organized by neighborhood residents to act upon a number of different issues perceived as vital to the economic, social, and/or political well being of the neighborhood. They display wide variations with respect to size, structure, and strategies pursued to achieve organizational goals.¹⁴ As with any organization, Norgs are characterized by various organizational attributes. Some specific organizational attributes of the type of Norg which is the concern of this paper are discussed below.

Inherent in the above definition is the point that neighborhood organizations have an organizational purpose. This is one organizational attribute. The purpose of a Norg is to represent resident interests on issues perceived as vital to neighborhood residents. The assumption here is that residents have "interests in common" which can be identified and addressed by the Norg.

These neighborhood interests are not fixed but change as neighborhood issues emerge and die.¹⁵

In representing the interests of neighborhood residents, Norgs may adopt both reactive and or proactive postures.¹⁶ As an example, if neighborhood residents are in opposition to a proposed land use decision, such as a rezoning, the Norg will represent these neighborhood interests by reacting to the proposal either through established formal participation channels, i.e., (public hearings) or through informal means, or both.

In adopting a proactive posture to address neighborhood interests, Norgs monitor neighborhood and/or external conditions and trends for the purpose of anticipating neighborhood interests. An example of a proactive posture would be for a Norg to assess the need for neighborhood daycare services, and if such a need were established, propose strategies to address that need.

As a second attribute, Norgs represent a definable constituency comprised of the residents of the neighborhood where the Norg is based.¹⁷ Typically, not all of a neighborhood's residents will belong to a neighborhood organization. Many residents who are members, may not participate in organizational activities on a regular or active basis. The percentage of residents who do participate can vary greatly from organization to organization or from issue to issue within the same

organization. Regardless of the level of participation, Norgs typically claim to represent the interests of the entire neighborhood by embracing the assumption that the interests of non-participating neighborhood residents coincide with the interests of residents who actively support the organization.¹⁸

A third attribute of Norgs is that they monitor the interests of their constituency as well as conditions and trends occurring outside the neighborhood. The purpose of this monitoring is to identify resident interests and anticipate the emergence of issues which may affect the neighborhood.¹⁹

A fourth attribute of Norgs common to all formal organizations is that they possess an identifiable organizational structure, including persons in leadership positions.²⁰ The leadership positions in Norgs are most commonly occupied by voluntary members, or in some cases paid professional staff, who function in many capacities including, organizing membership, monitoring interests and trends, delegating authority, developing strategies to address neighborhood issues, and acting as spokespersons for the Norg. Implicit in the organizational structures are decision systems and intraorganizational and interorganizational channels of communication. These decision systems and communication channels provide the

means through which the Norg can address resident interests and interact with its external environment.

A fifth attribute which is important to an understanding of the type of organization that is the concern of this paper is the strategies Norgs pursue to achieve organizational goals. Ahlbrandt and Cunningham (1979) have identified three basic organizational approaches which Norgs use to address neighborhood interests. They have classified these as the pressure strategy, the service strategy, and the hybrid strategy.²¹

The pressure strategy is a political approach aimed at social action. Norgs which follow this strategy address neighborhood issues, and attempt to achieve organizational goals by influencing other organizations. When successful, this strategy will bring about changes in the output and/or structure in other organizations and result in improvement in the neighborhood. The service strategy differs from the pressure strategy in that neighborhood issues are addressed at the neighborhood level using neighborhood resources. It is a self help approach to the attainment of neighborhood goals. Norgs which pursue service strategies seek to help neighborhood residents by directly providing services which the neighborhood needs.

The third variation and the focus of this paper, is the hybrid strategy. As the name implies, this approach

incorporates elements of both pressure and service strategies. Many Norgs use this organizational approach to address neighborhood issues and interests.²² The relative degree of emphasis upon utilizing pressure strategies or service strategies will vary from organization to organization, and will vary within the same organization dependent upon the nature of interests to be address, and the nature of the conditions and trends in the Norgs operating environment.

Thus, when referring to Norgs in this paper, I shall be referring to neighborhood based voluntary organizations, which represent a definable constituency. These organizations have identifiable organizational structures including persons in leadership positions. Norgs monitor and represent the interests of their constituency on issues which affect the economic, social and or political well being of the neighborhood. In addressing neighborhood interests, these organizations will adopt either reactive or proactive postures and use either pressure strategies and/or service strategies to address the needs and interests of neighborhood residents.

Organizational Linkages

One approach chosen by Norgs to achieve organizational goals has been to enter into linkages with other organizations. My focus in this paper is on two types of

linkages between Norgs and local governments. These are 1) direct local government funding or in-kind resource assistance to the Norg, and 2) joint program development and administration between the local governing body and the neighborhood organization.²³

Funding and Resource Assistance

A common form of linkage between a Norg and a local government is the provision by the local government of resource assistance to the Norg. As primarily voluntary organizations, Norgs often lack the financial resources or the professional or technical capacities to address neighborhood interests adequately. Direct financial assistance can assist Norgs in such ways as funding operating expenses, or funding the development and implementation of neighborhood services designed to address neighborhood needs. In-kind professional or technical staff assistance can assist Norgs in achieving organizational goals by providing the Norg with technical expertise which may be needed to pursue an organizational strategy.

Joint Program Participation

This second type of linkage is also a common form of association between Norgs and local governments. Lacking the capacity and resources independently to provide needed programs, or presented with the opportunity to participate in local government programs targeted to the neighborhood

area, Norgs enter into program relationships with local governments, and thus jointly participate in the development and or participation of program services to the neighborhood.

Organization of the Study

In Chapter II I provide a discussion of the theoretical context for the central question of this paper. Chapter II also contains a discussion of the methodology used to explore the question. The theoretical context presented forms the basis for Chapter III which is devoted to the presentation and analysis of selected case studies. Chapter IV is devoted to a discussion of conclusions drawn from the case studies and includes suggestions for further research in this area.

Conclusion

In this introductory chapter I have presented the central question to be explored, and have provided discussion to demonstrate that the question is relevant for investigation. The definitions offered above serve to clarify my area of concern, and further define the paper's scope.

Chapter Notes

1. The acronym "Norg" was initially used in neighborhood related literature to represent an abbreviation for neighborhood organization. Over the past several years the use of this acronym has been expanded to a point where it is now used by at least one research organization as a proper name: Neighborhood Organization Research Group. The use of "Norg" in this paper does not denote any particular organization, but is used in a generic sense to represent an abbreviation for a neighborhood based organization.

2. O'Brien (1976), Boyte (1980), Perlman (1978), and others writing in the area of neighborhood related research have documented the existence of these ties and have commented on their purpose and form.

3. Harry C. Boyte, The Backyard Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), p. 40.

4. David J. O'Brien, Neighborhood Organization and Interest Group Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 43-63.

5. Janice Perlman "Grassroots Empowerment and Government Response," Social Policy 10 (September/October 1979): 20.

6. My intent is not to imply that this is a universal job description for a local government planner. Some local government planners may have no responsibilities in the area of working with neighborhood groups, while others may devote considerable time to working on neighborhood issues.

7. In this paper, neighborhood organization success is defined as the accomplishment of organizational objectives and goals.

8. Arthur J. Naparstek and Chester D. Haskell, "Urban Policies and Neighborhood Services," in Reaching People, ed. Daniel Thursz and Joseph L. Vigilante (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 40.

9. William P. Hojnacki "What is a Neighborhood?," Social Policy 10 (September/October 1979): 47.

10. Milton J. Kotler, Neighborhood Government: The Foundations of Political Life (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 36

11. Suzanne Keller, The Urban Neighborhood: A Sociological Perspective (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 87.

12. Ibid.

13. O'Brien, Neighborhood Organization, pp. 8-10. O'Brien uses the phrase "interests in common" as a defining characteristic of a neighborhood. Referring to public service delivery, he states that the services an individual receives is dependent in large measure on which neighborhood he lives in. Since all individuals within a neighborhood are similarly affected by the quantity and quality of neighborhood services, neighborhood residents have a potential basis of common interest. The existence of "interests in common" is also an important key to understanding the functions of a neighborhood organization.

14. Milton J. Kotler "A Public Policy for Neighborhood and Community Organizations," Social Policy 10 (September/October 1979): 39.

15. O'Brien, Neighborhood Organization, p. 12.

16. Perlman, Grassroots Empowerment, p. 16.

17. This characteristic of Norgs is implicit within the definition of a neighborhood organization offered above. A constituency is a group of persons involved in or served by an organization. See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, rev. ed. (1976), s.v. "constituency."

18. Roger S. Ahlbrandt and James V. Cunningham, A New Public Policy for Neighborhood Preservation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), pp. 188-192.

19. Perlman, Grassroots Empowerment, p. 17.

20. Ibid.

21. Roger S. Ahlbrandt and James V. Cunningham, A New Public Policy for Neighborhood Preservation, pp. 200-202.

22. Ibid., p. 202.

23. The literature which reports on linkages between neighborhood organizations and local governments demonstrates that resource assistance and joint program participation are common forms of linkages between the two organizations. See Perlman (1979), and O'Brien (1976)

II. Contextual Framework and Methodology

The Context

This chapter provides a context within which the central question of the paper can be understood and its relevance for investigation established. To this end, there is elaboration on the cited works of O'Brien, Boyte, and Perlman, each of whom offer different viewpoints on the effects of organizational linkages on the success of neighborhood organizations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the methodology employed to explore the research question.

Linkages and Organizational Resources

Following Michels (1962) thesis that the first goal of all organizations is survival, O'Brien argues the achievement of this goal requires that neighborhood organizations be continually cognizant of changes in their sociopolitical operating environment. He states that being cognizant of these changes is necessary so that neighborhood organizations can adapt to meet current environmental conditions. "Failure to adapt to environmental conditions can", states O'Brien, "result in an organization not achieving any of its objectives."¹

Adaptation to environmental conditions may involve adjustments to organizational processes, organizational

structure, or both. One form of structural change which has characterized neighborhood organizations seeking to adapt to environmental conditions has been to enter into linkage relationships with larger "sponsoring" organizations, for linkages with such organizations can provide the resources and legitimacy needed to achieve organizational objectives.² According to O'Brien, obtaining adequate financial resources and establishing and maintaining organizational legitimacy are two of the major problems facing neighborhood organizations. He states that both are needed if neighborhood organizations are to achieve their organizational goals and objectives.³

However O'Brien argues that there are tradeoffs involved when a neighborhood organization establishes a linkage relationship and that entering into a linkage with a larger organization can cause major problems for a Norg. One such problem is that the survival needs of the larger organization must be taken into consideration when the Norg chooses strategies aimed at addressing neighborhood issues. Strategies chosen by the Norg which threaten the resources or legitimacy of the larger organization will influence the larger organization either to dissolve the organizational linkage (thereby denying the Norg needed resources and legitimacy), or put some constraints on future Norg activities (thereby denying the Norg autonomy of action). Loss of autonomy is thus one effect which can

result from a linkage relationship between a Norg and another organization. O'Brien takes the perspective that loss of autonomy affects success to the degree that constraints on organizational actions prohibit Norgs from using strategies perceived (by the Norg) as necessary to achieve goals and objectives.

In summarizing his discussion of the relationship between organizational linkages and organizational success, O'Brien concludes that the costs and benefits of a given organizational structure must be weighed in terms of the short range and long range consequences of the structure chosen. In the short term a linkage relationship can provide the resources and legitimacy necessary for organizational survival. However, the long term consequences of such a relationship can be the loss of the autonomy required to pursue desired strategies towards achieving organizational goals.⁴

O'Brien's argument implies the importance of adopting a strategic perspective with respect to a neighborhood organization's decision to establish a linkage with another organization. In seeking to adapt to environmental conditions, neighborhood organizations should consider the long term consequences of a given organizational structure and evaluate such consequences against the short term effects of a linkage on organizational success. By adopting a strategic approach,

neighborhood organizations can increase their effectiveness in adapting to environmental conditions, and thus increase their effectiveness in achieving their goals and objectives.

Autonomy and Organizational Success

In contrast to O'Brien who defines organizational success in terms of goal and objective achievement, Boyte states that the success of a community organization can best be defined, and is contingent upon, an organization's capacity for autonomous organizing and political independence.⁵

Acknowledging that autonomous action can result in resource deficiencies, he argues that community based groups must find ways to achieve their desired goals without sacrificing their autonomy. To support his argument, Boyte cites Miller who states:

A strategy for institutional change requires organizational and political independence in a largely voluntary organization . . . The trick is to make the institutions change their policies and practices without becoming responsible for their day to day operations . . . Organizations to be able to affect both public and private decision making . . . must retain organizational and financial independence from government, corporations and most foundation programs.⁶

Boyte continues by stating that citizens' groups have tried many techniques to guarantee organizational autonomy, from refusal to accept government or corporation aid,

to prohibiting public officeholders from membership or leadership positions. He concludes that the only guarantee of organizational autonomy is the subordination of all organizational goals and activities to the priorities of grassroots organizing.⁷

An Unresolved Question

Perlman disagrees with both O'Brien and Boyte on the effects of organizational linkages. However, rather than arguing that organizational linkages have specific identifiable effects, she asserts that the relationship of linkages to success is an issue which is yet to be resolved. She reports that during the 1970s numerous neighborhood organizations entered into relationships with local governments. As a product of these linkages, neighborhood organizations attained new degrees of recognition and legitimacy as local governments decentralized their functions and responsibilities so as to devolve power to local community groups. Commenting that the effects of this official recognition are as yet unknown, she concludes:

The question then becomes whether this official recognition . . . will "enable" or "disable" the grassroot groups. Will it be another case of "the helping hand strikes again"? Since very often the powerful things about these groups are their localism, diversity, and autonomy, will governmental recognition, programmatic responsibility, and federal funding be the proverbial kiss of death? Even if co-optation or social control is

not the governments intent, it is unclear whether the groups⁸ can maintain their integrity and own direction.

Perlman's comments indicate that the information available to date is inadequate to determine the effects linkages have upon organizational success. She concludes that in the interim, there are measures government can take to increase the capacity and effectiveness of a Norg, such as increasing access to and dissemination of information useful to a Norg's activities.⁹

The discussion above indicates that the question which is the topic of this paper has been considered in research devoted to neighborhood related issues, and further indicates that there are different opinions on the effects linkages have on the success of neighborhood organizations. Through the description and analysis of case studies, the effects organizational linkages have on the success of neighborhood organizations is explored in the next chapter. The methodology employed in the case analysis follows below.

Methodology

Case study analysis is used as a methodological approach to address the research question. Three case studies were selected. Two of the case studies were

chosen from Henig's (1982) analysis of neighborhood mobilization efforts.¹⁰ The third case study was selected from an article by Cooper (1980).¹¹

The use of multiple case studies will also allow me to undertake cross case comparison. However, the use of case studies limits the formulation of generalized conclusions concerning the research question beyond the material the case studies contain.

Criteria for Case Study Selection

The case studies chosen were evaluated and subsequently selected on the basis of several criteria. First, in order to analyze case studies which were examples of recent work in the areas of neighborhoods and neighborhood organizations, the case studies evaluated were only considered suitable if they were published during or after 1975. Considerable research on Norgs was published during the last eight years, and the selection of this time frame did not adversely constrain the selection of suitable literature.

The second criterion used to evaluate and select case studies, was the organizational attributes of Norgs. As "neighborhood organization" is a generic term used to describe a multiplicity of different groups, with different organizational purposes, case studies were selected which focused on neighborhood based voluntary

organizations which represented a definable constituency. Each Norg in the case studies has an identifiable organizational structure with respect to persons in leadership positions. The Norgs existed to represent the interests of their constituencies on issues which were perceived to affect the economic, social and or political well being of the respective neighborhoods.

A third criterion for selection was organizational linkages. The suitability of a case study was evaluated on the basis of the type of organizational linkage between the Norg and the local government. Many forms of linkages can be developed between these two organizational types. In evaluating the suitability of case studies for analysis, I focused on case studies which revealed either organizational linkages characterized by interorganizational arrangements involving funding and or resource assistance, or arrangements involving joint program participation.

A final criterion used to select literature, was the nature of the issue the Norg was addressing when it entered into a linkage relationship with local government. In evaluating case studies for their suitability, I selected only those studies which reported on Norgs focusing their activities in areas relating to land use development or policy.

Description and Analysis of Case Studies

In Chapter III, each of the selected cases is described. These descriptions contain discussion pertaining to the nature of the issue being addressed by the Norg, and the nature of the organizational linkage, including which organization initiated the linkage and for what purpose. The effects of organizational linkages, as reported in the case studies, will be evaluated against the theoretical context presented in Chapter I and developed in this chapter.

Chapter Notes

1. O'Brien, Neighborhood Organization, p. 53.
2. Ibid., p. 59. Legitimacy refers to the capacity of any organization which claims to represent a constituency, to convince persons or groups with which it hopes to negotiate or influence, that it is a legitimate spokesperson for that constituency.
3. Ibid., p. 43.
4. Ibid.
5. Boyte, Backyard Revolution, p. 40.
6. Ibid., p. 41.
7. Ibid.
8. Perlman, Grassroots Empowerment, p. 20.
9. Idem, "Grassroots Participation from Neighborhood to Nation," in Citizen Participation in America, ed. Stuart Langton (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1978), p. 77.
10. Jeffrey R. Henig, Neighborhood Mobilization (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1982)
11. Terry L. Cooper, "Bureaucracy and Community Organization," Administration and Society 11 (February 1980)

III. Description and Analysis of Case Studies

Three case studies are presented in this chapter. Each case contains information useful to the exploration of the central question of this study. The description of each case is followed by an analysis against the contextual framework developed in Chapter II.

Case One: The North River Commission¹

The North Park neighborhood is in northwest Chicago approximately eight miles from the Loop. It is a neighborhood of well maintained single family homes. The residents of North Park are wealthier, better educated, live in a more stable community, have higher status occupations, are more likely to own their own homes, and less likely to live in overcrowded conditions than the population of Chicago as a whole.²

Near the center of the North Park lies the 155 acre site of the Municipal Tuberculosis Sanitarium (MTS). Much of the MTS site is covered by unspoiled woodlands, ponds, and active plant and animal life. As it was until recently a functioning sanitarium, its grounds have been off limits to the surrounding neighborhood and larger community for a long time.

On November 13, 1973, the mayor's Committee on Shopping Centers, headed by developer Harry Chaddwick (a

personal friend of then Mayor Richard Daley), announced plans for a network of in-city shopping centers in Chicago. One of the centers to be constructed was to be a mixed use shopping and residential development on the MTS site. The shopping center would cover 70 acres of the site. Twenty-five hundred apartment units would cover an additional 58 acres. The remaining 27 acres of the 155 acre site would be set aside as a park.³

The reaction to the proposal within the North Park neighborhood was immediate. Members of the North River Commission (NRC), a preexisting community group, began making telephone calls to discuss what to do the same day as the announcement. The proposal had not taken local neighborhood leaders completely by surprise. The staff of the NRC had heard rumors that such a plan was in the works, and a connection within the city government had confirmed the rumors.

On November 14, Ronald Cope of the Peterson Park Improvement Association (which was federated with NRC), contacted Alderman Seymore Simon to request he attend a meeting of the association to discuss the Chaddwick proposal. Simon was unable to attend, however he wrote Cope to say that he assumed the consensus of the neighborhood meeting will be to oppose the Chaddwick proposal, and if that is the case, "you have my full support and energy."⁴ Simon also called Chaddwick the

same day to inform him that he had received many calls from North Park residents, and every caller was opposed to the shopping center proposal.

The Hollywood-Northpark Improvement Association (also federated with the NRC called an open meeting for November 20, to discuss the Chaddwick proposal. At this meeting a resolution was introduced calling for the organization to pursue all necessary actions to oppose the use of the MTS for any private purpose.⁵ Flyers were distributed at the meeting encouraging people to send letters to Mayor Daley, circulate petitions on their blocks, and volunteer their time in any other way necessary to preserve the MTS site.

At this meeting, Gerald Spector, president of NRC emerged as a spokesperson and leader of the opposition to the Chaddwick proposal.⁶ On November 23, Spector appeared on a local news radio program to respond to an editorial supporting the Chaddwick proposal. Spector's response did not condemn the entire network of shopping centers proposed by Chaddwick. It focused rather on the distinctiveness of the MTS site when compared to the location of the other proposed shopping centers which were to be built on sites used as a brickyard, a railyard, and a stockyard.

Another member of the NRC, Sara Segal, was also a member of the Open Lands Project (OLP), a nonprofit citizen environmental group. Several years before, Segal

had conducted graduate research exploring alternative uses for the MTS site. Segal exploited her position within OLP by using project letterhead to contact other environmental groups in the Chicago area. She realized that each area environmental group was a potential ally in the fight to preserve the MTS site. Her strategy was effective.⁷ Numerous Chicago area environmental groups began to take public positions in support of preserving the MTS. The strategies chosen by these groups ranged from letters to the editors of local newspapers, to articles opposing the Chaddwick plan in conservation oriented newsletters and magazines.

At this time the NRC staff, several of whom were full time paid employees, were developing and implementing strategies aimed at building generalized neighborhood support in the area immediately surrounding the MTS site. A series of neighborhood meetings were held, with Spector in attendance. Aware that neighborhood residents were already concerned about traffic congestion in the area, Spector spoke of the shopping center and apartments generating 60,000 cars per day. Also aware that some of the homeowners around the site were periodically experiencing flooded basements, Spector evoked the image of more severe flooding if so much of the absorbent land on the MTS site was paved over.⁸ Segal also attended these meetings, and showed slides of alternative uses for

the sanitarium. Playing upon the possibility that protection of the environment might be a rallying point around which people could give their support, Spector and Segal told residents that trees, in addition to their aesthetic qualities, produce oxygen, and that destroying so many trees at the MTS would reduce the air quality in their neighborhood. As many of the neighborhood residents were members of NRC or a federated organization (such as Peterson Park), very little effort was needed to secure their support on the NRC position on the shopping center proposal.⁹

However, one of NRC's objectives in fighting the Chaddwick proposal was to expand the appeal of the issue beyond the area immediately adjacent to the MTS. Realizing that voters were a valued commodity to the Chicago machine, the broader the support for the issue, the greater their chances of success. To this end, the North River Coalition to Save the MTS Site was formed.¹⁰

The decision to form a completely new coalition was unusual in the sense that the North River Commission was already in existence and had been operating for over ten years. However Spector and several other decision makers in NRC believed a separate coalition to oppose the Chaddwick proposal was beneficial for several reasons.¹¹ First, was NRC's desire to win the technical and financial support of Chicago area environmental groups. Realizing

that many environmental groups did not have branches in the North Park area, Spector feared that the traditional geographic foundation of the NRC would inhibit their support. The formation of the Coalition then, was seen as a strategy to bypass the image that only North Park area groups participated in supporting NRC activities. The second reason for forming the Coalition also involved the image of the NRC. Some area neighborhood groups had chosen to stay out of NRC for one reason or another. The formation of a new coalition would allow these groups to participate in the organized fight against the shopping center, without aligning themselves directly with the NRC which they had avoided in the past.

The North River Coalition to Save the MTS Site continued to fight the Chaddwick proposal throughout the winter. In the spring of 1974, their efforts for the first time incorporated a proactive posture with respect to the MTS site and the Chaddwick proposal.¹² Realizing that simply opposing the shopping center proposal would not be as effective a strategy as proposing alternative uses for the MTS buildings and grounds, the NRC developed and distributed a survey during the Spring and Summer. The survey asked people what they would like to see the MTS site used for.

Three thousand surveys were returned.¹³ The survey results demonstrated that there were three uses for the

MTS site favored: 1) a multi-medical facility housed in the existing MTS structures; 2) housing for senior citizens; and, 3) maintain 80 to 100 acres as a public nature, walk-park, and recreation area. The survey results were incorporated into a petition which was eventually signed by 10,000 persons.

Using the survey results as a guide, the Coalition staff began to develop a community plan for the MTS site. They were aided by an array of experts who served on advisory committees. Local architects began to evaluate the rehabilitation possibilities of the buildings already standing on the MTS site. Environmental experts catalogued the variety of plant and wildlife on the site and began to explore the feasibility of a nature laboratory on the grounds. The educational potential of such a laboratory encouraged representatives of three area colleges and the Illinois Office of Education to participate in the formulation of the community plan.¹⁴

The community plan was to be presented to city officials at a mass rally on October 29th. On October 8th, in an effort perhaps to diffuse the rally, Mayor Daley sent a letter to Alderman Laurino of the neighboring 39th Ward. In this letter, he stated he was personally opposed to the shopping center plan of his friend Harry Chaddwick.¹⁵

The Coalition did not want its supporters lulled into a false sense of security, and the leadership continued to mobilize for the scheduled rally. The week before the rally, the Coalition provided Lew Hill, the Director of Chicago's Department of Development and Planning, a copy of their plan. At the rally on October 29, attended by over 900 persons, the plan was formally presented to the city. Lew Hill repeated the Mayor's assurance that there would be no shopping center on the MTS site. This pledge would be repeated again in the Mayor's budget message delivered on November 14.

On December 11, Mayor Daley's pledge was delivered in person to approximately fifty coalition members who met in his office. After the Coalition had presented its proposal to the Mayor, he instructed Lew Hill to establish a joint planning process between the Department of Development and Planning and the Coalition.¹⁶ The purpose of this joint venture was to develop a feasible and mutually acceptable alternative to the Chaddwick proposal. With the personal assurances of the Mayor, the Coalition believed its efforts had been successful. There was no need to further mobilize community residents against the Chaddwick proposal. Rather, the energies of the coalition leadership and technical experts could be channeled towards working with the city to develop a plan for the MTS site.

The Coalition attempted to work with the city during the next eight months to develop a plan. There was little progress.¹⁷ In retrospect, coalition members viewed this eight month period as a drain on their energies and a waste of time. Without the pressure of the mobilized residents the city appeared to be stalling.

The city was not fully cooperating with the Coalition. Although it was suppose to be a joint planning process coalition members were totally dependent upon the Department of Development and Planning and other city officials for information. The information the Coalition did receive during this eight month period was slow in coming, was at times incomplete, and at other times inaccurate. Whether city officials were deliberately stalling and trying to confuse the Coalition or whether they were just not devoting the time to the MTS project which the Coalition expected is not known. The city was, however, setting the pace of the planning process and the pace was close to a standstill.¹⁸

The coalition leadership became fearful that unless a plan for MTS could be agreed upon and implemented in the near future, its gains to date would be voided. As the summer of 1975 showed no progress in the development of a joint plan, the Coalition once again turned to the tactic of mass mobilization. The Coalition distributed flyers warning residents that the city was going to build a

shopping center at the MTS site and five hundred residents turned out at a meeting to encourage the city to stop dragging its feet.

The mobilization tactic elicited a quick response from the city. On November 6th, the city presented community organization leaders and residents the city's plan for the site. The plan reflected in more detail the preliminary proposals of the Coalition. Implementation of the first phases of the plan were to begin in less than 60 days, with total implementation completed by late the following spring.¹⁹

Case Analysis

This case indicates that the NRC was a neighborhood based organization which possessed various organizational attributes as described in Chapter I. A brief discussion of these attributes precedes an analysis of this case against the research question and previously developed contextual framework.

Organizational Attributes

In this section discussion is offered on the organizational attributes displayed by the NRC including its organizational structure, constituency and purpose. Two other attributes are also discussed below, namely, NRC's monitoring capacity, and its adoption of both reactive and proactive postures.

The NRC had an identifiable structure. Persons occupied leadership positions and directed various organizational activities including monitoring of environmental conditions, choosing strategies, delegating responsibilities, and speaking on behalf of the organization. This structure, which was in place at the time of the MTS issue, provided NRC the means to react quickly to the city's proposal.

From the nature of its constituency, and its decision to become involved in the MTS issue, it can be concluded from the case study material that NRC existed within the North Park area to represent the interests of its constituency, that is, the residents of the North Park area of Chicago. NRC's efforts to develop additional neighborhood support for its position, indicates that not all North Park residents were members of the organization.

The monitoring of resident interests, and environmental conditions and trends was another attribute displayed by the NRC. Its understanding of the critical role voters played in the Chicago machine, and its use of a source of information within city hall, were two indications that the organization monitored its operating environment. The case also indicates that NRC monitored resident interests. This point was displayed by NRC's survey of North Park residents to obtain ideas for alternative uses for the MTS site.

As a final attribute the case indicates that NRC adopted both reactive and proactive strategies addressing the MTS issue. Their initial strategy of mass mobilization was a reactive response to the city's proposal, while the strategy to propose an alternative plan for the MTS site was proactive in nature.

Comparison against Contextual Framework

In this section the above case is evaluated against the central question of this paper, and the contextual framework developed in Chapter II.

The goal of the NRC was to successfully oppose the use of the MTS site for any private purpose, including the shopping center proposal recommended by the Mayor's committee. With respect to this goal, the NRC was successful in its efforts.

As presented in Chapter II, O'Brien argues that neighborhood organizations will enter into linkages with larger organizations such as a local government, for the purpose of obtaining the organizational resources and legitimacy necessary for success. He continues to state that the effects of the linkages can be loss of autonomy necessary to pursue desired goals and objectives. In the above case, the NRC entered into linkages with various organizations including the city of Chicago. The effects of these linkages on the success of NRC is analyzed below,

with specific focus given to the linkage between the NRC and the city of Chicago.

As an organization with a ten year tenure, and a paid professional staff, the NRC had resources and legitimacy within the community. As part of its chosen initial strategy of mass mobilization in opposition to the shopping center proposal, the NRC sought and entered into linkages with a variety of groups in the Chicago area. Largely informal in nature, these linkages were developed with other neighborhood organizations and Chicago area environmental groups. The linkages had a positive effect on the resultant success of the NRC, for they provided it with a source of additional financial and technical resources beneficial to the mobilization effort. In addition these linkages provided NRC with an expanded constituency base. In the view of the NRC, a broader base of citizen support was critical to its mobilization effort, given the role voters played in the stability of the Chicago machine.

Whereas O'Brien argues that Norgs will enter into linkages with larger "sponsoring" organizations to obtain necessary resources, this case demonstrates that a neighborhood organization can obtain needed resources through informal linkages with non-sponsoring organizations. The informal linkages developed between NRC and other neighborhood and environmental groups were

not linkages with "sponsoring" organizations as presented by O'Brien. However, these linkages did provide the NRC needed resources and legitimacy, both of which were needed to pursue a mass mobilization strategy towards achieving its organizational goal.

The joint planning process, which was the formal linkage between the NRC and the city, was not entered into by the NRC for the purpose of obtaining needed resources or legitimacy. Rather, it resulted from NRC's desire to be proactive in response to perceived environmental conditions.

NRC's monitoring of environmental conditions assisted in its mobilization efforts. The knowledge obtained from this monitoring led NRC to conclude it would have a better chance of successfully opposing the shopping center if it could demonstrate to the city it was not just capable of reacting negatively to a proposal, but was capable of proactive action as well. This desire to adopt a proactive posture, which would be accomplished through the development and proposition of feasible alternative uses for the MTS site, set the stage for the eventual formal linkage established between the city of Chicago and the NRC.

This linkage had negative effects on the success of the NRC. One effect was that the linkage gave the city increased control over environmental conditions. The city

was controlling the speed of the planning process, and was controlling the source and flow of information, as the NRC was dependent upon the city's staff for technical assistance.

Another negative effect on the potential success of the NRC was a constraint on organizational autonomy. Once linked with the city's administration in the joint planning process, the NRC was constrained from continuing its effective mass mobilization strategies. O'Brien argues that linkages with larger organizations can result in such a loss of organizational autonomy. However, his argument is based on the point that a linkage is established for the purpose of obtaining needed resources and/or legitimacy. This organizational need forces the Norg either to accept constraints on strategies, or to risk losing the resources and/or legitimacy obtained from the linkage.

As the linkage between the NRC and the city was not established for this purpose, the basis for the organizational constraints on autonomy, as described by O'Brien, do not exist in the above case. The constraint which prohibited the NRC from adopting a mass mobilization strategy, was not the potential loss of resources or legitimacy. It was the organizations perception that it would not be appropriate to mobilize against the city while attempting to undertake a successful joint planning

process. This was demonstrated by NRC's eventual dissolution of the linkage which occurred when the Norg decided the city was not making a good faith effort in the joint planning process. Once the linkage was dissolved, NRC remobilized in protest to the city's proposal, and successfully achieved its goal.

O'Brien concludes that Norgs need to consider the short range versus long range consequences of a structure chosen. This implies that Norgs need to be strategic in their decisions to pursue particular strategies or structures. It can be argued that in the above case the NRC failed to consider at the appropriate time, the consequences of the proactive strategy it chose. While the strategy of proposing feasible alternatives to the shopping center proposal, was seen as a response to current environmental conditions, the long range consequence of this environmental adaptation was the unsuccessful linkage with the city.

In summary, several points can be made as a result of the above analysis of this case against the research question, and O'Brien's arguments as presented in Chapter II. First, neighborhood organizations can obtain the resources and legitimacy needed to accomplish specific goals and objectives without entering into linkages with larger "sponsoring" organizations. As this case demonstrates, needed resources and legitimacy can be

obtained from informal linkages with various smaller organizations. The informal linkages NRC established with other Norgs and environmental groups had a positive effect on the success of NRC, for in the aggregate these linkages provided resources which were sufficient for NRC to achieve its goal. The case provided no information to indicate that these linkages in any way impeded NRC's autonomy.

Second, linkages between a neighborhood organization and a local government can be initially established for reasons other than providing the Norg a source of resources and legitimacy. The linkage proposed by the city and agreed to by the NRC was the by-product of NRC's desire to increase their legitimacy as an organization by adopting a proactive strategy. The linkage was in one sense an unplanned consequence of a strategy designed to address current environmental conditions.

Third, linkages between a Norg and a local government can result in negative effects on the success of the neighborhood organization. While linked with the city, NRC was constrained in available strategy options and was dependent upon the city for information and technical assistance. Only after dissolving the linkage and returning to a reactive strategy of mass mobilization did the NRC achieve its goal of successfully opposing the shopping center proposal.

I proceed now with an analysis of this case against Boyte's argument as presented in Chapter II.

Boyte argues that linkages with a local government will impede a neighborhood organization in its efforts to achieve organizational goals. The MTS case provides information to support this argument. The NRC was successfully achieving its goal of defeating the shopping center proposal when it was operating as a largely autonomous organization. Its strategy of mass mobilization had influenced the city's administration to make public statements in opposition to the shopping center. This successful reactive strategy did not require, nor did it involve a linkage with the city of Chicago.

Boyte acknowledges that resource deficiencies can result from autonomous action. These resource deficiencies can impede goal achievement, and thus Norgs must find a way to obtain needed resources without sacrificing autonomy. The informal linkages which the NRC established with other neighborhood organizations, and environmental groups accomplished this objective. They provided the NRC with the various resources required to undertake an effective mass mobilization strategy.

As stated above, the linkage between the NRC and the city which was eventually established at the latter's suggestion, had negative effects on the NRC. Resultant

constraints on organizational autonomy, and loss of control over environmental conditions negatively affected the Norg's ability to accomplish its goal.

In summary, and as Boyte argues, this case demonstrates that a linkage with a local government can result in conditions detrimental to the success of a neighborhood organization. In the paragraphs below I conclude this case analysis with a brief discussion of Perlman, who presents a third view on the relationship between organizational linkages and success.

In contrast to O'Brien and Boyte, Perlman argues that we do not yet know the relationship of linkages to success, for the information available to date is inadequate. In some cases linkages with local governments have resulted in increased legitimacy and recognition, while in other cases linkages have resulted in governmental cooptation of neighborhood organizations.

The above case reports on one series of events which eventually led to a linkage between the NRC and the city. It is only speculation to state that a slightly modified or different series of events could have led to a linkage which resulted in different effects on the success of the NRC. However, environmental conditions, per O'Brien, can play a major role in the success of a Norg, particularly with respect to the way a Norg chooses to adapt to those conditions.

By analyzing the second case study described below more information is provided on the relationship between linkages and success.

Case Two: The Stevens Square Community Organization²⁰

The Whittier and Lyndale neighborhoods are located in the southwest corner of Minneapolis. Their mutual border is near the intersection of Nicollet Avenue and Lake Street. These two neighborhoods are two of nine neighborhoods which comprise the Powderhorn Planning District.

One third of Minneapolis' public assistance case load in 1975 lived within the Powderhorn area, although the district comprises just seventeen percent of the city's population. In 1970, the combined median family income in the Whittier and Lyndale neighborhoods was about \$8100; almost \$1900 below the city as a whole. In addition, the residents of these two neighborhoods are more likely to be younger, single, and more mobile than the average resident of the city of Minneapolis.²¹

In the early 1970s city officials began to evaluate the physical deterioration occurring around the intersection of Nicollet and Lake. As early as the mid 1950s, a city report had classified the area as experiencing "accelerated decline." The city's analysis in the early 1970's concluded that many of the buildings

in the Nicollet-Lake area were "decrepit or becoming so", and crime and other "social malfunctions" were high in the neighborhood. The report conceded that neighborhood businesses continued to be viable, producing annual sales in excess of 10 million dollars, however the city was concerned that "straight" businesses were being displaced by those engaged in "raffish" activities.²²

In 1972, in an effort to revitalize the area, the city council adopted the Nicollet-Lake Development District and set aside seven million dollars for land acquisition, relocation costs, land clearance and site preparation, legal and administrative costs, and the construction of public facilities. The proposal was to create a commercial, entertainment, and housing complex, and was to be paid for through the use of tax increment financing.

By late 1975, the redevelopment proposal had only resulted in the creation of a large empty lot. The city had bought and cleared the land, and relocated people and businesses. However, no major commercial tenant had been found to "anchor" the development project and spur additional private investment.

In December of 1975, K-Mart department stores made a quiet proposal to the city to locate in the development district.²³ Interest charges on the borrowed seven million dollars were \$1000 a day, so when K-Mart made

their proposal, the city's response on March 2, 1976 was favorable in spite of the harmful effects which were possible. The most drastic effect was likely to be the permanent closing of Nicollet Avenue, north of Lake Street for a distance of about one and one-half blocks. Nicollet Avenue had a traffic volume of over 10,000 vehicles per day, was a link for two crosstown bus routes, and was a major connector between southwest Minneapolis, and the central business district. Merchants north of the Nicollet-Lake intersection depended on Nicollet to bring their customers; residents in the Whittier and Lyndale neighborhoods depended on these businesses for essential economic activities and services. The city's plan called for Nicollet traffic to be rerouted through the surrounding area, increasing congestion, noise and pollution in these neighborhoods.²⁴

The Whittier Action Council (WAC) was a small neighborhood organization concerned with such locally significant issues as housing, zoning, and crime. WAC had no regular office space, and no paid staff, but it did have close working ties with the city planning department and local elected officials.²⁵ Several of the active members of WAC had been involved in the election campaign of one of the area's aldermen.

When the K-Mart announcement was made on March 2, the WAC leadership was surprised. Although the city had been

negotiating with K-Mart for over four months, WAC members had no knowledge that plans were being made. They were as upset with the city for excluding them from the planning process, as they were over the content of the K-Mart proposal. WAC chairperson Bob Knight commented at the time that the exclusion of WAC from the planning process forced WAC into an adversary role with the city.²⁶ WAC's immediate response to the March 2 announcement was to contact their friends on city council. It was a strategy they were familiar with, and one that had been successful in the past. But as the end of March approached, and WAC was receiving no cooperation from city council, the leadership of WAC decided to pursue alternative strategies. A community meeting was called for March 29.

The meeting on March 29 was attended by approximately 150 persons including two city aldermen and three planning officials. Some of the most pointed questions asked of city officials concerning the environmental impact of the plan did not come from WAC members, but from the Steven's Square Community Organization (SSCO). Steven's Square is a 20 block area on the north most tip of the Whittier neighborhood, just south of the city's central business district. The city did not consider Steven's Square a part of the Powderhorn district; however because of similarities in economic and social makeup, a portion of the Steven's Square population recognized the

interdependence of the two neighborhoods. The recognition of this interdependence was heightened by the SSCO's participation in drafting the Steven's Square Design Plan.²⁷

The Design Plan was a comprehensive land use plan that the neighborhood was preparing with the assistance of a \$77,000 public grant. Since 1975, Steven's Square residents and hired professionals had been analyzing factors such as land use, zoning, circulation patterns, noise levels, crime areas, building conditions, and business and social service activities. One of the findings of the design plan was that Nicollet was important to Steven's Square as a transportation link, and as a commercial area.

The morning after the March 2 announcement Ken Wik, SSCO chairperson, redirected the efforts of the SSCO design team from the Design Plan, to the city's proposal. SSCO began planning for a public meeting on the issue, but when the WAC meeting was called for March 29, SSCO members attended with the encouragement of Bob Knight. The March 29 meeting ended with no resolution of the basic issues, and a second meeting was set for April 19. City officials stated that a report by the city's traffic engineer on the plans to reroute Nicollet traffic would be completed by that time.

Between the first and second community meetings, structured opposition to the proposal continued to build. A coalition emerged between the WAC, the SSCO and a third community group, the Powderhorn Community Council (PCC). The PCC was the overarching citizen's representative body for the Powderhorn district. Unlike WAC or SSCO, PCC had a formal role in the decision making structure of the city's government. It had a three person full time staff, and its general membership was composed of about 60 representatives from the nine neighborhoods in the Powderhorn district.²⁸

The core of the PCC was comprised of a contingent of activist residents who gained their political know-how through official citizen participation in the Model Cities program. The program had until recently targeted federal housing and development funds for the Powderhorn area. The PCC was generally perceived to be more willing to adopt a combative position in relation to city officials than were members of WAC or SSCO.

PCC's ongoing involvement with city policies was an assurance that the city's plan to close Nicollet would not go unnoticed. When the city council's Committee on Community Development held a special unannounced meeting during the week of March 7 to discuss the K-Mart proposal, Charles Warner, head of the PCC housing committee was present to raise objections. The committee's intent was

to push through the plan without opportunity for public input. On March 23, prior to the first WAC meeting, PCC held a meeting and invited city officials to discuss the K-Mart plan. City officials were given a hostile reception, and the PCC took a formal stand against closing Nicollet Avenue.

The organizational relationship between WAC, SSCO, and PCC was not a formal coalition, but a loose bond among those groups most interested in the issue. The actions between the three groups were not centrally coordinated. Leaders in each group acted on their own impulses and provided coordination for group activities. No single leader emerged to provide centralized guidance to the three groups.²⁹

At the April 19 meeting, the 120 people who attended were presented with a traffic engineer's report which said it was possible to reroute traffic and accommodate the proposed K-Mart plan. City officials present saw the report as the go ahead sign. Since it was apparent that the development district officials were going to move ahead with the K-Mart plan, two strategies for action emerged from the loose coalition between the three community groups. The strategies, which were pursued simultaneously, resulted from individual initiative and general consensus, rather than from formally debated and voted upon policy decisions.

The first strategy chosen by these groups was to attempt to continue constructive negotiations with city officials. It was a strategy consistent with the organizational style of WAC and SSCO in past endeavors with the city. Leaders in both organizations stressed the importance of the trust and mutual respect that they had developed in dealing in the past with city officials. Knight viewed this trust and mutual respect as a sign of WAC's maturity as an organization. John MacNamara, a Steven's Square resident and architect working on the Steven's Square Design Plan, suggested at the time that SSCO had been highly successful in receiving city funding for projects largely because of its traditional non-confrontational style in dealing with the city.³⁰

Not only was the negotiating approach in line with past efforts, it was viewed by WAC and SSCO as apt because two of the five members of the Community Development Committee, who would review the K-Mart plan, represented wards in the Whittier and Lyndale neighborhoods. The lobbying efforts of the WAC and SSCO were successful in postponing action at the Development Committee meeting on May 10, however the committee at a special meeting three days later, approved the plan. Provisions were attached which required K-Mart to give priority to hiring local residents, and to provide significant landscaping. Another provision of the approval was that a traffic

committee be formed between representatives of the developer, WAC, SSCO and PCC, to work out any problems concerning traffic rerouting. Council subsequently approved the K-Mart plan on May 14.

Since the negotiation approach failed to influence Council, efforts were concentrated on their second strategy, which was a legal approach using the courts and public law. If the coalition could collect five hundred signatures on a petition, the group could request the State Environmental Quality Commission to review the K-Mart plan to decide whether the proposal had potential for significant environmental effects. This would mean that the city would need to prepare and file an environmental impact statement before implementing the plan. Two hundred signatures were collected while neighborhood leaders were negotiating with city officials, however efforts to obtain signatures increased after council's approval of the K-Mart plan, and by June 9, nine hundred persons had signed the petition submitted to the Environmental Quality Commission.³¹

The coalition viewed the legal approach against the city as another tool which could be used to influence the city to rethink its decision on closing Nicollet Avenue. It hoped that the prospect of having to prepare and file an environmental impact statement would influence the city to continue to negotiate differences. However in October

of 1976, the Minnesota Environmental Quality Commission voted not to require an impact statement for the K-Mart plan and the city could proceed to close off Nicollet Avenue.

Case Analysis

My focus in this case is on the Whittier Action Council and the Stevens Square Community Organization and their organizational efforts to prevent the closing of Nicollet Ave. Before proceeding with an analysis of this case against the central question and contextual framework, a brief discussion is presented on the organizational attributes of these two groups.

Organizational Attributes

Based upon the activities of the WAC and SSCO, it can be concluded that each organization existed to represent the interests of their neighborhood residents. Although each organization had persons in leadership positions, the case indicates the structure of the SSCO was more fully developed with respect to having a paid professional staff.

In addressing the main issue of the above case, neither organization demonstrated a great capacity to monitor environmental conditions; however based upon the general past activities of both organizations, it can be

concluded that each monitored, to some degree, the interests of their respective constituencies.

Finally, although both organization adopted a reactive posture with respect to the closing of Nicollet Ave, the SSCO demonstrated their use of proactive strategies to address resident interests through the preparation of the Steven's Square Design Plan.

Comparison against Contextual Framework

In this case the goal of the WAC and the SSCO was to prevent the city from closing Nicollet Avenue. With respect to this goal, these organizations were unsuccessful. Presented below is an analysis of this case.

O'Brien's arguments are beneficial in that they can help to explain why the WAC and the SSCO were unsuccessful in their efforts to prohibit the city from closing Nicollet Avenue.

With respect to a Norg's need to monitor and adapt to environmental conditions, the case indicates that neither the WAC nor the SSCO had an adequate knowledge of their current operating environment at the time of the K-Mart proposal. This point is demonstrated in two ways. First, neither organization knew of the proposal prior to the city's announcement, even though the city had been negotiating with K-Mart for several months. This lack of

knowledge constrained the initial strategies of these organizations, forcing them into a reactive mode. Second, the leadership of both organizations erroneously presumed that once they approached city officials about the proposal, the city would be cooperative and responsive to their concerns as they had many times in the past. The leadership of the WAC and the SSCO did not realize that environmental conditions were such that the city had a strong vested interest in approving the K-Mart proposal. From the case it is clear that the basis for this vested interest was the city's need to find an anchor tenant for the development district, for the district was a financial burden for all of the city's residents.

Of the two organizations, the SSCO had greater resources and, it can be argued, greater legitimacy. The WAC lacked a budget sufficient to employ a paid professional staff, and had no office space. The degree of legitimacy the city conferred upon the WAC is difficult to ascertain from the case study material, however the case does provide evidence to indicate that the city recognized the existence of the WAC, as WAC leaders periodically discussed neighborhood issues and obtained information from city officials.

In contrast to the WAC, the SSCO at the time of the K-Mart proposal had considerable financial resources. These resources were obtained from a formal linkage with

the city, and were being used to hire a paid professional staff to prepare the Design Plan. The case indicates that the SSCO had been highly successful in the past in obtaining city funding for organizational projects. This demonstrates that the city viewed the SSCO as a legitimate organization within the Stevens Square neighborhood.

The linkages between the SSCO and the city were more formalized and identifiable than the informal relationship between the WAC leadership and city officials. However, both the formal and informal linkages between these two organizations and the city, affected the nature of the strategies chosen by the WAC and the SSCO. As my concern in this paper is with formal organizational linkages as described in Chapter I, at this point I shall focus my discussion on the SSCO, its linkage with the city, and the effect of this linkage on the organization's goal achievement.

O'Brien argues that while providing resources and legitimacy, linkages with a local government can result in constraints on organizational autonomy. Such a scenario occurred in the above case. The strategies of negotiation and legal action adopted by the SSCO to address the city's proposal were chosen largely because SSCO had a history of nonconfrontation with the city. This non-confrontational style was a major contributing factor to SSCO's success in obtaining city funding for organizational activities, such

as the Design Plan. In addressing the city's proposal to close Nicollet Avenue, the SSCO was hesitant to adopt a confrontational style, presumably for fear of losing future city funding.

With respect to O'Brien's conclusion that an organization must weigh the short term versus long term consequences of a particular structure, a conclusion which can be drawn from this case is that the SSCO made such an evaluation. Whether a confrontational approach would have successfully influenced the city to keep Nicollet Avenue open, or whether such an approach on the part of SSCO would have influenced the city's future funding decisions for the organization is not known. However, in choosing not to adopt a confrontational style, the SSCO evaluated its short term versus long term goals and chose the latter.

Based upon the information presented in this case, Boyte would likely argue that the linkage between the city and the SSCO was a contributing factor in SSCO's unsuccessful efforts to keep Nicollet Avenue open. This linkage denied the SSCO complete autonomy of action, and thus, the organization was constrained from using strategies needed to achieve goals and objectives.

However, a consideration that must be made before asserting that the information in this case supports Boyte's argument for complete autonomy is that the SSCO

had both long term and short term goals. In addressing the K-Mart proposal, the organization chose between the two. Whereas the linkage with the city constrained the strategy options available to the Norg as it addressed a short term goal, this strategy constraint permitted the SSCO to preserve its long term successful relationship with the city so that it could continue to have the resources to address other needs and interests of neighborhood residents.

Perlman's argument that the relationship of linkages to success is as yet unknown is supported by the above case, which indicates the potential complexity of relationships. A funding linkage, such as that which existed between the SSCO and the city, had both positive and negative effects on the Norg's overall goal achievement.

I proceed now with a description and analysis of the third case study.

Case Three: The Pico-Union Neighborhood Council³²

The Pico-Union neighborhood is located in central Los Angeles on the southwest side of the central business district. It is a low income residential area, with more than half the residents below the poverty level, and a median education level well below that of Los Angeles County.³³

By the mid-1960s, some of the neighborhood's more concerned citizens realized that the viability of Pico-Union was declining. Absentee ownership in the area was increasing, and the neighborhood's older housing stock was deteriorating rapidly. The business core of Los Angeles was expanding, with commercial enterprises encroaching upon the eastern edge of the neighborhood. The city was considering locating a new convention center on a site adjacent to the neighborhood; and the construction of such a facility would increase economic pressure on the community and make it a politically desirable area for urban renewal.

Anticipating the neighborhood would soon be selected for some type of neighborhood redevelopment program, a small group of residents began a neighborhood organizing effort in 1965. They were provided assistance by the local Methodist church. A series of community forums on law enforcement and housing problems were held in the neighborhood, and from these forums the Pico-Union Neighborhood Council was formed in 1966.³⁴

Councilman Bradley, who represented the Pico-Union area, offered his assistance and cooperation to the newly formed neighborhood organization, and church assistance to the group broadened in scope as the local Lutheran church offered assistance. PUNC held an initial series of neighborhood meetings to develop organizational goals and

objectives. The result of these meetings was the consensus that improving the areas housing stock would be the primary focus of the organization's work.³⁵

Over the next several years PUNC expanded its regular membership to about thirty members who attended weekly meetings. This core group could mobilize as many as three hundred residents for particular issues and programs. The organization had successfully achieved many of its objectives during these first few years: street lighting was improved and streets were cleaned more frequently; teen centers and child care facilities were established; and regular communication was established with the community relations division of the police department. However during this time, little progress was made in improving the area's housing stock.³⁶

Early in 1968, Councilman Bradley contacted the organization to say that the Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) was interested in including Pico-Union in a new approach to urban renewal called the Neighborhood Redevelopment Program (NDP). Unlike earlier redevelopment programs, NDP placed heavy emphasis on citizen involvement, rehabilitation of existing structures, and planning and development on a year to year basis.

Coincident with the city's proposal, a major private redevelopment firm also expressed interest in the neighborhood. Their proposal was to construct a housing

project which would cover a four square block area, and they requested the neighborhood organization's assistance in acquiring the necessary land.

PUNC was in the position of having to consider two proposals, both of which were highly technical. Seeing the need for expert technical advice, the organization contacted the University of California at Los Angeles as a possible source of assistance.³⁷ A PUNC member who was a student at UCLA knew several university administrators, and a meeting between the neighborhood organization and UCLA was arranged for mid-July. At this meeting Pico-Union residents presented summaries of the two proposals. Most of the UCLA representatives present were interested in establishing a formal working relationship with the neighborhood organization. As such an arrangement would take time, and PUNC needed advice within a few weeks, one member of UCLA agreed to approach a local foundation for enough money to hire a consultant to study the proposals.

The Norman Foundation awarded PUNC a five thousand dollar grant, and consultants were hired to analyze the proposal of the private development firm.³⁸ When the study was completed, the consultants concluded that the privately proposed project would not contribute to the achievement of the neighborhood organizations goals. The project would result in large scale dislocation of

residents, and rental housing too expensive for most of those currently living in Pico-Union.

By the end of 1968, PUNC's membership had decided that the new Neighborhood Development Program, with its emphasis on citizen involvement, rehabilitation, and incremental planning, provided a real possibility for maintaining Pico-Union as a residential neighborhood. The organization realized there were risks involved in inviting an urban renewal agency into the neighborhood; however members felt the risk was worth taking since the university was offering significant technical advice, and the possibility existed for additional funding from the Norman Foundation.³⁹ Thus in December of 1968, Pico-Union was officially approved by the City of Los Angeles as a NDP area.

As soon as PUNC agreed to participate in the NDP, staff members from UCLA, with the assistance of neighborhood organization members, planned a series of training sessions for PUNC members. These sessions focused on planning concepts, governmental decisionmaking processes, and federal housing programs. At this time, a proposal was also submitted to the Norman Foundation for major funding which would be matched by UCLA staff time. The money would be used to provide office space, and hire a full time community organizer and a four person planning staff. The foundation grant was obtained, and the

neighborhood organization began the process of reorganizing in preparation for full participation in the Pico-Union Neighborhood Development Program.

In January of 1969, three task forces were organized: housing and planning, education, and recreation. Each task force had technical assistance from UCLA faculty and graduate students. Art Love, a locally prominent architect, was also recruited by the Methodist church to provide technical assistance to the housing and planning task force. Since PUNC would be handling large sums of development and foundation money, and would be employing a professional staff, it became necessary to incorporate as a non-profit organization. Articles of incorporation were prepared by UCLA and signed by officers of the neighborhood organization in February.

On May 8, as provided in the articles of incorporation, a community wide meeting was held to discuss the proposed by-laws of PUNC, and to nominate candidates to a board of directors whose first official action would be to hire the professional staff. The hired staff included John Mutlow, a Pico-Union resident and planner.

From the first meeting of the planning and housing task force, the relationship between Pico-Union residents, and the experts offering technical assistance needed to be defined.⁴⁰ The residents had little or no experience ,

working with planners and architects, and likewise the professionals had little or no experience dealing with members of a grassroots organization. PUNC members who attended these first task force meetings were uneasy with the technical jargon used by the planners and architects.

Each group realized the need to define boundaries of competence, and realized that they each had a particular type of expertise important to a successful planning process.⁴¹ While the planners and architects had technical knowledge, the residents of Pico-Union had knowledge of neighborhood needs. Art Love and John Mutlow were effective in synthesizing the two knowledge bases. During the task force meetings, each was willing to listen to all of the comments of the neighborhood residents, and sift out important information about the neighborhood and its preferences. They offered their opinions about the feasibility of neighborhood ideas, and at times proposed alternative proposals. Their efforts helped establish a firm working relationship between the residents and experts participating in the planning process.⁴²

In the late spring of 1969, the staff of the CRA began to participate in the task force meetings. Their involvement changed the nature of the successful working relationship which had been established between the neighborhood residents and the technical experts.⁴³ The CRA staff attempted to control the agenda of the task

force meetings, and attempted to impose their own planning views on everyone present. Rather than attempting to work with all who attended the meetings, the CRA staff ignored the presence of neighborhood residents, and focused on engaging the PUNC staff in technical debates. Mutlow, Love, and UCLA faculty members attempted to redirect the discussions to include residents, however most residents felt intimidated by CRA's aggressiveness, and remained silent.

After several meetings of this nature, PUNC members decided that the CRA staff had to be excluded from the task force meetings until a PUNC plan had been developed. CRA's presence had caused resident attendance to decline sharply. The CRA opposed PUNC's decision, however PUNC remained firm in its position.⁴⁴

With CRA excluded from the planning process, the PUNC staff sought to broaden resident participation once again by holding a series of planning workshops, during the spring of 1969. Their efforts in broadening resident participation were successful, and at the conclusion of the series of workshops, a neighborhood plan had been developed and approved by the residents.

Having been excluded from the neighborhood planning process, the CRA staff devoted its time to organizing an Advisory Council required by NDP regulations. CRA believed the Advisory Council could be used to their

advantage as the council's role was to officially recommend a redevelopment plan to city council for approval.⁴⁵ A typical advisory council in Los Angeles was comprised of twenty to thirty persons, the majority of whom were supportive of CRA staff and routinely rubber-stamped CRA staff proposals.

However at the first meeting of the Advisory Council, approximately fifty PUNC members were in attendance. PUNC staff had learned of CRA's intention to influence the council to approve a plan which they had independently developed without neighborhood participation. The meeting was a competition between CRA and PUNC for control of the council.⁴⁶ At the end of the struggle, PUNC had gained control of the council, and was able to influence through majority vote, council decisions.

PUNC now had firm control of the planning process. They had developed a community plan with broad based participation, and they had voting control of the advisory council charged with recommending a plan to city council. CRA staff was angry over their non-control of, or involvement in the planning process. Yet because they desired to maintain an image of control, they were reluctant to approach PUNC about negotiating a compromise plan.

In an effort to maintain an image of control, CRA staff secretly copied the PUNC developed plan and

presented a slightly modified version to the Advisory Council as their own proposal.⁴⁷ As the PUNC plan presented to the council was essentially the same, confusion ensued among Advisory Council and PUNC members who were unaware of CRA's tactics. CRA had arranged for representatives of Pico-Union's business community to attend the Advisory Council's meeting to support the plan presented by CRA. Amid the confusion, the Advisory Council approved the proposal submitted by CRA, and recommended its adoption to city council. CRA was credited with developing the plan, and it was approved by the City of Los Angeles in January of 1970.

With the plan approved, PUNC's efforts were directed towards the development of low income housing. To accomplish this end, PUNC established a community development corporation to construct and manage the housing. Through this corporation PUNC has developed to date 260 dwelling units, and is now the property owner and landlord for over 500 persons in the Pico-Union neighborhood.⁴⁸

Case Analysis

My focus in this case is on the Pico-Union Neighborhood Council; its organizational linkages with the the City of Los Angeles and UCLA, and its efforts to preserve the residential nature of the Pico-Union

neighborhood. A brief description of PUNC's organizational attributes follows below.

Organizational Attributes

It is clear from the case that PUNC is a neighborhood based organization, formed by the efforts of neighborhood residents. Its purpose at the time of its formation was to address various neighborhood interests, such as housing, police relations, and the need for day care facilities. The residents of Pico-Union were the organizations constituency. With respect to PUNC's organizational structure the case demonstrates that the organization was initially a grassroots advocacy group with largely, if not totally, a non-professional voluntary staff. The organization was however, eventually transformed into a highly structured development corporation.

The organization's understanding that the expansion of the central business district was creating economic pressures on the neighborhood, demonstrates that PUNC monitored environmental conditions. The case indicates that PUNC used both proactive and reactive strategies to address neighborhood interests. Their mobilization of up to three hundred persons to address certain issues indicates the adoption of reactive strategies, while their

participation in the NDP evidences the organizations willingness to adopt proactive postures as well.

Comparison Against Contextual Framework

The goal of PUNC in the above case study was to address the neighborhood's housing needs, and preserve Pico-Union as a residential area. The case indicates that the organization was successfully accomplishing this goal.

PUNC was aware of the environmental conditions placing economic pressures of the neighborhood. It understood that the central business district was expanding, and with this expansion would come commercial pressures which would eventually displace neighborhood residents. O'Brien argues that a Norg must monitor and adapt to such an environmental condition if it is to be successful. The linkages which PUNC entered into with UCLA and the City of Los Angeles were an adaptation to these environmental forces.

PUNC found itself faced with two proposals, each originating from outside the neighborhood, and each highly technical. The proposal themselves were a response to the environmental conditions affecting the neighborhood. Lacking the financial and technical capacity to analyze either, the linkage with UCLA provided PUNC the resources to analyze these alternatives. The effects of this

linkage with UCLA were beneficial to PUNC's eventual success.

Per O'Brien, this linkage provided PUNC with some of the resources required to successfully adapt to their operating environment. O'Brien states that such a linkage can place constraints upon a Norg's autonomy by denying the Norg use of strategies required to achieve organizational goals. The linkage established between PUNC and UCLA was in one sense a "sponsoring" arrangement, for UCLA was providing PUNC needed resources. However, in contrast to O'Brien, the case does not indicate that this linkage in any way constrained PUNC in the use of strategies required to achieve organizational goals.

The linkage between PUNC and the City of Los Angeles which was eventually established, was also the result of environmental conditions present at that time. These conditions are easily identifiable. First, as mentioned above, nonresidential redevelopment pressures were threatening the stability of the Pico-Union neighborhood. Second, during its first several years of operation, PUNC had been unsuccessful in achieving its primary goal of preserving and improving the neighborhood's housing stock. Forces external to the neighborhood such as increased absentee ownership, were affecting the condition of the neighborhood's housing. PUNC lacked the resources to

address these forces. Third, PUNC realized that the neighborhood, due to its transitional nature, would eventually be selected for some type of urban renewal program. When the organization found itself faced with two proposals, it chose to participate in the NDP. Available technical analysis had demonstrated it was the better of the two proposals, and it offered PUNC the resources and technical assistance needed to achieve their primary goal.

The effects of this linkage with the city are evident. The linkage with the city, through participation in the NDP, provided PUNC the resources required to address the neighborhoods housing needs. This was a positive effect on the organization's goal achievement.

Another effect of the linkage with the city was the resultant reorganization of PUNC. This reorganization not only involved a change in PUNC's organizational structure, but eventually led to an apparent change in PUNC's organizational purpose as well. The structural changes resulting from the linkage with the city were necessary if the Norg was to use the city's resources to achieve its organizational goals. In this sense then, the transformation of PUNC from a grassroots organization to a development corporation was a price PUNC was willing to pay to achieve organizational goals.

O'Brien argues that Norgs must consider the short range versus long range consequences of a particular organizational structure when choosing a structure to adapt to current environmental conditions. The long range consequences of PUNC's participation in NDP was the transformation of its organizational purpose from addressing neighborhood interests at the grassroots level, to the development and management of housing for neighborhood residents.

This redirection of PUNC's organizational purpose provides an interesting basis against which to evaluate this case against Boyte's arguments as presented in the previous chapter. At one level of analysis this case provides information which is contradictory to Boyte's argument that neighborhood organizations must retain political and financial independence from sponsoring organizations such as a local government, if they are to be successful. As an autonomous organization, PUNC lacked the resources necessary to accomplish its organizational goal. The linkage with the city provided these needed resources, to the apparent benefit of neighborhood residents who were eventually afforded new housing opportunities.

Boyte would likely argue though, that the transformation of PUNC from a grassroots advocacy organization to a corporate organization devoted to

service provision was not in the long term best interests of the Pico-Union neighborhood. To Boyte, organizational success is dependent upon political power; and political power requires that neighborhood organizations such as PUNC remain politically independent. The ties which PUNC developed with the city through participation in the NDP, provided PUNC with the resources required to address its current housing goal. However, the linkage resulted in a reduction in the Norg's independence and the transformation of its organizational purpose. PUNC could no longer act as an advocate for the interests of Pico-Union residents for it no longer had as its primary purpose, addressing the various current needs and interests of its constituency.

Perlman's argument as previously presented states that the relationship of linkages to success is as yet unknown. The first two cases presented in this paper lent support to her argument, for they demonstrated the complexity of important factors involved when trying to identify this relationship. In the first case presented, the need for organizational resources, or lack thereof, was an important factor in the resultant effects of the linkage between the Norg and the city. The linkage had no effects on the eventual success of the neighborhood organization, only because the Norg did not need the resources the linkage provided. In the second case study,

the effects of the linkage between the Norg and the City could be evaluated against both the short term and long term goals of the organization. The linkage had negative effects on the achievement of the Norg's short term goal, and positive effects for the organizations long term goal achievement.

In the case study just presented, the potential complexity of identifying the relationship of linkages to success is further demonstrated. In the case of the PUNC, the key factor in identifying this relationship is the definition of success itself. If organizational success is defined in terms of goal achievement (as it was in Chapter I), then the linkage established between PUNC and the city was beneficial to the organization's success. However, if success is defined in terms of a Norg's continual capacity for autonomous organizing and political independence (as per Boyte), the linkage between PUNC and the city had negative effects on the neighborhood organization's long term success.

Chapter Notes

1. The material for this case study was found in Jeffrey R. Henig, Neighborhood Mobilization (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1982) pp. 31, 80-91.

2. Ibid., p. 80.

3. Ibid., p. 31.

4. Ibid., p. 81.

5. Ibid., p. 82.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 83.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 84.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 85.

13. Ibid., p. 86.

14. Ibid., p. 88.

15. Ibid., p. 89.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 90.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 91.

20. The material for this case study was found in Jeffrey R. Henig, Neighborhood Mobilization pp. 33-35, 117-124.

21. Ibid., p. 117.

22. Ibid., pp. 33-34.

23. Ibid., p. 118.

24. Ibid., p. 35.

25. Ibid., p. 118.

26. Ibid., p. 119.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 121.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 123.

31. Ibid., p. 124.

32. The material for this case study was found in Terry L. Cooper, "Bureaucracy and Community Organization," Administration and Society 11 (February 1980): 411-443.

33. Ibid., p. 414.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., p. 415.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 416.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., p. 419.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 420.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p. 421.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., p. 422.

48. Ibid., p. 424.

IV. Conclusions

This concluding chapter consists of four parts. The first part is a summary discussion of the effects of organizational linkages on the success of neighborhood organizations, as identified in the three case studies presented. The second part is a discussion of general trends which emerged from the analysis of the cases. The third part of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of information useful to practicing local government planners and neighborhood organizations. The chapter concludes with suggestions for further research in the area of organizational linkages between neighborhood organizations and local governments.

The Effects of Linkages on Organizational Success

The three case studies presented in this paper give evidence of the numerous and varied effects on organizational success which can result when a neighborhood organization establishes linkages with a local government. A summary of these effects will be useful in clarifying the findings of this study.

The NRC case demonstrated that a linkage between a Norg and a local government can result in a reduction in a neighborhood organization's autonomy with respect to choosing strategies required to achieve organizational

goals. The linkage established in this case study also resulted in the local government having increased control over environmental conditions, with respect to control over information, and the speed of the planning process.

The case also indicated that such a linkage can be entered into for reasons other than obtaining needed resources. The reason for, and circumstances under which a linkage is established, can ultimately be an influencing factor in the linkage's effect on the success of a Norg. The linkage between the NRC and the city did not effect the resultant success of the NRC, for the neighborhood organization was not dependent upon the linkage for needed resources. The Norg was thus able to dissolve the linkage at a time when the linkage imposed constraints on organizational autonomy threatened goal achievement.

The second case study, which focused primarily on the formal linkage between the SSCO and the City of Minneapolis, demonstrated that a given linkage between a Norg and a local government can have both positive and negative effects on the success of a Norg when distinction is drawn between a Norg's short term and long term goals. With respect to long term organizational goals, the series of formal funding linkages between the SSCO and the city provided the Norg the resources required to address resident interests and needs. However in the short term, the funding linkage between the Norg and the city put

constraints on the neighborhood organization's autonomy of action (the organization was unwilling to adopt a confrontational approach), with respect to choosing strategies to address an immediate issue facing the neighborhood. Whether a confrontational approach would have resulted in the Norg successfully achieving its short term goal is not known, however, to the degree that the linkage reduced the organization's strategy options, it had negative effects on the Norg's potential success.

The third case study, which focuses on the Pico-Union Neighborhood Council, demonstrates that a linkage between a local government and a Norg can provide a Norg the financial and technical resources, and the organizational legitimacy required to achieve neighborhood adopted goals. Such a linkage does not need to directly impede the autonomy of the Norg with respect to placing constraints on actions required to achieve those goals. However as demonstrated in this case, such a linkage can ultimately result in a transformation of a Norg's organizational structure and purpose, to the extent that a grassroots advocacy organization is transformed into a development corporation responsible for the construction and management of housing.

General Trends Emerging from the Case Analyses

The effects summarized above of linkages on success (as identified from the case studies), provide a basis from which other general trends emerging from the case studies are discussed. These are offered below.

Each of the case studies provides information to indicate that it is important for a neighborhood organization to effectively monitor environmental conditions if it is to adapt to its operating environment, and increase its potential for goal achievement. The NRC's knowledge of its operating environment influenced its initial strategy selection, and thereafter influenced the nature and scope of its successful mass mobilization effort. In addition, NRC's prior knowledge of the city's proposal enabled them to react quickly once the proposal was publically announced.

In contrast, SSCO's and WAC's lack of knowledge about the K-Mart proposal, forced these organizations into an unsuccessful reactive mode against the city. The three month lead time during which the city worked with K-Mart without the knowledge or input of neighborhood residents, gave the city an advantage over the neighborhood in that when the proposal was finally made public it had already reached a stage of finality.

At another level of analysis, the neighborhood

organizations in this case study should have been continually cognizant of the current status of the development district, especially in respect to the financial burden the district was imposing on the City of Minneapolis. Knowledge of the city's financial situation with respect to the district, could have led the Norgs to be more proactive with respect to working with the city on finding a suitable tenant to anchor the district, and a proposal that would not involve the closing of a major thoroughfare.

Finally the experience of PUNC in the third case further demonstrates the benefits of monitoring environmental conditions. This was demonstrated by the organization's understanding of the economic pressures affecting the neighborhood. This understanding was the first step in the organization's goal identification and strategy development, which together led to the eventual fulfillment of a neighborhood need.

A second general trend which emerged from the case studies dealt with the linkages themselves. Two points can be made in this respect. First, linkages can affect goal achievement (both positively and negatively), and can ultimately influence, to the point of transformation, the organizational purpose of a Norg. Second, linkages between a Norg and a local government can result in unanticipated effects on the Norgs success. These

unplanned for effects can counteract any positive aspects of the linkage.

A third general trend which emerged from the case study analyses is the importance for Norgs to adopt a strategic posture with respect to evaluating the long term versus short term consequences of chosen strategies aimed at goal achievement. In the NRC case, the organization saw its proactive strategy of proposing feasible alternatives as a way of improving its chances of defeating the shopping center proposal. The net effects of this "strategic decision" were the temporary loss of organizational autonomy and a reduction in control over environmental conditions. Both resulted from the linkage with the city, and both inhibited the Norg from achieving its organizational goal.

In the SSCO case, it can be concluded that the Norg undertook a strategic evaluation of its short term versus long term goals, and on the basis of that evaluation strategically opted for the preservation of its long standing non-confrontational method of dealing with the city. Finally, the third case study gives no indication that PUNC strategically evaluated the long term consequences of entering into the linkage with the city. The consequences of this linkage were the achievement of the organization's primary goal, and the eventual redirection of the organization's purpose. The case

provides no indication that the organization evaluated the potential consequences of the linkage, or that the organizational redirection of PUNC was considered a negative effect on the organization. It can be argued however, that it would have been appropriate for the Norg to evaluate its potential for goal achievement against the potential for organizational redirection.

Useful Information for Planners and Neighborhood Organizations

The general information presented thus far could be of benefit to local government planners who have responsibilities for working with neighborhood organizations, and who wish to assist Norgs in their goal achievement. For the purposes of clarity, this section provides a review of what I believe to be the most important points:

Planners have the potential to provide valuable assistance to neighborhood organizations, particularly with respect to the provision of information. The dissemination of relevant information to a Norg can assist an organization in monitoring and adapting to its operating environment.

The cases indicated that Norgs can obtain needed resources from sources other than local governments. The pooling of resources among neighborhood groups and the

establishment of linkages with other community based organizations, can provide a neighborhood organization the resources required to achieve organizational goals. Planners can assist Norgs in their resource needs by identifying the various available sources of needed resources.

Linkages with local governments, although established without the intent of cooptation on the part of the local government, can result in unanticipated effects which can negatively impact on the success of the Norg. Thus, planners need to develop strategic plans and or programs which involve the establishment of a linkage between a Norg and a local government. Of particular importance is an understanding that a linkage, designed to assist a Norg in the achievement of a short term goal, has the potential to negatively impact the long term success of the organization and vice versa.

Neighborhood organizations can also benefit from this same information. First, Norgs can increase their potential for success if they have and use their ability to monitor their operating environment. This implies that Norgs can benefit if their organizations are structured such that persons in leadership positions are cognizant of environmental conditions.

Second, Norgs can benefit from the realization that there may be short term and long term consequences of a

particular strategy or structure chosen. In choosing a particular strategy or structure, Norgs need to adopt a strategic posture so to maximize the possibility of overall goal achievement. Thus in addressing a particular issue, Norgs should carefully evaluate their available strategy options at all key decision points, and choose a strategy which has the highest potential for addressing short term needs, and long term goals.

Suggestions for Further Research

The existing literature on neighborhoods and neighborhood related issues would benefit from additional case studies which report on the relationship of linkages to success. The criteria established to select the cases used in this study, did not constrain the selection of suitable material. However, the general review of the existing and available literature indicated that few case studies have been prepared in this area.

As a second area for further research, the literature focusing on neighborhood organizations would benefit from additional inquiries in the general area of organizational theory; specifically the relationship between organizational goal setting, and organizational survival. The need in this area is one for a clear understanding of the importance of organizational survival goals, vis-a-vis, other neighborhood organization goals.

Finally, local government planners would benefit from additional research which provided information on the techniques and strategies used by other planners to provide assistance to neighborhood organizations.

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