STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE: THE ROLE OF BOUNDARY SPANNING, NETWORKING, AND COLLATERAL ORGANIZATIONS IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

This work investigates the organizational differences among organizations which have experienced and responded to acts of international terrorism and those which have not. The author investigates several organizational characteristics, using both qualitative and quantitative data collection methodologies. The relationship between organizational experience with international terrorism and the external focus of the subject organizations is examined. Specifically, the author compares experienced and non-experienced organizations on the following variables: perceived importance of external organizations; perceived sources of organizational information; perceived sources of organizational innovation; perceived sources of external communication; and existence of formal external coordination mechanisms. Comparisons are drawn across managerial and technical levels of the experienced and non-experienced organizations.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to whose patience is the paper on which it is written, and to and whose sacrifices are the ink with which it is written.

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CHAPTER I

THE THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM TO U.S. INTERESTS

Introduction

The problem of international terrorism has been treated by the professional and academic literature for, quite literally, several decades. During that time, the phenomenon has been treated as a political problem, a psychological problem, a sociological problem, an ideological problem, a communications problem, and a non-problem. Virtually no literature exists, however, which treats the phenomenon as an organizational problem. The literature which does address the organizational aspects of international terrorism does so perfunctorily, with little application of current, or past, concepts of organizational theory. It is the purpose of this research to address the problem of international terrorism specifically as an interorganizational problem, with the understanding that no matter the cause of international terrorism, the problem of response will fall to the organizations developed by governmental institutions for the purpose of responding to

emergencies. In the United States, this translates to "police agencies," which have the primary, and in some instances, the only, responsibility for responding to violent acts which the government and the media have classified as international terrorism. To accomplish this purpose, it is necessary to synthesize a great deal of previous research. Specifically, the literature review which supports this research is a melding of the literature on organizational theory, terrorism, organizational design, strategic management, and emergency management.

Threats of Terrorism to U.S. Security Interests

The academic and non-classified governmental literature develops at least five inherent threats of international terrorism to the security interests of the United States. Alexander and Gleason have developed a comprehensive listing of these threats. They characterize these threats as significant and suggest that the real threat to democratic societies from terrorism endangers:

1.) The quality of life and orderly civilized existence of the targeted society;

2.) The safety, welfare, and individual rights of the populace of the targeted society;

3.) The political, social, and economic stability of the state system of the targeted society;

4.) The health and pace of economic development of the targeted society; and

5.) The very survival of democracy itself.[1]

Other authors have identify the same threats, and have added to or clarified the potential for terrorism to make a significant impact upon democratic societies.[2] Many of these identify the same dangers of terrorism mentioned above. The list developed by Alexander and Gleason, however, serves as a clear guide to the discussion of the dangers of terrorism to a democratic society. This list will be used to focus a selective review of some of the works which identify specific threats of international terrorism.

The Quality of Life and Civilized Existence

Several authors identify the potential for terrorist acts to disrupt the quality of life of a targeted society. For example, Brian Jenkins, of the Rand Corporation, notes the potential for terrorism to develop significant economic drains through attempts to protect the society from potential terrorist operations. In testimony before the U.S. Senate in 1978, he noted that the cost of protective precautions to private industry alone in the United States was estimated at "between two to three billion dollars" annually, and was expected to grow at approximately a twelve

per cent rate for the next few years.[3] In addition, Jenkins has noted the danger of a "trickle-down" budgetary effect of expenditures by the government and private individuals which will possibly create a "continuing growth of an 'internal defense' budget disbursed among the budgets of other government agencies... that are passed on to the consumer" and to the taxpayer, and creates a "major shift" in the defense patterns of American society.[4] Others, among them Ray Cline, a senior associate with Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a former Deputy Director for Intelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) note that losses to terrorism worldwide have exceeded 701 million dollars since 1970, and during the first three months of 1981 alone, had exceeded sixty million dollars.[5] Approximately ten per cent of all losses to terrorists occur within the U.S.[6] For example, in 1982, losses to terrorism were projected by the FBI to be in excess of thirty million dollars.[7]

The indirect losses from terrorist activity appear to be the more significant than direct losses, but also appear to be the more difficult to calculate. For example, the amount of resources lost to contingency planning for terrorist events throughout the United States is thought to be quite significant, yet the consensus seems to be that the

planning that has been done is not sufficient.[8] In the final analysis, however, financial losses to terrorism through both direct and indirect means can be judged to be significant.[9] In addition to the financial losses, acts of terrorism obviously affect the "orderly civilized existence" of the targeted society.[10] It is argued that no segment of American society can consider itself free from the potential effects of a terrorist operation. Alexander and Gleason suggest that "government officials, politicians, judges, diplomats, business executives, labor leaders, university professors, college students, school children, travelers, athletes" and virtually every other member of a targeted society can logically consider themselves potential terrorist targets.[11]

The psychological threat of terrorism is identified by those such as Abraham Kaplan who identifies the extreme psychological pressures placed on victims of terrorist activity, and implies that similar pressures exist among potential victims or those who perceive themselves as potential victims.[12] The mass effects of terrorism on targeted populations is seen as "significant" by Alexander and Kilmarx,[13] and as having "serious ramifications" by Ochberg.[14] Others suggest that terrorism is effective in reducing feelings of cohesiveness and dependability of

existing systems and increasing feelings of uncertainty, fear, and vulnerability of the members of targeted groups.[15] Ample literature appears to exist to support the contention that terrorism poses a significant threat to the quality of life and the orderly civilized existence of the civilian population of the targeted society.

Safety, Welfare, and Individual Rights

Terrorism is also postulated to pose a significant threat to the individual rights of the targeted society.[16] For example, Ledeen notes the extreme measures taken by Italian authorities in their attempts to deal with the Red Brigade terrorist, and suggests that although many Italians agreed with the infringements on civil liberties imposed by the government, such infringements are actually part of the plan of such terrorist groups. The hope is that these reductions of civil liberties will reduce governmental legitimacy and win political and social support for the terrorists.[17] Others have noted that the overly repressive response can create more difficulties for the targeted society than the original acts of terrorism.[18]

In spite of such warnings, however, some suggest that increased, strict government response is necessary. For example, some of the more prevalent suggestions for

counter-terrorist response include: creation of special internal security forces with nation-wide jurisdiction and greatly expanded powers of arrest, investigation, and pursuit; significantly reducing the due process rights of those accused of terrorist operations; a strict reintroduction of the death penalty, where none exists; and uniform use of such penalties for those convicted of terrorist activity.[19] Wilkinson argues that capital punishment for terrorist activity is a necessity and that it may be necessary to re-think many of our concerns about protection of civil liberties when responding to such events.[20] Wolf suggests that it may be necessary to implement a "discretionary" death penalty.[21]

The literature seems to support the contention that a reduction of civil liberties may be made necessary by a protracted terrorist siege against a given government. This contention is supported both through an analysis of actual state responses to terrorism, such as that fielded by Italy and Britain, and through an analysis of the measures suggested as necessary in order to respond to terrorist activity.

Political, Social, and Economic Stability

The current consensus in the literature is that terrorism also poses a significant threat to the stability

of targeted state systems. For example, Alexander and Gleason note that:

> [t]errorism poses dangers not only to individuals but also to the stability of the state system. A characteristic of the state which distinguishes it from other social organizations is the monopoly of power. To the extent that subnational actors remain free to engage in terrorism, the power of the state diminishes. Currently, some states are no longer able to protect their civilians at home and abroad, or to ensure the safety of visiting foreigners.[22]

Other authors have noted a similar threat of terrorism to the stability of the state. For example, Van Dalen has noted that the inability of the state to offer a defense against terrorism can create an inherent hostility between the state and its citizens. Such a hostility can openly question the legitimacy of the state, and can seriously impair the ability of the state to lay claim to powers of taxation, the rule of law, and other necessities of state control.[23] Others identify similar problems with governmental response and reduced political, social, and economic stability. These problems include a backlash of support for terrorists because of an overly repressive response, a weakening of the legitimacy of the government, and an enhanced potential for political or violent overthrow.[24] Terrorism, it appears, is an "indirect strategy that wins or loses only in terms of how [one]

responds to it."[25]

The danger to the stability of the state is not that of direct loss; neither is it the threat that terrorism will force the central government to abdicate out of fear. It is that the government will respond in a manner which is not balanced, legally, socially, and politically, and which creates more difficulty for the responding government than the original act of terrorism itself.

Health and Pace of Economic Development

It is also postulated by many who investigate terrorist activity that the phenomenon poses a threat to the health and pace of economic development in the targeted society. Alexander and Gleason note:

> [t]errorism also poses a threat to the smooth functioning of the economic system. Terrorist groups-- those ideologically committed to the destruction of the capitalist system and those in need of funding, or both-- have selected as primary targets the personnel, facilities and operations of the business community at home and abroad...[a]pproximately 45 per cent of [all] terrorist incidents [between 1970 and 1980] were business related."[26]

A literature review also supports this contention. It appears that business, either because it is a source of funding-- businesses appear more willing to pay ransoms to halt terrorist activities than are governments-- or because

American business represents the epitome of the capitalist ideology, is a prime target for terrorist operations.

The literature concerning business and terrorism is quite comprehensive. It suggests that business is in the position of constantly "fending off" attacks from terrorists, and argues that the business target is as much a philosophical target as it is an economic target.[27] Cathey develops an argument that business was terrorism's "prime target" during the decade from 1968-1978. The consensus developed among many heads of private security consultant firms is that business is not only a "favorite target," but that American business is an "increasingly attractive target" for international terrorism.[28] These arguments are supported by statistics which indicate that over thirty-six per cent of the terrorist acts on U.S. citizens or property during the period 1970-1980 were committed against business targets.[29]

Threats to Democracy

Finally, terrorism appears to develop a specific threat to democracy itself. Again, Alexander and Gleason argue that:

> Democracy, too, is seriously threatened by terrorists. Unlike dictatorships that are both physically and emotionally conditioned to deal with opposition forces, democratic societies generally make it possible for terrorist groups to organize,

> although not necessarily to achieve popular political support. When the challenge of terrorism is met with repression, democracy weakens considerably.[30]

The effects of repressive response to terrorist activity have been discussed previously. Such a response mode is believed to be counter-productive, producing a weakening of civil liberties, a loss of legitimacy to the central government, and, when new systems are developed specifically for the purpose of responding to terrorism, establishing a significant financial drain, causing the government to incur opportunity costs which it may not be able to afford.

Economic and Social Costs of Responding to Terrorism

The necessity for changes in the international terrorism response system, however, must be addressed in the light of the economics of the response alternatives. A review of the literature identifies several alternative responses to international terrorism. The major suggested responses are:

--Target hardening, the process of identifying potential terrorist targets and taking steps to improve the physical security provided to those targets;[31]

--Development of a repressive response, the process of suspending certain civil liberties for those accused

of terrorist acts and of imposition of strict penalties and, in some cases, extra-legal response and suppression tactics;[32]

--Treatment of terrorism as a political rather than as a legal problem;[33]

--Simply ignoring the problem, in the hope that it will present no substantial difficulties for modern liberal democratic societies,[34] or in the belief that the phenomenon is being used to legitimate the reduction of civil liberties and the expansion of police powers;[35]

--Refusing to acknowledge the existence of international terrorism in the U.S. by controlling the media, and thus reducing the publicity of terrorist events and the fear such publicity spreads;[36]

--Development of a nationwide, federally controlled response organization which can centralize intelligence, response personnel, response policy and tactics, and resources,[37] and

--Improved contingency planning, which attempts to develop detailed response plans of an action-oriented nature, requiring identification of potential terrorist targets and preparation of

operational plans for responding to all potential acts.[38]

Each of these suggested alternatives obviously has disadvantages, but the use of strategic management to develop a response capability may as overcome most of the inherent weaknesses in the major proposals for combatting international terrorism. This advantage of the strategic management approach to counter-terrorist response is that it addresses economic, political, and social considerations. The true strength of a planning process which includes a strategic management perspective lies in its ability to address the organizational and interorganizational factors in counter-terrorist response. Each of these suggested response methods will be discussed briefly and the strategic management approach will be compared to the other major proposals for combatting international terrorism in the U.S.

Strategic Management and Target Hardening

The process of target hardening is a workable response to the problems of international terrorism. The process has been used successfully in the past. There are, however, limits to the potential effectiveness of this

process. These limitations center around several factors which strategic management of America's counter-terrorist response can address. The limitations are expense and practicality. Target hardening, if pursued as the response to terrorism can become exorbitantly expensive. Jenkins has already noted the projected cost of an counter-terror response based solely on target hardening.[39] The price of developing terror proof institutions is undoubtedly too high to consider an attempt based solely on this method of response. The current literature attests to the creativity of modern terrorist actions. Attempts at divining potential threats and constructing fail-safe prevention plans is probably not feasible. As the primary targets are made resistant to terrorist activity, terrorists can simply move to secondary and tertiary targets. As the current director of FEMA's counter-terrorist response campaign has noted: "There are simply too many targets."[40] It is simply not possible, financially or otherwise, to identify all potential terrorist targets available in a free society, and to then develop plans to make the targets terror-resistant.

While strategic management utilizes the concept of prevention activities, it does so only as part of an overall strategy which can balance the costs and benefits of target

hardening and prevention. If target hardening becomes too costly, this response method can be augmented by another tactic. For strategic management, prevention and target hardening tactics are useful only in that they tend to smooth the organization's environment by controlling somewhat the total number of terrorist incidents. Target hardening, if developed as the major approach of America's counter-terrorist response, presents the difficulty of what has been identified as one of the major threats of terrorism discussed in the first section of this chapter: presenting a significant drain on the economic productivity of the nation which creates questions about the government's political legitimacy.

Development of a Hard-Line Approach to Terrorism

This second proposed counter-terrorist response presents similar problems as the first. Here, however, the threat to governmental legitimacy is one of a political nature rather than one of an economic nature. Many authors who treat the problem of international terrorism call for the development of a hard line response which temporarily suspends the civil rights of those suspected of international terrorism, and which institutes capital punishment for most associated crimes. Just as there are many who suggest repression as a response to terrorism,

there are those who suggest that such measures will create a significant backlash. The possibility of such a backlash is one of the central concerns identified earlier concerning the dangers of terrorism. A hard line approach such as that urged by Wilkinson[41] and others might well create such a backlash if it were adopted as the only or the major response to terrorism in the U.S.

The Political Response to Terrorism

A third suggestion for a response process to deal with terrorism is to recognize the fact that terrorism is a political problem as much as it is a legal or social problem. Such a perspective may be workable, but it requires the development of strong international agreements on the problem of terrorism. As noted earlier, attempts at such international agreements have not been successful. A political solution to the problems of terrorism does not seem close at hand. It is difficult to foresee, for example, the U.S. developing the ability to affect the internal politics of many of the countries which support terrorism. Proposals by Evans[42] and Buckley[43] notwithstanding, such attempts do not appear to offer a great deal of promise.

The No Response Option to Terrorism

Some authors suggest simply ignore the problem.

They argue that the response will be worse than the problem itself.[44] Benign neglect may be acceptable as a response. It certainly would be less expensive, in the short run, than any of the other proposals. Whether the American public would accept such a response is another matter. Furthermore, such a response, if it were to become public policy, creates critical questions about liability for losses. The no-response policy may increase the number of terrorist events in the U.S. In any event, the no-response option may create resentment on the part of many Americans who see their government taking no steps to protect them or their property.[45] While the no-response policy may have its supporters, defining terrorism out of existence may not be politically feasible, and certainly seems not to be the policy of choice of the Reagan Administration.[46] The American public, perhaps spurred by symbolic action by the current administration, most certainly has expectations of protection from terrorist activities. It is doubtful that benign neglect could survive as a viable policy or response process in the current atmosphere.

Control of the Media

The literature discussing terrorism and its reciprocal relationship with the media is significant. That

terrorist organizations use the media to further their goals is widely accepted.[47] Despite the fact that the media appear to be as much victimized by terrorism as the real casualties of terrorist attacks, much of this literature is critical of the media, and some suggests that the media should be controlled to the point that they no longer function so as to disseminate terrorist demands, provide publicity for terrorist acts, and magnify the terrorist problem through media exposure. Wolf[48] suggests that control of the media is essential if we are to control the fear of terrorism in the population at large, minimize the effectiveness of terrorism as a weapon for change. The prospect of controlling the media raises several problems for democratic societies. We are faced with the choice of allowing unlimited publicity for terrorist events and thus allowing perpetrators full access to the media, or controlling the media by restricting freedom of the press. Thus, relying on media control as a sole, or even chief, response to terrorism in the U.S. seems to offer unacceptable tradeoffs.

Creation of a Nationwide Federal Counter-Terrorist Response Unit

An additional solution recommended by some is the creation of a nationwide federal counter-terrorist response

unit. Such a unit would overcome many of the deficiencies inherent in our current system which relies on a federal-state-local response to terrorism. The costs involved, however, appear to be prohibitive. The development of such a unit would create the equivalent of a national police force, prepared to respond to a terrorist event anywhere in the U.S.. While such a force more than likely would be well-coordinated, it is not likely that it would be acceptable on either political or economic grounds.

A nationwide, federal counter-terrorist police would require manpower concentrated in most standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs), since it is here that most terrorist acts occur. Additionally, it is assumed that such a force would need on-site personnel in most locations to avoid problems of local intelligence, and to overcome the significant problem of lack of local tactical knowledge concerning geographic, topographical, and demographic characteristics. Even in New York City, where the FBI maintains a joint task force to combat terrorism, and SWAT-type units which cross train with the New York Police Department's Emergency Services Unit, the federal response capabilities are seen as not completely sufficient. Interviews with those who know the federal response system in that city indicate that the usual response time for

federal SWAT teams is over three hours. The cost of such a nationwide, federal organization is likely to be significantly higher than that envisioned in a strategic approach to counter-terrorist response. In addition to the fiscal costs, it is unlikely that, given the current state of affairs in the U.S., Congress would promulgate legislation allowing the creation of a national terrorist police force.

Contingency Planning Compared to Strategic Planning and Management

Perhaps the most acceptable call for a workable counter-terrorist response in the U.S. comes from those who suggest improvement of the contingency response.[49] The suggestion is that by mounting a prepared response we can thwart the terrorists' tactics. The call is for improved action-oriented planning of a specific, what-if nature. The desired end-state is a response system which has placed in archives the identification of many potential terrorist activities with matching counter-terrorist response plans. The problem with such a suggestion is evident from the comments of FEMA's chief of the counter-terrorist response section: there are simply too many targets. It is not fiscally possible to devote sufficient planning resources to develop specific plans for possible terrorist attacks. Even

if the plans could be developed, the expense of mounting a sufficient stand-by reserve would be exorbitant.

The application of strategic management concepts to America's counter-terrorist response would ameliorate many of the problems with the contingency planning approach. Instead of developing action-oriented plans, strategic management practices would create capabilities. The end-state of strategic management is development of a flexible, interorganizational capability of responding to acts of terrorism wherever they occur. Strategic management planning processes are not predicated on the assumption that terrorists will strike specific targets, since the process creates a flexibility which allows counter-terrorist response regardless of the specific target. These planning processes do not create multiple plans directed at specific contingencies. They produce, instead, plans directed at creating organizational capabilities essential to adequate response. Once these capabilities have been created, the location of the terrorist event is largely of tactical consequence, since the requisite response capabilities will exist prior to the event.

Strategic management processes present an additional strength over standard tactical or contingency planning. The capabilities needed for an adequate counter-terrorist

response-- at least those identified by the organizational design literature-- are much the same capabilities needed for adequate response to other pre-existing societal problems. The capabilities needed for strategic management of America's counter-terrorist response are similar to those needed to respond to natural disasters, organized crime, and similar problems. Thus the capabilities developed for counter-terrorist response will not be developed for use only in the event of a terrorist event. They can be developed, improved, and maintained by use on a daily basis.

Each of the proposed responses to terrorism has disadvantages. It appears that what is needed is a response system which can draw from each of the proposed response methods as needed-- a strategic rather than a tactical approach to counter-terrorist response. It is hypothesized that those organizations which have had experience in counter-terrorist response will have made significant strides toward the development of such a response system, while organizations with little counter-terrorist response experience will operate with a tactical approach to the problem. Chapter Two discusses the concept of strategic management of counter-terrorist response in more detail.

CHAPTER II

APPLICATION OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO ANTI-TERRORIST RESPONSE-- THE IDENTIFICATION OF PROCESS

Introduction

Chapter Two develops an explanation of the process of strategic management as applied to counter-terrorist response in the U.S. It does so by addressing the concept of strategic management as a process designed to aid in the development of an adequate counter-terrorist response. This discussion of strategic management of America's counter-terrorist response:

1.) Develops a comparison of contingency planning and strategic management as alternative counter-terrorist management techniques;

2.) Develops an understanding of the need for an interorganizational approach to counter-terrorist response in the U.S.;

3.) Identifies, through a literature review, the processes of strategic management which are critical to the development of a well-managed

counter-terrorist response in the U.S.;

4.) Identifies, through a literature review, the context of counter-terrorist response in the U.S. which require strategic planning and management;

5.) Identifies, through a literature review, the critical organizational design concepts which should influence the design of an counter-terrorist response organization; and finally,

6.) Develops a specific model of strategic management processes, comparing that model with tactical management processes.

Strategic Management and Contingency Approaches to International Terrorism

This section of chapter two develops a more complete model of contingency planning as compared to the proposed model of strategic management and planning. As practiced in the field of counter-terrorist response, contingency planning has come to mean pre-planning specific organizational actions, based on the identification of potential terrorist targets. As O'Connor observes, "in its original form, contingency planning was considered to be an alternative plan postulated on the occurrence of a

particular event."[1] Contingency plans are developed for "unexpected events or conditions-- the remote possibilities."[2] Under the contingency planning model, planning consists of identifying in advance "of a course of action to meet a situation that is not expected, but that, if it transpires, will have a significant impact on the [organization].[3] As O'Connor suggests, contingency planning attempts to allow reasoned response:

> When crises and emergencies do arise, when swift decisions and actions are demanded, a plan prepared in advance-- when time is not critical-- eliminates scrambling for response... contingency planning reduces ... expense and confusion.[4]

Contingency planning consists of three phases: identifying a critical event, establishing the point at which action should be taken, and pre-planning the response.[5] The weaknesses of contingency planning are numerous, and are well recognized in the literature.[6] Calls for counter-terrorist contingency planning are numerous, despite the acknowledged weakness of this planning model. For example, during the 1980, RAND-hosted International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Violence, it was reported that:

> A participant from the U.S. private sector faulted the U.S. government for not devoting adequate resources and planning to problems that concern the private sector... He ... recommended that the two sectors [government and private] cooperate in contingency plans tailored to the maritime

> environment and that they provide adequate resources to carry [out the contingency plans][7]

Further, one of the key "recommendations for future research" developed from this conference was that "there should be much more contingency planning."[8]

Strategic management of the counter-terrorist response differs markedly from the contingency management method. While contingency planning attempts to create specific plans designed to handle specific possibilities, strategic management and planning, as envisioned in this research, attempts to develop capabilities designed to be used in the event of a terrorist event. Strategic plans are not dependent on specific trigger events at specific locations. Rather, strategic plans develop flexible capabilities which can be used in the event of a terrorist event-- regardless of the jurisdiction, the target, the time, the location, or the intent.

While strategic planning develops flexible capabilities, strategic management insures that these capabilities are realized, maintained, and enhanced. While strategic planning identifies the needed capabilities, strategic management insures that the needed capabilities are generated, practiced, and refined. Strategic management relies on non-formal aspects of formal organizations, and is the process of managing these informal relationships to

the point that identified capabilities can be attained, maintained, and delivered when needed. Strategic planning is the process of identifying future capabilities needed for delivery of adequate counter-terrorist response. Strategic management is the process of creating, nurturing, and delivering those needed capabilities. As such, strategic management is seen as a process which uses boundary spanning, networking, organizational innovation, and other informal communication processes to create the flexible response capabilities needed. A more specific model of strategic management is articulated toward the end of this chapter. This model, however, builds on the various literatures involved in counter-terrorist response, and requires a more detailed discussion than can be supported at this point.

The Need for an Interorganizational Approach

The need for a well-managed interorganizational approach to counter-terrorist response in the U.S. is well established in the literature. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice,[9] the U.S. Senate,[10] Schultz,[11] and others call for an interorganizational approach. To date, no workable interorganizational approach has been effected. Schultz argues that counter-terrorist response at the federal level is characterized by confusion

and disagreement.[12] Bell suggests that:

> In the U.S., the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism met only a few times after 1972. The Working Group of the Committee represents 26 departments, but the representation is often by officials with little if any bureaucratic leverage. The group is a coordinating body, not a control center. The Department of State's Office for Combatting Terrorism has five officials and two secretaries...There is thus really no command and control. The decision, if there is a major political component to an incident or a number of potential victims, may end up in the Oval Office... The whole field of prior planning... leaves much to be desired.[13]

If Bell is correct, it appears that the situation appears to be no better at the state and local level.[14] As Schultz observes, the problems of coordination must be resolved "if effective ... management [of the response system] is to occur." [15]

The need for development of an interorganizational response can perhaps best be illustrated by analyzing the elements of an effective response to a terrorist event. Table One contains a listing of the various response capabilities needed for an effective response to terrorism, with a hypothesized "capability" of each of three separate "task spheres" to provide the requisite capabilities. In Table One, "local" agencies are considered to be city, county, and state governmental agencies, such as police, fire, and rescue agencies. "Internally focused federal"

agencies are considered to be agencies of the federal government which have an internal, national focus, rather than an external, international focus. Agencies represented in this group are the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. "Externally focused" agencies are those with mainly an external, international perspective, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Table One also reveals a weakness in current response capabilities. No single task sphere is seen as having strong capabilities to respond to terrorist events. As Table One indicates, strong capabilities appear to exist in the areas of tactical response, containment, damage control, intelligence gathering, and international sanctions. Weak or marginal capabilities appear to exist, however, in the areas of intelligence dissemination, negotiation, investigation, pursuit, and prosecution. Earlier research indicates that these areas of marginal or weak capabilities actually do exist in the field of counter-terrorist response.[16] The problem remains of determining how to rectify the perceived weaknesses in current response capabilities.

The question arises, then, concerning what may be

TABLE 1

SUGGESTED COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE CAPABILITIES OF LOCAL AND FEDERAL AGENCIES

Required Capability	Level of Agency		
	Local	Internally Focused Federal	Externally Focused Federal
1. Tactical Response	Strong. 50,000 local police departments trained to respond to local violent events.	Weak. No jurisdiction. Little available manpower, and weak knowledge of local geography.	Weak. No jurisdiction without reorganization of responsibilities.
2. Containment	Strong. Adequate emergency manpower and equipment, strong knowledge of local geography and conditions.	Weak. Jurisdiction too wide insufficient manpower, and marginal knowledge of local conditions	Weak. No jurisdiction without reorganization of responsibilities.
3. Damage Control	Strong. Experienced local fire departments and emergency service units with adequate equipment.	Weak. Existing damage control capabilities require long periods for mobilization. Oriented to after-the-fact operation.	Weak. No jurisdiction without reorganization of responsibilities.
4. Evidence Collection	Strong for local prosecutions and investigations. Generally marginal for transfer to the federal level.	Strong if involved from the outset of the incident. Cannot control collection processes of local agencies in order to assure quality control.	Weak. No jurisdiction without reorganization of responsibilities.

Table One Continued

Required Capability	Level of Agency		
	Local	Internally Focused Federal	Externally Focused Federal
5. Negotiations	Generally little knowledge of the the types of international questions germane to the problem. No authority to deal with demands	Marginal. Lack of comprehensive tactical intelligence. Stronger ability to address questions likely to be raised by international	Marginal. No existing
6. Investigations	Marginal. Little knowledge of potential suspects, method of operation, and lack of an internationally oriented communications network to allow an integrated investigations	Marginal. No original jurisdiction, no quality control of most evidence collection processes, restricted knowledge of international suspects or methods of operation. Stronger than local level.	Weak. No jurisdiction. to investigate most acts of international terrorism.
7. Pursuit	Weak. Little knowledge of potential suspects, method of operation, international communications network, and international extradition processes. No extradition budgets for international crime.	Strong. Knowledge of international extradition procedures, adequate budget for international extradition	Weak. No jurisdiction.

Table One Continued

Required Capability	Level of Agency		
	Local	Internally Focused Federal	Externally Focused Federal
8. Prosecution	Weak. Lack of knowledge Potential suspects, extradition process, etc.	Marginal. No original jurisdiction in many cases, no control over evidence collection, etc.	Weak. No jurisdiction.
9. Intelligence Gathering	Lack of internationally oriented charter. No international communications network.	Marginal. No strong international charter. Somewhat effective international communications network.	Strong. International charter, in-place international intelligence gathering system.
10. International Sanctions	Weak. No jurisdiction	Weak. No jurisdiction.	Marginal. charter, access to Congress, but few international agreements.

Source: Compiled by the author.

done to strengthen the marginal areas of the law enforcement response to acts of international terrorism in the U.S.. Specifically, the concept of strategic management and planning, is offered as a process designed to improve response capability. This management process is discussed in more detail in the pages that follow.

Strategic Management and Interorganizational Cooperation

Conditions within the task environment of counter-terrorist response organizations suggest that an interorganizational approach is needed to respond adequately to terrorist emergencies in the U.S. However, in addition to an interorganizational approach, a strategic management approach also seems to be necessary, since a purely tactical interorganizational response would do little to rectify many of the problems with America's counter-terrorist response system. What appears to be needed is a process which will develop a strategic interorganization to respond to acts of international terrorism in the U.S.. Such an organization is referred to here as an counter-terrorist response interorganization (CTRI). To develop adequately a theory concerning operational CTRIs, it is necessary to discuss strategic management as it applies to counter-terrorist response.

The concept of strategic management is not easily defined in operational terms, and requires a somewhat comprehensive introduction to the body of literature which deals with the concept. According to Ansoff, the process of strategic management serves to align the organization with its environment.[17] It does so by selecting an "organizational domain" and by aligning management processes to function in that domain. McCaskey develops a similar concept which he refers to as "directional planning."[18] In addition to the attempt to align the organization with the environment, Kronenberg incorporates the "values, priorities, and resources of the entire society" into the concept of strategic management of national security.[19] McCaskey says of strategic management that it

> identifies an intrinsic pattern of movement which in itself, is worth pursuing for the organization. Planning here is directional... After the direction has been identified, goals might be named as a secondary process... A chief characteristic of [strategic management] is that as the individual or organization interacts with the environment, the domain and direction of the organization change as a result.[20]

McCaskey identifies several types of situations which call for the use of strategic management:

1. When it is too early to set goals;
2. When the environment is unstable and uncertain; and

3. When people cannot build enough trust or agreement to decide on a common goal.[21]

All three conditions identified by McCaskey as conducive to strategic management appear to apply to counter-terrorist response in the U.S. The development of specific goals for U.S. CTRIs is problematic; it is doubtful that we know exactly what specific goals we should establish for our counter-terrorist response system. This appears evident from a review of literature in the field. While literature on the problem abounds, few exact "goals" are suggested.[22] The environment in which such a system must operate appears to be uncertain and unstable according to accepted definitions of these terms in the literature.[23] In addition, recent attempts to establish common goals in counter-terrorist response have been less than successful. As an illustration of the lack of consensus about counter-terrorist response, the results of thirteen separate meetings held by western democracies between 1975 and 1979 appear to be most useful. These meetings, held specifically for the purpose of dealing with international terrorism, resulted in few formal documents or specific plans to combat terrorism. What did result from the meetings were "frank discussion," "support for United Nations recommendations," "expressed determination," and

other platitudes.[24]

Strategic Management Characteristics

It appears that strategic management may be a useful tool for managing America's response to internal terrorist threats. The problems remain, however, of determining exactly what strategic management is, and of determining how it can best be employed in the U.S. This section of Chapter Two deals specifically with defining the process of strategic mangement as applied to counter-terrorist response. Specifically, this section identifies the characteristics of strategic management which make the strategic management process applicable to problems posed by international terrorism.

Ansoff has defined strategic behavior as a process of organizational interaction with the environment which creates certain adaptive changes in organizational configuration and dynamics.[25] It follows that strategic management is the purposeful directing and controlling of an organization's adaptive changes, based on information about environmental considerations or turbulence. The purpose of strategic management, according to Ansoff, is to match the organization's strategic thrust with its environmental turbulence. He suggests that this process is dynamic, and that the "match between turbulence and thrust occurs only

when the turbulence level has remained stable long enough to produce a steady pattern of strategic behavior."[26] He suggests that adequate management of this environment-organization symbiosis results in successful alignment externally and internally. The internal factors to be considered are strategic culture, and managerial and logistic capability. Ansoff notes that strategic culture is described by six attributes: the time perspective of management, the perceived domain of alternatives, the focus of the organization, the change propensity of the organization, its historical perspective, and its risk propensity.[27]

According to Ansoff, strategic management is exhibited by three types of leadership: legitimating, decision-making, and action leadership. While legitimacy is obviously important, the two processes of most interest to counter-terrorist response are decision and action leadership. Ansoff depicts decision leadership as leadership which makes strategic choices by establishing realistic aspiration levels, selecting suitable strategic thrusts, and selecting specific strategies. Action leadership involves causing the organization to act in the chosen strategic mode. He suggests this can be accomplished through creating organizational climates and capabilities

supportive of the strategic activity chosen, mobilizing management in strategic decision making, and by coordinating and controlling the implementation mechanism of strategic operation. Strategic management, however, is susceptible to political, informational, and cultural distortions. Any of these factors can influence strategic decisions to the point that they become ineffective. To counter the potential problems, Ansoff suggests a marshalling of information and social energy through a process which may best be described as networking[28] and boundary spanning.[29]

The end result of a functioning system of strategic management is selection of a strategic thrust which moves the organization to a point of anticipatory adaptation to the environment. The organization is capable of selecting courses of action which, rather than being goal-directed, serve to place it in a favorable relationship to the demands made on it by its domain of operation. While specific plans for goal attainment are not developed, specific capabilities <u>are</u> developed. These capabilities are then used to handle problems that arise from the organization's external environment.

Utilizing strategic management in responding to internal terrorism in the U.S. requires the development of a strategic decision based on an assessment of the environment

in which responses must be made. These strategic decisions can eventually be forged into a strategic thrust, or planned direction of movement which will place the organization in a more responsive position to adapt to and to deal with future environmental turbulence.

A strategic decision is a statement of the desired direction selected for the organization in the future. It is the selection of an organizational domain[30] or organizational direction.[31] Such a projection of domain is not a clear statement of goals and objectives, as is generally associated with long-range planning. It is instead a statement of the desired future direction or sphere of activity which the organization and its leaders would prefer over the current sphere of activities. The strategic decision will identify "... the preferred style of acting for the organization... and an arena for [that] activity. The emphasis switches from carefully formulating what goal is out there to be accomplished to consideration of the agent's thrust."[32] In the case of the counter-terrorist response in the U.S., the strategic decision, at least at the level of organizational rhetoric, has been made: to respond aggressively to acts of international terrorism.[33] Such a statement of desired effect is hardly a well defined goal. It is a statement of a

strategic decision in the truest sense of the phrase: a statement of intended or preferred arena and style for acting for the U.S. in responding to international terrorism.

A strategic decision is also a indication of what realistically can be expected of the organization operating in its new direction or thrust. The strategic decision identifies what can logically follow the adoption of a new organizational mode of action. In the case of counter-terrorist response in the U.S., the strategic decision would indicate the manner in which the terrorist threat would be resolved. The strategic decision can also lead to a statement of "action which will achieve the desired situation as far as possible."[34] Thus the strategic decision is both an indication of what can be expected from the organization operating in the new domain, and an early development of the steps which must be taken to reach the desired strategic thrust. In the case of counter-terrorist response in the U.S., the strategic decision would be a statement of the expected benefits from an improved counter-terrorist response system, as well as a statement of the steps initially necessary to begin improving that response capability.

The theory underlying this paper is supported by

several key assumptions. Among these are:

1. Management of the problem of international terrorism within the U.S. requires a more strategically oriented approach than has been utilized in past efforts;
2. Such a strategically oriented approach will require a "marshalling" of social energy and information through boundary spanning and networking processes;
3. Adequate response will require the efforts of an interorganization rather than those of single organizations; and
4. The nature of counter-terrorist response is sufficiently different from the task assigned Ansoff's typical organization to make strategic management more problematic for counter-terrorist response interorganizations .

The Requirements for a Strategic Orientation

As previously discussed, the current status of counter-terrorist response in the U.S., and among other western democracies, is not at a stage which allows clear articulation of goals and standards . In addition, the organizational environment created by terrorism is indeed uncertain and unstable. Although it appears that terrorist

activities are centered around major ports of entry in the U.S., and that mainly the larger standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) are most frequently affected by terrorism, it is not possible to identify all potential terrorist targets so as to develop counter-terrorist plans for each target[35] The environment within which such events take place is simply too complex to allow a purely tactical response. Consideration of how the local jurisdiction handles a given terrorist event must include national priorities, articulated national policies, and in some cases, international foreign policy. Such considerations are not normally part of the tactical plan of most police agencies. While the tactical operations of a given counter-terrorist operation will be finalized at the scene, the strategic capabilities and interorganizational relationships cannot be finalized successfully on an ad hoc basis.

Additionally, the problem of consensus building can be highlighted by reviewing the tactical response plans and policies of various responding units. For example, the standard New York City plan allows unit negotiators to permit the suspect freedom of movement if such freedom is essential to the negotiations. Procedures in Los Angeles specifically prevent allowing access to mobility by a

suspect once he has been isolated. The purpose of this illustration is not to argue tactics. It is to point out the problem with developing consensus or agreement concerning operational methods. Such disagreements concerning tactics may never be settled; however, it is necessary that we develop a working interorganizational system to deal with the terrorism problem. Currently, however, the system simply does not have the capability to manage the counter-terrorist response.

The lack of capability to manage the counter-terrorist response is supported by the literature. For example, Kupperman and Trent argue that:

> For the small hostage incident we have developed behavioral techniques that seem to work well. A bigger event, such as the LaGuardia bombing, can escalate to open Presidential involvement within hours. In the case of the Croation skyjacking, our no-concessions policy eroded... [I]n the Hanafi matter it was hard to tell who were the heroes-- the police, the psychiatrists, or the Muslim ambassadors. Somehow, whether by muddling through or by using honed behavior tools, a massacre was avoided. Over the last five years [most terrorist threats] were amateurish.[36]

They further note that:

> The details of present organizational arrangement are more elaborate than illuminating. They are steeped in statutory and bureaucratic precedent rather than tuned to meet the external threat.[37]

Finally, they argue:

> As of today we are poorly prepared to deal with nationally disruptive acts of terrorism. Our

> capability to manage terrorist crises is limited. Our state of preparedness is not adequately developed. The international community is not integrated into pre-planned modes of response. Research on terrorist behavior, target hardening, and the problem of restoration after attack is only in its infancy.[38]

Corrective efforts designed to eliminate some of the problems noted by Kupperman and Trent have been of questionable success in improving capability. As noted in earlier in this chapter, the "whole field of prior planning leaves much to be desired"[39] Governmental planning for counter-terrorist response has been criticized as ineffective, and most calls for improved response capabilities have centered around improved contingency planning[40]

Tactical coordination may prove impossible; we may find difficulty integrating disparate tactical response practices. Strategic coordination, however, through use of strategic planning and management should prove attainable. For this paper, strategic planning is defined as developing future courses of action based on intended application of political, social, economic, military, or paramilitary resources, values, and priorities to the perceived problems to be encountered. Such planning should be instrumental in providing sufficient decision leadership to allow development of a strategic alignment between response

organizations and the environment. Such strategic alignment should provide the possibility of coordinating the strategic response to terrorism in the U.S. (a response which considers political, social, economic, and value aspects of the response process). Without a strategic management approach to terrorism in the U.S., we are left with a patchwork of tactical approaches-- some of which may prove to be tactically effective, but none of which lead to an overall ameliorative approach to the problem.

A terrorist attack against a municipal building, from a tactical standpoint, is merely a problem of manpower, negotiations, and, if necessary, application of sufficient force. The problem becomes more significant, however, if the attack demands concessions from the federal government concerning U.S. aid to Nicaraguan contras. At this stage the problem becomes one not easily addressable by the municipal government. From what source would the local agencies attain intelligence concerning Nicaraguan rebels? From what foundation would the local negotiator be able to work with the terrorists. What values would be protected during the siege -national or local? Would the local agency be capable of making concessions to such demands? Just as the questions involved are strategic, so it seems should be the solution.

With a tactical response, we may find that we are able to handle the physical problems generated by terrorism. We can solve the extant situation with a minimum of losses. What we cannot do with a tactical approach, however, is address the overall problem of terrorism from a unified approach which evaluates the various values involved in counter-terrorist response, and which responds in a manner which achieves the greatest benefit for overall policy.

The Need for Boundary Spanning

While a strategic solution is most probably preferable, the peculiarities of the American system of governance make such a strategic approach difficult. Were this solely a unitary national system of government, rather than a federal system, strategic coordination would not be as difficult. Unfortunately, the problem of coordination of a strategic response system composed of federal, state, and local governmental entities, and in some cases private organizations, is a formidable problem. Strategic decisions made at federal level cannot be dictated to autonomus local and state governments. Such an attempted usurpation of local power and autonomy would not be tolerated. Further, federal attempts at such coordination of local and state initiatives through such programs as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration have proven to be of questionable

success. While such a program could be mounted to meet the terrorist threat, it is highly doubtful that the financial resources necessary could be justified. What appears to be required to formulate an adequate strategic response capability is what Ansoff refers to as a marshalling of social energy and information.

This marshalling process can most efficiently be achieved through an informal process of boundary spanning and networking. Networking is used here to refer to the activities of key executives and managers within public organizations, while boundary spanning includes the activities of any member of an organization who serves an informal information gathering, processing, an dissemination activity. These activities establish status group loyalties external to the organization as well as avenues of communications among members of the networks. Mitchell defines networks as "a specific set of linkages among a defined set of persons, with the additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social behavior of the persons involved."[41] Tichy, et al. develop the concept of networking as central to an organization's ability to exchange affect, influence, power, information, goods, and services.[42] In addition, Kelly suggests that

networking may be a key factor in the ability of organizational actors to foster innovation.[43] Similarly, Mizurchi and Bunting credit strong networking capability with the ability to "influence the outcome of events." [44] Galeskeiwicz and Shatin argue that networking is a central factor in an organization's ability to deal with environmental uncertainty.[45] Many types of organizational activity are enhanced by a strong networking capability of managers, it and may be a key factor in determining organizational ability to carry out a specific task.

Similarly, the literature has frequently addressed the importance of boundary spanning activity in increasing an organization's potential for effective operation. Boundary spanning is differentiated from networking in that boundary spanners, by definition, operate at organizational boundaries. Networking, on the other hand, refers to the activities of those actors central to agency operation, i.e., key executives. The boundary spanner, in contrast, who is not necessarily central to the organizational chart of the agency in question, but who is, nonetheless, important to the organization because of the ability to bridge formal boundaries both internally and externally. James Thompson offered an explanation of the importance of

boundary spanning activity in regulating the flow of information between organizations.[46] Aldrich and Herker postulate that boundary spanning activity is important in assisting an organization in adapting to environmental contingencies, coping with environmental constraints, and establishing organizational legitimacy.[47] Tushman cites boundary spanning activity as a key indicator and facilitator of organizational innovation.[48] Similarly, Tushman and Scanlon cite boundary spanning as a key facilitator of information transfer.[49]

The capabilities fostered for organizations by active networking and boundary spanning appear to be needed to respond to terrorist-generated emergencies. However, these activities are not (usually) formally assigned. Boundary spanners and networkers are not normally compensated for such activities, and such actions are rarely a part of their job description. These actions more closely conform to actions of the "collateral organization,"[50] which serve the following functions. They:

1. Identify and solve problems not solved by the formal organization;
2. Allow new combinations of people, channels of communication, and ways of seeing old problems;
3. Are complementary of the formal organization, and

exist simultaneously with it;

4. Serve as input mechanisms for the formal organization ("The ultimate value of a collateral organization depends on successfully linking it to the formal organization, so its outputs are used"); and

5. Facilitate new approaches to problems and obstacles.[51]

According to Zand, the major benefit to be derived from a collateral organization is the development of a communications network which can handle non-routine information and develop it for input into the formal organization. Such a communication network is formed at no real cost to the organization, but can come from the informal boundary spanning and networking activities of its members. While Zand focuses mainly on internal communications and work processes, the idea of the collateral organization is easily adaptable to problems of external communications. The importance of the collateral organization to an adequate counter-terrorist response is that it provides important capabilities of innovation, problem solving, and communications without adding significantly to the cost of delivering the counter-terrorist response.

Requirements for a Response Interorganization

According to much of the literature in the field of interorganizational relations, interorganizations do not form without reason. As Van De Ven notes, "[o]rganizations do not coordinate for coordination's sake... Two reasons appear sufficiently compelling for interagency activity to emerge: a.) an internal need for resources, or b.) commitment to an external problem or opportunity."[52] An ability to depend on other agencies within the interorganizational network for support, i.e., resources in the form of information, referred clients, political support, et cetera is a necessity for social service organizations, such as CTRIs.[53] Van De Ven notes the importance of such support, stating that coordination among agencies is necessary

> for coping with health, welfare, manpower, and other social problems too complex for any one agency to solve by itself. The premise is that many complex problems of a community can be dealt with effectively... through joint interagency planning and programming, because the resources and expertise needed to cope with the problems are contained within external autonomous organizations and vested interest groups.[54]

The necessity for support attaches to more than the need for financial support from agencies within an organization's interorganizational network. For an organization to be effective within its environment, it must

be able to function within this network, drawing necessary support from other related agencies as needed.

Other literature suggests that coordination of its activities with others results in restrictions and conflict.[55] The ability of an organization to withstand such conflict depends upon the similarities of cooperating organizations in terms of goals, decision-making processes, authority structures, and leadership subsystems.

The stimuli for interorganizational relationships appears to be generic, regardless of organizational task: complexity; need for greater resources and expertise than one organization can provide; and similarity among cooperating agencies concerning goals and decision making processes.

From previous discussion the necessity for an counter-terrorist response mode which is interorganizational in nature should be clear. Few organizations have the resources needed to mount a nation-wide response-- the manpower, equipment, expertise, and support services necessary simply do not exist within any one agency. In addition, the legal authority to respond to such problems does not exist on a single jurisdiction basis. Terrorism as an activity is not in all cases a matter of federal jurisdiction in the U.S. Thus, in many cases, response will

be within the jurisdiction of a state government, enforcable by a local, i.e., city or county government. Complexity appears to be the hallmark of a terrorist event. For example, a group of foreign nationals, seizing and threatening to bomb a city building unless the federal government reconsiders its aid to funding allocations to a regime the terrorists consider repressive, appears to present a problem beyond the capabilities of a local government, without external assistance and advise. The manpower required simply to seal off the scene of a terrorist crime, or to assure its prevention, might well surpass the resources available to a local government, thus requiring outside assistance. Similarly, the wide variety of terrorist techniques will most probably preclude the possibility of all local agencies having adequate expert knowledge and information at hand when the terrorist incident occurs.

Problematic Nature of Anti-Terrorist Strategic Management and Planning

Ansoff makes an inherent assumption about the organizations for which he suggests the use of strategic management: that the organizations' personnel will be constantly exposed to opportunities to marshall social energy and information.[56] Under normal circumstances,

this would be true of most organizations. Personnel within such organizations are normally exposed to opportunities to monitor their environment daily. The turbulence with which they are faced in determining an organizational thrust is routinely there to be observed daily. Under these conditions, it is possible to engage in activities which will allow agency actors to develop a strategic thrust to match the degree of environmental turbulence. The day-to-day situation, the daily turbulence, helps managers identify critical dependencies; critical interorganizational networks; key boundary spanners; and information types required by the specific type, intensity, and duration of the environmental turbulence. In short, the exposure to daily turbulence allows managers to engage in decision leadership and action leadership which will define the organization's strategic thrust.

Unfortunately, the environmental turbulence which makes strategic management a necessity for CTRIs is not present on a daily basis for most of the organizations involved in counter-terrorist response. Terrorist events, and the environmental complexity and turbulence they create are not commonplace for CTRIs. Because terrorist events occur only infrequently, the local organizations charged with responding to such events do not have the benefit of

daily exposure to the environmental turbulence for which they need to develop a strategic thrust. As a result, managers of CTRIs are not given accurate stimuli to identify critical dependencies, interorganizational networks, key boundary spanners, or information types. As a result, it is more difficult for CTRI managers and personnel to develop a strategic thrust capable of meeting the environmental turbulence created by a terrorist event. Thus, most agencies resort to tactical planning, utilizing mostly an intraorganizational approach. When the agency is then faced with a terrorist event, it responds tactically, and in most cases has not prepared critical networking and boundary spanning channels in advance.

The tendency to organize along tactical, intraorganizational lines is enhanced by other factors. Most police agencies, for example, do not place counter-terrorist response capabilities high on their list of priorities. There are always abundant problems more real, immediate, and pressing. In addition, most police departments have had little actual experience with terrorist events. Thus key managers responsible for developing and implementing plans for counter-terrorist response have very little to work with. A review of the academic literature concerning terrorism and terrorism response shows little of

use to managers attempting to plan for such events. The literature that does exist is of a mostly tactical nature.[57] The lack of experience in terrorist incident management is compounded by the generally perceived inability to plan before the fact for response to the myriad possible targets open for selection by international terrorists.[58] The general perception appears to be that it is virtually impossible to develop an operational plan along an if-this, then-that approach. There are simply too many potential targets and modes of attack.[59] The result of this inability to plan is a more tactical approach, focusing on intraorganizational capabilities and operational plans for obvious targets.

Since it appears that detailed pre-planning is not possible, it is suggested that strategic planning and management of the counter-terrorist response system is the major workable alternative. Strategic management of the counter-terrorist response can be identified as a <u>process</u> rather than simply a concept. The process can be clarified by reviewing the organizational design literature for recommendations for planning and management processes for organizations faced with environments similar to that of counter-terrorist response.

<u>Design Guidelines for Counter-terrorist Response</u>

Responsibilities for, and capabilities of response to, civilian terrorist emergencies have evolved over the last 25 years in a haphazard manner. There has been little purposive effort to consolidate and coordinate the responsibilities for dealing with terrorist emergencies which create the need for responses which draw upon resources from outside the immediately responsible organization. In fact, as Fern might suggest, to the extent that these responsibilities have been developed and defined, it has been done through power struggles within the federal government and certain state and local jurisdictions.[60] Rather than a history of controlled growth, with concomitant specifically assigned authority and responsibilities, the development of the terrorist response system, when it has been specifically addressed, has been occasionally a spotted story of interagency jealousy, power plays, struggles for control, and fragmented response capabilities. For the most part, however, the problems of developing an counter-terrorist response system have been ignored. The literature concerning complex organizational theory and organization design theory has not been well applied to this crucial question of emergency response, and the extant terrorist emergency response system is indicative of the lack of methodical organizational practices. The current

federal counter-terrorist response system is so fragmented that, despite the fact that the FBI has been designated the lead agency, several separate federal agencies have terrorist emergency response authority and responsibility, depending on the nature of the threat. However, there are still necessary performance characteristics that are not adequately covered by one or another of these agencies. (See Table One).

It is the purpose of this section of the research to address the problems of terrorist emergency response capabilities in light of established theories of organizational design. Attention will be devoted to the entire terrorist emergency response system: federal, state, local, and private sector.

Any question of organizational design must focus on several explicit variables which have been identified in the organizational design literature as driving the design of any specific organization. Such variables include technology, the task environment, available resources, etc.[61] A great deal of empirical and conceptual literature exists which should be directly applicable to civilian CTRIs. The questions to be answered when determining the design of such interorganizations are basically two-fold:

1. What is the context of terrorist emergency response which requires more than tactical response?
2. What established organizational design literature applies to this context?

The Context of Anti-Terrorist Response

Two of the variables critical to adequate civilian terrorist emergency responses are technology and the environment, for it is these two variables more than any others which identify the task of terrorist emergency response as separate from other questions of organizational design. A great deal of literature exists dealing with these two organizational variables, and much of this literature is directly applicable to civilian CTRIs. Environmental and technological characteristics of civilian terrorist emergency response can be generically identified as follows:

1. Environmental complexity,
2. Necessity for response to peak demands for service,
3. Necessity for making decisions under conditions of high uncertainty,
4. Conditions of high group interdependence,
5. Requirements of high degrees of legitimacy from

the organization's task environment, and

6. Necessity of highly specialized technologies.

Obviously terrorist emergency response takes place in an environment which Burns and Stalker would characterize as organic.[62] At first glance this would tend to indicate a need for the development of CTRIs which are organic in nature; however, such a priori assumptions can lead to basic organizational design flaws.[63] It will perhaps be more beneficial to take each identified characteristic of civilian CTRIs and their activities, and analyze the indications for an overall design for an organizational structure which can efficaciously respond to such events.

Emergency Response: Applying Organizational Design Theory

The environment in which CTRIs must work is exceptionally complex, encompassing scores of local, state, federal, and private agencies, as well as terrorist organizations, and addressing inumerable problems of a technical and logistical nature. Child has defined environmental complexity as relating to "... the heterogeneity and range of activities which are relevant to an organization's operations."[64] Thompson's concept of a heterogeneous-shifting environment is also applicable to

our study of CTRIs. Thompson adopts Dill's description of environmental heterogeneity: "...the degree to which social entities in the organizational environment are similar or dissimilar to each other."[65] It seems that few organizational entities would need to deal with such diverse groups as would a terrorist emergency response interorganization. Additionally, these organizations face a shifting environment instead of a stable one. Thompson predicts that organizations faced with heterogeneous-shifting environments would be most effective if they were differentiated functionally to correspond to segments of the task environment, and each operated on a decentralized basis to monitor and plan responses to fluctuation in its sector of the task environment."[66] Thompson expands this statement, suggesting:

> The more heterogeneous the task environment, the greater the constraints presented to the organization. The more dynamic the task environment, the greater the contingencies presented to the organization. Under either condition, the organization seeking to be rational must put boundaries around the amount and scope of adaptation necessary, and it does this by establishing structural units specialized to face a limited range of contingencies within a limited set of constraints. The more constraints and contingencies the organization faces, the more its boundary-spanning component will be segmented."[67]

While Thompson's classifications are useful, work done by

Jurkovich may go further in developing guidelines for CTRIs.

Jurkovich, in an in-depth study of various organizational environments has developed 64 separate types of environmental classifications. His key defining variables are differences in rates of change, complexity, routineness, degree of organization, and relatedness of environmental sectors of the organization. It is apparent from his analysis that CTRIs would belong to his type 64 environment, which is characterized by high rates of change, high complexity, non-routine events, inherent disorganization, and indirect and demanding task environment components.[68] Jurkovich makes the following comments about organizations in this type of environment.

1. Special units that monitor individual components or clusters of the environment are necessary. These units monitor activities of others and routinely report the behavior patterns to critical decision-making points.
2. When faced with complex, non-routine environmental sectors, decision-makers tend to concentrate more on the information available than they do on the decision making process itself. "Experience in earlier but similar situations whose abstract patterns resemble the

existing situation is also helpful."[69]

3. Intervening organizations usually must be enlisted to locate sources of certainty and uncertainty in information exchanges with unorganized sectors of the environment.
4. The more indirect an exchange sector is, the more difficult it is to exercise control over that sector.
5. In situations of rapid, unstable change, organizations tend to design coping tactics of decentralization and multidisciplinary approaches to problems; boundary spanning roles increase in importance; some organizational resources are always kept in reserve; and a premium is placed on new ideas and innovation.[70]

Jurkovich summarizes his statements about type 64 environments and their effects on organizational design by adding:

> Organizations confronted with [this] type of environment have major information problems; have very abstract, tentative sets of strategies, operations, and tactics and cannot execute them without expecting major alteration; have very vague coalitions that change unpredictably; and are constantly making exceptions to existing decision-making programs.[71]

The type 64 organizational environment is one which does not

foster reliance on decision making by established rules. It requires innovation, flexibility, and recognition of the often abstract nature of the problems faced by the organization, in other works, strategic management.

Galbraith also has some specific comments to make in reference to environments characterized by Jurkovich as type 64 organizational environments. He would identify type 64 organizations as operating under near-ultimate conditions of uncertainty. Galbraith defines uncertainty as "the difference between the amount of information required to perform the task and the amount [of useable information] already possessed by the organization."[72] To Galbraith, organizational uncertainty "is the concept upon which the organization design frameworks are based."[73] He stipulates that the amount of information necessary to successfully perform any task is a function of the nature of the task and the requisite level of performance. Similarly, he sees the diversity of output goals and internal diversity as key indicators of the nature of the task. He intimates that higher levels of preferred goal performance tend to increase the number of variables which must be considered when making decisions. From Galbraith's analysis of environments, structure, and task, it should be clear that CTRIs will require substantial amounts of information

processing capabilities.

By combining the analyses by Ansoff, Thompson, Jurkovich, and Galbraith of environmental characteristics similar to those postulated for CTRIs, the following conclusions may be drawn. Civilian CTRIs will:

1. need the ability to operate on a decentralized basis,
2. need strong boundary spanning structures,
3. tend to distribute discretion among the various subunits of the organization,
4. need to process vast amounts of information,
5. require specific authority to control, or significantly influence, indirectly associated sub-units,
6. require access to linking organizations to mate needs with specific resources, and
7. require mechanisms to foster innovative decision making and problem solving.

These characteristics developed for counter-terrorist response organizations are used as the basis for data collection for the proposed research. The organizational design literature indicates that organizations which would respond to situations similar to those of terrorist emergencies should have specific capabilities. The purpose

of the data collection is to determine the extent to which the four organizations selected for study have designed these capabilities into their response system. Further, it is hypothesized that organizations experienced in counter-terrorist response will have more of these capabilities designed into their response system than will organizations without experience in responding to terrorist events.

The perception of strategic management as a process, rather than as simply a concept, is an extension of Lenz's concept of strategic management as a capacity which can be measured.[74] The perception of strategic management as a measurable process will be discussed in more detail later in this research. Lenz, in turn, bases his concept of "strategic action" on that developed by Ansoff[75] and Chamberlain[76] To Lenz, an organization which engages in strategic management does so by relying on more than the "stock of resources it owns and controls." It must also rely on support "from environmental components that may be projected in pursuit of strategy as if each were a tangible asset."[77]

The process of strategic management, then, is the process of marshalling, creating, generating, acquiring, and, above all, managing the processes, which create the

necessary "beliefs, attitudes, and commitments" and the various capabilities "embodied in the evolving networks of interdependence both within the organization and within its environment."[78] These organizational assets are then used to accomplish organizational purposes. Lenz specifically notes that the process of measuring an organization's capability for strategic action should consider: the organization's knowledge base, its ability to acquire and generate resources, and its general technology. Thus, if one is to assess strategic capability, it becomes necessary to assess the organization's ability to manage properly the

> essential character of relationships between an organization and components of its environment..., the attitudes, beliefs, and expectations that affect the quality and consistency of support [an organization] may draw upon in pursuit of a strategy..., and knowledge about the interorganizational network, and the abstract level of social, legal, technical, and economic factors that affect the viability of the [organization's environment] as well as knowledge about the social fabric of an organization and the degree to which its formal and informal administrative arrangements are sufficient to energize and focus human effort.[79]

The importance of adequate boundary spanning and networking to such capabilities is obvious.

The literature contains one additional concept which bears discussion here. Not all organizational members can be expected to have the same perception of the importance of

external communications and strategic management. Parsons identifies three distinct levels of organizations, and suggests that each level has a major purpose. The three levels of organizations identified by Parsons are the technical, managerial, and institutional.[80] The technical level is concerned with the nature of the task being performed. The managerial level is concerned with the process of "mediating between the technical suborganization and those who use its products."[81] The institutional level is concerned with creating "meaning" and "legitimation" for the overall organization.[82] Given these organizational levels and their corresponding concerns, it is important to understand that differences in perceptions may exist among levels concerning responding to counter-terrorist events.

By expanding Lenz' concept of measurement of strategic action capability, one can develop specific concepts to be used in addressing the degree of strategic management processes used in responding to terrorist events in the United States. These processes can be seen to involve the formal and informal organization, and seem to center around the processes of boundary spanning, organizational innovation, formal and informal planning processes, and establishment of an acceptable organizational

domain. It should be noted that these are the same processes predicted elsewhere in the organizational design literature as important to the ability to respond to events in complex Type 64 environments. Merging the discussion by Ansoff and Lenz yields a concept of strategic management which is more than an extension of time horizon. It becomes a process, one which uses boundary spanning, networking, innovation processes, and other informal communication processes to create the necessary beliefs, attitudes and commitments and the several capabilities which exist in the evolving interdependencies within response organizations and their environments.

The process of strategic management of America's counter-terrorist response consists of the following elements:

--The use of boundary spanning and networking to facilitate intra- and interorganizational communication, understanding, and negotiation of policies, procedures, and responsibilities concerning counter-terrorist response among involved organizations, e.g., use of decentralized planning and response methodologies;

--Reliance on collateral organizations[83] to develop interpersonal and interorganizational

capabilities not readily found in formal organizations;

--Provision of relatively inexpensive and effective methods of mutual adjustment to organizational and interorganizational conflict;

--Development of alternative problem solving methodologies not normally utilized by formal organizations during the routine course of operations, e.g., the purposeful, planned use of informal contacts with members of other agencies in the organizational network to solve problems;

--Development of coping mechanisms for the unusual environmental complexities created by terrorist events;

--Provision, or acquisition by prior contact, of external resources which can assist the responsible organization in responding to the terrorist event;

--Provision of more essential expertise than is normally available to any one organization in the organizational network by tapping interorganizational networks to import expertise from external sources;

--Development of similar goals, decision-making

processes, authority structures, and leadership subsystems among organizations in the organizational response network;

--Provision of an artificial level of environmental turbulence similar to that encountered under actual terrorist incident management through the use of simulations, field exercises, and other emulative planning processes;

--Development of subprocesses for identifying critical interorganizational networks, information requirements, and boundary spanning requirements;

--Recognition of the need for maintenance of synapses between cells of responding organizations;

--Development of participative and emulative planning methodologies which involve the indirect sector components of the organizations' environment in the planning and response process; and

--Provision of channels for information transfer, innovation, and information screening among the various organizations involved in counter-terrorist response.

Organizations which manage their crisis response

along tactical lines are assumed to have a markedly different response process, generally characterized as an internally focused response. The elements of a tactical response, which are generally the inverse of those of a strategic response, are:

--A tendency to see the terrorist inspired incident as a local problem requiring local resources, policy, and response mechanisms, e.g., use of centralized planning and response methodologies which do not consider the need for input into the planning and response process from other organizations;

--Reliance on formal organizations, formal rules and policy, and formal, action-oriented planning methodologies for response to terrorist situations;

--Little, if any, provision for mutual adjustment with other agencies which could be involved in the crisis response;

--Reliance on formal plans as the key problem solving process for the crisis response mechanism, rather than recognizing the need for creative problem solving processes and mutual adjustment as a means of conflict resolution among the different

organizations involved in an counter-terrorist response;

--A perception of terrorist events as extensions of crises handled regularly by the responding organization, rather than as a qualitatively different set of problems;

--Reliance on internal resources rather than a recognition of the need for provision of external resources for providing response;

--Reliance on internal expertise rather than recognition of the need for expert assistance from outside the organization;

--Limited perception of the need for similar decision processes, goals, authority structures, and leadership subsystems among various responding agencies;

--Limited perception of the need for providing, through emulative planning, artificial levels of environmental turbulence similar to that encountered by agencies responding to terrorist events;

--Little, if any focus on identifying critical interorganizational dependencies;

--Use of formal, written plans developed internally

and for which there is no external review by agencies affected by the plan; and

--Little, if any, provision for channels of information transfer, innovation processes, and information screening among agencies involved in the counter-terrorist response, and one which uses interorganizational practices to develop organizational thrusts to meet unusual environmental complexities.

For the purposes of this research strategic management is seen as a process, one which can be identified as having more than an expanded time horizon. It is a process which actively develops interorganizational relations processes in order to more effectively develop an counter-terrorist response. As reflected in the propositions which will be developed in Chapter Three, it is assumed that experienced organizations will develop a more strategically oriented counter-terrorist response than will non-experienced organizations. The exact differences between tactical management and strategic management can be made more clear by a discussion of the operational indicators developed to measure the differences.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION

Development of Empirical Measures for the Proposed Research

Quantitative Measures

The proposed research was guided by five "propositions," each of which required the collection of specific data and the development of specific measures. The five propositions developed for this research were that, when compared to non-experienced organizations, experienced organizations would:

P-1: Express a greater need for boundary spanning and networking processes to enhance information acquisition and processing capabilities, to assist in the management of intergroup interdependencies, and to foster innovation;

P-2: Express a greater need for use of more interactive planning methodologies and use of specific plans testing techniques;

P-3: Express a greater need for, and use of, a capabilities-oriented, strategic planning technique as opposed to a tactical, contingency planning technique;

P-4: Tend to perceive the organization's planning methodologies before initial experience with international terrorism as more oriented toward tactical planning; and

P-5: Tend to have written materials, procedures, rules, memoranda, and policies which are more strategically oriented.

The development of specific quantitative measures for each of the variables used in the proposed research is made easier by the 1980 work of Van De Ven and Ferry. Their work was developed specifically for "organizational researchers, consultants, and practitioners who diagnose, evaluate, and take action to solve problems in the design and performance of organizations."[1]. The text is a comprehensive and exhaustive synthesis of the literature on organizational design and organizational assessment, and is based on the results of a "longitudinal research program called Organization Assessment (OA), which has been in progress since 1972."[2] Van De Ven and Ferry describe,

evaluate and propose "a revised framework, a set of measurement instruments, and a process for conducting ongoing assessments of complex organizations."[3] The instruments they develop measure the "context, structure, and behavior of an overall organization and of work groups and individual jobs. [They] are intended to be used for basic and applied research and evaluation."[4] Their work has been accepted by the "cosmopolitan elite"[5] of organization design theorists, and appears to be a "standard" in the field. Lawler and Seashore note that Van De Ven and Ferry have created a work which "represents the first contribution to issues [of conceptualization and measurement in the assessment of organizations] that is comprehensive in ... coverage, firmly grounded in organizational theory, and supported by a sophisticated methodology."[6] Lawler and Seashore go on to note that Van De Ven and Ferry's work

> "is sufficiently detailed to serve as a manual of procedures for those who wish to apply, or adapt, the instruments and methods to their own purposes. The work reported is an exemplary model for the development of improved measurement methods, with admirable attention given to the sequential stages of field trial, quality assessment, revision, and validation."[7]

Many of the measures required for the proposed research will be adapted from the work of Van De Ven and Ferry. Each of the measures used is discussed below, and

the exact questions are reproduced in Appendix A. Specifically, measures are needed for the following concepts.

--The degree of centralization/decentralization of the planning and response mechanism of the organizations involved (Proposition One);

--The use of boundary spanning of the organizations involved (Proposition One);

--The degree of sophistication and use of specific information processing capabilities (Proposition Two);

--The use of innovation in planning and response mechanisms (Proposition Two);

--The use of formal prevention activities designed to reduce the incidences of terrorist activity (Proposition Two);

--The use of specific interorganizational processes designed to develop more effective counter-terrorist response (Proposition Two);

--The existence of a specifically articulated response authority (Proposition Two);

--The existence of an identifiable individual position responsible for coordinating the on-scene

response (Proposition Two);

--The use of external information acquisition sources (Proposition Three);

--The use of boundary spanning specifically for the purpose of information processing (Proposition Three);

--The use of interactive planning methodologies (Propositions Two and Three);

--The degree of perceived intergroup and interorganizational interdependencies * (Propositions Two and Three);

--The use of interactive plans testing (Proposition Two and Three);

--The use of boundary spanning as a method of controlling intergroup and interorganizational dependencies (Propositions One and Four);

--The use of formalized cooperation agreements or "mutual aid pacts" (Proposition Five);

--The degree to which the operational environment is perceived as stable or unstable and analyzable or unanalyzable (Proposition Three);

--The nature of the organizations' planning processes before initial experience with terrorist events (Proposition Four);

--The degree of understanding of a need for more strategically oriented planning (Proposition Four); and

--The degree to which archival data conform to strategic or tactical management processes (Proposition Five).

Each of the required measures will be discussed in turn. The measures used by Van De Ven and Ferry will be discussed in terms of their conceptual and literature foundations. The exact measure as used in the proposed research will be reproduced in Appendix A. For cases in which the measure used is not adapted from Van De Ven and Ferry, the source of the measure will be identified, and that measure will also be reproduced in Appendix A.

Measuring the Degree of Centralization/Decentralization

Proposition One stipulates that experienced organizations will be more inclined to utilize a decentralized counter-terrorist response than will non-experienced organizations. This proposition stems from the organizational design literature concerning organizations operating in a complex environment. Thompson[8], Jurkovich[9] and Galbraith[10] all suggest that such environments will create a need for a

decentralization of the organization. Van De Ven and Ferry develop several useful measures of the degree of centralization or decentralization in an organization. The first, referred to as the perceived structure of authority index (PSAI) consists of three questions which measure the "amount of influence of different individuals and groups on (1) the internal operation of each unit, (2) the total [organization], and (3) relationships with other organizations in the community."[11] The measure is based on many of the seminal works in the field[12] thus, it appears to have valid support in the literature. The three questions adapted for this research are reproduced in Appendix A, questions one, two, and three. These questions measure the perceived structure of authority in the focal organization. Perceptions of authority or influence residing within the work unit connote a decentralized organization; in the office of the chief a centralized organization; and within other organizations an interorganizational dependency.

In addition to these questions, Van De Ven and Ferry have developed a measure of employee discretion which is useful in determining the amount of centralization or decentralization in an organization. Van De Ven and Ferry define job discretion as "the degree of latitude that a job

incumbent exercises in making job-related decisions, the amount of work load pressure involved in the job and the degree to which the job incumbent is held accountable for his or her work behavior and decisions" and "the degree to which the job provides substantial freedom, independence, and discretion to the employee in scheduling his work and determining work procedures."[13] The three questions designed to measure discretion are reproduced in Appendix A, questions four, five, and six.

In addition to the measure developed by Van De Ven and Ferry, an additional measure will be used for the purposes of this research. Aiken and Haige[14] have developed an exceptionally widely used measure of centralization which can be adapted to measure the degree of centralization of an organization as it plans for and responds to a terrorist event. The measure developed by Aiken and Haige, and adapted for this research, are reproduced in Appendix A, questions seven, eight, and nine. These questions should provide an adequate understanding of the degree of centralization or decentralization of the organizations studied, and should provide empirical indicators of that characteristic. The questions have been modified only to reflect the specific nature of their use in relation to counter-terrorist response.

Measuring the Use of Boundary Spanning

Proposition Two suggests that experienced organizations will express a greater need for boundary spanning activities than will inexperienced organizations. This proposition comes from Ansoff who suggests that strategic management requires a "marshalling" of information and social energy.[15] Additional support for this proposition comes from Thompson[16] and Galbraith[17] who suggest that boundary spanning is critical in complex environments.

Van De Ven and Ferry develop their discussion of boundary spanning around several key characteristics important to the proposed research. They suggest that boundary spanning is important in identifying and controlling resource dependencies, creating interorganizational consensus, identifying domain similarity, and formalization of interagency agreement. Since all of these concepts are important to the proposed research, the measurements developed by Van De Ven and Ferry will be of specific use, and can be adapted directly for use in the current project. The measures developed by Van De Ven and Ferry are supported by the literature.[18] Van De Ven and Ferry define resource dependence as the "extent to which an organization needs external resources to attain its

self-interest goals for a specified period of time."[19] The questions used by Van De Ven and Ferry to measure resource dependence, and adapted for use in the proposed research are reproduced in Appendix A, questions ten through fourteen.

Questions Sixteen and Seventeen are designed to measure domain consensus. Van De Ven and Ferry also have developed five questions designed to measure domain similarity, a characteristic postulated as important to the development of strong interorganizational networks.[20] The specific questions used in the proposed research are reproduced in Appendix A, questions nineteen A through E.

Just as the existence of interorganizational boundary spanning is important, so is the frequency and intensity of that activity. Van De Ven and Ferry have developed excellent measures of the frequency of communications between the focal organization and other members of the organizational network. They define frequency of communications as "the number of times during the past six months that messages about the nature of the relationships or units of exchange were transmitted between the [focal agency] and [member agency] through the following media: written reports and letters, telephone calls, face-to-face discussions, and group or committee

meetings."[21] The four questions used to measure the frequency of boundary spanning activity are reproduced in Appendix A, questions twenty A through E.

In addition to the frequency of communication with external agencies, it is also important to understand the purpose behind those interactions. One of the purposes of IR networks is to facilitate the flow of necessary resources into the focal agency. Van De Ven and Ferry develop a specific measure of resource flows, which they define as:

> any valued transaction between agencies,"whether tangible or intangible. Tangible resources include money, office space, and physical equipment, client or customer referrals, and also specific joint problem-solving or planning activities among agencies. Intangible resource flows include consultation or technical assistance, pubic visibility, goodwill, and prestige that an agency either gives or receives in its involvement with other organizations.[22]

To measure these resource flows, Van De Ven and Ferry developed twelve questions, six each dealing with resource flows into and from the focal agency. The questions used for the proposed research are reproduced in Appendix A, questions twenty-one A through F and twenty-two A through F.

An additional integral part of the proposed research is the degree of formalization of the boundary spanning process. Van De Ven and Ferry have developed a four-question measure of the degree to which the interorganizational processes engaged in by the focal

organization are formalized. They define the formalization of interagency agreements as "the degree to which the role behavior and activities of each agency are clearly prescribed and codified."[23] The measures developed by Van De Ven and Ferry are reproduced in Appendix A, questions twenty-three through twenty-six.

Measurement of the Perceived Need for Effective Information Processing Capabilities

Proposition Two suggests that members of experienced organizations will express an understanding of the need for effective information processing capabilities more so than will members of non-experienced agencies. This proposition stems directly from Ansoff's suggestion that strategic management will require a "marshalling" of information to allow adequate strategic thrusts to be developed.[24] Galbraith[25], Thompson[26] and Jurkovich[27] also support the need for enhanced information processing capabilities for organizations operating in complex environments. Van De Ven and Ferry have developed several measures of the use of information technology within organizations. Proposition Two also suggests that members of experienced organizations will have more frequent communication than will members of non-experienced organizations, and that the communication patterns will be

more diverse than those found in the non-experienced organizations. The measures developed by Van De Ven and Ferry address these specific points. They define information flows as "work-related messages sent between people through one-to-one contacts, in group meetings, and through reports and memos."[28] They use three questions to measure frequency and direction of information flows. The questions are reproduced in Appendix A, questions twenty-seven through thirty.

These measures should provide an accurate assessment of the frequency and direction of communications in the agencies studied.

Measuring the Perceived Need for Innovation in Planning for and Responding to Terrorist-Generated Emergencies

Proposition Two also deals with the perceived need among respondents for the use of innovation when planning for and responding to acts of terrorism. Innovation is postulated by Galbraith,[29], Jurkovich[30] and Perrow[31] as imperative for organizations operating in complex environments. Aldrich and Herker[32] infer that an ability to innovate is essential to problem solving. Ansoff[33] also suggests that the ability to innovate is critical to developing new strategic thrusts to match environmental turbulence. Since Van De Ven and Ferry have

developed no useful measurements of the perceived need for innovation, measurement of the characteristic is accomplished by using a modification of Patchen's eleven-point scale of the use of innovative processes. Patchen defines innovation as the degree to which a system is "a first or early user of an idea among its own or similar social systems."[34] The measure can be adapted for this research with no major change. The questions used are reproduced in Appendix A, questions thirty-one though thirty-four.

Measuring the Use of Formalized Prevention Activities

Proposition Two suggests that experienced organizations will use prevention activities to "buffer" their technological core. This proposition comes directly from Thompson's assumption that smoothing peak demands can be accomplished through operations to prevent unwanted calls for services or drains on resources.[35] Van De Ven and Ferry obviously have not developed a measure of the use of formalized prevention activities among organizations responsible for counter-terrorist response; however, a measure of such activities can be adapted rather easily from their previous measures. Proposition Five suggests that experienced organizations will more frequently develop

formalized terrorism prevention activities than will non-experienced organizations. The existence of formalized prevention units will be measured using questions thirty-five through thirty-seven, which are reproduced in Appendix A.

Measuring Interorganizational Cooperation

Proposition Two suggests that experienced organizations will use interorganizational processes to assist in management of the complexities created by terrorist events. The literature supports this assumption, in that Lenz notes that strategic management will assist successful organizations in developing networking processes to create "beliefs, attitudes, and commitments" which will create capabilities "embodied in the evolving networks of interdependence ... within [the organization's] environment."[36] Ansoff also suggests that the ability to communicate with and enlist the support of other organizations in the focal organizations environment is critical to the concept of strategic management.[37] Measures of interorganizational cooperation have been discussed previously under part two of this section dealing with boundary spanning. Useful indications of the degree to which the studied organizations engage in interorganizational cooperation can be extracted from the

measures included in part two. No new measures are needed for Proposition Two, which suggests that personnel from experienced organizations will engage in more frequent processes of interorganizational cooperation than will personnel from non-experienced organizations.

Measuring Specifically Articulated Response Authority

Measures of specifically identified and assigned response authority are not readily available in the literature; however, such a measure is adaptable from Van De Ven and Ferry's concept of authority structure. Proposition Two suggests that experienced organizations are more inclined to have an articulated specific response authority than are non-experienced organizations. This proposition directly reflects the literature in complex organizations. Thompson[38], Jurkovich[39], and Galbraith[40] all note the importance of an identified, on-scene position authorized to make critical decisions. The measure for the existence of specifically articulated response authority is adapted from Van De Ven and Ferry and is reproduced in Appendix A, questions thirty-eight and thirty-nine.

Measuring the Use of Specific Responsibility for On-Scene Response Coordination

There exist no known organizational measures for

assessing the use of an identified individual position responsible for on-scene coordination of the counter-terrorist response. However, as with the previous proposition, a measure can be readily adapted from existing accepted measures. Proposition Two suggests that experienced organizations will be more inclined than non-experienced organizations to develop an identifiable individual position which is responsible for coordination of the on-scene counter-terrorist response. The measure for this position of responsibility is reproduced in Appendix A, questions forty through forty-two.

Measuring the Need for External Information Acquisition

The importance of external information acquisition is noted by Ansoff,[41] Thompson,[42] Galbraith,[43] and Tushman.[44] The processing of information has been dealt with previously in part three of this section. The measures developed for that part are useful in determining the direction of information flow. Proposition Three suggests that experienced organizations will acquire more information concerning counter-terrorist response from external sources than will non-experienced organizations. Specific questions used to measure the amount of information acquired from external sources are reproduced in Appendix A,

questions twenty-seven through thirty. In addition to these questions, responses to question thirty can be used to identify the source of information acquisition by the studied organizations.

Measuring Boundary Spanning as an Information Processing Activity

The questions developed in part two of this section, concerning the use of boundary spanning as an interorganizational coordination process can be used to test Proposition Three. This proposition suggests that experienced organizations will be more inclined than non-experienced organizations to use boundary spanning as a method of gaining needed information from external sources. No new measures are needed to test this proposition.

Measuring Interactive Planning Methodologies

Thompson[45], Ansoff[46], and Lenz[47] suggest that interactive planning is important in establishing cooperative agreements, organizational legitimacy, and effective organizational thrusts to meet environmental turbulence. Proposition Three suggests that experienced organizations will be more inclined than non-experienced organizations to use interactive planning methods. As with Proposition One, which discusses the use of

interorganizational processes, the questions used for part two of this section can be used as measures for the adaptation of interactive planning methodologies.

Measuring Understanding of Intergroup Dependencies

Propositions Two and Three suggest that experienced organizations will be more inclined than non-experienced organizations to express an understanding of existing intergroup dependencies. These propositions are supported by Tushman and Scanlon[48], Kotter[49], and Galaskeiwicz and Shatin.[50] The measurements developed by Van De Ven and Ferry concerning intergroup dependencies are directly adaptable to the proposed research. The three-question measure for "work flow interconnectedness of ...personnel."[51] is reproduced in Appendix A, questions forty-three and forty-four.

Measuring Understanding of the Need for Plans Testing

Parts of Propositions Two and Three were developed from the literature on terrorism response which suggests that plans should be tested for viability prior to implementation.[52] These propositions suggest that members of experienced organizations will be more inclined than members of non-experienced organizations to express an

understanding of the need for testing of operational plans prior to their use. At the present time, no known measure exists for this concept; however, one may be readily adapted using the work of Van De Ven and Ferry.[53] The form of the measure is reproduced in Appendix A, questions forty-five through forty-seven.

Measuring Attempts at Controlling Intergroup Dependencies Through Boundary Spanning for Mutual Adjustment

Reliance on boundary spanning and networking to control intergroup dependencies in complex organizational environments is suggested by Ansoff[54], Lenz[55], Van de Ven[56], Tushman and Scanlon[57] and Kotter[58]. Van De Ven and Ferry have developed several measures of coordination processes. They define coordination as "linking or integrating different parts of an organization to accomplish a collective set of tasks."[59] The measures used by Van De Ven and Ferry measure intraorganizational as well as interorganizational coordination processes. The questions used can easily be adapted to research in the area of counter-terrorist response. The questions are reproduced in Appendix A, questions forty-eight through fifty.

Measuring the Understood Need for the Development of Cooperative Arrangements with Other Agencies

Proposition Five suggests that personnel from experienced organizations will be more inclined than personnel from non-experienced organizations to recognize the need for the existence of cooperative arrangements with other agencies.

The data necessary for analysis of this proposition will be collected when respondents answer the questions in part two of this section concerning the interorganizational processes engaged in by members of the organization. No further measures are needed.

An Analysis of the Importance of Organizational Experience in Counter-Terrorist Response

The importance of individual and organizational experience in responding to and planning for counter-terrorist response is a key assumption of the proposed research. The experience level of the organization involved is assumed to be important for several reasons.

1. Ansoff, in his treatment of strategic management, makes the assumption that organizational personnel will be constantly exposed to opportunities to monitor and learn from environmental turbulence;[60] however, when strategic management of the counter-terrorist response is considered, we

find that such daily experience with environmental turbulence-- a vital need according to Ansoff-- is not present. Such turbulence comes mainly from confrontation with environmental contingencies with which the organization is not familiar, e.g., from actual experience with a terrorist event.

2. Cyert and March note that experience with a unique event not readily addressable through established organizational practices will cause the organization to resort to investigation of new methods, or will cause "problemistic search" to develop new methods of handling an event which will not be affected by standard organizational procedures.[61]
3. Police agencies, the focal agencies in this study, and police officers in general tend to be affective learners as opposed to cognitive learners[62], thus experience tends to be more important to individual officers and to the organization than is education, classroom training, or concepts developed in professional journals.
4. There exists little professional literature

within the realm of police science dealing with managing the counter-terrorist response, thus the police are left little choice but to rely on experience as a guide in responding.

Experience and Strategic Management

Ansoff makes an inherent assumption about the organizations for which he suggests the use of strategic management: that the organizations' personnel will be constantly exposed to opportunities to "marshall" social energy and information concerning their strategic activities.[63] Under normal circumstances, this would be true of most organizations. Personnel within such organizations are normally exposed to opportunities to monitor their environment daily. The turbulence with which they are faced in determining an organizational thrust is routinely there to be observed daily. Under these conditions it is possible to engage in activities which will allow agency actors to develop a strategic thrust to match the degree of environmental turbulence. The day-to-day situation, the daily turbulence, helps managers pin-point critical dependencies, identify critical interorganizational networks, identify key boundary spanners, identify information types and innovation practices required by the specific type, intensity, and duration of the environmental

turbulence. In short, the exposure to daily turbulence allows managers to engage in decision leadership and action leadership which will define the organizations' strategic thrusts.

Unfortunately, the environmental turbulence which makes strategic management a necessity for counter-terrorist response organizations is not present on a daily basis for most of these organizations. Terrorist events, and the environmental complexity and turbulence they create, are not commonplace for these organizations. Because terrorist events occur only infrequently, the local organizations charged with responding to such events do not have the benefit of daily exposure to the environmental turbulence for which they need to develop a given strategic thrust. As a result, managers of these organizations are not provided accurate stimuli with which to identify critical dependencies, interorganizational networks, key boundary spanners, innovation processes, or information sources. As a result, it is much more difficult for managers and personnel to develop a strategic thrust capable of meeting the environmental turbulence created by a terrorist event. Without the experience of actual day-to-day exposure to the complexities generated by terrorist events, most agencies could be expected to resort to tactical planning, utilizing

mostly an intraorganizational approach.

As the organization experiences the response process, however, the experience is assumed to provide the turbulence which creates the need for the process of strategic management. When the organization responds to a terrorist event, the need for external resources becomes apparent. For example, as illustrated by the scenario used earlier, the local department has no control over the actions of the federal government and its foreign aid program. It is unable to consent to the terrorists' demands, even if that is its wish. In the typical non-international, or local event, most demands are local in nature-- money, transportation, food, etc. The police can meet these demands if they so desire. In addition, with the international event, the local department may have little knowledge of the intent, organization, or methods of operation of the internationally focused group with which it is forced to deal. If the act is completed and the perpetrators are not apprehended at the scene, the local department has few resources to investigate a crime of international scope, unless it can rely on other agencies.

It becomes apparent, upon experience with international terrorism, that the local department is dependent upon outside resources which can be provided only

by other local, state, federal, or private organizations. (See Table One). It is hypothesized that this external resource dependency, coupled with the unpredictable nature of terrorist activity, will lead the experienced organization to understand the need for a strategic management approach to planning for and responding to a terrorist event. The event itself provides the environmental turbulence that fosters the use of strategic planning and strategic management. It is realized that the actual experience of being confronted with an incident which cannot be contained to a response within the individual organization's internal capability will also engender other organizational capabilities and characteristics, such as increased group cohesiveness, improved training methodologies, improved team work, enhanced sophistication of response methodologies, etc. The importance of these capabilities is not underestimated here. They are simply not part of the focus of this study.

Problemistic Search and the Role of Organizational Experience

The second rationale for inclusion of organizational experience as a key variable in the proposed research is the concept of problemistic search as developed by Cyert and March. Cyert and March note the tendency of an organization

to develop well-honed repertoires of organizational responses, and to cling to those repertoires until forced to abandon them because they no longer work well.[64] The importance of experience as a precursor of development of a strategic management approach to counter-terrorist response can be traced back to their concept of "problemistic search." As Cyert and March note, the process of problemistic search explains the tendency of people to follow familiar procedures and operational methodologies, as well as to continue to rely on traditional sources of information. This reliance on standard decision-making procedures continues until the organization encounters a problem or set of problems for which the traditional procedures simply do not work. It is at this point that the organization's personnel will first step outside the traditional methods of operation. The occurrence of this unusual problem serves as the motivational source which encourages them to search for alternate methods of response to a problem. Experience with an event of international terrorism is assumed to be a significantly different experience which creates the need for problemistic search. The result of this problemistic search, it is assumed, is a management perspective more closely aligned with strategic management.

The Nature of Police Learning Processes

A third requirement for the use of experience as a key variable in the proposed research is the nature of the police organizations which will respond to the events of terrorism, and the nature of the personnel with which they will respond. The tendency of the police to be affective learners, learners more focused on experiential processes than other learning processes, is relatively well documented in the literature. For example, as Sherman has noted, the major requirement for police science instructors has been experience, not education.[65] In 1976 the National Planning Association noted that criminal justice faculty at the two-year institutional level were significantly less well educated than their non-criminal-justice counterparts. Criminal justice faculty were found to have completed graduate education at a rate one fourth of that of non-criminal justice faculty.[66] During development of guidelines for faculty recruitment and retention, the Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP) articulated a preference for an experience base for police science instructors.[67] The preference for experience in faculty carries through to the organizations themselves, and in fact is most likely a reflection of what is demanded by the police organizations.

As Harry Mansfield, director of the Tennessee Law Enforcement Planning Agency noted:

> [s]ince most of the students taking criminal justice courses are already employed in criminal justice agencies, it is quite difficult for a professor to get up and instruct policemen on police-related subjects when they have never experienced what they may be talking about. Policemen find it hard to relate to someone who only has ... book knowledge.[68]

The tendency is, in fact, for police agencies in general, and police officers in particular, to view cognitive learning as a hindrance, and to attach an onus to those who possess the wrong kind of knowledge.[68] The existence of this phenomenon is so pervasive that this author, when developing training programs for police officers, frequently stresses the fact that "I am an experienced cop, not simply an academic."

What is important to the police instead of cognitive learning in the form of classroom education, in-service training, or developing solutions to problems based on journal research, is affective learning developed experientially. This appears to be the only real learning, and, where the police are concerned, is much preferred over cognitive learning.[69] When police agencies are faced with problems which generate problemistic search, they will generally avail themselves of fact-finding trips to other police agencies who have experienced the same problems and

who have had some success in solving them. They seldom resort to journals, texts, or academic consultants. These sources are not seen as legitimate sources of usable knowledge in many instances.

Available Solutions to the Problem

A final consideration concerning the importance of experience as a key variable in the proposed research is the amount of usable literature that exists concerning the management of terrorist events. There appears to be little useful information regarding the problem of management of these events in either the popular police journals or the academic journals. The literature that does exist is mostly of a tactical, intraorganizational nature.[71] Added to this lack of professional literature is the perception that it is not possible to plan for terrorist response before the fact. There are simply too many potential targets and too many potential terrorist methods.[72] Thus, according to the police view, one simply has to experience the event and develop responses based on that experience. The role of organizational experience, then, becomes critical to the proposed research.

Logic of the Focus upon Selected Types of Data

The research process collects a great deal of data

relating to boundary spanning, networking, information networks and interoganizational cooperation. This data is deemed important for the research for the following reasons. Terrorism is seen as one of the many problems confronting modern government which have a tendency to create a need for such a complex response that the problem "'falls between the cracks' of any single public agency."[73] Organizational theory indicates that problems such as terrorism which "fall between the cracks" of any single public agency will require an interoganizational response. Management of that response can best be described as strategic, since it involves aligning the organization with an unstable and uncertain environment. Such practices relate to:

1. Task and technology related unit differentiation
2. Allocation rules among members
3. Authority structure for task accomplishment
4. Buffering of technological or task cores, and
5. Provision of an incentive system sufficient to cause other organizations to participate in the interorganizational network.[74]

Other literature exists bearing on this problem, and it is discussed in detail in the body of the prospectus. Specifically, the proposed data collection focus for the

research is based on the following assumptions.

Terrorism presents most police departments with problems that cannot be addressed solely from an internal perspective. Such problems include:

-- Requirement for information which can be generated only from outside the organization, e.g., information concerning methods of operation, identities, philosophies, and current status of the terrorist group engaged in the actions to which the department is responding.

-- Requirement for resources which go beyond that available to the individual department, e.g., manpower, specialized equipment, ability to meet ransom or other negotiated demands, etc.

-- The need to provide sufficient capacity to meet terrorist threats during a period of fiscal retrenchment.

-- The need to provide specialized technologies not normally required in the routine operation of the police department.

-- The lack of adequate jurisdictional authority to respond to acts of terrorism, e.g., some acts committed in local jurisdictions are federal crimes and are directed at changing actions of the federal

government, yet local police departments are required to respond.

-- The need for the provision of unique kinds of organizational expertise not normally required in the routine operation of the police department, e.g., negotiation skills with international terrorists.

-- The need to develop plans for events which occur infrequently and which are difficult to plan for.

A review of the literature suggests that organizations faced with such problems will respond through strategic management of interorganizational cooperation. The proposed research is designed to measure the degree to which the organizations selected for study use the tools of strategic management and interorganizational cooperation to accomplish their tasks in responding to terrorist events. Thus, the following processes need to be measured.

-- The degree of use of boundary spanning to enhance organizational legitimacy, establish information channels within and among cooperating organizations, and foster organizational innovation.

-- The use of networking to establish interoganizational trust, to deal with high degrees of uncertainty, to establish an expanded knowledge base, and to deal with

interorganizational conflict.

-- The degree to which strategic management processes are used to develop strategic goals, interorganizational trust, etc.

-- The extent to which interorganizational information processing structures are developed and utilized.

-- The degree to which interorganizational processes are managed to develop support from external network components.

The theory developed for this research suggests that organizations which are experienced in counter-terrorist response will exhibit a higher degree of strategic management processes-- boundary spanning, networking, interoganizational information and conflict resolution processes, and intergroup cooperation-- than will organizations not experienced in responding to terrorist events.

Selection of the Research Design

As Edward Suchman has noted, "the extent to which a research worker adheres to all the basic requirements of [the research] process represents, by and large, a compromise between the level of incontrovertible proof desired and the administrative resources at hand."[75] He

continues to note that all research designs represent a compromise "dictated by the many practical considerations that go into social research."[76] So it is with the research design chosen for this research. The compromise is between the goal of accuracy, validity, and reliability on the one hand, and that of a workable research design on the other. There are obvious choices to be made if the only criterion is accuracy and generalizability; however, the researcher in the field of organizational response to terrorism is faced with other considerations. Ideally, the research design chosen will allow isolation and control of the stimulus under study, sampling of equivalent experimental and control groups, and accurate definition and measurement of criteria of effect.[77] But, as has been noted previously, "[p]ractical difficulties of gaining access to genuinely comparable groups have made the use of this ideal design a rarity."[78] So it is with the research conducted here.

The research design selected for this research is the static group comparison design discussed by Suchman[79] and Sellitz, et al. There are several inherent weaknesses in such a design. For example, Sellitz, et al., note that this design has several threats to validity. It lacks random assignment, thus any measured differences may

be attributable to the differences in selection. This design is also open to threats from differential exposure to historical events which may yield differences in the organizations studied, not attributable to the independent variable.[80] Suchman also notes several risks inherent in the use of the static group comparison design. He suggests that there is no ability to control for exogenous variables, time, or pre-treatment measurement bias.[81] Given the inherent weaknesses of the static group comparison design, some rationale for its selection in this research is in order.

The research required a great deal of data to be collected from each agency studied. In order for the research to be productive, it was necessary to obtain insight into each subject's understanding, conceptualizations, and perspectives of the basic issues involved. Thus, the data collection methodology was intensive for each agency involved, requiring hours of time for each respondent. Such intensive data collection processes preclude utilizing a large number of agencies as subjects, and thus excluded the possibility of using more powerful research designs such as the Solomon Four-Group. In addition, the very nature of terrorism makes use of other more methodologically sophisticated research designs

difficult. Terrorism is not predictable. It is not possible to determine exactly where terrorist events will occur within the next few weeks or months. Thus, the use of quasi-experimental designs for the proposed research was hampered by the requirement for an observation before and after the stimulus. It would have been exceptionally difficult to make the intensive and extensive commitment of interview time and cost in order to obtain a pre-stimulus observation of a sufficient number of agencies to insure that group of agencies would be required to respond to a terrorist incident in the near future. For this reason, all research designs requiring a pre-test were eliminated from consideration. Of the remaining designs, the one shot case study and the static group comparison, it was felt that the latter offered better probability for usable results.

Selection of Research Sites

In order to enhance the results of the study, it was felt that using two police agencies in each cell of the design (two experienced departments and two non-experienced departments) would be the preferred method. In response to this consideration, four city police departments, each the major enforcement agency within its respective standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA), were selected as subjects for the proposed research. At the request of the

departments involved, the names of the participating departments are protected. Given the sometimes sensitive nature of counter-terrorist response, it was felt that this was not an unreasonable request. Anonymity was required in many cases to gain access to the data needed to complete the research. Of the four cities selected for the research, one, an experienced agency, was located in an SMSA in the northeast, two, one experienced and one non-experienced, were located in the southeast, and one, a non-experienced agency, was located in the midwest.

The rationale for selection of these departments as subjects of the proposed research centered around organizational experience with terrorist activities and willingness to participate in the research. The two experienced cities, Northeast and Southeast, were identified as having a sufficiently lengthy organizational experience with terrorist events through an analysis of acts of international terrorism in the United States from 1965 to 1980. This pool of data was developed by reviewing information contained in Jenkins' 1975 chronology of terrorism, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 1976 report on disorders and terrorism, and Facts on File.

Several organizations were identified which had

experienced several acts of international terrorism over the period, 1965-1980. It was felt that organizations should be chosen for the experienced cell only if their experience had been over a period of years. This lengthy experience was seen as necessary to allow time for the organization to adapt to the requirements of counter-terrorist response. Once the total pool of organizations eligible under these requirements was identified, several were eliminated because of perceived excessive costs in obtaining the necessary data. For example, Los Angeles, California was not considered because of the cost of travel involved in conducting interviews. Requests for assistance were sent to the list of financially feasible experienced agencies. Some of those contacted refused to participate. Two organizations were selected from among the remaining agencies. Northeast and Southeast were selected because they possessed the greatest amount of experience with international terrorism-- in terms of actual numbers of events-- as defined for this research:

> an attempted or completed criminal act of violence committed by, or in behalf of, individuals representing groups or countries outside the territorial boundaries of the United States or its possessions, for the purpose of altering,

protesting, or calling attention to perceived inequity in the political, economic, or social status quo.

A similar process was used to select the non-experienced cities. First, a list of major SMSA cities which had not experienced incidents of international terrorism in the 1965-1980 time period was developed. Second, cities which posed financial difficulties in terms of access were eliminated from the list. Third, the police agencies responsible for serving these cities were mailed written requests to participate in the research. From among the few agencies which consented to the research, two were selected as subjects, Midwest and, although the second city is actually located in the southeast, for clarity in distinguishing it form the experienced city in the southeast, South. It is interesting to note, parenthetically, that the percentage of police departments agreeing to participate was much lower in the non-experienced cell than in the experienced cell.

No effort was made to match the subject departments since the relative low numbers of agencies agreeing to participate precluded a sufficient choice of available agencies to do so. As the number of variables used to match

agencies grew, the number of agencies available for selection shrank. Development of a sufficient number of matching variables closed out the pool of willing agencies. This was particularly true with the experienced agencies, which represented a much smaller sample size to begin with. Given these restrictions, then, selection was reduced to the following criteria:

1. Experience or lack of experience with terrorist events;
2. Location within an SMSA;
3. Willingness to participate; and
4. Financial considerations of access.

Description of Sites Selected for Data Collection

The parameters developed for selection of participant organizations led to final selection of four police organizations, located in different areas of the United States. All four organizations serve Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). All four organizations were the largest law enforcement agencies in their respective areas, and all seemed to serve as a lead agency in the development of law enforcement practices within their respective areas, much as would be expected from the largest law enforcement agency in a given area. All four selected organizations were larger than two-hundred

sworn personnel. Each of the organizations had developed a specialized response unit which was assigned the responsibility for delivering crisis management services in the areas of emergency services and hostage situations. Each of the agencies, and their service areas are described in detail below. In order to protect the anonymity of the individual agencies, as requested by the agency heads, the discussion will deal with some criteria in a generic manner. The anonymity of the responding agencies was a prerequisite to participation in the research. As a result, some of the detail that would normally be included in the description of the participating organizations will be omitted from this discussion.

Describing the Non-Experienced Organizations

Midwest

The Midwest Police Department was the least experienced of the four organizations studied. The response unit was newly formed in 1979. The unit functions as a part-time unit, with the officers performing generalist policing functions until the need for an emergency response unit arises. The officers are then assigned temporarily to the crisis, and perform the emergency response required. At the completion of the crisis, the officers return to their

normal duty assignments. It was found that this was the accepted method of operation for all of the departments studied for this research, with the exception of the Northeast Police Department. The Midwest Police Department consisted of more than 1000 sworn officers, of which more than thirty were assigned to the emergency response unit. The environment in which the Midwest Police Department's emergency response operates can be described by reviewing census data for 1980, the last available census year for Midwest.

Table Two depicts the census data for Midwest for 1980. As Table Two indicates, Midwest is the largest SMSA in its state, with an SMSA population of over 1.7 million. It can also be noted that the Midwest SMSA has a predominately white population, comprising more than eighty per cent of the population. Less than one per cent of the population of Midwest was of Spanish origin. Slightly more than seventeen per cent of the population was Black. The median age of the Midwest SMSA's population was slightly over 30 years in 1980. Median family income in the SMSA for 1980 was over $22,000 per year, but less than $23,000. More than nine per cent of the population of the SMSA was reported below the poverty level in 1980. More than two per cent of the population eighteen years of age and older

TABLE 2

CENSUS DATA FOR APPLICABLE STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS -- 1980 CENSUS

	SMSA			
Characteristic	"Midwest"	"South"	"Southeast"	"Northeast"
Largest SMSA in State?	YES	NO	YES	YES
Population of SMSA (In Millions)	>1.7	>1.5	>1.6	>2.0
Per Cent of Population White	>80	>89	>77	>64
Per Cent of Population Black	>17	>09	>17	>23
Per Cent of Population of Spanish Origin	<1**	<1	>3	>17
Median Age of Population (In Years)	>30	>38	>34	>32
Median Family Income (In $1,000)	22-23	16-17	18-19	18-19
Per Cent of Persons Reported Below Poverty Level	>9	>11	>15	>18
Per Cent of Persons 18 Years and over Who Speak a Language other Than English at Home	>2	>7	>32	>24
Per Cent of Persons 18 Years and over Who Speak English "Not Well or Not at All"	>10	>13	>38	>24
Per Cent of Civilian Labor Force Unemployed	>11	>5	>5	>7

* Equal to or Greater Than ** Equal to or Less Than

NOTE: Some figures are not given in exact amounts or percentages to protect the anonymity of participating departments.

Source: United States Census Bureau, Summary of General Population Characteristics: 1980, "Summary Characteristics for Governmental Units" .

spoke a language other than English at home, while more than ten per cent of those indicated that they spoke English not well or not at all. The unemployment rate for the Midwest SMSA was more than eleven per cent for 1980.

South

The South Police Department, although considered to have no experience with international terrorism, as defined for the purposes of this research, did have a jurisdiction which seemed to offer many targets to the potential international terrorist. This fact was acknowledged by the personnel of South, and seemed to lead to an enhanced awareness of the potential problems which might be generated by an event of international terrorism.

The response unit at South, like that at Midwest, was a part-time response unit. The unit also consisted of more than thirty members who worked generalist police duties until the need for the team's services arose, at which time they would be assigned temporarily to the crisis response role. Upon completion of the response, the officers would return to their generalist roles. The environment in which the South Police Department delivers its response can best be understood by reviewing Table Two.

Table Two depicts the census data for the South Police Department SMSA for 1980, the last available census

data for the area. The South SMSA is the second largest SMSA in its state, registering about 1.5 million, some 56,000 persons less than the largest SMSA in the state during the 1980 census. The South SMSA is a sufficient distance from the largest SMSA in the state, however, to allow the South Police Department to remain the lead agency in area law enforcement. Like the Midwest, the South SMSA is predominately white, with eighty nine per cent of the population white, nine per cent Black, and about one per cent of spanish origin. The median age of the South SMSA for 1980 was slightly over 38 years. Median family income in the SMSA for 1980 was over $16,000 per year, but less than $17,000. More than eleven per cent of the population of the SMSA was reported below the poverty level in 1980. More than seven per cent of the population over the age of eighteen spoke a language other than English at home, while roughly thirteen per cent of those indicated that they spoke English not well or not at all. The unemployment rate for the South SMSA was slightly more than five per cent for 1980. The demographic characteristics for the South and Midwest SMSAs can be seen to be similar. The same holds true for the experienced organizations selected as research sites.

Describing the Experienced Organizations

Southeast

Of the two experienced organizations, the response unit within the Southeast Police Department was the lesser experienced in responding to international terrorism. The unit at Southeast was a part-time unit, with the officers doing normal patrol duty until a response emergency arose, and then serving as needed in the response unit. The Southeast Police Department consisted of more than 1000 sworn police officers, and the response unit consisted of more than thirty officers. The response unit at Southeast was, as with all departments described previously, composed of officers from various operational units within the police department. The environment in which the Southeast response process operated is described in Table Two.

Table Two depicts selected census data for the Southeast Police Department's SMSA for the year 1980, which was the last available data. As Table Two indicates, the Southeast SMSA was similar to that of Midwest and South in 1980. Southeast was the largest SMSA in its state, with an SMSA population of more than 1.6 million. Southeast had a predominately white population, with more than seventy-seven per cent of the population white, seventeen per cent Black, and nearly four per cent of spanish origin. The median age

of the Southeast SMSA's population was slightly over 34 years. The median family income in the SMSA for 1980 was over $18,000, but less than $19,000. More than fifteen per cent of the population of the Southeast SMSA was reported below the poverty level in 1980. Slightly more than thirty-two per cent of the population of the SMSA reported speaking a language other than English in the home, while thirty-eight per cent of those indicated that they spoke English not well or not at all. The unemployment rate for the Southeast SMSA was around five per cent for 1980.

Northeast

The Northeast Police Department differed from the other agencies participating in this study in that the officers of the response unit worked that assignment on a full-time basis. The response unit in Northeast consisted of more than thirty officers. Response officers in Northeast delivered a wide range of special services, in addition to the counter-terrorist response role. These services included emergency rescues, crowd control, dignitary protection, and other specifically assigned duties. In addition, the Northeast Police Department was the largest of the four organizations studied, having more than 1000 sworn officers. The environment in which the Northeast Police Department operates can best be understood

by reviewing Table Two.

Table Two depicts the census data for the Northeast SMSA for the year 1980, which was the last available census year for Northeast. As Table Two indicates, Northeast is the largest SMSA in its state, with an SMSA population of over two million. It can also be noted that in 1980 the Northeast SMSA had a predominately white population, with whites comprising more than sixty-four per cent of the population. Approximately twenty-three per cent of the population of Northeast was Black, and more than seventeen per cent of the population was of Spanish origin. The median age of the Northeast population in 1980 was slightly over 32 years. Median family income in the SMSA for 1980 was over $18,000, but less than $19,000. More than eighteen per cent of the population of the Northeast SMSA was reported below the poverty level in 1980. More than twenty-four per cent of the population of the Northeast SMSA spoke a language other than English at home, while twenty four per cent of those indicated that they spoke English not well or not at all. The unemployment rate for the Northeast SMSA was slightly more than seven per cent for 1980.

Data Collection Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Methodology-- An Approach to Triangulation

As Downey and Ireland note, the selection of

research method depends to a great degree on the context of the given research setting, the goals of the research, and the conditions of the given research.[82] Research projects which attempt to answer questions of cause may be best suited to quantitative approaches[83] while qualitative approaches may be more suitable to gather an understanding of a process or to determine meaning.[84] In fact, some authors have viewed purely quantitative methods to be "impoverished," leading to an "absurd confusion [which] stems from a kind of goal displacement in [organizational] research over a number of years."[85] This goal displacement centers around the tendency to focus too much attention on quantitative measures, and too little on conceptualization of organizational settings which give rise to the phenomenon under study. This argument relates directly to Kaplan's suggestion that "too often, we ask how to measure something without raising the question of what we would do with the measurement if we had it."[86] What is needed is a conceptual approach to research methods, one which will consider the efficacy of proposed measures, as well as the adequate conceptualization of the need for those measures.

Downey and Ireland note that these two concepts

center around the two dimensions of what is being measured and how it is being measured. They note that:

> The first distinguishes between conceptualizing the environment: (1) in terms of the participant's interpretations of the environment or (2) in terms of environmental attributes. The second distinguishes between operationalizing the concepts (1) with quantitative variables or (2) with qualitative variables.[87]

The unfortunate assumption of work such as Downey and Ireland's is that the choice between quantitative or qualitative is "either, or." It is possible to develop research methods which use both a qualitative and a quantitative methodology. For example, Sieber has noted that a blend of the qualitative and quantitative can produce a more powerful analysis than either method used separately.[88] What is important in such an approach is the development of a conceptual guideline to indicate the what and the how of the proposed research.

A major problem confronted in this research was its exploratory nature. While the literature on terrorism is, as Mickolus[89] notes, quite extensive, there is a grave lack of research on the organizational and management factors of the problem. Similarly, while the literature on organizational behavior is quite extensive, there is no known example of that body of literature being applied to the problem of terrorism. There is no body of established

research that directly provides guidelines for the development of a quantitative approach to organizational problems encountered in responding to terrorist incidents. In addition, the sample size required to generate usable quantitative data would require enormous investments in terms of time, money, and personnel, and would involve research of a truly nationwide scope. Thus, while some quantitative measures were used during the course of the research, it was used mainly to triangulate the process of qualitative investigation of the problem of terrorism.

For example, in the proposed research, it is important to understand whether or not the organizations studied actually engage in boundary spanning activity. The existence of such activity is measurable, and measures for determining its existence have been developed for this research. It is also important to understand how and why this activity exists, if it does, or why it does not exist if the measures show no use of the process. Quantitative measures will adequately demonstrate the existence of the phenomenon; however, reliance on quantitative measures alone will lead to what Tinker has labeled the "poverty of empiricism."[90] We will know that boundary spanning activity exists, but we will not know <u>why</u>. In order to understand why such activity exists requires a more

qualitative approach.

The intention of the research to take both a qualitative and a quantitative approach to method was an attempt at using various styles and forms of data collection to enhance reliability and validity of the research process. This attempt conforms to the suggestions of many authors concerning triangulation of methodology.[91] Triangulation involves establishing alternate sources of data in order to control somewhat the inherent weaknesses in all data collection methodologies and data sources. For this research, triangulation is accomplished by obtaining both quantitative and qualitative data, by acquiring archival data to cross check the information given by respondents in the quantitative and qualitative data collection, and by attempting to verify respondents reports of boundary spanning activity and planning techniques with the agencies listed as important cooperating agencies.

Accordingly, some concepts involved in the research are analyzed according to measures developed by a highly quantitative approach, while other concepts are addressed by a more qualitative approach. It is hoped that this process has produced research which is both supported by specific measures of concepts and activities involved in strategic management of the counter-terrorist response, and in

research grounded in strong conceptualization of the need for measures of these concepts and activities. The results of this dual method, it is hoped, is a determination of the degree to which the proposed relationships exist, as well as an understanding concerning why and how they exist. Quantitative research methods assist in determining the degree to which these activities exist. Qualitative research methods assist in determining the "how" and "why."

As a result, the data collection process seemed to require a mixture of the focused interview and structured questionnaire processes. The structured questionnaire (see Appendix A) was useful in establishing a cross check on the reliability of the data collection process. All respondents were given the same questions which were printed on prepared response forms. There was little room for collector-generated error, since each respondent was subjected to identical stimuli.

A similar control over reliability was generated by use of the structured interview form reproduced in Appendix D. For example, there are several propositions which relate to information acquisition and processing. In the focused interview schedule, these propositions were grouped together under a common heading, and one specific question was asked concerning information acquisition and processing. Three

follow-up questions were also prepared for this category. The same was true of the other propositions. They were grouped into inclusive categories.

The intent of the focused interview was to provide an additional data collection process to focus on the why and how of the organizational process involved in planning for and responding to terrorist events. The use of qualitative data to support the structured questionnaire was seen to have several benefits. First, it allowed a deeper penetration into the organizational processes involved in counter-terrorist response.[92] It directly addressed perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs which may not have been foreseen and recorded on the structured questionnaire. Second, it served as a triangulation of the data collected with the structured questionnaire. While it covered the same basic areas of organizational activity, it did so with a different process. The focused interview was open-ended, and allowed the respondent to develop verbal responses rather than pencil and paper responses. The depth of understanding of organizational processes should have been increased.[93] Third, the focused interview more readily captured the "frame of reference and definition of the situation of a given informant" than use of a structured questionnaire only.[94] Fourth, the use of a focused

interview allowed development of the "factors peculiar to the case that may allow greater understanding of causality."[95]

In addition to these benefits suggested by the literature on qualitative research, use of the focused interview schedule allowed the researcher to tap into the organizational ethos. This was more difficult to do with structured questionnaires.[96] The final question of the focused interview dealt with other organizational experiences, still within the institutional memory, which may have accounted for the existence, or lack, of a strategic approach to counter-terrorist response planning. Such a question allowed an open approach to the problem of identifying alternate explanations for the existence of a strategic approach when experience level would indicate that it should not exist.

Archival Data and Assisting Agency Follow-up-- The Third and Fourth Components of Triangulation

As an additional attempt at triangulation of method, where possible significant attention was devoted to existing archival data in an attempt to cross-check previously collected data. This provided a third method of data collection to assist in validating the first two. This process was again qualitative, and served to bolster

usefulness of the information gained with the focused interview and the structured questionnaire. Each respondent was asked about existing policies, plans, procedures, rules, or memoranda which related to the process of counter-terrorist response. In some cases, the researcher was assured that such written documents existed, but was not allowed access to them. In others, the documents were provided for a detailed analysis. This data collection process resulted in an enhanced validation of the conclusions drawn in Chapter Six of the research report.

A final quality control measure was attempted to validate the data collected from the focal agencies. The individuals listed by respondents from the focal agencies as important outside contacts were asked to complete questionnaires concerning their relationship with the focal agencies. This was an attempt to cross-validate the data collected at the focal agencies. This information would have provided a check on the accuracy of the perceptions of individuals interviewed in the focal agencies.[97] The questionnaire developed for these follow-up interviews is shown in Appendix B.

Interestingly, a telling problem surfaced with this final attempt to validate the research. Most of the respondents of the experienced agencies, and many of the

respondents from non-experienced agencies, specifically asked that the follow-up contacts with cooperating agencies not be made. Some respondents with the experienced agencies simply refused to give the requested information. As one respondent remarked, "Those contacts [with assisting agencies] are very personal. They have grown over the years. I'm not sure how much they [the assisting agencies] would like us telling other people that we get information or whatever from them. The feds [federal agencies] are pretty sensitive in that area. I would really not want to give you the names of my personal contacts there. It may hurt my relationship with my contacts there."[98]
There was no intention in this methodology to diminish the importance of either the structured questionnaire or the focused interview. The basic contention was that both are needed if we are to develop a thorough investigation of the phenomenon under study. It was in that spirit that this methodology was chosen. The quantitative data collection was not designed to test research hypotheses. It was instead used to verify the data collected qualitatively, and to serve as an aid in analyzing the qualitative data.

Data Collection Processes

The processes used to collect the data used in the

research were relatively complex. According to the research design, both qualitative and quantitative data were necessary in order to assure validity of the research. This is particularly true since the research is not guided by previous efforts at analyzing organizational response to international terrorism. The data collection proceeded in several stages. In the summer and fall of 1982, several weeks were devoted to preliminary contact with various federal and local agencies responsible for anti-terrorist response. Preliminary interviews were conducted with representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The purpose of these interviews was to develop an understanding of the federal response system and the degree to which it interfaces with the state and local response systems. During the winter of 1982-3, preliminary contacts and interviews were conducted with several local police agencies, requesting their cooperation with the proposed research. At the same time, the questionnaire to be used in the research, and he interview questions proposed for the research were field tested with a local police agency. This agency was not one of the agencies selected for participation in the actual data collection phase of the research.

As a result of the field testing of interview and questionnaire questions, several changes were made in the data collection devices. These changes reflected a desire on the part of the participants to protect certain types of information. In addition, changes were made to enhance the clarity of the questions used, and to make the questionnaire more acceptable to those persons who would be completing the actual research. The field test changes were the result of personally administering the questionnaires and interviews to personnel at the local agency, explaining the intent of each question, and determining whether or not the respondent understood the question as intended. This process involved using the response team of a medium-sized police agency. After revision of the questionnaire and interview schedules, the research process progressed to the next stage: data collection.

The data collection process proceeded in several stages. Once the preliminary contacts had resulted in an agreement to participate in the research, a contact person was identified with each of the four participating agencies. This contact person was then interviewed extensively to determine the number, rank, and responsibilities of the various individuals which needed to be interviewed and who would need to complete questionnaires. This process

resulted in the compilation of a list of respondents/informants, which is reproduced in Appendix C. Each individual identified by this preliminary process was then contacted and asked to respond to the questionnaire and the interview process. In the interest of time, and in response to an expressed need for greater confidentiality of the answers to the questionnaire by personnel who field tested the data collection process, each respondent was provided a copy of the questionnaire along with a stamped, addressed return envelope. Field testing indicated that confidence in the security of questionnaire responses would be enhanced if the respondents could personally mail their completed questionnaire out of the department, rather than having the responses returned to a central point within the department. Even though the return point was the researcher, it was felt that allowing the completed questionnaires to be mailed out of the department would enhance the number of candid responses obtained. In addition, allowing the respondents to complete the questionnaire at their leisure reduced the time commitment for each respondent from ninety minutes to forty-five minutes, the approximate time required to complete the interview schedule.

The interview process followed exactly the interview

schedule reproduced in Appendix D. During the interview, the responses were coded on the coding schedule reproduced in Appendix E. Concurrently, however, specific comments were also recorded by the researcher on a separate sheet of paper. For the purposes of confidentiality, those interviewed were identified by codes which identified their position of responsibility within the department. The codes corresponded to the analytic scheme developed for data analysis, thus the codes simply showed whether the interviewee was an administrative officer, negotiator, investigator, or supervisor. Where more than one functional category was interviewed from within the same department, which was nearly always the case, each interview was given a sequence code. For example, the second administrative officer interviewed would have his responses coded AD-2 (the code for administrative officer followed by a sequence code of 2). In this manner, the confidentiality of individuals' responses could be better protected. At the same time, space was provided on the written questionnaire for the respondents to place their name and mailing address, so that the results of the research could be mailed to them is they so desired. It is interesting to note that all but one of the respondents requested to be informed of the results of the research. Once the interviews had been recorded, the

data were reviewed for completeness. In many instances, follow-up telephone calls were made to verify certain responses, and to clarify specific comments made by respondents.

This procedure was followed in all but the Northeast Police Department, which has specific guidelines developed for the processing of questionnaire-related data collection techniques. At Northeast, the department requested that the questionnaires be left in advance of the interview process, so that approval for response could be obtained from the appropriate offices. At Northeast, preliminary interviews were conducted in April, 1983, and shortly after that time the questionnaires were mailed, for approval of the proper authorities. Several contacts were made after April, 1983 in an attempt to establish interview dates, and to inquire about approval for the return of the questionnaires. Eventually, the researcher was informed that the Northeast Police Department could no longer participate in the proposed research. Although no one at Northeast would specifically state why the decision had been made, several members of the department intimated that that the information requested was simply too confidential to provide. In a lengthy telephone conversation, one member of Northeast stated that he had made specific objections to the

provision of any questionnaire or interview data because the information which was targeted by those techniques involved extremely sensitive relationships with other police organizations on the federal and state level, as well as some international contacts. The officer felt that to reveal much of the requested information would, or could, severely hamper specific agreements with these organizations "if the information was ever made public."[99] For that reason, very little information could be collected from the Northeast Police Department, except for the preliminary interviews with response personnel.

Similar problems were encountered with the Southeast Police Department, although on a less severe scale. It was noted that the questionnaires which were returned from Souhteast were early questionnaires-- those which were completed and returned immediately. Those which were not returned early at Southeast were never returned, in spite of several follow-up telephone calls. Members of the Southeast Police Department, as a group failed to return even the site feedback questionnaires, which dealt with generic conclusions regarding anti-terrorist response. As with Northeast, although no one would specifically articulate the specific reasons for this lack of response, it appears that, once the questionnaires had time to percolate to the more

sensitive areas of the experienced police departments, a decision was made not to respond to any further questions. It appears that this decision was not necessarily an internal decision, as the individuals interviewed at Northeast and Southeast were willing to offer some relatively sensitive information during the course of the on-site interviews. Once the knowledge of the specific intent of the research spread to other levels, it appeared, the willingness to participate among personnel of experienced organizations seemed to evaporate. As one respondent at Southeast noted concerning requests for names and telephone numbers of contacts in external organizations, those contacts appeared to be sensitive and there was a certain amount of concern that the researcher's attempts to garner information from them may dry up sources of information and cooperation.[100]

Chapter IV

REPORTING AND ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED DATA

Analytical Scheme

Analysis of the qualitative data proceeded along the lines suggested by Sieber[1] and Miles[2] and developed in some detail in Chapter Three. The analysis of the qualitative data is a four-step process in which:

1. Generalizations were analyzed to determine if they hold for different levels of the organizations studied;
2. Propositions were analyzed in a similar manner;
3. The "extreme bias" test was used to analyze conclusions; and
4. Validation of conclusions, propositions, and gerneralizations was developed through the use of site feedback.

Use of this methodology guarded against the main danger of qualitative research identified by Miles: that the research will be "earthy, undeniable, serendipitous... and wrong!"[3]

Accordingly, the following generalization and propositions were analyzed using this five step process.

Generalization:

Personnel from the experienced organizations will tend to be more externally oriented than personnel from the non-experienced organizations.

Propositions:

The key propositions developed for this research were identified in Chapter Three. It is proposed that, when compared to personnel in non-experienced organizations, personnel in experienced organizations will:

P-1: Express a greater need for boundary spanning and networking processes to enhance information acquisition and processing capabilities, to assist in the management of intergroup interdependencies, and to foster innovation.

P-2: Express a greater need for use of more interactive planning methodologies and use of specific plans testing techniques.

P-3: Express a greater need for, and use of, capabilities-oriented, strategic planning techniques as opposed to a tactical,

contingency planning techniques.

P-4: Tend to perceive the organization's planning methodologies before initial experience with international terrorism as more oriented toward tactical planning.

P-5: Tend to have written materials, procedures, rules, memoranda, and policies which are more strategically oriented.

In addition to the measures suggested above, the methodology employed in this research used additional measures to insure the validity of the conclusions and recommendations made as a result of the research. In addition to the use of site feedback and the extreme bias test, the research design employed also utilized archival data and cross-validation of the qualitative data through use of quantitative survey measures. Each of these is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

Statistical Method for Analysis of the Data

The data collected for the research were analyzed by subjecting the results of the content analysis to tests for statistical significance using a chi-square analysis. The chi-square is admittedly a weaker method of analysis than

many other processes which could have been used for the research if certain underlying assumptions and criteria for these more powerful methods of analysis could be met. Given the state of research into the organizational response to terrorism, however, and given the methodology applied in this research, it was felt that the chi-square was the most suitable method for statistical analysis of the content analyzed data. The use of the chi-square reflects the realization that much of the data collected as a result of the content analysis were not arranged on interval scales. Much of the data collected concerning the independent variable in this research was organized on the coding sheet (Appendix E) along nominal or ordinal scales. Since the independent variable in this research is a dichotomus, nominal variable, experience or no-experience in responding to terrorist incidents, the use of non-interval dependent variable dictates an analysis of the data generated during the research by a non-parametric statistical method.

Each of the independent variables was subjected to a chi-square test to determine whether or not observed differences between experienced organizations and non-experienced organizations were attributable to chance or to sampling error. If the results of the chi-square statistic indicated that the differences were not

attributable to chance or to sampling error. If the results of the chi-square statistic indicated that the differences were not attributable to chance or sampling error, a correlation analysis was conducted to determine the strength of the relationship between the independent variable and experience in responding to acts of terrorism.

The measure used for testing the strength of the relationship between the variables involved was "C," the contingency coefficient. The maximum value of "C" is not one, and must be computed for each case. In all cases in this research, "C" was found to have a maximum value of .71. In developing interpretations of the strength of the relationship between independent and dependent variables, then, the following scale was used.

Very High Positive (Negative) Correlation	.64-.71
High Positive (Negative) Correlation	.50-.70
Moderate Positive (Negative) Correlation	.36-.49
Low Postive (Negative) Correlation	.21-.35
Little Positive (Negative) Correlation	.00-.20

This method of interpretation follows very closely the scheme for interpreting the size of a correlation coefficient of 1.00. For example, with a maximum correlation coefficient of 1.00, >.49 is considered to

exhibit a moderate correlation. With a maximum correlation coefficient of .71, >.35 is considered to exhibit a moderate correlation.

In many cases, the scales developed for the coding form were collapsed to avoid instances in which more than twenty per cent of the cells of the chi-square table had expected frequencies of less than five, or to avoid cases in which the cells of the chi-square table had expected frequencies of less than one. Given the problems of responses to some of the research questions from members of experienced organizations, however, not all of the statistical analyses could avoid these problems, even with collapsed tables.

A statistical analysis of the data collected for this research does generate some problems, however. The sample size used in this study is relatively small. In addition, the sample is not a random sample, but is a stratified sample. Thus the reader is advised to use the results of the statistical analyses included in this chapter solely as a validation process for the qualitative data.

In addition to the quantitative analysis, however, a detailed reporting of qualitative data is also included in the analysis of the data. The method of analyzing the qualitative data is discussed below.

Analyzing Generalizations against Different Levels of the Organization

The generalization developed in the analysis of the qualitative data was that the personnel of the experienced agencies would be more externally oriented than will the personnel of the non-experienced organizations. To test the validity of this generalization, data from different levels of the organizations studied were reviewed. Essentially, the data collection process discussed in Chapter Three identifies two levels of organization. The technical level consisted of those individuals charged with the actual delivery of counter-terrorist response. The managerial level consisted of supervisory personnel charged with planning the counter-terrorist response. The institutional level, which would normally consist of administrative personnel charged with overall development of the response and mediation of the organization's response plans with outside organizations, was found to be closely identified with the managerial level. What would normally be thought of as an institutional level, i.e., chiefs of divisions and chiefs of police, were found to have very little impact on the counter-terrorist response. The members of the studied police departments who were responsible for relations with external organizations were found to be managerial personnel

who also contributed specific boundary spanning and mediating roles.

The qualitative data suggested that the generalization does not hold across levels of the organization in some cases, while it does hold in others. While personnel at the managerial level of the Northeast and Southeast Police Departments were obviously more externally oriented than their counterparts at the South and Midwest Police Departments, the generalization did not appear to hold consistently for the technical level of the experienced organizations.

Importance of External Organizations

When asked the question "Are there any outside organizations that are important in helping you respond to terrorist events?" a distinct difference was noted among the technical and managerial level of the experienced and non-experienced organizations. The differences in the coded information shows interesting results. Table Three depicts the differences in response to this question among two of the organizational levels of the experienced organizations.

As the analysis of Table Three indicated, the differences between the perceptions of the technical and managerial levels of the experienced and non-experienced organizations, concerning the importance of external

TABLE 3

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTIONS OF IMPORTANCE OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AMONG TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL CORES OF EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization			
	Non-Experienced		Experienced	
Perceived Importance	Technical Level	Managerial Level	Technical Level	Managerial Level
External Organizations of Little Importance	3 (1.09)	1 (2.91)	2 (0.55)	0 (1.45)
External Organizations of Some Importance	1 (3.55)	12 (9.45)	1 (1.09)	3 (2.91)
External Organizations Very Important	2 (1.36)	3 (3.64)	0 (1.36)	5 (3.64)
	n= 22		n= 11	
	X^2 = 7.51		X^2 = 7.22	
	df = 2		df = 2	
	p< .05		p< .05	
	C = .504		C = .629	
	C_{max} = .71		C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

organizations were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that is significant at the .05 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational level and respondents' perceptions concerning the importance of external organizations was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a high positive correlation between organizational level and respondents' perceptions concerning the importance of external organizations. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated for each chi-square statistic individually. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational level and perceived importance of external organizations was .504 for non-experienced organizations, and .629 for experienced organizations.

Qualitative Data and External Orientation

It appears from Table Three that the managerial level of the experienced organizations were more externally oriented than their counterparts in the non-experienced organizations. The technical levels of these organizations

showed strong similarities to each other across organizational boundaries. The members of the technical level responsible for actual tactical control of the situation appeared to be less externally oriented than their colleagues in the managerial level, regardless of experience. For example, one member of the response team for the Southeast Police Department responded to this questions by stating:

> Not really. It's a pretty self contained process. We do most of out planning at the scene. Each situation is different, and we don't have to ask for help from any outside people to handle most situations.[4]

This response appeared to be fairly typical of those of most members of the technical level response teams for both non-experienced organizations and experienced organizations. In comparison, a member of the response team for the South Police Department, in response to the same question, stated:

> I can't think of anybody on the outside we need. It's always nice to have assistance and help, but there's nobody we depend on. We have our own CIU [Criminal Investigations Unit] which has varying usefulness. We have a good rapport with other police agencies, but, as far as needing them to do our job, I would say 'no.'[5]

This perception was not unusual on the part of tactical response personnel, as the analysis of the quantitative data in this chapter indicated.

The predicted differences in perceptions surfaced,

however, once the managerial level of the experienced organizations and non-experienced organizations were reached. The results depicted in Table Three indicate that members of the managerial level tended to perceive external organizations as more important to the delivery of counter-terrorist response than did members of the technical level of both experienced and non-experienced organizations. It is clear that the interview data uncovered a distinct difference in the perceptions of the managerial level personnel among the experienced and non-experienced organizations.

This distinction can perhaps best be illustrated by comparing the responses to Question One of the focused interview for personnel from the managerial level of the four organizations. For example, after listing eight federal and five local organizations with which the Southeast Police Department interacts in preparing for and responding to incidents of terrorism, a supervisor/negotiator with that department stated:

> We have access to almost all federal agencies in the [SoutheastPolice Department] area. They're critical. We coordinate with them for intelligence information on terrorist groups. They provide us with information, equipment, training, ideas and so on. We even have an agreement with NOAA [National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration]. They'll help us out if we need it. We also have agreements with [several local police agencies]

> concerning mutual assistance if we need it during these situations. We've actually had people from these other [federal and local] teams operating with us on occasion. It is very important to have this reserve available when it's needed. Thirty or so people is really not very many, especially if we're talking about a long, drawn-out situation. For the 'average' terrorist incident that just isn't enough. If we've had previous coordination, if we know the other people involved, then we are pretty comfortable about a joint operation. If we haven't had that previous contact and coordination, then we just won't [participate in a joint exercise]. The ability to supplement your team with outside people, information, equipment and so on is essential. I don't know of anybody who 'has it all.'[6]

An interesting observation is that this individual was careful to put the inflected quotation marks around the word "average" in his remarks. It was obvious that to this supervisor no average terrorist incident existed.

Another member of the Southeast Police Department's managerial level had similar comments. In response to the question about assistance from outside organizations, this supervisor of a unit responsible for investigating acts of terrorism responded:

> To give you some idea of how critical these outside agencies are to us, all of the members of my unit have received 'top secret' clearances from the bureau [Federal Bureau of Investigation]. That includes everyone from the assistant chief on down to the unit sergeant. The 'web' of terrorist activity seems to escape a lot of people. A lot of people seem to think that terrorism is isolated, that 'it can't happen here.' We know in [Southeast] that that just isn't true. He [the terrorist] may actually be getting <u>physical</u> <u>support</u> from people in your own community. If we have learned anything, it's that if you have any 'foreign

> interests' in you community, then you'd better get your ass in gear. You're going to need information about certain groups. How they operate, who their targets are, what their complaints are, who their supporters are. That means you'll need to talk with the FBI, CIA, DEA, ATF, the Coast Guard, Customs, the Secret Service if there are any VIPs involved, the [state police], the [state attorney general] and local police departments too.[7]

Types of Organizations Important

A similar perception of the need for interorganizational cooperation was evident at the Northeast Police Department. A similar list of necessary contacts with federal, state and local agencies was developed from the interview data with members of this department, although the list was somewhat shorter for Northeast due to the participation problem mentioned in Chapter Three. Table Four depicts the results of the content analysis and coding of interviews concerning the types of organizations perceived as important to the delivery of counter-terrorist response among members of the various organizational levels of experienced and non-experienced organizations.

As the analysis of Table Four indicates, the differences between the technical and managerial levels of experienced and non-experienced organizations, concerning their views of the types of organizations perceived as important, could be attributable to chance or to sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a

TABLE 4

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF TYPES OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS PERCEIVED AS IMPORTANT TO COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE AMONG MEMBERS OF TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL CORES OF EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization			
	Non-experienced		Experienced	
	Technical Level	Managerial Level	Technical Level	Managerial Level
Organizational Type				
Internally Focused, Non-Federal	2 (3.09)	19 (17.91)	3 (2.02)	8 (8.98)
Internally Focused Federal	3 (1.76)	9 (10.23)	7 (6.23)	27 (27.76)
Externally Focused Federal	0 (0.15)	1 (0.85)	1 (2.75)	14 (12.75)
	n = 34		n = 60	
	X^2 = 1.64 df = 2 p. < .50 C = .214 C_{max} = .71		X^2 = 2.07 df =2 p. < .50 C = .217 C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

statistic that was significant only at the .50 level for both experienced and non-experienced organizations. The direction of the correlation between the types of external organizations perceived important and organizational level was in the direction anticipated by the theory developed in Chapters One and Two.

As Table Four indicates, personnel from among the managerial level tended not to perceive different types of external agencies as important to their ability to plan and deliver an adequate counter-terrorist response than did personnel from among the technical level. More enlightening than the quantitative difference, however, was the qualitative differences in the managerial and technical levels of the four organizations. The vast majority of the external agencies which were perceived as important by personnel from experienced organizations were federal agencies. Some of these agencies were internally focused as defined in Chapter One; others were externally focused. It is important to note that none of the personnel from technical levels of the non-experienced organizations identified externally focused federal agencies as important to their ability to plan or deliver an adequate counter-terrorist response. It may be as important to note, however, that it tended to be the experienced managerial

level which mentioned federal agencies as important assisting organizations. Thus the generalization of differences among experienced and non-experienced organizations concerning perception of the importance of federal agencies appeared to hold across organizational levels.

Sources of External Information

The same conclusions were drawn concerning the generalization that experienced organizations will be more externally oriented when responses to the second major set of interview questions was analyzed. These questions concerned external sources of information. Again, analysis of the interview data tended to suggest that the proposition concerning external orientation did not hold across organizational levels of the four organizations studied.

Table Five depicts the results of the content analysis of the interview responses to Question Eleven, "Are there any important external sources of information for your organization in responding to terrorist events?" The results of Table Five were similar to those of Table Four. Interestingly, during the course of the interviews, many respondents replied that the answer to this question was "the same" or even "identical" to their answers to the first question. The generalization concerning perceived

TABLE 5

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED EXTERNAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION IMPORTANT TO COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE AMONG MEMBERS OF TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL CORES OF EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization			
	Non-experienced		Experienced	
	Technical Level	Managerial Level	Technical Level	Managerial Level
Organizational Type				
Internally Focused Non-Federal	4 (4.15)	12 (13.84)	0 (1.07)	6 (4.93)
Internally Focused Federal (23.84)	1 (1.62)	6 (5.38)	7 (5.15)	22
Externally Focused Federal	0 (0.231)	1 (0.769)	1 (1.78)	9 (8.22)
	n = 19		n = 37	
	X^2 = .829		X^2 = 2.51	
	df = 2		df = 2	
	p. < .70		p.< .30	
	C = .204		C = .252	
	C_{max} = .71		C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

importance of external organizations appeared to hold true across the technical and managerial levels of either the experienced or non-experienced organizations observed. The technical levels of the experienced organizations, those responsible for tactical control and response, were as inclined as the members of the managerial level to identify as important external sources of information. This finding reflects a consistent and underlying theme in the response patterns of experienced organizations: access to information is crucial to the satisfactory termination of a terrorist event. This sentiment was expressed by both technical and managerial personnel.

As the analysis of Table Five indicates, the differences between the perceptions of the technical and managerial levels of experienced and non-experienced organizations, concerning the types of external sources of information could be attributable to chance or to sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at only the .70 level for non-experienced organizations and at the .30 level for experienced organizations. While the direction of the correlation between types of organizations which were important sources of information and organizational level was in the direction anticipated by the theory developed in

Chapters One and Two, the test statistic does not allow support for a specific conclusion concerning external orientation of personnel from various organizational levels.

Qualitative Data and External Information

The responses of the technical and managerial levels of the non-experienced organizations did not reflect a sensitivity to the need for external information. The perceptions of the technical level of the non-experienced organizations were typified by that of a member of the South response team, who, in response to Question Eleven stated:

> No. The information we get, at least that is 'good,' comes from inside the [South Police Department]. We either collect it at the scene-- you know, from scouting, negotiating with the 'bad guy' or interviewing witnesses-- or we get it from CIU [the South Police Department's Criminal Investigations Unit]. They have given us some really good information in the past on motorcycle gangs and so on. In the future, as others [problems] develop, I would see CIU as being our major source of information -- at least the information not collected on-scene.[8]

Similar responses were gathered from members of the Midwest Police Department. To these individuals, information was something best gained from inside the department. As one Midwest supervisor noted, procedures established by the department require the intelligence unit to respond to all incidents requiring a specialized response. If any information is necessary at the scene, he reported, "it's

run down by intelligence and passed on to us. There really aren't any 'important' sources of outside information. Intelligence does all of that."[9]

A supervisor of the intelligence unit remarked that:

> Intelligence is important because some knowledge of the person you're dealing with is critical. The intelligence team is responsible for developing record checks, etc. We try to provide anything the team needs.[10]

This intelligence supervisor indicated that the key external sources of information for the intelligence unit were the telephone, gas, and electric companies. It was clear from the responses to Question Eleven that information for members of the Midwest response team was mostly an internal matter. Little information was seen to be developed from sources outside the department. Those organizations that were mentioned as important sources of information by members of the Midwest Police Department tended to be locally focused organizations such as the utility companies which serviced the Midwest area.

Not all of the personnel from the response team of the experienced organizations responded with a recognition of the importance of external information sources, however. In response to Question Eleven, one Southeast response team member replied:

> The <u>job</u> itself is pretty much routine. There are only so many ways you can go after a guy. We

> generally have all the information we need before we assault. It comes from the team supervisors. I can't think of a single operation where we had problems pop up because of a lack of reasonably accurate information.[11]

Despite this internally oriented response, these responses typified those of the technical and managerial level of non-experienced organizations to Question Eleven. They were markedly different from those of the technical and managerial levels of the experienced organizations.

Question eleven stimulated interesting responses when asked of the personnel from experienced organizations. The contrast with the responses of the technical and managerial levels of non-experienced organizations was obvious. For example, one of the supervisors with Southeast stated, in response to Question Eleven:

> You wouldn't believe the information required on each job. That's how each job is different. We never get the info we need from the same place twice. It's new each time. If we could figure out a way to handle that info better, we'd have it made... We almost always have to go outside the department for the info we need. That's where the problems will pop up.[12]

Another supervisor of the Southeast Police Department reflected similar perceptions of the importance of outside organizations in information gathering. He stated:

> Outside intelligence on terrorist group information [activities] is essential if you are going to deal

> with an organized terrorist group. I don't see how anybody could plan on dealing with that type of problem without really good outside intelligence[13]

Similar perceptions were found among managerial level personnel at the Northeast Police Department. For example, one administrative officer with the Northeast Police Department responded:

> Our major source of information, both from inside and outside the department, is a set of informal connections with people from other divisions and other departments. The real information collection comes from there. It isn't the formal connection that gets us our valuable information. We talk with the bureau [Federal Bureau of Investigation] every day. We work with the Secret Service, too. But it's not just the feds that we use for intelligence. We have a really good network built up with other [local police] departments, too.[14]

Another officer responded that:

> We have a host of external departments that are important. You name it. I talk to a dozen different departments a week. Most of the information we exchange is about booby traps, the latest activities of the groups that are active now, that sort of thing. We've got a real strong group of folks that keep each other up to date about what's going on. We can depend on each other.[15]

The veracity of this previous statement is attested to by the fact that during the interview, the officer received three telephone calls from officers at other police agencies. The topic of all three calls could be classified as intelligence. For example, the officer commented that one of the topics of calls he frequently receives involves

intelligence concerning current activities of terrorist groups and the modus operandi of those groups. He explained that the latest piece of intelligence involved a new explosive device which consisted of a black-powder ball rigged to a light bulb base. The device could be screwed into a light fixture and would explode, yielding a lethal amount of shrapnel when the light switch was activated. It is possible that it was simply serindipitous that the interview took place at a point in time when the officer would receive three such communications, but given the officer's discussion of his role, this is not likely.

To further his point, this officer at the Northeast Police Department commented:

> It [the external intelligence network] is on a first name basis. It has to be. You need tremendous relations with those people. It has to be a situation where you have good rapport with the other people. It has to be a situation of mutual trust.[16]

The qualitative differences uncovered in the interview data tended to depict a difference among the organizational levels of experienced and non-experienced organizations. The quantitative analysis based on that data, however, did not support a conclusion of a significant difference between organizational levels of experienced and non-experienced organizations concerning the types of organizations which serve as important sources of external

information for counter-terrorist response. This may be due, in part, to a failure to impress upon the respondents that informal relationships were considered valid sources of information. In any event, the statistical analysis of the data concerning sources of external information showed no significant differences between managerial and technical levels of experienced and non-experienced organizations.

Sources of Organizational Innovation

Differences in the external orientation of members of the technical and managerial levels were not found in responses to the third group of questions concerning innovation. The responses indicated that personnel responsible for tactical response to a terrorist event were as likely to perceive of the innovation process as externally influenced as were personnel from the managerial level. Question Sixteen was designed to tap the location of innovation among organizational personnel. It asked "When your organization develops a new method of planning for or responding to a terrorist event, would you say that the new method comes from within your organization or from outside your organization?" Among the personnel from the experienced organizations, the near universal response to Question Sixteen was: "I would say about 50/50."[17] In contrast, personnel from non-experienced organizations

tended to respond that innovations usually initiated from an internal organizational source. External influences on organizational innovation were not perceived as important to either managerial or technical personnel of the non-experienced organizations. Table Six depicts the frequency with which personnel from the managerial and technical levels of experienced and non-experienced organizations identified external agencies as important contributors to the innovation process. Again, this generalization appeared to hold across levels of the organizations studied. The managerial levels of experienced and non-experienced organizations appeared no more prone to identify external sources of organizational innovation than did the technical levels.

As the analysis of Table Six indicates, the differences between the perceptions of the technical and managerial levels of experienced and non-experienced organizations, concerning the source of organizational innovation could be attributable to chance or to sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that is significant only at the .50 level for non-experienced organizations, and at the .70 level for experienced organizations. While the direction of the correlation between perceived source of organizational

TABLE 6

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED SOURCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AMONG THE TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL CORES OF EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization			
	Non-experienced		Experienced	
	Technical Level	Managerial Level	Technical Level	Managerial Level
Source of Innovation				
Innovation Sources Mostly Internal	7 (6.39)	14 (14.61)	1 (0.81)	2 (2.18)
Innovation Sources about Fifty-Fifty	0 (0.61)	2 (1.39)	2 (2.18)	6 (5.82)
	n = 22		n = 11	
	X^2 = .958		X^2 = .076	
	df = 1		df = 1	
	p. < .50		p. < .70	
	C = .204		C = .085	
	C_{max} = .71		C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

innovation and organizational level was in the direction anticipated by the theory developed in Chapters One and Two, the test statistic did not allow support for a specific conclusion concerning differences among the organizational levels to be based on Table Six. There appeared to be no significant difference in the perceptions of technical and managerial personnel concerning the source of organizational innovation.

Inclusion of External Organizations in the Planning Process

With respect to planning processes, it appeared that the generalization concerning the external orientation of personnel from experienced organizations failed to hold across organizational levels. Technical personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations tended to perceive planning as an internal function, while managerial personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations tended to see planning as also externally applicable. Table Seven depicts the results of the content analysis and coding of interviews concerning the degree to which external organizations are included in the planning processes of non-experienced and experienced organizations.

As the analysis of Table Seven indicates, the differences between the perceptions of the technical and

TABLE 7

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED FREQUENCY OF INCLUSION OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PLANNING PROCESSES AMONG TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL CORES OF EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization			
	Non-experienced		Experienced	
	Technical Level	Managerial Level	Technical Level	Managerial Level
Degree of Inclusion in Planning				
External Organizations Generally Not Included	12 (10.67)	4 (5.33)	3 (1.50)	3 (4.5)
External Organizations Generally Included	0 (1.33)	2 (0.67)	0 (1.50)	6 (4.5)
	n = 18		n = 12	
	X^2 = 4.50		X^2 = 4.00	
	df = 1		df = 1	
	p.< .05		p.< .05	
	C = .447		C= .500	
	C_{max} = .71		C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

managerial levels of the experienced and non-experienced organizations, concerning the frequency of inclusion of external organizations in the planning process, were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .05 level for both experienced and non-experienced organizations. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational level and respondents' perceptions concerning the inclusion of external organizations in the planning process was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there is a moderate correlation between organizational level and respondents' perceptions concerning the degree to which external organizations are included in the planning process. The correlation among experienced organizations was stronger, with the correlation coefficient indicating that, among these organizations, there was high positive correlation between organizational level and perception of frequency of inclusion of external organizations in the planning process. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated for each chi-square statistic individually. In this case, C was found to have a maximum

value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational level and inclusion of external organizations is .447 for non-experienced organizations and .500 for experienced organizations.

Qualitative Data and Planning

The meaning of the statistical interpretation of this question needs to be tempered with an understanding of the interpretation of the word "planning" by members of the technical and managerial levels of experienced and non-experienced organizations. Planning was seen as a pencil and paper chore by most respondents to the interview process. Those who saw planning as different from pencil and paper planning tended to see it only in terms of an operational process to be engaged in at the scene of a terrorist event. This at-scene planning did require some external input, however.

The perceptions of the need for an external orientation in planning for terrorist events was best typified by the responses of officers from experienced organizations, who replied with comments which indicated their understanding of a planning process that "really isn't planning." "Planning for a job really isn't possible," noted one team member from Southeast. "It can only be done

by training, training, and more training, so our team will be ready when it's needed."[18] The general consensus of personnel from both experienced and non-experienced organizations is that real planning is an internal function which requires little support from external sources. As one administrative officer with the Southeast Police Department noted:

> We do basically two types of planning: operational and budgeting. The operational planning we began four or five years ago when we saw that the old 'what-if' planning just wouldn't work anymore. You know it's not possible to have workable plans that way. You can't plan for 'What if they kidnap the mayor and hold him at this warehouse,' because as sure as you do, they'll kidnap [the city comptroller] and hold him at a <u>different</u> warehouse. So now we use operational planning. We plan at the scene, and we plan after the job. The debriefings are really important. They are closed to everybody but SWAT, but it's completely open with the people who are there. We've had times when officers will tell the team commander: 'Hey! Your screwed up!' It's all very open. We avoid repeating our mistakes this way. We learn from them. We also do a lot of planning 'informally.' We refuse to put that type of planning in writing. Most of our actual planning, however, is on-scene, tactical intelligence gathering.[19]

An administrative officer from the Northeast Police Department made a similar comment about planning processes, noting that:

> There's none of this 'contingency' bullshit! You can't rely on that. The only real way to plan in advance is to plan to have the ability to do things that you can reasonably expect will be needed to handle [a terrorist event]. After that, your planning has to be on-scene. We won't trust anybody

> else to plan for us. We even double check the height markings under the overpasses when we remove a bomb in the bomb disposal truck. It all has to be done from inside. If we make a mistake, it could kill. Our planning has to be right. There's no room for 'contingency plans' with dust on them.[20]

The necessity to plan with external input was not part of the perceptions of the respondents. The use of external input into the training process, which was perceived as important, but not labeled as planning, did show differences among the organizational levels of the experienced and non-experienced organizations. The managerial level of the experienced organizations tended to perceive the need for external input into training processes as more important than did the technical level of the experienced organizations. It may be that this confusion between planning-- as a pencil and paper task-- and training created a semantic problem which caused the statistical refutation of the proposition concerning the inclusion of external organizations in the planning process when compared by organizational level. In any event, the quantitative analysis of the data collected concerning the planning process fails to allow support of the proposition across organizational levels.

Improvements in Planning

Similar distinctions to those found with Question

One were found with Question Thirty-Seven. Question Thirty-Seven asked "Would you recommend any improvements in the way your organization plans for counter-terrorist response?" The generalization that personnel from the experienced organizations would be more externally oriented than would personnel from the non-experienced organizations was found not to hold across levels of the experienced organizations, while it was found to hold true across organizational levels of non-experienced organizations. The explanation for this observed difference lies in the role of the various organizational levels. The role of the technical level is not one that calls for extensive external communications. The delivery of technical services for counter-terrorist response tends to be an internal process, which can be fairly well self-contained. Managerial services, as will be discussed later, are not so internally oriented. The delivery of managerial services among experienced organizations calls for a great degree of interorganizational cooperation and communication. Thus it could be expected that, while the managerial level of experienced organizations would perceive the need for improvement in planning processes, the managerial level of non-experienced organizations may not perceive the need for improvement. Table Eight depicts the results of the content

TABLE 8

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT IN PLANNING PROCESSES AMONG PERSONNEL FROM TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL CORES OF EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization			
	Non-experienced		Experienced	
	Technical Level	Managerial Level	Technical Level	Managerial Level
Perceived Degree of Improvement Needed				
No Need for Improvement Noted	7 (5.78)	12 (13.22)	3 (1.22)	3 (2.78)
Some Need for Improvement Noted	0 (1.50)	4 (4.50)	0 (1.50)	6 (4.50)
	n = 23		n = 12	
	X^2 = 2.11		X^2 = 4.00	
	df = 1		df = 1	
	p. < .20		p.< .05	
	C = .290		C = .577	
	C_{max} = .71		C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

analysis and coding of interviews concerning the perception of the need for improvements in the planning processes of experienced and non-experienced organizations.

As the analysis of Table Eight indicated, the differences between the perceptions of the technical and managerial levels of the experienced and non-experienced organizations concerning the need for improvement in planning processes were not attributable to chance or sampling error for experienced organizations, while differences among the levels of non-experienced organizations <u>were</u> attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .05 level for experienced organizations. The same was not true for non-experienced organizations, however. The chi-square statistic for non-experienced organizations yielded a statistic that was significant only at the .20 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational level of experienced and non-experienced organizations and respondents' perceptions concerning the need for improvement in planning processes was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there is a high positive

correlation between organizational level of experienced organizations and respondents' perceptions concerning the need for improvements in planning processes. The correlation for non-experienced organizations was much weaker, however. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated for each chi-square statistic individually. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational level and perceived need for improvement in planning processes was only .290 for non-experienced organizations, while it was .577 for experienced organizations.

The results indicated that managerial personnel from the experienced organizations were more prone to perceive the need for improvements in their organizations' planning processes than were members of the technical level.

Qualitative Data and Need for Improvement

The replies to this question from the managerial level of the non-experienced organizations were found to be very similar to those from the technical level of the non-experienced organizations. Almost universally, the personnel from the technical levels of both the experienced

and non-experienced organizations responded that improvements needed to be made in weapons or equipment available in doing the job of counter-terrorist response. A sampling of the responses to Question Thirty-Seven, from both experienced and non-experienced organizations yielded statements such as:

> What we need, as far as I'm concerned, is a different sidearm. These .38s [.38 caliber police standard issue sidearms] are useless in a 'real' situation. We've asked for permission to issue and carry .45s [.45 caliber, semi-automatic sidearms]. That is one major improvement I can see that is needed. We could also stand for some improvement in our equipment. A lot of the water-borne equipment we have is 'on loan' or is surplus from Army Special Forces. We need our own equipment.[21]

Similarly, a team member from the South Police Department responded:

> The only major changes I see that need to be made are in the area of equipment. We need some compact, semi-automatic rifles for assault situations-- the CAR-16 [a collapsible and shortened version of the M-16] would be about right. We need specialized scopes [telescopic sights] for our rifles, you know, night vision devices and that sort of thing. We need a lot of 'small' equipment, like carrying cases, and so on. Too, I'd like to see us get a good stockpile of stun-grenades [hand grenades that use bright flash and sound to stun the perpetrator, rather than shrapnel to injure]. As far as I'm concerned, those would solve most of our jobs without anyone actually being hurt.[22]

Similarly, a member of the Midwest Police Department's technical level remarked that the major improvement needed was that "all of the sergeants should have take-home cars."

Most of the recommendations from members of the Midwest Police Department were of a similar nature, addressing equipment, selection of team members, weapons, and armament. As one Midwest member noted:

> I've seen the time when we've had a hard time getting 20 or 30 floodlights. There's too much bargaining required to get what we need. It's become a morale problem. Our hostage van is a 'hand-me-down' from communications that we put together ourselves. If you need the equipment, it should be provided.[23]

These comments are typical of those received from the technical level of all of the organizations observed. The recommendations were of an internal nature, and did not encompass improvement of relations with external organizations-- except where such improvements might result in an improved equipment situation.

Tables Three through Eight indicate that the generalization concerning the external orientation of personnel from experienced organizations, when compared to personnel from non-experienced organizations, tended not to hold consistently true across the various organizational levels. Managerial levels of the experienced organizations tended to be more externally oriented than any of the other classes of individuals interviewed during the course of the research when the questions centered on importance of external organizations, inclusion of external organizations

in the planning process, and perceived need for improvement in the planning process. On other measures, however, managerial officers of experienced and non-experienced organizations did not score significantly higher than other officers. For example, on measures used to determine the degree of external orientation of the organizations participating in the research, officers from managerial levels scored no differently than those from the technical level. Table Nine recapitulates the recorded differences in external orientation among technical and managerial levels for both experienced and non-experienced organizations.

Table Nine indicates that not all of the selected measures of external orientation of personnel from the experienced and non-experienced organizations held true across the various organizational levels. Specifically, the generalization did not hold true when importance of external organizations and frequency of inclusion of external organizations in planning efforts were compared across organizational levels. The differences in frequency of inclusion in planning efforts may have been due to the problem with the word "planning" found in the research. No reasonable explanation for the differences in identification of the importance of external organizations was found, however. In addition, a split was found among experienced

TABLE 9

RECAPITULATION OF PERCEPTIONS OF PERSONNEL FROM TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL CORES OF EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNING MEASURES OF EXTERNAL ORIENTATION OF THEIR ORGANIZATIONS' COUNTER-TERRORISTS RESPONSE

	X^2 Statistic Significant at .05 Level?/ Degree of Correlation	
	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Characteristic		
Perceived Importance of External Organizations (Table Three)	Yes/ High	Yes/ High
Types of Organizations Perceived as Important (Table Four)	No/ Low	No/ Low
Perceived External Sources of Important information (Table Five)	No/ Little	No/ Low
Perceived Sources of Organizational Innovation (Table Six)	No/ Little	No/ Little
Perceived Frequency of Inclusion of Important External Organizations in Planning Efforts (Table Seven)	Yes/ Moderate	Yes/ High
Perceived Need for Improvement in Planning Processes (Table Eight)	No/ Low	Yes/ High

and non-experienced organizations concerning perceived need for improvement in planning processes. The generalization concerning need for improvement in planning processes was found to hold true across organizational levels for non-experienced organizations, but was not found to hold true for experienced organizations.

Analyzing Proposition One: Boundary Spanning, Information Acquisition, Innovation, and Interdependence

Types of Organizations Considered Important

Proposition One suggests that personnel from experienced organizations will engage in boundary spanning activities more frequently than personnel from non-experienced organizations in order to foster information acquisition, innovation, and to coordinate interorganizational interdependencies. Several measures were used to test this generalization. Questions in Section One of the interview guide were used to measure the degree of interorganizational activity among the organizations studied for this research. For example, questions one and two asked "Are there any outside organizations that are important in helping your respond to terrorist events?" and "Would you name these organizations?". Table Ten depicts the results of the content analysis of the

interviewee responses to Questions One and Two. The results of Table Ten indicate that personnel from experienced organizations tended to see a greater importance in assistance from federal-level organizations than did personnel from non-experienced organizations.

As the analysis of Table Ten indicated, the difference between the perceptions of the members of the experienced organizations and those of the members of the non-experienced organizations, concerning the types of external organizations identified as important to counter-terrorist response, were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .001 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the types of external organizations identified as important to counter-terrorist response was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a high positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the types of external organizations identified as important to counter-terrorist response. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated

TABLE 10

TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED AS IMPORTANT TO THE COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE CAPABILITY AMONG PERSONNEL FROM NON-EXPERIENCED AND EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
Organizational Type	Non-Experienced	Experienced
Internally Focused, Non-Federal	26 (15.8)	11 (21.2)
Internally Focused Federal	11 (15.8)	26 (21.2)
Externally Focused Federal	1 (6.4)	14 (8.6)

$n = 89$

$X^2 = 21.99$

$df = 2$
$p. = <.001$
$C = .502$
$C_{max} = .71$

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

individually for each chi-square statistic. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational experience and the types of external organizations identified as important to counter-terrorist response was .502.

Importance of External Organizations

In addition, it appeared that personnel from experienced organizations also tended to perceive external organizations in general to be of more importance to their ability to deliver an acceptable counter-terrorist response, than did personnel from non-experienced organizations. Table Eleven depicts the results of the content analysis of the interview data collected in response to Question Four, which asked "How important are these organizations to your ability to respond to terrorist events?". The results of Table Eleven indicated that personnel from experienced organizations tended to see relations with external organizations, whether local, state, or federal, as more important to overall response capability than did personnel from non-experienced organizations. Interestingly, none of the individuals interviewed from among the experienced organizations made comments that were coded to indicate that external organizations were of "very

TABLE 11

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF IMPORTANCE TO COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AS PERCEIVED BY PERSONNEL FROM EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Perceived Importance of External Organization		
External Organizations Perceived To Be of Little Importance	1 (1.14)	1 (.857)
External Organizations Perceived To Be of Some Importance	13 (9.71)	4 (7.29)
External Organizations Perceived To Be Very Important	2 (5.14)	7 (3.86)

$n = 28$

$X^2 = 7.11$

$df = 2$
$p. < .05$
$C = .450$
$C_{max} = .71$

Numbers in Parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to two significant positions beyond the decimal point for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

little" or of "little" importance. The majority of the personnel from non-experienced organizations made comments which were coded in the "very little" or "little" columns.

Source of Importance of External Organizations

Question Six asked "Why are [the external organizations you mention important?". Responses to Question Six ranged from responses that external organizations simply provided needed equipment, material, or other necessary components of the counter-terrorist response, to the comment that external agencies provide essential information and cooperation. Table Twelve is a summary of the responses to Question Six, categorized by the degree of experience of the respondents' organizations. The results of Table Twelve indicated that personnel from experienced organizations tended to perceive less of a dependence on external organizations for equipment, material, and manpower, and more dependence on these organizations for information, intelligence, and cooperation. Personnel from non-experienced organizations, on the contrary, tended to perceive less of a dependence on external organizations for cooperation, information, and intelligence, and more for equipment, material, and support services, such as fire, ambulance, and emergency medical services.

TABLE 12

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED SOURCES OF EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS DRIVE AMONG PERSONNEL OF EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Source of External Communications Drive		
Source Mainly for Resources Such as Equipment, Manpower, and Medical Support	9 (5.67)	4 (7.33)
Source Mainly for Information and Intelligence	8 (7.85)	10 (10.15)
Source Mainly for Cooperation in Training and Planning	0 (3.49)	8 (4.51)
		n = 39
		X^2 = 9.66
		df = 2
		p.< .01
		C = .524
		C_{max} = .71

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

As the analysis of Table Twelve indicated, the difference between the perceptions of the members of the experienced organizations and those of the members of the non-experienced organizations, concerning the source of external communication drive, were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .01 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the source of external communication drive was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a high positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the source of external communication drive. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated individually for each chi-square statistic. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational experience and the source of external communication drive was .524.

Qualitative Data and Planning Method

Question Seven inquires "How did you identify [these

important external organizations] as important?". Responses to this question can be seen to fall into two categories. The resources, manpower, and services organizations tended to be identified by a process of logical programming--simply meeting with other members responsible for counter-terrorist response and brainstorming the important connections. One respondent from a non-experienced organization, in response to Question Seven noted that the process of identification of the required psychiatric hospitals, and external emergency service organizations were identified through a brainstorming approach. Similar responses were gained from most of the individuals interviewed. The answer to Question Seven was so obvious that the question often created difficulties in the tenuous relationship between interviewer and respondent. For example, in response to Question Seven, and mention of the routine advise- and cooperation-oriented organizations, one Southeast Police Department response team leader commented "Isn't it obvious?"[24] The respondent was somewhat taken aback that the interviewer would ask such an obvious question. His subsequent answer was short and to the point "Those kinds of things simply are common sense!"

While personnel from experienced organizations apparently did use the logical programming approach to the

advise and services organizations, such was not the case, however, with the interorganizational connections necessary for information processing and management of innovation. With these organizational connections, identification of the important synapses "have evolved over the years." One administrative officer with the Southeast Police Department noted:

> It's not really something you can predict. It's too personal. Sure, you know that it's important to have a contact at the bureau [Federal Bureau of Investigation], but the real trick is knowing <u>who</u> that contact should be. It's something that really only comes about from doing what has to be done. It 'grows' over a period of years. Years of conducting business with the same group of guys. It develops through contacts, not planning. It is a question of trust, more than anything else. You can't plan that.[25]

A Southeast negotiations team member responded similarly. He noted:

> Most of the identification of one outfit or another as important to the operation of the unit happened as part of a natural learning process. For example, before we saw the need for helicopters, we didn't talk with the guys at NOAA. There was no real coordination with them, because we didn't see them as important to our operations. Once we saw that need, though, we followed up and nailed it down. Now we talk to them almost every day about one thing or another. I think that's the way it almost always works. You don't know you need one guy or another until it happens-- either to [your police department] or to [a police department] you know about. Then you get busy and nail down the connection for future use.[26]

An administrative officer of the Southeast Police Department

made a similar comment, but noted the usefulness of after-action critiques as the way to identify critical deficiencies in the response process. He suggested that an open exchange among the members of the response team was the only real way to learn, and that the critique could only come from two sources: either after an actual event or after a realistic simulation. This administrative officer noted that the process of simulation of terrorist events was an important method of identifying critical dependencies. Simulation has become an important part of the training process for the Southeast Police Department, he reported. It has progressed to the point that the cost of a 100-officer, multi-jurisdiction, four-square block, fifteen-hour terrorist simulation was seen as an exceptionally cost-effective way of identifying organizational strengths and weaknesses. Given the costs of such an operation, the benefits most certainly must have been perceived as significant in order for the Southeast Police Department to have funded the program in 1981. Since 1981, simulation has become a regular part of the training at Southeast.

Question Eight deals with an aspect of planning methodology, and, as will be discussed later, poses a particular problem with analysis of the data collected for

the research. Therefore, Question Eight will be discussed in detail as part of the discussion of Proposition Two.

Frequency of Communication with External Organizations

As with Question Six, responses to Question Nine also showed substantial differences among personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations. Question Eight asked "How frequently do you communicate with [the organizations you have identified as important]?" Personnel from the non-experienced organizations tended to contact important external organizations much less frequently than did personnel from experienced agencies. This aspect of the comparison between experienced and non-experienced organizations showed the greatest degree of difference of all of the factors studied. Table Thirteen depicts the results of the content analysis of the interview data concerning the frequency of contact with important external organizations. Personnel from non-experienced organizations tended to see contact with external organizations as "very infrequent" or "infrequent," while personnel from experienced organizations tended to see contact with external organizations as "very frequent" and "frequent."

As the analysis of Table Thirteen indicated, the difference between the perceptions of the members of the experienced organizations and those of the members of the

TABLE 13

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED FREQUENCY OF COMMUNICATION WITH IMPORTANT EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AMONG EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Contact with External Organizations Perceived as Infrequent	21 (15.56)	2 (7.44)
Contact with External Organizations Perceived as Somewhat Frequent	1 (0.68)	0 (0.32)
Contact with External Organizations Perceived as Frequent	1 (6.76)	9 (3.24)
		n = 34
		X^2 = 21.54
		df = 2
		p.< .001
		C = .622
		C_{max} = .71

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

non-experienced organizations, concerning the frequency of contact with external organizations were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .001 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the frequency of contact with external organizations was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a high positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the frequency of contact with external organizations. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated individually for each chi-square statistic. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational experience and the frequency of contact with external organizations was .622.

Qualitative Data and Frequency of Communication

The responses to Question Eight from members of the non-experienced organizations tended to be similar to the comments of one South Police Department team member, who

commented:

> Really, once we've contacted these people and written them into our plans, there is not much need to continue those contacts. They've agreed to provide the service, and we have the arrangements we need. It's sort of a one-shot deal unless someone leaves or something.[27]

Members of the Midwest Police Department made similar comments concerning the frequency of contact with outside organizations. One administrative officer noted, for example, that:

> We communicate very infrequently. The working relationship has been established already, and we just use it [the service provided by these organizations] when we need it. It's strictly a business relationship that we call on when we need to.[28]

Another response team supervisor noted that these contacts with outside personnel come "at the scene, while they are being used" to provide a given service.

The emphasis among the personnel from the non-experienced organizations tended to be on a more formal brand of communication. Their contacts tended to center around provision of advise, cooperation, or specialized equipment or services, and their perceptions seemed to be that once a specific agency had agreed to provide the assistance requested, not much more formal contact was needed. Among the personnel from the non-experienced organizations, telephone was the most frequently mentioned

method of contact with external organizations, followed by personal interaction and then written communications. The frequency of communication was quite low for these individuals. Most respondents reported fewer than two contacts-- either by telephone, in person, or in writing-- with the organizations they mentioned as important in maintaining their ability to deliver adequate response. Interorganizational communications was simply not seen as an important on-going process among personnel from the non-experienced organizations.

Quite the opposite appeared to be the case with the personnel from experienced organizations. In organizations experienced in counter-terrorist response, the frequency of contact most normally reported was "almost daily." For example, the researcher noted that it was a rare occasion when interviews with managerial or institutional level personnel within experienced organizations were not interrupted by telephone calls from personnel from relevant assisting agencies. These interruptions were consistent and so frequent that during one forty-five minute interview with a member of the Northeast Police Department's response team, the respondent received three calls from other agencies passing on intelligence, checking information, and "just touching base to see how things were going." That this was

not simply a serendipitous occurrence is attested to by the responses to Questions Eight and Nine. One member of the Southeast Police Department responded to the questions "how frequently" with the comment:

> Probably not as frequently as we should. If you're talking about formal, written communications regarding specific problems or situations, maybe only once each six months or so. But, if you're talking about informal, personal communications over the telephone or in the gym, then it's a daily routine. It's really a matter of personal contact anyway. Half of the stuff we get would never be put in a formal report. I'll give you an example. A lot of the local [FBI] agents use our gym. We run into them a lot down there, and we'll pump iron while we swap intelligence information, ideas, that sort of thing. Sometimes that's the best way to do it if you ask me![29]

A respondent from the Northeast Police Department commented that the frequency of communications with other organizations observed by the researcher was not unusual. He noted:

> This sort of thing goes on all the time. It's part of my job. When that phone stops ringing, I know there is something wrong. We've got an extremely informal network established here for intelligence. It's on a first name basis. It has to be. It's based on a tremendous relationship with specific personnel. But informality is the key. A great deal of the information we get is like that. It comes in over the phone from [one of several local organizations] or the bureau [FBI], or the secret service.
>
> Take our relationship with the bureau, for example. We know those guys over there really well. We train with them, bullshit with them, drink with them. They're our friends as well as being people we work with. That's the only way you'll ever get the kind

> of rapport we have with them. You don't do that by written memo. Sure, we get things in writing from them, but that's not where the real information comes from. You've got to be down there with them, along with the coffee and the buns.[30]

An investigative supervisor with the Southeast Police Department noted that he "works the circuit"[31] almost daily to keep himself current. A Southeast response team leader also noted the importance of the contact made with personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation in their gymnasium. He noted:

> A good working relationship is as much personal as it is official, though. We just seem to get along with those guys [from the FBI]. They have the same kinds of interests and we spend a lot of time in the gym, or just bullshitting. That's an important part of the job as I see it. We see them at least weekly, if not more often than that. Formally, though, we hear from them maybe every few weeks.[32]

A great deal of the communications developed between cooperating organizations comes about during the training sessions provided by both experienced and non-experienced organizations. Since all of the organizations studied were the major local law enforcement agencies within their SMSAs, it appears that they received significant training responsibilities for other agencies in their area. Personnel in all agencies remarked that they provide training in counter-terrorist response to most police departments in their respective areas. The purpose of this

training, which in all cases was provided by the focal agencies at no cost to the receiving agencies, varies among the experienced and non-experienced organizations. Personnel from experienced organizations tended to perceive a networking benefit from the interorganizational training exercises, as well as viewing them as learning processes. Personnel from non-experienced organizations tended to perceive the training processes as important for "learning new tricks of the trade," and for confidence building and planning "in case we need to have a joint operation with one of these departments."[33]

The perceived networking potential of the training function was evident in the responses of the personnel from the experienced organizations. The training process appeared to be more than a learning process for these individuals. For example, one Southeast team leader responded:

> We train almost all of the local police departments. They all go through our three-week school at one time or another. We also cross-train with the Coast Guard, Army Special Forces, and other federal agencies in the area. The training is important, of course, but that's not all.
>
> I don't think its really the training that's so important. It's the CONTACTS. Really what we do there [at the response school] is to build a set of contacts-- people we really know, not just a voice on the phone. People who we can call if we need help with info or equipment or anything else. Sure the training is good-- we couldn't function without

> it-- but it's the person-to-person contact that's the real key.
>
> The training we do for surrounding departments is kind of like making deposits in a bank. We build a lot of goodwill that way. Later, if we need a favor, it usually gets done. Not so much because they owe us, but more because they know us. To me that's the real key-- the cross training. IF you get to know these guys its a hell of a lot easier to do business with them. If they don't know you-- don't know that they can depend on you-- you're out of luck if you need anything from them out of the ordinary. So I guess you could say the real benefit of all of this cross training we do is that we get to know who the ass-holes are and who the people are you can work with.[34]

An administrative officer with the Southeast Police Department noted that the benefit of the cross-training was information. He added:

> These cross-training and training exercises are expensive, but they are worth it. They provide us with information and knowledge that we couldn't get anywhere else. The training sessions actually came about through the social contacts from our [team members] who were in the army reserve. Some of the regular army types who knew them, knew their background and the kind of work they do, said 'Hey! We could use that.' They were looking for the finer points of urban warfare building searches. As a result, we find ourselves not only training with them, but learning with them too.[35]

A Northeast Police Department administrative officer noted the same benefit to the training of other police departments. He responded:

> We do training for other police departments at the demand of the [chief of police]. It's so stupid not to do it. You always get something from these people. We're able to learn more over a cup of coffee during one of these training exercises than

> we would ever learn in an official inquiry. The looser you can keep these things the better. We're probably there as much to keep the flow of intelligence moving as we are for any other reason. It's not a formal process. We've even been known to lend fully operational [response teams] to some of these local police departments. We don't do that kind of thing because our guys like to get shot at. It's important to have that kind of cooperation and trust. Otherwise, no one shares information or ideas and we all are in trouble.[36]

These responses can be seen to vary dramatically from those of the personnel in the non-experienced organizations. While these organizations also provide training for smaller police departments, the perceived reason for providing that training is significantly different from those responses reported above. For example, one South Police Department team leader reported that the provision of training to smaller area departments was good, since:

> That's a good way to learn new tricks of the trade. We've learned that if we do have a terrorist event, we're probably going to be outgunned by the bad guys. It also builds our confidence. You get to see just how good you are. A few of the local police departments will send guys here for training who are fat and over forty.[37]

Parenthetically, he added, almost as an afterthought: "They might have some good intelligence information; we get a little bit of that."[38] The distinction, despite the mention of the "little bit" of intelligence information, between personnel from experienced and non-experienced

organizations is clear. The training processes served as a significant source of networking nodes for personnel from the experienced organizations. For personnel from the non-experienced organizations such training was not perceived as a significant source of information for future application.

Personnel from the Midwest Police Department did not mention training as an important process in contacting individuals with other departments. In fact, it appeared that there was little or no contact by members of the Midwest Police Department with other police departments regarding counter-terrorist response. The personnel from Midwest seemed to perceive of counter-terrorist response as a strictly internal function, requiring a minimum of communication with outside organizations.

External Sources of Information

Questions in Section Two of the interview guide dealt with information acquisition and processing through boundary spanning activity. Question Eleven asked "Are there any important <u>external</u> sources of information for your organization in responding to terrorist events?". Responses to Question Eleven were remarkably similar to the responses to Question One. Again, personnel from experienced organizations tended to see a greater need for

access to external information sources than did personnel from non-experienced organizations. Table Fourteen depicts the results of the content analysis of the interview responses to Question Eleven. Table Fourteen can be seen to be remarkably similar to Table Ten, which depicts the results of a question concerning all important external organizations, regardless of the reason perceived for their importance.

As the analysis of Table Fourteen indicated, the difference between the perceptions of the members of the experienced organizations and those of the members of the non-experienced organizations, concerning the importance of external information sources, were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .01 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the perceived importance of external information sources was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a moderate positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the importance of

TABLE 14

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION OF IMPORTANCE OF EXTERNAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION AMONG PERSONNEL FROM EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Perceived Importance of External Organizations		
External Organizations Not Viewed as Important Sources of Information	15 (10.51	1 (5.49)
External Organizations Viewed as Important Sources of Information	8 (12.49)	11 (6.51)

$n = 35$

$X^2 = 10.28$

$df = 1$
$p < .01$
$C = .476$
$C_{max} = .71$

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

external information sources, were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .01 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the perceived importance of external information sources was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a moderate positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the importance of external information sources. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated individually for each chi-square statistic. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational experience and the perceived importance of external information sources was .476.

Importance of External Information

Question Thirteen asked "How important to your ability to respond to terrorist events are these external sources of information?". The responses to this question indicated that personnel from experienced organizations

tended to perceive external information sources as more important than did personnel from non-experienced organizations. For example, none of the respondents from experienced organizations responded with comments that were interpreted to mean that external information sources were of little importance. While the perceived importance of external information sources varied across experienced and non-experienced organizations in the direction predicted by the theory underlying this research, the interesting differences observed in responses to this section of the interview guide were the differences noted in Table Fifteen. Many fewer respondents from non-experienced organizations noted that external organizations were important to the ability to respond to incidents of international terrorism. Table Fifteen depicts the results of the content analysis of responses to question thirteen.

As the analysis of Table Fifteen indicated, the differences between the perceptions of the personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations, concerning the degree of importance of information obtained from external organizations could be attributable to chance or to sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant only at the .50 level. While the direction of the correlation between the

TABLE 15

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE TO COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AS PERCEIVED BY PERSONNEL FROM EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Perceived Importance of External Information		
Information Perceived as of Some Importance	4 (3.11)	4 (4.88)
Information Perceived as Very Important	3 (3.89)	7 (6.11)
		n = 18 X^2 = 0.74 df = 2 p.<.50 C = .199 C_{max} = .71

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

degree of importance of information obtained from external organizations and organizational experience was in the direction anticipated by the theory developed in Chapters One and Two, the test statistic did not allow support for a specific conclusion to be based on Table Fifteen. In addition, the correlation coefficient, C, for Table Fifteen was found to indicate a low correlation between organizational experience and the degree of importance of information obtained from external organizations, as C was equal to only .312 of a possible .71 maximum. Again, these findings supported the contention that information is a key to adequate response to emergency events similar to those responded to by all organizations studied. Whether the event was an emergency created by international terrorists, or simply an emergency created by an irate local gunman, information appeared to be perceived as important to the proper solution of the problem.

Existence of Interorganizational Coordination

Proposition One also suggested that personnel from experienced organizations would be more inclined than their counterparts from non-experienced organizations to develop mechanisms for coping with interorganizational dependencies. Several questions from the interview guide addressed the concept of coping with interorganizational dependencies.

Question Twenty-two, for example, asked "Has any kind of interagency committee or group been established to coordinate activities among your organization and other organizations which respond to terrorism?". Table Sixteen depicts the results of the content analysis of responses to this question. Again, as the theory underlying the research would predict, personnel from among the experienced organizations tended to perceive the existence of an interorganizational committee more frequently than did personnel from non-experienced organizations. The general consensus among those respondents who saw the existence of a coordinating body was that it was something that was necessary, and something which surfaced as the result of past difficulties in responding to terrorist events.

As the analysis of Table Sixteen indicated, the difference between the perceptions of the members of the experienced organizations and those of the members of the non-experienced organizations, concerning the existence of an interagency group to coordinate their counter-terrorist response, were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .05 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the

TABLE 16

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED EXISTENCE OF AN INTERAGENCY GROUP TO COORDINATE COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE PLANNING AND RESPONSE DELIVERY FOR PERSONNEL IN NON-EXPERIENCED AND EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Type of Interagency Group		
None	23 (20.37)	8 (10.63)
Informal Interagency Group	0 (1.31)	2 (0.69)
Formal Interagency Group	0 (1.31)	2 (0.69)

$n = 35$

$X^2 = 8.65$

$df = 2$
$p < .05$
$C = .445$
$C_{max} = .71$

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

existence of an interagency group to coordinate counter-terrorist response was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a moderate, positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the existence of an interagency group to coordinate counter-terrorist response. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated individually for each chi-square statistic. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational experience and the existence of an interagency group to coordinate counter-terrorist response was .445.

These coordinating bodies were informal in the Southeast Police Department's jurisdiction. They met once a month, and gave officers a chance to discuss, in detail, current problems, plans, and prospects for improving counter-terrorist response processes. In the Northeast, the group consisted of a more formal joint task force with the Federal Bureau of investigation, and consisted of such processes as joint investigations and joint undercover operations to prevent terrorist acts. For obvious reasons,

respondents from the Northeast area were not at liberty to discuss in detail the operations of the task force. The unit did exist, however, and its main purpose was to coordinate interagency activities and dependencies.

Organizational Innovation

Questions in Section Three dealt with organizational innovation. Question Fifteen asked "When your organization develops a new method of planning for or responding to a terrorist event, would you say that the new method usually comes from within your organization or from outside your organization?". This topic has been discussed previously; however, it perhaps deserves additional attention at this time. As noted previously, personnel from experienced organizations tended to perceive a much greater external influence on organizational innovation than did personnel from non-experienced organizations. Table Seventeen depicts the results of the content analysis of replies to questions concerning organizational innovation.

As the analysis of Table Seventeen indicated, the difference between the perceptions of the members of the experienced organizations and those of the members of the non-experienced organizations, concerning the perceived source of organizational innovation were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square

TABLE 17

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED SOURCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AMONG NON-EXPERIENCED AND EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Perceived Source of Innovation		
Innovation Source Mainly Internal	19 (14.64)	4 (8.36)
Innovation Source Equally Divided, Internal/External	2 (6.36)	8 (3.64)

n=33

$X^2 = 11.80$

df = 1
$p < .001$
C = .549
$C_{max} = .71$

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .001 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the perceived source of organizational innovation was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a high, positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the perceived source of organizational innovation. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated individually for each chi-square statistic. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational experience and the perceived source of organizational innovation was .549.

Qualitative Data and Organizational Innovation

As Table Seventeen indicates, innovation appeared to be basically an internal process for the non-experienced organizations. As one member of the negotiation team of the South Police Department noted:

> Most of our new ideas come from within the unit. The same is true for the [response team]. We don't really rely on outside help that much. Our team is

> organized so that the team members serve as part-time [incident response team] members. Their 'full-time' assignments are in narcotics, burglary, patrol, homicide. That way we get different perspectives. The fellow from narcotics can keep us informed on the latest booby traps used by people he knows, for example. We trade information on the latest techniques. If we get a new idea-- say from [one of the police journals] we'll try it out. Were not closed to ideas from the outside, but we don't make a conscious effort to look for ideas from the outside.[39]

An administrative officer with the South Police Department also indicated the nature of innovation there. In recounting the processes followed in deciding on the type of body armor worn by team members, he remembered that no suitable body armor appeared to be available. "We designed it to our own specifications, the way our team members wanted it," he noted. "Then once we had the design established, we contacted [different police equipment suppliers] to see if they could get it to us the way we wanted it."[40]

These comments concerning organizational innovation were mirrored almost exactly by members of the Midwest Police Department. To the members of Midwest, with one exception, innovation comes strictly from within the department. As one supervisor noted, "most changes come from within the department."[41] He carried this comment even further, suggesting that most new ideas come "from within the unit itself."[42] As with the South Police

Department, members of the Midwest Police Department saw a great deal of innovation developing from critiques of simulated and actual terrorist events.

In contrast, members of the experienced organizations tended to see external organizations as important in fostering innovation in the response process. For example, the team leader in the Southeast Police Department noted:

> I would say that new ideas come from outside about as often as they come from inside. We always keep an eye on the latest incidents and the tactics used by the bad guys and the police. That's pretty much how we identify our needs. Once we identify a need-- say so-and-so used a certain technique in handling a situation in their police department's jurisdiction, or they were really strapped because they didn't have a certain capability-- then we train to be able to meet that need.[43]

This team leader continued to explain how the Southeast Police Department has developed an informal system of "mixed scanning"[44] in an attempt to insure that the needed innovations are internalized within the department. This method of mixed scanning entailed using a broad-lens approach to scan the operational environment of counter-terrorist response, looking for news items, reports of terrorist tactics, or other infromation that appears to be of interest. Those items that appear interesting are isolated for detauked review. If this detailed review proves to yield data of value, the department disseminates

the information to those affected by it. The department has identified an individual responsible for liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. One of the duties of the officer assigned to this position is to disseminate the synopses developed by the bureau to team members. Another position has been identified which is responsible for reviewing state and local happenings in the area of organized terrorist activity and which produces periodic training bulletins concerning that activity. When asked what happens to those bulletins and synopses, the team leader replied:

> Well, to be honest with you, most of them are read and filed. But every so often, we find something in them that causes us to realize we need some work in that area. That's when we will design the need that we've seen into our training program.[45]

As an example of an organizational innovation spawned by an outside agency, one member of the Southeast Police Department recounted the development of certain water-borne tactics and equipment. "That came about as a result of some cross-training we did with Army Special Forces," he noted. "You get a lot of new ideas that way."[46]

Innovation at Northeast tended to be perceived as more externally oriented than at non-experienced organizations. The lubricant for innovation there was a combination of ideas from inside the department and outside the department

according to the personnel interviewed. For example the training officer noted that:

> We get many of our ideas during cross training exercises with the feds [the federal bureau of investigation] and we work as back-up for the Secret Service. You'd be surprised the ideas you can get in a couple of days of working DP [dignitary protection]. Too, we train out-of-town departments and other law enforcement agencies in [Northeast] city proper, you know, like the housing authority [and other city agency] cops. We get as much out of those sessions as the guys we're training.[47]

It is clear from the qualitative data, that experienced organizations tend to perceive external sources as important in the organizational innovation process.

Analyzing Proposition Two: Interactive Planning Methodologies and Experience

As mentioned previously in this chapter, Questions Twenty through Thirty-One (Section Four) proved to be somewhat problematical. These questions dealt directly with the planning processes used by the various departments to prepare for and respond to terrorist events. The word "planning" in these questions was generally perceived to mean contingency planning. The reaction of respondents to these questions was, however, indicative of their perceptions of the field of counter-terrorist response. It should be noted that the meaning of "planning" was not defined for respondents, as it was one of the purposes of this section to produce some insight into the respondent's

interpretation of the planning process. It was felt that a definition of "planning" provided by the interviewer would unnecessarily bias responses. Respondents from experienced organizations generally perceived of contingency planning as futile, wasteful, or at best of limited use. It appeared to be viewed with disdain. The researcher felt, at times, that the rapport established with the respondents, which in part had been based on his explanation of his eight years' experience in handling terrorist events, was significantly eroded during this part of the interview. Respondents from experienced organizations behaved as if only the uninitiated would suggest contingency planning as a viable way to prepare for response to terrorist events. Conversely, personnel from non-experienced organizations tended to espouse contingency planning as an appropriate planning measure. Table Eighteen depicts the results of the content analysis of the interview data from section four. A more detailed analysis of the qualitative data gathered as a result of Section Four of the interview guide will illustrate the differences found among experienced and non-experienced organizations. Prior to such a review, however, a discussion of the quantitative differences found between experienced and non-experienced organizations is necessary.

As the analysis of Table Eighteen indicated, the difference between the perceptions of the members of the experienced organizations and those of the members of the non-experienced organizations, concerning the most frequently used planning method were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .01 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the most frequently used planning method was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a high, positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the most frequently used planning method . As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated individually for each chi-square statistic. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational experience and the most frequently used planning method was .619.

In response to Question Twenty: "What would you describe as your most successful technique in planning for

TABLE 18

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PLANNING METHODOLOGIES PERCEIVED AS MOST FREQUENTLY USED AMONG EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Type of Planning Perceived as Most Frequently Used		
Planning Mostly Contingency Planning	7 (2.96)	0 (4.04)
Planning Mostly "At Scene" Planning	0 (1.27)	3 (1.73)
Planning Mostly Through Training	3 (2.54)	3 (3.46)
Planning Mostly Through Simulation	1 (4.23)	9 (5.77)

n=26

$X^2 = 16.16$

df = 3

$p < .01$

C = .619

$C_{max} = .71$

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

counter-terrorist response?", members of non-experienced organizations tended to respond in two categories: contingency planning and planning by simulation. Each will be treated in turn. Contingency planning for response to terrorist events will be discussed in detail below. The perception of simulation as a method for plans testing will be discussed here.

Another member of the South Police Department identified a preplanning process that deserves mention as critically important to the ability to deliver adequate response to terrorist events. It is also interesting to note that this response came from the leader of the negotiations team. His suggestion was that one of their most successful planning technique was a cost-benefit analysis of two separate incidents which occurred in 1981. In one incident the standard team response was used; in the other officers rushed the location without team support. The resulting cost analysis suggested that the team response was the most cost-effective method of solving crises involving severe threats of violence. Table Nineteen reproduces the work of the South Police Department, and shows that a team solution to such problems compares favorably to individual action by patrol officers, with

TABLE 19

COST COMPARISON, ASSAULT VERSUS NEGOTIATION AS A METHODOLOGY OF RESOLVING HOSTAGE INCIDENTS

Resolution by Assault Technique		Resolution by Negotiation Technique	
IOD * Costs....	$32,000	Manpower Costs:	
Medical Expenses...	$95,000	One Major.....	$ 120
Recruit, Train, and Equip Replacement Officers.....	$75,000	One Captain.....	$ 96
		Three Lieutenants..	$ 240
		Four Sergeants.....	$ 288
		Four Corporals.....	$ 256
		Five Detectives....	$ 320
		Thirty Patrolmen.....	$ 1120
TOTALS:	$202,000		$ 2240

* IOD is an abbreviation for "Injured On Duty"

Source: "South" Police Department

individual action resulting in medical expenses, workman's compensation, and recruiting and personnel costs of nearly ten times the cost of overtime for a negotiated settlement of a similar problem. The planning process used at South was to take this information to the patrol officers and other members of the police department in order to gain greater acceptance for specialized response team activities.

Another member of the South Police Department noted that planning consisted mainly of "monthly training" and "practicing hypothetical situations using other officers as terrorists." He noted that:

> We develop scenario training and we train with the FBI, the [local county sheriff's department], etc. Using scenarios helps us train for the real thing without paying the costs of making real mistakes. I guess that's our best planning method.[48]

Other members of non-experienced organizations responded similarly when asked about their most successful planning technique. Some discussed team member selection processes. Others discussed highly realistic scenario and simulation training. What is interesting to note, however, is the lack of discussion, at least among members of the non-experienced personnel, of mutual aid pacts, preparation of advanced agreements concerning assistance needed from other organizations, or preparation of information network synapses. It is not necessarily the case that the

non-experienced personnel do not engage in this type of planning. They do, although apparently to a lesser extent than personnel from experienced organizations. What is significant is that neither non-experienced personnel nor experienced personnel viewed such activity as planning.

This failure to note the need for planning, establishing, and nurturing the critical interorganizational nodes may stem from a lack of development, both in the literature and in police training processes, of the importance of interorganizational cooperation. To date, most of the literature which deals with the problem of terrorism in the U.S. has not addressed the need for multi-organizational responses. Most of the training that is developed for police response teams fails to consider the external factors important in providing counter-terrorist response. It is precisely at these types of problems which this research is aimed.

Qualitative Data and Planning Processes

For example, members of the South Police Department, which has a highly refined and well practiced response team, did not see the networking and boundary spanning processes they had engaged in with utility companies, psychiatric centers, news organizations, and the Veteran's Administration as planning. Yet that activity had taken

place only a few years prior to the research visit. In fact, as the negotiations team leader had noted:

> We have one form of agreement or another concerning outside assistance with the telephone company, the electric company, the gas company, the EMT [Emergency Medical Technicians] folks, the VA [Veteran's Administration], local news organizations, and the [local professional organization for psychologists]. We've had meetings with all of these people. For example, we've developed special hostage phones with the phone company. We met with all of these people before hand and identified them and worked out assistance agreements well in advance. We identified the key people in advance. That way there's no arguing or passing the buck. It was a matter of common sense. We put a manual together by brainstorming the necessary connections.[49]

Nearly identical comments were made by personnel from the Midwest Police Department in response to Question Twenty. While Midwest had made advanced contacts with individuals from utility companies, ambulance and fire services, and other local organizations, none of these contacts were mentioned in response to this question. Personnel from Midwest tended to mention after-action critiques of actual and simulated terrorist events as their most successful planning method, although one member of Midwest did mention participation as the most successful planning method.[50]

One might legitimately ask why such an obviously planning-oriented process as networking needed organizational connections was not mentioned in response to Question Twenty. Two explanations come to mind. First, the

process was several years old, and was not fresh in institutional memory. In fact when the researcher asked to see a copy of the manual from South, he was told, "I'm not sure where it is. It's probably lying around somewhere collecting dust."[51] The offer was made to attempt to secure the manual, but, to date, it has not been located. In addition, it appeared that the process had not been recently updated so as to refresh institutional memory as to its importance. Second, such a process appeared to be only common sense, according to many of the respondents, and planning may have been perceived to be more than just common sense. The same problem appears to hold true for members of experienced organizations.

Despite the apparently substantial degree of boundary spanning and networking among personnel of experienced organizations, and despite the importance of the information and innovation processes apparently spawned by that activity, few of the respondents from experienced organizations mentioned that activity as planning activity. "Planning for a job really isn't possible," noted one team member from Southeast. "It can only be done by training, training, and more training, so our team will be ready when it's needed."[52] Interestingly, the managerial and institutional cores of the experienced organizations, the

personnel who would be expected to foster this type of activity, also appear to perceive planning as an internal function. As one administrative officer with the Southeast Police Department noted:

> We do basically two types of planning: operational and budgeting. The operational planning we began four or five years ago when we saw that the old 'what-if' planning just wouldn't work anymore. You know it's not possible to have workable plans that way. You can't plan for 'What if they kidnap the mayor and hold him at this warehouse,' because as sure as you do, they'll kidnap [the city comptroller] and hold him at a <u>different</u> warehouse. So now we use operational planning. We plan at the scene, and we plan after the job. The debriefings are really important. They are closed to everybody but [the response team], but it's completely open with the people who are there. We've had times when officers will tell the team commander: 'Hey! Your screwed up!' It's all very open. We avoid repeating our mistakes this way. We learn from them. That's the best way to plan as far as I'm concerned.[53]

Another member of the Southeast Police Department noted that the most successful planning method was the active "study and critique of other incidents throughout the world." He noted that:

> We get periodic reports from the FBI on world terrorist events. We review those and make changes in our training processes to add the needed techniques. The best way to plan is to look at other people's mistakes in handling the same type of problems and apply those mistakes to your own situation. A lot of the capabilities that we train for come from that type of review. But, some come from after-action critiques of our [response situations] and simulations. We avoid a lot of mistakes that way. That's the only way to really plan for this type of situation.[54]

Still another team leader of Southeast's response team suggested that most planning comes from simulation. He too, identified two types of planning: tactical planning done at the scene, and long range planning consisting of training processes and simulations. He noted:

> Most of our planning is done at the scene. That way we can be sure that we get it right. We don't have a standing committee for planning, but we do put on a school once a year for [surrounding police departments]. The major benefit from that type of planning is the contacts we get with [other police departments]. Quite a few new ideas come from these sessions, and we get a good jump on cooperation with [other police departments in the area], including the FBI. We do simulations three times a year, using plastic bullets or blanks. We set aside one of these simulations for building search tactics, and one for water-borne tactics.[55]

Quite noticeable in its absence from any of the responses from the personnel from experienced organizations is the lack of mention of informal boundary spanning and networking activities. These organizations do engage in such activity. That is supported by responses to questions in Sections One and Two of the interview guide. That type of activity was not seen as planning, however. The obvious question, as with the personnel from non-experienced organizations, is "Why not?". The first suggested answer to this question discussed earlier for personnel from non-experienced organizations would not appear to suffice. The boundary spanning and networking activity of personnel

from experienced agencies appeared to occur daily, thus it should have been fresh in institutional memory. The second suggested answer for personnel from non-experienced organizations may have applied to personnel from experienced organizations, however. The processes of boundary spanning and networking as practiced by members of the experienced organizations appeared not to be formally mandated activities. They may have been "just common sense," and thus not qualify as planning.

When one looked at the boundary spanning and networking processes as discussed by members of the Southeast and Northeast Police Departments, it was seen to be a "personal thing that has developed over the years."[56] The departments tended not to make the time required officially available; it was not a compensated activity. As one investigations supervisor for the Southeast Police Department noted: "We seldom get paid for it; it's not official. What we need is some type of system that makes the time available... Without that time we've had it."[57] Apparently, if these activities were not institutionalized, they were not perceived of as planning, and they were not perceived as important enough to warrant compensation.

Reasons for Success of Planning Processes

Question Twenty-One inquired "Why has this method been so successful?". The near universal response, from personnel from both experienced and non-experienced organizations was "Because it works!"[58] Contingency planning and after-action critiques of actual and simulated events were seen as effective in the non-experienced organizations. After action critiques and on-scene tactical intelligence was seen as the most effective planning techniques in the experienced organizations. Specific remarks made by respondents to Question Twenty-One were not illustrative of any specific differences between the two types of organizations.

Existence of an Interagency Planning Committee

Question Twenty-Two asked "Has any kind of interagency committee or group been established to coordinate activities among your organization and other organizations which respond to terrorism?" The responses to this question were discussed earlier in this chapter; however, they are indicative of differences between the two types of organizations, experienced and non-experienced, in terms of the interactive nature of the planning effort as well as in terms of the process of controlling intergroup dependencies. For that reason, the response to this

question will be dealt with again here. The non-experienced organizations appeared to have neither formal nor informal interagency committees to assist in coordinating activities among the various organizations which might be required to respond to an event of terrorism. None of the personnel from the non-experienced organizations indicated an awareness of such an interagency committee. In contrast to this response from the personnel of the non-experienced organizations, personnel from the experienced organizations did indicate an awareness of the need for, and an existence of, formal or informal interagency coordinating groups. Table Twenty, which replicates Table Sixteen, depicts the results of the content analysis of responses to Question Twenty-Two. It is clear from this analysis that personnel from non-experienced organizations tended to perceive no interagency committee established for the purpose of coordinating the counter-terrorist response. Personnel from experienced organizations, however, did note the existence of such a committee.

As the analysis of Table Twenty indicated, the difference between the perceptions of the members of the experienced organizations and those of the members of the non-experienced organizations, concerning the existence of an interactive planning method in the form of an interagency

TABLE 20

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED EXISTENCE OF AN INTERAGENCY GROUP TO COORDINATE COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE PLANNING AND RESPONSE DELIVERY FOR PERSONNEL IN NON-EXPERIENCED AND EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Type of Interagency Group		
None	23 (20.37)	8 (10.63)
Informal Interagency Group	0 (1.31)	2 (0.69)
Formal Interagency Group	0 (1.31)	2 (0.69)
		n = 33
		X^2 = 8.65
		df = 2
		p< .05
		C = .445
		C_{max} = .71

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

committee to coordinate counter-terrorist response were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .05 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the existence of an interactive planning method in the form of an interagency committee to coordinate counter-terrorist response was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there is a moderate, positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the existence of an interactive planning method in the form of an interagency committee to coordinate counter-terrorist response. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated individually for each chi-square statistic. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational experience and the existence of an interactive planning method in the form of an interagency committee to coordinate counter-terrorist response was .455.

Qualitative Data and Interagency Planning

Qualitative differences emerged between experienced

and non-experienced organizations concerning the existence of inter-agency planning processes. For example, the Northeast Police Department has established a formalized interagency working group to combat terrorism. This group includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation and several other agencies. The purpose of the group is to coordinate the counter-terrorist response in the Northeast Police Department area. The joint Northeast/FBI counter-terrorism task force was created "in the face of an obvious need to do something to meet the growing challenge of terrorism in the area."[59] The joint task force involves sharing of intelligence information, joint investigations of terrorist incidents, infiltration of terrorist groups which have claimed credit for past terrorist acts, and dissemination to affected law enforcement agencies of information concerning specific acts of terrorism within their jurisdictions.

The joint task force boasts several accomplishments, including the prevention of some terrorist acts and arrests and convictions of those responsible for others[60] The work of the task force is enhanced by several factors, according to those familiar with its operation. There is a great deal of "informal communication"[61] between members. The task force is a formal entity; however, its operation is based on "informal

give and take and good rapport between [sic] its members"[62] In addition to the informal nature of the task force's operation, however, there is a more formal side to its existence. Obviously, the existence of the task force is the result of a formal agreement among the parties which participate in its operation. Moreover, according to those familiar with its operation, its members are covered with a top secret security clearance, so that they can be privy to the latest counter-terrorist intelligence developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, or other participating federal law enforcement agency.[63]

In addition, the effectiveness of the combined Northeast area operation to combat terrorism is enhanced by cross-training among the officers of the Northeast Police Department response team and the FBI response team. Cooperation among the members of the unit is high. As one member noted:

> It's on a first name basis. It has to be! There is absolutely no jealousy involved. I don't want to do their job; they don't want to do mine. There is a tremendous relationship between [sic] the personnel on the teams. We have a good rapport. It's team work to the nth degree![64]

Interorganizational cooperation appears to be the hallmark of the task force. As one officer from Northeast noted, "rank is not nearly as important as getting the job done. Cooperation is the key word."[65]

The coordination of counter-terrorist response is not as formalized in the Southeast Police Department's operational area. There exists no formalized group which has as its purpose the coordination of counter-terrorist activities. There does exist an interagency coordination activity within the Southeast area, however. This process is informal, and is centered within the investigative units of the police department, but the scope and intent of the process are clear from respondents' descriptions of it. As one unit supervisor with the Southeast Police Department's special investigations function stated:

> We do this sort of thing at least every month. The guys up in [the organized crime investigations section] get together with us and we meet with the people from [a local county sheriff's department],the Coast Guard, the bureau [Federal Bureau of Investigation], etc. It's damned important. There is no such thing as 'local' terrorism anymore. I've never seen a terrorist group that says 'Hey, wait a minute! We can't blow up that building. It aint in our jurisdiction!' We've got to realize that things that happen in Lebanon or Nicaragua do affect things that happen in [Southeast]. That's why it's important that we have some communication and coordination with the other people who are doing the same kind of things we are. Otherwise you just get a bunch of guys in [Southeast], and a bunch of guys over at the Coast Guard or the Bureau, and we're all just spinning our wheels against different parts of the same problem. There's no coordinated effort.[66]

Another investigative supervisor agreed. What is needed, he suggested is a formal coordinating body, with:

> two or three agents from each of the different

> operational agencies. It's been my experience that the problem with these types of operations is that nobody trusts anybody else. You get a situation where everybody shows up and it's a big grab for power. These things need to be worked out in advance, so we're dealing with known quantities. I've seen it happen too many times. You wait 'til the last minute and '<u>bang</u>!' The gun goes off and this department is ready; so is that department. But they've never <u>worked</u> together in similar situations-- at least not the same guys-- and they don't know each other. There's no trust and in the end there's no cooperation, either. We all stand around and grab for glory, or power, or whatever turns us on, but we don't get the job done. It's FUBARED [Fouled Up Beyond All Reason] from the start.
>
> We've tried to solve some of these problems, and it's because we've <u>seen</u> the screw-ups in the past. It's just like that [organized crime bombing] deal five or six years ago. The bureau was there; so was the ATF [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] and [the local county sheriff's people], plus us. We were all doing things, but the damn <u>procedures</u> were all different. As a result, some things didn't get done, or they were done wrong. We lost some valuable evidence that way.[67]

The exact steps taken by the organizations in the Southeast Police Department's operational area to rectify these problems of coordination of effort among interested investigative agencies were explained as follows:

> We've gotten together with the bureau [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and the Coast Guard, the ATF [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] the county [sheriff's department], and other people in the area. We've gotten an informal agreement so that there is a 'lead agency' declared at the scene. That way we can establish that someone is in charge. The 'lead agency' then becomes the decision maker, and the rest of us are around to assist, advise, or

> whatever. We don't have a written agreement on this. It's hard to determine in advance who the lead agency will be in each case. It varies from case to case, but at least we have that informal agreement, and we meet once a month to discuss things in general. There are always new ideas and suggestions that come from those monthly meetings.[68]

Another member of the Southeast Police Department's negotiations team, who responded to Question Twenty-Two stated that although some form of interagency working group did exist, it was really "not necessary" since:

> We work with those people on a day-to-day basis. When a situation arises, there is no problem with slipping into a different method of operation, from one of several separate groups 'doing their own thing,' to one of a group of several agencies working together to solve a specific problem. I don't think you would find any real problems with the way we work together.[69]

Respondents indicate that coordination mechanisms did exist for the experienced organizations, and that they were recognized as such. In the Northeast Police Department's case, the coordination mechanism was formal, although the decisions of the group were not binding on the department. In the Southeast Police Department, the coordination mechanism was entirely informal, and the decisions of the group were only binding on those individuals who saw membership in the group as important. The coordination process, however, was seen as important and necessary in both organizations.

Methods of Plans Testing

Question Twenty-Seven inquired into the methods used by the responding organizations to test plans before implementation. Given the somewhat unexpected perceptions of planning among respondents to the research, responses to this question were somewhat difficult to analyze. Table Twenty-One depicts the results of the content analysis of interview responses to Question Twenty-Seven. It appeared that there was no significant difference among experienced and non-experienced organizations in terms of the methods they used to test their plans before implementation. Members of non-experienced organizations tended to test their plans before implementation just as frequently as did experienced organizations. The most frequently used method of plans testing was consistent across organizations: simulation. Non-experienced organizations trained at locations identified as probable terrorist trouble sites; they trained to build capabilities which they perceived as being necessary to handle a terrorist event, and they obtained advanced agreements with internally focused, local organizations they perceived as important to an adequate counter-terrorist response. In no instances did personnel from non-experienced organizations arrange to include in their simulation exercises representatives from internally

TABLE 21

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED METHOD OF PLANS TESTING IDENTIFIED BY PERSONNEL FROM EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Type of Plans Testing Method Identified		
No Plans Testing Methods Identified	6 (4.57)	2 (3.43)
Plans Testing Mostly through Non- Simulation Methods	4 (2.86)	1 (2.14)
Plans Testing Mostly through Simulation	6 (8.57)	9 (6.43)

$n = 28$

$X^2 = 3.90$

$df = 2$
$p. < .20$
$C = .349$
$C_{max} = .71$

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

focused, local organizations which they had identified as possibly important in their ability to deliver an adequate counter-terrorist response.

Plans Testing Methodology

As the analysis of Table Twenty-One indicated, the differences between the perceptions of the personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations concerning the methods used to test plans for counter-terrorist response could be attributable to chance or to sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant only at the .20 level. While the direction of the correlation between the methods used to test plans for counter-terrorist response and organizational experience was in the direction anticipated by the theory developed in Chapters One and Two, the test statistic did not allow support for a specific conclusion to be based on Table Twenty-One. In addition, the correlation coefficient, C, for Table Twenty-One was found to indicate a low positive correlation between organizational experience and the methods used to test plans for counter-terrorist response, as C is equal to only .349 of a possible .71 maximum. Thus, while the qualitative data did point out a difference in the manner in which experienced and non-experienced organizations test plans for counter-terrorist response, the

difference is not a significant one.

As with personnel from non-experienced organizations, personnel from experienced organizations also tended to test their plans through use of simulation, to train to build capabilities which they perceived as being necessary to handle a terrorist event, and to obtain advanced agreements with internally focused, local organizations they perceived as important to an adequate counter-terrorist response. There appeared to be little difference in the method of plans testing among experienced and non-experienced organizations. Simulation appeared to be the accepted method.

None of the respondents indicated that the use of simulation was covered by written procedures (Question Twenty-Eight). There also appeared to be no noticeable difference in the frequency of personnel who stated that outside organizations were included in the use of simulations. Thus, it appeared that the actual process of plans testing was not an area in which the two types of organizations vary substantially.

The response of one administrative officer at the Southeast Police Department was perhaps the most enlightening response to Question Thirty, which asked "How was this method [of plans testing] decided on over other

methods?". His response was "Can you think of anything that would work better?"[70] The simulation technique for plans testing was ranked by this officer as not only "very important to knowing what's really going on with your team,"[71] but also as "like an insurance policy"[72] to insure that the response team can do its job. The same was true with responses from the Northeast Police Department. At Northeast, training was considered a primary administrative function. The training officer works directly for the chief administrative officer of the response team. Simulation, according to the training officer, was the key to plans testing. "Trial and error learning is an important part of the process,"[73] he noted, "and it's a great deal better to make those errors when the fellow on the other side is using blanks, than when it's the real thing."[74] The use of simulation appeared to have simply evolved as the best method of plans testing among both experienced and non-experienced organizations.

Frequency of Inclusion of External Organizations in Planning

Question Thirty-One asked "How often are external organizations included in your planning process?", and is designed to measure the degree of external participation in the planning and plans testing process. Table Twenty-One

depicts the results of the content analysis of the responses to Question Thirty. Responses to Question Thirty-One yielded interesting results when compared with responses to Question Twenty-Seven. For example, responses to Question Twenty-Seven indicated that no external agencies are included in the plans testing processes of experienced or non-experienced organizations. External organizations <u>were</u> included in the formal planning activities of those organizations, however. Table Twenty-Two indicated that external organizations were included in the planning activities of experienced organizations much more frequently than in non-experienced organizations. As mentioned previously, respondents from non-experienced organizations tended to perceive of planning as an administrative process which required little, if any, outside participation. Plans <u>testing</u>, on the contrary, need not involve external agencies, according to the personnel from non-experienced organizations. Plans testing, when it was used among non-experienced organizations, tended to be by internal simulation, which was also the method of preference for plans testing among experienced organizations.

As the analysis of Table Twenty-Two indicates, the difference between the perceptions of the members of the experienced organizations and those of the members of the

TABLE 22

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED FREQUENCY OF INCLUSION OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PLANNING ACTIVITIES AMONG EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Frequency of Inclusion of External Organizations		
External Organizations Generally Not Included	16 (13.20)	6 (8.80)
External Organizations Generally Included	2 (4.80)	6 (3.20)

n = 30

X^2 = 5.56
df = 1
$p < .05$
C = .395
C_{max} = .71

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

non-experienced organizations concerning the frequency with which external organizations are included in the planning process were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .05 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the frequency with which external organizations were included in the planning process was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a moderate, positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the frequency with which external organizations were included in the planning process. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated individually for each chi-square statistic. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .71. Using .71 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the correlation between organizational experience and the frequency with which external organizations were included in the planning process was .395.

Testing Proposition Three: The Perceived Need for Strategic Management

Planning Methods

Non-Experienced Organizations

The questions in Section Five-- as well as some of the questions from other sections-- of the interview guide were designed to determine the degree to which the personnel interviewed perceived a need for strategic management processes in response to the problems with which they are confronted in delivering an adequate counter-terrorist response. Specifically, the determination needed to be made as to the methodology of planning. The theory developed in Chapter One would predict that experienced organization would use a more strategically oriented, capability building planning model, while non-experienced organizations would use a contingency model of planning. The responses to these questions were perhaps the most telling responses in identifying differences among personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations.

For personnel from non-experienced organizations, contingency planning appeared to be perceived as possible and desirable. For example, an administrative officer with the South Police Department, in response to Question Twenty

remarked:

> We are currently going through a new planning phase for emergency operations. We are in the process of developing new SOPs [Standardized Operating Procedures]. We are developing detailed plans for events we see as possible, and we are updating all of our old plans. What we have in mind is a twenty page Emergency Operations Command Center Operations Manual with thirty or so annexes that assign everyone a job-- by annex. This way we'll have responsibilities planned for in advance.[75]

This type of perception of successful planning methodologies is most definitely of a contingency nature. The same administrative officer also noted the tendency of the South Police Department to plan through other methods of contingency planning. He responded:

> I guess the closest thing we do to actual 'planning' are our site walk throughs. We'll try to identify potential problem sites-- like the stadium-- and then we'll walk through them. We ask 'where would terrorists go?' We have diagrams of airport buildings, port buildings. In some cases we even have the building plans. For example we have complete plans of the stadium, and we practice there with simulations two or three times a year. We've trained downtown in the mall area on Sundays. We send people to review these potential sites, to build up in their heads how you'd handle it if it happens. Then we train anyplace that looks good [as a potential trouble site]. We've identified several of these places throughout the area: tall buildings, ports, interstate highways, shopping centers-- anyplace where large numbers of people gather.[76]

Personnel from the Midwest Police Department also noted that contingency planning tended to be the method of choice for planning for counter-terrorist response. Nearly

all of those interviewed at Midwest commented that a large part of the planning process centered around identifying potential trouble spots and obtaining maps or blueprints of those sites. As one key administrative officer from Midwest noted:

> We maintain maps of key buildings, buildings that are probable trouble sites. That way, if a situation goes down, we've got the blueprints we need to handle the situation. Our intelligence officers have reconned specific buildings like the stadium, city hall, housing projects, major apartment buildings, etc.[77]

Experienced Organizations

Members of experienced organizations tended to suggest that the best planning method is that of building capabilities, not plans. As one administrative officer with the Northeast Police Department noted:

> There's none of this "contingency" bullshit! You can't rely on that. The only real way to plan in advance is to plan to have the capabilities that you can reasonably expect will be needed to handle [a terrorist event]. After that, your planning has to be on-scene. We won't trust anybody else to plan for us. We even double check the height markings under the overpasses when we remove a bomb in the bomb disposal truck. It all has to be done from inside. If we make a mistake, it could kill. Our planning has to be right. There's no room for contingency plans with dust on them.[78]

The previous section noted that it appeared that members of experienced organizations tended to disregard the importance of contingency planning as an effective method of planning for counter-terrorist response. Members of the

non-experienced organizations, on the other hand, tended to regard contingency planning as a workable technique for planning for counter-terrorist response. The theory developed in Chapters One and Two equates contingency planning with a tactical orientation, while connecting a strategic planning orientation with strong interorganizational processes.

Recommendations for Improvements in Planning Processes

Questions Thirty-Seven through Forty were designed to collect data on the types of recommendations for improvements in planning processes made by members of the experienced and non-experienced organizations. Table Twenty-Three depicts the results of the content analysis of these questions. As Table Twenty-Three indicates, personnel from experienced organizations tended to see the need for improvement in planning processes much more frequently than did personnel from non-experienced organizations. In addition to the frequency of the perceived need for change, there was also a qualitative difference between the two types of organizations in the <u>types</u> of change perceived as necessary. Members of experienced organizations tended to note a need for improvement in interorganizational aspects of the planning process, while personnel from

TABLE 23

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT IN PLANNING PROCESSES FOR COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE AMONG NON-EXPERIENCED AND EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Type of Organization	
	Non-experienced	Experienced
Perceived Degree of Improvement Needed		
No Perceived Need for Improvement	19 (16.43)	6 (8.57)
Need for Improvement Perceived	4 (6.57)	6 (3.43)

$n = 35$

$\chi^2 = 4.10$

$df = 1$
$P < .05$
$C = .324$
$C_{max} = .71$

Numbers in Parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to three figures for clarity of Presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

non-experienced organizations tended to note a need for improvements in equipment, resource distribution, and tactics.

As the analysis of Table Twenty-Three indicated, the difference between the perceptions of the members of the experienced organizations and those of the members of the non-experienced organizations, concerning the perceived need for change in the planning process were not attributable to chance or sampling error. The results of the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was significant at the .05 level. Testing for the correlation coefficient, C, it was revealed that the correlation between organizational experience and the perceived need for change in the planning process was in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, C was found to suggest that there was a moderate, positive correlation between organizational experience and respondents' perceptions concerning the perceived need for change in the planning process. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, C does not always have a maximum value of 1.00, and must be calculated individually for each chi-square statistic. In this case, C was found to have a maximum value of .707. Using .707 as the maximum value of C, it was found that the

correlation between organizational experience and the perceived need for change in the planning process is .324.

Qualitative Data and Perceived Need for Change

Members of the Southeast Police Department tended to perceive needed changes in the area of interorganizational cooperation. For example, an investigations supervisor noted:

> First, I would say that we need a little more free flow of information from the federal level to the local level. It's always been pretty good from the local to the federal, but not the other way around. Second, we need more use of organizations like the IABTI [International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators]. It's important for the response team that information be available in advance. When they respond, they need to know the mental make up of the group they're up against. The negotiators need to know not only the mental make-up, but also the customs, etc. of the people they're dealing with. We don't want a negotiator offering a Hindu a Burger King. I don't think you'll get that kind of information access on a formal basis. Third, we need to identify who's important and get those folks together. The department has to make the time available for those informal connections to be formalized in an information exchange. Fourth, we need to improve our coordination efforts. Coordination is our biggest problem. Getting folks to tell you what's happening [e.g., current events in terrorism] and getting that information funnelled into one spot is critical. We have not licked the multiple-agency, multiple-scene problem yet. That's where we really need work. I think the key to solving that problem is to have people who are used to responding together-- people who know each other.[79]

Similarly, other members of the Southeast Police Department identified other areas of their counter-terrorist

response which needed improvement. Interestingly, almost all of the areas of needed improvement identified by personnel from this agency centered around either negotiations or investigations. Such a finding would have been predictable, given the theory of counter-terrorist response developed in Chapter One. Technical level personnel from Southeast noted recommendations for improvement in the equipment used to respond to terrorist events, but admitted that these improvements were not critical, but simply improvements to a system which worked well already.[80] Negotiators and investigators, on the other hand, noted that their suggested improvements were "critical" and "absolutely necessary"[81] to the delivery of acceptable counter-terrorist response in the face of increased activity of an international scope. The key to improvement of the investigative and negotiation function, at least as far as the personnel of the Southeast Police Department were concerned centered around coordination and enhancement of the interorganizational connections currently being developed by members of that police department.

It appeared that personnel from experienced organizations responded with comments which supported the contention that planning in those organizations is capability oriented as opposed to being contingency

oriented. For example, the response by one Northeast Police Department administrative officer concerning contingency planning is most vivid: "There's none of this contingency bullshit!"[82]

In contrast, the suggestions for improvement which were made by personnel from non-experienced organizations tended not to focus on external connections, but instead on refinements of internal processes already found in those departments. For example, one South negotiations team member commented in response to the questions in Section Five:

> Our main problem right now is one of attitude. We get into too big of a hurry at the scene. We need to learn to do things 'by the book' and to really <u>believe</u> that time is on our side. It's hard to overcome the old police mentality. The only other problem I could identify right now is that we need more support from psychologists during the negotiations. We're in the process of hiring a new psychologist now, though, so that shouldn't be a problem for much longer.[83]

Members of the Midwest Police Department also tended to have a mostly technical focus in terms of recommendations for improvements. For example, one response team supervisor noted in response to Question Thirty-Seven:

> We need to recognize that it is a unit, but it goes beyond that. Our compensations structure needs to be more realistic, and more equal. All team supervisors should have take-home cars. It's something that doesn't require a great deal of money. There are cars available.[84]

Other members of the Midwest Police Department also noted the need for additional resources to be devoted to the response team. One supervisor of the intelligence unit suggested:

> The department should put up the money that's needed to get the job done, to get the equipment that we need. We've had a hard time getting floodlights. There's too much bargaining to get us what we need. It's become a morale problem. Morale would be stronger if we saw some kind of commitment to our needs.[85]

Other members of non-experienced organizations tended simply to see no need for change in the way the organization plans for counter-terrorist response. One administrative member of the South Police Department simply noted:

> Our planning process is really adequate. We've been innovative and taken the lead. We critique each call-up and the situation is written up and gone over step by step for recommendations. After action remedies are always developed. This is an on-going process for us. 'Have a plan, but train the plan.' Instead of being reactionary [reactive] we're innovative and anticipatory. As far as international terrorism is concerned, though, we just don't feel that we've been targeted yet, even though we've had threats here against Japanese and Cuban shipping. Most of our SOPs [standard operating procedures] have been generated for 'local' events.[86]

Another member of South noted:

> Our planning process is good to very good. I don't know that it's excellent, because I don't know what to compare it to. I feel safe and confident with the team. We're prepared for most possibilities.[87]

It appeared that most members of the non-experienced agencies were relatively well satisfied with their response capabilities and that they felt few changes were necessary. There were, however, exceptions to this perception. Particularly, the administrative officers of the South Police Department appeared to be sensitive to the distinctly different nature of true, internationally focused, terrorist events, as opposed to those which the non-experienced organizations had been handling. There appeared to be a feeling among some of these administrative personnel that, should the day come that their response team were forced to deal with real international terrorists, they would not be able to develop easily an acceptable response. For example, one South officer noted:

> We'll be sorely prepared to challenge six people who trained in Cuba or Moscow for six months or two years. That's a completely different breed of "terrorist."[88]

Still another member of the South Police Department noted more important differences between conventional terrorism and truly international terrorism. He responded:

> This seems to be the 'in' thing. I personally see a shift to the right in the thinking of this country. That leads to a kick ass and take names mentality... We're heading for a phase in this country when we're ripe for that kind of terrorism. For those, you need a different response. The traditional police department response will not do. You need a different style of training, planning, and response. You'll find that the group you're up against may be

> as well trained as you are. They'll also be more prepared to do harm for the benefit of politics. That makes them different from your normal hostage incident. The politics of that kind of situation could transcend local politics. Decision that would normally be made at the CP [command post] will be transcended by political decisions. These situations will involve problems that aren't addressable by the local assault/negotiations team. For example, we train to avoid killing. A real terrorist incident may require us to kill. Because of that, I think we would find our current planning, training, and response practices to be of limited use. It is a totally different situation.[89]

A similar awareness was found among members of the Midwest Police Department. For example, one unit supervisor noted that:

> In dealing with everyday hostage takers, you're dealing with someone who wants publicity, who wants their story told, who wants to get on TV. But, you're not dealing with someone willing to DIE for their cause. True terrorists are willing to die. They will be well equipped-- probably better than we will-- with explosives. If it happens here, we're in real trouble.[90]

It was apparent from the responses of the personnel from the South and Midwest Police Departments that they saw a clear difference between normal terrorism and terrorism of the international variety. The consensus appeared to be that they would be hard pressed adequately to respond to international terrorism. Such terrorism was seen to require significantly different planning, training, and response processes, processes which, according to the perceptions of South personnel, most police departments would not be

capable of providing. Such terrorism, if these Police Departments were to be faced with it, would require significant changes, but, as one member of the South Police Department noted:

> We haven't been faced with that problem yet, although it is possible that it could happen in the near future. We train a great deal using international terrorism as the focus, but we've never had to do it.[91]

Thus, the perception among members of experienced organizations tended to be that improvements need to be made in the use of interorganizational coordination, in information processing, and in negotiations and investigations capabilities. These are the areas which strategic management of the counter-terrorist response addresses, and are the areas that the theory developed in Chapters One and Two would predict that personnel from experienced organizations would perceive as needing improvement. In contrast, personnel from non-experienced organizations tend to see the planning process as adequate and well-suited to the development of an counter-terrorist response of the type they are likely to be required to produce. Tables Twenty-Four and Twenty-Five summarize the results of characteristics noted during the course of interviews with personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations. Table Twenty-Four analyzes

the characteristics noted as tactical in Chapter Two, while Table Twenty-Five analyzes the characteristics noted as strategic in Chapter Two. Indicators of the characteristics discussed in these tables were adapted from the measures developed by Van de Ven and Ferry. For example, in Table Twenty-Four, perception of terrorism as a local problem is dealt with using the degree to which the focal organization associated with non-local organizations. The assumption was that the more the organization perceived of terrorism as a non-local problem, the more the organization would tend to associate with non-local organizations to assist in responding to a terrorist event. In both tables, the characteristic of tactical and strategic response are given in the first column, and the indicator used to measure that characteristic in the research is given in the second column.

Table Twenty-Four is an analysis of the characteristics of tactical management of the counter-terrorist response process. As the table indicates, there is a significant difference between perceptions of the response process among experienced and non-experienced organizations. On all but one indicator the non-experienced organizations exhibited a significantly more tactical perception of the method their organizations used to respond

TABLE 24

COMPARISON OF TACTICAL MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS AMONG NON-EXPERIENCED AND EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

Characteristic	Associated Indicator	Significance of X^2 Statistic/ Degree of Correlation
Perception of Terrorism as Local Problem	Degree of Association with Non-local Organizations (Table 10)	.001/ High
Reliance on Formal Organizational Responses	Planning Methods Most Frequently Used (Table 18)	.001/ High
Lack of Provision for Mutual Adjustment	Existence of Interagency Group for Coordination (Table 16)	.01/ Moderate
Reliance on Formal, Contingency Planning	Frequency of Use of Varying Planning Methods (Table 18)	.001/ High
Perception of Terrorism as "Extensions" of Problems Normally Handled	Perceived Need for Improvement in Planning Processes (Table 23)	.020/ Moderate
Reliance on Internal Resources Rather Than External Resources	Source of External Communication Drive (Table 12)	.01/ High
Reliance on Internal Expertise Rather Than External Expertise	Source of External Communication Drive (Table 12)	.01/ High
Limited Perception of Need for Similar Organizational Systems Among Organizational Network	None *	None *

TABLE 24--Continued

Limited Focus on Identification of Interorganizational Dependencies	Use of Simulation as a Planning Method/ Frequency of Communication with External Organizations (Tables 18 and 13)	.001/ Very High .001/ High
Limited Inclusion of External Organizations in Planning Methodologies	Frequency of Inclusion of External Organizations in Planning Processes (Table 22)	.05/ Moderate
Limited Provision for Information Transfer, and Externally Oriented Organizational Innovation	Source of Innovation/ Importance of External Information Sources (Tables 14 and 17)	.01/ Moderate .001/ High

* Indicators for perception of similar organizational structures were included in quantitative collection procedures only, and a comparison on this measure cannot be made concerning tactical and strategic perspectives of experienced and non-experienced organizations.

to terrorist events. The single indicator which did not show a significant difference among experienced and non-experienced organizations was the indicator used to measure perceptions of terrorism as extensions of problems normally handled by the non-experienced organization. This indicator was the extent to which respondents saw a need for improvement in the planning process. As was mentioned previously, the semantic difficulty with the word "planning" may have caused this anomaly. The differences among the experienced and non-experienced organizations on the indicators used in Table Twenty-Four were all in the direction suggested in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, there appeared to be a high correlation between a lack of organizational experience and the use of tactical response methods for eight of the twelve indicators of tactical management processes. The remaining four indicators showed a moderate correlation between lack of organizational experience and tactical response methods.

Table Twenty-Five lists the characteristic of strategic response in the first column, and the indicators of strategic response in the second column. All of the differences observed among experienced and non-experienced organizations were in the direction predicted by the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. In addition, all of

TABLE 25

COMPARISON OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS AMONG NON-EXPERIENCED AND EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

Characteristic	Associated Indicator	Significance of X^2 Statistic/ Degree of Correlation
Decentralized Planning and Response Methods	Inclusion of External Organizations in Planning/ Source of Innovation (Tables 25 and 17)	.05/ Moderate .001/ High
Use of Collateral Organizations	Source of Innovation/ Interagency Group for Coordination (Tables 16 and 17)	.05/ Moderate .01/ Moderate
Mechanisms for Mutual Adjustment to Conflict	Interagency Group for Coordination/ Frequency of External Communication (Tables 16 and 13)	.05/ Moderate .001/ High
Problem Solving Through Informal Networks	Source of External Communication Drive (Table 12)	.01/ High
Existence of Non-formal Coping Mechanisms	Interagency Group for Coordination (Table 13)	.001/ High
Provision of External Resources and Importation of Operational Expertise	Source of External Communication Drive (Table 12)	.01/ High

TABLE 25--Continued

Development of Similar Operational Structures	None *	None *
Provision of Artificial Environmental Turbulence	Types of Planning Processes Used (Table 18)	.001/ High
Existing Processes for Identification of Key Interorganizational Networks	Frequency of External Communication/ Inclusion of External Organizations in Planning/ Planning Methods (Tables 13, 25, 18)	.001/ High .05/ Moderate .001/ High
Recognition of Need for Maintenance of Interorganizational Synapses	Frequency of External Communications (Table 13)	.001/ High
Participative and Emulative Planning	Planning Methods Used/ Inclusion of External Organizations in Planning (Tables 18, 22)	.001/ High .05/ Moderate
Provision of Channels for Information, and Innovation Processes	Source of External Communication Drive/ Source of Innovation (Tables 12, 17)	.01/ High .001/ High

* Indicators for perception of similar organizational structures were included in quantitative collection procedures only, and a comparison on this measure cannot be made concerning tactical and strategic perspectives of experienced and non-experienced organizations.

the indicators were found to be significant. Of the eighteen indicators of a strategic management perspective, twelve were found to have a high, positive correlation between organizational experience and use of strategic management processes in counter-terrorist response. The six remaining indicators all showed a moderate, positive correlation between organizational experience and use of strategic management processes for counter-terrorist response. The interpretation that can be drawn from Tables Twenty-Four and Twenty-Five is that there existed, among the organizations studied in this research, a significant difference between the management processes engaged in by experienced organizations and those engaged in by non-experienced organizations. The experienced organizations tended to manage their counter-terrorist response in a more strategic manner than did non-experienced organizations.

Testing Proposition Four: Planning Methodologies Before and After Initial Experience with International Terrorism

Proposition Four suggests that members of experienced organizations will tend to see distinct differences in the way they plan for response to terrorist events at the present time, and the way such response was effected prior to experience with terrorism. Questions in

Section Six of the interview guide were designed to collect data on this proposition. Again, there appeared to be substantial differences among the responses of personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations. Members of non-experienced organizations tended to report that their organizations had not experienced any significant, non-routine events in the last few years which caused them to rely on external resources to handle the event. Personnel from non-experienced organizations tended to see counter-terrorist response as strictly an internally handled process. Responses from personnel from non-experienced organizations to question thirty-two tended to be universally negative. One team member from the South Police Department summed up the responses to questions thirty-two and thirty-three when he stated:

> No. We've been very lucky. We've never had to hurt anybody. I've seen no major problems. The only changes I see that are needed are changes in equipment.[92]

When members of the non-experienced organizations did respond to these questions with examples of non-routine events, nearly all of these examples focused on internal problems rather than external problems. For example, an administrative officer with the South Police Department noted that the latest crisis occurred "three weeks ago," and remembered:

> We had a lot of communications problems with a Cuban refugee who eventually surrendered. I am the only member of the team who speaks Spanish, but I wasn't called up. We also ran into some problems with the command post. We only had one house available that was suitable, but we were hesitant to use it, since the people there were somewhat antagonistic toward the police. We also found a small problem with the press. They jumped on us as soon as the situation was over, and before we were able to get our initial post-event critique finished. They were getting conflicting stories from people at different parts of the perimeter, and broadcasting them at the same time. We looked pretty foolish. During the after-action critique the next day, though, we solved these problems.[93]

The same held true among members of the Midwest Police Department. Significant crisis events did surface during the course of interviews with personnel from this department; however, all of these events illustrated internal problems. No respondent from Midwest identified a crisis event which would have required improvement in external relations, information sources, or external expertise. While the Midwest Police Department did have several events which respondents identified as crisis events, their comments concerning the event, despite the obviously external orientation of the question, all focused around internal improvements in response tactics and procedures.

While some members of the experienced organizations also remembered significant crisis events, they tended to be the type of events which required external resources beyond

those secured by the organization at the time. Those respondents who could not recall a significant non-routine event also tended to report that their department's response process had changed substantially over the years. The near universal perception among the personnel from the experienced organizations was that the response was better although it was, in effect, an improved, or refined version of the response originally developed. "We're a hell of a lot better at it now than we were when we first started,"[94] remarked one team member of an experienced organization.

Personnel from experienced organizations tended to identify crisis events more readily than did personnel from non-experienced organizations. The most illustrative recollection came from an investigative supervisor, who recounted the facts of a terrorist bombing that occurred in his jurisdiction several years earlier. He remarked:

> It was a bombing by [one of the most active terrorist groups in the United States]. We were there, but so was [the state police] the FBI, the [local county sheriff], and [a smaller city jurisdiction], as well as the ATF [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] . Most of the people at the bank [that was bombed] had worked together before and it worked out well. The ATF, the FBI, the county, city, and state police all had input into the case. We were able to solve it fairly easily, but it couldn't have been done if everyone hadn't had some input into the process. On the other hand, if we hadn't declared a lead agency, like we had agreed to earlier, then we would have

> had trouble. The way it worked out, though, someone was 'in charge' and he was able to coordinate the work the rest of us were doing. It was a job that required outside input, but it was done without some of the chaos I've seen in previous cases. That's the one thing I've seen change over the years. We're able to work together better now than we used to be.[95]

Personnel from the Northeast Police Department reported no recollection of a crisis event, which caused a significant change in operation, occurring in the past few years. This could be due to the fact that the unit has been in existence so long as to have experienced most possible contingencies, and thus to have planned for their successful resolution prior to the event. It is also possible that the respondents at Northeast were not providing unfavorable data. The latter possibility may be the more probable, since none of the Northeast respondents provided data which would tend to hinder their standing in the law enforcement community. The existence of such data is discussed in detail below.

Given the respondents' perceptions of planning, however, it is not surprising that none of the respondents reported lasting effects on planning efforts of these significant events. Since planning tended to be perceived as a highly technical paper and pencil process, few of the respondents made any connection between lessons learned during these significant events and changes made in

organizational processes. The tendency was to view planning as something done by administrative personnel (i.e., budgeting) or to view it as on-scene tactical planning, e.g., the planning done before an assault of a barricaded building.

While the qualitative data seemed to suggest a difference among experienced and non-experienced organizations in terms of the perception of personnel of the existence of past crisis events which caused them to rely on external resources or organizations, the statistical analysis of the data collected on this point fails to yield a significant difference. Table Twenty-Six is a summary of the content analysis of responses to questions concerning the existence of such events. As Table Twenty-Six indicates, the difference in perceptions of experienced and non-experienced personnel is attributable to chance or to sampling error. Thus no conclusion can be drawn from Table Twenty-Six supporting proposition Four.

Testing Proposition Five: The Existence of Archival Data Supporting Strategic Planning

Non-Experienced Organizations

The existence of archival data concerning counter-terrorist response was somewhat difficult to find in both experienced and non-experienced organizations. While

TABLE 26

CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVED EXISTENCE OF A PAST CRISIS EVENT REQUIRING EXTERNAL RESOURCES

	Type of Organization	
	Non-Experienced	Experienced
Perception of Crisis Event		
No Crisis Event Perceived	10 (10.51)	6 (5.49)
Crisis Event Perceived	13 (12.49)	6 (6.51)

$n = 35$

$X^2 = 0.135$

$df = 1$
$p. < .80$
$C = .063$
$C_{max} = .71$

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to two significant positions beyond the decimal point for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

personnel from experienced organizations tended to mention documents such as mutual aid pacts and standard operating procedures for multi-jurisdiction problems, these tended to be difficult to locate, and thus of questionable use in an actual terrorist incident. For example, to locate a copy of the mutual aid pacts and operating procedures for multiple jurisdiction operations at the Southeast Police Department took several follow-up telephone calls to administrative offices and several referrals to various administrative officers with the comment "I think he would have a copy." Such documents buried so deeply in the institutional memory would, it appears, be of questionable use in a fast-moving response to a terrorist incident. Nonetheless, such documents did exist, and the following is a comparison of the available archival data from the participating organizations.

Midwest

The personnel of the Midwest Police Department were helpful enough to provide the researcher with complete access to not only current operational procedures, but also all planning documentation for the development of their response team. Thus one is able to reconstruct a very accurate picture of the rationale behind development of the

team at Midwest. The catalyst to development of the response team at Midwest was the occurrence of several incidents which had "less than desirable"[96] outcomes from the police view. One respondent candidly recounted an incident in which the responding Midwest personnel "did everything exactly wrong!"[97] Shortly after this incident, in 1977, the Midwest Police Department began planning for implementation of adequate procedures and policies for development and deployment of an counter-terrorist response team. Their planning documents indicate that their concerns were basically tactical in nature, much as predicted by the theory developed in Chapter Two. The major conceptual document leading to the development of the response team states:

> There are four basic hostage situations that the police are called upon to deal with. The first involves the criminal. Police often become involved with the criminal where he is escaping from a crime, is confronted by the police, and takes a hostage.
>
> The second type and the most common situation, involves the mentally disturbed person....
>
> Third is the unorganized group. These involve the typical jail riot. This usually occurs when a common cause among the inmates emerges, igniting a fanatical, full-scale rebellion.
>
> The fourth, and at this time, least common in this area, is the radical or revolutionary organized group, that takes one or more hostages to further its political aims (terrorists).[98]

After discussing, in some detail, the ramifications of hostages incidents for the police, the memorandum states:

> It is therefore the recommendation of the advisory committee [studying the implementation of a counter-terrorist response team], based on the above information that the ... response unit be called to and take over full responsibility of the following incidents:
>
> 1. All hostage incidents
> 2. All barricaded suspects
> 3. All threatened suicides by jumping (negotiations only)
>
> It is further recommended that the [response team] be utilized in the protection of dignitaries and or other possible targets of the hostage taker.[99]

It is interesting to note that, with the exception of one brief, obligatory mention of possible counter-terrorist responses, the planning document fails to take cognizance of the potential need of the unit to respond to such threats. In fact, in its final recommendations, the planning document does not mention counter-terrorist response as a possible function of the response team.

In the original stages of planning for its response team, Midwest included a crisis think tank whose purpose was "to measure motivesd an demands made by hostage taker (sic)... to decide what demands to meet," and "to serve in an advisory capacity to the [response team]."[100] The planning document further indicated that the main thrust of the use of the think tank was in the areas of terrorist involved political incidents. The think tank was designed primarily to respond to problems presented by international terrorism. In its implementation of the counter-terrorist

response plan, the Midwest Police Department deleted the think tank from the operational order. Respondents suggested this deletion was due to the fact that such capabilities simply were not needed. The real experts commented one respondent at the Midwest Police Department, were the "guys on the team. We felt that they did not need the think tank there to 'second guess' them."[101] Thus, despite some minor references to possible terrorist activity, and the preliminary intent to develop a capability to deal with that threat, the actual Midwest plan for incident response did not contain that capability.

Another archival indication of the tactical nature of the Midwest response is evident in the planning document's treatment of the role of the intelligence team in responding to hostage incidents. The Planning and Development Division noted in the 1977 planning document that:

> Good intelligence gathering is vital in helping the [response team] Commander and the Think Tank to determine what tactics to employ at a hostage scene. Intelligence gathering continues on many fronts simultaneously and lasts throughout the police response until the hostages are freed and the taker is captured....
>
> The Intelligence Unit will maintain the names of individuals that (sic) could be contacted for immediate desires services (sic) in hostage situations, such as [telephone, electric, gas companies], etc. They will also maintain building plans for major facilities within [the police department's jurisdiction] such as: City Jail, [the

major sports stadium], City Hall, etc.[102]

The planning documents also outlined the training philosophy and objectives for response personnel. The Planning and Development Division suggested in the planning document that:

> It is the recommendation of the committee that with all the management capabilities within this department all training can be done in-house...
> The training will be both specific and general in nature, that is, each particular squad within the unit will have concentrated education with their particular field as well as generally assembly of all parts of the [response team]. The unit will also receive ongoing training during the year to update techniques.[103]

The planning document delineated the training schedule for response personnel as consisting of team structure, negotiations techniques, and self defense,[104] and noted the need to train "all district captains and lieutenants to provide them with knowledge of Department responsibilities and procedures in handling hostage situations."[105] Important elements of training for the managerial core of the department included team concepts, functions, procedures, and responsibilities.[106]

It is indicative of the nature of the planning conducted by Midwest that in only few areas was the need for outside information or assistance noted. The intelligence unit was given responsibility for maintaining names of individuals at local utility companies who could assist in team response. Additionally, the intelligence unit was also

assigned the responsibility to "establish complete pedigrees, psychological attitudes and organizational philosophy of any person and/or group identified as hostage takers [sic]."[107] The planning document called for a police/media relations function, although the intended benefits of this function were not clear. The think tank, which was eventually deleted from the plan, was to provide advise if the incident were terrorist-oriented. With these exceptions, there were no other mentions of the importance of interorganizational relations in the planning document. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and the Secret Service were not mentioned in the document. Also conspicuous in their absence from the planning document were the state police, and other local police departments. The emphasis of the planning document, with the exceptions mentioned, was obviously of a tactical nature.

The finalized operational order issued as a result of the staffing of the planning document was of an even greater tactical nature. Operational Order 79-S-20 eliminated the advisory role of the think tank for terrorist incidents of a political nature. The News Media Liaison Officer's responsibilities were more clearly articulated, and he was given responsibility for clearing all interviews,

updating information given to the media, and insuring a "safe location for the news media press area."[108] The role of the intelligence unit remained unchanged in the operational order. No additional elements were added to the operational order, thus its nature remained distinctly tactical. No consideration appeared to be given to the need for additional support from area police departments. No mention was made of the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in providing information regarding the suspects in a terrorist event. There was no establishment of a liaison position with federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, which could assist in the investigation of terrorist events. There was no provision in the Midwest archival data for mutual adjustment with other organizations which could be involved in counter-terrorist response. The hostage incident appeared to be perceived as an extension of normal police problems. The operational order tended to rely solely on internal resources (with the exception of identifying utility companies as potential allies in a terrorist incident). There was no provision for developing participative and emulative planning into the response system, either through training by strategic simulation or by other means. The Midwest Police Department has no mutual aid pacts with

surrounding jurisdictions, nor does it have, according to one respondent, any plans for developing such mutual aid agreements. By any analysis, the archival data collected from the Midwest Police Department support the contention that counter-terrorist response in that jurisdiction is a tactical response.

South

If the archival data at the Midwest Police Department indicated a tactical approach to the problem of counter-terrorist response, the data were even more indicative of a tactical approach to the problem at the South Police Department. Two specific documents were found which address the problem of counter-terrorist response in the South Police Department's jurisdiction. Both General Order Number 63 (January 1, 1978) and Policy Statement Number Fourteen (May 1, 1977) address the problem directly. Neither of these two documents indicated a perception on the part of policy makers at the South Police Department to consider the need for interorganizational cooperation; external resources, expertise, or advise; or acquisition of external information. While the archival data from the Midwest Police Department made note of the necessity of maintaining lists of contacts at utility companies, for

example, the policies and general orders relating to counter-terrorist response at the South Police Department contained no such references. In fact, neither General Order 63 nor Policy Statement 14 contained any specific recognition of the potential of terrorist incidents in the South's jurisdiction.

For example, while the general order noted that "'Special Threats' may be defined as any situation that involves a sniper, barricaded suspect, hostage taking, or other terrorist activity that may be beyond the capability of available patrol resources,"[109] the document failed to make any distinction between incidents of true terrorism, such as those defined as terrorism by this research, and incidents of criminal activities resulting in hostage takings. In fact, the extent of the perception of the definition of terrorism among the South's policymakers was evident in the wording of Policy Statement Number Fourteen. This document noted "two basic hostage situations that may present immediate problems"[110] to the police department.

> The first being a subject interrupted in the act of committing a crime and then takes a hostage in order to perfect an escape... [This is] perhaps initially the most volatile and dangerous to both hostage and police....
> The second situation may stem from a mentally deranged, or alcohol or drug influenced individual taking a hostage as a form of protest or in hope of obtaining notoriety or monetary gain....[111]

Thus, the policy statement made no allowances for the type of terrorism which is the concern of this research: illegal violent acts by, or in behalf of, non-nationals designed to alter, protest, or call attention to perceived inequity in the political, economic, or social status quo. The policy statement prepared the South Police Department for acts of violence only from thwarted criminals and mentally deranged individuals. It did not establish consideration of a potential confrontation between the police department and mentally stable, rational, well-trained, violent terrorists who may be willing to die to bring public attention to their cause.

Nor did these two documents make any mention whatever of external organizations. There was no stipulation for mutual aid agreements should the incident prove to require resources beyond those available to the South Police Department. There was no mention of key external information resources, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. There was no provision for any form of intelligence function within the two documents. There was no discussion of formal or informal agreements with utility companies, or other external organizations which could be of assistance with counter-terrorist response. Neither

document mentioned provision of external emergency medical assistance, fire department equipment or personnel support. The state police and all surrounding law enforcement agencies were conspicuous in their absence from both documents. By all indications, the archival data from the South Police Department, as predicted by the theory developed in Chapter Two, was of a tactical nature.

The circumstances of special threats were seen by those who prepared the written policies and orders as a local problem. There appeared to be a reliance on formal planning methods, i.e., written policies and rules. There was no provision for mutual adjustment with other involved organizations. The perception of terrorist events seems to be that they are purely extensions of problems normally handled by the South Police Department. Policies and general orders stipulated a reliance on only internal departmental resources, expertise, and information. No consideration was given to the goodness of fit between South Police Department's management processes and those of agencies which may be called upon to assist in counter-terrorist response. The general orders and policy statements made no provision for participative or emulative planning for terrorist events. To an even greater extent than encountered in the archival data of the Midwest Police

Department, the archival data from the South Police Department indicated a highly tactical perspective among key administrative personnel responsible for preparing departmental plans, policies, and procedures.

Experienced Organizations' Archival Data

While the Midwest and South Police Departments provided the researcher with archival data which tended to support the proposition that non-experienced organizations will have archival data which will be tactically oriented, the data from the Northeast and Southeast Police Departments, contrary to expectations, tended to indicate no appreciation for the strategic nature of adequate response to international terrorism. This could be explained by two suppositions: that experienced organizations were hesitant to release archival data concerning their formal arrangements for counter-terrorist response; and that the majority of those arrangements were developed through routine, informal daily interaction, thus required no documentation.

Southeast and Northeast

Personnel from the Southeast Police Department did not provide any archival data to the researcher. This may relate to the fact that, since the data appeared to be

difficult for Southeast personnel to locate, the request was made to mail the data to the researcher when it could be located. As noted previously, requests for information which were left with the experienced organizations, rather than being collected at the time, tended not to be responded to. The same was true with the information requests at Northeast. Requests which were made at the time of the interviews tended to be honored; however, requests which were allowed to be reviewed before being honored, especially at Northeast, were not honored. This finding can be explained by either (or both) of two suppositions: requests not followed up in person tend to be forgotten or neglected; and requests for archival data concerning confidential information and relationships in some cases simply cannot be honored. The archival data provided by Northeast covered only the tactical arrangements of that organization. That Northeast has developed tactical arrangements should not be surprising, since the theory developed in Chapter Two suggested that certain elements of even a strategically managed response would require tactical planning. In any case, Proposition Five was not supported by the archival data of the four organizations studied.

CHAPTER V

VALIDATING THE COLLECTED DATA

Introduction

The work of Sieber[1] and Miles[2] suggest several methods to validate qulaitative data collected during the course of field research. They suggest that the data be subjected to validation by use of the "extreme bias" test, and use of site feedback to validate conclusions. These methods suggested by Miles and Sieber are supplemented by the use of a quantitative data collection technique, discussed in Chapter Three. Thus, the conclusions developed through analysis of the data collected in this research are validated by several methods. Each of those methods is discussed below.

Use of the "Extreme Bias Test" to Validate Data

Miles[3] and Seiber[4] suggest the use of the "extreme bias" test to further validate the data collected by qualitative methods. Their argument is that if respondents to specific questions of the research

are willing to offer information which is unflattering to themselves or their agency, or which in other ways does not serve the self interest of the respondent, then the data are prone to be more valid. Because of the epistimological problems created by the phrase "extreme bias," the methodology suggested by Miles and Seiber has been couched in different phraseology for this research. What Miles and Seiber refer to as the extreme bias test will be referred to for this research as the "test-of-candor." Although the use of the extreme bias test, as suggested by Miles and Seiber and others appears to be a useful test of the validity of the data gathered during the course of this research, one would assume that very little information which reflected poorly on the respondent or the respondent's organization would be collected during the course of the research reported here. Such was not the case, however, with the respondents to this research. The test-of-candor data which was collected will be discussed below. It appears that, with the exception of the Northeast Police Department, candid information was gathered rather equally from both experienced and non-experienced organizations. The Northeast Police Department, however, yielded no instances of test-of-candor data with which to validate the interview data obtained. This could be due in part to the problems

discussed in Chapter Three concerning the willingness of the Northeast Police Department to respond to the research. Table Twenty-Seven contains a description of the frequency of candid data gathered from respondents in experienced and non-experienced organizations. It should be clarified that respondents did not know the specific theory underlying the research during the time of their interview. They did, of course know the intent of the research, and the general nature of the processes under study.

TABLE 27

RECAPITULATION OF ANALYSIS OF CANDID DATA COLLECTED FROM PERSONNEL FROM EXPERIENCED AND NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

Type of Organization	Number of Interviews	Number of Individuals Giving Candid Responses	%
Experienced	12	8	66.6
Non-Experienced	23	17	73.9

Southeast

The type of data that were obtained from the Southeast Police Department is perhaps indicative of the

types of candid data that were collected. For example, in response to a question regarding planning processes one administrative officer replied:

> Well, to be honest with you those [synopses of terrorist events from around the world] are usually read and filed. We don't do much with most of them.[5]

The impression was that, although the FBI synopses were of prime importance to his organization's planning process, he was willing to admit to the fact that they were not used to the fullest extent, that there was probably more that could be done with the synopses.

A similar remark was made by another administrative officer of the Southeast Police Department. This remark came in response to a question concerning the frequency of contact with assisting agencies. The context of the remark was that the more frequent the contacts with these agencies, the better the standing of the Southeast Police Department. Despite this context, the respondent replied:

> Those contacts are probably not made as frequently as they should be, at least as far as formal contacts are concerned. We have informal contact almost every day, but formal contacts, written memos, reports, that kind of thing, aren't that frequent. We could stand some improvement there.[6]

Other members of the Southeast Police Department also were willing to make candid statements that did not necessarily

reflect well on their department. For example, one investigative supervisor remarked that no formal interagency committee existed to help coordinate counter-terrorist response. From his comments it was obvious that he felt such a committee was necessary, yet he openly admitted no such committee existed. He commented:

> One of our key problems is coordination. We need some type of 'task force' operation to coordinate these kinds of investigations so we don't wind up stepping on each others' toes. I've seen that kind of thing happen in the past here. You get a man into [a local activist group] meeting and you don't know it but three of the other guys there are cops too. There's one from the bureau [FBI], one from the Coast Guard, and maybe one from Customs. There's no coordination, and you may wind up working at cross purposes. At the very least you've duplicated effort.[7]

Similar comments were gleaned from other officers concerning the operations of the counter-terrorist response process within the Southeast Police Department. Many of the officers interviewed were willing to comment that, at least originally, there were a great many problems with their particular method of counter-terrorist response. Many officers referred to "petty jealousies" and "hostility" within the department concerning the men who were selected for and tactics used by the response team. One senior administrator with Southeast even remarked:

> Things run pretty smoothly now. That wasn't the case when we first started. I remember serious problems as late as 1978. You know, organizational

> problems. When [the response team] arrived they didn't have complete control of the scene. We were not accepted very well by the local press and the people. Even our own officers seemed to resent us. Our officers didn't receive any bonus for being on [the response team].[8]

Such comments are not necessarily flattering to the organization, and would not be expected unless the respondent were being relatively candid. Given the small number, but nearly universal nature of these comments (nearly every member of the Southeast Police Department interviewed made at least one such comment) it is concluded that the data gathered from the Southeast Police Department are relatively valid data.

Northeast

A similar tendency to make candid or non-flattering comments was not noted among the members of the Northeast Police Department. Although this may in part be due to the fact that the number of personnel interviewed was less at Northeast than at the other departments, there is not evidence to indicate that this is the case. None of the personnel interviewed at Northeast made comments which reflected negatively on their performance, or the performance of their department. The use of the test-of-candor at Northeast did not aid in the validation of the data collected from that source.

South

Such comments were gathered from the South Police Department, however. Officers there appeared to be relatively candid in their remarks to the researcher. There appeared to be no attempt to cover up deficiencies in the response or planning system. Several of the officers of the South Police Department made comments which were not necessarily flattering of their organization. For example, one team member remarked:

> We have a good group of people [on the response team] but we'd be sorely prepared to challenge six people who trained in Cuba or Moscow for six months or two years. We just don't have that kind of capability.[9]

An administrative officer of the South Police Department's response team remarked that his department has no plans for response to truly international terrorism even though it was clear at the outset of the interview that international terrorism was the focus of the research. Rather than attempting to persuade the researcher that his department was on top of such a current problem, this administrator candidly remarked:

> We simply haven't planned for truly international terrorism, even though we have an international airport that goes everywhere and a large international port. We've had several threats against foreign shipping, but I guess we just don't feel like we've been 'selected' as a target yet. We've generated most of our SOPs [standard operating

procedures] for local events.[10]

Another administrative officer noted that planning methodologies needed some work. He indicated that the South Police Department had "duplicated a lot of effort" in developing tactics. He commented:

> Developing equipment and processes is tough. It's a slow process and it's hit and miss, and the information doesn't get passed around. We need to avoid duplication of effort, and that's something we've not done too well in the past.[11]

Just as with the Southeast Police Department, members of the South Police Department were willing to admit problems in their response and planning practices. Many of the comments reflected directly on the respondent's own unit of the department, and at times reflected perceived failings on the part of the respondent himself. Given this kind of candor, it is felt that the respondents from the South Police Department were reporting accurately their perceptions of the counter-terrorist response situation in the South area.

Midwest

Similar findings of candor-supporting information were noted among the data collected from members of the Midwest Police Department. For example, when asked how often he contacted members of the important outside organizations, one member of Midwest remarked:

> certainly not as often as we should. It's really almost on an 'as needed' basis. We call them when something comes up and we need their help. I wouldn't say it's ongoing, or anything.[12]

Other Midwest respondents were forthcoming with similar comments. Many, in response to questions thirty-two and thirty-three, were quite willing to relate graphic detail of one of several crisis events which reflected poorly on the Midwest Police Department. For example, one administrative officer related the facts of a 1978 hostage incident to which the department responded by "doing everything exactly wrong!"[13] He stated:

> A few years ago, we had a fellow in a tavern here who had taken hostages, and was demanding money and a car-- you know, standard stuff that you get when you interrupt a robbery in progress. Anyway, we managed to wind up doing everything exactly wrong! The chief of police served as negotiator, which, as you know is a no-no. We allowed prime-time news coverage of the event. In fact, when the guy finally blew his brains out at 6:15 or so, the department got a lot of complaints from citizens who were home eating dinner and who saw the whole thing live on TV! When we look back over that incident, we can see that we made plenty of mistakes.[14]

Another officer with the Midwest Police Department recounted an incident even less favorable to the department. Still others were candid in their criticism of departmental policy concerning funding, allocation of equipment, and training policies. Some of the comments received from members of the Midwest Police Department reflected directly on the ability of the unit to respond to terrorist events.

Other comments were directed at the department as a whole. All comments, however, appeared to reflect a candid evaluation of the relationship of the unit and the department to the ability to field an adequate counter-terrorist response.

While interviewing at Midwest, the researcher found no instances where it was felt that only the best side of the situation seemed to be depicted by the respondent for the benefit of the department. Nearly every respondent made at least one comment that was negative and did not reflect well on his department as a whole. Many of the respondents made comments which were not necessarily supportive of their own unit, or their own activities. As such, it appears that the test-of-candor suggested by Miles[15] and Seiber[16] was a useful test in supporting validity of the data gathered. With the exception of Northeast, the willingness of respondents to yield data not favorable to themselves, their unit, or their department seems to indicate a candor on the part of respondents.

Obtaining Validation of Conclusions and Propositions through Use of Site Feedback

A final recommendation of Miles[17] and Seiber[18] was that the data collected and the conclusions

and propositions developed from the data be validated through site feedback. In accordance with that recommendation, executive summaries of the findings of the research were mailed to each of the respondents, with a request that any errors in reporting, misinterpretations, misstatements, or erroneous conclusions be identified and clarified. Each of the respondents was also provided a questionnaire to determine the degree of agreement of disagreement with the specific conclusions and recommendations of the research. A copy of the material mailed to each respondent is included in Appendix F. This was part of the basic agreement which the researcher entered into with the respondents, since each individual who was interviewed by the researcher specifically requested a copy of the finished results of the research. These requests seemed to illustrate a basic interest in the research topic, and a willingness to help in quality control of the research findings. Respondents were advised that the findings were mainly organizational-wide findings, and not meant to be confined to simply one functional position within the department. For example, while the respondent may have been a negotiator, the findings covered the full spectrum of counter-terrorist response, including tactical response, negotiations, investigations, training and planning. With

that caveat in mind, each respondent was asked if he had any specific corrections, changes, additions or deletions he thought necessary to insure the correctness of the final report. The final report also contained a condensed version of the "Recommendations" section of the final chapter of this research.

The general response to the follow-up questionnaires was that the research findings were accurate, and that the recommendations section was correct. Few changes, deletions, additions, or corrections were recommended, and most respondents "agreed" or "strongly agreed" with the conclusions and recommendations of the research report. Table Twenty-Eight depicts a breakdown of the site feedback results for the non-experienced police departments involved in the research. The table indicates a basic acceptance of the interpretation of the data collected for the research, and an acceptance of the recommendations made for police departments involved in the various aspects of counter-terrorist response.

It is important to note that Table Twenty-Eight included only responses from personnel with non-experienced organizations. As mentioned previously in Chapter Three, the Northeast Police Department declined to complete any of the questionnaires due to a fear that to do so might

TABLE 28

MEAN SCORES OF SITE-FEEDBACK FROM PERSONNEL WITH NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNING CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE AS A RESULT OF THE RESEARCH

1= Strongly Disagree 2= Disagree 3= Unsure 4= Agree 5= Strongly Agree

Conclusion/Recommendation	Mean Score
CONCLUSIONS:	
Personnel with experienced organizations, when compared to personnel with non-experienced organizations will tend to:	
1. Communicate more frequently with federal level agencies	4.66
2. Communicate more for information, and less for assistance in terms of manpower, material, or other resources	4.66
3. Communicate more frequently with personnel from external agencies	3.83
Identification of important external information sources is not part of the official "job description" of those who identify these sources	3.25
Identification of important external information sources is not identified as part of the planning effort	3.83
Identification of important external information sources is not officially planned, but tends to "just happen"	4.75
Personnel from experienced organizations view planning as threat identification and building capability to handle the perceived threats	4.66
Personnel from non-experienced organizations view planning as identification of potential threat locations and obtaining blueprints, plans, etc., for those locations	3.83

TABLE 28--Continued

Contingency planning-- planning for response to a specific threat at a specific location-- is universally avoided by personnel from experienced organizations	3.25
Simulation tends not to be used as a method of identifying important contacts in external organizations	4.25
Simulation tends not to be used as a method of involving external organizations in the planning process	4.33
Personnel from non-experienced organizations tend to perceive of planning in terms of obtaining assistance from utility companies, fire-rescue units, psychiatric hospitals, etc.	4.00
Personnel from experienced organizations tend to perceive of planning in terms of identifying capabilities of information acquisition and processing, focusing primarily on federal-level organizations	4.42
Experienced organizations tend to include external organizations in the planning process more frequently than do non-experienced organizations	4.33
Personnel from experienced organizations tend to perceive a greater need for improvements in the planning process than do personnel from non-experienced organizations	3.83
Processes of damage control, containment, site security, perimeter control, and assault techniques are well managed in both experienced and non-experienced organizations	4.17
Negotiations, investigation, and intelligence functions among experienced organizations tend to include both local and federal-level factors, including an awareness of the "international" factors of terrorism	3.83

TABLE 28--Continued

Negotiations, investigation, and intelligence functions among non-experienced organizations tend to include mainly local factors, tending to exclude an awareness of the international factors of terrorism	4.00
Relations with external information sources tend not to be formal, but rather are mostly informal	4.17
Acquisition of external information concerning terrorist threats tends to be accomplished more through informal relations than through formal written reports	4.25
Simulation and training for counter-terrorist response tend not to be recognized as formal planning processes used to identify critical external organizational contacts	4.25
RECOMMENDATIONS:	
The use of contingency planning should be replaced with a method of strategically oriented planning which will identify critical interorganizational connections	4.08
The use of simulation to aid in the identification of critical interorganizational connections should supplement the use of simulation as a method of training for capability building	4.25
The creation, maintenance, and use of interorganizational connections should be recognized as part of the official duties of those who do such work, and should become part of the institutionalized management processes of organizations involved in counter-terrorist response	4.25
The use of simulation to provide non-lethal equivalents of the organizational, informational, and resource problems created by international terrorism should be practiced	4.25
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's leadership function in the field of counter-terrorist response should be used to shape attitudes, strategies, and philosophy of counter-terrorist response in the United States	4.75
Simulation as a planning methodology which involves both organizations indirectly and directly concerned with counter-terrorist response, should be implemented as a formalized method of planning for counter-terrorist response	4.67

jeopardize their relationship with some members of their interorganizational network. With this in mind, and in an attempt to avoid any further restriction of questionnaire data from the Southeast Police Department, the site feedback questionnaires for Southeast were mailed directly to respondents, rather than to an administrative officer with the Southeast. It was thought that this method would allow a better response rate. Despite these attempts, not one site-feedback questionnaire was returned from Southeast. This total lack of response to the site-feedback questionnaires is more evidence to indicate a concerted effort on the part of experienced organizations to protect external contacts from exposure. The site feedback questionnaires were relatively generic in nature, and treated all experienced and non-experienced organizations together. The feedback questionnaires contained no reference to specific names, addresses, or organizations, yet, somewhere at Southeast a decision was made not to process the questionnaires. This perceived desire to protect the interorganizational network is indicative of the importance of that network.

As Table Twenty-Eight indicates, those who responded to the site-feedback questionnaire were overwhelmingly supportive of the conclusions and recommendations developed

as a result of the research. Few of the respondents disagreed with either the conclusions or recommendations. Most agreed or strongly agreed with the results of the research. None of the mean scores of the various conclusions and recommendations fell below the 3.0 "unsure" mark, an only six of the twenty-one conclusions fell below the 4.0 "agree" mark. None of the mean scores for recommendations fell below the 4.0 "agree" mark. The return rate for the site feedback questionnaires was slightly over thirty-six per cent. If only non-experienced organizational personnel are included in the calculation of the return rate, since Northeast and Southeast did not participate, the return rate is slightly over fifty per cent.

Validation of Qualitative Data Through Associated Agencies

As discussed in Chapter Three, the original research design included an attempt to cross-validate the data collected by contacting the individuals named in the associated agencies section of the questionnaire. This methodology proved unsuccessful, however, since the vast majority of those asked in the interview process, and nearly all of those returning questionnaires, suggested, even among the non-experienced agencies' personnel, that the names of contacts at the associated agencies were confidential enough

not to be provided. The request for associated agency data, in fact, was the specific reason for the reluctance of the Northeast Police Department to continue with the proposed research. Even among the personnel of the non-experienced organizations, a reluctance to divulge the names, addresses, and contacts of important individuals in the associated agencies was noted. For example, only two of the officers responding to question eleven provided the requested data. All other respondents simply wrote in comments such as "CONFIDENTIAL" or left that section blank. Responses to the interview questions concerning the contacts at the associated agencies generally resulted in comments such as "I would have to look that information up and get back to you."[19] Despite the general reluctance of respondents to provide this information, some associated agencies were identified, although the number was small. Follow-up questionnaires were sent to these agencies. None of the questionnaires were returned. Given this type of response to the data collection sections concerning associated agencies, it was not possible to follow up with contacts in associated agencies as expected. The data collected concerning these contacts could not be used to validate the work at the focal agencies as planned.

Validation of Qualitative Data through Comparison with Quantitative Data

Given the state of the literature of organizational theory concerning adaptation to terrorist threats, some of the concepts developed for this research could not be measured effectively through use of quantitative means. For example, one of the questions of the qualitative data collection dealt with the planning techniques used by the organizations studied to plan for counter-terrorist response. The content analysis of those responses allowed for four types of responses: contingency planning, at-scene planning, planning through training, and planning through simulation. Given the difficulty encountered in the qualitative data collection phase of this research in dealing with the concept of planning, it is doubtful whether a valid quantitative measure of planning process could be developed. Such problems did not preclude the use of quantitative data to cross-validate the data gathered by qualitative means. Several of the key measures discussed in Chapter Four were subject to development of corresponding quantitative measures.

All qualitative measures developed for this research for which quantitative measures were developed were cross-validated by comparing the results of the qualitative

and quantitative data collection. Such cross-validation was possible for eight of the key analytical processes developed in Chapter Four. More of the analytical processes would have been subject to this type of cross validation, were it not for the problems encountered in obtaining some forms of quantitative data from experienced organizations. Tables Twenty-Nine through Thirty-Seven depict the results of cross-validation of qualitative data with quantitative data.

Source of Organizational Innovation

Table Twenty-Nine compares the results of qualitative and quantitative data collection concerning the source of organizational innovation in counter-terrorist response. The qualitative data in Table Twenty-Nine, which were reported previously in Table Seventeen, were compares with the results of the quantitative data generated by responses to Questions Forty-Three and Forty-Four of the distributed questionnaire. The results of Table Twenty-Nine indicated that the qualitative data underestimated the source of innovation among non-experienced organizations by .212 on a three point scale. Results, of the analysis of the differences between the two data collection techniques yield a chi-square statistic which indicated that the differences between results of the two methods were attributable to chance or sampling error. The chi-square

TABLE 29

COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION PROCESSES CONCERNING PERCEIVED SOURCES OF INNOVATION BY PERSONNEL FROM NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Data Collection Methodology	
	Qualitative	Quantitative
Perceived Source of Innovation		
Source of Innovation Mainly Internal	19 (17.3)	9 (10.7)
Source of Innovation Approximately Equally Divided Between External and Internal Sources	2 (3.7)	4 (2.9)
	n = 23	n = 17
N = 40	$\bar{X}$ = 1.095238	$\bar{X}$ = 1.30769
	X^2 = 2.49	
	df = 1 p.< .20 C = .242 C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to two significant positions beyond the decimal point for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

statistic resulting from analysis of the data in Table Twenty-Nine is not significant at the .05 level. In addition, the correlation coefficient of the relationship between data collection method and perceived source of innovation is low, at .242 of a maximum of .71. It appeared from Table Twenty-Nine that the qualitative data collection process exhibited no significant differences from the quantitative data collection process when measuring the perceived sources of organizational innovation. Analysis of the data collected by qualitative and quantitative means indicated that the two methods of data collection yielded similar results concerning the perceived sources of organizational innovation. The two methods yielded results similar enough to serve as cross-validation of the conclusions drawn from the qualitative data.

Frequency of Communications with External Organizations

Table Thirty compares the results of qualitative and quantitative data collection concerning the perceived frequency of communications with important external organizations for non-experienced organizations. The qualitative data in Table Thirty were reported previously in Table Thirteen in Chapter Four. Table Thirty compares the results of Table Thirteen with the responses to Questions Twenty a-c in the distributed questionnaire. As Table

TABLE 30

COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION PROCESSES CONCERNING PERCEPTION OF FREQUENCY OF COMMUNICATION WITH IMPORTANT EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS BY PERSONNEL FROM NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Data Collection Methodology	
	Qualitative	Quantitative
Perceived Frequency of Contact		
Contact Perceived as Infrequent	21 (19.77)	34 (35.23)
Contact Perceived as Somewhat Frequent	1 (1.80)	4 (3.20)
Contact Perceived as Frequent	1 (1.79)	3 (3.20)
N = 64	n = 23	n = 41
	$\bar{X}$ = 1.1304347	$\bar{X}$ = 1.3429024
	X^2 = 0.879	
	df = 2 p.< .70 C = .116 C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to two significant positions beyond the decimal point for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

As Table Thirty indicated, the differences in means for the qualitative and quantitative data collection processes is only .113 on a three-point scale. The results of the chi-square analysis of the data in the table indicated that the differences in the qualitative and quantitative data were attributable to chance or sampling error. The data yielded a chi-square statistic that is not significant at the .05 level. In addition, the correlation coefficient indicated that there was little if any correlation between the data collection processes and perceived frequency of communication with external organizations. Thus, there appears to be no significant difference between the qualitative and quantitative data collection processes concerning the perceived frequency of communication with external organizations. Analysis of the data collected by qualitative and quantitative means indicated that the two methods of data collection yielded similar results concerning the frequency of communications with important external organizations. The two methods yielded results similar enough to serve as cross-validation of the conclusions drawn from the qualitative data.

Important External Organizations

Table Thirty-One compares the results of qualitative and quantitative data collection processes concerning the

types of organizations identified as important external sources of information for non-experienced organizations. This table compares the results of Table Fourteen in Chapter Four with responses to Questions Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen in the distributed questionnaire. As Table Thirty-One indicated, the difference between the means of the qualitative and quantitative data collection process was .224 on a two-point scale. The chi-square analysis of Table Thirty-One indicated that any difference between the qualitative and quantitative data collection processes was attributable to chance or sampling error. The chi-square analysis yielded a test statistic that was not significant at the .05 level. In addition, the correlation coefficient for Table Thirty-One indicated that there was, little if any, correlation between data collection methodology and perceived importance of external organizations as information sources. Thus, no significant difference was found between the qualitative and quantitative measures developed for this research, and any differences found between the two data collection techniques was attributable to chance or to sampling error. Analysis of the data collected by qualitative and quantitative means indicated that the two methods of data collection yield similar results concerning the types of organizations identified as

TABLE 31

COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION PROCESSES CONCERNING PERCEPTIONS OF IMPORTANCE OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AS SOURCES OF INFORMATION AMONG PERSONNEL FROM NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Data Collection Methodology	
	Qualitative	Quantitative
Perceived Importance of External Organizations		
External Organizations Not Perceived As Important Sources of Information	15 (13.8)	3 (4.2)
External Organizations Perceived as Important Sources of Information	8 (9.2)	4 (2.8)
N = 30	n = 23	n = 7
	$\bar{X}$ = 1.347826	$\bar{X}$ = 1.5714285
	X^2 = 1.11	
	df = 1	
	p.< .30	
	C = .189	
	C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to two significant positions beyond the decimal point for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

results concerning the types of organizations identified as important sources of external information. The two methods appeared to yield results similar enough to serve as cross-validation of the conclusions drawn from the qualitative data.

Types of Important External Organizations

Table Thirty-Two compares the results of qualitative and quantitative data collection concerning the types of organizations identified as important to the counter-terrorist response capability of non-experienced organizations. Table Thirty-Two compares the qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques for data depicted in Table Ten of Chapter Four with the responses to Question Ten in the distributed questionnaire. As Table Thirty-Two indicated, the difference between the mean score of the qualitative data and the quantitative data was .246 on a scale of three. This difference showed a variance in the qualitative data in favor of the proposition concerning the nature of organizations identified as important to counter-terrorist response. The chi-square analysis of the data in Table Thirty-Two, however, indicated that the differences in the two data collection methods was attributable to chance or to sampling error, not to a variance in the data collection process. The chi-square

TABLE 32

COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION PROCESSES CONCERNING TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED AS IMPORTANT TO THE OVERALL COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE OF NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Data Collection Methodology	
	Qualitative	Quantitative
Organizational Type		
Internally Focused Non-Federal	26 (22.8)	7 (10.2)
Internally Focused Federal	11 (14.51)	10 (6.50)
Externally Focused Federal	1 (0.69)	0 (0.31)
N = 55	n = 38	n = 17
	$\bar{X}$ = 1.3421052	$\bar{X}$ = 1.5882352
	X^2 = 4.64	
	df = 2	
	p.< .10	
	C = .279	
	C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to two significant positions beyond the decimal point for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

The chi-square analysis of the data in Table Thirty-Two, however, indicated that the differences in the two data collection methods was attributable to chance or to sampling error, not to a variance in the data collection process. The chi-square analysis yielded a statistic that was not significant at the .05 level. In addition, the correlation coefficient for Table Thirty-Two indicated that there was a low correlation between data collection technique and the types of organizations perceived as important to the overall counter-terrorist response. Thus, it appeared that the two methods of data collection were relatively similar. Analysis of the data collected by qualitative and quantitative means indicated that the two methods of data collection yielded similar results concerning the types of organizations identified as important. The two methods yielded results similar enough to serve as cross-validation of the conclusions drawn from the qualitative data.

Frequency of Inclusion of External Organizations In Planning Process

Table Thirty-Three compares the results of qualitative and quantitative data collection processes concerning the frequency of inclusion of external organizations in the planning processes of non-experienced organizations. The table compares the results of Table

TABLE 33

COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION PROCESSES CONCERNING PERCEPTIONS OF FREQUENCY OF INCLUSION OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PLANNING PROCESSES OF NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Data Collection Methodology	
	Qualitative	Quantitative
Frequency of Inclusion of External Organization in Planning Processes		
External Organizations Included Some of the Time	16 (16.88)	14 (13.13)
External Organizations Generally Are Included	2 (1.13)	0 (0.88)
N = 32	n = 18	n = 14
	$\bar{X}$ = 1.11111	$\bar{X}$ = 1.00000
	X^2 = 1.65	
	df = 1	
	p.< .20	
	C = .222	
	C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to two significant positions beyond the decimal point for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

Twenty-Three in Chapter Four with responses to Question Seventeen in the distributed questionnaire. The results of Table Thirty-Three indicated that the qualitative data tended to underestimate the degree to which external organizations were included in the planning processes of the non-experienced organizations by .111 on a two-point scale. Analysis of the data indicated that the differences between qualitative and quantitative data collection processes was attributable to chance, since the chi-square analysis yielded a statistic which was not significant at the .05 level. The correlation coefficient indicated that there was a low correlation between data collection technique and perception of inclusion of external organizations in the planning process among personnel from non-experienced organizations. Again, the qualitative data tended to underestimate the degree to which external organizations were included in the planning processes of non-experienced organizations when compared to the quantitative data. The two methods of data collection, however, did not show a statistically significant difference in terms of the way they measured the degree to which external organizations were included in the planning efforts of experienced and non-experienced organizations. Thus, it appeared that the qualitative and quantitative measures served as

cross-validation of the extent to which external organizations are included in planning processes.

Existence of Interagency Planning Committee

Table Thirty-Four compares the results of the qualitative and quantitative data collection processes concerning the perception of the existence of an interagency committee or group designed to assist in the coordination of counter-terrorist response. This table compares the results of Table Twenty in Chapter Four with responses to Question Twenty D in the distributed questionnaire. The qualitative data tended to underestimate slightly the degree to which personnel from non-experienced organizations perceived the existence of an interagency committee to coordinate counter-terrorist response. The difference in mean scores for qualitative and quantitative data collection processes was .143. The chi-square analysis of the data in Table Thirty-Four indicated that the differences in qualitative and quantitative data collection processes were attributable to chance or sampling error, not to a difference in the collection processes themselves. The chi-square statistic was not significant at the .05 level. In addition, the correlation coefficient for Table Thirty-Four indicated that there was a low correlation between data collection

TABLE 34

COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION PROCESSES CONCERNING PERCEPTIONS OF EXISTENCE OF AN INTERAGENCY GROUP OR COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE AMONG NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Data Collection Methodology	
	Qualitative	Quantitative
Existence of Interagency Group		
Interagency Group Does Not Exist	23 (21.76)	12 (13.24)
Interagency Group Does Exist	0 (1.24)	2 (0.76)
N = 37	n = 23	n = 14
	$\bar{X}$ = 1.00000	$\bar{X}$ = 1.14285271
	X^2 = 3.47	
	df = 1	
	p.< .10	
	C = .292	
	C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to two significant positions beyond the decimal point for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

technique and perceived existence of an interagency group to coordinate counter-terrorist response. Thus, the differences in the qualitative and quantitative data collection processes appeared to be relatively small, showing no statistically significant differences in the type of indications supported by the data. It appeared that the qualitative and quantitative measures concerning the existence of an interagency groups for the purpose of coordinating the counter-terrorist response of experienced and non-experienced organizations were sufficiently similar to allow cross-validation of the two measurement techniques.

Importance of External Organizations

Table Thirty-Five compares the qualitative and quantitative data collection processes and perceptions of personnel of non-experienced organizations concerning the perceived importance of external organizations to counter-terrorist response of experienced and non-experienced organizations. Table Thirty-Five compares the results of Table Eleven in Chapter Four and Questions Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen in the questionnaire. The difference in means between the qualitative and quantitative data collection processes was .275. As with the previous table, analysis of the data indicated that any difference between the two data collection processes was attributable

TABLE 35

COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION PROCESSES CONCERNING PERCEPTIONS OF IMPORTANCE OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS TO COUNTER-TERRORIST RESPONSE OF EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS

	Data Collection Methodology	
	Qualitative	Quantitative
Perceived Importance of External Organizations		
External Organizations of Little Importance	1 (2.67)	4 (2.33)
External Organizations of Some Importance	13 (11.73)	9 (10.27)
External Organizations Very Important	2 (1.6)	1 (1.4)
N = 30	n = 16	n = 14
	$\bar{X}$ = 2.0625	$\bar{X}$ = 1.7857142
	X^2 = 2.73	
	df = 2 p.< .30 C = .289 C_{max} = .71	

Numbers in parentheses indicate expected frequencies for each cell of the chi-square table, and are truncated to two significant positions beyond the decimal point for clarity of presentation. Chi-square values are computed using full numerical values.

was attributable to chance or to sampling error. The chi-square statistic yielded by analysis of the data in Table Thirty-Five was not significant at the .05 level. In addition, the correlation coefficient for Table Thirty-Five indicated that there was a low correlation between data collection technique and perceived importance of external organizations to counter-terrorist response. It appeared that the qualitative and quantitative measures concerning the perceived importance of external organizations to the counter-terrorist response of experienced and non-experienced organizations were sufficiently similar to allow cross-validation of the two measurement techniques.

The qualitative data collection technique appears to have been a valid technique. It correlated well with the quantitative measures developed in the distributed questionnaire. On the seven major variables measured both qualitatively and quantitatively, the qualitative measure tended to underestimate the quantitative measure, on average, by only .079. Perhaps more importantly, however, is the fact that the data collected by qualitative and quantitative methods do not show a <u>consistent</u> bias in a direction which would indicate that the qualitative data were coded so as to support the propositions developed for the research. For example, while some of the qualitative

measures tended to favor specific propositions, other qualitative measures tended to lend less support to the proposition involved. Thus, there was no consistent bias in the qualitative data. Table Thirty-Six depicts a recapitulation of the analyses of the qualitative and quantitative data collection processes. As Table Thirty-Six indicated, none of the seven measures showed a significant difference between the qualitative and quantitative data collection processes.

The attempt at cross-validation of the interview data through quantitative data appears to have been reasonably successful. It should be noted, however, that insufficient data from the experienced organizations could be collected to allow cross-validation of the qualitative data concerning experienced organizations. There exist no substantial differences, however, between the qualitative and quantitative data collection process used for the the non-experienced and experienced organizations.

Conclusions and Discussion

Chapter Five has dealt with the analysis of the qualitative data collected as part of the research. Six separate cross-validation methods were used in analyzing the data. The data were subjected to validity tests through the following processes.

TABLE 36

COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES FOR NON-EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variable	Significance of Chi-Square Statistic/ Degree of Correlation
Source of Innovation (Table 29)	.20/ Low
Frequency of Communication with External Organizations (Table 30)	.70/ Low
Importance of External Organizations as Sources of Information (Table 31)	.30/ Low
Types of External Organizations Identified as Important (Table 32)	.10/ Low
Frequency of Inclusion of External Organizations in Planning Efforts (Table 33)	.20/ Low
Existence of an Interagency Group to Coordinate Counter-Terrorist Response (Table 34)	.10/ Low
Degree of Importance of External Organizations to Counter-Terrorist Response (Table 35)	.30/ Low

Analyzing Generalizations across Organizational Levels

The specific generalization developed for this research suggested that personnel from experienced organizations would tend to be more externally oriented than would personnel from non-experienced organizations. This generalization was analyzed to determine if it held across organizational levels. It was found that the generalization did hold across organizational levels on some measures of external orientation, while in did not hold across organizational levels on other measures. For example, the generalization was found to hold across organizational levels on measures of the types of external organizations perceived as important, types of organizations perceived as important sources of information, and perceived sources of organizational innovation. The generalization failed to hold across organizational levels on measures of the importance of external organizations and the frequency of inclusion of external organizations in planning processes. The measure of perceived need for improvement in organizational planning processes was found to hold across organizational levels in non-experienced organizations, while it did not hold across organizational levels in experienced organizations. In most cases, the data collected appeared to be valid for the technical and

managerial levels of the organizations studied.

Analyzing Propositions across Organizational Levels

Each of the propositions developed during the research was analyzed to see if those propositions were supported by the data collected. It was found that, with the possible exception of some planning processes, three of the five propositions developed for this research were strongly supported by the qualitative and quantitative data collected during the course of the research. The proposition concerning higher levels of boundary spanning and networking, information acquisition and processing, innovation, and intergroup management processes within experienced organizations was supported by the data. The proposition concerning higher levels of interactive planning methodologies and use of plans testing techniques for experienced organizations was supported by the data. The proposition concerning higher levels of capability oriented strategic planning among experienced organizations was supported by the data. Data either did not support, or were not collected in sufficient quantity to support the propositions concerning archival data and planning methodologies before and after initial experience with a terrorist event.

Use of the "Extreme Bias" Test to Validate Data

The "extreme bias" test was used to validate the conclusions drawn and the data collected during the research. It was found that, while the amount of candid* information gathered during the course of the research was small, it was ubiquitous. Nearly every respondent, with the exception of those from the Northeast Police Department, was found to have made some type of comment which would tend to reflect unfavorably on his organization. Many respondents were found to have made comments which reflected unfavorably on their own work, or that of their unit. The pervasiveness of these candid comments tended to support the validity of the data gathered through use of the qualitative methodology.

Site Feedback as a Validity Test

Site feedback was developed to test the validity of conclusions and recommendations. Each respondent was provided with a copy of the conclusions and recommendations of the research. It was found that most respondents were in substantial agreement with the conclusions drawn from and the recommendations made as a result of the research. Few exceptions were voiced by respondents reviewing the findings and the recommendations of the research. Thus, it is felt

that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the research are valid.

Archival Data as a Validity Test

Use of archival data to validate respondents' perceptions also enhanced the apparent validity of the data collection and analysis processes, as well as the conclusions and recommendations of the research. It was found that archival data generally supported both respondents' perceptions and the propositions developed for the research. Personnel from non-experienced organizations tended to report few formal external agreements, and archival data tended to support that perception, with a lack of mutual aid pacts and multi-jurisdictional agreements. However, personnel from experienced organizations were not willing to provide the type of archival data necessary to assess the strategic orientation of their counter-terrorist response. As a result, the research was unable to support Proposition Five in terms of a strategic orientation of archival data from the experienced agencies.

Quantitative Data as a Validity Test

Quantitative data were used to cross-validate qualitatively reported perceptions of counter-terrorist response. It was found that the qualitative and

quantitative data collection techniques yielded similar results. The data gathered with qualitative methods correlated very highly with the data gathered with quantitative methods. Of the seven measures selected for use in the cross-validation of qualitative data, none showed a significant difference between qualitative and quantitative data collection processes. The quantitative and qualitative employed in this research tended to serve as strong cross-validation measures for the data collection processes employed in the research.

Given the exhaustive effort to cross-validate the qualitative data, and given the results of that effort, it appears that the data are valid, and that the conclusions drawn from that data are legitimate. It appears that the propositions developed for the research are, for the most part, supported by the qualitative data, the quantitative data, and the site-feedback data.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Introduction

This final chapter is devoted to discussion of the conclusions, and recommendations for organizations involved in counter-terrorist response, and suggestions for future research. Given the conceptual richness of the responses gathered from the research, the conclusions and recommendations are numerous. Given the infant state of research in the field of strategic management of the counter-terrorist response, suggestions for future research are also numerous. The final chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses each of eight major conclusions in detail. The second discusses each of six major recommendations for organizations developing or contemplating the development of counter-terrorist response capabilities. The final section discusses each of four specific recommendations for future research into strategic management as it applies to counter-terrorist response.

Conclusions Derived from the Research

The results of the research indicate that the following conclusions are valid conclusions, requiring the consideration of those interested in planning and delivering adequate counter-terrorist response in the United States. The major conclusions of concern to those interested in counter-terrorist response are:

1. There are substantial differences in the boundary spanning and networking activities of experienced and non-experienced organizations. These differences appear to be designed to provide the experienced organizations with sufficient contact within the internally focused and externally focused federal task sphere to insure the free flow of intelligence, negotiations, and investigations information;
2. Networking and boundary spanning processes do not appear to be formally recognized as planning, *per se*, but instead appear to exist among experienced organizations as part of the "collateral processes"[1] of the experienced organizations.
3. While differences in formally recognized planning methodologies do exist among experienced and non-experienced organizations, these differences

are differences in focus rather than differences in competencies. For example, experienced organizations tend to plan by identifying needed capabilities and then training to attain those capabilities. While non-experienced organizations also train to build capabilities, they also utilize a planning technique which focuses on identification of probable contingencies. Contingency planning appears to be universally avoided by experienced organizations.

4. Both experienced and non-experienced organizations use a planning methodology which utilizes simulation as a plans testing mechanism. Currently, it appears that both experienced and non-experienced organizations use simulation as a process to build capability rather than as a process to assist in the identification of needed boundary spanning and networking synapses.

5. It appears that experienced organization are more inclined to use a planning methodology which is strategically focused, while non-experienced organizations use a planning methodology which is more tactically focused;

6. Tactical response processes appear to be well

managed, with experienced and non-experienced organizational personnel responsible for the actual tactical response perceiving little need for improvement in the management system of counter-terrorist response.

7. Negotiations, investigations, and intelligence functions appear to be less well managed, with personnel from experienced organizations noting the need for significant improvement in those functions.

8. The management processes necessary for adequate counter-terrorist response, as defined by personnel from experienced organizations, are not yet formalized processes. These management processes have not been institutionalized to the point that they are openly recognized as part of the responsibilities of the personnel assigned the responsibility for managing the counter-terrorist response. Instead, the management processes continue to be perceived as part of the informal management process.

Conclusion One: Differences in Boundary Spanning

Conclusion One suggests that there are substantial

differences in the nature or quality of the boundary spanning and networking processes of personnel in experienced and non-experienced organizations. While personnel in both types of organizations engage in boundary spanning and networking activities, these activities vary qualitatively. The personnel in non-experienced organizations tend to engage in boundary spanning and networking with internally focused organizations (see Table Thirteen). The personnel in experienced organizations, however, tend to engage in boundary spanning and networking activities with both personnel from internally focused organizations and personnel from externally focused organizations (see Table Ten). Such a relationship is suggested by the theory developed in Chapter One.

The strong capabilities hypothesized in Table One indicate an ability on the part of police departments responding to terrorist events to be capable of containment, damage control, and tactical response. These processes require, under most circumstances, cooperation from utility companies, advise from psychiatrists or psychologists concerning the mental state of the perpetrator, additional manpower to secure perimeters, and specialized expertise in building entry and search tactics and special weapons. These requirements are also common to non-international

terrorist events encountered by response teams from non-experienced organizations. Thus, to find among experienced and non-experienced organizations a similarity in boundary spanning and networking activity with internally focused organizations such as utility companies and other local police departments is not surprising. Nor is it surprising to find, as was the case with this research, that internally focused boundary spanning and networking activity is taken for granted among personnel from experienced organizations. It is simply something that one does based on common sense as one respondent reported.

The major differences found among personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations in boundary spanning and networking activity exists at the internally and externally focused federal levels, as suggested in the theory developed in Chapter One (see Table One). The personnel from experienced organizations tended to develop boundary spanning and networking processes which focused on the internal/external federal level much more than did personnel from non-experienced organizations. It is clear from the analysis developed in Chapter Four that the rationale behind this boundary spanning and networking activity is the enhancement of the specific areas which were predicted as areas of marginal capabilities by the theory

developed in Chapter One. The preponderance of the boundary spanning and networking activity engaged in by personnel from experienced organizations is aimed at improving intelligence gathering and dissemination. This intelligence information is required to aid in identification of terrorist groups, to assist in negotiations with terrorists, to enhance investigative processes after the completion of a terrorist act (and thereby enhance prosecution), and to coordinate evidence collection processes. Each of these uses of the intelligence information gathered by boundary spanning and networking with federal agencies was specifically mentioned by respondents from the experienced organizations. Such uses were not noted by personnel from non-experienced organizations. They tended to see the Federal Bureau of Investigation as useful mainly a conduit for National Crime Information Center (NCIC) information on individuals for whom there are outstanding arrest warrants, for example.

Recognizing Networking and Boundary Spanning as Planning Methods

Conclusion Two suggests that the boundary spanning and networking activity mentioned by respondents from experienced organizations would tend not to be recognized by managers and administrators of those organizations as part

of the formal job description of members of the response team and the organizations' managerial levels. Nowhere in any of the experienced organizations studied, was there a single, identifiable position which had as part of its assigned duties the establishment of liaison with external organizational contacts. This function was achieved by personnel in both experienced organizations studied; however, the process was completely informal, just "something that grew naturally over the last few years." The roles of boundary spanner and networker appeared to have fallen to different personnel in the different experienced organizations studied. In the Southeast Police Department, a department whose experience with international terrorism has, to this point, been confined totally to incidents of bombings and attempted bombings, the task of establishing workable interorganizational relationships fell mostly to investigative personnel in the police department's specialized investigations unit. Still, the process was, and is, informal, evolving "over the years" as something that "simply had to be done." Secondary boundary spanning and networking functions were developed at Southeast by personnel responsible for negotiations. This occurrence is consistent with the theory developed in Chapter One, which suggests that positions responsible for negotiation,

investigation, prosecution, and evidence collection are most likely to be sensitive to the need to work with outside contacts to obtain the information they need.

The relegation of boundary spanning and networking functions to the informal collateral organization is not necessarily less effective than assigning formal responsibility for these activities. For example, Zand suggests that these informal connections may be more effective than formal connections if one desires the ability to:

1. identify and solve problems not solved by the formal organization;
2. allow new combinations of people, new channels of communication, and new ways of seeing old problems;
3. facilitate new approaches to old problems and obstacles[2]

Such capabilities are obviously important to adequate counter-terrorist response, and among experienced organizations, they appear to have been well attended to by the collateral organization. However, reliance on the informal processes developed by the personnel who comprise the collateral organization has given rise to difficulties in responding to events of terrorism at Southeast. For

example, during a recent terrorist bombing, the informal coordination system at Southeast broke down. Several agencies, federal, state, and local, were attempting to work the case at the same time. Part of the investigative process involved infiltration of the suspected terrorist group. Because the informal coordination system had failed, several police agencies had conducted the expensive and dangerous infiltration. The presence of police agents was made known to the suspect group mainly because the investigative process was not coordinated. Eventually, one undercover agent "reported" another to the terrorist group because he was unaware of the identity of the other agent, whose activities were suspicious. He brought these activities to the attention of the terrorist group because he had thought the other undercover officer was a member of a rival terrorist group on an intelligence mission. He had planned to use the reporting of a "rival terrorist" to enhance his position in the group. While Southeast is undoubtedly better able to respond to international terrorism because of the existence of its collateral organizations, reliance on purely informal coordination methodologies has created difficulties.[3]

The informal network, however, was obviously important to the members of the experienced organizations.

For example, members of Southeast refused, as a group, to return questionnaires which asked for additional information concerning their organization's response to terrorist events. This refusal on the part of the personnel from experienced agencies to continue their agreement to cooperate in the research once the exact nature of the research was known is nearly as telling as the information which could be gained from cooperative experienced personnel. The individuals who refused further cooperation were afraid that such cooperation would create difficulties for them with other agencies. Such refusals meant that the respondents who refused to cooperate further perceived something worthy of protection from external scrutiny. Further, that perception appeared to be either externally generated, or developed to protect external connections important to the experienced organizations.

Differences in Formal Planning Methods

Conclusion Three suggests that differences in formal planning focus exist among experienced and non-experienced organizations. Planning was seen to be an administrative task in most police departments researched. However, the research did uncover differences in planning focus among the police departments observed. The research indicates that personnel from non-experienced organizations tended to focus

their planning activities around the development of contingency plans designed to develop site- or problem-specific knowledge and capabilities. Training was selected as a primary planning function by personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations alike, as it was utilized by these organizations to build capabilities seen as necessary for counter-terrorist response. The data indicate that there were substantial differences among experienced and non-experienced organizations, however, in the method by which determinations were made concerning which capabilities should be "trained into the counter-terrorist response system. Table Eighteen depicts the different methodologies used by experienced and non-experienced organizations in determining which capabilities were implemented through training. The South Police Department used a combination method of event simulation and reviewing the status of their own organizational domain. The emphasis at South was to identify the specific sites in the South's jurisdiction and specific problems that had arisen there during actual or simulated terrorist events which required specific capabilities. A large part of the South's planning process appeared to be oriented toward the contingency/domain review process. Once the necessary capabilities were identified

through the domain review/contingency identification process, the South Police Department tended to rely on simulation to test the efficacy of their training program. The Midwest Police Department developed a planning system similar to that of the "South's combination of review/simulation. The critical problems were identified by critiquing actual and simulated events. Once the critical problems were identified, the Midwest Police Department developed training exercises to build capabilities to respond to the problems. Again, as with the South Police Department, personnel at the Midwest Police Department seemed to place a great deal of emphasis on the planning process of locating blueprints of, and conducting walk-throughs and simulated training at, locations which appeared to be good targets for terrorist events. The Southeast Police Department used a mixed scanning approach combined with simulation. The process at Southeast seemed to center around the review of terrorist incidents from other jurisdictions, as reported by various sources, including the evening news, newspapers, synopses of terrorist events provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, war stories traded during interorganizational training processes, and other sources. Obviously, such a broad lens approach omitted a great deal of detail concerning events. However,

if an event appeared interesting, i.e., problematic for the Southeast Police Department, the event was viewed more closely, and the capabilities necessary to successfully handle the event were then trained into the Southeast Police Department's response repertoire. Simulation was used to test the effectiveness of the training. The Northeast Police Department also used a combination of mixed scanning/simulation.

It appears from the results of Table Eighteen that the differences in planning focus show similarities among experienced organizations, which rely on a mixed scanning/simulation combination, and non-experienced organizations, which rely on a domain review/simulation combination. Both experienced and non-experienced organizations tended to rely on training as an implementation mechanism once the necessary capabilities were identified. The difference in focus among the experienced and non-experienced organizations tends to be a difference in internally focused and externally focused planning practices, with the personnel from the experienced organizations expressing a much greater external focus than the personnel from the non-experienced organizations.

Simulation as a Plans Testing Method

Conclusion Four suggests that both types of

organizations studied, experienced and non-experienced, use simulation as a method of testing their organizational planning processes. Neither group of organizations, however, appears to use simulation to identify those external contacts with assisting organizations which are helpful, or as one respondent suggested critical to the delivery of an effective counter-terrorist response. The failure to rely on simulation to identify these connections can perhaps best be explained by looking at the response system of each of the organizations observed. Two of the organizations, South and Midwest have had no experience with actual international terrorism, and thus had no reason to concern themselves with the identification of those organizational positions which would be able to assist with negotiation, investigation, evidence collection, or information processing concerning an event of international terrorism. As one respondent remarked "We just don't feel we've been targeted." Conversely, the Southeast and Northeast Police Departments have had extensive experience with events of international terrorism. Should we not expect them to be actively searching for useful organizational connections? It appears that these connections have been identified previously. As one respondent noted, they were contacts that just "evolved

naturally, over the years."[4]

To the personnel of the Southeast Police Department, these are not connections which need to be identified through a specific planning methodology; they are known entities. At least this is the perception of many of those interviewed from the experienced organizations. The data indicate that there may yet be some work to do concerning identifying, establishing, nurturing, and maintaining those connections, however. Indications that all was not well among the networks of the experienced organizations were found in the interview data. These indications pointed to difficulties in the flow of information from the federal to the local level, in the ability to establish advanced agreement on multiple jurisdiction operations, the ability to avoid power plays, and in the ability to coordinate investigative processes. Thus while the selection of certain external contacts appear to have been made at the experienced organizations observed, there appears to be room for improvement in the management of those connections. It may be that the identification and maintenance of these connections is perceived by the managerial and institutional levels of the experienced organizations as too obvious to need official attention. It appears from the interview data, however, that such attention is necessary.

Use of Strategic and Tactical Planning Methods

Conclusion Five suggests that experienced organizations are more inclined to use more strategically oriented planning methodologies than are non-experienced organizations. For the most part, the data supported the conclusion that experienced organizations tended to develop more strategically oriented counter-terrorist response processes than did non-experienced organizations. The data collected during the research indicated that experienced organizations tended to use a more decentralized response mode than did non-experienced organizations. This was evidenced by a tendency to include external organizations in planning processes more frequently than did non-experienced organizations. Experienced organizations also tended to utilize collateral, informal organizational processes more frequently, and made more frequent use of interorganizational coordination mechanisms. These mechanisms included problem solving through informal networks, development of important connections for information processing and transfer, and recognition of the necessity of maintaining interorganizational connections. A substantial bias toward the strategic mode of organization was observed for the experienced organizations, while a similar bias is seen for the non-experienced organizations

for the tactical mode of organization.

Management of the Tactical Response Process

Conclusion Six suggests that the tactical response processes involved in an effective counter-terrorist response appear to be well managed. There appears to be no noticeable difference among the experienced and non-experienced organizations in terms of the capabilities or perceptions of the tactical, on-scene response personnel. Very little data were generated from members of the tactical response teams themselves which indicate a difference in approach, perception, philosophy, or operational tactics among members of experienced and non-experienced organizations. In the process of this research, there were found no effective differences concerning tactical response among response personnel from experienced and non-experienced organizations.

This conclusion, however, is very much like that which would have been predicted from the theory developed in Chapters One and Two. That theory suggests that strong capabilities exist at the levels of tactical response, containment, damage control and local evidence collection. As one respondent from an experienced organization remarked: "The job itself is pretty much routine. There are only so many ways to go in after a guy."[4] One could expect

those individuals involved in doing the job of counter-terrorist response to have similar approaches, perceptions, philosophies, and operational tactics.

The actual methods of tactical response, containment and damage control are relatively established in the craft of counter-terrorist response. It should also be noted that even in department characterized by a strategic orientation to counter-terrorist response, the tactical response is a critical part of response delivery. A well-honed strategic response system would be of little use if the organization were not capable of also delivering a workable tactical response.

Negotiations, Investigations, and Intelligence Functions

Conclusion Seven suggests that the negotiation, investigations, and intelligence functions of the counter-terrorist response of the organizations studied tended not to be as well managed as the tactical response function. Consistently, personnel from the experienced organizations noted the need for improvements in these functions of the counter-terrorist response. Again, such a conclusion is not surprising given the theory underlying the research. As suggested in Chapter Two, marginal capabilities could be expected to exist in the areas of

investigations, identification and pursuit of terrorists, prosecution, negotiations, and evidence collection in multi-jurisdictional settings. The data tend to support the theory on this point. Most of the suggestions for improvements in the response system suggested by personnel from the experienced organizations centered around one of these functions. (The consistent exception to this conclusion, as mentioned above, are the personnel responsible for tactical response who tended to suggest that improvements in equipment were needed). In the Southeast Police Department, where counter-terrorist response involved generally responding to bombings, the emphasis on improved investigation, intelligence, and evidence collection was the strongest. In the Northeast Police Department, where counter-terrorist response more frequently included response to situations in which hostages were being held, improvement in the negotiations process was also frequently mentioned.

In these circumstances, intelligence took on new meaning, with the negotiator sensing a need for up-to-date intelligence information on the group with which he was working. It appears, from the information obtained during the interviews, that the most efficacious method for improving the negotiations, investigations, and intelligence functions is to improve the interaction among the focal

organizations and the organizations in its domain which provide similar service, and which possess information helpful to an effective counter-terrorist response. It appears that once the original tactical response is made, once the scene has been sealed and the tactical situation is under control, the raw material of counter-terrorist response is information. The personnel of experienced organizations appear to realize the role of information to a much greater degree, and improving the information collection, processing, and dissemination function of counter-terrorist response ranks high on their lists of improvements to the system. The information function is seen as a prime factor in the management of the negotiation, investigation, and prosecution processes by members of the experienced organizations. Nearly all respondents from experienced organizations mentioned, in one aspect or another, the need for improvement in the information processing functions of their counter-terrorist response system.

Informal Nature of the Response System

Conclusion Eight suggests that management of the counter-terrorist response system within experienced organizations is normally accomplished as part of the informal, collateral processes of the organizations

observed, and that the formalization of these processes is not being actively considered at the current time in either of the experienced organizations observed during the execution of the research. In each of the experienced organizations, at least one key boundary spanner existed. For example, in the Southeast Police Department this functional position rested with an investigative supervisor, who served to link the formal organization with the assisting agencies in the area of investigative intelligence. This position also served to provide detailed information for the department's mixed scanning approach to planning. In the Northeast Police Department the key boundary spanning position was the training officer. Neither of these positions had the sole responsibility for external relations; however, interview data soon established the fact that these two positions were the key points of external relations for their respective police departments.

The actual duties assigned each of these officers did not require substantial external communication. Each was assigned a functional set of tasks within the organizational framework which were sufficient to keep him occupied nearly full-time. Each of these key positions also served an additional function, however, of key external

communications processor of the organization. These extra duties were not formally recognized as compensated duties for the personnel who provided the majority of the external communications functions. The burden of providing such service for the two experienced police departments studied appeared to be substantial. The burden was significant enough to prompt the Southeast's key boundary spanner to comment:

> You have to build a relationship. That's time consuming. It becomes a matter of recruiting people who are willing to 'go the extra mile' and spend the time that's necessary. We seldom get paid for it; it's not official. What we need is some type of system that makes the time available. Call it a 'bullshit session' if you want, but that's what makes us successful or kills us. If it takes four hours, it takes four hours. Without that time we've had it. We'll get nowhere.[5]

A similar situation existed with the training officer at the Northeast Police Department. His official function was that of arranging and delivering training exercises to the members of the response unit. In addition, however, he was also unofficially responsible for collecting, processing, and disseminating information concerning counter-terrorist response which the other members of the Northeast network provided to the department. During the interview with this officer, he was interrupted several times with short, two-part telephone calls. The first part of the call appeared to be an informal process

aimed at cementing and maintaining the relationship between the training officer and the person from the external agency. It consisted of minor pleasantries concerning the weather, the local sports teams, family, or the nature of law enforcement work in general. The second part of the call, usually by far the shorter of the two parts, consisted of an information transfer process. A short message concerning a new tactic or a new type of booby trap encountered by the outside organization would be conveyed, followed by a confirmation by the training officer concerning whether the tactic or method had been encountered before, or a discussion of the impact of the information. The training officer seemed to serve a clearinghouse function for local police departments. The dissemination phase of the process took place during training, both for internal training exercises and during the training provided by Northeast for other police departments in the area.

Recommendations for Improving Counter-Terrorist Response

The results of the research indicate some potential improvements which would enhance the ability of the United States to develop an effective counter-terrorist response. While some of the recommendations are relatively straight-forward, dealing with improvements in process,

other recommendations deal with attitudinal changes, and may be more difficult to implement. The specific recommendations for changes in the American counter-terrorist response system are:

1. The use of contingency planning, particularly that of identifying potential trouble sites and developing response plans for those locations, should be replaced with a method of strategically oriented planning which will identify critical interorganizational connections, and will ensure creation, maintenance, and use of those connections to foster information transfer.

2. The use of well-planned simulations to aid in the identification of these interorganizational connections should supplement the use of simulation as a method of training for capability building.

3. The creation, maintenance, and use of interorganizational connections should be recognized as part of the official duties of the selected communications stars and should become part of the institutionalized management processes of organizations involved in counter-terrorist response.

4. The use of simulation to provide non-lethal

environmental turbulence for organizations engaged in counter-terrorist response should be practiced, so that strategic adaptation can correctly align the organization to the turbulence to be expected during a terrorist event.

5. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's inherent leadership function in the field of counter-terrorist response should be used to shape the attitudes, strategies, and philosophy of counter-terrorist response in the United States, particularly among the institutional core of involved police departments.

6. Participative and emulative planning methodologies which involve indirect and direct sector components of the organizations concerned with counter-terrorist response should be implemented.

Contingency Planning and Counter-Terrorist Response

Both of the non-experienced organizations studied in this research engaged in contingency planning to a certain extent. This contingency planning generally consisted of identifying potential terrorist targets and reconnoitering those locations, developing site maps, or obtaining blueprints. Such a process is of questionable value,

especially given the fact that none of the sites selected by the personnel from the two non-experienced organizations had ever been the site of a terrorist event. This lack of site matching occurred despite the fact that both non-experienced organizations have been involved in contingency planning for several years. While blueprints of buildings and site maps are undoubtedly helpful in responding to terrorist events, personnel from experienced organizations report that the best possible site planning is on-scene, real-time site planning. Buildings are remodeled, entrances and exits are relocated, ventilation shafts are closed off, and sites can be otherwise altered after the contingency planning visit. As one administrative officer with the Northeast Police Department noted, even the overpasses along the route of a bomb removal action are measured at the time of the incident. "There's no room for error,"[6] he noted.

In addition, there are simply "too many targets"[7] from which terrorist may choose. The planning effort involved in identifying all of these potential targets and constructing site maps and obtaining blueprints for all of them would be significant in any SMSA. As O'Connor notes in a recent treatment of the disadvantages of contingency planning:

> even a well concerted effort in identifying contingencies and planning for them would not have

> included some of the recent discontinuities that have interrupted ...plans. The Arab oil embargo is often cited as an example of a contingency that not only was largely unidentified, but also was nearly impossible to anticipate.[8]

It is doubtful that such a planning effort would be fruitful, as the lack of a match with non-experienced organizations indicates. Perhaps the effort could best be redirected into a planning process to identify important interorganizational connections which could assist the responding police department with its counter-terrorist response. The tactical response of experienced organizations appears to be well-managed and not adversely affected by on-site information gathering processes. The site generally appears to be reconnoitered at the time of the incident in any event. The processes which need enhancement are the negotiations, investigations, and intelligence functions. The data collected during the research seem to indicate that these functions can best be improved through an improvement in the amount of networking and boundary spanning activity of the responding organizations. These are the processes to which the experienced organizations have devoted attention in attempting to enhance their counter-terrorist response.

Simulations and Interorganizational Planning

The critical question concerning the development of

necessary networking and boundary spanning positions for enhancement of the counter-terrorist response capability is that of selecting the proper position, function, or person as the gatekeeper. It appears that not all organizations are the same in terms of the location and formal function of the communications stars who serve as key nodes in the organizational network. For example, the Northeast Police Department has informally assigned this position to the training officer of the response unit. The Southeast Police Department has informally assigned this position to an investigative supervisor. Both individuals appear to fulfill the position well. How is one to determine who would best fill the role of gatekeeper? The development of simulations designed to confront the organization with environmental turbulence similar to that which could be expected in a terrorist incident would, it seems, provide an opportunity to identify the natural communications stars for the police department in question. That the simulations would of necessity need to be designed by someone familiar with the requirements of counter-terrorist response also appears evident. Simulations designed to test tactical response appear to do little to enhance networking and boundary spanning techniques, since the tactical response appears to be basically the same for all terrorist

incidents, regardless of their nature. As one respondent commented, the actual job is the same no matter what the situation. What changes is the information required to negotiate, investigate, and bring the situation to an end with less danger of loss of life.

The design and execution of such simulations would require no more time than the design and execution of simulations designed to test tactical response abilities. The difference between simulation exercises designed to enhance tactical response capability and those developed to identify important interorganizational connections is a difference in purpose. Simulations designed to point out the importance of external expertise, resources, cooperation, and information in counter-terrorist response require a different focus, not a different methodology. A significant finding of the research is that, while tactical response teams appear to learn through simulation frequently, negotiators and investigators seldom had the opportunity to learn through simulation. When the ability to practice does present itself to negotiators and investigators, it is generally offered in the context of a simulation designed to hone tactical response skills. While the need for improvement in the negotiations and investigations processes is noted by respondents to the

research, it appears that little has been done to foster those improvements. This appears to have been the result of a failure on the part of non-experienced and experienced organizations alike to recognize the nature of identification of critical networking and boundary spanning roles as a planning process.

That the experienced organizations engage in networking and boundary spanning activity is obvious. However, these organizations do not seem to recognize boundary spanning and networking activities are activities which may need established priorities and managerial guidance. Simulations are offered as a method by which the priorities and guidance may be established. Simulations are particularly valuable in accomplishing two things.

1. They can provide critical environmental turbulence matched to real events of international terrorism for organizations lacking experience in responding to such events, thus allowing them to match organizational strategies in advance of actual experience with such an event; and

2. They can provide a means of controlling, guiding, and fostering the identification of important interorganizational contacts for

organizations experienced in responding to events of terrorism, thus providing a formal recognition of the importance of networking and boundary spanning activities.

Recognition of Networking and Boundary Spanning as Institutionalized Roles

Once the organization has recognized the appropriate individuals who should serve in the roles of key boundary spanners, it is important that the function be institutionalized to the degree possible. While in the experienced organizations observed in this research, networkers and boundary spanners simply evolved into their positions over a period of years, in none of the organizations was the key boundary spanner compensated directly for that activity, nor were they given any managerial direction concerning the types of information, contacts, relationships, or organizations which were considered important by the management of their police departments. This reliance on informal processes appears to have been reasonably efficient in the past, but some evidence indicates that these informal roles are beginning to take an ever-larger portion of the key boundary spanners' time on the job. For example, the investigative supervisor who served as the key boundary spanner for the Southeast

Police Department commented that what was needed in his department was some method to make sure that the time needed for this networking and boundary spanning activity was provided. He remarked that the process is:

> more than just the information though. You have to build a relationship. That's time consuming. It becomes a matter of recruiting people who are willing to 'go the extra mile' and spend the time that's necessary. We seldom get paid for it; it's not official. What we need is some type of system that makes the time available. Call it a 'bullshit session' if you want, but that's what makes us successful or kills us. If it takes four hours, it takes four hours. Without that time we've had it. We'll get nowhere.[9]

In addition, evidence was developed that even those on the experienced police officers who were not communications stars were beginning to realize that an insufficient amount of time was being devoted to the networking and boundary spanning activities of their department. The near universal reply to the question concerning frequency of contact with important external organizations was "not as often as we should!"

While the use of networking and boundary spanning to develop the interorganizational communications necessary to respond to terrorism has developed in the experienced organization studied in this research, it is still not recognized as an official part of the planning for or management of counter-terrorist response. It is doubtful

the system requested by the Southeast key boundary spanner will be developed unless some form of education of top and middle management personnel of police departments engaged in counter-terrorist response is undertaken. As Gilboa notes, simulation is an excellent method by which training and educational goals may be met.[10] The use of strategic simulation is suggested as a method by which middle- and top-level management personnel can be educated concerning the importance of the creation of a viable interorganizational communications network to assist in the delivery of an effective counter-terrorist response.

In addition to the development of management sensitivity to the need for networking and boundary spanning actors, strategic simulation would also serve to provide a platform on which the identification of important interorganizational connections becomes part of the official planning process for counter-terrorist response. Individuals involved in the delivery of and management of counter-terrorist response can begin to be evaluated in terms of their ability to create, maintain, and utilize these important interorganizational connections, and systems can then be developed to make the time available to build the necessary relationships with important external organizations and personal contacts within those

organizations. The complexity and severity of the problems presented by international terrorism may have progressed beyond the point that the interorganizational relationships necessary to respond to the problem can be handled strictly through unguided collateral means.

Strategic Simulation and Strategic Management of Terrorism

The theoretical perspective developed in Chapter Two suggests that a key problem in developing a successful counter-terrorist response is that the environmental turbulence created by international terrorism is simply not present on a day-to-day basis for the management personnel of most American police departments. When an event does occur, the focus is on successfully solving the problems it presents, not on the study of the event as an "opportunity space"[11] for the solution of management problems. The tendency for management personnel to try out new ideas or alternative processes which might work but which have not been tested is understandably low. Actual terrorist events are life-threatening situations, not pure learning experiences. Innovation, discussion, consideration of unusual alternatives, and experimentation are not generally part of the response procedure.

The process of strategic simulation, on the other

hand, provides an opportunity for the organization to confront and learn from the environmental turbulence generated by a terrorist event. Strategic simulation differs from tactical simulation in the goal of the simulation process. Tactical simulation is designed to assist organizations in responding by delivery of specific tactics-- rapelling, building entry, arrest, search, or hostage rescue. Strategic simulation is designed to assist the organization in identifying critical organizational connections which will allow a more balanced counter-terrorist response. Adequately designed scenarios can confront the organization with contingencies similar to those generated by an actual event, with the exception that the situations are not actually life-threatening. Under such circumstances, personnel involved in the strategic simulation are more free to innovate, experiment, discuss alternatives, and learn from the environmental turbulence presented by the situation. Provision of the environmental turbulence normally associated with international terrorism in the form of strategic simulation will assist management personnel in developing the legitimating leadership and decision-making leadership necessary to create an adequate strategic thrust. The development of an adequate strategic thrust should be effective in moving the organization in a

direction which will allow it to meet actual events of terrorism effectively.

Without the use of strategic simulation, the organization is faced with the necessity of learning strictly from situations which are life-threatening, and which offer a much lower possibility of learning. As Gilboa[12] notes, simulation is an excellent method of training, education, research, and planning. Using simulations designed to focus on the strategic implications of international terrorism should allow the development of those four processes along more strategic lines than has occurred in the past. When strategic simulation becomes a part of the institutionalized management processes of the organization, the organization has, in effect, significantly fostered the processes of strategic training and education of its personnel, strategic planning, and, to a lesser extent, strategic research.

The Role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Terrorist Response

President Reagan, in 1983, declared the Federal Bureau of Investigation the lead agency in the federal response against international terrorism.[13] The Bureau has established the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, a branch of the Terrorism Section within the

Criminal Investigation Division. In addition, the Bureau has numerous SWAT teams centered in major offices across the United States. However, the Bureau is, under no circumstances, capable of being the responding agency to events of international terrorism in the United States. The manpower, resources, and, knowledge simply do not exist within the Bureau's structure. However, the Bureau does have the ability to offer an even more important resource to America's counter-terrorist response: the manipulation and management of the strategic culture of the response system.

The existence of a positive strategic culture within the interorganizational network which responds to events of terrorism in the United States is, perhaps, the key to meeting the threat posed by terrorism. As Kraemer notes, public agencies tend to be faced with mainly three types of problems, operational, programming, or developmental.[14] Operational problems are those with single objectives which are readily defined and on which agreement is easy. He suggests that operational problems are best handled on the local level by basic task units with operational planning methods. Programming problems are identified as those with multiple objectives which are difficult to define and which are often conflicting. Consensus, he suggests, is difficult to achieve and the criterion of success is effectiveness as

opposed to efficiency. Programming problems are best handled by state or local governments or middle management personnel, he suggests. The planning method for programming problems is strategic planning. Developmental problems have no objectives, he notes. It is in setting those objectives that the planning process functions. These objectives tend to be value-laden and qualitative. He suggests that developmental problems are best addressed by normative planning at the top management level. In the area of counter-terrorist response, it appears that we have managed to control the operational problems quite well, as predicted in the theory developed in Chapters One and Two, and as indicated by the data collected for this research. However, little evidence exists to suggest that we have addressed the programming or developmental problems created by international terrorism. It is in this context that the Federal Bureau of Investigation could offer the greatest benefit to improving the counter-terrorist response system in the United States.

The state of the art in counter-terrorist training in the United States at the present time is tactical. Courses provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation focus on building entry and search tactics, arrest tactics, firearm proficiency, negotiation techniques, physical

readiness, and specific physical skills such as rapelling. While such skills are obviously necessary, they are just as obviously part of the tactical, or operational, response process. The greatest contribution of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the counter-terrorist response system of the United States would be to begin to manage the strategic culture of the response system through indoctrination of middle- and top-management police personnel into the requirements of strategic management of the response process.

The strategic culture of an organization, or in the case of counter-terrorist response in the United States, an interorganizational network, consists of the atmosphere in which organizations assist, hinder, constrain, learn about, and support each other. The role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a manipulator of the strategic culture of the counter-terrorist response system in the United States is crucial to the development of an adequate response. The type of training developed by the Bureau and other key training organizations in the field of counter-terrorist response should begin to emphasize a realignment of the strategic culture of the counter-terrorist response in the U.S. This realignment should be from a culture which is primarily concerned with tactical response to one that is

concerned with key elements of a strategic response. Data collected during this research indicate that the tactical response process in the U.S. is well managed. The area that appears to need improvement is the area of strategic management.

As Van Cavenberg and Cool note, organizational culture is manipulated by top management though several key processes:

1. Keeping informed ("by looking for intelligence in a visible way a top manager sends signals which convey information about ... current preferences");
2. Selective dispersion of information;
3. Careful management of non-verbal cues; and
4. Carefully using the activities of staff.[15]

For the most part, controlling the organizational culture, as discussed by Van Cavenberg and Cool, and manipulating the strategic culture are similar processes. It is accomplished through the manipulation of symbols and the dissemination of specific types of information designed to move the strategic culture in desired directions. For example, Van Cavenberg and Cool note that:

> it follows that, by creating a sufficient consistent set of symbols, top management can enhance the coherence in strategic calculation and action at lower levels. It follows [that] by an adequate manipulation of symbols, individual energy can be channeled in a desired direction.[16]

Just as top management within a given organization can use symbols and manipulation to control organizational culture,

so can a member of an interorganizational network use the same measures to manipulate the strategic culture of that group of organizations. This is especially true when the symbol manipulator is currently in a central position within the organizational network, as is the Bureau.

It is thus recommended that the Bureau, and other current providers of counter-terrorist response training, such as Northwestern University's Traffic Institute, add to their curricula the topics of strategic management and strategic research, planning, education and training. It is also recommended that these entities begin to pull into their class constituency the middle- and top-management figures who must begin to participate in the process of strategic management of the counter-terrorist response in the United States. This process is seen as one which will develop an interest in, commitment to, and desire for strategic management concepts in the planning, education, and training of their own personnel. The need for networking and boundary spanning activity, as well as other strategically oriented activities, has been indicated by the data collected from the experienced organizations observed in this research, but unless steps are taken at the national level to develop these processes, we are faced with a learning process which will significantly retard the

development of such processes. Unless the Bureau and other providers of counter-terrorist response training begin to manipulate the strategic culture of the response interorganization, learning will occur mainly through experience during life-threatening situations. Such a learning process would preclude a great deal of innovation, adaptation, creativity, and experimentation. The resulting difficulties appear to be preventable.

Development of Participative and Emulative Planning Techniques

Response to terrorist events inevitably involves cooperation with organizations not under the direct control of the responding organization. This has been indicated by data collected not only from the experienced organization observed for this research, but also from the non-experienced organizations. Even response to a routine act of domestic terrorism, such as a hostage-taking as a result of a family dispute can result in the requirement of obtaining cooperation from a host of indirect sector organizations-- organizations which are not under the direct control of the responding agency, but whose cooperation is essential to delivery of adequate response processes.[17] Two problems remain: the first, of determining which organizations are important and which ones are not, and the

second, of assuring the cooperation of those organizations. Not all organizations are inclined to deliver the support requested by agencies responding to a terrorist event, despite the obvious real need for the assistance requested. For example, power companies have been known to be hesitant to disconnect power to a site, since to do so would mean blacking out a whole block or more. The prevalent question is "Who's responsible for the damages: ruined food, lost merchandise, etc.?"

It is suggested that, again, strategic simulation is a workable answer to both problems. In the case where the identity of the important indirect sector organization is known, strategic simulation will serve to involve the personnel from that organization in the problems presented by the simulation. One of the key benefits of simulation as an organizational planning process is that the role playing required involves its participants; creates interest in and dedication to solving the problems simulated; develops comraderie, trust, and teamwork; and develops a sense of participation and ownership in plans developed as a result of the simulation.[18]

The use of strategic simulation is seen as a method of both identifying critical indirect sector components which could be of assistance in counter-terrorist response,

and of involving those components in the interorganizational system. Terrorism is, apparently, one of those organizational problems which "'falls between the cracks' of any one public agency,"[19] and thus require an interorganizational response. As such, just as Keller and Wamsley suggest, what is required in order to develop such an interorganizational response is:

> 1. Task and technology related unit differentiation;
> 2. Allocation rules among members;
> 3. Authority structures for task accomplishment; and
> 4. Provision of an incentive system sufficient to cause other organizations to participate in the interorganizational network.[20]

It is suggested that strategic simulation will provide much of the requirements specified by Keller and Wamsley by providing an interactive planning process which assigns unit differentiation, allocation rules, and authority structures on the basis of an observable reality created by the simulation. The involvement, enthusiasm, commitment, and interest normally generated by simulation role playing is seen to provide a large measure of the incentive required to the indirect sector components to participate in the interorganizational network.

Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research

Research into the organizational aspects of

counter-terrorist response is in its infancy. To date, almost no research has been completed which investigates the relationship between terrorism and organizational response beyond the tactical level. That research which does exist[21] concerning the organizational response to terrorism fails to develop adequately an empirical synthesis of key problems facing organizations which respond to international terrorism. The current research has tested theory against the reality of the field, and has developed several major conclusions and recommendations for improvements in the counter-terrorist response system of the United States. This research was not, however, based on a significantly large sample size to allow broad generalizations to all organizations within the United States charged with delivering an counter-terrorist response. While this research tested several key propositions, and was able to substantiate some of them, the problem remains that the n-size of this research was only four.

Accordingly, it is recommended that future research be focused around the following areas.

1. Large scale, quantitatively oriented research involving stronger quasi-experimental research designs and strategic simulation structured to test

systematically key hypotheses regarding the strategic management of the counter-terrorist response;

2. Large scale, repetitive organizational simulations of international terrorism, followed by quantitative, detailed, after-action critiques to determine the extent of need for strategic management of the counter-terrorist response;

3. Large scale qualitatively oriented research, initiated both in real world situations and through strategic simulation, to obtain a greater understanding of the collateral organization as it relates to counter-terrorist response;

4. Application of the large bodies of knowledge currently being generated in strategic management and interorganizational relations, particularly in the areas of networking and boundary spanning, to the problem of counter-terrorist response.

Formation of knowledge in the field of counter-terrorist response is obviously in its earliest stages. It has remained for many years a theorist's field. Theory about causes, effects, responses, and counter-effects abounds. It is now time that we begin to test those theories. It may be, as many have said, that the real

danger of terrorism is that we will worry about it too much. It may be that the real danger is that we will spend too much to attempt to combat it, or that we will create unnecessary governmental power to suppress it. It is suggested that adequate theory exists to begin the long process of empirically testing that theory.

Can we develop an effective counter-terrorist response without bankrupting our moral, political, economic, and social, bases? Is our best hope against the terrorists to heed Horowitz'[22] advise and simply ignore them? Or can we develop an economically efficient, politically effective, socially acceptable response to the terrorist threat in the United States? It appears that the questions are well set. The major concepts have been identified. The major alternatives have been reasonably well identified. It is time to begin to test our alternatives, to test our theories. Given the exceptional difficulties discussed in Chapter Three concerning research designs and counter-terrorist response research, it appears that Gilboa[23] and Sloan[24] were correct. Simulation appears to offer an exceptional opportunity to both study and plan for counter-terrorist response.

The literature on simulation as a tool in counter-terrorist response, to date, has appeared to focus

on the wrong aspects of the response problems, however. It is not within the tactical realm that we need the additional expertise and understanding that simulation can give. It is instead within the strategic realm that we need a sharpened focus. Most recent literature on the problem of terrorism in modern democratic societies seems to concur that the era of the super terrorist is not imminent,[25] thus our tactical capabilities as they now exist should suffice. Our major area of weakness at this time appears to be in the area of strategic management of our counter-terrorist response. It is in this area that the use of strategic simulation can best be used to improve our response system.

As Gilboa has noted, simulation has several purposes. He suggests these are:

> (a) training of policy makers and officials who are directly responsible for dealing with terrorism; (b) research; (c) planning; and (d) education of the public and several groups of individuals who are indirectly involved in terrorist incidents, such as reporters,...[26]

To date, with few exceptions,[27] the use of simulation has been confined to the training of those involved in the tactical response to terrorism. What is needed, as Gilboa has suggested, is an expanded interest in the use of simulation for research, planning, and education. Gilboa notes several uses for simulation in research and planning. Among those are:

1. Testing current decision making processes;
2. Testing current negotiation processes; and
3. Development and testing of more comprehensive contingency plans[28]

While Gilboa's work, and that of Sloan, can be considered state of the art in counter-terrorist response simulation, they miss a critical element of the response process: the development and testing of a consistent, workable, effective, and efficient strategy for counter-terrorist response.

Contingency plans serve a comforting role. It is nice to know that they exist, and one feels that one is doing one's job when developing those plans; however, experience shows that they seldom are used. (The two organizations included in this research which used contingency planning had not one incident in a combined ten years of contingency planning in which an event occurred at a location for which a contingency plan existed). Similarly, good decision making processes are not very useful if the interorganizational communication processes do not exist to implement those decisions. Gilboa and Sloan have correctly identified an important concept in the use of simulation: identification of purpose; however, they have seemed content to leave the concept in a unidimensional

mode.

Adequate use of simulation has at least two, and possibly three dimensions: purpose, focus, and time. Adequate strategic management, as Camillus has noted, requires a focus on three dimensions of the problem under study.[29] One must concern one's self with the analytical dimensions of the problem (environmental, organizational, social, demographic, political, technological, economic considerations). It is with these concerns that counter-terrorist response theorists have worked to date. There are other concerns, however, concerns which Cammillus identifies as the interactive dimension of strategic management. He notes convincingly:

> That interactions between participants are key to the logical incrementalist approach to [organizational] design stems from the accepted necessity of integrating incremental changes and the outputs of subsystems so as to avoid a 'piecemeal' ...approach. It also stems from the near truism that an appreciation of the importance of group processes, relative power and personal values involves the recognition that interactions-- their nature, form and identities of individuals involved...-- are the key to understanding an influencing strategic planning processes.[30]

It is suggested that we are at risk if we continue to consider only the tactical aspects in our effort to develop an effective counter-terrorist response. It appears from the literature and from the results of this research that the major problems with counter-terrorist response in

the United States surface because of an inability to effectively deal with strategic issues, not because of an inability to deal with the tactical issues involved.

We are not at the stage where we are ready for the development of specific objectives, plans, and goals; we are not dealing with stable environments which will allow useful contingency planning; nor do we appear to have the domain consensus to develop exact solutions to these problems. The state of the strategic environment in the field of counter-terrorist response appears to call not for conventional management, nor conventional management tools. What is needed, it appears, is the application of strategic management and the tools associated with that process. It is in this context that it is felt that the counter-terrorist response system can achieve the most from the training, education, research and planning processes offered by the use of strategic simulation.

APPENDIX A

SURVEY INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTED TO PERSONNEL OF FOCAL AGENCIES

PART ONE. This section deals with your perceptions of everyday work processes. Please use the reverse side of this sheet to make any comments you may have concerning the topics covered by these questions. Please remember that we value your written comments as much as your responses to our specific questions.

	NONE	LITTLE	SOME	QUITE A BIT	VERY MUCH
1. How much influence do you think each of the following has over the internal operations of your work unit (e.g., setting goals, allocating work among unit members, and reviewing performance of unit members)?					
A. The members of your unit:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Your unit supervisor:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Other unit supervisors:	1	2	3	4	5
D. Your division supervisor:	1	2	3	4	5
E. Other division supervisors:	1	2	3	4	5
F. The chief administrative officer of this organization:	1	2	3	4	5
G. People in other organizations:	1	2	3	4	5
2. How much influence do you think each of the following has over the internal operation of this organization (such as setting office policies and goals, allocating resources between units, etc.)?					
A. The members of your unit:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Your unit supervisor:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Other unit supervisors:	1	2	3	4	5
D. Your division supervisor:	1	2	3	4	5
E. Other division supervisors:	1	2	3	4	5
F. The chief administrative officer of this organization:	1	2	3	4	5
G. People in other organizations:	1	2	3	4	5
3. How much influence do you think each of the following has over the external community affairs and activities of your organization (such as developing and maintaining joint programs with other agencies, getting funds and grants, establishing and protecting the role of your organization in the community)?					
A. The members of your unit:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Your unit supervisor:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Other unit supervisors:	1	2	3	4	5
D. Your division supervisor:	1	2	3	4	5
E. Other division supervisors:	1	2	3	4	5
F. The chief administrative officer of this organization:	1	2	3	4	5
G. People in other organizations:	1	2	3	4	5

4. How heavy was your work load during the last six months?

OFTEN NOT ENOUGH TO KEEP ME BUSY	SOMTIMES NOT ENOUGH TO KEEP ME BUSY	JUST ABOUT THE RIGHT AMOUNT	HARD TO KEEP UP WITH	ENTIRELY TOO MUCH TO HANDLE
1	2	3	4	5

	NONE	VERY LITTLE	SOME	QUITE A BIT	VERY MUCH
5. During the past six months, how much control did you have in setting the pace of your work?	1	2	3	4	5

	ABOUT AN HOUR OR LESS IN ADVANCE	ABOUT A DAY IN ADVANCE	ABOUT A WEEK IN ADVANCE	ABOUT A MONTH IN ADVANCE	ABOUT 6 MONTHS OR MORE IN ADVANCE
6. How far in advance do you generally know how much work will be asked of you?	1	2	3	4	5

7. When you plan for an organizational response to a terrorist event:

	NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	ALWAYS
A. How frequently do you participate in decisions on the adoption of new policies?	1	2	3	4	5
B. How frequently do you participate in decisions on the adoption of new programs?	1	2	3	4	5

8. Would you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning your organization as it plans for response to terrorist events?

	DEFINITELY FALSE	FALSE	TRUE	DEFINITELY TRUE
A. There can be little action taken here regarding planning efforts until my superior approves:	1	2	3	4
B. A person who wants to make his own decisions regarding planning processes would be quickly discouraged here:	1	2	3	4
C. Even small matters regarding planning have to be referred to someone higher up for a final decision:	1	2	3	4
D. Any decision I make regarding planning processes has to have by boss' approval:	1	2	3	4

9. Would you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning your organization as it responds to a terrorist event?

A. A person who wants to make his own decisions would be quickly discouraged during response to a terrorist event:	1	2	3	4
B. There can be little action taken during such responses unless my superior approves the decision:	1	2	3	4
C. Even small matters concerning anti-terrorist response have to be approved by someone higher up:	1	2	3	4
D. I have to ask my boss before I do almost anything concerning anti-terrorist response:	1	2	3	4

PART TWO. This section deals with your perceptions of the importance of other organizations in your everyday work processes. Please use the reverse side of this sheet to make any comments you may have concerning the topics covered by these questions. Please remeber that we value your written comments as much as your responses to our specific questions.

10. What other organizations are necessary to assist your organization in attaining its goals in the field of anti-terrorist response?

NAME OF ORGANIZATION

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

NAME OF ORGANIZATION

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

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11. Who are your contact persons in these agencies? (PLEASE INCLUDE THE NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF AT LEAST ONE PERSON IN EACH AGENCY LISTED ABOVE).

NAME	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER	HOW MANY MONTHS HAVE YOU KNOWN THIS PERSON?
1.		( )	
2.		( )	
3.		( )	
4.		( )	
5.		( )	
6.		( )	

12. In order for these other agencies to attain THEIR goals in the field of anti-terrorist response, to what extent do they need services, resources, or support from your organization?

	NOT AT ALL	A LITTLE	SOME	QUITE A BIT	VERY MUCH
A. Agency One:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Agency Two:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Agency Three:	1	2	3	4	5
D. Agency Four:	1	2	3	4	5
E. Agency Five:	1	2	3	4	5
G. Agency Six:	1	2	3	4	5

13. In order to attain your organization's goals in the field of anti-terrorist response, to what extent does your organization need services, resources, or support from these other agencies?

A. Agency One:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Agency Two:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Agency Three:	1	2	3	4	5
D. Agency Four:	1	2	3	4	5
E. Agency Five:	1	2	3	4	5
F. Agency Six:	1	2	3	4	5

14. For what specific services, resources, or support does your organization need these other agencies? (Please use the reverse side of this sheet if this space is not adequate).

A. Agency One: _____

B. Agency Two: _____

C. Agency Three: _____

D. Agency Four: _____

E. Agency Five: _____

F. Agency Six _____

15. Generally, how well are your personally acquainted with the contact persons in these organizations?

NOT VERY WELL ACQUAINTED	NOT WELL	SOMEWHAT WELL	QUITE WELL	VERY WELL
1	2	3	4	5

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PART THREE. This sections deals with your perceptions of your interaction with other agencies in developing an anti-terrorist response. Please use the reverse side of this sheet to make any comments you may have concerning the topics covered by these questions. Your knowledge and experience are valuable indicators, and we are interested in your comments.

16. How well informed are you about the specific goals and services that are provided by the other agencies which your organization assists, or which assist your organization in attaining established goals in the field of anti-terrorist response?	NOT WELL INFORMED	A LITTLE INFORMED	SOMEWHAT INFORMED	QUITE WELL INFORMED	VERY WELL INFORMED
	1	2	3	4	5
	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	MUCH EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT
17. To what extent did these agencies participate in earlier phases of planning for your anti-terrorist response?	1	2	3	4	5
18. To what extent do you and the contact persons in these other agencies agree on:					
A. The most important needs of organizations developing an anti-terrorist response?	1	2	3	4	5
B. The general response policies which should be developed by your organizations?	1	2	3	4	5
C. The specific goals of anti-terrorist respose?	1	2	3	4	5
D. The specific way anti-terrorist response services are provided?	1	2	3	4	5
19. To what extent do other agencies with which your organization cooperates in planning and implementing anti-terrorist response:					
A. Provide the same kind of anti-terrorist response services as provided by your organization?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Provide services to the same clients or communities as your organization?	1	2	3	4	5
C. Have the same kind of operating program goals as your organization?	1	2	3	4	5
D. Have staff with the same kinds of professional training and skills as those required for the staff of your organization?	1	2	3	4	5
E. Have the same types of operating procedures, policies, authority structures, and decision making processes as your organization?	1	2	3	4	5

PART FOUR. This section deals with your perception of the frequency of your contacts with other agencies which assist you in developing your anti-terrorist response.

20. During the last six months, how frequently:

A. were letters or written reports of any kind exchanged with the agencies with which you cooperate in developing anti-terrorist response?

0-- No, or zero times during the past six months
1-- One time during the past six months
2-- Two times, or about every three months
3-- Three times, or about every two months
4-- About every month, or six times
5-- About every two weeks, or twelve times
6-- About every week, or 24 times
7-- About every two or three days
8-- About every day

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20. (Continued) During the last six months, how frequently:

B. Were personal face-to-face discussions held with people in these agencies?

0-- No, or zero times during the past six months
1-- One time during the past six months
2-- Two times, or about every three months
3-- Three times, or about every two months
4-- About every month, or six times
5-- About every two weeks, or twelve times
6-- About every week, or 24 times
7-- About every two or three days
8-- About every day

C. Were telephone calls made to (or received from) personnel in these agencies?

0-- No, or zero times during the past six months
1-- One time during the past six months
2-- two times, or about every three months
3-- Three times, or about every two months
4-- About every month, or six times
5-- About every two weeks, or twlelve times
6-- About every week, or 24 times
7-- About every two or three days
8-- About every day

D. Is there a formal interagency committee or group which meets to discuss problems of mutual concern?

NO	YES
0	1

E. If "yes," please indicate the number of times the committee or group has met in the past six months.

_____

21. To what extent did the agencies with which your organization cooperates receive each of the following resources for its involvement with your organization during the past six months?	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	QUITE AN EXTENT	VERY GREAT EXTENT
A. Money:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Use of your organization's staff:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Information referrals:	1	2	3	4	5
D. Consultation or technical assistance:	1	2	3	4	5
E. Public visibility, goodwill, or prestige:	1	2	3	4	5
F. Attainment of its own goals or mandates:	1	2	3	4	5

22. To what extent did your organization receive each of the following resources from agencies with which you cooperate in anti-terrorist response?					
A. Money:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Use of the other organization's staff:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Information referrals:	1	2	3	4	5
D. Consultation or technical assistance:	1	2	3	4	5
E. Public visibility, goodwill, or prestige:	1	2	3	4	5
F. Attainment of your organization's goals:	1	2	3	4	5

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23. Has any form of agreement been established to define the relationships between your organization and the other organizations with whom you cooperate?

NO	YES
0	1

24. If "yes," to what extent is/was this agreement with these organizations:

	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	QUITE AN EXTENT	VERY GREAT EXTENT
A. Explicitly verbalized and discussed?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Written down in detail?	1	2	3	4	5
C. Legally binding, or contractual?	1	2	3	4	5
D. Mandatory by law?	1	2	3	4	5

25. Has any kind of interagency committee or group been established to coordinate activities between your organization and the organizations with which you cooperate?

NO	YES
0	1

26. If "yes," to what extent is this committee:	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	QUITE AN EXTENT	VERY GREAT EXTENT
A. A permanent, standing committee?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Formalized, with agendas, minutes, etc.?	1	2	3	4	5
C. Able to make decisions which are binding on your organization?	1	2	3	4	5

PART FIVE. This section deals with your perceptions of communication processes between your organization and the organizations with which you cooperate. Please use the reverse side of this sheet to make any comments you may have concerning the topics covered by these questions. Your written comments are an excellent source of valuable information.

27. During the past six months, how often did you provide written reports or memos, or other such documents, to each of the following to coordinate the work of your unit?	NOT ONCE	ABOUT 1-3 TIMES A MONTH	ABOUT 1-3 TIMES A WEEK	ABOUT 1-3 TIMES A DAY	ABOUT EVERY HOUR
A. People in other units of this division:	1	2	3	4	5
B. People in other divisions of this organization:	1	2	3	4	5
C. People in other organizations:	1	2	3	4	5
28. During the past six months, how often did you have work-related discussions (face-to-face or by telephone) with each of the following on a one-to-one basis?					
A. People in other units of this division:	1	2	3	4	5
B. People in other divisions of this organization:	1	2	3	4	5
C. People in other organizations:	1	2	3	4	5
29. During the past six months, how often were you involved in work-related, problem solving meetings with two or more of the following?					
A. People in other units of this division:	1	2	3	4	5
B. People in other divisions of this organization:	1	2	3	4	5
C. People in other organizations:	1	2	3	4	5

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30. During the past six months, how often did you receive written reports, memos, telephone calls or other communications from each of the following regarding coordination of your anti-terrorist response?

	NOT ONCE	ABOUT 1-3 TIMES A MONTH	ABOUT 1-3 TIMES A WEEK	ABOUT 1-3 TIMES A DAY	ABOUT EVERY HOUR
A. People from other units of your division:	1	2	3	4	5
B. People from other divisions of your organization:	1	2	3	4	5
C. People form other organizations:	1	2	3	4	5

PART SIX. This section deals with your perceptions of your activities to plan for and respond to incidents of terrorism within your jurisdiction. Please use the reverse side of this sheet to make any comments you may have concerning the topics covered by these questions. Your written comments are equally as important to our research as your responses to our specific questions.

31. When a person tries to change his ususl way of planning for anti-terrorist response, how does it usually work out with your organization?

USUALLY TURNS OUT WORSE	NO DIFFERENCE	USUALLY TURNS OUT BETTER
1	2	3

32. Some people prefer doing a job in pretty much the same way because this way they can count on always doing a good job. Others like to go out of their way in order to think up new ways of doing things. When it comes to planning for anti-terrorist response, how is it with your job?

ALWAYS PREFER SAME WAY	USUALLY PREFER SAME WAY	USUALLY PREFER DIFFERENT WAY	ALWAYS PREFER DIFFERENT WAY
1	2	3	4

33. How often do you get chances to try out, on your own, a better or faster way of doing something to plan for anti-terrorist response?

RARELY OR NEVER	EVERY FEW MONTHS	ABOUT ONCE PER MONTH	2-3 TIMES PER MONTH	ONCE PER WEEK OR MORE
1	2	3	4	5

34. How often do you get the chance to try out your own ideas concerning planning for anti-terrorist response, either before or after checking with your supervisor?

1	2	3	4	5

35. Has any form of agreement been established, either within your organization or among the organizations with which you cooperate, concerning activities to PREVENT terrorism?

NO	YES
0	1

36. If "yes," is this agreement internal or external to your organization?

INTERNAL	EXTERNAL
0	1

37. If "yes," to what extent have these prevention activities been:

	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT	VERY GREAT EXTENT
A. Explicitly verbalized and discussed?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Written down in policies, plans, procedures, or memoranda?	1	2	3	4	5
C. Established by legally binding contract?	1	2	3	4	5
D. Mandated by law?	1	2	3	4	5

38. Is there agreement among members of your organization's cooperating agencies concerning who has authority to respond to incidents of terrorism in your jurisdiction?

NO	YES
0	1

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39. If "yes," to what extent is the agreement:	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT	VERY GREAT EXTENT
A. Explicitly verbalized and discussed?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Written down in policies, plans, procedures or memoranda?	1	2	3	4	5
C. Established by legally binding contract?	1	2	3	4	5
D. Mandated by law?	1	2	3	4	5

40. Has any form of agreement been reached to define the individual position-- either by rank or position-- which is responsible for on-scene coordination of the anti-terrorist response?

NO	YES
0	1

41. If "yes," to what extent is this agreement:	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT	VERY GREAT EXTENT
A. Explicitly verbalized and discussed?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Written down in policies, plans, procedures or memoranda?	1	2	3	4	5
C. Established by legally binding contract?	1	2	3	4	5
D. Mandated by law?	1	2	3	4	5

42. Is this agreement internal or external to your organization?

INTERNAL	EXTERNAL
0	1

43. To what extent do you depend on each of the following people to obtain the materials, personnel, or information needed to do your work?	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT	VERY GREAT EXTENT
A. Other personnel within your unit:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Your unit supervisor:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Personnel from other divisions of your organization:	1	2	3	4	5
D. Personnel from other organizations:	1	2	3	4	5

44. How often does your job require that you check with the following people while doing your major tasks?					
A. Other personnel within your unit:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Your unit supervisor:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Personnel from other divisions of your organization:	1	2	3	4	5
D. Personnel from other organizations:	1	2	3	4	5

45. Has any form of agreement been established concerning the need to "test" operational plans by simulation, exercise, or other means prior to implementing the plan in actual anti-terrorist response?

NO	YES
0	1

46. If "yes," is this agreement internal or external to your organization?

INTERNAL	EXTERNAL
0	1

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	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT	VERY GREAT EXTENT
47. If "yes," to what extent has the agreement been:					
A. Explicitly verbalized and discussed?	1	2	3	4	5
B. written down in detailed policies, plans, procedures or rules	1	2	3	4	5
C. Legally binding or contractual?	1	2	3	4	5
D. Mandated by law?	1	2	3	4	5
48. To what extent are written rules and/or unwritten procedures established to coordinate your work with each of the following?					
A. People in other units in your division:	1	2	3	4	5
B. People in other divisions in your organization:	1	2	3	4	5
C. People in other organizations:	1	2	3	4	5
49. when you check with each of these people while doing your work, to what extent are the issues about which you are communicating:					
A. Mostly standard information matters?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Mostly old, recurring problems or mistakes?	1	2	3	4	5
C. Mostly new problems requiring novel solutions?	1	2	3	4	5

50. we realize that your activities may vary a great deal from day to day. However, during the past month, on the average, HOW MANY HOURS PER DAY did you NORMALLY spend in each of the following activities? (Your answers need not add up to eight hours).

A. Talking informally to people, taking coffee breaks, and taking care of personal matters (exclude lunch hour):

_____ (hours per day)

B. Coordinating work with other units in this division, discussing and solving work problems encountered with other units, performing office-wide projects and activities:

_____ (hours per day)

C. Coordinating work activities with people from other divisions of this organization, issuing reports, responding to directives, and working out issues with other division personnel:

_____ (hours per day)

D. Coordinating work activities with other organizations outside your organization, developing and maintaining cooperation with other organizations concerning anti-terrorist response, and working with the community concerning planning, prevention, or other non-direct tasks:

_____ (hours per day)

E. Providing direct service to the community:

_____ (hours per day)

PART SEVEN. This sections deals with your perceptions of the nature of your task in responding to terrorist events. Please use the reverse of this sheet to make any comments you may have concerning the topics covered by these questions. Please remember that we value your written comments as much as your responses to our specific questions.

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	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT	VERY GREAT EXTENT
51. To what extent is there a clearly known way to do the major types of work you normally do?	1	2	3	4	5
52. How easy is it for you to know whether you do your work correctly?	1	2	3	4	5
53. In the past six months, to what extent did difficult problems arise in your work for which there were no immediate or apparant solutions?	1	2	3	4	5
54. To what extent are you generally sure of what the outcome of your work efforts will be?	1	2	3	4	5

	NO TIME	LITTLE TIME	SOME TIME	GREAT DEAL OF TIME	VERY GREAT DEAL OF TIME
55. About how much time did you spend solving these work problems?	1	2	3	4	5

	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT	VERY GREAT EXTENT
56. How much the same are the day-to-day problems, situations, or issues you encounter in performing your major tasks?	1	2	3	4	5
57. To what extent are your tasks the same from day-to-day?	1	2	3	4	5

	ALMOST NEVER	SELDOM	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN
58. During a normal week, how frequently do exceptions arise in your work which require substantially different methods or procedures for doing the work?	1	2	3	4	5
59. How often do you follow about the same work methods or steps for doing your major tasks from day-to-day?	1	2	3	4	5

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE! If you would like, we will provide you with an executive summary of the completed research at no cost to you. If you would like an executive summary, please circle "yes" below. Thank you again for your cooperation.

NO	YES
0	1

APPENDIX B

SURVEY INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTED TO PERSONNEL OF ASSOCIATED AGENCIES

ASSOCIATED AGENCY QUESTIONNAIRE

PART ONE. This section deals with your perceptions of the degree of interaction you have with members of the Police Department. Please use the reverse side of this sheet to make any comments you may have concerning the topics covered by these questions. Please understand that we are very much interested in your written comments, as they are important indicators of your thoughts and feelings.

	NOT AT ALL	A LITTLE	SOME	QUITE A BIT	VERY MUCH
1. In order to attain your organization's goals in the field of anti-terrorist response, to what extent does your organization need the services resources, or other support from the Police Department?	1	2	3	4	5

2. For what services, resources, or support does your organization need the cooperation of the Police Department? (Please List).

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(Please use additional paper if necessary)

	NOT INFORMED	LITTLE INFORMED	SOMEWHAT INFORMED	QUITE INFORMED	VERY WELL INFORMED
3. How well informed are you about the specific goals and services that are provided by the Police Department which assist your organization in attaining established goals in the field of anti-terrorist response?	1	2	3	4	5

	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	MUCH EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT
4. To what extent does the Police Department participate in your planning efforts for anti-terrorist response?	1	2	3	4	5

	NOT ACQUAINTED	NOT VERY WELL	SOMEWHAT WELL	QUITE WELL	VERY WELL
5. How well are you personally acquainted with the contact persons in the Police Department?	1	2	3	4	5

6. To what extent do you and the contact persons with the Police Department agree on:

	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	MUCH EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT
A. The most important needs of organizations developing or providing anti-terrorist response services?	1	2	3	4	5
B. The general response policies which should be developed by organizations responding to terrorist events?	1	2	3	4	5
C. The specific goals and objectives of organizations responding to terrorist events?	1	2	3	4	5
D. The specific manner in which anti-terrorist services should be provided?	1	2	3	4	5

7. To what extent does your organization and the Police Department:

A. Obtain funding from the same sources?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Provide the same kind of anti-terrorist response services?	1	2	3	4	5

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7. (Continued) To what extent does your organization and the Police Department:

	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	MUCH EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT
C. Provide services to the same clients or communities?	1	2	3	4	5
D. Have the same kind of operating goals?	1	2	3	4	5
E. Have staff with the same kinds of professional skills and/or training?	1	2	3	4	5
F. Have the same types of operating procedures, policies, authority structures, and decision making processes?	1	2	3	4	5

PART TWO. This section deals with your perceptions of the frequency with which you interact with the Police Department. Please use the reverse side of this sheet to make any comments you might have concerning topics covered by this section. Your written comments are valued as much as your specific answers to these questions. Please feel free to add them.

8. How frequently were letters or written reports of any kind exchanged with the Police Department in the last six months?

0-- No or zero times during the past six months
1-- One time during the past six months
2-- Two times, or about every three months
3-- Three times, or about every two months
4-- About every month, or six times
5-- About every two weeks, or twelve times
6-- About every week, or 24 times
7-- About every 2-3 days
8-- About every day

9. How frequently were personal face-to-face discussions held with persons in the Police Department in the last six months?

0-- No or zero times during the past six months
1-- One time during the past six months
2-- Two times, or about every three months
3-- Three times, or about every two months
4-- About every month, or six times
5-- About every two weeks, or twelve times
6-- About every week, or 24 times
7-- About every 2-3 days
8-- About every day

10. How frequently were telephone calls made with persons from the Police Department during the last six months?

0-- No or zero times during the past six months
1-- One time during the past six months
2-- Two times, or about every three months
3-- Three times, or about every two months
4-- About every month, or six times
5-- About every two weeks, or twelve times
6-- About every week, or 24 times
7-- About every 2-3 days
8-- About every day

11. Is there a formal interagency committee or group which meets to discuss problems of mutual concern between your organization and the Police Department?

NO	YES
0	1

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12. If there is a formal interagency committe or group, how many times has it met in the last six months?

0-- No or zero times in the past six months
1-- One time during the past six months
2-- Two times, or about every three months
3-- Three times, or about every two months
4-- About every month, or six times
5-- About every two weeks, or twelve times
6-- About every week, or 24 times
7-- About every 2-3 days
8-- About every day

13. If there is a formal interagency committee or group, to what extent:

	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	MUCH EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT
A. Is this committee or group a permanent, standing committee?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Is this committee or group formalized with agendas, minutes, etc.?	1	2	3	4	5
C. Are the decisions made by this committee binding on your organization?	1	2	3	4	5

PART THREE. This section deals with your perceptions of the flow of resources between your organization and the Police Department. Please use the reverse side of this sheet to make any comments you may have concerning topics covered in this section. Please remember that your knowledge and experience are valuable to an understanding of the problem under study. We value your comments.

14. To what extent did persons from the Police Department receive each of the following resources or rewards for their involvement with your organization during the past six months?

	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	MUCH EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT
A. Money, grants, or other financial aid:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Use of your organization's staff:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Information referrals (intelligence reports, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5
D. Consultation or technical assistance:	1	2	3	4	5
E. Public visibility, goodwill, or prestige:	1	2	3	4	5
F. Attainment of specific goals or mandates:	1	2	3	4	5

15. To what extent did YOUR ORGANIZATION receive each of the following resources or rewards from the Police Department during the last six months?

A. Money, grants, or other financial aid:	1	2	3	4	5
B. Use of the Police Department's staff:	1	2	3	4	5
C. Information referrals (intelligence reports, etc.):	1	2	3	4	5
D. Conslutation or technical assistance:	1	2	3	4	5
E. Public visibility, goodwill, or prestige:	1	2	3	4	5
F. Attainment of specific goals or mandates:	1	2	3	4	5

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PART FOUR. This section deals with the degree of fomalization of the relationship between your organization and the Police Department. Please use the reverse of this sheet to make any comments you may have concerning topics covered in this section. Please remember that we value your written comments equally as much as we do your specific answers to these questions.

16. Has any form of agreement been established between your organization and the Police Department concerning the need to TEST operational plans by simulation, exercise, or other means prior to implementing the plan in actual anti-terrorist response?

NO	YES
0	1

17. If "yes," to what extent has the agreement been:	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	MUCH EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT
A. Explicitly verbalized and discussed?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Written down in detailed policies, plans, procedures, or rules?	1	2	3	4	5
C. Legally binding or contractual?	1	2	3	4	5
D. Mandated by law?	1	2	3	4	5

18. When you communicate with people from the Police Department while planning for or responding to terrorist events, to what extent are you communicating mainly about:

	NO EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	MUCH EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT
A. Mostly standard information matters?	1	2	3	4	5
B. Mostly old, recurring problems or mistakes?	1	2	3	4	5
C. Mostly new problems requiring novel solutions?	1	2	3	4	5

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE! If you would like, we will provide you with an executive summary of the completed research at no cost to you. If you would like to receive an executive summary, please circle "yes" below. Thank you again for your cooperation.

NO	YES
0	1

APPENDIX C

LIST OF RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED

APPENDIX C

LIST OF RESPONDENTS INTERVIEWED

"SOUTHEAST" POLICE DEPARTMENT

1. Former SWAT team leader
2. Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Police
3. Investigative supervisors (2)
4. Investigative officers (2)
5. Negotiations team members (2)
6. SWAT team members (2)

TOTAL INTERVIEWS: 10

"SOUTH" POLICE DEPARTMENT

1. SWAT team commander
2. SWAT team members (2)
3. Leader of negotiations team
4. Negotiations team members (3)
5. Investigations supervisor (2)
6. Investigative officers (2)
7. Intelligence officer

TOTAL INTERVIEWS: 12

"MIDWEST" POLICE DEPARTMENT

1. SWAT team leader
2. Intelligence unit commander
3. Intelligence unit officers (2)
4. Negotiations team members (2)
5. SWAT team members (2)
6. SWAT team supervisor (1)
7. Planning officer
8. Administrative assistant to Chief of Police

TOTAL INTERVIEWS: 11

"NORTHEAST" POLICE DEPARTMENT

1. SWAT team commander
2. SWAT team training officer
3. SWAT team member

TOTAL INTERVIEWS: 3

TOTAL DEPARTMENTAL INTERVIEWS: 36

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SELECTED PERSONNEL

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction to Interviewer

Law enforcement background

Anti-terrorist response background

Explanation of problem under study

Explanation of process and intent

Feedback from respondent

Clarification

DATA COLLECTION

Explanation of rationale for triangulation of qualitative, archival, and associated agency follow-up methods

Personal interviews

USE OF BOUNDARY SPANNING/INTERORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION

1.) Are there any outside organizations that are important in helping you respond to terrorist events?

If no: Why do you feel outside assistance is not needed?

If yes:

2.) Would you NAME these organizations

3.) Would you tell me the NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER of your major contact in each of these organizations?

4.) How important are these organizations to your ability to respond to terrorist events?

6.) Why are they important?

7.) How did you identify them as important?

8.) Are they included in your planning efforts? How?

9.) How frequently do you communicate with these organizations?

10. What is the usual method by which you communicate with these organizations?

11.) Are there any important EXTERNAL sources of information for your

organization in responding to terrorist events?

11a.) If no: Why is external information not needed?

If yes, then...

12. Would you tell me the NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER of your contact with each of these external sources of information?

13. How important to your ability to respond to terrorist events are these external sources of information?

14.) Why are they important?

15.) How did you identify them as important?

IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF INNOVATION

16.) When your organization develops a new method of planning for or responding to a terrorist event, would you say that the new method comes from within your organization or from outside your organization?

17.) Why?

18.) Have these methods usually been successful?

19.) Would you tell me about the development of one of these new methods?

IDENTIFYING PLANNING METHODOLOGIES

20.) What would you describe as your most successful technique in planning for anti-terrorist response?

21.) Why has this method been so successful?

22.) Has any kind of interagency committee or group been established to coordinate activities among your organization and other organziations which respond to terrorism?

If no, then...

22a.) Why was it felt that such a committee or group was not necessary?

If yes, then...

23.) Why was it felt such a committee or group was necessary?

24.) How frequently does this group meet

25.) To what extent are the decisions of this group binding on your department?

26.) How is this group organized?

27.) Do you have a method of testing your plans before implementation?

27a.) If no: Do you feel a need for such a process?

28.) If yes: Would you tell me how this method works?

29.) Is this method covered by written procedures?

30.) Who participates in this plans testing?

30a.) How was this method decided on over other methods?

31.) How often are external organizations included in your planning processes?

IDENTIFYING OTHER SALIENT NON-ROUTINE INCIDENTS AFFECTING INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY

32.) Are you aware of any significant, non-routine, crisis events which have occurred in the past few years which required your department to rely on external resources to handle the situation?

If no, then...

32a.) Has your response process changed significantly in the past few years?

32b.) Why do you think this is so?

If yes, then...

33.) What incidents or incident do you recall?

34.) How did it affect your department?

35.) Do you think it had a lasting effect on the way you plan?

36.) Why?

PERCEIVED NEED FOR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

37.) Would you recommend any improvement in the way your organization plans for anti-terrorist response?

37a.) If no: Why do you feel changes are not necessary?

If yes, then...

38.) Why do you feel changes are necessary?

39.) What changes do you feel are necessary?

40.) How do you see these changes as helpful?

REQUEST FOR ARCHIVAL DATA

41.) Are you aware of any written policies, plans, procedures, memoranda, or other such documents that directly address the terrorist response activities of your organization?

42.) Would you let me see those documents?

CLOSING

43.) Do you have anything you would like to add that you think is important?

Offer to share results

APPENDIX E

CODING SHEET FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW DATA

APPENDIX E

CODING SHEET FOR INTERVIEW DATA

**TYPES OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS IMPORTANT:

LOCAL [] INTERNAL FEDERAL [] EXTERNAL FEDERAL []

**HOW IMPORTANT?

NONE [] LITTLE [] SOME [] VERY []

**WHY IMPORTANT?

RESOURCES, EQUIPMENT ETC. [] INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE [] COOPERATION, TRAINING, PLANNING []

**FREQUENCY OF COMMUNICATION?

VERY INFREQUENT [] INFREQUENT [] SOMEWHAT FREQUENT [] FREQUENT [] VERY FREQUENT []

**TYPES OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS IMPORTANT AS SOURCES OF INFORMATION

LOCAL [] INTERNAL FEDRAL [] EXTERNAL FEDERAL []

**HOW IMPORTANT?

NONE [] LITTLE [] SOME [] VERY []

**SOURCE OF INNOVATION

INTERNAL [] 50/50 [] EXTERNAL []

**METHODS SUCCESSFUL?

NEVER [] SOMETIMES [] USUALLY [] ALWAYS []

**MOST SUCCESSFUL PLANNING METHOD

CONTINGENCY [] AT SCENE PLANNING [] TRAINING [] STRATEGIC SIMULATION []

**INTERAGENCY PLANNING GROUP?
NO [] YES []

**FREQUENCY OF GROUP MEETINGS?

VERY INFREQUENT [] INFREQUENT [] SOMEWHAT FREQUENT []
FREQUENT [] VERY FREQUENT []

**DECISIONS BINDING ON DEPARTMENT?

NEVER [] SOMETIMES [] USUALLY [] ALWAYS []

**METHOD OF PLANS TESTING?

NONE [] MOSTLY NON-SIMULATION [] MOSTLY SIMULATION []

**WHO PARTICIPATES IN PLANNING

INTERNAL [] INTERNAL/EXTERNAL []

**FREQUENCY OF INCLUSION OF EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PLANNING

NEVER [] SOMETIMES [] USUALLY [] ALWAYS []

**AWARE OF SIGNIFICANT, NON-ROUTINE CRISIS EVENT REQUIRING EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE?

NO [] YES[]

**RESPONSE PROCESS CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY?

NO [] YES []

**RECOMMEND ANY IMPROVEMENT IN PLANNING PROCESS?

NO [] YES []

APPENDIX F

RESPONSE SHEET

REPORT OF RESEARCH RESULTS

RESPONSE SHEET

REPORT OF RESEARCH RESULTS

DIRECTIONS: Each of the conclusions developed with the attached report deals with our perception of the data collected in your department and three others. In order to insure that the conclusions and recommendations developed during the course of this research are valid, we would like your opinion on each. Each of the below questions corresponds to a conclusion or recommendation included in the executive summary. Would you please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the conclusions and recommendations made in the executive summary? Please circle the response which matches your feelings concerning the corresponding conclusion or recommendation. When you have finished marking your responses, please mail them back to us in the attached envelope. YOUR DEPARTMENT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE AN EXPERIENCED ORGANIZATION IN RESPONDING TO EVENTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. Thank you for your help in this research project.

SECTION ONE: PRELIMINARY INFORMATION

(Please Check the Applicable Section)

Departmental Position

[] Administrative (Lieutenant or Above)
[] Supervisory
[] Negotiator
[] Technical (Response Team Officer, Technician, etc.)

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

SECTION TWO: CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion One A:

Personnel with experienced organizations tend to communicate less with local agencies, and more with federal-level agencies than do personnel with non-experienced organizations. (See Table One).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion One B:

Personnel with experienced organizations tend to communicate more for information and less for assistance in terms of resources, manpower, or material than do personnel with non-experienced organizations. (See Table Two).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion One C:

Personnel with experienced organizations tend to communicate more frequently with individuals from external organizations than do personnel with non-experienced organizations. (See Table Three).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Two A:

Identification of external information sources, in experienced organizations, is not usually part of the official "job description" of the individuals who identify these sources.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Two B:

Identification of external information sources in experienced organizations is not usually identified as "planning" by the administration of the organization.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Two C:

Identification of external information sources, in experienced organizations, is a process that "just happens," and is not officially planned.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE

1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Three A:

Personnel from experienced organizations tend to view planning as a process which identifies types of threats, and then builds capability to handle those threats through processes of training and simulation. (See Table Four).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Three B:

Personnel from non-experienced organizations tend to view planning as a process which identifies types of threats by location and then plans to respond to specific threats at specific locations by acquiring blueprints, plans, etc. for those locations, and through training and simulating events at those locations.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Three C:

Contingency planning-- planning for response to a specific threat at a specific location-- is universally avoided by experienced organizations. (See Table Four).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Four A:

Neither experienced nor non-experienced organizations use simulation specifically as a method of identifying important contacts in external organizations.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Four B:

Neither experienced nor non-experienced organizations use simulation specifically as a "planning method" to include external organizations in the department's planning processes.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Five A:

Planning to personnel involved in response for non-experienced organizations tends to focus on problems of obtaining assistance from utility companies, fire-rescue units, local psychiatric hospitals, etc. (See Table Five).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Five B:

Planning to personnel involved in response for experienced organizations tends to focus on problems of identifying capabilities of information acquisition and processing concerning the terrorist threat, focusing particularly on federal-level organizations for information concerning the terrorist threat. (See Table Six).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Five C:

Experienced organizations tend to include external organiztions in the planning process more frequently than do non-experienced organizations. (See Table Eight).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Five D:

Personnel from experienced organizations tend to perceive a need for improvement in planning processes more frequently than do personnel from non-experienced organizations. (See Table Nine).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Six A:

Processes of damage control, containment, site security, perimeter control, and assault techniques are well planned and implemented at both experienced and non-experienced organizations.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Six B:

Internal organizational communications, command, and control processes are well managed at both experienced and non-experienced organizations.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Seven A:

Negotations, investigation, and intelligence functions among experienced organizations tend to include both local and federal-level factors, including an awareness on the part of personnel with experienced organizations of the "international" aspects of terrorism. (See Tables One and Seven).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Seven B:

Negotiations, investigation, and intelligence functions among non-experienced organizations tend to include mainly local factors, tending to exclude an awareness of the "international" aspects of terrorism. (See Tables One and Seven).

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Eight A:

Relations with external information sources tend not to be formal, but rather tend to be mostly an informal process.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Eight B:

Acquisition of external information concerning terrorist threats tends to be accomplished more through informal relations than through formal written reports.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Conclusion Eight C:

Simulation and training for anti-terrorist response tend not to be recognized as formal planning processes designed to identify critical external organizational contacts.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

SECTION THREE: RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation One:

The use of contingency planning, particularly that of identifying potential trouble sites and developing response plans for those locations, should be replaced with a method of strategically oriented planning which will identify critical interorganizational connections, and will ensure creation, maintenance, and use of those connections to foster information transfer.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Recommendation Two:

The use of well-planned simulations to aid in the identification of these interorganizational connections should supplement the use of simulation as a method of training for capability building.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Recommendation Three:

The creation, maintenance, and use of interorganizational connections should be recognized as part of the official duties of the selected individuals who do such work, and should become part of the institutionalized management processes of organizations involved in anti-terrorist response.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Recommendation Four:

The use of simulation to provide non-lethal equivalents of the organizational, informational, and resource problesm confronted by organizations engaged in anti-terrorist response should be practiced, so that strategic adaptation can correctly align the organization to the turbulence to be expected during a terrorist event.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Recommendation Five:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's leadership function in the field of anti-terrorist response should be used to shape the attitudes, strategies, and philosophy of anti-terrorist response in the United States, particularly among the chief administrators of involved police departments.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

Recommendation Six:

Simulation as a planning methodology, which involves both organizations indirectly and

directly concerned with anti-terrorist response, should be implemented as a formalized method of planning for anti-terrorist response.

STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	UNSURE	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE
1	2	3	4	5

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[29]John C. Camillus, "Reconciling Logical Incrementalism and Synoptic Formalism-- An Integrated Approach to Designing Strategic Planning Processes," Strategic Management Journal 3 (July-September) : 277-283.

[30]Ibid. p., 279.

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