

From Display of Force to Normalization:
Exploring the Transformation of Power in China

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Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
In
Political Science

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February 8, 2012
Blacksburg, VA

Keywords: China, Foucault, Uyghurs, Tibetans

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ABSTRACT

In the period since Tiananmen the People's Republic of China has deployed new controlling mechanisms in society to better integrate minorities. These mechanisms of control are more subtle and use elements of discipline, panopticism, and bio-power; rather than the spectacle of power associated with sovereigns and gristly punishment. This study uses Foucault to analyze the transition that seems to be occurring in China, in order to show that it should no longer be viewed singularly as an authoritarian power that uses force to control its population. To do this two groups are analyzed, the Uyghur people of Xinjiang, and the Tibetan people. Within each case this thesis explores the development of disciplinarity in the educational system, panopticism and its deployment in religion, and bio-power in birthing and migratory policies. Upon analysis, it is argued that China must be viewed as an authoritarian state that has adopted subtle methods of control, like those found in Western liberal democratic states. Because of this the international community must adapt their views of China in order to better understand how minorities are integrated into Han culture in more highly developed ways.

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ACRONYM LIST

PRC- People's Republic of China

CCP- Chinese Communist Party

PLA- People's Liberation Army

XUAR- Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

TAR- Tibetan Autonomous Region

MOE- Ministry of Education

SARA- State Administration of Religion Affairs

RAB- Religious Affairs Bureau

RRA- Regulations of Religious Affairs

WUC- World Uyghur Congress

CTA- Central Tibetan Authority

CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION

Introduction

China's cultural ethos regards its history and culture highly; a fact reflected by its name in Chinese: Zhōngguó. In Chinese this means 'Middle Country,' which corresponds to ancient beliefs with the simplified characters, 中国, symbolizing the country as the middle kingdom¹. The symbolism of these characters, and the mentality of the Chinese, denotes the belief that the culture of China is historically at the pinnacle of what other cultures aspire to. Under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), this ethos became the foundation for the widespread government policy to Scinify ethnic minorities. While "Chinese nationality (*Zhonghua minzu*) can refer to both a singular ethnic entity of an overarching and unified Chinese nationality," the usage of "xiongdi minzu" (minority people) carries with it a paternalistic view of these groups (Chen 2008, 1). Indeed, China's history is rife with examples of how "Han people historically regard[ed] ethnic minorities [and] 'peripheral peoples as children,' which implies that minorities are socially and economically inferior" (Chen 2008, 3). Current policies reflect this mindset and a desire by the Han Chinese government to assimilate minorities into their society. While the state uses some of the same techniques on the Han populace, this study focuses on the Uyghur and the Tibetan people, and analyzes how the Chinese government tailored controlling mechanisms specifically for minorities.

My thesis explores how the People's Republic of China endeavors to integrate ethnic minorities into the Han Chinese culture. China has undergone two major economic transitions since 1978. In the first period, from 1978 into the mid-1980s, China liberalized its economy and social and political mechanisms of control to allow more freedom. This ultimately led to political strife at the end of the 1980s, leading to the Tiananmen Square incident. The year 1989 was a crucial point in Chinese political history as the country entered another period of transformation: political freedom decreased as the economy opened. At the same time, the techniques through which the Government exerted control on populations changed. I will use Foucault to analyze the

¹ Between heaven and the underworld.

shift in power relations between minority groups and the CCP in this thesis and to understand how new modalities of power have been crafted to pursue political motives. My findings indicate the Communist government relied less on coercive methods to control minorities and began to develop and intensify what Michel Foucault called disciplinary and bio-political techniques of control in order to assimilate non-Han ethnic groups into society. Although there appear to have been some attempts to integrate minorities prior to this time, there did not seem to be a concerted effort to apply policies broadly: it appears that the idea of the government applying broad minority-integration methods became more popular in the early 1990s. Some policies, like integrating minorities by educating them in boarding schools, were present before the Eighties; but I intend to demonstrate in Chapters 3 and 4 that in the past 25 years the Communist Party increased its efforts to diversify and enact numerous new policies which intensified the State's avenues for control.

I argue that this shift is due to increasing scrutiny from the human rights groups of the international community as the Chinese government attempts to integrate into the world economy. The use of force against minorities is still present, as was evident in the government's response to the Tibetan Uprising protests in 2008 and the Xinjiang riots of the Uyghurs in 2009. Despite these instances, it appears that the Chinese government's efforts to control the population in the last two decades have expanded to include less violent, more sophisticated means. The current goal of the state is integration: to "welcome" minorities into the Han community and encourage them to assimilate into the mainstream culture, often through government programs that operate in apparently innocuous ways.

Foucault analyzed the transformations of power in Classical Europe from "punishment as spectacle" into disciplinarity and bio-politics. His conceptual framework forms the foundation for my analysis of the Han Chinese government and how it integrates the Uyghur and Tibetan people. I rely on Foucault's theoretical analysis of the transformation of modalities of power in classical Europe to analyze the transformation of modalities of power in China since Tiananmen:

Foucault advances the need to engage the elementary specifics of how power is exercised at the precise and localized individual levels of particular institutional interfaces; he prioritizes as such the specifics of

how power is ‘interacted’ between subjects and institutions [to] analyze the states’ use of bio-politics, i.e. the control of movement and lifecycles of the body; disciplinarity, i.e. the process of molding and creating new behaviors and attitudes in people; and panopticism, i.e. a schema of continuous surveillance aimed at fostering the internalization of discipline (Hook 2007, 64).

I use Hook’s descriptions of bio-politics, disciplinarity, and panopticism in Foucault’s model to explore the People’s Republic of China’s strategies of minority integration in Tibet and Xinjiang.

For Foucault, power is “above all, a *relation of force*, maneuvering in multiple and often less than predictable ways... rather than being held, possessed, exchanged, given- existing as a potentially static entity- power may find form only as something that is *exercised*” (Hook 2007, 65). This study focuses on the deployment of mechanisms of power and how these mechanisms attempt to control the lives of minorities. Barry Hindess points out, “what matters in the study of governmental power is not so much the state itself, considered as a more or less unified set of instrumentalities, but rather the broader strategies of government within which the instrumentalities of the state are incorporated and deployed” (Hindess 1996, 109).

Foucault studied Europe in a transitory phase where states, ruled by powerful sovereigns, became liberal modern democracies. China is a one-party state, ruled by the CCP, and historically responds violently to opposition within its borders.² The CCP does continue to rule as an authoritarian power that puts the progress of the state above personal liberties and remains willing to crack down on demonstrations, protests, and free speech to maintain order and profits, but China has also now mimicked the governments of classical Europe – and even modern day states of the West— as it moved away from the ‘gallows’ as a way to control citizens; and instead put in place disciplinary institutions. Like European states, China attempts to produce docile citizens who would be productive members of society; so Foucault is applicable to analyzing how China’s modalities of control have evolved because PRC policies parallel those Foucault observed in Europe.

² This is in reference to China since the 1940s, following the Republican Era and the Chinese Civil War. For more on this, see Edwin Moise, *Modern China: A History*.

The techniques of control in China have transitioned in similar ways to the governments Foucault studied; but even as China evolved its government remained authoritarian, unlike the governments of the West that became democratic states. In Classical Europe, the process that took place involved the transformation from a state power based on display of force, into one relying on the deployment of an array of mechanisms aimed at knowing, controlling, and “normalizing” populations. Foucault describes this shift as follows: “the physical confrontation between the sovereign and the condemned man must end; this... fight between the vengeance of the prince and the contained anger of the people, through the mediation of the victim and the executioner, must be concluded” (Foucault 1995, 73).

China used the police, military, and Party organizations like the Red Guard extensively to maintain order. These units of state power used violence to keep all the people of China in line –especially minorities – in the same way a sovereign would.³ But as the country evolved, the techniques used to maintain order evolved as well, as both China and Western States began to:

Shift the object and change the scale. [They] define new tactics in order to reach a target that is now more subtle but also more widely spread in the social body... [to punish] new principles for regularizing, refining, universalizing the art of punishing. Homogenize its application (Foucault 1995, 89).

But the state’s transformation went past punishment: it adopted new ways to control the population through discipline. China coupled the unlimited power of the sovereign to exert unlimited power with modern governmental techniques based on disciplinary and bio-power; and the state began to shape its techniques as though subjects of power could be ‘re-made.’ As the state targeted the body, in both China and the West, “what was being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour” (Foucault 1995, 138).⁴

³ For more information, consult Chapter 8 in Edwin Moise’s, *Modern China: A History*, pages 165 to 186. This details the violent upheaval during the Cultural Revolution, which included the use of violence by Red Guard brigades who were expected to ‘fight’ the remnants of imperial China. The government was complicit in this, and allowed many people to be subject to brutal punishment for a variety of crimes many did not commit.

⁴ It is critical to remember that, as Foucault explained, power was not wholly repressive. Rather power could be productive in nature. For native Han Chinese, this means disciplines can manipulate them into

Question and Hypothesis

My goal in this thesis is to answer the following question:

What are the modalities of power used by the Han Chinese government to control dissident minority groups and how did these modalities change over time? My work will attempt to describe the transformation of these modalities.

I hypothesize that the Chinese government refined its techniques for controlling these minorities by shifting from the display of massive force to more knowledge intensive modalities of control and integration in order to efficiently manage minority groups in China and to decrease the visibility of these policies in order to avoid additional scrutiny from the international community.

I will examine PRC modalities of integration by analyzing the policies directed at two groups: the Uyghurs and the Tibetans. I will document the ongoing transformation from the power of the spectacle toward intensification of disciplinarity in both education and religion, and of bio-power in the forced migration of minorities' movements. I will show that PRC policies parallel those Foucault observed in Europe, although the CCP still uses powerful displays of force when necessary to bring unruly protestors in line.

Methodology

This thesis focuses on China's attempts, since roughly 1990, to integrate minorities into Han culture by using subtle mechanisms of control like discipline, panopticism, and biopower. To do this I study two groups: Uyghurs and Tibetans. I will explore the use of discipline in schools in China, where minorities have three options for schooling: boarding schools, local schools, and minority schools;⁵ I outline the states use of panopticism to reshape Islam and Buddhism in Xinjiang and Tibet; and I also discuss the states use of bio-power through birthing policies for rural Uyghurs, and migration

becoming more 'productive' members of society. For minorities, mechanisms of control can actually create 'new' people in the sense that they are not just productive, like the Han, but rather they have been molded by the state to a point in which a new identity has been produced. This can help minorities function better in Han society; however it also can lead to a debate between those believing it is in their best interest to conform, and those who might say it is wrong to reshape minority identity.

This is part of a larger discussion trying to understand the relationship between the community of the state and the politics of local identity in a globalized world; and how government policies can reshape identity (for which this paper tries to address an authoritarian government's attempts to integrate minorities with disciplines that are productive in nature, e.g. in the case of schooling).

⁵ The differences, and options in terms of choice, are outlined briefly in Chapter 3 prior to the discussion on Uyghur students.

policies in Tibet and Xinjiang and the PRC's movement and relocation of minorities. I will take an extensive look into how Uyghur and Tibetan society has been changed due to these policies, and explain some of the reaction to them. I will also demonstrate that China has not applied these policies as the only means of control because they still use force to bring in line unrest; and I attempt to show that this is because the nation is in transition.

I have chosen the Uyghur people of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibetans of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) because of their similarities and in order to better show that CCP policies are broadly applicable to minority groups and ensure that evidence can be compared (rather than being anecdotal references to a single group). These two groups are two of the largest minority groups in the country⁶ which makes controlling their behavior a high priority for the Chinese government. The groups' homelands are remote and historically hotbeds for unrest, but also are rich in natural resources, which make the regions valuable for industry.⁷ Another similarity is the visibility of their independence movements. While international notoriety often falls upon the Tibetan government-in-exile, the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) and its former political leader the Dali Lama, Rebiya Kadeer is influential as the leader and voice of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). The PRC deemed both organizations and their leadership as threats since Tiananmen because international visibility of both ethnic groups rose. In the period surrounding Tiananmen, unrest grew in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and the Tibetan Autonomous Region; and the CCP response in the early 1990s was swift. At that time the PRC created policies focused on ending influences considered dangerous.

These two groups also make up the largest number of minority students in Chinese boarding schools. When analyzing Uyghur students in Chinese boarding schools, Yangbin Chen examined the influences of ethnic integration and policy. Chen understood the complex relationship as such:

⁶ Additionally, their cultures are very dissimilar to Han Chinese culture

⁷ Discussion on this is found in Bernát Péter's study, *The Uyghur Question and what is behind it?*; and in the most recent U.S. Congressional Report on China.

If the dominant social group declares ethnic integration to be a societal goal, then it will also develop programs for both the superordinate and the subordinate groups to follow in order for the goal of ethnic integration to be achieved... the definition implies some key points for ethnic integration: Firstly, the superordinate group decides what its goal is. Secondly, ethnic integration governs relations between superordinate and subordinate groups. Thirdly, the achievement of the goal of ethnic integration is a developing process, not a static status. Fourthly... the subordinated ethnic group may be forced, or at least persuaded, to follow a path of compliance, a path towards which they may not hold a positive attitude (Chen 2008, 19).

Chinese history, from the past twenty years, contains elements of these steps: throughout this study I discuss State goals for assimilating minorities led to the development of new mechanisms which seek to reshape minority groups and what the expectations are of the State. I will show how some of these policies, implemented since the late 1980s, have been received negatively by minorities and what their response is to them. I use this method in order to understand how the superordinate group (the Chinese) attempts to achieve ethnic integration for the subordinate groups (Uyghurs and Tibetans) using a broad array of government policies. I specifically focus on what the Chinese are doing to integrate minorities⁸ and to shape a new perspective, I use Foucault to analyze the mechanisms of control.

Susette Cooke used governmentality, “the Foucauldian concept defining government as ‘the conduct of conduct’ and so a form of activity aiming to ‘shape, guide or affect’ the conduct of a population within a particular sociopolitical body,” as the “framework for examining the governmental activity called religious work” in China (Cooke 2009, 127). I too will use Foucauldian concepts; this time bio-power, discipline, and panopticism to understand how these methods shape religion, education, migration and birthing policies of minorities. Cooke noted that China’s views towards religion are “embedded in an array of agencies and institutions that aim to shape or reshape the conduct of China’s religious citizens,” and I use some of these agencies and institutions in my analysis of minority religions to discover the broader set of institutions of control in China. I use a similar framework to Cooke’s, because of our shared reliance on

⁸ Although some State controls of minorities resemble those on the Han people I am concerned solely with how the State’s mechanisms of control evolve to transform minorities’ identities.

Foucault, but my study is broader to better understand the controlling mechanisms of the State beyond their use for religion, and then I try to understand how they develop these mechanisms throughout the country. I apply this framework not to all of China but specifically to the Tibetan and Uyghur groups.

Due to the nature of this study, and the nature of the struggle between the Uyghurs and Tibetans with an authoritarian state, there is the potential for bias in the materials I use. To eliminate potential bias I use the “bilateral perspective” detailed by Yangbin Chen in his work, which explains: the “intervening variables of ethnic integration should be contextualized against its specific background,” so I look at each situation in its own context while incorporating “the point of view of the ethnic majority and the ethnic minority groups” (Chen 2008, 20). To do this, I incorporate statements by Chinese officials in my discussion, along with material from sources representing the minority groups.

To obtain evidence for my case studies I used literature on migration, education, and religion in China. I primarily analyzed secondary sources: academic literature from peer reviewed publications, government reports from the U.S. Department of State, and some personal accounts of expatriates and individuals writing from within China. There is always the potential for bias in the materials I use, which is why I use the most objective evidence and attempt to present both sides. For example, I am limited to source material written in English because I have only an elementary understanding of Chinese and no skills using the native languages of the Uyghur or Tibetan people. To elaborate on the official Chinese government position, I use statements gathered by the U.S. Congressional Commission on China and published in their annual reports. While there are political reasons the Commission publishes their report, they also use a number of scholars from accredited and respected universities; as well as direct translations of Chinese government releases and statements. This helps ensure that what is included in this thesis is balanced; and helps me present the CCP’s perspective. In addition, I use secondary sources that include excerpts of the Chinese Constitution, as well as official positions and declarations made by agencies within China. In addition, while I am aware that official statements and materials from the World Uyghur Congress and Central Tibetan Authority are biased for obvious reasons, but I include official releases and

statements from them in order to present their views. By using numerous sources to corroborate facts and include both positions, I use the ‘bilateral perspective’ discussed in Yangbin Chen’s study to proceed objectively and reduce the potential for bias.

Historical Background – Tiananmen

Both Xinjiang and Tibet were historically independent regions prior to Chinese rule in the past century. Policies in both provinces (deemed “autonomous” by the central government) have fluctuated between very controlling to relaxed, depending on who controlled the CCP. The international community influenced policy swings within the country—by using political and economic sanctions—since Tiananmen. I will briefly discuss the history of Tiananmen and the provinces and elaborate on the cases central to this thesis before discussing the modalities of control used in Chapters 3 and 4 to analyze the two regions. The demonstrations in Tiananmen Square were a climactic event in China’s history because they came at a time when the country was changing rapidly. While the State’s use of force continued following the incident, China faced international pressure to reform in the aftermath.

In 1989 economic success was building thanks to government reforms starting in 1978. These instituted ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,’ which liberalized the economy by moving people off collectivized farms and setting up special economic zones where capitalism and the free market began to thrive. At the same time political reforms allowed greater personal freedom and freedom of expression. Among the poorest of the poor (which included students) some remained dissatisfied with the government. In April 1989 thousands of students appeared in Tiananmen Square to demonstrate and call for reforms following the death of Hu Yaobang, a prominent liberal in the CCP (Moise 1994, 216-23). Groups of students seized the moment in order to celebrate his life and demonstrate against the punishment (his forced resignation and public self-criticisms) that was handed to Hu only two years previously for being too ‘soft’ on the pro-democracy movement. By the end of April and into May, the demonstration in Tiananmen became extraordinarily popular among students and quickly blossomed into a national movement; but the movement lost steam by the end of May as most students began to leave in the second month. Embarrassed by their failure to control the protests, which coincided with a visit from Mikhail Gorbachev, the Party sent in troops to restore

order. Reluctant to let remaining protestors walk away freely, the Party deployed the military and authorized the use of force. In the ensuing clash between protestors and the military, now known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre, many protestors were killed: later estimates put the number killed at between 700 and 3,000 protestors.

As expected, the international community expressed outrage at “the suppression of the democracy movement” and a number of countries agreed on “punitive measures, including cutting off loans from governments and from the World Bank” (Moise 1994, 227). The Party reacted domestically by purging liberal elements; in “secret Document Number 10, the Party specified the target areas as central government and Party organizations, universities and colleges... and official institutes engaged in literary or other artistic pursuits” (Miles 1996, 27). In addition the Party responded to the unrest of minority students around the country who used the protests to call for independence. At the time of the protests, minorities made up a meager 10 percent of the population, yet occupied “half the country’s total land area” (Miles 1999, 70). Following Tiananmen, Deng Xiaoping satisfied conservative elements in the CCP by targeting several sources of the unrest, including schools. Since the early 1990s the state developed new ways of assimilating minorities, attempting to intensify subtle controlling mechanisms used previously, and focused on a broader integration program.

Policy

To better control the Tibetans and Uyghurs, the CCP recognized that it needed policies to bring minorities from the fringes of society and incorporate them into Han culture; and to this end it seems to recognize that policy is like a hammer:

We pick up the hammer and use it to drive in a nail. As long as it does what we want, we do not think much about the hammer. Its “being” as a hammer-and our relation to it-comes to the fore only when it does not do what we want it to do (Ransom, Foucault’s Discipline, 4).

Like hammers, government policies are not entirely precise instruments. When a hammer, or policy, is “a tool that is ready to use, one that fits seamlessly and without interruption into the uses we have assigned to it, is not noticed,” but when there is a disconnect with society and the innocuous policy meets the displeasure of the public⁹

⁹ For example, if a policy becomes a rallying point for protests.

then it becomes instantly visible, which completely undermines how it is meant to be used (Ransom, Foucault's Discipline, 4). This means that often the most efficient policies are those that are subtle and enforce change unnoticed.

The international community perceives overtly coercive domestic policies aimed at assimilating minorities negatively; China's policies reflect an understanding that oppressive regulations could cause scrutiny, hindering continued prosperity. Policies that create less unrest and silently assimilate minorities lead to less scrutiny and instability from the international community. I argue that these policies are more efficient because they lead to greater stability as they coerce minorities to blend in with mainstream society. For example, the PRC adopted religious policies which mirror those of France, a western liberal state, one which was the focus of Foucault's studies:

When the party-state guarantees citizens freedom of religion, it adopts much the same political philosophy that French public policy holds..." which allows the freedom of religion so long as any "religious practice should recognize the principles of French public political order, i.e. 'sacred secular ideas'..... particularistic interests in and practices of one's own culture is structured or 'disciplined' through a state political engagement in the form of public associations in the sense that the interests and practices would otherwise impair the liberty of others if an official sanction is absent. As a result, the political structure will impose its priority over cultural interests when there is a conflict (Yi 2005, 22-23).

In their attempts to prevent international pressure, they have created policies which mimic Western states. Policies, created to aid assimilation, place the State above religion whenever there is a conflict, meaning the State places its demands above minorities' culture as it expects obedience to the law. This creates a climate that encourages conformity, which then aids progress since the lack of unrest and elevation of social cohesion is 'good for business.' China now attempts to imitate Western states because the CCP appears to recognize that disciplinarity – present in liberal states – is an effective tool for nations in attempting to control their populations without force. At the same time, this prevents the West from increasingly scrutinizing Chinese government programs.

The next chapter overviews Foucault's analysis of "power as spectacle" and its transition to different forms of control, including bio-power, disciplinarity, and

panopticism; and Chapters 3 and 4 outline cases which reveal parallels between classical Europe and present day China.

CHAPTER 2- THEORY

Introducing Foucault

Mechanisms of control, adopted by China's government to integrate minority groups deemed dangerous or threatening to Han society, are very similar the methods of controlling unruly masses that—according to Foucault—emerged in classical Europe: both employ subtle means of coercion, such as disciplinarity, bio-politics and panopticism. I will first discuss the concept of the spectacle of power, and then describe bio-power, disciplinarity, and panopticism. This chapter will serve as a reference for the two cases (Chapters 3 and 4 on Tibet and Xinjiang, respectively) and outline the theoretical background I employ to develop my argument that China is transitioning its methods of control and that its policy no longer is modeled after traditional forms of autocratic and authoritarian power, but has now adopted a variety of disciplinary, bio-political, and panoptic mechanisms of control.

Spectacle of Power

Foucault wrote that, in classical Europe, the power to punish criminals lay in the hands of sovereigns, who used violent public displays to reassert control and punish offenders; authority known as the power of spectacle. It was not enough to punish the individual, it was necessary to have the criminal on display in full view of the public to show the revenge of the king. This made punishment, such as the public execution of a criminal, more than just a judicial ritual; it was a political one belonging “to the ceremonies by which power is manifested” (Foucault 1995, 47). The ‘spectacle’ of public punishment was a display that affects not only the individual being punished but those watching as well. The visibility of the punishment was “a highly violent and demonstrative form of power, a type of physical retribution acted out on the body of the criminal and staged for the public at large;” it was something that was meant to be seen (Hook 2007, 9). The visibility is political because it reinforces the position of the sovereign, it was “ritualized... as a political operation... inscribed in a system of punishment, in which the sovereign, directly or indirectly, demanded, decided and carried out punishments, in so far as it was he who, through the law, had been injured by the crime” (Foucault 1995, 53). The Chinese have a similar history of using overt displays of physical power by the military, police, and Party organizations in Xinjiang and Tibet.

The spectacle was meant to show people, “with their own eyes... because they must be made to be afraid; but also because they must be the witnesses;” people would develop a fear of the public punishment (Foucault 1995, 48). The logic of the system was a calculated one: it is meant to mark the criminal and to purge the crime, deterring spectators from violating the law of the land; the “public execution did not re-establish justice; it reactivated power” (Foucault 1995, 49). The political logic dictated that, even if the offense did not require torture or heinous punishment, the retribution must be public and create a theater where there can be a display of power so that it could reestablish the relationship between the sovereign and the body of the offender. The power to punish remained the privilege of the sovereign, it demonstrated his infinite might over his subjects’ bodies, “to punish belongs to ‘that absolute power of life and death’...” while restoring his position politically (Foucault 1995, 48). The spectacles were intended to instill a “ceremonial of triumph” over the criminal (Foucault 1995, 51).

However, this deterrent, the public spectacle, was inherently inefficient. Over time it proved to be limited in its reach: it was a “discontinuous and performative type of power” and required constant repetition of the ceremony (Hook 2007, 9). In some cases the illegal offenses did not result in the public punishment, so the ‘circle’ of punishment was incomplete (Hook 2007, 9). Furthermore, despite being a political ritual, “subjects are... only infrequently ‘brought into power’, and only by virtue of a discontinuous set of moments and actions” and “activated relations of force cannot be assured” (Hook 2007, 10). In a large country or territory, the sovereign may ‘punish’, but it would not always have the effect intended since the visibility of punishment was swift and localized.

Furthermore, Foucault wrote that “in these executions... there was a whole aspect of the carnival, in which rules were inverted, authority mocked and criminals transformed into heroes” (Foucault 1995, 50). If the spectators viewed the punishment as unjust, the public spectacle had the potential to turn people against the king; and turn criminals into martyrs. There was a constant possibility the crowds could feel the sovereign overstepped his power and “could express its rejection of the punitive power and... revolt” (Foucault 1995, 59). A single crime, or act against the king, brought to the public’s attention through the punishment (meant to reinforce the power of the sovereign) could actually have the opposite effect and “could easily lead to the beginnings of social disturbances”

(Foucault 1995, 61).¹⁰ This type of display was woefully inefficient and could actually create larger problems than it attempted to solve. Because of this, Foucault noted, states began to transition to more disciplinary and bio-political forms of control.

I argue that in China a similar change took place. John Pomfret, a journalist who studied in China in 1981 as an exchange student at Nanjing University, recounted the story of one of his classmates in his book *Chinese Lessons*. In the story, Zhou Lianchun and members of his Red Guard team beat an old man accused of once being a landlord in September of 1966. Fearing further torture the man killed himself. To punish him further the guards instructed his sons to chop the body into three pieces, and put it in the pigpens after parading around the village; failure to do so would have resulted in them being labeled “evil spawn of the feudal class”(Pomfret 2006, 22). This vignette illustrates a time in China’s Communist history when punishment carried out on behalf of the Party (in lieu of a ‘sovereign’) was both brutal and public. This was a technique to control the masses, both Han and minority alike, by instilling fear of violence through a brutal and public spectacle. Episodes like this, from the Cultural Revolution and after, could stymie any country’s attempt to gain favor in the international community, so it was necessary to depart from these violent displays.

¹⁰ This could be seen through a different lens for China. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) Mao (at the time Chairman of the CPP) instituted a plan to reinforce the goals of the socialist revolution and to take it a step further: to encourage permanent revolution. This created an environment of pure chaos in China, as students took to roaming the countryside to punish any perceived capitalist roadies, or those who were decedents of land owners.

As noted by Susan Shirk, “Mao closed the schools and summoned students to become ‘Red Guards’ and make revolution against teachers, school principles, and other professionals who were defined as ‘bourgeoisie experts’.” This, following the disastrous Great Leap Forward, “Turned society upside down”:

In hospitals doctors were forced to clean toilets and the orderlies treated patients. The Red Guards attacked the government and Communist Party officials who ‘were taking the capitalist road,’ and fought with one another using weapons stolen from the military arsenals. The country was brought to the brink of total anarchy before the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) restored order in 1969.

(Shirk 2007, 13)

Because of this period the Communist Party and its leadership sought to centralize control in order to counter the ‘Cult of Mao.’ In reality the CCP does not fear only rebellion because of oppressive police tactics, but also the anarchy that followed the unleashing of the spectacle of power that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Meant to maintain control and reinforce socialist ideals, the Cultural Revolution led to professors being paraded through streets and beaten (the spectacle meant to reinforce the power of the CCP), all in the name of Communism. This too is a fear that remains at the forefront of CCP policy.

Both France in the Classical era and China in contemporary times understood that “the new schema of punishment would require secrecy; and as with the advent of disciplinarily these mechanisms “would be exercised through a kind of practical invisibility...” in which there is a “continuous seizure of the body and the soul” (Hook 2007, 17; 19). Juridical power, associated with the power of the spectacle, was often “exercised mainly as a means of deduction... essentially a right of seizure,” but (like in modern Western states) it appears that China has “undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power” (Foucault 1995, 185). Deduction became “no longer the major form of power but one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control... optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than... destroying them” (Foucault 1995, 136).

As liberal states shifted from the power of the spectacle to new modalities of control they attempted to ‘reform’ bodies, “not to punish less but punish better... in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply in the social body” (Foucault 1995, 82). This reformatory power attempted to be corrective and reach the souls of all; crimes are now an insult to the social body, not the sovereign. The criminal violated their pact with society, and “is therefore the enemy of society as a whole” (Foucault 1995, 190). In Western democratic states there is the inclusion of law to punish, on behalf of society, within the government. The state grants citizens inalienable rights, like due process, and equal standing under the law. The power to punish becomes reformatory; but it is also a power to mold and create new individuals.

While—in China—disciplinarity eclipsed punishment as the mechanism of control in the socialist state, the Communist Party holds the power of the sovereign and uses violence when order breaks down, while still relying upon disciplinarity. In this case, it is useful to note Agamben briefly: he points out that within totalitarian states, the “dynamic identity of life and politics, without which it remains incomprehensible... life and politics – originally divided... begin to become one, all life becomes sacred and all politics becomes the exception” (Agamben 1998, 148). This refers to bare life, a life outside the law (an individual who is a body but not protected by the state, an outsider), and the state of exception, a principle where the rule of law may be suspended—by the

sovereign—for the good of the state. In China, minorities find themselves within the state of exception within society; such as when the Party suspends law and uses force to bring in protestors (as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). The state can deny rights and place minorities within the bare life: they are individuals who can be killed in order to achieve peace; it is useful to understand that in China, “the juridical procedures and deployments of power by which human beings could be so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that no act committed against them could appear any longer as a crime” (Agamben 1998, 171).

This exception becomes the norm, and the two become indistinguishable from one another; creating the metaphoric Nazi concentration camp within society where minorities like the Uyghurs and Tibetans become “the people that refuse to be integrated into the national political body... almost the living symbol of the people and of the bare life that modernity necessarily creates within itself, but whose presence it can no longer tolerate in any way” (Agamben 1998, 179). So, in the modern authoritarian state¹¹ it appears that Agamben’s argument of the combination of the violence of the sovereign and disciplinarity allows a better understanding Chinese Communist Party rule:

... the birth of the camp in our time appears as an event that decisively signals the political space of modernity itself. It is produced at the point at which the political system of the modern nation-state, which was founded on the functional nexus between a determinate localization (land) and determinate order (the State) and mediated by automatic rules for the inscription of life (birth or the nation), enters into a lasting crisis, and the State decides to assume directly the care of the nation’s biological life as one of its proper tasks... the structure of the nation-state is... at the point marking the inscription of bare life... camps appear with new laws on citizenship and the nationalization of citizens... (Agamben 1998, 174-75).

This, in turn, morphs the state as “the state of exception now becomes a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by the bare life that more and more can no longer be inscribed in that order...,” where the political system then “contains at its very center a dislocating localization that exceeds it and into which every form of life and every rule can virtually be taken;” so “the camp as a dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of

¹¹ In this case, China.

politics in which we are still living, and it is this structure of the camp that we must learn to recognize” not only in our cities, but within the dominate structure of Chinese politics and state mechanisms of control used to regulate minorities (Agamben 1998, 175). I elaborate on the use of the exception, and its combination with disciplinarity, because it appears to help explain the transitory nature of CCP rule as a political system struggling to employ new tactics, similar to those found in the West, to assimilate minorities; but has thus far been unable to fully exclude the use of force and the employment of the state of exception.

Discipline

China struggles to accommodate each minority culture under the weight of the dominate Han culture, which in turn marginalizes the minorities. To better control subaltern populations, and assimilate them, policies seek to mold these masses through disciplinary power. Agamben wrote,

...our age is nothing but the implacable and methodical attempt to overcome the division dividing the people, to eliminate radically the people that is excluded. This attempt brings together, according to different modalities and horizons, Right and Left, capitalist countries and socialist countries, which are united in the project... of producing a single and undivided people. The obsession with development is as effective as it is in our time because it coincides with the biopolitical project to produce an undivided people (Agamben 1998, 179).

Minorities in China struggle or refuse to conform to Han society, creating an environment complicated by social strife. Foucault noted liberal governments desire to “have methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern” (Foucault 1985, 140-41). China now embraces similar mechanisms of control, by removing the shackles and physical grip on the body; just as the power of Western governments departed from the power of the spectacle and sought a more efficient means of control.

Foucault wrote that discipline offered a more efficient means of control because it created mechanisms aimed at normalizing behavior: “the classical age discovered the body as object and target of power... a body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (Foucault 1995, 136). Because “disciplines do not function through consent—they do not derive their legitimacy or their goals from the individuals

who come into contact with them;” these disciplines are meant to control the population without their knowledge (Ransom 1997, 17). Discipline works through techniques of control “which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called ‘disciplines’ ... in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the disciplines became general formulas of domination” (Foucault 1995, 137). The principle purpose of discipline “was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior,” shaped in a way that would maximize the individual’s utility in society (Foucault 1995, 137-38).

Disciplines were “directed not only at the growth of its [the body’s] skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful” and visible (Foucault 1995, 138). For the wide masses, “disciplines promised to organize, distribute, and individualize this growing mass as a way of reducing the threat that it posed... to integrate this newly organized mass into a complex production apparatus as part of the industrial revolution” (Ransom 1997, 39). Disciplines “served to economize the time of life, to accumulate it in a useful way and to exercise power over men through the mediation of time arranged... Exercise, having become an element in the political technology of the body and of duration, does not culminate in a beyond, but tends towards a subjection that has never reached its limit;” so over time new methods of control were refined and redeployed, only to become more effective and controlling (Foucault 1995, 162). In schools, disciplines acted through the maintenance of routines. Strict timetables structure students’ days allowing normalization in the curriculum. Additionally there are examinations and ranking. Within schools in China, students are distributed according to their proficiency in school, impacting minorities who want to do well by forcing them to adopt Han habits.

Discipline is not only a method of control, it is “a productive power par excellence: it aims not only to constrain those over whom it is exercised, but also to enhance and make use of their capacities” (Hindess 1996, 113). Rapid development of institutions of discipline, like the school, exposes the government’s management of the body of the individual. Power, to Foucault, is not exclusively repressive; rather it is active

in the production of new subjectivities. China uses disciplinary power to create new identities for minorities to assimilate them into Han society. Institutions are harnessed to ‘discipline’ each new generation of minorities as “every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes... in short, it normalizes” (Foucault 1995, 183). In China, the schools minorities attend are geared to a disciplinary technique that use, what Foucault called “new mechanisms of normalizing judgment,” in order to create Scinified subjects (Foucault 1995, 183).

To create these subjects, the state creates standards, and discipline “introduces... the constraint of conformity that must be achieved” (Foucault 1995, 183). For individuals, past behaviors are taken away and replaced: “disciplines are to individuals... a means of inculcating properties in the individual that were not there before;” and “disciplinary power... does not protect preexisting “properties” of the individual; rather, it *inserts* such qualities... they are produced by it” (Ransom 1997, 18-19). Instilled through discipline is normalizing judgment; in the regime of disciplinary power, “it differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an optimum...” (Foucault 1995, 182). Disciplines then, in the eyes of the Communist Party, offer a way to reshape, redefine, and reinvent minorities in a way creates a new individual separated from their cultural heritage. Through normalization, the CCP emphasizes what is ‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ behavior. Rigorous scheduling of exercise, lessons, patriotic and language training exemplify features of disciplinary power (Foucault 1995, 149). In China, emphasizing language skills and teaching in Chinese is one way the state uses normalizing techniques in schools. By requiring students to complete their lessons in Chinese, the state is able to create a better baseline for comparison and rank everyone according to their proficiency in the Han language. The combination of constraints and repetitions is meant to instill precision within the individual, to have time penetrate the body and “with it all the meticulous controls of power” (Foucault 1995, 152).

Over time modalities proved to be efficient controls combined as their numbers and use grew:

...[a] multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another, support one another, distinguish themselves from one another according to their domain of application, converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method (Foucault 1995, 138).

These methods, employed wherever they can be useful (in workshops, schools and in the military), often become generalized and used to a greater extent throughout society. Foucault identified a meticulous ‘new micro-physics’ of power that sought to reach out to broader domains so that they might “cover the entire social body;” all while “small acts of cunning endowed with a great power of diffusion, subtle arrangements, apparently innocent... mechanisms that obeyed economies too shameful to be acknowledged, or pursued petty forms of coercion” (Foucault 1995, 139). While discipline shapes individuals, “neither with nor without consent...,” it does so without violence: “this method of training—its originators and practitioners hope—will not only impart skills but will do so while reducing the political efficacy of the individuals involved;” and “if violence has not been used, the discipline cannot be criticized using the normal liberal rhetorical devices” (Ransom 1997, 37). Through discipline, the Chinese government controls, with limited violence, in a way that does not invite scrutiny from the international community.

The government establishes ‘norms’ and evaluates individuals accordingly. “What disciplinary power does is *normalize*... the goal is not static distribution...,” rather a standard is set to evaluate performance. This method of control is meant to create acceptable behaviors. (Ransom, 1997, 17). It is not to ensure each student is equal; rather,

...the objective of a discipline is to create a particular capacity among a group of individuals... in disciplines, capacities and inclinations are created... disciplines work to transmit capacities to subjects in a way that increases their powers (and thus their productivity) without at the same time enhancing their autonomy: in schools... the method for inculcating these abilities is simultaneously the model for how they will be put to use in the examination... (Ransom, Foucault’s Discipline, 31).

Examinations are important because they “introduced a whole mechanism that linked to a certain type of the formation of knowledge a certain form of the exercise of power” (Foucault 1995, 187). This means that individuals who must be examined are exposed to

compulsory visibility, “their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them... the fact of being constantly seen, of being able to always be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection;” and the individual is forced into a field of vision where they can be documented, meaning that their examination now creates an individual case that can be judged against the whole of cases (Foucault 1995, 187). The examination establishes written records, through which individuals can be compared to one another, they can be ranked, and they can then be ordered in a hierarchy and judged based on their capacities.¹²

In the chapters that follow, I will show how the Chinese government attempts to normalize the Uyghurs and Tibetans in order to integrate them into the Han culture. The State’s use of disciplinary mechanisms in schools, although used for Han students, focuses on integrating minorities into Han culture. Disciplinary power then molds individuals into efficient workers who can to fuel the progress of the state.

Panopticism

Panopticism, a form of control characterized by the partitioning of space and “the penetration of regulation into even the smallest details of everyday life through the mediation of the complete hierarchy that assured the capillary functioning of power,” is dispositive which intensifies disciplinarity (Foucault 1995, 198). Based on architectural figure, the panopticon was the idealized prison meant to achieve the normalization of delinquents through “a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault 1995, 201). The panopticon was a circular prison designed by Jeremy Bentham, with individual units on the outside and a central point of observation from the center that those on the outside could not see in too. Its description by Foucault is vivid:

... at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of

¹² Obviously examinations were used in France in the Middle Ages, and prior to Tiananmen in China. However, what is important is less the examination itself, but what content is within the exams and how they are used to rank students according to their performance. The standards, created by the state in order to create a universal education, have political motives, but use this disciplinary technique. The following paragraph alludes to this.

the building; they have two windows, one on the inside corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker... (Foucault 1995, 200).

Prisoners in the cells were always visible because of backlighting; the guards can always see clearly into each cell from the tower because inmates stood out against the light filtering through their cells. This is possible due to the partitioning of space, where each cell holds one prisoner and is constructed to certain dimensions that increase its utility. Prisoners cannot violate rules because they are never hidden, they are never free from the piercing gaze of the tower; and each occupant is “perfectly individualized and constantly visible,” and they never know precisely when they are being watched (Foucault 1995, 200). For those in the cells, there is no hope of escaping the field of visibility.

Control cannot be realized without structuring space. Prisons incorporated enclosure, partitioning, and functional sites. Discipline, according to Foucault, “sometimes requires enclosure, the specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself,” and panopticism combined with enclosure creates a “protected place of disciplinary monotony” (Foucault 1995, 141). Additionally, disciplinarity relies on the partitioning of space, “where each individual has his own place,” and “its aim was to establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it...” (Foucault 1995, 143). Finally, functioning sites are “particular places... defined to correspond not only to the need to supervise, to break dangerous communications, but also to create useful space;” which can be places the government uses in society as places of discipline (Foucault 1995, 143-44). In China, places of worship have institutional boards and officials that monitor religious activities and the actions of the clergy. Because religious activity is restricted to religious sites, individuals practicing religion are always under the potential gaze of the State. The State uses this to their advantage by defining allowable behaviors so those practicing religion are forced to abide by the State's norms. The State practices their supervisory efforts on all religion, but focuses on Islam and Buddhism since these religions are traditionally sources of unrest in China.

The intent of panopticism is “so to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise necessary” (Foucault 1995, 201). In society, “the panopticon... must be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men,” so the state creates institutions which then regulate space in society and “the panoptic schema, without disappearing as such or losing any of its properties... destined to spread through the social body... was to become a generalized function” (Foucault 1995, 205 – 207). The partitioning of space is a significant controlling mechanism: it controls the locations of particular actions through control in a number of institutions (prisons, schools, hospitals); “whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviors must be imposed,” all while intensifying the gaze of the state (Foucault 1995, 205).

The creation of a field of visibility, where there is also invisibility in the observational techniques, means individuals do not know when they are being watched. Observation by institutions in China (like the State Administration of Religious Affairs [SARA]), conditions minorities to believe they are always being monitored; inhibiting their actions and movements for certain activities, like religion. This observational method “improves social control...” and “allows for the collection of information about the inmates, [in the case of the prison] – their habits, their responses to corrective practices... This knowledge is not simply accumulated... It is used to refine structures of power so as to optimize controls and adjust the handling” of people within the system (Ransom 1997, 22). Man “becomes the principle of his own subjection,” and Foucault means that panopticism controls those subjected to the gaze of the panopticon by having them police themselves, making it unnecessary for the government to constantly have its eye on its subject constantly (Foucault 1995, 203). The function of panopticism in China is to discourage behaviors that run counter to mainstream Han culture, like engaging in religious rituals not sanctioned by the state (ones which could build a sense of community and link to one's culture). Government officials attend, document, and sanction religious officials, rituals, and sites deemed acceptable for religious behavior.

Panoptic mechanisms of control, present in China, include: constant surveillance on Buddhists and Muslims, tracking attendance at religious sites and ceremonies, and controlling religious sites through enclosure by creating laws limiting how they may be used and who may patronize them. Panoptic forms of control are deployed in institutions which function like a “microscope of conduct,” meaning they are always monitoring behavior (Foucault 1995, 173). In China, “transnational ethno-religious links have increasingly preoccupied the PRC Government from the late 1980’s, particularly in Tibetan areas and in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where religious work routinely addresses the negative influence of ‘hostile international forces’ on social stability and unity of nationalities.” In fact:

The collective nature of much religious practice and the need for transmission of religious ideas and ritual through teaching and performance thus present physical, institutional, and intellectual targets for religious work. Policy reformulation from the early 1980’s onwards has reflected the more tolerant reading of religion’s place in reform society by structuring policy implementation around these targets rather than marking religion for elimination... but religious believers, individually and collectively, remain the base object of governmental calculation, acted on through the institutional, managerial, and ideological operations of religious work (Cooke, 135).

PRC institutions and policies (like the Regulations on Religious Affairs [RAA]) support boards that monitor the activities of Muslim and Buddhist clergy, making them ever cognizant they are watched. Laws forbid anyone under 18 receiving a religious education, which instills a fear of deviation (and devotion). Meanwhile teachers, and other government officials, like “police officers, state enterprise workers and civil servants risk losing their jobs if they engage in religious activity” (Amnesty International 2009).

In China, some institutions were created prior to the Tiananmen era, “religious revival has been an increasing reality in the PRC since the CCP adopted its reform and opening up program in December 1978,” and the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) was created in 1979, followed by the patriotic religious associations in 1982 (Cooke 2009, 128). These allowed religion to grow because of the State’s liberalized stance at the time; which ended following the unrest surrounding Tiananmen. It wasn’t until the late 1980s that the Party “theoretically accepted religion as a long-term social reality”, and efforts since then have been to intensify institutional controls in the country in order to control

the course of religion (Cooke 2009, 128). In the early 1990s, minority cultural adaptation to socialist society because the “key process for achieving transformation in society,” and at this time the work of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (formerly the Religious Affairs Bureau) “assumed increased significance and complexity” (Cooke 2009, 128).

Bio-power

While the power to withdraw life was the ultimate privilege of the sovereign, bio-politics focuses on making life productive, for ensuring a better future for the population. “The ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it,” and death or deduction became one of many different elements “working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them” (Foucault 1985, 138 – 139). Bio-politics uses bio-power to control the masses through the calculated life management of human populations (Hook 2007, 227). Above all, the focus of bio-power was the “attention to the processes of life – characterized a power whose highest function was... no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through” (Foucault 1985, 139).

Bio-politics is a modality of exerting power that relies on “the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” (Foucault 1985, 136). Bio-politics efficiently manages groups of people, like the population of an entire country or elements within a population (in this case bio-power is evident throughout China for all ethnic groups, but we are concerned with the effects on the minority groups identified in Chapter 1); at the present, “power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population,” so the control of individuals dictates the need to control the various life-processes of the entire population (Foucault 1985, 137). The shift to bio-power occurs when “the old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life;” and the government begins to focus on regulating the physical and biological bodies of its subjects (Foucault 1985, 140).

Unlike discipline, meant to normalize each individual, bio-power seeks to control populations on a larger scale through life processes which are the object and the target of control:

There was a rapid development of various disciplines – universities, secondary schools, barracks... There was also the emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing and migration... There was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of bio-power... For population controls, one notes the emergence of demography, the evaluation of the relationship between resources and inhabitants, the constructing of tables analyzing wealth and its circulation... (Foucault 1985, 140).

The explosion of disciplines Foucault noted in the schools, hospitals, and workshops, was coupled with the gathering knowledge and control of population's life processes. Western states compile statistics on how many people were born, where they live, how they move; and then set out to refine their techniques and influence this in order to improve their own rule. Biopower was then:

... present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions... They also acted as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence on the respective forces... guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony. The adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit, were made possible in part by the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of application. The investment of the body... and the distributive management of its forces were... indispensable (Foucault 1985, 141).

This meant the “expansive mandate of administering human life in the broadest possible sense would mean that a successful regime of government need rely on a wide range of semi-autonomous technologies, on a web of disciplinary and bio-political effect, which, while made up of often discrete components...,” can “work in a mutually coherent manner” (Hook 2007, 239-40).

Recent policies in China contain elements of bio-power, perhaps showing the government understands that these are “without question an indispensable element of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes” (Foucault 1985, 140-41). Governments realized that death became predictable in ways, preventable in others, and the ultimate dominion no longer was death, “but with living beings;” thus governments now focused on the management of life

to ensure optimal efficiency in society (Foucault 1985, 142). Controlling the life processes proved to be helpful for governments. Birth and mobility greatly affect the development of the economy and political sphere; to maintain control, governments needed to understand, plan, and enact population policies in a way that reinforced liberal society and its economic system. Bio-politics was “focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and servicing as the basis of biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary...” (Foucault 1985, 139). This linked to how a state controls and attempts to manipulate population dynamics, something the Chinese state is very concerned with in Xinjiang and Tibet.

My analysis of bio-power in China focuses on Party control over birthing policies and (sometimes forced) internal migration. In order to meet numerous social, political, and economic objectives, the CCP regulates aspects of minority mobility to efficiently manage their population. “China's anti-Uighur policy, which encourages Han Chinese settlement and employment in the western Xinjiang region while jobless Uyghurs, especially young women, are recruited to work in factories in eastern China,” is an example of state control over internal movement and willingness to displace individuals (Gershman 2010). Removing women from their homelands is no coincidence, according to Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, “it is part of the authorities' efforts to threaten our continuity as a people because they are taking these women out of their communities at the time they would be getting married and starting families” (Gershman 2010). The control of mobility and the regulatory policies regarding reproduction represent two forms of bio-power used by the Chinese government. Chapters 3 and 4 then analyze these strategies to better understand their development and intensification in the post-Tiananmen era.

CHAPTER 3- XINJIANG

Background

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is a nominally autonomous province in Northwest China. It is the largest province in the nation, and it is unique because the Uyghurs make up the majority of people living in the region, but are a minority group in the country. The Uyghurs trace their ethnicity back to the Turkish people of the Asian steppe and have lived in the region for hundreds of years. This group's culture directly contrasts mainstream Chinese society. They have their own language, practice Islam, and have a rich culture tied to their ethnic heritage. The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) represents Uyghurs internationally and works in the global community to raise awareness of Chinese policies in the region.

Chinese troops occupied the region in 1759, and named it Xinjiang, or “New Frontier.”¹³ The area continued to trouble the Chinese after the occupation: in 1862 there were 42 notable revolts, and in 1864 East Turkistan declared its independence. The Chinese regained control in 1876 and annexed the region. The Uyghur people gained independence from China in 1933-1936 (under the Nationalists) and 1944-1949, but they never retained autonomy for a long period of time (Péter 2009).¹⁴ In the late 1990s, the central government of China announced plans to develop the western region of the country in order to boost the investment in the “long-neglected lands” (Wong 2009). This created an influx of Han migrants, transforming Xinjiang: “the percentage of Han in the population was 40 percent in 2000, up from 6 percent in 1949” (Péter 2009).

Although Uyghurs desire independence, the CCP considers this region vitally important to the state's economic progress. The natural resources in the region make it an important building block in China's industrial growth. To better control the Uyghurs, the

¹³ These “Chinese” were actually of the Qing Dynasty – a dynasty originating in Manchuria, headed by Manhus, rather than Han Chinese.

¹⁴ When gaining independence during this time, it was due to a very tenuous rule by the Chinese at the time. In 1912 the Qing Dynasty was overthrown and replaced by the Republican China, and the Republican Era devolved into a period dominated by numerous warlords controlling the country. This was countered by the Guomindang, who fought back to regain control of the country, and Chiang Kai-shek consolidated control around 1938. After losing control in 1933, Guomindang (Nationalist) forces seized control; and then lost it again during WWII, after which the Chinese Communists regained control and have held power since.

central government intensified its use of subtle policies (since the late 1980s), utilizing bio-power and disciplinarity, to incorporate the group into Han society. The region's large deposits of natural resources keep the CCP focused on the province. In the same way that India served as the crown jewel to fuel the British Empire, Xinjiang is a key cog in China's growth:

With 18 million people, Xinjiang produces one-third of China's cotton, and explorations in the Tarim Basin have revealed the country's largest oil and gas reserves. The region borders Mongolia, Russia, several Central Asian republics, Pakistan, and India, making it a useful springboard for projecting Chinese influence abroad....The government has also invested a great deal in the region. As part of a grand scheme to develop China's western areas, Beijing plans to spend more than 100 billion Yuan (\$12 billion) on 70 major projects in Xinjiang over the next five years, mostly to improve infrastructure. The government has recently completed a railway linking the remote western city of Kashgar to the rest of Xinjiang. And the regime is considering proposals for using foreign investment to build oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia across the Taklimakan Desert (Chung 2002).

Since 2000, the number of projects and amount of investment in XUAR grew. This helped the state access these resources, but the government's policies also deteriorated the economic potential these people have (Péter 2009). Because of this, relationships are strained in Xinjiang between Uyghurs and the Han dominated government, leading Uyghurs to protest their lack of political, religious, and social freedoms. This often requires the state to maintain stability: Chinese stand firm in the face of unrest, and state policies cement the Han presence and ensure their control well into the future.

Modalities of Assimilation

Obstacles remain in the government's way as they attempt to control the Uyghur people. In Xinjiang the government limits the freedom of minorities; elements of "autonomy are absent (or present only in truncated form) in that region... government institutions have been heavily colonized by Hans, and have been subordinated at all levels to the heavily Han Party structure," while "Uyghur (and other non-Han) leaders have been carefully chosen and forced to act as apologists and even boosters for unpopular policies, all but ensuring that these leaders would develop no popular constituency... educational institutions have remained under tight state control in all

periods except the 1980s... it can be argued that political controls on these institutions are tighter than they were at the beginning of the reform era” (Bovingdon 2004, 4). The reform era of the 1980s was one factor that influenced the state to incorporate disciplinarity and bio-power as mechanisms of control. Ethnic unrest during that time brought the state’s attention to the region; in the period since, they have amplified the controlling mechanisms used to assimilate the Uyghur people.

By using bio-power to control mobility birthing policies, disciplinarity and panopticism in education, and religion, the Chinese adopted numerous tools to better shape and control Uyghurs and their culture. This chapter explores the introduction of new modalities of power¹⁵ deployed by the central government to integrate the Uyghur people, and is the first of two cases attempting to better understand the policy transitions in China to subtly integrate minorities. The focus remains on Uyghurs, although some policies outlined affect more than this ethnic group, and in some cases affect Han Chinese, the government’s efforts in the region specifically target aspects of Uyghur culture.

Disciplinarity & Education

Education is critical for minorities now that China is more open economically. The growth of numerous economic sectors requires skilled workers as the economy evolves. In school, students gain knowledge and exams validate an individual’s abilities and show they are adequately educated so they can contribute in the workforce. Schools, especially in the 1980s, have also been a source of unrest in China and for the Communist Party. Currently there are three options available for minorities in China: they can be selected to attend boarding schools,¹⁶ they can attend integrated local schools, or parents can send their children to local minority schools. In this case there is some choice by families on where they can send their children; but their choice is tempered by the reality that choosing a school will often define their opportunities in Han

¹⁵ Those introduced since the 1990s.

¹⁶ For this, it is a combination of selection by the state, choosing the most suited students, and choice by the parents to send their children to these schools.

society and their chance for economic advancement.¹⁷ Each school offers a different environment and combination of segregation and language lessons are taught in, and all are meant to make minorities competitive according to Han standards (although standards are lower for minorities).

Education offers the Party a ‘laboratory’ where it can try new ways to organize, observe, and control the actions of students in its educational system. To better mold young students, the CCP introduced policies which separate children, traditionally educated in madrasas (Arabic term for educational institutions, both secular and religious), from their culture (made up in part by language and religion). State educational institutions use disciplinary techniques to form “new mechanisms of normalizing judgment” in subjects by establishing curriculums and regulating the educational system; to instill new values in an individual (Foucault 1995, 183). Some of the techniques used are timetables in boarding schools, examinations, and the use of language to normalize lessons.

In China, the “national education provided to minority students successfully promotes integration while at the same time downplaying their ethnic identities,” so the state uses each grade level to ingrain in the individual Han qualities and characteristics,¹⁸ which raises their exposure to normalizing techniques in school which instill new

¹⁷ It is clear there is a tradeoff for each school: boarding schools offer an environment that is 80% Uyghur (Chen 2008, 5); but classes are segregated; however this is because Uyghur students tend to lag behind their Han peers. Never the less they are taught in Han Chinese. This can be perceived two ways: the Chinese have set up forms of affirmative action to help educate minorities; yet at the same time they are denying minorities the opportunities for traditional schooling (in madrasas).

Local schools are integrated, and create the boarding school environment in Xinjiang and Tibet; as students are taught in Han Chinese alongside Han pupils. These schools tend to have better teachers than Minority schools, which offer class in the minority language and have classes in minority history and culture (along with the approved national curriculum). In all cases, the ultimate goal is to make Uyghur students (and Tibetans) competitive for higher placement exams; yet to do this the state sets the standards (although minorities have lower ones, another instance of ‘affirmative action-like’ policy) which conform to the norms of Han society.

¹⁸ Minorities are given preferential treatment, like lower requirements for entering universities and lower standards, which keeps them engaged in school and offering incentives to continue their education at the next level; which then increases their exposure to Han culture and prompts them to live according to Han standards. For more, consult the first chapter of Yanbin Chen’s work, *Muslim Uyghur Students in a Chinese Boarding School*.

identities in Uyghurs (Chen 2008, 30). The understanding of one's education level is not noted in the grade of school passed, rather what is asked is:

What is your cultural level? 'Culture' here refers only to learning in state-sponsored schools and literacy in Chinese characters. In the volume of 'nationality statistics' recently published by the Department of Populations Statistics of State Statistical Bureau and Economic Department of State Nationalities Affairs Commission, the educational sections are all listed under the category of 'cultural levels' of the various minorities nationalities as compared to the Han (Postiglione 1999, 59).

Because the Chinese government believes "education [is] the means to acculturation into Chinese society, which depended on literacy, or the learning of Chinese," educational institutions use mechanisms of disciplinarity to accomplish political goals, such as elevating Han culture so it would be universally accepted and followed. Because lessons emphasize Han culture and the Chinese language, "the Chinese educational system is highly centralized via curriculum management" by the state (Chen 2008, 65). Educational policies contain elements of normalization: *nationwide* (universal) curriculums incorporate lessons on Han culture to promote assimilation into mainstream society – meant to reach each student regardless of ethnicity.¹⁹

For the Communist Party, "value transmission in schools serves the stabilization of society" (Chen 2008, 2). In minority schools, for example, "education for ethnic minorities... functions as an agent of national integration" (Chen 2008, 2). Like liberal states, Chinese schools incorporate normalization as a "a principle of coercion in teaching with the introduction of a standardized education...the marks that once indicated status, privilege and affiliation were... replaced-or at least supplemented- by a whole range of degrees of normality indicating membership of a homogenous social body," and marking minorities (Foucault 1995, 183). CCP policies, since the 1980s, are often contradictory:

¹⁹ Because of this it is true that Hans are subjected to discipline, like minorities. However there is a fundamental difference between the two: with Han students they are being shaped to conform with their own culture and their own societal standards, it is not foreign to them; while minority students are being shaped to conform with a foreign culture while shedding many of the remnants of their own. In this sense power is productive, it is creating a 'new' identity, which I argue is different for minorities than Han. At the same time, minority policies in education are different because they are offered a third option: minority schools. In the end, discipline is more exacting for minorities because it occurs in an environment unusual for minority students- they are expected to learn a foreign culture, in a foreign language, according to (albeit loose) foreign standards.

The Constitution in 1982 stipulated that all nationalities are equal and minority rights are protected although unity is emphasized; anything that damages national unity is prohibited. The same is true in the case of the PRC Regional Autonomy Law for Minority Nationalities enacted in 1984, which guaranteed the language rights of minority students, despite the fact that minority students are required to learn Mandarin Chinese (Wong & Phillion 2009, 3).

But new, in 2010, “the XUAR government intensified steps to promote Mandarin Chinese and marginalize the use of the Uyghur language in XUAR schools, in violation of Chinese law” (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 46).

Despite government policies mandating equality, “discriminatory views toward minority language and culture from local government officials minority students’ language learning and language rights are not realized” in schools (Wong & Phillion 2009, 3). The use of a national language and national curriculum is a normalizing technique because it ensures each student²⁰ is exposed to and learns about Han culture. The emphasis placed on the importance of Han language and culture is universal: each student is expected to emerge from school with an appreciation of it and the aspiration to embody what they have learned. Above all, this normalizing technique is the collective application of the political objective within schools, which the state uses to assimilate those not within the culture already²¹.

The Chinese set up special boarding schools in China to educate Uyghur students. Since the 1980s, the state brought larger numbers of minority students to these schools each year. Elements of discipline in boarding schools have been present since their inception, and although they predate Tiananmen (Tibetan classes were established in 1984, Uyghur students’ classes first commenced in 1987), the efforts of the Chinese have intensified since the early 1990s, as newly-instituted exchange programs bring more students yearly (Chen 2008, 4). These schools regulate students efficiently because they are structured to enable administrators to constantly supervise and observe students and the schedule of students is completely arranged. In some schools, “the Xinjiang Classes are segregated from the Han students” as well (Chen 2008, 70). Like in France, in China

²⁰ Every student, no matter where they attend, even if attending minority schools

²¹ Which effects those not accustomed to following Han beliefs, like the Uyghurs, who are naturally inclined to use their own language and practice their own customs

the “the school building was to be a mechanism for training... an apparatus for observation” (Foucault 1995, 172). By September 2000 the Chinese Ministry of Education (MOE) newly implemented the “Inland Xinjiang Senior Secondary School Classes” in thirteen senior secondary schools: these schools enroll 1,000 Uyghur students each year, something never done before Tiananmen (Chen 2008, 5).

These ‘classes,’ funded by the government, educate students from XUAR so they can help develop their homeland and assist in ethnic integration nation-wide (Chen 2008, 5). The boarding schools environment can be unsettling: Uyghurs are located in Han-dominated urban areas far from Xinjiang, students are required to learn in Chinese rather than through their native tongue, and the government “explicitly regards this program as a political task,” so the state emphasizes loyalty to the Party over minority cultural values (Chen 2008, 5). The key element emphasized is normalization; the schools subject Han and Uyghur students to similar disciplines and regimes; but these efforts are intensified for Uyghur students because they are coerced to adopt a new culture and customs; since “traditionally Uyghurs placed more value on family and community education than of secular school education,” schools’ disciplinary efforts directly target Uyghurs for integration.

Yangbin Chen outlined how these boarding schools use an intricate timetable to control students’ activities. Scheduling is a central element of discipline: “three great methods- established rhythms, impose particular occupations, and regulate the cycles of repetition- were soon... found in schools... disciplines had no difficulty in taking up their place in the old forms...” (Foucault 1995, 149). The scheduling now found in the minority boarding schools in China is the same that Foucault identified in schools in France. The timetable in the Xinjiang classes, unique to boarding schools, is a display of a rigorous schedule: all the hours in the day, and all the days in the week are accounted for. Students wake by 5:50 am, they then exercise, eat breakfast, and attend various sessions (measured units of time used for classes, study, etc.). This continues until after dinner when they have three self-study sessions and then lights out at 10. This schedule is for the 5 weekdays: on Saturday, they are given one session free (Session 8, 5:20-6:05 pm),but cannot leave the school during these 45 minutes of free time. On Sunday, students have three required self-study sessions in the morning, followed by one free

session, followed by 4 sessions (2:30-6:05 pm) where they are free to leave the premises (Chen 2008, 193 [Appendix A; Fig. 1 and 2]). These 3 hours and 35 minutes on Sunday are the only time students can leave campus.

Students' routines are very rigid; schedules are broken down hourly for each day. This schedule leaves little time free:

Discipline... poses the principle of a theoretically ever-growing use of time: exhaustion rather than use; it is a question of extracting, from time, ever more available moments and, from each moment, ever more useful forces. This means that one must seek to intensify the use of the slightest moment, as if time, in its very fragmentation, were inexhaustible or as if, at least by an ever more detailed internal arrangement, one could tend towards an ideal point at which one maintain maximum speed and maximum efficiency (Foucault 1995, 154).

The efficiency of the state's mechanisms of assimilation is maximized by using the schedule. In sessions, students complete work on courses or attend ceremonies geared toward integration into mainstream society (i.e., every Monday from 7-7:40 am is a national flag hoisting ceremony).²² Exercises like this are found in western liberal states, and are meant to instill allegiance to the state above students' cultural identity. In China controlling time, "the meticulousness of the regulations... the supervision of the smallest fragment of life and the body... provide, in the context of school... a laicized content, and economic or technical rationality," which focuses so completely on the meticulous details of life, and therefore the schedule of the body, is intended to optimize the normalizing elements of power within the timetable, because no moment of time is wasted (Foucault 1995, 149).

The schedule is an efficient method of control because it accounts for every minute of every day for every student. The time table "allows both the characterization of the individual as an individual and the ordering of a given multiplicity;" each individual can be given a schedule and the school knows where they will be at that time, and at the same time the school can control the movement of all students at all times (Foucault 1995, 149). The intricacies of the schedule are mapped out to the minute "to assure the quality of time used: constant supervision, the pressure of supervisors, the elimination of

²² This is similar to some modern liberal democratic states, like the U.S., which create routines in schools to form values in students, like loyalty to the country.

anything that might disturb or distract; it is a question of constituting a totally useful time... time measured and paid must also be a time without impurities or defects; a time of good quality, throughout which the body is constantly applied to its exercise” (Foucault 1995, 150; 151). These schools, despite teaching a limited number of Uyghur students, illuminate China’s use of discipline in education; which is important because the minority students educated in these are educated by the government that plans for the students to be the future leaders of Xinjiang, but they want them to be leaders who have been integrated and believe in the Chinese state and are part of Han society.

Mechanisms of control in Xinjiang schools attempt to recreate the atmosphere of boarding schools. While Uyghurs “use their native language (called Uyghur) and emphasize their ethnic art in Xinjiang schools,” the “Chinese government prescribes the policy of the Xinjiang Classes as a mechanism for addressing the political issue of the integration of the ethnic Uyghur minority into the Han Chinese majority” (Chen 2008, 11). Because of this, educational measures in XUAR schools mimic many disciplinary elements of the boarding schools, like language, to separate education and culture for minorities since the 1990s, and have intensified in recent years:

The XUAR government intensified steps to promote Mandarin Chinese in XUAR schools and to largely phase out instruction in other languages, a development that in the future could permanently marginalize the role of the Uyghur language within broad segments of society in the XUAR. Authorities announced in May 2010 that by 2015, they would aim to universalize “bilingual education”-a policy that, within the XUAR, has come to promote class instruction almost exclusively in Mandarin- with the goal of making all ethnic minority children proficient in Mandarin by 2020 (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 107).²³

In discipline, “the aim is to derive the maximum advantages and to neutralize the inconveniences... to master the labour force” (Foucault 1995, 142). In Chinese schools, mandating that Han be used, by requiring it as the national curriculum language, is a

²³ China’s desire, and efforts, to enforce and “make Mandarin the dominant language of instruction in XUAR schools contravene protections for ethnic minority languages in Chinese law and underscore state failures to safeguard and promote local languages as one component of regional ethnic autonomy” (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 107)

technique of control that employs normalization which requires conformity from students because they are forced to learn a ‘standard’ language, in fact:

Prior to the May [2010] announcement, XUAR authorities had already increased promotion of “bilingual education.” In 2009, 31.79 percent of the total ethnic minority student population in the XUAR-753,300 ethnic minority preschool, primary, and secondary school students-received “bilingual education,” *an increase of over 25 percent from 2008*, according to official statistics. *Another 240,900 ethnic minority students (minkaohan students) received education solely in Mandarin through longstanding programs that track ethnic minority students directly into Mandarin Chinese schooling* (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 107 [emphasis added]).

This style of education is so effective that, “regardless of the popularity of speaking Uyghur outside the classroom, Uyghur students strive to impose more Chinese practice on their fellow Uyghur students” (Chen 2008, 126). Students police themselves which is an example of school lessons being reinforced outside of the classroom. Testing in Chinese dialects also allows students to be ranked according to their competency and forces students to meet specified norms. Teaching a curriculum based on foreign languages forces students to adapt and discourages them from using their native tongue.

The development of educational policies targeting Uyghurs since the 1990s include elements of disciplinarity. By ordering time in boarding schools, who have received increased use in the past 20 years, and forcing students to be educated in a ‘foreign language,’ which has gained more support in the last 15 years, the state is able to use a number of normalizing influences in the educational setting to shape Uyghur students. While the focus of this study is on minorities, it was evident in my research that the state uses discipline to shape native Han students as well. But it is the experience of minority students that is critical to my study because use of discipline is used particularly reform the habits and behavior of Uyghur youth in accordance with the political views of the state. Assimilation into the Han majority requires the state to constantly interact with minorities and use subtle means of coercion; and setting restrictions on language and scheduling are efficient policies. In Xinjiang, the Chinese government uses discipline in schools in ways that Foucault noted in French schools.

Panopticism & Religion

The very question, ‘what is religion in China’ is complicated. The state makes a distinction between religious belief, religious affairs, and religious work. In China, religious work is a governmental activity; “it implements and carries out the Party’s religious policy which has been formulated on the basis of current theoretical orthodoxy and in response to current conditions within China;” so religious practices (or rituals) are considered ‘government’ activities and exist at the discretion of the state, which has greatly evolved since the late 1980s (Cooke 2009, 126). The Party places “the space of personal belief beyond state intervention and the space of religious expression within it... policy then applies legitimacy only to the category of ‘normal’ religious activities, deciding what lies inside and outside ‘normal’ bounds and how the respective spaces can be treated” (Cooke 2009, 130). This allows the state to “demarcate the governmental terrain of religious work... thereby constructs the governmental field of operation,” and manage religious activities “which in practice involves territorializing religion’s active expression- specifically the places, persons, associations, teaching, published texts, rituals and speech of religious practitioners as detailed in policy, law and regulation” (Cooke 2009, 120). The state cannot keep a person from ‘believing,’ but it can keep individuals from practicing their beliefs. Furthermore, the Communist government requires its citizens’ loyalty to lie with the Party and country above all; but some minorities theologically answer to a ‘higher’ power. This creates a very tenuous relationship between religion and the state.

In Xinjiang, the CCP fears Muslim Uyghurs will draw international support and strength from foreign religious officials and use Islam as a unifying element for an independence movement. This influenced the state to advocate atheism in the educational system, where the state encourages all students to shed traditionally held beliefs:

Party strategists have... placed hopes on mandatory classes in atheism. An Amnesty International report on Xinjiang claimed that the CCP began the “education in atheism” campaign in 1997. Yet a textbook purchased in Kashgar demonstrates that the campaign began earlier. The text of the book makes clear that students no longer enjoy “freedom of religious belief.” The fifth lesson is devoted entirely to the bald assertion that “teenagers must become atheists (Bovingdon 2004, 35).

But religion is a significant part of Uyghur culture, so it is almost impossible for the state to completely stamp it out. Therefore, the CCP created institutions to loosen the influence of religion by creating regulations giving the state the right to oversee religious practices.²⁴ The Chinese monitor individuals engaging in religious activities, but the state's capacity to continuously supervise every practicing Uyghur Muslim is impossible. China's answer to this problem was to develop mechanisms of control, which implore individuals to police themselves. Thus, the generalized function of panopticism is a mechanism of control allowing the state to maintain omnipresence in the intimate rituals of religion; possible only by allowing institutions to evolve and take on a supervisory role.

The CCP does not allow proselytization or religions to recruit new members; historically state policies curb religious practices since the Party believes they create values counter those of the socialist state. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, from 1982, specifies in Article 36 that:

Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. *No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state.* Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination (Cooke 2009, 125 [emphasis added]).

The constitution guarantees the rights of people to have faith, but under certain conditions. The constitution states the country protects normal religious activities; but does nothing to define them. Since the constitution remains vague, the state created agencies produce policies that define 'allowable' behaviors. While "no objective definition for the abstract and arbitrary term 'normal' has thus far been determined... qualifications for normalcy of their [religions] actions resides in compliance with regulatory provisions that target the conduct of religion, only outside the intimate space of personal belief per se, but also by reference to specific conformities" (Cooke 2009,

²⁴ Discussed further later in Chapter, including SARA.

131). The state ‘shapes’ religion, aiming to achieve the “mutual adaptation of religion and socialist society” (Cooke 2009, 125).

The state uses panopticism to control religion through the techniques outlined in Chapter 2 such as establishing norms and monitoring religious practices. “Governmental thinking on religion in the PRC is embedded in an array of agencies and institutions that aim to shape or reshape the conduct of China’s religious citizens... ideologically and practically the masses of religious believers must be incorporated into the PRC Government’s programmes [sic] - social, economic, cultural, political and even international- under the general directive of adapting to socialist society” (Cooke 2009, 127). This is, in part, due to events in Tibet and Xinjiang: in 1991 an assessment “of religious work appeared after the State Council’s National Work Conference on Religion in December 1990” in response to a range of “crises, particularly ethno nationalist unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang and the events of June 1989”²⁵(Cooke 2009, 129). Religious policies in China link to the late 1980s because of the unrest during the reform era and in the period surrounding Tiananmen. Policies since then reflect an intensification of the use of new modalities of control, like panopticism, in order to better control Uyghur’s religious behaviors.

State institutions take on the role of the panoptic tower in society. These institutions are tasked with surveillance and monitoring of mosques and temples, and the institutions are the omnipresent guard within society that is not always seen but is feared. The State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) replaced the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) in 1998, and SARA draws its power from the “Party’s assumption of totalizing responsibility for the nation” (Cooke 2009, 130). SARA acts as the sole institution in China that defines ‘acceptable’ religious behavior in China. It “has nation-wide responsibility for the practical conduct of religious affairs... as the designated ‘administrative unit’ for religious groups, its comprehensive functions encompass administration, regulation, surveillance, guidance, policy drafting and dissemination, enforcement, and education in the religious sphere...” (Cooke 2009, 137).

²⁵ Tiananmen

The role of SARA, “as the main bureaucratic interface between social religious elements and government,” is surveillance and enforcement of PRC religious mandates; to do this it “uses techniques of supervision of religious organizations and local RAB’s, and oversight of the education of religious personnel to carry out its governmental commitments down the level of the county Party-state apparatus...” (Cook 2009, 138). Over 3,000 religious organizations in China have a measure of autonomy but must accept state management and supervision. Management committees in mosques and temples report on institutional activities, while other means of religious expression like education and the publication of texts are closely monitored (Cooke 2009, 139). In addition to the physical governmental agency, the PRC also uses policies governing religion to build its foundation for its mechanisms of control.

Another mechanism of control China adopted in 2004 was the Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA) to assert “the state’s right to manage religious affairs whenever they impinge on national and public interests” (Cooke 2009, 130). The RRA are not laws, but a set of administrative regulations which “explicitly [define] obligations for religious bodies, venues and personnel in performance of their religious activities in many of its articles,” and are “essentially a tool for delimiting the space allowed to religious affairs based on the PRC Government’s determination of state and public interests... specifying disciplinary mechanisms in areas [functional sites] where the state anticipates problems from religion... and requires religious bodies, sites and citizens not only to adhere to Constitutional and legal regulation, but also to safeguard national unification, unity among the nationalities, and social stability” (Cook 2009, 136-37). The RRA define where in society religious activities are acceptable and they also formulate what is expected or acceptable behavior in those places. Institutions like SARA and policies like the RRA attempt to create harmony between the state, society, and the people.

Observational techniques used by SARA to monitor Muslims²⁶ ensure they are abiding by the RRA. This discourages Uyghurs from deviating from accepted norms, and do so through a number of boards and unannounced official visits, “the more numerous... anonymous and temporary observers are, the greater the risk for the inmate [individual]

²⁶ Developed since its reformulation from the RAB in 1998.

of being surprised and the greater his anxious awareness of being observed (Foucault 2005, 202). This is possible because religious sites across the country must register with the local county Religious Affairs boards, allowing the Communist Party to form observational apparatuses. These target the religions of minority groups:

Government authorities in the XUAR continued to restrict children's freedom of religion. Authorities adopted a new regulation on the protection of minors, *effective December 2009*, which restricts children's religious activities. While the regulation excludes a previously codified ban (now void) on parents "permitting children to engage in religious activities," it broadens an earlier provision to prohibit people from "luring or forcing minors to participate in religious activities (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 107).²⁷

Parents, teachers, and clergy, facing new restrictions never seen before 2009, are not allowed to foster the religious growth of minors. "Uyghur Islamic minors in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are forbidden to enter mosques or receive religious instruction at home" and since "Islam in China for the most part has grown biologically through birth and intermarriage," and leaders of the faith are limited in their ability to proselytize, the state limits the transmission of religion (Cooke 2009, 131; Gladney 2003, 464).

China ensures these behaviors are followed by maintaining a presence through "tight control over mosques and religious clergy, intervening in the appointment of local imams, stationing police within and outside mosques, and closely monitoring all religious activities" (Amnesty International 2009). "Inside 'venues for religious activities' – temples, monasteries, mosques, churches, management committees report on institutional activities, specifically compliance with religious policy and regulations, to local RAB branches as well as their relevant patriotic religious organizations" to the extent that the state no longer needs to use the police or physical force to control the activities in these religious centers. Mechanisms in place are efficient enough that the state "may throw off

²⁷ The government does not provide a list or exact outline of what is 'luring' or 'forcing,' instead they leave a "wide latitude to interpret the terms in a manner that constrains children's exercise of freedom of religion and parents' right to impart a religious education.... in Nilka county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, launched a campaign in March to spread government policies including the 'six forbiddens:' forbidding students from believing in religion, participating in religious activities, fasting, wearing clothes with a 'religious hue,' viewing or listening to audio-video products with 'reactionary content,' and disseminating "separatist thought." (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 107).

its physical weight; it tends to the non-corporal; and, the more it approaches this limit, the more constant, profound and permanent are its effects: it is the perpetual victory that avoids any physical confrontation and which is always decided in advance” (Cooke 2009, 139; Foucault 1995, 203). In effect, the state, through these management boards, is able to monitor behaviors. In the past 20 years since SARA was established, practicing Muslims adhere to governmental policies, allowing the state to rely less on their actual presence and more on the omnipresence of the institutions.

The purpose of SARA and the RRA is to ensure Muslims follow policies outlining proper religious behavior. These appoint officials to observe and report on the ongoing activities; but “the multifaceted repression of religion—including the closure of mosques, supervision and dismissal of clerics, and the prevention of religious practice by the young” still troubles some Uyghurs (Bovingdon 2004, viii). The omnipresence of the state cements its presence in religious ceremonies and within Uyghurs’ souls; the Party shapes behaviors by irregularly monitoring religious activities, discouraging Uyghurs from deviating from accepted norms. Some individuals acquiesce to Communist Party policies and no longer raise their children as Muslims. The function of panopticism is to strengthen the hold over the soul; by disciplining the body, by coercing individuals to police themselves.

Bio-Power & Birthing And Migration

As noted in Chapter 2, bio-power is a technique of government that controls the individuals’ life processes and the circulation of the population in society. Controlling movement within the country, through sometimes ‘forcible’ migratory policies, and birthing policies are ways the Communist Party controls the Uyghur population as a whole. Although the state uses bio-power in migration policies for Han Chinese as well, policies weigh on Uyghurs because the techniques of the state pressured to adopt Han practices. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out the conquest of Xinjiang to ‘free’ the local population (the Uyghurs) from ‘feudal’ conditions in 1949. The Communist Party then sent massive numbers of Han Chinese settlers to the region; arguing the backward economic nature of the area was due to lack of human labor (Bovingdon 2002, 4). Settlers did not leave once the region was modernized and since the invasion “the army never left... the settlers grow more numerous every year: the Han

population rose from roughly two hundred thousand in the mid-1940s to some six and a half million in 1995—an increase from 5% to 38% of the region's population” (Bovingdon 2002, 4). Government incentives spurred this growth, which was an early attempt to control population movement within the region, prior to the 1980s.²⁸

However, in the late 1990s the central government of China intensified these efforts when they announced newly developed plans to develop the western region of the country, to boost the investment in the “long-neglected lands” (Wong 2009). Government policy simultaneously relocated Uyghurs across the country, under the auspices of moving them for jobs. The government argued opportunities for Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang was limited, necessitating state intervention that sent Uyghurs to areas with jobs available. The “PRC's policy of Han migration to Xinjiang,” a biopolitical technique of controlling migration in order to achieve a political goal: transforming “the majority Uyghur population into a minority group in Xinjiang itself... [eroding] the very basis of autonomy extended to a minority province... [while] the Chinese continue to exhibit all real political power in the region” (Bhattacharya 2003, 366). Recent figures for the province show the Uyghurs makeup a plurality of 45 percent, while Han Chinese comprise about 41 percent of the population (with the remainder of the people being Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Mongols, and other small ethnic groups) (Péter 2009).

In Xinjiang “Hans enjoy better jobs, do better economically, and benefit from a cultural dominance that has been decades in the making;” thanks to favorable migration policies (Bovingdon 2002, 4). Since the late 1990s “the consistent choice of Han officials for the top positions at all levels of Xinjiang’s Party bureaucracy strike[s] many Uyghurs as colonial practices... [and] both Han immigration and state policies have dramatically increased the pressure on Uyghurs to assimilate linguistically and culturally, seemingly contradicting the explicit protections of the constitution” and creating stratification in society and example of how biopower is used to control the migration of the Han, but

²⁸ These efforts, to move west, were not about controlling minority groups and their populations; rather it was about concentrating Han populations in places that economic growth could be fostered and develop rapidly (often by taking advantage of natural resources). Later efforts, in the last twenty years, focused more on continuing development while diminishing the proportion of Uyghurs to Han.

pressure Uyghurs to adapt (Bovingdon 2004, vii-ix). So, in the last 15 years, the Communist Party virtually imported a loyal Han constituency; the “government-sponsored immigration of Hans into the region has been a central component of CCP policy in Xinjiang” (Bovingdon 2004, 23). This helps the state control the province because there is a greater balance between ethnic groups. Combined with Uyghur relocation programs, “officials in Beijing and Ürümqi have deployed many of those Han immigrants in a manner that neatly complemented the division of Xinjiang into sub regional autonomies” leading to additional stratification (Bovingdon 2004, 26).

Wealth is also now located in Han-dominated areas, “the Chinese enjoy bigger advantages in all parts of life than the native Uyghurs, since all of the economic and Party leaders in the province are Chinese... leading, better paying jobs are also filled by Chinese, and a salient amount of the new homes are also given to the Chinese... relocation affects first of all the cities, therefore most Chinese live in the capitol, Ürümqi, and its surroundings (Péter 2009). These areas dominate the region because they control the wealth, keeping it from Uyghurs, which reinforces the government’s rationale for relocation programs Furthermore, “...Party’s latest concern has been the scarcity of the most desirable kinds of immigrants to Xinjiang: educated youths; technical workers; and committed, politically reliable cadres,” while the state “has tried a variety of stratagems to remedy those deficiencies, including subsidies to college graduates willing to immigrate and temporary “swaps” of cadres from the interior with groups in Xinjiang” (Bovingdon 2004, 24). Since educated Han are encouraged to migrate to the region, the marketplace marginalizes Uyghurs and squeezes them out of possible jobs. Han fill the void in skilled work, so there is no reason to educate Uyghurs in technically-proficient jobs Han immigrants take. Since Uyghurs suffer high unemployment (due in part to state controlled factors) the state transfers them to jobs in the interior of China through relocation programs, marked by coercion and abusive practices (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 46).

The situation in XUAR is directly due to the state using bio-power through migration policies. This applies to Han, who benefit from them, and to Uyghurs who are affected negatively because they cannot find work and are relocated for jobs. The state’s

use of bio-politics is present in relocation programs which coerce Uyghurs to migrate from their homeland:

Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region continued to send young non-Han men and women to work in factory jobs in the interior of China through programs that, in some cases, reportedly have involved coercion and have placed participants in exploitative working conditions. XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri has denied that workers are coerced into participating in the government-led labor transfer programs versions of which exist elsewhere in China and has described the programs as a means for XUAR residents to earn income and gain job training (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 211).

Opportunities for work outside XUAR help the CCP control the Uyghur people by providing a 'legitimate' rationale for moving them. In 2010, the "XUAR Labor and Social Security Department reportedly planned to transfer 300,000 rural workers... an increase of approximately 60,000 people over the number of workers who went to jobs in the interior of China in 2008" (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 211). The state argued these measures helped the Uyghurs because migratory policies provide Uyghurs with jobs; but the policy's elements of bio-power show the state's concern about "distributing the living in the domain of value and utility" (Foucault 1990, 144). The state uses migratory policies to better make use of unskilled Uyghur work by transferring them to work in factories along the coast; making them more useful for the state.

The state continues "to tie the labor transfers," a technique used to regulate circulation, "to broader efforts to promote state political ideology" and according to a "XUAR Human Resources and Social Security Department official, labor transfers not only have allowed participants to earn money but, 'more significantly,' have enabled ethnic minorities in border areas to 'transform their ideas, liberate themselves from old thinking, and experience the huge achievements gained from the state's reform and opening" (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 211-212). In addition to the bio-political aspect of migratory policies, the state viewed these policies as a way to shape new attitudes and rid minorities of their old customs:

An article on labor transfers in Qaba (Habahe) county in Altay, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, reported that under county government leadership,

numerous rural women changed ‘traditional concepts’ and ‘vigorously threw themselves into various kinds of economic construction.’ Another article reported that authorities in Jiashi (Peyziwat) county, Kashgar district, strengthened services to protect the rights of transferred workers, but also carried out work in ‘ideology education’ and ‘persuasion for morale’ (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 212).

State transfer policies have distinct elements of bio-power, but also incorporate normalization, “the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life” (Foucault 1990, 144). This goes back to the discussion above, the government controls migratory patterns in order to influence Uyghurs to adopt the culture of immigrants to their region, or adapt to the culture of where they are transferred. Meanwhile, in Xinjiang, the state takes steps to restrict migratory patterns of minorities for more than just work; by creating “many obstacles in the way of Uyghurs attempting to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, known as the Hajj, which is a requirement for all practicing Muslims” (Amnesty International 2009). In Xinjiang, “oversight of groups including büwi, people who have gone on unauthorized pilgrimages...” has led to greater supervision and “in line with XUAR government direction, various local authorities pledged to continue curbing unauthorized religious pilgrimages” (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 107). National patriotic religious organizations, including the Chinese Islamic Association (whose prime responsibility is to the Party-state) serve “in the international arena by approving and arranging religious study exchanges and organizing the Hajj for Chinese Islamic Citizens...” deterring many Muslims from going on their pilgrimage and those who do find their movements heavily scrutinized and controlled by the government (Cooke 2009, 139). The Hajj is greatly important for Uyghur Muslims because it is required by the Islamic faith to go on the pilgrimage once in their lifetime. The government’s ability to limit this is another instance the state can separate Uyghurs from their cultural heritage.

While migratory policies are one component of bio-power used by the PRC, the state regulates birthrates of minority groups as well. While the state uses bio-political means to control the Han Chinese through the one child policy, the government extended “national family planning policies to non-Hans in Xinjiang in 1988” (Bovingdon 2004, 26). Uyghur families are limited to only two children, and in some rare exceptions three

in the countryside (under Article 15 of the XUAR's Regulation on Population and Family Planning, rural ethnic minority families are permitted to have a maximum of three children[U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 210]). Although this seems favorable – Uyghurs traditionally have large families – their population cannot grow at the same rate as the Han Chinese, since the proportion of Uyghurs in the country's population continues to decline. This policy is resented by many Uyghurs, who “consider CCP-mandated birth restrictions proof of colonialism—a decision made by an alien power that they would never have made... no category of social life more clearly constitutes ‘their own affairs’ than do fertility decisions, which therefore fall under the purview of autonomous rights... many Uyghurs object on religious grounds that in controlling births, the state is arrogating to itself a power it has no right to wield,” while the state contends it pursues this policy to battle the complex population dynamics of the People's Republic (Bovingdon 2004, 26).

The state distinctly uses bio-power when it regulates the birthing policies of Uyghurs since it is a direct control over the biological processes of the Uyghur people. Besides restricting birthrates the state also incentivizes not having more children:

In October 2009, the National Population and Family Planning Commission signed an agreement with the XUAR government to launch a series of initiatives in the region to strengthen the region's population control work, including through ‘special rewards’ (teshu jiangli) for families in poor and border counties who have fewer children than permitted. Official media reported that the new reward policy mainly targets rural ethnic minority households that already have two children and have ‘been certified’ as voluntarily forgoing a third birth...In March 2009, a XUAR Party official called on ethnic and religious affairs departments to train religious leaders to ‘bring their relatively greater prestige and influence among the religious masses into play [and] actively propagandize the importance of family planning[.]’ *The steps build on earlier measures to target population planning in predominantly non-Han areas within the XUAR* (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 210 [emphasis added]).

These measures exclusively targeted the Uyghur minority – these initiatives exclusively target Uyghurs, who have been identified by the state as a source of overpopulation–, especially Uyghurs living in rural areas who are often uneducated and poor and culturally have large families. This is a deliberate move to rein in minority birthrates, and the state represents it in a positive light. The state also relocates young women for work,

something WUC leader Rebiya Kadeer felt was an attempt to decrease birthrates for Uyghurs because these women are often at the age they would marry and have children (Gershman 2010). State policies that attempt to control the reproductive habits of the Uyghurs have noticeable elements of bio-power and show how the state uses diverse modalities of control to regulate the species body of the Uyghurs. Policies, created to support economic and population stabilization, contain subtle efforts at controlling the migratory and birthing options for Uyghurs especially, and are an example of the state using bio-political processes.

Policy Effects: Discussion on Recent Events

XUAR is a key piece in China's expanding economic building project. The rich abundance of natural resources in the region, discovered recently, contribute to the development of China's domestic policies. At stake in are "122 types of minerals to be found in Xinjiang, oil, natural gas, coal, lead, zinc and gold are the most important ones... the fossil energy sources have the greatest significance... six major oilfields revealed in Xinjiang, which according to today's estimates contain enough energy resources for thirty years," which properly extracted means "1-1.5 million tons of oil can be brought to surface from each oilfield every year" (Péter 2009). While the Chinese squeeze the region for its riches, Uyghurs feel the control over their lands and their lives slipping:

Many Uyghurs have consistently opposed state-sponsored Han colonization as an abridgement of their hypothetical autonomy. Even before the founding of the XUAR, Uyghur leaders and intellectuals warned the influx of Hans would diminish their political influence and force cultural assimilation. In the reform era, Uyghurs worried immigration would drive them out of jobs... (Bovingdon 2004, 26).

By intensifying its use of of disciplinarity, panopticism and bio-politics since the late 1980s, the Communist Party continued to refine its methods of control by adopting policies with 'legitimate' reasoning. These policies are also motivated by the states desire to assimilate the Uyghurs.

In July 2009 riots broke out in Ürümqi, the capital of XUAR, leaving many Han and Uyghurs dead. Uyghur unrest built due to many long-standing CCP policies, some of which were very visible because they officially prevented the "open expression of

dissatisfaction in the region has only increased that discontent” (Bovingdon 2004, viii). On July 5, police in Ürümqi confronted a large protest group comprised of Uyghurs who wanted a government investigation into a fight between Uyghur and Han factory workers in the southern province of Guangdong. State relocation programs were partly to blame for sparking this incident. On May 2, 2009, the CCP relocated a group of Uyghur worker 3,000 miles across China for work, with 818 others following soon. This was part of the government’s plan “to encourage migration [of Uyghurs] from poorer western regions such as Xinjiang to wealthy eastern provinces such as Guangdong” in order to close the income gap and provide work for “the estimated 1.5 million surplus workers in Xinjiang” (Watts 2009). On the night of June 25, “two Uyghurs were killed by a Han mob,” leading to a fight between Uyghur and Han workers of a toy factory the next day, leaving two Uyghurs dead and 118 people injured (Watts 2009; Wong 2009). Guangdong police later arrested a former worker of the factory who “ignited the fight by starting a rumor that 6 Uyghur men had raped 2 Han women at the work site.” (Wong 2009).

Uyghurs in Xinjiang were frustrated because they believed the state was doing little to punish Han instigators and appeared disinterested in the matter entirely. A crowd of over 1,000 Uyghurs took to the streets, taking Chinese officials by surprise. The protest started peacefully; but on the night of May 5, the crowd in the Central Square transformed into angry mob and lashed out against Han Chinese shops and people in the area. Uyghur sources argued this protest was a peaceful “demonstration of 2-3000 thousand people, and riots broke out only after policemen and soldiers attacked the peaceful demonstrators,” while “China accuse[d] the World Uyghur Congress and personally its leader, Rebiya Kadeer of instigating the riots” (Péter 2009). Reports indicated that during the rioting victims were “slashed, stabbed and beaten to death;” the government said 184 people were killed, of which 137 Han Chinese and 46 were Uyghurs, while approximately 1,000 individuals were injured (Wong 2009).

This violent outburst illustrates current tensions in Xinjiang and the level of Uyghur discontent. The Chinese reacted to the Uyghur demonstrations by deploying soldiers who cracked down on protesters violently while the state barred the international media from the region during the crisis. This incident displays one instance where the state relied on force when more subtle mechanisms of control could not be counted on to

maintain stability. The state's use of force indicates the transitional nature of China, which intertwines elements of control used in liberal state but falls back on force to restore order. Since the riots, "billboards in cities all over Xinjiang warn that 'separatism is the greatest threat to the stability of Xinjiang' ... and one finds the same message in political study textbooks and occasional accounts in the local papers;" reminding residents of the region that the state is not leaving (Bovingdon 2002, 42). State actions imply the state is committed to staying in the region and is unwilling to cede control to minority groups in the province. The state also appears to be intensifying the subtle modalities of control that parallel those found in liberal states analyzed by Foucault. The next chapter explores the state's use of these techniques, adapted to Tibet, to see how they compare to those in Xinjiang.

CHAPTER 4- TIBET

Background

Like the Uyghur homeland, Tibet is a remote region with a history of self-rule ended by Sino-domination. Another similarity is the role of religion, an integral component of Tibetan culture. Native Tibetans governed the region prior to Chinese inquests, adopted Buddhism as the state religion, and ruled the area as the Tibetan Empire. Since the PRC invaded Tibet, uprisings have marked PRC control of the region. China points to historical treaties as the basis for their claim over the region and the legitimacy of their rule, which receives significant attention from the international community because of the Dalai Lama (whose homeland is Tibet) and his calls for its independence (echoed in the region by the native Tibetans).

Prior to World War Two, Tibet enjoyed de facto independence following the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the loss of interest by the British. There were several raids by the Chinese into the region before this, occasionally the Chinese ruled indirectly through local nobles, but never held direct control. Between 1912 and 1951 Tibetans were able to claim independence; but in 1949, “the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China marched into Tibet’s eastern provinces of Kham and Amdo, seizing control over the eastern Tibetan headquarters of Chamdo in the following year” (Central Tibetan Administration 2001, 2). The PLA then “circulated a ten-point document, asking Tibetans to cooperate with China in ‘liberating’ Tibet from foreign imperialists;” an attempt by the CCP to legitimize their invasion (Central Tibetan Administration 2001). Fearing continued bloodshed, the Tibetan government at the time dispatched delegates to meet with the Chinese. Chinese Ambassador Yuan Zhong Xian demanded “the Tibetan delegation accept a three-point proposal: i) Tibet should be recognized as part of China ii) Tibetan national defense will be handled by China; iii) Tibet's political and trade relations with foreign countries must be conducted through China;” a proposal Tibet rejected (Central Tibetan Administration 2001, 2).

Following the diplomatic impasse, the PLA resumed its aggressive military campaign in the region. To resolve the problem the “Tibetan National Assembly convened an emergency session and requested the Dalai Lama, only fifteen at that time, to assume full authority as head of state and move his government temporarily to Yatung,

near the Indian border” (Central Tibetan Administration 2001, 3). On 17 November 1950, “the Dalai Lama assumed power at a formal ceremony and wrote to Mao Zedong,” asking for the release of prisoners of war and the withdrawal of Chinese troops in the region (Central Tibetan Administration 2001, 3). After no response the Dalai Lama reached out diplomatically again and, in 1951, the Tibetan government dispatched a delegation to Beijing to reach an armistice. In Beijing, however, the Chinese pressured delegates to sign the 17-Point Agreement on May 23, giving control of Tibet to China as the primary concession. With their military advantage, the Chinese drove through the country and occupied the major cities, crushing resistance, and brought Tibet under the Party’s control.

Following the 17-Point Agreement, the PLA relied on force to contain unrest to maintain order and control the Tibetan people. On March 10, 1959, in Lhasa, the CCP invited the Dalai Lama to a summit. Tibetans took to the streets fearing the Chinese were planning to kidnap their leader. After surrounding the Dalai Lama’s palace the crowd declared national independence. In reaction, Mao “proposed that more troops should be dispatched to Tibet to surround Lhasa and that their mission should be directly tied to the introduction of ‘democratic reforms’ in Tibet,” (Jian 2006, 74). Following orders, the PLA then advanced into the western areas of the region and quelled the Tibetan national uprising of Lhasa in 1959; leading to the exodus of “the Dalai Lama and some 80,000 Tibetans who sought refuge in India, Nepal and Bhutan” (the CTA lists the current exile population at over 140,000, of which about 100,000 are based in India) (Central Tibetan Administration).

Modalities of Assimilation

Since the Tibetan uprising the Chinese remain wary of volatility in the region. To maintain control the state uses policies similar to those in XUAR (and, like in Xinjiang, attention on the region recently escalated in response to protests in March 2008). During the Commission’s 2009 Annual Report period the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China found that:

...as a result of Chinese government and Party policy and implementation,²⁹ and official campaigns to ‘educate’ Tibetans about their obligations to conform to policy and law that *many Tibetans believe harm their cultural identity and heritage, the level of repression of Tibetans’ freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, and association increased further....* (U.S. Congressional Executive Commission on China 2009, 1 [emphasis added])

Although the international community recognizes some of these policies, the Chinese continue to use them in TAR to separate Tibetans from their culture and assimilate them into Han society as. As they did in XUAR, the Communist Party targeted mobility, education, and religion, as key characteristics of minority culture in order to develop policies which could then use these to control the Tibetans.

This chapter analyzes the different modalities of control used by the PRC to assimilate Tibetans. Discipline, panopticism, and bio-politics are evident in some state mechanisms of assimilation, which have intensified in the post-Tiananmen era. Education, religion and migratory patterns are used as examples in this case, as they were in XUAR. Tibet is often the focus of PRC policies because of its economic growth and its future potential, but resistance to Han rule, coinciding with the Dalai Lama’s international role, gives the state added incentive to assimilate Tibetan people in order to prevent future volatility.

Disciplinarity & Education

The Communist Party “created various strategies to deal with... Tibetan problems,” and like other minorities “preferential policies in education are one of the major measures that help to establish and maintain interethnic integration” (Chen 2008, 4). Boarding schools for minority students are an example of this, in 1984 “dislocated boarding classes and schools in inland cities” were established for Tibetan students in sixteen different provinces, all outside Tibet, which “enroll 1,300 to 1,500 Tibetan

²⁹ Some of these policies include “the refusal to engage the Dalai Lama in meaningful talks... increasing the repression and control of religious freedom for Tibetans; poor implementation of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law; and strengthening economic development initiatives that will increase further the influx of non-Tibetans into the Tibetan autonomous areas of China (and in doing so, increase the pressure on the Tibetan culture and heritage.” (U.S. Congressional Executive Commission on China 2009, 3)

students yearly” in order to offer them a better education (Chen 2008, 4³⁰). These schools educate (and integrate) Tibetan students in the same way the state educates the Xinjiang classes. These institutions are institutions of indoctrinate Tibetans into Han culture like those studied in Chapter 3, and are just one place the government uses disciplinarity.

In local schools in Tibet students are integrated and divided according to rank within their classrooms, an example of discipline. A study – done since 2000 – of Muslim children in the Longwu Township the seat of Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, noted “inside classrooms, one of the common scenes is that Muslim students were mainly concentrated at the back of classrooms: ‘The teacher arranges seats in the order of academic achievement. Higher achievers are arranged to sit in front of the classroom and lower achievers are behind’” (Yi 2005, 16). The study, while on Muslims, serves as a firsthand account of educational conditions in Tibet, and Yi notes that all students, both Tibetan and Han, are ordered. This is an example of the use of ordering in Tibetan schools, and parallels Foucault’s assertion that “discipline is an art of rank” (Foucault 1995, 146). In these schools, “rows or ranks of pupils in the class,” distinctly delineate who is successful and who is performing well; the organization of the classroom is “one of the great technical mutations of elementary education,” since the teacher could instruct the entire class at once (rather than one at a time) while more promising students are selected to sit up front making the “educational space function like a learning machine, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchizing, rewarding” (Foucault 1995, 146). Again, although the focus of this study is on minorities it is evident the state uses discipline to shape native Han students as well. But the experiences of minority students in these schools is critical to my study because it shows how students are ranked according to the universal and normalized values defined Han Chinese state, so while Han students are being acted upon, Tibetans and other minority students are not only subject to discipline, but the use of discipline is used particularly reform the habits and behavior of Tibetan youth in accordance with the political views of the state.

Discipline is not only limited to education in schools. Patriotic Education Campaigns (PEC) target religion as well. The state requires monks and nuns to read four

³⁰ Inland areas being those primarily located along the eastern coast, areas populated by majority Han as opposed to the landlocked western areas.

Party issued books (along with other materials and pamphlets) during these campaigns. The first book bases China's claim of Tibet on Kuomintang³¹ policy from the early 1900s (the nationalist opposition to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War), which declared Tibetans were one of five races of China, and stated it was China's duty to liberate the region. The second book is about the Dalai Lama and his "separatist activities," the history of Tibet's feudal society, and its union with China, which emphasizes that China and Tibet are historically united and that Tibetans must preserve the integrity of China. The third book discusses the legal system in China and its relation to religion in Tibet; it outlines approved activities of monks and nuns and stresses the importance of obeying the law. The fourth book titled "A Summary Explanation of the Policy on Religion," explicitly details acceptable behaviors and explains why "rules and regulations are necessary for proper functioning and protection of monasteries and nunneries" (Smith 2008, 179). All Tibetan religious officials must read these four books that outline the Party understanding of history. The core lesson of each emphasizes faith in the Party, loyalty and respect to Party members, and prohibits subversive behavior. The books build "one upon another... orientated towards a terminal, stable point; in short, an evaluative time..." and these volumes follow each other, and the books attempt to influence monks by creating new perspectives in the clergy (Foucault 1995, 160). These campaigns continued on and off "not only in monasteries but among the general population as well, from the mid-1990s to the present" (Smith 2008, 182). The books form a foundation of knowledge based on Party pedagogy, which the CCP uses to normalize the behaviors of those targeted by the PEC, a manifestation of discipline in China.

Following the extensive study of these texts Buddhist religious officials face an examination. While the "number and order of questions on the examination" vary based on the area or religious site, material is always from the Patriotic Education books (Smith 2008, 180). Exam questions in the exams focus on loyalty to the Party and the Dalai Lama's separatist teachings; revealing "that a primary theme of the China's Patriotic Education Campaign was to oppose the Dalai Lama" and to "repress monks' and nuns' opposition to Chinese rule and transform their loyalty from the Dalai Lama and their

³¹ Also known as the Guomindang.

religion into patriotism to china and obedience to China's laws" (Smith 2008, 181). PEC exams had "the triple function of showing whether the subject has reached the level require[d]," or according to the state did the individual renounce the Dalai Lama's policies, and each exam needed to be similar so "that each subject undergoes the same apprenticeship," so the education campaign was standardized so each lama and layperson received the same training, and the exams final purpose was "differentiating the abilities of each individual," Foucault, 1995, 158) which was calculated by an individual's performance on the exam, that served as the basis for used deciding who in the clergy would be trusted or even who must be expelled from the monastery .The goals of the campaign focused on the transformation and obedience of the clergy, which are two results of discipline. Within temples, "democratic management committees claimed that its efforts were successful;" so much so that the "campaign was said to have won understanding from and support of lamas and laymen" (Smith 2008, 181). According to the state, even the "discipline of monks and nuns had improved" (Smith 2008, 181). Successes of the campaign in the monasteries influenced the Party to spread it even further:

...a Party-run Web site reported in June 2009 that students at four TAR 'institutes of higher education' would receive increased "ideological and political education." Among the campaign goals were the creation of 'a defensive 'Great Wall of Steel,' 'increasing anti- separatist, political, and ideological resources available on the school websites, and 'cleaning up' and monitoring information on the internet.' The campaign would 'aim to strengthen the opposition to the Dalai Clique's separatist activities and create a solid educational foundation.' Each of the tertiary education institutions would conduct a speech contest with the theme, 'Gratitude for progress, determination for success, give back to the community'(U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2009, 34).

Discipline in Tibet is evident in schools, where rank orders students so they state can compare them to each other. In schools, Tibetans must compete with their Han Chinese counterparts, so there is added incentive to shed their cultural values and conform to Han society, a struggle not faced by Han children. In temples the Patriotic Education Campaigns subject Buddhist clergy to lessons and examinations to instill new values in monks and nuns, and then rate their capacities to practice their religion. These are two

ways the Chinese state has adapted disciplinarity to function as a tool of integration for Tibetans.

Panopticism & Religion

The cultural identity of Tibetans is distinctly tied to Buddhism in the same way that Uyghurs identities are tied to Islam. But Buddhism is in some ways more divisive because of the stature of the Dalai Lama. Because the Dalai Lama is a vocal proponent of Tibetan independence, the PRC to constantly battles pressure from the international community to cede control of the region. The CCP attempts to appease Tibetans by allowing some freedom of religion, but this is tempered by Chinese attempts to control Tibetans *through* Buddhism, like when the state uses elements of panopticism to partition religious space in Tibet. China found success using discipline to shape the attitude of the Buddhist clergy through the Patriotic Education campaign, and state supervisory institutions provide another aspect of control.

As noted in Chapter 3, China's policy on religion allows people to practice religion, but expects them to obey stringent regulations: remain loyal to the country and oppose instability and separatism. Religion must adapt to the society created by the Communist Party and "no one is allowed to use religion to interfere with the administration of the state, the law, or education" (Smith 2008, 179). Even though this applies to all religion in China, the state intensified these efforts in Tibet to control Buddhists. Attempts to "manage a 'normal order' for Tibetan Buddhism, and transform the Tibetan Buddhist community into one that adheres to state-approved positions and practices, creates increasing restraints on the exercise of freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists," to which the mayor of Lhasa emphasized, in March 2010, that "in Tibet, people can believe whatever they want as long as it is legal" (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 220).

The PRC uses "institutional, educational, legal, and propaganda channels to pressure Tibetan Buddhists to modify their religious views and aspirations," like the Patriotic Education Campaigns, combined with "escalating government efforts to discredit the Dalai Lama... and to transform the religion into a doctrine that promotes government positions and policy has resulted instead in continuing Tibetan demands for freedom of religion and the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet" (U.S. Congressional-Executive

Commission on China 2010, 1,30). In order to accomplish this, the state created the Tibetan Buddhist Academy, a state operated religious school built to “train patriotic and devotional religions personnel who are widely recognized both in their religious accomplishments and moral character,” clergy are taught subjects like politics and sociology (Smith 2010, 257). But younger monks, who have deviated from acceptable norms, are removed from monasteries and sent to the academy also (Smith 2010, 258). This institution is one example of panopticism’s use in religion. The Academy is an important place, it is a site where the government can focus its disciplinary efforts and better shape these monks, effectively creating a site of government power in society.

One organization that serves a supervisory function is the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), a “‘Patriotic religious organization’ established under Chinese government regulation and charged with serving as a ‘bridge’ linking Buddhists to the Chinese government and the Communist Party” (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 30). This organization is structured according to the provincial level, and the Tibet Branch of the BAC (TBBAC) is:

...bound under 2006 TAR government regulations to uphold government policy and accept government supervision and management. The same regulations authorize the TBBAC to establish Democratic Management Committees (DMCs, “management organizations”) within each TAR monastery and nunnery, and to establish provincial-level “measures” that determine how and whether a person may be officially “confirmed” as a monk or nun in a TAR monastery or nunnery (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 32 [emphasis added]).

The modification of behavior requires an extensive system of surveillance, possible in China because of the number of institutions and boards sanctioned by the Communist Party. State omnipresence is possible because its “oversight does no limit state action to religious citizens’ behaviour alone, but also reserves the right of access ‘inside’ religion by means of bureaucratic instrumentality... its framework of regulatory mechanisms inside religious institutions- state oversight of institutional religious life extending to administration, doctrine and ritual, publications, education, and the appointment of personnel- the PRC Government is able to reach into religion’s heart” (Cooke 2001, 139). Buddhists, like Uyghur Muslims, are targeted for observation.

The RRA defines the parameters of acceptable behavior and confines it to a given space, “the RRA explicitly defines obligations for religious bodies, venues, and personnel in performance of their religious activities in many of its articles” (Cooke 2009, 136). All religious sites must register in accordance with the RRA: “is essentially a tool for delimiting the space allowed to religious affairs based on the PRC Government’s determination of state and public interests” (Cooke 2009, 137). In Tibet, the state uses panopticism by creating a growing number of government apparatuses which dictate, enforce, and monitor behaviors, which is possible since the CCP “constructed a state supervisory presence within the organizations and required them, as a condition of legitimacy, to show active support for Party-state policies and goals” (Cooke 2009, 138). In essence, the state supports these institutions, like SARA, because they monitor and observe religious activities according to their charters; placing the clergy under a field of supervision and ordering space. The state regulates religious sites in order to induce a “state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” within Buddhists (Foucault 1995, 201). The state must first “arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of the power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this... apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustain a power relation independent of the person who exercises it...” (Foucault 1995, 201). Panopticism is also a “type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition and of mode of intervention of power...” (Foucault 1995, 205). In Tibet:

People are not allowed to build or restore monasteries or other religious places at their own initiative with their own funds; this is meant to control the revival of Buddhism in Tibet and the number of monks and nuns. No one is allowed to propagate religion outside the confines of approved religious establishments (Smith 2008, 179).

The state restricts the placement of religious sites to make it easier for government entities to maintain their observation over Buddhism, Limiting their places of worship shrinks the necessary gaze of the state and makes monitoring Buddhists easier.

One monastic official, who also holds the rank of Vice Chairman of the TAR Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) spoke to Buddhist monks,

after the protests of 2008, in Tibet in June 2009, at the Jampaling Monastery in Changdu prefecture, and “emphasized the dependency of “freedom of religion” on Party control and patriotism toward China. “Without the Party’s regulations,” he told the monks, “there would be no freedom of religion for the masses. To love religion, you must first love your country”” (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 33). At this time Patriotic Education Campaigns were conducted to teach the CCP ideology, and the state made use of these:

... To ‘educate’ monks and nuns after protests spread through the ethnic Tibetan areas of China in March to April 2008 and maintained such campaigns during... 2009... *A TAR Party official said on March 9, 2009, the day prior to a sensitive March 10th anniversary, that in the period since March 14, 2008, more than 2,300 officials had been dispatched to 505 TAR monasteries and nunneries to ‘promote the legal awareness of monks and nuns and dissuade them from being duped by separatist forces and ensure the normal practice of Buddhism’* (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 33 [emphasis added]). The dispatch of officials to educate and observe the clergy was in response to the Tibetan uprising anniversary, but the role of state officials remained the same as before the incident. They maintained a presence and reminded Buddhists the state remained committed to monitoring them in order to discourage misbehavior, as a guard would monitor a prisoner (within the panopticon) to discourage unacceptable behavior.

The TBBAC made amendments to its charter in February 2009 to pressure monks and nuns to disavow the Dalai Lama as the leader of their religion and the voice of the Tibetan people. New changes included “language characterizing the Dalai Lama as a ‘separatist,’ which combined with their charter as a government-designated religious organization only increases the risk of punishment for monks and nuns who maintain religious devotion to the Dalai Lama even if they do not engage in overt political activity” (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 32). “Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individual on whom a task or particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used;” so its use to counter subversive behavior of Buddhists is another example of the state adapting this modality of control to integrate minorities (Foucault 1995, 205).

Bio-Power & Migration

Tibet's economic structure parallels Chinese society: "the tertiary (service) sector, which includes government administration and security, is abnormally large and dominates the provincial economy, and; the secondary (industry) sector is abnormally small, urban, government-owned and construction oriented... the Tibetan economy is characterized by a Chinese dominated service sector that is largely unrelated to productive activities and that is superimposed on the Tibetan, non-industrial agrarian economy" (Fischer 2002, 6-7). This hurts Uyghurs since government policy "influences regional development through the incentive structures used to encourage the immigration of skilled Chinese workers to Tibet..." which is very "controversial among the Tibetan cadres of the TAR in the past because it was perceived as giving preferential treatment to Chinese cadres and as encouraging Chinese immigration to Tibet rather than investing in local human capital" (Fischer 2002, 30).

Unlike this new economic structure, Tibetan society is traditionally agrarian and nomadic. Tibetans travelled with their herds to graze, making nomadism a part of Tibetan cultural identity. "Mobility provided by nomadic tribes when they allied with the more agricultural areas of Central Tibet during the rise of the Tibetan Empire facilitated the expansion of that empire to the edges of the" Tibetan Plateau (Smith 2010, 256). The state targeted this lifestyle for eradication because the Chinese considered it backwards.

Required to move into newly built housing settlements or nearby towns, many Tibetan herders have been forced to kill most of their livestock and abandon their traditional way of living. After moving to the resettlements, they are frequently unable to find jobs other than temporary or menial labor. This results from their inability to speak Mandarin Chinese, the lack of capital to start small businesses, the lack of skills training available on resettlements, and the inappropriateness of the newly resettled areas to their existing skill sets. Additionally, while the state purports to act as an indefinite caretaker, promising shelter, food, and fuel, resettled populations need to get food and fuel from elsewhere (often relatives), the provided shelter is of poor quality, and healthcare and education are mostly difficult to access (Jue 2011, 170).

The state justified policy by arguing the actions were necessary to "protect the environment and to 'develop,' 'civilize,' and 'modernize' China's western provinces... concentrating Tibetans closer to towns, they arguably would have better access to jobs, education, and medical services" (Jue 2011, 170). A program in 2003 resettled 28,000

people, and then again another 43,600 people in 2004; the “resettlement was said to be ‘voluntary’ and nomads were to be compensated for their unemployment for a few years,” but the new lodgings “had the appearance of low-income housing projects in other countries” and were “devoid of any ethnic style” (Smith 2010, 257). One resettlement program started in 2006 relocated Tibetans who rejected modernizing influences brought by the Han to Tibet. In 2008 alone “312,000 farmers and herders from 57,800 families were moved from shanty homes into new solid brick houses under a government-subsidized housing project... removed from grasslands so they [grasslands] could recover and farmers were to be paid to plant trees and shrubs on their former lands” (Smith 2010, 256). Nomads, accustomed to living off the land without government interference, struggle to adapt.

Recently, “on March 9, 2009, President Hu Jintao urged Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) deputies to the National People’s Congress (NPC) to ‘vigorously advance’ the program of constructing ‘socialist new villages’—an initiative that establishes greater control over the Tibetan rural population by implementing programs which will end the traditional lifestyle of Tibetan nomadic herders by settling them in fixed communities, and reconstructing or relocating farm villages (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 230). Following this “China’s state-run media reported in August 2009 that a program to settle 55,700 nomadic herders living in the Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve (SNNR) in Qinghai province would be complete in 2010,” with “nearly all of the settled nomads... likely to be Tibetans, based on official Chinese census data for the counties within the SNNR” (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 230). This policy directly targets Tibetans, and since nomadism is a distinct part of their native culture the government “intervention aimed at the entire social body or groups taken as a whole,” displays distinct elements of bio-power as the state is trying to reorder their population and make it easier to control.

The policy of relocation is an effective tool for the Chinese state to rein in native culture and centralize the Tibetan population. Rather than being dispersed across the Tibetan Plateau, Tibetans are placed in state created sites; this makes it easier to control their movement throughout the region. The state continues to emphasize that PRC relocation efforts are necessary in order to modernize the people:

Chairman of the TAR government Pema Choling (Baima Chilin) said in March 2010 that ‘constantly deepening efforts to build a new socialist countryside’ was a priority ... state-run media reported in November 2009 that ‘more than 1 million farmers and herdsman’ in the TAR were already ‘enjoying safe houses,’ and that by the end of 2009 an additional 330,000 nomadic herders and farmers would move into new houses. These figures total approximately 1.33 million, a figure equal to about half the TAR Tibetan population. A September 2009 State Council Information Office white paper listed ‘building settlements for formerly nomadic people’ as a measure to ‘relieve the poverty the ethnic minorities suffer,’ but an international advocacy organization said in 2010 the policy threatens Tibetan nomads’ livelihoods and often results in ‘ghetto-like’ conditions (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 230).

860,000 farmers and herders have been moved into new government housing since these policies were implemented. While one effect of the program is the destruction of “one of the most important components of Tibetan culture,” the state benefits from the program greatly because it adds to the stability of the TAR (Smith 2010, 257).

In addition to modernizing Tibetans, the state is heading numerous infrastructure efforts in order to develop the region. Some Tibetans welcome the investment, since it leads to greater wealth in a historically agricultural and poor region; while others condemn it; saying the development benefits too few and encourages further Han migration to the area which damages Tibetans’ culture. The reaction by the Dalai Lama was scathing in his March 10, 2009, address to Tibetans:

Many infrastructural developments such as roads, airports, railways, and so forth, which seem to have brought progress to Tibetan areas, were really done with the political objective of sinicising Tibet at the huge cost of devastating the Tibetan environment and way of life” (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 42 [emphasis added]).

The government spurs growth, but it does little to help ways that native Tibetans have traditionally made their livelihood:

The dramatic increase in urban incomes reflects, in part, the influx of Chinese migrants to the TAR and the financial incentives they receive. Government incentives to encourage the immigration of skilled Chinese workers include substantial wage increases, tax exemptions and tuition waivers. Even within urban areas, inequality appears to be high between cadre and non-cadre urban households. In addition, the growth of the TAR economy has been almost exclusively concentrated in the urban industrial and service sectors. For most

Tibetans, engaged principally in farming and animal husbandry (primary sector activities), the economy has stagnated (Fischer 2002, 6).

Tibetan workers, passed over for work in favor of Han Chinese, try to relocate but the state uses bio-power to control their mobility by controlling in what areas they can work. Favoritism weighs heavily in the selection of workers: “in terms of mobility, the new laws that offer flexible registration to Chinese migrants effectively imply that Chinese migrant labour in Tibet is exceptionally able to freely respond to changing labour market demands;” but “to the contrary, local Tibetan labour may even be restricted within the region based on local registration requirements, and thus forced into temporary status outside their county of residence” (Fischer 2002, 37). This policy “gives a considerable competitive advantage to the Chinese migrants over the locals in their ability to respond to the labour market, and it also allows migrants to exercise influence over local policy because they can effectively vote with their feet” (Fischer 2002, 37). With movement controlled by the state, Tibetans face limitations in their ability to move fluidly throughout TAR to find work and must adapt to Han culture since they cannot fall back on traditional forms of work.

Regulations on movement are significant: in Tibet it is apparent the government uses bio-power to regulate movement for Tibetans and Han Chinese. Han Chinese get incentives while Tibetans are more restricted in their movements. The consolidation of the Tibetan population is a dramatic example of the intensification of bio-power; it is an “adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes” (Foucault 1990, 141). Tibetans cannot rely on traditional animal husbandry and must find work, and discriminatory practices in hiring and travelling for work act “as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence on the respective forces of both these movements [institutions and techniques], guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony” (Foucault 1990, 141). “Successful government of others is often thought to depend on the ability of those others to govern themselves,” and to control conduct, “it must therefore aim to secure the conditions under which they are enabled to do so;” and it appears China’s use of bio-politics to relocate nomads creates the conditions to control the life processes of an entire population more efficiently (Hindess 1996, 105).

Policy Effects: Discussion On Recent Events

The government takes an active role by shaping controlling mechanisms in society by incorporating discipline, panopticism, and bio-power, all of which appear to have intensified since Tiananmen. Like with the Uyghurs, some policies are visible, but are comparatively much more subtle than violent displays of force present in the reactions to minority unrest. The state reaction to protests helps to show that they are still in a transition, and their reliance on force in times of unrest.

A recent example of Tibetan unrest occurred in 2008 shortly after Tibetan Uprising Day, on March 14. Communist Party control over the region reached 50 years at that point and Tibetans remained unhappy with the Chinese occupation. On March 14 demonstrations called for Tibetan independence and as the protests grew so did mobs, which started to riot and lash out against state infrastructure including police cars and state buildings. The Tibetan's protests quickly spread to other provinces, something that had never happened before. The CCP reported the Dalai Lama incited the incident to create havoc and encourage separatism in Tibet. "The Beijing-based think tank, Open Constitution Initiative... released a May 2009 report that rejected the government's core assertion about Tibetan protests and rioting in March 2008," and submitted that the March 14 incident "was not the exclusive result of external influence by the Dalai Lama and organizations that the Chinese government associates with him... but the result of domestic ('internal') issues" (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 9). The Chinese responded to the protests by sending in the police and military to clear out protestors.

Chinese government followed up their use of force with a "crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries, nunneries, schools, and workplaces following the wave of Tibetan protests" which continued well into 2009 (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 56). To maintain control "Chinese authorities continued to attempt to prevent information from leaving ethnic Tibetan areas on the abuse, detention, and punishment of peaceful Tibetan protesters; the political detention of Tibetans for non-protest activity; patriotic and legal education campaigns; other measures to enforce what the government and Party describe as 'stability;' and measures by officials to restrict or prevent the flow of information about conditions in Tibetan areas of China"

(U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 56). The government suppressed international access to Tibet also, as they did in XUAR when they banned the international press during the Ürümqi riots. Measures preventing information about the protests from leaving China “hindered human rights monitoring organizations from providing an adequate account of protests and their consequences” (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 3).

Following the uprising, the PRC resumed “official campaigns to ‘educate’ Tibetans about their obligations to conform to policy and law” (U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2010, 1). Resuming these educational campaigns helps to show the dedication the Chinese have to disciplinary methods. Although they relied on force to end the protests, in the aftermath the Chinese resumed the types of educational campaigns, discussed in this chapter that use elements of disciplinarity like examinations and lessons which build upon each other. This seems to support the hypothesis that China is in a transition: recent policies show Chinese efforts to control the minority population subtly and efficiently, although not invisibly, and have found success; in difficult times they have resorted to force, but then returned to the subtle modalities of control. The final chapter briefly compares state policies to evaluate what similarities the policies have for both minority groups and their development since 1989.

CHAPTER 5- CONCLUSION

A Country in Transition

This thesis identified PRC attempts to deploy new, more subtle control mechanisms; since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989; or intensify ones found before this (such as the boarding school).³² To determine how the state adapted to an increasingly small world by mimicking elements of control found in western liberal democratic states, I focused on ways the state defined normal behavior and created new policies which incorporated three main mechanisms of control to achieve political ends: discipline in the educational system of minorities, panopticism through religion, and bio-power to organize minority populations by controlling the circulation of bodies within the state. In the analysis of Xinjiang and Tibet it appears that CCP efforts to use these modalities are not limited to minorities; but the state does use them to target minority groups, especially the Uyghurs and Tibetans. The intensification of bio-power to regulate movement is an excellent example of the state using it for both minorities and Han Chinese, but the negative effects (intended to coerce minorities to integrate) impact minorities more. The intensification of some PRC assimilation efforts, in schools and religion, attempt to form new behaviors in minorities by shaping the individual, making them the object of discipline rather than necessitating the continuous presence of the state.

It helps to turn back to Agamben in order to understand how the evolution of China is in part an often realized struggle by states seeking to achieve the ‘good life.’ To achieve the good life society must eliminate that which it excludes (in China, the others are minorities and those who don’t fit within Han culture). To accomplish this, the state must reform the body of each subject, and each body is:

... always already caught in the deployment of power... nothing in it or the economy of its pleasure seems to allow us to find solid ground on which to oppose the demands of sovereign power... we no longer know anything of the classical distinction between *zoë* and *bios*, between private life and political

³² Such as cases like restricting Uyghur adults from educating Uyghur youth in Islam (see page 50); or the Tibetan relocation programs which commenced in 2003 (page 73).

existence, between man as a simple living being at home in the house and a man's political existence in the city (Agamben 1998, 187).

It appears that China is in transition: they continue to develop new modalities of control used in XUAR and TAR since Tiananmen and they have intensified some subtle mechanisms found prior to 1989; but recently the state also relied on force to crack down on protestors in both regions. The coupling of disciplinarity and the use of force in China is unique because of the duality of their deployment. The state tries to maintain economic success by assimilating fringe elements within society (minorities) through subtle policies which won't invite international scrutiny. And, while China disassociated itself from the gristly displays of power Foucault associated with the monarchy, there are several incidents within the past five years that demonstrate the state is committed to using force when necessary. The Communist Party now uses 'corrective' power in its policies which target unique traits of a minority group's culture, including schooling, religion, and movement in society. Foucault's analytical perspective is useful when examining state efforts to assimilate minorities through religion and education, and to reshape the culture of their minority group in ways similar to those of liberal states which transformed unruly masses into docile bodies.

Findings

The state made numerous policy changes and implemented reforms targeting the minority groups studied in the period since 1989. It seems, however, that there were elements of some of the three types of power studied. Prior to Tiananmen there were boarding schools in China for minorities, like the Tibetans, that sought to integrate them into Han Chinese culture. Similarly, there were times in the 1980s reform period that restrictions were lifted on religious sites, but government agencies like the Religious Affairs Bureau still monitored and tried to control religion in the People's Republic. It appears that it is more accurate to state that the state has employed new mechanisms of control in the post-Tiananmen era, such as nomadic Tibetan relocation programs. Prior to the 1980s the Communists relied on displays of force,³³ but PRC policy implementations

³³ As illustrated in Chapter 2, on page 18-19, in the story about the Red Guards in during the Cultural Revolution prior to Tiananmen.

in the post-Tiananmen era expose new techniques of control. While Han Chinese were, and still are subjected to some of these mechanisms of control, the state developed specific programs to target minorities and their culture to reform their behaviors and attitudes so that they would accomplish the political goal of assimilating into Han culture.

One prime example was the use of a regimented schedule in the boarding schools; which created a time-table accounting for every minute of time for every week for the students. There was no wasted time, there were established rhythms and cycles of repetition; schedules were so refined they paralleled religious orders of Europe: time was regulated so meticulously that “one began to count in quarter hours, in minutes, in seconds” (Foucault 199, 150). For the Xinjiang classes; students know what they will be doing at any given minute of any given day; because the educational institution has laid out a detailed schedule that maximizes the efforts of students while inserting ceremonial and educational events that serve the goals of the state. While they form a portion of the students in the boarding schools, this shows state efforts to use discipline to incorporate minorities into Han Chinese culture.

The panopticism is applied to religion through the partitioning of space: Foucault described functional sites as an element within discipline “code a space that architecture generally left at the disposal of several different uses,” which is particularly useful for panopticism because it creates a field of vision (for the state) in which they can observe the religious activities of minorities (Foucault 1995, 143). Mosques and temples are closely regulated and overseen by institutional boards sanctioned by SARA and the RRA, preventing the education of youth in religious sites; and religious clergy comply with state “technologies of legalization, standardization, institutionalization...” (Cooke 2009, 136). While the state monitors all religions, even those for Han Chinese, unrest comes from Islamic and Buddhist communities in China and these predominantly minority religions historically fostered dissent at their religious sites, these “particular places were defined to correspond not only to the need to supervise, to break dangerous communications, but also to create a useful space” (Foucault 1995, 143). Partitioning space in society allowed the state to use these sites to “establish presences... to know how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual” (Foucault 1995, 143) The

state partitioned space to enhance panopticism, to maintain a presence in the ceremonies of religion and ensure that individuals were conditioned to behave according to state established norms.

In classical Europe, “at the juncture of the “body” and the “population,” sex became a crucial target of power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death” (Foucault 1990, 147). Instead of a sovereign threatening death, the political apparatus transformed into a custodian of organizations and policies meant to regulate and control the population’s biological and circulatory processes. While the one-child policy applied to the Han population is more lenient for minorities, the two (or sometimes three) child policy for minorities counters traditional Han and Tibetan families, which historically were larger. It additionally does not counteract the migration by Han Chinese into their homelands, which increases the proportion of Hans to Uyghurs and Tibetans (because the Chinese greatly outnumber the Tibetans and Uyghurs, limiting the number of children they can have still decreases the proportion of minorities to Han Chinese because the number of children born each year to Han parents, even if they have just one, will always be higher if minorities are limited in any way). In addition, the Han government perceives minority customs as backwards. The state now does more to change the environment minorities live in by relocating or resettling them. The state moves them for work or to ‘settle’ them in a fixed location while encouraging Han migration to XUAR and TAR. Government control over minorities’ biological processes supports the conclusion that bio-power is present; regulations on migration, combined with relocation policies in Tibet and Xinjiang represent steps by the government to limit minorities’ circulation.

CCP policy is historically vulnerable to radical shifts; some policies ushered in severe practices targeting minorities and forced them to assimilate while others were a liberalization of policies respecting minority rights. International scrutiny played a part in the states intensification of subtle mechanisms of control since the reform era of the 1980s because of economic sanctions and diplomatic pressured applied to China in 1989, due to the state’s response to the Tiananmen demonstrations. This helps explain why China started to transform. Well known figures like the Dalai Lama and Rebiya Kadeer draw greater awareness about their homelands. Examining the vast role of international

of pressure on Chinese domestic policy is impossible in this thesis, but evidence of its role is easy to find:

Today the million-strong Uighur émigré community... Located across the globe... are not all radical... The Washington, D.C.-based Eastern Turkestan National Freedom Center, for instance, lobbies members of Congress on behalf of the Uighur cause and publishes books and tapes on pan-Turkic nationalism for circulation inside Xinjiang... the Xinjiang separatist groups both at home and abroad are too small, dispersed, and faceless to constitute a threat to Chinese control over the region. Beijing fears them nevertheless, because the mere possibility that they may cause disruption creates an impression of social instability in Xinjiang and dampens foreign investment (Chung 2002).

CCP policies are vulnerable to scrutiny now more than ever. The Communist maintains its legitimacy thanks to its economic success in the past 25 years but the state must continue to prevent unrest that would create economic troubles in the country. And it must do so without using domestic policy which could lead to further international sanctions. To stay competitive and to prevent international condemnation, China adapted its controlling mechanisms and modalities of assimilation to resemble those of liberal states in the modern world.

Recent events suggest this transition is not complete however. Uyghurs protested unequal treatment in the summer of 2009, and Tibetans took to the streets to demonstrate the anniversary of Tibetan Uprising Day in March of 2008, and these groups faced a strong response from the CCP. The state used force on demonstrators and barred foreign press from the area, severely limiting the exposure of the incidents to the international community. The states return to subtle policies of assimilation show that they are dedicated, and this lapse in these mechanisms seems to support the conclusion that China is still in transition as its modalities of power still evolve.

Potential for Future Study

The meteoric rise of China's economy in the past two decades places greater demand on the CCP to ensure continued progress. Control over Xinjiang and Tibet is central to the future development of the economy because of the natural resources they hold. PRC migration policies indicate the government plans to add more Han in XUAR and TAR to form majorities in the regions. Both the Uyghurs and the Tibetans struggle to find any amount of autonomy in their provinces; and finding little success they appeal to

the international community. In both cases there is little avenue for political and social expression other than open resistance in the streets. A possible study to follow this thesis would be to document minorities' attempts to realize agency, and find patterns of resistance in the nation. It would seem the intensification of new types of control would affect how minorities resisted the state, and would give more insight on governments like China counteract this resistance by continuing to develop their mechanisms of control.

Since the creation of the World Uyghur Congress in 2004, Uyghurs attempt to voice their concerns and demands to the international community. Their mission statement attempts to voice agency by declaring they represent “the sole legitimate organization of the Uyghur people both in East Turkestan and abroad, [the] WUC endeavors to set out a course for the peaceful settlement of the East Turkestan Question through dialogue and negotiation” (World Uyghur Congress). The Tibetan people have a longer history of government in exile, started in 1959 by the Dalai Lama after the failed Tibetan Uprising. Their goals are to free the Tibetan people and emphasize that they are a transitional government “His Holiness the Dalai Lama stated that the present exile administration would be dissolved as soon as freedom is restored in Tibet,” (Central Tibetan Administration). In both cases, the governments in exile see little avenue for autonomy in the country.

The PRC use of disciplinarity, panopticism, and bio-power to regulate and control subaltern groups could have a dramatic effect on the resistance of minorities. On one hand the international community focuses on human rights violations by the police and military; because of these state policies of forced cultural assimilation go under-recognized because they are subtle, despite intense reactions to them. Both the March 14 incident and the Xinjiang riots in 2008 were responses to Chinese policies. International media coverage and discussion by some academic scholars focused on the incidents, and while some analyzed the events that led to there the academic community would benefit from a more overarching analysis connecting more cases in the country. These incidents suggest that CCP policies are successful because there is more focus on the violent responses to unrest than there is to the reasoning behind the protests.

Conclusion

Chinese policies attempt to separate the Uyghur and Tibetan cultural identities from their religion, native languages, and even their histories. This study documented the intensification of PRC policies to subtly control minorities and the development of new ones. This study also attempted to understand how disciplinary power could be deployed in new ways. Rather than studying a western liberal state, this study used Foucault's analytical perspective to understand power in authoritarian states because of the complexities encountered studying this type of power:

Difficult to localize, hard to formulate, and pulled together from diverse bits and pieces, such exercises of power are, as a result, resistant to analysis and focused opposition. This very difficulty we have in conceiving the exercise of power in terms other than those of the sovereignty model allows the exercise of disciplinary power to go undetected (Ransom, Foucault's Discipline, 19).

Showing China in transition requires a reimagining of power in an authoritarian state. Since China remains a Communist state ruled by a single Party, with a history of hard-line elements that used violence to stop unrest, a new perspective is necessary. In Tiananmen Square the military and police cracked-down on protesters, leading to the deaths of students and the reassertion of power by the state, but if this remained the only type of power analyzed in China (looking at the 3.14 incident in 2008 in Tibet or the Ürümqi riots in 2009) then scholars could miss new developments in the modalities of control used by the state, which prove to be subtle and resistant to analysis.

In conclusion, Foucault helps understand the new forms of "power" in China; by analyzing the Uyghurs and Tibetans it is clear the state employs new forms of control similar to those of western states. This study tries to show that authoritarian governments, like the PRC, must be seen as countries which use elements of power like discipline, panopticism, and bio-politics rather than as bastions of brute oppression. It is now critical to understand how policies can subtly target and integrate minorities in these countries. China's transition shows that authoritarian states can be successful using new forms of control to organize and manage minority populations and reshape their behavior according to norms defined by the state.

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APPENDIX A

Timetables referenced in Chapter 3

Timetable in the Xinjiang Classes

Morning:	
● 5:50 to 6:10 am	getting up, ablutions
● 6:10 to 6:30 am	morning exercise
● 6:30 to 6:55 am	Breakfast
● 7:00 to 7:40 am	reading session / national flag hoisting ceremony (Monday)
● 7:40 to 7:55 am	morning gym
● 8:00 to 8:45 am	session 1
● 8:55 to 9:40 am	session 2
● 9:40 to 9:45 am	eyes protection exercise and music appreciation
● 9:55 to 10:40 am	session 3
● 10:50 to 11:35 am	session 4
● 11:40 am	lunch
Afternoon:	
● 12:30 to 2:00 pm	afternoon break
● 2:00 pm	preparation bell
● 2:10 to 2:25 pm	calligraphy
● 2:30 to 3:15 pm	session 5
● 3:25 to 4:10 pm	session 6
● 4:10 to 4:15 pm	eyes protection exercise
● 4:25 to 5:10 pm	session 7
● 5:20 to 6:05 pm	session 8 or outdoor activities
● 6:10 to 6:35 pm	dinner
Evening:	
● 6:55 pm	preparation bell
● 7:00 to 8:00 pm	self-study session 1
● 8:10 to 9:00 pm	self-study session 2
● 9:10 to 9:50 pm	self-study session 3
● 10:00 pm	lights off and sleeping

Fig. 1 [fair use]

Chen, Yangbin. *Muslim Uyghur Students in a Chinese Boarding School*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 192. Fair Use determination attached.

**Weekly Schedule for Class Fifteen, Grade One, Xinjiang Classes
September 1, 2003**

	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun
Session				Morning			
1	history	math	Chinese	English	Chinese	history	self-study
2	math	geography	English	Chinese	history	math	self-study
3	Chinese	Chinese	math	physics	chemistry	geography	self-study
4	IT	English	chemistry	math	math	Chinese	free
				Afternoon			
5	English	PE	IT	history	politics	chemistry	free/outing
6	physics	arts	geography	chemistry	English	politics	free/outing
7	class meeting	politics	physics	geography	PE	free	free/outing
8	self-study	English	self-study	self-study	physics	free	free/outing
				Evening			
1	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study
2	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study
3	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study	self-study	self study

Fig. 2 [fair use]

Chen, Yangbin. *Muslim Uyghur Students in a Chinese Boarding School*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 193. Fair Use determination attached