

The Rise of Regional Hegemons: Assessing Implications for the International System through a  
Neo-realist Perspective

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## Abstract

Never before have developing nations been able to compete at the international level, both economically and militarily. But, we are currently in an age where developing nations, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, are able to develop so rapidly that they are able to excel within the international economy, which allows for an increased investment in military and technological capabilities. Consequently, these rapidly developing nations are able to influence the international system. To see how much of an effect these rapidly developing nations are having within the international system, they will be measured against 5 indicators that correlate with becoming a rising regional hegemon, a feature of a multi-polar system. The multi-polar international system that we see emerging is contrary to Kenneth Waltz's assertion that a multi-polar international system is unstable, and a bi-polar international system is preferred. New global conditions indicate that Waltz's analysis may not stand the test of time.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

### Background

Since the end of the Cold War and up until the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US has arguably been the global hegemon of a uni-polar international system. More specifically, “[i]n 2000, the United States was at the apex of international power in a unipolar world...” (Hadar, 2009<sup>i</sup>). However, as the rapidly developing nations of Brazil, Russia, India, and China emerge as potential rising regional hegemon, we see the international system moving away from being uni-polar to what we are seeing as an evolution into a multi-polar international system based upon regional hegemon. According to Chinese analysts, this can largely be attributed to the fact

that having won the cold war, the United States had also been badly weakened by years of overextension and exhaustion. Rampant global turbulence and America's growing rifts with allies and Russia, persistent U.S. economic woes, debilitating social problems, and rising isolationist domestic public opinion all imposed important constraints on U.S. power (Deng, 2001, pp 345-346).

The issues that Chinese analysts identified in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century continue a decade later, which further weakens the US's ability to be the sole guarantor of global stability and order. Furthermore, in Asia specifically, we are seeing “...a relative decline of U.S. influence and authority” (Shambaugh, 2005, p. 64). Therefore, as the role of the US within the international system continues to devolve away from being a uni-polar hegemon, it will no longer be looked to as the sole guarantor of collective security and enforcer of the stable and orderly continuation of the international system. Consequently, responsibility will ultimately fall on the regional hegemon within the multi-polar international system that we see emerging.

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<sup>i</sup> Quotation can be found in the last paragraph of the cited reference.

## **Main Argument and Concepts**

Never before have developing nations been able to compete at the international level, both economically and militarily. But we are currently in an age where developing nations, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, are developing so rapidly that they are able to excel within the international economy, which allows for an increased investment in military and technological capabilities. Consequently, these developing nations are able to impact the structure of the international system, effectively explaining the current transition of the international system from being one of uni-polarity (based upon the United States), to one of multi-polarity based upon regional hegemons (potentially Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Through my research, it will be evident that the BRIC countries are indeed interested in becoming regional hegemons through greater investments in their respective militaries, promoting the security of other nations globally, greater involvement in humanitarian assistance projects worldwide, and more emphasis on the development of regional initiatives to insure greater stability in their regions. It is my argument that uni- and bi-polar systems are no longer feasible due to the emergence of potential regional hegemons within the international system. The multi-polar international system that we see emerging runs counter to the theory developed by Kenneth Waltz, a neo-realist thinker, who argues that a multi-polar international system is unstable, in favor of the more stable bi-polar system.

To provide a clearer understanding of my argument, the following section will articulate the key concepts used in this thesis. The first concept that needs to be discussed is hegemony. In most definitions of hegemony, the main focus is on the ability to exude force through power. According to Robert Gilpin, hegemony is characterized by “[a]single powerful state [that]

controls or dominates the lesser states in the system” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 29). The most powerful country is ultimately the hegemon. Incorporating an economic perspective, a hegemon has “...an economic capability so far ahead of anybody else in the world...that it could undersell anyone in their home markets” (Wallerstein, 2003<sup>ii</sup>). A hegemon economically has the ability to out-compete lesser countries within their own markets, threatening their economic livelihood. Other authors assert that hegemony is where “...the strongest state that appears, by its very strength and influence, to pose a threat to lesser states” (Dougherty, et al, 2001, p. 132). Consequently, through the use of force or influence, the ability to dominate other nations symbolizes hegemony. Scholars therefore agree that in traditional hegemony, lesser states feel threatened by an overarching power.

However, unlike historical examples of hegemony where quantitative power was the sole determining factor, in today’s international system, quantitative power is combined with a social view of power for a more effective hegemonic leader. Yannis A. Stivachtis provides an excellent discussion on hegemony and the distinction between social and non-social conceptions of power (Stivachtis, 2010). Basically, “[t]he latter is based on a quantitative measurement of a country’s military, economic and technological capabilities in relation to those of other countries” (Stivachtis, 2010<sup>iii</sup>). Therefore, the former “...focuses on the voluntary acceptance of the hegemon’s rules and values by a significant number of states in the international system, including some important great powers” (Stivachtis, 2010<sup>iv</sup>). Accordingly, non-social conceptions of power focus on the ability to force other nations to do something through the use of greater capabilities. Social conceptions of power focus more on mutual agreement that the rules and values being established are in everyone’s best interest.

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<sup>ii</sup> Quotation can be found in the third paragraph of the cited reference.

<sup>iii</sup> Quotation can be found in the second paragraph of the cited reference.

<sup>iv</sup> Quotation can be found in the second paragraph of the cited reference.

For the purposes of this project, the concept of hegemony will be defined utilizing Stivachtis' discussion on the social conceptions of power. Gone are the days when hegemony simply referred to brute force. In today's international system, more emphasis is placed on diplomacy and other peaceful means of conflict resolution; a hegemon is expected to be a leader within those areas.

Now that the concept of hegemony has been clarified, the concept of regional hegemony can be discussed. It is difficult to find a solid definition for regional hegemony; however, it is possible to define a regional power. It must be noted though, that these two terms are not the same. According to Buzan and Wæver, "[r]egional powers define the polarity of any given RSC [regional security complex]...Their capabilities loom large in their regions, but do not register much in a broad-spectrum way at the global [system] level. Higher-level powers respond to them as if their influence and capability were mainly relevant to the securitization processes of a particular region" (Buzan, et al, 2003, p. 37). Per this definition, regional powers are important and have leverage within their respective regions, but that is where their influence ends. This definition for a regional power leaves something to be desired when discussing a regional hegemon because, within a multi-polar international system, it would be expected that a regional hegemon would be involved at the system level, as well as at the region level. When looking at Buzan and Wæver's definition of a great power, that additional link is found in "...that [great powers] are responded to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power" (Buzan, et al, 2003, p. 35).

Therefore, in defining the concept of regional hegemony for this project, Buzan and Wæver's "great power" and "regional power" definitions are combined into a single descriptive term – regional hegemony. A regional hegemon will need to "...define the polarity of any given



RSC...” and have the capability to “...loom large in their regions...” through greater investments in its respective military and an emphasis on the development of regional initiatives to insure greater stability in its region, as well as be “...responded to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power” by promoting the security of other nations globally and through greater involvement in humanitarian assistance projects worldwide (Buzan, et al, 2003, pp. 35, 37). A regional hegemon will need to be a force within its region, as well as be able to communicate at the system level.

Of note, Stivachtis’ social conceptions of power discussed in the context of hegemony are still relevant for regional hegemony and are included within my conceptual definition. This is due to the fact that Buzan and Wæver’s regional security complex theory (RSCT) is dependent upon the security interactions and security interdependence of countries within close proximity of one another (Buzan, et al., 2003, pp. 4, 45). It follows that security interactions will be more fully realized if there is mutual respect and acceptance of the rules within the region, rather than if nations within the region feel they are being forced to accept rules based upon the fact that another nation is more powerful.

Based on the theoretical complexity of a regional hegemon, five indicators were identified to determine a rising regional hegemon in this project. A rising regional hegemon will be determined based on annual growth in GDP, military strength, involvement in the security of other nations globally, support for humanitarian assistance projects worldwide, and the effective use of diplomacy through the development of regional initiatives.

Finishing up the discussion on regional hegemony requires defining the concept of rapidly developing nations who are in the position to become rising regional hegemons. Developing nations are generally considered as such based solely on their economic

development. According to the World Bank, developing countries are those “...countries with low or middle levels of GNP per capita as well as five high-income developing economies – Hong Kong (China), Israel, Kuwait, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates” (World Bank, 2004<sup>v</sup>). The World Trade Organization (WTO) does not have definitions for developing or developed countries. Members are simply allowed to “...announce for themselves whether they are ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ countries. However, other members can challenge the decision of a member to make use of provisions available to developing countries” (World Trade Organization, 2011). Lastly, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) utilizes more of an exclusionary type of definition when determining if a nation is developing or developed. Specifically, “[c]ountries in the very high HDI [Human Development Index] category...are referred to as developed, and countries not in this group are referred to as developing” (UNDP, 2010<sup>vi</sup>).

Due to the fact that there is no over-arching definition of a developing nation, it is also difficult to define a rapidly developing nation. However, the term rapidly developing *economy* is frequently utilized in relation to a rapidly developing *nation*. A rapidly developing economy is often used to describe a developing nation whose growth in GDP is significantly greater than the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Hawksworth, et al, 2008, p. 10). For the purpose of this thesis, a rapidly developing economy is being correlated to a rapidly developing nation. This is due to the fact that a rapidly developing nation can become a rising regional hegemon; a rapidly developing economy cannot. More specifically, even though economic development can be the mark of a rapidly developing nation, it alone does not make a regional hegemon. That being said, additional measurement variables are

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<sup>v</sup> Quotation can be found under the term “developing countries” in the cited reference.

<sup>vi</sup> Quotation can be found under the term “developed/developing” in the cited reference.

incorporated in this thesis to determine if a rapidly developing nation is indeed a rising regional hegemon, such as military strength, involvement in the security of other nations globally, support for humanitarian assistance projects worldwide, and efforts at regional initiatives to further diplomacy. As mentioned previously, these measurement variables are being utilized to illustrate whether or not a rapidly developing nation is a rising regional hegemon per the definition derived from Buzan and Wæver where a regional hegemon is expected to "...define the polarity of any given RSC..." and has the capability to "...loom large in [its region] as well as be "...responded to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power" (Buzan, et al, 2003, pp. 35, 37). The BRIC countries are all considered to be rapidly developing economies; therefore, they are included in this thesis as rapidly developing nations against which the indicators of a rising regional hegemon will be measured (Bhattacharya, et al, 2006, p. 14).

After clarifying who could potentially be involved within the international system, it is necessary to discuss polarity within the system itself. When looking at polarity within the international system, each type, uni-, bi-, and multi-polar, must be addressed individually as separate concepts. Traditionally, "...[p]olitical scientists describe as *unipolar* the structure of an international system where there is one preponderant power" (Nye, 2000, p. 34). Notably, "...[u]nipolar systems tend to erode as states try to preserve their independence by balancing against the preponderant power, or *hegemon*, or a rising state eventually challenges the leader" (Nye, 2000, p. 34). It follows that a uni-polar international system is precarious in that nations will constantly be balancing against the uni-polar power in an effort to overthrow it. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. agree that, "...theorists contend...unipolarity is both dangerous and unstable. There is a tendency for other powers to ally or coalesce to oppose the

strongest state...” (Dougherty, et al, 2001, p. 132). Therefore, “[a]ccording to this logic, a balance can only be restored if the leading state is confronted with the countervailing capabilities of an opposing group of states. Therefore, unipolarity [by its very nature] is likely to be temporary” (Dougherty, et al, 2001, p. 132). Again, a uni-polar international system is conducive to violence and unrest due to the fact that other nations are constantly looking to oppose the strongest state. Therefore, for the purposes of this project, a uni-polar international system is defined as a single preponderant power and is precarious in its stability.

In regards to the concept of a bi-polar international system, scholars agree that there are two centers of power; however, the stability of said system is open to debate. According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “[i]n *bipolar* systems, two major centers of power, either two large countries or two tightly knit alliance systems, dominate politics...In bipolar systems, alliances become more rigid, which in turn contributes to the probability of a large conflict, perhaps even a global war. Some analysts say that ‘bipolar systems either erode or explode’” (Nye, 2000, p. 34). A bi-polar international system can be characterized by violence due to the fact that it encourages two sides to build up against one another. Robert Gilpin agrees that in a bi-polar international system, "...in which two powerful states control and regulate interactions within and between their respective spheres of influence; despite important exceptions, the tendency has always been for such systems to be unstable and relatively short-lived" (Gilpin, 1981, p. 29).

Kenneth Waltz’s view of a bi-polar international system is much different from the other noted definitions in that he considers it to be more stable, not less. He argues that, “[w]ithin a bipolar world, four factors conjoined encourage the limitation of violence in the relations of states. First, with only two world powers there are no peripheries” (Waltz, 1964, p. 882). In a bi-polar international system, the fact that there are only two powers limits the possibility of

violence with lesser countries because those other countries do not matter (Waltz, 1964, p. 882). The only actions taken would be in response to something the other major power had done (Waltz, 1964, p. 882). Secondly, “[n]ot only are there no peripheries in a bipolar world but also...the range of factors included in the competition is extended as the intensity of the competition increases” (Waltz, 1964, 883). As opposed to needing to maintain a competitive advantage against numerous countries, and being unsure of how to do so all at once, the two powers are only occupied with staying competitive with, and responding to, one another (Waltz, 1964, 2003). Each power is always wholly aware of where the other stands.

Following on, “[t]he third distinguishing factor in the bipolar balance, as we have thus far known it, is the nearly constant presence of pressure and the recurrence of crises” (Waltz, 1964, p. 883). It is understood that both sides are powerful and able to exert a similar level of force against the other (Waltz, 1964, p. 884). However, when dealing with crises, the fact that both sides are “equally” powerful encourages both sides not to push the other too far (Waltz, 1964, p. 884). Lastly, “[t]he constancy of effort of the two major contenders, combined with a fourth factor, their preponderant power, have made for a remarkable ability to comprehend and absorb within the bipolar balance the revolutionary political, military, and economic changes that have occurred” (Waltz, 1964, p. 886). More specifically, the two major powers within a bi-polar international system are able to absorb changes within the system without those changes affecting the overall system (Waltz, 1964, p. 886). This is due to the fact that the two powers are able to control their balance with one another and can choose not to allow these outside changes to create disruptions (Waltz, 1964, p. 887).

As can be seen in the aforementioned definitions, the issue of stability within a bi-polar international system is obviously debatable. This author would tend to agree that a bi-polar

international system is in fact unstable. However, due to the fact that this project argues against Kenneth Waltz and his assertion that a bi-polar international system is the most stable, his definition will be utilized to define the concept of a bi-polar international system.

Lastly, when discussing the concept of a multi-polar international system, it is acknowledged that there are "...three or more centers of power..." (Nye, 2000, p. 34). According to Nye, "[i]n multipolar or dispersed power systems, states will form alliances to balance power, but alliances will be flexible. Wars may occur, but they will be relatively limited in scope" (Nye, 2000, p. 34). Within a multi-polar international system, alliances will still be formed, just like in a bi-polar international system; however, these alliances do not encourage a major build up. More specifically, according to Gilpin, a multi-polar international system is characterized by "...a balance of power in which three or more states control one another's actions through diplomatic maneuver, shifting alliances, and open conflict" (Gilpin, 1981, p. 29). It is not to say that there will not be conflict within a multi-polar international system; however, conflict will be one of a number of options when attempting to deal with issues within the international system.

According to Waltz, a multi-polar international system is defined as more than two states where "...states rely for their security both on their own internal efforts and on alliances they may make with others" (Waltz, 2000, pp. 5-6). As opposed to simply relying on themselves or their bloc to ensure security as in a bi-polar international system, countries within a multi-polar system must make alliances with the other major powers. Taking this argument a step further, Waltz states that a multi-polar international system is more unstable due to the fact that "[c]ompetition in multipolar systems is more complicated...because uncertainties about the comparative capabilities of states multiply as numbers grow, and because estimates of the

cohesiveness and strength of coalitions are hard to make (Waltz, 2000, p. 6). There is more uncertainty within a multi-polar international system, which results in more instability and potentially more violence.

Waltz's definition of a multi-polar international system is important due to the fact that my project is arguing for a multi-polar international system while Waltz, as a neo-realist, must argue against it. However, for the purpose of this project, Gilpin's definition of a multi-polar system is being utilized. This is due to the fact that Gilpin emphasizes diplomacy, something Waltz does not, shifting alliances and open conflict as characteristics of a multi-polar international system, which incorporates Stivachtis' notion of social conceptions of power through the inclusion of diplomacy (Gilpin, 1981, p. 29). As mentioned previously, Stivachtis' notions of social conceptions of power are very important factors when discussing modern-day hegemony, particularly when there are numerous powerful nations within one international system.

## **Methodology**

This research argues against Kenneth Waltz's theory, specifically his assertion that a bi-polar international system is the most stable and preferred, while a multi-polar international system is considered unstable. It is my argument that a uni-polar or bi-polar system is no longer feasible due to the ability of rapidly developing nations to become regional hegemony within the international system. Furthermore, it is my argument that a multi-polar international system can be more stable than a bi-polar system by establishing a foundation for the implementation of regional collective security initiatives. Buzan and Wæver's regional security complex theory

(RSCT) is utilized to further support the argument that the region-level will be instrumental in the stable and orderly continuation of the international system both now and in the future.

In support of the argument, statistical evidence is utilized as the main source of data collection. The project follows a nonexperimental design, which "...is a strategy for collecting information and data that will be used to test hypotheses..." (Johnson, et al., 2008, p. 148). It has been noted that nonexperimental design is "...an important design to use for developing and evaluating public policies as well as for developing explanations for and testing theories of political phenomena" (Johnson, et al., 2008, p. 15). Nonexperimental design was also chosen due to the fact that the author did not have control over the application of one of the independent variables, the rise of potential regional hegemony (Johnson, et al., 2008, p. 148). Specifically, the project takes the form of a comparative case study between the individual BRIC nations, and the US when applicable, in an effort to provide "...more explanatory power...[as it]...allows for replication; that is, it enables a researcher to test a single theory more than once" (Johnson, et al., 2008, p. 152).

More importantly, in a comparative analysis, "...cases are chosen for the presence or absence of factors that a political theory has indicated to be important" (Johnson, et al., 2008, p. 152). In the comparative analysis, the presence or absence of the chosen indicators is examined across the BRIC countries, focusing on the time period after the Cold War through 2010, which aids in determining if the BRIC countries can be deemed rising regional hegemony per the definition. When appropriate, I will be comparing the information and data to that of the US as well. The comparative analysis between rising regional hegemony and a developed nation will provide an excellent opportunity to see if a rising regional hegemon is indeed in the position to affect the organization of power within the international system as a whole.



## **Research Question**

What are the implications of the rise of rapidly developing nations for Kenneth Waltz's theory that a bi-polar international system is the most stable, while a multi-polar international system is considered unstable?

## **Hypothesis**

If patterns of behavior of rapidly developing countries, in this case Brazil, Russia, India, and China, indicate the emergence of regional hegemony and consequently, a change in the structure of the international system from uni-polar to multi-polar, then Waltz's argument that bi-polar international system is the most stable will be deemed a poor match for the world that is emerging and in need of serious revision.

## **Variables**

Dependent variable: Structure of the international system [multi- versus uni-polar]

Independent variable: Rise of regional hegemony (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)

Other independent variables: Weakening US leadership; Extended/global financial crises

## **Measurements of Independent Variables**

Indicators of rising regional hegemons:

**Yearly growth in GDP.** Based on data derived from Table (1), the baseline set to determine whether a developing nation is a rising regional hegemon is a minimum of 5 percent annual growth in GDP since the end of the Cold War (1990) thru 2010.

**Table (1) Gross Domestic Product - Annual Percent Change**

<b>World Economic Outlook (WEO) Aggregate</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>
<b>Emerging and developing economies</b>	3.4	3.8	2.3	3.3	3.4	4.0	5.1	5.6	2.5	3.2	5.8
<b>World (All WEO countries)</b>	3.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	3.4	3.3	3.8	4.3	2.6	3.5	4.8

<b>World Economic Outlook (WEO) Aggregate</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
<b>Emerging and developing economies</b>	3.7	4.7	6.2	7.5	7.3	8.2	8.8	6.1	2.7	5.0
<b>World (All WEO countries)</b>	2.3	2.9	3.6	4.9	4.6	5.2	5.4	2.9	-0.5	5.0

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011

This baseline was chosen due to the fact that, according to the International Monetary Fund, "Emerging and developing economies<sup>viii</sup>" have had an average overall growth in GDP of 4.89 percent from 1990-2010, and the "world" has had an average overall growth in GDP of 3.41 percent from 1990-2010 (International Monetary Fund, 2011). Therefore, the 5 percent baseline places the annual growth in GDP of rapidly developing nations above that of the world average and right at the average expectation for a well-performing emerging market/developing country. The average GDP figures for the "Emerging and developing economies" and the "world" were derived by taking the annual percent change in GDP for each year from 1990-2010, and then averaging them together to get the overall average percent change in GDP for the time period examined. US annual change in GDP was also included for this indicator, along with BRIC-country data, for the basis of a comparative analysis between the level of annual GDP growth between a developing and a developed nation. Of note, if the global extended financial crises are

<sup>vii</sup> Per the IMF website, there are 150 "Emerging and developing economies." The list in its entirety can be found at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/groups.htm#wa>.

responsible for the changes in the international system, then the data will be expected to illustrate a decrease in GDP beginning in the mid-2000s for all countries on which data was collected. Resulting from this, there is also the expectation that any follow-on indicators relating to monetary support would also see a decrease beginning in the mid-2000s. The global financial crises that began in the late-2000s hit the US hard and have been very detrimental to its economy. For the international system to change per this indicator there would be the expectation that the US would fall as an economic powerhouse and another nation(s) would step up to take its place.

***Military Strength.*** Three aspects of the military that this project will examine for the individual BRIC countries are: 1. force strength [size of the military]; 2. financial strength [defense spending as a percentage of GDP]; and 3. new military equipment and technology being purchased [warships, aircraft, nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles]. This data will then be used to correlate whether or not these rapidly developing nations are in fact attempting to become rising regional hegemony within their respective areas. In determining the baseline for force strength [size of the military], I chose to utilize the size of the United States' military, averaged over the time period examined, to determine if a rapidly developing nation is a rising regional hegemon. Therefore, as derived from Table (2), a rapidly developing nation will be expected to have a standing military at or above 1,601,000 persons.

**Table (2) United States Military Strength (measured in 1000s)**

	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>
<b>United States</b>	2180	2110	1920	1810	1710	1620	1570	1530	1510	1490

	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
<b>United States</b>	1366	1368	1414	1427	1450	1473	1546	1507	1498	1540	1580

Data compiled from the following sources: Singer, et al, 1972; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 29; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, p. 28; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 29; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, p. 31; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 31

The US does not necessarily have the largest military in the world; however, it is arguably the world's strongest military power (Parrish, 2012). A rapidly developing nation, who strives to be a regional hegemon, will be expected to have similar aspirations for military might. Therefore, if the force strength of a rapidly developing nation is comparable to that of an acknowledged military power, in this case the US, it will be considered a rising regional hegemon per this first sub-indicator.

In order to measure financial strength, data were collected on the amount of GDP dedicated to military expenditures for each BRIC country, as tracked by *World Military Expenditures*. To determine whether or not a rapidly developing nation has aspirations to be a regional hegemon per this second sub-indicator, a baseline of 4 percent of GDP dedicated to military expenditures was chosen. The 4 percent baseline was chosen based on the fact that the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) considers nations with at least 4 percent of their GDP dedicated to military expenditures to be "Countries with high military expenditure" (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012). Rapidly developing nations as rising regional hegemons will need to continue to upgrade their military equipment and technology to bring them into the modern age, which will require large sums of money. Therefore, it would be expected that these rapidly developing nations would need to have at least 4 percent of their GDP dedicated to military expenditures if they are to be considered rising regional hegemons per this second sub-indicator.

In regards to measuring technological and weapons advancements and upgrades, the baseline for the third sub-indicator is the ability of a rapidly developing nation to militarily reach out to countries beyond its immediate border countries. Therefore, it would be expected that a

rapidly developing nation will have ballistic missile capabilities<sup>viii</sup>, nuclear capabilities, a strong naval force (warships<sup>ix</sup>), and a strong aviation force (fighter/attack aircraft<sup>x</sup>). Data regarding new military equipment and technology ordered from 1990-2010, as tracked by *The Military Balance*, was collected. Of note, the purchasing of new military technology and equipment was chosen as a sub-indicator instead of looking at the overall equipment levels and technology being used per country due to the fact that the trends being looked for were in relation to the desire of the potential rising regional hegemony to have a modern and effective force able to reach militarily beyond their respective borders. While some countries have very large numbers of weapons and equipment, the technology and systems are out-dated and no longer effective. Supplemental research was conducted through the Library of Congress's country studies and country profiles, the Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China – 2010, and other scholarly sources.

***Investment in its region, and beyond.***

*Security of other nations.* The United Nations (UN) is a recognized legitimate international body that utilizes its peacekeeping forces in an effort to "...provide security and the political and peacebuilding support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace" (United Nations Peacekeeping - What is peacekeeping?, 2011<sup>xi</sup>). As of 30 April 2011, 115 countries were involved in various UN Peacekeeping missions (United Nations Peacekeeping - Country Contributions, 2011). The UN tracks not only the number of

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<sup>viii</sup> Notably, "...ballistic missiles have become both the essential long range artillery of modern warfare, and the means par excellence of exerting international pressure" (Claremont Institute, 2012).

<sup>ix</sup> According to the US Navy, a warship is "[a]ny commissioned ship built for or armed for naval combat," to include, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, littoral combat ships, submarines, amphibious helicopter carriers, and land craft carriers (NAVSEA, 2012).

<sup>x</sup> Fighter aircraft are primarily involved in maintaining air superiority, while "[a]ttack aircraft are equipped to strike ground or naval targets" (Fighter/Attack Aircraft, 2012).

<sup>xi</sup> Quotation can be found in the third paragraph of the cited reference.

peacekeeping operations that individual countries are involved in, but also the number of troops, military experts on mission, and police that are supplied by the respective countries. The data were utilized to show potential rising regional hegemon involvement in helping to maintain the security of other nations worldwide. Notably, the security of a regional hegemon's region will be paramount; however, the regions do not operate in a vacuum and they will likely be called upon to assist outside of their region. By being willing to assist beyond their regional borders, a regional hegemon will be helping to ensure the future security of its region.

In regards to providing security for other nations, the baseline for a rising regional hegemon per this indicator is 3500 peacekeeping forces for each year of the time period examined. The UN actively tracks the top 20 highest contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations<sup>xii</sup>. Therefore, this baseline was chosen by taking the top 20 contributors for 2011 [as of December 2011] and averaging the amount of peacekeeping forces they have provided to UN peacekeeping operations, which were 3837 peacekeeping forces (data derived from United Nations Peacekeeping – Ranking of military and police contributions, 2011, p. 1). It is expected that a rising regional hegemon will be a leader at providing security for other nations, which means they should fall within the top 20 contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations, solidifying their place as a regional hegemon within the international system. Data concerning US support for humanitarian assistance operations have also been included for this indicator as a means of comparing a developed nation, and acknowledged hegemon, to a rapidly developing nation. Of note, if weakening US leadership is responsible for changes in the international system, the data will be expected to illustrate a decrease in US involvement in UN-related peacekeeping operations during the chosen time period.

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<sup>xii</sup> The top 20 contributors of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations for 2008 and 2011 can be found at <http://www.un.org/events/peacekeeping60/PDF/personnel.pdf> and <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf>.

*Humanitarian assistance.* The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) tracks humanitarian assistance by donor country through the Financial Tracking Service (FTS). The FTS

... is a global, real-time database which records all reported international humanitarian aid (including that for NGOs and the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement, bilateral aid, in-kind aid, and private donations). FTS features a special focus on consolidated and flash appeals, because they cover the major humanitarian crises and because their funding requirements are well defined – which allows FTS to indicate whether populations in crisis are receiving humanitarian aid in proportion to needs. FTS is managed by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). All FTS data are provided by donors or recipient organizations (UNOCHA, 2011<sup>xiii</sup>).

Of note, even though FTS data is provided by donors or recipient organizations, the fact that the data is managed by the UNOCHA ensures the integrity of the information. The FTS data for donor countries was utilized to track the amount of humanitarian assistance provided by the rapidly developing nations. That information was then compared to country GDP to determine the percentage of GDP contributed per country. This takes into account countries with a lesser GDP, which rising regional hegemon, as developing nations, would be expected to have, without penalizing them for not having additional funds to provide. Of note, data concerning US contributions for humanitarian assistance projects were included for this indicator for comparison reasons.

The baseline for a rising regional hegemon per this fourth indicator – contributions to humanitarian assistance projects – is 0.3 percent of GDP for each year examined. In 1970, and reaffirmed in 1992 and 2002, “global leaders agreed that 0.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of their states should be devoted to aid” (Mulama, 2005<sup>xiv</sup>). However, only the most generous few countries provide 0.7 percent of their GDP to humanitarian assistance

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<sup>xiii</sup> Quotation can be found in the first paragraph of the cited reference.

<sup>xiv</sup> Quotation can be found in the second paragraph of the cited reference.

projects, with the majority of developed nations providing around 0.3-0.5 percent of their GDP (Gates, 2010, p. 11). Therefore, it would be expected that a rising regional hegemon should at least contribute the same amount of its GDP as a well-performing developed nation to solidify its position as a regional hegemon; hence the baseline set at 0.3 percent of GDP dedicated to humanitarian assistance projects.

*Effectiveness of diplomacy in international relations.* Effectiveness of diplomacy will be measured by the number of regional cooperation initiatives, regional integration initiatives, economic/political leadership initiatives, and regional broker/mediator initiatives implemented by the rapidly developing nations. While data will also be collected regarding at the effectiveness of these regional initiatives, they will not be the focus. The main emphasis is whether or not rapidly developing nations are making strong attempts to ensure the integration and security of their regions. Therefore, if the rapidly developing nations are involved in establishing regional security initiatives beyond their border countries, then they will be considered potential regional hegemon per this indicator. Sources for this indicator will include the US Department of State, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) website, and other scholarly websites and journals.

## **Organization of Material**

Chapter one provides a basic understanding of the thesis topic, to include background, statement of argument and relevant key concepts, methodology, research question, hypothesis, independent and dependent variables, and measurement indicators. Chapter two is the literature



review, which lays the foundation for an understanding of Waltz's argument for a bi-polar international system, as opposed to a uni- or multi-polar international system. The perspectives of other neo-realist and realist thinkers will also be included in this section in support of, and against, Waltz's position. The second portion of the literature review will focus on Buzan and Wæver's RSCT and how it explains the emergence of regional hegemons and their role in the stable and orderly continuation of a multi-polar international system.

Chapter three will be an analysis of data on the BRIC countries per identified variables and indicators, and how they, as rapidly developing nations, are in the position to become rising regional hegemons per the chosen indicators. According to RSCT, "...operation of RSCs hinge on patterns of amity and enmity among the units in the system, which makes regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors, not just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power" (Buzan, et al., 2003, p. 40). The chosen indicators emphasize the importance of a rapidly developing nation, and consequently a regional hegemon, being not only a strong military power within the international system, but also having a strong, growing economy, and being involved in maintaining peace and security globally. It is not only military strength that determines a regional hegemon, but also its interactions, both economically and diplomatically. Lastly, Chapter three will conclude with a discussion on the working hypothesis of how our current international system is changing from being uni-polar into a multi-polar international system based upon regional hegemons.

Chapter four concludes the thesis with a discussion of how the data from Chapter three correlates rapidly developing nations to rising regional hegemons. I will then further clarify how rapidly developing nations, as regional hegemons, can positively affect the international system. Taking that argument further, I will examine how the rise of regional hegemons, and the

consequent patterns of growth within the international system, is supported by Buzan and Wæver's RSCT. I will then utilize that information to further illustrate how Waltz's analysis that a bi-polar international system is the most stable may not stand the test of time based on the multi-polar international system that we see emerging. The data and analysis are expected to support the argument that a bi-polar, or even uni-polar, international system is no longer relevant, and that a multi-polar international system based upon regional hegemons is forthcoming. This project is brought to a close with a discussion of how other independent variables, specifically the weakening of US leadership and the extended international financial crisis, could also affect the dependent variable – the structure of the international system. In doing so, I will be able to provide additional courses of research and analysis, which will allow for further validation of the argument.

Sources: Books, electronic books, interview transcripts, online periodicals, online journals, scholarly websites, and scholarly magazines.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

The literature review examines realist and neo-realist perspectives on the stability of uni-polar, bi-polar and multi-polar international systems, and the applicability of polarity on the peaceful and orderly continuation of the international system. Notably, the rise and role of regional hegemons within a multi-polar international system is emphasized. Particular attention is also paid to Kenneth Waltz's opinion that a bi-polar international system is the most stable and should be strived for. The literature review then delves into Buzan and Wæver's regional security complex theory (RSCT) in support of the argument that RSCT most accurately reflects the multi-polar international system that we see emerging through the current re-balancing of the international system. More specifically, Buzan and Wæver's argument that a multi-polar international system based upon RSC's can indeed be stable and orderly is highlighted, counter to Waltz's argument for a bi-polar international system.

### **Waltz's Bi-Polar International System vs. a Multi-Polar International System**

Waltz believes that the balance of power theory continues to have applicability when explaining current, and even future, international relations. While I tend to agree with Waltz that the balance of power theory should not be so easily discounted, I would argue that Waltz's assertion that a multi-polar international system is inherently unstable should be revisited. The basis for Waltz's position is rooted in his argument that "Competition in multipolar systems is more complicated than competition in bipolar ones because uncertainties about the comparative capabilities of states multiply as numbers grow, and because estimates of the cohesiveness and

strength of coalitions are hard to make” (Waltz, 2000, p. 6). Accordingly, Waltz argues “[t]he conclusion that a multipower balance is relatively stable is reached by overestimating the system’s flexibility, and then dwelling too fondly upon its effects” (Waltz, 1964, p. 900).

Of note, Waltz finds a uni-polar international system to be equally, if not more, unstable than a multi-polar international system as exemplified by his discussion of the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the US as a uni-polar power. More specifically, Waltz asserts that a uni-polar international system is unstable because the “...dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their own borders, thus weakening themselves in the long run...The other reason for the short duration of uni-polarity is that even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior” (Waltz, 2000, pp. 28). It follows that, being over-extended is one of the main reasons why a uni-polar international system generally does not last long and can be ineffective at maintaining stability within the international system.

Waltz’s support of bi-polarity is evidenced by his argument that with

“the absence of peripheries, the range and intensity of competition, and the persistence of pressure and crisis...combine to produce an intense competition in a wide arena with a great variety of means employed. The constancy of effort of the two major contenders, combined with a fourth factor, their preponderant power, have made for a remarkable ability to comprehend and absorb within the bipolar balance the revolutionary political, military, and economic changes that have occurred” (Waltz, 1964, p. 886).

Waltz’s thinking follows that, while a bi-polar international system is not immune to changes, it already has the means in place to absorb any changes that arise, without detrimentally affecting the stability and orderliness of the system itself. Waltz’s support of a bi-polar international system can be further understood through a discussion of Structural Realism. In explaining Structural Realism, Waltz asserts that

[t]he structure of the international political system is defined first by its organizing principle, which is anarchy. Some people would think of that as a disorganizing principle, but it's a principle that tells one how the major units of the realm relate to one another. The relation is one of anarchy, as opposed to hierarchy. It's not an ordered realm. It's not a law-bound realm. It's an anarchic realm in which the various units have to figure out for themselves how they're going to try to live with one another, and how they're going to pursue, specifically, and manage, ultimately, their own security worries. It is described as a realm of self-help: if you don't do it for yourself, you cannot count on anybody else doing it for you. They may help; they may not. You don't know. You can't count on that. You're on your own (Krisler & Waltz, 2003, p. 3).

Basically, because of the uncertainty within the international system, the more nations are able to compete to become the most powerful, the more chance there is for violence and instability. However, this author would argue a way to negate that issue would be to incorporate these competitive nations as regional hegemon into a multi-polar international system.

Not only would this allow rapidly developing nations to become regional hegemon and a recognized force within the international system, but it could also create a more stable and orderly system than a uni-polar or bi-polar international system. More specifically, "[i]n multipolar or dispersed power systems, states will form alliances to balance power, but alliances will be flexible. Wars may occur, but they will be relatively limited in scope" (Nye, 2000, p. 34). This is counter to uni-polar systems, which "...tend to erode as states try to preserve their independence by balancing against the preponderant power, or *hegemon*, or a rising state eventually challenges the leader;" or bi-polar systems, where "...alliances become rigid, which in turn contributes to the probability of a large conflict, perhaps even a global war" (Nye, 2000, p. 34). The nexus for Nye and his opinion on the stability of the international system is based on the type of alliances that are formed. The more flexible the alliances are, the more stable and less violent the system is. Of note, the uni-polar international system is at a disadvantage because the hegemon is always going to be challenged.

Continuing the discussion on Structural Realism, one of Waltz's defining principles

...is by the distribution of capability among those units, with the more capable ones, of course, shaping the realm, posing the problems that the others have to deal with. The analogy there, of course, is between international politics on the one hand and oligopolistic sectors of an economy on the other hand. It's not a purely competitive realm. It's one in which the major actors, those of greater capability, set the scene in which the others must act (Kreiser & Waltz, 2003, p. 3).

As evidenced by his discussion of direct opposition and competition, Morgenthau agrees with Waltz and his assertion that those nations with greater capabilities will ultimately influence how others must act. Direct opposition explains balance of power as it results from one nation attempting to wield imperial power over another, which refuses, or from one nation attempting to wield imperial power over a third nation, which the second nation opposes. An example of this can be seen "...in the competition for dominant influence in Germany that in the aftermath of the Second World War has marked the relations between France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States" (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 185).

The pattern of competition emphasizes that one nation, when attempting to take over a second nation, will encounter a balance of power when a third nation, opposed to the imperialistic tendencies of the first nation, will be able to outweigh the first nation's power, and vice versa. Historically, balance of power has been an effective means of preserving the independence of weak nations, as long as it served the best interest of the more powerful nations. Notably, "[s]mall nations have always owed their independence either to the balance of power..., or to the preponderance of one protecting power..., or to their lack of attractiveness for imperialistic aspirations" (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 188). This directly correlates to examples of such buffer states as Belgium during the Second World War, and "...the so-called Russian

security belt, which stretches along the western and southwestern frontiers of the Soviet Union from Finland to Bulgaria” (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 189).

Therefore, the more powerful nations do include developing nations into their calculations of balance of power politics; however, the more powerful nations do not see developing nations as being important to the international system on their own because they are unable to have an effect. In this version of realism, developing nations are only important to the international system to the extent of how they can serve the interests of the more powerful nations. Developing nations are unable to directly oppose or compete against a great power. Therefore, their only role, according to the aforementioned discussion of Morgenthau, is to be in a position of being defended, as long as a great power feels that it is in their best interest to do so.

While I would agree with Waltz and Morgenthau that those nations with greater capabilities will ultimately influence how others act, I do not see why there cannot be a number of nations within a functioning multi-polar international system that can collectively shape the realm. From an economic standpoint, Gilpin agrees that developing nations should be included within balance of power politics within the international system. In his book *War & Change in World Politics*, Robert Gilpin attributes change in the international political system to the balance of power based on a cost-benefit calculation. He asserts that, due to various economic, technological, and developmental changes in the international system overall, some state actors will realize greater benefits than others. These greater benefits will result in some state actors being able to realize greater levels of power than other state actors, which will enable them to effect change within the international political system and, consequently, change the balance of power to reflect their own interests. More specifically, “...a precondition for political change

lies in a disjuncture between the existing social system and the redistribution of power toward those actors who would benefit most from a change in the system” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 9).

Gilpin emphasizes the importance of the disequilibrium that inevitably occurs due to differing rates of growth of declining and rising states in a dynamic international system that must be addressed through a balance of power. This disequilibrium actually benefits the rising states in that they “...enjoy lower costs, rising rates of return on their resources, and the advantages of backwardness...[which produces]...a decisive redistribution of power” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 185). If the disequilibrium is not addressed by the dominant nation(s) and equilibrium restored, then, as the relative power of the rising state increases, it will attempt “...to change the rules governing the international system, the division of the spheres of influence, and, most important of all, the international distribution of territory,” resulting in war (Gilpin, 1981, p. 187). Gilpin’s argument in fact supports the concept that new actors will rise to compete for influence within the international system.

Gilpin’s discussion of disequilibrium, and its consequent effect on the international system in favor of rapidly developing nations, supports the inclusion of rapidly developing nations in balance of power politics based on comparative advantage within the international economy. Comparative advantage is “[w]hen one nation's opportunity cost of producing an item is less than another nation's opportunity cost of producing that item. A good or service with which a nation has the largest absolute advantage (or smallest absolute disadvantage) is the item for which they have a comparative advantage” (United States Department of Labor, 2008<sup>xv</sup>). Developing nations tend to have a comparative advantage concentrated “...in agriculture, food products, textiles and clothing and other manufactures...,” primarily low-skill, labor intensive

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<sup>xv</sup> Quotation can be found in under the term “comparative advantage” in the cited reference.



industries (Panitchpakdi, 2004<sup>xvi</sup>). This investment by developed nations into developing nations provides the foundation for developing nations to form more developed infrastructures, increase their military strength, better their positions in international trade, and, consequently, attain a more powerful position within the international system.

Continuing with Waltz's discussion of a bi-polar international system, he relies on historical precedent. To support his argument, Waltz utilizes the effect on the European states as the international system shifted from multi-polarity to bi-polarity after World War II as a means of showing how the shift to bi-polarity created a more stable and unified international system. More specifically, he argues,

So long as European states were the world's great powers, unity among them could only be dreamt of. Politics among the European great powers tended toward the model of a zero-sum game. Each power viewed another's losses as its own gain. Faced with the temptation to cooperate for mutual benefit, each state became wary and was inclined to draw back. When on occasion some of the great powers did move toward cooperation, they did so in order to oppose other powers more strongly. The emergence of the Russian and American superpowers created a situation that permitted wider ranging and more effective cooperation among the states of Western Europe...For the first time in modern history, the determination of war and peace lay outside the arena of European states, and the means of their preservation were provided by others. These new circumstances made possible the famous "upgrading of the common interest," a phrase which conveys the thought that all should work together to improve everyone's lot rather than being obsessively concerned with the precise division of benefits. Not all impediments to cooperation were removed, but one important one was - the feat that the greater advantage of one could be translated into military force to be used against the others. Living in the superpowers' shadow, Britain, France, Germany and Italy quickly saw that war among them would be fruitless and soon began to believe it impossible. Because the security of all of them came to depend ultimately on the policies of others, rather than on their own, unity could effectively be worked for, although not easily achieved [Keohane (Ed.), 1986, pp. 58-59].

Waltz presents an excellent argument in support of bi-polarity versus multi-polarity. I would agree that numerous nations striving to become regional hegemony within one region, with no desire for cooperation, would encourage instability and violence. However, I would argue that

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<sup>xvi</sup> Quotation can be found in the thirteenth paragraph of the cited reference.

the multi-polar international system that we see emerging is more reflective of Buzan and Wæver's regional security complex theory (RSCT) where the security interdependence of nations within close proximity of one another encourages greater security interactions, which promotes greater stability, than that of post-WWII Europe (Buzan, et al., 2003, pp. 4, 45).

### **A Multi-Polar International System and the Regional Security Complex Theory**

According to the balance of power theory, with the US attempting to maintain its uni-polar position of power, it is inevitable that a re-balancing of the international system will occur to ensure power is spread across the developed world. If the balance of power theory is correct, the other developed nations should at some point form a coalition to counter the powerful position of the US. Notably,

[a] key proposition derived from realist theory is that international politics reflects the distribution of national capabilities, a proposition daily borne out. Another key proposition is that the balancing of power by some states against others recurs. Realist theory predicts that balances disrupted will one day be restored. A limitation of the theory, a limitation common to social science theories, is that it cannot say when (Waltz, 2000, p. 27).

Since it cannot be predicted when this re-balancing will occur, balance of power as a theory, and as a system, cannot be discounted.

The re-balancing of power within the international system can take on various forms, one of them being “[a]...countervailing force that limits the expansion of a state and international change...[through]...the generation of opposing power” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 147). While “...this technique is not always effective, the tendency is for opposition to an expanding state to be generated in the form of counterbalancing political and economic alliances” (Gilpin, 1981, p.

147). War is another potential option for re-balancing. Notably, “[w]ith many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire - conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur” (Waltz, 2001, p. 159).

However, Buzan and Wæver’s regional security complex theory (RSCT) most accurately reflects the multi-polar international system that we see emerging through the current re-balancing of the international system. According to Buzan and Wæver, “[t]he region...refers to the level where states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other. The regional level is where the extremes of national and global security interplay, and where most of the action occurs” (Buzan, et al, 2003, p. 43). Of note,

[t]he particular character of a local RSC will often be affected by historical factors such as long-standing enmities..., or the common cultural embrace of civilizational area. The formation of RSCs derives from the interplay between, on the one hand, the anarchic structure and its balance-of-power consequences, and on the other the pressures of local geographical proximity. Simply physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbors than among states located in different areas...The impact of geographical proximity on security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal, and environmental sectors” (Buzan, et al, 2003, p. 45).

In determining how the RSCs will be established, Buzan and Wæver argue that “[a]narchy plus the distance effect plus geographical diversity yields a pattern of regionally based clusters, where security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside such complexes than between states inside the complex and those outside it” (Buzan, et al, 2003, p. 46). Due to the necessity of security interdependence within the RSCs, it follows that they will strive to develop regional collective security initiatives to ensure orderliness and stability within the

respective RSCs. Orderly and stable RSCs will translate into the continuation of a stable and orderly international system.

In summary, once developing nations are established as rising regional hegemony, they are able to positively affect the stability of their regions through the implementation of what Buzan and Wæver term a regional security complex (RSC). According to RSC theory (RSCT), "...since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes" (Buzan, et al., 2003, p. 4). Moreover, "[p]rocesses of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between the actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and those outside it" (Buzan, et al., 2003, p. 4). It follows that, those nations within a particular RSC will be more invested in its stable and orderly continuation since it directly affects them. The notion of RSCs correlates closely to what Efraim Inbar terms regional security regimes. More specifically,

[t]he conceptual framework of [regional] security regimes concerns itself with the creation of international rules of behavior in situations when war and the states' individualistic pursuit of security is seen as very costly. Such regimes, once established, tend to foster moderation, cooperation and reduced chances for interstate violence [Inbar (Ed.), 1995, p. viii].

Per RSCT and the notion of regional security regimes, regional hegemony, as members of a multi-polar international system, are in the position to ensure the stable and orderly continuation of their respective regions, which will have a positive impact on the stable and orderly continuation of the international system as a whole.

In conclusion, Waltz, as many realists and neo-realists do, pays particular attention to the interactions and effects of the international system on the great powers, with very little attention paid to the weaker or developing nations. This is due to the fact that, according to John

Mearsheimer, another notable neo-realist, “Realism...is really all about the relations among states, especially among great powers” (Kreisler & Mearsheimer, 2002, p. 5). Historically, developing nations have not been able to have much, if any, affect on the international system. Therefore, they were largely left out because the balance of power theory was supposed to be utilized as a means of preserving the major powers, which developing nations obviously were not (Sheehan, 1996, p. 203).

As mentioned previously, we are at a time where rapidly developing nations are able to compete with great powers, such as the US, within the international system. Therefore, the role of rapidly developing nations as potential rising regional hegemons within balance of power is changing and their increasing power must be acknowledged. These rapidly developing nations, as potential rising regional hegemons, should be encouraged to take responsibility for their respective regions as discussed in the section concerning Buzan and Wæver’s RSCT. This would allow for an even more stable and secure multi-polar international system than has previously been seen.

## **Chapter 3: Data and Analysis of BRIC Countries and their Potentiality for becoming Regional Hegemons**

As mentioned previously, a functional uni-polar or bi-polar international system is no longer feasible. This is due to the emergence of rising regional hegemons and their ability to be competitive internationally while continuing through the developmental stages, which has historically been unfeasible. The countries examined in this chapter as examples of rising regional hegemons who, consequently, could become leaders within a multi-polar international system, are the BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China. The BRIC countries were chosen because, as of 2006, they are all considered to be fast growing economies with the largest sources of labor (Georgieva, 2006, p. 3). Therefore, “[t]heir role in the global policy is increasing as well [as] the geopolitical importance for their regions and the world” (Georgieva, 2006, p. 3). Even more importantly, it is expected that in less than 40 years, the BRIC countries will have a larger GDP, measured in US dollars, than that of the G6 (Georgieva, 2006, p. 28). The BRIC countries are in the position to be competitive against their developed counterparts. That being said, the chosen indicators and correlating data will aid in clarifying just how close these developing countries are to becoming rising regional hegemons.

### **Annual Percent Change in GDP**

According to the data found in Table (3), none of the BRIC countries have had a constant 5 percent change in GDP annually for each year from 1990-2010.

**Table (3) Gross Domestic Product - Annual Percent Change**

<b>Country</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	-4.2	1.0	-0.5	4.9	5.9	4.2	2.2	3.4	0.0	0.3

<b>Russia</b>	n/a	n/a	n/a	-8.7	-12.7	-4.1	-3.6	1.4	-5.3	6.4
<b>India</b>	5.6	2.1	4.4	5.0	6.2	7.4	7.6	10.3	5.3	3.3
<b>China</b>	3.8	9.2	14.2	14.0	13.1	10.9	10.0	9.3	7.8	7.6
<b>United States</b>	1.9	-0.2	3.4	2.9	4.1	2.5	3.7	4.5	4.4	4.8

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011

<b>Country</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	4.3	1.3	2.7	1.1	5.7	3.2	4.0	6.1	5.2	-0.6	7.5*
<b>Russia</b>	10.0	3.9	4.7	7.3	7.2	6.4	8.2	8.5	5.2	-7.8	4.0*
<b>India</b>	4.4	3.9	4.6	6.9	8.1	9.2	9.7	9.9	6.2	6.8	10.4
<b>China</b>	8.4	8.3	9.1	10.0	10.1	11.3	12.7	14.2	9.6	9.2	10.3
<b>United States</b>	4.1	1.1	1.8	2.5	3.6	3.1	2.7	1.9	0.0	-2.6	2.8

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011

\* IMF Staff estimate

Notably, China is the closest to meeting this indicator as it only dipped below five percent for one year, 1990, during the time period examined. China has shown incredible annual growth in GDP from 1990-2010, and fluctuations as noted in Table (3) are to be expected. Even though swings of as much as 5 percentage points can be seen in Table (3), these fluctuations are actually quite minor due to the fact that China's overall annual GDP growth rate is so high, notably a minimum of 2 percentage points higher than the 5 percent baseline set for the indicator for every year after 1990.

While China is considered to have one of the fastest growing economies in the world, it may be possible for India to surpass China for yearly GDP growth within the next two years. In support of this argument, “[Capital Economics Ltd. (CE) of London] holds that economic growth in India will remain above 9.0 percent annually beyond [2012], while growth [of] its main Asian rival China should settle out at about 8.0 percent [in 2012] -- which means India could finally outperform China over the next two years” (Ghosh, 2010<sup>xvii</sup>). Morgan Stanley also agrees and “...asserts that Indian GDP will grow faster than China’s by as early as 2013, buoyed by

<sup>xvii</sup> Quotation can be found in the third paragraph of the cited reference.

improving demographics, structural reforms and globalization” (Ghosh, 2010<sup>xviii</sup>). While it appears that India has a strong economic future ahead of it, according to Table (3), however, it can be seen that India's annual growth in GDP has been marked by sporadic increases and decreases. Only since 2003 has India been able to stay consistently above the five percent baseline set for the indicator. Prior to 2003, it must be noted that India's annual growth in GDP hit as low as 2.1 in 1991, as high as 10.3 in 1997, and returned to 3.3 in 1999. This lack of a consistent positive annual growth in GDP above the five percent baseline is not reflective of a strong rising regional hegemon. However, if the trend that started in 2003 continues, then India will strengthen its economic position and support the possibility of it continuing as a rising regional hegemon.

Moving on to a country with even more sporadic and chaotic annual growth in GDP, Brazil has had a difficult economic history characterized by “...economic boom and bust and its development has been hampered by high inflation and excessive indebtedness...” (The World Bank Group - Brazil Country Brief, 2011<sup>xix</sup>). However, “...reforms in the 1990s and ongoing sound macroeconomic and social policies have resulted in an extended period of stability, growth and social gains” (The World Bank Group - Brazil Country Brief, 2011). According to Table (2), Brazil has shown no consistent pattern in regards to annual growth in GDP from 1990-2010. If anything, the only thing Table (2) can hope to predict is that Brazil will remain unpredictable in terms of economic performance for years to come. Of note, Brazil made it through the global financial downturn relatively well - "...it was one of the last to fall into recession in 2008 and among the first to resume growth in 2009" (The World Bank Group - Brazil Country Brief, 2011). While Brazil's GDP grew 7.5 percent in 2010, it is expected to grow only around 4

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<sup>xviii</sup> Quotation can be found in the fourth paragraph of the cited reference.

<sup>xix</sup> Quotation can be found in the second paragraph in the “General Overview” section of the cited reference.



percent in 2011 (The World Bank Group - Brazil Country Brief, 2011). With its projected GDP growth, Brazil will need to post significant increases in later years to reach the average 5 percent baseline to meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon.

Moving on to Russia, its annual growth in GDP, as illustrated by Table (3), is also characterized by chaotic swings. There is a noticeable downswing that occurred after the end of the Cold War and Russia's annual growth in GDP was markedly negative from 1993-1998. However, from 2003-2007, Russia has posted annual GDP growth well above the 5 percent baseline set for the indicator. Notably, much of Russia's annual growth in GDP is reliant on oil prices and not necessarily the result of better economic processes (Gaddy, 2011). The current consensus is that its economy will continue to grow through 2011 and into 2012. In 2010, The World Bank asserted that "with heightened uncertainties and moderating global and Western European growth and oil prices, and volatile capital flows, Russia [was] likely to grow by 4.2 percent in 2010, followed by [projected] 4.5 percent in 2011 and 3.5 percent in 2012 as domestic demand [expanded] in line with gradual improvements in the labor and credit markets" (The World Bank Group, 2010, p. 2). In 2011, with Russia having posted an annual growth in GDP of 4 percent in 2010, The World Bank reassessed their projections, noting

Russia has seen even higher oil windfall in the past few months, which translates into likely fiscal surpluses this year and next. The government should not miss the opportunity provided by this large oil windfall to substantially improve its long-term fiscal position, reduce inflation, improve the effectiveness of public expenditures, and ensure a basis for durable stability and healthy growth in the future. Rising domestic demand and credit activity are increasingly supporting solid growth. We maintain the growth outlook for Russia at 4.4 percent in 2011 and 4.0 percent in 2012, closer to the post-crisis long-term potential growth (The World Bank Group, 2011, pp. 2-3).

However, even with that projected growth, Russia will continue to have trouble meeting the baseline average of 5 percent annual growth in GDP that correlates to a rising regional hegemon

due to the fact that the projected growth is still less than 5 percent annually, and the trend is downwards. Russia will need to have drastic increases in its GDP growth for the upcoming years to overcome its negative growth from 1992-1996.

The US economy has been hit hard by the economic downturn that began in 2007. The financial crisis in the US at that time was characterized by

a striking contraction in wealth, increase in risk spreads, and deterioration in credit market functioning. The 2007 United States sub-prime crisis, of course, has its roots in falling U.S. housing prices, which have in turn led to higher default levels particularly among less credit-worthy borrowers. The impact of these defaults on the financial sector has been greatly magnified due to the complex bundling of obligations that was thought to spread risk efficiently (Reinhart, et al., 2008, p. 3).

While it remains to be seen how severe the economic downturn will be as a result of the financial crisis, there has been noticeable decreases in the US's growth in GDP since the financial crisis began. As can be seen in Table (3), there was an immediate drop in GDP growth in 2007, concluding with negative growth in 2009. While the US economy does slowly appear to be bouncing back, the damage may have already been done. This weakening of the US economy internally has taken its toll on the US's economic position internationally, culminating in the potential default of the US on its debt in 2011. Consequently, the US's weakened economic position has opened the door for other countries with strong economies, developing or developed, to take over powerful international economic roles. For example, in November 2008, the US Treasury Department announced that, "China passed Japan to become the U.S. government's largest foreign creditor in September, ...reflecting the dramatic expansion of Beijing's economic influence over the American economy" (Faiola, et al., 2008<sup>xx</sup>).


Lastly, in an effort to ensure that economic anomalies, both positive and negative, do not minimize the overall economic trends seen per country from 1990-2010, the data from Table (3)

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<sup>xx</sup> Quotation can be found in the first paragraph of the cited reference.

has been averaged for the time period examined, which is reflected in Figure (1) below. As seen in Figure (1), when the annual percent change in GDP from 1990-2010 is averaged per country, both India and China exhibit an average annual percent change in GDP growth rate of at least 5 percent for the time period of 1990-2010.

Figure (1)



Graph

calculated based on data taken from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011

Average Overall Percent Change in GDP Growth Rate by Country from 1990-2010:

- Brazil percent change: 2.75
- Russia percent change: 1.72
- India percent change: 6.54
- China percent change: 10.15
- US percent change: 2.52
- World (all World Economic Outlook countries) percent change: 3.41
- Emerging and developing countries percent change: 4.89

Their average annual growth in GDP from 1990-2010 was 6.54 percent and 10.15 percent, respectively. Both Brazil and Russia fell well below the 5 percent baseline with growth in GDP of only 2.75 percent and 1.72 percent, respectively. Of note, the US also fell not only below the 5 percent baseline for GDP growth of a well-performing emerging market/developing country, which was to be expected due to its “developed” status, but the US was also noticeably below the

3.41 percent baseline for world growth. In summary, after examining the data for the first indicator of a rising regional hegemon, annual percent change in GDP, none of the BRIC countries meet the strict definition. However, when taking into account economic anomalies and averaging the annual percent change in GDP for each BRIC country from 1990-2010, both China and India fall above the 5 percent baseline required for this indicator.

### **Military Strength**

The second indicator of rising regional hegemony is military strength. In determining military strength, data will be collected and analyzed regarding: 1. force strength [size of the military]; 2. financial strength [defense spending as a percentage of GDP]; and 3. new military equipment and technology being purchased [warships, aircraft, nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles]. This data will then be used to correlate whether or not these rapidly developing nations are in fact attempting to become rising regional hegemons within their respective areas. To re-cap, for a rapidly developing nation to be considered a rising regional hegemon per this indicator, it will be expected to have a standing military of at least 1,601,000 persons, at least 4 percent of its GDP dedicated to military expenditures for the time period examined, and have the capability to militarily reach beyond its immediate border countries through the use of ballistic missiles, nuclear capabilities, strong naval forces, and strong aviation forces. As there are three sub-indicators within this section, the data and analysis for the second indicator is conducted by country instead of conducting a comparison and consolidated statistics across the BRIC countries. A rapidly developing nation will be expected to meet the requirements of at least two of the three sub-indicators to be defined as a rising regional hegemon per the second indicator.

Brazil:

Military personnel growth has remained relatively unchanged up until 2008. This can largely be attributed to the fact that “Brazil is by far the largest country in Latin America and enjoys generally good relations with its ten South American neighbors” (Library of Congress - Brazil - National Security, 1997<sup>xxi</sup>). Notably, there has been "...no threat to Brazil's internal security in the narrow sense of insurgencies. The politically inspired terrorism of the late 1960s and 1970s is nonexistent" (Library of Congress - Brazil - National Security, 1997). However, 2008 brought about the installation of a new defense minister, Nelson Jobim, and a planned increase in military service intake of around 100,000, which is accurately reflected in Table (4) below (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 56).

**Table (4) Brazilian Military Strength (measured in 1000s)**

	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>
<b>Armed Forces</b>	295	295	296	296	296	296	296	296	296	300

	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
<b>Armed Forces</b>	288	288	288	288	295	302	287	288	368	326	328

Data compiled from the following sources: Singer, et al, 1972; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 401; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, p. 409; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 446; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, p. 450; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 466

This increase in military service intake can likely be attributed to reports that, following Jobim’s appointment, “...a process had been initiated that could lead to the production of a new defense doctrine. It is thought that this could increase cooperative activity across the services,” which would require additional personnel (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 56). However, even with this increase in military service intake, Brazil still falls well below the baseline of 1,601,000 persons necessary to have a standing military that meets the definition of a rising regional hegemon per this sub-indicator.

<sup>xxi</sup> Quotation can be found in the sixth paragraph of the cited reference.

As a contrast to the static growth in military force size discussed previously, military expenditure as a percent of GDP, as evidenced by Table (5) below, has increased and decreased sporadically from 1990-2010.

**Table (5) Military Expenditure as a Percent of GDP**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Brazil	[1.9]	[1.2]	[1.2]	[1.6]	[1.6]	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Brazil	2	1.9	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Publications, 2011

[ ] = SIPRI estimate

Brazil has traditionally had some of the lowest military expenditures in the world; however, it still has the largest standing military in Latin America (Library of Congress - Brazil - National Security, 1997). Consequently, Brazil is nowhere close to meeting the 4 percent baseline throughout the time period examined, which is necessary for meeting the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the second sub-indicator. Notably, “...in recent years, Venezuela’s ongoing military modernization program provided the background for another increase in Brazil’s military budget,” which could be the reason for the increase in military expenditure as a percent of GDP in 2009, and the troop increase in 2008 seen above in Table (5) (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 59). However, the Brazilian “...government has rejected claims that its rising military budget is a reaction to developments elsewhere on the continent, saying instead – and not without reason – that the extra money is due to the urgent need to upgrade and replace parts of its ageing military inventory after years of underinvestment” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 59).

The replacement of old weaponry and upgrading indigenous technologies are issues that are slowly coming to the forefront; however, “[r]eplacing the armed forces’ old equipment...will continue to be a challenge, given that in 2009 only around US\$2.3bn of the total budget was

allocated to procurement, whereas US\$22.4bn (75% of the budget) was spent on personnel-related issues” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 59). Allotting enough of the military expenditure budget to procurement has been an ongoing battle. Case in point, in 2005, “[f]inancial shortfalls forced the Brazilian Air Force finally to cancel the much delayed next-generation F-X fighter aircraft program. The original plan was launched in 1999 to cover the \$700m purchase of 12–24 new fighter aircraft to replace the aging fleet of Mirage IIIeBr’s” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 355). Thus far the data show that, at a time of relative economic stability exemplified by the GDP trends in the previous section, Brazil chose not to spend more money on enhancing its defense capabilities. As can be seen from the previous discussion, this is likely due to the fact that Brazil experiences minimal military threats.

Table (6), seen below, further supports the argument that Brazil has only recently begun seriously looking into upgrading its military equipment. Notably, according to the data, there were no significant purchases of new military technology and advancements from 1990-2004.

**Table (6) Brazil - New Military Technology and Advancements being Pursued by Year the Order was Placed (1990-2010)**

	<b>Sea</b>	<b>Air</b>	<b>Nuclear</b>	<b>Land</b>
<b>2005</b>		- 12 <i>Mirage</i> 2000-C (fighter ground attack) - 12 C-295 (transport) - Upgrade 8 P-3A Orions (maritime patrol) - 9 F-5 <i>Tiger</i> E/F (fighter)		
<b>2006</b>	- 2 NAPA 500 type (patrol craft)	- 30 Mi-35/Mi-171 (helicopter) - <i>Derby</i> active radar/BVR (air-to-air missile)		- 240 <i>Lepoard</i> 1A5 (main battle tank) - 5 Mowag <i>Piranha</i> IIC (armored personnel carrier)
<b>2007</b>		- A-Darter (air-		- <i>Urutu</i> IIIs

		to-air missile)		(armored personnel carrier)
<b>2008</b>		- 50 EC725 <i>Super Cougar</i> (transport helicopter) - 12 Mi-35M (helicopter) - 2 Embraer 190 (transport aircraft)	- Plans for an indigenous nuclear submarine	
<b>2009</b>	- 4 SSK (patrol submarine with anti-submarine warfare capability) - 1 SSN (attack submarine nuclear-powered)	- 22 KC-390 (tanker/transport) - 10 UH-60L <i>Black Hawk</i> (helicopter)	- Funding approved for indigenous nuclear submarine	
<b>2010</b>			- Development of an indigenous nuclear submarine	

Data compiled from the following sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 358; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 345, 444-445; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, pp. 91, 447, 449; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, pp. 57, 99, 491-492; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, pp. 57, 97, 484-485; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, pp. 57, 100, 487-489

According to Table (6), Brazil has had minimal investment in its fighter/attack aviation forces prior to 2005. In regards to its Navy, Brazil has taken the laudable steps to develop its own indigenous submarine; however, its inventory of warships is minimal. There has also been no investment in ballistic missile capabilities. In regards to nuclear capability, while Brazil does have a modest nuclear power program, it has not successfully created nor detonated a nuclear weapon (Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2012).

This can likely be attributed to the fact that, up until the early 2000s, the Brazilian military's focus had not been on military action. Instead, the Brazilian military had become more



involved in civic-action and humanitarian assistance activities. More specifically, "[t]hey [were] expanding their presence in the Amazon under the Northern Corridor (Calha Norte) program...[supplying personnel to] United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces [and]..., especially the army, [had] become more involved in civic-action programs, education, health care, and constructing roads, bridges, and railroads across the nation (Library of Congress - Brazil - National Security, 1997<sup>xxii</sup>). In 2005, Table (6) seen above reflects a push by the Brazilian government to start upgrading and modernizing its forces, likely an indication that the military was moving away from its focus on civic-action and humanitarian assistance. However, "...despite the increase in funding[,] the structure of Brazil's defense budget [was] still seriously unbalanced, with very little money available for much needed modernization" (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 355). The push for continued modernization came to fruition in 2008 with the implementation of the new National Defense Strategy. The National Defense Strategy included "...a plan to enlarge, modernize, and reposition military forces and restore Brazil's defense industry...[,]...[where] [m]ilitary modernization was linked explicitly to technology transfer and industrial development" (Einaudi, 2011, p. 6). Table (6) above supports this assertion as evidenced by the introduction of plans for an indigenously created nuclear submarine in 2008.

Of note, "...it should be remembered that much of the equipment currently in service dates from the 1950s and 1960s and that many recently announced programs are primarily upgrades and replacement of old technology (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, p. 57). However, in 2008, "[w]ith one eye on developments in Venezuela, Brazil appears to be following other Latin American countries with plans to upgrade and modernize parts of its aging military inventory," particularly with the introduction of plans to build an indigenous nuclear

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<sup>xxii</sup> Quotation can be found in the eighth paragraph of the cited reference.

submarine (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 62). As illustrated in Table (6), 2008 marked the year that serious military equipment upgrades and modernization appears to become a priority for the Brazilian government, particularly regarding naval vessels. Around that same time we see an increase in military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, as seen in Table (5), and an increase in the number and type of military advancements being pursued. However, due to the latent interest in upgrading and modernizing its military equipment, Brazil has not had the funding to establish itself as a strong naval or aviation force, and interest in forming a strong ballistic missile capability has proven non-existent. For these reason, Brazil's ability to militarily reach beyond its borders countries is hindered; therefore, Brazil does not meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per this third sub-indicator.

In summary, at a time of relative economic stability exemplified by the GDP trends in the previous section, Brazil chose not to spend more money on enhancing its defense capabilities. Not until the introduction of the new National Defense Strategy in 2008 did military modernization become a national priority. Therefore, with static growth in its military personnel resulting in a standing military of less than 1,601,000 persons, minimal increases and, at times, even decreasing military expenditures as percent of GDP for the time period examined (well below the 4 percent baseline), and delays in the upgrading and modernizing of its military equipment/technology, hindering its ability to militarily reach beyond its borders, Brazil does not meet the criteria of a rising regional hegemon per the second indicator.

Russia:

The Russian military has been in a noted downward spiral since the end of the Cold War and has recently been looking for ways to increase its military spending in an effort to form a

more capable, and technologically current, military force. As can be seen in Table (7), troop levels drastically decreased post-Cold War and have been hovering around 1 million since 1998.

**Table (7) Russian Military Strength (measured in 1000s)**

	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>
<b>Armed Forces</b>	3,400	3,000	1,900	1,500	1,400	1,400	1,300	1,300	1,000	900	1,004

	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
<b>Armed Forces</b>	977	988	961	999	1,037	1,027	1,027	1,027	1,027	1,027

Data compiled from the following sources: Singer, et al, 1972; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 399; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, p. 407; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 444; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, p. 448; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 463

That being said, from 1990-1992, Russia met the baseline for the first sub-indicator, that a rising regional hegemon have a standing military of at least 1,601,000 persons. However, since 1992, the massive decreases in personnel within the Russian military have been so extreme, bottoming out at 961,000 in 2003, that Russia cannot meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the first sub-indicator.

While Russia has been moving forward with its ability to successfully target information infrastructures, low morale and troop dissatisfaction has led to issues with reliable defensive and offensive forces. More specifically, "Russia's military has been in turmoil after years of severe force reductions and budget cuts. Readiness, training, morale, and discipline have suffered. The global economic downturn and strong opposition among some in the armed forces appear to have slowed force modernization" (Nichol, 2010, p. 3). However, even with these setbacks, "Moscow for the past several years has...been strengthening its conventional military force to make it a credible foreign policy instrument, both to signal its political resurgence and to assert its dominance over neighboring states, like Georgia" (Blair, 2009, p. 26).

As seen in Table (8) below, military expenditure as a percent of GDP also drastically dropped at the end of the Cold War, from an all-time high of 12.3 in 1990, and slowly continued to creep down through 2000.

**Table (8) Military Expenditure as a Percent of GDP (all figures are SIPRI estimates)**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<b>Russia</b>	12.3	..	5.5	5.3	5.9	4.4	4.1	4.5	3.3	3.4

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Russia</b>	3.7	4.1	4.4	4.3	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.5	4.3

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Publications, 2011

.. = Data not available or not applicable

Notably, Russia’s percentage of GDP dedicated to military expenditures remained above the 4 percent baseline for this sub-indicator from 1990-1997. According to Table (8), military expenditures as a percent of GDP bounced back above the 4 percent baseline between 2001 and 2003, but then continued its downward slide through 2008.

However, in 2009 where there are cutbacks across the board for most Russian ministries, “...President Dmitri Medvedev...vowed to actually increase spending: transforming Russia's creaking Soviet-era defense industry into a modern technological power, and turning the 1.1-million-man Russian army into a leaner but more effective fighting force” (Walt, 2009<sup>xxiii</sup>). This can likely be attributed to the outcome of Russia’s five-day war with Georgia in August 2008 (Walt, 2009). Notably, “[t]he limitations of both equipment and men [were] obvious...[and]...[d]espite Russia's superior firepower and its bigger army, its ground offensive was not the overwhelming success it should have been” (Walt, 2009<sup>xxiv</sup>). The year 2009 is a notable one for Russia in that it is where the data illustrates Russia’s desire to regain its position of military power within its region – potentially a push for regional hegemony.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Quotation can be found in the first paragraph of the cited reference.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Quotation can be found in the fourth paragraph of the cited reference.

For this second sub-indicator of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Russia does not meet the strict definition due to the fact that it does not meet the 4 percent baseline for each year during the time period examined. However, when averaging the data from Table (8) above, Russia’s percent of GDP dedicated to military expenditures is actually above the 4 percent baseline at 4.6 percent for the time period examined. Therefore, taking into account economic anomalies by averaging the yearly percentages, Russia does meet the definition of this sub-indicator by having an overall average percent of GDP dedicated to military expenditures throughout the time period examined of 4.6 percent.

In regards to military equipment, Russia has struggled with its modernizing. As supported by Table (9) seen below, “[d]uring the 1990s, weapons procurement was almost completely halted...” due to a lack of available funds (Defense Industry Daily, 2008<sup>xxv</sup>). Notably, according to the data, there were no significant purchases of new military technology and advancements from 1990-1992, and only sporadic purchases of minimal size from 1993-1999.

**Table (9) Russia - New Military Technology and Advancements being Pursued by Year the Order was Placed (1990-2010)**

	<b>Sea</b>	<b>Air</b>	<b>Nuclear</b>	<b>Land</b>
<b>1993</b>	- 6 SSN (attack submarine nuclear-powered)			
<b>1994</b>	- 1 SSBN upgrade (ballistic-missile submarine nuclear-fueled)			
<b>1995</b>				
<b>1996</b>	- 4 SSBN (ballistic-missile submarine)			

<sup>xxv</sup> Quotation can be found in the second paragraph of the cited reference.

	nuclear-fueled)			
<b>1997</b>				
<b>1998</b>				
<b>1999</b>				
<b>2000</b>	- 1 <i>Agat</i> -class MSC (mine- sweeper coastal)			
<b>2001</b>	- 9 <i>Scorpion</i> project (corvette)			
<b>2002</b>				
<b>2003</b>				
<b>2004</b>				
<b>2005</b>	- 1 FFG (guided missile frigate) - 1 LCU (landing craft utility)	- 1 Tu-160 (bomber) - 8 Mi-28N - 12 Yak-130 (advanced jet trainer) - 104 aircraft - 52 helicopters - 200 Yak-130 (advanced jet trainer) - 8 Mi-28N (helicopter)		- 6 SS-27 ICBM (inter- continental ballistic missile) - 31 T-90 (main battle tank) - 100 BTR- 80/90 (armored personnel carrier) - 3,770 trucks (logistics) - 139 MBT (main battle tank) - 125 armored personnel carrier - 125 artillery
<b>2006</b>	- 1 ROV (submarine rescue) - 3 SSBN (ballistic- missile submarine nuclear-fueled)	- 24 Su-34 (fighter ground attack)		- 180 T-72/T- 80 (main battle tank)
<b>2007</b>		- 30 Tu-160 (bomber) - 50 medium transport		- SS-26 SRBM (short-range ballistic missile)

		aircraft		- 40 BMP-3 (infantry fighting vehicle) - SA-21 Growler (surface-to-air missile – air defense)
<b>2008</b>		- 30 Ka-52 (attack, reconnaissance helicopter)		
<b>2009</b>	- 4 <i>Steregushchiy</i> -class (corvette) - 2 research ships - SS-NX-30 (submarine-launched ballistic missile)	- 48 Su-35S (multi-role aircraft) - 16 Su-27SM, Su-30M2 (fighter ground attack) - <i>Searcher II</i> (unmanned aerial vehicle)		- SA-17 (surface-to-air missile) - SA-15 (surface-to-air missile)
<b>2010</b>				

Data compiled from the following sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 164, 443-445; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, pp. 206, 448; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, pp. 223, 492-493; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, pp. 228, 483-485; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, pp. 233-234, 487-489; Endres, et al, 2002, pp. 363-364

However, as evidenced by Table (9), during the mid-2000s and onward, purchases of military technology advancements and upgrades skyrocketed. The increase in military equipment orders from 2005-2007 is likely due to excellent oil prices in those years, which made additional moneys available (Conrad, 2009, p. 1). The spike in purchases in 2009 can likely be attributed to the aforementioned increase in the defense budget in an effort to seriously modernize Russia’s outdated forces (Walt, 2009). Notably, due to the USSR’s strong military position during the Cold War, Russia actually inherited valuable technology, most specifically, a nuclear weapons capability. While a lot of the military equipment from the Cold War era may be outdated, Russia has made strong attempts at modernizing its military equipment and technology since the mid-

2000s, as can be seen by Table (9) above. While Russia's naval forces are adequate with numerous nuclear-powered submarines, according to Table (9) above, military expenditures have largely been invested in its aviation component. Russia's aviation component is characterized by many newer and more advanced fighter/attack aircraft such as the Su-27, Su-30, and Su-35, and it has achieved UAV capabilities. Russia has also placed a lot of emphasis on its ballistic missile capabilities as evidenced by the achievement of the SS-27 inter-continental ballistic missile, the SS-26 short-range ballistic missile and the SS-NX-30 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Therefore, Russia has the ability to reach militarily beyond its immediate borders and, consequently, meets the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the third sub-indicator.

In summary, only since the mid-2000s, and specifically in 2009, has the modernization of its military become a priority for Russia. Notably, military personnel growth has remained largely static after an initial decrease at the end of the Cold War, which has meant a standing military of less than 1,601,000 persons for the majority of the time period examined. Russia's overall change in GDP has been marked by large fluctuations, both positive and negative, which has made increasing military expenditures as a percentage of GDP difficult. Consequently, upgrading and modernizing its military equipment/technology had proven difficult for Russia up until the mid-2000s due to a lack of funds. However, even with the fluctuations, Russia has been able to maintain an overall average percentage of its GDP dedicated to military expenditures of over 4 percent for the time period examined, which has enabled it to continue to invest in its aviation and naval forces, and ballistic missile capabilities. That, coupled with a nuclear presence inherited from the Cold War era, allows Russia to have a strong military force able to reach militarily beyond its immediate border countries.



Therefore, due to meeting the second sub-indicator of having at least 4 percent of its GDP dedicated to military expenditures, and the third sub-indicator of having a strong military presence able to militarily reach beyond its immediate neighbors, Russia does meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the second indicator. While Russia did come up short in regards to military personnel strength, its overall desire, and ability, to be a strong military power in the region is obvious.

India:

While India does have a competent military force that is moving in the right direction, there is still room for improvement to ensure a combat and defense ready force. As seen in Table (10), India has remained relatively steady in regards to the size of its military forces. That being said, for the first sub-indicator requiring a rising regional hegemon to have a standing military of at least 1,601,000 persons, India does not meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon at any point during the time period examined.

**Table (10) Indian Military Strength (measured in 1000s)**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
<b>Armed Forces</b>	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,300	1,300	1,303

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>Armed Forces</b>	1,263	1,298	1,325	1,325	1,325	1,325	1,316	1,288	1,281	1,325

Data compiled from the following sources: Singer, et al, 1972; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. iv; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 400; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, p. 408; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 45; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, p. 449; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 464

In regards to manpower, there continues to be the need to emphasize quality over quantity and recruit excellent leaders and officers (Singh, 2011, pp. 6-7). More specifically, fluctuating defense expenditures have made it difficult to ensure the Indian military is as prepared as its principal adversaries whose defense expenditures continue to increase, such as China and

Pakistan (Singh, 2011, p. 2). Money must be spent to ensure combat effectiveness through the availability of technologically advanced weaponry and training.

Moving on to military expenditure as a percent of GDP, Table (11) seen below reflects rather consistent numbers, consistently below the 4 percent baseline for the second sub-indicator of a rising regional hegemon.

**Table (11) Military Expenditure as a Percent of GDP**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<b>India</b>	3.2	3	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.8	3.1

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>India</b>	3.1	3	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.8

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Publications, 2011

Therefore, India does not meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the second sub-indicator. Of note, at no point has India had a percentage of its GDP dedicated to military expenditures of 4 percent or more. Therefore, averaging the yearly data to account for economic anomalies is not necessary.

Indian military expenditures are broken into two categories – Revenue Expenditure and Capital Expenditure. The majority of India’s military expenditures have traditionally been allocated to Revenue Expenditure, which “...caters to the running or operating expenditure of the defense services. The major items under this head of expenditure includes, Pay and Allowances of the Defense Services, Stores and Equipments, Maintenance of Buildings and Installations, etc” (Defence Review Asia, 2010<sup>xxvi</sup>). The remainder is allocated to the Capital Expenditure, which “is spent on creating assets of long-term nature. [The] most crucial part is the acquisition

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<sup>xxvi</sup> Quotation can be found in the fourth section, titled “Revenue Expenditure & Capital Expenditure,” in the cited reference.

expenditure which caters to procurement of hardware such as aircrafts, tanks, missiles, radars, naval ships, etc” (Defence Review Asia, 2010<sup>xxvii</sup>).

The progress on modernization has been hindered and is “...way behind the desired level and funds amounting to billions of dollars have been surrendered at the end of each fiscal year” due to the fact that the “...Defence Ministry has been witnessing a great deal of difficulty in spending its full budget, especially the capital portion which is meant for procurement of hardware for the armed forces” (Defence Review Asia, 2010<sup>xxviii</sup>). This can likely be attributed to the

“...inefficiencies of the defence procurement process[,]...including the delay in approval of the long term perspective plans, deficiencies in the formulation of the qualitative requirements, inadequate vendor survey and identification, lack of objectivity in technical and commercial evaluation, inordinately large number of processing points, and the multiplicity of dealing agencies and with dispersed centers of accountability (Singh, 2011, p. 3).

Therefore, due to the fact that billions of dollars have been returned back to the government at the end of each fiscal year, the government has not been inclined to increase the amount of money provided to military expenditures.

India experienced huge growth in its GDP from 1992-1997 and from 2002-2010 (International Monetary Fund, 2011). Notably, even though the military expenditures as a percentage of GDP has remained relatively static, the fact that India’s overall GDP has increased means that the amount of money provided for military expenditures has actually increased as well. Therefore, the numbers in Table (11) may not accurately reflect the increase in money that the Indian military has received. However, it must be taken into account that, even with these increases, it is difficult to quantify exactly how much extra military equipment can or has been

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<sup>xxvii</sup> Quotation can be found in the fourth section, titled “Revenue Expenditure & Capital Expenditure,” in the cited reference.

<sup>xxviii</sup> Quotation can be found in the sixth section, titled “Full Utilisation of Capital Expenditure,” in the cited reference.

bought due to the fact that inflation runs rampant within the Indian defense sector (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 251).

As far as India’s military is concerned, it has been acknowledged that “India’s military capabilities are rapidly improving through increased defense acquisitions, and they now include long-range maritime surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, air interdiction, and strategic airlift” (Department of Defense, 2010, p. 60). India is currently looking to modernize its military forces by spending “...between \$50 billion and \$55 billion on military equipment over the next five years to turn its largely Soviet-era armed forces into a modern fighting machine” (Misquitta, et al., 2009<sup>xxix</sup>). As seen in Table (12) below, since 1996, India has been very consistent in its pursuance of new and advanced technology and weaponry. Notably, from 2006-2010, India was actually the world’s largest arms importer (SIPRI – India, 2011).

**Table (12) India - New Military Technology and Advancements being Pursued by Year the Order was Placed (1990-2010)**

	<b>Sea</b>	<b>Air</b>	<b>Nuclear</b>	<b>Land</b>
<b>1990</b>	- 4 <i>Kora</i> FSG (guided missile corvette)			
<b>1991</b>	- 3 <i>Magar</i> (landing ship tank) - <i>Sagarika K-15</i> SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missile)	- 14 <i>Nishant</i> (unmanned aerial vehicle)		
<b>1992</b>				
<b>1993</b>				
<b>1994</b>				
<b>1995</b>	- 8 <i>Sandhayak</i> AGHS (hydrographic survey vessel)			
<b>1996</b>	- 16 SS-N-25 (anti-surface-	- 125 MiG-21bis (upgrades)		

<sup>xxix</sup> Quotation can be found in the sixth paragraph of the cited reference.

	ship missile) - 5 <i>Super Dvora</i> MKII (fast patrol craft coastal)	(fighter ground attack) - 238 Su-30 MKI (fighter ground attack)		
<b>1997</b>		- 2 <i>Harrier</i> T MK4 (training) - 12 KA-31 (helicopter) - 3 P-3C (maritime patrol)		
<b>1998</b>	- SS-N-27 (anti-surface- ship missile)	- 18 GR3 (fighter ground attack)	- Successful nuclear weapons test	
<b>1999</b>	- 1 <i>Viraat</i> CV (aircraft carrier) - 1 <i>Admiral Gorshkov</i> CV (aircraft carrier) - 3 <i>Shivalik</i> - class FFG (guided missile frigate)	-24 MiG-29K (fighter ground attack) - 7 DO-228 (maritime patrol) - 12 PZL TS-11 (training) - 125 <i>Astra</i> AAM (air-to-air missile) - 16 HJT-36 (training)		- 124 <i>Arjun</i> (main battle tank) - <i>Surya</i> ICBM (inter- continental ballistic missile)
<b>2000</b>		- 40 Mi-171 (helicopter) - 140 Su-30 MKI (fighter ground attack) - 8 Tu-142M (reconnaissance) - 10 M-2000 (fighter ground attack)		- 310 T-90 MBTs (main battle tank)
<b>2001</b>	- 1 CV (aircraft carrier)	- 80 Mi-8 (helicopter) - 40 MiG-27M (fighter ground attack)		
<b>2002</b>	- 10 <i>Sindhughosh</i> SSK (patrol			- 500-600 T-72 VT (main battle tank)

	submarine with anti-submarine warfare capability)			
<b>2003</b>	- 6 <i>Scorpene</i> SSK(patrol submarine with anti-submarine warfare capability) - 3 <i>Mod. Delhi</i> -class DDG (guided missile destroyer) - 3 <i>Kolkata</i> -class DDG (guided missile destroyer)	- 12 M-2000-5 (fighter ground attack) - 66 Hawk Mk132 (advanced jet trainer) - 3 IL-76TD (airborne early warning and control)		- 1300 T-72 VT (main battle tank)
<b>2004</b>	- 1 <i>Akula</i> -class SSN (attack submarine nuclear-powered)	- 3 IAI-707 (airborne early warning) - 16 MiG-29K (fighter ground attack) - 66 <i>Hawk</i> Mk132 (advanced jet trainer) - 245 <i>Dhruv</i> (helicopter)		- 228 WZT-3 (armored vehicle recovery)
<b>2005</b>	- 6 <i>Scorpene</i> -Class SSK (patrol submarine with anti-submarine warfare capability) - 1 oceanographic survey vessel	- 12 <i>Nishant</i> UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) - 125 MiG-21 (fighter ground attack) - 40 MiG-27 (fighter ground attack) - 20 <i>Tejas</i> (fighter)		- 28 <i>Smerch</i> -M BM 9K58 (multiple-launch rocket system)
<b>2006</b>	- 3 <i>Talwar</i> -class FFG (guided missile frigate)	- 20 ALH – <i>Dhruv</i> (helicopter) - 20 <i>Jaguar</i> IS		- 54 <i>Prithvi II</i> (short range ballistic missile)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>BrahMos</i> (anti-ship cruise missile)</li> <li>- 28 <i>Novator</i> 3M14E Klub-S (submarine launched cruise missile)</li> <li>- 1 landing platform dock</li> <li>- 4 landing craft mechanized</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(fighter ground attack)</li> <li>- 12 HJT-36 (training)</li> <li>- 67 Mig-29 (fighter)</li> <li>- 6 UH-3H (search and rescue)</li> <li>- Mistral (air-to-air missile)</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 20 <i>Tejas</i> (landing craft assault)</li> </ul>
<b>2007</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 40 Su-30 MKI (fighter ground attack)</li> <li>- 6 C-130J <i>Hercules</i> (transport)</li> <li>- 24 <i>Tejas</i> (fighter)</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 347 T-90S (main battle tank)</li> </ul>
<b>2008</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 67 MiG-29 (fighter)</li> <li>- 6 C-130J <i>Hercules</i> (transport)</li> <li>- 3 IL-76TD (airborne early warning and control)</li> <li>- 3 EMB-145 (airborne early warning and control)</li> <li>- 8 P-8i (maritime patrol)</li> <li>- 80 Mi-17 (helicopter)</li> </ul>		
<b>2009</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1 SSBN (ballistic-missile submarine nuclear-fueled)</li> <li>- 7 <i>Shivalik</i>-class FFG (guided missile)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 5 KA-31 (airborne early warning helicopter)</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Dhanush</i> SRBM (short-range ballistic missile)</li> <li>- <i>Nirbhay</i> (cruise missile)</li> <li>- <i>Agni III</i> IRBM</li> </ul>

	frigate) - 10 <i>Nicobar</i> - class PCF (patrol craft fast) - 15 high-speed interceptor boats			(intermediate- range ballistic missile) - <i>Agni IV</i> IRBM (intermediate- range ballistic missile) - 443 <i>Nag</i> ATGW (anti- tank guided weapon) - 18 medium range SAM (surface-to-air missile)
<b>2010</b>	- 5 SSBN (ballistic- missile submarine nuclear-fuelled)			

Data compiled from the following sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, pp. 254-255, 443-445; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 245-246, 443-445; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, pp. 329- 330, 448-449; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, pp. 356- 357, 491-493; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, pp. 360-361, 483-485; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, pp. 374-375, 487-489; Library of Congress - Federal Research Division - Country Profile: India, 2004, p. 21

As can be seen in Table (12) above, India has invested its money in all facets of its military. It has established a robust navy including numerous submarines, aircraft carriers, frigates, and destroyers. India's aviation component is extensive with a variety of ever-newer fighter/ground attack aircraft purchased throughout the time period examined, which emphasizes India's desire to acquire new technologies. In regards to ballistic missiles, India has inter-continental, submarine-launched, short-range, and immediate-range ballistic missiles at its disposal. The aforementioned capabilities coupled with a successful nuclear weapons test in 1998 make India a formidable military power within its region, very capable of reaching militarily beyond its immediate border countries. Therefore, India meets the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the third sub-indicator.



In summary, while India has had exceptional increases in overall GDP during the time period examined, military expenditures as a percentage of GDP have largely decreased. Growth in military personnel has remained largely static, with no significant increases or decreases. Most notably, even with the issue of decreasing military expenditures and the issues with purchasing new military equipment/technology, India has consistently purchased ever larger amounts of military equipment/technology in an effort to solidify its position as a rising regional hegemon militarily. However, due to the fact that military personnel growth has been static and has never reached the 1,601,000 persons baseline, and there has been declines in the percentage of GDP dedicated to military expenditures (which has never met the 4 percent baseline), India does not meet the criteria of a rising regional hegemon per the second indicator.

China:

China is attempting to place more emphasis on quality versus quantity of its military forces in an effort to create a more efficient and effective military as evidenced by the decrease in troops seen below in Table (13).

**Table (13) Chinese Military Strength (measured in 1000s)**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<b>Armed Forces</b>	3,500	3,200	3,160	3,030	2,930	2,930	2,650	2,600	2,600	2,400

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>Armed Forces</b>	2,810	2,310	2,270	2,250	2,252	2,255	2,255	2,255	2,105	2,185	2,285

Data compiled from the following sources: Singer, et al, 1972; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, p. 400; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, p. 408; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 445; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, p. 449; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 465

While faced with an official drawdown of its military personnel to approximately 2.3 million in 2005, China's military "...continues to grow impressively in terms of quality and quantity of its materiel" (Moore, 2005<sup>xxx</sup>). The drawdown was most noticeable in the reduction of ground forces, "...while the navy, air force, and Second Artillery Corps were strengthened" (Library of

<sup>xxx</sup> Quotation can be found in the fifth paragraph of the cited reference.

Congress - Federal Research Division - Country Profile: China, 2006, p. 37). Notably, throughout the time period examined, even with the drawdown of its military personnel, China's standing military has far exceeded the 1,601,000 persons baseline to be defined as a rising regional hegemon per the first sub-indicator.

As seen in Table (14), China is another country who has seen incredible growth in its GDP annually from 1991-2010 (International Monetary Fund, 2011).

**Table (14) Military Expenditure as a Percent of GDP (all figures are SIPRI estimates)**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<b>China</b>	2.5	2.4	2.5	2	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.9

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>China</b>	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	2	2	2.1	2	2.2

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Publications, 2011

However, at no point has China's military expenditure as a percent of GDP met or exceeded the 4 percent baseline set for the second sub-indicator; therefore, China cannot be considered a rising regional hegemon per this sub-indicator. Of note, the fact that the military expenditures as a percent of GDP has not increased do not necessarily accurately reflect the large increases in money being given to the military, and this is a caveat that several authors identified. Of note, "[i]n the 1990s, the difference between the official budget and true military spending in China was considerable. In those days China's armed forces received significant additional funds from their own business activities, and China's defense industry received massive government subsidies" (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 393). Whether due to inconsistent data reporting, or compiling, or due to significantly different statistical methods to report such data, the number in Table (14) are the best we have available, but not necessarily the most accurate ones. However, "[d]uring the past decade...as the official budget has risen by more than 10% per year, the likely gap between the official budget and true spending has narrowed considerably" (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 393).

The modernization and upgrading of the Chinese military continues to be a top priority as shown by its inclusion in the Government Work Paper 2010. Per Premier Wen Jiabao,

...This year, we need to focus on the overall work of the Party and government and strengthen all aspects of the army in accordance with the principle of making it more revolutionary, modern, and standardized, so that it can complete its missions in this new stage and this new century. We will concentrate on making the army better able to win informationized local wars, and will enhance its ability to respond to multiple security threats and accomplish a diverse array of military tasks. We will work to strengthen the army ideologically and politically. We will accelerate the comprehensive development of a modern military logistics system. We will intensify R&D on national defense and the development of weapons and equipment... (Jiabao, 2010, p. 14).

As seen in Table (15) below, China has been consistently purchasing new weaponry and has made strides at solidifying itself as a strong naval force in its region through its submarine and destroyer fleets.

**Table (15) China - New Military Technology and Advancements being Pursued by Year the Order was Placed (1990-2010)**

	<b>Sea</b>	<b>Air</b>	<b>Nuclear</b>	<b>Land</b>
<b>1990</b>		- EC-120 (helicopter)		- 30 SA-10 (surface-to-air missile)
<b>1991</b>				
<b>1992</b>				
<b>1993</b>		- J-10 (fighter ground attack)		
<b>1994</b>	- 4 <i>Song</i> (patrol submarine with anti-submarine warfare capability)			
<b>1995</b>				
<b>1996</b>	- 2 <i>Sovremenny</i> (guided missile destroyer)	- 200 Su-27 (fighter ground attack)		
<b>1997</b>				- 4 CSS-N-4 (surface-to- surface missile)
<b>1998</b>				- 24 SSN-24 (surface-to- surface missile) - 12 FT-2000

				(surface-to-air missile)
<b>1999</b>		- 30 Su-30MKK (fighter ground attack)		- DF-21X (intermediate range ballistic missile)
<b>2000</b>		- 6 A-50 (airborne early warning) - 28 Su-27UBK (fighter ground attack)		
<b>2001</b>		- AS-13 (air-to-surface missile)		
<b>2002</b>	- 2 <i>Sovremenny</i> (guided missile destroyer) - 8 <i>Kilo</i> submarines (patrol submarine with anti-submarine warfare capability)			
<b>2003</b>		- 28 Su-30MKK (fighter ground attack)		
<b>2004</b>				
<b>2005</b>		- 30 IL-76TD (transport) - 8 IL-78M (tanker)		
<b>2006</b>				
<b>2007</b>		- 6 Be-103 (amphibian aircraft)		
<b>2008</b>				- 100 4x4 <i>Tigr</i> (light armored combat vehicle)
<b>2009</b>	- 4 Zubr Class Hovercraft (landing craft air cushion)	- 9 Ka-28 (anti-submarine helo)		- 4 Zubr Class Hovercraft
<b>2010</b>				

Data compiled from the following sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, pp. 310-311, 443-445; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, pp. 300, 445; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 413; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, pp. 419, 484; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, pp. 436, 487-488

In regards to its aviation component, China has also purchased a number of newer fighter/attack aircraft. Notably, there is very little data concerning nuclear advancements, even though China has had nuclear weapons since 1964, and ballistic missile advancements (Condon, 2011). There is often a lack of transparency in relation to Chinese activities, particularly when it has to do with their military (The Economist, 2011). Therefore, since China has the capabilities to produce military weapons and technology indigenously, it is possible that they have pursued more than what the IISS has recorded (The Economist, 2011). Per Table (15) above, China has placed emphasis on strengthening its naval and aviation forces, and it has nuclear weapons capability, which allows it to reach militarily beyond its immediate border countries. While there is minimal data in regards to ballistic missile advancements, China still meets the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the third sub-indicator.

In summary, China's economy has been marked by exceptional annual growth in its GDP; however, that growth does not appear to have directly translated to an increase in the percentage of its GDP dedicated to military expenditures. Consequently, China does not meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the second sub-indicator requiring at least 4 percent of GDP dedicated to military expenditures. Of note, the number of military personnel has largely decreased during the time period examined; however, even with the decreases in its military forces, China still far exceeds the baseline of 1,601,000 for the first sub-indicator. In regards to military technology and advancements, through its purchases of warships and fighter/attack aircraft, and its ability to make nuclear weapons, China meets the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the third sub-indicator. Therefore, by meeting the first and third sub-indicators, China meets the definition of a rising regional region per the second indicator.

## Summary:

In conclusion, across the board, none of the BRIC countries meets the strict definition of a rising regional hegemon per the second indicator and its three sub-indicators. For military personnel growth, the trend for all BRIC countries has been to remain relatively static, or even decline, as in the case of Russia and China. Most notably, China is the only country who met the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the first sub-indicator requiring a standing military of at least 1,601,000 persons. In regards to military expenditures as a percent of GDP, except for Russia, none of the BRIC countries for any year during the time period examined had their military expenditures as a percent of GDP meet the 4 percent baseline. Notably, Russia did not meet the strict definition of a rising regional hegemon per the second sub-indicator necessitating at least 4 percent of GDP dedicated to military expenditures. However, when taking into account economic anomalies by averaging the yearly percent of GDP dedicated to military expenditures, Russia did meet the definition of the second sub-indicator. In regards to new military technology and equipment being purchased, only Russia, India and China met the third sub-indicator. Therefore, meeting at least two of the three following sub-indicators: 1. force strength [size of the military of at least 1,601,000]; 2. financial strength [defense spending as a percentage of GDP of at least 4 percent]; and 3. new military equipment and technology being purchased [warships, aircraft, nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles], only Russia and China meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the second indicator.

## **Investment in its Region, and Beyond**

Unlike historical examples of hegemony where quantitative power was the sole determining factor, in today's international system, quantitative power is combined with a social view of power for a more effective hegemonic leader. This is most accurately depicted by Stivachtis through his discussion on hegemony and the distinction between social and non-social conceptions of power (Stivachtis, 2010). More specifically, social conceptions of power focus more on mutual agreement that the rules and values being established are in everyone's best interest, which will encourage diplomacy and other peaceful means of conflict resolution when necessary (Stivachtis, 2010).

It follows then, that a rapidly developing nation striving to be a regional hegemon must be willing to invest in and support the countries within its region, and beyond, when necessary. The UN provides innumerable opportunities for countries to be involved and assist with peacekeeping operations worldwide, which directly aids in ensuring the security of other nations. Beyond simply providing security to other nations, there is also the expectation that a regional hegemon will provide monetary support when a country is in need of humanitarian assistance. Just as with providing support to the UN peacekeeping forces to countries outside of its region, a regional hegemon will also likely be expected to provide monetary support beyond its regional borders to ensure the stability of the international system as a whole.

Security for other nations:

The following section will examine the third indicator - how BRIC nations provide security to other nations - and compare their contributions of peacekeeping forces to that of the baseline 3500 peacekeeping forces required for a rising regional hegemon. Data have also been included for the US as this comparison enables the research to show how support from a

potential regional hegemon compares to the support provided by a developed country/recognized hegemon.

At first glance at Table (16) below, it is obvious that, since 1992, of all the countries under discussion, India has been at the forefront of providing personnel in support of UN peacekeeping forces worldwide and, since 2005, far exceeding the baseline 3500 peacekeeping personnel required for a rising regional hegemon per this indicator.

**Table (16) UN Peacekeeping Forces (troops, military experts on mission, and police) by Country (averages for each year)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>1990<sup>#</sup></b>	<b>1991<sup>%</sup></b>	<b>1992<sup>@</sup></b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998<sup>^</sup></b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	27	35	93	90	218	382	1102	532	24	21	95
<b>Russia</b>	35*	72*	735	1042	1466	1566	1196	990	235	138	247
<b>India</b>	40	33	946	3370	5109	1627	1376	755	383	901	3636
<b>China</b>	5	34	341	352	63	45	40	36	33	33	67

Troop and police contributors archive (1990-2010), United Nations Peacekeeping, 2011

\* - USSR

# - Data only available for the month of November 1990

% - Data only available for April – December 1991

@ - Data only available for January – April and August – December

^ - Data only available for January – November

<b>Country</b>	<b>2001<sup>&amp;</sup></b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011<sup>~</sup></b>
<b>Brazil</b>	96	102	80	842	1288	1260	1280	1294	1345	2118	2266
<b>Russia</b>	332	362	329	340	299	267	295	287	341	354	252
<b>India</b>	2536	2929	2827	3075	6309	9033	9401	8922	8691	8805	8629
<b>China</b>	113	129	261	824	1013	1462	1825	2061	2150	2054	2036

Troop and police contributors archive (1990-2010), United Nations Peacekeeping, 2011; Contributions by Country, United Nations Peacekeeping, 30 April 2011

& - Data only available for January and March – December

~ - Data only taken for January – April

On that same token, Russia has provided noticeably less support to UN peacekeeping forces than its developing country counterparts since 1997; its numbers more closely reflect those of the US. Brazil, while having a slow start up until 2003, has provided support numbering in the thousands since 2004. Lastly, according to Table (16), China was not interested in providing much support to the UN peacekeeping forces up through 2003. However, 2004 showed a marked increase of approximately 600 peacekeeping personnel, with support numbering in the thousands ever since. Notably, “China’s increased peacekeeping activity helps to put into action the 2004 call by



President Hu Jintao for the PLA to perform ‘new historic missions’. It thus parallels the PLA’s growing interest in expanding its [military operations other than war]—such as counterpiracy, disaster response and humanitarian relief—both in China and abroad” (Gill, et al, 2009, p. 29; Mulvenon, 2009, p. 9). The US's prime support years to the UN peacekeeping forces were from 1993-2000, and the support has steadily decreased ever since. This can likely be attributed to the fact that the US began its global war on terror (GWOT) in 2001 after the events of September 11, and has also been involved in numerous other conflicts in the Middle East since that time, requiring an overall drawdown in its peacekeeping forces outside of that area.

In summary, based on the aforementioned data, none of the BRIC countries meet the strict definition of a rising regional hegemon per the third indicator requiring a rising regional hegemon to have yearly contributions of peacekeeping forces of 3500 persons. However, when India’s yearly contributions of personnel provided in support of peacekeeping operations is averaged for the time period examined (accounting for any anomalies), India does meet the baseline with 4061 persons contributed. Therefore, India does meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the third indicator, which requires a rising regional hegemon to have contributions of personnel in support of peacekeeping operations of at least 3500 persons.

Humanitarian assistance:

Beyond simply providing security to other nations, there is also the expectation that a regional hegemon will provide monetary support when a country is in need of humanitarian assistance. Just as with providing support to the UN peacekeeping forces to countries outside of its region, a regional hegemon will also likely be expected to provide monetary support beyond its regional borders. To meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per this indicator, a rapidly developing nation will be expected to provide at least 0.3 percent of its GDP in support

of humanitarian assistance projects. The following section examines data, by BRIC donor country, of paid contributions to countries in need of humanitarian assistance, as tracked by UNOCHA. That data are then utilized to find the percent of BRIC country GDP dedicated to humanitarian assistance projects to determine if the BRIC countries meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the fourth indicator. Of note, data was only available back to 1999.

According to Table (17) below, of all the countries under analysis, Brazil has traditionally provided the least amount of monetary support for humanitarian assistance.

**Table (17) Paid Contribution (measured in 1000s of USD) for Humanitarian Assistance by Country**

Country	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<b>Brazil</b>	0.0	200.0	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,325.0*
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	1,492.1*	760.0*	753.7*	11,000.0*	479.2*	20,524.0*
<b>India</b>	0.0	329.4	0.0	7,444.2	1,139.4*	0.0	0.0*
<b>China</b>	0.0	5,969.9	788.5*	207.3	251.7	1,255.0	18,488.5*
<b>United States</b>	39,465.6	346,475.3*	823,640.2*	1,198,770.9*	1,307,946.4*	732,587.5*	1,127,655.7*

Paid Contribution (measured in 1000s), Financial Tracking Service, 2011

\* Provided non-monetary assistance

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>Brazil</b>	0.0*	130.0*	2,210.0*	1,668.4	26,887.4	17,460.3
<b>Russia</b>	18,177.0*	2,924.9	34,073.0	30,460.0*	34,305.9*	13,652.2*
<b>India</b>	1,000.0*	1,273.0	5,000.0*	13,238.1	35,543.5	1500.0*
<b>China</b>	2,723.8*	7,837.7	8,099.6	1,054.6	34,743.1*	5,218.4*
<b>United States</b>	952,794.6*	1,049,604.5*	1,391,739.2	2,334,774.4	2,534,126.2*	1,171,385.7

Paid Contribution (measured in 1000s), Financial Tracking Service, 2011

\* Provided non-monetary assistance

As of 2010, Brazil drastically increased the amount of monetary assistance it has provided; however, it still has a ways to go to match even its developing nation counterparts, much less a developed nation, in paid contributions in support of humanitarian assistance. In contrast to Brazil, as seen in Table (17), Russia has historically provided the most consistent, and greatest amounts of, monetary support for humanitarian assistance of any of the BRIC countries.

In regards to India, it must be noted that India receives foreign aid along with providing monetary assistance to its neighbors and other foreign countries within which it has interests (Dehejia, 2010). Therefore, it should be noted the amount of India's GDP it provides in support

of humanitarian assistance is somewhat skewed. However, even with the foreign aid it receives, India still does not provide consistently high amount of humanitarian assistance. Like India, China still receives international aid even though it also provides foreign aid. As an example, in 2009, China provided an estimated \$1.4 billion to Africa; however, China also received more than \$2.5 billion foreign aid in that same year (Wong, 2010). Again like India, even with the foreign aid it receives, China still falls short in its monetary contributions in support of humanitarian assistance.

As seen in Table (17), the US has traditionally and consistently provided extremely large amounts of monetary assistance yearly in support of humanitarian assistance. No developing country even comes close to the amount of support provided by the US. Notably, most developing countries are not in the position to provide the same levels of monetary assistance as developed nations due to the fact that their money available per GDP is lower. According to Table (18) seen below, the amount of humanitarian assistance (in USD) provided has been averaged against each country's respective GDP to see the amount of humanitarian assistance provided as a percentage of GDP.

**Table (18) Donation (measured in billions of USD) to UN Humanitarian Assistance Projects as a Percent of GDP**

<b>Country</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	0.0	0.0000311	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<b>Russia</b>	0.0	0.000575	0.000248	0.000218	0.00256	0.000811
<b>India</b>	0.0	0.000072	0.0	0.0014	0.00019	0.0
<b>China</b>	0.0	0.00050	0.00006	0.000014	0.000015	0.000065
<b>United States</b>	0.0000042	0.0035	0.0008	0.011	0.012	0.0062

Table percentages derived from GDP data per country from International Monetary Fund (measured in billions of USD), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011, and Paid Contribution (measured in 1000s of USD), Financial Tracking Service, 2011

<b>Country</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	0.000149	0.0	0.00000943	0.000134	0.000104	0.00129
<b>Russia</b>	0.00269	0.00184	0.000225	0.00205	0.00249	0.00234
<b>India</b>	0.0	0.00011	0.00011	0.0004	0.001	0.0023
<b>China</b>	0.00082	0.0001	0.00022	0.00018	0.000021	0.00059
<b>United States</b>	0.0089	0.0071	0.0075	0.0097	0.017	0.017

Table percentages derived from GDP data per country from International Monetary Fund (measured in billions of USD), World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011, and Paid Contribution (measured in 1000s of USD), Financial Tracking Service, 2011

Table (18) further shows that not only do the BRIC countries not come close to the overall money spent by a developed nation in support of humanitarian assistance projects, but the percentage of their GDP that they are willing to donate is far less than the baseline of 0.3 percent of GDP. Accordingly, none of the BRIC countries meet the definition of a potential regional hegemon per the fourth indicator due to the low percentage of GDP provided in support of humanitarian assistance. However, the fact that these developing nations are providing any amount of monetary support is commendable and bodes well for solidifying their roles as potential rising regional hegemons within the international system in the future.

### **Effectiveness of Diplomacy in International Relations**

A potential regional hegemon who strives for a legitimate position within the international system will need to be involved in the peaceful resolution of conflict versus relying on violent means to solve a problem. Within the international system, diplomacy is a widely recognized method of securing peace and ending hostilities within the international system. Therefore, the following section will examine the use of diplomacy by the BRIC countries. For the purpose of this project, the use of diplomacy will be measured through the implementation of regional cooperation initiatives, regional integration initiatives, economic/political leadership initiatives, and regional broker/mediator initiatives by the rapidly developing nations. To meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per this indicator, it will be expected that a rapidly developing nation be involved in the aforementioned initiatives beyond its immediate border countries. This is due to the fact that it is unlikely a regional hegemon will only be required to

work diplomatically with its immediate neighbors, or that its region will only extend as far as its border countries.

As can be seen in Table (19), all of the BRIC countries have made strong efforts at implementing and/or becoming involved in regional initiatives. While regional integration initiatives are somewhat lacking, the regional cooperation initiatives are booming with activity, along with economic/political leadership initiatives, and regional broker/mediator initiatives.

**Table (19) Regional Initiatives by Country (1990-2010)**

	<b>Regional Cooperation Initiatives</b>	<b>Regional Integration Initiatives</b>	<b>Economic/Political Leadership Initiatives</b>	<b>Regional Broker/Mediator Initiatives</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	- 2004: Union of South American Nations (UNASUR/UNASOL)	- 1991: Mercosul	- 1991: Mercosul	- 2008: <i>Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa</i> (CSD – South American Defense Council)
<b>Russia</b>	- 2002: Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) - 2005: ASEAN-Russia Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) to Promote Cooperation between ASEAN and Russia 2005-2015	- 1991: CIS - 1997: Belarus treaty	- 1991: ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership - 2005: Agreement between the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the Government of the Russian Federation on Economic and Development Cooperation	- 1994: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace initiative - 2010: Proposed new NATO treaty based on the Lavrov Paper (“Agreement on Basic Principles Governing Relations Among NATO-Russia Council Member States in Security Sphere”) - 1990: Ukraine and Moldova (Dniester) - 2008: Ukraine (Crimea)
<b>India</b>	-1992: became full ASEAN Dialogue Partner		- 2006: Foreign Secretary talks (concerning	- 1996/7: low level talks between India and

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2004: Composite Dialogue - SAARC summit (addressing outstanding issues between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir)</li> <li>- 2004: ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>bilateral relations with Pakistan)</li> <li>- 2003: ASEAN-India Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation</li> <li>- 2009: ASEAN-India Trade in Goods (TIG) Agreement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pakistan</li> <li>- 1999: Lahore Accord signed</li> <li>- 2006: Foreign Secretary talks (concerning bilateral relations with Pakistan)</li> </ul>
<b>China</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1991: opened diplomatic relations to former Soviet Union republics</li> <li>- 1996: ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations</li> <li>- 2003: Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (7th ASEAN-China summit)</li> <li>- Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (through which China conducts military exercises with Russia)</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2002: ASEAN-China Free Trade Area established (ACFTA)</li> <li>- 2010: Premier Wen visited India to continue to develop bilateral relations</li> <li>- 2003: President Hu state visit to Russia</li> <li>- 2011: China sent disaster relief team and humanitarian assistance money to Japan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 2003: Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program</li> </ul>

Data compiled from the following sources: US Department of State - Background Note: Brazil, 2011; Sánchez, 2008; Ritvo, 2008; Klonsky, et al., 2009; Collective Security Treaty Organization, 2011; US Department of State - Background Note: Russia, 2011; Association of Southeast Asian Nations - External Relations - ASEAN-Russia, 2011; Neuger, 2010; US Department of State – Background Note: India, 2011; US Department of State - Background Note: China, 2011; Association of Southeast Asian Nations - External Relations - ASEAN-China, 2011; Association of Southeast Asian Nations - External Relations - ASEAN-India, 2011; BBC, 2005; Bajoria, et al, 2009; CIS, 2011; Paddock, 1997; BBC, 2011; Mayr, 2008

Brazil is the marked forerunner within Latin and South America. Notably, “Brazil has traditionally been a leader in the inter-American community and played an important role in collective security efforts, as well as in economic cooperation in the Western Hemisphere” (US

Department of State - Background Note: Brazil, 2011<sup>xxxix</sup>). Brazil places much emphasis on the establishment of diplomatic relations with its South American neighbors, both individually and collectively.

Brazil is already stepping up as a leader within South America as it spearheads the establishment of the *Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa* (CSD – South American Defense Council), an organ of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR/UNASOL) (Sánchez, 2008). While much is left to be seen as to the effectiveness of this organization versus those that have already been established, such as “...the Andean Pact, MERCOSUR, the Venezuelan-led ALBA, IBA which includes Brazil, the Rio Group, the Ibero-American Secretariat and now UNASUR[, and the] hemispheric-wide security entity, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and College,” it can be argued that the lack of inclusion of the United States “... could lead to greater security and cooperation among a group of autonomous Latin American countries feeling enthusiastic and free” (Sánchez, 2008<sup>xxxix</sup>). Notably, through the formation of the CSD, Brazil is making an effort to establish regional security and cooperation throughout the continent of South America and well beyond its immediate border countries<sup>xxxix</sup>. Therefore, Brazil does meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the fifth indicator that a rising regional hegemon be involved in regional initiatives beyond its border countries.

Russia is involved in numerous regional initiatives in an effort to ensure greater levels of stability and growth. One such initiative is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which was established through the renaming of the Collective Security Treaty of the

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<sup>xxxix</sup> Quotation can be found in the “Foreign Relations” section of the cited reference.

<sup>xxxix</sup> Quotation can be found in the fourth paragraph of the “Brazil in a Militarized Region” section of the cited reference.

<sup>xxxix</sup> The CSD, as an organ of UNASUR, incorporates all UNASUR member states. The 12 member states are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Union of South American Nations, 2012).

Commonwealth of Independent States (Collective Security Treaty Organization, 2011). The creation of the CSTO was “...based on the reactivation of long standing plans to create a joint CIS rapid reaction force needed to support “collective security”” (Collective Security Treaty Organization, 2011<sup>xxxiv</sup>). Russia is actively involved in NATO as well. In support of NATO’s operations in the Balkans in the mid-90s, including the NATO-led peace-support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR) and in Kosovo (KFOR), it is notable that for both operations, Russia made the single largest non-NATO country troop contribution (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2008). Further supporting NATO, “Russia and Ukraine have contributed ships to [Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean]. Russia’s participation, with two frigates in September 2007, marked the first time that Russia participated in a NATO maritime operation” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2008<sup>xxxv</sup>).

In an effort to provide more economic stability and equality throughout its region, Russia became a member and strong proponent of The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), founded in 1991. In September 1993, the CIS

signed an Agreement on the creation of Economic Union to form common economic space grounded on free movement of goods, services, labor force, capital; to elaborate coordinated monetary, tax, price, customs, external economic policy; to bring together methods of regulating economic activity and create favorable conditions for the development of direct production relations (CIS, 2011).

The CIS currently unites the 12 countries of: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine (CIS, 2011).

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<sup>xxxiv</sup> Quotation can be found in the sixth paragraph of the cited reference.

<sup>xxxv</sup> Quotation can be found in section 21 of the cited reference.



As further evidence to Russia's desire to become a strong regional hegemon, Russia signed the Belarus Treaty in 1997. In doing so, Russia and Belarus formed "...a new union that will seek economic and political integration of the two nations," which is notably "...the biggest step toward re-integration by any of the former Soviet republics since the empire collapsed" (Paddock, 1997). Russia also continues to be heavily involved in peace-brokering within its region for issues that arose during, and shortly after, the fall of the Soviet Union. Case in point, the conflict between Moldova and Dniester, which had its foundations set in 1990, continues to be an issue within which Russia is involved. While not recognized for its independence internationally, Dniester maintains its desire for autonomy, with potential to re-join Russia in the future (BBC, 2011). Russia continues to attempt to broker peace and a political resolution with the Ukraine, Dniester, and Moldova regarding the Dniester-Moldova conflict; however, there has been no final resolution (BBC, 2011). In the meantime, Russia continues to provide military security and financial assistance to Dniester (BBC, 2011).

Russia is not only involved in numerous regional initiatives in its immediate area, but it is also involved in regional initiatives in the periphery. Notably, Russia is very involved with ASEAN, particularly in support of ASEAN economic development. Specifically, "[i]n December 2005, ASEAN and Russia concluded the Agreement between the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the Government of the Russian Federation on Economic and Development Cooperation. The Agreement provides for favorable conditions for the development of multifaceted cooperation between the two sides in economic, trade and investment, scientific, technological and cultural areas" (Association of Southeast Asian Nations - External Relations - ASEAN-Russia, 2011<sup>xxxvi</sup>). As can be seen from the aforementioned discussion, Russia, while having an extensive border that touches numerous countries, is heavily

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<sup>xxxvi</sup> Quotation can be in section 11 of the cited reference.

involved in regional initiatives within its immediate area and well beyond. In doing so, Russia solidly meets the definition of a rising regional hegemon per this fifth indicator that a rising regional hegemon be involved in regional initiatives beyond its immediate border countries.

Of note, the Russia-Georgia war is noticeably absent from the list of regional broker/mediator initiatives even though it is arguably one of the most aggressive attempts by Russia to reconstitute its sphere of influence (BBC, 2008). This is due to the fact that Russia's handling of the conflict did not coincide with the definition of regional hegemony in this project per Stivachtis' discussion on social conceptions of power. In this case, Russia used a more traditional notion of hegemony relating to Stivachtis' non-social conceptions of power, which is "...based on a quantitative measurement of a country's military, economic and technological capabilities in relation to those of other countries" (Stivachtis, 2010). Therefore, Russia was able to defeat Georgia through its usage of superior military capabilities. The issue between the Ukraine and Russia concerning Crimea is following along similar lines as those leading up to the Russia-Georgia war, so it will be interesting to see how that progresses (Mayr, 2008).

India is greatly invested in the South Asian region as a charter member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Established in 1985, "[i]ts members are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, with the People's Republic of China, Iran, Japan, European Union, Republic of Korea, and the U.S. as observers" and it "...encourages cooperation in agriculture, rural development, science and technology, culture, health, population control, narcotics, and terrorism" (US Department of State - Background Note: India, 2010<sup>xxxvii</sup>). The push for cooperation through diplomacy rather than aggression will hopefully serve to foster peaceful negotiations within the South Asian region.

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<sup>xxxvii</sup> Quotation can be found in the section titled "SAARC" in the cited reference.

India is also very active within its region through ASEAN. Currently, “ASEAN and India are...intensifying their political and security dialogue to add a new dimension to a mutually beneficial economic and commercial relationship” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations - External Relations - ASEAN-India, 2011). Also, “[s]ince the establishment of the ASEAN-India dialogue relations, development cooperation activities/areas have grown in strength and number. In terms of sectors, ASEAN-India cooperation covers the following: trade and investment, science and technology, human resources development, tourism, transport and infrastructure, health, small and medium scale enterprise and people-to-people contact” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations - External Relations - ASEAN-India, 2011). As evidenced by the aforementioned discussion, India is very dedicated to the ASEAN program, which incorporates its immediate border countries, as well as countries outside of that area. In doing so, India meets the definition of a rising regional hegemon per this indicator that a rising regional hegemon be involved in regional initiatives beyond its immediate border countries.

Notably, one of the biggest issues that India faces within its region is its rocky relationship with Pakistan. While India does make an effort to deal with its issues with Pakistan diplomatically, it appears that the diplomatic effects do not last long. After each effort towards a diplomatic resolution, something happens to mitigate the progress that had previously been made. From 1996/7, “India and Pakistan set up low-level meetings to defuse tension over Jammu and Kashmir. The diplomatic push became more concerted a year later and an agenda for peace talks was agreed on” (BBC, 2005). Then, in 1999, “[r]elations between India and Pakistan improved again in February...when Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee travelled to Pakistan to meet Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif” (BBC, 2005). At that time, “[t]hey signed the Lahore accord pledging again to ‘intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue

of Jammu and Kashmir” (BBC, 2005). Next, “[i]n February 2004, India and Pakistan agreed to restart the "2+6" Composite Dialogue formula, providing for talks on Peace and Security and Jammu and Kashmir, followed by technical and Secretary-level discussions on six other bilateral disputes” (US Department of State – Background Note: India, 2011<sup>xxxviii</sup>). Then, in November 2006, “[t]he Foreign Secretary talks resumed...after a 3-month delay following July 11, 2006 terrorist bombings in Mumbai. The meeting generated modest progress, with the two sides agreeing to establish a joint mechanism on counterterrorism” (US Department of State – Background Note: India, 2011). While it is laudable that India continues to press for a diplomatic solution with Pakistan, for India to be able to be a regional hegemon, it will need to figure out the best way to definitively deal with its issues.

China is very active within ASEAN as well. Specifically, “[t]rade and economic ties between ASEAN and China have been growing rapidly over the past years, especially after the signing of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in November 2002 to establish the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA)” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations - External Relations - ASEAN-China, 2011<sup>xxxix</sup>). More importantly, “[d]uring the global financial crisis in 2009, China established a US\$15 billion loan to ASEAN Member States for economic development” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations - External Relations - ASEAN-China, 2011<sup>xl</sup>).

China has also been involved in assisting with North Korea. Notably, “...China has made efforts to reduce tensions in Asia, hosting the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear

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<sup>xxxviii</sup> Quotation can be found in the ninth paragraph of the section titled “Bilateral and Regional Relations” in the cited reference.

<sup>xxxix</sup> Quotation can be found in section 10 of the cited reference.

<sup>xl</sup> Quotation can be found in section 15 of the cited reference.

weapons program” (US Department of State - Background Note: China, 2010<sup>xli</sup>). In regards to the Six-Party Talks, “Beijing serves as Pyongyang's long-standing ally and main trade partner, and has used its influence with the Kim regime to bring North Korea to the Six-Party negotiating table” (Bajoria, et al, 2009<sup>xlii</sup>). While North Korea is a border country with China, China’s role within the Six-Party Talks actually extends well beyond its borders as they include North Korea, South Korea, the US, Russia, China, and Japan (Hancocks, 2011). Therefore, with China’s involvement in the Six-Party Talks and its role and participation within ASEAN, it meets the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the fifth and final indicator, that a rising regional hegemon be involved in regional initiatives beyond its immediate borders.

In regards to other relationships within its region, China has traditionally had a rocky bilateral relationship with Japan (Institute for International Policy Studies, 2008, p.8). However, the current negative relationship between China and Japan is a result of Japan’s insecurity in light of China’s extensive military budget and recent development of military technology (Institute for International Policy Studies, 2008, p. 4). While China wants to continue its strong push ahead to become a strong military power and an economic superpower, if it wants to succeed as a regional hegemon, it will need to focus on Stivachtis’ notion of the social conception of power in an effort to allay some of Japan’s fears. Otherwise, a region kept stable and orderly through force will not remain a stable and orderly region for long. In contrast, China has a great relationship with Russia. Both are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, through which they are able to conduct military exercises (Scheineson, 2009). Also, as of 2011, “...the evolution of stable bilateral relations at the governmental level may

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<sup>xli</sup> Quotation can be found in the ninth paragraph of the section titled “Foreign Relations” in the cited reference.

<sup>xlii</sup> Quotation can be found in the fourth paragraph of the section titled “Objectives for Parties Involved” in the cited reference.

spearhead the advent of more broad-based commercial relationships” between Russia and China (Mills, 2011).

Based on the previous discussion and, according to the fifth and final indicator of a potential regional hegemon, all of the BRIC countries meet the definition through their effective use of diplomacy beyond their immediate borders, via their extensive involvement in regional initiatives.

## **Summary**

To recap, none of the BRIC countries meets all of the indicators of a rising regional hegemon. Consequently, through the analyses conducted, the working hypothesis – if the rise of regional hegemons (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), then a multi-polar international system – has been disproved. The data has conclusively shown that, per the five indicators discussed in this section, the BRIC countries are not rising regional hegemons. Therefore, the international system is not in the process of transitioning into a multi-polar system based upon regional hegemons.

## **Chapter 4: The Connection between Rapidly Developing Nations, Regional Hegemony, and the Possibility of a Multi-Polar International System**

According to the five indicators of a potential regional hegemon, India and China met three of them, Russia met two of them, and Brazil met one of them. While that conclusively shows that none of the BRIC countries are in the position to become regional hegemons at this time, it provides enough of a foundation to see that regional hegemons, and consequently a multi-polar international system, is potentially on the horizon.

Notably, according to the data and the analyses conducted in Chapter 3, all of the BRIC countries meet the definition of a rising regional hegemon per the fifth indicator, through their effective use of diplomacy via their extensive involvement in regional initiatives. By becoming more involved in diplomatic relations via their participation and implementation in regional initiatives, the BRIC countries are making their mark as diplomatic leaders within their regions and the surrounding areas – something that is very important for a regional hegemon. Utilizing diplomacy as a means for a hegemon to ensure the effective growth and cooperation of its region touches again on Stivachtis’ notion of the social conception of power. If nations within a region feel that there is a mutual agreement that the rules and values being established are in everyone’s best interest, then they will be more likely to want to maintain the stable and orderly system that they have.

Referring back to Buzan and Wæver’s RSCT, they argue that “[t]he central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes” (Buzan, et al., 2003, p. 4). Buzan and Wæver’s notion of emerging security interdependence is

evident from the previous discussion in Chapter 3 regarding the BRIC countries' involvement in regional initiatives. Through these regional initiatives, the BRIC nations are establishing formalized security complexes upon which a stable multi-polar international system can be built. It follows that regional peace and security can be attained because regional hegemons are more invested in them since any instability will directly affect their own borders.

One large issue not really addressed by Buzan and Wæver and their regional security complex theory is what will happen should multiple regional hegemons emerge within one region. Notably, they advocate for an international system based on three different levels of power – superpowers, great powers, and regional powers (Buzan, et al, 2003, pp. 38). Therefore, “[a]n indigenous regional rivalry, as between India and Pakistan, provides opportunities or demands for the great powers to penetrate the region. Balance-of-power logic works naturally to encourage the local rivals to call in outside help...” (Buzan, et al, 2003, p. 46). Accordingly, a great power will be expected to step in and assist with the resolution of issues at the regional level. However, I would question whether or not two regional powers would really be interested in calling in outside help. If both powers determine that they have more to gain by going to war than by trying for peace, then the notion that an RSC encourages stability is successfully countered.

Another issue with Buzan and Wæver's regional security complex theory is that it does not explain what will keep regional powers from trying to expand outside of their region. It is their position that RSCs are mutually exclusive where “...the whole world [is] divided up on a map producing mutually exclusive RSCs, insulator states, and global actors. RSCs are distinguished from each other by degrees of relative security connectedness and indifference” (Buzan, et al, 2003, p. 48). However, Waltz argues that, “[w]ith many sovereign states, with no



system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire – conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur” (Waltz, 2001, p. 159). More specifically, “[a] state will use to force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace” (Waltz, 2001, p. 160). I would tend to agree with Waltz. It seems very idealistic to believe that RSCs will remain mutually exclusive with no concern that another regional power will decide that it would be in their best interest to expand.

Moving on to Waltz, his argument that a multi-polar international system is unstable is based on his assertion that, if there are numerous great powers, they will constantly fight one another in an effort to ensure their own individual superiority, even if cooperation could provide greater mutual benefits. Waltz's example of post-WWII Europe provides an excellent illustration of his argument. Waltz states, “So long as European states were the world's great powers, unity among them could only be dreamt of. Politics among the European great powers tended toward the model of a zero-sum game...[where] [e]ach power viewed another's losses as its own gain” [Keohane (Ed.), 1986, p. 58]. To further destabilize a multi-polar system, the European powers, when “[f]aced with the temptation to cooperate for mutual benefit, each state became wary and was inclined to draw back. When on occasion some of the great powers did move toward cooperation, they did so in order to oppose other powers more strongly” [Keohane (Ed.), 1986, p. 58]. While Waltz’s analysis was based upon observed patterns at that time, new global conditions indicate that Waltz’s analysis may not stand the test of time.

While I was unable to disprove Waltz’s argument that a bi-polar international system is most stable through it being deemed a poor match for the world that is emerging, I was successfully able to prove that developing [weaker] nations have a growing role within the

international system, and should be recognized for that. As discussed previously, neo-realists traditionally discount weaker nations because they view the role of a weaker nation to be limited only to how they can best be utilized by the great power[s]. However, in looking at China who, as a developing nation, would correlate to a weaker nation, it has one the fastest growing economies in the world, a strong military, and has become influential in its region through its implementation of, and role in, regional initiatives. Notably, the international system has become much more interconnected economically, which has encouraged economic and industrial alliances. These alliances are oftentimes with developing [weaker] nations, such as China, which strengthens the role of the developing nations independent of the great powers within the international system. Therefore, the developing nations have a role within the international system beyond what is traditionally accepted by neo-realists.

Referring back to the concept of regional hegemony, the BRIC countries do not conclusively meet the definition per the analyses conducted in Chapter 3. Accordingly, a regional hegemon will need to "...define the polarity of any given RSC..." and have the capability to "...loom large in their regions..." as well as be "...responded to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the present and near-future distribution of power" (Buzan, et al, 2003, pp. 35, 37). Notably, through their regional initiatives, the BRIC countries could eventually become able to define the polarity of their RSC. To loom large within their region, the BRIC countries will need to continue to grow their military strength to solidify their positions as rising regional hegemons. Lastly, in regards to being included at the system level for calculations of the present and near-future distribution of power, the BRIC nations have not met that part of the definition.

In summary, based upon the data and analysis included in this project, patterns of behavior of rapidly developing countries, in this case Brazil, Russia, India, and China, do not definitively indicate the emergence of rising regional hegemon. Therefore, Waltz's argument that a bi-polar international system is most stable cannot be deemed a poor match for the world that is emerging, and is not currently in need of serious revision. However, for future research, this author argues that rapidly developing nations as regional hegemon are much better suited to maintain peace and security within their respective regions, should a multi-polar international system emerge. It will be worthwhile to see if any of the BRIC nations, or any other emergent rapidly developing nations, decidedly move in the direction of regional hegemony, which will illustrate issues with Waltz's analysis that a bi-polar international system is most stable, or if they remain at their current level of development and influence.

### **Other Hypotheses**

For the other two independent variables – weakening US leadership and the global financial crises – the following analyses were conducted. Based on the data collected for the first indicator – annual growth in GDP – if the independent variable of the global financial crises were responsible for the change in the international system, it would be expected that the US would fall as an economic powerhouse and (an)other nation(s) would step up to take its place. Based on the research conducted, it is evident that “emerging and developing economies” traditionally have higher levels of annual GDP growth than the “world” – an average annual growth in GDP from 1990-2010 of 4.89 percent and an average annual growth in GDP of 3.41 for the same time period, respectively (International Monetary Fund, 2011).

The fact that the US had lower levels of annual GDP growth as compared to the BRIC countries should be of concern. It can be argued that the US's economic position has been weakened, which may have potentially opened the door for other countries with strong economies, developing or developed, to take over powerful international economic roles. However, while the US economy has certainly taken a hard hit from the economic crises, even posting negative growth, it would be very premature to say that the US has lost its position as an economic power within the international system.

In regards to the third indicator – security of other nations – if the independent variable of weakening US leadership is responsible for changes in the international system, the data will be expected to illustrate a decrease in US involvement in UN-related peacekeeping operations during the chosen time period. Per the data collected, the US provided the majority of its support to UN-related peacekeeping operations from 1990-2001. Beginning in 2001, and since that time, the US has been involved in a number of conflicts within the Middle East and elsewhere, which has likely affected its ability to provide personnel support to the UN-related peacekeeping operations. It can be argued that, based on that data, the US is losing its place as the hegemonic leader at the forefront of all actions. However, for a change to occur within the international system, there has to be another country(ies) to step up and take over the hegemonic role. While India by far provided the most personnel in support of the UN-related peacekeeping operations, there is not enough information to ascertain if that alone would be enough to take over the hegemonic role of the entire international system. This author would argue not.

Based on the fourth indicator – humanitarian assistance – if the independent variable of the global extended financial crises are responsible for changes in the international system, the data will be expected to illustrate a decrease in monetary support for humanitarian assistance

projects beginning in the mid-2000s for all countries upon which data was collected. Based on the data collected, it is difficult to determine whether or not the global financial crises had any affect on humanitarian assistance contributions due to the sporadic contributions normally given by the BRIC countries. The US has been relatively consistent in regards to the amount it contributed; however, the data did not reflect a decrease in contributions until 2011. Therefore, the global financial crises had no affect on the international system per this indicator.

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