Circuits of Power in Alabama's Immigration Politics:
Labor Justice and Corporate Social Responsibility

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ABSTRACT

At the time of its debate and passage in 2010-2011, Alabama’s immigration law evoked support and opposition from across the state and nation. Despite the outcry, the Alabama business community projected a pronounced public “silence.” This silence was particularly curious because of the law’s clear and intended goal of self-deportation of Latinos who are a significant labor source for Alabama agri-businesses and food processing industries. The key question for this dissertation is: Why did the poultry processing industry, which has high populations of Latino employees and a significant industrial presence in Alabama, stay publicly silent despite a predictable impact on their labor supply?

This qualitative analysis used the lens of the circuits of power model to interrogate this question. The findings indicate that Alabama poultry processors found themselves susceptible to the same opportunities and challenges as any other social actor confronted with the racialized, politicized, and historically contingent challenges facing Latino labor in Alabama. In other words, these business actors were fully socially embedded actors within Alabama. I demonstrate that individual residents, relevant associations, Alabama’s politicians, and even the poultry processors themselves never fully realized the political vulnerability of their particular embeddedness until it was too late for poultry processing employers to publicly act to protect their Latino employees from this unjust state law.

I collected and triangulated data from multiple sources, including semi-structured interviews, media reports, state and national statistics, official websites, and legal documents. Through discourse and content analysis of this data, I developed a case study that demonstrates how Alabama’s poultry processors were on a collision course with Alabama state politicians over immigration reform, but they never saw it coming. In so doing, I raise important questions about limits on the “real” power of economic actors for achieving self-interested business outcomes when those interests contest strongly-held social and cultural norms that are infused with a particular history of race, difference, and alterity in local spaces. I demonstrate that these limits raise questions for the democratic process and have consequences for economic actors with regard to corporate social responsibility claims as they pertain to labor justice.
Dedication

To Mark. For everything.
Acknowledgements

I first need to "acknowledge" that there is insufficient language to express my deep sense of indebtedness to those people who have supported, inspired, guided, provoked, and invested in this project and in me. The generosity of spirit I have encountered throughout this project has been meaningful in ways I could have never anticipated and by which I am deeply moved.

To my committee, the Dream Team of dissertation advisors, I want to express my sincerest of thanks. Beginning with my Chair, Dr. Barbara Ellen Smith, I am eternally grateful for her boundless support, searing insights into issues of place, power, race, and social justice, willingness to read endless numbers of drafts, and for being a strong, compassionate mentor and friend. I can only hope to make the difference to someone else that she has made to me. Dr. Max Stephenson provided discerning guidance on the issues of policy and democracy raised by this research, as well as an important set of sharp editorial eyes that proved priceless after I had worn out Barbara Ellen’s and my own. Dr. Patricia Nickel added crucial insights and resources regarding critical theory, as well as valuable guidance about best practices for a new scholar and thinking about next steps. Dr. Rich Wokutch shored up my foundational knowledge regarding ethics and corporate social responsibility and generously helped me to locate management communities that might be interested in this interdisciplinary work.

To my Alabama connections, I am much obliged for the generosity and hospitality extended to me by my interviewees. In particular, Ray Hilburn was instrumental in educating me about and connecting me to Alabama’s poultry network. Joyce Bishop was the key to unraveling “where to begin” and “who to begin with” for fieldwork in Albertville.

To my Virginia Tech communities, I nod in solidarity. The ASPECTers were the bedrock of my VT experience both in and out of class with special thanks to Tamara Sutphin and Dr. Francois DeBrix for their administrative and professional wisdom. My Women’s and Gender Studies classmates and faculty provoked and inspired me to do and be better. The Community Voices Team provided a playground of wonderful people engaged in academic conversations directed toward impacting “real life” in real time. These communities collectively provided support, friendship, and motivation in ways they probably did not see, but who nevertheless were indispensable to my success.

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For me, this Ph.D. was more than a prize to be earned, and I leave this stage of my life changed in ways big and small. To everyone along the way, I offer heartfelt thanks.
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Preface

The following preface is an edited version of the remarks delivered prior to my dissertation defense. In the words of my Chair, Dr. Barbara Ellen Smith, “It is the story of the story.” I provide it here for two reasons. First, it provides an explanation of how one person (me) found the world of interdisciplinarity when confronted by issues irremediable by the disciplinary solutions available to her. Second, in following a feminist research tradition, I feel an ethical imperative to more deeply contextualize this project by recognizing myself as just as socially embedded as the Alabama poultry processors I studied. Although I feel confident in the integrity of the collected data and analysis, my own situated knowledge implicitly informed every decision affecting this project. I, as an embodied researcher, am inseparable from any insight and bias contained herein.

Twenty-five years ago, I was a recent Anthropology graduate out of JMU, and I only knew that I wanted to work with “people in business.” To that end, I was off to earn my M.B.A. at Vanderbilt University. The plan was to make a quick fortune in corporate America, and then I was sure to return to academia to earn my Ph.D. in Cultural Anthropology by studying the World’s Sleeping Giant, China. My guess was I would have this all done by the time I was 30 years old. Sufficed to say, it did not quite work out that way. Here I am, 25 years later, and I am earning my Ph.D., but not in Anthropology, and not on China, and somehow I missed the fortune part too. I guess part of what learned is that I am not very good at prognosticating.

I share this reflection because it occurs to me that this journey has been as much about learning what my project is not, as what it is. With that said and with the benefit of hindsight, my life and career have been remarkably aligned under my original impulse. I have accumulated over 20 years of experience working with people in organizations generally trying to improve our collective abilities to think, work, and act in ways that might better our communities of work, life, and play. Primarily, my work has been in the fields of training and development, leadership, organizational behavior, and educational administration. I always have been committed to seeking
innovative and collaborative solutions to organizational challenges. But by 2008, I could not ignore the gnawing feeling that I had been missing something; that I was failing to see something.

When the U.S. economy tanked in 2008, I had a strange, abstracted sense that I had contributed to its demise. I was part of the problem, but I didn’t see exactly how. I was not directly involved in the subprime lending markets, or in the strange world of imaginary money that involved derivative markets and selling short. I certainly was not a beneficiary of the exorbitant C-suite compensation packages making the news.

But...

I went to school with those people. I taught those people. I socialized with those people. I have been connected to that world. Somehow, I was sure I had contributed to some small part of the zenith of the arcing economic maelstrom that became The Great Recession, and I have to tell you: it bugged me.

It really bugged me; yet, I couldn’t figure out how to think about my business practice any differently than in the ways I had been taught and always had thought, taught, administrated, and acted. I was 40, professionally frustrated, and flailing. However, in the back of my mind was that whole Ph.D. idea, and I started looking around. As fate would have it, I had a chat with Dr. Wolfgang Natter, the (then) Director of a new Ph.D. program called the Alliance for Social, Political, Ethical and Cultural Thought (ASPECT) at Virginia Tech.

Boom. In one short phone conversation, I was convinced. Interdisciplinarity was my answer. “That’s it,” I told myself, “An ASPECT graduate certificate from Virginia Tech is clearly what I need.” Well, one class led to another, which led to me quitting my job, and then I was teaching history (of all things!), and here I am, researching power, poultry, immigrant labor, and Alabama.

In actuality, one class led to another because each class revealed questions I hadn’t been asking; things I hadn’t been seeing, and people I hadn’t been wondering enough about. In my first class, I was introduced to a new vocabulary full of words I was sure had been made up (thank you,
Michel Foucault). My next class was my first ever Women’s and Gender Studies class with Dr. Smith, and I suddenly realized that I had always been a feminist (who knew?) and that oppression, power, and embodied knowledge mattered a lot, in a lot of complex ways. Half way through my third ASPECT class, I was suddenly a vegetarian (thanks a lot Chad Lavin, wherever you are), and so it went. Each class changed how I saw the world. I was on the verge of getting more than had I bargained for.

I soon was punch drunk with ways to reconsider my “business as usual” concerns. I was overwhelmed by all the possible interventions available, and I feared that by drowning in possibilities, I would be just as disabled from making meaningful change in my praxis, as I had been by NOT knowing my options. (Turns out, interdisciplinarity can do that to a person.)

On the verge of desperation, I found my case. I was looking for a paper topic for my Identity, Migration and Place class (again with Dr. Smith), and as it turned out, Alabama conveniently was waging a Republican-led political war against federal immigration policy in response to real and perceived threats to their economic, border, and cultural/racial security through the debate and ultimate passage of the Alabama immigration law. Embedded in this state turmoil, I found a question I couldn’t stop thinking about: why wasn’t the Alabama business community saying something, anything, about this? Labor costs are almost always the most expensive line item on a company’s balance sheet. It didn’t make sense.

I had found my question, but it would be 18 months before this question intersected with power and critical theory to be translated into the proposal that I submitted to my committee and another 27 months before that proposal became the finished dissertation. Between the proposal and dissertation defense, this project evolved both in structure and intent. After the first trip to Alabama, I realized almost immediately that I was missing an actor in my original framework: Alabama itself. Most of my interviewees were Alabamian, and to a person, each one made clear that being from Alabama changed things. Being Alabamian matters in terms of how you understand
your world. Those interviewees who were not Alabamian were equally clear that being from the state matters. This was verified when several interviewees pointed out to me that while I was not from here, they would try to explain it to me anyway. This Alabama identity became a chapter unto itself. Additionally, at the urging of my committee, methodology became a chapter of its own. Dr. Max Stephenson suggested repurposing a puzzle metaphor that I had originally included as an Epilogue as the framework for the chapter. Both these recommendations improved the project, in no small measure because these additions better reflect how I thought about the research data. This Alabama project did indeed feel like piecing together a puzzle, and Chapter 2 better reflects the intent and execution of my strategy.

Finally, what I thought I would find, or was even looking for from this project, changed. I proposed to analyze the potential intersection of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and social justice for Latino labor in Alabama. I wanted to see if poultry processors, through the pursuit of their own CSR goals, could be an unrealized political resource that might enhance socially just outcomes for immigrant labor. What I learned early in the research is that my project was not about CSR. But instead, it is a project with significant implications for CSR. My findings are clear: firms are fully, socially embedded actors. My research suggests that first attending to the highly contextual conditions of power that are informed by issues such as race, ethnicity, and cultural geographies is critical to understanding what a firm can or cannot do: even in the name of economic self-interest or CSR.

In the end, this project raised multiple questions both inside and outside the scope of my stated research. Frequently, it seemed like the Alabama 2011 context was a harbinger for the nation’s political experience, especially in regard to the rhetoric and the ramifications of the radical rightward, shift represented in the Tea Party movement and on-going immigration debates. My first trip to Alabama in 2013 began the same day that the federal government was shut down because of the unmet demands from the newly elected and influential “Hell No” Caucus in the U.S. Congress.
The similarities of that 2013 moment in national politics to the 2011 Alabama political experience seemed almost eerie. I must confess; particularly on my drives to and from Alabama, I was often sidetracked by lingering questions about what Alabama immigration politics could tell me about the future of participatory democracy, the policy process, and community life and politics for underrepresented populations within this neoliberal enterprise.

Though a specific focus on democratic process fell beyond the scope of this research, the specific political context was critical to answering my initial question: why were the Alabama businesses so publicly quiet about a law that worked against their own economic self-interest? One answer is that in Albertville, Alabama, poultry processors had nothing to gain, but arguably much to lose, by publicly protesting the Alabama immigration law. In private, the protestations of the poultry industry fell on deaf ears, when these concerns fell on political ears at all. Ironically, the industry that was powerful enough to attract immigrants to Alabama was politically impotent to protect this labor pool, in no small part because they employed Latinos in rural Alabama in the first place. In this specific moment, Alabama’s Republicans clearly were not good for those businesses that relied on bodies that contested geographies of whiteness. As a result of complicated social, political, and historically contingent factors, Alabama’s immigrant labor could not count on their employers as an additional potential avenue for social justice. This case raises broader questions about the viability of any firm’s ability to protect its workforce when it employs marginalized labor pools in certain contextual conditions.

Certainly, other questions about the nexus of power, immigrant labor, poultry processing, and Alabama politics lay buried in the approximately 90,000 words of this dissertation, but I close with this. For me, this project is what I didn’t know I was looking for in 2008. It is my proof of how different the world seems when you find the questions you weren’t asking, look for the things you hadn’t seen, and wonder about people who you hadn’t wondered about before.

And to all of you who helped me ask, see, and wonder, I am deeply indebted.
Chapter 1. Introduction to Alabama’s Politics of Immigration

The more we looked at it [H.B. 56] we just couldn’t believe how bad it was. We could not believe what it was doing. It just was...and it is contrary to everything they say you know about family values and government intrusion, and this was a big old honking mess that got into everybody's lives...

~ Joey Kennedy, The Birmingham News

The close of the twenty-first century's first decade ushered in a new wave of immigration rhetoric and politics in the United States in the form of state-based immigration reform initiatives. These state-initiated legislative processes contested the boundaries of federal jurisdiction and enforcement of immigration law and tested the legal limits of state's rights arguments as they pertained to policing borders. By 2011, six states had passed fresh immigration statutes targeted at identification of “illegal aliens,” and these laws became flashpoints of a federal versus state immigration debate. While these states’ actions were an explicit challenge to federal dominion over immigration enforcement, these laws also reflected a stream of national anti-immigration sentiment, as well as localized reactions to changing migration patterns and settlement affecting smaller communities across the United States. Of the six “hot spots” of immigration reform, Alabama was arguably the most contentious case. Alabama’s legislature passed its immigration law in 2011, revised it in 2012, and finally reached a negotiated settlement with the ACLU and the U.S. Justice Department in 2013 after being largely enjoined from enforcing it by a series of court challenges (Associated Press 2013). From its inception, the Alabama immigration legislation had one goal: to make life completely untenable for people living in the state “illegally,” and to prohibit legally documented Alabama residents from supporting such individuals. The policy logic was that in so doing, affected individuals would voluntarily leave Alabama of their own accord. This policy conception became discursively recognized, in both state and national frames, as enforcement through attrition, or more commonly as “self-deportation.”
Research Questions

At the time of its debate and passage, Alabama’s immigration law evoked support and opposition from across the state and nation for many reasons. However, the Alabama business community evidenced a pronounced public “silence” regarding this issue. This silence was particularly curious because of the law’s clear and intended goal of securing the self-deportation of a significant labor source – Latinos - in Alabama agri-businesses and food processing industries. It was this silence that initially raised a multitude of questions.

Question 1) Why did these affected employers in Alabama fail to act in their own self-interest (e.g., by speaking in opposition to the legislation) in order to protect their labor supply? In particular, why did the poultry processing industry, which has high populations of Latino employees and a significant industrial presence in communities in northern Alabama, stay silent?

Question 2) Why was it that northern Alabama became the primary hub from which much of the political maelstrom emanated and fueled the (anti-) immigration debate? In particular, why was Albertville, a small city (population of approximately 22,000 people) located in the northeastern corner of Alabama and home to several major poultry processing facilities, a vortex of anti-immigrant mobilization?

For insight into this enigma, this research focused specifically on the circumstances of the poultry processing industry as a socially embedded, economically important business actor in Alabama. To identify the constraints shaping poultry processing, I structured data collection and analysis concerning the Alabama poultry industry around the three intersecting power networks within which poultry processing is embedded. I adapted Clegg’s Circuits of Power model in which he re-conceptualized organizational power away from the traditional notions of power as a pre-constituted entity exercising unilateral power over subjects. Clegg drew heavily on Foucault (1977) to suggest that flows of organizational power are constitutive of networks by simultaneously
reinforcing and changing institutional systems. In so doing, operations of power can create, reinforce, and eradicate structures that create meaning, and in so doing, govern social conditions (Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006, Clegg 1989a).

The initial conceit of this project posited that by identifying and remediating these constraints on business, a new possibility would emerge: The business community could serve as a potential, unrealized source of social justice for immigrant labor in Alabama. For instance, if poultry processors had publicly advocated for their own existing local labor praxis, perhaps the business community could have influenced both state and national-level immigration policy development and implementation, and in so doing, a new measure of corporate social responsibility would be introduced: accountability for ensuring particular measures of “justice” for their own workforce. Such corporate action, politically advocating on behalf of immigrant labor, would also expand notions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) through its critical attention to the “social.” While much of the recent work concerning CSR has focused on issues such as financial misconduct and sustainability (Ferrell, Fraedrich, and Ferrell 2013, Luke 2013), a growing group of scholars are returning a focus to issues of the “social” as it relates to business. These authors are trying to reformulate the CSR model that has been criticized for falling short of its promise because it, among other things, frames society as a contrary interest to business, rather than recognizing their fundamental interdependency (Porter and Kramer 2006).

This scholarly tension regarding the separation of “the social” from “the market” is not new (Polyani 1944). In fact, business ethics and its CSR concerns developed as a field of study during 1970s in reaction to increasing societal and governmental pressures to ensure protections of civil and human rights in by the business sphere (Ferrell, Fraedrich, and Ferrell 2013). More recently, there are at least two contemporary expressions of this shift toward exploring this interdependency: first, the growing interest in social entrepreneurship, which deploys existing business models to meet social (or community) needs, and second, the desire to provoke societal
transformations while still pursuing a capitalistic model as seen in model of microfinance (Porter and Kramer 2011, Alvord, Brown, and Letts 2004, Karnani 2009, Prahalad and Hart 2002). Kramer and Porter suggest another approach to change the CSR model by shifting it to a focus on what they labeled – Creating Shared Value (CSV). CSV suggests that profit maximization is not the only "good" of business. Instead, CSV argues that strategic investment in the community with which the business engages (e.g., employee wellness programs, community microfinance loans, etc.) better meets the goals of a capitalist enterprise through the maximization of value creation, not just profit creation (Porter and Kramer 2011). I consider the possibility of addressing immigrant labor concerns in relation to this emerging stream of inquiry. My findings suggest that corporations have far less control over achieving socially just and economically advantageous outcomes when they run contrary to dominant public and/or political discourses, as was the case with immigrant labor in Alabama in 2010. Simply put, this work raises questions regarding the ability of corporate actors to achieve their own social responsibility goals for employees, when those employees are Latinos in Alabama. Further, I question the assumptions of a "mutually beneficial" interdependence among state governments, state politics, and capitalistic economic actors through the Alabama context.

The initial, unfettered implementation of this law resulted in Alabama’s agri-business sector facing fiscal year 2012 with labor shortages, reductions in planting and production, and engaged in an active debate on the long-term impact of the law on the economic health of the state (Addy 2012). The headline of a Time Business issue read: “Why Undocumented Workers Are Good for the Economy: Tough Immigration Laws in Arizona and Alabama are Costing the States Billions of Dollars. Business and agricultural leaders have had enough” (Serrano 2012). The business community waited until the controversial legislation in Alabama became law to publicly protest its detrimental impacts on their access to an affordable Latino labor source. These circumstances framed a fascinating puzzle regarding how, why, and when a business is motivated to become an active agent in protection of its labor supply (which could create tangential protections of the rights
of labor). Though initially framed primarily as a question of expanding corporate social responsibility, this research suggests far more about the ways the workings of non-economic power limit opportunities available to free market actors, and hence raises additional critical questions concerning the viability of corporate social responsibility as a resource for social justice.

**Contextual Background**

In the time following the September 11, 2001 (9-11) terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, a well-documented political movement emerged within states to implement state-level immigration “reform.” Alabama’s legislation emerged from that movement and arguably represents its apex (Winders 2007, Coleman 2007). Alabama’s immigration reform efforts, however, must be considered through both the state’s role in this contemporary political movement and its particular racial history.

**Alabama’s Immigration Law**

On June 2, 2011, Alabama passed what is widely regarded as the most restrictive, some say “mean-spirited,” and detailed immigration statute in the United States, Alabama Immigration Law - Act No. 2011-535, also known as the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act. (2011b, 2011c, 2011a, Berry 2011a, Fausset 2011, Robertson 2011, Lyman 2011). Alabama Governor Robert Bentley, who signed the law is quoted as saying, "We have a real problem with illegal immigration in this country...I campaigned for the toughest immigration laws, and I’m proud of the Legislature for working tirelessly to create the strongest immigration bill in the country” (2011a). In voicing opposition to this statute the mayor of the state’s largest city, Birmingham, associated the law’s impact with apartheid and Jim Crow (Associated Press 2011c). Notably, the very “toughness” of the immigration law criticized by opponents is the attribute most appreciated by its advocates. The Alabama legislation, still frequently referred to as H.B. 56, had one goal: to make life in Alabama completely untenable for a person living there illegally, including making it
illegal even for citizens to support an undocumented individual. Additionally, a critical intention of the law was to change not only the context of undocumented immigration, but legally to shift responsibilities and duties of enforcement to Alabama citizens in relation to undocumented residents. There were virtually no aspects of life left untouched by the scope of this law, which included “hiring, firing, policing, the criminal justice system, state contracts, schools and religion” (Associated Press 2011c, 2011b).

The Alabama Immigration Law is typical of the model used by several states across the U.S. South. A critical similarity among the state-initiated immigration bills is their reliance on enforcement methods that racialize immigrant populations by requiring visual recognition of suspected “illegal aliens” wherein law enforcement and other citizens use judgments of phenotypical characteristics (e.g., skin color) or spoken language to determine national status, and therefore enforcement. Also, these efforts share a focus on the “interiorization” of enforcement in the name of national security; that is, the protection of boundaries in locations physically distant from the nation’s border (Coleman 2007). This statute’s language was designed to be specific enough to address the legal challenges that had blocked implementation of the Arizona legislation, yet broad enough to make “life harsher and less hospitable for illegal immigrants” (Jacoby 2011). The first four pages of the 74-page statute summarize the approximately 32 restrictions that constitute H.B. 56. These restrictions were designed to work collectively to dissuade undocumented immigrants from living in Alabama by creating an environment of perpetual surveillance and threat of deportation. However, the Alabama law is unique in both its sheer quantity of restrictions, plus the addition of surveillance via the required presentation of “papers” in previously “safe” locations such as in the public school system and in all forms of contracts (Associated Press 2013). The overarching goal of the law was to make a sufficient number of specific commercial and interpersonal engagements explicitly criminal acts, such that collectively, the restrictions serve to
so severely limit all life functions that an undocumented immigrant would seek refuge in another state. The requirements for Alabama residents generally fall into these categories:

- Proof of citizenship/legal residence to receive all government benefits, to include public school access
- Law enforcement to request proof of citizenship during other law infractions (as secondary offense), for example in traffic stops
- Prevention of economic activity with undocumented persons to include housing agreements, employment, or any explicit or implied contract. This is broadly defined and could include activities such as providing rides to individuals to and from church. Penalties extended to any citizens/residents who knowingly (or should have known) assisted undocumented immigrants
- Use of e-Verify program\(^1\) for all businesses receiving government incentives (2011b, Ala. Code 2011)

While the national immigration debate since has taken a variety of different rhetorical trajectories, in 2010, Alabama's law was designed to be the model for a (then) new immigration regime of self-deportation. From the time of its implementation, Alabama faced constant court challenges. Despite key measures of the law being consistently and progressively enjoined, the state of Alabama battled tirelessly in the courts for more than two years arguing for full implementation (and restoration) of its statute. Even after much of the law was enjoined by federal courts, many Alabama politicians continued to laud their initiative’s success by citing the unprecedented number of Latinos who left the state, or “self-deported” in the days following the law’s enactment (Beyerle 2012). On October 29, 2013, more than two years after H.B. 56 became Alabama law, the odyssey that had become the Alabama immigration law sputtered to an end after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Alabama’s appeal. Shortly thereafter the state of Alabama finally ended its pursuit of the law’s revival. Alabama agreed to settle out of court all remaining challenges from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the U.S. Justice Department (Associated Press 2013).

**Alabama’s Racial History**

Alabama has had a contentious and complicated history within the U.S. narrative of race relations, which continues to inform its political discourse. Concluding the 2013 annual march from
Selma to Montgomery was a protest rally against the on-going challenge to the Voting Rights Act before the U.S. Supreme Court, which was brought by the state of Alabama. In another recent example, Alabama Republican legislators proposed a 2012 ballot measure to amend the state constitution to remove the remaining language that referred to race-based school segregation and the poll tax. This was the only ballot amendment (of twelve) that failed in Alabama, and racial tensions were revived in its wake. It failed, in part, because much of the ballot initiative’s public opposition came from Democratic African-American legislators who contended its passage was a way to end the guarantee of free public education and open the doors to charter schools. The concern emerged from retention of the following phrase from the original amendment that protected racial segregation in schools: “Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as creating or recognizing any right to education or training at public expense.” Opponents were concerned this would enable the de-funding of public education in Alabama and create the conditions necessary for de facto segregation. (Chapman 2012, Stewart 2012). These contemporary examples illustrate the way in which the racial history and experience of Alabamians inform current politics explicitly and, as we will see, have implications for power networks that influence local business actions.

There are intriguing parallels between business response to whites’ massive resistance to civil rights activism and the more recent lack of business efficacy in relation to Latino immigrant labor in Alabama. Scholars have analyzed the legacy of race relations for business decisions during the Jim Crow era. Elizabeth Jacoway has described the general reactions of businessmen across the South during the 1950s and 1960s in this way: "In this extremity [of rapid industrialization and progressive business ideals while being a part of deeply racialized communities] southern businessmen reacted as southerners first and businessmen second. While preoccupied by their own fears, resentments, and deep-seated prejudices, they allowed racial extremists to capture control of their communities" (1982, 5). In the 1950s, businessmen, along with their communities, began
responding to the U.S. Supreme Court’s *Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas* decision in which “…law-abiding southerners found some of their most cherished institutions [my emphasis] and deeply held values stripped of the sanction of law; many of them faced for the first time, the necessity of reconciling their progressive pretensions with their region’s racial realities [my emphasis]” (Jacoway 1982, 2).

However, in contrast to the sizeable African American population of Alabama and longstanding black-white structure of race, the Latino population is relatively recent and small in size. Indeed, the speed and urgency with which Alabama enacted this legislation appear curious given that slightly less than 4% of the state’s entire population is Latino (2010 U.S. Census), and Alabama does not have a high “unauthorized resident” Hispanic population relative to other states (Passel and Cohn 2011). According to the 2010 census data, Alabama is 67% white (not Hispanic) and 26.2% black, and Albertville is whiter still, at 68.1% white (not Hispanic) and 1.9% black (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). However, in their legal briefs state attorneys noted a 145% rise in Alabama’s Hispanic population to 186,000 between 2000-2010 (as cited by Easton 2013). In Albertville, this increase was even more dramatic. Lawmakers promoting the legislation said it was motivated mainly by the need to protect the jobs of citizens and legal residents (Mears 2011). Thus, when the lens of analysis shifts to the local, the narrative and demographics change, and some insight is gained into the question of why Alabama, a state in which analysts estimate only 2.5% of the total population is unauthorized, has responded with the most stringent immigration legislation in the United States (Passel and Cohn February 1, 2011). Even with only this data in evidence, the motivation for this level of legislation seemed, at a minimum, curious. However, Alabama has a well-documented, “curious” history in relation to issues of race.

In 2012, the irony of the “Juan Crow” South was that one of the “most cherished institutions” of the 21st century South has silently become the exploitation of racialized migrant labor and its inextricable connection to industrial productivity (McWhorter 2012, Brooks 2012).
Although it once relied on enforcement of laws requiring segregation and facilitating exploitation of African-American labor, productivity in many industries in Alabama more recently demanded reliance on a system of *unenforced* regulation of the migrant workforce. The perpetual threat of deportation enabled a power imbalance between employer and labor that allowed some employers to sustain lower than minimum wages and substandard working conditions (i.e., *de facto* segregation), creating a highly precarious category of workers (Rodriguez 2004, Browning and Rodriguez 1982, West and Moore 1989).

Unlike the period of reliance on unenforced federal immigration statutes, the 2011 Alabama law represents the addition and *enforcement* of law (i.e., *de jure* segregation), which may be forcing the business community to face the “region’s [contemporary] racial realities” as local communities grapple with the impact of a growing Latino labor force living and working in close contact. In Albertville, my interviewees frequently, and immediately, denied “race” as a cause of the community tensions, but rather referred to the issue of “culture” as the reason for their rise among native Albertvillians. However, my findings suggest that the tensions in Albertville are contemporary illustrations of the relevance of Omi and Winant’s assertion from racial formation theory that “the effort must be made to understand race as an unstable and ‘decentered’ complex of social meaning constantly being transformed by political struggle” (1994b, 55). In so doing, claims of ethnic or cultural tensions in this historically specific context become clear codes for race and racial tension. By closely examining the “grappling” with new Latino neighbors, the immigration debate in Alabama echoes debates that emerged from the segregated South about how to integrate a new ethnic “other” into its traditionally bipolar black/white social order.

The varied motivations for the Alabama immigration law (i.e., political, cultural, social, economic) among its proponents at the local, corporate, and state-level of analysis, make Alabama, and specifically Albertville, an interesting lens through which to consider the role of corporate agency, social justice, and the discursive networks of power that initially worked to constrain public
business action to influence 2011 Alabama immigration policy. For instance, in Albertville, did poultry processors believe this new law would simply increase their labor purchasing power as it had in the past? Or, in 2011, did other factors prevent these employers from speaking out on behalf of their labor supply? My findings support the latter. Poultry processors, as identifiable employers of immigrant labor, are fully embedded social actors impacted by many of the same social, cultural, and political constraints as their Latino workers.

**Power Analysis: Theoretical Framework**

The purpose of this research was to seek the reasons the poultry processing industry in Alabama, and in Albertville specifically, did not publicly contest H.B. 56 and the subsequent Alabama immigration law prior to its passage, despite its clear impact on an important labor supply for this industry. To address this purpose, I conducted a qualitative analysis of the Alabama power networks within which poultry processing is embedded. My methodology, addressed in Chapter 2, was principally guided by an adaptation of Clegg's Circuits of Power theoretical construct that relied on a framework of three existing, intersecting power networks relevant to Alabama's poultry processing industry:

1. **Economic Networks.** The Alabama business community is increasingly divided between agri-businesses and high technology industries, which have different labor needs and interests, and receive different priority from Alabama's power brokers. The poultry industry is located in an economic “blindspot” of sorts in the state with its economic actors bridging the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. A further complication for poultry processing within the economic network is Alabama's struggle to leave behind its agricultural legacy in favor of higher technology economic actors. In recent years, the state’s economic development office has publically emphasized its interest in expanding high tech/manufacturing industries and new global business partners (i.e., not poultry) by helping to realize an increase in such positions from 5% to approximately 10% of Alabama jobs during the last five years (Kavilanz 2012). Less public attention has been paid to Alabama’s traditional, agri-business base, which is often perceived as backward or retro, despite the fact that this sector provides one-fifth of the state’s jobs and Alabama is acknowledged as the third biggest processor of broilers in the nation (Hall 2011).

2. **Local political/economic/social networks.** Albertville politicians and activists were vocal advocates in the Alabama immigration debate, strongly favoring extremely strict immigration reform. This was despite the presence of three poultry processing plants within city limits generating significant economic opportunities for the community, while also relying heavily upon an immigrant labor pool. This Latino labor pool is an important
factor in community political attitudes regarding immigration reform. Within thirty years, Albertville shifted from a community that was 98.2% white in 1980 to 68.1% white and 27.9% Latino in 2010 (according to the 2010 U.S. Census). This has ushered in new community contestations over racialized local geographies. Poultry processing plants are often "blamed" for demographic changes in rural, north Alabama locations like Albertville, and the social, political, and economic conditions of the local sphere directly influenced and shaped the efficacy of political action by local poultry processors.

3. **Political Networks.** Alabama’s particular political history shaped the engagement among local, state, and national political actors and members of the state’s business community. Business is part of Alabama’s political history through a storied relationship with statewide lobbyists. This past shaped the Alabama immigration debate in 2011 as well as the particular, specific context of Alabama electoral politics at that time, while intersecting with the national GOP political immigration discourse and newly emergent policy forms (e.g., “self-deportation”). By 2010, new power flows and power brokers emerged that directly linked local and national political power brokers, as well as state legislators; flows that bypassed previously acknowledged channels for business lobbyists to wield influence in Alabama politics. Within this self-proclaimed “business friendly state,” a new Republican supermajority ushered in a campaign platform entitled *Handshake with Alabama* that contained many pledges, one of which was immigration reform. Once elected, the majority made good on its promises regardless of their real economic impacts, raising questions of whether Republicans really were “good for business,” despite their public proclamations.

An examination of these interconnected power networks relevant to poultry processing in Albertville, Alabama revealed the principal constraints on actors in this highly contextual, institutional system. In fact, my findings demonstrate that the poultry industry and its representatives, both locally and at the state level, were actively engaged in lobbying behind the scenes against H.B. 56 as originally written. However, their particular position both inside and outside important power networks in Alabama diminished their political efficacy (i.e., their ability to achieve desired results) even as they exercised political agency (i.e., the ability to act). In some instances, Alabama’s poultry industry had their “voice” silenced, as they and their labor interests were bypassed in the emergent sites of power that ultimately influenced the immigration statute.

I identified these three specific networks within which processing plants are embedded in Alabama for the following reasons. The economic network represents the reference groups of agents within which the poultry processing industry operates within Alabama. This inherently variegated group both enables and precludes particular opportunities for the industry’s lobbying arm as well as for local processors. The local network mobilizes the political, economic, and social
concerns as experienced by community members, politicians, and business community representatives. This local social context includes the daily community life of Albertville’s residents. These everyday experiences were translated into new meanings and actions shaping the political power of poultry processing managers as local residents and employers of immigrant labor. The political network constrained and enabled the interconnected, embedded actors, across multiple spectra, which mobilized the enabling conditions for this new immigration policy ultimately to become law in Alabama. Finally, these networks were interconnected by discursive flows of power that constitute the obligatory passage points (OPPs) through which the circuitry of power moves. Using Clegg’s Circuits of Power Model, my findings reveal how these highly contextual flows disciplined the discursive resources available to a poultry processing plant during the Alabama immigration debate.

I use Clegg’s Circuits of Power model (Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006, Clegg 1989a) to conceptualize the discursive flows of power among these networks. Essentially, Clegg’s model operationalizes a Foucauldian, poststructuralist conception of power relations, and of individual and organizational identities. In this view, the intersection of power relations and identities results in continuous co-construction of fields of knowledge that result in social control. This model has been adapted to a variety of contexts to consider the role of power in systemic circumstances (Hutchinson et al. 2010, Mahadevan 2012, Davenport and Leitch 2005). One of the strengths of the Clegg model is that it is intentionally designed to be fully inclusive of specific contexts when analyzing the operations of power. Figure 1-1. Circuits of Power and Alabama’s Business Network, represents my adaptation of Clegg’s model using the networks listed above (A larger version of this figure appears in Appendix A: Circuits of Power Model). Hutchinson's application of the circuits of power in her study of workplace bullying influenced my adaptation of Clegg's model (Hutchinson et al. 2010, Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006, Clegg 1989a).
Clegg conceived of power as the variable outcome of the organization of social relations. It therefore only exists within “a relational field of force.” In other words, agents only “possess’ power in so far as they are relationally constituted as doing so” (1989a, 207). Consequently, power is not ubiquitous within a system, but rather episodic, and contingent on the specific context supporting these social relations. This conception of power proved critical to recognizing and interpreting shifts in who possessed political influence in 2010-2011 Alabama. By viewing power as a variable outcome contingent on social relations, new, unexpected channels for power and influence became clear in Alabama, and these often by-passed previously established avenues of power that had been utilized by poultry processing and other businesses in Alabama. As I argue throughout the dissertation, poultry processors (and the business community in Alabama more generally) were
weakly positioned inside, and often positioned outside, many of the relevant political power channels that rapidly emerged after the 2010 Alabama state elections. These shifting power positions had direct implications for the efficacy of their political efforts, and in some cases removed agentic possibility entirely. Interestingly, representatives from the business and poultry sectors entered power/political structures that had been previously necessary to influence the issue of immigration policy, but these groups, on this labor issue, were suddenly no longer “relationally constituted” to effect change.

Clegg built his circuits of power model to “operationalize” his conception of power. His model includes three Levels of Circuits, three Types of Power and Obligatory Passage Points (OPPs), and these circuits are each influenced by the social knowledge possessed by agents embedded in a specific, existing context. The three levels of circuits identified by Clegg are: Agency, Social Integration, and System Integration. Each circuit refers to a different level of engagement in the system of power; however, no circuit is ever operating independently of the other two. Although each has a separate function, each circuit also constrains and creates opportunities for change elsewhere in the system. Clegg insists on a highly contextualized and integrated understanding of power.

The most individualized operation of power in Clegg’s model is a micro-level circuit entitled Agency. The Agency circuit is concerned with day-to-day interactions among individuals with intermittent engagements with power. Social and System Integration circuits are both macro-level and deal with the construction of rules and meanings and the innovation of material, disciplinary techniques used to enforce the rules of production, respectively. Clegg associates the three Circuits with three different types of power. The Agency level exercises a “causal” type of power typified by the engagement of at least two agencies and is reflective of Foucault’s “power over” that typically elicits resistance to power from one or more agents. Clegg associated social integration with “dispositional” power that deploys processes of social integration to reconcile and stabilize
differences (emerging from resistance) between Agencies through new rules and meanings. Systematic Integration implies “facilitative” power whose outcome is the domination of a system resulting from facilitating or restricting the “rules” or “meanings” that emerge from the dispositional circuit. The interconnection between the circuits is facilitated by OPPs. Clegg conceptualizes OPPs as interdependent nodes through which the three levels (or circuits) of power pass and interact. These are the points at which certain social relations within the system are enhanced or degraded in their influence. Finally, Clegg asserts that any moment of power is highly contextual. Therefore all of the above is informed by a specific, existing context that informs any processing of power through the social knowledge embodied by agents (Clegg 1989a).

In Figure 1-1, the Agency circuit is primarily (though not exclusively) located within the boxes labeled “Discursive Flows.” These “Discursive Flows” are representative of Clegg’s OPPs out of which arise possibilities of reproducing or transforming the “rules” of relations within and among the networks through episodes of power among agents. Critical to Clegg’s model is that episodic or agentic power holds the potential to create change or maintain the status quo, since agentic power is “constituted in social relations” through episodes of power whereby individual agents intend to cause some outcome (Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006). Fundamental to Clegg’s understanding of agency, and therefore the Agency circuit, is that it is not a category restricted to individuals; agency may also reference collective decision-making such as would be reflected by organizations, as well as other nonhuman actors under “the appropriate” conditions. This definition of agency is useful to my adaptation of Clegg’s Model as it enables consideration of the power implications of the decisions and actions of both individual and organizational agents within and among the delimited networks. This creates a lens through which to consider the individual poultry manager acting within the realm of his/her workplace or in the Albertville community, as well as the Alabama Poultry and Egg Association (AP&EA) (the poultry industry’s primary lobbyist), as an actor, within the broader economic context of Alabama.
Furthermore, Clegg’s agency is “an achievement [my emphasis] of control produced by
discipline” resulting from episodes of power and resistance between agents that result in
“consistency, coherence, and memory of self as...[it is] learned and accomplished” (1989a, 188). So
understood, agency is not a fixity, but rather, subject to the variability that results from a “dialectic
of power and resistance” (1989, 189). This conceptualization provides insight into whether and
how poultry processing plant managers in Albertville, as well as the poultry industry in Alabama
more generally, achieved agency by responding, or learning to respond, to their changing legislative
environment in 2010-2012. My findings suggest that the poultry industry did not. Though there is
evidence of resistance from these agents in response to the threat to their labor supply, their
resistance was largely disciplined in the Agency circuit such that any contestation was muted, and
in other instances, poultry agents never gained access to the relevant Agency circuit at all.

As for Clegg’s other circuits, the social integration circuit is “concerned with fixing or
refixing relations of meaning and of membership” through dispositional power. For instance, the
complex, socially constructed understanding of the poultry industry in Alabama vis-à-vis immigrant
labor becomes its own discursive flow wielding power of its own. This, and other new meanings
influenced the system integration circuit, which refers to the material conditions reflecting systems
of power within the organization in question. The system integration circuit also is concerned with
issues of “empowerment and disempowerment of agencies’ capacities” that result from changes in
disciplinary and/or other power production techniques emerging from the translation of meanings
into systemic power structures. These shifts result in variable systems of domination, which reflect
the integration of the disciplined power discourses into organizational components of the system
(1989a, 224). The creation and passage of the Alabama immigration law is the most evident
example of the workings of the system integration circuit in this case. Other general examples of
Circuits of Power outcomes are provided in Figure 1-1, which depicts how Clegg’s model explains
how power, within a sphere of particular organization of social relations, uses discursive flows (OPPs) to connect and intersect each network.

The nodes of discursive flows are a critical part of the mechanisms of power in the model. An important underpinning of Clegg's model is that power is not ubiquitous; in fact, the opportunity for stabilization or disruption of existing routines, meanings, norms, etc., is only possible at the OPPs (i.e., the discursive flows in Figure 1-1) in the flow of power through the circuits since this is the location of agentic/episodic power and resistance. Clegg identifies OPPs as interdependent nodes through which the three levels (or circuits) of power pass and interact. These are the points at which certain social relations within the system become enhanced or degraded in their influence. Clegg uses the metaphor of electricity to explain the operation of his Circuits of Power model, and this descriptor is an apt representation for my adaptation as well. Discursive flows are those spaces within and between networks where discursive formations enter and either move through with little change or are met with resistance, and become transformed into new meanings or rules within the context of existing social relations. The entry of multiple discursive formations from several circuits into OPPs creates fluid opportunities to inform and shape all levels within the system because of their intersections. OPPs are those points at which power is exercised, and the outcomes of those power exchanges then leave the OPPs through discursive flows that continue to run through the existing system reinforcing, shaping, and changing.

In my adaptation of Clegg’s model, these intersecting flows are all set within a “Specific, Existing Context” (as labeled in Figure 1-1). The specific, existing context accounts for the possibility of exogenous environmental contingencies to exert influence on the dispositional and facilitative circuits of power (e.g., a national discourse of “self-deportation” or a global recession). This context also represents the infusion of localized, social knowledge that is possessed by agencies and therefore is present in operations of power at every level of circuit (Clegg 1989a). According to Clegg, change in power is available at every level of the system. However, Elisheva
Sadans argues in his examination of empowerment in community development work that the most accessible point for change within the Circuits of Power is at the System Integration level because it actually generates a material outcome. By producing a tangible, visible innovation intended to enforce a social constructed meaning, it also becomes the target most easily changed (1997). This theoretic argument proved valid in Alabama as the Alabama immigration law occasioned high profile unintended arrests, public scrutiny, and lawsuits that ultimately led to the dismantling of this law by October of 2013 (Associated Press 2011b).

To enliven this model through one simplified example, when a poultry processing manager from Albertville met with Republican State Senator Clay Scofield to discuss the negative labor implications of H.B. 56, a new discursive flow was created. This OPP was located within an Agency-level circuit with the intention of exercising causal power by the poultry processor in the political system through Sen. Scofield (i.e., attempting to create change to key elements of H.B. 56). The manager’s resistance represented “causal” power deployed in the Agency circuit; however, this OPP resulted in “disempowerment” as Scofield did not carry forward a defense of poultry processors’ arguments, but rather staunch advocacy for self-deportation. The rhetoric of self-deportation took on important social meaning among Alabama residents (social integration), and ultimately resulted in a disciplinary innovation – the harshest immigration law in the nation (system integration). This illustrates that some economic agents (e.g., an Albertville poultry manager) did try to enter the discursive flows connecting Alabama’s economic and political networks with a new discourse arguing against the proposed immigration law for economic reasons. However, within this OPP, this discourse was disciplined, or silenced, by the dominant discourse within the network. As depicted in Figure 1-1, the social and system integration circuits continuously inform and co-construct one another by the flow of power through interconnected networks and are constantly operationalized by episodes of agentic power within the discursive flows. Further, they are permeated by factors external to the Alabama circuits of power shaping the specific, existing context of the Alabama
immigration law debate and passage (e.g., rhetoric from the national Tea Party movement, the “Alabama Identity,” etc.). This suggests that economic agents possessed insufficient agentic power within the various discursive flows to disrupt the prevailing or dominant discourses, meanings and structures in Alabama’s circuits of power. The scale and contexts in which that disempowerment occurred (e.g., within local networks of Albertville, as well as Alabama’s state-level political networks) are key empirical issues address by this dissertation. Many OPPs (those missed and entered) informed the ultimate disempowerment of Alabama’s poultry processors and identifying other relevant discursive formations/OPPs in Alabama’s circuits of power is the puzzle the next four chapters of this dissertation address.

The role of discursive flows here is addressed through a poststructuralist lens because of its explicit attention to the roles of power and politics throughout knowledge systems. This critical stance makes power a central focus and examines discourses for what they may reveal about the nexus of power and knowledge. Furthermore, “Clegg’s circuits of power provide the theory of power with a strategic approach to power relations,” as stated by Sadan (1997). This dissertation uncovers how, why, and in what ways local and state-level business agents, as individuals and organizations, did (and did not) actively enter the discursive flows related to Alabama’s immigrant labor. Poststructuralism’s particular approach to the interplay of knowledge, discourse and power permits a critical examination of who entered the discourse in Alabama, who was privileged within the various network discourses and why, and what discursive options were available to agents within the specific context of Alabama (Adler, Forbes, and Willmott 2007, Jones 2009, Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006). In Alabama, understanding the role of the “Alabama Identity claim,” with its historically contingent roots, proved critical to reconciling some of the behaviors of power brokers in the Alabama networks.
Clegg’s frame was used in this inquiry to guide how and where to locate the relevant agents within Economic, Local, and Political Networks, as well as in the analysis. As these relevant agents were identified, I labeled them as “power brokers” within the system. This is another of my adaptations of Clegg’s model, and not terminology explicitly deployed by Clegg. Power Brokers here are defined as those agents who possessed the capacity to empower or disempower particular discourses (and their agents) within Alabama’s interdependent OPPs. As aligned with Clegg, power brokers are not necessarily individuals, but also organizations, within the three networks. The State-level Economic, Local Political/Economic/Social, and State-level Political Networks, while interrelated, have sufficiently distinct boundaries to merit identification as separable entities within a power analysis. Figure 1-2. Alabama’s Networks of Power, is a simplified representation of the way in which the networks’ boundaries are evident, yet integrated though the discursive flows of power and influenced by shared context.

This dissertation addresses each of these networks in turn through its own dedicated chapter although there is considerable overlap and intersection between and among chapters. By focusing on Alabama’s poultry processing industry and theorizing the mechanisms of power flowing through and across these three Alabama networks, some complicated answers begin to emerge. Each of these networks and an overview of research findings is addressed as described in the chapter outline of the following section.

Chapter Outline and Summary of Findings

As is the case when addressing any research question, describing the relationship between cause and effect is complicated and often not easily compartmentalized. My research is no different.
In this section, I present the outline of chapters that most aptly compartmentalizes the data while capturing the dynamic conditions that impacted the relationship between Alabama’s poultry industry and the state's politics of immigration. Although a chapter listing is necessarily linear, the analysis flows across, within, and between Chapters 3-6 reflecting the discursive flows that intersect and bind the three networks in the circuits of power model discussed above. Therefore, in the following chapter outline, I provide a description of each chapter, and for Chapters 4-6 (each of which specifically addresses one of Alabama’s power networks), I sketch the chapter findings to demonstrate the cumulative interrelatedness of the networks across chapters.

**Chapter 1. Introduction to Alabama’s Politics of Immigration** outlines the research questions, preliminary background, literature review and theoretical frame for the research. This chapter also provides an overview of research findings. **Chapter 2. Putting Together the Alabama Puzzle: Research Design and Methodology** provides the framework that guided and informed the data collection and analysis that produced this research. In brief, I pursued a qualitative research approach that included discourse and content analysis as well as the development of a case study of one poultry processor in Albertville, Alabama. Albertville, as will be explained in detail in this chapter, was selected because its demographic characteristics typifying the kind of north Alabama community that has been a site of disproportionate Latino settlement as compared to the state writ large since the 1990s. Additionally, Albertville has a documented history of whiteness, of the poultry processing, and of public, political xenophobic mobilization in response to its changing community. Broadly speaking, the data collected for this research included semi-structured interviews, journalistic coverage, official documents (e.g., statements, webpages, press releases, etc.) and descriptive statistics.

**Chapter 3. Alabama Identity Claims: Contemporary Implications of a Defiant Legacy** explores the implications of Alabama as an identity marker by introducing the concept of “Alabama Identity” as a discursive form that informs the specific, existing context. This elite identity is
constructed through a myriad of factors including a particular understanding and experience of the state’s history and racialized and physical geography. As noted above, Alabama, as another actor, looms large in the data collected for this project. In the interview data, but also evident in the journalistic accounts, the history and character of “Alabama” are a clear presence in how individuals interpreted the state’s immigration debate in 2010-2011. This discourse both reflects and constitutes the set of meanings used by participants in this study and understanding it is critical ultimately to interpreting how and where the flows of power became disciplined. For this reason, Chapter 3 provides a brief history of the intersection of politics, economics, and racial identity in Alabama, with a particular focus on Northern Alabama, the location of the City of Albertville. This chapter contextualizes the “2010-2011 moment” that culminated in a Republican Governor and supermajorities in the Alabama Statehouse with a Handshake with Alabama platform featuring immigration “reform” as one of its key political calls to action. In addition to a political and economic history, this chapter provides a snapshot of how the state has changed over time, with a detailed look at Alabama’s demographic profile in 2010-2011.

The complicated history of employer recruitment of immigrant workers and the impact such past practices have on present understandings of such labor in the Alabama workplace is explored here and in Chapter 4. A significant body of work exists to explore the role of the capitalist labor system in immigration practice and the changing meanings of immigrant employment in the United States, particularly in the South (Burawoy 1976, Massey 2008, Schmid 2003, Gutiérrez 2004, Hirschman and Massey 2008, Ngai 2004, Sadowski-Smith 2009, Weise 2009a, Weise 2009b). This historical, employment perspective, in conjunction with the aforementioned racial history of Alabama, returns the focus to the epistemic question of how did the economic actors, particularly poultry processing plant managers, know what to do, or say, in reaction to the immigration law? How did the historic normalization of unenforced immigration law (with the complicity of the political network) influence the poultry processing industry’s capacity to anticipate this threat to its
labor supply accurately? History serves as a discursive formation in the processes of power and as a mechanism of control within the discursive flows that then influenced the (in)actions of economic network agents. This final consideration is part of the specific, existing context influencing economic network agents.

Chapter 4. Losing Track of $15.1 Billion: Alabama’s Love/Hate Relationship with the Poultry Industry addresses the state-level Economic Network by centering the poultry industry in the analysis. Poultry processing is a $15.1 billion industry in Alabama, and poultry complexes dot the landscapes of many rural areas providing vital economic impact (Alabama Field Office 2011, AP&EA 2014, Conner 2008). However, Alabama’s political relationship with the poultry industry is complicated despite its clear economic importance to local and state bottom lines. This complexity emerges from the intersection of Alabama’s economic structures, social constructions, and public perceptions of the state’s poultry industry. Poultry processing receives little official recognition for its contribution to the Alabama economy with no single voice representing its interests for political action as a member of both the business and agricultural communities. This chapter analyzes the discursive political and economic structures that define Alabama’s business community at the state level in an effort to locate and contextualize the political position of poultry processing within this network of influence. This structural content analysis locates poultry processors’ diffuse location within the networks of influence in Alabama and identifies how its fragmented identities within these networks contributes to the potential political silencing of its vital poultry processing industry. Using data collected from interviews, economic reports, state websites, local and national news outlets, and other regional sources, I present how poultry processing’s presence in Alabama’s multiscalar network of economic and political spheres has become fragmented and therefore politically marginalized.

Generally, the purpose of focusing on the state-level economic network within the circuits of power is two-fold. The first goal is to complicate the notion of a monolithic, Alabama business
environment, and second to consider the ramifications of the complicated history of immigrant employment in Alabama. My findings indicate that all Alabama business actors do not share the same labor interests, and as a result, do not have equal access and influence in the state political network. In fact, the disproportionate economic impact of the immigration law on agribusiness demonstrated the disparate interests within the economic networks relevant to immigrant labor.

This power analysis of Alabama’s economic network explains how the concerns of the burgeoning, high-tech industrial sector in Alabama are privileged in the discursive flows between the political and economic networks. Investigating the specific causes of this privileging reveals reasons that demonstrate a “social ordering” of the market in Alabama that reifies this sector as more politically desirable. This ordering is connected, in part, to its need for a preferred labor pool (e.g., higher skilled, higher paid, etc.), which is also a reflection of the shifted pattern of racialized labor distribution. Specifically, high-tech workers visually represent a desired, white vision for Alabama that is coupled with a vision of economic prosperity that is often elusive even for the elite of Alabama’s economic society, yet characteristic of the arguments offered by split and dual labor markets theorists (Bonacich 1972, 2008, Piore 1972, Hudson 2007, Kandel and Parrado 2005). The privileged position of high-tech manufacturing comes at the expense of Alabama’s agribusiness sector, which continues to serve as a significant economic and employment base for Alabama, but is characterized by dependence on a labor pool typified by “low-skill” and “racialized” characteristics, particularly the poultry processing industry with its reliance on Latino labor (National Council of La Raza 2012). By viewing the poultry processing industry as an independent agent within the state-level economic networks, it was possible to isolate discursive flows within and between the economic and other networks. This analysis identifies which discursive formations disciplined the agentic action of poultry processing with regard to its stable Latino labor supply, which formations isolated poultry processing from engaging in potentially agentic political actions, and raises
questions about the ability of poultry employers to protect their precarious Latino workforce in an effort to uphold their CSR commitments.

**Chapter 5. Albertville People, Poultry, and Politics** is the Local Political/Economic/Social network (hereafter referred to as the local network) and focuses on individual and organizational agents’ experience with poultry processing employers and the power brokers influencing state-level immigration policy from Albertville. By shifting the level of analysis to the local, I examine how Albertville, a small, north Alabama city of under 22,000 people, became vitally important to the passage of this 2011 law. This chapter provides a close analysis of the experience of native Albertvillians in relation to poultry processing and shifting community demographics within its localized social, political, and economic context. This social and political phenomenon is explained in part by generating a thick description of a case to define the circumstances of one Albertville poultry processor (Miles and Huberman 1994, Gerring 2004). The explanatory case study at the end of Chapter 5 illustrates the lived experience of one set of poultry employers who were positioned within the nexus of state and local power flows. This snapshot demonstrates how mobilized political, economic, and social concerns impacted locally embedded poultry processing managers who employed Latino labor. My findings demonstrate that despite the fact that Albertville and Albertvillians are dependent upon the economic contributions of the poultry industry, key local agents who wanted stronger anti-immigrant political action became the most efficacious actors within the discursive flows that informed local and state level immigration discourse and outcomes. By 2010, Albertville was a locus of power for the advocates of the Alabama immigration law.

The theorization of power described in the economic and political (Chapters 4 and 6) networks applies equally to deciphering the local network. However, theories of racial formation also proved useful in illuminating reactions from Albertville’s community to the changed demographics in their labor market, poultry processing plants, neighborhoods, and community
discourse, and are a critical piece of the complex puzzle that comprises the specific context at the time. The 2010-2011 state and local power networks were infused with the racialized knowledge of the labor history of the South and especially with Alabama's particular history and experience. In fact, the Alabama immigration law inspired opponents to dub this the era of "Juan Crow" in Alabama (McWhorter 2012). In my interviews, most Albertvillians flatly denied "race" as a motivating factor in the community's immigration attitudes, and instead referred to a "culture shock." Interestingly, two of the only three local individuals who mentioned that the Alabama immigration law was motivated by race-based considerations were the two poultry processing managers I interviewed. I found that an Albertville-level application of racial formation theorization produced different results from those seen at the state-level of analysis. Albertville has been shaped by demographics distinct from the dominant state-level demographics marked by black/white dichotomies. These factors, taken into consideration along with historic traditions of local business culture, produced different discursive formations in the local network of power flows (e.g., "culture shock") reflecting a different racial trajectory and therefore different racial, and racist, discourses and racial past (Hale 2010, Jacoway 1982, Keating 1995, Omi and Winant 1994a, Omi and Winant 2008, 2012, Winant 2000).

Within this framework, one example that raises curiosity about the local network is that Albertville politicians both initiated and endorsed the political rhetoric that ultimately framed immigration "reform," in part, as "A Jobs Bill." This is a strange argument to be embraced by Albertville's economic and political agents, unless you consider Albertville's particular intersection with race and whiteness. In Albertville, nearly a third of the population is Latino, largely employed in the poultry processing plants, and the local unemployment rate was lower than the state average (8.1% in 2012) (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). So, the local question becomes: employment for whom? Did local whites seek to claim these specific jobs in poultry processing? Theorizations from whiteness studies, critical race theory and LatCrit become valuable resources for understanding
such discursive flows within and across the local, economic, and political networks (Delgado and Stefanic 2000, Hernandez-Truyol, Harris, and Valdes 2006, Keating 1995, Parker and Lynn 2002, Schneider 2004, Wildman 1997, 2005). Additionally, scholars who have focused on historical employment issues within the poultry processing industry inform the situatedness of poultry processing and the actions of its managers in Albertville. These analyses have provided insights into the interconnectedness of immigrant labor, poultry processing plant, and local, rural communities in the south, in so doing revealing varied evidence and interpretations of the attitudes of plant managers toward their immigrant workforce (Marrow 2011, Striffler 2005, Fink 2003). My findings resonate with the complicated relationships described by these scholars.

Chapter 6. Alabama Politics and Poultry: Backroom Networks, Front Page Politicians, and the Inglorious Fate of H.B. 56 is the last analytical chapter of the dissertation and returns the level of analysis to the state with a specific focus on the political network. Chapter 6 examines how Alabama’s particular multiscalar, networked politics silenced the potential for political action by its poultry processing industry. Using data collected from interviews, local and national news outlets, and other regional sources, this chapter builds upon the power analysis of the previous chapters and identifies state-level OPPs where negotiations among Alabama’s power brokers occurred in order to analyze their real and imagined effects via influence on the poultry processing industry within these political networks. Using discourse analysis, this chapter analyzes the political rhetoric used to justify this bill to the public to consider the impact on state-level business lobbying efforts.

The state-level political network in Alabama was permeated and shaped by local and national political
discursive streams in much the same way Alabama’s Networks of Power were influenced. Therefore, the same model (as depicted in Figure 1-3. State-Level Political Network) is an apt representation of Alabama’s political network. The agents who enter the discursive flows within and through Alabama’s state-level political network are not singularly monolithic organizations or individuals, but rather are subject to in-network discipline as well as to the influence of discursive flows at the intersection of networks. This cross-pollination, and cross-discipline, of discursive flows is true of each network. As specific to the state-level political network, evidence suggests that the immigration rhetoric emerging from Alabama’s elected officials was directly informed by the prevailing national Republican political rhetoric (e.g., “self-deportation”) and local power brokers. Political power brokers from Albertville successfully transformed Albertville into a site of OPPs through initiatives such as the creation of “crime tours” and the solicitation of assistance from a national policy entrepreneur, Kris Kobach, Kansas Secretary of State and author of the Arizona immigration law who helped draft H.B. 56. These local actions proved important to other state power brokers (e.g., state legislators). Alabama’s political leaders ultimately tapped the national rhetoric of self-deportation and local examples of the “immigration problem” from Albertville to structure a legal “distance” between Alabama’s citizens and “illegal immigrants;” creating a ‘subject’ and ‘other’ that could then be addressed differently in statute and in practice through legally socially constructed identities. This distance cloaked the identity of the individual among the masses: thereby making the dehumanization of the “other” both possible and ultimately, legal by way of H.B. 56 (Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006). In this way, the agents of the local and national political discourse exercised dispositional power, albeit latently, within the political network. Alabama legislators then translated this national meaning of the new “other” into their law through the facilitative power evident in the system integration circuit.

Critical to understanding how this immigration legislation came to have such urgency in 2011 in Alabama is Nkomo’s understanding of “race as an undiscussed consideration” (489).
Nkomo has directly challenged the presumption of "fair laws" when they decline to interrogate questions of “fair to whom” and on what basis. Nkomo has pointed to the historical understanding of knowledge as arising from science, which has a history of leaving out gendered and racial categories (1992). Understanding Alabama’s legislative and social processes in part as an outcome of that state’s white population’s racial epistemology as embedded in existing law is not only logical, but arguably aligned with the racial history of Alabama business and electoral politics (Webb and Armbrester 2001, Badger 1984, Jacoway 1982, Tullos 2011). This is represented through the legislature’s presumption of an immigrant’s complete assimilation into white Alabama, which is of course impossible as Latino immigrants are fully racialized as an ‘other’ by physical and cultural characteristics. This assumed erasure of ethnicity was masked by the rhetoric of “legal” versus “illegal.” This dichotomy seems to be interchangeable with ideas of the “good” immigrants, whom we want to keep in Alabama, and the “bad immigrants” a.k.a. “illegal aliens,” who are not one of “us.” For example, the arrest of the European-origin immigrant was viewed as a mistake, as the law unintentionally racialized the wrong (which also reads ‘white’) immigrant, and therefore the Alabama legislators, in 2012, “fixed” their law. “Good,” upstanding, money-making, job-bringing, car-making, non-Latino immigrants were NOT whom they intended to encourage for self-deportation.

In addition to Nkomo’s work, Racial Formation, Poststructuralism, Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Whiteness scholars open useful avenues of thought to understand better the racialization of self-deportation and other immigration narratives that Alabama legistors used to dominate the discursive flows within the political network (Hale 2010, Martinez 1997, Montoya 2002, Omi and Winant 2008, Wildman 1997, 2005, Winant 2000, Omi and Winant 1994b). How the Latino immigrant is created and then known as a category by Alabama legislators is critical to the discourses within this political network. Evidence of earlier political other-ization of Alabama’s Latinos dates back to the 1980s with the emergence of “English Only” bills and regulations.
peppering the Alabama landscape. All these legal anti-immigrant processes are marked by an inherent racialization specific to the Latino in Alabama. By 2010-2011, Alabama’s Latino immigrants discursively had become a homogenized group, often referred to as “illegals” and “criminals” in public and political rhetoric. By 2011 when the Alabama immigration law passed, one was then either a recognizable Alabama citizen, or one was “other,” who required new levels of enforcement. To this end, poststructural epistemology is useful as a tool to engage notions of language and its role in power constructions, the shift in understanding of the subject/object of knowledge as well as the contextual positioning of the “knower” (Jones 2009: 81).

Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Whiteness studies offer different views into the discursive structures that informed the political agents in Alabama. State legislators and local elected officials and other law advocates insisted in media reports that this Alabama immigration law was not racist, was not about race, and did not intend to profile Latinos. This is also reflected in many of the public comments coming from Alabama’s political network, but perhaps Albertville Councilman Chuck Ellis, a strong proponent of the immigration law, best captured a central theme of the discourse; “Ultimately, it shows the fact that we’re just wanting to see what’s right...black is still black, and white is still white, right is still right, and wrong is still wrong” (Haven 2011c). This presence, with its insistence on absence, of a racialized understanding of people outside the black/white dichotomy in Alabama makes CRT a useful theoretical lens. CRT has specifically concerned itself with the intersections of the law, race, and power, as a theoretical stream that emerged from critical legal studies (Yosso 2005, Montoya 2002, Parker and Lynn 2002). Relatedly, Omi and Winant’s racial formation theory is useful for their contribution to the understanding of ideological and structural consideration of racialized identities as well their implication of the state in structuring and perpetuating race and racism (Gomez 2002, Omi and Winant 1994a, Omi and Winant 2008, 2012, Winant 2000). These and other CRT scholars have sought to make race explicit in frames that govern the social relations in which power relations are invested (Romero 2008,
Schneider 2004, Delgado and Stefanic 2000). Within CRT, the work of Latino Critical Race Theorists (LatCrit) is also relevant because they have specifically examined the legal and social injustices experienced by Latino/a communities intersecting with and outside of the black/white binary (Arriola 1998, Hernandez-Truyol, Harris, and Valdes 2006). As is particularly evident in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, the tools of CRT and whiteness literatures center race in the analysis of political discourse, and the motivations of vocal state legislators who advocated for this law become clearer particularly in dealing with the relationship between whites and Latinos. The literatures on Whiteness, especially the emerging LatCrit Whiteness literature, provide additional opportunities to consider the complexities of the political implications of racial intersections (Wildman 1997, 2005, Delgado and Stefanic 2000, Keating 1995).

Utilizing Clegg’s Circuits of power model to consider the role of language and racialized realities in the political network made clear why this anti-immigration rhetoric was suddenly politically actionable in 2011. While anti-immigration rhetoric was far from a new political discourse in Alabama, it was previously discounted by means of economic arguments that demonstrated the positive impacts of migrant workers, both documented and undocumented. This chapter’s finding again raises questions regarding the assumptions of a “mutually beneficial” interdependence between state governments, state politics, and economic actors and explicitly points to the political ramifications of recognizing poultry processors as fully, social embedded actors in Alabama. Of particular interest in this case is the challenge to the prevailing discourse that “Republicans are good for business.” In 2011, Alabama Republicans were conclusively not good for the poultry processing business.

Chapter 7. Conclusions, provides a summary of the findings of this dissertation as well as suggesting new research directions. This dissertation is interdisciplinary in its theoretical and methodological approaches, and accordingly, contributes to several different literatures. This chapter provides a big picture synthesis of the findings through a reconsideration of Clegg’s circuits
of power model, articulates the gaps and weaknesses of this research approach, explicitly identifies the literatures to which this research provides the most significant contributions, and finally, reconsiders the broader research questions in light of the dissertation findings. I return to the intersections between corporate social responsibility, social justice, and immigrant labor. Although this was one of the initial impetuses for this research (CSR), the data suggests that prior to dialogue on CSR, more attention needs to be paid to the feasibility of organizational CSR commitments by attending to the conditions of power within which an organization is embedded.

Conclusion

The Alabama agribusiness community began publicly speaking out against H.B. 56 once its economic impacts began to be felt in late 2011 and early 2012. This response highlights the question: what took so long? The findings presented in the following chapters demonstrate that the poultry industry did not wait, but instead, was thwarted from effective action through a complicated web of power involving Alabama's racial history and identity, the culture of business and politics, and the contemporary economic and political realities influencing Alabama’s power networks in 2010. Despite the nation’s centuries-long political debate concerning immigration policy, serious consideration of immigration reform is a relatively new discourse at the intersection of the political and economic stage. For example, The Wall Street Journal sponsors a CEO council that produces an annual report of issues facing national economic health from the business perspective of top CEOs, and though “building a competitive work force” was present in the 2008 report, it was not until 2011 that the CEO council explicitly named immigration policy as a primary issue for developing a competitive and innovative future workforce (2012b, a). In the meantime, Alabama’s immigration policy lead to labor shortages in the poultry processing industry in plants across the state, creating hardships for business and its Latino labor supply. By investigating this individual case in search of an explanation concerning why Alabama businesses, specifically poultry
processors, did not act on behalf of their labor, this research identifies gaps in the pervasive assumptions about the power of business in the political sphere.

These gaps are critical because one of the long-argued, dominant streams of political and economic rhetoric in the U.S. that insists if business (broadly-defined) is less regulated and issued properly enabling free market conditions, society as a whole will be improved. This study of Alabama suggests that there is more than economic and policy regulations standing between the attainment of business self-interest and the betterment of society. In Alabama in 2011, the economically-powerful industry of poultry processing found itself in the crosshairs of the political juggernaut of “illegal immigration” and “self-deportation.” Despite its own legally defensible employment practices and a Republican state government that ran on the platform that “Republicans are good for business,” the poultry processing industry was unable to achieve its self-interest in protecting its marginalized Latino labor force. The next six chapters provide some insight into why they failed.

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1 E-verify is a free, government-sponsored “internet-based system that allows businesses to determine the eligibility of their employees to work in the United States.” It is intended to facilitate employer compliance with federal employment law as applied to immigrant workers (2013i).

2 Clegg et al employ a broad understanding of Foucault that interprets identity, noting, “it is constituted, construed, and performed in organizations [and] will be multiple and contradictory” (2006, 218).

3 Clegg spends significant time explaining the selection of domination as the descriptor of power institutionalized through the innovation of the dispositional circuit, rather than using the more conventional term “authority.” Briefly, Clegg employed the term domination to reflect processes of power more accurately, which may or may not result in “Authority” as a legitimizing source of power (1989: 213-214).

4 Clegg refers to both the “types of power” and the “levels of circuits” interchangeably as types of “circuits.” Therefore, this is how the terms are deployed in my adaptation of the Clegg model.

5 The use of “Organization” reflects Clegg’s terminology. However, this is intended broadly to include any interconnected, and co-constitutive power system of agents and meanings.


7 Empower and Disempower are Clegg’s words used to describe the act of granting power over or refusing power to actors within the system as manifest in the “innovation in techniques of discipline and production” in the system integration circuit (Clegg 1989a, 214).
8 Discursive Formation is used here in the Foucauldian meaning to capture power/knowledge as exerted through mechanisms in addition to written or spoken language. This also references systems of meaning captured in structures that include bodies, unspoken intention, etc. (Foucault 1972, 1977)

9 For the creation of a “white Alabama,” I turn to Grace Hale’s work focused on the creation of whiteness in the American South through segregation between 1890-1934. (Hale 2010).
Chapter 2. Putting Together the Alabama Puzzle: Research Design and Methodology

When I start a jigsaw puzzle, I always try to find all the edge pieces first. I work from the outside in. I like to find the boundaries of the puzzle I am creating, so that I can proceed with the knowledge that everything else will eventually fit inside. Then, I start collecting the pieces for identifiable sections within the big puzzle picture; this could be a smaller image within the puzzle or looking for pieces with a particular shade or color. I try to fill in the frame I have created by connecting small image to small image.

Alabama is like a 5000-piece jigsaw puzzle.

When standing back from the picture, it appears as one cohesive picture. And, like all jigsaw puzzles, you may (or may not) like the picture before you, but in either case, you can read it as one intelligible image. Now, imagine the 5000 pieces of this puzzle all detached and scattered on the table. This is Alabama. Sometimes one piece looks like a complete story in itself, but more frequently, it requires its interlocking neighboring pieces to make sense of the one. Even with several pieces together, you only have a small part of the picture that will take on additional meanings once it is connected to the frame of the puzzle.

This chapter is intended to share the method I designed to put together the puzzle that initially looked like a perplexing, public silence from the state’s poultry processors in response to Alabama’s vehement pursuit of immigration reform from 2009-2010.

Engaging the Picture on the Puzzle Box: A Qualitative Approach

The purpose of this research is to explore the reasons that poultry processing plant managers in Albertville, Alabama, did not appear to publicly oppose H.B. 56 and the subsequent Alabama Immigration Law, despite the clear impact on an important labor supply. To address this purpose, I conducted a qualitative analysis of the Alabama power networks within which poultry processing is embedded. The use of three “networks” as a lens of analysis (discussed in Chapter 1)
was constructed from my initial theoretical framing using Clegg’s networks of power model, and my methodological approach was principally guided by this theoretical construct. The initial data sources I identified in my research plan were based upon their potential to provide some combination of context, discursive content, and insight into the key actors within the three networks, while keeping the poultry industry centered in my analysis.

The Alabama poultry industry initially was selected for two primary reasons (discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5). First, the poultry industry has a long history as an important economic engine for Alabama’s economy, and second, it is disproportionately dependent on Latino immigrant labor whose legal status it had been verifying since 2000. I selected Albertville, Alabama, as the case study site because it was the first site of commercial poultry processing operation in north Alabama (designated after World War II by the state legislature), and the poultry industry is recognized as having been instrumental in growth and transformation for the city and region (Maloney 2011). More recently, Albertville is generally recognized as an active site of anti-immigrant rhetoric and activity in Alabama dating back to the 1990s. As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, Albertville’s rapidly changed demographic characteristics deviate significantly from the rest of the state but are typical of small, southern locales whose demographic makeup has been dramatically transformed by changing Latino migration patterns (Massey 2008, Odem and Lacy 2009, Marrow 2011, Schmid 2003). Finally, Albertville captured my attention early in the research process when, during Alabama’s immigration debates, this small city attained a national profile when the City of Albertville and its Mayor Lindsey Lyons appeared on NPR, Fox News, and other high profile media outlets across the United States (Green 2008b, a, Stock 2009, Llorente 2011, Cox 2011).

I pursued a qualitative research approach that included content and discourse analyses and relied on the development of a case study of Albertville to ascertain the role of and full impact on the local poultry processors from approximately 2009-2011. I am using the term “case study” as it is defined by John Gerring: “the case study as an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of
understanding a larger class of (similar) units.” Gerring describes the case study method as a way of defining cases, not of analyzing them (2004, 342). In this sense, Chapter 5, with its geographically-specific and temporally-limited focus on Albertville, defines my case of Albertville and is provided with the intention of understanding the larger unit of “Alabama,” comprised of a state-level economic and political sphere, in an effort to understand the power flows and the Alabama poultry industry.

**Looking for the Edge Pieces: Data Collection**

Initial data collection was very much akin to locating a corner piece amidst the jumble of 4,996 other puzzle pieces. I stumbled upon the first corner piece as the result of a seminar paper written in Fall 2011 for a class entitled Identity, Migration, and Place. The research conducted for this paper about the on-line rhetorical response to the Alabama Immigration Law ultimately became the foundation of this dissertation. Perhaps the more apt metaphor is that this paper provoked me to pick up the puzzle box and look hard at the picture printed on the outside, and made me want to open the box lid. This initial paper inspired me to engage in considerable, contemporaneous research that included following the real-time political and legal events connected to H.B. 56’s implementation, and in particular the economic and social justice consequences publicly unfolding across Alabama. This research was bolstered by academic engagement with the literatures of immigration, race, power, policy, corporate responsibility, and labor markets and culminated in my dissertation proposal. These literatures were deepened and expanded by my reading lists for my preliminary exam and defense. By the end of these early research stages, I estimate that had located about one third of my puzzle’s edge pieces. The subsequent section of this chapter addresses how I found the rest of these puzzle pieces and began constructing a strategy to piece together the middle.

As a content and discourse analysis, the collection of appropriate “texts” was imperative. I conducted semi-structured in-person and telephone interviews; collected written texts form a
variety of sources, and located basic descriptive statistics to decipher the network contexts of state and local level discursive flows. For my analysis, I primarily considered the discourse of each of the networks as presented by:

- Semi-structured interviews with a census of major players and/or representatives from key agent organizations representing each of the three networks
- Local, regional, and national journalistic coverage of the Alabama immigration discourse from 2009-2012
- Official statements and reports issued by government representatives, economic development officials, business leaders, and other representatives of economic and political networks at the state and local levels (e.g., press releases, web commentaries, official websites, etc.)
- Descriptive statistics released by the U.S. Census Bureau, the Auburn University Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Alabama’s (UA) Center for Business and Economic Research’s (CBER), and the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture

Using this initial framework of targeted data, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) application was submitted and approved during the summer of 2013, and renewed in June 2014 and 2015 (see Appendix B for approvals and Consent Form. Additional written “use permissions” also are included in Appendix B). The first set of interviews in Alabama was conducted in October 2013 with two return trips to Alabama in December 2013 and January 2014. In October 2013, I traveled to Charlottesville, Virginia, to interview the former legal director of the Southern Poverty Law Center who had relocated from Birmingham, Alabama, in the time since the Alabama Immigration Law debate. The original, semi-structured interview guides were developed with a focus on obtaining the highly contextual and multiscalar data demanded by the circuits of power model, particularly seeking information about the operations of power at the intersections between the economic, local, and political spheres of Alabama (see Appendix C. Semi-Structured Interview Guides). Additionally, the guides were designed with the intention of collecting information that, through triangulation, would validate or dispute other data sources, as well as provide new knowledge and provoke new questions not otherwise available in the public sphere. Therefore,
prior to each interview, I used the initial interview guides as a framework to develop customized, semi-structured interview guides such that each interview both verified and built upon the previous research and interviews. Prior to each interview, I reviewed and revised my interview guide by adding questions, if necessary, prioritizing and noting questions in terms of criticality to ensure that these points were covered.

Interviewee selection initially began as a structured, orderly process first based upon an assessment of organizational or individual relevance found in the preliminary research that provided the theoretic framing of this study (i.e., economic, political, and local). My first step was to generate a list of organizations and individuals who appeared to be key actors at each level of analysis. Furthermore, one explicit criterion I used to evaluate the initial (and subsequent) participant list was whether or not the sample of potential interviewees represented the economic, political and local spheres through their own knowledge and experience. I also considered the participant pool as a totality to ensure that it represented the potential breadth of opinion regarding the impact of immigration reform on the actions of business in Alabama, and specifically, on poultry plant managers in Alabama. Through this approach to interview selection, my intention was:

...to assimilate some early theoretical hunches and wishes to identify examples that demonstrate the range or variation of a concept in different situations and in relation to other concepts. The sampling is done to saturate a concept, to comprehensively explore it and its relationship to other concepts so that it becomes theoretically meaningful. (Rudestam 2007, 108)

This approach immediately raised the question of, how many interviews would be “enough?” My initial efforts generated 22 potential individuals and/or organizational sources to be interviewed with the intention of using a snowball approach to identify additional interviewees in Alabama. From the outset, it was clear that this participant list would change as I collected data, which is typical of many qualitative research projects (Baker and Edwards 2012, Creswell 2008, Miles and Huberman 1994, Rudestam 2007). The final interviewee list resulted from the snowball
technique as I was referred to additional people throughout the process. As stated by Adler and Adler, “...because qualitative research is exploratory by nature, qualitative researchers may not know how much data to gather in advance” (Baker and Edwards 2012). Therefore, clearly understanding my criteria for participant selection was more critical than a firm commitment to my initial participant list.

In response to the question “how many interviews is enough,” the answer depends on many factors, but key among them is whether the qualitative research is designed to be descriptive of what people do, versus developing a subjective understanding how and why people do what they do (Baker and Edwards 2012). This power analysis falls squarely in the second category, and my data collection goal was to attempt to achieve saturation of the topic to the extent possible. I resolved that when I began to hear the same things repeated and no significant new information, those criteria would serve as evidence that I had accumulated sufficient data to begin analysis. By the end of my third trip to Alabama, I had conducted 16 interviews with 19 individuals (see Table 2-1. Interview Data) and had engaged in several informal, off-the-record “chats” with local residents of Albertville. My average interview length was approximately 1 hour, with variation ranging from as little as 24 minutes to as long as two hours. The informal chats were typically about 10-20 minutes. Table 2-2. Interviewees and Chats lists the interviewees by their research codes (i.e., names or numbers) as organized by trip. By the end of these scheduled and impromptu conversations, I distinctly detected the emergence of repeated themes and ideas, as well as the sense of being overwhelmed. Pieces that belonged in a different puzzle were beginning to obscure the one I was putting together. At this point, I determined it was time to begin analysis in order to assess whether any gaps in the data remained, and what data would be necessary to fill these gaps. I did have email follow-up question and answer discussions with some interviewees.
**Table 2-1. Interview Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of Interviews</th>
<th>Number Interviewed</th>
<th>Total Interview Hours (Audio Recorded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery &amp; Birmingham, AL (Trip 1)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5:45:59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlottesville, VA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>00:48:41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertville, AL (Trip 2)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4:50:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertville, AL (Trip 3)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3:05:16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1:36:32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>16:10:59</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2-2. Interviewees and Chats**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Alabama Trip 1 (Oct. 2013)</th>
<th>Alabama Trip (January 2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ray Hilburn</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jennifer Moore Palmer, President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous 1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td>003/4-AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy Hall</td>
<td></td>
<td>005-AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>001-AL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>002-AL</td>
<td></td>
<td>John Weathers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Brooke, Senior Staff Attorney</td>
<td></td>
<td>Richard Cohen, President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joe Kennedy, AL.com Blogger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alabama Trip 2 (December 2013)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Chat in La Tienda Del Sol</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clay Scofield, Alabama State Senator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joyce Bishop, Former Assistant Superintendent of Schools &amp; Judit Gay, Migrant Program Recruiter and Home School Liaison</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matt Arnold, President / CEO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Bauer, Director of Advocacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Microtel Chat - Management Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Microtel Chat - Front Desk and Misc. Guests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without exception, each interview quickly became a discussion that led into new, unanticipated areas of information and commentary, and thus the interview guides served as a checklist to ensure that the highest priority items were addressed. Generally, the discussions progressed organically and covered the entirety of the topics of the interview guide; as expected, some discussions raised new questions while making other moot. There are several items of note from Table 2-2. Interviewees and Chats. First, all interviewees gave permission for me to tape our
interviews. However, some interviewees gave full permission to use their names in context. Some individuals requested that their identities be held confidentially per an option on the Consent Form, and these interviewees are coded by a number system. Also, two interviewees are coded “Anonymous 1/2.” These individuals were part of Alabama’s state-level economic sphere and requested to remain anonymous and “off the record,” though they willingly agreed to be recorded. Therefore, the information they shared largely provided context and additional leads. They are quoted directly only once in Chapter 4, and they each provided separate, explicit permission for this quote to be used. Finally, informal conversations with native Albertvillians (see “Chats” in Table 2-2) yielded important contextual information that helped me better understand some of the community attitudes, concerns, and interests as they pertained to the Latino and poultry communities of Albertville. I recorded my reflections and/or took notes immediately following three of these chats. While these conversations were not officially part of my interviewee list, they provided me with access to different, lived insights into the local context and events of the time. I kept a research journal about information, topics, and themes that emerged from the longer conversations. (See below.)

These interviews and preliminary research provided much of the outside edge of my Alabama puzzle. To ensure that the totality of my data collection fully addressed my theoretical framework (i.e., that there were no edge pieces missing), I developed the Venn Diagram in Appendix D. Interview Participants and On-site Data Collection. I used this tool after my second trip to Alabama, to assess my final on-site interviewee pool to ensure I had targeted and collected sufficient variety in interview sources to support my inquiry. I concentrated my data collection on the context, discursive content, and key actors within the identified networks. Despite my best efforts, one important gap remains unfilled – an interview with a poultry processing representative from one of the multinational meat processing companies with plants in Marshall County; specifically, Tyson’s Foods, Inc., Wayne’s Farms, and Pilgrim’s Pride. Despite multiple efforts to
make contact, including efforts on my behalf by representatives from the Marshall County Economic Development office and the Alabama Poultry & Egg Association (AP&EA), my interview requests were repeatedly declined. In the cases of Tyson’s and Wayne’s Foods, the rejections came from their corporate headquarters in Arkansas and Georgia. However, I was able to speak at length with representatives from the poultry industry and with managers at an Alabama-based poultry processing plant. Therefore, this gap in data, while not optimal and limiting to the scope of my findings, does not preclude other productive conclusions from this research.

The Middle of the Puzzle: Data Analysis

The twist in the Alabama puzzle is this: the puzzle image is not a simple picture or painting; it is a 3D stereogram--one of those optical illusions where if you stare at the original image long enough, and your eyes “un-focus” just enough, another image emerges. This was my dawning realization as I fell deeper into analysis. I drew on the insights of grounded theory in the data collection and coding process and its attention to linking data collection and analysis (Creswell 2008, Strauss and Corbin 1997). Put differently, grounded theory coding techniques, such as early analytical writing, helped develop a heuristic early in the process to help narrow the research landscape while also developing the state-level network contexts (Charmaz 2006). After each interview day, I wrote or audio-recorded a research journal entry to capture my thoughts about the day of information, emerging themes, and new directions and considerations for the next set of interviews and research collection. Ultimately, a paid transcriptionist transcribed 15 of the 16 interviews, and I either transcribed or wrote my journal at the end of interview days to capture new questions and ideas provoked by the day of interviewing, as well as to explore possible connection between other research sources and the experiences of the interviewees. This accumulation of reflection and knowledge was carried forward into subsequent interviews: as I became more informed, I was able to ask more relevant follow-up questions and listen more carefully to answers thereby capitalizing on the advantages of semi-structured interviews. Additionally, these journal
reflections began shaping the coding system that would emerge to interpret the empirical evidence through an emic coding systems for analysis.

My approach to this research is one of a social constructivist, defined by Creswell as holding “assumptions that individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live and work. Individuals develop subjective meanings of their experiences – meanings directed toward certain objects or things.” Importantly, this perspective demands the researcher take account of the complexity of viewpoints, contexts, and meanings, and rely on the viewpoint of participants (Creswell 2008). In recognition of this position and as a feminist researcher, I tried to recognize and account for how my own life experiences and responses to the research may bias or otherwise influence my interpretation of collected data. To this end, in my audio and written researcher journal, I dedicated space to my own personal reflections and reactions to the data I collected, as well as my preliminary interpretations of the data. I anticipated that I would encounter attitudes or behaviors that I would find personally offensive (and I did), or, at the other end of the spectrum, aligned with my own subjective preferences (and I did). In any case, this journal was my attempt to process my own subjectivities and to assess their potential impact on my analysis of the dissertation research. It also became the opportunity to capture my preliminary analytical thoughts for coding, as well as track my own evolving conceptualization of what I was learning.

My experience of Alabama was interestingly contradictory and complex, and one of these early journal entries was the genesis of Chapter 3 of this dissertation, a chapter I did not foresee needing at the proposal stage. An excerpt from that journal entry was, “History is important to Alabamians – at least to several of the white, male Alabamians I have spoken to thus far” (December 16, 2013). This one entry evolved into a persistent observation. I have never been to a place where the random sample of people I met were so steeped in particular narratives of their own state history. Without exception, everyone I spoke to was both generous with their opinion and experiences, friendly, and those from Alabama were also deeply committed to his or her particular
identity as Alabamians. However among these same people, this Alabamian identity was clearly a deeply contested notion. The criteria for who may claim the identity of an Alabamian are at the root of this contest, and the answers to this identity question impact not only individuals, but also businesses and organizations who may, or may not, belong. This “belonging” had significant implications for access to, and voice within, the power networks that influence state action and support of policy and action, and became the primary topic for Chapter 3.

Coding the transcribed interviews served as an important bridge between data organization and data analysis. The emic approach is frequently used in ethnographic projects to study “phenomena...from within their own cultural context...” and related back to their own context (Van de Vijver 2010). This approach informed my coding strategy in that I did not approach the interview transcriptions with pre-conceived categories into which the data would fit. Instead, by referring to my initial journaling heuristics and by combing through the transcribed interviews, I translated patterns in ideas, concepts, phrases, and other references into codes. My process for data analysis of the interviews was multistage. First, as I waited for my interviews to be transcribed into text, I re-listened to the audiotapes of every interview (usually while traveling in my car). The intention of this practice was to keep the information and context as “fresh” in my mind as possible. I listened to every interview, without any note taking, at least one time before coding. My second “pass” at the interview data involved uploading the transcriptions into NVivo for Mac version 10.2.0 and listening to the audio of the interviews while reading the transcription. During this pass, I made corrections to the transcriptions per the interview audio and began creating Nodes (i.e., Nodes = Codes in NVivo terminology) for the major categories. This was a slow, meticulous process, and subcategories quickly emerged. The initial code list was quite lengthy evolving into categories and subcategories represented in the numbering system in Table 2-3. Interview Codes.
During the second review of the interviews, I also created Memos (an NVivo tool) that summarized important ideas, concepts, or quotes linked to each interview. I also wrote reflections on how these data connected to my theoretical model and, as analysis progressed, how the interviewees were and were not in conversation with each other. Essentially, these Memos served as additional prewriting. These memos proved invaluable to the final analytical stages, and many

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding Structure</th>
<th>6_Connections to National Landscape</th>
<th>12_Power Circuits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1_AL Economy</td>
<td>6a_Federal Immigration LawPrograms</td>
<td>12a-'Liberal' Voices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a_Albertville-Econ</td>
<td>7_Immigrants, Migrants &amp; Immigration</td>
<td>12b-Bus. Interests&amp;Voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b_Hispanic Businesses</td>
<td>7a_AL Political Narrative 'Illegals'</td>
<td>12c-Econ Press &amp; Compet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c_Labor in North Alabama</td>
<td>7a_AL Political Narrative Undocumented</td>
<td>12d-Economic &amp; Poultry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1d_Marshall County-econ</td>
<td>7b_Community Chatter About Law</td>
<td>12e-External Influences on AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2_AL History</td>
<td>7c_Illegal Immigration but...</td>
<td>12f-Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a_Albertville-Hist</td>
<td>7d_Illegal is illegal</td>
<td>12fa-Outside to local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b_Marshall County-Hist</td>
<td>7e_Immigrant Labor</td>
<td>12g-Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3_AL Alabama Narrative ID</td>
<td>7f_Immigrant Voice</td>
<td>12h-Power Brokers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a_21st Century ID</td>
<td>7g_Law Impact</td>
<td>13-Race-Whiteness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b_Alabama is just like anywhere else...</td>
<td>8_Immigration law</td>
<td>13a-Ethnicity or Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c_Albertville; real or imagined</td>
<td>9_Notable Quotes</td>
<td>14-Sez You &amp; Federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d_Constitution legacy</td>
<td>9a-Not from here</td>
<td>15-References &amp; Materials Collected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4_AL Local-soc.&amp;cult&amp;geog&amp;pol.</td>
<td>10-Populist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a_Albertville-social&amp;cultural</td>
<td>11_Poultry Industry-&amp; local history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b_Immigrants&amp;'Illegals' in Community</td>
<td>11a-Corporate Citizens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4c_Local Poultry</td>
<td>11b-Differences Within Industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4d_Local Power Brokers</td>
<td>11c-Poultry and Race...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4e_Marshall County-S&amp;C&amp;G</td>
<td>11d-Poultry Imagined &amp; Real</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5_AL Politics-processes</td>
<td>11e-Poultry Labor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a_Alabama political partisanship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b_Albertville-Marshall Politics</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
dissertation paragraphs (or parts thereof) are verbatim from these Memos. My third review of the interview data was a much quicker pass that targeted the interviews coded earliest to ensure that codes and subcodes that emerged later were captured. By considering the interviews three different times, I strove to maintain the contextual integrity of the data in my analysis, and not to superimpose the changing political and cultural landscape on the interviewees’ intended meanings.

The changes in the specific, existing context since 2011 (e.g., as a result of the 2012 Presidential election and a shift in rhetoric about federal level immigration “reform”) was of theoretical concern for data collection and analysis. This shift in the national immigration discourse has increasingly made this a project concerned with historical framing in a way that was not originally envisioned. Though efforts were made through the design of the interview questions to differentiate between past and present, many of the interviewees merged time frames in their discussions. Further, several interviewees referenced in some way that, in the end this law was not really a big deal since most of their workers had gradually returned once the law was meaningfully enjoined. These interviewee data suggest that for some interviewees, the ultimate outcome of the immigration law (e.g., returned Latino workforce) may have altered their memory by diminishing the significance of this experience while it happened (i.e., loss of Latino work force). Additionally, distance (in time) and memory may have also tempered their reactions to questions of why this law happened and how they felt about it at the time, though notably, some interviewees still conveyed passionate commitment to their experience. The role of memory and temporal distance was a complication in data collection and analysis in ensuring the collected data was referring to the circuits of power and discursive flows that existed prior to and immediately after passage of the 2011 Alabama Immigration Law. To address this concern in analysis, I triangulated among the discursive data sources listed above to ensure the data collected is representative of the identified timeframe. Triangulating among the data proved critical for confirming, and occasionally contradicting, recollections of my interviewees.
Discourse analysis was the primary analytical approach for the data analysis. Discourse here is interpreted through a postmodern and poststructural lens, where texts are more than their content. Texts construct meaning and are products of existing sets of meanings, and therefore are only partial in the reflection of reality. As described by Cheek, “at any in time in history, certain discourses will operate in such a way as to marginalize or even exclude others. Which discursive frame is afforded presence is a consequence of the effect of power relations” (2004). Therefore, texts are value and meaning-laden, and discourses (which may be a product of multiple texts) must be analyzed within their specific social, cultural, historical, and political context, and it is this contextual interpretation that discourse analysis offers to this network analysis (Cheek 2004, Talja 1999, Jørgensen, Jordan, and Mitterhofer 2012). Cheek describes discourse analysis as an approach, rather than a method, and therefore specific procedures are varied and multiple. However, this approach does demand that all data selected for inclusion must be justified and collection explained using theoretically grounded criteria (Cheek 2004). Given Clegg’s reliance on Foucault in his development of power, discourse analysis is a theoretically aligned methodology for this project in its recognition that contextualizing the discourse is critical to understanding meaning (Jørgensen, Jordan, and Mitterhofer 2012). Part of this research also uses content analysis to analyze discursive content across multiple sources and to identify meta-trends of emerging themes embedded in the contextual knowledge systems. I used the coding heuristics (discussed above) to initiate the discourse analysis process. The coding structures fed the other analytic tools, such as a series of diagrams that mapped the flow between and influence of Alabama’s “Power Brokers” (Code 12h). Power Brokers became an important analytic tool and are defined and deployed throughout the dissertation to located the circuits of power. This is one example of how the empirical evidence drove the emergent categories, and the categories translated into analytic tools. These categories revealed patterns that informed the analysis as reflected in the Chapter content and organization of this dissertation presented in Chapter 1.
Conclusion: The Big Puzzle Picture

While putting together the puzzle section that looked like “why didn’t poultry processors speak out against the 2011 immigration law?” I began to realize that there was a lot of puzzle pieces of the same color within this giant puzzle, and they did not all belong in the same section of the puzzle. The strategy (a.k.a., my methodology) for assembling this puzzle was critical to creating a coherent picture. This became critically apparent as I pieced more of the puzzle sections together. Through the traveling, listening, and coding, I started to see new images rise out of the original Alabama picture that escaped the frame I thought I had constructed. These new images connect Alabama to its past, to the nation’s present, and to unexpected state-level political and economic streams of power flows and power brokers. In the end, this puzzle ended like all my efforts at puzzling; one or two (or 10-20) pieces are still missing by the time I have pieced the rest of the puzzle put together – probably stolen by the cat. Nevertheless, the puzzle’s big picture is together enough to see the stereogram image escape the linear boundaries of the puzzle. This stereogram reveals the shifted flows of power in Alabama that were not visible at first glance, and certainly were not evident from one small section of the puzzle. Embedded in the stereogram is the answer to my original question about Alabama’s poultry processors, as well as many more questions. Some of those questions are answered here, but others are a puzzle for another day.

1 “Texts” here is broadly defined to include, for example, written and verbal discourse, feminist and post-structural notions of the body as text, as well as silence as text.
2 Ironically, this interview occurred in the same week the court settlement was announced. As the former Legal Director of the SPLC, Mary Bauer was particularly delighted to speak about her experiences on this case.
Chapter 3. Alabama “Identity” - Contemporary Implications of a Defiant Legacy

Alabama felt a magic descending, spreading, long ago. Since then, it has always been a land with a spell on it – not a good spell, always. Moons, red with the dust of barren hills, thin pine trunks barring horizons, festering swamps, restless yellow rivers, all are a part of a feeling – a strange certainty that above and around them hovers enchantment – an emanation of malevolence that threatens to destroy men through dark ways if its own...But the stranger is more apt to realize sorcery is at work on these people and know that the land on which they live is its apprentice.

~From the Forward, Stars Fell on Alabama (Carmer 1934)

Alabama is no stranger to center stage in national debates regarding politics and social policy. The state’s history is repeatedly marked by moments when Alabama has been gripped by fervors of opposition to the prevailing winds of social change. These kinds of heated public reactions have placed Alabama squarely in the national and international public eye intermittently throughout its history. Perhaps these recurring reactions are a reflection of the “enchantment” Carl Carmer noted (quoted above) in his 1934 classic book, Stars Fell on Alabama, as evidenced by their constancy and cost across time and space. Frequently motivated by challenges to the racial and socioeconomic status quo, Alabama fervors have consistently had the ability to move a powerful majority of Alabama’s white elite¹ (and sometimes black²) population to ignore the extreme social and political costs that their rebellions exact on the state’s population writ large; costs then reflected in its stagnant and dismal placement in national measures of well-being of U.S. state residents.

These human and material costs on the majority of the state population are evident by Alabama’s national rankings in areas such as the quality of public high school education (ranked 42 by U.S. News and World Report), poverty levels (ranked 45 out of 50 by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Poverty Map), and overall state health rankings (ranked 47 by the United Health Foundation) (Morse 2014, 2012c, 2013b). In 1999 and again in 2001, Alabama was proclaimed as the most poorly governed state in the nation according to Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs (as referenced by Flynt 2004). These oppressive rankings are not
simply a twenty-first century phenomenon, but instead, reflect a doggedly stagnant status quo in Alabama reflecting entrenched patterns of political dysfunction created by Alabama’s particular intersection of history, politics, race, and identity.

Allen Tullos documented the defiant and reactionary history of white Alabamians and captured this attitude in his branding of Alabama as the “Sez You State.” Tullos clearly demonstrated how elite Alabamians repeatedly have chosen the “sez you” political option in a variety of historical circumstances as a response to being “told what to do” despite avoidable and significant state-wide consequences (Tullos 2011). Prior to Tullos’ Sez You designation, V.O. Key made similar observations about the raucous Alabama political spirit by saying:

There [In Alabama] a wholesome contempt for authority and a spirit of rebellion akin to that of the Populist days resist the effort of the big farmers and 'big mules' – the local term for Birmingham industrialists and financiers – to control the state. Alabamians retain a sort of frontier independence, with an inclination to defend liberty and to bait the [authority'] interests. (1949, 36)

Importantly, Key is describing the political machinations of the white population in Alabama, as he ultimately draws broad and deeply discerning conclusions about the role of race (and racism) permeating all of Southern politics. The myriad ways in which elite, white Alabama political actors repeatedly have stirred the political imagination of whiteness to garner support across socioeconomic categories of white Alabamians is well documented (Feldman 2004, Flynt 2004, Jackson 2004, Long 1965, McWhorter 2001, Rogers et al. 1994, Thomson 2002, Tullos 2011). Collectively, this literature reveals a pattern of non-rational decision-making wherein white Alabamians across socioeconomic strata consistently have acted in support of issues that reflect elite constructions of whiteness, even when those actions create material costs to their everyday lives. These counter intuitive, often counter productive, actions typify Tullos’ “sez you” Alabama.

With this historical backdrop as precursor, Alabama again appeared on the national stage in 2011; this time as the most contentious case of the six state “hot spots” of immigration reform. Alabama’s immigration law was debated in 2010, passed in 2011, debated and revised in 2012, and
reached negotiated settlement with the ACLU and the U.S. Justice Department in October 2013 after the Supreme Court refused the case. What had once been the toughest immigration law in the nation was essentially dismantled (Associated Press 2013, Holland 2013, Liptak 2013, Sarlin 2013) with its “most far-reaching elements have proved unconstitutional, unworkable, or politically unsustainable” (Holland 2013). From the outside looking in, Alabama’s full throttled entry into the nation’s immigration debate seems, at a minimum, curious. In this state, where the demographic profile from the 2010 U.S. census reflected a population that was more than 95% “white only” or “black or African-American only,” what accounts for why Alabama would expend the extensive political, legal, and financial resources necessary to pass, implement, and defend the nation’s toughest immigration law targeting Latinos? (2010a) Is this yet another case of “Sez You?” Why Alabama?

These questions call for a deeper understanding of what it means to be “an Alabamian,” in order to account for “who counts as a citizen of the state” in the nexus of place, space, and history defining the first decade of the twenty-first century. Representations of being an “Alabamian” in the twenty-first century are often presented by the elite classes as a singular identity claim that universally applies across the state’s geographic, race, and class structures. This monolithic Alabamian identity conflates a redemption identity narrative that claims (among other things) both progress that has moved Alabama “beyond” its racist history and a “proud” history of resistance to the supposed oppressive intrusion of the federal government upon its rights. By complicating this notion of a monolithic “Alabamian” through an examination of a specific social, political, cultural, and regional history, a new picture of Alabama whiteness emerges. This portrait reveals racial dynamics that are both subtle and coded and imbued with different meanings in different areas of the state. A more nuanced understanding of an otherwise totalizing Alabama history and identity is critical to understanding how north Alabamians, specifically those in Marshall County, responded to becoming a new immigrant destination in the Nuevo South, and ultimately how this region’s power
brokers became critical political voices in advocating for state-based, restrictive immigration reform. To this end, this chapter traces two intersecting historical and narrative threads: the narrative identity associated with being “an Alabamian” traditionally espoused by the state’s white political elite and the divergent regional histories of north Alabama counties. Better understanding these threads reveals important contextual elements critical to the rationale that drove an overwhelming majority of Alabamians to support vigorously state-initiated immigration reform in 2011.

To this end, the first section of this chapter discusses the relevance of identity and history to creating a specific context that influenced the conditions within which the circuits of power operated for the 2010-2011 immigration debate. Next, a brief overview of Alabama’s history is provided with an emphasis on pivotal moments that structurally reinforced the public perception of a monolithic “Alabama identity,” often captured as The Heart of Dixie (Mohl 2002a, Rogers et al. 1994, Tullos 2011). This section will also draw attention to the ways in which residents from north Alabama “fit” into, and diverged from, the dominant racial history and narratives of Alabama identity. It will also briefly draw specific attention to Marshall County, the home of the City of Albertville. Relatedly, the chapter’s next section examines the changing post-Civil Rights era economic, political, and labor history with a focus on the emergence of poultry processing in Marshall County and north Alabama. The chapter closes with analysis of the recent political history that precipitated the 2010 election with particular attention paid to the ways in which the national political discourse infiltrated and influenced Alabama’s state and local electoral outcomes. The final section provides a brief summary of how these discursive forms, history and identity, informed and shaped the context that enabled swift passage of the strictest immigration bill in the country.

**Creating a Specific, Existing Context: Alabama Identities and Histories**

In Alabama, the confluence of internal and external political and cultural flows by 2010 resulted in a Republican supermajority in both Alabama statehouses and a Republican governor;
marking the first time the Republican Party controlled all state-level electoral politics in Alabama since Reconstruction. It is difficult to overstate how momentous this was in the political history of Alabama. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are dedicated to identifying the specific operations of power that enabled this historic political shift, but this chapter considers how the political, economic, and social histories of Alabama collectively resulted in a specific, existing, context for this discursive moment such that new power brokers emerged in Alabama’s circuits of power, generating discursive flows that garnered enormous political and popular support for their anti-immigrant rhetoric. The context of these narrative identities (e.g., “an Alabamian”) and regional histories created a foundation that enabled rapid and popular acceptance and political action on H.B. 56 in 2011, despite previously failed efforts to introduce anti-immigrant legislation and policy.

This chapter provides the foundational context that informs the 2010 political, cultural, and economic moment in Alabama. The relevant context, per Clegg, is critical to mobilizing the discursive flows that operationalize the circuits of power that in this case that led to the Alabama Immigration Law. Identity and history are far from the only relevant contextual elements within which the Alabama circuits of power are embedded. However, these concerns reveal new insights into the context informing the 2010 moment because of the ways in which they collectively shaped how Alabamians intrinsically understood (and misunderstood) themselves and one another. Understanding the different ways in which the racial, political, and cultural experiences of Alabamians affected 2010 is critical to answering the question, “Why Alabama?” Clegg’s model requires a deep contextualization both by the potential of cumulative, lived histories and identities embedded in the agents of power, and by emergent, exogenous factors. Subsequent chapters incorporate additional contextual elements that are reflected in the system integration circuit. These elements refined and changed the material outcomes of power through the deployment of facilitative power and the achievement of domination of the system. A summary of the factors in the specific, existing context presented in this chapter are included in Appendix E. Alabama’s Specific,
Existing Context (Chapter 3). Essentially, being “an Alabamian,” or perhaps, being understood as a particular kind of Alabamian matters in the state’s politics, and accounting for this meaning of identity is foundational to recognizing how power flows during immigration policy change in 2010.

A “Civil” Alabama History: The Founding (and Confounding) of an Alabama Identity from Civil War to Civil Rights

The threads of history and identity are simultaneously distinct and inseparable in terms of their effect on the deployment of power through the imaginary of north Alabama politics and social life. One Alabama identity is a historical narrative espoused, deployed, and popularized by white, elites, most typically by political officials, throughout the state’s two-century history and continues to be reified in its Sez You defiance and commensurate political rhetoric. To be sure, this particular identity echoes and is linked to Alabama’s embedded position as an important member of “The South.” Key documented how “The South” (defined as the eleven ex-confederate states) operated as a one party system, heavily reliant upon the politics of race into the 1940s; however, the prevailing party at the time was the Democrats (Key 1949). Since V.O. Key’s seminal publication, other scholars of southern politics have predicted, documented, and analyzed the history and strategies of the Republican ascendancy, and specifically with their interdependence with the politics of race; the most notorious of these being the Southern Strategy (Bass 1995, Black and Black 1989, Critchlow 2009, Phillips 1969). The second historical thread is one that reflects the ways in which the regional history of north Alabama created very different lived experiences being a citizen of the state. A monolithic telling of “an Alabama history” often overshadows the ways one in which the north Alabama’s historical experience diverged; this difference is further obscured by the white, elite, power-wielding residents of north Alabama who still proudly declare title to the monolithic “Alabama” identity. By considering how each claim informed the other in a particular identity formation, this chapter explores the roots of a particularized state-based identity claim and its
intersection with the specific history that ties poultry processing to northern Alabama counties and this region’s particular racial history of whiteness.

The monolithic identity reflects a history often told by elite Alabamians as a singular narrative conveyed as though this adequately captures the history and experience of all of the state’s residents from its Civil War past to a post-civil rights present. This redemption narrative features a history in which all previous racial and social divides, and all their associated repercussions, have mended. This chapter aims to understand how this state-level narrative intersects and departs from documented history and informs modern day Alabama identity claims. Interviews and contemporary evidence indicate that north Alabamians still make claims on the monolithic redemption narrative used to validate a particular Alabamian identity, despite the historical evidence.

The general “story” of Alabama by Alabamians loosely parallels the account provided by The Dictionary of American History and the Encyclopedia of Alabama (Stevens 2003). The earliest historical accounts recognize the removal of the Native American tribes from their home territory in Alabama. However, this is depicted as a brief and largely inconsequential part of the state’s history, but it does inform the identity narrative in its framing as “conquest,” not theft. This particular construction moves quickly into a celebration of Alabama’s founding in 1819 as an agricultural, proslavery state. This founding position is framed as a natural lead-in to the state’s emergent position as a strong states’ rights advocate that subsequently morphs, logically, into its role as a secessionist stronghold in “the Heart of Dixie” as a result of its anti-abolitionist position. This positions Alabama as a leader of other southern states for “southern causes” and enables Alabama leadership of the South into the Civil War, inextricably embedding Alabamians in identities as Southerners, while being uniquely Alabamian (Stevens 2003, Tullos 2011, Denman 1971, Bridges 2014). Following this Civil War legacy, Alabamians experienced continuous racial turmoil that ultimately shaped a particularly notorious Alabamian identity into the twentieth
century including its storied history as a member of the Jim Crow South and culminating in Alabamians’ rebellion to, recoiling from, and, ultimately, forced legal acquiescence to the U.S. Civil Rights Movement. This twentieth-century identity story concludes with a generalized notion that all Alabamians engaged in a full post-civil rights race reconciliation (Flynt 2008, Stevens 2003, Bridges 2014).

This historical narrative typifies the redemption story of elite, *white* Alabama. This particular historical narrative, though recognizable in the stories espoused by many Alabamians today, has been challenged and complicated by scholars at every turn. Scholars have steadily dismantled the notion of a monolithic Alabamian experience at each of the above historic junctures, while simultaneously explaining how Alabamians fit into the broader narrative of a Southern identity that sweeps across much of the post-reconstruction and Jim Crow South. In short, the historiography that has emerged in the post-civil rights era reveals a complicated picture of an elite Alabama populace that is at once united in its narrative of southern identity; yet deeply divided by its disparate regional histories of race and class (Bever 2012, Denman 1971, Feldman 2004, Flynt 2004, Jackson 2004, McWhorter 2001, Rogers et al. 1994, Thomson 2002, Tullos 2011).

Even in these critical scholarly works, historical “events” are acknowledged for their substantial impact on all Alabamians. With regard to structuring, reinforcing, and perpetuating identity claims associated with whiteness, few events were more critical than the creation and structure of the 1901 Alabama constitution and the legacy of George Wallace’s Alabama as symbols of the state’s on-going struggle for independence (and defiance). These “events” are pivotal in Alabama history and identity formation by fundamentally touching the lives of all Alabamians through altered power structures. Each of these events built the framework for, and the possibilities for how, the elite Alabamian identity was to be perpetuated. For these reasons, they merit a brief separate overview.
The 1901 Alabama Constitution

Alabama's constitution was ratified in 1901 and is the oldest and longest state constitution in the United States. As of June 2014, Alabama's constitution contained eighteen articles, 287 sections, and 799 amendments. Scholarship about the Alabama constitution incontrovertibly establishes that the Alabama constitution was intentionally crafted to embody the prevailing racist and classist ideology and to preserve power in the hands of Alabama’s white elite minority through the disfranchisement of black and poor people. Research on the Alabama constitution also seems to coalesce convincingly around two broad, interrelated premises. First, the racist and classist ontology of this document continues to structure Alabama politics at local and state levels to the detriment of democratic principles and therefore to the Alabama citizenry. Second, the 1901 constitution ensured power remained centralized in the hands of the legislature, particularly with regard to economic development (Flynt 2004, Jackson 2002, 2004, Rogers et al. 1994, Tullos 2011, Flynt 2002).

With regard to the first premise, the 1901 constitution prohibited “home rule” by Alabama’s localities making them beholden to state-level political interests when revenue needed to be raised, while simultaneously increasing the power of special interest lobbying groups. Alabama’s constitution is written such that Alabama localities are required have their ordinances addressed by the legislature. Wayne Flynt writes that this is perhaps “the greatest anomaly” of the 1901 constitution:

The state's motto, 'We Dare Defend Our Rights,' has been played out over a long history. Localism, devotion to community, states’ rights, antipathy to outsiders (especially self-righteous ones), resistance to external threats, and opposition to centralized authority – all these attributes inclined even the casual observer to predict that Alabamians would fiercely resist any attempt to infringe upon their capacity to govern themselves or to remove that power from them. Yet that is precisely what that 1901 constitution did. (2002, 42-43)

Through the passage of abundant amendments, Alabama's cities now have more discretion concerning their legislative and taxation actions, but counties and non-incorporated areas still
require action by the state legislature, which effectively hands the power of locally elected authorities to the county's state delegation. As a result, approximately fifty percent of each legislative session is spent providing amendments to address local legislation (Flynt 2002, 44). This convoluted process introduces a new level of politics resulting from this reallocation of local power to state legislators. The redistribution of power to the state increases the potential for influence by special interest groups. This became critically important to poultry processors in 2010 because their lobbying voice was marginalized in the relevant, political discursive flows (discussed in Chapters 4, 5, & 6). Importantly, Alabama legislators now do not possess the necessary time or resources to research adequately all the (local and state) issues facing them in their 30 legislative days a year.\(^5\) Over time, they have become heavily reliant on lobbyists from powerful interest groups to provide them with data, information, and often, draft legislation – as was the case with H.B. 56 – the Alabama immigration law. Essentially, the 1901 constitution centralized power in the statehouse, and the by-product has been a proliferation of special interest groups that collectively dominate Alabama's legislative agenda. By 2001, four lobbyists were dedicated to every one legislator, and these advocates play a critical role in facilitating Alabama's legislative process as a by-product of the structural constraints of the 1901 constitution (Flynt 2002, 45). According to comments by Joey Kennedy of The Birmingham News, and Sam Brooke and Mary Bauer of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), legislators are regularly provided pre-written legislation, the details of which are seldom fully read, as was reportedly the case in H.B.56.\(^6\)

The second premise scholars have investigated is the active role the 1901 constitution continues to have in legislating daily life of Alabamian localities, through its strong edicts regarding economic development. Constitutional examples that influence individual actions abound. For example, Amendment 756 is entitled " Enforcement of Traffic Laws in Shelby County," and states "In Shelby County, the Legislature, by local law, may provide for the enforcement of traffic laws on private roads in private gated communities in the county." However, Amendment 799 is entitled
“Amendment of Amendment 756” and states “In Shelby County, the Legislature, by local law, may provide for the enforcement of traffic laws on private roads in private gated communities and platted subdivisions with 35 or more existing houses whose roads are not public in the county.” This is illustrative of the kind of managerial overreach the legislature retains for managing the affairs of localities around Alabama and is just one of the challenges the 1901 constitution poses to luring business and industry to the state. The constitution is littered with examples where Alabama cities and counties have requested amendments to issue bonds, raise taxes for health or education, create inter-locality Economic Development Councils, collect special fees, build roads, more. In his work, The Aftermath of the 1901 Constitution, Wayne Flynt provides a clear connection between the decay of social goods (e.g., state infrastructure, education, etc.) resulting from the constitutional impediments to state funding, and the resultant challenges and self-inflicted wounds that have hampered efforts to attract industry and commerce to Alabama as legislators sought to pass new amendments necessary to keep up with competing states. There have been political efforts to reform, revise, and/or rewrite the 1901 constitution dating back to 1915 (Thomson 2002). All have failed. The Sez You state prevails.

This constitution creates certain unspoken understandings in daily life in Alabama. First, the presumption of central state rule is implicit. This is an interesting irony in a state whose populace prides itself on its self-perception of being rebellious and contrarian to centralized authorities – this is an important element in the construction of being an Alabamian. Relatedly, state legislators have disproportionate political power over the local. These same legislators may not have time to read the bills they are voting on creating opportunities for political vagary at the expense of localities expressed interests. Finally, the structure of this constitution implicitly contests the notion that local communities are capable of exercising effective political agency. Further, certain political voices – those with the interests or ears of state legislators – become
privileged, while others do not. These voices may come from within or outside of Alabama, as the case of H.B. 56 demonstrated.

**George Wallace’s Alabama**

It is hard to overestimate the importance of George Wallace for the state’s twentieth-century political imaginary as well as establishing legitimacy for the regime of whiteness among white, elite Alabamians. Dan Carter captures best ‘the meaning of George Wallace’ in the 1970s in his book *Politics of Rage*. When discussing Wallace’s 1972 Florida presidential primary victory, where he won 60% of the state’s nonblack voters, Carter says Wallace “understood and voiced the longing of millions of white middle-class and working-class voters for a stable world in which work was rewarded, laziness punished, and blacks knew their place, men headed the household, women were men’s loyal helpmates, and children were safe from vulgar language” (as quoted in Tullos 2011, 118). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, George Wallace embodied not just the institutional racism against blacks in Alabama (and the country) at that time, but also the social values of institutionalized whiteness. Wallace is recognized has having captured the political imagination of white Alabamians better than any other Alabama politician before or since and was the embodiment of the state’s racial trajectory in the mid-twentieth century (Flynt 2004, Jackson 2004, Tullos 2011).

The political tenure of George Wallace, though infamous for his inflammation of white Alabamian racism through his outspoken and engaged opposition to civil rights activism and desegregation, ironically began and ended with Wallace politically downplaying the importance of race in daily life. Wallace’s political career symbolized Alabamians’ complicated struggle with the on-going impact of desegregation, whiteness, and the civil rights movement (Jackson 2004). In the beginning of his political career, Wallace lost a primary race for Governor to his opponent, John Patterson, who won by accusing Wallace of being soft on race and therefore a danger to the values of Alabama. Wallace took this political lesson to heart, and he reportedly vowed he would never be
“outniggered” again (Tullos 2011, 112). Wallace was a master of astutely, if notoriously, gauging which political buttons would most accurately trigger the white Alabama imagination such that a vote for Wallace was equated as a vote for the protection of white supremacy in Alabama for all but six years7 from 1962 until the beginning of his last term in 1983. He publicly abdicated his role as the explosive crusader for white politics during his last term as governor from 1983-1987 (though he remained unapologetic for his 1960s segregationist actions) and instead turned to the rhetoric of a class-based populist for Alabamians, and this too created significant ripples in developing the elite Alabama identity. Although Wallace narrowly won this race by claiming much of the white vote, as well as a majority of the black vote, this election signaled the beginning of a political shift in Alabama’s electorate (Tullos 2011). The significance of the Wallace tenure in Alabama is that it traces not only the public racial turmoil of the state, but also the shifting tides of Alabama politics of whiteness. When George Wallace publicly abandoned his policy of white supremacy in Alabama in 1982, a position the Democratic National Party had embraced by 1972, Alabama’s electorate joined the U.S. South in a national political swing that took these one party states from Democrat to Republican (Bass 1995, Black and Black 1989, Phillips 1969). That is, “The GOP became the latest white people’s party” (Tullos 2011, 28). Republicans had been regularly winning southern states in national elections, but by 2011, the internal shift was complete in Alabama, and Republicans would hold supermajorities in both Alabama statehouses and claim the Governor’s seat. In 2010, Alabama’s One Party politics became wholly Republican.

“Belonging” in Alabama

Alabama history is a living presence among its residents. In my own travels, Alabama is the only state where I have witnessed such a clear connection between its residents and their particularized understanding of their history, in which they were both proud and well versed. In my interviews and conversations8 with some of Alabama’s “native-born,” generally white, middle class residents, a different kind of history emerged. These narratives sound much more like identity
stories where "Alabama" itself was revealed as a critical character in the lives of white Alabamians. This narrative identity shapes a particular, historically informed understanding of their world that connects belonging in Alabama, with being recognized as an Alabamian. Importantly, a claim to a particular Alabama identity is not the exclusive purview of white Alabamians (though it will be the focus of this work). As mapped by Allen Tullos in *Alabama Getaway: The Political Imaginary and the Heart of Dixie*, Alabama's African-American population has actively engaged in shaping a counter narrative of belonging. As stated by Tullos:

> Occupying a high moral ground (but not without occasional feet of clay), black Alabamians have shaped the political imaginary in sharp contrast with that of the Heart of Dixie [typified by a normative white Alabama], emphasizing economic justice and an end to poverty, democratic inclusiveness, affirmative action, education equity, prison reform, and claiming rights to health care, child care, and housing. (2011, 183)

The experience of Alabama history with its implicit requirements for belonging has radically different meanings for Alabama’s different racial and ethnic populations. However, there is at least one element present across these different identities: whiteness matters. Whiteness mattered in 2011, and histories reveal that it has mattered across time, space, region, and socioeconomic class, with repeated stories of how whiteness trumps other interests, including those of class or economic self-interest. The narratives shared in my interviews indicated that white Alabamians reflected a keen awareness of both their versions of state and regional histories, and a particular historical understanding that shapes their Alabamian identity and imbues meaning to the current world they inhabit. These (white) accounts are rich with detailed moments demonstrating the triumph of the independent spirit of Alabamians over its foes, and, of note, a favorite enemy is frequently the federal government (Tullos 2011). In fact, one of the strongest political arguments used to rally support for passage of H.B. 56 was that Alabama would do what the federal government refused to do – fix the broken immigration enforcement system (discussed in detail in Chapter 6). Overall, these accounts of “being an Alabamian” are deficient in the explicit detailing of the lingering impact of the racialized legacy of the U.S. South – a legacy that Alabama has been a key
player in throughout the twentieth-century. Joey Kennedy, a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist from the Birmingham News described one way in which Alabama’s racialized past shapes the contemporary social order. He has argued that the Alabama culture uses racial criteria to establish social pecking order. According to Kennedy, Alabamians say:

‘Yeah, you may be a poor white person but at least you’re not black.’ You know, ‘you aren’t that way.’ That truly is the rhetoric....that legacy lives, I mean it lives even today. There is always someone out there to tell you that no matter what is going on with you there is someone that is worse off than you. Maybe it is the gay, maybe it is the black, maybe it is the undocumented person, and that has been part of the political rhetoric here for most of the past 100 years.”

Often, contemporary accounts of Alabamian belonging weave a narrative identity with its redemption story with selective use of the state’s history, such that separating the two versions is virtually impossible in terms of their individual identity claim. This narrative is structurally reinforced by the memorialization of Alabama history. In much of Alabama, history is a visual spectacle. Even for a Virginian who grew up among Civil War battlefields, a walk through Montgomery, Alabama evoked a keen sense that its history is startlingly present here. In walking from the Capital Building to the Dexter Avenue King Memorial Baptist Church to the Civil Rights Memorial, the capital’s streets are laden with memorialized tributes to its celebrated and notorious racialized Southern past. Near the capital building on Goat Hill (Figure 3-1. State Capital Building in Montgomery, Alabama10) with its Greek-styled architecture that once served as the Capital of the Confederacy, there are multiple signs posted to convey a particular narrative. The signs serve as visual remembrances and suggest a redemptive history in which Alabama immediately began moving beyond the racialized commitments that underpinned its motivation to enter the Civil War (see Figure 3-2, Figure 3-3, & Figure 3-4). However, a two minute walk takes you approximately 100 years into the future and to the doorstep of Dexter Avenue King Memorial Baptist Church, the home church of Martin Luther King, Jr. Four minutes further and you encounter the Civil Rights Memorial (see Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6) located across the street from the SPLC. These later memorials provide visual contestation to the suggestion that continuous progress has been made
toward racial equanimity in Alabama. This presence of a living history was equally evident in my brief stay in Birmingham, Alabama. Both of these cities, Montgomery and Birmingham, provide modern day material echoes of the segregated South described by Grace Hale in her book, *Making Whiteness*. She argues that through southern cities’ use of spectacle, they connect to their racialized past through visual mileposts reminding, and in subtle ways reinforcing, a black/white racial order: an order that, until recently, did not include brown. This history of a dichotomous racial order matters for contemporary understanding of the Alabama immigration debate, and for translating the complexity facing white and black Alabamians who were suddenly confronted with Latino neighbors. Memorialized reinforcement of Alabama’s black/white racial order continues to be familiar terrain for the Alabamian imaginary, a terrain that renders the “otherness” of brown bodies illegible (Hale 2010).

**Figure 3-1. State Capital Building in Montgomery, Alabama. Author’s photo, 2015**
Figure 3-2. Photo Example of Memorialization of Civil War History in Montgomery. Author’s photo, 2015

Figure 3-3. A Nation Divided and the Alabama State Library. Author’s photo, 2015
Figure 3-4. Photo Example of Memorialization of Civil War History. Author’s photo, 2015

Figure 3-5. Civil Rights Memorial in Montgomery [Photograph], 2013. Retrieved from http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/Multimedia.jsp?id=m-3117. Used under fair use, 2015
However, the visual memory of Alabama’s civil rights past is not as clearly memorialized, nor as consistently experienced in all areas of the state. In particular, the cities and counties of north Alabama experienced both Civil War and Civil Rights history distinctly differently. Significantly different racial and socioeconomic demographics mark large cities in north versus south Alabama (with the latter within “the Black Belt”) Table 3-1. Geographic Comparison of Racial Demographics (Percent of Population), presents a comparative overview of the dominant racial demographics of Alabama to the United States, and these regions against two representative areas in Alabama, one from the Black Belt (Jefferson County, home of Birmingham) and one in north Alabama (Marshall County) to show change over time.
Table 3-1. Geographic Comparison of Racial Demographics (Percent of Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Alabama</th>
<th>Jefferson County</th>
<th>Marshall County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W^X</td>
<td>B^X</td>
<td>L/O^X</td>
<td>W^X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>64.3</td>
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<td>1940</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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<td>65.3</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<td>67.9</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
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<td>69.9</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
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<td>73.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>73.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>71.1^y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>72.4^y</td>
<td>12.6^y</td>
<td>16.3^y</td>
<td>68.5^y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

W = White; B = Black; L/O = Latino and Other L = Latino/a (This is encompassing the category of Hispanic used by the U.S. Census) Data for this table was compiled from multiples sources.11

^x Data for these cells were collected from: (Hobbs and Stoops 2002)

^y Data for these cells were collected from: U.S. Census Population, printed reports; Census population estimates historical data: http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html; U.S. Census Bureau 1990; U.S. Census Bureau: 2000 Census, 2010 Census.12

In north Alabama, “blackness” was present only through media representations and not through personal interactions, and Hale’s “whiteness” arguably existed in an even more robust form because it developed uncontested. Therefore, whiteness became invisible in its omnipresence. As reflected by the statistics above, the demographic trend continues into the twenty-first century. This state has been marked by a dichotomy of white and black bodies, with little experience with the new, growing presence of brown bodies. One impact of this racial history is the way in which race, as a measure of whiteness, became a coded factor in the language of Alabama’s immigration reform efforts. Sam Brooke from the SPLC (notably, Mr. Brooke is not from Alabama) provided this example of how race, as a measure of visibility, became coded into the language of immigration reform:

The legislators, of course, claim this was not a thing about race, there is no race here, it is all about immigration and yet when you talked to them and you listened to them in the debates they talked about ‘well we have this trailer park in our town that is a real problem and there are lot of undocumented immigrants there.’ Well how do you know they are undocumented? ‘Well, they’re all Latino.’13
This quote illustrates typical example of how the visible (i.e., racialized) requirements for Alabama belonging (as reflected in the enforcement criteria in the Alabama Immigration Law) were officially denied by Alabama power brokers. By implication, Alabama’s lawmakers implicitly asserted that under the law, Alabamians come in white and black bodies under the law, and by implication, brown bodies must not belong.

The demographics led to different twentieth century economic and social experiences between northern and southern Alabama areas although arguably they remained united by a shared political reality given the structure of Alabama politics. These long-term demographic divides can be traced to the settlement patterns of Alabama that resulted from the diversity of the Alabama’s physical geography. The topography of Alabama is so notably different that during discussions of establishing Alabama’s borders in 1817, one Alabama leader, John Williams Walker, supported a division of the state. Walker wanted to separate the Tennessee Valley and north Alabama from the Tombigbee Valley and South Alabama “with a view to preventing as far as might be, and collisions of interest between the upper and lower country” (as quoted in Rogers et al. 1994, 62). This pre-statehood concern translates into a sectionalism that “plague[d] Alabama throughout its history” (Rogers et al. 1994, 63). The sectional experiences of north versus south Alabama can be largely linked to these geographic differences. The geography translated into important differences for each region’s socioeconomic potential. Southern Alabama was host to the Black Belt featuring rich soil on flat land and connected to transportation waterways that ultimately served as host to the vast majority of Alabama’s plantation system and its critical labor pool: slaves. The plantation system created extreme wealth and state political power for a relatively small group of white, large landowners, while fueling the local economies where they were located. In these regions, black slaves constituted the majority population. South Alabama landowners, by virtue of their education and property, wielded substantial political power over the Democratic party14 of Alabama before and after the antebellum period. The legacy of this centralized, and corrupt, political power base
rooted in south Alabama has important consequences into the twentieth century for two reasons. First these power brokers shaped the state constitution in 1901, which ultimately fuels the Civil Rights battles in Alabama through the 1970s (Webb 2002, Jackson 2002, Rogers et al. 1994). Second, the legacy of corrupt politics and centralized state political power created a culture of politics that still informs Alabama politics today, both through political action and reaction (discussed in Chapter 6).

North Alabama, on the other hand, particularly the Hill Country (north central Alabama) is marked by rocky, mountainous terrain that is subject to significant erosion, and prior to the advent of modern agricultural techniques, they struggled to produce goods for Alabama’s largely agriculture-based economy. Further, pre-1900, the Hill Country was far from the waterways used for commerce and its associated economic marketplaces. These geographic characteristics resulted in lower land values, lower socioeconomic status for the region's farmers, and a significantly lower black population than in the neighboring counties to the south. Plantations in the Hill Country were rare, and most farmers were small, self-sufficient operations (i.e., using family labor) in this predominantly white region. This difference in economic prosperity likewise translated into a regional political ethos that echoed certain Jacksonian principles such as self-sufficiency and support of the “common man” (or the yeoman farmer) against the elites and elite structures. This ethos departed in real ways from the political sensibilities emerging in south Alabama and its elite structures (e.g., banking and unlimited slavery) (Webb 2002).

Evidence of this divide emerged over the issue of secession prior to the Civil War. Though most of Alabama ultimately united behind its membership in the Confederacy (Denman 1971, Long 1965), historians have since cited many instances of formal and informal resistance by individuals and groups from northern Alabama who formed assorted kinds of Union allegiances during the Civil War (Polites 2013, Rogers et al. 1994, Bever 2012). In point of fact, the political motivation and will for secession in Alabama is a source of significant historical debate. In any case, by the late
1800s, the divided politic in Alabama translated into “the Populist Revolt.” The Populist movement in Alabama was rooted in the Hill Country with some support from the Wiregrass region (located in southeastern Alabama), and this movement served as the first real challenge to the stronghold of Alabama Democrats from the south. Ultimately, the Populists are fully defeated largely because of the combined impacts of white demagoguery and corruption at the ballot box by the Black Belt landowners. This corruption reinforced the resentments that existed between north versus south Alabamians and fueled the political fires that led to the 1901 Constitution (Jackson 2002, Webb 2002).

This sectional and class history is relevant to illustrate the emerging and complex identity claims within Alabama and among Alabamians. Despite the differences noted above, strong ties bind the distinct regions of Alabama, many ties originating out of the Civil War. Identity claims that continue to unite Alabamians are the strong assertion of state’s rights over federal influence and the connected claim to a Southern identity as Alabamians (Jackson 2002, Rogers et al. 1994, Jackson 2004, Denman 1971). Despite north Alabamians objections to the economic and political privileging that slavery offered to large landowners, pre-Civil War north Alabamians were not supportive of President Lincoln’s commitment to the abolition of slavery. In fact, Alabamians were united in their support of the property tax paid by slaveholders and the racial hierarchy that slavery instituted. Without the income tax on the rich, north Alabamian residents would be called to make up the difference, and with their overall lower educational and economic status, political and economic opportunities for most north Alabamians were precarious at best. Additionally, given that north Alabama already had diminished political power, as affirmed by Kennedy’s earlier quote, there was a sense that reinforcing the racial hierarchy minimally guaranteed that whites would not fall to the bottom, or experience other potential social or political ramifications that full equality might bring (Hale 2010, Feldman 2004, Jackson 2004). These particular intersections with race and class are
indicative of how complicated the north Alabama region's political history has been with regard to its relationship to the rest of Alabama.

Despite attempts to differentiate themselves by race, the north Alabama populace has often found its interests bound to the class outcomes of Alabama's black population. An early, well-documented example of this complicated history began in the aftermath of the Civil War when the rich, white Alabama Democrats from southern Alabama (particularly the Black Belt) began the political maneuverings necessary to create the 1901 Constitution that would disfranchise blacks and poor white farmers through the implementation of literacy tests. Historians have provided a class-based analysis that suggests that, while race remained a divisive issue, many vocal white Alabamians, particularly from the Hill Country, mobilized and voted to prevent the 1901 constitutional convention in Alabama out of socioeconomic solidarity (Jackson 2002, 2004, Rogers et al. 1994, Stevens 2003). However, Glenn Feldman provides a convincing counter-analysis in The Disfranchisement Myth that argues the issue of race/racism swayed a majority of poor white Alabama voters far more than the argument of common economic interest. Indeed, the majority of poor white North Alabama men voted to have the convention; a decision that would ultimately rebound and take their own franchise rights (Feldman 2004). Importantly, this moment reflects a repeated pattern in the Alabama identity claim – to vote ideology over economic self-interest. As this case suggests, affirming existing race and social status trumps economic interests. In Alabama, the “Sez You” state, the prevailing ideology consistently has had an implicit, or frequently explicit, claim to its investments in whiteness.

A comparison of Birmingham's steep economic decline from the 1950s-1970s to Huntsville's boom (a north Alabama city) provides a more contemporary example of how regions of Alabama experienced the intersection of race and economy differently. Birmingham's decline has been attributed to the confluence of its full throttled engagement in racial conflict curing the Civil Rights Era, while arguably being inattentive to a massive loss of jobs in the manufacturing and
mining industries of the region. Meanwhile, Huntsville, Alabama (a smaller city located 190 miles north of Montgomery), thrived economically because of its strategic expansion into the “high tech sector” through engineering and the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center while simultaneously “eschew[ing] racial conflict” (Flynt 2008). However, this does not mean that the regions of north Alabama did not have the same racist sentiments that pervaded the rest of Alabama in the 1970s. For instance, north Alabama citizens were active participants in contributing to the overwhelming statewide majorities George Wallace commanded in his multiple gubernatorial runs from 1963-1967, 1971-1979, and 1983-1987 (Tullos 2011). As discussed earlier, Wallace was the contemporary embodiment of institutionalized whiteness and the entire landscape of Alabama conservatism.

Though north Alabama residents may have shared the racist sentiment loudly espoused in other areas of the state, the public expression of these racialized attitudes did not typically create the same kinds of racialized experiences (e.g., racial conflict) in north Alabama counties. Simply put, since its founding, northern Alabama has never been a locale where a significant Black population resided because the agricultural labor demand, (i.e., extensive plantation system,) never existed here. Therefore, these counties never experienced significant levels of lived, localized challenges to the normative assumptions of whiteness that have infused social life in other Alabama regions. White residents of north Alabama did not witness an “everyday” challenge to its accepted racial hierarchy in their communities. Instead, they experienced the contestations of race and its psychological consequences from afar through broadly shared culture and politics. This distinct historical, economic, and racial trajectory, a trajectory defined by whiteness, has consequence in understanding the recent collision in north Alabama with its new experience as a destination in the *Nuevo South* – where white meets Latino, often for the first time, in a place where few people of any other color typically have made their home.

Though Birmingham was renowned as a site of the 1960s civil rights struggle and is only ninety minutes south of Albertville, the drive from Birmingham to Albertville evokes a full sensory shift. The visual shift is evocative of a different sense of place, and yet, casual conversations with people in Albertville reveal that making a claim on the identity-laden “Alabama history” remains just as important here as it is elsewhere in the state. Alabama’s Civil War and Civil Rights history make the clearest identity claims on the imaginations of white Alabamians across the state. In Marshall County generally, and Albertville specifically, this history contextualizes its intersection with Alabama’s recent economic and labor history: particularly since the arrival of poultry processing to the state.

Just as the “aberrant” demographics of whiteness in the Hill Country created a different economy and lived experience during the Civil War and Civil Rights Movement, a new demographic aberrance has again changed the social and cultural experience of many north Alabama counties – the arrival of a critical mass of Latino immigrants into rural Alabama locales. These shifts can be traced to two legislative changes in the 1980s that impacted the existing patterns of labor migration. The first was the 1986 federal immigration reform: the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). IRCA was the last federal comprehensive immigration reform legislation passed by the federal government. IRCA offered amnesty to three million undocumented immigrants (mostly from Mexico and Central America) and was intended to stop the flow of future undocumented workers. Practically speaking, this enabled a new mobility for this labor force by allowing immigrants currently in the U.S. to freely search for employment opportunities across state lines. Additionally, these immigrants could now bring family members to the United States from their
home countries. The second significant shock to the patterns of migration came in 1994 with the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Despite assurances by U.S. politicians that NAFTA would not increase transnational labor flows, NAFTA undermined Mexican manufacturing and agriculture to such an extent that the incentive to migrate into the U.S. was increased as Mexican workers sought greater opportunity for economic security (Berry 2011b, Mohl 2007, Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003). These policy changes and concurrent global and U.S. economic shifts, such as the significant increase in industrialized employers moving to the U.S. South for its accessible non-union, inexpensive labor pools, jointly created fundamental social and economic structural changes such that the faces of small southern towns and cities across the U.S. South were quite literally changed (Sims 2009). Immigrant labor found its way into new destinations across the U.S. South, including locations in northern Alabama, such as the City of Albertville, where a black face had been relatively rare, and a brown face unheard of just a few years earlier (Mohl 2007).

The arrival of Latino labor to Albertville was not a random coincidence. Albertville was designated by the Alabama legislature as the first site of commercial poultry processing in North Alabama in the years following World War II and has since become the home for several vertically integrated poultry processing complexes (Conner 2008). The specific history of the arrival of poultry processing complexes will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4; however, it is relevant here that when the federal structure shifted immigrant labor’s migratory patterns, the existing poultry processing plants in north Alabama became a natural economic “lure” for Latino labor. To be sure, employers trying to meet their need for inexpensive labor explicitly cultivated this lure. The arrival of a Latino labor pool created both real and imagined challenges to Albertville residents, and the poultry processing plants are often the source of blame for the arrival of their new Latino neighbors. Chapter 4 and 5 examines this assertion in detail. In 2009, The Birmingham News ran a feature article on the arrival of the Latino community to Albertville directly “blam[ing] the poultry
plants, major employers in Marshall County," reporting "the often-repeated tale around town – no one knows if it is true -- is that one company planted a sign at the U.S.-Mexico border: 'Need a job? Come to Boaz,' a city that neighbors Albertville." In this article, they feature interviews with longtime, white residents who wax nostalgic about the Albertville of 20 years ago with bucolic memories of a virtually crimeless city that contrasts with so much concern for crime that one resident "now owns three guns" (Stock 2009). Though the poultry processing plants existed in Marshall County well before the influx of Latino labor, the connection by its white residents of immigrant labor to its local poultry processing industry is an important point to note in the shifting power terrain that ultimately leads to Alabama's immigration law.

Albertville is a prototype of the kind of new destinations created across the U.S. South. Albertville is a small city of approximately 21,000. Notably, Albertville's Latino-origin population is approximately 27.9%; an atypical demographic compared to 3.9% in all of Alabama (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). However, this is increasingly typical of small southern towns that have become rural "new destinations," also known as the Nuevo South, across Alabama and the U.S. South (Massey 2008, Smith and Winders 2008). Also, Albertville has been, and continues to be, a predominantly white community. As is typical of many north Alabama locales, the percent of Black residents in Albertville is significantly less than is represented by total state population (see Table 3-2. Albertville versus Alabama Racial Profile 2000 & 2010). However, Alabama has seen the number of persons of Hispanic origin rise exponentially. Between the 1980 and 2000 censuses the reported number of residents of Hispanic origin more than doubled from 34,000 (1980) to 76,000 (2000) (Mohl 2007).

As noted in Table 3-2, by 2000, persons of Hispanic origin still only accounted for 1.71% of Alabama's total population. In contrast, Albertville experienced both a significant rate of change as well as dramatic increase in the proportion of residents of Hispanic origin. In this small city, this demographic shift has been a palpable and uncomfortable change for Albertville's residents (Stock
The cultural transformation is evident in the proliferation of Hispanic shops, bilingual signs, and visually diverse people that populate Main Street just a block from the City Hall and other city administration buildings (See Figure 3-7. Welcome to Albertville). Albertville's community is the archetype that typifies the statement: "Dixie is experiencing a demographic and cultural transformation" (Mohl 2002b, 14). With its population at almost one-third Latino, this distinctive racial/ethnic profile is aberrant for Alabama as a state, yet increasingly typical in certain locations across the U.S. South. Though Albertville is demographically atypical, many of the residents I spoke to still lay claims to Alabama's grand identity narrative with its historical and cultural commitments to state’s rights and the associated protection of whiteness. The friction created between this cultural transformation and the Alabama white identity is one of the significant factors influencing why this small, “aberrant” place became a nationally recognized anti-immigration hub in 2011.

Table 3-2. Albertville versus Alabama Racial Profile 2000 & 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Profile</th>
<th>Albertville 2000</th>
<th>Alabama 2000</th>
<th>Albertville 2010</th>
<th>Alabama 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White persons not Hispanic</td>
<td>80.7%</td>
<td>71.12%</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons of Hispanic or Latino origin*</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>1.71%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black persons</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>25.99%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Albertville is the largest city in Marshall County\(^{15}\) and its population grew 19.6% between 1990-2000 and 24.75% between 2000-2010 (2012a, City-data.com 2012, U.S. Census Bureau 2000c, 2012), dwarfing the overall state population increase of 7.5% between 2000-2010 (U.S. Census Bureau 2010b). As of 2010, 21% of Albertville’s population speaks a language other than English at home (versus only 4.4% in Alabama overall). 22.4% of Albertville residents are at or below the poverty level and have a lower median age (32.3 years) as compared to the broader state median (40.9 years). Only 13.1% of residents go on to earn a Bachelor’s degree or higher (below the Alabama state average of 21.5%) and only 66.3% of the Albertville population earn a high school degree or equivalent (U.S. Census Bureau 2010b).
The picture emerges of an Albertville community at the lower end of the education spectrum while situated within a state, as noted earlier, that is notably deficient in education, economic prosperity, and health measures according to national rankings. Two points are key in considering how these changes create a collision between the white narrative identity of Alabama and the lived experience of the local community. First, the rapidity of this change was remarkable. Alabama went from being a state with one of the lowest rates of growth in immigration in 1990 to one of the highest by 2010. Although the absolute number of the Hispanic population in Alabama is much smaller than other reception states, Alabama “ranks fifth in the rate of immigrant growth among all states this [2000-2010] decade” (Sims 2009). Second, in small communities like Albertville, the rapid increase in the presence of immigrant workers and their families had an immediate impact on communal social, cultural, and economic systems such as schools, neighborhoods, medical systems, and workplaces. The sudden, increased burden on these systems created tensions within Albertville’s community as they struggled to create the necessary community capacity to accommodate the needs of their rapidly growing population and to adapt to an emerging Albertville characterized by unprecedented diversity and language barriers. For example, an emergency town hall meeting was necessary in 2009 to address the rising community tensions that emerged after the city council voted to remove taco trucks from Albertville’s main road. The Latino community argued the vote was discriminatory, and the white community defended the decision as “aesthetic.” At this same time, the Latino enrollment was only 27 students short of overtaking the white enrollment at Albertville’s public kindergarten (Sims 2009, Stock 2009).

Taken together, these factors sketch a picture where the white community of Albertville has experienced noticeable local population growth with simultaneous cultural transformation over the past twenty years, among a population arguably ill-equipped to adapt to demographic changes that threaten their cultural (e.g., ubiquitous presence of spoken Spanish language in the community)
and socioeconomic stability (e.g., competition for jobs and services). A manifestation of the reaction to these changes was the political visibility and outspokenness of Albertville’s local and state representatives at the state-level in their call for immigration “reform” and enforcement in Alabama by the mid-2000s (2011a, Green and Haven 2011, Haven 2011d, b, Liorente 2011). In the weeks preceding and following the law’s implementation, quotes from local and state level Alabama politicians appeared in national news outlets such as the BBC, U.S. News and World Report, NPR, and The Washington Post (Gallacher 2011, Lyman 2011, Elliot 2011a, Constable 2011). In the BBC report, a local Albertville City councilman, Nathan Broadhurst was quoted; "It’s a local movement to put increasing pressure on the federal government." In the same article, GOP Alabama Representative Micky Hammon (representing parts of two north Alabama counties) was quoted as saying, "This is a jobs-creation bill for Americans,'" and "We really want to prevent illegal immigrants from coming to Alabama and to prevent those who are here from putting down roots.” (Gallacher 2011) These examples are illustrative of a discursive framework that transformed immigration reform in Alabama into a project that protects a variety of borders – borders of whiteness, borders of economic precarity, borders of state versus federal dominion, borders of rural, southern identity – the borders protecting the white identity of the heart of Dixie.

**Conclusion: After “Civil” History...**

In addition to these demographic challenges to identity in north Alabama, there were two concurrent shifts in the Alabama landscape that were largely compatible with the white Alabama identity, yet created unanticipated challenges to the local political and social order of whiteness that had prevailed since the state’s founding. As referenced earlier, recent political history reveals a dramatic shift in Alabama state politics over the two decades. In the last decade, Alabama’s shift rightward was also supported by a national shift toward the Republican Party, most keenly represented in the power of the Tea Party movement in the late 2000s. Further, the influence of national organizations on state and local level conservative politics in Alabama echoes the findings
presented by Skocpol and Williamson in their recent book *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism* (2012). This connection will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6; however, these cumulative impacts were clearly reflected in Alabama politics in 2010 when the Alabama GOP won supermajorities in both state houses and all the top elected positions for executive branch since for the first time in Alabama history.

Simultaneous to the steady march toward new GOP political power holders, the 2008 recession that rocked the United States also took a significant economic toll on the already struggling Alabama populace. One of the political reactions to this real economic threat took form in the political rhetoric that propagandized the Alabama Immigration Law as a jobs bill. As a “jobs bill,” the racial profiling inherent in this law’s operation effectively allowed visual identification of who should be allowed to work (i.e., those who looked like Alabamians), and this was particularly evident in places like Albertville who have both an identity defined by whiteness and a demographic that has shifted as an immigrant new destination in the U.S. South. The shock and discomfort from Albertville’s local cultural transformation entered a historical, political, and social moment ripe to receive this legislation, which was designed to again define the rightful place of whiteness in Alabama.

Taken together, these more recent histories (social, economic, and political) complicate the historical narrative that dominates the white Alabama identity claim, particularly in north Alabama and specifically in Albertville, and sheds light on how Alabama became the state with the most “mean-spirited” immigration law in the United States. The narrative Alabama identity is bound up in historic construction of whiteness that, in the counties of north Alabama, connected to the white Alabama identity narrative by an imagined, not a lived, experience of communities with significant racial difference. When migratory patterns shifted, immigrant labor began to fill the labor demands of poultry processing. Latino labor became neighbors with native Albertvillians. In Chapter 5 I discuss in detail how the cultural, social, and economic shocks experienced in the local (Albertville)
reverberated from Albertville politicians, to north Alabama legislators who were also receiving input from national Republican figures while being fed from the Tea Party trough. For the first time in this region’s history, the previously uncontested identity claims of Alabamian whiteness were contested in everyday life through the presence of Latino labor; people who then made their homes in these Alabama spaces and challenged the assumptions of who belongs in Alabama.

So, "Why Alabama?” Why did Alabama expend the extensive political, legal, and financial resources necessary to pass, implement, and defend the nation’s toughest immigration law? As this chapter argued, at least part of the answer is revealed by critically examining the repercussions of the narrative identity claims of being “An Alabamian” during a particular historical moment of changing political tides and economic turmoil, while centering analysis on a particular Alabama region experiencing challenges to whiteness for the first time.

1 For the purposes of this paper, “elite” Alabamians references the group of people within the state who potentially have both voice and influence over matters of the state and/or local concerns directly and/or indirectly. In almost all historical moments in Alabama, this group has been white, land owning and/or middle-class or above, and predominantly male. My differentiation of the elite class of Alabamians from other Alabamians is generally made across racial and socioeconomic lines and the disproportionate power accorded to this group in both local and state-decision making. The existence of this elite power class across time has been affirmed by other research (Bass 1995, Black and Black 1989, Key 1949).

2 Specifically, I am referencing examples cited by Allen Tullos. For example, in 1982, one-third of black voters supported George Wallace’s primary victory over another Democratic candidate who was endorsed by the presumed powerbrokers of the Alabama black vote, such as Joe Reed and the Alabama Democratic Conference and an endorsement by Coretta Scott King (119). In 1990, the support by a surprisingly significant number of black voters, and the significantly low turnout of the majority of black voters, led to the re-election of Republican Governor Guy Hunt’s despite Hunt’s dismal track record on many social and economic issues, especially those accorded to race (130). In both cases, it is worth noting that Alabama’s economic and political climate greatly influenced black voter turnout and support in both races. Wallace appealed to economic solidarity for all struggling Alabamians, and Hunt capitalized on growing political animus toward Joe Reed and Paul Hubert (2011). In other words, the black voters of this time may have been voting for what they perceived as the lesser of two evils in both elections, and not an active support of the political ideology of the candidate.

3 North Alabama is a geographic reference used often in the Alabama scholarship, yet it is rarely clearly defined in the literature. Therefore, I consulted Mr. Bob Smith, Assistant Director of Business Development at the Alabama Department of Commerce and Mr. Matt Arnold, President

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and CEO of the Marshall County Economic Development Council. Both individuals (separately) confirmed that north Alabama is generally considered to be the 13 counties served by Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for power. I use this definition for this paper. Though the historical references to north Alabama predate the arrival of TVA, suggesting it likely was a cultural reference long before this economic definition, north Alabama references are generally pointing to somewhere within this 13 county boundary, and Marshall County, my focus, is consistently included in the north Alabama region. The 13 counties are (from west to east): Lauderdale, Colbert, Franklin, Lawrence, Winston, Limestone, Morgan, Cullman, Madison, Marshall, Jackson, Dekalb, and Cherokee.

4 To put this document in some relative perspective, the Constitution of Virginia first passed in 1776 and has been revised six times, including in 1902, and most recently revised in 1971. It has twelve articles, 204 sections, and 48 amendments. The Constitution of the United States of America, ratified in 1788, has seven articles, and twenty-seven amendments.

5 As noted by the official website of the Alabama legislature. The Alabama Legislature may not meet more than 50 legislative days within a 105 calendar-day period (sectorallegislature.state.al.us/).


7 Lurleen Wallace, George Wallace’s wife, held one of these gubernatorial terms before Alabama changed its law such that Governors could succeed themselves. Lurleen Wallace died in office before her term expired (Tullos 2011).

8 My discussions with residents about identity in Alabama largely address the historical experiences of white Alabamians. Importantly, my interviews and conversations were with a small cross-section of the population, who were representative of traditional power brokers in Alabama. My interviews were predominantly with white, middle class (or above) businessmen. Three of my interviews were with business women both active and retired (two white women and one Latina), and my informal conversations with random members of the community were more frequently with women, including more Latinas. While in Alabama, I did not converse with any African American residents, either formally or informally. This absence is not unexpected in a study focused on a community within northern Alabama given its historic demographic profile (predominantly white).


10 All pictures in this chapter were taken by the author unless otherwise noted.

11 Data for this table was compiled from multiple sources and because the methods for collection of racial demographic data has changed over the past century, not all data here may not precisely represent the exact same designation from decade to decade. However, every effort has been made to ensure that, for comparative purposes, the data is sufficiently similar to support the broad comparisons made in this study. The footnotes in the table are intended to note these differences. When making a city-by-city comparison between the 2000 and 2010 census, the racial demographics of Birmingham, Alabama (the largest city in Jefferson County and in Alabama overall), as compared to Albertville (the largest city in Marshall County, but a very small city in comparison) reveal strikingly different populations. Birmingham city total population has been
declining since 1960, while Birmingham urbanized and metro area population continued to increase. These data are provided in order to make a city-to-city comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Birmingham</th>
<th>Albertville</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SECTORAL</td>
<td>SECTORAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>35.07</td>
<td>62.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for this table were drawn from: U.S. Census Population, printed reports; Census population estimates historical data: [http://sectoral.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html](http://sectoral.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html); U.S. Census Bureau: 2000 Census, 2010 Census.

12 This data was provided by Ms. Viktoria Riiman, Research Associate at the Center for Business and Economic Research at the University of Alabama (2015).
14 The Democratic Party was the dominant ruling party in Alabama for most of the two centuries the state’s existence.
15 According to the 2010 Census, Marshall County was 12.1% Hispanic and 1.6% Black (U.S. Census Bureau 2010a). Other population centers in the city are Arab, Boaz, and Guntersville.
Chapter 4. Losing Track of $15.1 Billion: Alabama’s Love/Hate Relationship with the Poultry Industry

...Business was remarkably ineffectual and not loud. And we regularly got calls from business people saying, ‘This is terrible, what can you do?’ And we would be like, ‘What? Are you kidding us? You’re the businesses - are you kidding us?!’

~Mary Bauer, Legal Director of Southern Poverty Law Center in 2011

I used to say we [Marshall County] made everything from chicken parts to space shuttle parts because at one time we did. Like I said, we just don’t do that because the space shuttle isn’t flying any more. [There is] extreme diversity in our industry, in manufacturing, but it all started in the poultry industry.

~Matt Arnold, President and CEO
Marshall County Economic Development Council

In Alabama, poultry matters. After all, the state’s poultry industry can tout an impressive list of economic achievements. Alabama is the third largest broiler (broiler = young chicken) producing state in a nation where the consumption of poultry has skyrocketed in recent decades, and the poultry and egg industry generates more than $15 billion a year for the Alabama economy. In 2013, poultry was the number one commodity in Alabama earning 60% of all agricultural revenue in a state where agriculture already accounts for more than 20% of the state’s jobs and more than 40% of Alabama’s $174 billion economy (Fuller 2012, Auburn University Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology et al. 2013, Ernst 2014, Striffler 2005). The poultry industry employs over 86,000 people in the state, often in rural outreaches where other employment options are limited. Furthermore, approximately one-third of the state’s counties rely to some degree on economic activities connected to the poultry industry. When juxtaposed against Alabama’s Department of Commerce proud claim of having “one of the top five business climates in the country,” poultry is clearly a success story for Alabama and is a business that matters (2014c, Alabama Department of Commerce 2013a, AP&EA 2014). At least, it seems like it should matter.

Despite this statistical picture of clear and important economic impact, the labor concerns of the poultry industry seemed to carry little sway with state politicians in the 2010-2011 Alabama immigration debate over H.B. 56. According to Ray Hilburn, Membership Director of the Alabama Department of Commerce
Poultry & Egg Association (AP&EA), the poultry industry anticipated a significant reaction by the Latino laborers populating its plants, and AP&EA voiced its objections to the proposed statute.

Hilburn emphatically explained:

Oh yeah, we knew that was what was going to happen. You think about if you were in a foreign country, and they were passing some kind of law. You would want to get out of there. I don’t care if you knew you were legal...So, that is what we warned them against. We [the poultry industry] do everything [the Alabama government] want us to do. We e-verify these employees. We take taxes out on them and all that. But, we knew that was coming, and we did; we lost good, legal workers because they were just intimidated by this law.¹

With the benefit of hindsight, it is quite remarkable how little influence the voices of Alabama’s business representatives had with Alabama’s politicians in regard to a piece of legislation anticipated to directly affect the labor supply of an important Alabama industry. This is especially perplexing when accounting for Alabama as an eager, “business-friendly” state operating within the prevailing, national discourse of “Republicans are good for business,” and in which the GOP had just attained supermajorities and the Governor’s mansion. Specifically, a peculiar question lingered in the aftermath of the passage and implementation of the 2011 Alabama Immigration Law: Given its economic significance to Alabama, why did the labor concerns of the poultry industry seem to matter so little (in terms of effective power and influence) in achieving state-level political ends to shape the final immigration law?

This chapter addresses this contradiction and finds that answers to it are bound up with the fragmentation of the poultry industry’s identity across Alabama’s economic and social spheres. The impact of this splintered identity translates into diminished political representation by key power brokers in Alabama. My research suggests that the poultry industry is structurally fractured within the state’s economic classification system resulting in divides concerning social distinctions, roles, reputation, and status. This fragmentation complicates political representation of the poultry industry at the state level by enabling poultry processing, as an industry, to fall into fissures within Alabama’s collective business voice thereby diminishing the influence it wields within obligatory
passage points throughout Alabama’s circuits of power. As this situation demonstrates, aggregate economic statistics alone do not speak to all the information relevant to understanding why a powerful economic engine such as Alabama’s poultry industry can or cannot influence state politics on particular issues. Importantly, the economic statistics do not capture the nature of the work, perceptions of those people who actually perform the work, or where the work of poultry processing is done. Nor do statistics reflect the strategic direction of a state’s economic development plans or how Alabamians regard certain types of businesses versus other types of firms. Finally, statistics cannot explain how certain industries attain more, or more effective, political representation than others. The passage of the 2011 Alabama Immigration Law given the explicit concerns of the poultry industry belies assumptions that connect economic clout to immediate political influence within a state. Examination of the microcosms of the Alabama economy provides insight explaining how a “disconnection” between an industry’s economic value and its resulting political influence can occur.

Most of the poultry industry operates in and provides disproportionate and choice economic benefits to the rural areas of Alabama. However, the relationship between the poultry industry and rural Alabama is complicated, to say the least. Given that the economic contribution of the poultry industry is concentrated in some of the most rural and poor areas of Alabama, a significant economic disruption in the poultry industry could quickly devastate entire communities. Buried within this economic argument is a reality of a changed geography of race in many of these same communities. Small cities like Albertville, Alabama, located in Marshall County (the third largest broiler producer in Alabama), experienced a rapid increase in its Latino (or Hispanic) population, growing from 16.1% in 2000 to 27.9% in 2010, far outpacing the Latino and Hispanic population of the state at large (U.S. Census Bureau 2000b, 2012). A simple articulation of a mutually beneficial economic relationship is insufficient to explain why communities, like Albertville, have reacted negatively to their local poultry industry, and it certainly does not answer
the larger question of why the labor concerns of poultry processing complexes in rural, north Alabama locales went unheeded in the 2011 political context. If anything, this economic information complicates the question since the Alabama Immigration Law clearly seemed poised to affect the poultry industry, and by association, select (relatively) economically-stable rural populations negatively. With this predictable, looming impact on a lucrative, state-wide industry, one might have expected an outcry from the local communities against the immigration plank of the Handshake with Alabama GOP platform, but this was assuredly not the case. In fact, it was quite to the contrary and speaks to the social fragmentation of poultry’s identity at the state and local levels, as these inevitably intersect and inform one another.

This chapter focuses on why the labor concerns of the poultry industry, as an important economic actor, did not garner more influence with Alabama’s state level power brokers. The next chapter extends the analysis by examining the issue through local perspectives on immigration, community, and the poultry industry in Albertville, Alabama. In this chapter, I demonstrate how three important discursive forms both enabled and limited the influence of the poultry industry in the state’s immigration debate: the economic classification of the poultry industry within the Alabama business environment; the legacy of poultry processing’s reputation within the state, and the assumptions of key power brokers who were explicitly tasked to represent the political interest of poultry in the circuits of power. Collectively, these three factors begin the process of sense-making of the (in)effectiveness of political representation for the poultry industry in state level political decision-making. Ultimately, poultry processors were unable to protect their immigrant employees from undue harassment, despite their corporate commitments to employee protection as suggested by corporate values and social responsibility statements published in websites, press releases, and in corporate annual reports (such as in 2009, 2012b, Tyson Foods 2014). The findings of this chapter calls into question the implicit assumption that an industry important to a state economy, like poultry, has a privileged position from which to advocate for its own self-interest,
particularly when its self-interest intersects with powerful social and spatial claims related to who belongs and where within Alabamian geographies. Essentially, this chapter seeks to reveal how the economic, social, and political fragmentation of the poultry industry created consequences for a particular group of free market actors – specifically, Alabama’s poultry processors.

This chapter begins the process of mapping the intersections and disruptions connecting state and local circuits of power for poultry processors as economic and political actors in Alabama. This exercise will be expanded through an examination of Albertville, Alabama in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 completes the circuits by analyzing specifically the workings of state-level Alabama immigration politics in 2010-2011. These chapters rely on the insights into the state’s history and identity claims discussed in Chapter 3 in order to piece together the contemporary puzzle that is Alabama.

**Context, Power Brokers, and Alabama’s Economy**

This chapter will examine the ways in which economic power brokers representing the interests of the poultry industry were structurally marginalized in Alabama’s economic network thereby shaping their influence in the circuits of power (as adapted and discussed in Chapter 1) in 2010-2011. To this end, this chapter deepens understanding of the specific, existing context by describing the role of the poultry industry in the Alabama economy, as well as by presenting a brief social history of poultry processing as an embedded actor in Alabama’s rural locales. This context has implications for the exercise of power by Alabama’s power brokers in the 21st century. As will be explained here, the power brokers for Alabama’s poultry industry were indeed active and present in state-level obligatory passage points (OPPs) intended to influence H.B. 56; however, these voices were disciplined in the episodic nodes and agentic power from power brokers representing political and social spheres overpowered the voice of poultry.

Recalling the contextual and episodic nature of Clegg’s deployment of power is particularly useful in this analysis. Clegg insisted that power is not omnipresent, but rather episodic, and
further, power is contingent on the constitution of social relations within a particular context (Clegg 1989a). As will be demonstrated here, in 2010, Alabama’s poultry industry was embedded in a local and state social and political network within which poultry processing actors were no longer relationally constituted to effect political change on behalf of their Latino labor. Further, this shift in social relations was a relatively new phenomenon that can be linked to an accumulation of divisions of the identity of the poultry industry among multiple publics. The myriad ways in which this fragmentation occurred effectively shifted actors in the poultry industry from a position in the 1950s that was privileged in the obligatory passage points (OPPs) connecting the economic and political networks, to a position in 2010 that essentially ignored the expressed concerns of those same actors. At one time, poultry complexes³ were economically and politically sought after entities for rural Alabama communities. Now, the social relations between these complexes and Alabama’s rural communities have degraded for reasons to be discussed in this chapter such that the outcry from these regions has changed the operation of power in the political landscape for poultry processors.

Poultry companies once exercised facilitative and dispositional power in Alabama because of the opportunities they were believed to offer struggling Alabama farmers. Confounding contemporary deployments of power is the official discursive structure of Alabama’s economy with regard to poultry processing. As this chapter demonstrates, the discursive position of poultry within Alabama’s economic community, its reputation in small communities as a social actor, and its fragmented political voice now inhibit poultry processors from effectively expressing public self-interest, particularly with regard to their Latino employees. As a result of this context and discursive landscape, Alabama’s poultry processors were poorly positioned with regard to the H.B. 56 debate and were both ineffectual and often absent from the most critical OPPs. When present, those representing poultry’s interests did not possess sufficient agentic power to change the
contemporary status quo. The analysis offered in this chapter is visually depicted in the Circuit of Power model in Appendix F. Poultry Processing within Alabama’s Circuit of Power (Chapter 4).

The Clucking in Alabama’s Economic Engine

The cultural and social connection among the rural communities of Alabama and the poultry industry is clearly complicated, and this complexity spills into the relationship between the poultry industry and the Alabama economy. In my research, I thought I was asking two simple questions that would have straightforward answers: “What are the most important sectors in Alabama’s economy?” and “What is the importance of poultry processing to Alabama’s overall economic picture?” As it turns out, the answer is not so simple. The problem quickly became “finding” the poultry industry in the first place. Delineating who belongs in what economic sector immediately emerged as the first issue of contention; an issue evidently commonly faced by other agricultural-production businesses. Poultry is an industry that fits in multiple economic paradigms. Is it an Agri-business? Yes. Is it a manufacturing business? Yes. Is it a food products industry? Yes. Is it a high technology business? Yes. Is it an agricultural industry? Partly. Is it the kind of high tech business Alabama wants to attract? No. These economic characterizations reflect cultural contestations about where poultry processing fits within the interlocking puzzle of power, politics, and Alabama culture. These conceptual challenges make it difficult to ascertain where and how poultry is measured within Alabama's economic landscape in order to determine its fiscal importance to the total economic pie. The cultural tensions even become an issue in estimating the industry’s monetized value, as well as in ascertaining the more nebulous measure of how important poultry processing is perceived to be by Alabama’s power brokers. In the economic network, power brokers matter in that they ultimately frame the economic discourse presented to lawmakers, and therefore the sectoral classifications for the Alabama economy. In other words, multiple human players embedded in different local contexts - from local chicken farmers and politicians to state-level business people and giant corporations such as Tyson Foods all conceptualize poultry
processing differently as an economic entity. As this section will demonstrate, the conceptual framing and placement of poultry processing in the Alabama economy matter because they impact how poultry processing’s economic impact is measured and whose voice was perceived as representing the poultry industry to political decision makers across the state.

Interestingly, despite its lengthy history as an agrarian economy (Shell 2013), Alabamian politicians and business representatives seem reticent to claim agriculture-related production as an important economic driver. When acknowledged, it appears almost as an afterthought, and consistently after first referring to industry from Alabama’s burgeoning high-tech research or manufacturing sectors. One is left with the distinct impression that Alabama’s power brokers (economic and political) consider agriculture to be an industry of Alabama’s past, not of its future. For example, I asked someone familiar with state-level politics and business lobbying about where to “put” the poultry processing industry in the Alabama economic picture, and in so doing I mentioned that Alabama Poultry and Egg Association (AP&EA) placed it in Agriculture Sector. The response was:

Hmm...Because that is interesting...I mean I would classify that as a manufacturer like you said, but I do see how it could be tied into [the agriculture sector]...Yeah, the agri-business, agriculture, you know it still has...it is probably one of the largest sectors of Alabama. I know there is data out there on that as well. You know, most people don’t realize this, that are not from here, [but] Alabama produces 850,000 automobiles annually.4

This quotation is illustrative of two key points. First, the question of how to categorize poultry is always in play. Second, this comment is typical of the kind of re-direction I observed in conversation and in other public sources that shifts away from the discussion of the importance of agriculture-related business and toward the smaller, but growing, “high tech” and “clean” manufacturing industries of Alabama such as automotive and aerospace.

One contributing factor to this contradiction is the challenge of delineating who thinks what industry belongs in which of Alabama’s economic sectors. Poultry processing poses multiple challenges to sectoral classification as a vertically integrated, food production industry. A variety of
formal and informal discursive traditions offer different naming structures of the Alabama economy. These structures inhibit the creation of a clear-cut, common organizational understanding of Alabama’s economy. Briefly, I consider the economic constructs drawing from three sources emanating from two different, significant, Alabama entities. The first is The University of Alabama’s (UA) Center for Business and Economic Research’s (CBER) annual Economic Outlook. The other two sources are published by the Alabama Department of Commerce (ADOC); its official website and its 2012 strategic planning report. Data from these sources is compared in Table 4-1: Competing Discursive Structures Framing the Alabama Economy. Both of these organizations were mentioned during the course of this research in news reports (Carter 2012) and referenced in conversation by interviewees.5

Each year, CBER projects Alabama’s economic well being through its econometric model, and each January, publishes an Economic Outlook report. This report is an internal analysis of select economic indicators, primarily employment and GDP, drawn from its own collected data as well as an analysis of national data sources. This data is then used to make an economic forecast for the next fiscal year. The organizing principle of this report is consistent from year to year and its topic headings are organized by "Major Sectors of the Alabama Economy" (see Column 1 of Table 4-1). The intention of the CBER report is to help Alabama attract new business and inform existing business strategies by anticipating the Alabama economic climate for the coming year.

The ADOC is another influential agency, particularly in Alabama's business and economic development community, and frames the understanding of Alabama's existing business climate for the purposes of attracting and expanding business opportunities within the state. In 2012, the ADOC released a report to the public entitled “Strategic Economic Development Plan” (SEDP). This report delineated twelve “Target Industries.” These became the basis around which the ADOC now organizes its efforts to attract, maintain, and develop the Alabama business community. They constitute the framework that organizes its webpage information. Table 4-1 lists the “Target
Industries” in the order of their appearance in both the Department of Commerce’s public report (Column 2) and on its website (Column 3).

**Table 4-1: Competing Discursive Structures Framing the Alabama Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CBER¹</th>
<th>Accelerate Alabama: Strategic Economic Development Plan (SEDP)¹</th>
<th>Alabama Department of Commerce Website (ADOC)²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>Advanced Manufacturing: Aerospace/Defense Automotive</td>
<td>Aerospace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondurable Goods*</td>
<td><em>Agricultural Products/ Food Production</em> Steel/Metal</td>
<td>Automotive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable Goods</td>
<td><em>Forestry Products</em></td>
<td>Bioscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td><em>Forest Products</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td></td>
<td>Metal Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Rental and Leasing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Business Services</td>
<td>Technology Biosciences Information Technology Enabling Technologies</td>
<td>Information Technology Chemicals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational and Health Services</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Food Products</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure and Hospitality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources and Mining</td>
<td>Distribution/Logistics</td>
<td>Enabling Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, Warehousing, and Public Utilities</td>
<td>Corporate Operations</td>
<td>Corporate Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cyber Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Services, Forestry, and Fisheries and Farming*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: (Addy et al. 2012, Boyette Strategic Advisers 2012, 2014c)

1 All categories are listed in the order they appear in their original documents.
2 In full screen, these categories appear as a 4x3 table and are listed here as though reading left to right.

The bolded and italicized titles in Table 4-1 indicate where some portion of Alabama's agribusiness is located. The different stages of the poultry processing industry are located within these cognitive categories. CBER breaks the vertically-integrated poultry processing industry into different component parts. Essentially, all processes beginning from the point a chicken enters a plant to become meat or meat products are positioned within the Nondurable Goods manufacturing category. All steps prior to that point (e.g., contract poultry farmers) are organized into the separate sector of Agricultural Services, Forestry, and Fisheries and Farming. However, the ‘Target Industries’ of ADOC treats agricultural-related businesses significantly differently. In the SEDP and
on its website, the Commerce Department separates ‘Forestry’ and ‘Forest Products’ from ‘Food Products,’ and on the ADOC website (arguably the most public face of the department), the separate identification of ‘Agricultural Products’ disappears entirely, and the entirety of the poultry processing complex is bundled as ‘Food Products.’ This classification scheme essentially erases the rhetorical connection of agriculture (and therefore farmers) to the Alabama economy. Even in the CBER scheme, the category explicitly encompassing Agricultural production is listed last despite the economic magnitude of these combined industries. CBER cites no reason for this ordering, and the CBER scheme closely mirrors the coding structure used by the national Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) for the poultry industry; one code agriculturally focused and another manufacturing focused. (2014f). Although no explicit rationale for this ordering is cited, it is notable that this thinking mirrors the conceptual priority system that interview respondents seemed to hold, with highest economic priority typically given to high-tech industries engaged in “clean” manufacturing. Most importantly, this comparison clearly demonstrates the way the poultry industry is publicly fragmented across multiple economic classifications of agriculture, manufacturing, and food production.

Marking how the classification scheme characterizes the poultry industry is significant because these schemes represent very different conceptualizations of Alabama’s economy. Fragmentation changes how economic impact or projection is reported, as well as which power brokers assume political responsibility for an industry’s interests. As will be discussed in the last section of this chapter, power brokers representing the political interests of “agriculture” are different from those that represent the political interests of Alabama’s “manufacturers,” and this has consequences for representation. For instance, the Business Council of Alabama (BCA) represents poultry processors as part of Alabama’s manufacturers, but BCA does not represent poultry farmers because they are an agricultural business, and therefore another association’s concern. With regard to an industry’s economic argument (i.e., how much does it contribute to a
particular economic sector), consider this example. This statement is prominent on the homepage of the AP&EA: “Poultry in Alabama generates more than $15 billion in revenue each year. It accounts for an astounding 65.6% of annual farming revenues and employs more than 86,000 workers on farms, processing plants, and in allied industries” (2014). However, to reach this number, AP&EA uses all components of the poultry complex in its calculation and does not deconstruct the vertical integration strategy that characterizes the poultry processing industry. However, the ADOC Food Products Industry webpage buries the economic contributions of the vertically-integrated poultry processing industry by dividing it into two reported categories, making a specific dollar attribution to this industry difficult to identify (2014b, 2014a). By fragmenting the industry's total economic impact, the argument for the economic importance of poultry to the Alabama's overall economy is discursively diminished, although the aggregate financial reality remains the same.

The discursive diminishment of the poultry processing industry's economic influence in the state divides the agricultural industry into partitions. As represented in Table 4-1, agriculture appears to be a marginalized industry in the eyes of economic power brokers in Alabama. Though agriculture-related business should logically be listed first (or near first) using common measures such as alphabetization or economic impact on the state, it is instead buried within subcategories (i.e., nondurable good in CBER), or falls at the end of the lists. A review of the public language used by state officials in official reports and public statements also leaves the distinct impression that the clean, high technology industries of Aerospace and Automotive are currently “king” in Alabama's economic hierarchy. Regardless of the current realities represented in its economic outlook and impact, Alabama’s long agricultural history reads like a footnote to be discursively left behind.

Despite clear economic value to the state and local levels of Alabama, the poultry processing industry is located deeply between the discursive cracks that frame the Alabama agricultural and manufacturing sectors by being buried in “either,” “or,” and “both” of these sectors across all three
frames described in Table 4-1. When economic versus agricultural actors are asked directly about the role of poultry processing in the state and local economies, (as reflected in the literature, reports, and interviews) they consistently provide a convoluted response reflecting these discursive disparities (2013a, 2014d, Addy et al. 2012, Alabama Department of Commerce 2013b, 2014c, a, Auburn University Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology et al. 2013, Crew and Runge 2000, Kavilanz 2012, National Association of Manufacturers 2014). The evidence concerning this contradiction is presented in the following sections.

**Finding Poultry Processing in Alabama’s Agricultural Sector and Economy**

Poultry processing seems to be an industry *claimed* by multiple economic sectors because of its economic value to the state, but at the same time, rarely *named* for its contribution. As described earlier, the agricultural sector is an important contributor to the Alabama economic engine. As cited in the ADOC SEDP, agricultural-related industries, especially when including forestry, provide an important stable base to the overall Alabama economy. In addition, a report issued in 2013 by Auburn University’s Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology demonstrated that agricultural-related business continues to expand and invest across Alabama, generated $70.4 billion in annual economic output for the state, and employs one of every 4.6 Alabamians (Boyette Strategic Advisers 2012, Auburn University Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology et al. 2013). In response to this 2013 data, John McMillan, commissioner of the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries, is quoted as saying, “This study clearly indicates that agriculture, forestry, and agribusiness are the backbone of Alabama’s economy, amounting to some 40% of the state’s $175 billion gross domestic product” (Alabama Department of Commerce 2013b). Despite its clear economic relevance, non-agriculture power brokers in the state rarely tout a singular agriculture-related industry (except Forestry), and this complicates the power networks within which poultry processing is enmeshed. It also raises questions: Why? Why is the narrative importance of agriculture on the wane in Alabama, while its economic importance clearly remains
salient? More specifically, what is it about Alabama's poultry industry that creates a narrative aversion for its potential power brokers?

Part of the answers to these questions lays in Alabama's longstanding and well-documented ties to agriculture, in addition to the poultry industry’s twenty-first century reputation issues to be discussed later in this chapter. The contemporary importance of land to this region (and to the state of Alabama) is reinforced by the presence of Auburn University in Lee County, a land-grant university that anchors this eastern Alabama city and cultivates many of the state's future farmers and agriculturalists. A day at Auburn University brings to the fore the importance of agriculture to Alabama’s present and future. Though a comprehensive university offering more than 140 degree options (Auburn University 2014), the investment in research and technology for all of Alabama’s agricultural industries is a lifeblood of Auburn University, especially when taking into consideration its state-wide support of agriculture-related industry through its cooperative units connecting farmers, agricultural businesses, and cutting-edge research and technological support it offers across the state (ACES 2014). Auburn makes clear the importance of agribusiness to Alabama, and specifically the importance of the poultry industry.

Auburn University’s faculty and staff at Alabama Cooperative and Extension Service (ACES) develop cutting edge agricultural research in cooperation with Alabama A&M University, as well as Alabama’s farmers and agri-business representatives, to support and expand agricultural investment across the state. Furthermore, there is an entire unit dedicated to Poultry Sciences, where they are proud to tout the importance of agriculture to the economic health of Alabama and the critical contribution that poultry adds. Simply stated, the importance of Alabama’s agricultural scene is “huge” according to one poultry scientist. Furthermore, this same scientist emphasized that within agriculture, “$0.60 out of each Ag dollar is poultry... [the poultry industry is] huge from that that standpoint. Maybe bigger than forestry.” On this point it is worth noting that based on Table 4-1, poultry is never categorized separately, though forestry is; therefore, there must be reasons
other than contemporary economic import dictating the prioritization. However, this same expert acknowledged the challenges with capturing a self-contained economic category for many agricultural products. Specifically, this scientist said, “The problem of assessing each Ag sector is where do you stop?...How do you count a cut down log - $25? As a 4x4 or 6x6, [that same log becomes a] $15/board. Ten boards, and you get to $150...Same thing with chicken. To calculate value of a live chicken at market age...$0.50 a pound or whatever, and then by the time you process it and add value, now it’s $3-4 a pound.” Measuring the economic starts and stops of agriculture’s contribution hobbles efforts to establish a clearly delineated conceptualization for where certain agri-businesses “fit” in existing economic sectors.

Answering the important question of which Alabama economic sector gets to claim the added economic value produced during each step of the process that transforms an egg into a chicken and then into a “food product” is at the heart of the confusion in placing the poultry processing industry into a single economic sector. This question matters because access to power and influence within Alabama is directly connected to which organization(s) represents your political and, by implication, economic interests. Though there are official channels for political representation such as professional associations, multiple conversations with Alabama business people (informal chats and interview) referenced the unofficial system whereby a business actor's access to political power in Alabama occurs through an acknowledged system of closed-door meetings and/or backroom conversations between sanctioned political players. All sanctioned political players (a.k.a. Alabama's power brokers) are representing the interests of a recognized group of stakeholders (e.g., Alabama Farmers Federation is an acknowledged voice for Alabama farmers). The confusion regarding the classification of the poultry industry has significant ramifications with regard to who represents their business' voice: thereby affecting access and exercise of power in pursuit of its self-interests. For instance, when the BCA represents all of
Alabama’s manufacturers to state lawmakers, the specific labor interests of poultry processing would necessarily be subsumed in the broader category.

**Poultry Processing: Claimed, but Never Named**

The poultry processing industry has been an important part of Alabama’s post World War II economic growth. In 1940, Alabama farms produced 1.7% of the 106 million broilers produced in the United States (Shell 2013). As of 2012, Alabama produces one billion broilers each year. “For a state of 4.5 million population, it’s really remarkable,” states one poultry scientist.⁹ In total, Alabama is widely acclaimed as the second or third largest broiler producing state in the United States.¹⁰ Before specifically discussing the strange invisibility of poultry processing in the discourse of Alabama’s economy, consider the key characteristics of poultry processing that make it hard to categorize. As referenced earlier, part of the confusion is connected to the vertical integration strategies deployed by all major poultry processing corporations in Alabama (as well as across the United States). Research by Helen Marrow, Steve Striffler, Christopher Leonard and others document the strategies and operations of the vertical integration structures that define poultry processing across the country (Marrow 2011, Striffler 2005, Leonard 2014, Shell 2013). Their descriptions of the poultry processing industry’s vertical integration approach were echoed in my interviews with experts from Auburn’s Cooperative Extension office, the AP&EA, the Alabama Farmers Federation (Alfa), and the Marshall County Economic Development Council. Furthermore, a relatively small number of integrators dominate the market and are heavily interdependent upon other allied businesses, such as animal feed and pharmaceuticals (2013c).

The following description of the typical contract grower relationship with an integrator comes from the University of Georgia’s extension website:

The broiler industry is rapidly changing and highly technical. It is ‘vertically’ integrated, meaning that all or most production aspects are owned and controlled by an individual company called an ‘integrator.’ Integrators usually own the breeder flocks, hatcheries, feed mills and processing plants and contract out the growing and egg production flocks to farmers. The integrator provides a contract producer with
the chicks, feed, medication and technical advisors to supervise farm production. Under this system, the company retains ownership of the birds and expects producers to grow their flocks under very specific management programs. (UGA Extension 2014)

Across Alabama, there are an estimated 19 poultry complexes, and each of these is vertically integrated. Essentially, vertical integration in the poultry industry translates into one company controlling every process, idea, and resource necessary to turn a fertilized chicken egg into a chicken broiler (or some other chicken-based food product). As described by one of Auburn’s poultry scientists,

Each [poultry] complex is an independent production unit. They hatch their own chicks. They make their own feed. They have their own production farms, and they have their processing plants so each complex will have a complex manager that...reports to corporate. We [Alabama] have one or two Tyson complexes, four to five Wayne Farms complexes, and they [all] report back to their corporate headquarters.

As recently explored by Christopher Leonard, the one link in this strategy not wholly owned by the integrator is that of the “contract grower” (2014). The “grower” is the only cog in this wheel that is generally recognized as a farmer. A grower is connected to a poultry complex by contract and is often a self-proclaimed “Chicken Farmer.” The grower is provided chicks and feed by a corporation (the integrator), and the farmer provides housing and chicken maintenance to a quality standard as dictated by the integrator. Multinational food corporations headquartered outside of north Alabama (e.g., Tyson Foods, Wayne Farms, Pilgrim’s Pride, etc.) own all the major Alabama poultry complexes. Growers contract with one of these food corporations, which require the farmer to take a chick (that they provide), and then grow that chicken over the next 48-50 days into a six and a half pound bird.

Within this complex, only the poultry farmers are consistently discursively located within Alabama’s agricultural sector, despite being embedded actors within a larger poultry complex. The success of the entirety of the poultry complex depends on the health of an animal grown by farmers, and both of whom, animal and farmer, are (in a contractual sense) owned by the integrators. The
agricultural-rootedness of the farmer within the corporate landscape is a fundamental complication in conceptualizing poultry processing clearly as a manufacturing sector industry separate from agriculture. Another fundamental, conceptual complication is the very nature of poultry “manufacturing.” A live animal (agriculture) enters the plant, and through a variety of technological and human interventions, this animal is transformed into meat (product). As demonstrated here, the vertical integration strategy that defines the poultry complex and generates massive efficiencies for the corporations, also creates the confusion that economically locates poultry processors in rural agricultural locales, inextricably connected to agricultural products through advanced manufacturing technology.

The comprehensive nature of the vertical integration strategy of poultry complexes, as well as their geographic locations in the most rural areas of Alabama, obscures the economic contributions of the poultry industry to the Alabama public. This effect is to dislocate the operations of growers from poultry processors, and this is reflected in the political narrative of state legislators. Poultry occupies landscapes and spatial territories that are different economically, geographically, and racially from industrialized, urbanized areas of Alabama. The differences are so stark that in many ways, a poultry processing plant in Albertville may well be unintelligible as a manufacturing operation to the Hyundai Motor manufacturing plant managers in Montgomery, Alabama. Guy Hall, Director of the Dairy, Pork, and Poultry Divisions of Alfa, shared the following illustration:

The auto plants? They are looking at, as best as I can understand, you look at where they are...they are around the Tuscaloosa/Birmingham corridor, then you have one outside of Birmingham towards Lincoln, then you have the Hyundai here south of Montgomery. They are locating near these larger cities that have a population...have a school system, that have enough people, skilled people, that they can draw into those plants. And, the skill level still has to be high in the poultry plant, but [it is] usually lower paying jobs, and...one thing you have to realize also, I mean, Albertville, Boaz, are not big cities. The poultry industry and the agricultural industry always boost your rural economy.

I will give you an example. Where I come from is Bullet County. It is a lowly densely populated county, probably 10,000 to 12,000 people and is shrinking. Over the last
30 years, 70% of the cropland has gone into pine tree production. And the whole county wasn’t row cropping, but 50 years ago, you had a lot of small farms growing cotton, corn, and peanuts, and running cattle, and they had a few hogs and all that. So, basically 70% of the agriculture has shrunk down. Well, no more feed store, no more local store. These agriculture industries feed the rural economy. When they go away so does the rural county because everybody moves to the city.

If you will go to, you know, that part of Alabama up there, Albertville, Boaz...you need to go. My God, along that road there is a poultry plant and three car dealerships...and all these restaurants. The money that comes from paying those workers buys cars, pays for food, builds houses...that is, some of the most densely populated rural areas in the United States...up around what they call ‘Sand Mountain.’ And it is the same way down in some of the places like Enterprise and Dothan and Troy where processors are...really boost the economy down there. That farmer out there, you know, he is getting his feed and his chickens from the plant, but all of those workers are buying cars, so the farmer...he has tractors and bush-hogs and some stuff...he is going to the tractor dealership and buying parts, he is going to the poultry house equipment store and buying parts for his poultry house. He is buying the feed and seed and chemicals at the local feed store, the co-op. It is a multiplying effect so that is why the poultry industry is so important to these rural communities.14

This example illustrates another important characteristic of the poultry industry that has implications for power and voice at the state-level – poultry processing is almost always located in rural areas of a state, and many of the benefits of this thriving industrial base feeds smaller populations and microeconomies within the state. As noted by Hall, these benefits help sustain communities that have few other options, though the demand for labor for poultry jobs also attracted immigrant labor to these same communities. Hall’s conclusions about the role of poultry processing on Alabama’s rural communities in northern Alabama appear to hold true when triangulated against data on rural poverty in the United States reported by the United Stated Department of Agriculture (USDA), other interview data, and data from the 2010 U.S. Census. In particular, the USDA’s Economic Research Service provides data maps reflecting the U.S. Census reporting growing populations in Marshall County (home of both Albertville and Boaz), even after the 2008 recession, from April 2010-July 2012. Marshall County is coded in blue on the map in Figure 4-1 and the superimposed, black arrow indicates its general location. Perhaps more to Hall’s point, Marshall County in north Alabama has not experienced dramatic changes in poverty levels.
over the last decade as compared to other rural areas, even when considering the effects of the 2008 recession (See Figure 4-2). Though Marshall County, and Albertville within it, is not an affluent region (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 5), it does not suffer from extreme, persistent poverty as measured by the USDA. This economic outcome is in contrast to higher, more persistent, poverty measures in western and southern Alabama, as well as across other, predominantly rural regions in the southern U.S., as shown in Figure 4-3.
Hall’s point becomes evident by superimposing the location of fifteen of the largest poultry processing operations in Alabama over the USDA map of persistent poverty (Figure 4-4). Figure 4-4 illustrates that persistent poverty, with one exception, does not exist in counties with a concentration of poultry operations. Further, it illustrates that poultry complexes tend to locate in rural locales. Though some counties are labeled as “Metro” versus “Nonmetro,” a Metro designation does not necessarily suggest that the specific location of a poultry plant is in an urban area. The USDA differentiates between metro versus nonmetro counties in the following way:

Metro areas include all counties containing one or more urbanized areas: high-density urban areas containing 50,000 people or more; metro areas also include outlying counties that are economically tied to the central counties, as measured by the share of workers commuting on a daily basis to the central counties. Nonmetro counties are outside the boundaries of metro areas and have no cities with 50,000
residents or more. (from http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/rural-poverty-well-being/geography-of-poverty.aspx)

One example of how a metro designation may or may not mean a population of 50,000 people near the poultry processing operation is one Tyson facility located in Blount County, a metro county. The Tyson’s facility is located in the city of Blountsville, population 1,703 (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). By considering these sets of data together, the connection between the location of poultry complexes in rural Alabama locales and the absence of persistent poverty is suggestive of Hall’s idea that the poultry complex provides a stabilizing economic infrastructure often unavailable to other rural locales.

Recognizing the real economic significance of poultry to the rural economy complicates the question of why the political interests of poultry do not carry more weight within the state. However, it is equally clear that outside of the business communities of Alabama, Alabamians remain relatively ignorant of the economic significance of poultry to rural economies. Part of the reason the poultry industry’s importance goes unrecognized may stem from the fact that it receives very little financial support from local and state governments. The “culture” of the poultry industry is to fly beneath the public radar; this is a marked difference in contrast to other high investment industries often demanding corporate welfare packages before agreeing to locate in a state. When asked whether the poultry industry receives the same level of attention or even “respect” that other Alabama industries receive, Ray Hilburn, AP&EA Membership Director, was clear:

No, people don’t know that we are big. When you tell people that we are going to build a poultry farm...When you tell these people that one guy is going to build 4 houses, that is going to be a $1.5 million investment, and again they use local utilities, electricity, propane gas, water and all that and it puts that back in the local economy...[but] if you were having an [different] industry to come in and say I am going to invest $1.5 million in a small little county, and I am going to employ 10-12 people? They [local governments] would be falling over their back trying to help them. They would pave the road out there; they would do all the infrastructure. We have never asked for that help in poultry. We make it on our own [my emphasis]. But, that is why I want the local people to understand, your county commissioners, the representatives, the senators, what this means is that we are self-sufficient. We don’t get any help from the government when we have a bad crop or whatever or we have a bad flock of chickens like cotton farmers and corn farmers and cattle
people do. That is fine, we don’t want that help. We want to be able to make it, but sometimes we do need some help. Or, at least [have] people to recognize how important we are to the local economy.\textsuperscript{15}

Figure 4-4. Alabama’s Persistent Poverty and Large Poultry Complexes (Map outline and county names retrieved from http://www.waterproofpaper.com/printable-maps/alabama.shtml, 2014) Public, 2015

Blue numbers indicate quantity and approximate location of 19 major poultry processing companies in Alabama. Represented are Tyson Foods (2), Koch Foods (4), Wayne Farms (7), Alatrade (2), and Pilgrim's Pride (4) in Alabama.

* This poultry processing plant was not opened by Wayne’s Farms until 2012.

The county blocks outlined in heavy blue lines above are those counties identified by the USDA with persistent poverty experienced over three decades.
Alabama is a state often cited as the first to open the floodgates for other states to compete though ever increasing subsidized financing of corporate industry. To attract the Mercedes-Benz facility in 1997, “Alabama offered Mercedes-Benz a package valued at more than the cost of the plant itself.” Among the incentives offered, “the state promised to buy the site for $30 million and lease it to Mercedes for $100” while nearby areas contributed an additional $5 million each, and Alabama provided a “package of tax breaks valued at more than $300 million, which will, among other things, allow the plant to be paid for with money that would have been paid to the state” (Zaretsky 2014). This high profile corporate welfare bid won Alabama the facility, and Mercedes-Benz continues to be lauded as a proud feather in the Alabama economic cap. However, the poultry industry with its long history of economic investment and financial independence within Alabama is received as a far different local business proposition for many reasons, but not the least of these seem to harken back to both its reputation and economic classification in Alabama. It is worth noting the irony of Alabama’s full embrace of corporate welfare recipients given their history of fierce rhetoric defending their independence as a state actor and rejection of taxation to serve the interests of public welfare (see Chapter 3). At the same time, this position exemplifies Alabamian’s commitment to the prevailing neoliberal imperative to enable corporate investment at almost any cost. That is, unless it is for poultry.

In sum, the economic impact of the poultry industry in Alabama is substantial to both the state and local economies in Alabama. However, a clear articulation of the economic importance of poultry processing to Alabama is obscured in part by the complicated classification system deployed by other state actors, but also from the dubious, historical reputation of the poultry industry, both real and imagined, that is complicated by the contemporary rural geographies of race that inform the perception of the general population. The shaping and impact of this reputation is the topic to be explored next.
Named, but Not Claimed: The Reputation and Visibility of Poultry Processing Across Alabama

For all the economic “good” that the poultry industry provides the state of Alabama, very few people outside those involved with it explicitly tout its economic contributions. Part of this silence can be attributed to the vast array of activities that characterize a vertically-integrated industry. Despite the many different types of businesses within the larger poultry industry, the poultry processing operation is typically the public face for poultry because of its high employment numbers and presence of large (occasionally smelly) physical plants. This public face is problematic. Poultry processing plants are a source of contention in many Alabama locales resulting from the fragmentation of the social roles among community members inside and outside of them.

Two contemporary issues emerge in connection with poultry processing plants: the nature of the work there and who performs it. Turning a live animal into a consumer product is physically hard and dirty work often conducted under difficult and dangerous circumstances (Striffler 2005, Schwartzman 2013, National Council of La Raza 2012, Katz 1996, Fritzsche 2013). Additionally, the identity of those who perform this kind of work in the United States poultry industry has shifted in recent decades. According to a 2012 report by the National Council of La Raza, Latinos, documented and undocumented, hold 34% of all animal slaughtering and processing jobs in the United States. Within this frame, “Cutting and Trimming” accounts for about 25%, and, as of 2011, Alabama employed the most cutters and trimmers (12,090) in the nation (2012). Assuming these employment proportions apply in Alabama, this immigration law had the potential to affect the lives of, at minimum, a quarter to a third of the workers in the state’s poultry processing industry. Individual interviews in Albertville suggest that the percentage was actually closer to 50% or more.16 References to poultry processing conjure up connections to shifting local demographics that have become contentious in some communities.
Members of Alabama’s business community do reference the contributions of the poultry industry when specifically probed, but poultry processors are often received with scorn by the small communities who live with the plants in their midst. The plants are blamed for a litany of ills including heavy tractor-trailer traffic on local roads, unsavory smells that permeate the surrounding area, and, not least of all, attracting a large Latino population into traditionally white neighborhoods and schools. Alabama State Senator Scofield (R-Marshall County) is also a poultry farmer, and he highlighted the perceptual connection between increasing immigrant populations and the poultry industry when he said: “I had several legislators, Democrats, Republicans, black, white, male, female come to my office and talk to me about it because I provided a very interesting perspective of, ‘hey, I’m from the industry that purportedly is the cause and root of this [immigrant issue].’” Interestingly, the poultry industry has not always been received with such a conflicted response in Alabama, and this shift in attitude is an important consideration in recognizing how and where integrators wield power and influence in the state.

At one time in Alabama’s history, poultry processing was hailed as the shining hope for family farms. Beginning in the 1950s, the state’s agricultural economy, once a bastion for cotton crops, struggled under the confluence of changing federal law and incentives for agriculture, over-farmed soil, increased competition, and shifting farming technologies (Shell 2013). In “Leaving the Farm to Save the Farm: The Poultry Industry and the Problem of Public Work, 1950-1970,” Monica R. Gisolfi details how corporate poultry farming was initially regarded as an opportunity to save family farms in upcountry Georgia, and this story mirrors the experience of many other agricultural states like Alabama. In order to make ends meet, many farming families entered this capital-intensive, high-technology version of poultry farming lured by potential year-round employment and income that would level out the seasonal fluctuations inherent to an agricultural economy (Gisolfi 2009, Maloney 2011). Alabama farmers adopted a new business model that integrated poultry farming to keep their farms afloat. However, this approach ultimately required farmers,
over time, to relinquish ownership of their poultry in favor of “leased” chickens provided by integrators. Once a corporate poultry player established a network of growers in a region, poultry processing plants were built. These processing facilities offered further employment opportunities to the community. In recalling the experience of Marshall county in Alabama, and of his own family, Senator Scofield described the allure of poultry processing:

You had small farms dotted all over the place, not big farms, but small little farms, and they would raise a patch of cotton. They had some corn. They’d have 40 acres, and they would just get by. Well, if I’m an integrator, and I’m thinking, ‘h’mm, where’s a good place to expand our operation?’ I’m not going to look at an area that has, you know, big farms and is sparsely populated; I want 40 acres, 60 acres, 80 acres, 100 acres, 20 acres, 40 acres...with a lot of people around there. I will come in and sit the plant down; I’ll build this plant, and I’ll go to this 40 acre farmer and say, ‘I’ll tell you what, if you will take out a loan to build two chicken houses I can promise you ‘x’ amount a year.’ So [the farmer replies], ‘You mean, I can stay on my farm, and I can guarantee $40,000 a year raising chickens?’ [The integrator says,] ‘That is what I’m telling you.’ [The farmer says,] ‘Where do I sign?!’ Then, [the integrator] goes to the next fellow...You can’t just plop a plant down and [have] it work. We farmers are the ones that make that [processing] plant happen, dotted all over the place. And these small little Sand Mountain, Brindley Mountain, Lookout Mountain farms dotted all over the place was just constant. It was perfect for them [the integrators], and they knew that.18

In fact, Albertville, located in Marshall County, was the first north Alabama location designated by the Alabama legislature to receive a commercial poultry processing plant (Tyson’s) post-World War II, setting the stage for Albertville to become a hub for Alabama’s poultry-related enterprise for the rest of the twentieth century (Conner 2008). As illustrated by the example from Senator Scofield, the arrival of poultry complexes in small, economically struggling, rural communities provided significant local impacts that created structural changes in the economy and in social and cultural experiences of community life. In the 1950s and 1960s, entering into contract with corporate poultry entities seemed like the financial answer to a prayer for many farmers who wanted to remain on their family farms, but the ramifications of this structural change would not be fully realized for decades. Almost immediately, the labor dynamics of these households in north Alabama changed. Gender roles shifted, as wives became integral links connecting family farms to the poultry complexes, through their responsibilities in either operating the chicken houses or...
working in the processing plants themselves. According to Senator Scofield, “And these guys, their wives would take care of the chicken houses and do a better job than he ever could. Animal husbandry. I have a lady who takes care of mine, and she is the best I've ever had.” When asked about who worked in the original poultry plants in Marshall County, he responded, “Mostly women did that. Mostly women...You worked at the textile mill or you worked at the chicken plant. It was a good job. It is still a good job. It's still a good job, and it's honest work.” Scofield's memory of a gendered division of labor is supported by a 2012 report by the National Council of La Raza arguing that women continue to be an important labor source for poultry processing and “are overrepresented in labor-intensive occupations such as cutting and trimming” (2012, 3). From his own life, the Senator shared this example of how the arrival of poultry processing shaped poultry farmer’s lives:

My grandma built her first set of chicken houses in 1963. She had six chi’ren, and they would work those houses with her, and she made a good living off of it. They'd [the chickens] come in; they'd catch 'em...she raised pullets which were small hens that eventually laid eggs. They would come in, and they'd catch them, and you had to help catch them. The kids had to help catch them, and they would load them up in coops and put them on the back of the truck.

As this example demonstrates, shifting women into these labor roles also enabled a realignment of duties of other family members on the farm, including husbands and children, such that time spent would be most financially beneficial. Senator Scofield was also emphatic that the reason the poultry processing companies were attracted to places like Marshall County was because of the hardworking nature of people on these small family farms, not because of immigrant labor:

So, you know... Like I say, I think people aren't looking at [immigration policy] with any common sense, which is... I have found since I have been in office, it's a lot of what has been missing. These plants aren't here because of the illegal labor. They didn't come here because of that. They came here because of the work ethic of the people and because of these small farms these small farmers dotted around. They gotta have us. They can close a plant down and say ‘see ya,’ but you know that is a pretty big economic decision to make that I don’t think... Again, you couldn’t pick a plant up and move it to California. You know you don't have the infrastructure; you don't have the feed mill that feeds all the houses.... The hatcheries are there. I mean
you have a feed mill, a hatchery and a processing plant and then all of that feeds hundreds of farms around that. Hundreds of farms.²¹

These examples suggest that the reputation of poultry processing has long been bound up with intersections of rural, agricultural, and working identities for area farmers. The arrival of poultry processing in the 1950s could be interpreted as a physical testament to the potential of those people.

In north Alabama locales, white women primarily assumed poultry processing jobs, whereas in other areas of Alabama (and across the south), processing plants provided job opportunities for African-American women and some men (Schwartzman 2013). However, given the historically low numbers of African-Americans in north Alabama, the labor demand was initially met by native, white, female labor (Mohl 2002a, Schwartzman 2013). Although Senator Scofield and others interviewed commented that poultry processing provided “good jobs,” the meat processing industry generally has come to be regarded as a job of last resort: a low skill, low wage opportunity for individuals with few other options. Consistently, when other, more lucrative and/or less onerous jobs become available, those individuals with the skills and flexibility to leave poultry processing do so. The traditionally high levels of employee turnover in meat processing reflect this labor preference, and when combined with the high levels of reported workplace accidents resulting from increasingly hazardous conditions in meat processing plants, it comes as little surprise that those individuals with other employment options exercise them (Kandel and Parrado 2005).

Poultry processing continued to expand operations across the south: primarily in rural locations from the 1950s through the 1980s. Simultaneously, the attitudes toward poultry processing jobs began to change. These thirty years witnessed rapid technological and market changes. By the 1960s, the poultry system had completely shifted from one dominated by an open market for poultry farmers, to one “bound by contracting and vertical ownership. In short, broilers became one of the most tightly coordinated and institutionally dense commodity systems in US
agriculture” (Boyd and Watts 1997, 199). By the 1970s and 1980s, major poultry processors had consolidated their control over the supply chain through full vertical integration, and many farmers, once eager to contract with an integrator, were experiencing the effects of a system that hollowed out financial stability through contracts that required mounting individual debt to keep up with the technological demands issued by integrators. While poultry companies earned record profits during this time period, the typical poultry farmer experienced declining income and autonomy as technological demands and strict quality standards increased a farmer’s investment in physical operations while also replacing the need for skilled human intervention thanks to increasing standardization (Gisolfi 2009, Leonard 2014, Boyd and Watts 1997).

Poultry processing jobs also evolved during this time. Rendering a chicken into a broiler has never been a particularly pleasant or “clean” job. However, as firm’s incorporated technological advancements into poultry plants, these jobs become even more difficult, dangerous, and dull. A study of U.S. meat processing industries by Kandel and Parrado found that “a formerly urban, unionized, and semiskilled workforce employed in production plants, supermarkets, and butcher shops in the 1950s was transformed into one with rural, mostly nonunion, and unskilled workers concentrated at the industrial processing end of the meat production chain by the end of the 1980s” (2005). As technology has improved, rendering a chicken into a broiler now embodies the ethos of Taylorism, and the dis-assembly of a chicken has been conducted at ever faster rates in ever more unpleasant working conditions (e.g., extremes of temperatures, slick floors, unpleasant smells, etc.) with minimal protections. It is worth noting that relative to other options for unskilled workers, jobs in a poultry processing plant do tend to pay more; however, these working conditions have contributed to up to 100% annual turnover in some factories (Kandel and Parrado 2005, Striffler 2005, Fritzsche 2013, Stuesse 2010). Needless to say, by the 1980s, the lived experiences of both the rural chicken farmer and the poultry-processing worker had stripped away the initial promise of the better life seemingly offered by the industry in the 1950s.
By 1990, two important moments had changed the playing field for poultry processors and their labor pool, and ultimately, their reputation among the general public. First, in 1986, the United States Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) fundamentally changing the long established migratory patterns and trajectories of labor migrants. These shifts contributed to the arrival of Latino workers in new destinations including Alabama, as well as a subsequent rise in unauthorized immigration. (Kandel and Parrado 2005, Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003, Marrow 2011, Stuesse 2010). Second, an important cultural shift radically changed the world of poultry processing – Americans were now consuming more chicken than beef for the first time in history (Boyd and Watts 1997). This high water mark reflected a decades long shift in the American diet away from beef and toward poultry. To meet the growing demand, poultry processing needed to increase production (Striffler 2005, Boyd and Watts 1997). A debate in the literature exists regarding the reasons why, by the 1990s, the labor pool for poultry processing dramatically shifted toward immigrant Latino workers. This controversy addresses issues connected to questions of labor replacement versus displacement, the role of dual labor markets, globalization, transnational corporate recruitment, race and ethnicity, and avoidance of unionization (Boyd and Watts 1997, Gisolfi 2009, Green and Ciobanu 2006, Kandel and Parrado 2005, Parado and Kandel 2008, Schwartzman 2013, Shell 2013, Stuesse 2010). However, there is a general consensus regarding the last point mentioned: poultry processors are attracted to the south and southeast U.S. because of a generalized aversion to unionization expressed by the general public. This observation is important because as demand for chicken increased, companies needed more labor. However, with poultry processors ensconced in rural locales with low population numbers, there was rarely sufficient native born labor to meet the demand. In addition, Alabama was simultaneously attracting new investment by other, “cleaner,” manufacturing employers in high tech economic sectors. Immigrant labor became a necessary and attractive replacement for many native workers who had new employment options. Immigrant workers became a “necessary” supply that met the rise in labor
demand and also an “attractive” one because these individuals were an inexpensive labor source perceived as less likely to organize and contest the working conditions of most poultry plants in the 1990s, than were native workers (Schwartzman 2013). Notably, many immigrant workers were not as reluctant to contest their own working conditions as some employers may had hoped (Fink 2003, Ansley 2010, Bacon 2011, Milkman 2011); nevertheless, many scholars argue that it was at this point that direct and indirect transnational, corporate recruitment efforts began to feed a transnational labor pipeline contributing to the exponential increase of Latino labor flows to the U.S. South that would continue into the twenty-first century (Krissman 2000, Kandel and Parrado 2005).

This economic behaviors align with the assumption that businesses and markets predictably behave in rational ways to protect their interests in the name of *homo economicus* (Brennan 2008). With the passing of IRCA and its initially low enforcement levels, hiring only documented labor was not, in fact, in businesses’ economic self-interest. The cultural, social, and economic structure of the labor market has frequently been the source of disincentives, or market constraints, which discourage businesses from complying with federal immigration law. The calculus for determining actual “self-interested” outcomes with regard to labor involving undocumented and migrant workers is historically complex with racialized economic and cultural factors influencing the analysis. Substantial research demonstrates that business communities across the nation have repeatedly demonstrated a preference for new immigrants, and particularly undocumented workers, because this labor pool does, in fact, serve their own best interest for stable, low cost employees. In fact, social and political anti-immigrant rhetoric has historically served business interests because of its effect of driving down labor costs. This labor cost containment strategy, however, is reliant on anti-immigrant rhetoric being coupled with low-levels of official enforcement efforts because the net effect is to expand the coercive power of employers over immigrant laborers by increasing the potential (but rarely exercised) vulnerability of the
immigrant community. The success of these informal immigrant labor practices relied in part on the ability to visually identify which laboring bodies within the community could fit this role in the marketplace (Cohen, Gutkind, and Brazier 1979, Cockcroft 1986, Cornelius 1993, West and Moore 1989, Burawoy 1976, Anderson 2010). In Alabama, Latino workers became highly visible in contrast to its historically black/white demographic history (Chapter 3).

From 1990 forward, Alabama became dependent upon Latino workers, both legally documented and otherwise, to fuel the state’s widespread low-wage, low-skill economy primarily centered in the agri-business and service economies. With the passage of IRCA, all immigrant employees were required to present documentation verifying a legal right to work in the United States; IRCA did not place any burden on employers to ensure the authenticity of employment papers. Subsequently, this employment loophole led the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to raid targeted workplaces, resulting in high profile deportations. These raids brought heightened attention to the presence of Latino labor in the poultry processing industry among residents across Alabama. Arguably, that attention peaked with a massive INS investigation of Tyson Food in 2001 (Stuesse 2010, Mohl 2002a). In this high profile moment, not only did poultry processing become linked to Latino labor, Tyson was implicated in scandals involving smuggling rings and transport of undocumented immigrants to Alabama raising humanitarian concerns, nationalist protectionism, and workers’ rights questions all at the same time. Raymond Mohl has recounted a string of highly publicized events that connected the poultry industry and the recent influx of Latino labor:

In June and September 1995, for instance, the INS raided Hudson Foods and Gold Kist poultry plants in northeast Alabama, arresting and deporting more than 250 illegal workers. In July 1997 an INS raid at the Tyson Foods plant in Ashland, Alabama, netted 106 illegal Hispanic workers—seventy-two Mexicans, thirty-three Guatemalans, and one Honduran. Another fifty or so workers fled and eluded capture. Those arrested represented about 15 percent of the Tyson plant’s workforce, suggesting the sizable dimensions of illegal immigration in the poultry industry. Tyson Foods claimed that it followed the letter of the law by demanding documentation and denied any efforts to recruit illegal workers. Nevertheless, in December 2001 the U.S. Justice Department charged Tyson Foods and six of its
managers with running a smuggling ring that recruited illegal Hispanic workers for fifteen Tyson plants in ten states, including several in Alabama. (2002a, 255)

Tyson Foods was ultimately acquitted in this case, but in many ways, the damage to the reputation of Tyson Foods, and by association, the poultry industry, was done. The scandal became a dramatic, highly-publicized example of the way in which U.S. immigration policy was failing. Depending upon political allegiance and perspective, the federal immigration policy was cited as a failure by pointing to varied combinations of three primary reasons. First, the policy was credited with motivating the egregious human rights abuses corporations appeared to be committing (Stuesse 2010). Second, the policy was structured to attract immigrant labor such that unionization efforts were thwarted generating a deleterious impact on the rights of all U.S. workers (Tanger 2006). Finally, from a purely political perspective, the immigration policy's inherent tolerance of “illegals” in the U.S. labor pool denigrated the integrity of the American workforce by tolerating the discursive figure of the “illegal” in this (also discursively created “nation of law” (Milkman 2011). In any case, the poultry processing industry and undocumented Latino labor became inextricably linked in the discussion of U.S. immigration policy beginning in 2001, and the poultry and meat processing industries have been on the defensive ever since. For example, the CEO of the American Meat Institute still publicly defends its hiring practices; “The meat industry has been involved in the E-Verify program since its inception” (2011g), and Tyson Foods lists immigration policy as one of its "priority issues" on its Public Policy and Political Contributions webpage. Tyson’s official position is:

We believe comprehensive immigration reform is necessary, and therefore, closely monitor the issue. We value Team Members who are immigrants—legal immigrants. Our Team Members, immigrant and American born, want their children to enjoy greater opportunities and the stability that enables families to stay together and thrive. We feel that a comprehensive immigration reform bill should include border security, an improved employer verification system and provide a pathway for citizens to earn legal status. (Tyson Foods 2015)
However, the public memory of this scandal, and its connection to poultry and immigrant labor, lingers. When Senator Scofield was asked, “what do you think creates this reputation around [poultry processing] as an industry?” His response was, “Well, [chuckling] a lot of it is true.”

Though Tyson “won” against the federal government, this high profile case can be seen as instrumental in framing the reputational “final straw” for many Alabamians against the poultry processing industry. Taken together, the poultry industry arrived in north Alabama post-World War II as a great hope to salvage struggling family farms. Instead, during the course of sixty years, rural communities with poultry processing plants felt increasingly uncomfortable changes. Contract poultry farming gutted the savings of chicken farmers with some farmers ultimately having to sell their family farms (Gisolfi 2009). The gender relationships and responsibilities within farming families shifted in order to support wage-earning connections to the poultry industry. Poultry processing jobs became progressively deskillled, hazardous, with generally stagnant wages, and steadily transitioned to an increasingly immigrant workforce. With passage of IRCA, many previously migrant workers became permanent members of Alabama communities challenging previously understood racial orders. And finally, public accusations against poultry processors for bringing “illegal immigrants” to Alabama challenged understood notions of “law and order” and rural community working identities. These public indictments served another important purpose by providing affected community residents someone to blame for the cultural stressors they experienced as a result of the rapid influx of new immigrant arrivals. With an established connection of poultry processors to undocumented immigration, Alabamians had pain they could not only feel, but also see, as embodied in their new Latino neighbors.

**Representing Poultry – Power Brokers and the Official Channels for the “Voice” of Poultry in Alabama**

In this context of fragmented social and economic identities, the poultry industry, among many other business entities, sought political means to amend and revise H.B. 56 as it was initially
written and presented. When the immigration debate in Alabama was coalescing into what would ultimately become the Alabama Immigration Law in 2010-2011, a variety of political agents engaged the state politicians to try to shape the bill. The intersection of business and politics is not a unique phenomenon to Alabama, and it is common practice for business practitioners to establish avenues through which they can express their voice on issues of concern to their local, state, or nation's legislators. These avenues may include activities such as donations to political parties, membership in relevant professional associations, joining their local or state Chamber of Commerce, or employing their own lobbyists. The size and nature of the business enterprise or industry in conjunction with its vulnerability to legislative action are some of the factors that influence how organizations determine investments advocacy efforts. The poultry industry is no exception. In the aftermath of the Alabama Immigration Law, a pervasive observation remained among other parties interested in the outcome: even the “big” power brokers, who were opposed to the bill as written, seemed to have little influence in the immigration debate. Here, I identify those power brokers tasked in some formal way to represent the interests of the poultry industry during the political debate in 2011 and provide a brief explanation of how and why they did it.

The complications that cloud the poultry industry’s economic classification are reflected in which organizations represent poultry’s political interests at the state level, as well as in how they do it. The confusion over who represents what group and how, at least where it intersects with issues of immigrant labor, contributed to what was, collectively, a remarkably ineffectual political effort to shape H.B. 56 on behalf of the business sector generally. Mary Bauer, the former Legal Director of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) has said:

It was real interesting to us [the SPLC] because, when we would get these calls from big business people, [and] we would say, ‘well surely NOW. Surely NOW [they will take action]. They are so upset about it...’ And they were looking to us as though we were calling the shots, and we were like, ‘we’ve filed these lawsuits, we’ve done all these things, but like ‘What?!” People [business], you are the ones with all the money! You know...do something!” I’m not sure that I ever entirely understood what happened with business, and I sort of feel that way a little bit with the national stuff now, but maybe that is just easier to understand, that it was entirely ideological.
The irony is that the business sector was indeed trying to “do something” about H.B. 56, but, as this section will demonstrate, the assumptions made about who would do what, and for whom, in this process left “holes” in the political voice and timing of opposition to the bill as written. Generally, the broader Alabama business community seemed aligned in its thinking about H.B. 56. Although I discovered no reported public business opposition to H.B. 56, multiple interviews revealed that advocates representing multiple business sectors were formally, and actively, opposed to the bill as originally written, and generally cited some combination of three reasons for resistance. First, firms were concerned about the undue administrative and financial burdens it placed them, specifically disadvantaging small businesses. Second, a highly-restrictive state-based immigration law placed Alabama at a competitive disadvantage in labor acquisition with its neighboring states that did not pass similar laws. Third, this statute made Alabama look bad and that is bad for business. This reason was frequently connected to the reputation Alabama had developed in connection to its racial intolerance during the Civil Rights era. While additional reasons for opposition were also cited, several interviewees suggested that these three were the dominant narratives taken to the statehouse on behalf of Alabama business.\(^{25}\) However, prior to stating opposition to H.B. 56, every interviewee was careful to articulate his or her support for legal employment practices and opposition to all “illegal” ones. This rhetorical practice is reflected in the Tyson public policy statement presented earlier. Business representatives from the Business Council of Alabama and Chamber of Commerce Association of Alabama community summarized their opposition by first stating their support for law-abiding practices. Furthermore, they asserted that most business people do indeed follow the law and pay appropriate taxes and essentially are good corporate citizens. Therefore, their objection to this statute was based on the premise that it was ill-conceived, and as a result, it was cumbersome, if not impossible, for some law-abiding businesses to comply fully with it as written, as well as financially burdensome to do so.\(^{26}\) Within this generalized business opposition to H.B. 56, I sought information on and from those political
actors who, in some way, were tasked with representing the political interests of the poultry industry to Alabama state lawmakers in 2011.

Dominant, state-level power brokers representing the poultry industry are listed in Table 4-2. Official Politics of Poultry, along with a brief description of their primary constituents as well as a brief statement of their organizational goals as gleaned from interviews with them and from the public websites of each organization. Each organization’s particular history and political agenda is discussed in more detail after the table. Note that individual poultry/food company representatives are not mentioned in Table 4-2. In all likelihood, the largest meat processing companies in Alabama make political contributions and individually lobby statehouse politicians. However, the evidence collected for this study suggests that individual poultry firms do not function as primary power brokers in Alabama and instead rely upon the collective political action of the associations listed in Table 4-2. Therefore, associations representing organizations are the primary targets of this analysis. Additionally, specific information about the major processors was unavailable for this study. Representatives of all three of the largest poultry corporations located in and around Albertville (i.e., Pilgrim’s Pride, Tyson Foods, and Wayne Foods) denied my request for interviews. Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the role of individual actors in Alabama’s circuits of power.

Table 4-2. Official Politics of Poultry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Constituents</th>
<th>Stated Goals/Vision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama Poultry &amp; Egg Association (AP&amp;EA)</td>
<td>Poultry Growers, Poultry Companies, Allied Industries (those who sell to poultry companies) within Alabama</td>
<td>Promotion and education of and for the Poultry Industry in Alabama. Enhance communication between poultry industry players</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama Farmers Federation (Alfa)</td>
<td>Farmers and Rural land owners in Alabama, and other Alfa members (e.g., insurance customers through the Farm Bureau.)</td>
<td>“The Voice of Agriculture” as a multi-commodity organization in Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama Agribusiness Council</td>
<td>Agribusiness leaders and organizations</td>
<td>Umbrella organization to “advocate, enhance and promote” all aspects of agribusiness in Alabama.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Business Council of Alabama (BCA)*
Member companies and local Chambers of Commerce – publicly emphasizes small business members in Alabama
Improvement in Alabama’s business climate and serve as “the voice” for all Alabama Business.

Chamber of Commerce Association of Alabama (CCAA)*
Chambers of Commerce, their executives and staff, and members of business and community organizations directly serving chamber of commerce work in Alabama.
Advocacy, professional development, and communication of key issues impacting local business community. Seek to strengthen Chambers of Commerce across Alabama.

* These organizations established a formal partnership called “The Partnership,” at the state level, in 2003.

**Alabama Poultry & Egg Association (AP&EA)**

AP&EA is the only organization that is dedicated singularly to the comprehensive needs of the poultry industry in Alabama. As indicated in Table 4-2, AP&EA membership includes growers, members of poultry's allied industries (e.g., pharmaceutical companies, food additive companies, chemical companies, etc.), and poultry processors. In terms of identifying the designated power brokers for poultry processors in Alabama, AP&EA appears to be the undisputed center of poultry influence and power. When beginning the process of setting up interviews in Alabama concerning poultry processing, I was repeatedly told essentially the same basic thing, "Oh, well, you don’t want to talk to me. You have to talk to Ray Hilburn.” Ray Hilburn is the Membership Director of AP&EA and has been an active member of the poultry community for his entire career. He grew up on a chicken farm and spent a substantial portion of his career working in the Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries prior to joining AP&EA. In terms of connections among poultry farmers and complexes, Ray Hilburn is clearly an individual power broker in the state of Alabama and was instrumental in getting meetings set up for me with other members of the poultry community. Hilburn described AP&EA and his role in it as follows:

So we are mainly involving in doing promotional type things for the industry, and also we do educational seminars for not only our company personnel like your Tyson’s, Pilgrims, and things like that, but also for the growers. We are unique from other poultry associations. A lot of the poultry associations in other states either deal with just strictly the growers, the producers or they work strictly with the
poultry companies. We are kind of a three-legged stool. We work with the poultry companies, like your Pilgrims and Wayne’s, and we also work with the allied industry, which is support groups that sell to the poultry companies - you know, like your pharmaceutical companies, chemical type things, disinfectants, things like that, and feed additives...We also have the growers who belong to our association. So, we serve the entire industry.\textsuperscript{27}

This structure is unique among state poultry associations in its outreach to all three areas of poultry-related businesses. One of the intended benefits of the AP&EA structure is the opportunity to enhance communication among all poultry’s vested players, which, according to Hilburn, is hampered by the contract system that segments responsibilities between growers and processor: “these producers will furnish the labor, the land, the buildings and all and the utilities and labor are looking after the birds. The poultry companies furnish the chickens, the feed and things like that, the technical know how. So it is a unique thing, but communication is not very good sometimes so we try to improve on that.”\textsuperscript{28} As a result of this central position in communication, AP&EA has become the organizational power broker for “all things poultry” in Alabama, and this is reflected in their membership roles:

We have all the poultry companies in the state of Alabama. We have 100% participation [by poultry processors]. We have close to, I guess, probably around 100 or something what we called allied members. Those are the ones who sell to the poultry industry. Then we also have a little over 2,000 grower members. We have about 2,700 growers in Alabama, so about 2,000 of the 2,700 are members. I am trying to work on getting the rest of them.\textsuperscript{29}

In addition to these members, there are five egg producers in Alabama who are also on AP&EA’s member roles. AP&EA’s Executive Director (Johnny Adams) is the organization’s lobbyist, and his role is to engage directly with poultry company leaders and to represent all member needs to state and national level politicians. Essentially, if any branch of poultry has a political concern, AP&EA is the group that will be leading the charge to ensure that issue is addressed.

While Hilburn regards the interests of grower members and corporate members as of equal importance to AP&EA, the perception of other key power brokers is that AP&EA is chiefly an advocate for the companies. For instance, Guy Hall from Alfa mentioned:
Like Ray and the Poultry and Egg, they represent the poultry industry, but their bread and butter comes from the poultry companies. I mean Wayne farms, Pilgrim Pride, and Peco....all of these organizations are members of that plus farmers are members, but the main thrust of their compensation comes from the companies. So, they lobby...Ray and them represent growers in the industry, but they mainly represent the industry...the companies.30

This perception is significant to note when considering the difference between the reputations of poultry processors versus poultry growers and the subsequent influence certain voices may have with regard to the circuits of power in Alabama (to be discussed in Chapter 6). Additionally, as the voice of “the companies,” other power brokers appear to assign the political interests of poultry companies singularly to AP&EA. In other words, though poultry processing is also in the manufacturing sector, its political interests as a manufacturer seem only to be represented by AP&EA, which as an association is committed to the interests of members from two other branches of the poultry industry. Even within their primary political organization, the identity of the poultry processors is fragmented, and they must share political representation with the interests of poultry farmers and the allied industries. Yet, Hall’s comment implies that the political perception is that the poultry processors, “the companies,” have the primary attention of AP&EA, and therefore, these interests are covered.

The collected data and the passage of H.B. 56 suggest that this may not actually be the case. The labor interests of processors were indeed represented by AP&EA, but integrators are far from the only focus of AP&EA, and H.B. 56 did not reflect the labor for growers or the allied industries in the same manner. Presumptions of AP&EA “clout” appears to have been overstated as it pertained to wielding political sway over state immigration reform in 2010. Additionally, because other power brokers within this network believe AP&EA to “have the industry covered” (so to speak), those individuals did not necessarily feel the same urgency to advocate for the poultry processor’s labor interests.
**Alabama Farmers Federation (Alfa)**

Alabama farmers, including poultry farmers, have been engaged in formal political advocacy since the early decades of the twentieth century through the Alabama Farmers Federation (Alfa). Alfa was originally organized in 1921 to support Alabama farmers and rapidly “became the unified voice of those men and women” who made their living from the products of the earth. Importantly, Alfa is now the largest farm organization in Alabama and boasts 400,000 members that it represents through its insurance products and political action stating on its website that: “The Federation’s ‘one voice’ delivers a powerful message, at the Statehouse in Montgomery and on Capitol Hill in Washington” (Alabama Farmers Federation 2015). Guy Hall mentioned in an interview with me that the nonprofit arm of Alfa particularly “like[s] to talk about themselves as the voice of agriculture.”

Alfa’s self-assertion of its position as a state power broker was echoed in other interviews. Mary Bauer reiterated that, “Someone like Alfa is a big political player. If you were re-writing the worker’s compensation laws, Alfa is going to be there at the table working with people and making that happen.” In terms of immigrant labor, Alfa’s position is aligned with those of other business entities, and Guy Hall reflected another commonly: the desire for some kind of easily accessible, guest worker status. Specifically, Hall said:

> Our position, the Farmer’s Federation, we are for legal, documented workers. In other words, we are for border security; we are for not having people here illegally. We would like to have people legally and have a program where if you need workers for the farm or for the factory or whatever, that you are able to document them, you are able to get them in and out without a lot of hassle.

Though Alfa clearly carries political clout, a provision enabling this outcome did not make it into any version of H.B. 56, despite the evidence that it would have benefited Alabama farmers and poultry processors, not to mention many other Alabama businesses. However, as noted in Table 4-2, Alfa’s primary constituency is the Alabama farmer. Guy Hall was clear on this point: “We represent the farmers. We don’t have industrial partners or members.” This is where the fragmented identity of poultry processors interferes with its potential political influence. This
agribusiness does not qualify as a farmer. With that said, he did acknowledge that there is necessary crossover of interest into other industrial sectors. Organizationally, Hall has five peers at Alfa and discussed the Alfa division of responsibility this way:

> So each one of us work directly with the farmers in the counties on issues that pertain to them. Whether it be tax related, environmentally related, labor related. So if they have an issue they come to us and say, 'hey, we have a problem with this.' I got a call the other day. A farmer is trying to get his poultry farm built so he has to have a permit to build. The agency that gives those permits has not called him back. They [farmers] get a little nervous about calling the enforcement agency, so I called for them. Because we keep close connections with the different agencies and other allied industries such as the poultry and egg and the cattlemen and all of those, because we are kind of a coalition. We are on the same page on a lot of issues. Now certain issues we are not going to be.

Shortly after this observation, Hall clarified that even with this singular focus on the farmer, Alfa does remain organizationally vigilant to those issues that might affect partner industries, like poultry processing, because of the potential ramifications for poultry farmers if poultry processing is threatened. Poultry processing is a partner industry for farmers as a byproduct of the vertical integration strategy of the industry. Much as this strategy blurs a clear economic classification for the poultry industry, the vertical integration of related companies also blurs the advocacy lines among state-level political players. For instance, as political actors engage in advocacy for their primary constituent, there are certain assumptions made about partner industries. Hall, for example, shared the common assumption that the poultry industry would be unaffected by H.B. 56:

> “One of the neat things about the poultry industry, I think, before this immigration law got passed, was they had already dealt with some of these issues.” This was a pervasive assumption by organizations outside of AP&EA, and this discourse, among the allies of the poultry processors, may have had a role in diminishing state level political urgency about the potential impact of H.B. 56 on poultry processors.
According to its webpage, the Alabama Agribusiness Council is an umbrella organization that exists to advocate, enhance and promote agribusiness in Alabama as the collective voice." This organization was originally formed as a volunteer collective of Alabama’s agribusiness leaders in 1989, and it evolved into “the umbrella organization for all aspects of agribusiness” (2015a). Per its 2010 strategic plan, the Alabama Agribusiness Council is to accomplish its mission by engaging in the following key activities (in the order written in the strategic plan):

- Legislative and regulatory
- Education and Outreach
- Member Services
- Coalition Building
- Resource for Agribusiness Enhancement
- Communications
- Strategic planning (AAC Board Members 2010)

In my interviews, this organization was not mentioned as a primary political actor for poultry processors but does appear to serve as an additional political voice in the advocacy for issues facing poultry processors. Of note, the members of the Alabama Agribusiness Council include AP&EA (Ray Hilburn serves on the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors), and Alfa (an Alfa Director sits on the Board of Directors) as well as a significant number of Alabama’s forestry, meat, financial, chemical, and insurance providers. Equally as interesting are those that are not members. None of Alabama’s major poultry producers appear on the membership role on the web, and neither is the BCA nor the CCAA (2015a). At face value, the membership docket reflects the confounding divides between business, agriculture, and agribusiness. While the Alabama Agribusiness Council surely represents the political interests of poultry processors through AP&EA and Alfa, the primary membership appears to reflect the interests of businesses engaged in more
traditional understandings of “farming,” and though it is an agribusiness organization, the recognized voices of Alabama business (BCA & CCAA) are not affiliates of this organization. This divide will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

**Business Council of Alabama (BCA) and Chamber of Commerce Association of Alabama (CCAA)**

The BCA and CCAA will be addressed as a single entity in this discussion because in 2003, the two organizations entered into a formal, state-level Partnership that formally links the local Chambers of the CCAA to the BCA for political advocacy and voice in leadership in the state-level affairs of the organization. In their collective form, these organizations seek to leverage the political potential created by the more than 60,000 members of Alabama local chambers to influence the “the halls of government” (BCA 2015). Officially named “The Partnership,” these organizations are designated to represent the interests of Alabama businesses to the statehouse and effectively to communicate the legislative agenda to its membership. Both the BCA and the CCAA have a long history of advocating for the commercial and industrial interests of Alabama, and each organization has long established ties to the local Chambers of Commerce. Through the engagement of the CCAA with Alabama’s local Chambers, and the BCA’s experience and focus on political advocacy, the two organizations saw The Partnership as an opportunity to formalize and strengthen the business representation and voice in Alabama’s capital by uniting these two, historically aligned associations (BCA 2015).

The members of The Partnership include all of Alabama’s local chambers of commerce (as represented through CCAA) and small and large businesses (as represented through BCA). The CCAA membership includes the executives and staff of local Chambers of Commerce. The CCSS goal is strengthening Alabama’s local Chambers and business communities by sharing information about new opportunities, securing enhanced governmental access, and providing administrative support and leadership development for Chamber executives and staff (CCAA 2015). The BCA members, on
the other hand, are majority small businesses (85% of the membership), and BCA particularly touts its commitment to advocating for Alabama’s manufacturers as evidenced by 1300 manufacturing members and as Alabama’s “exclusive” affiliate of the National Association of Manufacturers (BCA 2015). Since its creation in 1985, the BCA has focused on bringing the political interests of Alabama business to the state capital, and thanks to The Partnership in 2003, BCA now claims (on its website) to be “working on behalf of nearly three-quarters of a million working Alabamians” and “through its member companies and local chambers of commerce, the BCA is the voice for Alabama business” (BCA 2015). By explicitly incorporating the voice of the local chambers into its public policy development, BCA now can lay claim to localized “grassroots” support, and the CCAA offers bolstered political advocacy and communication about relevant issues in governmental affairs. In addition to the website statements of support of The Partnership, representatives of both the BCA and CCAA indicated in conversation that this partnership has been extremely valuable to the shared political interests of the organizations by creating a higher profile, consolidated face for the Alabama business community in the statehouse.

Despite the intention of representing the entirety of Alabama's business community, there are structural gaps in the process of including all business voices that make achieving full representation at the state level difficult, if not impossible. The way the BCA and CCAA establish their annual public policy agenda is through a succession of networked committees, starting at the local Chamber level, and this is the first opportunity for omitting representation. Each year, local Chambers collect business concerns through discussions with their Boards of Directors, who are charged with representing the overarching concerns of local membership. In a perfect system, every local business is a member of its local Chamber, and every business' representative is willing and able actively and publicly to voice their concerns to the larger body. However, research has demonstrated that this imagined world of balanced access to power and influence within business communities is a fiction on many fronts. For instance, researchers have shown that minority-owned
businesses generally experience disparate treatment in credit markets (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo 1998, Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken 2002); minority women entrepreneurs systematically receive fewer resources than white women entrepreneurs (Smith-Hunter and Boyd 2004), and that social networks and their benefits for entrepreneurs vary by gender and race (Dixon 2003). These kinds of disparities influence wide-ranging business behaviors including engagement and effectiveness in available support networks. Given these pre-existing structural barriers, it is likely that every local business does not (or cannot) enter the local Chamber discussion equally, if at all. Local poultry processors and their representatives enter their local networks with the pre-existing conditions of a poor reputation, confused economic classification, and specific history; all of which likely served as extra barriers to a full expression their “voice” at the business table. I address in detail “the local” in the next chapter, but the argument here is simply to raise a challenge to the assertion that the BCA is “the voice for Alabama business” and to suggest that this flawed assumption has state-level political ramifications in terms of who and what receives necessary political representation by The Partnership.

Other related structural, process-oriented representation gaps emerge in the subsequent stages of the CCAA-BCA process. After a local Chamber establishes its list of priorities, its executive will represent these interests at a regional meeting of Chamber executives, a process facilitated by the CCAA and BCA. Out of this regional meeting, the interests are collected and prioritized, and then one executive from this regional group is elected to represent it at the state-level committee meeting. The decisions made at the state-level meeting then inform the annual public policy agenda to be pursued by the BCA with legislators. At each of these successive gatherings, the impact of any absent business concern, particularly if it consistently underrepresents a particular economic classification, becomes a magnified absence until it is minimized or even eradicated from consideration. Necessarily, “business,” as represented by the BCA, becomes somewhat homogenized at the state-level, as no one local business need will be identical to another. However,
when an organization positions itself as “the voice of Alabama business” to state politicians, then there are potential repercussions for individual businesses and industries who have fallen into the structural gaps.

The last structural challenge is connected to the contested economic classification of the poultry industry discussed earlier, and the charge of the BCA. The BCA and CCAA are committed to the needs of business, and at the local level, poultry processors do indeed become members of their local Chambers. However, the BCA is an organization committed to the needs of businesses, and businesses represented by the BCA do not include those of the individual farmer. Though poultry processing companies are “claimed” by the BCA as a manufacturing company, the interests of the vertically integrated business of the poultry farmer are not included in its model.

To be clear, the changes to H.B. 56 that the BCA advocated for were aligned with the stated interests of the poultry industry, as expressed by Ray Hilburn. However, the way in which these structural gaps appeared was in the ranking of the issues in terms of the attention they received for advocacy. Immigration reform was only one plank of the GOP Handshake with Alabama platform, and for the most part, the BCA was optimistic and enthusiastic about the promise of the new, incoming administration as indicated on the BCA website: “With the help of the Alabama legislature, which in 2011 -- for the first time -- was truly committed to addressing the concerns of business, the BCA was instrumental in securing passage of a number of real reforms…” (BCA 2015). However, while the immigration plank had the full attention of the AP&EA from the beginning of the session,35 publications by the BCA indicate that this bill received far less attention from the BCA advocates until relatively late in the session, as compared to other business-friendly measures proposed at the time (2011d).

**Conclusion**

Locating the “voice” of poultry in the economic and political networks of Alabama is complicated by many factors. While poultry producers are in some ways acknowledged as an
important economic engine for Alabama’s fiscal stability, in other ways, they are made structurally invisible through their role as a vertically integrated agribusiness with a complicated history in the rural locales of Alabama.

Compounding the economic complications are questions of where Alabama’s business community appears to place poultry processing as an agribusiness. Poultry processing is shrouded in the fundamental confusion over whether its economic (and discursive) “home” is in Alabama’s “Advanced Manufacturing” sector or some variant of “Agriculture-Related Products.” In both cases, poultry processing is neither fully claimed, nor rejected, by any of Alabama’s economic sectors, instead it haunts both and neither. Deciding where to draw the line within a poultry complex’s processes drives the confusion of where to locate poultry processing within Alabama’s economic measures. This confusion was articulated again and again by my interviewees, across economic sectors with top state power brokers from the agricultural, political, and economic networks. The ambiguity of “where” poultry processing fits is perhaps best reflected in the response by President and CEO of Marshall County Economic Development Council, Matt Arnold, when asked explicitly whether poultry processing was part of the Agricultural sector, despite its manufacturing function. Mr. Arnold responded: “it has to be…I mean it is agri-business. It has to be tied in because you can’t transport the chicken too far: You have a limited window there…So you have to have the farms pretty close…So, you have to have the grower, but you also have to have the feed [close] because they [poultry processors] handle all of that too. It is altogether.” However, the reality of the connectedness of this business processes becomes discursively lost at the level of state economic analysis. The resulting “invisibility” is one important consideration in evaluating why voices from the poultry processing industry were never clearly, distinctly heard in the 2011 Alabama immigration debate.

While discussed at greater length in later chapters, it is worth noting here that the impact of this discursive absence has potential ramifications for understanding state-wide power relations as
they pertain to poultry processing. For instance, only one power broker (AP&EA) is truly dedicated to representing poultry processors in the discursive flows, and even they must also consider the political needs of two other stakeholders, while all other economic power brokers believe the poultry processors to be adequately represented. Clegg’s Circuits of Power model provides resources for analysis to understand both individual and organizational roles of power. However, if an organization such as the poultry processing industry, rarely or never independently enters a circuit of power because it has been subsumed into other discursive structures, then Clegg’s model would suggest little political influence is possible. A visual summary of these factors is attached in Appendix F. Poultry Processing within Alabama’s Circuit of Power. Importantly, when corporate actors become disenfranchised from the political structures within which they are embedded, questions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that rely on political cooperation or support, such as is the case of immigrant labor policy, become moot. Simply put, Alabama’s poultry processors could not make CSR commitments to protect immigrant employees even if they wanted to because they lacked the power that would ensure success.

The next chapter looks specifically at the complexity of the relationship between poultry processors and the people of Albertville, Alabama. To explore more deeply the reputation issues introduced in this chapter, Chapter 5 analytically centers the relationship between the people of Albertville, the local poultry producers, and their connections to the 2011 Alabama Immigration Law.

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2 Latino or Hispanic is the terminology used by the U.S. Census in 2000 and 2010.
3 The terms “Poultry complex” refers to a poultry company’s vertically-integrated firm structure discussed in detail later in this chapter.
4 This quotation is drawn from a conversation with representatives from Business Council of Alabama and the Chamber of Commerce of Alabama Association. As explained in Chapter 2, these
individuals wished to remain anonymous and “off the record,” but provided explicit permissions for this quotation to be used. This conversation occurred in 2013.

5 Mentioned by Kennedy, Joey. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Birmingham, AL, October 18, 2013


7 001. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Auburn, AL, October 16, 2013


9 Ibid.

10 Hilburn interview.


12 001 interview.

13 Ibid.

14 Hall, Guy. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Montgomery, AL, October 17, 2013

15 Hilburn interview.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.


24 To be clear, though many of the changes to H.B. 56 that were desired by the SPLC and Alabama’s business community were aligned, they were not motivated by the same goals. My interviewees reported that there was never a political partnership cultivated between the SPLC and any of the major business power brokers in the state, despite the shared interest in revising H.B. 56 in similar ways. Further, some business representatives made it clear that there never would be any alliances between their organization and the SPLC because they believed the SPLC to have antagonistic goals that were clearly anti-business. Bauer’s comments also point to the national political context. At the time of the interview, the U.S. Congress had reached a budget impasse and the federal government was in partial shutdown while already under the mandates of the budget “Sequester,” a previous political standoff that took effect six months previous. I highlight the interconnection between the state and federal context here because it will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5. Bauer, Mary. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Charlottesville, VA, October 31, 2013.
25 Arnold Interview; Bauer Interview, Kennedy Interview; Brooke, Sam. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Montgomery, AL, October 16, 2013
26 This reference was made in informal conversation with representatives from Alabama’s business network.
27 Hilburn Interview.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Hall Interview.
31 Ibid.
32 Bauer Interview.
33 Hall Interview.
34 Ibid.
35 Hilburn Interview.
36 Arnold Interview.
Chapter 5. Albertville Poultry, People, and Politics

The Mexicans are taking over our schools and taking over our neighborhoods. If they don't have the right paperwork, they need to send them back to Mexico. I don't know why the mayor or council wasn't there to back us up. We need to stand up for our rights and take Albertville back. Let's all get together and set up another meeting somewhere and let's take our town back.

~Jacky Cannon, Attendee at Albertville's 2008 Eagle Forum Meeting
(As quoted in Green 2008a)

Yes, it has been slow, and sometimes you cannot change the hearts of rednecks. But educated people in Albertville understand the need we have to be a diverse community. We have enrolled children from outside the district who want their children to have a diverse background, to be exposed to different cultures.

~Joyce Bishop, Former Assistant Superintendent
Albertville City Schools

The local bankers kept their mouth shut, although some of them would voice their opinion privately. To be honest, if I was still in the retail business I would have kept my mouth shut. My primary concern would have been survival, but since I'm out of retail, I wasn't hobbled by that restriction anymore and I really, I raised hell.

~John Weathers, Owner
Weathers Realty

In 2008, two years before H.B. 56 would be introduced as a key plank in the Alabama GOP's Handshake with Alabama campaign platform, a capacity crowd gathered in the Albertville Depot to listen to a ninety-minute presentation by Eagle Forum, a national conservative advocacy group, about the dangers of “illegal immigration.” This gathering would not have happened twenty years prior, and indeed, the visual shifts in Albertville were a significant causal factor and the purpose of this gathering. Reportedly, the vast majority of the 300+ Albertville attendees were eagerly receptive to the messages issued by Eagle Forum, which were thick with descriptions of failed federal immigration enforcement, rising threats to liberty and the democratic republic posed by a globalized economy, and the urgent need to “take our town back.” Eagle Forum was directly calling for community-based political mobilization that could address the multiple perceived threats to their community through local, state, and national-level immigration reform. As one Albertvillian
translated the message locally; "The Mexicans are taking over our schools and taking over our neighborhoods. If they don't have the right paperwork, they need to send them back to Mexico...We need to stand up for our rights and take Albertville back" (As quoted in Green 2008a). By 2008, this local sentiment was gaining momentum building what would become a critical mass of political discontent in connection with the evident cultural shifts attributable to the influx of Latino immigrants who now lived in their community; the employers and other economic “sympathizers” of immigrants in Albertville, and the impact of the large and rapidly growing population of documented and undocumented immigrants living in Albertville (e.g., stress on the health care local system, exploding local school population). The executive director of Eagle Forum of Alabama, Brooklyn S. Burgess, said of the Albertville event: “This is by far the largest attendance we’ve had and the most interest...I think it has to do with the fact it’s such a serious problem up here [in Albertville]” (As quoted in Green 2008a). The community frustration was reflected in sentiments such as the one opening this chapter, as well as a large turnout at the event.

Albertville was not the only source of anti-immigrant sentiment in Alabama. Prior to this meeting, a flurry of anti-immigrant bills had been introduced in the state Senate and House that were designed to enhance enforcement approaches such as the provision of new, more stringent citizenship identification requirements applied to both individuals and employers, as well as legislation proposing English-only state workplaces. While these early bills were ultimately killed by the Democratically-controlled legislature, with the assistance of key political allies (e.g., the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC)2), these proposals and the popular sentiment supporting them proved to be a foreshadowing for the shifting political tides that would sweep Alabama in the 2010 state elections and create space for passage of the 2011 Alabama Immigration Law (Green 2008a, b). However, this 2008 Eagle Forum event can be framed as a harbinger of the role Albertville would play in fueling the Alabama immigration debates to come.
Albertville’s local political actors proved to be surprisingly instrumental in the state-level political machinations that ultimately led to passage of the Alabama Immigration Law. Albertville politicians have consistently introduced public discourse narrating a nebulous “threatening potential” from the infiltration of Latino immigrants since the early 1990s, echoing many of the same themes presented by Leo Chavez in his aptly named book, *The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation* (2008). In the mid to late-2000’s, local politicians fanned this nascent fear to cultivate a discursive formation\(^3\) that transformed the public representation of Albertville into the “face” of all Alabama locales allegedly besieged by an influx of undocumented (and documented) immigrants. This new public depiction broadly framed Albertville as a community victimized by failed federal immigration policy resulting in uncontrolled “illegal immigration.” These immigrants were alleged to have ushered in international crime rings\(^4\) and threatened the jobs of Albertville’s legal populace. This framing was a key component for creating the state-level discursive landscape that led to the virtually uncontested passage of H.B. 56 in 2011. Importantly, Albertville-based politicians and activists played leading roles in cultivating this image of a besieged community, and ultimately, this little Alabama city found itself to be the talking point in immigration media coverage from local to international spheres (Haven 2011b, Gallacher 2011, Chandler 2011, Constable 2012, Llorente 2011). This public narrative was sufficiently powerful that local businesses and individuals who publicly and privately opposed the original bill were effectively silenced in terms of local and state-level political influence.

Ultimately, key agents from Albertville’s social, political, and economic networks who wanted stronger anti-immigration political action were the most influential agents in the discursive flows informing local and state level immigration discourse and outcomes. With this in mind, this chapter explores questions of “How?” How did Albertville, a small, north Alabama city of under 22,000 people, become so important to the passage of this 2011 law? How did select Albertville residents and politicians become “power brokers,” and how did they respond to resistance to H.B.
56? How did the business community, particularly Albertville’s poultry processors, publicly and privately respond to the looming immigration law, and how did their voice get suppressed, and even bypassed, in the circuits of power? Lastly, how did Albertville discourse enter into the state-level circuits of power in such a way as to become potently influential in the framing and passage of the Alabama Immigration Law? To address these questions, this chapter first considers the question “why Albertville?” by locating Albertville geographically, demographically, and discursively, particularly in relation to issues of Latino immigration and immigrants in 2010-2011. Then, the chapter provides an overview of the relationship between the Albertville community and its poultry processors within its localized social, political, and economic context. To illustrate this relationship, this section ends with the specific experiences of a poultry processing company and its managers in the Albertville area in 2010-2011 to demonstrate the way in which local power networks were mobilized to defend the prevailing political, economic, and social concerns regarding immigration reform. The chapter closes by summarizing the specific, existing context of Albertville in 2011 and articulating the discursive flows that enabled Albertville to play such an important role in the state-level political landscape, despite the predicted, detrimental effect H.B. 56 on Albertville’s own economy vis-à-vis the impact on the poultry processing industry.

There were at least three reasons poultry processors failed to effectively influence local politicians in shaping H.B. 56 and the final immigration law. First, Albertville’s local and state representatives were integral to creating a powerful political machine that ultimately bypassed business voice at the state and the local levels with regard to immigration reform. This political operation was fueled by outspoken political operatives from inside and outside the state, fevered public support for H.B. 56 with few local voices opposing the law, and an existing xenophobic and racist history ready to be stoked by more than twenty years of cultural change resulting from rapid demographic shifts. Second, the culture of business advocacy in Albertville is a quiet, behind-the-scenes network, and many local poultry processors rely on state-level representation by an
association rather than engaging in local, self-interested, political advocacy. These practices intersected in this moment to produce a belated business response to the politics of H.B. 56. Even once mobilized, this response proved to be ineffectual in persuading self-proclaimed, “business-minded” Alabama politicians to modify H.B. 56 to better suit business’ economic self-interest in labor protection. Third, once the passage of the law became a clear foregone conclusion, it was not to poultry processors’ advantage to contest the unjust statute publicly. Despite evidence that some integrators were genuinely concerned about the looming impacts on their business and employees, both economically and as a matter of justice, the complicated, contradictory reputation of local poultry processors created a circumstance where they arguably stood to lose more than they might gain through any public protest. Poultry processors remained publicly quiet about H.B. 56, despite having deep objections to the law as written. Ultimately, this chapter reveals significant cleavages among economic and political elites in terms of power and influence, calling into question assumptions about how much power and influence corporations have with an elected Republican majority.

**Power, Immigrants, and Albertville: Power Brokers, Discourse, and the Circuits of Power**

This chapter shifts the lens of analysis to the specific, existing context in the local network to Albertville, Alabama. It considers Albertville’s local politics, its thought leaders, its sites of power and politics, and its influence on the creation of state level immigration policy. Building on Clegg’s theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 1, this chapter argues that in 2010 Albertville’s power brokers were uniquely positioned at the intersections of local, state, and national discursive flows such that important obligatory passage points (OPPs) were suddenly located within Albertville’s discursive landscape. This influential positioning was the result of multiple historical, political, and cultural factors that had coalesced by 2010 into the specific, existing context defining this locale in relation to immigration reform politics. By 2010, Albertville was clearly identified as a new
immigrant destination within Alabama. As such, new power brokers emerged who primarily were concerned with a discursive environment that *illegalized* (Bauder 2014) the undocumented population in invisible ways while also conflating the conception of “immigrant” with “illegal immigrant.” New OPPs became created at sites of anti-immigration mobilization that will be introduced in this chapter: The Eagle Forum rally (as described at the beginning of this chapter), Crime Tours of Marshall County, and other public, political events and rhetoric where anti-immigrant sentiment went essentially uncontested by business owners and most Albertvillians.

Another reason to look critically at the circumstances of Albertville in the flows of power at this time is not just because new OPPs were created *within* Albertville. Albertville *itself* became an OPP through which resistance was expressed and overcome and out of which flowed new forms of anti-immigrant discourse. The OPPs described in the paragraph above, collectively represented resistance by native Albertvillians to the previously observed, yet uncontested cultural and economic shifts they had experienced in their community (e.g., Little Mexico, Latino-owned and/or operated storefronts on Main Street, bilingual signage, etc.). Until this moment, the economic need for labor by the area’s poultry plants had enabled an uncontested, and largely unremarked, flow of immigrant bodies into Albertville who quietly contested the existing status quo of whiteness simply by living, and creating a home, within the spatial boundaries of Albertville. By 2010, Albertville, as an OPP, became a racial and political geography where native residents publicly expressed agentic resistance within the circuit of power. The case of Albertville’s immigration reform politics demonstrates how the achievement of agentic power can influence statewide politics, Ultimately, the agentic resistance expressed by these native Albertvillians successfully overcame the opposition within the local dispositional circuit and successful entered the state’s systemic and dispositional circuits of power with the expression of new formal and informal forms of anti-immigrant sentiment, one of which becoming H.B. 56.
Some Albertvillians emerged as pivotal power brokers on this issue, one of whom was Albertville Mayor Lindsey Lyons. In 2010, Lyons was an outspoken advocate for “immigration reform.” As a local, elected leader, he became a significant agent in the politically influential social relations of Albertville, and he and his allies generated local, political discursive flows of anti-immigration rhetoric and political support that transcended local circuits and entered state OPPs. He (and his allied local network) achieved power by voicing the predominant local discourse of that specific context that favored strident immigration reform while disciplining dissent into silence. Albertville’s organization of agents within this discursive flow quickly became politically aligned with state delegates who represented Albertville and who then lobbied for immigration law “reform.” Albertville’s agentic action (represented in anti-immigration rhetoric) flowed into the discursive node connecting local to state political networks. In this OPP that linked local to statewide political processes, viewpoints were aligned with and validated other entering discursive formations (e.g., existing political rhetoric, national policy entrepreneurs who were invited to Albertville, and partisan alliances). This cohesive narrative flowed into the dispositional circuit where it was transformed such that new meanings, rules, and relationships emerged. In so doing, this discourse exercised dispositional power by framing the immigration debate in a new way freighted with different public meanings to be examined in Chapter 6. Finally, the anti-immigrant political rhetoric was stabilized via repetition into a normalized meaning such that a new immigration law that was widely considered to be anti-immigrant became viable. In Clegg’s parlance, this was the innovation in the technology of discipline in the system circuit. This exemplifies Clegg’s “facilitative” notion of power: a fully achieved disciplining of multiple subjectivities, as evidenced by swift state legislative passage of the immigration law, and subsequent two year legal battle waged by Alabama state politicians despite clear economic, reputational, and even political damage. All of this occurred within an enabling specific, existing
context that included a nationwide rhetoric of immigration reform and local agitation over recent demographic shifts.

There are two interesting features of the agentic resistance expressed in this example. First, native Albertvillians’ opposition to the idea of immigrants living in community did not emerge suddenly in 2008, as will be discussed in the following section. This resistance existed long before, but by 2008, resistance became sufficient to challenge a “status quo” that had heretofore privileged the economic logic that sanctioned recruitment and employment of immigrant labor into area industries, particularly poultry processing, over cultural norms that privileged the traditions of whiteness. By 2010, Albertville’s cultural context had shifted such that Albertville’s anti-immigration advocates successfully exercised agentic power within the local OPPs to overcome and silence the previously prevailing economic logic. This Albertville “moment” was not an isolated event, but instead was informed by and integrated into, the broader national fabric of the contemporaneous, anti-immigration discourse. Arguably, the U.S. immigration rhetoric was simultaneously building toward a political “tipping point” reaching its emblematic zenith in Mitt Romney’s political decision to base his immigration plank on the policy of self-deportation in his run for the U.S. presidency in 2012.

The second notable characteristic of this resistance was that this conservative, traditional, economically depressed southern city was reacting against the logic of rational, economic self-interest. Latino immigrants came and settled in Albertville because of the demand for labor, largely generated by the poultry processing plants, that was otherwise unfilled by native Albertvillians (as discussed in Chapter 3). Through a relatively thriving industrial base, fueled in no small part by Latino labor in the poultry industry, tangential industries (e.g., banks, feed stores, real estate, etc.) have also thrived in this community while much of the rest of Alabama has struggled economically (discussed in Chapter 4). This new resistance against the logic of economic self-interest and in favor of a particular kind of racialized, cultural preservation effectively deployed by a select group of
native Albertvillians permeated the dispositional, facilitative, and integrative circuits of power in Alabama changing the specific, existing context of state level politics. Albertville, seen as an OPP, and the power brokers of Albertville who created new OPPs within the local circuits of power, were pivotal in the creation of a context that insulated H.B. 56 and its political advocates from any business sector arguments for labor protection. This thwarted channel particularly silenced poultry processors, the industry particularly blamed for the arrival of all immigrants, documented and not (Stock 2009).

The remainder of this chapter will detail the evidence of these new OPPs and the changes to the discursive landscape that emanated from Albertville as depicted in Appendix G. Albertville Within Alabama’s Circuits of Power (Chapter 5) and Appendix H. Albertville’s Circuits of Power (Chapter 5). Taken together, this chapter adds another layer of theoretic and lived detail to explain why Alabama passed the most restrictive, mean-spirited immigration law in the United States. As this chapter suggests, without key power brokers from Albertville intentionally interceding in the state circuits of power, this law might never have come into being.

**Why Albertville?**

The native residents of Albertville did not wake up one morning in 2010 and suddenly determine this was the day to oust the resident Latinos, some of whom who had been living in their community for more than two decades. In fact, Albertville can trace a twenty-year history of intermittent and outspoken political backlash against the cultural changes that were resulting from changing regional demographics. Even prior to the full-to-capacity 2008 Eagle Forum meeting described at the opening of this chapter, state representative Euclid Rains of Albertville noted in 1989 legislative debate that “the Spanish are creeping into Alabama.” In 1990, Rains went on to become the initial sponsor of a statewide referendum to amend the state constitution so as to “insure that the role of English as the common language of the state of Alabama is preserved and enhanced.” The Alabama English Committee, a grass roots organization, spearheaded this English-
only effort and allied with a national organization called U.S. English. U.S. English was the original source for this successful, official referendum, which was approved by 88.5% of Alabama voters (as quoted in Mohl 2002a, 264).

This 1989-1990 example provides evidence of two particularly relevant conditions in the Albertville social and political environment. The first is Alabama’s long history of relying on select “outside experts” to address issues to enable the disruption of changes to the status quo. In this case, outside experts guided immigration policy formation in Alabama. In 1989, U.S. English was an organizing force of “experts,” and by 2010, the Kansas Secretary of State (Kris Kobach), the Eagle Forum, and the Tea Party were poised to inform H.B. 56 (Greenblatt 2012, Talbot 2011). As will be discussed later in this chapter and in greater detail in Chapter 6, the role of outsider Kris Kobach (Republican) as a policy entrepreneur factored heavily in the creation of the Alabama Immigration Law. Importantly, these “outsiders” were welcomed by key Albertvillians precisely because they advocated for a status quo that reflected the white, rural history of North Alabama’s past. However, “other” outsiders also passed through Albertville who were advocating for Latino rights and opposing the law. These “outsiders” were described in a considerably more hostile tone and generally as coming in to create problems/cultural tension where none otherwise existed in Albertville. “Outsiders” in Alabama are typically associated with liberal political leaning and directly targeted the interests of groups not otherwise represented (i.e., Latinos) such as national media representatives (i.e., CNN), the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). In essence, outsiders appeared to be welcomed when they provided support to the presumed interests of an existing elite culture, but were considered warily, or even as intruders, when their cause threatened to disrupt existing social structures, if not economic ones. This conflict, between Albertville’s social and economic elite structures, is an important point. The political and economic elites are not a homogenous group, as will be made evident later in this chapter. Joey Kennedy, reporter for The Birmingham News, connected the immigration rhetoric to
that from Alabama’s Civil Rights history. In particular, he described the rhetoric used by Bill Armistead, then Chairman of the Alabama Republican Party, as follows:

Again, you know, and I [Kennedy] have written some pretty strong stuff in opposition to Armistead, but still in all...and he has said some stupid stuff as well. I mean when the immigration stuff was first happening, he used the exact same rhetoric that was used during the Civil Rights time when you had these ‘outside agitators’ coming in here...because groups were coming in from you know all over the country, not only to hold workshops to help people be able to cope with what the law was about to do, but to protest. You know he used that...’you know, he got all of these outside agitators coming in,’ and it was just a very, very bad rhetoric.\(^8\)

The condition that the 1989-1990 moment exemplified was the significant demographic, and subsequently cultural changes Albertvillians had been experiencing for over two decades; changes that had agitated many constituents from Albertville (Stock 2009)\(^9\). As stated by Raymond Mohl, “Rains’ district in DeKalb and Marshall Counties [in 1989] soon became a center of growth for Alabama’s Spanish-speaking population. The dramatic increase in Hispanic migration in the 1990s only confirmed the worst fears of the English-only proponents.” (2002a, 264) The kind of racialized and xenophobic political activism represented by the Eagle Forum rhetoric was not new to Albertville residents in 2008. Instead, these activists arguably found an Albertville audience primed and receptive to these kinds of messages as is suggested by the changing make up of their elected city leadership. Later rhetoric, masked in references such as “culture shock,” rather than the 1989 “the Spanish,” were living examples of the way in which Latinos were transformed from a nationality, to an ethnicity. Following the insights of Omi and Winant’s race formation theory, ethnicity serves as a coded reference for race (1994b).

By 2010, two members of Albertville’s City Council had a long history as outspoken advocates for heightened immigration enforcement: Councilman Chuck Ellis and Mayor Lindsey Lyons. Prior to 2008, Ellis, Lyons, and citizen Teresa Ferguson had created the Concerned Citizens of Albertville to serve as a forum for local immigration discussions, and this organization aided in the organization of area “crime tours.” These tours led many Alabama elected officials through predominantly Latino areas of Marshall County, “showcasing the ‘negative attributes on this illegal
alien issue we had here in Albertville,” according to Mayor Lyons (As quoted in Haven 2011b).

Lyons touted that “many federal, state and local elected officials and candidates took the tour, including 2010 [Alabama] gubernatorial candidate Bradley Byrne, future Alabama Governor Robert Bentley, Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange, former Alabama [Attorney General] Troy King, and U.S. Congressman Robert Aderholt” (Haven 2011b). State Senator Scofield (GOP) was then a candidate for the Alabama Senate, and he reflected on his experience of this tour:

I took a tour with the Vice Narcotics Officer of the City of Albertville police department. And we drove around, and I have to say that is really when my eyes were opened. He showed me some areas that was heavily populated with El Salvadorian gangs; I believed it was called MS-13 gangs. They had built out of mobile homes a fortified compound. They had parked these mobile homes in such a way that there was a central courtyard, like a fort kind of. At the time, I think I can say this now because it has been four years ago, they were conducting surveillance on that area. They had informants. They have done a really good job of getting informants, good people that would inform. The scary thing was the number of informants that they said had just disappeared over the years, which hit me. I really got to thinking when you have undocumented individuals, how easily it would be for them to just disappear and be buried somewhere in a mass grave. That really bothered me. I asked a lot about this, about children for instance. Children were in the same boat. Who knows, I mean they are human beings that, Lord knows what could have happened, and no one would ever know. No one would ever know.

They showed me...keeping in line with children... a mobile home that they were using as a brothel that was just down the street from Albertville Elementary, which is the largest elementary school in the state... Huge, and a lot of it is because of the increase in labor. This particular home was right beside a Baptist Church and a playground was right between it. The church and this trailer -- they found an 8-year-old little girl in there that was being prostituted. So to get back to undocumented, you don’t know what type of atrocities are being carried out on individuals, whether there are small children being abused or people being shot in the head and being buried in the middle of a cornfield. And the...narcotics folks had said, ‘there is no way to know.’ But when you are dealing with gangs like this you know it is happening.10

Scofield’s recounting of this experience made clear that that this tour made a significant impression on him. His reaction was steeped in outrage at the human condition he witnessed on these orchestrated tours. Lyons was quoted in the SandMountainReporter as saying, "We wanted to create something to open a lot of officials’ eyes and help us get some assistance here in Albertville...That was the ultimate goal - to help Albertville. Ultimately, it got to the point where it
really impacted the whole state" (Haven 2011b). In the case of Scofield, it was indeed influential as parts of this experience were reiterated throughout our interview as a key reason for his continued commitment to and defense of H.B. 56. Lyons was also quoted as saying, "people may not realize that Albertville had a large impact on this bill...Some of the ideas in the bill originated here in Albertville. I don't mean just from elected officials. I mean from people in the community that were very supportive of immigration reform" (Haven 2011b). Scofield’s reaction combined with statewide popular and bipartisan support of H.B. 56 suggests that Lyons was correct. These crime tours became new OPPs where new meanings were created in the immigration discourse for Albertville, and new power brokers became committed to the reforms advocated by Albertville politicians. For instance in my interview with him, Senator Scofield seemed genuinely distressed by what he experienced on that crime tour. However, it is worth noting that in some of my other interviews and in newspaper articles where other figures discuss the need for H.B. 56, the language from the crime tours used is eerily similar to that used by Scofield. Another interviewee, Matt Arnold, President and CEO of Marshall County Economic Development Council, repeated very similar stories about this particular area of Albertville. One interviewee from local media described the organizer and purpose of these tours as, “they [Eagle Forum] were big...they planned like a tour of the area where they could take politicians, State and National politicians, to see the worst areas and show them why they wanted the law...”11 In other words, these tours were designed to create an experience for its participants that translated into a particular political script that politicians would use as immigration reform advocates. This script traveled through Alabama’s political flows until the “truth” presented by these orchestrated tours was quoted by media and politicians across the state when discussing the “dangers” posed by undocumented immigrants across the state.12

While these tours indeed seemed organized to generate this specific political response, they did not appear to be used to agitate the local community. Instead, organizers targeted those power brokers with explicit political influence – the political elite, not the economic elite. My interviewees
raised questions about the validity of these tours. One interviewee was the former Assistant Superintendent of Albertville City schools, Joyce Bishop and another was Judit Gay, Migrant Recruiter. When asked about these alleged crime rings so close to the elementary school, they responded that they had heard about one instance of adult prostitution, but no reports of child prostitution or gang activity like that reported by Senator Scofield. This gap is an odd disconnect. Logic suggests that the Assistant Superintendent of Schools and someone intimately familiar with the immigrant community would have heard about gangs and child prostitution reportedly located across the street from the only elementary school in Albertville.

While the crime tours may have galvanized the support of state officials, they were by no means the only reason for widespread, local support for H.B. 56. Senator Scofield referenced the popular support of the bill:

The voters of this state had made it loud and clear. It was polling extremely high in every district that we polled. I mean even, like I say a bipartisan, bipartisan poll. They can say what they want, but I know as many what I would call Democrats, the few that are left here, they are very much for it; they are very much for it...

Some of this support can be attributed to the fact that by 2010, much of North Alabama had expressed a kind of cultural “chafing” resulting from the creation of permanent roots by their new Latino neighbors who were entering their schools, opening businesses, and living in newly formed “Little Mexicos” throughout the region. These “new” Latino community members disrupted the historic demographic and cultural patterns of whiteness in these areas (as discussed in detail in Chapter 3), and by 2010, native Albertvillians had new avenues (a.k.a. OPPs) through which to express actively their resistance to the experienced changes (Mohl 2002a, b). At the 2008 meeting organized by Eagle Forum, this chafing was expressed repeatedly by the majority of the 300 people in attendance. As reported in the SandMountainReporter, a sea of hands were raised in response to the question, “If you think you have a problem in Albertville, (will you) raise your hand?” (Green 2008a) This sentiment was specifically with the reference to “The Mexicans” provided in the example at the opening to this chapter.
Documented and undocumented Latinos living in Albertville are often homogenized into the same group. Although there is a reference to paperwork in the quote above, the larger image of “Mexicans” appears to be the speakers main concern. This kind of conflation of the legal status of Latinos was acknowledged as part of the issue for native Albertvillians by Senator Scofield; “I think a lot of it is folks, and this is unfortunate, but, you know folks can't; you know, if we had a Hispanic sitting in these chairs you couldn't identify which ones were legal and which ones were illegal. And so, I think a lot of people, unfortunately, when they see Hispanics they may think ‘ah...they're illegal.’”

Within this changed cultural context, where Albertville was framed as a town under siege, any resident Albertvillians who looked Latino lived under additional scrutiny in the build up to H.B. 56.

About Albertville

A small city located in the northeastern corner of Alabama, Albertville has some striking, and surprising, demographic characteristics. This community’s profile portrays the archetype of the small, southern city whose demographic makeup has been dramatically transformed by changing Latino migration patterns during the past twenty to thirty years across the U.S. south (Massey 2008, Odem and Lacy 2009, Marrow 2011, Schmid 2003). Albertville is particularly well situated for investigating the questions raised here for two interrelated reasons. First, in 2010, Albertville (the largest city in Marshall County), was home to two major poultry processing facilities with addresses within its city limits: Tyson Foods, Inc, and Wayne Farms, LLC, with two further processing plants located in Albertville and Boaz. Boaz and Guntersville, neighboring cities on either side of Albertville, each host sites for Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation, which is a third major poultry processor in the region. Figure 5-1 illustrates that geographically, if someone is living in Albertville, he or she could physically travel to one of five significant poultry employers within 15 minutes by car. The location of these poultry processors is significant because many in the region “blame” the poultry processors for the influx of documented and undocumented Latino immigrants to the region. The
intersection of blame and cultural chafing in Albertville was succinctly captured in a 2009 photo caption in *The Birmingham News* that said, "Longtime Albertville resident Judy Beekley blames the poultry plants for the immigration debate in Albertville. When Beekley and her husband moved to Albertville 20 years ago, she saw it as a clean and prosperous place where she never needed to lock her doors. Now she owns three guns" (Stock 2009). The relationship between the poultry processing industry and the native Albertvillians is complicated and fraught by a variety of issues, which are specifically addressed later in this chapter.

Second, Albertville is an example of a specific locality within North Alabama that has “experienced” immigration differently than has its parent state. From a state perspective, the speed and urgency with which Alabama enacted this legislation appears curious given that Latinos make up slightly less than 4% of the state’s entire population (2010 U.S. Census data), and Alabama does not have a high “unauthorized resident” Hispanic population relative to other states, according to the Pew Hispanic Center (Passel and Cohn 2011). In 2010, estimates of Alabama’s total undocumented population range from 2.5-3% of the state’s total population, but this total represents a significant rate of increase between 2000 and 2010 with the state’s estimated number of unauthorized individuals from 25,000 to 120,000 (Fernandez 2011, Passel and Cohn 2011, Sarlin 2013). The growth rate of immigrants was the statistic that most captured the xenophobic imagination of native Alabamians. In legal briefs, state attorneys noted a 145% rise in Alabama’s Hispanic population (to a total of 186,000) between 2000-2010, and these estimates included only a portion of the unauthorized people mentioned (as cited by Easton 2013). The relatively rapid rate of population growth, combined with this swift demographic change, was another distinctive trend for Albertville; one that likely influenced local public opinion and stimulated calls for stricter immigration law enforcement. Alabama political representatives cited the exponential growth of the Hispanic population in the state as one of the factors driving the need for the immigration law (Liorente 2011, Mears 2011). The perceived need for immigration change began in areas such as
Albertville, rather than being widely dispersed across the state, but soon captured the attention of Alabama politicians, and ultimately spread to Alabama constituents statewide. State Representative Kerry Rich (R-Albertville) was one such politician who was frequently quoted in the media with statements such as this one on the day the state legislature passed H.B.56: “The illegals in this
country are ripping us off...if we wait for the federal government to put this fire out, our house is going to burn down” (Sarlin 2013). The framing of the Latino “illegal” as a widespread economic threat to native Alabamians became an important narrative for the advocates of this law. It was instrumental in garnering public support, which ultimately silenced public economic arguments in favor of protecting immigrant labor, as well as the poultry processing industry’s political voice.

As described in Chapter 3, Albertville became a hub for poultry processing, an industry with a high employment demand for stable, low skill jobs. However, in the last decades of the twentieth century when the economy boomed, Albertville had insufficient numbers of employees from the local labor supply as its white residents migrated to higher paying, less strenuous jobs that also moved into the region. The Executive Director of Albertville’s Chamber of Commerce, Jennifer Palmer, said: “...the poultry industry has been slammed a lot of years, and really beat up for hiring immigrant workers. The fact of the matter is when the poultry industry really expanded here, our unemployment rate was so incredibly low they could not find the workforce they needed; that’s when that whole trend started. So what you have now is an immigrant workforce.” This change is reflective of the concurrent changes in immigration law (as discussed in previous chapters) and migration patterns that created conditions that transformed Albertville into a new member of the *Nuevo South*. Notably, Albertville’s Latino population in 2011 was approximately 27.9%; an atypical demographic makeup compared to the remainder of Alabama (Massey 2008), but quite characteristic of many rural “new destinations” across Alabama and the South, often referred to as the *Nuevo South* (Smith and Winders 2008). These cultural changes combined with relatively sudden population increases paint a picture of a community undergoing significant change at a rapid pace. However, the impact of a marked increase in Albertville’s Latino population provides only one part of this racial demographic story.

As presented in Chapter 3, Marshall County, and Albertville within it, has been and continues to be a predominantly white community. Albertville’s distinctive racial profile and
history is one key factor influencing why this area became such a public, anti-immigration hub during this debate. However, another was a shift in the economic precariousness of the region in 2008. The 2008 U.S. recession affected unemployment rates in Alabama, as it did nationally, and local and state lawmakers who supported H.B. 56 in 2010 used this newly emergent condition to make urgent claims regarding the economic necessity of the Alabama immigration law. Specifically, political candidates and lawmakers in 2010 argued H.B. 56 was motivated by the need to protect the jobs of citizens and legal residents, implicitly and explicitly framing undocumented immigrants as economic threats (Mears 2011).

The state-level political discourse of H.B. 56 as a “jobs bill” will be extensively addressed in Chapter 6. However, this chapter demonstrates that the local discourse regarding demographic, economic, political, and social shifts explain how Albertville served as a catalyst for statewide passage of the most strident immigration legislation in the United States.

The Cultural Geography of Albertville in 2010

Albertville’s new Latino residents have created visible changes in its public geography. The rise of spoken Spanish in
Albertville's public sphere is visually evident in downtown, and Albertville's main street is dotted with Mexican restaurants and tiendas. Albertville's Little Mexico is located just outside downtown. Interviewees in Albertville describe Little Mexico as an almost instantly recognizable area in their town, but this outsider (me) needed directions to find it. Located along Route 205, Little Mexico looks much like most of Albertville except that it is marked by a quite large Hispanic grocery at its center with a cluster of other Hispanic businesses nearby (see Figure 5-2. Albertville's Little Mexico: Anchor Grocery Store). Following the street directions from one interviewee, I drove through Little Mexico in the middle of the workday, and I observed (as instructed) a neighborhood directly behind the grocery store that was organized in several linear blocks of small homes with tidy yards. Some of the yards flew Mexican flags, some U.S. flags, and some flew both, but mostly, none were flown. A few yards had visual clutter, but I noticed this same tendency in similar, presumably white, Albertville neighborhoods. Absent any people in their yards, the flags were one of the very few visible signals to differentiate the Little Mexico neighborhood from any other Albertville working class area I had seen (See Figure 5-3. Albertville's Little Mexico Neighborhood, Typical Views). However, based on conversations with Albertville residents, it seems that this area is culturally marked by the long-term residents of Albertville as an area of alterity, even though visible demarcations of its Latino inhabitants seemed subtle.

Importantly, I describe these reactions as racialized, but the individuals from Marshall County that I interviewed did not. Interviewees generally described the reactions of the Albertville community as resulting from the “speed of cultural change” or “culture shock,” not reasons connected to race or ethnicity. However, I submit that this is a distinction without a difference, as supported by the work of race formation theorists (Omi and Winant 1994a, b, Omi and Winant 2008, Winant 2000). Interview responses bound up identifications of “otherness” and the racialization of their new Latino neighbors. An example of this otherness was connected to the emergence of spoken Spanish in the public sphere. Six out of the nine interviewees based in
Marshall County mentioned “Spanish” or “language” as a challenge for native Albertvillians. Interviewees, however, were particularly careful to emphasize that the response was cultural reaction, not a racial or ethnic one. The following is an exchange with Matt Arnold of Marshall County Economic Development Council and myself, and it is typical of these kinds of responses:

[Jamison] And then I am also hearing this kind of perception of this push back against kind of the influx of the Hispanic workers...you know...is it a fairness issue? Is it racial? Is it....

[Arnold] It's not a racial thing, it's a component of change. I mean at one point Albertville was changing very quickly. You had certain areas of the city where you know there were no English signs, there were no English businesses anymore and everything would be in Spanish, and I think for a community that prided itself in being a strong community, that was difficult. Now a lot of that has changed.18

Arnold implies a “strong community” as a homogenous unit. By correlation, the demographic statistics suggest a community bound by whiteness. Therefore, otherness was readily demarked by
language and appearance. For example, some respondents did suggest more direct links to issues of race to community tensions. In an exchange with a local media representative, she said:

[Jamison] How do you feel like the people of this region are adjusting to this new demographic, I mean, what kinds of evidence would point to how they are adjusting or not adjusting or both?

[005] I think they are adjusting slowly. I think it is still...they are still a little bit behind getting used to having, you know, people of different color and different language and everything here. I see it more in the kids in the schools than anything. You know like we mentioned before: the business owners, they work together a lot better I think from what I can see. But in the general public, I think there is still a pretty good dividing line there.

Interestingly, the word "racism" was used only twice in all the interviews I conducted, and one instance was from a poultry manager at Albertville’s Finest Chicken Cuts (the other, more expectedly, was from Mary Bauer of the SPLC). Specifically, he said “I mean some people are more vocal about it than others, but you know. I guess it leads back to racism or whatever you want to call it. There is just change and a lot of people didn’t like it when they [the Latinos] came.”

This culture versus racial divide was prevalent among the majority of interviewees, regardless of their support or opposition to H.B. 56. One of the most interesting exchanges on the topic of culture versus race occurred in the interview with representatives from the Albertville School district. Both were outspoken in their opposition to H.B. 56. However, Joyce Bishop, a native Albertvillian, and Judit Gay, a self-identified Mexican, differed in their reactions to questions of culture versus race, even in terms of the safety in answering the question:

[Jamison] So let me ask, if you don’t mind, in your experience here, certainly with the school system and we talked kind of obliquely about the transition...have you heard...has anybody talked about these adoptions, like explicitly kind of in racial terms? Is this an ethnic-culture-shock-race issue here?

[Bishop] It probably wouldn’t be from my perspective, but Judit has taught me that my perspective is not right about a lot of things. So, you speak to that Judit. Do you think it is a racial issue?

[Gay] (Pause in Silence...)

[Jamison] You don’t know? Okay. You know [I ask because] I’ve heard a lot of ‘them’ and ‘they’ and ‘those’ which....
[Bishop] ‘Those people…’

[Bishop whispers to Jamison that Gay is uncomfortable and is not going to speak freely about this topic now because a white cable repair man has entered the hotel lobby, and the interview environment is now potentially hostile - or minimally - unpredictable. The interview continues after the repairman exits.]

[Gay] Oh yeah, you hear that all the time. My husband is white, and he is from Aniston. And when he goes to buy his cigarettes, a little lady says, 'Those Mexicans are going to run me out of my house!'... my husband says, ‘...I got me one!’ [laughter]

These exchanges are intended to demonstrate the complexity of navigating these issues even among the elite of Albertville's community. The majority of native Albertvillians, even those with sympathetic viewpoints, were likely ill-prepared to respond to their experience of what they perceive as significant cultural changes in their community. Albertville has remained at the lower end of educational attainment measurements according to the 2010 U.S. Census. Albertville is not designated as a site of extreme, persistent, poverty as described by the USDA (see Chapter 4), but many in Albertville still struggle economically. According to data from 2007-2011, 23% of persons in Albertville lived below the poverty level as compared to the Alabama state average of 17.6% (U.S. Census Bureau 2012, City-data.com 2012, Passmore 2010). Many of these people were likely “working poor” as the 2011 unemployment rate in Albertville (8.3%) was actually below the Alabama seasonally adjusted average for October 2011 (9.3%) (Department of Industrial Relations Labor Market Division 2011). As of 2009, the percentage of Albertville’s Black residents who were poor was 36.6%; the percentage of Hispanic poor was 34.5%, and for the white poor, it was 18.6%. Albertville is below the state average in median household income and house value, and percentage of population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. It is also “significantly above” the state average in Hispanic and foreign-born populations (City-data.com 2009, 2012). In total, Albertville is a suddenly culturally diverse locale, with solid economic infrastructure thanks in large part to its poultry industry, but across all ethnic and racial categories, significant portions of Albertvillians remain in the lower realms of educational attainment and socioeconomic status.
Albertville: Employment, Poultry, and Community Perceptions

The leading employers in Albertville are in the food sector (predominantly male employees) followed by health care (predominantly female employees) (City-data.com 2009). 2.2% of Albertville’s companies are Hispanic-owned, as compared to 1.2% of total firms in Alabama (U.S. Census Bureau 2000a). Alabama as a whole has more poultry processing jobs in “cutting and trimming” than any other state in the country, and as discussed in Chapter 4, the industry is an important contributor to the state’s economic health (National Council of La Raza 2012). Pilgrim's Pride, Wayne Farms, Tyson Foods, and three smaller operations all operated poultry processing-related plants operating within ten miles of Albertville’s city-limits (2013f, 2013d). The work in these plants is typically blue-collar and physical in character. The demographic make up of the labor force for each plant is not publicly available, but one Albertville-area poultry processing company shared that its workforce was approximately 50% Latino. Nationally, the poultry processing industry disproportionately relies on Latino labor. Given the 2010 demographics of Albertville (approximately 28% Latino and 67% white), it stands to reason that Albertville’s other processors employ a similarly significant proportion of Latinos (National Council of La Raza 2012, Striffler 2005, U.S. Census Bureau 2010b).

In the aftermath of the 2008 national recession, Albertville experienced an increase in unemployment, albeit less than that of the state’s unemployment rate. However, as a rapidly changed community, Albertville’s local and state representatives were well positioned to become very politically visible in a call for immigration enforcement, particularly because they framed part of the advocacy for the law as a “jobs bill” to put legal residents back to work (2011a, 2011b, Banaszak 2011). Furthermore, in the aftermath of implementation of the Alabama Immigration Law, Albertville’s poultry processing plants witnessed an immediate impact via the exodus of labor in October 2011 (Roop 2011, Reid 2011, Reeves and Caldwell 2011, Robertson 2011). For example, Wayne Farms received wide publicity for the job fair it held to replace the exodus of immigrant
workers from its Albertville plant (Reid 2011, 2013d). While commenting on the law's impact, Senator Scofield remarked on this job fair. "Wayne Farms is another integrator...they held a job fair shortly after, and they had over 300 people show up and waited in line for over 3½ hours. That was a fact. I drove by and saw it."22 The statute's advocates hailed the mass exodus of Latinos and the resulting job fair as proof of the claimed need for the law to address economic issues (Llorente 2011). The discursive form of this law as “a job’s bill,” to benefit the “legal” community proved to be a powerful idea among Albertville's politicians and citizenry. Scofield illustrated this discursive point as he continued:

Our unemployment rate in this County decreased faster than any of our neighbors, any of our neighbors, during this time. I was eating lunch one day, and this was probably five or six months after the fact, I guess. A man walked in the restaurant and he was wearing overalls and was real dusty. Real dusty. I noticed him sitting across the room, and we made eye contact, and I winked at him. Later, he got up when he was leaving and came over there, and he came to my table and said ’Are you Senator Scofield?’ And I said, ‘Yes sir.’ He said, ‘well, I want to thank you,’ and I said, ‘thank me for what?’ He said, ‘I have been a brick mason, a trained brick mason,’ and said, ’I haven't had work for a very long time.’ He said it was noticeably different after the Immigration Bill passed. He said, 'I've got more work than I can handle.'

So, there you go. You know those are American taxpayers who are going to work..., and they can't tell me that Americans don't want to do these jobs. You go in these plants and there are white people; there are black people; there are Hispanic people; I mean there is a rainbow in there of people who are doing these jobs. When I was a kid I used to pick tomatoes and pole beans. They can tell me that Americans don’t...that is the biggest lie there is. I mean I am just telling you; I've seen it. You can talk to management, and they will tell you that. You know, I think it is a question of cheap, cheap labor; so, you get back to the corporate responsibility and the social duties of corporations...

...You know when we were trying to get our folks back to work, we meant we are going to get our folks back to work. And again, when we saw the unemployment numbers for Marshall County decline, we had not had a new plant open, and we had not had expansion of a plant. I firmly believe it was from jobs being opened up.23

Scofield's comments reflected several recurring themes expressed by H.B. 56 supporters.

The first discursive theme was that illegal immigrants were taking jobs from law-abiding citizens. The second was that these same native citizens would willingly perform the tasks of the jobs occupied currently by these immigrants. Third, the implication is that this is, at least in part, the
result of questionable labor practices by corporate entities, specifically implicating the poultry industry by association. Taken together, the argument was that H.B. 56 was the reason for lower unemployment. Scofield’s efforts were also praised by other state politicians, such as this quotation from Alabama GOP Senate Pro Tem, Del Marsh published in the SandMountainReporter, after passage of H.B. 56 into law: “I want to thank Senator Scofield for his commitment to the people across his district in working to pass a plan that keeps those who come here illegally from being a burden on our hard-working citizens and small businesses...We have passed a fair and responsible bill that serves the taxpayers’ best interest” (Green and Haven 2011). To be clear, Scofield did not directly implicate the poultry industry. In fact, earlier in the interview, Scofield stated that he doubted the major poultry corporations committed any major infractions against federal immigration law because their checkered legal past (with regard to the immigration issue) had already prompted industry wide change in the early 2000s. Scofield said, “because you remember when Tyson, Tyson got nailed. They got nailed, and that is when they all [other integrators] put on the brakes and said, ‘We better keep this from happening to us.’ So, I think that a lot of our actual plants, I would be surprised...[if the integrators] turned their nose [to the documentation requirements] and hired them [undocumented immigrants].” Nevertheless, the memory of the earlier offenses by poultry combined with the local reputation of poultry by the community, placed the integrators in the bull’s eye of blame for the “immigration problem.”

Scofield, and other advocates reinforced a contemporary impression that connects the poultry industry with hiring undocumented immigrants by using the “jobs bill” framing in advocating for H.B. 56. Despite Scofield’s defense of the integrators’ employment practices, by promoting the immigration law as a jobs bill, he (and others) created the impression that poultry processors were indeed the primary violators. His examples of Wayne Farms’ jobs fair and other job openings in the region’s poultry plants left an uncritical implication that undocumented immigrants fled the plants. These high profile examples reinforced the existing discursive
reputation held by many Albertvillians that connect poultry processors to “illegal immigration,” which then perpetuates the imagined connection between the local integrators with the existing animosity toward immigrants living in their community disciplining any contestations of this interpretation into silence because of its widespread public support.

The reputation of the poultry processing industry does not simply come from Albertvillian’s experience with the integrators in their community, but as discussed in Chapter 3, has been built over time. Ray Hilburn, from the Alabama Poultry and Egg Association (AP&EA) said:

I think the general public does not even know that we [the poultry industry] e-verify all of these workers. They have no idea. They thought we were just bringing these people in from Mexico and putting them in our plants. They went through an employment service just like everybody else does. I think the general public did not know that.26

However, the imagined connection linking undocumented labor to the poultry industry seems intractable given its persistence across a variety of state stakeholders. When asked about poultry and Latino labor, Joey Kennedy, the Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter from The Birmingham News said, “I know the poultry plants were, and probably still are in some way, big employers of undocumented people, in fact recruited them. They may not want to talk about it, I don’t know.”27

From a more regional view, Matt Arnold commented on the community perceptions of the poultry industry in this way:

...and you know, a lot of folks I would say probably blame the poultry industry for the influx of the Hispanic population in the community. Although it is....I mean you go into the poultry facilities, and it’s a very diversified workforce. People think it is 100% Hispanic in these facilities, but it isn’t. It’s not at all, and it hasn’t been. I don’t know that it ever was. And that’s just, you know, people are slow to change. Poultry has been really good to this County. And, people that are educated, and understand, and can look at it holistically, understand that.28

The point here is not to ascertain whether or not the poultry processing industry violates federal employment law, but rather, to assert that the Albertville community still believes that it does, as do many others across the state. Arnold summed up the local response to connecting the “cultural” changes in Albertville to the poultry industry in this way, “…I mean Albertville still has
the largest population, but you know, I think it was the speed in which the [demographic] change took place that really got a lot of folks...and blaming it all on the poultry industry.”

The quotations by Arnold point to a perceptual division that emerged in my interview data with local and state level stakeholders. Those individuals directly concerned with Alabama’s “big picture” economic health through positions such as business ownership, associations, or corporate upper management recognized the importance of the poultry industry to the overall economic health of the region. Those individuals, who are not in these positions, yet live in geographic proximity to these operations, do not. One code that emerged early from the interview data was “Poultry Imagined and Real.” The comments in this code revealed distinct differences in the way that local residents identify and prioritize what’s “real” about the poultry industry. For instance, Matt Arnold, as a stakeholder committed to the economic development of the region, is a staunch supporter of the poultry industry because of the region’s economic interdependence upon the infrastructure generated as a result of a robust poultry industry. However, for many Albertvillians, other forms of “real” are more important to shaping their “value estimation” of the poultry industry.

When asked why poultry is viewed negatively, Arnold commented:

I don’t know. I think a lot of people have a misconception of it. They think it’s dirty; it’s nasty, and it stinks. There are times in the summer when Albertville Waste Water Treatment Facility cannot handle the discharge that is coming out of the Tyson plant, and every now and then...it doesn’t happen often, but every now and then you can go by there, and the smell will just about drive you crazy. Like I say, it doesn’t happen that often, but when it happens, people remember it.

Senator Scofield offered a different example that equally vexed native Albertvillians – uninsured traffic accidents:

It [the topic of crime and unauthorized immigrants] was a [community] conversation that began to pick up, I would say in 2008, and when it really began to pick up and a lot of that was due to crime. The courts were filled all the time in this County, especially traffic court. Driving without a license.... In the state of Alabama you have to have liability insurance, driving without insurance. I myself was hit, rear-ended, by an illegal, and this was after I had actually won the primary. I was coming back from Birmingham at the State Party Headquarters for a meeting, and I was a Locust Fork and all of a sudden the car in front of me stopped and slowed down just like normal, and I look in my rear view mirror and there is a white Ford
truck barreling at me and BAM. So, I sat there, and a Hispanic gets out, and you
know comes to my window saying 'I'm sorry, I'm sorry.' I said, 'That's fine let's pull
over into this road right up here, and I am going to call the Blount County Sheriff.
And I told him, 'You go ahead, and you pull out first' because they would always,
nine times out of ten, they would run and just go. So I said, 'you go ahead, and you
pull out first and then I'll pull in behind you.' I told him, 'If you try to go I'm going to
follow you and I'll be on the phone and I'll have your tag number.' He says, 'OK, OK.'
So he pulls in, and the Deputy gets there five minutes later, and he comes up to me (I
knew him) and he says, 'Now Clay, you know more than likely you are going to eat
this.' I already knew that. I said, 'Well, I want to see this process unfold in front of me
to see what the people here are going through.' Because this was going on all the
time, all-the-time. You go up on Sand Mountain and you survey 10 people and one or
two of them will tell you that this has happened to them.31

Interestingly, Scofield's last sentence was anecdotally verified by an incidental conversation
I had in my hotel lobby the morning prior to this interview. In casual conversation, the desk clerk
shared her own, eerily similar traffic accident story, which provoked two other local residents
(friends of the clerk) to recount (with some palpable ire) the uninsured traffic stories of other
people they knew. The emphasis on “uninsured” is an interesting code. If these accidents are indeed
with undocumented drivers, the outcome is of no surprise since the undocumented cannot get
insurance. Nevertheless, Scofield’s account brings out two important points. First, the irritants and
inconveniences connected with the (apparently) increasingly common experience of uninsured
traffic accidents provoked community conversation that conflated the area’s immigrant population
and criminal behavior. Second, these and other experiences (e.g., “…to see what the people here are
going through…” ) defined Latino immigrants as disruptive in the collective imagination of many
native Albertvillians. Therefore, Latino immigrants became perceived as potential problems to
individuals in the region, and it was the poultry processors that brought them there.

For those native Albertvillians to whom their economic livelihood does not seem clearly
connected to a thriving poultry industry, the smells, tractor-trailers, new Latino neighbors, and the
very public presence of an industry perceived to be “dirty” is likely sufficient "real" evidence
enough to dislike living near the poultry processing plants. John Weathers, a long-time businessman
in Albertville and one of the few local outspoken opponents to H.B. 56 stated it this way:
I would say that for a pretty large minority of people that know and understand the infrastructure; understand that we wouldn’t have the quality of infrastructure. Every city has its problems, and you’ve hit on one of the key problems in Albertville, but Albertville has some assets, and one of them is, other than the roads, Albertville has a tremendous infrastructure system. Albertville pulls water off the Tennessee River and sells it to communities all over...within 50 miles of us. We have a the sewer system that has won awards for the cleanliness of the water and an investment...The electrical grid in Albertville is: it’s a local utility company and it is just in the city limits, and it is condensed, it is, in terms of a utility company, it is the crown jewel in the state of Alabama in terms of making money, it is a cash cow because they don’t have problems because they: it is condensed. It’s tight. They have a population that is a good cash basis. Albertville has a superb infrastructure system, superb.

But we have that ‘ugly, old poultry industry, ugly, ugly, nasty,’ you know and that is the perception. Part of that is...one of the plants is located next to the high school. That plant 12 years ago was going to buy some land on the opposite side of town and build a new state-of-the-art plant, but city council denied their zoning changes. It just broke my heart. There was a company wanting to make a huge multi-million dollar investment in the city, and the city wouldn’t let them do it. City council at the time wouldn’t do it because some of the neighborhood people raised hell about it, and didn’t want to do it. Part of the reason is both of the plants are highly visible. One of them is on U.S. Highway 431. One is right next to the high school: walk out of the door of the brand new gymnasium, and you are looking right at Wayne Farms.

As this quotations attest, the negative reputation of the poultry industry in Albertville does not simply come from the employment of Latinos, but rather is bound up with the spatial realities and discomforts of the industry itself. As a result, there is yet another segment of Albertvillians who are more welcoming and open to their new Latino neighbors, if not fond of the poultry plants. I noticed in my conversations that those Albertvillians who had reasons to develop personal relationships with someone (or many) from the Latino community were more opposed to H.B. 56. Typically, these opportunities were born out of the shared school system or in places of business. For instance, a casual eatery called Garcia’s Grille & Cantina was owned and operated by an Albertville developer, Jeff Beck, for six years. However, he closed his restaurant with a sign on the front door reading, “Thank you for your patronage. Due to the circumstances created by the immigration law, it is necessary for us to close Garcia’s.” While Beck was quite clear that his employees were operating with legal documents, he described the complicated social web in which his and other immigrant employees live: “It’s not that we were working illegal people...The problem
is you’re not going to get rid of just the illegals. You're going to get rid of a lot of legal people.”

Further, Beck reflected on the impact the immigration law would have on his community in the long run. Beck was concerned by how politics changed local social dynamics:

H.B. 56 and the local politicians painted a real negative picture of the Hispanic population...I wish they [the state and local politicians] would’ve found some common ground, but they’ve put a real big distance between the Hispanic population from a humanitarian and cultural perspective. A lot of people are more negative now than they’ve ever been (Green 2011).

There is an attitudinal divide noted between the people of Albertville on the issues of immigrants and poultry processors in the city. However, certain sectors of the populace see clear economic and cultural value stemming from the influx of immigrant residents. Among the local advocates of welcoming the immigrant influence in Albertville was Joyce Bishop, former Assistant Superintendent of Albertville City Schools:

For somebody like me, or like most school people, it is A-Okay. It is just people who don’t see that aspect of it, but their viewpoint is like [State Senator] Clay Scofield’s. It is from up here looking down on the whole. You know, they are not concerned with the...well, I’m not saying they aren’t concerned; they don’t see what we see as far as the advantage of having the diversity. They are looking at it from the business point of view. But I’m telling you; I was like, well, the economy of Albertville will be completely shut down, and I am an educator not a businessperson, but you could see that.32

However, Bishop is no fan of most of the poultry processors in the area. As a leader in the local school system, she sees most of the local poultry operations as contributing far less to the community than they gain. Bishop and Gay recalled many instances where they were asked come to area poultry plants to “...talk about what can we do in the schools to make it better for your children, or what could the community add to make it a nicer community for you all? The poultry people wanted us there talking.” According to Bishop, the school system was an important benefit the poultry processors promoted to their employees because:

...they wanted those families to stay here...Because of the good work. I tell you, Melissa [Bishop’s daughter who works Wayne’s Farms], she will tell you right away because the Caucasian white people, I mean, they aren’t going to do the work. Or they are going to end up, [turning to Gay] I mean what would you say there are? I don’t even know, but I would say that 90% of their workers are Hispanic at Wayne.33
However, Bishop also contends that most of the Albertville-area poultry processors are not good community partners in terms of providing financial assistance or donations to the same services they depend upon, such as the school system. Scofield and Bishop do not agree about the approach to immigration reform, yet they do share two perceptions: first, poultry processors are poor community partners who could do more to support the community within which they operate. Second, there is one exception: Albertville’s Finest Chicken Cuts (AFCC). AFCC, an Alabama-based further processor (i.e., company that creates specific poultry cuts and/or products as ordered by integrators) will be specifically discussed at the end of this chapter.

Despite this general impression of poultry processors as poor corporate partners, Bishop still recognized the criticality of the industry to the Albertville economy (e.g., “...well the economy of Albertville will be completely shut down...”). The interviewed members of the regional business community, as mentioned, echoed this opinion. This recalls the question of: how did the power brokers in the business community respond to the looming H.B. 56, given that at least some segments of the local business community were not in favor of the law? The remainder of this chapter shifts the focus from the local community reaction to consider how the Albertville business community responded to H.B. 56.

**Poultry Processing within The Politics of Albertville Business**

By the time I arrived in Albertville, my conversations with a variety of state-level poultry and business representatives from organizations such Alabama Poultry and Egg Association (AP&EA), Alabama Farmers Federation (Alfa), the Business Council of Alabama, and the Chamber of Commerce Association of Alabama, revealed their opposition to H.B. 56 as it was written. In most cases, these organizations had engaged in active political opposition to the bill (as written) within the back channels of Alabama politics. However, it was not yet clear why opposition from these groups never appeared in the public sphere. Jennifer Palmer, Executive Director of the Albertville Chamber of Commerce, explained the answer to this question, and importantly, this local answer
illuminated the rationale for business’ public silence at every level of analysis. Palmer explained the process of how businesses intersect with politics in this way:

Our chamber represents all different kinds of our member businesses. I understand what you are talking about, and I guess when I first talked to you I thought I really don’t know how much help I am going to be in what you are looking for. Because our approach to things is a little bit different. We [The Chamber] know our community. We know our town, our county, our state. We know what functions for us. So when you are talking about legislation, and you are talking about not seeing how the business was responding and that kind of thing... No, you wouldn’t because the way things function here; I mean, we build relationships. That is my job. I build relationships with our local politicians, our county, our state, and so how we function is when we have an issue that affects our business community, a lot of times they will just contact me. I go one-on-one with those politicians and say, ‘Hey, have you thought about it this way, have you looked at it from this avenue, have you...?’. We handle things a lot of times behind the scenes. You won’t see that publically.34

Therefore, within this networked political system, poultry processors become one voice of many within the local business community, regardless of a disproportionate interest in this particular issue. Further, Palmer points to the “backstage” nature of political influence. Palmer also suggested that this “behind the scenes” approach is a common business practice for poultry processors. Even more than the local Chamber, poultry processors predominantly rely on the AP&EA to handle local poultry interest in state-level politics, and AP&EA (as was the larger business community) was told that immigration legislation was “given,” not a “possibility.” Said differently, in 2010-2011, Alabama’s business community was informed that there would be an immigration law; their only option seemed to be to try to make it less damaging to business. One Albertville poultry manager said:

Well the best weight we have is still through our Association [AP&EA]. It really is. You know our Association is generally going to team up with a lot of the other AG [agriculture] business groups down there. So, if we can get all of those working together then we have a better chance. They kind of told us from the beginning because of the way everything got rolling and with the chance for the Democratic stronghold and above legislature that has been there forever, you know the Republicans saw a way to change that all and this was one way they were going to do it was ride the Immigration Bill all the way through. They told us pretty early that we were going to have a Bill, we just need to try to work it to try to get as good of a Bill as we could get.35
By the time local poultry processors were fully aware of the potential implications of the immigration debates in 2009-2010, H.B. 56 was already a fast moving, political popular bill that essentially arrived at the feet of local poultry processors as a fait accompli, closing off many political channels.

Bishop and Scofield noted AFCC as the only local poultry processor that in their view was engaged in Albertville as a corporate citizen; however, Palmer had a different view. According to her, the poultry industry has been an important positive force in the efforts to acculturate Latino immigrants into the region. She said, "What the poultry industry as a whole decided to do was roll up their sleeves behind the scenes and try to help the situation. And so a lot of people never even saw that.” Taken together, a picture begins to emerge of an industry that has a business culture that mandates a low, public profile. Palmer also cited other examples of corporate community support:

They are very, very supportive, you know, as far as Wayne Farms and Tyson are the two main that are in our city limits that I deal with the most. They are very supportive of the school system, community outreach, a lot of the charities around. They constantly are raising money, doing benefits and different things and behind the scenes [my emphasis] just donating to those entities to help along with that. They have been very active in helping the school systems come up with funding for different programs and translators and they provide translation for different things and they have been very involved in that.36

This perspective is a stark contrast to Joyce Bishop's quite negative perception of these local poultry processing plants. There are several possible explanations for this disconnect. First, a school administrator and the executive director for the local Chamber likely have very different expectations and priorities for corporate community engagement. Second, these individuals also have different vantage points from which to assess the value of corporate contributions to community value. Additionally, part of the difference may be attributable to the poultry processors' apparent strategy of purposeful public silence. Note Palmer's reference again to "behind the scenes" involvement of poultry processors in the above quotation. I suggest that this purposeful silence is ultimately detrimental to attaining interdependent economic, political, and corporate social goals (as exemplified by the public perception held by Bishop). However, the strategy of public silence
could also be seen as a legitimate, rational, and perhaps the most viable option at the time while the poultry industry managed and were managed by both real and imagined reputations. In other words, local poultry processors had nothing to gain by speaking out publicly against H.B. 56, but potentially, lots to lose.

As a case in point, the last section of this chapter provides a more deeply contextualized account of one local poultry processor to illustrate the business responses and challenges faced during the debate over H.B. 56.

**Albertville's Finest Chickens Cuts (AFCC)**

“Well you have to think too, these plants are local. Yes they may be big corporations, but all of their employees live here. Their kids go to school here. You know, they are bought into this community, and so you know it may be that the pros of one part and the con of the other weren't in their own households. You know, you don't know.”

~Jennifer Palmer, Executive Director
Albertville Chamber of Commerce

As opposed to other poultry operations in Albertville, AFCC appears to have developed a social capital network within the community unique among integrators. Therefore, it is useful to consider the experience of AFCC and its management with regard to H.B. 56 because if any poultry processor could have influenced local political outcomes, it might have been AFCC. AFCC emerged as the outlier in the interview data in several ways.

First, when discussing poultry processors in Marshall County, AFCC was consistently marked as the “exception” to an industry that was otherwise regarded negatively by the community. Second, AFCC falls into the category of “further processing” within the poultry industry. A further processor enters the supply chain at the end of the manufacturing process. They render the bird into particular, contractually-specified cuts of meat; for example, the ubiquitous chicken nugget is a product of further processing. These manufacturers often serve as a connection between a particular integrator (the company that shepherds the chicken from egg to meat) and the retailer
(who sells the chicken part to the consumer). Matt Arnold shared one example illustrating AFCC's operations:

Now [AFCC] would take product from...I think Tyson is who they [used to] process for. Now, They'll take product from Tyson [and] further process it. I know one thing they made at one time...they bought a special laser cutting machine that was used because Chick Fil-A wants every piece of chicken to look, feel and taste exactly the same: exactly the same. So, they have to be very precise in their cutting. And so, at one time that is all this one plant made was just for Chick-Fil-A. I know at one time, they were bringing in product from Tyson, processing it for Chick-Fil-A, and a couple of other customers, and then it was going back out, but it was Tyson's [product]. They were just being paid a fee to do that. They didn't even own the chickens. Those chickens were coming in already slaughtered, and then they were processing it and sending it back out.37

This is an example of one part of AFCC’s business model, but generally speaking, it is fair to describe AFCC, as a specialty meat cutter that produces customized poultry products to the retail market both directly and through integrator relationships.

Two additional, intertwined reasons for AFCC’s position as an outlier are its founder and its commitment to its employees and community. Pat Cluck38 is a charismatic, unconventional, and occasionally controversial Alabama entrepreneur who was noted as someone who wielded significant power and presumed influence in Albertville. Relatedly, AFCC is one branch of a larger limited liability corporation owned by Mr. Cluck, with multiple operations throughout Alabama. Not all of these engage in poultry operations, but the entire organization demonstrably is committed to a business strategy that invests in the well-being of its employees and communities within which it operates. No corporate social responsibility report was made available to me, but evidence points to AFCC engaging in behaviors aligned with the Creating Shared Value model (discussed in Chapter 1) (Porter and Kramer 2011). As opposed to other major integrators in Albertville that are part of corporations concerned with interstate, transnational, and global business strategies, AFCC focuses on success within Alabama. Pat Cluck never responded my interview request, but a clear picture of Cluck’s strategic and leadership characteristics emerged from other interviewees. The six interviewees that mentioned AFCC referenced, in some way, that AFCC and Pat Cluck were an
exception to the common understanding of local poultry processors. For example, Joyce Bishop, who was quite critical of the contribution of integrators, grudgingly made this remark:

I know that his [Cluck's] [AFCC] employees funded the [Freedom’s Foundation\textsuperscript{39}] Program for Albertville City Schools for the 5th grade, and when we had the kickoff one of the principals asked, ‘If you helped contribute to bring this program to us would you please stand,’ and several Hispanic families stood up that they had contributed. So, they cooked on their lunch breaks and sold plates and made the money to do that. So, he’s [Cluck’s] a mixed bag. That’s all I know about him [Cluck].\textsuperscript{40}

Managers from AFCC elaborated on how Liberty’s Legacy fit into the organizational scheme. They described it as “more of a not-for-profit” branch of the organization. They explained the reason for its existence this way, “...[Cluck] is a big patriot, and he wanted to bring back patriotism and super citizenship programs back into the middle and high schools so started a company and that is really all they do.”\textsuperscript{41} Cluck does use his companies to re-invest locally albeit through clearly value-laden initiatives. Senator Scofield, also a critic of the integrators involvement in the community commented this way: "...Like for instance, one of our really good [processors]...it is a home grown one, AFCC. They’re good friends." And later, “Now AFCC they do stuff but... Pat Cluck, who is the owner here, now [he] is an individual that gives back SO much to the community. He is a great person. Pat is terrifically engaged. He is just a genuinely good person. I think a lot of him.”\textsuperscript{42}

Other interviewees echoed the sentiment of Cluck as a “good” corporate neighbor; yet when it intersected with poultry, even Cluck was not able to persuade areas of Marshall County to expand operations. Matt Arnold illustrated the powerful way in which the reputation of poultry limits economic investment:

...you know [Cluck] is very good to his employees. He took some criticism a few years ago. Locally, there was a lot of people that...he had built two or three plants and then some local leaders kind of said ‘well wait a minute, we've got enough poultry, we kind of don't want any more,’ and there was some push back. I know in Arab [an adjacent city in Marshall County], he wanted to build a facility...These are state-of-the-art multi-million dollar, you know $20 million facilities. He has a lot of money invested in these things. Anyway, then he wanted to build another one and he was looking over in Arab and the city leaders basically said no. And their standing was that they had areas zoned, but the only land that was available that he could have put a facility in was not zoned properly for that type of processing and
the city council said ‘no we aren’t going to rezone that.’ Guntersville did a similar thing.

We are working on Conner’s Island that is one of our business parks...It is about a 400 acre park. He wanted some property over in this section of the park, and we talked about it, and the industrial board said ‘no, that is not the type of manufacturing that we want for this park.’

This example illustrates economic limits on corporate activity that are specific to the poultry industry. Cluck and AFCC could not garner sufficient political capital to overcome the reputation of the poultry industry (i.e., one that would thwart investment by “high tech” companies”) despite being recognized as good corporate citizens within Marshall County. Arnold explained how the reputation of the broader poultry industry infiltrated this specific business negotiation for AFCC and Cluck. Arnold said, “So, during all that time...Pat was real vocal about ‘look I am very good to my employees.’ At the time he had a health care clinic for his employees with Spanish speaking physicians and...he is top notch...he does it right.” However, Arnold also referenced criticism Cluck received when creating AFCC; “[Cluck] got very upset when people criticized him for creating these companies that brought in Hispanic labor. People thought he was paying them low paying wages, and it’s really not the case.” These examples clearly demonstrate the pervasive influence the negative reputation of the poultry industry had on this local poultry processing operation. Even a business like AFCC, one that is generally recognized as engaging in positive corporate behaviors (e.g., community altruism, employee health services, and economic investment), does not prevent negative claims about labor supply (i.e., Hispanic), or being the wrong “type of manufacturing.” AFCC was not the desired “clean” or “high technology” manufacturing companies that, as discussed earlier, attract a different type of labor (i.e., “white”) and bring a different kind of corporate reputation to the region. Therefore, when AFCC representatives entered the local circuits of power, their claims advocating for their own economic self-interest (i.e., new poultry processing facility in business park), were denied by the power brokers (i.e., the city council) within that OPP. In so doing, status quo was reaffirmed and the
community meanings that constructed poultry processors as dirty, low technology companies responsible for the Latino residents in Marshall County were reified.

These local understandings of poultry processing exercised the same kinds of limits (social, economic, and political) on poultry processors during the H.B. 56 debates. One result was that AFCC, as an economic and social actor, was unable to advocate effectively for its own self-interest on behalf of its labor, thus also limiting the possibility that they could have been an additional source for social justice for their Latino workforce. In speaking with managers from AFCC, they were very aware that despite being strongly opposed to H.B. 56 as individuals and corporately, they had very little recourse through which to protect their Latino labor from the ramifications of the looming immigration law. One AFCC manager (referred to as Manager B below) shared his personal opinion this way:

It was very frustrating. I mean I am a Republican, too, but not as much of one with that group as I used to be just because...you know, the way everything happened. Because I don’t know what percent of the law has been in effect [now], but it is not very much. There were just some things that were attached to it that really did not need to be there. I mean there could have been a way to do a reasonable [bill], don’t ask me what it would have looked like, but a reasonable immigration bill without having children, or parents of children themselves, potentially checked in school. Because for a while around here, the police when they knew the shift change was coming from our plants or others, road blocks would get set up. You know our folks or anybody’s people would go through it and they didn’t have a driver’s license with them that day then they could have been taken off and remanded in jail overnight (Manager B).45

The AFCC managers interviewed indicated that they were outspoken about their opposition to H.B. 56, as written, in a variety of personal and professional forums. One manager was a member of the Marshall County Manufacturer’s Association where he reported speaking out against the bill. Further, both these managers indicated that in their private spheres they believed that their opposition was generally known, but they also noted that few people ever broached the immigration issue with them.46 In their official capacity, these managers also reported attempts to influence their local politicians but to no avail. Managers A & B at AFCC recounted their experiences of trying to lobby for changes to H.B. 56 with their state representatives:
[Manager A] knows Clay [Scofield] better than I do. I know you talked to Clay and I talked to Kerry Rich [GOP-AL State Representative], and [it got] pretty heated at one time with him....[I] just [discussed] problems that we had with the Bill, but most of [the lobbying] was done through the Alabama Poultry and Egg. And Johnny Adams is our Executive Director down there, and he is also the person that does the lobbying in Montgomery for the Association. So most of our efforts went through him because of his contacts and knowledge about how that system works down there.47

When asked about their experiences of speaking with their local representatives, Manager A indicated that Scofield was somewhat uninformed about their labor processes. He said:

I think he [Scofield] was surprised to see what the poultry industry actually does: that we were leading the pack in what we do [for employment status verification]. So I think he was a little surprised at what we do...Yes, and we do internal audits and external audits, and those type of things to be sure we are compliant [with labor laws]. I think he was surprised at that.48

Unlike Manager A’s experience with Senator Scofield, Manager B had a much more negative experience with State GOP Representative Kerry Rich, an outspoken supporter of H.B. 56 (Gallacher 2011, Chandler 2011). Manager B left his meeting with Rich with the feeling that nothing he had to say would make a difference in the outcome of the final statute. Manager B said, “Now with [GOP State Representative] Kerry Rich, I still think a lot of the percentage of his motivation was purely political, and that is just my opinion, and it hasn’t changed from just before when I was talking to him to...you know, with how the things have happened.”49 These AFCC managers also indicated that their conversations with Albertville Mayor Lindsey Lyons and Councilman Chuck Ellis were similar to the one with Rich in that their advocacy fell on deaf ears. Notably, these managers used the same kinds of business tactics described by Jennifer Palmer: one-on-one, behind the scenes, and private. None of these managers mentioned writing editorials, participating in open forums to voice opposition, nor aligning themselves with other individuals or groups who stood in opposition to the law.

Additionally, these managers reaffirmed the belief that the most effective lobbying for the poultry industry occurred through AP&EA, the state-level Association. However, from the
viewpoint of these managers, the outspoken advocacy of local political leaders was singularly responsible for riling up of Albertville’s anti-immigrant fervor. In the words of Manager A:

[Manager A] What’s happened here is that we have 3 cities – Guntersville, Albertville and Boaz, and basically, it is one place. The cities of Guntersville and Boaz have chosen to remain silent through all of this and they both have a large, not population of residents, but of working Hispanics in their plants...But they saw what it [poultry processing] brought to their cities so there was never an issue with them, but it was only the two or three people inside that Albertville City Council and the Mayor, and it exploded from there. Now since they are out of office everything is back to normal, and the Mayor now and the City Council are okay with how things are now.

[Jamison] ...So let me make sure I have that statistic right...it is a higher percentage of working Hispanic population in Boaz than in Albertville?

[Manager A] Well, Guntersville and Boaz have the largest two poultry plants. And it is Pilgrim’s Pride. They were the #1 employer in the County. Now the one in Boaz is closing this month. But even though they had those two large plants, and they were the largest employer in the county, those Mayors and Councils were never in the paper.50

Essentially, from the viewpoint of Manager A, the local firestorm surrounding the H.B. 56 debate was created by a very few, vocal, local political agents. Both Managers A & B recounted the local story that Kris Kobach (Kansas R-Attorney General, and architect of H.B. 56) became involved in Alabama politics at the behest of either Lyons or Ellis. Assuming these managers are correct, and other evidence provided in this this chapter suggests they are, a question of the efficacy of a business’ political strategy that relies on state-level lobbying is raised, particularly when key issues emanate out of a local context. AFCC and other Marshall County poultry processors likely missed a window of opportunity to reclaim some political power in this process by ignoring the threat to their immigrant labor that was germinating in their own local communities. By relying on existing cultural patterns of Alabama business, poultry processors missed opportunities to quell the rising political furor by entering into critical local OPPs earlier. For instance, had more Albertville-area poultry processors (beyond the efforts of AFCC) invested in more effective, more public, community building at an earlier point in time (e.g., in the schools or other civic organizations), perhaps some of local furor would never have erupted. In this case, the immigration reform issue may have been
“stirred up” by a few Albertvillian political elites, however, this discursive shape clearly appealed to a wider, receptive Albertville audience. This fervent, local support became the fan that enabled local politicians, such as Lyons and Ellis to gain traction locally; creating momentum to influence state-wide politics. This vocal support, and the rise of immigration as a top priority, was one of the elements that surprised Manager B:

I guess I was a little bit surprised about how vocal some of the political people were about it. And how one-sided it became. Not all but just a few just like I said, it became their mission. Above everything else that we had going on at the time, it was their mission. You know, the economy was probably on everybody’s mind, but this is the thing that we lived and breathed for several months. That was a little surprising.51

Another prevailing theme these managers noted was the limited recourse they had as a business to assist or protect their employees. Despite AFCC’s corporate commitment to protecting their employees, these managers’ reported being hampered significantly by the emergent legal and political boundaries. They reported that internal to the plant, the most they could do was provide as much information as possible to their workers. Manager B said:

[We] would post flyers and everything about what the law actually said because you heard all kinds of things said that weren’t true that maybe got campaigned on but never got put into the law which made it seem even worse than it actually was. So, [we were] more of an information source, and you know a place where they could come and ask questions if they wanted to.52

Watching and hearing about the impact of the immigration law was difficult for these managers; despite being an employer following the legal requirements in place, turmoil still ensued. In recounting the law’s aftermath, Manager B said:

But when the law got passed it affected our folks more than just whether they were legal working for us because if they had family members that were not and could not work for whatever reasons, then they may leave and go to a state that didn’t have laws like that. So we saw, initially, some fear and some people taking actions, and then you know for a few weeks, it was a lot of concern and a lot of chaos, and then it kind of settled down. And then, just over time, as they went through the school verification type thing you know that kept…I know we had people leave the area because of that, they just weren’t going to put up with it.

...I only heard about a tenth of 1% of them [immigrant stories], but it created a lot of panic, hardship. For [the law] to come in and create all the havoc and then, over the
next two years just be dismantled down to what it is today, is just a terrible exercise for people to have to go through.53

Expressions of genuine concern for Latino employees by poultry processing managers are not unprecedented. In studies in other meat processing locales, Marrow, Fink, and Striffler all document moments of individualized, often complicated, human compassion from a manager toward his/her employees (Marrow 2011, Striffler 2005, Fink 2003). Arguably, a difference in this case was that these managers were not just voicing their concern and exercising agency as individuals, but also attempted to exercise agency as a corporate entity with their local political power brokers. Despite AFCC’s involvement with Albertville and the broader community as a respected corporate citizen, AFCC and its leadership proved powerless to protect their legally documented employees from the hardships created by this law. Further, they were similarly powerless to shape or alter the form of H.B. 56 despite being a law-abiding, economically powerful, company that would be predictably affected by the law’s draconian approach to immigration reform. Given the efforts of these local poultry processing managers to influence H.B. 56 through their politicians, it is clear the local power brokers were aware of the potential ramifications on local business, not to mention the local Latino community, prior to the passage of the Alabama Immigration Law. This knowledge, in conjunction with the particular history of Albertville and poultry processing, does raise tough questions: were Alabama politicians (individually, and on behalf of their constituents) singularly aiming to punish “illegal immigrants?” And/Or, was there an intentional political aim to indirectly punish those who brought Latinos to Alabama in the first place?

**Conclusion**

Albertville, a small North Alabama city, largely reliant on the poultry industry for its economic well being, was the catalyst for building political momentum leading to rapid passage of the Alabama Immigration Law. On its face, this seems like a conundrum. Why would a conservative,
economically struggling city initiate an attack on one of the foundational industries propping up its economy? As presented by this chapter, the answer lies in a fairly straight-forward calculus involving a changed contemporary context that reflected the intersections of Albertville’s specific racial history, changing local demographics, changing political landscapes, a behind-closed-doors business culture that links the local to state politics, and a long-term, tense relationship with local poultry processors. As a result, new power brokers emerged among the political elites of Albertville who articulated discursive forms that proved persuasive in the local OPPs. These discourse were so influential that draconian immigration reform (espoused by political elites) was able to overcome previous discursive forms that protected economic elites from the kind of expected, detrimental effect that H.B. 56 was predicted (and did) have on Albertville’s own economy vis-à-vis the poultry processing industry.

Poultry processors failed to influence local politicians in shaping H.B. 56 and the final immigration law for several reasons. First, Albertville’s local and state representatives bypassed business voice at the local and state levels with regard to immigration reform. The organizational efforts of motivated power brokers used Albertville as symbolic evidence to unite a highly connected network of political players on the issue of immigration reform. These power brokers used the Eagle Forum Meeting, organized crime tours, brought in outside experts (e.g., Kris Kobach), and created other public forums to connect local to state politicians with little opportunity for business input. This is not to say local businesses did not speak their opposition to these politicians: the case of AFCC provides evidence to this opposition. However, the poultry processors clearly lost efficacy in the process when they were able to voice concerns. A contributing factor to this diminished efficacy was the prevailing business culture that dictated private, political conversations with Albertville’s politicians. This private, quiet approach proved to be ill-matched against the vocal political operations publicly advocating for reform with outspoken operatives who tapped into a wellspring of widespread public support for immigration reform. With few local
voices publicly opposing the law, a well-organized Republican Party takeover that campaigned on immigration reform, and an existing xenophobic history stoked by recent and rapid demographic change, Albertville poultry processors produced a belated political response that proved to be ineffectual at best. Additionally, with the passage of H.B. 56 presented as a clear foregone conclusion, poultry processors, as law-abiding yet unpopular economic actors, stood to gain little by publicly contesting the immigration law, despite genuine concern about the impact on their business and employees. These circumstances eradicated the potential of local poultry processors to achieve the implicit CSR commitments made to the protection and safety of their Latino employees. Poultry processors were ill equipped to protect their Latino workforce from the community itself. Based on AFCC accounts, poultry processor managers felt their individual opinions were publicly known; however, their opposition was clearly not influential in the OPPs shaping H.B. 56, nor in calming the anti-immigrant rhetoric from the community. Furthermore, given their known opposition, these managers likely were not included in community conversations that did matter in the immigration debate.

Lastly, the case of Albertville reveals an important finding about the workings of power that differentiates political and the economic elites when confronted with questions of political efficacy regarding immigrant labor that are embedded in historical, social, and cultural systems reflecting an existing order of power. In the local sphere, Albertville’s political elites wielded power that prevented economic elites from influentially voicing concern about H.B. 56. In the realm of elected politics, state politicians were ideologically committed to the broader, statewide Republican platform that included self-deportation as a plank in the platform (to be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6), which then prevented local poultry plant managers from entering some local OPPs with regard to immigration reform. Local politicians became avid advocates for immigration reform that aligned with and reinforced the community politic, resulting in galvanized support of the strictest of immigration reform measures. Taken together, business opponents to H.B. 56 had little
political recourse to voice concern, and this was exacerbated by a business culture of only behind-
the-scenes advocacy.

As will be examined more deeply in Chapter 6, Albertville and Alabama operated under a
presumption that political and economic elites were one in the same, as captured by the common
rhetoric of “Republicans are good for business.” This presumption was shared by both economic
and political elites across Alabama until confronted with the issues of immigrant labor when
businesses suddenly realized that in Alabama, perhaps Republicans are good for some businesses,
but not others. Error! Reference source not found. summarizes the shifts in Albertville’s local
specific, existing context and outcomes from the local flows of power discussed in this chapter.
Generally, as Manager B at AFCC was quoted as saying earlier, “I mean I am a Republican, too, but
not as much of one with that group as I used to be…”54 In Alabama in 2011, Republicans were good
for, and listened to, businesses that did not employ Latino immigrants. For an industry like poultry
processing, the circuits of power nimbly bypassed or disciplined dissenting voices to reinforce the
social and “cultural” stability of this historically white region.

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1 Bishop, Joyce, and Judit Gay. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Albertville, AL,
December 13, 2013. Weathers, John. Interview by Eli Jamison. Phone Interview. Albertville, AL,
January 15, 2014
2 Bauer, Mary. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Charlottesville, VA, October 31,
2013.
3 Discursive Formation is used here in the Foucauldian meaning to capture
power/knowledge as exerted through mechanisms in addition to written or spoken language. This
also references systems of meaning captured in structures that include bodies, unspoken intention,
etc. (Foucault 1972, 1977).
4 Politicians went on “crime tours” in Albertville organized by the Albertville Police Chief
Benny Womack, Mayor Lindsey Lyons, and citizen Teresa Ferguson. These tours were described in
media from local to international in reach (Haven 2011b, Gallacher 2011) and in my interview with
Senator Scofield (Scofield, Senator Clay. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Guntersville,
AL, December 16, 2013).
5 “Immigration reform” advocates officially used language that targeted only unauthorized
immigration practices, but the socially understood meaning of immigration reform often became
translated into targeting all residents of brown skin, as reflected in the Eagle Forum quotation
opening this chapter referencing “the Mexicans.”
Interestingly, some lawmaker’s who are clearly not “anti-immigrant,” created policy that is widely acknowledged as anti-immigration through its racist intent and language. Interview data from Senator Scofield included in this chapter explores this idea more deeply.

Multiple references were made to a nebulous group of “outsiders” who were just trying to cause trouble. The paper provides a collective list of those that were explicitly named in the interviews, although other interviewees mentioned different notions of “outside” agitators or “outside forces.” These specific references were drawn from: Palmer, Jennifer. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Albertville, AL, January 13, 2014; Weathers, John. Interview by Eli Jamison. Phone Interview. Albertville, AL, January 15, 2014; Kennedy, Joey. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Birmingham, AL, October 18, 2013.

Kennedy Interview.

This article from The Birmingham News provides an example of the level of animosity present among Albertvillians by 2009.


005. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Albertville, AL, January 13, 2014

Mary Bauer also stated the idea of a homogenized political narrative, in our interview.

Bauer interview.

As explained to me by Judit Gay, The Migrant Recruiter position is a position employed by the Alabama State department and federally funded. In this position, Gay interviews all immigrant families arriving in the area for employment (largely in poultry processing and agricultural roles), to make them aware of Migrant programs for which they may be qualified to include school assistance for their children. Therefore, this position is positioned within the Albertville school system.

Scofield Interview.

Ibid.

Palmer Interview.

People of Latino heritage are often referred to in terms of “ethnicity” on official surveys such as the U.S. Census. By using the tenets of race formation theory, I am intentionally selecting the framework of “race” for this analysis because of the way in which the Alabama Immigration Law dictated a racialized treatment of Latinos through the profiling mandates of the law. Further, the social and cultural treatment of Latinos in community reflect a racialized identity recognized by other LatCrit and Nuevo South scholars (Omi and Winant 1994a, Wildman 1997, Winant 2000, Gomez 2002, Winders and Smith 2012, Winders 2005).


Albertville’s Finest Chicken Cuts (AFCC) is a pseudonym for the company located in Albertville to protect the identity of the managers I interviewed who requested anonymity. 003 and 004. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Boaz, AL, January 13, 2014.

According to the National Council of La Raza, cutting and trimming represent 25% of all poultry processing jobs in the United States. “Cutting and trimming” is reference to a particular job within the assembly line of chicken processing.

003 and 004 Interview.

Scofield Interview.

Ibid
Joyce Bishop dismissed claims of significant impacts on unemployment in Albertville. “It didn’t stay down...It was all a matter of timing. We have those same ups and downs all the time. They [the politicians] just used it.” Bishop and Gay interview.

25 Ibid & Scofield Interview.
27 Kennedy Interview.
28 Arnold Interview.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Scofield Interview.
32 Bishop and Gay Interview.
33 Ibid.
34 Palmer Interview.
35 003 and 004 Interview.
36 Palmer Interview.
37 Arnold Interview
38 Pat Cluck is a pseudonym of the owner/founder of AFCC.
39 Freedom’s Foundation is a pseudonym selected to mimic patriotic meaning of the actual name of the foundation.
40 Bishop and Gay Interview.
41 003 and 004 Interview.
42 Scofield Interview.
43 Arnold Interview.
44 Ibid.
45 003 and 004 Interview.
46 John Weathers also noted a community silence in the private sphere in the interview. All three interviewees believed that their opposition to the immigration law was known, and therefore, the topic was avoided with them in their social circles. Weathers Interview. 003 and 004 Interview.
47 003, and 004 Interview.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.


But we have a history of not being very tolerant, and it is a well known history. If Iowa had passed this law it might not have ever been that big a deal, but we have a history in Alabama of treating people who look different (and that of course, is the power, white, population treating people who look differently), look different, act different, are different whether it be immigrants, African Americans, the LGBT population, whoever it might be, then we are not very welcoming. The phrase I use is....you know our state's motto is 'We Dare Defend Our Rights,' and the phrase I use is, 'No, 'We Dare Defend Our Wrongs.'

~Joey Kennedy, Pulitzer Prize Winning Journalist1
The Birmingham News

And this immigration thing, it was a cowboy thing. We had representatives from our area that ran on this immigration thing because they heard people say 'when you get down to Montgomery, you do something about these Mexicans, these damned Mexicans.' It was a cowboy thing. So by God when they got down to Montgomery they did something about these Mexicans. So they hired this guy out of Arkansas, or wherever he is from, and he writes up this bill for them, and he sells them a bill of goods and says 'this will stand up under the U.S. Constitution.' They buy it hook, line and sinker and go with it. Then, of course, we see what happens.

~ John Weathers, Owner2
Weathers Realty

Politics here has a unique history. I mean it is a contact sport. I think folks who would be, I mean we hear a lot about Chicago politics. I think they would fit in well in Alabama, or we would fit in well there. We would just struggle with the accents.

~ Anonymous

While still seeking economic recovery from the 2008 recession, Alabama implemented H.B. 56 in September 2011, officially making the Alabama Immigration Law the toughest immigration law in the country to go into effect in its entirety (Associated Press 2011a). Alabama politicians framed this legislation as a needed “jobs bill” that would rely on the newly popular policy of “attrition through enforcement,” also known as “self-deportation,” as its prime enforcement mechanism. These key provisions, legal and conceptual, fundamentally changed the management of immigration enforcement by intentionally expanding the burden of enforcement to new areas within the public sector as well as to Alabama’s individuals and private organizations. This cross-
section of enforcement created a network of unwitting, and sometimes unwilling, “volunteers” from all sectors of the populace including businesses, churches, and other Alabama residents. This law was steadily largely enjoined throughout 2012 and was finally settled out of court by October 2013 and heralded as a major defeat for the statute’s proponents (Sarlin 2013, Associated Press 2013).

Since 2013, Alabama’s particular approach to immigration policy-making has been largely discredited, and several U.S. states have adopted different, more welcoming, immigration approaches (2013g, 2015b, Scott 2012). However, the federal government has proven unable or unwilling to take action, leaving immigration policy a hot button issue in national politics and leaving discursive room for advocacy by those desiring harsher immigration approaches more like those promoted by Alabama in 2011. The reality of the federal impasse was demonstrated in early 2015, when Congressional Republicans refused to fund the Department of Homeland Security in retaliation against the Democratic President’s Executive Order providing temporary clemency for certain groups of undocumented immigrants (Dovere 2015). The relevance of this issue again appeared in the early run up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Donald Trump, a GOP primary hopeful, skyrocketed to the top of the Republican primary ranks in part by asserting a ‘tough on immigration’ stance in his candidacy speech. This speech was designed to reinforce the “imagined immigrant” as being both Latino and dangerous and going on to make inflammatory comments describing the majority of undocumented immigrants from Mexico as murderers and rapists (Scott 2015). As these examples indicate, immigration reform remains a contentious, contemporary issue in national politics; one that inflames passions from individuals across the political spectrum.

In this same vein, Alabama’s 2011 immigration law elicited both support and opposition from constituencies across the state and beyond; however, during the Alabama immigration debate, there was a notable public “silence” from the business community generally, and poultry processors in particular. Interviews revealed that these circumstances were even more interesting than this public depiction; Alabama passed and implemented this law despite the private, political
protestations from some of the state’s most influential political agents: business and agricultural lobbies. These lobbyists warned of a predictable, negative impact on Alabama’s overall economic health and business climate as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Consequently, this public silence seemed even more curious – what if the business community generally, and poultry processors in particular, had been public in their opposition? Would it have changed the outcome of the immigration debate? Then again, could they have been more public, or were there factors preventing this strategy?

This chapter considers the rationale for and the repercussions of the public silence of key economic stakeholders with regard to political decisions that directly affected their own labor interests by analyzing how Alabama’s multiscalar and networked local, economic, and political systems silenced potential political action from its poultry processing industry in the state level networks of political power. To this end, I discuss how power brokers navigated Alabama’s circuits of power, provide a brief overview of the 2010-2011 political “moment,” integrate the prevailing national, state, and local level discourse on immigration, and review Alabama’s recent political history and the role of political players advocating for the interests of the poultry industry and of those opposing the law. These seemingly separate trajectories intersected with the ever-evolving Alabamian “identity” and built upon the discursive context and power flows introduced in the previous three chapters. By integrating this collective information, this chapter aims to complete the framing of Alabama’s specific, existing context in 2010-2011 and add the missing components of power that enabled the creation and passage of the 2011 Alabama Immigration Law. In so doing, I identify junctures of real and imagined influence within Alabama’s public, political networks between governmental, private, and third sector actors. This chapter closes with a summary of missed and/or foreclosed opportunities to access political influence on the 2011 Alabama Immigration Law by Alabama’s poultry processors. I also raise questions regarding the
assumptions of a "mutually beneficial" interdependence among state governments, politics, and capitalist "free markets" within this particular Alabama context.

**Alabama’s Political Networks: Power, Influence, and New Outcomes**

Alabama’s economic, political, and local networks co-construct one another. As a result, independently considering each separately creates a false sense of analytic completeness, and content “spill-over” from chapter to chapter is a necessary and important consideration. Arguably, the political network in Alabama requires particular attention to the knowledge from the other two networks in that the political is a creative by-product of the expectations of local and economic networks. Additionally, external influences, such as national politics and social trends, flow into Alabama’s circuits of power generating new possibilities. This chapter adds the last piece of the theoretic model by centering political network for analysis and by building upon the system integration begun in the previous three chapters.

As represented in the Circuits of Power model in Appendix A: Circuits of Power Model (Chapter 1) the circuits flow through and between three distinct networks, and each network’s power brokers theoretically possessed the capacity to influence the confluence of power at the nodes that interconnect relevant discursive flows. This interconnectedness creates conditions that both enable and constrain possibilities for agentic actions by power brokers within the OPPs. The flow of power through the circuits and networks results in an organization of power structures that continuously normalizes existing power structures while introducing the possibility of destabilization through episodic/agentic action or unpredicted internal or external discourses. For example, shortly after passage of the Alabama Immigration Law, one repercussion of the new statute’s application was the arrest and detainment of German and Japanese businessmen working in Alabama at a Mercedes-Benz and Honda plant, respectively (Associated Press 2011b). In response, Republican lawmakers, with the support of Governor Bentley, revised portions of the law to address its impacts on the business climate of Alabama and to “make it easier on our law-abiding
citizens” (Rawls 2011, Beyerle 2012). The arrests of the (non-Latino) foreign, automotive executives disrupted the understood meaning of “illegal immigrant” that had emerged in Alabama as a result of the dispositional power circuit. As a result of this unexpected disruption, the Alabama legislature exerted agentic resistance to revise the law to define more clearly “which” immigrants were to be targeted, arguably making an already “tough” law, even tougher for Latinos in some ways (Editorial Board 2012a, Beyerle 2012). These same actions would be not available to Alabama lawmakers today. The national economic picture, as well as the tenor of the nationwide immigration discourse has changed significantly since the Alabama law passed in 2011. These new conditions have created a different discursive landscape that has since muted the rhetoric Alabama agents used to advocate for H.B. 56 within the OPPs with regard to immigrant labor issues. However, this shift in power only makes the previous, undeterred exercise of dispositional and facilitative power by Alabama lawmakers to implement H.B. 56 all the more striking. It supports Clegg’s assertion that power is not ubiquitous since in Alabama, the OPPs that emerged in 2010 that served to fast-track H.B. 56 and other GOP campaign initiatives have largely evaporated as the specific existing context changed.

The agents who entered the discursive flows within and through Alabama’s state-level political network in 2010-2011 were not singularly monolithic organizations or individuals, but rather were subject to in-network discipline as well as the influence of discursive flows at the intersection of networks. This cross-pollination and cross-discipline discursive flow is true of each

Figure 6-1. Discursive Flows and Alabama’s Political Network
network. However, as specific to the state-level political network, my findings indicate that the immigration rhetoric emerging from Alabama's elected officials was informed directly by national political rhetoric and strong local (i.e., Albertville) political advocacy as conceptualized in Figure 6-1. Discursive Flows and Alabama's Political Network. These discursive flows shaped the specific, existing context of Alabama while also creating new OPPs within the circuits of power. Importantly, the national flows represent the infiltration of exogenous factors that ultimately shaped prevailing political rhetoric adopted by Alabama state lawmakers such as “self-deportation,” with the eradication of all “illegal” immigration as its aim. Alabama's political leaders used the national rhetoric of self-deportation to structure legally a “distance” between Alabama's citizens and “illegal immigrants;” creating a 'subject' and 'other' that could then be addressed differently in statute and in practice. This distance cloaked the identity of the individual among the masses: thereby making the dehumanization of the “other” both possible and legal (Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006).

In this case, the employers of "others" also were by-passed in the circuits of power. As will be discussed later, new political channels were created within which political decisions about immigration policy were made independent of input from business actors who would have argued for a different approach to immigration reform policy. In this way, the agents of the national political discourse exercised dispositional power, albeit latently, within the political network. Alabama legislators then translated this national meaning of the new “other” into their law through the facilitative power evident in the system integration circuit. Importantly, some OPPs were forged that connected the local directly with national flows, specifically with the introduction of a national-level policy entrepreneur into the Alabama debate at the invitation of Albertville politicians.³

The national discursive flows were also important in shaping the particular context of 2010. Alabama's legislation echoed other state immigration “reform” legislation, and those laws and policies served as other discursive forms that lent new meaning to “illegal immigration” (e.g., its translation into a “jobs bill”) that resonated with citizens at that time. Alabama's state and local
politicians were influenced in part by the concerns of constituents living in its small rural communities who have faced demographic change driven by new immigrant arrivals, within a state traditionally bounded by notions of whiteness and blackness (Chapters 3 and 5). Further, the partisan character of Alabama’s politics shifted in 2011 when all of the state’s newly elected state legislators and its Governor came from the Republican Party for the first time in its history earning a GOP supermajority in the statehouse. This raises the question of how the national Republican Party’s discursive flows concerning immigration entered the state’s political discursive flows and shaped perceptions, and ultimately, action. The campaign rhetoric of these politicians shaped debate and influenced what ultimately became the immigration law in 2011; in other words, the dispositional power connected to the discourse of immigration “reform” entered the Alabama circuits of power prior to the election of the legislators who then voted for it as a plank for the state Republican 2010 campaign platform: A Handshake with Alabama. This was an important factor in creating the almost blind (and deaf) allegiance to H.B. 56 that fast-tracked this bill and many others through Alabama’s legislature at the end of 2010 (in special session) and into the official legislative session in 2011.

Ultimately, this chapter provides evidence that the voices advocating for the poultry industry’s labor interests were both prevented from entering key Obligatory Passage Points (OPPs) in Alabama, as well as systematically marginalized within the OPPs their voice entered. This context includes a long-term and complicated association between the poultry processing industry and immigrant labor. In Alabama, this connection constructed a reputation of the poultry industry (Chapter 4) that is inseparable from conceptions and perceptions of immigrants and immigrant labor in the local and state Alabama imaginary (Chapters 3 and 5). This made the poultry processing industry susceptible not just to economic swings, like that of the 2008 Recession, but also to pervasive political discourses hostile to immigrants. The next sections refer back to Alabama’s particular identity claim and the poultry industry's history in Alabama (discussed in
Chapters 3 & 4) to explain how the prevailing 2010-2011 (anti-) immigration and (anti-) immigrants discourse became so popular that passage of the Alabama Immigration Law was almost a political inevitability, regardless of economic backlash. A summary list of the contributing elements to the Alabama context and theoretic outcomes resulting from the analysis are provided in Appendix I. Alabama’s Circuits of Power (Chapter 6).

**Politics and Poultry: An Uncomfortable Twenty-First Century Courtship**

As presented in Chapter 3 and 4, Alabama is far from a thriving state by almost any measure of economic or individual well-being. Within this discouraging snapshot of Alabama’s statewide vitality, operates a thriving poultry industry that provides needed economic stability in many rural areas where this would be otherwise lacking (Chapter 5). When juxtaposed against Alabama’s proud claim of having “one of the top five business climates in the country,” according to Alabama’s Department of Commerce, the poultry industry appears to have all the hallmarks of an industry that should receive the political clout commensurate with its economic contributions (2014c, Alabama Department of Commerce 2013a, AP&EA 2014). With this predictable, looming impact on a lucrative, statewide industry, one might have expected an outcry against the immigration plank of the Republican *Handshake with Alabama* platform in 2010 (discussed in the next section), and this was assuredly not the case. The passage of the 2011 Alabama Immigration Law, given the explicit concerns of the poultry industry, belies assumptions that connect economic clout to immediate political influence within a state. To begin to unravel this conundrum requires a closer look at the context of the particular political moment in Alabama, and integrating it with an understanding of the Alabama Identity (Chapter 3) and the history and reputation of the poultry industry in the state (discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5).

The Alabama GOP’s 2010 ascendancy was at least four years in the making and intersected with the changing political landscape in the nation. Through a political strategy crafted by GOP Party Chair and Representative Mike Hubbard, the Republicans won every constitutional office,
every court position, the U.S. Senate seat, six of seven congressional seats, and control of both houses in the Alabama legislature in 2010. This victory was heralded by U.S. Representative Mike Rogers (R-Alabama) as “one of the most significant political victories in Alabama history” (As quoted in Hubbard 2012, x). One of the key components to the landslide victory was the Republican Handshake with Alabama. Essentially, every Republican candidate on a ballot in Alabama in 2010 committed to the agenda outlined in The Handshake, and Hubbard unveiled it by saying, “When you look someone in the eye, give them your word and shake their hand, you make a bond. This Handshake Agenda is our bond with the voters of Alabama, and if Republicans are successful in taking over the Legislature, these are the items we will immediately work to pass” (Richards 2010).

Ultimately, The Handshake yielded 265 bills falling within the five broad categories of Creating Jobs and Economic Opportunities, Controlling Wasteful Spending, Ending Corruption in Montgomery, Combating Illegal Immigration, and Blocking the Washington, D.C. Power Grab. Many of the political sentiments and bills proposed aligned with the prevailing Tea Party conservatism. All 265 bills were pre-filed and passed the Alabama House within ten days of the new legislative session. (Alabama House Republicans 2011, Hubbard 2012, Richards 2010, White 2011). The speed with which this legislation passed took many people by surprise, and business people and civil rights advocates alike admitted to being caught “flatfooted” in their response, particularly to H.B. 56.4 This strong consensus, in conjunction with the rhetoric of having made “a bond with the voters of Alabama,” created a fast moving political train that sped by existing stations that previously served as OPPs for Alabama’s poultry industry and other interested business lobbyists to board.

This Alabama political context was not the only political rhetoric informing the landscape of power in 2010. Alabama is both a part of, and distinct within, the larger political picture of the United States. One prevailing discourse that gripped the nation, also made deep inroads in Alabama politics. The United States was coming to terms with a small, yet vocal and powerful, political movement in American politics, The Tea Party. Skocpol and Williamson have documented how the
Tea Party, as a grass roots movement with major, national level funders, pushed the national Republican Party rightward as demonstrated by their successes in the 2010 elections. As importantly, the Tea Party also strategically dominated the ideological discourse emerging from the national Republican Party, and this discourse “align(ed) the party with a label that principally appeals to older, very conservative white voters” (2012, 155). This Tea Party brand of conservatism proved very appealing in Alabama. When Ray Hilburn was asked whom he believed legislators were most influenced by, he responded, “I assume the Tea Party is what they were looking at. And, they were working off reactions to what was happening in Arizona and places like that.”

The impact of the Tea Party (Chapter 3) on elections in Alabama mirrored much of the nation. Even in this deeply conservative and Republican state, the Tea Party created significant angst among party faithful. In one candid, informal conversation, a business lobbyist shared his frustration with some of the newly elected lawmakers and their intransigence with regard to immigration reform, particularly implying that they had helped get some of these new, tea party legislators elected who were now willfully damaging the business environment with poorly considered legislation. Another interviewee, Matt Arnold (CEO, Marshall County Economic Development Office (MCEDO)), expressed his shock about a long respected Democrat in Marshall County who lost his seat because of the recent, rapid far-right swing of both the politicians, but also of the sentiment of the voters who were rallying behind Tea Party rhetoric in 2010.

Alabama had a powerful state elected Democratic presence since Reconstruction, as did most southern states (Lea 1988), but the state was steadily trending toward embracing a new, more powerful Republican party in the United States during the second half of the twentieth century (Critchlow 2009, Phillips 1969). The slow, steady disenchantment with being a Democrat in the U.S. South has been well documented and discussed in Chapter 3 (Tullo 2011, Simpson III 1988), and it is no coincidence that this disenchantment intersects with the rise of a reinvigorated Republican Party that embraced
a socially conservative agenda while also voicing an anti-statist ideology; a package that appealed to many white Southern voters (Critchlow 2009).

This GOP ascendency was endorsed heartily by the Alabama business community given the accompanying “good for business” rhetoric that accompanied the overall Republican campaign. However, this uncritical enthusiasm for the Republican sweep, with its deep roots in complicated, far right Tea Party ideology, was short lived. Matt Arnold (MCEDO) expressed dismay at the attitudinal change represented by the 2010 election. He indicated that while Alabamians had supported Republican candidates in national elections for some time; 2010 marked the first time that voters en masse stopped using more individualized, person-based criteria to vote locally.

…but I just think there has been a shift in the mindset that in the last 6 years, and I think what probably solidified that was Obamacare. Because that was the ultimate of the federal government telling everybody how it should be. For the federal government to tell us we have to purchase something - you know, that's unprecedented. I think that changed a lot of people's mindset [from] 'Well I can still vote for my Frank McDaniel [local Democrat] and vote for my George W. Bush [Republican].7

Recalling the consideration of the Alabama Identity discussed in Chapter 3, Obamacare represents the kind of imagined federal incursion Alabama has consistently rebelled against in its “Sez You” political imaginary (Tullos 2011). Indeed, Obamacare or Obama was specifically discussed as a factor in understanding the Alabama voter and or environment in 2010 by six different interviewees and in two additional informal conversations. John Weathers is a resident, businessman, and entrepreneur in Albertville as current owner of Weathers Realty. He was the only publicly outspoken opponent of H.B. 56 that I interviewed in Albertville. He acknowledged the role of the Tea Party in the radical political swing rightward, but he added an additional factor to consider for the current political environment – race:

If you want a study of politics in Alabama...[drive] anywhere within 100 miles of Birmingham and turn on 101.1 and listen to the conservative talk show 24/7. Oh my gosh. So hardcore right wing, it would make Fox News blush. I don’t know where a person would turn. We are so staunchly ingrained in conservative...you know...it is just, and to be honest, I think it is worse. It is an over-reaction to, and I hate to say this, but I’m going to say it, because it’s the truth. And you would never get anyone
to admit it, but I think you saw an over-reaction because a black man got elected President. And I’m just giving you a gut feeling. You don’t hear that, but if you ask...I think there was an over-reaction in this state and probably other states too. I think it...I mean, the Tea Party. I think that it just goes back to the Law of Physics where with every reaction there is an equal or opposing reaction, and I think that some of the conservative base, the extreme conservative base was pushed to just blindly supporting anyone who was Republican as an over-reaction to President Obama.  

Importantly, both of these quotations are from representatives of Alabama’s business community (i.e., Arnold and Weathers) are representative of the kind of shock and awe many business people experienced with the election of the 2010 Republican supermajorities to the state legislature. The business community (and poultry processing within it) was reportedly caught unprepared for the way in which the political shift shut certain doors to their lobbying efforts, while it certainly opened other business opportunities unrelated to immigrant labor. Mary Bauer, then Legal Director of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), commented this way:

> It [Alabama in 2010] is really this microcosm of the whole, you know, the Tea Party and that whole dynamic, that back side of the Republican party just won so utterly and completely that people were afraid to [take them on, including]...big business. We heard things about businesses saying; you know, ‘if they won’t do the right thing here, they won’t reform the law; we are going to have to consider switching our allegiance back to the Democrats.’ But, you never saw anything serious in that direction. The Democratic Party in Alabama is now so marginalized. I always thought it was a really, really interesting precursor to what we have seen nationally, with the business people just unable to control, kind of the crazy way of the Republican Party.

To be clear, this section suggests that the following elements of power had fallen into place by early 2010:

- Full transference of the One Party political system to Alabama Republicans by the election of GOP supermajorities; further solidified by a marginalized, and weak Democratic Party, and newly powerful far right wing representing influence of the national Tea Party movement.
- Business community committed to assumptions that all Republicans would be equally good for all businesses leaving them, and their lobbyists, vulnerable to fast-tracked legislation emerging from *The Handshake* and a highly organized, powerful Republican party.
- Alabama populace was agitated by federal healthcare reform; an agitation arguably exasperated by the election of a black U.S. president leaving residents ripe for the messages of the emerging Tea Party movement.
In addition to these elements, consider the impact of a state constitution virtually requiring strong, active lobbyists for desired legislation (Chapter 3), the tarnished reputation of poultry processing by 2010 (Chapters 3, 4, & 5), the contemporaneous challenge to whiteness by Latino immigrants in Alabama’s rural locales (Chapter 5), and the prevailing Sez You identity claim made by white, elite Alabamians. Taken together, the makings of a perfect political storm had swirled together by 2010; a perfect storm unless, of course, you were a Latino resident or his/her employer in Alabama.

**Twenty-First Century Immigration Discourse in the United States & H.B. 56**

As suggested by the previous section, Alabama was far from the only state to react to the shifts in migration trends. In many ways, the Alabama Immigration Law could be framed as an embodiment of a particular vein of nationwide sentiment. As mentioned in Chapter 1, six state legislatures had approved immigration laws targeted at “illegal aliens” by the end of 2011 all of which highlighted the growing tensions concerning federal versus state regulation of immigration. In this context of multi-state adoption of strict immigration laws, Alabama’s legislature voted H.B. 56 into law proud of its reputation as the most restrictive and detailed immigration law in the United States (2011c, 2011a, Berry 2011a, Fausset 2011, Robertson 2011, Lyman 2011). In this section, I review briefly the provisions of H.B. 56 (initially presented in detail in Chapter 1), and then present the discourses that advocated for and against it with the intent of highlighting the locations of power within the political network.

Many of the early state-based policy initiatives shared basic characteristics such as the implementation of e-verify systems and new voter identification requirements. The most strident states, Arizona and Alabama, included the use of visual criteria to create “reasonable suspicion” for the identification of undocumented immigrants and blurred the jurisdictional lines between federal and state enforcement of immigration law. The policy similarities between Arizona and Alabama are not coincidental and can be attributed to the creative, and seemingly tireless, legal efforts of a
single policy entrepreneur,⁹ the Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach (GOP) (Roberts and King 1991, Greenblatt 2012). Kobach’s influence on innovating U.S. immigration policy has been multiscalar and pervasive. Kobach shaped immigration enforcement policies in Pennsylvania and Texas localities, co-authored state laws in Arizona and Alabama and served as an ‘informal advisor’ to Mitt Romney on immigration policy during Romney’s unsuccessful run for the U.S Presidency in 2012 (Acosta 2012, Greenblatt 2012). Furthermore, U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Alabama) was outspoken in his support of Kobach’s zero-tolerance efforts in Alabama; this political connection persists since Sessions continues to be an outspoken advocate for Kobach-style strict immigration controls, and in January 2015, Sessions was named chair of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border Security. This appointment occurred in a year when federal immigration policy was the subject of high-stakes, political acrimony across all three branches of U.S. government, and the voice of Sessions (and perhaps of Kobach by proxy) could carry more weight (Kim 2015, Perez 2015, Dovere 2015, Talbot 2011).

In 2010 and 2011, the most prominent state-based immigration policy conceptions became discursively recognized as “Show Me Your Papers” laws that often resulted in “Self-Deportation” policies. Perhaps the most recognized case was the Arizona Immigration Law (S.B. 1070), and it reached the Supreme Court in 2012 (Greenblatt 2012). While much of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 was overturned, the rudiments of the so-called “show me your papers” requirement was left in place, enabling the specter of racial profiling of Latino immigrants to continue (Guttentag 2012, Llorente 2011, Fahrenthold 2012, Editorial Board 2012b, Glionna 2012, Santos 2012). Alabama’s 2011 Immigration Law (H.B. 56) received less national press but was a progenitor of S.B. 1070, and Kobach’s direct involvement in drafting the Alabama legislation was publicly lauded by both Alabama sponsors: state Representative Hammon (R-Decatur) and state Senator Beason (R-Gardendale) (Talbot 2011). The Alabama bill was designed to heighten immigration enforcement measures while purportedly addressing the concerns of constitutionality faced by the Arizona law
The involvement of a national actor in the state policy development for Alabama, within a rhetorical landscape infiltrated with Tea Party sentiment that helped shift Alabama's political context rightward, arguably created new OPPs at the intersection of the local, state, and national political context (see Figure 6-1). Given the reported speed of this legislation, these OPPs were clearly both powerful and only effectively available to certain, privileged political actors within Alabama's circuits of power. Given the economic landscape of Alabama (Chapter 4), Alabama's business actors became cognizant of these new OPPs only after the language that would become H.B. 56 was a fait accompli and a part of the Republican Handshake with Alabama.

The October 2011 implementation of the Alabama law reportedly coerced tens of thousands of Latino people, undocumented and documented alike, to leave their Alabama homes in the days following its adoption (Addy 2012, Elliot 2011b, 2011c, Bailey 2011, Green 2011, Reeves and Caldwell 2011, Reid 2011, Robertson 2011, WHNT News 19 Staff Reports 2011). These departures hit Alabama agriculture particularly hard with its timing during the harvest season as migrating workers left and/or avoided the state. However, agriculture was far from the only industry affected. Small businesses in Alabama, such as rental properties and restaurants that relied on Latino labor and customers, also cited the law as the cause of detrimental economic impact (Green 2011, Fausset 2011). Several poultry processors immediately held job fairs to try to backfill quickly the positions previously held by their legally verified employees who fled the state for a variety of personal reasons that stemmed from the targeted racial profiling mandated by the statute. (Addy 2012, Elliot 2011b, 2011c, Bailey 2011, Reeves and Caldwell 2011, Reid 2011, Robertson 2011, WHNT News 19 Staff Reports 2011). The statute was progressively enjoined by the courts since its implementation and was finally settled out of court in October 2013 (Sarlin 2013, Associated Press 2013), the Alabama Immigration Law continued a long tradition of U.S. policy making that racialized

However, the racialization of Latino immigrants was not the only goal of this approach to immigration policy. Efforts by Arizona and Alabama represented a changing tide in immigration law where states entered the previously unquestioned purview of the federal government in the arena of immigration enforcement, often in the name of employment. Policy shifts, such as Alabama’s, occurred within an overall context of increased local and state immigration policy-making. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, there was a 33.34% increase in the consideration of state-level bills and resolutions that related to immigrants and refugees introduced in the 50 states and Puerto Rico in the first three months of 2011 as compared to the same time in 2010. The policy areas with the greatest increase in immigration-related activity were those addressing law enforcement and employment (Carter, Lawrence, and Morse 2011). These trends reflect the increased “criminalization” of the immigrant.

In many ways, this national trend was ideally situated to appeal to many Alabamians. These bills and regulations advanced a new immigration agenda that reframed immigration politics such that local levels of government could claim increased control, and, in Arizona and Alabama, contest the federal government’s enforcement powers within the states. Suddenly, immigration enforcement, which had always been the unquestioned responsibility of the U.S. federal government, became a contemporary battleground for states’ rights. As discussed in Chapter 3, when it comes to issuing a virulent defense for real or perceived infringement on states’ rights, the traditional, white elite population of Alabama has been a standard-bearer across U.S. history (Flynt 2004, Rogers et al. 1994, Thomson 2002, Tullos 2011). In the years after the 2013 defeat of the Alabama Immigration Bill, Alabama’s Republican supermajority, as well as some of its state judges, continued to wage war in the name of “states’ rights” by contesting (and winning in the U.S. Supreme Court) a portion of the Voting Rights Act (Mencimer 2014). A recent 2015 battle between
the Alabama Supreme Court and federal district courts over the issuance of same sex marriage licenses is another example (Fausset 2015). In summary, when a dominant thread of the nation’s twenty-first century discourse reframed immigration policy as enforcement, jobs, and border protection issues all falling within the purview of state jurisdiction, Alabama’s white elite arguably recognized this battle cry as familiar political terrain.

**The Alabama Immigration Law: Intent and Discontent**

Even during a time of increasing state-level enforcement of immigration laws, the Alabama Immigration Law was still highly controversial inside and outside the state (2011c, 2011a, Berry 2011a, Fausset 2011, Robertson 2011, Lyman 2011). The basic framework of the Alabama Immigration Law was presented in Chapter 1, and as mentioned there, the very “toughness” that the law opponents criticized was the attribute law advocates most appreciated. The Alabama legislation’s one goal was to make life in Alabama completely untenable for a person living there illegally, or as a legal citizen or permanent resident, to support someone who is. Collectively, the Alabama legislation was designed to achieve “attrition through enforcement;” also known as self-deportation (McWhorter 2012). It is difficult to overstate Alabama’s political commitment to self-deportation in 2010. As one journalist for MSNBC reported, “politicians were so eager to arrest undocumented immigrants that they included a provision empowering citizens to sue individual officers caught shirking their enforcement duties.” Provisions such as this created widespread enforcement confusion for police officers and citizens alike when the law was implemented (Sarlin 2013).

In terms of circuits of power, the discursive landscape for the Alabama law was enmeshed in the legislative trends occurring across states (Conan 2012) whose net impact increasingly resembled Goffman’s “total institution.” The desired total institution in this case would have been a network of states united against the newly recognizable “illegal immigrant” (by racial designation) with the ultimate goal of achieving the power dimension of *domination* structured through Systemic
Integration and exacted by individual Alabamians (Clegg et al. 2006). Domination was, in many ways, achieved in Alabama through the translation of the national immigration discourse into a state law that was then enforced by local organizations and resident communities. The successful deployment of Self-Deportation, as Alabama's immigration policy stands as evidence of the creation of a politically enacted total institution. In 2009, Clegg described the experience of a total institution as:

People within total institutions are cut off from the wider society, leading an enclosed and formally administered existence. What these very different types of organizations have in common that make them total institutions are that each member's daily life is carried out in the immediate presence of a large number of others. The members are very visible; there is no place to hide from the surveillance of others. (2009, 330)

The policy form of Self-Deportation effectively achieved these ends by deploying all eyes of the community upon those who did not appear to belong in Alabama locales. To enforce this responsibility, significant fines were associated with failing to uphold one's new citizen duty of policing one's community and managing this newly re-defined “risk” of the “illegal alien.” With the reach of the law's provisions and its reliance on visual criteria for enforcement, Alabama fundamentally changed the requirements of being a “citizen” or even “legal resident” by transforming the state into a contemporary version of Bentham's “panopticon” where surveillance was often unseen yet constant, and was “all-seeing” because present in all avenues of life (Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006: 44). In this way, the law used the local community sphere to achieve domination over Latinos of any legal status and their supporters, inherently conflating “Latino” with “illegal” through visual recognition requirements. Many Latinos in Alabama lived in communities and households of mixed legal statuses and implementation of this law frequently forced a choice between being an “Alabamian” and keeping a family together. The effect of this statute was not simply on undocumented immigrants; rather, “the laws are also directed at all Latinos who are perceived as unwilling to assimilate to American cultural values. These laws encourage and lend legitimacy to exclusion of “the other” - the Latino other” (McKanders 2010, 4).
By translating Alabama into a *total institution* for all Latinos, poultry processors became ensnared in a trap that disabled their political mobility within the political and local circuits of power. As a recognized employer of Latinos and a presumed “culprit” in the rise in undocumented immigrants (Chapter 4), Alabama’s poultry processors were legally bound to enforce a law that would knowingly affect their legally documented, Latino workforce. However, to voice public objections to the law, either through media outlets or in other community forums, poultry processors risked confirming the imagined relationship between the industry and “illegal labor,” despite their defensible position of using only legally verified employees. One poultry executive interviewed for this research commented on the social and political pressures by saying: “You know, I think we were expected to live with whatever law came out just like everybody else was. But we get a lot of the attention because we have so many employees and so much [more] Hispanic labor than smaller companies around here that they aren’t going to get the attention.” 12 This “live with it” expectation exemplifies how all public OPPs became inaccessible to the poultry industry, leaving only private and backdoor political channels available to try to influence the framing of H.B. 56.

**Alabama Discourse: Proponents and Opponents of the Alabama Immigration Law**

From April to July 2011, many justifications were declared *in support of* the Alabama immigration law by Alabama’s elected legislators and other officials who wrote and advocated for passage of the law. Those who defended it in various legal challenges used these same justifications. In evaluating both the “official” language of the law’s sponsors in promoting and defending it, as well as the “unofficial” language that came from elected officials in support, three primary themes for its justification emerged repeatedly in the rhetoric of local and state-level officials in many different public forums. The three themes of justification were “jobs bill,” “enforcement failure by the federal government,” and “border protection.” Examples of the specific discourse used follow.

1. Create jobs for legal Alabamians – “A Jobs Bill”
• GOP Senator Scott Beason: “It would help the unemployed by preventing illegal immigrants from getting jobs in the state.” (2011a)
• Senator Beason: “This will put thousands of Alabamians back in the work force.” (2011a)
• GOP Alabama Senator Orr: “This is allowing the opportunity for employment for a lot of people who are citizens or who are here legally.” (Banaszak 2011)
• Lawmakers promoting the legislation said it was motivated mainly to protect jobs of its citizens and legal residents. (Mears 2011)
• Republican Alabama State Representative Micky Hammon: “This is a jobs-creation bill for Americans.” (Gallacher 2011) And “This is a jobs bill.” (Green and Haven 2011)

2. Enforcement failure by the Federal government – “The job the Federal government refuses to do”
• GOP Governor Bentley: “It would not have been necessary to address this problem if the federal government would've done its job and enforced the laws dealing with this problem.” (Elliot 2011a)
• GOP Alabama State Representative Kerry Rich: “There’s a lot of these things where there’s no verification asked for…It’s against federal law for them to do it, but the law is just not enforced.” (Haven 2011a)
• GOP Alabama State Representative Mike Hubbard: “What's unfortunate is that we had to do this because the federal government is refusing to enforce its own laws… But we're also sending a very strong message to the federal government: [we] fixed the problem [that you could not].” (Elliot 2011a)

3. Provide "border protection," and therefore protect our people and country from "illegal" immigrants and reduce the harm done by "illegal" immigration to "legal" citizens (e.g., physical danger, drag on public services.)
• Republican Alabama State Representative Kerry Rich: “We’re not trying to do anything to disturb those who are here legally...We’re going after the illegals” (Haven 2011a).
• GOP Alabama State Representative Mike Hubbard: “…And a lot of what we're doing is to protect our borders as best we can…” (Elliot 2011a).
• Albertville Mayor Lindsey Lyons (Republican), outspoken advocate for the immigration law: “It’s our duty to protect our citizens, and we’re going to do it” (Haven 2011c).
• Alabama State Representative Kerry Rich (R-Albertville): "The illegals in this country are ripping us off... If we wait for the federal government to put this fire out, our house is going to burn down" (Sarlin 2013).

These three framing arguments were critical to the political discourse that defined the terms of the debate and ultimate passage of the Alabama Immigration Law. This state rhetoric was important to the achievement of domination by politically undoing, re-shaping, and communicating the new duties of an Alabama citizen. Creating and reinforcing intertwined, epistemic assumptions of “illegal immigrant,” “citizen,” and “work” were inherently important to this rhetorical strategy. These three arguments were entangled with assumptions about a “desirable” citizen’s role in a capitalist
marketplace as an economic actor, and the failure of the federal government to protect those citizens. The first assumption posits that the “illegal immigrant” in Alabama is “taking” a job that a legal citizen or resident would otherwise select. Second, this rhetoric subtly reinforced presumptive notions that equate Alabama “illegals” with people of Hispanic\textsuperscript{13} descent. As discussed earlier, the “Latino” population is often conflated with the “illegal” population in the discourse. Third, this argument assumed there was indeed a “jobs problem” that would be solved for “legal citizens” with this immigration legislation. Fourth, there is an inherent assumption that citizens live separately from “illegal” residents. Fifth, the argument posits that “illegal” residents are a “burden” on legal citizens, and all “legal” citizens are inherently “hard-working.” Finally, Alabama’s state politicians could defend and protect all threats to Alabamian citizens, while the federal government averts its eyes from the immigrant “problem.”

Taken together, these arguments were very persuasive in defining how other Alabamians, particularly those small and rural communities with a rapidly growing Latino population, understood the meaning and intended outcomes of this law. This discourse was an important element for the Social Integration circuit of power. Alabama politicians, in keeping with the national political rhetoric, used these arguments to create an “imagined immigration” that was to be enforced by this law. Scott Blinder develops the notion of imagined immigration and demonstrates how public perceptions of immigrants in Great Britain diverges “significantly” from the immigrants that public policy actually targets (2015). In Alabama where the official Latino population is less than 4\% of the total (U.S. Census Bureau 2010a), the argument can be made that the national and state rhetoric that illegalized Latino immigrants (Bauder 2014) created an imagined immigrant in the U.S. This imagined immigrant is Latino (and probably Mexican), is in the U.S without proper documentation (i.e., “illegal”), deprives U.S. citizens of jobs, and poses a potential threat to the safety of Americans. By making this law about jobs, border protection, and a state’s rights argument, this law was framed in a way that resonated with many defining themes from Alabama’s
history, and simultaneously distracted its citizens from the reason most immigrants arrived to the state in the first place: Alabama’s employers recruited them once the resident population could not meet the labor demand.

Given this framing, one of the outcomes of the imagined immigrant is that the economic concerns of those who employ these imagined immigrants are diminished, as they are implicated in the perceived danger and state decline created by their workers. If poultry processors had publicly spoken in opposition to this law, they risked losing the existing, thin protection from the discursive form of the imagined immigrant. The possibility of creating and/or entering a public OPP (e.g., editorials, speaking before city council or the legislature, etc.) in opposition to the law became impossible for poultry processors since they were already framed as culprits in the “immigration problem.” Additionally, speaking out would have created a new political problem: it would have publicly aligned the interests of poultry with organizations that are often viewed with disdain by the Alabama elite. Some of the highest profile public opponents are also regarded as “agitators,” “anti-business,” “liberal,” and/or “anti-free enterprise”14 such as the SPLC, the ACLU, and/or the Obama Administration. As summarized by Mary Bauer from her experience at the SPLC at this time:

I think there was a very broad consensus in the business community that H.B. 56 was terrible for the state, and some very, very big players behind the scenes were putting a lot of pressure on politicians, the Governor, and the various people in the legislature. It was interesting how little they were able to achieve. They [did not] want the law. They didn’t want the law passed. They wanted it repealed. They did not come out as publicly. They would say things, but they didn’t come out as publicly as I think they should have. They got what they wanted only because of litigation.15

Despite clear self-interested alignment with the desired outcomes articulated by the lawsuits, the Alabama business community could never conceive of publicly supporting this litigation because of the social identity of the groups bringing the lawsuits. The result? Social and cultural identity pressures caused the Alabama business community not to enter two more important OPPs: a network of new political alliances with new, albeit unlikely partners like the SPLC and the court system. I return to this issue of cross sector alliances later in this section.
The official opposition to this law put forward equally adamant and public arguments. These arguments appeared in the media rhetoric, but more clearly, they were represented in the lawsuits filed against this law. The opposing themes appear below with examples of the public rhetoric and public actors who argued and/or filed legal action against it. Themes 2 - 4 (below) were associated with lawsuits in 2011:

1. Impact will be severe and “mean-spirited” in terms of real human suffering
   - Mary Bauer, legal director for the SPLC: "It is clearly unconstitutional. It's mean-spirited, racist, and we think a court will enjoin it." (2011a).
   - Bishop William Willimon of the North Alabama United Methodist Conference was reported to say that: “A new Alabama law that makes it a crime to offer rides to undocumented immigrants is the ‘meanest’ immigration law in the country” (Berry 2011a).
   - Assistant Attorney General Tom Perez told reporters that local leaders are concerned about reports of increased bullying in schools and a large absence of Hispanic students from classes (Mears 2011).

2. Unconstitutional: Racist in its intent and execution
   - Shay Farley, legal director of Alabama Appleseed: “The bill invites racial profiling not only by law enforcement officers but by landlords and employers” (Johnson 2011).
   - From the ACLU website: “It effectively turns Alabama into a police state, and invites rampant discrimination against all Alabamians who look or sound ‘foreign.’” And: “Moreover, the law results in systematic racial profiling [author’s emphasis]. Because HB 56 requires interrogations and prolonged detention based on "reasonable suspicion" of being an undocumented immigrant, even well-intentioned police officers will be put in the position of relying on stereotypes and characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or accent in deciding whom to stop and investigate” (2011f).

3. Unconstitutional: Infringes on the rights of legal Alabama citizens in two primary ways
   - Profiling will impact people of color disproportionately whether legal residents or not
     - Shay Farley, legal director of Alabama Appleseed: "It's going to make us profile our neighbors and our church brothers and sisters” (Johnson 2011).
     - Mary Bauer, legal director at the SPLC: “I think there are real concerns about racial profiling. I think, you know, in the next few days we may see people denied such basic services as water. We'll see kids who don't enroll in school. The real live human toll of this ruling will be disastrous” (Elliot 2011a).
     - The Mexican government also filed a friend of the court appeal, arguing the law would promote racial profiling, targeting Hispanics especially (Mears 2011).
   - Infringes on individual rights to religious freedom
     - Bishop William Willimon: “One of the most nefarious aspects of this law is it appears criminalize Alabamians in the act of being helpful and compassionate” calling the claim that an immigration crackdown will create jobs "particularly repugnant" (Berry 2011a).
• News release from the Catholic League on its website: “The idea of punishing the clergy for doing what they are called to do - servicing those in need independent of any condition - is morally reprehensible and constitutionally offensive... rewrite the law, allowing for the kinds of religious exemptions stipulated by the Bedford amendment” (2011e).

• Catholic League president Bill Donohue: “Every state has a right to enforce reasonable laws designed to thwart illegal immigrants from entering and settling in its communities, but the Alabama law that was scheduled to be operative on September 1 is not reasonable. Its principal flaw lay in its failure to ensure religious liberty” (2011e).

4. Unconstitutional: Federal jurisdiction and States have no right to address issues of national security (e.g., immigration policy)
• The Federal government filed a legal injunction on these grounds.

Ultimately, the opponents of this law won the federal court battle when Alabama agreed to a negotiated settlement with the ACLU and the U.S. Justice Department in October 2013, after the law had been largely enjoined by a series of court challenges. However, this victory took two years of nonstop, legal action to bring official closure to the 2011 Alabama Immigration Law, and the rancor this debate created still lingers because of continued federal inaction on existing immigration law (Associated Press 2013, Lawson 2013, Liptak 2013, Sarlin 2013). Importantly to this analysis, the particular coalition of opponents to this law created an obstacle to another route to political power for poultry processors. Despite sharing an interest in opposition to H.B. 56 and general agreement with the opponent’s arguments, poultry had no desire or motivation to become aligned with this particular coalition of third sector actors and the federal government as it would have created more negative political ramifications for the poultry industry’s already damaged reputation.

Theoretically, building a cross sector coalition might have increased the profile of the political voice of opposition; however, it is important to note that no one in my research ever mentioned this cross-pollination as a possibility. In fact, it is not overstating to suggest that the business sector representative to whom I spoke probably found the idea of coalition building with these, or the other third sector organizations working against H.B. 56 (e.g., Alabama Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, Alabama Coalition for Immigrant Justice (ACIJ), etc.), to be ludicrous.
In conversation and interviews, it became evident that Alabama’s power brokers tend to work in sectoral silos, and this is in part due to the reputation imparted to each group. In conversation, one business lobbyist asserted that the SPLC is an anti-business organization, and he believed that SPLC was drawing attention to the immigration issue solely so they could then disparage the non-union plants in Alabama. Despite a shared opposition to the law, he felt there was no possibility of building a political coalition with these other non-business or third sector actors to oppose immigration because he believed their immigration opposition was a ploy to advance their larger agenda of radical, essentially “socialist” (in his view), antibusiness commitments. Mary Bauer disputes the portrayal of the SPLC, a civil rights organization, as radical, and countered, “I think that civil rights in Alabama is not a mainstream idea the way it is in some other places. That it is really seen as, a kind of a radical notion...” When asked about potential political alliances at the time, she did confirm public resistance from the business community: “My sense was that none of the business people were interested in being seen with us.” However, Bauer went on to share that behind the scenes, the SPLC was very much in touch with Alabama’s business community, and she was somewhat perplexed by their political approach to this issue. She said, “…Business was remarkably ineffectual and not loud. And we regularly got calls from business people saying, ‘This is terrible, what can you do?’ And we would be like, ‘What? Are you kidding us? You’re the businesses - are you kidding us?!’” 16

This evidence demonstrates two things in terms of the intersection between the economic and political circuits of power. First, there was at least one additional OPP where opposition voices engaged lawmakers to express opposition to H.B. 56, and second, the business community (and poultry processors by extension) were not in it. One of the political voices that represented the poultry processors (as a manufacturer) was the Business Council of Alabama (BCA). The BCA did not align itself with any other third sector organizations, much less those filing lawsuits against H.B. 56. In this way, this OPP linking to the political circuit was blocked. It may appear as though the
business community exercised agency in rejecting these alliances as an option, but I argue that the social and cultural constraints of Alabama’s economic, local, and political networks precluded this as a viable option since it would not have been visible as an intelligible discourse to business actors. Accordingly, the potential for employers to enhance social justice outcomes for their Latino labor pool were diminished through the exclusion of alliances with organizations that were dedicated achieving the same legal outcomes. In any case, rejecting an alignment with perceived oppositional organizations was not the only barrier to entry of this OPP. The Alabama political business culture was another power structure obstructing OPP entry.

None of the lobbyists that represent any portion of the poultry industry to the Alabama legislators framed any public opposition to the law. When asked about the public silence, one Alabama poultry processing executive responded, “maybe cause we did try to handle it through the lobbyists and folks that we have with the cattlemen, poultry and the forestry, and all of those people in Montgomery, rather than it being so much just out front and in the news and everything.”\footnote{17} This quotation points to the way the Alabama political business culture exercises implicit power over local economic agents with regard to public political action. Jennifer Palmer, Albertville Chamber of Commerce, explained it to me this way:

You’re not going to see the business community blasting the politicians much. And I don’t know if it is just because our [way]...I mean you know the old adage ‘you catch more flies with honey than you do with vinegar,’ it still applies. You know, the best thing I can do in my job is build the relationship so when those issues do happen, we go one-on-one. We have sit down meetings [with our politicians]. So there are a lot of things that happen behind the scenes of that you will never see in the public but is how the business responds.\footnote{18}

Palmer’s description of the advocacy process explains how the possibility of a public business voice on political issues has been systematically removed from the process. This “relationship” dependent approach to linking business to the political sphere creates a reliance on backdoor, behind-the-scenes politics that privileges certain Alabama power brokers over others. Only those “sanctioned” to attend these meetings have the potential to enter directly the discursive
space connecting the political and economic spheres. Therefore, in consideration of both public and private voice, sanctioned lobbyists matter because they are regarded as the primary tool for influencing a political outcome on behalf of Alabama’s poultry processors. When the poultry processing executives were asked, in hindsight, how their company or industry might wield more political influence, they responded:

Well the best weight we have is still through our Association. It really is. You know our Association [Alabama Poultry & Egg Association] is generally going to team up with a lot of the other Ag[riculture]-business groups down there. So, if we can get all of those working together then we have a better chance. They kind of told us from the beginning because of the way everything got rolling and with the [limited] chance for the Democratic stronghold… you know the Republicans saw a way to change that all and this was one way they were going to do it, was ride the Immigration Bill all the way through. They told us pretty early that we were going to have a Bill, we just need to try to work it to try to get as good of a Bill as we could get [my emphasis].

This quotation encapsulates several of the previous points of analysis. First, it illustrates the siloes for political advocacy in Alabama. Collaboration is referenced in this in this interviewee’s remark, but it is clear that alliances are expected within the agribusiness community and innovation in coalition building appeared not to have been a viable option in 2011. This mirrors the business culture and is a reflection of the fragmented identity of poultry processors in the Alabama economy, discussed in Chapter 4. Second, it captures the point made earlier in this chapter that the OPP where H.B.56 was crafted and developed was never available to the business community. The only option communicated to this organization was to try to get as good of a Bill as we could get; an alternative that works against the self-interest in labor of poultry processing. In this way, poultry processing was silenced before it could ever have considered having a voice. Third, and connected to the previous point, this interviewee’s comment demonstrates the ramifications of the speed of this bill for poultry processors. Finally, this provides further evidence of the strength of a political business culture that relies on sanctioned relationships and private negotiations to influence state politics. This culture quietly shuts out the possibility of public debate and contestation by economic actors in Alabama and creates only one kind of avenue, a private one, for political influence. It
eliminates from consideration the possibility of a different kind of politics engaging a diverse set of stakeholders interested in serving a specific local interest such as immigrant workers.

**Conclusion**

This chapter’s stated intent was to investigate the repercussions when state actors effectively silence political input from key economic stakeholders with regard to decisions directly affecting their corporate self-interest. In some ways, this answer would be easily calculable. Many of the interviewees believed that, in the end, not much came of it. For instance, despite an immediate and significant economic and human cost in the days and months that followed the law’s October 2011 implementation, Matt Arnold says the impact hit “immediately, but it rebounded very quickly.” However, other reports claim that this law was a human rights and public relations debacle for Alabama, and the economic consequences have been far more significant than law makers anticipated (Addy 2012, Holland 2013). I suggest that by understanding the processes that enabled the silencing of poultry processors’ self-interest in immigrant labor, new knowledge and questions are raised with regard to real and imagined power and politics at the intersection of economic and political networks. In the language of the circuits of power, the social, political, and economic structures of Alabama became elements of systemic integration that invisibly reinforced the Sez You identity of Alabama through the domination of the systems that prevented some power channels from ever being available to poultry processors.

Error! Reference source not found. summarizes and provides a snapshot of the analysis presented throughout this dissertation. An examination of these results, bearing in mind the collective data from previous chapters, suggest a disconnect existed between the real and imagined influence of the Alabama networks that connected state government to state and local actors. The idea that “Republicans are good for business” was not just a passive national narrative permeating Alabama politics, it was stated as a key campaign pledge during the GOP takeover and belief in this sentiment was echoed by interviewees from across the state (Hubbard 2012, 2011d). However,
the reality in this case suggests otherwise, particularly when business interests intersect with the
contested social and spatial claims connected to immigrant labor. Indeed, this case challenges the
assumption that a neoliberal structure, like the Alabama government, inherently is in service of
major economic actors; acting independently of social and cultural constraints.

As this case demonstrates, in Alabama, strong existing social, cultural, and political identity
systems intertwine with national discourses to create a complicated calculus of what economic
actors may enter the OPPs that best serve their own self-interests. Alabama GOP politicians, despite
their own “pro business” assertions, in fact selectively limited and/or eradicated free market
agency of economic actors. In 2011, the circuits of power served to discipline poultry processing
because it was perceived to deviate from the social values defined by Alabama elites connected to
whiteness (i.e., employing immigrant labor), and further delineated by the newly anointed, far right
Republican party. The strength of these social claims also blinds “free” market actors in Alabama to
potentially important coalitions that would indeed serve poultry processors by protecting their
important labor source. Analysis of Alabama’s circuits of power demonstrates that the particular
infusion of social, cultural, and political values forecloses possibilities for employers of Latino labor
to serve as sites for social justice for immigrant labor while pursuing their own self-interest. By
preventing coalitions across silos and entry into the critical OPPs, poultry processing was disabled
from protecting its labor interests. In this way, Alabama legislators have reoriented the Alabama
circuits of power such they do not create an economic environment that is “good for business,” but
rather a political environment that is “good for some business” (e.g., automotive manufacturers
from Chapter 4). Those businesses that benefit most are those that conform to the contested social
and cultural legacy of being an Alabamian.
3 In interviews and local conversations, several people mentioned that Kris Kobach, Kansas Secretary of State was invited to Alabama by Albertville local politicians and political activists. Weathers Interview. 003 and 004. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Boaz, AL, January 13, 2014; 005. Interview by Eli Jamison. Personal Interview. Albertville, AL, January 13, 2014.
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Weathers Interview.
9 I am using definition of “policy entrepreneur” developed by Nancy Roberts and Paula King in their 1991 article "Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and Function in the Policy Process" on page 148.
10 In keeping with the Spanish language convention, “Latino” addresses male and female members of this community.
11 Weathers Interview.
12 003 and 004 Interview.
13 The term “Hispanic” was chosen here as a reflection of the language used by the dominant survey instruments that collect demographic data.
14 This information was shared during an informal conversation with a key member of an Alabama’s business lobby, and it was echoed two other interviews: Kennedy Interview. Palmer Interview.
16 Ibid.
17 003 and 004 Interview.
18 Palmer Interview.
19 003 and 004 Interview.
20 Arnold Interview.
Chapter 7. Conclusion

...[B]e co-signatories to charters of rights and obligations, all of which took the care of the Other seriously. An organization full of non-instrumentalized people who could justify, ethically, all that they did in terms of Lévinas’ conception of care for the Other is entirely feasible. Such a basis for organizational life would sustain practices that were not sources of illegitimate domination. Imperative commands could still be issued but if they were not in accord with the duty of care for the Other, in a generalized way, then they would not be regarded as legitimate and could legitimately not be enacted. Now, I can see that many people might think this sounds like some kind of organizational purgatory for the politically correct, but in the present context of increasing care for the environment and the widespread failures of many conventionally ethical (which is to say unethical) organizations to be financially, socially and ecologically sustainable, the tide may be turning.

~Stewart Clegg (As quoted in Vallas 2011)

In reflecting on the conclusions of the previous chapters, the following assertion is my summary statement of dissertation findings:

Businesses are fully embedded social actors.

This simple statement seems intuitively obvious, yet when viewed through the lens of power, the ramifications of this assertion are both surprisingly complex and interestingly invisible to the affected agents. In Alabama, poultry processors found themselves susceptible to the same opportunities and challenges of every other social actor, particularly the racialized and historically contingent challenges faced by their immigrant labor pool. As a socially embedded actor within Alabama’s poultry processing industry, neither individual residents, nor other Alabama organizations (e.g., SPLC), nor Alabama politicians, nor even the poultry processors themselves really, fully realized the political vulnerability of their particular embeddedness in 2010 until it was too late to protect their Latino employees from an unjust state law. With hindsight and the theoretic and methodological tools provided by Clegg’s Circuits of Power model, the collision of poultry processing and Alabama state politicians over immigration reform seems as though it was almost inevitable. This brief chapter discusses questions and challenges raised by applying Clegg’s circuits of power model by framing a state (Alabama) as the organizational actor, considers the implications
for corporate social responsibility (CSR), and closes by introducing the broader questions (both answered and not) that are opened by this dissertation.

**Returning to the Circuits of Power**

As reflected in the quote opening this chapter, Clegg is interested in advancing organizational theory that helps explore the potential for creating better, more ethical, more human-centric organizations through the critical consideration of the impact of power on, power over, and power to individuals and organizations located within the *relational field of force* (1989: 207). The idea of the circuits of power is founded on this notion. The resources for the relational field of force, Clegg argues, are not a priori and are wholly dependent upon the immediate context.

In other words, what may be resources of power in one exchange between A and B, may not be in the next. In this way, Clegg embeds a highly contingent, contextual understanding of the operation of agentic power; power that then becomes translated into meanings and rules and “domination” through the circuitry of dispositional and facilitative power through obligatory passage points. Clegg’s goal is to deeply examine and explain the operation of power, and the acts of agency and resistance by agents within the circuits are a reflection of the context, specific histories, and other social knowledge relevant to that moment of power. In other words, the actions of agency and resistance by individuals or organizations reflect the embedded, contextualized knowledge influencing the exchange. In this way, Clegg’s theoretic model of the circuits of power provided an excellent lens through which to analyze the operation of power in Alabama. However, using the circuits as a methodological tool revealed some challenges in its application, particularly in adequately capturing the impacts on power by identity claims, specifics of how power operates within the circuits, organizations as fully socially embedded actors, the prevention of political alliances, and the consequences of silences and/or absences in OPPs.

In Clegg’s schematic representing the circuits of power, he depicts the importance of context to power relations by creating separate boxes in his schematic entitled “Social Relations”
and "Standing Conditions." In my adaptation of Clegg, I proposed capturing the intended contextualized knowledge by embedding the circuits of power within a specific, existing context that informs the operations of power within each circuit. This change in the schematic, socially embedded circuits versus socially embedded actors, proved to be an important analytical shift in emphasis. Within Clegg's operations of power is the assumption of active resistance occurring within episodes of power. However, what happens when the organizational agent does not recognize him/her/itself to be in an episode of power and therefore does not resist? Or, how does one explain agents being absent from the circuits of power altogether? Both of these were relevant questions for Alabama's poultry industry and business community. Though Clegg's theory of the circuits of power accounts for a role for social knowledge informing a power exchange between two agents (e.g., each party comes loaded with understandings of each agent's reputation, historical knowledge, etc.), Clegg's model as a method is less clear regarding how to account for instances where the conditions of that context privilege or marginalize agents before they even engage in a power exchange. Simply put, the schematic representation of Clegg's circuits of power as a model for analyzing power does not enable sufficient emphasis on the social embeddedness of individual and organizational actors. The circuits themselves are suffused in social context, not simply the agents in the power exchange.

Without embedding the circuits in the context, the circuits of power model, as a tool for analysis, seems to have two potential weaknesses. First, the potential exists in the analysis (if not in theory) to discount the impact of the full environmental context, and instead only account for the social knowledge the actors are cognizant of bringing into an OPP. This may not include all relevant factors. For instance, poultry industry lobbyists may not have been aware that they were also combating the reaction of Alabamians to a black president and recent national innovations in health care when they were arguing against H.B. 56, yet this certainly played a role. By situating all the circuits in a broader interpretation of context, then all relevant factors are more likely to be
captured in analysis. Second, Clegg’s original model leaves little room to express the ways in which the context enables or inhibits the opportunities for OPPs to materialize within the circuits. The context enables, inhibits, shapes, and changes the location of OPPs in ways that create consequences for power precisely because power is not ubiquitous. This seemingly passive set of existing conditions is not simply a necessary ontology for an episode of power to occur. I suggest that the context itself is an actor in the creation of power. In this Alabama case, examples included the role of the elite Alabama identity claim, the reputation of the poultry industry, and north Alabama’s tradition of whiteness. The mobilization of these existing contextual elements by 2010 played an instrumental role in the debate over and passage of H.B. 56. Clegg offers no explicit possibility of an active role for the mobilization of an existing contextual condition during an operation of power. Instead, these are covered by the possibility of exogenous conditions to enter the circuits. However, in Chapter 6, I argue that poultry processors were prevented from entering certain OPPs and were likely ignorant of the newly emergent OPPs’ impact on power. The foreclosure of previous OPPs and the creation of new political OPPs that bypassed poultry were enabled by the specific, existing context of that time period. However, without embedding the circuits in the context, these activated epistemic conditions may escape analysis when considering only the episodic power relations with actors’ incumbent social knowledge.

With this critique in mind, this research offers theoretical contributions to the literature in Organizational Studies. Clegg’s Circuits of Power model has been used in many different research applications (Davenport and Leitch 2005, Hutchinson et al. 2010); however, using it as a lens on deeply embedded business actors in the socio-political networks of state politics appears to be a gap this work fills. For example, a key question raised by this theoretical model is: Why do some voices never make it into any of the discursive nodes? This raises the question of how agents are counted and discounted by the social relations (and social reputations) that create and operate within each network. Within any human network, some agents hold privileged positions, and this
implies an implicit possibility of *a priori* privileging of certain network voices and potentially silencing "othered" voices who may never enter nodes – the only location where the possibility of resistance to power occurs. In other words, some agentic voices (e.g., local and national GOP politicians) entered the discursive flows with the effect of changing then stabilizing the “rules of the game” as they pertained to immigrant labor policy, while some voices (e.g., local poultry processing managers, state level business lobbyists and associations) never entered or were never heard. Operationalizing this model through research on Alabama’s economic, political and local networks demonstrates how in operations of power, individuals at the margins of each network may have been structurally silenced or “unhearable,” (e.g., poultry processing manager in an Albertville plant or a “legal” immigrant worker). Therefore, these voices could remain “unknowable” in the discourses of power unless made explicit. To be clear, I am not contesting Clegg’s definition of power that is described as constituted by contextual social relations and, therefore, neither ubiquitous and nor an a priori condition. I am suggesting the “relational field of force” also activates certain *a priori* epistemic conditions otherwise latent in the context, and in this way the context profoundly influences the OPPs. Further, this research demonstrates that perceptions enabled and prevented the mobility of poultry processors in the circuits of power: the reputation of the poultry industry prevented public advocacy on behalf of its immigrant workforce, and the perceptions of other organizations, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center, prevented poultry and other industries from creating alliances with groups sharing their position on this issue.

This research implicitly assessed how well Clegg’s circuits of power model explicitly considered the “unheard” and “unsaid” moments by agents of the Alabama immigration debate within the networks. In many ways, my research validates the theoretic construct of Clegg’s circuits of power model. Indeed, Clegg intentionally left room for adaptation; he concedes that other models may serve as better tools for certain purposes, and he suggests the possible incorporation of Bourdieu’s concept of ‘field’ into his model (Clegg 1989a). However, building upon the earlier
suggestion that the circuits of power need a more robust inclusion of context, Bourdieu 'habitus’ and ‘symbolic capital’ offer opportunities to address the issues mentioned above. Habitus, as the embodied history of behaviors that enters individual actions, would strengthen the circuits by capturing the impact that issues such as identity and reputation have on enacted agency through internalized discipline. Likewise, symbolic capital is a potentially complementary tool for understanding how social relations are both relationally unstable and disciplined and influenced by power. An individual’s, or institution’s, recognition of the capital entering into the social relation would, by virtue of a shared cultural, historical experience, discipline certain behaviors through the unspoken norms of the social field in relation to those symbolic capital accumulations (particularly, but not singularly, cultural and economic) (Bourdieu 1998, 2002, Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006, Clegg 1989b, a, Foucault 1977). These tools might better capture the absences and silences, as well as the spoken discourses of power.

In terms of the circuits of power, an agency (in Clegg’s terminology) entering an episodic circuit would enter a social field, a field of power that has particular spoken and unspoken rules, that discipline behavior to include resistance. The habitus of the agents as well as the recognized meaning of the symbolic capital attributed to each agent would further influence these episodic planes. So, in 2011, the poultry industry association exercised resistance in political discussions with state politicians about immigration reform, but because of the political, cultural, and legal capital of both the Alabama GOP, the Handshake with Alabama, the Sez You Identity of Alabama, and the reputation of the poultry industry with regard to immigrant labor, this resistance was easily and repeatedly disciplined in the agency circuit. Future theoretical contributions could explore the incorporation of Bourdieu’s conceptual landscape in order to offer a more concrete method for what to “look for” in trying to identify markers of power in a particular social space, while operating within the circuits of power model.¹
Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility Literature

In 2015, Indiana’s GOP dominated legislature passed into law SB 568: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The law’s advocates claim that it was intended to provide inclusive protection of all individuals’ rights to religious freedom in the state; however, the law was widely perceived as being an attempt to “insulate [Indiana] from the gay rights movement” and create sanctioned opportunities to discriminate against gay clients in the marketplace. One week after passage, that law was completely overhauled with GOP Indiana Governor Mike Pence quoted as saying that "...resolving this controversy and making clear that every person feels welcome and respected in our state is best for Indiana" (Bradner 2015). What happened during the seven days between passage and overhaul to change the mind of legislators and the governor? In addition to a high profile media ruckus created by LGBTQ advocacy groups and individual supporters, “big companies like Wal-Mart, Apple Inc. and Yelp made clear they would oppose any law that gave even the perception of discrimination,” and most analysts believe these economic giants wielded the most power in moving GOP legislators rapidly back into negotiations (Sneed 2015).

At first glance, one could point to several parallels between these two sets of circumstances. For instance, the Alabama Immigration Law was voted into existence with much of the same avid GOP support, negative national media coverage, advocacy group opposition, and high profile lawsuits that the Indiana lawmakers experienced. However, there are many significant, contextual differences between this Indiana case and the passage of Alabama’s immigration law, which further endorses the argument that the specific, existing context changes outcomes at the intersection of political and economic power. Importantly, there are two immediate and glaring differences between the two cases. First, Alabama lawmakers amended, but never reversed, their own law and only through aggressive court action was the law finally overturned. Second, Alabama never had high profile, public opposition from the corporations operating in its state. This surface level comparison suggests that when considering discrimination against marginalized labor (particularly
immigrant labor), rather than marginalized consumers, different criteria may guide the application of corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitments by corporations.

Though there certainly exist other significant differences in the specific contexts of each state’s circumstances, these two differences point to ideas relevant to this dissertation. First, businesses, as socially embedded actors, can wield the power necessary to contain instances of poor state policy making that will negatively impact economic health, particularly when those policies impact individuals and businesses that carry lower levels of “social baggage.” As opposed to attitudes toward immigrants, the rapid transformation of the national attitude toward the LGBTQ community has been well documented (and litigated), and in a nutshell, the widespread social condemnation that once plagued the LGBTQ community has (fortunately) diminished, though the fight for full equality is far from over as this group is also viewed as transgressing social borders (Brewer 2003, Avery et al. 2007, Lax and Phillips 2009, 2015c). Nevertheless, the Indiana case suggests that the missing voice of global businesses on the state political stage might also have made a difference in Alabama. For instance, only after local Alabama police arrested German and Japanese auto executives under the Alabama Immigration Law was there a sudden rallying cry from state politicians and Alabama’s business network to amend the bill to prevent such occurrences in the future. This missing, public business voice is the fundamental question connecting this work to the literature of CSR.

With this dissertation, I contribute to the current literature of CSR by entering into several different streams in the CSR scholarship. First, corporate responsibility is still acknowledged as a “contested concept” with ongoing questions and debates regarding the scope, boundaries, purpose, and even accepted definition of the concept (2013e, Windsor 2006, Dillard and Murray 2013, 2006, Dahlsrud 2008). As reflected in the Indiana example above, questions of “for whom” and “for what purpose” litter the contestations in CSR scholarship. The issue of identifying the scope of CSR is reflected, for example, in scholarly efforts to create clearer separation between sustainability and
CSR (Dillard and Murray 2013). By introducing the issues connected with an immigrant labor pool, this work further challenges the emerging definition of CSR by expanding the answers to “for whom” is CSR formulated and “to whom” are its tenets applied. Second, this work enters the CSR discourses that challenge the fundamental assumption that businesses possess the ability to, unilaterally and fully autonomously, achieve their stated CSR outcomes independent of social, political, or economic constraints. Though other work has focused on the role market pressures have in preventing changes in corporate consumption of natural resources (i.e., corporations are in business to meet customer demand, and customers demand resource consumption) (Toms 2013), this work is aligned with the fundamental challenge issued by these scholars who contest the idea that corporations are able to act how they want, when they want. The refrain that “corporations have acquired a dominating position within current society... as a result of this increased power and presence, companies find themselves coming under greater pressure to act in socially responsible ways” (Dillard and Murray 2013, 10) reflects an inherent assumption in much CSR literature, that companies only need to choose to implement social responsibility policies in order for it to happen.

As this dissertation has argued, businesses are fully, socially embedded actors, and I join those scholars who challenge the CSR assumptions that assert businesses operate separate and apart from structures of power existing in local communities within which they are located (Palazzo and Scherer 2008, Aguilera et al. 2007, Porter and Kramer 2006).

This work directly targets the emerging CSR literatures that again are addressing social issues, including early wrangling with issues addressing social justice. Scholars are taking seriously the questions of what CSR can and cannot do in advancing social interests through corporate social responsibility. Though progress has been made in the CSR field (Aguilera et al. 2007, Alvord, Brown, and Letts 2004, Bornstein 1997, Porter and Kramer 2011, Porter and Kramer 2006, Prahalad and Hart 2002, Seelos and Mair 2007, Yunus 1999, Murray and Haynes 2013, Carroll et al. 2012), much of the literature takes what Fitch identified as an operational focus where “social problems are
distinguished from non-social problems.” (1976) As a result, much of the CSR literature has been
dedicated to the role of business in environmental sustainability, with less CSR research dedicated
to social issues though this appears to be an emerging field within CSR. Within the literature there
is an unresolved debate regarding how any organization can truly legitimate its own discursive
claims of being socially responsible (i.e., in what ways), as well as academic concerns regarding how
language use influences power in a socially constructed reality (Coupland 2005, Welford 2002,
Banerjee 2008, Siltaoja 2009). This work contributes to the voices casting critiques of the viability
of CSR, but from a different vantage point. I suggest that organizations may, in fact, make CSR
statements aligned with guiding principles, yet never realize they have no power to realize these
explicit goals.

Furthermore, I argue that this equally applies to theories of Creating Shared Value (CSV)
(Porter and Kramer 2011). This suggests that corporations serious about acting as social agents
must explicitly consider the ramifications of power through power analysis as a strategic tool (as
suggested by (Sadan 1997) and demonstrated in this dissertation), and this work contributes to
future research to measure effective achievement of statements against the real conditions of
power available to an embedded corporate agent. Next steps in this research may include explicitly
measuring the publicly expressed, corporate responsibility statements of the major poultry
processors (i.e., Tysons Foods, Wayne’s Farms, and Pilgrim’s Pride) about their workforces in north
Alabama against actions they did or did not take to achieve their stated goals or values through the
lens of power. Also, a content analysis of public CSR statements of poultry processors (as pertaining
to immigrant labor) could produce a better understanding of how corporations gauge commitment
and prioritization of corporate action by using stakeholder salience theory (Mitchell, Agle, and
Wood 1997). As “the social” returns as a viable avenue for CSR research, the CSR literature finds
itself with insufficient resources to effectively address significant social issues, such as global
poverty (Newell and Frynas 2007), or as faced by poultry processing plant managers in areas for social justice for labor. My research is intended to help fill this gap.

Future research directions raises another connection to CSR literature through the question of “how does a corporate actor decide which stakeholder receives attention and therefore political advocacy?” This question of stakeholder salience was notably raised by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood in the CSR literature and creates an opportunity to more deeply explore the intersection between public policy and corporate action (1997). Though not specifically addressed here, this research opens up future directions by using the framework of Power, Legitimacy, and Urgency to examine which stakeholders receive voice for two different lenses of analysis. First, at the individual corporate level, considering how and when immigrant labor becomes salient to a poultry processing organization vis-à-vis their own CSR commitments may lend further insight into why the poultry industry generally was delayed in recognizing H.B. 56 as a threat and why the multinational poultry companies chose to remain publicly silent in the debate. Second, this framework opens theoretical possibilities by considering how corporate decisions intersect with policy making. By centering the question of how corporate actors give voice to certain interests, policy theories such as agenda setting and the punctuated equilibrium theory may provide additional insights into why immigration policy became accelerated in the Alabama policy process particularly. A critical consideration of the integration of these theories may provide more specific insight into the rationale for individual actors’ specific actions and decisions within the discursive flows of power to explain how and why certain stakeholders are attended to in policy and corporate practice (Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen 2014, Jones and Baumgartner 2012, Kingdon 1984, Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997).

This research contributes to the CSR literature by explicitly considering the role of immigrant labor internal to the United States. Much of the scant contemporary CSR literature that is concerned with labor is focused on the globalized market place and the oppression, poverty, and
displacement of labor in marginalized locales, particularly with the emergence of literature using CSR in global economic development (Broomes 2013, Prieto - Carrón et al. 2006, Hopkins 2007, Prahalad and Hart 2002, Yunus 1999). In this international (non-Western) context, the CSR literature more directly concerns itself with issues of human rights. However, as pointed out by the authors of Corporate Responsibility: The American Experience, issues of globalization, human rights, and outsourcing coalesce with impacts for the United States as they ask, “To what extent do American companies have responsibilities to their labor force in the United States?” and “Is there now a social contract for employment?” (Carroll et al. 2012, 397). This dissertation research enters the discussion of these questions.

Finally, on this question of labor, this research makes a contribution to the scholarship on segmented labor markets, particularly with regard to the literature about the impact of immigrant labor on local markets (Lusis and Bauder 2010, Piore 1980, Piore 1986, Bauder 2006, Brown 2000, Bulow and Summers 1986, Hudson 2007, Kandel and Parrado 2005). In particular, this research serves as a case study about the mechanisms of labor within a dual market by providing a view from the perspective of managers. Additionally, the research questions here are positioned from the perspective of “business” as an active agent in issues of social justice, even if the action is “inaction.” Therefore, by investigating the constraints and opportunities for business actors within the Alabama circuits of power, labor scholars and activists have new resources through which to analyze routes leading toward an emancipatory politic for immigrant labor. Through these new analytical resources, opportunities may be created in future research to reorient the political positions of those with a business voice so that they yield a positive impact on traditional labor interests, such as through the creation of previously unacceptable political alliances. By realistically assessing how and why businesses do and do not act, this becomes a resource for businesses to better understand how and where they should engage in social justice to protect their labor supply,
as well as for labor rights activists who can better position themselves within the network discourses constraining social justice.

**Considering the Broader Questions and Implications**

Questions that were raised by the primary research of this dissertation are:

- Under what conditions do businesses reject the possibility of improving the rights of their immigrant labor despite ostensible economic benefit from acting?
- Are there conditions that render a business truly powerless to act in its own best labor interests? If not powerless, then do certain positions within networks of power lead to predictable, counterproductive outcomes for some business actors?
- If these conditions can be identified, is there an opportunity to call for explicit, reasonable expectations of business accountability as social actors within their networks, thereby becoming de facto, active agents for social justice for labor within the capitalist framework?
- Alternatively, if the networked circumstances of power render businesses powerless to protect their own labor interests, then what resources might be brought to bear to change that framework? If none, what are the implications for a capitalist system reliant on economic rationality within markets?
- If those politicians who are ostensibly most committed to supporting the business community do not respond to economic arguments posited against proposed legislation, then who (or what) are they actually responding to, and what challenges does this raise about market domination and the future of the democratic enterprise?
- Under what conditions of power can business actors behave and be recognized as fully, socially embedded actors possessing political agency within communities and on what issues?
- Finally, what do these outcomes suggest for the creation of new discursive space for business to expand existing notions of corporate social responsibility?

These questions essentially probe and expand the question of why poultry processors did not take public action to protect their immigrant labor since it would have clearly yielded economic benefits. The answers to each of these questions are ultimately bound up with the assertion opening this chapter: Businesses are fully embedded social actors. As such, there are indeed instances where business actors find more value in complying with political and/or social pressures (through action or inaction) despite potential negative economic consequences. Put differently, a business’ economic argument steeped in rational self-interest can be outweighed by
the perceived value connected to social location. By implication, this undermines assumptions that the “economic might” of a corporation necessarily leads to enhanced political clout.

This contradiction is particularly concerning in a post-Citizens United era and draws attention back to the importance of investigating more deeply the specific, existing context of the networks within which corporate actors are embedded. In the neoliberal world, the expectation is that businesses will be “heard” (and largely obeyed) by politicians. This research addressed the question of when a firm’s concerns are not listened too, why not? However, if the lens of analysis shifts to the actors within the Alabama political network (rather than the state’s poultry processors), this same circumstance raises equally important questions about politics, justice, and democracy: if business-friendly politicians were not swayed by economic logic, then what criteria were paramount for legislators? What specific contextual conditions impacted the ways in which politicians evaluated their legislative agenda? Who or what were Alabama’s politicians listening too? As I have suggested through the modification of Clegg’s model, it is not simply the actors that are embedded in the context, but the circuits themselves are socially embedded. As such, the research findings suggest that politicians were responding to the cultural conditions of Alabama in 2010-2011 equally as much as the poultry processors were. The social context of this moment was fueled by intentional political demagoguery designed to create an imagined state of peril blamed upon the unchecked flow of illegal immigrants to Alabama. The state’s GOP legislators were at once responsible for producing and sustaining this environment, but they were also a product of the same confluence of internal and external factors that resulted in a politics of reaction, a politics of fear, and a politics of xenophobic activism that ultimately trumped the neoliberal enterprise in Alabama. Though outside the scope of this study, these questions suggest serious ramifications in the pursuit of justice for marginalized populations in Alabama, as well as elsewhere. Put differently, just because capitalism lost, it does not mean that democracy won.
In this case, poultry processors stood very little to gain for themselves, or arguably for their immigrant workforce, by drawing attention to themselves as political actors in the debate over H.B. 56. This analysis suggests that without a radically different strategy, the poultry industry, as well as Alabama’s economic network writ large, was positioned outside the requisite obligatory passage points (OPPs) to effect real change in the immigration law. Further, a different political strategy would have been inconceivable to the agents in the poultry industry because of the depth of their social embeddedness. Most radical options were foreclosed to poultry processors before the debate even began because of the epistemic conditions framing “the way things work in Alabama.” Though individual business people in Albertville reported speaking about their opinions in social circles, collectively interviews suggest that poultry processing companies had nothing to gain by drawing attention by publicly opposing the law and would have risked additional reputational losses. As discussed in all previous chapters, certain white Alabamians have a strong cultural identity with social norms that infuse economic power networks. Business actors in Alabama do not go public with their political grievances; this would be distinctly un-Alabamian. Business actors do not vote for (or publicly support) Democratic candidates – Democrats are not the “one-party” in charge of this “one-party state” now. Business actors do not align themselves with organizations perceived to be agitators, socialist, outsiders, or generally anti-business (e.g., the ACLU or the SPLC) regardless of alignment with their business interests because that would be un-Alabamian (and probably Democratic). Poultry processors do not draw attention to the fact that they employ a significant number of Latino immigrants because that would be social and political suicide, and in all likelihood, it would prove detrimental to the very labor pool they would be trying to protect.6

As discussed in prior chapters, the reputation of poultry processors in Alabama is marginal at best, and one of the key reasons behind that reputation is their continued role in attracting immigrant labor to traditionally white communities. Immigrant labor brought cultural, language, and economic changes to these spaces. With little of the dominant rhetoric distinguishing between
documented and undocumented immigrants, the 2011 Immigration Law quickly became a meta-code that attributed the economic, social, and cultural issues of struggling communities to their new Latino inhabitants of all legal statuses. In this way, by 2010, the poultry processing industry was inextricably linked to Alabama’s Latino residents who were the political and social target of the community hostility. Business actors were fully embedded social actors, and they were granted the same political agency of any other marginalized, racialized resident of Alabama – diminished agency with limited efficacy to move policy in the direction of justice.

Since the passage (and ultimate enjoinment) of the Alabama Immigration Law, immigration discourses have emerged from all three branches of the United States government. However, previous state-based legislative activity concerned with the perceived threat of “illegal” immigration, such as H.B. 56, remains politically relevant. The state sentiments that motivated immigration reform actions in the mid- and late 2000s remain an active presence in national immigration discourse as state actors wait impatiently for promised action at the federal level. For instance, in mid-2015, Republican primary candidates for the 2016 presidential election still struggled for the “correct” rhetoric on immigration reform as the early frontrunner, Donald Trump, led in the polls, according to one report, precisely because of his hardline, racialized rhetoric on immigration policy (Blanton 2015). For these reasons among others, a clear examination of H.B. 56 as immigration policy and discursive formation is still salient. In the prospects for using business agents to improve justice for immigrant labor, there remains much at stake.

1 Clegg mentions Bourdieu in one reference on one page in Frameworks of Power in 1989, but in 2005 in Power and Organizations, five of Bourdieu’s publications are cited on four pages, three of which are in the chapter on Foucault. Perhaps not a fair comparison, but it seems worth noting that Bourdieu is later recognized as relevant critique to Foucauldian theory.

2 It is worth considering that on this particular issue, it is conceivable that had this bill passed in Alabama instead of Indiana, the outcome may well have echoed immigration. Since the June 26, 2015 Supreme Court ruling legalizing gay marriage, Alabama has been fighting its
implementation, even subsequently asking for an Alabama Supreme Court ruling against gay marriage (Faulk 2015).

3 Since the early-2000s, there has been work by CSR scholars, specifically to address global poverty by re-envisioning capitalistic model through a Bottom of the Pyramid strategy. This approach is both lauded and contested in the literature as an approach to address significant, global, social issues (Bornstein 1997, Hahn and Wagner 2009, Karnani 2005, Prahalad and Hart 2002, Seelos and Mair 2007, Karnani 2009). Nevertheless, there is general consensus that there is more work to be done.

4 This references the Supreme Court decision that entitles corporations to political personhood through protected free speech rights by allowing corporate political donations for political causes. The full court decision is located at: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf.

5 Attribution for this sentence goes to Dr. Patricia Nickel who provided this lovely turn of phrase during my dissertation defense.

6 Anecdotal evidence from interviews and public reports suggest that though all Latino poultry processing workers provide papers that satisfy E-verify, those papers may not always belong to the person who presents them. Therefore, poultry processing managers are likely hesitant to draw attention to their immigrant labor pool for fear of bringing real and substantial harm through an investigation of those same employees they intend to protect.
References


U.S. Census Bureau. 2000c. Table Dp-I. Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000. Text from:  


Appendix A: Circuits of Power Model (Chapter 1)
Appendix B. IRB Information and Use Permissions

Informed Consent Form

The 2011 Alabama Immigration Law and Poultry Processing

Informed Consent for Participants in Research Projects Involving Human Subjects
Barbara Ellen Smith, Ph.D., Principal Investigator, Department of Sociology, Virginia Tech
Eli C.S. Jamison, Co-investigator, ASPECT PhD Candidate

You are being asked to participate in a research project that investigates the impact of the 2011 Alabama Immigration Law on poultry processors in Alabama.

This study requires minimal effort on your part beyond participating in an interview, which is expected to last between thirty to ninety minutes. In order to participate in this study, you must be at least 18 years old. This research involves no known risk to your person.

There is no compensation for participation in this project. Participation is voluntary and you may discontinue the interview at any time if you wish with no penalty. Your decision whether or not to participate or withdraw will not adversely affect you in any way.

The information you provide during this research will be recorded for accuracy. Should you agree to participant, your name and contact information will be collected as well as other identifying information. Your contact information will be held confidentially and stored privately in an encrypted file only accessible by the research team. If you prefer to remain anonymous, you may be assigned a code and all identifying information will be held confidentially, and you will NOT be identified in any report or publication about this study. Only the listed researchers will have access to the identifying information of the interviews. Otherwise, anything you say during the interview may be attributed to you, unless otherwise indicated during the interview.

We will make every effort to faithfully and accurately record each response you give. Following standard university research procedures, all data will be held in a secure location in encrypted files.

This research project has been approved, as required, by the Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects.

____________________ I agree to participate, but I prefer to be anonymous and my identifying characteristics coded.
(Initials)

I voluntarily agree to participate in this study. I have read the Consent Form and conditions of this project, and all my questions have been answered. I hereby acknowledge the above and give my voluntary consent:

____________________ Subject signature ____________ Date

Should I have any pertinent questions about this research or its conduct, and research subjects’ rights, I may contact:

Principal Investigator: Barbara Ellen Smith, Ph.D., (+1) 540-231-8189 (smithbe@vt.edu)
Co-investigators: Elizabeth Jamison, ASPECT PhD candidate (elicsj1@vt.edu)
David M. Moore Chair, Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (+1) 540-231-4991 (moored@vt.edu)

Office of Research Compliance
2000 Kraft Drive, Suite 2000 (0497)
Blacksburg, VA 24060
IRB Approval Letters

MEMORANDUM

DATE: July 15, 2013

TO: Barbara Smith, Elizabeth Cori Shields Jamison

FROM: Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (FWA000000572, expires April 25, 2018)

PROTOCOL TITLE: Jamison Dissertation

IRB NUMBER: 13-425

Effective July 15, 2013, the Virginia Tech Institution Review Board (IRB) Administrator, Carmen T Papenfuss, approved the New Application request for the above-mentioned research protocol.

This approval provides permission to begin the human subject activities outlined in the IRB-approved protocol and supporting documents.

Plans to deviate from the approved protocol and/or supporting documents must be submitted to the IRB as an amendment request and approved by the IRB prior to the implementation of any changes, regardless of how minor, except where necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. Report within 5 business days to the IRB any injuries or other unanticipated or adverse events involving risks or harms to human research subjects or others.

All investigators (listed above) are required to comply with the researcher requirements outlined at:

http://www.irb.vt.edu/pages/responsibilities.htm

(Please review responsibilities before the commencement of your research.)

PROTOCOL INFORMATION:

Approved As: Expedited, under 45 CFR 46.110 category(ies) 6,7
Protocol Approval Date: July 15, 2013
Protocol Expiration Date: July 14, 2014
Continuing Review Due Date*: June 30, 2014

*Date a Continuing Review application is due to the IRB office if human subject activities covered under this protocol, including data analysis, are to continue beyond the Protocol Expiration Date.

FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS:

Per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.103(f), the IRB is required to compare all federally funded grant proposals/work statements to the IRB protocol(s) which cover the human research activities included in the proposal / work statement before funds are released. Note that this requirement does not apply to Exempt and Interim IRB protocols, or grants for which VT is not the primary awardee.

The table on the following page indicates whether grant proposals are related to this IRB protocol, and which of the listed proposals, if any, have been compared to this IRB protocol, if required.
MEMORANDUM

DATE: June 26, 2014

TO: Barbara Smith, Elizabeth Cori Shields Jamison

FROM: Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (FWA00000572, expires April 25, 2018)

PROTOCOL TITLE: Jamison Dissertation

IRB NUMBER: 13-425

Effective June 26, 2014, the Virginia Tech Institution Review Board (IRB) Chair, David M Moore, approved the Continuing Review request for the above-mentioned research protocol.

This approval provides permission to begin the human subject activities outlined in the IRB-approved protocol and supporting documents.

Plans to deviate from the approved protocol and/or supporting documents must be submitted to the IRB as an amendment request and approved by the IRB prior to the implementation of any changes, regardless of how minor, except where necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. Report within 5 business days to the IRB any injuries or other unanticipated or adverse events involving risks or harms to human research subjects or others.

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(Please review responsibilities before the commencement of your research.)

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All investigators (listed above) are required to comply with the researcher requirements outlined at:

http://www.irb.vt.edu/pages/responsibilities.htm

(Please review responsibilities before the commencement of your research.)

PROTOCOL INFORMATION:

Approved As: Expedited, under 45 CFR 46.110 category(ies) 6,7
Protocol Approval Date: July 15, 2015
Protocol Expiration Date: July 14, 2016
Continuing Review Due Date*: June 30, 2016

*Date a Continuing Review application is due to the IRB office if human subject activities covered under this protocol, including data analysis, are to continue beyond the Protocol Expiration Date.

FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS:

Per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.103(f), the IRB is required to compare all federally funded grant proposals/work statements to the IRB protocol(s) which cover the human research activities included in the proposal / work statement before funds are released. Note that this requirement does not apply to Exempt and Interim IRB protocols, or grants for which VT is not the primary awardee.

The table on the following page indicates whether grant proposals are related to this IRB protocol, and which of the listed proposals, if any, have been compared to this IRB protocol, if required.
Emailed Permission for Use of Maps in Chapter 4


Subject: RE: Rural America at a Glance: 2013 Edition
From: "Kusmin, Lorin - ERS" <LKUSMIN@ers.usda.gov>
Date: 10/27/14, 12:36 PM
To: Elizabeth Jamison <ecsjamison@gmail.com>

Hello,

If .png files are sufficient, then you can download them by going to our Web site


and clicking on "Download zip file for EB24", which will give you access to .png files for each figure.

If you need more than that (e.g. if you need data from the source files for the graphics), let me know and I will see what I can do.

For a citation, I think this is appropriate:


In some contexts, I am listed as author rather than editor, but since most of the content comes from other researchers here at ERS, I think it is more appropriate to list me as the editor.

Lorin

Mr. Lorin Kusmin
Economist
Resource and Rural Economics Division
Economic Research Service, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture

LKusmin@ers.usda.gov
202-694-6429

Hours: 830 AM-500 PM Monday-Friday

Physical address:
6th Floor, #225-A (6-52)
355 E Street, S.W.
Emailed Permission for Use of Figure in Chapter 5 from North Alabama Industrial Development Authority

From: Elizabeth Jamison  
ecamjamison@gmail.com  
Subject: Re: Permission to use Maps  
Date: April 24, 2015 at 10:45 AM  
To: Cindy Burns  
cburns@naida.com

Many thanks,
El

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 24, 2015, at 10:29 AM, Cindy Burns <cburns@naida.com> wrote:

Ms. Jamison,

You may use the maps from our website. Good luck with your dissertation.

Cindy

Cindy Burns, CEd  
Vice President  
North Alabama Industrial Development Assn.  
PO Box 1668 (35602)  
410 Johnston Street  
Decatur, AL 35601  
256-353-9450

-----Original Message-----
From: Elizabeth Jamison  
mailto:ecjamison@gmail.com  
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2015 12:22 PM  
To: Cindy Burns  
Subject: Re: Permission to use Maps

Dear Cindy,

Certainly! My dissertation is looking at the ways in which Alabama's political and economic networks impact the poultry processing industry's ability to advocate for its own political self-interests at the state level. Essentially it is a powerful analysis to examine the conditions under which an economic actor (poultry in this case) can and cannot achieve an effective political voice. To this end, I am using Albertville, Alabama as a case study.

Essentially, I hope to use your maps simply to locate Albertville within Marshall County and then to locate Marshall County within the state. Part of my work will explaining the close economic relationship between Boaz, Guntersville, and Albertville. The maps you have created are best "close-up" depiction of the spatial relationship between Albertville, Boaz, and Guntersville that I have seen, while also demonstrating the geography and available infrastructure that has helped support and grow the poultry industry in this County. Also, your maps provide a clear overview of the county so that I can illustrate where Marshall County is within north Alabama. Most other maps I have located are tend to be of the entire state with just a colored "block" indicating Marshall county.

Thank you for your quick reply and consideration of this request.

With kind regard,

El

On 4/23/15 10:07 AM, Cindy Burns wrote:
Could you tell me a little about your dissertation and how the maps will be used?

Thanks,

Cindy

Cindy Burns, CEd  
Vice President  
North Alabama Industrial Development Assn.  
PO Box 1668 (35602)  
410 Johnston Street  
Decatur, AL 35601  
256-353-9450
Appendix C. Semi-Structured Interview Guides

Semi-Structured Interview Guides:

NOTE: These questions are intended to guidelines for the information to be collected. The interviews are designed to be semi-structured and will rely on follow-up questions based on the direction taken by the interviewee.

Interview Set 1: State Level Economic and political networks

Potential Political Interview Questions

1. Name, Position, Organization, Years with organization, Position in 2011 and 2013. Contact information and Consent form.
2. This seemed to be a fast-moving piece of legislation. As you recall the Alabama immigration debate and passage, why did this become such a big issue here so quickly? What factors enabled this bill to be so politically successful so quickly?
3. Who were the big players in this debate at the time? Why? Were there other people whose voices seemed to carry the most "weight" in the state? How could you tell? (looking for organizations, individuals, groups, etc.)
4. Did the business community take much of a role in the debate? Who represented business interests? What were those interests?
5. What were the pivotal moments/factors in the debate before and after implementation?
6. Who seemed to be interested in the connection with immigrant labor in Alabama? How were they represented in the discussion? Was there any talk about labor prior to the law's passage?
7. What were the arguments and tactics being used to promote and to prevent this bill? (Who, Why, What?)
8. Is there anyone else you think I should talk to about this topic?

Potential Economic Interview Questions

1. Name, Position, Organization, Years with organization, Position in 2011 and 2013. Contact information and Consent form.
2. At the time of the debate of HB56, how did you anticipate this bill would impact the state's labor force?
3. Was there any disagreement within the business sector about what to do about this bill during the debate in 2011? How did it play out?
4. What have you seen as the most significant impact of the immigration law on the business community in Alabama? Was this a surprise? In other words, is this what the business community generally expected to happen?
5. More generally, how do Alabama's businesses advocate for their needs (in terms of labor) – particularly when it needs political action?
6. What are the state's primary business sectors? Who is the primary labor market for these sectors? Did this seem to matter?

7. Did all businesses respond in the same manner to the bill? If not, how did they differ? Why do you think this was the case?

8. How would you describe the state’s agribusiness sector? Who is in it? Who does it include and exclude? How important is it in state level decision making by politicians? How has it changed in Alabama over the last 30 years?

9. Does there seem to be ant preference to one sector over another? What is the direction Alabama seems to want to go in economically?

10. Do all the sectors advocate in the same ways? Is there competition between or among the business sectors or do they operate cooperatively?

11. Who are the big players that influence labor policy in Alabama? Is there anyone else you think should talk to about this issue?

**Interview Set 2: Local network - Albertville**

**Potential Local Interview Questions**

**For all:** Name, Position, Organization, Years with organization, Position in 2011 and 2013. Contact information and Consent form

**For Plant Managers**

1. In early 2011, before the law passed, how did you believe this law would affect your business?

2. In 2011, were you a member of local civic organizations? Of any state level business or political groups?

3. Locally, do you recall discussing H.B. 56 and its merits or problems before it's implementation? Discussions internal to the plant? Externally, in Albertville, as a member of the community? Where (if at all) did you find yourself discussing the law during the debates and its passage? Did these discussions make a difference to you as a decision-maker for the plant?

4. Did your business feel an impact after the implementation of the law in October 2011? What was it? Was it what you expected? Why or why not?

5. Were you in favor of the immigration law at the time? Now? Did it seem important? Why or why not?

6. How did the community of Albertville seem to react to this law at the time? Was there any fallout toward your plant? Examples?

7. Do you recall ever feeling pressure about your plant’s labor policies and practices from outside sources?

8. What kind of options do you believe you have, as a business operator in Alabama, to influence political processes impacting labor? What do you do to make sure your plant’s labor interests are best served?

9. How would you describe your business' role in the Albertville community? A community partner? Simply neighbors?
10. I read your CSR statement on-line. How do you implement your CSR statement? What does CSR mean here?

*For the Economic Development Council and Other Local Organizations*

1. What did you see as the most critical industry to Albertville in 2011? Why? For the future of Alabama? Why?
2. At the time of the debate, how did you anticipate this bill would impact the region’s labor and poultry employers?
3. What have you seen as the most significant impacts of the AL immigration law on the business community in Albertville? Was this impact anticipated/articulated during the 2011 debate? In other words, is this what the business community generally expected and desired?
4. How would you describe the relationship of three major poultry plants with the City of Albertville?
5. What are the most significant issues impacting the region’s businesses and communities?
6. How has Albertville changed over the last 30 years? What are some examples of how these changes impacted local business?

*For local politicians*

1. What did you see as the most critical issue for Albertville in 2011? Why? For the future of Alabama? Why?
2. How has Albertville changed over the last 30 years? What are some examples of how these changes have impacted local business?
3. What were the key factors that influenced your advocacy for the Alabama Immigration law for Albertville? What did you hear or see in the community that suggested the position of public sentiment on this issue? Can you describe what people were concerned about? What did they say? What was the level of intensity or passion from the community about immigration reform?
4. Were people in Albertville talking about H.B. 56? Where did they talk about it? What did they seem to think would happen? What did they want to happen?
5. During the debate for the Immigration Law, how did you believe its passage would impact Albertville’s poultry plants? Did you believe this was important?
6. During the debate in 2011, how much contact/conversation did you have with Albertville’s poultry plant operators about H.B. 56? What is your recollection of these conversations? In agreement? Points of dis/agreement? How did business concerns factor into your political position?
7. What have you seen as the most significant impacts of the AL immigration law on the business community in Albertville? Was this impact anticipated/articulated during the 2011 debate? In other words, is this what the business community generally expected and desired? Is it what Albertville had hoped would happen?
8. How important was poultry processing to Albertville in 2011? Today? How would you describe the relationship of three major poultry plants with the City of Albertville in 2011?

*For local Agricultural agent and journalist*
1. At the time of the debate, how did you anticipate this bill would impact the local poultry processors? What formed your opinion about this?

2. Do you have a sense of what kind of role the poultry processors play in the Albertville community? A community partner? Simply neighbors? Positive? Negative? Neither?

3. Locally, do you recall discussions about H.B. 56 and its merits or problems before it’s implementation? Discussions internal to your organization? Externally, particularly in or around Albertville, as a member of the community? Where (if at all) did you find yourself discussing the law during the debates and its passage?

4. In your opinion, did poultry plants feel any impact from the immigration debate and after the implementation of the law in October 2011? What was it? Was it what you expected? Why or why not?

5. What did you hear or see in the community that suggested the position of public sentiment on this issue? Were you in favor of the immigration law at the time? Now? Did it seem necessary? Why or why not?

6. How did the community of Albertville seem to react to this law at the time? Any repercussions or reactions toward the poultry plants? Examples?

7. How has Albertville changed over the last 30 years? What are some examples of how these changes have impacted local business?
Appendix D. Interview Participants and On-site Data Collection
Appendix E. Alabama’s Specific, Existing Context (Chapter 3)
Appendix F. Poultry Processing within Alabama's Circuit of Power (Chapter 4)
Albertville Within Alabama’s Circuits of Power

Circuit of Power

Networks Operating Within Circuit

Constraints/Outcomes of Circuit Flows of Power

Local Impact on State Discursive Flows
- Albertville became a key site of immigration discourse within which resistance was disciplined and overcome.
- Immigration discourse flowed from the local into integrative and facilitative OPPs as “fully formed” concepts more resistant to revision
- “Meanings” formed in Albertville created political scripts for HB 56 advocacy

Dispositional Outcomes of Local Flows
- Fear of retribution: Localized “meaning making” of anti-immigration sentiment created/reinforced public routines that silenced most local business actors opposed to HB56.
- Albertville as “face” to the “problem” of immigration in Alabama infiltrated state and national media increasing power of anti-immigration discourse.
- Efforts in Albertville rouse significant political support for HB56.
- Local, public forums on immigration issues taps significant existing angst about “cultural changes.”
- Crime tours and Eagle Forum meetings: Formalization of informal and/or formal local enforcement mechanisms to normalize new “meanings” of “immigrant

Changes to Albertville’s Specific Existing Context in 2010:
- History of mounting xenophobic anxiety by Albertville native residents
- Shift in local politics – Mayor and city councilman outspoken advocates of stricter immigration enforcement
- Growing national presence of Tea Party rhetoric infiltrates Alabama politics and its anti-immigration policy position find purchase in Alabama populace
- Outside “experts” on immigration reform are brought to Albertville
- National 2008 recession negatively impacted employment across Alabama, which enabled a discourse that framed H.B. 56 as a “jobs bill” for Alabamians – by inference came to mean, jobs for white Alabamians

Albertville - Specific, Existing Context in 2010
Albertville’s Local Circuits of Power

System Integration/Facilitative Power (The State-level Power Flows)

Social Integration/Dispositional Power

Discursive Flows

Local Networks

Dispositional Outcomes of Local Flows

- Fear of retribution: Localized “meaning making” of anti-immigration sentiment created/reinforced public routines that silenced most local business actors opposed to HB56.
- Albertville as “face” to the “problem” of immigration in Alabama infiltrated state and national media increasing power of anti-immigration discourse.
- Efforts by Albertvillians rouse significant political support for H.B. 56
- Local, public forums on immigration issues taps significant existing angst about “cultural changes”
- Crime tours and Eagle Forum meetings: Formalization of of Informal and/or formal local enforcement mechanisms to normalize new “meanings” of “immigrant
- Local poultry processors and opponents of anti-immigrant legislation are “disciplined” into silence, and anti-immigrant rhetoric became publicly accepted as norm.
- Poultry processors become public scapegoat for Latinos in Albertville; these enables the minimization of processors political concerns
- New OPPs created (e.g., crime tours) to which economic elites have no access
- The local, behind-the-scenes business culture enabled the disciplining of business voice in existing OPPs by politicians (i.e., ignoring business concerns about immigration reform)
- Political interests that supported H.B. 56 were heard while economic interests concerned about H.B. 56 were silenced.

Changes to Albertville’s Specific Existing Context in 2010-2011:

- History of mounting xenophobic anxiety by Albertville native residents
- Shift in local politics – Mayor and city councilman have been outspoken advocates of stricter immigration enforcement
- Growing national presence of Tea Party rhetoric infiltrates Alabama politics and its anti-immigration policy position find purchase in Alabama populace
- Outside “experts” on immigration reform are brought to Albertville
- National 2008 recession negatively impacted employment across Alabama, which enabled a discourse that framed H.B. 56 as a “jobs bill” for Alabamians – by inference came to mean, jobs for white Alabamians
- Albertville reacting to changes resulting the impact of the rapid (~25 years) demographic shift in their community from 97% white, to the inclusion of 27% Latino (e.g., Spanish Language, Hispanic tiendas on Main Street, etc.)
- Local poultry processors have tried to expand economic enterprises, but have been denied
- A schism between local economic and political elites emerges; those opposed to anti-immigrant rhetoric are silenced in the community while advocates receive increasing public attention

Albertville - Specific, Existing Context in 2010
Alabama’s Political Circuits of Power

Specific, Existing Context impacting Poultry Industry in 2010:
- Federal immigration policy stalemate and inaction
- Pervasive and popular Tea Party discourse at national and state level
- Shifting political tide: rise of the GOP and political shift rightward
- Continued recovery from the Great Recession
- National Policy Entrepreneur guiding immigration policy in Alabama
- Nationwide trend towards increasing state-based immigration policy and legislation
- Prevailing national “Republicans are good for business;” echoed by AL politicians
- First African-American U.S. President and passage of Obamacare flies in the face of Alabama’s Sez You elite identity and racialized history of South
- Business advocates work in silos and through networked political business culture
- Demographic changes: Increased Latino presence in rural AL locales

Outcomes from Political Discursive Flows
- New OPPs created between the national context and Alabama’s political network that bypassed the Economic Networks
- “Republican Handshake with Alabama:” a fast-moving, political commitment creating new OPPs only engaging political power brokers
- No public coalitions created: Only potential policy allies for businesses were politically controversial third sector parties (e.g., SPLC)
- Creation of total institution: The policy of self-deportation created a total institution for immigrants and poultry processors
- New citizen responsibilities: enforcement expected by the private and third sector AL residents - creating a double bind for Poultry Processors and marginalization in OPPs
- Creation of the Imagined Immigrant: limited agentic possibility for poultry processor political action because of reputation
- Public silence: Poultry processors both missed and were shut out of opportunities in public OPPs.
- “Backdoor” political channels (OPPs) previously useful for poultry processors were unavailable or ineffective in 2010
- Existing business silos, and the Alabama business culture inhibited innovation in political action by poultry processors